Treading Softly: U.S. Marines in China, 1819-1949

TREADING SOFTLY: U.S. Marines in China, 1819–1949

George B. Clark

PRAEGER

TREADING SOFTLY

TREADING SOFTLY U.S. Marines in China, 1819–1949 George B. Clark

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Clark, George B. (George Bransfield) Treading softly : U.S. Marines in China, 1819–1949 / George B. Clark. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–275–97078–7 (alk. paper) 1. United States. Marine Corps—China—History. 2. China—History, Military—19th century. 3. China—History, Military—20th century. I. Title. VE23.C493 2001 359.9'6'0973—dc21 00–042778 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright 䉷 2001 by George B. Clark All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 00–042778 ISBN: 0–275–97078–7 First published in 2001 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America TM

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

As always, to my dear wife Jeanne who has helped me immeasurably with this and every other accomplishment that I have been involved in for nearly fifty years. And My grandchildren Thomas and Andrew Clark and their cousins Paul and Clare Evett. May they live forever and a day. Or, barring that, be in Heaven an hour before the Devil knows they are dead.

Contents

Maps

ix

Preface

xi

Introduction

xiii

1 The Beginnings, 1819–1899

1

2 The Boxer Rebellion

19

3 Early Twentieth Century, 1905–1929

47

4 The China Marines, 1930–1941

83

5 Back to China, 1945–1949

131

Conclusion

167

Appendix A:

Boxer Rebellion

171

Appendix B:

Boxer Rebellion, Reports

175

Appendix C:

Third Brigade

179

Appendix D:

Billets of the Second Brigade (1937)

183

Appendix E:

A Brief Chronological History of the Peking Guard (1905–1934)

185

Bibliography

187

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CONTENTS

Index

195 Photo essay follows p. 82

Maps

1.1

Battle of the Barrier Forts

8

2.1

Defense of the Legations—Peking, 1900

23

2.2

The Relief Columns

25

2.3

Attack on the Walled City of Tientsin

37

3.1

Shanghai, 1927

64

4.1

4th Marines Defense Sector, Shanghai, 1932

95

4.2

4th Marines Defense Sector, Shanghai, 1937

109

4.3

Defense Sectors in Shanghai, 1937

111

5.1

North China: Amphibious Corps Operations Area

137

5.2

Anping Ambush, 29 July 1946

154

5.3

Attack on Hsin Ho, 5 April 1947

158

Preface

This is a brief history of the U.S. Marines’ service in China from 1819 to 1949. For some of the Marines, those 130 years meant, for the most part, exotic service and extravagant living. For the men of the 4th Marines and of the Peking Legation Guard, it was nirvana. They lived the life of Riley, and Riley may even have been there. For others, like those who went to China after World War II, it was dangerous, highly unpleasant, and usually very boring. I became interested in the U.S. Marine Corps many years ago, primarily because of one man—John W. Thomason, Jr., and his exciting fictionalized stories of the “old Corps.” That wasn’t all; I even joined the Marines, to enjoy the life that Thomason had written about. But by that time it had all changed. There was a serious war going on, and the seeming casualness of the Thomason period had completely disappeared. Many of his stories were about service in China, and they were the most exhilarating of all. No questions were ever raised in a ten-year-old’s head about right and wrong, like “Why were U.S. Marines in China?” It was just like the British in India—it was their “inalienable” right to be there, that’s all. Hollywood told us it was O.K. For the most part, so did our history books, if they bothered to identify right or wrong. As an adult I began to search for published material describing the American experience in China and found numerous memoirs of missionaries, writers, travelers, and Sinophiles. But there was little in the way of what soldiers or sailors experienced, and a paucity of what U.S. Marines thought of the whole thing. After all, of American military personnel, they spent

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the longest time in China—and, it might be added, contributed greatly, for better or worse, to the entire story. So I decided to try to fill the gap. No one can pull together as much data as you’ll find within, however, without at least some help. Over many years when I needed a friend at USMC History and Museums, the one man who could always be counted upon was Richard A. Long. I didn’t learn until years later that each time he assisted me in my hour of need he got himself deeper in trouble with the “management.” Thanks pal; this is long overdue, but I won’t forget you and your assistance. In recent years I have come to lean heavily upon Lt. Col. Merrill “Skip” Bartlett, USMC (Ret.), more and more. He certainly is the font of knowledge, or knows where it is. My friend Ms. Patricia “Pat” Mullen, archivist, Marine Corps University, provided valuable photos from its collection. There is also Alfred “Al” Bonecki, who gave portions of his collection of photos and material relating to his beloved brother-in-law, Sgt. James E. Kenny, a China Marine, as did Col. Richard D. Camp, USMC (Ret.), from his magnificent collection of China photos—some of which, like Bonecki’s, are included in this book. I mustn’t forget Col. Henry “Hank” Aplington, USMC (Ret.), who provided me with his unpublished memoir, which I gratefully utilized. Rear Adm. Kemp Tolley, USN (Ret.), clarified a certain point concerning the Yangtze Patrol, on which he is the acknowledged expert. Thanks also to W. R. “Billy Bob” Crim, a longtime Texas friend who connected Tolley and me a number of years ago. Conversations with a China Marine of the 3rd Brigade, Gen. Merrill B. “Bill” Twining, USMC (Ret.), now deceased, clarified a number of questions regarding who did what to whom. Bill was there as a young lieutenant in both the 4th Marines and later the 12th Marines. Essential encouragement came from James “Jim” Hallas, noted author of books about Marines, and for many years from Anthony P. Restuccia, who will read anything about the “Old Corps, the real Old Corps”—even my writing, and that is true dedication. The same goes for Brig. Gen. Austin C. “Shifty” Shofner, USMC (Ret.), now deceased but not forgotten. We can all be heartily sorry that his memoir was never finished. Thanks also to Norman V. “Vern” McLean, who provided some material for the section on “Horse Marines.” There are many others who have supported this project, mainly because they wanted to read it. Thanks to all of you.

Introduction

You may ask why the Americans felt they had a right to impose a military force upon an unwilling friendly nation. Simply stated, officially the reason was to ensure that our mercantile efforts would not be thwarted, nor our citizens abused by the natives. Why our citizens were in China as missionaries or capitalists was a legitimate question. Most of this will be covered in the text. But briefly, in the nineteenth century many European nations looked upon trade with China as their prerogative. The attitude of the Yankees wasn’t far removed. They too believed in taking whatever they could get while the getting was good, and they did. The one major difference between the Americans and the others was the continued refusal of our government to collaborate with the other nations in their depredations. We did not grab territory like most of the others, other than occupy space in the U.S. section in Shanghai. Nor did we take hardened positions versus the Chinese government alongside the others. When it came time to extract money for presumed damages, it was always the U.S. government that attempted to modify the numbers downward, usually unsuccessfully. If one could exaggerate a trifle, the United States could almost be considered China’s only friend among nations. One of the most persistent aggravations from the Chinese point of view was the foreign imposition of missionaries upon an otherwise satisfied populace. For some reason, the Chinese seemed not to appreciate this intrusion, disruption, and interference into what they considered their nation and religious heritage. Forced trade was secondary but a powerful irritant. In the nineteenth century, China was still in the “Dark Ages,” but it appealed

xiv

INTRODUCTION

to and seemed to satisfy many Chinese. They seemed not to want intercourse with foreigners, but because they were nearly powerless as a nation, they had little to say about the matter. Never in modern history has any major power been so weak and literally defenseless for so long a time. The weakness lasted for a very long period. Europeans were the major violators of China’s sovereignty, with Great Britain first among equals. France did whatever it was capable of doing, as did Russia, Germany, and later that friendly nation just across the China seas, Japan. There were others, too numerous to list here. Unfortunately, because of these intrusions the Chinese rebelled violently several times against foreigners and frequently against their own government. That in turn led to ruthless foreign military intervention. Later, the excuse foreign nations used to maintain troops on the Chinese mainland was principally so that they would have troops at hand to stifle immediately any Chinese dissent. In order to do it as “legally” as possible, they forcibly negotiated land away from Chinese control. Shanghai was designated as the International Settlement. In other parts of the country, like the British at Hong Kong and the Germans on the Shantung Peninsula, it was a foreign occupation, pure and simple. The French, the Russians, and a few other nations, not including the United States, grabbed their portions as well. They all forced their wills upon a weak Chinese government for quite a number of years. During the entire period covered by this chronicle, China was in a constant state of political turmoil. In the nineteenth century a spate of rebellions, revolutions, and armed insurrections erupted, all of which the Manchu government successfully crushed. With the turn of the twentieth century came the Boxers, and then a revolution that soon overturned the dynastic rule of many centuries. Yet lack of stability was to be the continuing fate of the Chinese people. For many years differences between the so-called revolutionary government, the Kuomintang, and the various warlords brought destruction and bloodshed upon China. Foreign incursions followed that, and finally a full-blown invasion by Japan. Much of the time the Chinese Communist Party fought the Kuomintang—all of which added strain for the populace of a nation suffering what really amounted to anarchy. While these various struggles were taking place, U.S. Marines were there, observing and sometimes participating in what was happening. At least as early as 1757, the Ch’ing dynasty had restricted trade with foreigners—limiting all transactions to the coastal city of Canton. Trade was an imperial monopoly, with all the inherent vexations of greedy, bribeseeking Chinese officials. The Europeans, anxious to remove those hindrances and create more favorable conditions for the further development of trade, wanted to meet the Ch’ing monarchy face to face. That wasn’t allowed. Self-protecting court officials kept everyone from meeting anyone

INTRODUCTION

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at court. That protection eventually destroyed the monarchy and the court officials as well. The self-reliant Chinese people saw little need to import goods. What merchandise had been coming in was mainly from British India. In return the British bought tea and silk products in China, but the trade balance was not satisfactory to them. The Chinese charged more for Chinese products than the Chinese were willing to pay in return for the Indian merchandise. As far as the Chinese authorities were concerned, the British had nothing of importance to sell them—certainly, nothing that the Chinese weren’t already producing or could not if the product was sufficiently desired. Consequently, Britain, in dealings with China, was a debtor nation. Great Britain has never readily accepted an inferior status. Ingeniously, British merchants discovered a product that would sell very well in China, thereby eliminating the trade imbalance. The product was opium, produced in volume in southern India and Ceylon. Surreptitiously at first, but later through widespread bribing of Chinese officials, the British managed to garner a large part of the burgeoning Chinese drug market. By the 1830s the British financially controlled enough of the drug trade to offset all the cost of Chinese exports. The Ch’ing dynasty then, much too late, tried to put a halt to the widespread traffic. That action brought China into a serious confrontation with the British. The government demanded that the British and other foreigners surrender to them the immense stocks of opium they had stored in their warehouses. When the foreigners ignored the demand, the government established a blockade of the foreign factories and recalled all the Chinese servants. The foreigners gave in and turned over their opium to the imperial commissioner, Lin Tse-hsu¨, who had it destroyed in public. Soon after, curiously, the Chinese government lifted the restrictions previously imposed, and it was not long before the foreigners were again smuggling opium into China. At this time, some drunken British sailors ashore killed a Chinese man in Canton. The British authorities ignored Commissioner Lin’s demand that the guilty men be surrendered to the government; instead the British informed the Chinese authorities that the men would be tried in a British court. After a farcical trial the sailors were set free. It was a direct slap at Chinese sovereignty; Lin countered with a boycott of all British ships. Soon afterward a British naval and military force arrived, and two British menof-war attacked a fleet of Chinese junks in the Pearl River estuary. The First Opium War was on. Of the conflicts that followed, it is sufficient to state that the British were quite well able to handle the antiquated military forces sent against them. Following the war, and without much difficulty, Britain imposed its will upon the Chinese government. Among many other harsh terms, one of major significance was forcing the Ch’ing to relinquish Hong Kong to Britain, and, of course, to continue its “license” to sell opium in China. Amer-

xvi

INTRODUCTION

icans expressed pious indignation against the unequal treaty, all the while reaping handsome profits. France immediately jumped on the bandwagon and in 1844 forced China to accept the same basic unequal treaty already agreed to with Britain and the United States. Next came the Taiping Revolution. The main precept of the revolutionists was to depose the Ch’ing regime and restore the Ming dynasty. It began successfully but after many defeats ended in a terrible massacre of the last holdouts on 14 July 1864. While these conflicts were transpiring, U.S. Navy ships were landing U.S. Marines to protect American citizens and their property. In September 1853 the city of Shanghai collapsed into utter chaos. One segment of the Triad Society, which was against the Ch’ing dynasty, successfully took over all eastern China and in Shanghai occupied all but the foreign settlement. Meanwhile, the British and American residents of the city had taken over the customs service. That was the beginning of the lengthy and extensive control of that city by foreigners. It was during this period that the official International Settlement came into being. Shortly afterward, the British were unsuccessful in rewriting the already unequal treaty they had with the Chinese government; it then declared the Second Opium War. Again, this war was very much a disaster for the Chinese. Meanwhile, the Taiping leadership were oppressing their opponents. Chinese merchants got together and arranged to finance the hire of some foreign soldiers to lead a newly created army to fight the rebels. It was inaccurately distinguished as the “Ever Victorious Army,” and its specialty was rapine and plunder. Among the foreigners hired were several American officers, including their leader, Frederick Townsend Ward, who, in 1863, did everyone a favor and died, but not until the British had also begun to support his army. In fact, they provided his replacement, a British officer who became known in history as “Chinese” Gordon, and who came to his own end in the Sudan many years later. For the next thirty to forty years, the Europeans, ably assisted by the Americans and later by the Japanese, managed to bleed China white. After being defeated several times by the British and the French, the government and its political servants were convinced that no Chinese army could ever defeat an Occidental military force. In 1900 a new enemy appeared on the scene: Chinese insurgents popularly known as “Boxers” threatened the foreigners in Peking. For fifty-five days they laid siege to the foreign enclave and nearly succeeded in their attempt to destroy the community. The China Relief Expedition, after it got its act together, badly defeated both the regular Chinese troops and the Boxers. As a condition of ending the foreign military intervention in China, the government was forced to sign a protocol giving foreigners certain extraterritorial rights. Essentially, it allowed the establishment of zones in which the foreign residents would have their own governing bodies. They would have courts of law, money, banks, police protection, military occupation, and other things that ensured that

INTRODUCTION

xvii

those foreigners would own a piece of China. It was a bitter pill for the Chinese to swallow, and for good reason it remained a problem for many years to come. In 1911 a coalition of radicals led by Sun Yat-sen overthrew the Manchu dynasty. It was a nearly bloodless coup, and Sun Yat-sen tried to establish a republican-style government. Unfortunately, the revolt broke down— many of the generals took control of parts of the army. They then used their power to take over sections of China for themselves. They were like bandits, though they called themselves “warlords.” Instead of following the political line proposed by Sun, many of them set about ravaging any territory over which they marched. A decade went by, and China had become a cat’s-paw between a dozen hostile forces— and the foreigners were only part of the problem. Chiang Kai-shek, a young follower of Sun Yat-sen, assumed the leadership role of the Kuomintang (KMT), also known as the Nationalists. In 1925 the KMT took the offensive against the warlords. Chiang’s armies, marching north from their base in the province of Canton, drove everything before them. He ordered an embargo, which was mainly directed toward the British but threatened all foreigners living in China. His military successes, in a nation where military victories were very scarce, frightened the foreign establishment badly. Soon military and naval forces from many nations were converging upon China to protect foreign citizens. Somehow peace was preserved in the International Settlement until 1932. However, because of the conflict between an aggressive Japan and a resurgent China, the city of Shanghai was several times the victim of Japanese incursions that sometimes overlapped into the settlement. Keeping the settlement free of either or both military forces was not an easy task. During the latter years of their occupation, the U.S. Marines had a very difficult time keeping the peace within the American zone. The Marines in Peking, as a direct result of the Boxer debacle, were a legitimate guard and were considered a part of the embassy staff. They had fewer international problems than did the 4th Marines at Shanghai, but still the swirl of political activity sometimes engulfed them also, especially in the later 1930s. Though the foregoing was upsetting, the Occidentals, Americans included, were living extremely well. But it eventually became obvious that the time was getting very late. Most dependents of the Americans, military and civilians, were sent home, just in case. For a year or two Marine officers and the more senior enlisted men had to do without their families close by. Nevertheless, unlike their men, at least their women and children would be safe. As the 1930s came to a close it was obvious to all that Japan wasn’t about to cease its depredations. Sooner rather than later they were likely to defeat and occupy China. In John Letcher’s letters home he continually

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INTRODUCTION

wrote that this would most likely happen, and “What was the world going to do about it?”1 He was nearly right on the money, but China, though badly battered, survived. Very late into the “game,” the U.S. forces, including Marines, were withdrawn from China. As the Marines left, they were shipped to the dubious safety of the Philippines, where in a few months they would go down to defeat with their U.S. Army buddies. The Marines would come back to China when the war ended, but things would be much different. Now they would be obvious supporters of one side against another, which was a bad policy for China and the United States. What we can say at this late date is that the Marines carried out their primary mission. Their mission was to defend Americans and, if possible, not shoot any Chinese people. When they went back to China in 1945, ostensibly to extricate the Japanese soldiers and civilians still there (among their many other duties), they accomplished that as well. They always accomplished their mission, regardless of the “roadblocks” placed before them. As will be seen in the following pages, China was weak. It has taken over a century for the country to become strong enough to withstand foreign intrusion. That is why no foreign garrisons occupy China today— instead, the Chinese occupy other lands. In fact, the twenty-first century may well be China’s century. Let us hope they will be more decent to others than others have been to them. NOTE 1. Roger B. Jeans and Katie Letcher Lyle, eds., Good-bye to Old Peking: The Wartime Letters of U.S. Marine Captain John Seymour Letcher, 1937–1939 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1998).

