Transforming NATO in the Cold War: Challenges Beyond Deterrence in the 1960s (Css Studies in Security and International Relations)

Transforming NATO in the Cold War Based on original documents from the archives of NATO and member nations, the 12 ess...

Author: Andreas Wenger | Christian Nuenlist | Anna Locher

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Transforming NATO in the Cold War

Based on original documents from the archives of NATO and member nations, the 12 essays in this collection focus on the expansion of NATO’s political role rather than its military and force planning functions. These essays show how, in the context of the Berlin crisis, NATO dealt with the twin challenges of Gaullism and détente, evolving into a more political and less hierarchical alliance later in the decade. Focusing on the multilateral dynamics of NATO’s political deliberations rather than on national policies, the book explores the role of small allies that could “wag the dog” and underscores the importance of democratic consensus in the successful reinvention of NATO in the 1960s. Integrating insights from social and cultural history, the book also examines the role of transnational groups in NATO’s transformation and shows that NATO’s nuclear dilemmas were driven as much by domestic and social changes as by technological factors and elite considerations. The conclusions about the resilience of political NATO highlight the importance of common norms and values, of institutional ﬂexibility and adaptability, and of transgovernmental and transnational groups to the cohesion of NATO in a period of a declining threat. This book will be of much interest to students of international history, Cold War studies, and strategic studies. Andreas Wenger is professor of international security policy and director of the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich. His latest publications include International Relations: From the Cold War to the Globalized World (2003). Christian Nuenlist is senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich. Anna Locher is senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich.

CSS studies in security and international relations Edited by Andreas Wenger and Victor Mauer Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich

War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War Threat perceptions in the East and West Edited by Vojtech Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger Transforming NATO in the Cold War Challenges beyond deterrence in the 1960s Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist, and Anna Locher

Transforming NATO in the Cold War Challenges beyond deterrence in the 1960s

Edited by Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist, and Anna Locher

First published 2007 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2007 editorial matter and selection Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist, and Anna Locher; individual chapters, the contributors All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Transforming NATO in the Cold War : challenges beyond deterrence in the 1960s / Edited by Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher. p. cm. – (CSS studies in security and international relations) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization–History–20th century. 2. Cold War. I. Wenger, Andreas. II. Nuenlist, Christian. III. Locher, Anna. IV. Series. UA646.3.T7328 2007 355'.03109182109046–dc22 2006013284 ISBN10: 0-415-39737-5 (hbk) ISBN10: 0-203-08884-0 (ebk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-39737-7 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-08884-5 (ebk)

Contents

List of contributors Preface Acknowledgments

vii x xii

PART I

Introduction 1 New perspectives on NATO history

1 3

ANDREAS WENGER, CHRISTIAN NUENLIST, AND ANNA LOCHER

PART II

The Atlantic community: the promise of alliance 2 The normative resilience of NATO: a community of shared values amid public discord

13

15

JEREMI SURI

3 Not a NATO responsibility? Psychological warfare, the Berlin crisis, and the formation of Interdoc

31

GILES SCOTT-SMITH

4 Beyond NATO: transnational elite networks and the Atlantic alliance

50

THOMAS W. GIJSWIJT

PART III

NATO, de Gaulle, and détente 5 Into the 1960s: NATO’s role in East–West relations, 1958–63 CHRISTIAN NUENLIST

65 67

vi

Contents

6 Through the looking glass: the Berlin crisis and Franco-American perceptions of NATO, 1961–63

89

ERIN MAHAN

7 A crisis foretold: NATO and France, 1963–66

107

ANNA LOCHER

PART IV

Nuclear dilemmas: NATO consultation and social protest 8 Diverging perceptions of security: NATO, nuclear weapons, and social protest

129

131

HOLGER NEHRING

9 From hardware to software: the end of the MLF and the rise of the Nuclear Planning Group

148

ANDREW PRIEST

10 NATO and the Non-Proliferation Treaty: triangulations between Bonn, Washington, and Moscow

162

OLIVER BANGE

PART V

Changing domestic perspectives on NATO

181

11 Striving for détente: Denmark and NATO, 1966–67

183

JONATHAN SØBORG AGGER

12 A decade of delusions and disappointments: Italy and NATO in the 1960s

201

LEOPOLDO NUTI

PART VI

Conclusion

219

13 NATO’s transformation in the 1960s and the ensuing political order in Europe

221

ANDREAS WENGER

Index

243

Contributors

Jonathan Søborg Agger is currently head of section within the Danish Ministry of Defense. Until late 2005, he was a researcher at the Department of Cold War Studies at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Copenhagen. From 2001 to 2005, he worked on DIIS’s government commissioned White Paper on Danish security policy from 1945–1991, Denmark during the Cold War (2005). His articles on Danish security policy during the Cold War have appeared in Contemporary European History and the Danish Historisk Tidsskrift. Oliver Bange is a senior researcher at the University of Mannheim, working on the international project “Ostpolitik and Détente.” He holds a Ph.D. in modern history from the London School of Economics (1995). He is the author of The EEC Crisis of 1963: Kennedy, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Adenauer in Conﬂict (Macmillan, 2000) and of several book chapters and articles. He completed his Habilitationsschrift on Ostpolitik and Détente in Europe, 1966–69 in 2004. Thomas W. Gijswijt is a Curt Engelhorn Ph.D. scholar at the University of Heidelberg. He holds an MA in modern history from the University of Amsterdam and was a visiting scholar at Columbia University in 2001–02. He is currently writing a history of the Bilderberg Group during the ﬁrst half of the Cold War. Anna Locher is senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich. Her research interests cover transatlantic relations, the modern history of Finland, and the role of language in history. Her publications include articles on Canada and NATO and NATO’s search for a new role in the 1960s in International Journal and Journal of Transatlantic Studies. She is currently completing a monograph on NATO’s management of intra-bloc dissent in the 1960s. Erin Mahan is chief of the Asia and Americas Division at the Historian’s Ofﬁce of the US Department of State and a research historian at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia. She is the author of Kennedy, de Gaulle, and Western Europe (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) and an

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associate editor of The Great Crises: The Presidential Recordings Series of John F. Kennedy (Norton Press, 2001). Her articles have appeared in Diplomatic History, The Journal of Economic Integration History, and American Diplomacy. She is currently editing three volumes of The Foreign Relations of the United States. Holger Nehring is lecturer in contemporary European history at the University of Shefﬁeld, UK. He was Rhodes scholar at the University of Oxford, lecturer in modern history at University College and Pembroke College, and junior research fellow at St. Peter’s College, University of Oxford. His articles have appeared in Cold War History, Contemporary British History, Zeithistorische Forschungen, and Historical Social Research. He is currently working on a monograph on the comparative history of the British and West German protests against nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 1960s. Christian Nuenlist is senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich. His research focuses on transatlantic relations, the history of détente, and Swiss foreign policy during the Cold War. He is the author of a political biography of McGeorge Bundy in the Kennedy years (1999) and of articles in International Journal and Journal of Transatlantic Studies. He is currently working on a monograph on Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Political Cooperation in NATO: Western Reactions to Khrushchev’s Foreign Policy, 1955–1963. Leopoldo Nuti is professor of the history of international relations at the University of Rome III. He is the author of Gli Stati Uniti e l’apertura a sinistra, 1953–63 (Laterza, 1999) as well as the editor of International Crises and Diplomatic Sources (1998) and Dividing the Atom: Essays on the History of Nuclear Proliferation in Europe (1998). His articles have appeared in Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali, Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Relations Internationales, and Contemporary European History. Andrew Priest is a lecturer in international politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Birmingham, UK. His main areas of research interest are the history of US foreign policy and US–UK relations. His articles have appeared in the Journal of Military History and Contemporary British History. His book Kennedy, Johnson and NATO: Britain, America and the Dynamics of Alliance is due to be published by Routledge in 2007. Giles Scott-Smith is senior researcher with the Roosevelt Study Center in Middleburg, Netherlands. He has published The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA, and Post-War American Hegemony (Routledge, 2001) and, with Hans Krabbendam, The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe 1945–60 (Frank Cass, 2003). His articles have appeared in Diplomacy & Statecraft, Journal of Contemporary History, and Intelligence and National Security. His research interests cover Cold War

Contributors ix public diplomacy and transatlantic relations, and he is now completing a book on the Foreign Leader Program in Western Europe. Jeremi Suri is associate professor of history at the University of Wisconsin. He received his Ph.D. from Yale University in 2001 and was awarded the John Addison Porter Prize for the best dissertation in the humanities and the Hans Gatzke Prize for the best dissertation in international history. He is the author of Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Harvard University Press, 2003). He has published articles in International Security, Journal of Cold War Studies, Cold War History, Diplomatic History, and Contemporary European History. Andreas Wenger is professor of international security policy and director of the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich. His main research interests are in security and strategic studies and the history of international relations. His publications include International Relations: From Cold War to the Globalized World (Lynne Rienner, 2003), and Living with Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nuclear Weapons (Rowman & Littleﬁeld, 1997). He has published articles in Journal of Cold War Studies, Cold War History, Presidential Studies Quarterly, and Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte.

Preface

In August 2004, the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich sponsored a conference on NATO in the 1960s. The theme centered on the changes in NATO from a US-dominated military alliance in the 1950s to a more political relationship in which the European allies loomed larger than they had in NATO’s ﬁrst decade. This is not a new perception; NATO historians over the years have recognized the ways in which the organization has evolved from its inception in 1949. What distinguishes this book from other contributions to NATO scholarship in this decade are new approaches to the 1960s, ranging from newly accessible sources to innovative concepts. First, the scope and depth of research in the archives have increased. The authors have taken full advantage of records that were not available to earlier historians. Among the sources tapped are the NATO archives opened in the past few years. Although the records are not complete, they cast light on key problems of the 1960s. As the Cold War recedes into the past, member nations have quickened the pace of declassiﬁcation of documents relating to the alliance. The language capabilities necessary to exploit these opportunities are present in abundance among the contributors to this collection. Second, the focus of this volume is not on the familiar Soviet–US or NATO–Warsaw Pact confrontations but on the transformation of the alliance in the 1960s from the military orientation of the 1950s to a more nuanced relationship that modiﬁed some of the disparities between Europe and the United States. The Cold War did not dissolve, as some historians believed likely in the 1960s. But its hold over the alliance dissipated after the end of the Cuban and Berlin crises. The subsequent relaxation of tensions between East and West permitted the inﬂuence of transnational groups to interact with the national interests of NATO members. Transforming NATO – to use the language of the title – meant giving voice to the smaller nations as the Wise Men’s advice of 1956 became the accepted wisdom of the Harmel report in 1967. It is noteworthy that the United States, while not invisible in the book, does not dominate its chapters. Third, US scholars working on the 1960s are conspicuous by their absence. Out of 12 studies in this volume, representing scholars from eight NATO countries and three from Switzerland, only two are from the United States. The question arises: why are there not more? This is a subject I have addressed in the

Preface xi past, particularly in an American Historical Association Newsletter on the occasion of NATO’s 25th anniversary and at a conference in Kansas City on the occasion of the alliance’s 40th anniversary.1 In 1974, and again in 1989, I found reasons for the relative lack of interest among US historians in NATO’s history: the treaty initially was subsumed as a subject of research under the Truman Doctrine; NATO was an ongoing alliance with no immediate termination in sight; and archival records were not available. These deterrents are not valid today. Interest in NATO as an institution is no more alive among US scholars than it was a generation ago. That there is a wealth of material open to scholars and a variety of new interpretations possible is made clear in this book. Fortunately, European scholars have recognized what their US counterparts have neglected. I like to think the intellectual excitement a book of this quality should generate might revive NATO scholarship in the United States. Lawrence S. Kaplan Director Emeritus, Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center for NATO and European Union Studies, Kent State University Professorial Lecturer in History, Georgetown University

Note 1 “After Twenty-Five Years: NATO as a Research Field,” American Historical Association Newsletter 12 (November 1974), pp. 6–7; “After Forty Years: Reﬂections on NATO as a Research Field,” in NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe, ed. Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), pp. 15–23.

Acknowledgments

This book evolved in the context of the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP: www.isn.ethz.ch/php). In an attempt to shed new light on the achievements and failures of the two Cold War alliances, the PHP brings together a network of scholars and academic institutions to collect, analyze, and interpret formerly classiﬁed documents from Eastern European and NATO records. In 1999, the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, as one of the founding members of the PHP, initiated an international NATO history project that aimed at providing new scholarly perspectives on the transformation of NATO from the US-dominated military alliance of the 1950s to the more political and participatory alliance of the late 1960s. The opening of the NATO archives in 1999, together with the release of documents in NATO member archives, promised a wealth of new material for such a project. The research for the chapters in this book was originally undertaken for a conference held at the ETH Zurich in August 2004 that brought together an extensive mix of leading NATO scholars and young academics from ten countries. The original texts were rewritten based on the discussion during the conference and the editor’s comments. Thus, this book represents the ﬁnal product of what for us has been an exiting and stimulating collaboration among a group of friends and colleagues. We have been extraordinarily fortunate to have been assisted by many people and in a variety of ways, from the development of the conference concept through to the publication of the book. We thank Lawrence Kaplan, Gustav Schmidt, and Vojtech Mastny for sharing their insights at the conference. We would like to thank all the conference participants who presented their views and provided useful comments. In addition to the authors of this volume, they are Bruna Bagnato, Ralph Dietl, Vincent Dujardin, Daniele Ganser, Robin Gendron, Mary Halloran, Oliver Benjamin Hemmerle, Michael Kieninger, Ine Megens, Daniel Möckli, Erwin Schmidl, Heide-Irene Schmidt, David Tal, and Bruno Thoss. Many of the book’s chapters have drawn on sources from the NATO archives in Brussels. While all archive staff members have been unfailingly helpful to all of us, we wish to extend our special thanks to Paul Marsden for sharing his insights with the group gathered at the conference in August 2004. Our thanks

Acknowledgments xiii go also to Jennifer Gassmann and Thomas Holderegger from the Center for Security Studies for their invaluable help with the organization of the conference. We are delighted that our project ended up in the capable hands of Andrew Humphrys at Routledge, who has handled the review and production process with great skill. We wish to extend our thanks also to Victor Mauer, the coeditor of the CSS Studies in Security and International Relations series, for his support of the project. Finally, we thank Michelle Norgate and Christopher Findlay for their excellent editorial assistance. While we are indebted to all those mentioned above, the ﬁnal responsibility for any errors is ours alone. Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist, and Anna Locher Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich Zurich, 31 January 2006

Part I

Introduction

1

New perspectives on NATO history Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist, and Anna Locher

This book about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the 1960s concentrates on the political dimension of the alliance. Most studies on NATO have centered on the alliance’s deterrence and defense functions, that is, on how changing perceptions of the Soviet threat and the military balance informed NATO’s debate on military strategy and force planning. Far less attention has been paid to how NATO evolved into a forum of political consultation and cooperation and how it reacted to the challenges beyond deterrence that culminated in a debate about the future political order in Europe. NATO’s political roles go back to the foundation of the alliance itself and are rooted in the unsettled nature of the postwar order in Central Europe. The alliance’s role in keeping the Anglo-Saxon powers engaged on the continent and in ensuring West German integration into an emerging Europe is well documented.1 By the mid1960s, however, the key political challenges had shifted from keeping “the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down” (Lord Ismay) to designing political structures that would allow the multilateralization of détente and accommodate the demands of an economically revived and politically more assertive Europe. The 1960s are the crucial decade for studying the political dimension of NATO, not least because at the time the future of the alliance seemed uncertain. As NATO’s twentieth anniversary in 1969 approached, one member – France under President Charles de Gaulle – seriously seemed to consider using its right under Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty to cease its alliance membership. De Gaulle’s opposition to military integration and central nuclear control is also well documented. At the heart of the Gaullist challenge to NATO, however, was the questioning of NATO’s political legitimacy: was NATO, dominated by the United States, the right political forum for achieving German and European unity, for proceeding with détente with Eastern Europe, and for negotiating a lasting European settlement? De Gaulle was convinced that the Europeans had to assume political leadership outside of NATO’s structures.2 The fact that policy makers in Bonn and other European capitals at times raised the possibility of dissolving NATO and the Warsaw Pact as an alternative model for designing a new European order stirred considerable anxiety in NATO’s corridors. The founders of the alliance, in the context of the early Cold War, had not

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conceived NATO in the tradition of a classical defense coalition of sovereign states. NATO was founded as an alliance of like-minded states with a common heritage – shared democratic values and common interests – that combined the defense of values with the defense of territory.3 The North Atlantic Treaty represented a compromise between the European aim of securing US guarantees to deter and defend Western Europe in case of a Soviet military attack, on the one hand, and Washington’s goal of encouraging (Western) Europe’s economic reconstruction and democratization as a means of curbing Soviet political inﬂuence in Europe, on the other.4 It was the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 that catalyzed NATO’s militarization. The Korean War shifted the focus from the political to the military ﬁeld – from Soviet intentions to Soviet capabilities – thus jumpstarting a process of military integration that resulted in the buildup of a centralized command structure and the nuclearization of NATO. The evolution of NATO’s strategic thinking dominated NATO’s cooperative efforts for the remainder of the 1950s.5 Policy makers at that time – like scholars in later periods – paid much less attention to the expansion of NATO’s political functions and consultative procedures than to the development of its military and force planning efforts. While the peaceful coexistence policy of Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev put the issue of how to approach détente onto NATO’s agenda in 1955–56, a series of international crises in Asia and the Middle East, along with a growing perception that the locus of the East–West confrontation was shifting from Europe to the global south, led to conﬂict among the allies over “out-of-area” issues. As a consequence, the perception took hold within NATO that the changing patterns of East–West as well as West–West conﬂicts demanded a strengthening of the political dimension of the alliance. The 1956 exercise and report of the “Three Wise Men” represented a ﬁrst attempt to strengthen NATO as a forum for transatlantic political consultation and cooperation – a development that was met with French opposition once de Gaulle had returned to power in June 1958.6 By the end of its ﬁrst decade, NATO had entered a phase of transition that led to a widespread perception of crisis and a pronounced public and governmental debate about the future of the alliance. Disagreement over NATO’s political role built up through the Berlin and Cuban missile crises and erupted in January 1963, when de Gaulle announced his veto to Britain’s admission to the Common Market, rejected US Polaris missiles, and signed a treaty of friendship with German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. The malaise of the mid-1960s revolved around such important questions as the management and application of nuclear power, out-of-area issues – including Vietnam – and the perception of a decreasing Soviet threat. Once France had left NATO’s military structures in the spring of 1966, the transformation of NATO into a more political and less hierarchical alliance became possible. The new balance between its military and its political functions, as recorded in the public statement of the landmark 1967 Harmel report, would carry NATO into the post-Cold War world.7 This book distinguishes itself from earlier studies in that it focuses on topics pertaining to NATO’s political dimension and in that it invites an assessment of

New perspectives on NATO history 5 the alliance’s role in the debate and design of a new political order in Europe. In general, the evidence presented here broadens the scope of existing analyses in at least three ways: ﬁrst, most of the authors have beneﬁted from the release of new archival material. Since the opening of NATO archives in 1999, a wealth of newly declassiﬁed material on NATO has become available in Brussels, as well as in many archives of the member states. Studies on the history of NATO require multinational and multi-archival research, as demonstrated by the exemplary multi-volume project on the history of NATO from 1949 to 1956, launched by the Military History Research Institute (MGFA) in Germany in the 1990s.8 This fresh scholarship on NATO at times challenges earlier readings of the alliance and reveals the valuable contribution of new sources and perspectives to a fuller appreciation of the complex intra-West interactions during the Cold War. Second, in an attempt to complement research focusing primarily on the NATO policies of key member states, the contributions of this volume explore the multilateral dynamics of NATO’s political deliberations. Analyses of NATO as a multilateral forum for political consultation tend to shift the focus from the East–West conﬂict to the West–West conﬂict and from a situation where the superpowers had the initiative to a situation where the small allies seized the opportunity to “wag the dog.” Trans-governmental coalitions emerged that shaped the political agenda, sometimes with a decisive impact on the domestic policy making process of key member states.9 Third, integrating insights gained in other ﬁelds of study, such as international relations and social and cultural history, some of the chapters of this book examine the perceptions of transnational actors. Investigations into transatlantic elite networks and anti-nuclear protest movements can enrich our understanding of NATO’s political impact. Arguably, the transformation of NATO was driven as much by domestic political and social changes as by great power policy initiatives.10 The book consists of four main sections. Part II analyses NATO as a pluralistic security community (Karl Deutsch) and discusses the extent to which NATO’s survival beyond the 1960s was the result of a common political culture. Introducing the section, Jeremi Suri argues that a set of shared values, which transcended the actions of US and West European leaders, allowed for the continued prosperity of NATO into the 1970s. According to Suri, the alliance fulﬁlled two vital political functions during the second half of the Cold War. One the one hand, NATO provided a vehicle for overcoming the unavoidable disunity of the Western states by assuring acceptable West German participation in European politics, by keeping the United States and Britain engaged militarily and politically on the European continent, and by facilitating the emergence of a West European identity. On the other hand, the alliance successfully leveraged the political order among the Western states as the basis for building new bridges to Soviet-dominated Europe, in effect legitimizing the process of East–West normalization. By the late 1960s, Suri concludes, NATO’s commitment to democratization and détente had proved as important as the military functions that had underpinned the initial formation of the alliance.

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NATO politicians were in fact concerned about the alliance’s democratic image, which was very much at stake in its handling of the delicate psychological warfare issue. Roused by the Berlin crisis and West German fear of isolation, Bonn proposed at the end of the 1950s the development of an offensive political warfare capability within the NATO structure. West Germany’s proposal, Giles Scott-Smith notes, transcended NATO’s established political role and radically challenged the identity of the alliance. But since London opposed a psychological warfare agency within NATO, and since Washington’s reaction was only lukewarm, Bonn proposed to work through an independent private group. As Scott-Smith demonstrates, the establishment of the private and transnational “Interdoc” network provided the West Germans with an outlet for their concerns about Eastern bloc propaganda, in effect giving them an alternative to an offensive psychological warfare capability within NATO. Within the alliance, psychological warfare remained in the hands of the military for use in times of conﬂict only. Psychological warfare never made it into a formal NATO body, Scott-Smith concludes, because it clashed with NATO’s democratic values. Transatlantic elite networks, Thomas W. Gijswijt argues in his contribution, were a key characteristic of the Atlantic political culture. Elite networks like the Bilderberg Group were deeply concerned about the cohesion of the alliance, and with their activities they contributed to Western unity and to a basic consensus on transatlantic cooperation. Gijswijt traces the inﬂuence of this private informal network of high-level policy makers on NATO decision making, demonstrating how the Bilderberg Group played a key role in forming the international response to the Franco-German treaty. Supplementing rather than replacing ofﬁcial NATO gatherings and procedures, the Bilderberg conventions, according to Gijswijt, formed part of the overall fabric of the Atlantic alliance. Transatlantic elite networks provided Washington with an effective instrument to legitimize its leadership role while offering the Europeans an opportunity to understand and inﬂuence US policy. The participants’ list of the Bilderberg meetings, which included such inﬂuential NATO personalities as Washington’s Undersecretary of State George Ball and NATO Secretary-General Dirk Stikker, conﬁrms the important role of the network in shaping ad hoc coalitions that could be used as leverage to inﬂuence national policy making. Part III deals with the two challenges – Gaullism and détente – that resulted in a fundamental disagreement about the legitimacy of NATO’s political role. De Gaulle’s demand that NATO move to a tripartite directorate – which challenged the United States and embarrassed and infuriated the smaller allies – put the issue of the alliance’s political leadership up for discussion. And Khrushchev’s Berlin ultimatum brought conﬂicting détente policies to the fore, which in fact seemed to prove that incompatible visions of Europe’s future had emerged within the alliance. Within this context, Christian Nuenlist discusses the political debates among NATO ambassadors in Paris and NATO foreign ministers from 1958 to 1963. Political consultations on the Berlin crisis and on the related issue of East–West détente revealed serious intra-bloc tension among Western allies. Nuenlist argues that NATO political consultations dramatically

New perspectives on NATO history 7 deteriorated in the second half of 1959, both because of de Gaulle’s anti-NATO stance and because of Eisenhower’s policy of bilateral détente with Khrushchev. Reconciling superpower détente and alliance politics became increasingly difﬁcult for the United States as NATO’s hegemonic leader. Comparing Eisenhower’s record of political consultation with NATO on East–West relations with Kennedy’s, Nuenlist concludes that Kennedy was more successful than Eisenhower in managing détente within the NATO forum. In addition, SecretaryGeneral Dirk Stikker’s handling of the NATO Council encouraged substantial multilateral political debates within NATO, whereas the restless efforts of his predecessor Paul-Henri Spaak to improve political cooperation within NATO produced less concrete results. Erin Mahan narrates the battle between Kennedy and de Gaulle over power politics, international economics, and NATO strategy in the context of the escalating Berlin crisis. Mahan offers a comprehensive account of how the Berlin crisis led to the emergence of incompatible, if nebulous, US and French visions for the future of Europe. The Berlin crisis convinced de Gaulle that France would have to withdraw from military NATO, once the direct threat to the city had passed, and it bolstered his determination to veto Britain’s membership application to the Common Market as a means of minimizing Anglo-Saxon inﬂuence in Bonn. In Washington, by contrast, tension over Berlin persuaded Kennedy that a war with the Soviet Union could be avoided only through his grand design of a uniﬁed Western Europe, tightly bound economically and militarily to the United States. Mahan blames both leaders for establishing too many linkages between economic policy and security policy – connecting nuclear sharing with British entry into the Common Market – so that the two policy areas became difﬁcult to separate. The question of how NATO insiders coped with the alliance’s internal crisis between 1963 and 1966 is the topic of Anna Locher’s chapter. The French stance in NATO triggered crisis perception and “crisis talk” at NATO’s routine political meetings, and among NATO and national ofﬁcials from January 1963 on. This talk anticipated, and prepared the alliance for coping with, the 1966 crisis following France’s withdrawal from NATO’s military command. While de Gaulle used Secretary-General Manlio Brosio as a channel for informing the allies about his next moves, small allies, led by Canada and Belgium, initiated a debate about the future of the alliance that paved the way for the understanding that NATO was necessary beyond 1969 and would continue, even if France were to leave the alliance. NATO’s multilateral discussions were an expression of the general malaise that had beset the alliance since the early 1960s and thus highlighted the need for reform. But at the same time, Locher emphasizes, this West–West bargaining process produced methods of crisis management and a set of ideas that proved instrumental to the successful transformation of NATO towards the end of the decade. Part IV addresses NATO’s perennial nuclear dilemmas. The focus of the three chapters, however, is neither on the evolution of NATO’s nuclear strategy nor on the history of the Multilateral Force (MLF).11 Rather, the contributions in

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this volume concentrate on the political aspects of NATO’s nuclear challenge, exploring the role of anti-nuclear protest movements, the delicate balance of political interests in the evolution of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), and the interconnection between NATO’s nuclear sharing schemes and the negotiation of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Addressing the nuclear issue from the perspective of social history, Holger Nehring locates the fundamental dilemma of the alliance in the diverging perceptions of security within Western societies from 1955 on. For the anti-nuclear weapons protesters, Nehring argues, NATO’s nuclearization would not contribute to a “long peace” (John Lewis Gaddis). Analyzing the discussion of NATO within the protest movements against nuclear weapons in Britain, West Germany and France, Nehring is struck by the degree to which the protest movements framed NATO’s nuclear issues as national problems. While Britain and West Germany both experienced largescale anti-nuclear protest movements between 1955 and 1963, France had no strong protest movement. This can be explained by de Gaulle’s unilateral nuclear policy, which became the symbol for the stabilization of the French state. While protesters in all countries regarded the NATO crisis as severe, only a vocal minority among them in Britain and France wanted their countries to leave NATO. By 1963, in the wake of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the antinuclear weapons protest movements began to transform into broader protest movements that cumulated in the violent protests of 1968. The long petering out of the MLF project and the parallel, initially almost unrecognized rise of the NPG is the subject of Andrew Priest’s chapter. The campaign of the MLF “theologians” in the State Department to bind West Germany more permanently into the alliance through the MLF is well-known. Priest argues that support for the MLF remained only lukewarm in many countries because the question of control – of central importance to national nuclear sovereignty – was never solved and because the MLF was perceived as antidétente in the domestic political debates of some NATO countries. After the unofﬁcial demise of the project in December 1964, US Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara introduced, in May 1965, the idea of a select committee of NATO defense ministers to discuss nuclear problems and to share expertise in the nuclear ﬁeld. Gradually, West Germany was won over to the idea, the demands of the smaller allies that the new committee would not be a trilateral affair were accommodated, and the Soviet Union decided not to oppose a “software solution.” The NPG, Priest concludes, represented a signiﬁcant change in NATO’s political and military structures that facilitated a consensus on ﬂexible response and made progress on the NPT possible. Connected with the issue of NATO’s nuclear sharing, if much broader in scope and with wider-ranging implications, was the search for a nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Examining the “triangulations” between Bonn, Washington, and Moscow that were necessary to make the NPT possible, Oliver Bange notes that a majority of European statesmen saw the NPT as a means to perpetuate Germany’s non-nuclear status. While Johnson had decided by late 1966 to move ahead with bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union and

New perspectives on NATO history 9 had confronted the allies with the Soviet–US draft treaty as a fait accompli, policy makers in Washington and elsewhere realized that West Germany had to be compensated by an expansion of its role in NATO’s nuclear policy making that would at least amount to limited sovereignty over nuclear weapons on German soil. Given this context, Bange argues, the nuclear ambitions of the ruling conservatives in Bonn and their opposition to the NPT became an obstacle to both the NPT and Ostpolitik. Progress became possible only after Willy Brandt, who understood that the success of his Ostpolitik depended on West Germany’s participation in the NPT, had won the West German elections of September 1969. Bange thus shows how the NPT negotiations and the parallel rise of the NPG legitimized NATO’s political role and facilitated the reconstitution of political NATO. Part V of the book addresses the perception of NATO in the domestic politics of selected member states and the impact of these domestic perceptions on national policies within the alliance. Jonathan Søborg Agger examines the factors that motivated the Danish government to promote NATO’s role as an instrument for peace. At the request of the United States, Denmark suggested that NATO should promote East–West détente, and it proposed a European security conference in May 1966. The Danish initiative was partly driven by a genuine interest in détente – prompted by an increased interest of the East bloc in détente, by a Western unwillingness to leave the propaganda value of détente initiatives to the Warsaw Pact, by the wish to pre-empt de Gaulle’s 1966 Moscow trip with a multilateral initiative, and by a fear of the possible outcome of bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and West Germany. However, domestic factors also provide an explanation for the Danish push for a multilateral détente. According to Agger, public support for NATO was being eroded in Denmark by stirrings of détente in Europe and by the unpopular US war in Vietnam. Thus, it was considered essential that NATO should become a modern, progressive organization that embraced East–West dialog in order to sustain public support into the 1970s. Further, Agger notes, Danish policy makers wanted to avoid a showdown with France, not least because of Paris’s considerable inﬂuence over Denmark’s membership application to the Common Market. The crucial effects of the decreasing public support for NATO, with regard to national perceptions of NATO and to policies within NATO, are also evident in the case of Italy, examined by Leopoldo Nuti. Italy’s traditional ﬁrm reliance on the alliance was mitigated during the 1960s by frustration in Italy over its nuclear ambitions, US involvement in Vietnam, and a growing perception of instability in the Mediterranean. Since the 1950s, Italy had tried to achieve nuclear status through NATO. By the late 1960s, however, the success of the NPG was more than offset in the eyes of Italian policy makers by the bitter pill of the NPT, which sanctioned a permanent, discriminating division between the ﬁve nuclear states, on the one hand, and Italy as a non-nuclear state, on the other. According to Nuti, the Italians feared that the NPT was the price the United States had to pay to get out of Vietnam. The US preoccupation with

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bilateral superpower détente and with ﬁnding a way out of Vietnam forced Italy to sign the NPT, work out its own limited détente with the East, and shift to a policy of “equidistance” in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. While NATO remained crucial as Italy’s insurance against domestic revirements and Soviet pressure, Nuti concludes, NATO gradually became less useful for promoting Italy’s interests in other ﬁelds. Building on some of the major ﬁndings presented in the chapters of this book, Andreas Wenger, in the concluding section, offers a more general assessment of NATO’s transformation in the 1960s. Tension over NATO’s political legitimacy, induced by de Gaulle, accumulated between 1958 and 1963. The Berlin crisis forced NATO into a transition phase that witnessed the emergence of contradictory visions of a new European order, while at the same time suppressing open disagreement until the direct threat by the Soviet Union had passed. De Gaulle’s double non of January 1963 refocused NATO members’ attention from the East–West crisis to the future of NATO at a time of détente. In the period from 1963 to 1966, NATO dealt with France’s dissent and managed to isolate Paris within the alliance. At the same time, policy makers began to realize that domestic changes within the members states demanded a reform of NATO’s form and functions. NATO’s transformation culminated in the trilateral talks and the Harmel exercise of 1966 to 1968, which strengthened the alliance’s political functions and transformed its institutional structures. Wenger argues that the essence of NATO’s transformation from the integrated military alliance of the 1950s – dominated by the United States – into the less hierarchical and more participatory alliance of the late 1960s was political: the new NATO emerged as a tool that anchored the multilateralization of détente during the early Helsinki process in the multilateral structure of the alliance and that welcomed the emergence of a more assertive political voice of an enlarged Europe through the European Economic Community. The early 1960s exposed NATO to unprecedented tension; there was a real possibility that NATO would cease to exist after its twentieth anniversary. By the mid-1960s, however, it had become clear that the new NATO would persist into a time of détente. NATO, accepting the risk of fragmentation, had successfully managed the arduous task of reinventing itself to adapt to a rapidly changing international environment. The political structures of the alliance had absorbed a great deal of dispute and disagreement, and the alliance had lived through instances of great-power unilateralism, while also witnessing a considerable degree of anti-hegemonic behavior. But through all of this, NATO had provided a working environment in which a world of diffusing power could be organized into a world of diffused responsibility. In addition to addressing different themes and providing varying perspectives, the chapters of this book draw three overarching conclusions that explain the resilience of political NATO in a period of a decreasing military threat. First, the importance of common norms and values – of soft power in addition to hard power – emerges in a majority of the contributions in one form or another. The effects of a

New perspectives on NATO history 11 “habit of consultation,” as these effects accumulated in NATO’s institutions and in associated transatlantic elite networks, brought about a sense of a community of values and interests among the allies that facilitated NATO’s political role. While the impact of norms on concrete policy decisions is often hard to pin down, democratic values certainly transcended the declaratory level of policy and shaped the policy making cultures within and outside NATO’s institutional structures. Second, over time, NATO’s decision-making process integrated and expanded elements of democratic consensus building. Political consultations within NATO were marked by continuing consideration of the balance between bilateralism and multilateralism and between genuine consultation and post-fact information. The United States had to learn to lead by persuasion, rather than by control; the Europeans, in turn, were able to exert considerable inﬂuence on NATO’s political structures, even with regard to the highly contentious issue of nuclear sovereignty. The growing political inﬂuence of the smaller allies, both within NATO’s multilateral framework and in bilateral and trilateral bargaining processes, is evident in most of the contributions in this book. Moreover, coalitions of transgovernmental and transnational actors were at times able to decisively inﬂuence domestic politics in key member states. Transatlantic elite networks facilitated personal contacts between policy makers on a regular basis, which in turn contributed to the formation of ad hoc coalitions that allowed quick reactions to often ﬂuid and ambiguous policy challenges. Finally, many chapters emphasize the importance, at the time, of institutional ﬂexibility and adaptability to the successful integration of the often disparate political interests of the alliance’s members. The focus of the individual chapters ranges from a detailed analysis of the multilateral gatherings of permanent representatives and ministers to the workings at the level of NATO working groups and committees. Moreover, the chapters bring the NATO secretaries-general Paul Henri Spaak, Dirk Stikker, Manlio Brosio, and the national ambassadors to NATO back into the picture as inﬂuential actors. The alliance’s institutional structure was ﬂexible enough to accommodate the growing assertiveness of West Germany, to meet the increasing demand of the smaller allies for transparency and consultation, and to keep France in NATO’s political bodies, while leaving open the possibility of its return to NATO’s military bodies. A close look at NATO’s transformation during the Cold War of the 1960s helps us to understand why NATO was able to avoid a sudden collapse in 1989–91 and why the alliance continued expanding its political role and evolving into a organization that was able to deal with the broader management of security in the 1990s. Although the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 entailed the ﬁrst invocation of Article V in the alliance’s long history, NATO, in the context of the US war against terror, is currently once again struggling to redeﬁne its political role. While the current international environment and the character of today’s security problems are remarkably different from the Cold War setting, policy makers and analysts might ﬁnd it useful to look back and reﬂect on what it takes to successfully manage an alliance of democracies that is facing a long-term but primarily political threat.

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Notes 1 See Lawrence Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance (New York: Twayne, 1994). 2 See e.g. Frédéric Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance (Lanham: Rowman & Littleﬁeld, 2001); Maurice Vaïsse, La grandeur: Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, 1958–1969 (Paris: Fayard, 1998); Michael Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). 3 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 329; George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–50 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), pp. 397–414. 4 See e.g. John English, “‘Who Could Ask for Anything More?’ North American Perspectives on NATO’s Origins,” in A History of NATO: The First Fifty Years, vol. 2, ed. Gustav Schmidt (London: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 305–20; Klaus A. Maier and Norbert Wiggershaus (eds), Das Nordatlantische Bündnis, 1949–1956 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1993); André de Staercke, edited by Nicholas Scherwen, NATO’s Anxious Birth: The Prophetic Vision of the 1940s (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985); Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947–1949 (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1977). 5 Andreas Wenger, “The Politics of Military Planning: The Evolution of NATO’s Strategy,” in War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West, ed. Vojtech Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 165–92; Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); Richard L. Kugler, Laying the Foundations: The Evolution of NATO in the 1950s (Santa Monica: RAND, 1990). 6 Christian Nuenlist, “Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Political Cooperation in NATO: Western Reactions to Khrushchev’s Foreign Policy, 1955–63” (Ph.D. thesis, University of Zurich, 2005). 7 Anna Locher, “Crisis – What Crisis? The Debate on the Future of NATO, 1963–66” (Ph.D. thesis, University of Zurich, 2006); Helga Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility, 1966–1967 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Andreas Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity: NATO’s Transformation and the Multilateralization of Détente, 1966–1968,” Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 1 (2004), pp. 22–74. 8 Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.), Entstehung und Probleme des Atlantischen Bündnisses, vols 1–6 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998–2005). 9 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies: The European Inﬂuence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 10 Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Andreas Wenger and Jeremi Suri, “At the Crossroads of Diplomatic and Social History: The Nuclear Revolution, Dissent and Détente,” Cold War History 1, no. 3 (2001), pp. 1–42. 11 See e.g. Jane E. Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO’s Debate Over Strategy in the 1960’s (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988); Helga Haftendorn, “Das Projekt einer multilateralen NATO-Atomstreitkraft (MLF): Vademecum für die Glaubwürdigkeit der nuklearen Strategie? Das ‘Nukleare Patt’ und die Zweifel an der Glaubwürdigkeit der nuklearen Abschreckung,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 54, no. 2 (1995), pp. 417–51.

Part II

The Atlantic community The promise of alliance

2

The normative resilience of NATO A community of shared values amid public discord Jeremi Suri

Introduction In retrospect, the survival of NATO in the 1960s and early 1970s seems to have been inevitable. At the time, however, many prominent observers predicted otherwise. Henry Kissinger, among others, expected that the alliance would neither survive nor prove effective at deterring external challengers in future years. During the Berlin crisis of 1958–59, he published an article in the New York Times Magazine that pointed to “grave doubt about our [America’s] willingness to run risks on behalf of our allies, and even about our ability to understand what might constitute a threat.”1 He followed this article with a barrage of prominent pieces making similar arguments in Foreign Affairs, The Reporter, Harper’s Magazine, and a book entitled The Troubled Partnership.2 Kissinger argued that America’s failure to consult more substantively with its West European allies, combined with the gaping power differential on the two sides of the Atlantic, made it unlikely that productive NATO relations could continue much longer.3 This argument became more persuasive as relative Soviet nuclear power grew during the 1960s and as the United States showed a clear desire to avoid direct conﬂict with Moscow, especially around contested strategic areas – most particularly West Berlin. Kissinger was hardly alone when he wrote, in the aftermath of France’s military withdrawal from NATO command in 1966: “The present crisis marks the end of the phase of US–European relationships that was ushered in by the Greek–Turkish aid program and led through the Marshall Plan to the construction of the Atlantic Alliance.”4 Kissinger believed that NATO could remain a vital international force only if the West Europeans played a more active and self-conﬁdent role in their own defense. Contrary to the ofﬁcial policy of the United States, this included the development of an independent, or at least semi-independent, West European nuclear capability.5 It also meant that the United States should encourage political leaders on the Continent, including French President Charles de Gaulle, to move toward a more uniﬁed political and military structure that would allow for the development of a true “third force.” This third force would work in conjunction with Washington as more of an equal than a dependent.6 US President John F. Kennedy had, in fact, given credence to this concept when he spoke in

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Frankfurt, Germany, on 25 June 1963 of an “Atlantic partnership” that addressed “questions” about “America’s nuclear position.” Echoing Kissinger, Kennedy called for the development of “a more closely uniﬁed Atlantic deterrent, with genuine European participation.”7 Domestic unrest in nearly every NATO country during the late 1960s encouraged public criticism of the alliance. Throughout the United States, West Germany, France, Great Britain, and other states, a new Cold War generation of youth challenged the apparent contradiction between public rhetoric about “new frontiers” and the reality of a stalemated, divided world. The anger and disillusion surrounding this contradiction was particularly evident in urban university settings, where the best and the brightest of each society found themselves stiﬂed by institutional barriers to progressive change. NATO, in the eyes of many students and social activists at the time, was one of the powerful conservative institutions that froze the divided geopolitical status quo in place and prohibited alternative policies. Accordingly, many protesters throughout the United States and Western Europe condemned the Western alliance in the late 1960s, calling for both nuclear disarmament and signiﬁcantly reduced troop commitments.8 NATO had become a perceived enemy of political reform. In this context, democratically elected leaders felt strong pressure to disengage, at least in part, from the alliance. Those national ﬁgures who remained strong supporters of NATO – including US President Lyndon B. Johnson, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, West German Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, and others – sought to articulate a strategic re-orientation for the alliance and a new purpose for NATO beyond Soviet containment. The transformed nature of the domestic Cold War environment in the Western states necessitated a change in NATO’s international behavior.9 Andreas Wenger has recently argued that NATO addressed these and other challenges in the 1960s by building a more multilateral framework for consultation and coordination. The creation of the Nuclear Planning Group in 1966 and the Harmel exercise of 1967 are the clearest examples of how the alliance reformed the hierarchical proclivities that so alarmed Kissinger, not to mention de Gaulle and other European leaders.10 Wenger’s analysis points to important institutional changes within the structure of NATO, but these alterations did not reconﬁgure the basic elements of the alliance. For all the talk of joint planning, the United States continued to control the major force of nuclear weapons at the disposal of the alliance. No politician or general could order the use of these weapons without the White House’s approval. Similarly, in pursuing superpower détente, the United States continued to operate primarily through direct exchanges with Moscow. Ostpolitik gave West European states, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, a leadership role in détente, but this role remained subsumed beneath the Soviet-American negotiations that determined the geopolitical setting for the Continent. In the aftermath of NATO’s groundbreaking reforms during the late 1960s, US President Richard Nixon pursued a form of détente with the Soviet Union that largely operated through secret “back

The normative resilience of NATO 17 channels,” at the exclusion of allies. Ironically, it was Henry Kissinger who, despite his frequent criticisms of America’s alliance mismanagement, oversaw this period of extended European separation from substantive US strategic consultation.11 This observation should not trivialize the signiﬁcance of the reforms within NATO during the late 1960s. The institutional changes of the period were important and far-reaching. Nonetheless, they alone do not explain the survival of the alliance through its most challenging time. The institutional reforms did not transform the core operations of NATO and, more signiﬁcantly, they did not alleviate the problems of inequality among the member states. This chapter argues that a set of shared values, transcending the actions of US and West European leaders, allowed for the survival and continued prosperity of the alliance, despite recurring structural frictions. These shared values underpinned the policies pursued by reformers and critics alike. By the 1960s, NATO had developed into more than a mere alliance of states confronting a common adversary. From its initial mission to contain communist advances, the alliance had grown into a true “security community” that deﬁned interests and ideals in broad, transnational terms.12 As a security community, NATO served two vital political functions during the second half of the Cold War. First, it provided an architecture for overcoming the inherited disunity of the Western states, particularly with regard to their long-term national interests. In place of state-to-state competition, NATO encouraged a broad deﬁnition of shared interests, including stability on the European continent, arms control, and collective security. It also propagated a transnational set of common ideals centered on free markets and liberal democratic politics. NATO was a hinge of political order in what had been the largely anarchic world of European international relations. Second, by the late 1960s the alliance leveraged the political order among the Western states as the basis for building new bridges to Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe. This is the context, of course, for the Harmel exercise of 1967 and its explicit advocacy of “détente.”13 NATO provided its member states with the core security needed to pursue openings with the East. Cooperation between Western governments through the alliance assured that bilateral agreements with the Soviet bloc would not undermine unity. NATO encouraged improved East–West relations, and it assured that overtures in this direction followed “parallel courses” that did not jeopardize basic security interests.14 In this sense, the alliance provided a necessary and conducive setting for the progress of détente. This chapter consists of two main parts. It begins with an analysis of the common values and “Western” identity that emerged among the NATO member societies. The ﬁrst section of the chapter examines how the articulation and propagation of these values, within the institutions of NATO, contributed to the remarkably resilient political order that formed among the Western states by the second half of the Cold War. From here, the second section investigates how the political consensus underlying NATO contributed to détente with the Soviet bloc. The concluding analytical section assesses the implications of common

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values and of a “Western” identity for the continued functioning of the alliance and for the broader formation of transnational and transgovernmental coalitions in the post-Cold War world.

NATO, democracy, and “Western” identity Much of the public attention given to NATO during the Cold War focused on Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty. Article 5 pledged that, in the event of an attack on any alliance member, the other signatories of the treaty would offer assistance, “including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”15 For the nations of Western Europe most vulnerable to Soviet assault, especially the Federal Republic of Germany, this meant that US military power – including nuclear weapons – would defend against foreign incursions. The aim of Article 5, of course, was not to turn a regional conﬂict into a global thermonuclear war. By making this commitment to extensive defense – to core national security interests that far exceeded the immediate territorial boundaries of each individual state – the NATO signatories hoped to deter Soviet aggression of all varieties. This was precisely Dwight D. Eisenhower’s thinking when he sought, ﬁrst as commander of NATO forces and then as president of the United States, to assure allies and adversaries that Soviet incursions into Western Europe would trigger a massive American nuclear retaliatory strike. NATO emerged, in this context, as a traditional defensive alliance with the addition of nuclear weapons.16 Unfortunately, that is where many accounts of NATO and Cold War strategy leave the story. The North Atlantic Treaty, however, is ﬁlled with language that is not traditional in great power politics or defensive alliance formation. The preface to the document afﬁrms that the alliance will safeguard “the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.” Article 2 of the treaty pledges that: The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and wellbeing. They will seek to eliminate conﬂict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them. This is the so-called “Canadian article” of the NATO treaty, written speciﬁcally to assuage Canadian anxieties about the early militaristic image of the alliance and the absence of constructive policies for realizing cooperative international ideals.17 The underlying sentiment of the Canadian article, however, is broader and more central to the founding NATO document than one would expect from a section written to appease one single signatory. The entire NATO treaty is, in fact, couched in terms that afﬁrm the authority of the United Nations as a

The normative resilience of NATO 19 representative world body deﬁning principles of legitimate international behavior. Article 1 of the NATO treaty, for example, states: The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.18 Even the rights of collective defense deﬁned in Article 5 of the NATO treaty look to the United Nations for legitimacy and the UN Security Council, in particular, for consultation.19 This explicit dependence on an international institution and its asserted values for normative authority was unprecedented at the time of NATO’s formation in 1949. One can still largely dismiss the democratic rhetoric of the NATO treaty as public packaging for an essentially Cold War military alliance. Formed as a bulwark for political stability and anti-communist defense on the European continent, NATO’s military functions became most prominent in its early years, particularly after the outbreak of war in June 1950 on the Korean peninsula. The alliance prepared intensely to deter, and if necessary thwart, any possible Sovietsponsored aggression around West Berlin. During the 1950s and early 1960s NATO continued to allocate the lion’s share of its resources to containing communism. It also concentrated on managing a series of recurring East–West crises in Central Europe and more distant areas, including the Caribbean Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Further complicating NATO’s ideological claims, the alliance included a number of countries with questionable democratic credentials at the time, notably Portugal and Turkey. Developments during the 1960s did not alleviate the inconsistencies in the application of NATO’s democratic rhetoric. As the scope of West European political and economic integration deepened, however, the alliance’s avowed democratic mission became crucial. NATO promoted a consensus on political values among members that allowed for the further development of the Common Market and its ties to the United States, despite the various domestic and international challenges during the period. Even during the darkest days of the alliance – when de Gaulle withdrew French military forces in 1966, when each of the member countries confronted growing domestic unrest, and when the Vietnam War opened up a deep rift between the United States and the European nations – the North Atlantic Council continued to function as a political body, bringing leaders together for consultation and the moderation of vituperative public rhetoric. Even de Gaulle recognized the North Atlantic Council as a valuable instrument, maintaining France’s membership after 1966. NATO’s democratic consensus building operated on three levels during the 1960s and early 1970s. It centered simultaneously on integrating West Germany into Western Europe, on recalibrating British and US commitments to the

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Continent, and on forging a ﬁrm sense of West European identity. Member states continued to differ on crucial issues, but their differences became far less signiﬁcant than their points of common understanding. The German question Following the Berlin crisis of 1961–62, NATO assured acceptable West German participation in the “new” European politics that included more independent governments in Paris and Bonn, as well as stronger moves toward integration among the West European states. The controversial Treaty of Friendship signed between President de Gaulle and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in January 1963 exempliﬁed the simultaneous national assertiveness and integrationist impulse. NATO did not endorse the de Gaulle–Adenauer agreement; in fact, many prominent ﬁgures in the alliance strongly opposed it.20 Nonetheless, NATO played a crucial role in providing an overarching political architecture that assured that the Franco-West German Treaty of Friendship did not allow for the emergence of new power centers that threatened Continental stability. In particular, NATO institutions secured West Germany’s neighbors against a replay of a recent historical tragedy: the emergence of a revitalized and assertive German colossus under Adenauer’s leadership.21 This was much more than “keeping the Germans down.” On the contrary, NATO provided a framework for the West European and Atlantic states to leverage German resources – military, economic, and cultural – in a manner consistent with democratic development. As West German power grew, NATO assured that the Federal Republic retained its consultative obligations with its neighbors. It further mandated that German strengths in productivity and wealth be integrated with Continent-wide interests. NATO tied West German institutions to a series of European and transatlantic dependencies, and it also placed a premium on the maintenance of liberal capitalist hinges of political order – including individual freedoms, private property, and limits to the exercise of state power. These qualities, as much as West Germany’s phenomenal economic growth in the 1950s, were at the core of the postwar Wirtschaftswunder.22 Adenauer’s successor as West German chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, understood the importance of NATO’s integrative and guiding role to his society. He and other prominent West Germans strongly reafﬁrmed the primacy of NATO for the nation’s strategic interests and the future prosperity of democracy in Europe. Erhard went so far as to renounce many of Adenauer’s more independent actions, including the 1963 Treaty of Friendship with France. Afﬁrming West Germany’s commitment to Soviet bloc containment through the institutions of NATO, the leadership in Bonn during the mid-1960s attempted to enforce the “Hallstein doctrine” – prohibiting the recognition of East Germany – as a further reinforcement of West European unity and cooperation.23 NATO transformed West Germany from a strategic problem into a democratic asset.

The normative resilience of NATO 21 The Anglo-American commitment to the European continent During the two centuries that preceded the middle of the Cold War, both the United States and Great Britain maintained an aloof and frequently distant attitude towards military affairs on the European continent. Before the twentieth century, the United States had lacked the resources and capabilities to play a serious role among the great powers. In the decades after World War I, American society multiplied its economic and cultural connections with Europe, but this spread of US inﬂuence notably excluded any willingness to become embroiled in military affairs.24 World War II and the early Cold War muted the inherited US prejudice against a military commitment in Europe, but not entirely. As late as 1957, a ﬁgure with no less stature than George Kennan called for a return to US military disengagement in Central Europe and eventually on much of the rest of the Continent.25 This was exactly the traditional US attitude that Henry Kissinger and other advocates of NATO feared. Anthony Eden, the long-serving British foreign minister and prime minister who succeeded Winston Churchill in 1955, shared Kissinger’s fears of US disengagement from Europe. He also recognized that such a move by the United States would trigger a British withdrawal from the Continent, as well. London was dependent on US capital, equipment, and personnel to maintain its deterrent force. In addition, Eden knew very well that Britain had a long and venerable tradition of emphasizing its imperial interests in Asia and Africa above European affairs. After all, Britain was primarily a sea power, and its prosperity derived from empire, not from Europe.26 London had intervened intermittently in crises on the European continent before World War II, but these periods of direct British engagement in military conﬂict across the Channel were the exception, not the rule.27 Eden worried that, during a period of surface stability, the heavy cost of Britain’s Cold War military commitments to the defense of the European continent would motivate London to disengage. British observers would be tempted to focus their limited resources on the last vestiges of their overseas, and now underfunded, empire. Eden expressed these concerns to President Eisenhower as early as July 1956. The British prime minister described the “growing reluctance, among the peoples of the free world, to accept the social and human sacriﬁces required for the maintenance of large forces of the conventional pattern.”28 Eden recognized that in an era of nuclear weapons, large contingents of soldiers stationed on European soil had diminishing military value, but that these nonetheless served crucial political purposes – bolstering public anti-communist commitment and asserting a common purpose between the countries of Western Europe, Britain, and the United States. Eden explained that: It was the forces in being under NATO Command, and particularly the presence of the United States and British forces in Europe, that gave conﬁdence and courage to those who were ready to resist political encroachment by Communism in Europe. Or to put it another way: the political cohesion of

22

Jeremi Suri the Western European countries in resisting the internal threat of Communism was inspired by growing conﬁdence in the military side of the alliance. The political need to maintain the solidarity of the European countries is as strong as ever. For this purpose, even if for no other, it would still be important that some United States and British forces should remain on the ground in Europe under NATO Command.29

Eden’s emphasis on NATO’s institutionalization of the Anglo-American commitment to Europe is deeply signiﬁcant. For him, as for many of his British and US counterparts, NATO created a presumption of consistent military engagement in Europe that had not existed before. One could argue that this position simply afﬁrmed the deﬁned national interests in London and Washington, but the institutionalization of this commitment meant something more. Despite the threats of nuclear conﬂict with the Soviet Union and the growing demands on Anglo-American resources in other parts of the globe, NATO made pledges of military defense on the European continent sacrosanct.30 Fighting a threatened Soviet encroachment on West Berlin and on other exposed areas was no longer a matter of calculation, but a basic political axiom. After the signing of the NATO treaty, neither Britain nor the United States engaged in a period of intensive questioning about European commitments, in contrast to that which had occurred in the early twentieth century.31 Even challengers to existing policy assumptions, like US Senator Mike Mansﬁeld, failed to attract support, because their claims ran against the pledges underpinning NATO.32 Radical domestic critics who attacked the Cold War “military–industrial complex” largely avoided criticisms of NATO’s commitment to West European defense, because the alliance seemed to encourage cooperation, rather than armed conﬂict, in this area.33 NATO ﬁrmly “Europeanized” British and US strategic calculations. The consistent commitment of the United States and Britain to European affairs supported the construction of new institutions – including planning councils, developmental agencies, and juridical bodies – that converted the Common Market from a trading association into a real integrative unit in the 1960s. Washington generally encouraged the formation of these institutions. Britain’s support was often less consistent, but it also promoted these endeavors on most occasions.34 More signiﬁcantly, the assured US and British Continental presence through NATO meant that the political cultures of these two democratic societies attained unprecedented standing among West Europeans. During the years after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, assumptions about individual rights, public deliberation, a free press, and personal property protection became more ﬁrmly rooted than ever before in places like Germany, Italy, and even France. One can attribute this, in part, to non-native inﬂuences, but there is little doubt that NATO provided a prominent channel for politicians, military ofﬁcers, and bureaucrats from the United States and Britain to carry their ideas on to the Continent. By the late 1960s, NATO not only offered a shield for the furtherance of

The normative resilience of NATO 23 European integration, but it also helped to constitute the central assumptions about democracy and cooperation that made unity in this formerly war-torn region conceivable. Even a critic of NATO like Henry Kissinger recognized that the alliance made a simultaneous Atlantic and European democratic identity possible. This is what he meant when he advocated an “Atlantic commonwealth” that would include a more effective European core.35 West European identity Most often overlooked is the fact that the existence of NATO furthered the emergence of a West European identity, as distinct from Eastern Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty spoke explicitly of a “common heritage and civilization” among the member states.36 By implication, this excluded non-NATO countries from such a pedigree. George Kennan most famously opposed the creation of NATO for this reason. He believed that any European identity that excluded the Eastern and “neutral” parts (that is, Switzerland, Sweden, and Finland) of the Continent was illegitimate and counterproductive. Kennan’s criticisms of NATO went hand-in-hand with his calls in the late 1950s for US military disengagement from Europe.37 Despite Kennan’s warning, by the 1960s NATO had given rise to a palpable West European identity within the alliance. This is perhaps most evident in the degree to which political activists on the left and the right thought of their programs in explicitly West European terms. Willy Brandt, for example, transformed the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) into a party that looked to West European models of social democracy, rather than to more traditional models of socialism.38 Similarly, men like Franz Josef Strauss, who sought to assert a more conservative mode of politics, also looked West to de Gaulle in France, rather than to traditional landed elites in Central and Eastern Europe.39 Most startlingly, the student radicals of the 1960s were most inﬂuential in the dominant Continental NATO countries – France, Italy, and West Germany. When these students spoke of revolution, they believed that radical change would begin under the NATO umbrella, because the alliance provided for common institutions, channels of communication, and freedoms to protest. NATO was rarely a direct target of public attack, and it appeared to many activists as an enabling institution for nurturing political programs distinct from US domination.40 This was the paradox of NATO. It assured US inﬂuence in Europe, but it also furnished an institutional nexus for European efforts to carve out limited independence from the United Sates. NATO provided both security and legitimacy for a West European identity that came to dominate politics, society, and culture in the region. The 1960s was a period of more assertive nationalism in France and West Germany, but it was coupled with an unprecedented belief in a larger regional mission. De Gaulle, Strauss, and Brandt all called for a stronger Western Europe with more independence from the United States. NATO was the institutional and intellectual embryo for this appeal. Even de Gaulle’s claims to

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French grandeur after 1958 began with an appeal for more coordination between what he perceived as the leading NATO powers.41 The alliance was, after all, the only substantive forum for the region to operate as a recognized and empowered entity. This observation explains, in large part, why NATO preceded West European integration and the more recent expansion of the European Union to include parts of Eastern Europe after the Cold War. Like other Cold War institutions, NATO served a wide range of purposes. It was a traditional defensive alliance in its coordination of collective security. It was also an unprecedented alliance that promoted democracy through the assurance of responsible West German participation in European politics, the maintenance of an American and British commitment to Continental affairs, and the promotion of a legitimate West European identity. These characteristics emerged most clearly in the 1960s. During a time when key elements of the strategic impetus behind the creation of the alliance came under attack, the democratizing consensus and consultative mechanisms of NATO preserved this unique community. Without NATO, Western Europe would have lacked a key anchor for defense, democracy, and regional self-awareness during the Cold War. Historically, Larry Wolff has shown, the concept of the “West” in Europe was more imagined than real.42 For better and for worse, NATO made half of a continent into an identiﬁable and powerful political entity in its time.

NATO and détente However, the West European identity constructed by NATO extended its reach beyond the Western half of the European continent. The period of détente in the late 1960s and early 1970s illustrated that the alliance was not only a source of security and common values, but also a promoter of peace and reconciliation across Cold War blocs. As Soviet and US nuclear power reached approximate parity, NATO became a bridge between East and West.43 It served this function in two ways: by coordinating security policy and by legitimizing the process of East–West “normalization.” The scheduled beginning of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 highlighted what I will call the “dilemma of détente.” All of the states in the Western alliance recognized a need to forge better relations with the Soviet Union for the sake of stability on the European continent. The time seemed propitious, as Moscow’s leadership had made numerous overtures to the West in previous years, including a hastily arranged Soviet-American summit meeting in Glassboro, New Jersey, on 23–25 June 1967.44 The war in Vietnam, the increasing violence on the Sino–Soviet border, and the pervasive domestic unrest within many societies motivated many leaders in the West, including presidents Johnson and Nixon, to search for a new anchor of stability in their relations with Moscow. Johnson and Nixon, in particular, hoped that they could chart a new course to international and domestic quiescence through evidence of effective Cold War peacemaking.45

The normative resilience of NATO 25 The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the Kremlin’s subsequent threats to Romania, as well, undermined much of the optimism in Western Europe and the United States about Moscow’s intentions. It now appeared that the communist leadership might embark on a new wave of aggression in Europe. Henry Kissinger, among others, called for the United States to delay the ratiﬁcation of the recently negotiated Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a warning to Moscow that offensive actions would invoke reprisals.46 Members of Johnson’s administration recognized that they had to cancel a proposed late 1968 summit meeting between the president and his Soviet counterpart for fear of appearing to condone the invasion of Czechoslovakia.47 In these difﬁcult circumstances, NATO coordinated the security policies of the member states to allow for both the protection against Soviet aggression and overtures in arms control and other areas. Lawrence Kaplan has referred to the alliance’s immediate indecision in its reaction to the Soviet invasion; but, in fact, NATO embarked on a series of maneuvers that strengthened the common defense of the member states. In particular, Kaplan points to the creation of a new Maritime Air Force facility in Naples, Italy, designed to react against possible Soviet activities on the southern rim of the continent.48 Similarly, the implementation of a new NATO doctrine of ﬂexible response, adopted in December 1967 with strong US urging, promised that the alliance would deploy a wider range of conventional and limited nuclear options for effective deterrence, and war ﬁghting, if necessary. This was a crucial decision for the operational strength of the alliance and its ability to serve as a regional defense force in light of US preoccupation elsewhere.49 The same December 1967 North Atlantic Council meeting that adopted the ﬂexible response doctrine also approved the Harmel Report, ofﬁcially entitled “The Future Tasks of the Alliance.” This document argued that: “Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary.” Accordingly, NATO pledged to merge its commitment to ﬂexible response with “realistic measures designed to further a détente in East–West relations.” The Harmel Report explained that: The relaxation of tensions is not the ﬁnal goal but is part of a long-term process to promote better relations and to foster a European settlement. The ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees.50 This commitment to a “European settlement” and a “lasting peaceful order in Europe” was about more than traditional military affairs. It was a statement of political purpose that legitimized diplomatic overtures to the East. The Harmel Report made East–West détente a central mission for an alliance initially formed for anti-communist containment. Disarmament and arms control merited speciﬁc mention in the Harmel Report, along with balanced force reductions and “a solution of the German question.”51 Not surprisingly, each of these issues received extensive attention during the

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crucial Soviet-American and Soviet-West German deliberations of the early 1970s. SALT I, concluded in 1972, was the ﬁrst signiﬁcant arms control treaty of the Cold War to limit the deployment of new nuclear devices and delivery vehicles. It drew on strong support within NATO and on the conﬁdence that the alliance could provide for its collective defense without unchecked arms construction. The stability that the alliance provided in Europe made it possible, as never before, for Cold War leaders to contemplate serious reductions in military deployments on the Continent.52 Similarly, the Moscow Treaty signed by the leaders of West Germany and the Soviet Union in August 1970 used the recognized borders of NATO and its Soviet bloc counterpart, the Warsaw Pact, to establish peaceful East–West relations. The “present frontiers” enforced by the alliances, and the abandonment of national (particularly West German) claims that challenged these frontiers, provided the foundation for Ostpolitik. The West German leadership negotiated the Moscow Treaty on its own initiative, but it could only do this because NATO provided a stable and secure territorial framework that superseded claims to German uniﬁcation. The Western alliance was essential for the “normalization” of East–West relations that accompanied Ostpolitik.53 NATO members recognized that negotiations over speciﬁc measures would continue to occur on a bilateral and limited multilateral basis. The Harmel Report endorsed these activities and integrated them into an alliance-wide strategy that balanced deterrence and détente. In subsequent years, Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik and Richard Nixon’s triangular diplomacy would operate along secret channels that were largely independent from NATO, but they nonetheless depended upon the alliance’s ability to integrate new arrangements. The Harmel Report proved that, NATO was, if anything, ahead of the member governments in envisioning a new environment that transcended the very Cold War constraints that had given birth to the alliance in the ﬁrst place. In endorsing détente so strongly, NATO helped to move the Western strategic and moral consensus in this direction. Without such an endorsement, one can imagine that there would have been far greater domestic opposition to détente within each of the major states.

Conclusion The second half of the 1960s witnessed a series of crucial transformations in the structure of NATO. The alliance developed new procedures for consultation and coordination that made the relationship between member states more multilateral than it had ever been before. As Andreas Wenger has convincingly argued, the evolution of NATO during this period allowed it to become a dynamic and valuable contributor to the strategic deliberations of the next decade.54 That said, the reforms in NATO did not address many of the criticisms raised by Henry Kissinger and other prominent analysts. Contrary to Kissinger’s counsel, the United States continued to retain a monopoly over the major strategic nuclear forces deployed by the alliance. Consultative mechanisms on

The normative resilience of NATO 27 nuclear and other issues were expanded, but they remained secondary to the bilateral and ad hoc arrangements of independent states negotiated with adversaries. Most signiﬁcantly, NATO never restored full European conﬁdence in the quality of the US commitment to the Continent. Throughout the early 1970s, European public skepticism toward the policies of the United States continued to grow. NATO survived, but transatlantic differences multiplied, especially with regard to the war in Vietnam. The survival of NATO beyond the late 1960s, and even beyond the end of the Cold War, reﬂects the consensus on values that the alliance embodied. Members may have differed in many of their political and strategic judgments, but they remained ﬁrmly committed to democratization and détente – at least in principle, if not always in action – after the mid-1960s. These values found expression in the structure of NATO, in its daily activities, and, most importantly, in its language. NATO promoted a language of democracy and détente that, ultimately, pulled the states on both sides of the Atlantic together for a common purpose. It gave them a shared mission during a period of domestic turmoil and international uncertainty. NATO transformed the culture of great power politics in the West, and this proved as important as the traditional military issues that underpinned the initial formation of the alliance. NATO’s embracing of democratization and détente made the alliance a hub for new transnational and transgovernmental coalitions of actors in the 1970s and 1980s. Social democratic ﬁgures like Willy Brandt and Felipe González Márquez of Spain worked through NATO institutions to build interest and support for programs that offered new overtures to the Soviet bloc. They also leveraged the Western alliance as a mechanism for carving out legitimate areas of policy independence from the United States. In coordination with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the ground-breaking Helsinki Final Act of 1975, NATO provided the foundation for an identiﬁable West European approach to the Cold War, emphasizing conciliation and nonmilitary sources of political change. To this day, NATO continues to play a similar role in building broad transnational coalitions. It has moved faster and more effectively than any other institution to integrate formerly communist countries into an enlarged democratic and peaceful European order. It has set an agenda for cooperation across cultures. Despite the policy differences that emerged over the recent war in Iraq, NATO has also assured that the United States and Britain continue to participate in an unprecedented era of European political stability. While serving a variety of security interests, NATO has been remarkably successful at promoting a community of shared values.

Notes 1 Henry Kissinger, “‘As Urgent as the Moscow Threat,’” New York Times Magazine, 8 March 1959. 2 See the following publications, all by Henry Kissinger: “The Strains on the Alliance,” Foreign Affairs 41 (1963), pp. 261–85; “NATO’s Nuclear Dilemma,” The Reporter

28

3 4 5 6 7

8

9 10

11 12

13 14 15 16

17 18 19 20

Jeremi Suri (28 March 1963), pp. 22–37; “The Illusionist: Why We Misread de Gaulle,” Harper’s Magazine 230 (March 1965), pp. 69–77; The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965). See Letter from Brodie to Kissinger, 11 May 1966, UCLA Special Collections, Bernard Brodie Papers, Los Angeles (Brodie papers), Box 1, K Correspondence; Letter from Kissinger to Brodie, 9 November 1966, Brodie papers, Box 6, K. Henry Kissinger, “For a New Atlantic Alliance,” The Reporter (14 July 1966), p. 18. See also Henry Kissinger, “What about the Future?” Atlantic Community Quarterly 4 (1966), pp. 317–29. Kissinger believed that the small French and British nuclear arsenals were insufﬁcient. He contended that Western Europe needed a larger nuclear force under broader West European command. See n. 4 above. Letter from Brodie to Kissinger, 26 August 1966, Brodie papers, Box 6, K. John F. Kennedy, Address in the Assembly Hall at the Paulskirche in Frankfurt, Germany, 25 June 1963, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1963 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1964), pp. 516–21. See also Geir Lundestad, “Empire” by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 58–82. See Andreas Wenger and Jeremi Suri, “At the Crossroads of Diplomatic and Social History: The Nuclear Revolution, Dissent, and Détente,” Cold War History 1, no. 3 (April 2001), pp. 1–42; Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). See n. 8 above; Don Oberdorfer, Senator Mansﬁeld: The Extraordinary Life of a Great Statesman and Diplomat (Washington: Smithsonian Books, 2003), pp. 387–91. Andreas Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity: NATO’s Transformation and the Multilateralization of Détente, 1966–1968,” Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 1 (Winter 2004), pp. 22–74. See also Thomas Alan Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). For more on this point, see Suri, Power and Protest, pp. 213–59; Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev. edn (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994). See Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichterman, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, and Richard W. van Wagenen, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957). “The Future Tasks of the Alliance: (The ‘Harmel Report’),” 13–14 December 1967, www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b671213a.htm (accessed 3 August 2004). Ibid. “North Atlantic Treaty,” 4 April 1949, www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm (accessed 3 August 2004). See Campbell Craig, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Nuclear War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Andreas Wenger, Living with Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nuclear Weapons (Lanham: Rowman & Littleﬁeld, 1997); Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). See Marilyn D. Eustace, Canada’s Participation in Political NATO (Kingston, Ontario: Center for International Relations, Queen’s University, 1976). “North Atlantic Treaty,” 4 April 1949, www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm (accessed 3 August 2004). Emphasis added. Ibid. For a sample of critical comments about the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship, see Rusk to the American Embassy, Bonn, 19 January 1963; Adenauer to McCloy, 29

The normative resilience of NATO 29

21

22 23

24 25 26

27 28

29 30

31 32 33

34

January 1963, both in John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA (JFKL), National Security Files (NSF), Box 77, Germany, general 1/63–2/63; McCloy to Adenauer, 4 February 1963, Amherst College Archives and Special Collections, Amherst, MA, Papers of John J. McCloy, Box GY1, 3; Acheson to Adenauer, 19 January 1963; Adenauer an Acheson, 28 January 1963; Knappstein (Washington, DC) to Adenauer and Secretary of State, 30 January 1963, all in Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus, Rhöndorf, Germany, Adenauer Nachlaß, Ordnung III/1. See Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer: Der Staatsmann, 1952–1967 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1991), pp. 758–61, 810–26; Maurice Vaïsse, La grandeur: Politique étrangère du Général de Gaulle, 1958–1969 (Paris: Fayard, 1998), pp. 162–263. See Klaus Hildebrand, Von Erhard zur Großen Koalition, 1963–1969 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1984). See ibid.; William I. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent, 1945–2002 (New York: Doubleday Books, 2003); William Glenn Gray, Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949–1969 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). See John Milton Cooper Jr, Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). See George F. Kennan, Russia, the Atom, and the West (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), esp. pp. 32–116. Niall Ferguson criticizes the British leadership for entering World War I, because Britain’s involvement reversed the tradition of valuing empire above European continental matters. See Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War: Explaining World War I (New York: Basic Books, 1999), esp. Ch. 3. On the British priority of empire over Europe, see Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (New York: Scribner, 1976); C.A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780–1830 (London: Longman, 2004). See Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972). Letter from Eden to Eisenhower, 18 July 1956, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS (DDEL), Ann Whitman File, International, Box 21, Eden. I would like to thank David Tal, of Tel Aviv University, for ﬁrst bringing this document to my attention. I am also grateful for his advice and encouragement on this topic. For Eisenhower’s short but corroborating response to Eden’s letter, see Letter from Eisenhower to Eden, 27 July 1956, DDEL, Ann Whitman File, International, Box 21, Eden. See n. 28 above. On the extensive ﬁnancial challenges that the United States and Britain confronted during the 1960s and early 1970s, see Francis J. Gavin, Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958–1971 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Jeremy Richard Fielding, “The Currency of Power: Anglo-American Economic Diplomacy and the Making of British Foreign Policy, 1964–1968” (Ph.D thesis, Yale University, 1999). Lawrence Kaplan describes this ﬁrm commitment to the European continent as a “revolution” in US thinking. Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance, updated ed. (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), pp. 1–11. See Oberdorfer, Senator Mansﬁeld, pp. 387–91 It is remarkable how little attention NATO’s defense commitments in Europe received from radical critics of domestic and foreign policy in the 1960s. See Jeremi Suri, “The Cultural Contradictions of Cold War Education: The Case of West Berlin,” Cold War History 4 (April 2004), pp. 1–20; Suri, Power and Protest, pp. 88–130, 164–212. See Lundestad, Empire by Integration; Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (London: Macmillan, 1998).

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35 Henry Kissinger, “What kind of Atlantic partnership?” Atlantic Community Quarterly 7 (1969), pp. 18–38. Kissinger recognized that both US and European leaders often stood in the way of the creation of a true “Atlantic commonwealth.” 36 “North Atlantic Treaty,” 4 April 1949, www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm (accessed 3 August 2004). 37 See Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947–1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Kennan, Russia, the Atom, and the West, pp. 32–116. 38 See Willy Brandt, People and Politics: The Years 1960–1975 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976); Arnulf Baring, Machtwechsel: Die Ära Brandt–Scheel (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1982). 39 See Franz Josef Strauss, Entwurf für Europa (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1966). Strauss was a critic of NATO, but he also relied on the state-to-state relations created by the alliance to formulate and publicize his Gaullist position on West Germany’s political future. 40 See Lawrence S. Wittner, Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); Suri, Power and Protest, pp. 164–212. 41 Letter from de Gaulle to Eisenhower, 17 September 1958, in Charles de Gaulle, Lettres, notes et carnets, 1958–1960 (Paris: Plon, 1986), pp. 82–4; Letter from de Gaulle to Eisenhower, 6 October 1959, in de Gaulle, Lettres, notes, pp. 262–5; Vaïsse, La grandeur, pp. 113–25. 42 Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). 43 Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity;” Wenger and Suri, “At the Crossroads of Diplomatic and Social History.” 44 See the accounts of the Glassboro Summit between Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin and US President Lyndon Johnson, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1964–68, vol. XIV, pp. 514–56. See also Jeremi Suri, “Lyndon Johnson and the Global Disruption of 1968,” in Looking Back at LBJ: White House Politics in a New Light, ed. Mitchell B. Lerner (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), pp. 53–77. 45 See Suri, Power and Protest, pp. 245–58. 46 As early as May 1968, Henry Kissinger called for a combination of sticks and carrots in US policy toward the Soviet Union. Kissinger perceived a Soviet desire for détente, coupled with a tendency toward aggression in areas of the world, including Latin American and Africa, where Moscow estimated limited Western capabilities for resisting communist expansion. See “U.S. Relations with the U.S.S.R.,” included in Brieﬁng Book for Nelson Rockefeller, 15 May 1968, Rockefeller Archive Center, Pocantico Hills, New York, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, Gubernatorial, Ann C. Whitman Files, 35, Box 5, 88. 47 Despite the counsel of his advisers, Johnson wanted to go ahead with the summit meeting, anyway. He was, however, unable to organize the summit because of public acrimony and his lame-duck status as a president serving his last months in the White House. See Suri, “Lyndon Johnson and the Global Disruption of 1968.” 48 Kaplan, NATO and the United States, pp. 104–5. 49 Ibid., pp. 104–14. 50 See “The Future Tasks of the Alliance: (The ‘Harmel Report’).” 51 Ibid. 52 See John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1973); Gerard C. Smith, Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (Garden City: Doubleday, 1980). 53 See Baring, Machtwechsel; Suri, Power and Protest, pp. 216–26. 54 Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity.”

