INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON EDUCATION AND SOCIETY Series Editor: Abraham Yogev Volume 1:
International Perspectives on Education and Society
Volume 2:
Schooling and Status Attainment: Social Origins and Institutional Determinants Education and Social Change Educational Reform in International Perspective
Volume 3: Volume 4:
Series Editor from Volume 5: David P. Baker Volume 5:
Volume 6: Volume 7: Volume 8:
New Paradigms and Recurring Paradoxes in Education for Citizenship: An International Comparison Global Trends in Educational Policy The Impact of Comparative Education Research on Institutional Theory Education for All: Global Promises, National Challenges
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON EDUCATION AND SOCIETY VOLUME 9
THE WORLDWIDE TRANSFORMATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION EDITED BY
DAVID P. BAKER Pennsylvania State University, USA
ALEXANDER W. WISEMAN Lehigh University, USA
United Kingdom – North America – Japan India – Malaysia – China
JAI Press is an imprint of Emerald Group Publishing Limited Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley BD16 1WA, UK First edition 2008 Copyright r 2008 Emerald Group Publishing Limited Reprints and permission service Contact:
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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Philip G. Altbach
Center for International Higher Education, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, USA
Marcelo Parreira do Amaral
Institut fu¨r Erziehungswissenschaft, Abteilung Allgemeine Pa¨dagogik, University of Tu¨bingen, Tu¨bingen, Germany
Karin Amos
Institut fu¨r Erziehungswissenschaft, Abteilung Allgemeine Pa¨dagogik, University of Tu¨bingen, Tu¨bingen, Germany
Lu´cia Bruno
Faculdade de Educac- a˜o Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo, Sa˜o Paulo, Brazil
Chuing Prudence Chou
Department of Education, National Cheng-chi University, Taipei, Taiwan
Christopher S. Collins
Graduate School of Education and Information Studies, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Los Angeles, CA, USA
Adiya Enkhjargal
University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Gae¨le Goastellec
Observatoire Science Politique et Socie´te´, Universite´ de Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
Mark S. Johnson
Colorado College, Colorado Springs, CO, USA
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Sunwoong Kim
Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI, USA
Jun Li
Department of Educational Policy and Administration, Hong Kong Institute of Education, Hong Kong
Jing Lin
Confucius Institute, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
Patti McGill Peterson
Institute for Higher Education Policy, Washington, DC, USA
Francisco O. Ramirez
School of Education, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
Robert A. Rhoads
Graduate School of Education and Information Studies, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Los Angeles, CA, USA
David Turner
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Treforest Campus, University of Glamorgan, Pontypridd, UK
John C. Weidman
Department of Administrative and Policy Studies, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Christine Min Wotipka
School of Education, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
PREFACE Higher education is ripe for comparative study. Currently it is the sector of education at the cutting edge of the education revolution, in terms of worldwide expansion of undergraduate and graduate enrollments, and new innovations in organizational arrangements, governance, and funding strategies. Once taking a backseat to the comparative study of primary and secondary schooling, there is now renewed attention on the quality and future role of the university. The rise of super-research universities, world rankings of universities, interest in higher education as an engine of economic development and other related topics have all converged to reinvigorate comparative study of higher education. There is an interesting paradox about higher education in society today. On one hand there is no lack of criticism of the university and other higher education institutions, yet the sector is flourishing in a way unimaginable even several decades ago. Arguably the university is one of the most successful of institutions in the global society. Its longevity alone attests to the robustness of the model it is based on, as many of its fundamental characteristics leading to its success early in the second western millennium have carried through to the successful modern university of today. Indeed, most of the long-lived organizations in the world today are universities. Even in light of the constant drum roll of criticism of the university, in many ways it is obvious that the western university, which is now spreading throughout the world, has been effective as a cultural organization right from its founding in medieval Europe over the 12th and 13th centuries. The earliest institutions founded in medieval Europe are still functioning today; the universities of Paris, Bologna, and Oxford are all about 800 years old. And what is more, after all the centuries these institutions and many others like them are not merely so many propped up museum pieces, instead they are vibrant, dynamic organizations of learning and scholarship. Contrasting the circumstances of the earliest universities with those of the most successful ones today illustrates the degree to which the institution has continued to thrive. When first formed, universities were little more than a collection of scholars who banded together to protect their common interest in medieval society. These early universities often had no official buildings ix
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or common grounds and borrowed private residents and existing public buildings for teaching. Students paid individual scholars directly to teach, and in some cases fined those scholars who did not teach up to their expectations. Indeed early universities were such virtual and under-funded communities that they could, and sometimes did, completely decamp for another location as part of a strategy to win resources and freedom from local powers. Compare these humble beginnings to the epitome of the successful contemporary university. To be included among competitive American super-research universities with an extensive portfolio of scholarship and research (including a medical research center) requires minimal funding at about 2 billion dollars annually. And some research universities, such as The Johns Hopkins University, support special research and technology facilities with annual costs far exceeding this. Commanding and sustaining this level of resources (from both public and private funds) would be virtually impossible if the university was not a successful institution. This is not to say that there are no problems for the future of higher education; there are clearly many. As mass education moves into higher education it changes not only the scale of institutions, but expands their very mission and charter. Similarly the worldwide expectations of what higher education will do for human life continues to escalate. And in their day-today operation many higher education institutions scramble for funds, beset by conflicting interests both within and without. All of this and much more is a wide-open opportunity for comparative study as the world is literally awash with higher education. This volume offers a sample of the best of contemporary comparative study of the dynamic sector of higher education. Attesting to the growing interest in this subfield, when we first put out the call for this volume we received enough chapter proposals for well over two full volumes. There were so many excellent studies and essays to choose from that it was a formidable editorial challenge to select a handful of these for publication here. Across the selected chapters, we have tried to provide a representative range of issues, comparative approaches, and institutional dynamics, but in no way this is a comprehensive survey of what is proving to be a robust renaissance in comparative higher education. To make the range of representative issues in this volume more manageable, we have broadly organized the chapters in this volume into two groups. The first group encompasses issues of higher education expansion and the impact of this global trend. Goestellec’s first chapter on ‘‘Changes in Access to Higher Education’’ is a fitting lead for this
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volume. In this chapter she outlines the global factors that both contribute to higher education expansion as well as ways that higher education has developed an institutional structure and pattern of its own across systems. The following three chapters by Turner, Weidman and Enkhjargal, and Wotipka and Ramirez address specific issues arising as a result of the global expansion of higher education. For example, the relative importance and quality of universities around the world has become a field of study in its own right. Turner’s chapter on ‘‘World University Rankings’’ is a thoughtful critique on the methods for ranking and provides an explanation of both the rankings themselves and their importance. As with any legitimate institution, issues of accountability and expectations are often closely tied to these sorts of ranking systems. Weidman and Enkhjargal’s chapter on ‘‘Corruption in Higher Education’’ furthers the discussion on this important topic by addressing specific issues of corruption in the broader community and investigating how universities and other higher education institutions are affected by corruption. Finally in this first section of chapters, Wotipka and Ramirez investigate how women’s studies in higher education has risen and developed across nations and time. The establishment of new fields of inquiry and scholarship is an important consideration as higher education expands worldwide. The second grouping of chapters in this volume includes examinations of specific national system phenomena related to the expansion of higher education. The systems specifically investigated are Brazil, Germany, Russia, Uganda, Thailand, South Korea, China, Taiwan, and the United States. The broad range of systems both in terms of geographic location, political affiliation and organization, and socio-cultural traditions is striking – and important. As higher education expands it has come to exist in recognizable forms in every type of political, social, cultural, and economic context. How is this possible, and what are the effects of this sort of expansion? To best understand and answer these questions, the chapter authors in this half of the volume look at many different perspectives. For example, Johnson examines the historical legacies of higher education systems and how they have transformed through political transition in post-Soviet systems. Collins and Rhoads look at the impact of one of the most influential organizations in terms of education and development: the World Bank. Kim takes a close look at the ‘‘Political Economy of Education Fever’’ in South Korea. Li and Lin address China’s higher education expansion by examining policies using a rational framework. Chou also uses a theoretical lens in her discussion of the ‘‘Impact of Neo-Liberalism’’ on Taiwanese higher education. And in this volume’s
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final chapter, well-known higher education comparativist, Philip Altbach, and Peterson discuss the ways that American higher education has expanded into the global marketplace. As a whole, the chapters in this volume in the International Perspectives on Education and Society series present a thoughtful discussion of the worldwide transformation of higher education from multiple perspectives. It is our hope that these chapters will provide not only answers to many of the questions surrounding this transformation, but will inspire further investigations and study. As we said at the beginning of this preface, higher education is ripe for comparative study – as this volume’s chapters attest. And, since higher education is on the frontier of worldwide educational expansion, we further hope that this volume makes an important contribution to the field of comparative higher education for many years to come. David P. Baker Alexander W. Wiseman Editors
CHANGES IN ACCESS TO HIGHER EDUCATION: FROM WORLDWIDE CONSTRAINTS TO COMMON PATTERNS OF REFORM? Gae¨le Goastellec The question of student access to higher education institutions is one of the major issues facing the academic world today. It results from a societal choice and is translated into the organization of higher education. Rethinking access is thus inscribed within a broader reshuffling of the entire higher education sector, higher education being considered in its broad definition, from post-secondary to research institutions. Analyzing changes in access to higher education from an international comparative perspective helps to understand some of the main worldwide transformations of higher education systems and to identify both quantitative and qualitative trends, as well as policies and organizational processes. This chapter first identifies why the issue of access has become a priority for most higher education public authorities. It gives a largely descriptive account of the major forces at play and show how internal and external sources of pressure coincide to create a situation where higher education first expands under the influence of these joint pressures rather than through a specific program or set of policies designed for higher education. Three kinds of global pressure have an impact on access to higher education. Demographic pressure comes first. It is due to the interplay of trends The Worldwide Transformation of Higher Education International Perspectives on Education and Society, Volume 9, 1–26 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1479-3679/doi:10.1016/S1479-3679(08)00001-7
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fostered by globalization: mechanical population increase, political choices meant to increase access offer, higher social demands and a growing symbolic importance vested in higher education. This demographic pressure contains two other sources of pressure: economic pressure, which includes the diffusion of the concept of efficiency within higher education systems, and political pressure, which calls for the diversification of the student body, especially when it comes to the selection of an elite. The issue of student access takes the form of a tension between the laws of the market and democratization, or between efficiency and equality. Solutions to these global pressures are sought through similar patterns of reform in different national contexts. The second part of the chapter analyzes these patterns. First came the management of expansion of the higher education system through its structural differentiation.1 Although it allowed an increasing number of students to gain access to higher education worldwide, this quantitative management pattern has come under criticism. Research (Wolf, 2002; Duru-Bellat, 2005) demonstrates that massification tends to reproduce inequalities instead of promoting social justice: the opening of higher education to a larger number of students merely displaces inequalities in the world of education. Concern has shifted from expanding access – i.e. increasing the number of students entering higher education – to widening access, i.e. focusing on providing equal access to higher education for previously under-represented groups. Indeed, behind the quantitative dimension lies the issue of equity in higher education systems, an issue which is paramount on two levels. The first level concerns the representation of students’ social background in higher education. The problem lies in finding out who enters what kind of institution and earns what kind of degree. Moreover, how can a fair admission process to higher education be organized, so that higher education does not reproduce social structure but promotes social mobility? I have demonstrated elsewhere (Goastellec, 2008) that the norms governing access to higher education have changed from ‘‘inherited merit’’ to a commitment to formal equality before leading to attempts to guarantee equal opportunity. The diffusion of this last norm goes along with the reshuffling of admission processes and the broadening of national and institutional definitions of social diversity. Those measures aim at taking into account the impact that different social backgrounds have on access to education. The second dimension related to the problem of fair access consists in identifying who bears the cost of higher education. Two international trends are at play here: the transformation of student funding and the changes in
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the way academic institutions are financed. Higher education public authorities are more and more numerous to implement cost-sharing (Johnstone, 1986), as well as contract-based funding. Thanks to incentivesensitive budgeting, this aims at encouraging institutions to be more efficient and accountable. Of course, these common trends are not dealt with in the same manner worldwide, national and local public policies adopting their own approach to those issues. Path dependencies, as well as national contexts, have an impact on the local re-appropriation, translation (Callon, 1986) or transcoding (Lascoumes, 1997), as revealed by quantitative and qualitative research2 carried on in France, the United States, South Africa, Indonesia, Israel, Ethiopia, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Vietnam. Nevertheless, analysis of the multidimensional changes caused by the impact that these sources of pressure have on access to higher education also reveals that the new organization of access always tends towards a restructuring of governing bodies in higher education.
1. A COMMON SYSTEM OF CONSTRAINTS The realities of access to higher education changed dramatically within the last century. The second half of the twentieth century more particularly was characterized by a worldwide increase in access to higher education institutions that proved to be the main force disrupting the traditional organization of academia. This international trend is due to the several intertwined dynamics: demographic, economic and political pressures.
1.1. A Contextual Source of Pressure: Demography In 1900, the world population was estimated at approximately 1.6 billion. By 1950, it had reached 2.5 billion, and grew to 6.5 billion in 2005 (UN, 2004). Within a century, the population had thus increased fourfold, which had direct consequences on the number of individuals claiming access to education in general and higher education in particular. Indeed, the sizeable increase of the potential students’ age group spurred a nearly mechanical augmentation of the number of students. The worldwide student body skyrocketed from 40 million in 1975 to 100 million in 2000 (UNESCO, 2004), and this increase is likely to reach the number of 150 million students in 2025.
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Although today this trend mainly concerns developing countries, where demographic increase still prevails, it also takes the form of a global phenomenon. It is estimated for instance that in the US, demographic growth in itself will swell the ranks of higher education students by 1.6 million in 2015 (Heller, 2002), which will bring their number to 16 or even 17 million. Nevertheless, when it is compared to changes in the world population over the same period, the number of students seems to have increased more quickly: it multiplied by 2.5% while the world population increased by only 1.5%. If demographic pressure constrains access to higher education, the increasing number of students is also related to an augmentation in both supply and demand. This point for example is illustrated by the fact that in the US, the number of students rose by 31% between 1979 and 1999, while the number of high school graduates decreased by 10% (KIRP, 2003). What’s more, the margin for increase remains quite wide in developing countries where approximately 20% of a given age group enters higher education compared with 51% in the European Union. Moreover, this rate strongly varies depending on countries: within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), approximately 70% of a given age group enters higher education in countries with the highest access rate (Australia, Finland, Island, Poland and Sweden), compared to 30% in those with the lowest rate (Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Mexico and Switzerland) (OECD, 2004). The number of students applying for college is also rising. This is due to two reasons: on the one hand, the number of students completing high school has increased, which is an international trend of the twentieth century. This goes hand in hand with a differentiation in the types of higher education institutions (with old and elitist higher education institutions preserved from massification, and more recent and ‘‘open’’ institutions dedicated to massification). On the other hand, higher education degrees become increasingly important as keys to social mobility, as testified by the correlation between education level and income. In Hungary, Indonesia, Portugal or the United States, 30–40-year-old higher education graduates have an income that is on average 80% higher than the income of high school graduates (OECD and UNESCO, 2002; OECD, 2004). This international trend of greater access to higher education is reinforced by the development of knowledge societies and by globalization, which use enrollment rate figures as a reliable indicator of individual countries’ development level. The introduction of comparative enrollment rates (by the OECD, UNESCO, European Community, etc.), their classification into categories – such as that developed by Martin Trow (1973), which
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distinguishes between elitist, massified and universal systems – participates in an increase of symbolic pressure. What’s more, the attention paid to international indicators dominated the research field during the 1990s in order to invest in institutional and political fields (Cyterman & Demeuse, 2005). Finally, everything happens as if the degree of ‘‘development’’ and democratization of each country ought to be measured according to the proportion of students from one given age group entering higher education. On the one hand, this would mean that there are ‘‘developed’’ countries, such as Canada and Japan (with an enrollment rate of respectively 51% and 50% for the 25–35-year-old age group) (OECD, 2004), and on the other hand, ‘‘developing’’ countries confronted to a slow increase in the enrollment rate for one given age group, despite a significant increase in the number of students.
1.2. Economic Pressure: Improving Efficiency Due to the drastic increase of the number of students, the question of funding for higher education is at stake: the need for additional resources is increasing steadily and public resources are at best stagnating. As a result, even if it increases in general or mobilizes a larger share of the gross domestic product, higher education funding per capita tends to drop. Economic pressure thus causes a shift from increasing funding to making higher education institutions more efficient. The efficiency rationale in higher education systems is part of the broader problematic of accountability that came to the fore as a consequence of the opening of higher education (be it massive like in the United States, or relative, like in Indonesia) to a broader segment of the population. It thus follows the question of the diversification of the student body. In the United States, this rationale became central in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Two contingencies explain this dynamic: on the one hand, the increase in tuition fees augment the financial burden supported by individuals and thus legitimize the demands for accountability expressed by students and their families. On the other hand, the States and the Federal State reinvested in public higher education in the 1980s. Even though this does not counterbalance the tendency towards lower public funding per student, at least it allows the State to demand results. As a consequence, public institutions have become accountable for their activities, as expressed by the States through the National Governor Association: ‘‘The public has a right to know that their resources are being wisely invested and
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committed’’.3 This demand for transparency and efficiency on the part of institutions comes with measures that may be taken at the national or institutional level. For example, during the 1990s, the State of Florida renamed its performance indicators ‘‘accountability measures’’ and redefined the indicators with the help of the campus governing boards. This initiative fostered the creation of six measures designed for the state’s higher education system: an indicator measuring the enrollment rate, the graduation rate after six years, the retention rate, research and development activities financed by the state thanks to sponsors’ funding, the evolution of endowment and the degrees conferred (St John et al., 2001). These measurement criteria testify to the necessity, for the States as well as for public institutions, to be accountable for their activities. Nevertheless, they do not constitute a drain on the list of missions entrusted to universities. Students increasingly enroll in a higher education institution that is geographically close to their residence and universities have to think more and more about the congruence between the proposed curricula and the job opportunities available on the local market place. More broadly, higher education systems are expected to correlate their graduates’ training to the needs of the market place. Policies aimed at promoting scientific careers amongst students appear on the agenda of an increasing number of states. They can be considered not only as a means to equalize chances but also as a tool to balance the preference of students for ‘‘soft sciences’’ as opposed to ‘‘hard sciences’’. The objective then targets the regulation of the influx of students. Indeed, the efficiency expected from the institutions also concerns, as revealed by the State of Florida’s measurement system, the graduation rate. This constraint is taken into account differently by higher education institutions. For example, at New York University – a private and elitist institution which is also expensive (it enrolls approximately 35% of applicants and tuition fees are approximately 30,000$ per year) – admission officers state that: ‘‘What also weighs on our decision is the graduation rate students coming from a specific high school usually have. We know that students coming from this specific high school tend to graduate in four years while the retention rate for this other school is not so good. So yes, the high school’s previous results are one thing we analyze to admit students’’ (interview, admission officer). Between admission strategies and the cost of tuition fees that encourage students to graduate as quickly as possible, the graduation rate for a BA in six years reaches nearly 80%. Because of the different campuses that compose City University of New York (CUNY), admission strategies are differentiated. Among
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Community Colleges, efforts are focused on matching the proposed courses to student needs. At the Bronx Community College, the beginning of the academic year is organized in two periods in order to take into account the needs of students who enroll after classes officially begin. A late program is organized so that students who enroll belatedly are not disadvantaged and are given the possibility of completing classes simultaneously with the rest of the students: ‘‘Some students over the counter walk straight into our community college without applying at the central level. They go straight to the admissions office with $45 and the documents. Some of them even come in one day before classes start and stand in line in front of the registrar’s office. For those who come late there is a late start program starting two weeks later so that they don’t get lost from the beginning’’ (interview, student counselor). Bridging classes also characterizes these junior colleges. Similarly, the seven CUNY Honors Colleges,4 which enroll students selected on their previous academic performance, invest in resources that they make widely available: from complete funding of studies to cultural packages that enable students to discover New York’s cultural life y These Honors Colleges, which were created recently, appeared in the American higher education landscape in 1994. They were established to serve as institutions that could be used by renowned public and massified universities (such as the University of Arkansas or Massachusetts) to improve their image. Regional colleges (such as the University of Indiana and the University of Pennsylvania) resort to that system of Honors Colleges to diversify student enrollment by attracting academically talented individuals who were not initially likely to enroll (Kirp, 2003). Analyzing the way higher education institutions implement policies to recruit students and build curricula aimed at increasing their efficiency proves that these institutions’ strategies become more complex when it comes to dealing with how students choose their degrees. This preoccupation appeared in one of the latest surveys ranking American universities conducted by the Washington Monthly (2005). This ranking used the institution’s ability to produce social mobility as a parameter. Similarly, a recent academic study (Guinier, 2005) emphasized the necessity to measure the added value provided by institutions by comparing the social and ethnoracial diversity of entering students, always advertised by institutions, with the graduates’ diversity, which remains largely hidden. As a result, the economic pressure is twofold: on the one hand, it concerns the adaptation to the country’s productive needs, as stated in the World Declaration on Higher Education (World Conference on Higher Education, 1998) by focusing on the link between the workplace and higher education.
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On the other hand, it questions higher education institutions’ profitability: costly as they are, do they ‘‘produce’’ enough graduates? The economic pressure influencing student access also comes from the fact that an enlarged access to higher education and degrees can be perceived as an investment for society. Research has indeed demonstrated the recurrent parallel between higher education and economic performance (Barro & Salaa-i-Martin, 1995; Barro & Lee, 1993), and more broadly, the fact that public investment in higher education improves, at different levels, national economies (Fischer & Varga, 2003; Nelson, 1986). A recent study (Frenkel & Leck, 2006), investigating the link between investments in higher education and the economic growth of OECD member countries confirms that investments in Higher Education and Research (HE&R) significantly influence OECD countries’ economic performance. Korea and the United States, which invest respectively 8.2% and 7.3% of their GDP in education, illustrate this trend. The American system best demonstrates the importance given to higher education, as it invests twice as much in its students as OECD countries (OECD, 2004). In an economic context which depends upon the type and the quality of the knowledge acquired and produced, the degree of development of one society, and its ability to produce added value, are indexed on its aptitude to produce graduates. As a result, although the US does not rank first in the enrollment rate of a given age group, they take into account the possibility for the entire population to earn a degree. The number of graduates is about the same for the 25–34-year-old age bracket as for the 35–44-year-old one (42%; OECD, 2004). This simultaneously testifies to a protracted effort aiming at making higher education accessible and to the flexibility of the American higher education system: adjustments are possible for atypical students, be they mature students enrolling for the first time or students returning to higher education. Nevertheless, the question of access to degrees is sensitive: Fitzgerald and Delaney (in Heller, 2002) have analyzed data showing that ‘‘eliminating income-related gaps in (access to) post-secondary education would add hundreds of billions of dollars to national income annually’’. This argument based on social return, which is made possible by national investment in human capital, is used by international bodies such as the OECD and UNESCO (OECD, UNESCO, 2002). The international shift from elite to massified higher education has been justified as leading to desirable social benefits and economic profits as access rates to degrees became a new tool of evaluation and monitoring. There is interest not only in the economic efficiency of higher education systems but also in a new
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definition of the equity rationale. The issue of political pressure partly lies there.
1.3. Political Pressure: Accounting for Equity? Political pressure is shifting from focusing on enrollment rates to improving fair access practices for students. In order to do so, it must articulate the efficiency and equality rationales. Indeed, in addition to the question of access rates, political pressure has to contend with the need to legitimate student influx into higher education institutions, as well as with the admission processes regulating this influx. Who enrolls in what institution and with what results? The differences due to the impact of social background on access to higher education and the unequal added value of the earned degrees on the students’ professional careers are ever more under scrutiny. Access is increasingly advertised in its democratic and egalitarian aspects, probably also because it is considered as a guarantee of the democratic nature of the nation-state concerned. As a matter of fact, Schofer and Meyer (2005) have underlined the positive correlation existing between the times when democracy prevails in the world and the expansion of education. This political pressure exists at two levels: the international level and the societal one. At the international level, Schofer and Meyer establish a relationship between ‘‘the intensified structure of the world polity itself, measured by the proliferation of INGO’s’’ and the increase in ‘‘tertiary enrollments’’. They even conclude that ‘‘education expands not because a particular society democratizes but because of global norms and discourses about democracy and human rights’’ (p. 42). As a result, ‘‘worldwide higher education expansion in the period since 1960 reflects a common global model of national society more than national social economic and cultural variations’’. At the same time, ‘‘the expansion of higher education produced a world in which national elites are culturally integrated with each other’’ (p. 49). Moreover, the democratic warrant increasingly focuses on the higher education systems’ ability to produce an elite that is representative of social diversity. Thus, ‘‘society and individuals are bound together by rationalized systems of imperfectly egalitarian justice and participatory representation, in the economy, polity, culture and social interaction. These are global conceptions, not local, expressed as general principles applied everywhere’’ (p. 162). Indeed, international bodies have
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normalized the imperative of actively promoting fair access to education: the 1998 World Conference on Higher Education led to the publication of a ‘‘World declaration on higher education’’, and made it a worldwide goal that ‘‘no discrimination can be accepted in granting access to higher education on grounds of race, gender, language or religion, economic, cultural or social distinctions or physical disabilities’’ and that ‘‘access to higher education for members of some special target groups, such as indigenous peoples, cultural and linguistic minorities, disadvantaged groups, peoples living under occupation and those who suffer from disabilities, must be actively facilitated y’’ This document can be analyzed as a framework for public authorities and higher education institutions to reorganize access in higher education by making sure that it is fair and allowing a representative sample of society to enroll. At the internal or societal level, the same trend is at play. Social forces demand transparency on the part of institutions as regards access – most of all when it comes to the most prestigious degrees – and the national elite, identified by Shoefer and Mayer as ‘‘culturally integrated’’, backs up this demand. The elite’s specific understanding of fair access policies goes hand in hand with the elaboration of devices deemed necessary to guarantee equity. An illustration of this trend can be found in France, in the Parisian Institute of Political Science, where the administration, which largely interacts with American higher education institutions, has adopted the principle of Affirmative Action to limit the reproduction of the elite. A few years ago, this school was characterized by its very strong rate of social reproduction (more than 80% of its students come from the upper class), maintained by an entrance examination resting largely on the students’ cultural capital. The school recently implemented a second path of admission for students coming from high schools identified as being located in economically disadvantaged areas (Priority Education Zone). Another example, at the national level this time, is that of the Indian government, which is pushing Higher Education Institutions (HEI) to implement affirmative action measures for low-caste Indians (Carnoy, 2006). The political pressure for fair access figures prominently on most public authorities’ agendas. Finally, whatever the extent to which the analyzed pressures influence higher education, they contribute to legitimizing the fact that the question of access figures on political agendas. Although national variations in higher education policies prevail, general trends can be identified: firstly, the internal differentiation of higher education systems with new institutions being created as a means to enlarge access and secondly, the introduction on political agendas of the norm of equality of opportunities.
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2. SIMILAR PATTERNS OF REFORM IN CONTRASTED NATIONAL CONTEXTS 2.1. Increasing Admissions Through Internal Differentiation In order to cope with demographic pressure and with the need to build a student body which is more representative of social diversity, public authorities have developed, at various levels, a similar strategy: the expansion and internal differentiation of the higher education system. The creation of new public institutions compensates for territorial inequalities. In France for example, the 1970s were characterized by the creation of new universities in regions that did not have higher education institutions until then. The number of university towns doubled between 1945 and 1970. This dynamic expanded to middle-sized towns between 1980 and 2000 (Filaˆtre & Grossetti, 2003). In South Africa, new universities were built in the 1960s and 1970s, in keeping with the policy of separate development, with institutions dedicated to Black, Indian and Colored communities and others for the Afrikaner community, such as Rand Afrikaans University or Port Elizabeth University (Waast & Gaillard, 2001). In Indonesia as well, the Javanese university monopoly ended with the creation between 1956 and 1963 of one state university for each province. In Israel, public undergraduate colleges were established in peripheral areas in the 1980s, in order to meet the needs of students from disadvantaged backgrounds. In England, following the Robbins Report, higher education expanded from a small number of elite institutions to a broad and more geographically dispersed group of universities and colleges. In Ethiopia, the last decade was marked by the emergence of new regional universities in order to balance the centralization of higher education institutions around Addis Ababa. In Vietnam, the extension of the higher education system is on the Government’s agenda, with the objective of ensuring the spread of higher education institutions across various areas of the country, from cities to remote places. In order to face the increasing demand for access to university and the diversification of the student body, public authorities diversify the higher education system, introducing new types of institutions or new curricula. In the US, at the beginning of the twentieth century, authorities decided to create public institutions offering a two-year professional curriculum in addition to universities. Such institutions covering most of the territory aimed at developing local access to higher education. These Community Colleges (or Junior Colleges) absorb the demand for admission. At the end
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of the twentieth century, they represented 40% of the student body. For public authorities, these Colleges constitute an answer to the diversification of academic careers, academic levels and the students’ different social backgrounds. In 1999, students coming from the high-income families were four times more numerous in these colleges than those coming from lowincome families (39% versus 10%; Heller, 2002). In France, the creation of Brevet de Technicien Supe´rieur (BTS) (1959) and Instituts Universitaires de Technologie (IUT) (1967) illustrates the same dynamic: proposing short and professionalizing curricula to less academically gifted and socially modest students. In Indonesia, the absorption of this demand is reserved to private institutions where 71% of new students were enrolled in 1999 (Depdiknas, 2000). Public authorities have chosen to externalize the costs generated by the relative opening of access by providing a framework for the development of private institutions. These very expensive institutions enroll students who belong exclusively to the middle and upper classes with an academic background that does not make access to public universities possible. Conversely, the short and professional curricula of public universities (Diploma curricula) favor a relative social diversification of the student body as well as the necessary qualitative management of access. In Ireland, the rapid expansion in enrollment, which started in the 1960s, was accompanied by a differentiation of the system with the development of a large technological sector. It was completed mainly through the establishment of a network of Regional Technical Colleges in the 1970s and the expansion of the few pre-existing technical colleges, principally in Dublin. Student enrollment in these institutions offering mainly vocational two-year certificate programs in applied sciences, engineering, business studies, art and design, accounts for 38% of all enrollments today, compared with 54% for the seven state-funded universities. In what became the state of Israel, universities were created between 1925 and 1965 on the model of the Humboldtian University system, and constituted an elitist system. The expansion of the higher education system has been favored by differentiation, mainly in the development of the non-academic sector, as a result of bottom-up initiatives as well as governmental top-down planning. The 1980s saw the creation of new colleges, both public and private, the new public colleges being established mainly in the periphery, to absorb students from lower status groups. As a result, massification has been partly achieved outside the universities: in 2005, 54% of all undergraduates were enrolled in colleges, as opposed to 46% in universities. In Ethiopia, only 1.5% of one given age group enters higher education, so massification is still a long way off. However, the indispensable extension of the higher education sector
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partly fell to the private sector: 10 years after the creation of the first private institution, 23% of students nationwide are enrolled in that sector. In Vietnam, the higher education system is diversified, and its expansion has been organized outside the universities, through the introduction of semipublic,5 people-founded6 and private7 higher education institutions (after 1993). This trend has been pursued since 2001 with the encouragement of cooperation with foreign higher education institutions to deliver degree courses at the higher education level. The MOET Strategic Plan also foresees the creation of new universities and colleges before 2010, and calls for the consolidation of community colleges as well as the expansion of the university network so as to increase their size and provide more opportunities for those coming from low socio-economic backgrounds. The creation of new public universities has transformed the academic landscape and institutional differentiation modified the system’s organization. However, even if the new institutions globally allow for a partial democratization of access to higher education, such is not necessarily the case in prestigious and selective institutions. Massification in higher education has been contained to less selective or non-selective institutions. Thus, the higher education systems’ differentiation provides a quantitative answer to the principle of equality. In order to assess the qualitative achievement of this principle, local or national statistical databases are introduced. They are supposed to allow for the characterization of the student body, regarding some specific and predefined criteria, and thus to measure, at the institutions’ level as well as at the university system’s level, the extent to which this equality principle is applied. The issue is thus shifting from expanding access to widening access: at another level, widening access tends to be appreciated not only at the general Higher Education (HE) system level but also at the level of the most prestigious institutions so as to provide for a more qualitative appreciation of equity within the HE system. Access to HE is perceived as a means to evaluate how democratic societies are. The work of social scientists (see e.g. Clancy & Goastellec, 2007) and international bodies (such as the OECD) dedicated to establishing indicators aimed at measuring and comparing equity in access also testifies to this trend.
2.2. Widening Access Through the Reorganization of Student Influx Massification in the higher education system does not necessarily improve equity between students coming from different backgrounds. In systems
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such as the French one, the choice of different academic paths according to social background creates a ‘‘segregated democratization’’ (Duru-Bellat, 2005) and intensifies the diploma race between students and social groups, as degrees become positional goods. Indeed, with the enlargement of access to higher education, not only do degrees become the cornerstone of social mobility but the kind of degree that is earned also has a great impact on the student’s future, as well as the academic institution chosen. Focusing on widening access must come with an interpretation of higher education degrees as providing individuals with important private returns. Some researchers have concluded from this that not only are private returns increasing, but that they are also higher than social returns (Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004). Organizing a fair distribution of the students within higher education systems thus becomes a very sensitive issue, in which two tools are of particular importance: admission processes and funding frameworks. 2.2.1. Admission Processes: To What Institutions and to Whom do They Apply? Admission processes have long been used as key instruments to regulate student influx within the higher education system. Following the introduction of the Equality of Opportunity norm on the political agendas of most higher education public authorities (see Goastellec, 2008), they have become an even greater issue in the most prestigious and selective higher education institutions of each society. At the Core of the Debate: Elitist Institutions. Elitist institutions correspond to the 146 most elitist colleges in the US (approximately 10% of all institutions, including the Ivy League8 institutions and the big public universities), the historically white institutions in South Africa, the ‘‘Grandes Ecoles’’, preparatory classes and a few numerus clausus universities curricula in France, as well as the most ancient Javanese universities in Indonesia, the eight historical universities in Israel and the Universities of Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. In these institutions, the tension between merit and equality is paroxysmal, which entails a double questioning. The representativity and thus the legitimacy of the national elite they select on the one hand and on the other hand, the fair distribution of the goods (the degrees) they deliver. The South African context illustrates this question. Since the integration of distinct higher education systems, which up to this point served different ethno-racial communities organized around the principle of ‘‘separate development’’, the institutions faced with the strongest increase
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in applications are those that until recently admitted exclusively white Afrikaans-speaking students. Recruitment in the most elitist institutions is de facto socially unequal. This important social reproduction of inequality is all the more problematic since global access to higher education has increased: for the time being, this reproduction can only be explained by the burden of social, economic, cultural and academic factors on individual lives. In the US, social factors making for unequal access to higher education have not been eradicated but attempts to establish a socially fair admission process have been made since the beginning of the twentieth century. With the end of racial segregation, selective institutions such as the University of Berkeley developed admission processes aimed at taking merit and equality into account simultaneously. These procedures are progressively adapted in other higher education systems. The institutions’ international network, which makes the diffusion of admission processes easier, participates in this process of adaptation. Another example is the organization of admissions to higher education in Vietnam, which is being reorganized in order to achieve social equity and offer more opportunities to people from every walk of life to achieve a continuing education. This policy, which was endorsed by the government, implies working on improving the national higher education entrance examination, set up in 2002, in order to ensure social equity in admission criteria and processes. The centralization of the admission process, which is in the hands of the government, makes for an easier procedure for students to enter higher education. As the examination is highly selective (approximately 15% of all examinees are accepted), the benchmark differs depending on the geographic origin of the students (mountainous areas, remote areas and very poor social backgrounds; country areas; towns and provincial cities and its suburbs; and state/big cities such as Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi). This organization takes into account the differences between high school levels and educational facilities depending on the students’ geographic origins, and thus attempts to guarantee equality of opportunity. In addition, foundation courses for ethnic minority groups are provided by some universities under the supervision of the government, which has set up a special policy allowing these students to enter universities without taking any entrance examination. This has been made possible thanks to admission processes which reveal a transformation in the way identities are interpreted. The international diffusion of ‘‘academic know how’’ (i.e. modes of organization, tools, techniques), of multiform processes that can take an
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anecdotal, accidental or rational form, participate in the common search for equality of opportunities in access to higher education. The diffusion of admission tools first concerned standardized tests, then Affirmative Action practices and recently, the more holistic consideration of student background. For example, the establishment in 1981 of a National Institute for Testing and Evaluation (NITE) by the Israeli universities, whose aim was to construct a Psychometric Entrance Test valid for all applicants to Israeli Universities closely resembles the American Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT): the NITE was to provide standardized tests that all universities would resort to, and use in addition to the Bagrut, a high school diploma quite similar to the French Baccalaure´at or the German Abitur. Like in the US, some Affirmative Action practices are used at the institutional level and aim at providing access to disadvantaged students on account of their socioeconomic background or ethnic origin. The adoption of a national entrance examination to public universities in Indonesia illustrates the same trend. This technological transfer would not have been adopted if the Indonesian elite (called the ‘‘Berkeley Mafia’’) had not been trained and educated at the University of Berkeley, in California, since the 1960s ... Indonesian graduate students in computer sciences discovered the SAT and trained in the company that commercializes the SAT. Later on, they spread the use of a similar entrance examination in Indonesia, solving the problem of territorial management in the Indonesian higher education system. Following the creation of this test, a second path of admission was developed which allowed universities to foster diversity in the student body by favoring minority students. What’s more, the adoption by the Parisian French Institute of Political Sciences of a second path of admission is clearly inspired by those used in the United States.9 In South Africa, the reform of the Higher Education sector relies on consultations with the international scholarly community. The introduction of Affirmative Action practices, as well as the negotiations taking place around the reorganization of the admission process, involving the potential use of an national entrance examination developed by the University of Cape Town, the most elitist of all South African universities, testify to this international diffusion of admission tools, and, more discretely, to the adoption of standards providing qualitative equity in admissions. In Ireland, in response to the statutory requirement spelled out in the Universities Act (1997) and other legislation, most third-level colleges have introduced their own direct admission processes to deal with atypical student admission outside the framework of the Central Applications Office (CAO). This office grants student status on the national scale to individuals
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in almost all higher education institutions on the basis of academic achievement: the pool of reserved places represents a form of Affirmative Action designed to facilitate access for students who are mature or disabled and students from socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds who would not normally meet the standard academic requirements for admission. In many cases the Affirmative Action measures taken for high school graduates from socially disadvantaged backgrounds are meant to admit students whose level of achievement falls short of the Leaving Certificate requirements for traditional students. It is widely accepted that when access is regulated by competition, those who enter the competition with higher economic, social and cultural resources are at an advantage. The absence of a ‘‘level playing field provides a rationale of some affirmative action’’. In the same vein, the national higher education entrance exam used to admit students in Ethiopian universities incorporates some affirmative action measures by requiring a lower level of achievement from female students, disabled students and students coming from disadvantaged areas. The admission norms, the systems’ organization and the higher education configurations are always embedded in national histories. Yet globalization and the higher education international market, in which the most prestigious universities of each country take first place, participate in a process of normalization for admissions. Admission policies reveal and take into account the diversification of social identities. They establish a link between inequalities, which are taken into account, and the identities acknowledged as prevalent in each society. The complexification of admission processes testifies to a shift towards a more holistic consideration of identities. Admission Processes: Reassessing ‘‘Who’’ Enters Higher Education. Historically, each nation-state is built on a specific understanding of identities. These categories are idiosyncratic: each nation defines what parameters apply depending on its history. In Indonesia, geographic origin is one of the parameters used to classify the population. This statistical construction goes back to a specific understanding of identities, linked to the national integration model. Built on the unification of a heterogeneous geographic area, the Indonesian state uses provincial origin to interpret social inequalities: racial, ethnic and social identities are taboo, and restricted to the private sphere. In the US, it is the melting pot and the ethno-racial dimension which constitute the main criteria used to assess social inequalities. In France, the republican model defines the human being as a universal category: the assessment of social injustice relies on socio-professional categories, a
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euphemistic term for social classes. In Ireland, social diversity traditionally takes socio-economic background as well as national census figures into consideration to assess inequality in access to Higher Education. In Israel, the data concerning each student includes information on religion, geographic origin and school districts, but the socio-economic background is absent from the list. Far from being permanent, these systems of information evolve and follow the transformations and problems at play in the population’s social makeup, depending on the negotiations between the State and civil society. The evolution of admission processes reveal, through the complex issue of inequality, a common trend to recognize that identities are more numerous today than they used to be. On the one hand, in societies where racial identities were traditionally dominant, social identities emerge as a new element helping to reduce social divides (in the US and South Africa). This dynamic is particularly perceptible in the work of the American scientific community, which rely on the emerging concept of Economic Affirmative Action in addition to the concept of race (Kahlenberg, 2005). It aims at going beyond the traditional opposition between Affirmative Action and Blind Admissions thanks to admission processes which take the impact of racial and social identities on access to higher education into account. Several considerations justify this proposition: firstly, the ban on affirmative action practices has reduced ethno-racial diversity on campuses. In order to compensate for this, some universities, such as the University of Berkeley (Goastellec, 2004) have developed a holistic admission process which takes the students’ social background into consideration. The problem with this kind of procedure does not concern its results (because it does provide for the diversity of the student body), but the difficulty to justify the selection principles resorted to. Holistic recruitment is comprehensive because of the diversity of the variables taken into account, but it is hardly transparent, and thus its objectivity is difficult to assess. Secondly, it is known that the use of an Affirmative Action procedure based on social origins only reduces the representation of African-American and Hispanic students in higher education (Kahlenberg, 2005). Ethno-racial origin still influences the probability of access to higher education, especially when it concerns high school students from disadvantaged backgrounds. In the end, the use of an admission model based on the concept of Economic Affirmative Action and on race would have a compensating influence on social and racial problems limiting access to higher education. It would make admission practices transparent at the same time. In South Africa, the Department of Education
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(DoE) and the universities are looking for a way to take social background into account and even the student’s entire background. On the other hand, in societies which historically approach social diversity as based on socio-economic background and restrain ethno-racial identities to the private domain, such as in France, Ireland, and, to some extent, Indonesia, indirect attempts to take ethno-racial diversity into account appear. In Indonesia, the most elitist institutions have developed a second path of admission named ‘‘regional excellence seed’’ (Penelusuran bibit unggul daerah) which facilitates access for students coming from ethnic minorities (non-Javanese), under the cover of geographic diversity. The selection of a national elite introduces a new diversity criterion aimed at giving more legitimacy to a group which has been historically dominated by the Javanese. In some other countries, sometimes because of the transformation of the population makeup, the government implements measures to take ethnic minorities into account. In Ireland, the National Access Office for Equity and Access to Higher Education has enlarged the three previously targeted groups (socially disadvantaged students, mature and disabled students) to two other groups, members of the Traveler or Gipsy Community and ethnic minority groups. The complexification in admission processes and in the way identities are seen as having an impact on access to higher education goes hand in hand with a change in the funding of higher education. 2.2.2. Rethinking Funding If changes in admission processes participate in the widening of the student body in higher education, they cannot be dissociated from funding issues. In this specific domain, a first trend consisted in organizing different modes of cost-sharing, either in the form of tuition fees compensated by grants or loans, or of public funding provided by taxes accompanied by grants awarded to specific students. Here again, grants can be based on merit or need. Every higher education system has organized a specific student-funding framework, linked to its societal understanding of higher education. For example, in France, open access to universities for high school graduates is sustained by free studies and fellowships based on parental income, family size and distance between the place of study and the family residence. More broadly, the organization of funding is linked to the configuration of the higher education systems: when they are characterized by strong centralization, such as France, rules are the same on the national scale. On the contrary, when a sector is characterized by the autonomy of its institutions, such as the French ‘‘Grandes Ecoles’’, institutions are free to
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organize their funding. Thus, the complexification of admission processes and the question of identities have a counterpart in the reorganization of the national student-funding framework and in the way the institution is funded. For example, the Parisian Institute of Political Science has recently supported the introduction of a second path of admission via the reorganization of student funding. On the one hand, tuition fees have increased from h1,000 a year to h5,000, which is closer to actual costs. The rationale behind this increase may be that, in the French context, students in the highly elitist sector of the ‘‘preparatory schools’’ leading to the ‘‘Grandes Ecoles’’ are supported by public taxes to a greater extent than their university counterparts. Considering that most students enrolled in those institutions come from high-income families, the unfairness of the system becomes obvious. However, on the other hand, at the same time as it raised tuition fees, the administration of the Institute of Political Science opted for indexing them on family income. This policy has resulted in the same 20% of students benefiting from fee exemptions while another 12% are charged less than before (h500 instead of h1,000). The richest 29%, coming from the 2.5% wealthiest families at the national level are charged tuition fees which are five times higher. The added income provided by this raise is then used by the institution to match by 50% the fellowships provided by the national student support organism Centre Re´gional des Œuvres Universitaires et Scolaires (CROUS) to low-income students (IEP, 2005). Fairer admission practices lie in a wide interpretation of students’ needs and of their ability to afford higher education. What emerges from the confrontation between national practices and fair access procedures is that free higher education does not warrant equity. For instance, although French students and their families oppose tuition fees and universities selection in access, Eurostudent research (2005) reveals that the French higher education system is plagued by one of the highest levels of inequality by social group in Europe (along with Austria, Germany and Portugal). What can be observed at a global level is the reorganization of both national and institutional student funding and support. We could analyze for example how tuition fees were introduced in Vietnam (1993) and Ethiopia (2003), and how the number of specific fellowships was increased in Vietnam for students from very low-income families and minority groups and from poor socio-economic areas, as well as the changes in student funding in Israel, South Africa and Australia. However, if students can benefit from some financial incentives to enter Higher Education and specific institutions in particular, direct funding for students does not allow for the monitoring of equity in access to institutions.
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To face this challenge, some national public authorities have introduced a different institutional funding framework, aimed at helping institutions that favor equity. In Ireland for instance, the new government-funded model (2006–2008) incorporates existing provisions for special initiatives targeting nontraditional students into the overall funding pattern. In this case, the government implements a new funding pattern as an incentive for institutions to widen access, as students coming from identified target groups will attract premium funding. In Vietnam, the government targets women, students coming from low-income families, as well as ethnic minorities. In Ethiopia, the 2003 Higher Education Proclamation introduced a funding framework taking into account the type of course program chosen by female and disadvantaged students in order to fund institutions. In Israel, universities using affirmative action to promote minorities’ access get financial assistance from the council of higher education. In South Africa, institutional funding incentives are very precisely organized by the funding framework, which takes into consideration the proportion of ‘‘disadvantaged’’ students. These funding frameworks acknowledge the fact that students who are ‘‘at risk’’, i.e. come from disadvantaged backgrounds, demand a bigger financial investment on the part of the institution to be able to graduate (thanks to remedial courses or tutoring). It thus rewards more adequately the institution’s effort to favor these students’ admission and success and thus participates in a national innovation aimed at promoting equity in those fields. As such, both institutional and student funding frameworks appear to follow the same trend as admission processes: they aggregate student and institutional needs to improve equality in access to higher education and degrees. Worldwide transformations of higher education systems, identified through the perspective of student access, can partly be explained by common economic, demographic and political pressures. These pressures are largely intertwined: of course, the increase in size of an age group applying for access to higher education mechanically augments the pressure put on admission. But the international diffusion of some ideas, such as the necessity to improve the population’s general level of education, for both competitive and ‘‘democratic’’ reasons, but also the need to legitimate the (re)production of a social organization through higher education, also play an important role. Political pressure interacts with demographic pressure and student massification, whatever its extent, makes resources scarcer.
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Putting in perspective the shared constraints with an impact on higher education systems gathers several dynamics at play in the organization of access and its transformation. Several dimensions can be identified that characterize these worldwide transformations. At a first level, a common set of action repertories to monitor the influx of students: admission processes and funding frameworks. The evolving definition of these action repertories accompanies the generalization of a common concern for the question of equity in higher education. Broadly speaking, it explains how inequality is measured, i.e. through changes in the interpretation of legitimized identities and social diversity. As a result, a first process consisting in the redefinition of the link between access to higher education and degrees and societal organization proves to have an impact on individual mobility and thus on the production of each society. Changes in the access organization prove that higher education systems act as democratic windows onto the globalization of higher education understood as a process through which nation-states lose their prerogatives in the production of global frames to interpret the world (Muller, 2003). Of course, these common changes still have to become full-fledged ones. The history of national higher education systems as well as the specificity of each nationstate has an impact on the devices they use to improve access to academic institutions. A second level characterizes the link between the reorganization of access and the reform of the higher education sector, or, more deeply, the reconfiguration of the higher education is governed. The definition and implementation of these two main tools influencing access to higher education reveal how public authorities and institutions share responsibility. Indeed, differentiation has historically been the first answer to the imperative of expanding and widening access. Public authorities were then the artisans of this sectional policy, and a sort of Gordian knot in the configuration of higher education. Yet procedures and funding policies reveal a shift in this configuration: public authorities become more of an arbiter and institutions are central within the new configuration. The new organization of access to higher education participates in a change in higher education configurations. However, this analysis of the changes in access to higher education reveals the weight of national and ‘‘institutional paths’’ (Pierson, 2000) on the translation (Callon, 1986) or transcoding dynamics (Lascoumes, 1997) of international norms by both public authorities and institutions. The worldwide reform participates in an economic, organizational and societal reform of higher education tending to diffuse common principles, which are always adapted on the local level. It also underlines
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that the worldwide transformation of higher education systems have a common denominator: the rethinking of higher education’s mission, common policies and a focus on organization. So to speak, for the researcher, it calls for the adoption of variables simultaneous taking into account the different territories (global, new-regional, national and regional), as well as historical contexts, systems and actors of the higher education systems.
NOTES 1. Differentiation corresponds to ‘‘a process in which new entities in a system emerge’’ (Van Hught, in Meek, Goedegebuure, Kivinen, & Rinne, 1996, p. 43). 2. The comparative research on the US (on New York State), Israel, Ethiopia, United Kingdom, Ireland and Vietnam was completed by the Access and Equity research group of the Fulbright New Century Program 2005–2006, and was funded by the Fulbright Commission. Information relevant to these countries are borrowed from the following papers: Clancy (2006), Eggins (2006), Goastellec (2006a, 2006b), Guri-Rosenblit (2006), Nguyen (2006), and Yizengaw (2006). The South African case study was conducted thanks to a Lavoisier post-doctoral fellowship (2004–2005) awarded by the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs and with the support of the University of Witwatersrand. Finally, the French, Indonesian and American (on California) cases were first developed in a PhD dissertation thanks to the funding of the French Ministry of Education. 3. Report of the National Governor Association, Time for Results, 1991, p. 3, quoted by M. Nettles and J. Coles in ‘‘A study in Tension: State Assessment and Public Colleges and Universities’’, in Heller (2001). 4. Honors Colleges consist of specific curricula proposed in 7 of the 11 CUNY colleges. 5. In the case of semi-public universities, the facility is owned by the state and managed by a public authority at the central or provincial level, but operating costs are covered mainly by tuition fees and financial sources searched for by their own capacity. 6. People-founded universities are owned and managed by a public authority at the central and provincial level, but operating costs are covered mainly by tuition fees. 7. Private universities are owned and managed by private individuals with costs covered by tuition fees. 8. This prestigious private universities association includes the universities of Brown, Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth, Harvard, Pennsylvania, Princeton and Yale. 9. In 2001, the governing body of this institution adopted conventions allowing a specific admission procedure (based on student files and interviews instead of the usual entrance examination) for students coming from seven high schools located in Priority Education Zones (ZEP). If this second path of admission does not directly promote student access on the basis of ethno-racial or social background, this
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territorial positive discriminatory measure targets ‘‘without naming them expressively, and, overall, without naming them exclusively, groups that, in the US, would without doubt have been apprehended as ethnic or racial minorities’’ (Calve`s, 2005, p. 31). Simultaneously, it answers a socio-economic need, these areas being designated on the basis of the students’ socio-economic background.
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Goastellec, G. (2006a). Access and equity: National report of France. An internal paper, New Century Scholars Program of Fulbright. Goastellec, G. (2006b). Access and equity: National report of South Africa. An internal paper, New Century Scholars Program of Fulbright. Goastellec, G. (2008). Globalization and implementation of an equity norm in higher education: admission processes and funding framework under scrutiny. Peabody Journal of Education, Forthcoming. Guinier, L. (2005). Race and class in college admission. Steinhardt Institute for Higher Education Policy Seminar, New York University. Guri-Rosenblit, S. (2006). Access and equity: National report of Israel. An internal paper, New Century Scholars Program of Fulbright. Heller, D.E. (2001). The States and public higher education policy: Affordability, access and accountability. Baltimore, LN: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Heller, D. E. (2002). Conditions of access, higher education for low income students. Westport: American Council on Education/Praeger series on higher education. IEP. (2005). Conseil de direction, Proce`s Verbal de la se´ance du 27 juin 2005, Paris, IEP website. Johnstone, B. (1986). Sharing the costs of higher education: Student financial assistance in the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Sweden, and the United States. New York: College Entrance Examination Board. Kahlenberg, R. (2005). Promoting economic diversity in America’s elite colleges. Steinhardt Institute for Higher Education Policy Seminar, New York University. Kirp, J. L. (2003). Shakespeare, Einstein and the bottom line. The marketing of higher education. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lascoumes, P. (1997). Rendre gouvernable: de la traduction au transcodage. L’analyse des processus de changement dans les re´seaux d’action publique. La Gouvernabilite´. Paris: PUF. Meek, L. V., Goedegebuure, L., Kivinen, O., & Rinne, R. (1996). The mockers and mocked: Comparative perspectives on differentiation, convergence and diversity in higher education. Paris: IAU Press, Pergamon (Issues in Higher Education). Muller, P. (2003). L’analyse cognitive des politiques publiques, Vers une sociologie de l’action publique. Communication au se´minaire MESPI, Paris, 4 novembre. Nelson, R. (1986). Institutions supporting technical advance in industry. American Economic Review, 76, 186–189. Nguyen, P. N. (2006). Access and equity: National report of Vietnam. An internal paper, New Century Scholars Program of Fulbright. OECD. (2004). Education at a glance. OECD indicators. Paris: OECD publishing. OECD, UNESCO. (2002). Financing education, investments and returns, analysis of the world education indicators. Paris: UNESCO/OECD. Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics. American Political Science Review, 92(4), 251–267. Psacharopoulos, G., & Patrinos, H. A. (2004). Returns to investment in education: A further update. Education Economics, 12(2), 111–134. Schofer, E., & Meyer, J. W. (2005). The world-wide expansion of higher education. Stanford, CDDRL Working Paper no. 32. St John, E. P., Kline, K. A., & Asker, E. H. (2001). The call for public accountability: Rethinking the linkages to student outcomes. In: D. E. Heller (Ed.), The states and public higher education policy, affordability, access and accountability (pp. 219–242). Baltimore, LN: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
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Trow, M. (1973). Problems in the transition from elite to mass higher education. Berkeley: Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. UN. (2004). World population prospects: The 2004 revision population database. Sur le site de l’ONU. UNESCO. (2004). Online database. UNESCO: Institute for Statistics Online Publication. Waast, R., & Gaillard, J. (2001). Science in Africa. Country Report, IRD, University of Stallenbosch. Wolf, A. (2002). Does education matter? Myths about education and economic growth. London: Penguin Books. World Conference on Higher Education. (1998). World declaration on higher education: Visions and actions. Paris: UNESCO. Yizengaw, T. (2006). Access and equity: National report of Ethiopia. An internal paper, New Century Scholars Program of Fulbright.
WORLD UNIVERSITY RANKINGS David Turner This chapter presents an alternative method for benchmarking university performance in national and international contexts, namely data envelope analysis or DEA. DEA is then used to examine the more conventional ways of developing world university rankings, by showing what assumptions need to be combined with DEA to produce the rankings that are similar to those that are widely published. A comparison between DEA and other ranking methodologies highlights the effects of those assumptions and supports the development of a more critical understanding of what we mean by such terms as ‘‘academic quality’’ or ‘‘world class university’’. In traditional league tables, a final position in the table is calculated by finding a simple sum of weighted performance indicators. In other publications the author has looked at league tables as a way of benchmarking university performance in the UK and in Canada. In the present chapter a similar approach is used, using DEA to re-examine the data used by the Times Higher Education Supplement to construct their 2006 world university rankings. This preliminary research is used to explore the possibility of a system of international benchmarking that is established on a less arbitrary footing.
INTRODUCTION The use of national and international rankings of universities is increasing rapidly. Dill and Soo (2005), who take a generally positive view of university The Worldwide Transformation of Higher Education International Perspectives on Education and Society, Volume 9, 27–61 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1479-3679/doi:10.1016/S1479-3679(08)00002-9
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league tables, review the performance of some leading examples of the genre. They conclude that ‘‘Our review of the five leading commercial university league tables from Australia, Canada, the UK, and the US suggests that the definitions of academic quality used in these tables are converging y It would be valuable to extend the analysis to league tables developed in Europe, Asia, and Latin America to see the extent to which a common construct of academic quality is becoming truly international’’ (Dill & Soo, 2005, pp. 525–526). Taking a rather less sanguine view of rankings, Rocki (2005) argues that an objective system of ranking cannot exist. The basis of Rocki’s argument is that the most common method for producing rankings (and certainly the method used in the examples selected by Dill and Soo), ‘‘consists of adding up a converted value by means of an a priori (e.g. subjectively) assumed system of weighting’’ (Rocki, 2005, p. 179). The argument would appear to be that any convergence which can be seen in the production of rankings is based upon a spurious consensus over what that subjective weighting should be. However, the debates over the reliability or usefulness of university rankings, both nationally and internationally, go far beyond a methodological discussion over whether such comparisons can be made legitimately. Rocki, for example, notes that ‘‘the emergence of rankings results from recent profound, qualitative changes in our systems of higher education’’ (Rocki, 2005, p. 179). Those changes may well include an increased sense that the student is the ‘‘customer’’, buying the ‘‘service’’ of higher education, linked with government initiatives to concentrate investments in institutions where they can produce most benefit. The transformation of higher education, through massification, privatisation and globalisation, is intimately tied to the emergence of league tables and rankings. Rankings are frequently promoted as a simple and efficient way of disseminating ‘‘consumer’’ information, and the emergence of higher education as a consumer good is therefore linked with the idea that an unambiguous ranking is possible. Marginson (2006) develops this argument fully, to argue that higher education is now a ‘‘positional good’’, and therefore depends upon the existence of a worldwide hierarchy. The important point about positional goods is that they are, by definition, in short supply. Even if 50 per cent of the world’s population can eventually attend higher education, only a fraction of 1 per cent will ever be able to attend the ‘‘top’’ university or universities. The emergence of world university rankings is therefore either a result of globalised competition or a driver of it. However one may view these trends, national rankings of universities have become common. In the US, US News and World Report produces a
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listing of America’s best colleges. In Canada, Maclean’s magazine produces a ranking of national universities, and in the UK two national newspapers, The Times and the Guardian, both produce league tables of university performance. More recently, international comparisons have blossomed, with the Times Higher Educational Supplement producing a list of the top 200 global universities, and Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU), 2007 producing a ranking of the top 500 world universities. With so many people producing rankings of the best universities, it is to be hoped that there is not any ambiguity about what a good university is. And, as Dill and Soo (2005) note, there does seem to be some consistency about which institutions top the rankings; Harvard, MIT, University of California, Berkeley, Stanford, Oxford and Cambridge always seem to be near the top of the list. But ironically, this sudden booming of league tables and benchmarking has happened against another globalising backdrop. University systems across the world have been moving towards mass provision. At an institutional level, this has meant increased diversification of mission, and a recognition that some institutions will specialise in teaching, others in research, some in science and medicine, others in liberal arts and vocational preparation. And such a diversification of institutions is perhaps only an indication of a much more deep running recognition that knowledge itself is contested, and that conclusive answers are likely to be unsatisfactory or illusory. The whole post-modern project implies that there is likely to be more than one way of being a world class university. In the first place, it should be noted that there is nothing wrong with the impulse to compare institutions, to attempt to benchmark and identify areas for possible improvement. If we identify two institutions which are, to all external appearances, similar, but where one seems to be performing much better than the other on one performance indicator, then it makes very good sense to start examining the institutions in detail to see why one is performing better than the other. However, there may be very good reasons for such disparities of performance; one institution may be better resourced in some way, one may attract students who, for some reason, find higher education more challenging, one institution may have a mix of course offerings that make it possible to score well on the performance indicators, and so on. Benchmarking should be exploratory and a starting point for further questioning and discussion, not an end in itself. In order to promote such a discussion, in this chapter I will present a reanalysis of some of the data used in constructing supranational university rankings. The technique that I will use will be DEA. DEA is a mathematical technique for conducting comparisons between units working in similar
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fields of endeavour, but where there are no absolute standards or criteria for performance. Perhaps more importantly, DEA does not incorporate an a priori weighting like those criticised by Rocki (2005), nor does it assume a convergence on a single standard of quality like that identified by Dill and Soo (2005). But by combining DEA with a number of explicit assumptions, it can be made to mimic the convergence that we see in widely consulted rankings. In this way the implicit assumptions behind league tables, and the hidden principles guiding consensus, can be examined. It is that critical examination which is the purpose of this chapter.
DATA ENVELOPE ANALYSIS (DEA) The basic concepts of DEA are relatively simple. The process compares the functions of entities (in the accepted language of DEA, decision-making units or DMUs) which operate in a similar way but for some reason are not directly comparable. For example, automobile factories might be considered to be broadly comparable, but different factories might produce very different mixes of saloon cars, SUVs, vans and lorries. If we then wished to compare factories to identify which was the most profitable, the result of analysis would probably only show the factory that produced most vehicles in the most profitable market segment was the most profitable factory. Similarly, if we wished to compare supermarkets, we would need to take into account the specific mix of products sold, which might vary according to the specific location of the supermarket. Since DEA is designed to produce a comparison of how well different DMUs convert resources into outcomes, the first step in DEA is to identify a range of data that will be used for the comparison. Some performance indicators are selected to measure inputs, and other performance indicators are selected to measure outputs. DEA can then be used to evaluate the process that converts the inputs into outputs. In the case of higher education, as will be seen later, there might be some ambiguity as to whether a particular variable should be taken as an indicator of a process input or a process output. However, the sensitivity of the DEA analysis to the assumptions made and the performance indicators selected can then be tested by changing the inputs and outputs and comparing the results of the analysis, as will be illustrated in the later description. It will be argued that the possibility of exploring this ambiguity is a strength of the DEA process, as in the methods most commonly used all variables are treated in the same way, effectively treating them as outputs.
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(Rather confusingly, Guarino, Ridgeway, Chun, and Buddin (2005, p. 156) refer to performance indicators as ‘‘inputs’’, in the sense that these are the data that is input into their statistical model. Throughout this chapter, however, I will refer to inputs and outputs in relation to the supposed relationship to the process of higher education.) Once the inputs and outputs have been identified, DEA then selects those units as exemplars which excel in producing one of the outputs. These units, which will become the standards for subsequent comparison, produce more of the outputs than any other units, taking into account their consumption of inputs. So, in the example of the car factories cited earlier, we might expect to have four exemplars identified, being the best factory at producing each of the four categories of vehicle identified. The next step in the process of DEA is a little more abstract, as it involves the creation of virtual exemplars, by combining the characteristics of the actual exemplars identified in the previous step. So, for example, if we took the inputs and outputs of the two exemplars that are best at producing saloon cars and SUVs, we could produce virtual exemplars which represent the best performance that we might expect from a factory producing some intermediate mixture of saloon cars and SUVs. If any actual unit exceeds the performance of the virtual unit which has been created in this way, that unit is added to the list of actual exemplars. In this way exemplars are chosen which excel on one criterion or on a mixture of criteria, and these are units which are in some way ‘‘pushing the envelope’’ of performance. This gives rise to the name of DEA. Each of the exemplars identified is given a score of 100. (This score is frequently described in DEA literature as ‘‘the efficiency’’, although for the purposes of this chapter I prefer to stay with the more neutral expression of ‘‘score’’.) In a similar next step, a virtual unit is created for a unit which is not an exemplar, from a combination of exemplars. The virtual unit is created in such a way that its outputs are the same as for the actual unit, but the inputs are as low as possible. The ratio of the virtual inputs to the actual inputs is the score for the unit under consideration. The end result is that each unit is given a score to indicate how well it compares with the exemplars in its field of activity. Of course, such scores are provisional, in the sense that if a very effective unit has been omitted from consideration, the results might be dramatically affected by its inclusion. Although conceptually relatively simple, DEA is computationally complex, as it involves a series of steps in which values have to be optimised. As a result, simple user-friendly programs and sufficient computing power to make DEA a practicable option for the non-specialist user have not been
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available until relatively recently. However, both are now available, and that means that the topic of this chapter is of increased relevance. For the purposes of this chapter, all DEA analyses have been conducted using the program Frontier Analyst, created by Banxia Software. In order to further illustrate the application of DEA I will take a very simplified example from the UK, and my re-analysis of the Sunday Times University League Table for 2003(Turner, 2005). Fig. 1 shows the scatter plot for two performance indicators – one crudely associated with teaching and the other crudely associated with research – in relation to an input measure. A number of features are clear from Fig. 1. In the first place, four exemplars can be relatively easily identified (B, C, D and E). One of these exemplars, B, is the institution which excels in turning inputs into research performance, as measured in this example. A second exemplar, E, enjoys similar pre-eminence in relation to teaching performance. And the other two exemplars, C and D, achieve a mixture of outputs which cannot be matched by any possible combination of the properties of the other exemplars. That is, they lie outside the line BE, and therefore form part of the data envelope in their own right. Collectively, these four exemplars form the data
Research Quality / Student Staff Ratio
3.00 A
B C
2.50
D 2.00
1.50
E
1.00
0.50
0.00 0.00
Fig. 1.
F 1.00
2.00 3.00 4.00 Teaching Quality / Student Staff Ratio
5.00
A Graph of the Relative Performance of Universities in the UK.
6.00
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envelope, ABCDEF, and represent the best performance among the sample that is shown in the graph. Each of the other institutions can be given a score, according to how close they come to that envelope. It should be noted that each institution is compared with the part of the envelope which is nearest to it, so that the comparator for institutions near the top boundary of the envelope is different from that used for institutions near the right hand boundary. Put in other words, this means that each institution is matched to a standard that is appropriate to its own mix of activities, or that like is compared with like. The importance of this observation should be stressed. It can be seen from Fig. 1 that institutions can be grouped into two rather loose clouds. The first group of research-focused institutions occupies the upper part of the figure, while the second group of teaching-focused institutions extends below them to the right hand boundary. In the process of comparison, each group will be compared only with its peers, rather than making a single global comparison. In view of the diversity that exists in higher education institutions across the world, this claim that ‘‘like is compared with like’’ needs some qualification. Similarity, in this sense, is in terms of the performance indicators used, and the profile of the institutions as shown by those performance indicators. Hence, in this example, research-intensive institutions are compared with other research-intensive institutions, and teachingintensive institutions are compared with teaching-intensive institutions. It might be argued that there are other important dimensions of difference, such as the age of the institution or language of instruction, which are important when making comparisons, but which are not reflected in the data, and that is certainly true. It is at least theoretically possible that additional performance indicators could be included that reflected those other dimensions of difference. What is important here is that within the DEA process, institutions are compared only with those which have similar profiles in terms of the data included. Even with that important qualification, DEA represents a major advance on the techniques that are commonly used.
CONVENTIONAL UNIVERSITY RANKINGS In order to examine the conventional construction of university rankings, I will take the example of the Times Higher Education Supplement rankings
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for 2006 and re-analyse the data contained in those rankings (THES, 2006). But before embarking on re-analysis, a preliminary examination of the original rankings would be in order. There are many possible criticisms that can be made of world university rankings – the methods are poor, the data is incomplete, the data has been collected differently in different national settings, the data has different cultural significance in different national settings, and so on. In fact, world university rankings are the archetypical naı¨ ve comparative exercise. It looks to the outsider that this is exactly the kind of question that comparative education ought to be addressing: who has the best university system? And for exactly that reason, all of the methodological caveats that arise in the context of serious comparative study arise in this case also. The purpose of this chapter is to apply the exploratory form of analysis offered by DEA to the data used in the Times Higher Education Supplement study, in order to highlight the methodological problems of producing international benchmarks. The purpose is not to produce better league tables of international comparisons, but to examine why some institutions do well when certain assumptions are made. The fact that different institutions can be brought to the top of the league table by making alternative, but reasonable, assumptions, should serve to introduce a sense of methodological caution into the process of international comparison. First, let us take the league table of the top 200 universities in the world, as judged by the Times Higher Education Supplement. Table 1 shows only the top of the table, with the six variables that were used to construct the table. The table is constructed by adding the scores, weighted according to the value shown in the first row of Table 1. For example, the ‘‘Peer Review Score’’, a score made up of responses by academics when asked to name the leading institutions in their field, accounts for 40 per cent of the overall score in constructing the ranking. The proportion of staff from another country is given a weighting of only 5 per cent, so that indicator contributes relatively little to the overall score. Even the most cursory review of this method makes it clear that the final ranking is susceptible to manipulation, by increasing or decreasing the weighting that is given to any specific criterion. For example, by increasing the weighting given to the ‘‘Citations per Faculty Score’’, the California Institute of Technology could be moved up the ranking. It should be noted that all variables are entered into the process in exactly the same way, namely, weighted and added to the overall score. This is precisely the process identified by Rocki (2005). All of the variables are thus treated as outputs, in the sense that scoring higher on the indicator is taken
1 3 4 2
7 5 8
6
13 9
1 2 3 4=
4= 6 7
8
9 10
2006 2005 Rank Rank
Harvard University Cambridge University Oxford University Massachusetts Institute of Technology Yale University Stanford University California Institute of Technology University of California, Berkeley Imperial College London Princeton University
Names
UK US
US
US US US
US UK UK US
Country
65 68
92
72 82 53
93 100 97 81
44 61
75
81 85 21
100 79 76 93
Recruiter Review (10%)
55 21
6
45 9 24
15 58 54 11
56 29
13
26 34 40
25 43 39 39
International International Faculty Score Students (5%) Score (5%)
World Ranking of Universities.
Peer Review Score (40%)
Table 1.
88 53
22
93 32 67
56 64 61 42
Faculty/ Student Score (20%)
12 34
39
24 55 100
55 17 15 54
Citations/ Faculty Score (20%)
78.6 74.2
80.4
89.2 85.4 83.8
100 96.8 92.7 89.2
Overall Score
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to be an indication of success. The point of this last comment can be made clearer by introducing the alternative method of analysis, DEA.
A FIRST DEA ANALYSIS The DEA calculation results in a figure, normally described as ‘‘efficiency’’, where the unit being considered is compared with an ideal unit, which produces the same pattern of outputs, and where efficiency is judged in terms of the level of inputs to produce the desired level of outputs. In very simple terms, like units are compared with like, and the outcome is a measure of how effectively the unit turns inputs into outputs. That is to say, variables are treated in one of two ways, as inputs or outputs, rather than all being treated in the same way. In order to conduct a DEA analysis, therefore, at least one variable needs to be identified as an input. For illustrative purposes in this first analysis a dummy variable has been added to each university, with the same value, and all the variables used in the Times Higher Education Supplement study are treated as outputs. The top of the resulting table is shown in Table 2. This can be seen as a calculation which is in many ways similar to that used to develop the ranking in the first place; the fact that there is a university (input) is taken as a given, and the effectiveness with which the institution uses that resource to create outputs is examined. To be quite clear about what this means, if we assume that every university in the world has equal access to resources, or, which is the same thing, that the actual consumption of resources is irrelevant, and we then compare the effectiveness with which institutions produce outputs, as shown by the performance indicators selected, then we produce a ranking which is very similar to the one that is produced by conventional methods. This is one of the benefits of DEA, and one that would entirely justify its use, that it highlights the assumptions which lay behind the convergence towards a concept of academic quality. The important point to notice about Table 2, which presents the outcomes of the DEA analysis, is that the first 13 institutions in the table all have a score of 100; the table shows 13 institutions in equal first place. Six of those institutions have a maximum score on one of the six output variables used in the Times Higher Education Supplement analysis. One might say that Cambridge is top of its class in terms of peer review, while the London School of Economics is best in terms of the International Student Score. It is fairly easy to understand that the process of DEA will use these six
42 93 81 70 26 32 53 100 72 26 39 65 51 82 21 48 21 97
100 100 100
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 97.99 97.71 97.39 97.17 97
London School of Economics Harvard University Massachusetts Institute of Technology National University of Singapore Otago University Macquarie University California Institute of Technology Cambridge University Yale University Geneva University Duke University Imperial College London ETH Zurich Stanford University Basel University University of Hong Kong Sciences Po Oxford University
Peer Review Score
Score
44 17 40 21 79 81 13 78 44 25 85 0 40 29 76
85 100 93
Recruiter Review
82 94 100 24 58 45 69 11 55 84 9 76 84 22 54
89 15 11
International Faculty Score
47 20 51 40 43 26 58 21 56 45 34 28 27 53 39
100 25 39
International Students Score
22 45 10 67 64 93 81 100 88 44 32 63 46 86 61
53 56 42
Faculty/ Student Score
DEA Analysis Using Dummy Input Variable.
Unit Names
Table 2.
8 3 5 100 17 24 7 19 12 23 55 10 6 0 15
1 55 54
Citations/ Faculty Score
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
100 100 100
Dummy Input
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institutions as reference points, as ideal comparisons against which the performance of other institutions can be judged. The other seven institutions that achieve a score of 100 are there because they have a distinctive and distinct combination of qualities, even though they do not achieve the top score in any one category. Thus Yale has a combination of high recruiter review and a high score on student/staff ratio, while Harvard combines high peer review score with a high recruiter review score. For example, the National University of Singapore does not score 100 on any one of the performance indicators used in constructing the rankings. It does, however, have a specific combination of ‘‘Peer Review Score’’ and ‘‘International Faculty Score’’. The institutions which excel on those two performance indicators alone are Cambridge University and Macquarie University, respectively. But no combination of the characteristics of Cambridge University and Macquarie University can be produced that is as good as the National University of Singapore, and the National University of Singapore is, as a result, on the data envelope for this sample of universities. For this reason the National University of Singapore is given a score of 100 and it takes its place among the exemplars or benchmarks in the analysis. All the other institutions, at position 14 or lower in Table 2, including those that do not appear in Table 2, are evaluated by comparison with an ideal institution which is made up out of a combination of those leading 13 institutions. Table 2 therefore gives a clear guideline as to how we could manipulate the league table in order to bring specific institutions to the top. By giving a very large weighting to the international student score, we could bring the London School of Economics to the top, while a large weighting for peer review would bring Cambridge to the top. Similarly, giving joint high weightings to recruiter review and staff/student ratio would bring Yale to the top. This prompts the question as to why peer review has been given such a heavy weighting in the Times Higher Education Supplement analysis, as it is clear that this heavy weighting on reputation has brought Cambridge and Harvard to the top of their table. This very simple first step shows how arbitrary is the process of constructing the standard league table rankings. One further important piece of information can be gleaned from the DEA process. For every university which does not score 100, an ideal or virtual comparator is constructed from the characteristics of one or more of the exemplars. This virtual comparator is constructed so as to have the same pattern of performance on the output measures as the actual university, so that a comparison can be made of the level of inputs required for
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comparable outputs. This is the central idea behind the notion that DEA compares like with like. So it will be interesting to examine which of the exemplars are being used to make the comparison with any specific nonexemplar university, and DEA provides that information. In the present case, Oxford University is being compared with Cambridge University, while the University of Hong Kong is being compared with a composite made up mainly of the London School of Economics and ETH Zurich, with minor contributions from the National University of Singapore and Cambridge University. These four institutions are the exemplars on the data envelope which are closest to the University of Hong Kong in terms of the mixture of inputs and outputs that they involve. By combining the characteristics of those four institutions, a virtual exemplar can be constructed which has the same outputs as the University of Hong Kong, but which used fewer inputs. This virtual exemplar composed of elements of the London School of Economics, ETH Zurich, the National University of Singapore and Cambridge University which is shown in Fig. 2. As a benchmarking tool, DEA offers considerably more information to institution managers. Fig. 2 shows the composition of the virtual comparator that was constructed as the basis for evaluating the University
Fig. 2.