1 The Beginnings, 1819–1899

As early as 1819, U.S. Navy ships had been visiting various parts of China. We have historical records, such as ship’s logs, to prove that. Additionally, the same records show that U.S. Marines, as part of the crews, also visited Chinese ports. The first U.S. warship to visit China was the Congress, aboard which 1st Lt. William Nicholl, USMC, commanded the Marine detachment. The Congress, under Capt. Robert Henley, USN, arrived at Lintin Island (about 70 miles from Canton) on 3 November 1819, after a “disagreeable passage of forty days” from Java. As far as can be determined, Nicholl was the first Marine officer to visit both the Philippines and China.1 One might add that the Marines he commanded were also the first enlisted Marines to visit China. From Nicholl’s letters to the Commandant of the Marine Corps we find that the Chinese kept a close watch upon the ship and its crew. In fact, the officials “urged and ordered” Captain Henley to move along. He ignored them, but on 15 January 1820 the ship did leave China for Manila. The Congress returned to Lintin Island in March 1820 and spent 70 days cruising the China Sea. The U.S. Navy’s East India Squadron established its first base at Hong Kong in 1835, and where the navy ships were, one would also find Marines.2 According to McClellan, “In 1841, Marines began to take part in Chinese affairs when they visited Whampoa on the Constellation and the Boston.” That statement would make it seem that neither the Congress nor any of its officers and crew had ever arrived. It seems to be a mistake, by more than twenty years. Great Britain had been engaged since the First Opium War with China,

2

TREADING SOFTLY

which ended in January 1841. According to the peace treaty, Britain was to receive control of the island port of Hong Kong, six million Chinese dollars and the continued “right” to import British opium into China. When the Chinese authorities realized what the actual terms were, and how much of their sovereignty had been lost, they quickly revoked the treaty. This resulted in the British resuming military action in the Yangtze River valley and shortly after attacking the city of Nanking. Britain, and all foreigners for that matter, were always the victors in fighting China. As the old saying goes “to the victor belong the spoils.” In the nineteenth century, Britain almost always took the lead in “spoiling” China. Though Britain was often in the lead, other nations were also pushing open the doors of China. France had its own reason to interfere in Chinese affairs: a French missionary had done something unacceptable to the host nation, and a Chinese court tried and convicted him. If that had happened anywhere but in China, it would have been considered standard jurisprudence. Nevertheless, that was sufficient excuse for the French to initiate violence. France, with the help of Britain, once again began combat operations against China. What Britain’s excuse was isn’t clear, but it wasn’t long before Britain and France once again defeated China, forcing her to again sue for peace. Meanwhile, the U.S. State Department was trying to establish trading relations with China. Unfortunately, foreigners were still foreigners, no matter which nation they emanated from. The Chinese authorities did not receive the citizens of the U.S. more rapidly or hospitably than those of Britain and France. As a result, the hostile activities of the Chinese caused much maneuvering by the American naval forces during this period. Finally an agreement was accepted, the beginning of what became known as the “Open Door policy”—which the United States maintained well into the mid-twentieth century. The same policy also contributed to a shooting war with Japan a century later. The U.S. Marines’ earliest semipermanent appearance on mainland China occurred when the United States sent Caleb Cushing, its first diplomatic minister to China. Cushing, a Massachusetts politician, left for China in 1843 and arrived at Macao, the Portuguese-controlled island, on 24 February 1844. Three U.S. Navy ships, the Brandywine, St. Louis, and Perry, escorted Cushing and his entourage to Macao, where Cushing established his legation. As the legation’s defense, a squad of Marines from the Brandywine remained with him for about two months. They apparently impressed the local populace, because nothing unpleasant occurred to upset the status quo while the Marines were there. Pres. John Tyler had written a letter to the emperor of China, couched in the same language as the “Great White Father” used in addressing various American Indian chiefs, and probably written in English. Regardless, Cushing managed to obtain the desired treaty, which was signed in

THE BEGINNINGS

3

Wanghia in July of 1844. The treaty allowed the United States everything the British had obtained in their 1842 Treaty of Nanking, the same treaty in which Britain had forced the Chinese to open five ports for trading. But Cushing’s treaty, in addition to gaining the “full package,” also gained extraterritorial rights, a very big plus for the Americans. This treaty placed American residents under American criminal and civil jurisdiction—something that no other foreign nation had yet been able to extract officially from the Chinese officials. The American treaty would be the basis for future negotiations between various European powers, notably Britain and France, and a prostrate China. Most of the excesses thereafter by foreigners during the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries can be credited to the terms of that treaty. It would be the crowning humiliation for China, and one that high- and low-born Chinese would never cease to complain about. A few months after the treaty was signed, a “Factory”—in reality, a trading post—was established on Whampoa Island in the Pearl River, a short distance downriver from Canton. Regardless of its constant defeats, China would still not allow foreign nationals to trespass on the mainland of China. Each was restricted only to communication through its commercial trading posts. Most of the foreign trading posts were located on Whampoa Island. In June 1844, a landing party of U.S. Marines and sailors from the St. Louis encountered a Chinese mob bent upon attacking the Americans at their trading post. Using their muskets and cutlasses to good effect, the landing party soon broke up the attack. For a period of time thereafter the Marine detachment remained as an armed guard. It evidently performed this duty well, because Mr. Cushing, and other American officials, commended them to the U.S. Navy Department. Several months later a SinoFrench accord, based almost entirely upon the Sino-American treaty, was signed. But one new and significant article allowed the French to build Roman Catholic churches in the treaty ports. The French consequently presumed that the article also gave them permission to protect Catholic missions anywhere in China. The French interpretation made a very significant point, one that would greatly affect China’s future relationships with the various European nations, both Catholic and Protestant. In 1845, the treaty also extended toleration to Protestantism, its churches and missionaries, thereby opening the door wider, with new and greater problems. The Chinese were playing a dangerous game. They seemed to believe that the various treaties would turn the foreign barbarians against each other. It didn’t quite work that way. China was still the “patsy” and would continue to suffer intervention by foreigners for a hundred more years— until 1949, when the last of the American forces in northern China, mostly Marines, were finally withdrawn. Ships from the East India Squadron in and around Chinese waters joined with Commodore Matthew C. Perry’s ships to make up part of the U.S.

4

TREADING SOFTLY

diplomatic and commercial party that landed in Japan in 1854. That was another eastern nation that excluded contact with foreigners. This intrusion was inevitable, but during the next hundred years it would be the immediate cause for turmoil all over the Far East. Pandora’s box would never again be closed. There were Marine detachments on board each of Perry’s ships, and when he landed, Marines from all ten ships were with his party. After Perry’s success in opening the doors of Japan to the outside world, U.S. naval ships once again took up their stations off the coast of China with the East India Squadron. Perry had left the sloop Plymouth, under Cdr. John Kelly, USN, behind at Shanghai while the Japanese negotiations were in progress. That was done so that Perry would have a base for further operations should that become necessary. It also maintained the American naval presence, which was by now essential. Otherwise, the Chinese might consider the U.S. power a “paper tiger,” making a reentry into the “doors” extremely difficult. The reign of Hsien Feng (1851–1861) clearly revealed the approaching dissolution of the dynasty. During the period 1846–1849 there had been much unrest in and around the city of Canton, mainly because of foreign encroachments in that area. In the early 1850s various Chinese factions, including government troops, had been warring against each other as well as against foreigners, who protected themselves as best they could. Agrarian unrest due to official exactions, natural calamities, and absentee landlords, mainly in Kiangsi Province, found expression in the T’ai P’ing Rebellion (hereafter Taiping). The Taiping revolution was the most significant eruption against the established government during the century. Hung Hsiu-ch’u¨an (1814–1864), originator of the Taiping ideology, was also the most important leader of the sect. A son of humble peasants and a teacher in the village school, he had had visionary hallucinations, which have been recognized in recent years as the probable result of medical problems. In 1843, influenced by Christian missionary tracts, he transmuted his visions into a creed. It was a creed in which elements of Christianity and concepts derived from Chinese classical tradition were inextricably intermingled. His altered vision of the Trinity conceived of him as the younger brother of Jesus Christ. He founded “The God Worshipers Society,” which gained many converts during the following years. By 1849 the leadership began formulating its revolt against the Ch’ing. The aim was to establish a new government and society. In July 1850, the leadership had perhaps 20,000 followers, but at most only 5,000 were potential soldiers. The Taiping leaders openly proclaimed the establishment of their new state, the T’aiping T’ienkuo, the “Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace.” What followed was basically the establishment of an egalitarian communistic society, with all members sharing in a pool of captured supplies and other forms of wealth. As always, fanatic religious fervor became a formidable

THE BEGINNINGS

5

weapon. The entire rebellion will not be covered here; it suffices to state that its early successes caused many problems for the foreigners in China. Consequently, the U.S. Marines were kept very busy. When the Taipings showed promise of possibly sweeping aside the Ch’ing, efforts were made by the British and other foreigners to establish ties with what might be the new government of all China. The Taiping leaders were naive; because of their religious fervor, they regarded Protestant British and Americans as “brothers in Christ.” That expectation led them to expect aid, sympathy, and support, which of course they never received. To the foreigners, the capture of Shanghai in 1853 by the rebels was a very important event. This ultimately led to the installation of a foreign inspector of customs in the city. Hereafter, Chinese customs would be controlled by a conglomerate of non-Chinese in the International Settlement. This would continue until the foreigners officially left Shanghai in 1941, nearly 100 years later. To demonstrate how important that was, by 1852 over one-half of Chinese exports passed directly through Shanghai. Later years would see that volume increased to include nearly all Chinese exports and imports. With this control, the British managed to provide a steady increase of opium into China through Shanghai. It was enough to pay for the silk and tea imported from China. The consequent destruction of a large number of Chinese peasants seemed not to be significant, if it mattered at all. On the evening of 4 April 1854, the Plymouth received a signal from shore: “Want Assistance.” In response Lt. John Guest, USN, was ordered to organize a landing party of sixty men to protect the Americans ashore. This was to include the ship’s entire Marine guard and enough sailors to make up the difference. That night the shore party defended the American mission, but the imperial Chinese forces continued to encroach upon all foreigners on shore. Something had to be done in order to protect the threatened American civilians. Therefore, the following morning Kelly sent another small body of sailors to join those already ashore, and then the entire American group was to join with a British force of marines and sailors totaling perhaps 150 men. Together the defense force numbered less than 250 officers and men, but it soon received additional support of some 150 American and British merchant sailors from the various ships in port. This influx soon brought the shore party to about four hundred. By means of a vigorous allied attack, both front and flank, Chinese troops were soon thrown into a disorderly retreat that quickly cleared them from the foreign settlement. Thirty-five members of the U.S. Marine detachment remained ashore to provide a consulate guard, and 11 more protected the mission until 15 June 1854. One American sailor had been killed, and two Marines and another sailor had been wounded during the fracas. On 19 March 1855, Marines were again landed to protect U.S. citizens

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from rampant piracy. First Lt. James H. Jones with 41 men from the Powhatan went ashore and remained there for two days.3 Although available records are scant, it appears that nothing ominous occurred during that period. But a few months later, Jones and his Marines would be engaged in some real activity. In August he and 26 Marines along with seven naval officers and 66 sailors went ashore at Hong Kong to join with other forces in attacking a large group of pirates gathered nearby. The Powhatan’s skipper, Capt. William J. McCluney, USN, included four days’ provisions and an appropriate amount of whiskey to complete their stores. The Americans joined a shipload of British marines and sailors, and both groups proceeded to Ty-Ho Bay. There a battle ensued in which the combined Occidental force was again victorious; the allies captured 17 pirate junks and many of their crews. Two U.S. Marines and nine sailors were casualties; three of the latter were killed in action and the others were seriously wounded. But the two Marines, Privates Adamson and Mullard, later died aboard the British hospital ship and were buried at Hong Kong. Within 48 hours of their departure the American forces were back aboard the Powhatan, minus stores and whiskey. THE BARRIER FORTS The next altercation in which American Marines were engaged began on 22 October 1856, and it turned out to be a most serious fracas. The American consul at Canton sent Cdr. Andrew H. Foote, commanding the sloop Portsmouth, a message that American interests were in great danger; “Please help.”4 The next morning, at a little after 0600, Foote took five officers and 78 enlisted men ashore to Canton. Second Lt. William W. Kirkland commanded the 18 Marines sent ashore, most of the ship’s Marine detachment.5 Foote also took along a field howitzer, which gave his small force a loud and imposing source of firepower. But it soon became evident that the small force was not sufficient to provide the protection required for the American community at Canton. Therefore, on 27 October Cdr. William Smith, USN, of the sloop Levant ordered his detachment of Marines and a complement of sailors to assist Foote at Canton.6 Second Lt. Henry B. Tyler went ashore with his Marine detachment and a group of sailors and proceeded up the Pearl River to Canton, where they joined the landing force from Portsmouth.7 The American Marines were soon established as sentinels on rooftops and behind newly created barricades. From that vantage point they fired their muskets at any Chinese moving target. That was what Marines were hired to do and were usually quite successful in doing. Again, on 3 November, the Marine sentinels engaged in another spirited exchange of musketry with Chinese soldiers, but this time there were no reported casualties on either side.

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The steam frigate San Jacinto arrived off Whampoa Island on the morning of 12 November with Commodore James Armstrong aboard. As senior officer present, he assumed local command.8 On 14 November he ordered Brevet Capt. John D. Simms to take 28 Marines ashore to join Foote and assist in the defense of the “factory.”9 After arriving at what appeared to be a satisfactory agreement with the Chinese authorities, the following day most of the force was ordered back to the Levant, leaving a few Marines at the American compound. Foote, the senior American officer ashore, had developed a plan with the Chinese commissioner Yeh, based on a promise to provide protection for American citizens in and about Canton. The Levant would remain anchored off Canton as a possible refuge for the consul or other Americans. However, as Foote was rowed back to Canton to carry out the plan, his boat was fired upon from the first barrier fort.10 It became necessary for him to return to Whampoa Island to fix matters once and for all. In those times it was believed that American honor required a military confrontation to adjust such matters. Armstrong was furious, as was the always irascible Foote. The commodore ordered both the Levant and Portsmouth, to which he transferred his flag, to proceed up the river to attack the four Chinese forts. Before her guns could be brought into action, Levant went aground. That left Portsmouth, which went forward alone. The four forts were equipped with a total of 176 modern European guns, which ranged in caliber from eight to 10 inches (some records say 11-inch, a German caliber), and were mounted behind granite walls eight feet thick. In addition, at least 5,000 Chinese regular troops manned the “strongest defenses of the Empire.”11 The American sailors might have been very angry, but no fighting seaman worth the name should ever go up against a granite fortress with a wooden ship. But they did, and somehow it all came out right in the end. The fire from the forts was accurate, and it wasn’t long before Portsmouth was hit several times, losing some of her rigging and suffering a badly wounded Marine. Herculean efforts were made, and Levant was finally moved off the sandbar. Shortly after midnight, as soon as it became light enough, she was in position to help her sister Portsmouth take on the forts. Instead, a three-day lull followed while the navy repaired the minor damage to Portsmouth. In the meantime Armstrong became ill and turned command over to Foote, admonishing him not to fire unless the Chinese attacked. On 19 November Armstrong ordered Foote to take any action necessary to forestall a Chinese attack. Foote made the decision to seize and level the forts. The defenders had 5,000–6,000 men behind the walls of the four forts, while Foote could gather together 500 Marines and sailors, more or less. In making his decision he must have considered the odds just about right (see Map 1.1). Early the next morning both ships were in position and at first light they began their bombardment on Fiddler’s Fort, the fort (number 2 in map) on

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Map 1.1. Battle of the Barrier Forts

the south bank of the Pearl River. Along with his Marines, Captain Simms and six naval officers and sailors were landed and were ordered to proceed upriver to attack the first Chinese fort (no. 1) on the north bank. The nearly 300-man landing force reached a village to the right-rear of the fort, from which they brushed aside Chinese resistance and with accurate, destructive musketry soon drove off the defenders, killing upwards of 50 as they fled. The Marines occupied the fort and raised the American flag over it. The next nearest fort upriver (no. 3) opened fire, but the Marines used the captured guns to reply. Soon after, Chinese troops that had reoccupied the village began putting pressure on the Americans in the fort. A Marine detachment from Fort No. 1 was obligated to retake the village and drive them away, whereupon the Chinese troops fell back into rice fields, making further pursuit difficult. Simms brought his men to a halt and then retired toward the fort. The Chinese, seeing the retrograde movement and assuming that the Marines were retreating, followed them with approximately 2,000 soldiers. The Marines turned on the advancing force and delivered another blast of fire so deadly that the Chinese again broke and ran. Simms and his little force then returned to the captured fort to reassume their interrupted duties, which was spiking the captured guns. Some were instead thrown down the

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rise into the Pearl River. The river was quite deep at that point, and the guns were not retrievable. By this time the Chinese leaders in the city of Canton had gotten their act together and sent a force of about 5,000 additional Chinese troops the four miles to the captured fort. This large host made three assaults upon the defending Americans, but each time deadly accurate musket and howitzer fire drove them back. The final attack soon turned into a bloody rout. For the balance of that day and through the following night a portion of Simms’s Marines held Fort No. 1, while the balance of the landing party returned to the ships from whence they came. The next morning at 0300 Fort No. 3 (Center Fort) began firing upon Portsmouth. For some reason, it would be three hours before the two American ships returned the fire. That morning Simms and his landing party were embarked in landing boats. As several forts were firing upon the ships, they also began working over the small boats occupied by the Navy/Marine landing force. One of the boats was raked by a medium-sized shot, killing or wounding most of the bluejacket occupants. Shortly afterward, the balance of the landing party commenced its assault upon Fort No. 2, also known as Fiddler’s Fort, which lay on the south side of the river. Though the landing party was forced to cross waist-deep ditches filled with what could be euphemistically called “dirty” water, they soon successfully stormed the fort. The only Marine casualty was Private Thompson, who was seriously wounded but managed to survive. Cpl. William McDougal planted the Stars and Stripes on the fortress walls in the face of fire from thousands of Chinese soldiers. Simms and his party soon captured the fort and promptly turned the guns upon Fort No. 4, which lay on the tip of Napier Island, just to the west of their current position. As soon as Fiddler’s Fort had been taken, Center Fort had turned its destructive fire upon Simms’s group. It was able because of its location to work over the landing force at Fort No. 1 on the northern bank as well. The Marines were now engaged in spiking the captured guns in Fiddler’s Fort. They also burned the carriages and dumped the gun barrels into the river to forestall permanently any attempts by the previous occupants to reintroduce them in another engagement. In small boats, Simms’s group now advanced across the river toward Center Fort. Quickly landing, the sailors and Marines advanced up the slight incline, and in so doing Simms came upon a breastwork with seven guns. His Marines soon captured this and then promptly turned those guns upon Center Fort. The enemy presently counterattacked, but the Marines easily repulsed them, retaining ownership of the redoubt. Preparing to advance, Simms left 2d Lieutenant Kirkland behind with a small detachment. His instructions were to destroy the remaining guns and to hold the breastwork against any attack as long as possible before withdrawing. Simms took the balance of his Marines and joined a navy landing team that was then forming up.

