Thinking and Acting as a Great Programme Manager

THINKING AND ACTING AS A GREAT PROGRAMME MANAGER Sergio Pellegrinelli

Thinking and Acting as a Great Programme Manager

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THINKING AND ACTING AS A GREAT PROGRAMME MANAGER Sergio Pellegrinelli

© Sergio Pellegrinelli 2008 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2008 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 9780230525283 ISBN-10: 0230525288 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 Printed and bound in China

Contents

Preface

vii

Part One

Introduction

Chapter 1 Chapter 2

Programme management Programme management competence research

3 17

Part Two

Introduction to the chapters on the individual attributes

33

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF AND WORK Chapter 3 Granularity of focus Chapter 4 Emotional attachment Chapter 5 Disposition for action Chapter 6 Approach to role plurality

1

36 48 59 70

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF AND OTHERS Chapter 7 Engagement with team Chapter 8 Approach to conflict and divergence Chapter 9 Development and support Chapter 10 Purpose of inquiry Chapter 11 Expectations of others

83 95 110 121 134

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF AND PROGRAMME ENVIRONMENT Chapter 12 Adaptive intent Chapter 13 Awareness of organizational constraints Chapter 14 Approach to risk Chapter 15 Approach to communications Chapter 16 Approach to governance Chapter 17 Attitude to scope Chapter 18 Attitude to time

146 158 170 180 192 204 215

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Contents

vi

Chapter 19

Attitude to funding

226

Part Three

Applications of the competence framework

239

Chapter 20

Applications of the competence framework

241

Bibliography Name Index Subject Index

249 252 253

Preface

The intellectual basis for this book lies in research conducted in 2001 and 2002 by Dr David Partington, Malcolm Young, and me. At the time relatively little rigorous research had been conducted into programme management and even less on what was required to be an effective programme manager. Our experience of working with a wide range of organizations that had introduced programmes and programme management was that project management competence was a necessary but not sufficient condition for success in a programme role. We perceived a need both to advance academic knowledge and, perhaps more relevant and important for me, to help organizations to select and develop competent programme managers. We chose an unusual, but remarkably robust and revealing methodology in phenomenography. It served us well. As with any good research, we embarked on a journey keen to learn and open to new ideas. Little did we imagine that our findings and competence framework would become an important contribution to the development of programme management. It has been flattering to have academics and practitioners approach us at conferences to tell us how much they liked our competence work and how it had taken forward the field of programme management. Even the latest edition of the Office of Government Commerce’s (OGC) Managing Successful Programmes (2007) refers specifically to our work. The research has been used in various ways. It has been a key input and analytical framework for subsequent research. It has been directly or indirectly incorporated in courses and management development events that David and I facilitate. A particularly successful course has run at Cranfield School of Management since 2005. It is based largely on the original competence research, plus some insights from subsequent research. We have used the framework successfully as the basis for development and assessment centers. The framework has stood the test of time and application remarkably well, though, as with any research, it remains incomplete and subject to refinement and modification. vii

viii

Preface The decision to write this book was prompted by repeated requests for more information on the competence framework, and how best the synthetic descriptions of the attributes at the four levels could be interpreted and applied. This book is intended to address these requests, at least in part. There will always be contexts and situations that will not fit precisely, and the examples and interpretations provided can always be improved upon. Nonetheless, I believe the book to be a good source of help, explanation, and insight for practitioners wishing to improve the way they go about their work. I owe a debt of gratitude to my research collaborators, in particular David Partington who led the original research. Had it not been for other commitments, David would have been the coauthor of this book. I thank the organizations that sponsored the research and the individuals who willingly gave us access to their work and shared their thoughts. I must also thank the reviewers whose editorial correction and helpful comments have improved the quality of the final draft, especially Ruth Murray-Webster, Ian Simpson, and Roger Niven. I also thank the many organizations and managers who, by commissioning or participating in courses and development centers, have added depth and richness to our knowledge. They were the sources of inspiration for many of the case scenarios. A final word of thanks goes to my partner Sabine and our sons, Alexander and Dominik, who provided encouragement and showed great patience with me as I wandered about the house preoccupied with drafting one chapter after another over many months.

PART ONE

Introduction Thinking and Acting as a Great Programme Manager is intended to help experienced project and programme practitioners perform their work better. The focus is not on methodologies, tools, or techniques, but on the conceptions that underpin and guide action. By elaborating and exploring these conceptions or mindsets the aim is to stimulate thought, prompt reflection, deepen appreciation, and change practice. The book touches on the nature of programme management, its principal themes and methods, and its relationship to project management. The book incorporates experiences, ideas, and insights from practice across diverse industries. But its primary purpose is not to tell you about project and programme management in an abstract sense, nor to instruct you on how you should manage a project or programme. Its primary purpose is to engage you in thinking about how you might interpret and address different aspects of and challenges common in project and programme management work. Competence is about being good at doing something, not only knowing something. As such its value lies in helping you to think deeply about what you do, and what you could do differently. The book is intended to facilitate personal and professional development. But this requires you to engage in a dialogue with the text and to rise to challenges posed. A detached or superficial read will inform and provide ideas, but is unlikely to change in any fundamental way how you approach your work. Chapters 1 and 2 discuss project and programme management as management disciplines and fields of academic research, and outline a competence framework that emerged from research into what project and programme management practitioners do and how they do it. Chapters 3–19 are dedicated to exploring the 17 attributes that make up the competence framework. Each attribute is the subject of a chapter and is explored through the use of a scenario – a caricature of a real project or programme 1

2

Introduction created to highlight certain aspects or features. The scenario sketches out a situation with a number of challenges and dilemmas, then a set of questions is posed, and finally the scenario is interpreted from the four levels of the competence framework. The attribute chapters are relatively self-contained and can be read in any order. It is probably best to treat each chapter as a “unit of study,” and to pause and take stock before moving to another chapter. The scenarios are distinct, complex, and rich in nuance, the questions draw attention to different issues, and time is needed to digest and reflect upon the interpretations offered. The attribute chapters may become repetitive and tedious if too many are read in one sitting. In Chapter 20 some experiences and thoughts are offered on the practical applications of the competence framework and on the challenges facing practitioners wanting to transform the way they perform their work.

CHAPTER 1

Programme management

When individuals involved in projects and programmes meet, they each spend time trying to understand what the other means by programme management. Synthetic descriptions are exchanged. The individuals smile and nod. But as they part there frequently remains a lingering feeling among experienced programme managers that they have not communicated the subtleties of what they do and what makes programme management different from project management. Those steeped in the project management tradition struggle to appreciate what is so special and unique about programme management. Yes, programmes are bigger, take longer, and are more complex, but the same basic approach and techniques can be applied. In some organizations and by some individuals, programmes are conceived as a collection of projects. Programme management is implicitly or explicitly treated as an advanced form of project management. Projects are a collection of lower-level packages of work, each of which is delivered through discrete smaller tasks. Programmes similarly are a combination of projects and other activities. In some cases responsibility for realizing benefits, or at least monitoring the likely realization thereof, sits with the programme. The shift in focus from outputs to outcome held up as a distinguishing feature by some texts (OGC, 2003, 2007) is hardly new – good project managers have always had an eye on how their work was going to affect the organization. Project managers have dealt with stakeholders and suppliers, and have established governance arrangements. Programmes represent just another level in a pyramid of increasing scope and complexity. Experienced practitioners involved in bringing about complex strategic initiatives or in programmes intended to transform large organizations (or aspects of society in the case of public-sector programmes) tend to view this positioning as an oversimplification. In such cases, programme work transcends the management of related projects. It 3

4

Introduction involves coping with the ambiguities of strategy, with environmental turmoil, with cultural tensions and inertia, and with political undercurrents. They feel responsible, through the programmes they manage, not just for delivering the formally mandated change, but also for developing capabilities and for facilitating the growth, renewal, and vitality of their organizations. Studying the planned change initiative labeled programmes in numerous organizations suggests that programmes do range from complex projects to corporate transformations. In some cases, what one organization calls a project many others would describe as a programme. Maylor et al. (2006) point out that what is conceived as a project ranges from the management of whole product life cycles comprising multiple decades to small, short-duration units of work that would in other circumstances or other organizations be considered activities or tasks. The lived experiences of programme practitioners are clearly diverse. It is how they perform their work that makes a difference, not (only) how they or others label their work. Programme management has many incarnations and is still taking shape as a formal discipline. The following sections provide a little background on programme management as an emergent discipline, alternative perspectives on the nature of programme management, some research findings, and some implications for practice.

Brief history of programme management Programme management is now an acknowledged, high-profile approach in the public and private sectors, especially defense, aerospace, financial services, software development, telecommunications, and utilities. Its prominence, in part, is due to the success of project management. Project management is used to undertake a wide range of initiatives in practically every commercial and public-sector organization. The term “project” has entered common parlance to mean almost any discrete endeavor with an objective and some constraints. For many organizations projects are no longer infrequent, stand-alone endeavors but the principal vehicles for implementing planned change. Faced with increasing levels of project-based working, organizations sought to coordinate project, and sometimes nonproject, work to achieve otherwise elusive benefits and control. To distinguish this activity from the core project management it has often been called programme management.

Programme management In parallel, the success of project management, or at least the structure and control it offers, has seduced senior managers in organizations into using the approach to bring about complex change initiatives. Organizations have typically turned to project management practitioners to undertake these initiatives. As practitioners have taken on ever more varied, multifaceted change initiatives, they have adapted, extended, or reconceived their approaches. Since this work, at its core, has entailed defining, sequencing, and coordinating multiple projects, it too has been called programme management.

Codification Incrementally, programme management has emerged as a distinct discipline. Its uses and practices have been studied, synthesized, and disseminated. Ferns (1991) offered a definition of programme management centered on the notion of the programme as a coordinating mechanism for projects that enabled otherwise unrealizable benefits to be extracted. Gray (1997) reviewed alternative approaches to programme management based on the degree of control the programme management function exerts on the activities of the projects, and the mode of coordination. My own early research suggested important qualitative differences between projects and programmes (Pellegrinelli, 1997). The research revealed three archetypal programme configurations based on the purpose or nature of the coordinating benefits sought by the programme: portfolio, goal-oriented, and heartbeat. Portfolio programmes are a collection, cluster, or aggregation of projects, managed in a coordinated way to extract benefits associated with resource deployment, prioritization, and the transfer of knowledge and learning. Goal-oriented programmes realize major change through initiating, shaping, and integrating multiple projects. Heartbeat programmes enable the regular improvement of existing systems, processes, or infrastructure through planned step changes in capability or functionality delivered via projects. Murray-Webster and Thiry (2000) proposed that programmes could comprise both projects and operational activities and that the core logic for the creation of a programme was the realization of strategic or tactical benefits. Thiry (2002) later sought to introduce the notion of concurrent performance and learning loops in the management of programmes through the introduction of value management techniques. Vereecke et al. (2003) offered an alternative to the programme configurations, and suggested that programme management was still an immature discipline.

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Introduction A number of authors have sought to codify programme management practices, primarily based on personal or corporate experiences of working in the area, both observing practice and providing consultancy advice. Reiss (1996) draws distinctions between projects and programmes, and provides witty insights into the perceptions and misperceptions on the nature of programme management and the role of programme managers. Bartlett (2002) offers a structured, systematic approach to programme management work and practical tools and guidance on their use. The project management professional bodies have also felt the need to say something about programme management. The UK Association for Project Management’s Body of Knowledge published in 2000 notes variations in the use of the term “programme,” suggesting that “the most common – and cogent – definition is that a programme is a collection of projects related to some common objective” (APM, 2000, p. 15). The Fifth Edition of the Body of Knowledge (APM, 2006) provides a more comprehensive definition: Programme management is the co-ordinated management of related projects, which may include related business-as-usual activities that together achieve a beneficial change of a strategic nature for an organisation. (Body of Knowledge, Fifth Edition, Definitions, p. 3) The Project Management Institute (PMI) has attempted to document a set of processes that represent generally recognized good practice in the discipline of programme management in the form of The Standard for Program Management (PMI, 2006). The Standard offers definitions of a programme and programme management: A program is a group of related projects managed in a coordinated way to obtain benefits and control not available from managing them individually. Programs may include elements of related work (e.g., ongoing operations) outside the scope of the discrete projects in a program.    Program management is the centralised coordinated management of a program to achieve the program’s strategic benefits and objectives. (p. 4, italics in original) The Standard for Program Management (p. 9) postulates “three broad management themes that are key to the success of a program: benefits management, program stakeholder management and program governance.”

Programme management Programme benefits encompass both benefits emanating from successful projects and incremental benefits from programme management activities. A rational-linear benefits management approach is illustrated: identification, analysis, planning, realization, transition. Programme stakeholders management is described as projects’ stakeholder management plus “consideration of additional levels of stakeholders resulting from broader interdependencies among projects” (p. 11). Similarly, programme governance appears a scaled-up version of project governance set in a hierarchical organizational governance model. Over the last few years one publication issued by the Office of Government Commerce (OGC) has begun to dominate the way programme management is understood and undertaken in the United Kingdom, and is now increasingly being recognized and adopted in the rest of Europe. The OGC is an independent office of the UK Treasury. It works with public-sector organizations to help them improve their efficiency, gain better value for money from their commercial activities, and deliver improved success from programmes and projects. The OGC has expended considerable effort to distill and propagate best practice in project and programme management. Building on earlier work by the Central Computing and Telecommunications Agency (CCTA), the OGC’s publication Managing Successful Programmes (2003, 2007) represents the UK government’s view on the programme management principles and techniques. In drafting the 2003 edition and its subsequent revision in 2007, Managing Successful Programmes (MSP), the OGC consulted widely for views and contributions from leading practitioners from within the public and private sectors, professional bodies, and leading consultancies. MSP is the approved approach for managing programmes throughout the UK public sector. The latest edition of MSP (OGC, 2007) offers its own definitions of a programme and programme management and is framed as an interconnected set of principles, governance themes, and a transformational flow. The principles draw on diverse literatures and experiences of bringing about complex change, and include factors such as maintaining strategic alignment, leading change, and adding value. The governance themes comprise the management elements or foci for maximizing the chances that the desired outcome and benefits are realized. The transformational flow provides a route through the programme life cycle. A broad consensus has emerged on the nature of programmes and programme management. The shift from outputs or deliverables to outcomes or desired end states is generally accepted along with far greater

7

Introduction

8

emphasis on understanding, and actively seeking to realize, the benefits. Thus, the programme team needs to understand the strategic context and drivers of the business, and to accommodate “business as usual” as well as bring about change in the organization. Stakeholders are more prominent, and the programme team needs to communicate, consult, and involve those involved in or affected by the change. Stakeholders need to understand the implications of the desired outcomes and their contribution. The legacy of past change initiatives needs to be understood, as well as the interdependencies between the programme and other change initiatives under way or planned. Factors that could affect, constrain, block, or influence the outcome(s) need to be recognized and mitigated, in part using governance arrangements that address the scale, scope, and complexity of the specific programme.

Challenges and debates While the project management community and its professional bodies have tended to stress the commonality between projects and programmes, others have sought to accentuate their differences. They have argued that programmes are qualitatively different from projects. A critical review of programme management approaches, including MSP, conducted by Lycett et al. (2004) suggests that the shortcomings in standard programme management approaches can be traced to two flawed assumptions. The first flawed assumption is that programme management is a scaled-up version of project management. The second is that a “one size fits all” approach to programme management is appropriate. While some relatively small, self-contained change initiatives labeled programmes are amenable to a management approach that is a scaled-up version of project management, others are not.

Project-based and strategic management perspectives The differences between projects and programmes are greatest when programmes are used to implement strategy and to bring about corporate renewal. A better starting point for conceiving programmes is then strategic programming – the articulation and elaboration of strategies or visions (Mintzberg, 1994), practiced for years under the guise of strategic planning. This “strategic management” perspective draws guidance and inspiration from another intellectual tradition and practitioner community, rather

Programme management than the project management community from which the “project-based” perspective has emerged. In contrasting the “strategic management” perspective with the “projectbased” perspective of programme management, four key differences emerge. 1. Programmes are emergent phenomena and programme managers need to be more conscious of, and responsive to, external change and shifting strategic goals than indicated by a project-based perspective that promotes the definition and pursuit of fixed objectives and scope. 2. Programmes are conceived as frameworks or structures, and so atemporal or with indeterminate time horizons, rather than having linear life cycles akin to projects. 3. As a vehicle for enhancing corporate vitality, programme management is concerned with the nurturing of individual and organization-wide capabilities as well as the efficient deployment of resources. 4. Programme management work is intimately bound up with, and determined by, context in which the work is undertaken, rather than governed by a common set of transferable principles and processes. The two perspectives are grounded in fundamentally different assumptions. The project-based perspective conceives programmes as creating order and exerting control in relation to complex change initiatives. The implicit presumption is that there is a (relatively) knowable, predictable, and manageable business or social environment. In contrast, the strategic management perspective starts from the presumption that the environment is inherently ambiguous, fluid, and unstable. Programmes therefore need to cope with shifting agendas and uncertainty, flex to changing circumstances, accommodate divergent interests and aspirations, engage stakeholders and contributors, and enable change. So, in a commercial context, if competitors introduce new offerings or improve their performance standards, it may not be sufficient for the programme to realize its anticipated benefits or the progress originally planned. The requirements of the business, and hence the ultimate goals for the programme, should be some form of competitive advantage (or at least commercial viability). Competitive or comparative advantage is a relative, not an absolute measure. Programme success, from a strategic perspective, depends on what others do, as well as what the programme team does and achieves. Moreover, creating any form

9

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Introduction of advantage usually depends on numerous initiatives and ongoing activities within the organization combining synergistically. It has to build on strengths and competencies, and in some cases replace outdated processes, know-how, or attitudes. This adds to the complexity and highlights the importance of context in carrying out programme management work.

The importance of content and context The contention of Lycett et al. (2004) that the “one size fits all” approach to programme management is a flawed assumption is supported by various research findings. The nature of the change and the business or organizational environment in which a project or programme operates have profound effects. Even if programmes are not on the frontier of strategy implementation, they are usually set up to bring about major, complex changes with many risks, interdependencies, and conflicting priorities. Research by Buchanan and Boddy (1992) suggests that effecting radical changes to the core task of the organization presents the change agent with a high-hassle, high-vulnerability environment. Hassle refers to the frustrating, conflictual, and time-consuming technical and organizational issues, and vulnerability refers to the potential damage to the change agent’s reputation and status. Radical changes to the core of an organization have multiple dependencies, are influenced by unpredictable, shifting forces outside the control of the change agent, and are marked by fluid, uncertain contributions and ambiguous responsibilities for realizing the desired end state. Research conducted into actual programme management practices highlighted that the organizational context is experienced acutely by programme practitioners and it influences the choices they make and the decisions they take (Pellegrinelli et al., 2007). The study identified a large variation in approaches to programme management. Even where there was a mandatory methodology, it was adapted in subtle and creative ways, ignored completely, or contradicted. The diversity of practices, especially between three programmes that notionally were applying the same mandated programme management approach, was remarkable. The organizational context was the dominant factor determining the approach to the programme: Managers at all levels were acutely aware of the context in which they operated: contextual factors focused their attention and efforts, caused

Programme management them to make compromises and re-shape the programme, dictated core processes and prompted the stances they took. (p. 49) Most programme management frameworks and guides are largely silent on the context within which the work unfolds. Yet projects and programmes are now no longer a temporary adjunct to the standing or line organization. It is unreasonable to presume that projects and programmes operate in isolation, untouched by the politics, stresses, and routines of the organization. Programmes in particular have a role in shaping the context in which they exist, aligning and embedding the work to the evolving needs of the organization (Pellegrinelli, 2002). Vereecke et al. (2003) report that the formalized and rigorous approach to managing projects within the programme as described in programme management handbooks is not widely adopted. Research by Ribber and Shoo (2002) suggests that successful enterprise resource planning (ERP) implementation programmes are characterized by differentiated approaches. The approach varies according to the complexity encountered.

Implications for practitioners and practice The practice of programme management is somewhat messier and fuzzier than depicted, and implicitly advocated, in texts such as the PMI’s The Standard for Program Management (2006), or the OGC’s Managing Successful Programmes (2003, 2007). If these texts do not reflect important aspects of programme management work, how far can they be relied upon for guidance? Critical scrutiny can help to reveal implicit biases and potential shortcomings. From a strategic management perspective, the PMI’s The Standard for Program Management (2006) is disappointing. In seeking to embrace programme management within the domain of project management and to codify its diverse practices into concepts and categories familiar to project practitioners, The Standard for Program Management minimizes the different and diverse nature, scope, and purpose of programmes and programme management. It shies away from recognizing and addressing the management challenges associated with the complex, shifting, and politically charged contexts in which many programme managers find themselves. It does not recognize the emergent nature of

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Introduction many programmes, nor the importance of experimenting, learning, and innovating in bringing about major organizational or societal change. Managing Successful Programmes (OGC, 2007) is much more encompassing and holistic in tone and perspective, and is considerably closer to the strategic management perspective than the 2003 edition. But, there is still little discussion on molding programme work within the contours of the organizational context, redefining achievable objectives, or relieving intolerable constraints. Practitioners have few places to turn to for guidance as they initiate major change, or alert them to the pitfalls they may encounter. The projectbased perspective dominates the programme management landscape. It is sustained by the location of programme management broadly within the project management community. It is promoted implicitly by consultants and software companies, which have adapted, refined, and enhanced project management concepts and techniques. It is reinforced by commercially available software packages able to deal with multiple deliveries, numerous stakeholders, interproject coordination, and shared resources. The project-based view can be a source of comfort and assurance, especially for project managers newly promoted into programme roles. The gulf is not as great as they might have feared. They can apply enhanced but familiar tools and frameworks to operate effectively. It is comforting for the managers responsible for project and programme management in their organizations whose careers have almost exclusively been in project management. Their experiences and approaches are relevant and directly transferable. Such presumed similarity and familiarity, though, can dull the senses and curtail exploration. Research, practitioners’ experiences, and case studies of actual programmes have highlighted a number of pitfalls associated with a project-based view.

Pitfall in the project-based perspective of programmes Individuals and organizations that fall into these traps do so neither through incompetence nor through conscious lack of diligence. Rather, they fall into these traps by drawing on past experience and concepts of best practice that may not be relevant. Typically, they seek to impose degrees of order, control, stability, and predictability that are untenable in the circumstances.

Programme management Definition pitfall A project-based view may encourage managers and organizations to strive for higher levels of programme definition in terms of the desired outcome or “blueprint” than warranted by fluid programme environments and powerful external influences. The understandable search for clarity and a baseline against which to control and forecast programme outcomes can constrain the flexibility of the programme. In some cases this desire for clear definition may curtail experimentation and testing in favor of the first apparently feasible solution. Attention is then focused on achieving a “frozen” plan rather than accommodating emerging requirements, exploiting opportunities, capturing incremental benefits, and learning from experience. A robust, enduring definition requires a relatively stable and knowable environment. This presumption may be reasonable for short-duration bounded projects, but is less tenable for long complex programmes that bring about change as they unfold. Commercial organizations, and thus the programmes they run, are subject to forces beyond their control in terms of regulations, consumer trends, competitor activity, and developments in technology. Even traditionally stable government departments and programmes are buffeted by the winds of globalization, social change, supranational legislation, as well as the shifting aspirations of politicians. Moreover, new processes enabled by programme outputs may reveal unforeseen problems or opportunities, and/or may generate interest or rejection among stakeholders. Delineation pitfall A project-based view may promote the purpose, internal cohesion, and identity of the programme at the expense of embedding the programme within the fabric of the organization. Setting apart the programme, whether through separate reporting arrangements, dedicated teams, offsite location, or branding, can provide focus and momentum. However, this approach may foster an “us and them” divide and an unspoken belief that the programme is “right.” Consequently, stakeholders, especially other members of the organization, need to be managed (i.e., persuaded, prompted, or sometimes even forced into accepting programme deliverables and outcomes). However, in complex change the “right” answer is rarely obvious (if it exists at all). Stakeholders have the intimate knowledge of the micro-level details, views on what is valuable and desirable, and ultimate responsibility for enacting changes to behaviors, routines, and

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processes. Lack of true engagement limits access to this rich source of knowledge, closes down collaboration and contribution, and increases the chances of a “not invented here” reaction (Pellegrinelli et al., 2007). Strong delineations and demarcations mean that those performing liaison roles, such as Business Change Managers, have to work harder to facilitate integration and absorption of the programmes’ deliverables into the organization. Decomposition pitfall At the heart of the project-based view is a tendency to see programmes as the aggregation of their constituent projects. Consequently, the programme business case is the sum of the project business cases. The aggregation logic lends itself to the view that project business cases can and should be considered on their individual merits. However, the benefits expected from a programme may not always directly and unequivocally be decomposed and allocated to projects, especially where early project deliverables include enabling infrastructure or technology upon which later projects build. These early projects tend either to suffer from negative financial appraisals or to receive allocations of future benefits to justify their existence. Neither approach provides a sound economic basis for analyzing the effects of overruns, alternative scenarios, or variations to scope. To compound the problem, in the first instance the contribution of the project, and the team working on it, is not fully recognized. In the second instance, later projects are more likely to be cancelled or descoped because of insufficient benefits (already allocated/accounted for) even though on an incremental basis the project is attractive. Considering projects in a programme on their own merits may also lead to seeking funds from those that benefit from the project deliverables. This risks parochialism creeping into programme governance under the guise of prudent control of funds, with funders shaping project deliverables to serve their own interests. Where projects (can) build on each other, this parochialism may undermine the creation of most value for the organization as a whole. Opportunities for adding value to another group or department at little incremental cost may not be pursued. Programmes may lose their integrity and be disconnected from the overarching strategic purpose and enterprise-wide perspective – advantages claimed for their existence.

Programme management Can-do pitfall Project management places great emphasis on effective risk management and issue resolution to improve the chances of achieving the project’s objectives, whether by mitigating adverse events or by exploiting favorable circumstances. At a programme level, new risks and issues emerge, such as interproject dependencies and compatibility of their deliverables, procurement and deployment of resources, or the integration and use of outputs by the organization. From a project-based view, the task is fundamentally the same – do whatever is required on the programme to achieve the agreed outcome. The possibility of failure may not be truly embraced. Consequently, the nature and implications of failure for the organization or society may go unexplored. Ways of rendering the organization less vulnerable in case of failure may not be put into place. The programme may expend lots of effort remedying an adverse situation that may not matter much or that could more effectively be handled elsewhere. Focus on risk management for the programme may deflect from identifying, tracking, and acting upon early warning indicators of business or policy failure. Windows of opportunity may close, competition may rewrite the rules of the game, new technologies may emerge, or public opinion may change. Decisions to stop programmes or radically change their scope and outcomes may be delayed, wasting resources and making remedial action more difficult. Ardent endeavor may win battles but lose wars. Enterprise-wide pitfall Supporters of the project-based view see uncoordinated initiatives as suboptimal in the achievement of objectives and wasteful of resources. They perceive the promotion of local priorities and interests and unresolved differences of opinions as unhelpful in the realization of organizational goals. Project and programme managers are sometimes cast as victims of indecision, reversals of policy, and political intrigue. The extension of rationality, structure, and discipline throughout the organization is proposed to remedy underperformance on projects and programmes (Williams and Parr, 2004, Gaddie, 2003). Such organization-wide portfolio management or enterprise programme management undoubtedly provides greater order, but may unintentionally stifle responsiveness, innovation, and experimentation. If applied unthinkingly, such frameworks may restrain highly competent programme managers or disempower stakeholders. Moreover, set within this formalized context, programme management may appear to leaders of organizations as bureaucratic and similar to strategic planning frameworks

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Introduction discredited and largely abandoned two decades ago (Mintzberg, 1994). Portfolio planning and control frameworks, however well designed, are an ill-advised defense against the rising tide of global change and economic turbulence.

Reexamining and reconceiving programmes and programme management The project-based view does not provide a fit-for-purpose approach for the most complex and demanding change forced upon organizations that increasingly operate in fluid organic environments. Reliance on the projectbased view in such circumstances may result in underperformance or even failure. This underperformance affects not only organizations in terms of lost advantages and squandered effort, but also individuals tasked with leading programmes. Without help many competent practitioners are condemned to stumble and struggle, and pay a high personal price in terms of stress and dissatisfaction. Project and programme management practitioners and members of the professional community need to look beyond the project-based view and to embrace new, sometimes counterintuitive, ideas and approaches. As a community we need a deeper understanding of the competence of realizing planned change, whether the change is labeled as a project or a programme. The labels, definitions, and demarcations are not problematic in themselves, but in the actions and expectations they invoke. The critique offered by the strategic management perspective exposes the limitations of an approach and mindset grounded in the project management tradition. There is no doubt that project management is a powerful way for bringing about specific, bounded change in a controlled manner. Nor is there any doubt that a project-based approach to more complex initiatives – programmes – is fine in most instances. But, projects are venturing well beyond their traditional domains, and programmes are being used to bring about “mission-critical” change while practice is still taking shape. Chapter 2 describes research into what practitioners do and how they do it, and reveals a hierarchy of conceptions that guides and underpins thought and action in relation to project and programme work. The research sheds light on how we might approach our work, and on the very essence of that work.

CHAPTER 2

Programme management competence research

The growth of programme management has brought with it a demand for competent programme managers. Experienced project managers have typically been promoted into these roles, often with little development or support. From the widely held project-based perspective the logic is self-evident, so it is rarely articulated or questioned. Programme management is an extension of project management – more demanding and complex, but amenable to the same underlying principles and approaches. Programme management competence is therefore an advanced form of project management competence, and a programme role is a progression in the careers of project managers. Consequently, an organization’s pool of project managers is the natural source of individuals capable of moving into programme roles. The most competent and successful project managers are best placed to take on programme roles. Experience suggests otherwise. Proficiency in applying the frameworks and techniques contained in project management texts and bodies of knowledge, alone, is not enough to cope with programme roles. Success as a project manager is not a reliable guide on how an individual will perform in a programme management role. A global systems consultancy experienced difficulties as it promoted successful project managers into programme roles (Pellegrinelli, 2002). The consultancy found that many of these individuals lacked the competence to deal with complex systems implementations aimed at effecting significant business transformation in client organizations. These newly appointed programme managers needed to “raise their games” significantly to address the cultural, political, and organizational challenges. Programme management was considerably more than project management. In some cases they succeeded, in other cases they had to be replaced, tired and dejected. 17

Introduction

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Other organizations had similar experiences. The promotion of successful project managers to programme roles was a “hit and miss” affair. Those responsible for the selection and development of competent programme managers were struggling to understand how the role was different from that of a project manager, and what it took to be a good programme manager. They sensed that treating programme management competence as an extension of project management competence was a dangerous extrapolation. Certainly the skills and approaches employed by practitioners working on bounded projects were required, but in a programme role they needed to be more flexible and sophisticated, with increased reliance on intuition, adaptation, and improvisation. New skills and attributes were also required: a subtle blend of interpersonal skills and personal credibility, a deep understanding of agendas and organizational politics, an ability to build and tap into informal networks, and an appreciation of the broader strategic landscape. How could these skills, attributes, and qualities be assessed? Past accomplishments and seniority were not reliable indicators. How could they be developed? Some individuals seemed to grow and mature into programme roles, so there was evidence that programme management was a learnt competence. But what needed to be learnt went well beyond the bounds of traditional project management (Pellegrinelli, 2002). Could every project manager learn to be a good programme manager or are only a select few able to develop to the higher level of performance?

The competence research In 2001 when David Partington, Malcom Young, and I embarked on the research, we could not provide satisfactory answers to the dilemmas and concern raised in relation to the selection and development of competent programme managers. There was little useful formal knowledge on programme management competence. We were sure that stretching the prevailing project management frameworks was inadequate. Some research was required, free of the conventional assumptions and grounded in actual practice. Our specific research aims were to develop a fuller understanding of the meaning of programmes in diverse contexts, and to explore the competence possessed and applied by individuals who perform the role of programme manager/director (Partington et al., 2005). Our view was that by exploring competence we would gain an understanding of the nature of programmes and programme management work.

Programme management competence research Our next step was to find the appropriate theoretical and methodological underpinning. Viewed simply, “competence” is about being good at something. However, underlying this basic notion is a large body of literature on human competence at work, which reveals contrasting methodologies and perspectives, and some controversy. The work-oriented competence research uses functional analysis of work activities to define performance standards, typically for use in assessment and management development activity. Project management’s professional bodies around the world had developed “bodies of knowledge” to define the discipline of project management and to publish standards by which project management competence may be assessed. The United Kingdom’s Association for Project Management Body of Knowledge (2000) and the Project Management Institute’s PMBOK© Guide (2000) were examples, at the time, of work-oriented competence research. The characteristic “expert survey” approach produces lists of relevant knowledge topics, work activities, and key performance indicators. The more recent Standard for Program Management (PMI, 2006) is another example of a work-oriented approach. The main criticism of work-oriented approaches is that they do not specifically address what the worker is required to think, feel, or know to efficiently accomplish those activities. These shortcomings are particularly telling where the work is largely self-directed and lacks an established tradition surrounding its nature and practice. Such approaches risk offering a loose, consensus-derived perspective and limited pragmatic guidance. Practitioners are left to “pick and mix” processes as they deem appropriate, and the competence frameworks cannot be relied upon as a sound benchmark for evaluating performance. The worker-oriented approach to studying individual competence takes the competent worker – rather than the work – as the point of departure. The aim of worker-oriented studies is to capture a generalization of the competencies – typically knowledge, skills, and abilities – possessed by competent workers. From the field of project management, Gadaken’s (1994) study of the characteristics of top-performing project managers in UK and US military acquisition commands is a typical example of the genre. Gadaken used a critical incident interview methodology with 75 project managers consisting of a group of outstanding performers and a control group of average performers. A follow-up survey set out to validate the model of competence that was developed from an analysis of the interviews. The resulting model contains 16 competence elements, 6 of which distinguished the outstanding project managers. The six are sense of ownership/mission, political awareness, relationship development, strategic

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Introduction influence, interpersonal assessment, and action orientation. However, the worker-oriented approach results in descriptions of competence that tend to be too generic and abstract to be practically useful. Both approaches had significant shortcomings in relation to the field of research and our own philosophical perspectives. The approaches are inwardly focused, based on the assembled opinions of professional experts, and predefine what constitutes competence. As a result they may not capture workers’ competence, especially where there is disagreement on the very nature of the work, and where “backstage” tacit or covert dimensions of competence may be important. Inspired by the ground-breaking work of Jorgen Sandberg (1994, 2000), we adopted an interpretive approach known as phenomenography. Phenomenography was first developed within the field of educational psychology and is specifically designed to describe variations in people’s experiences of given aspects of reality (Marton, 1981, 1994). Central to the phenomenographic approach is the researcher’s aim of understanding how an individual apprehends, makes sense of, and enacts a specific aspect of their world, termed a conception. The methodology has been extensively used to answer such questions as why some students are better at learning than others, and its use has spread to other disciplines. Sandberg applied the approach, with its robust built-in theoretical and philosophical foundations, in a management context to explore different levels of competence among individuals in a group of engine optimizers in an automobile factory. The methodology is predicated on the fundamental tenet that a person’s competence at work consists of, and is inseparable from, the way he or she conceptualizes that work. A conception encapsulates the meaning the work has for the individual, shapes understanding, determines action, and frames reflection. Competence and the underlying conception are both manifest and given substance through doing. Competence is more than knowing and cannot be captured in objective lists of work activities and training manuals, except in a superficial way disconnected from the act of doing and the thought processes that underpin that doing. Unlike “rationalistic” models of competence, typified by both work-oriented and worker-oriented approaches, phenomenography does not separate worker and work, nor assume that researchers have access to objective knowledge of competence that is independent of those who perform the work. As such we did not need to formulate a potentially restrictive or vague definition of what constitutes programme management (as would have been required by the work-oriented approach), nor rely on “experts” or “past accomplishments”

Programme management competence research to identify the best-performing programme managers (as would have been required by the worker-oriented approach). The phenomenographic method allowed us simultaneously to understand how practitioners themselves conceived of (project and) programme management work and to understand what it means to be competent in programme management. In any group of people, there are a limited number (typically between two and six) of conceptions of the same aspect of reality (Marton, 1981). The conception held by an individual governs the awareness, appreciation, and actions of that individual. Conceptions of any aspect of reality (in this case programme management work) form a hierarchy of mental models. Higher-order conceptions are more holistic, integrative, and encompassing than the lower-order conceptions. Higher-order conceptions are linked with superior performance. Individuals holding higher-order conceptions can recognize and appreciate, though not necessarily apply or agree with, lower-order conceptions, but not vice versa (Sandberg, 1994, 2000). Our research design involved interviews with and observation of individuals from a range of sectors involved in project and programme management. We approached and secured senior management cooperation and permission to conduct research in large UK-based organizations that used programmes and programme management. To avoid problems of competitive rivalry and to provide the opportunity of cross-sector comparison, we selected organizations from different sectors. In each organization we identified and gained access to ongoing programmes. Between October 2001 and September 2002, we conducted in-depth phenomenographic interviews with individuals working on 15 programmes from 7 large organizations based in the United Kingdom representing different sectors. Our central informant was the programme manager or programme director. In some cases where access was limited, the programme manager was our only informant. The interviews entailed open-ended questions on what they conceived as programme management work, with extensive use of follow-up questions, such as “can you give me an example of that?,” to reveal how they conceived of it. These were supplemented with follow-up questions designed to capture qualitative data on their views of the programme manager’s performance in the execution of his or her work, where such information was not provided unsolicited. Where possible we shadowed them, observing their actions at key meetings and other events for the purpose of data triangulation. We also conducted phenomenographic interviews with a range of superiors,

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Introduction clients, peers, and members of the programme team. These interviews were designed not only to corroborate the programme manager’s account, but also to get an understanding of their conception of the meaning of programme management work, for comparison with the programme manager’s conception. This enabled us to obtain a wide range of conceptions of programme management work. Table 2.1 summarizes our data collection. Using the interview transcripts and observation notes, our analysis sought to identify our informants’ most essential and basic meaning structures, what they conceived as programme management work, how they conceived of it, and, through the examples, the relationship between the what and the how. By comparing these meaning structures or attributes, between individuals, we developed and refined a generic set of attributes. The analysis ran in parallel with the data collection, and the process was refined through a series of iterations involving identifying, prioritizing, developing, and arranging attributes and their levels between informants and between researchers. Guided by Sandberg’s work (1994, 2000), our aim was to generate from our data a two-dimensional matrix, or model, of programme management competence. The rows of the model would represent a generalization of the essential aspects of competence revealed by our informants’ conceptions of programme management work. The columns would represent a hierarchy of “levels” of conception. At the beginning we had no preconceptions of how many attributes would represent an appropriate level of granularity, and how many distinct levels of conception would be discernible. To facilitate ease of comprehension and the usefulness of the model an early decision was taken to keep the number of levels consistent across all the attributes. In practice this was not difficult to achieve, since each level was found to have its own internal consistency across attributes. We drew on three important aspects of conceptions to help establish the hierarchy of each attribute. First, people who hold lower-order conceptions are sometimes able to articulate the rhetoric of higher-order conceptions. However, they explain the superior competence of people who hold higher-order conceptions in terms of their own lower-order conceptions. Also, they exhibit behavior that confirms their lower-order conceptions. Second, people who hold higher-order conceptions are able to express and enact their own higher-order conceptions as well as lower-order conceptions. Thus people holding higher-order conceptions explain the behavior of those holding lower-order conceptions in terms of those lower-order

Table 2.1

Data collected: sectors, programmes, and informants

Programme identification by sector

Nature of programme

Aerospace 1 Aerospace 2 Aerospace 3 Software development 1

Defense Defense Civil Treasury systems for central banks Integrated suite for rail operator Drug development Drug development Drug development Schools Offices Rail Customer service initiatives Shared services platform Broadband expansion Construction

Software development 2 Pharmaceuticals 1 Pharmaceuticals 2 Pharmaceuticals 3 Construction 1 Construction 2 Construction 3 Financial services 1 Financial services 2 Telecoms 1 Public utilities 1

Programme manager shadow (days) 2 2 2

Individuals interviewed Programme manager Yes Yes Yes Yes

Superiors

1 1 1

Clients

Peers

Team members

1

2 2 1

1 1 2

1 1 1 1 1

2 2 1 3 4

2 3

2 3

Yes

1 2 2 2 2 1

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1

1 1

Source: Reprinted from: International Journal of Project Management, 23, 87–95, Partington, D., Pellegrinelli, S. and Young, M. (2005). Attributes and levels of programme management competence: an interpretive study, with permission from Elsevier.

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Introduction conceptions. Sometimes behavior relating to a lower-order conception is more appropriate in the situation, and individuals holding higher-order conceptions can operate effectively at a level either equivalent to or below that represented by their conception. Third, an individual’s position in the organizational hierarchy is not necessarily related to position in the conceptual hierarchy. As the number of interviews we analyzed grew, our focus shifted from the individual to the conception. As the basic meaning structures of the attributes stabilized, four distinct conceptions emerged. For instance a common feature or attribute of programme management work is the ability to focus appropriately on the programme’s detail and/or its wider context. At one level, this entailed understanding the detail and the relationship between activities. At another level this entailed having a “helicopter view,” operating at a summary level and not getting swamped in detail, with only occasional reactive involvement in detail for the individual’s own reassurance. At another higher-order level this entailed holding an overall view of the programme, but also exploring and/or experiencing detail to gain a deeper appreciation of the issues and outcome for key stakeholders (e.g., customers or staff). At level 4, the highest level we found, this entailed holding an overall view and selected aspects of detail, and appreciating the impact of programme decisions and actions outside the programme (e.g., own or client organization) and potential future consequences (e.g., inadequate functionality or capacity). Once we had concluded our data collection and analysis, we invited all those who had participated in the research to attend a 1-day workshop. Our purpose was to explain the programme competence model that was emerging, and to get comments, suggestions, and other feedback. The workshop, attended by 70% of those invited, provided an excellent forum for discussion and resulted in some clarification and minor modifications of the model. The model of programme management competence that emerged from the research is included as Table 2.2. The model has 17 attributes at 4 levels, with the attributes grouped into 3 categories broadly representing: (1) the relationship between the individual and the programme work; (2) the relationship between the individual and the programme team (including contributors and stakeholders); and (3) the relationship between the individual and the programme environment. Neither the sequence in which the attributes are presented in the model nor the categories, which were introduced to facilitate comprehension, have any theoretical significance. Each level forms a broadly coherent whole

Table 2.2

Programme management competence framework

Attribute

Level 1

Level 2

Relationship between self and work Broad view of Detailed view of plan; plan, including day-to-day reactive understanding of wider involvement in detail impact within within project the organization; boundaries occasional reactive involvement in detail for own reassurance

Level 3

Level 4

Level 2, plus occasional proactive involvement in detail to experience customers’ perspective

Level 3, plus strong orientation toward the future, including awareness of organization-wide and external impacts/benefits

S1

Granularity of focus

S2

Emotional attachment

Professional attitude to delivery of scope

Ardent commitment to delivery of scope

Passionate commitment to achievement of programme outcomes and benefits

Professional commitment to delivery of organization-wide and external outcomes; able to disconnect

S3

Disposition for action

Reactive; procedural; troubleshooter

Reactive; flexible

Proactive; reflective; flexible approach to rules and procedures

Opportunistic; intuitive ability to reshape, reconfigure, and realign

S4

Approach to role plurality

Comfortable with a focused, single role

Able to fulfill multiple roles, but is uncomfortable when roles conflict

Copes with multiple conflicting roles by adopting a clear position

Deliberately takes on multiple conflicting roles to integrate divergent interests 25

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Table 2.2

(Continued)

Attribute

Level 1

Level 2

Level 3

O1

Engagement with team

Supportive; transactional; sets tasks

O2

Approach to conflict and divergence

Not considered legitimate – procedural or imposed solution

Considered legitimate – adopts procedural/rational approach to derive solution

Seeks reconciliation and negotiated solution

Uses subtle facilitation to encourage creative and value-adding solution

O3

Development and support

Helps others to solve their problems

Directs others where to look to solve their problems

Coaches in how to influence the situation – provides the approach

Coaches in context to enable understanding and influence

O4

Purpose of inquiry

Own clarification

Level 1, plus challenge others

Level 2, plus encourage creative thinking

O5

Expectations of others

Expects contracted effort

Expects special effort when required

Exploits individuals’ talents, prepared to drive hard but not burn out

Level 3, plus redefine problem or reframe purpose Extends individuals’ talents, but not burn out

E1

Adaptive intent

Relationship between self and others Inclusive; explains Seeks detachment; where and how transactional; uses individuals are adding “need to know” value approach; sets objectives

Relationship between self and programme environment Adapts approach to suit Adapts programme Does what has worked environment environment to suit own in the past; applies approach standard processes

Level 4

Seeks to inspire; charismatic and credible; able to get people to modify their natural behavior

Adapts environment to suit organizational purpose

E2

Awareness of organizational constraints

Aware of capacity constraints; reports impact

Aware of capacity constraints; pushes for priority and delivery

Aware of capacity and technical constraints; prepared to go outside for support or resources

Aware of capacity, technical, and cultural constraints; facilitates development and knowledge transfer from outside

E3

Approach to risk

Analyses, reports, monitors

Attempts to manage out or mitigate risks

Prepares extreme contingency; uses backup and redundancy

Is ready for failure; anticipates wider consequences

E4

Approach to communications

Reports objective facts (consistent style)

Provides analysis and opinions (consistent style)

Level 2, plus sells vision of outcome (style more sensitive to audience)

Level 3, plus cultural and audience sensitivity

E5

Approach to governance

Uses standardized management, control, and reporting hierarchy

Attitude to scope

Defined at outset and fixed until changes authorized

Adapts/changes management and control processes to specific/dynamic situations Staged definition of scope; experimentation and learning via trials/pilots/prototypes

Seeks to embed programme in organizational management structures/processes

E6

Creates stable structures; appropriate involvement and adequate control/direction Scope subject to influence through cost/benefit analysis

E7

Attitude to time

Schedule driven based on defined scope; reschedule when necessary

Level 1, plus anticipates and plans for possible work, recognizes mobilization time

Level 2, plus takes into account the rate at which change can be absorbed or accommodated

Level 3, plus conscious of issues of timeliness and maturity

E8

Attitude to funding

Budget driven; manages allocated funds

Points out consequences of underfunding

Aware of budget ambiguities and financial uncertainty

Creates funding from achievement – self-financing

Shaped to meet emerging and changing business needs

Source: Reprinted from: International Journal of Project Management, 23, 87–95, Partington, D., Pellegrinelli, S. and Young, M. (2005). Attributes and levels of programme management competence: an interpretive study, with permission from Elsevier. 27

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Introduction across the attributes – a distinct conception of programme management work. Some of the attributes are cumulative across level, for instance purpose of inquiry (O4). Individuals with the highest-order conception tend to ask many more questions. Like individuals holding lower-order conceptions, they use questions to clarify an issue and challenge assumptions, but they also use questions to foster creativity and to shape others’ understanding and response to a situation. Other attributes are qualitatively different at the four levels, for instance attitude to time (E7). An individual holding a level 1 conception thinks of time primarily in terms of the project/programme schedule, the duration of activities, float, and deadlines. An individual holding a level 2 conception tries to think ahead of the current plan and preempt the need to mobilize resources and prepare for possible future work. An individual holding a level 3 conception is concerned about the flow of change (or deliverables) emanating from the programme and the rate at which the client or own organization can absorb or accommodate the change. An individual holding a level 4 conception has a more strategic, opportunistic view of time and is concerned about windows of opportunity or circumstances that would make the organization predisposed to the changes to be brought about by the programme. In some cases the changes in levels are discontinuous, for instance emotional attachment (S2). There is an increasing personal emotional commitment to the work and the outcomes, with individuals at level 3 expressing a passion for the programme outcomes and benefits. Individuals at level 4, while still committed, can detach themselves and see their work and the programme dispassionately in its broader context. The chapters that follow explore the attributes in more detail and attempt to illustrate how the attribute might be manifest at the four levels in relation to a specific situation. Clearly, some attributes lend themselves more easily to exploration in this way.