Dummy Input
Citations / faculty
Faculty / student sc
International student
International faculty
Recruiter review (10)
Cambridge University London School of Eco National University ETH Zurich
Peer review score (4)
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Reference Contributions for the Virtual Exemplar of the University of Hong Kong.
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of Hong Kong. This indicates that on most of the performance indicators, the University of Hong Kong was being compared to a standard made up mainly of the London School of Economics. Therefore, the most obvious measure that managers might take to make sure that they move up the supranational rankings in the future would be to examine policies that would made them more like the London School of Economics. The obvious exception to this is in the area of ‘‘Citations per Faculty’’ where the University of Hong Kong is being compared more closely with the performance of ETH Zurich (the London School of Economics having an unaccountably low score on ‘‘Citations per Faculty’’). However, it should be noted that there is nothing deterministic about these policy conclusions, and it would be open for managers to conclude that their aspirations were to approach the performance of other institutions entirely, and select a different route to improvement.
DEA USING INPUTS AND OUTPUTS We can take the analysis one step further by taking one of the variables used in the Times Higher Education Supplement as an input variable rather than an output. In this case, I have taken the staff/student ratio as an indicator of the resources that are being put into each institution. The other five variables are used as output variables, but there is no need for a dummy input variable in this case. The results are shown in Table 3. (The complete list of 200 institutions is given in the appendix.) It is typical of DEA analysis that those institutions that top the table should be of very different types. Since DEA compares like with like, those that come to the top of the table are outstanding in different ways. Of those six institutions that achieve a score of 100 in this analysis, only one (University of California, Berkeley) was in the original top 10 of the Times Higher Education Supplement list. That is, only this one representative of the traditional ‘‘top’’ universities makes it to the top of the DEA analysis. It should perhaps been noted why it was the University of California, Berkeley that made it to the top of the list. Berkeley has a profile which is otherwise comparable with Oxford, Cambridge and Harvard, but has a much lower staff/student ratio, implying that it produces world class outputs on fewer resources. It is, of course, crude to use the staff/student ratio in this way. Generally, staff/student ratios are used as an indicator of the quality of the student experience, a proxy for the teaching quality, and therefore a measure of a desirable output. It is therefore arguable that this
34 32 43 22 63 92 28 44 70 37 38 82 35 52 40 23 72 65 57 33 56 39 30 32
100 100 100 100 100 100 92.94 91.56 80.25 78.22 76.31 74.07 73.87 71.16 69.92
69.04 68.72 68.57 68.24 66.95
66.78 66.07 65.64 64.27
RMIT University Macquarie University Vienna University Erasmus University Rotterdam University of Toronto University of California, Berkeley Curtin University of Technology University of Texas at Austin National University of Singapore La Sapienza University, Rome University of Adelaide Stanford University Tel Aviv University Queensland University Hong Kong University of Science and Technology University of Wollongong Melbourne University Sydney University Monash University Queensland University of Technology University of New South Wales Fudan University Brussels Free University University of Paris-Sorbonne (Paris)
Peer Review Score
Score
36 47 19 29
8 44 26 40 8
26 40 22 49 51 75 18 56 44 15 0 85 22 26 41
Recruiter Review
23 11 15 6
69 51 56 61 51
31 100 23 24 37 6 71 24 82 2 47 9 0 51 74
37 8 39 29
64 36 31 51 19
65 51 26 31 17 13 70 14 47 6 44 34 3 31 21
20 18 13 13
15 25 23 21 13
9 10 10 11 15 22 12 19 22 11 14 32 13 18 17
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3 7 8 5 2
1 5 15 38 25 39 0 53 8 5 14 55 21 12 16
International International Faculty/ Citations/ Faculty Score Students Score Student Score Faculty Score
DEA Analysis Using Staff/Student Ratio as an Input Variable.
Unit Names
Table 3.
World University Rankings 41
37 81
57.89 57.85
34 93
38 25 20 39 16
Recruiter Review
58 11
23 48 7 12 3 29 39
15 11 5 13 9 17 42
19 13 16 16 26 9 54
16 14 20 13 42
International International Faculty/ Citations/ Faculty Score Students Score Student Score Faculty Score
Note: Staff/student ratio is the more commonly used term in the UK, while Faculty/student ratio is more commonly used to refer to the same concept in the US.
51 25 38 30 46
63.59 63.29 61.73 60.78 59.63
University of British Columbia Universite´ de Montre´al Helsinki University Texas A&M University University of California, San Diego Trinity College Dublin Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Peer Review Score
Score
Unit Names
Table 3. (Continued )
42 DAVID TURNER
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43
ratio is an output measure not an input measure. However, equally, high levels of staffing can be construed as a measure of input. Indeed, we can recognise that this difference of view, as to whether staff/ student ratio should be taken as an input or an output measure, may simply be a difference of perspective. To the student it may be an output, while to the government funder or administrator it may be an input. Both these perspectives seem to be perfectly legitimate, but having understood that, it should make us much more sensitive to the risks that are inherent in freezing such an evaluation into a static league table. Such a static league table privileges a particular arbitrary judgement, and in particular reinforces a particular, traditional view of what makes a good university. Previous work by Sarrico, Hogan, Dyson, and Athanassopoulos (1997) has shown, however, that differences of opinion as to what are important inputs and outputs may not simply reflect different positions within the organisational structure of universities. Even within a supposedly single user group, such as students, there may be differences. Students who have consistently achieved high grades may value those institutions with very high entry grades, and regard high entry standards as a proxy for reputation, and therefore an output. However, students who have struggled to achieve high grades may regard those qualifications as their contribution to the educational process, and an input. For almost any performance indicator, it is possible to imagine an argument that it should be taken as an input and a contrary argument that it should be considered an output. High staffing ratios? An input for the bureaucracy that is providing resources to higher education, but an output for the student who enjoys having a high level of support in their studies. Citations? An output for the academics who value and rely upon the esteem of their peers, but an input or cost to the administrator who sees this as an unwelcome distraction from teaching functions. And so the important question is not so much whether a specific performance indicator is a measure of output or a measure of input, but who would regard it as an input and who an output? And how different would the benchmarking analysis be when conducted by observers with those different perspectives? What is most striking about the results of the current DEA analysis, however, is the very high proportion of Australian institutions that now feature at the top of the table. No fewer than 11 of the top 25 institutions are Australian. And it is worth considering why this should be the case. By and large, Australian universities combine a modest staff/student ratio with high scores for both international staff and international students. We do not need to look very far for reasons why this high international profile should
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be found in Australia. (Similar factors can be seen combined in other states where there is a small population with a large academic community, which bring Hong Kong, Singapore and Finland into the top of the table.) But we do perhaps need to look at why these two measures were given such little weight in the original analysis of the Times Higher Education Supplement. And it also raises the question of what counts as a ‘‘world class’’ university. It could be argued that large proportions of international staff and students are an indication that a university is truly cosmopolitan in a way that was not recognised in the original rankings. Much of the virtue of DEA is that, by providing an alternative analysis, it raises in very concrete terms the questions that need to be asked about the traditional way of constructing rankings. From even the simple analysis that has been offered here one can see the effect of arbitrary weighting on the eventual format of the rankings, and in addition the very radical impact of trying to take into account the consumption of resources. This by no means exhausts the possible perceptions that different participants in higher education might have as to what should be counted as an input and what an output. However, enough has been put forward to illustrate the kind of discussion that DEA can facilitate. It might be argued that it is a weakness of DEA that it highlights the ambiguity as to whether a particular performance indicator should be treated as an input or an output. But actually it is a strength of DEA that it prompts this question, as can be shown by recalling that if we treat all performance indicators unthinkingly as outputs within DEA, then we arrive at a ranking which is very similar to conventional league tables. It is the traditional method of adding weighted values, without being able to differentiate between inputs and outputs, that demonstrates the real weakness. Similar conclusions might be prompted simply by looking at competing versions of supranational rankings that have been offered from different perspectives. For example, the SJTU has a website that offers a ranking of the top 500 universities in the world (Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 2006). The top of that table is shown in Table 4. The definitions of the variables listed in Table 4 are as follows: ‘‘Score on Alumni’’ gives the number of Nobel Prizes and Field Medals won by alumni of the institution, ‘‘Score on Award’’ is the same measure for staff in the institution, ‘‘HiCi’’ is the number of highly cited researchers, as defined by the ISI, ‘‘N&S’’ is the number of articles published in the journals Natrure and Science, ‘‘SCI’’ is a citation measure based on the number of articles indexed in the Science Citation Index and associated indices and ‘‘Size’’ is a
Source: Shanghai Jiao Tong University (2006).
Harvard University University of Cambridge Stanford University University of California, Berkeley Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) California Institute if Technology Columbia University Princeton University University of Chicago University of Oxford Yale University Cornell University University of California, San Diego University of California, Los Angeles University of Pennsylvania University of Wisconsin, Madison University of Washington, Seattle
Institutions
Table 4.
100 96.3 39.7 70.6 72.9 57.1 78.2 61.1 72.9 62 50.3 44.9 17.1 26.4 34.2 41.5 27.7
Score on Alumni 100 91.5 70.7 74.5 80.6 69.1 59.4 75.3 80.2 57.9 43.6 51.3 34 32.1 34.4 35.5 31.8
Score on Award 100 53.8 88.4 70.5 66.6 59.1 56 59.6 49.9 48 59.1 56 59.6 57.6 57 53.3 53.3
Score on HiCi 100 59.5 70 72.2 66.4 64.5 53.6 43.5 43.7 54.3 56.6 48.4 54.8 47.5 41.7 45.1 47.6
Score on N&S
Shanghai Jiao Tong University Rankings.
100 67.1 71.4 71.9 62.2 50.1 69.8 47.3 54.1 66 63 65.2 65.6 77.3 73.6 68.3 75.5
Score on SCI 73.6 66.5 65.3 53.1 53.6 100 45.8 58 41.8 46 49.3 40.1 47.1 34.9 40 29.3 27.8
Score on Size
100 72.6 72.5 72.1 69.7 66 61.8 58.6 58.6 57.6 55.9 54.1 50.5 50.4 50.1 48.8 48.5
Total Score
World University Rankings 45
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DAVID TURNER
weighted score of the above five indicators divided by the number of staff in the institution. Although this ranking of universities has a great deal in common with the Times Higher Education Supplement ranking discussed in detail earlier, in terms of the institutions that feature prominently, there are some important differences. In the first place, this table includes some performance indicators that would appear to be quite distinct from those that have been dealt with before. Examples are indicators of the number of Nobel Prize winners or other comparable awards that have been won by members of faculty of the institutions. While these indicators of extreme high esteem may overlap to some extent with peer evaluations of institutions, which may be influenced informally by such considerations, the overall image of the top 500 universities drawn by this league table is rather different. While all of the indicators used in the Times Higher Education Supplement ranking might be assumed to have an impact on the everyday student experience of members of the institution, this is less obviously the case for the indicators in the SJTU rankings. Liu and Cheng (2005, p. 133) acknowledge that, ‘‘If one wants to construct a reliable ranking of the world’s universities, the only possible ranking will be a comparative display of research performance. This is why the Ranking Group (of SJTU) chose to rank the world’s research universities by their academic or research performance, based on internationally comparable and easily verifiable data’’. That is to say that the purpose of the Ranking Group was appropriately modest, and circumscribed by what is possible. The Ranking Group is not able, however, to set such limits to the purposes to which their rankings are put, and it is difficult to reconcile their circumspection with the rather more sweeping aims described by Dill and Soo (2005, p. 495): ‘‘Because a college education is a rare purchase and an increasingly important as well as expensive decision in one’s life, students and their families are seeking information that will help them make informed choices in the selection of a university and/or academic program’’. While Dill and Soo do not include the SJTU ranking in their evaluation, it is fairly clear that rankings made for one purpose are being used for another. What we can see from this comparison of rankings is that there are at least three distinct concepts of what constitutes a ‘‘world class university’’ that are confused and compounded in the process of making supranational rankings. The first, most clearly recognised in the SJTU rankings, is of an institution that is at the cutting edge of scientific discovery, and contains a necessarily small group of very highly regarded scholars who have a
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worldwide influence in their specific field. The second model of a world class university is of an institution which is highly regarded as a centre for excellence in a range of subject areas, as recognised by peer evaluation. There may be some overlap with the first model, since it is not clear what factors might contribute to such a peer evaluation. But it is also possible, perhaps probable, that such an evaluation will take into account a broader range of academic activity, of strength in depth, than would be identified by restricting consideration to the most prestigious awards. And then there is a third model of a world class university, as an institution which incorporates students and staff from a wide range of nations and cultures, and which is diverse and cosmopolitan, and dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge without regard to the backgrounds of those involved. This third model is reflected in some of the performance indicators used in the Times Higher Education Supplement ranking. It should perhaps be noted that there might be some overlap between this third model and the other two, and that this overlap is likely to increase if international faculty and students select the institutions where they choose to work and study on the basis of rankings such as those discussed here. Another feature of the rankings shown in Table 4 is that the performance indicators have been selected in such a way that, on all but one, Harvard University achieves the top score. This means that the SJTU rankings would not show the diversity of criteria that can be examined effectively using DEA – in effect all institutions are being compared quite explicitly with Harvard University, and shifting the weightings would not dramatically affect the position of Harvard, although the position of other institutions might be altered considerably.
CRITIQUES OF DEA I have argued in this chapter that DEA is a valuable tool that can be used in the exploratory investigation of benchmarking for universities, and which can be used to examine the effect of different assumptions that are made in constructing university rankings, whether that is performed nationally or supranationally. And I have further argued that one of the reasons why this is an important issue now is that the software and computer power that make DEA feasible as a common form of analysis have only become available relatively recently. However, that does not mean that DEA is a particularly new form of analysis. As a technique within a larger grouping of approaches known as operational research, DEA was developed in the
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period from 1945 onwards, and has achieved a fairly high level of acceptance in some areas of management and micro-economics. And, although it has not become widely used in educational studies, the kind of application exemplified in this chapter is not unprecedented. I have published analyses of national university rankings in both the UK and Canada (Turner, 2004a, 2004b, 2005) and in those works have also cited work by other scholars. It should be noted, however, that DEA is not without its critics. Johnes (2004, p. 643) who on the whole is an advocate of DEA, and has published some interesting work on the evaluation of educational institutions using DEA, has also pointed out some of its weaknesses. Since DEA operates by comparing institutions with the best of their peers in the group subjected to analysis, DEA results can be radically affected by the accidental inclusion of, or omission of, a single institution. For example, in the DEA analysis of the Times Higher Education Supplement rankings, the institutions most frequently used in creating virtual comparators were the London School of Economics, Yale University, Cambridge University, Imperial College London, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Duke University. If these are omitted from the analysis, the scores of many institutions change dramatically, and a much wider range of institutions are used as comparators. Similarly, if an outstanding institution were to be included that is currently omitted (leaving to one side for the moment what would count as ‘‘outstanding’’) then the analysis might be very seriously changed. As Johnes has noted, and unlike those statistical measures that are widely used in educational studies, there are no standard tests in DEA for assessing the sensitivity of the analysis, or for calculating the validity or reliability of the measures employed. In order to examine the robustness of DEA analyses it is necessary to examine them on a trial and error basis, examining the actual effect of omitting or including a specific element. This may be seen as a disadvantage when compared with multiple regression, factor analysis, correlation studies or other techniques that have become established in the armoury of educational statisticians. However, it no more than reflects the exploratory nature of DEA and the caution with which results should be regarded. It should be noted in this context that in the analysis of national rankings of the UK, many institutions which do not appear in the top 200 of the supranational ranking appeared to perform better that Oxford and Cambridge Universities. For example, the University of Lancaster appeared to be particularly effective at converting inputs into research-oriented outputs (as did the University of York, but the latter does appear in the top
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200). Similarly, in the DEA analysis of Canadian institutions, the University of Toronto did not maintain the pre-eminent position that it does in conventionally constructed rankings. It follows from this that there are probably some institutions omitted from the current analysis that could have an important impact on the overall evaluation. However, the point that Johnes makes, that DEA is without standard statistical tests for sensitivity to changes in variables, might usefully be juxtaposed with the critique of conventional means of producing university rankings advanced by Guarino et al. (2005). They note that, ‘‘A strong and noteworthy criticism of ranking systems is that statistically significant differences generally do not emerge between adjacently ranked universities or even between universities that find themselves at a distance from one another in the rankings’’(Guarino et al., 2005, p. 149). Guarino and colleagues therefore adopt a method which, like DEA, does not rely on an a priori weighting of variables, and, unlike DEA, does provide an indication of the uncertainty that surrounds the allocation of an institution to any rung in the ranking. But while the rankings thus produced give a range rather than an absolute position, it is interesting to note that the general order of precedence in the rankings is much as one finds it in the more conventional rankings. A rather more stringent critique of DEA has been offered by Goldstein (1990, 1992). He argues that, although well understood by statisticians, DEA is not an appropriate technique for examining the kind of problem being examined in this chapter. In essence, Goldstein’s argument is that there is a relationship between the variables given in studies such as the one made by the Times Higher Education Supplement, but that DEA is not capable of identifying that relationship. In contrast with this, Goldstein cites multiple regression analysis, which is designed precisely to identify a relationship between measured variables. In one sense, Goldstein’s argument is absolutely correct. If we assume that higher education is some kind of black box with inputs and outputs which are related in some objective way which can be discovered, then DEA is not the best way of approaching that reality. Indeed, the main point illustrated through the performance of DEA analyses on the data is that the relationships between inputs and outputs, and indeed the status of performance indicators as indicators of inputs or outputs, are strongly contested, and a matter of subjective perspective. But this begs exactly the question that is to be examined. Goldstein assumes that there is a relationship that is to be discovered. Yet, even the limited discussion presented here illustrates that there is not a single view to be taken of the relationships involved. One person’s input will be another
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person’s output. What is needed is a technique which is exploratory and allows one to examine the various possible relationships, or spread of possible relationships, rather than identifying an assumed relationship precisely. In short, what is needed is a technique like DEA. Of course, there is very much more that can be said about the quality of data which is being used, and which could be available. In the present paper the data being used comes from a secondary source and it has been collected for other purposes, and the measures of input particularly are not really satisfactory. So there is certainly a great deal of improvement that could be made in the quality of data that is used for such studies. But an exploratory technique such as DEA is ideally suited for the examination of what is possible and the extent to which comparisons can be made, and the extent to which benchmarks can be established which extend across national and cultural boundaries.
A POSSIBLE FUTURE FOR SUPRANATIONAL RANKINGS One of the problems that clearly arises in the examination of supranational rankings of universities is that there cannot easily be one, objective ranking. Different stake-holders in higher education will have different views not simply with reference to the scoring or ranking of institutions on performance indicators, but they may even diverge on issues as fundamental as whether a specific performance indicator is a measure of input or a measure of output. This raised a serious concern about the facile manner in which we are currently able to refer to ‘‘the best’’, ‘‘first class’’ or ‘‘world class’’ universities, generally meaning Harvard, Yale, MIT, Oxford or Cambridge, or those other institutions that regularly top the supranational rankings. DEA has proved to be a useful tool in interrogating the assumptions behind those rankings. But, looking to the future, DEA may actually offer something much more positive, in the form of a more policy-oriented approach to benchmarking. The technology currently exists, in the form of DEA software, linked to a database of information on university performance indicators, with a webpage interface, to have a benchmarking system where each individual could select those indicators that they considered to be important measures of input and important measures of output. Moreover, individuals could select those institutions that they wished to include in, or exclude from, the analysis, by country, region, type of institution or a la carte from a list of available institutions.
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Thus, a student would be able to compare which institutions within their region were providing the best student experience to students who brought particular qualifications, while university administrators could find out whether they were producing similar output measures in relation to the investment in staff salaries. Any individual with a specific purpose in mind could run the benchmarking analysis that they thought would be most interesting. In addition, since this could be powered by DEA software, such analyses would show which exemplary institutions were being used as the benchmark in a particular case, and even which performance indicators needed to be addressed in order to make an institution more like its benchmark. In short, this technology could relatively easily be combined so that it could be differently interrogated by individuals with their own purposes. I would describe this as a process of ‘‘active benchmarking’’, as opposed to a process of ‘‘passive benchmarking’’ where each institution is compared to Harvard (or Yale or Cambridge) and ranking printed showing how much each institution falls short of ‘‘the best of the best’’. Active benchmarking would enable a ranking to be constructed for the purpose for which they were intended. Rather than having rankings of research used as consumer information by prospective students and their families, individuals could compare institutions on the basis of the performance indicators that they valued. In terms of technology, as I have said, all that is needed for such an approach is currently available at relatively little cost. What is lacking is either the will (to fund the project as a public service) or the business plan (to make it sustainable as a private enterprise). Such a situation may not last very long into the future, and at that point we might have what we can currently only envisage, a dynamic benchmarking tool which facilitates a process of benchmarking for a purpose. When such a tool becomes available, it will be possible to address a range of questions, each of which is more interesting than the one that currently drives supranational university rankings, namely which are the ‘‘best’’, ‘‘world class’’ universities. We could collect the data to address such questions as: Who values which performance indicators as measures of input and output of universities? Are there systematic differences in the measures that people value, in terms of their role in the system, their geographical location or cultural affiliation? How different are the evaluations that are produced by people from different perspectives? How sensitive are such analyses to errors in the original data? Is it possible to build up a database of performance indicators which is relatively robust in terms of the benchmarking conclusions reached?
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This would take us into areas which cannot easily be addressed at the moment, and might have quite concrete implications in terms of policy. At this point there are certainly many questions that could be raised about the quality of the data being used in creating supranational university rankings. If a measure of ‘‘peer evaluation’’ or ‘‘employer evaluation’’ is to be used, it could hardly be irrelevant to ask where those peers and employers are located; employers in the US are not likely to be interested in more than a handful of European institutions, and vice versa. But at the same time, there seems relatively little point in delving into the well-known shortcomings of performance indicators, when the overall structure into which those measures are being fed has so many more obvious flaws. In the age of mass higher education, national policy frequently makes allowances for, and indeed celebrates, the fact that universities can have diverse missions. It cannot be assumed that in populations where half of all adults have experience of higher education all needs can be met by a ‘‘one size fits all’’ solution. And in policy terms, and in terms of highlighting those features of institutions that can be improved, comparisons with institutions that might fit the aspirations of managers are more valuable than an abstract comparison with Ivy League/Oxbridge universities that are very distant from the practical experience of most institutions. Indeed, by stimulating comparisons with only those institutions, by suggesting that only those institutions which measure up to them should be taken seriously, by students, staff or research sponsors, by driving a process where the wealthiest institutions accumulate yet more resources, the current, static system of benchmarking at a supranational level is a clear case where the ‘‘best’’ is the enemy of the ‘‘good’’.
REFERENCES Dill, D., & Soo, M. (2005). Academic quality, league tables, and public policy: A cross-national analysis of universities ranking system. Higher Education, 49, 495–533. Goldstein, H. (1990). Data envelopment analysis: An exposition and a critique. Evaluation and Research in Education, 4(1), 17–20. Goldstein, H. (1992). DEA: A response. Evaluation and Research in Education, 6(1), 43–44. Guarino, C., Ridgeway, G., Chun, M., & Buddin, R. (2005). Latent variable analysis: A new approach to university ranking. Higher Education in Europe, 30(2), 147–165. Johnes, J. (2004). Efficiency measurement. In: G. Johnes & J. Johnes (Eds), International handbook on the economics of education (pp. 613–742). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. Liu, N. C., & Cheng, Y. (2005). Academic ranking of world universities-methodologies and problems. Higher Education in Europe, 30(2), 127–136.
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Marginson, S. (2006). Dynamics of national and global competition in higher education. Higher Education, 52(1), 1–39. Rocki, M. (2005). Statistical and mathematical aspects of ranking: Lessons from Poland. Higher Education in Europe, 30(2), 173–181. Sarrico, C. S., Hogan, S. M., Dyson, R. G., & Athanassopoulos, A. D. (1997). Data envelope analysis and university selection. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 48, 1163–1177. Shanghai Jiao Tong University. (2006). Academic Ranking of World Universities – 2006. Available at http://ed.sjtu.edu.cn/ranking.htm. Retrieved on 22 January 2007. THES. (2006). World University Rankings. Available at http://www.thes.co.uk/downloads/ rankings/worldrankings2006.pdf. Retrieved on 10 December. Turner, D. A. (2004a). Theory of education. London: Continuum Books. Turner, D. A. (2004b). Benchmarking universities: The Canadian case. World Studies in Education, 5(2), 5–18. Turner, D. A. (2005). Benchmarking in universities: League tables revisited. Oxford Review of Education, 31(3), 353–371.
34 32 43 22 63 92 28 44 70 37 38 82 35 52 40 23 72 65 57
100 100 100 100 100 100 92.94 91.56 80.25 78.22 76.31 74.07 73.87 71.16 69.92 69.04 68.72 68.57 68.24
RMIT University Macquarie University Vienna University Erasmus University Rotterdam University of Toronto University of California, Berkeley Curtin University of Technology University of Texas at Austin National University of Singapore La Sapienza University, Rome University of Adelaide Stanford University Tel Aviv University Queensland University Hong Kong University of Science and Technology University of Wollongong Melbourne University Sydney University Monash University
Peer Review Score
Score
Unit Name
8 44 26 40
26 40 22 49 51 75 18 56 44 15 0 85 22 26 41 69 51 56 61
31 100 23 24 37 6 71 24 82 2 47 9 0 51 74 64 36 31 51
65 51 26 31 17 13 70 14 47 6 44 34 3 31 21
15 25 23 21
9 10 10 11 15 22 12 19 22 11 14 32 13 18 17
3 7 8 5
1 5 15 38 25 39 0 53 8 5 14 55 21 12 16
Recruiter International International Faculty/ Citations/ Student Faculty Students Review Faculty Score Score Score Score
APPENDIX. DEA ANALYSIS USING STAFF/STUDENT RATIO AS AN INPUT VARIABLE – DATA FOR THE TOP 200 UNIVERSITIES IN THE TIMES HIGHER EDUCATION SUPPLEMENT TABLE
54 DAVID TURNER
Queensland University of Technology University of New South Wales Fudan University Brussels Free University, France University of Paris-Sorbonne, Paris University of British Columbia Universite´ de Montre´al Helsinki University Texas A&M University University of California, San Diego Trinity College Dublin Massachusetts Institute of Technology University of Alberta Leiden University Catholic University of Leuven Nanyang Technological University University of Western Australia Nanjing University Purdue University Shanghai Jiao Tong University Warwick University Georgia Institute of Technology Tokyo University University of Massachusetts Amherst Harvard University McMaster University Michigan State University Australian National University Hebrew University of Jerusalem
66.95 66.78 66.07 65.64 64.27 63.59 63.29 61.73 60.78 59.63 57.89 57.85 56.19 54.01 53.71 53.36 52.15 51.94 49.45 49.43 49.13 48.41 48.31 47.7 47.57 46.19 45.32 44.83 44.06
33 56 39 30 32 51 25 38 30 46 37 81 32 33 37 40 34 35 32 31 39 30 72 32 93 29 28 72 41
8 36 47 19 29 38 25 20 39 16 34 93 11 21 35 37 11 20 42 37 40 36 29 28 100 24 39 30 0
51 23 11 15 6 23 48 7 12 3 58 11 40 33 11 77 61 24 20 13 38 2 8 1 15 9 10 48 14
19 37 8 39 29 15 11 5 13 9 29 39 21 11 20 56 28 2 15 5 41 27 10 10 25 13 12 33 5
13 20 18 13 13 19 13 16 16 26 17 42 17 20 18 21 19 16 21 19 22 19 35 20 56 18 21 38 22
2 7 2 12 0 16 14 20 13 42 9 54 18 26 13 3 13 3 6 1 4 13 27 23 55 19 9 13 16
World University Rankings 55
Score
43.57 43.51 43.2 42.61 42.1 41.61 41.19 39.47 38.07 38.04 37.69 37.63 37.52 36.8 36.24 36.21 35.96 35.59 35.31 35.27 35.23 34.88
Unit Name
University of California, Santa Indian Institutes of Technology California Institute of Technology Cornell University Durham University University of California, Irvine University of California, Los Angeles London School of Economics Oxford University Utrecht University Frankfurt University Virginia University Cambridge University Maastricht University Northwestern University University of Minnesota Amsterdam University Georgetown University Free University Berlin Leeds University George Washington University China University of Science and Technology
31 45 53 60 25 24 58 42 97 37 30 20 100 18 32 26 42 19 37 32 24 36
Peer Review Score 11 34 21 74 41 16 42 85 76 12 17 57 79 28 71 20 20 65 0 33 46 14
7 0 24 10 43 2 2 89 54 24 22 6 58 34 12 8 30 6 27 28 3 3
8 1 40 25 25 10 12 100 39 9 17 11 43 46 20 10 10 17 17 25 13 0
22 27 67 44 23 19 34 53 61 25 19 34 64 24 44 20 28 41 25 25 30 24
24 24 100 26 10 21 25 1 15 18 7 14 17 13 19 16 15 11 6 7 5 5
Recruiter International International Faculty/ Citations/ Review Faculty Students Student Faculty Score Score Score Score
APPENDIX. (Continued )
56 DAVID TURNER
Technion — Israel Institute of Technology Nottingham University ETH Zurich Pennsylvania State University Manchester University University of Michigan City University of Hong Kong Princeton University Lomonosov Moscow State University Notre Dame University Bristol University Auckland University Carnegie Mellon University Kyoto University Malaya University Aachen RWT Edinburgh University Catholic University of Louvain McGill University Birmingham University University of Kebangsaan Malaysia Queen’s University Technical University of Denmark Pennsylvania University University of Illinois Munich University Heidelberg University University of Hong Kong
31 34 51 33 44 50 28 68 42 19 36 51 44 61 33 23 54 37 57 34 32 21 25 45 39 35 43 48
34.78 34.63 34.41 34.35 33.96 33.56 33.46 33.38 32.96 32.71 32.71 32.57 32.24 32.24 31.98 31.32 31.05 30.98 30.93 30.67 30.19 30.12 29.98 29.95 29.25 28.72 28.51 28.18
37 25 43 50 61 11 61 28 51 44 17 64 20 14 37 42 25 61 27 22 36 0 64 31 23 28 40
17 34 84 7 42 15 75 21 1 17 37 44 28 15 10 24 28 29 31 34 9 38 19 17 10 19 17 84
6 29 45 8 29 19 14 29 7 14 26 21 40 7 7 24 29 25 33 29 6 8 19 26 16 21 28 27
6 28 44 31 38 46 25 53 30 35 34 38 48 44 24 28 42 29 52 28 25 28 25 52 32 29 36 46
23 6 23 6 6 15 5 34 3 9 10 2 11 18 1 4 11 11 10 9 0 7 17 22 9 9 11 6
16
World University Rankings 57
Score
27.8 27.74 27.56 26.97 26.77 26.77 26.75 26.5 26.06 25.49 25.43 24.91 24.24 24.19 24.11 24.02 24.01 23.6 23.59 23.5 23.32 23.24 23.23
Unit Name
St Andrews University University of Barcelona Jawaharlal Nehru University University Louis Pasteur Strasbourg Bath University University of California, Davis University of Wisconsin Tohoku University Glasgow University Ecole Polytech Fe´de´rale de Lausanne Chinese University of Hong Kong University of North Carolina Innsbruck University Delft University of Technology Beijing University Maryland University Go¨ttingen University King’s College London Sheffield University University of Chicago Chulalongkorn University Washington University Lund University
26 31 32 25 21 30 39 26 35 28 39 23 23 34 70 27 32 42 31 57 33 31 35
Peer Review Score 20 16 14 15 36 0 11 0 33 13 38 38 0 13 55 33 0 28 22 67 18 23 0
40 2 2 22 34 2 0 8 17 70 62 7 30 52 5 16 17 42 32 19 9 13 26
53 11 6 34 35 8 14 7 16 66 24 8 48 18 11 15 17 30 28 30 1 10 9
33 26 27 28 32 30 35 31 35 47 41 36 32 37 69 35 31 44 33 73 33 38 36
9 4 4 12 5 17 16 21 9 11 7 19 6 7 2 14 8 7 8 17 0 20 10
Recruiter International International Faculty/ Citations/ Review Faculty Students Student Faculty Score Score Score Score
APPENDIX. (Continued )
58 DAVID TURNER
Aarhus University State University of New York, Stony Br New York University Yale University Columbia University York University Liverpool University National Taiwan University Zurich University Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology Dartmouth College Boston University Ecole Normale Supe´rieure, Paris Osaka University Otago University Johns Hopkins University Oslo University Uppsala University Vienna Technical University Ecole Normale Supe´rieure, Lyon Copenhagen University Southampton University Tokyo Institute of Technology Cardiff University Newcastle upon Tyne University Reading University Technical University Munich Brown University
30 26 39 72 57 28 26 40 26 24 22 35 46 39 26 49 30 36 29 21 44 26 29 29 25 21 30 32
23.23 23.15 22.94 22.64 22.47 22.29 21.97 21.63 21.47 21.36 21.31 21.23 21.13 21.04 20.89 20.69 20.61 20.42 20.31 20.09 20.06 19.98 19.94 19.77 19.48 19.42 18.9 18.55
56 38 30 0 17 37 0 0 17 18 21 16 18 13 24 19 26 32
15 16 51 81 64 22 26 0 0 11 13 9 22 4 94 15 17 17 27 15 12 38 3 27 33 32 22 34
38 6 8 45 9 31 32 1 69 14 17 21 28 9 20 20 9 8 34 19 13 25 14 23 32 25 30 20
13 15 16 26 32 30 21 0 23 6 59 47 69 45 45 65 34 41 36 50 51 34 39 36 36 30 42 50
33 30 55 93 74 33 32 43 41 29 16 10 37 17 3 29 5 9 3 34 5 7 16 4 7 6 10 18
9 14 6 24 17 8 8 4 11 12
World University Rankings 59
Score
18.46 18.35 18.2 17.96 17.8 17.54 17.42 17.4 17.37 17.19 17.12 16.96 16.93 16.78 16.63 16.36 16.17 16.01 15.91 15.9 15.51 15.44 14.99
Unit Name
Indian Institutes of Management Brandeis University Imperial College London Aberdeen University Duke University Seoul National University Nagoya University Sussex University Humboldt University Berlin Tufts University Ecole Polytechnique University of Southern California Cranfield University School of Oriental and African Studies Free University of Amsterdam University College London Waseda University Ghent University Pierre and Marie Curie University University of Tubingen Kobe University Queen Mary, University of London Wageningen University
31 19 65 20 39 43 29 27 32 17 37 27 14 23 25 46 27 29 31 21 25 26 16
Peer Review Score 46 23 44 9 78 13 11 18 15 31 40 28 26 9 9 28 24 9 0 21 17 9 9
0 7 55 37 11 2 4 42 18 12 18 7 31 48 19 39 11 20 29 21 8 44 16
10 23 56 25 21 7 9 27 18 17 40 28 62 74 8 47 6 10 35 19 7 40 45
60 34 88 33 100 57 41 41 43 42 64 45 52 64 36 70 42 43 49 37 38 47 61
2 13 12 7 19 4 13 6 5 22 17 9 2 0 8 12 1 4 6 9 5 4 17
Recruiter International International Faculty/ Citations/ Review Faculty Students Student Faculty Score Score Score Score
APPENDIX. (Continued )
60 DAVID TURNER
Rice University Keio University Basel University National Autonomous University of Mexico Chalmers University of Technology Lausanne University Royal Institute of Technology Saint Petersburg State University Hokkaido University Geneva University Tsing Hua University Washington University, St Louis Korea University Vanderbilt University Nijmegen University Emory University Case Western Reserve University University of Twente Sciences Po Pittsburgh University Wake Forest University University of Bern Kyushu University Yeshiva University Rochester University University of Ulm Brussels Free University Eindhoven University of Technology
20 28 21 29 27 20 24 26 29 26 45 25 25 22 21 19 19 23 21 22 10 17 21 7 21 12 16 19
14.85 14.71 14.36 13.88 13.82 13.48 13.28 13.05 12.97 12.7 12.7 11.41 10.74 10.74 10.4 10.32 10.26 9.94 9.89 9.63 8.98 8.88 8.55 8.27 7.37 6.2 5.95 5.4
8 37 9 38 34 15 29 19 32 9 17 0 26 0 15 18
9 21 11 18 0 13 34 32
31 25 0 36
5 2 33 1 3 29 22 20 2 1 8 9 8 22 21 21
17 54 17 1 8 69 22 5
12 18 76 3
19 14 10 14 24 16 53 10 6 16 8 6 23 16 17 11
8 33 12 9 6 58 9 18
23 4 28 1
55 81 55 84 77 59 86 62 80 54 59 70 91 70 72 92
46 53 43 47 52 81 84 73
50 48 63 65
1 14 7 15 19 3 0 11 10 9 7 20 12 9 0 3
5 9 4 1 8 7 1 22
15 2 10 0
World University Rankings 61
CORRUPTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION$ John C. Weidman and Adiya Enkhjargal Corruption has been observed in human societies as far back as the 4th Century BC (Pinto et al., in press) and continues to be a matter of great significance in the international community. One estimate of its economic magnitude was indicated in a statement by the German ambassador to South Africa in the opening session of 5th Global Forum on Anti-corruption at Sandton in Johannesburg on April 2, 2007 attended by over 1,500 delegates from more than 100 countries, including ministers, heads of anti-corruption and law enforcement agencies, and officials dealing with governance, money laundering, and customs: Regardless of increasing success, fighting corruption on a global scale has become ever more necessary. More than 20 percent of loans distributed by the World Bank are linked to corruption.
Corruption in education can also have significant non-economic effects on a country: Deterioration of professional skill levels and achievement motivation. According to Rumyantseva (2005, p. 84), ‘‘incompetent doctors, teachers, $
This chapter is based on a paper prepared for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the scope of which was conceived by the USAID Europe and Eurasia Bureau Social Transition team (Weidman, 2007). The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.
The Worldwide Transformation of Higher Education International Perspectives on Education and Society, Volume 9, 63–88 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1479-3679/doi:10.1016/S1479-3679(08)00003-0
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and other professionals who have purchased their grades or licenses to practice’’ can pose a threat to social well-being. Corruption in educational systems may also reduce the pace of sustainable development by diminishing the capacity of graduates to compete in increasingly global economies. Individual achievement motivation may also be distorted if ‘‘young people come to believe that cheating and bribing is an acceptable way to advance their careers’’ (Rumyantseva, 2005, p. 84). Economic loss. In most countries, the education sector is among the largest components of public expenditure. Given the sheer size of the educational budget and the number of actors involved in educational activities, high levels of corruption can result in significant leakage of funds, waste, fraud, and other types of inefficient expenditures. To the extent that problems with quality are recognized as limiting viable economic opportunities, young people may choose to migrate to other countries in search of better educational preparation and employment opportunities, with significant numbers not returning home. Social inequality. Corruption promotes social inequality and undermines social cohesion because poorer members of society cannot afford to pay supplemental expenses resulting from corrupt practices of teachers, educational administrators, and government officials. Ethical loss. In a society where dishonesty and corruption are rampant, the ethical cost of corruption in education can be higher than for any other public service. As a result, citizens may develop cynicism and discouragement that translates into lack of trust in government and, consequently, lack of civic and political participation, thereby undermining democratic society and social cohesion (Heyneman, 2004). It follows also that ‘‘because education is an important public good, its professional standards include more than just material goods: hence the definition of education corruption includes the abuse of authority for personal as well as material gain’’ (Heyneman, 2004, p. 637). This means corruption in education is not simply an economic concern, but rather can be an insidious factor undermining moral authority of and transparency in governments and political systems. The chapter begins with a discussion of the dimensions of corruption, focusing particularly on higher education. A conceptual model illustrating the complex interaction among structural characteristics and stakeholder interests across higher education systems is developed. While the major regional focus of this chapter is on higher education corruption in the former Soviet Republics of Eastern Europe and Eurasia (E&E), it includes
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consideration of research in other regions that addresses significant substantive and/or methodological issues. The next section addresses the measurement of corruption, describing the indicators most commonly used for research and country ranking purposes and discussing their strengths and weaknesses. The third section discusses several articles which develop empirical models of corruption and examine its relationship to indicators of educational and national economic development as well as returns to individuals. The review focuses primarily on articles published in refereed journals, but also includes a few conference and other working papers that address mathematical models of educational corruption directly, focus on the E&E region, and/or are written by authors whose work is otherwise widely published. It points out shortcomings of this approach and argues that developing quantitative indicators of the actual costs of corruption are a pre-condition to effective mathematical modeling of its effect on various economic outcomes at both the individual and national levels. This section expands the notion of corruption and emphasizes the importance of going beyond basic economic indicators and corruption perception indexes in order to estimate the costs of corruption in education more directly. It illustrates the types of costs incurred by various stakeholders, both corporate and individual (Chapman, 2002; Heyneman, 2004; Rumyantseva, 2005), suggesting the importance of building an inventory of types of corruption in the education sector and collecting data on the costs of each. Such an approach can be used with confidence if (a) there is a reasonably complete inventory of most common corrupt practices in the education sector; and (b) it is possible to obtain reliable cost/expenditure data for virtually the entire set of common corrupt practices. Identifying key variables is the more straightforward of these two tasks. Obtaining robust measures is a far more difficult task, particularly since it seems safe to assume that people participating in corrupt practices are likely to be reluctant to provide information about either the costs or the economic benefits to themselves. Hence, this section addresses the feasibility of collecting data on the financial costs of education corruption in order to estimate the effects of actual costs incurred, as opposed to peoples’ perceptions, on indicators of individuals’ economic status and national development. Survey methods, including public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS), are discussed (Reinikka & Smith, 2004; Reinikka & Svensson, 2003). The concluding sections of the chapter focus on approaches to fighting higher education corruption in developing nations and recommendations for improving the collection of data on the actual monetary costs of corruption
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in higher education so better estimates of its effects on personal income and national development can be obtained.
STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF CORRUPTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION Fig. 1 shows a conceptual framework describing several core elements of corruption in higher education, taking into consideration the complex interrelationships among educational institutions, national and local government agencies, external agencies, and stakeholder communities. It is not meant to be an exhaustive representation but rather to show key general elements in the complex process of corruption in education, more generally, and higher education, in general. It represents a conceptual synthesis based on my own work on sector-wide approaches (SWAPs) to education planning
NATIONAL AGENCIES Central Ministries Regulation/Accreditation Student Selection Funding
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS Region/District Taxation Staff Resourcing
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS Teachers/ Administrators/ Courses Support Staff Instruction Access to Grading Resources Student Management Selection Finances
OTHER AGENCIES Domestic/ External Banks Contractors Donors
STAKEHOLDERS Students Taxpayers Employers Governments
Fig. 1.
A Conceptual Model of Potential Sources of Corruption in Higher Education.
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(Weidman, 2001) and educational reform in the formerly Soviet style economic and education system of Mongolia (Weidman & Bat-Erdene, 2002) as well as the typologies of education corruption by Chapman (2002) and Rumyantseva (2005). This framework also reflects themes appearing in many reports and articles that, taken collectively, provide a detailed description of corruption at all levels of the educational systems in the E&E region (USAID, 2005; Anderson & Photos, 2003; Asian Development Bank, 2004; Broers, 2005; Levin & Satarov, 2000; Rostiashvili, 2004; World Bank, 2006a) as well as other parts of the world (Bray, 2003; Heyneman, 2004; Tanaka, 2001; Hallak & Poisson, 2007; Meier, 2004; Meier & Griffin, 2005). The framework in Fig. 1 is shown as a set of intersecting ellipses, each reflecting an element of a national educational system and the types of potentially corrupt activities occurring within each, many of which are suggested by Chapman (2002). The boundaries of the ellipses are depicted in broken lines in order to reflect the permeability of corruption and its highly interactive, as opposed to linear, nature across an entire educational system. We also recognize that various types of corruption occur in different ways, depending upon the particular country, culture, and organizational/ regulatory structure. In addition to structural/organizational dimensions (local governments, national agencies, other domestic and external agencies, and educational institutions), the framework adds an individual level which reflects the possibility of corruption through exchanges of cash and/or favors among stakeholders at various levels of the system.
Educational Institutions The core of Fig. 1 is the educational institutions in any country that are staffed by teachers, administrators, and supporting personnel. Opportunities for corruption occur in the daily work of these key personnel through interaction with the main direct clients (students, their families, and community members). For instance, in the E&E region, teachers at all levels, including higher education, tend to be poorly paid civil servants, especially given their high level of education. Consequently, they can be particularly susceptible to accepting payments for providing services beyond what are normally available under less than ideal teaching conditions (e.g., large classes; poorly equipped facilities with less than fully functional mechanics, such as heating and plumbing; lack of teaching materials and equipment, including laboratories, internet access, library resources, etc.).
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Teachers/Courses In many countries around the world, teachers at all education levels may provide tutoring for pay outside of regular course hours as a way to supplement their incomes (Bray, 2003). If this is due to deliberately not teaching the required curriculum during regular school hours, it may be construed as a form of education corruption. Teachers may also, through acceptance of bribes or actual solicitation of students and their parents, sell test scores and course grades. Student selection processes such as promotion and graduation (Chapman, 2002, Table 1), as well as recommendations for subsequent employment, may also require payments.
Administrators/Support Staff These people are concerned with the management and operation of educational institutions and, as such, generally have fiduciary as well as managerial responsibilities. Administrators have the opportunity to divert operating funds, student fees and scholarships, and other revenue (e.g., stakeholder and other donor gifts, income from service provision, central ministry funding, etc.) for personal gain, extract bribes for appointments of both faculty and support staff, and receive payments for student admission as well as for grade changes. They also control resource allocation within higher education institutions and may expect financial consideration for providing access to institutional resources that should otherwise be available.
Local Governments Fig. 1 contains three external entities affecting educational institutions but with more variable direct intervention, namely local governments, national educational agencies, and other agencies, especially those that might be involved with financing their activities. Local governments generally have some control over allocation of resources, either through taxation or distribution of funds from the central government. They may also play a role in staffing of educational institutions, approving appointments of administrators, and possibly even teachers and support staff. To the extent that local or regional, as opposed to national, governments and/or education agencies provide funding to higher education institutions, bribes
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or other favors may be expected in order to overlook violations of regulations. Financial resources collected via taxation or other revenue streams that are intended for higher education may be diverted to personal use by local government officials. Appointments of institutional administrators, faculty and other personnel may be subject to payment of financial considerations by candidates (Chapman, 2002, Table 1). Admission exams may be made available in advance or scores altered in exchange for payments from individuals.
National Agencies/Central Ministries National agencies regulate activities related to student selection and movement between grades and levels of education. They also allocate financial and other school resources such as textbooks to local schools, including contracting for construction and furnishing of buildings. It is not uncommon for public officials around the world to find ways to steer lucrative contracts to firms in which they have some personal and/or financial interest. Central ministries of education in E&E countries are generally responsible for establishing regulations and standards, monitoring compliance, and channeling both operational and capital funding to educational institutions. As such there are opportunities for corruption by diverting funding from government as well as international donor accounts to personal use, withholding and/or delaying approvals on expenditures in exchange for bribes, extracting kickbacks on construction and supply contracts (including creating markets in which officials, their families or friends have a monopoly), and requiring payment for services that should be free (Chapman, 2002, Table 1).
Other Agencies These agencies either provide services (e.g., contractors) or resources (e.g., banks, donors) for the educational system. Common types of corruption include payment of bribes for various types of contracts, payment of unnecessarily high fees for services or salaries for local employees, skimming funds from education projects, and selection of employees on the basis of personal connections rather than qualifications. Banks handling foreign currency and funds for cash payments are particularly susceptible to opportunities for corruption. Currently, for instance, it is common practice
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for donor contractors in the Russian Federation to use private agencies to make certain (for a fee) that funds to pay local employees are available in local banks, at least for a day or two, and that employees are informed about when to get their salaries. Stakeholders Stakeholders reflect the world of students, their families, and friends. Students’ parents may offer bribes to teachers and administrators for good grades or promotion to the next levels of education. They may also offer bribes to facilitate admission to successive levels of education, including university. Administrators in schools may also have direct access to school finances and the possibility to use them for personal gain. The foregoing is not to say that corruption in education is inevitable, but rather that the opportunity for corruption exists and, under certain conditions, may take place. Whether or not corruption actually occurs in a particular country depends on the complex interaction of activities conducted across a number of organizational entities and individuals. It is conditioned by its social, economic, political, and cultural climate. Given the large number of potential sources of corruption in the education sector, estimating its total costs would require collection of representative financial information on carefully chosen indicators that are representative of all five dimensions shown in Fig. 1 and include data about income and expenditure patterns of both organizational entities and individuals. The next section describes the most commonly used approaches to measuring corruption.
MEASURING CORRUPTION: WIDELY USED INDICATORS International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Research on the economic consequences of corruption at the national level has tended to use measures of people’s perceptions derived from sample surveys. Among these measures are both publicly available and proprietary (sold to clients, data not publicly available) indices. According to Dreher and Herzfeld (2005), arguably the pioneering work on corruption and economic growth was published by Paolo Mauro (1995). His research (Mauro, 1995, 1998) on corruption uses the International Country Risk
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Guide (ICRG) as its indicator of corruption. This is a proprietary index of corruption developed by the PRS Group that is based on people’s perceptions of governments. It was developed to provide information to business clients who were considering international investments: The system is based on a set of 22 components grouped into three major categories of risk: political, financial, and economic, with political risk comprising 12 components (and 15 subcomponents), and financial and economic risk each comprising five components. Each component is assigned a maximum numerical value (risk points), with the highest number of points indicating the lowest potential risk for that component and the lowest number (0) indicating the highest potential risk. The maximum points able to be awarded to any particular risk component is pre-set within the system and depends on the importance (weighting) of that component to the overall risk of a country. The ICRG staff collects political information and financial and economic data, converting these into risk points for each individual risk component on the basis of a consistent pattern of evaluation. The political risk assessments are made on the basis of subjective analysis of the available information, while the financial and economic risk assessments are made solely on the basis of objective data. In addition to the 22 individual ratings, the ICRG model also produces a rating for each of the three risk factor groups plus an overall score for each country. After a risk assessment (rating) has been awarded to each of the 22 risk components, the components within each category of risk are added together to provide a risk rating for each risk category (Political, Financial, or Economic). The risk ratings for these categories are then combined on the basis of a formula to provide the country’s overall, or composite, risk rating. As with the risk component ratings, the higher the rating computed for the political, financial, economic, or composite rating, the lower the risk, and vice versa (Source: http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx).
Users of the ICRG data must pay for it and, as a proprietary data set, there is not full disclosure of the components. In addition, the ICRG has not included countries in the E&E region and is, therefore, not appropriate for studies of education corruption there.
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) By far, the most common indicator of corruption used in research is another index of people’s perceptions, the Transparency International (2006b) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). This index includes individual questions about people’s views across the entire spectrum of government and business activity, including education, but the composite index reflects perceived corruption in a country, generally, not specific to any particular
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sector. It is possible, however, to get disaggregated data for the various sectors represented in the composite index (Heyneman, Anderson, & Nuraliyeva, 2008). The CPI draws on 12 different polls and surveys from 9 independent institutions. TI strives to ensure that the sources used are of the highest quality and that the survey work is performed with complete integrity. To qualify, the data must be well documented and sufficient to permit a judgment on its reliability. All sources must provide a ranking of nations and must measure the overall extent of corruption. This condition excludes surveys which mix corruption with other issues, such as political instability or nationalism for instance. Data for the CPI has been provided to TI free of charge. Some sources do not allow disclosure of the data that they contribute; other sources are publicly available. For a full list of survey sources, details on questions asked and number of respondents for the CPI 2006, please see the detailed document on the CPI methodology at http:// www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006/methodology
Søreide (2005) provides a comprehensive critique suggesting that composite CPI scores should not be used to rank countries and, by implication, is not necessarily the best indicator for empirical studies of corruption for the following reasons: 1. It is not clear to what extent the CPI refers to legal or illegal activities. 2. The lack of consensus on what qualifies as corruption makes it difficult to understand the criteria behind the ranking. 3. The ratio between the different scores is unknown and not constant. 4. Individual perceptions of hidden activities are not reliable. 5. The weaknesses are not comprehended by the masses and the ranking is generally not referred to with the necessary consideration. 6. Its value for statistical studies is uncertain. 7. Its value for poor countries in which corruption is a huge challenge is uncertain. 8. Its value to reduce corruption worldwide is not verified. Nonetheless, recently published research continues to use the CPI composite index for analyses of the relationships among corruption, education, and economic outcomes (Me´ndez & Sepu´lveda, 2006; Heyneman et al., 2008). In large part, this is due to Transparency International’s high stature in the international community and its anti-corruption publications, including the ‘‘Corruption Fighters’ Toolkit’’ (http://www.transparency. org/publications/toolkit); the TI Sourcebook 2000, ‘‘Confronting Corruption: The Elements of a National Integrity System’’ (http://www.transparency. org/publications/sourcebook); the Bribe Payers Index (Transparency
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International, 2006a); the Global Corruption Barometer (Transparency International, 2006c); and reports on corruption and education by Meier and Griffin (2005) and Meier (2004).
ESTIMATING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORRUPTION AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMETRIC MODELS The most common way of estimating the relationships among corruption and economic outcomes is to use a production function approach as shown in Fig. 2. Each of the variables included represents a construct to be operationalized rather than a specific indicator. The model is intended to illustrate possibilities, not provide an exhaustive list. In this approach, indicators of key input, throughput (intervening), and output (outcome) variables are entered into multiple regression models and the coefficients for each variable are calculated. Common input variables in such models include GDP data for the years leading up to a particular year; educational achievement at both the country and individual level; and investment of public and private resources. Various types of corruption are generally introduced as intervening variables, along with adjustments for inflation, worker productivity, and other patterns (e.g., privatization). Outcome variables include economic growth (real GDP), educational attainment, and personal income. Models may differ, depending upon the variables of interest, statistical properties of the measures, and the linearity assumptions underlying them.
Inputs Prior Years’ GDP Educational Achievement Resources (Public, Private)
Fig. 2.
Intervening Variables Inflation Productivity Privatization Corruption Governance Finance Service Provision (Quantity, Quality)
Outcome Variables Real GDP Growth Educational Attainment Personal Income
A Production Function Model of Higher Education Corruption’s Cost.
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There are several illustrative examples of articles that employ mathematical modeling of corruption. Mauro’s (1995, 1998) pioneering empirical work used data from Business International (BI) as proxies for corruption and various other institutional variables: y now incorporated into The Economist Intelligence Unit, BI is a private firm that sells these indices typically to banks, multinational companies, and other international investors. BI published indices on 56 ‘‘country risk’’ factors for 68 countries, for the period 1980–1983, and on 30 country risk factors for 57 countries, for the period 1971–1979. (Mauro, 1995, p. 683)
These data are subjective indices of corruption, amount of red tape, efficiency of the judicial system, and various categories of political stability. Corruption in the education sector is not measured. It is interesting to note that Mauro (1995, footnote, p. 682), himself, was somewhat skeptical about these data: ‘‘I do not necessarily agree with the Business International consultants’ views and subjective indices relating to any individual country.’’ In addition, given the time period for which these data were collected, no E&E countries were included. Overall findings from this study were that ‘‘corruption is found to lower investment, thereby lowering economic growth’’ (p. 682). Using the proprietary International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index described in the foregoing, Mauro (1998) found that corruption was related to reduced government spending on education in a cross section of countries that did not include those in the E&E region. A more recently published article by Me´ndez and Sepu´lveda (2006) addressing the relationship between corruption and economic growth includes political freedom as an intervening variable. These authors estimate models for each of three corruption indices, the ICRG, the CPI, and the Institute for Management Development (IMD) index published in the World Competitiveness Yearbook. Independent variables include data from 1960 to 2000 on values of real population growth, real income per capita, annual GDP growth, secondary school enrollment rates, the investment share of GDP, and the share of government expenditure as a percentage of GDP taken from the World Bank’s (2006d) World Development Indicators. The index of political freedom is taken from Freedom House International and includes two sub-indices, political rights and civil liberties. The results of this study show no significant relationship between corruption and economic growth for the countries that do not have political freedom, a common condition across countries in the E&E region. Hence, this study supports the inference that the type of political regime can be an important determinant of the relationship between corruption and economic
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growth. However, these authors also acknowledge the limitations of the type of data used in the analyses, suggesting that: y a definitive judgment about the exact role of government cannot be made in this study. Direct measures of the cost of combating corruption, of the cost that bureaucratic regulations impose on investment and of the misallocation of government expenses due to corruption would be needed to explore this issue further. (p. 95)
Le Van and Maurel (2006), in an unpublished paper, develop a sophisticated mathematical model of education, corruption, and economic growth that focuses on developing countries. They lag economic growth variables between 1960 and 1996 against governance indicators developed by the World Bank (2006b). Overall, the empirical analyses support the inference that corruption decreases the return to education, though there also appears to be a threshold level of per capita GDP, below which corruption has no effect. Heyneman et al. (2008) use existing data to study costs of corruption in higher education. They report on surveys of students in six countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Serbia) that show corruption varies by market demand of academic major, with greater frequencies in high demand fields such as law, economics, and finance. Universities in these countries with local accreditation were also more corrupt than institutions accredited in Europe or North America. These authors used data from Transparency International on perceptions of corruption in education in 68 countries to examine its association with payoff to higher education, finding that pervasive corruption tends to reduce income among people with higher education. In short, education corruption reduces the value of higher education, possibly through dilution of its quality. It can be very difficult to get people to report actual income in these countries, largely because acceptance of government taxation is not widespread in formerly socialist countries. Consequently, Heyneman et al. (2008) had to use respondents’ perceptions of their income relative to others as being high, medium, or low. They estimated the effects of corruption perceptions on income perceptions and then estimated the actual monetary effect by calculating the reduction in lifetime marginal return from higher education for those countries for which such data were available. Heyneman et al. (2008) concluded their paper with the assertion that ‘‘the first step to effective policy intervention is to acquire information about the experience and cost of corruption.’’ Economic data from E&E countries as well as from other countries with emerging market economies in the immediate pre- and post-transition years (e.g., late 1980s through
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mid-1990s) are very unreliable due to the rapid economic shifts (e.g., hyperinflation, rapid growth of income inequality, etc.) countries were experiencing in their transitions from command to market economies (Asian Development Bank, 2004). Governments in many of the E&E countries (and China) are still controlling their currencies and keeping them at an unrealistic high value rather than letting them float in international markets. Several of the authors mentioned in the foregoing acknowledge that it is necessary to quantify corruption in order to get more accurate estimates of its effect on national economic growth and other personal returns to education. Experience at the World Bank has indicated that it is possible to collect data on micro-economic indicators of corruption through PETS, service provider surveys, and enterprise surveys (Reinikka & Svensson, 2003). PETS is the best documented (Reinikka & Smith, 2004) of these approaches. While this methodology has been used to assess financial flows in basic education, it could conceivably be adapted to track public expenditures on higher education. The following describes briefly the steps involved in PETS (Reinikka & Smith, 2004, Chapter 4): 1. Preparing for the study through consultation a. Reach agreement on the purpose and objectives of the study b. Identify key service delivery issues and problems (research questions) c. Determine the structure of government’s resource flow, rules for resource allocation to frontline schools, and the accountability system d. Obtain a good understanding of the institutional setting with respect to the relationship of government and private for-profit and not-forprofit providers e. Assess data availability f. Assess available local capacity to carry out the survey and engage in data analysis and research g. Choose the appropriate survey tool 2. Sampling strategy (representative set of schools in a country) 3. Design of questionnaires (for interviewing head teachers, principals, or staff responsibility for financial matters; separate data sheets to collect quantitative data from school records; and questionnaires to collect data at the local, regional, and national levels). The following general elements are to be included in the school questionnaires (Appendix 1 of the Reinikka & Smith document contains a sample questionnaire): a. Identification of the school b. Number of students in the school c. Personal information about the head teacher
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Teachers Facilities Location, distance, and school choice Organization and governance Supervision and accountability School’s sources of funding What did the school spend its money on? Data sheet to the value of in-kind support Quality of records.
Administering PETS can be complex because they require reasonably well-educated people to administer the surveys, enter data, and do analysis. They also require significant cooperation (and time) of school staff and government officials at the local, regional, and national levels. All of this can be very expensive. The World Bank (2006c) recently completed PETS in Mongolia, a country with 2.5 million people that is transitioning from a Soviet-style education system similar to those found in E&E countries. This study cost between $70,000 and $90,000, not counting time of World Bank staff (Charles Abelmann, World Bank, personal communication). In addition, because the primary objective of PETS is tracing public resource flows (e.g., funding leakage) through the education sector, it does not address private expenditures of families and individuals for influencing various desired outcomes. To reiterate, such surveys are labor intensive, expensive, and limited in scope to the flow of government funds. They are also limited by the capacity of local agencies to conduct the surveys as well as representativeness of the set of providers and enterprises accessible and willing to provide data. Further, even if there is systematic documentation of funds leakage, bribery, and other types of favoritism, conventional approaches to reducing government corruption across sectors such as audit and legislation may not be enough, especially in developing countries with weak government regulation.
FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION As suggested in the foregoing discussion, corruption in the education sector is very likely to be related to the overall level of corruption in a country. Referring to studies of African countries, (Reinikka & Svensson, 2003, p. 13) identify several ‘‘fundamental determinants of corruption’’ which are
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equally applicable to countries in the E&E region and that also must be dealt with in order to develop successful national anti-corruption programs:
Restricted civil society involvement; State/government perceived as a vehicle for personal wealth accumulation; Prevalence of patronage politics; and Small elite with close political connections.
These and other issues related specifically to the E&E region are also addressed in another World Bank publication outlining a ‘‘multi-pronged strategy’’ with the following five elements:
Building political and public accountability; Strengthening competitiveness in the private sector; Building capacity and institutions for public sector management; Enhancing civil society participation; Fostering institutional restraints (Anderson & Photos, 2003, p. 2).
Three common themes emphasizing good governance cut across the initiatives by the World Bank for fighting corruption in Europe and Central Asia: First, bringing transparency to government processes and decisionmaking makes corruption more difficult to disguise. Second, establishing institutions that emphasize accountability for public sector performance helps ensure that officials have incentives to perform well. Lastly, allowing stakeholders to have some voice or direct input into the decisions that affect them helps ensure a more responsive government (Anderson & Photos, 2003, p. 4). This report indicates that the World Bank will continue to emphasize good governance that includes transparency, accountability, and voice in its anti-corruption campaigns. To support its efforts in monitoring anticorruption progress, the World Bank (2006b) has developed indicators of these governance issues. That there has been significant investment in research and program development in the E&E Region aimed at fighting corruption in education indicates a wide-spread acceptance of the notion there are substantial reasons for taking steps to reduce the problems associated with corrupt governance and finance that are found throughout the region. Publications from the World Bank (Anderson & Photos, 2003) and USAID (2005) have provided extensive analyses of corruption in the region, including policy and programmatic recommendations for reducing corruption at all levels. Appendix D of the
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TAPEE report (USAID, 2005) deals specifically with corruption in education and Heyneman (2004) provides a comprehensive list of interventions to lower the incidence of corruption in education across the entire spectrum from preprimary through higher education. The paper on ‘‘Corruption and the Education Sector’’ prepared for USAID by Chapman (2002) is thorough and comprehensive. Transparency International (Meier, 2004; Meier & Griffin, 2005) has also commissioned reports on corruption in education. UNESCO’s International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) in Paris has funded an extensive program of research and training on corruption and education (Bray, 2003; Hallak & Poisson, 2002, 2007; van Nuland & Khandelwal, 2006; Levacic & Downes, 2004). Taken together, these volumes alone provide a wealth of information on the various types of corruption in education and contain recommendations about what needs to be done to combat its negative effects. They also provide methodological information about conducting surveys of education corruption in developing countries. While most of these sources focus on basic education, their findings are relevant for higher education as well. The volume by Hallak and Poisson (2007) is a major resource for understanding corruption in education. The final chapter synthesizes the findings from the entire volume about how to address the challenge of corruption in the education sector. Hallak and Poisson (2007) describe three ‘‘major strategic axes for improving transparency and accountability in the management of the education sector:’’ the creation and maintenance of regulatory systems involves adapting existing legal frameworks so that they focus more on corruption concerns (rewards and/or penalties), designating clear norms and criteria for procedures (with regard to fund allocation of procurement, for instance), developing codes of practice for the education profession, and defining well-targeted measures, particularly for fund allocation; the strengthening of management capacities to ensure the enforcement of these regulatory systems. This involves increasing institutional capacity in various areas, particularly information systems, setting up effective control mechanism against fraud and promoting ethical behavior; and encouraging enhanced ownership of the management process. This involves developing decentralized and participatory mechanisms, increasing access to information particularly with the use of ICT’s, and empowering communities to help them exert stronger ‘‘social control.’’ Table 1 shows the synopsis of findings included in the volume, with column headings reflecting each of the three foregoing dimensions
Involvement of ministry of education Information to the public Peer monitoring/control (integrity networks) Citizen oversight committee
Involvement of trade unions Information to the public
Detailed and transparent contract specification Pre-qualification of suppliers Computerized/automated process (e-procurement, linear models) Procurement scrutiny Internal and external audits Sanction of fraud (penalties)
Clear legislation and regulation on procurement procedures (guidelines) Standardized policies for school maintenance and repairs Clear policy for equipment/ materials Clear copyright and book policy
Open competition for teacher recruitment Clear and objective criteria for teacher management (including promotion and transfer system)
Construction, maintenance, and school repairs Writing, production, and distribution of textbooks Distribution of equipment, furniture, and materials (including transport, boarding, canteens, and school meals)
Teacher appointment, management (transfer, promotion), payment, and training
Cleaning the list of teachers Computerized/automated process Adequate incentive systems Control of absenteeism Reporting of anomalies
Social mobilization Information to the public Training of stakeholders
Ownership
Computerized/automated process Training of principals and administrative staff in financial procedures Budget scrutiny Independent mechanisms of control Internal and external audit Sanction of fraud (penalties)
Management
Equitable and transparent allocation formula Clear financial procedures (guidelines) Standardization of the format of financial reports
Regulations
Regulation, Management, and Ownership.
Financing Allocation of specific allowances (fellowships, subsidies, etc.)
Areas
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Adoption of standards of academic integrity by the profession Adoption of honor codes by the profession Establishment of reliable and user-friendly information systems on recruitment procedures, list of graduates, accredited institutions, accrediting agencies, etc.
Computerized/automated process Training Adequate incentive systems Independent mechanisms of control of the reliability of data Periodic audits of information Sanction of fraud (penalties) Confidentiality of exam content and anonymity of candidates Computerized exam management Mechanisms to detect fraud (use of statistical tools) Sanction of academic fraud (penalties) Design of standardized national exams Outsourcing the management of exams and accreditation procedures
Clear anti-academic fraud policy Transparent rules and procedures for being admitted to universities Transparent criteria for obtaining accreditation Design of international guidelines on cross-boarder education
Examinations and diplomas Access to universities Institution accreditation Cross-border movements (overseas students, franchised courses, or institutions)
Source: Reprinted with permission from Hallak and Poisson (2007, Table 9.2).
Information to the public (information displayed on public boards, available through the main newspapers, the internet, etc.)
Establishment of reliable education management information systems (EMIS) Report cards Tracking surveys
Involvement of the profession (design, enforcement of the codes) Peer monitoring/control of the implementation of the codes Information to the public
Information systems
Training Private tutoring complementary to mainstream education Adequate incentive systems
Professional and ethical standards/codes Basic norms (private tutoring)
Teacher behavior (professional misconduct)
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(regulations, management, and ownership). The rows contain several areas in which opportunities for corruption may occur and each column contains suggested anti-corruption actions that might be taken. One additional example is the International Monetary Fund (IMF) supported publication of an extensive edited volume (Abed & Gupta, 2002; reviewed by Hillman, 2004) on governance, corruption, and economic performance in a variety of low-income countries. All of these resources commissioned by major donors and/or development NGOs include much that is applicable to the E&E region and, taken together, largely cover what is known about education and corruption. Table 1 and Fig. 1 in the present chapter reflect this knowledge.
CONCLUSIONS 1. Corruption in education is widely accepted as an important international concern and is continuing to receive extensive attention by a variety of highly respected agencies such as the World Bank (Anderson & Photos, 2003) and IIEP (Bray, 2003; Hallak & Poisson, 2007). It has also been addressed in the scholarly journal literature (Heyneman, 2004; Tanaka, 2001). Further, some of the best policy and program-oriented work already existing in this area has been funded by USAID (2005) and Chapman (2002). 2. The research employing production function approaches to estimating the relationships among corruption and indicators of economic growth is limited in its usefulness for several reasons: a. Studies tend to employ widely used indices based on peoples’ perceptions of various types of corruption in a country rather than indicators reflecting actual amounts of money changing hands for various corrupt activities, or withholding goods or services for which payment has been made. The most commonly used indicator of corruption, the CPI developed by Transparency International (2006b), is a global measure reflecting the way that citizens view their countries with respect to corruption in several sectors. While there is an education component to this index, it is not disaggregated because this would make the overall CPI less robust in statistical analyses. b. The unit of analysis tends to be the country rather than individuals, so statistical analyses reflect a country-wide estimation of associations
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rather than one related directly to educational experiences at the school or individual levels. c. Several of the more theoretical articles present arguments that are synthetic and purely mathematical without subjecting them to empirical testing (e.g., Bjorvatn & Søreide, 2005; Tirole, 1996). d. Results also depend on the methods of estimating relationships among variables in the equations, including the selection of intervening variables (Dreher & Herzfeld, 2005). e. The econometric literature is not accessible to lay audiences and tends to have limited policy relevance. f. There is no agreement on the ‘‘best’’ indicators to use in such studies. Rather, indicators tend to be chosen on the basis of the particular hypotheses being tested and/or the availability of data. g. No single model has been developed that can comprehensively account for all of the forms of corruption discussed in this chapter, many of which may be disguised as a cultural norm (e.g., giving a gift to a teacher for a major holiday) and vary in importance from country to country. h. Given the absence of actual data on what is being spent for various types of corruption, coefficients reported for regression analyses can provide only rough approximations of relationships among corruption in education and indicators of economic development. Therefore, there is no way to tell how actual expenditure on corrupt practices in education at the individual, institution, local government, and national government levels is related to economic growth or individuals’ economic resources. 3. Collecting data on expenditures for corrupt practices in education from individuals at the household level as well as from stakeholders at the national, regional, and local levels is very expensive, and hence, not feasible on a large, multi-national scale without significant investment.
RECOMMENDATIONS Whether or not corruption in the education sector can be related to economic development in a rigorous, statistical way, through sophisticated econometric models is not likely to change the already widespread international acceptance of its importance and necessity to reduce its occurrence (Kaufmann et al., 2006). What is, however, likely to make a difference is for
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empirical research to contribute further to understanding of the nature and dynamics of corruption in education as a social and economic phenomenon. This would involve exploring ways to quantify the costs of corruption across all levels of education, recognizing that there is no single model of corruption, no ‘‘one size fits all’’ model that is uniformly applicable across countries and cultures. In other words, to understand costs, it is necessary to develop a comprehensive set of indicators of funds changing hands. Further, quantifying the costs of corruption in education is a necessary first step to any subsequent analysis of how such expenditures might be related to opportunity costs in the broader economy of a country. Given the dearth of real data on the amount of money that changes hands, we would suggest three steps in identifying indicators of the actual costs to individuals and governments (at both local and national levels) of corruption in education: 1. Identify dimensions of corruption in higher education and possible indicators for each. This chapter provides examples of many types of corruption in education, in general, and higher education, in particular. The various dimensions listed could be used as starting points for further elaboration and exploration of indicators that could be used to estimate their actual costs to individuals as well as national systems of education. More refined indicators of expenditures reflecting corruption in education could be gleaned from existing studies and reports such as those mentioned in the following recommendation. 2. Review existing data. Identify countries for which there are already existing data that contain appropriate indicators for various dimensions of corruption in higher education. Possible sources include country personal income and expenditure studies funded by such agencies as the World Bank and UNDP (e.g., country human development reports). There may also be appropriate data sets in repositories such as the Davidson Data Center and Network (DDCN), 2007 on transition and emerging markets housed at the University of Michigan. Select only those indicators for which the data are reliable and robust. 3. Collect primary data to assess the feasibility of obtaining reliable cost information for main indicators of corruption in higher education. To make this feasible on a cost basis, it would be necessary to limit primary data collection to countries in which government officials were supportive of this particular type of activity. Survey design and data collection could be accomplished with the help of local NGOs that would organize interviews with samples of students, family members, teachers, and
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administrators in higher education institutions about any payments offered and/or received with respect to the provision of education services. Data would have to be collected in a non-judgmental way without reference to whether or not specific types of payments are legal or culturally appropriate. An inventory could be made of the various possible costs associated with higher education attendance and students asked to indicate how much they spend for each. In fact, being able to put an actual price tag on various types of educational costs would contribute to understanding the full costs across the entire educational sector. Since people and countries (as reflected in their laws and regulations) vary in their definitions of corrupt practices, this approach could conceivably be more informative than trying to develop universal definitions of corruption. Ultimately, of course, fighting corruption depends on the commitment of countries and individuals to the establishment and enforcement of legal, moral, and ethical codes that permeate social and economic structures across an entire society, not just the education sector. The stakes are high for national development in an increasingly global economy that places a premium on professional skills. The success of any efforts to understand the complex issues underlying corruption in higher education will ultimately depend on the commitment of government officials not only to supporting data collection but also to using results to implement policies and programs designed to address underlying problems at governmental, educational institution, and personal levels.
REFERENCES Abed, G. T., & Gupta, S. (2002). Governance, corruption, and economic performance. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. Anderson, J., & Photos, I. (2003). The World Bank and anti-corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Asian Development Bank. (2004). Education reforms in countries in transition: Policies and processes. Six country case studies commissioned by the Asian Development Bank in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Manila, Philippines. Available at http://www.adb.org/Education/educ-reforms-countries.pdf. Retrieved on 11 October 2006. Bjorvatn, K., & Søreide, T. (2005). Corruption and privatization. European Journal of Political Economy, 21, 903–914. Bray, M. (2003). Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring: Dimensions, implications and government responses. Paris: International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP).
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Broers, L. (2005). After the ‘Revolution:’ Civil society and the challenges of consolidating democracy in Georgia. Central Asian Survey, 24(3), 333–350. Chapman, D. (2002). Corruption and the education sector. Sectoral perspectives on corruption. Prepared by MSI, sponsored by USAID, DCHA/DG, Contract no. AEP-I-00-00-0000900 Rapid Response Task. Available at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_ and_governance/publications/ac/sector/education.doc. Retrieved on 11 October 2006. Davidson Data Center and Network (DDCN). (2007). An integrated, fully searchable database on transition and emerging markets. DDCN archives and provides free access to socio-economic micro and macro data on transition economies (http://ddcn.prowebis.com/). Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, William Davidson Institute (http://www.wdi.umich.edu). Dreher, A., & Herzfeld, T. (2005). The economic costs of corruption: A survey and new evidence. Thurgau Institute of Economics, Kreuzlingen, Switzerland. Available at Social Science Research Network (SSRN) http://ssrn.com/abstract=734184 Hallak, J., & Poisson, M. (2002). Ethics and corruption in education. Results from the Experts Workshop Held at IIEP, Paris 28–29 November 2001. Paris: International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP)/UNESCO. Hallak, J., & Poisson, M. (2007). Corrupt schools, corrupt universities: What can be done? Paris: International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP)/UNESCO. Heyneman, S. P. (2004). Education and corruption. International Journal of Educational Development, 24, 637–648. Heyneman, S. P., Anderson, K. H., & Nuraliyeva, N. (2008). The cost of corruption in higher education.. Comparative Education Review, 52, 1–25. Hillman, A. L. (2004). Corruption and public finance: An IMF perspective. European Journal of Political Economy, 20, 1067–1077. Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2006). Measuring corruption: Myths and realities. Development Outreach, September, 37–41. Available at http://www1.worldbank.org/ devoutreach/september06/article.asp?id=371 Le Van, C., & Maurel, M. (2006). Education corruption and growth in developing countries. Unpublished paper. Paris: CES, Universite´ de Paris I Panthe´on Sorbonne. Levacic, R., & Downes, P., with country case studies by Caldwell, B., Gurr, D., Spinks, J., Downes, P., Herczynski, H., Luce, M.-B., & Farenzena, N. (2004). Formula funding of schools, decentralization and corruption: A comparative analysis. Paris: International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP). Levin, M., & Satarov, G. (2000). Corruption and institutions in Russia. European Journal of Political Economy, 16, 113–132. Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(August), 681–712. Mauro, P. (1998). Corruption and composition of government spending. Journal of Public Economics, 69, 263–279. Meier, B. (2004). Corruption in the education sector: An introduction. Unpublished paper. Berlin: Transparency International. Meier, B., & Griffin, M. (Eds). (2005). Stealing the future: Corruption in the classroom. Ten Real World Experiences. Berlin: Transparency International. Me´ndez, F., & Sepu´lveda, F. (2006). Corruption, growth and political regimes: Cross country evidence. European Journal of Political Economy, 22, 82–98. Pinto, J., Leana, C. R., & Pil, F. K. (in press). Corrupt organizations or organizations of corrupt individuals? Two types of organization-level corruption. Academy of Management Review.