3

Not a NATO responsibility? Psychological warfare, the Berlin crisis, and the formation of Interdoc Giles Scott-Smith

Introduction This chapter examines a particular episode during the early 1960s that had profound implications for the non-military role of NATO and its identity as a defensive alliance. In 1960, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) submitted a proposal for the creation of a permanent civilian body within NATO to initiate and coordinate psychological warfare operations against the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic (GDR).1 The background to this proposal was Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s attempt to force an ultimatum on the status of West Berlin. The FRG’s main concern was that it could be left out of a potential compromise solution brokered by the United States and Britain. In the period between the Khrushchev–Eisenhower discussions at Camp David in September 1959 and at the Paris Summit in May 1960, the FRG responded by developing plans for an offensive political warfare capability within the NATO apparatus. The aim was to respond to Soviet and GDR propaganda in order to prevent the communist bloc from holding the initiative during this tense period of negotiations. This hard-line approach was opposed mainly by the British, who were unwilling to allow negotiations with Khrushchev to be threatened by such a move. The British were also less than enthusiastic about passing this extra responsibility to NATO, preferring to maintain national control of this sensitive area of activity. While the German proposal did provoke discussions within NATO on speciﬁc aspects of psychological warfare, the main outcome was a realization that these activities could best be dealt with outside of ofﬁcial NATO channels. The result was the creation, in 1962, of the International Information and Documentation Center, or Interdoc, in The Hague. The relationship between NATO and Interdoc was never an ofﬁcial one. Neither was Interdoc solely a product of the discussions held within NATO during 1960–61. However, it is possible to piece together both the internal debate within NATO and the discussions elsewhere concerning Interdoc’s formation to draw conclusions about the linkages between the two. This reveals an intriguing episode of NATO history, involving an internal debate over the division of responsibility between the civilian and military branches of the organization and the problem of deﬁning its defensive role in a changing international context.2

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The Berlin crisis and the formation of the working group on psychological warfare From its very beginnings, NATO had to face the problem of Soviet propaganda and the threat that this would have a debilitating effect on both public opinion and morale within NATO countries. However, there was never a consensus on developing propaganda or psychological warfare capabilities within NATO. First, there was opposition to centralizing these tasks within NATO at the expense of independent national initiatives. Second, there was a dislike of directly associating the organization, mainly representing democratic states, with any outright propaganda body. The standard Western view during the Cold War was that propaganda was the occupation of an aggressive communist bloc, against which the West presented only its truthful response. Third, there was the problem of deﬁning exactly what counter-propaganda might involve. It was a matter of contention whether it should refer to defensive intentions or to a more offensively-oriented psychological warfare strategy that was not understood as a peacetime activity. The result of these many discussions was merely an agreement on greater collaboration and sharing of information, with little willingness to commit NATO to this undeﬁned responsibility. Despite repeated attempts to break this impasse during the 1950s, particularly by the French and the Italians, no unanimous signiﬁcant agreement was reached.3 This impasse was broken by the rising tensions over Berlin. On 10 November 1958, Khrushchev delivered a speech that demanded a ﬁnal settlement between the occupying powers, turning Berlin into a “free city” and handing all questions of access to the GDR. If no agreement could be reached within six months, the Soviet Union would unilaterally sign a peace treaty with the GDR and so force the West to negotiate with the East Germans over access rights. Khrushchev had several reasons for introducing this ultimatum, but the principal one was the aim to force recognition of the GDR and Soviet concerns over the future military capabilities of the Federal Republic within NATO.4 West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had committed his government to negotiating for German reuniﬁcation only from a position of strength, a policy that refused recognition of the GDR. Yet the reaction of US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to Khrushchev’s demands was not reassuring. In a press conference on 26 November 1958, Dulles was prepared to concede that the United States might deal with GDR ofﬁcials acting as agents of the Soviet Union and that this broadly represented Western policy.5 The implication was that the United States was open to negotiations and would not risk a war over relatively trivial questions concerning bureaucratic identity.6 The danger for the FRG was that by holding on to its hard-line no-negotiation policy it would become increasingly isolated from its NATO allies. The chancellor was deeply concerned that Dulles had framed this position without consulting him, and he wrote in response to the secretary of state in January 1959: In constantly characterizing the reuniﬁcation of Germany as the most important problem one conjures up the danger of a movement being

Not a NATO responsibility? 33 launched in certain countries to the effect that the world should not be imperilled for the sake of reuniting Germany. Such a movement would be ominous.7 Western requests for a foreign ministers’ conference to undermine Soviet brinkmanship by stringing out the negotiations resulted in rolling but indecisive discussions between May and August. However, the fact that the GDR had been represented at the talks in Geneva as an equal to the FRG was difﬁcult for Adenauer to take. During 1959, German–British relations worsened, as the chancellor feared that British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was inﬂuencing US President Dwight D. Eisenhower towards a weaker position on Berlin. US Ambassador David Bruce in Bonn recognized Adenauer’s “frequent and indiscreet references to British ‘softness’ in dealing with Soviets, his conviction that their tactics reﬂected appeasement spirit, fear lest Macmillan had made secret concessions in Moscow [in February 1959].”8 Britain was certainly more prepared to develop trade relations with the GDR, and it became the chief target for East German propaganda to further isolate the FRG.9 With no new ideas on how to deal with the Berlin issue coming from Bonn, at Camp David in September 1959, Eisenhower agreed with Khrushchev to negotiate further on this in the context of reaching a general disarmament agreement.10 The period between the Camp David discussions and the planned Four-Power Summit in Paris in May 1960 was a tense time for the Adenauer Government. Soviet propaganda was exploiting intra-alliance disagreements by portraying Adenauer as a “frustrated and embittered supporter of continued East–West tension and revanchist policies.”11 On their part, Adenauer and West German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano felt under pressure from Eisenhower’s proposals for more normalized relations with the GDR. American diplomat Foy M. Kohler had already noticed in late 1959 that Eisenhower’s proposals expressed “a complete lack of self-conﬁdence in the capacity of the West Germans to stand up against any political or psychological blandishments from the East.”12 During the Four-Power Working Group negotiations (the United States, France, Britain, and the FRG), set up to ﬁnalize the Western position for the forthcoming summit, French President Charles de Gaulle backed Adenauer’s no-negotiation stance. The Franco-German position favored “a rigidly inﬂexible position based on the principle that no change in the juridical status of Berlin can be contemplated.” Within the FRG itself, Adenauer “engaged in a major propaganda effort committing his government publicly to such a position.”13 This was the immediate political context when, in early March 1960, the West German delegation circulated a proposal within the North Atlantic Council (NAC) entitled “NATO-Wide Co-operation and Co-ordination in the Field of Psychological Warfare.”14 The proposal began by stressing that a shift in emphasis had occurred in Soviet strategy under Khrushchev, from “the threat of military aggression . . . to indirect attack, in particular to political and ideological attacks.” All forms of mass media – radio, television, cinema, the press, and pamphlets – were being used. The goal of this strategy was broadly to

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undermine the belief in collective defense, solidarity, and mutual conﬁdence that NATO rested upon, and the principal means to achieve this was to create distrust among the peoples of other NATO nations towards German ambitions. Alongside this was the fear that the momentum for partial reconciliation with the East would undermine the FRG’s identity and cohesion, which had been built on a negation of the GDR (exempliﬁed by the Hallstein doctrine). Psychological defense was therefore needed, not just to oppose the GDR’s propaganda, but also to strengthen West German resolve, should reconciliation actually take place. This transformation of Soviet strategy and its potential consequences led the Germans to reject as inadequate the established NATO line of individual member countries responding with their own (often uncoordinated) counter-propaganda initiatives. Instead, they were in favor of a more radical solution, expanding the threat to involve all NATO allies. The German proposal stated: Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides for assistance in the case of an “armed attack.” In view of the psychological threat, which has increasingly been added to the military one, mutual aid should, in the spirit of the Treaty, also be extended to defence against these attacks, for, in this psychological war, that attack against one NATO ally is also as attack against them all and against NATO as a whole.15 The German proposal also invoked Article 4, which provides for NATO countries to consult whenever their security is threatened. To deal with this dramatically altered state of affairs, a new apparatus within NATO was required. The proposal called for “a permanent international planning team on Psywar with the Standing Group” and “the creation of a Psywar Co-ordination Section within SHAPE” to clarify psychological warfare initiatives within the military in times of both peace and war. But the most innovative aspect was in the civilian sphere: “To deal with the political dimension,” a council committee should be established to be “responsible for analysing communist propaganda and ‘subversive activities,’ and ‘recommending joint counter-measures.’”16 The FRG proposal used the heightened tensions surrounding Berlin and the looming summit meeting to force the deadlock on psychological warfare operations within NATO. On 1 April 1960, German Minister of Defense Franz Joseph Strauss formally introduced the proposal at a NATO ministerial meeting. Aware that military matters dominated the meeting’s agenda, Strauss sought legitimacy for his topic by stressing that Soviet psychological warfare aimed “to weaken the Western nations’ will to defend themselves so that the military effort necessary for a hot war would no longer be required.” The defense minister emphasized how inconsistent it was to upgrade NATO with advanced weapons without paying attention to “moral solidarity” and to “the spirit of those who use them for the defence of freedom.” Anticipating criticism, Strauss stressed how essential it was that NATO adapt to the changing circumstances of Soviet strategy. By focusing on the values of freedom and democracy in the West on which NATO

Not a NATO responsibility? 35 rested, he also appreciated that any psychological warfare campaign would operate as much in an offensive as in a defensive manner against the Soviet Union, and with great potential.17 The ministers agreed to pass the matter over to the NAC, with the intention that it should report back by December.18 But the failure of the Paris summit of 16–19 May increased the German desire for action. Khrushchev refused to negotiate substantive disarmament issues and once more raised the specter of an ultimatum for a settlement on Berlin. In the following weeks, Soviet efforts to undermine Western unity and Berlin’s morale were “largely in [the] area [of] psychological cold warfare.” The danger was that this propaganda offensive would be followed up with attempts to disrupt the economic lifeline between West Berlin and the FRG.19 During a visit to the United States in early June 1960, Strauss stated to US Secretary of State Christian Herter that the West “should worry somewhat more than they have” about Soviet psychological warfare activities. According to Strauss, the threat of war with the USSR was minimal, yet whenever the issue of psychological defense was introduced in NATO, “Canada and the United Kingdom protested that this was not a NATO responsibility.” There was much irritation that this matter was regarded as little more than “a German idiosyncrasy.”20 Strauss made the point that the anti-German propaganda campaign was having some success amongst certain trade union, media, and political groups in Britain. Herter replied favorably to Strauss’s plea for “a special bureau” to “hit back in defence of democracy,” commenting that a recent meeting with NATO Secretary-General Paul Henri Spaak on long-term planning had included discussions on better coordination of informational and “psychological defence policy.”21 Encouraged by this response, the German delegation to NATO resubmitted the proposal for the NAC’s agenda “as a matter of urgency.” Having discovered that Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) had already begun to examine psychological warfare matters, the Federal Republic’s permanent representative secured NAC agreement in July that serious attention would be given to this issue after the summer recess.22 The council duly accepted the German proposal for the establishment of a working group under the chairmanship of the Assistant Secretary-General of Political Affairs, R.W.J. Hooper. The US, British, Danish, French, German, Greek, and Turkish representatives indicated their willingness to be a part of the new group. The Canadians supported its creation but were more interested in assessing the existing arrangements for psychological warfare within NATO and remained dubious about forming a new permanent apparatus. The Belgian, Dutch, and Italian representatives agreed but were unable to state whether they would take part. The group was given the deliberately broad task to “consider and make recommendations on the problems connected with psychological warfare.” In the face of Canadian objections, it was decided to allow the group to set its own agenda and not in the ﬁrst place be limited by council directives, although it was stated by the US representative that psychological strategy in time of war should not be part of the group’s interest.23

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The ﬁrst meeting of the group was held on 13–14 October 1960. The Canadians, by this stage, had decided to join, but the Belgians, Dutch, and Italians remained absent. Each country represented put forward a member of its NATO delegation, except for Germany, France, and Britain, who sent their experts: Lieutenant-Colonel Mittelstaedt from the German Ministry of Defense; G. Paques from the French Ministry of National Defense and Henri FromontMeurice from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and D.C. Hopson, Head of the British Foreign Ofﬁce’s Information Research Department (IRD).24

The working group: deﬁning the task for NATO In his note to the participants of the working group entitled “Problems Connected with Psychological Warfare,” Hooper outlined the need to concentrate on “psychological defence measures in time of peace, and in particular, on the counter measures necessitated by Soviet attacks on NATO or on individual members of the Alliance.”25 Over the next few months, the group confronted several issues that lay at the heart of NATO’s identity. The subject of psychological warfare crossed boundaries and raised questions that inevitably caused major disagreement. The division of responsibility between the civilian and military establishments within NATO had to be clariﬁed, and the very nature of the alliance as a defensive organization was questioned. Even before the group’s ﬁrst meeting, it was clear that two opinions would dominate the debate. The Germans wanted a permanent body, preferably staffed by outside experts, to coordinate a NATO psychological warfare campaign with an offensive strategy. It was this position that demanded a major adaptation of NATO’s identity and objectives. Against this was the more status quo position of the British, who were open to upgrading the existing NATO infrastructure in this ﬁeld but wanted to maintain national control over these types of activities. Problems arose immediately in deﬁning terms. Hopson insisted that psychological warfare was an activity “in support of military operations” and was therefore the sole responsibility of “the military planning staffs working under political direction.” While the Germans agreed with this, in a note on 13 October they introduced the concept of psychological defense as “defence and counter-attack against aggressive radicalism in all spheres of life,” involving “the immunisation of the population against inﬁltration, demoralisation and propaganda of world communism and at the same time the prevention of a ‘revolutionary situation.’” The French introduced the similar concept of “psychological action,” meaning a coordinated effort to “enlighten public opinion.”26 These positions expanded dramatically the scope of the debate. While all parties accepted that psychological warfare was aimed at “hostile communities” and was the concern of the military, the German and French positions called for responses to the impact that Eastern bloc propaganda was having on public opinion within NATO countries during peacetime. Not surprisingly, other nations reacted negatively to this. The Canadian representative rejected psychological defense as having “certain psychiatric connotations which are not particularly desirable” and ﬂatly opposed “an active NATO propaganda unit.”27

Not a NATO responsibility? 37 The German document of 13 October 1960 also recommended discussions on efforts to counter-attack against the Soviet ideological offensive, including “into the enemy’s camp.” Despite clarifying that psychological defense had been chosen as a term because “it corresponds best to the NATO defence concept,” it was apparent that the German position regarded the Soviet actions as immediately threatening to German national sovereignty. They therefore justiﬁed an offensive response in kind.28 But what was most interesting about the German argument was the method by which they proposed to operate their counter-propaganda. Despite the existence of the Inter-ministerial Working Group for Psychological Defence to coordinate activities, due to the experience of national socialism, the West German government was itself unable to undertake largescale campaigns to inﬂuence public opinion. For any defence measures against these attacks it is in principle necessary to enlist to the greatest possible extent the help of private agencies, which have to be provided by the government agencies concerned with the material necessary to devise counter-measures . . . There are a few private organizations which take part in the work of exerting inﬂuence on the population of the Soviet zone. The success of such efforts on a private basis have, however, clearly revealed the vulnerability of the Soviet zonal regime with respect to information.29 The German proposal for increased state–private cooperation allowed greater ﬂexibility and, where necessary, deniability on the part of the government.30 This would require the coordination of private groups operating independently, provided with covert material support by each government, and steered according to an overall strategy decided on in secret within NATO. At the end of October, the working group drew up a study of all activities within NATO already concerned in some way with the ﬁeld of psychological warfare: the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations (AC/52), the Special Committee on Information (AC/46), the Committee of Political Advisors (POLADS), and the Division of Political Affairs.31 The survey highlighted the fact that, while well-researched advice and information was being offered by various bodies, there remained a lack of coordination of, and particularly application of, such material in a counter-offensive manner by a single outﬁt within NATO. To ﬁll this void, the German representatives circulated a discussion document in early November 1960 that proposed the establishment of a permanent committee on psychological action consisting of experts from NATO member states under the leadership of an adviser for psychological warfare. In terms of hierarchy, the adviser would operate as an assistant to the secretary-general.32 The proposals effectively stated that changing international conditions were requiring a wholesale re-appraisal of NATO’s raison d’être. In these circumstances, it was appropriate that the Greek representative called for a study of “the known methods, means and procedures used in Soviet propaganda,” after

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which “an attempt could be made to decide which of these methods it might be suitable to adopt and which must remain strictly barred.”33

The outcome of the working group: a failed attempt to reposition NATO In mid-November, the group forwarded a report to the NAC for presentation to the NATO ministerial meeting in December. The report that emerged from the meetings of 3–4 November in many ways represented a major step forward. The group’s focus was deﬁned by the French concept of psychological action: “activities in peacetime variously known as ‘psychological defence,’ ‘counter propaganda,’ ‘propaganda,’ and ‘information.’” The report went on to acknowledge that the existing apparatus was “insufﬁcient effectively either to counteract this overt and covert propaganda offensive or to encourage positive initiatives designed to promote NATO and Free World objectives.” The group also accepted that, whatever form of coordination might emerge within NATO, responsibility for carrying out any strategy of psychological action would remain with the member governments.34 During the council meeting at the end of November, the Germans received support from the Belgians and the Turks in their effort to push through changes to NATO’s civilian apparatus. However, the Netherlands, Italy, Canada, Denmark, and Norway followed the lead of Britain’s Sir Paul Mason and backed the proposal for improving the existing apparatus. Signiﬁcantly, one of Mason’s objections centered on how it would be almost impossible to maintain secrecy concerning any new permanent body that dealt with psychological action.35 The positions taken by France and the United States at this meeting deserve comment. Despite their previous active promotion of similar initiatives, the French did not support the German proposal for a permanent committee. By the end of 1960, the shift in de Gaulle’s foreign policy away from full cooperation with NATO was becoming more apparent, and the idea of such a committee no longer ﬁt the developing Gaullist worldview. Compared with that of other nations, US participation in the working group had been relatively subdued. While the US representative reacted positively to the efforts of the working group during the council meeting, he did not make an explicit statement on any changes required within NATO. There were several reasons for this. In December 1959, President Eisenhower had commissioned Mansﬁeld Sprague to head a president’s commission on information activities abroad. The top-level commission did not submit its report until December 1960, making it unlikely that the United States would commit itself to NATO initiatives in this ﬁeld before the ﬁndings became known.36 Aside from the obvious unwillingness to pass a controlling role in this ﬁeld to others within a multinational organization, the inability of the Eisenhower administration to aid the Hungarian revolt of 1956 had totally discredited the “rollback” policy exempliﬁed by the NSC 68 in 1950. The Americans feared that the German proposals would promote social unrest in the East, causing unwelcome instability and upsetting the status quo.37 Any

Not a NATO responsibility? 39 extension of NATO responsibilities in this ﬁeld, especially on the terms that the Germans were looking for, would have been unacceptable because of the fear of provoking unnecessary consequences and uncontrolled escalation. Despite these reservations, Secretary-General Spaak was strongly in favor of revamping NATO machinery to accommodate an expanded psychological warfare role. To generate momentum, Spaak drafted a memorandum for the upcoming ministerial meeting in December that outlined the essential issues of disagreement and ended by stating “it is essential that the Ministers should give some guidance on these points if continuation of the studies of the Ad Hoc Working Group is to serve any useful purpose.”38 Yet the ministers hesitated. No speciﬁc resolutions were taken, and the group’s report was placed in the context of long-term planning.39 Spaak overrode this procrastination by stating that “more vigorous action should be undertaken to expose the true meaning of peaceful co-existence as interpreted by the Soviets.” On 9 February 1961, the council therefore sanctioned the working group to continue.40 By this stage, the Germans were showing some impatience with the slow progress. In early March 1961, they circulated a note that attempted to both shift the focus and move the discussion on in one go. The note emphasized that existing bodies such as the information and culture committee were inadequate because “the members of the delegations do not possess a detailed knowledge of these often highly technical and/or complex problems.” The Germans supported the French proposal, already expressed in the group’s report in December, to allow outside experts to attend the working group meetings. By raising the level of expertise in one go, endless discussion on deﬁning terms of reference would be avoided. Also “the discussion on substantial problems should be started already at the next meeting, even though it should be impossible to arrive at a decision on institutional questions.”41 Effective counter-measures to Soviet propaganda could then be discussed immediately. Setting the tone for what they would like to see in the future, the German delegation followed this up prior to the next group meeting with two detailed papers, one on the European March for Disarmament and another on the World Youth Forum to be held in Moscow in July 1961.42 Both papers demanded discussion on the most appropriate countermeasures to be taken, either on a national or multinational basis. The German move was unmistakably a plea for action rather than words. Again, the context for this move was the continuing uncertainty over Berlin. Just prior to Adenauer’s visit to US President John F. Kennedy in April 1961, Henry Kissinger wrote a brieﬁng paper for the president in which he explained the “psychological exhaustion” of the Federal Republic. The chance that the United States might still strike a deal with Khrushchev involving concessions on either Berlin or the Polish–GDR border without consulting the FRG led the FRG to a perennial “fear of being left alone or sold out” by its main allies.43 While the German proposal for action received the support of the French “both as regards procedure and as regards substance,” the report that emerged from the working group meeting of 3–4 March 1961 indicated that the Germans were not going to succeed with their demand.44 The British proposals for a restating of the role,

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importance, and agenda of the information committee were accepted. As a compromise, it was recommended that, alongside the committee, “there should be an Ad Hoc Study Group of experts which should meet as its business requires and not less than twice a year.” This new forum should report to the council, which would then arrange the appropriate follow-up. In April, the NAC accepted Council Memorandum C-M(61)25 in its entirety within the context of long-term planning.45 The working group, having achieved its purpose, was disbanded.

NATO as hub: the ad hoc study groups While the attempt to reform NATO’s structure to deal with psychological defense had failed, the admittance of outside experts for discussions on this issue was an important development for building contacts and cooperation across this ﬁeld. Ideally, NATO was meant to operate as a central “hub” for consultations among otherwise disconnected agencies. This was partly the function of the three ad hoc study groups, created during the summer of 1961 to pursue the following speciﬁc objectives: AC/201(A) focusing on communist radio broadcasting to sub-Saharan Africa, AC/201(B) on youth and education matters, and AC/201(C) on Berlin.46 But the problem with the study groups was that they rested on a compromise. Since it was highly unlikely that a more permanent or comprehensive responsibility for any of these areas would be taken up by NATO itself, participation in the Africa and Berlin groups was half-hearted, and neither survived beyond the end of 1961.47 The youth group did function more according to its intended purpose. There was serious concern amongst the Western powers over Soviet attempts to attract the support of elites from the decolonizing world, and for this reason the group attracted active British, French, and US participation, alongside the Germans. However, even this group lasted only until 29 April 1963, when its function was taken over by the Information Committee.48 The main cause of the youth group’s demise was the fact that it could not fulﬁll the German demand for arranging counter-measures to Soviet and Eastern bloc propaganda. The British view that all discussions within NATO should remain on an informational level and not cross over into matters of operational signiﬁcance basically prevailed. This stimulated a substantial exchange of documents on Soviet inﬂuence and activities among youth and students. NATO Secretary-General Dirk Stikker (1961–64) himself remarked in March 1962 that “the practice of consultation at the expert level between those who are actively dealing with problems is one which we have found immensely useful and which has quietly but gradually greatly extended the degree of cooperation between member states.”49 The documents from the group’s sessions reveal that all participants took great care to avoid associating it with NATO in order to avoid implicating NATO as an arbiter of psychological counter-measures against the Soviet Union. In other words, the defensive identity of NATO seems to have held, even in this arena. As Stikker made clear:

Not a NATO responsibility? 41 Many of the most effective forms of action in this ﬁeld are carried out on an unattributable and indeed in some cases a clandestine basis. The difﬁculties of transferring this sort of work from a national to an international footing hardly need to be emphasised; and some of our governments, while not reluctant to see others doing this sort of thing, might not wish to get involved in it themselves.50 Therefore while the study groups fulﬁlled a certain purpose, their role was strictly limited. Another means to ensure cooperation and coordination on a broader front was needed.

The formation of Interdoc The FRG’s report of October 1960, with its reference to the importance of independent private groups in the propaganda war, indicated the way forward. Interdoc came out of an informal West European network created in the late 1950s to discuss mutual interests and the changing nature of East–West relations. There was a precedent in Paix et liberté, which had functioned during the 1950s as an independent network promoting anti-communist propaganda in support of NATO. While Interdoc was created on the foundations of Paix et liberté, Interdoc was a more sophisticated operation. Paix et liberté’s brand of simplistic “negative anti-communism,” which was based wholly on an antiStalinist foundation, was no longer effective in the changed political climate of the late 1950s. A constructive, positive vision was needed that confronted communist ideology with a more effective doctrine built around fundamental Western values.51 The origins of Interdoc date back to 1957, when the ﬁrst meetings (or colloques, to use the French term) were organized by Frenchman Antoine Bonnemaison. Bonnemaison was chief of Guerre/Action psychologique within the Service de documentation extérieure et de contre-espionage (SDECE, the French intelligence service), and from this position he coordinated a network of psychological warfare organizations known as the Cinquième bureau. He ran the colloques via a public front of the bureau, the Centre de recherche du bien politique. The colloques were attended by invited representatives from the military, politics, business, academia, the media, and the security services, and they were held once or twice a year. Beginning in 1955, they served above all as a forum for FrancoGerman intelligence cooperation. Behind them lay the general rapprochement between the two countries, aided by European integration and the greater French willingness to cooperate after Suez in 1956.52 Led by the then chief of Dutch intelligence (the BVD) Louis Einthoven, a Netherlands delegation began to attend the colloques from 1957 onwards. The discussions focused on the Soviet policy of “peaceful coexistence” and the threat that opposing communism would cause a weakening of resolve among Western publics. To combat this directly, the participants sought ways to combine the interests and resources of the business, academic, media, and

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intelligence communities in a common anti-communist endeavor. In 1960, a colloque study group concluded that an international center should be created to act as a central node and coordinating point for the separate activities then going on across Western Europe. The result was Interdoc, opened ofﬁcially on 7 February 1963 in The Hague.53 Interdoc was a transnational enterprise, having close links with cooperating groups in Britain, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, and the United States. However, its core was based on Dutch–German cooperation, and it was always meant to remain a European enterprise, despite occasional attempts to secure more US ﬁnancial and logistical support. Much to his chagrin, Bonnemaison was forced to withdraw when in early 1963 de Gaulle closed down the Cinquième bureaux. The French president was less interested in psychological warfare matters, and the bureaux had become a site of opposition to his policy for Algerian independence. Bonnemaison resigned, and although he secured corporate support for continuing his colloques in a private capacity, they were no longer multinational. French participants continued to attend Interdoc meetings, but they did not play a role in its management.54 Interdoc’s location in The Hague was the result of several factors. The Dutch BVD had already created its own psychological warfare institute in 1960, the Stichting voor Onderzoek van Ecologische Vraagstukken (SOEV), funded by the Dutch multinationals and based on the CIA’s Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology. The Dutch, unencumbered by weighty national interests, were also preeminent in acting as middlemen between the larger European powers and were therefore the ideal managers for an enterprise based on transnational cooperation. Einthoven, now retired from the BVD, became Interdoc’s president, with the day-to-day running of the organization under the control of a director, Cees van den Heuvel. Van den Heuvel had previously been head of the BVD’s training section and with Einthoven’s encouragement had laid the groundwork for the SOEV.55 The German interest was initially controlled via a front of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND – the federal intelligence service), namely, the Verein zur Erforschung sozialpolitischer Verhältnisse im Ausland e.V. (society for the investigation of the socio-political situation abroad), based in Munich and under the leadership of BND psychological warfare chief Rolf Geyer. The Verein was represented on Interdoc’s board, and a staff member was placed in The Hague as deputy director and chief liaison. In 1966, the Verein was renamed the Deutsche Arbeitsgruppe für West–Ost Beziehungen (German working group for West–East relations). Intellectual input from the German side came from the Verein’s secretary, Nicolaus von Grote, and the specialists on the Soviet Union and the GDR, C.D. Kernig and Hans Lades. The largest share of the Interdoc budget was also provided by the Germans. In 1970, when cuts were being introduced, the German contribution was 605,300 Dutch guilders (about US$150,000), more than 90 percent of the total.56 At that time, the organization involved around 20 people, either on a full-time basis or as contract-based employees for speciﬁc projects. Interdoc was formed to fulﬁll three main tasks. First, it was to function as a

Not a NATO responsibility? 43 stimulus and collection point for the analysis of communist ideology and strategy. Simultaneously, it attempted to clarify Western values in order to meet the communist challenge with a clear-sighted opposing doctrine.57 Annual conferences of experts were held in various locations, and the results were published. Close links were built up with existing institutes across Western Europe that examined East–West relations, with the goal that Interdoc would function as the principal liaison point between them. From the Dutch side, the journal Oost–West had been created under van den Heuvel’s patronage in 1962, and its editorial ofﬁce was situated in the same building as Interdoc. Second, Interdoc had an activist dimension. One of Bonnemaison’s chief contributions from the colloques was an analysis of the formation of anti-communist “cadres” in key positions throughout society. Using the principles of Leninism, Interdoc’s role was to establish training facilities for aspiring individuals who would then form a kind of anti-communist intellectual vanguard within each nation’s body politic.58 In an article in 1961, van den Heuvel himself referred to this cadre formation as being aimed at the three most inﬂuential areas in society: education, the military, and the business world.59 To this end “Ostkollegien” were run for selected Dutch students and military personnel by the Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung (central federal agency for political education) in Cologne and at Interdoc Berlin, by Geyer’s Verein. Third, there was the development of counter-measures. This was wholly aimed at disrupting prestigious communist-orchestrated events such as the large youth and student festivals run by two fronts, the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Students. Interdoc’s origins therefore lie in the mid-1950s, but its eventual realization in 1963 was closely connected to the discussion within NATO, as outlined above. Once the German push in 1960–61 to secure an offensive psychological warfare capability within NATO had failed, Interdoc was the alternative. It was no coincidence that it opened just two months before the last surviving ad hoc study group, on youth affairs, was disbanded. With Interdoc up and running, the need for the study group declined. The institute in The Hague was meant to fulﬁll the role of a coordinating central point for the anti-communist activities of private agencies. No ofﬁcial link between NATO and Interdoc existed. No traces of a connection exist among the papers of the psychological warfare working group, and van den Heuvel has denied any connection.60 It is more important to regard the NATO discussions as a stimulus for the negotiations already taking place at the private colloques. In his article published in early 1962, van den Heuvel made direct reference to the fact that all attempts to develop a psychological warfare capability within NATO had met with opposition, and while research and committee work continued, no further concrete results emerged.61 A few years earlier, he had also suggested that, even if the NATO discussions were successful, the need for an independent private agency would still exist.62 Lines of contact can be traced in some of the NATO documents. The study group on youth affairs had met several times during 1961–62 “to consider what counter-measures [were] likely to be most effective” against the WFDY’s

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festivals. But any possible connection with NATO had to be avoided: “The Study Group stresses the need to ensure that action taken by national authorities in this sensitive ﬁeld, particularly in connection with the [WFDY] Helsinki Festival [in August 1962], should not appear as being a concerted NATO effort.”63 Helsinki happened to be the ﬁrst counter-action organized through Interdoc. Van den Heuvel was asked by the Germans to organize and coordinate student teams from various European countries to attend the festival. With a Dutch team already in training, van den Heuvel attempted to add groups from France, Belgium, Italy, and Britain. Other groups such as the Swiss Aktionskomitee Wahret die Freiheit (action committee “preserve freedom”) were also active. The goal was not only “the study of this Youth Festival on the spot,” but also “to form a certain counter-poise to the one-sided communist inﬂuence.”64 One example was a speech by Dutch student Hans Beuker on 3 August 1962 to one of the conference sessions. In order to disrupt the conference theme of anti-colonialism, Beuker’s speech pointed to the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe as being equally deplorable. According to van den Heuvel’s post-festival report, “the effect of his speech was immediately felt and clearly seen during the following days, as both Communists and non-Communists frequently referred to his declaration.”65 Van den Heuvel and his Interdoc (and ex-BVD) colleague Herman Mennes were present in Helsinki to run the coordination between the various groups, in the process laying the groundwork for future cooperation. “It was,” according to Dutch team member Pieter Koerts, “a coordinated operation.”66 Helsinki was a turning point for the WFDY festivals. Having taken an offensive posture by holding large events in the non-communist world (Vienna in 1959 and Helsinki in 1962), the communist movement found that the drawbacks ultimately outweighed the beneﬁts. It was six years before another festival was held, in Soﬁa in 1968. Interdoc was not solely responsible for this result, but the combination of Western tactics to disrupt the smooth operation of the Helsinki festival certainly had a debilitating impact on communist strategy. Interdoc lasted on paper until 1986, but its operations were drastically reduced when, in 1970, the BND decided to cut off its ﬁnancial contribution. This decision came suddenly and was wholly connected to the shift in FRG foreign policy towards a rapprochement with the East. In 1965, Rolf Geyer was enthusiastic about the “solid basis” that had been created for Interdoc and the many possibilities for developing its potential in the following years.67 But the dominant theme for the Germans was always the relationship with the GDR.68 The developments within NATO conﬁrm this, since the initial impulse for the German psychological warfare proposal was exactly the Berlin crisis and the need to respond to Eastern bloc propaganda in defense of the FRG’s sovereignty. Following the inauguration of the CDU-SDP (Christian Democratic Union–Social Democratic Party) Grand Coalition on 1 December 1966 and the changing attitude towards the GDR, a major reappraisal of the BND’s role and purpose was inevitable.69 Uncertainties over the budget for Geyer’s Arbeitsgruppe forced a temporary halt to cash ﬂow from Munich in early 1967, but normal service was then resumed.70

Not a NATO responsibility? 45 During 1968–69, Interdoc was still expanding its activities, giving special attention to the rise of the New Left and forming Interdoc-Youth as a response.71 But the arrival of the SDP government under Willy Brandt in 1969 had farreaching consequences. Brandt’s Ostpolitik and the search for a full rapprochement with the GDR undermined the legitimacy of Interdoc for the new government. Rolf Geyer resigned in early 1970, ostensibly for health reasons, but also as a consequence of this policy.72 In June 1970 Geyer’s successor announced that there could no longer be a ﬁnancial guarantee from the BND. At the end of that year, Gerhard Wessel, Reinhard Gehlen’s successor as head of the BND, announced his utmost appreciation for the services of Interdoc over the previous years but stated that the connection with the BND had to be broken. An attempt was made to shift responsibility to Claus Kernig’s new Institut für Gesellschaft und Wissenschaft (institute for society and science) in Freiburg. However, the failure of this transition meant that by 1972 Interdoc was no longer receiving any German funding.73

Conclusion The proposals from the FRG in 1960–61 to create a psychological warfare facility within NATO radically transcended the established role and identity of the alliance. The invoking of Article 5 in response to the propaganda threat to FRG sovereignty highlighted the fact that the FRG’s goals challenged the fundamental dichotomies that deﬁned NATO: peace–war; defensive–offensive; civilian–military. Yet the US and British determination to defuse the Berlin crisis through negotiation overruled the German desire to go on the ideological offensive. The fallout of “rollback” and the fear of security leaks were also decisive factors in the stance of Britain and the United States. In terms of actual developments, the long-running debate within NATO concerning its counterpropaganda role was not greatly altered by the activities of 1960–63. Psychological warfare matters remained in the hands of the military command, appropriate for times of conﬂict only, and other counter-propaganda issues were dealt with by the enhanced civilian Information and Culture Committee. However, the formation of Interdoc as a private agency and clearinghouse for anti-communist information, analysis, and counter-measures was an important solution to the obstacles faced within NATO. Flexibility and deniability were increased, and the FRG had an outlet for its immediate concerns about Eastern bloc propaganda. The relationship between Interdoc and NATO was never made formal, and it is highly likely that Interdoc would have been created in some form, even if the NATO negotiations had led to a successful conclusion. But the ideas that were being presented within NATO in 1960–61 were the same as those that led to Interdoc’s formation. And, with Interdoc in place, the negotiations for major changes within NATO were clearly no longer necessary.

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Notes 1 “Psychological warfare as deﬁned here includes the planned use in time of war by NATO nations and NATO commanders of authorized propaganda and related informational measures designed to inﬂuence the opinions, emotions, attitude and behaviour of enemy, neutral or friendly groups, in such a manner as to support agreed NATO plans, policies and objectives.” Ofﬁcial deﬁnitions for NATO armed forces, n.d., 1954, National Archives, The Hague (NAH), Ministeries AOK en AZ, Kabinet van de Minister-President (1944) 1945–79, Papers of the Bijzondere Voorlichtings Commissie (BVC), 11778. 2 Until now, the vast majority of studies on NATO have concentrated on the military aspects of the alliance. See Lawrence S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The Formative Years (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), p. 189; Vojtech Mastny, “The New History of Cold War Alliances,” Journal of Cold War Studies 4 (Spring 2002), pp. 55–84. 3 See, for instance, Memorandum by the French Delegation, 12 December 1953, “The Problem of Enlightening Public Opinion,” NATO Archives, Brussels (NA), C-M(53)171; North Atlantic Council (NAC) Meeting, Summary Record, 16 December 1953, NA, C-R(53)57. 4 “New Evidence on the Berlin Crisis 1958–1962. Khrushchev’s November 1958 Berlin Ultimatum: New Evidence from the Polish Archives,” introduction, translation, and annotation by Douglas Selvage, Cold War International History Bulletin 11 (Winter 1998), pp. 200–3. 5 Record of Secretary of State Dulles’ Press Conference, 26 November 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1958–60, vol. VIII, p. 125. 6 Richard J. Barnet, The Alliance: America–Europe–Japan, Makers of the Postwar World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 181. 7 Adenauer to Dulles, 30 January 1959, FRUS, 1958–60, vol. VIII, p. 310. 8 Bruce to State Department, 10 August 1959, FRUS, 1958–60, vol. IX, p. 2. 9 Klaus Larres, “Britain, East Germany and Détente: British Policy toward the GDR and West Germany’s ‘Policy of Movement,’ 1955–65,” in Europe, Cold War and Coexistence, 1953–1965, ed. Wilfried Loth (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 115. 10 Joint Soviet–United States Communiqué, September 1959, FRUS, 1959–60, vol. IX, pp. 51–2. 11 Bruce to State Department, 10 August 1959, FRUS, 1959–60, vol. IX, p. 3. 12 Kohler to Secretary of State, 21 August 1959, FRUS, 1959–60, vol. IX, p. 7. 13 Kohler to Secretary of State, February 1960, FRUS, 1959–60, vol. IX, p. 83. 14 9 March 1960, NA, C-M(60)22. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 The text of Strauss’s speech can be found in 27 June 1960, NA, RDC/60/208. (RDC refers to International Staff Executive Secretary Richard Dean Coleridge.) 18 29 April 1960, NA, C-R(60)14. 19 State Department to US Embassy Bonn, 8 July 1960, FRUS, 1958–60, vol. IX, p. 537. 20 Memorandum of Conversation, 20 June 1960, FRUS, 1958–60, vol. IX, p. 684. 21 Ibid. Efforts to coordinate Western information and propaganda activities to oppose the Soviet pressure on West Berlin did occur, but these were organized via ad hoc meetings of ministers from Britain, France, the FRG, and the United States. These meetings did not meet the German wish for a permanent bureau within NATO. See Rusk to Department of State, 7 August 1961, FRUS, 1961–63, vol. XIV, p. 308. 22 27 July 1960, NA, C-R(60)32. 23 27 September 1960, NA, C-R(60)35. 24 10 October 1960, NA, AC/186-N(60)2; 18 October 1960, NA, C-M(60)88. The IRD

Not a NATO responsibility? 47

25 26

27 28 29 30

31 32

33 34 35 36 37

38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

was created in 1948 and soon became the principal arm of the British Government for analyzing communist tactics and developing anti-communist propaganda. See Hugh Wilford, “The Information Research Department: Britain’s Secret Cold War Weapon Revealed,” Review of International Studies 24 (July 1998), pp. 353–70; W. Scott Lucas and C.J. Morris, “A Very British Crusade: The Information Research Department and the Beginning of the Cold War,” in British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945–51, ed. Richard J. Aldrich (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 85–110. 10 October 1960, NA, AC/186-N(60)1. Note by the United Kingdom Delegation, 10 October 1960, NA, AC/186-WP(60)1; Note by the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, 2 November 1960 (originally circulated at the ﬁrst Working Group meeting, 13 October 1960), NA, AC/186-WP(60)4; Note by the French Delegation, 4 November 1960, NA, AC/186WP(60)7. Note by the Canadian Delegation, 25 October 1960, NA, AC/186-WP(60)3. NA, AC/186-WP(60)4 (Annex II). Ibid. On the concept of state–private networks, see Scott Lucas, “Mobilising Culture: The State–Private Network and the CIA in the early Cold War,” in War and Cold War in American Foreign Policy, 1942–1962, ed. D. Carter and R. Clifton (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 83–107. “NATO Machinery and Activities in the Field of Psychological Action,” 31 October 1960, NA, AC/186-WP(60)5. Working Group Progress Report, NA, C-M(60)88; Council Resolution, 2 November 1960, NA, C-R(60)40 item V; Note by the German Delegation, “Proposal for Psychological Action within NATO,” 30 November 1960 (originally circulated informally on 3 November), NA, AC/186-WP(60)10. NA, AC/186-WP(60)2. “Psychological Action,” 10 November 1960, NA, C-M(60)94. Summary Record, 6 December 1960, NA, C-R(60)45. Lois Roth, “Public Diplomacy and the Past: The Search for an American Style of Propaganda, 1952–1977,” Fletcher Forum (Summer 1984), pp. 367–8. See Edmond Taylor, “Political Warfare: A Sword we must Unsheath,” The Reporter, 14 September 1961, p. 31; Laszlo Borhi, “Rollback, Liberation, Containment, or Inaction? US Policy and Eastern Europe in the 1950s,” Journal of Cold War Studies 1, no. 3 (1999), pp. 67–110. “Report on Psychological Defence,” 7 December 1960, NA, C-M(60)112(revised). “Verbatim Report of the Meeting of the Council,” 16 December 1960, NA, C-VR(60)49, C-VR(60)50, C-VR(60)51. NA, C-M(61)6 and Addendum; Developments since the Last Meeting, 17 March 1961, NA, AC/186-WP(61)2. “Psychological Action,” 7 March 1961, NA, AC/186-WP(61)1. Emphasis added. “European March for Disarmament,” 17 March 1961, NA, AC/186-WP(61)3; “International World Youth Forum in Moscow from 20th to 30th July, 1961,” 20 March 1961, NA, AC/186-WP(61)5. Henry Kissinger, “Visit of Chancellor Adenauer: Some Psychological Factors,” 6 April 1961, Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, John F. Kennedy, President’s Ofﬁce Files (JFK POF), 1961–63, part 5, Countries File, microﬁlm collection, reel 9. “Psychological Action” (French Note), 21 March 1961, NA, AC/186-WP(61)4. Attendance at the third group meeting involved representatives from eleven NATO states. Only Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway stayed away. “Long-Term Planning, Part III: Psychological Action,” 18 April 1961, NATO, C-M(61)30. “Psychological Action” (Report by the Working Group on Psychological Action), 30 March 1961, NATO, C-M(61)25.

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47 The Berlin group met only once, on 4–5 September 1961, to consider a paper from the British delegation entitled “Berlin: Suggested Major Publicity Themes.” 48 13 November 1961, NATO, C-R(61)57; 29 April 1963, NATO, AC/52 R(63)14. 49 Stikker to Goedhart, 21 March 1962, Archive of C.C. van den Heuvel, National Archives, The Hague (CC). At the time of writing the papers of C.C. van den Heuvel were still being categorised by the National Archives. Therefore the ﬁle names and numbers used here may not correspond to the notations used once categorisation is complete. 50 Ibid. 51 Louis Einthoven, Tegen de Stroom In (Apeldoorn: Semper Agendo, 1974), pp. 232–4. 52 Brian Crozier, Free Agent: The Unseen War, 1941–1991 (London: Harper Collins, 1993), pp. 31–3. 53 Paul Koedijk, “Van ‘Vrede en Vrijheid’ tot ‘Volk en Verdediging’: Veranderingen in Anti-communistische Psychologische Oorlogsvoering in Nederland, 1950–1965,” in In De Schaduw van de Muur: Maatschappij en Krijgsmacht rond 1960, ed. B. Schoenmaker and J.A.M.M. Janssen (The Hague: Sdu, 1997), pp. 77–8. Koedijk’s chapter is the pioneering work on Interdoc’s formation and this research is indebted to his original contribution. 54 Crozier, Free Agent, pp. 47–49. 55 C.C. van den Heuvel et al., “Possibilities of Psychological Defense against Soviet Inﬂuence,” April 1959, CC (not yet categorised). 56 Protokoll der Sitzung mit Herrn Wiggers am 2.6.1970, CC, Eind Interdoc, 1970–72. 57 See C.C. van den Heuvel et al., Tasks for the Free World Today (The Hague: Interdoc, 1964); S.W. Couwenberg, Oost en West: Op de Drempel van een Nieuw Tijdperk (The Hague: Pax, 1966). 58 The colloque held in Mont St. Michel in 1962, organized by Bonnemaison, was devoted to an in-depth theoretical and practical study of cadre formation. CC, Kadertraining Italië, 1962–64. 59 C.C. van den Heuvel, “Psychologische Oorlogvoering,” De Militaire Spectator 131 (1962), p. 24. 60 C.C. van den Heuvel, interviews with author, The Hague, 6 June and 18 August 2002. 61 C.C. van den Heuvel, “Psychologische Oorlogvoering,” pp. 22–3. See also Koedijk, “Van ‘Vrede en Vrijheid,’” p. 77. 62 C.C. van den Heuvel, “Hoofdlijnen van een Internationaal Instituut ter Bestrijding van de Psychologische Oorlogvoering van het Communisme,” 16 November 1959, CC. 63 “The Communist Offensive in the Youth Field,” 16 October 1961, NA, C-M(61)91. 64 C.C. van den Heuvel, “Communist World Youth Festival Helsinki,” 17 February 1962, CC, Interdoc Italië, Correspondentie Algemeen 1962–63. 65 C.C. van den Heuvel, “VIIIth World Youth Festival, Helsinki, 29th July to 6th August 1962,” CC, p. 24. 66 Pieter Koerts, interview with author, Amsterdam, 2 June 2004; Hans Beuker, interview with author, Houten, 3 September 2003. 67 Geyer to van den Heuvel, 8 September 1965, CC. 68 George Embree, interview with author, The Hague, 15 March 2004. Embree was an independent journalist who was given an ofﬁce by van den Heuvel in the same building as Interdoc and the Oost–West Center. 69 The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen (New York: Popular Library, 1972), p. 278. 70 Van den Heuvel to Rijks, 11 January 1967, CC. 71 “The New Left: Interdoc Conference, Zandvoort, 27–28 September 1968” (The Hague: Interdoc, 1968). This is a collection of papers from the conference, including contributions from Brian Crozier and C.C. van den Heuvel. 72 Geyer to van den Heuvel, 11 May 1970, CC.

Not a NATO responsibility? 49 73 Protokoll der Sitzung mit Herrn Wiggers am 2.6.1970; Besprechung mit dem Präsidenten des BND am 3.12.1970; Van den Heuvel to Interdoc Board, 5 June 1972, all in CC, Eind Interdoc, 1970–72. For an analysis of Interdoc’s formation and operation during 1963–72 see Giles Scott-Smith, “Interdoc and Positive Anti-Communism: A Case of Dutch–German Cooperation in Psychological Warfare”, Cold War History (forthcoming).

4

Beyond NATO Transnational elite networks and the Atlantic alliance Thomas W. Gijswijt

Introduction A crucial characteristic of NATO and the Atlantic alliance was the existence of a highly integrated transatlantic elite that had come into being during and after World War II.1 Most research on the transatlantic elite has focused on the ofﬁcial sphere: the diplomats and politicians who cooperated in NATO, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and other institutions of the so-called Free World. Only recently have historians become interested in the networks, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and exchange programs that were as much part of the Atlantic alliance as NATO itself was.2 These networks and organizations were funded in part by Washington and large US philanthropic foundations, and they led to an unprecedented increase in contacts – political, cultural, and economic – across the Atlantic during the ﬁrst decades of the Cold War. One of the most important networks created in this period was the Bilderberg Group.3 The Bilderberg Group was (and still is) a transnational elite network aimed at improving transatlantic cooperation by holding informal high-level discussions on important geopolitical and economic problems facing the Western world. Bilderberg and similar organizations succeeded where NATO, to a certain degree, failed, that is, in building a consultation infrastructure that went beyond purely military and strategic issues. The ﬁrst meeting of the Bilderberg Group took place in the Netherlands in 1954. It had taken the organizers two years to develop the concept of the meetings and build sufﬁcient interest and support for the initiative in Western Europe and the United States. The idea for the Bilderberg Group originally came from the Polish lobbyist Joseph Retinger, a former adviser to the Polish wartime leader General Vladislav Sikorski. Retinger regarded a united Europe as the sole hope for success in the struggle against the Soviets. He was one of the driving forces behind the European Movement and several other European organizations. By 1952, however, Retinger had become increasingly worried about the state of transatlantic relations. A long list of misunderstandings and problems – ranging from McCarthyism to the difﬁcult war in Korea – seemed to threaten the vital Western unity. Retinger enlisted the help of Prince Bernhard of the

Beyond NATO 51 Netherlands and several European politicians and businessmen to write a general report on European–American relations. Paul van Zeeland, the former Belgian prime minister, contributed to the report, as did Guy Mollet, the French socialist leader, and Hugh Gaitskell, the British Labour politician. The report was sent to US President Dwight D. Eisenhower and several highranking US ofﬁcials in early 1953 with the request for an American reaction. After a delay of several months, the American response was put together by members of the newly-founded Committee for a National Trade Policy, among them international lawyer George Ball. Finally, in May 1954, the ﬁrst meeting of the Bilderberg Group took place in the Netherlands under the chairmanship of Prince Bernhard. In the following years, Bilderberg established itself as one of the most important elite networks in the Atlantic alliance, funded partly by the American Ford Foundation and by several large corporations and private participants. The founding members of the group held three basic assumptions about transatlantic relations in the Cold War era. First, they were convinced that the Soviet threat was a threat common to the whole Western world. Second, they believed that the United States and Western Europe shared the same cultural and historical background and values. Finally, they thought that the lessons of Versailles had taught that the United States was needed as a stabilizing force in Europe. Not surprisingly, therefore, the organizers were strongly in favor of NATO. Prince Bernhard made this clear at the beginning of the ﬁrst meeting in 1954: “In the face of the present challenge the Western world must act as one. We must therefore ﬁnd appropriate forms of action. One of the best ways to do this seems to me to make multilateral agreements, such as for instance NATO.”4 Typically, at the 1955 meeting in Germany both Lord Ismay, the ﬁrst secretarygeneral of NATO, and General Alfred M. Gruenther, NATO’s top military commander, were present to welcome the Federal Republic of Germany as a new member of the alliance. This NATO bias did not mean, however, that only likeminded people were invited to the meetings. On the contrary, a special effort was made to include representatives of all political parties and trade unions, though communists, of course, were not included. Another lesson of the interbellum years had been that democracies could be dangerously divided and vulnerable. In the face of the communist threat, all democratic forces had to cooperate. The Bilderberg meetings were not intended to directly inﬂuence policy making. Rather, the organization provided a forum where Americans and West Europeans could inﬂuence each other. As the Bilderberg organizers put it: The sole object of these meetings is to reach a better understanding of prevailing differences between the Western countries and to study those ﬁelds in which agreement may be sought. To reach this aim men of outstanding quality and inﬂuence are brought together in circumstances where discussions can be frank and where arguments not always used in public debate can be put forward.5

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Of course, given the fact that over the years the Bilderberg meetings consistently attracted high-level participants, in many cases the discussions did have an impact on policy making. We should be careful, however, not to focus exclusively on these instances. Most of all, transatlantic networks were important for building consensus on international issues, for emphasizing common interests and values in the Atlantic alliance, and for expanding contacts among the Western foreign policy elites. Since NATO consisted of democratic countries, the organization could not function effectively without a certain measure of basic consensus, especially in pursuing new policies. Therefore, a close collaboration between West European and North American elites was vital to its existence. In practice, the existence of organizations like Bilderberg had several consequences for the Atlantic alliance. For one, such organizations facilitated the Westbindung of the Federal Republic at different sociopolitical and economic levels. The participation of several high-ranking Social Democratic Party (SPD) politicians in the Bilderberg meetings, for example, contributed to the acceptance of the Atlantic alliance by the German Social Democrats in the late 1950s. But for the purposes of this chapter, the most important consequence was the fact that America’s active engagement in these networks legitimized and enhanced the US leadership role in the alliance. Many of the problems that seemed to lead NATO from one crisis to another in the 1960s concerned the question of US leadership. In particular, two issues stood out: nuclear strategy – the question of whether Europe should continue to rely on the US deterrent – and French President Charles de Gaulle’s challenge to America’s predominant position in Europe. The question is how the transatlantic discourse concerning these two issues developed in the Bilderberg Group and, consequently, what role transnational elite networks had to play in the alliance.

The 1961 Bilderberg meeting: US leadership and the nuclear question The Bilderberg meeting in 1961 took place in St. Castin, Canada, from 21–23 April. Coming so soon after the inauguration of US President John F. Kennedy, it provided European participants with the ﬁrst possibility to get acquainted with the people and policies of the new US administration. In fact, many high-level members of Kennedy’s foreign policy team were already familiar faces at the Bilderberg meetings. The new Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, Kennedy’s special assistant for national security affairs, McGeorge Bundy, and the high-ranking State Department and Pentagon ofﬁcials George Ball, George McGhee, and Paul Nitze had all been participants. Ball, Nitze, and McGhee had accepted invitations to the 1961 meeting, although McGhee was unable to attend because of the Bay of Pigs crisis earlier that week. The main point on the agenda in St. Castin was the question how “a new sense [of] leadership and direction in the Western Community” could be brought about, taking into consideration “the role of N.A.T.O. in the world policy of the

Beyond NATO 53 member countries” and “the role and control of atomic weapons inside N.A.T.O.”6 Lester B. Pearson, the former Canadian secretary of state for external affairs, started off the discussions at St. Castin with an introduction identifying the most pressing issues confronting NATO. Pearson was a respected and well-known diplomat and politician. He had been a member of the 1956 NATO Committee of Three advising on the future development of NATO. Although in favor of NATO, Pearson did not hesitate to criticize the shortcomings of the alliance. First of all, the approaching nuclear deadlock between the West and the Soviet Union urgently called for a rethinking of NATO strategy. Moreover, the fact that the Cold War battlegrounds had shifted from Europe to Asia and Africa created difﬁculties, aggravated by the global disruptions of the decolonization process. As Pearson put it, certain countries “were pro-Atlantic in Paris but not in New York.” With respect to nuclear strategy, Pearson said, “the main difﬁculty to be overcome was the fact that N.A.T.O. depended more and more on the nuclear deterrent at a time when the risk of non-nuclear aggression was increasing.”7 NATO’s lack of conventional means to deal with limited conﬂicts was a real problem in a situation where a nuclear response would probably lead to total war. From a European point of view, moreover, the question was whether the US nuclear guarantee could still be trusted at a time when the Soviet arsenal directly threatened the North American continent. Paul Nitze, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and Albert Wohlstetter, a RAND Corporation analyst and foreign policy adviser to the Kennedy administration, presented American thoughts on the nuclear issue. Both men had been involved in the drafting of the so-called Acheson Report, which served as a blueprint for the NATO policy of the new administration, and they could therefore be expected to speak with some authority on any changes or new impulses in US policy. Assistant Secretary Nitze was one of the strongest proponents in Washington of a new strategy of ﬂexible response. He set out to explain the need for stronger conventional forces and less reliance on the Eisenhower–Dulles strategy of “massive retaliation.” He argued that these ideas were neither new nor revolutionary: I can well remember long discussions with Mr. Acheson in 1949 in which we both agreed that in the long run, and probably sooner rather than later, the NATO powers including the United States should have non-nuclear forces available to Europe sufﬁcient to balance the non-nuclear forces of the U.S.S.R.8 This position was adopted for three reasons. First, it was clear that US nuclear predominance would not last. Second, if the West wanted to be in a position to seriously negotiate arms control and disarmament, conventional forces were necessary as a fallback. “The third reason was the obvious one, that if at all possible, the West should get out of the position of excessive reliance upon nuclear weapons for its defense.” Nitze emphasized that the United States would answer any nuclear or “major non-nuclear” Soviet attack upon a NATO member with “a

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full nuclear reply.” Still, NATO should be capable of resisting any Soviet nonnuclear attack long enough “for signiﬁcant political consultation within NATO, and long enough for the Soviets to reassess the effect upon themselves of our determination to react.”9 Indeed, NATO should be capable of a ﬂexible response. Wohlstetter based his presentation on his inﬂuential article “Nuclear Sharing: N.A.T.O. and the N + 1 Country,” published earlier that April in Foreign Affairs.10 His main conclusion was that a proliferation of independent national nuclear forces or the creation of a NATO force would destabilize the international situation. Given the high degree of interdependence between Europe and the United States, the US nuclear guarantee remained the best solution. Wohlstetter thus clearly departed from the Eisenhower policy of nuclear sharing. Predictably, especially some of the French participants took issue with Wohlstetter’s statement. Olivier Guichard, a Gaullist member of the French National Assembly, pointed out that France would develop a nuclear capability with or without US cooperation. If Washington, however, was prepared to give technical assistance, Paris would be willing to reconsider its inﬂexible attitude on NATO stockpiling in France and on disarmament or test ban negotiations. In NATO, Guichard said, a “tripartite formula on atomic strategy” was urgently called for, echoing a recurring theme in French foreign policy since de Gaulle’s proposal for a US–British–French NATO directorate in September 1958.11 Guichard received little support for his arguments from the other European participants. Many may have agreed with his analysis of the major problems in NATO: the need for a greater European voice in nuclear policy and for more consultation on out-of-area problems. But the Gaullist idea of a US–British–French directorate in NATO did not appeal greatly to the other NATO members. Participants from the smaller NATO member states and the Federal Republic, such as the former Dutch foreign minister Eelco van Kleffens and SPD defense specialist Fritz Erler, argued that there was simply no alternative to strong US leadership in NATO. According to Wohlstetter, even many of the French participants privately expressed doubts about de Gaulle’s effort to build an independent force de frappe.12 The American suggestion to base Polaris-armed submarines in European waters was therefore welcomed by most participants. A lasting solution to the nuclear question in Europe was, however, not yet in sight. In this respect, it was telling that former US secretary of state Christian Herter, who in December 1960 had presented a plan for a multinational NATO nuclear force, and Paul Nitze, who had just counseled against Herter’s land-based scheme, were sitting at the same table in St. Castin. Even in Washington there was no consensus on NATO policy.13 Thus, the Bilderberg discussions served not only as a transatlantic exchange of views, but also as a sounding board for the internal US policy making process. Prince Bernhard himself told President Kennedy a few days after the Bilderberg meeting that, based on the discussions, he had concluded “that there should not be a tripartite control over the use of nuclear weapons nor a 15-nation control through NAC, but rather he felt that the sole control should rest with the

Beyond NATO 55 14

President of the United States.” The talks in Canada had revealed strong objections to the Gaullists’ ideas about tripartism, especially among the smaller NATO countries. Kennedy replied with surprising candor that the Polaris proposals had been made “with the thought in mind of discouraging the development of an independent nuclear capability on the part of the French and eventually the Germans.”15

De Gaulle’s challenge At the May 1962 Bilderberg meeting in Saltsjöbaden, Sweden, the future of the Atlantic alliance was discussed at length. Max Kohnstamm, the vice president of Jean Monnet’s Action Committee for the United States of Europe, presented a report on the relations between Europe and the United States. The basic problem, Kohnstamm argued, was that: Due to the United States’ leadership, leading to de facto hegemony, not wished by it, an unhealthy situation developed from the fact that the Americans felt that they had to carry too much of the weight alone, at the same time as there was distrust in Europe of American hegemony, mixed with the converse fear of being left in the lurch if things became really dangerous. In order to restore the balance, the Alliance must be placed on a new basis.16 Kohnstamm and Monnet believed that the British application to the Common Market was the key to a more balanced, “equal partnership” between Europe and the United States. Moreover, at the St. Castin Bilderberg meeting, Kohnstamm had reached the conclusion that a solution to the nuclear question could only be reached if Europe could act as one.17 They were therefore delighted to hear President Kennedy say very much the same thing in his famous Independence Day speech on 4 July 1962, which was drafted in part by George Ball. In this speech Kennedy said: We believe that a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in the common defense, of responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, of joining with the United States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving problems of commerce, commodities, and currency, and developing coordinated policies in all economic, political, and diplomatic areas. We see in such a Europe a partner with whom we can deal on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations.18 Yet Kennedy also implicitly made it clear that a Europe without Britain would not qualify as an equal partner.19 De Gaulle’s famous press conference on 14 January 1963 and his veto of the British application to the Common Market put a temporary end to the hopes for an equal partnership. De Gaulle publicly pointed to the Nassau agreement

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between the United States and Britain as proof that London had again chosen the special relationship over Europe.20 The fact that less than two weeks later West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer visited Paris to sign a hastily upgraded Franco-German Treaty of Friendship (the Elysée Treaty) was interpreted in Washington as a direct challenge to the United States.21 The provision concerning a Franco-German harmonization of defense strategy caused the most concern, given the possible effects this could have on NATO. As George Ball later wrote in his memoirs: “I can hardly overestimate the shock produced in Washington by this action or the speculation that followed, particularly in the intelligence community . . . We looked at all possibilities of a Paris–Bonn deal with Moscow.”22 In the international response to the Franco-German treaty, members of the transatlantic elite played a key role. Former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson and former US High Commissioner for Germany John McCloy, who both enjoyed great prestige in the Federal Republic, privately urged Chancellor Adenauer to consider the long-term consequences of de Gaulle’s policies for the Atlantic alliance. But more importantly, several Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and SPD politicians set out to counter the anti-American impact of the Franco-German treaty. The key ﬁgure was Kurt Birrenbach, a CDU foreign policy expert and Bilderberg member with excellent contacts in the United States. Birrenbach coordinated the German reaction to the Elysée Treaty with Monnet and Kohnstamm and with American friends like McCloy. It was this group that came up with the idea of a preamble to the Elysée Treaty, re-emphasizing Germany’s adherence to the Atlantic alliance and NATO. It was also this group that made sure that the preamble was added to the treaty at the time of its ratiﬁcation in the Bundestag in April 1963.23 In the meantime, the 1963 Bilderberg meeting was held in Cannes, France, from 29–31 March. George Ball emphasized in his subsequent report to the National Security Council on 2 April that the meeting in Cannes had “brought together for the ﬁrst time since de Gaulle’s press conference of January 14 the leaders of major European States.”24 The Secretary-General of the Gaullist Party, Jacques Baumel, gave what is described as “the most forthright presentation of the Gaullist point of view ever put forth in any forum.”25 Baumel asserted that it was necessary to “restore the balance of the very foundations of this Alliance on both sides of the Atlantic in a more suitable manner.” The Atlantic alliance was too much a US organization. In particular, the US predominance in the nuclear ﬁeld could no longer be accepted, “for everyone knows perfectly well that the world of tomorrow will be dominated by the atom and that only nations having the atom at their disposal will tomorrow be modern nations, strong nations with which it will be necessary to reckon.” Baumel went on to accuse the United States of trying to maintain its nuclear monopoly. He argued that: Everything proposed [by America] on the subject of nuclear forces, and now in a different form of multinational or even multilateral force, consists

Beyond NATO 57 in giving their allies the impression of [possessing] a certain amount of responsibility, but in sovereignly retaining the sole right to press a button! Since it was the ultimate responsibility of the French government to assure the security of the French people, continued dependence on the United States was not acceptable. After all, who could tell if in ten or twenty years’ time the nuclear guarantee could still be counted on?26 The Multilateral Force (MLF) was now the first line of the US defense against the Gaullists. Drawing on his January presentation to the NATO Council in Paris, George Ball presented the MLF as a realistic solution to the nuclear problem in NATO. He emphasized, however, that it was up to the Europeans to decide on the precise size and character of the MLF. Subsequently, it quickly became clear in the discussion that the crucial question once again concerned control. Was the United States prepared to relinquish its veto over the force? Prince Bernhard, in a shift from his 1961 position, expressed the opinion of many European participants when he declared that the ideal solution would be a truly European nuclear force within the Atlantic framework. In a memorandum to the US president, written two weeks after de Gaulle’s press conference, McGeorge Bundy had predicted that precisely this would happen. He wrote: There remains one crucial question which we are still pushing ahead of us and on which it may be essential to make a decision, at least among ourselves, before long. This question is whether we are prepared to accept and support a real European requirement for a real European role, as and when that demand is presented. Our Nassau multilateral proposals are a major step forward, but they are presented still within the framework of a U.S. veto. Thus we still leave to General de Gaulle the chance to pose as the one true spokesman of real independence for Europeans.27 George Ball left the Cannes meeting, however, convinced that the majority of Europeans did not accept de Gaulle as their true spokesman. As he reported to the National Security Council, the Bilderberg discussions had shown that: De Gaulle is isolating himself more and more, and . . . he does not have a “grand design”, or even a clear European policy. All de Gaulle can really do is to oppose the initiative of others by being negative. He cannot build the Europe he desires because his actions are conditioned by his overriding desire to build the predominance of France. As a result, he has nothing to offer other European states. Mr. Ball said Ambassador Bohlen agreed with the analysis that de Gaulle cannot organize a European nuclear force. De Gaulle still yearns for a U.S./U.K./France directorate in which France would speak for all of Europe. However, Europeans are not prepared to have de Gaulle speak for them. Except for de Gaulle, most Europeans do not want the U.S. to get out of Europe.28

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Ernst van der Beugel, the Dutch honorary secretary-general of Bilderberg and a convinced Atlanticist, expressed this sentiment forcefully in a letter to his friend Henry Kissinger: The French were absolutely impossible; the Gaullists stated their case and the others, amongst whom Faure, former Prime Ministers and people like Fontaine and Baumgartner did not really dare to speak up. Since 1944 I never had the feeling that fascism was in a room where I was; now I had. If after the Bilderberg meeting anybody would have any illusion about their attitude they must be nuts.29 The fact remained, however, that especially in the Federal Republic, pressures existed for a more profound German role in the nuclear defense of Europe. If the United States could not engage the Germans, the French option remained a distinct possibility for Bonn.

The multilateral force offensive at the 1964 Bilderberg meeting By early 1964, the MLF group in the US State Department, the so-called “theologians,” had won over a considerable number of European politicians and opinion makers for the multilateral force. Van der Beugel, for example, had initially doubted the feasibility of the MLF, no doubt inﬂuenced by Kissinger. But after talks in Washington with, among others, Henry Owen and Walt Whitman Rostow of the State Department policy planning staff, van der Beugel wrote to Owen: “You convinced me about the multilateral force. I immediately went to work on this point and I hope and expect that a positive attitude will be taken [at the next Bilderberg meeting].”30 The State Department decided to stage a large MLF offensive at the March 1964 Bilderberg meeting in Williamsburg in the United States. It had become clear that a particularly strong European delegation would be present in Williamsburg, including NATO Secretary-General Dirk Stikker; Ludger Westrick (one of Chancellor Erhard’s most trusted advisors); Jacques Baumel; Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns; EEC Commissioner Sicco Mansholt; the British EEC negotiator Edward Heath; and General Hans Speidel, Commander of the NATO land forces in Central Europe. US Ambassador McGhee in Bonn even tried to schedule a collective visit to the US president for the German participants.31 The Ofﬁce of the Special Assistant for the MLF arranged personal brieﬁngs on the MLF for all US participants. Thus, Senator William Fulbright, Senator Henry Jackson, Representative Chet Holiﬁeld, Dean Acheson, Shepard Stone (Director of the International Affairs program for the Ford Foundation), John McCloy, and other US participants were well prepared for the discussions. Dean Acheson led the ﬁeld with a call for greater unity in the alliance. Comparing NATO to a Mississippi steamboat (“going upstream it can’t go forward and blow the whistle at the same time”), Acheson argued that it was more

Beyond NATO 59 important to “perfect the alliance” than to “pursue the Russians.” Since “we will in our lifetime live in a divided world,” it was critically dangerous to divide the United States and Western Europe. The French attitude in NATO was something “we must live through.” Acheson ended by wholeheartedly endorsing the MLF. Secretary-General Stikker was next. The main point he set out to make was that the unanimity rule in NATO had to be changed. Saying that in better times he used to have a list of ﬁve or six problems that could not be solved because they were “blocked” by one country, at present the list stood at 30. He did not need to explain to his audience which country was the main culprit. In order to move NATO forward again, Stikker proposed to introduce the OECD rules into NATO decision making, which would mean that one or two members could abstain but not “stop others from going ahead.”32 In a repeat of the Cannes scenario, Baumel attacked US nuclear and NATO policy. But he was even more isolated than the year before. Max Kohnstamm told the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, J. Robert Schaetzel, afterwards that this time, in contrast to Cannes, “Europeans were speaking up against the Gaullists and did not leave the task to Americans.”33 And as Eric Roll, economic minister at the British embassy in Washington, DC, and a ﬁrst-time participant, reported to the British Foreign Ofﬁce: Apart from a short intervention by La Malene, his Gaullist colleague, Baumel got no support from anyone in the subsequent discussion which was only divided between those who were wholeheartedly in favour of the M.L.F. as a means of strengthening the Alliance and those who were rather dubious about it.34 The participants – besides the Gaullists – who voiced serious reservations about the MLF could be counted on one hand. British Labour MP Denis Healey doubted that the MLF was “a good starting point for wider European control” over nuclear weapons. It was expensive, and in the end Washington would still push the button. Henry Kissinger also voiced his well-known opposition to the MLF: it would provide a rallying symbol for anti-Germans and disarmament proponents. The most serious objection – in Kohnstamm’s opinion – came from Italian politician Paolo Vittorelli, who said that the MLF had become an issue in Italian domestic politics that was used by the communists as proof that the government was opposed to détente. McGeorge Bundy, in particular, was impressed by this argument.35 In general, however, the State Department could be satisﬁed. Most participants at the Williamsburg meeting were in favor of the multilateral force. Moreover, the Gaullists were even more isolated than they had been in 1963. In the end, the MLF did not make it. US President Lyndon B. Johnson effectively killed the multilateral force in December 1964. However, as the evidence from the Bilderberg meetings shows, the MLF fulﬁlled a useful role in US–European relations in the ﬁrst half of the 1960s. First and foremost, the MLF and the Polaris proposal of 1961 deﬂected and absorbed pressure for

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national deterrents in Europe, particularly in Germany. Without the proposal for a multilateral solution to NATO’s nuclear dilemma, US policy makers would have had a more difﬁcult time replying to the Gaullist charges. With it, they were able to convince inﬂuential Europeans – in Bilderberg and elsewhere – that there was an alternative to de Gaulle’s vision of an independent Europe. In January 1963, when the MLF for the ﬁrst time became a major element of US policy, the risk of a Franco-German Alleingang seemed real. Furthermore, there was considerable pressure in Germany for a national nuclear force. By the end of 1964, however, it had become clear that de Gaulle had overplayed his hand and had become completely isolated in Europe. The general was never able to explain to his European partners how his, in essence, nationalistic policy of grandeur for France could be squared with his ideas for an independent Europe. Faced with the choice between a Europe under French hegemony and an Atlantic alliance dominated by the United States, most Europeans preferred the latter. In his famous devil’s advocate memorandum that led to President Johnson’s decision in December 1964, McGeorge Bundy put it this way: We can continue to prevent de Gaulle from dominating Europe even without an MLF – the Europeans themselves have no desire to follow him. His nuclear force is not a big magnet. The number of Germans who really tie their fate to France as against the U.S. is ridiculously small. The German politicians who favor France today would be the ﬁrst to come to Washington if they ever came to power.36

Conclusion Historians may disagree on the nature of power in international relations, but it is clear that America’s long-lasting predominance in Europe was much easier to maintain by consent and persuasion than by coercion. In this sense, transatlantic networks in effect underpinned NATO and the US leadership in Europe. Bilderberg and other transatlantic elite networks could, of course, never be a substitute for diplomacy. We should, therefore, be careful not to overestimate the importance of these organizations. As the Bilderberg discussions on NATO and the question of US leadership show, however, elite networks did have several distinct consequences for the alliance as a whole. First, and most importantly, they fostered what might be called an Atlantic political culture – a basic consensus on transatlantic cooperation and the need for Western unity. The informal Bilderberg discussions strengthened the sense among its participants that all Western nations were part of a community of values and interests. Second, transatlantic networks provided Washington with an effective instrument to legitimize its leadership position in NATO. In the battle for leadership in Europe between Paris and Washington, the Americans were able to make more effective use of the informal transatlantic consultation infrastructure than their French counterparts. As we have seen, the French Gaullists had become

Beyond NATO 61 largely isolated by 1964. Moreover, by consistently participating in such transnational organizations, the United States indicated a fundamental willingness to consult its partners in Europe. Conversely, the European members of the transatlantic elite could use the off-the-record discussions to better understand and inﬂuence the US policy making process. A third consequence of the Bilderberg meetings was the large increase in personal contacts and friendships among the transatlantic foreign policy elite. This meant that ad hoc coalitions could quickly be formed across the Atlantic, as in the case of the international reactions to the Elysée Treaty. Many of the consequences and effects of transatlantic networks were, of course, indirect and difﬁcult, if not impossible, to measure. Nevertheless, if the case of the Bilderberg Group is representative, they were indeed part of the fabric of the Atlantic alliance.

Notes 1 On this point, see Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From “Empire” by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 66; Charles S. Maier, “The Making of ‘Pax Americana’: Formative Moments of United States Ascendancy,” in The Quest for Stability: Problems of West European Security, 1918–1957, ed. Rolf Ahmann, Adolf M. Birke, and Michael Howard. (London: German Historical Institute, 1993), pp. 389–434. 2 See, for example, Oliver Schmidt, “U.S. Philanthropy and Exchange of Scholars,” in Culture and International History, ed. Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), pp. 116–34; Volker Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 3 There exists little research on Bilderberg. For two recent efforts, see the chapter on Retinger in Hugh Wilford, The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War: Calling the Tune? (London: Frank Cass, 2003), and the article by Valérie Aubourg on the early years of the Bilderberg Group, “Organizing Atlanticism: The Bilderberg Group and the Atlantic Institute, 1952–1963,” in The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945–1960, ed. Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 92–105. 4 National Archives, The Hague (NAH), Bilderberg Papers, Box 1. 5 Report Bilderberg Meetings, St. Castin Conference, 21–23 April 1961, Introduction, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS (DDEL), Charles D. Jackson Papers, Box 36. 6 Ibid., p. 7. 7 Ibid., pp. 9–10. 8 Remarks by Paul H. Nitze at Bilderberg Meeting, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Manuscript Division, Paul H. Nitze Papers, Box 61. 9 Ibid. 10 Albert Wohlstetter, “Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+1 Country,” Foreign Affairs 39, no. 3 (April 1961), pp. 355–87. 11 Handwritten Notes by Paul Nitze, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Manuscript Division, Paul H. Nitze Papers, Box 61. 12 Albert Wohlstetter, “Impressions and Appraisals in Hong Kong, May 19–May 23, 1962,” www.rand.org/publications/classics/wohlstetter/DL10364/DL10364.html (accessed 30 January 2005). In these notes Wohlstetter refers to the St. Castin Bilderberg meeting in 1961.

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13 On the internal differences in Washington and the resulting “mixed signals” on NATO policy, see Constantine A. Pagedas, Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the French Problem, 1960–1963: A Troubled Partnership (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 142. 14 Meeting between Kennedy and Bernhard, 25 April 1961, JFKL, NSC Country Files, the Netherlands. 15 Ibid. 16 Report Bilderberg Meetings, Saltsjöbaden Conference, 1962, Ford Foundation Archives, PA 56–341. 17 See Kohnstamm’s Notes on the St. Castin Meeting, European University Institute, Historical Archives, Max Kohnstamm Papers, Box 19. 18 Address at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, 4 July 1962, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1964), pp. 537–9. 19 For Britain’s application to the EEC, see Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe (London: Macmillan, 1993); Jeffrey Glen Giauque, Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization of Western Europe, 1955–1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Alan S. Milward, The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy, 1945–1963 (London: Frank Cass: 2002). 20 The Nassau agreement has caused much confusion, because it tried to combine three different policies: • direct assistance to the British deterrent in the form of Polaris missiles, with the door held open to the French for similar assistance (this meant a shift in Kennedy’s earlier position that no aid should be given to France); • a multinational NATO force that included the British V-bombers (IANF); and • a multilateral NATO force with mixed-manned components (MLF).

21

22 23

24 25

Because of bad drafting and a lack of time, the last two were mixed up, and the British did not feel bound to the multilateral force. McNamara and Nitze at the Pentagon hoped that direct help to France combined with a MLF to keep the Germans happy would solve the nuclear problem in Europe. However, de Gaulle’s press conference quickly destroyed this possibility. On Nassau, see Richard E. Neustadt, Report to JFK: The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). Marc Trachtenberg’s analysis in A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 360ff., is basically convincing, although in attempting to distance himself from the “standard interpretation,” he misrepresents Neustadt’s version. In fact, Neustadt and Trachtenberg share much more common ground than the latter seems to realize. On the Elysée Treaty, see Matthias Schulz, “Die Politische Freundschaft Jean Monnet–Kurt Birrenbach, die Einheit des Westens und die ‘Präambel’ zum ElyséeVertrag von 1963,” in Interessen verbinden: Jean Monnet und die europäische Integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ed. Andreas Wilkens (Paris: Bouvier, 1999), pp. 299–327. George Ball, The Past has another Pattern (New York; London: Norton, 1973), p. 271. The ofﬁcial reaction of the Kennedy administration left Bonn with little doubt on the US reservations regarding the Elysée Treaty. But as Ball told McCloy in a telephone conversation, the administration could not openly press for a preamble. Here the transatlantic elite could step in. See Telephone Conversation between Ball and McCloy, 11 February 1963, JFKL, George Ball Papers, Box 4. Summary Record of National Security Council Meeting, 2 April 1963, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA (JFKL), National Security Files (NSF), Box 314. Steering Committee Meeting Bilderberg, 1963, DDEL, Charles D. Jackson Papers,

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26 27 28 29 30 31

Box 36. Ball afterwards had Baumel’s speech translated and sent to Bundy, Rusk, and McNamara. Speech by Jacques Baumel, JFKL, President’s Ofﬁce Files (POF), Box 116. The speech bears the signs of a hasty translation. Memorandum for the President, 30 January 1963, “The U.S. and De Gaulle: The Past and the Future,” JFKL, NSF, Box 404. Summary Record of National Security Council Meeting, 2 April 1963, JFKL, NSF, Box 314. Van der Beugel to Kissinger, 4 April 1963, NAH, Ernst van der Beugel Papers, Box 7. Van der Beugel to Owen, 25 November 1963, NAH, Ernst van der Beugel Papers, Box 7. In a telegram to Rusk, McGhee wrote: A group of inﬂuential Germans will be traveling to the United States to attend the Bilderberg Conference in Williamsburg March 19–22. The group includes: Fritz Erler, Fritz Berg, Kurt Birrenbach, Ernst Majonica, Max Brauer, Helmut Schmidt, Baron Knuet von Keuhlmannstumm, Otto Wolf [sic] and General Hans Speidel. Most of these plan to be in Washington before or after the conference. I understand that the President’s schedule would preclude individual calls by these men. However, this is a high-powered group, and I wonder if an appointment might be made with the President for the group as a whole. Such a meeting would be of great value to our operations here in Germany, and would I believe be of considerable interest to the President.