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Again it was Corporal McDougal who planted the American flag on this Chinese stronghold. Under cover of the ship’s guns the landing force, composed of sailors and Marines, had landed on Napier Island and with modest difficulty captured the well-constructed Center Fort. The victors took and rapidly spiked 38 additional guns and, as elsewhere, dumped the guns into the river. From that position the navy ships began an artillery duel with the remaining fort (no. 3), which was on the north bank and in front of the city of Canton. Most guns were utilized—ship’s guns, howitzers of the landing party, and the guns still remaining at Fiddler’s Fort. Firing didn’t cease until darkness entirely blanketed the place of battle, preventing observation and accuracy. The following morning the storming of the final barrier fort took place. The landing party, covered by the guns of the two ships and Fiddler’s Fort, made its way forward. But it was unable to land close to the fort and the men were forced to wade quite a distance under the most adverse conditions. Once again they were successful, capturing that 28-gun fort. Once again the Chinese army counterattacked, but as before, they were easily routed, this time with exceptionally heavy losses. Also as before, the guns were destroyed and carriages burned, then both dropped into the river. The forts were entirely denuded of weapons and now had to be flattened. Marines and sailors dug beneath the walls while troops inserted powder in holes drilled in the granite itself. Unfortunately, a spark from one of the crowbars connected with some powder and set off a major explosion, killing three men and wounding nine others, all sailors. Still, the granite walls came tumbling down. Effectively, nothing now stood between the Americans and Canton, that most important Chinese port. That was the end of the attack upon the barrier forts, but during the very brief encounter the U.S. naval force had managed to capture four extremely powerful forts, kill an estimated 500 Chinese troops, and rout their army, all at a cost of seven men killed in action, three of whom died because of the explosion at the fort, and 32 wounded. No Marines were killed in the fighting, but a Pvt. William Cuddy later became ill and died, and six Marines were wounded. They were Cpl. William Boyce and Pvts. Patrick Mahon and Joseph McNeil from the Levant, and Cpl. James Linus and Pvts. Patrick Melvin and John G. Thompson of the Portsmouth. Two years later Cdr. Foote, now executive officer of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, began the project of creating in his own backyard a monument to the sailors and Marines killed defeating the Empire of China. It was dedicated late in 1858 with a list of twelve names. One name chiseled into the marble belonged to a Marine named “John McBride, Corporal of Marines.”12 There was no John McBride on the muster rolls of any of the ships, nor for that matter neither was there a sailor named Thomas McCann. Faulty research and an apparent ardent desire on the part of Foote to complete the project sooner rather than later was the probable

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reason behind the errors. If there were actually two men with those names, it must not have brought them much pleasure, assuming they ever knew of it. The continuing friction between the British and the Ch’ing authorities in the area of Canton served as the background for the outbreak of the Second Opium War (October 1856–October 1860). An incident with a supposedly British ship, the Arrow, provided the British the excuse they wanted to begin another military adventure on the mainland—one that would help to convince the Chinese government that a modified treaty with Britain was to everyone’s benefit or at least to Britain’s benefit. The ship, with a Chinese crew that the British claimed was guilty of piracy, was blown out of the water by British warships in accordance with Lord Palmerston’s theory that “such half barbarian countries as Chin . . . needed a dressing down every ten years or so.” A few other events also increased tensions in the Canton area. Additional Chinese military naval forces arrived on the scene. So did numerous British and French reinforcements, a French missionary was murdered and both again began hostilities on 29 December 1857. Canton was bombarded; it surrendered and was occupied by both powers for nearly four years. All of that was made possible by the American destruction of those barrier forts. The Anglo-French fleet was then sent to Taku with four envoys of the two powers. There the representatives of the United States and Russia joined them. The allies occupied Taku on 20 May 1858, and that brought about the desired results. Taku was the port for Tientsin and Peking, so the Ch’ing court finally agreed to reopen negotiations in June. A treaty concluded on 26 June was imposed “with a pistol at the throat,” according to the British commissioner Lord Elgin. China finally gave in and allowed foreign envoys to reside in Peking. This must have appeared to be an impressive victory to the foreigners at that time. Up until then, the foreigners had been restricted almost solely to the coast of China. The entry of foreign envoys into Peking, the city of Tientsin, and its port, Taku, would mean added importance for foreigners based in China. It would now be necessary for the foreigners to maintain access to both the port of Taku and Tientsin, to be able to respond quickly to beleaguered foreigners based in Peking. Less than fifty years later those ports would be essential when a most serious conflagration developed. Perhaps getting to Peking wasn’t all that impressive, after all. The Anglo-French, with help from the Americans and Russians, had forced the weak Chinese government to allow penetration of all of China. This was especially so since the Yangtze River, the nation’s jugular vein, was now open to foreign shipping. The treaty terms, principally allowing foreigners into Peking, were very difficult for the Manchus to swallow. Efforts were made by the Chinese to have that point of contention discarded; the allies rejected them out of hand. Britain, in a particularly pro-

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vocative manner, insisted that the allies should sign all the accords in Peking. Adding insult to injury, they also insisted that a large military force accompany the envoys for their protection. The Ch’ing government requested reductions in the size of the force, which was also rejected. To support their planned march on Peking, on 26 June an Anglo-French landing party attacked the Taku forts. For once the Europeans were stopped dead in their tracks. The skill of the Chinese gunners was sufficient to prove that the Westerners weren’t supreme in all matters pertaining to war. The battered allied force beat a hasty retreat to Shanghai to await reinforcements. It would not be until the following summer that the allies would finally gather together enough troops to try again. Fourteen months after their defeat the Anglo-French once again attacked the Taku forts, and this time they were successful. The Ch’ing court again decided to negotiate. But the detention of the 39 allied negotiators led to another breakdown of talks. In October, after gathering supplies, the Anglo-French again marched on Peking. After being subjected to Manchu barbarity, only 19 of the original negotiators were still alive. As a result, Lord Elgin ordered that all 200 buildings of the Summer Palace be burnt down. It took the allies more than three days to loot the palace. Tientsin was added to the list of Treaty Ports, and a part of Kowloon (near Hong Kong) was awarded to Britain. In July of 1859, U.S. Marines were once more called upon to provide protection for American citizens, but this time at Shanghai. The continued friction between the Chinese and the British caused a spillover that encompassed all foreigners. Therefore, American consul William L. G. Smith called upon the East India Squadron for assistance. Capt. William C. Nicholson, commanding the U.S. sailing ship Mississippi, provided the necessary landing party. On the morning of 31 July, Nicholson landed a party of 60 Marines, sailors, and a boat howitzer, under the overall command of navy lieutenant Roger N. Stemble. First Lt. Jacob Read led the Marine detachment during the period that the small force remained in Shanghai.13 The party was withdrawn on 2 August 1859, and returned to the ship, having satisfactorily accomplished the mission. When the War between the States began in 1861, the ships, sailors, and Marines of the East India Squadron were recalled to the seas or ports of the United States. This was done in order to supplement the ships and men available in those waters to blockade Southern ports. In 1866, after the termination of hostilities, twelve U.S. Navy ships reestablished the Asiatic Squadron, which then resumed the activities and duties of the former East India Squadron. The eternal unrest and agitation against foreigners in China hadn’t dissipated one little bit. Accordingly, and almost immediately, the American fleet and their landing forces were called upon to settle varied situations that affected or afflicted citizens of the United States. Mr. Francis P. Knight, the American consul in Newchwang, was as-

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saulted by a Chinese mob, whereupon the commander of the newly rejuvenated squadron, Rear Adm. Henry H. Bell, sent the Wachusett, Cdr. Robert Townsend, Master, to protect the consul and his consulate.14 Soon after their arrival on 20 June 1866, Townsend dispatched a landing team of 50 Marines and sailors ashore to assess the situation. The local villain was Sword Rack Hoo, the leader of the Chinese Triad gang, who had led the assailants. Hoo was well known to the local authorities, but they were unwilling to arrest him. Therefore, a force of approximately 100 Marines and sailors was sent ashore on 25 June to round him up, with his cronies. Townsend saw to it that the offenders were captured, tried, and punished, while the Americans provided the prison guards (and the laws?). Shortly after the trial, on 7 July, Townsend transferred the American consul to Chefoo, for additional protection. Contrary to what might seem obvious, Commodore Townsend and his sailors and Marines weren’t always looking for trouble with the Chinese. Later they went to Shanghai and soon after arrival helped extinguish a serious fire that had broken out in the city, saving lives and property, Chinese as well as foreigners’. Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt, in command of the Ticonderoga, arrived at Taku in 1878.15 At the request of Li Hung-chang, China’s prime minister to the U.S. government, he was there to help China develop coastal defenses. China, of course was at that time, and certainly for a long period afterward, the continued victim of predatory powers, European and Japanese.16 The Ticonderoga had recently been in Korean waters, Korea being then a vassal state of the Chinese emperor. Inadvertently it had provoked an accident that might have caused an international incident, but did not. First Lt. Daniel P. Mannix, Jr., USMC, a Marine officer aboard the Ticonderoga and a torpedo expert, had launched a practice torpedo while the ship was anchored in the Wu-long River, in northern China. The torpedo, with a faulty steering mechanism, had run up onto the beach and had come to rest near a small village. Naturally this modern device intrigued the locals, who set about trying to determine its value. While the ship was preparing to launch a small boat to retrieve the wandering device—which, by the way, was loaded and primed—the villagers had the local executioner bring his huge, two-handed sword to test the torpedo. Somehow, though he was completely ignorant of the device, the executioner correctly determined that the percussion cap was the most vulnerable part of the object. He whirled the sword over his head and brought it down on the cap. “The village simply disappeared.”17 Li Hung-chang heard of the disaster, but he thought only of the wonderful destructive power of torpedoes. He also considered the desirability to China of having some to deter or wipe out the aggressive ships of the predatory nations that were continually picking on China. Evidently the loss of several hundred Koreans wasn’t of importance to him, and that seemed not to affect or interfere with the relationships between China and the United States.

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Mannix was “loaned” to the Chinese government to help develop their coastal defenses and to help train the nascent Chinese navy in the use of torpedoes. He was still in China in 1881 and planning a longer stay; he sent for his family to join him. His son’s memoir gives some details of life in China for an Occidental family during those times, but few relative to what his father did, except that he trained the Chinese in the use of torpedoes. Mannix elected to leave China in 1885, when it became apparent that China and Japan were about to go to war again with each other. Mannix senior believed, correctly, that war with Japan would be a decided disaster for the Chinese—it was, though it didn’t take place for almost another ten years. Mannix later served aboard the USS Brooklyn, also in Chinese waters. He was finally a captain, having served as a lieutenant since the War between the States, twenty-five years before. Promotions were a bit slow in those days. EARLY SINO-JAPANESE WARS Trouble between China and Japan began with the struggle for domination of Korea. For over two centuries Korea had been a vassal state of the Ch’ing empire, but trouble in the “hermit” kingdom, especially antiforeign riots (mainly anti-Japanese) riots, caused an armed incursion in 1882 by both states. China and Japan stationed troops in Seoul, the capital. On the advice of the Ch’ing, Korea established diplomatic relations with nearly every major power with which it was in contact, notably Japan. Two major political factions arose within Korea during this period. The pro-Ch’ing element was a conservative group; the other, more reformist, was proJapanese. In two years, aided and abetted by the Japanese, the reformist faction staged a coup. That almost brought about a war between Japan and China, but the Japanese deemed that they were not yet prepared for a full-scale war, even with China. Instead, negotiations resulted in a treaty, signed on 18 April 1885. In it both nations agreed to withdraw their troops from Korea, making it a coprotectorate of China and Japan. Ch’ing suzerainty over Korea had been effectively dismantled. Korea then lay before Japan as a potential colonial prize, which it would become nine years later. The major Ch’ing representative, Yu¨an Shih-k’ai, aggravated the Koreans in an already tense situation. This led to a rising in March 1894 by the Tonghak, a syncretic religious group. The movement had strong antiforeign and antifeudal overtones and bore a remarkable resemblance to the Taipings of midcentury China. Unable to deal with the rising, the Seoul government requested aid from the Ch’ing, which immediately sent 1,500 soldiers. The Japanese promptly seized the opportunity and sent 7,000 troops to Seoul. The rising was soon over, but although the presence of so many foreign troops in Seoul was by now superfluous, Japan refused to withdraw. Japanese troops poured into Korea, and Tokyo promptly set

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about the realization of long-standing plans. China, hoping to avoid war with Japan, turned to Great Britain and Russia for their good offices in preventing further Japanese aggression. But it wasn’t long before the bushido tradition took command. Japanese forces launched an attack without warning, sinking a British ship carrying Chinese troops to Korea. As will be seen several times in the following century, Japanese army or naval officers often took upon themselves delicate “diplomatic negotiations.” China and Japan declared war upon each other on 1 August 1894. The Sino-Japanese War quickly turned into a series of humiliating defeats for China. First, its army was routed in Korea; then it suffered a great naval defeat on the Yalu in September; and Japan took Port Arthur in November. The Treaty of Shimonoseki in April 1895 forced China to cede Taiwan, the Pescadores, and the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan and to open further treaty ports. (The major European powers soon pressured Japan to accept other indemnity instead of Liaotung.) The war made clear the extreme weakness of China. It also led to a further surge of foreign imperialism and to Chinese demands for internal reform. The level of Chinese vehemence and insults against foreigners increased dramatically during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. Col. Charles Denby, American minister to China, requested Rear Adm. Charles C. Carpenter to provide the Peking legation with a Marine guard. Marines under Capt. George F. Elliott, from the USS Baltimore had been guarding the legation at Seoul.18 Denby’s request for support kept the Marines from returning to the Baltimore. Laboriously, they made their way from Seoul to Tientsin. But upon his arrival, Elliott found that the emperor had issued a proclamation forbidding foreign soldiers access to inland China. Transportation from Tientsin by train was impossible; 25,000 Chinese imperial troops barred the way. Those odds were difficult even for Marines. Consequently, in order to obey his orders, Elliott proceeded to Peking on horseback and alone. The 80-mile trip took him two days. While in Peking, Elliott and Thomas J. Cowie, a naval paymaster, were assigned as military attache´s to Denby while the minister was in audience with the emperor of China. Peace was soon declared, and anti-Occidental anger became less of a problem. There was no further need for Elliott’s Marines at Peking. Therefore, by 10 May 1895 they were on their way back to the USS Baltimore; their ship, which they had left six months before, was now at Nagasaki, Japan. After the 1894–1895 Sino-Japanese War, the emperor of China sensed a major reform movement in his country and tried to bring about necessary social changes. But his aunt, the dowager empress, who had acted as regent during his minority, stymied his every move. She ultimately had him seized and made a virtual prisoner, and her control became absolute. All the changes he had managed to inaugurate were modified or expunged. Meanwhile, the antiforeign undercurrent continued to create a feeling of

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near helplessness for the foreign ministers in Peking. Mr. Edwin H. Conger was now the American minister to Peking. When the coup de main removed the emperor from the throne, Conger decided that it was time for a Marine guard for his legation and another for James W. Ragsdale, the U.S. consul at Tientsin. Adm. George Dewey, then commanding the Asiatic Station, agreed. He issued instructions that a garrison force be made up of Marines from the cruisers Baltimore, Boston, and Raleigh, all in Chinese waters. Capt. Frank Wildes of the Boston, being senior, was placed in overall command. He instructed 1st Lt. Robert McM. Dutton to gather Marines from the three warships located at Taku, proceed to Peking, and establish a temporary legation guard.19 Dutton and 18 Marines left for Peking on 4 November, arriving later that day. Eight days later, naval lieutenant John Gibson was directed to take thirty Marines from the same ships and proceed to Tientsin, where he was to form and then command the consulate guard. The two guard units were well equipped with ammunition, plus one Gatling gun each. Early in the following year, they were both still there, since the situation was still unsettled. But by 15 March 1899 conditions in Peking had improved enough that both guards could be safely withdrawn. The combined Marine detachment was then transported to Shanghai, where its members reported aboard the Monocacy and Zafiro for further transfer to their respective ships. This brings to an end the earliest period of the U.S. Marines’ relationship with China. The most serious affair was that of November 1856, when sailors and Marines had attacked and took four powerful forts designed to protect Canton from the “barbarians.” During the nineteenth century, China was always the victim, sustaining many humiliations and losses of territory. The Chinese inherent disdain for anything foreign, or barbarian as they preferred, was the main cause of their constant defeats; they failed to learn the basics of modern warfare. Japan was just the opposite; it soon learned how to make the best use of foreign weapons and inventions. In fact, China would not really accept Western ideas or developments until shortly after the turn of the new century, when it was soundly defeated once again. It was not until the revolution in 1911 that the Chinese began looking elsewhere for training and weapons. Russia, which had led in the “attack” against Japan’s seizure of the Liaotung Peninsula in 1895, grabbed it for herself in May 1898—another treaty and another defeat for China’s territorial integrity. So many nations jumped on the bandwagon that on 6 September 1899 the United States sent a sharp protest to the ambassadors of England, France, Germany, and Russia. Our nation’s position then and later was that no nation should impede trade with China; In other words we wanted the “Open Door Policy” maintained. Until 1899, U.S. Marines assigned to various duties ashore in China were

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mainly from various ships’ detachments. The landing forces were always temporary. Their members always returned to shipboard duties immediately after a crisis. No long-term habitation seemed desirable, and none was deemed necessary. Americans wanted no part of picking China apart nor of occupying land that wasn’t theirs. The next period of Chinese history would change all of that; the United States would take some ground and remain there for over forty years. NOTES 1. Edwin N. McClellan, History of the United States Marine Corps, 1816 to 1820, Materials and Sources of Chapter II, Volume Two (Part One), vol. 1 (N.p., n.d.), pp. 62–63. 2. Clyde H. Metcalf, A History of the United States Marine Corps (NY: G. P. Putnam, 1939), pp. 91–92. 3. Jones, who joined the Marine Corps in 1847, served aboard naval ships in the Pacific Ocean for some years. He also participated in the Battle of Bull Run in 1861. After the war he remained mostly at stateside navy yards, eventually dying in 1879 a full colonel. 4. Foote went on to become a rear admiral and in 1863 Chief of Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting. 5. Metcalf identifies him on page 173 as “Kirkman” but later, on page 175, as Kirklan. There was a W. D. Kirkland who joined the Corps in 1855 but resigned in 1860. Harry A. Ellsworth identifies him as “William W. Kirkland” in his One Hundred Eighty Landings of the U.S. Marine Corps, 1890–1934 (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1974), p. 24, as does Edwin N. McClellan, “The Capture of the Barrier Forts in the Canton River, China,” Marine Corps Gazette (September 1920): 265. 6. He was later promoted to commodore and in 1863 was in command of the naval station at Pensacola, Florida. 7. He entered the Corps on 2 January 1855. Tyler was dismissed from the Corps as of 21 June 1861 after being tried and found guilty of making “seditious” statements while in the uniform of a U.S. Marine. His father, Maj. Henry B. Tyler, Sr., resigned his commission on 2 May 1861 after serving as a Marine for 34 years. Both went south and entered the Confederate Marine Corps. 8. Armstrong was a captain on the retired list in 1861 and, interestingly, was listed as “Under Suspension,” not recommended for promotion. 9. Even though he received a brevet for actions during the Mexican War, Simms was dismissed from the Corps on 8 July 1861. He entered the Confederate Marine Corps. 10. There were four well designed and constructed forts deployed to protect the city of Canton from a water-borne advance. They had been built with advice from foreign engineers and were designed to withstand almost any volume of heavy gunfire. The ship’s small-caliber guns, which were badly outranged, could do little against the mass of granite. Consequently, all serious efforts against the forts had to be made by landing parties. 11. Annual Report, Secretary of the Navy, as quoted in McClellan, p. 264. See

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also Bernard C. Nalty, The Barrier Forts: A Battle, a Monument, and a Mythical Marine Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1962), p. 5. 12. The others were all sailors; E. C. Mullen, Louis Hetzel, Thomas Krouse, James Hoagland, William Mackin, Alfred Turner, Edward Riley, Joseph Gibbings, Edward Hughes, Charles Ream, and Thomas McCann. 13. Read was another Southerner who went south in 1861. His career in the Confederate Marine Corps ended in a complete disaster for him and the Confederacy. He was dismissed from that corps effective 1 February 1863 and died the following year. 14. Although he entered the navy from North Carolina, Bell remained with “the old flag” during the war. 15. Shufeldt, an experienced mercantile seaman as well as long-service naval officer, had seen service during the War between the States as part of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 16. Japan had only recently come out of its centuries-long repose as a result of mainly the U.S. encroachment in 1854. In 1878 she was as hungry for Chinese territory as were the regular jackals—Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Russia, or the relative newcomers Germany and Italy. Its new navy was mainly the product of British shipyards, and her army was equipped with the most modern German weapons. China was also buying equipment and ships but didn’t purchase enough of the best. Additionally, it disdained European training in the use of the modern weapons it had purchased. The results would be continued defeat. 17. Daniel P. Mannix III, The Old Navy (New York: Macmillan, 1983), p. 4. 18. Elliott rose from captain to brigadier general commandant in five years. Dismissed from West Point, he obtained a commission in the U.S. Marine Corps. He was 51 years old when he commanded a Marine company at Cuzco Wells in Cuba during the Spanish-American War. Upon Heywood’s retirement he became commandant in 1903. 19. Dutton joined the Corps in 1891 and retired a major on 17 July 1906.