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Reinikka, R., & Smith, N. (2004). Public expenditure tracking surveys in education. Paris: International Institute for Educational Planning. Reinikka, R., & Svensson, J. (2003). Survey techniques to measure and explain corruption. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3071. Rostiashvili, K. (2004). Corruption in the higher education system of Georgia. Tbilisi: Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC), Georgia Office, Starr Foundation and IREX. Available at http://www.traccc.cdn.ge/publications/index.html. Retrieved on 11 October 2006. Rumyantseva, N. L. (2005). Taxonomy of corruption in higher education. Peabody Journal of Education, 80(1), 81–92. Søreide, T. (2005). Is it right to rank? Limitations, implications and potential improvements of corruption indices. Paper prepared for the IV Global Forum on Fighting Corruption, Brasilia, Brazil, 7–10 June. Tanaka, S. (2001). Corruption in education sector development: A suggestion for anticipatory strategy. International Journal of Educational Management, 15(4), 158–166. Tirole, J. (1996). A theory of collective reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and firm quality. The Review of Economic Studies, 63(1), 1–22. Transparency International. (2006a). Bribe Payers Index (BPI) 2006: Analysis report. Berlin: Transparency International – International Secretariat. Available at http://www. transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/bpi/bpi_2006 Transparency International. (2006b). Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2006: Press release. Berlin: Transparency International – International Secretariat. Available at http:// www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi Transparency International. (2006c). Report on the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2006. Berlin: Transparency International – International Secretariat. Available at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2006 USAID. (2005). TAPEE (Transparency, Accountability, Prevention, Enforcement, Education): An analytic framework for combating corruption & promoting integrity in the Europe and Eurasia region. USAID Europe and Eurasia Bureau Anti-Corruption Working Group. PN-ADD-630. August. van Nuland, S., & Khandelwal, B.P. with contributions from Biswal, K., Dewan E. A., & Bajracharya, H. R. (2006). Ethics in education: The role of teacher codes – Canada and South Asia. Paris: International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP). Weidman, J. C. (2001). Developing the Mongolia education sector strategy 2000–2005: Reflections of a consultant for the Asian Development Bank. Current Issues in Comparative Education [Online], 3 (No. 2, May 1). Available at http://www.tc.columbia.edu/cice/ Archives/3.2/32weidman.pdf Weidman, J. C. (2007). Quantifying the relationship between corruption in education and economic development in the Eastern Europe and Eurasia region: A feasibility study. Paper prepared for the Social Transition (ST) team in the United States Agency for International Development’s Bureau for Europe & Asia, Office of Democracy, Governance and Social Transition (E&E/DGST) for the Supporting Outreach, Communication, Interdisciplinary Analysis, and Legacies (SOCIAL) project. Washington, DC: USAID. Weidman, J. C., & Bat-Erdene, R. (2002). Higher education and the state in Mongolia: Dilemmas of democratic transition. In: D. W. Chapman & A. E. Austin (Eds), Higher education in the developing world: Changing contexts and institutional responses. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
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World Bank. (2006a). Russian federation. administrative and regulatory reform in Russia: Addressing potential sources of corruption. Policy note. Report No. 36157-RU. Washington, DC. World Bank. (2006b). Worldwide governance indicators. Six dimensions of governance, 1996–2004: (1) Voice and accountability, (2) Political stability and absence of violence, (3) Government effectiveness, (4) Regulatory quality, (5) Rule of law, and (6) Control of corruption. Available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata World Bank. (2006c). Public financing of education in Mongolia: Equity and efficiency implications. Report No.: 36979-MN. Washington, DC. World Bank. (2006d). World development indicators – 2006. Washington, DC. Available at http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/cover.htm
WOMEN’S STUDIES AS A GLOBAL INNOVATION Christine Min Wotipka and Francisco O. Ramirez Between 1970 and 2000 women’s studies curriculum in universities emerged in a wide range of countries and regions throughout the world. This project offers a comparative and longitudinal analysis of the adoption of women’s studies curricula, defined as the offering of the first women’s studies department, program, or degree at a university from 1970 to 2000. Using event history models of estimation, we test a number of different explanations at the national- and international-levels. We find that the initial adoption of women’s studies curriculum is positively influenced by global dynamics such as the diffusion of women’s studies activities and the timing of international women’s conferences. These global dynamics operate net of the positive influence of national factors such as the level of economic development and the degree of democracy. These global dynamics suggests the further development of a global logic of inclusiveness, transforming what counts as knowledge in higher education and leading to women’s studies as a global innovation.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE ACADEMIC ARM OF THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT Starting in the 1960s, university systems around the world began to undergo a variety of drastic changes that would forever alter higher education. The Worldwide Transformation of Higher Education International Perspectives on Education and Society, Volume 9, 89–110 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1479-3679/doi:10.1016/S1479-3679(08)00004-2
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The spread of social movements were fueled by anti-war protests, demands for civil rights, and new forms of economic and political organization (Lipset, 1993). In terms of changes in universities, students demanded greater educational access and equal opportunities. A worldwide logic of inclusiveness increasingly affected national political and educational outcomes, including transformations in multiple dimensions of the status of women in the polity and in the educational system. This chapter focuses on the emergence and expansion of women’s studies curricula in universities throughout the world, treating this unexpected development as a further manifestation of the globalization of a logic of inclusiveness. With the International Women’s Year in 1975 and subsequent United Nations Decade for Women, the ‘‘second wave’’ of the women’s movement took on a truly global character (Chen, 1996). This movement, combined with greater numbers of female faculty and students, brought intense demands for an expanded place for women in the academy, not simply in terms of their numbers but in their representation in the curricula across the disciplines. The result of such demands was a new field of studies known generally as women’s studies,1 in which ‘‘new faces, alternative perspectives, and innovative approaches to scholarship as well as teaching’’ (Boxer, 1998, p. 2) were introduced into academia. By the beginning of the 21st century, women’s studies have come to exist in many countries, albeit the degree of institutionalization varies widely from one country to the other.2 Numerous case studies have documented the institutionalization of women’s studies in individual countries in Europe. Far less work has examined women’s studies elsewhere, but even fewer offer a comparative analysis chronicling changes over time.3 This project provides a comparative and longitudinal quantitative analysis of the expansion of women’s studies activities throughout several countries. Our goal is to elucidate those global- and national-level factors that give rise to the establishment of women’s studies using event history models of estimation. We start by reviewing the literature on the emergence and institutionalization of women’s studies and comment on the difficulty inherent in such a project including how to define ‘‘women’s studies.’’ We then present the theoretical perspective that guides this project, emphasizing the role of global dynamics in shaping national curricular innovations. We focus on the worldwide women’s movement and on worldwide pressures on higher education to become less elitist. These developments are both influenced and influence a changing world cultural order within which women and women’s issues increasingly count. We expect these dynamics to influence the adoption of women’s studies curriculum, net of the effects of
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economic development and political democracy. After describing our methods of analysis and data, we present our findings and a discussion of them. We close with some suggested directions for future work on the topic.
WOMEN’S STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE Although the literature on women’s studies consists primarily of case studies focused on individual countries,4 a few comparative studies attest to the influence of regional and global trends on its emergence and reveal some interesting patterns (Wotipka, Ramirez, & Martinez, 2007). In the case of several Western European countries and the United States, women’s studies courses got a boost from the women’s movement (both national and international) and women’s activism.5 Also important were feminist scholars and students within the academy (Gumport, 2002; Boxer, 1998) as well as female activists from outside the academy such as those involved in the workers’ education movement, adult classes, and other non-university teaching in the U.K. (Silius, 2002). Having scholars in the social science and humanities disciplines who were willing to incorporate women’s studies topics into their courses was also critical, as establishing women’s studies as a unique discipline met with much resistance throughout Europe, which continues to this day. Particularly in its early stages, some of the main supporters of women’s studies were also the most vocal opponents of institutionalization of women’s studies due to fears that institutionalization in male-dominated universities would co-opt the activist nature of women’s studies. Proponents of a more nurturing and differentiated child care system also fear the costs of institutionalizing child care in male dominated schools (O’Connor, 1990). In France and in other Western European countries, the university system was resistant to innovative changes in course or degree offerings by opening up to women’s studies despite a range of other reforms that had started taking place in the system in the 1960s. Eastern European women, on the other hand, had to wait until after the fall of Communism to introduce women’s studies into the university curricula. When the time came in the early 1990s to begin the process of institutionalization, they had two decades’ worth of experience from surrounding countries on which to draw upon (Kupryashkina, 1996). For the most part, there was little delay in offering women’s studies courses despite the ‘‘second-class status’’ experienced now more than ever by women
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in Central and Southeastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (Silova & Magno, 2004), their fledgling national women’s movements (Oleksy, 1994; Posadskaya, 1994), and conflicts between traditional and new feminists (Koncz, 1996). In their assessment of women’s studies in Asia, Chamberlain and Howe (1995) suggest several factors to explain the development of women’s studies in that region. The fact that women’s studies began as early as the 1970s in India, they argue, may be attributed to several factors such as the advanced status of social science research in India and the number of Indian women in the social sciences and their ties with Western feminist scholars. Korean women’s studies (Pilwha, 1996) got a boost from female scholars working at a number of influential women’s universities6 as well as from the Korean Women’s Development Institute, the national machinery for women which was founded in 1983. Japan also got an early start to women’s studies thanks to the influence of women’s studies in the U.S. and Europe, the women’s liberation movement in the 1970s, a large number of unemployed married women with university degrees and the sharp rise of women in the paid labor force in Japan (Watanabe, 1994). In lesser developed Asian countries, attention given to women in development issues helped spread women’s studies in the 1980s. The spread of an urban-based Chinese women’s movement helped advance women’s studies starting in the 1980s. However, as Beijing prepared to host the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, influences from the international women’s movement and organizations helped spur tremendous growth in the number of women’s studies centers and to widen the scope of topics addressed by Chinese scholars (Chow, Zhang, & Wang, 2004). Led by Nigeria and South Africa, women’s studies in Africa developed in the late 1980s and 1990s. Emerging from a devastating decade of structural adjustments programs that coincided with a strengthening international women’s movement, which included the UN Decade for Women Conference held in Nairobi, Kenya in 1985, African women’s studies received its impetus from its attachment to women in development activities. To this day, women and gender studies typically falls within development studies (Boswell, 2003; Prah, 1996) . An overall women in development perspective was fostered by international development donors who were mainly interested in promoting better education and better health for women to better harness their human capital potential in the service of economic development (Boswell, 2003). This approach was less conducive to feminist scholarship and women’s studies programs rooted in a critique of
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male dominated hierarchies. Reacting to the narrower women in development perspective, networks of feminist scholars have emerged, the first of which was the Association for African Women for Research and Development (AAWORD) established in 1977 (Mama, 1996; Pereira, 2002). However, women in development studies continues to dominate the higher education landscape in much of Africa. Indeed, efforts at the global level underway in the 1970s were key to developing women’s studies in many parts of the world. In particular, the United Nations Decade for Women (1976–1985) and the World Conferences on Women facilitated the spread of ideas and actions to address women’s rights issues (Chamberlain & Howe, 1995; Neale, 1992). Particularly beneficial to the emergence of women’s studies in developing countries was the special forum on women’s studies offered at the Forum of Non-Governmental Organizations held at the Second World Conference on Women in Copenhagen in 1985. Meetings, seminars, roundtables, and workshops on research and teaching about women offered over the course of 10 days provided some women, especially from developing countries, with their first glimpse into this burgeoning field (Chamberlain & Howe, 1995, p. 54). These activities continued at the subsequent international conferences as well as the Interdisciplinary Congresses on Women held every few years in various locales around the world. Governments participating in the Fourth World Conference on Women held in 1995, agreed to the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, which includes references to women’s studies in relation to three specific strategic objectives (United Nations, 1995). In order to strengthen women’s economic capacity and commercial networks (F.4), governments were encouraged to ‘‘promote gender equality through the promotion of women’s studies y .’’ With the aim of integrating gender perspectives in legislation, public policies, programs and projects (H.2), national machinery were called upon to do the following: ‘‘promote and establish cooperative relationships with relevant branches of government, centers for women’s studies and research, academic and educational institutions, the private sector, the media, non-governmental organizations, especially women’s organizations, and all other actors of civil society.’’
Finally, it was agreed that women’s studies centers and research organizations should be involved in ‘‘developing and testing appropriate indicators and research methodologies to strengthen gender analysis, as well as in monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the goals of the Platform for Action’’ to fulfill the objective (H.3) of generating and disseminating
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gender-disaggregated data and information. The organization mandated to carry out the development of women and gender studies on a global scale was the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW).
DEFINING AND CONTEXTUALIZING WOMEN’S STUDIES The dearth of comparative studies on women’s studies stems in part from the difficulty in defining ‘‘women’s studies,’’ which is known as women’s, feminist, gender studies or a combination of terms. This shift to broaden the scope of women’s studies has resulted from a movement beyond a focus on women’s concerns and sexism to include other marginalized groups and characteristics as well as to address the construction of gender (Stake, 2006). Given its unpleasant history with ‘‘isms,’’ feminism is a term avoided in Eastern Europe, where the more ‘‘neutral’’ gender is preferred (Kupryashkina, 1996; Shymchyshyn, 2005). In many parts of the world, ‘‘women’s studies’’ does not translate well into other languages. In the Ukraine, the difficulty was not with ‘‘women’’ but with ‘‘studies,’’ which is confused with ‘‘an artist’s studio’’ (Kupryashkina, 1996). Beyond just finding an appropriate name, the process of institutionalization of women’s studies has varied widely across countries in both university and non-university contexts (Silius, 2002). Furthermore, just within the higher education system, university and degree structures diverge across countries and over time, making comparisons of women’s studies activities all the more challenging. In the United States, the debate continues as to the most appropriate location for women’s studies, whether it be as programs or as a unique department (Boxer, 1998). Examining women’s studies across countries reveals the variety of contexts and activities that it may entail. Unlike descriptions of the founding of women’s studies in the U.S. that focus on its institutionalization within the higher education system, women’s studies activities in nonuniversity contexts played a large role in other countries, namely in the form of non-university research centers and networks. We argue that curricular innovations in higher education are more likely to take place within universities where the latter are more permeable and less elitist. Within both university and non-university contexts, women’s studies activities are comprised of three types of activities. The first, women’s
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studies in curricular form is comprised of courses, minor or major undergraduate degrees or certificates or graduate degrees, and departments or programs organized to offer these courses and degrees. Scholarly activities such as research centers, institutes, and libraries make up the second type of activity, while networks (national level collaboration including associations) comprise the third. Both contexts and each type of activity have played important roles in institutionalizing women’s studies curricula in higher education and need to be considered when describing the range of women’s studies activities taking place throughout the world. Given the scope of women’s studies activities in both university and nonuniversity contexts, for the sake of this project, we define the commencement of women’s studies as the first degree or department or program in women’s studies within a university in a country. As seen in Table 1, few countries had established women’s studies programs or degrees in the 1970s. Those countries that created women’s studies courses in the 1970s were primarily the most industrialized countries (e.g., France and the U.S.), but also include the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Lebanon. Those establishing a formal curriculum in the 1980s consist of other European countries and industrializing countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Formally Communist countries and a number of African countries joined the international movement in the 1990s and beyond.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE From a world society perspective crucial developments in higher education after World War II reflect fundamental changes in world culture. These changes involve major shifts in who counts and what counts. People increasingly count, both as human capital engines and as bearers of human rights. The idea and the ideal of the empowered person as crucial to societal progress are increasingly celebrated. Moreover, the empowered person is not viewed solely as a national resource that should be efficiently allocated, but more importantly as a human right that should be freely exercised. The women’s movement appropriates, refines, and extends the category of the empowered person to include all women. The net effect of this movement is that throughout the world women increasingly count. To be sure some of the earlier ‘‘counting’’ simply involves extending the rights of men to women. In some parts of the world battles over inclusion persist but for the most part an inclusionary logic has triumphed. Cross-national studies show women’s increasing participation in higher education
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Table 1.
Founding Year of the First Women’s Studies Department/ Program or Degree, by Country, 1970–2000.
Country Argentina Austria Bangladesh Barbados Belgium Benin Botswana Brazil Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Canada Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Congo Costa Rica Cote d’Ivoire Czech Republic Denmark Dominican Republic Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Ethiopia Finland France Gabon Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Hungary Iceland India Ireland Israel Jamaica Japan Kenya Korea Lebanon
Year 1987 1994 2001 1993 1994 None by 2000 None by 2000 1980 None by 2000 None by 2000 1993 1975 None by 2000 None by 2000 1991 1987 1985 None by 2000 1987 None by 2000 1998 1981 1987 None by 2000 None by 2000 None by 2000 1986 1975 None by 2000 None by 2000 2005 1981 1989 1992 1996 1984 1990 1982 1986 1975 1987 1975 1973
Country Lesotho Liberia Lithuania Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritius Mexico Mozambique Namibia Netherlands New Zealand Niger Nigeria Norway Palestine (not in dataset) Peru Poland Puerto Rico Russia Senegal Sierra Leone Somalia South Africa Spain Sudan Swaziland Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Thailand Togo Trinidad and Tobago Turkey Uganda U.K. Ukraine U.S.A. Venezuela Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe
Year None by 2000 None by 2000 1992 None by 2000 1999 None by 2000 None by 2000 1983 None by 2000 2000 1979 1986 None by 2000 1995 1985 1994 1990 1992 1986 1993 None by 2000 1995 None by 2000 1984 1979 1989 None by 2000 1984 1995 1985 1986 None by 2000 1993 1989 1991 1980 1995 1970 1982 1993 1995 1991
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(Bradley & Ramirez, 1996) and even in the fields of science and engineering (Ramirez & Wotipka, 2001). Broader changes are evident in a world where more and more countries ratify international conventions to ban all forms of discrimination against women (Wotipka & Ramirez, 2008). The inequalities between women and men that persist are apt to be coded as inequities in serious need of rectification. International conferences identify the inequalities that need to be rectified and generate national gender equity report cards that make cross-national comparisons evident to all countries. National policy makers and social movement activists increasingly know where their countries stand on a number of gender equity dimensions relative to other countries. Prior studies show that these international conferences are important sites of socialization and mobilization and their timing influences national outcomes (Wotipka & Ramirez, 2008). What other countries adopt by way of policy or activity is also an important influence, as theories of normative cascades emphasize (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). From a world society perspective, the global dynamics at work involve classical diffusion processes (the cumulative impact of what other countries adopt) and international occasions that foster innovation (international women’s conferences that highlight women’s issues and the need for change). But world cultural change involves not only who counts but what counts. There are basic changes with respect to the socially dominant theories of both personnel and knowledge (Meyer, 1977). With respect to higher education, the earlier challenge to its dominant male composition (its personnel) increasingly involves the additional challenge to its male-centric curriculum (its knowledge base). Both challenges, of course, are broader than the gender issue that preoccupies this paper. The ideal university is expected to be more inclusive with respect to admissions and as regards curricula; this is a novel but intensive theme in European higher education circles and increasingly worldwide (Meyer, Ramirez, Frank, & Schofer, 2007; Ramirez, 2006). So, while universities and systems of higher education have historically varied as regards inclusiveness or eliteness with respect to admissions and curricula, in the post World War II era a transnational ethos favoring inclusiveness has evolved. This transnational ethos suggests a third global dynamic and that is the expansion of higher education itself (Schofer & Meyer, 2005). Greater inclusiveness with respect to composition should increase the likelihood of greater inclusiveness with respect to what counts as knowledge, that is, the curriculum. The triumph of an inclusionary logic should raise questions about the terms of inclusion. In higher education these questions opened the door to a set of curricular innovations that included women’s studies curricular initiatives (Gumport, 2002).
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From a world society perspective, the initial adoption of a women’s studies curriculum will be positively influenced by the adopting practices of other countries (global diffusion), by the timing of international women’s conferences (socialization opportunities), and by the inclusiveness of the system of higher education (its relative size). Throughout these analyses we control for the effects of economic development and political democracy. The literature suggests that wealthier countries are both more able and more likely to undertake curricular experiments. Expanded resources facilitate risk taking and limit potential costs of curricular experiments. The literature also suggests that democratic regimes are also more likely to engage in innovations in higher education, especially those innovations more in line with democratic ideas and practices. More inclusive polities may have more inclusive systems of higher education that in turn may find it easier to incorporate educational innovations such as the establishment of women’s studies curricula.
METHODS OF ANALYSIS Methods and Models of Estimation For our analysis, we use event history models of estimation. Event history analysis is an appropriate tool to explain events occurring to individuals (or in this case, countries) over a specified period of time (Allison, 1984; Strang, 1994; Tuma & Hannan, 1984). It provides a more dynamic method in that it provides coefficients demonstrating the influence of explanatory variables on the rate of first establishment of a women’s studies course – a single, non-repeatable event. Event history analysis also allows for the possibility that some cases (countries) will not experience an event, as in the case of countries that have yet to have a women’s studies department/ program or degree within a university. The event studied is the year in which a country opens its first women’s department, program, or degree at a university during the time period (1970–2000). When it does, it receives a value of 1 for that year. For those years in which none of these exist in a country or if a country has already offered such a course, the country receives a score of 0. The set of states at risk of offerings its first women’s studies department/program or degree (the risk-set) is made up of all countries in the world for which data was obtainable for the dependent variable (for details see below). The exponential model has been used in prior cross-national studies and is
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employed in this analysis. The results we present are very similar to those obtained when we use Wiebul models instead.
Variables The task of collecting dates (years) for the first women’s studies degree/ program or degree in each country involved consulting written reports and country-specific articles. When written works lacked information on the first women’s studies department/program or degree, we contacted informed academics involved in women’s studies activities in each country. For Europe, names and electronic mail addresses were gathered from the European Women’s Studies Guide II (Krops, 1997) and the web sites of the Advanced Thematic Network in Activities in Women’s Studies in Europe (ATHENA)7 and the Women’s Studies Euro Map.8 Information for several Latin American and African cases came from directories of women and gender studies programs in those regions (GWS Africa, 2002; Programa Interdisciplinario de Estudios de la Mujer, 1993). Country reports from various issues of Women’s Studies Quarterly helped us obtain data for several other cases. When dates could not be obtained from written sources, we contacted authors of relevant papers on women’s studies or directors of existing programs or departments via email. In the end, we were able to obtain dates for 83 countries out of which 59 had constructed a women’s studies curriculum by 2000 (see Table 1 for a list of those countries). We use the following independent variables to capture the ideas expressed in the world society perspective.9 First, we test the diffusion argument using the cumulative number of women’s studies programs/departments or degrees at the world level in the year prior. This is a standard way of gauging the influence of global density on national adoption likelihood. Next we measure the influence of the timing of international women’s conferences by focusing on the three conferences that predict the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). At issue is whether the adoption of a women’s curriculum is more likely during the year immediately before and during the conferences instead of during nonconference years. Lastly, we use tertiary enrollments as a percent of the appropriate age cohort (20–24) to measure the inclusiveness of the system of higher education (World Bank, 2001). Systems with smaller proportions of the age cohort enrolled in higher education are considered more elite. To determine the influence of national economic development on the commencement of women’s studies courses, we use gross domestic product
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per capita (constant US$ for 1995), which comes from the World Bank (2001). Democracy is measured as a dummy variable for democratic regimes (coded 1) versus autocratic ones (Cheibub & Gandhi, 2004). Our findings are described in the next section.
Results Table 2 reports the results from the event history analyses of the rate of offering a first women’s department/program or degree between 1970 and 2000. In the final analysis, 83 countries having a total of 59 events (instances of offering a women’s studies department/program or degree) are included. We present five different models. Model 1 is the base model with measures of national economic development, political democracy, and the cumulative number of women’s studies programs/departments or degrees in the world. In this model, all three variables show statistically significant positive effects. The adoption rate is clearly and strongly influenced by the cumulative adoptions in the prior year. This global density effect holds, net of the also strong positive effects of economic development and political democracy. If the latter effects suggest that country differences matter, the global density effect indicates that what other countries do is consequential as well. In the second model, we add the international women’s conference variable to the base model. The results show that the timing of international women’s conferences is indeed an important influence on the timing of the adoption of a women’s studies curriculum. Note that none of these conferences were especially focused on the issue of women’s studies. But it appears that international conferences that highlight women’s issues increase the likelihood of curricular innovations that also highlight women’s issues. The inclusion of this variable does not alter the effects of the variables in the base model. All these variables continue to show positive and significant effects. In models 3a and 3b, we add measures of the degree to which the system of higher education is inclusive or elitist, in 3a we use a gender-specific measure, that is, the number of women in higher education as a percent of the age cohort. In 3b, we look at the relative size of the tertiary system, that is, the proportion of the age cohort enrolled in higher education. In neither model do we obtain the expected finding: system inclusiveness in these models is unrelated to the timing of the adoption of a women’s studies curriculum. These models are estimated without the international women’s
Interaction effects Women in higher education (%) and regime dummy
Tertiary system Women in higher education, as % of age cohort Percent of 20–24-yearold cohort in higher education International linkages Yearly total of GWS programs, worldwide 2-year window around international women’s conferences Regional effects Africa
Rights Regime dummy
0.01738 (0.00728)
1.03072 (0.34636)
0.41183 (0.08213)
Model 1
0.02119 (0.00756) 0.69346 (0.22646)
1.01501 (0.34618)
0.41097 (0.08197)
Model 2
0.02316 (0.00845)
0.01804 (0.01159)
1.05456 (0.35359)
0.47998 (0.09869)
Model 3a – Women in Cohort
0.02006 (0.00825)
0.00950 (0.01317)
1.07335 (0.35855)
0.43603 (0.10021)
Model 3b – Overall Elitism
0.02670 (0.00865) 0.71265 (0.22698)
0.01708 (0.01161)
1.03101 (0.35377)
0.47249 (0.09791)
Model 4a
1.49428 (0.49342)
0.02384 (0.00893) 0.70154 (0.22721)
0.00941 (0.01223)
1.26398 (0.37796)
0.59009 (0.10721)
Model 4b – with African Dummy
0.06173 (0.04344)
0.02764 (0.00879) 0.71455 (0.22717)
0.07477 (0.04374)+
0.49810 (0.47515)
0.49142 (0.09852)
Model 5
Coefficients of Exponential Models Predicting Hazard Rate of the Founding of First Gender or Women’s Studies Department or Program, 1970–2000.
Economic development GDP/capita (logged)
Variables
Table 2.
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3102 (50) 69.16 (4) 83.657
3102 (50) 60.88 (3)
87.797
Number of observations (failures) LR w2 (d.f.), compared to constant-only model Log likelihood
Note: Exponential models. po.001, po.01, po.05, +po.10; Standard errors are in parentheses.
15.33701 (2.02504)
15.00863 (2.02211)
Constant
Model 2
Model 1
Variables
85.855
2920 (48) 55.46 (4)
16.50653 (2.41738)
Model 3a – Women in Cohort
86.320
2923 (49) 56.47 (4)
15.49601 (2.42211)
Model 3b – Overall Elitism
Table 2. (Continued )
81.502
2920 (48) 64.16 (5)
16.68806 (2.39896)
Model 4a
76.938
2920 (48) 73.29 (6)
20.10866 (2.71723)
Model 4b – with African Dummy
80.133
2920 (48) 66.90 (6)
16.75435 (2.38130)
Model 5
102 CHRISTINE MIN WOTIPKA AND FRANCISCO O. RAMIREZ
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conferences variable; this variable is included in models 4a and 4b. Note that the results are very similar across models 3a, 3b, and 4a. The independent variables that influence the dependent variable do so across these three models. We attempt some exploratory analyses in models 4b and 5. In model 4b, we include a dummy variable for Africa, coded 1 with all other countries coded 0. A positive value would indicate that African countries were more likely to earlier adopt than other countries. We undertake this analysis in an experimental vein: the lower level of economic development in Africa should result in a negative effect but the extent to which Africa is subjected to globalizing influences via the international donor community could lead to earlier adoption. While we find that economic development continues to be positive and significant in this model, the African dummy variable is positive and significant. This suggests that for African countries the pressures of the external environment in favor of a curricular innovation may offset the negative influence of limited resources. Here again all the other variables behave as they did in the earlier models, suggesting a degree of robustness to these cross-national findings. Lastly, in model 5 we estimate an interaction effect, net of the effects of the other independent variables we have examined. Here the idea is to see whether more gender-specific inclusionary systems of higher education lead to earlier adoption in democratic regimes. A positive interaction value would show that this was the case. We indeed find a positive albeit modest interaction effect, significant at the 0.10 level. What this suggests is that the impact of system inclusiveness is greater in a political system within which universities may have an easier time to experiment with new curricula. Once more the effects of the other independent variables remained the same as in prior models. In additional analyses not reported in this paper, we estimated the influence of several indicators of the status of women. These include the length of time women have been enfranchised, the labor force participation rates of women, the strength of the national women’s movement, etc. None of these measures significantly influenced the dependent variable. Nor did their inclusion alter the results presented in Table 2.
DISCUSSION In this study, two core findings are consistent with the world society perspective and with the results of prior cross-national studies that examined
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other changes in the status of women. The adoption of a women’s studies curriculum is positively influenced by the adopting practices of other countries. In a more integrated world environment it is easier to know what other countries do by way of curricular innovation in higher education. Moreover, the universalistic assumption that what counts as knowledge in universities in some country should also count in universities in other countries facilitates emulation and diffusion. Educational plans and their rationales are more rapidly transmitted through professional discourse often articulated in international organizations and conferences. International agencies are often engaged in the early stages of the planning itself, offering templates and assisting in the refining of national initiatives. As more countries move in the direction of establishing women’s studies curricula in a university, the legitimacy of this innovation increases, thereby increasing the likelihood of being further adopted. This dynamic is discussed at great length within the world society perspective but more broadly within both neo-institutional and population ecology theories. Furthermore, in addition to the classical diffusion or normative cascades process, we find the timing of international women’s conferences is indeed consequential. These conferences, of course, are driven by an ongoing women’s movement and their influence reflects the global reach of this movement. The agenda setting authority of these conferences is often underestimated because these conferences – and indeed the women’s movement itself – lack official sanctioning power. But in a world in which international non-governmental organizations increasingly exercise influence over a broad range of issues, it is perhaps not surprising that these conferences facilitate curricular innovations in line with gender equity concerns. This facilitation may take the form of within site socialization, but anticipatory socialization processes may also take place. The timing of these conferences provides national actors with international opportunities for displaying gender equity sensitivity or awareness in one form or another. However, contrary to what we expected, more inclusive national educational systems are not clearly more hospitable environments for this further exercise in curricular inclusiveness. The worldwide trend in the direction of the formation of more women’s studies curricula directly reflects an overall world inclusionary logic applied to women and women’s issues. This overall inclusionary logic may be especially influential in the contemporary era of expanded women’s rights consciousness, reflected in a growing number of treaties, conferences, and organizations upholding and elaborating these rights. We had thought that this ‘‘world press’’ would nevertheless vary in its impact depending on the degree of inclusiveness of
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the system of higher education. The positive effects of both economic development and political democracy indicate that some cross-national variation continues to be important. But in this study, cross-national variation in the inclusiveness of the system of higher education is unrelated to the timing of the adoption of a women’s studies program or degree, except in more democratic regimes. The relevant variation in large part appears to be temporal and global in character.
CONCLUSION Before 1970 no country in the world had a university with a women’s studies curriculum. Over a 30 year period, we find that at least one university in nearly 60 countries offers a program or degree in women’s studies. We say at least because our data is restricted to the countries for which we have information on the timing of the adoption of the first women’s studies program. We know in fact that this curricular innovation has taken place in some countries for which we as yet do not know the date of adoption. We further know that adoptions continue beyond 2000, in Georgia in 2005 for instance.10 This chapter reviews the literature on the development of women’s studies curricula in different countries and regions throughout the world. We then demonstrate that net of the effects of societal factors such as development and democracy, the timing of the adoption of women’s studies curricula is strongly influenced by both the adopting practices of other countries (global density) and by the timing of international women’s conferences (international opportunities for national displays of gender equity commitments). Global dynamics reflecting the influence of a growing ‘‘world press’’ are clearly at work. In what follows we briefly sketch some further research directions. First, prior studies of the diffusion of an innovation suggest that earlier in the process local or endogenous factors are more likely to be influential while the behavior of other adopters and the external environment in general becomes more consequential later on. This finding is reported for within country diffusion of innovation studies (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983) but also for cross-national studies, such as the analysis of the spread of the franchise for women (Ramirez, Soysal, & Shanahan, 1997). Perhaps the character of the national political regime carries greater weight between 1970 and 1985, while the impact of cumulative adoptions in the prior year may be stronger in the later 1985–2000 periods. To answer this and related
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questions about the relative importance of internal and external factors that foster adoption, different event history models need to be estimated that allow for varying effects contingent on different time periods. A second research direction focuses on how international conferences work to influence the formation of the first women’s studies curriculum. In our discussion, we recognize that this may not be a simple one-way process; international conferences are unlikely to simply awaken national actors in a state of slumber. Some national actors were deeply involved in the formation of these conferences and their agendas. Some international agencies may provide advice to both international and national actors at varying stages of the planning and decision-making. In countries where national ministries of education exercise much authority over university curricular plans ministries may nudge universities to move in a given direction in anticipation of national participation in the appropriate international conferences. Or, alternatively university actors may have taken the lead earlier on but found a welcoming ministry more so during times when women’s issues were highlighted in international conferences. To get a better handle on these varying dynamics may require different research designs. These may take the form of comparative case studies or, in some instances, of an analysis of the networks that support the establishment of an international conference and its agenda (Chabbott, 2003). Lastly, it is important to figure out how much global factors interact with local features in influencing outcomes such as the formation of a women’s studies curriculum. By local features we have in mind not only national attributes but also characteristics of universities. To illustrate, consider the issue of inclusiveness. Obviously one can think in terms of interaction effects in which a changing world measured by global density of adoptions for example, increases the likelihood of national adoption but especially so for countries with higher levels of system inclusiveness. The exploratory analysis in which we show a positive interaction effect between regime and genderspecific inclusiveness suggests that we should give further thought to other possible interaction effects that may influence this curricular innovation. But there is clearly within nation variation in how inclusive universities are. By 2000 there may not be striking differences across universities in some countries as far women’s share of higher education is concerned, but earlier on, sharper differences may co-vary with the timing of curricular innovations. Moreover, the concept of inclusiveness should not be limited to the dimension of admissions access. An older literature in the sociology of education suggests that some systems are more open to innovation and expansion because they are less controlled by centralized authorities
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(Collins, 1979) and because the curricula is less controlled by a canon protecting faculty and more open to external influences (Ben-David & Zloczower, 1962). Studies at the university level of analysis are much needed to evaluate these explanatory ideas. Here again we may find that university differences matter more so in an earlier era, but that these differences prove to be soft barriers to the worldwide logic of inclusiveness. This has certainly been the case with respect to the composition of higher education; higher educational growth is much driven by women’s accelerated rise in higher education. The emergence of feminist studies at Oxford University suggests that even deep historical legacies affirming faculty authority and canonical knowledge are unlikely to shield university curricula from the influence of a worldwide logic of inclusiveness. By comparing different universities in different national contexts one can ascertain the relative weight of societal and organizational factors in shaping educational innovations such as the formation of a women’s studies curricula. More qualitative studies may lead to more refined portraits of adoption processes in concrete cases, while the use of hierarchical linear methods may help gauge the relative weight of organizational, societal, and global factors in influencing curricular developments in universities.
NOTES 1. We use the widely used term of ‘‘women’s studies’’ recognizing that other terms such as feminist studies, woman studies, and gender studies have been used in countries and institutions around the world. 2. The web site run by Joan Korenman out of the University of MarylandBaltimore County Women’s Studies Program organizes the most comprehensive listing of Women’s Studies Programs, Departments, and Research Centers in the United States and in other countries. See http://research.umbc.edu/Bkorenman/ wmst/programs.html 3. See for an exception Silius (2002). 4. See Women’s Studies Quarterly (20: 3/4, 1992 and 24: 1/2, 1996). 5. For an analysis of the growth of women’s studies programs within the United States see Olzak and Kangas (2006). For an analysis of the influence of the black power movement on the establishment of black studies in American universities see Rojas (2007). 6. Ewha Women’s University offered the country’s first women’s studies courses in 1977. 7. Available at http://www.let.uu.nl/womens_studies/athena/index.html 8. Available at http://women-www.uia.ac.be/women/index.html 9. We also employed other indicators of women’s status (women’s share of higher education enrollment; proportion of women in the age cohort enrolled in higher
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education; women’s share of the labor force; date of female suffrage; and state ratification of international women’s rights treaties) for which insignificant results were found and therefore not reported here. 10. Marine Chitashvili (Director, Center for Social Sciences, Tbilisi State University, Republic of Georgia), private communication, September 29, 2007.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS A version of this chapter was presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, Association for the Study of Higher Education, and the National Women’s Studies Association. We thank Moreica Allana-Kim Ortega for her assistance with data collection and Elise Paradis for data collection and analysis. This project benefited from the advice of John W. Meyer, Karen Bradley, John Boli, David John Frank, Susan Christopher, Gero Lenhardt, the members of the Stanford Comparative Workshop, and the Global Fellows Program at the University of California, Los Angeles, the volume editors, and several anonymous reviewers.
REFERENCES Allison, P. D. (1984). Event history analysis: Regression for longitudinal event data. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. Ben-David, J., & Zloczower, A. (1962). Universities and academic systems in modern societies. European Journal of Sociology, 3, 45–84. Boswell, B. (2003). Locating gender and women’s studies teaching and research programmes at African Universities: Survey results. Available at http://www.gwsafrica.org/directory/ index.html. Retrieved on August 15, 2007. Boxer, M. J. (1998). When women ask the questions: Creating women’s studies in America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Bradley, K., & Ramirez, F. O. (1996). World polity and gender parity: Women’s share of higher education, 1965–1985. In: A. M. Pallas (Ed.), Research in sociology of education and socialization (Vol. 11, pp. 63–91). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Chabbott, C. (2003). The construction of educational development: Development organizations and the world conference on education for all. In: E. R. Beauchamp (Ed.), New York: Routledge Falmer. Chamberlain, M. K., & Howe, F. (1995). Women’s studies and developing countries: Focus on Asia. In: The women and international development annual (Vol. 4, pp. 51–75). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
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THE RESEARCH UNIVERSITY IN CONTEXT: THE EXAMPLES OF BRAZIL AND GERMANY Karin Amos, Lu´cia Bruno and Marcelo Parreira do Amaral The title ‘‘The Research University in Context: The Examples of Brazil and Germany’’ addresses three well-established dimensions: (1) the university’s embeddedness in a specific system of higher education which is a part of a national education system, (2) a specific national tradition and understanding of science and research, and (3) the changes in meaning of the term ‘‘research university’’ over time, which may or may not be self-critically observed and interpreted by prominent actors or interest groups. In all of these dimensions, the nation-state figures prominently, because it is the one crucial actor with the necessary power and legitimization to design and implement policies, and to initiate and enforce reform processes. Consequently, comparative educational research has a long tradition in defining the nation-state as the single most important unit of analysis. At the same time, the organization of the modern education system, from its very inception, is strongly linked to an international dynamics that shapes and directs its development. While the influence of this international dimension on national education systems is well studied, these exchange relations are usually conceived of as taking place between two or more nations. The mechanisms of these exchanges have been variously described, as lending The Worldwide Transformation of Higher Education International Perspectives on Education and Society, Volume 9, 111–158 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1479-3679/doi:10.1016/S1479-3679(08)00005-4
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and borrowing, as importing and exporting, and as copying and adapting. ‘‘Isomorphism’’, ‘‘mimesis’’, and ‘‘path dependency’’ are the overarching terms indicating a common orientation to imitate and adapt whatever proves to be successful in a given policy area. Thus, internationally informed discursive peaks and policy changes are taken to indicate systemic readjustments and realignments on a national level. Ju¨rgen Schriewer (1992, 2004) has elaborated on the strategic dimension of this ‘‘looking abroad’’ and coined the term ‘‘externalization’’ – the reference to practices and policies abroad to lend strength and justification to domestic reform arguments. Turning to the topic at hand, a comparative look at the research university as part of the transformation of higher education, we start with a brief delineation of our perspective. To be sure, universities as such are not novel institutions to either Brazil or Germany. However, in the past, in line with the dominance of the nation-state as central actor, they were shaped by very different, mainly indigenous forces. In other words, education systems although shaped by transnational forces, were dominated by nationally bound actors and specifically molded to fit into particular societies. This can be illustrated very clearly with a look at the historiographies of both countries highlighting not only different developments in higher education but also different ways of writing about these traditions. We deliberately chose not to homogenize the historical perspective in order not to create the false impression of convergencies in that particular area when there was little or none. Nevertheless, even if there are few direct relations between Brazilian and German higher education in a historical perspective, the historical dimension has to be taken into account as an integral part of a comparative perspective. It is important to understand the paradigms of past relations between the national and the international levels in order to make sense of the present changes. Having observed that the research university is part of higher education, which in turn is part of the education system, and that modern education systems are core institutions of the nation-state, the specifics of this kind of university need to be briefly considered. Most importantly, research universities are defined as high-profile institutions of outstanding symbolic significance, the ‘‘flagships’’ of any national higher education system. As places of research and teaching, sitting squarely between the education and the science systems they are intricately linked to social and economic progress as well as to human capital development. Epitomizing a high stage of human perfectibility and national progress, research universities are icons of internationally competitive states since the nineteenth century.
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The emergence of this unique institution is usually associated with Wilhelm von Humboldt and although his model was developed before German national unification, it came to be known as the German type of university, exported and adapted in a worldwide disseminated discourse. Considering the case at hand, in the well established, if still controversial logic of borrowing and lending, the direction of influence would appear to be clear, leading from Germany to Brazil. In fact, there is evidence of this, although Germany was a less important point of orientation than France. Apart from indicating time and scope of ‘‘borrowing’’, what the historical perspective clearly shows is that the Humboldtian model, whatever its specific meaning, was so strong in Germany that it survived for almost 200 years. The idea of Humboldt was alive and well serving as a point of orientation, defining science and research in very broad terms and holding on to the unity of teaching and studying even under the conditions of the so-called mass university in the latter half of the twentieth century. Against this background, great resilience against changes would be expected in the German case. Therefore, the great surprise in the comparison between Brazil and Germany comes when the current situation is considered. Here we find that both countries follow a new model, a transnational model of the research university, a model that is loosely based on the American type of research university but that is mainly disseminated through international organizations. Despite persistent path dependencies and despite different strategies of intervention on the part of international organizations, there is unexpected convergence. We take this as an indicator for an overall change in the way education systems are embedded and therefore as a sign for a realignment between the national and the inter- or transnational levels. To summarize: The rather unusual historical and international comparison between Brazil and Germany throws tendencies of national reactions to international (global) developments into stark relief. The assumption is that if countries with apparently few similarities in common with regard to historical development, and with regard to main societal indicators such as demographics, economic development, welfare state arrangements etc., can be shown to share isomorphic tendencies in a particular area, which they did not share in the past, it is a strong indicator for the changing relation between the international and the national levels. Hence, we argue that the current research university model is shaped by the same transnational forces. We develop our argument in three major parts. We begin by discussing our theoretical frame and contextualize the research university debate. Then we discuss the historical developments of higher education in both countries. We do this on the basis of the historiographical traditions in
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higher education of both countries. Finally, we present current relevant data on both countries indicating areas of convergency in higher education in spite of both historical and socio-economic variation. The implications of these trends will be addressed in the concluding part of our paper.
EMBEDDED EDUCATION – THE CASE OF THE RESEARCH UNIVERSITY For the longest period of its history, the university was the guardian and transmitter – not the producer – of knowledge. This relatively recent change of transmitting canonical knowledge and generating new knowledge is normally associated with Wilhelm von Humboldt. Other highly influential university models were provided by France and Great Britain. The association of certain types of universities with particular countries is a strong indicator of the intricate link between nation-state and education. Hence, the history of tertiary education and its elite institutions, the research universities, must be considered in relation with a sea change in educational history – the gradual emergence of national education systems. Only under the conditions of the by now standard form of organizing modern societies as nation-states did education become a central institution (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997) collapsing individual perfectibility and national progress. The nationally redefined university was integrated into the education system as its keystone while also being considered the motor of societal development. From a social history perspective, the latter aspect in particular indicates the pragmatic (training professionals, imparting military and technical knowledge, etc.) and symbolic expectations, ‘‘myths’’ of the nation-state that have been so aptly described and analyzed in numerous macro-sociological neo-institutionalist studies (Meyer, Ramirez, & Soysal, 1992; Meyer et al., 1997; Ramirez & Boli, 1987). In a macro-phenomenological perspective, the term ‘‘myth’’ is used to denote a fundamental change in the self-description of European society which since the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries no longer views itself as consisting of separate collectivities divided from each other by social origin – as was the case under feudal conditions – with each collectivity providing itself the necessary education for its members or being provided for by others in the case of neediness. Instead, as a result of a number of material and immaterial changes, society now defines the individual as its key unit, with the nation being consequently the aggregate of individuals and not of
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collectivities and the state redefined as the guardian of the nation. This conception might be taken as a kind of overlapping area which includes different approaches, such as Michel Foucault’s concept of the disciplinary society (Foucault, 1977), Balibar and Wallerstein’s (1991) deliberations on the relation between race, class, and nation, and Benedict Anderson’s (1991) description of nations as imagined communities. All these studies could be taken as sharing the notion of ‘‘constructedness’’ (cf. Berger & Luckmann, 1972) of modern society with the neo-institutionalist perspective. The concept of a ‘‘world polity’’ which encompasses the ‘‘myths’’ society is based on, the overall notion of a cognitive culture, which takes Max Weber’s concept of rationality as a point of departure, is identified as the basis of isomorphic change in the organizational structure of modern education systems (cf. Baker & Wiseman, 2006). However, the strong emphasis on international, world system embeddedness of nation-states and their education systems is not to be taken as a unidirectional dependence on external forces. While modern nation-states originate from and remain tied to international dynamics and developments, they are conceived as unique entities. For most of their history, modern nation-states have been preoccupied with making themselves distinct from each other. Thus, while international competition has always been present, looking abroad traditionally meant reworking, adapting, and reshaping what was imported, or borrowed (Halpin & Troyna, 1995; Steiner-Khamsi, 2004). This is true for education as well as for other areas of society. Against this background, we take the term research university to designate an institution that is deeply embedded in the cognitive culture of world society and that has changed meaning over time. In addition, we follow the macro-sociological phenomenological approach of neoinstitutionalism in identifying the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as the period when the key elements of world society emerged, in the sense of a wide acceptance and spread of a specific rationality. Against this background, the Humboldtian model was just that – a model of a university that realigned the relations among teaching, studying, and research. Which aspects of the concept were taken up und how they were reworked, strongly depended on the specific circumstances of the ‘‘observer’’ nation. As a model, heralded for its innovative, progress-promoting character, it had a strong symbolic resonance in aspiring, modernizing countries, such as the United States and a much weaker one in countries that either had a different focus on tertiary education altogether, or strong indigenous traditions. The former would be true for Brazil, for example, the latter for England and France which were themselves providers of models.
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Even in the United States, where the founding of Johns Hopkins is usually taken to be strongly modeled after Berlin, ‘‘Humboldt’s’’ concept was never copied but adapted to the particular circumstances of US-American society (Clark, 1995). Most importantly, even in Germany, Humboldt’s vision of a university was never fully realized, not even in Berlin as the following, slightly hyperbolic observation by a famous visitor, Henry Adams indicates: He had thought Harvard College a torpid school, but it was instinct with life compared with all he could see of the University of Berlin. The German students were strange animals, but their professors were beyond pay. y The mental attitude of the university was not of an American world. What sort of instruction prevailed in other branches y Adams had no occasion to ask, but in Civil Law he found only the lecture system in its deadliest form as it flourished in the thirteenth century. (Adams, 1973, p. 75)
Undeniably, Humboldt’s vision of science has strong humanistic overtones, firmly placing it in the eighteenth and not in the industrializing nineteenth century. Especially the description of the dedication to science and the pursuit of truth as a lonely and free activity, conceived of as an intra-individual process strongly linked to self-cultivation (Bildung) is far from our current understanding of science: Der Universita¨t ist vorbehalten, was nur der Mensch durch und in sich selbst finden kann, die Einsicht in die reine Wissenschaft. Zu diesem Selbst Actus im eigentlichsten Verstand ist nothwendig Freiheit und hu¨lfreiche Einsamkeit, und aus diesen beiden Punkten fliesst zugleich die ganze a¨ussere Organisation der Universita¨ten. Das Kollegienho¨ren ist Nebensache, das Wesentliche, dass man in enger Gemeinschaft mit Gleichgestimmten und Gleichaltrigen und dem Bewusstsein, dass es am gleichen Ort eine Zahl schon vollendet Gebildeter gebe, die sich nur der Erho¨hung und Verbreitung der Wissenschaft widmen, eine Reihe von Jahren sich und der Wissenschaft lebe. (Humboldt, 1993, p. 191)
Suffice it to say that notwithstanding the multi-faceted, often contradictory reality in the history of the modern university, the name of Wilhelm von Humboldt is an international icon signaling the collapsing of science, research and teaching into one single institution, the modern university (cf. Ash, 1999; Clark, 1993; Turner, 1980, 2001; Ben-David, 1984). If Humboldt might be considered as the distant mirror of the modern research university, he is usually not taken as the direct precursor, especially not in the sense that research is understood today. How much the current debate of the research university differs from Humboldt’s vision can be seen
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from the following indicator based definition provided by The Center for Measuring University Performance: Many indicators serve this purpose, but most observers know that research matters more than anything else in defining the best institutions. In its annual reports, The Center provides both the total research and development expenditures and the highly-competitive federally sponsored research and development expenditures as indicators of research scale. While the dollars give a good approximation of research activity, it is the faculty who provide the critical resource for university success, and The Center reports the number of members of the National Academies among an institution’s faculty along with the number of significant faculty awards earned as indicators of faculty distinction. Students provide a double indicator by reflecting both the externally perceived quality of the institution and providing with their own credentials an important contribution to that quality. For the graduate and research instructional dimension, The Center provides the number of doctorates awarded and the number of postdoctoral appointments supported; and The Center offers median SAT scores as indicators of student competitiveness. (The Center for Measuring University Performance, 2006, emphasis in orig.)
Today, the data collection and interpretation of higher education worldwide is designed by national, international, and transnational organizations in similar ways and posted on a large array of different Internet sites ranging from those of the organizations collecting the data to such clearing houses as the Italian-based Social Capital Gateway (cf. Social Capital Gateway, 2006). Statements like the one quoted earlier illustrate that the criteria of research have shifted significantly since Humboldt’s time, a major difference being now the central role of evaluation and assessment, the competitiveness, efficiency, and cost effectiveness of the university. Today, funding and thus the existence of the university depend much more on clearly defined and increasingly internationally accepted benchmarks (cf. also LERU, 2002, 2003). We argue that higher education systems are subject to the same rationale in defining a particular segment of the higher education system as research universities. This ‘‘pull’’ can, from a neo-institutionalist point of view, be explained as peer pressure. In order to carry weight as an actor in the world knowledge society, states need to present certain ‘‘credentials’’, such as being in possession of research universities. In a different perspective, arguing along the lines of Foucault, the discursive field around research universities could be described as a dispositive of power. We do not underestimate the importance of these issues but will focus on a different theoretical aspect. Meyer and Ramirez (2000, p. 125) posited that worldwide standardization has been least evident in the educational organizational dimension, that is, standardized models of financing and governance of education systems (see also Inkeles & Sirowy, 1983).
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We will argue that the new increase of convergency, particularly associated with evaluation and other new governance techniques, will bring increased standardization, especially in higher education. While the self-perception of nation-states throughout the nineteenth and during much of the twentieth centuries consisted in emphasizing differences, on creating their own national cultures and histories, and promoting their national languages as a central vehicle for membership constitution, the perspective now is directed at the successful adaptation of standardized models. Concomitant to this general development was that in previous times the university especially in disciplines belonging to the humanities, was entrusted with creating a national frame of reference with nationally defined communication structures.1 The explanation for this is their embeddedness in the national culture. Schriewer’s and Keiner’s (1992) paradigmatic study of the different communication spaces of educational science in France and Germany has illustrated the dominance of the national space of reference. The complex interrelation networks of education consisting of national and international components are said to be shaped in a way that the international impulses, programs, policies etc. are reworked and fitted into the national tradition. In other words, the national reference to developments abroad is claimed to be filtered through a special lens, as it were, for which the term externalization (Schriewer, 1992) was employed. This position emphasizes the importance of national, historical, and cultural path dependency, thus putting into perspective the neo-institutionalist notion of a universally disseminated ‘‘script’’ that is accessed by national societies to construct their education systems. In a similar way, Thomas Popkewitz’s concept of ‘‘indigenization’’ of the foreigner, also confirms the persistence of national traditions (Popkewitz, 2003). The current situation, however, differs in that convergency is achieved mainly through outcome/output orientation, that is, focusing on results and standardized procedures to measure the results. Thus, more than ever before, national particularities become secondary and the university everywhere is reshaped by the same forces. These discernible isomorphic mechanisms can best be described with DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) concepts of coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism (150ff.), and are caused by the organizational environment in which universities operate which is characterized by formal and informal pressures, (technological) uncertainty, and (rational) professionalization. As a consequence of this development, national specifics are increasingly deemphasized.
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES A Brief History of Higher Education in Brazil: The Relations between Research and Teaching Higher education2 in Brazil has its origin at the beginning of the nineteenth century when in 1808 the Portuguese court came to Brazil after fleeing from Napoleon’s armies (Oliveira, 2004, p. 947; Cunha, 1980). Before 1808, a substantial number of the young offspring of the colonial elite graduated from universities mainly in Portugal, but also in France and England. However, it was not the Portuguese model that the court brought to Brazil. Influenced by the ideas of the French Revolution and of the Enlightenment (Cunha, 1998), the Portuguese who had studied outside Portugal had a strong influence in promoting institutions of higher education for professional training in areas such as political economy and medicine. In Bahia, the then prince regent and later King of Portugal, D. Joa˜o VI, laid the foundation for what would later become the School of Medicine of the present Federal University of Bahia (see also Schwartzman, 1979). A second example is the Academia Real Militar, founded after the court moved to Rio de Janeiro. It retained its military character until 1823, when it started to accept the admission of civilians. In 1842, courses had been modified by including civil engineering and the school was definitely dissociated from its military roots by 1874 when it was renamed Polytechnic School. The school presented a strong French influence with regard to its formal organization and its main intellectual influence was Comtean positivism (Silva Telles, 1984). Another school devoted to professional training founded in this period was The Escola de Minas founded in Ouro Preto, Minas Gerais (a gold mining region) which also had a strong French orientation, since the director and board of professors came directly from France to assume their positions. By the end of Empire in 1889, two other law schools were founded – Olinda and Sa˜o Paulo – which also had a professional rather than a research design. In short, the first schools of higher education in Brazil established during the nineteenth century were directed towards professional training, were strongly compartmentalized and completely independent from one another. They were secular institutions whose didactic organization and structure of power was based on lifetime chairs. Professors had an excellent reputation and they dedicated themselves strictly to teaching activities (Oliven, 2005). National independence of the country in 1822 did not change this situation,
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and Brazilian higher education was constituted through successive associations of institutions and preexisting isolated schools. During the Empire, higher education was controlled by the Central State while elementary and secondary education was administered by the provinces (Oliveira, 2004, p. 948). The interest of the Central State in this arrangement is an indication of the characteristic power structure of the time (Saviani, 2002, p.25ff.). With the introduction of a federal system of government following the proclamation of the Republic in 1889 this pattern was interrupted. The Federal State retained the right to create higher education institutions (IFES) in the states, while at the same time allowing the opening of state institutions of higher education in all units of the federation. The diplomas granted by these institutions were only recognized when issued by accredited state institutions, or by private institutions that followed the same curriculum as the federal ones and were under the supervision of the respective ministry in charge. During the following two decades the number of institutions of higher education increased in Brazil, resulting in an economic and symbolic depreciation of the diploma and leading to the introduction of an entrance examination in 1911. Beginning in 1925 the number of available slots in each course of study was limited and could only be increased with ministerial authorization (Cunha, 2004). The Polytechnic School of Sa˜o Paulo was founded in the beginning of the Republican period mainly for the training of professionals to work on the construction of railroads which were used for transporting coffee (Silva Telles, 1984). Its first directors – all members of the coffee elite in Sa˜o Paulo – strongly supported professional training as well as research in the field of civil engineering. The Polytechnic School in Sa˜o Paulo does not represent an isolated instance; a number of institutions were created to increase knowledge in the area of civil engineering which marked an important change in the organization of higher education in Brazil, that is, the combining of teaching and research. Both the Gabinete de Resisteˆncia dos Materiais da Escola Polite´cnica and the famous Laborato´rio de Ensaios de Materiais (LEM) had their origins at this time and represented an especially important center of technological research in civil construction (Gitahy, 2001). The LEM became the Institute of Technological Research in 1934 when the Polytechnic School was integrated into the newly founded University of Sa˜o Paulo (USP). From the beginning the Escola Polite´cnica adopted the German model, combining teaching and research, distinguishing itself from other engineering schools which were under French influence (Gitahy, 2001).
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The first Brazilian universities – the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, founded in 1920 and the Federal University of Minas Gerais, founded in 1927 – aggregated distinct schools and did not bring any innovation concerning the objectives and organization of higher education. They retained a focus on professional training, the isolation among departments, the professorial Chair as an important basis of the power structure, and the elitist nature of education. This situation would remain unchanged until 1968 (Fa´vero, 2006, p. 24). Furthermore, it did not stimulate the development of science and technology, remaining distant to most of the needs of the Brazilian population. As early as 1931 the Statute of the Brazilian Universities, elaborated by Brazil’s first minister of education, Francisco Campos, established that a precondition of founding a university was the aggregation of at least three out of four accredited preexisting faculties: engineering, medicine, law and one from the group of philosophy, sciences, and languages authorized by the state. Being connected only by administrative bonds they could retain their legal autonomy. Against the background of the fragmented landscape of IFES and isolated faculties, the foundation of the Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo in 1934 represents an important milestone, for it did not follow the traditional model and proved innovative in its purposes. In terms of scientific research, the USP achieved the status of a national center of reference in several areas of knowledge. However, in organizational terms, it did not succeed in establishing the newly founded Faculdade de Filosofia, Cieˆncias e Letras as the integrating axis of teaching and research3 which figures prominently at the center of the Humboldtian model. A further important milestone was the founding of the Universidade do Distrito Federal in Rio de Janeiro (1935). It was conceptualized to be a national university, a model for all institutions of higher education in Brazil, setting a new education standard for all universities (Schwartzman, 1996; Fa´vero, 2006, p.24ff.). During Getu´lio Vargas’s dictatorship (1931–1945) the first great expansion of private education in Brazil occurred. Besides conferring fiscal immunity for private educational institutions4 on all levels, the government accredited the first private university, the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro. The administration of Getu´lio Vargas exerted heavy, centralized control over the higher education system. From 1945 to 1964 Brazilian higher education experienced a phase of integration. Universities were created through administrative bonds among existing faculties. Moreover, large numbers of institutions of higher education were placed under the control of the federal government. At the
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beginning of the 1960s 65% of the students in higher education were enrolled in universities. The organizational model of universities during these years was based on traditional faculties that offered professional training for the ruling elite (Cunha, 1998). While the National Educational Law (1961) allowed for some flexibility, in practice, it consolidated the traditional model based on a juxtaposition of existing faculties without major concern for research. Considering the developments described earlier, the foundation of the University of Brası´ lia (UnB), in 1962 in the new capital, was an important landmark. For the first time a university was created according to a previously devised plan and not by just bringing preexisting faculties together. This new model of a university had a more integrated structure. Modern, flexible and strongly research oriented, it stood in opposition to the former traditional model. Departments replaced the chairs as the unit of teaching and research serving, in part, as a model for the university reform of the late 1960s (Fa´vero, 2006, p. 29). In 1968, when student demonstrations were taking place in many countries, Brazilian students not only mobilized against the military dictatorship that had seized power in 1964, but also against the lack of access to higher education. While these pressures proved decisive the government’s special interest consisted in forming qualified young workers according to an economic model that had as its goal the modernization and internationalization of the Brazilian economy. To cope with the challenge the military government stimulated the opening of private institutions of higher education. Though many public universities were founded during the period of military dictatorship (1964–1985), their capacity for admitting students was yet not sufficient to answer the demand of a country with an enormous contingent of young people. Thus, the growth of the private educational sector was so significant that in two decades it absorbed 60% of the enrollment in higher education. For the military government it was of special concern that the young middle class – to whom it looked for support – be satisfied with the options available in higher education. The accelerated privatization of higher education at this point in time resulted from the determination of the government to increase the number of college slots without increasing the state investment in undergraduate courses. The proposal of the group in charge of writing the 1968 reform, Equipe de Assessoria para o Planejamento do Ensino Superior (EAPES)5 clearly defended the expansion of the private sector. As early as 1965 Rudolph Acton, an American expert and member of USAID, suggested a new model of the university entirely independent from the government,
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proposing the involvement of the private sector (enterprises) and the payment of fees. This project underwent several changes until 1968 and was eventually abandoned because the EAPES became wary about the creation of institutions detached from state power. Thus, the idea of granting administrative and juridical independence to universities was disregarded, as was the raising of tuition fees in face of the resistance it would provoke.6 The Law approved by the National Congress in 1968 (law LDB 5.440/68) defined new directions for the universities and modified its initial structure significantly. The chairs were replaced by departments whose head professors took turns. The entrance examination was no longer an elimination, but followed classification rules. Students could opt for more than one course when registering for entrance examinations allowing for the redirecting of applications to areas with lower demands. Short duration courses were introduced, mainly in technical and teacher-training areas. The adoption of a credit-system for the subjects studied was encouraged and a two-year basic cycle for the beginners was established. This regulation was intended to increase the number of students in public universities without excessively raising operational costs. The introduction of a two-year basic cycle was not successful and represented only a further failed attempt to implement a model similar to the American system in Brazil (Oliven, 2005). The reform placed the universities at the top of IFES. They were expected to develop the activities of teaching, research, and university extension.7 These three activities were considered inseparable insofar as they endorsed the unity of teaching and research and a system of full-time professorships. It augmented professional status of personnel and set the conditions for the development of a system of postgraduate and scientific activities in the country (Cunha, 2004; Oliven, 2005). These principles were not enforced on private institutions which focused on teaching, sometimes with questionable standards. Even though there are significant differences as to the degree to which research has been actually pursued in the different institutions, from this period on a host of provisions were made to improve research and consequently teaching in higher education in Brazil. Thus, the university was consolidated as the main locus of national research. The most relevant provisions were financial support for research as well as for further qualification of academic personnel. Financial resources for the development of the scientific research and for the training of researchers were provided to the public system by the government, allowing the major public universities (Federal institutions as well as the ones of the State of Sa˜o Paulo) to introduce a postgraduate system stricto sensu in the various
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fields of knowledge.8 This achievement was crucial to the development of postgraduate studies in respect to standards of access and advancement in the academic career. A further element was the activity of specialized support agencies for scientific development, on both the federal and state levels. On the federal level the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES) qualified a great number of university professors abroad and later also in consolidated national programs. The National Council of Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) financed research projects and granted scholarships for research professors as well as master and doctoral scholarships. Equally important were agencies on the state level such as the Foundation for the Support of Research of the state of Sa˜o Paulo (FAPESP), its cognate foundation in the state of Minas Gerais, FAPEMIG, and other similar public institutions in the different regions of Brazil. The reform had a different impact on undergraduate courses as compared to graduate courses. Undergraduate courses had to follow a minimum curriculum and emphasized professional training, graduate courses had autonomy to organize, evaluate, and reformulate their curriculum according to the program needs. Professors selected students based on their own criteria, and could determine the financial use of the available funds. The national plans for the development of graduate studies were reformulated and beginning in the 1970s CAPES initiated a program of evaluation for the master and doctoral courses which still orient their content to this day. For this purpose specialized commissions composed of experts from different areas of knowledge set standards with the approval of the scientific community. Such evaluation established criteria governing the professors’ qualification, the scientific work of the program, the number of graduates, the average time needed for the students to achieve a degree, the material conditions (facilities), and the libraries. Based on data supplied by the programs themselves, this evaluation was initially conducted annually and from 1982 onwards, every two years. After 1980 evaluation procedures changed and, in addition to data collection, regular visits to the postgraduate programs were introduced, aiming at a better support and assessment of operational conditions of current programs at universities. Brazilian education institutions, despite suffering repression and embarrassment, benefited from modernizing policies and generous financial support during the dictatorship period – in contrast to the Argentinean institutions and others in Latin America. Three public universities of great importance were founded and developed greatly during this period: the University of Campinas (UNICAMP), the Universidade Estadual Paulista
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Ju´lio de Mesquita Filho (UNESP), and the Federal University of Sa˜o Carlos (UFSCAR). The development of graduate study programs contributed significantly to the expansion of national research associations in several areas of knowledge. Their annual meetings integrated the scientific community in related areas, universities, and different regions of the country. All regulations resulting from the 1968 university reform were decisive for the development and recognition of research in the public university system.
A Brief History of Higher Education in (West) Germany: The Relations between Research and Teaching The predominantly practical requirements leading to the establishment of universities in Brazil, where professional training in applied fields was the main motive, were also reflected in the German university reform of the late eighteenth century which was strongly influenced by the Enlightenment concepts of industrias and utilitas. In the political climate of late absolutism, the legal, constitutional, and social composition of the old, often termed ‘‘pre-classical’’ university (Moraw, 1984) came under attack. In contrast to their British or French counterparts, German universities in early modern times were not corporative institutions but foundations by territorial lords with the explicit intention of training civil servants and political counselors. Thus, they were ‘‘Landesuniversita¨ten’’ of independent sovereign states (Baumgarten, 2001, p.107f.). Territorial and, later, religious loyalty traditionally played a key role in shaping German universities (cf. Hoffacker, 2000, p. 1). Over time the relationship changed from one of rather lose involvement to one of stronger control under enlightened absolutism. Societal and economic developments in the eighteenth century brought in their wake a stronger orientation of useful and practically applicable knowledge. However, universities were slow to respond to this trend. The first chairs of Cameralia and Oeconomica were established in Halle and Frankfurt/Oder in the first third of the eighteenth century (Mu¨ller, 1990, p. 61). The centers of innovation at this time were less the universities and more the learned societies and the academies modeled after the example of the Acade´mie de France, the Royal Society, and the Acade´mie des Sciences. By the end of the eighteenth century the number of universities had far exceeded the demand and the Napoleonic wars as well as the succeeding territorial reconstruction contributed to a reshaping of German higher
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education so that many universities were closed or reduced in size. Many institutions were either shut down altogether or relegated to second rank (Mu¨ller, 1990, p. 66). The transformation of the German system, the transition from the pre-classical to the classical era, included the adoption of the French model of specialized schools. In the end, the Enlightenmentuniversities and their reforms inspired by positivism, idealistic philosophy, and neo-humanistic educational concepts prevailed. The new balance between modernism and institutional traditionalism with a strong research orientation was the product of several prominent thinkers: Kant, Schelling, Schleiermacher, Fichte, and finally synthesized by Wilhelm von Humboldt. What became known as the Humboldtian model represented the new ideal type of the German university even though Humboldt was not writing in the context of German unification in the later part of the nineteenth century, but in the context of reforming and developing the Prussian educational system. His famous Denkschrift: ‘‘U¨ber die innere und a¨uXere Organisation der ho¨heren wissenschaftlichen Anstalten in Berlin’’ (1809/10) is the most relevant document in this context, but was not discovered before 1900. All of these factors contributed to what has aptly been termed ‘‘Mythos Humboldt’’ (Ash, 1999). However, taking up the neo-institutionalist argument on the ‘‘constructedness’’ of collective identities there can be no doubt that Humboldt is the single most important factor in shaping the perception of the German universities at home and abroad. Humboldt was writing against the utilitarian policies of absolutist rulers that tended towards dismantling the traditional university and replacing it with specialized institutions for professional training. The reforms of old and venerated institutions such as Halle or Jena formed the backdrop to Wilhelm von Humboldt’s own ideas which culminated in the founding of the University of Berlin in 1810. However, even this institution, the one most closely associated with his name, was not the practical realization of an ideal model. From the beginning a neo-absolutist understanding of utilitas combined with state interference diluted the idea of a research university solely dedicated to the principle of truth and the expansion of the frontiers of knowledge (vom Bruch, 2001, p.34f.). Even if the practical realization was deficient, the idea shaped by Humboldt proved very powerful (cf. Walther, 2001). The sea change in the understanding of the university affected by Humboldt is epitomized in his Denkschrift. In particular he referred to the limitation of state influence stemming from liberal ideas, and a decisive redefinition of the universitas litterarum in which the traditional professionoriented faculties training loyal civil servants for the church, administration, and justice, were distinguished from the (lower) faculty of philosophy.
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The faculty of philosophy, according to Kant’s Streit der Fakulta¨ten (1907[1798]), was the only faculty free from state and church influence and thus was free to judge everything relevant to truth and scientific interest. The relation between the humanities and the natural sciences must be briefly considered in this context, as it is central for understanding what Humboldt meant by the term ‘‘Wissenschaft’’. The common denominator between both the natural sciences and the humanities was the development of a system of inquiry and conclusions based on general philosophical principles, thus founding the universitas litterarum on the scientia scientiarum. The central positioning of the term ‘‘Bildung’’ as the gradual unfolding of the inner self must be mentioned. Although it has been politically instrumentalized in the course of the nineteenth century to support social stratification, it retained its influence as an idea of personal ‘‘growth’’ through science. Vom Bruch emphasizes this collapsing of an idealistically conceived science and the neo-humanistic conception of Bildung as the decisive attractive factor of the modern university (vom Bruch, 1999, p. 36). Finally and most importantly in the present context, science and scholarship were freed from their encyclopedic traditions and aligned with research. The new type of professor who came to be associated with Humboldt was not a generalist but a specialist. The formula ‘‘unity of teaching and research’’ came to express an ideal that was no longer directed towards the needs of state, but took the ideal of the autonomous citizen as its point of reference. Hence the new professor was teacher, researcher, and scientist. He had to prevail in a highly competitive environment which distinguished between three types of universities corresponding to the progression of the professorial career; entry, advancement, and ‘‘final destination’’ universities, with each step of the progression characterized by an increase of salary, material, and personnel resources. It is a further characteristic of this new paradigm that not just the professorial role was transformed but also that of the student. The openness of the research process also affected the quality of teaching. The professors were liberated from the traditional teaching obligations consisting of canonized courses and literature as well as standard exams. However, despite their critique of enlightened utilitarianism, the proponents of university reform by no means conceived of the new model as having no relevance for professional training. To the contrary, they were convinced that the prevalence of science would lead to a deeper and more profound understanding of the disciplines they studied. As progressive as what came to be commonly termed the Humboldtian model appears to be, it should be remembered that the number of students was small and that they came
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mostly from privileged social backgrounds. They were all men because university access for women did not become standard before well into the twentieth century. Despite its claim to replace the birth principle with the merit principle, the origins of the modern university in the ‘‘Sta¨ndegesellschaft’’ evidently are far from the more democratic conditions of the modern mass university. Even today, the German university is said to not having satisfactorily answered the question about the relation between elite and mass training and qualifications. Within Germany’s own historiographical tradition, the significant change in the meaning of the term science over time is frequently overlooked. As Ru¨diger vom Bruch (2001) has pointed out, this change marks the difference between the early and the late nineteenth century. In contrast to Humboldt’s vision, a strong utility and application-oriented use had asserted itself. The name associated with the change, Friedrich Althoff, is much less well known in the context of German university history. Hence, when the German tradition is mentioned in the context of the foundation of the Escola Polite´cnica de Sa˜o Paulo, Althoff’s concept, not Humboldt’s, provides the model. A key role in the German university reform of the early nineteenth century was played by the humanities. It was here that the idea of the seminary first took root and became the model for other disciplines. However, the industrial and military requirements of the second-half of the century quickly led to a change of policy on the part of the state, which was responsible for funding the universities. The universities’ organization mirrored the authoritarian and hierarchical patterns of the political regime and of the German social structure. The central element of the university was the ‘‘Ordinarius’’, the full professor who had the power to control and shape the hierarchical structures of the departments, called institutes. An element of change was introduced by the increase of students in the early decades of the twentieth century, accompanied by the first complaints about the alleged massification and perceived loss of quality in the scientific and scholarly work. A famous example of this irritation is the rectorate of the philosopher Martin Heidegger, who stressed the elitist character of the university and advocated a separation between academic and professional training (cf. Grunenberg, 2006, p. 144). He was also notorious for his ‘‘Gleichschaltungspolitik’’ after the National Socialists’ ascension to power. German universities were by and large corrupted into the political regime and could only be freed from this ideology after the breakdown of the Third Reich (cf. Gellert, 1993, p.11ff.). Hannah Arendt would later perceptively comment on this issue of the susceptibility of German
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intellectuals to support the National Socialists (cf. Arendt in Grunenberg, 2006, Chapter 3). After World War II there was much debate over the necessity to fundamentally reorganize universities in Germany. The question of the involvement of the universities in the Nazi-regime was a controversial one, but the final verdict was that the universities were ‘‘healthy in their cores’’ (cf. Teichler, 1990, p. 13), provided that the pre-1933 structures were re-established. One of the most acute issues was how to secure the independence of research from being politically corrupted and was solved through constitutional provisions. Against this background, educational planning was increasingly seen as a common task for both the federal and the La¨nder governments during the 1960s. Educational planning and the construction of IFES were implemented in 1969 in the constitution as a common task, the ‘‘Gemeinschaftsaufgabe’’ (Art. 75; 91 a and b GG). In September 1957 the Wissenschaftsrat (WR) was created by an agreement between the federal government and the La¨nder. As the oldest advisory body for science and higher education policy in Europe it was intended to provide an overview of scientific work in Germany. The WR issues comments, recommendations, and prepares reports which primarily concern scientific institutions, in particular their structure, performance, development, and financing. It also deals with general questions relating to the system of higher education, selected structural aspects of research and teaching as well as the strategic planning and assessment of specific fields and disciplines (cf. WR, 2007). During the 1960s and early 1970s two different rationales prompted the reform of higher education in Germany – a manpower or human capital approach and a social justice approach. The manpower approach followed the opinion of employers and policy makers that Germany had to expand and improve its segment of qualified personnel in order to successfully compete internationally. This view was propagated by Georg Picht who coined the term ‘‘Bildungskatastrophe’’ (educational catastrophe) to indicate that Germany was falling behind in (economic) competitiveness. The social justice approach wanted to see higher education grow more equitable. One of the prominent advocates was Ralf Dahrendorf (1965) who proclaimed ‘‘Bildung ist Bu¨rgerrecht!’’ (‘‘Education is a civil right!’’). These policy orientations triggered structural and organizational reforms that, in the end, led to what has been derogatorily referred to as ‘‘massification’’ of higher education.