Implications of the competence research The research described above adds to our understanding of the programmes and programme management. Project and programme management is more complex and diverse than often portrayed. By seeking to capture what practitioners conceive as their work and how they conceive it, the research offers new ways of making sense of the relationship between project and

Programme management competence research programme management. It also provides a new way of thinking about what it means to be good at bringing about planned change. The conceptions of programme management that underpin the competence frameworks point toward an integration and reconciliation of the different schools of thought. Our research participants had no difficulty in labeling the level 1 conception as a typical approach to core project management work. In the research itself, this conception was typically held by individuals performing a project manager role or newly appointed to programme roles. Within a level 1 conception, programmes are large, complex projects. A level 2 conception of programme management work reflects greater proactive intent, adaptation, and anticipation, and recognizes in the work itself more complexity, divergence, and detachment from project activities. Programmes transcend but at the same time comprise projects. Programme management work encompasses and extents the agenda, horizon, and disciplines of project management. From within a level 2 conception programme management naturally emerges from and builds on project management. From a level 3 conception programme management is a distinct approach and agenda. The focus is on bringing about beneficial change within an organization characterized by diverse interests, stresses, and constraints. Greater attention is paid to the process of organizational change, to engaging team members and stakeholders, and to selling compelling visions of the future. At level 4 there is a strong future and strategic orientation. The boundaries between the text, the programme, and the context are blurred, permeable, malleable. Programme work is seen as shaping, aligning, mediating, developing, nurturing, seizing opportunities. From within a level 4 conception, programme work resonates with many characteristics of established themes in strategy (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994), strategy implementation (Balogun and Hope Hailey, 1999, 2003), and organizational development and change (Beckhard and Pritchard, 1992). The framework describes what practitioners involved in programmes do and how they do it, rather than how the work is labeled or their formal roles. As discussed previously, one organization’s project is another organization’s programme. Individuals with the title of and formal responsibilities associated with a project manager may hold higher-order conceptions, while colleagues in the same organization may be called programme managers but hold lower-order conceptions. The competence framework thus has relevance for both project and programme management, as generally understood. This book, and in particular the chapters exploring the individual attributes, seeks to be inclusive and to speak to all those

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Introduction directly involved in planned changes, whether they are called project managers, programme managers, or programme directors. The framework describes levels of competence. Individuals holding lowerorder conceptions are not incompetent. Many participants in our research held lower-order conceptions. Their performance was not inadequate. In fact some had performed consistently well over many years and made hugely valuable contributions to their organizations. Their conceptual levels were sufficient to accomplish the work assigned to them successfully. Holding higher-order conceptions might or might not have improved the outcomes of their work. Our research describes the thinking, the considerations, and the behaviors associated with programme management work. The competence framework thus provides a tool for selecting individuals for specific roles and a route map for the development of programme managers and directors. But, the research also grates with vested interests and common practices. The research helps to explain why success, or even excellence, in project management roles is unlikely, on its own, to be a reliable guide to how an individual might perform on complex strategic programmes. Individuals holding lower-order conceptions may simply seek to recreate the approach and environment that had served them well on simpler, more defined initiatives. These may not be adequate for the inherent complexity and ambiguity of the situation – the processes, the assumptions, and the expectations may be inappropriate. The individual is likely to fall victim to one or more of the pitfalls described in Chapter 1. Or, they may create structures and processes that mirror those linking a project to its component work packages. In doing so they may overemphasize aspects of the role related to detailed planning, managing interdependencies, monitoring progress and intraprogramme risks. They may replicate, interfere with, or excessively scrutinize the work of project managers. They are likely to subtract rather than add value. Effort and attention to the internal aspects of the programme may lead to less attention being paid to external factors. Hierarchical seniority cannot be relied upon, on its own, to deliver superior direction and judgment. Some senior managers may be holding back rather than promoting the development of competence – namely acquiring and applying higher-order conceptions. Senior managers who themselves hold lower-order conceptions may be poor role models, setting limited expectations and exhibiting lower-order behavior. They may recruit and promote project and programme managers who hold similar views, potentially overlooking or sidelining those individuals best able to handle complex

Programme management competence research programmes. Such senior managers may also tacitly expect programme managers to “do the job as they would” and so impose inappropriate processes or demand irrelevant outputs. Collectively, such senior managers may unwittingly be hindering the performance of programme management work through their attitudes and ways of working. Under these circumstances higher-order behaviors are unlikely to be recognized and rewarded, and they may even be deemed wasteful, inappropriate, or disruptive. Our findings suggest that project-based organizational processes, structures, and expectations, applied uniformly across all planned change initiatives, may be stifling the performance of those holding higher-order conceptions. Subsequent exploratory research has corroborated this implication of the competence research. Programme managers were interviewed to ascertain which organizational factors are perceived as helping and which as hindering the performance of their work (Pellegrinelli et al., 2006). While those holding lower-order conceptions sought structure, clarity, direction, and support, higher-order informants wanted to be unshackled, to be trusted, and to be allowed to get on with their work as they deemed necessary. These practitioners wanted to set aside methodologies or structures that did not enable their work, to abandon plans that were overtaken by events, and expressed a desire for flexibility, emergence, participation, and openness. In essence, those holding lowerorder conceptions tend to prefer the more structured, orderly, deterministic, or “mechanistic” contexts, and those holding higher-order conceptions tend to prefer “organic” contexts (Burns and Stalker, 1961). The prevalence of mechanistic structures and processes may demand extra effort and patience of those holding higher-order conceptions as they “go against the grain” of the organization. Equally, practitioners holding lower-order conceptions may experience considerable stress when asked to take on programme roles in such fluid environments. The blurred distinction between project management and programme management may lead to a compromise in terms of organizational processes, structures, and expectations that neither support projects (and project managers) nor enable programmes (and programme managers). Tightly specified and bounded initiatives may have too loose a governance arrangement, while governance arrangements for emergent, fluid initiatives may be too rigid.

From theory into practice The framework suggests that practitioners can improve their ability to deal with the most complex and challenging programmes by understanding,

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Introduction internalizing, and ultimately holding (in a deep, embedded sense) higherorder conceptions. Our challenge, though, is to recognize and acknowledge our own conceptions, and then to begin to appreciate others’ conceptions. The application of the research, especially when set in the context of previous work into the nature of conceptions (Sandberg, 2000, Marton, 1981, 1994), suggests that this is far from easy. Conceptions are coherent self-contained ways of perceiving, making sense of and acting upon an aspect of reality – in this case programme management work. Our research supports Sandberg’s (2000) findings that individuals holding lower-order conceptions do not recognize or appreciate behaviors, attitudes, and actions emanating from higher-order conceptions. While they may readily acknowledge the good or superior performance of an individual with a higher-order conception, they explain the performance in terms of their own lower-order conception. Practitioners wishing to improve fundamentally the way in which they work may need some help and guidance to see with different eyes. The following chapters try to bring the competence framework to life. Each chapter explores an attribute at the four levels, and tries to make it more tangible and meaningful by relating it to a specific situation.

PART TWO

Introduction to the chapters on the individual attributes Part two comprises 17 chapters, each one focused on an attribute in the competence framework. The chapter starts with a short scenario or case, then invites you to answer some questions based on the scenario. The attribute at the four levels is then explained, and the last part of the chapter is an interpretation of the scenario at the four levels. The chapters on the attributes are relatively self-contained, within the context of the opening chapters, and can be read in any order. They are presented for consistency in the sequence the attributes appear in the competence framework. There is no sequential logic or chronological link between the chapters. Each chapter starts with a different scenario and centers on one attribute. The scenarios are drawn from actual projects and programmes, but are not complete and accurate accounts of those projects or programmes. Rather, they are caricatures that provoke thought and highlight prominent features. The scenarios have been written to explore a specific attribute, and consequently details have been omitted and some creative license has been applied to bring out the key points. They have been deliberately drafted to disguise the organizations and individuals involved and protect confidentiality. Any apparent reference to actual people, organizations, projects, or programmes is unintentional and purely coincidental. In some cases this has meant a change of industry, in other cases the “technology” has been modified. The purpose of finessing or omitting the intricacies of the technologies and systems is to make the scenarios accessible, as far as possible, to all practitioners irrespective of their technical backgrounds. In some instances this may have unwittingly led to a distortion of the 33

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Individual attributes technological, market, or commercial possibilities, for which I apologize in advance. The effort to write down your personal answers to the questions will be richly rewarded in terms of a deeper appreciation of the interpretations sketched out at the end of each chapter. The four interpretations of the situations described in the scenarios relate to the four conceptual levels of the attribute being examined. The interpretations touch on other attributes, which is to be expected since the attributes are not stand-alone dimensions. They are an interpretation rather than the interpretation. They are not exhaustive. They presume existing knowledge of project and programme management, and experience of working with teams and in organizations. The interpretations build from level 1 to level 4, rather than repeating the analysis and considerations from the previous conception – individuals holding higher-order conceptions recognize and appreciate lower-order conceptions. They highlight the key differences between the conceptions in relation to the attribute. The interpretations are not infallible. You may have a completely different perspective, a better analysis, or an interpretation closer to the spirit of the level, the attribute, or the framework as a whole. Your experiences may suggest other courses of action. Effort expended developing and articulating your perspective and judgment will help you to understand the competence framework and will facilitate your own development. Confronting your approach to the proposed interpretations will highlight areas of disagreement. It should make you more aware of your personal approach to project and programme management work, and possibly shed light on some “blind spots.” I urge you to reflect, to recall similar situations you have encountered, and to imagine what, if anything, you might do differently in future. It is wise to take a break between each chapter to pause and reflect. Internalizing a new way of thinking and acting, whether suggested by the text or a personal reformulation of your own approach takes time. I hope the book becomes a mirror on your conceptions, a source of stimulation, and a sounding board for the way you address the challenging situations you meet in your professional life.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF AND WORK

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CHAPTER 3

Granularity of focus

The Systems Implementation Programme Pat Mullins read the e-mail from Paul Ross, one of the project managers on the programme, and wondered what to do. As an experienced project and programme manager for IS-Con, a major international software firm, Pat’s professional life always had a good measure of challenge and frustration, yet this assignment was proving more difficult than anticipated. Paul Ross had done some research and found a new off-the-shelf software product apparently capable of producing data clean enough to be useful for testing purposes. It was clear that he felt that this product was a potential solution to the problem that threatened to delay his project. For weeks he had flagged erratic support and dwindling resources from the client’s IT Division and, more pressing, a lack of “clean” data with which to test the software his project team was developing. The project Paul Ross was managing was one of eight projects within a major programme being run by IS-Con for a leading European financial services group. The programme’s mandate was to overhaul the group’s financial systems, and it was expected to last two or more years. The aim was to create a fully integrated suite of systems able to streamline business processes and give the group unprecedented access to information on their clients across multiple products and lines of business. The programme was seen as a “flagship” account within IS-Con, with success providing an opportunity to enhance its reputation within the financial services sector. Seven of the projects were scoped around key financial functions. These projects were building on existing IS-Con software packages, though extensive customization was required, and were being managed by IS-Con project managers. The project teams were composed of IS-Con consultants and client staff, both from the various business units and from the corporate IT Division. The eighth project was responsible for data conversion and cleansing, and was managed and staffed in its entirety by members of 36

Granularity of focus the IT Division. In parallel to the systems development programme, the group was changing its infrastructure platform. The IT Division was responsible for a smooth platform conversion and for installing the infrastructure capable of supporting the new suite of systems. After nearly 12 months and a huge spend, there was little to show for the time and effort. The programme had been hampered by a late start and slow progress. It had taken weeks to secure the necessary development environment and support systems from the IT Division for the project teams, in part due to an elaborate and open procurement process. Moreover, managers and staff within the IT Division were not familiar with IS-Con technology and were involved in a range of other programmes and projects. IS-Con project managers had had private concerns over the IT Division’s competence and commitment to the programme. Ever greater numbers of IS-Con consultants had been assigned to the programme to speed up delivery. Senior managers with the client organization, faced with little visible progress and mounting costs, had complained forcefully to IS-Con. They had accused the previous programme manager of not understanding their business and of swamping the programme with inexperienced IS-Con consultants and training them at the financial services group’s expense. IS-Con made commitments at the highest level that the programme would be brought back on track and under control. Pat Mullins was parachuted into the programme. Pat Mullins immediately tried to build relationships with key stakeholders within the client organization and to understand their goals, agendas, and requirements. It quickly became apparent just how close IS-Con had got to losing the engagement and tarnishing its reputation within the financial services sector in Europe. Excessive focus had been placed on trying to define precise requirements and producing voluminous reports, and not enough on providing something that the business community could react to and that could subsequently be developed and refined. It was clear that managers within the various lines of business did not have the experience, time, or inclination to help draft and review detailed specification or process maps. It was also clear that the IS-Con consultants had not adjusted their style or behavior to suit the client’s culture. Client complaints that the programme was overstaffed and with inexperienced consultants, often performing low-value adding activities, had some justification. Within a couple of weeks of arriving, Pat Mullins started to reduce the number of consultants working on the programme. A tighter, more disciplined regime began to emerge as Pat Mullins began to exert control,

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Individual attributes and there was far greater emphasis placed on schedules, timesheets, and delivering functioning modules to the client. Pat Mullins established good working relationships with the Executive Sponsor and the IT Division Director, and personally committed to bring about improvements and reenergize the programme. After numerous off-line discussions, it became clear that the programme needed some “quick wins” to demonstrate progress and generate support within the financial services group. The descoping of one of the deliverables was agreed, and then formally discussed and ratified at the previous Steering Committee. Pat Mullins also committed to a revised programme plan with ambitious deadlines for the deliverables from the various projects. The descoping of one of the deliverables had an unanticipated downside. All eyes then seemed to focus on this deliverable, and the project became a magnet for resources, especially IT Division staff. The IS-Con project managers began to complain that control of their projects was slipping away as client team members absented themselves. Paul Ross in particular was concerned that little or no clean data would be available to test the work that his team was doing. His project entailed extensive development/customizations and he would need clean data for testing purposes in about 10 days’ time. The project responsible for data conversion and cleansing, however, had practically no resources. This situation, though widely known, had not been reported formally by the IT Division project manager and the project was still scheduled to supply clean data to Paul Ross at the end of the following week. The data cleansing product, if it worked, offered a potential solution to the clean data problem. The cost of the product was insignificant in terms of the overall spend on the programme, and small when compared to the waste of client money if IS-Con consultants sat around, potentially for weeks, underutilized waiting for clean data. The software vendor, however, was unwilling to release a copy of the software for evaluation. IS-Con could bring a data set to the vendor’s offices in Silicon Valley, California, and evaluate the software’s effectiveness there. Paul Ross had already identified a data set in relation to his project that could be used for the evaluation. In the e-mail, Paul Ross urged Pat Mullins to recommend to the client that the software should be evaluated by IS-Con as soon as possible, and, if it worked, the software should be bought by the client at the end of the evaluation process. He argued that it would demonstrate initiative on the part of IS-Con and could relieve pressure on the data cleansing project.

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Granularity of focus Assume you are Pat Mullins: • How do you proceed? • What factors or considerations have you taken into account in arriving at your course of action? Please take the time to write down your answers to these two questions before reading further, especially the factors that you consider relevant and important in addressing the situation. The remainder of the chapter will explain the attribute granularity of focus and explore interpretations of the scenario above, and potential courses of action, from the perspective of the four levels of conception in the competence framework. The possible interpretations are not intended to be exhaustive, but are illustrative of the thoughts and actions of individuals holding different conceptions of their work.

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Granularity of focus Granularity of focus relates to what a project or programme manager looks at and attends to in analyzing or making sense of a situation. The attribute deals with the depth and breadth of the information, the level of detail, the factors, and the considerations connected and brought to bear in arriving at a course of action. The conceptual level determines what is deemed the text, namely the substance and the boundaries of the situation or issue, and the context, namely the background or peripheral information and considerations. Someone holding a level 1 conception focuses on the agreed scope of the work and the project or programme plan. The plan is known and analyzed in detail. Events or issues outside the boundaries of the project or programme are of peripheral interest or not considered. Problems or issues are framed in relation to the agreed remit for the work and in relation to the impact on the plan. Someone holding a level 2 conception attends to the agreed scope of the work and the project or programme plan, but seeks to maintain a broad view. Summary plans that facilitate a “helicopter vision” of the work are preferred to detailed plans. The detailed plans are probed on occasions for robustness and viability. Individuals holding level 2 conceptions want to reassure themselves that they can rely on the summary plans and the information provided by others. Factors, events, or issues outside the boundaries of the project or programme are considered in terms of their effects on the project or programme. Also, the implications of actions and deliverables from the project or programme on the organization (or community of users or recipients) are broadly understood and taken into account. A level 3 conception incorporates a level 2 conception, but has a fundamentally different view on the importance of detail. Someone holding a level 3 conception proactively delves into detail and tries to experience personally specific aspects of the project or programme. The details of most interest relate to the various actions or outputs of the project or programme and how they might be interpreted or experienced by users, customers, or recipients. A level 4 conception incorporates and extends a level 3 conception. Someone holding a level 4 conception proactively seeks to connect the work and outcomes of the project or programme to wider organizational or societal trends or themes. The benefits to be generated by the programme are important, but at the same time the work of the project or programme

Granularity of focus is framed within a broader understanding of how it enables other goals or initiatives to be progressed, the precedence it sets, the avenues it forecloses, and the capabilities it fosters. The project or programme is seen as an episode in a stream of change required for the organization’s vitality or society’s welfare. These conceptual levels manifest themselves in different ways depending on the project or programme. In the following section the scenario at the beginning of the chapter is explored from the different conceptual levels.

Exploring conceptual levels in relation to the Systems Implementation Programme The actions and suggestions of Paul Ross reflect a concern to overcome a difficulty facing him and to keep his project on track. They indicate drive, initiative, and commitment to delivering in accordance with the plan. Level 1 conception Pat Mullins holding a level 1 conception would empathize with Paul Ross’ perspective and agree that his suggestions, phrased appropriately and communicated well to the client, are a reasonable course of action given the prospective delays in obtaining clean data for testing. The focus of attention would be on dealing with the expected delay to Paul Ross’ project. Action would need to be taken and soon. Ideally a solution would need to be found and implemented in the 10 days before the lack of clean data affected the project. Doing nothing would not be a viable option from Pat Mullins’ perspective. It would mean accepting that Paul Ross’ project would slip, and in turn the overall programme plan to which Pat Mullins had personally committed would slip. Pat Mullins would know in detail the plans and issues facing the data conversion and cleansing project, irrespective of whether or not progress and status had been accurately reported. There would be an unwillingness, or great reluctance, to accept assurances from the IT Division project manager running the data conversion and cleansing project that clean data would be available as scheduled. Apart from running late and having to replan, the consequences of not having clean data would be expected to have a negative impact on the client and/or IS-Con. Paul Ross’ team could continue their customization work on untested “code,” but this would almost inevitably mean rework.

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Once clean data were available, the “code” would be tested, “bugs” would be discovered, the team would correct the “code” but would find that subsequent development would have to be revisited because it would have been built on faulty “code.” If Paul Ross’ project were to stop at the end of the following week, Pat Mullins would have to decide what to do with the IS-Con team. Asking the client to pay for idle consultants might provoke an adverse reaction, even if the problem were caused by the project staffed and managed by the IT Division. Standing the team down would mean that the team members would be eligible to work on other projects. If the situation persisted for any length of time, many of the team members would be reassigned. Paul Ross, if he were still on the programme, would lose the team and with it all the knowledge the consultants had acquired about the work they were doing. Pat Mullins could try to hold the team together on a nonbillable basis, but would very soon come under scrutiny and criticism from IS-Con’s senior commercial managers for incurring a loss of (potential) revenue. Team members would also begin to complain since their bonuses might be affected by the drop in their utilization rates, or because they were getting bored and restless. Pat Mullins would recognize that the off-the-shelf data cleansing product might not work, but given the information available it was worth evaluating its effectiveness. If the off-the-shelf product did not work, another solution would have to be found quickly. In either case, the situation demanded an expedient approach for the programme to stand any chance of delivering against plan. Level 2 conception Pat Mullins holding a level 2 conception would understand Paul Ross’ point of view and the rationale for the suggestions he was making. But, Pat Mullins would want to explore other options and study the implications of purchasing and using the off-the-shelf data cleansing product before approaching the programme’s Executive Sponsor or the IT Division Director. Paul Ross would be asked to do as much desk-based research into the data cleansing product as possible, and to understand the processes for buying and deploying it at the client site. Pat Mullins would also initiate an immediate review of the data conversion and cleansing project to ascertain the exact status of the project and determine a realistic schedule for the production of clean data for testing. In the interim, Pat Mullins would

Granularity of focus operate on the assumption that clean data would not be forthcoming at the end of next week, and could be delayed for an indeterminate period. Pat Mullins would focus on the issues facing the programme as a whole. The prospective shortage of clean data raised by Paul Ross, if not sorted, would affect the other projects in due course. The off-the-shelf software could provide clean data for testing purposes for all the projects. The software might not provide data clean enough for the financial services group to use for business purposes, so the data conversion and cleansing project would still have to do all or most of the work in scope. The extra effort and expense might be worthwhile to maintain momentum on the programme and to decouple the projects working on customizing IS-Con software packages from the data conversion and cleansing project. If the off-the-shelf software package were to be evaluated it needed to be done from the perspective of the benefits to the programme as a whole. A more detailed understanding of the requirements of each of the projects would need to be ascertained. The other projects would also have to identify data sets to use in any evaluation, not just the data set Paul Ross had identified. Pat Mullins would see a longer time window for deciding if and how to proceed with the evaluation of the off-the-shelf data cleansing software. Paul Ross’ project was slightly ahead of the others, so a minor delay might be acceptable, albeit begrudgingly, to the client. The next week, Paul Ross and his team might usefully be redeployed to the other projects. They might not be as effective, but they would be doing useful work and maintaining progress on the programme as a whole. Time would also be needed to address the client’s procurement requirements and to involve members of the IT Division who would normally deal with such software purchases. Pat Mullins might subsequently need to ask the Executive Sponsor to circumvent the procurement processes, if the progress stalled. Ultimately, the client organization would have to decide whether progress on the programme or adherence to procurement processes was more important and to accept the consequences. Ideally, members of the IT Division would take part in an evaluation, if it went ahead. Before approaching the Executive Sponsor or other senior managers from the financial services group, Pat Mullins would want to be absolutely certain of the status of the data conversion and cleansing, to have a realistic schedule for the provision of clean data, and to have calculated the implications for progress on the programme. Opportunities for redeploying Paul Ross’ team would have been examined and exhausted before Pat Mullins

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would raise the evaluation of the off-the-shelf data cleansing product – as a last possible option for keeping the programme on track. Pat Mullins would also use the lack of clean data as a catalyst for a broader discussion on discipline and commitment. The programme was experiencing drift and loss of resources (except on the project where one of the deliverables had been descoped). Unless there were greater commitment and discipline on the part of the IT Division staff, the programme plan would slip irrespective of whether clean data were made available as scheduled. The prospective lack of clean data, and an apparent reluctance on the part of the IT Division project manager to flag the situation, was symptomatic of a deeper malaise affecting the programme. Any proposed solution would need to be linked to, or part of, a wider initiative to improve performance on the programme. Pat Mullins would recognize that the revised programme plan would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve given the current issues and lack of commitment. Level 3 conception Pat Mullins holding a level 3 conception would read Paul Ross’ e-mail and try to imagine how the Executive Sponsor or the IT Division Director might react if it appeared on their computer screens. Whatever the shortcomings of the data conversion and cleansing project and whatever the options examined, Pat Mullins would consider them in relation to the pressures on the client organization and a strained relation between IS-Con and the client. Pat Mullins would be acutely aware of the heavy workload on the IT Division and the stress it created on its staff. Apart from working on the systems development programme, the IT Division was responsible for a smooth platform conversion and for installing the infrastructure capable of supporting the new suite of systems. Other programmes and projects and the task of maintaining existing systems and responding to urgent requests from business users had not gone away. IT Division staff working on the programme were being pulled in different directions and were forced to balance competing priorities. Pat Mullins would admit that the situation was far from ideal, but at the same time would accept it as a fact of life. Pat Mullins would have picked up the signs that problems were emerging with the data cleansing project even if they were not formally communicated. The fragile relationship between IS-Con and the client, largely held together by personal assurances from Pat Mullins to the Executive Sponsor,

Granularity of focus the IT Division Director, and the key stakeholders, needed to be protected. If a one-to-one discussion with the IT Division project manager responsible for data conversion and cleansing confirmed Paul Ross’ concerns, Pat Mullins would want to position the delay as the result of difficult circumstances rather than as a failure. Pat Mullins would call together the project managers to discuss the implications of clean data not being available as scheduled and the options available. These would include replanning the projects to accommodate the delay in clean data, redeploying resources, and shifting timelines. The stated purpose of the meeting would be to agree on appropriate actions. Pat Mullins would also let everyone know that the key discussion points and decisions from the meeting would be shared with the Executive Sponsor and the IT Division Director. In advance of the meeting Pat Mullins would suggest to Paul Ross that he should offer the idea of using the off-the-shelf data cleansing software to the IT Division project manager. Pat Mullins would handle the meeting so ISCon would be perceived to be helpful rather than critical, and encourage the IT Division project manager to research the software as a fallback solution to the current problem. Pat Mullins would try to get the IT Division project manager to own the solution, with support from Paul Ross or other experts within IS-Con. Having confirmed that ownership of the problem of lack of clean data and responsibility for finding a solution rested within the client organization, Pat Mullins would support actions, including or excluding the off-the-shelf software, to find a way forward and ensure progress on the programme. Level 4 conception Pat Mullins holding a level 4 conception would read Paul Ross’ e-mail, recognize the concerns and issues that it might raise, and try to understand what opportunities Paul Ross’ efforts and discovery offered. IS-Con was a major international software firm. This was not the first, nor could it be expected to be the last, time clean data for testing were not available as scheduled. If the off-the-shelf software worked, or could be made to work reasonably well, then it could be used on many other IS-Con projects and programmes. Collaboration in evaluating the software, whatever the final outcome, might deepen the relationship between IS-Con and its client. If the product worked, it would benefit both parties. The client would potentially find a way of ensuring progress on a high-profile programme,

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Individual attributes without incurring all the evaluation costs. IS-Con would potentially add a tool to its systems implementation armory that might stand it in good stead competitively. Pat Mullins would ask Paul Ross to conduct more detailed research, including contacting relevant people within IS-Con about the software. Pat Mullins would then personally contact senior managers within IS-Con to discuss how best to proceed given the circumstances, and what costs IS-Con could absorb both from a client relationship perspective and from a tool investigation perspective. Pat Mullins would also have a one-to-one meeting with the IT Division project manager responsible for data conversion and cleansing to understand in detail the status of the projects, what options had been considered, and what remedial actions were being taken. At a meeting of all the project managers the implications of clean data not being available as scheduled would be discussed. Options such as replanning, redeploying resources, and shifting timelines would be discussed and some actions agreed. Pat Mullins would inform everyone that Paul Ross had been doing some excellent research and had found new off-the-shelf data cleansing software. Its efficacy was uncertain, but ISCon would probably want to evaluate it. The IT Division project manager would be asked whether it might be helpful in addressing the immediate problem and whether Pat Mullins should approach the Executive Sponsor and IT Division Director to get involved in the evaluation. Having done exhaustive research on the software, Pat Mullins would individually and informally meet the Executive Sponsor and the IT Division Director. The discussion would revolve around the programme, current issues, and how they were being addressed. Pat Mullins would raise the subject of the off-the-shelf data cleansing software and outline IS-Con’s proposal. With the Executive Sponsor, Pat Mullins would emphasize that it could avoid the programme slipping, with the resulting loss of benefits and personal credibility. With the IT Division Director, Pat Mullins would emphasize the advantages the tool might offer in the future and the stress it might relieve on the data conversion and cleansing project. Concerns and objections would be noted and reflected in subsequent discussions and any formal proposals. Pat Mullins would recognize that underperformance on the programme would adversely affect both parties, independent of the source of the underperformance, and would seek to look after the interests of both

Granularity of focus parties. Pat Mullins would be concerned about progress on the programme and delivery against commitments, the relationship with the client, and wider reputation in the financial services sector. Pat Mullins would also have an eye on how what was done or learnt on the programme might benefit the client and IS-Con in the future.

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CHAPTER 4

Emotional attachment

The Renewable Energy Programme Terri Lund was not looking forward to the forthcoming meeting with the CEO of Amalgamated Power. It was the first one-to-one meeting since Neville Smythe had become CEO following the very acrimonious and public departure of the previous CEO, and Terri Lund had to report some bad news. Terri Lund had been with Pennine Electric (PE) since its formation as a privatized energy company in the 1990s, and had contributed significantly to PE’s research and development activities. PE had been acquired by Amalgamated Power, though it still retained a fair degree of independence as part of Amalgamated Power’s portfolio of energy companies. Amalgamated Power’s strategy had been one of rapid growth and diversification, and PE had been encouraged to pursue actively the exploitation of renewable energy sources alongside its more traditional power plant operations. Terri Lund had been appointed Programme Director for the Renewable Energy Programme, an assortment of projects aimed at developing and exploiting renewable energy sources. Terri Lund was delighted to accept the role since it meant taking responsibility for turning research and development activities into tangible, commercial energy generation. While most of the projects were relatively small, the programme was dominated by the design and construction of a significant new hydropower scheme. This project, referred to as EHF (Ecological Hydropower Facility), was under construction and was expected to be complete in about 15 months. In terms of its investment-to-output ratio EHF was an expensive power plant. The planning constraints were extremely stringent, particularly regarding the impact of the plant on the local environment and on the survival of river fish passing through the plant’s turbines. What was special about EHF was its use of a combination of leading-edge technological solutions, designed by a 48

Emotional attachment team led and managed by Terri Lund. This enabled the planning constraints to be addressed with room to spare, at the same time allowing the plant’s output to be changed rapidly to balance supply and demand. The leading-edge design was also selected because it was seen to epitomize Amalgamated Power’s commitment to “green” energy and sustainable development. Amalgamated Power’s “green” image undoubtedly contributed to its acquisition strategy by winning over target companies’ shareholders and on occasions securing regulatory approval. Success had created a wave of enthusiasm and euphoria that had also infected the operating companies with no venture or project being out of reach. Terri Lund felt that PE’s bold ideas for renewable energy technology, including EHF, strongly supported Amalgamated Power’s vision. EHF was to be a flagship project that would showcase leading-edge, environmentally friendly technology for customers, both energy users and other energy producers interested in new-generation methods and technologies, and investors at home and abroad. This decision to use the project as a technological showcase resulted in significant increases in scope, over and above the basic hydropower plant required to meet projected energy demands. From informal discussions with the previous Amalgamated Power CEO, Terri Lund was led to believe that the cost increases would be a small price to pay for the massive global business advantages the leading-edge plant would offer in terms of facilitating license sales of new technology. The projected overrun of £5m at the end of the detailed design phase was under 5% of the approved budget of £115m and well within the risk-based contingency allowed for the project. The projected overrun was not formally brought to the attention of the PE Capital Investment Board. With construction under way the EHF budget situation became rather uncomfortable. The project manager informed Terri Lund that the project would exceed the budget plus risk-based contingency (totaling £125m) by over £10m. Shocked, Terri Lund asked for a fuller explanation and a detailed breakdown showing why the costs had increased so much. The project manager set about conducting a detailed analysis of the costs involving all the project’s main contractors and suppliers. When the project manager presented to the PE Capital Investment Board the expected outturn cost had risen to £141m “give or take a couple of million.” The project manager also reported that all possible ways of reducing costs had been exploited within the current design. The cost increase would directly come off PE’s bottom line. There was no possibility of agreeing to higher energy charges with the industry regulator

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Individual attributes to fund the increase. EHF could possibly be redesigned along traditional lines, abandoning the technological showcase idea. A very basic plant with the same expected power output and compliant with planning regulation could be built and in service for well under £90m. The latter course of action would mean starting the project again, practically from scratch, including a rerun of the lengthy planning approval stage that would be costly, embarrassing, and with an uncertain outcome. Construction was already well under way, and, according to the project manager, at least £52m of design and construction costs were already spent or committed. Minor savings could be made by descoping other projects within the Renewable Energy Programme or abandoning planned research and development investments in new renewable energy technology. The latter course of action would end PE’s aspirations of being at the forefront of renewable energy, and potentially condemn PE to a strategic cul-de-sac. Terminating the Renewable Energy Programme was likely to be welcomed by Neville Smythe whose catch phrase since joining Amalgamated Power had become: “back to basics.” Ambitious expansion was not what Amalgamated Power’s shareholders had wanted; they had bought into a boring but steady dividend stream. Shareholder pressure had forced the previous CEO out, and Neville Smythe was quickly installed with a mandate to sell off the majority of the overseas businesses and stick to being a domestic energy utility focusing on earnings. At a senior management conference a few weeks earlier, Neville Smythe had stated that Amalgamated Power had spread itself too thinly. Renewable energy sources, such as wind farms, were welcomed in concept but resisted in practice by the public – quite apart from generating poor returns for shareholders. Requests for additional funds for the EHF project had to go to the Amalgamated Power Board, so a meeting with Neville Smythe was scheduled. Preparing for the meeting, Terri Lund stared at the models of the EHF plant and the other technologies PE was pioneering. Renewable energy sources had to be the future.

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Assume you are Terri Lund: • How do you feel about the situation? • What course of action would you propose to Neville Smythe? • What factors or considerations have you taken into account in arriving at your course of action?

Emotional attachment Please take the time to write down your answers to these questions before reading further. Try to imagine the emotions that you might experience if you were Terri Lund and how that might affect your approach. The remainder of the chapter will explain the attribute emotional attachment and explore possible interpretations of the scenario above from the perspective of the four levels of conception in the competence framework. The possible interpretations are not intended to be exhaustive, but are illustrative of the thoughts and actions of individuals holding different conceptions of their work.

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Emotional attachment Emotional attachment relates to the feelings and emotions that project or programme managers have in relation to their work. The attribute deals with the personal connection to the project or programme and what the work means to the individual. Someone holding a level 1 conception has little emotional connection with the work. The attitude is one of professionalism and neutrality. There is no deeply felt ownership of the outcomes, though the individual may take pride in adhering to prescribed methods and best practices. The work needs to be done, and done as well as possible within the remit of the job and the prevailing circumstances. Someone holding a level 2 conception is personally committed to the work and experiences a sense of personal success from delivering the agreed scope (or elements thereof) of the project/programme. Passion and commitment are clearly manifest in the behavior and attitudes of an individual holding a level 2 conception. Getting the job done is important and is a personal driver. Someone holding a level 3 conception is passionately committed to achieving the project’s or programme’s outcomes and benefits. Delivering the agreed scope is instrumental to achievement of the outcomes and there is no sense of emotional loss from curtailing work on projects, abandoning plans, or changing direction as long as it serves the ultimate goals. Not realizing the benefits or outcome is experienced personally as a failure or sense of loss. Someone holding a level 4 conception is professionally committed to realizing the project’s or programme’s outcomes. The commitment covers the tangible benefits and advantages to the organization, and the benefits to the wider stakeholder community and potentially society at large. Someone holding a level 4 conception is able to review the project or programme dispassionately and critically within a wider organizational, business, or social context and to appreciate the need and pressure to change, suspend, redirect efforts or terminate the work. Someone holding a level 4 conception is able to disconnect from the work and switch allegiance to a new mandate or mission without experiencing (much of) a lingering sense of loss, failure, or lack of satisfactory closure. These conceptual levels manifest themselves in different ways depending on the project/programme. In the following section the scenario at

Emotional attachment the beginning of the chapter is explored from the different conceptual levels.

Exploring conceptual levels in relation to the Renewable Energy Programme The arrival of a new CEO with a mandate to sell off overseas businesses and stick to being a domestic energy utility focused on earnings inevitably brings with it a change in attitudes toward specific projects and investments in new technology. Level 1 conception Terri Lund holding a level 1 conception would feel that it was unfortunate, but not completely unexpected, that the EHF project had run into difficulties. The nature of the project meant that scope creep and overruns were likely, however much risk analysis might have been done. Keeping the projected overrun to a little over 22% was good considering the leading-edge design. The Ecological Hydropower Facility met the planning constraints with room to spare, had considerable output flexibility, and was a showcase for PE’s new technology. There was little point agonizing over past decisions; the question now was what to do about the EHF’s projected overrun. Terri Lund would feel that the appropriate course of action was to inform Neville Smythe of the project’s status and get his decision on how to proceed. Neville Smythe was Amalgamated Power’s new CEO and was changing the company’s strategic direction, and therefore he was best placed to decide what to do with the EHF project. Terri Lund would identify and analyze the options available. The project could continue based on the current scope, minus whatever minor scope reductions could be identified that would not compromise the integrity of the plant and would comply with the design that secured planning approval. PE (Amalgamated Power) would then just have to accept the cost overrun and the consequent reduction in profit, possibly spreading it over two years. The other option would be to stop the project and redesign the plant along traditional lines, abandoning the technological showcase idea. This would mean starting the project again, practically from scratch, including seeking planning approval. Much of the £52m spent or committed would have to be written off, and PE would face a shortfall in energy production for at least a couple of years. Abandoning the project altogether would be worse than redesigning the plant since apart from the write-off and

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ongoing energy shortfall it would also incur significant additional costs to restore the site. Either way, the shareholders would have to be placated and the publicity would have to be managed. Terri Lund would feel that it should be a commercial decision, and would prepare comparative cost estimates. The CEO would have to weigh up the intangible factors such as the impact on Amalgamated Power’s reputation. Descoping other projects in the programme would be a separate decision if Amalgamated Power needed to find additional saving. Terri Lund’s key objective for the meeting would be to inform Neville Smythe of the status of the EHF project, since it would be formally reported at the next Amalgamated Power Board, and solicit his view and ideally get a decision from him on the way forward. During the meeting and in answering questions, Terri Lund would recount the history of the project, the processes adopted, and decisions taken, and present the analysis as clearly and objectively as possible. Any criticism, implied or stated, of Terri Lund’s lack of professionalism or diligence as Programme Director for the Renewable Energy Programme, and hence sponsor for the EHF project, would be of more concern than the fate of the project. Level 2 conception Terri Lund holding a level 2 conception would feel intensely annoyed that cost overruns were threatening the EHF. The previous CEO had understood that this type of project was subject to scope creep and overruns. The Ecological Hydropower Facility was not just about generating energy but also about selling technology licenses to other energy companies looking for new technologies. Even if Amalgamated Power wanted to be a domestic energy utility focusing on earnings, there was considerable value to be created from marketing the technologies developed over the previous decade. Neville Smythe had to be made to see that completing the EHF project as planned was the best way forward, and not at odds with Amalgamated Power’s new strategic direction. The reduction in bottom line profits even if around £26m would be, in the words of the former CEO, “a small price to pay” for an organization the size of Amalgamated Power for the green credentials and business advantages the leading-edge plant would offer. In any case the past could not be undone, and completing the project would make the best of the bad situation. The EHF project was the centerpiece of the Renewable Energy Programme and Terri Lund’s baby. It was the fruition of many years of research and development efforts.

Emotional attachment Terri Lund would validate the cost estimates personally and ensure that the revised estimate, including any necessary contingency, was watertight. Asking for additional funds was bad enough, but doing it twice on the same project would be career limiting. Terri Lund would then try to find some minor scope reductions to trim costs. In addition the intangible benefits of a “green” image and possible future sales of technology would be added to the argument for continuing with the current plan. The option to stop the project and redesign the plant along traditional lines would be evaluated. Estimates of the cost of redesigning a conventional plant and obtaining planning approval, plus contingencies, would be added to the £52m spent or committed that would have to be written off. Terri Lund would also highlight the shortfall in energy production associated with redesigning the plant, and the embarrassment such a public admission of having got the original plant design or execution wrong would cause. Terri Lund’s key objective for the meeting would be to convince Neville Smythe that continuing the EHF project as planned was the best course of action, and that he should support the formal request for additional funds to be submitted to the next Amalgamated Power Board. During the meeting Terri Lund would extol the merits of the Ecological Hydropower Facility and the dedication and commitment of the PE people involved. The project team and PE’s research and development staff would all be devastated if the project were terminated. The fate of the project would be paramount. Terri Lund would take responsibility for (some) perceived shortcomings and assure Neville Smythe that the best redress would be to bring in the project ahead of schedule and within the revised cost estimates. Level 3 conception Terri Lund holding a level 3 conception would be disappointed about the cost overruns on the EHF project but more concerned about the future of the Renewable Energy Programme. The previous CEO had supported renewable energy, recognizing that it would be an investment for the future and a commitment to sustainable development rather than achieving the best short-term returns for shareholders. Projects utilizing leadingedge technology tended to cost more and to experience more problems and overruns. The expected reduction in bottom line profits of around £26m was regrettable, but it could and would have to be absorbed by Amalgamated Power – it was a sunk cost. In analyzing the two broad options available, Terri Lund would conclude that there was little to choose between them on purely financial grounds. Both would cost around

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Individual attributes £141m, and while the redesign option would create a temporary shortfall in energy production, this could be made up by purchasing energy in the market. A decision had to be taken on the appropriate course of action. The decision on the EHF project could also set the tone for how future proposals and investment schemes would be evaluated. Neville Smythe could initiate a review of the other projects within the Renewable Energy Programme with a view to recouping some of the overrun on the EHP or even wind down the programme altogether. This would end PE’s aspirations of being at the forefront of renewable energy, and leave PE dependent on existing technologies. The development and exploitation of new sustainable energy sources, to which over a decade of Terri Lund’s working life had been dedicated, would come to a premature close. There would be little chance of later restarting the work as the team would disband and other energy companies would overtake PE. A commercial opportunity for PE and a small contribution toward safeguarding the future of the planet would be missed. Terri Lund would realize no tangible results from the years of research and development. Terri Lund’s key objective for the meeting would be to persuade Neville Smythe to maintain the Renewable Energy Programme intact, whatever the decision on the EHF project. The discussion on the EHF project and options available would be framed within the context of the Renewable Energy Programme. Teri Lund would argue that if new technologies were not actively pursued and traditional energy sources became prohibitively expensive or out of reach, PE would have a bleak future. Moreover, the public may not be keen to have wind turbines blotting the landscape or waste to energy power plants polluting their air, nor be overjoyed at being asked to pay, whether directly or through some form of taxation, the extra costs of green energy. But, the press and public would take a dim view of a major energy producer not taking active steps toward sustainable development and minimizing the impact of its operations on the environment. Terminating the Renewable Energy Programme, if it became public, could provoke a public outcry, and with it regulator and governmental displeasure. While continuing with the EHF project intact was the preferred solution, Terri Lund would argue that if necessary the EHP, or some part of its scope, could be offered as a sacrificial lamb to demonstrate to shareholders that the new “back to basics” strategy was being implemented. Future projects within the Renewable Energy Programme would be more modest in scale, closer

Emotional attachment to proven technologies, and easier to turn into viable commercial solutions. Amalgamated Power could hedge its strategy bets in an uncertain future. Level 4 conception Terri Lund holding a level 4 conception would feel that the euphoria of the past had probably affected decision making. Personal aspirations and agendas had probably led to overly optimistic estimates on costs and to downplaying the risks involved in the EHF project and the development of renewable energy technology. The shareholders had sent a clear message that Amalgamated Power had to deliver a steady adequate return on capital and they did not feel that rapid overseas expansion and risky investments in new technology were the way forward. Neville Smythe had a clear mandate to retrench and deliver a boring but steady dividend stream. The change in direction, just like the £26m overrun, was now an unwelcome fact of life and had to be dealt with. The Renewable Energy Programme did not fit with the new strategy, but winding down the research efforts and canceling or cutting short the projects under way would be throwing away a huge amount of value. Even if Amalgamated Power did not want to pursue the search for and exploitation of renewable energy sources, other companies were interested. In other countries governments were backing up the rhetoric of sustainable development and environmental protection with larger incentives and tighter regulations that were making new technologies commercially viable. PE had prospective customers for the technologies being developed. Given the mandate to divest noncore activities, perhaps this should include the Renewable Energy Programme? It would be possible to separate out the research and development activities and the personnel involved. Perhaps the EHF project could also be included in the sale? The sale would release value for Amalgamated Power, or at least offset part of the overrun on the EHF project. It would avoid admitting an embarrassing overrun and the net figure reported in the annual accounts would not, with a little luck, be scrutinized too closely. If terms could be agreed, Terri Lund would be prepared to transfer to the new company as part of the sale, and so provide continuity and facilitate integration. If Terri Lund were not wanted by the acquirers, there would still be a need for research. Amalgamated Power could not afford to stand still in a competitive market in terms of technology. There would be an ongoing need to enhance conventional power generation plants and technologies, and to investigate alternative, renewable sources of energy for

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Individual attributes use in conventional power plants. Squeezing out efficiencies and refining existing technologies might not be as exciting as exploring completely new technologies, but they were safer commercially and likely to give PE and Amalgamated Power a competitive advantage for the next two or three decades. Terri Lund would want to use the meeting to understand how Neville Smythe intended to implement the new back to basics strategy and what was now core and noncore to Amalgamated Power’s business. Terri Lund would explain the situation on the EHF project and the options available, and if appropriate would propose the divestment of the Renewable Energy Programme, including the EHF project. Terri Lund would also discuss the remit and scope of future development activities and how they would support the strategy and future success of Amalgamated Power.

CHAPTER 5

Disposition for action

The Global Managed Voice Up-grade Programme Kim Park wondered whether opportunities had been missed to reshape the Global Managed Voice Upgrade (GMVU) Programme. While the programme was on track and going to deliver, Telco might struggle to operate and develop the new technology effectively and this would make realizing the desired benefits more difficult. The GMVU Programme was of paramount strategic importance to Telco, which needed to upgrade its Global Managed Voice functionality to keep up with its competitors. Kim Park had been given the responsibility for programme managing the upgrade. Telco had minimized investment expenditure on its infrastructure in previous years and was now taking a gamble by moving to the latest technology. Despite aspirations to be one of the leading players in the telecommunications market, Telco had not managed to secure a dominant market position outside its home market. In fact that position in its home market was being eroded rapidly by new players. Business customers were aggressively targeted by new entrants, with new services and lower prices, and domestic customers were switching to bundled service offerings including television and Internet broadband. At the heart of the GMVU Programme was the implementation of a leadingedge “soft-switch” technology solution (integrated software and hardware to route digital data – including voice) from XL-net, a leading technology and outsourced services supplier to the telecommunication industry. The soft-switch solution provided Telco with a much lower cost base and the necessary capacity to meet expected demands and to offer new services. Following the initial installation of the core solution, the intention was to phase in extra capacity and enhancements to the technology in line with market demands and new products to be offered by Telco. In fact the marketing of 59

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Individual attributes revolutionary new services was running ahead of the implementation of the technology, which demanded considerable work in terms of customizations, interfaces with Telco legacy telephony systems, and upgrades of related systems for customer billing. Telco had targeted major corporates that had outsourced significant parts of their operations, including call centers, administration, and IT support, to lower-cost locations, primarily in Asia and Eastern Europe. Telco promoted itself as the provider of choice for “high-intensity” communications able to facilitate the transfer of professional and quasi-professional functions such as management accounts, credit control, procurement, payroll, cost estimation to lower-cost countries. Telco’s marketing slogans included “Making virtual teams real” and “Being there: TV quality video-conferencing at your desk!” Telco’s strategy was to create the market for high-intensity communications rather than just to respond to customer requests, and so transform itself into a “business facilitator in the networked economy of the 21st century.” Kim Park found out that a few weeks after the initial contract was signed with XL-net, Telco’s business development groups had agreed deals with some major corporate clients. Kim Park was expected to have the solution working within 15 months. The consequences of delays were dire: turn away hard-won business or face significant losses on the service. The contract with XL-net though carried only minor penalties for any delays. Rick Tosi, the Programme Sponsor and recently appointed Executive Vice President, Marketing for the Business Communications Division, appeared confident and determined to exploit the new technology to the fullest. Progress over the first few months was reasonable, despite a number of challenges. Joint teams of XL-net consultants and Telco specialists were set up to analyze Telco’s requirements and the interfaces of the soft-switch solution with Telco’s systems. The customization work began on schedule, and the early indications were that the programme could achieve its target dates, but that it would require considerable effort. However, Kim Park had huge problems getting sufficient resources from within Telco to work on the programme and was conscious that the Telco people from the Infrastructure Division eventually assigned to the programme lacked experience and technological know-how. For more than a decade Telco had undergone considerable downsizing, and had outsourced a number of functions. Telco managers were generally of the opinion that the organization was not just lean, but on the verge of becoming emaciated. The series of restructuring exercises and BPR initiatives had inadvertently led to the best staff leaving, in most cases with generous redundancy packages. XL-net consultants were asked to perform tasks that should have been

Disposition for action done internally and the consulting time included in the contract was quickly utilized. Expensive contract personnel were recruited, but some of them were only slightly better than Telco’s own staff. Everyone was learning on the job. It seemed that the telecommunications industry had not fully recovered from the downturn in investment, and the consequent shedding of people by operators and suppliers, in the early part of the decade. Kim Park was also frustrated with the marketing team who were part of the programme but had a tendency to interact directly with Rick Tosi. The marketing team was supposed to be exploring the new service offerings the technology would enable, but was detached from the technical realities and seemed to prefer the “blue sky” approach. One of the ideas put forward at a Programme Board was transmitting holograms, much to Rick Tosi’s delight and Kim Park’s dismay. Despite a challenging 14 months, Kim Park had managed to keep the programme on track through concerted efforts and a touch of good luck. A few experienced contractors had been found and engaged on short-term contracts. They were a fraction of the cost of XL-net consultants and more focused on the work. XL-net’s drawn-out acquisition of one of its rivals as part of its rapid expansion strategy had unsettled XL-net consultants. Uncertainties over how the two companies would be integrated and which posts would remain diverted attention away from the programme. The customization of the technology to support Telco’s GMV legacy functionality had gone remarkably smoothly over the previous three months, and the upgrade of Telco’s core systems was only slightly over the original cost estimate. However, the competence to manage and evolve the technology was also seeping out of Telco. The Telco strategy had shifted over the previous six months to consolidating its position in its home market and becoming a global business facilitator for major corporates. Anything that did not fit this business services strategy, including the running of the telecommunications network, was open to critical scrutiny in the face of mounting pressure to reduce costs. Kim Park was expected to hand over the installed technology to an Infrastructure Division that had barely been able to support the programme and had been subjected to yet another round of redundancies. Given the novelty and complexity of the technology, Kim Park wondered how the Division was going to operate it, or evolve it in response to shifts in the market, let alone deal with potentially outlandish requests from the marketing teams.

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Individual attributes Assume you are Kim Park: • What would you consider could or might need to be done? • What would you do? • What would be the rationale for your actions and what would you hope to achieve? Please take the time to write down your answers to these questions before reading further. The remainder of the chapter will explain the attribute disposition for action and explore possible interpretations of the scenario above from the perspective of the four levels of conception in the competence framework. The possible interpretations are not intended to be exhaustive, but are illustrative of the thoughts and actions of individuals holding different conceptions of their work.

Disposition for action Disposition for action Projects and programmes exist in a changing organizational, industry, and societal environment. Estimates and assumptions may become untenable, requirements may evolve, constraints may tighten or loosen, and the very purpose of the project or programme may be called into question. Disposition for action is an individual’s inclination to take decisions and to act, either in response to circumstances or proactively to influence them. The attribute reflects an individual’s sensitivity to the changing context and incorporates the approach used to determine the appropriate course of action. Someone holding a level 1 conception tends to be reactive, not intervening while the project or programme is progressing according to plan but sorting out problems and issues as they occur. The approach to issues and problems is sometime expeditious, taking the stance of troubleshooter in perceived crisis or difficult situations, or is procedural in relation to more routine circumstances. Someone holding a level 2 conception tends toward being reactive as well, but the approach to dealing with issues or opportunities that present themselves tends to be more analytical, structured, and deliberate. There is more flexibility of response and a willingness to step outside or go beyond the prescribed process or conventions. Someone holding a level 3 conception anticipates issues and situations, and proactively intervenes to avert problems or to seize opportunities. There is an awareness of external factors that might have an impact on the work and considerable flexibility in terms of strategies adopted and actions taken. Someone holding a level 4 conception senses the shift in circumstances and shapes the evolution of a project or programme accordingly. The project or programme is steered with a “light touch,” avoiding major decisions or changes of direction, but kept constantly aligned toward the achievement of the end goal. Someone holding a level 4 conception is acutely aware of the changing context and makes the most of events and circumstances, adapting and reconfiguring the project or programme. These conceptual levels manifest themselves in different ways depending on the project or programme. In the following section the scenario at the beginning of the chapter is explored from the different conceptual levels.