2 The Boxer Rebellion

Where and how the “Boxer” revolutionary movement originated still isn’t known.1 Neither is it known when (or if) the dowager empress, who was still de facto ruler of China, managed to shift the Boxers’ anger from her government toward the despised foreigners, or if she was carried along on the tide of that hatred.2 All that is of no serious concern here. What does matter is how the rebellion affected U.S. citizens and the U.S. military forces sent to help control and defeat it. The U.S. Marines were the military force de jour, and they would be on the scene almost from the very first moment that serious difficulties began.3 In those times there was always a band of Marines aboard a nearby warship, ready for action. Serious trouble began in the latter part of 1899, when the Boxers destroyed several Chinese Christian villages and massacred the converts. They also hacked up two English missionaries the following May. In January the American minister to the court of the emperor (in reality, the empress), Mr. Edwin Conger, wrote to Washington advising that there seemed to be a change in Peking’s policy toward foreigners. But to him it appeared relatively unimportant. Conger was dead wrong. At this point the Boxers initiated a series of provocations against all foreigners; the foreign representatives in Peking began calling for help. Individually and collectively they made representation after representation to the Chinese government to put a stop to the Boxer movement. Their answer was usually gracious banality but little actual satisfaction. By mid-May many of the highest-ranking Chinese at court were openly supportive of the Boxers, which made the Europeans in Peking very nervous. Actually it was Conger

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who finally first recognized the probable danger. In March 1900 he notified the State Department of what appeared to be a serious developing conflagration, but it wasn’t until 18 May that he made the first open request for military assistance. This was nearly two weeks before the other foreign representatives seem to have realized the danger looming in northern China. According to Dr. Robert Coltman, Jr., an American physician in Peking, and contrary to other reports, the only foreign minister aware of the seriousness of the situation seemed to be the French minister, M. Pichon.4 Coltman ridicules the lack of perception of British minister, Sir Claude MacDonald, “for whom the entire English community outside his legation feel, and have openly expressed, the greatest contempt.” Coltman continues that “MacDonald would not believe that there was any danger coming, and vigorously opposed Pichon’s advice that the troops be sent for ten days ago.”5 According to Coltman, Conger agreed with MacDonald for personal reasons, and he and MacDonald finally came around to Pichon’s position— but not until the town of Fengtai, only six miles distant, had been burned and the Boxers were marching unopposed on Peking. Finally the other representatives also began making their fears known, and they too called for assistance. What began as a small cry became a large howl for help. Every week European and American refugees from the hinterlands came to Peking, in ever greater numbers. Herbert Hoover, a mining engineer with a British firm, and his wife Lou passed through Peking on their way to the relative safety of the foreign settlement at Tientsin.6 Hoover’s actions during the forthcoming siege would be long remembered by other Americans who were present, and not always favorably. In the meantime, riots against foreign churches and trading posts were the order of the day. Still, according to Mary Hooker, the residents of Peking were acting in a civilized manner, as much as they were able to. She tells of being taken to dinner at Sir R. Hart’s by the secretary of the German legation, Otto von Below, “a most soldierly-looking person.” She recalls that Hart had two Chinese orchestras and that she danced until twelve.7 But she had also asked several times on previous occasions, “Where are the marines?” By the 28th of May, telegrams requesting aid were being sent by each of the now-desperate legations. They also sent messages to their naval commanders at Taku, Tientsin’s anchorage. Each strongly urged that they send marines and naval infantry to bolster the foreign settlement at Peking. The international representatives at Peking collectively requested permission of the Chinese court to bring more of their own troops into their section of the city. Unfortunately for the legations, the Chinese foreign office, known officially as Tsungli Yamen (or Yomen), did not and would not approve the entry of foreign troops into the city. Even when the foreigners demanded an answer, the Chinese bureaucrats continued to stall. Finally the collective group gave an ultimatum to the Chinese government; the follow-

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ing morning it received a qualified yes. The qualification was a limitation of thirty soldiers for each legation, which was conveniently ignored by everyone. MARINES TO THE RESCUE Acting under orders from Rear Adm. Louis Kempff, USN, commander of the U.S. Naval Force, Asiatic Station, Capt. Bowman H. McCalla, USN, left Nagasaki, Japan, on 29 May 1900 in the USS Newark. After a swift trip, Newark was the first American ship to reach the Taku anchorage. Capt. Newt H. Hall, USMC, was in command of Newark’s detachment of 23 Marines plus 25 from the USS Oregon, who were merged with his detachment in Japan. Hall would also have five sailors to accompany a landing. One of the sailors was a hospitalman apprentice, in today’s parlance a corpsman—a necessary addition to any Marine team. Upon their arrival at Taku, Capt. John T. “Handsome Jack” Myers assumed command of both Marine units plus their navy colleagues. According to reports, Myers had been entertained aboard a nearby British warship, where he was known, and the libations had spread widely and thickly. All this had happened just a few hours before, so Myers was still feeling a little low when he reported to McCalla aboard Newark. So it was that the first Marines in action on Chinese soil would be from ships’ detachments; they would help save the legations at Peking. McCalla decided to make his way with his Marines and 66 naval officers and men to Tientsin, in heavy marching order but without extra baggage. He elected to take the Monocacy, a paddle-wheeler from the Civil War period, across the Taku bar and up the Pei-Ho River to Tang-ku, the railhead for Tientsin.8 There, an attempt was made to hire a train for the trip to Peking, but the local railway authorities refused to transport foreign troops. Never one to be stymied, McCalla contracted with a local tugboat company to transport his force to Tientsin, where they arrived at 2300 that same evening. They were the first foreign contingent to have made it to Tientsin since trouble began; a crowd and a brass band greeted them.9 McCalla and the American consul at Tientsin, Mr. Dugsdale, decided after a parlay to send the detachment forward to Peking the next morning. The following morning, 31 May, contingents from several foreign countries arrived at Tientsin, and under that pressure the railway officials gave in to the demands to take the entire force forward to Peking. In addition to Myers and Hall and the 48 enlisted Marines, McCalla included in the American group naval surgeon Thomas McC. Lippitt, his hospitalman apprentice, and a Colt machine gun manned by the four sailors. At Tientsin the other legation defense forces which had arrived included 75 British marines, 75 French sailors, 72 Russian sailors, 39 Italian sailors, and 24 men from the Japanese Special Naval Landing Force. Unfortunately,

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a wrench was thrown into the works when the Chinese railroad men, regardless of what the railway officials had agreed too, refused to run the train. That problem was quickly worked out; it was learned that a Marine, Pvt. William C. Horton, had been a railroad hand. He, with two other Marines shoveling coal, fired the boiler and got the train to Peking, making the 83-mile trip in three hours with no difficulties.10 When the train arrived at Manchiapu, a station about four miles from the main gate in Peking, Myers and the Marines were the first to disembark. The disembarkation was hurried but, according to Myers, preplanned. Consequently the Marines led the procession into the city. Myers later reported that he, the Marines, and the other relief troops made the march to Peking through a mass of Chinese, who “thronged either side of the roadway”; “It seemed more ominous [the quiet] than . . . hostility would have been.”11 Myers had his Marines fix bayonets, and the other foreign troops followed suit. They marched the four miles to the city, through the Chien Men (gate), and into Peking, arriving at the American legation at 2100. That U.S. Marines were leading the column gave the assembled Americans a great deal of pride. The U.S. legation was too small to accommodate the additional Marines and sailors. Myers and his Marines were assigned quarters behind the adjoining Russian Bank.12 Conger is quoted as telling Myers, “Thank God you’ve come. Now we’re safe.” Myers would note in his report that they brought in nearly 10,000 rounds for their rifles and 18,000 for the Colt machine gun, rations for five days, and two large containers of drinking water.13 In addition, the legation already had 7,000 rounds of rifle ammunition available. Although the amount may have seemed large at the time, as it turned out 17,000 rounds would barely be enough (see Map 2.1). One situation that seemed insignificant at the time later loomed very large and troublesome: the Russian sailors had intended to bring a cannon with them but in the confusion at the railroad terminus had left it behind. They did, however, bring the ammunition, and later that would come in very handy. Now that the guards had arrived at Peking, the foreign civilians would be able to obtain a few nights’ rest. Unfortunately, as they would find out, that situation wouldn’t continue for very long. McCalla, always the activist, went to Peking with Myers and his Marines to get a look at what was going on. He remained there until 2 June, when he and two other naval officers who had accompanied him managed to get the last train out of Peking to Tientsin. At this time the Boxer Rebellion divided into two main theaters of activity. The troubles around and about Tientsin would cause more casualties and drudgery than at Peking, yet the siege at Peking would attract more notice and print, then and now. We find in Myers’s official report to his superiors that nothing of im-

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Map 2.1. Defense of the Legations—Peking, 1900

portance happened during the period between 1 June and 5 June. But on 6 June the railroad lines were torn up, and the Chinese interrupted the Tientsin-Peking connection; traffic ceased entirely. Myers wired McCalla that he needed at least 25 more Marines to man and protect the legation properly. In addition to the foreign troops already in residence, 52 German and 37 Austrian Marines joined the group of foreign guards at the Peking legations. Chief Machinist’s Mate Carl T. Peterson, USN, had arrived at Peking the previous day. Alone and unarmed he had made his way from Tientsin.14 On 7 June, Myers took it upon himself to ask British Marine captain Strouts to call together all the officers of the various foreign detachments to plan a common defense. Myers had observed little if any planning for a possible military crisis. The proactive Myers had acted in this way (rather than call the meeting himself) because arrangements had already been made by the foreign ministers to give the British minister, MacDonald, who had been a military officer, operational control over all the legations in case of a siege or attack. Great Britain, with greater length of time and influence in China, held the senior residency post. As a consequence MacDonald was deferred to, and Strouts was chosen as chief of staff. The ultimate decision coming out of the meeting was that at the first sign of hostilities all noncombatants would gather their immediate personal belongings and provisions and retire to the British legation. As Map 2.1 indicates, that legation was farthest from the walls and consequently safest

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from direct fire. All streets leading into the legation quarters were to be barricaded, and no Chinese was to be allowed access unless he had a pass. They also agreed to hold each of the exposed legations as long as possible; only as a last resort would they fall back upon the British legation. There they would make their last stand. It looked that serious to the occidental occupants of Peking. The following day, 8 June, Mr. Conger requested that Myers send a detachment of Marines to guard the local Methodist mission, at which a number of American missionaries had arrived in recent days. Cpl. Martin Hunt and 10 Marines were assigned that duty. By the next day, many more refugees from Tungchow and vicinity had greatly increased the number at the mission. Capt. Newt H. Hall, with 10 more Marines, was sent to provide additional protection. The mission lay about three-quarters of a mile outside the lines. It was a controversial move: the small force of Marines was being divided in the face of an enemy. Should the Boxers overwhelm that small detachment, it would be a great loss to the American legation. (They did not, and consequently the decision was never a matter for inquiry after the relief of the legations.) For the next three days nothing of any consequence happened in Peking, and the time was spent in planning a defense against what would obviously be overwhelming odds. Meanwhile, on 4 June, a troop of Cossacks from Tientsin had made an attempt to save a group of Belgian railroad men who were trying to escape from the interior. The Belgians had suffered immensely and were reduced greatly in numbers by the time they finally reached relative safety at Tientsin. (The barbarous cruelties inflicted upon Europeans and Chinese Christians are too lengthy to expand upon here. But the manner and methods used were indicative of an unusually cruel mind-set and obviously extreme hatred of all things foreign on the part of the majority of the Chinese people.) Meanwhile, a great deal of activity was going on at Tientsin. Additional foreign ships were arriving at Taku anchorage, and landing forces were making their way forward to Tientsin, already coming under siege. THE FIRST PEKING RELIEF COLUMN McCalla, still at Tientsin, had received a few more sailors and Marines in addition to the 50 or so seamen already there. All told, approximately 2,500 officers and men from the various nations had gathered in the city. Vice Admiral Sir Edward Seymour, RN, the senior officer on hand, made plans to reinforce the greatly outnumbered legation guards at Peking. On 9 June the assembled commanders of the eight-nation relief force argued over how to relieve Peking. Finally, McCalla, Seymour’s second in command, not known for a cool or even disposition anyway, made clear his reaction to the long-winded debate. He told the assemblage, “I don’t care what the rest of you do. I have 112 men here, and I’m going tomorrow

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Map 2.2. The Relief Columns

morning to the rescue of my own flesh and blood in Peking. I’ll be damned if I sit here 90 miles away and just wait.” Hyperbole or not, McCalla influenced the conference. The others finally made a decision: the next morning they too would also set out for Peking (see Map 2.2). Seymour left a small detachment behind and set out for Peking with the main body. In their passage westward the small force attempted to repair the torn-up railroad tracks. According to Heinl, “The most essential man in the force soon proved to be a U.S. Navy coal-passer who had once been a (railroad) section hand. He was the only man out of 2,129 who could set out a fishplate and spike down a rail.”15 The Seymour column finally made it to Langfang, 25 miles from Peking, but it took a week to do it. Boxers were harassing the column everywhere. What was even more important, Imperial troops were also engaging the “barbarians,” not just the fanatic Boxers. This meant a military force with modern training and equipment. The outgunned and greatly outnumbered allied force was now very hungry, since most of its supplies were gone. It was facing complete destruction. Therefore, on 18 June 1900 it reluctantly turned back to Tientsin. It took the troops another four days of fighting off swarms of red-scarved and turbanned Boxers to reach, almost, their destination. For a time it seemed they were unable to move in any direction. They were completely surrounded and had over 200 wounded. A group of U.S. Marines, Royal Marines, and German Marines attacked and carried the strongly manned and fortified Imperial arsenal at Hsi-ku, just six miles

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north of Tientsin. While two American Marine sharpshooters picked off the Chinese artillerymen, killing five at one gun and seven at the other, the Royal and Imperial Marines took the arsenal in the rear. That was sufficient to free the Seymour group. The allies occupied the arsenal and were now, albeit unintentionally, protected and provisioned by the Chinese government. The allies found enormous amounts of medical supplies, rifle ammunition, shells, and food in the arsenal. Out of the 112 Americans that started toward Peking on 10 June, McCalla’s losses in dead and wounded were 32. That was twice as many casualties, percentagewise, as any of the other foreign forces had suffered. McCalla himself had received three wounds but still managed to retain command of the Americans. While the Seymour relief column had been attempting to get through to Peking, more allied forces had joined the approximately 600 allied forces left behind at Tientsin. Within a few days a Russian force of nearly 1,800 men arrived, increasing the total force in the city to 2,400 officers and men. Of this total 50 were Americans, probably a mix of bluejackets and Marines. In the meantime, shiploads of additional troops were making their way to the Chinese coast. When the true extent of the impending disaster in China had become known, Maj. Littleton W. T. Waller, with 106 Marines, had been diverted from a trip to Guam. Smedley Darlington Butler was absolutely thrilled to be a member of the advance party, or in fact any part of the force, advanced or not. Then a very young second lieutenant, he would soon make a very large reputation for himself in China. Among his letters, which he wrote to his mother, is the following: USS Solace, at Sea June 17th ’00 My dear Mother Well we are about 200 miles from our destination (Taku) and steaming 15 knots an hour. We left Cavite with 99 men and five officers attached. It is needless to say that I am the happiest man alive and that for the last few days my feet have not touched the ground at all.16

Butler mentioned that Lieutenants George Reid, Robert F. “Pete” Wynne, William G. Powell, and Arthur E. Harding were part of Waller’s party.17 They had all been volunteers for the anticipated trip to Guam. Also included with the group was 1st Lt. Henry Leonard and 2d Lt. Wade L. Jolly.18 Their ship arrived at Taku on 19 June, and soon after the always proactive Waller was on the move. With him in the lead, his detachment soon made contact with a force of 400 Russian soldiers, several of whom were carrying their overweight colonel. The Russian colonel asked Waller to wait for reinforcements, since their way to Tientsin was barred by hordes of Chinese, both Boxers and Imperial troops. Waller left it up to his most junior officer as to whether the Marines should stop or go forward.19 The

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junior officer was naturally reluctant to suggest stopping, since Waller had just given them a pep talk about the suffering at Peking and what they should do to relieve it. He voted to go on, and of course the others were reluctant to vote otherwise. Waller had the responses he expected and wanted, and therefore he got his own way.20 Butler tells of what he remembered of the trip to Tientsin in his always informative, if somewhat journalistic, account of his experiences, Old Gimlet Eye. After the vote, even the Russian colonel agreed to go forward. Lugging a Colt machine gun and dragging a three-inch field piece was discouraging; they dropped the three-inch piece in a creek but fortunately retained the Colt. At daylight on the 21st of June, as the force approached a small village of mud huts, the Russians, who were now leading the march, ran into a force of Chinese in a concealed trench. Its occupants opened fire, and at about the same time a fusillade came from the village as well. Caught in this ambush, the Marines and Russians fell flat on the ground. Examining their frontage they saw that Tientsin lay just a short distance beyond. Just then a bunch of Boxers charged across the open fields toward the prostrate forms, “waving swords and banners frantically.” But the attackers were slaughtered and broken at 500 yards. Several more attempts were made, but all came to nothing, except for continued heavy Boxer losses. For over four hours the two allies remained where they were and shot down hordes of Chinese who attempted to reach and break their lines. After those fruitless exercises, the Chinese remained where they were and delivered a very accurate and devastating fire upon the allies. At about 1830 hours, the column of Marines and Russians—which had nearly reached the Chinese section of Tientsin and was within a half-hour of the Imperial arsenal—began to feel the pressure. Its combined force of less than 550 fighting men was attempting to push back an estimated 50,000 Chinese. Now the Chinese army, supported by Boxers, opened a scathing fire from its surrounding positions. Caught in this hazing fire, both Marines and Russians fell to the ground. Chinese regulars, in trenches in front and to the right of the line, began to push troops to the rear of the Marines. The Russians, still forward, were hardest hit, and they were badly mauled. They decided that they had had enough and began filtering back through the prone Marines. Waller decided that his handful of Marines could “not lick the whole Chinese nation.” Thereupon he too gave the order to retire. The Marines soon learned, however, that one of their wounded, a Private Carter, was missing; someone remembered last seeing him back in “the hornet’s nest.” Butler and Lt. Arthur E. Harding, plus Pvts. Albert R. Campbell, Charles R. Francis, and Clarence E. Mathias, returned to find a still very much alive Carter.21 Since they lacked a stretcher, they carried him in their hands most of the distance. Butler and

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his small group continued for miles down the railroad tracks, fighting off the Chinese. Several times the main body would turn about and with steady rifle fire cover the stretcher party. Finally, after four hours of the grinding labor, 1st Lt. Henry L. Leonard arrived with twenty-five Marines who had been acting as rear guard for the small column.22 The reinforcement gave Butler and his little crew a great lift, even providing a poncho to make a stretcher for Carter and willing hands to spell the spent carriers. According to Butler, by day’s end they had marched a total of about 30 miles without any food other than hardtack. On that march several events occurred that impressed the young Lieutenant Butler so much that they contributed to his life-long attitude of dismissing hardship and pain. He tells of two oldtimers, a corporal and a sergeant who had been wounded— the former in his leg—but continued for fifteen miles without murmur or complaint. The sergeant was walking beside Butler when, at the sound of a rifle crack, the sergeant pulled his hat down over his wound to try to stop the blood trickling down and without a murmur continued his march. Butler later observed that the amazing courage of those men did more than anything else to “make us a fighting company.” Overall, the retreat was orderly, and both the Marines and Russians brought back their wounded. The Marines covered the entire withdrawal to Chin Liang Cheng, from which they had started their advance, having acquitted themselves creditably during the entire episode. Marines and Russians had marched twelve hours for thirty miles and had fought for five hours in the intense heat. There were three Marines killed; Cpl. J. F. Lanigan, Pvts. J. K. Miller and W. H. Morris; the wounded were one sergeant, Cpl. Thomas W. Kates, and five privates, one of whom was Charles R. Francis.23 RELIEF OF TIENTSIN’S FOREIGN SETTLEMENT Meanwhile, the action around Tientsin was still hot and heavy. The very weakly defended Foreign Settlement was in a bad way. Chinese troops outnumbered the defenders at least 25 to one. To make matters worse, the garrison had no artillery, whereas the attackers splattered the settlement with upward of 60,000 shells. Herbert Hoover’s memoir is the only American source for the initial defense of the city. He was at the American compound of the commissioner of customs, Edward Drew. The Chinese gunners aimed most of their guns at the foreign compounds, including Drew’s, and consequently Hoover was located where most of the action was. But his own performance at the defense of Tientsin has been called into question. On 23 June 1900, a force of Germans, British, Japanese, and Italians, and with Waller’s Marines as the advance guard, moved on into Tientsin