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The WR’s recommendations included the expansion of the physical structures of the higher education system, the reorganization of studies and administration, personnel issues, the status of the Fachhochschule, and the recommendation to intensify competition within the system. An example of this phase of innovation is the founding, in 1969, of the University of Bielefeld which was conceived as a ‘‘reform university’’ from the beginning. The University of Bielefeld was to follow the primacy of research, the combining of research and teaching, and the linking of science and praxis, in accordance with the idea of the founding commission headed by the sociologist Helmut Schelsky. It was one of the first attempts to break with the old organizational tradition and design the university in a more progressive and democratic way. Since 1970 several technical and applied schools, especially in engineering, business, administration, social services, and design, were upgraded and a new type of institution of higher education, the Fachhochschule, was created. For example, the Fachhochschule Du¨sseldorf founded in 1971 integrated the Staatliche Ingenieurschule Du¨sseldorf, the Peter-Behrens-Werkkunstschule Du¨sseldorf, the Werkgruppe Architektur und Innenarchitektur der Werkkunstschule Krefeld, the Ho¨here Fachschule fu¨r Sozialarbeit, the Ho¨here Fachschule fu¨r Sozialpa¨dagogik, and the Du¨sseldorf branch of the Ho¨here Wirtschaftsfachschule Mo¨nchengladbach. A further innovation of this period is the comprehensive university (Gesamthochschule). Legally equal to universities they were established to unite the functions of a university and of the Fachhochschule. The Gesamthochschule Kassel founded in 1971 is an early example of this type. It integrated several technical and applied schools and offered courses as diverse as agricultural sciences and arts. After a phase of innovation in which the Fachhochschulen and some Gesamthochschulen were created, the attempt to pass legislation to regulate higher education on a national scale failed in 1972 and a compromise could not be reached before 1976. In this year the first Federal Framework Act on Higher Education Hochschulrahmengesetz (HRG 1976) was passed which was intended to provide a framework for the legislation of the La¨nder. It defined regulation of personnel issues, and composition of commissions and committees. Moreover, it set up development goals for higher education policy which pointed in the direction of a general national educational planning. In 1985 the HRG was amended strengthening the role of professors and granting them the right to administer third-party funds themselves (cf. Teichler, 1990, p.14ff.). However, the idea of national educational planning would eventually be turned down completely (cf. Webler, 1990, p.79f.).
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Concomitant with the phase of the founding of new institutions and reorganization of universities was the issue of the relation between research and teaching. In the case of the Fachhochschule both functions were largely separated since professors at Fachhochschulen were expected to teach heavy loads whereas university professors have lower teaching loads and are legally required to do research. In the Gesamthochschulen, like in the universities, the professors should do both teach and research. However, the Gesamthochschule did not prevail and research remained confined to the universities for a long time. In short, during the nineteenth and twentieth century teaching and research were seen as integral elements of the institutional organization model of universities. In the German tradition the term ‘‘research university’’ is a pleonasm since all universities are viewed as research universities. Due to constitutional provisions mandating equality, universities have developed similar levels of quality and ranking these institutions according to excellence criteria – either in teaching or research activities – was the exception. Their homogeneity is due to the fact that funding was very similar, highly dependent on public provisions, and acquisition of research resources from sources other than the state in many fields a scarcity. There is no long tradition in considering funding from private foundations as an indicator of quality and this is especially true for the humanities and the social sciences. Another factor to be considered is that since the middle of the twentieth century research is increasingly conducted outside the university, for which the Max Planck group of research institutes is the most famous example. However, most importantly for an understanding of the present changes is the unresolved relation between mass higher education and research. As institutions heavily dependent on the state, universities have suffered from inadequate funding in order to adjust to the expansion of the sixties and seventies. In the first-half of fifties, the average German university or institution with equal legal status was attended by between 4.000 and 6.000 students. Munich, the biggest university, only had 11.000 students. Only a small percentage of an age-cohort was immediately qualified to study having successfully completed the Abitur, which during this time was and, still is, the formal requirement necessary for admission (Turner, 2001, p. 15). This changed dramatically in the sixties and seventies when many more students completed the Abitur leading to an unprecedented expansion of the German higher education system. Between 1970 and 1975 expenditures on higher education doubled (ibid., p.24). One only has to look at the figure of 400.000 new positions in the academic field in the seventies, to immediately grasp the high demand. As Clark (1995) has pointed out and described as the
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‘‘Vicissitudes of the Humboldtian Project’’, the crux of the matter was that the German university never structurally adjusted to mass higher education. Clark identifies as serious defects the lack of formal differentiation between the undergraduate and the graduate levels of study and a lack of Ph.D. programs. The situation had its roots in the ideas of Humboldt. Humboldt’s liberalism strongly emphasized the freedom of teaching and studying. Despite little formal differentiation and, in comparison to other systems, minimal regulation, the system functioned well for over a century. Not only was the number of students entering the university low, but so was the number of students in the Gymnasium, the higher level of secondary education providing them with an ‘‘Allgemeine Hochschulreife’’ ready to pursue their specialized studies with the necessary maturity and independence. With rising educational inclusion rates, the Gymnasien also absorbed higher numbers of young people. Since the second-half of the seventies, mass conditions and underfunding sent the system into heavy turbulence. Debates on reforms however were suspended with German reunification and the system was transferred without significant modifications to East Germany, ‘‘The Humboldt Myth’’ (Ash, 2006) was preserved once more.9
SUMMARY In this brief historical sketch of higher education in both countries, a number of common themes were sounded, but also differences highlighted. The aspect immediately evident concerns the embeddedness of the research university in the system of higher education, which in turn is embedded in specific national traditions. In Brazil, the research university emerged out of a context of professional training, specifically in the area of technological sciences. Engineering in the nineteenth century was a cutting-edge field immensely influential in providing the infrastructure of fast growing and modernizing societies. Consequently, the Brazilian research university followed Althoff’s model who adapted the Humboldtian vision to the conditions of a quickly industrializing society. Due to factors outside of the university, this progressive move on the whole remained a fairly isolated phenomenon with little direct effect on overall developments. In Germany, the idea of the research university was initially formulated in opposition to the quest for direct applicability of knowledge; that is to say, it did not arise from immediate needs of professional training. Nevertheless, from a practical point of view, the university has been entangled with applied science from the beginning. In Brazil the line of distinction separates the
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research from the teaching universities. In Germany the line of distinction was more between basic and applied science. However, since the end of the World War II, common themes are sounded more frequently. Issues of social justice and equality constitute an important element of what the neo-institutionalists have termed ‘‘the world polity’’ and have led to a vast expansion of higher education systems worldwide triggering the necessity to realign professional training and research. Although path dependency led to different answers, especially with regard to the relation between public and private higher education, there are similarities in the structure of higher education governance as well as in relegating the research university to the public sector. This tendency towards convergency which has become more pronounced since the middle to the late nineties is even more interesting when considering the challenges posed by the unification of the two different German societies. The fact that the West German university tradition was transferred to the eastern part without significant modification, illustrates that Germany has kept its tradition until very recently.
CURRENT PERSPECTIVES Characteristics and Current Legal Framework of the Brazilian Higher Education System Public universities10 in Brazil are controlled by the federal or by their respective state governments. While administration of financial resources and recruitment of personnel is rigidly controlled, more flexibility is allowed in choosing administrators. An exception to this rule is the state of Sa˜o Paulo, where global budgets are granted to the institutions based on state revenues; there the government transfers to the three state universities approximately 9% of its revenues, granting them autonomy in the use of resources. There are three main types of IFES in Brazil: ‘‘faculdades’’, ‘‘centros universita´rios’’, and ‘‘universidades’’ (Brasil/Presideˆncia da Repu´blica, 2006 Law 5.773 from May 9, 2006).11 Article 52 of the law 9.394/96 – the National Education Law of 1996 – determines that universities are pluridisciplinary institutions that combine the formation of professionals, research, and university extension. The law also specifies that at least a third of the faculty of universities must have an academic degree of ‘‘mestrado’’12 or doctorate and be in full-time positions (Brasil/MEC, 1996 Law LDB 9.394/96, Chapter IV).
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The Law of Guidelines and Bases for Education of 1996 reiterated the incumbency of the Union to coordinate education policy through the Ministry of Education (MEC) which is conceived of as a centralizing organ that has normative competence over all education systems (federal, state, and municipal). It is the responsibility of the Union, in collaboration with the states, the Federal District, and the municipalities, to elaborate National Plans of Education, conduct periodical evaluations of all education levels, authorize, legally recognize, and supervise the courses of institutions of higher education. In 2004 the Secretaria de Educac- a˜o Superior (Federal Secretariat of Higher Education) was created as a unit of MEC to formulate and implement the National Higher Education Policy. It directs the maintenance, supervision, and development of the Federal Public Institutions of Higher Education (IFES). Also, the supervision of private institutions of higher education falls under its responsibility. In addition, there are also State Secretariats of Education and the National and State Councils of Education, which in collaboration contribute to the formulation and implementation of educational policies.
Current Relevant Data on Brazil Brazil is a fast growing country with 188,400,000 inhabitants (as of 2006) (IPEA, 2007). In 2006 a third of its population, 60.1 million people, participated as students in the education system (INEP, 2007a). In 2005 the number of students enrolled in undergraduate courses was 4,163,733 of which 1,178,328 (23.3%) were enrolled in public institutions and 2,985,405 (71.7%) were enrolled in private institutions (cf. INEP, 2007b). Higher education students are distributed in 2,013 Brazilian institutions (as of 2004). The vast majority of these institutions, 1,789 (INEP, 2004, p. 14) are private institutions. The remaining institutions are federal and state institutions of which 169 are universities. It is important to emphasize that only universities are under the obligation to integrate teaching, research, and extension. The remaining institutions, according to the current legislation, are exempted from having to conduct research and extension. The number of institutions doubled between 1980 and 2005 and the prevalence of private institutions was accentuated. Private institutions constituted 90% of the total institutions, absorbing 72% of the students.
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During the same period the student population tripled, it went up from 1.4 (1980) to 4.2 million (2005). Private expenditure in higher education almost doubled between 1999 and 2005, from R$8.8 to R$15 billion. Public spending on higher education equaled 0.82% of the Brazilian GNP (cf. IPEA, 2005), totaling R$6.9 billion. Also of great relevance are the funding activities of the specialized support agencies for scientific development, especially CNPq and CAPES. The total of expenditure of these two agencies amounted to R$1.7 billion (cf. CNPq, 2005; CAPES, 2006) signaling the increasing importance of third-party funding, particularly for graduate studies and research. According to the 2003 census of higher education 39.5% of the academic personnel in public universities (163) hold a doctoral degree (INEP/MEC, 2003, p. 32). For the highly heterogeneous Brazilian institutional context the percentage of academic personnel holding a ‘‘mestrado’’ degree/doctorate is 56.3% for all HE institutions (INEP/MEC, 2003, p. 42). The national average of Ph.D. holders for all IFE is 21.9% while only six out of 26 states present a ratio higher than the average (INEP, 2005, p. 43). In the federal institutions of higher education the percentage increase in doctorates between 1995 and 2000 reached 58.4% (MEC, 2002, p. 11). While we do not suggest that all universities are research oriented to the same degree,13 the statistical development of faculty qualification shows a high degree of convergence with what might be described as a trans- or international model. Changes in Brazilian Higher Education since the 1990s The last stage of the economic model based on the substitution of imports came to an end by the late 1980s, when the first structural adjustment of the Brazilian economy was made as a result of the growing difficulty of obtaining external credit in worldwide financial markets. This adjustment led to a serious recession. The GDP fell by 3% and unemployment rose to 8% (IBGE, 1999, in Dupas, 2000, p. 124). This situation prompted severe social consequences and accelerated the end of the military dictatorship, already under pressure from the revival of popular movements. A second structural adjustment (Pomeranz & Nunes Ferreira, 1996) was initiated in 1990 under the government of Fernando Collor de Mello – the first elected president after the end of the military regime – and was continued and reinforced during the two successive mandates of president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995/1998 – 1999/2002). This second adjustment, based on a strict stabilization program, brought about important changes to the Brazilian economy. These included
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privatizations, commercial opening, and financial liberalization, deregulation of domestic markets through the elimination of instruments of state intervention such as price controls, and deregulation of the labor market. It is worth pointing out some of the consequences, considering the peculiarities of the country. The commercial opening of an economy that operated under strong economic protectionism forced companies operating in national and international markets to undergo a profound and continuous restructuring (Dupas, 2000) which included radical automation of some sectors, outsourcing, reduction of hierarchy levels and administrative structures, and adoption of lean production techniques. Such adaptation processes to the world market aggravated the difficulties already faced by the country including the intense urbanization during the previous 50 years. The changes in technological standards in agriculture, and the resulting internal migrations, caused cities that had absorbed 12 million people in the early 1950s to amass an overall urban population of 130 million by the early 1990s. This constituted one of the largest demographic movements in world history (Dupas, 2000). The adoption of new techniques and organizational forms by the companies, in turn, accelerated the disqualification of a large number of workers trained according to previous technological standards, bringing the issue of education and scientific/technological research to the forefront of the political, academic, and business debates. The process of adaptation of the country to the new dynamics of international capitalism caused a redefinition of the attributions of the state, and its political-administrative reform. Its repercussions in the educational field started to be felt by the beginning of the 1990s, when a new national Law of Guidelines and Bases for Education began to be formulated. The major issue was how to reconcile the needs to eradicate illiteracy, to universalize access to education, to improve the quality of teaching, and to develop research and technology with the deepening fiscal crisis of the state and with the pressure – notably from the IMF – to reduce public spending. The response of the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso was, especially after 1995, to promote the reform of the state oriented by the principles of managerialism, based on the rhetoric of the so-called ‘‘third way’’ (Giddens, 1996, 1999). The order of the day was to increase the efficiency of services delivered by the state. This was to be achieved through the setting of objectives and administrative decentralization, giving more operational autonomy to the agencies in order to meet centrally defined targets. As described by former finance minister Bresser-Pereira/Spink
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(1999, p. 11), who was in charge of formulating and implementing the reform of the state, ‘‘it is an imposition of the globalization process, which has intensified the competition among nations. Consequently, the bureaucratic public administration has become obsolete, and the public bureaucracies are being forced to adopt a more managerial approach, based on decentralization, on managed competition, and on direct social control’’. This ‘‘perspective, developed in business administration, is also valid for public organizations’’ (ibid., p.7). Within this reform the state is conceptualized according to four aspects: strategic core, state exclusive activities, non-exclusive or competitive services, and production of goods and services for the market. To the Union, the most relevant non-exclusive state services are universities, technical schools, research centers, hospitals, and museums. The reform proposed is to transform them into a special kind of non-state entity: the social organizations [y] [are] entities that have a managerial contract with the executive power and have the authorization of the parliament to participate in the public budget. (Bresser-Pereira, 1996, p. 286)
In this way, universities should be transformed into ‘‘public entities of private nature’’, and they should answer to three kinds of control: state, community, and market. State control because they would be run through managerial contracts with the state; community control since they would be ruled by an administrative council; and market control because it would be the responsibility of the market to look after the efficiency and quality of the services offered as well as to provide them with supplementary funding. This proposal unleashed such opposition from faculty and students that it was abandoned. Nevertheless, public universities are increasingly moving towards this model. The new Law of Guidelines and Bases for Education (LDB/96) passed in December 1996 introduced a series of changes in the Brazilian education system. The section concerning higher education incorporates previous decrees and provisional acts, such as the decree that instituted the National Examination of Courses which should be progressively applied to all existing courses. However, LDB/96 did not alter entrance examination provisions, a traditional element of the Brazilian higher education system, although it did refer to selection processes and to the requirement of concluding secondary education. This omission allowed private institutions to adopt various selection processes for admission, according to their level of market insertion (Cunha, 2003, 2004). Perhaps the most important innovation in the present context is the one defining a new academic organization of the institutions of higher education. Article 45 of the LDB/96 states that ‘‘Higher education shall be
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provided in institutions of higher education, public or private, with various degrees of scope or specialization’’. In the following year, two new decrees established that the institutions of higher education could have different formats: universities, university centers, integrated faculties, faculties, higher institutes, or higher schools (for the current legislations, see: Law 5.773 from May 9, 2006). The new element of this period was the emergence of university centers, defined as pluri-curricular institutions of education with quasi or full autonomy. These centers were created mainly in the private sector and took the place, in government discourse, of the ‘‘teaching university’’, defined in opposition to the research university, which, as the fully constituted university (op. cit. Cunha, 2003, p. 54), was considered expensive for the state to continue financing. This measure accelerated the growth of the business sector in education, because of the low cost implied in the creation and maintenance of these university centers, when compared to a multitask university that addressed teaching, research, and extension. It is important to emphasize that this diversification of the forms of organization of higher education was one of the solutions found by the government for what it characterized as the crisis of the Brazilian university. This crisis was highlighted in a document of the World Bank (BIRD/World Bank, 1994) and in articles by experts associated with the ministry for education (Durhan, 1996; Schwartzman, 1996) as resulting from several interconnected factors: the elitism of the Brazilian university which is incapable of dealing with the high demand for tertiary education and for preparing youngsters for the labor market; the model of a research university that is too expensive and not feasible for the state to finance in the medium term; the adoption of a single system of careers and wages within the public system, including the indiscriminate concession of full-time work regimes; the isonomy between active and retired teachers; the predominantly public funding system; and the incapacity of the public institutions of higher education to face new challenges created by the redefinition of the role of the state in contemporary societies. In 2003, the IBRD produced a further document titled ‘‘A Fair, Sustainable and Competitive Brazil’’ (Brasil Justo, Sustenta´vel e Competitivo), in which it puts forward its diagnosis of university education and the situation of research. In general terms, the document states that Brazil spends more on research and development (R&D) and on higher education per capita than most Latin American nations. While the public sector dominates R&D, the links between the universities and the private sector are relatively weak. At the same time, the exposure of Brazilian corporations to
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cutting-edge technology and high-profile management through commerce (and through foreign export oriented investment) is relatively low. For these reasons, the document concludes, the spending on higher education benefits only a small and privileged segment of the population (BIRD/World Bank, 2003). This line of criticism, intensely discussed in the media, depicts academic research and higher education as the slayers of basic education, responsible for subtracting from it the funds necessary for its expansion and improvement. It attributes to free public higher education perverse effects in terms of wealth distribution conspiring against the low-income population, precisely the strata most in need of publicly provided schooling. In fact, the criticism that the Brazilian public university is elitist shifts the focus of attention away from the nation’s grave problem of concentration of wealth. According to data from a study conducted in 2005 by the IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisa Econoˆmica Aplicada – Institute of Applied Economic Research), 70% of the Brazilian employed population age 35 in 2003 had entered the labor market as children, and around 30% in their adolescence. What were the chances of these workers to follow an educational career similar to that of youngsters who, free from the burden of paid jobs, could prepare themselves for the higher education entrance exams? Hence, it is not the public university, which strives to combine teaching and research that is elitist. Rather, the social-economic structure of the nation has to be addressed that, through a concentration of wealth, prevents the larger part of young Brazilians from being free to study. Data from the same study (IPEA, 2005) show that everyone in Brazil enters school but only 57% finish the eight years of basic schooling. At the secondary level, the conclusion rate is as low as 37%. The World Bank document insists that the cost of the public universities is too high. It argues that the government’s total spending for higher education amounts to 0.82% of the GDP, yet it enrolls only 5.2% of the population of university age. Such high cost/student ratio would be inferior only to the ones found in Germany and the United Kingdom. In a country of huge social inequalities such as Brazil, the discourse about the elitism of the public university has an allure not to be dismissed lightly. The defenders of the separation between teaching and research count on that argument, and it justifies – in the eyes of the government and international agencies such as the IBRD, UNESCO – the proposals for new changes in higher education and in the forms of funding and organization of research in Brazil. By means of the new reform of university education the administration of President Lula da Silva intends to tackle the issue of the limited access of
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poorer youngsters to higher education without, however, placing a financial burden on the state. Several alternatives are being analyzed, all of them proposing to split the undergraduate studies in two stages: one basic stage, lasting for three years, and one professionalizing stage lasting one or two years more in specific areas (Universidade Nova, 2007). The orientation of research is outlined in the General Guidelines for the Industrial and Foreign Commerce Policies of 1990 (Dia´rio Oficial da Unia˜o, 1990, p. 12.367, Section 1). Here it is established that the effort for economic growth should emulate the technological solutions already adopted in developed countries – the so-called catch-up strategy – and place emphasis on the import of technology and on the creation of a flexible workforce, qualified for lean production. This method of research in Brazil follows from the way in which the country inserted itself in the global chain of production of goods during the 1990s. Brazil engaged itself mainly (although not exclusively) in the links of the production chain constituted of relatively simple work, where there is limited need for advanced science and technology. Therefore, government investments in research tend to be primarily targeted at applied research. A recent study by the IPEA (2005) – ‘‘Innovations, technological standards, and the performance of Brazilian industrial companies’’ – reveals that from the 72,000 companies with more than 10 employees, only 1.7% promote technological innovation and differentiate their products (De Negri & Salerno, 2005). Such information resembles the conclusions by Brisolla and Carvalho (2001), according to which the number of companies of national capital that focus their business strategy on the production of technological knowledge is very limited. The large companies are practically the only ones that invest any money in R&D, and the multinational companies carry out most of their technological research activities abroad. The federal government created in 1999 the Sectorial Funds (Fundos Setoriais) to finance the development of research in Brazil. They are stable, non-budgetary funds of the ministry for science and technology made up of income taxes from companies involved in exploring the Union’s resources, such as oil, energy, water and minerals, or companies involved in transportation and telecommunications. These funds, which used to go to the ministry, are now collected under the National Fund for Science and Technology. While this measure has doubled the funding available for research at public universities, it has also brought distortions in the application of funds. Three out of five important areas of research – education, environmental sciences, and agricultural production – were left out from the measure because the funds are tied to specific sectors which
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excluded financing of the other sectors. Given the meager resources for research at universities, these funds concentrate research in the fields they finance. Moreover, the government has determined that 70% of these funds should be directed towards applied research, and not to basic research. During the first mandate of President Lula da Silva (2003–2006), the National Congress approved the Law of Technological Innovation (Brasil/ Presideˆncia da Repu´blica, 2004 Law No. 10973/2004) introducing important changes to research activities of universities, and promoting a closer link between universities and private businesses. The law encourages the creation of networks and international projects of technological research, stimulating technological entrepreneurship, and promotes spin-off companies and technological clusters. Companies are to be given access to the laboratories, facilities, and human resources of the public universities, the main producers of research in the country. The activities are concentrated in the Southeast Region of the country, where the wealthiest states are located, and especially the USP, responsible for nearly 36% of the national production of scientific knowledge and for graduating the largest number of Ph.D. students in the country (cf. Schwartzman, 2006). However, the effects of this law impinge on all Brazilian public universities in different aspects. First, the law allows for the creation of ICTs – Institutions of Science and Technology – bodies or entities of the public administration having as their institutional mission to execute activities of basic or applied research and foster strategic alliances with enterprises and non-profit organizations. Based on a conception of research focused on application and oriented by missions to be accomplished by trans-disciplinary teams, the ICTs dissociate research from the institutional context of the university and open the possibility for teacher–researchers to leave their academic positions, not only for the duration of the mission, but, if necessary, for a period of up to six years, in case they wish to open their own businesses with the aid of the findings of the research. It creates the figure of the entrepreneur–researcher (see also Etzkowitz, 2002; Bertrams, 2007), and also the figure of the researcher lent by the universities for the development of projects at an ICT. Such teacher–researchers are forbidden by article 12 of the Law of Innovation from announcing or publishing anything related to the project without prior authorization of the ICT. Hence, the knowledge produced by researchers of a public university is privatized under the rules of secrecy of the private sector. The professional ethics and the social responsibility of researchers are subjected to the rules of the world of business, to which they then owe allegiance.
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Faced with the scarcity of funds to develop their own projects some university teachers optimistically look at the option of joining a research group under these conditions. In the name of productivity and under the possibility of substantial financial rewards, the public university begins to replace its objective of producing basic knowledge by the production of specialized innovations for the private sector. Also, pressure is exerted upon faculty by such bodies as CAPES, which evaluate graduate programs usually according to the individual performance of the professors and the number of externally financed projects. At the same time, the criteria of teacher evaluation rely more on quantitative aspects. The emphasis is placed on the number of articles published in highly regarded and peer-reviewed journals, rather than on the quality and social and scientific relevance of their results. So, the instrumental knowledge (Horkheimer) is institutionalized in the university as the only knowledge valuable and reliable. The Law of Innovation also has implications for teaching insofar as it removes researchers from their teaching activities, separating in practice what the Law of Guidelines and Bases for Education (1996) brought together on the legal plane: teaching and research. The Law allows the hiring of personnel – often formally less qualified – to substitute for the absence of faculty who are on leave to conduct innovation-related business activities. Furthermore, vacancies are not filled after retirements because of an alleged lack of funds which directly affects teaching quality. In a country like Brazil this aspect is very important because it impacts the formation of the new generations of researchers, a process that stems from their insertion in stricto sensu graduate programs. The quality of academic training is jeopardized because these research results often are neither directly applicable nor have immediate market value. Finally, the orientation imposed on Brazilian public universities not only clashes with the constitutional precept of didactic-pedagogical autonomy of the universities, but also contradicts the constitutional principles of freedom of production, expression, and circulation of knowledge.
Characteristics and Legal Framework of the German Higher Education System More recently, universities in Germany are internally classified according to stronger und weaker research records but on the whole considered more or less equivalent with respect to quality of teaching and research. This characteristic developed, in particular, after the World War II and can still
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be perceived in the tendency of employers to select personnel according to grades and not according to the relative status and prestige of the institution issuing a diploma. A further characteristic is the widespread professional orientation of the studies. In some cases such as medicine, law, and teaching, one can only receive a state certificate and not an academic diploma below the doctorate. These facets of the German higher education system highlight the strong intrinsic relationship with the state. The constitutional provisions that placed state control over education in the hands of the La¨nder (Art. 30 GG; BverfGE 6, 309, 346/347) contradicted the postulate of ‘‘uniformity of living conditions’’ (Art. 72, (2) Nr. 3 GG) and resulted in the need for intensive cooperation between the federal and state levels after World War II. What became known as ‘‘cooperative federalism’’ (Peisert & Framheim, 1990, p. 4) began during the 1950s – especially with the constitution of the WR in 1957 – and grew into a complex system of influence exertion. On the federal level there is the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and on the state level, the La¨nder Ministries of Science and Research, and ‘‘Kultus’’ (including education). The teaching part of the universities is coordinated by the Kultusministerien who hold a Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the La¨nder (KMK) and the Bund-La¨nder Commission for Educational Planning and Research Promotion (BLK) as their coordinating institutions to ensure that organization and content of study formats do not diverge too greatly because of state sovereignty in these matters. The German Rector’s Conference (HRK), the WR, and research organizations and funding agencies (e.g. DFG, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft) represent the consulting and coordinating bodies. Since the 1990s, the international influence has increased in importance for education policy, especially with regard to higher education. The different institutions of the European Union play an important role in shaping higher education policy today, as the Bologna and Lisbon Processes attest. Yet, other international organizations also gained in influence during the past decade, including the OECD, the WTO, or the UNESCO.
Current Relevant Data on Germany By 2004 Germany had a population of 82.5 million with 24% (20.4 million) of its total population age 6–26, that is, of compulsory and post-compulsory education age (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2006, p. 25). The total number of students enrolled in the education system was 14.3 million of which
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1,960,000 were enrolled in higher education (ibid., p.21ff.). Germany has 379 institutions of higher education (as of 2005) of which 177 are universities or comparable institutions and 202 Fachhochschulen and Verwaltungshochschulen (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2005, p. 9). This number increased by 16% during the past decade. This growth can be explained by the upgrading of public institutions, but more importantly by the increase in the number of private institutions. In a country with no tradition in private higher education, the number of private institutions has risen to over 60 which is a 287% increase over the past 10 years. Yet, private universities still only enroll about 2% of the students. In the fiscal year 2003, 30.6 billion Euros (1.4% of the GNP) were spent on the higher education system in Germany. The modest increase of 1% in comparison to the previous year is offset by the increase in student numbers by 4%. Although the budget for education, R&D has been raised over the last years, public funding of the universities has been tight, leading to a decrease in the number of faculty in many institutions. The federal government declared the intention to raise spending on R&D to 3% of the GNP by 2010, the goal set by EU member states in relation with the Lisbon strategy. This rather high percentage combines public and private spending. The expenditures for the higher education system are covered from different sources with the main source coming from public budget allocation. The collection of administrative fees and (recently) modest tuition fees also represents an important source of funding as does third-party funding from both public and private sources (e.g. DFG, international organizations, foundations, ministries, private sector enterprises, and others). In 2003, 3.4 billion Euros were donated from third-parties, a number in constant rise over the last several years (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2005, p.12f.). In the face of tightening public budgets the active soliciting of external funds adds another dimension in the funding of higher education, thus becoming crucial for the entire system. As Francisco Ramirez (2002) pointed out in his comparison of German and American universities, mixed funding has been a reality in both systems, although the perception tends to be distrustful of state and federal funding in the US and of private funding in Germany. Changes in German Higher Education since the 1990s When it comes to responding to current societal changes, the university is attributed a leading role in political and public debates. In particular two converging discourses strongly affect how the university is re-conceptualized. One discourse relates to intensified international competition because of globalization, and the other discourse relates to human capital development.
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Both might be described as specifications of the transnational ‘‘knowledge society’’ debate and the research university addresses both discourses. On the one hand, R&D is emphasized with a strong focus on technological innovation and applied science, and on the other, the teaching element is seen as an essential factor in transmitting new knowledge to the next generation and in exposing upcoming talent to research activity. The socio-economic changes associated with globalization and internationalization trigger discussions that are quite similar to the Brazilian debates. The same new public management framework is operative in Germany as it is in Brazil. Quality control, evaluation, efficiency, and effectiveness are characteristics of a new rationale that might be said to orient policies globally. Additionally, Germany has seen the recent rise of the entrepreneurial university that professionally manages a highly diversified funding in which the acquisition of research money from thirdparty donors plays a significant role. These processes are amplified and transformed from a general orientation into specific practices by the measures taken to promote European integration. In particular, the ambitious European vision of becoming the most competitive economic region in the world based on what is commonly known as the knowledge society is a decisive factor in the most thorough and rapid restructuring the German university system has ever encountered. This transformation has two intersecting dimensions. The first dimension relates to the governance and definition of research, while the second dimension relates to the reorganization of university studies and will be discussed below. The first dimension especially is to be viewed in the broader context of changes in steering and governance. In a historical perspective, the paradigms of transformation could be highlighted in a sequential order: (1) the republic of scholars centered around the powerful ‘‘Ordinarius’’, (2) the more democratic and participatory group university of the seventies giving junior faculty, non-academic personnel and students a greater range to exert influence, and (3) the present entrepreneurial or managerial university (Clark, 1995; Mu¨ller-Bo¨lling, 2000; Hoffacker, 2000; Turner, 2001; Kru¨cken & Meier, 2006). In Kru¨cken’s and Meier’s analysis, the university is turned into an organizational actor affecting both its teaching and research functions. The meaning of teaching shifts from the professorial aura to become more technical and self-directed. The meaning of research shifts to strongly encourage networks and flexible research groups. This shift in the organization of inquiry is meant to be more effective in serving societal needs than the previous form which assumed that social progress was brought about in a quasi-evolutionary manner (Kru¨cken & Meier, op. cit.,
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p.241). As a consequence, the university becomes more organizationoriented. Specifically, Kru¨cken and Meier identify four features to indicate this global trend: accountability, the definition of goals, the elaboration of formal structures,14 and the rise of the management profession. This process is legally backed by the new Hochschulrahmengesetz that went into effect in the late 1990s. Universities are granted more autonomy and the roles of presidents and deans are strengthened, with the intention of improving decision-making processes. In Germany a key actor promoting change in these specific directions is the Center for Higher Education Policy Development (Centrum fu¨r Hochschulentwicklung, CHE) in Gu¨tersloh. The expertise of this think tank influences educational policy makers by turning the international discourse into specific programs and agendas (cf. Mu¨ller-Bo¨lling, 2000). The university rankings conducted by the CHE are authoritative in guiding the reform process of higher education. Across the disciplines, the criteria of measuring the quality of academic output increasingly follow an internationally standardized model (Geiger, 1986, 1993; Clark, 1995). These criteria include international visibility, publication in peer-reviewed journals, and acquisition of large amounts of research money from prestigious donors such as the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), the Volkswagen-Stiftung, European Union programs, or BMBF. The DFG plays a significant role in defining what is considered as high-quality research, thus impacting the restructuring process significantly. The Gemeinschaft strongly supports research networks such as the so-called Forschergruppen or Sonderforschungsbereiche, the latter drawing an even greater number of researchers together under a broad and inter- or transdisiplinary umbrella. As is to be expected, these forms of research are strongly dominated by the natural and technical sciences, but the social sciences are also becoming involved. Another policy instrument encourages universities to concentrate in specific areas, and create distinctive profiles for themselves. Competition and distinction are to be substituted for the former homogeneity of the German university landscape. As a consequence, universities may decide to focus on their strong faculties or departments and close those they perceive to be non-competitive. In this context, the so-called Exzellenzinitiative deserves special mention. This is to date the most ambitious attempt to single out a few research universities in the new international meaning of the term. The rationale separates research from teaching universities and implies a hierarchy of status and prestige. As is to be expected, these transformations are not occurring without criticism. With reference to the old Humboldtian ideal, the limits of new planning and technological intervention are pointed out (Mu¨nch, 2007) with the main
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argument being that the new parameters and formats will simply be quickly adopted without positively influencing the quality of the output. The controversy of standardization and rationalization notwithstanding, the ambition to be ranked among the research universities is attractive in at least three respects. First, the research universities will be better funded and hence materially more attractive than non-research universities. Second, they will also be more prestigious, the vision being that the top ranking German universities are ranked among the world’s best. The last aspect is the ability on the part of the university to attract and to handpick the most talented students – young men and women with the potential and academic inclination to participate in the research process and to contribute to the reputation and renown of the university. In this context, the watchwords of competition, evaluation, effectiveness, responsibility, and autonomy of the universities, are emphatically embraced. It is taken as a chance to cure what is perceived of as a misguided development of the German university system – the inclusion of too many students, not all of which are academically inclined. This observation leads to a consideration of the second dimension. Concomitant to the changes in defining and organizing research along internationally disseminated, standardized models, is the most far reaching transformation in the organization of teaching in modern times. It is in this area that the most visible, but also the least predictable change is currently taking place. For many years, the lack of strongly formalized internal differentiation into undergraduate, graduate, and postgraduate levels contributed to the aggravations in the studying conditions in under-funded mass universities (Ash, 2006; Clark, 1995). Despite widespread uneasiness this issue has not been adequately addressed for 30 years. Instead, it is with regard to finding an adequate answer to the education of ever increasing numbers of young people flocking into the tertiary education sector, that the waning enthusiasm for guiding the university reform process is most painfully felt. Since the late seventies, the motivation to reform the university that had previously united a variety of key actors in the field gave way to a minimal consensus and a mood of resignation (Turner, 2001, p. 26). The comprehensive universities (Gesamthochschulen) were not extended and the application-oriented Fachhochschulen did not absorb as many students as the full universities. With a worldwide trend towards longer and larger inclusion rates in the tertiary sector, the adequate training of almost two million students to be absorbed by a higher education sector of little inner differentiation was therefore clearly an issue waiting to be addressed. Although several La¨nder initiated diversification by introducing
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new institutions such as the Berufsakademien in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, the restructuring of higher education on a national level came with the European Union’s resolution to create a homogenous European education space by introducing a consecutive study cycle of B.A. or M.A. degrees. The degrees are conferred on the basis of a new system of achievement, the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) and documentation. The implementation of this policy on the system and organizational levels is, however, intra- and internationally very diverse. The communication problems are visible on different levels. The framework allows for many possible ways of putting the new formats into practice and there is great variation even on the level of the individual organization to define their study cycles. Some departments and institutes opt for a broad definition, with the intention to qualify for a number of professional areas, while others opt for a very narrow one, with the intention to qualify highly specialized experts. In the final analysis, the lack of coordination evident in this great variety may be attributed to the fact that the relation between professional and academic training is as little resolved as it had been previously. Of course, this general observation does not apply equally to all disciplines but it is not restricted to specific ones either. Tight budgets and an intense discussion of human capital development, help to explain the rather quiet acceptance of the radical transformation currently implemented. Linking this trend of the transformation of higher education to our immediate interest in the research university, some general observations shall be added. The open question in this regard concerns the old question of the relation between teaching, studying, and research. Had the current reform of the research university followed the model of looking abroad for inspiration, a more direct copying of the American model would have been the expected strategy guiding higher education policies. After all, the American research university modified the Humboldtian model, so there is by necessity considerable affinity. In this respect, it should not be left unconsidered that the American undergraduate education which is concluded with the Bachelor degree is very different from the European format but, criticism of the American school system notwithstanding is very well aligned with the American high school system (Ash, 2006; Clark, 1995). As it is, the current reform takes place largely without a broader consideration of whether this expected facilitation of student mobility and accelerated period of study also answers the needs of raising the next generation of scholars and scientists. Without question these are turbulent times for German universities. Their professional and academic training functions are realigned with only limited coordination and previous planning. Also competition is intensified
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not only among the universities but also between the universities and other institutions of higher learning. A reason for this new kind of competition is a loss of clear distinction and definition between the various institutions. To illustrate, the Fachhochschulen may refer to themselves as ‘‘universities of applied science’’. However, the loss of distinctions is not an issue of mere naming but also related to changes in academic practice. The competition between the Fachhochschulen and the universities has intensified as illustrated by the amount of research grants received by the Fachhochschule. At this point, the most significant difference is that only universities are entitled to confer doctoral and postdoctoral degrees. However, even this distinction is now openly discussed and may change in the near future. In addition, the role of the private sector should be taken into consideration. The founding of a Hochschule is an attractive investment, a means to shape public policy and to contribute to societal development. These Hochschulen are not as burdened by need to encompass the entire range of faculties as at the full universities, they are better funded and more attractive to students (whom they can also select according to their own criteria).
CONCLUSION Our review of the existing literature and statistical data on higher education with special consideration of the research university in Brazil and in Germany provides evidence for interesting tendencies towards convergency that cannot be explained along the lines of the established framework of lending and borrowing, exporting and importing, and copying or adapting because these terms were introduced into the methodological debates of comparative education to describe the exchange mechanisms between nations. More research is needed to analyze more precisely which actors, what direction and which scope shapes current higher educational policy. With regard to the cases under consideration, we will address these issues in an empirical research project based on the findings described here. However, deeper analysis notwithstanding, general tendencies can already be identified. First of all, the relation between teaching and research is being reshaped in accordance to similar pressures. Two trends in particular are noteworthy in this context. Against the background of (1) a worldwide trend towards longer and expanded inclusion of young people in the higher education systems, and (2) the decrease in or reallocation of public funds, the
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universities in both countries are under pressure to look for additional resources and to compete with each other. In Brazil and in Germany, the field of higher education is therefore (re)structured in accordance with the same international trend to differentiate between research and teaching institutions, with research institutions clearly fewer in number and more prestigious than those devoted to teaching. This in itself would be neither new nor unusual. The truly novel element lies in the increased standardization and outcome orientation. In both countries there is considerable pressure on universities to give evidence of their efficiency and to generally follow the governance paradigms of new public management. The instruments of measurement in both countries follow a transnational model that includes rating of publications according to a certain set of criteria, and giving precedence to larger research teams and to externally funded research. The framework of the evaluation procedures is provided by such umbrellas as the DFG or the League of European Research Universities (LERU), in Germany, and CAPES and CNPq in Brazil. However, the validation procedures are not yet given the same political attention in both countries. Although the parameters of the documentation of the faculty’s research and teaching activities are similar, the level of standardization is much higher in Brazil than in Germany. The implementation of a uniform format for the curricula vitae of academic personnel which in turn leads to prerequisites for other activities such as support-granting processes (cf. CNPq, 2007 W Plataforma Lattes) may be taken as an impressive illustration of this trend. There is also a common tendency to focus on applied research in the technological and natural sciences. An indication for the latter is provided by the ‘‘winners’’ of the Exzellenzinitiative in Germany and the state incentive to found ICTs in Brazil. In both cases public funding of research becomes more selective and unevenly distributed because of a specific understanding of ‘‘research’’ which is less encompassing and more oriented towards normal science than the Humboldtian concept. At the same time, there is still a considerable degree of path dependency. Whereas Germany is strongly interested in supporting strong research universities, Brazil might delegate most of its research activity to non-university institutions. Most importantly, contrary to past developments, where reforms were more directly related to the specific national needs defined by ‘‘indigenous’’ actors, the present changes are more informed by the specific constellations of national and international actors in (higher) educational policy. Brazil
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is strongly encouraged by the World Bank to invest in primary and secondary education, whereas Germany is under EU pressure to follow the strategies set by Bologna and Lisbon. In Brazil, the policies of international actors impact the way research is embedded between the public and the private spheres as the example of the ICTs shows very clearly. If there is a certain danger that universities might be turned into resource pools with no activity of their own in certain relevant areas, the rationale provided is that of cost-efficiency. In Germany, cost-efficiency, and the requirement to fulfill the same functions with shrinking resources also resonates with current higher education policies. The main ambition however is to increase the funding of those universities with the strongest potential to be internationally competitive and to put the German institutions on the list of highly ranked research universities worldwide. In both countries there is a trend to decrease the number of full universities. In as far as the restructuring of research universities is part of a general transformation of higher education the status of teaching also needs to be considered. In both countries, the link between secondary education and university training is an issue. In Brazil, economic necessity prevents many students from adequately preparing for the demanding entrance examinations to public universities. This helps explain the big market for private institutions. Consequently, these have a reputation for being academically less challenging than the top ranking public universities. In Germany, the PISA-panic of 2000 reinforced the already existing uneasiness concerning the state of the Gymnasium to prepare students to pursue university studies. Although the introduction of a two-tier study cycle answers a reform desideratum, it is not clear at all whether this introduction improves the ‘‘fit’’ between the secondary and the tertiary education sectors especially in regard to vigorous academic training. The effects of the outcome-based measurement on the tertiary level are quite comparable to that in primary and secondary education. Output oriented large-scale student achievement assessments also contribute to isomorphic changes by introducing competency models and educational standards, contracting, evaluation, and assessment procedures and techniques. In all spheres, research, teaching, and studying the focus on effects in the form of results and outcomes, is the single most important change in rationale causing organizational differences and their societal contexts to be largely ignored. Path dependencies will always exist, but they are no longer as relevant as they were in the past.
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NOTES 1. From the eighteenth century onwards the historiography of education has commonly portrayed education theory as nationally defined; Oelkers points to the role of text books in this process of ‘‘nationalization’’, but more interestingly, he also argues that this development could not have occurred without continuous observation of international concepts that were not nationally bounded, especially from psychology (cf. Oelkers, 2006). 2. The Brazilian higher education system is composed of public (federal, state, and municipal) as well as private institutions. In this chapter, we focus on public institutions – specifically on universities – for only these are required by law to integrate teaching, research, and academic extension services to the communities. 3. The reason for this failure was due to the refusal of some faculties to give up control of the processes of selection and qualification of their students (Oliven, 2005). 4. This arrangement appears for the first time in the constitution of 1934 and remains part of all subsequent ones, including the current one, from 1988. 5. Cf. the agreement between MEC (Brazilian Ministry of Education and Sport) and the USAID (United States Agency for International Development); see also Fa´vero (1994). 6. Tuitions would eventually be an issue again only during the 1990s, when a new National Education Law was elaborated. 7. ‘‘Extensa˜o universita´ria’’ aims at building a bridge to other segments of society in that it offers knowledge/know-how and services to the community in which it is inserted. 8. Strictu sensu graduate programs – as opposed to latto sensu – refers to traditional doctoral and postdoctoral programs. 9. A somewhat different systematization is provided by Bjo¨rn Wittrock (1993) who succinctly discusses the transformations of the modern university in relation to broader intellectual movements. 10. The data presented in this section are drawn from official statistical compilations and legal frameworks of both countries. 11. The term ‘‘faculdade’’ is often used synonymously with ‘‘integrated faculties, faculties, higher institutes or higher schools’’. 12. ‘‘Mestrado’’ is the first academic degree in graduate studies. It brings together some of the characteristics of M.A. and Ph.D. programs. In general, ‘‘mestrado’’ programs aim at furthering research while at the same time training students for research and higher education teaching positions. Until a few years ago it used to be the average minimum requirement for university faculty entrance; however, since the mid-nineties it was supplanted by the doctorate which is today the minimal requirement. 13. The highest concentration of Ph.D. holders is in the public system where research activities are in fact pursued; it is also important to note that there is a geographic concentration – both of Ph.D. holders and research output – in the Southeast as well: only three universities in Sa˜o Paulo State (USP, UNICAMP, and UNESP) are responsible for approximately 50% of the national research output. 14. By this they mean the institutionalization of special offices embedded in a discourse of rationalization which from a world society perspective has been
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identified as an integral part of the world polity. Most notably these are the ubiquitous technology transfer centers (Kru¨cken & Meier, 2006).
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HISTORICAL LEGACIES OF SOVIET HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEMS IN POSTSOVIET RUSSIA AND EURASIA$ Mark S. Johnson Higher education systems throughout the former U.S.S.R. have experienced dramatic transformations since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and these systemic changes at the national level have been related to equally wrenching changes in modes of professional organization; in state funding and policies for science, research, and innovation; and in the interactions between institutions in the region and worldwide trends and policies. The central thesis of this chapter is that the distinctive historical legacies of Soviet higher education were especially ill-suited to adapt to the economic crises of the 1990s, and that sharp declines in state funding combined with the particular policy choices that were made after 1991 to severely $
This essay has been expanded and refocused from a presentation at a conference on ‘‘Debating the Knowledge-Based Economy,’’ held at the Institute for Advanced Studies, University of Lancaster, UK, August 31–September 1, 2006, with thanks to IAS Director Bob Jessop. This essay is also related to a book-length research project, Globalization and the Transformation of Russian and Eurasian Higher Education (Palgrave Macmillan).
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‘‘disarticulate’’ and disrupt higher education and research in Russia and across Central Eurasia. Of course, the severe economic conditions that began in the late Soviet period and worsened into the 1990s would have degraded any higher education system. However, I will argue that while the prevailing neo-liberal policy prescriptions of privatization and decentralization had some positive effects in the region, those specific policy choices had far more severe negative effects in the distinctive conditions of post-Soviet societies, because both the legal and formal political systems were too weak to properly regulate privatization, and because both institutional autonomy and professional networks were too weak to implement coherent decentralization. In these conditions, the sharp decline in state funding and administrative capacity in the 1990s proved especially destructive to what had been tightly integrated and carefully regulated systems of higher education and research, even as those tensions broke along lines of institutional and curricular fragmentation that had been built into the Soviet system, as detailed later. The crises of the 1990s thus severely degraded the ability of the ‘‘new’’ (or newly independent) nation states in the region to maintain policy coherence in higher education, to sustain a reasonable level of social equity, to regulate academic quality, or to systematically link higher education reform to new mechanisms for economic innovation. The heart of this argument is that the Soviet-era separation of higher education, research, and advanced professional training into various branch ministries, and especially the system-wide separation of research from teaching (between three sectors, the secretive military-industrial laboratories, the dominant Academy of Sciences research institutes, and the universities and professional institutes) meant that when state funding declined sharply and economic enterprises were chaotically privatized, the ability of any of the three sectors of the Soviet higher education system to sustain world-class education or research (either basic or applied) deteriorated rapidly (David-Fox & Peteri, 2000; Tomusk, 2004). Perhaps even more problematically, there were pervasive institutional and professional barriers to using new insights from research, or new approaches to research management, to drive the reform of education in post-Soviet universities, perhaps especially because of the enduring dominance of an ethos of ‘‘pure’’ research in Academy research institutes, a ‘‘theoretical bias’’ which was widely shared across the profession (and seemingly regardless of whether faculty were primarily engaged in teaching). In other words, it has proven to be difficult throughout post-Soviet Russia and Eurasia to shift towards the emerging global model of the research university (CRDF, 2004), as well as to link those attempted changes and ‘‘demilitarization’’ to
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economic and technological innovation in market-oriented and more entrepreneurial ways (Schweitzer, 2000; Schweitzer & Gunther, 2006). This combination of powerful historical legacies and the particular policy choices that were made in the 1990s shaped the region’s ambiguous interaction with worldwide trends in higher education reform since 1991, and all of this has led to extremely uneven patterns in the attempted transformation of higher education across the region. Some of the poorer regions or more isolated nations (especially in rural areas, in much of the southern Caucasus, and in Central Asia), have experienced the steady decline of state-sponsored education systems and, in some areas, to their virtual collapse (as Soviet or ‘‘all-Union’’ subsidies ended or as state capacity declined). In more urban regions or nation states which began in a stronger position in terms of higher education and research capacity (parts of Ukraine and especially the urban nexus of the Russian Federation); or which have benefited from energy or other natural resources (Russia and Kazakhstan, with Azerbaijan struggling and gas-rich Turkmenistan in a league of its own, as detailed later); or which have benefited from more reform-minded governments with ambitious higher education reform agendas and more deliberate efforts to embrace worldwide reform trends (Kyrgyzstan in the late 1990s, Georgia after the ‘‘Rose Revolution’’ of 2003), the picture is more positive but still very uneven, and for many of the same historical reasons. Finally, since 2001, there has been a new wave of efforts across the region to restore the role of the state in guiding higher education and to create (or, perhaps more accurately, to recreate in new quasi-market conditions) ‘‘national innovation systems.’’ In other words, some of the leading governments in the region are experimenting with alternative global models – and embracing new worldwide policy trends – as they attempt to restore the integrity and vitality of their state-sponsored or national higher education systems, and to link those reforms to state capitalist approaches to economic development (Jessop, 2002; Berglof, Kunov, Shvets, & Yudaeva, 2003). In other words, the leading states in the region are working to reassert the role of the state in guiding (and controlling) all three sectors of their postsecondary systems (military research, Academy-based research, and university-based education). Across the region, most of the newly independent states have struggled to reform these systems to build comprehensive research universities and to integrate with the mainstream of global higher education and research, yet with very mixed results. Finally, taken as a whole, these developments complicate some of the central tenets of ‘‘neo-institutionalism’’ and world culture theory (Drori, Meyer,
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Ramirez, & Schofer, 2003; Frank & Gabler, 2006), and suggest that even if various attempts at post-Soviet reforms accord with worldwide policy trends rhetorically or superficially, the ways in which state power and professional relations work beneath the surface remain historically conditioned, culturally particular, and very regionally specific.
THE AMBIGUOUS HISTORICAL LEGACIES OF SOVIET HIGHER EDUCATION The history of Soviet higher education was closely intertwined with the broader histories of Soviet-era general education, with science policies and research institutions, and with the various models of political economy that were embraced and then altered between 1917 and the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1991. Such close bureaucratic control and tight policy coordination were inherent in the state socialist higher education system that allowed no private institutions or alternative models to function (Chanbarisov, 1988), and was arguably the source of Soviet higher education’s greatest strengths as well as the cause of its greatest weaknesses. State support and massive public investment meant that Soviet higher education witnessed some of the most rapid and truly impressive quantitative and institutional growth in the world (Yelyutin, 1959). In other words, Russian and then Soviet higher education grew from its modest domestic influence and marginal global status in the early 1900s to become one of the largest and most comprehensive systems of higher education and research in the postwar era. This rapid growth was also shaped by a historically unprecedented expansion of access to postsecondary education, especially for disadvantaged groups such as peasants and working-class young people (Fitzpatrick, 1979), women, and some national minorities, or at least for those nationalities who were dominant in their titular or union republics (Pennar, Bakalo, & Bereday, 1971). Furthermore, the close integration of higher education and science policy with the highest echelons and priorities of the Community Party and Soviet state leadership contributed directly to these massive investments (and networks of patronage), as Soviet higher education, professional training, and research became tightly connected with the planned economy and rapid technological development. In fact, for all of the intellectual drama and bitter conflicts that often characterized this history, it is clear that many of those ‘‘specialists’’ who were involved
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in this rapid expansion of Soviet higher education and research effectively embraced the Soviet regime’s fundamental goals of industrial modernization and social development, at the same time that millions more gained access to new professional careers and other vocational opportunities. Soviet higher education and research thus directly served the regime’s goals of economic and cultural development, and also provided a significant source of compensatory legitimacy among a large and influential segment of the Soviet population. However, the tight state control, organizational integration, and policy coordination that characterized this system also led to destructive political and ideological interventions by particular factions of the Communist Party and Soviet state into higher education and academic research (Vucinich, 1984; Graham, 1993). Such interventions became especially destructive when aimed at alleged ‘‘bourgeois nationalism’’ in the union republics; against any manifestations of religious or private higher education; and in certain academic fields such as history, philosophy, and economics (in the 1920s and 1930s); and later in fields such as linguistics, botany, and genetics (in the 1940s and 1950s, see Krementsov, 1997). The Soviet system of higher education was also characterized by parallelism, inefficiency in its use of financial and human resources, and often artificial barriers to mobility within and across the system. Soviet higher education was fragmented organizationally between different branches of the national economy (so-called branch, or otraslevye, institutes), and as students were often locked into narrow and rigid vocational and professional curricula (Ushakov & Shuruev, 1980). Finally, the Soviet system of higher education and research was also handicapped by pervasive militarization, which meant that state funding was skewed to particular military priorities (which absorbed nearly 70% of research funding), and that entire postsecondary and research institutions were sealed off from all outside contact, often in ‘‘closed’’ cities (Dezhina & Graham, 2002). Other chronic problems in Soviet higher education included the acute weakness of critical disciplines in the social sciences, which were dominated by dogmatic orthodoxies in fields such as sociology and political economy, even as rich scholarship was unfolding in some areas of the humanities and especially in many areas of the natural, behavioral, and physical sciences (Kojevnikov, 2004). Other systemic problems included an emphasis on rapid quantitative growth and high admission rates, with only sporadic attention paid to the qualitative dimensions of teaching and learning, and the persistence (or active restoration) of traditional instructional methods and rigid academic hierarchies. Many Soviet students (and potential employers)
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also seemed dissatisfied with an involuntary and seemingly often ineffective system for the ‘‘distribution’’ (raspredelnie) of graduates to job placements after their university or postsecondary training (Galkin, 1958). Finally, one of the Soviet system’s greatest strengths – the flourishing network of research institutes clustered around or modeled after the Soviet Academy of Sciences (Akademiia nauk SSSR), with parallel Academies and networks of research institutes in medicine, agriculture, and pedagogy or teacher education – was also directly related to one of its greatest and most persistent weaknesses, the chronic separation of advanced research from undergraduate and, often, even from graduate education. This system-wide separation endured into the 1990s, and remains an acute problem across the former Soviet Union. Of course, this bifurcated system had both strengths and weaknesses. Many Academy research institutes sponsored world-class scholarship, even if the results of that work were only sporadically integrated into university teaching or even into faculty preparation. Another undeniable dimension of the distinctive strengths of the Soviet system of higher education and research was the powerful (if often ponderous) bureaucracy that could ‘‘force’’ educational resources and professional talent ‘‘out and down,’’ out into the rural regions and nationality areas, and down into the provision of services for working class and other disadvantaged groups, often in the form of ‘‘correspondence’’ (zaochnyi) programs (Rosen, 1963). This state-sponsored emphasis on quantity and mass education then shifted towards an emphasis on full-time programs and academic quality in the 1970s and 1980s, as the Soviet regime attempted to strengthen the role of regional universities and engaged in fitful attempts to combine research and education in new ways, for example by fostering cooperation between Academy of Sciences research institutes and universities. The nearly 900 exceedingly narrow specializations of the Stalinist era were narrowed to 300, and the policy emphasis was shifted to training ‘‘specialists of a broad profile’’ (Matthews, 1982). Thus, while rigid and dogmatic in many ways, the Soviet higher education system at least attempted to sustain and, in its later years, to improve ‘‘systemic coherence,’’ between the various components of education and research; between higher education, professional training, and economic development; and between the union republics and various other constituent parts of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet system also at least attempted to sustain a broad measure of social equity and mass educational opportunity, even if those measures were arguably compromised by episodes of repression, corruption that spread in the postwar era, and political favoritism. Finally, an especially important aspect of Soviet higher education in terms of its
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systemic integrity or coherence was the lavishly subsidized system of higher education and research exchanges, especially within the U.S.S.R. (the constant and very influential ‘‘circulation’’ of academic elites between the union republics and the academic centers of Leningrad, Moscow, and Kyiv), as well as internationally (both with nations in the Soviet bloc and with selected Third World client states). Furthermore, while admittedly often enforced in brutal and arbitrary ways, there were undeniably at least some ‘‘controls’’ that operated within the Soviet system to restrain the most blatant corruption and nepotism. In fact, it is entirely possible attempts in the late 1980s to investigate and suppress such practices in the regions and some of the union republics contributed to the restiveness of national elites and their propensity to move towards separatism and anti-Soviet ‘‘nationalism’’ (Holmes, 1993). Of course, many of those systemic ‘‘strengths’’ were logical and functional only within the highly centralized and bureaucratized system of Soviet state socialism and the planned economy, and, in a very real sense, many of those same structures and practices became systemic weaknesses as the late Soviet and newly independent elites embraced market-based economics and privatization in the 1990s. Other weaknesses of late Soviet higher education that were thrown into stark relief included its ‘‘institutional automatism,’’ and the fact that little or no allowance was made for professional initiative or institutional adaptability in the provision of higher education, as sharp legal limits were upheld on private tutoring, any forms of religious or private higher education, and any ‘‘unregulated’’ international travel for study or research (Avis, 1991). To summarize, the profound strengths and very real achievements of Soviet higher education and research before 1991 flowed from many of the same systemic characteristics that caused its chronic, and perhaps ultimately fatal, weaknesses (Gustafson, 1980). There is no clear consensus in the scholarly literature about many of these issues, but it does seem undeniable that Soviet higher education drew enormous financial benefits from its close integration with the Communist Party and the Soviet state, even if that organizational and professional integration or dependence ultimately contributed to the slow paralysis of the system in the 1980s and then its partial collapse in the 1990s. In fact, it is entirely possible that these unique characteristics: close integration with state and industrial policy, broad and inclusive admissions and promotion policies, and the systematic separation of research from teaching, are precisely what facilitated the rapid growth of Soviet higher education and advanced training in its early and middle phases from 1917 to the 1950s (to be more precise, dependence on massive state
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investments and ‘‘block grants’’ to institutions; the pervasive forcing of ‘‘specialists’’ through accelerated training programs; and separating mass or quantity in postsecondary education from quality in research). However, it is also possible that those same unique characteristics then ultimately served to block or at least to limit the Soviet system’s institutional adaptability and academic quality in its later phases from the 1960s to the 1980s, and contributed to the uniquely dysfunctional processes that overtook higher education systems throughout the Soviet successor states after 1991.
NEW FREEDOMS, SYSTEMIC DYSFUNCTIONS AND POLICY CHOICES SINCE 1991 Most recent scholarly and popular accounts of developments in Russia, Belarus, parts of the southern Caucasus, and much of Central Asia tend to focus on the erosion of market democracy and the resurgence of the authoritarian state, often at the hands of former Communist elites who have reinvented themselves as nationalists or capitalist oligarchs. From another perspective, these same processes of elite (re)formation began in the 1980s, accelerated through the 1990s, and only came to full fruition in recent years. Much of this critical analysis is, of course, quite accurate, and one should have no illusions about the malign persistence (or resurgence) of authoritarianism, or about the disastrous effects of rampant corruption and official criminality (Politkovskaya, 2004). However, there are also important dimensions of these region-wide trends and dysfunctions that too often go unacknowledged in many Western accounts. Perhaps most salient are the ways in which the often naı¨ ve emphasis on rapid privatization in the 1990s, in the absence of state regulatory power, adequate mechanisms for political accountability, or sufficient media transparency, contributed directly to corruption and criminality (see the prescient account by Holmes, 1997; also Stiglitz, 2002). Chaotic privatization also contributed to the ways in which an equally naı¨ ve emphasis on rapid decentralization and deregulation undermined the ability of post-Soviet states to sustain and reinvent the rule of law, or to sustain social institutions, social cohesion, and social trust (Klein & Pomer, 2001; Zaslavskaya, 2004). Finally, and most importantly for our purposes here, this single-minded emphasis on privatization and decentralization in the 1990s made it nearly impossible for the newly independent states to focus the necessary public resources on sustaining and reinventing the human capital that had been painstakingly
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developed over the years within the Soviet education system, before those systems went into terminal crisis in the late 1980s and 1990s, and especially in the Soviet east and south (Dudwick, Gomart, Marc, & Kuehnast, 2003). In fact, it seems that many analysts both within the region and perhaps especially outside observers overestimated the very real strengths of the Soviet system of higher education and research, and underestimated its profound weaknesses, which may have helped set the stage for the severe crises of the 1990s. In other words, it seems that many domestic actors as well as international analysts overestimated the inherent strengths of the new or newly ‘‘national’’ higher education systems after 1991 and severely underestimated how closely integrated and interdependent the Soviet system of higher education had been. This in turn caused many policymakers to underestimate the disruptive effects that abrupt policy changes would have in the 1990s, as all concerned seemed to fail to realize just how difficult it would be to adapt to quasi-market conditions (Committee on Higher Education, 1992; also Balzer, 1994). There was in fact a widespread assumption both in the region and internationally that Soviet achievements in public health and higher education would cushion the ‘‘shocks of transition,’’ and seemingly only a (very) belated recognition of how poorly education systems in Russia and Eurasia were ‘‘aligning’’ with the transition to market economies (Berryman, 2000). Of course, by the late 1990s, that larger transition was also proving to be intensely problematic. In fact, the distinctive strengths of the Soviet model of higher education and research – predicated as it was on tight policy coordination and a very high level of public investment – seemed to ‘‘translate’’ very badly into the rapid shift towards market-based economies, especially as privatization in the region often ran ahead of the legal structures to regulate it in transparent and legitimate ways. Furthermore, rapid decentralization, which often seemed to be little more than central authorities simply abdicating their fiscal responsibilities towards public higher education, exacerbated the weakness of professional and disciplinary networks and the acute lack of experience with institutional autonomy in both research institutes and regional universities (OECD, 1999). Of course, it must also be acknowledged that the emphasis on rapid privatization served powerful indigenous interest groups, just as the emphasis on decentralization served powerful regional interest groups, and that thus those policies did not emanate solely from the influence of Western governments or multilateral agencies such as the World Bank. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that there were powerful unintended consequences that resulted from the often uncritical ‘‘borrowing and lending’’ of these particular neo-liberal policy paradigms in the 1990s (Steiner-Khamsi, 2004).
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Of course, there were also undeniable benefits to the new freedoms of the 1990s. Newly ‘‘national’’ higher education systems in Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia restored instruction in national languages, and in some cases (Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan) also quickly restored Latin scripts. Private higher education institutions opened up (the first since they had been banned by the Communist Party in 1918), which came to include some innovative graduate schools and new universities such as the New Economic School in Moscow, the European University of St. Petersburg, and the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences in Russia; Khazar University in Azerbaijan; the American University of Armenia; the KyrgyzTurkish Manas University and the American University of Central Asia in Kyrgyzstan; and others. Several innovative new or reconfigured public institutions were also created, such as the Russian State Humanities University and the State University Higher School of Economics in Moscow, the University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in Ukraine, and the Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics and Strategic Research. Unfortunately, this wave of institutional transformation also saw the creation of an array of under-regulated legal and business ‘‘academies,’’ as well as blatantly commercial and often low-quality ‘‘affiliates’’ (filialy) of public and private universities across the region. Perhaps most significantly, some degree of constructive competition began to emerge within and between higher education and research institutions, and student tuition payments began to shape a new ‘‘market’’ in higher education, at least in the urban core of Ukraine and Russia (Avrus, 2001). There were also sweeping transformations in curricula and instruction, with dramatic changes in fields such as economics, law, business, religious studies, history, and sociology (Ruble, Popson, & Bronson, 1999). Perhaps most importantly, scholars and students across the former Soviet Union were able to travel more freely; were freed from censorship, even if it was later restored in some nations in the region; and benefited from an array of new international exchanges and grant programs (Dezhina, 2000). Of course, plunging salaries and the chronic inability of higher education or research institutions to afford the purchase of publications or new equipment often clouded those new freedoms, and it is also undeniable that some of the early international programs contributed to ‘‘brain drain’’ out of the profession and out of the region (Iurevich & Tsapenko, 2001). However, while the new freedoms of the 1990s are undeniable, it is also clear that rapid privatization led to gross corruption in many public universities and some of the new private institutions (with the
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‘‘seizure’’ of state property and facilities and the unregulated imposition of tuition and student ‘‘fees’’); and that decentralization at least contributed to a universally acknowledged plunge in academic quality, as attempts to establish new state curricular standards (Kinelev, 1995) were often ignored or effectively disregarded by institutions or regional authorities. The 1990s also witnessed a sharp rise in educational inequality as subsidies for underdeveloped areas and disadvantaged groups evaporated (Shishkin, Zaborovskaia, Kliachko, Korolev, Chernets, Chirkova, & Shilova, 2004). The newly independent nations, especially in the former Soviet south, inherited the Soviet apparatus for higher education and research, but now without the support structures, educational exchanges, and federal subsidies that had sustained that system. Finally, it also often seemed that many of the newly independent national higher education systems lacked the research capacity, or even simply the ability to publish new scholarly materials and textbooks, that were now so urgently needed. To summarize, while clearly necessary in some ways, the abrupt and often chaotic ways in which global neo-liberal policy prescriptions were implemented in the 1990s had the effect of ‘‘disarticulating’’ and disrupting the formerly highly integrated and relatively functional system of Soviet higher education and research, which contributed directly to the degradation of both systemic coherence and social equity. From another perspective, it may be that the policy intentions of the early 1990s were not necessarily so malign but that they were so wildly beyond the capacity of the post-Soviet systems to implement that they constituted a sort of academic (and public policy) malpractice. These ‘‘utopian’’ intentions were often combined with an open hostility to ‘‘professional’’ interest groups (whether rectors, professors, or Academy researchers), many of whom were seen as hopelessly parochial or self-interested. Unfortunately, these policy prescriptions seemed to simply assume that robust ‘‘new’’ (and thus, by definition, more ‘‘democratic’’ and committed to neo-liberal reform) professional networks and associational structures would emerge ‘‘naturally’’ to fill the vacuum created by the sharp decline in state regulation and public investment. This same logic, in ways that sometimes seemed to become a sort of magical thinking, insisted that robust markets and entrepreneurial initiatives would ‘‘organically’’ spring up once the ‘‘command-administrative system’’ was destroyed and state property privatized. While there have, undeniably, been some transformations more recently along these lines, the broader picture is one of economic crisis and endemic poverty, especially in rural areas and across the southern tier of the former U.S.S.R.
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THE REASSERTION OF STATE POWER AND NEW POLICY FRAMEWORKS SINCE 2001 Thus, while we should not have any illusions about the abuses of administrative and executive power that are endemic throughout Russia and Eurasia, it is perhaps not entirely negative that efforts have been made recently to restore the capacity of the national states to guide and shape higher education policy, to subsidize science and research, and to establish more coherent market-based ‘‘national innovation systems’’ (Gokhberg, 2003; Watkins, 2003). This trend is emerging across the region, in states such as Russia, Georgia, Armenia (NRC, 2004), and Kazakhstan (OECD, 2007). More specifically, this broad regional trend to restore state or federal power, or perhaps more accurately to balance the new market mechanisms with functional state regulation and new investments in higher education and research, has accelerated since 2000 in the more economically dynamic nations of the region such as Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan (flush with oil and gas profits), as well as in the more politically dynamic nations of the region such as Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan (all of which experienced political ‘‘revolutions’’ in 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively). However, some of these reform trajectories remain problematic, as all three of the latter nations have experienced subsequent political turmoil and economic problems. From another perspective, one could argue that in many post-Soviet nations attempts at higher education reform have been handicapped, either by persistent economic crises (Moldova, Armenia, Tajikistan), or by persistent political dysfunction and authoritarianism (Belarus, Uzbekistan) or by a uniquely unfortunate combination of both (Turkmenistan). It should also be noted that the post-Soviet Baltic nations (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) embarked on a different trajectory of reform, as they gained access to new financial and administrative support systems upon accession to the European Union in 2004. Regardless of one’s judgment of the process, it is clear that Vladimir Putin has presided over the consolidation of a relatively stable form of state capitalism in Russia, an ‘‘accumulation regime’’ that contains its own distinctive modes of social regulation and uses of state power, and that now seems more-or-less balanced between those interests clustered around resource extraction and raw material exports (the oligarchs or, more commonly in Russian, syroviki) and those clustered around the state security services and defense industries (the siloviki). In fact, one might argue that, with some variations and again, for better or worse, this same system of state capitalism has emerged in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, with variations
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on this same model also emerging in the nominally more democratic nations in the region such as Armenia, Georgia, and Ukraine. In the sphere of higher education, these processes have been characterized across the region by the adoption of the rhetoric of the information society (Vartanov & Tkachev, 2004) and the necessity of a knowledge-based economy, even as those terms are deployed in distinctive ways, and often in pursuit of particular national goals. In other words, while serious systemic crises remain, especially in the southern Caucasus and much of Central Asia, the last few years have witnessed the establishment of a relatively stable new ‘‘state system’’ in much of the former Soviet Union, which has in turn led directly to attempts to articulate new policy frameworks for higher education and research. For example, Russia is now the fifth most ‘‘wired’’ country in the world and has seen the rapid spread of new information and communication technologies (Peterson, 2005), and still enjoys a relatively high level of freedom in its electronic media (in contrast to its print media). Russia has also achieved macroeconomic stabilization, if admittedly in part through authoritarian controls on demands for social spending (the ‘‘Asian’’ model); has ended all restrictions on ruble trading and established full convertibility of the ruble; and has seen a net inflow of foreign investment in the first half of 2007 in the amount of $67 billion, more than entire period from 1991 to 2001. Other nations in the region such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have also experienced macroeconomic stabilization as a result of oil and gas income, and consumer capitalism is spreading rapidly throughout the urban areas of the region. However, conditions might be worse than Western scholarly and popular accounts realize in several other ways and in particular regions. For example, both political and criminal violence continues across the region, most severely in the northern Caucasus and southern Central Asia (which has resulted in catastrophic educational crises in regions such as Ingushetia, Chechnya, and Tajikistan), and both economies and polities remain fragile along that southern rim (with ominous trends towards regional separatism, endemic narcotics trafficking, ethnic extremism, and, in some regions, Islamic radicalism). Many of the smaller post-Soviet nations suffered severe economic disruption from the severing of ‘‘all-Union’’ economic subsidies and, most importantly for our purposes here, the collapse of Soviet-era academic interdependence. To summarize, higher education in almost all of the post-Soviet states in the 1990s was characterized by contradictory and often bitterly contested transformations. On the one hand, the sector gained unprecedented freedom, and there have been widespread reforms in curricula, instructional methods, and university management (Filippov, 2006). Less positively, this also meant the equally unprecedented freedom to fail and universities
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in Russia and across the region suffered grievously when exposed to market conditions and the new demands of ‘‘autonomy’’ (Bain, 2003). While Western governments, multilateral agencies such as the World Bank, and major private foundations have poured substantial resources into the reform of post-Soviet higher education since 1991, there was arguably a sense by the end of the decade that much of that technical assistance had been ineffective, perhaps most notoriously in the scandals surrounding the European TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) Program, or that somehow the whole – the goal of systemic higher education reform – was struggling to become more than the sum of its externally funded or grant-dependent parts. In hindsight, significant policy changes had been developing since the passage of the Russian Law ‘‘On Higher and Professional Education’’ in 1996, which may well have represented the high-water mark of Americanstyle ‘‘marketization’’ and the de facto privatization of higher education in Russia (and throughout the region). This new policy trend came to be characterized by a reassertion of the authority of the state and, in Russia, of the Ministry of Education and Science through its control of academic standards, the approval of degree programs, and accreditation. This new trend also entailed a new wave of public investment in Russian state universities, even as the state worked to close down low-quality providers (especially commercial degree mills) and to consolidate redundant or narrowly profiled institutions. These trends were laid out clearly in a new Russian federal policy framework issued in late 2001 (Ministry of Education, 2001), which sought to balance market forces and competitive pressures with greater state regulation and policy coordination. Of course, these new policies were only part of the changing dynamic, and combined with a growing recognition among regional university leaders that they would have to embrace significant internal reforms, especially involving strategic planning and international partnerships, in order to adjust to the demands of the new environment. One could also argue that this shift away from a more market-driven U.S. model towards a more state-regulated or European model not only aligned more closely with Soviet academic traditions but also reflected deeper trends in European higher education, as had begun in the TEMPUS and other transnational programs and as was then confirmed by the entry of Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia into the Bologna Process in 2003 and after (Shadrikov, Larionova, Zhelezov, & Gorbunova, 2004; Tomusk, 2006). Of course, worldwide policy trends have also shifted since the neo-liberal emphases of the 1990s, and there is now a greater focus on the role of the
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state in fostering policies conducive to the creation not just of knowledge economies but also of knowledge societies (UNESCO, 2005; Sorlin & Vessuri, 2007). Working in close collaboration with the World Bank, the OECD, and various UN agencies, Russian and Eurasian governments have been working to establish new policies for innovation and the transfer of technologies from the physical and natural sciences and engineering to the marketplace, and some have led the way in the creation of new national innovation systems. These new policy paradigms have focused on efforts to create the legal and tax regimes necessary to foster more ‘‘entrepreneurial’’ universities (Shattock, 2004); have struggled to establish a new role in governance for boards of trustees, junior faculty, and students; have worked to enhance the role of higher education in regional development; and have sought to create new national examination systems (perhaps most notably the Unified State Exam, edinnyi gosudarstvennyi ekzamen, or EGE, in Russia), which are intended to improve social equity and lessen corruption. Perhaps most importantly, many nations in the region have embraced aggressive strategies of internationalization, and have sought ambitious partnerships with U.S., Turkish, European, and Asian universities. In fact, all nations in the region seem to share a renewed commitment to state regulation, public investment in higher education and research, and the creation of new innovation systems that seek to establish functional relations between the state, industry, and higher education. In other words, almost all of the post-Soviet nations have embraced the new global policy rhetoric of knowledge societies, but all are doing so for their own distinctive and often quite strategic reasons. The essential purpose of these policy strategies seems to be to restore national sovereignty and thereby to control their integration into global economic processes on their own terms (or at least on the terms of their economic and political elites). However, stark challenges remain in these processes of transformation, in part because of the powerful and ambiguous legacies of Soviet higher education, in part because of the very real weaknesses that were built into the Soviet system, but also because of the intensely disruptive effects of the neo-liberal policy prescriptions that were embraced in the 1990s.