32 33

34

35 36

Telegram from McGhee to Rusk, 20 February 1964, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, TX (LBJL), NSF Country Files, Box 183. As far as I know, such a meeting did not take place. President Johnson did, however, see several other Bilderberg participants. All quotations in this paragraph are taken from the notes McGhee made at the meeting; see Georgetown University, McGhee Papers, series XIII, Box 2. Stikker also introduced his proposal to the NATO council. Conversation between Kohnstamm and Schaetzel, 26 March 1964, US National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, MD (USNA), US Department of State, Washington, DC (DoS), Ofﬁce of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Multilateral Force, Lot 69D55, Box 14. Eric Roll, Williamsburg 1964, UK National Archive, Kew, London (UKNA), Foreign Ofﬁce (FO) 371/178959. As a result of Baumel’s speech – speakers were generally limited to ﬁve or ten minutes speaking time – a trafﬁc light was introduced at the Bilderberg meetings to signal when a speaker’s time was up. The chairman of Bilderberg, Prince Bernhard, later admitted in an interview that he especially enjoyed using the trafﬁc light against Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Luns. Conversation between Kohnstamm and Schaetzel, 26 March 1964, USNA, DoS, Ofﬁce of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Multilateral Force, Lot 69D55, Box 14. Memorandum for the President by McGeorge Bundy, 6 December 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1964–68, vol. XIII, pp. 134–7.

Part III

NATO, de Gaulle, and détente

5

Into the 1960s NATO’s role in East–West relations, 1958–63 Christian Nuenlist

Introduction For US policy planner Leon Fuller, NATO’s tenth anniversary in April 1959 marked the alliance’s transformation from a “post-war experiment in crisis management” to a “long-term and apparently permanent aspect of US foreign policy.”1 Besides the transformation of NATO into a highly integrated military organization after the outbreak of the Korean War, NATO’s political importance had increased considerably in the mid-1950s. In December 1956, NATO governments deliberately strengthened the political role of NATO by approving the report of the Committee of Three on non-military cooperation within the alliance and by electing Paul-Henri Spaak, one of Europe’s leading statesmen, as NATO’s second secretary-general.2 Under Spaak’s energetic leadership, NATO’s political cooperation blossomed considerably in 1957–58. Arguably, the importance of the secretarygeneral grew, as political questions became more important than military ones because of a relaxation of East–West relations in the mid-1950s. The NATO Council regularly discussed key political questions, including the UN disarmament negotiations in London in 1957 and Western preparations for a possible summit meeting with the Soviet Union in 1958.3 Thus, Spaak in September 1958 proudly characterized the progress in NATO political consultations as an “innovation and revolution” in diplomatic relations.4 Yet despite NATO’s success as a multilateral political clearinghouse in 1957–58, two major political challenges loomed large by late 1958. First, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s Berlin ultimatum of November 1958 had the potential to split the alliance into supporters of a wider East–West détente and advocates of an intransigent line. Second, France under President Charles de Gaulle was increasingly displeased with central aspects of NATO, desiring support from its allies for its policy towards Africa and criticizing Washington’s military and political predominance within NATO. This chapter examines how NATO governments as well as NATO ambassadors under the leadership of the NATO secretary-general dealt with cycles of détente and with de Gaulle’s criticism towards the alliance from 1958 to 1963. In general, historians consider the state of the alliance to have been much better

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in the late 1950s than in the early 1960s. While US President Dwight D. Eisenhower is usually portrayed as a staunch supporter of NATO due to his experience in World War II and as NATO’s ﬁrst supreme commander,5 his successor John F. Kennedy has been criticized for “failing to consult” with NATO and for desiring a bilateral détente with the Soviet Union at the expense of NATO allies.6 This chapter argues that despite major efforts by NATO insiders, such as the NATO secretary-general and the 15 NATO ambassadors, to preserve the NATO forum as the main locus of discussing Western Cold War strategy, political cooperation within the Western alliance deteriorated in mid-1959. Eisenhower’s ﬂirt with superpower détente and the return of traditional big-power policy during preparations for the 1960 Paris Summit threatened the nascent political cooperation within NATO as much as de Gaulle’s challenge to US leadership. While the Kennedy administration at times was guilty of non-consultation or of only holding consultations after the fact, it made clear its commitment to an improved political role of NATO from the very beginning; it also made good use of the NATO forum to debate political aspects of the Berlin crisis in mid1961 as well as in the follow-up of the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in the summer of 1963.

New challenges for NATO: de Gaulle’s directorate and the Berlin Crisis In September 1958, Charles de Gaulle’s demand for a tripartite entente between Washington, London, and Paris to determine the political and military strategy of the West caused a prolonged intra-bloc crisis. In the opinion of NATO Secretary-General Paul-Henri Spaak and of the smaller allies including West Germany, Italy, and Canada, a three-power directorate was completely unacceptable and would mean the end of NATO.7 When US President Dwight D. Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan nevertheless gave Paris the green light for sub-ministerial tripartite talks in Washington, the smaller allies insisted – after pressure from Spaak and against the wishes of de Gaulle – that the three powers inform NATO about the meeting and its results.8 Originally, Spaak and the lesser allies had intended to use the occasion of de Gaulle’s September memorandum to strengthen NATO political consultations through a comprehensive discussion on a NATO reform at the ministerial meeting in December 1958.9 In the end, however, no such debate took place within NATO,10 as even Spaak feared that the progress in political cooperation made since 1956 could be jeopardized in an open confrontation with the French delegation at the multilateral NATO ministerial meeting.11 In the middle of this intra-bloc crisis caused by de Gaulle, Khrushchev caused the second Berlin crisis in November 1958 in the hope of opening up negotiations with the West on Berlin and Germany and trying to secure Western recognition of East Germany.12 With its Berlin offensive and the resulting East–West talks, the Soviet Union managed to divide the Western camp in no

Into the 1960s 69 time at all. The special responsibility for Germany and Berlin borne by the US, Britain, and France led to complaints by the other 11 NATO member states, which felt that they were being left out by the Three and West Germany. On the eve of NATO’s ministerial meeting in December 1958, the Four had published a communiqué on Berlin without waiting for input from the smaller NATO allies.13 Thus, NATO was more or less asked to rubberstamp the decisions made independently by the Western Four. During the multilateral NATO debates, there were heated discussions within the alliance between critics and supporters of a détente with the East. In general, Britain, Canada, and the Scandinavians desired a more ﬂexible approach than NATO’s continental European members.14 The split in the alliance led to a compromise position in NATO’s “Berlin Declaration” that was mainly drafted by Spaak. On the one hand, the NATO Council fully associated itself with the hardline views of the US, France, and West Germany, blaming the Soviet Union for having created “a serious situation which must be faced with determination” and recalling the rights of the Western powers with regard to Berlin. On the other hand, it emphasized the readiness of the West to discuss with the Soviet Union the problems of Germany, European security, and disarmament.15 However, neither de Gaulle’s demand for a three-power directorate nor Khrushchev’s Berlin ultimatum managed to seriously disturb NATO’s ten-year anniversary celebrations in April 1959.16 Already in February 1959, de Gaulle had assured Spaak that France would not deepen the NATO crisis while the Berlin crisis was ongoing.17 In addition, NATO governments and the NATO secretary-general apparently preferred a false display of unity, which no longer existed in reality, in order to be able to deal with the Soviet Union from a position of strength.

NATO and the “spirit of Camp David”: non-consultation par excellence By mid-1959, the fear of a directorate as proposed by de Gaulle and the fear of a superpower deal at the expense of Europe began to overlap. The catalyst for a major intra-Western crisis was the unexpected détente policy of the Eisenhower administration. In July 1959, without prior consultation with his Western allies, Eisenhower decided to invite Khrushchev to visit the US in September 1959.18 Since the US had always considered progress at the Geneva foreign ministers’ talks a prerequisite for a summit with Khrushchev, Eisenhower’s independent action annoyed most NATO allies. The NATO Council (NAC) thus asked the US to consult with its allies on its intentions regarding the meeting with Khrushchev.19 During his European trip in late August and early September 1959, Eisenhower was confronted with widespread concern among NATO members about the possibility of a US–Soviet agreement. Spaak was extremely concerned about the situation in Europe and the state of the alliance. West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer also worried about how the public in Italy and elsewhere

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would react to Khrushchev’s visit to the US.20 To dispel European concerns, Eisenhower reassured the NAC during a spontaneous visit that he would not conduct substantial negotiations with Khrushchev and that US policy on East–West relations remained unaltered.21 Despite his promises to NATO, however, Eisenhower did enter into serious negotiations with Khrushchev on Berlin, and the two leaders reached an informal bilateral agreement at Camp David. After Khrushchev withdrew his ultimatum for a separate peace treaty, Eisenhower agreed to resume East–West negotiations on Berlin. He acknowledged that the situation in Berlin was “abnormal.” Even worse from the allies’ point of view, they were only selectively informed about the summit – the informal Berlin agreement was not conveyed to the alliance.22 Eisenhower wanted to use the “spirit of Camp David” to achieve a breakthrough in détente. He was seriously tempted to favor détente with the Soviet Union over solidarity with the Western alliance. In the aftermath of Khrushchev’s visit, Eisenhower asked US Ambassador to Moscow Llewellyn Thompson to inform Khrushchev that for the time being, intra-bloc problems were preventing a common Western position for summit talks with the Soviet Union. Eisenhower did not want Khrushchev to assume that future delays were caused by a lack of interest on the part of the US.23 Together with the selective consultation with NATO on Camp David, Eisenhower’s secret message to the “enemy” saying that difﬁculties with NATO were preventing progress towards a mutually desired superpower détente amounted to a remarkable act of disloyalty to the alliance by the Eisenhower administration. Yet, NATO still played an important role in Eisenhower’s thinking at that time. In his meeting with Thompson, Eisenhower confessed that reaching an agreement with the allies on East–West issues was “far from easy.” Nevertheless, to prepare NATO for the planned four-power summit with Khrushchev, Eisenhower knew that in order to take the next step in his détente policy, he needed to have his “ducks in a row.”24 Instead of moving ahead bilaterally on the road towards détente, he decided to wait and bring NATO along. However, it was not an easy task to achieve a harmonization of Western views on détente and of preparations for a summit meeting with Khrushchev.

Transatlantic disputes over détente in late 1959 After Camp David, there were feelings of mistrust in NATO circles with regard to the intentions of the Western major powers.25 In Spaak’s view, the rapid change in East–West relations after the Eisenhower–Khrushchev summit made the NATO meeting in December 1959 extremely important. During a visit to Washington, he explained to US Secretary of State Christian Herter that the spirit of Camp David had alienated many NATO countries. Herter agreed that the waning of the Soviet threat was making it more difﬁcult to keep the alliance together.26 The US NATO mission in Paris also felt that NATO’s political cooperation was in for a “rough period.” 27 First, there was confusion in NATO governments

Into the 1960s 71 about whether or not the Cold War was already over, and about whether or not there was a détente. Second, the decline of Soviet pressure on Western Europe exposed intra-bloc difﬁculties, such as the French attitude towards NATO or fears of an “inner circle” within NATO.28 In early December, Herter complained that he was receiving no support from the French in preparations for the NATO meeting and a summit with Khrushchev, and that Adenauer, too, was blocking any progress in East–West relations. Eisenhower replied that “he was getting rather weary of the frozen attitudes taken by the French and the Germans.”29 Eisenhower confessed that the US played too big a role within NATO. He was strongly committed to substantially reducing US troops in Europe and believed that Europeans should feel ashamed that the US still had troops stationed on their continent.30 The NATO consensus that had prevailed from 1949 to 1959 increasingly gave way to a strong frustration in Washington about West Europeans. At the ministerial meeting in Paris in December 1959, NATO foreign ministers dedicated much time to the détente that had been registered during that year. Some NATO governments felt that, without concrete steps or agreements, the détente of 1959 was only an atmosphere, not a reality. Other countries, including Norway, Canada, and Britain, maintained that a relaxation of international relations had already taken place, and that they expected NATO to present new, imaginative disarmament positions in response. In their view, the summit of 1960 was intended to demonstrate to Khrushchev that he was on the right path with his changed strategy that favored détente instead of a cold war. Even West German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano viewed the international situation in relatively mild terms. He suggested that NATO, while avoiding the danger of wishful thinking, “contribute its efforts to seek a real détente.”31 While there was only a fragile consensus within NATO on the desirability of East–West détente, NATO’s smaller allies were united in their demand that the Western Four consult them with regard to Western preparations for the summit with Khrushchev. Spaak blamed the Western Four for having taken important steps in 1959 without prior consultation with NATO. He warned that the challenge for NATO resulting from Khrushchev’s détente policy needed to be taken seriously, and he urged for Western unity and improved consultations.32 Within the multilateral NATO forum, no confrontation took place between the diverging concepts of the US and France for the future of Europe. Spaak had tried in vain to encourage Eisenhower to confront de Gaulle and to take the lead within the alliance to isolate France.33 As early as mid-August 1959, Spaak had warned of the dangers of de Gaulle’s escalating obstructionism within NATO – de Gaulle had withdrawn its Mediterranean ﬂeet from NATO command in March 1959 and rejected both French participation in NATO’s integrated air defense and the storage of US nuclear devices on French territory in early June 1959. However, except for two cursory discussions of de Gaulle’s directorate proposal on 16 June and 1 July 1959, there was no real debate on the French challenge within the NATO Council.34

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Preparing for the 1960 Paris Summit: what role for NATO? After Italy, Canada, Turkey, and Belgium, in particular, had raised concerns that the four-power preparations violated the equality principle within NATO, substantial discussions took place in the NATO Council on the most important issues on the international agenda, including disarmament and European security.35 In addition, Alexander Böker, a German member of NATO’s International Staff, represented the interests of the alliance as NATO observer to the preparatory meetings of the four-power working group on East–West relations from January to May 1960.36 At this stage, Spaak was seeking to strengthen NATO’s role in East–West relations in the long term. In February 1960, he proposed to establish a ﬁvepower NATO committee – after the model of the UN Security Council – to harmonize future preparations for East–West summits. However, Spaak’s suggestion was unanimously rejected by all NATO members except Italy, which enthusiastically endorsed the idea, undoubtedly hoping for a seat in the ﬁvepower committee.37 It was no small irony that Spaak, who in 1958–59 had vehemently fought against notions of an “inner circle” within the alliance, at this point launched a similar “senior NATO partners” idea. Even more unconventional was Spaak’s idea of inviting Khrushchev to a meeting of the NATO Council during the Soviet leader’s visit to Paris – an idea that was also unanimously rejected.38 At the NATO ministerial meeting in Istanbul in early May 1960, the US assured its allies that the value of NATO was independent of cycles of détente. Washington promised not to make any commitments to Khrushchev that would have negative repercussions on the alliance.39 Even though all NATO members felt that the state of political consultations had improved since late 1959 through the position of the NATO observer and due to NATO’s considerable involvement in the summit preparations, some NATO countries, such as Canada, Italy, and Turkey, remained skeptical with regard to the substance of the Western bargaining position. In their views, the West was not yet sufﬁciently prepared for an encounter with Khrushchev, particularly in the disarmament ﬁeld – the Paris Summit thus seemed premature and was thought to have been summoned too hastily.40 At the end of their debates, the ministers agreed with Spaak’s suggestion to mention détente in the ﬁnal communiqué as a concept “inseparably linked with alliance solidarity.” 41 By welcoming the prospect of negotiations with the Soviet Union and desiring a true international détente, NATO’s Istanbul communiqué anticipated NATO’s 1967 Harmel formula of defense and détente as the alliance’s twin tasks. Yet, in 1960, the West insisted on speciﬁcally mentioning the “indivisibility of détente.” The Soviet Union was called upon to stop admitting some of NATO’s allies to the beneﬁts of a détente policy while subjecting others – i.e. West Germany – to pressure or violent attacks.42

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The de Gaulle problem revisited and Spaak’s resignation In the aftermath of the U-2 incident, Khrushchev refused to meet with Eisenhower at the Paris Summit.43 The failure of the summit brought to an end the détente of 1959–60. NATO’s primary attention in the summer of 1960 shifted back to internal problems, in particular to de Gaulle’s challenge. When US NATO Ambassador W. Randolph Burgess briefed the NATO Council on 8 June 1960 on a meeting of the US, British, and French foreign ministers that had taken place a week earlier in Washington, the NATO ambassadors from Belgium, André de Staercke, and from the Netherlands, Dirk Stikker, as well as Spaak complained in unusually harsh words about the apparent implementation of de Gaulle’s tripartism.44 In late August 1960, Eisenhower ﬁnally confronted de Gaulle’s challenge to US leadership in NATO. In a letter to the French president, he regretted that de Gaulle had taken steps against an integrated military organization within NATO without proposing any constructive ideas himself. For Eisenhower, the French leader’s suggestions were contradictory. On the one hand, de Gaulle rejected a closer union as a means of better organizing the defense of the West. On the other hand, he suggested exactly such a union between France, Britain, and the US, which of course was unacceptable to the other NATO partners. Invoking the smaller NATO nations, Eisenhower rejected de Gaulle’s idea of a tripartite directorate.45 On 14 September 1960, Burgess delivered to the NATO Council the ﬁrst clear ofﬁcial US statement rejecting tripartism and informed the alliance about Eisenhower’s rebuff to de Gaulle: A tripartite organization that might have the overtones of a “directorate” would ignore the important interests of other NATO members, would also meet with opposition elsewhere in the world, and in some instances would run counter to our UN obligations. Burgess emphasized a strong US commitment to using the NATO Council as the principal forum for political consultations in the West, namely to harmonize the policies of NATO countries towards the Soviet Union.46 Informally, NATO supreme commander Lauris Norstad had already informed Spaak about Eisenhower’s letter to de Gaulle a few days earlier during an ad hoc “NATO summit” at Dirk Stikker’s villa by Lake Como.47 Despite this apparent success, Spaak seriously considered retiring from the position of secretary-general in the fall of 1960. Deeply concerned about the future of NATO, he struggled to come to terms with the fact that his intentions of late 1956 of developing a common NATO policy in various ﬁelds had been drastically challenged in 1959–60 – despite promising beginnings in 1957–58. Spaak now doubted whether NATO was capable of agreeing on a common policy. He thus regarded the future of NATO with great pessimism: “We are now at a period where the ‘great men’ were using personal visits and diplomacy,

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with each seeking to push his own policy, but with little attempt to evolve a common approach in the common interest.” Under such circumstances, Spaak could not see an important role for himself or for NATO. He realized that the alliance, at variance with constant US promises to strengthen political consultation, had not been used to ﬁnd solutions to the most central current problems.48 Spaak informed NATO ambassadors of his decision to leave NATO at the end of the December ministerial meeting and ofﬁcially resigned on 31 January 1961.49 Thus, NATO in 1961 and beyond would be marked by two new leaders – a new secretary-general and a new US president. Upon leaving NATO, Spaak sent a “personal testament”50 to the new US president in mid-February 1961 analyzing the problems confronting the Atlantic alliance and asking Kennedy for unreserved US support for NATO and for more complete, more loyal, and more timely consultation.51 France’s attitude since 1958, which Spaak summarized as “silence and abstention,” was particularly difﬁcult for the alliance. He emphasized that policy consultation should take place within the organization and not through the usual diplomatic channels. Smaller countries were “highly sensitive” in this regard, as they regarded political consultations as a reward for the military efforts they were asked to make. If the Kennedy administration improved US consultations within NATO, this would set a precedent for London, Bonn, and lesser powers – and maybe even for France, Spaak concluded.52

New NATO leaders: Kennedy, Acheson, and Stikker The departure from the NATO arena of such personalities as Eisenhower and Spaak in early 1961 led to uncertainty about the future of the Western alliance. Dirk Stikker from the Netherlands was favored in the US and most of the other countries as a possible successor for Spaak.53 France, however, blocked Stikker’s candidacy for some weeks, supported by Italy and Greece.54 Britain at ﬁrst wanted to suggest a French secretary-general to improve relations between France and NATO; later, London even considered a British candidate.55 A solution in favor of Stikker began to take shape only in early April, when Italy withdrew its candidate Manlio Brosio from the race.56 The NATO Council elected Stikker unanimously on 18 April.57 For Stikker, the relationship with de Gaulle proved to be very difﬁcult, as he had been appointed against French wishes. Thus, his authority to mediate between de Gaulle and NATO was very limited from the beginning. At the May ministerial meeting in Paris, Stikker discussed the French problem with US Secretary of State Dean Rusk. He expressed pessimism that de Gaulle’s ideas on NATO would change: “The problem will, therefore, be to ﬁnd solutions so that other countries can go ahead with essential steps in the integration ﬁeld.”58 De Gaulle waited for three months before receiving the new NATO secretary-general – and then only did so after Adenauer had personally intervened. Their ﬁrst (and only) meeting on 12 July 1961 lasted for mere 30 minutes. De Gaulle made clear that while he wanted to cooperate with NATO, this had to be done in a different form. He conﬁrmed that he still stood by the demands of his 1958 memorandum.59

Into the 1960s 75 A few days after his inauguration, Kennedy appointed Dean Acheson, one of the founding fathers of NATO, to evaluate and review US NATO policy.60 Acheson produced a ﬁrst draft of his report in mid-March. In his view, not only de Gaulle’s France, but the US too, had increasingly rated national interests above alliance interests in recent years. Like Spaak, Acheson suggested that Kennedy clearly signal Washington’s commitment to the Atlantic community. Leadership in the alliance needed to be improved through consensus building and consultation.61 Acheson urged Kennedy to “take NATO much more seriously as a forum for consultation.”62 Acheson envisaged a militarily and politically better integrated alliance. In the military ﬁeld, central US control should replace Eisenhower’s more decentralized approach.63 Deputy National Security Advisor Walt Rostow praised Acheson’s thoughts and replied that he had “never read the case for the Acheson view on the priority of the Alliance better stated.” He agreed that the 15 NATO countries needed to adapt “an Alliance view of the map of the world,” even if this meant “a fundamental reassessment of national interests in the light of contemporary facts and relationships to replace conceptions of national interests ﬁxated on a past which no longer exists.” He suggested carrying the Berlin and Germany negotiations over into NATO to demonstrate Washington’s commitment to political consultation: “To place the matter in NATO is already half the battle; because behind the fears over such talk is the notion that Washington and Moscow might make a deal over Europe’s body.”64 In addition to reviewing NATO policy – Acheson’s 74-page report was completed on 24 March and approved as ofﬁcial US NATO policy on 21 April65 – the new US administration tried hard to reassure the NATO allies of its undiminished commitment and support. In a presidential message to the NATO Council on 15 February 1961, Kennedy pledged to improve the processes of consultation.66 At the spring ministerial meeting in Oslo, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk promised that “NATO was the keystone of US policy” and promoted a dual US strategy in East–West relations, assuring that Washington “stood for ﬁrmness and strength in dealing with the Soviets, while at the same time always being ready to engage in negotiations with the Soviets.”67 Rusk’s pragmatism, his effort “to encourage effective consultation by talking less about how to consult and just starting consulting,” was very well received by most of Washington’s allies. Rusk proudly cabled back to Kennedy that “NATO’s old timers” – both US and foreign – had praised Oslo as “the most open and intimate political discussion in NATO within their memories.”68 The Kennedy administration was well aware from the very beginning that a revitalization of the transatlantic alliance would require more than just the promise of improved political consultation. For NSC staffer Robert Komer, the most important problem of Washington’s NATO policy was “how to bring de Gaulle along,” because most of Washington’s NATO initiatives since 1958 had been stymied by the “obduracy of an obsessed old man.”69 For Komer, “Uncle Charlie” was the “real nut to crack in revitalizing NATO.” He regretted that this aspect was missing in Acheson’s report. Since de Gaulle had no faith in a “horde

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of lesser ofﬁcials” such as US Ambassador to France James Gavin, US NATO Ambassador Thomas Finletter, or Supreme Allied Commander Europe Lauris Norstad, Komer pointed to the importance of Kennedy’s “personal relationship with the man who is France.”70 In late April, Acheson prepared the ground for Kennedy’s ﬁrst and only meeting with de Gaulle. Visiting Paris, Acheson promoted the new US NATO policy and its focus on “full consultation.” An interesting dialog arose between the US NATO architect of the 1940s and the French NATO critic. Acheson explained his view of consultation: the US “hoped to listen as well as talk” and expected that its own views and those of its allies would be inﬂuenced by the NATO discussions. At that point, de Gaulle asked whether this was possible. In his view, that “was a mistaken use of NATO, which had been created for a wholly different purpose, was a purely military alliance and not a proper forum for [political] discussion.” Due to such insurmountable differences of opinion, Acheson saw no other choice than warning de Gaulle that the US too had a strong tradition of isolationism.71 When Kennedy ﬁnally met with de Gaulle in Paris in late May and early June 1961, the French plans for reforming NATO dominated the talks. Although de Gaulle was highly critical of the present state of the alliance, he promised again – as in early 1959 – that France had no intention to weaken NATO during the ongoing Berlin crisis.72

Kennedy, Stikker, and NATO’s role in the 1961 Berlin crisis The Berlin crisis was the ﬁrst test case of how serious the Kennedy administration really was about political consultation within NATO. At the May ministerial meeting in Oslo, Rusk saw increased tensions in Berlin and an increased likelihood of a separate peace treaty between Moscow and the GDR being signed within the next few weeks and months. In view of the simmering Berlin crisis, Rusk said, inter-allied consultations on the position to be taken in the event of negotiations were “urgently desirable” immediately.73 The Vienna summit between Kennedy and Khrushchev in early June offered the superpowers the ﬁrst opportunity to debate unresolved East–West problems at the highest level since September 1959. On the way home from Vienna, Rusk returned to Paris to brief NATO on 5 June 1961 about the results of the summit. While Khrushchev’s attitude in general had been “calm, friendly, and conﬁdent,” Rusk said, the Soviet leader had issued to Kennedy an ultimatum on Berlin virtually identical to that given to Eisenhower in 1958 – a six month interim for negotiation of a peace treaty between the two German states; otherwise Moscow would conclude a separate Soviet–East German treaty and thus end Western rights in Berlin. Kennedy had replied with great clarity that the US had an important commitment in Berlin and that the rights of the three powers in Berlin could not be unilaterally terminated by Moscow. East German interference with access to the city would be regarded in the West as a belligerent act. Summarizing the Vienna experience, Rusk thought that the West had “a formid-

Into the 1960s 77 able issue in prospect with heightening of tension and perhaps even grimmer problems before long.” Rusk circulated copies of a Soviet aide memoire on Germany and Berlin. Belgium’s de Staercke emphasized the importance of keeping the NATO Council informed about follow-up action on Berlin.74 When Stikker visited Washington in mid-June, he charged in a public statement that Khrushchev “was deliberately increasing world tension,” but assured that all NATO governments would be “ﬁrm” on the question of Berlin.75 As in late 1958, the acute danger of war arising out of the Berlin crisis welded together the alliance – the unity of NATO was considered a crucial element of deterrence. While the NATO Council frequently discussed NATO strategy and Berlin contingency planning in June and July 1961, NATO ambassadors were not consulted about the political aspects of the Berlin crisis.76 When Stikker and smaller NATO members such as Canada, Italy, and Turkey demanded consultations, Rusk harshly instructed Finletter to silence Stikker: “We are deeply disturbed by the restlessness on the part of Stikker and the NAC members about consultations on Berlin.” The US ﬁrst wanted to complete its comprehensive reviews of US policy on Berlin and Germany before opening discussions about it with NATO.77 After week-long debates in Washington, Kennedy presented US policy on Berlin in a landmark speech on 25 July 1961. He coupled a ﬁrm US commitment to the defense of vital Western interests in West Berlin with a readiness for negotiations with Moscow over the issues of Germany and Berlin.78 He had not, however, waited for the input from Rusk’s consultations with NATO in early August. Despite his earlier efforts at reassurance and the rhetoric about improving political cooperation within NATO, Kennedy had moved ahead unilaterally. When Stikker met privately with NATO ambassadors on 26 July to discuss Kennedy’s speech, the Scandinavian states, Belgium, and Canada primarily emphasized the need to negotiate and expressed relief that Kennedy had left the door open for negotiations. After the meeting, however, French NATO Ambassador Pierre de Leusse approached Finletter and said that France was opposed to negotiations with Moscow.79 Thus, NATO was split on the desirability of negotiations with the Soviet Union even before formal NATO discussions on the subject had started. On 8 August, Rusk presented an hour-long report on the new US policy for Berlin to the NATO Council. He predicted that negotiations with the USSR on Germany and Berlin “will and must occur.”80 To his own surprise, there had been no bad feelings or dissent about Washington’s non-consultation with its allies since early June.81 The crisis atmosphere, coupled with Stikker’s passivity, apparently prevented the traditional complaints of NATO’s small allies. In July, Stikker had thought “it would be a mistake to have a substantive discussion in NATO on Berlin” before the German elections in September 1961, as Bonn would be forced to assume a rigid position.82 He therefore recommended to “postpone discussion at any rate.”83 After the border closure in Berlin on 13 August 1961, pressure began to build for negotiations with Moscow on the status of Berlin and Germany. Stikker was

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in a “very pessimistic mood” and, in a reversal of his earlier position, now demanded meaningful consultations on East–West negotiations. He expressed considerable concern about the future of NATO “unless more substance could be breathed into it.” He feared that, as far as “the other Eleven” were concerned, the Council would become “more or less a rubber stamp.” Stikker even threatened to resign if political consultations did not improve.84 Stikker’s volte-face can perhaps be explained with the psychological crisis in Western Europe and West Germany resulting in particular from Washington’s de facto acceptance of the Berlin Wall.85 At a highly restricted meeting on 1 September, NATO ambassadors agreed to seek negotiations with Moscow. Yet, they still had to decide what forum should be used for the negotiations, whether they wanted to talk about Germany or just about Berlin, and what their vital interests were in Berlin. De Staercke made clear that Belgium would not consider any military buildup until the NATO Council had moved to the more important question of substantive negotiations about Berlin. Spaak also thought, since everyone agreed that the West should negotiate, that “we ought to start negotiating now.” The French representative, however, could not see any difference between the current situation in 1961 and the crisis of 1959, and warned of the danger of abandoning West Berlin. US Ambassador Thomas Finletter, who “had not said much of anything,” was challenged by Staercke, who bluntly asked whether the American had “anything to contribute to the meeting.” Embarrassingly, Finletter remained silent. Overlooking French objections, Stikker summed up the NATO debates by saying that “all agreed there should be negotiations” and that the basic interests of the West were the continued presence of allied forces in Berlin, the viability of Berlin, and access to West Berlin. Further discussion was needed on the link between Berlin and the more general German problem, and on the question of whether a new status for Berlin was negotiable.86 Stikker was satisﬁed with NATO’s political discussions and felt that “the Alliance was beginning to function in this area.”87 On 15 September, Rusk informed Kennedy that the problems regarding the Berlin negotiations did not result from superpower tensions, but from disagreement among the Western countries. France, which was still categorically opposed to negotiations, and the Adenauer government, which did not want to risk a defeat at the elections in September, prevented a common front, although the other 13 NATO countries all favored narrow negotiations with Moscow on Berlin.88 In secret talks with the Soviet Union beginning in September 1961, the Kennedy administration explored possibilities for a settlement of the German problem, including Berlin, but was unable to produce a consensus on an ofﬁcial Western bargaining position within NATO.89 In the fall of 1961, two faultlines existed within NATO. First, the smaller allies felt they were not being sufﬁciently informed and consulted by Washington, London, Paris, and Bonn – although, in their view, the Berlin and German problems concerned NATO as a whole. Italy, Belgium, and Canada, in particular, repeatedly reminded the Four to consult the NATO Council in a timely

Into the 1960s 79 manner. Together with Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway, they also heavily criticized Washington’s policy during the so-called “tank crisis” at Checkpoint Charlie in late October 1961, emphasizing that the US behavior was unreasonable and could lead to a dangerous escalation of the crisis.90 In addition, Canada did not want to go along with an economic embargo against the Soviet Union in response to Khrushchev’s Berlin ultimatum.91 As a result, NATO could not act as one bloc in this matter. Second, France’s consistent opposition to negotiations prevented progress towards a common Western position. In several NATO Council meetings, however, a fragile consensus was achieved that was supported by France. On 14 November, the NATO Council unanimously approved narrow negotiations with Moscow on Berlin.92 Nevertheless, both Paris and Bonn, despite their assurances, remained rather skeptical towards the Anglo-American push for détente.93 Even after a personal intervention of Kennedy, French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, speaking at the December ministerial meeting, repeated the French attitude that the West should not seek East–West negotiations under pressure and without a common negotiating basis.94 After spirited debates, Stikker had to acknowledge that NATO was still split into various camps on the question of East–West negotiations. France strictly opposed negotiations. Washington supported talks with Moscow, despite skepticism about their prospects. The other NATO countries – Belgium, Norway, and Canada in particular – were in favor of limited negotiations on Berlin, while Bonn preferred a broader mandate focusing on German reuniﬁcation.95 Stikker was shocked about the near “public breakdown” within NATO over a major issue, and was very pessimistic about the future of the alliance.96 For Stikker, the December 1961 meeting had revealed that “too many members of NATO attached greater value to certain political principles than to the overriding idea of the Alliance, which implied a give and take.”97 In the end, Kennedy faced the same dilemma during 1961 as Eisenhower had in the fall of 1959. He desired a superpower détente with the Soviet Union, but did not want to risk a serious breach with France or West Germany within the NATO forum. In 1961, even more than in late 1959, NATO failed to agree to speak with one voice. However, substantial debates on the political aspects of the Berlin Wall crisis had taken place from September to December 1961, shaping a NATO consensus that all allies except France could support. This was no small success for the new NATO secretary-general and the new US administration. Political consultations had improved in 1961 – despite continuing and deepened French obstructionism and temporary non-consultation on the part of the Kennedy administration.

NATO and the summer of détente in 1963 In the spring of 1962 and in early summer 1963, Kennedy decided on a unilateral approach towards the Soviet Union without NATO consultations in order to draw the US and Soviet positions closer. However, the Kennedy administration

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again took alliance management seriously after the so-called “leak crisis” in April 1962 – when Adenauer sabotaged a new US modus vivendi approach – and after concluding a Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) with the Soviet Union and Britain in July 1963. The international context in 1963 was remarkably different from 1961. After the East–West confrontations over Berlin and Cuba, a superpower détente had evolved in 1963 that stabilized the territorial and nuclear status quo. For the US, the question arose whether this superpower détente could be multilateralized.98 After Bonn signed the LTBT on 19 August 1963, Kennedy reassured NATO that there would be “a NATO view” on the next steps towards détente and that the alliance would be consulted on a European inspection zone and a nonaggression pact.99 In the immediate aftermath of the LTBT negotiations, US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William Tyler had briefed NATO on the outcome of the Moscow talks on 29 July 1963. France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Greece, Turkey, and Portugal vehemently opposed the idea of a non-aggression pact as the next East–West agreement, whereas Belgium, Canada, Italy, Norway, and Denmark urged NATO to take advantage of the new opportunities for wide-ranging détente.100 When NATO discussed the desirability of ground observation posts at a meeting on 21 August, Canada, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, and Norway argued that an inspection zone agreement would be a positive step towards peace and would reduce the danger of a Soviet surprise attack on Western Europe. However, the political ramiﬁcations of the suggested measures led German Ambassador to NATO Wilhelm Grewe to join his French colleague François Seydoux in opposing the idea of observation posts.101 NATO was essentially split on the question of how to follow up on the “little détente” of 1963. On 28 August, Grewe buried any hopes for a non-aggression pact when he stated that such a treaty would give a certain degree of recognition to East Germany and imply permanent legal recognition of the status quo in Central Europe.102 The NATO debates on a non-aggression pact and ground observation posts concluded on 18 September. Canada once again regretted that “silence on the part of NATO was not a strong position.” Stikker agreed that exploratory talks with the USSR must continue, but also warned that Washington had to proceed carefully. Finletter thanked his colleagues for their frank discussions, which he judged to be more important than a superﬁcial closing of ranks. The Norwegian Ambassador Jens M. Boyesen agreed that NATO’s strength was its diversity, in stark contrast to the Warsaw Pact.103 Another positive aspect of the détente consultations in the fall of 1963 was that Stikker actively assumed the role of mediator between advocates and critics of a broader détente and thus enhanced the importance of the NATO secretary-general in the political debates of the alliance.104 However, in the end, NATO lacked a united position on détente, and French silence and German opposition blocked further East–West agreements. At NATO’s ministerial meeting in December 1963, several foreign ministers deplored that the West had missed an opportunity to multilateralize détente after the LTBT. Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak and Canadian Secretary

Into the 1960s 81 of State for External Affairs Paul Martin were disappointed that NATO’s negative stance against a European inspection zone had prevented progressing one step closer to peace.105 West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder departed from the rigid Adenauer line and reviewed Bonn’s tentative efforts at normalization of relations with Eastern Europe by establishing trade missions in Poland, Romania, and Hungary. He expected a spillover effect, ﬁrst to the cultural and later to the political sphere.106 Schröder’s “policy of movement” was meant to improve the situation in Central Europe instead of hardening the status quo.107 This early effort to coordinate West German Ostpolitik within NATO was the most interesting and promising approach in NATO’s search for a new meaning in the era of détente. In the summer of 1963, the US State Department had begun to draft a new policy towards Eastern Europe. Walt Rostow, director of the Policy Planning Council, suggested carrying discussions about détente over into NATO: “I think we should move promptly to engage the Alliance in serious and basic discussion of a common policy on Central Europe . . . The East–West dialogue should be kept going.”108 For Rostow, the key to a broader European settlement was the integration of Germany into Western détente policy. Playing the “Eastern game” should be a “planned Atlantic effort . . . with the Europeans out front,” particularly West Germany.109 In the fall of 1961, the Kennedy administration welcomed and strongly encouraged Schröder’s overtures towards Eastern Europe.110 At the ministerial meeting in December 1963, NATO foreign ministers succeeded in building a consensus to continue a policy of détente with Moscow. As Rusk summed it up in his report about the meeting: All speakers except French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville agreed that signiﬁcant changes had taken place in the Communist World and that NATO, while maintaining the military strength of the Alliance, should explore avenues for possible future discussions with the Soviets on outstanding East–West issues.111 This trend towards multilateralization in Western détente policy, as written down in the ﬁnal communiqué, was not lost on “the other side.” The Soviet Union found the communiqué that resulted from the December NATO meeting “very interesting,” as it seemed to “encourage and promote the exploration towards détente.”112 Drew Middleton of the New York Times, too, wrote that the prevailing impression on the NATO meeting was that “the Atlantic Alliance, for the ﬁrst time in its 14-year history, was being led to think in terms of continued discussion with the Soviet Union, the enemy that NATO was formed to repel.”113 In terms of concrete results, however, détente did not gain much weight in the ﬁrst years of the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson. The new policy towards Central and Eastern Europe was barely noticeable before October 1966, and no decisive steps were registered in the ﬁeld of arms control.114 NATO’s role in

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East–West relations was diminished under Johnson until NATO, with the “Harmel exercise,” resumed the debate on alliance and détente and ﬁnally overcame the French challenge in 1966–67.115

Conclusion Between 1958 and 1963, Charles de Gaulle’s nationalism and cycles of superpower détente led to great uncertainty about the role of NATO in East–West relations. The main responsibility for responding to Nikita Khrushchev’s détente policy lay with the US as the Western hegemon. Yet, for both the Eisenhower and the Kennedy administration, alliance politics constituted a complex ingredient in the formulation of its détente policy. The US needed the support of its NATO allies in order to expand the growing understanding between the superpowers of common problems into a multilateral, bloc-to-bloc détente that would include Eastern and Western Europe. In addition, de Gaulle’s challenge threatened the unity of NATO, which was regarded as essential for dealing with the Soviet Union from a position of strength. In retrospect, NATO’s role in East–West relations already began to decline in the last two years of the Eisenhower era. Recently declassiﬁed documents of 1959 and 1960 indicate that the US president was very frustrated over the refusal of West European states to share the burden of NATO’s defense, and growing tired of de Gaulle’s and Konrad Adenauer’s rigid policies. At that stage, Dwight D. Eisenhower was eager to reach a breakthrough on détente with Khrushchev, even at the expense of security interests of NATO allies and of West Germany in particular. In the end, however, he did not risk a serious breach in the alliance, and consultative patterns improved in early 1960. Eisenhower also avoided an open clash with de Gaulle, until he clearly rejected the French idea of a global three-power directorate in late August 1960. John F. Kennedy’s record in dealing with de Gaulle and détente in the NATO forum is ambivalent as well. In a concerted effort in early 1961, Kennedy assured the allies of Washington’s commitment to political consultation within NATO. The improvement of political consultation was the core political task postulated in Dean Acheson’s NATO report of March 1961. Kennedy presented the allies with his vision of an alliance that was both militarily and politically integrated. He was prepared in principle to debate East–West problems within NATO. When de Gaulle and Adenauer blocked progress on East–West negotiations, however, Kennedy was increasingly ready to move towards bilateralism with the Soviet Union. After the Cuban missile crisis and de Gaulle’s double non, Kennedy returned to his original goal of enhanced political consultation within NATO. In the ﬁnal analysis, Kennedy was more willing than his predecessor Eisenhower to multilateralize the management of détente. Yet, both US presidents were stopped by French (and West German) intransigence. Kennedy’s strengthening of political consultations within NATO led to substantial debates within the Western alliance, both on the Berlin problem in the fall of 1961 and on

Into the 1960s 83 easing tensions during the “summer of détente” in 1963. In both instances, however, multilateral NATO debates only started after the Kennedy administration had announced its Berlin policy in July 1961 and after it had concluded the LTBT in July 1963 without properly consulting its allies in advance. Paul-Henri Spaak grew tired of the twin challenge to the alliance presented by de Gaulle’s nationalism and by superpower détente. He protested against the growing irrelevance of the political role of the NATO secretary-general in East–West relations and against de Gaulle’s boycott of NATO’s political role by retiring in late 1960. During his time in ofﬁce, however, he played an important role as the “voice of NATO” and fought for the importance of NATO in East–West relations. His efforts to strengthen political consultations remained tireless, even if they were not always successful. Dirk Stikker was even less able to mediate between de Gaulle and NATO than his predecessor, because the French had tried to prevent his appointment to the secretary-general post and simply refused to cooperate with him. While Stikker accepted a reduced role of NATO in June and July 1961 to preserve NATO unity during an acute US–Soviet crisis, he played a constructive role in the NATO “tea party” discussions of the Berlin problem in the fall of 1961. Two years later, he handled NATO’s debates on the desirability of détente with great skill and thus contributed to early attempts to multilateralize détente and to ﬁnd a new mission for NATO beyond deterrence. NATO’s severe crisis of conﬁdence, caused by superpower détente and the French challenge to US leadership in Europe between 1958 and 1963, would only be overcome after the French withdrawal from NATO’s military integration in the spring of 1966 and the reinvigoration of the alliance in 1966–67. The drive of the alliance’s ﬁrst ten years could not be sustained into the 1960s. At NATO’s 15th anniversary in April 1964, there was widespread pessimism as to whether NATO would still be there to celebrate its 20th anniversary in 1969.

Notes 1 Memorandum by Fuller, 24 July 1959, “NATO by the End of 1959,” US National Archives, College Park, MD (USNA), RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff 1957–61, Box 151. 2 Winfried Heinemann, Vom Zusammenwachsen des Bündnisses: Die Funktionsweise der NATO in ausgewählten Krisenfällen 1951–56 (München: Oldenbourg, 1998), pp. 239–60. 3 Christian Nuenlist, “Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Political Cooperation in NATO: Western Reactions to Khrushchev’s Foreign Policy, 1955–63” (Ph.D. thesis, University of Zurich, 2005), pp. 130–238. 4 Speech by Spaak, 27 September 1958, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS (DDEL), Ann Whitman File (AWF), Dulles-Herter Series, Box 10. 5 Anthony O. Edmonds and E. Bruce Geelhoed, Eisenhower, Macmillan and Allied Unity, 1957–1961 (Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–1961 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996); Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, 2 vols. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983–84). 6 Frank Costigliola, “Kennedy, the European Allies, and the Failure to Consult,”

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8 9 10 11 12 13 14

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16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Christian Nuenlist Presidential Studies Quarterly 110, no. 1 (1995), pp. 105–23. See also Christof Münger, Die Berliner Mauer, Kennedy und die Kubakrise: Die westliche Allianz in der Zerreissprobe, 1961–63 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2003); Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s Crisis Years: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of a European Settlement 1945–63 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Andreas Wenger, “Der lange Weg zur Stabilität: Kennedy, Chruschtschow und das gemeinsame Interesse der Supermächte am Status quo in Europa,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 46, no. 1 (January 1998), pp. 69–99. See Anna Locher and Christian Nuenlist, “Containing the French Malaise: The NATO Secretary-General and de Gaulle’s Challenge, 1958–69,” in Intra-bloc Conﬂicts during the Cold War, ed. S. Victor Papacosma and Ann Heiss (Kent: Kent University Press, forthcoming). On Spaak, see also Paul-Henri Spaak, Combats inachevés, 2 vols (Paris: Fayard, 1969); Michel Dumoulin, Spaak (Brussels: Editions Racine, 1999). Dulles to Houghton, 26 November 1958, USNA, RG 59, Central Decimal Files (CDF), 740.5/11–2658. Diary Entry by Blankenhorn, 24 October 1958, Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BA), NL Blankenhorn, vol. 91. Summary Record, 16 December 1958, NATO Archives, Brussels (NA), C-R(58)61–62. Roberts (Paris) to Foreign Ofﬁce (FO), 28 October 1958, British National Archives, Kew/London (UKNA), PREM 11, 3002. See Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 251–82; Rolf Steininger, Der Mauerbau: Die Westmächte und Adenauer in der Berlinkrise 1958–63 (München: Olzog, 2001), pp. 21–54. Dulles (Paris) to Department of State (DoS), 15 December 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1958–60, vol. VIII, pp. 200–7. See, for example, Klaus Larres, “Die Politik der Nachgiebigkeit: Harold Macmillan und die britische Strategie in der Berlinkrise, 1958–1961,” in 1961: Mauerbau und Aussenpolitik, ed. Heiner Timmermann (Münster: Lit, 2002), pp. 163–88; Roy Rempel, Counterweights: The Failure of Canada’s German and European Policy (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996); Paul Villaume, Allieret med forbehold: Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig: En sutide i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949–1961 (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995). NATO Declaration on Berlin, 16 December 1958, www.nato.int/docu/ comm/49–95/c581216b.htm. For the debate, see Léger, 17 December 1958, “NATO’s Berlin Communiqué,” Documents on Canadian External Relations (DCER) 24 (1958), no. 313. Annual Political Appraisal by Spaak, 17 March 1959, NA, C-M(59)27; Herter (Paris) to US Diplomatic Posts, 4 April 1959, USNA, RG 59, Conference Files (CF), Box 169, CF 1237. Memorandum of Conversation (MemCon) between Gaulle and Spaak, 28 February 1959, Documents Diplomatiques Français (DDF) 1959, vol. 1, pp. 248–9. MemCon between Eisenhower and Herter, 10 July 1959, DDEL, AWF, DDE Diary Series, Box 43. See Gary J. Tocchet, “September Thaw: Khrushchev’s Visit to America, 1959” (Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University, 1995). DoS to Herter (Santiago), 12 August 1959, USNA, RG 59, CDF, 740.5/8–1259. MemCon between Eisenhower and Adenauer, 27 August 1959, DDEL, AWF, International Meetings Series, Box 3. Herter (Paris) to DoS, 3 September 1959, USNA, RG 59, CDF, 740.5/9–259. A day later, US Secretary of State Christian Herter repeated Eisenhower’s assurances. See Record of NAC Meeting, 4 September 1959, UKNA, FO 371/146302. Herter to Eisenhower, 29 September 1959, DDEL, AWF, Dulles-Herter Series, Box

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26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

12. On the 1959 Camp David talks, see Michael Jochum, Eisenhower und Chruschtschow: Gipfeldiplomatie im Kalten Krieg, 1955–1960 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1996), pp. 118–27; William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), pp. 425–44. Thompson to Herter, 16 October 1959, USNA, RG 59, CDF, 396.1/10–1659; MemCon between Eisenhower and Thompson, 21 October 1959, DDEL, AWF, DDE Diary Series, Box 45. MemCon between Eisenhower and Thompson, 21 October 1959. “Grundlagen der politischen Information und Konsultation in der NATO,” 18 October 1959, Political Archive of the German Foreign Ofﬁce, Berlin (PAAA), Referat 301, vol. 104; “Synopsis of State and Intelligence Material Reported to the President,” 29 October 1959, DDE, AWF, DDE Diary Series, Box 45. MemCon between Spaak, Herter et al., 17 November 1959, USNA, RG 59, CDF, 396.1–PA/11–1759. Nolting (Paris) to DoS, 18 November 1959, USNA, RG 59, Records of the Ofﬁce of European Regional Affairs (EUR/RA), Records of the Director, 1955–60, Box 2. Nolting (Paris) to DoS, 27 November 1959, USNA, RG 59, CDF, 396.1–PA/11–2759. See also Spaak’s Questionnaire on the 1959 Détente, 4 December 1959, NA, PO(59)1615. MemCon between Eisenhower and Herter, 3 December 1959, DDEL, AWF, DDE Diary Series, Box 47. Draft MemCon between Eisenhower, Spaak, Herter, and Burgess, 24 November 1959, USNA, RG 59, DF, 740.5/11–2459. Summary Record, 15 December 1959, NA, C-R(59)44. Ibid. Draft MemCon between Eisenhower, Spaak, Herter, and Burgess, 24 November 1959. “Synopsis of State and Intelligence Material Reported to the President,” 16 June 1959, DDEL, AWF, DDE Diary, Box 42, Brieﬁngs June 1959; Burgess (Paris) to DoS, 1 July 1959, USNA, RG 59, CDF, 740.5/7–159. Roberts (Paris) to FO, 10 March 1960, UKNA, FO 371/149364; Roberts (Paris) to FO, 12 March 1960, ibid.; Burgess (Paris) to DoS, 27 April 1960, USNA, 396.1–PA/4–2760. Merchant to Burgess (Paris), 13 January 1960, USNA, RG 59, CDF, 740.5/1–1360. Spaak to NATO Delegations, 5 February 1960, “The Preparation of Future Summit Meetings,” NA, PO(60)139. Roberts (Paris) to Millar, 17 February 1960, UKNA, FO 371/154552. Scope and Objectives, 29 April 1960, USNA, Bohlen Papers, Box 47, Preparations for Summit, Paris 1960. Herter (Istanbul) to DoS, 1 May 1960, USNA, RG 59, CF, Box 218; Summary Record, 2 May 1960, NA, C-R(60)18. Summary Record, 3 May 1960, NA, C-R(60)20. Final Communiqué, 4 May 1960, www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95/c600502a.htm. For Khrushchev’s reasons, see Taubman, Khrushchev, pp. 460–8. Roberts (Paris) to FO, 8 June 1960, UKNA, FO 371/152099. Eisenhower to de Gaulle, 30 August 1960, FRUS, 1958–60, vol. VII, part 2, pp. 413–17. Burgess (Paris) to DoS, 15 September 1960, USNA, RG 59, CDF, 740.5/9–1560. Houghton (Paris) to Herter, 10 September 1960, DDEL, AWF, Administration Series, Box 28, Norstad. Other participants were Adenauer, Herbert Blankenhorn, and de Staercke. Burgess (Paris) to Herter, 17 August 1960, DDEL, Norstad Papers, Box 90, NATO General (4). Mason (Paris) to Home, 19 December 1960, UKNA, FO 371/154553.

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50 Paul-Henri Spaak, Memoiren eines Europäers (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1969), p. 427. 51 Spaak to Kennedy, 13 February 1961, USNA, RG 59, DF, 740.5/2–1861. 52 MemCon between Kennedy, Spaak et al., 21 February 1961, FRUS, 1961–63, vol. XIII, pp. 260–6. 53 The discussions on Spaak’s successor can be traced in detail in USNA, RG 59, CDF, 740.5. 54 See also Dirk U. Stikker, Bausteine für eine neue Welt: Gedanken und Erinnerungen an schicksalshafte Nachkriegsjahre (Wien/Düsseldorf: Econ, 1966), pp. 418–32; Robert S. Jordan and Michael W. Bloome, Political Leadership in NATO: A Study in Multilateral Diplomacy (Boulder: Westview, 1979), pp. 103–17. 55 Shuckburgh to Mason, 27 January 1961, UKNA, FO 371/161278; FO Minute by Shuckburgh, 7 March 1961, UKNA, FO 371/161281. 56 Mason to FO, 12 April 1961, UKNA, FO 371/161281. 57 Finletter to Rusk, 18 April 1961, USNA, RG 59, CDF, 740.5/4–1861. 58 MemCon between Stikker and Rusk, Paris, 7 May 1961, USNA, RG 59, CF, Box 248. 59 MemCon between Stikker and de Gaulle, Paris, 12 July 1961, Dutch National Archives, The Hague, Stikker Papers (NLNA), Box 56. Cf. Stikker, Bausteine, pp. 429, 444–5. 60 “Suggested Terms of Reference for Review of Atlantic Community Policies,” n.d. [January 1961], JFKL, NSF, Box 221, NATO: General. See also Douglas Brinkley, Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 117–24. 61 Draft Acheson Report, 16 March 1961, JFKL, NSF, Box 220. 62 Komer to Kennedy, 14 March 1961, JFKL, NSF, Box 439. 63 For a discussion of Acheson’s military vision of NATO, see Andreas Wenger, “The Politics of Military Planning: The Evolution of NATO’s Strategy,” in War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West, ed. Vojtech Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 165–92, 173. 64 Rostow to Acheson, 20 March 1961, JFKL, NSF, Box 220. 65 “A Review of North Atlantic Problems for the Future,” 24 March 1961, JFKL, NSF, Box 220; Policy Directive, 20 April 1961, FRUS, 1961–63, vol. XIII, pp. 285–91. 66 Text in Department of State Bulletin (6 March 1961), pp. 333–4. 67 Scope and Objectives, 20 April 1961, USNA, RG 59, CF, Box 241, CF 1865. 68 Rusk (Paris) to DoS, 10 May 1961, FRUS, 1961–63, vol. XIII, pp. 301–2. 69 Komer to Acheson, 20 February 1961, JFKL, NSF, Box 439. 70 Komer to Bundy, 12 April 1961, JFKL, NSF, Box 220. 71 Acheson to Kennedy and Rusk, 20 April 1961, FRUS, 1961–63, vol. XIII, pp. 291–5. 72 MemCon between Kennedy and de Gaulle, 1 June 1961, FRUS, 1961–63, XIII, pp. 309–16. 73 Summary Record, 8 May 1961, NA, C-R(61)16. 74 Finletter to DoS, 5 June 1961, USNA, RG 59, DF, 740.5/6–561. For a different view, charging the US with manipulative information of its allies, see Münger, Kennedy, pp. 81–5. 75 New York Times (17 June 1961), p. 1. 76 See, for example, Finletter’s reports on NATO’s Berlin discussions both in USNA, RG 59, CDF, 740.5 and USNA, RG 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts, France, Paris Embassy, Classiﬁed General Records of the USRO, 1959–61 (USRO), Box 68, Berlin, NAC Reporting. 77 Rusk to Finletter (Paris), 9 July 1961, in Digital National Security Archive, The

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78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85

86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108

Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962, ed. William Burr (Alexandria: Chadwyck-Healey, 1992), no. 2150. Kennedy, Radio/TV Address, 25 July 1961, Public Papers of the President of the United States: Kennedy, 1961, pp. 533–40. Finletter (Paris) to DoS, 27 July 1961, USNA, RG 84, USRO, Box 68, Berlin: NAC Reporting. Rusk (Paris) to DoS, 9 August 1961, USNA, RG 59, CDF, 762.00/8–961. MemCon between Rusk and Adenauer 10 August 1961, USNA, RG 59, CDF, 396.1–PA/8–1061. MemCon between Stikker and Macmillan, London, 14 July 1961, NLNA, Box 58. MemCon between Stikker and Home, London, 13 July 1961, NLNA, Box 58. Durbrow to Kohler, n.d. [ﬁled on 25 August 1961]; MemCon between Durbrow and Stikker, 19 August 1961, both in DDEL, Norstad Papers, Box 90. On the US reaction to the Berlin Wall, see Christian Nuenlist, Kennedys rechte Hand: McGeorge Bundys Einﬂuss als Nationaler Sicherheitsberater auf die amerikanische Aussenpolitik, 1961–63 (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 1999), pp. 100–3. Finletter to DoS, 4 September 1961, USNA, RG 59, CDF, 740.5/9–461. MemCon between Stikker and Green, 11 September 1961, NLNA, Box 55. Rusk to Kennedy, 15 September 1961, JFKL, NSF, Box 220. For the talks of Rusk and Kennedy with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in late September and early October 1961, see Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990), pp. 224–8; Nuenlist, Kennedys rechte Hand, pp. 103–12. Finletter to DoS, 27 October, USNA, RG 59, CDF, 740.5/10–2761. See, for example, Finletter (Paris) to DoS, 20 December 1961, USNA, RG 59, CDF, 740.5/12–2061. Finletter (Paris) to DoS, 4, 6, 10, and 14 November 1961, USNA, RG 59, CDF, 740.5. See Münger, Kennedy, pp. 132–40. Summary Record, 13 December 1961, NA, C-R(61)64. Summary Record, 15 December 1961, NA, C-R(61)71. Stikker to Rusk, 18 December 1961, FRUS, 1961–63, vol. XIII, pp. 340–1. MemCon between Stikker and Adenauer, 11 January 1962, NLNA, Box 56. See Wenger, “Der lange Weg zur Stabilität,” pp. 83–7; Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 344–451. New York Times (20 August 1963), pp. 1, 3; New York Times (21 August 1963), p. 10. The section on NATO’s détente debates in the fall of 1963 is based on Anna Locher and Christian Nuenlist, “What Role for NATO? Conﬂicting Western Perceptions of Détente, 1963–65,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 2, no. 2 (2004), pp. 185–208, pp. 189–93. Summary Record, 29 July 1963, NA, C-R(63)41. Summary Record, 21 August 1963, NA, C-R(63)46. Summary Record, 28 August 1963, NA, C-R(63)47. Finletter to DoS, 18 September 1963, Declassiﬁed Documents, 1998, no. 489240; Tyler to Rusk, 20 September 1963, USNA, RG 59, EUR/RPM: RPA 1957–66, Box 12. Van Hollen, 1 October 1963, “Stikker’s 4th Visit to Washington,” USNA, RG 59, EUR/RPM: Records relating to NATO, Box 4. Summary Record, 16 December 1963, NA, C-R(63)74. Van Hollen, “East West issues,” 20 January 1964, USNA, RG 59, EUR/RPM: RPA 1957–66, Box 4. MemCon between Rusk and Schröder, 20 September 1963, Akten zur auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD), 1963 (2), p. 349. Rostow to Harriman, 30 July 1963, JFKL, NSF, Box 376.

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109 Rostow to Rusk, 8 August 1963, USNA, RG 59, Records of S/PC 1963–64, Box 256. 110 Memorandum, 1 November 1963, “The President’s Meeting with Erhard,” USNA, RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Council, 1963–64, Box 252. 111 Rusk to DoS, 16 December 1963, RG 59, CDF 1963, Box 4230, NATO 3: Meetings FR (PA). 112 MemCon between Zinchuk and Manning, 20 December 1963, USNA, RG 59, CDF 1963, Box 3696. Final Communiqué, 17 December 1963, www.nato.int/docu/ commu/49–95/c631216a.htm. 113 New York Times (17 December 1963), p. 3. 114 Pascal Morf, “Building Bridges: Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik unter Lyndon B. Johnson zwischen Allianzpolitik und Détente, 1964–66,” (M.A. thesis, University of Zurich, 2001). A more positive view on Johnson’s early efforts to continue Kennedy’s détente policy is presented in Thomas A. Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 17–26. According to Taubman, however, Khrushchev was not willing to take risks with Johnson. Taubman, Khrushchev, pp. 604–5. 115 See Andreas Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity: NATO’s Transformation and the Multilateralization of Détente, 1966–1968,” Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 1 (2004), pp. 22–74; Frédéric Bozo, “Détente versus Alliance: France, the United States, and the Politics of the Harmel Report (1964–68),” Contemporary European History 7, no. 3 (1998), pp. 343–60.

6

Through the looking glass The Berlin crisis and Franco-American perceptions of NATO, 1961–63 Erin Mahan1

Introduction The administration of US President John F. Kennedy often felt like it was in the Lewis Caroll novel Alice in Wonderland when it dealt with challenges posed by French President Charles de Gaulle. The Kennedy administration viewed Gaullism as an irrational cult of national vanity based on the charisma of the French general. In one colorful assessment, the president’s special assistant, Arthur Schlesinger Jr, passed along a characterization provided by Pierre Mendès-France, a former French prime minister, that suggested there was “a strain of madness in de Gaulle. He once said to me ‘I have two brothers. One is crazy, and we had him put away. The other is normal. I am in between.’”2 The Berlin crisis of the early 1960s, in particular, was the issue that thwarted US policies toward Western Europe and the looking glass that distorted Franco-American perceptions about NATO policy and challenges beyond deterrence.3 During the early 1960s, Franco-American relations were riddled with controversies. Should Great Britain enter the Common Market? How should the Western powers deal with balance-of-payments problems? What was the most effective NATO strategy for countering the Soviet threat to Berlin before and after the building of the Wall? What mechanism would satisfy West European insistence on independent nuclear capabilities? Alliance issues during the early 1960s cannot be studied in isolation from one another. Three primary problems – Berlin, European integration, and international ﬁnance – were linked in the minds of the Western leaders. The relationships between the issues accentuated Franco-American differences and foreclosed cooperation. Most previous analyses of Kennedy and de Gaulle’s disagreement over West European policies have relied almost solely on US documents, which has left out a key dynamic.4 After all, many diplomatic historians have long recognized that understanding the superpower crises and other international developments during the Cold War requires an examination of the policies of their allies. Monetary issues became entangled with NATO strategy; Britain’s European Economic Community (EEC) candidacy became enmeshed with nuclear sharing; and the ongoing Berlin crisis served as a backdrop to all of those policies. In

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short, Franco-American differences during this period resulted from related questions of international economics, defense strategy, and power politics.

NATO military strategy and nuclear weapons Beginning in November 1958, NATO faced an acute crisis from the East, when the Soviets used the threat of signing a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to force the Western powers out of West Berlin. Initially, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev set a six-month ultimatum to reach an agreement with the West and then let his ultimatum pass in 1959, when the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to give up the US position in Hitler’s former capital. On 13 August 1961, in the stealth of the early morning hours, East German engineer battalions, under Soviet supervision, erected barriers that eventually became the Berlin Wall. Kennedy, who likely anticipated some Soviet move to seal the Eastern border, felt a mixture of shock and relief. Many administration ofﬁcials expected Soviet initiatives to come after the signing of a peace treaty with East Germany, not before.5 Kennedy was eager to cement the status quo in Central Europe and insisted privately to his aides, “Why would Khrushchev put up a wall if he really intended to seize West Berlin? This is his way out of his predicament. It’s not a very nice solution, but a wall is a hell of a lot better than war.”6 The Kennedy administration had no strategy to destroy the raw and ugly barrier in Berlin. The president vaguely hoped that over time world opinion might force the Soviets to tear down the barrier.7 For his part, de Gaulle did not advocate destroying the Wall. He publicly supported Washington but privately scorned Kennedy’s symbolic dispatch of 1,200 troops down the autobahn under the command of Brigadier General Lucius D. Clay, hero of the Berlin Blockade of 1947–48. De Gaulle believed it was an unnecessary provocation, even though Kennedy sent the troops to test whether Khrushchev would cut off Western access to Berlin. “The Americans think differently,” de Gaulle exclaimed bitterly, “because their interests are not those of Europe.”8 For the Kennedy administration, the ensuing Berlin crisis catapulted NATO strategy ahead of other European concerns, including plans for expanding the Common Market through Great Britain’s admission. The US president believed that the immediate threat to Berlin required deﬁning NATO’s nuclear posture and preparing NATO for armed combat short of a full-scale nuclear attack. In the event that the Soviets tried to block Western access to Berlin, NATO needed sufﬁcient conventional ground forces and arms with air and sea lift to counter a Soviet conventional arms threat.9 The ongoing crisis also led to increased US demands on France and the other major West European allies for conventional military capabilities on the Continent. President Kennedy, who had campaigned on a platform of personal sacriﬁce, extended his clarion call for burden-sharing beyond the nation’s borders to ask not what the United States could do for Western Europe but what Western

Through the looking glass 91 Europe could do for the United States in its common ﬁght against international communism.10 De Gaulle resented US calls for a conventional weapons buildup. In a private memorandum circulated among his advisers, he fumed that a war over Berlin would rapidly turn French territory into a bloody battleﬁeld: “America can lose the battle of Europe,” he noted with bitterness, “without disappearing.”11 French generals and civilian ofﬁcials at the ministry of defense shared their president’s sentiments. They believed that conventional weapons lacked both political and strategic credibility as a deterrent. They reasoned that the Kremlin knew that the United States would never escalate a conventional war to a nuclear one unless the Soviets struck ﬁrst.12 The Berlin crisis had decisive effects on French military policy. Unbeknown to Washington, de Gaulle began formulating plans that culminated in the withdrawal of French forces from NATO in 1966. As long as a direct threat loomed over Berlin, the French government would allow US forces to remain and use French territory for logistical purposes. Beyond that point, de Gaulle insisted that French territory would not be at US disposal unless the Atlantic alliance was revised along several lines. For example, he wanted all US forces and logistical support units within France to be under the authority and control of his government. As it stood in the early 1960s, NATO’s supreme commanders were a US general and a US admiral. In the future, de Gaulle envisioned that strategic agreements currently falling under NATO purview would have to be worked out between Washington and Paris. In effect, he planned to reject the NATO framework and revert to bilateral arrangements. He also left open for further consideration whether he would allow the storage of atomic weapons in France for use by US squadrons in the event of a ﬂare-up in Central Europe.13 Perceived American unilateralism concerning Berlin also strengthened de Gaulle’s determination to develop an independent nuclear capability. He declared unequivocally that under no circumstances would France put its nuclear weapons at the disposal of NATO. Although the French president recognized that Washington, London, and Paris needed to coordinate nuclear strategy, he continued to insist on a tripartite body independent of NATO to coordinate Western strategy.14 De Gaulle conceived of foreign policy in terms of réalités and “trucs,” the latter term a pejorative for amorphous “things.” For Gaullists, NATO was also a partial réalité and a partial truc. It was a temporary annoyance, necessary only while de Gaulle maneuvered to implement his grand dessein of placing France at the helm of an independent Europe. He scorned the other Continental nations that accepted a permanent US military protectorate. For de Gaulle, NATO was simply a means for the United States to maintain dominance. He continued to call for a “tripartite directory” between Great Britain, the United States, and France to handle NATO as well as global issues. Yet he never sufﬁciently clariﬁed whether tripartism would eliminate his dissatisfaction with NATO.15 Attempts by the United States to accommodate and circumvent French nationalist aspirations were difﬁcult because the French president frequently conﬂated

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his aims and tactics. At times, de Gaulle posited demands for tripartism as a means of reorganizing NATO in order to achieve French participation in nuclear targeting and strategy. On other occasions, tripartism was an end in itself because it conferred great-power status.16 Similarly, French possession of a nuclear arsenal constituted both a role and a capability. De Gaulle strove to ensure France’s security and inﬂuence in world affairs primarily through the development of an independent nuclear capability. Yet in the same way that he insisted upon tripartism, de Gaulle often framed his pursuit of a force de frappe in symbolic terms as the keystone to his foreign policy. His detractors felt that he simply believed the syllogism that “great nations have nuclear weapons; France is a great nation. Therefore, France must have nuclear weapons.”17 In other respects, de Gaulle valued a nuclear arsenal as a means to an end. It would provide political and diplomatic leverage as a force de persuasion. At the same time, he considered a nuclear arsenal strategically indispensable as a force de dissuasion. He believed that command of a nuclear arsenal would permit France to defend itself without the humiliation of stationing US troops on French soil. In short, it would allow strategic independence between the superpowers. 18 The value of a French nuclear arsenal for de Gaulle’s European policy also conﬂated means and ends. A force de frappe would ensure French supremacy on the Continent. In solidifying the Franco-German rapprochement, it would mark France as the dominant partner while supposedly satisfying West German nuclear ambitions by offering it protection.19 The Berlin Wall was not built overnight or even over several months. As construction went on and East Germans attempted to escape, Berlin continued to be a dangerous place throughout the early 1960s. The tactical differences that arose between France and the United States over how best to shape a credible deterrent to the Soviets had a divisive impact on relations between the two allies and far-reaching implications for the Western alliance as a whole. First, it heightened West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s fear of US abandonment, which facilitated de Gaulle’s strategy of tying West Germany ﬁrmly to France.20 This growing entente thwarted the formulation of a NATO strategic doctrine based on graduated responses ranging from conventional to tactical nuclear and strategic levels. As Kennedy exclaimed in exasperation to French Ambassador Hervé Alphand: This great Franco-German [entente]. We are always subject to very sharp criticism by the Germans for not doing one thing or another . . . but we are doing everything we committed to under NATO and in addition carrying SAC [Strategic Air Command], and in addition the navy, and in addition Southeast Asia . . . Now France isn’t even fulﬁlling its NATO commitment.21 Under NATO policy directives MC 70 and MC 26/4, France was committed to contributing four divisions but produced only two-and-one-third divisions. The

Through the looking glass 93 Kennedy administration also remained frustrated that the West Germans would not pressure de Gaulle to meet the French commitment under the 1962 NATO policy proposals. Even worse, West German Defense Minister Franz Joseph Strauss informed US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara that West Germany could not meet the requirements of an armed force of 750,000 needed to fulﬁll a commitment of 12 divisions under MC 26/4, and it might need to reduce the size of its divisions.22 The Berlin crisis created an insurmountable obstacle to moving declarations of a shift in NATO strategy to ﬂexible response to the implementation of such a doctrine. Kennedy articulated his rationale for ﬂexible response to his predecessor, Eisenhower: When we have this problem of maintaining our position in Berlin, where you may be using sort of gradually escalating force to maintain yourself in Berlin, you can’t suddenly begin to drop nuclear weapons the ﬁrst time you have a difﬁculty . . . and it’s a very valid reason for our emphasizing the necessity of their [the West Europeans] building up conventional forces. You can’t go up the autobahn waving an atom bomb. And say, the ﬁrst time a bridge is blown out in front of you, you can’t begin a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union over getting to Berlin.23 Due in part to French and West German opposition, however, the so-called ﬂexible response remained in the theoretical realm, rather than becoming actual adopted NATO strategy.24

Britain’s EEC bid, burden-sharing, and foreign economic policies From the summer of 1961 until the end of 1962, the Kennedy administration and de Gaulle’s government dealt almost daily with the ongoing crisis over Berlin, but the turmoil in Central Europe was not the only image in a rapidly shifting West European kaleidoscope. The NATO alliance faced challenges beyond deterrence. On 31 July 1961, two weeks before the building of the Berlin Wall began, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan announced that his nation sought membership in the European Economic Community. Although most accounts of the Kennedy administration’s attitude toward West European unity interpret US policies in terms of the double containment of Germany and the Soviet Union, relatively few studies examine in any detail the critical linkage between Britain’s Common Market bid and the ongoing Berlin crisis. Similarly, despite the importance of solidifying the Franco-German rapprochement to de Gaulle’s European policies, few non-French historians have noted the effects of the Berlin crisis on de Gaulle’s attitude toward the EEC.25 Yet during the second half of 1961 and throughout 1962, the economic disagreements between the United States and the major West European nations unfolded against the backdrop of the crisis in Central Europe. The Berlin crisis

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inﬂuenced the major Western leaders’ position toward Britain’s Common Market bid in conﬂicting ways. For example, angered by what he regarded as Macmillan’s timidity and Kennedy’s sloppy diplomacy during the building of the Wall, de Gaulle was determined to minimize Britain’s opportunities for politically inﬂuencing West Germany.26 At a time when de Gaulle was exerting pressure on Adenauer to oppose negotiations with the Soviets over Berlin, Macmillan hoped Britain’s entrance into the EEC could offset French inﬂuence on West Germany. Macmillan was not seeking to neutralize West Germany through negotiations with the Soviets, as Adenauer feared, but the prime minister insisted that diplomacy was the only possible way to resolve the Berlin question peacefully.27 Adenauer held a Bismarckian view of alliances as constructive entities and had long supported a uniﬁed Western Europe. Yet he was greatly disturbed by Macmillan’s apparent willingness to “sell out” West Germany for peace with the Soviet Union in Central Europe. He was also increasingly disturbed by Kennedy’s calls to revise nuclear strategy for NATO by an increased reliance on conventional military capabilities. The chancellor was willing to entertain de Gaulle’s conception of a “little Europe,” which excluded Britain, if the general were to maintain a hard-line stance against negotiating with the Soviets over Berlin.28 The Kennedy administration deemed a uniﬁed Atlantic alliance, which Britain’s accession to the EEC would signal, as necessary to avoid war with the Soviet Union in Central Europe. Many Department of State ofﬁcials, however, held oversimpliﬁed assumptions about the virtues and importance of Western unity amid the Berlin crisis. The Department of State Policy Planning Staff (PPS) and the European desk argued that the United States should show that it was not merely reacting to a series of Soviet-incited crises, especially over Berlin, but that it had a vision for the “Free World.” They particularly wanted to convince Adenauer that the Kennedy administration shared his conception of what the Department of State’s Bureau of European Affairs described as a “grand design” – a uniﬁed Western Europe tightly bound economically and militarily to the United States to form an increasingly cohesive Atlantic community. They believed that the West German chancellor would then “have more conﬁdence in [the US] Berlin strategy, since he would appreciate that it was being formulated in the same broad framework as his own.”29 Given his personal preoccupation with the Berlin crisis, Kennedy left longterm foreign economic planning to the Department of State. The Policy Planning Staff and European Bureau revised a cooperative framework, called the Atlantic Community, which rested on the imperative of the West’s surpassing the communist bloc in economic efﬁciency. They decided that the United States should concentrate on exposing the deceptive aspects of communism by comparing them to the “practicality of [Western] policies and programs.”30 What emerged to guide the Kennedy administration’s policies toward Western Europe was a “pragmatic” ideology – a rhetorical banner of community supported by the president’s faith in the efﬁcacy of economic growth and propelled by a commit-

Through the looking glass 95 ment to an open system of multilateral world trade and the democratic-capitalist system.31 By the time the Soviets began building the Berlin Wall, mistrust had infected the Atlantic alliance, and the major Western powers ascribed the darkest motives to each other. French ofﬁcials suspected that US calls for “burden sharing” were a way to coerce the West European allies into ﬁnancing US policies and offset the growing US balance-of-payments deﬁcit. De Gaulle returned to power to extract France from the Algerian war, which had been draining French coffers since 1954. The effects of the Algerian war – one of the bloodiest wars of postWorld War II decolonization – on the French national psyche have been described as analogous to the Vietnam syndrome on the United States. The effects of the war on the French political economy were more measurable. De Gaulle’s insistence on a common agricultural policy for the Common Market, for example, stemmed from domestic economic problems exacerbated by the necessity of decolonization. As the Algerian war came to a close, de Gaulle expected an inﬂux of French Algerians, who would establish large commercial farms and require export markets for their commodities. Farmers were an important Gaullist constituency that could not be ignored, especially as riots created political turbulence. For de Gaulle to implement continued subsidies would have created a hemorrhaging French balance-of-payments deﬁcit. As he explained on one occasion during a cabinet meeting, “if agriculture is not resolved, we will have another Algeria on our own soil.”32 In other words, French national economic interests were grounded in both structural macroeconomics and in the political economy of France. Despite the costly Algerian war, during the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the United States began experiencing balance-of-payment difﬁculties, France was enjoying an economic miracle of ﬁnancial stability, industrial progress, and an annual growth rate of 4.5 percent. The Fourth Republic had already laid the groundwork for the upward surge in the economy when de Gaulle came to power, but prosperity had often been marred by monetary crisis.33 De Gaulle realized that military power required economic strength. He sought a monetary force de frappe in the form of increased gold reserves. His trusted economic adviser, Jacques Rueff, urged the conversion of France’s dollar reserves into gold as an indication of displeasure with US abuses of the reservecurrency system, which accelerated French inﬂation. Under the Bretton Woods agreement, foreign central banks were permitted to convert inﬂows of dollars into gold. The practice of “hoarding” gold aggravated the US payments deﬁcit by draining reserves from its economy. Yet French ofﬁcials legitimately worried that the United States would devalue the dollar and make those surplus dollars worth much less, unless they were converted to gold.34 Rueff had little patience for US complaints about bearing the burden of Cold War security commitments. Before the Rueff plan in December 1958, many French politicians blamed the weakness of the French franc on the draining wars in Algeria and Indochina. Even though the fardeau algérien continued, the French franc became one of the world’s strongest currencies, after the Bank of

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France stopped increasing its domestic money supply. Rueff argued that US foreign economic and military aid programs were a small proportion of the gross national product, hardly an intolerable burden. A practitioner of strict ﬁscal and monetary orthodoxy, he believed that a sharp increase in the discount rate would eliminate the US deﬁcit overnight, as the French Government did in 1958.35 De Gaulle realized that France needed to diminish its dependence on agriculture and develop its industries, for social as well as economic reasons. He insisted that the EEC must include a common agricultural policy, which would establish prices for trading key commodities throughout the EEC, prevent cheaper imports from entering the Common Market, and regulate prices among the EEC members. Until a common agricultural policy was adopted, de Gaulle understood that France needed to export its agricultural surplus to other European nations, particularly to West Germany. He sought bilateral accords that would ensure a preference for French agricultural products. He was reluctant to agree to multilateral trade liberalization agreements under the General Agreement Trade and Tariffs (GATT), which the United States favored. In short, Franco-American economic disagreements during this period cannot be separated from a quadrilateral saga that also included West Germany and Great Britain. 36

The Cuba and Berlin crises During the early 1960s, intermittent Cold War crises forced the Atlantic alliance to focus on challenges of deterrence. Although the details of the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 have been told countless times, relations between the United States and France ﬁgure minimally in most accounts. Most scholars view de Gaulle’s reaction as a derivative of a classic balance-of-power axiom about alliances, where during times of crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union, France was a ﬁrm ally, while in times of decreased superpower tension, France sought independence from US dominance. Other historians regard de Gaulle’s irritation over a lack of tripartite consultation as a standard reﬂex. The problem with both conclusions is that scholars mistakenly dismiss de Gaulle’s foreign policy demands as “sound and fury” about being informed rather than consulted. By dwelling on France’s exclusion from the process of Western nuclear decision making, scholars have perpetuated the myth of tripartism and neglected de Gaulle’s substantive concerns.37 While US interaction with France is not central to the unfolding of the 13-day missile drama, cursory depictions of de Gaulle and the other Western allies ﬁrst as anxious bystanders, and then as resentful obstructionists, overlook important elements of the crisis and its aftermath. The United States never viewed the Cuban missile ordeal as a conﬂict between the United States and the Soviet Union or as exclusively restricted to a showdown in the Caribbean. For the United States, the Cuban missile crisis was more accurately viewed as a twin Cuba–Berlin crisis. Many in the West believed that Khrushchev’s motives for installing nuclear missiles in Cuba were set against the backdrop of the perennial

Through the looking glass 97 Berlin question. As Marc Trachtenberg describes it, a “mutual hostage situation” had developed between Cuba and Berlin.38 Recently published transcripts of Kennedy’s presidential recordings from this period reveal the extent to which a linkage between the Cuban missile crisis and a renewed crisis over Berlin was certainly the expectation created in Washington. Whether the Soviets intended a linkage is unclear. An authoritative account of Khrushchev’s motives and actions prior to and during the Cuban missile crisis, which draws on documents from the former Soviet Union, refutes any direct connection between Khrushchev’s attempt to place missiles in Cuba and his attempt to cut off Western access to Berlin, but Soviet materials related to Berlin are limited. Nevertheless, the constant consideration of how events in the Caribbean could affect Berlin, as well as the reverse, ﬁgured prominently in Washington’s evaluation of its response options.39 Inﬂuenced by US reports and actions, the French Government and other major West European allies were forced to view the tense days of October 1962 as a parallel crisis, when in fact they were not. If the building of the Berlin Wall had de Gaulle worried about Kennedy’s reckless crisis management and had highlighted Franco-American strategic differences, the Cuban missile crisis reinforced those differences. The 13 days in October 1962 catalyzed a series of French calculations that culminated in de Gaulle’s double non of participation in the NATO nuclear multilateral force (MLF) and Britain’s EEC candidacy, as well as his signing of the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship in January 1963. According to the standard interpretation, the French president shocked Kennedy with an unexpected veto, which ended the Anglo-Saxon “grand design” for an economically and militarily integrated Western Europe.40 This standard account of de Gaulle’s actions and Kennedy’s reaction, however, is too simple and is not supported by documentary evidence. The French president’s veto of Britain’s EEC candidacy and his rejection of the US offer of Polaris missiles was not the abrupt shock that Kennedy advisers later maintained that it had been. At least two days before the double non, the Kennedy administration received reports that “de Gaulle, at a press conference on Monday, will reject the Nassau offer.”41 Moreover, de Gaulle’s double non, by itself, did not overly disturb the US president. Kennedy’s national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, reminded him that “the British entry into the Common Market, while important and desirable, has never been the ﬁrst object of our policy in Europe, nor even a matter in which we could expect to have decisive inﬂuence.” Bundy pointed out that “the speciﬁc defense of Berlin and the general defense of NATO” had been, and remained, the primary US objectives.42 The conventional view of de Gaulle’s double non as the climax of a “grand design” drama also misrepresents US priorities with regard to Europe. Although Kennedy’s advisers agreed that the Soviet threat to Berlin had subsided, they worried about the effects of de Gaulle’s decisions on NATO and on wider Cold War European settlement. Historically, the United States regarded European integration as a vehicle for the double containment of Germany and the Soviet Union. The Franco-German Treaty of Friendship potentially disrupted that

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strategy. US policy makers questioned whether Adenauer intended to follow de Gaulle’s lead in altering the integrated command structure of NATO. They also worried about possible policies that a Franco-German bloc might pursue toward the Soviet Union. Although Adenauer never planned or spoke of the substitution of a Franco-German entente for US protection under NATO, the Kennedy administration misread the treaty as a Faustian bargain. Many of Kennedy’s advisers spent the president’s last year in ofﬁce grappling with the tension between securing West German allegiance to the US conception of NATO strategy and pursuing a settlement with the Soviet Union that stabilized Central Europe. Those goals were not inherently incompatible. Yet during 1963, Kennedy increasingly articulated either/or dichotomies by declaring, for example, that “unless we make clear our opposition to the Franco-German treaty, we would not be able to make clear to the Germans that they faced a choice between working with the French or working with us.”43 As the goals of double containment became enmeshed in the multilateral relationships of the Atlantic alliance, US strategies for containing Germany and the Soviet Union no longer worked in tandem.