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to relieve the besieged foreign settlement. These were the first foreign troops to arrive after the siege had begun. As they entered Marine buglers played a loud rendition of the popular Spanish-American War song “There’ll be a Hot Time in the Old Town Tonight.” American occupants of that city later related their joy, relief, and pride when the Marines came marching in under the American flag. Herbert Hoover later told in his personal memoir how those Marines looked coming in: “I do not remember a more satisfying musical performance than the bugles of the American Marines entering the settlement playing There’ll be a Hot Time in the Old Town Tonight.”24 Possibly Herbert Hoover didn’t actually witness their arrival; in later years, he was to be accused of dressing in women’s clothes and hiding with the ladies in the cellar of Drew’s compound. Stories were later bruited about as to how the men, who were fighting off the savage Chinese attacks, found him and gave him “a bashing about for his cowardice.”25 On 25 June, after a few days’ rest in Tientsin, Waller’s small band of Marines was sent with a relieving force to the Hsi-ku (East) Arsenal, about six miles north of Tientsin, where the main part of Seymour’s small army was still holed up. The relief was successful, and the 300 sick and wounded at the arsenal were brought back to Tientsin. McCalla, who had been in the arsenal and was wounded, gladly gave up his overall command of the Americans in North China to Waller. During the following three weeks, the Marines were actively engaged in the attempt by the allied forces to oust Chinese forces occupying the Walled City inside Tientsin. This had to be consummated before a relief column could be dispatched to Peking. In a letter to Rear Admiral Kempff, USN, on 2 July, Waller advised him that a Chinese army, some 10,000 strong and with four batteries of guns, had left Tsai Tsun, about 28 miles distant, for Tientsin. He also wrote of how a group of 40 Marines supported a thrust by the British toward the Chinese fort. Waller related how Lieutenant Butler and his Marines sustained the British, they being cornered and unable to retire. Marines “moved to their position under a hot fire, permitting the British to retire. He [Butler] then fell back, forming the rear guard of the column, and protecting them thoroughly.” The British colonel thanked the Marines for their “great assistance today.” The general commanding the Russians refused to cooperate with the other allies. Because his force was the largest and best equipped, serious trouble and even disaster threatened the allied force if it went forward without his cooperation. In the meantime, Ma San Yuen, the Chinese Imperial general leading the substantial force mentioned above, was able to move unhindered into the city of Tientsin with his troops and guns. The following morning the shelling of the allies began, and for several days nothing but intermittent and disconnected skirmishes took place. Waller continues his report:

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On July 3 a small party of our men, subsequently increased to 80 in all, went under the immediate command of Lieut. Smedley D. Butler, joining a battalion under the command of Colonel Bower, of the British service, to capture a gun that had been annoying us considerably. The gun had been moved to the opposite side of the river [Pei River] and that part of the expedition was unsuccessful. Two villages were captured after sharp hand-to-hand fighting. When ordered to retire parts of the Wei hei wei Regiment were unable to fall back because the fire was so bad.26 Lieutenant Butler asked and received permission to support these men. He deployed the Marines, advanced at the double to the position, opened fire by volleys, and permitted the Chinese regiment to fall back in comfort. He then fell back by sections in fine order and without casualty. I have before mentioned the fine qualities of Mr. Butler, his control of men, his courage, and excellent example in his own person of all the qualities most admirable in a soldier. Colonel Bower sent his thanks for the services of our men and expressed his admiration for their training and fine discipline.

Back in Peking, the situation had been relatively quiet until 20 June. On that date the German minister, Baron von Ketteler, accompanied only by his interpreter, took it upon himself to leave the compound and go by carriage to visit the offices of the Tsungli Yamen, on Hatamun Street. While traveling on a road lined with Imperial soldiers, he was shot in the back. His badly wounded interpreter managed to make his way to the American mission and the protection of Newt Hall and his Marine detachment. German Marines tried to recover the body of von Ketteler but were fired upon and withdrew back to their legation grounds.27 That afternoon, Myers, with 15 Marines, 10 Russians, and an equal number of British soldiers, went out to the mission to escort Hall and his charges back to the legation. The situation was becoming hourly more dangerous for the foreigners, but no effort was being spared to protect the civilian legation population, Chinese and foreigners as much as possible under the circumstances. As had been previously planned, the nonbelligerents of each nation were dispatched to the British legation. With them went a guard of ten soldiers from each national force to help with their protection. THE BOXERS ATTACK IN PEKING At 1800 the Chinese outside the Walled City began firing upon the legations. But according to Myers’s report, the firing seemed disorganized and as a result was inaccurate and ineffective. Spies soon brought word that Boxers were entering the city gates unhindered by the Chinese imperial army. It became evident that the long-dreaded attack would soon come. It was also apparent that the government was acquiescing with the Boxers’

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program of terror for all foreigners. As previously agreed, it was now time to anoint the British minister MacDonald as head of the legations’ defense. Captain Strouts continued as his Royal Marine chief of staff until he died of natural causes on 16 July. At that point H. G. Squiers, first secretary of the U.S. legation, took his place. He, having spent a number of years in the U.S. Army, did a creditable job in that post.28 In addition, during the entire siege Squiers also served as commissary for the American Marine guard, doing a splendid job in that post also. Unfortunately, he and Conger, who had also served briefly as a soldier, tried to take command of the Marine defense, causing dissension even among the lower ranks. On 22 June the Chinese attempted to burn the British legation, but the fire was quickly suppressed. A major blunder also took place on that same date; it was one that, if noticed by the Boxers, could have caused a complete disaster for the legations. By some error or misunderstanding, orders were issued that caused practically all the foreign guards, including the U.S. Marines, to fall back upon the British legation, leaving their posts completely unattended. Fortunately the Boxers didn’t learn of that foul-up. Before it became obvious, each group made its way back to its posts. On 23 June the Austrian legation and the Russian bank were burned, and the Marines spent much of that day fighting fire as well as the Boxers. The next day brought more Chinese onto the walls; they soon opened a harassing fire upon the American legation. For some unknown reason, not one of the defenders had actually mounted the walls, even though that would have made tactical sense. Whether Captain Strouts even suggested that obvious move is not known. Myers tried to occupy independently the point on the walls opposite his position; however, dense smoke and the refusal of the Chinese coolies within the Walled City to build barricades under continuous fire from the Boxers thwarted that idea. That day, sentry Pvt. C. B. King was shot directly in the forehead and instantly died, the first Marine mortality at Peking. Six Marines would join him before the siege ended. On 24 June Pvt. J. W. Tutcher was wounded in the knee, but for him worse was yet to come. On 25 June the Marines finally succeeded in occupying a position on the wall. A contingent of German Marines had also managed to seize their portion of the wall, coming in behind the Boxers and quickly driving them away. They then erected a barricade about 500 yards in the rear of one that Myers’s men were erecting, but facing the Hatamun Gate. Luckily, the Chinese were too busy constructing barricades on the portions of the wall that they still occupied to pay much heed to what the defenders were doing. Marine Privates Martin L. Muller and Harry Gold both received flesh wounds that day, but both recovered; Gold was able to go back to duty after twelve days, whereas Muller spent at least 30 days in the British

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legation hospital. At midnight or a little afterward, while sharpshooting on the wall, Sgt. John Fanning took a round just behind his left ear. He was the second Marine to die. On the 27th, during broad daylight, the Chinese sallied from their barricades along the wall and advanced on the run toward the Marines. They received a few well-aimed volleys and were soon driven back. Myers later said it was the only occasion during the siege that he could remember the Chinese leaving their shelter to launch an attack. For the next three days the Chinese continued firing at the Marine positions. Each night, in the darkness, they would inch their barricades forward, until by 30 June the lines were only about 30 yards apart. Since the Russians and British weren’t holding sections of the wall and that portion held by the U.S. Marines was where most of the action was occurring, the Russians sent ten soldiers to aid the Marines on the wall. The British sent six or seven men to help hold the trench that connected the legation with the wall, Myers’s only method of communication with the civilians. On a nearly daily basis the Germans had been sending men to aid the Marines until assaults upon their own section of the wall compelled them to cease. Doctor Thomas M. Lippitt, physician to the U.S. legation, was wounded on 29 June while crossing the courtyard, and Dr. George Lowry, a missionary, took his place, providing great medical services throughout the siege. That same day Private Tutcher, who had been wounded just five days before, received a head wound and died instantly. At about the same time Pvt. John H. Schroeder was wounded in the right arm and was taken to the British hospital for treatment. The small band of U.S. Marines was taking casualties it could ill afford. Probably it was inflicting many on the Boxers as well, but we have no definitive reports about that side of the action. There is no question that most if not all of the action at Peking was centered upon the position held by the U.S. Marines. Because of that, they would gain much-needed publicity.29 On 1 July, heavy Chinese shellfire forced the German marines to retire, leaving Myers’s Marines’ rear unguarded and exposed. Accordingly, Myers too retired from the wall into the legation compound. But it was obvious within 15 minutes that the former position on the wall was of the highest importance and would have to be retaken and held at all cost. Myers and his Marines found that the Chinese had not taken advantage of their absence, and soon the situation was again “well in hand.” Myers’s Chinese coolies had apparently regained some of their courage; they were soon back building barricades on the wall for the Marines, including across the rear of their position, where they were most vulnerable. While working on the barricades Pvt. Francis G. Silva was severely wounded in the left elbow and chest. He too was sent to the British hospital, eventually recovering. This Spartan band of U.S. Marines was daily being whittled down, and the legation’s residents were rightly asking when their deliverers would ar-

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rive. Meanwhile, back at Tientsin, their heroes were having a difficult time. They were trying hard but making little headway. Conger and Squiers now discovered that Captain Myers had been on duty since the wall had been originally occupied, five days before. Consequently he was ordered back for rest, and Capt. Newt Hall took his place. Hall’s main role, since returning from the mission, had been to guard the U.S. compound. His terse orders from Mr. Conger were not to leave the wall unless absolutely forced to. Unfortunately, during Hall’s tenure the Chinese were allowed to erect barricades within a few feet of the Marine position. In addition they also erected a 15-foot tower overlooking the Marine position. After only about 24 hours, Hall’s tour of duty on the wall terminated. Upon his return, Myers found that his work was cut out for him. He barely had enough time to make up for the five nights’ sleep he had already missed; he was near exhaustion. Meanwhile, the casualties kept growing at an alarming rate. At about 1600 that afternoon, two Marines working on the defenses were hit. Pvt. J. Kennedy was killed instantly, while Pvt. Thomas F. Hall was wounded in the right knee and would be out of commission for about six days. Each passing day the defender’s numbers were getting smaller, creating abysmal gaps on the wall. At dusk on 2 July, when Myers returned to the wall, he was assigned five additional Russian soldiers plus an officer and 20 men from the British contingent; they arrived at about 0300 the following morning. With these reinforcements he was instructed by Conger to advance and take the barricade to his front. Myers, now having what Conger considered sufficient manpower, made his plans to take the tower and barricade. The Chinese had been insolently throwing stones at the Marines, and everyone was fed up with that kind of treatment. The Russians were instructed to take the inside portion of the wall. Their orders were to stay at the parapet and dislodge the enemy from their positions at the head of the ramp leading to the top of the wall. The Americans and their allies would proceed, left and center, over the barricade and once across would break to the left and follow the wall around to the rear of the Chinese position. The attack proceeded as scheduled. It wasn’t long before the Chinese were completely defeated and forced to retire some hundred yards to the next barricade. Although many rifles and ammunition were taken, Myers reported, “I regret to state that two of the best men in the guard, Privates Turner and Thomas, were killed along with one Englishman and one Russian. . . . Turner’s body was picked up well inside the Chinese barricade, showing that he had, evidently because of darkness, gotten far ahead of our lines. Being slightly wounded myself [a bad spear wound in the leg], I sent for Captain Hall to relieve me.” In addition to the two men killed in action, Pvt. Herman Khem had been wounded by shrapnel but within seven days had recovered and was back on duty. On 4 July a Marine named Woods was reported wounded.30

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Although Myers retained command until 21 July, in actual fact Hall now was responsible for the American defense, and because Myers’s already infected wound got worse, Hall would remain so for the balance of the siege. For a while, it appeared as though the spear wound might force removal of Myers’s leg. According to Hall’s report, he relieved Myers at 0230 on 3 July and remained in command only until “relieved by Captain von Strauss at 0330 hours 3 July. At his request I took charge of the old barricade, making a passage through it for the men, and strengthening the rear side of the barricade. I remained on the wall until ordered down by you [Myers] at 1130 hours.” Something seems very odd about that portion of Hall’s report. Nowhere does it clarify why a German officer would relieve a U.S. Marine officer of command on the American section of the wall, nor why Myers, who was very ill, would relieve Hall after so short a period on the wall.31 An even more confusing situation concerning Captain Hall was to develop on 15 July. In a diary entry for 1 July, Mary Hooker described the tensions that existed between the various nationalities in the legation compound at Peking. According to her, the Americans and British, “though teasing each other were almost one people here.” The Russians and British detested each other; however, the reverse was true of the Russians and Americans, whose compounds joined. “Baron von Rahden (the Russian commander) orders his men to work and fight as much as possible side by side with our Marines, as in this way he hopes to increase the efficiency of his untrained guard.” The Germans remained by themselves and fraternized with no one. They were defending the wall alongside the Marines post and when under the command of a non-German officer became “notorious for their utter disregard of ordinary military precaution.” She added that the Japanese defended their post “with the greatest valor . . . and are tremendously proEnglish and anti-Russian.” An Englishman dropped into the American mess and admonished those within hearing: “You Americans are the devil. You are on good terms with every damned dago in the place.” Mary Hooker commented that the Marine enlisted men “in many instances . . . do the work of an officer, and take as much responsibility.” She also tells us that the weather was unbearably hot, 109 degrees in the shade, which was not exceptional, and that all the men wore “filthy clothes.” The temperatures continued to run that hot more or less, for most of the summer months in north China. Later in the month Hooker told of the general depression of the community at Peking because the allied forces weren’t coming as quickly as expected. MORE MARINES ARRIVE AT TIENTSIN Meanwhile, back at Tientsin, plans were being made to send another relief column to the beleaguered legations at Peking. A new group of 318

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American Marines, led by Col. Robert L. Meade, arrived at about midnight on 11–12 July; he replaced Waller in command of the Marines ashore in China. The other new officers included a few names that in the years ahead would become famous throughout the Corps. They included Maj. George Richards and Capts. Melville J. Shaw, William B. Lemly, Austin R. Davis, Charles G. Long, Ben H. Fuller, and Philip M. Bannon. In addition, there were 1st Lts. John H. A Day, Charles G. Andresen (also known as Carl Gamborg-Andresen), Robert H. Dunlap, Arthur J. Mathews, David D. Porter, William H. Clifford, Jr., John F. McGill, and William Hopkins. Other junior officers included 2d Lts. Frederick M. Wise, Jr., Wirt McCreary, and Louis Mc. Little.32 They were the remnants of Waller’s 1st Marine Regiment, now known as the 3d Battalion, left behind in the Philippines. It was composed of one infantry battalion, regimental headquarters, and an artillery company, which included three 3-inch landing guns and three Colt machine guns. At about this time the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 9th U.S. Infantry, commanded by Col. Emerson H. Liscum, USA, arrived and with the 1st Marine regiment were formed into a brigade.33 Colonel Meade, being senior U.S. officer present, assumed overall command of the 1,000 officers and men of the American force.34 The Americans, in turn, were brigaded with a British force of over 2,000 men, which included Indian troops, units of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and Royal Marines. All told, the foreign troops now numbered 5,650, of which more than half were Americans and British. But before a column could be sent anywhere, the allied council agreed that first the Chinese forces within the walled city of Tientsin would have to be eliminated. Such a large and powerful force would otherwise constitute a dramatic danger to their rear. On 13 July 1900, at 0300, Meade marched out of the barracks with four companies of Marines, A, C, D, and F. Capt. Ben H. Fuller, a future commandant, commanded F, the artillery company, with the three 3-inch rapidfire guns and three Colt machine guns. Company D, Capt. Charles G. Long in command, supported Company F. In two columns the allies marched through Taku Gate, the Japanese on the right, and the British and Americans on the left. The two companies of the fusiliers in the lead were followed by the four U.S. Marine companies, then the British Naval Brigade. Finally, catching everyone else’s dust, there was the 9th U.S. Infantry. Regardless of how much dust they swallowed, they did the job when the time came, as always. ASSAULT ON OCCUPIED TIENTSIN At approximately 0630, 7,000 allied troops began an assault against the walled city, defended by about 50,000 Boxers and Imperial troops. The defenders were well supplied with artillery, had been trained to use their Krupp guns by European experts, and had sufficient food and ammunition

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to withstand a lengthy siege. Two walls ringed the city. The first was about one mile before the city and approximately 30 feet in height. The interior wall was that which encircled the city itself. Mounted on its 30-foot-high walls was artillery, which continued to bombard the foreign concessions (see Map 2.3). Under the overall command of British brigadier general A. R. F. Dorward, the allied forces moved against the southern side of the wall. Soon after the attack began, Meade was ordered to support the Royal Welch Fusiliers on the extreme left of the line. For that purpose at 0730 Meade dispatched Companies A and C to the left. The balance of the Marine regiment and the 9th Infantry continued to attack directly to the front. By 0800 Companies A and C were stalled at a moat about 800 yards from the walled city. The Chinese appeared in large numbers on the left of Meade’s position, but he quickly organized a flanking attack and drove them away. The Marines lay in ditches for the remainder of the day. It has been recorded that the heat in that area went as high as 140 degrees Fahrenheit. The ground between the two cities was composed of rice paddies, graves, salt mounds, and sewer muck from the old city, all of which contributed greatly to the overall discomfort of the allied forces. While British heavy guns pounded the Chinese artillery on the walls, Captain Fuller’s artillery and three machine guns supported the Marine positions with accurate fire. After firing their allotted thirty rounds, however, Fuller and his guns were finished; Fuller and his men became infantrymen. In the meantime, from the walls and salt mounds before them the allied infantry forces were receiving heavy, though inaccurate, rifle fire. First Lt. David D. Porter moved his company of Marines to the left to prevent a flanking attack from that direction. The other Marine company moved to the right to support the 9th Infantry. As the Americans advanced, they passed hidden Chinese snipers who soon got behind them, whereupon the Marine casualties increased dramatically. Marine Private Partridge was wounded in his left shoulder; he was left behind as his company struggled to advance through the “filthy swamp, with bullets splashing and whining around us.”35 Soon the enemy fire forced the Marines to retire, and as they did so Smedley Butler and two other Marines picked up the wounded Partridge and began carrying him to safety. Butler received a bullet wound in his thigh. Using his first-aid packet he covered the torn flesh; he found that even though it “hurt like hell” he could still walk. When they finally reached a place of relative safety the battalion doctor came along and offered to care for Butler’s wound, but Butler directed him to Private Partridge instead. With Butler, then and later, an enlisted man in need always came first. In addition to Butler, Captain Lemly and 1st Lt. Henry Leonard were also wounded; all three were commanded to report to the rear. Butler vigorously protested but was overruled.36 When the day ended the majority