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Iurevich, A., & Tsapenko, I. (Eds). (2001). Nuzhny li Rossii uchenye? Moscow: Editorial URSS. Jessop, B. (2002). The future of the capitalist state. Malden, MA: Polity. Kinelev, V. (Ed.) (1995). State educational standard of higher professional education. Moscow: State Committee on Higher Education of the Russian Federation. Klein, L. R., & Pomer, M. (Eds). (2001). The new Russia: Transition gone awry. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Kojevnikov, A. B. (2004). Stalin’s great science: The times and adventures of Soviet physicists. London: Imperial College Press. Krementsov, N. (1997). Stalinist science. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Matthews, M. (1982). Education in the Soviet Union: Policies and institutions since Stalin. London: George Allen & Unwin. Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation. (2001). O kontseptsii modernizatsii rossiiskogo obrazovaniia na period do 2010 goda. Moscow: Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation. NRC. (2004). Science and technology in Armenia: Toward a knowledge-based economy. Washington, DC: National Research Council and National Academies Press. OECD. (1999). Tertiary education and research in the Russian Federation. Paris: OECD. OECD. (2007). Higher education in Kazakhstan. Paris: OECD. Pennar, J., Bakalo, I. I., & Bereday, G. Z. F. (1971). Modernization and diversity in Soviet education: With special reference to nationality groups. New York: Praeger. Peterson, D. J. (2005). Russia and the information revolution. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Politkovskaya, A. (2004). Putin’s Russia: Life in a failing democracy. New York: Metropolitan Books. Rosen, S. M. (1963). Higher education in the U.S.S.R.: Curriculums, schools, and statistics. Washington, DC: U. S. Department of Commerce. Ruble, B., Popson, N., & Bronson, S. (1999). The humanities and social sciences in the former Soviet Union: An assessment of need. Washington, DC: Kennan Institute. Schweitzer, G. E. (2000). Swords into market shares: Technology, economics, and security in the New Russia. Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press/National Academies. Schweitzer, G. E., & Gunther, R. S. (2006). Innovating for profit in Russia: Summary of a workshop. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. Shadrikov, V. D., Larionova, M. V., Zhelezov, B. V., & Gorbunova, E. M. (2004). Formirovanie obshcheevropeiskogo prostranstva vysshego obrazovaniia. Moscow: Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation and Higher School of Economics. Shattock, M. (Ed.) (2004). Entpreneurialism and the Transformation of Russian Universities. Paris: International Institute for Educational Planning and UNESCO. Shishkin, S. V., Zaborovskaia, A. S., Kliachko, T. L., Korolev, I. B., Chernets, V. A., Chirkova, L. S., & Shilova, L. S. (2004). Vyshee obrazovanie v Rossii: Pravila I real’nost. Moscow: Independent Institute for Social Policy. Sorlin, S., & Vessuri, H. (Eds). (2007). Knowledge society vs. knowledge economy: Knowledge, power and politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Steiner-Khamsi, G. (Ed.) (2004). The global politics of educational borrowing and lending. New York: Teachers College Press. Stiglitz, J. (2002). Globalization and its discontents. New York: Norton. Tomusk, V. (2004). The open world and closed societies: Essays on higher education policies ‘‘in Transition’’. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
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Tomusk, V. (Ed.) (2006). Creating the European area of higher education: Voices from the periphery. Dordrecht: Springer. UNESCO. (2005). Towards knowledge societies. Paris: UNESCO. Ushakov, G. I., & Shuruev, A. S. (1980). Planirovanie I finansirovanie podgotovki spetsialistov. Moscow: Vysshaia shkola. Vartanov, E. L., & Tkachev, N. V. (Eds). (2004). Natsional’nye modeli informatsionnogo obshchestva. Moscow: IKAR. Vucinich, A. (1984). Empire of knowledge: The academy of sciences of the USSR (1917–1970). Berkeley: University of California Press. Watkins, A. (2003). From knowledge to wealth: Transforming Russian science and technology for a modern knowledge economy. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Yelyutin, V. P. (1959). Higher education in the USSR. New York: International Arts and Sciences Press. Zaslavskaya, T. I. (2004). Sovremennoe rossiiskoe obshchestvo. Moscow: Delo.
THE WORLD BANK AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: THE CASES OF UGANDA AND THAILAND Christopher S. Collins and Robert A. Rhoads We [the World Bank] are the Queen Mary here so it’s hard to say when we start turning, because we move so slowly. But anyway, for about 10 years there was a lot of emphasis on basic education in the developing world and to some extent there still is in countries where illiteracy is high. On the other hand, as progress has been made and the knowledge economy has come to the fore we have not been so tightly focused on basic education, particularly in countries that have been making good progress in that area. Working across sectors, we now get more involved with our macro-economists and private-sector people talking about skills development and human capital or institutional capacity building – all those buzz words today – which are cross-cutting in a sense. An Official at the World Bank With changes in trade policy, scarcity of natural resources, regional conflicts, and everything else it is not easy to say that this is what our [the World Bank’s] higher education project contributed. But having said that, certainly in Africa, you find the very lowest enrollment ratios anywhere in the world. I don’t know what the right proportion is, but it has got to be more than 1 or 2 percent of the population participating in higher education. You cannot run a competitive economy in the world today with such few graduates. So, to the extent that we’ve been supporting the expansion of higher education in Africa, which we have been doing, I think it is only for the betterment of those nations. The challenge has been to get people to worry about the quality of higher education while you are expanding enrollments. In a political environment you can The Worldwide Transformation of Higher Education International Perspectives on Education and Society, Volume 9, 177–221 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1479-3679/doi:10.1016/S1479-3679(08)00007-8
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imagine all the politicians wanting to expand enrollments, because it makes everybody happy to get into the university, but nobody wants to champion quality because it is basically telling people you aren’t good enough or you have to be fired because you didn’t publish. As we say around here, ‘‘expanding access has a thousand parents but quality is an orphan’’ – politically speaking at least. We also try to weigh in on the side of the orphan. An Official at the World Bank
The above comments were collected as part of formal interviews conducted with World Bank officials involved with higher education projects in the developing world. The comments call attention to challenges developing nations face as they seek to strengthen universities1 and their ability to contribute to social and economic development. The remarks speak to two issues in particular that we intend to address in this chapter. First, developing nations face a monumental challenge in raising adequate funds for expanding the size, scope, and quality of their universities. Overcoming this challenge is critical if nations are to build forms of human capacity suitable for competing in a global knowledge-based economy. Second, financial constraints also limit the ability of universities in the developing world to contribute forms of research-based knowledge suitable for advancing a nation’s role in the global economy. Overcoming this latter challenge requires developing nations to address a variety of complex issues, including brain drain, the inadequacy of scientific facilities and laboratories, and limited knowledge-based cultures upon which to advance science and technology (Peters & Besley, 2006). Adding to concerns linked to transforming universities and strengthening their role in the global economy is the fact that university contributions to nation building extend far beyond simply advancing scientific and technological knowledge; universities also play key roles in social development, especially in terms of supporting important elements of a society’s culture as well as its social and cultural institutions. The introductory comments also raise an important issue specific to the World Bank and its role in assisting developing nations and their universities: Because of the incredible size of the Bank, it oftentimes suffers from inertia. Like a gigantic sea-faring vessel – the ‘‘Queen Mary’’ in the words of one Bank official – whose change in course must be charted far in advance, the Bank can be slow and lumbering in its response to legitimate criticism and the need to shift direction. This facet of the Bank is particularly relevant to our discussion, as its policy makers maintain that a new course was charted in the 1990s in which the Bank increased support for higher education. In brief, during the last decade of the 20th century the
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Bank began to recognize that its general policy of focusing on primary and secondary education, while pressuring developing nations to limit (sometimes withdraw) public support for higher education, was shortsighted and in need of correction. Given this relatively new course in educational policy, we intend to examine the Bank’s funding priorities over the past several years by focusing on universities in the developing world. Our examination of the role of the Bank centers on key concerns raised in the opening comments, regarding the challenges of human capacity and institutional building, given their importance to any nation hoping to increase participation in a global environment. More specifically, we focus our attention on the cases of the Republic of Uganda and the Kingdom of Thailand. We select these nations for several reasons. First, and most obviously, these countries are considered by most to be developing in nature and face serious financial challenges. For example, Uganda ranks 144th on the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) and its national debt of $5 billion consumes an estimated 64 percent of its GDP. Thailand ranks 75th on the HDI and its national debt at over $52 billion consumes half of the national GDP. Second, Uganda and Thailand represent two distinct and key regions of the developing world – Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asian. Third, we have intimate knowledge of these particular contexts, having traveled to and conducted research in both countries. And finally, we gained access to World Bank officials who have worked in Uganda and Thailand and who were willing to share their thoughts and insights regarding higher education projects in the respective countries. In what follows, we first discuss the concept of globalization and its relationship to the worldwide transformation of higher education. We then examine the role of the World Bank in the developing world, including a brief discussion of the history and background of the Bank, as well as the evolution of its educational policies. A central piece of the puzzle for us concerns criticism of the Bank’s educational priorities and its efforts to make adjustments from the mid-1990s to the present. We use a discussion of the Bank’s shift in policy as a starting point for introducing key research questions framing our analysis. We move on to the cases of Uganda and Thailand by exploring their higher education systems and efforts to strengthen universities in light of World Bank funding programs. We then discuss key findings deriving from our analysis of higher education in Uganda and Thailand with a critical eye to the role of the Bank. Finally, we conclude by offering two competing interpretations concerning the Bank’s involvement in the developing world. We do this with the hope of
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extending the dialog as to how intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the World Bank might best serve the educational needs of developing nations.
THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION Globalization has become such an all-encompassing concept that it is almost meaningless. However, most scholars recognize that the term conveys in some manner or form a shrinkage of time and space such that events happening in one part of the world have the potential to impact other locales (Giddens, 1999; Held, 1991). Beyond this most basic meaning, it is hard to find any agreement on what the term actually conveys or when in fact the world actually entered a global age (Morrow & Torres, 2000). Given the vagueness of globalization as a concept, the challenge then is to be as clear as possible in discussing various forces related to globalization that may impact a particular phenomenon under study. In the case of this chapter, the phenomenon of interest is university transformation in the developing world. Several forces have been at work over the past 20 to 30 years to produce significant reforms in the structure of higher education at a global level. First, there has been a shift from an industrial-based to a knowledge-based economy driven by scientific and technological advances located primarily in central countries such as Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, among others. We are not suggesting that an industrial-based economy has disappeared, but only that a new form of the global economy has emerged and this new form often assumes a dominant position. To a large extent, the new knowledge-based economy reflects the growing power of computerized, network-based processes connected to the production and management of information and/or knowledge. A variety of descriptors have emerged to better represent this worldwide transformation, including phrases such as ‘‘new economy,’’ ‘‘information age,’’ ‘‘network society,’’ ‘‘knowledge society,’’ ‘‘age of knowledge capitalism,’’ ‘‘post-Fordism,’’ ‘‘post-industrialism,’’ and so forth (Carnoy, Castells, Cohen, & Cardoso, 1993; Castells, 1996, 1997; Morrow & Torres, 2000; Peters & Besley, 2006; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Stromquist, 2002; World Bank, 2002). This global economic transformation is closely tied to changes in the university, whereby science and technology, along with research and development,
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assume central importance (Calderone & Rhoads, 2005; Geiger, 2004; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997). Although the transformation of economies and key institutions such as the university impact all nations of the world, such a shift is far more prominent in the wealthier nations, where the most advanced forms of science and technology exist. Consequently, the place of developing nations and the role of their universities is a question that IGOs involved in economic development, including organizations such as the World Bank, have had to work through over the past few decades. Indeed, a central point of this chapter is to examine how World Bank policies have taken into account the changing nature of the global economy and the role of universities in the developing world. Another broad trend linked to globalization – or cultural globalization in particular – is what some scholars define as ‘‘internationalization’’ (Scott, 1998). Although we treat cultural globalization as a distinct form of globality, clearly it would be shortsighted of us not to acknowledge the interconnections between economics and culture; obviously, as nations become increasingly intertwined economically, given their participation in a global marketplace, there will be concomitant cultural interactions and interactive effects. And given the economic dominance of the West, some have described the cultural influences linked to the growing power of global markets as the ‘‘Westernization’’ of the world, or in the case of the United States, ‘‘Americanization’’ or ‘‘McDonaldization’’ (Rhoads, 2003; Ritzer, 2004), although the power of local contexts to integrate global influences in a hybridized manner suiting their own needs also has been acknowledged (Luke & Luke, 2000; Rhoads & Liang, 2007). In any case, the internationalization of higher education is revealed in the movement and exchange of students and scholars transnationally; this includes the emergence of new forms of identity grounded in constructions of ‘‘global citizenship’’ (Szele´nyi & Rhoads, 2007) and increased opportunities to share ideas, including the growing reliance on the Internet for transnational communications and knowledge production. The growing prominence of English as the language of global academe is another example of cultural globalization and its influence on tertiary institutions (Altbach, 2003). A set of global forces operating on today’s universities may be linked to the growing dominance of neoliberal economic views. Here, neoliberalism is understood as an economic philosophy stressing increased transnational and multi-national trade, the rapid flow of capital and investments, limited government intervention (with the exception of ensuring a free market), and a general rejection of public forms of services (often discussed as
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‘‘privatization’’). Historically speaking, neoliberlism is seen as arising from the political/economic regimes of Ronald Reagan (‘‘Reagonimcs’’) in the United States and Margaret Thatcher (‘‘Thatcherism’’) in the United Kingdom (Apple, 2000; Torres & Rhoads, 2006). As an overarching philosophy, neoliberalism is enacted at a global level through the economic initiatives of multi-national enterprises (MNEs) and multi-national corporations (MNCs) seeking an unfettered global marketplace, often following policies enacted through a host of IGOs such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Seen in this light, actions of a neoliberal variety may be understood by some as simply a sign of the times, reflective of the neoliberal revolution that was led by Reagan and Thatcher. As such, the neoliberal revolution and its organizational outcomes often are situated as the natural progression of global processes playing themselves out in a social Darwinian sense. In terms of the impact on universities, the power of neoliberalism is reflected in four major trends centered on: (1) accountability and efficiency, (2) accreditation and universalization, (3) international competitiveness and massification, and (4) privatization (Torres & Rhoads, 2006). The push for greater accountability and efficiency speaks to increased pressure on public forms of higher education to do more with less. This push is manifested in legislatures, governments, governing boards, and policy makers to increase productivity. The growing importance of accountability and efficiency is readily observable in the United States, where over the past two decades or so colleges and universities have faced significant pressure to manage public funds in a more productive and transparent manner and where an economic-based discourse centered on cost-benefit analysis has become dominant. The movement toward accreditation and universalization represents the treatment of higher education services and students as products that may be more easily articulated and exchanged. A major push in this area comes from the WTO and its efforts through GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) to define and regulate higher education services (Altbach, 2001). But there are also more regional efforts to universalize colleges and universities, such as the case of the European Union and the Bologna framework, which is intended to harmonize higher education throughout the EU (Altbach, 2003). International competitiveness and massification speak to a growing recognition of the importance of higher education to nations competing or seeking to compete in the global marketplace. This trend includes efforts to
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expand higher education systems, while also updating the kinds of programs offered for students, given the growing impact of a knowledge-based economy. Challenges related to international competitiveness also include efforts to update and advance forms of academic science and technological development undertaken by universities. The trend toward international competitiveness and massification is readily apparent in the People’s Republic of China, where policies of decentralization have been adopted with the goal of increasing organizational innovation and commercialization as a means of expanding and enhancing the nation’s system of higher education (Mok, 1997, 2000, 2002). Additionally, national programs such as Project 211 have sought to enhance the scientific and technological contributions of China’s top 100 universities with the goal of achieving world-class status as research universities. Such an effort is directly tied to national interests and the need to compete globally in a knowledge-based high-tech economy. Finally, the push to privatize higher education is a central facet of neoliberalism and speaks to the deeply engrained conviction that market competition offers the best solutions to pressing organizational and social problems. Of the major trends associated with neoliberalism and the global transformation of higher education, we see the push toward privatization as particularly relevant to analyses of the developing world and the involvement of IGOs such as the World Bank. We say this because a central element of the policies of many IGOs involved in international policy setting has been the push to privatize public services, including higher education. In the past, for example, the World Bank and IMF have supported policies aimed at minimizing public support for higher education, while seeking to advance and/or strengthen the private sector. This policy trend is evident in structural adjustment programs of the IMF in countries such as Argentina and Mexico, as well as through efforts of the WTO to treat higher education services as a tradable commodity much in the manner of any other consumer product (Rhoads & Mina, 2001). Given the position over the years of key IGOs to support the dissolution of public services in favor of privatization – a position that often has led to underfunding the higher education sector – we are concerned about the degree to which present-day World Bank policies in the developing world adequately support the transformation of universities in a manner consistent with nation building, including advancing a nation’s participation in a growing knowledge-based economy, but also in terms of strengthening social development. To better address the Bank’s position with regard to higher education, we find it necessary first to explore its history.
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THE WORLD BANK History and Background of the World Bank At the end of World War II, in July of 1944, the U.S. government invited 44 countries to participate in a conference held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. The conference’s central concern was the creation of an international monetary fund that would rebuild and stabilize international currencies severely damaged during the war period (Goldman, 2005). Only once during the 14 days at Bretton Woods was the idea of a bank for development in the Third World mentioned (Kapur, Webb, & Lewis, 1997). Indeed, during the 1940s much of the southern hemisphere was still colonized and the idea of development was tabled by John Maynard Keynes and the British in lieu of rebuilding war-torn Europe (Goldman, 2005). The creation of the International Monetary Fund became the primary outcome of the conference. In the following year, 1945, the focus on development in the Third World became the primary concern of a second organization created from the Bretton Woods impetus – the World Bank. Thus, the Bretton Woods conference served the purpose of creating a worldwide banking and monitoring system aimed at preventing weaker economies from dragging down the rest of the world to be spearheaded by the IMF and the World Bank (Goldman, 2005). World Bank tradition holds that the president must be a U.S. citizen, while the IMF is led by a European. The fifth World Bank president, Robert McNamara, known as the champion of the developing world, served from 1968 to 1981 (Kraske, 1996). McNamara believed in lifting people out of poverty, and that rich countries had a moral responsibility for redistributing wealth to poorer countries (Goldman, 2005). When McNamara’s tenure ended at the Bank, a shift began to occur. Debt in the developing world was rising, and countries were borrowing just to pay the interest on old loans. During this period, the World Bank required governments to reorganize and reorient their economies. This resulted in dramatic decreases in spending on health, education, and welfare in order to comply with Bank stipulations. The shift was part of the Reagan–Thatcher neoliberal revolution, in which development economists were replaced with orthodox macroeconomists in what one Bank official called ‘‘economic genocide’’ (Goldman, 2005, p. 92). As a consequence of the neoliberal revolution, including the push toward marketization and privatization, developing nations increasingly faced strict requirements on loans. The process of attaching requirements to a loan is
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often referred to as ‘‘conditionality,’’ and is defined by Killick (1997), as ‘‘policy changes stipulated as a prerequisite to the approval of, or continued access to, a grant or loan, or to subsequent assistance’’ (p. 487). Oftentimes, the mandated changes were opposed by the borrowing governments, but nonetheless were forced upon them through the ‘‘financial leverage’’ of the lenders. For example, many such mandates have included requirements to shift portions of public expenditures to the private sector. From the Bank’s perspective, loan conditions are necessary for creating systemic economic change, given that ‘‘the success rate of individual projects is closely associated with the overall management of the economy in developing countries’’ (Pincus & Winters, 2002, pp. 10–11). As a consequence of this strategic view of economic development, policies and practices emphasizing greater conditionality were implemented throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Recently, conditionality has come under criticism, but the Bank continues to place certain requirements on loan recipients nonetheless (Stiglitz, 2002). Currently, the World Bank operates with over 10,000 staff members located in over 100 countries with its primary headquarters in Washington, DC (www.worldbank.org). In 2005, 278 projects were approved for a total of US$22.3 billion in loans. The Bank is divided into two primary lending organizations: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Agency (IDA).2 The IBRD is dedicated to loans for middle-income countries to be repaid over 15 years, while IDA funds are used for low-interest loans to developing countries to be repaid within 30–40 years. The breakdown of lending by these two arms of the Bank can be observed in Fig. 1.3 Beginning in June 2005, the Bank’s president was Paul Wolfowitz, a noted neo-conservative often included in discussions of the powerful DC policy makers constituting the so-called ‘‘Washington Consensus.’’ However, by mid-2007, Wolfowitz was pushed out of the Bank as a result of accusations that he engaged in favoritism and misconduct by arranging for a large pay and promotion package for his companion, Shaha Ali Riza. Subsequently, Robert Zoellick was nominated by the Bush administration and approved as the 11th president of the Bank. One of the primary responsibilities of the Bank’s president is to oversee the Executive Board of Directors, which is comprised of representatives from the 185 member nations comprising the Bank. Every member nation has a voting representative on the Executive Board of Directors, but each representative’s vote is weighted by the amount of the country’s membership subscription (roughly equivalent to equity shares). The five member nations with the greatest share and hence influence
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Water, Sanitation & Flood Protection
Transportation
10%
Agriculture, Fishing & Forestry
9%
Education
9%
14%
8%
Law & Justice & Public Administration
Energy & Mining
Finance
8% 25% 10%
Information & Communication
1%
7%
Health & Other Social Services Industry & Trade
Share of total lending of US$22.3 billion
Fig. 1.
IBRD/IDA Lending by Sector, Fiscal Year 2005.
are the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. Twenty-one countries from Africa, including Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya, are represented on the Board by only one vote. The weight of those 21 countries equals only 3.36 percent of the total share of voting. The United States constitutes a super majority with 16.41 percent of the weighted vote, based on its membership subscription. Obviously, the structure of the Bank provides wealthier nations the greatest influence, given their ability to make much larger contributions. A current World Bank official spoke to this issue: With Africa you have two executive directors for about 50 countries, so it is not one country one vote. So, if the U.S. doesn’t agree on a project and one or two of the other countries doesn’t go along, they can pretty much block decision making. They don’t have veto power, but because they are prominent they can influence the outcome. Also, if African countries wanted to do something important they would have to do an awful lot of lobbying and coalition building in order to get their voice projected into that decisionmaking arena.
Given the Bank’s size and complexity, including how power and influence are disbursed, it is fairly easy to understand why one Bank official likened the organization to the Queen Mary, while another described it as a ‘‘1,000 organizations in one.’’
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Evolution of the Bank’s Educational Policy When the Bank made its first move from providing infrastructure (e.g. roads, dams, electricity) to building human capacity (e.g. education), the primary framework for understanding development was that of human capital. This occurred around 1980, when the Bank hired economists to empirically calculate earning functions (Heyneman, 1999). George Psacharopoulos, one of the Bank’s primary economists, utilized this framework as a method for understanding where to allocate money for educational development. The most basic explanation of human capital is that education enables individuals to be more productive and consequently they become more likely to contribute to improved economic conditions within a society (Psacharopoulos, 1988). With human capital theory as a foundation, the success of education may be analyzed through rate-of-return (ROR) analyses. Through his studies, Psacharopoulos repeatedly found primary education to be a better investment than secondary or higher education, based on the fact that unit costs for primary education are small relative to the extra lifetime income or productivity associated with literacy (Psacharopoulos, 1981, 1987, 1988, 1996, 2006). With regard to university education, Psacharopoulos (1988) concluded the opposite to be the case – meaning that unit costs are high relative to the extra lifetime income. Consequently, and based on human capital theory, for some 25 years Psacharopoulos (2006) has maintained that university education has a negative effect on equity and that too much of a typical national budget is allocated to an area with a low rate of return. Psacharopoulos’ findings were reported in World Bank policy documents and research papers. The World Development Report 1980 noted that returns to investment (in countries with low incomes) in basic education amount to 27 percent, while secondary and higher education yield returns of only 17 percent and 12 percent, respectively. Based on ROR analyses, the World Bank (1986) explored policy options for financing education in developing nations. The outcome – based to a large degree on the work of Psacharopoulos – was that the World Bank started pushing for a disinvestment of public funds for higher education, primarily by attaching conditions to their loans. This was most evident at the Jomtien, Thailand Education for All (EFA) conference sponsored by the World Bank and UNESCO in 1990, where participants came out in support of public investment in primary education, women’s education, and basic literacy, while largely ignoring higher education as a public enterprise. A consequence of Jomtien, according to Altbach (2004), was
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that subsequent funding and policy decisions ‘‘disadvantaged higher education’’ (p. 71). What has become increasingly clear over the years, since Psacharopoulos’ early work with human capital theory, as well as the Jomtien EFA conference, is the reality that returns from higher education investment may be far more complicated than was originally considered. Debates about the role of public investment in higher education, both within the Bank as well as external to it, have raged over the years (Birdsall, 1996), although methodologies for measuring higher education’s social contributions clearly have lagged behind the less complicated ROR calculations. Even as late as 2004, Psacharopoulos generally refused to account for social returns or ‘‘externalities’’ associated with higher education and continued to argue from an individualistic human capital perspective, although by this point he had returned to academe (and later a position with the Greek Parliament) after some 17 years of service to the Bank. As Psacharopoulos (2004) noted in a moderated discussion published in Comparative Education Review, ‘‘[P]oor countries need additional literate people more than they need an extra handful of university graduates’’ (p. 84). Again, funding for primary and secondary education versus higher education, for Psacharopoulos, is decided by a calculus of individual or private return, mostly in terms of increased wages, and not in terms of any larger social or economic benefit such institutions might offer. For Birdsall (1996), as well as other policy makers within the Bank, working largely in opposition to Psacharopoulos, ROR analyses were inadequate and ignored externalities associated with higher education, including benefits of advanced training (well-educated teachers, for example, may benefit personally from higher wages but they also may contribute to social improvements), basic and applied research, and various nationbuilding aspects of higher education such as conserving and/or adapting local traditions as well as advancing national identity. Growing support for funding higher education in the developing world was evident in two key World Bank publications: the 2000 Higher Education in Developing Countries: Peril and Promise produced by the Task Force on Higher Education and Society (TFHES) and the 2002 Constructing Knowledge Societies: New Challenges for Tertiary Education. The fact that the Bank was taking steps to revise its position on the importance of higher education investment, after years of internal debate, was evident in then Bank President James Wolfensohn’s comments about the TFHES report, wherein he noted that higher education was key to advancing poverty reduction and economic development (Bloom & Rosovsky, 2004).
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Over the last 10 years or so, the Bank has essentially shifted its discourse about higher education. This shift has advanced a more sophisticated analysis of the utility of higher education to a nation’s economic development. This evolving position of the World Bank suggests that commitments to new policies for higher education in developing countries should neither be discounted nor accepted uncritically. As evidence, the TFHES report concluded that, ‘‘Without more and better higher education, developing countries will find it increasingly difficult to benefit from the global knowledge-based economy’’ (2000, p. 9). This policy position was a stark contrast to the Bank’s previous perspective based on human capital theory and ROR analyses. The report regarded such thinking as outdated and noted the following: Narrow – and in our view, misleading – economic analysis has contributed to the view that public investment in universities and colleges brings meager returns compared to investment in primary and secondary schools and that higher education magnifies income inequality. As a result, higher education systems in developing countries are under great strain. They are chronically underfunded, but face escalating demand – approximately half of today’s higher education students live in the developing world. (World Bank, 2000, p. 10)
Just as important, the report argued that higher education offers the potential to increase a country’s engagement in research and knowledge production. Two years later, the Bank released a second report (Constructing Knowledge Societies: New Challenges for Tertiary Education) that reinforced the need to strengthen higher education in the developing world, placing great emphasis on expanding a country’s capacity for participation in an ‘‘increasingly knowledge-based world economy’’ (World Bank, 2002, p. 2). The report also sought to address the mounting criticism of the Bank’s policies toward higher or tertiary education: There is a perception that the Bank has not been fully responsive to the growing demand for tertiary education interventions by clients and that lending for the sub sector has not matched the growing importance of tertiary education for economic and social development, especially in the poorest developing countries. It thus became necessary to revisit the Bank’s policies and experience regarding tertiary education in light of the changes in the world environment and the persistence of the traditional problems of tertiary education in developing and transition countries. (World Bank, 2002, p. 2)
Although the discourse was fairly calculated, casting potential policy errors simply as ‘‘perceptions’’ of clients, the Bank nonetheless seemed ready to direct greater attention, and most importantly, money, to higher education in the developing world.
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$1,400.00 $US Millions
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World Bank Loans for Higher Education.
In terms of financial commitment alone, there is a clear trend toward increasing funds for higher education projects. Fig. 2 shows the progression of Bank loans for higher education over time.4 At first glance, the Bank appears to be walking the talk, in that funding trends over the past decade and a half seem to reflect the conclusions of the 2000 and 2002 World Bank reports. However, more in-depth analysis is required to better ascertain the Bank’s engagement in developing nations and its commitment to higher education. For one, we need to know more about the nature of higher education projects in the developing world. Additionally, we also must recognize the complexity of the World Bank and that its influence goes well beyond its funded projects; more specifically, the Bank’s influence also includes the manner by which it shapes governmental spending in the developing world through conditionality.
Criticism of the Bank Although increased loans for higher education in recent years have provided much needed assistance, there nonetheless exists a good deal of criticism of the Bank and its educational policies. Embedded within this criticism are three primary concerns: (1) policies that condition an exclusive primary and secondary education focus, while calling for a disinvestment in higher education; (2) the pervasive effort to expand the private sector, while sacrificing public enterprises, often through structural adjustment programs (this includes difficulties inherent in the decentralization of government services in areas such as banking, airlines, utilities, etc.); and (3) the overall broad effect of preventing developing nations from participating in the knowledge economy in culturally appropriate ways, including forms of
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participation that incubate indigenous ingenuity and research (Caffentzis, 2000; Goldman, 2005; Peet, 2003; Pincus & Winters, 2002). The first criticism speaks to conditions that resulted from ROR analyses demonstrating that investment in higher education was less productive than investing in primary and secondary education (and basic education in general). Studies published by the Bank from 1986 to 1991 showed that the organization called for ‘‘a drastic reduction of higher education in Africa y advocated in the name of higher efficiency and a more egalitarian distribution of educational resources’’ (Caffentzis, 2000, p. 3). Such loan conditions reduced the ability of the region to support adequate development of the higher education sector, given the pressure to focus almost exclusively on primary and secondary education. The logic and reasoning behind the conditions were written and explained, but the motives and impact were left in question. Caffentzis attributed the decrease in support for higher education to the Bank’s ‘‘bleak view of Africa’s economic future and its belief that African workers are destined for a long time to remain unskilled labor workers’’ (2000, pp. 3–4). The World Bank, in turn, was not well regarded in Sub-Saharan Africa, due to a strong conviction that policies and behaviors directed toward borrowing nations were largely conducted in an arrogant manner (Sender, 2002). Indeed, numerous student protests and empty classrooms at the university level were suggestive of the shortcomings of the Bank’s sub-Saharan educational programs (Federici & Caffentzis, 2000). Caffentzis criticized the Bank’s position for implying that the surest way to ‘‘improve African higher education is to decrease the investment in the universities (by laying off ‘unnecessary staff’), decrease the number of students, and charge high fees to those who remain’’ (2000, p. 6). In our interview with World Bank officials, bringing up such issues as the Bank’s marginal support for higher education and the practice of mandating loan conditionalities elicited responses such as, ‘‘That was the 1980s’’. However, Eurodad, a network of 52 nongovernmental organizations working to overcome debt crisis and poverty, found that there is currently an average of 67 conditions attached to each World Bank loan (Eurodad, 2006). For example, Uganda was granted a large poverty reduction loan in 2005. Eurodad counted 197 conditions in the loan, including ‘‘87 social and environmental conditions followed by 72 public sector reform related conditions and finally 35 financial and economic reform conditions’’ (2006, p. 8). A few of the objectives found in the World Bank (2006c) loan document include conditions related to reducing public expenditures as a percentage of the GDP through ‘‘budget rationalization’’ (p. 12), and increasing private sector competitiveness by liberalizing trade policy and
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harmonizing initiatives in support of private sector development (p. 13). Both of these objectives are conditions of the loan. The loan agreement also states that the original amount was for US$150 million, but because of unsatisfactory performance with regard to certain objectives, it was reduced to US$135 million (World Bank, 2006c, p. 11). Consistent with the Eurodad report, and in terms of education, Stephen Heyneman (2003), a former World Bank executive, cited three common Bank recommendations often presented as conditions to a loan: (1) shift public expenditures away from vocational and higher education toward academic and basic education; (2) increase the private cost for attending universities; and (3) install loan schemes to set off the financial burden on individuals who must now face high tuition increases for higher education (p. 325). A second criticism is tied to the Bank’s commitment to expanding privatesector growth. Here, Bank officials are much less apologetic in their support of loan conditions and structural adjustment programs – the general view being that privatization will ultimately bring great benefits to developing nations. This belief seems beyond reproach, from the Bank’s perspective, and, of course, is consistent with neoliberalism, or what Carroll (2006) described as the post-Washington consensus (PWC) in action in the form of a socio-institutional neoliberalism focused on fundamentally altering key social institutions. As an example, one Bank official spoke of efforts to privatize higher education in Brazil and the possibility of conditions: In higher education, we occasionally put in ideologically driven conditions which have to do with radically shifting the cost of education from the public to the private sectors y In Brazil, we were advising the minister of education. The minister was the biggest champion of no additional public funding to universities, so we didn’t have to do it. This was in the late 1990s, so there has been a maturation process. The minister at the time was a former rector of a top university of Brazil. So he had seen it from both sides. It made our job easier.
Based on conversations with this Bank official, as well as with others, the importance of privatization was a dominant theme. In the scenario described above, loan conditions were not deemed necessary, as the minister of education made the Bank’s job easier by opposing increased public funding for higher education. A second Bank official noted, ‘‘Anytime you can get private capital to do something that the government is trying to do, you increase the impact.’’ Although there clearly is a reasonable economic rationale – reducing public expenditures – behind seeking privatesector support, there may also be a downside to overemphasis on privatization.
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In developing countries like Uganda, where the private sector is relatively weak, policies that encourage decentralization and privatization are difficult to implement. As noted in the preceding comments by two Bank officials, the private sector can be very useful in providing additional services and options for a country; however, when private-sector support is used to replace or undermine the public sector or when a government-run industry is privatized, the impact can be damaging to the country. For example, over reliance on private education, while undercutting public education can contribute to a financial crisis that serves both to limit human capacity building and constrain research and development, including the promotion of various fields of inquiry needed for meeting local and regional needs in the developing world (Santos, 2006). In the push to dismantle the public sector, neoliberal policies have in effect disempowered public and national universities, oftentimes in favor of less productive and less accountable private institutions, believing that all that is private is ‘‘good,’’ and all that is public is ‘‘bad’’ (Apple, 2000). Such a philosophy challenges the idea of a public university created to serve a democratically negotiated public good (Rhoads & Torres, 2006a, 2006b; Schugurensky, 2006; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). In part, a third criticism is derived from the second, concerning the degree to which World Bank programs have adequately considered, practically and theoretically, the role of developing nations in a global, knowledge-based economy. For example, by prioritizing funding in the primary and secondary sector, while ignoring the development of university science and technology, the Bank has been criticized for relegating developing nations to the industrial sector of the world economy. Here, we cannot underestimate the importance of developing nations strengthening academic science and technological development. Indeed, a system of science, including public research laboratories and institutions of higher education, has been identified as one of the key components of a nation’s participation in the knowledge economy (Peters & Besley, 2006). Concerns about strengthening academic science and technology also are tied to issues of human capacity building in that the development of skills and talents among a nation’s citizens must be grounded in a particular conception of its role in the broader global economy. Thus, a legitimate concern to raise is the degree to which World Bank policies and practices have adequately acknowledged (and theorized) the relationship between human capacity building and academic science in a knowledge-based economy. Additionally, the Bank’s self-proclaimed shift from a ‘‘lending bank’’ to a ‘‘knowledge bank’’ raises questions about how such a shift is reflected in its support for higher education in the developing world.
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In addition to the preceding criticisms tied to support for higher education, other broader concerns about the Bank have surfaced over the years. For example, several issues consistently arise within the extant critical literature on the Bank, including the following: conditionalities inappropriately linked to various social concerns (concerns that go well beyond support for higher education), conditionalities informed by weak policy assumptions, the cultural appropriateness of various Bank policies and practices, the broad nature of interests being advanced (public versus private; socialism versus capitalism; U.S. hegemony versus interests of the developing world), the degree to which democratic decision-making processes are employed, and the evolving nature of the Bank and its leadership (Caffentzis, 2000; Dreher, 2004; Goldman, 2005; Pincus & Winters, 2002; Ritzen, 2005; Wade, 2002). With widespread commitments for private sector growth and a history of promoting disinvestment in higher education, Fox (2005) raised serious questions about the Bank and its programs: ‘‘What does it mean when the World Bank changes its discourse to call for substantial policy changes and financial investments in sustainable development, gender equality, and poor people’s empowerment? How do we assess this shift in the official discourse? Is it just for show?’’ (p. 308). The skepticism inherent in questions raised by Fox frames our analysis as well, for we cannot simply accept proclamations by the World Bank at face value. Critical analysis must be brought to bear on the Bank’s claim that it has shifted its focus as a ‘‘lending bank’’ to a ‘‘knowledge bank,’’ positioned to assist developing nations and their participation in a knowledge economy. In light of the aforementioned criticism, it must be acknowledged that the structure of the World Bank is such that it cannot entirely direct its own course. For example, the Bank raises funds to give the least developed countries credits or grants from the International Development Association (IDA), a branch of the bank. In order to generate funds for these credits, the Bank relies on contributions from the governments of wealthier member countries, often described as the ‘‘donor community.’’ Pressure to promote or avoid particular projects is often associated with these contributions. Additionally, various organizations (i.e. agencies, private foundations, etc.) may make contributions and these too may include certain restrictions or expectations about the use of funds. For example, during the past several years there has been pressure from the United States and other major donors to combat corruption in developing countries. Former President Wolfowitz attempted to make this a major focus of his tenure (this was of course interrupted by his own conflict of interest and subsequent departure
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from the Bank). To further complicate matters, while the United States sought loan conditions aimed at limiting governmental corruption, in September 2006 the British government, arguing that corruption-related concerns came at the expense of helping the poor, threatened to withhold about $US 94 million in protest of conditions (Associated Press, 2006). Clearly, in some cases the Bank is at the mercy of conflicting desires deriving from the donor community. Given the preceding concerns and realities of the World Bank’s operations, we now turn to the Bank’s higher education initiatives in the nations of Uganda and Thailand. Three overarching research questions frame our analysis: (1) To what degree and in what manner has the World Bank addressed development of the higher education sector and its role in human capacity building in Uganda and Thailand? (2) What view of knowledge (and its relationship to society) is suggested by an analysis of World Bank higher education programs in Uganda and Thailand? (3) To what degree and in what manner do World Bank initiatives in the area of higher education incorporate decision-making processes that adequately account for local and national concerns, as identified by educational leaders and policy makers in Uganda and Thailand? Although answers to these questions may speak most directly to the particulars of Uganda and Thailand, the literature on higher education transformation in the developing world affirms the critical nature of our concerns (Chapman & Austin, 2002; Reddy, 2002, World Bank, 1994, Ziderman & Albrecht, 1995).
THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA Establishing the Context Located in Eastern Africa, west of Kenya, Uganda has a population of about 28 million and is slightly smaller than the state of Oregon. Prior to British colonization in the late 19th century, what is now known as Uganda was occupied by diverse kingdoms of various ethnic groups representing a range of cultures and socio-political systems. Uganda’s diverse kingdoms, including the powerful Kingdom of Buganda, at times limited the control of the British East Africa Company (surrogate to the British government), and eventually contributed to the independence of Uganda in the early 1960s. Milton Obote led Uganda in its early years as an independent nation, but was overthrown in a 1971 military coup led by Idi Amin. Uganda suffered
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for some nine years under Amin’s authoritarian regime, witnessing violent oppression and economic stagnation. Today, Uganda is led by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, who came into power in 1986 and has maintained the presidency ever since (he extended his presidency with a 2006 victory in which he achieved 60 percent of the vote). The violent conflicts of the past are still present in the clash between the northern tribes and the often favored Buganda tribe of the south. What is known as the Lord’s Republic Army (LRA) actively resists the powerful south and engages in the abduction of children for military training and other inhumane activity to advance its position. Thus, Uganda’s present-day challenges must be understood in the context of its postcolonial environment, in which despite being considered one of the fastest growing economies in Africa, with a GDP close to US$52 billion, it nonetheless remains one of the poorest countries in the world (Musisi, 2003). Furthermore, with half of the population under the age of 14, education is a critical component of this growing economy. Given the nation’s political, economic, and postcolonial conditions, public education was not a national project until the 1960s. Prior to independence in the early 1960s, education was framed to a great extent by colonial influences and Christian missionaries (Musisi, 2003). Today, the structure of the Ugandan education system consists of primary education (seven years), followed by the lower secondary cycle (four years), and the upper secondary cycle (two years), after which there is the possibility of three to five years of university studies for students who gain entrance and obtain either government or private sponsorship. Upon completion of primary school, a student may either join lower secondary school or take a three-year craft course at a technical school. However, only about 40 percent of primary school graduates are absorbed into the secondary school cycle (Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, 2007). Upon completion of lower secondary school, students may continue on to a variety of upper secondary options and upon completion be eligible for university studies. Musisi (2003) reported that 24,000 students annually reach the eligibility mark to enter into higher education, but only 25 percent actually enroll. Through years of turbulent governments and disinvestment in the university sector, Uganda has struggled to adequately support the higher education needs of its citizens. According to the Ministry of Education and Sports, there are 6 public and 13 private universities in Uganda. Quality is a general problem in higher education. Qualified professors are scarce in all disciplines and the nation’s entire system has fewer than 550 PhD faculty,
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about 1 per 200 students. Professors are poorly paid; some take on huge teaching loads to supplement their salaries, while others may neglect teaching in favor of paid consultancies (World Bank, 2006b). The sector also is relatively young. For example, in 1986, the only university in existence was Makerere University, with an enrollment of less than 5,000 students. Today, Makerere has over 30,000 students, accounting for over 75 percent of the entire higher education enrollment in Uganda (Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, 2007). Thus, to speak of advanced education in Uganda largely centers on a discussion of Makerere and its role in meeting the nation’s higher education needs. Located in the capital city of Kampala, Makerere maintains an academic staff of almost 1,000, with 221 holding doctorates (Musisi, 2003). Until around 1990, Makerere University relied on 100 percent government funding, which covered both tuition and living expenses for all students. Despite the government’s support, it was still considered one of the most underfunded universities in Eastern and Southern Africa (Mayanja, 1998). Funding arrangements began to change in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with a withdrawal of support for students’ living expenses, support for books, and free education. Uganda’s shift in support was congruent with World Bank conditions for reducing public expenditures. This resulted in the closure of Makerere during two separate periods (1989–1990 and 1990–1991), a consequence of student demonstrations aimed at challenging the government’s withdrawal of transportation allowances and the introduction of a book bank to save on book costs (Kajubi, 1992). Issues of insufficient staff pay, heavy faculty and staff workloads, increased enrollment, inadequate facilities and equipment, space problems, including overly congested lecture theaters and laboratories, all persist today (Ssesanga & Garrett, 2005). In 2005, the Washington Post published an article about Makerere, describing the university as underfunded and overrun. Students commented that there are 20 students to every one computer and four students crammed into closet-sized rooms in the university’s dormitories (Wax, 2005). The Chronicle of Higher Education reported that in November 2006 a faculty strike at Makerere closed the university for just over a month and ended with a proposed salary increase substantial enough to entice faculty to return to work (Kigotho, 2006). As part of its effort to address financial constraints, Makerere has been lauded by Clark (2004) for implementing cost sharing schemes that include tuition fees, as well as the provision for privately sponsored students (supported by parents, employers, churches, etc.). While cost sharing can be an effective way to enhance the ability of a university to advance
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enrollments, Mayanja (1998) warned that it must not be an escape route to relieve the government of its obligation: ‘‘The government must continue to accord high priority to higher education and shoulder the primary responsibility’’ (p. 37). The broader economic perspective concerning education and government funding in Uganda is highlighted in Figs. 3, 4, and 5.5 Fig. 3 shows that the GDP has increased and is estimated to continue increasing over time, while government expenditures as a percentage of GDP are expected to decrease from 23.7 percent in 2001 to 20.7 percent in 2008. Fig. 4 builds on Fig. 3 by showing the education budget at a peak in 2003, followed by a decline in support for education as a percentage of government expenditures and GDP since 2004; the percentage of government expenditure targeted for education
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is estimated to decline from 18.3 percent in 2001 to 17.8 percent in 2008. Additionally, the education budget, as a percentage of the GDP, is expected to decline from 4.2 percent in 2001 to 3.7 percent in 2008. Fig. 5 shows a break down of the education subsectors – primary, secondary, and tertiary. It also reveals an increase of tertiary education spending as a percentage of the education budget over time. In an effort to diversify university funding, the World Bank and the IMF have stipulated the development of private higher education in Uganda, in addition to several other African nations (Federici, 2000; Heyneman, 1999). Recent World Bank efforts in Uganda reflect the previously discussed shift in funding policies and practices – that is, there is a greater financial commitment to developing the nation’s higher education sector. For example, in the 1980s and early 1990s, the Bank actually conditioned the disinvestment of public funds for higher education. However, through its apparent shift in public policy – in part, a consequence of a political struggle at the Bank over the role of ROR analyses and the relevance of higher education to a nation’s development – the Bank now offers loans to developing countries such as Uganda for higher education. Out of the current and active US$1 billion in World Bank loans that Uganda has procured, US$30 million go to a project for the development of university science and technology for the entire country.6 Although the Bank has increased its support for higher education, there is still great emphasis placed on private sector growth (this will be demonstrated further in the next section) and cost sharing programs within the public sector. In addition, the percentage of overall funds that actually go to higher education versus other areas (utilities, road projects, etc.) still remains relatively low (only three percent).
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World Bank Loans and Projects Uganda has been collaborating with the World Bank on education projects since 1967, when its first education loan was approved to support the growth of secondary schools. Projects with the Bank, however, have certainly not been limited to education. The first loan, granted in 1961, targeted improving the supply of electrical power. Since then, Uganda has taken out a total of US$5.5 billion in loans from the Bank. The loans have been for a variety of projects, including roads and railways, the privatization of water and electricity (to improve delivery and reliability of service), as well as education and many other concerns. Large-scale loans in the late 1980s and early 1990s were called structural adjustment programs, which essentially stipulated a reduction in public expenditures in order to stabilize the national economy. It is within the context of the structural adjustment programs that controversial loan conditionalities came into play. For example, the following subsection of a Project Information Document on a structural adjustment loan to Uganda in 1994 for US$ 80 million noted some of the objectives of the loan (the italicized words represent our emphasis): The objective of the proposed credit is to reduce poverty through accelerated economic growth and rapid human resource development. Accordingly, it will assist the Government to achieve a number of key objectives. First, it will support further deregulation of the economy involving the removal of the remaining barriers to trade and investment in the coffee subsector and liberalization of the cotton industry. Second, the credit will support actions aimed at completing the divestiture of the Departed Asians’ Custodian Board properties [during the 1970s under Amin, the government expelled owners of tea estates, mostly Asians, and this Board allows those who were expelled to apply for repossession or compensation]. Third, it will assist the Government to step up domestic revenue generation which is still only around 8 percent of GDP. Fourth, the credit will help to deepen the Government’s efforts aimed at prioritizing both recurrent expenditure and development expenditure. Fifth, it will support further measures directed at downsizing the civil service and raising its efficiency. (World Bank, 1997, p. 2)
The loan conditions highlight the Bank’s interest in supporting privatesector development, while calling for disinvestment in public services, including higher education (based to a large extent on ROR analyses, and apparently still in use in 1994). One Bank official elaborated on the role of conditionality and structural adjustment loans: ‘‘The word conditionality is often used to refer to structural adjustment loans that were made in the 80s and they are coordinated with the IMF [but still managed by the World Bank]. Basically, a structural adjustment loan is an attempt to get an economy back on its feet because it has been mismanaged or ineffectively
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managed.’’ Although conditionality is often associated with the 1980s, as this Bank official noted, we have already noted that a present-day loan to Uganda also contains significant conditions. An existing project – the ‘‘Millennium Science Initiative Project’’ (MSI) – was approved for Uganda in 2006 and is presently underway in the amount of US$ 30 million. This is the second major project that Uganda has had with the Bank for the development of university education. The project has two objectives that align with Uganda’s Poverty Eradication Action Plan7: (1) enhancing productivity, competitiveness, and income by increasing the amount and quality of skills available to the labor market in areas critical to private-sector growth and (2) improving human development by reforming higher education curricula through greater emphasis on science and technology (World Bank, 2006c, pp. 4–5). In order to fulfill these objectives, the project has two components: (1) a competitive fund to support research, education, and training in science and engineering, as well as linkages to the private sector and (2) an outreach, policy, and institutional strengthening component (World Bank, 2006c, pp. 8–9). Essentially, the first component includes a fund that will provide grants for the following requestors: (1) to individuals or teams who are emerging young investigators at universities or research institutes, (2) to those boosting undergraduate programs in the sciences (laboratory equipment, texts, etc.), and (3) to those seeking to form partnerships with industry. The second component involves marketing campaigns like a National Science Week, and strengthening the Ugandan Council for Science and Technology through reorganization and improved science policies (this Council is similar in mission to the National Science Foundation in the United States, with the exception that it does not focus on national defense). The agreement between Uganda and the World Bank for the MSI is representative of the Bank’s evolving commitment to higher education and its recognition of the importance of universities to the knowledge economy. However, previous policies involving structural adjustment programs and conditionalities, as well as the emphasis on developing the private sector at the possible expense of public-sector services, leave unanswered questions about the adequacy of present-day policies.
Analysis We organize our analysis by our three key research questions, the first concerned with the degree and manner by which the Bank has addressed
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development of the higher education sector and its role in human capacity building in Uganda. Considering data collected about the Bank’s involvement in Uganda, the organization clearly has noted the need and desire to improve higher education. The MSI is a practical outcome of this strategic mission. The degree to which funding for higher education in Uganda has increased demonstrates this relatively recent policy change. However, one might raise questions about whether or not 3 percent of US$1 billion in Bank loans is adequate support for university development. In terms of a commitment to human capacity building, the Bank ties such activities to advancing science and technology at the university level and mostly ignores other important facets of nation building and the role of universities, such as the promotion of centers for history and cultural preservation, citizenship development, and so forth. As part of the MSI, science and technology (S&T) are defined as key areas in which human capacity building takes place, and consequently, the Bank’s program in Uganda focuses entirely on this area of knowledge advancement. Our second research question is concerned with the view of knowledge undergirding the Bank’s higher education programs in Uganda. A Bank official involved with projects in Africa offered insight into the organization’s strategic mission in developing countries such as Uganda: The bar has been raised for knowledge about most goods and services [meaning there is an increase of information about trade in the knowledge economy] and the world economy is more integrated than it used to be. So for developing countries to even maintain their current share of global income, they have to try to advance at the same pace that the leading countries are advancing. There are a lot of strikes against them in doing that and I think that the increasing view of high technology as a driver of global economic growth or technological mastery has gotten the attention of policy makers. They realize that they are going to need to try to invest in skills and capabilities, high-end skills, for the sake of economic growth and prosperity. That has had a strong effect on the role of higher education.
A large injection of money, combined with the goal of advancing research to promote scientific and technological growth, appear to be driven by the assumption that knowledge and the production of knowledge are core components to a nation’s development. In this regard, the Bank’s position seems to recognize that developing nations such as Uganda cannot be relegated only to the industrial sector of the world economy. A major problem though is that for many years the Bank’s policies did not reflect such a view; instead, the Bank tended to subscribe to the position that developing nations had no chance of competing in science and technology arenas and so providing loans in this area made little sense. In light of
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previous damage to the higher education sector as a consequence of under funding, one is left to wonder about the adequacy of present-day World Bank initiatives. Can $US30 million really help Uganda keep pace with advances in university science and technology, keeping in mind that a single university in the United States, Johns Hopkins University, received US$612 million in one year alone (2005) from the National Institutes of Health, and Stanford University spent over US$600 million on research for one year, while our own university, UCLA, spent over US$800 million. A third concern relates to the manner in which the Bank’s higher education initiatives incorporate decision-making processes that adequately account for local and national needs. In terms of garnering input from developing nations, one Bank official was particularly concerned about past mistakes and the need to account for national and societal differences: Political appropriateness is a factor where countries have their own internal processes for deciding what they want to spend on higher education and how they want their economies to be oriented. One country’s idea of their culture may include economic success, prosperity, increasing technology, and so forth. Others may be different – it means that there is not one model. Higher education and skills are shown to be important for economic growth. One has to remember that there can’t be a single model. You have to respect people’s desire, as expressed through the political process: Do they want to be a developmental state like Korea or do they want to be Ethiopia or Eritrea? You can’t expect that every country wants to adopt the same developmentalist goals that perhaps are considered most effective by the Bank, which focuses almost strictly on economic development.
In the project documents for Uganda’s MSI, there is a thorough evaluation of what the country’s goals are in areas of poverty reduction, educational development, and economic growth. There is also a process in place for garnering input from experts throughout the country. Members from the ministry of education, the parliament’s committee on science and technology, the Uganda National Council for Higher Education, Uganda Christian University, Uganda National Academy of Science, Makerere University Faculty of Medicine, and others were a part of the process of preparing the loan. Despite these apparent steps to instill more democratic processes, Ugandan officials expressed serious concerns about the level of the Bank’s commitment to developing their nation’s university sector, as well as resentment over past conditionalities and structural adjustment programs that have left the higher education sector in such terrible shape. Ugandan officials believe their nation is paying a heavy price for years in which the World Bank and the donor community ignored their calls for increased support for academic science in particular and university
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education in general. The Bank’s own documents point to this problem, noting that Uganda has neglected science and technology and presently has a large disconnect between its needs and the ability to meet them (World Bank, 2006b). However, the same report stops short of pointing a finger at the Bank and its previous policies.
THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND Establishing the Context The Kingdom of Thailand, known as ‘‘Siam’’ until the 1940s, borders Malaysia and Cambodia, and is commonly recognized as the only nation of Southeast Asia never to have been colonized by a European power. With a population of over 64 million, the country is geographically about the same size as France. Functioning governmentally as a constitutional monarchy, the chief of state, King Phumpiphn Adunyadet and Prime Minister, Surayut Chulanon, both are located in the capital city of Bangkok. Generally, the Prime Minister is selected by the House of Representatives (selected through national elections), but the most recent change in Prime Ministers occurred through a coup in September 2006. Today, the GDP is almost US$180 billion (by comparison, over 20 times that of Uganda) with rice and rubber being the major agricultural products and tourism and textiles as the predominant industries (World Bank, 2007). With a free-market-enterprise economy, and although Thailand has been one of East Asia’s best performers, it nonetheless suffers from a public debt roughly equal to 45 percent of the GDP; the country also has been hit hard economically by the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, the 2004 Tsunami, and the 2006 military coup (World Bank, 2006a). Other challenges include sectarian violence in the southern provinces, the ongoing threat of the spread of avian flu, and fallout from the SARS epidemic (which hurt the service/tourism sector of the Thai economy during the early 2000s). Given its fortune never to have been colonized by the West, Thailand’s long cultural history has been protected and preserved to a great extent. The nation’s educational structure also has benefited from its cultural stability. The general educational structure includes six years of primary school followed by three years of lower secondary school, thus amounting to nine years of compulsory education. There are also three years of upper secondary school, which are free, but not compulsory (Thailand Ministry of Education, 2004). A breakdown of levels of educational attainment among
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Distribution of Highest Level of Educational Attainment by the Population Aged 25–64.
25-to 64-year-olds may be observed in Fig. 6.8 With 2.2 million students in higher education, Thailand has seen an increase from 26 to 40 percent of the enrolled population from 1995 to 2004 (Thailand Ministry of Education, 2004). One reason for the enrollment growth is believed to be expansion within the higher education sector, in terms of an increase in the number of colleges and universities. In 1995 there were 30 private and 22 public universities, but by 2003 the sector had grown dramatically to 77 private and 171 public universities (Thailand Ministry of Education, 2004). Despite some significant progress, Thailand also has experienced its share of difficulties in supporting education. For example, Kirtikara (2001) argued that Thailand has failed to couple higher education with industrial development, and consequently, has lagged behind economies such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. In addition, although the nation’s GDP has been growing, the percentage of support for education, relative to the GDP, is decreasing (see Fig. 7 for the percent of GDP spent on education and Fig. 8 for a breakdown by educational sector).9 After 40 years of industrialization, the National Education Act of 1999 was designed to initiate reform in the higher education system, in terms of restructuring the administrative system, changing the public sector role from regulatory to supervisory, and creating a national set of education standards (Kirtikara, 2001). In order for students to gain entrance into a college or university, they must score well on the highly competitive Joint Higher Education Entrance Examination (JHEEE) in addition to obtaining a Certificate of Secondary Education by completing the mandatory three years of lower secondary school and the optional three years of upper secondary. Only 30 percent of those who take the examination secure a place at a public university (Sedgwick, 2005). A 2004 Thai Ministry of Education Report identified
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6 5 4 3 2 1 0 2000
Fig. 7.
20 15
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Percent of GDP Spent on Education. Note: Data for 2001 was not available.
17.6 15.5 11.6
13.8 13
11.5
Primary level 10
6.4
5.9
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5
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0 1995
Fig. 8.
2000
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Public Expenditure Percent on Education by Sector.
equity in higher education as a central concern, as the selection process clearly gives advantage to students from wealthy backgrounds, especially those who live in the Bangkok area, considering that almost half of all universities in the country are in or around the capital city. In addition, the cost of attending higher education places low- and middle-income families at a considerable disadvantage. The report suggested that financial reasons for not attending higher education should be addressed through scholarships and income-contingent loans designed to ‘‘ensure that all can afford higher education fees’’ (Thailand Ministry of Education, 2004, p. 52). Some of the more selective universities include Culalongkorn, which is ranked in the top 200 universities in the world (according to the Times Higher Education Supplement in the UK) and is the oldest university in Thailand with an enrollment of almost 30,000 students, Thammasat, which has over 20,000 students and was founded in 1934, and Mahidol, which began as a public health institution and now has an enrollment of 27,000. All three of these universities offer bachelors, masters, and doctoral degrees.
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In addition, they are all beneficiaries of World Bank loans to develop university science and technology.
World Bank Loans and Projects Thailand began borrowing from the World Bank in 1950 with three loans procured to develop railways, ports, and an irrigation system totaling just over US$25 million. Since then, the Thai government has taken out a total of US$7.7 billion in World Bank loans for projects ranging from the aforementioned to the development of dams, telecommunication systems, and education. Over the course of more than 50 years of borrowing, the government has limited its procurement of structural adjustment loans to only two, for a total of US$325 million during the 1980s. Of these two loans for structural adjustment, the World Bank has made only one loan document available. Although the document includes the typical language of deregulation and decreasing taxes, the demanding conditions found in other nation-specific loan documents are lacking. Lending for education began in 1966, with a US$6 million loan for vocational education. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, Thailand continued to borrow from the Bank for primary and secondary education. Lending for education was absent from 1982 to around 1996, when the government procured a loan to improve the quality of secondary education. In 1997, the Universities Science and Engineering Education Project loan was procured for US$260 million. Since this project loan was granted, there has not been additional Bank lending for education in Thailand. Thus, the total lending for education since the first loan in 1966 to the present is almost US$600 million. Of the US$7.7 billion that the Bank has provided Thailand throughout the history of this lending relationship, less than 8 percent has been dedicated to education. We focus primarily on the Universities Science and Engineering Education Project, as it represents the Bank’s commitment toward advancing Thai universities and their ability to contribute to the knowledge economy. The project was completed in 2003 and is summarized in the ‘‘Implementation Completion Report,’’ provided by the Bank (World Bank, 2004). The document explained that the project supported quality improvements in 20 pubic universities through financing and implementing the following objectives: (1) to strengthen teaching capabilities of faculty; (2) to upgrade the content of existing programs in science and engineering and broaden the range of programs relevant to Thailand’s technological
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advancement; (3) to modernize laboratories and strengthen their management; (4) to improve the utilization of resources in faculties of engineering and science and establish a system for the large-scale procurement of equipment (pp. 2–3). The report beams about the impact of the loan on the development of Thai science and engineering programs, stating that all objectives were either met or exceeded. Various outcomes of the project are included throughout the report. The project helped to create 139 staff development programs in engineering and science, contributed to an 82.7 percent increase in graduate engineering programs, and updated equipment in 295 laboratories (World Bank, 2004). The report also states that all institutions supported by the loan reported a significant increase in their ability to produce science and engineering graduates. In terms of scientific development, increased research and improved methodologies, as well as an improved capacity to develop resources, also were mentioned as important outcomes of the project. To date, Thailand continues its relationship with the Bank, having recently finished a project focusing on the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT). Of importance to this chapter perhaps was the clear intent of the Bank to privatize the EGAT through a step-by-step process known as the ‘‘Privatization Action Plan,’’ and involving commercialization, organizational restructuring (‘‘breaking up’’ the EGAT into five autonomous business units), and corporatization.
Analysis As in the case of Uganda, we organize our analysis around the three key research questions, with the first focusing on the nature and degree of the Bank’s involvement in higher education and human capacity building. Through its loan for the Universities Science and Engineering Education Project, the Bank offers a concrete example supporting claims to an educational policy shift. In addition to demonstrating a fairly modest commitment to the transformation of higher education in Thailand, the project also reveals the Bank’s focus on science and engineering, connecting these areas of academic development to human capacity building and Thailand’s involvement in the new knowledge economy. Outcomes related to increases in the number of students interested in science and engineering, courses offered, and research projects all demonstrate a degree of impact on the part of the Bank. These outcomes speak directly to a serious challenge Thailand faces, a concern revealed in World Bank documents and through
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data collected from Thai officials: a shortage of university graduates with advanced technical skills has limited the nation’s ability to participate in the knowledge economy. The view of knowledge suggested by the Bank’s involvement in Thailand clearly recognizes the importance that science and engineering play in today’s global economy and in the development of national economies. The project specifically supports research projects with the goal of extending the knowledge of academics and improving their teaching. Engagement in the construction of knowledge reinforces the development of human capacity in the university setting by advancing the theoretical, conceptual, and practical understanding of professors and students. An additional point to note is that the Bank’s role as a ‘‘knowledge bank’’ seeks to enhance the development of scientific knowledge in developing nations not only by supporting research projects financially, but also by utilizing the expertise of scientists and economists to ‘‘transfer knowledge.’’ This involves enhancing research projects in Thailand and elsewhere by sharing pertinent knowledge held by the Bank and its extensive staff. A Bank official spoke to this matter: The exchange of experience, international experience, and knowledge about how things are done in other countries is quite accelerated in almost every area by the presence of the Bank. There is an active searching for things that have worked elsewhere – a very active transfer of those experiences. The extent to which the countries adopt them or whether we get them right is various. The transfer of knowledge and best practice experiences is an important part of the way that we influence development.
This statement reinforces the idea that the Bank sees its contributions to development as extending well beyond its financial resources to include the knowledge of its staff and their role in working with developing nations. This was a key component of the Thai science and engineering education project. In terms of decision-making processes involving the Thai government, the science and engineering education project heavily involved the Ministry of University Affairs. Indeed, the Thai government appears to have had a significant voice in shaping this project, as well as other decisions to distance itself from World Bank involvement, including the decision to reject participation in another of the Bank’s higher education projects – the Millennium Science Initiative, a program piloted in Chile and presently operating in Uganda. As one Bank official explained, ‘‘The MSI loan in Thailand never led to lending. There was some initial interest, but it didn’t lead to a project. Thai officials didn’t want to borrow or never got the political support for it to become a lending operation.’’
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Thailand’s habits as a borrowing nation appear different from other developing nations. Whether this has to do with the government’s inability to reach consensus with the Bank or its general sense of autonomy remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that Thailand has managed to avoid some of the more significant entanglements (e.g. severely restrictive conditionalities) that other developing countries have dealt with, the consequence being a greater ability to shape its nation’s policies based on its own local and global interests. Perhaps, the fact that throughout its history Thailand has been able to avoid colonization and retain a degree of autonomy plays a part. But despite the government’s independence, economically and politically speaking, Thailand continues to struggle against other neighboring economies, including that of South Korea – a country which has not borrowed from the Bank since its last project ended in 1998.
DISCUSSION A key concern of our study focused on the manner and strength of World Bank efforts to transform higher education in the developing world, as part of human capacity and institutional building. Here, the Bank has not always had a stellar record, as up until the 1990s it offered virtually no support for higher education. But our analysis of World Bank involvement in Uganda and Thailand reveals a policy shift in which increased attention is paid to higher education and its role in aiding these nations and their engagement in the global knowledge-based economy. Although one might argue that the amount of money loaned is relatively small – as we pointed out, World Bank loans to Uganda, as well as to Thailand, pale in comparison to research expenditures in the United States, where individual universities such as Stanford and UCLA spend millions in one year alone on research and development – nonetheless, the Bank appears to have shifted its position in recognition of the economic contribution of university investment. This is a key finding and represents movement toward a broader recognition of externalities associated with investing in higher education (particularly in terms of enhancing scientific and technological capabilities), as opposed to the previous individual-oriented rate-of-return analysis. Bank officials recognize that human capacity building in today’s knowledge economy must involve a proper dose of science and technology. This was obvious in both Uganda and Thailand, where science and engineering initiatives tended to define the Bank’s priorities.
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We also must point out that in the process of developing loan agreements, national governments negotiate the terms and conditions that they are willing to accept, based on their own assessment of need. But both Ugandan and Thai officials noted that at various points certain projects and their conditions were more aligned with national initiatives than others. For example, a professor at Makerere University in Uganda emphasized that the conditions of any loan have to be understood from the perspective that, ‘‘when you are desperate and hungry you need to eat and the consequences are not readily considered but impact the country for generations to come.’’ Although governments certainly play a role in loan negotiations and have the responsibility to protect their citizens from long-term harmful consequences, an element of desperation clearly accompanies such processes. In the end, some governmental officials may accept certain conditionalities for the benefit of a short-term fix. Overall, the World Bank’s progression toward increasing its support for higher education was long in coming and reveals some of the ideological tensions taking place behind the scenes. For example, an ideological element fairly apparent throughout our study relates to economic assumptions grounded in neoliberalism and those who generally believe in the essential benefits of the privatization of public services, including higher education. It is not surprising to us that many of the Bank’s assumptions about economics and public policy are presented as logical outcomes of rigorous analysis, when in fact they reveal what amounts to nothing more than a particular ideological orientation – one that is quite hostile to public services in particular and socialism more broadly conceived. In pointed remarks, one former Bank official alluded to how research was often conducted to prove something that the Bank already believed, upon which it was already committed to act: You have to understand one thing and that is that research at a public institution, including most government research, or World Bank research, is strategic in its orientation. An institution does not engage in research for research sake; it engages in research because it has a strategic interest in the outcome. And very often we already know the outcome and what we do is use this research to generate what we want. So it is not true that research results lead to better operations or management y In order to lend in areas where we currently do not, we generate the kind of research that will justify doing what we want to do.
This official talked about how the work of Psacharopoulos had served its purpose at one time, but as pressure to support higher education in developing nations increased, new forms of research (and ‘‘findings’’) were needed to justify such a shift. Consequently, ROR studies fell into disrepute
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and other studies focusing on the broad economic and social returns associated with higher education became more popular. Another key element of our findings relates to the view of knowledge advanced by the Bank in its efforts to transform universities in the developing world. The Bank’s support for higher education in Uganda and Thailand reveals a view of knowledge fairly in line with neoliberalism and the growing dominance of scientific and technological knowledge. Within the context of university knowledge production in wealthier nations, market-oriented and revenue-generating academic fields have come to dominate universities in what Slaughter and Leslie (1997) defined as ‘‘academic capitalism.’’ Several years later, Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) drew upon Michel Foucault’s (1977, 1980) work on power and knowledge and elaborated the ‘‘academic capitalist knowledge regime.’’ As they explained, ‘‘The academic capitalism knowledge regime values knowledge privatization and profit taking in which institutions, inventor faculty, and corporations have claims that come before those of the public. Public interest in science goods are subsumed in the increased growth expected from a strong economy’’ (p. 29). As a regime of power giving shape to the contemporary university, academic capitalism operates as a set of norms and practices in which university scientists find themselves in hot competition for research revenues, driven by an expanding, global knowledge-based economy. As a consequence, revenue-generating fields have taken on greater relevance, while other less profitable areas of academic life become more or less second- or third-class citizens in the increasingly hierarchical neoliberal model of the university. The Bank’s view of knowledge and its definition of human capacity building are clearly grounded in the academic capitalist knowledge regime, but as an overall contribution to nation building we find this view of knowledge rather limited. It is noteworthy to us that even in wealthier nations of the West, including the United States, where the academic capitalist knowledge regime dominates university affairs, there still exists other regimes of power, including what Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) described as the ‘‘public good’’ regime. An element of the public good regime includes a broad view of liberal education and the role universities play in preparing citizens for participation in civic life. What seems lost in the Bank’s projects in Uganda and Thailand is any notion of the broader mission of university education and the responsibility to develop citizens knowledgeable of their own history and culture. Some associate this view of the modern university to the Humboldtian ideal, in which the university is seen as obligated to educating students in the ways of the nation, in part as a means of forging
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national cohesion (Aronowitz, 2000). However, we find the discussion of the ‘‘deomocratic and emancipatory university’’ by Santos (2006), in which universities are oriented to serving a ‘‘national project’’ – essentially the interests of the particular society as defined and negotiated by a nation’s citizens – more in line with our thinking, given certain elements of elitism that also accompany Wilhelm von Humboldt’s vision and the early German model. We are not suggesting that universities in the developing world ought to provoke nationalism, but certainly universities can do a great deal toward preserving and advancing local and national cultural and historical understandings, as well as addressing specific local and national needs. Clearly, universities in wealthier nations serve in this capacity, but apparently this is not a priority of the World Bank, where the definition of what counts as knowledge is firmly embedded in a neoliberal model of the world. Another key finding concerns the degree to which World Bank involvement may have damaged higher education sectors in developing nations to such an extent that any hope of contributing to human capacity building consistent with a knowledge-based economy (including the critical elements above that we suggest ought to be included) seems remote, even with present-day Bank lending commitments. The case of Uganda is particularly instructive here as it highlights how past Bank project involvement limited university development, given conditionalities that forced Uganda to reduce support for higher education. This latter finding raises serious questions about the present level of financial support and whether or not the Bank may have a large debt to repay to the developing world for past damages done in the name of ROR analyses that left universities in such disrepair. Related to this point, Dikson (2003) offered sharp criticism in noting that the Bank ought to take a good deal of the responsibility ‘‘for the current poor state of science in many developing nations.’’ He added that the Bank’s structural adjustment programs inflicted serious damage to higher education, arguing that, ‘‘Many countries in Africa, for example, continue to suffer from the consequences of policies that, while attempting to streamline economic efficiency, frequently did so at the expense of much-needed investment in public goods (including research).’’ Santos (2006) supported this argument as well when he discussed the serious damage that had been done to African universities by the Bank: ‘‘Unable to include in its calculations the importance of the university in the building of national projects and the creation of long-term critical thinking, the World Bank concluded that African universities do not generate sufficient ‘return’ on their investment’’ (p. 66).
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Questions concerning the degree of nation-specific participation in World Bank decision-making also raise interesting considerations. For example, several Bank officials with whom we spoke noted how ministry of education officials had been angry with the Bank’s policies regarding support for higher education for many years. Indeed, policy makers in both Uganda and Thailand voiced serious criticism of World Bank processes that tended to define government officials and policy makers in the respective countries as ‘‘outsiders’’ in loan and project decisions, at least at the initial stages of development. Ugandan officials complained for many years about World Bank pressure to reduce public expenditures for higher education only to see the Bank revise its stance and begin programs to advance university science and technology. Obviously, conditionalities played a major role in shaping the Ugandan policy on higher education. Lost autonomy linked to World Bank conditionalities seems less of an issue in Thailand, given its ability to retain control over its own educational policies. In part, the economic situation of Thailand is much better than that of Uganda. But additional factors may be more historical and cultural in nature, given that Thailand has avoided colonialism and consequently has retained a greater degree of independence throughout its history. Along these lines, Jansen (2001) included the avoidance of colonialism as a factor in the country’s impressive economic growth. A sense of national esteem or ‘‘resurgent nationalism,’’ linked to its long-standing independence in part contributed to Thailand’s negative reaction against Western hegemony, globalization, and IGO interventions, such as those of the World Bank and IMF, in the wake of the 1997 economic crisis and the de facto devaluation of the Thai baht. The crisis threatened the nation’s independence with a new form of colonialism – ‘‘economic colonialism’’ – and generated populist calls for ‘‘demonizing international institutions’’ (McCargo, 2001, p. 99). This may help to explain why more recent higher education plans between Thailand and the World Bank, involving the Millennium Science Initiative, for example, have not come to fruition.
CONCLUSION A key matter undergirding our discussion in this chapter concerns the degree to which developing an adequate university structure for academic science and technology falls on public versus private sources, and if both, what is the proper balance. The new knowledge economy based on a
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neoliberal version of globalization is dominated by private ownership and the accumulation of profit. In order to increase or liberalize private ownership, the role of state support must be diminished. Indeed, disinvestment in the public university has occurred in instances where the World Bank has concluded that higher education does not generate a sufficient return on investment (Santos, 2006). In such an environment, higher education expansion is predicated on the view that private providers, often involving international parties, are to support such growth. However, without the state’s support for an autonomous and national higher education sector, the construction of a public-good university capable of balancing local and global pressures arguably is severely weakened (Rhoads & Torres, 2006a; Santos, 2006). As a consequence, processes associated with a neoliberal vision may in the end relegate developing nations to consumer status in the global knowledge economy as well as ignore the ways in which public support has been crucial to advancing university science and technology in developed nations such as the United States (Geiger, 1986, 1993). Based on the evidence we have gathered from the Bank, and relative to the cases of Uganda and Thailand, as well as the Bank’s overall efforts in the developing world (with regard to support for higher education), two alternative conclusions warrant consideration. One possibility is that the Bank, as it has claimed, has indeed reformed and now acknowledges that one-size-fits-all solutions just do not work. And so blanket conclusions with regard to the role that higher education plays in elevating the development of a particular nation have fallen by the roadside and opened the door to greater funding for the sector, including possibly the role of state support. Consistent with its self-professed identity as a knowledge bank, the World Bank has come to recognize the legitimate role developing nations can play in a global knowledge-based economy. But another interpretation also exists and speaks to the matter of conditionality as well as the limited scope of the Bank’s higher education projects in the developing world. On the one hand, the Bank clearly has increased loans for higher education projects, and seems mindful of the national importance of knowledge construction and the advance of academic science and technology. On the other hand, the Bank continues to attach conditions to loans that restrict national support for higher education and the development of public universities. This contradictory position raises serious questions about the Bank’s real ambitions, and whether or not World Bank policy makers fully believe developing nations hold the potential to contribute meaningfully to the new economy.
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NOTES 1. We recognize that the category of ‘‘higher’’ or ‘‘tertiary’’ education includes many more types of postsecondary institutions than simply universities (e.g., twoyear or community colleges, technical schools and/or institutes, liberal arts colleges, comprehensive universities, etc.). However, given our interest in the role postsecondary institutions play in economic development, most specifically in terms of advancing science and technology as well as human capacity building, we choose to focus on universities and their importance to developing nations. 2. The World Bank Group is actually made up of five different agencies, but the IDA and IBRD are the two primary lending agencies. 3. The source for this chart is a World Bank Group brochure available at: http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/wbgroupbrochure-en.pdf 4. The World Bank projects page, located on their website (www.worldbank.org), lists all of the loans that have been made for the theme, ‘‘education and the knowledge economy.’’ This chart is the result of analyzing 215 loans listed under this theme and extracting the percentage of each loan dedicated to higher education. While there are other types of postsecondary education funding (e.g. vocational education) this chart exclusively displays loans for higher education relative to the improvement of colleges and universities. 5. The data for these figures are taken from the World Bank (2006b) project appraisal document for the Uganda Millennium Science Initiative loan. Each figure is a medium term expenditure framework, which offers data from the past five years and estimates the figures for three years into the future. The currency used in Fig. 3 is the Uganda Shilling (Ushs) in billions (US$1 ¼ 1750 Ushs). 6. Each World Bank project has a set time and amount of money to accomplish the project’s objectives. Some projects (e.g. the road development project) began in 1999 and are still active, while others began in 2004 and are already completed. There is currently around US$1 billion in active loan money for Uganda. 7. This plan was established in 1997 on four pillars to help Uganda become a modern economy: creating a framework for economic growth and transformation, ensuring good governance and security, directly increasing the ability of the poor to raise their incomes, and directly increasing the quality of the life of the poor. 8. The source for UNESCO Institute for Statistics is at: www.unesco.org 9. The source is at: Thailand Office of the Education Council (2006).