Détente Despite de Gaulle’s rhetoric of a Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, the French president opposed a Continental and global détente during Kennedy’s presidency. At a cabinet meeting in February 1963, de Gaulle exclaimed in exasperation that Americans accused him of seeking a separate European settlement when “ce sont les Américains qui sont neutralistes!”44 The de Gaulle of the early 1960s was quite different from the one of 1966, remembered as the ﬁrst Western head of state to visit Moscow during the Cold War. The contrast deserves note, because it demonstrates divergent Franco-American views about the Cold War strategy of double containment. For de Gaulle during the early 1960s, curbing and co-opting German power was a prerequisite to containing the Soviet Union and was only possible by meeting Bonn’s demands visà-vis Moscow. Because Adenauer opposed any form of Ostpolitik, whether normalizing Soviet-German trade, recognizing East Germany and the postWorld War II borders, or accepting the status quo in Central Europe, a European settlement was out of the question from de Gaulle’s perspective. After all, the general’s strategy for French dominance in Europe was predicated on a “partnership,” albeit unequal, with West Germany in a subordinate role. De Gaulle’s leverage with Adenauer depended on opposition to any form of Ostpolitik, and as Adenauer lamented on more than one occasion, “we are the victims of American détente policy.”45 Whereas de Gaulle viewed the containment of Germany and the Soviet Union as separate but reinforcing goals, Kennedy fused the strategies into a genuinely “double” policy. In other words, for the Kennedy administration it was less a matter of ﬁrst tying the Federal Republic of Germany to the West and then containing the Soviet Union. Instead, the Kennedy administration’s twin strategy of

Through the looking glass 99 containment required a ﬁne calibration, so that the United States could avoid having to assign priority to one or the other. Kennedy failed to provide that deft management. Because the German question was the principal Cold War issue in Europe, the US president regarded West Germany less as an actor and more as the object upon which to act. Kennedy and many of his key advisers regarded a lessening of tensions with the Soviet Union as a way to settle the problem of Berlin and to “normalize” the German question. As a consequence of FrancoAmerican differences during 1963, however, the limits of a détente in Europe, like US policies toward the Continent in general, reﬂected the role played by Gaullist ofﬁcials, who aptly described themselves using the analogy of the Lilliputians who thwarted the ﬁctitious giant Gulliver.46 The question of détente in Europe within the broader context of relaxing Cold War tensions illustrates the importance of middle powers in determining East–West relations during the early 1960s. Kennedy faced continual pressures from France and West Germany that shaped his responses to the Soviet Union, drove a wedge in détente initiatives, and ultimately precluded a European settlement. Throughout 1963, détente remained a nebulous phenomenon infused with superpower mistrust and complicated by allied resistance. East–West dialogue did not alleviate mutual suspicions. The test ban treaty, which was partial, not comprehensive, reﬂected that mutual mistrust. An expanded Vietnam War loomed, and East–West proxy wars in the Third World – Laos, Yemen, the Congo – obstructed the already dubious progress toward a détente in Europe. Talk of a non-aggression pact gradually faded. European relations stabilized, but no resolution to either the Berlin problem or the more general question of a divided Germany was on the horizon. Although Khrushchev dropped his threat of a separate peace treaty with the GDR, confrontations in Berlin continued. During the late fall of 1963, the Western occupying powers faced a problem with the Soviets and East Germans over access for military convoys. One of Kennedy’s advisers remarked that the “Berlin ﬂare-up illustrates the way in which spats between us continue to rise” and disproved the belief that the Kennedy administration was “speeding down the road toward détente.”47 The octogenarian Adenauer stepped down a month before Kennedy was assassinated. Former West German minister of economics Ludwig Erhard’s accession to the chancellorship placed US–West German relations on a better footing, while simultaneously eliminating de Gaulle’s ability to cast West German policies as a choice between France and the United States. Not until the early 1970s would the former mayor of West Berlin, Willy Brandt, become chancellor and pursue Ostpolitik, which normalized Soviet-German trade, recognized the East German regime and post-World War II borders, and generally stabilized Central Europe. During the last months of 1963, Adenauer remained the leader of the ruling party, the Christian Democratic Union, and West German foreign policy adhered to the ﬁrm policy of non-recognition of East Germany that had prevailed during Adenauer’s long tenure.48 On 21 November 1963, the day before Kennedy’s assassination, in his ﬁrst meeting with the new West German Chancellor Erhard, de Gaulle denounced

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the possibility of a détente with Soviets, principally over concern about Berlin and future German reuniﬁcation. In his view, the US “strategy of peace,” as the French president derisively called détente, jeopardized both issues.49 De Gaulle, of course, was in no hurry to see Germany reuniﬁed. Only a few months before, when British ofﬁcials had asked him whether his initiatives toward West Germany suggested that he favored reuniﬁcation, he scoffed, “the Germans will always be Germans,” meaning that they could never be trusted.50 Yet reassuring the West German leaders of French commitment to West Germany’s protection was critical to his larger strategy of institutionalizing a rapprochement, which would provide him with levers of inﬂuence through bilateral consultation and the coordination of policies. The French president’s efforts to sign a treaty with West Germany and his resistance to Ostpolitik reﬂected his fears of a post-Adenauer government.51 During the early 1960s, the limits of détente underscored French and American distinctions between appropriate means and ends for Western policies toward the Soviet Union. Invoked cautiously by Kennedy and disapprovingly by de Gaulle, détente reﬂected divergent containment aims and differing tactics. For the French president, détente was an objective, not a tactic. The ongoing Berlin crisis, which ebbed and ﬂowed, compelled him to see initiatives, such as a non-aggression pact, as merely a change in Soviet tactics to force the Western nations from Berlin or as a fraudulent means to an unacceptable end. Once the Soviets stopped trying to end Western rights in Berlin and in other regions, de Gaulle was willing to accept a détente with the Soviets. Relaxed international tensions, in his view, could then create an atmosphere conducive to resolving East–West conﬂicts.52 The general’s position, however, revealed a measure of inconsistency that inhered in the French security dilemma over Europe. How did de Gaulle expect a French-led European third force to mediate between the superpowers when he did not want any negotiations with the Kremlin? How did he expect to bring about détente before solving the German question? De Gaulle never resolved these questions during the early 1960s. In essence, the French government accepted a de facto détente over Central Europe but rejected the global nuclear status quo. Determined to develop an independent nuclear capability, de Gaulle was unwilling to accept purportedly peaceful measures such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), which preserved the US–Soviet nuclear condominium. Preferring to perpetuate a divided Germany, de Gaulle was unwilling to negotiate with the Soviets. The Kremlin’s threat to Berlin provided him with a justiﬁcation for siding with Adenauer and rejecting Ostpolitik. Kennedy’s conception of détente was equally confusing. Viewing relaxed Cold War tensions as a form of double containment of the Soviet Union and Germany, the president postulated a strategy that could not be sustained, given the shift in the alliance toward a stronger Franco-German voice. A British conﬁdant, Ambassador W. David Ormsby-Gore, described President Kennedy’s general philosophy toward détente: “It would be easier to ﬁnd areas of agreement when you ﬁrst of all improved the atmosphere. It was very hard to reach

Through the looking glass 101 agreements when the atmosphere of distrust was so intense.”53 Distrust, however, permeated both the Atlantic alliance and East–West relations. Kennedy believed that if the West probed the Soviets for arrangements over Berlin and the security of Central Europe, then the allies could create an atmosphere for resolving Cold War disputes. Yet it was those very contentious issues, Berlin and the overall German question, which polarized the Western alliance and generated perpetual East–West enmity.

Conclusion In sum, Franco-American disagreements over the timing and nature of a détente in Europe accentuated the allies’ competing strategies for ensuring Western dominance. In questions of détente, as with most alliance issues, Kennedy and de Gaulle worked at cross-purposes. Although Kennedy’s youthful arrogance and de Gaulle’s established hubris came to stereotype Franco-American relations, both presidents were mindful of the structural economic and strategic constraints deﬁning their policies for Western Europe. They clung to the logic inherent in their contrasting strategies for Western Europe, but more often spoke of the burdens of the alliance. While the United States strove to mold the Western alliance to its vision of global preeminence, France pursued dominance within Europe as a prelude to expanded international aspirations. Yet these competing geostrategies were constrained by East–West crises. The Berlin and Cuba crises made the perils of the nuclear era a frightening reality. The exigencies of the nuclear age trapped Kennedy in a crisis mentality and encouraged France and West Germany to aspire to atomic capability. US uncertainty about the implications of the strengthening FrancoGerman rapprochement fed Kennedy’s ambivalence about many policies toward Western Europe, especially in defense matters. His administration sought to reconcile the tension between German security anxieties, exacerbated by the Berlin and Cuba crises, and de Gaulle’s resistance to overt US inﬂuence in Western Europe. Rather than confronting a simple choice between the two allies, the Kennedy administration worried that alienating either France or West Germany would cause one vexed power to conspire with the other against the United States. Kennedy and de Gaulle so linked economic and security policies that they became difﬁcult to separate. The French president ﬂirted with swapping nuclear assistance to Britain with consent to the latter’s entrance into the Common Market. Kennedy contemplated providing nuclear aid to France in return for de Gaulle’s vote to allow Britain into the EEC and for his compliance with the present NATO command structure. De Gaulle fed Adenauer’s suspicions that Macmillan’s desire for détente with the Soviets was reason to keep Britain out of the Common Market. Kennedy continued to see the burgeoning US payments deﬁcit that was carrying the bulk of Western Europe’s defense as an unfair burden. And despite economic disadvantages posed by Britain’s entrance, Kennedy supported West European integration primarily for the geopolitical

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reason of creating an EEC that served as a bulwark of Western unity against Soviet penetration. At times, the Western leaders established false linkages among policies that should have been treated independently. Kennedy’s personal attention was devoted more to security issues concerning Western Europe. As a result, his interest in economic problems related to the Continent was greatest when these impacted on security issues. Kennedy, for example, worried incessantly that the US payments deﬁcit was leverage that France and West Germany could use to force changes in US defense policies in Europe. In fact, Kennedy’s advisers would have been wise to discern where de Gaulle was exploiting US vulnerabilities and where French economic complaints were legitimate. Instead, quarrels over balance-of-payments arrangements evolved into opposing views about responsibilities for Cold War security commitments in Europe and globally. Similarly, both Kennedy and de Gaulle would have been prudent to separate the issue of nuclear sharing from Britain’s entrance into the Common Market. Instead, Kennedy provoked de Gaulle by using a carrot-and-stick approach with the offer of nuclear aid, and de Gaulle politicized already contentious economic issues. In short, the tendency to establish linkages between economic and security policies transformed many Franco-American disputes over individual issues into more severe multilateral disagreements. The ongoing Berlin crisis of the 1960s brought into stark relief the challenges of deterrence for the Atlantic alliance. At the same time, the turmoil in Central Europe distorted Franco-American perceptions about the most effective NATO strategies for the Continent, as well as about Western policies for challenges beyond deterrence. To understand the real nature of Franco-American relations during the period 1961–63, one must understand the inability of the Kennedy administration to forge a coherent policy on the basis of the president’s blurred ideas about security and European integration, his tendency toward economic simplicity, and his overriding Cold War fears. De Gaulle, on the other hand, did not suffer from these inconsistencies. With less power, but more skill, de Gaulle battled Kennedy to a standstill.

Notes 1 The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reﬂect the views of the US Department of State. 2 Memorandum from Schlesinger to Kennedy, 8 May 1961, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, (JFKL), National Security Files (NSF), Countries, Box 70, France. 3 There are numerous works that touch on Franco-American differences during the Berlin crisis, but these typically examine the Berlin crisis only brieﬂy on the continuum of post-World War II Berlin crises. See, for example, Ann Tusa, The Last Division: A History of Berlin (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 225–353. See, also, Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). Other studies either depict the Berlin crisis of the early 1960s as a brief interruption to Kennedy’s and de Gaulle’s conﬂicting grand designs without examining the adverse effects of the crisis on overall US policy toward Europe, or they analyze allied handling of Berlin as a

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case study of Kennedy’s crisis diplomacy. See Frank Costigliola, “The Pursuit of Atlantic Community: Nuclear Arms, Dollars, and Berlin,” in Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963, ed. Thomas Paterson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 24–56; Thomas Schwartz, “Victories and Defeats in the Long Twilight Struggle: The United States and Western Europe in the 1960s,” in The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade, ed. Diane Kunz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 115–33. A few French historians assert the general importance of the Berlin crisis to different aspects of de Gaulle’s European design but do not provide a comprehensive description or analysis. See Pierre Maillard, De Gaulle et les allemands (Paris: Guibert, 1990), pp. 200–1; Cyril Buffet, “La politique nucléaire de la France et la seconde crise de Berlin, 1958–1962,” Relations internationales 59 (Fall 1989), pp. 350–8; Frédéric Bozo, Deux stratégies pour l’Europe: De Gaulle, les États-Unis et l’alliance atlantique, 1958–1969 (Paris: Plon, 1996), pp. 77–82. The best account is in Maurice Vaïsse, La grandeur: Politique étrangère du Général de Gaulle, 1958–1969 (Paris: Fayard, 1998). For signiﬁcant exceptions, all by French historians, see Bozo, Deux stratégies. See also Vaïsse, La grandeur. See, for example, Memorandum by Walter Heller, 2 August 1961, “A Non-economic Report from Germany,” President’s Ofﬁce Files (POF), part V, reel 8: 899; Martin Hillenbrand, Director of Berlin Task Force, telephone interview with the author, 19 September 1997. Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–63 (New York: Edward Burlingame Books, 1991), p. 278. Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 289. Hervé Alphand, L’Étonnement d’être: Journal, 1939–1973 (Paris: Fayard, 1977), p. 364. Oral History Interview with Martin Hillenbrand, JFKL, p. 37; John S. Dufﬁeld, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Forces Posture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 154, 158. Kennedy proclaimed in his inaugural address: “Ask not what your country can do for you. Ask what you can do for your country.” Kennedy’s address was a declaration that the United States would “bear any burden” to protect liberty from communist challenges around the globe. Inaugural Address, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1962), pp. 1–3. Note by de Gaulle, 17 July 1961, “L’Europe,” in Charles de Gaulle, Lettres, notes et carnets, 1958–1960 (Paris: Plon, 1986), pp. 107–8. Inspection général de l’Armée de terre, July 1961, “Les formes de la guerre et de l’armée future,” French Ministry of Defense, Cabinet du ministre de la défense, Service historique de l’Armee de terre, Paris (SHAT), Politique de défense, Box 1R58, 2, no. 412. Notes by de Gaulle, 18 September 1961; 4 October 1961; 26 October 1961, all in Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, Paris (FNSP), Archives de Couve de Murville, vol. II, CM7; Oral History Interview with General George Buis, Institut Charles de Gaulle, Paris (ICG), Archives orales. The scholarly literature on de Gaulle’s management of the Berlin crisis and its effects on his overall European strategy is limited. For exceptions that were published before the opening of French documents on the crisis, see Buffet, “La politique nucléaire de la France,” pp. 347–58; Bernard Ledwidge, “La crise de Berlin 1958–1961: Stratégie et tactique du Général de Gaulle,” in ICG, De Gaulle en son siècle, vol. 4, La securité et l’indépendance de la France (Paris: Plon, 1992), pp. 366–80. For one example published after French documentation opened but which speaks in generalities, see Bozo, Deux stratégies. Note by de Gaulle, 14 August 1961; de Gaulle, “L’annotation manuscrite sur le télégramme-circulaire no. 218,” 30 November 1961, both in FNSP, Papiers de Couve de

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25

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Murville, vol. II, CM7. Most of the literature on the force de frappe neglects the decisive effects of the Berlin crisis. For the best studies of the French nuclear program, see Raymond Tourrain, De la défense de la France à la défense de l’Europe (Besançon: CRIPES, 1987); Marcel Duval et Yves le Baut, L’arme nucléaire française: Pourquoi et comment? (Paris: S.P.M., 1992); ICG, L’aventure de la bombe: De Gaulle et la dissuasion nucléaire, 1958–1969 (Paris: Plon, 1985). For de Gaulle’s evolving views on NATO, see, for example, Vaïsse, La grandeur, pp. 111–61. Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), pp. 95–110. Memorandum of Conversation between Spaak and Kennedy, 28 May 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961–63, vol. XIII, p. 582. Oral History Interview with General George Buis, ICG, Archives orales. François Seydoux, Mémoires d’outre-rhin (Paris: B. Grasset, 1975), p. 224. See, generally, Christoph Bluth, “Reconciling the Irreconcilable: Alliance Politics and the Paradox of Extended Deterrence in the 1960s,” Cold War History (January 2001), pp. 77–84; Hans-Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction (Providence: Berghahn, 1997), pp. 605–6. Kennedy talked about his discussion with Alphand of 10 September 1962 in Meeting with Dwight Eisenhower, The Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, Charlottesville (MCPA), The Presidential Recordings: John F. Kennedy; The Great Crises, ed. Philip Zelikow and Ernest May, vol. 2 (New York: Norton, 2002), p. 129, transcribed by the author. Strauss’s visit of 7–8 June 1962 was discussed in a meeting about the Soviet Union on 21 September 1962; see MCPA, The Presidential Recordings: JFK, vol. 2, pp. 216–17, transcribed by the author. Conversation between Kennedy and Eisenhower, 10 September 1962, MCPA, The Presidential Recordings: JFK, vol. 2, p. 129. This analysis is shared by Francis Gavin, “The Myth of ‘Flexible Response,’” The International History Review (December 2001), p. 859. Gavin points out that “Senior U.S. ofﬁcials did not necessarily believe in the strategic, as opposed to the political, logic behind their call for increased conventional capabilities, nor that the United States should enlarge its own conventional forces in Europe.” Representative studies include Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community, 1955–1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); Ernst van der Beugel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1966); Costigliola, “The Pursuit of Atlantic Community;” Thomas Alan Schwartz, “Victories and Defeats in the Long Twilight Struggle: The United States and Western Europe in the 1960s,” in The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade, ed. Diane B. Kunz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 115–48; Geir Lundestad, “Empire” by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 26–7, 58–82; Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance: European–American Relations since 1945 (London: Macmillan, 1980), pp. 199–200; Pierre Maillard, De Gaulle et l’Europe: Entre la nation et Maastricht (Paris: Tallandier, 1995), p. 205. Some scholars mention Berlin as a backdrop to the EEC question but offer no details. See, for example, Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer, p. 521. The scholarship dealing with the relationship between Britain’s bid and the Berlin question is sparse. For two recent works that focus exclusively on the two issues as discrete phenomena, see, for example, John P. S. Gearson, Harold Macmillan and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958–62 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998); Jacqueline Tratt, The Macmillan Government and Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996). Adenauer’s veiled threats are conveyed most vividly in the memoir literature. See, for

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32 33

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example, Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision (New York: G. Weidenfeld, 1989), p. 207; Seydoux, Mémoires d’outre-rhin, pp. 211–12, 222. Memorandum from McGhee to Rusk, 26 October 1961, RG 59, Policy Planning Staff, 1957–1961, Box 139, Germany, August–December 1961. See also “Talking Paper: Discussion of General Issues with Chancellor,” unsigned, 8 November 1961, Bureau of European Affairs, Records of the US Department of State (DoS), RG 59, Records Relating to Berlin, 1957–1963, Box 3, Chancellor Adenauer’s Visit, 20–22 November 1961. “Highlights of Discussion at the Secretary’s Policy Planning Meeting,” 3 November 1961, RG 59, Box 132, Secretary’s Policy Planning Meetings. Kennedy’s faith in a politics of plenty as a way to prevent the rise of socialism or communism was prevalent among post-World War II policy makers. See, generally, Charles Maier, “The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II,” in Between Power and Plenty: The Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), pp. 23–49. Quoted in Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 180. William Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–1954 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), pp. 12–71. See also Richard Kuisel, Capitalism and the State in Modern France: Renovation and Economic Management in the Twentieth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). There have been few detailed studies of de Gaulle’s economic concerns and policies of the early 1960s. Most articles and books detail the French economic miracle of the late 1950s and the Bretton Woods system crisis of the late 1960s. Representative works that offer a good starting point include Alain Prate, Les Batailles économiques du Général de Gaulle (Paris: Plon, 1978); Michael Loriaux, France after Hegemony: International Change and Financial Reform (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). Rueff to Wilfrid Baumgartner, 26 June 1961, FNSP, Papers of Wilfred Baumgartner, Box 3BA34, DR 7. See, generally, “Les problèmes du marché commun,” L’année politique, économique, sociale et diplomatique en France, 1961 (1962), pp. 193–6; Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, pp. 159–237; ICG, De Gaulle en son siècle, vol. 5, L’Europe. See, for example, Frank Costigliola, “Kennedy, the European Allies, and the Failure to Consult,” Political Science Quarterly (Summer 1996), pp. 105–23; Josephine Brain, “Dealing with de Gaulle,” in Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited, ed. Mark J. White (New York: New York University Press, 1998), pp. 173–4; Maurice Vaïsse, “Une hirondelle ne fait pas le printemps: La France et la crise de Cuba,” in L’Europe et la crise de Cuba, ed. Maurice Vaïsse (Paris: Armand Colin, 1993), pp. 89–105. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, p. 399. See, generally, MCPA, The Presidential Recordings: JFK, vol. 3 (New York: Norton, 2001). For an authoritative account of Soviet motives and actions during the Cuban missile crisis, see Alexander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964 (New York: Norton, 1997). For a persuasive analysis, though based on circumstantial evidence about Soviet aims, see Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), pp. 99–109. See, for example, Grosser, The Western Alliance, pp. 206–8; Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), pp. 315–29. Memorandum for the Record, 15 January 1963, “Meetings with President Kennedy of 12 January 1963,” JFKL, NSF, Meeting with President, Box 317, 1/63–2/17/63.

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42 Memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, 30 January 1963, US Army Institute, Carlisle, PA, James M. Gavin papers, Box 21, Letters to President about de Gaulle. Emphasis in the original. 43 Although the present analysis draws different conclusions about the effects of the Atlantic alliance politics on a European settlement in 1963, the framework of interpretive questions was inﬂuenced by Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace (see pp. 379–98). For the quotation by Kennedy, see Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, p. 375. For Adenauer’s commitment to NATO, see Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer, p. 597. 44 Alain Peyreﬁtte, C’était de Gaulle, vol. 1 (Paris: Fayard, 1994), p. 379. 45 The present analysis expands upon the phases and linkages between de Gaulle’s policies toward Germany and French attitudes on Ostpolitik and détente offered in Michael Stürmer, “De Gaulle, l’Allemagne et l’Ostpolitik,” in ICG, De Gaulle en son siècle, vol. 5, pp. 480–9. For the statement by Adenauer, see Schwarz, Adenauer, p. 687. 46 Stanley Hoffman, Gulliver’s Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 171–2, 451–2. 47 The scholarly literature is unclear and somewhat misleading on the establishment of a European settlement in 1963. Trachtenberg, for example, argues that there was a European settlement; see Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 352–402. For the quotation about the Berlin ﬂare-up, see Memorandum from Komer to Bundy, 16 October 1963, JFKL, NSF, Staff memos, Box 322, Komer. On the question of continued East–West tensions in Berlin, see, generally, John C. Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Berlin–Cuba Crisis, 1961–1964 (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1996), pp. 79–90. For Kennedy’s personal preoccupation, see Meeting about Berlin, JFK POF, Presidential Recordings, tape 118/A55/Cassette 1 of 2, transcript by the author. 48 See, for example, Horst Osterheld, Außenpolitik unter Bundeskanzler Ludwig Erhard, 1961–1963: Ein dokumentarischer Bericht aus dem Kanzleramt (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1992), p. 30. 49 Memorandum of Conversation between de Gaulle and Erhard, Afternoon Session, 21 November 1963, République Fédéral Allemande, Europe 1961–1965, 1575, Entretiens entre de Gaulle et Erhard. 50 Record of Lord Avon’s Conversation with de Gaulle, 11 June 1963, UK National Archives, Kew, Foreign Ofﬁce 371/169124. 51 See Michael J. Sodaro, Moscow, Germany, and the West from Khrushchev to Gorbachev (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 43. 52 Charles De Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1971), p. 259; Maurice Couve de Murville, Une politique étrangère, 1958–1969 (Paris: Plon, 1971), pp. 179–81. 53 Oral History Interview with W. David Orsmby-Gore, JFKL, pp. 24–5.

7

A crisis foretold NATO and France, 1963–66 Anna Locher

Introduction Strains and tensions have loomed large throughout the entire history of the Western alliance. One major West–West problématique was the role of France in the alliance, and in particular its gradual dissociation from NATO under President Charles de Gaulle between 1958/59 and 1966. The French “challenge” triggered a continuous debate on the importance of the Western alliance and its prospects. An important dimension of the debate – amounting to a bargaining process on the future of NATO – was a “crisis talk” both within NATO and outside the alliance. In many ways, it anticipated the “real” crisis of 1966 that was triggered by the French withdrawal from the integrated NATO command. Since crises are subject to conﬂicting perceptions, it is essential to consider “by whom, how, and why an event is perceived as a crisis.”1 Communication also played a vital role in NATO’s mid-1960s debate as different interpretations of a situation found their expressions in a continuous negotiation about dominant deﬁnitions of a situation.2 NATO as a consultation forum thus provided an arena for comparing and aligning perceptions and policies vis-à-vis the French challenge. This chapter explores how Western policy makers, government ofﬁcials, and NATO staff assessed French intentions and actions, and what countermeasures they devised. Special attention is given to the dynamics at the NATO Council meetings in ministerial and ambassadorial sessions, which decisively formed the debate on the state of the alliance, and to the position of the NATO secretarygeneral. While the literature devotes much attention to France’s withdrawal from the integrated command structure in 1966, 3 far less attention has been paid to the creeping onset of the crisis in the early 1960s. In fact, an acute transatlantic crisis had been felt in NATO and remedies had been attempted since 1963, and throughout the mid-1960s. France’s NATO policies rooted in de Gaulle’s thinking since World War II, gained practical importance with his return to power in 1958, and radicalized since the 1959 decision to withdraw the French Mediterranean ﬂeet from the NATO command. This chapter focuses on the widespread perception within NATO that from January 1963 on, de Gaulle’s alliance policies revealed a French strategy that would eventually accept or even

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promote the dismantling of NATO. The crisis at issue was not conﬁned to the French problem, yet by focusing on the impact of French policies on the other 14 members’ understanding of NATO, we may determine how intra-bloc dissent was tackled within the NATO forum in view of the option offered by Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty, allowing any member to withdraw from the alliance with a year’s notice after 1969. The ﬁrst two sections of this chapter detail the turning point of January 1963 and its immediate aftermath as seen in NATO. The third and fourth examine allied exposure to French Atlantic policies and the collective search for an answer to de Gaulle in 1963 and 1964. The ﬁnal section analyzes the strategies devised for coping with the French threat to leave the alliance as of late 1964 and 1965.

The January 1963 caesura In an essay in Foreign Affairs of July 1963, Belgian Foreign Minister PaulHenri Spaak referred to what he thought was a conspicuous caesura: It becomes clearer and clearer that January 14, 1963, is fated to go down in history as the “black Monday” of both European policy and Atlantic policy. What occurred that day was something much more signiﬁcant than the mere dooming of negotiations between Great Britain and the European Community. It was, in plain fact, an attack on the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community.4 Indeed, on 14 January 1963, de Gaulle had vetoed British membership in the European Economic Community (EEC), rejected the offer to buy US Polaris missiles, and expressed disinterest in the renewed discussion on a NATO Multilateral Force (MLF). Furthermore, on 21 January, he signed the exclusive French-German Elysée Treaty, providing for consultation on external matters and the development of common military doctrines.5 Much more than a reﬂection of an amazing European recovery and reconciliation, these moves for many implied a dangerous potential, particularly because of their French-German angle. The announced policies were of European as well as NATO-wide relevance and added up to an acute crisis – and an important rift – in transatlantic relations. According to Robert J. Schaetzel, Washington’s deputy assistant secretary of state for Atlantic affairs, de Gaulle had “for the ﬁrst time publicly conﬁrmed his vision of an autarchic Europe.”6 This perceived French notion necessarily collided with dominant US policies on Europe. Washington registered de Gaulle’s moves with great concern, and Kennedy held stocktaking sessions with chief ofﬁcials to discuss measures to tackle the setbacks to the notion of “Atlantic partnership” caused by de Gaulle.7 On 6 February 1963, US Ambassador to NATO Thomas K. Finletter conveyed his concerns about French “pro forma membership” in the alliance to US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. He complained that the French government had

A crisis foretold 109 in recent years withdrawn its Mediterranean Fleet; refused to meet NATO force goals; rejected US nuclear weapons on French soil; and obstructed coordination of allied air defense in France. Also, France had not really taken part in NATO Council deliberations. But most importantly, Finletter recognized in de Gaulle’s January moves a radical step-up of French opposition in the alliance, which could only develop in two ways: it could either amount to an “abrupt and brutal withdrawal of France from NATO and the request that NATO members leave French soil” or in an “increased tempo of sabotaging” which, at a certain moment, would likewise reach “the unbearable point.” Therefore, Finletter urged the US, as the alliance leader, to prepare for such a situation and “to block [de Gaulle] in any effort he will make to break up the NATO Alliance.”8 Indeed, anticipating that de Gaulle “may begin shortly trying to lock us out,” US President John F. Kennedy ordered contingency planning for the case that de Gaulle should seek “a deal with the Russians, break up NATO, and push the U.S. out of Europe.”9 When Bonn’s ambassador to Washington, Heinrich von Knappstein, met Kennedy to deliver Adenauer’s explanatory letter on the Elysée Treaty, he found the US president “in a noticeably bad mood” and concerned about “the inner state of the alliance.” Rusk, although “in a more composed frame of mind,” deplored the French attitude of abstinence towards NATO.10 Besides Washington and its representative to NATO, other alliance insiders also feared the worst. For London, the prospect was somber, even if the Common Market issue was left out of the equation. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan “was very worried about the prospects in NATO – things were very bad. . . . If [de Gaulle] got his way in the Common Market, he would be tempted to move on with further power moves affecting the Alliance.”11 British Lord Privy Seal Edward Heath stated the matter in similarly drastic terms in a telegram to the British EEC negotiation delegation: “General de Gaulle’s fundamental challenge is to the Alliance as a whole.”12 The Dutch, Belgian, Italian, and Luxemburg governments – representing the other four EEC members – showed themselves appalled by de Gaulle’s course of action. Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister and former NATO secretary-general (1957–61), criticized de Gaulle in a most outspoken manner. As he explained in talks with NATO Secretary-General Dirk Stikker, “the current crisis is the most severe since the end of the war.”13 In particular, the small NATO powers opposed the attempt by the French government to impose its will on the others. Neither Belgium, nor the Netherlands, nor Italy had a desire for French leadership, let alone French domination.14 For obvious reasons, this view was not shared in Bonn. The German government was shaken by Washington’s reaction to the friendship treaty and emphasized its conciliatory and European character.15 The NATO Council meeting of 30 January 1963 revealed fears that the European developments might affect NATO. The day before, the Brussels negotiations on British entry in the Common Market had been adjourned sine die after ministers had carried them on in a desperate effort following de Gaulle’s press conference.16 The Belgian doyen of the permanent representatives, Ambassador

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André de Staercke, urged that close attention be paid to the recent events. Comparing the current situation to the serious crisis of 1954, when the project for a European Defense Community had collapsed, he advocated that an in-depth discussion be held in NATO on the implications of the French decision on the Atlantic alliance, a position that other ambassadors shared.17 Interestingly, NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Robin Hooper counseled low-key treatment of the matter.18 Likewise, on 30 January Stikker referred to the crisis in European affairs, but, denying the existence of a crisis in NATO, refused to be drawn into a discussion of implications of the French veto at Brussels. Rather, he asked NATO ambassadors to concentrate on urgent alliance business that demanded their full attention.19 While Stikker deplored French nationalism, he rejected “the rather vindictive position taken by Spaak,” whose reaction “tended to . . . dramatize the situation caused by de Gaulle.” However, when Stikker tried to get in touch with the French government, he did not get a response. “For France, NATO almost does not exist,” he told Spaak. Given his lack of contacts with de Gaulle, Stikker asked the West German government to help in persuading France to do more for NATO.20 Nevertheless, and despite his recent illness, Stikker thought it opportune to visit various NATO capitals in early 1963 to help calm things down.21 Since his major fear was that Bonn and Paris were aiming at strategic and tactical doctrines that were opposed to those of SACEUR, he also favored nuclear cooperation in NATO. 22 Indeed, Stikker was determined to portray the provisions for a NATO nuclear force, outlined at the US-British Nassau summit in December 1962, as “not bad” and “realistic.”23 At a meeting with Adenauer, Stikker defended, albeit with little success, the Anglo-American idea of a NATO nuclear force as protecting European interests – although he admitted in talks with policy adviser Henry A. Kissinger that he had not yet really understood the implications of the Nassau agreements.24

Damage control à la NATO Council On 20 March 1963, against the background of the intensiﬁed NATO crisis, NATO ambassadors and the foreign ministers of Britain, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Italy addressed the “current problems facing the Alliance.” The main speaker, British Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home, stressed that he had not come to Paris to “conduct a post mortem on Brussels,” but to make sure the veto on British EEC membership would not have “averse effects” on NATO. According to London, “the future of the Alliance” could only be secured through equal risks, comparable contributions, and harmonized policies. Mainly addressing the French, Home maintained that by doubting US readiness to protect Europe, NATO – meaning France – risked provoking an aggressive act by the Soviet Union.25 Indeed, the ambassadors and foreign ministers welcomed Home’s presentation, which revealed the acute British need for allied encouragement, as a timely initiative. Regardless of “the endless discussions in the international press on crises and disagreement within the Alliance,” Joseph Luns of the Netherlands

A crisis foretold 111 saw “no reason for undue pessimism.” His statement seemed to capture the mood of the others present: satisfaction at the consultation in the NATO Council prevailed, and the need to redress NATO’s communal bond took the edge off ministerial statements. Only Spaak observed that the gathering was “a sign of the confusion of ideas now reigning in Europe, and as a result in the Alliance” and demanded that the Council unequivocally reiterate its ﬁrm belief in the fundamental principle of NATO, namely the close cooperation between Europe and North America. The German, Norwegian, Danish, Greek, Turkish, and US representatives agreed that alliance unity was of utmost concern.26 Stikker stressed as “highlights of the discussion” that allies should not look backwards, but forwards in the interest of improving the essential unity and interdependence; that NATO defense was indivisible; and that conﬁdence among NATO states should prevail over unfounded doubts about the US preparedness to defend Europe.27 Yet the exercise had a bizarre character – the French position remained inarticulate. France’s allies in the NATO Council were annoyed with the “total silence” and “total non-participation” of French Ambassador to NATO François Seydoux, and with the “French refusal . . . to participate meaningfully in the work of NATO.” When Spaak asked Seydoux after the meeting to explain the French unwillingness to cooperate, the French ambassador “shrugged his shoulders and gave no reply.” This accorded with the view of Jean de la Grandville of the French foreign ofﬁce’s NATO section, who described the situation thus: “The position of France is to take no steps – forward, backward, or sideways.”28 On a symbolic level, then, the visit of the British foreign secretary helped to redress Atlantic relations and restore them to a more normal condition. How important this level of discourse was also became apparent in the NATO Council meeting of 10 April 1963, when US Secretary of State Dean Rusk spoke to NATO ambassadors. Also present were the foreign ministers of France, Germany, the UK, and Italy. The participation of French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville’s was seen as the most encouraging feature of the council meeting. Rusk warned the NATO ambassadors of the historical “ghosts haunting the corridors of the Alliance.” He suggested that the following ghosts “be recognized, named and then banished once and for all:”29 Doubts that the United States would meet its commitment to defend Europe in the event of an attack; the assertion that the United States wished to dominate NATO; the accusation that the United States was seeking a settlement with the Soviet Union at the expense of Europe; the idea of Europe becoming a third force capable of defending itself by its own means and adopting a neutralist attitude; the doubt that Europe would ﬁght for its own defence; suspicion in Germany that France would make an agreement with the Soviet Union at Germany’s expense; etc.30 Rusk asserted that the US was not seeking to dominate NATO, but wanted a “partnership based on interdependence” and on the mutual commitment of

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forces. Rejecting the “ghosts” metaphor, Couve de Murville advocated turning to the facts. His German colleague Gerhard Schröder also asserted that Rusk’s ghosts were “no more than that.” Home said he would gladly help to make them vanish at the upcoming Ottawa ministerial meeting.31 Together with the drive in MLF discussions, the movement in trade affairs (GATT), and the plans to amend the Elysée Treaty with a preamble conﬁrming Bonn’s Atlantic orientation,32 the visits of Home and Rusk to the Council contributed to NATO reassurance. This positive turn quickly generated optimism among policy makers. Schröder announced that he was looking forward to the Ottawa meeting, US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William Tyler spotted a conciliatory attitude in the most recent French statements, and Home, too, thought de Gaulle was willing to reestablish normal relations.33 Not least, French Ambassador to Washington Hervé Alphand said he could “no more feel the irritation that had emerged three months ago.”34 Rusk’s appearance before the NATO ambassadors and his meeting with de Gaulle on 8 April35 were also acknowledged in the media. “After three months of posturing, bickering and name-calling,” the New York Times recognized “signs of an Atlantic thaw.”36 Yet, despite this short-term feeling of relief among the alliance members, the alarm bells with regard to the prospects for NATO did not stop ringing. While at the surface, Atlantic relations had improved in March and April 1963, and although the worst-case scenario that the January announcements had evoked appeared to have been warded off, France’s possible intentions retained allies’ attention. In the run-up to the NATO’s May 1963 meeting in Ottawa, the ministers gave utmost attention to the “state of the alliance;” Washington thought that the “crisis provoked by the French” continued to exert a “depressing inﬂuence on the Alliance.” The basic US goal for the meeting therefore was to “maintain Alliance solidarity and morale in the face of the French onslaught,” while direct confrontation with the French was to be avoided to prevent a divisive conﬂict in NATO.37 George Ignatieff, Ottawa’s ambassador to NATO, recommended trying to restore “some unity of purpose” at the May meeting, and to launch an “appraisal of where we should be going in the Alliance.”38 The two implicit antipodes of the meeting, Rusk and Couve de Murville, each addressed the difﬁcult internal condition of the alliance in a characteristic manner. The French foreign minister dissociated himself from the crisis in NATO by “intentionally” referring to the challenges to NATO as “problems” rather than a crisis. Beyond admitting that the nuclear problem and the European problem were “essential and inevitably essential,” Couve de Murville did not address any concrete issues. His statement was an “intricate piece of phraseology,” the foreign minister of Luxembourg, Eugène Schaus, told Rusk at a oneon-one meeting.39 Rusk for his part dwelled on the relevance of NATO sensitivities: in December 1962, the ministers had felt that NATO was “vital and healthy.” Less than two months later, “NATO’s future role” was a matter of concern, and the public was left with the impression that the alliance was “afﬂicted with a serious malaise.” While some of this distress had recently been dispelled, Rusk called for a return to NATO’s fundamental objectives.40

A crisis foretold 113 Since there was still an elementary consensus on NATO’s essential purpose and ends, Rusk’s argument went, the Soviet Union could be crucially tempted to misinterpret West–West disagreements as “major cracks” that could be exploited by aggressive action or selective blandishments. Yet by expressing the readiness to investigate “any differences or rumors of differences” in transatlantic relations, Rusk indirectly conﬁrmed that the intra-bloc problems were more than just a minor test. The US secretary of state therefore asked his colleagues “to be more introspective about the ‘State of the Alliance.’”41 This call was not only addressed to Gaullist France, but also other European governments which, Washington suspected, could adopt Gaullist criticisms of the US.42 Concluding NATO’s May gathering, Stikker observed that “while problems existed there were no crises.”43 Yet a number of NATO insiders increasingly worried about de Gaulle’s plans for NATO and his next moves.

What does de Gaulle want? Indeed, NATO allies remained preoccupied with French intentions. Would de Gaulle really apply his policy of blocking European developments to NATO as well? According to a CIA memorandum, the struggle over the future of Europe and the Western alliance that had begun in January 1963 “was only the opening battle of what may be a long drawn out campaign.”44 It soon became apparent how superﬁcial the new-found Western consensus was when the French president reclaimed the NATO stage with a next move. On 15 June, he announced to NATO allies his decision to withdraw the French Atlantic Fleet from NATO command. As the French explained, this step was a “change of status” rather than a withdrawal, a move that was necessary to enable the navy’s functioning.45 Yet NATO governments were not pleased with this news. Bonn emphasized that even if the move did not necessarily imply French neutrality in case of an attack, the German public could only regard the measure as “a further detachment of France from NATO” and “a weakening of NATO.”46 Also, Germany reproached France for non-consultation in this matter; this objection was not accepted in Paris. Claiming that Washington and Bonn had both been informed about the French intentions well in advance, French Ambassador to Bonn Roland de Margerie recalled the “story by Kipling, [where] the crocodile knew that the heron knew that the crocodile knew.”47 Kennedy deemed the French withdrawal “a test for France’s views on NATO” and planned to discuss in the NATO Council its “severe psychological and political disadvantages.”48 Like Bonn, Washington assessed the political and psychological implications of the withdrawal as being worse than its military implications, which could be made up for via bilateral agreements: the French action would necessarily “affect adversely the solidarity and well-being of the Alliance.” Therefore, the US and France were intent on minimizing publicity.49 Overall, France’s allies were keen to publicly downplay both the military and psychological consequences of the ﬂeet withdrawal. Yet when the difﬁculties of coordinating NATO policies with Paris increased in summer 1963, they had

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further ground for concern. The French government, which had practically ignored Stikker from the onset, opposed talking to the NATO secretary-general regarding his integrated defense planning exercise.50 At the NATO Council meeting of 25 July 1963, French Ambassador François Seydoux ofﬁcially buried any hopes that Paris might agree on the project. When Stikker suggested exploratory talks between French authorities and French members of NATO’s International Staff, the Quai d’Orsay rejected such contacts. An upset Stikker recalled a basic NATO document from 1952 stipulating that the secretarygeneral “should have direct access to all NATO agencies and to Governments,” but had to realize he could not win the French over.51 Due to France’s radical opposition, discussion of NATO strategy was basically frozen until after the French withdrawal from NATO’s integrated command in 1966. To NATO allies, both France’s ﬂeet withdrawal and its refusal to cooperate in the strategy debate opened room for speculation about de Gaulle’s plans for the alliance. In fact, the French government was reticent as to the changes it felt were necessary in NATO. While de Gaulle kept criticizing the ‘O’ in NATO, as he considered the organizational structure to be inadequate and secondary to the treaty, he did not voice speciﬁc reform plans. Since his famous memorandum to Eisenhower and Macmillan of June 1958, in which he proposed a US-BritishFrench directorate to coordinate global policies and strategies and a French say in the targeting and control of nuclear weapons,52 de Gaulle had produced no more concrete proposals regarding NATO. In talks with Kennedy in May 1963, Couve de Murville made clear he had no interest in talking about reorganizing NATO – “if there was less talk, the situation would be more normal.”53 Among Western allies, this caused helplessness and discussions about what the speciﬁc demands and intentions of the French government might be. Stikker put it most clearly in a conversation with Bonn’s Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel in October 1963: The great difﬁculty . . . was precisely that the French were saying what they did not want but never said what they did want. For instance, would they still like to have the three power directorate as embodied in the famous communication by General de Gaulle of 1958?54 On a personal level, many felt frustrated at de Gaulle and hoped for his early departure. The person most at the mercy of de Gaulle was NATO SecretaryGeneral Stikker. Communication between NATO Headquarters and the Elysée or the Quai d’Orsay, all in Paris, was close to zero. Stikker increasingly felt the wish to retire to Italy and leave all these problems behind him. On a technical level, Stikker proposed as the “only answer” to de Gaulle’s unalterable policies “a position of ‘mutual forbearance’ with the French.” This meant that other allies should no longer be prevented in their efforts toward integration.55 Washington objected that such a strategy would reduce France’s role in NATO to observer status, which was “only playing de Gaulle’s game.”56 In February 1964, Stikker explained to new US President Lyndon Johnson his severe dif-

A crisis foretold 115 ﬁculties originating with de Gaulle’s attitude: de Gaulle was blocking the way to agreement and refused coordinated action. The only way to make progress in NATO defense planning efforts or the integrated air defense project was to work “around him,” Stikker asserted.57 Other NATO members were less ready to give up on de Gaulle and began to look for ways to cope with what Stikker called French “obstruction”58 and the implicit demand for NATO reform. Ignatieff called for “some fairly fundamental soul-searching” if NATO was to carry on beyond 1969 as an institution providing more than a minimum of military cooperation.59 Referring to the French practice of dealing with defense issues bilaterally rather than multilaterally, von Hassel proposed that NATO, with its 15 years of experience, systematically determine what it was striving to achieve.60 In London in early November 1963, Stikker reported that the Kennedy administration was perplexed about the future of NATO.61 For Rusk, much depended on French solidarity in a crisis. He expressed doubts about the usefulness of a debate with the French on their role, maintaining that these questions could only be dealt with in private.62 To his eyes, “it was hopeless to try to get the French to ‘provide the missing sentence,’ to explain why they think that NATO is not now a useful instrument, and to clarify exactly what they do wish.”63

In search of an answer to de Gaulle Not all allies shared this view. For Canada and other middle and minor NATO powers, the vital reinvigoration of the alliance was to be sought via the multilateral framework of NATO. In view of French NATO policies, Canada and Belgium requested that a restricted session, dedicated to the role of NATO in the mid-1960s and beyond, be held at the May 1964 ministerial convention.64 Stikker supported the idea of a “real discussion” to establish within a small circle “where NATO is going” and suggested that a fully-ﬂedged abstention doctrine following the OECD pattern be considered there.65 Rusk was skeptical of the idea, but expressed a willingness to participate in such a discussion. Against the background of the GATT Kennedy Round, military questions, and the situation in South East Asia and Europe, he advocated restraint and argued against setting an ultimatum for the French. Rusk believed that too much anxiety, which he attributed mainly to Spaak, could play into de Gaulle’s hands.66 Indeed, Spaak’s statement at the May 1964 convention in The Hague gave voice to, and was determined by, his worries about the “destiny” of NATO in view of the “very clear regress compared to the situation of the years 1958/60.”67 He labeled Stikker’s concerns voiced in the Annual Political Appraisal of April as typical Dutch “understatement.”68 There, a disheartened Stikker had reﬂected on the prospects of NATO; in view of the numerous intra-bloc tensions and organizational difﬁculties, he considered the state of alliance “no longer . . . as completely healthy.”69 Spaak was particularly enraged about a speech by Maurice Schuman, president of the French Foreign Affairs Commission, which

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called for reforming NATO now rather than in 1969. One by one, Spaak rejected ﬁve reasons Couve de Murville had put forth the day before to prove that NATO needed to undergo radical changes (without specifying what changes) – namely the doubtful US promise to defend Europe; decolonization; the new European strength; improving East–West relations; and the shift of threat away from Europe.70 Others saw no need for alliance reform either. In spite of the palpable intrabloc disagreements and uneasiness in the public opinion, Halvard Lange, the Norwegian foreign minister, thought any necessary changes could be accomplished in the existing Atlantic framework, and Joseph Luns of the Netherlands, while agreeing that NATO was “not perfectly healthy” expressed the Dutch government’s satisfaction at the structure of the alliance. Taking the French to task, he urged that they speak up and clearly explain the direction of the attempted modiﬁcations.71 Paul Martin, the Canadian foreign minister, praised the ongoing fundamental discussion on NATO. Recalling that NATO as a free community had inevitably encountered certain problems of coordination at times, he went out of his way not to blame France.72 Addressing not only Paris, but also Washington, he called for more willingness to propose concrete changes on the one hand, and for real efforts towards practical partnership on the other. Mutual mistrust would lead to an obsession with differences – already now, there was “much too much loose talk on both sides about good allies and bad allies; about the imminent break-up of this organization; about the difﬁculties of cooperating with this, or with that, country.” Nevertheless, with a view to the global and domestic public, he asked his colleagues to publicly acknowledge that they had begun discussing the alliance’s future.73 While Schröder saw no reason for fundamental reform,74 Rusk admitted that NATO might need to be changed “to reﬂect new situations.” For his part, he expressed his readiness to consider creating a standing body of ministers in permanent session, awarding the functions of a foreign and defense minister to the NATO secretary-general, and improved (crisis) communication.75 These suggestions, however, did not appease the French – on the contrary. Couve de Murville took the ﬂoor as the last and long-awaited speaker, “in a mood of controlled, even patient, irritation.”76 To clear up a fundamental misunderstanding, as he said, he stressed that French criticism only regarded NATO’s military dimension and the idea of military integration in particular.77 Yet when they talked about reform in the framework of the treaty, the other NATO governments asked for more, rather than less, (military) integration. Therefore, France thought it was pointless to seek an open debate on the future of the alliance, since every French proposition would immediately meet with opposition by its partners.78 As before, Couve advocated an end to the talk about a “NATO crisis.” He considered it “absurd” to say that NATO was in disarray and maintained that the West had “never been as prosperous and strong.” In spite of intra-Western differences, the alliance would continue as long as it corresponded to members’ interests.79 Still, the lengthy debate mirrored the ability of small allies and of the secretary-general to set on the multilateral agenda a multilateral review of

A crisis foretold 117 alliance affairs that was desired by neither the US nor France. Moreover, it showed that NATO as an institution had started to grapple with the French challenge. In Washington, the State Department gladly registered that Spaak’s intervention had not resulted in a difﬁcult situation. Some even saw a French “relaxation of its previous assault on the Organization.” While prior to the ministerial in The Hague, French criticism had been “vague and almost in the nature of a smoke-screen,” Couve de Murville had “dispelled some of the ambiguity” at the convention. Stikker agreed that the old idea of the three-power directorate had disappeared, and Tyler concurred that now “at least there was some deﬁnition of what the French desired.”80 Nevertheless, these positive assessments clouded the fact that France’s allies still had rather few clues as to de Gaulle’s speciﬁc intentions. In June 1964, Ball traveled to Paris to see de Gaulle and ﬁnd out “what de Gaulle wants of NATO.”81 What Adenauer’s successor, West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, reported in late June about a recent conversation with de Gaulle did not improve things. The French president had repeated that NATO’s conception was “wrong and inefﬁcient,” but had not proposed any changes. It may be indicative of the prevailing uncertainty that Erhard called it “signiﬁcant” that de Gaulle had not destroyed the entire structure of NATO, as he easily could have done if he wanted.82

Coping with the French threat to leave the alliance After the preliminary answers of May, French intentions became more explicit when Stikker’s successor, the Francophile Manlio Brosio, entered ofﬁce as NATO secretary-general on 1 August 1964.83 As Italian ambassador to France in 1961–64, Brosio was “very much persona grata in Paris” – and thus met Washington’s call for a candidate “who will not be anathema to the French.”84 In a ﬁrst substantial discussion with de Gaulle in early September, he inquired bluntly about French plans to revise the alliance. De Gaulle replied that the charge of “denouncing the treaty” was “quite a big word,” but things could not remain the way they were. France rejected “categorically” the notion of military integration, which implied nuclear and thus political dependence.85 Brosio came away with the impression that France was likely to leave the alliance in 1969. US Ambassador to France Charles Bohlen considered de Gaulle’s exposition “more brutal and speciﬁc” than his previous statements. Moreover, Bohlen, who regularly called for restraint in dealing with France, deemed it signiﬁcant that de Gaulle had turned to the NATO secretary-general in this matter; the French president was obviously using Brosio as a channel to NATO governments.86 In the US and Canada, Brosio reported his impression with quite some impact.87 Against this background, the Canadian government launched a multilateral initiative to counteract the decreasing sense of purpose within the alliance in fall 1964.88 Triggered mainly by France’s dissociation policy, the central idea was to support “the process of re-thinking the role of the Alliance in the 1970s and 1980s” under conditions of détente.89 Ottawa was convinced that systematic

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discussion of transatlantic differences would beneﬁt the community and counteract the talk of NATO being “in imminent danger of breaking up.”90 Against Brosio’s objections, Martin introduced a proposal at NATO’s 1964 December convention to study the future prospects of the alliance. While in Brosio’s view, the future of the alliance could not be meaningfully discussed until after the French and German elections at the end of 1965, ministers approved of the idea of having NATO examine its foundations and prospects.91 In March 1965, the Canadian delegation to NATO circulated for discussion among allied governments a paper entitled “The Future of the Alliance.” Its goal was to establish a common ground agreeable to all, which should allow for a discussion of the controversial issues of how NATO could adapt to the changed international order.92 In spring 1965, the pace of French (verbal) disengagement accelerated.93 Talking to Brosio on 27 February, de Gaulle insisted that by 1969, the West needed an “alliance of the classical type,” free of the current political and military organization. Brosio concluded from the discussion that France would not break up the structure of NATO before 1969, unless the organization was strengthened by a multilateral or an inter-allied nuclear force.94 In early May, however de Gaulle announced in discussions with Bohlen that the integrated structure of NATO in France would be eliminated, and that all foreign military installations would have to leave French soil.95 Statements by the French president and the administration in Paris suggested that France would consider its participation in NATO terminated within ﬁve to six months after the French presidential elections.96 In the ﬁrst instance, this information boosted attempts at alliance reassurance via multilateral debate. Ottawa expected to ﬁnd support for its “Future of the Alliance” paper at the May 1965 ministerial in London, which the US administration regarded as an occasion more appropriate for stocktaking than for action. With the French decision looming like a sword of Damocles, Washington depicted NATO’s inner strength as being “sapped.” Among the most critical problems were the relationship between the US and Europe, the assessment of possibilities for détente, the sharing of NATO’s defense burden, out-of-area activities, and unﬁnished business on the military side of NATO.97 The US Department of State intended to call for a restatement of alliance objectives and to offer “a clear signal that the US for its part means to grapple with the new problems of the Alliance.”98 Thus, the broadly phrased Canadian project was complemented by a US attempt to reassure its allies at NATO’s spring 1965 meeting. Acting Secretary of State George Ball tabled ﬁve fundamental questions that the US administration proposed for discussion within NATO in December.99 The US campaign was indicative of a renewed awareness in Washington that France’s intra-bloc course of action and de Gaulle’s autonomous détente policies called for action.100 Indeed, the NATO foreign ministers agreed on the necessity of discussing the future of NATO in the coming months. According to Brosio, this was the “most signiﬁcant theme raised by Ministers.”101 Yet at the same time, the expectation of a complete and imminent French disengagement from the organization was hampering debates on NATO’s perspec-

A crisis foretold 119 tives. When NATO ambassadors got together for a ﬁrst exchange of views on the state and future of NATO in early June, French Ambassador Pierre de Leusse made a “short, but very important declaration,” as Belgian Ambassador André de Staercke reported to Spaak. De Leusse explained that since his colleagues were no doubt primarily referring to France in their discussions on NATO’s adaptation to the new situation, he wanted to clarify that he would not be able to make “the slightest suggestion” on the French ideas before the next year, or at least not before the presidential elections.102 This announcement terminated the inchoate “future of the alliance” exercise. In late June, Brosio sent NATO ambassadors the promised draft list of international factors impacting the alliance. Cautious in its wording and very basic in its reasoning, the list incorporated elements of Spaak’s list of May 1964, Ottawa’s March 1965 paper, and the question on a shift in the Warsaw Pact’s military pressure that George Ball had brought up in May 1965.103 While it seemed to represent the essence of what was at stake in NATO’s debate on the alliance’s future, the increasingly palpable French problem was obstructing a proper multilateral continuation of the process. NATO ambassadors feared the risk of provoking disagreements, which they saw as inevitable in such a discussion, and preferred to postpone the exercise in alliance introspection until after the summer of 1965. Since the worst thing would be to “approach France on a ‘put up or shut up’ basis,” Canada also favored postponing the discussion on the state of the alliance. Ottawa did not want to see its initiative used as a pretext for something it was meant to prevent, namely the dissolution of the alliance.104 Allied efforts now concentrated on concrete measures towards reinstalling alliance unity. In a large consultation effort, the US pursued contingency planning for a NATO without France. In July 1965, Ball traveled to European capitals to secure allied support for the alliance in bilateral talks. The uncertainty about France’s time schedule strengthened the determination of the 14 other member states not to let any confrontation with France emerge.105 The imminent French action favored classical channels of diplomacy rather than multilateral discussions that were designed to include deviant positions as well. In fall 1965, the debates on how to pursue alliance policies in view of a possible French withdrawal shifted further and further away from the NATO forum. Schröder’s advice to concentrate more on informal bilateral talks to ﬁnd means to reinvigorate NATO was shared by the US, where “the need for intimate discourse” with selected allies was gaining new weight.106 Renewed US efforts within NATO endorsed a shift away from the debate about the nature of NATO towards substantial steps at “getting the Alliance moving again.”107 The fresh US activism was partly triggered by France’s obstructionist stance, partly by the disquieting German demand for nuclear participation. It became evident in the proposal for a “Select Committee” as put forward by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in May 1965. The committee, later renamed the “Special Committee,” was intended to give alliance members a greater degree of nuclear participation108 and was an expression of “speciﬁc projects” that the US wanted to carry out “as evidence of the continuing

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vitality of the alliance.”109 Alliance reassurance was now sought with preparedness to act: “We have done our homework.”110 The new beginning initiated by the US led to a situation that has been described in the literature as putting NATO “back on track” by December 1965.111 In the run-up to the December ministerial meeting, there was thus a general agreement not to bring up the state and the future of the alliance. In the eyes of West German and US ofﬁcials, only the untiring Spaak was unwilling to stop his endeavors.112 The Belgian foreign minister’s tentatively scheduled idea of a small committee as a means of buying time met with little enthusiasm in Washington, London, Paris, and Bonn. It seemed untimely, as the problems of the day were seen as being “tougher.” Looking back to 1956 and to the work of the Group of Three in reporting on political consultation in NATO, Ottawa considered the situation in NATO to be “now very different:” in contrast to the unity of purpose prevailing in 1956, such a committee in the present situation would be likely to intensify, rather than reconcile, the differences between France and the other NATO members.113 It thus hardly came as any surprise, when, after contradictory signals to Brosio and NATO governments, de Gaulle announced in February/March 1966 that France would withdraw its remaining forces from NATO’s integrated command, and that allied troops and facilities would have to leave French soil.114 According to the literature, this put NATO in “a situation in which the survival and future course of the Alliance were in jeopardy.”115 While this may indeed have been the case, the feeling of criticality had already been prevalent during the three preceding years in terms of allied perceptions, dialog, and countermeasures.

Conclusion An analysis of the years 1963 to 1966 in the history of NATO shows that the perception of a severe Atlantic crisis took hold among NATO’s advocates shortly after January 1963. Alliance insiders, in turn, carried this interpretation of the situation into the NATO forum. The ensuing extensive bargaining process on the future of NATO revealed the importance of atmospheric and psychological work in NATO and produced ideas on how the alliance could regain momentum. NATO ambassadors and ofﬁcials reacted ﬂexibly and rather early, and NATO tackled the difﬁculties before they became an open conﬂict. In this process of adjustment, two phases can be discerned: a period of multilateral reassurance of alliance solidarity, and a later period of classical bilateral diplomacy focusing on devising speciﬁc policies to advance alliance business despite French obstruction. While the ﬁrst stage produced a collective consensus that NATO was still necessary and temporarily marginalized French alternative visions for Europe and Atlantic cooperation, the second stage allowed the allies to make practical preparations for France’s withdrawal, as a result of a deliberate shift away from the multilateral arena toward traditional diplomacy. In this process, NATO as a multilateral forum offered small member states

A crisis foretold 121 the opportunity to make their inﬂuence felt in a signiﬁcant way that put to test the alliance’s major powers. The genuine contribution by certain minor powers to this effort of alliance reassurance was outstanding. Canada and Belgium, through their unwavering preoccupation with NATO’s condition, were particularly responsible for multilaterally advancing the debate on NATO’s health in view of French policies. To a remarkable extent, they held their own against persistent French and, initially, US assertions that nothing unusual was going on. As an institution, NATO offered additional paths to all parties. In several instances, the NATO secretary-generals, Manlio Brosio in particular, served as a reliable channel from and to NATO governments. Therefore, the 1966 crisis was largely foretold – much more so, in fact, than the January 1963 shock. The debates on the future of the alliance, co-triggered by the French January 1963 moves, had paved the way by the end of 1965 for the understanding that NATO was necessary and would continue, even if France were to translate its withdrawal announcements into action in 1966. If there was, in Stikker’s words of May 1963, a “perennial talk of crisis in NATO,”116 it had positive aspects in that it was useful in ﬁnding ways to cope with the French challenge and planning for a NATO beyond the mid-1960s long before de Gaulle’s actual withdrawal.

Notes 1 Paul t’Hart, “Symbolism, Rituals and Power: The Lost Dimensions of Crisis Management,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 1, no. 1 (1993), pp. 36–50, 46. 2 See the contributions by Harald Müller and Lars G. Lose in Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (eds), Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation (Armonk: M. E. Sharp, 2001); Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman (eds), Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1996). 3 See Frédéric Bozo, Deux stratégies pour l’Europe: de Gaulle, les Etats-Unis et l’alliance atlantique, 1958–1969 (Paris: Plon, 1996); Maurice Vaïsse, Pierre Mélandri, and Frédéric Bozo (eds), La France et l’OTAN 1949–96 (Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 1996); Maurice Vaïsse, La grandeur: Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, 1958–69 (Paris: Fayard, 1998); Georges-Henri Soutou, “La décision française de quitter le commandement intègre de l’OTAN,” in Von Truman bis Harmel: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Spannungsfeld von NATO und europäischer Integration, ed. Hans-Joachim Harder (München: Oldenbourg, 2000), pp. 185–208; Helga Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Thomas A. Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). 4 Paul-Henri Spaak, “Hold Fast,” Foreign Affairs 41, no. 4 (July 1963), pp. 611–20, here at 611. 5 See for example Erin Mahan, Kennedy, de Gaulle, and Western Europe (Houndsmill: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 128–42; Christof Münger, Kennedy, die Berliner Mauer und die Kubakrise: Die westliche Allianz in der Zerreissprobe, 1961–63 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2003), pp. 214–63; Jeffrey Glen Giauque, Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization of Western Europe, 1955–1963 (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), pp. 196–223.

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6 Schaetzel to Kennedy, 22 January 1963, quoted in Josephine Brain, “Dealing with de Gaulle,” in Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited, ed. Mark J. White (New York: New York University Press, 1998), pp. 160–92, 180. 7 See for example Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe (Houndsmill: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 265–94; Giauque, Grand Designs, pp. 98–125. 8 Finletter to Rusk, 6 February 1963, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston (JFKL), National Security File (NSF), Box 220A. 9 Summary record of NSC Executive Committee meeting, 25 January 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961–63, vol. XIII, pp. 487–91. In retrospect, Ball labeled the worries about a Paris–Bonn deal with Moscow and the end of NATO “wild rumors.” George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern (New York: Norton, 1982), p. 271. See also Oral History Interview Sorensen, JFKL, pp. 101–10, particularly 106. 10 Knappstein to Schröder, 23 January 1963, Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD), 1963, vol. 1, pp. 163–7. 11 Memorandum of Conversation (MemCon) between Stikker and Macmillan, 25 January 1963, Dutch National Archives, The Hague (NLNA), Stikker papers, Box 58. 12 Heath to Brussels, 7 February 1963, quoted in Münger, Kennedy, 270. 13 MemCon between Stikker and Spaak, 1 February 1963, NLNA, Stikker papers, Box 54. 14 Spaak, “Hold Fast,” 612–15; Spaak letter to von Brentano, 7 June 1963, Fondation Paul-Henri Spaak, Brussels (FPHS), 32/300/5621; Rusk to The Hague, 11 September 1963, FRUS, 1961–63, vol. XIII, pp. 610–11. On Italy, see Chapter 12, this volume. In a similar if inversed manner, this rule also applies to Canada, where Europe was the welcome distant partner that counterbalanced US inﬂuence. 15 See e.g. MemCon between Adenauer and Kissinger, 17 May 1963, JFKL, NSF, Box 321. 16 See Oliver Bange, The EEC Crisis of 1963: Kennedy, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Adenauer in Conﬂict (Houndsmill: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 112–16, 207–33. 17 Summary record of NAC meeting, 30 January 1963, NATO Archives, Brussels (NA), c-r(63)4-e. See also Summary record of NSC Executive Committee meeting, 31 January 1963, FRUS, 1961–63, vol. XIII, pp. 156–63; MemCon between Kennedy and Spaak, 4 October 1963, FRUS, 1961–63, vol. XIII, pp. 219–23. 18 Hooper Memorandum for Stikker, “France–German Treaty,” 4 February 1963, NLNA, Stikker papers, Box 56. 19 Summary record of NAC meeting, 30 January 1963, NA, c-r(63)4-e, 3; Howe (the Hague) to Rusk, 7 February 1963, US National Archives, College Park MD (USNA), Record Group (RG) 59, Alpha-Numeric File (ANF) 1963, Box 3697, DEF 4: Collective Defense Pacts, NATO. 20 MemCon between Stikker, Lefevre, and Spaak, 1 February 1963, NLNA, Stikker papers, Box 54; MemCon between Stikker and Adenauer, 22 August 1963, ibid., Box 56; MemCon between Stikker and von Hassel, 5 January 1963, ibid. 21 MemCon between Kennedy and Stikker, 6 March 1963, FRUS, 1961–63, vol. XIII, pp. 518–23; MemCon between Stikker and Bundy, 6 March 1963, NLNA, Stikker papers, Box 58; MemCon between Stikker and Rusk, 8 March 1963, ibid. 22 MemCon between Stikker, Home, and Thorneycroft, 24 January 1963, ibid., Box 54; MemCon between Stikker, Lefevre, and Spaak, 1 February 1963; MemCon between Stikker and Kennedy, 6 March 1963. 23 MemCon between Stikker, Lefevre, and Spaak, 1 February 1963. 24 MemCon between Stikker and Adenauer, 4 January 1963, NLNA, Stikker papers, Box 56; MemCon between Stikker and Kissinger, 12 January 1963, JFKL, NSF, Box 321. See also MemCon between Kennedy and Stikker, 6 March 1963, p. 520.

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34 35 36 37 38

39 40 41 42 43

44 45 46

Summary record of NAC meeting, 20 March 1963, NA, c-r(63)14-e, pp. 5–13. Ibid., pp. 15–26. Ibid., p. 27. MacArthur (Brussels) to Rusk, 21 March 1963 and Finn (Paris) to Rusk, 17 March 1963, both USNA, RG 59, ANF 1963, Box 3697, DEF 4: Collective Defense Pacts, NATO. NATO Paris to Ottawa, 10 April 1963, Canadian National Archives, Ottawa (CNA), RG 25, vol. 4803, 50102-AG-40, pt.1. Summary record of NAC meeting, 10 April 1963, NA, c-r(63)19-e. NATO Paris to Ottawa, 10 April 1963; Summary record of NAC meeting, 10 April 1963. In general, see Münger, Kennedy, pp. 272–83, 287–91. NATO Paris to Ottawa, 10 April 1963; Tyler Memorandum to Ball, “Progress in the Atlantic Area,” 23 April 1963, USNA, RG 59, EUR/RPE, ANF 1948–63, Box 3; Finn (Paris) to Rusk, 10 April 1963, USNA, RG 59, ANF 1963, Box 3697, DEF 4: Collective Defense Pacts, NATO; MemCon between Schröder and Home, 10 April 1963, AAPD, 1963, vol. 1, p. 473. Alphand to Couve de Murville, 6 and 9 April 1963, Documents Diplomatiques Français (DDF), 1963, vol. 1, pp. 360, 385. The de Gaulle–Rusk talk covered a wide range of issues, see MemCon between de Gaulle and Rusk, 8 April 1963, DDF, 1963, vol. 1, pp. 374–9. Editorial article, “Signs of an Atlantic Thaw,” 4 April 1963, New York Times, p. 46; Drew Middleton, “Unity of the Allies is Improved but Problems Remain,” New York Times, 14 April 1963, p. 159. Strategy Paper, 17 May 1963, “NATO Ministerial Meeting,” FRUS, 1961–63, vol. XIII, pp. 575–9. Ignatieff Memorandum, 17 May 1963, “Brief for Talk with NATO SecretaryGeneral,” CNA, RG 25, vol. 4803, 50102-AG-40, pt.2; Strategy Paper, 17 May 1963, “NATO Ministerial Meeting.” On the issue of language use, see NATO Paris to Ottawa, 9 May 1963, CNA, RG 25, vol. 4803, 50102-AG-40, pt.2 and, for comparison, Mahan, Kennedy, de Gaulle, and Western Europe, p. 126. Verbatim Record of NAC meeting, 23 May 1963, 3:30pm, NA, c-r(63)30-e, 32f.; MemCon between Rusk and Schaus, 24 May 1963, USNA, RG 59, Conference File (CF), Box 316. Draft speech, 20 May 1963, USNA, RG 59, EUR/RPE, ANF 1948–63, Box 5. For a summarized version, see Rusk to NATO missions, 29 May 1963, FRUS, 1961–63, vol. XIII, p. 589. Ibid. Summary record of NSC meeting, 2 April 1963, FRUS, 1961–63, vol. XIII, p. 547; MemCon between Rusk and Schaus, 24 May 1963. Rusk (Ottawa) to DoS, 24 May 1963, USNA, RG 59, CF, Box 316. See also the declaration by French Information Minister Alain Peyreﬁtte at a press luncheon: “None of the somber predictions made in the press and elsewhere have materialized . . . The Atlantic Alliance is viable and capable of functioning in the face of differences of opinion.” Anschuetz (Paris) to DoS, 1 June 1963, JFKL, NSF, Box 223. CIA/Ofﬁce of National Estimates Memorandum, “What Now After Brussels?,” 14 February 1963, JFKL, NSF, Box 213. Memorandum, “La situation de la ﬂotte française de Atlantique,” 24 July 1963, DDF, 1963, vol. 2, pp. 141–2. Carstens Memorandum, 15 June 1963, AAPD, 1963, vol. 2, p. 632. See also Carstens to certain NATO missions, 22 June 1963, AAPD, 1963, vol. 2, p. 655; MemCon between Adenauer and de Gaulle, 4 July 1963, AAPD, 1963, vol. 2, pp. 689–702; de Margerie to Couve de Murville, 22 June 1963, DDF, 1963, vol. 2, pp. 637–40.