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Exploring conceptual levels in relation to the Global Managed Voice Upgrade Programme The installation of functioning technology from the GMVU Programme is nearing completion. The handover of responsibility for operating the technology to the Infrastructure Division is expected within the next couple of months. The technology is capable of meeting existing demands and offering new services, but only if it is operated and developed effectively. Level 1 conception Kim Park holding a level 1 conception would wonder what the Infrastructure Division could do if there were really not enough experienced people to support the technology. Options such as redeploying resources, finding contractors, or reemploying XL-net would flash into Kim Park’s mind. An action plan would form, and Kim Park would experience a mild exhilaration just at the thought of going into the Infrastructure Division to sort out the problem. Confident that a solution could be found and implemented, Kim Park’s attention would return to the more humdrum work of planning the wind-down of the GMVU Programme. A possible deficiency in expertise in the Infrastructure Division at some unspecified future date was not an actual problem. At most it was risk, and in any case it was not a risk to the programme. The programme was on track to deliver the soft-switch solution to specification. Infrastructure Division personnel had been involved in the programme and had not formally raised any concerns about the Division’s ability to support the new technology. The core solution once fully installed would deliver against current requirements and generate value through cost savings. In any case, however much expertise and talent were to remain in the Infrastructure Division it would be impossible to realize the fanciful aspirations of Telco’s blue sky marketers. Nonetheless, Kim Park would consider it prudent to highlight the issue of ongoing support as an agenda point on the handover meeting that would occur toward the end of the programme. If the Infrastructure Division did not have the manpower or expertise to operate and enhance the softswitch technology, the meeting would be the opportunity to table the issue formally. It might mean tagging on some extra knowledge transfer at the end of the programme – something that could easily be accommodated. Kim Park would also include the requirements for ongoing support as

Disposition for action one of a number of critical success factors for benefits realization post implementation of the core solution in any briefing to Rick Tosi and in the postprogramme review. Having overcome the challenges of the past 14 months, Kim Park would feel able to deal with whatever might transpire in the months and years to come. Level 2 conception Kim Park holding a level 2 conception would work through the implications of the Infrastructure Division not having enough experienced people to develop the soft-switch technology. Operating the core solution would probably be within its capabilities, even following the last round of redundancies. Kim Park would find it difficult to imagine that the senior managers in the Infrastructure Division would deplete it of the necessary resources and expertise to operate the Global Managed Voice technology. But, maintaining the core solution and evolving it to enable Telco to become a “business facilitator in the networked economy of the 21st century” were two different things. Rather than explore opportunities and map out a development plan, a stretched Infrastructure Division would reluctantly respond to demands from the business. There would be discussions over priorities and schedules, and doubts raised in senior management forums about the feasibility of some of the requests. The marketing team’s detachment from the technical realities would come back to haunt them. Kim Park, though, would not feel there was enough evidence to raise the matter directly with Rick Tosi, who might feel obliged to raise it with his counterpart in the Infrastructure Division. Suggesting that the technology was too novel and complex for the Infrastructure Division to evolve was a serious assertion likely to provoke a denial or counter-assertions. Kim Park would be asked to justify the claim, and would find that difficult. The Infrastructure Division was aware of the company’s strategy, the GMVU Programme, and the need both to operate and to enhance the technology. It would be easy for Infrastructure Division managers to say that the redundancies were planned in the knowledge of the future requirements and the lessons learned from prior redundancies about not losing the best staff had been learned. Kim Park might even be suspected of covering up problems on the programme by pointing the finger of blame for future performance shortfalls at the Infrastructure Division. The direct approach would not appear to be the most effective.

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An indirect way of raising the issue and gaining some insight into the situation in the Infrastructure Division would be to raise the operation and enhancement of the technology as a risk and log it in the programme’s risk register. Kim Park could then nominate the most senior person from the Infrastructure Division working on the programme as the risk owner. The risk owner could then be asked to develop a contingency plan and present it to Rick Tosi and other senior managers at the next Programme Board. It would force the Infrastructure Division to reveal their operational plans and arrangements, and if they were not in place or not considered adequate by the Programme Board there would be legitimate grounds for concerns. The action might even be welcomed by some within the Infrastructure Division, keen to retain staff and to get support from Rick Tosi. As Executive Vice President, Marketing for the Business Communications Division, Rick Tosi appeared determined to exploit new technology to the fullest and needed the expertise of the Infrastructure Division. Having kept the programme on track over the past 14 months, Kim Park would not want to do anything rash that might undermine the little support from the Infrastructure Division and jeopardize the delivery of the softswitch solution. If a problem did exist and was surfaced, albeit through a ruse or pretext, Kim Park would be able to address it. Level 3 conception Kim Park holding a level 3 conception would be most concerned about the Infrastructure Division’s ability to evolve the core soft-switch solution that was about to be installed. Telco’s vision of becoming a “business facilitator in the networked economy of the 21st century” was going to need a series of step changes in terms of technology. An under-resourced Infrastructure Division, demoralized by successive waves of redundancies, was hardly likely to be operating at the vanguard of technology. The focus would be on ensuring the operation and service availability of the existing network, not learning new skills and exploiting new technologies. Senior managers might deny the exodus of the best people and claim that they could operate the soft-switch solution, but the novelty and complexity of the technology was understood by very few Telco employees. The Infrastructure Division had barely been able to support the programme and Kim Park had been forced to employ contractors. Apart from the XL-net consultants, these contractors were among the few people who understood the solution in detail and the interfaces with Telco’s legacy functionality. With the programme drawing to a close they would undoubtedly be

Disposition for action looking for other assignments, and Telco would lose their knowledge. If operational issues emerged, the Infrastructure Division might be forced to contract expertise in from XL-net, probably at premium rates. The development envisaged at the outset would quickly grind to a halt under budget pressures, and a significant proportion of the potential benefits would never materialize. Kim Park would take the view that immediate action was called for, rather than flagging a concern or raising a risk. The latter course of action would potentially be open to debate and procrastination. Kim Park would want more time, both to assess and if necessary to remedy the situation. The proposal presented to Rick Tosi and then the next Programme Board would be to extend the programme to incorporate an operational period to iron out any problems. It would allow Kim Park to prolong the engagement of some of the contractors and facilitate knowledge transfer to Telco personnel. Given the lack of resources, senior managers in the Infrastructure Division might find it attractive as long as their budgets were not affected (too much). Rick Tosi and the other members of the Programme Board would have to be persuaded that this extension was important and so find some additional funding and commit the unspent funds set aside as contingency. Kim Park would argue that the period would enable the planning of the next stage of development – perhaps not sending holograms, but investigating in greater detail and potentially implementing one or two of the marketing team’s ideas. As a supporting argument, Kim Park would highlight that the Infrastructure Division appeared stretched and might need more time to absorb the necessary knowledge of the technology and solution. Kim Park would also initiate informal discussions with XL-net managers about the possibility of outsourcing the enhancements of the soft-switch solution to XL-net. A reasonably large contract with a major telecommunications company would probably be welcome after the acquisition. In a year or so, XL-net might not have as much spare capacity, and so might not be as keen to do a deal at reduced rates. Such arrangements would be beyond Kim Park’s remit, but worth exploring. Level 4 conception Kim Park holding a level 4 conception would be disappointed not to have acted before: only a few weeks to the scheduled end of the programme left little room for maneuver. Continuing on the basis that the Infrastructure Division, tight on resources and faced with the possibility of more of

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Individual attributes its operations and functions being outsourced, would be able to maintain and develop the technology would be foolhardy. The senior management in the Infrastructure Division had not given the GMVU Programme the attention and support commensurate with the novelty and complexity of the technology. Rick Tosi might not be well versed in, nor care much about, the technology, but would strive to realize the possibilities it promised in terms of radically new services. Marketing might easily find itself pressing in vain for the functionality to offer TV quality videoconferencing over the Internet for less than the price of a standard telephone call, while the Infrastructure Division struggled to deliver a basic telephony service. Outsourcing the operation and enhancement of the soft-switch technology to XL-net would be something that Kim Park would consider. XL-net would undoubtedly be interested since the provision of such a service was part of their business and fitted in with their growth strategy. Timing would be good too, since a deal with Telco would provide a boost in terms of earnings and morale following the acquisition. By structuring the deal well and allowing XL-net to use Telco as a reference site, XL-net would have a showcase for its technology and would thus have an incentive to operate well and keep Telco at the leading edge. There was always the risk that Telco might slowly become dependent on XL-net, even if Telco retained some managerial control and insisted that XL-net should transfer knowledge and develop internal capabilities. Outsourcing would probably be a good solution for a steady-state operational system, or even its gradual evolution. But, the realization of Telco’s strategic goals demanded the rapid introduction of new offerings. Kim Park would be sure that a programme framework would be the best way of achieving this. The GMVU Programme needed to undergo a metamorphosis from a programme installing a core technology solution to a programme structured and geared up to deliver business-driven enhancements to that core solution. While unconventional, the new incarnation of the GMVU Programme could be responsible for operations as well as for developing and implementing the enhancements and upgrades. It would be funded and take direction from the Business Communications Division and draw resources from the Infrastructure Division, yet have the autonomy to contract outsiders, whether XLnet or independent contractors. Such an arrangement would be aligned to the emerging strategy of becoming a global business facilitator for major corporates rather than just a telecommunications network operator.

Disposition for action Kim Park would realize that there would be a lot of persuading to be done and political obstacles to overcome. But the new programme configuration would deliver the capability vital for the business without relinquishing control of the underpinning technology to an outside entity.

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CHAPTER 6

Approach to role plurality

The Urbansprawl Highways Maintenance and Management Service PFI It was great news. The Route Force consortium had won the contract to renew and maintain the Urbansprawl’s highways under a 25-year Private Finance Initiative (PFI) contract. Robyn Pleat, who had led Pryde, Wade, and Rawlins’ (PWR) involvement in the successful bid, was put forward for the role of interim Managing Director for the Asset Management Company, which would have direct responsibility for specifying and managing the work in the PFI contract. About three years earlier, an Audit Commission inspected the Urbansprawl Highways Maintenance Service and concluded that the City Council was providing a “fair,” 1 star service and that it was unlikely to make any stepchange improvement. The City Council was urged to seek funding through a PFI. A major cash injection in a core investment programme was needed to remove the backlog of highway infrastructure works that had accumulated over the previous 20 years. Investment over the core period was estimated to be in the order of £160m, comprising: • • • •

£ 40m renewing the road network to a reasonable condition; £ 65m maintenance on bridges and other structures; £ 50m upgrading street lighting; and £ 5m renewing the road drainage network.

Additional funding of around £ 460m (at outturn prices) was also required over the 25 years that a PFI contract was expected to run to maintain the highways network to the required standards. Urbansprawl’s City Council had looked at various mechanisms to fund the highways maintenance service for some time, including raising the funds through borrowing or issuing bonds. However, the Council was unwilling either to divert resources away from other services or to push 70

Approach to role plurality through a significant increase in Council Tax. The Department of Transport’s award of significant PFI credits (subsidies) for a Highways Maintenance and Management Service made the PFI the only realistic financial vehicle available to the City Council. After much deliberation, a scope for the PFI contract was agreed. It was influenced by the desire for coherence of service provision, and the retention of local (district) control over local services wherever possible. The Council invited parties to submit outline proposals prior to finalizing the details of the scope of the contract and the operational arrangements. Issues such as the management and liaison processes, employment conditions for the Council’s existing staff employed on highways maintenance works, the tariff (pricing) mechanism, and performance targets still had to be finalized. It was clear from the subsequent formal Invitation to Negotiate that ideas and proposals contained in the various outline proposals had been incorporated into the contract specification. A consortium comprising Pryde, Wade, & Rawlins (PWR), Road Crew, Countrywide Energy, and Watershed was formed specifically to bid for and if successful undertake the work contained in the PFI. The aim was to combine the skills, experience, and credibility of the separate entities into a compelling service delivery partner for Urbansprawl: •

Pryde, Wade, & Rawlins

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Road Crew

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Countrywide Energy

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Watershed

Technical, surveying, and planning services Construction, engineering, and asset management Network and asset management, reliability-centere maintenance and electrical contracting Sewage, drainage, and asset management

PWR and Countrywide Energy were already working successfully together on another PFI contract. Road Crew was a construction company with a strong local presence and a track record of working with Urbansprawl Council on highways maintenance. Watershed had formerly been the Engineering Division of the water services company that served Urbansprawl, and was now an independent infrastructure management company. The consortium, branded Route Force, stressed its depth of experience in major PFIs, asset management, project and programme management, and construction and maintenance capabilities. The consortium members’ local credentials were emphasized and the City Council was given firm assurances

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Individual attributes that Route Force had the resources and capacity to deliver the Core Investment Programme (CIP) in five years. Moreover, Route Force proposed the establishment of an integrated set of processes (e.g., performance management, emergency response, customer queries) linked through a geographic information system to a set of databases and records (e.g., network inventory, inspection records, programme of works). The databases would be visible to the City Council and a call center would provide the interface with residents and other interested parties. The consortium promised a planned, coordinated, and highly responsive service delivery in partnership with the Council and the local community. Robyn Pleat led PWR’s input into the bid and subsequent negotiations while winding down a highways improvement programme in another part of the country. Born and raised in Urbansprawl with strong local ties, Robyn Pleat was ideal for the role. Robyn seemed to have an uncanny ability to relate to and empathize with Council officials, picking up on unspoken concerns, using appropriate language and adopting a slower pace than usual in PWR. On a number of occasions sticking points had been overcome by assurances from Robyn Pleat. Only after a number of months did it emerge that Robyn Pleat’s father had until recently worked for the City Council as a surveyor. Robyn Pleat’s tact and diplomacy were also in great demand in reconciling differences between the consortium members. The outline proposal was easy enough to agree, but as the financial model was put together and then subjected to critical scrutiny, divergent commercial interests began to surface. Each member wanted to get as big a slice of the work from the PFI as possible, and as soon as possible. While the members of the consortium had equal equity stakes, their share of the CIP and Lifecycle Investment Programme (LIP) was different. Maintaining the assets post the CIP and providing the required residual life (hand-back) at the end of the contract was a major undertaking. The LIP comprised a combination of major works, and routine and cyclical maintenance (e.g., winter maintenance, patching, and making good potholes). While spread over a period of approximately 20 years, the LIP was just under three times the size of the CIP. Estimating whole life costs was a tough technical challenge. Deciding how much “sweating of the assets” was optimal in the light of deductions for shortfalls against performance targets and required asset condition at handback was as much based on internal politics as it was on economic analysis. The consortium members had very different views on the effects of the Council’s negative reactions and adverse publicity on their other contracts and prospects. The absolute requirement to offer a competitive pricing structure was well understood, but consortium members were reluctant to compromise their rates, especially if they felt they were getting a smaller

Approach to role plurality share of the work. The internal negotiations were tougher than those with the Council. The assertive behavior of managers from the other consortium members grated against the polite, professional services firm culture of PWR. Within PWR the consortium was dubbed “brute force,” and Robyn Pleat was regularly reminded to protect PWR’s interests. Winning the PFI contract generated a sense of euphoria, and previous disagreements were forgotten. Attention turned to setting up the new Asset Management Company. The Company would undertake Highways Maintenance and Management Service and would be backed by guarantees from the consortium members. A nonexecutive Chairman, who was also the Chief Executive of a major retailer based in Urbansprawl and Chair of a couple of local charities, was quickly found. Senior managers from within the consortium members were appointed as nonexecutive Directors of the Company. Surprisingly, a Director of Road Crew nominated Robyn Pleat for the post of interim Managing Director, citing Robyn’s familiarity with the contract and programme management experience. There was a pressing need to get on with the CIP and demonstrate commitment to the Urbansprawl City Council. Personally and professionally the post was attractive, and Robyn Pleat was pleased to be asked to attend an interview with the nonexecutive Chairman. The post was expected to last between six and nine months, including a period of handover to the future Managing Director who would be recruited. The Chairman was keen to understand how Robyn Pleat proposed to manage the relationships with, and potentially competing demands of, the many stakeholders.

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Assume you are Robyn Pleat: • How would you define the role of interim Managing Directors for the Asset Management Company? • Whose interests would you feel you had to take into consideration when taking important decisions? • How comfortable would you feel dealing with conflicting interests, and how would you approach the task? Please take the time to write down your answers to these three questions before reading further. Imagine as Robyn Pleat what loyalties you might have and how they might influence you. The remainder of the chapter

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Individual attributes will explain the attribute approach to role plurality and explore possible interpretations of the scenario above from the perspective of the four levels of conception in the competence framework. The possible interpretations are not intended to be exhaustive, but are illustrative of the thoughts and actions of individuals holding different conceptions of their work.

Approach to role plurality Approach to role plurality Approach to role plurality relates to how a project or programme manager deals with multiple objectives, responsibilities, and interests, in many cases beyond what might formally be specified to be within the boundaries and duties of the role. The attribute encompasses how an individual identifies and addresses multiple legitimate interests, and potentially conflicting objectives and agendas. Someone holding a level 1 is comfortable with a focused single role usually associated with the delivery of an agreed output or achievement of a welldefined objective. Other interests or considerations are peripheral to this central role. Tensions and conflicts are perceived within the boundaries of the role, and are usually to do with the allocation of time between responsibilities. Other duties not directly associated with the central role, such as the professional development of team members, are declined, ignored, or treated as by-products of the core work. Someone holding a level 2 conception is able to fulfill multiple roles, recognizing and taking into account the interests of different parties and addressing diverse objectives and agendas as part of the work. For example, someone holding a level 2 conception would be aware of the need to ensure, or accept responsibility for, delivery as well as personnel development, or to look after the organization’s interests as well as represent a group of stakeholders. However, someone holding a level 2 conception experiences discomfort when these roles conflict, finding it difficult to resolve the (often internal) tension that arises. Someone holding a level 3 conception is aware that the work of a project or programme manager encompasses multiple roles and entails looking after diverse interests. Where conflict arises between the various interests, someone holding a level 3 conception adopts a clear position. All the stakeholders are made aware of the position and the basis for resolving conflicts or tensions. For instance, a project or programme manager might actively support the development of new skills within the team, as long as this does not threaten or impede progress on the project or programme. Someone holding a level 4 conception perceives the need to address all legitimate interests as far as possible, and regards divergent interests as normal, especially on complex programmes. Dealing with this divergence of interests, and the conflict it almost inevitably generates, is not shunned but embraced. Someone with a level 4 conception will deliberately take on multiple roles, and so be better placed to reconcile and integrate the

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divergent interests. Reconciliation and integration is facilitated by the project or programme manager being formally responsible for all “sides,” and usually having excellent information, knowledge, and insight and/or familiarity with the people at the center of any conflict. These conceptual levels manifest themselves in different ways depending on the project or programme. In the following section the scenario at the beginning of the chapter is explored from the different conceptual levels.

Exploring conceptual levels in relation to the Urbansprawl Highways Maintenance and Management Service PFI The decision to appoint an interim Managing Director of the Asset Management Company may not be an ideal solution. This interim arrangement might suggest a lack of forethought on the part of the Route Force consortium or reflect their surprise at winning the PFI contract. However, the interim post was deemed necessary to form a core organization and to start planning and delivering work on the CIP. Immediate action was important to demonstrate the consortium’s commitment to improving the highways infrastructure to Urbansprawl City Council. Level 1 conception Robyn Pleat holding a level 1 conception would consider the post of interim Managing Director as an interesting challenge and something that would look good on the CV. It would be similar to the early phases of any programme. Robyn Pleat would feel qualified to assemble a core team, scope and plan the CIP work, and kick off some of the early activities. Knowledge of the content and terms of the PFI contract would speed up the process and so help allay any concerns within the Council about inactivity. Familiarity with the Council officials would be a marked advantage in managing stakeholder relationships. In the interview with the Chairman, Robyn Pleat would suggest that the appointment should be regarded as a programme management assignment. Robyn Pleat would work full-time for the Asset Management Company for the six- to nine-month period, but would still be employed by PWR. PWR would charge the Asset Management Company an agreed professional rate for services rendered. Robyn Pleat would report directly to and take direction from the Chairman and the Board on matters relating to the Asset

Approach to role plurality Management Company and the CIP. They would in essence be the Sponsor and Steering Group for the programme. Once assigned, Robyn Pleat would focus on assembling the relevant resources and working on the delivery of the CIP as set out in the PFI contract. The hard work and negotiations undertaken to develop the bid provided the framework for allocating the work between the members of the consortium and the rates for services performed for the Asset Management Company. The interim Managing Director had to safeguard the interests of all the consortium members. The Highways Maintenance and Management Service had to be planned and delivered in line with the contract and internal consortium agreements had to be honored. Conflicts might arise with the City Council, if officials felt that the CIP work was not started soon enough or that it did not to generate enough of a step change in the standard of the highways infrastructure. However, the relationship with the City Council could be managed through regular communications and by setting realistic expectations. This was normal practice on projects and programmes. A change control process would be established to accommodate special requests and variations to the contract demanded by the City Council. Any disagreements between the consortium members could be referred to the Board of the Asset Management Company, which had representation from all the members and was best placed to resolve such issues. Level 2 conception Robyn Pleat holding a level 2 conception would appreciate the challenges of finding a suitable Managing Director for the Asset Management Company, but feel somewhat hesitant about taking on the interim position. There was scope for considerable conflict but, being an interim position, it would carry relatively little power and influence. Robyn Pleat would have to manage the tensions between consortium members over their share of the work, and face potentially unreasonable demands from the Council and residents of Urbansprawl. Yet there was significant risk of being ignored, contradicted, or bypassed by consortium members or Council officials safe in the knowledge that a new Managing Director was going to be appointed soon. Robyn Pleat would be concerned that the euphoria of winning would soon be replaced by the squabbling that was a feature of the bid preparation. Now the members of the consortium would be playing for real money, and it might get unpleasant. While the bulk of the work was broadly agreed,

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Individual attributes at the margin each member would want a bigger share and more of their work included in the CIP rather than the LIP. Robyn Pleat would have to look after their interests individually and collectively. If the consortium members were not happy, and PWR in particular, Robyn Pleat could look forward to late night conversations with the Managing Partner of PWR on the subject of stress, pressure to conform, and the importance of not “going native.” Over the first six months or so as the CIP took shape, the Council would spot where the contract fell short of what they really wanted or needed, and the unintended consequences of the payment mechanisms and penalty regime. Robyn Pleat would come under pressure not to stick rigidly to the letter of the contract. A confrontational, legalistic approach to the Highways Maintenance and Management Service contract lasting 25 years would be a disaster for all parties. Understanding and flexibility, though, usually had a cost attached to them. The citizens of Urbansprawl would also want to see their roads mended and street lighting improved as soon as possible. The call center could be expected to receive requests outside the scope of the contract. Not all could be turned down or referred to the Council without going back on the commitment to provide a highly responsive service delivery in partnership with the Council and the local community. Yet, the Council was unlikely to have the budget to pay for anything outside the scope of the contract. In the interview with the Chairman, Robyn Pleat would suggest taking on the role as a full-time assignment, but still being employed by PWR. Robyn Pleat would highlight the various roles and potential conflicts of the job and insist on reporting directly to the Chairman and Board. The interim Managing Director had to be firm and fair in dealing with the consortium members, and flexible and responsive in planning and delivering the Highways Maintenance and Management Service. Robyn Pleat would want to secure support from the Chairman to enforce the framework for allocating the work and the rates agreed for services performed for the Asset Management Company. The Chairman also had to help find a balance between accommodating requests from the Council or residents of Urbansprawl and upholding the commercial interests of the consortium. While Robyn Pleat would establish liaison and communications, the Chairman’s involvement in dealings with Members of the Council and senior managers from the consortium members would be invaluable. This would both add weight to the discussions and facilitate the transition to the new Managing Director.

Approach to role plurality Level 3 conception Robyn Pleat holding a level 3 conception would not be bothered by having to operate in this pivotal position between the consortium and the Council, having to serve both yet not be dominated by any party’s parochial interests. Consortium members would inevitably jostle for advantage and the Council and residents would undoubtedly want as much as possible out of the PFI contract. Suspicions of favoritism in allocating work or work contracted at above the agreed rates might lead to a breakdown of the consortium, and with it damage to reputations and exposure to contractual claims. For some of the consortium members, the guarantees granted as part of the PFI contract were “tombstone” risks. The role of Managing Director for the Asset Management Company would have to be performed diligently, as the agent of the shareholders. Robyn Pleat would have to serve first and foremost the interests of the Asset Management Company. While every reasonable effort needed to be made to establish and maintain good working relationships and accommodate requests, there would have to be limits and boundaries. The consortium members were shareholders whose collective interests had to be promoted, and their role as suppliers to the Company had to be secondary. If members failed to honor commitments or deliver to the timescales and standards required, they would be dealt with as suppliers and if necessary replaced. If the Council pressed for unreasonable changes or failed to honor their part of the contract, the commercial interest of the Asset Management Company had to be protected and the essential terms of the contract upheld. In the interview with the Chairman, Robyn Pleat would emphasize the onerous responsibilities that came with the job and the view that the interests of the Asset Management Company had to be paramount. If appointed, Robyn Pleat would make this position clear, so there was no question of favoritism toward PWR. The appointment had to be on the basis of a secondment, where Robyn Pleat would be seen, in practice at least, as part of the Asset Management Company rather than a PWR consultant. The term “interim” had to be taken out of the title, since it undermined authority and influence. Robyn Pleat would be the Managing Director until someone took over the role, and have a direct relationship with the Chairman and Board. The Managing Director had to have, and be seen to have, executive control of the Company’s employees and contractors. The Chairman and Board would be consulted on matters of

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policy and key decisions, and their contributions invited in dealings with Members of the Council and other key stakeholders. Otherwise Robyn Pleat would run the Company and deliver the Highways Maintenance and Management Service in compliance with the contract. Whatever Robyn Pleat’s period of tenure, the role would be performed as if it were a permanent job. Level 4 conception Robyn Pleat holding a level 4 conception would appreciate the need to go through a rigorous and transparent recruitment process to find a permanent Managing Director. Neither Robyn Pleat nor anyone else from the consortium members would be an ideal candidate since there would always be a suspicion in the minds of the other consortium members that he or she would show favoritism to his or her former employer. The person might seek earnestly to be fair and neutral, but would be to some extent conditioned by the former employer’s values and mindset, and by the ongoing relationships with former work colleagues. There would be a subtle predisposition toward the former employer and it would be more difficult to argue with or deny help to former colleagues. He or she might not even be conscious of any bias or potential conflict of interest: decisions and stances would genuinely seem, and be defended as, rational and objective. The first six to nine months would be crucial since they would map out the CIP, and so influence the LIP, and set the tone for the internal working arrangements and those with the Council. The interim Managing Director role was crucial, and the insights and knowledge gained during the bid process would be immensely useful. Internally, the interests of the individual consortium members had to be embraced and transcended, and the reality of their dual roles of shareholders and suppliers dealt with. Members had to perceive that their interests were being served and protected at the same time, and that they were being neither exploited nor granted favors. The Asset Management Company had to assume its own identity, which would make it easier to separate the role of shareholder from that of supplier. With the Asset Management Company becoming more than the sum of its consortium members, it would be clearer that one member cannot trade off shared profits for individual gain on work done on the CIP or LIP. Enforcing the original agreement would quickly become unmanageable as conditions changed – mutual respect and goodwill had to be the basis of ongoing relationships.

Approach to role plurality Robyn Pleat would be inclined to point out rather than exploit shortcomings in the contract. It might emerge that the payment mechanisms and penalty regime in specific cases promoted undesired behaviors (e.g., it may cost less to pay the penalties for poor standards of highway maintenance than pay for its repair). Whether from a true corporate social responsibility perspective or enlightened self-interest, a little flexibility and self-restraint would make sense. The consortium members, as much as Urbansprawl City Council, had vested interests in the PFI contract achieving the desired improvements of the highways infrastructure. More PFI contracts were likely to be put out to tender, and success on the Urbansprawl contract would stand the members in good stead. The Council had other work for which they might bid, and Council officials were notorious for sharing unofficial recommendations. But, the Asset Management Company was a commercial undertaking with an obligation to make reasonable returns for its shareholders. As an Urbansprawl resident, Robyn Pleat also had a vested interest in the PFI contract delivering the desired improvements, and would feel the need to look after the community. In the interview with the Chairman, Robyn Pleat would outline the challenges of reconciling and integrating the diverse interests, and the view that the Asset Management Company needed to assume a distinct identity. The risks of lingering suspicions making the job more difficult would be acknowledged, though Robyn Pleat would make every effort to be professional, fair, and impartial. Robyn Pleat would, however, understand the Chairman’s desire to bring in an independent person as quickly as possible to take over the role of Managing Director. Robyn Pleat would seek to consult widely, mediate and reconcile the diverse interests as much as possible, and would welcome the active participation of the Chairman and the Board. The Board members in particular would be both an invaluable source of insights into the interests and priorities of the consortium members and excellent conduits inside their respective organizations to resolve tensions and dispel misunderstandings. Robyn Pleat would admit that the relationship with PWR might be the most difficult, and that the Chairman would have to point out any loss of impartiality. Robyn Pleat would also share a personal interest as a resident of Urbansprawl in the success of the Highways Maintenance and Management Service.

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CHAPTER 7

Engagement with team

The Secure Employee Programme Andi Fallon knew that the forthcoming team meeting needed to be handled carefully and sensitively. As the Rascent programme manager for the Secure Employee Programme, the team reported to Andi Fallon. But the team members worked for three other consultancies or software firms. Andi Fallon suspected that the senior managers of these firms could exploit difficulties on the programme to forge stronger relationships with Rascent’s client, Global Flogistics. This in turn might weaken Rascent’s position on the programme, reduce its already slim margin and its ability to generate new business opportunities within Global Flogistics. Global Flogistics, one of the world’s large freight forwarders and logistics groups with its headquarters in Europe, had contracted with Rascent to implement a Secure Employee solution to: •

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Reduce the risk of internal fraud by ensuring users have the appropriate system access privileges necessary to do their job, reducing the potential for damage, misuse, or fraudulent use of systems and data. Improve efficiency through the reduction of the number of sign-on activities required to access applications.

Secure Employee Programme comprised Single Sign-on (SSO), User Identity Management (UIM), and Role Management (RM) capability, which had to be integrated seamlessly to deliver Global Flogistics’ ambitious goals of effortless global operations in a secure environment. The programme was set within a wider initiative to upgrade and rationalize Global Flogistics’ infrastructure, systems, and processes following a spate of recent acquisitions. Global Flogistics had decided to go for best of breed for each component of the Secure Employee solution, believing this would maximize functionality. The necessary expertise in systems integration would be brought in to 83

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Individual attributes ensure a seamless solution. Software vendors able to deliver the necessary functionality for each part of the overall solution were approached. Idencert from VBG was the clear front-runner in the SSO space, and the US firm had a good reputation and an established track record in implementing its product in a wide range of client environments (technologies and systems). In the UIM functional space, JNS was one of the firms approached because, despite being small (less than 100 employees), its product, Trackstar, was very good and proven. JNS did not have implementation capabilities but relied on SST Associates, its preferred implementation partner. SST Associates was an ambitious specialist consultancy with offices in San Francisco, Chicago, and New York, and was mainly staffed by former employees of the major consultancies and systems integrators. SST Associates had secured preferred implementation partner status with a range of niche Californian independent software vendors (ISVs) largely on the grounds of low rates and local presence in the main US commercial centers. JNS also proposed the use of Kellet’s leading-edge RM product, Rsquared, in conjunction with its own UIM product since the two products had been successfully implemented together on past occasions. Kellet, also based in California, was larger than JNS and had expertise in both software development and implementation. Kellet managers and consultants were familiar with Trackstar and comfortable that there would not be any interface problems. Some of the Kellet technical architects and consultants knew as much about implementing Trackstar as many of the consultants working for SST Associates. JNS had put forward SST Associates as a possible consultancy to do the implementation, though JNS had stressed being willing and able to support any implementation approach adopted by Global Flogistics. Before the outcome of Global Flogistics’ selection process was announced, Rascent acquired JNS as part of its strategy of securing “pivot points.” As a mid-sized systems integrator, Rascent struggled to win engagements against the major players in the industry. The “pivot point” strategy was centered on owning leading-edge niche applications and technologies that fitted into complex solutions. This was intended to give Rascent an involvement in the implementation of these applications and technologies, and an opportunity to pitch for the systems integration of the wider solution. Global Flogistics’ favored solution following the detailed evaluation process comprised Trackstar for UIM, Rsquared for RM, and Idencert for SSO. Global Flogistics approached Rascent to be the prime contractor for the implementation work. Senior managers at Rascent were delighted – this validated the acquisition of JNS and opened a new client relationship

Engagement with team with Global Flogistics. The Global Flogistics managers also hinted that two SST Associates consultants from New York had impressed the evaluation team, and the assumption was that they would be working on the implementation. Rascent accepted the prime contractor role for implementing the Secure Employee solution, but had to agree to very competitive rates on the time and materials (cost reimbursable) contract. VBG and Kellet both agreed to be Rascent’s subcontractors on the engagement, but at rates that left Rascent with wafer-thin margins. Engaging SST Associates was the only viable option for Rascent, despite concerns that the firm was a potential competitor since it did some systems integration work. SST Associates was keen to obtain assurances of ongoing involvement in Trackstar implementations in return for some reduction in fees. Rascent was not keen to provide such assurances formally. Plans were already being drawn up to use Trackstar to exploit the rapidly growing employee security market. Accommodating SST Associates as a formal partner would create unwanted complications. Following some difficult negotiations a compromise was reached and SST Associates accepted a subcontract relationship with Rascent, but at rates that gave Rascent practically no margin. Global Flogistics was keen to exert significant direct control on the work, despite having employed Rascent. Global Flogistics insisted on using its own IT implementation and business change methodologies, and on having its own people perform key roles on the programme. Global Flogistics people would also manage the Business Change and Infrastructure workstreams, and the Global Flogistics Programme Director specified the organization structure (as illustrated in Figure 7.1). The SSO, RM, and UIM projects were planned to be undertaken in multiple overlapping phases, set out in the project management plan developed by Andi Fallon. Andi Fallon was tasked with managing the engagement with Global Flogistics and was responsible for the successful delivery of a seamless Secure Employee solution. Three months into the Secure Employee Programme, Andi Fallon faced the first crisis. The latest forecast of cost for consulting support to implement the solution had increased from an early estimate of 3.2m euros to almost 4.1m euros. The Global Flogistics Programme Director was annoyed at the projected overrun and concerned that the overrun might increase further. Global Flogistics wanted to talk about staffing and changing to a fixed-price contract. Rascent senior management was keen to use the assignment to develop its competence in implementing Trackstar and the other products, and to use

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Programme Team: Global Flogistics managers Rascent consultants SST Associates consultants Kellet consultants VBG consultants

Programme Implementation Board

Business Change Projects PM

Project Office Design Authority Testing Implementation

Figure 7.1 Programme

Solution Development PM (Andi Fallon)

Infrastructure Projects PM

SSO PM

RM PM

UIM PM

SSO Team

R3 Team

UIM Team

Infrastructure Projects Team

Organization and reporting relations for Secure Employee

Global Flogistics as a reference site. Some of the staff on the UIM project were Rascent consultants and other Rascent consultants were fulfilling “quality assurance” roles on the SSO and RM projects, but were increasingly perceived as spies and irritants by the Kellet and VBG consultants as they asked for detailed reports and explanations. The suspicion within Global Flogistics was that Rascent was using the Secure Employee Programme to train its consultants on the various products, and that, in part, had led to the cost increase. SST Associates also felt that the firm was slowly but surely being squeezed out, and the informal promises of future collaborations were not going to be fulfilled. Andi Fallon arranged a meeting with the project managers and senior consultants from SST Associates, VBG, and Kellet to discuss the situation. Andi Fallon was keen to talk to the key members of the team before involving their respective commercial managers and practice directors, and the Rascent Commercial Director. All three firms had time and materials contracts with Rascent.

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Engagement with team Assume you are Andi Fallon: • How do you approach the meeting and what do you say to the team? • What would you hope to achieve? • What factors or considerations have you taken into account in arriving at your course of action? Please take the time to write down your answers to these questions before reading further. In particular, try to capture your thoughts on how to engage and possibly unite the disparate members of the team. The remainder of the chapter will explain the attribute engagement with team and explore possible interpretations of the scenario above from the perspective of the four levels of conception in the competence framework. The possible interpretations are not intended to be exhaustive, but are illustrative of the thoughts and actions of individuals holding different conceptions of their work.

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Engagement with team Engagement with team describes how a project or programme manager relates to and deals with individuals involved in the work. The attribute focuses primarily on the relationship and interactions with members of the team, but extends to other contributors and stakeholders. Someone holding a level 1 conception feels part of the team carrying out the work and is supportive of team members and others involved in the work. The approach is transactional in that the focus is the accomplishment of work. Someone holding a level 1 conception will tend to set clearly defined and bounded tasks. Someone holding a level 2 conception does not feel part of the team, but in charge of the team. There is a conscious need to lead and a belief that a level of detachment is necessary to provide this leadership and, where required, to take hard decisions. Information is filtered, often from a desire not to swamp or burden the team members, and team members are provided with information on a “need to know” basis. Someone holding a level 2 conception will tend to set specific objectives, allowing team members to determine how best they will achieve the objectives. Someone holding a level 3 conception feels secure in the role and is very inclusive, sharing information and being open to questions, ideas, and comments. A social dimension to the work is fostered and someone holding a level 3 conception is concerned about the well-being of the team as well as the accomplishment of the task. Time and effort is expended on explaining how individuals are adding value and the contributions they are, and could be, making. Someone holding a level 4 conception is self-assured and at ease with the team and those involved with the work, and that self-assurance is transmitted to others. Someone holding a level 4 conception seeks to inspire others and where appropriate is able to get others to modify their natural behavior, being at times highly engaging while still maintaining a sense of distance and distinctness. Members of the team perceive the person to be credible and charismatic, and are willing to comply with requests and direction. These conceptual levels manifest themselves in different ways depending on the project/programme. In the following section the scenario at the beginning of the chapter is explored from the different conceptual levels.

Engagement with team Exploring Conceptual levels in relation to the Secure Employee Programme The decision to introduce Rascent consultants into the Secure Employee Programme is understandable from a strategic perspective. The programme is an excellent opportunity to advance the firm’s aspirations and fulfills the need to acquire knowledge and expertise on the software product, the solution, and the market. A successful programme would also establish a presence in Global Flogistics and the “employee security” market for Rascent. Level 1 conception Andi Fallon holding a level 1 conception would be keen to create a sense of team spirit and as far as possible eliminate the tensions that had emerged. The consultants working on the Secure Employee solution were from four different firms and were liaising closely with managers from Global Flogistics. They were not familiar with each others’ ways of working, nor with the client’s IT implementation and business change methodologies. Misunderstandings and tensions were to be expected. Everyone had to work together for the programme to deliver a seamless solution. At the meeting, Andi Fallon would highlight the importance of the programme to Global Flogistics, the ultimate client, and for each of the firms involved. Global Flogistics had chosen the best of breed for each component of the Secure Employee solution and each firm had a unique product and/or competence it was bringing to the work. Rascent’s competence was in system integration and the role the firm had taken on was to bring the elements together as a seamless solution. Managing the integration inevitably meant learning new skills and technologies. If the Rascent consultants fulfilling “quality assurance” roles on the SSO and RM projects were asking for detailed reports and explanations, it was to ensure the success of the programme. Andi Fallon would remind the project managers and senior consultants from SST Associates, VBG, and Kellet that only by agreeing to work together had they each won part of the engagement. Now everyone had to operate with professionalism and integrity as part of a single team to deliver the solution. Andi Fallon would note and empathize with issues raised by the individuals from the three firms, and promise to see what could be done to address them. Andi Fallon would mention Global Flogistics’ concern regarding the increase in the cost estimate for the consulting support to implement the solution from 3.2m euros to almost 4.1m euros, and that Global Flogistics

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wanted to talk about staffing and changing to a fixed-price contract. Andi Fallon would want to know if and where costs could be trimmed, and each project manager would be tasked with coming back in two days with a revised plan and budget incorporating any feasible changes. The issue of the form of contract would be reviewed briefly, but not discussed in depth. Andi Fallon would not see this as an appropriate forum nor as within the remit of those attending the meeting to make such decisions. The possible switch from a time and materials to a fixed price would be discussed in detail by Andi Fallon and the Rascent Commercial Director with the SST Associates, VBG, and Kellet commercial managers and practice directors. Andi Fallon would quickly draft minutes of the meeting and circulate them to all present, highlighting any agreed actions, along with the individuals responsible and the dates by when the actions had to be completed. Level 2 conception Andi Fallon holding a level 2 conception would feel the need to exercise a degree of control and authority. Rascent had taken on the prime contractor role and SST Associates, VBG, and Kellet had all agreed to act as subcontractors. Each had distinct skills and expertise, but it was Rascent’s role, and Andi Fallon’s in particular, to create a seamless solution. Being dependent on SST Associates, VBG and Kellet left Rascent vulnerable and exposed to any one of the three trying to bypass Rascent or acting selfishly. Each firm could reasonably be expected to have different expectations of, and success criteria in relation to, the programme, and these would inevitably determine their actions and stances. Alignment with Rascent’s own aspirations was unlikely, but Rascent’s legitimate authority had to be respected. Something needed to be done to close the obvious rift between Rascent and SST Associates stemming from the feeling within SST Associates that promises were not going to be fulfilled. Information or misinformation could be passed to Global Flogistics managers without Andi Fallon knowing, and this might cause (or have caused) tensions and concerns. Andi Fallon would make a mental note to build a closer relationship with the Global Flogistics managers and to emphasize Rascent’s distinctive expertise and pivotal role on the programme. At the meeting, Andi Fallon would highlight the importance of the programme to all parties, and their individual commitments. The project managers and senior consultants from SST Associates, VBG, and Kellet

Engagement with team would be reminded that Rascent was the prime contractor. Rascent had to answer to Global Flogistics and its reputation was at stake. Andi Fallon would take all necessary measures to ensure the quality of the work performed by the various parties and the success of the programme, and would expect commitment and support from every member of the team. If anyone felt unable to give his or her wholehearted support, then Andi Fallon would like to know about it now. Otherwise, the project managers from the three firms would be expected to deliver according to plan. Andi Fallon would deal with issues raised, repeatedly referring to (mutual) goals and objectives. The development and documentation of revisions to the plan or to the working arrangements would be delegated to one or more of the project managers. Andi Fallon would mention Global Flogistics’ concern regarding the increase in the cost estimate. Andi Fallon would be speaking to Global Flogistics managers about staffing arrangements and a likely outcome would be the need to increase productivity. Andi Fallon and the Rascent Commercial Director would arrange a meeting with the SST Associates, VBG, and Kellet commercial managers and practice directors in due course about the contractual arrangements. At the end of the meeting an instruction would be issued that all communication with Global Flogistics managers relating to the programme should be channeled through Andi Fallon. A project manager would be nominated to draft the minutes of the meeting for approval by Andi Fallon and for subsequent circulation. Level 3 conception Andi Fallon holding a level 3 conception would be concerned about the stresses the members of the team were undoubtedly under. The SST Associates, VBG, and Kellet consultants had been working in a foreign country and far from home for three months. For many it had been impractical to return home more than once every three or four weeks. They had been forced to adapt to each others’ working practices and the client’s implementation methodology. Andi Fallon would also presume that concerns at the firm level about promises not being honored and Rascent trying to encroach in others’ areas of expertise would have filtered down to the team on the ground. No doubt they were contributing to the irritation experienced by having to work alongside inquisitive and demanding Rascent consultants unfamiliar with the products and implementation methodology.

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Individual attributes Establishing trust within the team would be vital. Each party had distinct knowledge and expertise and Andi Fallon would be unable to monitor their actions completely. Trust had to complement formal governance. Otherwise Andi Fallon and Rascent would be exposed to deceit, casting blame, or even sabotage. Andi Fallon would need to forge a closer relationship with the Global Flogistics managers and especially the Programme Director, but improving the relationship with the team had to start immediately. Andi Fallon had to be seen as delivering on promises, acting honorably, being tolerant and open, and not acting selfishly. At the meeting, Andi Fallon would review the objectives of the programme, the contractual arrangements, and the progress that had been made to date. The stresses and strains of working on the programme would be acknowledged, along with the contributions of the various parties. Andi Fallon would share that Rascent wanted to leverage the engagement to develop knowledge of the Trackstar and other leading products in the employee security functional space. The intention was to seek more work in the employee security market, leveraging what was hoped to be a successful implementation at Global Flogistics. As a systems integration specialist, Rascent would expect to work with VBG and Kellet, and there was a strong chance that SST Associates would be asked to provide additional resources and support. Independent of the arrangements on future projects and programmes, it was in everyone’s interest to make this programme a success. Andi Fallon would personally commit to ensuring that the firms could benefit directly from the work, through referrals and by having Global Flogistics as a reference site. Achieving a successful outcome and having a happy client, though, were necessary prerequisites. Andi Fallon would share Global Flogistics’ concerns over costs and staffing arrangements, and the talk of changing to a fixed-price contract. Comments would be invited, and Andi Fallon would empathize with concerns and reservations. If any cuts had to be made, Rascent would absorb its fair share. Andi Fallon would strive for a team consensus on what could be done to take into the planned discussions with SST Associates, VBG, and Kellet commercial managers and practice directors. If fissures appeared at the corporate level between the firms as a result of divergent strategies and agendas, Andi Fallon would want to minimize their effects at the programme level. The aim would be to create a protected enclave and to cement a working relationship between the members of the team. Passing reference would be made about the grief Andi Fallon was experiencing

Engagement with team from senior managers in Rascent as a result of putting the interests of the programme foremost. At the end of the meeting Andi Fallon would inquire whether it was worthwhile organizing a social event over the weekend for those not flying home. Andi Fallon would ask for a volunteer to organize the event and another to write up the salient points of the meeting.

Level 4 conception Andi Fallon holding a level 4 conception would realize that the collaborative arrangements on the programme were set within a wider landscape of cooperation and competition between the various parties. This was a defining feature of the industry as a whole as clients sought leadingedge solutions comprising elements and contributions from various software vendors and consultancies. Being a partner on a project but expecting to become a rival on another was an uncomfortable experience for most consultants. Considering the inherent tension, the stresses of working abroad, new methodologies, and the probing of their professional competence, things had gone reasonably well to date. Rascent’s strategic objectives were to learn about Trackstar and other leading products in the employee security space and leverage that newly acquired expertise as soon as possible in the market. Speed was important because there was nothing to guarantee that Trackstar or the other products would be best of breed in a year’s time. A successful implementation at Global Flogistics would enhance the firm’s reputation. VBG and Kellet needed to feel Rascent offered a complementary product, and the desire to learn about their own products related to the systems integration capability, not an attempt to encroach into their market space. SST Associates’ expectations had to be reset. The moment Rascent bought JNS, SST Associates lost its preferred implementation partner status, so it should consider any work gained thereafter as a bonus. If the firm cooperated, the bonus could be substantial, given that the employee security market was growing rapidly. While these messages had to be communicated to the SST Associates, VBG, and Kellet commercial managers and practice directors, Andi Fallon would want to share them with the team. They needed to understand the commercial realities, issues, and tensions for themselves. Adopting an adversarial or indifferent stance on the programme out of ignorance or prejudice would help nobody.

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Individual attributes At the meeting, Andi Fallon would describe Rascent’s strategy, the purchase of JNS, and its intentions in the employee security market. The role of the various parties on the programme would be reviewed, accompanied by a discussion of how this might provide a model for future mutually beneficial collaborations. Andi Fallon would also suggest that the relationship between the parties was a delicate point. It could become either a vicious spiral of mistrust, self-protection and self-centered behavior or a virtuous circle of trusting, acting with respect and integrity, and building trust. The vicious cycle would damage everyone’s interests and make working on the programme a very unpleasant experience – there were enough challenges and stresses without creating more. Andi Fallon would personally commit to fostering a virtuous circle, and would want to investigate the source of tensions thoroughly and explore opportunities for a local resolution, only escalating the issues that had to be dealt with corporately. Andi Fallon would also share the issues about costs, staffing, and form of contract raised by Global Flogistics. There would be a meeting with the SST Associates, VBG, and Kellet commercial managers and practice directors to understand the corporate perspectives. The current meeting was about understanding the team’s perspective. Andi Fallon would facilitate the discussions, pointing out the advantages and disadvantages of various responses and options. Andi Fallon would expect, even encourage, individuals to protect their corporate (and personal) interests but not at the expense of other members of the team. Only by demonstrating a determined defense of their own interests could the project managers and senior consultants manage the inevitable interference and possibly unreasonable demands from their superiors. Andi Fallon would suggest that they had to think like commercial managers and practice directors if they wanted to serve their own interests and those of their firm. They would also be urged to share their views with their managers in advance of the meeting with Andi Fallon and the Rascent Commercial Director. At the end of the meeting Andi Fallon would suggest getting together again a few days later to discuss possible improvements to the working arrangements on the programme, and any other ideas people had.