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RAPID EXPANSION OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN SOUTH KOREA: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EDUCATION FEVER Sunwoong Kim Martin A. Trow, a long-time scholar of modern higher education, identifies three forms of higher education system throughout its expansion process: elite, mass, and universal (Trow, 2005). In the elite system, a small number of elites are educated in a relatively homogeneous and isolated environment, and the main goal of the high education system is to cultivate the minds and characters of future leaders. In the mass system, the focus is on the transmission of knowledge and skills, and the educational opportunities are expanded beyond a small group of elites. In the universal system, higher education is regarded as an obligation for the upper and middle class, and its mission changes to ‘‘adapt whole population to rapid social and technological change.’’ While the conceptualization and taxonomy involves several criteria, such as instructional methods, characteristics of students, and characteristics of higher education institutions (HEIs), and so on, a key operational definition to classify the system is the participation rate, and his suggestion was 15% and 50% to distinguish the three (see also Brennan, 2004). South Korea (Korea hereafter) has moved to the universal higher education system in record time. When Korea was liberated from the The Worldwide Transformation of Higher Education International Perspectives on Education and Society, Volume 9, 223–268 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1479-3679/doi:10.1016/S1479-3679(08)00008-X
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Japanese colonialism in 1945, there was only one university. In 1950, the number of students enrolled in 55 HEIs was only 11,358 (o1% participation rate). In 2005, 55 years later, the enrollment has increased to more than 3.5 million, and the participation rate for higher education now exceeds 80%. In 2006, 48.4% of the population aged between 18 and 21 are enrolled four-year universities. In addition, 19.7% of the population aged 18–19 is enrolled in two-year junior colleges. Based on the Trow’s definition, Korea reached a mass higher education system in the early 1980s, and a universal system at the turn of the century. The expansion of higher education has been happening all over the world (Windolf, 1992). Since the World War II, higher education in the U.S. and other advanced western European countries started to expand quite rapidly. The growth was also eminent in the former communist countries since the fall of the Soviet Union. Even many developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have been experiencing the ballooning of higher education sector recently. However, even in the age of global expansion of higher education, Korea’s speed in achieving universal education has been quite spectacular. In 1960, the number of tertiary students per 10,000 capita in Korea was 37.2, which is about the same level as the average of 19 Latin American, 18 Asian, and 13 Middle Eastern/North African countries in their sample. In 2000, the ratio increased to 390, which was almost the twice the number of those countries and became even higher than the average of 15 industrialized countries whose ratio averages about 340 (Schofer & Meyer, 2005). With the rapid expansion of higher education, Korea has to increase its spending in higher education as well. According to OECD (2006), Korea spent 2.6% of its GDP on higher education in 2003. Relatively, the United States is the only country that spent a higher proportion of its GDP on higher education than Korea by spending 2.9%. With the high enrollment rate, Korea’s spending is not particularly surprising. What is surprising, however, is that Korea’s higher education sector has been mostly financed by private funding, notably by tuition fees charged to students. In 2003, out of Korea’s 2.6% spending on higher education, 2% was financed by private sector. Korea ranks by far the first in the world in terms of the share of private spending in higher education measured as the percentage of GDP. In the international comparison of quantitative statistics, Korea is in an envious position. In addition to universal participation in higher education, gender inequality has been drastically reduced over time. For example, in 2006, the enrollment rate of female students in four-year universities was
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42.8%, which was very close to its male counterpart, 45.5%. However, dissatisfaction among education consumers has not been subdued. Education policies are one of the most contentious and visible social discourses in the society. In 2006, the Korean National Assembly was completely paralyzed when the major opposing party walked out of the Assembly as a protest against the newly passed legislation on the private school governance system. Recently, the President himself defended the government’s university admission policies in public, while many national associations representing education stakeholders have expressed their strong opposition. Also, many presidents and faculty organizations in national universities express vigorous opposition to the proposed legislation that includes the plan to create independent governing boards for the national universities. The economically successful middle-income country has been struggling with education policies for several decades. Korea’s experience of rapid expansion of higher education provides an interesting case study. Why and how did Korea achieve universal higher education in such a short time? With such spectacular expansion of higher education, does it achieve the social objectives that liberals have been advocating? What does Korea’s experience in reaching universal higher education teach about the transition of higher education that is happening in other parts of the world? The large-scale expansion of the higher education system inevitably brings about challenges not only to higher learning institutions, but also to the social, economic, and political environment in which they are operating (Adams & Gottlieb, 1993). The development and transformation of higher education system, therefore, should be viewed from a systemic and comprehensive perspective. This essay is an attempt to summarize what happened in Korea from a political economy perspective. That is to say, it tries to examine the historical development of the rapid expansion by identifying government policy initiatives and other stakeholder’s responses (i.e., education consumers and providers) from a rational choice perspective. Also, it tries to explain the undesirable side effects of the Korea’s rapid expansion of the higher education sector. It is organized as follows. In the following section, we provide an overview of the current system of higher education system in Korea. In Section 2, major characteristics of the Korean higher education system are highlighted. In Section 3, we provide historical background of the changes in Korean education system before the massification of its higher education sector. In Section 4, we discuss the political economy of the massification and its consequences. In Section 5, the last section, we discuss the Korean
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experience from the perspective of various theories of the expansion of higher education.
1. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEM IN KOREA The basic structure of Korea’s formal education system is 6-3-3-4. This school system, which was established soon after its independence from Japan after World War II, has not been changed very much until recently. Primary education covers grades 1–6. Kindergarten has not been a part of the official school system until now, although making it a part of the pubic school system has been under discussion for some years. In the secondary education sector, there are two levels of schools: middle schools covering grades 7–9, and high schools covering grades 10–12. After 12 years of formal education, students advance to higher education. Typically, undergraduate degree (B.A. or B.S.) takes four years. The curriculum for primary and middle schools is uniform across the nation, which is strictly controlled by the government. Student allocation in primary schools is done by the location of the student’s residence. In middle schools, limited school choices within the school district are allowed. Upon graduating from middle school, students have a choice to go to liberal arts high schools that prepare students for higher education or to technical high schools that offer technical and occupational training courses in agriculture, commerce, industry, and so on. The popularity in technical high schools has been steadily declining, and the majority of their graduates also advances to HEIs rather than seek employment immediately after graduation. Although there are a substantial number of private middle and high schools, the difference between them and their public counterpart is rather minimal, thanks to the nationwide equalization policies implemented in the 1970s and 1980s. The specifics of that policy will be discussed later. Currently, elementary schools and middle schools are free and compulsory. Students in high school are required to pay tuition. The annual tuition for the academic year 2006–2007 was about US $2,200.1 The level of tuition is uniform across schools, independent of its location and whether it is public or private, although schools in poor areas such as remote islands and the countryside have tuitions as little as one half of the regular tuitions. While private high schools are required to charge the same tuition, the government covers any deficit in their operating cost. Besides tuition,
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students pay for their textbooks, uniforms, extra curricular activities, and so on. Even with such a substantial expenditure to attend high school, high school attendance is virtually universal. Traditionally, households have shared a substantial portion of the cost of schooling in Korea. Although primary education has been compulsory since 1950, parents are required to pay substantial amount. However, over the last 50 years the government has been taking up a greater and greater share of the formal education expenditure. Middle school tuition was completely eliminated in 2004. Besides the formal schooling, Korean households spend substantial amount of money in private tutoring performed in and out of the formal school system. It is estimated that the total amount of household expenditure for private tutoring is about three quarters of government’s expenditure on primary and secondary education. While out-of-school education activities include music, arts, and sports, the overwhelming majority of such education is academic preparation for the college entrance examination (Kim & Lee, 2002a). After 12 years of formal schooling, students advance to HEIs. If the student advances normally, the first-year student in a HEI is 19 years old. The higher education sector in Korea consists of several types of institutions: junior colleges, universities, Teachers Universities, the National Air and Correspondence University, industrial universities, technical colleges, cyber (internet) colleges and universities, and other miscellaneous institutions (Table 1). The largest and the most important part of the higher education system is universities. They are comprehensive institutions that have multiple majors ranging from accounting to zoology and multiple degrees ranging from four-year undergraduate degrees (such as B.A. or B.S.) to Ph.D.s. Since most undergraduate degrees in the universities require four years, they are typically called four-year universities (universities hereafter). The second largest component of the Korean higher education system is junior colleges and technical colleges (junior colleges hereafter). Such institutions typically grant associate bachelor degrees requiring two to three years of full-time study, depending on the subject. They serve mostly two types of students. The first group of students are those who plan to enter the labor market quicker, and want to obtain vocational skills. The others are those who wanted to advance to four-year universities, but failed to do so. Some of those try to gain the entrance (or transfer) to four-year universities when opportunities arise. Although the four-year universities and two-year junior colleges are the most important type of institutions, there are other types of HEIs worth
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Table 1.
Key Indicators of Higher Education in South Korea, 2005. Institutions
Enrollment
Departments
Faculty Members
3,548,728 871,354 48,132 2,629,242
26,953 5,124 398 21,431
66,862 15,384 911 50,567
Total National Public Private
419 50 10 359
(11) – – (11)
Junior college National Public Private
158 6 8 144
– – – –
853,089 13,405 22,748 816,936
6,118 87 148 5,883
12,027 292 359 11,376
11 11
– –
25,141 25,141
12 12
798 798
173 24 2 147
(11) – – (11)
1,859,639 379,254 21,414 1,458,971
10,189 1,916 108 8,165
49,200 12,471 537 36,192
Teachers university National University National Public Private Air and correspondence university National
1
–
282,023
21
131
1
–
282,023
21
131
18 8 10
– – –
188,753 90,324 98,429
1,367 589 778
2,658 1,411 1,247
Technical collage Undergraduate course (private) Junior course (private)
1 1
– –
189 102
4 2
–
–
87
2
Miscellaneous school Undergraduate course (private) Junior course (private)
5 4
– –
1,148 1,094
24 17
33 28
1
–
54
7
5
17 2
– –
56,460 3,304
180 14
342 21
15
–
53,156
166
321
1 1
– –
61 31
3 1
– –
–
–
30
2
–
Industrial university National Private
Cyber college and university Undergraduate course (private) Junior course (private) College in company Undergraduate course (private) Junior course (private)
– –
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Table 1. (Continued ) Institutions
Graduate school National Public Private
o1,051W o164W o14W o873W
{34} – – {34}
Enrollment
282,225 81,207 3,970 197,048
Departments
Faculty Members
9,035 2,499 142 6,394
1,673 281 15 1,377
Notes: (1) The figures in ( ) show the number of branch campuses, and are not included in the total schools. (2) Graduate school: – The number of all the graduate schools shows the sum of all the ‘‘graduate schools’’ and ‘‘graduate school colleges{34 colleges}.’’ – The total number of schools includes 34 graduate school colleges, which have only graduate programs. However, the number of all the graduate schools is not included in the total number of schools. – The number of departments at graduate schools shows only the number of master’s degree programs. – The number of students in master’s degree programs and that of Ph.D. degree programs are included in that of freshmen and sophomore, respectively. (3) Technical college has junior college course and undergraduate course. (4) ‘‘College in the company’’ has changed from junior college course to undergraduate course beginning in 2005. (5) The number of departments is specified, considering the size of each college and university enrollment quota. (6) The number of faculty members is the sum of all the president (dean) and full-time professors (teaching assistants are not included in the total number). Source: KMOE ( 2006 ).
noting. There are 11 Teachers Universities that train primary school teachers, and they are owned and operated by the central government. Currently, they are four-year institutions. However, most of these institutions started as normal schools at the high school level. In the 1950s, the elementary school system experienced a remarkable expansion. The enrollment in primary schools which was less than 2 million in 1945 increased to almost 6 million at the end of 1960s. As the government wanted to produce teachers very quickly in order to meet the overwhelming demand for primary school education, it established several normal schools throughout the country. They were heavily subsidized by the government in order to attract able young people who otherwise would not been able to
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go to high schools into the teaching profession (McGinn, Snodgrass, Kim, Kim, & Kim, 1980). Over time, the qualifications for teachers have improved, and these institutions turned into two-year colleges in early 1960s and four-year universities in the 1980s. However, the heavy subsidy to these institutions by the government was continued. These universities and junior colleges educate mostly conventional students, that is, full-time students who enroll immediately after high school. The recent growth in Korean higher education system is also due to the development of open universities for non-traditional students. The government established the Air and Correspondence University within the Seoul National University (SNU) in 1972 in order to absorb the burgeoning demand for higher education in the 1970s. In 1982, it became an independent national university. Initially it started with radio correspondence school curriculum. TV has been used for the medium of instruction since 1990. With the development of information and communication technology, more programs are offered through Internet. Currently, it offers graduate as well as undergraduate degrees. In addition to this national university, there are 17 private cyber universities offering associate bachelor degrees and bachelor degrees. All of these universities were established after 1995, when the government eased the entry requirement of HEIs. Most HEIs conduct competitive admission process. Typically, the process involves a nationwide scholarly achievement test given during the grade 12, high school transcripts, essays, and personal interviews. The process and the weight given to each part have been heavily regulated by the government. The rules for the college admission have been one of the most contentious issues in Korean educational policy. In 2005, there were 419 HEIs in Korea, out of which 50 were owned by the central government (called national universities), 10 were by local governments (called public universities), and 359 were by privately owned (see Table 1). Among them were 173 four-year universities, and 24 universities were national, 2 were public (owned by local governments), and 147 were private. Additionally, 11 private universities have branch campuses which are not counted separately in the 147 private universities. These branch campuses are located outside of the Seoul metropolitan area, which were established by major private universities in Seoul during the rapid expansion of the system. Because of the government’s policy to suppress the growth of the capital city region, private universities were not allowed to expand in the Seoul metropolitan area. Consequently, the major universities in Seoul opted to open branch campuses, just outside of the capital region to absorb excess demand for their students. There were also
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158 junior colleges, and the 144 of them were private and the remaining 14 were public. There were also 18 industrial universities. They were similar to polytechnic universities teaching professional skills in various engineering fields. Most of them started as two-year institutions, but have been converted to four-year institutions. They are operated or regulated by the Ministry of Labor rather than the Ministry of Education and Human Resources Development (KMOE). Total enrollment in higher education in 2005 was more than 3.5 million. More than 1.8 million students are enrolled in universities, about 850,000 students in junior colleges, and another 340,000 students were in open universities. Considering the fact that the population of 20 year olds in 2005 was slightly over 600,000, the Korean higher education system can be regarded as universal. More than 80% of high school graduates advance to higher education, and 48.4% of age cohorts between 19 and 21 years old were in four-year universities, and with an additional 19.7% were in junior colleges. In terms of the gross enrollment figure reported to OECD, Korea (85%) was one of the highest in the world (Clancy & Goastellec, 2007). The neighboring high-income nations in East Asia, such as Japan and Taiwan, also have quite high enrollment rates in higher education.2 In 2005, the advancement rate to four-year universities in Japan was 44.2% and to junior colleges was 7.3% (Japan Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 2006). The major differences between Japan and Korea were that (1) Korea had significantly larger junior college participation (19.7% compared to 7.3%) and that (2) Japanese junior college system was dominated by female students, while Koreans had similar sex ratios between the university system and the junior college system (see below). Taiwan had slightly lower participation rates than Korea even though Korea’s GDP per capita was lower than that of Taiwan. In 2005, the gross participation rate in Taiwan was 82%, and close to 50% in four-year universities (Taiwan Ministry of Education, 2007). Although most university undergraduate degrees require four years, some professional degrees require longer undergraduate schooling. For example, degrees for medical and dental professionals require six years of education. MBAs (Masters of Business Administrations) require two years of additional education after four years of undergraduate education. Currently, legal professions require four years of undergraduate education. However, in 2007 the legislation to introduce American-style law schools (three years after an undergraduate degree) has been passed after a long contentious political wrangling. Less sophisticated professional degrees which used to require less than four years in earlier decades, such as nurses,
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primary school teachers, and so on have strengthened their educational requirements so that more and more schools have four years of higher education. In general, as the higher education sector expands, professional degrees tend to require longer years of formal schooling.
2. MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF THE KOREAN HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEM 2.1. Rapid Expansion One of the most striking features of the Korean higher education system is the speed in which the rate of participation increased. In 1952, there were only about 31,000 students enrolled in universities. The enrollment in these institutions has increased to 105,000 by 1965, 209,000 by 1975, 931,000 by 1985, 1,188,000 by 1995, and 1,887,000 in 2005. The enrollment in junior colleges in 1965 was only 23,000. It has increased to 63,000 by 1975, 242,000 by 1985, 570,000 by 1995, and 853,000 by 2005 (Table 2). In addition to the Table 2.
Enrollment in Universities and Junior Colleges in Korea, 1952–2005.
Year
Universities Total
1952 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006
31,342 78,649 92,930 105,643 146,414 208,986 402,979 931,884 1,040,166 1,187,735 1,665,398 1,859,639 1,888,436
Junior Colleges
Public Institution
Female Student
Total
Public Institution
Female Student
31,718 25,964 36,038 56,830 114,686 243,378 254,748 295,941 372,078 400,668
23,761 32,641 55,439 90,634 250,088 296,129 378,418 596,389 684,238
23,159 33,483 62,866 165,051 242,117 323,825 569,820 913,273 853,089 817,994
4,699 14,383 18,998 26,881 22,956 26,959 21,413 37,331 36,153
6,800 8,316 17,761 42,724 87,123 119,345 214,310 339,233 316,326
Source: KMOE (various years).
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enrollments in these institutions, the enrollment in open universities increased tremendously over the last two decades. However, the expansion did not happen smoothly. Up until 1960, the rate of increase in higher education enrollment was quite high, even though the level was relatively low (o 3%). For instance, the number of students enrolled in four-year universities in 1950 was only 11,358. The number has increased to 101,014 in 1960, a nine-fold increase in 10 years! Between 1960 and 1980, there was a slow but steady expansion under the very suppressive government policy. The enrollment rate in four-year universities reached 7.2% in 1980, with an additional 3.7% in junior colleges. The massification of higher education occurred starting in 1980. It followed the rapid expansion of secondary school enrollment that happened during the 1970s. The secondary school enrollment followed the early rapid expansion of primary school enrollment that happened during the 1950s and 1960s. Meanwhile, Korea’s economy started to take off in the early 1960s, recording an annual average growth rate of 6–10%. The successful economic growth and secondary school equalization policy greatly expanded secondary education. During the period between 1960 and 1997 (the year of Asian financial crisis), Korea’s economy recorded the growth rate of 6–10% per year with the exception of a few years during the oil crises of the 1970s. After 1998, the economy recovered to a slower but steady growth rate of 4–5% per year (Fig. 1). Elementary School High School
Kindergarten Higher Education
Middle School Real GDP/GNI per capita
100000
7
5
10000
4 3 1000
2
Thousand won
Million students
6
1 0
100 1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Year
Fig. 1.
Trends of School Enrollment in South Korea and per Capita Income, 1945–2005.
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In terms of student enrollment, the expansion of higher education happened both in the public and private sectors. In 1960, about 25% of students enrolled in universities were in public universities. The ratio remained stable until 1995. Since then, the ratio declined gradually to 21% by 2005, reflecting the fact that private universities grew a little bit faster than public ones. Two-year colleges are much more dominated by private suppliers. About 20% of students enrolled in junior colleges were at public institutions in 1965. However, the ratio has dropped abruptly in early 1980s when many public junior colleges converted into four-year universities. The ratio of enrollments in private junior colleges is only 4% in 2005 (Table 3). With respect to gender balance, the ratio of female student enrolled in four-year universities has been increasing steadily. In 1965, 22.5% students enrolled in universities were female. In 2005, 36.3% of those students were female. The ratio of female students in junior colleges is similar to that of universities. Considering the fact that junior colleges are the second-tier institutions in Korea, the similar ratio of female students in both types of institution suggests that there is no gender discrimination between the two subsystems.3 In 2006, the female enrollment rate for universities is 42.8%, whereas the enrollment rate for both sexes combined was 44.2%. During the period until 1980, about 25% of students enrolled in junior colleges were in public colleges. Since the reform in the early 1980s, the ratio of students enrolled in junior colleges has declined.
Table 3. Year
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006
Enrollment Rates by Types of Higher Education Institution in Korea, 1970–2005.
Junior Colleges
Teachers University
Total
Female
Total
Female
Public
Female
Total
Female
1.0 1.7 3.7 5.6 6.8 13.2 19.4 20.0 19.7
0.6 1.1 2.1 4.4 6.0 11.7 17.2 18.2 18.3
0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.7
0.6 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.9 1.0
3.9 4.4 7.2 16.5 15.4 22.0 29.8 41.7 44.2
2.2 2.9 3.9 11.0 12.4 18.6 27.6 40.2 42.8
2.5 3.3 3.5
1.5 2.3 2.2
Source: KMOE (various years).
Universities
Industrial University
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Table 4. The Number of Universities and Junior Colleges in Korea, 1952–2005. Year
1952 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Universities
Junior Colleges
Total
Public
Private
Total
Public
Private
34 44 52 70 71 72 85 100 107 131 161 173
14 15 15 20 22 24 26 26 26
56 56 57 65 78 83 105 135 147
48 65 101 128 120 117 145 158 158
12 26 36 36 17 16 18 16 14
36 39 65 92 103 101 137 142 144
Source: KMOE (various years).
Looking at the number of institutions over time, the number of universities in 1952 was only 34, and it had increased to 70 in 1965, 72 in 1975, 100 in 1985, 131 in 1995, and 173 in 2005 (Table 4). In 1965, 14 out of 70 universities were public. The number of public universities remained stable until 1980, and it has increased gradually to 26 since then. While the number of public universities has increased only from 14 to 26 during the last four decades, the number of private universities has increased more substantially from 56 to 147 during the same period. The number of junior colleges increased even more substantially from 48 in 1965 to 158 in 2005. While the number of private junior colleges has increased steadily during the last four decades, the change in the number of public junior colleges has not. Between 1965 and 1975, the number of public colleges increased rapidly from 12 to 36. In early 1980s, many of the public junior colleges changed to four-year universities. Consequently, the number of public colleges decreased from 36 in 1980 to 17 in 1985. Since then, the number of public junior colleges has decreased slowly. During the period of expansion, the average size of universities increased substantially as well. The average number of students at a public university was 2,300 in 1965. By 2005, it increased to 15,000. Generally, private universities are smaller than public universities. Currently major universities have student sizes of 15,000–20,000. In 1965, the average size of student
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Table 5. Year
1952 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
The Number of Academic Staff in Universities and Junior Colleges in Korea, 1952–2005. University
Junior College
Total
Public university
Female
Total
1,220 2,420 3,439 4,732 6,591 8,575 14,458 20,128 25,337 33,938 41,943 49,200
1,895 2,422 3,097 4,578 6,635 8,289 10,183 11,359 13,008
604 621 867 2,266 2,428 2,984 4,195 5,758 7,973
431 212 135 5,488 5,369 6,139 8,426 11,707 12,027
Public college
Female
1,259 845 835 516 678 651
64 67 50 916 1,050 1,322 1,898 2,764 3,214
Source: KMOE (various years).
body at private universities was only 1,400, but it also has increased to more than 10,000 by 2005. Similarly, junior colleges have increased their student body sizes during this time period. In 1965, the average size of student body at junior colleges was less than 500. By 2005, the enrollment in public colleges increased to more than 2,500. The growth of the size of the private colleges was even more spectacular. In 2005, the average enrollment in private colleges was more than 5,500. Unlike the university system in which public universities are generally larger than their private counterpart, private colleges are generally larger than public ones in the junior college system. As the size of higher education sector increased, the number of teaching staff also increased. Table 5 shows the increase of faculty size in universities and junior colleges. For example, in 1965, the number of full-time teaching staff was only 4,732 in universities and 431 in junior colleges. In 2005, those numbers increased to 49,200 and 12,027, respectively. As in the expansion of student enrollments, the faculty expansion has increased in both public and private institutions. In 2005, the fraction of female teaching staff was 16.2% in universities, and 26.7% in junior colleges. In contrast to the balanced sex ratio in student enrollments, males dominate the faculty, particularly in universities. The fraction of female staff has been increasing, but the rate of interest has been rather slow.
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2.2. Low per Student Input While the number of academic staff, the most important input in higher education, has increased quite rapidly, their growth has been much slower than the growth of the student population. Consequently, the student– faculty ratio has been increasing over time. In 1952, the student–faculty ratio in universities was 26. It remained relatively stable until 1980, when it jumped to more than 40 by 1985. Since then, it has been gradually decreasing, but remains high – 38 in 2005. The situation in junior colleges is even worse. In 1965, the student–faculty ratio was 26, and it has been increasing since 1980. In 2005, the ratio was more than 70 (Table 6). In general, public institutions have a lower student–faculty ratio. In 1965, the ratio for public universities was 13.7, whereas it was 28.1 for private universities. During the last four decades the ratio has increased in both public and private universities. It was 30.8 in public universities and 41.1 in private universities in 2005. Although the ratio is higher in private universities, the rate of increase is lower. In 1965, the ratio in public universities was less than a half of that in private universities. However, in 2005 it was about three quarters. The rise in faculty–student ratio in higher education is striking compared with the declining ratio in primary and secondary schools. In 1965, the ratio was 62 in elementary schools, 40 in middle schools, and 32 in high schools. Table 6.
Student Faculty Ratios in Different Level of Schools in Korea, 1952–2005.
Year
Elementary School
Middle School
1952 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
67 63 58 62 57 52 48 38 35 28 29 25
42 43 40 39 42 43 45 40 25 25 20 19
Source: KMOE (various years).
Liberal Arts High School
32 32 32 34 32 25 22 21 16
Vocational High School
32 32 32 34 32 25 22 21 16
University
26 32 27 22 22 24 28 46 41 35 40 38
Junior College
26 21 23 30 45 53 68 78 71
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By 2005, it had decreased to 29, 19, and 16, respectively. In fact, the student– faculty ratio in universities is more than twice that in high schools. In junior colleges, the ratio is more than five times that of high schools! However, the quality of academic staff has increased. In 1970, only 1,440 out of 7,944 full-time academic staff (18.1%) in universities had Ph.D.s (Table 7). In 2006, the ratio of Ph.D. holders has increased to 83.6%. There are several reasons for this improvement in the quality of faculty. First, the supply of foreign Ph.D.s (particularly from the U.S.) returning to Korea has increased drastically since the 1980s. Second, the supply of domestic Ph.D.s has risen dramatically in Korea since 1990. Third, since 1995, competition among universities forced them to hire better-qualified professors (see Kim, 2004 for more discussion for the market for professors in Korea). Korea spends relatively less resource in higher education per students compared to primary and secondary education. Table 8 shows per student expenditure spent in higher education and secondary education. Compared to Japan and other countries, Korea’s per student expenditure on secondary education is quite high. The figure does not include substantial expenditure on private tutoring. The amount of private tutoring is estimated at about 60–70% of government expenditure. Therefore, if you include private tutoring expenditures, Korea’s spending per student in secondary school exceeds that of the U.S. in purchasing power parity. However, the per student expenditure on tertiary education in Korea is almost the same as that on secondary education, while the figure is about twice as much in Japan, the UK, and the U.S. Although the increase in educational input does not necessarily convert into the increase in education output, the
Table 7.
Doctoral Degree Holders in Universities.
Year
Full-Time Teaching Staff (A)
Doctorate Holders (B)
(B/A) in %
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006
7,944 10,242 14,696 26,459 33,340 45,087 41,943 49,200 51,859
1,440 2,807 4,835 9,090 16,055 26,771 34,666 41,397 43,362
18.1 27.4 32.9 34.3 48.5 59.3 82.7 84.1 83.6
Source: KMOE (various years).
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Table 8. Per Student Expenditure in Tertiary and Secondary Education in Selected Countries. Per Student Expenditure (in US$, ppp)
Japan United Kingdom United States Korea OECD mean
Tertiary education (A)
Secondary education
11,716 11,822 20,545 6,047 10,655
6,952 6,505 9,098 5,882 7,002
A/GDP per Capita in %
43 41 57 33 43
Source: Internal Government Document. ppp, purchasing power parity.
absolute and relative low input toward Korean higher education should be of serious concern. There are several reasons that explain the contrasting trends in faculty– student ratios between higher education, primary, and secondary schools. First, there has been a sharp decline in fertility rates since 1970.4 Consequently, the number of students in primary schools started to decrease post-1980, while the number of students enrolled in higher education started to increase very rapidly since then (see Fig. 1). Second, the higher education system relies heavily on private funding while primary and secondary schools depend mostly on public funding. The emergence of a strong teachers union (described in more detail later) in the late 1980s prevented the reduction of government expenditure in this sector.
2.3. Heavy Reliance on Private Funding In terms of funding sources, heavy reliance on private funding is a key characteristic of the Korean higher education system. Table 9 shows the spending on higher education by public and private sectors as a percent of GDP. Korea spends 2.6% of its GDP on higher education. In terms of percentage, Korea ranks second in OECD countries after the U.S., which spends 2.9% of its GDP in higher education. Out of the 2.6%, only 0.6% is spent by the government. The remaining 2% (77% of total spending on higher education) is borne by private households. In terms of the share of private funding, Korea ranks the first in OECD. The U.S. ranks a distant second in terms of the share of private funding with 55%.
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Table 9. Spending on Tertiary Education as % of GDP in OECD Countries, 2003.
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Korea Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States OECD average
Public
Private
Total
0.8 1.1 1.2 1.3 0.9 1.7 1.7 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.5 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 1.6 1.6 1.1 0.8 1.2 1.1
0.8 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 Negligible 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.8 2.0 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 n.a. 0.1 0.3 1.6 0.4
1.5 1.1 1.3 2.4 1.1 1.8 1.8 1.4 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 0.9 1.3 2.6 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.8 n.a. 1.1 1.1 2.9 1.4
Notes: n.a., not available. Numbers do not always add due to rounding. Source: OECD (2006).
Korea’s funding of higher education relies much more directly on tuition revenue from students. Table 10 shows the source of funding in private universities in Korea and the U.S. In Korea, about 70% of total revenue by private universities is from students, compared to 40% in the U.S. U.S. private universities receive much more funding from the government (about 20%) compared to Korean private universities (only 4%). This is primarily due to the fact that there are no government grants to students in Korea and
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Table 10.
241
Source of Funding of Private Universities in Korea and the U.S. (in %). Korea (2003)
U.S. (2000)
69.0 20.3 4.0 2.7 4.0 100
39.7 10.5 19.6 3.8 26.3 100
Student Gifts Government Educational revenue Non-educational revenue Total Source: Internal Korean Government Document.
that government research support for universities is much smaller in Korea. Korean private universities receive substantial gifts and donations (20%) from the owners of universities, industries, and private citizens. However, Korean universities’ ability to generate operational revenue by their assets is much smaller compared to U.S. private universities. Older private colleges and universities in the U.S. have used residential campuses, similar to Oxford and Cambridge in England. Therefore, the emotional attachment to Alma Maters in the U.S. is strong, and it has been used to generate a great deal of gifts and donations from alums. Also, U.S. institutions have much longer histories so they have been able to accumulate substantial endowments over time. The reliance on tuition revenue is even higher for junior colleges. Since these are the institutions that are more teaching-oriented and less established in terms of their reputation and alum base, the amount of gifts is much smaller than universities. Also, as the Korean government subsidy is mainly for research activities, these type of institutions are not likely to be able to obtain any competitive research grants operated by the government. It is estimated that more than 90% of these institutions’ operating expenses are from students. This heavy reliance on private funding sharply contrasts with substantial subsidy by federal, state, and local governments to community and technical colleges in the U.S. Therefore, it would be safe to say that Korean junior colleges require relatively higher user fees. Such high reliance on private funding in junior colleges in Korea inevitably makes the institutions second-class. Even though their tuition is lower than those of universities, the quality of instruction is even lower. It does not function as a technical school because of its lower financial base, nor as a low-cost feeder school for the university system. In the U.S. heavy government subsidies along with cheap tuition make the community college
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system a viable feeder system for low-income households who often have full-time jobs and are forced to stay near home. In Korea, the junior college system does not necessarily cater to low-income households living nearby. Mostly, they are filled with full-time students whose academic credentials are not strong enough to advance to universities.
2.4. Hierarchical Structure of Institutional Pecking Order Another important characteristic of the Korean higher education system is its hierarchical nature. The university system is clearly superior to the junior college system. Within the subsystem, the well-established rankings among institutions are well known among students, parents, professors, and the general public. Students are sorted by their academic ability (often measured in standardized test scores) through the admission process. The basis for this hierarchical system is the competitive entrance examination that has been used throughout the history of Korean higher education sector. While the nature of the entrance examinations have changed overtime, all Korean HEIs are allowed to select students and students are allowed to choose the institution they attend. There are several market and institutional forces that sustain this hierarchical structure of the system. First, individual universities have general reputations among the public. Such reputations are the combined results of the institution’s history, locations, the quality of faculty, academic programs, facilities, alums, and so on. Since the reputation is pretty well known to the student applicants, they strive to get an admission to the best institution given their academic abilities and personal preference. Korea is geographically a small country (only 400 miles long and o200 miles wide), and the transportation network within the country is very well developed, so the market for higher education is more or less national. Such competition among students results in the hierarchy of students’ academic ability and the reputation of the institution. Second, highly ranked universities attract not only the best students, but also better faculty members. Given the same level of salary, faculty members would like to teach better students. The attraction of better students is much higher for graduate programs in which students become assistants and coworkers. At the same time, higher ranking institutions can attract more gifts and donations from corporations that would like to link up with the best institutions and alums that are more likely to be successful. Also, high-ranking institutions can secure more government funding, because better quality faculty members in
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243
high-ranking institutions are more likely to be successful in attracting competitive research grants. In addition, high-ranking institutions have better network of alums that can contribute more gifts, and governmental support for flagship national institutions distributes more funding to highranking public universities. Such gifts and donations allow high-ranking institutions to subsidize education more than their less reputable counterparts. Therefore, high-ranking institutions are able to charge less for tuition, pay higher salaries to their faculty members, and have better facilities (Rothschild & White, 1995; Winston, 1999). Such advantages are selfserving and more likely to be sustained for a long time period. See Lee, Kim, and Kim (2003) and Kim and Lee (2006) for more details, regarding the hierarchical nature of the Korean higher education system.
2.5. Heavy Government Regulation Another major characteristic of Korean higher education system is the high level of centralized government regulation exerted on universities and colleges, even though the funding support by the government is smaller relatively compared to other countries. Some have argued that the success of Korean economic development can be attributed to the efficient market intervention by the government (e.g., Amsden, 1989). However, neoliberalism, deregulation, and privatization have been on the agenda of many governments in OECD. Although Korea had some limited success in deregulation recently, Korea’s economy is still considered to be highly regulated (World Competitiveness Center, 2006). It is very common that educational sector is much more regulated than other sectors of the economy in general. In most countries, a substantial portion of education is directly supplied by the government. Even in the countries where the private market is considered to be the major resource allocation mechanism (e.g., the U.S. or UK), public sector directly or indirectly provides funding for education, certifies teachers, and regulates various aspects of the operation of the sector. In general, the level of government regulation was highest between 1960 and 1980, under Park Chung-Hee’s administration. Park’s government regulated not only the key aspects of the quality of higher institutions such as minimum quality standards for physical facilities and academic staff, but also the quantity of supply by limiting the number of students in the higher education system. Although such heavy-handed regulation diminished over time, Korean government still maintains a high level of regulation.
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For example, recently, the Roh administration asserted that it will maintain the so-called sambul (three impossibilities) policies regarding the admission of students to the HEI. The policies prohibit three potential admission policies that HEIs may want to adopt: first, consideration of the quality differentials among high schools from which the students are graduating; second, individual entrance examination by the institution; and finally, favorable consideration for the children of benefactors to the institution. It is interesting to observe that the high level of government regulation has been maintained in various political environments throughout Korea’s modern history. The military dictatorship between 1960 and 1987 exerted a strong government power over all aspects of economic regulations and social control. In such a dictatorial form of government, strict government regulations may be easily understood. The first government after 1987, though it was elected by a fair election, has strong ties to the previous military government; the President himself was a former general, and was handpicked by the previous military dictator. During this time period, the legacy of strong regulations was maintained, while political freedom was expanding. The next administration, a moderately conservative government, wanted to liberalize the economy including the education sector; the extent of deregulation was not great, and the length of the education reform was cut short by the emergence of moderately liberal government. Now, with the more left-leaning Roh Moo-hyun government in place, the bureaucracy has maintained its strong grip partly through the politics of populism and partly through the self-preserving behavior of bureaucrats. The majority of students and parents do not wish to rescind the secondary school equalization policies. Also, the level of capture by bureaucrats in Korean education is quite substantial. In fact, it is not uncommon for high-level bureaucrats in the government to become presidents of public universities or board members of private universities after they finish their government careers.
3. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE KOREAN EDUCATION SYSTEM BEFORE THE MASSIFICATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN 19805 Modern institutions of higher learning in Korea can be traced back to the late nineteenth century when the West influenced the early development of the education system in Korea. Several Christian missionaries started to
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establish modern learning institutions. An American Methodist missionary, Rev. Henry Appenzeller started teaching English in Korea in 1885. His effort was recognized by King Kojong in 1886, and he bestowed the name Paichai School, which still exists as a university and a high school. Another American missionary established a girls’ school in 1886, and the King gave the name Ewha School, which is the precedent of the current Ewha Womans University. In 1885, an American missionary Horace Allen, who worked as a doctor for the King, established a medical school, which was incorporated into the Severance Medical School in 1893. The Medical School is currently a part of Yonsei University, which was merged with Yonheui Specialized School after the Korean Independence. The beginning of that school was the Chosun Christian College established by Rev. Underwood in 1915. In 1897, an American missionary Baird established Soongsil School in Pyongyang. It was closed to protest the Emperor worship forced by the Japanese wartime military government, and reopened in Seoul after the Korean War. It later became Soongsil University. While most of the schools in this period were founded by Christian missionaries, other progressive Koreans established private learning institutions as well. For example, Bosung School established in 1905 by an aristocrat Yong-Ik Lee later developed into Korea University. Buddhist monks established a higher learning institution called Myeongjin School in 1906, and it later became Dongguk University. A teaching institution for girls called Myeongsin Women’s School established by the Court in 1906 later became Sookmyung Women’s University. The burgeoning system of modern education in the late Yi Dynasty was substantially disturbed by the encroachment and annexation by Imperial Japan. When Korea was colonized by the Japanese, the Japanese government strongly suppressed education in Korea. No universities were allowed in Korea and the length of primary and secondary schools were shorter than those in Japan. The demand for higher education could only be satisfied by studying abroad. Many went to Japan and China for higher education. Some even went to the U.S. as well.6 While many of them were from privileged groups who were typically pro-Japan, many others were active in the Korean Independence movement. The discriminatory education policy changed substantially after the 1919 Korean Independence movement. The Japanese tried to assimilate Koreans into Japan. In 1924, the Japanese government established Kyeongseong Imperial University7 in Seoul in order to accommodate the demand for higher education in Korea (including the Japanese who were living in Korea) and to preempt the movement to establish a private university following the model of Japanese
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higher learning institutions. However, the class size was very small (typically fewer than 200), and only about one-third was Korean (Han, 1996). While there was only one ‘‘university,’’ there were several private and public higher learning institutions called specialized schools (jeonmunhakyo) teaching engineering, law, business, and education (Ahn, 1998). One positive aspect of Japanese colonial rule (1910–1945) was the virtual elimination of social classes that existed during the Chosun Dynasty. While many of the early sympathizers to the colonial government were from the Yangban (aristocracy) class, the new political system eliminated the socioeconomic influence of that class. Also, the secondary schools and universities established by the colonial government had meritocratic examinations to select the students. The students who successfully graduated from these schools had a great career advantage of being employed as professionals and managers in the colonial political economy. At the same time, the Japanese imperial government left a highly authoritarian school system. In 1939, as Japan immersed itself in the War effort, schools began to require that students wear black uniforms that looked more like those of military cadets, and each school day started with an inspection parade in the military style with a public speech by the principal and physical exercise. Students’ school behavior was strictly disciplined, and principals and teachers had significant authority over students including corporal punishments. During the Japanese colonial rule, primary education experienced a substantial growth. However, the educational opportunities for higher-level education for Koreans were heavily restricted. In 1945, when Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule, only 65% primary school-aged children and less than 5% the properly-aged children were enrolled in secondary schools. Less than 0.5% was enrolled in higher education. In 1945, there were 19 higher learning institutions (only one was called a ‘‘university’’), which had less than 7,819 students in total (KMOE, 1998). As the establishment of the unified Korea government in the peninsula became impossible, two nation states, South Korea (Republic of Korea) and North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), were established in 1948 separately. The new South Korean government lacked any infrastructure or resources of running a successful school system. In particular, soon after the liberation, the Japanese teachers, who made up 40% of primary school teachers and 70% of secondary school teachers, returned to Japan. However, after the liberation, the enrollment in various levels of schools increased very rapidly. This suggests the education demand had been severely suppressed during the colonial period. Between 1945 and 1950,
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enrollment in primary schools almost doubled. Although the absolute size of the increase was small, the middle school enrollment increased four times during the period, and high school enrollment increased five times (McGinn et al., 1980). Meanwhile, the number of HEIs increased to 42 in South Korea, enrolling about 24,000 students. They include four comprehensive universities (Seoul National, Yonsei, Korea, and Ewha) (KMOE, 1998). The Rhee Syngman administration of South Korea announced the ambitious universal and free primary school education plan on June 1st, 1950. However, the Korean War broke out in June 25th of the same year and greatly disrupted the growth of the education system. Many schools had to be closed or moved in order to avoid the military conflict and devastation. Many students could not attend the schools regularly because of the War. Moreover, many school buildings were destroyed, because they were commonly used by military forces during the war, and became popular targets for attack. During the Rhee administration, higher education in Korea expanded tremendously. The enrollment in higher education increased to more than 100,000 in 1960. The expansion of higher education was in both public and private sectors. During the Korean War, several universities conducted classes (sometimes jointly) in provincial cities (such as Pusan and Kwangju). The experience of having temporary national universities in lesser populated provinces gave credence to the possibility of establishing permanent national universities. Within one year after the end of the War, at least one national university was established in each province of Korea. At the same time, the stipulation in the land reform of 1949–1950 created strong incentives for large landowners to convert their land holdings into schools, as the government exempted school grounds from the land reform. Also, the laissez fair attitude of the government toward higher education invited many educational entrepreneurs into the ‘‘education business.’’ In the aftermath of the War, the demand for primary school resumed its increase very rapidly. The government tried to cope with the rising demand, but had very little in terms of public resources. Domestic resources that could be mobilized from the damaged economy were very small. In 1954, the budget for the Ministry of Education was 4.2% of the government’s budget. The proportion increased to 15.2% by 1960. Although there was substantial foreign aid to the government, particularly from the U.S., not much of the resources were diverted to the education sector. The biggest exception was the construction of new school buildings supported by the American aid (McGinn et al., 1980).
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Faced with the growing demand in primary school education coupled with insufficient public resources, the government decided to accommodate the rapidly rising education demand by distributing the public resources thinly while asking the private sector to bear a substantial portion of the education cost. The education input per pupil was very low. For example, the student–faculty ratios in the late 1950s were above 60. There were simply not enough classrooms, and two, sometimes three, classes shared the same room. School facilities were of poor quality even lacking basic heating (not to mention cooling) equipment. There was a severe shortage of schoolteachers. The government established several normal schools to train teachers for primary education positions. In order to attract more students, the tuition fee for these normal schools were almost free, and jobs after graduation were guaranteed. However, the level of their salaries was kept low compared to workers in the private sector. As a compensatory measure, teachers were promised better job security, tenure-based salary, and higher pensions after retirement. Also, they were asked to collect wolsageum (monthly gratitude due for teachers) from students to supplement their official salaries. As the collection of quasi-tuition by teachers became detrimental to their educational mission, a yukseonghoe (parent organization to support the school) was organized for each school. Although the organization had some responsibility of parents–teacher communication, its main objective was to raise extra funds to run the school as the level of public resources allocated to schools was way too small. The organization paid as much as 80% of the local school’s operating expenditure. Although universal primary education was the official policy, students were supposed to pay fees to the organization. If the student was not able to pay, sometimes the student was not allowed to attend school. Textbooks and other teaching material had to be bought by the students themselves (McGinn et al., 1980). Clearly quantity expansion was the priority for the government. In fact, the government had an automatic promotion policy for all primary and secondary school grades. However, there was also a very important sorting mechanism among students. All middle and high schools had competitive entrance examinations administered by each individual institution. Any student who passed the entrance examination for a specific school could attend that school. Since secondary schools had different levels of quality, in terms of teachers and school facilities, and different reputation and alum bases, the entrance examination was a very important sorting mechanism among student in terms of academic merit. The national sorting of secondary school students based on academic merit created a substantial competition among primary school students.
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Many parents spent substantial amounts of their private resources (in addition to the payment to schools, such as the yukseonghoe fee and teaching material) on private tutoring in order to prepare their children for middle school entrance examinations. The amount of private tutoring for middle school students was smaller, as there was already a nationwide sorting done in middle school. Teachers prepared their lessons according to their relatively homogeneous student bodies, and students benefited from peer-group effects in terms of expectation of their future academic success in the next round of competitive entrance examinations. While the automatic promotion policy masked the differentials among students within a school, the competitive entrance examinations highlighted the inter-school differences. When General Park Chung-hee took over power in a bloodless coup d’e´tat in 1961, his primary policy objective was to promote rapid economic growth through export promotion. In order to achieve this goal, the government started a series of five-year economic development plans accompanied by strong government initiatives. The plans entailed subsidized capital accumulation for industrialists particularly in export businesses while suppressing wages in order to make the domestic products more competitive in the world market. The economic planning exercise had proven to be very effective, and the Korean economy started to grow very rapidly under Park’s leadership (Amsden, 1989). In the early 1960s, more than 95% of primary school grade students were enrolled in schools. While a substantial portion of the educational expense had been paid by households, the goal of universal primary education had been achieved. During the 1960s, there had been a continuous effort to deliver ‘‘true’’ universal primary school education by continuously increasing public expenditure. The de facto tuition charge through yukseonghoe in primary school continuously decreased. The government initiated free textbook program for poor regions and extended the coverage of that program throughout the nation. In 1971, 4.62 million students benefited from the free text program. The budget of MOE in 1971 took 19% of the total government’s budget of which an increasingly larger share was devoted to primary school education (KMOE, 1998). The rapid expansion of primary school enrollment created a direct impact on the demand for secondary schools. As public resources were increasingly devoted to meet the government’s commitment for universal primary education, the role of private providers in the secondary school system became more prominent. During the 1960s, there was an expansion of private secondary school providers. The number of private middle schools
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in 1965 was 513, and it increased to 698 by 1970. In 1969, the proportion of students enrolled in private middle school was 50.2% compared to 33.5% in 1952. In the same year, 53.7% of high school students were enrolled in private schools compared to 20.3% in 1952 (KMOE, 1998). The proliferation of private secondary schools resulted in widespread fraud. Although the government did not allow for-profit schools, many proprietors of those schools took advantage of the rising demand for education. The tuition revenue was sometimes diverted to personal uses for the owners rather than being used for students’ education. Founders used the school as a mechanism for tax evasion and wealth accumulation by buying up real estate. The prominent role of private schools in secondary education sharply contrasts to the almost non-existence of private elementary schools. Another serious social problem was the heated competition to enter more prestigious secondary schools. Many well-to-do families spent substantial sums of money on private tutoring so that their children had advantages in entrance examinations. Public secondary schools charged tuitions, but they were much lower than private schools. At the same time, the quality of instruction, facilities, and prestige of more established public schools were higher than those of private schools. The complete school choice among secondary schools created wellestablished nationwide rankings among middle and high school. Consequently fierce competition for better secondary schools emerged. With such fierce competition, education policy makers recognized serious problems such as rising private tutoring costs and too much pressure for young children. The Park administration’s answer to these problems was the equalization policy. Under the equalization policy, all schools, public and private, were forced to give up their rights to select new students and were required to take all students assigned by the Ministry of Education through district-wide lotteries. It also made curriculum, tuitions and teacher salaries of private schools equal to those of the public schools. Meanwhile the government guaranteed any deficit in operating cost (but not in capital cost) of all private schools. Accordingly, private schools became almost public in terms of their accessibility to students, content of learning, and quality of teachers. The only meaningful difference between private and public school remained in the governance structure. Owners of private schools were allowed to maintain certain rights over the school governance, such as appointment of teachers and board of directors, non-educational for-profit activities, or capital improvement of school facilities. But even those were under the supervision of the government.
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The equalization policy was gradually implemented starting in 1969, first in middle schools, then later in high schools. In 1969, the middle school equalization policy was first implemented in Seoul. It was expanded to major cities in the following year. In 1971, all middle schools throughout the nation were under this policy. In contrast to the sweeping and complete implementation of the equalization policy for middle schools, the high school equalization policy went through a more gradual implementation (and sometimes reversal of the policy), and substantial modifications over time, with substantial opposition. Also, it has never been completely implemented throughout the nation. In 2006, about 60% of schools, 70% of teachers, and 70% of students were in districts where the policy was in place. Although there have been some modifications from time to time, the basic structure of the policy has remained intact. For the last 30 years, the equalization policy has been one of the most controversial issues in Korean education policy (see Kim & Lee, 2002b for more information on the secondary school equalization policies). Higher education was not a priority of the Park administration’s policy agenda. In fact, Park actively suppressed the supply of higher education for several reasons. First, toward the end of Rhee administration there had been a rapid increase in the number of private HEIs.8 Although they were de jure non-profit institutions, they were de facto for-profit institutions. Many owners abused lax regulations for their own advantage by controlling the governance, finance, and even faculty appointments of their institutions. The Park administration wanted to reduce such fraudulent behavior, and the basic mechanism it chose to use was stiff regulation through micromanagement. Second, the education planners were worried about unemployment of highly educated graduates, which might occur if higher education was allowed to expand. Third, the government simply did not have any resources to provide public higher education, as the expansion of the secondary education was such a pressing matter. The pent-up demand was eventually fulfilled through two major waves of policy changes. The first expansion of higher education happened in 1980 during the Chun Doo-hwan administration, and the second one in 1995 during the Kim Young-sam administration.
4. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES The expansion of higher education in Korea happened in three stages. First, during the Rhee administration (1948–1960), the government concentrated
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its public resources to finance the burgeoning primary education sector. Due to the economic hardship of underdevelopment, the War and corruption, the government left the higher education sector alone. Under this regime, many education entrepreneurs entered the market to satisfy the burgeoning demand. In 1949, the administration implemented a nationwide land reform in order to redistribute the ownership of land. As land for educational purposes was exempt from the reform, several large landowners started private schools including higher education. The second wave of the expansion occurred during the Chun administration, a military dictatorship. Its approach to solve the excess demand of higher education was to increase the student quota that was established by the previous administration headed by Park Chung-hee. The third wave happened during the Kim Young-sam administration, a moderately conservative government that emphasized deregulation, free entry, and competition. Below, I discuss the latter two policy initiatives in more detail, because during the first expansion period the participation in higher education was still very low. Despite the rapid growth in secondary school enrollments, Park’s government maintained a very suppressive policy toward the expansion of higher education. It restricted the number of students that could be admitted to each academic department at each HEI. This extremely suppressive micromanagement policy was motivated by two objectives. First, the government wanted to get rid of profiteering by the owners of HEIs. But, the expansion of secondary education and the new equalization policy that subsidized the operation cost of private schools in the secondary education sector required substantial educational investment. Also, the manpower required to plan for rapid industrialization did not call for a larger supply of university graduates. Despite the suppressive policy, the demand for higher education continued to grow. In the late 1970s, it was very apparent that there was a great deal of excess demand. In 1978, the total admission quota for universities was 76,000, while the number of graduates who took the college entrance exam was 320,000, more than one-third of whom were repeaters. While the Park administration gradually increased the quota, the increased number of slots was simply not enough to accommodate the exploding number of high school graduates who desired to enter university or college (Fig. 2). A major expansion of higher education in Korea started with Chun’s education reform in 1980. Chun obtained power through a military coup in 1979 during the power vacuum created by Park’s assassination. Therefore, his government lacked political legitimacy. Since there was substantial political dissatisfaction by the general public, Chun administration needed
Rapid Expansion of Higher Education in South Korea Total Higher Edu. Correspondence School
4-yr University Industrial University
253
2-yr College Grad School
Teachers College
4,000,000 3,500,000 3,000,000 2,500,000 2,000,000 1,500,000 1,000,000 500,000 0 1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Year
Fig. 2.
Enrollment in Higher Education Institutions.
to vent the social frustration of the time. The rising difficulties of entering universities and growing financial burden of private tutoring were among the top of the public’s social concerns. In particular, the continuation of military government since 1960 had been most sternly opposed by urban middle classes who valued higher education the most. One of the key elements of Chun’s education reform was to release the pressure of pent-up demand for higher education. The Chun administration allowed universities to admit up to 130% of the previously set admission quota in 1981, and the following year, to admit 150%. However, the universities were not allowed to graduate them all, and set limits for the number of graduates based on the previous admission quotas. This policy was aimed to reduce the competition in college entrance examinations and to encourage college students to study harder during their university career. During that time, advancing and graduating in universities were mostly automatic, and university students were known to spend their time, not studying, but rather involving themselves in political endeavors such as anti-government demonstration. At the same time, the government allowed the conversion of many public junior colleges to universities. The increase in the student quota in existing universities and the upgrading of two-year colleges were accepted quite positively by all stakeholders. Students saw the increase as an opportunity to be able to be admitted to their
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dream universities. Private universities saw it as a chance to increase their tuition revenue and financial stability, because much of their revenue was from tuition payments. Public junior colleges saw it as an opportunity to improve their institutional reputation and to attract better students and more public and private financial resources. Faculty members in public universities worried about the possibility of increased teaching loads, but they felt that the extra revenue would offset the negative consequences. However, the graduation quota was extremely unpopular with students and college administrators alike, and was extremely difficult to implement. The faculty was not used to giving failing grades to substantial portions of the student body. Moreover, it was very difficult to fail a predetermined number of students. Students were anxious about failing, and mobilized politically in order to prevent forced discharge from universities they had spent so much time and money getting into. Consequently, the graduation quota was soon discarded, and the government was forced to switch back to the admission quota in 1988. In effect, Chun’s policy on higher education greatly expanded the enrollment in the early 1980s. The number of university students increased from about 330,000 in 1979 to 970,000 in 1986. However, enrollment in junior colleges did not change very much during that same period, as many junior colleges converted to universities. Meanwhile, a major change in Korea’s political environment took place in 1987. The military dictatorship that had ruled the nation for the past 30 years gave way to a fully democratic government. Fair and direct elections were put into place, and there was a gradual movement to democratic integration by the concession of Roh Tae-woo, a retired general, handpicked by Chun. Although the increase in student quota was implemented during the 1980s, demand for higher education increased more rapidly than the quota. Because of the quota in the university system, excess demand for higher education was absorbed mainly by the expansion of private junior colleges that became the second-tier of the higher education system. Another major policy change that greatly contributed to the rapid expansion of higher education occurred in 1995 during the Kim Young-sam administration (1993–1998), a moderately conservative regime. Kim was the first civilian president since 1961. The government adopted free competition and deregulation throughout the national economy as a major policy objective. In higher education, government regulations were substantially relaxed. Enrollment quota was eliminated except for the universities located in the Seoul metropolitan area. The exception was made to suppress the growth of a region that already contained almost one half of the population. This policy shift encouraged many private universities located outside of the
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Seoul metropolitan area to increase their enrollment, as the increased enrollment translated directly into more revenue. Also, the regulation of establishing a new HEI was relaxed substantially. The deregulation created a wave of new universities including the branch campuses of the universities in Seoul. Additionally, many small private universities were established in regions outside of Seoul. Consequently, the enrollment in both segments of the Korean higher education system, universities and junior colleges, increased steadily during this time period. In the beginning of the 2000s, the participation of higher education in Korea reached above 80% for the traditional college-going age groups, a figure that is unlikely to increase any further. One of the most important institutional developments during this democratization period was the formation and the legal recognition of teachers unions. In the aftermath of the civil unrest in 1960 that led to the fall of the dictatorial Rhee government, the primary and secondary school teachers formed a union. The union was quite successful, and within a year, about 40,000 teachers (50% of all teachers) joined the union. However, Park’s military government dismantled the union in 1961, and made it illegal to form a teachers union. The assassination of Park and subsequent democratization movement rekindled the organization of teachers. During the 1980s, civic movements against the dictatorial government happened extensively in many spectra of the society. In addition to the traditional antidictatorial forces of out of power politicians and intellectuals including university students, workers, religious leaders, and schoolteachers joined the movement. In 1986, primary and secondary school teachers announced the so-called Declaration of Educational Democratization. The Declaration promoted more participatory democratic governance in private secondary schools in which corruption and abuse of power by the owners were common. It advocated less intervention by the government bureaucracy, but asked for more government financial support. Also, it argued that the objectives of education should be determined by teachers and parents rather than by the government and owners of schools. Despite overt suppression by the government, thousands of teachers gathered to establish the National Teachers Union on May 28, 1989. In response to this apparent illegal activity, the government fired 1,527 schoolteachers, and many of the leaders were arrested. The continuous union movement during the 1990s resulted in the rehiring of the 1,294 teachers who were fired in 1989 during Kim Young-sam government. In 1999, the left-leaning Kim Dae-joong government legalized the teachers
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union. Since then, the Union has been regarded as a legal representative of its members in negotiating collective bargaining agreements. In return for its legalization, the Union has not been allowed to participate in political movements or to initiate strikes. However, in many instances the Union did participate in political movements and coordinate strikes by coordinating the use of its members’ sick leaves. The Union is a major component of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions that has been known for its aggressive and militant tactics. The strong teachers unions in Korea has been able to force the government to increase the public expenditure in primary and secondary education leaving the higher education sector to private sector funding; the political power of university staffs was and is not comparable to the union’s, in terms of both numbers and organizational skills. The upshot of the strong Teachers Union was the maintenance of high levels of government spending on primary and secondary education and low levels on higher education, despite the fact that enrollments in primary and secondary schools started to decline quite rapidly. While the salary level of Korean teachers is relatively very high, the student–teacher ratio is not when compared to other OECD countries. The overall high performance of Korean students in international achievement tests and high student– teacher ratio has given enough political power to the teachers to maintain their position. Despite the secondary school equalization policies, the student selection mechanism for colleges and universities has remained selective. In other words, students have a complete freedom in school choice, and virtually all schools have complete freedom in student choice. Consequently, the hierarchical structure of higher education system has remained the same. There are several reasons why competitive school/student choice remained the rule in higher education, even with the sweeping change that occurred in the secondary school system. First, the social pressure to create excellence and train elites at the university level has not disappeared. Recently, the push for global competitiveness of higher education has been a top priority of the national government. In fact, the government started to allocate substantial resources for researching excellence through a series of programs such as Brain Korea 21 (BK21). The selection of best students at the university level is regarded as the first step toward world-class researchers in science and engineering. Second, there was a substantial opposition to secondary school equalization by some socioeconomic classes, and the government had to reverse its trend toward a more equalized system during the early 1990s. The sentiment to reverse the equalization policy at the secondary education has been debated for more than two decades. In this
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environment, equalization of higher education was not likely to be realized. Third, the government’s inability to deliver significant amount of public resources to higher education prevented them from intervening directly with student choice. For private universities, most funding is not governmental. Even in public universities, government funding is rather limited. Without a substantial government funding increase, major policy change will not be possible. Fourth, the legacy of elitism inherited from Japanese colonialism, and the prominent reputation held by top public and private universities has created a substantial base of alums in leadership positions. Given the dominance of alums from the so-called SKY (SNU, Korea University, and Yonsei University) in virtually all segments of society, it would be difficult to eliminate elitism in higher education. Nonetheless, during the early period of Roh administration, dismantling SNU, the flagship public university of the nation, was proposed by the Labor Party. Such proposals were opposed by most political, economic, and academic elites. Over time, SNU has produced the majority of elites.9 When the proposal to dismantle SNU was circulated, the alums mobilized successfully to block it. The equalization of higher education (or at least public universities) was also proposed. It involved the forced circulation of professors between the national universities. However, the proposal did not get much support. Obviously, SNU (students as well as faculty) would not support such proposal, as the proposal would dilute the prestige of the university. Another radical proposal to eliminate the elitism was to consolidate all public universities. Faculty members would be appointed not to specific universities, but would be rotated to different universities by the government, similar to primary and secondary school teachers. The proposal was defeated because of the desire to protect elitism in the higher education system. There are also public universities supported by branches of the government other than the Ministry of Education. These universities tend to be more elitist-oriented. For example, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) is supported by the Ministry of Science and Technology. KAIST is a very elitist-oriented institution. The president was recruited from a group of world-renowned scientists and engineers including the past president, a Nobel laureate in physic. KAIST students pay virtually no tuition, and the entrance is quite competitive. Although these radical solutions challenging elitism did not succeed, the battle lines between elitism and mass education were drawn in university admissions policy. The government continuously tried to reduce the ill effects of ‘‘too much’’ competition to enter top universities by regulating the college entrance examinations. Although, each university gained substantial
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freedom in their student selection mechanism, they all had to adhere to the government’s guidelines. The guidelines stipulated that more weight be given to high school records rather than the tests of individual institutions. Only nationwide achievement test scores could be used, and those test scores were reported in nine general groups rather than a more accurate scoring system (e.g., percentiles). Also, universities were not allowed to take into account any academic differentials among high schools when they evaluated high school records. The current so-called sambul policies are not likely to change under the current administration. Since the mid-1980s, the glut of university graduates has resulted in a tight labor market for highly educated workers. The labor market premium for higher education decreased. The wage differential between university graduates and high school graduates holding other worker characteristics (such as gender, experience, and so on) and firm characteristics (such as industry, size, and so on) constant in 1981 was about 45%. The wage differential steadily declined to 20.7% in 1994. However, since then, the trend shows the reversal. The wage premium of the university graduates has been increased to 26.7% in 2004 (KLI, 2006). The trend of the relative wages of the graduates from junior colleges shows a similar trend. However, the net premium (after controlling worker characteristics and firm characteristics) is much lower than the university graduates. It was about 20% in 1980, and steadily decreased to 2.7% in 1994, but started to increase to 4.8% in 2004. The not-so-significant benefit of junior college graduates over high school graduates is a reflection that labor market does reward the junior college diplomas very much, reflecting the relative low quality of the instruction there. Moreover, although the junior colleges are supposed to provide occupational training, the unemployment rate of junior college graduates is not any different from that of high school graduates (Nam, 2006). At the same time, the employment rate for the highly educated decreased, because the Korean economy has not been able to create professional jobs that are attractive to university graduates.10 After the 1997–1998 financial crisis, the Korean economy recovered fully, with a GDP growth of 4–5% per year. However, that growth was not accompanied by corresponding employment growth (the so-called jobless growth). The number of so-called decent jobs decreased from 710,000 in 2002 to 670,000 in 2007.11 The competition for those decent jobs increased as the number of university graduates increased. Consequently, many graduates spent a substantial amount of time and effort attempting to secure those jobs during and after their university career, thus making the labor market more competitive.
Rapid Expansion of Higher Education in South Korea
Table 11. Year
1975–1976 1980–1981 1985–1986 1990–1991 1995–1996 2000–2001 2005–2006
259
Korean Students in the U.S. Higher Education Institutions. Foreign Students in U.S. Higher Education Institution (A)
Korean Students in U.S. Higher Education Institution (B)
B/A (%)
Korean Students in Intensive English Program in the U.S.
179,334 311,880 343,780 407,530 453,787 582,996 564,776
3,260 6,150 18,660 23,360 36,231 49,046 59,002
1.8 2.0 5.4 5.7 8.0 8.4 10.4
– – – 2,179 3,493 5,830 8,907
Source: IIE (various years).
High costs along with the decreasing returns of higher education encourage many students, particularly those from the upper middle class, to go abroad for advanced degrees. According to data by the U.S. Institute of International Education (IIE), there were 564,766 students enrolled in HEIs in the U.S. in the 2005–2006 academic year. Koreans rank third among countries with the most students in the U.S. following India with 76,503 students and China with 62,582 students. There were 59,002 Korean students in that year representing more than 10.4% of all foreign students (Table 11). Among them, 46% were registered in undergraduate programs and 41% in graduate programs. Compared to the academic year of 1975–1976 when 3,260 Korean students (1.8% of all foreign students in the U.S.) were registered in U.S. institutions of higher education, the current number shows a dramatic increase over the past 30 years. In addition, there are currently about 9,000 Korean students enrolled in intensive English programs in the U.S. Korea sends the largest number of students to the U.S. for language training in the world, followed by Japan.
5. CONCLUSIONS: THEORIES OF HIGHER EDUCATION EXPANSION AND THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE As the expansion of higher education occurred throughout the world, many theories in social sciences tried to explain it. The first category of theories
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postulates that social economic development produces the expansion of higher education. At the microlevel, the human capital theory (Schultz, 1961; Becker, 1964) argues that investment in humans (through more education) happens if such investment produces returns that are high enough for the individual or household. As the economic structure becomes based on more sophisticated technologies, the labor demand requires more education and training. As the rate of returns for education, particularly higher education, increases, the demand for higher education increases. However, as the supply of university graduates increases, the rate of return for higher education may start to decrease, and such negative market signals may slow down or reverse the expansion of higher education. At the macrolevel, social functionalism postulates that the state or ruling elite wants a certain number of highly skilled professionals in order to maintain their economy. The growth of a modern economy demands for more technical and skilled workers through the modernization. This process causes a large push for the massification of higher education. That is, the students who would not have gone to university under the elite system (because of their social status) find it feasible to enter the system and successfully employed after graduation. The process of expanding professionals drives the change of higher education system from an elite system to a massified one. In contrast to the human capital theory, the signaling theory (or credentialism) argues that the demand for higher education is driven by an individual’s desire to obtain an observable signal (or credential) so that he or she can show to potential employers the unobservable but favorable information (e.g., higher ability or motivation) about him- or herself. In this model, education itself may not improve the worker’s ability, but the diploma can convey that this worker is superior. In an extreme version of this model, demand for higher education can arise even if university education does not improve a student’s human capital at all, as long as the cost of acquiring a signal is cheaper for higher ability students than for lower ability students, because high-ability students will want to distinguish themselves from the rest (Spence, 1973). The neo-Marxist theory (e.g., Bowles & Gintis, 1976) postulates that the elite use the credentials awarded by HEIs as an entry barrier. According to this theory, massification, which would dilute the value of such credentials, makes the power of the elite weaker. Therefore, the elite would prevent the expansion of higher education in society. The neo-Marxist theory will make more sense when the effect of social class or stratification is very strong, and social mobility through education is limited. Also, the theory will be more
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applicable when the economy does not grow very quickly. The stagnating returns to higher education found in such situations would not attract large numbers of middle class children to higher education. Demand for higher education can arise by a consumption motive. Students may enjoy taking courses in universities. Also, they may enjoy future consumptions or activities associated with higher education. In this case, the future monetary return from education would not be an important factor (Lazear, 1977). Finally, the demand for higher education increases as the number of high school graduates increases. The number of high school graduates depends on not only demographic factors but also the percentage of children who attend high schools. The latter variable depends crucially on the education policy regarding secondary schools. In the massified higher education system, there is always a danger of ‘‘over-education.’’12 ‘‘Over-education’’ may happen through several channels. First, it is common that higher education is highly subsidized by the government. In this case, the private return to higher education is higher than the social return, as the cost of education is not fully borne by the individual. With excessive government subsidies in higher education, the demand for higher education may be greater than socially optimal. The second channel for the possible ‘‘over-education’’ is the nature of competition in the labor market and the imperfect signal that is generated. Since the quality of education and the impact of the education on graduates are not perfectly observable, individual students may want to obtain more than optimal levels of education. The decision to obtain a higher education can be thought of as a prisoner’s dilemma game. If the private returns to education depend not only on the individual’s education but also on those of others in society, and the others’ higher education hinders the labor market premium of the individual, the individual is obliged to obtain more education even though the returns to that education may turn out to be lower than the opportunity cost of capital. Korean higher education has never developed a Western-style elite system in which the primary function of the system is to nurture the minds of the elite. While private HEIs established by American missionaries and Korean civic leaders could have developed into an elite system, they became antiestablishment soon after the Japanese annexation. In response to the suppression by the colonial government, the private HEIs became the major social institutions that the growing nationalism was nourished. Also, the meritocratic system of student admission was established early on in the development of higher education in Korea. Even though the Japanese colonial government discriminated against Korean students in the student
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selection of the first university, Kyeongseong Imperial University, the integrity of the meritocratic system has been maintained. Also, since the independence, meritocratic admission has been the one principle that has never changed even though there have been many changes in the administration process. Moreover, major social changes that occurred during a relatively short span of time period such as Japanese colonialism and the collapse of the Chosun Dynasty, the defeat of Japan and the American occupation, divided independence of the nation state, the Korean Conflict, and fast economic development, created an environment for social mobility. Therefore, it would be quite difficult to form or maintain a closed group of ruling elite that could use the higher education system as an instrument of extending their privilege. Lett (1998) called it yangbanization of the Korean society. The breakup of the social class system enables virtually everyone can become a yangban through education. While the yangban class in Chosun Dynasty was hereditary, and the education was more or less restricted to the class, the ‘‘new’’ yangban class was the urban middle class in modern Korea. These people seek to upgrade their social class through more and better education. Seth (2002) documented that the open access of the Progressive American ideal was adopted by the earlier educational policy makers who were trained in the U.S., particularly at the Columbia Teachers College in New York under John Dewey. While other major aspect of American educational system such as decentralization and democratic governance were not adopted, one aspect of American educational system, open access, was incorporated from the beginning of the foundation of the Korean educational system. Trow argued that the American higher education system was ready for massification before it actually happened, as the emergence of land grant institutions and the fact that the American higher education (unlike its European counterpart) started to engage with the daily lives of common people (such as how to grow better corn, etc.) rather than classical study (e.g., classic) in the isolated ivory tower. Also, the system was ready for universalization before it happened, as the progressive movements in the early twentieth century and the establishment of community colleges happened before access to higher education became universal. The availability of relatively affordable and easily accessible institutions made working-class students attend HEIs. In this regard, the Korean higher education system is quite similar to the American one. Korean higher education system was ready for massification even while the enrollment rate was still very low (say below 5%). The doors to HEIs were open to all classes, and merit was the key criterion that determined admission.
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However, such sociological and institutional explanations do not tell the complete story. The returns on higher education were quite high so that there was strong demand for more education. In the early stages of higher education development, there were two major constraints on the expansion of higher education: the number of higher school graduates was small and the average income for the middle class was not high enough to pay for the cost of higher education. As the number of high school graduates and the average income of the middle class increased, so did the demand for higher education. The suppression of higher education during the Park administration was not able to prevent massification. It just deferred the timing of the expansion. The administration’s emphasis on secondary education actually increased the potential entrants into higher education. Also, the successful economic development created added demand for higher education. In addition, the suppression generated even greater rates of return in higher education, and the artificially high rate of return encouraged more demand for higher education. Schofer and Meyer (2005) conjectured that the expansion of higher education is more likely in a society in which sectarian and/or racial competition is greater, as the competition for leadership by different groups leads to greater education. However, the Korean case demonstrates that such motivation may not be important. Korea is linguistically and culturally homogenous, and there is no ethnic or linguistic competition among people. The Korean experience shows that even in this relatively homogeneous cultural environment, education fever can manifest itself quite strongly. However, in Korea the competition for economic success and social status was regarded as an important individual and societal goal. Since the old system of social stratification, that had been in place throughout the Chosun Dynasty, was destroyed by the Japanese colonialism, the devastation of the Korean War, the establishment of a new state, and the military coup, the playing field for competition had been shuffled frequently. In this environment, education (both as human capital and credentials) was used as a major vehicle for personal advancement. The fact that the expansion of Korea’s higher education has been financed by private funding, mainly through tuition revenue, is noteworthy. It gives credence to the idea that education is mainly a private good, and can be financed successfully privately in a universal system as well as in a massified system. Based on the Korean experience, as long as entry to the system is open and the returns of education justifies the investment, education fever that fuels the expansion of higher education can be successfully maintained.
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Korea does not have much in terms of valuable minerals or other natural resources, so the notion that resource-rich countries will have faster expansions of higher education may not hold. The causality may actually run in the reverse direction. Increased human capital (just like increased physical capital) can be used as an engine of economic growth. The increased income through successful economic growth was able to move the society to universal higher education. Korea’s experience tells that government support is not the key driving force for expansion. It is the market demand that fuels the expansion. Korea’s government reacted in various ways depending on the political and social structure of the time. Under a chaotic administrative structure, the government had a hands-off policy. When the government was strong and dictatorial, it mandated strong regulations and control. When the government was democratic, it had to formulate policy through public participation of various stakeholders. Whatever the case may have been, the government’s role was mostly reactionary. Although its policies affected the timing and the extent of the expansion, it did not initiate the expansion by actively allocating more public resources. This observation favors the view that the government’s role should be limited to the rule-making and transparent operation of the system rather than direct infusion of fiscal resources through existing channels. Korea’s experience tells that affordability is not the key aspects of the higher education expansion. The key is rather the ability to generate high enough returns on education. Achieving universal higher education is not a panacea in solving the social problems of inequality and poverty. Even with an 80-plus percent of participation, the income inequality has not decreased. In fact, the recent experience is that income inequality has been increasing, because within the group inequality (say, inequality among university graduates) has gone up. The returns on educating junior college graduates have fallen so low that the premium for those graduates over high school graduates is less than 5%. Such low returns to education are likely to be related to the fact that the quality of education in that system is very low. As shown earlier, the relatively higher tuition and student–faculty ratio in the system is not conducive to providing opportunities for low-income and/or less-talented students. The fact that primary school expansion started more than a decade before the economic takeoff in Korea suggests that the increase in demand for education can arise without supporting income growth. In the case of Korea, the subsequent administration was able to device policies that made the human capital developed useful in the earlier government. If the Park
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administration were not able to take advantage of the expanded human resources in the 1960s, the implementation of effective universal primary education would have not been possible. It may be relatively easy to expand primary education without much fiscal resources by sacrificing the quality. However, if the economy of the nation did not grow fast enough, the level of education input and the quality of outcome are likely to remain low as well. In that case, the rapid expansion of primary education will result in just lowquality instruction, and the economic benefit of the education is not likely to be realized, because there would be no guarantee that education expansion will necessarily bring out economic growth. However, in Korea’s case, the ambitious primary school expansion paid off because of the successful economic growth of the following administration. The rapid expansion of university graduates reduced their wage premium quite substantially. In this regard, the effect of elitism was diminished by the expansion of higher education. However, recent evidence suggests that the reversal of the wage premium of university graduates was presumably due to the transformation toward a knowledge-based economy in Korea. Moreover, graduates from the top five universities earn about 20% more than those who graduate from universities below the top 30. In this regard, the labor market premium for top universities has still been maintained. Meanwhile, the public policy conflict between elitism and equality continues. Although the current government has been pushing for equality as its top priority, their action was ambivalent. There has been substantial government support for research funds, and these funds are typically allocated to top universities. The continuing practice of heavy regulation in student admission policy as a major instrument to promote equality has been controversial, as the policy-making process becomes more participatory and politically charged.
NOTES 1. The Korean school year starts at the beginning of March and ends at the end of February of the next year. 2. In 2006, GDP per capita (in purchasing power parity) of Korea was $24,000, Taiwan, $29,000, and Japan, $32,600 (IMF, 2007). 3. The relative gender equality in Korea contrasts sharply with the situation in Japan, where female participation in higher education is highly concentrated in junior colleges. In 2005, 51% of Japanese male high school graduates advanced to universities and only 1.8% to junior colleges, whereas 37% of female high school graduates advanced to universities and 13% to junior colleges.
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4. The total fertility rate in 1970 was about 4.5, and it has decreased to about 1.5 in 1985. 5. See Seth (2002) for a more detailed account of the history of Korean educational development. 6. In some years, there were several thousands of Korean students in Japan, and hundreds of them in higher education institutions. However, less than 100 Korean students were in the U.S. (Chang, 2005). 7. Kyeongseong was an old name for Seoul. 8. Most of these institutions also provide secondary school education. 9. For example, according to Dona-A Ilbo, a major daily news paper, March 28, 2007, 171 of the CEOs of the 500 top Korean corporations are from SNU. The proportion of ministers, judges, professor, members of National Assembly would be undoubtedly higher. 10. It is reported that during the period between 2000 and 2006, 2 million jobs were created. However, employment for young workers (15–29 years old) decreased by 530,000 (Pyo & Nam, 2007). 11. While there is no agreement regarding the definition of the ‘‘decent job,’’ it refers here permanent job with the wage comparable to the worker’s education and a career development opportunity. 12. The terminology may be confusing. Here we define it as the labor market premium for the university graduates decreases so that it is below the opportunity cost of capital in the economy.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This research was supported by the 2005–2006 Fulbright New Century Scholars Program. The author thanks four anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are mine.