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47 De Margerie to Couve de Murville, 22 June 1963, DDF, 1963, vol. 1, pp. 637–40. Jean de la Grandville had informed Washington’s Ambassador to France Charles Bohlen on 13 June 1963: Bohlen to Rusk, 13 June 1963, JFKL, NSF, Box 223. 48 Memorandum by Carstens, 15 June 1963, AAPD, 1963, vol. 2, p. 632. 49 Rusk to NATO missions, 15 June 1963, FRUS, 1961–63, vol. XIII, pp. 775–6; Alphand to Lucet, 14 June 1963, DDF, 1963, vol. 2, p. 623. 50 The NATO strategy debate had been stimulated in May 1962 by US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara’s call for an adjustment of NATO’s strategy. Stikker had sought since early 1963 to coordinate NATO strategy, forces, and budgets. See Anna Locher and Christian Nuenlist, “Containing the French Malaise: The NATO Secretary-General and de Gaulle’s Challenge, 1958–69,” in Intra-bloc Conﬂicts during the Cold War, ed. S. Victor Papacosma and Ann Heiss (Kent: Kent University Press, forthcoming). 51 MemCons between Stikker and Seydoux, 26 and 30 July 1963, NLNA, Stikker papers, Box 56. See also Le Figaro, 24 July 1963. 52 De Gaulle to Eisenhower, 17 September 1958, FRUS, 1958–60, vol. VII, part 2, pp. 81ff. See Maurice Vaïsse, La grandeur, pp. 114–23. 53 MemCon between Kennedy and Couve de Murville, 25 May 1963, DDF, 1963, vol. 1, p. 538. 54 MemCon between Stikker, Erhard, and von Hassel, 31 October 1963, NLNA, Stikker papers, Box 56. To be sure, the French had told Stikker in July 1963 that the directorate was no longer a French demand. MemCon between Stikker and Messmer, 16 July 1963, ibid. 55 MemCon between Stikker and Rusk, 16 October 1963, NLNA, Stikker papers, Box 58; MemCon between Stikker, Butler, and Thorneycroft, 7 November 1963, ibid. 56 When asked about French reactions to this policy, Stikker had to admit he had “virtually no contact with the French Government.” MemCon between Stikker and Tyler, 16 October 1963, USNA, RG 59, ANF 1963, Box 2696. 57 MemCon between Stikker and Johnson, [February 1964], NLNA, Stikker papers, Box 58. 58 Departing October 1963, Stikker regularly used the expression “obstruction” to label French policies. See e.g. MemCon between Stikker and Tyler, 16 October 1963, ibid. 59 Ignatieff to Martin, 21 February 1964, CNA, RG 25, 27–4-NATO-1. The 1969 reference related to article 13 of the NATO treaty, which provided for the possibility to withdraw from the alliance after 20 years with one year’s notice; in view of French NATO policies, this provision caused recurrent rumors (and governmental disclaimers) about the imminent end of NATO. 60 MemCon between Stikker, Erhard, and von Hassel, 31 October 1963, NLNA, Stikker papers, Box 56. 61 MemCon between Stikker, Butler, and Thorneycroft, 7 November 1963, ibid., Box 58. 62 MemCon between Stikker and Rusk, 16 October 1963, ibid. 63 MemCon between Stikker and Rusk, 18 March 1964, ibid. 64 NATO Paris to Ottawa, 20 May 1964, CNA, RG 25, 27–4-NATO-12–1964-Spring; The Hague to Ottawa, 13 May 1964, ibid; Tyler to MacArthur, 2 April 1964, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, pp. 31ff. 65 Memorandum, “Hague Ministerial,” 19 March 1964, CNA, RG 25, 27–4-NATO12–1964-Spring; MemCon Stikker–Popper, Paris, 20 February 1964, NLNA, Stikker papers, Box 58; MemCon Stikker–Rusk, Washington, 18 March 1964. 66 MemCon between Stikker and Rusk, 11 May 1964, ibid. 67 MemCon between Rusk and Spaak, 9 May 1964, FPHS, 48/614/8789. 68 Spaak statement, 13 May 1964 (restricted session), FPHS, 32/301/6545. Spaak had considered and, accepting the US view, discarded the idea of tabling a proposal to

A crisis foretold 125

69

70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83

84 85 86 87

88 89 90 91 92

set up a NATO review machinery. Brieﬁng paper, 30 April 1964, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin TX (LBJL), NSF, Country File, Box 165. Annual Political Appraisal, 24 April 1964, NA, c-m(64)35-e, paragraph 20. See also Francis A. Beer, Integration and Disintegration in NATO: Processes of Alliance Cohesion and Prospects for Atlantic Community (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969), p. 31. Spaak statement, 13 May 1964. See also Summary records of NAC meeting, 12 May 1964, NA, c-vr(64)22-e, c-vr(64)23-e. De Staercke to Brussels, 28 May 1964, 13 May 1964, FPHS, 32/301/5651. NATO Paris to Ottawa, 20 May 1964, CNA, RG 25, 27–4-NATO-12–1964-Spring. See also Greg Donaghy, “Domesticating NATO: Canada and the North Atlantic Alliance, 1963–1968,” International Journal 52, no. 3 (1997), pp. 445–63. NATO Paris to Ottawa, 20 May 1964. The Hague to DoS, 14 May 1964, LBJL, NSF, International Meetings and Travel File, Box 34; see also de Staercke to Brussels, 28 May 1964. The Hague to DoS, 14 May 1964. These and similar suggestions were discussed in Washington since the early 1960s. Ibid. Couve de Murville to French Embassies, 14 May 1964, DDF, 1964, vol. 1, p. 519. See also The Hague to DoS, 14 May 1964; de Staercke to Brussels, 28 May 1964. Couve de Murville to French Embassies, 14 May 1964. For de Gaulle’s alliance notion, see Bozo, Deux stratégies, especially Chapters 4 and 5; Soutou, Décision. Couve de Murville to French Embassies, 14 May 1964. MemCon between Stikker, Tyler, and Schaetzel, 3 June 1964, NLNA, Stikker papers, Box 58. MemCon between Stikker and Ball, 3 June 1964, ibid. MemCon between Stikker and Erhard, 29 June 1964, NLNA, Stikker papers, Box 56. Stikker had repeatedly expressed his concern at Brosio’s unfamiliarity with NATO and insisted that his selection would “play into French hands.” MemCon between Stikker and Rusk, 18 March 1964, NLNA, Stikker papers, Box 58. See also Locher and Nuenlist, “Containing the French Malaise.” Draft memorandum, [2 December 1963], LBJL, NSF International Meeting and Travel File, Box 34; The Times [London], 14 May 1964. MemCon between Brosio and de Gaulle, Paris, 3 September 1964, DDF, 1964, vol. 2, p. 208. Bohlen letter to Tyler, 14 September 1964, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, pp. 71–3. See, for example, Cabinet conclusions, 3 November 1964, CNA, RG 2, Privy Council Ofﬁce, Series A-5-a, vol. 6265; Brieﬁng Memorandum, “France and NATO”, 24 September 1964; Defense Background Brief, 16 September 1964, USNA, RG 59, CF, Box 358. See Anna Locher and Christian Nuenlist, “Reinventing NATO: Canada and the Multilateralization of Détente, 1962–66,” International Journal [Toronto] 58, no. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 283–302. Brieﬁng notes for Pearson, 1 October 1964, CNA, MG 26-N3, vol. 273; Memorandum by D L (1) Division to Robinson, 11 January 1965, CNA, RG 25, 27–4NATO-1. Ottawa to NATO Paris, 10 November 1964, CNA, RG 25, 27–4-NATO-12–1964Fall. MemCon between Brosio, Martin, and Heller, 2 October 1964, CNA, RG 25, 27–4NATO-1; MemCons between Rusk and Brosio, 28 September and 13 December 1964, LBJL, NSF International Meetings and Travel File, Box 33. Paper, “Future of the Alliance,” attached to Ottawa to NATO Paris, 5 March 1965, CNA, RG 25, 27–4-NATO-1.

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93 See Speeches by de Gaulle, 4 February and 27 April 1965, in Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages: Pour l’effort, 1962–65 (Paris: Plon, 1970), pp. 325–42, 354–8; Bohlen to Rusk, 4 May 1965, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, pp. 206–7. See also Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, pp. 93–100. 94 De Staercke to Spaak, 1 March 1965, FPHS, 32/302/5670. 95 Bohlen to DoS, 4 May 1965, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, pp. 206f. See also Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, pp. 331ff. 96 Grewe to Auswärtiges Amt, 8 June 1965, AAPD, 1965, vol. 2, pp. 973–75, 973. 97 FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII: documents no. 80 (20 April 1965), 82 (1 May 1965), 84 (9 May 1965), 85 (14 May 1965); Verbatim record of NAC meeting, London, 11 May 1965, NA, c-vr(65)20. 98 Scope paper, “NATO Ministerial Meeting,” 1 May 1965, LBJL, NSF, Agency File, Box 39. 99 The questions regarded the changing conditions to be taken into account in considering the future of NATO; possible organizational changes in NATO; the reasons for the diminished military threat emanating from the Warsaw Pact; “NATO’s proper rôle in East–West confrontation outside the NATO area”; and the management and application of nuclear power. Verbatim record of NAC meeting, London, 11 May 1965, NA, c-vr(65)20. 100 Scope paper, 1 May 1965; MemCon between Schröder and Spaak, 2 June 1965, AAPD, 1965, vol. 2, p. 920; Grewe to Auswärtiges Amt, 8 June 1965, AAPD, 1965, vol. 2, pp. 73–5. In 1965, de Gaulle’s single-handed détente policy came to fruition. Bozo, Deux stratégies, pp. 133–9; Vaïsse, Grandeur, pp. 421–5. 101 Summary record of NAC meeting, London, 12 May 1965, NA, c-r(65)22-e. See also MemCon Schröder–Rusk, 13 May 1965, AAPD, 1965, vol. 2, pp. 822–34, 829. 102 De Staercke to Spaak, 9 June 1965, FPHS, 32/302/5672. See also Bozo, Deux stratégies, p. 145. 103 Cover letter and Report, “Present State and Future of Alliance,” 29 June 1965, NA, PO/65/366. 104 NATO Paris to Ottawa, 3 July 1965, CNA, RG 25, 27–4-NATO-1; Robinson speech, 6 October 1965, CNA, MG 31-E83, vol. 22; Robinson speech, 5 November 1965. 105 See e.g. DoS to Brussels, 21 October 1965, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, pp. 260f.; Circular airgram, 22 December 1965, USNA, RG 59, CF, Box 396; Robinson speech to National Defense College, 5 November 1965, CNA, MG 31-E 83, vol. 22. See also Bozo, Deux stratégies, pp. 138–45. 106 MemCon between Schröder and Spaak, 2 June 1965, AAPD 1965, vol. 1, pp. 918–21; Cover letter to report, “Atlantic Policy After the German Election,” 24 June 1965, USNA, RG 59, POL 3 1965, Box 1803. 107 NATO Paris to DoS, 18 December 1965, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, p. 285. 108 See Communiqué of the defense ministers meeting of 31 May–1 June 1965, paragraph 4, at www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95/c650531a.htm. Franz Eibl, Politik der Bewegung: Gerhard Schröder als Aussenminister, 1961–1969 (München: Oldenbourg, 2001), pp. 338–414. 109 Memorandum, “NATO December Ministerial Meeting,” 12 November 1965, CNA, RG 25, 27–4-NATO-12–1965-Winter, 48. 110 Memorandum, “Visit of Brosio,” no date, LBJL, NSF, Agency File, Box 35. 111 Bozo, Deux stratégies, pp. 139–49, 144. See also NATO Paris to DoS, 18 December 1965. 112 Memorandum, “Meeting with Secretary General Brosio,” 1 October 1965, CNA, RG 25, 27–4-NATO-12–1965-Winter; Bonn to DoS, 12 November 1965, USNA, RG 59, POL 3 1965, Box 1803; MemCon between Schröder and Brosio, 13 November 1965, AAPD, 1965, vol. 2, pp. 1716–20. 113 Memorandum, “Future of NATO: Mr. Spaak’s Idea,” 23 November 1965, CNA,

A crisis foretold 127 MG 31-E 83, vol. 13; Memorandum, “Committee of Distinguished Personalities,” 23 November 1965, CNA, RG 25, 27–4-NATO-1. The idea of reviving the “Wise Men” idea had earlier been considered in the US State Department as well; see Brieﬁng paper, “Brussels Visit, 8–10 May 1964,” 30 April 1964; Brieﬁng paper, “France and NATO,” 24 September 1964, LBJL, NSF, Agency File, Box 38. 114 De Gaulle press conference, 21 February 1966, Discours et Messages: Vers le terme, 1966–69 (Paris: Plon, 1970), p. 6ff.; de Gaulle to Johnson, 7 March 1966, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, p. 325f. 115 Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution, p. 1. 116 MemCon between Kennedy, Rusk, and Stikker, 29 May 1963, JFKL, NSF, Box 221.

Part IV

Nuclear dilemmas NATO consultation and social protest

8

Diverging perceptions of security NATO, nuclear weapons, and social protest Holger Nehring

Introduction The late 1950s and early 1960s saw the emergence of protests against defense and alliance policies in Western Europe and the United States. This chapter focuses on the discussions of NATO and NATO strategy in the protests against nuclear weapons in Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and France during this period. It seeks to illuminate important political dimensions stemming from NATO’s nuclear dilemmas in the early 1960s,1 and it aims to contribute to a more precise understanding of NATO’s crisis than the analysis of great-power diplomacy alone might allow. This chapter suggests that the social protests in the three countries formed part of wider debates on foreign and security policies at a time when international relations were in ﬂux and when the parameters of the immediate post-World War II order were beginning to change.2 This analysis thus highlights the “ambiguity” of deterrence on a social rather than merely governmental level.3 It locates NATO’s crisis not in the events of the mid-1960s, but in the emergence of diverging perceptions of security within the societies of the Western alliance from the mid1950s onwards. The social protests fundamentally questioned the governments’ abilities to fulﬁll the function of modern states: to guarantee their citizens’ security – both social and international – at a time of heightened international tensions. They addressed an issue that most Western governments could not or would not effectively voice in conversations with their North American ally.4 This chapter thus contributes to the debate about the interaction between the Cold War international system and social protests, an issue which Jeremi Suri and Andreas Wenger ﬁrst analyzed systematically from a historical perspective.5 There are, however, still no thorough historical studies on the social cohesion of the Western alliance in the 1950s and early 1960s. Even research on the protest movements of the 1980s has not taken diverging perceptions of security into account. Instead, it has tended to locate the causes of the protests in the protesters’ cultural values, speciﬁcally in their “anti-Americanism,” or to identify the social and political conditions in the individual countries. This research has failed, however, to regard the protests as indicators of diverging patterns of security within the societies of the Western alliance.6

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The argument offered in this chapter is based on the assumption that social movements tell us something about the times and places at which they occur. Social movements are, in effect, self-observations of these societies and their environments. As rather loosely organized and mostly extra-parliamentary actors, they communicate problems that other actors in the political system, such as the government and political parties, seem to neglect. For such self-observations of societies, the communication of the problems is key: as long as problems are not communicated, they do not have any social relevance.7 Thus, in the debates about nuclear weapons discussed here, the structure of international relations and the deﬁnitions of “security” and “national interest” are not given. They are socially constructed on the basis of speciﬁc events and trends.8 After giving an outline of the international situation, this chapter focuses on the debates about NATO within the British, French, and West German antinuclear weapons movements and highlights the emergence of diverging perceptions of security within the Western alliance.

The international context and the protests against nuclear weapons The debates about nuclear armament in Britain, France, and West Germany were connected to changes in international relations at the time. All three countries faced the same basic dilemmas ﬂowing from the development of thermonuclear weapons and from the nuclearization of NATO strategy in the mid-1950s.9 From the mid-1950s to the early 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union struggled to reconcile their political aims with the risks stemming from developments in thermonuclear weapons and delivery systems.10 A series of dangerous crises reﬂected this process of accommodation: the two Berlin crises 1958–59 and 1961, the U-2 incident in May 1960, and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. With the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, an arrangement was found that promised control of the arms race and thus reduced the importance of the arms race for international relations in favor of economic and ideological developments.11 Three more speciﬁc factors formed the backdrop of the British, French, and West German debates about nuclear weapons. First, debates about foreign policy in these countries were able to become more pronounced, as the acceptance of the status quo by both superpowers lowered the premium on conformity within both alliances. Second, the emerging recognition of the status quo by the superpowers from 1955 onwards began to transfer the superpower struggles to other areas: to the arms race as a “functional substitute for war,”12 on the one hand, and to economic, ideological and social issues, on the other. Third, fundamentally, the emerging status quo did not accommodate key interests of the three main American allies. NATO’s new nuclearized defense strategy meant that Britain, France, and West Germany were becoming increasingly dependent on weapons over which they had no control, while the use of US nuclear weapons for the defense of Western Europe had become less cred-

Diverging perceptions of security 133 ible with the development of Soviet intercontinental strategic capabilities. There now existed an incentive for the West European governments to acquire their own up-to-date weapons systems.13 For West Germany, these developments had even more pressing consequences. The superpowers’ (tacit) acceptance of the division of Europe threatened to make the division of Germany permanent. German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s “policy of strength,” which had been based on keeping the German question open, was thus no longer congruent with US and allied interests and no longer conformed to the general political environment.14

The protests and NATO Despite the connectedness of the debates in the three countries, the ways in which the protesters in the three countries “framed” the international situation and NATO’s role as social problems differed widely.15 The framing processes, in turn, reﬂected both the different domestic political and social circumstances. Fundamentally, however, these processes were intimately related to different perceptions of security: the movements voiced concerns about the diverging perceptions of security within NATO that their governments did not want to, or could not, address. In all three countries, protesters deﬁned “security” very broadly. It encompassed the realization of national goals in the international, political, social, and cultural ﬁelds. The protests had, therefore, very little to do with political or ideological anti-Americanism, but rather with perceptions of “national interest.” The movements were strongest and most resilient where a government was least able or willing to voice concerns about the diverging patterns of security within NATO. While Britain and the Federal Republic both experienced large-scale antinuclear weapons protests during this period, France’s anti-nuclear weapons movement remained comparatively small. In Britain, the focal point of the protests was the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), which was founded in 1958. In the fall of 1960, a more radical group founded the Committee of 100.16 In West Germany, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the trade unions launched the Campaign against Atomic Death when the Adenauer Government planned to acquire nuclear-capable equipment for the German Army in early 1958. After the SPD had abandoned the campaign in the wake of its programmatic changes, a group of Hamburg paciﬁsts founded a new movement after the British example, the Easter Marches of Atomic Weapons Opponents.17 The parameters of the French debate were more complex than those in Britain and West Germany. No signiﬁcant anti-nuclear weapons protests emerged in France in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as the government, with its unilateral policy of a force de frappe, appeared to enhance France’s national security. The French peace movement was, until 1963, almost entirely dominated by the activities of the French Communist Party (PCF) and its Mouvement de la Paix (MDP). The explosion of the ﬁrst French nuclear bomb in February

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1960 and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 reactivated French extra-parliamentary peace politics and led to the creation of an independent peace movement, albeit on a much smaller scale than in the other European countries.18 In 1963, the former resistance leader Claude Bourdet and the biologist Jean Rostand organized the Mouvement Contre l’Armement Atomique (MCAA). Bourdet had advocated socialist non-alignment policies since the early 1950s and had strong contacts with the British New Left. The French Socialist Party (SFIO) joined the protests from a pro-NATO position.19 Various issues overlapped in the discussions about NATO within the movements: the question of principle and doctrinal debates were intimately connected to more speciﬁc issues, such as stockpiling US weapons for US aircraft based in Europe, the installation of missile launching pads, and the acquisition of nuclear submarines. But these were all connected to the protesters’ central concerns about “national security.” Throughout, the situation of the ﬁrst and short détente in 1955–56 formed the point of reference for the ways in which the protesters in all three countries observed their international environment: this short period provided them with examples that some kind of détente, both between the superpowers and within Europe, was indeed possible. The suggestions for new defense and alliance policies that the protest movements made thus did not preﬁgure the suggestions for détente of the later 1960s. They presented solutions to the problems within the Western alliance during the “crisis years” that looked back to the mid-1950s.20

The national perceptions of security Britain: resisting “independence in concert” The British movements were primarily responses to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s policy of “independence in concert.” 21 The mainstream protesters did not take issue with the underlying assumptions of this policy, and they often even regarded themselves as supporters of the Atlantic alliance. They could, therefore, be easily reintegrated into the political system, as the government and the reformist wing of the Labour Party showed enough ﬂexibility to give the impression of representing national security concerns that would honor alliance commitments in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.22 Only a more radical section of the movement opposed British foreign and defense policies fundamentally. Two phases can be distinguished in the ways in which the British movement saw NATO’s role. During the ﬁrst phase, only a radical minority demanded that Britain leave NATO. During the second phase, this demand became more mainstream, as radical paciﬁst and new-left ideas percolated through the movement. If we exclude the small minority of radical paciﬁsts within the British campaign, only a very slim line divided British protesters from their opponents within the Conservative Government and within the Labour Party at the start of the campaign in 1958–59.23 This reﬂected the fact that both Labour and Conservative

Diverging perceptions of security 135 governments had pursued policies of détente in Europe and could thus be seen as pursuing national security interests. The small but crucial point of disagreement was that, while the government and the majority within the Labour Party favored multilateral disarmament within a United Nations framework, the campaigners sought unilateral disarmament. Although there were many different positions within the British protest movement, there was one basic consensus. This consensus, together with the tradition of liberal dissent against ofﬁcial foreign policy, gave the CND a unique degree of support even among the Atlanticist defense establishment: all protesters regarded the nuclearization of British foreign and defense policy, which Secretary of Defense Duncan Sandys had initiated,24 and whose roots predated similar ideas in the United States, as costly, dangerous, and unrealistic.25 At this early point, British protesters did not yet discuss Britain’s position within NATO. Most of the evidence even points to an endorsement of NATO’s role. Many even warned of the dangers that Britain’s disassociation from the Western alliance might have for international stability. During this early period, the protesters took up the various disengagement proposals that British and East European politicians had developed since the 1955 Geneva conference: the Eden,26 Macmillan, Gaitskell, and Rapacki Plans were all quoted in order to highlight the importance of reducing conﬂicts over Central Europe and of keeping the arms race under control.27 While the CND’s mainstream supporters were solely concerned with matters of foreign policy, two strong groups within the CND – the Labour left and the New Left – regarded foreign policy as an element of social policy. A possible third group, the British Communist Party, was in 1958–59 still opposed to the CND. It feared that unilateral disarmament might discredit the Soviet Union’s multilateral disarmament initiatives within the UN framework. From 1960 onwards, despite its attempts to capture this mass movement, the party formed only a small minority within the CND.28 The Labour left regarded the international situation of the late 1950s as the veriﬁcation of its arguments of the late 1940s. Without mentioning NATO, but with major implications for Britain’s role within it, it revitalized the “third force” proposals of the late 1940s, in which social security and international security were inextricably linked.29 Part of the CND’s foreign policy agenda was, therefore, the last glimmer of the ideas of the traditional Labour left, developed during World War II and most prominently discussed in 1946–47 under completely different international circumstances. CND’s short-lived triumph within the Labour Party was the success of a unilateralist motion at the Party’s 1960 annual conference. This group’s opponents within the Labour Party were the Atlanticist Labour politicians who were active in the Bilderberg Group and who supported the journal Encounter.30 As in the late 1940s, Labour left politicians involved in the CND warned of US hegemony and the dangers to British sovereignty stemming from it: the apparent dependence of British foreign and defense policy and strategy conﬁrmed their worst fears about the dangers ﬂowing from an Atlanticist foreign

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policy. Members of this group not only resented the hegemony of the capitalist United States in the West, they also feared a resurgent (West) Germany, possibly equipped with nuclear weapons, within a NATO framework. Positively, they envisioned Britain as a third force in world politics, a crucial mediator between the Eastern and Western blocs. Grouped around this new Britain would be the former colonies, ideologically united within a socialist commonwealth that would avoid the Soviet Union’s sins but could, at the same time, beneﬁt from the advantages of planning for a fair and just society. Britain would maintain its greatness through its ideological mission, rather than through nuclear weapons.31 Support for the disengagement proposals, and the contact of Labour left politicians to ofﬁcials from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Soviet Union, were the practical side of the coin.32 The other group within the British movement that regarded foreign and social policies as inextricably linked, and that came to dominate during the CND’s second phase, was the New Left.33 New-left ideas were most prominent from the early 1960s onwards, particularly after the defeat of unilateralist motions at the 1961 Labour Party conference. New Left activists only rarely employed foreignpolitical and strategic arguments against Britain’s NATO membership alone. For the New Left’s supporters, NATO was, ﬁrst and foremost, the expression of a speciﬁc political, social, and economic ideology. NATO’s ideology, they believed, emphasized apathy and consumption rather than active participation in public life. The Western alliance was the symbol of this “Natopolitan ideology” and the post-World War II liberal consensus in the West.34 For new-left activists, British membership in NATO endangered Britain’s national security needs. They regarded the alliance as the expression of the division of the world into two camps, a situation that contained “within [it] the threat to man’s peaceful advance, indeed to man’s future existence,” and thus endangered the very security and the humane character of the nation it was supposed to protect.35 If the Cold War continued, by contrast, “the half-frozen antagonists” would become “more sluggish in their reactions, more stupid in their thoughts,” merely amassing destructive power for the maintenance of power blocs and bases.36 The New Left assumed that the strategy of nuclear preparedness and the Cold War itself, rather than merely Britain’s bombs, posed the ultimate danger. It was, therefore, wrong for Britain to be part of an alliance that demanded to store and manufacture bombs. Due to the logic of the Cold War, Britain had given up any foreign policy ﬂexibility, argued Stuart Hall in a CND pamphlet, preﬁguring later Gaullist arguments for French nuclear weapons: once Britain had accepted the alliance’s premises, it was obliged to follow “every other dangerous twist in the weapons race.”37 The failure of NATO to consider the Rapacki and Macmillan plans for disengagement had illustrated how little could be done to move towards peace “from a position well within an alliance which is committed to the strategies of war.”38 The case against the bomb thus became a case against all nuclear alliances and strategies and for a just and fair society at home. New-left activists regarded Britain as the spearhead for “active neutrality” or

Diverging perceptions of security 137 39

“positive neutralism.” In contrast to what they saw as the merely “passive” neutrality of Sweden and Switzerland, this kind of active neutrality was the “reverse of isolationism.” Active neutrality would entail an active and “indeed aggressive” foreign policy that was aimed at relaxing East–West tensions, dismantling the military blocs, and resuming “economic, political and cultural intercourse between the Communist and non-communist world.” It would lead to the “elaboration of details of a possible diplomatic détente and the afﬁrmation of a community of human aspiration at levels deeper than diplomacy.”40 Only if ground broke away from under the feet of the two camps, the new leftists argued, could the United States and the Soviet Union be brought to talk to each other. It would, they believed, have an extraordinary effect if one NATO power contracted out of the Cold War. Such action would also lead to the collapse of the deadlock in disarmament negotiations and free socialist movements across Europe, and it would send the death-knell to the Stalinism of the French Communist Party.41 They believed that only Britain, through its traditional ties to the Commonwealth and due to the strength of the labor movement there, had the strength to pursue such a policy.42 The New Left’s argument of a national and independent policy of peace came to dominate CND publications from 1960 onwards. For the majority of supporters, however, national security seemed to have been achieved with the peaceful resolution of the Cuban missile crisis and the advent of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Due to Britain’s relative ﬂexibility in foreign policy matters, the government and the Labour Party managed to re-integrate the majority of protesters into the political mainstream by suggesting successfully that their policies reﬂected the national interest. West Germany: campaigning for survival Due to West Germany’s semi-sovereign status as a “penetrated system,”43 the West German government was not as ﬂexible as its British counterpart when facing the protesters. The ﬂuctuations in US declaratory national security doctrines were especially troublesome for the Federal Republic. The West German state was, due to it semi-sovereign status and its location on the frontline of the Cold War in Europe, much more dependent on the support of the United States than Britain and France were.44 The West German government was thus unable to create the impression of an independent national security policy, particularly because Adenauer’s “policy of strength” towards the Eastern bloc was running into trouble at exactly the same time. The West German protests, therefore, remained far more radical at a time when the British campaign had already begun to decline, although the West German campaigners expressed far less radical ideas than their British counterparts. In contrast to the British campaign, the overwhelming majority of West German anti-nuclear weapons protesters both within the Campaign against Atomic Death and within the Easter Marches saw the Federal Republic politically as part of the West. They questioned, however, the military and political

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components of NATO and the implications for West German security. Although the GDR’s propaganda machine played no small role by publishing disengagement plans in West Germany,45 a closer analysis shows that the West German protests addressed the far more fundamental issue of national “security.” Unlike British activists, and unlike communist propaganda, only very few West German activists in the West German Easter Marches saw a link between foreign and social policy.46 Not even national neutralist sentiments made it into the many leaﬂets and pamphlets. These sentiments remained conﬁned to either far-right or far-left publications.47 Instead, the theme of national survival was, and remained, central.48 The fundamental concern of the German movement was the reliability of US protection, given that the Soviet Union now appeared to be able to hit the United States with intercontinental missiles, and given that Germany was to become a battleﬁeld in a nuclear war. Like the West German Government, members of the German movement feared that the United States would not risk Washington, DC, or New York City for Berlin. Also, not unlike their government, they feared that Germany would become a battleﬁeld for a war fought with conventional or tactical nuclear weapons.49 Behind these arguments loomed the experience of destruction during World War II, as the gloomy name of the campaign “against atomic death” reveals.50 They believed that their government endangered their most fundamental security needs by following an alliance policy too closely. In the eyes of the West German protesters, the Adenauer Government’s alliance policy thus drastically reduced its legitimacy and its ability to protect its citizens. Nevertheless, most West German protesters did not fundamentally question Adenauer’s policy of political integration into the West. Instead, they sought to establish different foreign policy priorities. They referred to plans for military disengagement in Central Europe as alternatives to the Adenauer government’s policies for strengthening the Western alliance. The aim of these plans was to lock Eastern and Western Europe into a geostrategic stalemate. George F. Kennan’s proposals for neutralization, which he had voiced in the BBC’s Reith lectures in late 1957 and which were published in Germany in 1958, were especially popular among West German activists.51 Even during the seemingly more radical second phase of the West German movement, advocacy of programs that linked social and foreign policies remained unpopular. None of the Easter March publications in the early and mid-1960s ever suggested the Federal Republic’s political or military exit from NATO, and many even warned against advocating a military disassociation from the Western alliance. The Easter Marches continued to advocate disengagement proposals and plans for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe at a time when the SPD had already abandoned such plans.52 The observation that the defense of West Germany with nuclear weapons would bring about Germany’s end continued to be their central argument.53 Even when West German protesters began to campaign for a worldwide end to the arms race, they did not demand an end of “Natopolitan” ideology. West

Diverging perceptions of security 139 German protesters did not regard NATO as the central problem of security. They blamed the lack of progress towards a multilateral détente on the West German Government. West German activists argued that the goal of rolling back communism had remained the “lie” upon which Adenauer had constructed the Federal Republic’s integration into NATO in 1955, while other Western governments had already advocated policies of détente. Unlike the Adenauer Government, West German protesters argued, other governments took account of the irrationality of war in the atomic age and of the apparent liberalization in the Eastern bloc in the early 1960s.54 West German protesters thus echoed foreign critics of Adenauer’s hard-line stance.55 Although the West German protests were less radical than those of their British counterparts, the West German protesters’ emphasis on survival was non-negotiable within the West German political system. It was this factor that made the protests so resilient. The speciﬁc effects of the Cold War on West German society reinforced the protesters’ radicalism. As the West German activists advocated new politics that lay outside the parameters of the SPD, and thus outside respectable non-communist politics, it proved difﬁcult to reintegrate them into the conventional framework of politics.56 France: Gaullism as the functional equivalent of social protests The situation that presented itself in France was of an entirely different nature than the situations in Britain and West Germany. The government in France had, unlike that in Germany, the freedom and, unlike that in Britain, also the will to disassociate itself from the security imperatives of the Western alliance. In France, the extra-parliamentary movements made a very strong connection between foreign and social policies, but they faced a government that did the same and thus weakened the protest movements. President Charles de Gaulle’s unilateral nuclear security policy formed the functional equivalent of the anti-nuclear weapons protests in Britain and West Germany. The French solution to NATO’s nuclear dilemmas consisted precisely of an independent policy that relied on the creation of a nuclear force de frappe. The idea of a force de frappe was not “invented” by de Gaulle. It can be traced back to the attempts by governments in the Fourth Republic to reform NATO, invoke Article 2, and bring other parts of the globe into NATO’s purview. But France under President de Gaulle disassociated itself from NATO’s integrated military structure.57 The speciﬁc political situation, combined with certain historical experiences, meant that the French strategic nuclear force could become “a condensation symbol for the political stabilization of the state, the economic and technological modernization of French society, the maintenance of strong and effective defence . . . and an independent and relatively autonomous role of France on the world stage.”58 Therefore, the lack of a large-scale anti-nuclear weapons movement in France, rather than the ideas of the small movements that existed, sheds light on NATO’s crisis during the 1960s.59

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As in Britain and West Germany, the years 1954–55 appear as the crucial turning point. It was then that the socialist governments in France embarked on a program to nuclearize France’s forces in order to strengthen its position within the Atlantic alliance.60 What was new about de Gaulle’s stance was that he sought to transcend the military straitjacket of that alliance. By 1958, all other avenues of French assertion in the superpower conﬂict had led to nothing. There had been the humiliating withdrawal from Indochina, the escalation of an unwinnable colonial war in Algeria, the erosion of French inﬂuence within NATO in the wake of the nuclearization of NATO strategy, France’s increasingly inferior status vis-à-vis Britain, and the economic revival of the Federal Republic.61 At the same time, in the mid-1950s, Britain’s example had demonstrated that medium powers could develop their own deterrent.62 De Gaulle thus managed to bind the ambiguities of the French state at home and French foreign policy together in the development of an independent deterrent. For de Gaulle, therefore, the French nuclear program was essentially political.63 De Gaulle’s approach of linking politics with military affairs thus bore a striking resemblance to the structure of arguments advanced by the British and French New Left, but it differed sharply from the purely stabilizing approach of the West German protesters. Despite the SFIO’s initial disagreement, the French strategic nuclear force had become the touchstone of the French foreign policy consensus by 1969.64 The absence of a major anti-nuclear weapons movement in the early Fifth Republic was primarily due to a foreign policy consensus that reached beyond the political parties into French society, and thus seemed to make protests connected to NATO’s nuclear dilemmas unnecessary. The “presidentialization” of politics in the Fifth Republic, and the fact that, as a result, pressure group activity was organized almost exclusively by political parties, reinforced this consensus. Moreover, opposition to France’s ofﬁcial defense policy had traditionally meant taking up arms, rather than opposing armaments. Thus, for large segments of both the Right and the Left in France, national legitimacy had gradually come to be seen as being guaranteed by armed forces. Moreover, “paciﬁsm” in France was crucially connected with the ambiguous heritage of appeasement, the rather infamous reputation of allowing German dominance on the Continent, and, even more strongly than in the Federal Republic, the accusation of communist subversion.65 Conversely, the Bomb could be seen in France as a way of avoiding not only any future war and invasion, but also any future defeat. It could be sold to the French public as a means of preventing war and combat, and of protecting French territory. It thus helped to put memories of foreign occupation to rest. De Gaulle’s military (albeit not political) disassociation from NATO, which stressed that independence meant security, was therefore easy to communicate. De Gaulle’s calls for the dissolution of the blocs even echoed the demands of the nouvelle gauche from a different perspective and also the demands of antinuclear weapons movements in other countries. While the possession of nuclear

Diverging perceptions of security 141 weapons was associated with death and destruction in the Federal Republic, in France it could thus signify peace and stability.66 Most of the energies of more mainstream peace protests were taken up by the protests against the war in Algeria, a war on which the French Communist Party’s line was highly ambiguous. The only French movement against nuclear weapons comparable to those in Britain and West Germany was Claude Bourdet’s non-violent peace campaign linked to the French nouvelle gauche. The formative moment for the French New Left was the Algerian war which, for many on the left, appeared to have revealed the SFIO’s and the PCF’s bankruptcy.67 The nouvelle gauche debated policies very similar to those of the British New Left, attempting to establish a European socialist alliance that went beyond the Cold War. Yet until 1963–64, the French movement never assumed an appeal similar to that of its West German and British counterparts. After 1963–64, however, the issue of nuclear weapons remained salient in French politics at a time when it had gone out of focus in Britain and West Germany.68 When debating foreign policy, protesters also fought about different concepts of France. It was this feature that made the French protests more challenging for the government from early on. The speciﬁc character of the French debate was that protesters and governments argued within the same frame of reference, seeing social and foreign policies as inextricably linked. Here, de Gaulle’s decidedly Western ideological stance clashed with those new leftists who advocated policies of a third and socialist camp. In a way, France’s disassociation from NATO’s military command structure may have been less important for the coherence of the Western bloc than it seemed to be at the time, as the West’s ideological coherence had been preserved. 69

Conclusion This analysis has repercussions for our understanding of NATO’s crisis of the 1960s. It re-emphasizes the polycentrism of the debate at the time, not only with regard to governmental positions, but also with regard to the positions of social actors. Moreover, the analysis of the observations of these social actors suggests a novel emphasis for the debates on NATO history in the context of détente. It highlights the very different concepts of détente within the different societies, resulting in very different responses to NATO during this decade. While protesters in all countries regarded the crisis of NATO as severe, only a vocal minority amongst the protesters in Britain and France wanted to divorce their countries militarily and politically from NATO. For the majority of protesters in Britain and West Germany, NATO’s problems moved out of sight with the conclusion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. A younger generation of protesters in both countries now began to focus on the conﬂict in Vietnam. Neither the international situation nor social conditions at home can be singled out as the dominant factors inﬂuencing the movements. The debates reﬂected the ways in which the three movements conceptualized issues of

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international security as domestic social problems. The fragile international situation acted as a prompt, but the movements’ responses were more than mere reﬂections of the international strategic balance and international problems. They depended on the very speciﬁc domestic political conditions, and they were based on national experiences and memories. The degree to which the protesters framed these issues as national problems is remarkable. Initially, the British protesters campaigned for British unilateral disarmament. From 1960 onwards, there were calls from within the movement that Britain leave NATO as part of this unilateral policy. The West German protesters were equally worried about nuclear tests and US nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic, but they campaigned primarily for the abandonment of plans put forward by the Adenauer Government to equip the German army with nuclear-capable equipment. Only from the mid-1960s on did the West German movement become increasingly concerned with worldwide disarmament. In France, extra-parliamentary protests were either linked to the PCF’s political goals, or they emphasized the overcoming of the Cold War and thus the dissolution of NATO by means of a socialist foreign policy. The contemporaneous occurrence of national concerns about NATO’s nuclear weapons policies in the three countries highlights the fundamental dilemma of the Atlantic alliance: it brought nations together whose conceptions of national security and diplomacy differed.70 The arguments that the three movements put forward were grounded in the diverging perceptions of security within the Western alliance even before the NATO crisis in the mid-1960s. The protests thus preﬁgured the debates among NATO members in the 1960s, albeit with different arguments. For the protesters, NATO’s nuclearization did not contribute to guaranteeing a “long peace,”71 but rather to “organized peacelessness.”72 The size, strength, and degree of radicalism of the movements thus depended on how well the protesters perceived their governments as representing these national conceptions of security and diplomacy. This was the main reason why the protests in France were subdued, in comparison with those in Britain and West Germany. As the French Government under de Gaulle already addressed the dilemmas stemming from the nuclearization of NATO in a way that could command a broad consensus within French politics, and as de Gaulle linked social and foreign policy, French protests were submerged within the government’s position on international security. The majority of French foreign policy protests had to do with Algeria, rather than with nuclear weapons issues. Due to its speciﬁc position within NATO, the government of semi-sovereign West Germany, by contrast, had to follow US prescriptions more closely than the other allies. Protests in Germany were therefore more radical and stronger than in the other countries. As Britain followed a policy of “independence in concert,” the majority of British protesters could be re-integrated into the conventional channels of the political system: the British government managed to maintain the image of acting in what protesters regarded as the “national interest.”

Diverging perceptions of security 143 The root for the emergence of these diverging perceptions of security in the NATO countries lay in the period after the geopolitical stabilization of the European Cold War after the 1955 Geneva Summit. This period saw the nuclearization of NATO strategy by the United States at a time when many national governments, particularly the West German one, still focused on conventional armaments. The decline in credibility of US nuclear defense for Europe in the wake of the Suez crisis, and of the Soviet development of intercontinental missile capabilities, further contributed to the perception in West European societies that the security needs of Europe and the United States were different. An emphasis on the different security needs within NATO as the underlying reason for NATO’s crisis opens up room for a different set of questions about international relations during this period. These questions would address the reasons why these issues were discussed openly by the British and West German governments only in the early 1960s, rather than in the late 1950s. West Germany’s lack of full sovereignty and Britain’s close ties with the United States can explain a part, but not the whole, of the story. The period between 1958 and 1963, which is conventionally seen as one of transition that led to the construction of peace in Europe, may then, perhaps, appear as one that delayed, rather than accelerated, the progress towards a European settlement.73

Notes 1 David N. Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1983). 2 See for a similar approach Eckart Conze, “Staatsräson und nationale Interessen: Die ‘Atlantiker-Gaullisten’-Debatte in der westdeutschen Politik- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte der 1960er Jahre,” in Deutschland, Großbritannien, Amerika: Politik, Gesellschaft und Internationale Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert; Festschrift für Gustav Schmidt zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Ursula Lehmkuhl, Clemens A. Wurm, and Hubert Zimmermann (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2003), pp. 197–226. 3 The term “ambiguity” is taken from John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1964 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), especially pp. 4–5. 4 On the more general background, see Hans Braun, “Das Streben nach ‘Sicherheit’ in den 50er Jahren: Soziale und politische Ursachen und Erscheinungsweisen, ” Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 18 (1978), pp. 279–306 and Eckart Conze, “Sicherheit als Kultur. Überlegungen zu einer ‘modernen Politikgeschichte’ der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 53, no. 3 (2005), pp. 357–80. 5 Andreas Wenger and Jeremi Suri, “At the Crossroads of Diplomatic and Social History: The Nuclear Revolution, Dissent and Détente,” Cold War History 1, no. 3 (April 2001), pp. 1–42; Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). 6 For the 1980s, see, for example, William K. Domke, Richard C. Eichenberg, and Catherine M. Kelleher, “Consensus Lost? Domestic Politics and the ‘Crisis’ in NATO,” World Politics 39, no. 3 (1987), pp. 382–407; Jeffrey Herf, War by other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles (New York: Free Press, 1991). 7 Niklas Luhmann, Ecological Communication (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), pp. 15–21. 8 This follows Gustav Schmidt, “Strukturen des ‘Kalten Krieges’ im Wandel,” in

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15

16 17

18

19

20

21

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Vojtech Mastny and Gustav Schmidt, Konfrontationsmuster des Kalten Krieges, 1946–1956 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003), pp. 1–380, here p. 9. See Saki Dockrill and Günter Bischof, “Geneva: The Fleeting Opportunity for Détente,” in Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955, ed. Saki Dockrill and Günter Bischof (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), pp. 1–20. See Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). Schmidt, “Strukturen des ‘Kalten Krieges,’” pp. 375–80; Robert E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 189. Andreas Wenger, Living with Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nuclear Weapons (Lanham: Rowman & Littleﬁeld, 1997), pp. 248, 319–22. Ibid., p. 85. On the emergence of that consensus, see Jost Dülffer, Im Zeichen der Gewalt: Frieden und Krieg im 20. Jahrhundert (Cologne: Böhlau, 2003), pp. 219–37. On the implications for the division of Germany, see Helga Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung: Zur Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1955–1982 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1986), pp. 30–1, 66–7. On the concept of “framing,” see Mayer N. Zald, “Culture, Ideology and Strategic Framing,” in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 261–74. Richard Taylor, Against the Bomb: The British Peace Movement, 1958–1965 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). Hans Karl Rupp, Außerparlamentarische Opposition in der Ära Adenauer: Der Kampf gegen die Atombewaffnung in den fünziger Jahren; Eine Studie zur innenpolitischen Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik (Cologne: Pahl Rugenstein, 1984); Karl A. Otto, Vom Ostermarsch zur APO: Geschichte der ausserparlamentarischen Opposition in der Bundesrepublik, 1960–1970 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1982); Mark Cioc, Pax Atomica: The Nuclear Defense Debate in West Germany During the Adenauer Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). “Manifestations dans plusieurs villes,” Le Monde, 19 November 1963; “Contre ‘la force de frappe’,” Le Monde, 11 November 1963; Beatrice Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), p. 93. Sudhir Hazareesingh, Political Traditions in Modern France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 178–206; Jolyon Howorth, France: The Politics of Peace (London: Merlin, 1984); David Hanley, “The Parties and the Nuclear Consensus,” in Defence and Dissent in Contemporary France, ed. Jolyon Howorth and Patricia Chilton (London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp. 75–93. Wilfried Loth, “Blockbildung und Entspannung: Strukturen des Ost-West-Konﬂikts, 1953–1956,” in Zwischen Kaltem Krieg und Entspannung: Sicherheits- und Deutschlandpolitik der Bundesrepublik im Mächtesystem der Jahre 1953–1956, ed. Bruno Thoß and Hans-Erich Volkmann (Boppard: Boldt, 1988), pp. 9–23; Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963 (New York: Edward Burlingame, 1991). Lawrence Freedman, Martin Navias, and Nicolas Wheeler, Independence in Concert: The British Rationale for Possessing Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear History Project: Occasional Papers 5 (College Park: Center for International Security Studies, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland, 1989), especially p. 4. Ian Clark and Nicolas J. Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1955 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Lawrence Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1980). Jan Melissen highlights the political (in contrast to the military) importance of nuclear weapons in his

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23 24 25 26 27

28 29 30

31 32

33

34

35

36 37

38 39 40 41

Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning, 1955–1958 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). See the rather negative assessment by Nigel Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). Mark Phythian, “CND’s Cold War,” Contemporary British History 15, no. 3 (2001), pp. 133–56. Cmnd. 124: Defence: Outline of Future Policy (London: HMSO, 1957). Taylor, Against the Bomb, p. 25. Saki Dockrill, “The Eden Plan and European Security,” in Cold War Respite, pp. 161–89. See Wayland Young, Strategy for Survival: First Steps in Nuclear Disarmament (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1959); M. Saeter, “Nuclear Disengagement Efforts, 1955–80: Politics of Status Quo or Political Change?” in Nuclear Disengagement in Europe, ed. Sverre Lodgaard and Mark Thee (London and New York: Taylor and Francis, 1983), pp. 53–69. See John Callaghan, Cold War, Crisis and Conﬂict: The CPGB, 1951–68 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2003), pp. 145–9. Jonathan Schneer, “Hopes Deferred or Shattered: The British Labour Left and the Third Force Movement, 1945–49,” Journal of Modern History 56, no. 1 (1984), pp. 197–226. Lawrence Black, “‘The Bitterest Enemies of Communism’: Labour Revisionists, Atlanticism and the Cold War,” Contemporary British History 15, no. 3 (2001), pp. 26–62; Hugh Wilford, The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War: Calling the Tune? (London: Frank Cass, 2003), especially Chapters 2 and 7. Meredith Veldman, Fantasy, the Bomb and the Greening of Britain: Romantic Protest, 1945–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 139–45. J. B. Priestley, “Britain and the Nuclear Bombs,” New Statesman 54 (2 November 1957), pp. 554–6; Stefan Berger and Darren Lilleker, “The British Labour Party and the German Democratic Republic During the Era of Non-Recognition, 1949–1973,” Historical Journal 45, no. 2 (2002), pp. 433–58. For an overview of their ideas, see Michael Kenny, The First New Left: British Intellectuals after Stalin (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1995), pp. 168–96. For good examples, see Edward P. Thompson, “Revolution,” New Left Review 3 (1960), pp. 3–9. John Rex and Peter Worsley, “Campaign for a Foreign Policy,” New Left Review 4 (1960), pp. 49–62. On the emergence of this consensus, see Martin Conway, “The Rise and Fall of Western Europe’s Democratic Age, 1945–1973,” Contemporary European History 13, no. 1 (2004), pp. 67–88. “The New Left: General Statement Adopted by a Joint Meeting of the Editorial Boards of the New Reasoner and the Universities and Left Review on Sunday, 26 April 1959,” Brynmore Jones Library, University of Hull, UK (BJL), John Saville papers, JS-112. Edward P. Thompson, “Active neutrality,” manuscript, n.d., c.1959, BJL, JS-109; Peter Worsley, “Imperial retreat,” in Out of Apathy, ed. Edward P. Thompson (London: New Left Books, 1960), pp. 101–40. Stuart Hall, “N.A.T.O. and the Alliances,” CND pamphlet, n.d., c.1961, p. 4; John Gittings and Richard Gott, “Nato’s ﬁnal decade,” London Region CND pamphlet, 1964, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK (MRC), MSS 181–4 CND, pp. 2, 13, 23. Hall, “N.A.T.O. and the Alliances,” p. 5. Michael Barratt Brown, “Third World or Third Force?” New Left Review 20 (1963), pp. 32–6. Thompson, “Active neutrality;” CND April Notes, 1965, MRC, MSS 181–4. Thompson to Saville, 9 November 1957, BJL, JS-109.

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42 Peace News, 11 April 1958, p. 8; Edward P. Thompson, “Outside the Whale,” in Out of Apathy, pp. 141–94, here pp. 178, 186. 43 James N. Rosenau, “Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, ed. R. Barry Farrell (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 65; Wolfram Hanrieder, “Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy,” American Political Science Review 61, no. 3 (1967), pp. 971–82 44 Timothy Ireland, “Building NATO’s Nuclear Posture, 1950–65,” in The Nuclear Confrontation in Europe, ed. Jeffrey D. Boutwell, Paul Doty, and Gregory F. Treverton. (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 5–43; Uwe Nerlich, “Die nuklearen Dilemmas der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” Europa Archiv 20 (1965), pp. 637–52; Peter Fischer, “Die Reaktion der Bundesregierung auf die Nuklearisierung der westlichen Verteidigung, 1952–1958,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 52, no. 1 (1993), pp. 105–32. 45 See, as one of the many examples, Sicherungsgruppe des BKA (Dr. Brücker) to Interior Minister, Dept. VI A 3, 24 April 1958, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Germany (BAK), B106/16053. 46 Arnold Sywottek, “Die Opposition der SPD und der KPD gegen die westdeutsche Aufrüstung in der Tradition sozialdemokratischer und kommunistischer Friedenspolitik seit dem Ersten Weltkrieg,” in Frieden, Gewalt, Sozialismus: Studien zur Geschichte der sozialistischen Arbeiterbewegung, ed. Wolfgang Huber and Johannes Schwerdtfeger (Stuttgart: Klett, 1976), pp. 496–610. 47 Alexander Gallus, Die Neutralisten: Verfechter eines vereinten Deutschlands zwischen Ost und West, 1945–1990 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2001), Chapters 6 and 7. 48 For parallels in Japan, see John Whittier Treat, Writing Ground Zero: Japanese Literature and the Atomic Bomb (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). 49 For the similarities with the position within the West German military, see Christian Greiner, Klaus A. Maier, and Heinz Rebhan, Die NATO als Militärallianz: Strategie, Organisation und nukleare Kontrolle im Bündnis, 1949 bis 1959 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2003). 50 Michael Geyer, “Cold War Angst: The Case of the West-German Opposition to Rearmament and Nuclear Weapons,” in The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1969, ed. Hanna Schissler (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 376–408; Holger Nehring, “Cold War, Apocalypse and Peaceful Atoms: Interpretations of Nuclear Energy in the British and West German Anti-NuclearWeapons Movements, 1955–1964,” Historical Social Research 29, no. 3 (2004), pp. 150–70. 51 See George F. Kennan, Russia, the Atom, and the West (London: Oxford University Press, 1958); “Kennan gegen Atomwaffen für den Kontinent,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 December 1957; Hartmut Soell, Helmut Schmidt: Vernunft und Leidenschaft (Munich: DVA, 2003), pp. 311–58; “Das Selbstverständnis von Friedenskämpfern,” neue kritik, January 1961, p. 22; “Gegen Atomwaffen in Ost und West,” neue kritik, May 1961, pp. 31–2. 52 See Soell, Helmut Schmidt, pp. 333–62, 473–85; Hartmut Soell, Fritz Erler, Eine politische Biographie, vol. 1 (Berlin and Bonn: Dietz, 1976), pp. 337–489. 53 See, for example, Helmut Gollwitzer, “Ostermarschrede ’64,” BAK, ZSg. 1/262–1; Heinz Kraschutzki, “Koexistenz oder No-Existenz,” Friedensrundschau 12, no. 3 (1958), pp. 3–5. 54 Arno Klönne, “Zur Situation der Europa- und Deutschlandpolitik,” Informationen zur Abrüstung, no. 38/39 (September/October 1966), BAK, ZSg. 1–262/3, p. 5. 55 Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), pp. 270–81; Beatrice Heuser, “Stalin as Hitler’s Successor: Western Interpretations of the Soviet Threat,” in Securing Peace in Europe, 1945–1962: Thoughts for the Post-Cold War Era, ed. Beatrice Heuser and Robert O’Neill (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 17–40.

Diverging perceptions of security 147 56 Rolf Elker, ed., Beiträge zur Geschichte des SDS (Berlin: Asta FU Berlin, 1987), p. 45. 57 Frédéric Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance (Lanham: Rowman & Littleﬁeld, 2001); Frédéric Bozo, “Détente versus Alliance: France, the United States and the Politics of the Harmel Report, 1964–1968,” Contemporary European History 17, no. 3 (1998), pp. 343–60; Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 93–123. 58 Wolf Mendl, Deterrence and Persuasion: French Nuclear Armament in the Context of National Policy, 1945–1969 (London: Faber, 1970), p. 81; Michael M. Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), Chapters 1 and 2; Gérard Bossuat, “France and the Leadership of the West in the 1950s,” in Securing Peace in Europe, ed. Heuser and O’Neill, pp. 105–24; Maurice Vaïsse, “Le Choix atomique de la France, 1945–1958,” Vingtième Siècle 36, no. 1 (1992), pp. 21–30. 59 On public support for French nuclear weapons in the late 1950s, see Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities? p. 140; Philippe Engamarre, “Les partis politiques français face à la bombe atomique,” Revue de la Defence Nationale 43, no. 2 (February 1987), pp. 42. 60 Mendl, Deterrence and Persuasion, pp. 95–101. 61 On the importance of containing German strength, see Heuser, Nuclear mentalities? pp. 109–15; Mendl, Deterrence and Persuasion, p. 35. 62 Mendl, Deterrence and Persuasion, pp. 39–48. 63 Andreas Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity: NATO’s Transformation and the Multilateralization of Détente, 1966–1968,” Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 1 (Winter 2004), pp. 22–74, here p. 30. 64 La force de frappe, special edition of L’Esprit 31/32 (December 1963); Jules Moch, “A propos de la force de frappe,” Revue socialiste 162 (April 1963), pp. 337–48; Lionel de Tinguy, “A propos de l’atome,” Forum France 47 (March 1963), pp. 10–15; Philip G. Cerny, “Gaullism, Nuclear Weapons and the State,” in Defence and Dissent in Contemporary France, ed. Jolyon Howorth and Patricia Chilton (London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp. 46–74, here p. 51. 65 Howorth, Politics of Peace, pp. 15, 22. 66 On a contemporary assessment of the advantages that nuclear weapons brought, see Robert J. Lieber, “The French Nuclear Force: A Strategic and Political Evaluation,” International Affairs 42, no. 3 (1966), p. 428. On the general background, see Philip G. Cerny, Politics of Grandeur: Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle’s Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). 67 Sudhir Hazareesingh, Intellectuals and the French Communist Party: Disillusion and Decline (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), esp. pp. 138–40. 68 This is the argument in Beatrice Heuser, Nuclear mentalities? p. 93. 69 Heuser, Nuclear mentalities? pp. 120–6; and the chapter by Jeremi Suri in the same volume. 70 On the speciﬁcity of US traditions of diplomacy, see Frederik Logevall, “A Critique of Containment,” Diplomatic History 28, no. 4 (2004), pp. 473–99. 71 Gaddis admits, however, that his use means stretching the meaning of “peace” a bit: John Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 216, 245. 72 This term comes from Dieter Senghaas, Abschreckung und Frieden: Studien zur Kritik organisierter Friedlosigkeit (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969). 73 This would be an alternative reading to that by Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, pp. 352, 398, and by Andreas Wenger, “Der lange Weg zur Stabilität: Kennedy, Chrutschow und das gemeinsame Interesse der Supermächte am Status quo in Europa,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 46, no. 1 (1998), pp. 69–99.

9

From hardware to software The end of the MLF and the rise of the Nuclear Planning Group Andrew Priest

Introduction The history of the multilateral nuclear force (MLF) and plans for nuclear “hardware” sharing in NATO has been covered in great detail by scholars in recent years.1 Many different aspects have been explored, including the plans for alternative forms of nuclear sharing in the mid-1960s. However, far less attention has been paid to the development of what became the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), the “software” solution to the nuclear “hardware” issue in Europe. This chapter examines the relationship between plans for a nuclear hardware sharing agreement and the evolution of the Nuclear Planning Group. Speciﬁcally, it explores US President Lyndon B. Johnson’s decision at the end of 1964 to change the course of American NATO policy and not to press for a quick solution to the nuclear sharing problem, either in the form of the MLF or any other US-led venture. But it also shows how continued pressure from members of the State Department and the West German Government to create the MLF, or some other form of hardware sharing, encouraged US Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to suggest that consultation on nuclear matters between allies would be a more appropriate measure for the alliance. Advocates of nuclear hardware sharing believed that allied, and speciﬁcally German, participation in the nuclear affairs of the alliance was essential, and the only way to do this was to make the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) a member of a joint NATO nuclear force. Yet as this view became less popular within the US administration and NATO, so other concerns began to dominate US thinking as regards nuclear affairs, and McNamara was able to press ahead with his scheme for a permanent NATO body to consult on nuclear matters. Therefore, this episode provides a wider perspective on US relations with Europe during the Johnson administration.2 The NPG proved to be both a sensible and successful alternative to the MLF, and one that has endured. In contrast, the MLF was fraught with difﬁculties. It was a logistically complex and potentially expensive proposal for all countries that agreed to participate, and many in Europe feared that these difﬁculties were not offset by the possible beneﬁts of nuclear ownership and control. In particular, the issue of the control of nuclear

From hardware to software 149 warheads in times of peace and war remained hugely contentious and problematic. The US Government was unwilling to cede control to the Germans, fearing that this would antagonize so many in Europe and, especially, in the USSR. In contrast, the NPG offered the Germans an opportunity to participate in the nuclear affairs of the alliance without providing them with nuclear hardware, which antagonized the Soviets so much. In the mid-1960s, as the United States and the USSR attempted to broker a non-proliferation treaty (NPT), the MLF remained an outstanding issue. While the United States wanted to increase the role of the Federal Republic of Germany in NATO, the Soviets objected to a NPT that did not explicitly exclude the possibility of a MLF. The development of the NPG allowed the Johnson administration to advance its policy in the areas of nuclear sharing and non-proliferation simultaneously, thus making progress on the NPT. Therefore, the entire MLF-NPG process at this time provides insights into both relations between the United States and Europe, and also, more speciﬁcally, the management of German–Soviet relations. It sheds light on developing relations between the United States and Europe at this time, standing in contrast to tensions that developed over the US war in Vietnam. This episode also demonstrates some of the internal dynamics of the Johnson administration’s dealings with Europe and NATO.

NATO and nuclear sharing Plans for a NATO multilateral nuclear force originated at the end of the Eisenhower administration. The main advocates of a MLF were a group of State Department ofﬁcials who believed that the dangers of a shortfall in mediumrange ballistic missiles in Europe, as well as West German interest in the nuclear affairs of the alliance, could both be dealt with by sharing nuclear hardware in a new military force to be assigned to NATO. This idea became much more clearly developed during the early part of John F. Kennedy’s administration, and the new president made a statement endorsing a multilateral force approach to NATO nuclear affairs only months after taking ofﬁce.3 By the time a meeting between Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan took place at Nassau in December 1962, the basic features of the MLF were well established. The MLF would be a naval ﬂeet of some 25 surface ships, nuclear armed, most probably with Polaris A3 missiles, to be manned, owned, and “controlled” by various subscribing nations. By this time it was clear that the MLF policy was being driven by a group of State Department ofﬁcials (sometimes called the “theologians”), who saw the MLF as a way to bind West Germany into the alliance and give non-nuclear nations a role, thus encouraging stability in Europe. Despite some interest in establishing the MLF, particularly in West Germany, much European opposition existed.4 French President Charles de Gaulle rejected the proposal in January 1963 (simultaneously vetoing the British application to join the European Economic Community) and continued to develop an independent nuclear force for France. De Gaulle was convinced that relying

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predominantly on the United States for the supply and control of nuclear weapons was not in France’s interests, and although the British had tentatively explored the idea of bilaterally sharing nuclear information with the French, this had amounted to little. De Gaulle was also dissatisﬁed that the Nassau conference had been convened with little or no attention paid to France.5 Moreover, other key NATO nations, such as Britain and Italy, remained ambivalent. With Britain now promised US Polaris missiles of its own following the 1962 Nassau conference, there were few military reasons to sign up to a jointly owned and controlled force that would result in more costs and no discernible extra beneﬁts. And although Italy was becoming increasingly interested in alliance nuclear affairs, the Italian Government’s attitude towards a MLF was one of “qualiﬁed endorsement” in the ﬁrst months of 1963,6 although the issue of how much control nations other than the United States (which would have retained a veto, at least for the ﬁrst few years) would have remained the most contentious. Even in West Germany itself, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer expressed doubts during his ﬁnal months in ofﬁce. Kennedy therefore only cautiously endorsed the MLF throughout the last year of his presidency and had begun to reassess his attitude towards it by the summer of 1963.7 Yet many in Kennedy’s State Department remained wedded to the nuclear sharing idea and, after Kennedy’s death, they placed pressure on new president Johnson to press forward. Johnson initially supported their position and made positive statements on the MLF in April 1964, and also in June 1964, when he met with new West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard.8 However, when Johnson examined the MLF proposals in detail at the end of 1964, with the prospect of agreeing to a MLF charter with other NATO nations early in 1965, he found them wanting. He saw that the US congress was opposed to a MLF and that expending substantial political capital on it was unwise, when he required that so much congressional attention be paid to his ambitious domestic political program. Johnson also recognized that the considerable opposition in Europe would make it difﬁcult to broker an agreement in NATO, in the short-term, at least. In particular, he came to understand the position of the new British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, with whom he was to meet in December.9 Wilson’s presentation of alternative proposals for a force that combined various existing nuclear and non-nuclear forces and integrated a mixed-manned element into what became known as the Atlantic nuclear force (ANF) further convinced Johnson that a MLF should not be pressed on the Europeans. Wilson’s motivations in proposing the ANF are suspect. Wilson himself claimed that the ANF proposal was designed to kill the MLF. Yet more recently, some historians have suggested that his aims were more complex and that the ANF was a genuine contribution to the nuclear sharing debate and was intended as a realistic proposal.10 Wilson’s contribution and Johnson’s growing skepticism led directly to the president issuing national security action memorandum (NSAM) 322 in December 1964 in which he expressly directed the secretary of state and secretary of defense not to press speciﬁc nuclear sharing formulas on US allies.11 Despite

From hardware to software 151 this, in the weeks and months after this decision, the pressure for some kind of nuclear sharing arrangement remained.12 The original purpose behind the MLF – to contain German nuclear aspirations – had not changed substantially, and the president remained steadfast in his belief that the Germans were central to progress in the Cold War in Europe.13 With the MLF now a lesser priority for the United States and no new initiative on the NATO agenda, plans for nuclear sharing were in a state of ﬂux during the ﬁrst six months of 1965. This provided opportunities for State Department supporters of nuclear sharing to continue with their campaign for such a solution. This group was led by US Undersecretary of State George W. Ball. A few weeks after the president had issued NSAM 322, Ball assured Senator Thomas H. Kuchel (Republican, California) that the MLF had not been dropped and that “this was a decision on our part” to bring the Europeans into the nuclear arena without arousing the chagrin of President de Gaulle. He also expressed continued interest in the British proposal for the Atlantic nuclear force.14 Similarly, in April Ball met with the British ambassador in Washington, Lord Harlech, and with British Permanent Representative to NATO Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh and told them that the United States was still “very interested in the political components of the ANF/MLF.”15 The German Government under Ludwig Erhard also remained deeply dissatisﬁed with Johnson’s new position on the MLF. This was partially because a possible nuclear sharing arrangement had been part of US policy for so long, but the Germans were also concerned that the British would not produce a satisfactory solution to the nuclear sharing problem without some US pressure. Moreover, this was tied to German notions that US support for German reuniﬁcation was weakening.16 Before the elections in September 1965, however, Erhard was anxious not to press the MLF issue too hard, for fear of stirring up opposition in his own country.17

The nuclear planning group In the middle of the year, another strand re-emerged from debates that had taken place earlier in the decade.18 At the NATO ministers meeting, held from 31 May to 1 June in Paris, Robert McNamara, according to British reports, “‘out of the blue’ and apparently with no consultation of the State Department” suggested a “defence ministers select committee” to consult on nuclear issues.19 The committee was, McNamara said, intended to improve allied communications, consultation, and participation in conjunction with other measures. This proposal was not entirely new – a consultation body for NATO had been discussed at the Athens meeting in May 1962 – but this announcement substantially changed the political complexion of the nuclear sharing issue.20 It is clear that McNamara believed the committee idea was a viable alternative to the MLF, and although the way he circumvented consultation with other departments before announcing the proposal might suggest that he did not want to antagonize State Department members who still clung to some kind of

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hardware solution, State Ofﬁcial John Leddy claimed that McNamara pressed for the consultation in spite of protests from State Department colleagues.21 And while initially McNamara was eager to assert that this new proposal was in no way intended to cut across or replace the MLF–ANF discussions,22 he later claimed that he had only introduced the idea when it was clear that the MLF would fail, and with hindsight he acknowledged that he would have introduced the concept much earlier, in order to draw Europeans into nuclear affairs.23 In Europe, neither the British nor the Germans fully recognized the implications of the consultative committee idea at this time, or embraced the concept.24 During a meeting with McNamara in London immediately after the Paris conference, British Secretary of State for Defense Denis Healey claimed that “in Paris it became clear that our ANF idea was [the] front runner and the idea of switching its control to SACEUR [the Strategic Allied Commander Europe] was gaining support.”25 The British Foreign Ofﬁce reiterated its support for the ANF later the same month in the British NATO Intermediate Review. “In the context of their proposals for an Atlantic Nuclear Force HMG have signiﬁed their intention to commit their four atomic powered submarines, armed with Polaris missiles, to NATO for the duration of the Alliance,” it said.26 The Germans also remained cautious, suspecting that the new proposals might supersede the MLF.27 Yet still Erhard had to play down talk of nuclear sharing in the run-up to elections.28 MLF advocates objected to the consultation proposal for the very reason that it would obviate the necessity of such a force. MLF advocate and NATO Ambassador Thomas Finletter said he proposed “to recommend to Mr McNamara to drop the whole idea of arranging these consultations in NATO and to make such arrangements as he liked with individual Ministers of Defence.” This suggestion by the NATO ambassador to essentially circumvent the North Atlantic Council (NAC) as a forum for consultations suggests the degree to which Finletter and others remained attached to the nuclear sharing option and also indicates the threat that McNamara’s committee idea now posed to them.29 Key ofﬁcials from the State Department also objected to McNamara’s proposals, arguing that nuclear sharing still offered the best solution to the German problem and that the British could use consultation as a bargaining chip to prevent nuclear sharing from progressing.30 As soon as the elections in the Federal Republic were over in September and Erhard had been returned as chancellor, however, nuclear sharing became more important again.31 In a speech to the Bundestag on 10 November, Erhard stated: We are thinking in terms of a joint nuclear organization, and we are participating in relevant deliberation with the allied powers. We have repeatedly made known that we do not desire national control of nuclear weapons.32 The theologians also renewed their campaign for a hardware solution. At the start of December, Chairman of the State Department Policy Planning Council and MLF advocate Walt Whitman Rostow wrote to the president on the eve of a

From hardware to software 153 visit by Harold Wilson to suggest that it would be in the interest of the United States to get rid of Britain’s deterrent through some kind of hardware solution and, once this had occurred, to draw a post-de Gaulle France in as well.33 Ball, also galvanized by reports of Germany’s insistence on a MLF-type arrangement, sent a memorandum to the president suggesting that Wilson be “drawn out” over the assignment of Britain’s four Polaris submarines to NATO (which Wilson had promised, regardless of whether the ANF came into being or not) and thus give away Britain’s deterrent.34 State Department pressure was undoubtedly crucial to keeping alive West German hopes of a hardware solution, but Bonn still insisted on being given an opportunity to participate in a mixed-manned nuclear force alongside membership of McNamara’s ﬂedgling consultative committee.35 Yet splits within the government of the FRG over nuclear sharing, and increasing opposition to a hardware solution in Washington, meant that by the beginning of 1966, most in Bonn thought it highly unlikely that a MLF treaty would be signed in the shortterm, if at all.36 Although McNamara’s position had not changed radically, he was now telling the British that the MLF had failed, and consultation was the only option available. He hinted to the British that the nuclear sharing venture, including the ANF, might be nearing an end but that the Germans would be bought off only by adding “some substance” to his committee idea.37 Special Assistant to the US President McGeorge Bundy, who recommended what he called “a fresh start on nuclear defense” during the same month to George Ball, now openly supported McNamara’s position in Washington. The theologians were becoming isolated within the administration, as the difﬁculties of brokering a hardware solution became ever more apparent, and as McNamara’s committee proposal took hold in NATO. Facing such opposition, Ball retaliated, arguing that a collective nuclear arrangement was the only way the German people would feel on a level with the British.38 But the emerging position of the administration was clear. When Johnson and Erhard met at the end of year, the nuclear hardware sharing issue was clearly less important than other matters. Their joint statement at the end of a meeting in December addressed the issue of consultation only, rather than hardware: The President and the Chancellor gave close attention to the nuclear problem confronting the alliance. They agreed that the Federal Republic of Germany and other interested partners in the alliance should have an appropriate role in nuclear defence . . . [They] noted with satisfaction that the defence ministers of a number of NATO countries have started discussions on the possibility of improving present nuclear arrangements . . . [They] agreed that discussion of such arrangements be continued between the two countries and with other interested allies.39 By the time Erhard and Johnson met, the British were in the process of quietly dropping their ANF proposal in favor of the consultation approach. This may

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support the view that Wilson had never really intended the idea to be taken seriously, although it may also suggest that Wilson was now simply more realistic about the chances of the ANF ever coming into being, with the growing crisis over French participation in NATO and a possible alternative to a hardware solution on the agenda.40 Although Wilson stated that the ANF was still a part of ofﬁcial British policy when he met Johnson in Washington on 16 December, he now expressed his strongest interest in the nuclear consultation committee suggested by McNamara. In Wilson’s opinion, consultation would be enough. Despite pre-election talk of abandoning the British nuclear deterrent Polaris, he had decided to keep it for Britain alone, as it was clear that plans for the NPG made consultation a much more likely US policy than nuclear sharing. 41 Similarly, when he wrote to Johnson in February 1966, he concentrated on the nuclear committee and its utility as a “forum for discussion of nuclear policy, strategy and planning.” Privately, Wilson told US Ambassador David Bruce that he was still totally opposed to the Germans getting their hands on nuclear weapons, and so a hardware solution was now out of the question.42 By early 1966, McNamara was – privately, at least – now in line with the vast majority of the US Government in his opposition to nuclear hardware sharing. At this stage, work on the NPG was also progressing in NATO. The proposal had been greeted with some suspicion by various members when it was ﬁrst introduced the previous year. With the French challenge to NATO, and with the United States initially keen to pursue trilateralism with Britain and the FRG as a possible substitute for the alliance, smaller allies were concerned that they would be excluded from nuclear policy and that proceedings would be dominated by the United States, Britain, and Germany, while the Germans themselves still clung to hardware sharing as the only viable solution to a greater role in alliance nuclear affairs. Yet the idea of a nuclear consultative group rapidly took hold, and a special committee of defense ministers from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Britain, and the United States met in November 1965 to discuss the proposal further.43 By the beginning of 1966, this special committee had set up three working groups to explore consultation. These groups examined nuclear planning, data exchange, and communications, respectively, and comprised representatives of the United States, Britain, Italy, Germany, and Turkey (the last drawn from a hat to represent the smaller NATO nations).44 The ﬁrst group, on nuclear planning, was concerned speciﬁcally with the availability and possible use of alliance nuclear resources; the second, dealing with data exchange, examined what information on nuclear weapons member governments would require in the consultation process; and the third sought better ways for the allies to communicate on nuclear matters, if there should be an emergency.45 Initially, the non-nuclear powers remained skeptical of the consultation process, and agreement on the composition of the groups was a complex process. The Italians and Germans, in particular, still maintained that substantive nuclear control should be developed alongside consultation, in order to meet alliance security concerns.46 Yet pressure from the Pentagon now drove

From hardware to software 155 the venture forward, and although McNamara continued to acknowledge Ball’s position on nuclear sharing, his primary concern was the ongoing consultation process, which was gaining such momentum.47 By the April meeting, McNamara was canvassing British support by threatening that the MLF was in danger of resurfacing, if the NPG did not become a permanent feature of the NATO political landscape.48 Yet while McNamara had to try and keep the Germans in line by not explicitly rejecting a MLF- or ANF-type solution, the British really required a formal renunciation of nuclear sharing in favor of consultation.49 All in the United States except a few MLF zealots now openly supported McNamara’s position on consultation. With consultation now Washington’s preferred option, Johnson issued NSAM 345 on 22 April 1966, which explicitly required an examination of both consultative and hardware approaches. Yet it suggested that a “NATO Nuclear Force” would be agreed upon after a consultative approach (and perhaps arising out of it).50 When Johnson wrote to Wilson the following month, he still mentioned the ANF but stressed that he was not “wedded to any particular solution to this problem. . . . We are doing staff work over a whole range of options. We should not foreclose any of them.”51 These developments occurred in an atmosphere of confusion and disarray in the alliance, coming so soon after President de Gaulle’s announcement in March that he would withdraw France from NATO’s integrated military structure. There was also the fear in Washington that MLF advocates would attempt to rejuvenate the MLF-ANF to counter this.52 With Johnson’s clariﬁcation, however, it seemed that MLF advocates could now look forward at best to the assignment of some national units to a NATO force.53 The position of the FRG was also changing. In July, the US embassy in Bonn reported that, despite nuclear hardware sharing remaining a long-term ideal for the West German government, both Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder and Minister of Defense Kai-Uwe von Hassel felt that they might be willing to give it up “under certain circumstances,” namely if the NPG evolved into an acceptable forum for nuclear planning and crisis management with good communications.54 In Walt Rostow’s words, the US president simply did not want to “wring the German necks” over this decision but wanted, rather, to press ahead with the committee as events appeared to be moving in this direction.55 By September 1966, Washington was attempting to talk the West German government out of keeping the MLF option open, because US priorities were changing in relation to the Soviet Union. This put Erhard’s government in a precarious situation, and although his coalition was in crisis primarily because of domestic (and especially economic) factors, it seems clear that a disastrous trip to Washington, in which his nuclear aspirations were quashed, helped to seal its fate.56 The fall of the Erhard government at the end of 1966 removed another key reason for holding open any possibility of nuclear sharing.57 By this time, signiﬁcant progress was being made with the Soviets on a nonproliferation treaty, which became the other half of the solution to the MLF. Once again, the Johnson administration had to realize the need to make progress on the negotiation of the treaty without being seen to abandon its most important

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ally in Europe: West Germany. In June 1966, President Johnson had pressed for tripartite talks with Britain and Germany on the future of nuclear sharing in the alliance. He retained the option of a collective nuclear force, and members of the State Department continued to reassure the Germans that the nuclear force was a possibility, although this seemed unlikely to come into existence while consultation was gaining momentum.58 Then concessions by both the Americans and the Soviets in the ﬁnal months of 1966 made agreement on a non-proliferation treaty appear much more likely. The United States agreed to compromise on the nuclear sharing issue, and the Soviets acquiesced on increased nuclear consultation in NATO in order to enhance Germany’s role, and so the basic elements of the treaty were agreed.59 This placed Washington in the position of having to convince Bonn to accept another important element in its strategy for the alliance, but one that precluded Germany from getting any closer to nuclear hardware.60 With the nuclear sharing option having now all but disappeared, McNamara was able to push through his plans and achieve permanent status for his committee in NATO. This took place in spite of French opposition to permanent status and France’s threat to veto such a move in the NAC. The growing popularity of McNamara’s idea, however, ensured that he was able to proceed.61 The alliance now had the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC) for policy and the Nuclear Planning Group for more detailed discussions, both permanent bodies.62 While there had initially been some contention over the composition of the committee, by the beginning of 1967 the NPG comprised four permanent members; the United States, Britain, Italy, and West Germany, with three seats held by other members on a rotational basis.63 Both nuclear and non-nuclear members saw this as a satisfactory solution to the problem of membership, and ofﬁcial endorsement of the NPG by NATO nations ﬁnally removed the MLF from the political landscape. Despite de Gaulle’s withdrawal from the military structure of the alliance and the failure of MLF negotiations, the birth of the NPG, as well as the moves towards the NPT, represented signiﬁcant changes in NATO’s political and military structure, and with the apparent onset of détente, the organization appeared to have overcome the nuclear sharing controversy. The Vietnam War had also become a far more important issue in US foreign policy and was impacting on European–American relations. Progress on consultation and nuclear non-proliferation was therefore an important element of alliance cohesion at a time of increasing strain. With these issues coming to the fore, the nuclear sharing solution was simply no longer required, and no more diplomatic time and effort could be made available for its discussion. Yet the advocates of the hardware solution on both sides of the Atlantic were essential in shaping the NPG. Just as George Ball argued that German pressure for nuclear weapons necessitated a hardware agreement, so McNamara argued that the hardware option was not the answer, nor was it attainable or even particularly desirable in the international political climate of the time. Contrary to the defense secretary’s statement that the NPG was not intended to run counter to a nuclear sharing agreement, the reality was that it clearly under-

From hardware to software 157 mined plans for either a MLF or an ANF. Only West Germany retained anything like a strong interest in either of these options. Both the State Department advocates, led by George Ball, who left his post in September 1966, and the Germans themselves tried to keep the nuclear sharing idea at the forefront of NATO policy. But by the end of 1966, consultation was the only option. As McNamara remarked at a National Security Council meeting in December 1966, establishing the NPG would “end talk of the Multilateral Force.”64 In April 1967, President Johnson met members of the NPG as it convened for the ﬁrst time as a permanent body in Washington. “Hopefully,” stated presidential aide Francis M. Bator, “it will be an adequate substitute for MLF type ‘hardware’ arrangements.”65

Conclusion As Lawrence Kaplan notes, while the NPG was an adequate substitute for the MLF, it was also similar to the MLF in that there was an “element of deception” involved in making the allies believe they were now fully involved in NATO nuclear planning.66 Yet the NPG served a number of crucial functions during the period of its formation and in its early years. It demonstrated the determination of the United States, West Germany, and Britain to continue to improve consultation as France withdrew from the integrated military structure of NATO. The trilateral negotiations on nuclear consultation and offset arrangements in Europe had reignited interest in the NATO strategy debate, although the three were careful to inform and consult smaller members, so as not to exclude them. As part of this strategy debate, the most pressing concern in the ﬁrst meetings of the NPG was the issue of tactical nuclear weapons and the difﬁculty of envisaging a scenario in which these would be used, combined with discussion on US calls for an increase in European conventional forces. With de Gaulle’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure, and with closer consultation between the allies, the United States made progress in advancing the new doctrine of “ﬂexible response,” which was formally adopted in December 1967.67 Taken in conjunction with the report produced under the direction of Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel on political reform within the alliance (the Harmel Report), the NPG represented a highly signiﬁcant US effort to include smaller non-nuclear powers in political and military affairs.68 Finally, increased consultation broadly within NATO, and particularly within the NPG, was also important in making progress on the NPT. With the adoption of guidelines on the use of tactical nuclear weapons agreed in the ﬁrst months of 1968, the United States went some way in responding to concerns about national input into nuclear planning, as well as in assuring the Germans, in particular, that the NPT would not interfere with the work of the NPG. The United States also agreed to requests from the government in Bonn to consult prior to selective release by the US of nuclear weapons for use in or from Germany, and that the US would not selectively release nuclear weapons for use by German delivery forces over the objection of the FRG government.69 With this relatively small

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concession, Washington made considerable progress in persuading the Germans to agree to the treaty.70 Although the Johnson administration still had to balance its reassurances to Germany with those it made to the Soviets on these issues during the ﬁnal months of the negotiations, the signing of the treaty in July 1968 represented a triumph for the administration in a year of turmoil.71 Therefore, the NPG proved to be a successful software alternative to the hardware solutions envisaged in the MLF and ANF. It achieved its aim of offering the medium and small non-nuclear powers in NATO a role in the alliance by providing them with a forum in which to discuss nuclear matters and share their grievances with the United States and others. Moreover, it helped in broadening the NATO agenda at a time when the alliance was under attack and in need of clear direction. In both these respects, it marked a turning point in NATO affairs.72

Notes 1 For two recent accounts, see Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of a European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Thomas Alan Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). See also John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974). 2 For an overview, see Lawrence S. Kaplan, The Long Entanglement: NATO’s First Fifty Years (Westport: Praeger, 1999), pp. 121–47. 3 New York Times, 18 May 1961. 4 In this sense, the United States misperceived European desires regarding nuclear weapons. See David N. Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1983), pp. 131–5. For a brief summary of German interest in NATO nuclear policy, see Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategy and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 124–6. 5 It now seems clear that de Gaulle had decided to reject the British application to join the other six members of the Common Market before negotiations between the British and Americans at Nassau had been completed. The Nassau deal merely conﬁrmed his suspicions and, perhaps, the tone of his press conference on 14 January. See Richard Davis, “‘Why Did the General Do It?’ De Gaulle, Polaris and the French Veto of Britain’s Application to Join the Common Market,” European History Quarterly 28, no. 3 (1998), pp. 373–97; Geoffrey Warner, “Why the General said No: Documents diplomatiques français,” International Affairs 78, no. 4 (2002), pp. 869–82. See also Constantine A. Pagedas, Anglo-American Relations and the French Problem, 1960–1963: A Troubled Partnership (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 225–73. 6 Italian domestic politics and a desire to support the British position ultimately prevented successive Italian governments from endorsing the MLF more fully. Leopoldo Nuti, “‘Me Too, Please’: Italy and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons, 1945–1975,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 4, no. 1 (1993), pp. 124–30. 7 See Bundy to Kennedy, 15 June 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961–63, vol. XIII, pp. 592–5; Memorandum of Conversation, 29 June 1963, FRUS, 1961–63, vol. VII, p. 754; Memorandum for the Record, 10 July 1963, FRUS, 1961–63, vol. VII, p. 790; Memorandum of Conversation, 30 June 1963, FRUS, 1961–63, vol. XIII, p. 600; Bundy to Rusk, 11 July 1963, FRUS, 1961–63, vol. XIII, pp. 603–4.