Map 2.3. Attack on the Walled City of Tientsin

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of Marines had expended all 180 rounds of their rifle ammunition, as well as their meager allowance of artillery shells. Most of them were physically exhausted by their exertions in the day’s heat. They would all attempt to get some rest that night. During the night Japanese infantry attacked across the causeway leading to the city gates. At 0600 on 14 July a Japanese engineering officer blew the south gate (and himself) to bits, effectively opening Tientsin for the allied forces. The defenders were completely demoralized and, according to Butler, fled in all directions, ensuring the capture of the city. The American forces had been quite heavily hit. The Marine regiment had lost five killed and 23 wounded. Capt. Austin R. Davis, a Marine since 1894, was the highest-ranking Marine to be killed during the campaign. It seems that Davis had had a premonition of his death the previous evening; he had awakened one of his comrades and said, “I am going to be killed tomorrow and I want to wish you goodbye.”37 Waller’s report of the action to the Commandant on 30 July 1900 said: At noon on the 27th, the Russians having attacked the arsenal, the scene of my repulse on the 21st, and which had not been captured, asked for reinforcements. I sent out Second Lieutenant Jolly with forty men, Mr. Harding, my adjutant, going as a volunteer, and placed the whole [under the] command of Commander Craddock, R. N. This force was about 1800 strong, and succeeded in driving the enemy from the parapets out of their fortifications and in full flight. . . . [T]he enemy had about 7000 men at this point. Our men charged over the parapet with a British company, being the first in this part of the fight. Our loss here was one wounded and Lieutenant Jolly overcome with the heat, but not until after he had brought his men back to their quarters. Lieutenant Harding . . . captured an imperial flag, which he has presented to me. Today we are resting, sending away the wounded and getting ready for a march on Pekin. My effective strength is now about eightynine. Our men have marched ninety-seven miles in five days, fighting all the way. They have lived on about one meal a day for six days, but have been cheerful and willing always. They have gained the highest praise from all present, and have earned my love and confidence. They are like Falstaff’s army in appearance, but with brave hearts and bright weapons.38

At Peking the siege was still going on, but with a difference. Now the casualties were caused by Chinese sniper attacks upon the defenders of the legation walls. On 7 July Gunner’s Mate Joseph Mitchell of the U.S. Navy had found an ancient cannon barrel in the ruins of an ironmonger’s shop. He had it cleaned and mounted upon an Italian one-pounder gun carriage with rickshaw wheels.39 Russian sailors found shells that weren’t quite “fitting.” The first round fired dismounted the barrel from the carriage, but adjustments were made and soon the gun was doing a fine job for the entire legation. It received many nicknames, such as “Betsy” and “the Old

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Crock”; the final name was “the International Gun.” According to one Englishman, it and the Marine’s Colt machine gun “killed more men than all the rest put together.” Presumably he meant more Chinese. Newt Hall replaced Myers, who was incapacitated by his wound. This was not, according to several different reports, the best time during the siege for the Marines. Hall’s conduct during the entire period was found wanting by many, especially if a report of 10 July by London Times correspondent Dr. G. E. Morrison can be relied upon. On the evening of 15 July, Captain Hall and Pvt. Daniel Daly from Five Points, New York, scouted the wall. Hall asked Daly to stay put and hold the advanced position on the wall as best he could while Hall went to find more volunteers. The next morning Marines returned to where Daly was coolly holding his post. In front of his position Daly had piled up a sizable quantity of empty brass cartridges and prostrate Boxer forms.40 The next day a truce was established, although rifle fire continued sporadically until the legations were relieved on 14 August.41 THE SECOND PEKING RELIEF COLUMN On 30 July 1900, after a five-week voyage Maj. Gen. Adna Chaffee, U.S. Army, arrived at Tientsin. The old Indian fighter had been ordered to China to assume command of all American forces there. At about the same time another Marine battalion from Cavite in the Philippines, commanded by Maj. William P. Biddle, arrived in China. Colonel Meade had been invalided home, and Biddle, now senior Marine officer in China, assumed command of the 1st Marine Regiment. Major Biddle brought with him as adjutant 2d Lt. William C. Harllee plus Capts. Franklin J. Moses and Wendell C. Neville; 1st Lts. Charles C. Carpenter, John G. Muir, and Samuel A. W. Patterson; 2d Lt. Daniel W. Blake; and Gunnery Sgt. Horace D. Heaton. The last-named was detailed as sergeant major of the battalion.42 Chaffee assigned a detachment of six Marine officers and 177 men, supported by two Navy surgeons, to protect Tientsin from any possibility of a Chinese assault. If any serious Chinese attack had occurred, the 183 Marines would have had to try to defend the entire city; as a consequence, just two Marine battalions of the 1st Regiment accompanied the relief column. But Chaffee wasn’t yet finished with the Marines. He had the 2d Battalion assigned the onerous duty of guarding the pack train. That left just the one battalion for the anticipated fighting as they got near Peking. Naturally, the two battalions not included with the fighting men were greatly disappointed. (As would be expected, Smedley Butler was one of those who were not left behind.) Chaffee was not going to allow too many Marines forward where the action would be. His actions were such that if Marines were ever to suffer from paranoia, that would have been one of the times.43

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The heat on the march was intense, and it slowed the entire column.44 During the latter part of the day Philip M. Bannon’s Company H was almost entirely prostrated by the extreme temperatures. They had marched through high corn and were therefore unable to move forward easily. Several engagements took place during the period, but it wasn’t until 6 August that the battalion of Marines with the column became involved in any action. At Yangtsun they provided infantry support for Reilly’s Battery of the 5th Artillery, U.S. Army—a truly superlative organization.45 Chinese cavalry appeared on the right, but accurate Marine rifle fire repulsed them. Now without serious opposition, the Marines took the village. The intense heat caused the one death of the day, and one Marine was wounded. As one day followed another with no change in the heat, many Marines and soldiers were affected by it.46 Orders were issued on 10 August to leave all incapacitated men behind. The physical powers of the Marines were such that only four men were found unfit (although that may very well have been the result of intransigence as much as anything else). By the 14th the column was nearing Peking and was encountering fire from the walls. Major Waller issued orders for part of Companies A and H to move forward to put an end to the sniper fire. Here Smedley Butler and Pvts. G. P. Farrell and F. W. Green were wounded. In spite of Butler’s wound in the chest and his two previous wounds, after a few repairs he retained his place in line and continued to command Company A. That night the Americans and their allies bivouacked just outside the Tartar City. They were now very close to the legations. On the following day, in order to prepare a position for Reilly’s Battery, the Marines cleared away the barricades to their front. An advance was made against the Imperial City, with the Marines leading and taking a position upon the Chien Men Gate. Companies A and C of Waller’s 1st Battalion occupied the second floor of the pagoda, while the 2d Battalion took positions along the wall itself. There they concentrated their fire on the wall, at ranges of up to 900 yards, in order to protect the army gunners from sniper fire. Two pieces from Reilly’s Battery fired on this gate and blasted it open after a stubborn resistance, the defending enemy was driven out—but not until Reilly had received a fatal bullet. There are at least two stories told about who was with him at the time, and both may be correct. One declares that Waller was at his side, the other that it was General Chaffee.47 On the 16th, Waller’s Marines took the West Gate (Chang-yimein). Marines continued to hold the Chien Men as well until they moved into the Tartar City on 19 August. RELIEF OF THE LEGATIONS AND OCCUPATION OF PEKING The surviving members of the legations were, of course, ecstatic at their deliverance from what only a few short weeks before had seemed to be

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imminent annihilation. Unfortunately, newly arrived foreign troops, commanders and all, became unruly and indulged themselves in a destructive rampage, which was long remembered by the Chinese. Western troops joined with their Japanese colleagues to do as much damage to the Imperial City and its treasures as it was possible for barbarians to do. That is just what the Chinese had been calling them all along. The plentiful treasures became the property of any person that found them. Looting was the order of the day. According to one statement, Marine officers were as inclined as all the others to destroy Chinese property in a barbarous manner.48 Suffice it to say that many officers and men of all the nations involved became quite rich with what they stole from the Chinese people. It was not a noble moment for “civilization.” After the relief of the legations, Mary Hooker had a chat with Sir Claude MacDonald, the British minister, and M. de Giers, the Russian minister. Both complimented the Americans’ performance during the siege. They declared that our Marines lead in their intelligent work as soldiers. The accuracy of their shooting is extraordinary, and their ability to step forward, one after the other, on the death or retirement of an officer or non-commissioned officer and take his place is remarkable. They show the greatest aptitude to command, and are in no way disconcerted by the sudden increase of responsibility. In many instances which could be cited this was proved.49

She added that the British had never been known “to unnecessarily sing the praises of other nationalities.”50 On 4 September, Chaffee divided the 1st Marine Regiment and assigned each battalion to an army brigade. Capt. Franklin J. Moses, commanding the 2d Battalion, was assigned to the 1st Brigade; Waller’s 1st Battalion was assigned to the 2d Brigade. Ten days later Waller was also assigned as provost marshal of the Tartar City, while Lt. Louis McC. Little was appointed engineer and ordnance officer of the 1st Brigade, China Relief Expedition—the official title of the organization of which the Marines were now part. On 28 September the Marine battalions received a directive from the secretary of the navy to withdraw from China and return to their post at Cavite. The Marines made their way by rail to Taku and boarded waiting U.S. Navy ships. The U.S. Marines left China, for a while; they would be back.

NOTES 1. The literal translation of the Chinese phrase for the movement was “The Fist of Righteous Harmony.” Europeans and Americans soon identified them as

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“Boxers,” and the Western world still does. Their Chinese name was the Ai Ho Tuan. 2. The emperor, Kuang-hsu, nephew of the dowager empress, Tz’u-hsi, had been arrested by her followers. He was a prisoner for the balance of his life. His mistake was trying to invoke changes that would make China more modern and compatible with the rest of the world. 3. It was, and possibly still is, widely believed in the United States that the landing of Marines does not constitute a serious breach of the peace, even though that nation suffers the ignominy of the presence of a foreign, occupying military force on its territory. In contrast, it has been argued, a landing and occupation by army troops would be a serious breach that would, or could, lead to war. Although the United States was the prime mover behind that concept, Britain, France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, and numerous other European powers utilized Marines in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to solve problems. 4. Robert Coltman, Jr., Beleaguered in Peking: The Boxer’s War against the Foreigner (Philadelphia: F. A. Davis, 1901). 5. Ibid., 63. The opposite position was taken by Bertram Simpson—writing as B. L. Putnam Weale—in Indiscreet Letters from Peking (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1921). On pages 12–13 he mentions that at a dinner party on 24 May 1900 the French minister, Pichon, vehemently accused MacDonald of not pushing hard for troops to defend the legations against the coming storm. On the night of deliverance, 31 May, Simpson reflected that he found “the exuberance in the Legation Quarter rather depressing.” The movie version, 55 Days in Peking, shows David Niven (Macdonald), as the real leader of the defense, ably assisted by Charlton Heston (Myers). 6. Hoover’s memoir claims that his wife was very ill and that because the nearest doctor of consequence was in Tientsin, that was where they went. Fortunately Tientsin was in the right direction. See page 48, volume 1 of his memoir. 7. Mary Hooker, Behind the Scenes in Peking (London: John Murray, 1910), p. 14. Hart was the inspector general of customs. Von Below later led the German army that faced Haig at Arras in April 1917. In November 1917 he would supervise the veritable blitzkrieg that nearly destroyed the Italian army at Caporreto; also, he commanded an army that broke through the allied lines in March 1918. He not only looked “soldierly,” but he was one. 8. The Monocacy was under the command of Cdr. Frederick M. Wise, the father of one of the later Marine participants, 2d Lt. Frederick M. Wise. “Fritz” visited his father at his anchorage at Taku. 9. Twenty-five British Marines had arrived several months before but were not considered as reinforcements for the Boxer troubles. 10. The old saying that “Marines can do anything” reminds me of a situation I witnessed in 1945. A U.S. Navy ship returning a group of Chinese army officers to China had the misfortune of having one of them murdered in a Tong War incident. Since all Chinese desired burial in China, what was the ship’s captain to do? Carrying a dead body for several weeks was impossible. A Marine member of the ship’s detachment came forward and offered to do the job required. It seems he had been an embalmer in training when he enlisted and somehow carried his tools of the trade with him everywhere, even on this ship, in a war zone. The necessary chemicals were made available, and he accomplished his task with no difficulties.

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11. Report of Capt. John T. Myers to the Commandant, 1900, included in his report to the secretary of the navy as appendix C, pages 1266–1270, in 1901 [hereafter Report 1901]. Hooker claimed that when the troops arrived at the station an argument began about which detachment should have the honor of entering Peking first. McCalla settled that problem by hurrying “his men at the double-quick to get it, and our troops were the first to march up Legation Street.” 12. One of the reasons given for Mr. Conger’s unwillingness to push hard for military support was his concern about lack of space. With all the reports of outrages committed by the Boxers in the neighborhood, it doesn’t appear to be very mature reasoning. 13. See appendix A for a complete listing of Marines and bluejackets who defended the wall at Peking during this period. 14. Report 1901, p. 1266. What a story that must have been. 15. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Soldiers of the Sea: The U.S. Marine Corps, 1775– 1962 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press 1962), p. 130. 16. Anne C. Venzon, General Smedley Darlington Butler: The Letters of a Leatherneck, 1898–1931 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), pp. 17–18. 17. First Lt. George C. Reid, Medal of Honor in 1914, became a brigadier general. By 1908 Wynne had dropped out of the Corps. William G. Powell was promoted to captain and assistant paymaster, eventually becoming a lieutenant colonel paymaster; he was still in service in 1920. Arthur E. Harding was a captain in 1908, an assistant to the Judge Advocate General in 1912. 18. Leonard, a Marine since 1899, was to be badly wounded in a few days, eventually losing an arm. But like many a Marine before and since, he had remained in service—until at least 1908, at which time he was at the U.S. legation with the Marine Guard at Peking. He, like Butler, was breveted and advanced two numbers in seniority for his actions in China. Jolly entered the Marine Corps in 1899 and was still on active duty as late as 1908, when he was with the 1st Marine Brigade in the Philippine Islands. 19. Probably Wade L. Jolly. 20. A different version of events appears in Michael Miller’s article “Marines in the Boxer Rebellion,” American History Illustrated (January 1988): 38–47. He asserts that the Russian colonel woke Waller at 0200 hours and insisted that the entire column press on to Tientsin at once. That same story, nearly verbatim, appeared in John W. Leonard and Fred. F. Chitty’s The Story of the United States Marines, 1740–1919 (New York: U.S. Marine Corps Publicity Bureau, N.D.) p. 119, though their time is 2:00 P.M. Butler’s memoir gives an entirely different description of what happened. Knowing something of the character of Waller, I tend to agree that he decided to press on, with a reluctant ally finally acquiescing. 21. Venzon, p. 20. 22. Leonard would later serve as Butler’s civilian counsel when he was courtmartialed in 1931. See notes 25 and 36. 23. Kates and Francis were both awarded the Medal of Honor for their actions on 21 June 1900. 24. Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan, 1951). 25. That story would rebound on Hoover and his secretary of the navy, Charles F. Adams, many years later when based upon specious charges, they at-

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tempted to court-martial Butler. It doesn’t appear that the actual story was made public at that time. Needless to say, Butler was exonerated. See Hans Schmidt, Maverick Marine: General Smedley D. Butler (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1987), p. 210. 26. A Chinese formation in the British army. 27. Soon after, the German emperor, William II, who did not take kindly to this gross breach of diplomatic niceties, reacted stupidly. His retort was to arouse the balance of the European world and would be used against him and Germany 14 years later. In effect, William threatened China with the advent of a new breed of Huns that would make all Chinese, then and in the future, dread the word “German” and to pay for their inhuman deeds against his people. 28. Richard O’Connor, The Spirit Soldiers: A Historical Narrative of the Boxer Rebellion (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1973), p. 200. O’Connor claims that Squiers spent 14 years as a second lieutenant. If that is true, Squiers was certainly a recordholder in time in that rank. 29. Publicity has always been both a boon and bane to the Corps. It has been needed in order to retain support at home, especially in the Congress; otherwise, the army and navy would have done away with it on several occasions in the twentieth century. It is a bane, because both the army and navy resent what they see as needless adulation. 30. I cannot locate his name on the official roster. But in those times records weren’t always the best. 31. Using the two official reports, one by Myers and the other by Hall, I find that Myers tells us he relieved Hall “on July 2, at about dusk.” Therefore we have to assume that both Marine captains remained on the wall through 4 July at 1130, when Myers ordered Hall off the wall. 32. See appendix C for listing of brevets and other awards. 33. Colonel Liscum was killed in action on 13 July 1900. At the time he was holding his regimental flag, which he had taken from the dead body of the color bearer. 34. That must certainly be one of the first times that a Marine officer commanded a detachment of U.S. Army soldiers. It would happen again, with few if any problems, 18 years later—and again during World War II, when a few unfortunate problems would occur. 35. Lowell Thomas, Old Gimlet Eye: Adventures of Smedley D. Butler (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1933), p. 62. 36. Henry Leonard, who lost his arm that day, later became a famous lawyer in New York City. In 1931 he was the lawyer who came to Butler’s defense in the famous (infamous) attempt by Hoover and company to court-marital that fighting Marine. 37. Miller, p. 44. 38. Shakespeare, Henry V. 39. Heinl, p. 143. Where in the world they found an Italian gun carriage is not explained. The wheels must have been quite flimsy, but evidently it stood the test. 40. He earned the first of his two Medals of Honor for that night’s work. Captain Hall’s report gave Daly full credit for his defense of the wall. See appendix B. 41. See appendix B for a detailed explanation.

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42. Both Biddle in 1911 and Neville (in 1929) became Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps. 43. See in the next section what he did with “old Betsy.” 44. Venzon, p. 26. Butler, in a letter to his mother, starts off “We had a very tough time coming up, forced marches during the heat of the day, temperatures about 115 on an average, and very little to eat.” 45. Many have said that it was the best artillery unit in the army, and it would remain so for many years to come. Of the four junior officers, two would later make outstanding contributions to the American Expeditionary Force in France: Charles P. Summerall and Manus McCloskey. The former was an artilleryman who would be elevated to command the 1st Division (regular) and later V Corps during World War I. The latter became a brigadier general; he commanded the 2d Field Artillery Brigade in France and was awarded a Distinguished Service Cross, four Silver Star citations, a Legion of Honor, and two Croix de Guerre. 46. Venzon, p. 27, says up to 40 percent of one battalion of Marines “succumbed to heat exhaustion.” 47. Leonard and Chitty say (p. 133) it was Waller, as does Butler, American Marines in China: Annals of the American Academy, July, 1929 (Pike, NH: Brass Hat, 1990), p. 75. It doesn’t seem plausible that the commanding general would be where the heaviest action was. 48. Schmidt makes the point. He affirms that in Fuller’s papers a letter described a “bawl,” as Fuller called it, put on by Waller in the Tartar City. Fuller adds that the Marine officers and their guests destroyed all the buddhas and other relics found by throwing them against walls and the floor. The Americans were certainly not alone in their riotous activities—all of the troops of the conquering nations were engaged in many like tumults during their stay in Peking. 49. Hooker, p. 187. 50. Also see the two messages of appreciation in appendix B sent by American civilians in the besieged city. They were a fitting finish to the stalwart stand of 50 Marines and a few sailors for the 55 days of the siege.

3 Early Twentieth Century, 1905–1929

As soon as the Marines marched out of Peking, Major General Chaffee had “Old Betsy” packed up and shipped to the museum at West Point. At the instigation of the secretary of war, Elihu Root, Chaffee established a company of the 9th Infantry as permanent guard at the U.S. Legation in Peking. This last provocation induced Brigade General Charles Heywood, the commandant, to issue a protest to the secretary of the navy: It has always been the custom to furnish guards for the legations in a foreign country from Marines, and this custom has not been departed from until the present guard at the legation in China was established, which was furnished by the Army. Army troops are never to be sent to a foreign country except in time of war, and, for this reason, legation guards and other guards required in foreign countries have always been furnished by the Marine Corps. It is respectfully submitted that it is eminently proper that the guard to be kept at the legation in Pekin should be furnished by the Marine Corps.1

A Marine detachment resumed the position of legation guard in 1905, but only after the American minister, W. W. Rockhill, personally requested it. Rockhill wanted Marines to “restore the safety of the legation, as it had in times of previous trouble.”2 President “Teddy” Roosevelt signed the order on 31 July 1905 directing that the U.S. Marines relieve the 9th Infantry unit as the legation guards at the American legation in Peking. The many messages flowing back and forth through the various agencies involved must have created a crusty attitude between the army and the Marines.