CHAPTER 8

Approach to conflict and divergence

The Retail Bank Strategy Implementation Programme Fran Sanchez, Programme Director for Retail Bank Strategy Implementation, had been aware of a growing tension between Sylvia Lawrence, the LC&C consultant, and Nigel Mann, the IT manager responsible for the systems development workstream, but this was the first time that it had surfaced in an explicit way. Sylvia Lawrence had raised a number of concerns and had requested Fran Sanchez to attend a meeting she was scheduled to have with Nigel Mann. Despite significant efforts over the last few years to move away from volumebased sales targeting toward a more value-based approach, the Retail Bank had not delivered the planned contribution compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 14% set out in the strategic baseline plan. While the reasons for the shortcomings were understood, the Group Board was keen to improve overall performance. The strength of the competition from traditional high street banks and the incursions made by new, predominantly Internet-based entrants in the past few years had resulted in lower than expected returns. Competition to attract and retain profitable customers was unabated, with ever more sophisticated market segmentation techniques used to analyze and target ever finer segments. New entrants were not burdened by a high-cost branch network and a commitment to provide basic banking services to low-income groups. Consequently, they were better placed to attract and retain high-potential customers. In many ways the banking sector was going through the same sort of restructuring the general insurance market experienced over a decade earlier when the direct insurers used increasingly sophisticated underwriting techniques to pick off low-risk customers. Cost reduction alone was not going to give the Retail Bank the necessary performance improvement nor position it well in an increasingly demanding market environment. Efforts to focus on high-value customers rather than 95

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Individual attributes simply chasing volume had not produced the desired results. After much debate and soul-searching the Retail Banking Executive Committee agreed a radical strategy that would fundamentally change the way the Retail Bank initiated and managed relationships with customers. In essence, the agreed strategy represented a paradigm shift in the approach to the market. At the heart of this shift was a view that customers were neither inherently profitable nor unprofitable, but that the value created is the outcome of the relationship between the bank and the customer. By proactively shaping and managing the course of that relationship the Retail Bank would create the most value from existing and prospective customers. Specifically, the Retail Bank would offer very competitively priced “entry” products, comparable with the notion of “loss-leaders” in food retailing, and then at predetermined points offer customers either other products or replacement products (e.g., switch a loan into an overdraft account with lower interest charges). The design and pricing of these “development” products would be aimed at enhancing the bank’s relationship with the customer, and critically at fostering familiarity and trust. As the relationship progressed over months and years, customers would be offered more complex, high-value “maturity” products and services. Surrounding the core product-based development paths would be a sophisticated dialogue strategy where every customer contact, be it to offer a product or to respond to a query, would be leveraged as an opportunity to understand and to influence the customer. These development paths would evolve in the light of experience and market forces, a process of real-time dynamic adaptation that would ensure that the Retail Bank made the most of market opportunities. The concept of deliberately designed and managed development paths, along which a customer journey or relationship progressed, flew in the face of conventional approaches to marketing. At the Retail Bank products were designed to compete against others within the same category and promotional campaigns were common events. Increasing cross-selling to existing customers was a mantra for success espoused for more than a decade. The strategy also ran against an almost ingrained view within the Retail Bank that success was built on service excellence. Responsive, customer-centric service promoted loyalty and secured referrals. Stories of how the Retail Bank had served four or five generations of the same family abounded. The strategy was agreed by the Group Board despite concerns among the Board Directors, especially in relation to the cultural issues. Changing some firmly held beliefs about the nature of retail banking posed a significant challenge. The performance and goodwill of frontline staff needed to be

Approach to conflict and divergence maintained, in the face of continuing cost reduction, as the Retail Bank redefined its business model and repositioned itself. Fran Sanchez, a senior professional within the Group’s Change Management function, was appointed Programme Director, reporting to the Managing Director (MD) of the Retail Bank, shortly after the strategy was agreed, with the remit of helping the Retail Banking Executive Committee to implement the strategy. The MD wanted the strategy phased in as soon as practicable, beginning with a switch to new customer acquisition methods and targeted offerings for existing customers. The expectation was that most of the initial benefits would accrue from the cost reduction efforts. These would offset higher customer acquisition costs entailed in opening up new distribution channels and alliances and in offering attractively priced products to new customers. Clearly, the biggest risk was that customers would not progress along the designated paths to higher-value, higher-margin products. This would leave the Retail Bank with a significant financial performance shortfall. Working closely with the Retail Banking Directors, Fran Sanchez and a small team of experienced managers from within the Group started to scope a number of workstreams, each comprising a range of projects, activities, and operational measures. The strategy consultants, LC&C, who had worked with the Executive Committee on developing the strategy, were retained to work on the implementation. Fran Sanchez was given explicit instructions from the MD to make full use of LC&C’s expertise, and to act as their primary point of contact within the Retail Bank. Fran Sanchez formally became LC&C’s “client” and agreed to their role and expected contribution to the strategy implementation. Within a few weeks, the programme began to take shape. One of the workstreams was responsible for making changes and enhancements to the Retail Bank’s systems to support the proactive management of customers along development paths. The management of the workstream was entrusted to an experienced manager within the Group’s Information Technology (IT) function, Nigel Mann. Outline business requirements were soon formulated and agreed, and a team was quickly assembled from within the Group IT function. A couple of months after the programme was launched, Fran Sanchez received a confidential memorandum from Sylvia Lawrence, the LC&C consultant assigned to the IT development workstream. In the memorandum, Sylvia Lawrence claimed that some individuals assigned to the workstream seemed to be relatively inexperienced while others appeared wedded to the existing customer relationship management system and were unwilling or unable to conceive of the functionality required to implement the new strategy. The team of analysts, architects, and developers on the workstream

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Individual attributes talked of minor tweaks to the existing systems rather than the fundamental overhaul that was required by the strategy. Sylvia Lawrence reminded Fran Sanchez that the exact offering, the timing, and the pitch to the customer were critical to the successful development of the customer relationship and the economics of the development path. The achievement of the strategy relied on establishing and maintaining a structured approach, supported by detailed records of interactions with customers and their journeys across multiple products. In the absence of this structure there would be nothing but haphazard cross-selling, which had shown itself to be patchy at best. The Retail Banking would be promoting a range of loss-making entry products with little reassurance that they could and would lead to a series of more profitable sales in the future. Sylvia Lawrence claimed that she had raised her concerns with Nigel Mann on a number of occasions to no avail. Nigel Mann had always insisted that everything was on track. His team was dedicated and competent, and had in-depth knowledge of the Retail Bank’s systems. Instead he questioned her abilities and value to the programme. Sylvia Lawrence felt she had no alternative but to raise her concerns that the IT development might not deliver the necessary business functionality directly with Fran Sanchez. This was the first time LC&C consultants had worked with the Retail Bank, though they had worked for the MD when he was with his previous company. LC&C consultants specialized in strategy formulation, and Fran Sanchez suspected they had little experience of major programmes. LC&C, though, had prior experience in applying the development path concept in other organizations. Their role was to shadow the workstreams and to provide advice and guidance, and the MD occasionally referred to them as the guardians of the strategy. Fran Sanchez may have been LC&C’s client, but it was obvious that senior people within LC&C had maintained a direct link to the MD. Sylvia Lawrence, though bright and obviously committed to the success of the programme, was very much an abstract and conceptual thinker with little practical IT experience. She also had a terse analytical style, and appeared ill at ease in social situations. The contrast between Sylvia Lawrence and Nigel Mann was stark. Nigel Mann had been with the Retail Bank for nearly 30 years and was a staunch supporter of the IT function. He had been disillusioned at the treatment of IT over the previous few years and nearly took early retirement a few months before when the function had been downsized. Fran Sanchez had worked with Nigel Mann in the past when a relatively inexperienced project manager, and still had fond memories of the support and advice he had

Approach to conflict and divergence given. Nigel Mann had a detailed knowledge of the Retail Bank’s systems and development methodologies, and was committed to the success of the Retail Bank. While not altogether unexpected, Fran Sanchez could have done without this problem and wondered what needed to be done to resolve any disagreement and ensure effective progress.

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Assume you are Fran Sanchez: • What might have given rise to the conflict between Sylvia Lawrence and Nigel Mann? • If you chose to attend a meeting with Sylvia Lawrence and Nigel Mann, how would you prepare for and handle the meeting? Please take the time to write down your answers to these two questions before reading further. Try to articulate your reactions to the situation and what role you should or could play to resolve any disagreement. The remainder of the chapter will explain the attribute approach to conflict and divergence and explore possible interpretations of the scenario from the perspective of the four levels of conception in the competence framework. The possible interpretations are not intended to be exhaustive, but are illustrative of the thoughts and actions of individuals holding different conceptions of their work.

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Individual attributes Approach to conflict and divergence Multiple stakeholders, interested parties, and contributors are a feature of projects and programmes. Frequently, these individuals or entities have different opinions or assessments of the situation, of what is important, and/or of what should be done. These opinions are voiced and promoted with varying degrees of intensity. Approach to conflict and divergence relates to the way a project or programme manager perceives and addresses the differences of opinion, tensions, disagreements, and conflicts that surface, or simmer below the surface, during the course of a project or programme. The attribute includes the attitude toward the conflict or divergence itself, the interpretation of its nature and sources, and the way it should be addressed. Someone holding a level 1 conception finds it difficult to accept that others could legitimately hold, and continue to hold, different opinions or assessments. Such differences are a deviation from the unity of purpose and the agreed path toward the achievement of the project’s or programme’s objective(s). The conflict and divergence are considered detrimental to harmony and progress. The approach adopted is often one of closing the divide through a procedural approach or reference to a higher authority. Otherwise, a solution or an expedient plan of action to reach agreement is proposed or imposed. Little attention is paid to the (potential) root causes of the conflict or divergence, and/or there is little empathy for the individuals experiencing the tensions or conflict. Someone holding a level 1 conception can appear irritated or dismissive when handling a conflict situation. Someone holding a level 2 conception accepts that individuals can legitimately hold, and continue to hold, different opinions or assessments. Such differences are a normal feature of work on a programme and, unless the conflict becomes disruptive and threatens the success of the project or programme, are healthy. The aim is to find a resolution of the issue through the use of a rational problem-solving approach. The methodology and evaluation criteria employed are usually grounded in a taken-forgranted value system. The focus of attention is on finding a solution to the substantive issue that is generating the conflict and divergence. Someone holding a level 3 conception also considers conflict and divergence as legitimate and a normal feature of work on a programme. While finding a solution to the issue is important, the reconciliation of the individuals holding the different opinions is also important. From a

Approach to conflict and divergence level 3 conception conflicts and divergences of opinions are not disembodied, but are experienced, intellectually and emotionally, by the people involved. The aim is to find a solution that addresses the issues and satisfies the individuals. The approach is predominantly one of negotiating an acceptable outcome, usually by exploring the parties’ views and expectations, searching for common ground, and identifying where compromise is possible. A compromise that satisfies the parties, and does not threaten the success of the project or programme, is seen as acceptable by someone holding a level 3 conception. Someone holding a level 4 conception would find the absence of conflict and divergence abnormal, especially on a complex programme. Similar to a level 3 conception, the reconciliation of the individuals holding the different opinions is important. While the issue is perceived as substantive and important by those experiencing the conflict, it may also be a manifestation of, or lightening rod for, deeper tensions. These tensions may be personal or may arise from a need to represent others’ interests. Someone holding a level 4 conception will have considerable empathy for the individuals experiencing the tensions or conflict, and will sense the emotional charge carried by any interactions. The search for a solution comprises reconciling the individuals as well as advancing the project or programme – a compromise is not a desired outcome. The approach is one of subtle facilitation, where the perspectives, concerns, drivers, and values of those involved are explored and articulated, and the heat is taken out of the situation through acknowledgment of legitimate opinions and interests. The facilitative approach, by directing attention to solving the issue, seeks to shift an adversarial stance into a collaborative one and to make the former antagonists coauthors of a value-adding outcome. These conceptual levels manifest themselves in different ways depending on the project or programme. In the following section the scenario at the beginning of the chapter is explored from the different conceptual levels.

Exploring conceptual levels in relation to the Retail Bank Strategy Implementation Programme The confidential memorandum and the request to attend a meeting from Sylvia Lawrence suggest a note of exasperation and a desire to alert Fran Sanchez to what she felt was a serious concern. The actions also indicate an inability to resolve the issue personally, and shed light on Sylvia Lawrence’s own approach to conflict situations. The formality of

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the memorandum can be interpreted as a desire to stress the importance of the issue and/or to protect herself from possible reproach should something go wrong in the future. Level 1 conception Fran Sanchez holding a level 1 conception would find the request to attend a meeting slightly irritating. A professional consultant and an experienced IT manager should not have let the situation and their professional relationship degenerate to this extent. It should not require the intervention of the Programme Director to resolve their differences. An initial private reaction, which would usually be suppressed, would be to tell them both to sort it out themselves. Fran Sanchez would probably attend the meeting with the objective of sorting out the issue. The initial diagnosis would be a breakdown of communications between Sylvia Lawrence and Nigel Mann. If the IT team was not working toward the business requirements agreed, then Sylvia Lawrence should have been able to point out the shortcomings. If Nigel Mann and his team did not fully understand the strategy or the business requirements, then he should be experienced enough to clarify the requirements and ask for more information. If there was a misunderstanding or genuine disagreement then they should have sat down together and found a solution in line with the strategy and the objectives for the workstream. In preparation for the meeting with Sylvia Lawrence and Nigel Mann, Fran Sanchez would quickly review the business requirements and the quality plans developed by the IT team. At the meeting Sylvia Lawrence would be asked to restate her concerns. Thereafter, Fran Sanchez would drive the meeting, typically in a stepwise manner, soliciting each party’s perspective on whether the IT development would deliver the necessary business functionality. The focus would be on obtaining hard evidence, especially from Sylvia Lawrence, with which to come to a decision of whether a problem really existed. There would be little sympathy for unsubstantiated assertions, perceptions, or vagueness. Assurances and supporting evidence would be sought from Nigel Mann that he and his team understood what was required and that they were going to deliver. The conflict would be framed in terms of different assessments on the completeness of the IT development team’s translation of the business requirements into deliverables. A judgment would be reached on the issue, or what information was needed to address any uncertainties. There would be some exploration of options to clarify the requirements or validate the

Approach to conflict and divergence translation process. Sylvia Lawrence might be asked to present the strategy and the business requirements to the IT development team (again). In the absence of sufficient information to decide on the way forward or continued hesitance or resistance to proposed solutions, a follow-up meeting would be scheduled to resolve the issue once and for all. Throughout the meeting Fran Sanchez would remind Sylvia Lawrence and Nigel Mann on the need to work together, their roles, and the importance of the programme to the Retail Bank. Continued inability on the part of Sylvia Lawrence and Nigel Mann to reach some common understanding and agreement on a way forward would grate with Fran Sanchez. If Sylvia Lawrence and Nigel Mann seemed as far apart at the end of the meeting as at the start, Fran Sanchez would feel, but usually not voice, the need to have words in private with both individuals. Level 2 conception Fran Sanchez holding a level 2 conception would not be concerned by the memorandum nor by the invitation to attend the meeting, preferring any conflict to be raised and dealt with explicitly rather than remain simmering below the surface. Sylvia Lawrence’s role was to shadow the IT development workstream and to provide advice and guidance, which might reasonably have been resented by Nigel Mann and the IT development team as a questioning of their competence. LC&C’s focus was also different, in that they were expected to ensure the coherence and integrity of the strategy as formulated. Nigel Mann and the IT development team were tasked with enhancing or developing systems within time and cost parameters, which inevitably called for some judgments, trade-offs, and compromises. The arrangements had inbuilt tensions, and that these should manifest themselves was hardly surprising. Fran Sanchez would be aware that grasping the nuances and implications of such a radical strategy might be difficult for Nigel Mann and the IT development team, steeped in the culture of the Retail Bank, and so misunderstandings could easily have resulted. The initial diagnosis would be a difference in interpretation of what was required by the strategy and a communications gap between Sylvia Lawrence and Nigel Mann and the IT development team. Nigel Mann and the IT team might not understand, nor be particularly inclined to inquire thoroughly into, what Sylvia Lawrence was trying to tell them. Sylvia Lawrence probably did not understand the technical specifications and development methodologies and was panicked by references to the development work entailing minor tweaks

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Individual attributes to the existing systems. Fran Sanchez would realize that the different roles, loyalties, experiences, and professional backgrounds would strain the dialogue and highlight differences rather than areas of agreement. In preparation for the meeting with Sylvia Lawrence and Nigel Mann, Fran Sanchez would review the business requirements and the quality plans developed by the IT team. The focus would be areas of potential misunderstanding and the lack of clarity that would help anticipate possible issues and courses of action. Fran Sanchez might seek clarification in advance from Sylvia Lawrence on the exact nature of her concerns and what specifically had triggered them. Nigel Mann might also be contacted for an update on the status of the workstreams and any IT function concerns or issues. At the meeting Fran Sanchez would preface the concerns raised by Sylvia Lawrence by summarizing the importance of the workstream, the roles of Sylvia Lawrence and Nigel Mann, and the challenge in implementing such a radical strategy. Fran Sanchez’s stated reason for attending the meeting would be to help them to iron out any misunderstanding and differences. Fran Sanchez’s overriding concern would be determining whether Sylvia Lawrence’s concerns were well founded. Fran Sanchez would invite each party to share their perspectives on the status and likely outcome of IT development. The grounds for Sylvia Lawrence’s concerns as well as any assurances offered by Nigel Mann that things were on track would be explored. The questions would focus on what checks they had carried to validate their statements. The essence of the disagreement, framed in terms of what IT development was needed to support the business requirements and whether it was accurately reflected in the functional specifications, would be crystallized. Sylvia Lawrence and Nigel Mann would be asked what could be done to resolve the matter. An option that addressed Fran Sanchez’s overriding concern, such as an independent review of what the IT development team was planning to deliver, would be proposed if it was not suggested by either Sylvia Lawrence or Nigel Mann. A follow-up meeting would be scheduled to review the outcomes. Throughout the meeting Fran Sanchez would acknowledge the different roles and perspectives of Sylvia Lawrence and Nigel Mann, while directing attention to resolving the difference of opinion. Lack of agreement would prompt greater probing and options evaluation for an objective way of determining the actual situation. Personal criticisms would be described as unhelpful and unprofessional, and would not be tolerated.

Approach to conflict and divergence Level 3 conception Fran Sanchez holding a level 3 conception would appreciate the inbuilt tensions and the complexity of translating the strategy into a set of tangible IT deliverables. On receiving the memorandum and invitation to attend the meeting, Fran Sanchez would be wondering the extent to which the working relationship between Sylvia Lawrence and Nigel Mann had been strained. Sylvia Lawrence’s job of being the guardian of the strategy inevitably comprised a strong audit and quality control function, however much it was positioned as providing advice and guidance. The task of determining the merits of Sylvia Lawrence’s claims would be relatively straightforward. The greater challenge would be getting Sylvia Lawrence and Nigel Mann to work together effectively. Fran Sanchez would want to avoid this incident becoming a source of friction and resentment in the future. Nigel Mann could easily leave the Retail Bank, or maneuver himself into being offered an early retirement package. Fran Sanchez and the Retail Bank would then lose his detailed knowledge and probably a degree of goodwill from the IT development team, whose loyalty Nigel Mann had undoubtedly nurtured. If the tension persisted and adversely affected progress and working relations with the IT development team, Sylvia Lawrence could be taken off the workstream. Even if managed well, this would cast a shadow over Fran Sanchez in the mind of the MD. It would be an admission that Fran Sanchez could not get the team to work together. LC&C senior managers would agree to take Sylvia Lawrence off the assignment, but might insinuate in private that Sylvia Lawrence’s unpopularity was due to her diligence. In preparation for the meeting with Sylvia Lawrence and Nigel Mann, Fran Sanchez would contact them both separately, and time permitting meet with them individually. With Sylvia Lawrence the preliminary discussion would touch on the events, data, and analysis that had led to her concerns, and thus the initial credence to be given to the claims. But the main focus would be on how she had raised her concerns with Nigel Mann and his reactions and counterarguments. In particular, Sylvia Lawrence’s views on whether Nigel Mann and the IT team were unwilling, because of some reservations or misconceptions, or unable, due to a lack of explanation, skills, or methods, to conceive of the functionality required to implement the new strategy would be explored. Fran Sanchez would also contact Nigel Mann on a confidential basis, invoke their past relationship, and ask for his help. Fran Sanchez would preface the concerns raised by Sylvia Lawrence by acknowledging her lack of technical competence and probable overreaction to expressions

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Individual attributes such as “minor tweaks.” But the predicament facing Fran Sanchez would be shared: Sylvia Lawrence’s claims could not simply be dismissed, and even if they were only partially true they could spell disaster for the programme and the Retail Bank. Nigel Mann would be asked for his assessment of what might have caused Sylvia Lawrence to be concerned and what might be done to resolve the situation. Fran Sanchez would not mention the memorandum and would play down the intensity with which Sylvia Lawrence had expressed herself. At the meeting Fran Sanchez would adopt a conciliatory stance with a stated purpose of trying to help sort out any misunderstanding and differences. Sylvia Lawrence would be asked to share her concerns, which would be probed and clarified but not challenged by Fran Sanchez. Nigel Mann’s assurances would be gently examined. On track according to the plan did not necessarily mean the right IT support was going to be provided if the requirements had not been specified accurately or had inadvertently been misinterpreted. Fran Sanchez’s aim would be to raise the specter of doubt in Nigel Mann’s mind, to the extent that this had not already been done in the preliminary conversation, and to demonstrate to Sylvia Lawrence and LC&C that her concerns were being taken seriously. If Nigel Mann remained adamant that he and the IT development team knew what they were doing and what they were doing was going to support the strategy, then Fran Sanchez would ask Sylvia Lawrence what it would take to convince her. Suggestions that included some objective review or a detailed presentation of the translation process from business requirements to technical specification would be looked on favorably by Fran Sanchez. They would address, at least partially, the need to validate the situation objectively. Once Nigel Mann’s agreement was secured, with as little external persuasion as possible, Fran Sanchez would focus the discussion on future working practices. Nigel Mann would be asked what he and his team would find helpful in terms of support from Sylvia Lawrence. This would both address the need to build a better working relationship, and act as a form of remedy or compensation. Having been asked to do something, Nigel Mann would have the opportunity to get something back. Fran Sanchez would mediate in terms of the reasonableness and practicality of the requests from Nigel Mann, and apply discreet pressure on Sylvia Lawrence to comply with new working arrangements. In summing up the conclusions of the discussion, Fran Sanchez would express delight (strongly implied requirement) in attending any presentation by the IT team or reviewing the findings of an independent audit. Fran Sanchez would make a point of

Approach to conflict and divergence finding out timing of any presentation and speaking to the person leading the audit. Throughout the meeting Fran Sanchez would acknowledge the different perspectives, but not probe excessively or make explicit judgments on their validity. The facts would emerge after as part of an agreed process. Lack of cooperation and participation would prompt increased efforts to mediate and to find common ground from which to arrive at a working compromise. Commitment to the success of the programme, professional pride, and veiled threat of sanction would be used to try to dislodge Sylvia Lawrence or Nigel Mann from any firmly held positions.

Level 4 conception Fran Sanchez holding a level 4 conception would also appreciate the inbuilt tensions and the complexity of translating the strategy into a set of IT deliverables, and probably reflect that assigning Sylvia Lawrence to work with Nigel Mann may not have been the wisest decision. The tension generated by the LC&C consultants was vital to prevent a dilution of the strategy in its implementation. The challenge in changing firmly held beliefs about the nature of retail banking was acknowledged by the MD and the Group Board and understood by Fran Sanchez. The possible underestimation of the scale of the change suggested by Sylvia Lawrence may have been an example of the difficulties of, and resistance engendered by, changing mindsets. Fran Sanchez would want to avoid this incident taking on wider symbolic meaning between the new, unproven strategy and the established wisdom honed through years of practice. In addition, Fran Sanchez would suspect that Sylvia Lawrence had experienced considerable difficulties before resorting to sending the memorandum, and might now feel in a vulnerable position. Fran Sanchez would not want the programme or the Retail Bank to lose the expertise of Nigel Mann and the goodwill of the IT team. Reconciliation between the individuals would be the best solution, but admitting a mistake and substituting Sylvia Lawrence with another LC&C consultant with more experience of IT development would be a viable option. Fresh perspective on the work would be essential and ideally combined with practical support of Nigel Mann and the IT team. They were stretched given that the IT function had been downsized only a few months earlier and might welcome some tangible help rather than vague criticism.

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Individual attributes In preparation for the meeting Fran Sanchez would contact Sylvia Lawrence and Nigel Mann separately and if possible meet with them in person. Sylvia Lawrence would be thanked for the memorandum and commended on her efforts and forthrightness. The discussion would then explore the events and factors that had led to her concerns. Fran Sanchez would want to get an insight into the extent to which Nigel Mann and the IT team were struggling to turn inevitably vague business requirements into tangible deliverables, or were disinterested in or dismissive of the strategy. Information on LC&C’s experiences of similar implementations and support capabilities, and Sylvia Lawrence’s personal expertise would also be sought. Fran Sanchez would also contact Nigel Mann and ask, off the record, his opinion of whether the strategy could be made to work in practice. The response would indicate Nigel Mann’s commitment to the programme, assessment of the work, and the challenge he and his team were facing. (Unless Fran Sanchez felt comfortable that Nigel Mann was still committed and aware of what was required, the focus of attention would switch to ascertaining the true status of the workstream and finding a replacement for Nigel Mann.) Fran Sanchez would remind Nigel Mann that the strategy, however radical and counterintuitive it might seem, had been debated at length by the Board and represented the best course of action to ensure the Retail Bank’s continued survival and prosperity – his loyalty and efforts over the previous 30 years would otherwise be squandered. The role and importance of LC&C would be elaborated, and Fran Sanchez would suggest that any concerns they had would best be dispelled as soon as possible. Fran Sanchez’s stated agenda for the meeting would be to find the best way of ensuring the success of the programme and to facilitate the meeting, turning it as far as possible into a collaborative working session or workshop. Sylvia Lawrence and Nigel Mann would be asked to map out the work over the previous two months and any areas of concerns. Lack of clarity, gaps in understanding, and possible misunderstandings and misinterpretations would be identified, without attributing any blame and as far as possible avoiding recriminations. Sylvia Lawrence and Nigel Mann would then be asked how best to address the areas identified, and what support was needed. Fran Sanchez would want the involvement of a third party able to bridge the divide between the strategy and the IT development, unless convinced that Sylvia Lawrence and/or Nigel Mann had that competence. Their inability to bridge the divide may have caused their frustration, mutual resentment, and ultimately personal conflict.

Approach to conflict and divergence Throughout the meeting Fran Sanchez would encourage open dialogue and creative options, and ensure that ownership for the diagnosis and proposed solution rested with Sylvia Lawrence and Nigel Mann. In facilitating the meeting Fran Sanchez would try to foster a better working relationship. If it appeared that, because of their very different backgrounds, experiences, and/or personalities, Sylvia Lawrence and Nigel Mann were finding it hard to work together, a graceful exit would subsequently be engineered for Sylvia Lawrence. In drawing the meeting to a close, Fran Sanchez would apologize for not having given the workstream enough personal attention and would commit to attending the next few meetings, finding additional support and reviewing progress on the areas identified.

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CHAPTER 9

Development and support

The One World Programme Billie Moss prepared for the meeting with Ursula Lang, who was coming for advice on how to deal with a senior Enerce manager unwilling to release people to work on the One World Programme. Billie Moss was formally tasked with guiding and supporting the team but, as a consultant, was regarded as an outsider. Despite many years as a commercial company and significant international expansion, the culture at Enerce reflected its heritage as a state-controlled monopoly and the benign autocracy such a position fostered. Enerce people knew best, and consultants solved problems but did not take decisions. The team frequently met informally to discuss issues, advice was ignored, and instructions were treated as optional suggestions. As a major international energy company, Enerce had attracted the attention of consumer groups concerned about the effects of its energy generation operations on the environment. Charities had raised questions about its commercial practices in the developing world and its apparent lack of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in relation to the poor communities it served. Some shareholders had demanded at the previous Annual General Meeting (AGM) that Enerce should serve the interests of all stakeholders and promote sustainable development (development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs). They claimed that the rhetoric contained in Enerce’s glossy brochures was not carried through to meaningful, everyday actions. Enerce stood accused of token philanthropy rather than having CSR activity embedded within the business and intimately linked to strategy. The Board of Enerce decided that the traditional economic view that corporations create the most value for society by focusing on maximizing shareholder returns within the prevailing legislation was no longer tenable. It seemed that large corporations were expected to be more socially responsible than society at large. Even if governments 110

Development and support and other agencies were better placed to undertake social interventions, make intergroup and intergenerational trade-offs, and redress distributional imbalances, Enerce had to be seen to embrace CSR and sustainable development (SD). Otherwise Enerce risked losing goodwill and legitimacy in its home and international markets. The company would risk being criticized and boycotted in its local markets, and not be the energy partner of choice for governments in developing countries. A Board member agreed to champion CSR and SD, and the One World Programme came into being. Principles and guidance had to set out clearly to whom and for what Enerce should be responsible, and how competing interests should be prioritized or reconciled. The intention was to embed these principles into commercial practices in its operations worldwide, and to implement tangible actions that manifested Enerce’s commitment to CSR and SD. The Board was keen to have a list of compelling examples if needed at the next AGM. The decision was taken to entrust the work on the One World Programme to the cadre of high-potential managers Enerce was grooming for senior management positions. Work on the programme would be part of their personal and professional development and would ensure that Enerce’s future leaders lived and breathed social responsibility. A core team was assembled at the corporate center headed by Ursula Lang, the Executive Assistant to the Board member championing the programme. Ursula Lang, herself a high-potential manager on a two-year posting, relished the idea of leading such an important programme in support of a cause to which she was passionately committed. The programme champion and a group of senior managers acting as an informal Steering Group realized that Ursula Lang and the core team had no experience of managing such a complex initiative. They were obviously keen but had limited knowledge of the subject and little time due to other work obligations. Advised by contacts, senior managers approached and subsequently hired, on a part-time basis, Billie Moss to provide technical direction in defining, planning, and realizing the programme. Billie Moss was asked to guide the research and analysis leading to the formulation of the principles and guidance, and then to help the high-potential managers working in small teams to launch practical initiatives in selected markets in which Enerce operated. Billie Moss was introduced to Ursula Lang and the core team, who shared their ideas on the programme. The plan was to assemble relevant information on CSR and SD, hold a week-long workshop with the cadre of

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Individual attributes high-potential managers to disseminate the information and generate ideas. The workshop would become a springboard for field trips to the various operations. In the draft plan, about 35 managers would travel in groups of five or six to operations across the world for about a week to understand the local issues and the opportunities to make a tangible difference. They would then come back together to formulate the principles and guidance to be submitted to the Board for approval. The groups would then return to the operations for about three months to help embed the new corporate policy and launch the projects. The whole cadre of high-potential managers was expected to help embed the principles and guidance where they were working. In the discussions, Billie Moss suggested that it would be useful to ascertain what was already being done in various countries and to consult senior managers in the various operations to get their views and buy-in. Billie Moss took on the responsibility of pulling together and, where appropriate, synthesizing the academic literature on the subject prior to the review meeting with the programme champion a couple of weeks later. When Billie Moss met Ursula Lang and the team on the morning of the review meeting it was clear that little work had been done. E-mails had been sent to managers in the international operations, but had not been followed up and little had been received. At least Billie Moss had developed a presentation and had sent it to the team in advance, so there was something to review at the meeting. As Billie Moss took the programme champion and key senior managers through the presentation, blank expressions came over their faces as the subject of consultation with senior managers was raised. Billie Moss turned to the slide to find that the bullet point had been deleted. After the meeting, Ursula Lang admitted having taken it out because she and the team did not think it was important given the Board mandate for the One World Programme. Over the following weeks Billie Moss contacted managers in the international operations personally and found that they were being socially responsible. They had policies in place that supported poor communities and fostered economic growth. Many privately commented that managers at the corporate center were aloof and disconnected from the realities on the ground. They claimed that much CSR and SD work was done despite demanding performance targets. In mature markets, senior managers were wary of being undercut by competitors prepared to be more “economically rational.” New entrants were targeting the most profitable customers, leaving Enerce with an increasing proportion of low-income customers who struggled to pay bills and sometimes built up large unpaid arrears. Enerce had limited scope of action, given regulations and pressure from consumer

Development and support groups, to provide a “social service” independent of means to pay for it. Some managers even resented the One World Programme since it reflected corporate center ignorance, and it implied that local operators lacked a moral conscience and needed to be “helped” by a select elite. A senior management forum was organized to review the One World Programme and invitations were dispatched. In the meantime, Ursula Lang and the team sent out information about the programme to the cadre of high-potential managers and the contribution expected of them. However, the head of one of Enerce’s largest country operations replied to the invitation questioning the objectives and relevance of the programme and stating categorically that he was not going to release any of his most competent managers. The operation was under considerable commercial pressure and could not afford to have key managers disappear for extended periods. He intended to express this view very forcefully at the senior management forum the following week.

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Assume you are Billie Moss: • How do you handle the meeting with Ursula Lang? • What factors or considerations have you taken into account in arriving at your course of action? Please take the time to write down your answers to these two questions before reading further, focusing on the desired change in approach and behavior you would seek to bring about in Ursula Lang. The remainder of the chapter will explain the attribute development and support and explore possible interpretations of the scenario above from the perspective of the four levels of conception in the competence framework. The possible interpretations are not intended to be exhaustive, but are illustrative of the thoughts and actions of individuals holding different conceptions of their work.

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Development and support Development and support describes how a project or programme manager helps and interacts with team members, or other stakeholders, in relation to an issue or problem. The attribute deals with the nature and style of the interaction as well as the type of help and advice given. The attribute ranges from support in dealing with a specific issue to the personal and professional development of the individual, where the problem, if a specific problem is raised, is an opportunity to engage in a broader development process. Someone holding a level 1 conception wants to help and focuses on the problem or issue presented by the other person and sets about working on its resolution. Someone holding a level 1 conception takes on ownership or coownership of the problem, and in some cases takes personal responsibility for its resolution or some work required toward its resolution. Someone holding a level 2 conception focuses on the problem or issue presented but does not take ownership. Resolution of the problem remains firmly with the individual, but advice is offered on where to find out more information, what should be investigated, and how to address the problem. Someone holding a level 2 conception directs the team member or stakeholder, and encourages more self-reliance and the deployment of the individual’s own initiative. Someone holding a level 3 conception adopts a coaching style where the problem or issue is explored collaboratively until a workable approach is reached. Someone holding a level 3 conception asks questions and prompts ideas, primarily in relation to the problem or issue raised, but with a wider goal of stimulating thought and reflection. The desired outcome includes the development of the individual in the role and the skills to frame and address similar issues and problems in the future. Someone holding a level 4 conception also adopts a coaching style. The focus of the questions, reflections, and ideas is the context or potential source of the problem or issue. Attention is paid to how the specific issue might have arisen and what might be done to address the root causes. The coaching is intended to deepen the individual’s appreciation of the broader issues and provide new perspectives. The desired outcome includes the development of the individual and the ability to sense and diagnose the subtleties of a situation to influence proactively.

Development and support These conceptual levels manifest themselves in different ways depending on the project or programme. In the following section the scenario at the beginning of the chapter is explored from the different conceptual levels.

Exploring conceptual levels in relation to the One World Programme Ursula Lang was bringing a problem to Billie Moss that could jeopardize the whole programme. By not releasing high-potential managers working for him, the senior Enerce manager would create difficulties. Expressing the view at the senior management forum that his operation, and by implication probably other operations, could not afford to release talented managers for an extended period would make finding enough managers for the field trip much harder. Questioning in public the relevance and objectives would cast doubt over the programme itself. Level 1 conception Billie Moss holding a level 1 conception would want to help Ursula Lang address the problem she faced. It would be an opportunity for Billie Moss to demonstrate competence and to add value, and in doing so build a closer relationship with Ursula Lang and the core team. Helping the team to solve problems would be regarded as an important part of fulfilling the role assigned to Billie Moss by the programme champion. Billie Moss would empathize with any concerns or distress experienced by Ursula Lang. Billie Moss would listen carefully to the problem described by Ursula Lang and ask questions to clarify the situation. Billie Moss would want to be clear about the concerns raised by the senior manager and what he intended to do. The problem would be explored by Billie Moss in collaboration with Ursula Lang: How many high-potential managers were expected to come from the operation controlled by the senior manager? Could they be substituted if necessary? What might the reaction be at the senior management forum? Different options would be discussed, with Billie Moss increasingly making suggestions and taking the lead in finding a solution. Any helpful actions or preparatory work undertaken by Ursula Lang would be praised by Billie Moss. It would be clear to Billie Moss, and probably Ursula Lang, that someone had to speak to the dissenting senior manager and try to convince him to

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support the One World Programme, or at least not to sabotage it. If asked, or if Ursula Lang expressed any concerns or reservations about speaking to the senior manager, then Billie Moss would take on the job. Billie Moss would feel that the task required more experience and tact than Ursula had, and a short discussion might resolve the whole situation. Billie Moss would probably look forward to overcoming this challenge personally. A plan would be agreed, which would include actions for both Billie Moss and Ursula Lang, and a subsequent meeting scheduled. Level 2 conception Billie Moss holding a level 2 conception would recognize that Ursula Lang needed help to deal with the resistance from the senior manager, but would not want to take responsibility for resolving the situation. Billie Moss would feel that Ursula Lang had to address the problem she faced, but had to be steered in the right direction. Hopefully, Ursula and the core team would finally realize that Billie Moss was far more experienced and competent in managing such complex initiatives and that they should listen to and follow Billie Moss’ advice. Ursula Lang and the core team had not taken seriously the importance of consulting senior managers and a problem had arisen. Billie Moss would want the team to learn a lesson from the incident and to change their arrogant and presumptive approach to the programme. Little empathy would be shown for any distress experienced by Ursula Lang. Billie Moss would probe the concerns raised by the senior manager and what he intended to do, then would ask Ursula Lang what she had already done or planned to do to prevent an embarrassing situation at the senior management forum. Billie Moss would remain relatively detached and almost cross-examine Ursula Lang: If it had not been done already, Billie Moss would instruct Ursula Lang to do some specific research and analysis on the following: • proportion of high-potential managers expected to come from the operation controlled by the senior manager; • relative commercial pressure experienced by the operation, and what was being done already in terms of CSR and SD; • opportunity to substitute high-potential managers between operations; • impact of reducing the number of high-potential managers involved in the field trips or reducing the number of country operations visited;

Development and support • incentives or leverage that could be applied to get the senior manager to change his mind; • how much influence the senior manager carried, or could be expected to carry at the forum; • could the senior manager’s invitation to attend the forum be withdrawn, and what might the consequences be. Billie Moss would ask Ursula Lang to formulate a plan quickly, using the information she would gather, either to get the senior manager to change his mind or to get around the problem of having fewer high-potential managers on the field trips than expected. Billie Moss would be happy to review the plan and arguments she would use, but Ursula Lang would have to deal personally with the senior manager. Billie Moss would regard this as an important part of Ursula Lang’s professional development. If the senior manager remained intransigent and threatened to derail the programme at the senior management forum, Ursula Lang would have to develop a fallback plan. Again, Billie Moss would provide advice, but would avoid taking responsibility for the plan’s execution if possible. Level 3 conception Billie Moss holding a level 3 conception would realize that the problem arose in part because of Ursula Lang’s inexperience and reluctance to listen to and follow the advice offered. Billie Moss would want Ursula Lang to understand and deal with this shortcoming as well as to help find an approach to deal with the resistance from the senior manager. The programme could unravel if other senior managers at the forum, prompted by the dissenter, openly challenged the merits and objectives of the programme and felt able to withhold support. The threat was too great to let Ursula Lang stumble along. Billie Moss would suspect that Ursula Lang was concerned and unsettled, otherwise she would probably not have asked for a meeting at which she might have to admit mistakes and her own inexperience. Hopefully, she would be more receptive to Billie Moss’ advice than on previous occasions. Billie Moss would explore Ursula Lang’s analysis of the situation, what she had done, and what options were available. Ursula Lang would be asked what she had learned from the experience, how her attitude and actions might be interpreted by others. For instance, whether she appreciated that preempting agreement and bypassing senior managers in informing high-potential managers about the programme might not be conducive to

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gaining support. Billie Moss would encourage Ursula Lang to reflect on her approach and would check that she had understood and accepted that it needed to change. Unless Ursula Lang changed her haughty approach, she was likely to antagonize senior managers and other key stakeholders, and cause more problems in the future. Billie Moss would then address the options available by asking questions. Options would be explored, gaps in knowledge exposed, and an approach crafted to deal with the situation. Billie Moss would subtly lead Ursula Lang toward a course of action, but ensure that it remained her problem and her solution. This would be essential for Ursula Lang to truly learn from this unpleasant experience. Billie Moss would be prepared to have a discreet word with the programme champion, but would suggest that Ursula Lang should deal directly with the senior manager in the first instance. If the senior manager remained intransigent, then more support was required from other senior stakeholders. The programme champion might have to persuade some Board colleagues to attend the forum to lend their weight to the programme, and so contain and counteract any dissent. Billie Moss would be comfortable that alternative arrangements could be found that required fewer individuals for the field trips and subsequent projects. Billie Moss would be keen for Ursula Lang to understand and appreciate the logic of the approach and how it fitted together, and in broader terms how she might address a similar problem in the future. Level 4 conception Billie Moss holding a level 4 conception would feel that this reaction might have been expected. Ursula Lang’s approach probably confirmed views held in the various operations that managers at the corporate center were aloof and disconnected from the realities on the ground. The autocratic approach felt by Billie Moss was probably resented by managers in the country operations, especially those from acquired companies. Ursula Lang had simply acted out the cultural norms of the corporate center and triggered what might have been an emotional response. However, the response was a manifestation of the resentment that Billie Moss had picked up when speaking to managers in the country operations. The One World Programme lacked widespread support and possibly a compelling rationale. If local operators were doing much real CSR and SD work despite demanding performance targets, then the principles and guidance were unlikely, in their eyes, to add significant value. Local

Development and support country managers might be concerned that policies and initiatives dreamed up by a select elite would merely create complexity and make it even more difficult to meet their targets. They might believe that the projects to be launched as part of the One World Programme were going to be marginal or cosmetic. However committed they personally, or even Enerce as a corporation, were to CSR and SD, they still faced commercial realities and would suspect that ultimately they would be measured in terms of economic returns. Billie Moss would want Ursula Lang to appreciate the organizational and commercial context of the programme and how these factors might give rise to certain attitudes and resistance. Billie Moss would listen to Ursula Lang’s exposition of the problem, and suggest that Ursula Lang should speak to the senior manager in advance of the forum. Then Billie Moss might suggest that they should rehearse what Ursula Lang would say to the senior manager to convince him to support the programme. As Ursula Lang put forward her arguments and reasons, Billie Moss, acting in the role of the senior manager, would counter the arguments. Stepping in and out of role, Billie Moss might suggest that Ursula Lang needed to do more to communicate the merits and approach of the programme: how they built on good practice that already existed, how the field trips were about grounding corporate policy in local realities, how the local country managers had significant opportunities to shape the policies. Billie Moss would also suggest that resorting to corporate mandate should be avoided. Billie Moss would make the role play difficult, possibly by creating an impasse or reacting emotionally. Ursula Lang’s passionate commitment to CRS and SD would be met by equally passionate commitment, but put into practice in other ways. Ursula Lang would be made to feel the emotions and frustrations of senior managers in the country operations. Having helped Ursula Lang to experience the programme from the perspective of a senior manager in the country operations, Billie Moss would encourage Ursula Lang to reflect on what it would take to gain support, and on how her approach might need to change. Ursula Lang would need to take a hard, dispassionate look at the One World Programme and be sure it was worthwhile. If it was not, Billie Moss would be prepared to go with her and support her in recommending to the programme champion that the programme should be stopped. It would be easy enough to compile a list of the CSR and SD initiatives already under way to present to the Board and infer a set of principles from current practice. That might be enough to satisfy the Board and demonstrate that Enerce was actually doing things. If the programme was worthwhile, Ursula Lang

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Individual attributes would have the understanding and conviction to present a compelling case to the senior manager questioning the merits and objectives of the programme, and subsequently others attending the forum. Billie Moss might also suggest that the forum should be a way of engaging the senior managers and soliciting their input, rather than simply telling them what was going to happen. It might be rather countercultural but worth trying. Billie Moss would ask if Ursula Lang was willing to propose this approach to the programme champion.

C H A P T E R 10

Purpose of inquiry

The Site Modernization Programme Geri Walsh only had a couple of hours to make some inquiries before briefing the Human Resources and Operations Directors of Affiliated Chemicals (AC). Appointed Programme Manager for Site Modernization at the Cosyvale site less than a month earlier and just back from a long weekend in Paris celebrating a wedding anniversary, Geri Walsh was plunged into the first crisis of the new role. The previous Friday evening David Wilkins, one of the project managers on the Site Modernization Programme, had walked out of the Cosyvale site, leaving a note for Geri Walsh and the Site General Manager. David Wilkins claimed that he had instructed solicitors to make a claim for constructive dismissal (de facto termination of a contract of employment through unilateral variations in its terms and conditions). He also claimed to have sent a complete set of the project files to the Health and Safety Executive with a detailed note laying out how AC was trying to coerce him into adopting unsafe practices on the site. As a postscript to the handwritten note, David Wilkins had threatened to go to the local press about his safety concerns at the site. Affiliated Chemicals (AC) had eight major sites across Europe, manufacturing and processing base chemicals. The Cosyvale site in Northern England was one of the oldest sites and had been earmarked for modernization and redevelopment. The planned work comprised the demolition of old or redundant plants, the refurbishment of buildings, new equipment, and improved access and environmental infrastructure, as well as the building of state-of-the-art chemical processing plants. All this work had to be done with minimum disruption to operations – AC could not afford any loss of production given the low margins and intense competition on the processing of base chemicals. Historically, the company had done the majority of project work internally and had used contractors to provide support or to undertake specific tasks. As such the company had developed detailed 121

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Individual attributes standards and procedures for undertaking work within a chemical facility producing toxic and hazardous chemicals, which are rigidly followed. AC was proud of its expertise as a manufacturer and processor of chemicals and very keen to protect its safety record. Prior to Geri Walsh’s appointment, the Cosyvale Site General Manager had overseen the work of four project managers each tasked with different elements of the programme, but had found it impossible to combine both roles. The programme role demanded extensive travel to overseas plants and equipment manufacturers, and numerous meetings with AC’s planners and technical specialists based in London. After a few days in charge it was clear to Geri Walsh that one of the projects managed by David Wilkins was not going well. Geri Walsh decided to find out as quickly as possible what was happening. The project was the demolition of a fractionating column previously used to break complex chemical mixtures into their separate parts through heating and differential rates of cooling. The column occupied a central position on the site, and, because of its height, had become a landmark in the area and a symbol of the site for local people. The Site General Manager had personally scoped this project and decided on a two-stage process for the demolition: the column to be stripped and then demolished by controlled explosions. Recognizing that AC did not have any in-house expertise in the use of explosives, the Site General Manager recruited David Wilkins who had 15 years’ experience of managing demolition projects including the use of explosives. David Wilkins had not worked for a chemical company, but came with an impressive CV. AC put the two stages of the work out to contract separately. The stripping contract (including waste disposal) was awarded to a local contractor that was well known on-site. The demolition contract (also including waste disposal) was awarded to a US company with specialist expertise in the use of explosives within a wide range of industrial environments including chemical sites. Both were fixed-price contracts, with an agreed schedule of rates for scope variations and delays instigated by AC. The total project budget was £3.80m, broken down as follows: Price for stripping = £1.86m Price for demolition = £1.24m Project management cost = £ 0.80m The project management cost was primarily allocated costs for David Wilkins’ time (full cost recovery for the Project Organization) plus cross-charging

Purpose of inquiry for the inputs from various support functions including Design, Engineering, Procurement, Legal, Health and Safety, and Finance. The project duration was estimated at 16 months, from project approval through to complete restoration of the area. However, 15 months into the project, work ground to a halt. The demolition work had not started because of disagreements between AC and the US contractor. At a recent meeting, David Wilkins shared three major problems with Geri Walsh: 1)

2)

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AC’s management system and competencies did not lend themselves to this project. The support personnel were “blindly” applying the procedures, which had led to delays and significant rework. The management system was based around “new build” and modifications; it had nothing to do with demolition. For instance, AC insisted on the supplier providing a detailed inspection and reporting schedule for their work for the five years following completion. David Wilkins explained that purchasing staff at Head Office had insisted on the inspection schedule from the US company. The US company had refused, stating that it was unnecessary and not within the scope of the fixed-price contract. AC planned to build on the site of the fractionating column making “inspection” impossible, yet the US company might be deemed in breach of contract should any movement or subsidence occur. The US company had supplied its method statement based on its experience of this type of work. AC had asked for changes, claiming that the changes would improve safety. The contractor was not willing to change the method on the grounds that the proposed changes would have increased the risks. The US company had shared a concern with David Wilkins that the AC people were undoubtedly good industrial chemists, but were not demolition experts and did not seem to realize this. Despite extensive stakeholder management, both within AC and the local community, some functions and areas of the Cosyvale site and Head Office were claiming that they should have been involved. David Wilkins had consulted with a broad group of stakeholders including the immediate surrounding building personnel, the unions, senior management across AC, local community groups, the police, and the Health and Safety Executive. David Wilkins acknowledged that the demolition project had attracted considerable interest and had high visibility, especially because there were risks associated with this type of project. AC was totally risk averse and dreaded the possibility of bad publicity following a recent

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incident at another site. David Wilkins had dealt with a constant stream of inquiries from people who had at most a peripheral interest in the fractionating column or whose bosses had already been consulted. David Wilkins was exasperated and struggling to fit in with the immensely risk-averse and consensual AC culture. The absolute importance of following procedures had been ingrained in managers following a major incident six years earlier. Managers deviating from the procedures had been disciplined, and this has led to unwillingness to make exceptions. Also projects were historically run by committees, which had slowed progress but engaged stakeholders, some of whom sometimes used projects to flag unrelated concerns about the site as part of the risk assessment process. Tangential investigations and multiple reviews were often commissioned by these unwieldy Steering Committees. Projects also had to absorb high levels of cross-charges as functional representatives charged their time almost at will. Project figures produced by AC’s project control systems for the demolition of the fractionating column were: BCWS £ 3.23m

BCWP £2.56m

SV –£ 0.67m (0.79)SPI

ACWP £ 3.24m

CV –£ 0.68m (0.79)CPI

Note: BCWS: Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled (Planned Value) BCWP: Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (Earned value) ACWP: Actual Cost of Work Performed (Actual Cost) SV: Schedule Variance = BCWP – BCWS SPI: Schedule Performance Index = BCWP/BCWS CV: Cost Variance = BCWP – ACWP CPI: Cost Performance Index = BCWP/ACWP The other four projects managed by David Wilkins were less high profile. Three were refurbishment projects, and the fourth was a new build project using a novel technology and approach. The risk analysis had identified that the new build project might exceed the budget significantly, given that AC would be going through a steep learning curve. However, the overruns on this £2.2m (budget) project were significant: SV, –£ 0.15m (SPI 0.90); CV –£ 0.85m (CPI 0.62). Analysis of the projects in David Wilkins’ portfolio (total

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budget of £9.40m, including the demolition of the fractionating column) showed: BCWS £6.96m

BCWP £6.12m

SV –£0.84m (0.88) SPI

ACWP £7.62m

CV –£1.50m (0.80) CPI

At the meeting with David Wilkins, Geri Walsh promised to reflect on the concerns he had raised and get back to him within a week. There was a need to act quickly because any further delays on the demolition project would have a knock-on effect on the business performance on the site, over and above the cost overruns. The demolition of the fractionating column was intended to create space for the construction of a new £9m plant to replace an older inefficient plant. Given the long lead times for specifying and ordering the equipment (and minor delays in obtaining approvals), construction was scheduled to start in three months, with production starting eight months later. The plant had a payback period of three years on the basis of efficiency savings. On the Thursday after the meeting, Geri Walsh left for a long awaited extended weekend in Paris, accidentally leaving the work mobile phone at home. That very day, David Wilkins authorized a representative from the US contractor commissioned to do the demolition work to carry out an inspection of the fractionating column. The Cosyvale site Health and Safety representative claimed that the inspection contravened AC’s safety methods and reported David Wilkins to the Site General Manager. The Site General Manager, personally annoyed by the stream of grumblings against David Wilkins and unable to contact Geri Walsh, called a meeting the next morning. At the meeting, in the presence of the site HR manager, he laid out his concerns over David Wilkins’ cavalier attitude toward his work. The Site General Manager stated that the breach of method would go on David Wilkins’ record, and directed him not to contravene any more site methods, procedures, or accepted practices. On Sunday evening Geri Walsh picked up a series of “call me back as soon as possible” messages from David Wilkins and the Cosyvale Site General Manager. On walking into the office at the Cosyvale site the next morning, Geri Walsh was informed that the Human Resources and Operations Directors were on the way to the site and were expecting a personal briefing on David Wilkins’ walkout and threatened action. The Site General Manager had spotted the note on David Wilkins’ desk late on Friday evening and had immediately contacted AC’s Operations Director. The wall calendar in the office used by David Wilkins showed he was due to be at

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Individual attributes the local hospital that morning having a series of tests. As expected, David Wilkins’ mobile phone was switched off with calls diverted to the answering service.