From hardware to software 159 8 Oral History Interview with Thomas K. Finletter, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin (LBJL), pp. 14–16; Memorandum of Discussion, 10 April 1964, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, pp. 36–7; Joint Communiqué issued by President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard, 12 June 1964, Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–1964, vol. 2, pp. 771–3; Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organization, Washington, 3 July 1964, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, p. 59. 9 Memorandum of Conversation, 5 December 1964, “The Wilson Visit and the MLF,” US Declassiﬁed Documents Series, Washington, DC (USDD), 137/1701, 5/1/96; Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, pp. 39–46. 10 Susanna Schrafstetter and Stephen Twigge suggest that the ANF was a positive proposal intended to achieve a number of important policy objectives for the new Labour Government. In contrast, John Young has taken a much more cynical view. See Susanna Schrafstetter and Stephen Twigge, “‘Trick or Truth?’ The British ANF Proposal, West Germany and US Nonproliferation Policy, 1964–1968,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 11, no. 2 (2000), pp. 161–84; John W. Young, “Killing the MLF? The Wilson Government and Nuclear Sharing in Europe, 1964–66,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 14, no. 2 (2003), pp. 295–324. 11 National security action memorandum (NSAM) no. 322, 17 December 1964, “Guidelines for Discussion on the Nuclear Defense of the Atlantic Alliance,” FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, pp. 165–7. 12 Kaplan, The Long Entanglement, pp. 126–7. 13 Frank Costigliola, “Lyndon B. Johnson, Germany, and ‘the end of the Cold War,’” in Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963–1968, ed. Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 173–210. 14 Telephone Conversation between Kuchel and Ball, 30 January 1965, 10:30 a.m., LBJL, Personal papers of George Ball, Box 5, MLF II. 15 Memorandum of Conversation between Ball, Spiers, Harlech, and Shuckburgh, n.d., April 1965, LBJL, National Security Files (NSF), Country File United Kingdom, Box 207, 156. 16 Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, pp. 50–1. 17 Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), p. 255. 18 Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, p. 52. 19 NATO Select Committee of Defence Ministers on Nuclear Consultation, n.d., September 1965, UK National Archive, Kew, London (UKNA), DEFE 25/92; Remarks by McNamara at NATO Defense Ministers Meeting, Paris, 31 May 1965, USDD, 355D/129, 10/1/78. 20 Remarks by McNamara at NATO Defense Ministers Meeting, Paris, 31 May 1965, USDD, 355D/129, 10/1/78; Paul Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO, 1965–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 60. 21 Kaplan, The Long Entanglement, p. 133. 22 Shuckburgh to Foreign Ofﬁce, 1 June 1965; Dean to Foreign Ofﬁce, 4 June 1965; McNaughton to Healey, 14 July 1965, all in UKNA, DEFE 25/92. 23 Kaplan, The Long Entanglement, p. 133; Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, p. 52; Jane E. Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), p. 80. 24 Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation, pp. 41–4. 25 Note of Meeting between Healey and McNamara, 2 June 1965, UKNA, PREM 13/666. 26 NATO Intermediate Review, 1965, UK Submission, 22 June 1965, UKNA, FO 371/184417, p. 3. 27 Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, p. 53.

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28 Erhard informed de Gaulle that the MLF “was not dead, but neither was it really a live issue at present;” Roberts to Foreign Ofﬁce, 19 June 1965, UKNA, DEFE 25/92. 29 Shuckburgh to Foreign Ofﬁce, 8 July 1965, UKNA, DEFE 25/92. Finletter resigned shortly afterwards, the ofﬁcial reason being that he needed time to nurse his sick and dying wife. It was rumored, however, that he was disaffected with US policy towards the MLF negotiations. See Oral History Interview with Harlan Cleveland, LBJL, pp. 37–8. 30 Memorandum from Kaiser to Rusk, 16 December 1965, “Press Comment on Defense Aspects of Johnson–Wilson Talks,” 16 December 1965, LBJL, NSF Country File United Kingdom, Box 209; Spiers to John Leddy, 18 October 1965, “The Nuclear Problem,” US National Archives and Record Administration, College Park (USNA), Record Group (RG) 59, Ball Records. 31 Costigliola, “Lyndon B. Johnson,” p. 191. 32 Quoted in Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons, p. 261. 33 Walt Whitman Rostow to the President, 6 December 1965, “The Growing Shadow of a European Nuclear Force,” USDD, 30/0337. 34 Memorandum for the President from George Ball, n.d., December 1965, “Visit of Prime Minister Wilson (NATO Nuclear Arrangements),” LBJL, NSF Country File United Kingdom, Box 215, 10-b-1. 35 Susanna Schrafstetter and Stephen Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon: Europe, the United States, and the Struggle for Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1945–1970 (New York: Praeger, 2004), p. 153. 36 Matthias Küntzel, Bonn and the Bomb: German Politics and the Nuclear Option (London: Pluto Press, 1995), p. 46. 37 Dean to Foreign Ofﬁce, 7 October 1965, UKNA, DEFE 25/59. 38 McGeorge Bundy, 18 October 1965, “The Nuclear Problem, The Case for a Fresh Start on Atlantic Nuclear Defense (with no mixed manned forces or plans for such forces);” George Ball, “Comments on the Proposal to Substitute Bilateral ‘Consultation’ with Germany for a Collective Nuclear System,” both in USNA, RG 59, Ball Records. 39 Quoted in Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons, p. 263. 40 Young, “Killing the MLF?” pp. 314–17; Schrafstetter and Twigge, “Trick or Truth?” pp. 176–7; 41 Notes on President’s Meeting with Prime Minister Wilson, 16 December 1965, LBJL, NSF, Name File, Box 7, Neustadt Memos; Neustadt to Bundy, 9 August 1965, USDD, 96/1066. 42 Wright to Maclehose, 4 March 1966; Draft Reply to President Johnson, n.d., late February 1966, both in UKNA, PREM 13/805; Wilson to Johnson, 26 February 1966, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, p. 318. 43 Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation, pp. 44–45 44 Ibid.; Kaplan, The Long Entanglement, p. 133; Nuti, “‘Me Too, Please,’” p. 130. 45 Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation, p. 45. 46 Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation, pp. 50–1; Nuti, “ ‘Me Too, Please,’ ” p. 130. 47 See Telephone Conversation between Ball and McNamara, 8 April 1966, 7:00 p.m., LBJL, Papers of George Ball, MLF II. 48 Meeting between Healey and Nitze, 16 May 1966, UKNA, DEFE 13/673. 49 Lieutenant Colonel Alexander-Sinclair to British Defence Staff, Washington, DC, 4 August 1966, “Nuclear Planning Working Group,” UKNA, DEFE 25/99. 50 NSAM no. 345, Rostow to Rusk and McNamara, 22 April 1966, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, pp. 374–5; Rusk and McNamara to Johnson, 28 May 1966, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, pp. 402–3. 51 Johnson to Wilson, 21 May 1966, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, pp. 396–8. 52 Andreas Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity: NATO’s Transformation and the Multilat-

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53 54 55 56 57

58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72

eralization of Détente, 1966–1968,” Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 1 (Winter 2004), pp. 22–74, here pp. 37–8. Dean to Booth, 12 May 1966, UKNA, DEFE 13/673. George C. McGhee to State Department, 2 July 1966, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, pp. 427–30. Background Note, n.d., July 1966, “Prime Minister’s Visit to Washington,” UKNA, CAB 133/347. Küntzel, Bonn and the Bomb, pp. 52–4. However, new chancellor Kurt Kiesinger stated in an interview with Paris Match in December: “On the subject of a mixed-manned nuclear force, we reserve the right to have our say in the constitution of a European nuclear force.” See British Embassy, Moscow, to Foreign Ofﬁce, 19 December 1966, UKNA, DEFE 25/99. Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity,” pp. 42–3. Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, pp. 137–8. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, pp. 163–201; Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, pp. 53–9; Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons, p. 263; Schrafstetter and Twigge, “Trick or Truth?” p. 177. Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation, pp. 47–8; Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity,” pp. 29–30. Kaplan, The Long Entanglement, p. 134. Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation, p. 44; Shaun R. Gregory, Nuclear Command and Control in NATO: Nuclear Weapons Operations and the Strategy of Flexible Response (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 31–2. Summary Notes of 566th NSC Meeting, 13 December 1966, LBJL, NSC Meetings, vol. 4, Box 2; Kaplan, The Long Entanglement, p. 133. Francis Bator to President, 6 April 1967, LBJL, White House Central File, International Organizations IT 34, Box 6, NATO. Kaplan, The Long Entanglement, p. 134. Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity,” pp. 59–61. See Helga Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility, 1966–1967 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 320–62. Rusk and Clifford to President Johnson, 16 March 1968, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, p.679. Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity,” pp. 71–2. Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, pp. 208–10. Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation, p. 60; Nuti, “ ‘Me Too, Please,’ ” p. 132.

10 NATO and the Non-Proliferation Treaty Triangulations between Bonn, Washington, and Moscow Oliver Bange Introduction The following analysis focuses on the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and of the negotiations leading up to it, to the breakthrough into a new era of international détente. This analysis necessitates a multi-polar approach based on multi-archival work and multinational perspectives. Although the narrative of this chapter includes descriptions of diplomatic wrangling and political intrigues, its main focus is on the history of ideas and perceptions. From whatever perspective we might approach the issue of nuclear non-proliferation in the 1960s, the Germans, particularly those in the Western part of the divided nation, remained the key to a treaty. Some, perhaps even the majority, of European statesmen saw the NPT, in essence, as an anti-German instrument, an opportunity to rationalize their own germanophobia to keep the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which was gaining in economic and political inﬂuence, under control, at least militarily. Others perceived the seemingly unbroken continuation of a Cold War foreign policy by the government of Chancellor Ludwig Erhard as an unavoidable and therefore particularly annoying hurdle to a truly global control of nuclear weapons. From this perspective, the West Germans, and particularly the conservative right-wingers in Bonn’s cabinet, might be compared to an immobile obstacle between the superpowers, hindering and even preventing them from moving decisively towards détente in Europe, which each was doing for its own reasons. From these motives stemmed a marked dualism of efforts towards non-proliferation and détente, which could, at least temporarily, have become antagonistic, particularly if the West Germans had thrown their weight around within the Western alliance. Consequently, the present chapter is not a history of the NPT from Bonn’s perspective but, rather, it is an investigation of how West German policy on nuclear weapons ﬁtted into the sociopolitical and détente-political landscape of the latter part of the 1960s. Key to this question are the rather different perceptions of the Western camp and the Eastern camp regarding Bonn’s nuclear ambitions. To illustrate the often complicated relationship between national interests and perceptions, seven speciﬁc issues are discussed in this chapter.1 These issues are:

NATO and the Non-Proliferation Treaty 163 • • • • • • •

German nuclear ambitions, nourished by certain inﬂuential conservative circles in Bonn; the US administration’s drive to bring about an era of détente with Moscow through the NPT; the intention of the British Labour Government under Harold Wilson to use the NPT as an instrument for perpetuating control over the Germans; de Gaulle’s maneuvering to make the best use of the differences between East and West for achieving apparently contradictory goals of his policy; Soviet interests in détente with Washington and in security regarding Germany; the resulting special role of West Germany’s Social Democrats under Willy Brandt’s leadership; the repercussions and consequences of the multi-dimensional NPT controversies on NATO’s role.2

It is only the interplay between these different approaches to the critical issue of nuclear control that reveals the key inﬂuence of the German nuclear question: ﬁrst, on the increasing multilateralization of non-proliferation, and then, almost as a side-product, on the survival and revitalization of NATO.

The nuclear ambitions of the ruling conservatives in Bonn The ﬁrst and arguably one of the most fundamental issues regarding the NPT is the well documented wish of the Christian Democratic Union–Christian Social Union (CDU–CSU) leadership in Bonn to leave open a loophole for the still fairly young Federal Republic to gain a nuclear capability one day, even if the chance to secure nuclear hardware for the Bundeswehr and the Luftwaffe was not yet in sight. The list of protagonists working towards this goal – though for different reasons and with different strategies – included German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, security experts like Kurt Birrenbach and Heinrich Krone, and those who saw themselves as prospective candidates for the chancellorship, like Franz Josef Strauss, Rainer Barzel, and Eugen Gerstenmaier. Back in 1954, Bonn’s accession to the Western European Union was tantamount to a precondition for the re-establishment of a sovereign (West German) state. On that occasion, Adenauer had denounced the production, procurement, and possession of atomic, biological, and chemical (ABC) weapons by the FRG. The loopholes in Adenauer’s public relations move were obvious, as Adenauer himself repeatedly pointed out to French President Charles de Gaulle: the denunciation was made “voluntarily,” it had only been made to Adenauer’s allies (and could therefore be revoked at any time), and it only applied to German soil. Equally, the option of the control or shared control of nuclear weapons was not covered by the statement.3 Since that time, successive governments in Bonn had either stressed the German denunciation of nuclear weapons or had underlined the extent to which there was still a viable nuclear option for the FRG within the framework either

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of NATO or of the European Community, depending on contemporary international developments, demands, and restrictions. In 1958, Strauss – as Adenauer’s minister of defense – had tried to blackmail the new de Gaulle government into military nuclear cooperation. In 1962, Strauss returned to the subject with yet another idea: in return for French nuclear weaponry he offered, in effect, to lead West Germany out of the US-dominated NATO and into a closer political-military cooperation with France, once he had succeeded Adenauer as chancellor. To prove his sincerity, he offered an almost bizarre wedding gift: a special war gas developed by the infamous IG-Farben.4 In the following years, further approaches and plans were made by various prominent politicians, including Heinrich Krone, Rainer Barzel, Josef Hermann Dufhues, and Eugen Gerstenmaier. Recently declassiﬁed US intelligence information shows that this “important strand in German thought” sought as much independent control of nuclear weapons as it could possibly gain. The size of the prospective nuclear force seemed to be of secondary importance; the combination of independence and nuclear weapons was instead perceived as a basis for political power and personal inﬂuence; in short, the aim was “a larger German ﬁnger on a smaller trigger.”5 Undersecretary of the Federal Foreign Ofﬁce (Auswärtiges Amt) Karl Carstens and other ofﬁcials from the Amt even felt obliged to draw on Nazi terminology when they told their superiors that German Lebensinteressen were at stake, due to a sinister conspiracy between Washington and Moscow that they had detected in late 1966. And in December 1966, Kurt Georg Kiesinger, the CDU chancellor of the Grand Coalition with the Social Democratic Party (SPD), inquired personally: “Which European, Atlantic or other solutions are left open by the latest [NPT] draft”6 to German nuclear ambitions. What could be perceived, and possibly even excused, as mere personal intrigues appeared to create a volatile and dangerous situation – both in a domestic and an international setting – through the combination of secret national goals and the personal futures of the protagonists. Both Strauss and Barzel seem to have aspired to topple Kiesinger by raising national emotions over issues of nuclear defense and national status. From 1967, Strauss’s hysterical attacks on the “Atomsperrvertrag” (which translates as the “nuclear prohibition treaty” – a term still widely referred to in the German media today) gave evidence of his ambition. His desire for the chancellorship was thus linked to his long-standing doubts about the reliability of the US nuclear guarantee. Already in the fall of 1962, his closest advisers had deemed reliance on the United States to be “an incalculable risk” that could only be avoided by an “independent nuclear force,” for which preparations had to be initiated, and the sooner the better.7 Seven years later, in the summer of 1969, the rationale was still the same, only complemented by detailed ideas developed in Strauss’s entourage as to what the West German deterrent should look like: a minimum of 250 medium-range ballistic missiles with a reach of between 600 and 4,500 kilometers, preferably mobile Polaris and Poseidon missiles adapted to be carried by tracked vehicles on land, capable of destroying the USSR up to the Urals, as

NATO and the Non-Proliferation Treaty 165 well as key industrial spots beyond.8 Consequently, the opponents of German nuclear armament – be it in Washington, Moscow, or Bonn – had ample reason to press the urgency of their cause. The NPT appeared to be precisely the instrument to achieve their ends.

The NPT as an instrument of US détente policy A key factor in bringing about the NPT – given the resistance in Bonn and elsewhere – was the continuing acceleration of the Johnson administration’s drive in favor of the treaty. To enact his concept of ideological competition with the East – in which “bridge building” was only a euphemism – Johnson needed an era of détente between the superpowers, and particularly between the two opposing blocs in Europe. Without military, and particularly nuclear, détente, his policy of “penetration” would be impossible or, worse, much too dangerous. Former US president Dwight D. Eisenhower had already realized this, and the crisis in Prague in 1968 served as a warning to both the core members of the Johnson team and the small group gathered around Brandt. By 1965, President Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk realized that serious negotiations for a NPT offered promising leverage to break the ice with the new Soviet leadership. It appeared of utmost importance that they make the best use of Moscow’s apparent interest in cementing its exclusive status as a nuclear power (not least within the Warsaw Pact) and in perpetuating the nuclear disarmament of the Germans. It was all too obvious that without the Germans there would be no NPT with the Soviets. Not least for this reason, the allies in Bonn had to be bound into Johnson’s overall strategy – to which a nuclear prohibition ordered from Washington was hardly helpful. The State Department, therefore, argued for a course that combined the drive towards détente and a revision of the alliance. This, it was widely hoped, would give the Germans a greater and more visible part in planning and decision-making (in Johnson’s words, “a place in the sun”) while curbing British inﬂuence signiﬁcantly and axing London’s pseudo-independent nuclear force. Following the rationale of Francis M. Bator, Johnson’s deputy security advisor, the solution to the divisions within the alliance over nuclear proliferation appeared rather simple: one had to make the Germans understand their own national interests. After all, détente was the only feasible path to reuniﬁcation, if it should ever come about, and the renunciation of German nuclear ambitions had to be a key element in any new Ostpolitik. Technically, West Germany did not need nuclear weapons of its own so much as “a highly visible expansion of German participation in nuclear policy making, at every level and in every practicable way.”9 However, it became increasingly apparent that the Americans had underestimated the resistance this would cause within the ruling conservative circles in Bonn – a force that no CDU–CSU chancellor could ignore in any domestic political calculation. Neither Erhard nor Kiesinger wielded enough power within the party to simply push through the policy envisaged by Bator and others. As a result, Johnson

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became increasingly impatient about the obstruction of his own policy towards the East, which he believed to be fully in tune with both US and German interests. In January 1967, Johnson ﬁnally overruled Rusk and the strategists in the State Department and decided that progress with the Soviets over non-proliferation would have to be realized at the expense of Bonn’s so-called “European option.”10 This presidential decision virtually ruled out any West German participation in a prospective multilateral European nuclear force – while leaving decision makers and the public in the FRG completely in the dark about it. Bator’s colleague Walt Whitman Rostow put the president’s thinking in unambiguous words: “The track [to détente] may move more slowly if a nonproliferation treaty fails at this stage.”11 Rusk was charged personally with the task of seeing this presidential policy through with both the Soviets and the Germans, which he did with considerable skill. Already in September 1966, he had met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in New York. Whereas the head of the US Atomic Control and Disarmament Agency, Bill Foster, clearly alluded to German aspirations on this occasion by noting “we [do] not envisage and have never discussed a situation in which American nuclear weapons ceased to be American nuclear weapons,” Rusk recommended “complete discretion.” Soon afterwards, Gromyko and Johnson agreed at a dinner in Washington that the only thing left to do now was to ﬁnd a “treaty language” that would not compromise the allies of the United States more than was necessary.12 This was nothing else but a superpower fait accompli over the heads of even their most important allies.

Harold Wilson’s conception of the NPT as an instrument for perpetuating control over the Germans The attitude displayed in private by Prime Minister Wilson was exemplary of the pursuit of anti-German and anti-Bonn interests under the cover of the NPT – often paired with almost desperate attempts to defend Britain’s own status as a middle ranking power, or even a world power, in the face of rising German inﬂuence. Both in Western Europe and in dealing with the Soviet Union, Wilson played the role of a guarantor against West German nuclear armament, against German revanchism, and against a more powerful German voice in East–West affairs. Wilson’s role was everything but philanthropic. And this is completely unconnected to the question of whether Wilson believed – as his successor Margaret Thatcher did decades later – that the German national character was intrinsically dangerous and aggressive. During Britain’s repeated European Economic Community (EEC) applications in the 1960s, Wilson consciously gambled on the impact of Britain’s anti-German posture. British protection against an overly powerful Germany was clearly insinuated to the smaller EEC member states, and the old and mighty Charles de Gaulle in Paris was fed the illusion of a potential Anglo-French condominium with its own independent nuclear force. Relying on the credibility of his performance as a watchdog over Bonn’s sin-

NATO and the Non-Proliferation Treaty 167 ister intentions, Wilson also aspired to a key role in the West’s relationship with the Soviet Union – a mediatory position claimed also by de Gaulle with varying degrees of success since the mid-1960s. Wilson’s ambitions and self-image showed a remarkable continuity. Already in October 1963, as leader of the opposition, he had sketched out the role he intended to play in a conversation with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who cynically replied that “a re-united Germany would be a threat to the UK and France – but not Russia.” 13 Wilson’s aversion to German aspirations of becoming a part of the community of nuclear powers, and his promises to the Soviets in this respect, remained virtually unchanged over the years. Similarly, he did not change his approach to Britain maintaining its world power status by nuclear means and to the global role a nuclear capability would give Britain. According to Wilson, Britain – perhaps in combination with de Gaulle’s France – had to remain the most inﬂuential power in Europe, the most important adviser in Washington, particularly in nuclear questions, and a more potent (nuclear) mediator than Paris in East–West relations and in the Third World: We have a role in inﬂuencing America, and it is precisely for that reason that the Soviet Union, despite her very real difﬁculties, will come more and more to listen to us. France may claim to say more things that Russia likes, but they are essentially negative things. And for this very reason France has less in reality to offer. And Russia understands this.14 Wilson and his foreign secretary, George Brown, did not tire of bringing this message home to the Soviets over the following years. In a conversation with Kosygin early in 1967, Wilson and Brown wholly excluded West German participation in a NATO nuclear force and practically excluded a European nuclear force, too. Wilson himself pressed on Kosygin that the precondition for a European option was a new European state and repeated, so that Kosygin would fully understand the far-reaching meaning of this, “the word State must be emphasised.” London’s rationale was intriguing: at best – or from a British perspective, at worst – only a confederal European construction was feasible in the distant future; this would never be or become a “state,” which was why there would never be a European nuclear force.15 Wilson added: “We realise of course that we could not expect the Soviet Union to say publicly that they approved of these arrangements; nor would we gratuitously make our interpretations public.” These interpretations were even handed over to the Soviets in written form. By this, in effect, Wilson had put himself at the mercy of the Kremlin for the sake of his country’s, and his own, international role. Even the British protocol of the meeting had to be heavily doctored before it was allowed to be circulated on a very restricted basis in Whitehall. Thus, Wilson had made a far-reaching pledge in his private conversation with Kosygin, very much at Bonn’s expense: Indeed this was one of our two motives of seeking entry into the Common Market: to squeeze the German problem . . . He could assure Mr. Kosygin

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Oliver Bange that President Johnson feared the Germans, de Gaulle despised and hated them and so long as he himself was in power there would be no question of the Germans being allowed a ﬁnger on the nuclear trigger.16

And Wilson’s gamble seemed to pay off. When Brown communicated the same line to Gennadiy I. Voronov, a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Politburo, the answer was unequivocal and straight. If the British remained helpful in settling the German nuclear problem, Voronov virtually guaranteed that preferential treatment by Moscow would ensure a special role for the Wilson government in East–West affairs.17 Almost a year later, in early 1968, Wilson praised himself at having played the watchdog role over Germany “just right,”18 and when in early 1969 Kiesinger was still dragging his feet over a German signature to the NPT, Wilson, with no regard to the events in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, was yet again ready to jump at the Germans (to “bear down hard on Kiesinger”)19 and let the Soviets know about this.

Contradictory French interests The government in Paris monitored these proceedings from a distance. De Gaulle and his ministers had criticized the NPT from the outset as an American–Soviet plot and had refused to sign, citing France’s national interests. Nevertheless, it soon became clear that France – along with the United States and the USSR – would rank among the main beneﬁciaries of any treaty on nuclear non-proliferation. This was not least because the implicit understanding between the superpowers to freeze the number of nuclear powers at the current status quo would conﬁrm France’s status as a nuclear power of world rank, and France’s contemporary advantages over other states – whether in terms of strategic options or of mere prestige – would be reinforced in that other states would be prevented from acquiring nuclear forces. For much the same reasons, France had no interest whatsoever in the nuclear armament of German troops. This was stated in unambiguous terms both to France’s allies in the West and to the Soviet Union, while in their discussions with Bonn over the nuclear and reuniﬁcation issues, the French tended to refer to the possibility of resolving these issues in the distant future. In any case, the rapprochement between the superpowers helped Paris to avoid an otherwise unavoidable, deﬁnitive answer to Bonn’s repeated approaches regarding bilateral nuclear cooperation. Indeed, it allowed the French to exploit to their own advantage the differences within the Western camp over the “right” method of tying Bonn in. Within the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), French diplomacy was thus able to present itself (making a pointed barb at London) as a guarantor and nucleus of a future European nuclear force. At the same time, French diplomats in Moscow presented France as a protector of, and mediator for, Bonn. And in Bonn itself, France’s representatives continuously complained over the fait accompli presented by Washington and Moscow, both completely neglecting German interests for the sake of a super-

NATO and the Non-Proliferation Treaty 169 power condominium. One could not express French opportunism more bluntly than French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville did in a conversation with Karl Carstens in October 1964: France might have agreed to West German participation in the MLF back in 1963 in order not to lose the Germans entirely to the Americans; but that was yesterday, and today was a new situation with new rules of play.20 To the conservatives in Bonn, meanwhile, the French, and particularly de Gaulle, appeared to be natural allies in their ﬁght against the NPT.21 Although de Gaulle was quick to realize the opportunities this offered him, not for a second did he consider sharing his force de frappe with the Germans, nor did he allow himself to be used in the German drive towards nuclear reform within NATO. Instead, de Gaulle declared that France did not intend to sign the NPT but would act as if it had acceded to the treaty.22 Faced with ever-increasing resistance to the NPT in Bonn, despite Germany’s signature in July 1968, the Soviets approached the French secretly in late January 1969 asking for help with the West German government.23 Despite the temptation to allow France to display its role in European, if not in world affairs, de Gaulle restrained himself. Despite all the illusions of global grandeur associated with de Gaulle’s public rhetoric, his reserve in this situation was a clear indication that France, after all, saw itself as a signiﬁcant power only in West European terms and that France valued its good relations with Bonn considerably higher than any adventurous opportunity to attain a stronger global position.24 Until his resignation in May 1969, de Gaulle kept to his ambiguous line on the NPT – and was never forced by the course of events to choose between France’s role in Europe and France’s role in the world, or between posturing as a victorious power in Germany and simultaneously as Bonn’s best ally.

Soviet interests in détente with the West and in security regarding Bonn In the eyes of the leadership of state and party in Moscow, a comprehensive non-proliferation treaty would serve two important foreign policy goals: protection from Germany, speciﬁcally, and the launch of an era of détente with Washington and the West, in general. The aspects of this policy with regard to Europe, to the Warsaw Pact, and to domestic politics were closely intertwined. Thus, when the Polish and Soviet leaders met in fall 1967 in Moscow, the Poles had a disturbing story to tell, which they had in turn been told by de Gaulle during his recent visit to Poland: the Germans were producing nuclear weapons, which was why, de Gaulle had argued, the French needed their own force de frappe both as deterrence against the USSR, and also to hinder the Germans from gaining their own nuclear capability. Polish Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz said the Poles could only agree with de Gaulle’s conclusion: “The most important thing is that the Germans will not receive access to nuclear weapons in any form.”25 Fears of German aggression and nuclear intentions were deeply rooted not only within the Russian people, but also within its

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leadership, and these fears were a driving force that now appears almost irrational, given the division of Germany and the control achieved over its two parts by integration into the West and the East. Not until the series of meetings between Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev and German Chancellor Willy Brandt in the early 1970s would there be a slow revision of this picture of Germany and the Germans, established as a result of so much damage and trauma. Now, in the mid-1960s, the decision about the NPT also raised questions about the future of a détente policy devised by an ageing Soviet leadership and about the USSR’s master plan for the future of the communist world. The Soviet leadership had yet to prove to its people, its party, its allies, and not least to the younger (though still not so young) generation of hard-liners in the Politburo that détente with the West would not compromise Soviet security interests. In January 1967, Gromyko made his ﬁrst open appeal for a turn towards détente before the members of the Politburo of the CPSU. Reversing the argument that détente would weaken Soviet security, he claimed that only détente could bring about a non-proliferation treaty – and thereby bring protection from Germany.26 In the delicate domestic situation that existed, the supporters of détente in the Kremlin desperately needed an unequivocal signal from Washington, proving that – at least on the surface – US and Soviet interests coincided with regard to the maintenance of the status quo in Europe and that the Americans were prepared to exercise all their inﬂuence in Bonn accordingly. When US President Richard Nixon and his National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger ﬁrst stepped on to the stage as vigorous defenders of narrow national interests, détente seemed to be ﬁnished even before it had begun. In order to drive the Americans to concessions at the negotiating table, the Soviets advanced a counter-concept of a “selective détente,” including those forces in Europe, and particularly in Bonn, that wished to go forward with a constructive approach. Besides the Soviets’ greater strategic considerations, a number of opportunities for them to pursue their infamous “wedge-driving” game occurred in the course of the NPT negotiations between 1967 and 1969.27 Despite intrigue and rough language in public, the Soviet leadership was well aware of the delicate balance of power within the West and was attuned to the importance of this for obtaining the more important Soviet goals. When the Americans ran into more resistance over the NPT in Bonn than they had originally envisaged, and appeared to withdraw slowly from their original promises in early 1968, the Soviets reminded them in none too subtle a manner of the understanding reached in October 1966. They hinted at this in discussions with the West Germans, who – as was to be expected – started to ask penetrating questions in Washington.28 And in January 1969, leading ﬁgures in Moscow were even prepared to do what hitherto had been unthinkable: they went a long way towards meeting the demands made by Bonn and virtually guaranteed the Germans protection from nuclear blackmail and aggression. Despite concerted action in the following weeks by Premier Brezhnev, head of the KGB Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, Soviet Ambassador to the US Anatoly Dobrynin, Henry Kissinger, and Willy Brandt, the Conservatives in the Grand Coalition would have none of this, and

NATO and the Non-Proliferation Treaty 171 Kiesinger had to delay the decision – with tacit acceptance from Brandt – until after the general elections in September 1969.29 There was nothing Washington or Moscow could do but to wait for the outcome of these crucial elections. Meanwhile, the Kremlin had secured the most important goal it had hoped to achieve with the NPT: negotiations for a more cooperative and constructive coexistence with the US administration had been opened and were maintained, despite tensions after the Prague invasion of summer 1968. Following the change of government from Kiesinger to Willy Brandt as chancellor and Walter Scheel as foreign minister, Bonn acceded to the NPT in November 1969, and the Soviet Union could ﬁnally ratify the treaty and open the way towards a new era of détente.

A “special role” for Brandt’s Social Democrats If the Germans held the key to the launch of détente through the NPT, within Germany, Brandt’s Social Democrats had to overcome the hitherto insurmountable opposition of the Conservatives. All sides, divided in terms of the goals they pursued through the NPT, saw one thing clearly: that without the accession of the Federal German government, there would be no Soviet ratiﬁcation and thus no treaty. Johnson’s “penetration” of the communist world – under the camouﬂage of bridge building – had not been realized in partnership with the Erhard government. In spite of the change of chancellor and government in Bonn in December 1966, the CDU–CSU was still led by the same politicians who had dominated the party during the Adenauer era. However, there was now a new coalition partner, the SPD. And almost all the key proponents of the NPT had maintained close relations of respect and even mutual trust with its ﬁgurehead, new foreign minister Willy Brandt, since well before the relatively sudden change of government in Bonn. This was certainly true for Johnson and Rusk, for de Gaulle, and even for the Soviets. All of them now pinned their hopes on Brandt, whose position on nuclear armament and on the need for a new German policy of détente towards the East – Ostpolitik – was well known. With Brandt’s help, Johnson and Rusk intended to overcome the impasse that their own bridge-building efforts were up against; with his help, the Kremlin planned to free the way for its own European and détente policy; and with his help, de Gaulle envisaged a new order in Europe that would be more stable than the postwar situation and which would be more receptive to de Gaulle’s own ideas of a third power between the superpowers in the East and the West. Brandt and his new Ostpolitik became the key to the acceptance of the status quo in Europe and to the ﬁnal legalization of territorial losses and gains as a result of World War II. For the leading ﬁgures in the Kremlin, as for most British politicians, this remained a goal in itself. Others expected from Brandt’s Ostpolitik the start of still further developments, such as increasing doubt in the East about the merits of socialism or the resurgence of European national identities. However different the concepts of de Gaulle, Johnson, or Brandt might

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have been, in their rationales or details, all of them were ultimately aimed at overcoming the division of Europe and, in the case of Brandt, also the division of Germany. Brandt’s concept, in which the NPT, Ostpolitik, and reuniﬁcation were closely interconnected, was clearly laid out in Washington and Paris by trusted envoys at the beginning of the Grand Coalition. Thus, Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski, Günter Markscheffel, and Helmut Schmidt explained to the French: “Le parti SPD est en faveur de l’abandon de toute forme d’association à l’arme atomique” (the SPD is in favor of the abandonment of any form of association with atomic weaponry). Only this, they hoped, would create “a new climate,” the beginnings of détente between East and West, and would enable the “multiplication of contacts” with the people in the East, which was at the core of Brandt’s Ostpolitik strategy, because only this could possibly open up real opportunities for uniﬁcation by softening up the communist regimes from within. Helmut Schmidt, who would later succeed Brandt as chancellor, even pleaded for active French help for the NPT as a way of combating illusions over an eventual national nuclear force harboured in certain circles of the Conservative coalition partners,30 whom Herbert Wehner – yet another powerful ﬁgure within the SPD – simply labeled the “fetishists.”31 Brandt himself, in his new role as foreign minister, became somewhat drawn into the ﬁght against the superpower fait accompli in 1967, before realizing that this course was actually endangering his Ostpolitik goals.32 Without (West) German participation in the NPT, there would be no understanding with the Soviets regarding a renunciation of force agreement, as it was then codiﬁed in the Moscow Treaty of August 1970. Without such a renunciation of force agreement with Moscow – and this was the blueprint for all of the Eastern treaties to come – progress in all other areas of Ostpolitik, including inner-German relations and Berlin, would have been rendered virtually impossible. Valentin Falin, a close collaborator of both Brezhnev and Gromyko, acknowledged the gatekeeper function of the NPT, both with respect to “selective détente” with the Germans and also thereafter with respect to the desired global détente with the Americans; according to Falin, the NPT was an “enormously important treaty.” And US Ambassador George McGhee, not known as being overly friendly towards Brandt, judged in retrospect that the NPT “encapsulated the most important ideas which Willy Brandt had developed during his time as Foreign Minister.”33

NATO and the multilateralization of nuclear nonproliferation In 1966, NATO was, if not doomed as an international institution, then at least an alliance in profound crisis: with the all but certain failure of the multilateral nuclear force–Atlantic nuclear force (MLF–ANF), the issue of “nuclear sharing” within the alliance was once again wide open. The French withdrawal from NATO’s military structure posed fundamental questions about NATO’s future military and strategic viability. The move towards a strategy focused on a more

NATO and the Non-Proliferation Treaty 173 ﬂexible response, ﬁrst initiated by the Kennedy administration, was widely accepted. The West German response to ever-increasing US pressure to apply ﬂexible response might serve as an example: while the Ministry of Defense in Bonn and the Bundeswehr’s generals paid due rhetorical respect to the doctrine, they simultaneously attempted to resist the central changes connected to it.34 They refused to give up their nuclear-capable F-104 Starﬁghters (to be armed with US warheads) for more viable sea-based US Polaris missiles; they resisted the relocation of the ADMs, the atomic mines hitherto concentrated along the East German–West German border; and they refused the necessary restructuring of their defense budget towards conventional warfare.35 When US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara proposed a nuclear planning group (NPG) in December 1965 – implicitly as a “software” replacement for the MLF’s “hardware” solution to assumed German nuclear desires – and the NPG was institutionalized a year later, the West German military simply deemed the new developments “insufﬁcient.”36 In Washington and London, the full or partial withdrawal of troops from the European continent remained at the top of the public agenda and was mirrored by contingency plans drawn up in the respective ministries. The increasing bilateralism between Washington and Moscow found its equivalent in various efforts to form the EEC into a platform through which to pursue European interests in international affairs. As if bilateralism was itself not enough of a challenge to Western cohesion, the situation was exacerbated by a combination of doubts connected to the growing economic strength of the FRG; by factionalism among Europeans; by the intertwining of the interests that various member states brought to the NATO council (notably the British EEC entry); and by the seemingly endless trilateral quarrels over offset costs (of pivotal importance to the debate about whether one should maintain control over the Germans or augment their independence). All this coincided with the end of the NATO treaty’s duration in 1969, which many feared might signal the end of NATO itself. The NPT crisis – provoked by Soviet-American cooperation over their partners’ heads – hit NATO in the midst of this turmoil. The effect was so serious that no lesser person than the organization’s secretary-general, Manlio Brosio, convinced himself that this was going to be the last nail in NATO’s cofﬁn.37 Instead, the NPT, or rather the fundamental questions related to it, became yet another factor in the effective restructuring that turned NATO, within a few years, and in some respects even within months, into the forum that would effectively serve as a “smoothly functioning” platform for Western coordination in that crucial multilateral phase of détente culminating in the establishment of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975.38 It might well be argued that without NATO’s almost classical catharsis in 1967–68, the West might not have been able to achieve its clear superiority over the communist regimes of Eastern Europe that became obvious and institutionalized at the end of the détente era – and which held ﬁrm until the ﬁnal showdown in 1989–90.

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However, later developments are a far cry from the troubling shape of the alliance in early 1967. The months following the ﬁrst tabling of the joint SovietAmerican NPT draft were marked by multiple crises and by hysteria within the alliance. Washington was faced with a dilemma. Trust, the glue of any alliance, was being lost at an alarming speed in Paris (where NATO still resided) and had to be regained as soon as possible. At the same time, speed was of the essence, if the Americans were to maintain the timetable agreed with the Soviets, which foresaw agreement on a draft text by the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Conference (ENDC) in Vienna in May, to be presented to the UN General Assembly in the autumn. The unceasing protests of the nuclear have-nots within the alliance, particularly the FRG and Italy, necessitated a quick revision of the draft, which was tabled and explained to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) by Bill Foster, the US chief negotiator in Vienna, on 4 April. Foster’s was a courageous effort to win over the hesitant governments represented in this multilateral forum. Once again, the draft hit an Italo-German stonewall. The Italians – supported by Brosio – complained about the NPT’s unlimited duration (as set against NATO’s limited lifespan), and the German list of considerations was so “extremely detailed” that it had to be circulated in full after the meeting. Apparently driven by his country’s recent EEC application, the British representative replied with what – in light of the Wilson–Kosygin discussions mentioned above – can only be termed an outright lie, saying that his government did not want to see Euratom weakened and that it attached the “greatest importance to leaving open the option for European Federation which should be able to have nuclear weapons in succession. This option had been mentioned to Mr. Kosygin when he visited London and he had not objected to it.” And even the Dutch, who had emphasized their preference for a speedy signature of the NPT, found it right to remind the Americans of their “heavy responsibilities regarding the solidarity of the Alliance” and to urge for more time for the allies to study the new text.39 Still the Americans would not give up their ambitious goals. On 5 May, only days after the reopening of the Foster–Roshchin negotiations in Vienna, they were back with a more low-key approach, which included: an explanatory letter by their permanent representative, Harlan Cleveland, advising the allies not to hand in proposals in Vienna that might provoke the Soviet Union; written US interpretations of the NPT clauses; the latest information on the proceedings in Vienna; and an up-to-date compilation of the US and Soviet draft articles. Critique once again centered on the safeguards article (Article 3), detailing how adherence to the NPT was eventually to be controlled by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – a provision to which the Euratom members took particular offence.40 And again, the chairman closed the session by observing that there was a need for further consultations. In Vienna, meanwhile, the Soviets refused any softening up of the IAEA controls that would favor Euratom, which meant that the Johnson administration now faced two stonewalls; one in Paris and one in Vienna. By now it was clear that Washington’s timetable was on the rocks and that the Americans’ earlier tactic of steamrolling their allies had blown up in their faces. Finally, in late

NATO and the Non-Proliferation Treaty 175 May 1967, this situation was evident in the US negotiation posture. Still unwilling to give up on the prospect of an early UN debate on the treaty, the US administration proposed to table the draft text in New York, while leaving the controversial Article 3 blank. Simultaneously acknowledging the situation within NATO, Cleveland now pledged that his administration “keep the Council closely informed.”41 With the Americans now spending more time on consultations with their allies and staging considerable efforts to impress their Euratom problem upon the Soviets, the turmoil within NATO was still far from over. In July 1967, the other allies detected that the French – against their proclaimed will to stay out of the NPT negotiations – had indicated to the Soviets in various high-level meetings that they did not object to IAEA safeguards, thus effectively undercutting the position of the Euratom members, and particularly that of Bonn. Over the following months, German Permanent Representative to NATO Wilhelm Grewe maintained on behalf of the Federal Republic that IAEA controls were tantamount to discrimination, and the Italians fought ﬁercely against any unilateral US explanatory statements outside the NPT text, which they argued were not binding under international law. However, the French intervention, combined with Soviet stonewalling and increased consultation efforts, made it possible for the United States to recast its own role as that of honest broker and guardian of the alliance. It was only in this changed environment in September 1967 that the Soviets slowly gave way to the US compromise proposal to place the existing Euratom controls under the IAEA, thus paving the way for the treaty’s signature in summer 1968.42 The Johnson team had ﬁnally recognized that it was the only player in the game that could break the deadlock and broker an all-round deal, and it had come to realize the necessary components of such a deal. Parallel to the Americans’ efforts to agree on an NPT draft with the Soviets that would be acceptable to their partners in NATO, the US decided to beef up the NPG, so it would constitute sufﬁcient compensation for the FRG and also to foster comprehensive political and military consultations in NATO, while receiving in return the ﬁnal acceptance and codiﬁcation of “ﬂexible response” and all that came with it in terms of allocation and troop goals. Most of these considerations found their way into the so-called “Harmel Exercise” – a series of multilateral negotiations on the political and military restructuring of the Western alliance under the auspices of Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, institutionalized by the NATO ministerial meeting in December 1967. The Harmel Report ﬁxed a consensus on NATO’s overall strategy, on troop levels, consultation procedures, and nuclear planning, and it struck a balance between the organization’s political and military tasks and needs.43 The next NPG meeting in April 1968 included the necessary carrot for the West Germans: it established the principle that the use of nuclear weapons on German soil – thus including East Germany – would be “subject to conﬁrmation by the FRG Government” and that a future NPT “would not interfere” with Bonn’s role in the NPG.44 All this was accomplished within a few months and provided the framework in which the NPT could then be accomplished. Throughout all this, the NPT remained the magnifying glass through which

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national interests were identiﬁed. It is hard to see the kind of wider bargains that compensated for the speciﬁc disadvantages the NPT held for the FRG, Italy, and others to which Johnson, Rusk, and Brandt were looking, and to which recent scholarship has pointed. In the ﬁrst months of 1967, it became obvious that the superpowers had to backtrack at least far enough to allow their own allies to agree to the general outline of their draft treaty. That made it all the more necessary to engage in comprehensive multilateral consultations. And there was no better – or no other – institutionalized forum available than NATO. The realization of this led to an enhanced recognition of NATO’s value to the pursuit of both individual national interests and the interests of the West in general. This, in turn, facilitated the rebuilding of NATO and gave further credibility to its new second pillar – political consultations, which were meant to supplement the mere military cooperation that had dominated NATO so far. Nevertheless, NATO never became an actor in its own right – unlike, for example, the European Community during the CSCE negotiations. The discussions within the NAC created a certain dynamic of their own, which had repercussions on national policy decisions. The basis for this phenomenon were the unofﬁcial working procedures in and around the NAC, of which very few governments seemed to be aware. For George Vest, probably the most experienced NATO expert on the US side at the time, “most NATO council meetings that were recorded were discussions of a bunch of professional ambassadors who expressed themselves with great delicacy and reserve.”45 Almost always, the key participants in the forthcoming debates met and discussed their home governments’ instructions on a strictly personal basis before the council, and they did the same with NATO’s secretaries-general, Dirk Stikker and Manlio Brosio. In all of these meetings, ideas for compromise were thrashed out – and possibly even agreed upon – and, as a result, the council meetings, which the permanent representatives would later report on, appear to have been largely stage-managed by them in order to ﬁt into the tentative solution scenario. It was only this working scheme that made the rather ambiguous role of the German permanent representative to NATO, Wilhelm Grewe, possible. Ofﬁcially a representative of the FRG’s foreign ofﬁce under SPD leader Willy Brandt, Grewe held ﬁrm to the principles of Adenauer’s policy towards the East, thus repeatedly undercutting both his own superior and the new Ostpolitik of the Grand Coalition: détente, he intimated to his colleagues in the council in the summer of 1967, was a mere illusion.46 He continued to oppose the NPT in public, claiming that it would send the FRG back to the technological Stone Age, and his reports to Bonn remained tinted by the prospects of a broad front against the treaty within NATO, which in view of his own efforts behind the scenes in Paris was tantamount to a self-fulﬁlling prophecy.47

Conclusion The NPT showed that behind, below, or across the East–West confrontation there still loomed – and very large, at that – the long-established national inter-

NATO and the Non-Proliferation Treaty 177 ests of the various states, governments, and nations. But it also showed that the combination of the all-consuming East–West conﬂict and the new nuclear age – globalization at its purest – had changed the rules of the game. This meant that solutions to national problems (like the German question) or “only” to national status (as in the French and British cases) could be sought only within a multilateral framework. This is why nuclear sharing and nuclear non-proliferation became Siamese twins. The solutions lay in their parallel multilateralization. This was true within, as much as across, blocs. If the Germans at the center of the NPT controversy were to give up any nuclear aspirations, for now and for eternity, then they had to be given compensation: a truly reliable umbrella provided by their nuclear allies; full knowledge about the details and intricacies of this umbrella; and a practical veto against its consequences with regard to German soil. Simultaneous multilateralization also meant that both of these aspects – effective control48 (of the Germans and their non-nuclear status in particular) and sharing (of nuclear responsibility, at least for one’s own national territory) – could only be provided for within NATO. And this is something that both the United States and the USSR came to realize and acknowledge through the NPT process. For NATO, this meant a new role, the importance of which was recognized by East and West, the emergence of which helped to pave the way to NATO’s effective reconstruction in the Harmel exercise, and the institutionalization of which effectively guaranteed NATO’s future as the prime forum for multilateral Western consultations during the East–West conﬂict.

Notes 1 For a comprehensive, multinational account of the NPT, the road to détente, and the German question, see Oliver Bange, “Ostpolitik und Détente in Europa: Die Anfänge, 1966–1969” (habil., University of Mannheim, 2004). 2 A discussion that the doyen of NATO research, Lawrence Kaplan, started with the author at the Zurich conference. 3 Conversation between de Gaulle and Adenauer, Paris, 4 July 1962, 10:05–11:15 a.m., Archives Nationales, Paris (AN), 5 AG 1 (de Gaulle), vol. 161. 4 Conversation between Messmer and Strauss, Paris, 23 January 1962; summary and analysis from Messmer to de Courcel, both in AN, 5 AG 1 (de Gaulle), vol. 161. 5 Memorandum from the Head of the State Department’s Planning Council to the President, 6 December 1965, “The Growing Shadow of a European Nuclear Force,” Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, TX (LBJL), WHCF, Conﬁdential File, FG105, vol. 23. 6 Enquiry by Osterheld at the Ofﬁce of the Foreign Minister, Federal Foreign Ofﬁce, by personal request of Kiesinger, 22 December 1966, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin (PAAA), B150 (MB, VS-vol. 10083). 7 Memorandum from Schmückle to Knieper, on personal order of Strauss, 19 October 1962, “Gleichgewicht und Atommacht,” Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau (BAMA), BW 1/2377. 8 Letter from Seidl to Kiesinger, 9 June 1969, Archiv für Christlich Soziale Politik, Munich (ACSP), NL Strauss, Büro Bonn, vol. 3708. 9 Memorandum from Bator to Johnson, 4 April 1966, “A Nuclear Role for Germany: What do the Germans Want?” LBJL, Bator Papers, vol. 28. Bator’s rationale was clearly shared in comments by McNamara and Rusk. See also Rusk to Johnson, 6 April 1966, “Chronology on Nuclear Problem,” LBJL, Bator Papers, vol. 28.

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10 Francis M. Bator, conversation with the author, 27 March 2004, and written exchanges thereafter. On Johnson’s order, Bator used wording that would clearly rule out a European option and penciled this into the American–Soviet draft treaty; see LBJL, Bator Papers, vol. 21. 11 Cover Note from Rostow to Johnson, 8 September 1966, LBJL, NSF, Rostow File, vol. 11. 12 Memorandum of Conversations between Rusk, Thompson, Kohler, Goldberg, Foster, Gromyko, Fedorenko, Dobrynin, Roschin, and Mendlevitch, Waldorf Towers, New York, 22 and 24 September 1966, US National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, MD (USNA), US Department of State, Washington, DC (DoS), Conference Files, lot 67D586-CF84; Memorandum of Conversation between Johnson, Gromyko, Rusk, Foster, Thompson, Harriman, Leddy, Toon, Dobrynin, Zinchuk, Vorontsov, and Ippolitov, Madison Room, DoS, 10 October 1966, USNA, DoS, S/S-I Files, lot 79D246 (also in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1964–68, vol. XI, pp. 388–91). 13 Conversation between Wilson, Walker, Khrushchev, and Gromyko, Moscow, 10 June 1963, Bodleian Library, Oxford (Bodleian), Wilson Papers, MS Wilson c.957. 14 Manuscript of Wilson Speech before the Parliamentary Labour Party, 15 June 1966, Bodleian, Brown Papers, MS Eng. c.5015. 15 Conversation between Wilson, Brown, and Kosygin, London, 10 February 1967. This British position was even handed over in writing; see UK National Archive, Kew, London (UKNA), PREM 13/1840. 16 The handwritten alterations by Michael Palliser, Wilson’s foreign policy adviser, to the original protocol of Wilson’s private conversation with Kosygin on 7 February 1967 can be found in UKNA, PREM 13/1715. 17 Conversation between Brown and Voronov, British Houses of Parliament, 16 November 1966, UKNA, PREM 13/1220. 18 Handwritten Comment by Wilson on a Foreign Ofﬁce Note to Palliser, 22 January 1968, UKNA, PREM 13/3216. 19 Embassy Telegram by Bruce, 1161, London, 11 February 1969, USNA, DoS, POL FR-UK. 20 Conversation between Couve de Murville and Carstens, Paris, 24 October 1964, AN, 5 AG 1/162. 21 Memorandum on French attitude on disarmament, Ref. IIB1 (Lahusen), Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Bonn (AdsD), Dep. E.B., vol. 316. 22 Conversation between de Gaulle and Adenauer, Paris, 14 January 1967, Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD), 1967, doc. 19. 23 Conversation between Alphand and von Braun, Paris, 30 January 1969, Ministère des affaires étrangères, Quai d’Orsay, Paris (MAE), Europe, RFA, vol. 1610. 24 See Note of the Sous Direction Europe Centrale (YP/CT), Paris, 19 February 1969, “Le problem allemand,” MAE, Europe, RFA, vol. 1813. 25 Conversation between Gomulka, Cyrankiewicz, Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin, Moscow, 22 September 1967, Archivum Akt Novych, Warsaw (AAN), KC PZPR, Gomulka’s ofﬁce ﬁles, XI A/84. 26 This is, at least, the interpretation that Soviet Ambassador to the US Anatoly Dobrynin gave to the memorandum circulated by Gromyko before the Politburo on 13 January 1967. An English translation of the document can be found in Anatoly Dobrynin, In Conﬁdence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), p. 640. 27 See, for example, the memoirs of Julij A. Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm: Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten (Berlin: Siedler, 1993), p. 16ff. 28 The Soviets used the annual international Wehrkundetagung (later renamed the Munich Conference on Security Policy) in Munich to explain to the West Germans that they would prevent any European or NATO option. The Germans immediately

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29

30

31 32 33 34

35

36

37

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discussed this provocative Soviet stance with their allies in Washington. And Washington immediately sensed the covert warning from Moscow. Conversation between Guttenberg and Naumow, 16 February 1968; Telegram from Bonn to Washington, 154, both in PAAA, B150, Ref. IIA4 and IIB1, VS-vol. 4313 and 4348; Memorandum of Conversation between Davis and Tcherniakov, 7 May 1968, USNA, DoS, RG59/2665, POL US-USSR. For Soviet and US analyses of this concerted action, see Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, 19 March 1969, USNA, Nixon, NSC, PTF, vol. 489. The analysis of the German desk of the Soviet Foreign Ministry of 24 February 1969 came to very similar conclusions. See Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiskoi Federatsii, Moscow (AVP RF), 0757, op. 14, p. 53, d. 5, 1.1–8. For a detailed account of these triangulations between Moscow, Washington, and Bonn, see Oliver Bange, “Kiesinger’s Ostund Deutschlandpolitik von 1966–1969,” in Kurt Georg Kiesinger 1904–1988: Von Ebingen ins Kanzleramt, ed. Günter Buchstab, Philipp Gassert, and Peter Thaddäus Lang (Freiburg: Herder, 2005), pp. 455–500. For Wischnewski’s explanations to French diplomats in Bonn on 8 December 1966, see Telegrams, 6943–51, Bonn, 9 December 1966; Memorandum by Puaux on conversation with Markscheffel (on 12 December 1966), Paris, 13 December 1966; Statement by Schmidt to Seydoux, 7 January 1967; Telegrams, 100–05, Bonn, 8 January 1967, all in MAE, Europe, RFA, vol. 1608. Herbert Wehner, interview by Reinhard Appel, Bonn, 1969, “Gefragt: Herbert Wehner,” in Der Onkel: Herbert Wehner in Gesprächen und Interviews, ed. Knut Terjung (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1986), p. 148. “The position of the Federal Government on the NPT is putting the credibility of our entire détente policy at stake.” Letter from Brandt to Kiesinger, 15 July 1968, AdsD, Brandt archive, BAM, 13. Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen (Munich: Droemer Knaur, 1993), p. 65; George McGhee, Botschafter in Deutschland, 1963–1968 (Munich: Richard Bechtle, 1989), p. 377. For a detailed discussion of the available evidence, see Christian Tuschhoff, Deutschland, Kernwaffen und die NATO, 1949–1967: Zum Zusammenhalt von und friedlichem Wandel in Bündnissen (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002), especially pp. 215–72. Experts and leading politicians in the chancellor’s ofﬁce and in the West German ministries of defense and foreign affairs agreed upon the “ongoing erosion” of the US “nuclear guarantee” for the FRG through “ﬂexible response” and the need to maintain a credible nuclear deterrence. This is clearly borne out by Defense Minister von Hassel’s diary notes throughout 1966 and by the nuclear priorities within the drafts for the Bundeswehr’s planning exercises between 1965 and 1967. See BAMA, BW 1/108–110 and BW 1/373–594. Matthias Küntzel, Bonn und die Bombe: Deutsche Atomwaffenpolitik von Adenauer bis Brandt (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1992); Küntzel cites on pp. 95 and 101 corresponding documents of BAMA from the Nuclear History Program (NHP) collection. Wilhelm G. Grewe, Rückblenden, 1976–1951: Aufzeichnungen eines Augenzeugen deutscher Außenpolitik von Adenauer bis Schmidt (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein/Propyläen, 1979), p. 699. On the coordination of resistance to the Non-Proliferation Treaty between Grewe and Brosio, see Küntzel, Bonn und die Bombe, p. 152. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, interview with the author, Washington, DC, 29 April 2005. Memorandum of the NAC Meeting on 4 April 1967, NATO Archives, Brussels (NA), LOM 82/67. Letter by Cleveland, 3 May 1967, including an American interpretation of the NPT, statement by Cleveland from 3 May 1967, as well as US and USSR draft texts,

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45 46 47

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NATO, LOM 103/67. Record of NAC Special Meeting on 5 May 1967, NATO, LOCOM 7966. Cleveland’s Statement to NAC, 24 May 1967, NATO, LOM 113/67. NAC Meetings on 5 July and 20 September 1967, NATO, LOCOMs 8090 and 8232. Cleveland’s statement at the NAC meeting on 6 September 1967, NATO, LOM 198/67. “The Future Tasks of the Alliance: (The ‘Harmel Report’),” 13–14 December 1967: www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b671213a.htm. Memorandum from Rusk and Clifford to Johnson; Telegram from the US Embassy in The Hague to Washington, 19 April 1968, both in FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, p. 690 and p. 679, respectively. For a detailed discussion of these documents, see Andreas Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity: NATO’s Transformation and Multilateralization of Détente, 1966–1968,” Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 1 (Winter 2004), pp. 22–74, here pp. 69–70. Tuschhoff (Deutschland, Kernwaffen und die NATO, p. 343) rightly points out that the United States had already granted these rights – albeit secretly – to Italy and Turkey. George Vest, interview with the author, Washington, DC, 25 April 2005. Private Meeting of Permanent Representatives, Harmel Exercise, 12 July 1967, NATO, NISCA 4/10/5, Item 29, cited in Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity,” p. 62. The ﬁrst of numerous public statements by Grewe against the NPT, on 24 January 1967, can be found in Europa Archiv, 3/1967, p. 77ff. A much-cited speech against the treaty before the Wehrkundetagung in Munich in February 1969 – completely against the ofﬁcial line of the Coalition Government – led to a reprimand from the Foreign Ofﬁce’s undersecretary, which in turn triggered CDU–CSU accusations that Brandt and the SPD were trying to curb freedom of speech and which even led to a debate in the Bundestag. For a detailed analysis of Grewe’s reports on the NPT proceedings in Paris, his public statements, and the repercussions in Bonn, see Bange, “Ostpolitik und Détente in Europa,” pp. 572–726. Ultimately, Article 3 of the NPT established the principle of control through the IAEA to which the results of Euratom’s control measures had to be reported. It was and is clear, however, that this legal and technical framework had to be supplemented by viable political control – in effect executed by each superpower within its bloc and the various alliances themselves.

Part V

Changing domestic perspectives on NATO

11 Striving for détente Denmark and NATO, 1966–67 Jonathan Søborg Agger

Introduction This chapter addresses one of the biggest gaps in the study of Danish security policy during the Cold War: Denmark’s security policy in the mid- and late 1960s. The deﬁning characteristic of this policy was the steady search for a relaxation of tension between East and West. Most signiﬁcantly, the Danish government actively supported NATO’s efforts to reduce international tensions. This was Denmark’s diplomatic moment of glory. In Danish historiography, two cases in particular are generally seen as the most prominent examples of Denmark’s political initiative and groundwork for a more active NATO policy of détente: ﬁrst, the suggestion made by Denmark in 1966 that NATO take the initiative in organizing a conference on European security; and second, Denmark’s active participation in the process leading up to NATO’s adoption of the Harmel formula in 1967, according to which détente supplemented the former twin goals of the NATO alliance: defense and deterrence. Until now, Denmark’s attempts in the 1960s to strengthen NATO’s focus on détente have been touched upon only brieﬂy in a few general introductions to Danish alliance policy, and the motivations for the Danish policy of détente remain uncharted territory. However, there is a consensus that Denmark’s efforts were aimed at stimulating peace and understanding between East and West, although the domestic advantages of this policy have also been stressed.1 Based on recently accessed Danish documents, this chapter uncovers the driving forces behind the Danish pursuit of a NATO policy of détente. It argues that Danish efforts to increase NATO’s détente proﬁle were motivated not only by a genuine search for détente, but also, and to a large degree, by a number of other political factors, not least of a domestic political nature. In the early Cold War, Denmark followed a loyal but rather low-key alliance policy. The Danish governments showed some reluctance to participate actively in developing overall NATO policy and in solving international security problems. The general Danish attitude was that major security issues were matters for the great powers. In the early 1960s, however, Denmark more frequently assumed independent and often critical policies in international matters and engaged quite prominently in political, cultural, and economic contacts, ﬁrst

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with the Soviet Union, and later with the smaller East European countries. To some extent, the expansion of contacts with the Soviets was a conﬁdence-building measure in the wake of the establishment of the Danish–West German Baltic Command in late 1961. Furthermore, experiences from the Cuban missile crisis made a reduction in international tensions seem even more prudent. Furthermore, the appointment of the active and pro-Atlantic Social Democrat Per Hækkerup as foreign minister in 1962 helped to bring forth a more active Danish policy towards NATO and the UN, and to gain attention for the diplomatic engagement of Denmark, and later also NATO, with the Eastern bloc.

Denmark’s 1966 proposal for a European security conference and its reception in the North Atlantic Council Danish push or US pull? The possibility of a security conference had been a topic of discussion for many years. The Soviet Union had aired the idea in 1954, but the concept did not actually take shape until the early 1960s, when Poland began to advocate it strongly. In early 1966, the Eastern European states, including the Soviet Union, began to take a more earnest interest in the conference, though Moscow did not envisage US participation. This circumstance tempered the Western countries’ enthusiasm for the proposal.2 However, a number of countries did give some consideration to the notion of a security conference. Thus, during talks with Poland, Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Henri Spaak launched – in vain – the idea of a pre-conference meeting with representatives from the two alliances – NATO and the Warsaw Pact – and from the neutral countries. During talks with Poland in 1965, British Foreign Minister Michael Stewart also expressed an interest in a possible conference, acknowledging the usefulness of such a meeting if the circumstances were favorable, and if thorough preparations were made. Furthermore, Stewart stressed that US participation would be a prerequisite.3 In late 1965 and early 1966, the Danish government adopted a similar, relatively positive position during bilateral talks with the East European countries. This was especially the case during Hækkerup’s visit to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria in the fall of 1965. However, like the British, the Danes continuously stressed the necessity of US participation and thorough preparations.4 On 17 May 1966, the US deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, Arthur W. Barber, approached the Danish embassy in Washington. Barber, who was a close personal adviser to US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, suggested that the Danish government consider raising the question of NATO’s negotiating role during the next council meeting in Paris, possibly with previous British and Norwegian agreement. According to the embassy, Barber’s idea was that suggestions could be tabled during the forthcoming Permanent Representatives’ Council meeting and that, at the impending ministerial meeting in June, the NATO countries should discuss and

Striving for détente 185 decide in principle on their willingness to enter into negotiations over the security of Europe with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries.5 In all likelihood, Barber’s move to approach Denmark was mainly motivated by a desire to counter an unfortunate development arising out of the current crisis in NATO. In February–March 1966, a serious yearlong rift within NATO between France and the Anglo-American NATO countries, in particular, culminated in the announcement by French President Charles de Gaulle that France would withdraw from NATO’s integrated military command structure. This move caused a veritable crisis within the alliance. Given the recent proposals from the Eastern countries and the still more frequent comments by European NATO partners on the importance of a European settlement, Barber’s plan was probably partly aimed at preventing further political damage to NATO by exploiting existing sentiments to create détente. Only ﬁve months earlier, he had argued for a similar active policy directed at resolving political problems within NATO before these could grow to crisis proportions.6 Barber’s approach to Denmark was not in vain. Even though his plan was regarded as somewhat unorthodox, Denmark followed it to the letter. Already the following day, the Danish Foreign Ministry issued an instruction to its delegation to NATO and to the relevant Danish embassies. After an initial reference to Barber’s approach and remarks – which were to be kept conﬁdential – the Foreign Ministry instructed the Danish delegation to NATO to inform the council that Denmark was contemplating suggesting that, at the forthcoming ministerial meeting in Brussels, the NATO countries might engage in an initiative vis-à-vis the Soviet Union with a view to conducting more extensive negotiations on European security problems.7 Although Barber had presented his views on a purely personal basis, the Danish embassy in Washington expected his ideas to be in accordance with McNamara’s. However, the Danish willingness to follow Barber’s scheme should probably not be seen solely as evidence of Copenhagen’s submission to US political preferences. Barber had stated clearly that his view did not reﬂect the prevailing sentiment at the State Department. It was his impression that the State Department’s lack of initiative stemmed from its adherence to traditional Cold War thinking, and from its preoccupation with problems concerning the French withdrawal. According to Barber, US President Lyndon B. Johnson personally was not opposed to the idea of a negotiation initiative coming from NATO. However, the president did not have a proposal to this effect from the State Department, which, in turn, could not be expected to foster this kind of innovative thinking at this stage. Furthermore, Johnson would hardly support any US steps to inﬂict a new initiative on the European members of NATO. But, Barber argued, an initiative from the European members could obtain Johnson’s approval.8 Denmark took up Barber’s suggestion because it was in keeping with the prevailing overall Danish view of world politics. As the Danish embassy in Washington noted, Barber’s point of view corresponded rather well with Danish considerations as put forth during negotiations between the Fourteen in Paris –

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that is, the NATO countries excluding France – as well as during Danish Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag’s visit to Washington in April 1966.9 Furthermore, Danish decision makers had made several statements in late 1965 and early spring 1966 that not only remarked on the importance of East–West détente as such, but also called for an increased role for NATO in this respect. Thus, in December 1965, Hækkerup had stated in the council that the NATO countries should maintain and strengthen the alliance as an instrument of peace.10 Also, on 5 May 1966, Krag had said in a newspaper article that NATO should take up the task of promoting détente in Europe without jeopardizing the alliance’s defensive efforts.11 Together with Denmark’s relatively positive attitude towards the Polish suggestions in 1965–66, statements of this kind may have given Barber the idea of approaching Denmark, rather than other traditionally détente-oriented countries, such as Norway, to launch the conference proposal. Danish détente policy: NATO as a forum of political consultation Although the Danish government did not anticipate that NATO would assume the role of a negotiating partner, it now argued that the alliance should be a key instrument in achieving a reduction of tension between East and West. To some extent, this constituted a break with how Denmark had hitherto approached the achievement and development of détente in practical terms. Certainly, for years Denmark had stressed the importance of NATO’s focusing on obtaining détente. However, in connection with the initial Polish idea for a security conference, the Danes had promptly referred to bilateral contacts as a better means of improving the relationship between East and West.12 As the US State Department had noted, Danish decision makers felt especially qualiﬁed to engage with their smaller counterparts in Eastern Europe, while feeling that an opening from, for example, Britain or the US would be less likely to succeed.13 The persistent focus on bilateral approaches was in keeping with the traditional Danish stand on political consultations within NATO. Danish decision makers were concerned to avoid limitations to Danish sovereignty and political maneuverability – particularly, submission to West German policy. Furthermore, Denmark also attempted to avoid becoming trapped into controversial NATO decisions, especially with respect to out-of-area conﬂicts.14 Now, the Danish government had apparently changed its priorities: NATO was to play a more active role. According to Hækkerup’s brieﬁng to the Danish Foreign Policy Committee, the Danish change of policy was to be seen in light of the apparent real increase in the Eastern bloc’s interest in a security conference. While Hækkerup had doubted the depth of the Polish interest in late 1965, recently things had moved swiftly in Eastern Europe, and there was now an ardent wish for action on the European question.15 Also, the foreign ministry found it especially interesting that in March and April 1966, Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Jozef Winiewicz had mentioned that the idea of a security conference had now obtained the support of all members of the Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, the positive Danish

Striving for détente 187 expectations regarding Eastern willingness for talks were apparently based on recent Soviet statements on the subject. According to the Foreign Ministry’s instruction to the Danish delegation to NATO, these could constitute a starting point for such negotiations. Probably bearing in mind Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko’s recent negative statement concerning US participation in such a conference, the instruction stated that the Soviet Union might very well accept US participation in such a conference.16 The reasoning behind this estimate was that Gromyko’s negative statement had been provoked by the nature of the question put to him. Therefore, the ministry concluded, the question of the Soviet attitude towards US participation in such a conference was still unresolved.17 Barber had reached a similar position, starting from a somewhat different perspective. From discussions with Soviet contacts, Barber was under the impression that Moscow would hardly resist US participation, supposing that the West European countries wanted this, and the US showed a positive attitude. According to Barber, Gromyko’s negative comments on US participation were due to the dismissive US attitude that the Soviets believed they had witnessed during a conﬁdential communication.18 During another meeting at the Pentagon in late June 1966, Barber agreed with a Danish diplomat that there was a genuine interest in East–West negotiations among the East European countries. With regard to the Eastern desire for a conference, Barber mentioned Polish fears of a future European settlement through a US–German–Soviet agreement that completely bypassed Poland. Even though the main Polish purpose in raising the conference issue may have been a genuine attempt to ensure Polish security, subversive exploitation of the security conference was clearly on both the East German and Hungarian agendas.19 Pre-empting Eastern and Western détente initiatives The Danish focus on the Eastern bloc’s apparently genuine interest in a security conference did not just relate to the prospect of achieving real détente. Since Hækkerup found it desirable that NATO should not, in its present situation, be the hesitant party, the reasoning also seems to have been that it was now imperative for NATO to pre-empt any imminent proposal from the East.20 As Hækkerup stressed, the Soviet Union should not be allowed to reap the propaganda advantage of being the party to call for a security conference. Furthermore, as Hækkerup told the US ambassador to NATO, Yugoslavia was expected to call a European inter-parliamentary conference on European problems in Stockholm in fall 1966. Therefore, Hækkerup thought, it would be preferable if Western governments took the initiative before that. NATO simply could not allow itself to be outdone by the Eastern bloc on the question of détente.21 Moreover, displaying internal disagreement and hesitation over détente would open up a breach in the West that could be used in Soviet propaganda. Thus, as Hækkerup stated at the ministerial meeting in Brussels in June, the allies had to underline the peacemaking aim of the alliance clearly and to formulate their

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goals correspondingly, so that the Soviet Union would be unable to take advantage of any disagreement between the alliance partners.22 From the Danish point of view, however, it was not only the Eastern bloc’s expected initiatives that induced the need for NATO to act promptly. The Danes also expected President de Gaulle to raise the question of a security conference during his forthcoming visit to Moscow. During conﬁdential consultations with Danish politicians and NATO representatives, Foreign Minister Hækkerup repeatedly stated that it would be desirable for de Gaulle not to monopolize the idea of a conference on that occasion. By suggesting the possibility of a security conference in the forum of the Fifteen – that is, of all the NATO countries, including France – prior to de Gaulle’s talks with the Soviets, the Danish government hoped that France would support the Danish proposal for a NATO initiative. And even if the proposal obtained support only from the Fourteen, the security conference would appear to be a NATO initiative and would place France in a considerably weaker position with regard to any initiative to encourage East–West negotiations.23 Apparently, this tactical view, as Hækkerup called it, was central to the Danish plans. Barber’s reasoning seems to have been motivated by similar considerations. But whereas the Danes feared that NATO might be outdone by de Gaulle, Barber was focusing on the prospect of future US moves: if Paris presented the European desire for a security conference, the existing antagonism towards the French in the US State Department would prevent it from dealing further with the matter.24 The French, who generally seemed very well informed about Danish policies, were perfectly aware of the fact that de Gaulle’s visit to Moscow had stimulated the Danish suggestion. According to the French military attaché in Denmark, the suggestion appears to have been aimed at pulling the rug from under the French president in his charm offensive vis-à-vis the Eastern European countries.25 The French challenge: keeping NATO together – and Germany down The expected de Gaulle initiative seemed especially critical, as it appeared in the wake of the crisis that arose from France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command structure. The French withdrawal created a serious crisis within NATO and stimulated Danish attempts to prevent a deepening of the split between France and the rest of NATO.26 This, however, was also motivated by France’s inﬂuence over Denmark’s potential admission to the Common Market, together with Britain. The Danish concerns were further accentuated when it was rumored that de Gaulle intended, during his visit to Moscow, to try and engage the Soviets directly in bilateral negotiations on European security problems. Hækkerup believed that this prospect would have most unpleasant implications for the resurgence of German nationalism. He stressed that such a move posed a potential danger to European security.27 There appears to have been a twofold approach in the Danish reasoning behind these statements. First, the Federal Republic of Germany might beneﬁt from the French withdrawal by taking over the role of the strongest NATO

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country on the continent. For several years, Denmark had been very attentive to increased West German inﬂuence in NATO. In 1964, the Danish ambassador to NATO had stressed the expectation that, in gaining a more stable foothold in NATO, the Federal Republic would gradually attempt to achieve the Platz an der Sonne (place in the sun) that the German Reich had traditionally demanded.29 Second, West Germany might also be inclined to enter into bilateral negotiations directly with Moscow on security matters, meaning in this case the German question. The entry of West Germany on to the world stage as an independent actor was deﬁnitely not desirable. The prospect of increased German nationalism in the wake of de Gaulle’s initiative made it important to maintain solidarity between the Fourteen. According to Hækkerup, this collective solidarity had to be considered a prerequisite for NATO’s continuation.30 Barber stressed this point even more strongly, pointing out that the preservation of a united NATO would only be possible if the alliance was made an instrument for negotiations between East and West on a European peace settlement. Otherwise, Barber feared, the ground would slide from under the alliance.31 Although less alarmist with regard to NATO’s survival, the Danish Foreign Ministry instructed its delegation to NATO along similar lines: while NATO remained in its present state of inner weakness, it was important to focus attention and vigor on something more positive and to restore the alliance’s public reputation.32 If NATO were able to signal unity and a will for progress, attention would be directed away from the deplorable situation created by de Gaulle’s action.33 The domestic factor In 1969, any member could leave NATO after one year’s notice. With the prospect of a harsh debate over Denmark’s continued membership, the problems of NATO’s future were of increasing concern to the Danish authorities. In the mid-1960s, several parties in the Danish parliament argued repeatedly for the necessity of engaging on a fundamental discussion over continued Danish membership in the alliance. The possibility of holding a referendum on future Danish membership of NATO was also raised, although Danish decision makers repeatedly ruled this out during talks with the US side.34 However, the Danish government found itself in a most difﬁcult situation that was not eased by the increasing public opposition to US involvement in Vietnam. Furthermore, the fact that the Danish public was becoming less and less fearful of aggressive Soviet intentions made it increasingly difﬁcult for the Danish government to maintain public support for NATO membership beyond 1969. The Danish authorities feared that, if no steps were taken to promote détente, the alliance would be exposed as a rigid, static organization incapable of creating, and even unwilling to create, dialog between East and West. As the State Department in Washington noted, Danish decision makers in 1969 felt that they had to stress the importance of NATO for Danish security, but at the same time

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create the impression that NATO could, and would, be more than a purely military organization.35 According to the Danish authorities, a positive NATO announcement on the prospect of a security conference would accord with public opinion.36 Apparently, besides obviating criticism of Danish security policy, a rethinking of the main tasks of the alliance also held domestic advantages. Thus, the pursuit of a high-proﬁle policy of détente was also advantageous in a parliamentary context. One contemporary US analysis stated that: The Danish government’s behavior in Brussels may have important consequences for Krag’s and Hækkerup’s personal fortunes. Because of the shaky support that the Social Democratic minority government has in Parliament, defections from the left wing of the Social Democrats could drive the government from power.37 Besides smothering the beginnings of an anti-NATO campaign in order to secure what was considered the only wise security policy, the Social Democratic government probably gained political points by paying considerable attention to this popular issue. A chilly reception When the Danish proposal was ﬁrst presented to the permanent representatives on 26 May 1966, it received a rather chilly reception. Several members raised discreet criticism that the Danish proposal had not been thoroughly prepared and sufﬁciently thought through. Furthermore, there were doubts as to whether the Soviet Union would accept US and Canadian participation. Also, the question of East German participation became a stumbling block. None of the NATO countries had recognized East Germany, and it was argued that its participation would inevitably be construed as formal recognition. Apparently, the Danish representative did not clearly dismiss the prospect of East German participation. Furthermore, according to US press rumors, he only “assumed” that West Germany should participate in the conference. Presumably, this provoked a dismissive US and West German attitude.38 At a council meeting on 1 June 1966, the Danish ambassador attempted to soothe his colleagues by explaining the Danish reasoning in detail. The Foreign Ministry had issued him with relevant answers to the criticisms raised. With regard to East German participation, he was to stress that this was strictly a matter for West Germany to decide. However, the informal Danish position was that the exclusion of East Germany from the conference would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Nor did the Danes expect East German participation to constitute a problem with regard to recognition, since there was no precedent for a link between participation and recognition: for example, Hanoi’s participation in the recent Geneva Conference on the future of Vietnam had not led to the formal recognition of North Vietnam.39 Furthermore, the ambassador underlined that

Striving for détente 191 although the Danish government did not have a blueprint of the ﬁnal concept, this should not prevent it from raising the issue. Although the NATO allies appreciated the Danish initiative in raising the question, their overall reaction at this new meeting was apparently rather similar to that at the ﬁrst meeting. The most positive responses came from the Norwegians.40 Otherwise, the proposal was almost unanimously questioned on issues such as timing, participation or agenda. The main problem was the expected negative Soviet position on the matter of US participation. The US representatives themselves stated that a distinct line had to be drawn between symbolism and realities. Realities showed that the Soviets could not agree to a solution to European security problems without conﬂicting with their own security concerns. Despite Barber’s clear indication of the State Department’s misgivings, the negative US stand must have been somewhat surprising to the Danish authorities. Only a few days before Denmark ﬁrst raised the issue in the council, the Danish foreign minister had mentioned a possible Danish proposal to the US ambassador to NATO, Harlan Cleveland, who had responded positively to the idea and had even noted that Secretary of State Dean Rusk had recently expressed similar thoughts.41 When the Danish suggestion was discussed at the ministerial meeting in Brussels in early June 1966, the US and West German delegates, in particular, proved to be strongly adverse to it. Although stressing the importance of a general détente, Dean Rusk was categorically dismissive of even the possibility of a future conference. France also took a highly negative stand: an early conference should be avoided, and in any case, such issues were matters for the individual countries, not the military alliances. The general attitude of most of the other members was mainly negative, although a number of countries suggested that the matter might more appropriately be raised at a later stage.42 Although the Danish authorities believed that a far-reaching NATO decision on a security conference initiative was desirable, they would have been satisﬁed with even a positive NATO statement on the question.43 But despite these modest objectives, their hopes were disappointed. After a brief discussion, the Danish proposal was not even mentioned in the ﬁnal communiqué.44 This was mainly due to US and French opposition, but even Norway, which had previously been Denmark’s closest supporter in this matter, doubted the beneﬁt of a reference in the communiqué, since nobody expected results in the immediate future.45 The interim conclusion: the security conference In 1966, the Danish policy of détente went from focusing only on bilateral steps to focusing also on NATO as an instrument for peace. The direct inducement for the Danish proposal for a security conference had come from a US Pentagon employee close to Secretary McNamara. Although we cannot discount the possibility that Danish decision makers were themselves contemplating similar initiatives at that time, apparently no concrete plans existed, and the foreign ministry

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at least did not know of any such Danish deliberations prior to this US approach. Underlying Denmark’s willingness to promote NATO as a means of détente was a combination of internal and external factors. The apparent increase in Eastern interest was a key factor. The increased Danish promotion of the conference idea was due not only to the desire to exploit this window of opportunity to engage in real negotiations on the reduction of international tensions, but was also to a great extent driven by the wish to avoid being outdone by the East on détente issues. This perspective also applied to the expected French proposal of a security conference, which the Danes, in light of the imminent French withdrawal from NATO’s command structure, saw as a potential setback for NATO’s public image. In particular, the prospect of a public debate in Denmark on the country’s future NATO membership after 1969 reinforced the need for NATO to be seen as a vibrant and modern organization. Also, from a Danish perspective, the political problems regarding France made allied unity and coherence more important than ever, not least in order to avoid increased German military and political inﬂuence.