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BEGINNINGS OF THE MARINE LEGATION GUARD George F. Elliott, the new Brigade General Commandant, instructed the commanding officer of the 1st Marine Brigade in the Philippines to detail two officers and 100 selected men for transfer to Peking. In accordance with this directive, Capt. Harry Lee and 1st Lt. Thomas Holcomb, Jr., along with 100 Marines, boarded the army transport Logan and proceeded to China.3 The Marines officially relieved the 9th Infantry and were back in harness in Peking on 12 September 1905. Upon arrival they found at least one other Marine on duty there: Capt. Henry Leonard, whom we met on the road to Peking, was now, minus an arm, a military attache´ to the American minister. The Marine legation guard continued without serious interruption until 8 December 1941.4 Peking was always considered by Marines that were there, and those that wished they were, as the cre`me de la cre`me of U.S. Marine duty. Capt. John W. Thomason, Jr., who was on duty in Peking during the 1930s, wrote extensively about what a grand place China was for the well financed Americans. His short stories of Marine service in China are considered classics of reality by those who served there at the time and many who wish they had. China policy was predicated heavily upon the fears of the foreigners in China: that another uprising like the Boxer Rebellion might take place at any time and that they would be unable to leave. In order to protect the foreign citizens, especially the legations at Peking, substantial military forces had to be available close by. Most importantly, the railway line from Peking to Tientsin had to be kept open and under the domination of the foreigners. Any move by the Chinese to counter any of those points would create a cause ce´le`bre and require instant response. Each member of the foreign community furnished armed guards and a naval force, just in case. None were very large—all the legations were expecting to be treated according to the treaty signed in Peking following the Boxer affair, which declared that all would be considered as under, and covered by, the diplomatic code. The United States had, and would continue to have, the largest military contingent in Peking. Eventually there was a near-battalion-sized Marine Guard, and two battalions of the 15th U.S. Infantry at Tientsin.5 Protecting Americans in China, particularly north China, required a serious reorganization of the U.S. Navy Asiatic fleet. In those days, navy and Marine activities were governed by State Department policies, as to a certain extent is still true today. Often the department didn’t take that into consideration as it negotiated settlements and made agreements. It would place burdens upon the Navy Department that were sometimes impossible to carry. During this entire period the relationship between China and the United States of America was not on as high a plane as it should have been. For one thing, Congress had passed laws that excluded people from the Orient

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from emigrating to the United States. The Burlingame Treaty of 1868 had been very popular with the Chinese, because it decreed that “all men should be allowed to move wherever and whenever they so choose.” But the reality was quite different. Within ten years Congress had concocted and rapidly enacted an exclusion law prohibiting persons from the Orient from becoming American citizens. In San Francisco, especially, the continual savage abuse of the Chinese residents occurred on an almost daily basis. That was in addition to the great number of Chinese laborers being murdered by Californian mobs. The indignities heaped upon Chinese merchants by San Francisco Customs officials aroused deep resentment among the better-educated Chinese. This was especially true in Canton and other cities that regularly exported goods to the United States. Many of the officials in Chinese government who were in charge of foreign relations had been educated in the United States. They were consequently more naturally inclined toward the U.S. as China’s instinctive friend than toward most European nations and the Japanese. But the unjust treatment of their fellows in the United States brought about deep resentment and the anti-American boycott of 1905. It was more a Cantonese than a national movement; nevertheless, as an indication of new forces and tendencies its significance was unmistakable, and public opinion in the United States was visibly impressed. President Roosevelt went so far as to convey to all diplomatic representatives that the U.S. government would guarantee admission to America, and courteous treatment, of all Chinese travelers and students. But there was still no unrestricted immigration. If there had been, it undoubtedly would have meant civil war on the Pacific coast. Citizens of the United States were and would continue to be as bigoted against Asians as they were and would continue to be against each other. Still, as a further attempt to mollify Chinese attitudes toward the United States, a large portion of the indemnity paid by a prostrate China after the Boxer Rebellion was returned in 1908. At least it was a beginning. China used some of those funds to educate Chinese students in the United States; the balance went to establish Tsinghua College in Peking. Mr. Rockhill, the American minister at Peking, can be given credit for a far-reaching, intelligent policy. It certainly created an excellent base upon which the two nations could recover their natural friendly tendencies toward each other. THE CHINESE REVOLUTION BEGINS On 9 October 1911, one of the most significant events of China’s history occurred—a bomb exploded in the Russian concession at Hankow. Chinese revolutionaries had blundered during the construction of explosives. This incident caused some destruction and several casualties, and on the following day a Chinese officer was shot at Wuchang by one of his soldiers. But

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most importantly, it was the beginning of the Chinese revolution of 1911. The revolution against the Manchu regime had been long in planning, and it would generate an entirely new cycle in Chinese affairs, even though it began a week earlier than planned. The rebels were against the government, though they intensely hated all things foreign as well. For a while the legations at Peking seemed to be in no serious trouble; therefore the Marines were watchful, but nothing more. So was the U.S. Navy, which continued to patrol up and down the Yangtze River. The gunboat Helena, returning to Hankow from upriver on 12 October, unexpectedly found numerous foreign ships berthed there. It was but two days after the explosion, and it still wasn’t commonly known among foreigners that a revolution was beginning. But within days Helena found itself ferrying frightened U.S. missionaries from Wuchang across the river to the comparative safety of Hankow. There were three admirals on hand— British, German, and Japanese, with the latter, Vice Adm. Kawashima, the senior officer present. To support the German marines already ashore, in the suppression of looters, Kawashima gave orders to land U.S. and British marines. An American naval officer, Lt. Clarence L. Arnold, assisted by 2d Lt. Adolph B. Miller, USMC, and Ens. Andrew D. Denney, USN, was sent ashore with twenty-seven U.S. Marines and twenty-three bluejackets, with two Colt machine guns. In less than an hour they were in action, helping the Germans defend their concession. The situation soon settled down, and there were no further casualties. Four days later, Miller took 20 Marines ashore to guard the American consulate general. A few days later two more American ships, the Villalobos and Elcano, landed sailors and Marines to assist Helena’s men in defending the Japanese buildings.6 For ten days beginning on 4 November 1911, 24 shipboard Marines at Shanghai were transferred to duty at two American cable stations in the vicinity. This was duty that Marines enjoyed; they thrilled at getting into a shooting war. There was little enough of that during this period, and the average Marine was tired of sitting aboard ship doing literally nothing. At first the “loyal army,” led by Yuan Shih-k’ai, easily defeated the rebel forces. But it was soon evident that the rebels were there to stay, and efforts to negotiate with them became the order of the day. A secret agreement reached at a meeting in Shanghai provided for the safe exit of the Manchu dynasty. Sun Yat-sen, who had been a resident of the United States, had returned to his homeland four days before. He had dedicated his entire life to the destruction of Imperial China and was the man most responsible for the overthrow of the Manchus. On 29 December 1911, Sun became the first president of the new republic, and on 1 January 1912 he formally assumed that role at Nanking. It wasn’t long before Yuan Shih-k’ai’s “unruly troops” were causing the new civilian leadership many woes, especially in Peking. There the foreign-

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ers were being harassed; they would soon be forced to flee to the safety of the legation quarters. There was now a significant changeover; in a little over two months Sun Yat-sen was no longer president; he had stepped aside in Yuan’s favor. On 10 March Yuan was formally installed at Peking as provisional president. But constant turmoil continued for the next year as Yuan persisted in his efforts to consolidate control of the country. Another man had been selected premier, the actual ruler of China. Sun’s political party, the Kuomintang (KMT), began an aggressive effort to win votes and, as a result, seats in parliament. Often referred to as “the Revolution that Failed,” the troubles in China continued for another dozen or more years until another revolution broke out in the mid-twenties. That would be led by Chiang Kai-shek, one of Sun’s young followers. His would be more successful, but he too would have his work cut out. China was still not ready for parliamentary democracy or any kind of republican government. At this writing, she still isn’t. MARINE INTRUSIONS IN CHINA For at least the next half-dozen years, until the beginnings of the next decade, China duty for Marines was restricted to the Peking legation guard. However, there were a number of Marine landings from navy ships, or shipments of Marines from the Philippines to trouble spots in China. For the most part, within a few days or weeks they soon returned to their starting points. Only the legation guard remained constant, as the situation in China was becoming more difficult for foreigners while the various factions maneuvered for position. During the period 10 October 1911 through 19 January 1914, Companies C and D of the 1st Marine Regiment and Companies B and E of the 2d Marine Regiment, all from the Philippines, served on board the USS Rainbow. Maj. Philip H. Bannon commanded the 15 officers and 360 enlisted Marines, most of whom remained aboard all winter. Most likely the Marines would much rather have been embroiled in a shooting war than cramped aboard ship. There was a bit of relief when one company was assigned to reinforce the legation guard at Peking in December; more went in March 1912. During the following spring and summer, all of those Marines served ashore and afloat at various locations in China. They formed a sort of amphibious force in waiting. As an example of their duties during this period, on 24 August 1912 Capt. Thomas Turner, with one company of Marines from the Rainbow, landed on Kentucky Island, near Shanghai.7 Turner’s troop was recalled on the 26th, but that same day a different force was landed at Camp Nicholson and remained there until the 30th, when it too was withdrawn. For the Marines affected, this movement on and off the ship was almost like a revolving door. It would happen regularly for

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the next 15 or so years. But no matter what duties they were engaged in ashore, most would have agreed that it was much better than remaining aboard ship. Throughout this long, troubled period, the U.S. Army also maintained a force in China. In the beginning it was a single battalion of the 15th Infantry, commanded by Maj. James M. Arrasmith, formerly of the 18th Infantry. On 18 January 1912 it landed about 150 miles northeast of Tientsin, at Chinwangtao. Shortly after it was reassigned to Tientsin, soon to be its permanent station. The battalion had been detached from the Philippine Island command to provide support for American citizens in the aftermath of the 1911–1912 revolution. At the special request of the American minister, a detachment of six officers and 229 soldiers was sent from Tientsin to support the Marine legation guard. Upon arrival on 3 March 1912, it was sent to guard the four American missionary missions lying outside the legation compound. A week later the remainder of Major Bannon’s expeditionary force arrived at Peking and relieved those elements of the 15th, which returned to Tientsin. When British troops were withdrawn from China during the early months of World War I, the United States assumed responsibility along the railways in the German zone. Its troops were to relieve British troops that had been guarding the railroad between Tongshan and Lanchow. This was at the especial request of the Japanese, who would soon also be a belligerent nation (on the British side). In order to comply fully with this formal request, in September 1914 the 2d Battalion of the 15th Infantry was shipped to China. Both battalions would remain there until 1938.8 LEGATION GUARD DUTY Meanwhile, during the early stages of the Chinese Revolution, the Peking legation guard unit had been increased, and it was now of nearly battalion size. Most of the replacements had been sent from various navy ships in the vicinity. In his memoir, written many years later, a Marine would relate how he and his fellows, about 100 officers and men in all, were transferred from the Philippines to Peking during the fall of 1911.9 By the time they arrived the situation was basically under control, and the new arrivals’ main interest was where they would live and what they would eat. Apparently they were satisfied on both accounts. Payday for Marines at Peking could be a remarkable time for the relatively unsophisticated young men. Sometimes the Marines were paid in Japanese money, and sometimes Russian. No one trusted the easily counterfeited Chinese money, and that included coinage. On payday a trader in currency would come to the barracks and trade U.S. currency for Chinese silver. The Marines would frequently receive 12 dollars in silver for 10

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dollars in American cash. Evidently the Chinese silver coinage they received might have been debased, but never counterfeited. Marines have always been able to adapt to any situation, and they soon worked out a great system with the locals. On the 15th of each month the Marines could draw new clothes; in fact, it was called “clothing payday.” The scheme was for Marines to find out what clothing the local traders (fences?) were interested in and then request new clothes according to the demand. Of course the Marines had to do some fancy footwork to get the clothing out of the confines of their barracks. Presumably a friendly Marine guard possibly engaged in the same traffic, would be on the gate when the culprit wished to deliver the goods. Jodon tells us that one time he requested tan shoes, size 12 (for a policeman at the local bank); the quartermaster sergeant looked at him “kind of funny.” The officer in command said, “You heard what the man said. What stunned the sergeant was that I wore a size five double E.” Their quarters had no sewerage system; the toilets were copper vessels with chemicals inside. Each morning the Chinese servants would remove the copper vessels and the refuse therein and replace them with fresh vessels. Each squad room had its own Chinese “boy,” who would take care of the squad room and keep it clean. Usually the same man would take all their laundry to the cleaner and bring it back when finished. They even had Chinese barbers, who would bring in a basin of hot water to the squad rooms and shave anyone who had the price. According to Jodon, “the Marines never had to work any.” Jodon’s description of the food served would make you wish that you were a Marine on duty at the legation guard in Peking right now, or at least then. He insinuates that officers tried to arrange matters so that they could eat at the enlisted mess instead of at their own. That of course was not allowed, because there could be no socializing with the troops, even though their food was better. The guard formed an association that organized a drinking and eating society. It cost five dollars U.S. to join, and eventually almost all the enlisted Marines belonged. One of the members, a sergeant major, got so drunk one night that the next morning he put himself upon report. He earned a thirty-day confinement in his own home and had to report to the sergeant of the guard every day. That was strict attention to duty—no wonder he was a sergeant major. Not every moment was fun. The Marine legation detachment had its duties to perform, some of which were even military in nature. Marines at Peking spent a full month on the rifle range, which of course enabled the detachment to produce many crack shots for competitive shooting. Also according to Jodon, the legation Marines received thirty-six wild Mongolian horses and with them formed a troop of cavalry.10 The animals were wild and as ornery as they could be. One skeptic said they “were as

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tough as ten cent steak.” Reports say they stood about 12 hands, weighed in at about 800 pounds, and were all meanness, even after they had been broken. The Marines had to send to Manila for cavalry saddles and once they arrived it took some time to cinch the saddles on the ponies. “We finally got on them, and then the fun began.” After a few splendid motions on the part of the riders and mounts, the Marines finally broke the ponies. According to reports, there were enough trained bronc-busters to do the job. Afterward, those Marines that were still physically able were then given the task of escorting mission people to safety in case of trouble. Jodon admits that the unit never had to escort anyone while he was there. That would change later; the mounted Marines would, at times, be well occupied. The first group included seven Marines—one sergeant, one corporal, and five privates. The commander at Peking, Col. Dion Williams, requested an increase to one officer, two sergeants, four corporals, and 24 privates. His request was duly approved, and the troop became a full-fledged platoon.11 In February 1912 the local Chinese troops were not paid. That situation meant serious trouble for everyone, including the Marine legation detachment. It also happened to be the Marines’ payday and many of them were in town celebrating. The members of the detachment on liberty were quickly rounded up and prepared for any action that might ensue. Marines filled sandbags and barricaded Legation Street, the main street running through the American sector. A number of the Chinese soldiers rioted and looted anything standing in their path. They also attempted to loot the local bank but were quickly stopped by the Marines. It was a very critical and upsetting period, and it lasted for about six weeks. Marines were on alert 24 hours a day and made many changes in the defensive positions. These changes included digging tunnels and placing mines, none of which were ever used. During the troubles the Chinese never bothered the Marines. Some even provided them beer, and perhaps other libations—for a fee, of course. Eventually things got back to normal, or as normal as things could ever be in China. (At that point, Major Bannon’s detachment would be formally transferred from Peking back to the fleet to resume its offshore watching and waiting. However, not everything was entirely smooth. Several times during that summer, sailors and Marines were landed for protection of American interests—and that would continue for many years to come.) British soldiers taught the Marines how to play hockey, and then the Chinese built the Marines a rink. After that, Jodon says, if they could help it the troops were never off the ice. In fact, according to him, after they were taught the game the Marines won the first hockey match they and the British played together. But otherwise, he also added, the Marines didn’t get along with the British soldiers, or the French either. The English and French, according to Jodon, would take every opportunity to jump any

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Marine who was alone and “rough him up a bit.” One time they made a mistake: six British soldiers jumped a single Marine who, unbeknownst to them, was a professional heavyweight. He left them all lying in a pile and went merrily on his way. But the Marines usually got along with most of the other foreign troops in Peking, especially the Russians. Those friendly relations had carried forward from the Boxer period when they had served and bled together. During July and August 1913, Marines were landed from the USS Albany and the ever-present USS Rainbow. The former was commanded by Cdr. Mark L. Bristol and the latter by Lt. Cdr. Daniel W. Wurtsbaugh. Marines and sailors were on and off both ships between 7 July and 17 August, sometimes remaining ashore for only a day before being recalled. No Marines or bluejackets sent ashore during this period ever came to any serious harm, nor, apparently, did they cause anyone harm. For many years it was a matter of course to be included in landing parties. Probably it was the only real excitement that sailors or Marines encountered in their periods of service. Most likely, their only regret was that they didn’t get to shoot anyone. But those were the hazards of military service. THE GREAT WAR AND JAPAN’S “NEW ORDER” IN CHINA When the Great War began in 1914, most of the belligerents—Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia—began pulling their troops out of China. Only the Americans and the Japanese remained, much as before the war, except the latter fomented trouble in China while the former did what it could to constrain it. Japan declared war against Germany in 1914 and for some time busily grabbed German territory in China and the Pacific. This busy-work kept it from continued harassment in the settlement and against the Chinese nation as a whole. Early on, Japan took over the German concession in Shantung Province. Afterward it attempted to keep the province, consequently providing more grist for China’s mill. Japan had managed to take Korea but wanted much more of its neighbor’s territory. After all, the Europeans had appropriated much of eastern China; why not its nearest neighbor, Japan? This would continue for many years and go far beyond the demands of the Europeans. It would in fact eventually include all of China. Woodrow Wilson and many of his shortsighted advisors were convinced that through the efforts of the many American missionaries, the Chinese would soon be Christian. That change would, of course, make them more acceptable. Even in those days, the American public had much stronger positive feelings for the Chinese than they did for the Japanese. It became especially true following Japan’s defeat of Russia in 1904–1905. Jumping on and defeating an Asian nation was considered de rigueur. But to do the

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same to an occidental nation was bad form. In 1917 the United States, now a belligerent itself, negotiated with Japan about China and agreed to allow “Japan special interest and relationship within certain areas in China, namely Shantung.” But many Americans saw the agreement as a reversal of the “Open Door” principles that the U.S. had so ferociously stood for, for so many years. Many Chinese felt shocked and betrayed by the U.S. and the old relationship was soon headed for serious trouble. Some Chinese government officials turned toward the new Soviet government for succor instead of to the United States. This was to cause the Chinese republic more trouble in the decades ahead. It would also upset the status quo between the Great Republic and China for more than a decade. THE U.S. NAVY ON CHINA’S RIVERS During the entire time the 4th Marines served in China, it interacted with U.S. Navy gunboats plying the Yangtze River.12 Their association was close, and in the 1930s Marines were called upon to act as armed guards aboard some of the larger craft. In addition, the 4th Marines provided armed guards for privately owned American boats on the Yangtze.13 The larger rivers and offshore waters of China were crowded with bandits. They ceaselessly jumped ships on the rivers, often killing the crews and passengers, and took prizes. “Prizes” were anything of value they didn’t already own, and most of them were paupers to begin with. Armed guards were soon no longer considered a burden—they were a necessity. It had not always been thus. In the early days ships, foreign or domestic, could traverse the rivers without hindrance. But with the turmoil of the early twentieth century, pirates became a daily impediment. Before the turn of the nineteenth century, travel by American ships on Chinese waterways had not been common. But there are some examples of U.S. Navy warships that experimented up the Yangtze. The first was the Susquehanna, which traveled from Shanghai to Wuhu in June 1854. Twenty years later, in April 1874, the Ashuelot made a three-month, 1000mile journey from Shanghai to just below the great gorges. U.S. warships wouldn’t again cruise the river on a regular basis until after the Boxer Rebellion. Then the main reason would be to protect American ships, which like those of many other nations, sailed as far up the river as conditions would allow. Something had to be done to protect Americans and their goods; the gunboat, with its shallow draft, seemed to be the answer. The first to sail the Yangtze was the USS Monocacy, on 29 May 1914. She was closely followed a few days later by USS Palos. From that point on the U.S. Navy vessels worked up and down the great river, frequently fighting off pirates or patriots—sometimes the same people were both. Like the men of the