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Assume you are Geri Walsh: • Who would you speak to or contact and what would you ask? • What other investigations or analyses would you conduct? • What would you hope to achieve with the questions and discussion? Please take the time to write down your answers to these questions before reading further. The remainder of the chapter will explain the attribute purpose of inquiry and explore possible interpretations of the scenario above from the perspective of the four levels of conception in the competence framework. The possible interpretations are not intended to be exhaustive, but are illustrative of the thoughts and actions of individuals holding different conceptions of their work.

Purpose of inquiry Purpose of inquiry Asking questions and making inquiries are prominent features of project or programme management work and are an integral part of broader processes of communication, engagement, coordination, decision making, and direction. Purpose of inquiry relates to the rationale for asking questions and conducting inquiries, and the use to which questions and inquiries are put. Someone holding a level 1 conception makes inquiries or asks questions primarily to ascertain the facts of a situation, and sometimes to solicit options and opinions. The main goal is personal clarification and understanding. Statements and information are taken at face value, though a subject or issue may be explored in great detail. A level 2 conception incorporates a level 1 conception, so questions of clarification are asked. In addition, questions are used to challenge statements or information in order to gauge their validity or reliability (e.g., sources of data, verification undertaken, possibility of error). Questions are also used to test the conviction of a personal opinion or belief (e.g., counterview, personal interests), and to imply noncompliance in relation to policies, procedures, norms, or “common sense.” In some cases questions are deliberately confrontational. A level 3 conception incorporates a level 2 conception, so questions are used to clarify and challenge. Questions are also used to stimulate creative thinking and possibilities beyond the routine solutions or conventional approaches. Embedded in the questions are ideas, whether fully formed or embryonic, and someone holding a level 3 conception will use such questions to stimulate the other person’s thinking, generate a richer set of options, prompt a discussion of their merits, and/or obtain feedback. A level 4 conception incorporates a level 3 conception, and questions and inquiries are also used to redefine or reframe an issue or problem. Frame breaking questions are directed at fundamental objectives, constraints, and assumptions, and inquire what the consequences or options might be if the objective or constraint did not exist or the assumption proved incorrect. The aim of reframing questions is to enable “out of the box” thinking, to generate radical alternatives, and/or to prompt deep reflection. These conceptual levels manifest themselves in different ways depending on the project or programme. In the following section the scenario at the beginning of the chapter is explored from the different conceptual levels.

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Exploring conceptual levels in relation to the Site Modernization Programme The imminent arrival of the Human Resources and Operations Directors of Affiliated Chemicals for a personal briefing on the situation leaves little time to investigate the situation in detail. The potential questions and concerns of the directors need to be anticipated and the information and analysis marshaled. Level 1 conception Geri Walsh holding a level 1 conception would read very carefully the note left by David Wilkins. The claims would be separated from the threats. The impact and potential remediation for each claim would be assessed quickly. David Wilkins could easily stop his claim for constructive dismissal, but retracting his accusations of coercion to adopt unsafe practices and getting the project files back from the Health and Safety Executive would be far harder. AC’s actions would play some part in determining whether the threat of going to the local press about safety concerns at the site actually materialized. Geri Walsh would find out what the US contractor had done the previous Thursday and the grounds for the Cosyvale site Health and Safety representative claiming that the inspection contravened AC’s safety methods. Then Geri Walsh would set up a meeting with the Site General Manager and the HR manager to understand exactly what happened at the meeting with David Wilkins. Geri Walsh would want a full chronology of the meeting, and exact details of statements made. How exactly was the breach in methods expressed? Did the Site General Manager use the word “cavalier” to describe David Wilkins’ attitude toward his work? Was the reprimand expressed as a formal disciplinary warning or simply that the Site General Manager would not forget the breach of method? What specific instructions were issued to David Wilkins about not contravening any more site methods, procedures, or accepted practices? Was David Wilkins upset at the end of the meeting or did he give any indication that he might do something rash? Had there been any contact with David Wilkins since he left the site on Friday? The discussion would move on to whether David Wilkins really had grounds for claiming constructive dismissal, drawing on the HR manager’s expertise. Geri Walsh would probe into the factors that would be taken into account should the claim get to court and how AC could defend the claim. The other subject discussed would be the reaction of the Health and

Purpose of inquiry Safety Executive, and what investigations they might launch. Geri Walsh would check whether the Cosyvale Site General Manager had received any calls from the Health and Safety Executive and how well he personally knew the individual who dealt with the Cosyvale site. Geri Walsh would also ask if anyone on the Cosyvale site had connections with the local press, or if David Wilkins was a personal friend of a local journalist or editor. Geri Walsh would ask for the Site General Manager’s and the HR manager’s views on the appropriate course of action, and review the options. The situation and options would be summarized in anticipation of the briefing and Geri Walsh would check that the salient points had been captured. Level 2 conception Geri Walsh holding a level 2 conception would read the note left by David Wilkins and take stock of the situation. David Wilkins may have done exactly what he claimed in the note, or may have written the note in a fit of anger and just forgotten to tear it up before leaving the site on Friday evening. It would be wise to presume the worst but strive to understand the facts of the situation. Trying to coerce an employee to adopt unsafe practices was a serious charge. Even if it would be hard to prove, the bad publicity alone would provoke closer scrutiny from the Health and Safety Executive, which would be an added complication for the Site Modernization Programme. Geri Walsh would meet with the Site General Manager and the HR manager to find out what the US contractor had done the previous Thursday, what safety methods had allegedly been contravened, and the gravity of the contravention(s). Geri Walsh would want answers from the Site General Manager. What had compelled him to call the meeting the next day and without Geri Walsh? What had he hoped to achieve? Had he taken advice from the HR manager before the meeting? Time permitting, Geri Walsh would contact the representative of the US contractor to get his/her side of the story after the meeting. As the details of the meeting would emerge, Geri Walsh would question whether another course of action, such as a quiet chat or even an informal reprimand, would have been more appropriate. Information would be gathered on David Wilkins’ movements on Friday and whether he could have done what he claimed in his note. The Site General Manager would be quizzed extensively. When and where had he found the note? Why had he not tried to contact David Wilkins

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directly? What had possessed him to escalate the matter immediately to the Operations Director? The discussion would cover the grounds for claiming constructive dismissal, and the HR manager’s opinions would be challenged. How well did he know the law on constructive dismissal? How many other cases had he been involved in? Time permitting, Geri Walsh would get a second opinion on the issue of constructive dismissal prior to the briefing, given that the HR Director would no doubt have some familiarity with the subject. Geri Walsh would also ask the Cosyvale Site General Manager how seriously the Health and Safety Executive would take the claim, and take a counterstance (act as devil’s advocate) to check the robustness of the opinions expressed. Views on the appropriate course of action would be solicited and their relative merits investigated. The situation and proposed course of action would be synthesized, and Geri Walsh would insist that any disagreement should be aired there and then. Geri Walsh would anticipate that the Operations and HR Directors would like to be briefed about David Wilkins’ performance, and so would carry out an analysis of the project statistics (shown in Table 10.1). The analysis would suggest that while the summary performance did not appear very good, the variations could be explained and the three refurbishment projects were running to plan. It would be difficult to suggest that David Wilkins was incompetent or had consistently underperformed. Geri Walsh would make a mental note to investigate whether there had been any personal animosity between David Wilkins and the Site General Manager, who had been his boss prior to Geri Walsh’s appointment.

Table 10.1

Performance statistic on the projects managed by David Wilkins

Project

Budget BCWS BCWP (£m) (£m) (£m)

SV (£m)

SPI

ACWP (£m)

CV (£m)

CPI

Fractionating Column New Build 3 Refurbishment

3.8 2.2 3.4

3.23 1.56 2.17

2.56 1.41 2.15

–0.67 0.79 –0.15 0.90 –0.02 0.99

3.24 2.26 2.12

–0.68 0.79 –0.85 0.62 0.03 1.01

Total

9.4

6.96

6.12

–0.84 0.88

7.62

–1.5

Note: Bold indicates calculated numbers

0.80

Purpose of inquiry Level 3 conception Geri Walsh holding a level 3 conception would read the note left by David Wilkins and wonder how to extricate the Cosyvale site, the Site Modernization Programme, and AC from a potentially difficult situation. David Wilkins’ actions may have been precipitous and ill-advised, but something must have pushed him into it. Even without knowing him well as an individual, Geri Walsh would suspect that the actions were out of character for someone with David Wilkins’ experience and track record. Independent of the facts and merits of the case, deep emotions had been stirred and entrenched positions were being formed. Geri Walsh would prefer to tread carefully and act calmly, and would brief the directors accordingly. The incident and meeting with the directors would also be an opportunity to establish Geri Walsh’s control and authority over the Site Modernization Programme. Geri Walsh would meet with the Site General Manager and the HR manager to find out what had happened the previous Thursday and the seriousness of the alleged contravention(s) of site safety methods. Geri Walsh would explore the Site General Manager’s rationale for his actions and David Wilkins’ reactions during the meeting. Was there anything in David Wilkins’ demeanor that suggested something was wrong? Had he ever behaved erratically in the past? Could it all be a misunderstanding or an ill-conceived practical joke? Was there anything in the past relationship that could have contributed to or shed light on the actions? Geri Walsh would begin to explore what the Site General Manager would be prepared to do to remedy the situation. For instance, would he be prepared to apologize to David Wilkins and forget the whole incident? The discussion would deal with the claims for constructive dismissal, the relevant legislation and process, and David Wilkins’ chances of success. The HR manager would be asked, if David Wilkins pressed his case, how much it might cost to settle it immediately out of court with a proviso that David Wilkins did not disclose any details of his claim or make allegations about AC’s practices. Geri Walsh would also want to know AC’s policy on these matters. Would the unauthorized dispatch of the project file to the Health and Safety Executive help or hinder his cause? Was it worth taking some professional legal advice on the likely course and outcome should the case go to court? Did the HR manager want to present the contingency plan at the briefing?

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Geri Walsh would check whether the Cosyvale Site General Manager could speak discreetly to the person responsible for the Cosyvale site in the Health and Safety Executive to anticipate the possible receipt of the project file and note. The Site General Manager could explain the situation and that an internal investigation was under way. He could say he might be the butt of an unpleasant practical joke, a vindictive act following a formal reprimand, or possibly that David Wilkins was not himself when he sent the file. The Site General Manager could personally reassure the official from the Health and Safety Executive that AC took safety very seriously. As well as analyzing his performance, Geri Walsh would try to build up a picture of David Wilkins as a person, and would make some quick, informal inquiries among the people he worked with. Did David Wilkins have any professional concerns or problems in his private life? How did he get on with the Site General Manager? Geri Walsh would be desperate to speak to David Wilkins before the briefing. There was still too much uncertainty over the situation, in particular David Wilkins’ intentions, resolve, and state of mind. Could some diversion be created to keep the directors busy for an hour or so on their arrival at the site. By then David Wilkins might have finished at the hospital and switched on his mobile phone again. Geri Walsh would inquire whether a tour of the refurbished buildings and new equipment could be organized at short notice. Level 4 conception Geri Walsh holding a level 4 conception would wonder whether the incident would be an opportune moment to address the tendencies toward “blind compliance,” arrogance, and interference that seemed to pervade the site and AC as a whole. While Geri Walsh could understand how such cultural traits might have arisen and been reinforced, unless they were kept in check the Site Modernization Programme and the future prosperity of the company would be put in jeopardy. If this was the impact of having a fractionating column demolished using an unconventional method, then Geri Walsh would face a long, hard battle to have new plant and equipment installed. There would undoubtedly be differences between the plant manufacturers’ and AC’s operational and safety procedures. The delays and gratuitous charging of their time by functional representatives would kill the business cases for the individual projects and possibly the case for the programme as a whole. These traits would

Purpose of inquiry not stand AC in good stead in an industry with razor-fine margins continually under pressure from lower-cost operators in the developing nations. Support personnel had to learn when and how to intervene and to focus on adding value, not time, to the process. Geri Walsh would want to understand the details of the situation, the source of any underlying tensions, and what might have triggered the specific actions. Geri Walsh would first have a private meeting with the Site General Manager. Having received a resume of the situation, Geri Walsh would pose the question: Should I recommend to the directors to abandon or curtail the Site Modernization Programme? The current incident was a symptom of a deep-rooted problem at the site and within AC that, if left untreated, would undermine the programme and the survival of the company. The Site General Manager had manifest the very traits that had to be eradicated. With him consciously or unconsciously behaving this way, Geri Walsh would have no hope of succeeding. Did the Site General Manager want the role of programme manager back? The HR manager would then be asked to join the meeting to discuss the issues of a possible claim for constructive dismissal and the possible actions of the Health and Safety Executive. It would become clear to Geri Walsh that without speaking to David Wilkins it would not be possible to provide the directors with a thorough briefing. There was a risk of any action making matters worse rather than better. Geri Walsh would synthesize the key facts relating to the incident, and would ask the HR manager to continue trying to contact David Wilkins. Geri Walsh would want to speak to him personally as soon as possible. In the meantime, Geri Walsh would prepare an analysis of how aspects of the culture at the Cosyvale site and AC more broadly were threatening success of the Site Modernization Programme. Or did the Site General Manager want to call the directors and tell them to turn around and go back to London?

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C H A P T E R 11

Expectations of others

The Acquisition Integration Programme As the Integration Manager, Lyn Evans was keen for the programme to not peter out leaving a wide cultural divide. Pressures from day-to-day business operations were already diverting senior management attention. Fatigue was beginning to set in for many of those who had been involved in the acquisition and its integration from the very start. Members of the integration teams had secured roles in the new organization structure and were leaving the programme or simply not performing their roles effectively. The following morning Lyn Evans had to speak to Jay Kumar, who was returning from a week’s holiday, about what had been done to tap into the informal discussions and gossip. In the afternoon Lyn Evans had to raise the issue of winning over hearts and minds at the Integration Steering Board. TREC had started over 40 years earlier as a family-run electrical contractor, and had grown steadily for the first 30 or so, expanding in concentric circles outside its home base. Over the last 10 years as a public company, TREC expanded rapidly into building management systems, fire, security, and surveillance. The recent acquisition of Arthur Brown & Co. had nearly doubled the number of branches, giving TREC a near-national presence, as well as adding significant expertise in energy management. (TREC branches operated as relatively autonomous profit centers within their geographic areas. The branches pitched for business, designed and implemented the solution, and in some cases provided ongoing support. Branches were staffed with salespeople, project managers, and trained service engineers.) While still relatively small, TREC’s senior management believed that thanks to the acquisition the company would have the critical mass to compete with the large multinationals that dominated the industry. Arthur Brown & Co. had to be integrated quickly and effectively – rationalizing head office functions and shared services, and merging some branches whose geographic areas (territories) overlapped significantly. 134

Expectations of others Lyn Evans was appointed early in the process to focus on integration and to facilitate continuity between doing the deal and integrating Brown & Co. While there was talk of taking the best from both organizations and leveraging unique expertise, the TREC Board implicitly saw TREC absorbing Brown & Co. The directors were made responsible for integrating the corresponding Brown & Co. functions, and promptly drafted managers from their areas to work part-time on integration teams. Lyn Evans was given the role of planning and coordination, and asked to supervise the work of Jay Kumar who was handling the internal and external communications. Jay Kumar was TREC’s marketing services manager responsible for the corporate image, Web site, public relations, and the little advertising TREC did. As the integration unfolded, it became clear that presumed familiarity of Brown & Co., a former competitor, had got in the way of rigorous inquiry. Undue weight had been given to anecdotes, industry folklore, and out-of-date knowledge leaving TREC managers ill-prepared to deal with micro-level integration issues. Not enough had been done to understand how Brown & Co. operated and how it gained its competitive advantage. As TREC managers tried to force-fit their approaches and systems, Brown & Co. staff insisted that it would not work and might damage the business. Brown & Co. staff felt that their achievements and ideas were not valued and that their views were being ignored. Lyn Evans had picked up these signals of discontent and had flagged them at an Integration Steering Board a couple of months earlier. The TREC Directors, while sympathetic to the strains the integration was causing, felt unable to slow down the process significantly or to retain duplicate or marginal activities. TREC needed to extract all potential efficiencies and savings. There were skeptical shareholders to convince that the premium paid on the acquisition was warranted. If the integration went well, TREC would get support for more acquisitions that would strengthen the company’s position in the market. The growing tensions were not eased by what was perceived to be inadequate communications. The Web site, newsletters, and briefings were seen as broadcast, and lacking real consultation and personal dialogue. It was not only the former Brown & Co, staff who felt ignored. Unsettled and anxious TREC staff had complained that all the focus was on the newcomers. As Lyn Evans inquired discreetly, it became clear that TREC directors and managers appeared guarded about what they said and what they committed to. Their focus was on integrating the business processes, systems, and structures. They were following the plans and the mechanics of integration, but paying scant attention to the human dimension. Unknowingly, they were projecting an air of disengagement, and were not winning over hearts and minds. The

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Individual attributes physical and operational integration was going well, but Lyn Evans feared that the enlarged TREC would still exhibit the cultures of its constituent parts for years to come unless something was done. Lyn Evans approached Jay Kumar to suggest that the current communications approach was not having the desired effect. More needed to be done to reassure and inspire, and to tune into how actions, promises, and directions were being interpreted. There were signs of incomprehension and misunderstanding from within all parts of the new organizations. While TREC and Brown & Co. operated broadly in the same industry, this did not mean that the corporate cultures and the mindsets of their respective managers and staff were necessarily similar. Jay Kumar was asked to tap into the informal discussions and gossip, and to hear what stories were emerging about the integration and the enlarged TREC. Jay Kumar agreed. As Lyn Evans met with the integration teams in preparation for the forthcoming Integration Steering Board it became clear that the team members were tired and keen to get back to their jobs, or in some cases new jobs. Most of the directors heading the teams had absented themselves from the meetings and had already delegated responsibilities to their managers. When Lyn Evans commented to one team that more needed to be done to see the integration through, someone said that the 80/20 rule applied – once 80% of the elements of the integration had been successfully achieved the rest would sort itself out. The vast majority of the tangible benefits were expected to come from rationalizing assets, structures, and processes, and people’s eyes began to glaze over as Lyn Evans talked about cultural integration. Most saw this as part of communications and therefore Jay Kumar’s primary responsibility. Jay Kumar, though, was on holiday. Jay Kumar had sent Lyn Evans an e-mail a couple of days before leaving saying that a colleague had been briefed and was looking after the communications workstream while Jay Kumar was away. Lyn Evans decided to pay this colleague a visit in Jay Kumar’s absence. The colleague explained that Jay Kumar was on a family skiing trip booked a few weeks earlier to use up holiday entitlement that otherwise would have been lost, but had done what Lyn Evans had asked for. Jay Kumar had developed a “chat room” on the integration Web site and had e-mailed everyone, soliciting feedback on how the integration was going. Lyn Evans wondered what to say to Jay Kumar at the scheduled morning briefing, and how to keep the TREC Directors engaged in the integration process.

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Expectations of others Assume you are Lynn Evans: • What do you think about Jay Kumar’s actions and what do you say at the briefing? • What proposals do you make at the forthcoming Integration Steering Board? • What factors or considerations have you taken into account in arriving at your course of action? Please take the time to write down your answers to these three questions before reading further. Consider what you would expect of yourself, of team members, and of senior managers in such circumstances. The remainder of the chapter will explain the attribute expectations of others and explore possible interpretations of the scenario above from the perspective of the four levels of conception in the competence framework. The possible interpretations are not intended to be exhaustive, but are illustrative of the thoughts and actions of individuals holding different conceptions of their work.

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Expectations of others Expectations of others relates to the assumptions a project or programme manager makes in terms of what contribution and effort individuals should make and how their talents and skills should best be utilized, deployed, and/or enhanced. The attribute ranges from the assumptions of people as resources with defined skills and productivity to unique individuals who can make particular contributions while at the same time developing their own expertise. Someone holding a level 1 expects those involved in project or programme work to do what had been explicitly agreed or contracted, or what is contained in their job or role descriptions. People working on the project or programme, in relation to their work/contribution, are conceived as resources with specific skills and knowledge to be deployed in a planned manner and to perform at a predetermined level or standard. Someone holding a level 1 expects individuals to operate within the norms, conventions, and constraints of the organization. Someone holding a level 2 expects individuals to go beyond the prescribed roles, agreements, or contracts when required for the good of the project or programme. Individuals are expected to have specific skills and perform their assigned task effectively, but also to show initiative, and be dedicated and willing to work extra hours at weekends and forego breaks/holidays when necessary. Someone holding a level 2 is not personally, nor expects others to be, bound by the norms, conventions, and working practices of the organization, without at least questioning and challenging them. Someone holding a level 3 conception has a more fine-grained and personalized understanding of the skills and predispositions individuals have, and the contributions they can make to the project or programme. The aim is to exploit individuals’ specific talents – contributing the most they can, where best they can, rather than simply asking them to work longer or harder. Someone holding a level 3 conception is prepared to drive hard for results, but does not want people to “burn out” from exhaustion. There is an appreciation of work–life balance, and that individuals become less productive and motivated in the absence of breaks and rest. Pushing individuals too hard is seen as ultimately self-defeating, especially in long-duration projects or programmes. Someone holding a level 4 conception understands what individuals could or would like to gain from working on the project or programme, as well as what they have to offer. Beyond effectively exploiting individuals’

Expectations of others talents, someone holding a level 4 conception seeks to extend or develop their abilities and expertise, typically in line with the (new) requirements of the organization. Individuals are expected to grow professionally and personally from their experience. Someone holding a level 4 conception is also prepared to drive hard, but is sensitive to, and wants to avoid, “burnout.” These conceptual levels manifest themselves in different ways depending on the project or programme. In the following section the scenario at the beginning of the chapter is explored from the different conceptual levels.

Exploring conceptual levels in relation to the Acquisition Integration Programme Integrating acquisitions is rarely easy or painless, and characterized by concurrently bringing together two previously separate organizations and running the day-to-day business(es) of the enlarged organization. The effort is significant and the focus inevitably shifts away from the integration as the needs of the day-to-day business(es) take priority. Level 1 conception Lyn Evans holding a level 1 conception would feel that Jay Kumar had made a start on tapping into the informal discussions and gossip, but that the actions described by Jay Kumar’s colleague did not go far enough. Lyn Evans would want to investigate whether other things had been done or were under way, but not mentioned by the colleague. Jay Kumar was in charge of communications and had experience in the area, but had little expertise in change management, so other approaches might be worth exploring. But, what could be expected or achieved had to be set in the context of the many other responsibilities Jay Kumar had to discharge. At the briefing, Lyn Evans would discuss what was being done about tapping into the informal discussions and gossip. The possibility that a new communications strategy was required, given feedback that the Webbased communications were not having the desired effect, would be raised. Based on the time Jay Kumar could dedicate to the work, a plan would be agreed on other approaches and tactics to be employed. Lyn Evans would want to be sure that Jay Kumar could deliver against the revised plan, and would prioritize any ideas generated during the briefing. Lyn Evans would be concerned that the TREC directors and members of the integration teams were not honoring their commitments. While Lyn

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Evans might recognize the other pressures from the business and their desire to move on, there would be little sympathy for the view that doing 80% of the job was enough. Neglecting important tasks threatened the successful completion of the integration process. At the Integration Steering Board, Lyn Evans would report that while good progress was being made, the teams were struggling to complete their work as specified. The consequences would be highlighted. Lyn Evans might suggest deferring some of the redundancies and redeploying people or backfilling some roles to alleviate the burden on the team members. Lyn Evans would also urge the directors to personally manage the integration teams and attend integration team meetings. Their expertise and insight was required to guide the process and to ensure people were performing as required. Lyn Evans would raise a final point that the feedback from people within both parts of the organizations was that greater clarity was required and more information had to be provided to everyone in the enlarged TREC. Jay Kumar was working on improving communications, but the TREC directors also needed to be more open about their plans. Level 2 conception Lyn Evans holding a level 2 conception would be annoyed that Jay Kumar should have gone off on holiday during the integration process, especially since it was apparently motivated by a desire to use up holiday entitlement. Jay Kumar could have asked for the entitlement to be carried over given the exceptional circumstances. Lyn Evans would have put pressure on the relevant manager within the HR function to agree to this if necessary. At least Jay Kumar could have talked Lyn Evans through what had been done, even if this would have meant working late one evening. What would also be disappointing would be the perceived lack of thought that had gone into setting up the “chat room” and the solicitation for feedback. Jay Kumar should have realized that they were unlikely to tap into the informal discussions and certainly not the gossip. The feedback Lyn Evans had picked up speaking with people, and shared with Jay Kumar, was that the communications were seen as broadcast and lacking real consultation and personal dialogue. The integration Web site was impersonal, especially for members of staff not accustomed to the Internet and Internet chat rooms. Some would assume it would be monitored for

Expectations of others attacks and criticism, which would be fed back, and not necessarily anonymously, to TREC management. Surely Jay Kumar was aware of, or had used, focus groups, or had a network of contacts within TREC who were prepared to talk off the record. A little research would have thrown up a whole list of options. Perhaps other actions were planned, but Jay Kumar really should have taken the time to inform Lyn Evans before setting off on holiday. At the briefing Lyn Evans would remind Jay Kumar of the importance of integrating Brown & Co. effectively. Lyn Evans would ask what other initiatives Jay Kumar had planned apart from the “chat room” and invitation to provide some feedback. Lyn Evans would emphasize that more effort was required at this crucial moment, especially in light of the negative feedback on what had been done already. Communication efforts needed to go up a gear. Jay Kumar would be asked to come back with a plan the following day. Throughout the briefing Lyn Evans would be discreetly gauging Jay Kumar’s commitment. Lyn Evans would be disappointed that the TREC directors were not showing the necessary leadership and commitment to complete the integration process. Without the directors’ sustained attention the integration teams would begin to fragment and disperse. Tasks would be left unfinished and the integration process would drift. Pressures from the business were normal and had to be accommodated, but with a final push the programme could be closed successfully. TREC could then move forward as a single, smoothly functioning organization rather than two organizations crudely bolted together and poorly equipped to win business against major rivals. If the integration were left unfinished, TREC would be handicapped commercially, burdened with unnecessary costs and unable to leverage effectively the new capabilities and expertise. At the Integration Steering Board, Lyn Evans would report that the programme was still on track, but the gradual dilution of effort had to be stopped. The Board needed to send a strong signal that finishing the integration as planned was vital. Lyn Evans would suggest or imply that the directors needed to lead by example and motivate their integration teams. Level 3 conception Lyn Evans holding a level 3 conception would think that the “chat room” and solicitation for feedback lacked imagination, but would also reflect

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Individual attributes that Jay Kumar had little expertise in change management and might be excused if no other initiatives or actions were planned. Perhaps Jay Kumar needed a holiday given the effort already put into the post-acquisition communications with investors, clients, and internally. Using up holiday entitlement may have been incidental. Hopefully, Jay Kumar would come back refreshed. The integration still had a long way to run, and Jay Kumar had an even bigger marketing services job to do for the enlarged organization. At the briefing Lyn Evans would be keen to assess how Jay Kumar intended to facilitate a closer, more personal dialogue with all those involved in the integration. If Jay Kumar appeared to lack the requisite expertise or seemed to be struggling with the workload, Lyn Evans would raise the possibility of hiring someone with change management competence. The consultant could be responsible for engaging and facilitating staff through the change – it would be easier for staff to speak to an outsider, who would be perceived to be (more) neutral and independent. In the face of any hesitation, Lyn Evans would argue that keeping skeptical shareholders on board and telling clients about TREC’s new capabilities were probably the most important uses of Jay Kumar’s time and skills. With Jay Kumar’s agreement, Lyn Evans would raise the subject at the Integration Steering Board and seek authorization and funding for the consultancy spend. Lyn Evans would regard it as money well spent since facilitating some degree of cultural convergence would help to exploit synergies and share expertise across the enlarged business. This would be the platform for future growth and success. Lyn Evans would want the directors to be more visible and more open generally in their communications. They had to engage people across the enlarged organization and sell their vision of TREC and the bright future that lay ahead. Another round of briefings might well be required, probably with smaller groups to generate a sense of personal involvement among staff. Now that people had some idea of what the acquisition meant for them personally, they could ask questions and share concerns. It would be an ideal time for the TREC directors to get to know former Brown & Co. employees. Winning over hearts and minds would get tougher as time passed and entrenched, potentially erroneous, and unhelpful views took hold. At the Integration Steering Board, Lyn Evans would report that the programme was still on track, but that the directors now needed to focus on the human dimension of the integration. The cultural integration and the

Expectations of others forging of the enlarged TREC into a single, vibrant entity would determine whether the premium for Brown & Co. was going to be recouped. The directors also needed to hold the integration teams together and keep them focused on their work. If either the will or the energy to complete the integration was missing, then the programme should be replanned carefully to ensure that the essential work was done. The rest could be deferred and (hopefully) sorted later as part of business as usual. Level 4 conception Lyn Evans holding a level 4 conception would realize that Jay Kumar and the TREC directors had a lot to learn about integrating acquisitions. If TREC planned to grow and expand through acquisitions, then integrating them had to become a core competence. Otherwise, TREC would be unlikely to recoup the premium paid, especially in the case of a contested bid or offers from rivals. Jay Kumar had little expertise in change management and probably needed a holiday. A change management consultant working alongside Jay Kumar would relieve some of the burden and bring valuable knowledge and insight into the organization. At the briefing Lyn Evans would ask Jay Kumar about the feedback and the lessons learnt from the integration so far, and what expertise TREC needed to integrate a future, potentially more complex acquisition. Lyn Evans would suggest that while the communications had been fine, developing a more personal dialogue for those involved in the integration and facilitating them through an unsettling change process required significant change management expertise. Lyn Evans would ask Jay Kumar whether that type of expertise could be valuable on the current integration, and suggest hiring a change management consultant to work alongside Jay Kumar. Each could learn from the other. Jay Kumar’s intimate knowledge of TREC and the industry would be useful in deciphering what the consultant found and in gauging its importance. Working with the consultant, Jay Kumar would make a success of the current integration and gain valuable insights for future acquisitions. Lyn Evans would also want the consultant to advise the TREC directors on how best to engage with staff, address their concerns, and lead them through the integration process. They could not afford to project an air of disengagement – it would create a lasting and possibly detrimental impression in the minds of former Brown & Co. employees. The directors

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Individual attributes needed to be more visible and able to communicate a compelling vision of the future. The integration process was an opportunity for TREC directors to learn to operate in a different way. TREC had made a significant step change in size and capability and planned to expand further. They would inevitably be more removed from frontline staff, and be unable to rely on close personal relationships to win over hearts and minds. The directors were also pivotal in making the transition from integration to business as usual, and they needed to time the release of people from the integration teams and consciously decide what could be deferred. With most of the major tasks undertaken, the organization would undoubtedly recover from the surgery of integration. Without sustained direction and attention, though, TREC risked foregoing opportunities that would create shareholder value and justify the acquisition premium. At the Integration Steering Board, Lyn Evans would explain that the programme was approaching a point of transition. With the physical and operational integration nearing completion, the directors needed to focus on cultural integration. This was more intangible and elusive, but would establish the platform for growth. A different style and additional expertise was needed to succeed, on the current integration and in preparation for future acquisitions. Successful integration would reassure shareholders and make it more likely that TREC would be supported in future acquisitions.

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Adaptive intent

The Enterprise Systems Programme Bobbie Mason, the manager of the Enterprise Systems Programme for Standard Utilities, faced a dilemma: bypass company procedures or accept significant slippage and the possibility of more problems later in the programme. Standard Utilities was a major provider of energy and water services to consumers and industry. With its roots as a water company, Standard Utilities had expanded into services such as the provision of electricity and gas to consumers and industry within its catchment area. Overall, Standard Utilities spent around £1.1b per year on projects relating to the maintenance and enhancement of its water and power infrastructure. At any one time there were over 1000 projects under way, ranging from major construction projects to the replacement of broken sewers. These projects formed part of the Investment Management Programme that spanned all the company’s operations. Standard Utilities’ record on the project management of the projects within the Investment Management Programme was not good, with average cost overruns of 21% despite considerable effort expended on training and tools. Cost overruns had historically not attracted particular attention, but Standard Utilities could no longer pass on inefficiencies in the form of higher prices to customers. Part of the problem was that the multiple systems used within Standard Utilities to plan, monitor, and control projects added a significant burden to the project management process and did not facilitate a timely and holistic overview of the Investment Management Programme. It took Standard Utilities approximately four weeks to issue end-of-month reports. There was limited visibility across the programme to identify opportunities to batch work to reduce procurement costs, to deploy resources better, or to generate efficiency savings. Moreover, the interfaces between the main project management systems and core systems within the Finance, 146

Adaptive intent Supply Chain, and Human Resources (HR) functions were manual, and as such required significant effort and were prone to errors. It was clear that an integrated solution to managing such a key part of Standard Utilities’ business was vital. But, replacing a set of bespoke systems would be a complex operation and likely to provoke some resistance from users. The existing systems were familiar and many users had been using them for over a decade. Vince Rose, the Information Systems Director and member of the Investment Management Programme Board, decided that the replacement of the core project management systems for planning, cost and utilization reporting, and risk management was an ideal opportunity to rationalize and integrate other systems. Vince Rose’s aim was to improve process flows, visibility, and control. The solution envisaged was expected to cut across the organization’s notoriously rigid functional silos, but that was the only way to attain the targeted 5% efficiency gains on the Investment Management Programme. An Enterprise Systems Programme (ESP) with the replacement of the core project management systems at its heart was established, and Bobbie Mason was appointed as the programme manager. Architectural Solutions Partnership (ASP), a systems consultancy, was appointed to advise on the programme and to act as design authority. Following a formal review, the decision was taken to buy and implement applications and technology from a single supplier to facilitate integration and standard process flows. The Xappsoft suite of products was eventually chosen after detailed comparisons and tough negotiations. Bobbie Mason urged the ESP Programme Steering Group to appoint Xappsoft to do the implementation, given the lack of internal resources and expertise. However, Standard Utilities’ procurement processes required a contract estimated at anything more than £50,000 to be put out to competitive tender via a formal Invitation to Tender (ITT). In the case of comparable bids (taking into account aspects such as track record, quality, reliability) the contract had to be awarded to the lowest compliant bidder. A number of organizations with appropriate skill levels and experience of implementing Xappsoft products were invited to bid for the contract, including Xappsoft’s own consulting practice. Xappsoft Consulting won the engagement but had been pushed into agreeing a cut in fees by Standard Utilities’ purchasing function. Vince Rose also insisted on a complete implementation and rollout in 11 months, despite a high level of customization required to meet Standard Utilities’ business requirements. While Bobbie Mason favored the iterative development methodology based on standard process flows adapted to the organization’s specific

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Individual attributes requirements employed by Xappsoft, there was some resistance from within ASP and Standard Utilities’ Information Systems (IS) Group. They were used to and preferred the traditional “waterfall” approach (sequential requirements capture, analysis, design, customization/development, test, and commissioning) to information systems implementation. Their concern was that mapping standard processes to the business would constrain the design of a final solution and so it would not be fully tailored to Standard Utilities’ requirements. After repeated assurances from the Xappsoft project manager that the iterative development methodology was the best and only way to deliver the implementation to Standard Utilities’ time and cost requirements, the ESP Steering Group agreed. The Xappsoft project manager was puzzled that ASP had even suggested a waterfall approach and hinted that ASP consultants seemed unfamiliar with Xappsoft’s products and how they had to be integrated. Within the first two months of the programme Bobbie Mason realized that ASP might have been the cheapest, but they had neither the expertise nor the drive to facilitate the creation of end-to-end process flows crossing the organization’s functional silos and connecting the various Xappsoft products (applications). The Xappsoft team, under pressure to deliver, started to bypass ASP and deal directly with key managers within the various Standard Utilities functions such as HR and Finance to agree on design features and interfaces between the applications. As work progressed, the scope of the project increased as it became apparent that the scale of the customization had been significantly underestimated, and the contingency was being rapidly depleted. End users were given the opportunity to work with the applications, but rather than build confidence in the solution it started to generate resistance. Users felt that they were losing functionality and were going backward rather than forward. Bobbie Mason was bombarded by concerns and questions from users across the business. The briefings, workshops, and updates held across the country had proved to be inadequate. Standard Utilities had decided to manage the communications and change process internally, but had limited expertise to undertake the change management work. Efforts to communicate and to consult were perceived as missives in disguise, and grated with the culture of personal responsibility and professional pride that was being preached within Standard Utilities. Bobbie Mason renewed efforts to inform users and gain their buy-in. User resistance had to be turned around or else the solution would be rejected. Additional customization work in the form of screens with a series of pop-ups would provide the information users claimed was indispensable in an easy-to-understand format. The Programme Steering Group sanctioned

Adaptive intent the changes reluctantly. Bobbie Mason was convinced it was money well spent, but also realized that budgets were being tightened throughout Standard Utilities. Costs, and more specifically people, were being stripped out of the company, and a drive for improved performance was being pushed from the top of the organization. The senior management team was keen to remove the last vestiges of complacency and bureaucracy. A few months later Bobbie Mason was once again struggling to engage end users. Users were not signed up to define test scripts or to get involved in acceptance testing in general. A recent reorganization had unsettled middle managers and staff, and few wanted to volunteer or commit themselves to activities not directly related to their jobs. Those pressed into “user” roles needed considerable support, and felt unable to make decisions without extensive consultation with colleagues. The “Train the Trainer” strategy adopted to reduce costs seemed to have backfired. Nobody could be found with the skills and aptitude to write the necessary training materials. Writing procedures and training manuals was considered a chore by staff, and even those who had written them in the past claimed they did not (nor wanted to) understand enough about the new system to do the work. In fact, Bobbie Mason had to admit that the programme was unlikely to be able to find suitable internal trainers. Data cleansing and migration were also going badly. Once it had become clear that internal IS resources were not available, contractors were recruited directly by the IS Group to carry out the work. After nearly three months little progress had been made, and Bobbie Mason was told that unless radical action was taken Xappsoft consultants would be waiting for clean data to test scripts on various applications and the programme would be delayed. The Xappsoft project manager had made some discreet enquiries and found a company that could draft manuals and training materials, and run training courses for the managers and staff that would use the new systems. Xappsoft was happy to pass on the contact details or make the necessary introductions. Xappsoft also offered to take on the data cleansing and migration at reduced rates through its offshore operations. It would, however, mean writing off much of the work done by the contractors. Bobbie Mason stared at a major cost overrun and struggled to think of any practical alternatives to accepting the Xappsoft offers. The training company was not on Standard Utilities’ list of approved suppliers, but came with an informal recommendation. Another ITT for the data cleansing and migration would take weeks and not guarantee a better result.

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Individual attributes Assume you are Bobbie Mason: • What would you do or recommend to the Programme Steering Group? • What factors or considerations have you taken into account in arriving at your course of action? Please take the time to write down your answers to these questions before reading further. Reflect on how you might need to adapt your approach and stance, and what would be important to you. The remainder of the chapter will explain the attribute adaptive intent and explore possible interpretations of the scenario above from the perspective of the four levels of conception in the competence framework. The possible interpretations are not intended to be exhaustive, but are illustrative of the thoughts and actions of individuals holding different conceptions of their work.

Adaptive intent Adaptive intent The context, namely the dynamic cultural, political, and business environment, in which a project or programme exists can, to varying degrees, influence the way the work is performed. Adaptive intent relates to how sensitive a project or programme manager is to the work environment and how environmental factors are incorporated, or otherwise, in shaping processes, prioritizing efforts, and taking decisions. Someone holding a level 1 conception focuses on the content of the work and on the most effective way of delivering the change(s) or output(s). Best practices, proven methodologies, and objective standards are used as guides to action and benchmarks for performance. Experience is seen as directly transferable between organizations and between projects or programmes. What has worked in the past, or in other situations, is perceived as (directly) relevant to the current project or programme. Cultural and political factors tend to be considered and dealt with as threats, constraints, or unavoidable nuisance to the effective management of a project or programme. Someone holding a level 2 conception is aware of the context of a project or programme and the influence that culture, agendas, and politics can have on the work. Approaches, methodologies, and practices are adapted to conform to the prevailing norms and expectations. Making the project or programme fit within its environment is seen as part of the work. Someone holding a level 2 conception will (reluctantly) accept shortfalls in speed of decision making, levels of actual management support, or the degree to which promises or commitments are honored, and incorporate them into plans and ways of working. Someone holding a level 3 conception is aware of the context of the work as well as personal factors and influences. These are not accepted passively. A programme environment is created that will facilitate success. There is a desire to minimize the adverse incursions from the environment, and so ring-fence the programme and its micro-culture. Personal style, preferences, and shortcomings are recognized. Individuals are recruited and structures are created to play to the strengths and to compensate for the weaknesses. For instance, trusted team members may be brought from one programme to the next, or a particular function (e.g., finance) bolstered if it represents an area of limited expertise. Someone holding a level 3 conception is keen to ensure both personal and programme success in the face of external pressures and influences.

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Someone holding a level 4 conception is very aware that projects and programmes need to be embedded within their (shifting) organizational environments, and appreciates the artificiality and permeability of the boundaries – what is “inside” the programme and what is “outside.” The context is conceived broadly, comprising the organization and its wider social and business environment. Rather than seek a form of isolation and self-protection, someone holding a level 4 conception tries to influence the context for the benefit of the organization. This influencing is designed to facilitate programme success as well as create benefits for future programmes or other parts of the organization. These conceptual levels manifest themselves in different ways depending on the project or programme. In the following section the scenario at the beginning of the chapter is explored from the different conceptual levels.

Exploring conceptual levels in relation to the Enterprise Systems Programme The Enterprise Systems Programme will be delayed unless the data cleansing work is speeded up, and it will be virtually impossible to get willing trainers from inside Standard Utilities. The offers made by the Xappsoft contain elements of trying to help a client out of a difficult situation and of generating income. Level 1 conception Bobbie Mason holding a level 1 conception would feel that despite the best endeavors events had conspired against the programme. Risks associated with the decision to use internal trainers and progress on data cleansing had materialized and the programme had to take corrective action. The Xappsoft offer to provide details of a training company would be welcomed, and Bobbie Mason would contact them informally to get an indication of what the company could do and how much it would cost. This information would be used to create a formal change request to go to the Programme Steering Group. Bobbie Mason would expect the Steering Group to agree to the extra spend, albeit reluctantly, as it had done on the previous occasion. Busy internal resource would be substituted for expert outside support, so the costs of employing the training company would offset some overtime or other expenditure elsewhere. If the Steering Group did not want to spend the money, Bobbie Mason would ask the members to use their authority to get people within Standard Utilities to take on the

Adaptive intent work. Bobbie Mason would follow an expedited procurement process, and involve Standard Utilities’ procurement people. This would ensure that the chosen training provider was suitably qualified and offered best value for money. Also, Bobbie Mason could not be accused of favoritism or taking risky shortcuts. Bobbie Mason would approach managers within the IS Group about the perceived lack of productivity of the contractors the IS Group had employed to do the data cleansing and migration work. Bobbie Mason would insist on an up-to-date status report and forecast for the provision of clean data to the Xappsoft consultants. If a forecast were not provided or seemed unrealistic, Bobbie Mason would be prepared to escalate the issue up the chain of command to Vince Rose, the Information Systems Director, if necessary. When the IS Group admitted that the contractors could not deliver to schedule, Bobbie Mason would be in a position to propose the alternative solution offered by Xappsoft. This change too would go through formal change control and a formal procurement process. Bobbie Mason would press for the extra cost to come from the IS Group’s budget. While conscious of the need for speed, Bobbie Mason would regard following the correct processes as important in safeguarding the integrity of the programme, and in providing a degree of personal reassurance. The processes and approaches within Standard Utilities reflected sound practices. If choice was restricted or activities took longer, these consequences had to be accepted by the Programme Steering Group. Bobbie Mason would be aware of spending restrictions but regard the change proposals as necessary expenditures, especially when compared to the programme’s expected benefits.

Level 2 conception Bobbie Mason holding a level 2 conception would feel that the organizational and cultural changes taking place within Standard Utilities had played a big part in the difficulties experienced on the programme. Traditional assumptions and ways of working were no longer appropriate. Managers and staff now expected to be consulted not simply told about changes. There was little or no slack in the organization to take on project work. Extra funds might not be available to cover cost overruns. Bobbie Mason would feel the need to adapt to the new environment and display the values promoted within the organization. Standard Utilities’ managers

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were expected to take personal responsibility and professional pride in their work. Complacency and bureaucracy were frowned upon. If Bobbie Mason ended up going to the Programme Steering Group for money to pay for a training company, it would be after all other avenues had been vigorously investigated. Steering Group members would be approached informally for their assistance in getting people to take on the work of writing the manuals and delivering the training. In parallel, Bobbie Mason would work with the procurement people to identify potential suppliers and to find ways of expediting the procurement process. Bobbie Mason would personally follow up the training company suggested by the Xappsoft project manager. In presenting a formal change request to the Programme Steering Group, Bobbie Mason would express disappointment that the internal option was not viable and acknowledge that funds allocated to the training support would affect other programmes or budgets within the company. Bobbie Mason would feel a little aggrieved that the IS Group had employed incompetent contractors to do the data cleansing and migration work. Attributing blame would not help, so Bobbie Mason would work with IS Group managers to find a suitable remedy for the situation. The Xappsoft offer would be discussed with Vince Rose, the IS Director, in private. Bobbie Mason would stress the need for an accurate status report and a reliable forecast for the provision of clean data to the Xappsoft consultants. Unless the situation was significantly better than it appeared, Bobbie Mason would recommend a change in strategy to the Programme Steering Group. Bobbie Mason would sense and adapt to the shift in priorities occurring with Standard Utilities. Getting things done was more important than following formal processes. Going forward, Bobbie Mason would insist upon more robust estimates, more risk management, and more commercial considerations, and would resort less to formal structures. Project and programme work had to be more assured. Repeatedly going to Programme Steering Groups for extra money was no longer acceptable – there was neither the patience nor the funds. Level 3 conception Bobbie Mason holding a level 3 conception would feel that the organizational and cultural changes taking place within Standard Utilities were jeopardizing the success of the programme. The programme was expected to be a major contributor toward the targeted annual savings of £55m

Adaptive intent on the Investment Management Programme. The savings in trying to do work internally, choosing the lowest-cost supplier, and squeezing suppliers on rates were trivial, and had in any case proven to be false economies. The programme was facing a serious but recoverable set of problems. Bobbie Mason would be convinced that the Enterprise Systems Programme needed to be given adequate funding and freed from unnecessary interference and bureaucratic processes. As programme manager, Bobbie Mason would have to assume more control over decisions on resources and the choice and control of suppliers working on the programme. An external training company was vital and the immediate transfer of the data cleansing and migration work to Xappsoft was the most effective solution. These changes resonated with the cultural shift in Standard Utilities and were the only effective way of ensuring programme success. The analysis and recommendations would be shared with the Programme Sponsor and members of the Steering Group in confidential one-to-one meetings before being formally tabled at the Steering Group. Bobbie Mason would insist on driving the selection of prospective suppliers and take the lead in negotiating prices and terms with them. The procurement people and processes would not be overtly ignored. But, Bobbie Mason would stress the importance of the programme and take personal responsibility to override concerns about due process and choosing the lowest compliant bidder. Bobbie Mason would be prepared to pay Xappsoft considerably more for the data cleansing and migration work than it might cost from a group of contractors. It would eliminate an interface, restore some of Xappsoft’s margin, and provide more leverage to get work expedited. Processes would be bypassed, where possible, if they were unnecessarily bureaucratic. The minor crisis and need to secure additional funds from the Programme Steering Group would be used as an opportunity to make other changes to the programme. Bobbie Mason would want to bring on board more change management expertise to help embed the systems during the rollout, and potentially to strengthen the programme office. The programme would need to monitor the work of external suppliers, as well as tightening reporting and control processes. An analysis of forecast effort and costs would be undertaken and a thorough risk review would also be conducted to calculate the level of contingency required for the remainder of the programme. Bobbie Mason would be determined to not go back to the Programme Steering Group for more funds, and would build in a large

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degree of redundancy, both time and money, in the revised programme plans and the contingency for risks. The formal change request and the revised plan to the Programme Steering Group would be presented assuredly by Bobbie Mason as the necessary steps in regaining control of the programme and mitigating the unavoidable upheaval caused by a much needed change in culture within Standard Utilities. Level 4 conception Bobbie Mason holding a level 4 conception would be concerned about the signals the Enterprise Systems Programme was sending within Standard Utilities. The programme was launched to improve project and programme management working. It was central to the effort to reduce cost overruns and to improve procurement. It had to role-model good practices. From an external perspective the programme was in distress and suffering from the very illness it was trying to cure. But, it was an excellent case study of the structural problems and malaise afflicting Standard Utilities, and so might be used to bring about some far-reaching changes within the company. The costs of the programme were small compared to the targeted annual savings of £55m on the Investment Management Programme, and savings from doing work internally and choosing the cheapest options were negligible. The 11 months to complete that Vince Rose had insisted upon had to be considered more an aspiration than a carefully estimated schedule. Even directors like Vince Rose might need to reevaluate their approaches if they wanted individuals to take personal responsibility for results. Bobbie Mason would be disappointed about not having insisted on changing the strategy and about not having started looking for a training company months earlier. Once the downsizing had been announced, it was always going to be difficult to free up people to do the training – even if they had the time and inclination most would not dare admit it for fear of being made a candidate for redundancy. The recruitment of apparently incompetent contractors for data cleansing and migration was probably just an unfortunate mistake. But it could and should be used to highlight shortcomings in procurement expertise and processes. Most of the cost overruns on the programme were the result of overly optimistic estimating and inadequate risk management, rather than poor execution and control of project work. If the ESP programme were representative of Standard Utilities’ underlying problems, a significant part of the projected

Adaptive intent savings on the Investment Management Programme would have to come from better procurement practices. The better, timely information to be provided by the new systems was only part of the answer. The analysis of the situation, including status and options available on the programme itself, would be shared initially with the Programme Sponsor and subsequently with members of the Programme Steering Group in oneto-one meetings. Bobbie Mason would try to frame the discussions within the context of the changes in the industry and within Standard Utilities. Bobbie Mason would propose working closely with the managers within the IS Group to address the performance of the contractors. If necessary, Bobbie Mason would work with the IS Group and procurement specialists to find an alternative to the existing contractors. Bobbie Mason would explain the intangible benefits of contracting Xappsoft to do the work. In particular, Bobbie Mason would emphasize that Xappsoft should be considered a partner rather than just another supplier. The Xappsoft suite of products, and their subsequent upgrades, would provide the platform for managing Standard Utilities’ Investment Management Programme for many years to come. It would be easier to influence a valued partner than a supplier that had been squeezed on margin. The procurement people would be prompted to think about how such considerations might routinely be incorporated into the decision-making processes. Bobbie Mason would also offer to help the procurement function both to engage a training company and to streamline procurement processes to reflect Standard Utilities’ new commercial reality. By working collaboratively, Bobbie Mason would acquire more influence over decisions on resources, and the choice of suppliers working on the programme. A workshop with the Programme Steering Group would be used to rebaseline the programme and set reasonable expectations on what could be achieved and by when, based on sound estimation and risk management. Additional resources and support would be requested to support the change management efforts given the challenges already encountered and the need to make the programme an exemplar of desired practices. In formally presenting a rebaselined programme plan to the Programme Steering Group, Bobbie Mason would assure the members that invaluable lessons had been learned and were being used to redress shortfalls in the programme and to improve performance within Standard Utilities.