Challenges beyond deterrence: NATO’s adoption of the Harmel formula of 1967 Launching the Harmel study After a year’s preparatory work, NATO ministers in December 1967 adopted the so-called Harmel Report, which revised the political agenda for Atlantic cooperation. The study originally derived from a Canadian initiative of 1964, which, following on a suggestion made in 1966 by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, led to a NATO Council decision to discuss, and possibly alter, the goals and tasks of the alliance.46 A further impetus for the Belgian initiative might have been Dean Rusk’s statement at the ministerial meeting in Brussels in June 1966 that the alliance should expand its political work and strengthen its efforts to establish contacts between East and West. The US authorities received the suggestion positively, and Rusk speciﬁcally appreciated the fact that the initiative had come from a smaller European NATO country.47 When Harmel launched his suggestion in December 1966, the NATO countries received it very positively. According to NATO’s international staff, the degree of success that greeted Harmel’s suggestion stemmed from the fact that he had touched upon a general trend within the alliance. There was a general agreement that NATO was outdated and that the French withdrawal from the allied command structure had further strengthened the necessity to rethink the NATO concept. The future of the alliance depended on the ability of its members to act in unison.48 The Danish Foreign Ministry noted that there was reason to believe that a Danish effort might pay off, the more so as an opportunity had been presented to work towards positing NATO as an organization that promoted, rather than restrained, détente and that was a ﬁrm foundation for Western initiatives to advance the resolution of extant problems.49

Striving for détente 193 NATO’s purpose rethought: military security and détente The Harmel study gave rise to a redeﬁnition of NATO’s tasks. According to the study, the ﬁrst task was “to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur.” In this climate of stability, security, and conﬁdence, the alliance should carry out its second function, namely “to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved. Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary.”50 This duality of NATO’s agenda was fully in accordance with traditional Danish thinking on security policy, and during the Harmel study, the Danish authorities had consequently supported a greater emphasis on the détente aspects of NATO policy. Also, the formula on NATO’s dual purpose was mentioned in a Danish–Norwegian draft that clearly inﬂuenced the subsequent composition of the ﬁnal report.51 Yet, although Denmark was among the most persistent supporters of boosting détente in the rethinking of NATO’s tasks, and although it assisted in bringing the famous Harmel formula on to the dual track of NATO’s work into the ﬁnal report, the Danish ideas were far from unique. With regard to the crucial reference to the duality of NATO’s tasks, the wording in the Danish–Norwegian draft was actually adopted word for word from papers drawn up by US diplomat Foy M. Kohler, who was in charge of the Harmel study’s subgroup III on NATO defense policy.52 Furthermore, the wording on the dual nature of NATO in the ﬁnal report was actually phrased in the Belgian draft, which is also where the famous formula on military security and détente as complementary elements was ﬁrst drawn up.53 However, although several NATO countries clearly shared Denmark’s view on the necessity of a stronger allied focus on détente, this did not mean that there was a consensus on what NATO’s main focus should be. According to the Danish Foreign Ministry, Turkey and Greece were absolutely opposed to détente measures as such.54 Although most other countries appreciated the attempts to relax international tensions, there was no general consensus on NATO’s concrete role as a tool for such measures of détente.

Political consultations revisited: NATO as an instrument of peace In accordance with the Danish statements of late spring 1966 on the need for NATO to engage more actively in promoting détente, the foreign ministry noted in early 1967 that NATO, whose nuclear shield was a prerequisite for any discussion of détente, ought to be one of the forums where deliberations concerning détente should take place.55 The basic Danish stand was that détente policy could build just as well on bilateral as on multilateral steps. As far as bilateral moves were concerned, individual countries should be able to act without obtaining a prior consensus from NATO, while still being conscious of their responsibility towards their allies.56

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However, Denmark’s acknowledgement of NATO’s role as a protagonist in achieving détente between East and West also caused problems. The Danish fear was that support for a stronger political role for NATO in pursuing active détente could easily backﬁre, since other countries might agree and suggest that NATO should become the only forum for conceiving the détente policy, and might try to control the debate in practice through internal censorship and political regimentation. However, the Danish authorities thought it would be possible, to a certain degree, to ﬁnd expressions that, with a little ingenuity, could be interpreted differently depending on where the interpreters placed the main emphasis.57 There was yet another unfortunate implication of Denmark’s support for boosting NATO’s political role in order to promote détente. By increasing NATO’s political role in détente, there was a risk that the agenda would be broadened to include, for example, out-of-area matters. Denmark could by no means be politically implicated in conﬂicts in, for example, Vietnam or Angola.58 Thus, the Danish authorities stated that they would have no difﬁculties as long as the transformation of NATO into a “political alliance” did not involve more than the promotion of détente. However, if the transformation involved steps beyond this, the development would seem far more problematic from a Danish point of view. However, Danish deliberations on the extent of NATO’s political role extended beyond these objections in principle, to political cooperation. Avoiding a showdown with France was considered a main Danish foreign policy interest. Beside concern about France’s inﬂuence on future Danish membership of the Common Market, the Danes worried that a further decrease in French participation in the political work of the alliance would enlarge the gap between NATO and France. Therefore, the Danish authorities considered how they might promote a political stand that served Danish political interests relating to détente without alienating the French. In this connection, the foreign ministry pointed out that Krag had recently referred to NATO’s role as a clearinghouse for the exchange of experience and assessments. This approach, the foreign ministry felt, would hardly clash with French views. Nevertheless, it was considered prudent to investigate exactly how far France was willing to go in this direction.59 During their subsequent conversations with the French, the Danish authorities stressed that Denmark did not support too wide an expansion of political cooperation, especially regarding out-of-area issues. For Denmark, the domestic political necessity of boosting NATO’s image was a cardinal point. The Danes stated that, in order to prevent a serious problem from emerging in 1969, Denmark was aiming to provide NATO with an image that would make it seem attractive to the Danish population. However, if Denmark were to agree to a markedly expanded role for NATO in matters outside the geographic boundaries of NATO proper, the Danes argued, this would be counterproductive, and the public boost NATO could gain in Denmark by détente would be lost again.60 In addition, after emphasizing the problem of Danish public opinion during a conversation

Striving for détente 195 with French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, the Danish ambassador to France believed he had obtained French support for casting the Harmel Report as a constructive tool for détente.61 Yet although these Danish statements were clearly aimed at accommodating France, the political views put forward were in keeping with actual Danish perceptions. Countering domestic criticism At a Foreign Policy Committee meeting in late 1967, Danish Foreign Minister Hans Tabor stated that the Danish government had not so much seen the Harmel exercise as an attempt to change NATO than as an attempt to create a new image for the alliance.62 The exact meaning of the foreign minister’s words are, however, open to interpretation. It could be argued that Tabor was merely describing Harmel’s intention to launch a debate about NATO’s tasks and objectives. If that was the case, Tabor was largely correct. According to NATO’s International Staff, the Belgian proposal was motivated by fears that NATO might break up following France’s withdrawal, as well as by a desire to stimulate public debate in order to satisfy détente-oriented public opinion. The Belgian point of view was that the alliance should conduct a study showing that it still had something to offer, and thus be a few steps ahead of harsh criticism of it. According to the Belgian proposal, this study should be completed before 1969, from which point on a withdrawal from NATO would be possible for all members.63 However, in all likelihood, the Danish foreign minister’s statement to the committee was also an expression of Denmark’s own approach to the Harmel exercise. Starting with the very ﬁrst analyses in early 1967, the domestic angle appeared to be a key motivation behind Denmark’s policy. Indeed, the Danish preoccupation with the domestic aspect of the Harmel discussions was emphasized most explicitly by the director of the politico-juridical department of the foreign ministry, Janus Paludan, in September 1967: Danish participation in the operation must have as its main objective the eliciting of a result which can support the declared policy of the government. This is to the effect that NATO, and thus Danish membership thereof, must live on. Hence it follows that, seen from a narrow Danish point of view, this does not per se revolve around making the Alliance viable, seen objectively – for it will pull through – but around making it more attractive to that part of the Danish electorate which is, or may be, skeptical. The key instrument in this policy up to this point has been, and must surely be during the Harmel study too, a stronger assertion of NATO’s role as a protagonist of détente between East and West.64 Such clear statements on the domestic advantages of a policy of détente continued to appear in the following months. Thus, in a memorandum for the foreign minister, it was stressed that there was a domestic interest in the Harmel

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discussions resulting in a clear-cut demonstration in principle of NATO’s intention to contribute actively to the development of the current efforts at détente between East and West.65 Foreign Minister Tabor also focused on the importance of countering criticism from younger voters, in particular. By gradually incorporating détente among the political goals of the alliance, Tabor argued, NATO would acquire the image of a modern, progressive organization, which, under changed international circumstances, would contribute to making it attractive to the public, not least to the younger generation.66 Tabor’s comment on the role of young people was not unique. During the discussions in subgroup II on NATO’s internal relationships, the Danish ambassador to NATO, Henning Hjorth-Nielsen, stated that one of the most important tasks for the Harmel study was to provide something new for the younger generation, who did not have any personal knowledge of the prevailing political circumstances.67 The head of subgroup II, Belgian Minister of State Paul-Henri Spaak, retorted that the task ahead was to seek the truth, not to pander to the young. Anti-communism was NATO’s framework. This, Spaak stated, was something that young people had to understand.68 In a personal letter to Spaak following the meeting, Hjorth-Nielsen explained the reasoning behind the Danish stand. Although the Danish government and a majority in the parliament would support Denmark’s remaining in the alliance, there were elements in the Danish population as well as in other countries who were less enthusiastic. This was particularly true, Hjorth-Nielsen claimed, among the younger generation. Therefore, the Danish representative noted, it was important for NATO to put forward a realistic suggestion regarding the usefulness of a ﬂexible and modern alliance. In this respect, it would hardly be a good idea to portray NATO as an ideological tool against communism or, even worse, as part of an ideological crusade into Asia. Such ideas had very little support in Denmark. The only political step that Denmark could support was détente in Europe, Hjorth-Nielsen stated.69 Although Prime Minister Krag steadfastly dismissed the possibility of a Danish referendum on future NATO membership during talks with the US side in March 1967, the continuous domestic talk of a possible referendum caused him in 1969 to instruct the foreign ministry to cooperate closely with Norway in the Harmel discussions as a way of avoiding such a referendum, since an election campaign would be “unpleasant.”70 The strong Danish focus on the domestic situation did not mean that there was no sincere appreciation in Copenhagen of the possibilities of creating détente. As had previously been the case concerning the proposal for a security conference, the Danish government regarded the reduction of tensions between East and West as a key factor in the purpose of the Harmel study. As the Danish representative stated in the initial phase of the exercise, the Harmel study was useful in drawing up concrete measures for détente.71 However, he went on to observe that an important goal in modernizing NATO was to achieve public support for the alliance. The same kind of duality in the approach to the Harmel study emerged from an early Danish analysis of the potential content of the

Striving for détente 197 study. After referring to the importance of avoiding a referendum on Denmark’s future membership of the alliance because a majority of the population was expected to vote “no,” a senior Danish ofﬁcial noted that Denmark’s engagement in the Harmel initiative was motivated by the hope of reforming NATO in an unprejudiced direction. Thus, both in reality and in the public perception, he stated, NATO should develop into the kind of organization in which the military security aspects did not overshadow developments towards a more peaceful world.72 The interim conclusion: the Harmel study During the Harmel study, Denmark, together with Norway and Canada, represented a more active wing that aimed to “modernize” NATO, as the Danish authorities had phrased it, in early 1967.73 This modernization process was not only a matter of securing a stronger allied focus on détente: it also aimed at avoiding involvement in out-of-area affairs and at minimizing the role of ideology in NATO’s raison d’être. These two aims, in particular, demanded close cooperation between the three countries, while many more members supported the strengthening of détente, in particular Belgium and Britain. Denmark’s active participation in rethinking NATO’s main goals was mainly motivated by both a genuine wish for détente and a tactical attempt to counter speciﬁc domestic political problems. In particular, Danish decision makers feared that public support for NATO would plummet unless the alliance was seen as a modern and ﬂexible organization. However, the Danish line of policy was a delicate balancing act. Too strong an emphasis on political cooperation in order to strengthen NATO’s détente proﬁle might backﬁre and lead, for example, to Danish political involvement in out-of-area-matters. Similarly, the expected reserved French position on détente issues dictated a cautious Danish approach in order to avoid political problems with Paris. Besides risking further damage to the coherence of NATO, a conﬂict with France would possibly endanger future Danish admittance to the Common Market.

Conclusion In the mid-1960s, Denmark played a far more active role in strengthening NATO’s détente proﬁle than before. Although Denmark had steadily argued, since the 1950s, for a stronger allied focus on détente, the Danish government had focused almost exclusively on bilateral, rather than multilateral, approaches. Denmark’s new, rather high-proﬁle policy of détente was not least due to the development in the international situation. First, the international climate appeared to have improved, and Eastern interest in negotiations on security issues seemed to have increased. These factors increased the probability that the genuine Danish wish for détente could be fulﬁlled. But the increased Eastern interest also necessitated Western initiatives, if the Eastern bloc was not to outdo NATO on détente issues.

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Second, developments within NATO, in particular the French withdrawal, which might lead to increased German inﬂuence, made it increasingly important for the Western alliance to ensure and demonstrate political coherence. Not least due to the possibility of Denmark withdrawing from NATO after 1969, it had become increasingly necessary to counter the growth of anti-NATO opinion and to convince the Danish public that NATO was relevant. This was one of the most prominent and consistent motives behind the Danish efforts for a greater NATO proﬁle in promoting the relaxation of tensions between East and West. To sum up, the main motivating factors behind the Danish pursuit of a higher NATO proﬁle on détente were, on the one hand, a genuine wish for relaxation between East and West and, on the other hand, a blend of foreign and domestic political considerations, in particular the 1969 withdrawal option. There was a clear agreement between the political vision and political tactics, and it is difﬁcult to determine precisely the relative importance of the motives. Nevertheless, to put it somewhat simplistically, the wish for détente represented the principal political outlook and at the same time a somewhat distant political goal, whereas domestic and foreign politics were the immediate issues that triggered the political steps actually taken.

Notes 1 See, for example, Poul Villaume, “Denmark and NATO Through 50 Years,” in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook, ed. B. Heurlin and H. Mourtizen (Copenhagen: DUPI, 1999), pp. 38–9; Nikolaj Petersen, “Danish security Policy in the Seventies: Continuity or Change,” Cooperation and Conﬂict 3–4 (1972), p. 147. Here, Petersen clearly indicates the domestic advantages of the Danish policy of détente. 2 Danish White Book, Problemer omkring dansk sikkerhedspolitik [Problems Concerning Danish Security Policy] (Copenhagen: Danish Foreign Ministry, 1970), pp. 146–50. 3 Danish Foreign Ministry, Copenhagen, (DFM) Memorandum, 27 May 1966; Danish Embassy in Rome to DFM, 14 May 1966, both in Danish National Archives, Copenhagen, (DNA), Archives of the Danish Foreign Ministry (ADFM), 5.E.110.a. 4 DFM Memorandum, 27 May 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.a. 5 Danish Embassy in Washington, DC, (DaEmbWash) to DFM, 17 May 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.a. 6 See Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1965–68, vol. XV, p. 344. 7 DFM to Danish Delegation to NATO (DANATO), 20 May 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.a. 8 DaEmbWash to DFM, 17 May 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.a. 9 DFM to DANATO, 27 May 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.a. 10 Anna Locher and Christian Nuenlist, “What Role for NATO? Conﬂicting Perceptions of Détente, 1963–65,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 2, no. 2 (2004), pp. 185–208, 199–201. 11 Information, 5 May 1966. 12 DFM Memorandum, 27 May 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.a. 13 US Department of State (DoS) Research Memorandum, 1 July 1966, Lyndon B. Johnson Library (LBJL) Austin, Texas, National Security Files (NSF), Country File: Denmark Memos, Box 168, doc. 113. 14 Villaume, “Denmark and NATO,” p. 35. 15 Minutes of Meeting in the Foreign Policy Committee (FPC), 31 May 1966.

Striving for détente 199 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

DANATO, 20 May 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.d. DFM Memorandum, 27 May 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.a. DaEmbWash to DFM, 17 May 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.a. Memorandum of Conversation between the Deputy Foreign Ministers of Poland and the GDR, 23 October 1969, SAPMO-Barch, DY 30/J IV 2/201/1106. Minutes of NATO Ministerial Meeting, June 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.a. Memorandum of Conversation between Cleveland and Hækkerup, 23 May 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.a; Minutes of Meeting in FPC, 31 May 1966. Minutes of NATO Ministerial Meeting, June 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.a. Memorandum of Conversation between Hækkerup and Harmel, 4 June 1966; Memorandum of Conversation between Cleveland and Hækkerup, 23 May 1966, both in DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.a; Minutes of Meeting in FPC, 31 May 1966. DaEmbWash to DFM, 17 May 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.a. Military Attaché in Copenhagen to Paris, 2 June 1966, Rapports des attachées au Danemark, 14 S, Service historique de l’Armee de terre, Paris (SHAT). Minutes of Meeting in FPC, 25 October 1966. Memorandum of Conversation between Cleveland and Hækkerup, 23 May 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.a. DaEmbWash to DFM, 6 April 1966, DNA, ADFM, ad 5.E.126. DANATO to DFM, 14 April 1964, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.a. Naturally, the ambassador did not expect that Germany was actually still trying to acquire a colonial empire overseas as the original quote from 1897 refers to. Rather, he used the expression in its general, more metaphorical sense, namely a more central and inﬂuential position in world politics. Memorandum of Conversation between Cleveland and Hækkerup, 23 May 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.a. DaEmbWash to DFM, 17 May 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.a. DFM to DANATO, 27 May 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.d. Military Attaché in Copenhagen to Paris, 1 July 1966, Rapports des attachées au Danemark, 14 S, SHAT. See, for example, Bo Lidegaard, Jens Otto Krag, 1962–1978 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2002), p. 288. Intelligence Note, 12 August 1966, LBJL, NFS, Country File, Denmark Memos, Box 168, doc. 113. DFM to DANATO, 20 May 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.d. DoS Memorandum, 1 July 1966, LBJL, NFS, Country File, Denmark Memos, Box 168, doc. 113. Washington Post, 27, 29, and 31 May 1966. DFM to DANATO, 27 May 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.a. DANATO to DFM, 1 June 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.a. Memorandum of Conversation between Cleveland and Hækkerup, 23 May 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.a. Minutes of NATO Ministerial Meeting, June 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.a. DANATO to DFM, 1 June 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.a. “Ministerial Communiqué,” Brussels, 7–8 June 1966, www.nato.int/docu/comm/ 49–95/c660607a.htm (last accessed 19 December 2005). DFM to DaEmbWash, 10 June 1966, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.a. “Ministerial Communiqué,” Paris, 15–16 December 1966, www.nato.int/docu/ comm/49–95/c661215a.htm (last accessed 19 December 2005). Andreas Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity: NATO’s Transformation and the Multilateralization of Détente, 1966–1968,” Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 1 (Winter 2004), pp. 22–74, here pp. 57–74. Memoranda, 28 December 1966 and 13 January 1967, NATO Archives, Brussels (NA), NISCA 4/10/1.

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49 DANATO to DFM, 18 February 1967, DNA, ADFM, 5.D.110.d. 50 “The Future Tasks of the Alliance (The ‘Harmel Report’),” 13–14 December 1967, www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b671213a.htm (last accessed 19 December 2005). 51 DFM Memorandum, 26 September 1967, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.d; Danish–Norwegian Draft, undated, NA, NISCA 4/10/6; Minutes of Meeting in FPC, 8 December 1967. 52 Memorandum for Rapporteurs, 18 July 1967, NA, NISCA 4/10/5; Report by Kohler, 1 September 1967, NA, NISCA 4/10/4/3. 53 Draft Report, Belgian Version, undated, November 1967, NA, NISCA 4/10/6. 54 DFM Memorandum, 26 September 1967, DNA, ADFM, 5.E.110.d. 55 DFM Memorandum, 17 April 1967, DNA, ADFM, 5.D.110.d. 56 DFM Memorandum, 22 February 1967, DNA, ADFM, 5.D.110.d. 57 Letter by Paludan, 29 September 1967, DNA, ADFM, 5.D.110.d. 58 Ibid.; DFM Memorandum, 3 March 1967; Memorandum for the Foreign Minister, 14 October 1967, both in DNA, ADFM, 5.D.110.d. 59 Memorandum for the Foreign Minister, 14 October 1967, DNA, ADFM, 5.D.110.d. 60 DFM Memorandum, 18 October 1967, DNA, ADFM, 5.D.110.d. 61 Danish Ambassador to France to DFM, 27 October 1967, DNA, ADFM, 5.D.110.d. 62 Minutes of Meeting in FPC, 8 December 1967. 63 Memorandum, 13 January 1967, NA, NISCA 4/10/1. 64 Letter by Paludan, 29 September 1967, DNA, ADFM, 5.D.110.d, translated by the author. 65 Memorandum for the Foreign Minister, 14 October 1967, ADFM, NA, 5.D.110.d. 66 Krag to DANATO, 24 October 1967, DNA, ADFM, 5.D.110.d. 67 DFM Memorandum, 7 July 1967, DNA, ADFM, 5.D.110.d. 68 Ibid. 69 Letter from DANATO, 12 July 1967, NA, NISCA 4/10/4/2. 70 Krag to DANATO, 24 October 1967, DNA, ADFM, 5.D.110.d. 71 DFM Memorandum, 17 April 1967, DNA, ADFM, 5.D.110.d. 72 DFM Memorandum, 22 February 1967, DNA, ADFM, 5.D.110.d. 73 DFM Memorandum, 19 September 1967, ADFM, NA, 5.D.110.d.

12 A decade of delusions and disappointments Italy and NATO in the 1960s Leopoldo Nuti

Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to trace the evolution of Italy’s attitude towards NATO during the 1960s, showing how throughout the decade the original ﬁrm reliance on the Atlantic alliance was mitigated by a number of factors, such as the frustration of Italy’s nuclear aspirations, the mounting involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War, and the perception of a growing instability in the Mediterranean. In order to illustrate the process of transformation, this chapter looks at the Italian reactions to a number of simultaneous processes in the international system, namely: •

• •

the overall evolution of the global strategic context, with the gradual progression of the superpowers’ relationship from confrontation to détente, on the one hand, and the deterioration of the situation in Vietnam, on the other; the changes in West European relations and in the Atlantic alliance; the evolution of the Mediterranean strategic context and the twin crises of 1967–68, all of which were particularly relevant for Italy.

By analyzing the Italian response to these trends, the chapter suggests that a growing apathy characterized Italy’s relationship with the alliance in the late 1960s, as if NATO had progressively come to play an almost perfunctory role in the country’s foreign policy. The chapter concludes that after the twin shocks of the Six Days’ War and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which for a brief moment seemed to restore the old clear-cut division between the blocs, a trend can be detected towards the elaboration of a more independent foreign policy – somewhat comparable to a counter-insurance policy for meeting the challenges of a new, uncertain phase of the international system.

Italy, NATO, and détente For many years after Italy’s inclusion in the Atlantic pact, NATO fulﬁlled a central role in Italian foreign and security policy. NATO represented not only the best possible guarantee of US protection from a Soviet threat, but it also

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protected Italy from the subtler threat of a return to the old European game of power politics. The US presence in Europe through the Atlantic alliance implied, in fact, that no other West European power – be it a resurgent Germany or a Gaullist France – would again try to impose its supremacy over the rest of the Continent. In the words of one Italian diplomat, “the richest and most distant master is always the best.”1 At the same time, Italy’s membership in NATO represented the irrevocable pro-Western orientation of the country’s political system and provided a strong anchor against any attempt to steer it in a different direction. In a country where pro-Soviet forces numbered between one-quarter and one-third of the electorate, such a counter-insurance was regarded as crucial by all anti-communist political forces. This dual role made the Atlantic alliance a crucial feature of Italy’s postwar political landscape.2 The nuclear issue By the end of the 1950s, NATO had become even more important by becoming the main instrument through which Italy could try to achieve a nuclear status. As atomic armaments evolved into the central instrument of Western strategy, the Italian government had tried to gain access to the new status symbol by developing a strategy of cooperation with other powers, particularly with the United States within a NATO framework. By the late 1950s, therefore, the Italian government had become quite active in a range of initiatives related to military applications of nuclear power, all of which were based on a close collaboration with the United States. Paramount among these initiatives was the Italian decision in summer 1958 to accept the deployment of two squadrons of 15 Jupiter medium-range ballistic missiles, leading to the 26 March 1959 agreement on, and the subsequent set-up of, the 36th Air Brigade of the Italian Air Force, which manned and operated the missiles together with special US teams.3 In short, at a time when nuclear sharing was fast becoming the central theme of Atlantic relations, the Italian government had reached the conclusion that its only way to a nuclear status would be through close cooperation with NATO and the United States. This strategy was for quite some time fully compatible with the nuclear sharing schemes put forward by the late Eisenhower administration, as well as with the more general US interest in strengthening the Western military posture.4 NATO was therefore central to Italy’s nuclear aspirations, and the deployment of the Jupiters was seen as simply the ﬁrst step towards strengthening the country’s nuclear role. This explains the Italian readiness to follow through the deployment of the ﬁrst generation of intermediaterange ballistic missiles (IRBMs) with a new generation of missiles, whenever these might be ready: in spite of mixed signals from the Kennedy administration as early as 1961, the Italians probably expected through most of 1962 that the Jupiters would soon be replaced with sea-based Polaris missiles, either under Italian control, under NATO, or with a bilateral US–Italian agreement. The turning point of this modest bid for a nuclear status was probably Italy’s failure to ensure the continuation of the special nuclear relationship with Wash-

A decade of delusions and disappointments 203 ington when in early 1963 the United States decided to remove the Jupiter missiles from Italy and refused to provide a new generation of IRBMs to be installed aboard the cruiser Garibaldi, which the Italian Navy had modiﬁed in the previous years to host the new missiles.5 The removal did provide some behind-the-scenes resentment, and rumors circulated in Italian political circles that it was a result of a secret deal between Kennedy and Khrushchev to solve the Cuban missile crisis – not an entirely wrong speculation, indeed, since the Italian Jupiters were dismantled to ease the removal of the Turkish ones.6 The growing US resistance to providing nuclear weapons to its West European allies, therefore, was clearly going to deprive Italy of one of the trump cards that Rome had been willing to exploit during the previous years. At the same time, in December 1963, the formation of the alliance between the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) and the Christian Democrats (DC) meant that both parties would be inclined to keep a low-proﬁle Atlantic policy in order not to jeopardize the new fragile and unstable majority. As will be seen in the discussion of the impact of the Vietnam War below, any strong Atlanticist stance was likely to have a negative impact on the Socialist decision to support the government, since the PSI had only recently discarded its previous pro-Soviet attitude. Nevertheless, it took quite some time before Italy fully metabolized the notion that a nuclear option through NATO was ruled out by the growing inclination of the United States to seek a détente with the Soviet Union in the ﬁeld of arms control. For a number of years, and in spite of the many doubts that its political leaders nurtured about the project, Italy continued to display a moderate interest in the project of the NATO Multilateral Force (MLF), even if this represented only a second best, compared to the previous bilateral arrangements.7 By the summer of 1964, according to a number of reports, even the Socialist Party had given its quiet consent to the MLF, allowing Italy to participate in the MLF working group and in the mixed manning experiment on the USS Biddle. Inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a group composed of the leading Italian diplomats worked out a proposal for creating a small control committee inside NATO, which would allow the countries participating in the MLF to retain control of the force. As the Italian director-general for political affairs, Roberto Ducci, explained to US Ambassador Frederick Reinhardt, the proposal was meant to assure for Italy a “ﬁrst-class status” in NATO strategic planning, which otherwise Italy could acquire only by developing its own nuclear arsenal, following the French and British examples.8 When the Johnson administration let the matter drop, therefore, there were some clear signs of Italian discomfort at the disappearance of the project.9 The Italian government, however, still hoped that some form of joint NATO control of nuclear weapons could be created. When in April 1965 US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara proposed to set up a special committee that would study the possible solutions for implementing consultation on nuclear planning within the alliance, the Italian government initially took a very cautious attitude towards the initiative, as it was not sure what Italy’s role in the committee could be.10 As soon as it appeared that there was a chance of permanent membership in

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the new board, however, the Italians showed ﬁrm resolution to be included, and in spite of McNamara’s original preference for a small panel of knowledgeable experts, “the smaller allies, led by Italy, prevailed over US reservations and were able to gain broad representation on the Committee.”11 Eventually, in December 1966, the ministerial session of the NATO Council decided to create both a general board, the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC), open to all members of the alliance interested in discussing its broad policy outlines, as well as a select body, the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which would be the place for more detailed discussion of nuclear problems. The latter would be composed of the United States, West Germany, Britain, Italy, and three more members of the NDAC in rotation.12 The result was obviously pleasing for the Italian Government, and at the second NPG meeting held in Ankara in September 1967, the Italian defense minister took advantage of his position to sponsor a debate about national participation in the alliance’s nuclear planning.13 Finally, the active beginning and the amelioration of the Italian position in one of the alliance’s relevant bodies were capped by one of the peaks in the country’s nuclear diplomacy with the appointment of Italian General Nino Pasti as deputy supreme allied commander Europe (deputy SACEUR) for nuclear affairs, a new position created at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in September 1966 and terminated two years later.14 Italy’s modest success in ensuring a role inside the NPG was, however, more than offset by the developments related to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which turned into one of the most bitter pills Italy had to swallow in its postwar diplomacy. The NPT, in fact, generated a large amount of skepticism among West Europeans and in Italy, in particular – which shows that Italy’s concern with NATO nuclear problems was related to a broader range of factors that went beyond the mere desire to play an active role in shaping the alliance’s nuclear plans. While some members of the government majority, like Deputy Prime Minister Pietro Nenni and Secretary of the Republican Party Ugo La Malfa, openly supported the NPT, others, like Prime Minister Aldo Moro, Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani, and President Giuseppe Saragat, were perplexed about its implications, particularly its negative repercussions for NATO nuclear sharing and the fact that it seemed to sanction a permanent discriminating division between nuclear and non-nuclear powers. Italian diplomacy, therefore, ended up ﬁghting a sort of delaying action against the NPT. In one of his cutting quips, Ambassador Ducci scathingly referred to the treaty as “the treaty by which it is requested that those who have made a chastity pledge now emasculate themselves.”15 In the 1964–65 NATO discussions about the correlation between the MLF project and possible forms of arms control, the Italians had already shown an increasing restlessness at the idea of giving up all hopes of nuclear sharing for the sake of a non-proliferation agreement.16 When the United States ﬁnally worked out a joint draft with the Soviets and presented it to the allies between the end of 1966 and the early weeks of 1967, the Italian reaction was rather spirited.17 Italy began a rearguard action to try and slow down the implementation of

A decade of delusions and disappointments 205 the NPT – or at least to exact the highest possible price for its acquiescence. In particular, Italian diplomatic action focused on the general issue of non-discrimination between nuclear and non-nuclear powers, as well as on two speciﬁc facets, namely the duration of the treaty (which Italy successfully tried to limit) and the control of its implementation – which Italy insisted should be carried out by the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), rather than by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).18 Nevertheless, as will become clear below, the uneasiness displayed by Italy towards the NPT was not due only to Italy’s concerns about being cut out of the technological race or to its aspirations for a nuclear status. These preoccupations were indeed felt by a sizeable number of diplomats and politicians but were not at the core of the malaise. “This nuclear problem,” summed up Prime Minister Moro, “was essentially a political one,” and the Non-Proliferation Treaty “could have a negative effect on the Atlantic Alliance.”19 In Ambassador Reinhardt’s words, the Italians feared that: The policy of the United States toward Europe may be beginning to shift. They are worried that the US, in its enthusiasm for détente, will be led to settle US–Soviet differences at the expense of Europe. They thus believe that they see the beginning of a process which, if continued, would not only impair the NATO alliance but might eventually lead to a reversal of alliances.20 The documents of these years are, in fact, replete with expressions of discomfort at what the Italians perceived as the rationale behind the NPT, which from their point of view implied a number of unpalatable developments. Détente was to many Italian politicians a welcome development, and indeed one that they themselves had been working towards, but not at the price of a US withdrawal from Europe or of a deal between the superpowers sur le dos of the Europeans. The latter, in particular, became a recurring fear, as the United States became more and more involved in the Vietnam War. Here, sufﬁce it to say that even a moderate, centrist politician such as Aldo Moro went as far as declaring that the Vietnam War and the NPT were two facets of the same nightmare scenario, since their joint impact on Italy, as well as on the other West European countries, might end up pushing them towards a more neutralist stance.21 In short, the underlying fear among the moderate Italians was that NATO would become useless, a sort of empty shell devoid of a soul, if détente was achieved at the price of a Soviet-American deal over the heads of the European allies. The Vietnam War The Vietnam conﬂict was the other crucial problem that enhanced Italian suspicions about the future of the Western alliance. The growing US involvement in the war threatened Italy in more than one way. Domestically, it was the single most important issue on which the center-left coalition between the Christian

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Democrats and the Socialists (PSI) might founder, should the cabinet be called to pledge its full support to US escalation. Divided as it still was among several factions and groupings, the PSI was at best capable of quietly endorsing any declaration of approval for the United States that the government might make, but it was much more likely to take an openly critical stance against US involvement in the war – a position that the large majority of the Christian Democrats, on the other hand, would be certain to oppose.22 Furthermore, from the point of view of Italy’s foreign policy, the war in Vietnam seemed to conﬁrm that Western Europe was no longer the number one priority of the United States. As a US State Department memorandum noted: Italy is deeply concerned that the United States is becoming decreasingly interested in Western Europe and that because of our preoccupations with Southeast Asia, we may exchange the security of Western Europe for an agreement with the Soviet Union which would open the way for a more apparent than real settlement in Asia.23 From 1965 onwards, therefore, US–Italian meetings turned into a litany of Italian expressions of discomfort at the prospect of any further US involvement in the war. The Socialists were particularly hard put: “This war,” Nenni confessed in early 1965 to Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs W. Averell Harriman, “is creating many difﬁculties in Europe, in Italy, and in me.”24 Faced with loud leftist opposition inside his own party, which was constantly demanding a ﬁrmer stance against US participation in the war, Nenni was torn between his desire to see the success of the Center-Left – the political experiment on which he had staked the last years of his political career – and the need to prevent any further split inside the PSI, which had already lost a sizeable leftwing fraction upon entering the government in late 1963.25 Nenni was also afraid that the war would widen a gap between American and European public opinions, a belief similar to that held by the Italian ambassador in Washington, Sergio Fenoaltea. While in public Fenoaltea felt it necessary to display unwavering support for the United States – to the point that he handed in his resignation to protest against a speech by Foreign Minister Fanfani that he regarded as not supportive enough of Washington’s policy – in his private remarks Fenoaltea was very pessimistic about the outcome of the war and feared its repercussions on the Atlantic alliance.26 With the passing of time and the deepening of US escalation, Italy developed another, more subtle form of anxiety. As the United States found itself more and more incapable of getting out of its predicament, some European governments began to fear that Washington might look to the Soviet Union for help in persuading Hanoi to accept a reasonable settlement of the conﬂict. Thus, expressions of concern for a possible Soviet-American deal over the heads of the Europeans became commonplace, particularly in those countries, such as West Germany and Italy, which had the strongest interest in the development of a nuclear sharing formula inside NATO. As early as May 1965, Fanfani had asked

A decade of delusions and disappointments 207 US Secretary of State Dean Rusk whether the “Soviets might be trying to link the problem in Vietnam with talks on European problems, such as the MLF,” receiving a long, reassuring answer from Rusk.27 As the war got worse, however, suspicions grew more intense. In the gloomy, pessimistic interpretation of the NATO crisis that he entrusted to the pages of his journal, NATO Secretary-General Manlio Brosio made no mystery of his fear that the United States would end up paying a high price to extricate itself from Vietnam and that the Non-Proliferation Treaty would turn out to be the ideal ground for a SovietAmerican compromise – at the expense of Western Europe and NATO.28 The pursuit of the war, therefore, created such an element of friction in the transatlantic relationship that, not only did the Italians privately recommend moderation and a negotiated conclusion of the conﬂict, but they also actively participated in some of the clandestine initiatives aimed at opening a channel of communication between Washington and Hanoi, hoping to bring about a quick settlement of the war that would restore some strength and vitality to the Atlantic alliance.29 The repeated failures of these initiatives, however, left a deep sense of frustration and increased the Italian doubts about the US leadership of the alliance.

No progress in Europe30 In spite of all disillusionment with NATO, by the mid-1960s the alliance still offered Italy a better perspective than Europe did. After the outburst of several promising, if somewhat contradictory, initiatives in the ﬁrst two years of the decade, European integration had suffered a dramatic setback by 1963. Italy had pledged its qualiﬁed support both to the French Fouchet plan for the creation of a political union among the Six and to the British request about London’s possible inclusion in the European Economic Community (EEC), but after both projects had ground to a halt, the Italian optimism of the previous years gave way to a more sober assessment of what the EEC could achieve. Nevertheless, the Italian Foreign Ministry discussed new plans for re-launching a possible political project among the Six; it continued to sponsor the enlargement of the EEC to include Britain; and it appreciated the positive results in the ﬁeld of the Common Agricultural Policy. All these efforts to re-launch European integration in 1964–65, however, met with very limited success, while the “empty chair crisis” of 1965 persuaded Italy that no progress would be possible, at least as long as French President Charles de Gaulle remained in power in Paris. By the mid 1960s, the general feeling in Rome was that the whole pattern of relations within the Western bloc had to be watched with the utmost attention. The Italian Government could not help noticing that the élan and the conﬁdence of the previous years had gone and that the most likely result of a renewed British EEC application would be yet another failure. “Since 1962,” wrote Ambassador Ducci in 1968, “Europe is walking backwards.”31 To the Italians, therefore, the “empty chair crisis” of 1965–66 did not come as a surprise but

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merely conﬁrmed that the most that could be expected from the process of European integration was some slow progress in the economic ﬁeld – as shown by the success of the Common Agricultural Policy – but no outstanding innovation, as long as French foreign policy continued to be shaped by Gaullist conceptions.32 From the point of view of bilateral relations with the West European partners, the picture was hardly a better one, as relations with both France and Germany were marred by a number of problems. The Fifth Republic pursued a foreign policy that the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs found in many cases totally at odds with its own conceptions. In the ﬁeld of European integration, in particular, de Gaulle’s intentions and actions – and in particular the 1965 crisis – were deﬁned in an ofﬁcial Foreign Ministry study as “diametrically opposed” to those of the Italian Government.33 As for the Federal Republic of Germany, with which Rome had never managed to establish a connection as close as with other European partners, the relationship was now made more difﬁcult by the growing tensions between Italy and Austria about the unresolved problems of the AltoAdige region, brought to the foreground by a new wave of terrorist bombings.34 As the Italian ambassador in Bonn remarked at the time, the relations between Rome and Bonn, friendly as they may have been, still featured several “seeds of misunderstandings ready to ﬂourish at the ﬁrst opportunity.”35 The only European government with which the Italian Center-Left seemed to enjoy a rather warm relationship was the British Labour government led by Harold Wilson, both because of its reformist domestic approach and because of its foreign policy program. Rome was openly in favor of Britain’s entry into the EEC, and any proposals Italy put forward in the ﬁeld of European integration always emphasized the need to leave the door open to a later British inclusion; furthermore, the Labour government also shared the Italian belief in a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam War, although Wilson displayed more conspicuous support for the US position than Italy did.36 To put things in the correct perspective, however, it must be stressed that Italy attached more importance to its relationship with London than vice versa. Thus the center-left cabinets felt an increasing risk of isolation, which was intensiﬁed by the perception that since 1962 the two pillars of Italian foreign policy – NATO and European integration – had not only stopped growing, but had actually experienced a period of decline – temporary, perhaps, but clearly a source of serious concern. In 1966 this feeling of isolation was further heightened by the exclusion of Italy from the trilateral group formed by the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany to deal with the problem of the cost of NATO’s conventional forces.37 The event raised the specter of a new form of directorate when the scope of the talks was extended to broader strategic issues, and it was all the more resented in Rome because of the attachment to the alliance that Italy had displayed for many years. The creation of a “clandestine tripartite steering committee” would be “a tragic mistake,” noted Ambassador Fenoaltea.38

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The 1966 NATO crisis and the Harmel exercise At a time when its relations with the main European partners were rather cold – if not outright difﬁcult – and relations with the United States stood under the ambiguous shadow of the uncertain perspectives of détente and Vietnam, most Italian politicians felt they could not afford a serious showdown with France, which explains the rather mild Italian reaction to the 1966 crisis ushered in by the French withdrawal from NATO. Even if the French withdrawal was a very dangerous development, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs believed it was of the utmost importance not to exacerbate the situation, particularly if one wanted to keep the door open to a possible return of France into the alliance.39 To make things worse, the Atlantic crisis caught the Italian Government in a delicate domestic situation. The memorandum informing Italy of the French decision to withdraw from the integrated military structure was handed to Ambassador Giovanni Fornari on 9 March, after Aldo Moro’s newly completed third cabinet had received a conﬁdence vote by the Italian Senate (on 8 March) but before this had been conﬁrmed by the chamber of deputies. The very ﬁrst ofﬁcial Italian reaction, in fact, was contained in the foreign policy section of the speech with which Moro presented the cabinet to the lower chamber on 15 March. The prime minister stressed that the new government would remain loyal to the Atlantic alliance and its political and military goals, he hinted at the “risks” of the “re-emergence of nationalistic attitudes” which could “spread in a dangerous fashion,” and he formulated the wish that the “current developments” did not “weaken the existing ties.”40 This altogether mild reaction seems to have been shared by President Saragat, who reportedly sent a personal reply to de Gaulle stressing the traditional feelings of friendship between the two countries, feelings that remained, in spite of the recent French foreign policy initiatives.41 The new cabinet debated the problem of a possible reaction in its very ﬁrst meeting on 16 March 1966, in an atmosphere of general pessimism, and was dominated by the impression that the whole architecture of the Western bloc had received yet another shattering blow after the crises of 1962–63 and 1965. The gloomy session was concluded by the approval of the British proposal for a declaration of the “Fourteen.”42 On 26 March, after the declaration of support for the alliance by the other 14 members on 18 March, Italy gave a formal reply to the French memorandum when Ambassador Fornari presented a note asking the French Government to clarify the extent and the exact consequences of its decision.43 The cabinet debated the problem once again two-and-a-half months later, on 31 May 1966. This time the ministers were already focusing on the technical consequences of the withdrawal, as the immediate threat of a sudden dissolution of the alliance had disappeared. They discussed such problems as the ﬁnancial cost and the future location of the main institutions of the alliance. Nenni, however, touched on a very sensitive issue when he stated that the problem of where to transfer NATO’s headquarters to should be discussed in more depth at the time of the renewal of the Atlantic pact, which was going to happen in 1969 – thus

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implicitly, and perhaps even involuntarily, hinting at a possible alteration of the character of NATO.44 All things considered, and apart from the more outspoken reactions of the press, the Italian Government followed a remarkably quiet course of action. While constantly praising the virtues of the alliance and stressing the utmost Italian loyalty to its principles, no member of the cabinet openly criticized de Gaulle in such a way as British Foreign Minister Michael Stewart and German Undersecretary of State Ullrich von Hase did. Italy’s willingness to remain ﬁrmly anchored to Washington, in other words, was moderated by its desire not to break or damage irreparably the relationship with Paris.45 As Fanfani pointed out to Rusk, some Italian political forces were concerned with the possible strategic isolation of Italy resulting from the crisis and felt that “maximum links with France had to be maintained to facilitate France’s future re-association.”46 Eventually, aside from Foreign Minister Fanfani’s proposal to develop an Atlantic project to bridge the growing technological gap between the two sides of the Atlantic, Italy took a number of steps designed to enhance its own role within NATO. It made known that it was willing to accept that several of the alliance’s institutions be removed from French territory as a consequence of the French decision to withdraw, in particular, the NATO Supply Center and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency, and it eventually ended up hosting the NATO Defense College in Rome. It also made clear to the US Government that it might be willing to add its own contribution to the defense assistance provided by the alliance to Greece and Turkey, an issue to which the United States (the main contributor to the defense budget of these countries) attached great importance for the defense of the alliance’s southern ﬂank.47 Italy’s conﬁdence in the alliance, however, had been badly scarred, and in the subsequent debate about the Harmel Report – arguably the most signiﬁcant transformation of NATO since its foundation – Italy kept a very low proﬁle. This attitude was probably due to the impending political elections and the fact that the government felt it too risky to take any high-proﬁle political initiative.48 It is signiﬁcant, therefore, that the NATO secretary-general himself, the Italian Manlio Brosio, was deeply skeptical about the possible results that the Harmel exercise could achieve, and his line of thinking may have inﬂuenced the Italian perception of the initiative.49 Throughout the discussions of the four subgroups that prepared the Harmel Report, Italy played a rather passive role. It can be safely said that it accepted, but did not actively promote, the ﬁnal report adopted by the alliance in December 1967.

The changes in the Mediterranean and the two crises of 1967–68 At least as relevant as all previous changes was the transformation of the strategic context of the Mediterranean, where a number of alterations signiﬁcantly affected Italy’s perception of its security. The most signiﬁcant change was a growing Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, which became particularly

A decade of delusions and disappointments 211 strong at the time of the 1967 war, and which was all the more remarkable, considering that until 1963, Soviet naval activities had been almost irrelevant in that region. By 1965, however, the programs of naval rearmament launched by Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev in the late 1950s had come to fruition, and the Black Sea Fleet started to deploy some detachments in the Mediterranean – the Fifth Eskadra or Sovmedron (Soviet Mediterranean Squadron).50 The impact of the increased Soviet presence was heightened by the progressive withdrawal of the West European powers from the southern shore of the Mediterranean and by a variety of local tensions. Cyprus became independent in 1960, only to become a troublespot after a few years; France granted independence to Algeria in 1962 and also withdrew its forces from the alliance’s integrated organization, denying NATO the use of two major harbors, Toulon and Mers-el-Kebir; Britain granted independence to Malta in 1964. The legal status of the NATO command on the island, Allied Forces Mediterranean (AFMED), was negotiated with the new Maltese Government the following year and allowed NATO to retain its installations on the island, but a couple of years later, Britain left the command, and AFMED was deactivated, to be replaced by a subordinated command, Allied Naval Forces South (NAVSOUTH) – led by the Italian Admiral Luciano Sotgiu – under AFSOUTH. As the case of AFMED–NAVSOUTH shows, this gradual withdrawal of the European powers from the Mediterranean might have opened up a number of opportunities for Italy to ﬁll the vacant slots in the alliance’s chain of command and, above all, to expand its inﬂuence in the region. Coupled with the expanding Soviet presence and the growing tensions in the Middle East, however, the European retreat turned out to be a rather mixed blessing. Many of the maritime states of the southern shore of the Mediterranean seemed willing to step up their relationship with Moscow, and the Italian documents of the time reveal a growing concern over the Soviet penetration and the opportunities that the rising tensions in the area seemed to offer to the Soviet Union.51 Together with the preoccupation regarding a shift of US interests away from Europe and towards Asia, this concern made the Italian Government eager for a more direct NATO role in the Mediterranean, but also skeptical that the alliance was able to play that role.52 This concern was most visible during the Six Days’ War of June 1967. The new clash between the Arabs and the Israelis proved that, in spite of the proArab proclivities of many members of the government, the majority of Italian public opinion was at the time overwhelmingly in favor of Israel and forced the government, after some initial hesitations, to drop all pretenses of “equidistance” between the warring factions. Public criticism of the government “continued to mount until by the time of the Israeli military victory change became inevitable.”53 In a few days, the highest authorities, including President Saragat and Prime Minister Moro, took a clear-cut pro-Israeli stance, reafﬁrming that “Italian policy toward the Middle East must be based on traditional bases of Italian foreign policy, that is, solidarity with Italy’s Western Allies.” The traditional caution towards the Arab states was partially abandoned when, at the

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General Assembly of the United Nations, Moro added that a possible Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories should be part of a general settlement of all problems of the area. All Arab foreign ministries immediately expressed their deep resentment to the Italian ambassadors in the Middle Eastern countries.54 In the following weeks, these initial declarations were somewhat toned down, but it was clear, as US Ambassador Reinhardt cabled to the State Department, that “the recent Middle East crisis did stimulate renewed Italian devotion to the Alliance.”55 A few months later, the Czechoslovak crisis would once again renew Italian interest in strengthening NATO. The Prague Spring had been followed with the utmost interest in Italy, and the Soviet intervention in August 1968 – even though it had been feared since the inception of the Czechoslovak reformist movement – generated widespread indignation, to the point that it marked the ﬁrst serious disagreement between the Italian Communist Party and the Soviet Union. The repression of the Czechoslovak move towards a new form of socialism not only conﬁrmed all beliefs in the deeply illiberal nature of the Soviet regime, but it also seemed to wave aside – albeit only for a short while – previous progress achieved towards an international détente. Conjectures soon began to circulate that other possible dissident states in Eastern Europe, namely Romania and Yugoslavia, could be the object of the next Soviet attempt to regain full control of its sphere of inﬂuence, and both the Romanian and the Yugoslav governments made no mystery with the Italians of their preoccupations in this regard.56 From a purely military point of view, moreover, the Czechoslovak crisis altered the balance of conventional forces in Europe by bringing a large number of Soviet divisions into the heart of the European continent, from where they could easily strike in almost any direction. For Italy, this meant that a possible attack from the Warsaw Pact against Yugoslavia – if not directly against its own frontiers – could beneﬁt from the additional strength of the new forces deployed to crush the Dubcˇek Government. The Italian Government decided that, in such an uncertain international situation, détente had lost much of its meaning. The government decided that it could not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, even if the parliament had already granted the necessary authority to do so. President Saragat made clear that to go to Moscow and sign the treaty in the aftermath of the invasion was indeed impossible.57 As a consequence of this hardened attitude, all previous rumors about a possible Italian appeal in 1969 that the North Atlantic Treaty be deeply transformed by the time of its 20th anniversary were quickly abandoned. Suddenly, a strengthened NATO turned once again to the center of the Italian political stage as the best guarantee against any new Soviet initiatives, and in his speech that condemned the Soviet aggression, on 24 August, Italian Foreign Minister Giuseppe Medici openly called for a reinforcement of the alliance. Within a few days, however, the Italian Government was to ﬁnd out that there would be no strong reaction to the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia from the United States. Lest any harsh criticism spoil the remaining chances for détente, Washington issued only a rather bland censure and a call from US

A decade of delusions and disappointments 213 President Lyndon Johnson for the withdrawal of the occupation troops.58 From Vienna, Ambassador Ducci, with his customary lucidity, penned an even more disheartening comment about the relationship between the Prague invasion and the future of NATO: The contradiction of which this fundamental organization for the defense of Europe [i.e., NATO] suffers is that it is meant to help Europe, but its essence is American. Alas, the priority of Europe in American foreign policy varies with the passing of time: today it is very low. When one talks to the Americans about Europe . . . they turn their heads in the other direction. The motive is not just the Vietnam war . . . this is, after all, a contingent reason. There are two other basic motives. The ﬁrst is the absurd evaluation that it is necessary for the US to “pay” the Soviet support against the future Chinese threat, when it is actually the USSR which is the ﬁrst designated victim of Chinese expansionism, and it is therefore up to the Soviets to “purchase” the American support. Because of this primitive and rigid concept, détente with the Soviet Union enjoys, and will continue to do so (at least as long as the US will not adopt more realistic concept) the priority over Europe – including the countries of the Atlantic alliance. [Emphasis added.] True, these countries can hope in something better than the poor Czechs: but exactly how much better? The rape of Czechoslovakia is a conﬁrmation of the Cuban affair: in a situation of nuclear balance, victory goes to those who enjoy a conventional superiority in the local area. NATO (and this is the second reason why Europe holds a second place behind the USSR for American priorities) does not have a local conventional superiority. Since it does not have it, and since one cannot believe that the American government may unleash a nuclear war if not in the direst circumstances, NATO is forced to watch sans bouger all developments of the European military balance which work to her disadvantage . . . Even leaving aside the French secession, therefore, the current NATO cannot defend Europe from a gradual deterioration and weakening of its political and strategic positions.59

Conclusion Ducci’s gloomy reﬂections illuminate the mood of Italian diplomacy as the decade approached its end. In a few months, the seemingly powerful impact of the two crises of 1967 and 1968 had already been superseded by a return to the trends of the previous years and, above all, by the pursuit of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union. The deterioration of the strategic picture in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East seemed bound only to allow further Soviet encroachments, while the United States and the Western alliance seemed unable to provide the adequate means to oppose this penetration. With the United States intent on pursuing the logic of arms control and engrossed in ﬁnding a way out of Vietnam, Italian diplomacy felt that it would become

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necessary to rely more and more on the limited means Italy had at its disposal to protect Italian interests and security in the new, difﬁcult environment that was being shaped. This sensation was reinforced by the increasing stagnation of the domestic political situation, where the Center-Left was rapidly losing what little reformist zeal it had had in the past and was failing to give the country the stability it had been looking for. This meant going along, albeit obtorto collo for a sizeable minority of diplomats and politicians, with the logic of arms control, and it meant signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Italy did at the end of January 1969. It implied reinforcing Italian attempts to work out its own limited détente, on a regional scale, with some East European countries, as well as securing the country’s borders by eliminating all residual tensions from World War II with Italy’s neighbors (the pacchetto, or package deal, over Alto-Adige with Austria and the Osimo Treaty with Yugoslavia). Finally, it entailed a return to a policy of “equidistance” in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East, marked by the attempt to re-open channels of communication with the Arab world and by some conspicuous initiatives such as the 1969 Fanfani visit to Algeria – the ﬁrst ofﬁcial visit of a Western foreign minister in that country since its independence. By and large, and always bearing in mind that we are talking about a very nuanced shift rather than a radical reassessment, the foreign policy that Italy had begun to follow by the end of the 1960s was more independent and nationallyoriented; above all, it was a policy in which NATO continued to play a central and crucial role but in which it was gradually being emptied of the important functions it had played in the past. The alliance remained there as a crucial insurance against any domestic revirements and a possible Soviet aggression, but it turned out to be less useful for promoting the country’s interests in the other ﬁelds. For these interests, and for a number of years, Italy would have to look elsewhere.

Notes 1 Ducci to Foreign Minister Piccioni, 4 February 1963, Italian National Archives, Rome (ACS), Archivio Ugo La Malfa, Box 75, La grossa questione dell’Inghilterra. 2 Leopoldo Nuti, “Commitment to NATO and Domestic Politics: The Italian Case and Some Comparative Remarks,” in Contemporary European History 7, no. 3 (November 1998), pp. 361–77. 3 Leopoldo Nuti, “‘Me too, please’: Italy and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons, 1945–1975,” in Diplomacy and Statecraft 4, no. 1 (March 1993), pp. 114–48. On the Jupiters, see, in particular, L. Nuti, “L’Italie et les missiles Jupiters,” in L’Europe at la crise de Cuba, ed. Maurice Vaïsse, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1993). 4 Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); and, above all, Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 5 For a full analysis of this episode, see Leopoldo Nuti, Gli Stati Uniti e l’apertura a sinistra: Importanza e limiti della presenza americana in Italia (Roma: Laterza, 1999), pp. 553–67. 6 Ibid., p. 565. 7 “I can’t hide the fact that [the MLF] is just an illusion . . . But let’s be satisﬁed with

A decade of delusions and disappointments 215

8 9

10

11 12

13

14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21 22

23

this illusion, let’s believe in it, and let’s use it – since it is not dangerous – to move the ground from below other illusions which are far more dangerous.” Ambassador Quaroni to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 7 January 1963, Pietro Quaroni (Roma: Servizio Storico Ministero Affari Esteri, 1973), p. 117. Telephone Call from Reinhardt to Secretary of State, 2219, 18 February 1964, US National Archives and Record Administration, College Park (USNA), RG 59, Box 7, European clause. See, for instance, the reaction of Ambassador Fenoaltea in January 1965, as described in Letter from Livingston T. Merchant to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1964–68, vol. XII, pp. 217–18. Paul Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO, 1965–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 42; Glenn T. Seaborg and Benjamin S. Loeb, Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 173. Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, 13 October 1966, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XII, pp. 260–1; David N. Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1983), p. 182. Position Paper, Part 1, Permanent Nuclear Planning Arrangements, December 1966 Meeting, Declassiﬁed Documents Reference System (DDRS) 1978/425; Buteux, Nuclear Consultation, pp. 58–9; Robert Jordan, Political Leadership in NATO: A Study in Multinational Diplomacy (Boulder: Westview, 1979), pp. 233–6. Final Communiqué, NPG Meeting, 28–29 September 1967, 1949–74, Textes des communiqués ﬁnals des sessions ministérielles du conseil de l’atlantique nord, du comité des plans de défense et du groupe des plans nucléaires (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1974), pp. 201–2. Virgilio Ilari, Le Forze Armate tra politica e potere, 1943–1976 (Firenze: Vallecchi, 1978), pp. 93, 108. L’ambasciatore d’Italia a Vienna al Ministro degli Esteri, sen Medici, 30 August 1968, Roberto Ducci (Roma: Servizio Storico e documentazione, Ministero Affari Esteri, n.d.), p. 130. George Bunn, Charles N. Van Doren, and David Fischer, Options and Opportunities: The NPT Extension Conference of 1995, PPNN Study 2 (Southampton: The Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, 1991), p. 4. Egidio Ortona, Anni d’America (Bologna: Societˆ Editrice Il Mulino, 1984–89), vol. III, p. 48. Telephone Call from Department of State to American Embassy Rome, 133734, 8 February 1967, USNA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1967–1969, Box 1729, DEF 18–6 2/1/67. On these two points, see in particular Ortona, Anni d’America, vol. III, pp. 47–53, 95–9. Telegram from the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State, 26 April 1967, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XII, 267–70. Airgram A-47 from Rome (Reinhardt) to the Department of State, 14 July 1967, “Annual Policy Assessment,” USNA, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), 1967–1969, Political and Defense, Box 2238. See Moro’s thoughtful comments to Ambassador Ortona in late 1967, in Ortona, Anni d’America, vol. III, p. 55. Leopoldo Nuti, “The Center-Left Government in Italy and the Escalation of the Vietnam War,” in America’s War and the World: Vietnam in International and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Andreas W. Daum, Lloyd C. Gardner, and Wilfried Mausbach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 259–78. Memorandum for Reilly, Ofﬁce of the Vice President, 15 August 1967, “The Vice President’s Appointment with the Italian Ambassador Egidio Ortona,” USNA, CFPF, 1967–69, Political and Defense, Box 2238.

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24 Pietro Nenni, Gli anni del centro-sinistra: Diari, 1957–1966 (Milan: SugarCo, 1982), pp. 512–14. For the US version of the conversation between Nenni and Harriman, see Memorandum of Conversation, 18 February 1965, DDRS, 1975/5592. 25 Pietro Nenni, I conti con la storia: Diari, 1967–1971 (Milan: Sugarco, 1983), entry of 31 March 1967. A less forceful presentation of Nenni’s point can be found in Telegram 5110 from Rome to the Secretary of State, 1 April 1967, USNA, RG 59, Box 438, VP’s trip to Europe, vol. III, Memos of Conversations. 26 Pietro Nenni, I conti con la storia, entry of 21 March 1967. 27 Memorandum of Conversation, 24 May 1965, USNA, RG 59, Conference Files, Box 379, Visit of FM Fanfani. 28 Brosio Journal, 2 March 1966, Archivio Einaudi, Turin, Papers of Manlio Brosio. 29 On MARIGOLD, see George Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin: Texas University Press, 1983), pp. 210–370; FRUS, 1964–68, vol. IV. From the Italian angle, the story has been told by one of the members of D’Orlandi’s staff. See Mario Sica, Marigold non ﬁor“: Il contributo italiano alla pace in Vietnam (Firenze: Ponte alle Grazie, 1991). 30 This section of the chapter is largely based on my previous essay “Italy and the French Withdrawal from NATO in 1966”, in La France et l’OTAN, ed. Frederic Bozo, Pierre Melandri, et Maurice Vaisse (Paris: Colin, 1996), pp.469–88. 31 L’ambasciatore d’Italia a Vienna al Ministro degli Esteri, sen Medici, 30 August 1968, Roberto Ducci (Roma: Servizio Storico e documentazione, Ministero Affari Esteri, n.d.), p. 129. 32 Memorandum from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, attached to a letter from Saragat to Nenni, 19 September 1965, ACS, Archivio P. Nenni, Corrispondenza con Saragat, Giuseppe, 1944–79, Box 34, 1843. 33 Memorandum from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, attached to a letter from Saragat to Nenni, 19 September 1965, ACS, Archivio P. Nenni, Corrispondenza con Saragat, Giuseppe, 1944–79, Box 34, 1843. 34 On the Alto-Adige crisis and its historical roots, see Mario Toscano, Storia diplomatica della questione dell’Alto Adige (Bari: Laterza, 1967); Mario Toscano and George A. Carbone, eds, Alto Adige South Tyrol: Italy’s Frontier with the German World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975). See also Federico Scarano, “La Germania di Adenauer e la questione dell’Alto Adige,” in Rivista di diritto pubblico e scienze politiche 10, no. 3 (2000), pp. 349–94. 35 Mario Luciolli to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Fanfani), 16 September 1966, Mario Luciolli (Roma: Ministero Affari Esteri, Servizio Storico e Documentazione), pp. 103–7. 36 For a conﬁrmation of the proximity of the two governments, see the report of the conversations between Malfatti and Wilson in early April 1965: Memorandum by Franco Malfatti, Diplomatic Adviser to the President of the Republic, 8 April 1965, ACS, Archivio P. Nenni, Corrispondenza con Malfatti, Franco, 1944–77, Box 31, 1547. 37 For the trilateral negotiations, see Gregory F. Treverton, The Dollar Drain and American Forces in Germany: Managing the Political Economies of Alliance (Athens: Ohio State University Press, 1978); Diane B. Kunz, “Cold War Dollar Diplomacy: The Other Side of Containment;” Thomas A. Schwarz, “Victories and Defeats in the Long Twilight Struggle: The United States and Western Europe in the 1960s,” both in The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations During the 1960s, ed. Diane B. Kunz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). 38 Memorandum of Conversation, 30 December 1965, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, pp. 299–300; Telegram from the US Mission to NATO and European Regional Organization (ERO), 22 October 1966, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, pp. 485–7; see also NATO Ministerial Meeting, Paris, December 1966, Position Papers, Bilateral Papers, and Background Papers; Bilateral Paper, Italy, 3 December 1966, both in DDRS, 1978/425A.

A decade of delusions and disappointments 217 39 Note preparatorie del Ministero degli Affari Esteri per la visita in Gran Bretagna del Vice-Presidente del Consiglio P. Nenni, ACS, Archivio P. Nenni, Serie governo, Box 114, 2381. 40 On 7 March, however, the American embassy in Rome gave Moro a copy of President Johnson’s reply to de Gaulle’s memorandum, thus informing him of the French initiative before Italy had been ofﬁcially notiﬁed. Moro’s early speech at the Senate on 8 March, therefore, may already be regarded as an early reply to the French decision. See Corriere della Sera, 11 March 1966. 41 Corriere della Sera, 12 March 1966. 42 Verbali delle riunioni del Consiglio dei Ministri, 16 March 1966, ACS. See also Nenni’s own recollection of the debate in P. Nenni, Gli anni del centro-sinistra, pp. 611–12. 43 Corriere della Sera, 27 March 1966. 44 Verbali del Consiglio dei Ministri, 31 May 1966, ACS; see also P. Nenni, Gli anni del centro-sinistra, pp. 635–6, entry of 31 May. 45 It might be worth noting that during the summer, the Italian Government – after giving it some consideration – eventually refused the request of George Bidault, rumored to be connected with the anti-Gaullist terrorists of the OAS, to be granted asylum in Italy; see P. Nenni, Gli anni del centro-sinistra, pp. 646–7. 46 Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State, 6 June 1966, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XII, pp. 254–7. 47 NATO Ministerial Meeting, Paris, December 1966, Position Papers, Bilateral Papers, and Background Papers; Draft Defense Planning Committee Communiqué, 8 December 1966, both in DDRS, 1978/425A. 48 Airgram A-972 from Rome (Ackley) to the Department of State, 28 March 1968, “Annual US Policy Assessment,” USNA, CPFP 1967–1969, Political and Defense, Box 2238. 49 See Bruna Bagnato, “NATO in the mid-Sixties: The View of Secretary General Manlio Brosio,” in Transatlantic Relations at Stake: Aspects of NATO History, 1956–75, ed. Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher (Zurich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik, 2006). 50 John Chipman, (ed.), NATO’s Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 18. 51 See, for instance, Ortona, Anni d’America, vol. III, pp. 3–4. 52 When NATO drafted a Mediterranean study, for instance, the Italian Government took a rather cautious attitude towards it. See, Airgram A-972 from Rome (Ackley) to the Department of State, 28 March 1968, “Annual US Policy Assessment,” USNA, CPFP 1967–69, Political and Defense, Box 2238. 53 Airgram A-47 from Rome (Reinhardt) to the State Department, 14 July 1967. 54 Ortona, Anni d’America, vol. III, p. 28. 55 Airgram A-47 from Rome (Reinhardt) to the State Department, 14 July 1967. 56 Pietro Nenni, I conti con la storia, p. 222. 57 See the declaration of Italian President Saragat to Pietro Nenni in P. Nenni, I conti con la storia, p. 213. 58 Ortona, Anni d’America, vol. III, pp. 112–16. 59 L’ambasciatore d’Italia a Vienna al Ministro degli Esteri, sen Medici, 30 August 1968, Roberto Ducci, cit., pp. 127–8.