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Brennan, J. (2004). The social role of the contemporary university: Contradictions, boundaries and change. In: Ten years on: Changing education in a changing world. Buckingham: Center for Higher Education Research and Information (CHERI), the Open University. Available at http://www.open.ac.uk/pdfs/cheritenyears.pdf Chang, K.-S. (2005). Iljeha Miguk Yuhaksaengei DeundaeJisik Suyongkwa Kukminkukka Kusang [Adoption of modern knowledge and nation-state plan of the Korean students in North America during the period of Japanese colonialism]. Hankuk Keunhyundaesa Yeonku [Researches on Korean Modern History] (Fall), 121–156. Clancy, P., & Goastellec, G. (2007). Exploring access and equity in higher education: Policy and performance in a comparative perspective. Higher Education Quarterly, 61(2), 136–154. Han, Y.-J. (1996). Iljae Sikminji Godeungkyoyuk Cheongchaekgwa Kyungseong Jaekuk Daehakei Wisang [Higher education policy of Japanese colonial government and status of Kyungseong university]. Kyoyuk Munjae Yeonku [The Journal of Research in Education], 8, 154–172. Institute of International Education (IIE). (various years). Open doors: Report on international educational exchange. New York, NY: IIE. International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2007). Available at www.imf.org, downloaded on August 30, 2007. Japan Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. (2006). Available at http://www.mext.go.jp/english/statist/index.htm, downloaded on August 30, 2007. Kim, S. (2004). Brain drain, brain gain, and brain drain again? Changing market for Korean science and engineering Ph.D.s. KSEA Letters, 32(3), 19–27. Kim, S., & Lee, J.-H. (2002a). Private tutoring and demand for education in South Korea. KDI School Working Paper. Kim, S., & Lee, J.-H. (2002b). Secondary school equalization policies in South Korea. KDI School Working Paper. Kim, S., & Lee, J.-H. (2006). Changing facets of Korean higher education: Market competition and the role of the state. Higher Education, 52, 557–587. Korea Labor Institute (KLI). (2006). Tongkye prism [Statistics prism]. Nodong Review [Labor Review], July 10, p. 103. Korea Ministry of Education (KMOE). (1998). Kyoyuk 50 Nyeonsa: 1948–1997 [The history of 50 years of education]. Seoul: Government of Korea. Korea Ministry of Education and Human Resources Development (KMOE). (2006). Korean educational statistics yearbook. Seoul: Government of Korea. Korea Ministry of Education and Human Resources (KMOE). (various years). Kyoyuk Yeongam [Education statistics yearbook]. Seoul: Government of Korea. Lazear, E. (1977). Education: Consumption or production? Journal of Political Economy, 85(3), 569–598. Lee, J.-H., Kim, S., & Kim, S.-B. (2003). Hankook Daehakeui Seoyeolkwa Kyeongjaeng [Ranking and competition among Korean colleges and universities]. Kyeongjaehak Yeonku [Economic Studies], 51(2), 5–36. Lett, D. P. (1998). In pursuit of status: The making of South Korea’s ‘‘new’’ urban middle class. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. McGinn, N. F., Snodgrass, D. R., Kim, Y. B., Kim, S.-B., & Kim, Q.-Y. (1980). Education and development in Korea. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Nam, K.-k. (2006). ‘Itcheojin Jeolban’ae Daehan Kyoyukeun Seonggonghago Itneunga? Jeonmun Daehak Kyoyukei Nodongsijang Seongkwareul Jungsimeuro [Are we
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CHINA’S MOVE TO MASS HIGHER EDUCATION: AN ANALYSIS OF POLICY MAKING FROM A RATIONAL FRAMEWORK Jun Li and Jing Lin Within recent decades, higher education has undergone a radical transformation in many countries. The transformation takes quite different specific trajectories projected by disparate national policies and conditioned by particular economic and political contexts. The new initiative of higher education expansion launched by the Chinese government since the late 1990s has emerged as one of the most significant phenomena in this worldwide transformation. Since 2003, China has become a country with ‘‘the largest national higher education system in the world’’ (UNESCO, 2003, June 23–25). The great leap toward mass higher education has been brought about by China’s radical expansion policy of higher education made on June 24, 1999. This chapter adopts a rational framework to unveil the complicated policymaking process of the radical expansion action and intends to examine how the national policy was placed on government’s political agenda by Chinese leaders. The chapter begins by outlining the radical expansion of China’s higher education, giving facts and figures which illustrate how the policy decision of moving to mass higher education has led to rapidly increased enrollments The Worldwide Transformation of Higher Education International Perspectives on Education and Society, Volume 9, 269–295 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1479-3679/doi:10.1016/S1479-3679(08)00009-1
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in Chinese universities and made China the world’s largest higher education system in few years. The second part of the chapter lays out a rational framework we intend to use in analyzing China’s policymaking of higher education expansion. We will explain its main theoretical underpinnings for policy analysis. The third part of the chapter uses the rational framework to examine the policymaking process, looking at how the Chinese government has defined national demands and theories addressing them, identified problems, drafted strategies, and set mandates. The last part of the chapter synthesizes the rational framework, and reflects on China’s policymaking of higher education expansion as a unique policy case study. We intend to distill what are the unique features of policymaking that reflect China’s political, economic, and educational contexts, and what are the more general patterns for the process. The use and limitations of the rational framework as a lens for policy analysis will also be highlighted.
1. THE INCREDIBLE PACE OF EXPANSION Along with the ‘‘reform and open door’’ policy launched in the late 1970s, China has experienced an annual average GDP growth rate of 9.8% between 1978 and 2002 (Hu, 2003, October 19). China’s economy system has also gone through a fundamental transition from a central planning system to a socialist free market economy. To cope with the booming economy and radical social changes, the higher education system of China has been undergoing a process of expansion with marketization (World Bank, 1997). The term ‘‘expansion of higher education’’ has multiple connotations. Martin Trow repeatedly defines that the growth of higher education manifests itself, in general, in at least three quite different ways: the rate of growth, the absolute size, and the proportion of the relevant age groups (Trow, 1974, p. 57; 2006, p. 245). Taking into consideration of Trow’s three aspects, the expansion of China’s higher education refers to the growth of student recruitment and enrollment in higher education institutions. Meanwhile, it refers to the expansion of higher education institutions in terms of absolute size and campus space. Additionally, it also includes these changes happening in private higher education institutions, namely minban (non-public or private) colleges or universities which are encouraged by the Chinese government since the late 1990s.
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In 1991, only 3.5% of the relevant age group between 18 and 22 benefited from any form of higher education. This percentage reached 7.2% in 1995, 13.3% in 2001, 21% in 2005, as shown in Table 1 and Fig. 1, and 22% in 2006, with over 25 million students enrolled (MOE, 2007a). The average institutional size of regular higher education institutions has almost quadrupled from 2,381 students in 1993 to 8,715 students in 2005, as shown in Fig. 2. Student numbers in 100,000 inhabitants has sextupled from 304 in 1991 to 1,816 in 2006 (MOE, 2007b, p. 35). These changes are an incredible leap for a country like China, which traditionally has limited resources of higher learning but with the largest relevant age group in the world. In addition, after decades of closedown and re-entry into the higher education scene in the early 1980s, private higher education institutions have been growing rapidly since the late 1990s. In 2004, the Ministry of Education (MOE) started to publicize national data for private higher education institutions. According to the MOE’s Annual Statistical Communique´ 2003–2005, minban colleges and universities increased from 173 in Table 1.
Gross Enrollment Rate and Student–Teacher Ratio of China’s Higher Education (1991–2005).
Year
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
3.5 –
5.0 8.0
7.2 9.8
9.1 10.9
10.5 13.4
13.3 18.2
17.0 17.0
21.0 16.9
Gross rate (%) Student–teacher ratio
Note: Data from MOE (2006a, pp. 15, 17). Data for student–teacher ratio unavailable for the year of 1991. 2500 2000
Enrollment in Regular Higher Education Institutions New Entrants to Regular Higher Institutions (ten thousand) Total Enrollment (ten thousand)
2300 1900.0 1561.8
1500 1175.1
1108.6
1000 718.9
500
360.5 204.4 62.0
450.5 253.6 92.4
290.6
719.1
607.5
562.2 317.4
92.6
100.0
1995
1997
504.5
413.4
382.2 268.3
159.7
0 1991
1993
1999
2001
2003
2005
Fig. 1. Trends of Enrollments of China’s Higher Education (1991–2005). Data from National Bureau of Statistics of China (2007, p. 800) and MOE (2006b).
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13000
University
11000
Non-university Tertiary National Average
11662
8715
8730
9000
7143 7000 5275 5000 3000
3094 2381 1235
3632 2758 1405
4062 3112 1594
5870 3909
3815 1975
2337
2893
1000 1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
Fig. 2. Average Size of China’s Regular Higher Education Institutions (1992–2005) (Unit: Person). Data from MOE (2006a, p. 17). Data unavailable for the year of 1991.
2003 to 278, plus 318 second-tier colleges (established by public universites) in 2006, enrolling over three million students. In brief, there are three phases involved in the expansion of China’s higher education since the 1990s. During the initiating phase (1991–1992), higher education was expected to ‘‘keep at a stable enrollment with an average annual growth of five percent’’ (State Commission of Education, 1992), and ‘‘to be gradually expanded, amended, and enhanced’’ (The Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CPCCC) & the State Council, 1990, October). As a result, the enrollment of higher education only increased by 150,000 students in these years. In the exploratory phase (1993–1998), officials tentatively laid out the blueprint for higher education expansion and expected the system ‘‘to expand to a large extent’’ (The CPCCC and State Council, 1993, February 13). However, the notion at this point was that higher education expansion would happen slowly and gradually within the government’s capacity to finance it. Higher education enrollments in this phase increased from 4.5 million in 1993 to 6.4 million in 1998. The radical expansionary phase (1999–2006) was fueled by the National Meeting on Education and the 1999 Rejuvenation Action Plan for Education in 21st Century. In this most recent stage, China’s higher education system expanded at an astonishing pace: new entrants to regular higher learning institutions jumped by 46.7% between 1998 and 1999, and 28.5% between 2001 and 2002 (please refer to Tables 1 and 2, Figs. 1 and 2). During the period
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Table 2. Enrollment of China’s Higher Education in 100,000 Inhabitants (1991–2005). Year
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
Gross student numbers
304
376
457
482
594
931
1298
1613
Note: Data from MOE (2006a, p. 16).
from 1998 to 2004, the enrollment of new regular undergraduate students grew on average by 26.9% annually. By 2006, over 25 million students are studying in higher educational institutions, comprising 22% of the relevant age group. Looking back at the history of higher education expansion, Li and Min (2001) reported that In 1978, the admission number to regular higher education was about 400,000. In 1998, this number was about 1,080,000. The average annual increase rate was 6.11%. But in 1999, the admission number was about 1,560,000, which was 144% of that in 1998. In 2000, the admission number reached about 2,200,000, which was 141% of that in 1999.
These outcomes were very impressive in that the opportunities of higher learning have quadrupled within a decade, and that the size of higher education has expanded significantly. In dreaming of higher education for all, Wu Qidi, the then Vice Minister of the MOE, anticipates that China’s enrollment in higher education would continue to increase to 27 million by 2010 (Dong, 2003, October 20). More than one decade has passed since the Chinese government initiated the national policy of higher education expansion. How was the radical expansion policy of higher education placed on the government’s agenda and what were the ‘‘theories of action’’ upholding the policy action? Whose interests were best served and who benefited from the policy action, and why? And what implications can be drawn from the policymaking process? To take a closer and clearer look into China’s intricate case, the following sections will first introduce a policy analysis approach, i.e., the rational framework, then examine these policy questions.
2. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE RATIONAL FRAMEWORK While various analytic frameworks seem available for this analysis, the rational framework stands out as suitable for us to understand the
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complicated policymaking process of higher education expansion in China. In this part, we will provide some basic tenets of the rational framework which enable us to analyze the governmental behavior and the forces driving the radical expansion policy of higher education in China.
2.1. The Rational Framework The rational framework originates from classical models in economics. Rationality ‘‘refers to consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints’’ (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 18). It assumes that human behavior, including policymaking process, is at least purposively rational. Further, Weberians hold that organizations are hierarchically structured based on the principle of legal rationality (Baldridge, Curtis, Ecker, & Riley, 1977, p. 9). From these assumptions, a government is thought of as ‘‘a single individual or as a group functioning as a corporate actor’’ (Ostrom, 2007, p. 44). In other words, a government behaves as a unitary agent, who seeks to maximize policy outcomes. Allison and Zelikow (1999) write: Governmental behavior can be most satisfactorily understood by analogy with the purposive acts of individuals y. Treating national governments as if they were centrally coordinated, purposive individuals provides a useful shorthand for understanding policy choices and actions. (p. 3)
Governmental policy actions are thus regarded, from this angle, as purposive, goal-directed activity by rational and collective policy players. A number of central assumptions are embedded in the rational framework. First of all, a means–ends driven and goal-directed principle, by which the cause–effect relationship is identified and linearly constructed, is practiced by policy players and is evident throughout the policy process: ‘‘first the ends are isolated, then the means to achieve them are sought’’ (Lindblom, 1959, p. 81). Policy then ‘‘is cast as the instrumental means for achieving the stated ends’’ (Malen & Knapp, 1997, p. 423) and action is thus ‘‘chosen in response to the strategic situation the actor faces’’ (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 24). Beyond the means–ends driven and goal-directed principle, the rational framework assumes the ‘‘cause-effect’’ link as the theories of action, which refer to ‘‘the premises regarding how policy is formed and how it ‘works’ to produce effects’’ (Malen & Knapp, 1997, p. 420). Policy action is cast as the instrumental means to achieve the stated outcomes by identifying and eliminating the ‘‘causes’’ of substantial problems. In other words, theories of action can serve as ‘‘a conceptual
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scheme’’ (Parsons & Shils, 1951, p. 53), ‘‘to uncover and inspect the officially stated and logically related assumptions regarding the means–ends relationships’’ embodied in the policy (Malen, Croninger, Muncey, & Redmond-Jones, 2002, p. 114). The rational framework is characterized by the identification of substantial policy problems and ‘‘systematic, data-driven, ‘cost–benefit’ calculations of policy options’’ (Malen & Knapp, 1997, p. 423). An optimal choice is then chosen in the policymaking process to resolve the substantial policy problems based on comprehensive analysis of social development, policy needs and benefits, and causal links, etc. The diagnosis of policy problems involves intensive data analysis based on available information collected. Along with the identification of policy problems and the selection of optimal strategies as the best choice, some key normative values are recognized by unitary policy players while other values may be sacrificed in the policymaking process. In addition to the above assumptions, the rational framework holds public policy as a linearly advanced process. To achieve the policy ends through means, a policy process usually starts its linear journey with first identifying the substantial policy problems. Then, alternative strategies are considered, evaluated, and compared. Optimal strategies as the most efficient choice are finally chosen to solve the identified policy problems. Policy outcomes are evaluated, assessed, and judged by the degree of consistency between the intended resolutions ‘‘relative to a particular action’’ (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 17) and the originally identified substantial problems. There exist various theories about how a policy process is developed in distinct stages. For example, Jenkins (1978) detailed a seven-stage rational model conceptualized initially by Harold Laswell as: initiation, information, consideration, decision, implementation, evaluation, and termination (see Fig. 3).
Initiation
Fig. 3.
Information
Consideration
Decision
Implementation
Evaluation
Termination
Linear Stages of Policy Process from the Rational Framework. Adapted from Jenkins (1978, p. 17).
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The Jenkins’s rational model assumes that the following logical path exists in policy process: Basically, it assumes that policy emerges via a logical path; an issue moves through the political system in a processual way from point of entry, through decision and implementation, until a final choice is made to proceed with or terminate a course of action. (Jenkins, 1978, pp. 17–18)
This logical path is powerful in dismantling the policy action of China’s higher education expansion since the early 1990s. It allows policy actors and analysts to look into and focus on various distinct dimensions of policy development in different stages.
2.2. Rationale for the Selection of the Rational Framework At this point we have highlighted several major dimensions of the rational framework for policy studies in general and for this analysis in particular. It is necessary to justify why the rational framework is selected for this study. Dror (1984) recommends nine general guidelines for better policy analysts as gaining historical and comparative perspective, knowing policymaking realities, and studying analyst’s own society in depth, multiplying analyst’s disciplinary bases, etc. (pp. 13–18). Dye (2002) sets forth six general criteria for evaluating the usefulness of an operational framework. Basically it needs to 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
order and simplify reality; identify what is significant; be congruent with reality; provide meaningful communication; direct inquiry and research; and suggest explanations. (pp. 29–30)
Central to these guidelines and criteria is a basic understanding of policy process and relationships in a particular sociopolitical context, and the appropriateness of modeling for a specific policy analysis. They inspire us to think about three reasons about why the rational framework is finally adopted for this analysis. Firstly, a research framework must be selected to match the purpose of our analysis and the reality of the sociopolitical context of China. As introduced earlier, this analysis looks into the policymaking process of China’s higher education expansion since the 1990s. It aims to investigate
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and understand how the Chinese government initiated the policymaking process under certain circumstances. As the Chinese government has a steady and strong belief in science, the CPCCC leaders has been always requiring, clearly and unconditionally, that any governmental decisions must be made through ‘‘scientific considerations.’’ The national policy of higher education expansion has also been ushered by these scientific orientations, as stated repeatedly in China’s government documents. Therefore, a comprehensive examination on the scientific considerations of China’s policymaking process becomes a primary concern of our study. The rational framework can help us to be congruent with the reality of Chinese policymaking orientations, thus meets the goal of this study ideally. Secondly, a research framework must allow us to simplify the complicated policymaking process of China’s higher education expansion with more attention directed to basic analytic units and relationships among them. The rational framework can help us, with its logic path, to order and simplify the reality of the policymaking process, identify what is significant, and direct inquiry and research. By adopting the rational framework, we are able to focus on such analytic units as unitary behaviors throughout the policymaking process, varied theories of action underpinning the expansion incentive, sociohistorical problems driven behind the policy action, and the policy window opened for the radical expansion policy as the best choice, etc. With these promises in mind, we believe that the rational framework best serves the need of this study.
3. MAPPING THE POLICYMAKING OF THE EXPANSION THROUGH THE RATIONAL FRAMEWORK With the rational framework, we will examine how the policy of higher education expansion was placed on the agenda of the Chinese government and factors behind the national policy, uncovering: (1) unitary behaviors throughout the policymaking process; (2) varied theories of action underpinning the expansion incentive; (3) sociohistorical problems driven behind the policy action; and (4) policy window opened for the radical expansion policy as the best choice.
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3.1. Unitary Behaviors throughout the Policymaking Process The rational framework assumes that ‘‘governmental behavior can be most satisfactorily understood by analogy with the purposive acts of individuals,’’ and that government is ‘‘centrally coordinated’’ (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 3). This assumption is obviously evidenced throughout the policymaking process of China’s higher education expansion. At the national level, the Chinese government appears to behave as a unitary, collective agent in everyday political life all the time. This is mainly because that the Chinese political system is still highly centralized with a unified polity under the CPCCC’s central leadership, and there has been a heavy collective tradition deeply embedded in Chinese culture for thousands of years. In his report to the CPC’s 16th National Congress, Jiang Zemin, former CPCCC General Secretary, reclaimed that ‘‘the centralization and unity of the Party and the State are where the fundamental interests of the people of all ethnic groups lie. The whole Party and the entire nation must maintain a high degree of unity with regard to the guiding ideology, line, principles and policies and major questions of principle’’ (Jiang, 2002, November 8). This requirement has been stated repeatedly in every National Congress of the CPC, the National People’s Congress, or the CPCCC in the 1990s and then after. Moreover, the ‘‘unity’’ or ‘‘collectivism’’ is pervasively propagandized throughout the everyday life of ordinary Chinese people and becomes what John Campbell termed as the ‘‘national mood’’ (Kingdon, 2003), to motivate nation building. Presumably, no matter whom the actors are, and at which level, all of them are required to act in a ‘‘united’’ way to achieve China’s national goals. Policymakers associated with the expansion policy of higher education are no exception. For example, the MOE’s Department of Higher Education, the MOE, the then State Planning Commission (SPC), and the State Council are the dominant policy players. The provincial administrations of education, local governments, and leaders of higher education institutions are all required to strictly obey the policy mandates set by the central government. The freedom to participate in the policymaking process of higher education expansion is very limited for the local governments and leaders of higher education institutions. In other words, all of these policy actors are a ‘‘unified national actor’’ (Allison & Zelikow, 1999) in making the decision about the radical expansion of higher education. Immediately after the expansion policy was initiated with experts and stakeholders at the National Meeting on Education in June 15–18, 1999, the then SPC and the MOE jointly declared on June 24 that the student
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recruitment in higher education institutions would be increased significantly. The national plan for student recruitment in higher education institutions was soon finished and put into place by the then SPC and the MOE. In the following three consecutive years, the policy has enabled the size of China’s higher education system to double in student enrollment and new entrants as well.
3.2. Varied Theories of Action Underpinning the Expansion Incentive China has a long tradition that education, especially higher education, is viewed as a strong instrument to achieve individual and national development. Since the late 1970s when China opened its door to outside world, this view has been further enhanced by the modernization theory and human capital theory, and has been firmly held by Chinese leaders. The modernization theory, originated primarily from the evolutionary theory and functionalist theory (So, 1990, pp. 19–23), is an interdisciplinary exploration of explaining societal development. Alex Inkeles and his followers argued that ‘‘to modernize is to develop, and that a society cannot hope to develop until the majority of its population holds modern values’’ (as cited in Fagerlind & Saha, 1989, p. 16). As a psychologist attempting to explain economic growth, David McClelland argued that the ‘‘need for achievement’’ or ‘‘achievement motivation’’ is behind the drive for economic growth at national and individual levels as well (McClelland, 1961, 1964). Chinese leaders have kept pursuing modernization as the national drive for decades. Initially suggested by Chairman Mao Zedong, the Four Modernizations, i.e., Modernization of Agriculture, Industry, National Defense, and Science and Technology, were first officially introduced by Premier Zhou Enlai in The Government Work Report at the Third National People’s Congress in 1964. However, it was not until during the late 1970s that the national policy was fully embraced by the government, led by progressive leader Deng Xiaoping, toward accelerating China’s modernization process (please refer to Hsu, 2000, pp. 803–816). Deng Xiaoping believed that ‘‘development is the hard truth,’’ and that education has a strategic role for building China’s national strength. Since the late 1970s, neo-liberal Chinese leaders such as Deng Xiaoping has tried hard to pursue a path of modernization at all levels and all aspects of the country, and has shown a strong national achievement motivation to catch up with countries such as the U.S., Japan, UK, France, and Germany. On May 4, 1998, given his speech at Peking University for the celebration of its
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100th anniversary, Jiang Zemin appealed to build world-class universities to continuously boom China’s socioeconomical development. Soon after his speech, the Chinese government launched the Project 985 which aims at building world-class universities in China. By the implementation of this project, the Chinese government first identifies nine top key universities and pours huge funding annually into them (e.g. Peking University and Tsinghua University each receives 1.8 billion CNY, for a three-year period of time), anticipating the project would significantly enhance the competitiveness of Chinese universities in the world. The efforts that the Chinese government made have resulted in rapid socioeconomical development, including nationwide compulsory education, restructuring of educational systems, enhancement of educational quality, teacher education reform, and higher education expansion. Chinese leaders also have strong beliefs in the human capital theory, as they find themselves under heightened pressure, domestically and internationally, to view higher education more as an investment in human capital for competitiveness than as a social provision to ensure the welfare of all citizens. Human capital theorists look at schooling as capital or investment, in the sense of raising earnings, and assume that ‘‘education and training are the most important investments in human capital’’ (Becker, 1993, p. 17). On the basis of this assumption, human capital theorists advocate that education is powerful and thus plays a pivotal role in helping the poor and developing countries. Since 1980 when Theodore W. Schultz first visited China, the human capital theory has gained a high reputation among scholars and policymakers in China. A recently published quasi-government report, A Special Report of China’s Education and Human Capital Resource Development: Stride from a Country of Huge Population to a Country of Profound Human Resources lays out rich data with a length of 714 pages. It strongly argues that ‘‘human capital promotes economic growth and societal development through multiple ways,’’ and that ‘‘after education is developed, human capital is then developed, so is the economy, and eventually our national power’’ (The Project Team, 2003, pp. 13, 31). Since education contributes to national economic productivity and growth, and higher education is one of the most important sectors in China’s education system, the human capital theory becomes one of the major theories on which the expansion policy of higher education is based. Apart from the modernization theory and human capital theory, Martin Trow’s theory of higher education development provides a particularly practical model for China’s higher education expansion. Early in the 1960s, American sociologist Martin Trow conceptualizes three stages of higher
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education development: the elite phase (enrollment rate less than 15% of the relevant age group), the mass phase (enrollment rate higher than 15% but less than 50% of the relevant age groups), and the universal phase (enrollment rate higher than 50% of the relevant age group) (Trow, 1974, 1979, 2006). Trow’s three stage theory of higher education expansion identifies three dimensions of growth: the rate of growth, the absolute size of both systems and individual institutions, and the proportion of the relevant age groups enrolled in higher education institutions (Trow, 1974, 1979, 2006). Chinese theorists of higher education as well as policymakers warmly embrace Trow’s theory of higher education development and take it as the development model that China should follow, for Trow’s theory provides not only the general trends of higher education development but also the quantitatively specified stages of how higher education grows and expands. Lin (2001) documents: ‘‘since the [Trow’s] theory was introduced into China in the 1990s, it rapidly gained significant attention among domestic [Chinese] colleagues y and became an important theoretical foundation for governmental policymaking.’’ Chinese policymakers practically applied the modernization theory, the human capital theory, and Trow’s model of development as the rationale for higher education expansion. As the CPCCC and the State Council clearly stated in 1993 To achieve the Four Modernization, science and technology is the key, and education is the foundation y . Therefore, to improve the overall quality of the Chinese citizens and transform the heavy burden of a huge population into the advantage of having a huge source of human capital become the only way for our nation to accomplish socialist modernization. (The CPCCC & the State Council, 1993, February 13)
Meanwhile, the 1993 Guideline urges, in particular, that ‘‘higher education must take the important task of training advanced specialists, developing science, technology and culture, and supporting the modernization drive’’ (The CPCCC & the State Council, 1993, February 13). In subsequent years, the Chinese government repeatedly urged that education including higher education is the foundation of socialist modernization and reconstruction (The CPCCC & the State Council, 1999, June 13; The State Council, 2001, May 29). In his report to the CPC’s 16th National Congress, Jiang Zemin repeated the rationale for education reform and development as the following: Education is the foundation for scientific and technological advancement and personnel training. Playing a vanguard role and having an overall bearing on the modernization drive, education must be placed on our development agenda as a strategic priority.
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We must carry out the Party’s education policy that education should serve socialist modernization and the people and integrate itself with productive labor and social practice so as to train socialist builders and successors featuring an all-round development in morality, intelligence, physique and art. (Jiang, 2002, November 8)
The rationale for higher education expansion theorized by Chinese policymakers can be formulated as the following: EHE!QQW!MD=EG!NA By this simplified equation, Chinese leaders assume that the expansion of higher Education (EHE), would boost the quality and quantity of the whole workforce (QQW), then lay the foundation for modernization development (MD) and economic growth (EG), and finally fulfill national achievement (NA). On the basis of these assumptions, the expansion of higher education becomes the priority of China’s education reform. The MOE originally set one of the objectives of the national policy was to increase the enrollment rates to 15% by 2010 (MOE, 1998, December 24). After the radical expansion policy was made by the State Council, this goal has been achieved by 2002, eight years earlier than what was planned.
3.3. Sociohistorical Problems Driven behind the Policy Action If the theories of action upholding the expansion policy set the rationale for the policy action of the Chinese government, the diagnosis of sociohistorical problems explains why the policy incentive is taken under the particular Chinese context. Such sociohistorical problems have existed persistently in the inconsistency between tremendous social demand of higher education and the serious shortage of supply in reality. Among a large variety of normative values, higher education is widely viewed as a private good which is ‘‘retained by the individual being educated,’’ and also a public good which is actually ‘‘the sum of the private benefits and other benefits (which the individual cannot capture)’’ (Cohn & Geske, 1990). Higher education in reality ‘‘simultaneously improves individual lives and enriches wider society’’ (World Bank, 2000). A strong ideological tradition in Chinese culture sees higher education as a major instrument to achieving the highest good for both the individual and society. Two thousand years ago, the purposes of higher learning were explicitly defined as ‘‘to let one’s inborn virtue shine forth, to renew the people, and to rest in the highest good,’’ as stated in Daxue, the Confucian classical Great Learning (Li, 1998). Showing a harmonious integration
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between the individual good and the benefit for the Chinese society (Lee, 2000), this belief about the virtue of higher education is deeply embedded into Chinese culture over the past several thousand years and is still popularly recognized by most Chinese people. In modern China, this traditional value provides a commonly accepted ideological foundation for the expansion of higher education. Higher education as a private good is highly appreciated by the Chinese people primarily because it not only systematically and institutionally offers opportunities for an individual to pursue advanced (professional) knowledge, skills, and virtue, but also historically provides individuals with a competitive advantage in the struggle for desirable sociopolitical positions. The tremendous individual demand with the ideal value, however, has been traditionally inconsistent with the reality of higher education with limited provision and fierce competitiveness. In ancient China, higher education is considered as the only way for an ordinary young person to obtain a desirable governmental position following strenuous efforts to pass the Imperial Civil Examination. A fact of life, however, is that there were only very limited resources and channels for higher learning and social mobility, enjoyed almost exclusively by prestigious groups such as aristocrats, officials, and the like. Before the radical massification of higher education policy in 1999, the inconsistency and tension of the values of higher education as a private good and the provision of opportunities for higher education persisted as an extremely serious sociohistorical problem. For example, the gross enrollment rate of higher education was only 3.5% in 1991. In Trow’s definition (1974, 2006), higher education in China before the expansion is a privilege of birth or talent, or of both for the elite group, instead of a right for those with certain qualifications, namely the ordinary Chinese people, especially the new middle class. Higher education as a public good, on the other hand, is highly valued by the Chinese government, politically. In the eye of Chinese leaders, higher education can explore and produce advanced knowledge and skills for societal maintenance and amelioration. It can train qualified specialists available for social control and professional positions. It can also provide a large variety of knowledge-based services for the community and the society as a whole. Furthermore, two additional values have been recently implanted into the domain: higher education has been redefined by the Chinese government as a key ‘‘instrument’’ in nation building and modernization drive, and a dynamic ‘‘industry’’ in propelling economic growth and societal development. First, after suffering for decades with the invasion of Western super powers such as the U.K., France, Germany,
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Japan, and the U.S., the Chinese government realizes that ‘‘getting left behind always get eaten’’ luohou jiuyao aida and views higher education as a practical way for building up national strength and catching up with the Western super powers. Second, the human capital theorists recognize the economic value of higher education as ‘‘an industry’’ (Cohn & Geske, 1990). This economic value of higher education is accepted in very recent years by the Chinese government, as aforementioned. In fact, these two new values are tightly interwoven and integrated into higher education as a public good, which is reinforced while China grows up gradually as a global economic and political power. Although higher education is highly valued as a private and public good, the reality in China was far from desirable when access and level of development in higher education are examined, and the huge gap between them is defined by policy players as a serious policy problem. For example, the Rejuvenation Action Plan for Education in 21st Century diagnosed the inconsistency as policy problems: ‘‘the level of educational development is still low in our nation y . Lack of creative specialists with international leading level, currently and in the future, is one of the major factors that restrict the creative and competitive abilities of our nation’’ (MOE, 1998, December 24). In this action plan, as value definers, Chinese policymakers identify two major policy problems: (1) higher education as a private good has failed to serve the demands of individual citizens; and (2) higher education as a public good has not done a good job in providing enough qualified specialists/professionals for nation building and the country’s modernization drive. The policy action of higher education expansion as a result satisfies the tremendous demand for higher education as a private good. A life story in China’s Education describing the 2002 national college entrance examination offered a good example: At 9 a.m. on Sunday, 5.27 million students sat quietly in thousands upon thousands of classrooms across China, ready to begin the college entrance examination, which is probably the most important examination they will ever sit. ‘‘I am sure my daughter will do quite well in the exam,’’ said a Mr. Zhou who, like many other Chinese parents, was waiting anxiously outside the school. He said his daughter did not worry about the exams at all, whereas he himself sometimes was still haunted by the nightmare of sitting [for] his examination. ‘‘It is not as tough to enter college as twenty years ago because colleges and universities have begun taking in many more y students,’’ he recalled, ‘‘I think my daughter’s generation is much luckier than mine.’’ (as cited in Duan, 2003)
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Mr. Zhou’s different experience of sitting in the national college entrance examination from his daughter’s is attributed to the expansion policy. The affordable and tangible increase in higher education opportunities brought about by the policy action shows that the historically sustained gap between demand and provision of higher education has been narrowed to a large extent. While individual Chinese people appeal for the expansion of higher education to satisfy their personal needs, the Chinese policymakers promote higher education as a public good in the policymaking process. For example, the MOE declares: ‘‘higher educational institutions must follow the international frontlines of academic development, become the bases for knowledge innovation and advanced specialists training, and emphasize nurturing the advanced and creative specialists’ spirits of unity, collaboration, and contribution’’ (MOE, 1998, December 24). Furthermore, the Chinese policymakers set the goals of higher education ‘‘to train advanced specialists with creative spirits and practical skills, to develop science, technology and culture, and to propel modernization drive’’ (Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 1998, August 29). On the basis of the recognition of higher education as both a private and a public good, the Rejuvenation Action Plan for Education in 21st Century seeks to ‘‘actively and stably develop higher education, [and] speed up the reform of higher education’’ (MOE, 1998, December 24). In this sense, the policymaking process of higher education expansion serves as ‘‘a conscientious attempt to alleviate these sorts of problems, to ameliorate these specified conditions’’ (Malen & Knapp, 1997, p. 423).
3.4. Policy Window Opened for the Radical Expansion Policy as the Best Choice Although the theories of policy action have been advanced and serious sociohistorical problems are diagnosed, the expansion process of higher education in China is still very slow or even sometimes backward for the most years of the 1990s. For example, there was only 8.7% annual growth of new entrants on average in regular higher education institutions. A policy window, coined by Kingdon (2003), has not opened yet for the radical expansion of higher education until 1999. The term ‘‘a policy window’’ refers to ‘‘an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems y. Sometimes, the window opens quite predictably y. At other
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times, it happens quite unpredictably’’ (Kingdon, 2003, p. 165). In the case of China’s higher education expansion, the policy window for the radical expansion opened in June 1999, unpredictably. But the term ‘‘unpredictably’’ here means the timing of the radical expansion, instead of unpredictable logic or societal conditions for the policy action. The radical expansion policy was made by Chinese policymakers based on comprehensive considerations of the overall socioeconomic situations around the late 1990s. After the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the booming China’s economy slowed down and a long-term deflation was taking place as a result. As shown in Fig. 4, China’s GDP from 1997 to 1999 was unable to continuously keep the same growth rate as it used to be in previous years. Similarly, both consumer price index and increased savings deposit in urban and rural areas fell back, too. Moreover, according to China’s official statistics, in 1998 the total savings deposit in urban and rural area hit f5340.8 billion CNY (approximately $691.8 billion USD), the highest total savings deposit in China since 1978 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2007, p. 347). However, in the market, most consumers were very reluctant to pull money out of their pocket in exchange for goods or housing. The limited consumption expenditures further stagnated, if not worsen, the economy. The serious situation therefore exerted escalating pressures on the Chinese policymakers, financially and politically. Chinese leaders have firmly adopted a key economic policy which relies on stimulation of domestic demand to increase GDP growth, rather than
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solely relying on exportation. As Jiang Zemin, former CPCCC General Secretary, affirmed: Stimulating domestic demand is an essential and long-standing factor underlying China’s economic growth. We must stick to the policy of stimulating domestic demand and implement corresponding macroeconomic policies in light of actual needs. We must adjust the relationship between investment and consumption to raise the proportion of consumption in GDP gradually. (Jiang, 2002, November 8)
Under the murky prospect of economic stagnancy, any possible policy actions that could stimulate the national economy for new growth have fallen into more eager ears on the side of Chinese leaders for considerations. For example, upon economists’ suggestions, the People’s Bank of China, the central bank of the Chinese government with the power to control monetary policy and regulate financial institutions, continually lowered its bank interest for seven times within 1996 and 1999. In addition to the downward economy, the labor market turned from bad to worse as a huge number of workers were being laid off from state-owned businesses. In 1998 the real unemployment rate reached at 7.9–8.3%, with an estimated number of 15.6–16 million people who lost their jobs. In the year of 1999 alone, there were 11.7 million workers laid off from state-owned businesses, a layoff rate which was 5.6% of the total work force. Many Chinese families, especially those who had members working in state-owned businesses, experienced extremely hard time due to a feature in China’s employment system, that is, married couples used to work in the same state-owned factories. If the factory went bankrupt, both the husband and wife would lose their jobs. Adding oil to fire, China was having a large number of high school graduates who would be joining the work force but had nowhere to find jobs in the market. The situation could become uncontrollable if the young people and the unemployed banded together and possibly revolted. On February 19, 1999, Dr. Tang Min and Zuo Xiaolei wrote to Chinese leaders a public letter, entitled ‘‘Time Has Come for Using Education to Stimulate Consumption’’ Jiaoyu Qidong Xiaofei Huzhiyuchu, urging the Chinese government to stimulate domestic consumption by radically expanding student enrollment in higher education (Tang & Zuo, 1999, February 19). Both Tang and Zuo are economists who received their professional training in the Western world and are very familiar with the real situation of China’s economy and policies. Published in Economic Highlights, which is a Chinese newsletter for professionals in the field of economics, their proposal suggested that the Chinese government adopt a
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policy of radical expansion of higher education, mainly focusing on the radical expansion of student enrollment, as the new strategy to stimulate the slow-moving economy. According to their formula, the expansion would increase construction and infrastructure building, would increase services, and also stimulate economic growth in areas such as food and transportation. The new funding as a result of enrollment expansion would inject into the economy a total of f100 billion CNY (approximately $12.9 billion USD) if the new entrants of higher education could be doubled within the ensuing three years, and the f100 billion CNY of investment and expenditure could contribute to 0.5% increase in annual GDP growth. Tang and Zuo (1999, February 19) claimed, in the public letter, that the radical expansion of higher education would stimulate, without doubt, a new round of economic growth. Tang and Zuo’s theory is based on the unique Chinese cultural context. Traditionally, Chinese parents would like to invest whatever they can afford, or even cannot afford, to support their children for better education, even if they have to pinch pennies or cut any other living expenditures for themselves. As previously mentioned, higher education is viewed by most individual Chinese people as a prestigious private good as well as a decent honor for a family if their children can go to university. Under such a cultural tradition, education investment becomes one of the major purposes of household savings and deposits for most families. By 1999, the potential household expenditure on education was estimated approximately f250 billion CNY annually ($32.4 billion USD) (Li & Hu, 1999, as cited in Project Team of Peking University, 1999), but most parents had not even had an opportunity to spend the money for their children – as the gross enrollment rate of higher education was just approximately 9.8% in 1998. Tang and Zuo (1999, February 19) concluded that supporting a child to go to college is the best wish for every Chinese parent and investment in education is one of the rare but largest expenditures that most Chinese families are willing to do. Another rationale for Tang and Zuo to propose the radical expansion policy is the consideration for the worsening situations in the labor market. Around 1998 China was plagued by the highest unemployment rate since 1978, as aforementioned. According to Tang and Zuo (1999, February 19), the radical expansion of higher education would delay an estimated number of 5–6 million high school graduates who were otherwise supposed to enter the already crowded job market within the three upcoming years. The fouryear employment lag of a huge number of high school graduates, as a corollary, would avoid further exacerbation of the already gloomy labor
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market situation. As expected, their quantitative reasoning caught the eyeball of Chinese leaders, who were taking every chance possible to fight against the highest ever unemployment rate caused mostly by the rapid bankruptcies of state-owned businesses. Tang and Zuo’s timely proposal attracted expanding attention among both academia and top national policymakers. Their public letter provoked immediately a lush debate on if the Chinese higher education system is prepared for the radical expansion of student enrollment and if the then deflating economy can be boosted up by the policy action (Jiang, 1999, March 26; Project Team of Peking University, 1999, August 6; Qian, 1999, March 26; Wei, 1999, May 19; Wei, Wang & Ding, 2002). But Tang and Zuo’s supporters, including ardent policymakers at the national level, prevailed in the debate (Hu & Shi, 1999a, February 15; Hu & Shi, 1999b, March 26; Jiao, 1999, June 24; Li, 1999; Shen, 1999, May 18; Shi, 1999; Zhai & Mu, 1999, March 2). Under such a particular socioeconomic situation, the hot debate in fact served as ‘‘a policy window’’ to open the policy for radical expansion of higher education. While the argument is hotly debated in academic community, the neoliberal Chinese leaders led by Premier Zhu Rongji, who had been eagerly looking for new strategies to boost the growth of the nation’s economy and the labor market, took substantial actions on policymaking and opted for the radical expansion as the best choice. On June 24, 1999, shortly after the 3rd National Meeting on Education since 1978, the then SPC and the MOE jointly announced that student recruitment in higher education institutions would be expanded significantly (Jiao, 1999, p. 1). As originally planned, the new entrants were scaled up to 1.3 million in 1999 from 1.08 million in 1998. After the radical expansion policy was launched, an additional 0.33 million students were admitted into higher education institutions in 1999. The growth rate of new students leapt to 47%, the highest and fastest growth rate of new students in higher education institutions in China since 1949.
4. DISCUSSIONS China’s radical expansion policy of higher education follows general patterns of rational policy actions and considerations. In particular, the policymaking is overall a linearly advanced process in which a decision is initiated, debated and finally taken into place by a ‘‘logic path.’’ There is a cause–effect link between the theories of action and the stated policy goals. Policy resolutions are initiated largely to meet various sociohistorical
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demands. Efforts are made to adopt the best strategy for resolving substantial problems. A policy window was opened when various societal conditions for the radical expansion of higher education were ready. For example, the modernization theory, human capital theory, and Martin Trow’s theory serve as the strong theories of action for the policymaking of China’s higher education expansion. The theories of action are pervasive in every stage of the policymaking process and buttress the radical expansion policy to continue moving forward. On the other hand, policy resolutions of the radical expansion of higher education are initiated largely to meet various societal demands. The deteriorating economy in the late 1990s, including the soaring unemployment rate, forced the Chinese politicians to actively look for alternative policy actions. The efforts they made include applicable strategies such as stimulating domestic demand by lowering bank interest, expanding governmental expenditures, giving the public two days off rather than one day for weekend to increase consumption, etc. While the Chinese government was anxiously looking for alternative policy, Dr. Tang Min and Zuo Xiaolei proposed their plan for radical expansion of higher education. Their timely proposal served as a policy window for the expansion policy to take place. In addition to the general patterns observed in the policymaking process, there are some unique features of the incentive which reflects China’s political, economic, and educational contexts. First of all, the traditional Chinese political system provides a supportive societal context for the rational decision-making of higher education expansion. With a heavy tradition of central governance for more than three thousand years, the People’s Republic of China was founded under the leadership of the Communist Party of China in 1949. In the post-Mao era, especially since the early 1980s, the decentralization and deregulation of the central government along with the adoption of an open door policy have been gradually accepted. Although local governments and NGOs are now enjoying more and more freedom from the central government, the Chinese political system still remains highly centralized. Similar to the polity, the education systems in China are structured as a tightly centralized sector. Higher education is embedded within this centralized system. Under such unique sociopolitical context, Chinese policymakers behaved as a ‘‘unitary agent’’ in the policymaking process of the radical expansion policy. For example, shortly after the Third National Meeting on Education held in June 15–18, 1999, the then SPC and the MOE immediately announced on June 24 that the student recruitment in higher education institutions would be increased substantially.
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Second, the traditional cultural value of attaching great importance to education paves the way for the policymaking process. Traditionally, education as a private good is highly valued by individual Chinese people, for it historically provides individuals with a competitive advantage in the struggle for desirable sociopolitical positions. That education carries great value is widely recognized in China in general and the opportunity of higher education is especially deemed as a social advantage in particular. The heightened tension of social demand supported by the traditional value of attaching importance to education, and the serious shortage of supply turned into a substantial societal problem which finally forced Chinese leaders to pull the trigger of the radical expansion policy of higher education. The rational framework is powerful in interpreting policymaking process, especially in the case of China’s higher education expansion. The rational framework, however, has its limitations in examining and interpreting of policymaking process for several reasons. Firstly, the rational framework disregards a basic element common to policymaking, e.g., organizations are after all political systems with various conflicting benefits and actors. Regardless of how ‘‘scientifically’’ or ‘‘rationally’’ a policy is designed, as long as more than one administrative layers and actors are involved in the policy process, the directives of authority become much more blurred, since most policies are usually practiced by one layer but formulated by another (Hill, 2003, p. 91). Secondly, the rational framework is based on normative recognition of policymaking, and is designed to satisfy how organizations ought to function but not necessarily how they actually do. In fact, after the radical expansion policy was launched in 1999, it is widely observed that the quality of higher education in China has been continuously declining, and the exploding population on campus has become unmanageable in individual institutions. Universities that expand their size by taking out huge loans are under dire conditions as they have great difficulty in paying back to the banks the interest and the principal of the loans. In addition, the rational framework fails to recognize that any policy action usually benefits some specific groups rather than the society as a whole. In the case of China’s policymaking of higher education expansion, the policy action serves as a political and economic strategy to boom the slowdown economy, instead of particularly targeting at providing more opportunities for disadvantageous groups. Recent research show that students from rural areas or from families with low social status do not enjoy accordingly increasing opportunities originally theorized by the
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expansion policy (Ding, 2006; Li & Reynolds, 2005; Wen, 2005). The weaknesses of the rational framework call for alternative perspectives to broaden our understanding of the complicated policymaking process. In sum, the policymaking process of China’s higher education expansion evidences how the transformation of an extra large-scale, centralized higher education system moves forward, motivated by a national policy of radical expansion to address challenges and dilemmas arising from various demands, individually and socially. The China case provides a vivid picture how the transformation of higher education systems may occur in quite diverse specific paths, distinct from one cultural context to another, in terms of the uniqueness of policy initiation and decision making. In addition, it also demonstrates how important it is to learn about the cultural traditions of a society or region and their influences on policy practices, when seeking to understand varied phenomena of worldwide higher education transformation and policies driving behind them. While the unprecedented transformation of higher education has drawn urgent concerns on issues such as equity, efficiency, knowledge production, privatization, expansion, financing, and internationalization, etc., it is particularly important that such discourses must be understood by looking into deeply how various national policy actions beget the transformation of higher education, with alternative analytic frameworks.
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McClelland, D. (1964). Business drive and national achievement. In: A. Etzioni & E. Etzioni (Eds), Social change (pp. 165–178). New Year: Basic Books. MOE. (1998). Mianxiang 21shiji jiaoyu zhenxing xingdong jihua [The rejuvenation action plan for education in 21st century], December 24. Available at MOE web site: http:// www.moe.edu.cn/edoas/website18/info3337.htm. Retrieved on November 10, 2003. MOE. (2006a). Educational statistics yearbook of China 2005. Beijing, China: People’s Education Press. MOE. (2006b). 2005 Nian quanguo jiaoyu shiye fazhan tongji gongbao [Annual statistical communique´ of education 2005], May. Available at MOE web site: http://www.moe. edu.cn/edoas/website18/info20464.htm. Retrieved on March 25, 2007. MOE. (2007a). 2006 Nian quanguo jiaoyu shiye fazhan tongji gongbao [Annual statistical communique´ of education 2006], May. Available at MOE web site: http://www.moe.edu.cn/ edoas/website18/level3.jsp?tablename=1068&infoid=29052. Retrieved on March 8, 2008. MOE. (2007b). Educational statistics yearbook of China 2006. Beijing, China: People’s Education Press. National Bureau of Statistics of China. (2007). China statistical yearbook 2006. Beijing, China: China Statistics Press. Ostrom, E. (2007). Institutional rational choice: An assessment of the institutional analysis and development framework. In: P. A. Sabatier (Ed.), Theories of the Policy Process (2nd Ed., pp. 21–64). Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Parsons, T., & Shils, E. A. (1951). Categories of the orientation and organization of action. In T. Parsons & E. A. Shils (Eds.), Toward a general theory of action (pp. 53–109). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Project Team of Peking University. (1999). Ruhe kandai kuoda gaodeng jiaoyu guimo dui duanqi jingji zengzhang de zuoyong [How to look at the role of higher education expansion in the short-term economic growth]. Economic Highlights (Aug. 6), 3. Qian, X. Y. (1999). Jiaoyu ciji jingji zhishuo zhuguan secai guonong [The theory of stimulating economy by education too subjective]. Economic Highlights (Mar. 26). Shen, M. (1999). Dafudu kuoda gaoxiao zhaosheng shi jiaoyu chengwei xiaofei redian [Largely expand student recruitment of higher education institutions and enable education to become a hot consumption]. China Reform Daily (May 18). Shi, K. (1999). Ba fazhan gaodeng jiaoyu zuowei kuoda neixu he cujin chanye jiegou shengji de zhongyao cuoshi [Expansion of higher education as the key strategy to stimulate domestic demand and upgrade industrial structures]. Theory Front, 4, 24–25. So, A. Y. (1990). Social change and development: Modernization, dependency, and world-system theories. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. (1998). The higher education law of the People’s Republic of China, August 29. Available at http://www.moe.edu.cn/english/ laws_h.htm. Retrieved on February 18, 2008. State Commission of Education. (1992). The national ten-year (1991–2000) plan and eighth fiveyear plan for education. Available at the China Education Star Software Company web site: http://www.jdedu.net:8080/Resource/Book/Edu/JYLL/TS015055/0007_ts015055. htm. Retrieved on November 2, 2003. Tang, M., & Zuo, X. L. (1999). Time has come for education to stimulate consumption [Jiaoyu Qidong Xiaofei Huzhiyuchu]. Economic Highlights (Feb. 19). The CPCCC & the State Council. (1990). The eighth five-year plan for national economic and social development. December. Available at National Development and Reform Commission web
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site: http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgh/ghwb/gjjh/W020050715581806145575.pdf. Retrieved on February 18, 2008. The CPCCC & the State Council. (1993). The guidelines for China’s education reform and development, February 13. Available at MOE web site: http://www.moe.gov.cn/edoas/ website18/info3334.htm. Retrieved on February 18, 2008. The CPCCC & the State Council. (1999). The CPCCC and State Council’s decision on deepening educational reform and bringing forth quality education in an all-round way, June 13. Available at MOE web site: http://www.moe.gov.cn/edoas/website18/info3314.htm. Retrieved on February 18, 2008. The Project Team. (2003). Zhongguo jiaoyu yu renli ziyuan fazhan baogao: Cong renkou daguo dao renli ziyuan qiangguo [A special report of China’s education and human capital resource development: Stride from a country of huge population to a country of profound human resources]. Beijing, China: Higher Education Press. The State Council. (2001). Guanyu jichu jiaoyu gaige yu fazhan de jueding [The decision on the reform and development of basic education], May 29. Available at MOE web site: http:// www.moe.gov.cn/edoas/website18/info128.htm. Retrieved on February 18, 2008. Trow, M. (1974). Problems in the transition from elite to mass higher education. In: Policies for higher education (pp. 51–101), from the General Report on the Conference on Future Structures of Post-Secondary Education. Paris: OECD. Trow, M. (1979). Elite and mass higher education: American models and European realities. In: Research into higher education: Processes and structures (pp. 183–217). Stockholm: National Board of Universities and Colleges. Trow, M. (2006). Reflections on the transition from elite to mass to universal access: Forms and phases of higher education in modern society since WWII. In: J. J. F. Forest & P. G. Altbach (Eds), International handbook of higher education (pp. 243–280). Dordrecht: Springer. UNESCO. (2003). Synthesis report on trends and developments in higher education since the World Conference on Higher Education (1998–2003), June 23–25. Available at the UNESCO web site: http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/files/31182/10857396091SynthesisE.pdf/ SynthesisE.pdf. Retrieved on February 18, 2008. Wei, X. (1999). Kuoda zhaosheng nanyi xunsu ladong jingji zengzhang [Expansion of student enrollment hardly stimulate the rapid growth of economy]. China Reform Daily, (May 19), 2. Wei, X., Wang, R., & Ding, Y. Q. (2002). Kuoda gaodeng jiaoyu guimo dui duanqi jingji zengzhang de zuoyong [The role of higher education expansion in the short-term economic growth]. In: W. F. Min (Ed.), Gaodeng jiaoyu yunxing jizhi yanjiu [Research on the mechanism of higher education] (pp. 170–185). Beijing: Higher Education Press. Wen, D. M. (2005). Jiating Beijing dui woguo gaodeng jiaoyu jihui ji biyesheng jiuye de yingxiang [The impacts of SES on higher education opportunity and graduate employment in China]. Economics of Education Research (Beida), 3(2). Available at http://www.gse.pku.edu.cn/BeidaEER/pdf/050202.pdf. Retrieved on January 28, 2007. World Bank. (1997). China: Higher education reform. Washington, DC: The World Bank. World Bank. (2000). Higher education in developing countries: Peril and promise. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Zhai, B., & Mu, R. (1999). Jiaoyu: Ershiyi shiji xinde jingji zengzhang dian [Education – The new economic growth in the 21st century]. China Education Daily (Mar. 2), 2.
THE IMPACT OF NEO-LIBERALISM ON TAIWANESE HIGHER EDUCATION$ Chuing Prudence Chou As the world changed into a knowledge-based economy and with the globalization forces continuing to proceed in an unprecedented way, higher education systems have become one of the national imperatives for international competitiveness. Moreover, the impact of globalization has received mixed results. The Internet and the scientific community have created a new world full of more accessible and transparent knowledge; whereas the increasing worldwide inequality of educational resources and university expansion in the name of massification of higher education challenges many developing societies (Altbach, 2004; Yang, 2003). It is also argued that globalization has transformed public universities from a public entity into private commodities and consequently increased the number of private higher education institutes (HEIs). Moreover, in order to meet the new global challenges, universities are mandated to respond by restructuring their format, operation, management, and even mission of learning. Policy-makers across the world also have started to reexamine universities’ funding scheme, especially the public ones’, with the hope to recognize universities based on efficiency and accountability (Hooker, 1997).
$
The author would like to acknowledge Professor Amy Roberts, Mr. Stephen Kosak, and Gregory Ching for their editing assistance.
The Worldwide Transformation of Higher Education International Perspectives on Education and Society, Volume 9, 297–312 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1479-3679/doi:10.1016/S1479-3679(08)00010-8
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Along with the above-mentioned challenges in higher education, Taiwanese universities have also gone through a great transformation as the country enforced governmental restructuring policies by embracing the global neo-liberal ideology since late 1980s. In this chapter, the author attempts to explore issues such as the origin of Taiwanese higher educational changes, the format and profile of the change, and the possible future of Taiwanese higher education under the influence of market economies. Until the lifting of martial law in 1987, higher education had long been controlled by the Taiwanese government due to the political tension between Taiwan and China which started in 1949. Since then, higher education has come into a period of dramatic transformation alongside the introduction of market mechanisms into the education system in the early 1990s. First, the 1994 University Law was passed to reduce the power of the central government by granting more academic autonomy, institutional flexibility, and self-reliance to universities. Meanwhile, Taiwan also experienced an unprecedented expansion in universities and student enrollments as a result of public elections and economic deregulation. Following this expansion, private higher education institutions came to outnumber public; the latter traditionally have enjoyed more resources and social prestige. Yet with the global influence of neoliberalism, which focuses on privatization and gives privileges to the market economy, more and more universities are considered to be fee-charging and public institutions are suffering from shrinking government funding thanks to the expansion of higher education (Chang & Ho, 2007; Mok, 2003). The consequences of neo-liberalism in Taiwanese higher education have been mixed. Nevertheless, these results may provide valuable lessons to those countries whose universities are also in the process of transformation and expansion.
NEO-LIBERALISM AND HIGHER EDUCATION Worldwide systems of higher education are experiencing intense and unprecedented transformation, both in its operation and in their relationship to governments. The adoption of neo-liberal, free-market economic policies in the 1980s, and the consequent deregulation of education has impacted many systems in Europe, North and South America, and Asia (including New Zealand and Australia) (Olssen, 2002). Many of these nations have restructured their systems of public education in an attempt to acquire relative autonomy and to assume responsibility as individual institutions. As a result of deregulation and liberalization, the trends of individual institutions are to become more competitive and accountable by
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creating an overall market mechanism within the education system (Giroux, 2002; Dale, 2001). The issuance of educational loans by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) supports these trends. In general, the IMF and WB serve as a support mechanism for neo-liberalism in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe by the promotion of market mechanisms which effect increases in private investment in education and accountability in higher education institutions (Chou, 2003). As governments pursue this ideology, systems of higher education (HE) are consequently faced with a series of transformations, shifting from more specific norms of state control to those of state supervision (Song, 2005). In brief, government involvement has shifted from mandating rules and regulations for HEIs to specifying funding standards for universities and colleges to compete based on accountability and performances. Market-oriented higher education is becoming primarily focused on structures and actions tailored to competition and deregulation. In concrete terms this includes: performance-based funding schemes; increased competition for resources; encouragement of fund-raising by universities; growing numbers of private institutions; the deployment of external evaluation; and rising tuition fees (Dai, Mok, & Xie, 2002; Yang, 2001). Policy-makers are convinced that adopting market-oriented mechanisms will encourage universities to share the financial burden, especially in light of the expansion of student enrollment (Rhoads, 2006). This stance also facilitates the idea of cost-effective among HEIs, in terms of increasing the efficiency and improving educational quality. The positive impact is assumed to enhance institutional academic autonomy, as well as increase choice for students and parents as empowered customers in higher education. As a global trend, the establishment of market economies has particularly affected Asian HEIs, especially in China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, where higher education has experienced tremendous expansion since last decade (Altbach, 2004; Mok, 2003). In this chapter, the system of higher education in Taiwan is used to examine some of the trends associated with the globalized market economy. The case of Taiwan serves as an excellent example given the influence of neo-liberal principles in higher education policy since late 1980s when the country was in the process of political and economic transition.
WHAT INITIATED CHANGES IN TAIWANESE HIGHER EDUCATION? In this chapter, higher education is defined as four-year comprehensive and technology universities that grant academic degree in Taiwan. Post-secondary
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education in Taiwan that includes three years of junior college or, usually, four years of college/university with the exception of departments such as dental and medical science, which take six and seven years, respectively (Pan & Yu, 1999). According to national statistics, Taiwan’s old profile as one of the most equitable societies, due to low university tuition fees and associated social benefits, has shifted during the last fifteen years (Chen, 2006; Ministry of Education, 2007a). The 2001 National Annual Statistics report suggested that an income discrepancy between the top 10% and the bottom 10% of families has reached 161 times, in contrast to 39 times the previous year and 19 times in 1991. In comparison of annual family income differences, the gap between the top 20% and the bottom 20% was 7.45 in 2006 and only 4.97 in 1992. These statistics suggest that lower-income families presently earned less in comparison to fifteen years ago (Ministry of Education, 2007b). As a result of increasing income inequities the dream of upward mobility has become infeasible in recent years. Increasing university tuition and shrinking public school funding in the name of market economies has also contributed to this dilemma. In Taiwan institutions of higher education are, on the one hand, expected and obligated to represent national identity as well as the individuality of the institution. On the other hand, they serve as participants in the market of global competition sparked by processes of internationalization, globalization, and marketization in the Asia-Pacific region (Mok & Welch, 2003). Taiwanese universities entered an era of dramatic development after the lifting of martial law in 1987. This event marked the end of four decades of authoritarian leadership and the beginning of cross-strait dialogues between China and Taiwan. The efforts of advocates promoted social changes such as the abolishment of media censorship, autonomy of decision-making processes within banks, and provisions for promising college students to concentrate their academic interests within Taiwan’s emerging hightechnology-oriented industries. During this transitional era Taiwan’s school system was criticized for its inability to evolve with the shift of social and academic ideas. In response, the national government introduced market-oriented reforms to relieve budgetary pressures and to increase the autonomy of HEIs. The Educational Reform Committee (1994–1996) was established to publish five reform papers which served as guidelines for launching a nationwide reform movement (Chou, 2003). Concurrently the revised University Law (1994) was passed to facilitate the introduction of market reforms in Taiwan. The revised University Law impacted the Taiwanese governmental domination
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of higher education system in terms of the extent of control the Ministry of Education had over HEIs and campus operations (Tsai, 1996). The reforms promoted a diversified system of higher education; institutions gained autonomy in the appointment of presidents, as well as the decision-making process for determination of tuition fees, course offerings, and student recruitment. As a result the Taiwanese system of higher education dramatically expanded. A pivotal outcome of the reform efforts has been the creation and development of private HEIs.
WHAT CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED IN TAIWANESE SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION? The impact of neo-liberal ideologies and market economies introduced in Taiwan during the previous two decades is clearly evident within the Taiwanese system of higher education. With this in mind the following section explores associated issues and dilemmas affecting university expansion, institutional autonomy, external funding and tuition fees, and global competitiveness. In terms of university expansion, it is important to note that there has been long-term growth in the number of HEIs. In 1987 Taiwan had a total of 107 universities and colleges which expanded to 130 in 1994 and 163 in 2006 (Fig. 1 and Table 1) (Ministry of Education, 2007a). The introduction of marketization and deregulation in the Taiwanese education reform Numbers of Universities 200
150
130
134
137
139
137
141
150
154
154
158
159
162
163
100 Numbers of Universites 50
0 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Fig. 1.
Growth of Taiwanese Universities.
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Table 1. Numbers of Universities in 1994–2006. Year
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Number of 130 universities
134
137
139
137
141
150
154
154
158
159
162
163
Source: Ministry of Education (2007a).
scheme reinforced university expansion. New reform programs have been implemented to alleviate student pressure including privatization of textbook editing, and adoption of multiple routes for high school and university entrance exams. Among the expansion, the ratio of public to private institutions, 1:1.96 (55:108) (Ministry of Education, 2007b), indicates that the expansion of higher education in Taiwan can be accounted for mainly by increasing private institutions. Private institutions accommodate more than 70% of the student population and charge twice as much in tuition in contrast to public universities. In Taiwan, public institutions are still regarded as more prestigious than their private counterparts. It has been argued that the expansion of HEIs since 1990s occurred largely because of the upgrading of existing institutions (especially from private vocational high schools and two-year colleges), although other strategies, such as splitting, merging, and increasing the size of the existing institutions, were also used to develop ‘‘new’’ institutions (Tsai & Shavit, 2003). The trend of institutional expansion can be merged with a consistent growth in the net enrollment rate of higher education among the 18–22 age cohorts, particularly among female students (which now constitute more than 45% of enrollees) (Chou & Ho, 2007b). The effects of institutional autonomy follow a similar trend. In reaction to pressures to institute market mechanism, MOE and the Executive Yuan Education Reform Committee of 1994–1996 analyzed several influences in higher education associated with the employment of market mechanisms. In the early 1990s they responded with a call for deregulation of the HE system. As such the government’s role was transformed to one of regulator and facilitator. Deregulation occurred concurrently with university expansion. This meant that a growing number of new students, supported by government funds constituted a financial burden for the government and the institutions. The government could no longer afford to financially support higher education; rather its new charge was to simply supervise HEIs through the
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University Law and other state regulations. To facilitate this process, the Ministry of Education initiated a proposal regarding the incorporation of universities, enabling public institutions to become independent, efficient, and autonomous entities under the protection of law (Huang, 2003). In 2004 this process was initiated with an added chapter to the University Law, referred to as the ‘‘Incorporation of Universities’’ (Huang, 2003). The proposal was not completely approved in the Legislative Yuan 2005 due to a lack of consensus from the general public and leading universities across the island. However, most public HEIs started implementing the market economies by revising staff employment guidelines which had a different system from faculty employment. In another effort to upgrade higher education quality in terms of improving efficiency and accountability, the MOE in Taiwan initiated the ‘‘1999 Project for Pursuing Excellence in Higher Education.’’ Four years later the ‘‘White Paper Report on Higher Education in Taiwan’’ was launched. The latter summarized the most recent developments of higher education in Taiwan and recommended a range of measures to achieve excellence in higher education (Laws and Regulations, 2004). To improve university financing, the government proposed changing the ratio and method of funding, and at the same time encouraging public universities to search for other ways of raising revenue, such as opening up EMBA (Executive Master of Business Administration) courses, offering continuing education for senior managerial staff in enterprises or government business administration departments, cooperation with enterprises for sponsorships, adult and continuing education, and the like (Dai et al., 2002). The Ministry of Education and the Education Reform Committee also suggested that Taiwanese universities and colleges were too homogeneous in terms of their functions and goals. To assist higher education institutes in becoming diversified, the MOE and Education Reform Committee recommended that HE should be differentiated in their characteristics and mission (Yang, 2001; Hsieh, 1997). As such existing salary scales – based largely on seniority – were viewed as insufficient to promote the desired competition among faculty for state-of-the-art in teaching and research. To increase faculty competitiveness the Education Reform Committee suggested a competitive reward system to replace the old fixed one. The MOE attempted to lessen its control over the establishment and enforcement of curriculum requirements; guidelines to allow for competing resources, as well as financial subsidies based on merit and performance evaluation of universities were established.
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Although the White Paper Report initiated controversy among critics, most of its policies were implemented (Ministry of Education, 2003). Universities and colleges now experience increasing pressure from the market and government to compete for resources, funding, and student recruitment. The importance of meritocracy, accountability, and networking among faculty and staff has dramatically increased (Chen, 2007). Moreover, the introduction of market mechanisms into universities shifted the expense of higher education from a public service to the responsibility of citizens. In regard to university budgets, the proportion of financial support from the MOE decreased from 62.7% in 2000 to 49.2% in 2006, whereas the proportion of tuition income increased from 12.83% to 21.59% (Chou, 2007; Chang & Ho, 2007). Accordingly, an ‘‘Administrative Funding Scheme’’ was introduced into public universities to improve accountability. No longer relying on government budgets alone, public (or the so-called ‘‘national’’) universities are required to designate partial funds for sharing administrative costs. The MOE and other government budgeting offices still have the right to regulate various university practices. Consequently, the MOE started a trial program based on these principles with five universities in 1996, allowing them increased autonomy in the allocation of resources. At present 55 out of 70 public universities participate in this program (Table 2) (Chang & Ho, 2007; Ministry of Education, 2007a). To become financially self-sufficient, leading universities have initiated unprecedented fund-raising campaigns, gathering donations from their alumni, general public, and various enterprises. However, many institutions have been less than successful in obtaining significant support from these sources, due to the lack of an established alumni network. Universities of lower prestige, private institutes, and those without wealthy alumni face further fund-raising challenge (Chen, 2003) (Table 3). In addition, the increase HEI tuitions has become a heavy burden for many students across Taiwan. From 1997 to 2006, tuition at public Table 2.
Source of Administrative Fund for Public Universities.
Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Tuition (%) MOE (%) Other (%)
12.83 62.7 24.47
15.03 59.5 25.47
15.83 57.9 26.27
20.19 52.5 27.31
22.74 49.7 27.56
21.93 49.7 28.37
21.59 49.2 29.21
Source: Ministry of Education (2007a).
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Table 3.
305
Percentage of Self-Fundraising in Public Universities.
Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Percentage
37.3
40.5
42.1
47.5
50.3
50.3
50.8
Source: Ministry of Education (2007b).
universities has increased approximately 42%, while private universities have experienced a 14% increase (on an already high-cost base). As indicated before, the expansion of higher education in Taiwan is mainly the result of the increased number of private HEIs which enroll students from less-advantaged family backgrounds (Chou, 2007). The increased university tuition among private HEIs has become an extra burden to families in Taiwan because most parents (GDP ¼ 15,640 USD in 2006) incur the additional expense, especially for students who attend private institutions (Tang, 2007). As a result more than half of the total university student population in Taiwan has student loans or part-time jobs (Chou, 2007).
HOW DOES TAIWAN PURSUE WORLD-CLASS UNIVERSITIES? The Taiwanese government has given high priority to the global competitiveness of higher education and to the development of a knowledge-based economy. This trend is clearly evident within the top universities, particularly prestigious public institutions. The current reform policy, to upgrade the capacity and quality of higher education in Taiwan, targets only a small number of top universities with the goal to gain recognition within the realm of the so-called ‘‘top 100 world-class universities’’ (Huang, 2003; Lu, 2005). Since 2003, MOE has promoted a ‘‘World Class Research University’’ project, which proposes to upgrade at least one Taiwanese university to the ranks of the top 100 leading international institutions of higher education. To support this effort, MOE developed a ‘‘five-year, fifty billion budget’’ (an estimated US$1.6 billion) in 2006. The budget serves to empower potential universities to improve their fundamental development, to help them integrate human resources from different departments and disciplines, and to establish research centers of cutting-edge specialized research (Ministry of Education, 2006). Twelve universities (two private HEIs) were selected and granted a bulk fund in 2006.
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Recently, there has been debate concerning what constitutes the ‘‘top 100 world-class universities,’’ who defines them, and according to whose standards (Altbach, 2003; Hwang, 2003). Without a doubt, universities in Taiwan, even the most prestigious ones such as the National Taiwan University (NTU), have been striving for international competitiveness among professoriate. Like NTU, many universities, public or private, are now required to establish an internal and external faculty evaluation system to monitor their publication records in various international databases such as the Science Citation Index (SCI), Social Science Citation Index (SSCI), the Engineering Index (EI), etc. (Approaching the worldclass universities scheme, 2005; Chou & Ho, 2007a). The evaluation system is an effort to become aligned with international standards leading to awards, achievements, and contributions to academic knowledge (Altbach, 2003; Mok, 2003). As a result, the ‘‘Higher Education Evaluation and Accreditation Council of Taiwan’’ was established in 2006 as a semigovernmental agency to conduct university evaluations on a regular basis. It is hoped that this organization will provide constructive evaluation reports for institutional improvement and recommendations for public funding references.
WHAT ARE THE RESULTING CHALLENGES IN HIGHER EDUCATION? As indicated earlier, the adoption of neo-liberal, free-market economic policies, and consequent deregulation of education is an attempt to increase the relative autonomy and responsibility of individual institutions. By deregulation and liberalization, each HEI is expected to become more competitive and accountable. However, in recent years the influence of this market trend within university reform has created some controversy. First, the road to reform for higher education in Taiwan and its related pursuit of world-class standards has revealed significant challenges that the country must confront and overcome to achieve these goals (Chou, 2005; Lu, 2005). In Taiwan, universities, especially the public ones, have long been viewed throughout the culture and society as a public good which are accessible to anyone who can pass the college entrance exams, regardless of the ability to pay. The introduction of neo-liberal ideology and its various market-oriented commodity outcomes has transformed higher education
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into a more personalized option for individuals based on family income and investment decisions (Chang & Ho, 2007). Secondly, in response to market-oriented demands, HEIs are pressured to reorganize their departments and coursework according to the perceived dictates of the market. Students, keen to enhance their job prospects, tend to take courses that they can link to ‘‘practical outcomes’’ rather than to ‘‘theoretical foundations.’’ Institutions are viewed as trainers of academic entrepreneurs pursuing professional knowledge as a matter of business, rather than as facilitators of truth or discovery (Tsai & Shavit, 2003). The short-term and possibly short-sighted implications for research conducted in this new market environment seem obvious. Moreover, as a result of the shrinking public funding opportunities, universities now are pressured to engage in fund-raising from business enterprises and corporations. The shift away from government financial support may be transforming higher education into institutions molded by the interests of the business world (Chen, 2003). In addition, schools and departments of liberal arts are forced to transform either their names or programs to remain competitive. Programs such as those providing teaching credentials and education degrees are downsizing or even closing down because of the shrinking opportunities for their graduates in the job market (Olssen, 2002; Chou & Ho, 2007a). Courses that relate to critical theory, literature, philosophy, and other nonapplied subjects are today becoming regarded as ‘‘cold disciplines,’’ meaning they have lost popularity due to their lack of immediate value in the job market. Above all, tuition increases in both public and private HEIs have become a heavy burden for many students across Taiwan. During the period from 1997 to 2003, tuition at public universities has increased approximately 40%, while private universities have experienced a 12% increase from an already high base (Chang & Ho, 2007; Ministry of Education, 2005). In 1995, educational expenses for universities were approximately 80,000 NT (US$2,500) per student per year; by 2002, that number had increased to 120,000 NT (US$3,800) per student (Chou, 2007; Chang & Ho, 2007; Ministry of Education, 2005). Families have to bear these high costs, especially for students who attend private institutions. The latter make up about 66% of the total universities and colleges in Taiwan (Fig. 2 and Table 4). As a result of the rapid expansion of HEIs and the restriction of government funding, higher education has gradually transformed into a private business negotiation.
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1,400,000 1,200,000 1,000,000 800,000 600,000
Private
400,000
Public
200,000 0
1970
Fig. 2.
Public Private Total
2000
2004
2005
2006
year
Trend of Student Growth of Public and Private Universities.
Table 4. Year
1985
Student Growth of Public and Private Universities.
1970
1985
2000
2004
2005
2006
74,534 128,939 203,473
132,696 295,880 428,576
295,184 796,918 1,092,102
369,889 915,978 1,285,867
379,042 911,623 1,290,665
393,920 913,964 1,307,884
Source: Ministry of Education (2007b).
WHAT WILL HAPPEN NEXT TO TAIWANESE HIGHER EDUCATION? As indicated earlier, Taiwanese higher education, was until the late 1980s, administered by the government. Alongside the general trends toward political democracy and economic deregulation, coupled with the influence of the global advance of neo-liberalism ideology, Taiwanese higher education went through a period of great transformation. In the early 1990s, the general public called for the government to withdraw its control over universities, to allow autonomy, efficiency, and flexibility in university decision-making and daily operations (Chou, 2003; Hwang, 2003). Under this public pressure, a series of reforms aiming at decentralization and deregulation of public institutes were launched to enhance institutional autonomy and academic freedom, which were protected by the constitution.
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Specific reforms included: deregulation of government control; privatization of public services; introduction of accountability and competition; shared governance and funding resources between the state and HEIs; and implementation of external evaluation schemes to monitor reform outcomes. Meanwhile college enrollments expanded, university system were restructured, curriculum and instruction were revised, and there was a sharp increase in competition for resources; competition that largely replaced the collegial environment of earlier decades. In addition, many of the national universities are today striving to become world-class institutions, as the government earmarks special bulk funds to upgrade their education (Huang, 2003). In the long run, some leading HEIs in Taiwan have benefited and made significant progress, improving their physical infrastructure and increasing their presence in international research journals. As the years progressed, more and more universities have enjoyed institutional autonomy, but are also facing challenges in fund-raising, accountability, and evaluation (Chang & Ho, 2007). As higher education reform progresses, there are mixed feelings in all walks of life with regard to the change. Many universities today are providing education with more of an eye toward profit than quality. The implications for educational quality and equity of opportunities tend to be less emphasized in the era of market-driven environments (Olssen, 2002; Mok & Welch, 2003). In sum, Taiwan has been responding to the global trend toward marketoriented reform to higher education alongside its political and social transformation since the late 1980s. Taiwan’s reforms offer a valuable lesson to other countries, such as China, Japan, and Korea who are also grappling with reforms motivated by neo-liberal ideology. In the 21st century, education, especially higher education, has become more and more desirable, and therefore, should be available to any autonomous chooser in a neo-liberal society according to Foucaudian perspective (Fitzsimons, 2002). Nevertheless, McGinn (1996) and Carnoy (2006) argued that once the global market economies are introduced to a country, the government will eventually lose control over the domestic reform decision-making to its global forces. Several local or international critics (Huang, 1997; Dai, 1998; Altbach, 2003) also urged that any developing or middle-income country should be more aware of the consequences brought on by neo-liberalism, the market economy, and the globalization forces while reforming its higher education system. As countries like Taiwan establish new rules, pulling all educational resources together, in pursuit of the world’s first-class standard,
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the public mission of university must not be forgotten – preserving, passing, and creating culture and knowledge for the betterment of the human society, and especially the next generation (Hayhoe, 1989, 1995; Zappia, 2000).