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Awareness of organizational constraints

The Core Banking Systems Programme Shiv Patel felt the need to flag the issue of resources at the Steering Committee meeting the following week. The inability to attract business “users” and IS resources to work on the programme would inevitably mean higher costs and/or longer timescales – a prospect that would be disliked by members of the Steering Committee keen to maintain momentum and to secure the benefits set out in the outline business case developed months earlier. About eight months earlier Shiv Patel had taken responsibility for the definition, creation, and implementation of one standard core Business Banking Application and IS infrastructure for the International Wholesale Banking Division. The Core Banking Systems Programme was sanctioned by the Board following a comprehensive strategy review for the Longbeard Group. The review had confirmed that cost–income ratio would have to be reduced substantially. The global financial services industry had changed dramatically over the previous 20 years, mainly through mergers and acquisitions. A few huge and aggressive full-service players were dominating the market and squeezing the margins of smaller players such as Longbeard. Despite its strong position in various European country markets and presence in Asia and the Americas, Longbeard had not yet leveraged the potential synergies from its disparate international operations. The programme was intended to deliver a high degree of standardization and centralization, with processing on a regional or global basis to achieve the necessary economies of scale. The infrastructure was designed to be flexible enough to support a multisite and multiproduct approach, and to cope with a rapidly changing business environment. The existing International Wholesale Banking Architecture consisted of a confusing mixture of over 100 legacy systems. As the Longbeard Group had acquired banks in different parts of the world, their core systems had been retained and subsequently maintained and upgraded locally. In fact, Longbeard had given 158

Awareness of organizational constraints the acquired operations a significant amount of autonomy over systems, products, and operations, only gradually integrating the various entities into a coherent banking network. Clearly, that process had to speed up and at the same time costs needed to be taken out of the business. The programme was the biggest ever undertaken by Longbeard and was expected to transform how the International Wholesale Banking Division worked. Following a short but intense period of review and planning, the decision was taken to split the programme into two phases: an Architecture Study and the Development/Rollout. The exact design and structure of the second phase would be determined by the information gained in the Architecture Study, which was expected to deliver: • • • •

a business operating model; an IT infrastructure; the selection of banking packages and IT components in support of the business strategies; a plan for the Development and a Rollout strategy.

It was clear to Shiv Patel that the programme needed significant support and contribution from a range of senior managers and business users to ensure the development of comprehensive business requirements. This presented a number of challenges. The International Wholesale Banking Division was more like a confederation of geographically based business units, each competing in its local market, as well as forming a loosely connected network to service major corporates. Three Regional Managers reported to the Director for International Wholesale Banking, and coordinated the operations within the various countries. The country operations were managed by Country Managers, who had considerable autonomy over the way they ran their operations. The Country Managers regarded the increasing efforts from central business functions, such as Finance and Risk, to bring about greater uniformity and cohesion as an unnecessary complication and an erosion of their power and discretion. The Division did not have a good track record of freeing up senior managers and staff to work on programmes. But, Shiv Patel managed to get the Director for International Wholesale Banking to act as sponsor for the programme and to establish a Customer Board comprising the Regional Managers, a few Country Managers, and representatives from the central business functions. The role of the Customer Board was to support and advise the programme management team and the Steering Committee.

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Individual attributes The central Information System (IS) Division also had a poor record in supporting major programmes. Few IS managers and staff were attracted to such a challenging programme, the majority preferring the more tranquil existence of maintenance and support undertaken at the corporate IS center. Recruitment on to the Architecture Study had been difficult, and Shiv Patel had been forced to employ systems architects from Halcyon, an international consultancy, at premium rates, to expedite progress. Finding people to work on the Development was proving even harder. Shiv Patel had little to offer people to compensate them for the extra work and stress associated with such a big, high-profile programme. Human Resources managers within the IS Division insisted that corporate policies on pay, bonuses, and job assignments could not be abandoned to accommodate individuals moving to the programme. They cited concerns about precedents being set by varying employment terms. In any case, the few IS people with the relevant skills and experience were already assigned, and on finishing their current work would have a choice of projects and programmes to work on. It was not clear whether Longbeard had the depth of in-house expertise necessary, or could deploy it on the programme. The staffing difficulty related also to people from the country operations, who did not want to join the programme, and certainly not full-time. Many feared not having a job to go back to after the programme was over, and others were put off by the stories that programme teams worked every weekend. The Regional Managers on the Customer Board agreed to mobilize people to make specific contributions and to provide data, but were reluctant to use their authority or influence to second people to the programme. Shiv Patel realized that the geographic spread of the operations would make neither contribution nor communications easy. The Architecture Study was drawing to a close, and Shiv Patel had to finalize a plan for the Development and sketch out a Rollout strategy. Experience to date suggested that while everyone agreed in principle with the benefits of adopting a consistent, standardized way of working, individuals argued that exceptions had to be made in specific instances. Sometimes these arguments were supported with detailed explanations on how the benefits of a single operating model (i.e., significant IS and operational efficiencies, including productivity, capacity, and flexibility increases, for an existing or reduced IT and operations spend) were outweighed by the costs of making the changes to the business processes and organizational structures. This extra pressure for customizations came on top of an already significant development requirement. The preferred software package while rich in functionality suffered from a number of shortfalls in terms of even the desired standard functionality.

Awareness of organizational constraints Halcyon consultants were available, but most had little or no knowledge of international wholesale banking. The software vendor offered to provide specialists to support the programme, and Shiv Patel was assured that the package was easy to customize. Employing external people would definitely cost more than had been planned, but Shiv Patel was uncertain whether it would be effective. In preparation for the Steering Committee meeting, Shiv Patel tried to find a suitable way of raising the issue of resources for Development, and reflected on the options available and their relative merits.

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Assume you are Shiv Patel: • How would you raise the issue of resources? • What options do you believe are feasible, and which would you recommended if pressed for your preferred course of action? Please take the time to write down your answers to these two questions before reading further. The remainder of the chapter will explain the attribute awareness of organizational constraints and explore possible interpretations of the scenario above from the perspective of the four levels of conception in the competence framework. The possible interpretations are not intended to be exhaustive, but are illustrative of the thoughts and actions of individuals holding different conceptions of their work.

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Individual attributes Awareness of Organizational constraints Projects and programmes typically employ people, and other resources, within the organization to create something new. At times, project and programme work stretches the boundaries of, or potentially outstrips, an organization’s capacity, capability, or competence. Awareness of organizational constraints relates to what a project or programme manager perceives as constraints, limitations, blockages, or shortfalls within the organization in relation to the work. The conceptual level determines what is perceived and how the project or programme manager is predisposed to acting once the constraint is recognized and/or affects progress. Someone holding a level 1 conception is primarily aware of capacity constraints, whether in terms of physical assets or people to work on the project or programme. Individuals with specific skills, required to work on the project or programme, may be deployed elsewhere or may only be able to work on a part-time basis. Where the constraint has a direct impact on progress against plan, this is escalated to a sponsor or steering group. Someone holding a level 2 conception is also aware of capacity and concerned about constraints, whether they are related to physical assets or to people. Someone holding a level 2 conception actively takes steps to remove, reduce, or work around the constraint to ensure adequate progress on the project or programme. Typical actions include pushing for priority, “calling in” past favors, using personal networks, doing deals, and insisting on commitments being honored. Someone holding a level 3 conception has a broader awareness of the constraints and limitations of the organization, and in particular the subtle differences in skills and aptitudes between people. Someone holding a level 3 conception understands, or finds out about, the technical depth or breadth required to carry out the work effectively and whether that is present within the organization. Standard role and skills categorizations are treated as indicative rather than absolute. If the right people, or other resources, are not present or their availability cannot be relied upon, then someone holding a level 3 conception is prepared to go outside for support of resources without hesitation. Someone holding a level 4 conception has the broadest awareness of constraints. This awareness covers cultural biases and blind spots that might stifle innovation, open-minded exploration of radical options or consideration of countercultural practices or change. Again, these constraints are not accepted passively. Efforts are first made to secure the right resources

Awareness of organizational constraints internally, then external support options are examined. Bringing in external expertise has a dual purpose: to make up for internal shortfalls so the work progresses, and to alleviate or reduce the constraint. In employing external support, someone holding a level 4 conception tries to facilitate knowledge transfer, the development of internal competence, and the introduction of new perspectives. These conceptual levels manifest themselves in different ways depending on the project or programme. In the following section the scenario at the beginning of the chapter is explored from the different conceptual levels.

Exploring conceptual levels in relation to the Core Banking Systems Programme The difficulty in recruiting people internally to work on the programme and the unplanned development work, whether acknowledged earlier as a risk or not anticipated, have become pressing issues. They were threatening to delay the programme and/or increase costs, and so erode the expected benefits from the programme. Level 1 conception Shiv Patel holding a level 1 conception would create a demand and supply profile to ascertain the precise shortfall in capacity for the Development phase. The work needed for the missing (standard) functionality would be estimated. The (change) requests for extra functionality would be ranked using factors such as the number of country operations asking for the change and the costs of otherwise making the changes to the business processes. The effort required to meet each request would be approximately calculated. This would provide a prioritized demand profile. Shiv Patel would then speak to the responsible managers within the IS Division to find out what resources were available or could be freed from their current commitments. The importance of a reliable estimate that the IS Division could deliver against would be stressed. Regional Managers from International Wholesale Banking would be approached about the level of support they could guarantee. This would provide a supply profile. By putting the resource requirements to achieve the desired standard functionality and supply together, Shiv Patel would have a picture of the baseline shortfall. The resulting slippage could then be calculated. A profile of the additional delay generated by each extra request for functionality would also be produced in preparation for the Steering Committee meeting.

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Shiv Patel would consider escalating the issue immediately to the sponsor and Steering Committee as the appropriate course of action. The demand versus supply analysis would provide the evidence and the scale of the delay/impact of the resource constraints. It would be up to the Steering Committee to decide what actions to take. The Committee could put pressure on the IS Division to free up more IS resources and on the Regional Managers to make key users available, preferably on a full-time basis. Managers in the IS Division would have to determine how best to secure or redeploy resources, though Shiv Patel would mention the offers made by Halcyon and the software vendor. Responsibility for the performance of IS resources needed to stay firmly with the IS Division. Having already been obliged to hire expensive Halcyon consultants to work on the Architecture Study, Shiv Patel would be wary of vague promises and unsubstantiated assurances. The Committee could also limit the number of customizations: the Director for International Wholesale Banking (also Programme Sponsor) could insist on more process changes at the local level. If pressed for an opinion, Shiv Patel would comment that resisting requests for local customizations was advisable. The customizations were changes to the scope of the programme; they added complexity to the development work and undermined the standardization and centralization that would create economies of scale. Limiting customizations would also reduce the input required from users, and so reduce the pressure on the Regional Managers to free up resources. Level 2 conception Shiv Patel holding a level 2 conception would get someone to conduct a similar analysis of the demand versus supply for resources to work on the Development phase, based on the current trends and indications of availability. However, the discussions with the Regional Managers and the managers in the IS Division would be different. The Regional Managers would be approached to discuss how they were going to make available the promised business users. While acknowledging the difficulties in releasing people and obstacles in transferring them to the programme on a full-time basis, Shiv Patel would remind them that the programme was key to the future success of International Wholesale Banking. Shiv Patel would spell out the challenges and inefficiencies of people working remotely, in diverse locations and across multiple time zones on an ad hoc basis. Compared to a dedicated,

Awareness of organizational constraints colocated team, much more effort was required to achieve the same results. Shiv Patel would then turn to the subject of additional resources to work on the customizations that (their) country operations were demanding. If the customizations were not important enough to release people to work on them, then Shiv Patel would suggest that they should not be included in the scope of the programme. The Regional Managers were welcome to press their case at the Steering Committee for the customizations. Shiv Patel, though, would be obliged to point out the consequential delay and loss of benefits in the absence of sufficient resources. Shiv Patel would speak to managers within the IS Division to insist that the Core Banking Systems programme be given top priority in terms of resources. IS staff with the relevant skills and experience should be directed to the programme when they finished their current assignments. The programme was vitally important to International Wholesale Banking. It was one of the biggest and most complex programmes ever undertaken by the Longbeard Group and had to be a landmark programme for any self-respecting IS professional. The Core Banking Systems Programme simply had to have higher priority over other work that required less skills and could be done by contractors brought in to backfill any shortages of internal staff. Shiv Patel would ask for a plan on how the IS Division was going to ensure that the Core Banking Systems Programme had the necessary resources. Shiv Patel would make the Steering Committee aware of the resource shortages and the actions being taken to address the situation. The Steering Committee would be asked to add their weight to ensuring that the programme received top priority in relation to the allocation of experienced IS resources. The offer made by the software vendor to provide specialist support would also be mentioned as a way of easing the pressure on the IS Division, and implicitly as a fallback plan in case of continuing difficulties. Shiv Patel would mention that the Regional Managers were finding it hard to release sufficient people from the business, citing fears of not having a job after the programme and misapprehensions about the workload. The number of customizations was creating a significant additional burden, though these were being reviewed to determine which were absolutely necessary. Nonetheless, there was a very high risk that the programme would be delayed. Unless the programme had a higher profile both in the IS Division and in International Wholesale Banking, it would be strapped for resources and unable to deliver one standard core Banking Business Application and IS infrastructure urgently needed to lower costs

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and make the Longbeard Group competitive against its larger, aggressive rivals. Level 3 conception Shiv Patel holding a level 3 conception would estimate the shortage of experienced IS resources and the incremental time required from business users, based on the current workload and their availability to date. Shiv Patel would be aware that the shortfalls presented two different challenges. The programme would be able to substitute consultants, whether from the software vendor or from Halcyon, for some internal IS resources without any loss in productivity. There just needed to be enough internal IS resources to advise on the current systems, work on interfaces with other Longbeard systems (such as finance), and ultimately support the core system in the future. The vendor’s consultants could be expected to have more relevant expertise on their own software. Halcyon consultants worked harder and longer hours than the pampered staff of the IS Division. Any loss associated with the external consultants going up a learning curve would be more than made up given the long duration of the programme. Trying to change corporate policies on pay, bonuses, and job assignments was going to be a battle Shiv Patel was unlikely to win. Even winning might risk that the programme acquired unwilling team members who might sour morale. The programme was important enough and the business case robust enough to stand the higher costs associated with external support. Shiv Patel would double-check the availability of experienced IS resources with senior managers in the IS Division. Unless IS Division senior managers provided cast-iron guarantees, Shiv Patel would approach the software vendor and Halcyon to discuss bringing their consultants on to the programme for the Development phase. However, the knowledgeable business users could not be replaced by external people. International Wholesale Banking was a complex assortment of products, processes, and systems that had only partially been standardized and integrated. Their input would be vital in developing a core Banking Business Application and IS infrastructure that met the needs of the business. The Regional Managers were probably working hard to make business users available. Given that International Wholesale Banking was a confederation of geographically based business units they probably had limited power to order Country Managers to release people. The current arrangement of people contributing to address specific issues might be the best achievable, even though it was inefficient. Refusing to undertake the

Awareness of organizational constraints customizations was not a sensible response to the resource constraint. Buyin would be critical to the achievement of the benefits from the programme, so the programme had to deliver at least the essential customizations from a business and a political perspective. Getting the people with knowledge and credibility on the programme was needed to deliver a solution that was both right and acceptable. There would be no point in pressing too hard only to find that junior or inexperienced people from the business were assigned to the programme to make up the numbers. Shiv Patel would meet with the Regional Managers to discuss how best to reduce or overcome the obstacles to getting more time from key people within the business, and potentially some full-time resources. Shiv Patel would want to look at options to bypass corporate policies and provide guarantees to people that they would have jobs after the programme and at ways of increasing their remuneration to compensate them for the extra effort. Shiv Patel would inform the Steering Committee of chronic shortages of internal IS resources and recommend the engagement of consulting support to supplement those available. The incremental costs would be compared to the loss of business benefits associated with the delays that would otherwise occur in delivering the core Banking Business Application and IS infrastructure. Shiv Patel would describe that action being taken and options being investigated with the Regional Managers to ensure sufficient input from the business, both for the development of the standard solution and to deal with the customizations. Despite these actions there still remained a risk that the programme would be delayed, and the continued support of the Steering Committee was essential. Existing resource commitments had to be honored and the scope of the programme could not be allowed to grow out of control. Level 4 conception Shiv Patel holding a level 4 conception would assess the situation and impact of the likely resource shortages on the programme. Engaging external support would appear a necessary and justified step. Shiv Patel would have to determine what type of support, how much of it, and how best to deploy it. Shiv Patel would discuss the current and prospective availability of experienced IS resources with senior managers in the IS Division, acknowledging the corporate constraints they faced. The discussion would revolve around how best to deploy the individuals already in the team and those who might be attracted and/or freed to work on the programme. The discussion

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Individual attributes would then address how best to supplement their efforts and expertise with external consultants. It might make working on the programme more attractive to IS staff, as well as make the transition to operating the systems and subsequent maintenance easier. The IS Division, and probably some of the existing team members, would be expected to maintain and enhance the Banking Business Application and IS infrastructure. Shiv Patel would emphasize that the intelligent engagement of external support was about developing important capabilities within the IS Division, and was not a criticism. The new resource plan would be a collaborative effort with (and endorsed by) senior managers within the IS Division. Shiv Patel would approach the software vendor and Halcyon to discuss where their consultants could add the greatest value, and how they could work closely with and transfer skills to IS Division staff on the programme. Shiv Patel would facilitate the discussion between the parties toward a shared understanding and effective workable arrangements. Shiv Patel would talk to the Regional Managers and the Country Managers on the Customer Board about the most effective way of obtaining the input of knowledgeable business users. The constraints would be explored and options identified and evaluated in terms of what was possible within International Wholesale Banking’s federal structure and the Longbeard culture. Shiv Patel would highlight the importance of user input to secure buy-in, and would also discuss the process of embedding the new Banking Business Application and IS infrastructure. The users on the programme, apart from helping to shape the solutions and advising on which customizations were essential, would also be ambassadors for the programme and potentially act as internal trainers. Shiv Patel would be prepared to accept the inefficiencies of the part-time working and current logistical arrangements, but would want wider and willing participation. This would facilitate implementation, and so help make up for some lost time and extra effort in the Development phase. Shiv Patel would also propose shorter, six- to nine-month secondments to the programme – roughly equivalent to maternity leave. This would make it easier for them to return to their jobs. The disruption and effort to get lots of people up a steep learning curve would be compensated by higher productivity once they were up to speed. As they returned to their Country operations they would form a ready pool of informed users and, hopefully, local champions of the new systems. Shiv Patel would inform the Steering Committee of a necessary change in resource strategy in relation to IS resources. The IS Division was

Awareness of organizational constraints collaborating in formulating a plan that would maintain momentum on the programme while developing the internal capabilities. The likely impact on the programme business case would be reviewed, along with an analysis of other wider benefits to the IS Division and the Longbeard Group. Shiv Patel would outline the initiatives to increase the involvement of business users in the programme agreed with key members of the Customer Board. The Steering Committee would be made aware that the risk that the programme would be delayed remained. The Banking Business Application and IS infrastructure that would be implemented would not satisfy all the Country operations. Shiv Patel would ask for whatever support members of the Steering Committee could offer. The programme’s success depended upon overcoming some ingrained aspects of the organization’s culture and practices.

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Approach to risk

The Equity Clearing and Settlement Outsourcing Programme Gert Visser studied the financial analysis and realized that the only viable course of action was to outsource all the equity clearing and settlement to the Equities Backoffice Group (EBG). It would be a very difficult and risky programme, especially because EBG had been until recently the inhouse operations of a major financial services group. Home and Abroad would be its first “commercial” client. The outsourcing programme needed to manage the transition of Home and Abroad’s entire operation with minimum disruption to the day-to-day support of the Equities Trading business. The road to the Equity Clearing and Settlement Outsourcing Program (ECSOP) had been long and difficult. Over the previous decade Home and Abroad had been squeezed into niche markets in the Equities Trading business by larger and more aggressive players. As volumes of business declined, the essentially fixed cost base of the clearing and settlement operation became increasingly difficult to sustain. Staff numbers had been trimmed and developments in systems and infrastructure deferred as far as possible, yet the business complained that the costs of the operation were eating into profitability and eroding competitiveness. This ongoing process of reducing staff and squeezing out costs had affected morale as staff worried about job prospects. This had created a downcast, energy-sapping atmosphere. The aim of ECSOP was to outsource equity trade processing, and substantially if not completely retire Home and Abroad’s systems platform. A year earlier Home and Abroad started to discuss an alliance with Pond & Rim, a major investment bank, across a number of business areas. One of the ideas put forward was to “relocate” Home and Abroad’s operation and integrate it into Pond & Rim’s much larger equity clearing and settlement operations. A proportion of the 220 or so staff would stay with Home and Abroad’s operation with the remainder transferring. 170

Approach to risk The outcome for the employees in each case would be a more stable environment, with significant opportunities for promotion and professional development. Many Home and Abroad people were highly skilled and had a deep knowledge of the niche markets within which Home and Abroad did business. But, after protracted negotiations and much planning, the “relocate” deal was abandoned. The staff reductions that had been deferred were then pushed through, and 58 people were made redundant. The optimism of a few weeks earlier was replaced by gloom, and concerns were voiced that the operation was approaching breaking point. Despite the cuts, the costs of the operations were still too high when benchmarked against competitors. The inability to achieve a competitive cost per transaction because of insufficient volume meant that the high-quality Operations and IS platform that was in place at Home and Abroad did not have a viable future and a longer-term solution had to be found urgently. By virtue of already supporting a similar business mix for their “internal” customer, the Equities Backoffice Group (EBG) appeared a promising candidate. However, the company had only been formed a few months earlier. Its parent company, a major financial services group, decided to set up its clearing and settlement operations as a stand-alone business with the remit of acquiring new clients. EBG had converted a service level agreement with its parent into a commercial contract and set about finding new business. EBG’s inexperience showed, but at the same time EBG was very keen to acquire their first truly external client and appeared genuinely interested in the skills and expertise the Home and Abroad people would bring. Applying what seemed a marginal cost basis for pricing, EBG offered savings that brought the cost per transaction well below the industry average. EBG was also prepared to build in guarantees and flexibility into the contract that would protect Home and Abroad’s interests. As the due diligence and negotiations proceeded, EBG became the preferred option. The discussions with EBG, while always friendly, occasionally stuttered. Home and Abroad’s people were at times forced to drive the agenda, drawing on the preparatory work done for the Pond & Rim deal. Gert Visser was nervous that not a great deal of guidance would be received from EBG in transitioning the Home and Abroad operation onto the EBG platform. Managers and staff in the Home and Abroad equity clearing and settlement operation had experience in change and were familiar with project and programme management methods, but very little experience in doing outsourcing deals. The lawyers would no doubt tie up a water-tight contract, and various advisers would address the systems, compliance, financial, and other issues.

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But, who would guarantee continuity and quality of service. The outsourcing would affect practically every function of both Home and Abroad’s equity trading business and EBG’s operations, and require seamless interfaces and complete integration of processes. Large multifunctional teams would be needed from Home and Abroad, as well as EBG, and they would have to work together closely. Their specialist input would ensure that the service was right and the conditions in the final contract would be realistic and achievable. Despite EBG’s assurances that it had the depth of resources and expertise, lingering doubts remained in the minds of Gert Visser and other Home and Abroad senior managers involved in the outsourcing. As the negotiations drew to a close, Gert Visser sketched out a plan for the following months and a list of key deliverables: • • • • • • •

clearing and services agreement (including pricing schedule); business operating model; service description; process maps with hand-offs and revised procedures; two-way interfaces between Home and Abroad and EBG; test plan; and migration strategy/service commencement schedule.

Gert Visser was aware that the managers and staff in the operation were tired, stretched, and generally demotivated. Some had been on the verge of leaving in the absence of a clear future for them. The remnants of goodwill and team spirit were also at risk from the fact that the outcome of the outsourcing would be different for individual managers and staff. Some would be transferred to EBG, others would be made redundant where their roles and skills already existed within EBG, and a small group would continue to work for Home and Abroad as the “intelligent customer” for the outsourced service. Whatever their fate, Home and Abroad needed individuals to support the daily business activities during the transition. Over and above the people issues, the programme of change that Home and Abroad was embarking upon had inherent risks from a combination of factors, including process reengineering, third-party dependencies, systems development, systems enhancements, systems retirement, and business conversions. Effective organization, planning, communications, and governance were going to be vital to the success of the programme. The time and expertise would have to be used effectively. Channels of communication would have to be established to facilitate the identification of interdependencies and flow of information across functions, within and between Home and Abroad and EBG. The governance model would have to respect the

Approach to risk customer and supplier relationship, but avoid a “them and us” culture that would carry over into service delivery. Gert Visser was acutely aware that managing a service-based relationship was different from line managing an “internal” operation, given divergent perspectives and commercial interests. This would be compounded by potentially divided loyalties as former colleagues had to confront each other across organizational boundaries. The ECSOP programme would set the tone for the relationship for many years to come.

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Assume you are Gert Visser: • How do you approach the risks in the ECSOP? • What factors or considerations have you taken into account in arriving at your course of action? Please take the time to write down your answers to these two questions before reading further. The remainder of the chapter will explain the attribute approach to risk and explore possible interpretations of the scenario above from the perspective of the four levels of conception in the competence framework. The possible interpretations are not intended to be exhaustive, but are illustrative of the thoughts and actions of individuals holding different conceptions of their work.

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Approach to risk Projects and programmes are exposed to wide-ranging sources of uncertainty, and risk can be described as uncertainty that matters. Project and programme managers have to appreciate the uncertainty in relation to some aspect of the work, consider it relevant, and possibly do something about it. While many risk management texts talk about upside (opportunity) and downside (threat) risk, the attribute principally reflects the common preoccupation with downside risk. Approach to risk relates to how an individual addresses possible events or circumstances that, should they occur, would have an adverse effect on the project or programme. (How a project or programme manager responds to or leverages opportunities arising from events unfolding or work progressing better than expected is captured in part by the attribute disposition for action.) Someone holding a level 1 conception develops what is considered a robust project or programme plan and then conducts a risk analysis. Risks are identified, assessed, and captured in a risk log or risk register that is shared with those involved in the work. The risks are then monitored, and should they materialize are dealt with. Implicit risk management occurs in the planning phase to arrive at a robust plan. The risks identified subsequently are perceived as residual and are accepted, almost as an unavoidable consequence of doing the project or programme. Someone holding a level 2 conception identifies and assesses the risks to the project or programme and actively seeks to eliminate or mitigate (reduce probability or impact) the risks. The project or programme plan is different as a result of the risk management process, once risk-mitigating actions have been incorporated. Someone holding a level 3 conception undertakes risk management and seeks to eliminate or mitigate risks wherever feasible, including adding redundancy in the project or programme plan (e.g., schedule, resource requirements) and the performance (output) specifications. In addition, elaborate contingency plans are developed, even for unlikely events. Someone holding a level 3 conception wants the project or programme to succeed whatever befalls it. In some cases high-probability risks are artificially turned into issues (an event or set of circumstances that has occurred) to execute a (preventative) contingency plan. Someone holding a level 4 conception identifies risks and seeks to eliminate or mitigate the major ones wherever practically feasible and economically

Approach to risk warranted, and has contingency plans in place for other risks. However, someone holding a level 4 conception accepts that whatever is done there always remains the possibility of failure, and seeks to understand the consequences of failure on the organization (or society) and the indicators of possible failure. In some cases, the focus of attention is on what the organization could or should do were the project or programme to fail (or show signs of failing). These conceptual levels manifest themselves in different ways depending on the project or programme. In the following section the scenario at the beginning of the chapter is explored from the different conceptual levels.

Exploring conceptual levels in relation to the Equity Clearing and Settlement Outsourcing Programme The commercial realities of a dwindling business have forced the difficult step of outsourcing the equity clearing and settlement operation. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that both Home and Abroad and EBG, the preferred outsource provider, lack experience of effecting such a transition. There are considerable uncertainties surrounding the Equity Clearing and Settlement Outsourcing Programme (ECSOP). Level 1 conception Gert Visser holding a level 1 conception would recognize and accept that the outsourcing was risky. But, EGB was the best choice in the circumstances and the programme’s organization, planning, communications, and governance, undertaken properly, would provide all the safeguards that could be reasonably put in place. Home and Abroad just had to accept that it was a risky venture. Gert Visser would be aware of the risks related to the inexperience of EBG, and would closely monitor EBG’s inputs and contributions. But, the due diligence process and protracted negotiations had shown EBG to be the best option overall for Home and Abroad. The preparatory work done for the Pond & Rim deal would provide Gert Visser with a degree of comfort that Home and Abroad was not totally dependent on EBG for guidance and expertise. The use of lawyers and advisers would also provide input and reduce the chances of errors or omissions. Detailed planning and the involvement of both Home and Abroad staff and EBG staff, working as a cohesive team, would contain the risks from a combination

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of process reengineering, third-party dependencies, systems development, systems enhancements, systems retirement, and business conversions. A risk analysis would be conducted in collaboration with EBG with a view to surfacing and sharing the perceived risks. Gert Visser would want to understand EBG managers’ perspective on the risks, since it would give a better insight into their expertise and understanding. Gert Visser might also discover some risks overlooked by Home and Abroad, and these might result in (minor) modifications to the plan. A shared awareness and allocation of responsibility for monitoring the risk would be important. The risk would be described in the programme’s risk register and reviewed at the various governance meetings. EGB would be expected to handle any risk that materialized as a matter of routine. There would be a degree of confidence of being able to deal with the risks should they materialize, given the expertise available in the two organizations. Anything more than outline contingency plans would be an added burden on an already stretched and tired organization, and Gert Visser would not regard them as a priority or insist on them being done in detail and reviewed formally. Level 2 conception Gert Visser holding a level 2 conception would be preoccupied by the level of risk inherent in the programme and that it would be difficult to mitigate all the risks adequately. Mitigating the obvious risks and spotting the less obvious ones would be a primary concern. The interfaces between the functions would need particular attention since they relied on close collaboration and lacked clear ownership. Gert Visser would be relatively comfortable about the work of the lawyers and other professional advisers. Nonetheless, a formal risk management process would be followed, supervised by Gert Visser. The lawyers and advisers would be asked to identify the risks and any recommended mitigating actions, and then propose tracking processes and contingency plans. A risk analysis workshop would be conducted with EBG to flush out the risks and agree mitigating actions. Gert Visser would want to understand the risks in detail and would expect EBG managers to identify risks that had not been identified to date. If they were not able to do that, Gert Visser would take it as a sign of complacency or incompetence, either of which would be a cause for significant concern. With the risks identified, avoidance or mitigating actions would be developed, again in detail, and

Approach to risk incorporated in the programme plans. Risk responses couched in general terms like “working closely together” would be rejected, and more precise actions and formal, documented contingency plans would be demanded. A monitoring process would be established that would track changes in the perceived probability or impact of the risks identified. Gert Visser would conduct another formal risk workshop to review the Migration Strategy, since this would be perceived as crucial. Gert Visser would be determined to effect a smooth transition of the operations from in-house to EBG and a seamless service to internal and external Home and Abroad customers. Risks would be an agenda item at every governance meeting. Level 3 conception Gert Visser holding a level 3 conception would pay most attention to risks surrounding the continuity of service and quality, both before and after the transition of the operation to EBG. Risk management would not be limited just to what could happen or was happening on the programme. There would be formal risk management processes in place rigorously followed by the members of the programme team, from both Home and Abroad and EBG, as well as the various advisers. The programme governance structures and processes would comprise the monitoring and dealing with the risks related to the programme. Risks external to the effective execution of the programme though could fail to get enough attention. Gert Visser would personally feel the need to keep an eye on issues such as continuity of service. Gert Visser would be aware that the managers and staff in Home and Abroad operations were tired, stretched, and generally demotivated. If they left or withdrew their goodwill, it would have dire consequences for the programme. Retention bonuses and personal counseling for existing staff, and some support from temporary contract staff, had to be put in place by Home and Abroad line management and human resources. In the face of any resistance to these actions, Gert Visser would highlight the extra work that would have to be undertaken and the whispered concerns about the operations reaching breaking point. Particular attention would be paid to the Migration Strategy. Detailed plans for testing the new systems over more than one weekend, including full “dress rehearsals,” and a clear switch-over criteria would be formulated. Gert Visser would also want to develop plans for a continuation of the

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service in-house for a number of weeks after the expected switch-over date. However good the tests, there was always the possibility of something cropping up during live operations. Despite Home and Abroad choosing EBG as its outsource partner, Gert Visser would retain discreet, informal relationships with one or two of the other outsourcing candidates. Gert Visser would make sure that all the analysis of the operation would be documented thoroughly. If EBG proved unable to facilitate the transition or deliver the equities clearing and settlement service to the required standard, it would be an easier step for Home and Abroad to switch the provider – the initial work could be built upon effectively. Level 4 conception Gert Visser holding a level 4 conception would be determined to manage the risks associated with outsourcing the equity clearing and settlement operation, and ensuring continuity of service during the transition. The programme risks would need to be managed well and in close collaboration with EBG, and the formal risk management process linked to the governance arrangement would be established. But the nagging concern would relate to the strategic risks in transferring the operation to an external provider. Apart from a smooth transition, Gert Visser would be keen to ensure smooth ongoing service delivery – avoiding a discontinuity once the operation was part of EBG. Even if a contract rather than the organizational hierarchy was the formal basis of the relationship, the Equities Trading business should not notice the difference. The goodwill and positive predisposition of former Home and Abroad employees was going to be vital to overcome gaps and mistakes in the contract. The ECSOP programme had to set the right tone for the relationship. Gert Visser would have to listen to the gossip and judge the mood. Perceptions were not always amenable to rational analysis or captured adequately in staff surveys. Gert Visser’s concern would be that even a successful outsourcing would not put the Equities Trading business in a position to compete effectively against the larger more aggressive players. The costs of the clearing and settlement operation were below the industry average and so would benefit the Equities Trading business for the time being. But, if EBG had priced the contract on a marginal basis, that was not sustainable. If EBG did not generate the levels of business hoped for, the company would

Approach to risk not be able to achieve the economies of scale necessary to offer highly competitive, long-term prices and still make a reasonable margin. Failure to generate enough new business would also reduce its willingness to invest in new technology and processes and put upward pressure on the price for the service at contract renewal. The contract would safeguard Home and Abroad’s interests over the next few years but not indefinitely. The Equities Trading business had necessarily embarked on the road to becoming dependent on EBG initially and on external providers in the foreseeable future. It was important to set up mechanisms for tracking not only service performance and quality, but also the commercial health of EBG. Ultimately, the Equities Trading business had to grow to ensure its own future. The business had to achieve volumes that made the clearing and settlement operation attractive to other outsource service providers and make enough margin to absorb some potential loss in competitiveness in the clearing and settlement operation. The business could not afford to think the “operational cost” problem had been solved and allow any complacency to set in.

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C H A P T E R 15

Approach to communications

The Information Systems Quality and Compliance Programme The next Steering Group meeting was important. As the programme manager for the Information Systems Quality and Compliance Programme, Alex Weiss was expected, among other things, to present the benefits and business case for the programme at the meeting. Communicating a stream of benefits associated with shifts in corporate culture and climate and comparing them favorably against many years of effort was going to be a challenge. It seemed counterintuitive that operating in a highly regulated industry had led to constant reinvention, duplication, and variety, but the audit of the quality and compliance in relation to information systems had shown otherwise. As a major pharmaceutical company, Pharmagantia’s information systems had to be openly fit for purpose, meeting both the company’s own quality standards and the requirements of the regulatory authorities. A failure to pass regulatory inspection could have delayed or jeopardized regulatory approval and resulted in fines or even the closure of the local business unit. Ultimate responsibility for regulatory compliance rested at the local level, with senior managers personally liable for breaches of regulations. The geographic distribution of its operations meant that Pharmagantia was subject to differences in regulatory requirements. This in turn had led to divergent perceptions about Information Systems (IS) compliance, “risk,” and “risk management.” This local responsibility for compliance to local regulations was compounded by lingering divisions and multiple cultures in a company formed by a series of mergers over the previous decade. The desire for local autonomy in relation to the use of systems had a detrimental effect on operational efficiencies. Systems distributed from the center or other business units were subjected to elaborate validation and frequent redevelopment, with the slightest shortcoming used to score points and 180

Approach to communications justify local systems development capabilities. Pharmagantia, like others in the industry, was under pressure to reduce the price of its patented pharmaceutics and under fierce competition the moment the patent on a product expired. Resources had to be focused on research and development to strengthen its pipeline of new products, not unwarranted IS activities. The Information Systems Quality and Compliance Programme was designed to reduce the degree of duplication in validation effort through the adoption of more rational, risk-based approaches to local validation testing. The tangible deliverables were more readable, relevant, useful, and consistent policies and guidelines. But the real challenge for the programme was that these policies and guidelines demanded greater consistency in working practices, sharing, consultation, and involvement across Pharmagantia. Alex Weiss quickly realized that programme success necessitated winning over key senior managers and engaging those most affected by the changes to systems, infrastructure, or processes. Securing buy-in from senior management across the various locations entailed persuading them they had a problem – they believed that the process worked reasonably well and supported local validation. Winning over the hearts and minds of those responsible for the detailed IS compliance had to overcome a history of painful change being inflicted on them. The waves of restructuring that accompanied the mergers had unsettled people accustomed to the stability and professional independence offered by pharmaceutical companies in the past. For some the transition from cosseted, quasi-academic institution to “hard-nosed” commercial operation was proving difficult. Alex Weiss deliberately set about to engender a climate of comprehension, inclusion, and trust, and to draw upon expertise globally to create fit-for-purpose policies and guidelines. The programme was intended to provide best practice in change management, so Alex Weiss set about role-modeling the approaches and behavior the programme sought to embed within the business. Being outward-focused, inclusive, and demonstrably “walking the talk” was also necessary to overcome reservations among managers within the business over a programme run from the traditionally autocratic corporate center. Members of the project teams were drawn on a part-time basis from the diverse locations and business units. The teams comprised respected middle managers, who represented their areas and acted as reviewers, and more junior managers who were tasked with carrying out the detailed work. Cross-functional and international review panels were created and made open to all those wanting to comment on or contribute to the work of the programme. These review panels would receive drafts of proposals

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Individual attributes and deliverables in advance to conduct peer reviews. The intention was to demonstrate that the opinions of managers who would have to apply the policies and guidelines were valued. The detailed scrutiny was also expected to ensure that the policies and guidelines could and would be used. The panels were able to voice concerns but not veto proposals. An electronic forum and documents repository was established for members of the review panels and other interested parties to participate in online discussions, to make comments and contributions, and to follow progress. Newsletters were scheduled every six to eight weeks to supplement extensive communications at the individual project level and to provide stakeholders with a broader update of the programme. Programme Sponsorship resided with the Vice President, Quality Compliance and Information Management, who was keen to involve other senior managers. A Steering Group was assembled comprising 18 senior managers from different functions and locations within Pharmagantia. The Steering Group meetings were scheduled in a meeting room at the corporate center. Those senior managers who could attend in person were expected to do so. Others were expected to participate via a conference call arrangement. Alex Weiss had to send out all materials electronically in advance so members of the Steering Group had access to documents being discussed. This approach was fairly common at Pharmagantia, which had for many years used and promoted teleconferencing and the use of virtual teams. The first Steering Group meeting was difficult. The discussions seemed to ramble and go over the same points. There were lots of questions, and it was not clear that the members of the Group had read or fully understood the documents provided. While English was the common business language, for many on the Steering Group it was a second or even third language. Alex Weiss sensed that they did not all fully grasp the meaning of certain statements. Alex Weiss also suspected that, as predominantly IS, quality, and compliance specialists, they did not really appreciate the importance of shifts in culture and climate (i.e., greater trust and desire to collaborate) and that these could only be facilitated not imposed. The discussion about the programme being an “enabler” and that the process itself of creating enabling deliverables (i.e., policies and guidelines) was fundamental to winning over hearts and minds seemed to go over the heads of some Steering Group members. The Information Systems Quality and Compliance Programme was far removed from the typical IS programmes with substantive deliverables clearly linked to business process changes and financial benefits. Alex Weiss was convinced that some Steering Group members were wondering why so

Approach to communications much time and effort was being expended to produce some best practice guidelines.

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Assume you are Alex Weiss: • How do you prepare and handle the second Steering Group meeting? • What factors or considerations have you taken into account in arriving at your course of action? Please take the time to write down your answers to these two questions before reading further, focusing on the information to be shared and the nature and style of the interaction with the members of the Steering Group. The remainder of the chapter will explain the attribute approach to communications and explore possible interpretations of the scenario from the perspective of the four levels of conception in the competence framework. The possible interpretations are not intended to be exhaustive, but are illustrative of the thoughts and actions of individuals holding different conceptions of their work.

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Approach to communications A feature of project and especially programme management work is the variety and amount of communication that takes place. Approach to communications relates to the way a project or programme manager thinks about and handles communication and personal interactions with various parties. The attribute encompasses how a project or programme manager reports information, discusses issues, recommends courses of action, and facilitates meetings and similar events. Approach to personal communications influences the (preferred) ways of informing, consulting, persuading, or engaging more broadly with stakeholder groups. Someone holding a level 1 conception focuses on the facts and data contained in plans, benefits maps, investment appraisals, or risk analyses. The approach adopted is to report status and progress on a project or programme in terms of quantifiable metrics such as milestones achieved, expenditures to date, forecasts to completion, outputs delivered, and estimated benefits. Interactions and communications center on reporting and discussing the facts clearly and objectively. Reports and presentations are produced in a consistent style. Someone holding a level 2 conception presents and discusses the status and progress of a project or programme in a consistent style, but is aware that not all data are equally robust. Plans can change and estimates are subject to uncertainty. Reports are supplemented by analyses and opinions, which add depth to the discussions and help to take the required decisions. Implications, concerns, and potential courses of action are anticipated, and personal views and preferences are shared. A level 3 conception incorporates a level 2 conception, but the focus of the communication is on the outcomes and benefits to the various stakeholders, and how they will be achieved. Communicating includes efforts to persuade and to enthuse by “selling” the vision, taking into account the audience’s interest, desires, and reservations. Compared to individuals holding level 1 and level 2 conceptions, someone holding a level 3 conception is more flexible and interactive in terms of communication style, and is sensitive to personal and emotional factors. A level 4 conception incorporates and extends a level 3 conception. Someone holding a level 4 conception proactively seeks to engage the other parties in a dialogue about the project or programme work and its outcomes. Attention is paid to different norms and cultures of the audience(s), and to how the information, analyses, and opinions might be

Approach to communications interpreted. The style, the language, as well as the medium and context of any communication are considered and tailored. Feedback is solicited and reactions are observed. Such feedback is used to encourage a dialogue and to fine-tune the communication process. These conceptual levels manifest themselves in different ways depending on the project or programme. In the following section the scenario at the beginning of the chapter is explored from the different conceptual levels.

Exploring conceptual levels in relation to the Information Systems Quality and Compliance Programme Participation of some senior managers via teleconference may be less than ideal but is a consequence of Pharmagantia’s geographically dispersed locations. Familiarity with meetings handled via conference calls may reduce their awkwardness but not overcome the obstacles to effective communication. The combination of both physical and virtual presence of the participants adds to the complications, and limits the scope for “offline” or side discussions (via tools such as MSN) possible with wholly virtual meetings. Level 1 conception Alex Weiss holding a level 1 conception would want to introduce more structure and control in the Steering Group meeting and to minimize the rambling and repetition that occurred during the previous meeting. Alex Weiss had important information to communicate clearly and simply to the Steering Group. An agenda would be agreed with the Programme Sponsor and time would be allocated to each subject. The Sponsor’s support in running the meeting to the agreed schedule would be vital. The proposed agenda would cover review of progress to date, risks and issues, any decisions required, and the benefits and outline business case for the programme. Alex Weiss would prepare detailed progress reports, including graphical plans showing progress against specific tasks, spend to date, and would produce an up-to-date risk and issue log. The benefits analyses and/or benefits map would be documented, and the business case would include detailed spreadsheets with discounted cash flows and sensitivities analyses, either produced or audited by internal financial analysts. A presentation would be prepared, following the order of the agenda and covering the

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items in detail. Alex Weiss would use bullet points, supplemented by diagrams and tables where appropriate. Convoluted sentence structures and words and expressions not in common usage in English or within Pharmagantia would be avoided. Where formats and templates existed, they would be used – the programme was about reducing duplication and not “reinventing the wheel,” so it should adhere to those criteria internally. These documents would be circulated in electronic form in advance of the meeting. Even with these documentation predistributed, Alex Weiss would feel the need to go through the presentation slide by slide during the meeting. Beyond wishing to be comprehensive and ensure key points were covered, Alex Weiss would be concerned that Steering Group members might not have read the information supplied. There would be a request for questions to be posed at the end of the section relating to the agenda item. Alex Weiss would do most of the talking in an assured tone and brisk pace, mentioning sources of information and the contribution of the team and the review panels. The presentation would be punctuated by brief discussions, potentially cut short to stick to the meeting timetable. Problems and issues would be discussed and decisions sought. In the absence of questions, Alex Weiss would proceed to the next subject. Alex Weiss would want to demonstrate a command of the facts and control of the programme. There would also be an unspoken desire to create an effective format and protocol for the meeting that would be used in future. Minutes of the meeting would be drafted in summary form, highlighting any decisions taken or commitments made, and shown to the Sponsor. A final version would be circulated to members of the Steering Group. Level 2 conception Alex Weiss holding a level 2 conception would want to be in a position to address the questions and concerns of the members of the Steering Group. The rambling and repetition of the previous meeting would be attributed, in part, to a personal inability to explain the approach or allay implicit concerns. The programme itself was complex and operated at two interwoven levels. The rational, almost mechanistic, process of developing policies and guidelines was overlaid by a more subtle process of winning over hearts and minds, with which the members of the Steering Group were less familiar. The guidelines would be of little value unless people throughout Pharmagantia understood them and believed that systems developed and distributed in line with the guidelines could be relied upon,

Approach to communications with minimal validation and minor local customizations, to pass regulatory inspection. Alex Weiss had to communicate this fundamental aspect of the programme upon which the plans, the benefits analysis, and business case were based. In a preparatory meeting with the Sponsor, Alex Weiss would review what had happened at the last Steering Group meeting and put forward possible explanations. Alex Weiss would propose starting the next meeting with a summary of the goals and logic of the programme. Alex Weiss would read out a preprepared summary. This would be an opportunity to confirm that the Sponsor was fully on board, and discover any discrepancies in understanding or emphasis. The main points, assumptions, and limitations of the benefits analysis and business case would also be reviewed. A game plan would be agreed on roughly how much time to spend on each item and how to deal with questions, concerns, or misconceptions during the meeting. Alex Weiss would prepare the standard programme reports, paying particular attention to articulating the approach used for the benefits analyses and/or benefits map, and working assumptions underpinning the financial business case. Apart from the base case, a small number of scenarios might be analyzed as part of the overall business case. A summary presentation would be prepared in a format and style familiar to the Steering Group. These presentation and supporting documents would be circulated in electronic form in advance of the meeting. An accompanying note would tell everyone that the supporting documents could be referred to during or after the meeting should Steering Group members feel the need to delve into more detail. Alex Weiss would use the summary presentation to succinctly state the goals and logic of the programme and then review the benefits and the business case. Questions would be welcomed and used as an opportunity to elaborate on points of interest. Having clearly articulated the main points, Alex Weiss would be happy to run the rest of the meeting more as a question and answer session. This would accommodate those who had not read the documents in detail and those participating via the teleconference facility. A more interactive process would also surface concerns and allow Alex Weiss to explain the reasons for certain decisions or approaches, and the implications if they were not taken or did not succeed. Opinions (e.g., how committed the middle managers on the team were to the programme) and concerns (e.g., covert resistance or interference) would also be shared tactfully with the Steering Group. Alex Weiss would

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seek to reassure the Steering Group that the challenges were known and were surmountable, and would be keen to obtain support and commitment to the programme. Minutes of the meeting would be used to reinforce key messages and clarify issues, as well as confirm decisions taken or commitments made. A final version, approved by the Sponsor, would be circulated to members of the Steering Group. Level 3 conception Alex Weiss holding a level 3 conception would realize that the rambling and repetition of the previous meeting could have arisen from a lack of clarity, familiarity, or understanding of the subjects discussed. They could also reflect deep-rooted concerns about the programme and what it was trying to achieve. People tend to come back to issues that create discomfort or dissonance, and repeat the question if they do not fully understand or like the original answer. Their presence on the Steering Group did not necessarily imply that these senior managers were fully committed or convinced of the merits of the programme. Steering Group membership was a form of cooption. As such, it could mitigate overt resistance or, if handled well, facilitate a deeper level of engagement. Alex Weiss’ working assumptions would be that the members of the Steering Group represented, or to some extent felt the need to represent, local interest. They might also reasonably be expected to share a desire for autonomy and to be promoting agendas influenced by other organizational pressures. They might be as much part of the problem and they were being implicitly expected to be part of the solution. Winning over the Steering Group was an essential first step in winning over hearts and minds within the company. If they were seen to be wholeheartedly committed to the programme, it would encourage those working on the programme. Without the Steering Group fully committed, team members or individuals on the review panels unhappy with a decision might have sympathetic listeners, willing and able to voice concerns at Steering Group meetings. Minor cracks could become chasms that would destroy the fragile trust the programme was trying to build. Leading up to the steering group meeting, Alex Weiss would sound out team members whose bosses were on the Steering Group to ascertain what they had heard about the previous meeting and what concerns their senior managers might have. Alex Weiss would contact key Steering Group

Approach to communications members on the pretext of identifying agenda items. The opportunity would be used to explore what they wanted from the programme and how it would help them. The preparatory meeting with the Sponsor would also be used to solicit feedback and concerns. Alex Weiss would propose to the Sponsor to start the meeting with a review of the desired outcomes and the benefits of the programme. The programme approach, business case, and risks all followed from these. The information for the Steering Group meeting would be produced in accordance with company guidelines. A key document would be the benefits map. This would show how the strategic objectives (reduced risk) and tangible benefits (less validation and duplication) would be enabled by the outputs from the programme (guidelines) provided there was change in attitudes and approach. It would serve to explain the purpose and rationale of the various work-streams, the importance of collaboration and engagement, and what they and the company stood to gain if the programme succeeded. Alex Weiss would send out the various documents in advance, but suggest that the benefits analysis and business case would be explained in detail during the meeting. Following a brief review of status, Alex Weiss would use the benefits map to discuss the programme and sell its merits. Benefits would be personalized – reduced personal risk, ability to redeploy people from validation to other work, and so on. Even if the programme had formally been approved, the Steering Group could still decide to stop it, if they were not convinced it would deliver real value. Or, they could let it die a slow death, if they thought it was not worth the effort and potential upheaval. Questions would be welcomed and used as an opportunity to elaborate on points of interest. Silence or lack of questions would not be taken as signs of acquiescence or comprehension, especially where individuals were participating via the teleconferencing facility. It would be impossible to tell if they were nodding and smiling, or frowning and looking puzzled. Alex Weiss would regularly summarize the discussion, pause and check for understanding. Personal convictions and commitment would be shared with the Steering Group in an attempt to connect at an emotional as well as a rational level. Minutes of the meeting would be used to restate the merits of the programme and the commitment required to make it a success. Alex Weiss would realize that the minutes would not be read in any detail as long as the Steering Group felt comfortable that their efforts and those of their people would generate significant benefits.