Part VI

Conclusion

13 NATO’s transformation in the 1960s and the ensuing political order in Europe Andreas Wenger

Introduction During the Cold War, stability in Europe was based on deterrence. This explains why the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) imprinted itself on the European consciousness primarily as a powerful military structure. From its foundation in 1949 on, however, the Atlantic alliance fulﬁlled important political functions that went well beyond the challenges of deterrence. NATO had been conceived as a means of preventing the expansion of Soviet political inﬂuence in an economically weak Europe. Protecting Western Europe from a return of the old European game of power politics, the alliance was thought to ensure the pro-Western orientation of the West German and Italian governments. NATO membership signaled a commitment to a community of values and interests, as the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty makes clear: “They [the parties to the treaty] are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”1 For those present at its creation in 1949, NATO was as much about the defense of values as about the defense of territory.2 NATO’s ﬁrst transformation from a tool of political reassurance into a defensive alliance with an integrated military force under centralized command resulted from a dramatic turn in the early Cold War. Western threat perceptions changed as a result of the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. North Korea’s aggression was perceived as proof of communist expansionism by means of military force, and Western observers wondered whether military aggression could also be expected along the German border. The challenges of the Cold War seemed to move away from the political to the military arena. This led the United States and its allies to review their strategies, accelerate the buildup of their forces, expand and integrate NATO’s military and political structures, and accept West Germany’s rearmament.3 The Washington treaty deﬁned the organizational structures and procedures of the alliance only rudimentarily. Reﬂecting a pragmatic Anglo-Saxon political culture, NATO was provided with a high level of institutional ﬂexibility. Thus, in December 1950, General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed the ﬁrst

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Supreme Allied Commander to Europe (SACEUR), and the alliance’s command structure was divided into three major regional commands. The Lisbon Force goals, adopted in February 1952, called for the establishment of 96 NATO divisions by 1954. However, it soon became clear that a forward defense was credible only if NATO compensated for its numerical inferiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union by adopting the technical superiority of US nuclear power. Along with military integration in 1952, the post of a secretary-general, an international secretariat, and a permanent North Atlantic Council (NAC) were created. Strategic considerations, however, overrode political principle in the early Cold War: within two years, Greece and Turkey – of great strategic interest, if of a rather questionable democratic nature – joined the alliance. NATO’s second transformation from the integrated military alliance of the 1950s, dominated militarily and politically by the United States, into the more political and participatory alliance of the late 1960s is the overarching theme of this book. This chapter discusses some of the book’s major ﬁndings, placing these into the larger context of three distinct phases of NATO’s second transformation. Part I shows how the changing military balance and a growing desire for political détente – both of which were crystallized in French President Charles de Gaulle’s challenge to the raison d’être of the alliance – forced NATO into a transitional phase by 1958. The Gaullist challenge amounted to a double crisis within the alliance: on the one hand, the growing vulnerability of the United States to Soviet nuclear attack discredited the credibility of military NATO. As a result, increasingly ﬁerce debates about strategy and political control over (nuclear) decision making marked the end of NATO’s ﬁrst decade. On the other hand, the growing desire for détente in the context of the Berlin crisis and the ensuing debate about the German question called the political legitimacy of NATO into question. As a result, two fundamentally different political visions of Europe’s future had emerged in Paris and Washington by 1963. Part II analyzes how NATO dealt with France’s dissent and managed to isolate Paris in the period from 1963 to 1966. De Gaulle’s argument that US forces in Europe, as a symbol of US hegemony, had to leave Europe before the historic process of détente could proceed was rejected by a broad coalition within and around NATO’s institutions. Yet as the conviction took hold that any European settlement would require the continuing support of the United States through the alliance, NATO member states came to realize that domestic political and social forces in their societies made a transformation of NATO’s form and function unavoidable. The challenges of détente, nuclear control, and burden sharing were increasingly framed as national as opposed to alliance problems in domestic debates. Clearly, NATO was in need of a new balance between its military and political functions that would reintegrate the diverging perceptions of security among its members.4 Part III shows how NATO, as a result of the trilateral talks and the Harmel exercise, strengthened its political functions and transformed its institutional structures in the period from 1966 to 1968. The essence of NATO’s second

NATO’s transformation in the 1960s 223 transformation was political: NATO’s new two-pillar security policy – military security and a policy of détente – together with its new force-planning and nuclear-consultation machinery allowed it to shift the issues of a European settlement and of arms control away from the bilateral Soviet-US “little détente” of 1963 and place these issues into the broader context of the European détente of the 1970s. In short, the transformation of NATO in the 1960s was instrumental to the multilateralization of détente.5

NATO and the Gaullist challenge, 1958–63 In 1958, the French president informed the US leadership that France could “no longer consider that NATO in its present form [met] the conditions of security of the free world.”6 De Gaulle demanded that NATO be reorganized to accommodate France’s status as a great power. He proposed that NATO be run by a trilateral directorate, which should decide on strategic plans and on the use of nuclear weapons. When his demand was rejected by the allies, de Gaulle began a step-bystep withdrawal of France’s naval and air forces from NATO’s integrated commands in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. By the 1960s, the consensus among NATO members on US leadership of military NATO had dissolved. The Gaullist challenge went right to the heart of the political legitimacy of the alliance. By the end of its ﬁrst decade, NATO had entered a phase of transition in which structural forces – proliferating nuclear capabilities, economic growth in Western Europe and Japan, and growing assertiveness in the global south – brought about the diffusion of political power from Washington and Moscow to the most inﬂuential allies. As a result, discord would unavoidably deepen within the postwar alliances, as policy makers across the Atlantic began to think in terms of national rather than alliance interests. All this suggested to de Gaulle that the Europeans had to assume Europe’s political leadership outside of NATO’s integrated structures, which were dominated by the United States.7 The credibility crisis of “military NATO” The launching, on 4 October 1957, of the ﬁrst Soviet satellite Sputnik challenged the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee to its European NATO allies, resulting in pressure for control over nuclear forces not only from London and Paris, but also – causing particular concern in Moscow – from Bonn. To mitigate European demands for a nuclear role, Washington, under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, adopted a policy of nuclear sharing. It offered the allies additional stockpiles of tactical nuclear warheads and secured placements of US intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in Italy and Turkey under SACEUR’s direct control and in Britain under dual control, thus providing NATO with limited inﬂuence over nuclear weapons with targets beyond the battleﬁeld. It is now generally accepted by historians that US oversight and control of its Europe-based nuclear weapons earmarked for allied use was nominal only towards the end of Eisenhower’s presidency.8

224 Andreas Wenger Eisenhower’s successor approached the strategic dilemma of the decreasing credibility of the US security guarantee fundamentally differently from his predecessor – with wide-ranging repercussions for the debate about NATO strategy and decision making. In the context of growing tension around the divided city of Berlin, the incoming Kennedy administration rejected massive retaliation, which it considered as lacking credibility as a deterrent to limited aggression. Instead, the administration emphasized the deterrent value of a buildup of conventional forces that could enforce a pause during an attack, thus attempting to shift the responsibility for crossing the nuclear threshold to the adversary. The counterpart of this essentially political strategy of risk manipulation was an emphasis on central control to ensure crisis stability. The new administration feared that local use of tactical nuclear weapons would rapidly escalate into general war. As a consequence, the United States, under President Kennedy, began to install electro-mechanical locks on all short-range nuclear weapons and decided that it would be desirable if the European allies would “phase out of the nuclear deterrent business.”9 During the 1950s, the British had pushed for a top-down re-evaluation of NATO’s political directive. The Berlin crisis, by contrast, provided the Kennedy administration with an opportunity to advance its new strategic ideas bottom-up from the level of operational planning. As long as the tensions around Berlin were running high, the allies recognized the importance of achieving a compromise on Berlin contingency plans. However, once US Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara set out to ﬁlter the United States’ new strategic thinking into NATO’s strategic concept in his famous Athens address in May 1962, it became immediately clear that a consensus on a new military strategy could not be achieved in the absence of a common vision for Europe’s political future. Paris interpreted McNamara’s warning that “weak nuclear capabilities, operating independently, are expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent” as a direct attack on France’s nuclear weapons program.10 If de Gaulle needed conﬁrmation that the United States would never share nuclear control, McNamara had just provided it. In times of crisis, France believed, it would be informed retrospectively of US decisions, rather than consulted in advance – as happened during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. In reality, US NATO policy was very much in ﬂux in late 1962: Kennedy’s willingness to give the British a number of Polaris missiles and place these under British national control, which he expressed at the Nassau meeting in December 1962, signaled a readiness in the White House and the Pentagon to move away from the policy adopted in early 1961 and move to a system of national forces assigned to NATO and based on US, British, and French national forces.11 This, however, was anathema to the supporters of the centrally controlled Multilateral Force (MLF) in the State Department. In the end, de Gaulle decided the matter when he rejected the Polaris offer and expressed disinterest in the renewal of the MLF discussions in January 1963. While Washington, London, and Bonn were prepared to compromise on NATO’s strategic concept, Paris refused to move away from the “trip-wire”

NATO’s transformation in the 1960s 225 approach. In November 1963, France threatened to veto the further development of NATO’s strategic guidance, and by 1964, NATO’s force planning exercise had come to a standstill. Force planning could not be a substitute for strategy. And no compromise on strategy could be reached before the allies had found a solution to the fundamental political differences regarding NATO’s political role. The legitimacy crisis of “political NATO” During the period from 1958 to 1963, the perception that NATO could no longer serve as a legitimate forum for political consultation was driven by two key political issues: ﬁrst, Khrushchev’s Berlin ultimatum forced the allies to deal with the German question and the future of East–West relations at a time of emerging détente. Second, the British push to join the European Economic Community (EEC) went hand-in-hand with a debate about the future of European integration. The political implications of these issues went well beyond considerations of security and defense. Ultimately, they could not be separated from the debate about the political and economic structures that should govern a new European order. Thus, by 1963, two fundamentally different visions for the future of Europe in a globalizing world had emerged. Khrushchev’s Berlin ultimatum split the allies into two groups: the AngloSaxon powers and the Scandinavian countries were prepared to move toward a more ﬂexible détente policy that would allow the West to simultaneously move ahead on the German question and on the broader issues of European security. Conversely, the FRG and France ﬂatly refused to negotiate while Berlin was still under threat. Bonn, supported by Paris, opposed any discussion of broader European security issues as long as Germany remained divided. Washington, in turn, recognized that the smaller allies were concerned about a lack of consultation by the four Western powers and was prepared to carry the Berlin and Germany negotiations into NATO. Paris, however, wanted to keep the issues outside of NATO, thereby gaining leverage to sustain a continental European position. As a consequence, the political aspects of Berlin planning were only selectively discussed in NATO.12 President Kennedy accepted the Berlin wall as a reality that would facilitate a Berlin settlement based on the status quo. Over the summer of 1961, the United States was moving towards a more ﬂexible negotiating position. Kennedy decided to focus on the “three fundamentals of freedom for Berlin, free access, and a western presence” while shifting “substantially towards acceptance of the GDR, the Oder-Neisse line, a non-aggression pact, and even the idea of two peace treaties.”13 During a series of bilateral Soviet-US negotiations in early 1962, the main elements of a modus vivendi for the two superpowers in Europe emerged, centering on the future status of Germany and on the nuclear question. However, allied opposition and a series of decisions in Washington to accelerate the arms buildup, aimed primarily at reassuring the allies, quickly began to erode whatever chances had existed for a negotiated superpower settlement.

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The new US stance on Berlin negotiations was anathema to Bonn and Paris and made the continental European allies wonder whether the Soviet nuclear strength had inspired the sudden US interest in Berlin negotiations and in a conventional option for NATO. Since the late 1950s, the West German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, had feared what he considered British weakness. His worries grew, once he realized where Kennedy’s negotiation posture was moving to. Fearing a superpower deal over Germany’s head, he set out to sabotage Kennedy’s modus vivendi approach during the so-called “leak crisis” of 1962. He was able to get away with this because de Gaulle opposed a détente during Kennedy’s presidency and thought it necessary to contain German power by tying Germany closely to Paris. And here is where the Berlin and détente issues link up with the issue of European integration and Britain’s membership application to the Common Market: in return for an uncompromising stand on Berlin negotiations, Adenauer was willing to move closer to a conception of Europe that was built around the two big continental European powers.14 The West European economies had regained their strength in the 1950s. Once the Common Market was established, the ﬁnancial relations between the United States and the West European countries began to develop clearly in favor of the latter. The Kennedy administration, however, perceived European integration primarily as a means to strengthen the double containment of the Soviet Union and the FRG. Kennedy viewed British EEC membership as a key factor that would allow the realization of his grand design of a uniﬁed Western Europe tightly bound economically and militarily to the United States. The political beneﬁts of a Europe that included Britain over a Europe that was built on a Franco-German axis would outweigh the ﬁnancial disadvantages for the United States of an expanded Common Market. Yet Kennedy never fully understood the tension between the US commitment to a system of multilateral trade liberalization and the domestic social and economic dynamics of the Common Market. Moreover, his administration never faced up to the question of whether its vision of an expanded Atlantic partnership allowed for an independent European nuclear option.15 De Gaulle opposed a British EEC membership for economic and political reasons. A French veto would minimize British and maximize French political inﬂuence over the FRG. The British “Trojan horse” would transform the EEC to a point at which the continental countries would be absorbed into a “colossal Atlantic community dependent on America and under American control.”16 This France would not permit – the political leadership in Europe was in the ﬁrst place the responsibility of the Europeans. Thus, by 1963, it had become clear that the Gaullist challenge went right to the heart of the raison d’être of an Atlantic Community, as laid down in the 1949 treaty.

Managing dissent: NATO consensus building, 1963–66 The Cuban missile crisis catalyzed decisions in Paris and Washington that facilitated superpower détente while increasing tension among the allies. On 14

NATO’s transformation in the 1960s 227 January 1963, de Gaulle announced at a memorable press conference that France was vetoing Britain’s admission to the Common Market and was rejecting US Polaris missiles and France’s participation in the MLF. As if this alone was not enough to essentially block NATO’s debate about strategy and burden sharing, things began to look even bleaker a few days later: on 22 January 1963, Adenauer came to Paris to sign a treaty of friendship with France that seemed to indicate that a Franco-German entente was indeed taking shape. The establishment of this cooperation on defense issues was cause for concern not only in Washington but also in many European capitals that a joint Franco-German nuclear program or a program undertaken by the EEC countries was a real possibility. In Washington, the Cuban missile crisis was perceived as an extension of the simmering Berlin crisis, thus raising the willingness of policy makers to accept the territorial and nuclear status quo in Europe. Taking a step back from their focus on nuclear danger, Washington and Moscow worked with renewed vigor for a lessening of tension. The spirit of limited bilateral cooperation was formalized with the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Yet from the perspective of the United States’ NATO allies, the problem with this constructed Cold War settlement was that it did not allow for the lasting settlement of disputed issues that were top priorities for Bonn, Paris, and London, respectively. Without the consent of the allies, however, East–West détente could not deepen, because the next steps, notably a non-aggression pact and a nuclear non-proliferation treaty, would be multilateral and would require the consent of all NATO members.17 The politics of alliance solidarity and the isolation of France Policy makers in Washington realized that there were forces at work within both Cold War alliances, reﬂecting larger domestic and social changes, which would make the status quo unsustainable in the long term. Accepting the risk of fragmentation within NATO, they began, together with their allies, the arduous task of achieving a consensus on the way ahead. “The atmosphere of détente and the assertion of more familiar nationalist impulses,” Walt W. Rostow from the Policy Planning Staff wrote to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, “does not eliminate all the areas of common interest within the West, nor does it preclude continued movement forward in joint ventures which would, in effect organize the world of diffusing power into a world of diffused responsibility.”18 The essentially political nature of NATO manifested itself in the ways that the alliance managed dissent when facing the Gaullist challenge. NATO’s political functions were based on common norms and values and upheld aspects of democracy: every member had a right to voice its opinion, and the initiatives of the smaller allies carried considerable weight at times.19 The alliance’s institutional ﬂexibility and adaptability and its role as a hub for transnational and transgovernmental coalitions go a long way in explaining how the alliance managed to overcome the shock of January 1963. When de Gaulle decided to leave

228 Andreas Wenger military NATO in 1966, the allies were able to move ahead without France and reform the alliance. De Gaulle had cast the FRG’s policies as determined by a choice between France and the United States. Yet in early 1963, it was Washington that began to make it clear in Bonn that the FRG had to make a choice. If the Germans wanted US protection, they would have to follow the US political lead. Washington decided to play hardball in internal German politics and pressure the FRG not to ratify the Franco-German treaty in its present form. In essence, Washington leveraged a transnational coalition of key individuals to isolate the German Gaullists. Members of the transatlantic elite were instrumental in the design of a preamble that was unilaterally added to the treaty, afﬁrming the FRG’s continuing loyalty to NATO. Transnational elite networks facilitated the Westbindung of the FRG and legitimized US political leadership. Adenauer had badly miscalculated the situation and, in effect, was dismissed by his own party. Once Ludwig Erhard had replaced Adenauer as chancellor, de Gaulle lost much of his leverage over Bonn.20 De Gaulle and Erhard soon clashed over the US proposal of a nuclear MLF. While the former rejected it because of its decisively transatlantic character, the latter indicated a determination to proceed with it at all cost. The US State Department’s key aims in the MLF project were obvious enough: to guarantee the political integration of the FRG into the multilateral structure of the alliance, and to guarantee US central control over all NATO nuclear forces. The MLF proposal was useful in as much as the debate about it conﬁrmed what the 1961–62 “Fouchet negotiations” to set up a European political union had already brought to the fore: the Europeans did not accept de Gaulle as their spokesman. But by 1964, it had become clear that there was no real support for the project in the US Congress and US military. Moreover, Britain, Italy, and even the FRG were split about the project. Many policy makers in Europe feared that support for the MLF would be interpreted in domestic politics as opposition to détente. By late 1964, Washington decided that there was no longer any need for the MLF and let it sink out of sight – France was now completely isolated within NATO. Once it became clear that the Elysée Treaty of 1963 would not work, policy makers in Washington perceived a potential shift of the FRG to political and military unilateralism, raising the specter of a Soviet-German deal, as the ultimate danger of de Gaulle’s challenge to NATO. De Gaulle’s policies undermined the central assumption of the FRG’s position in the postwar world, which was that “Germany’s politics and policy have to be conducted within the collective NATO framework and that a separate German policy is not feasible.”21 If NATO were to disappear, what would West Germany’s position be? Integration into a European Union would be the second best solution but, at that time, also the most improbable solution. European integration had suffered a dramatic setback in January 1963. Aside from Adenauer, none of the other four EEC members wished to follow the French lead. Conversely, not only the current EEC countries but also applicant countries like Britain and Denmark did not

NATO’s transformation in the 1960s 229 want a show-down with France. A general feeling set in that progress towards a political union would not be possible as long as de Gaulle remained in power. This left NATO as by far the best option for dealing with the German problem. Emphasis on allied solidarity and unity as opposed to a direct confrontation with France marked the multilateral debate within NATO in 1963 and 1964. While France, aside from its critique of military NATO, remained silent and did not advance any speciﬁc reform plans, small allies like Canada and Belgium, anticipating the Harmel exercise of 1967, initiated a multilateral debate about the role of NATO beyond the 1960s. NATO consultation paved the way to a common understanding that the alliance would continue, even if France were to leave. But at the same time, the allies were careful not to provoke the French.22 Once de Gaulle signaled in his talks with NATO Secretary-General Manlio Brosio that military integration was totally unacceptable to France, the allies deferred further multilateral studies about NATO’s future until after Paris had acted. The changing domestic and social context and the need for NATO reform In the 1950s, NATO’s nuclearization had given rise to anti-nuclear weapons protest movements in all major member states. Once the two superpowers had accepted the status quo by 1963, the protest movements began to transform into broader social movements that increasingly attacked the moral vacuum and stagnant characteristics of public institutions and governmental authority.23 Slowly, policy makers came to realize that the changing domestic and social context – symbolized by a step-by-step retirement of the old postwar elites – necessitated a change in NATO’s form and functions. The perception of NATO as a powerful but static and conservative institution was shaped by domestic debates about détente, nuclear control, and burden sharing. Theses debates challenged NATO as a multilateral consultation platform and a hub for transgovernmental coalitions. Only if the alliance was able to integrate the widening domestic perceptions of security and détente among its members would it be able to sustain itself in the long run. The early and mid-1960s witnessed growing signs of emancipation within the Eastern bloc and a series of détente initiatives that seemed to signal a growing interest in the establishment of mutual economic, social, and political interchange across the Cold War divide. In this context, policy makers in allied countries began to fear that NATO was being perceived as an institution that froze the geopolitical status quo. Political analysts in the United States and the FRG began to realize that détente and German reuniﬁcation would not ﬂow top-down from great power policy that was oriented towards the status quo. Rather, given the diffusion of power in the world, the growing desire among Germans in both Germanys had to be met by a policy of movement and “bridge building” that linked the opening toward the East with the hope for reuniﬁcation. Increasingly, voices were heard that called for a strengthening of NATO’s

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role as an instrument of peace. NATO could not afford, so the argument ran, to leave the ﬁeld of détente propaganda to the East; it had to counter the Gaullist allegation that France alone was concerned about Europe’s future, and it had to take account of growing domestic interest in a lessening of tension.24 However, these early efforts at “bridge building” soon stagnated because of domestic policy dilemmas in Washington and Bonn. US policy makers realized that an opening towards the East, against the backdrop of the escalating war in Vietnam, would expose the administration to criticism from Congress that it was soft on communism. In Bonn, Erhard’s government was under increasing domestic pressure from the nationalist wing of his party to increase efforts toward reuniﬁcation. And as long as the Germans stuck to a position of reuniﬁcation ﬁrst and foremost, the United States ran the risk of losing the initiative to de Gaulle who, with his new economic overtures to the East, had begun to exploit the rigidity of the West German position. France’s objection to the dominant role of the United States in NATO’s military structure was reﬂective of a wider European feeling that the balance between national (nuclear) control and allied integration was domestically not acceptable in the long run. At the level of domestic politics, the stationing of US troops, the stockpiling of nuclear warheads, and the installation of nuclear launching pads were as important as questions of strategy and doctrine. The tightening of US custody over European-based US nuclear weapons elicited angry responses not only from anti-nuclear protesters, but also from ardent defenders of national sovereignty.25 Moreover, it exposed Washington to accusations from de Gaulle – who perceived NATO as a traditional defense alliance – that the United States was running Europe like a protectorate. If NATO wanted to prove that it was prepared to transform the culture of great power politics, the Europeans would have to be allowed to carve out an area of limited nuclear sovereignty. Already in the 1950s, Norway and Denmark, exposed at the Northern ﬂank, had decided not to allow the stationing of US nuclear weapons on their territory.26 Conversely, the FRG, in the early 1960s, did not know the number and location of US nuclear weapons deployed on German soil and had no knowledge of US plans for their use. This was clearly unacceptable to some political forces in the FRG that harbored nuclear ambitions and that used the country’s status as a nuclear protectorate as a political tool in domestic politics. By 1963, the FRG within NATO pressed for a veto on US use of nuclear weapons from and on German territory, including the GDR.27 The eventual move from a hardware solution to a software solution to NATO’s nuclear sharing problem is of great importance in the domestic political context. A hardware solution along the lines of the MLF proposal in political terms had the potential to accentuate domestic tension: it would draw domestic attention to the unsolvable issue of nuclear crisis decision making, and it would become the rallying symbol for anti-nuclear protesters and nationalist forces. A software solution could deliver what a hardware solution could not – a clear right to be consulted in cases of nuclear use from and on national territory –

NATO’s transformation in the 1960s 231 while at the same time deﬂecting domestic criticism in Europe about the visible symbols of nuclear dependence from the United States. Domestic support for NATO also eroded under growing domestic pressure for a reduction of defense costs. During a period of emerging détente, NATO membership seemed to translate into unnecessarily high defense expenditures. The United States, Britain, and the FRG all faced serious financial problems by the mid-1960s. The British and US balance-of-payments deficits were at least partially driven by a dollar loss caused by the maintenance of large forces in Germany. Since 1961, the FRG compensated its US and British allies for their expenses by buying its military hardware from them. But the offset negotiations also became more difficult because of economic and financial matters that were dealt with outside the national security context. Britain and France quickened the pace of colonial disengagement, thereby ridding themselves of costly colonial liabilities. The ECC countries pondered the financial consequences of a common agricultural policy. And the United States complained that the Common Market was blocking measures that would allow the United States to expand world trade without putting dangerous pressure on the dollar. Alliance leaders had to come to terms with the fact that national parliaments dealt with these matters in terms of national rather than alliance interests. Finally, the escalating war in Vietnam gravely compromised the domestic consensus on NATO for a whole variety of reasons. European support for ﬁghting communism in Asia collapsed as the United States started to dispatch growing numbers of troops by the mid 1960s. Strategically, the Europeans began to fear that Europe was no longer the number one priority of Washington and that the United States would start to concentrate its resources outside the NATO area. Politically, US support for a corrupt and inept government in South Vietnam, held in power by seemingly unrestrained military escalation, damaged the United States’ image with large parts of the European public, de-legitimizing its leadership role in the alliance. Economically, the cost of the war resulted in increasing Congressional pressure for a reduced US military presence in Europe. By the mid 1960s, it had become clear that NATO’s burden sharing problems needed a solution that would meet the changing domestic political requirements of Britain, the FRG, and the United States.28

The transformation of NATO, 1966–68 NATO’s 1966–67 crisis had been in the making since January 1963. De Gaulle’s announcement on 7 March 1966 that France “wished to recover the entire exercise of her sovereignty over her territory” and would “terminate her participation in ‘integrated’ commands and no longer place her forces at the disposal of NATO” publicly exposed the shaky credibility of military NATO.29 The fact that de Gaulle went to Moscow only a few weeks later and took his East European policy a step further – embarking on a rapprochement with the Soviet Union – expanded the challenge into a crisis also of legitimacy: NATO,

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dominated by the United States, was not to be trusted as a forum for political consultation regarding East–West relations and the German question. Yet, at the same time, the general’s actions unlocked the alliance and provided an opportunity for deﬁning a new vision for NATO at a time of détente. During the three years after the infamous January of 1963, the allies had expressed a general consensus that NATO should be preserved beyond 1969, with or without France. At the same time, however, it had become clear that NATO decision making was in need of reform and that its political functions had to be strengthened. The great question now was how a transformation could be achieved and whether the Germans would go along with the Anglo-Saxon powers or drift toward political and military nationalism.30 NATO’s institutional reform: leadership by persuasion Everyone in Washington agreed that the United States had to take the lead in addressing NATO’s double crisis. But President Lyndon B. Johnson’s advisers disagreed strongly about the kind of leadership the United States should provide to the other members of the alliance. A group around George Ball and Dean Acheson at the State Department pushed for ﬁrm leadership, a public stance and a very hard line against de Gaulle, and close guidance of the West Germans. Conversely, the White House staff, McNamara, and Rusk favored a quiet and polite open chair policy towards France and a wait-and-see approach with regard to the FRG that would not push the Germans toward a renewed MLF proposal or an acceleration of Ostpolitik. The Europeans had a legitimate role to play in international affairs, Dean Rusk told Ball, and he felt it “important to draw a clear line between leadership and hegemony.”31 Against the background of the escalating war in Vietnam, President Johnson was willing to abandon the hegemonic leadership style of the 1950s. The United States would instead outwait de Gaulle, exercise its leadership within NATO as primus inter pares, and opt for greater political consultation with its allies. Even before de Gaulle had made his move, Washington had realized that the NATO crisis could only be overcome if Britain, the FRG, and the United States stayed together and provided leadership to the other allies. But trilateral talks would have to be followed by consultations with the allies. A compromise on strategy and burden sharing would achieve its purpose only if it was properly integrated into NATO’s strategy and defense planning mechanisms. Washington realized that the new institutional structures had to be less hierarchical because of the increasing salience of the FRG. Some of the smaller NATO countries were worried about a US–British–FRG dominated military NATO without the counterbalance of France.32 The organizational adjustment was surprisingly smooth, and in the process, military NATO moved toward more democratic and consultative alliance structures. The establishment of the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC) and its seven-member Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) turned out to be the critical component of NATO’s institutional reform. The establishment of permanent

NATO’s transformation in the 1960s 233 machinery for nuclear consultation provided the institutional setting for West European input and joint nuclear learning. While McNamara’s brieﬁngs exposed the Europeans to “the problems associated with the use of nuclear weapons,” the Germans used the forum to persuade the allies that the initial use of tactical nuclear weapons should be targeted deep within Warsaw Pact territory and should not take place on German soil.33 By 1968, the NPG accepted guidelines on the use of nuclear weapons that accommodated Bonn’s “relatively modest request for sovereign rights in the nuclear ﬁeld,” establishing the principle that the “selective release of nuclear weapons employed from or on German soil” would be “subject to conﬁrmation by the FRG Government.”34 The establishment of new force-planning and nuclear-consultation machinery at the December 1967 NATO meeting went a long way toward deﬂating the “ghost of a tripartite directorate” that had marked the ﬁrst informal brieﬁngs of the 14 permanent representatives the preceding October.35 In the meantime, the Harmel exercise had provided the opportunity for the United States, Britain, and the FRG to ﬁlter the political results of the trilateral talks into NATO’s multilateral setting. In 1963 and 1964, the initiative to study the future role of NATO had been with the small allies. By 1967, in contrast, Secretary-General Manlio Brosio found to his surprise that the small countries did not want to take the lead but instead preferred to await the result of the trilateral talks. Trilateralism: reconceptualizing security – saving military NATO The Johnson administration reviewed existing US policies from March to October 1966. Increasingly, policy makers in Washington became convinced that the nuclear problem should be addressed on the basis of the principle that a sound Atlantic nuclear policy and a sound nonproliferation agreement were “mutually consistent and reinforcing.”36 While there were increasing signs that the Germans would be satisﬁed with a software solution, the Soviets seemed eager to conclude a nonproliferation agreement that would allow for a nuclearsharing scheme in NATO – provided that ownership of the warheads remained in US custody. Moreover, in his famous speech of 7 October 1966, Johnson proceeded to reverse US policy priorities in Europe, arguing that the East–West environment would have to be improved before the uniﬁcation of Germany could be achieved and emphasizing that the division of Europe would have to be “healed with the consent of Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union.”37 The United States had accepted that bridge building as a precondition of reuniﬁcation would be perceived in Moscow as an attempt to divide Eastern Europe, and, therefore, US policy priorities had to be reversed. The trilateral talks would have to establish whether the new German government was prepared to go along with Johnson’s new position. Chancellor Erhard’s visit to Washington in September 1966 opened a prolonged phase of negotiations that culminated in the compromise on offset of April 1967. The fact that Johnson broke with certain taboos in US European policies contributed to the collapse of Erhard’s government in October and November. Ambassador

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McGhee reported from Bonn that “Germany had reached a watershed in its postwar political development.”38 In fact, the government of Kurt Kiesinger, with Willy Brandt as foreign minister, fundamentally reoriented the FRG’s East European policies. The new West German government seemed prepared to endorse Johnson’s choice of Ostpolitik over reuniﬁcation. And at the December 1966 NATO meeting, Brandt very effectively told Rusk and McNamara that the new government was ready to “forget ‘hardware’” as a solution to NATO’s nuclear sharing problem.39 But whereas Brandt seemed to be prepared to accept a NPT in return for Washington’s approval of his Ostpolitik, Kiesinger publicly accused the United States and the Soviet Union of “atomic complicity” in putting forward the NPT.40 Johnson, while recognizing that the NPT was posing domestic political problems for Kiesinger in his own party, was not shy to impress upon his interlocutors his own domestic problems arising from increasing Congressional pressure to reduce US forces in Europe. In substance, however, he sided with the view that if the United States had to take a serious risk with domestic stability in the FRG, it should do so “in connection with nuclear-sharing/nonproliferation, rather than with offset and US forces in Europe.”41 It was left to a transgovernmental coalition of public servants to carve out a solution that would accommodate both the German and the US domestic political situation. Secretary of Defense McNamara had pushed a dual-basing scheme that would allow a reduction of US forces in Germany, while at the same time increasing the overall efﬁciency of the conventional forces that had been assigned to NATO since the early 1960s. But his plan had stalled, not only because of allied opposition, but also because it was opposed by the US military and their supporters in Congress. The need to rearrange NATO’s communications and transportation infrastructure – arising from France’s withdrawal from military NATO – and Congressional pressure for a reduction of the ﬁnancial burden of US forces in Europe – arising from the FRG’s inability to honor the offset payments – provided McNamara with an opportunity to at least partially implement his scheme. The United States devised “political warning and strategic mobility as a rationale for removing forces from Europe without reducing NATO military capabilities.”42 Ambiguity on strategic terminology – on the concepts of political warning, ﬂexibility, and escalation – was a precondition for a political compromise between the United States, Britain, and the FRG on strategy and burden sharing. On 9 November 1966, the three countries signed an Agreed Minute on Strategy and Forces that concluded that “existing NATO conventional forces for the Central region are adequate in size to support a ﬂexible response strategy.”43 The agreement revitalized the dormant work on NATO’s strategy and paved the way for the adoption of ﬂexible response with the signing of MC 14/3 in December 1967. Although the allies never did agree on how long the conventional phase of a war was likely to last, or on how the follow-on use of tactical nuclear weapons should proceed, the political signiﬁcance of the strategy was decisive in 1967: the allies had agreed on a common strategic concept after France’s withdrawal and had thus saved NATO’s integrated military structures.44

NATO’s transformation in the 1960s 235 By the late 1960s, the arms race had become the functional substitute of war, and at a time of détente, this meant that the political ability not to be drawn into unilateral troop cuts was more important than the level of instantaneous military readiness for worst-case scenarios. Johnson realized that the link between the allies’ military and economic security could be used as an instrument of détente. The trilateral talks brought to the fore the increasing importance of the economic and ﬁnancial dimension of alliance security. NATO was moving toward a wider deﬁnition of security that integrated political, military, and economic power, both in terms of intra-alliance relations and in terms of East–West relations. The Harmel exercise: political NATO and the multilateralization of détente in Europe A compromise on strategy at the multilateral level was only possible once the Harmel exercise of 1967 had produced a basic compromise on the primarily political nature of the Soviet threat and on the political role of NATO at a time of détente. Recalling ideas that had been put forward by Canada two years earlier, Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel suggested a major study on the future of the alliance in light of international developments since 1949. Although Washington was delighted that the initiative had come from a small European country, the key contributions were clearly made by the United States, the FRG, and Britain. Taking note of the increased public questioning of the relevancy of NATO, the study aimed at a highly visible report that would underscore the continued relevance of NATO beyond 1969. In a statement that would endure until the end of the Cold War, the Harmel Report enabled the alliance to strike a new balance between its military and its political functions.45 The report emphasized the close link between military power and political inﬂuence. NATO’s military strength would deter aggression and counter the political inﬂuence of Soviet military power. Building on this fundamental principle, the Harmel exercise working groups developed four major political functions of NATO as an instrument of peace: ﬁrst, by strengthening multilateral political and military cooperation and consultation, NATO should help to preserve the unity of the West. Détente came with the risk that the Soviet Union would relax tension selectively in the hope that it would be able to “weaken the cohesion of the Alliance, divide the states of Western Europe, and in particular . . . isolate the Federal Republic and open up differences between Western Europe and the US.”46 NATO and a policy of détente were not contradictory, and a peaceful European settlement would require the continuing support of the United States. Second, by engaging in constructive forms of cooperation with the East European states and the Soviet Union, NATO should help to encourage the evolution, rather than the fragmentation, of the East. Détente had to be a comprehensive process that had to involve everybody in order to be effective. The allies recognized that the Soviet Union could effectively block a European settlement, if the West failed to accommodate Moscow’s legitimate security interests. Third,

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NATO should offer a forum for harmonizing bilateral with multilateral détente initiatives. While bilateral contacts entailed the risk of a selective détente, multilateral approaches might perpetuate the division of Europe. NATO would anchor bilateral and multilateral contacts in a transparent way in the multilateral structure of the West. Fourth, NATO should offer a forum for harmonizing defense policies with arms control and disarmament policies. NATO should explore the possibility of achieving lower force levels at lower costs through arms control agreements that would limit Soviet forces as well. During the Harmel exercise, the views of the 15 converged to a signiﬁcant degree on the substance of a political program on European security and on a common vision of a peaceful European settlement. This left the French with little choice but to accept the “general concept of political consultation.” In return, however, the United States had to compromise on the establishment of new permanent political machinery and concede that Washington did not “contemplate an ‘integrated political command structure’ in the Alliance.”47 In essence, the Harmel exercise stabilized the results of the trilateral talks on military NATO and anchored them in a multilateral political dialog on the future of East–West relations and of the German question. On matters of substance, the multilateral structures of NATO allowed the allies to define constructive solutions to three policy dilemmas that had bedeviled the alliance over much of the past decade. The first dilemma was how to square nuclear sharing with the goal of nonproliferation. A transformed NATO was able to provide for the nuclear defense of the FRG in a way that was acceptable to Bonn, the allies, and the Soviets. The Soviets did not oppose a multilateralization of nuclear planning and consultation within NATO, a fact that increased West Germany’s (and the smaller allies’) role in allied nuclear planning but that also reduced US hegemony within the alliance. The strengthening of the NPG, in turn, made it easier for the Germans to accept the NPT. In essence, the NPT internationalized the touchy question of German nuclear control, which was of major concern to the Soviets. The signing of the NPT in July 1968 paved the way to the breakthrough in superpower negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons and antiballistic missile systems in the early 1970s.48 The second dilemma was whether to focus on German reuniﬁcation or on an improvement of the European environment. The enhancement of NATO’s political role, and the recognition that Germany would determine the pace of Ostpolitik, enabled a consolidation of the Central European status quo without alienating the United States, the other allies, or the Soviet Union. The United States worked closely with its European allies to engage the Soviet Union and the East European countries in bilateral and multilateral exchanges, seeking over the long run to facilitate the reuniﬁcation of Europe and of Germany. This opened the way to a European settlement that would have the continuing support of the United States and Canada, while leaving open the promises of European integration. Once Brandt’s Ostpolitik had led to a stabilization of the post-World War II border in Central Europe, the Soviets were drawn into the all-European

NATO’s transformation in the 1960s 237 process of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) that was built on the normative basis of the West. The third dilemma stemmed from the need to ensure military security without endangering economic prosperity. The United States worked with Britain and West Germany to forge a wider understanding of security that would facilitate a consensus of the fourteen on strategy and burden sharing. NATO integrated a reconceptualized notion of security – balancing defense with arms control and disarmament issues – in its new two-pillar security strategy. NATO proposed holding talks with the Warsaw Pact states on mutual force reductions that could lead over time to lower defense costs. In the short term, NATO consultations on mutual force reductions proved instrumental in containing public pressure for sharp defense cuts, bolstering the December 1967 consensus on strategy and force levels.

Conclusion The successes of the trilateral talks and the Harmel exercise had effectively reversed the slow process of disintegration that had beset NATO since the late 1950s and that – once the world had lived through the Berlin and Cuban crises – had come to the fore with de Gaulle’s challenge to the raison d’être of the alliance. The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 in effect stabilized the political meaning of NATO’s transformation in the 1960s: the outcome of the Czechoslovak crisis deﬂated exaggerated hopes for an early settlement and conﬁrmed the validity of NATO’s new two-pillar security policies; it increased the willingness of the allies to strengthen NATO’s collective military strength, thus stabilizing an only temporary consensus on burden sharing; it improved the alliance’s political cohesion, including Paris; and it tied the government of the FRG more ﬁrmly to NATO, facilitating the acceptance of US alliance leadership. Yet the Gaullist challenge had been a symptom rather than the real cause of NATO’s crisis in the 1960s. As long as France resisted British membership in the ECC and was not prepared to share control of the force de frappe with the FRG and the other ECC members, France’s vision of a “European Europe” lacked both legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of a large majority of the European elite. NATO’s double crisis was reﬂective of wider structural economic, social, and political changes in the international system that made the constructed Cold War settlement of 1963 unsustainable in the long term. De Gaulle’s realist great power rhetoric highlighted to the other allies what was really at stake: would they collectively be able to sustain cooperative security relations in multilateral structures at a time of emerging détente and reduced immediacy of the military threat, on the one hand, and of the diffusion of power and increasing pressure on US leadership within the alliance, on the other? The essence of NATO’s second transformation was political. Starting from the constructed yet limited peace of the early 1960s, US and West European views gradually converged on a new European order that – while anchored in

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NATO’s multilateral structures – would support the evolution of Eastern Europe and accommodate the demands of an economically more assertive Western Europe. NATO had evolved into a forum for a politically more balanced transatlantic relationship, while simultaneously engaging the Soviet Union and the East European states in talks that would lead to a wider European détente and promote gradual change in the Eastern bloc. In short, NATO’s transformation into a less hierarchical alliance at 14, and a more participatory alliance at 15, was instrumental in the shift from the bilateral superpower détente of 1963 to the multilateral détente of the 1970s. Three key factors explain the persistence of NATO beyond 1969: ﬁrst, NATO’s political functions were based on common norms and values. NATO had been founded as a community of values and interests, and this, over time, had led to a political culture that allowed the smaller allies to exert considerable inﬂuence within NATO’s structures. Second, NATO’s institutional ﬂexibility allowed the allies to negotiate a reappropriation of political inﬂuence in the alliance’s decision making and consultation procedures. Trilateral leadership – including the FRG’s limited nuclear sovereignty – had to be balanced with increased transparency and a less hierarchical structure of the new force-planning and nuclear-consultation machinery that would also accommodate the interests of the smaller allies. Moreover, the alliance’s new institutional structure kept France in NATO’s political bodies, while leaving open the possibility of its return into its military bodies. While the 14 clearly did not want a ﬁnal break with France, Paris did not want to lose the “nuisance value” of alliance membership and the political inﬂuence ﬂowing from it. Third, over time, NATO had become a hub for transgovernmental coalitions and transnational elite networks. In effect, NATO’s political decision making process took on elements of the domestic political decision making process of its democratic members. Transgovernmental and transnational coalitions were particularly relevant with regard to monitoring – and at times clearly inﬂuencing – the domestic political process in Bonn. During the Harmel exercise, the FRG’s position on the German problem had disappointed the allies as being rather traditional and not very innovative. However, the allies had realized that the key problem was that the new West German government simply could not agree on a more concrete statement of policy. It would take Brandt’s election victory of 1969 to allow the FRG to move ahead on Ostpolitik. In the meantime, NATO provided a forum for monitoring the impact of the generational change of the post-World War II leadership. Yet NATO’s transformation had its limits: the alliance’s political functions all remained closely linked to its military strength. NATO alone would be unable to sustain the process of détente between East and West while upholding the unity of the West. Complementary political and economic structures would have to evolve in the early 1970s before progress towards a new European order could proceed. Three developments are particularly notable in this regard: ﬁrst, the fact that NATO did not establish new permanent political machinery in the late 1960s was highly relevant in so far as it kept open the possibility of new political machinery at the level of an expanding European community. Progress-

NATO’s transformation in the 1960s 239 ing détente between Washington and Moscow – symbolized by the bilateral Soviet-US “Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War” of June 197349 – kept the specter of a superpower condominium very much alive in Western Europe, in particular in the context of US weakness due to Vietnam and Watergate. Expanding and deepening the EC as a means to tie Bonn and its Ostpolitik ﬁrmly to the West would become a major reason for the EC countries to launch the ambitious Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the European Political Cooperation (EPC) projects and to agree on the ﬁrst round of enlargement, with Britain, Ireland, and Denmark joining the original six. Second, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe process provided the EC countries with an opportunity to reconceptualize security in accordance with their own norms, serving as a catalyst for the EPC.50 As a nonmilitary actor, the EC nine found it easier to act as a community of values and to confront the East with a series of principles governing relations between European countries that reﬂected a broader notion of security and that added the security of individuals as a complementary factor to the security of states. Within NATO, the balance of values and strategic interests had to accommodate the political interests of allied “democracies” like Greece, Turkey, and Portugal and the political interests of a superpower focused on trilateral diplomacy with China and the Soviet Union regarding the future geopolitical balance in Asia. At the same time, NATO consultation and solidarity remained a key factor in keeping the West together during the Helsinki process and in reassuring the Europeans that Washington would not go it alone. Finally, the establishment of the G6 at the Rambouillet summit in August 1975 deﬂated ﬁnancial and economic pressures on the US Congress to withdraw troops.51 The establishment of the G6 structure reﬂected the increasing difﬁculty in separating security from economics. No longer would NATO have to provide the exclusive structure for achieving a compromise between military security and economic prosperity. The US decision to change the fragile monetary status quo of the Bretton Woods system and to move to a system of ﬂexible exchange rates disrupted the EC’s European Monetary Union project and restored US structural power, thereby facilitating the renewal of the US commitment to Europe. For NATO, this meant that it could focus on resisting unilateral troop cuts by engaging in multilateral negotiations on mutual force reductions, while leaving the governance of the global economy to other organizations.

Notes 1 The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, DC, 4 April 1949, www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm. 2 See Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969); George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–1950 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983). 3 See Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance (Westport: Praeger, 2004); Gustav Schmidt (ed.), A History of NATO: The First Fifty Years, vols 1–3 (Houndsmill: Palgrave, 2001).

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4 On the intersection between diplomatic history and social movements, see Andreas Wenger and Jeremi Suri, “At the Crossroads of Diplomatic and Social History: The Nuclear Revolution, Dissent, and Détente,” Cold War History 1, no. 3 (April 2001), pp. 1–42. On NATO’s détente debates, see Anna Locher and Christian Nuenlist, “What Role for NATO? Conﬂicting Western Perceptions of Détente, 1963–65,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 2, no. 2 (2004), pp. 185–208. 5 On NATO’s transformation, see Andreas Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity: NATO’s Transformation and the Multilateralization of Détente, 1966–1968,” Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 1 (Winter 2004), pp. 22–74. 6 De Gaulle to Eisenhower, 17 September 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1958–60, vol. VII (part 2), pp. 81–3. 7 On de Gaulle’s challenge to NATO see: Frédéric Bozo, Deux strategies pour l’Europe: de Gaulle, les Etats-Unis et l’alliance atlantique, 1958–1969 (Paris: Plon et Fondation Charles de Gaulle, 1996); Maurice Vaïsse, La grandeur: Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, 1958–1969 (Paris: Fayard, 1998). 8 See, for example, Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–63 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 194–200. 9 “A Review of North Atlantic Problems for the Future,” March 1961, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston Massachusetts (JFKL), National Security Files (NSF), Box 220. 10 Remarks by McNamara, NATO Ministerial Meeting, 5 May 1962, National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC (NSA), Nuclear History Box 14. 11 See Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 367–79. 12 See the chapter of Christian Nuenlist in this volume and Christian Nuenlist, “Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Political Cooperation in NATO: Western Reactions to Khrushchev’s Foreign Policy, 1955–63” (Ph.D thesis, University of Zurich, 2005). 13 Bundy to Kennedy, “Issues to be Settled with General Clay,” 28 August 1961, NSA, Berlin Crisis 1958–62 (BC), Microﬁche collection no. 2415. 14 See, for example, Christof Münger, Die Berliner Mauer, Kennedy und die Kubakrise: Die westliche Allianz in der Zerreissprobe, 1961–1963 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2003); Andreas Wenger, “Kennedy, Chruschtschow und das gemeinsame Interesse der Supermächte am Status quo in Europa,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 46, no. 1 (1998), pp. 69–99. 15 See Chapter 6 in this volume. 16 Press conference, 14 January 1963, in Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages, vol. 4 (Paris: Plon, 1970), p. 69. 17 On the limits of the little détente of 1963, see Wenger and Suri, “At the Crossroads,” pp. 7–18 and Chapters 5 and 6 in this volume. 18 Rostow to Rusk, “State of the World,” 17 September 1963, US National Archives, College Park MD (USNA), RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Council, 1963–64, Entry 5041, Lot 70D199, Box 256, USSR. 19 See Chapters 2 and 7 in this volume. 20 See Chapter 4 in this volume. 21 Memorandum, “Possible Effects of the NATO Crisis on German Foreign and Domestic Politics”, Undated, NSA, Non Proliferation Policy (NNP), Microﬁche collection no. 713. 22 See Chapter 7 in this volume and Anna Locher, “Crisis – What Crisis? The Debate on the Future of NATO, 1963–66” (Ph.D thesis, University of Zurich, 2006). 23 See Chapters 2 and 8 in this volume. 24 See Chapters 11 and 12 in this volume. 25 See Chapters 8 and 10 in this volume. 26 See Kjell Ing Bjerga and Kjetil Skogrand, “Securing Small-state Interests: Norway in NATO,” in War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East

NATO’s transformation in the 1960s 241

27

28

29 30

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

45

46 47

and the West, ed. Vojtech Mastny, Sven Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 218–40. See Beatrice Heuser, “Alliance of Democracies and Nuclear Deterrence,” in War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and the West, ed. Vojtech Mastny, Sven Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 193–218. See Chapter 12 in this volume and Lawrence S. Kaplan, “McNamara, Vietnam, and the Defense of Europe,” in War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and the West, ed. Vojtech Mastny, Sven Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 286–301. Letter From President de Gaulle to President Johnson, 7 March 1966, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, p. 325. The section on the 1966–68 NATO crisis is largely based on an earlier article in Journal of Cold War Studies, see Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity”; Helga Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Frédéric Bozo, “Détente versus Alliance: France, the United States and the Politics of the Harmel Report (1964–1968),” Contemporary European History 7, no. 3 (1998), pp. 343–60. Rusk to Bundy, 26 January 1965, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, TX (LBJL), NSF, Country Files, Eastern Europe, Box 162, no. 24. See Chapters 9 and 12 in this volume. McNamara and Rusk to Johnson, 28 May 1966, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, p. 402. Rusk and Clifford to Johnson, 16 March 1968, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, p. 679. US Mission to NATO to Department of State (DoS), 22 October 1966, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, p. 485. Johnson to Wilson, Undated, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, p. 317. Lyndon B. Johnson, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1963–1964 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1966 [II]), p. 1128. McGhee to DoS, “Implications of a New German Government For US Policy,” 2 November 1966, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XV, p. 227. Rusk to DoS, 16 December 1966, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, p. 517; Record of Meeting With President Johnson, 17 December 1966, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, p. 522. Rostow to Johnson, Undated, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, p. 538. Bator to Johnson, 11 August 1966, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, p. 446. Fairley to Kohler, “NATO Strategy,” 1 December 1967, Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), www.isn.ethz.ch/php/collections/coll_7.htm. McCloy to Johnson, 21 November 1966, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, p. 497; Agreed Minute on Strategy and Forces, 9 November 1966, ibid., p. 563. On the strategy debate, see Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution; Jane E. Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO’s Debate over Strategy in the 1960s (New York: St. Martins Press, 1988); Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (London: Macmillan, 1997). Final Harmel Report, East–West Relations Détente and a European Settlement, NATO Archives, www.nato.int/archives/harmel/harmel01.htm. For analyses, see Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity”, pp. 59–68; Helga Haftendorn, “Entstehung und Bedeutung des Harmel-Berichts der NATO von 1967,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 40, 2 (April 1992), pp. 169–220. Sub-Group I Draft Report, Subject of Discussion on 18/19 September 1967, NATO Archives, NISCA 4/10/4/1, Item 27, see PHP, www.isn.ethz.ch/php/collections/ coll_Harmel.htm. DoS to US Posts in NATO Capitals, 16 November 1967, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, pp. 640, ibid., pp. 637–9.

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48 See Chapter 10 in this volume. 49 For the text of the agreement, see www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/5186.htm. 50 For the rise of the EPC and the role of the EC countries in the CSCE process, see Daniel Möckli, Trilateral Leadership: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Rise and Decline of European Political Cooperation, 1969–1974 (Ph.D thesis, University of Zurich, 2005); Daniel Möckli, “The EC-Nine, the CSCE, and the Changing Pattern of European Security,” in At the Roots of European Security: The Early Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965–1975, ed. Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny, and Christian Nuenlist (forthcoming in 2007). 51 See Duccio Basosi, “Helsinki and Rambouillet: Security and Economic Matters at State,” 1972–75,” in At the Roots of European Security: The Early Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965–1975, ed. Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny, and Christian Nuenlist (forthcoming in 2007).

Index

Acheson, Dean 56, 58–9, 75, 76, 232 Acheson Report 53, 75, 82 Action Committee for the United States of Europe 55 Adenauer, Konrad: Campaign against Atomic Death 133; dismissed 228; de Gaulle 4, 20, 33, 163; Kennedy 226; Khrushchev 70; Macmillan 94; MLF 150; nuclear capability 60, 163–5, 169–70, 225, 230; Ostpolitik 98; policy of strength 133, 137; resigned 99; reuniﬁcation 32; security policies 138; Stikker 110; US 80, 92; see also Elysée Treaty AFMED (Allied Forces Mediterranean) 211 Africa 40, 67 AFSOUTH 211 Agreed Minute on Strategy and Forces 234 Aktionskomitee Wahret die Freiheit 44 Algeria 211 Algerian War 95, 140, 141 Allied Forces Mediterranean (AFMED) 211 Allied Naval Forces South (NAVSOUTH) 211 Alphand, Hervé 92, 112 Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich 170 ANF (Atlantic nuclear force) 150, 152, 153–4, 157, 172 Anglo-American commitment 21–3, 167 Angola 194 Annual Political Appraisal 115 anti-Americanism 131 anti-communism 21–2, 41, 90–1, 196 anti-Gaullist feeling 59, 60–1 anti-nuclear weapons protest movements 8, 131, 132–3, 137–9, 229 appeasement 140 Arabs/Israelis 211–12

arms race 132, 235 Asia 4, 239; see also individual countries Atlantic Community 94, 226 Atlantic nuclear force: see ANF Atlanticists 135 atomic, biological and chemical weapons 163 Austria 208, 213, 214 Ball, George: Bilderberg meetings 6, 52; Cannes meeting 56; European–American relations report 51; de Gaulle 57, 117; Independence Day speech 55; MLF 57, 151; NATO leadership 232; Warsaw Pact 119; Wilson 153 Bange, Oliver 8–9 Barber, Arthur W. 184–6, 187, 189, 191 Barzel, Rainer 163–5 Bator, Francis M. 157, 165, 166 Baumel, Jacques 56–7, 58, 59 Belgium 77–80, 109, 110, 115, 121 Berlin 6–7, 79; Eisenhower 53, 70, 90; Kennedy 77, 93, 101, 224; Khrushchev 31, 32, 67, 68–9, 70, 225; Kissinger 15; Macmillan 33, 94; NATO’s role 4, 6, 20, 40, 69, 76–9, 132; North Atlantic Council 69, 77; psychological warfare 32–6; Stikker 77–8; superpower détente 80; US/France 7, 89–90 Berlin Declaration 69 Berlin Wall 77–8, 90, 92 Bernhard, Prince 50–1, 54–5, 57 Beuker, Hans 44 USS Biddle 203 bilateralism 8–9, 69–70, 82, 173, 239 Bilderberg Group 6, 50–2, 135; 1961 meeting 52–5; 1962 meeting 55–6; 1963 meeting 56–8; 1964 meeting 58–60

244

Index

Birrenbach, Kurt 56, 163–5 Black Sea Fleet 211 Bohlen, Charles 117 Böker, Alexander 72 Bonnemaison, Antoine 41, 42 Bourdet, Claude 134 Boyesen, Jens M. 80 Brandt, Willy: Brezhnev 170; Europe, Eastern 234; NPT 176, 234; Ostpolitik 26, 99, 171–2, 176, 236–7, 238; SPD 23, 27, 45, 163, 171–2 Brentano, Heinrich von 33, 71 Bretton Woods 239 Brezhnev, Leonid 170 Britain: anti-nuclear weapons protest movements 132–3; balance-of-payments 231; Berlin 69; CND 133; colonial disengagement 231; détente 71, 80; EEC 55–6, 89, 93, 97, 101–2, 108, 149–50, 166, 207, 225, 226, 228–9; foreign policy/Cold War 136; de Gaulle 4, 55–6, 68, 94, 108; independence in concert 134, 142; NATO 74, 110, 134–5; nuclear disarmament 142; security 134–7; US relations 55–6; see also Conservative Party; Labour Party Brosio, Manlio 117; de Gaulle 7, 229; international factors 119; NATO 11, 74, 118, 121, 176; NPT 173; trilateral talks 233; Vietnam War 207 Brown, George 167, 168 Bruce, David 33, 154 Bundesnachrichtendienst 42 Bundy, McGeorge 52, 57, 59, 60, 97 Burgess, W. Randolph 73 BVD (Dutch intelligence) 41, 42 Camp David 31, 33, 70–1 Campaign against Atomic Death 133, 137, 138 Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament: see CND Canada: Berlin 69, 77–9; détente 69, 71–2, 80; de Gaulle 68; multilateralism 115, 117–18; NATO 68, 72, 116, 119; psychological defense 35, 36 Cannes meeting 56–8 Carstens, Karl 164, 169 CDU-CSU 163–5, 171–2 CDU-SDP 44 China 213 Christian Democratic Union 44, 163–5, 171–2 Christian Democrats (Italy) 203, 205–6

Clay, Lucius D. 90 Cleveland, Harlan 174, 175, 191 CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) 133, 135–6, 137 Cold War: British foreign policy 136; deterrence 221; ending 71; Geneva Summit 143; Harmel report 26; NATO 3, 18 colonial disengagement 231 Committee of Three report 67 Common Agricultural Policy 207–8 Common Market: see European Economic Community Communist Party of Britain 135 Communist Party of France 133–4, 137, 141 Communist Party of Italy 212 Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) 168, 170 communist radio broadcasting 40 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 27, 173, 176, 237, 239 consensus building 11, 19–20, 226–31 Conservative Government 134–5 Couve de Murville, Maurice: Carstens 169; Denmark 195; Kennedy 79, 114; NATO’s future 116–17; Rusk 81, 111–12; Spaak 116 CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) 168, 170 CSCE: see Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Cuban missile crisis 132, 134; Kennedy 101, 203; Khrushchev 96–7, 203; NATO’s role 4; superpower détente 80, 82, 226–7; US/France relations 96–7, 227 Cyprus 211 Cyrankiewicz, Józef 169 Czechoslovakia 24, 25, 201, 212–13, 237 Denmark: Barber 185–6, 189, 191; Berlin 79; Couve de Murville 195; détente 80, 183, 186–7, 191–2, 194, 197; domestic policies 189–90; EEC 197, 228–9; Foreign Policy Committee meeting 195; Harmel exercise 195, 196–7; NATO 9, 183–4, 186–7, 189–91, 190–1, 194–5; referendum possibility 196; security policy 183–4, 198; US 184–5, 230 détente: CPSU 170; Denmark 183, 186–7, 191–2, 194, 197; East–West dialogue 99; Eisenhower 69–70, 165; France 117–19; Gaullism 6–7; Hækkerup

Index

245

187–8; Harmel exercise 235–7; Harmel report 17; Italy 201–5; Johnson 81, 165–6; Kennedy 82–3, 100–1; Khrushchev 4, 6, 82; Kissinger 170; NATO 9, 69, 71–2, 78–80, 81–2; Nixon 16–17; Soviet Union 81, 169–71; superpowers 80, 82, 226–7 Deutsch, Karl 5 Dobrynin, Anatoly 170 dollar/franc 95–6 double containment strategy 98 Dubcˇek Government 212 Ducci, Roberto 203, 204, 207, 213 Dufhues, Josef Hermann 164 Dulles, John Foster 32, 53

European Atomic Energy Community: see Euratom European Bureau 94 European Common Market: see European Economic Community European Defense Community 110 European Economic Community: Britain 55–6, 89, 93, 97, 101–2, 108, 149–50, 166, 207, 225, 226, 228–9; Denmark 197, 228–9; “empty chair crisis” 207–8; origins 226; see also individual countries European March for Disarmament 39 European Political Cooperation 239 European–American relations report 51

Easter Marches of Atomic Weapons Opponents 133, 137–8 Economic and Monetary Union 239 economic policy 7 Eden, Anthony 21–2 Eden Plan 135 EEC: see European Economic Community Eighteen Nations Disarmament Conference (ENDC) 174 Einthoven, Louis 41–2 Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Berlin 33, 69–70, 90; de Gaulle 73; détente policy 69–70, 165; Eden 21–2; European–American relations report 51; Khrushchev 31, 70; MLF 149; NATO 68, 82; nuclear sharing 223; political consultations 7; SACEUR 222; Soviet threat 18; Sprague 38; tripartite directorate 68 elite networks 6, 11, 50, 61; see also Bilderberg Group Elysée Treaty 20, 56, 62n23, 97–8, 109, 112, 228 Encounter journal 135 ENDC (Eighteen Nations Disarmament Conference) 174 Erhard, Ludwig: foreign policy 162; de Gaulle 99–100, 117, 228; government collapse 233; MLF 151, 152; NATO 20 Erler, Fritz 54 Euratom (European Atomic Energy Community) 168, 174, 175, 205 Europe, Eastern 6, 36, 234, 235–6, 238; see also individual countries Europe, West: Anglo-American commitment 21–3; shared identity 5, 23–4; US troops 21, 71, 234; see also European Economic Community; individual countries

Falin, Valentin 172 Fanfani, Amintore 204, 206–7, 210 Fenoaltea, Sergio 206, 208 Finland 44 Finletter, Thomas 76, 80, 108–9, 152 Foreign Affairs 15, 54, 108 foreign policy 38, 61, 136 Fornari, Giovanni 209 Foster, Bill 166, 174 Fouchet plan 207 Four-Power Working Group 33 France: Algerian war 95, 140, 141; antinuclear weapons protest movements 132–3; colonial disengagement 231; Fouchet plan 207; FRG 140, 188–9; gold reserves 95; Italy 208; military withdrawal from NATO 7, 91, 107–8, 113, 114, 120, 157, 172, 185, 188–9, 198, 209, 222, 227–8, 231; MLF 228; NATO 4, 92–3, 140, 224–5; nuclear capability 54, 91, 92, 134, 140–1, 168; opportunism 169; peace movement 133–4, 140, 141; psychological action 36, 38; SPD 172; Stikker 83, 114; US 7, 89–90, 101–2, 118, 230; see also de Gaulle; Gaullism Franco-German rapprochement 92, 93, 227, 228 Franco-German treaties 20, 56, 97–8; see also Elysée Treaty French Atlantic Fleet 113 French Communist Party (PCF) 133–4, 137, 141 FRG (Federal Republic of Germany) 5, 6, 37, 188–9; anti-nuclear protest movements 132–3, 137–9; Bilderberg Group 52; CDU 44; CND 135–6; détente 71, 79–81; Federal Foreign

246

Index

FRG continued Ofﬁce 164; France 140, 188–9; de Gaulle 228; IAEA 175; Kissinger 39; MLF 228; NATO 139, 236; North Atlantic Treaty 18; NPG 155, 175; NPT 162–3, 164–5, 236; nuclear capabilities 60, 163–5, 169–70, 225, 230; nuclear deterrence 164–5; nuclear disarmament 142; nuclear sharing 148, 153; Ostpolitik 236–7; psychological warfare 31, 45; reuniﬁcation 32–3, 236; Soviet Union 170–1; SPD 23, 27, 45, 52, 133, 163, 171–2; US pressure 173; see also Berlin Fromont-Meurice, Henri 36 Fulbright, William 58 Fuller, Leon 67

Gehlen, Reinhard 45 General Agreement Trade and Tariffs (GATT) 96, 112, 115 Geneva Conference 143, 190 German Democratic Republic: see GDR Germany: see Berlin; FRG; GDR Gerstenmaier, Eugen 163–5 Geyer, Rolf 44 gold reserves 95 González Márquez, Felipe 27 Grandville, Jean de la 111 Greece 37–8, 222, 239 Grewe, Wilhelm 80, 175, 176 Gromyko, Andrei 166, 170, 187 Grote, Nicolaus von 42 Gruenther, Alfred M. 51 Guichard, Olivier 54

G6 239 Gaddis, John Lewis 8 Gaitskell, Hugh 51 Gaitskell Plan 135 Garibaldi 203 GATT (General Agreement Trade and Tariffs) 96, 112, 115 de Gaulle, Charles: Adenauer 4, 20, 33, 163; Ball 57, 117; Britain 94, 149–50; Britain/EEC 4, 55–6, 94, 108; Brosio 7, 229; criticized 210; double containment strategy 98; double non 82, 97; Eisenhower 73; Erhard 99–100, 117, 228; force de frappe 54, 92, 95, 139, 169, 237; foreign policy 38; FRG 228; Hækkerup 188; Italy 109, 207; Kennedy 76, 89–90, 108, 109; Komer 75–6; Limited Test Ban Treaty 100; MLF 149–50, 224; nationalism 82; NATO 23–4, 67, 113, 222, 223–6; North Atlantic Treaty Article 13 3; NPT 168–9; Poland 169; réalités/trucs 91; Saragat 209; Soviet Union 231–2; Spaak 68, 69, 83, 109; Stikker 73, 74, 114–15; tensions 10; tripartite directorate 6–7, 68–9; US 15, 52; see also France, military withdrawal from NATO Gaullism 139–41; détente 6–7; isolated 60–1; nationalism 82; NATO 91–3, 230, 237; US 89–90, 91–2 Gavin, James 76 GDR (German Democratic Republic): British Labour Party 136; Kennedy 225; Khrushchev 39, 90; propaganda 135; psychological warfare 31; Soviet Union 76–7

Hækkerup, Per 190; appointed 184; collective solidarity in NATO 189; détente 187–8; foreign policy 186; de Gaulle 188 Hall, Stuart 136 Hallstein doctrine 20 Harlech, Lord 151 Harmel, Pierre 157, 175, 192, 235 Harmel exercise: Denmark 195, 196–7; détente 235–7; Italy 209–10; Johnson 175; reconstruction of NATO 16, 177, 222–3, 235 Harmel report: anticipated 72; Cold War 26; détente 17; Italy 210; NAC 25; NATO 192, 193, 195; political reform x, 4, 157 Harper’s Magazine 15 Harriman, W. Averell 206 Hase, Ullrich von 210 Hassel, Kai-Uwe von 114, 155 Healey, Denis 59, 152 Heath, Edward 58, 109 Helsinki 44 Helsinki Final Act 27 Herter, Christian 35, 70–1 Hjorth-Nielsen, Henning 196 Holiﬁeld, Chet 58 Home, Alec Douglas 110 Hooper, R. W. J. 35, 36, 110 Hopson, D. C. 36 Hungarian revolt 38 IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) 174, 175, 205 Ignatieff, George 112 Indochina 140

Index Information, Special Committee on 37 Information and Cultural Relations Committee 37 Information and Culture Committee 45 intercontinental strategic capabilities 133 Interdoc network 6, 31, 41–5 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) 202, 223 Inter-ministerial Working Group for Psychological Defence 37 International Atomic Energy Agency: see IAEA International Information and Documentation Center: see Interdoc network International Union of Students 43 IRBMs (intermediate-range ballistic missiles) 202, 223 Ismay, Lord 3, 51 Israelis 211–12 Istanbul meeting of North Atlantic Council 72 Italian Air Force 202 Italian Navy 203 Italian Socialist Party 203, 206 Italy: Austria 208, 214; Center-Left 208, 214; Czechoslovakian invasion 213; détente 72, 80, 201–5; Euratom 205; France 208; de Gaulle 109, 207; Harmel exercise 209–10; IAEA 205; IRBMs 223; Jupiter ballistic missiles 202, 203; Labour Government 208; Mediterranean 213–14; MLF 203; NATO 74, 78, 201; North Atlantic Treaty 212; NPG 204; NPT 174, 204–5, 212, 214; nuclear capability 202; nuclear sharing 202, 206; Polaris missiles 202; terrorist attack 208; US 205; Vietnam War 205–7; Wilson 208 Jackson, Henry 58 Johnson, Lyndon B.: Barber 185; bilateral talks 8–9; détente 81, 165–6; Harmel exercise 175; invasion of Czechoslovakia 212–13; MLF 59–60, 148, 150, 155–6; national security action memorandum 345 155; NATO 16, 24, 232; NPT 234; nuclear capability 233; Ostpolitik 234; Stikker 114–15 Jupiter ballistic missiles 202, 203 Kaplan, Lawrence 25, 157 Kennan, George 21, 23, 138 Kennedy, John F.: Acheson 75; Adenauer

247

226; Alphand 92; anti-communism 90–1; assassinated 99; Berlin 77, 93, 101, 224; Bernhard, Prince 54–5; Couve de Murville 79, 114; Cuban missile crisis 101, 203; détente 82–3, 100–1; double containment 98–9; European ideology 94–5; French military withdrawal 113; de Gaulle 76, 89–90, 108, 109; GDR 225; inauguration 52; Khrushchev 76–7; NATO 68, 82; nuclear weapons 149, 224; Polaris 55; political consultations 7; Soviet Union 79–82; third force concept 15–16 Kennedy Round, GATT 115 Kernig, C. D. 42, 45 Khrushchev, Nikita S.: Adenauer 70; Berlin crisis 31, 32, 67, 68–9, 225; Cuban crisis 96–7, 203; détente 4, 6, 82; Eisenhower 31, 70; GDR 39, 90; Kennedy 76–7; naval rearmament 211; refusing disarmament talks 35; Stikker 77; Wilson 167 Kiesinger, Kurt Georg 16, 164, 168, 171, 234 Kissinger, Henry: détente 170; Europe/US 17; FRG 39; MLF 59; NATO 15, 23, 26–7; NPT 25; Stikker 110; van der Beugel 58 Knappstein, Heinrich von 109 Koerts, Pieter 44 Kohler, Foy M. 33, 193 Kohnstamm, Max 55, 59 Komer, Robert 75–6 Korean War 4, 19, 67, 221 Kosygin, Aleksei 167, 174 Krag, Jens Otto 186, 190, 196 Krone, Heinrich 163–5 Kuchel, Thomas H. 151 La Malfa, Ugo 204 Labour Party of Britain 134, 135, 136, 208 Lades, Hans 42 Lange, Halvard 116 Leddy, John 152 Leusse, Pierre de 77, 119 Limited Test Ban Treaty 8, 68, 80, 100, 132, 141, 227 Lisbon Force 222 Luns, Joseph 58, 110–11, 116 Luxemburg 109 McCloy, John 56, 58 McGhee, George 52, 58, 63n31, 172, 234

248

Index

Macmillan, Harold: Adenauer 94; Berlin 33, 94; future of NATO 109; independence in concert 134, 142; nuclear sharing 149; tripartite directorate 68 Macmillan Plan 135, 136 McNamara, Robert S.: ANF 153; Athens address 224; Barber 184–5; FRG 93; NATO leadership 232; NPG 8, 151–2, 155, 173, 203–4; nuclear capability 148, 233; Special Committee 119–20 Malta 211 Mansﬁeld, Mike 22 Mansholt, Sicco 58 Margerie, Roland de 113 Maritime Air Force facility 25 Markscheffel, Günter 172 Marshall Plan 15 Martin, Paul 81, 116, 118 Mason, Sir Paul 38 MC 14/3 234 MCAA (Mouvement Contre l’Armement Atomique) 134 MDP (Mouvement de la Paix) 133–4 Medici, Giuseppe 212 Mediterranean 210–11, 213–14 Mendès-France, Pierre 89 Mennes, Herman 44 Middle East 4, 211–12, 213 Middleton, Drew 81 Military History Research Institute, Potsdam 5 Mittelstaedt, Lt-Col 36 MLF (multilateral force): Acheson 59; Adenauer 150; Ball 57, 151; Bundy 59, 60; Erhard 151, 152; failure 172; France 228; de Gaulle 224; Germany 228; Home/Rusk 112; Italy 203; Johnson 59–60, 148, 150, 155–6; Kissinger 59; Nassau agreement 149–50; NATO 148–9; NPG 152, 156–7; Stikker 59; US State Department 58 Mollet, Guy 51 Monnet, Jean 55 Moro, Aldo 204, 205, 209, 211, 212 Moscow Treaty 26 Mouvement Contre l’Armement Atomique (MCAA) 134 Mouvement de la Paix (MDP) 133–4 multilateral force: see MLF multilateralism 16–17, 67, 80–1, 115, 117–18 Nassau agreement 55–6, 62n20, 97, 110, 149–50

national security action memoranda 150–1, 155 National Security Council 38 nationalism 82, 188, 189 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) x–xi, 17, 222, 237–8; ad hoc study groups 40–1; Africa 67; Ball 232; Belgium 77–80, 109–10, 115, 121; Britain 134–5; Canada 116, 119; Denmark 9, 183–4, 186–7, 189–91, 194–5; détente 9, 81–2; Eisenhower 68, 82; France 4, 92–3, 140, 224–5; French military withdrawal 7, 91, 107–8, 113, 114, 120, 140–1, 157, 172, 185, 188–9, 198, 209, 222, 227–8, 231; FRG 139, 236; future threatened 110–11, 116–17; de Gaulle 23–4, 67, 113, 222, 223–6; Gaullism 91–3, 230, 237; Harmel report 192, 193; institutions 221–2, 232–3, 238; as instrument of peace 193–5, 230; Italy 201; Johnson 16, 24, 232; Kennedy 68, 82; Kissinger 15, 23, 26–7; Macmillan 109; McNamara 232; military credibility crisis 223–5, 231; MLF 148–9; as multilateral forum 5, 120–1; nuclear capability 97, 132–3, 142, 229; political cooperation 3–4, 10, 70–1, 222–3, 225–6, 227–8; Soviet Union 221; US x–xi, 7, 67; Warsaw Pact 184, 237; see also NPG naval rearmament 211 NAVSOUTH (Allied Naval Forces South) 211 NDAC (Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee) 156, 204, 232–3 Nenni, Pietro 204, 206, 209–10 Netherlands 41, 42, 109 neutrality, active 136–7 neutralization proposals 138 New Left 135, 136, 137 New York Times 112 New York Times Magazine 15 Nitze, Paul 52, 53–4 Nixon, Richard 16–17, 24, 26, 170 non-proliferation treaty (NPT) 8; Brandt 176, 234; Brosio 173; CSCE 173; Ducci 204; Falin 172; FRG 162–3, 164–5, 236; de Gaulle 168–9; Italy 174, 204–5, 212, 214; Johnson 234; Kissinger 25; national interests 176–7; NPG 157; Ostpolitik 9; Soviet Union 155–6; US 9–10, 165–6; Wilson 163, 166–8 Norstad, Lauris 73, 76 North Atlantic Council 67, 111, 222;

Index Berlin 77; Council Memorandum C-M(61)25 40; de Staercke 109–10; Eisenhower 69–70; Foster 174; Harmel report 25; nuclear sharing 152, 156; psychological warfare 33–4; security conference 184–5; Stikker 74; Western Four 78–9 North Atlantic Treaty 4, 212, 221; Article 4 34; Article 5 18, 19, 34; Article 13 3, 108 North Atlantic Treaty Organization see NATO Norway 71, 79–80, 191, 196, 230 nouvelle gauche 141 NPG: see nuclear planning group NPT: see non-proliferation treaty nuclear capabilities: France 54, 91, 92, 134, 140–1, 168; FRG 60, 163–5, 169–70, 225, 230; Italy 202; Johnson 233; McNamara 148, 233; NATO 97, 142, 229 Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC) 156, 232–3 nuclear deterrence 7–8, 164–5 nuclear disarmament 135, 142 nuclear non-proliferation 172–6; see also non-proliferation treaty (NPT) nuclear planning group (NPG) 8; ANF 157; Ball 156–7; FRG 155; Italy 204; McNamara 8, 151–2, 155–7, 173, 203–4; MLF 152, 156–7; NATO 148–9, 151–7; NPT 157; setting up 16, 154–5, 157, 158, 232–3 nuclear power 4, 15, 56–7, 149, 224 nuclear sharing 148–51, 153, 156, 202, 206, 223, 230–1 Oder-Neisse line 225 OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) 50 Oost-West journal 43 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 50 Ormsby-Gore, W. David 100–1 Osimo Treaty 214 Ostpolitik 26, 236–7; Adenauer 98; Brandt 26, 99, 171–2, 176, 236–7, 238; détente 16; Johnson 234; Kiesinger 234; NPT 9 Owen, Henry 58 Paix et liberté 41 Paludan, Janus 195 Paques, G. 36 Paris Summit 31, 68, 72, 73 Pasti, Nino 204

249

PCF (Communist Party of France) 133–4, 137, 141 peace movement 133–4, 140, 141 Pigs, Bay of 52 Poland 169, 184, 187 Polaris missiles 4, 55, 202 Policy Planning Staff 81, 94 Political Advisors Committee 37 political consultations 6–7, 70–1 Portugal 239 Prague Spring 212 propaganda 6, 32, 36, 135 protest movements 8, 131, 229 psychological warfare 6, 46n1; Canada 35, 38; France 36, 38; FRG 31, 45; GDR 31; North Atlantic Council 33–4; Soviet Union 31 Psychological Warfare Working Group 32–8 Psywar Co-ordination Section, SHAPE 34 Rambouillet summit 239 Rapacki Plan 135, 136 Reinhardt, Frederick 203, 205, 212 The Reporter 15 Retinger, Joseph 50–1 Roll, Eric 59 rollback policy 38 Romania 25, 212 Roshchin, A. A. 174 Rostand, Jean 134 Rostow, Walt Whitman 58, 75, 81, 152–3, 166, 227 Rueff, Jacques 95–6 Rusk, Dean: Berlin 76, 78; Bilderberg 52; Couve de Murville 81, 111–12; Danish proposal 191; Fanfani 210; Finletter 108–9; Harmel 192; MLF 207; NATO 75, 81, 111–12, 232; Schröder 116; Soviet Union 81, 113; Stikker 77; US détente 165, 166 SACEUR (Strategic Allied Commander Europe) 110, 152, 204, 222, 223 St. Castin meeting 52–5 SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) 24, 26 Saltsjöbaden meeting 55–6 Sandys, Duncan 135 Saragat, Giuseppe 204, 209, 211 Schaetzel, J. Robert 59 Schaus, Eugène 112 Scheel, Walter 171 Schlesinger, Arthur Jr. 89

250

Index

Schmidt, Helmut 172 Schröder, Gerhard 81, 112, 116, 119, 155 Schuman, Maurice 115–16 Scott-Smith, Giles 6 SDECE (French intelligence) 41 security 7, 17, 142–3, 184–5; Adenauer 138; Britain 134–7; Denmark 183–4, 198; NATO 133, 143; trilateral talks 233–5 Seydoux, François 80, 111, 114 SFIO (Socialist Party of France) 134, 141 SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) 34, 35, 204 Shuckburgh, Sir Evelyn 151 Sikorski, W. 50 Sino-Soviet border 24 Six Days’ War 201, 211–12 Social Democratic Party 23, 27, 45, 52, 133, 163, 171–2 social movements 131–2 Socialist Party of France 134, 141 Socialist Party of Italy (PSI) 203, 206 SOEV 42 Sotgiu, Luciano 211 Soviet Union: Barber 187; détente 81, 169–71; FRG 170–1; de Gaulle 231–2; GDR 76–7; Greece 37–8; intercontinental strategic capabilities 133; invasion of Czechoslovakia 24, 25, 201, 237; Kennedy 79–82; Labour Party 136; Mediterranean 210–11; NATO 221; North Atlantic Treaty 4; NPT 155–6; nuclear power 15; peaceful coexistence 41–2; propaganda 32; psychological warfare 31; Rusk 113; Sputnik 223; Stikker 80; US 4, 190, 191, 239 Spaak, Paul-Henri 11, 67; anticommunism 196; Camp David 70–1; Couve de Murville 116; Foreign Affairs 108; de Gaulle 68, 69, 83, 108–11; and Martin 80–1; NATO 7, 39, 72, 111; political co-operation 7; pre-conference meeting 184; psychological defense policy 35; resignation 73–4; Schuman 115–16; tripartite directorate 68 SPD: see Social Democratic Party Speidel, Hans 58 Sprague, Mansﬁeld 38 Sputnik 223 Staercke, André de 73, 77, 78, 109–10, 119 Stewart, Michael 184, 210 Stikker, Dirk 11; ad hoc working groups 6,

40–1; Adenauer 110; Berlin 77–8; Bilderberg meeting 58; France 83, 114; de Gaulle 73, 74, 114–15; Johnson 114–15; Khrushchev 77; Kissinger 110; MLF 59; NATO 79, 111, 113, 121, 176; Rusk 77; Soviet Union 80; US 74 Stone, Shepard 58 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) 24, 26 Strauss, Franz Josef 23, 34–5, 93, 163–5 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) 34, 35, 204 Suri, Jeremi 131 Sweden 137 Switzerland x, 137 Tabor, Hans 195, 196 terrorist attack 11, 208 Thatcher, Margaret 166 third force concept 15–16 Thompson, Llewellyn 70 Three Wise Men report x, 4, 67 Trachtenberg, Marc 97 trilateral talks 222–3, 233–5, 236, 238 tripartite directorate 6–7, 54, 68–9 The Troubled Partnership 15 Truman Doctrine xi Turkey 222, 223, 239 Tyler, William 80, 112 U-2 incident 73, 132 United Nations 18–19 United States of America: Adenauer 80, 92; balance-of-payments 95, 102, 231; Berlin crisis 7, 89–90; Britain 55–6; CND 135–6; Denmark 184–5, 230; foreign policy/NATO 67, 119–20; France 7, 89–90, 101–2, 118, 230; de Gaulle 15, 52; Gaullism 89–90, 91–2; Italy 205; NPT 9–10, 155–6; nuclear monopoly 56–7; Policy Planning Staff 94; Soviet Union 4, 190, 191, 239; Stikker 74; troops in Europe 21, 71, 234 values, shared 5, 10–11, 22–3, 27, 34–5, 221 Van den Heuvel, Cees 42, 43, 44 Van der Beugel, Ernst 58 Van Kleffens, Eelco 54 Van Zeeland, Paul 51 Verein zur Erforschung sozialpolitischer Verhältnisse im Ausland e. V. 42 Vest, George 176 Vienna summit 76–7, 174

Index Vietnam 190 Vietnam War: Denmark 189, 194; escalating 24, 99, 201, 230, 231, 232; Europe 19; Italy 9–10, 205–7 Vittorelli, Paolo 59 Voronov, Gennadiy I. 168 Warsaw Pact: Ball 119; Moscow Treaty 26; NATO 184, 237; nuclear weapons 233; Winiewicz 186; Yugoslavia 212 Wehner, Herbert 172 Wenger, Andreas 16–17, 131 Wessel, Gerhard 45 Western Four 69, 71, 78–9 Westrick, Ludger 58 Williamsburg meeting 58–60

251

Wilson, Harold 16; Atlantic nuclear force 150; Ball 153; FRG 166–8; Italy 208; Khrushchev 167; Kosygin 167–8; MLF 150; NPT 163, 166–8; nuclear capabilities 154 Winiewicz, Jozef 186 Wischnewski, Hans-Jürgen 172 Wohlstetter, Albert 53–4 Wolff, Larry 24 World Federation of Democratic Youth 43–4 World Youth Forum 39 youth and education 40 Yugoslavia 212, 214

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