REFERENCES Altbach, P. (2003). Centers and peripheries in the academic profession: The special challenges of developing countries. In: P. Altbach (Ed.), The decline of the Guru: The academic profession in developing and middle-income countries. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Altbach, P. (2004). Globalization and the university: Myths and realities in an unequal world. Tertiary Education and Management, 10, 3–25. Approaching the world-class universities scheme. (2005). Ministry of Education, Higher Education Newsletter, p. 178. Carnoy, M. (2006). Rethinking the comparative – and the international. Comparative Education Review, 50(4). Chang, K. W., & Ho, M. S. (2007). Half-hearted neoliberal reform: Analyzing Taiwan’s college tuition policy and controversy. Education and Social Studies, 12. Chen, L. Y. (2007). Implications of competing values framework for developing internalization indicators for higher education evaluation plan. Journal of Educational Administration, 3(June). Chen, T. Y. (2003). A study of self-fundraising strategy and university administrative fund. Available at http://www.nou.edu.tw/Bresearch/data/data_01_39.htm. Retrieved on November 20, 2007. Chen, Y. L. (2006). The war between 80 versus 800. Business Weekly (Taiwan), p. 954. Chou, C. P. (2003). The great experiment of Taiwanese education: 1987–2003. Taipei: Psychology Publishing. Chou, C. P. (2005). The influence of neo-liberalism on higher education – New Zealand model. Journal of Education Research (136), 148–158. Chou, C. P. (2007). Beyond university tuition fee: A nation-wide on-line survey on university student living cost. Journal of Educational Research, 154. Chou, C. P., & Ho, A.-H. (2007a). Internationalisation of higher education in Taiwan: A case study of National Taiwan University. Unpublished preliminary research findings. Chou, C. P., & Ho, A.-Hsin. (2007b). Schooling in Taiwan. In: G. A. Postiglione & J. Tan (Eds), Going to school in East Asia. Westport: Greenwood. Dai, X. X. (1998). Higher education of the new century. Cross-strait Youth Scholar Forum proceedings. Taipei: National Taiwan Normal University. Dai, X. X., Mok, K. H., & Xie, A. B. (2002). The marketization of higher education: A comparative study of Taiwan, Hong Kong and China. Taipei: Higher Education Publishing. Dale, R. (2001). Constructing a long spoon for comparative education: Charting the career of the New Zealand model. Comparative Education, 37(4), 493–501. Fitzsimons, P. (2002). Neo-liberalism and education: The autonomous chooser. In Radical Pedagogy. Available at http://radicalpedagogy.icaap.org/content/issue4_2/ 04_fitzsimons.html. Retrieved on November 2006.
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Giroux, H. A. (2002). Neo-liberalism, corporate culture, and the promise of higher education: The university as a democratic public sphere. Harvard Educational Review, 72(4). Hayhoe, R. (1989). China’s universities and western university models. In: P. G. Philip & V. Selvaratnam (Eds), From dependence to autonomy: The development of Asian universities. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic. Hayhoe, R. (1995). Comparative reflections on the transition to mass higher education in East Asia. Comparative Education Review, 39(3), 299–321. Hooker, M. (1997). The transformation of higher education. In: D. Oblinger & S. C. Rush (Eds), The learning revolution. Bolton, MA: Anker Publishing Company. Hsieh, W. T. (1997). Review of the Taiwanese Executive Yuan Education Reform Committee report. Education Research and Information, 5(5). Huang, C. J. (1997). Problems and solutions on current university education reform. Taipei: Hanwen Publishing. Huang, J. T. (2003). The current development and challenges of higher education in Taiwan. A speech by Dr. J. T. Huang, Minister of Education, Taiwan, October 13, 2003. Available at http://www.edu.tw/EDU_WEB/EDU_MGT/BICER/EDUANDY001/ english/e031018.htm?open. Retrieved on November 29, 2007. Hwang, K.-K. (2003). What’s wrong with Taiwanese education reform? Taipei: INK Publishing. Laws and Regulations, Database of the Republic of China. (2004). University Law. Available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/Fnews/FnewsContent.asp?msgid=2307&msgType=en& keyword=undefined. Retrieved on July 9, 2006. Lu, M. L. (2005). Policies of higher education in Taiwan and the development of private higher education institutions. Paper presented at Seminar of Transformation in University Management – From the perspective of marketization in high education: Its Implication for the relationship private university and Taiwanese government. Taipei, Tamkang University. McGinn, N. (1996). Education, democratization, and globalization: A challenge for comparative education. Comparative Education Review, 40(4). Ministry of Education. (2003). White paper report on higher education in Taiwan. Available at http://history.moe.gov.tw/important.asp?id=37. Retrieved on November 25, 2007. Ministry of Education. (2005). Summary of universities, colleges and junior colleges. Available at http://www.edu.tw/EDU_WEB/EDU_MGT/STATISTICS/EDU7220001/data/serial/u.htm? UNITID=139&CATEGORYID=260&FILEID=130551&open. Retrieved on July 19, 2007. Ministry of Education. (2006). Financial report for Public Schools. Available at http://www.edu. tw/EDU_WEB/EDU_MGT/ACCOUNTING/EDU7538001/Address/Public/Address.htm? TYPE=1&UNITID=199&CATEGORYID=361&FILEID=142511. Retrieved on July 10, 2006. Ministry of Education. (2007a). Summaries of universities and colleges, SY 2006-07. Available at http://140.111.1.22/index.shtml. Retrieved on November 25, 2007. Ministry of Education. (2007b). Educational Statistics, SY 2006-07. Available at http:// www.accounting.tchcvs.tc.edu.tw/. Retrieved on November 10, 2007. Mok, K. H. (2003). Globalization and higher education restructuring in Hong Kong, Taiwan and mainland China. Higher Education Research & Development, 22(2). Mok, K.-H., & Welch, A. (Eds). (2003). Globalization and educational restructuring in the Asia Pacific region. Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan.
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Olssen, M. (2002). The restructuring of tertiary education in New Zealand: Governmentality, neo-liberalism, democracy. McGill Journal of Education (Montreal), 37(1). Pan, H.-L., & Yu, C. (1999). Educational reforms with their impacts on school effectiveness and school improvement in Taiwan. R.O.C. School Effectiveness and School Improvement, 10(1), 72–85. Rhoads, R. A. (2006). University reform in global times: Opportunities and challenges. Chung Cheng Educational Studies, 5(1). Song, M. M. (2005). Relationship of government and high education within marketization: Its implications for the role and development of private higher education institution in China. Paper presented at Seminar of Transformation in University Management – From the perspective of marketization in high education: Its Implication for the relationship private university and Taiwanese government, Tamkang University, Taipei. Tang, H. L. (2007). The disappearing seven years in Taiwan. NPFR Research Report. Available at http://www.npf.org.tw/particle-2110-2.html. Retrieved on November 28, 2007. Tsai, C. H. (1996). The deregulation of higher education in Taiwan. International Higher Education, Spring. Available at http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/soe/cihe/newsletter/ News04/textcy03.html. Retrieved on May 1, 2007. Tsai, S. L., & Shavit, Y. (2003). Higher education in Taiwan: Expansion and inequality of educational opportunity. Paper presented at the International Sociology Association RC28 Research Comty, August 22–24, New York. Yang, R. (2003). Globalization and higher education development: A critical analysis. International Review of Education, 49. Yang, S.-K. (2001). Dilemmas of education reform in Taiwan: Internationalization or localization? Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Comparative and International Education Society, March 13–17, Washington, DC, USA. Zappia, C. A. (2000). The private sector and public higher education. Perspectives, May.
AMERICA IN THE WORLD: HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE Philip G. Altbach and Patti McGill Peterson Higher education is in a period of significant transformation globally. Universities are influenced by market forces, and are everywhere asked to be responsive to demands from students, the society, and the state. Academic institutions are expected to conduct themselves in more competitive ways and to develop goals and strategies that take advantage of emerging opportunities in the academic marketplace. As David Kirp has noted, the ‘‘bottom line’’ is increasingly important (Kirp, 2003). Demand for higher education around the world is escalating rapidly. As a consequence, it has become one of the ‘‘growth industries’’ of the 21st century. Higher education is a point of strength for developed and developing countries alike – necessary for providing the personnel needed for complex postindustrial economies in the north and for economic development in the south. Research, much of it produced in universities, is an essential component of the development equation. Higher education also provides a key means for social mobility – providing opportunities for advancement for individuals and groups. In short, institutions of higher education are central to a country’s national as well as international aspirations (Altbach & Peterson, 2007). Much of the debate about higher education has focused on impact of market forces and the global dynamics of expansion (Task Force on Higher The Worldwide Transformation of Higher Education International Perspectives on Education and Society, Volume 9, 313–335 Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1479-3679/doi:10.1016/S1479-3679(08)00011-X
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Education and Society, 2000). Higher education is recognized as a growing international force – more than two million students are studying outside of their own countries, and there is a growing number of universities with overseas branch campuses. Research, always international in scope, flows beyond national borders. Nations, as well as academic institutions, increasingly have international strategies. In most cases, these strategies are intended to earn income from the growing cross-border international trade or help internationalize the academic experiences of students. This chapter examines a neglected element of higher education worldwide – the potential and reality of its contribution to the ‘‘soft power’’ of nations. How does higher education relate to the image, the influence as well as to the ‘‘bottom line’’ of nations? Do countries think about the contribution universities might make to their foreign-policy objectives and diplomacy, or to their overall role in the world? Is attention paid by higher education institutions or government policy makers to this contribution of higher education? We look at these issues by focusing mainly on the United States – the role of American higher education worldwide and the policies and programs of US institutions and the federal government in international higher education. We also briefly examine how international trends may be impacting several other major countries in terms of ‘‘soft power.’’ Higher education has always served as an international force, influencing intellectual and scientific development and spreading ideas worldwide. Its sphere of influence encompasses people and institutions. The experience of studying, either in one’s own country or abroad, helps to shape a worldview and attitudes toward society and culture. This essay focuses on the part that higher education has played in supporting America’s ascendant role in international education and in defining America’s place in the hierarchy of nations. Invented and expounded by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., the idea of ‘‘soft power’’ encompasses the nexus of influences in world affairs that relate to culture, science, technology, and other subtle forces. Nye explores the interaction of soft power with ‘‘hard power’’ in trade treaties such as the World Trade Organization, military alliances, and direct involvement by one country in the affairs of another (Nye, 2004). Recent discussions in US government circles about America’s public diplomacy around the world refer frequently to the strength and attractiveness of the country’s higher education system and the effectiveness of educational exchange as a way to explain American values to the rest of the world – themes emphasized by Joseph Nye throughout Soft Power.
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With polls indicating rising anti-Americanism, there has been a commensurate increase in discussions about reinvigorating America’s public diplomacy efforts among officials including the secretary of state and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as well as a significant amount of press coverage. Ultimately, the concept of public diplomacy, which consists of engaging, informing, and influencing citizens of other countries, is the same as Nye’s concept of soft power. What is not clear at this point is how the United States will choose to exercise its soft power. Much advice, whether officially requested or freely offered, focuses upon the importance of long-term engagement of foreign populations through educational and cultural exchange as opposed to shortterm propaganda campaigns. The American Academy of Diplomacy recommended a multibillion dollar endowment for America to fulfill a long-term and sustainable commitment to both exchange programs and the improvement of international understanding in the American education system. The purpose of the endowment would be to fund youth exchange programs, underwrite the Fulbright program, and make selective grants to educational institutions in the United States to enhance the teaching of international relations, history, and foreign languages (American Academy of Diplomacy, 2004). The Public Diplomacy Council, a nonpartisan group of professionals with extensive foreign-service experience, called upon the administration and Congress to revitalize public diplomacy efforts, integrating them into all foreign-policy deliberations, and supporting their contribution to the security and well-being of the United States. Among its recommendations was an increase in educational exchange programs (Public Diplomacy Council, 2005). The current emphasis among US government officials on ‘‘winning the hearts and minds’’ of people in the Muslim world has included strategies for bringing more secondary school youth and university students from the region to study in the United States. Many people who are concerned about the way the United States is currently perceived among Muslim populations see international education as an essential part of America’s strategy to foster greater mutual understanding (Djerejian, 2003; Council on Foreign Relations, 2003). The issue of how to structure US soft power has a much larger and longer context. International education and academic exchange have played a role in international relations for a very long time. Understanding that context and appreciating the special strengths of American higher education and the competition it will face will be important to determine how the United States can best exercise its public diplomacy through higher education in the future.
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE The relationship between soft power and international education is not a new phenomenon. Students have studied abroad since the origin of the modern university in the Middle Ages and have been influenced by what they learned and experienced. Faculty members and researchers have also crossed borders for millennia, and knowledge has always been international in scope. Indeed, medieval universities were international institutions, bringing together students and faculty from many European countries and operating in a single language, Latin (Haskins, 2002). Through its strong emphasis on theology and canon law, the medieval university served as a bastion of power for the Catholic Church. The Jesuit mission of spreading the faith through education was an important aspect of the church’s soft power. Historically, the Jesuits recognized education as a powerful force and established schools and universities around the world to spread knowledge and Roman Catholicism (O’Malley, Bailey, Harris, & Kennedy, 1999). Missionaries from various other Christian denominations were also actively involved in higher education overseas (Ashby, 1966; Lutz, 1971). Colonial administrators often saw higher education as a useful accompaniment to their work. The British were particularly adept at developing institutions on site and in sending promising students from the colonized regions back to England to study at British universities. Britishstyle colleges and universities were established in India as early as 1835, and students educated at these institutions provided the backbone of the colonial administration for a century or more (Basu, 1974). Colonial education also led to the rise of nationalist movements. Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru were, after all, educated in colonial schools in India and then in England. The United States, during its brief period as a colonial power, used higher education as part of its colonial policy. It established higher education institutions in the Philippines, as part of its presence in that country (Gonzalez, 2004). However, the United States played a far more active role in spreading its cultural and political ideas during the cold war. American higher education had a central role in the ideological struggle with the Soviet Union. Academic exchanges, scholarship programs, and research projects were sponsored by the US government, private foundations, and other agencies – with the goal of contributing to a positive American image worldwide as well as of creating links with academics and other sectors internationally. Some analysts criticized governmental links
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with academe, while others saw these efforts as essential to American foreign policy (Coombs, 1964; Altbach, 1971; Chomsky, 1997). The US government’s response to the cold war also prompted more federal support for the rise of the American university to an international leadership level. Nationally funded grant programs in the sciences, mathematics, language, and area studies contributed to this rise. In the post-World War II period, American higher education, especially its research universities, achieved world-class preeminence. Attracting students and scholars, the United States became the largest host country for international students. Further, English was established as the principal language of science and scholarship, and US universities came to dominate scholarly and scientific communication as well. Boosted by the battle over ideas of the cold war, the strength and attractiveness of American higher education became a critical element for the US government in its outreach to other nations.
THE CONDITIONS FOR AMERICAN ACADEMIC INFLUENCE A number of elements of the US academic system account for its worldwide influence. American colleges and universities are often cited as the ‘‘gold standard’’ in terms of academic structure, curriculum, and research. They are increasingly used as a model for the development of new universities around the world. American research and scholarship are also considered to be world class. The international reputation of science in the United States is a key element of its soft power (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2003). The paradigms and results of research have a wide influence internationally and also tend to dominate the networks of knowledge dissemination – journals and the Internet (Altbach, 2001). In addition to its dominant role in the academic hierarchy worldwide, the United States has the most highly complex and diversified higher education system. (Only China enrolls more students, but its higher education system is not as well developed as that of the United States.) In addition to the widespread influence of American research universities, a more diverse range of institutions are attracting foreign populations and are becoming models for other countries seeking to expand vocational postsecondary education. In recent years, America’s community colleges have increased their efforts to attract foreign students, and they have discovered a very
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receptive market for the type and cost of the education that they offer. In particular, their business management and computer science programs have been attractive to foreign students. The result is that over the past decade international student enrollments at US community colleges have risen by almost 60 percent. The fact that there is a differentiated academic system offering study opportunities at many levels is an advantage in the United States. While a high proportion of international students study at the toptier research universities, significant numbers can be found throughout the academic system. The organization of the American academic system also appeals to international students. Programs of study are, in general, transparent and tightly organized. The US course-credit system permits students to measure their academic progress and, if necessary, to transfer from one academic institution to another. Credit is given for individual courses and there is frequent feedback on academic work. It is possible to transfer certain academic coursework from one university to another. Graduate programs are designed so that students know the curriculum and can calculate the time it will take to earn a degree. This overview is in contrast to many other countries, where graduate study is not as well organized. Knowledgeable observers from Europe are keen to point out that these aspects of US higher education buttressed by its diversity, flexibility, and private sources of funding create an extraordinary competitive edge for US higher education (Wooldridge, 2005). So attractive are such features as the credit system and other elements that support coherency in US higher education that the European Union, through the Bologna initiatives, is adapting many of these practices to meet European needs. American higher education is also attractive to faculty members and researchers. The academic ranks are well defined, and US academic institutions have traditionally been willing to appoint foreigners to academic posts (in sharp contrast to many other countries where it has been difficult for noncitizens to obtain professorships). The immigration of highly educated people – some fleeing repression and others coming to improve their working conditions – have been and continue to be an important catalyst for intellectual and scientific life in the United States. The academic working conditions in the United States are also generally attractive. Academic freedom is an accepted norm, and there are few restrictions on teaching or research. The past several decades have witnessed some deterioration in academic work – for example, an increase in the number of part-time as compared to full-time staff, some cutbacks in appointments, and slow salary growth. But in contrast to higher education
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institutions in many other countries, American universities and colleges are attractive places to teach and study. With English as the official language of scholarship, the United States benefits from having the largest English-speaking academic system. Not only is English the most widely studied second language worldwide, it is the lingua franca of both science and international business. Countries that offer higher education in English have an inherent advantage in the international marketplace, so much so that many nations – including China, Japan, the Netherlands, and even France – are offering academic programs in English. American universities and American culture generally, have traditionally been open to international students. The United States, as a multiethnic and multiracial society, has a long experience with immigrants and is viewed as tolerant of people of various backgrounds. Despite a documented history of racial discrimination, the United States is seen abroad as an open society in comparison to many other countries. American universities have faculties that include people from many nationalities and backgrounds. This openness is an attraction to international students and scholars. For these and other reasons, American higher education has drawn students, faculty members, and researchers from many countries. They have come to the United States to study and have returned home after obtaining their academic degrees or after a period of employment in the United States. Others stay and make their careers in the United States. Still others study for shorter periods of time, experiencing American culture and academe, but obtain their degrees at home. Visiting scholars and researchers (97,000 in 2005) come to the United States for periods of research or study. The myriad ways in which foreign students and scholars have engaged in study and research in America have formed an extensive sustainable network of relationships that provides an important infrastructure for public diplomacy. Through study abroad and academic exchange, such as the Fulbright program, the United States has developed a deep reservoir of mutual understanding and goodwill with opinion leaders in other countries. It has served as a vital aspect of America’s ability to present and explain itself to the rest of the world.
THE US MOTIVATION IN INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION One reason for America’s successful role in higher education worldwide is the lack of central government planning and the presence of diversity.
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The federal government has sponsored a variety of initiatives – including well-known and successful programs sponsored by the US Department of State and other programs under the auspices of the National Science Foundation, the Department of Defense, and other agencies. However, only a small minority of international students and scholars in the United States are funded by these or other government programs. Further, while there is a growing international outreach by the new for-profit sector in the United States, the large majority of international initiatives are sponsored and funded by either publicly supported state institutions or private nonprofit academic institutions – with the bulk of funding coming from those participating in the programs. The interest of US colleges and universities is not merely altruistic in nature. Foreign students, totaling more than 564,000 in 2005, are estimated to add about $13 billion to the US economy. They contribute to the coffers of the universities that serve them and the communities in which they live. Indeed, many universities and colleges have designated staff whose sole purpose is to attract foreign students to their institutions. The huge exhibit hall at annual meetings of the Association of International Educators: NAFSA is filled with academics who are competing to attract foreign students to their countries and institutions. Whether for monetary or intellectual capital the value of attracting foreign students to US higher education constitutes very serious business. In the quest to be more successful in enrolling foreign students at US institutions, a number of national educational organizations have called upon the government to develop a national policy in this area (NAFSA, 2000). The motivations of the academic community vary, although most American colleges and universities define their main goals as academic rather than commercial. Committed to internationalizing their campuses, many institutions enroll international students as well as sending their own students abroad for study. Similarly, campus-based international programs, curricular offerings, and related undertakings are aimed at providing an international orientation for students. Some colleges and universities see internationalization as a key part of their academic programs. Foreign students, especially at the graduate and professional levels, also support research and teaching programs of many universities – serving as teaching and research assistants. In some fields of study such as a few graduate engineering specialties, as well as some doctoral fields in computer science and management studies, foreign students constitute a significant part of enrollments. In fact, some departments and programs could not survive
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without them. A small number of schools depend on international enrollments to fill seats and balance the budget. Direct commercial motivation increasingly serves as a stimulus for international programs and initiatives. Several of the new for-profit providers, such as Laureate Education (formerly the Sylvan Learning Systems) and the Apollo Group, are active internationally in higher education. Traditional academic institutions are now more likely to see overseas activities as potentially profitable ventures. It is unclear how commercialization and a market orientation will affect the traditional norms and values of higher education, but there is little question that some changes will occur. It is not possible to quantify the various goals for internationalization in American higher education, and there are certainly a mixture of rationales and motivations. However, if the motivation becomes largely commercial, as it is in many countries, it will in the long run weaken the academic enterprise of foreign study. Among the diverse motivations and policies, governmental initiative is without question only a minor factor.
THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN STUDY Much has been written about the impact of foreign study (Barber, Altbach, & Myers, 1984). This brief summary reveals a variety of influences and outlines the significant long-term impact. It is possible to see many of these factors as elements of soft power – of the continuing impact of one culture on the thinking and behavior of people from different countries. Without question, those who study abroad are influenced by their sojourn. They learn about the subjects they study, and many earn an academic degree that is useful at home. While science is of course universal, approaches to the curriculum, methodologies, and publications reflect particular countries. International students studying at American universities learn American approaches to science and scholarship, use American methods, and focus often on American data and problems. All these aspects of education shape lifelong perspectives on academic work. Students also experience the academic cultures where they study. It is common for graduates of American universities to return home with a zeal to alter their home institutions to resemble the American academic model – by promoting the departmental organization, seminars, the course-credit system, and the availability of laboratory and library facilities.
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These arrangements may be effective, and feasible, in Wisconsin but may be impracticable in Niger or Cambodia. Students learn ways of engaging in scientific inquiry, specific methodologies, forms of interaction on campus, and the other subtle but nonetheless important norms of academic life. They get linked to specific networks of colleagues who remain relevant to them in later life, networks easy to maintain because of the Internet. Students master the use of specialized equipment – certain kinds of laboratory instrumentation, computers, and programing. The American university has a style of academic work that is often adopted by international students and scholars. Nonacademic norms and values may also influence international students and scholars. Such effects may be as varied as a predilection for American fast food, an affinity for certain elements of US popular culture, adoption of aspects of the American life-style, or even marriage to an American spouse. Most international students return to countries that are not as academically developed as the United States, and a kind of center-periphery relationship takes hold. The graduates in their subsequent careers look to the United States as a central reference, working with American colleagues, using American scientific equipment, adopting American methodologies for work, and advising students to study in the United States. American universities and scholars help to maintain these links over time through alumni organizations, informal scientific networks, international conferences, and in many other ways (Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 2001). US universities even seek to raise funds from wealthy overseas alumni. In a number of cases returning scholars have provided the impetus for their own higher education institutions to adopt American models for substantial reform. The 1993 higher education act in Hungary reflected this kind of change. Hungarian university rectors were very influential in the law’s passage. Six of the rectors involved in this reform movement had studied in America as Fulbright Scholars.
THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE In the latter half of the 20th century, the United States became the world leader in attracting foreign students and scholars to its shores. The United States is widely admired for its renowned scholars and Nobel laureates, an enviable record of scientific discovery, as well as the institutions that spawn the research. The beginning of the 21st century, however, represented a period of significant transition in international higher education. The key
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factors are the impact of September 11, 2001 on the United States, especially in the area of immigration policy and the general openness of the society; and the simultaneous emergence of competitors in the field of international higher education; the advent of distance education; and the rise of new for-profit academic providers. The essential elements of American higher education’s role in the world did not change as a result of September 11. The US academic and research systems remain the strongest in the world, and students worldwide still see the United States as a major academic attraction. Yet shifts are evident – some obvious, some subtle, and some as yet uncertain. While the total numbers of international students worldwide continue to grow, increases in foreign-student enrollments in the United States stopped in 2002–2003 and actually decreased by 2.4 percent in 2003–2004 at a time when most major competitors were seeing significant growth in their overseas enrollments (Chin, 2004; Altbach, 2004). Overall numbers increased by 8 percent in 2005–2006, indicating a significant turn around. These countries, increasingly entrepreneurial in their pursuit of graduate enrollments, are benefiting from the progressively more inhospitable environment for foreign students in the United States. Coming to study in the United States has become an obstacle course, and prospective students abroad are increasingly leery of stringent, changing, arbitrary, and sometimes inconsistent government regulations regarding visas, reporting to government agencies, and the like. Students from developing countries, especially those from the Islamic world, report being treated in their countries with disrespect by US officials. American university administrators responsible for international students also express concern that a significant number of students are denied visas or are forced to wait so long that they are unable to study in the United States, although government statistics do not show a significant number of visa denials. A report from the Council of Graduate Schools documented a 28 percent drop in applications for 2004 graduate-school enrollments from foreign students in a survey of 125 top graduate schools in the United States (Council of Graduate Schools, 2004). While applications for 2005 did not decline as steeply, they were down by 5 percent. They have, however, shown some signs of rebounding since then. The Council of Graduate Schools has sounded the alarm by indicating that such a trend may signal a change in the nation’s status as the destination of choice for international students. This has prompted American university administrators to ask US government officials to examine what can be done to ameliorate the situation. The implementation of the SEVIS computer-based tracking system by the
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Department of Homeland Security and the imposition of new fees charged to students from abroad constitute additional barriers. News of the difficult visa process has spread rapidly through foreign-student populations and their families. The stories and myths concerning these difficulties have combined to create a new reality for the attractiveness of American higher education. Student applicants and their parents hear about these difficulties, and some choose not to come to the United States – particularly now that other countries are laying out welcome mats. It is not only students who may experience a chilling effect. Recent examples, such as that of Tariq Ramadan, also add to concern about the openness of American society and its institutions. Professor Ramadan, a Swiss theologian who was born in Egypt, is a well-known and respected authority on Islamic religion. His invitation to be the Henry Luce Professor of Religion, Conflict and Peace at Notre Dame University became a casualty of America’s new immigration policies. The revocation of his visa has been seen as a prime example of the decreasing openness of the American government and, by extension, academic institutions to a broad spectrum of visiting scholars. Professor Ramadan’s recent appointment at Oxford University poses an interesting juxtaposition of the US and UK response to terrorism. Other less high-profile scholars have experienced difficulties in securing permission to come to the United States for research projects, particularly in the sciences. Short-term visits for academic meetings have also been affected by increased restrictions that have limited the attendance of foreign scholars. These issues ultimately found a voice when a letter from the major higher education associations went to the Secretaries of State and Education expressing a general concern about these conditions as well as specific concerns about such issues as policies that would require researchers to obtain export-control licenses to use equipment designated as ‘‘sensitive’’ by government officials (Rainey, 2006). According to a 2002 survey conducted by JWT Communications, students considering studying abroad see the United States as a less safe place to study compared to such competitors as Australia and the United Kingdom (but that such safety concerns do not yet loom very large, at least in the absence of additional major terrorist attacks in the United States). Although American international study administrators have noted an increase in concerns about safety, foreign students currently studying in the United States report feeling quite safe – security is seen as a greater problem from outside the United States than it is by students actually studying in the country. Many foreign students are more concerned about the safety of American students studying in some countries and regions in light of
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anti-Americanism. Only a small number of foreign students went home immediately following September 11, and most of them later returned to the United States to complete their studies. The world of international higher education does not remain static. Key competitors have placed much greater emphasis on attracting students to their universities and see that increased American barriers to foreign students work to their advantage. Even before the effects of 9/11, there were indications that competitors were eroding some of the US ‘‘King of the Hill’’ status. In 1970, the United States enrolled about 30 percent of the world’s college students, but by 2000 its market share of the global college student population had fallen to 14 percent. This decline is apparent in the area of science and engineering. For example, in 1999, Europe surpassed US production of PhDs in science and engineering, and by 2001 was granting 40 percent more doctorates in science and engineering than the US. Asia (particularly China and India) is rapidly closing its gap as well. Over the past 30 years, America’s leading role in educating scientists and engineers has been steadily falling (Freeman, 2005). The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) sounded the alarm in its report, Rising Above the Gathering Strom, in which it called upon the US government to allow for an automatic one-year visa extension to foreign students who receive doctorates in science and technology fields in order to give them time to look for work here. As other countries build up their own higher education capabilities and competitors for international students strengthen their programs and enhance their marketing, pressures will mount for the US government to address the issues raised by the NAS and the business sector, which relies significantly on scientists trained in US universities. Other regions are successfully competing with the United States for foreign students. Australia is an especially aggressive recruiter of foreign students, with the United Kingdom and New Zealand not far behind. The Canadian government recently announced that it was altering its immigration policies to help its colleges and universities recruit foreign students. All of these countries see attracting students to their institutions as a major source of revenue and a way to perhaps increase their soft power through higher education. They are all in a position to take advantage of English as the lingua franca of international education. Their governments have stimulated an active foreign-provider education policy as a means of reducing local expenditures on higher education. Other countries may also begin to see their own higher education systems as strong enough to warrant less support of studying abroad for their
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students. For example, in 2004 the Mexican government decided to provide less funding for graduate study in the United States. The announcement was accompanied by a statement indicating the action was justified due to the increased strength and status of graduate programs at Mexican institutions. The governments of Singapore and Malaysia have announced their intentions of becoming attractive higher education centers in Asia and offering first-class higher education to a broad clientele. Countries such as Qatar and Dubai are building ‘‘education cities’’ to attract students from the region who might otherwise be lured to the United States. India’s Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, citing the need to make India’s institutions of higher education world class, has created a Knowledge Commission to advise him on educational excellence to keep up with the needs of the economy and to make India a more attractive education destination. Thomas Friedman’s book, The World is Flat, has also drawn increasing attention to the fact that countries such as China and India are moving significantly ahead in the development of their knowledge-based economies (Friedman, 2005). These trends may lead to a reduced dependence on US higher education for achieving their national ambitions. Japan is the largest host country for international students in Asia. Its academic system remains the strongest in the region. Prime Minister Nakasone’s call, several decades ago, to enroll 100,000 international students by 2000 was not quite met at the time, although more than 118,000 international students are now studying in Japan. More than 90 percent come from Asia, and the large majority is Chinese. Japan identified international higher education as a source of ‘‘soft power’’ and devoted modest resources to attracting students from other countries, with a special emphasis on its major Asian trading partners. Scholarships are available for well-qualified international students to study at the top national universities. Japan has been less successful in attracting students from North America and Europe, with fewer than 5 percent of Japan’s international student population coming from these regions. Japan faces several challenges in attracting international students – the most important of which is the Japanese language. Japanese is difficult to learn, and it is not used internationally. Students from China and Korea find it easier to learn Japanese; this has helped boost enrolments from these countries. Facilities for international students have been limited, although improvements have been made recently. While Japan has historically been a major force in international education in Asia, other nations in the region, such as Singapore, Malaysia, and China, are posing a challenge by making significant efforts to position
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themselves to be educational destinations for Asian students. China and India are traditionally the largest senders of students to the United States. Both countries show some variations in flow rates. In 2004, both sent fewer students to the United States, with China declining by 5 percent – reflecting perhaps difficulties encountered in obtaining clearances and visas to study in the United States (Chin, 2004). 2005–2006 statistics show that numbers have again picked up and the decline seems to have been temporary. The Chinese, however, aspire to having a world-class system of higher education, and this may in the long-run keep Chinese students at home. Chinese government has shown in recent years that it understands the relationship between national power and the quality of its institutions of higher education. The infusion of funding is illustrative of this understanding and is showing tangible results. For example, Tsinghua University, often referred to as ‘‘China’s MIT,’’ is becoming a powerhouse for scientific research with the Chinese government’s strong support. In just a decade the data on top undergraduate students from Tsinghua’s science departments have changed from the majority pursuing graduate education in the United States to the majority remaining in China for further education. China is rapidly closing its science and technology gap. It is projected that by 2010, Chinese universities will graduate more students with science and engineering doctorates than their US counterparts (Freeman, 2005). Another indication that China’s patterns of student mobility may be changing is the increase in the number of foreign students, primarily from Asia, choosing to pursue study in China. The number was up 11 percent in 2004 and hit a record high. The Ministry of Education has stated a goal of attracting foreign students to study in China. The ministry reported that the dramatic progress in attracting students from overseas could be attributed to outreach to countries by the government (Overseas Students, 2005). Services for foreign students have improved, adding to the attractiveness of Chinese universities. Newly developed institutions patterned on American models, like Shantou University, and the development of more innovative programs of study for international students at Beijing University are signs of new trends. Views of China’s role in the region and its international behavior may also be making it a more attractive destination. A poll of 22 countries by the BBC World Service revealed that China is viewed as playing a more positive role in the world than the United States. Particularly significant are the favorable views of neighboring countries where China has traditionally been regarded with suspicion and dislike. Also enhancing China’s attractiveness
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to students from the Asia region and beyond is that young people are more prone to view China positively (BBC World Service, 2005). While China’s institutions may be making progress in the exercise of soft power, European institutions historically performed a significant role in Europe’s influence on the United States, particularly in the development of US institutions. Over time, Europe’s influence waned, and the roles were reversed. It is thus noteworthy that Europe – both its individual countries and the European Union – is taking steps to regain its influence. This trend can be readily seen in Germany’s efforts to increase the strength of its scholarly community and research prowess vis-a`-vis that of the United States. A significant ‘‘brain gain’’ campaign is under way among Germany’s elite universities. In 2005, former Chancellor Gerhard Schro¨der pledged to inject $250 million into five institutions to attract world academic talent. Among other things, this campaign is seeking to bring back German scholars who have settled in at US institutions (To Halt Brain Drain, 2005). The changes taking place in Europe as a result of the EU Bologna process are equally important, although they are headed in a different direction. More European students will probably choose to study within the EU, where costs are low and the ‘‘common academic space’’ makes cross-border study easy. Once the procedures are fully implemented, which should happen in the next five years or so, the EU might well turn abroad to lure students from outside Europe, both to earn income and to contribute to the EU’s foreign-policy goals. At present, EU debates seem to be focused mainly on the complexities of implementing the Bologna initiatives rather than on Europe’s academic impact abroad. A few countries, such as Spain, are implementing international programs to expand the influence of Spanish higher education abroad, specifically to Latin America.
THE NEW TRANSNATIONALISM Not only are students on the move – so, too, are institutions. We are at the beginning of the era of transnational higher education, in which academic institutions from one country operate in another, academic programs are jointly offered by universities from different countries, and higher education is delivered through distance technologies. These developments will affect flows of students from one country to another. Transnational initiatives operate within the North-to-South dynamic and are almost without exception dominated by the partner institutions in the
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North – in terms of curriculum, orientation, and sometimes the teaching staff. Frequently, the medium of instruction is the language of the dominant partner, very often English, even if the local standard language of instruction is not English. There is often little effort to adapt offshore programs to the needs or traditions of the country in which the programs are offered – they are simply exported intact. A McDonald’s hamburger in Malaysia is the same as one in Chicago – even if the beef is halal, to meet Muslim religious requirements. Australia and the United Kingdom have been pioneers in transnational higher education, with the United States only now becoming a force in this area. In some cases, transnational arrangements are made between universities and postsecondary institutions abroad, and in others, the ‘‘partners’’ are corporations or entrepreneurs interested in entering the new education industry. Australian universities have, for example, linked up with academic institutions and private companies in Malaysia, and more recently in South Africa and Vietnam, to offer Australian degrees ‘‘offshore.’’ A student can earn an Australian degree in Malaysia or Vietnam, for example, without ever setting foot in Australia. There are also franchising agreements that permit local providers to use educational programs of offshore institutions, for which they give their own degrees. Governments see transnational education, like attracting foreign students, as a way to increase higher education’s revenues and, perhaps, their soft power. At the campus level, too, international initiatives produce significant income for a small but growing number of institutions. Indeed, the primary goal of many of the branch campuses and transnational programs is to enrich the home campus. Although their presence has not historically been a significant part of the overall picture, some American academic institutions have been involved in transnational enterprises for a long time. Some US universities – Boston University, the University of Maryland, and Widener University, for example – have been operating offshore branches for many years, to serve Americans (including those in the armed forces) overseas as well as an international clientele. A few foreign institutions have operated under the umbrella of American accreditation and sponsorship – the American University of Beirut is a prime example. In the 1970s, over a dozen American colleges and universities opened branch campuses in Japan, hoping to benefit from Japan’s booming economy and academic market at the time. But with one or two exceptions, the US institutions in Japan never achieved the status of the most prestigious colleges and universities. The American branches had problems with recognition by the Japanese
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education authorities and, after the Japanese economic ‘‘bubble’’ burst, with finances and enrollments. In 2005, just one of those branches continues to operate. The Japanese case illustrates the risks of expanding offshore higher education. But the last few years have witnessed a new and more sophisticated approach to global expansion on the part of American institutions. In Barcelona, The University of Chicago’s business school established a branch campus in Barcelona, Spain (now relocated in London to position itself better in the European market) offering an MBA, and the curriculum includes a period of study at the main campus in Chicago. Both Chicago and the Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania are establishing branches in Singapore. American universities have also assisted in the development of a growing number of institutions called the ‘‘American University of y ’’ in Bulgaria, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and some other countries. These schools typically seek and are often granted accreditation by agencies in the United States. American overseas expansion is in some cases taking on an unabashedly entrepreneurial design. When Israel opened up its educational market more than a decade ago, several US schools set up programs in teacher education and other fields in cooperation with Israeli entrepreneurs to meet a local need. The American institutions mainly consisted of low-prestige and in several cases quite marginal schools in need of a financial boost from overseas enrollments. Israeli authorities have since partially restricted such foreign collaborations, in part because of concerns about low quality and the lack of adequate supervision from the sponsoring institutions. Laureate Education, a for-profit higher education provider, is pursuing a different strategy for its overseas expansion. Laureate has purchased several foreign institutions (e.g., in Mexico and Spain). It is not clear if these schools will have links with US institutions or will be accredited in the United States. The University of Phoenix, the largest private for-profit university in the United States, is also working to expand its overseas network. It has a small campus in China and will open another one in Mexico. Without question, US higher education exports will grow and have an as yet undetermined impact on American higher education generally and on its soft power. The prospect for expanding trade in higher education services worldwide through the implementation of a version of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which is part of the current negotiations of the World Trade Organization, may accelerate both the opportunities and problems associated with transnational education. GATS, if implemented, would remove some restrictions on cross-border higher education initiatives,
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making it easier for US academic institutions and corporations to offer programs and set up branches abroad. How this would affect international student flows or the specific policies of American universities is unclear. The US government, through the Department of Commerce, and the forprofit private higher education providers have favored GATS, while organizations like the American Council on Education and the academic community generally have opposed it. The opponents are concerned that the increased emphasis on competition and markets produced by GATS would affect the traditional values of American colleges and universities. There is a general feeling that higher education is not a commodity to be traded in international markets like steel or bananas. Some people in higher education also worry that GATS would jeopardize academic autonomy in the developing nations, in that governments would no longer be able to control education imports to their own countries. The debate continues, and the effects of GATS remain unclear. Distance education is also part of the transnational picture. So far, crossborder distance higher education remains a small part of the total picture, but the number of students seeking Internet-based degrees is growing rapidly and will continue to expand. Will distance degrees be accepted in job markets around the world? If so, will students choose to study on the Internet in large numbers rather than traveling overseas? Distance education along with the provision of US degrees in other countries through jointdegree or franchise arrangements with foreign universities will affect the numbers of students choosing to go abroad to study and will raise many questions about how America’s soft power will be exercised in this context.
CONCLUSION The United States faces significant competition in the rapidly expanding world of international study. While American higher education remains attractive to foreign students and scholars, competitors have several major advantages. These countries have instituted national policies relating to international study and cross-border higher education initiatives. They have been setting goals, putting policies into place, and giving incentives to academic institutions to attract foreign students. The United States, in contrast, has never developed a national approach concerning international higher education, an area of low priority for the Department of Education at the federal level. Now, whatever national policies do exist have been erected in the cause of national security not international education. These
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policies have resulted in a myriad of new regulations that make it more difficult for foreign students and scholars to come to the United States. Further, the number of federally funded scholarships for overseas students is not significantly growing. The states, traditionally responsible for higher education policy in the United States, are quite focused on local issues such as the financing of higher education and have exhibited little interest in international students, despite the fact that those students bring significant amounts of money into local economies and provide needed help as lowpaid teaching and research assistants in public universities. These circumstances leave an open field for the competition and may be the prelude to changing patterns and destinations of students, particularly those from developing countries seeking higher education. The story of international student flows includes the significant expansion in worldwide numbers, increased competition among the major host countries, and the growing but as yet unclear impact of technology on the delivery of academic programs. The United States will remain a major player in all of these developments because of the size and excellence of its academic system. Whether the United States will be able to maintain its competitive edge and its leadership is another matter. As noted at the beginning of this essay, America’s soft power has rested primarily on the attractiveness of its ideas and institutions. For the past half-century, US institutions of higher education have played an increasingly active and vital role in shaping and sustaining positive relationships with other nations. At this point in the 21st century, the United States stands at a challenging crossroads in terms of its image in the world and its exercise of public diplomacy. The debate in the United States about how to improve international relationships has been intense. One school of thought proposes treating the United States like a brand with a bad image that could be improved with a well-planned advertising campaign. Building media networks that function with a propagandistic slant is also suggested as a winning strategy. Other variations on the theme involve sending high-profile basketball players and rock stars to the Middle East to convert teenage populations into admirers of the United States. The common bond between all of these schemes is that they seem to ignore higher education and the so-called elite groups educated in universities. This includes not only the academic profession but also public intellectuals and other opinion leaders. Juxtaposed to these suggestions is a deeper and more thoughtful vein of advice, some of which was noted earlier. This perspective focuses on the importance of educational exchange and the engagement of elites, as well as
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general citizenry. The American government has been counseled that its ideas and values about democracy, human rights, freedom of speech, religious tolerance, and respect for national sovereignty are critical components of the relationships between the United States and the rest of the world. In a recent discussion of the challenges to America’s ongoing attractiveness, a former Singaporean ambassador reminded everyone that American universities educated elites who flocked as young students from all over the world to study in the United States. Many of them learned the language and ideas of American democracy and its philosophical underpinnings. As leaders in their countries they now hold the government of the United States to the same high standards abroad to which Americans hold their own government at home (Mahbubani, 2005). When America’s admirers perceive the country to be less open or more dismissive of the rights of others, meeting the challenge to the attractiveness of America and its institutions may be the biggest test for the soft power of the United States. These issues of defining and acting on principles of democracy from a multicultural perspective and on an international scale will necessarily involve higher education. As opposed to defining the ‘‘American brand’’ in a monolithic way, the principles upon which American colleges and universities have been built foster free and open engagement of ideas and diversity of opinion. These are the traits that have made US higher education institutions such an attractive destination for study and research for generations of foreign students and scholars and a central part of its soft power.
REFERENCES Altbach, P. G. (1971). Education and neocolonialism. Teachers College Record, 72, 543–558. Altbach, P. G. (2001). The American academic model in comparative perspective. In: P. G. Altbach, P. J. Gumport & D. B. Johnstone (Eds), In defense of American higher education (pp. 11–37). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Altbach, P. G. (2004). Higher education crosses borders. Change, 36, 18–25. Altbach, P. G., & Peterson, P. M. (Eds). (2007). Higher education in the new century: Global challenges and innovative ideas. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. American Academy of Diplomacy. (2004). Report of a special task force of the American academy of diplomacy. Washington, DC: Author. Ashby, E. (1966). Universities: British, Indian, African. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Barber, E. G., Altbach, P. G., & Myers, R. G. (Eds). (1984). Bridges to knowledge: Foreign students in comparative perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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Basu, A. (1974). The growth of education and political development in India, 1898–1920. Delhi: Oxford University Press. BBC World Service. (2005). BBC World poll – Twenty-two Nation Poll Shows China Viewed Positively by Most Countries Including Asia Neighbors. Available at http://www. pipa.org/OnlineReports/BBCWorldPoll/3/05/05 Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. (2001). Outcome assessment of the U.S. fulbright scholar program. Washington, DC: SRI International. Chin, Hey-Kyung Koh. (Ed.) (2004). Open doors: Report on international educational exchange. New York: Institute of International Education. Chomsky, N. (Ed.) (1997). The cold war and the university: Toward an intellectual history of the postwar years. New York: New Press. Coombs, P. (1964). The fourth dimension of foreign policy: Education and cultural affairs. New York: Harper & Row. Council of Graduate Schools. (2004). International graduate student survey. Washington, DC: Council of Graduate Schools. Council on Foreign Relations. (2003). Finding America’s voice: A strategy for reinvigorating U.S. public diplomacy. Report of independent task force. New York, Council on Foreign Relations. Djerejian, E. P. (2003). Changing minds, winning peace: A new strategic direction for U.S. public diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim world. Submitted to the Committee on Appropriations, US House of Representatives. Washington, DC: Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. Freeman, R. (2005). Does globalization of the scientific/engineering workforce threaten U.S. economic leadership? Cambridge, MA: Labor Studies Program, National Bureau of Economic Research. Friedman, T. L. (2005). The world is flat: A brief history of the twenty-first century. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux. Gonzalez, A. (2004). The Philippines: Past, present, and future dimensions of higher education. In: P. G. Altbach & T. Umakoshi (Eds), Asian universities (pp. 279–300). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Haskins, C. H. (2002). The rise of universities. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Kirp, D. L. (2003). Shakespeare, Einstein, and the bottom line: The marketing of higher education. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lutz, J. G. (1971). China and the Christian colleges. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Mahbubani, K. (2005). Beyond the age of innocence. New York: Public Affairs. NAFSA. (2000). Toward an international education policy for the United States. Washington, DC: National Association for Foreign Student Affairs. Nye, J. S., Jr. (2004). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. New York: Public Affairs. O’Malley, J. W., Bailey, G. A., Harris, S. J., & Kennedy, T. F. (Eds). (1999). The jesuits: Cultures, sciences, and the arts, 1540–1773. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Overseas Students. (2005). Number hits record high. China Daily, May 24. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. (2003). Views of a changing world. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. Public Diplomacy Council. (2005). A call for action on public diplomacy. Washington, DC: Public Diplomacy Council.
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Rainey, A. (2006). Academic groups urge the White House to strengthen international education. The Chronicle of Higher Education, March 31, A47. Task Force on Higher Education and Society. (2000). Higher education in developing countries: Peril and promise. Washington, DC: World Bank. To Halt Brain Drain. (2005). Germany adopts ‘Competition’ mantra. Christian Science Monitor, February 1. Wooldridge, A. (2005). Secrets of success. The Economist, September 10–16.
AUTHOR INDEX Abed, G.T. 82 Adams, D. 225 Adams, H. 116 Africa, GWS 99 Ahn, C.-M. 246 Albrecht, D. 195 Allison, G.T. 274–275, 278 Allison, P.D. 98 Altbach, P.G. 181–182, 187, 297, 299, 306, 309, 313, 317, 323 Amos, K. 111 Amsden, A. 243, 249 Anderson, B. 72, 75, 115 Anderson, J. 67, 78, 82 Apple, M.W. 182, 193 Aronowitz, S. 213 Ashby, E. 316 Athanassopoulos, A.D. 43 Austin, A.E. 195 Avis, G. 165 Avrus, A.I. 168 Bakalo, I.I. 162 Baldridge, J.V. 274 Balibar, E. 115 Balzer, H. 167 Barro, R.J. 8 Basu, A. 316 Bat-Erdene, R. 67 Baumgarten, M. 125 Becker, G.S. 260, 280 Ben-David, J. 107, 116 Bereday, G.Z.F. 162 Berger, P. 115
Berglof, E. 161 Berryman, S. 167 Bertrams, K. 141 Besley, A.C.T. 178, 180, 193 Birdsall, N. 188 Bjorvatn, K. 83 Bloom, D. 188 Boli, J. 114 Boswell, B. 92 Bowles, S. 260 Boxer, M.J. 90–91, 94 Bradley, K. 97 Bray, M. 67–68, 79, 82 Brennan, J. 223 Bresser-Pereira, L.C. 137 Brisolla, S. 140 Broers, L. 67 Bronson, S. 168 Bruno, L. 111 Buddin, R. 31, 49 Caffentzis, G. 191, 194 Calderone, S. 181 Callon, M. 3, 22 Calve`s, G. 24 Cardoso, F.H. 180 Carnoy, M. 10, 180, 309 Carroll, T. 192 Carvalho, R. 140 Castells, M. 180 Chabbott, C. 106 Chamberlain, M.K. 92–93 Chanbarisov, Sh.Kh. 162 Chang, K.-S. 266 337
338 Chang, K.W. 298, 304, 307, 309 Chapman, D.W. 65, 67, 79, 82, 195 Cheibub, J. 100 Chen, L.Y. 304 Chen, M.A. 90 Chen, T.Y. 304, 307 Chen, Y.L. 300 Cheng, Y. 46 Chou, C.P. 297, 299–300, 302, 304–308 Chow, E.N. 92 Chun, M. 31, 49 Clancy, P. 231 Clark, B.R. 131, 145–148, 197 Cohen, S.S. 180 Cohn, E. 282, 284 Collins, C. 177 Collins, R. 107 Coombs, P. 317 Croninger, R. 275 Cunha, L.A. 119–120, 122–123, 137–138 Curtis, D.V. 274 Cyterman, J.-R. 5 Dahrendorf, R. 129 Dai, X.X. 299, 303, 309 Dale, R. 299 Demeuse, M. 5 Dezhina, I. 163, 168 Dikson, D. 213 Dill, D. 27–30, 46 DiMaggio, P.J. 118 Ding, X.H. 292 Djerejian, E.P. 315 Downes, P. 79 Dreher, A. 70, 83, 194 Dror, Y. 276 Drori, G. 162 Dudwick, N. 167 Dupas, G. 135–136 Durhan, E.R. 138 Duru-Bellat, M. 2, 14 Dye, T.R. 276 Dyson, R.G. 43
AUTHOR INDEX Ecker, G.P. 274 Enkhjargal, A. 63 Etzkowitz, H. 141 Fagerlind, I. 279 Federici, S. 191, 199 Filippov, V.M. 171 Filaˆtre, D. 11 Finnemore, M. 97 Fischer, M. 8 Fitzpatrick, S.L. 162 Fitzsimons, P. 309 Foucault, M. 115, 212 Fox, J. 194 Framhein, G. 143 Frank, D.J. 97, 162 Freeman, R. 325, 327 Frenkel, A. 8 Friedman, T.L. 326 Fa´vero, M.L.A. 121–122, 152 Gabler, J. 162 Gaillard, J. 11 Galkin, K.T. 164 Gandhi, J. 100 Garrett, R.M. 197 Geiger, R.L. 146, 181, 215 Gellert, C. 128 Geske, T.G. 282, 284 Giddens, A. 136, 180 Gintis, H. 260 Giroux, H.A. 299 Gitahy, M.L.C. 120 Goastellec, G. 1–2, 14, 18, 231 Goedegebuure, L. 23 Gokhberg, L.I. 170 Goldman, M. 184, 191, 194 Goldstein, H. 49 Gomart, E. 167 Gonzalez, A. 316 Gottlieb, E. 225 Graham, L.R. 163 Griffin, M. 67, 73, 79
Author Index Grossetti, M. 11 Grunenberg, A. 128–129 Guarino, C. 31, 49 Guinier, L. 7 Gumport, P. 91, 97 Gunther, R.S. 161 Gupta, S. 82 Gustafson, T. 165 Hallak, J. 67, 79, 81–82 Halpin, D. 115 Han, Y.-J. 246 Hannan, M.T. 98 Haskins, C.H. 316 Hayhoe, R. 310 Heller, D.E. 4, 8, 12 Herzfeld, T. 70, 83 Heyneman, S.P. 64–65, 67, 72, 75, 79, 82, 187, 192, 199 Hill, M. 291 Ho, A.-H. 302, 306–307 Ho, M.S. 298, 304, 307, 309 Hoffacker, W. 145 Hogan, S.M. 43 Holmes, L. 165 Holmes, S. 166 Hooker, M. 297 Howe, F. 92–93 Hsieh, W.T. 303 Hsu, I.C.Y. 279 Hu, A.G. 289 Hu, J.T. 270 Huang, C.J. 309 Huang, J.T. 303, 305, 309 Humboldt, W. von 116 Hwang, K.-K. 306, 308 Hyun-Nam, C. 266 Inkeles, A. 117 Jansen, K. 214 Jenkins, W.I. 275–276 Jessop, B. 161
339 Jiang, J.Q. 289 Jiang, Z.M. 278, 282, 287 Jiao, X. 289 Johnes, J. 48 Johnson, M.S. 159 Johnstone, B. 3 Kahlenberg, R. 18 Kajubi, W.S. 197 Kangas, N. 107 Kapur, D. 184 Keiner, E. 118 Khandelwal, B.P. 79 Kigotho, W. 197 Killick, T. 185 Kim, Q.-Y. 230, 247–248 Kim, S.-B. 223, 227, 230, 238, 243, 247–248, 251 Kim, Y.B. 230, 247–248 Kirp, D.L. 313 Kirp, J.L. 4, 7 Kirtikara, K. 205 Kivinen, O. 23 Knapp, M. 274–275, 285 Koh, H.-K. 327 Koncz, K. 92 Kraske, J. 184 Krementsov, N. 163 Krops, C. 99 Kuehnast, K. 167 Kunov, A. 161 Kupryashkina, S. 91, 94 Lascoumes, P. 3 Lazear, E. 261 Le Van, C. 75 Leck, E. 8 Lee, J.-H. 8, 227, 243, 251 Lee, T.H.C. 283 Leslie, L.L. 181, 212 Lett, D.P. 262 Levacic, R. 79 Lewis, J.P. 184
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Li, J. 269, 282 Li, S.X. 289 Li, W.L. 273 Liang, X. 181 Lin, J. 269 Lindblom, C.E. 274 Lipset, S.M. 90 Liu, N.C. 46 Lu, M.L. 305–306 Luckmann, T. 115 Luke, A. 181 Luke, C. 181 Lutz, J.G. 316
Nam, K.-k. 258 Neale, J. 93 Nelson, R. 8 Nunes Ferreira, A. 135 Nye, J.S. 314
Magno, C. 92 Mahbubani, K. 333 Malen, B. 274–275, 285 Mama, A. 93 Marc, A. 167 Marginson, S. 28 Martinez, C.D. 89, 91 Matthews, M. 164 Maurel, M. 75 Mauro, P. 70, 74 Mayanja, M.K. 197–198 McCargo, D. 214 McClelland, D. 279 McGinn, N.F. 230, 247–248, 309 Meek, L.V. 23 Meier, B 67, 73, 79 Meyer, J.W. 9, 97, 114, 117, 162, 263 Min, W.F. 273 Mina, L. 183 Mu¨ller, R.A. 125–126 Mu¨ller-Bo¨lling, D. 145–146 Mu¨nch, R. 146 Me´ndez, F. 72, 74 Mok, K.H. 183, 298–299, 303, 306 Morrow, R. 180 Mu, R. 289 Muller, P. 22 Muncey, D. 275 Musisi, N.B. 196–197
Pan, H.-L. 300 Parreira do Amaral, M. 111 Patrinos, H.A. 14 Peet, R. 191 Peisert, H. 143 Pennar, J. 162 Pereira, C. 93 Peters, M.A. 178, 180, 193 Peterson, D.J. 171 Peterson, P.M. 313 Photos, I. 67, 78, 82 Pilwha, C. 92 Pincus, J.R. 185, 191, 194 Poisson, M. 67, 79, 81–82 Politkovskaya, A. 166 Pomeranz, L. 135 Popkewitz, T.S. 118 Popson, N. 168 Posadskaya, A. 92 Powell, W.W. 118 Prah, M. 92 Psacharopoulos, G. 14, 187–188 Pyo, H.-H. 266
O’Connor, S. 91 Oelkers, J. 152 Oleksy, E.H. 92 Oliveira, M.M. 119–120 Oliven, A.C. 119, 123, 152 Olssen, M. 298, 307, 309 Olzak, S. 107
Qian, X.Y. 289 Rainey, A. 324 Ramirez, F.O. 89, 91, 97, 105, 114, 117, 144, 162
Author Index Reddy, J. 195 Redmond-Jones, D. 275 Reinikka, R. 65, 76–77 Rhoades, G. 180, 193, 212 Rhoads, R.A. 177, 181–183, 193, 215, 299 Ridgeway, G. 31, 49 Riley, G.L. 274 Rinne, R. 23 Ritzen, J. 194 Ritzer, G. 181 Rocki, M. 28, 30, 34 Rojas, F. 107 Rosen, S.M. 164 Rosovsky, H. 188 Rostiashvili, K. 67 Rothschild, M. 243 Ruble, B. 168 Rumyantseva, N.L. 63–65, 67 Saha, L.J. 279 Salaa-i-Martin, X. 8 Santos, B.de S. 193, 213, 215 Sarrico, C.S. 43 Saviani, D. 120 Schofer, E. 9, 97, 162, 263 Schriewer, J.K. 112, 118 Schugurensky, D. 193 Schultz, T.W. 260 Schwartzman, S. 119, 121, 138, 141 Schweitzer, G.E. 161 Scott, P. 181 Sedgwick, R. 205 Sender, J. 191 Sepu´lveda, F. 72, 74 Seth, M.J. 262, 266 Shadrikov, V.D. 172 Shanahan, S. 105 Shavit, Y. 302, 307 Shen, M. 289 Shi, K. 289 Shi, Z.L. 289 Shishkin, S.V. 169 Shuruev, A.S. 163
341 Shvets, J. 161 Shymchyshyn, M. 94 Sikkink, K. 97 Silius, H. 91, 94, 107 Silova, I. 92 Silva Telles, P.C. 119–120 Sirowy, L. 117 Slaughter, S. 180–181, 193, 212 Smith, N. 65, 76 Snodgrass, D.R. 230, 247–248 So, A.Y. 279 Song, M.M. 299 Soo, M. 27–30, 46 Soysal, Y.N. 105, 114 Spence, M. 260 Søreide, T. 72, 83 Ssesanga, K. 197 Stake, J.E. 94 Stiglitz, J. 166, 185 Strang, D. 98 Stromquist, N. 180 Svensson, J. 65, 76–77 Szele´nyi, K. 181 Tanaka, S. 67, 82 Tang, H.L. 305 Tang, M. 287–288 Thomas, G.M. 114 Tolbert, P.S. 105 Tomusk, V. 160 Torres, C.A. 193, 215 Torres, C.A. 180, 182 Trow, M. 4, 270, 281, 283 Trow, M.A. 223 Troyna, B. 115 Tsai, C.H. 301 Tsai, S.L. 302, 307 Tuma, N.B. 98 Turner, D.A. 27, 32, 48 Turner, G. 116 Turner, R.S. 116 Ushakov, G.I. 163
342 van Nuland, S. 79 Varga, A. 8 Vom Bruch, R. 126, 128 Vucinich, A. 163
AUTHOR INDEX Wittrock, B. 152 Wolf, A. 2 Wotipka, C.M. 89, 91, 97 Xie, A.B. 299, 303
Waast, R. 11 Wade, R.H. 194 Wallerstein, I. 115 Walther, H.G. 126 Wang, J. 92 Watanabe, K. 92 Watkins, A. 170 Wax, E. 197 Webb, R.C. 184 Webler, W.-D. 130 Wei, X. 289 Weidman, J.C. 63, 67 Wen, D.M. 292 White, L. 243 Windolf, P. 224 Winston, G. 243 Winters, J.A. 185, 191, 194
Yang, R. 297 Yang, S.-K. 299, 303 Yelyutin, V.P. 162 Yu, C. 300 Yudaeva, K. 161 Zappia, C.A 310 Zaslavskaya, T.I. 166 Zelikow, P.D. 274–275, 278 Zhai, B. 289 Zhang, N. 92 Ziderman, A. 195 Zloczower, A. 107 Zucker, L.G. 105 Zuo, X.L. 287–288
SUBJECT INDEX accountability, 5–6, 76–79, 146, 166, 182, 297, 299, 303–304, 309 active benchmarking, 51 admission, 2, 6, 9–11, 14–23, 68–70, 119, 131, 137, 163, 225, 230, 242, 244, 252–254, 261–262, 265, 273 Affirmative Action, 10, 16–18, 21 Association for African Women for Research and Development, 93 Australia, 4, 20, 28, 44, 240, 298, 324–325, 329 Austria, 4, 20, 96, 240 Azerbaijan, 161, 168, 170–172, 330 Belarus, 166, 170 Belgium, 4, 96, 240 benchmarking, 27, 29, 39, 43, 47, 50–52 Bologna Process, 172, 328 Borrowing, 112–113, 149, 167, 184–185, 191, 207, 210 Brazil, 96, 111–113, 115, 119–121, 123–125, 132–134, 138–140, 142, 145, 149–151, 192 Bribe, 72
Comparative education, 34, 111, 149, 188 Comparative Education Review, 188 Convergence, 28, 30, 36, 113, 135 Corruption, 63–79, 81–85, 164–166, 168, 173, 194–195, 252, 255 Corruption perceptions index, 71 Czechoslovakia, 4 DEA (Data Envelope Analysis), 30 Decentralization, 136–137, 160, 166–167, 169, 183, 190, 193, 262, 290, 308 Decision-making units, 30 Deregulation, 136, 166, 200, 207, 243–244, 252, 254–255, 290, 298–299, 301–302, 306, 308–309 developing countries, 4, 75, 77, 79, 93, 185, 188–189, 193–194, 199, 202, 210, 224, 280, 313, 323, 332 Duke University, 37, 48
Eastern Europe, 64, 91–92, 94, 299 Economic loss, 64 Education cities, 326 Education fever, 223, 263 Cambridge University, 35, 37–39, 48 Elitist institution, 6, 14–15, 19 Caucasus, 161, 166, 168, 171 Enrollment rate, 4–6, 8–9, 74, 224, 231, China, 76, 96, 183, 245, 259, 269–292, 233–234, 262, 271, 281–283, 288, 302 298–300, 309, 317, 319, 325–328, 330 Equalization policy, 233, 250–252, 256 Christian missionaries, 196, 244–245 equity, 2, 9–10, 13, 15–16, 19–23, 97, Communist party, 163, 165, 168, 104–105, 160, 164, 169, 173, 185, 187, 272, 290 206, 292, 309 ETH Zurich, 37, 39–40 Community college, 7, 11, 13, 216, 241, Ethical loss, 64 262, 317–318 343
344 Ethiopia, 3, 11–12, 14, 20–21, 23, 96, 186, 203 Eurasia, 63–64, 159–160, 167, 170 Event history analysis, 98 exemplar, 31–32, 39 Expansion of higher education, 9, 97, 133, 177, 223–227, 229, 231, 233–235, 237, 239, 241, 243, 245, 247, 249, 251–255, 257, 259–261, 263, 265, 270, 278, 282–283, 285, 288–290, 298, 302, 305 Expansion policy, 269, 273–274, 277–278, 280, 282, 285–286, 288–292 Federal University of Minas Gerais, 121 Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, 121 Finland, 4, 44, 96, 240 Foreign students, 259, 317–320, 322–325, 327, 329, 331–333 Foreign study, 321 France, 3, 10–12, 14, 17, 19, 91, 95–96, 113–115, 118–119, 125, 186, 204, 240, 279, 283, 319 funding, 2–3, 5–7, 14, 19–23, 66, 68–69, 77, 117, 128, 131, 135, 137–140, 143–145, 150–151, 159–160, 163, 179, 188, 190, 192–193, 197–199, 202–203, 215–216, 224, 239–243, 256–257, 263, 280, 288, 297–301, 303–304, 306–307, 309, 318, 320, 326–327 Gender, 10, 92–94, 97, 99–101, 103–105, 107, 194, 224, 234, 258, 265 Georgia, 96, 105, 108, 161, 170–172 Germany, 4, 20, 96, 111–113, 116, 118, 125, 128–129, 132–133, 139, 142–146, 149–151, 180, 186, 240, 279, 283, 328 Global corruption barometer, 73 Global market, 181–182, 309, 313, 315, 317, 319, 321, 323, 325, 327, 329, 331
SUBJECT INDEX globalization, 2, 4, 17, 22, 90, 137, 144–145, 159, 179–181, 214–215, 297, 300, 309 Government regulation, 77, 243–244, 254, 323 Harvard University, 35, 37, 45, 47 higher education, 1–23, 27–31, 33–34, 36, 38, 40, 43–44, 46–50, 52, 63–69, 71, 73, 75–77, 79, 81, 83–85, 89–90, 93–95, 97–101, 103–107, 111–114, 117–125, 129–135, 137–140, 142–144, 146–152, 159–173, 177–183, 185, 187–203, 205–216, 223–247, 249, 251–266, 269–292, 297–309, 313–333 Higher education expansion, 9, 215, 259, 264, 269–270, 272–274, 276–278, 280– 282, 284–286, 290–292 Honors college, 7, 23 human capacity, 178–179, 187, 193, 195, 202, 208–210, 212–213, 216 Human capital, 8, 92, 95, 112, 129, 144, 148, 166, 177, 187–189, 260, 263–264, 279–281, 284, 290 Humboldt Myth, 132 Humboldtian model, 113, 115, 121, 126–127, 148 Hungary, 4, 96, 240, 322 Indonesia, 3–5, 11–12, 14, 16–17, 19 inequality, 15, 18, 20, 22, 64, 76, 169, 189, 224, 264, 297 Information age, 180 input, 30–32, 36–37, 39–41, 43–44, 49–51, 73, 78, 203, 237–239, 248, 265 Institute for management development, 74 institutions, 1, 3–15, 17, 19–22, 28–29, 33–34, 36, 38–40, 43, 45–52, 66–69, 72, 75, 78, 81, 85, 93, 107, 112, 114, 117, 119–126, 129, 131, 133–135, 137–138, 141, 143–144, 148–152, 159, 162–163, 166, 168–169, 172, 178, 181, 188,
Subject Index 192–193, 208, 212, 214, 216, 223, 225, 227–237, 241–246, 251, 253, 258–259, 261–262, 266, 270–273, 278–279, 281, 285, 287, 289–291, 298–307, 309, 313–322, 324–333 Internal Differentiation, 10–11, 147 International country risk guide, 70, 74 International Development Association, 194 International education, 259, 314–316, 319, 325–326, 331 International higher education, 314, 322–323, 325–326, 331 International monetary fund, 82, 182, 184, 299 International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women, 94 International students, 35, 37, 41–43, 317–323, 325–327, 332 international trends, 2, 314 International women’s year, 90 Internationalization, 122, 145, 173, 181, 292, 300, 320–321 Ireland, 3, 12, 16, 18–19, 21, 23, 96, 240 Israel, 3, 11–12, 14, 18, 20–21, 23, 96, 330 Japan, 5, 92, 95–96, 180, 186, 226, 231, 238–240, 245–246, 259, 262, 265–266, 279, 284, 299, 309, 319, 326, 329 Joint Higher Education Entrance Exam, 205 Junior college, 7, 11, 224, 227–238, 241–242, 253–255, 258, 264–265, 300 Kazakhstan, 75, 161, 168, 170–171 knowledge, 4, 8, 29, 47, 82, 89, 97, 104, 107, 114, 117, 120–121, 124–126, 132, 140–142, 145, 152, 159, 171, 173, 177–181, 183, 188–190, 193–195, 201–202, 207–210, 212–216, 223, 265,
345 283, 285, 292, 297, 306–307, 310, 316–317, 326 Knowledge capitalism, 180 Knowledge society, 117, 145, 180 Korea, 8, 95–96, 203, 205, 210, 223–247, 249, 251–257, 259, 261–265, 299, 309, 326 Kyrgyzstan, 75, 161, 168, 170 Latvia, 170 League table, 27–30, 32, 34, 38, 43–44, 46 Lebanon, 95–96 Lending, 111, 113, 149, 167, 185–186, 189, 193–194, 207, 209, 213, 216 Liberalization, 136, 200, 298, 306 loan conditions, 185, 191–192, 195, 200 Loans, 19, 63, 184–185, 187, 190, 199–200, 202, 206–207, 210, 215–216, 291, 299, 305 London School of Economics, 36–40, 48 Macquarie University, 37–38, 41 Macro-sociological, 114–115 Makerere University, 197, 203, 211 Marketization, 172, 184, 270, 300–301 Mass higher education, 52, 131–132, 224, 269, 271, 273, 275, 277, 279, 281, 283, 285, 287, 289, 291 Mass provision, 29 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 35, 37, 42, 45, 48 Massification, 2, 4, 12–13, 21, 28, 128–129, 182–183, 225, 233, 244, 251, 260, 262–263, 283, 297 McNamara, Robert, 184 Mexico, 4, 96, 183, 240, 330 Millennium Science Initiative, 201, 209, 214, 216 Modernization theory, 279–281, 290 Mongolia, 67, 77
346 National economic development, 65, 73, 99–100 National Institute for Testing and Evaluation, 16 National Taiwan University, 306 National University of Singapore, 37–39, 41 Neo-institutional, 104, 114–115, 117–118, 126, 133, 161 Neo-institutionalism, 161 neoliberal, 181–182, 184, 193, 212–213, 215, 289 neo-liberalism, 181–183, 192, 211–212, 243, 297–299, 301, 303, 305, 307–309 Neo-Marxist theory, 260 Network society, 180 new economy, 180, 215 New York University, 6 Nigeria, 92, 96 OECD, 4–5, 8, 13, 143, 167, 170, 173, 182, 224, 231, 239–240, 243, 256 organizations, 92–93, 104, 113, 117, 137, 141, 143–144, 180–181, 185–186, 191, 194, 225, 274, 291, 320, 322, 331 output, 30, 36, 38, 40, 43–44, 50–51, 73, 118, 146–147, 151–152, 238 Over-education, 261 Oxford University, 35, 37, 39, 107, 324 Parisian Institute of Political Science, 10, 20 performance indicator, 6, 27, 29–33, 36, 38, 40, 43–44, 46–47, 49–52 Poland, 4, 96, 240 Political regime, 74, 105, 128 Polytechnic School of Sao˜ Paulo, 120 Portugal, 4, 20, 119, 240 Private higher education, 133, 144, 163, 165, 168, 199, 270–271, 297–298, 331 Private ownership, 215 Private sector, 13, 78, 93, 122–123, 138, 141–142, 144, 149, 183, 185,
SUBJECT INDEX 190–194, 199, 201, 224, 234, 239, 247–248, 256 Private universities, 23, 144, 168, 196, 230, 234–237, 240–241, 244, 254–255, 257, 305, 307–308 Privatization, 73, 122, 160, 165–168, 172, 182–184, 192–193, 200, 208, 211–212, 243, 292, 298, 302, 309 Psacharopoulos, George, 187 Public universities, 12–14, 16, 23, 122–124, 133, 135, 137, 139–142, 151, 168, 205, 215, 230, 234–237, 243–244, 254, 257, 297, 302–305, 307, 332 Qatar, 326 Rational framework, 269–270, 273–278, 291–292 Regional technical colleges, 12 Research university, 111–117, 119, 121, 123, 125–127, 129, 131–133, 135, 137–139, 141, 143, 145, 147–149, 151, 160, 305 Russia, 96, 159–161, 166–168, 170–173 Sector-wide approaches, 66 Seoul National University, 230 Signaling theory, 260 Social inequality, 64 Soft power, 314–317, 321, 325–326, 328–333 South Africa, 3, 11, 14, 16, 18, 20–21, 23, 63, 92, 96, 329 South Korea, 205, 210, 223, 225, 227–229, 231, 233, 235, 237, 239, 241, 243, 245–247, 249, 251, 253, 255, 257, 259, 261, 263, 265 Soviet Academy of Sciences, 164 Soviet republic, 64 Soviet Union, 92, 159, 164, 168, 171, 224, 316 Stanford, 29, 35, 37, 41, 45, 203, 210
Subject Index structural adjustment, 92, 135, 183, 190, 192, 200–201, 203, 207, 213 Student-faculty ratio, 237, 238, 248, 264 Supranational university ranking, 29, 51–52 Sweden, 4, 96, 240 Switzerland, 4, 96, 240 Taiwan, 96, 205, 231, 265, 298–307, 309 teaching, 29, 32–33, 40, 43, 67–68, 90–91, 93, 112–113, 115–116, 119–123, 125, 127, 129–134, 136, 138–139, 142–143, 145–152, 160, 163–165, 197, 207, 209, 229–231, 236, 238, 241, 245–246, 248–249, 254, 303, 307, 315, 318, 320, 329, 332 technology, 34–35, 37, 41–42, 45, 48, 50–51, 121, 136, 139–141, 153, 178, 180–181, 193, 199, 201–204, 207, 210, 214–216, 230–231, 257, 279, 281, 285, 299, 314, 325, 327, 332 Tertiary education, 114–115, 138, 147, 151, 188–189, 199, 238–240 Thailand, 96, 177, 179, 187, 195, 204–210, 212, 214–216 Times Higher Education Supplement, 27, 33–34, 36, 38, 40, 44, 46–49, 206 Transnational, 97, 112–113, 117, 145, 150, 172, 181, 328–331 Trow, Martin, 4, 270, 280, 290 Tuition, 5–6, 19–20, 23, 123, 144, 168–169, 192, 197, 224, 226–227, 240–241, 243, 248–250, 254, 257, 263–264, 299–302, 304–305, 307 U.S.S.R., 159, 162, 164–165, 169 Uganda, 96, 177, 179, 186, 191, 193, 195–204, 208–216 Ukraine, 94, 96, 161, 168, 170–172 UN Decade for Women Conference, 92 UNESCO, 3–4, 8, 79, 139, 143, 173, 187, 216, 269
347 United Kingdom, 3, 23, 139, 180, 182, 186, 239–240, 324–325, 329 United Nations decade for women, 90, 93 United States, 3–5, 8, 16, 63, 91, 94, 107, 115–116, 152, 180–182, 186, 194–195, 201, 203, 210, 212, 215, 224, 239–240, 314–320, 322–333 Universidade de Sao˜ Paulo, 121 Universal higher education, 223, 225, 264 University of Bielefeld, 130 University of California, 29, 35, 40–42, 45 University of Hong Kong, 37, 39–40 University ranking, 27–29, 31, 33–35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47–49, 51–52, 146 USAID, 63, 67, 78–79, 82, 122, 152 User fee, 241 Uzbekistan, 168, 170 Vietnam, 3, 11, 13, 15, 20–21, 23, 329 weighting, 28, 30, 34, 38, 44, 49, 71 Wolfensohn, James, 188 Wolfowitz, Paul, 185 Women’s studies, 89–101, 103–107 Women’s Studies Quarterly, 99, 107 World Bank, 63, 67, 74–78, 82, 84, 99–100, 138–139, 151, 167, 172–173, 177–181, 183–195, 197, 199–201, 203–205, 207–211, 213–216, 270, 282, 299 world class, 27, 29, 40, 44, 46–47, 50–51, 305, 317, 326 World Conference on Higher Education, 7, 10 World Conference on Women, 92–93 World Declaration on Higher Education, 7, 10 World development indicators, 74 World system, 115 World Trade Organization, 182, 314, 330 World-class, 160, 164, 183, 256, 280, 305–306, 309, 317, 327 Yale University, 35, 37, 45, 48