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Level 4 conception Alex Weiss holding a level 4 conception would regard the rambling and repetition of the previous meeting as an unavoidable step in bringing together disparate individuals to form a cohesive Steering Group and in starting a productive dialogue. For many Steering Group members the programme represented uncharted territory, so misunderstanding and search for clarification were to be expected. The programme was also embarking on changing beliefs and norms within the company, which would inevitably surface deep-rooted concerns and lingering questions about the merits of the programme. From a corporate perspective it was clearly the right thing to do, so senior managers could not oppose it in public. But it entailed taking a risk at the local level, and being prepared to subjugate local interests and local autonomy for the greater good. Members of the Steering Group would constantly need to be reassured that the prize was worth the risk, and that the programme was not going to lose sight of what was at stake at the local level. Wholehearted commitment to the programme was probably unrealistic, but a show of support was necessary to encourage team members and to deter dissenters from undermining the trust and organizational cohesion the programme was trying to build. The place for raising concerns and reservations, whether personal or reported by subordinates, had to be the Steering Group meeting. Prior to the steering group meeting, Alex Weiss would check with team members whether they had any concerns. Steering Group members would be contacted to clarify what they wanted from the programme and how it would help them. The preparatory meeting with the Sponsor would also be used to solicit feedback and concerns, and to get a better insight into wider organizational tensions or issues that might be affecting the programme. The Sponsor’s relationship with and views of the Steering Group members would also be explored discreetly. Alex Weiss would propose that the Sponsor should start the meeting by outlining how the programme fitted within the Pharmagantia’s strategy. It would carry more weight coming from the Sponsor. Alex Weiss could then outline the programme’s objectives and desired outcomes, and move on to the benefits and the business case. The collaborative programme approach, the business case, and risks would also be discussed. Alex Weiss would offer to pull together some slides for the Sponsor. The various documents would comply with company guidelines on content and style. Alex Weiss would send out the various documents in advance,

Approach to communications encouraging Steering Group members to review the documents but assuring them that they would be explained during the meeting. Alex Weiss would use a succinct presentation to lay out the logic and business case for the programme, highlighting the strategic imperatives of reducing reputation and compliance risk, and of eliminating unnecessary duplication of effort. The challenges of creating principles and guidelines that would address the range of local practices and regulatory requirements would be mentioned. Alex Weiss would hint at concerns, reservations, and prejudices the programme would have to overcome, acknowledging and foreshadowing the issues that the Steering Group members might have or that their people might bring to their attention. Alex Weiss would periodically recap and ask for feedback and comments, paying particular attention to those participating via conference call. Alex Weiss would try to read linguistic and cultural nuances as far as possible, and seek clarification where a comment seemed at odds with the subject being discussed or the sentiment of the meeting. Alex Weiss would want to engage the Steering Group, despite the large size and the remoteness of many members. Minutes of the meeting would be used to capture the essence of the discussion and strategic logic for the programme.

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C H A P T E R 16

Approach to governance

The Enterprise Resource Planning Programme With the overall architecture and design broadly agreed for the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) programme, the next phase was making the necessary customizations at the regional level prior to rollout to the various country operations. As programme manager, Jan de Beers had been asked to propose governance arrangements for the three regions: Americas; Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA); and Asia Pacific. Only two years earlier Innavax Technologies Inc. (ITI) had become an independent company quoted on the New York Stock Exchange, having previously been a division of a major industrial conglomerate. ITI had found life tough as a fledgling company, exposed to the pressures and expectations of demanding stockholders. Earnings dipped as it rationalized its product range, closed manufacturing operations, and reduced personnel numbers. But, ITI had a strong platform from which to build in terms of a reputation for product reliability and a commitment to quality. Freed from its former parent’s elaborate financial control systems and reluctance to invest in new technology, ITI had embarked on becoming a fast, focused, entrepreneurial, and customer-driven company, able to adjust quickly to marketplace and customer needs. A number of initiatives were explored to improve performance, including streamlining processes and introducing integrated global sourcing and supply (demand) chain management. It quickly became clear that the dated systems inherited from its former parent could not support ITI’s strategic ambitions. The systems had limited functionality, were expensive to maintain, and did not facilitate the seamless integration with suppliers and customers. Nor did they allow ITI to exploit important new purchasing opportunities and mechanisms, such as exchanges. ITI decided to invest in the development of more effective Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems and applications to replace legacy systems across all its international operations. 192

Approach to governance Such a move also served as a symbolic severance of all links to its former parent. The initial conceptual analysis for the ERP programme was undertaken by Allis & Ward (A&W), an international full-service consultancy firm. Omeca was chosen as the technology partner and tasked with supplying the new technology and applications, and with ensuring an effective systems implementation. A&W retained responsibility for the smooth transition from the old to the new ERP systems. Once the programme had been approved by the ITI Board and the license and implementation deals agreed with Omeca, Jan de Beers, an experienced programme manager working at A&W, was appointed as the ERP programme manager. The intention was to implement globally as fast and with as little development work as possible. Extensive discussions with ITI senior managers and the Omeca programme manager resulted in an agreement to divide the programme into three distinct phases: • • •

SHAPE (solutions at high level on applications enterprise-wide) Regionalization Local Implementation

SHAPE was scheduled to take about three months and to result in a global architecture and solution design for ITI, and to provide guidelines for the subsequent process of final configuration at the regional level. The regionalization work was divided and aligned to the three existing organizational regions: Americas, EMEA, and Asia Pacific. The plan was to configure the applications based on local requirements and then roll out and go live in the various countries as soon as practicable. The operations in the various countries mainly performed marketing and distribution functions, though some also hosted manufacturing plants that reported directly to the regional offices. ITI’s corporate center provided some services and shaped policies, but the regional offices, each managed by a Vice President of Operations, still had considerable operational autonomy. Jan de Beers had formed a close working relationship with Cynthia Steel, the ITI Transformation Manager, who was a finance specialist reporting to the Chief Financial Officer (CFO). As Transformation Manager, Cynthia Steel looked after a number of strategic initiatives designed to make ITI the fast entrepreneurial company it aspired to be. While ITI’s CFO was formally the Sponsor of the ERP programme, Cynthia Steel had day-to-day executive responsibility. The Steering Committee comprising a selection of Board members, including the Chief Operating Officer, and senior managers

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Individual attributes had only met twice since Jan de Beers had been programme manager. They appeared happy to ratify decisions already taken and to follow advice that was offered. The relationship with the Omeca programme manager, though, was strained. The Omeca programme manager was keen to take control of the implementation of the technology and applications, and was discreetly promoting the Omeca methodology to stakeholders within ITI. The Omeca methodology was designed to speed implementation and minimize customizations. However, the methodology provided little guidance on which customizations were necessary since there was no detailed mapping of existing processes. It relied heavily on input from expert users. The Omeca programme manager had convinced Larry Todd, the newly appointed Vice President, Information Systems and Technical Infrastructure, that the Omeca methodology was the best option. The Steering Committee, advised by Larry Todd, agreed to the use of the Omeca methodology without even debating the other options. The Regionalization phase was expected to be critical, given the diverse range of countries in which ITI operated. The plan was for the programme to have three broadly parallel workstreams, each undertaking the work of configuring the applications and making the necessary customizations. The teams to work on the Regionalization phase were being assembled at ITI’s corporate center for the Americas workstream, at the EMEA Regional office just outside Brussels, and at the Asia Pacific Regional office in Singapore. Customization, and even more so local implementations, was going to be difficult and could easily get out of control. There was considerable pressure from ITI to use their in-house resources, in part to reduce costs and in part to facilitate the knowledge transfer process. However, ITI operations were under considerable pressure to deliver business results and had recently experienced personnel reductions. Ensuring that resources were going to be made available to work on the programme was going to be tough, yet vital to success. Cynthia Steel was keen to exercise direct personal control of the programme, but was not in a position to spend significant amounts of time outside the United States. It had suited Cynthia Steel that most of the work on the SHAPE phase had been done at the corporate center. She had, though, secured the support of ITI’s Vice Presidents of Operations in EMEA and Asia Pacific. The Omeca programme manager declared that he would go back to Europe and personally direct Omeca’s work in Belgium, leaving his talented but less experienced deputy to direct the workstream in the United States. He also promised to find someone for the Asia Pacific workstream. Jan de Beers was acutely aware that Omeca’s contribution was going to be important,

Approach to governance and that A&W had few people with the relevant skills. Nonetheless, A&W was accountable for the success of the programme and smooth transition of the business on to the new systems. Good change management was not going to be enough on its own. Jan de Beers was convinced that the rather informal laissez-faire governance arrangements that had existed to date had to be strengthened.

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Assume you are Jan de Beers: • What governance arrangements do you propose for the regions and/or the Regionalization phase of the programme? • What factors or considerations have you taken into account in arriving at your recommendations? Please take the time to write down your answers to these two questions before reading further. The remainder of the chapter will explain the attribute approach to governance and explore possible interpretations of the scenario above from the perspective of the four levels of conception in the competence framework. The possible interpretations are not intended to be exhaustive, but are illustrative of the thoughts and actions of individuals holding different conceptions of their work.

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Approach to governance Governance comprises the policies, guidelines, and principles that underpin the management of a project or programme, and the organizational arrangements to support, direct, and control this process. The governance framework includes criteria and processes for defining benefits, securing funds and resources, flagging and resolving issues, choosing sponsors and members of steering bodies, levels of delegated authority, and protocols for meetings and decision making. Approach to governance relates to how a project or programme manager seeks to create, influence, or adapt the governance framework. Someone holding a level 1 conception adopts existing frameworks and guidelines, whether from texts, professional standards, or best practice guidelines or from established practices within the organization. Corporate governance arrangements, hierarchies, and reporting lines are respected and incorporated into sponsorship and steering mechanisms. Conventional structures and relationships, standard reporting templates, established routines on the frequency and format of meetings are all presumed to be applicable and are applied to the project or programme. Someone holding a level 2 conception is aware of existing frameworks and guidelines. These, though, are adapted in relation to the context or content of the project or programme. The specific issues, challenges, and requirements of the work are factored into the design of the governance framework, and in particular the structures and control mechanisms. The aim is to create stable structures providing adequate involvement, visibility, and the necessary means to direct and control the work. Someone holding a level 3 conception seeks to create a project- or programme-specific framework and guidelines, where useful drawing on existing practices. The nature and context of the work are central to the design and functioning of the governance framework. If these change, then someone holding a level 3 conception adapts or completely redesigns the framework. As the work progresses or specific situations arise, there is no hesitation in changing the governance arrangements. For instance, the composition of the steering group, the frequency and format of meetings, and the levels of delegated authority are actively modified to reflect the stage of the project or programme, the issues that arise, or the decisions that need to be taken. Faced with a crisis, additional governance processes are readily introduced (e.g., extraordinary meeting of the steering group, daily reports to the sponsor, twice daily telephone conferences with the team).

Approach to governance Someone holding a level 4 conception strives to establish arrangements that embed the project or programme within the organization, as well as ensure the effective governance of the project or programme itself. What is happening in the organization has to be reflected in the project or programme, and the capability and change created by the project or programme needs to be understood and exploited by the organization. Someone holding a level 4 conception seeks to be included in strategic debates and more broadly governance and decision making within the organization, thereby being more intimately aware of the issues and so better placed to shape and direct the project or programme. These conceptual levels manifest themselves in different ways depending on the project or programme. In the following section the scenario at the beginning of the chapter is explored from the different conceptual levels.

Exploring conceptual levels in relation to the Enterprise Resource Planning Programme The laissez-faire approach of the Steering Committee, a keen but timeconstrained Transformation Manager, and an Omeca programme manager wanting to take charge appear a recipe for disaster on such a complex programme. Level 1 conception Jan de Beers holding a level 1 conception would want to supplement the existing governance arrangements with another tier of management at the workstream level. The Steering Committee had to set direction, secure adequate funding, be a point of escalation for issues that could not be resolved at the workstream level, and ensure commitments were honored. Jan de Beers would advocate splitting responsibility at the workstream level into the implementation of the systems and technology, and the change management and transition. Each workstream would have an implementation manager and a transition manager at the same level in the programme organization structure. Workstream team members, both consultants and ITI staff, would report either to the implementation manager or to the transition manager depending on their roles. The three implementation managers would be experienced Omeca consultants and the three transition managers would be experienced A&W consultants. The current Omeca programme manager could act as implementation manager for the EMEA

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Region and his deputy for the Americas. Jan de Beers would have little doubt Omeca could find someone suitable for Asia Pacific. All six would report directly to Jan de Beers, who would be supported by a programme office function run by A&W professionals. Jan de Beers would feel that the organizational arrangements, plus the detailed progress and status reporting to be introduced and managed by the programme office, would provide greater control than had been exerted to date. The programme could not be effectively controlled without detailed information and analysis. Jan de Beers would also advocate the creation of three Regional Advisory Boards comprising the Vice President (VP) of Operations for the region and other senior ITI managers. The Advisory Boards would support the work-steams and feed in the needs of the regions into the process of determining the customizations and fine-tuning the software applications. Their expertise, alongside that of the team members, would be vital to ensure that local business variations, as well as local fiscal and regulatory requirements, were incorporated. Customizations outside the parameters set out in the SHAPE phase would have to be referred to the Steering Committee. Jan de Beers would also be keen to make the Programme Steering Committee meetings more regular (monthly) and structured. There would need to be a formal agenda and adequate debate on the issues raised by the workstreams. The CFO, as the Sponsor of the ERP programme, should chair the meetings, even if Cynthia Steel retained de facto executive control of the programme. Jan de Beers and the programme office would take on the role as supporting the Sponsor, Steering Committee, and in particular Cynthia Steel. Level 2 conception Jan de Beers holding a level 2 conception would feel that the existing governance arrangements had functioned reasonably well because the programme was in its early stages, involved relatively few people, and most of the work had been done at the corporate center. Colocation facilitated informal discussions, exchanges of information, direct monitoring of progress, and the immediate resolution of issues. But, the next phase would entail work in three different continents, separated by multiple time zones and diverse cultures and practices. More structure and discipline would need to be introduced to exercise adequate direction and control.

Approach to governance The Regionalization phase was likely to generate significant debate and determine the ultimate success of the programme, and would require considerable user input. The decision to accept or reject a proposed customization was not trivial. Accepting a customization increased the development timescales and so implementation costs, as well as the costs of ownership if the customization entailed rework to accommodate changes in technology or new releases of the applications. Rejecting a customization meant changing the business processes and so put pressure on an already stressed organization. Freeing expert users to work on the implementation was unlikely to be easy, whatever the reassurances from the corporate center. They could not be replaced directly by consultants. Their work could be shared out or additional resources could be brought in, but both options needed the support of senior management in the regions. Jan de Beers would recommend appointing experienced project managers from Omeca as workstream managers responsible for the Regionalization and local implementations in their regions. A&W consultants would be members of the workstream teams with specific responsibility for change management. A parallel reporting structure for Omeca and A&W would tend to create confusion and exacerbate any tensions – the Omeca programme manager had already shown signs of needing to feel in control. Given that the Omeca implementation methodology had been chosen and A&W had few consultants with expertise in the methodology, it would be better for Omeca project managers to take on, and to be seen within ITI to take on, the responsibility. This arrangement would reduce the reputation risk for A&W while retaining an involvement in the work. It would also give Jan de Beers direct access, via the A&W consultants, to what was actually happening in the workstreams. Jan de Beers would suggest that the Vice Presidents (VPs) of Operations for the regions should act as sponsors for the workstreams. The three workstream managers would take direction from their local sponsors and work with them to secure resources. The cooption of the VPs would help to mitigate two of the major risks facing the programme – inappropriate customizations and inadequate expert user input. The VPs would have an incentive to ensure a quick and effective implementation and were well placed to secure the involvement of relevant individuals in the business. The workstream managers would also report to Jan de Beers. A small programme office function run by A&W professionals would collate information on status, costs, issues, and risks, but would only have to deal with customizations on an exceptions basis.

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More formality and commitment had to be introduced to the Steering Committee to ensure effective overall control of the programme. Regional autonomy had to be counterbalanced with an active sponsorship from the Steering Committee. Otherwise the VPs of Operations might let the programme drift in favor of delivering business results or not feel obliged to adhere to programme budgets. In particular, the Chief Operating Officer (COO) had to attend the meetings and actively support the programme. As the person to whom the Regional VPs of Operations reported, the COO could exert direct pressure to perform on the programme, or personally explain what was more important and why. Jan de Beers would work closely with Cynthia Steel to maintain adequate control of the programme on a day-to-day basis, and flag key issues to the Steering Committee. Level 3 conception Jan de Beers holding a level 3 conception would feel it might be an ideal time to refresh the governance arrangements. The transition between the SHAPE phase and the Regionalization phase called for and facilitated a change. More formality would be needed to manage the complexity of geographically dispersed workstreams drawing on ITI resources for support and having to agree and implement a set of customizations. Asking the Vice Presidents (VPs) of Operations for the regions to act as sponsors for the workstreams would be relatively straightforward, especially since Cynthia Steel had already secured the support of the VPs for EMEA and Asia Pacific. They were ideally placed to pull in the right users and determine which customizations were absolutely needed. The challenge would be persuading Cynthia Steel to not sponsor the America’s workstream herself. Unless the programme showed signs it was in difficulty, her limited time would be better spent liaising with ITI Board members and senior managers. There would inevitably be some grumblings coming from the regions about having to change their processes and to release key managers just when they were under severe business pressures. Jan de Beers would suggest to the VPs to form their own steering groups to provide them with support and advice. Jan de Beers would recommend that Omeca should formally assume responsibility for the regionalization and local implementations, with A&W collaborating with Omeca and retaining specific responsibility for change management. Unless the A&W consultants in the regions reported problems, there would be little value in Jan de Beers monitoring closely or trying to direct the work of the Omeca project managers. However, there

Approach to governance had to be a rigorous review of proposed customizations and documented justifications for their inclusion or exclusion, whatever the Omeca implementation methodology might say. The VPs had to sign off the decisions and there had to be an audit trail. Agreeing to proposals without due consideration was a recipe for failure, and it might be necessary for the Steering Committee to delve into the detail. In any case, Jan de Beers and A&W would still be held accountable for success, and had to demonstrate due process. If the programme proceeded smoothly, it would be hard to make the case for more formality or more frequent meetings. However, Jan de Beers would maintain a structured and disciplined approach, and provide the Steering Committee with all the relevant information and document decisions and commitments. A small programme office would provide the administrative support. The information would be available if required, and much easier to produce on an ongoing basis than backtrack during a crisis. Jan de Beers would work closely with and advise Cynthia Steel on key issues. The question that would challenge Jan de Beers most would be whether the CFO was still the right sponsor. The limited involvement to date suggested other priorities and/or faith in Cynthia Steel’s ability. In any case, with the programme funds allocated, the license and implementation deals agreed, and the SHAPE phase practically complete, the CFO was not best placed to make the programme a success. The COO was better placed to influence the customizations and local implementations and realize the business benefits. The COO was also better placed to arbitrate on which customizations to undertake, to balance business pressures against progress on the programme, and to ensure that the Regional VPs paid attention to the programme. Jan de Beers would raise the possibility of a transfer of sponsorship responsibilities to the COO with Cynthia Steel, suggesting that she might take on the formal role of Programme Director. As Programme Director, Cynthia Steel would have a defined role of acting on behalf of the ITI Steering Committee in the executive management of the programme. She could also ensure that the CFO’s interests were represented and protected, and provide continuity through the change in sponsors. Level 4 conception Jan de Beers holding a level 4 conception would wonder what needed to happen for the programme to deliver the ERP systems and applications

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Individual attributes that would help ITI become a fast, entrepreneurial, and customer-driven company. ITI’s managers had to become more involved and take on more responsibility for the outcome. This could be facilitated by a closer mapping of programme roles to organizational roles. The sponsorship of the workstreams by the Vice Presidents (VPs) of Operations for the Regions would be vital to steer and support the development process, and to facilitate their implementation and use. The VPs could determine what was needed in terms of functionality and responsiveness to create an operational edge over the competition. The transition between the legacy systems and the new ERP systems would not be easy, especially if the local operations were under pressure and found it hard to change their processes. Jan de Beers would suggest to the VPs to engage the managers of the various country operations. A&W could advise and help with the transition, but it would need to be driven by ITI management. If managers throughout ITI personally felt a sense of ownership of the new ERP systems, then it would be more likely they would be accepted and exploited to the full. At the same time, Larry Todd, the Vice President, Information Systems and Technical Infrastructure, had to take on the responsibility for ensuring the integrity of the ERP systems and applications from a technology standpoint. Omeca was best placed to manage the implementation, but ITI would have to operate, maintain, and enhance them. Directing the implementation was within Larry Todd’s area of expertise and he could advise on the impact of customizations on whole life costs. The Omeca programme manager would probably find it easier to take direction from Larry Todd, with whom he had already formed a relationship, than either Jan de Beer or Cynthia Steel. As another consultant, Jan de Beer would be seen as a rival, whether consciously or not, and would never have the authority of a senior ITI manager. Jan de Beers would be suspected of having a hidden agenda (e.g., promoting A&W’s interests) that might color a decision or proposal. Cynthia Steel lacked the necessary technical expertise and would find it difficult to challenge the Omeca project managers. Larry Todd would have to travel to the regional centers on a regular basis. But it would also help him to understand the business far better and build relationships with managers throughout the company. This too would facilitate the transition and subsequent operation of the ERP systems. The strands had to come together at the Steering Committee. Jan de Beers would suggest that the Steering Committee should be run the same way ITI chose to run its Board. Formality, membership, and frequency of

Approach to governance meetings could reflect the status of the programme and the decisions and commitments required. But, the comparison alone would make the case for a structured and disciplined approach, the provision of relevant information, and the documentation of decisions and commitments. A&W was well placed to provide the necessary administrative support in the form of a programme office. While the COO was the more appropriate sponsor, if the Steering Committee operated effectively, the issue of sponsorship might not need to be raised. The style of governance and the balance between singular and shared responsibility had to align with the corporate culture. Managing the programme had to be seen as part of managing the business, not an adjunct or an alternative. Cynthia Steel had exercised executive responsibility on behalf of ITI up to now and, as Transformation Manager, was well placed to integrate the ERP programme with other initiatives under way. Promoting ITI ownership of the ERP programme would be accompanied by a change in Jan de Beers’ role from managing the programme to advising the ITI Steering Committee. Jan de Beers could add most value by supervising A&W’s involvement in the workstreams and the programme office, and supporting Cynthia Steel. The time Jan de Beers would spend on the assignment would be scaled down accordingly.

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C H A P T E R 17

Attitude to scope

The Sales Function Transformation Programme Chris Kowalski watched the Director of Operations closely as the consultants described the shortcomings in the sales function. There could be some arguments about the scale and importance of the shortcomings, but little doubt that they existed and that they were hampering the company’s development. Binsaway, a waste and environmental services company, had grown quickly in the previous two decades. It had established itself as a force in waste collection within the retail, commercial, and light industrial sectors. Through establishing new locations and the opportunistic acquisitions of small local operators, Binsaway had managed to create a network of depots (operational facilities where collection vehicles were kept, maintained, and routed). The company had targeted major retailers and multisite operators offering competitive waste disposal and management services, and had taken a reasonable share of this market. Binsaway also competed aggressively for the business of companies and shops around the depots. These local accounts tended to be more profitable and complemented the work for the major retailers, and were acquired and managed at the depot level. Recycling and reclamation services had been added to the core waste disposal offering. Most of Binsaway’s managers, from the depot managers to the Directors, had worked for years in the waste industry, and were quietly proud of their reputation as “high-street bin lifters” within the industry. Binsaway had ruthlessly pursued a low-cost strategy, stripping out any expenditure that was not absolutely necessary and maximizing route densities (tonnage or “lifts” per mile by collection vehicle). While many other industries had taken responsibilities away from local operators and imposed tight corporate controls, Binsaway depot managers retained considerable scope in terms of services offered, pricing, and fleet (collection vehicles) composition. At the same time, depot managers were held responsible 204

Attitude to scope for the achievement of stretching profit targets. They reported to regional managers, but they tended to act like franchisees rather than employees of Binsaway. Apart from the national accounts team, salespeople were assigned to individual depots and reported to regional sales managers. Salespeople prospected for new customers within their areas, and sold the services offered by the depot at prices sanctioned by the depot manager. Once the account was set up, responsibility was transferred to the depot for service and the renewal of annual contracts. Salespeople were largely left to their own devices, and, as long as they hit their sales target, received little attention or supervision. Until a couple of years earlier, the sales function was separate from the depot operations, and this arrangement had been the source of considerable friction. Depot managers dependent on new business from salespeople to make their profit targets accused them, with some justification, of inactivity, of selling the wrong services in the wrong place, of setting unrealistic customer expectations, and so forth. The departure of the Director of Sales provided the opportunity to transfer the sales function to the Director of Operations, who until then had only managed the depots, fleet maintenance, and other collection-related functions. Harry Bull, the Director of Operations, insisted on taking personal control of the salespeople and directing their efforts in support of the strategy and tactical requirements of the collection operations. Missives were issues from the Binsaway’s head office for the sales function to sell particular services, then a few months later to focus on customer retention, and then a few months later to target a competitor. Complaints that this whiplash approach to sales strategy was counterproductive and that the salespeople felt like second-class citizens began to reach the ears of Binsaway’s Chief Executive. The Chief Executive suggested that a head of the sales function might be a good idea. Chris Kowalski was duly appointed, but retained responsibility for handling major integrated waste management bids. These bids involved detailed analyses and submissions, protracted negotiations, and, if successful, the construction of new recycling and disposal facilities. It quickly became clear to Chris Kowalski that the sales function was still run as a separate, disconnected organization – the depot regions did not match the sales regions and there was little or no communication between sales and operations at the regional level. The sales function lacked a coherent strategy and salespeople spent huge amounts of time on administration and setting up accounts. Morale was low and turnover had increased over the previous year. Many vacancies were still to be filled. Leaving sales

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Individual attributes posts empty had reduced costs, but the results were being felt in terms of below-budget new business growth. Chris Kowalski shared these concerns with Harry Bull, who was unsympathetic and took the view that salespeople were “whingers” by nature. The Chief Executive, though, wanted an update, and, in the absence of a clear plan, offered to fund a review. Unable to refuse such a generous offer, Harry Bull agreed. When the consultants presented their findings, they described the problems Chris Kowalski knew about and confirmed that morale was low and that salespeople felt abandoned. The consultants recommended a number of measures to improve recruitment and retention of salespeople, and customer care and retention. They also suggested greater use of technology to improve the sales process and reduce administration. If salespeople could access the company’s systems from customers’ sites, they could obtain customer data, change or confirm service arrangements, and revise or set up a contract in real time. This change alone could generate an extra 50% face-to-face selling time, and, by creating the impression of a highly professional, technologically progressive company, might even increase the number of prospects that become customers. The consultants went on to say that, based on the in-depth strategy study they had recently completed for the Chief Executive, a more radical overhaul of the sales function was needed if Binsaway wanted to exploit fully the changes in the market. They pointed out that the industry was consolidating in terms of players, but that increasing levels of recycling were fragmenting what was, a decade earlier, a single “waste” stream into multiple “used materials” streams (e.g., cardboard, wood, metals). Consequently, Binsaway would increasingly compete against larger, more sophisticated companies in a more complex market. Customers were beginning to demand comprehensive solutions for used materials and waste, and this required segregated collections, more vehicles and routes, and more “pre” and “final” treatment facilities. Selling needed to become more consultative and the targeting of new business far more tightly integrated with depot operations. The consultants suggested that apart from exploiting developments in mobile technology (portable computing and telecommunication devices), the sales function had to move toward structured and disciplined market management at a regional level, and to use up-todate prospecting and customer relationship management techniques and systems. After the consultants had left, Harry Bull sat gloomily for a while, then flicked through the consultants’ detailed presentation, pointed to the page on

Attitude to scope the mobile technology, and declared that it was a good idea. The Chief Executive expected an update at the Board meeting, and Chris Kowalski was asked to come back the following week with an outline scope and plan to improve the sales function. Harry Bull grinned and said that the Sales Function Transformation Programme was now officially launched and that Chris Kowalski was duly appointed programme manager. The telephone rang, cutting short any further discussion, and Chris Kowalski left. A quick chat with the secretary revealed that Harry Bull was away the rest of the week visiting depots across the country, and so a meeting was scheduled for the following week. Walking past the Chief Executive’s office, Chris Kowalski spotted a copy of the consultants’ presentation on the desk and knew it would be studied in detail. The message from the Chief Executive’s secretary made Chris Kowalski smile – an hour had been scheduled at the next Board meeting to discuss what was going to be done to improve the performance of the sales function.

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Assume you are Chris Kowalski: • How do you scope the programme? • How would you explain or justify your approach to the Director of Operations and subsequently the Binsaway Board? • What factors or considerations have you taken into account in arriving at your decision? Please take the time to write down your answers to these three questions before reading further. The remainder of the chapter will explain the attribute attitude to scope and explore possible interpretations of the scenario above from the perspective of the four levels of conception in the competence framework. The possible interpretations are not intended to be exhaustive, but are illustrative of the thoughts and actions of individuals holding different conceptions of their work.

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Attitude to scope Attitude to scope encompasses the way a project or programme manager determines what work is included within a project or programme, and how and under what conditions the scope might change. Scope refers to the totality of the work required to achieve an objective or outcome, the organizational or physical boundaries of work, and/or the issues to be investigated and addressed. The attribute covers how rigid or malleable scope is for individuals, and how scope is translated into actions and deliverables. Someone holding a level 1 conception seeks to establish a considered and agreed scope of a project or programme that will be the basis for planning. Formally or informally, the agreed scope underpins the expectations or contract for the work. Someone holding a level 1 conception strives to contain the work within the agreed scope, sometimes resisting changes. Scope assumes a rigid, almost physical reality. Potential variations are subjected to change control – the identification, analysis, and (if appropriate) authorization of proposed changes to the scope. Someone holding a level 2 conception wants to agree the scope of the project or programme and then to plan and undertake the work accordingly, but is prepared to adjust the scope if that generates additional value. Scope is malleable. Potential variations are analyzed in terms of their costs and benefits in coming to a view on whether they should be included or excluded. Someone holding a level 3 conception thinks that scope cannot be accurately or completely pinned down early in the life of a project or programme, but should be developed in the light of experience. Uncertainties associated with the appropriate scope are embraced and addressed through experimentation, trials, pilots, and prototypes. Starting from a vision (goal, objective) and a broad definition of what needs to be done, the scope is crafted (narrowed, widened, truncated, etc.) as the work progresses. Scope crystallizes or converges over time and with experience. Someone holding a level 4 conception does not feel a pressing need to define scope but remains focused on the goals or outcomes to be realized. The work (scope) is shaped in response to changing organizational priorities or shifts in the business or social environment. Scope is left open as far as possible, and decisions taken as late as possible to create options, flexibility, and the ability to respond to changing circumstances. Someone

Attitude to scope holding a level 4 conception wants to accommodate new requirements and priorities, and to take advantage of opportunities. Scope is indeterminate. Consideration is given to work or to changes that might benefit the organization, but that potentially transcend the mandate or formal boundaries of the project or programme. These conceptual levels manifest themselves in different ways depending on the project or programme. In the following section the scenario at the beginning of the chapter is explored from the different conceptual levels.

Exploring conceptual levels in relation to the Sale Function Transformation Programme Chris Kowalski is faced with a considerable challenge. As head of the sales function, Chris Kowalski is expected to take the lead in planning and implementing the programme. There are two key stakeholders, the Director of Operations and the Chief Executive, whose views and interests need to be taken into account. It is far from clear that they are aligned, and the comments from the Director of Operations provide little guidance. Level 1 conception Chris Kowalski holding a level 1 conception would center the scope of the Sales Function Transformation Programme on the introduction of mobile technology to support the salespeople in their work. Harry Bull, the Director of Operations, had declared it to be a good idea. As the sponsor of the programme and the Director responsible for the sales function, it was Harry Bull’s role to determine which of the consultants’ recommendations should be implemented and which, for whatever reasons, should be ignored. Chris Kowalski would take the succinct comment about the mobile technology as a statement of intent around which to develop a more detailed scoping document and outline plan. The introduction of mobile technology would be a major endeavor. It would entail selecting appropriate portable computing and telecommunications devices, developing secure, effective, real-time connections to Binsaway’s internal systems, and training the sales force. The mobile technology would have a profound effect on how the salespeople operated in terms of their routines, their sales approaches, and their interface with depot and head office staff. The sales function would certainly be transformed, and arguably appear to customers as more

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informed and more professional. The consultants’ analysis suggested that the effective use of the technology would increase face-to-face selling time by 50%. Extra selling time should translate into extra sales and provide a significant boost in terms of new business growth. There was a tangible business case for the programme. Focusing on the mobile technology as the main lever for improving the performance of the sales force would make sense. The programme would have tight internal coherence and clear deliverables. The technology would enable a step change in productivity (sales per person). Harry Bull seemed prepared to live with the gripes from the salespeople and did not appear overly concerned about poor communications between sales and operations. At the review meeting with Harry Bull, Chris Kowalski would set out a draft programme brief and outline plan based on the introduction of mobile technology. Chris Kowalski would seek confirmation that the other suggestions and issues raised by the consultants were out of scope. A clear agreement on the scope of the programme was needed to develop a more detailed plan and budget. Other suggestions could, if necessary, be introduced via a change control process. Chris Kowalski would ask for guidance on what should be presented at the Board meeting, and would request a subsequent meeting to review the Board presentation. It was Harry Bull’s role to discuss and agree the scope with the Chief Executive, if he felt there were differences of opinion or had any concerns about the Chief Executive’s possible reactions. Level 2 conception Chris Kowalski holding a level 2 conception would view the Sales Function Transformation Programme as a set of related projects aimed at improving the effectiveness of the sales function. While the introduction of mobile technology would be an important part of the programme and would generate the most tangible benefits, the scope of the programme would include measures to improve recruitment and retention, and customer care and retention. Chris Kowalski would be keen to use the programme as a vehicle for introducing greater stability and for changing the way the sales function operated. Introducing the mobile technology that the Director of Operations thought was a good idea would involve considerable effort. But in the hands of the sales function suffering from low morale and high

Attitude to scope turnover, it would be less effective than it could be. Chris Kowalski would want the programme to include a clearer definition of the sales role and interface with the depots, and systematic recruitment and training. The mobile technology would both require and enable structural and process changes to be made, and help to transform the sales function into a more professional organization. Chris Kowalski would suspect that without structural and process changes the increased face-to-face selling time by 50% would not be realized. It would be even less likely that any extra selling time would translate proportionately into extra sales. Chris Kowalski would analyze and prioritize the consultants’ recommendations into a core scope for the programme and optional changes or projects. At the review meeting with Harry Bull, the draft programme brief and outline plan would focus on the introduction of mobile technology, but include the other core elements. The latter would be presented as enabling and leveraging the mobile technology. Chris Kowalski would want Harry Bull’s agreement that the scope of the programme could be broadened to include the other elements if there were clear business reasons for them. Chris Kowalski would want to amend the scope of the programme easily and without it being seen as a lack of planning or forethought. Chris Kowlaski would check what was expected at the Board meeting and when Harry Bull wanted to review the draft presentation. Chris Kowalski would ask whether the Chief Executive needed to be consulted prior to the Board meeting. Harry Bull was the sponsor and responsible for the sales function, but the Chief Executive had ultimate responsibility for the success of Binsaway and had funded the consultants’ review. Level 3 conception Chris Kowalski holding a level 3 conception would view the Sales Function Transformation Programme as the vehicle for redefining the role and nature of the sales function. The consultants’ findings had revealed that the sales function was barely fit for purpose in its current role and woefully ill equipped to support Binsaway in a changing market. Chris Kowalski would conceive some of the recommendations as a series of tactical initiatives aimed at generating immediate improvements, but that these initiatives had to inform and lead to a more fundamental shift in approach. The sales function had to learn how to be more consultative, more disciplined, and more market oriented in its approach.

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Individual attributes Chris Kowalski would want to divide the programme into stages or tranches. The first stage would focus on introducing the mobile technology and rectifying the operational shortcomings in sales force recruitment and retention, and customer care and retention. Together they could be expected to increase performance within the current definition of the sales function’s role. The second stage would be to shift the sales activity from self-directed prospecting and selling to a more structured approach based on local and regional market analysis. The mobile technology would not just be a sales tool, but also a sales management tool used to direct, support, and track salespeople. This would enable more effective deployment of sales effort. A third stage would be the introduction of up-to-date prospecting and customer relationship management techniques and systems. Information would be passed to the salespeople via the mobile technology on which prospects to target, which customers to visit to retain the business, or which service offerings to promote. Chris Kowalski would develop a roadmap showing how the Sales Function Transformation Programme might evolve over time. Recognizing that Harry Bull was keen on the mobile technology, the roadmap would show how the technology would generate streams of benefits as it was leveraged in increasingly sophisticated ways. Chris Kowalski would recognize that later stages would build upon the experiences and successes of the earlier ones, and consequently be less specific on details and timings. While Harry Bull was visiting the depots, Chris Kowalski would engineer a chance meeting with the Chief Executive when the programme would be discussed informally. Any comments or concerns would be addressed immediately or as part of the scoping and planning work. At the review meeting with Harry Bull, Chris Kowalski would sketch out how the programme would deliver tangible improvements in the business performance for Operations. Chris Kowalski would argue that the programme had to frame the strategy and direction of the sales function. The whiplash approach to sales strategy would undermine the programme and risk all the effort and investments in the new technology. Chris Kowalski would reiterate that the scope of the programme was not set in stone and that Harry Bull could direct developments on the programme in line with the needs of Operations. Chris Kowalski would suggest that the Chief Executive should be shown the presentation before the Board meeting and propose that Harry Bull should do it. Chris Kowalski would expect to be asked, or would offer, to attend the meeting with the Chief Executive to answer any questions.

Attitude to scope Level 4 conception Chris Kowalski holding a level 4 conception would wonder whether the Sales Function Transformation Programme needed to transcend the sales function. The consultants had recommended a series of tactical improvements for the sales function, and had outlined how Operations had to change to address shifts in the market. They had implicitly set out a longer-term strategy for the whole of Operations, not just the sales function. The strategy could reasonably be expected to be aligned with Binsaway’s business strategy and reflect the Chief Executive’s thinking, given the study the consultants had recently undertaken. The sales function clearly had to be improved and the recommendations could form the basis of the first tranche of the Sales Function Transformation Programme. Subsequent tranches could create a more structured, effective, and disciplined sales approach based on local and regional market analysis. The mobile technology would assume more roles over time: a sales tool, a sales management tool, and then a customer relationship and market management tool. Even in the current business environment those steps made sense and could be expected to generate significant benefits. Implemented quickly and effectively the programme could create significant competitive advantages for Binsaway. Beyond the introduction of mobile technology, which would involve systems development and building interfaces with other functions within Binsaway, the other changes could be considered part of running a sales function rather than something separate. A programme structure might then not add any value, nor help to integrate the various parts of Operations. Chris Kowalski would be concerned that the divide between the sales function and depot operations would inevitably limit the company’s success. Decisions would continue to be taken in relative isolation – at best achieving a degree of accommodation but not optimization. Salespeople would be implicitly encouraged to sell the services offered by the depots rather than the comprehensive solutions demanded by customers. Effective targeting would be limited or hampered by routing decisions and the need to utilize existing capacity. Chris Kowalski would describe the tranches of the Sales Function Transformation Programme leading to a more structured, disciplined, and effective sales function at the review meeting with Harry Bull. Chris Kowalski would then suggest that further developments would depend on what was

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Individual attributes happening in the market and how Harry Bull wanted to run Operations. Closer integration was not absolutely required at present, but would become vital if the market were to change in the ways predicted by the consultants. As head of the sales function, Chris Kowalski could follow developments and propose changes to Harry Bull. Once the technology was implemented, further developments could be managed as business as usual. Chris Kowalski would suggest that the presentation to the Board should cover the known scope of the programme and then offer outline strategies linked to different market scenarios. Chris Kowalski would ask for Harry Bull’s help in working out the scenarios and the appropriate strategies, and whether it was possible to ask the Chief Executive for a copy of the in-depth strategy study conducted by the consultants.

C H A P T E R 18

Attitude to time

The Services Outsourcing Programme Sam Hall was aware that competitive pressures meant that all opportunities to improve operational effectiveness had to be taken and quickly. However, the timing of the programme and the timescale for outsourcing some key services appeared problematic. As an advertising and marketing services business, SSA&F had always prized creativity and flair, and these virtues had served the company well in its rapid growth over the previous two decades. Creativity and flair had also been used as excuses for a lack of fiscal discipline and formal control. Support functions had grown with the business and, by providing a highly responsive service, had escaped the critical scrutiny of senior management. Other companies in the industry, though, had outsourced a wide range of activities and focused on value-added elements of their offerings to customers. Outsourcing had allowed them to benefit from lower costs and greater expertise provided by third-party suppliers. As growth stalled at SSA&F, the spotlight turned on these noncore functions. A few weeks earlier, Sam Hall was asked by Maria Sella, SSA&F’s Chief Executive, to look into the possibility of outsourcing a number of support functions. In the briefing, Maria Sella had indicated that nothing should be beyond consideration and talked in visionary terms about the merits of a virtual organization. However, as Sam Hall started to conduct a review of SSA&F’s operations to identify activities that could be outsourced it became clear that other senior managers were less favorably disposed to the idea of outsourcing. Most felt that the potential gains were not worth the perceived internal upheaval, and that the responsiveness and intimacy offered by in-house service provision could not be reproduced by external suppliers. Services such as facilities management, on-site catering, and payroll administration were already bought in. In other areas staff had built up a great 215

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deal of implicit or tacit knowledge that would be hard to specify, codify, and replicate. Word spread quickly about the work, and Sam Hall was quizzed by staff keen to know whether their jobs were threatened. However much Sam Hall tried to explain that the work was only a feasibility study, people were convinced that any service identified would be outsourced, irrespective of whether there was an economic rationale or not. Maria Sella was renowned in the firm both for her vision and creativity and for her single-mindedness and determination. Managers responsible for the various support functions admitted that little attention had been paid to how the services were provided. Exploring the latest technologies and thinking could reveal significant opportunities. But, they raised the possibility that most of the benefits might be realized by making internal improvements. The managers were concerned that any outsourcing arrangement might compromise future strategic development through losing key resources or through being tied to restrictive contractual agreements. The issue of morale kept surfacing in the discussions. Sam Hall was reminded that demotivated members of staff were unlikely to put in the extra effort when required. Stories were recounted of the times individuals had worked long into the night to meet a deadline or win a new account. Nonetheless, pressed by Maria Sella, managers within SSA&F cooperated with Sam Hall’s feasibility study and some services emerged as candidates for outsourcing: • • •

Information systems development and maintenance, IT helpdesk, maintenance of corporate Web site (including firewalls and security) Financial and management accounts, including accounts payable and receivable, information provision Training and development, including in-house training and budget center for external training provision

Sam Hall drafted and presented an interim report to the SSA&F senior management team suggesting the services could potentially be outsourced, but indicating that a business case could not be developed without more detailed analysis and investigation of the costs of external provision. The report sparked an impassioned debate within the senior management team, with some managers claiming the proposed “wholesale outsourcing” would tear out the heart of the firm. Despite pleas to abandon the initiative, Maria Sella was adamant that the outsourcing programme should continue. Senior managers were instructed to free up some resources in each of the three areas to help Sam Hall investigate external providers and draft specifications.

Attitude to time Maria Sella stated that a single provider, if at all possible, for all three areas was the ideal solution. One provider would reduce the disruption to the core work of the firm and create a single point of accountability. Objections to entrusting so much to a single party and concerns that the three areas were significantly different in terms of the skills and expertise required were summarily quashed by Maria Sella. Her final words on the matter were that she wanted a progress report at the following month’s senior management team meeting and expected an Invitation to Tender to be issued a month thereafter. Sam Hall managed to see Maria Sella briefly after the meeting. It was clear that Maria Sella was annoyed by what she perceived to be rash and emotional reactions to an important business issue. Sam Hall had to press ahead and not be diverted by the irrational paranoia and conservatism of some managers. SSA&F had to make changes to succeed. In the past few years the world of advertising and media services had become leaner and more cutthroat, and the previous slackness could no longer be tolerated. If Sam Hall encountered any resistance, Maria Sella promised to intervene. Reluctantly, senior managers identified individuals to work with Sam Hall. They all had heavy workloads and their diaries were quite full over the following months. As Sam Hall briefed them on the work they were expected to do, it became apparent that they lacked experience and enthusiasm. The rate of progress was inevitably going to be slower than Maria Sella wanted. Three concurrent outsourcing projects were scoped and planned. Just as the specifications were being developed and visits to potential suppliers organized, SSA&F unexpectedly won a major global account in the face of stiff competition. Servicing the account meant that SSA&F would have to open offices in the fast-growing markets of Russia, China, and India. It had been an aspiration for some time to enter these markets, but there had not been the underpinning business or reasonable prospects of gaining new business to justify such a move. At a stroke SSA&F had a platform for growth in these dynamic markets. The win lifted morale immediately and attention focused on ramping up to service the new account, which represented an increase in workload of nearly a third. Setting up the overseas offices would take a lot of work and careful planning. Sam Hall’s team had even less time and interest in working on the outsourcing programme. There would be little progress to report at the next senior management team meeting. Sam Hall arranged to see Maria Sella in advance of the meeting to discuss timescales.

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Assume you are Sam Hall: • What issues would you raise in relation to timescales with Maria Sella, and what recommendations would you make? • What factors or considerations have you taken into account in arriving at your recommendations? Please take the time to write down your answers to these two questions before reading further. The remainder of the chapter will explain the attribute attitude to time and explore possible interpretations of the scenario above from the perspective of the four levels of conception in the competence framework. The possible interpretations are not intended to be exhaustive, but are illustrative of the thoughts and actions of individuals holding different conceptions of their work.

Attitude to time Attitude to time Attitude to time describes how a project or programme manager makes sense of time in relation to a planned initiative, project, or programme. The attribute deals with the timescales or duration of project or programme work, the pace at which the work should proceed, and the timing of the work. The conceptual level determines which aspects of time are considered and given priority. Someone holding a level 1 conception thinks of time in terms of the duration of activities, phases, projects, or the overall programme. Timescales can be externally imposed, and so the plan is compressed and/or the scope cut to comply with the deadline set. Alternatively, timescales are determined through the planning process using techniques such as networks and critical path analysis. Attention is paid to float or slack in the plans and how it can be used to smooth resources and deal with unplanned events. The schedule of work dominates the individual’s thinking and slippages are to be avoided if at all possible. If the scope changes or the original schedule is untenable, then a new schedule is created and becomes the focus of attention in relation to time. Someone holding a level 2 conception is conscious when developing plans and schedules that resources may not be available when needed, if at all. Time to mobilize, to engage, and to become effective are all encompassed in the anticipatory or future-oriented notion of time. Someone holding a level 2 conception seeks to anticipate what it might take to start an activity or employ a resource, and how to alleviate any shortfalls or constraints. As with a level 1 conception, schedules and avoiding slippage are also important. A level 3 conception incorporates a level 2 conception, but another aspect of time is perceived and considered more important than adherence to a “production-oriented” schedule. Someone holding a level 3 conception assumes the perspective of those expected to use a deliverable or output, or to change their way of working. Time is needed to absorb, to accommodate, and to embed deliverables for the benefits to be realized. Time is conceived in terms of the pace of change, not only the rate of delivery defined by plans, technology requirements, and/or resources levels. Someone holding a level 4 conception has an additional understanding of time, over and above those contained in the other three levels. Time is understood contextually: the timeliness or timing of the project or programme in relation to other initiatives, expectations, pressures, and

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tensions. Notions of organizational readiness, building agendas and developing consensus, windows of (business/environmental) opportunity, and opportunism are incorporated in this conception. Someone holding a level 4 conception senses and picks the “right” moment to raise a point, press an issue, or initiate a new stream of activity. These conceptual levels manifest themselves in different ways depending on the project or programme. In the following section the scenario at the beginning of the chapter is explored from the different conceptual levels.

Exploring conceptual levels in relation to the Services Outsourcing Programme Sam Hall’s decision to arrange a meeting with Maria Sella to discuss the challenges faced by the outsourcing programme appears a wise course of action. Arriving at the senior management team meeting with practically nothing to report, apart from problems, would not inspire confidence in Sam Hall. Informing Maria Sella of the issues in private should enable a better and fuller discussion of the options available. Level 1 conception Sam Hall holding a level 1 conception would be disappointed that the team members were not prepared or disciplined enough to honor their commitments to the outsourcing programme. Without their support and efforts, the work would inevitably slip behind schedule. Even if the diversion of resources away from the programme was beyond Sam Hall’s control, there would still be a sense of failure in not being able to maintain the schedule laid out. Sam Hall would speak to the team to get a realistic assessment of the time they could dedicate to the programme, and try to validate that assessment with their managers. The work would then be replanned taking into account the lower level of resources available. Sam Hall would also run a series of analyses to understand what elements of the scope could, or would need to, be cut to hit the deadlines set by Maria Sella. Perhaps fewer visits to potential suppliers could be organized. Sam Hall would be aware that specialist knowledge would be required to develop comprehensive specifications and effective performance targets, but would work on the basis that some skills were transferable between the three areas. The option of running the three projects in sequence, or at least stagger the projects (Invitations to Tender), would be considered. Sam Hall would recognize

Attitude to time that it would make finding and contracting the services from a single supplier more difficult, and therefore might be vetoed by Maria Sella, but would feel that it was an option that should be investigated. Sam Hall would spend considerable effort going through the various permutations to ensure that the options were feasible and made effective use of the man-days available and the float. At the meeting, Sam Hall would report the lack of progress and the reasons. While stating that there was a genuine business reason for team members not putting as much time into the programme, Sam Hall would lay out the consequent shortfall in man-days. The revised plan based on the lower resource level and the options to cut scope to maintain the deadlines would be reviewed. Sam Hall would look to Maria Sella to decide whether the deadlines were crucial, whether the schedule could slip, or whether she would insist that the team members should work on the programme as originally planned.

Level 2 conception Sam Hall holding a level 2 conception would be annoyed that the team members were not honoring their commitments and would actively try to persuade and cajole them into doing work on the outsourcing programme. Sam Hall would want to avoid slipping behind schedule if at all possible. The existence of other priorities and distractions would be regarded as normal and Sam Hall would consider it part of the role to stop resources being the diverted away from the programme. Sam Hall would press team members for all the time committed, but realize that a drop in effort would be unavoidable. Sam Hall would find out what time team members could dedicate to the programme, and confirm with their managers no more time would be available. The work would then be replanned taking into account the lower level of resources, and the resulting slippage calculated. Sam Hall would also analyze the possible scope reductions to hit the deadlines. Sam Hall would be aware that transferring individuals between projects would be problematic. Apart from the specialist knowledge required, individuals would not be familiar with the issues and work done to date. Until they got up to speed they would be a burden on their colleagues, who would have to brief them and direct their efforts. Given the distractions and other work they had to do, going up a steep learning curve would be neither swift nor welcome.

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Sam Hall would prefer the option of sequencing or staggering the invitations to tender, but retaining the integrity of the team working on each area. Finding and contracting the services from a single supplier would be more difficult but not impossible. SSA&F could short-list only those able to provide all the services identified and announce that a single supplier was the preferred, but not necessary, arrangement. The supplier chosen for the first area would then be short-listed for the next area. The option would be less disruptive to the programme. Potentially it offered a better solution in terms of service provision since each submission would be examined on its own merits rather than as a bundled offering. In developing revised schedules, Sam Hall would allow additional time for tender evaluation and the process of transferring the services, if they went to an external supplier. Sam Hall would take the view that additional time would be required to engage people in the process and get them up to speed, especially since the programme would take longer. Other issues and developments would become top of mind for SSA&F managers and staff. At the meeting, Sam Hall would report progress, the reasons for the (expected) slippage, and the efforts already made to keep the programme on track. Ramping up to service the new account and setting up the overseas offices took priority, as far as team members and their managers were concerned, over the outsourcing programme. The consequent shortfall in man-days, expressed as a range, would be reviewed. Sam Hall would outline the revised plan based on the lower resource level, then offer the option of sequencing the projects. If pressed to reduce timescales, Sam Hall would propose staggering the projects, with the team/project most likely to complete the work scheduled to issue the first Invitation to Tender. Sam Hall would resist suggestions that the original schedule could be maintained by adding extra resources. Finding other people would take time and bringing them up to speed would detract from productive work on the programme. More people making smaller contributions would also create complications in integrating the work. Level 3 conception Sam Hall holding a level 3 conception would appreciate that the team members preferred to help ramp up to service the new account and set up the overseas offices. They were nominated to work on the outsourcing programme, the outcome of which was likely to be a change to their jobs and ways of working. Senior managers, including Maria Sella, undoubtedly believed that making a success of the major new account far outweighed the

Attitude to time benefits from outsourcing some support functions. With all the businessrelated activity under way, pressing ahead with the current schedule was unwise, even if there were enough resources to complete the project work. The people and the organization would struggle to cope the business change and transferring support functions to one or more external suppliers. Sam Hall would prefer to defer drafting the specifications and sending out invitations to tender until it was clearer how SSA&F would operate with the extra business and geographic expansion. However, Maria Sella would be unlikely to suspend the programme, having made such a public commitment to outsourcing. Some progress would have to be made even with the organization in a state of transition. Sam Hall would be convinced that sequential outsourcing projects would minimize the risks to business continuity and facilitate a smooth transition of the service to the external provider. The organization could digest one set of changes while invitations to tender were sent out and submissions evaluated for the next area. The outsourcing programme could proceed in well-defined tranches, each delivering a tangible change to the way SSA&F operated. The pace at which the invitations to tender were sent out could be adjusted, if necessary, to accommodate any business developments. Having one supplier could be achieved by short-listing only those able to provide all the services identified and announcing that a single supplier was the preferred arrangement. The first supplier chosen would be automatically short-listed for the next area. Each submission would be examined on its own merits and as part of a total service package. Suppliers would undoubtedly make their submissions with this in mind. Sam Hall would gauge the scale of the changes brought about by winning the new account and the involvement of the three areas identified by the feasibility study as outsourcing candidates. The area least affected would be progressed and put out to tender first. Sam Hall would investigate and validate the effort team members were in a position to dedicate to the programme and replan. At the meeting, Sam Hall would seek confirmation from Maria Sella that expanding the business successfully took priority over the outsourcing programme. Sam Hall would report that, as a result of the new priorities, the schedule was unachievable along with the reasons. The revised plan of sequential projects would be presented, and the advantages outlined. Sam Hall would hold firm against attempts to accelerate the pace of the programme, citing the risks to business continuity and performance, and the impact on an already stretched and unenthusiastic organization.

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Level 4 conception Sam Hall holding a level 4 conception would appreciate the need for a switch in priorities, and the team members’ preference for doing their jobs rather than doing away with their jobs. Sam Hall would empathize with the view that making a success of the major new account was vital. Sam Hall would suspect that Maria Sella would have a similar opinion. The concern in Sam Hall’s mind would be that for many people in SSA&F winning the new account appeared to eliminate the need for the outsourcing programme. SSA&F was growing again, prospects were good, and the firm did not need to make painful savings. It was unlikely that the programme would be stopped, as many managers and staff secretly hoped, but it might suffer neglect and a lingering death. The need to improve operational effectiveness and/or reduce costs, though, would remain. The expertise provided by third-party suppliers could generate significant benefits for SSA&F. The ramp-up and the setting up of the new offices might further ingrain outdated and inefficient practices. The timing of the outsourcing programme within the context of other changes within SSA&F created both a challenge and an opportunity. The current schedule was neither achievable nor desirable. Team members were not committed, distracted by other work and other priorities. The organization would struggle to cope with the magnitude of change. The programme could be postponed until the organization achieved a more stable state, or at least got over the current peak in activity. The planned outsourcing projects could be undertaken in sequence or staggered. But servicing the new global account and growing its fledgling businesses in Russia, China, and India necessitated a step change in the operations of SSA&F. This might be an opportunity to explore in a more fundamental way how the firm should operate. The outsourcing programme was predicated on a static operational model and no growth at SSA&F. Outsourcing was resented and perceived as a threat by most people in SSA&F, and there was widespread skepticism that it could generate the desired benefits. Sam Hall would reflect that outsourcing could become one of a number of initiatives to improve operational effectiveness. Perhaps the outsourcing programme should be absorbed within a broader initiative of helping SSA&F make a step change in operations and performance. A new “operational effectiveness” programme could be promoted as supporting growth and vitality, rather than squeezing out process efficiencies.

Attitude to time At the meeting, Sam Hall would talk about how the programme team members were supporting the ramp-up and the setting up of new offices. Sam Hall would discuss with Maria Sella how SSA&F might capitalize on the new account and the implications for the future strategic direction of the firm. Sam Hall would suggest that it might be an opportune moment for a wide-ranging review of operations, of which the outsourcing programme would form part. Changes could be introduced gradually in line with plans for expansion, and so tap into the enthusiasm and goodwill generated by the growth in the business. While Sam Hall would be prepared to drive forward the outsourcing programme as envisaged, there would be inevitable delays. The outcome would tend to replicate, in a more efficient form, what SSA&F already had in place rather than build what the firm needed for the future. Considerable effort would also be required from Maria Sella to ensure commitments were met and covert resistance overcome at a time when there were other priorities.

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Attitude to funding

The eBanking Programme Andrea Vetti looked at the draft funding submission for the eBanking Programme and wondered how the Steering Committee would react to being asked to approve nearly 50m euros to replace the existing Internet banking channels for Corporate Banking. The total cost was nearly 10m euros more than originally budgeted and the financial analysis did not present an overwhelming case for the programme. The Internet Banking Suite Replacement (IBSR) Programme, the eBanking Programme’s predecessor, was initiated about nine months earlier due to concerns that TransBorder Bank’s Internet banking systems were becoming increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain. The systems had grown organically in response to requests from the business over the previous decade, and extensive customizations were undertaken rather than fundamentally changing the business processes. Software packages and solutions had been acquired to address specific business requirements and interfaces had been developed to the other systems within the Internet banking suite. Installing an upgrade of one of the packages typically entailed recreating the customizations and the interfaces, so upgrades were deferred or avoided if at all possible. However, the backlog of upgrades was growing and software vendors informed the bank that they had stopped, or would at some point stop, supporting their earlier releases. The increasingly dated suite of systems was also beginning to constrain TransBorder Bank’s international corporate banking operations. From being leaders in the field of Internet banking, the Bank had slipped behind the leading international banks. Senior managers within Corporate Banking seized the initiative and demanded that the IBSR Programme should not simply focus on saving operational and maintenance costs but be used as a way of creating world-class Internet banking channels. They claimed that such leading-edge capability was fundamental to achieving Corporate 226

Attitude to funding Banking’s growth targets and longer-term success. In case there was any residual doubt about the appropriate scope for the programme, they stated that within three to four years corporate payments and cash management business would be impossible to sell without a fully functioning and integrated Internet banking channel. TransBorder Bank absolutely needed a world-class, Web-enabled platform for corporate customers, where transactions could be made and business-critical information exchanged between the Bank and customers. Customers needed to be able to undertake daily financial activities and take up the full range of products and services over the Web in an easy, coherent, and consistent way. From being a relatively straightforward systems replacement programme contained within and funded by the Information Systems and Operations function, IBSR became the eBanking Programme and assumed considerably more complexity. Three to four years was just about enough time to replace the existing systems, but not develop the type of leading-edge capability being demanded. Asked what functionality they need to be competitive, managers within Corporate Banking started to create a “wish list” that was far broader than had been originally anticipated, and they were adamant that the solution should be as flexible and as future-proof as possible. The requests for additional functionality were justified in terms of customer retention and new business acquisition. The consensus was that TransBorder Bank had a reasonably loyal corporate customer base. The minor upgrades to the existing Internet banking suite envisaged in the absence of the programme would satisfy the majority of the smaller customers for the foreseeable future. However, multinational customers in particular had various banking relationships and would gradually transfer some or all their business if TransBorder Bank did not have the seamless functionality offered by the leading international banks. Multinational customers represented around 55% of Corporate Banking’s annual revenues (primarily commissions) of 125m euros and Corporate Banking would start to lose the revenues in about three years’ time. The analysis of new business acquisition suffered from a lack of reliable numbers. Attempts were made to estimate the volume of new business by prospect and incremental share of existing customers’ business over time and to assign subjective probabilities to these new revenue flows for each time period. The first iteration of this analysis suggested that the eBanking Programme would generate more than the 12% compound annual growth target set for the corporate banking operations. Senior managers within Corporate Banking, not wishing to be held to such business growth estimates, questioned the accuracy of the analyses. The volume of new business was reduced and deferred to later dates, and the probabilities

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Individual attributes associated with winning the business were also scaled down. However, it was clear to all that the estimates were largely guesswork and subject to political influence. Moreover, a bright financial analyst pointed out that both customer retention and acquisition would depend on a whole range of initiatives and actions undertaken by Corporate Banking, and could not be unequivocally attributed to the eBanking Programme. Andrea Vetti and the programme team calculated that delivering all the desired functionality would cost about 47m euros, excluding the 2m euros already spent. This cost included license fees, IT infrastructure/hardware, IT and non-IT development costs, and the required infrastructure services. They then estimated the likely recurring/maintenance costs for the new system, and projected the cost savings from decommissioning the existing suite of systems thus eliminating their maintenance and operations. A discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis was developed in conjunction with finance specialists and representatives from Corporate Banking. On the basis of cost savings alone the eBanking Programme did not stack up unless the savings were projected more than 10 years from the programme’s formal investment approval (following feasibility and definition), which was against the Bank’s appraisal guidelines. Andrea Vetti and the team reexamined the structure of the programme and the proposed content of the various releases. Apart from the initial core platform release, the content and timing of the subsequent releases could be changed. The core platform was intended to provide the underpinning for subsequent releases that would add functionality to the system. A tighter scope with fewer releases, along the lines originally envisaged for the original IBSR Programme, showed a small positive net present value (NPV). Andrea Vetti knew that a descoped version of the eBanking Programme would face strong opposition from senior managers within Corporate Banking. Hesitantly, the claims associated with retaining existing and acquiring new business were factored into the initial DCF analysis for the programme. After much debate a third of the 55% of the Bank’s annual revenues, accounted for by multinational customers, was assumed to be lost over a period of five years, starting from year 4 of the DCF analysis. Also, 2% new business growth was attributed to the eBanking Programme. (Both revenue estimates were adjusted to reflect net incremental cash flows.) These additions to the initial DCF analysis generated a positive NPV. Despite their involvement in the production of the DCF analysis, the finance specialists were reluctant to sign off the figures. They explained that the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) was examining every major investment proposal carefully. Funds for such large programmes were in short supply at present, and a number of smaller systems development projects had recently failed

Attitude to funding to deliver their business case benefits. Given the long payback period and an NPV of less than 30% of the total planned expenditure, this programme was “risky” according to the investment appraisal guidelines, and so attracted even more scrutiny. They did not want to be associated with a financial analysis they considered overly dependent on subjective estimates. Andrea Vetti mused whether the programme vision of creating a seamless, state-of-the-art distribution channel that would give TransBorder Bank a competitive edge over its slower, less technologically progressive rivals was anything more than wishful thinking.

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Assume you are Andrea Vetti: • How would you raise the issue of funding with the Steering Committee and how much funding would you ask for? • What factors or considerations have you taken into account in arriving at your course of action? Please take the time to write down your answers to these two questions before reading further, and reflect on your experiences of asking for funds for work that is expected to last a number of years. The remainder of the chapter will explain the attribute attitude to funding and explore possible interpretations of the scenario above from the perspective of the four levels of conception in the competence framework. The possible interpretations are not intended to be exhaustive, but are illustrative of the thoughts and actions of individuals holding different conceptions of their work.

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Attitude to funding Securing funds, or at least formal approval to use an organization’s scarce resources, is usually an important, and sometimes challenging, part of the work on projects and programmes. While sponsors may take the lead in making the formal submission to the relevant bodies, they typically look to their project or programme managers to advise on the sums involved and to assure them that the funds will be spent (allocated) wisely. Sometimes a formal assessment of the probability that the objectives can be achieved with the funds requested is required as part of the submission. Attitude to funding relates to how a project or programme manager thinks about and deals with funding issues. Someone holding a level 1 conception tends to see funding as the process of obtaining the necessary financial, and other, resources to undertake the project or programme. The process usually includes the development of plans, estimates of cost and benefits, and the creation of a business case. The allocated funds become the budget for the agreed scope of work. Someone with a level 1 conception diligently allocates and manages the budget, and tracks spend on the project or programme. Sometimes cumulative cost against actual progress (earned value analysis) is also calculated and tracked. Someone holding a level 2 conception is aware that there may be funding constraints and assesses the impact of any shortfalls on the scope of the project or programme – what can be achieved for different levels of funding. Someone holding a level 2 conception prioritizes scope or functionality in the face of funding constraints using some form of costs/benefit analysis, whether rough estimates or detailed financial calculations. The consequences of adverse situations (major risks) materializing on the project or programme are also analyzed and reported. Someone holding a level 3 conception knows that funds for projects and programmes can come from different sources or budgets, so the choice of projects and their scope and objectives are subject to political (parochial) considerations. Someone holding a level 3 conception exploits different sources (project versus operational budgets), or accounting treatments (capital versus operational spend). Caps on organizational spending limit the number of projects or programmes – a positive NPV or adequate return on investment is a necessary but not sufficient condition for approval and funding. Funds allocated at the start may not be available later when they

Attitude to funding are required, especially on projects and programmes that span multiple accounting periods. Someone holding a level 4 conception is conscious of funding ambiguities and uncertainties and addresses them by planning the work so it generates valuable results and benefits as soon as possible. The benefits are used to fund, or justify the funding of, additional work – reducing external dependencies for funds where possible. Tight linkages between the investment (funds) and the tangible benefits stream are used to sustain a programme’s integrity and momentum. These conceptual levels manifest themselves in different ways depending on the project/programme. In the following section the scenario at the beginning of the chapter is explored from the different conceptual levels.

Exploring conceptual levels in relation to the eBanking Programme The finance specialists may be reluctant to sign off the figures, but some form of analysis needs to be presented to the Steering Committee and the Chief Financial Officer to secure funds for the programme. Level 1 conception Andrea Vetti holding a level 1 conception would review the financial analysis and begin to structure a funding submission for the Steering Committee with two options. The first option would be based on a scope of work that reflected replacing the Internet banking suite with an up-to-date suite of systems. The replacement suite of systems would retain the existing functionality and enhance it where extra functionality was incorporated (as standard) in the component software packages. This would cost around 40m euros, which had been originally budgeted and was the basis on which the IBSR Programme was launched. The business case would show that the expenditure was (just) warranted on the basis of known and achievable costs savings. Any growth in business would be a bonus. The second option would include all the additional functionality, and redundancy, needed to develop the leading-edge, flexible, future-proof capability being demanded by Corporate Banking. The working assumptions used in the DCF analyses would be set out in the business case supporting the funding submission. Even if the financial case was not very robust, it was the best available based on the business retention and new business growth suggested by Corporate Banking. It would be up to the Steering

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Committee whether they believed the estimates and whether the scope should be increased or not. At the Steering Committee meeting, Andrea Vetti would report the costs of 2m euros incurred to date and set out the two options for the scope of the programme and their funding implications. A detailed breakdown of estimated cost would be provided to justify the total funds being asked for each option. The financial case of each option would be presented succinctly, citing the involvement of the finance specialists and representatives from Corporate Banking. Andrea Vetti would bring to the attention of the Steering Committee the limitations of the financial business case and that no attempt had been made to quantify intangible benefits such as image or reputation in the market. Andrea Vetti would state a willingness to work within the funding (budget) approved by the Steering Committee. Andrea Vetti would conclude by describing the processes and methods that would be employed to monitor and control expenditures on the programme. Level 2 conception Andrea Vetti holding a level 2 conception would want to be sure that the funding submission related to delivering essential functionality not frivolous requests. Andrea Vetti would meet with senior managers within Corporate Banking to review the requests for new functionality, explaining that, having costed all the elements of the programme, the total anticipated cost exceeded the original budget by about 10m euros. While there was a global business case that suggested a positive NPV, this was not robust and could be challenged by the Steering Committee. Andrea Vetti would ask for their concerted help to identify specific benefits associated with the various requests or programme elements. Apart from bringing the costs to their attention, the aim would be to force Corporate Banking to provide justifications for the requests one by one (or as close to one by one a possible) rather than offer a global justification. Andrea Vetti would expect a number of the items on the “wish list” to be dropped since they would not save or generate much additional revenue, or not enough to justify their costs. The process would also provide a way of prioritizing the development efforts. Given the scale and complexity of the work, the programme had to be shaped into manageable releases. Where technically feasible and consistent with the creation of a seamless system, the functionality that

Attitude to funding generated the greatest value could be undertaken first. The result would be a series of releases that would generate an early stream of tangible benefits through, as well as after, the life of the programme. Identifying and linking benefits to functionality would give the financial analyses greater rigor, even if the inputs still contained a large element of subjectivity. By eliminating low/no-value elements of the programme and bringing benefits forward in time through the release configuration, the NPV could be improved. Together this would provide a more robust business case. The analyses and release configuration would also provide the basis for the Steering Committee to reduce the scope of the programme if there were a funding constraint, or if the net benefit from certain functionality was deemed too low. The last releases, containing the least valuable elements, could simply be excluded. Whatever funding was approved, if problems occurred during the programme and insufficient contingency or additional funding could be found, the Steering Committee could simply cancel the last release(s). At the Steering Committee meeting, Andrea Vetti would report the costs already incurred. The release plan for the programme would be set out, with a brief description of the functionality in each release and the expected benefits. The financial case would be built up from the core platform release to the creation of a seamless, state-of-the-art Internet distribution channel. Andrea Vetti would critically review the financial analysis, sharing the concerns of the finance specialists, the variance associated with cost estimates, and the major risks that might (adversely) affect the programme. The formal funding submission would be for a sum (significantly) over 40m euros, to comply with the requirements discussed with senior managers in Corporate Banking. However, Andrea Vetti would acknowledge that the Steering Committee might want to take other intangible factors into consideration and/or might need to descope the programme in response to funding constraints or other priorities. Andrea Vetti would assure the Steering Committee that every effort would be made to generate the most benefits for TransBorder Bank for the funds allocated to the programme. Level 3 conception Andrea Vetti holding a level 3 conception would meet with senior managers within Corporate Banking to scrutinize the requests for additional functionality and possible sources of funds. It would be better if Corporate Banking

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Individual attributes showed some self-restraint now rather than have the Steering Committee, or worse still the CFO, reject the submission on the grounds that there was insufficient justification for anything more than a straight replacement of the existing suite of systems. If senior managers from Corporate Banking insisted on the merits of state-of-the-art Internet distribution channels, they would find it hard to resist pressure for higher growth targets. The finance specialists had probably already leaked some information on the “shaky” business case for the programme, so it would be best to presume that the CFO had heard something. Andrea Vetti would expect senior managers within Corporate Banking to prune the “wish list” ruthlessly and to prioritize the remaining requirements. Andrea Vetti would then discuss what funds Corporate Banking had available for the eBanking Programme that would create significant competitive advantage. Andrea Vetti would remind senior managers that the original IBSR Programme was funded by Information Systems and Operations, but had a much narrower scope. Perhaps funds could be reallocated by them from other Corporate Banking initiatives that were expected to create less value? Andrea Vetti would then work on shaping the programme into prioritized releases. Top priority would be given to replacing and decommissioning the existing suite of systems as quickly as possible. This would generate sure and tangible benefits for the programme, and would ensure that something of value would be delivered even if the programme were terminated in a few years because of some funding squeeze or downturn in business. Andrea Vetti would be aware that funding for such a longduration programme could only be provisional and would be reassessed at one or more later dates. If funds were still available the incremental functionality could be developed. In any case Corporate Banking would probably find some way of funding later releases if they became crucially important, whether as part of the programme or as “operational” enhancements. In preparing the funding submission, Andrea Vetti would identify the major (adverse) risks and calculate their individual and cumulative impact on the financial business case. This would provide the Steering Committee and CFO with a sense of how badly things had to go before the programme became an “unwise” decision. Andrea Vetti would also talk to key managers within the finance function to get an idea of how tight funding was and what other programmes and initiatives were competing for funds. If the NPV was not significantly positive and the investment ratio (NPV

Attitude to funding divided by the investment outlay) not better than other investment opportunities, the programme might be deferred or abandoned. Andrea Vetti might have to advise senior managers within Corporate Banking that some political pressure might need to be applied and that they had to make a forceful case for the intangible benefits. At the Steering Committee meeting, Andrea Vetti would present the business case along with summary financial metrics and the sensitivity and risk analyses based on the “replacement first” development/release strategy. The challenges in synthesizing a robust business would be reviewed and the efforts of senior managers within Corporate Banking would be applauded. Any direct contribution from Corporate Banking would be flagged as a sign of their confidence in the value of the programme. Some of the intangible benefits would also be presented and reviewed. The formal funding submission would be for a sum over 40m euros agreed with the senior managers in Corporate Banking. Andrea Vetti would assure the Steering Committee that the programme would first give TransBorder Bank a modern seamless Internet banking platform and ultimately a competitive edge over its slower, less technologically progressive rivals. Level 4 conception Andrea Vetti holding a level 4 conception would meet with senior managers within Corporate Banking to understand how corporate customers were using Internet technology, what they expected from an international bank, and what other banks were doing. Andrea Vetti would want to understand what world-class Internet banking channels really meant, the best route to achieving this, and how long TransBorder Bank really had to develop this capability. These insights would then inform discussions on the functionality required, the timescales, and the (un)certainty around the tangible and intangible benefits that were expected. The aim would be to arrive at an agreed set of prioritized requirements based on a strategic logic and direction. Andrea Vetti would urge senior managers from Corporate Banking to assemble some data or research to support their qualitative estimates about losing or gaining business as quickly as possible to underpin the financial analyses. The Steering Committee and the CFO would rightly scrutinize the business case of such a large and important programme, and the lack of objective data had to be brought to their attention in advance. It would be critical not to end up only with approval and funding for the default option of a straight replacement of the

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Individual attributes existing suite of systems. This would provide some tactical benefits in terms of cost saving but potentially foreclose the creation of any longer-term advantage for Corporate Banking. It would be a decade before TransBorder Bank could justify another major upgrade in capability, by which time competitors would probably have eroded the Bank’s market share and stolen its major international customers. Andrea Vetti would then work on the development of world-class Internet banking channels. The first phase of the eBanking Programme, comprising the core platform and other releases to replace the existing systems, had to provide the seamless platform and lower cost base to enable Corporate Banking to compete effectively in the near and medium term. Future phases would develop the incremental functionality to meet emerging customer requirements and establish a leading-edge capability. The design of the core platform was vital since it had to be broad and flexible enough to accommodate future developments that were not fully known. Andrea Vetti would consult IS specialists, within TransBorder Bank and externally, as well as software vendors to understand technological developments and trajectories. The core platform release would have inbuilt redundancy compared to a like for like replacement of the existing suite of systems. Subsequent releases would be designed to enable the early decommissioning of the existing systems, with some incremental functionality that was deemed urgent. The tangible cost savings would provide a reasonable underpinning for most of the funds requested for the first phase of the programme, and Corporate Banking would only have to substantiate a small stream of additional benefits to generate a positive and robust NPV. The decisions to proceed with subsequent phases and releases, and their content could be deferred for a few years. Corporate Banking could justify future spend based on the benefits generated from the first phase. Moreover, TransBorder Bank would then be better placed to know what customers wanted, what technological developments could be leveraged, and the scale of the benefits. Such an approach would also derisk the programme significantly from a commercial perspective. The operational cost savings would be relatively sure compared to retaining existing and acquiring new business. There were always (adverse) risks in a programme of this nature, but a tighter scope and potentially less time pressure would reduce them. At the Steering Committee meeting, Andrea Vetti would present the strategic logic for the programme, the phased approach, and the business case for the first phase of the eBanking Programme and submission for

Attitude to funding funding a little over 40m euros. The business case would be critiqued and major risks discussed. The preliminary content, timing, and business case for a later phase, broken into discrete releases, would also be reviewed. These, though, would need to be validated in terms of market and technological development and how they would enhance TransBorder Bank’s competitive edge over its rivals. Aware that funding could be curtailed or withdrawn, Andrea Vetti would stress that the benefits stream from the eBanking Programme, and the future competitive position of Corporate Banking, required the full scope of the first phase to be completed. If funding in future years could not be guaranteed, then it presented a significant threat to the economic viability of the programme. Future phases and releases could be deferred or cancelled, based on their individual merits (using better, more robust, and current information) and the successes of the first phase. Such a phased development would ensure the best use of TransBorder Bank’s scarce capital.

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PART THREE

Applications of the competence framework

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C H A P T E R 20

Applications of the competence framework

My colleagues and I embarked on the research that led the competence framework elaborated in the previous chapters with the specific intention of informing the selection and development of programme managers. We have had some successes and hope that more individuals and organizations will benefit from our work. The competence framework has been used successfully by various organizations to assess project and programme managers. The insights gained have been used, in conjunction with other information on the individuals, in assigning people to programmes and in filling organizational roles. The framework has informed personal development plans and the content and design of many management development interventions. It has also encouraged project and programme managers to reflect on how they perform their work. Exposure to the research and the framework gives individuals a glimpse of other considerations, other interpretations of actions and stances, and other ways of working. Awareness opens up possibilities. This chapter describes some of the applications of the competence framework and comments upon the challenges individuals face in making the transition from one conceptual level to another.

Selection The competence framework was first used for selection, and indirectly for development, in Lloyds TSB (Pellegrinelli et al., 2003). One of the organizations that participated in the competence research was Lloyds TSB Group plc, a major UK financial services company, and in particular the Group Project Services (GPS) division. At the time, GPS’s role was 241

242

Applications of the competence framework to provide change management support to the rest of the group, ranging from business analysis to managing complex strategic initiatives. The GPS Executive Team was keen to identify which programme managers had the competence or potential to handle the major strategic change mandated by the Group Board from their pool of experienced managers. The GPS Executive invited David Partington and me to design and facilitate a series of one-day development centers, building on the research, for a group of experienced programme managers. The aims were to determine the competence and potential of individual managers, and to inform their personal development. As it transpired, the experience and insights gained from the development centers also suggested broader initiatives for the GPS to increase the overall capability of the division and to redress specific cultural biases. The development center comprised an in-depth phenomenographic interview and two business simulations set broadly within a Lloyds TSB context. The interviews and simulations were jointly conducted by either David Partington or me and a senior manager from GPS, and were taperecorded and subsequently analyzed. For the interview a series of questions were devised to explore managers’ conceptions on eight of the attributes in the competence framework. Some of the questions were deliberately vague since we were interested in the way managers interpreted them. Most of the questions invited participants to recall specific instances from their experiences, both directly and based on observations of others. It was stressed to participants that they should try to describe meaningful instances and examples in answering the questions. The business simulations were designed to explore conceptions on the other attributes and some also covered by the interview. Participants were given short case studies and briefing notes, and were asked to enact two situations, with David Partington, the GPS senior managers and/or me acting as characters in the case studies. In the first five months of 2003, 35 managers participated in the development centers. A detailed feedback document was prepared for each participant, and reviewed with them at a debrief session, again jointly conducted by either David Partington or me and a senior manager from GPS. Given that most of the participating managers were at the same organizational grade, there was a surprising and unexpected variation in the levels of conceptions they held, varying from level 2 (bordering on a level 1) to level 4. Moreover, some perceived “highflyers” exhibited level 2 conceptions, while some respected, but not

Applications of the competence framework high-profile, programme managers exhibited level 4 conceptions. The senior GPS managers facilitating at the development centers and the debrief sessions found the approach both robust and insightful. In many cases these senior managers had known the participants for many years, but had not fully recognized their potential or had not been able to articulate sensed short-comings. An overall analysis of the performance of all the participating managers highlighted areas of relative weakness with GPS. For instance, during the simulations participants tended to ask relatively few questions and mostly to clarify the situation, despite being briefed beforehand, and invited during the simulation, to ask questions. These findings were discussed with GPS senior managers to explore the implication of what appeared to be a cultural bias. Other UK-based organizations have used development or assessment centers based on the model developed for Lloyds TSB. The original interview guide has been revised in the light of experience and tailored case studies have been developed. Assessment centers have informed the assignment of individuals to organization roles. Development centers have identified talented project and programme managers; they have been used to recruit people and they have helped to select individuals to be sponsored for Masters programmes. Senior managers have gleaned valuable insights into the competence of individuals. Participants have learned more about themselves and how they think about their work by being presented with a different “mirror” to observe and interpret their own conceptions and behaviors. They were stretched, and a little stressed, by the process. While the development and assessment centers have proved robust and insightful, they only provide snapshots of existing competence, and some insight into potential. These are only some inputs of what should be many inputs and criteria in making important decisions, such as recruitment and promotion. We have had to remind senior managers that the centers are based on a competence framework, and as such do not provide direct insights into factors such as ambitions, motivations, or integrity. However, much effort is made to embed the centers in the organization’s reality, they remain artificial and individuals may to some degree “put on a good show” or “suffer from stage fright.” We have also had to remind senior managers that the framework does not address competence in other roles. It is not intended to be, and is not reliable as, an indicator of the competence of an engineering manager or a purchasing manager.

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Applications of the competence framework

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Development The development centers used by Lloyds TSB identified the relative competence of individuals. They were also very helpful in informing the professional development of all those who participated. Considerable effort was taken in drafting detailed feedback to all the participants, and then explaining it to them personally. For many participants the feedback reinforced their own perceptions of their competence. Some individuals were disappointed about the feedback, but acknowledged its accuracy in terms of their performances generally and on the day. They valued the suggestions for personal development. In some cases, individuals had the opportunity to admit that they were comfortable operating at the level they were, and did not really want to take on the complex, highly political cross-divisional programmes. Others found the experience an opportunity to reflect, and some decided that change (programme) management was not what they wanted to do. At the feedback session participants were asked to identify what they wanted from GPS to help develop their competence, and a development plan was agreed. A wide range of requests and developmental actions came out of the feedback sessions, as shown in Table 20.1. The average number of interventions or action per participants was just under three, and three interventions in particular were mentioned by about half the development center participants. The opportunity to work on stretching programmes was most frequently requested. Participants felt that there was no substitute for the experience of engaging with the company’s most senior managers and dealing with complexity, ambiguity, and politics of a major programme. Mentoring was also asked for as a way of broadening their experience and gaining insights into how individuals with higher-order conceptions might approach specific situations. The third most popular request was access to courses, both those designed to facilitate a shift to higher-order conceptions and those targeted at specific aspects of the work or technical skills. The prioritization, as indicated by frequency of request, of the development interventions lines up remarkably closely to what would be important in helping individuals move from one conceptual level to another from a theoretical perspective. The attributes and levels are a map of mental constructs that underpin perception, experience, and action. The levels are not about the volume of abstract knowledge or the fluency with which an individual can recall the theory contained in manuals or methodologies.

Applications of the competence framework

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Table 20.1 Analysis of development interventions or actions following Lloyds TSB Development Centers Intervention or action Assignment Mentoring

Course(s) Shadowing

Coaching

Feedback Work style Readings Review

Secondment Network

Elaboration

Frequency

Percentage

Programme to develop competence and exposure to business/directors Senior GPS individual to share experiences/advise/act as a sounding board Find and attend courses on specific subjects or programme approach Shadow/observe a highly competent Programme Director in work situation(s) Professional/independent coach to improve specific aspects of performance Seek formal and informal feedback (e.g., 360 degree) Apply feedback and understanding of conceptions in approach to work Increase knowledge and awareness through texts/manuals/papers Review feedback/competence framework, and determine actions/aspirations Experiences of programme management outside Lloyds TSB Opportunity to share ideas and learn from others within GPS/Lloyds TSB

18

51

17

49

16

46

12

34

7

20

5

14

4

11

4

11

4

11

2

6

2

6

Total

91

Note: Number of participants was 35.

The levels are about how individuals perform their work – what they do. Experience – doing – is fundamental to embedding a new conception. Mentoring is important in sustaining an individual through a usually bumpy period of transition. Individuals have to experiment, to try new approaches, to observe the results and reactions, and to learn from their experiences. Not every attempt to perform the work in a different (hopefully better) way will succeed, not all consequences will be anticipated and some knocks

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Applications of the competence framework are inevitable. Good mentoring directs attention and provides support in the face of uncertainty, discomfort, and adversity. Hopefully, it dissuades individuals from retreating into the comfort of a familiar lower-order conception. Courses need to focus on shifting mindsets and need to be highly experiential. They must give participants the opportunity to practice, to experiment, and to stretch themselves in a risk-free learning environment. Frameworks, concepts, and ideas are necessary, but it is their application, on the course and in the workplace, that makes the real difference. Courses need to provide ways of fostering new concepts and new practices rather than making participants more proficient in their existing ways of working. My experience of facilitating Master classes and other courses in project and programme management for multinational organizations is that they can give participants a new perspective on their role, and a deeper understanding of how to bring about major strategic change. The aim is to initiate a shift in mindset. The competence framework informs the content and themes of the class. The challenge is to reveal, with care and sensitivity, the limitations of participants’ existing approaches and suggest more effective ways of performing their work. Business simulations or role plays based on actual projects and programmes are very powerful vehicles for learning, especially for experienced managers. In the simulations they have the opportunity to enact an ambiguous and stressful situation, and so experience first-hand the issues and challenges that it presents, and the possible outcomes of their ideas and actions. To get the most from the simulations, participants have to be persuaded to prepare for and handle the meeting as if it were a real meeting. They should not “act,” but focus on how they personally would address the situation. The situations and the facilitator’s action (in role) are engineered so participants’ normal, usually lower-order, approaches can make a difficult situation even worse. The debrief, led by the facilitator, offers a constructive critique of the way the situation was handled and offers alternative approaches. The competence framework can inform the possible alternative interpretations, considerations, and action strategies. Moving from one conceptual level to another entails, for many, a discontinuous step. It requires abandoning some behaviors and approaches that have served the individual well in the past. It usually requires more factors and issues to be considered and incorporated into a course of action. It usually requires more tolerance of uncertainty, more embracing of change, and more awareness of wider business influences. It usually means being

Applications of the competence framework more adept at improvising and drawing on a repertoire of skills, rather than applying a familiar prescribed methodology. The competence framework reflects learned behavior in relation to project and programme management work, not innate characteristics or psychological motivations or predispositions. The latter factors may have an effect on an individual’s willingness and ability to move from holding (and enacting) a conception to holding another conception further up the hierarchy, but no research has been conducted that explores whether any link exists. The common psychometric instruments tend to have different theoretical and philosophical groundings to phenomenography, and would not be directly comparable. There has not yet been the opportunity to track individuals systematically, but personal experience and anecdotal evidence suggests that not everyone progresses up the hierarchy of conceptions. As indicated by the Lloyds TSB and other development center feedback sessions, some individuals are comfortable operating at their current level and have no aspiration to take on more challenging work. They nonetheless add considerable value to their organization. Some intuitively know their limits and chose their assignments carefully and are successful in their roles. Some experiment with a new approach only to falter and, in the absence of support and encouragement, give up. Many, though, do shift from one conceptual level to another, and the beginnings of the change is perceivable even during the course of a week-long management development intervention.

Awareness Many project and programme managers are blissfully unaware that there might be another way of working. They have not been exposed to or made consciously aware of how else they might think and act as project or programme managers. Conceptions are coherent self-contained ways of perceiving, making sense of and acting upon an aspect of reality. Unaided, individuals cannot understand or explain others’ performance except from their own conception. Too often they polish their approaches without realizing a step change in their abilities. Despite many years’ experience in project and programme roles, numerous individuals who participated in the GPS development centers held lower-order conceptions. Their performance in their roles had not been in any way inadequate – they had simply approached their work in the way in which they conceived it, and that had been adequate.

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Applications of the competence framework Until you know what to look for, you cannot recognize level 4 or even level 3 behaviors. It might be that you now recognize level 4 behaviors in others or in the way you approach your work. Or, you might realize that the senior managers you interact with have entrenched lower-order conceptions. I have worked with many project and programme management practitioners, but have met relatively few who hold level 4 conceptions. Perhaps there are many, and they have not needed to attend the courses or development centers I facilitate. I hope you are more fortunate. By reading this book you have gained an exposure to the competence framework. Hopefully, reading the scenarios, addressing the questions posed, and studying the possible interpretations made you slightly more self-aware and highlighted limitations and blind spots. Hopefully you can see something of practical value to you in the competence framework. You may disagree with some of the interpretations or that the courses of actions emanating from higher-order conceptions are in any way “better.” But, the very act of crystallizing your views and your objections has moved you on. Your aspirations may have changed. The individuals you consider role models may have changed. The people from whom you would readily accept professional advice and guidance may have changed. You may want to make a step change in the way you perform your work. If so, reflecting is important, imagining how to apply the insights gleaned is important, but doing something differently is vital. Breaking through the “invisible ceiling” of a level of conception requires significant effort. Other nonroutine experiences are important, especially those that prompt deep reflection and the questioning of your taken-for-granted approach. If you decide to embark on the journey of acquiring and enacting a new conception, may I wish you the patience and the resolve to succeed.

Bibliography

Association for Project Management (APM) (2000). Body of Knowledge. APM, High Wycombe, UK. Association for Project Management (APM) (2006). Body of Knowledge. High Wycombe, UK: APM, 5th Edition. Balogun, J. and Hope Hailey, V. (1999). Exploring Strategic Change. London, UK: Prentice Hall. Balogun, J. and Hope Hailey, V. (2003). Exploring Strategic Change. London, UK: Prentice Hall, 2nd Edition. Bartlett, J. (2002). Managing Programmes of Business Change. Hampshire, UK: Project Manager Today Publications, 3rd Edition. Beckhard, R. and Pritchard, W. (1992). Changing the Essence: The Art of Creating and Leading Fundamental Change in Organizations, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Buchanan, D. and Boddy, D. (1992). The Expertise of the Change Agent: Public Performance and Backstage Activity. London, UK: Prentice Hall. Burns, T. and Stalker, G.M. (1961). The Management of Innovation. UK: Tavistock Publications. Ferns, D.C. (1991). ‘Developments in Programme Management’. International Journal of Project Management, 9, 148–156. Gadaken, D.O.C. (1994) Project managers as leaders: Competencies of top performers. Paper presented at 12th INTERNET World Congress on Project Management, Oslo, Norway. Gaddie, S. (2003). ‘Enterprise programme management: Connecting strategic planning to project delivery’. Journal of Facilities Management, 2, 2, 177–189. Gray, R.J. (1997). ‘Alternative approaches to programme management’. International Journal of Project Management, 15, 3, 5–9. Hamel, G. and Prahalad, C.K. (1994). Competing for the Future. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Lycett, M., Rassau, A. and Danson, J. (2004). ‘Programme Management: A critical review’. International Journal of Project Management, 22, 289–299. Marton, F. (1981). ‘Phenomenography – Describing conceptions of the world around us’. Instructional Science, 10, 177–200.

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Bibliography Marton, F. (1994). ‘Phenomenography’. In T. Husén and T.N. Postlethwaite (eds), The International Encyclopaedia of Education (2nd edition, vol. 8), pp. 4424–4429. Pergamon. Maylor, H., Brady, T., Cooke-Davies, T. and Hodgson, D. (2006). ‘From projectification to programmification’. International Journal of Project Management, 24 (2006), 663–672. Mintzberg, H. (1994). ‘The fall and rise of strategic planning’. Harvard Business Review, 70, January–February, 107–114. Murray-Webster, R. and Thiry, M. (2000). ‘Managing programmes of projects’. In J.R. Turner and S.J. Simister (eds), Gower Handbook of Project Management, pp. 33–46. Aldershot, UK: Gower. Office of Government Commerce (OGC) (2003). Managing Successful Programmes. London, UK: The Stationery Office. Office of Government Commerce (OGC) (2007). Managing Successful Programmes. London, UK: The Stationery Office. Partington, D., Pellegrinelli, S. and Young, M. (2005). ‘Attributes and levels of programme management competence: an interpretive study’. International Journal of Project Management, 23, 87–95. Pellegrinelli, S. (1997). ‘Programme management: Organising project based change’. International Journal of Project Management, 15, 3, 141–149. Pellegrinelli, S. (2002). ‘Shaping context: The role and challenge for programmes’. International Journal of Project Management, 20, 229–233. Pellegrinelli, S., Partington, D. and Young, M. (2003). ‘Understanding and assessing programme management competence’. PMI Congress 2003 – Europe, The Hague, The Netherlands. Pellegrinelli, S., Partington, D., Hemingway, C., Mohdzain, Z., Shah, M. and Stenning, V. (2006, May). ‘Helping or hindering? The effects of organisational factors on the performance of programme management work’. PMI Research Conference 2006, Montreal, Canada. Pellegrinelli, S., Partington, D., Hemingway, C., Mohdzain, Z. and Shah, M. (2007). ‘The importance of context in programme management: An empirical review of programme practices’. International Journal of Project Management, 25, 41–55. Project Management Institute (PMI) (2000). PMBOK: Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge. PMI, Upper Darby, PA: Project Management Institute. Project Management Institute (PMI) (2004). PMBOK: A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (3rd edition). PMI, Newtown Square, PA: Project Management Institute. Project Management Institute (PMI) (2006). The Standard for Program Management. PMI, Newtown Square, PA: Project Management Institute. Reiss, G. (1996). Programme Management Demystified. London, UK: E +FN Spon.

Bibliography Ribbers, P. and Schoo, K.-C. (2002). ‘Program management and complexity of ERP implementations’. Engineering Management Journal, 14, 2, 245–252. Sandberg, J. (1994). Human Competence at Work: An Interpretative Approach. Bas, Göteborg, Sweden. Sandberg, J. (2000). ‘Understanding human competence at work: An interpretative approach’. Academy of Management Journal, 43, 10, 9–25. Thiry, M. (2002). ‘Combining value and project management into an effective programme management model’. International Journal of Project Management, 20, 221–227. Vereecke, A., Pandelaere, E., Deschoolmeester, D. and Stevens, M. (2003). ‘A classification of development programmes and its consequences for programme development’. International Journal of Operations and Production Management, 23, 10, 1279–1290. Williams, D. and Parr, T. (2004). Enterprise Programme Management. UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Name Index

Balogun, J. 29 Bartlett, J. 6 Beckhard, R. 29 Boddy, D. 10 Buchanan, D. 10 Burns, T. 31 Ferns, D.C.

Parr, T. 15 Partington, D. 18 Pellegrinelli, S. 5, 10–11, 17, 31, 241 Prahalad, C.K. 29 Pritchard, W. 29

5

Gadaken, D.O.C. Gaddie, S. 15 Gray, R.J. 5 Hamel, G. 29 Hope Hailey, V. Lycett, M.

Office of Government Commerce (OGC) 3

19

29

8, 10

Marton, F. 20, 21, 32 Maylor, H. 4 Mintzberg, H. 8 Murray-Webster, R. 5

252

Reiss, G. 6 Ribber, P. 11 Sandberg, J. 20, 21, 22, 32 Schoo, K.-C. 11 Stalker, G.M. 31 Thiry, M.

5

Vereecke, A.

5, 11

Williams, D.

15

Subject Index

Acquisition Integration Programme 134–44 action, disposition for conceptual levels 63 definition 63 exploration of conceptual levels 64–9 scenario 59–62 adaptive intent conceptual levels 151–2 definition 151 exploration of conceptual levels 152–7 scenario 146–50 Association for Project Management (APM) 6, 19 Body of Knowledge (5th edition, 2006) Central Computing and Telecommunications Agency (CCTA) 7 communications, approach to conceptual levels 184–5 definition 184 exploration of conceptual levels 185–91 scenario 180–3 competence assessment 18 data collection 23 demand for 17 framework 25–7, 28, 29–30 hierarchical seniority 301 implication of research 28–31 interpretive approach 20–1 lack of 17–18 model 22, 24 research 18–28 scenarios 33–4 theory into practice 31–2 work conceptions 22, 24, 30 work-oriented 19 worker-oriented 19–20

6

competence framework application 241 awareness 247–8 business simulations/role play 246 courses 246 development 244–7 feedback 244 mentoring 245–6 moving from one conceptual level to another 246–7 prioritization 244 selection 241–3 stretching programmes 244 conflict-divergence conceptual levels 100–1 definition 100 exploration of conceptual levels 101–9 scenario 95–9 Core Banking Systems Programme 158–69 development-support conceptual levels 114–15 definition 114 exploration of conceptual levels 115–20 scenario 110–13 eBanking Programme 226–37 emotional attachment conceptual levels 52–3 definition 52 exploration of conceptual levels 53–8 scenario 48–51 Enterprise Resource Planning Programme 192–203 Enterprise Systems Programme 146–57 Equities Clearing and Settlement Outsourcing Programme (ECSOP) 170–9 expectations of others conceptual levels 138–9 definition 138 exploration of conceptual levels 139–44 scenario 134–7 253

Subject Index

254

funding, attitude to conceptual levels 230–1 definition 230 exploration of conceptual levels scenario 226–9 Global Managed Voice Up-grade Programme 59–69 governance, approach to conceptual levels 196–7 definition 196 exploration of conceptual levels 197–203 scenario 192–5 granularity of focus conceptual levels 40–1 definition 40 exploration of conceptual levels scenario 36–9

231–7

41–7

Information Systems Quality/Compliance Programme 180–91 inquiry, purpose of conceptual levels 127 definition 127 exploration of conceptual levels 128–33 scenario 121–6 Lloyds TSB 241–5, 247 Managing Successful Programmes (MSP) 7, 11, 12 Office of Government Commerce (OGC) 7 One World Programme 110–20 organization constraints, awareness of conceptual levels 162–3 definition 162 exploration of conceptual levels 163–9 scenario 158–61 phenomenography 20–1 programme management can-do pitfall 15 challenges/debates 8 codification 6–8 comparisons with project management 3–4 competitive/comparative advantage 9–10

and concurrent performance/learning loops 5 consensus concerning 7–8 decomposition pitfall 14 definition 5, 13 delineation pitfall 13–14 enterprise-wide pitfall 15–16 goal-oriented 5 heartbeat 5 history of 4–5 implications for practitioners/practice 11–12 importance of content/context 10–11 key elements 9 portfolio 5 project-based perspective 8–10, 12, 31 reexamining/reconceiving 16 strategic/tactical benefits 5 strategic-based perspective 8–10 text/context boundary 29 project management 2–4, 29 Project Management Institute (PMI) 6 Renewable Energy programme 48–58 Retail Bank Strategy Implementation Programme 95–109 risk, approach to conceptual levels 174–5 definition 174 exploration of conceptual levels 175–9 scenario 170–3 role plurality, approach to conceptual levels 75–6 definition 75 exploration of conceptual levels 76–81 scenario 70–4 Sales Function Transformation Programme 204–14 scope, attitude to conceptual levels 208–9 definition 208 exploration of conceptual levels 209–14 scenario 204–7 Secure Employee Programme 83–94 self-others relationship 83–144 self-programme environment relationship 145–237 self-work relationship 36–81 Services Outsourcing Programme 215–25 Site Modernization Programme 121–33

Subject Index Standard for Program Management, The (2006) 6, 11, 19 Systems Implementation Programme 36–47 team engagement conceptual levels 88 definition 88 exploration of conceptual levels scenario 83–7

89–94

time, attitude to conceptual levels 219–20 definition 219 exploration of conceptual levels 220–5 scenario 215–18 Urbansprawl Highways Maintenance/Management Service 70–81

255