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15th Infantry, the 4th Marines and the Peking legation detachment, they too did what was needed. In 1920 the U.S. Navy revised its longtime policy of having its gunboats under a separate command. They were henceforth to be a part of the Asiatic Fleet. Rear Adm. William H. G. Bullard, USN, boarded his flagship, the USS Isabel, on 12 October 1921 and became the first flag officer in command of the U.S. gunboats on the river. At this time their base was shifted from Manila to Shanghai. Two years later the Navy requested and received funds for the construction of six new gunboats to replace most of the aging patrol craft in service. The six—Guam, Tutuila, Oahu, Panay, Luzon, and Mindano—were built in Shanghai and joined the fleet between 1927 and 1928. This service continued almost until Pearl Harbor. The USS Wake went the farthest into the interior and was the last to arrive at Shanghai. Its greatly reduced crew—the skipper and fourteen radiomen—was captured on 8 December 1941. It appears that most of the sailors of the other gunboats managed to escape to Corregidor, where they were captured with the other defenders of that rock in May 1942.14 WARLORDS AND MORE LANDINGS OF MARINES IN CHINA A violent ruckus between two Chinese warlords, Wu Pie-fu and Chang Tso-lin, both of whom were vying for power in north China, called for additional Marines ashore. The Marines aboard ships of the Asiatic Fleet were formed into a battalion and on 5 May 1922 were sent ashore at Taku to bunk with the 15th Infantry at Tientsin. Within a few days the discord settled down, and all returned to their respective ships to wait for the next call. A few days before that incident, the Marine detachment aboard the USS Albany had been disembarked for service directly with the Peking guard. It remained ashore under the command of Capt. Charles H. Martin from 28 April until 5 May, when it was recalled.15 On 5 May, Capt. Roy C. Swink and a battalion of Marines was landed from the USS Huron at Taku, only to be diverted six hundred miles south to Shanghai, where they remained until the 11th of May.16 Swink was a veteran of the 4th Brigade and had had to face a lot worse conditions in France during the world war than crossing six hundred miles of desolate China with a battalion-sized unit of officers and men. Still, the leadership and command qualities of Marine junior officers of that period, and others, never cease to amaze. In 1924, there was further distress, but this time it was at Shanghai. Two warlords were scrapping about the territory around and including Shanghai. The troops of one of them mutinied; he (the warlord) and his cronies

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rapidly made for the comfort and safety of the city. That brought in undesirable elements, who created much disturbance. Residents were frightened, and out went the usual call: “Send the Marines.” Thirty-one Marines, commanded by 1st Lt. John F. Thornton, disembarked from the USS Asheville at Shanghai on 6 October.17 Capt. Francis S. Kieren and 101 men from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force were also landed at Shanghai, on that same date.18 The detachment from Asheville was withdrawn on the 24th of October, but the force led by Kieren was transferred directly to Tientsin, on the 31st. Kieren and his company arrived there on 4 November, and they remained until 8 February 1925. At that time they too were withdrawn to Asheville. In January 1925 the Marine detachment from the USS Sacramento had been sent to help defend the settlement at Shanghai, but in early February, when the danger passed it too was withdrawn. Up north, more trouble required more Marines. At the request of the American minister another detachment of 225 Marines, from the Huron, was sent ashore to reinforce the legation guard. An additional 50 were sent to stay with the 15th Infantry at Tientsin as potential reinforcements for the capital. Many years later, a former Marine enlisted man remembered his days of China duty. Pvt. John Rose had taken sick on guard duty at San Diego when slated for transfer to Guam. When he recovered, he found that he was headed for Peking instead. There he would remain, as a member of the guard, for three years. In July 1924 he arrived at the main gate, Tian An Men (men meaning gate) the gate had been better known to Myers and his Marines in 1900 as Chien Men.19 When he settled in, Rose was assigned to the 39th Machine Gun Company. Later, after he did a repair job on a steel tower used for radio power lines, a U.S. Navy warrant officer asked him to transfer to the Radio Section, which was manned completely by Marines. He did, preforming a maintenance function there until his China service terminated. In the meantime he managed to “inspect” the Japanese radio equipment, noting that they had “re-created” the American transmitter “right down to the number plates.” He also was engaged in many other activities, such as building a 100-watt shortwave radio that made the first land-to-land transmission from Peking to San Diego. Rose mentions that the detachment commander, Col. Louis McC. Little, owned several race horses and seemed to favor them over his troops.20 Some other interesting tidbits include the fact that booze was not allowed in the legation quarters, since the United States was then in the throes of the Volstead Act—but anyone that wanted it could get his cup filled just outside the gates. Liberty uniform was dress blues with blue barracks-cap cover, but most Marines had civvies made up and wore them on liberty instead. According to Rose, the Chinese ricksha drivers tended to take every Marine in uniform to a brothel, no matter where they wanted to go. Rose returned to the States and was discharged as a private in 1926.21

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As each year advanced to another there was more conflict between the various factions maneuvering for control of China. Warlords were fighting warlords; Chiang and the KMT were very busy, fighting both warlords and communists. Chiang was making some progress toward stability but not enough to allow the foreigners to feel completely safe. The situation required even greater activity by Marines on the Asiatic Station. Marines were landed from U.S. Navy ships in larger numbers and more frequently than ever before. All foreigners, including Americans, were continually targets of Chinese soldiers and mobs. Many were badly hurt, and some were killed. The tumult increased dramatically during 1925 and 1926, and so did the number of landings made by U.S. Marines. In January, Asheville Marines landed at Tsingtao when a clash between warlord armies made the already dangerous situation in that area much too fragile for foreigners. Also, 1st Lt. Howard N. Stent, USMC, led 28 Marines from the Sacramento into Shanghai on 15 January; they remained until the 22d of that month. Capt. James P. Schwerin led the 2d Provisional Company from the Philippines into Shanghai on the 22d of January. Schwerin and his company would remain until 9 February, when they returned to the Philippines. Capt. Angus Wilson, with 127 Marines of the 2d Provisional Company, arrived in Shanghai from the Philippines in June 1925, staying until the 29th of August. They were shipped aboard the USS Abarenda and remained there within “striking distance.” On 9 November they were again called upon to land, but at Tientsin, where they remained for seven months. On 1 July 1925, Capt. William P. Richards landed at Shanghai with the Marine detachment from the USS Huron, remaining until the 29th. Another detachment, 69 Marines under Capt. Omar T. Pfeiffer, landed at Shanghai on 30 December.22 The Second Provisional Company at Tientsin was finally withdrawn to the Sacramento on 9 June 1926, and Pfeiffer’s Marines were removed from Shanghai on the 12th of March 1926. Every day the situation among the various Chinese factions was growing more fractious. More and more US Marines were being called upon to protect their citizenry in a highly ignitable, extremely combustible nation. Their main support base were the detachments offshore in the Asiatic Fleet or the few hundred Marines in the Philippines. Had a conflict of a serious nature occurred, those few hundred Marines would have been badly compromised. It was the good fortune of the decision makers in Washington to have a stalwart body of men on the scene who could be trusted to come through in almost any situation—and come out on top. But those same people in Washington were pressing their luck if they expected miracles forever. The situation was really beginning to heat up. Adm. Clarence S. Williams, now commander of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, was feeling constant pres-

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sure from Americans in China. He had already requested additional Marines from the States. Capt. Walter E. McCaughtry and Carl F. Merz, with 125 Marines from Guam, shipped aboard the USS Gold Star for China on 7 November 1926 and landed five days later at Chinwangtao.23 But half a company wasn’t anywhere near enough manpower. It was another bandaid action where major surgical intervention was required. Somehow these small units of Marines managed to keep the blood from flowing freely. THE SECOND CHINESE REVOLUTION The unrest and upset in China that afflicted foreigners was caused mainly by Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang, the young follower of Sun Yat-sen, was making a serious effort to unite China and rid it not only of foreigners but also of the warlords—each of whom had his personal army and agenda. Every warlord’s army had many thousands of poor, starving “second sons,” badly needing occupations. There were many such people, formed into huge, independent military hordes, well equipped and trained. These were considerable and formidable legions, but Chiang’s army was quite successful against them. As a graduate of the Japanese military academy in Tokyo, he had military skills that were already well developed, though later events might conflict with that assessment.24 To begin with, Chiang and his Cantonese forces had declared opposition to all foreign imperialism and had forced a boycott upon the British. He approached the city of Nanking, bringing about severe distress in that city. Eight foreigners were killed, and much of their property was looted or destroyed. Fifty-eight foreigners were forced to evacuate their homes; they wound up behind the wire fence of the Socony Hill oil compound to the east of town. British Marines and sailors landed a small force to protect them. The British gunboats brought their heaviest guns to bear upon the Chinese, who were attempting to break in, and finally managed to disperse them. But something more had to be done, something that would satisfy the needs of and placate the American residents of China. At this stage it appeared that the American government, always unwilling to resort to military action in China, would finally be forced to do so for its citizens. The matter was under serious consideration in Washington, even Pres. Calvin Coolidge had been brought into the discussions.25 Shanghai appeared to be Chiang’s main target from the very beginning. This was mainly because of the warlord Chang Tso-lin’s presence. The socalled “Christian” general and his massive army were the most troublesome of Chiang’s opponents. The residents of the entire Yangtze River Valley, especially the panicky foreign residents, were in a veritable state of chaos. No Caucasian was entirely sure what to expect from Chiang, and none wanted to find out firsthand. He had let it be known that he was going to carry out Sun Yat-sen’s revolution and that he didn’t care how much violence was perpetrated against foreigners during the course of it. That atti-

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tude and his closing in on Shanghai were reasons for the increased activity of Marines in that vicinity. As far as the U.S. minister, John Van A. MacMurray was concerned, Chiang’s victorious march down the Yangtze River Valley and the occupation of Nanking, with its attendant ferocity and rapine, were the last straws. To protect American lives and investment in China, MacMurray requested Admiral Williams to supply as many sailors and Marines from the fleet as possible. Williams quickly responded. His first move was to send ashore a force of 15 officers and 326 Marines on 9 February 1927 to assist in defending the International Settlement at Shanghai.26 Three fast cruisers were ordered to the eastern waters in order to back up Williams and the Marines in China. So far, this was the largest-ever concentration of U.S. naval and military power near the mainland of Asia. Before the unrest was even partially settled, it would get much larger. Major Samuel P. Budd, with four companies of Marines, the 88th, 89th, 90th, and 91st (Machine Gun), from Cavite, disembarked from the USS Pecos and landed at Shanghai on 9 February to assist in preserving order in the International Settlement. A provisional battalion of 337 Marines under the command of Maj. Julian P. Willcox was formed at Guam and in the Philippines for service in China. That group was strengthened by Marines from the Yangtze River gunboats as well as the Sacramento and Asheville. They joined Budd’s group from Cavite, then all were sent to bolster the 4th Marines at Shanghai. The necessary manpower was slowly being collected. In Williams’s opinion, there still weren’t enough Marines ashore to meet the occasion. It had become evident to other observers that if the U.S. was to remain in China, large military forces would have to be shipped there as soon as possible. American officials on the scene recognized that a small body of men could no longer stave off huge Chinese armies equipped with modern weapons. Williams fully agreed and officially requested that a full regiment of Marines be shipped to China immediately. This was at a time when the Marine Corps, like the army and navy, was severely underbudgeted, and consequently understaffed for the many tasks the State Department assigned to it. Nicaragua would be coming up in the near future; so would a few continental duties, like guarding the U.S. mails aboard trains. State was convinced that the Navy and Marines had to be available to satisfy needs in national and international arenas; the Congress didn’t seem duly impressed. It consistently cut military budgets but didn’t find it necessary to restrict State or the president from military intrusions in foreign affairs. THE 4TH MARINES ARRIVE IN CHINA As a result of the pressure, President Coolidge ordered a Marine regiment to the Far East to defend American lives and property. In a rapid response,

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the 4th Marine Regiment, then stationed in San Diego, was quickly outfitted to be sent to China for duty. The one exclusion to its anticipated duties was that it was not to defend the integrity of the International Settlement. The regiment was given explicit instructions to protect only Americans; if the Chinese made attempts to enter the settlement, the Marines were not to oppose them. As we will see, that provision would make life, and the performance of duty, very difficult in the days ahead.27 Until January 1927, the strength of the 4th Marines totaled only 37 officers and 345 men. By late January, when the regiment reassembled in San Diego, the totals had reached 80 percent of its authorized strength of 1,500 men.28 It was commanded by Col. Charles S. “Jumbo” Hill.29 The 4th Marines, less the 2d Battalion, embarked aboard the USS Chaumont and sailed on 3 February 1927 for Shanghai.30 Although they arrived on the 24th of the same month, for political reasons the Marines were not permanently disembarked until 21 March, nearly a month later. It was a very uncomfortable two months for passengers and crew. On board were the regimental headquarters and service companies, along with the 1st Battalion, commanded by Maj. Theodore A. Secor, and the newly formed 3rd Battalion, which was commanded by Maj. Alexander A. Vandegrift. His battalion included the 19th, 21st, 22d, and 24th Companies.31 Upon his arrival, at the urging of Admiral Williams to cooperate, and contrary to orders, Colonel Hill called upon Maj. Gen. John Duncan, senior British army commander. The latter had been requested by the Municipal Council to take charge of the defenses of the settlement. Duncan planned to extend his forces around the settlement perimeter and two areas outside that also included foreign interests. Those were the residential areas to the west and the predominately Japanese district extending to the north along the North Szechuan Road. Therefore, it was decided to push out beyond the political boundaries of the settlement to the west to include the raised-bed railroad tracks of the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railroad. That barrier of earth would provide the settlements with cover from any rifle or machine-gun fire, instead of the open ground where the settlements’ bounds really were. The French did not join in the common defense scheme. Because of their stance, and to protect the integrity of the settlement, the other military forces were also forced to defend the northern bounds of the French concession. Historically it wouldn’t be the last time that the French marched to the sounds of a different drummer. The International Settlement, a Western enclave in a hostile city of more than 3,000,000 Chinese, had been created by an agreement between China and Great Britain in 1846; it initially covered an area of about 140 acres. Within two years the acreage had increased to 470. In 1863 the sprawling 1,300-acre U.S. settlement was incorporated into the main settlement. In 1899, through agreements worked out with the Chinese, more acreage was added; the total then stood at nearly 5,600 acres. Under an 1849 agree-

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ment, the original French concession was 164 acres, by 1914 its total would increase to more than 2,500 acres, or nearly half the entire International Settlement. Whereas the foreigners totaled only about 60,000, eventually Chinese citizens were able to move into the settlement areas, and by 1929 one and a half million lived in the two concessions. Within the settlements, the laws of each nation applied to its own citizens, but the Chinese in the settlements were still governed by their own courts. The municipal government hired and paid the police, who were mainly Sikhs from India, although in later years large numbers of Chinese were hired and formed into a separate police force. The Marines and Sikhs admired each other; for some reason, the Sikhs began calling any Marine they saw “John.” The Marines returned the “favor” and started calling the Sikhs “John.” Even after General Duncan’s defense plans were implemented, the extensive boundaries were sparsely protected by the international troops. Duncan was limited to specific areas, and those were outfitted with barbed wired and sandbagged barricades. He had about 20,000 troops, of which nearly 14,000 were British, 3,000 Japanese, 1,500 Americans, and approximately another 650 various others. In addition there was a body called the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, totaling some 1,400; in later years it would increase to about 2,000. It was composed of civilians of various nationalities, and when things really got rough some of its units were utilized.32 The French had about 3,000 troops in their concession, which mattered little to the other settlement partners, since they couldn’t be called upon. Perhaps as a sop to Hill’s orders, internal security rather than perimeter duty became the Marines’ responsibility. Their territory was composed of two unconnected areas that made up two-thirds of the total settlement. The eastern area included all the settlement east of Hongchew Creek.33 The western area included nearly all the settlement west of Carter Road. Secor’s 1st Battalion and Willcox’s Provisional Battalion divided the eastern area between them.34 Major Vandegrift’s 3d Battalion assumed responsibility for the western area (see Map 3.1). A force divided in that way wasn’t a good situation, but Hill had no alternative. His instructions precluded the Marines from defending anything but the integrity of the American settlement. Because there was no connection where the settlement was divided, consequently Hill’s units were badly compromised. A severe problem was the fact that the Marines were still aboard their ship, at least five miles downstream. Besides being cramped and extremely uncomfortable, they were forced each morning to use lighters to get to their destinations and back each evening. Colonel Hill had already requested Admiral Williams to allow the Chaumont to tie up at the Bund in downtown Shanghai, but the admiral failed to respond, even after Chaumont’s captain also urged him to do so. Possibly he was embarrassed by the situation and was ignoring the situation in hopes it would go away. Loading onto and off lighters was at least four times slower than landing troops

Map 3.1. Shanghai, 1927

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directly onto the dock. Apparently no one considered the possibility of Chinese violence after dark, when the Marines were asleep in their bunks aboard the ship. On the morning of 4 March the Meifoo XIV, a Standard Oil ship, went upriver towing barges. The Meifoo had been commandeered by a local warlord near Hangchow on the 19th of February, and now he was using it to drag a string of barges loaded with his troops up the river. Piling into another company boat, Lt. Col. Fredrick D. Kilgore, executive officer of the 4th Marines, led 30 Marines from the 22d Company and took off after it. Kilgore overtook the barges and without resistance regained custody of the ship, returning it to Standard Oil. After more than a month aboard the Chaumont, Marines took it upon themselves to stretch their legs on terra firma. The event was identified as a training march through the settlement area, but the men still had to return back to the ship once it was fulfilled. The first hike took place on 5 March. The troops were limited in what they carried; they didn’t carry any ammunition and accordingly lacked real fighting capability had the situation required it. On 21 March, after a 16-day hiatus, the second training march took place, but this time the men were ready for action. Each Marine had ammunition, and an additional supply had been loaded aboard lighters for any eventuality. The reason for the switch was that the vanguard of Nationalist troops had reached Lungwha Junction, on the southern outskirts of the city of Shanghai. Within the settlement perimeter, General Duncan’s troops stood ready for trouble. The 4th Marines’ march went off without trouble, and by evening it was again back aboard the ship. Capt. Harold S. Fassett, 2d Lt. Edwin C. Ferguson, and 62 Marines landed at Shanghai on 25 March to act as a semipermanent patrol for the Bund. But the situation and direction changed, and before noon the following day they returned aboard ship. These Marines again landed on 31 March but were back on their vessel on the 3d of April. Why this happened isn’t clear, but with so many levels of command, the reason could have been almost anything.35 First Lt. John M. Greer and 16 of the Marines aboard the gunboat Sacramento were sent ashore to guard the property of the Universal Leaf and Tobacco Company at Pootung, on the south side of the Whangpoo River. They arrived on 24 March and remained until the 19th of April, which allowed at least those few Marines to stretch their legs ashore for that brief period. Fortunately nothing unpleasant occurred. This was not within the U.S. settlement, and being there effectively exposed those Marines to any group that had grudges to settle. Lieutenant Colonel Kilgore, commanding the 4th in the absence of Colonel Hill, received a phone call from Admiral Williams’s chief of staff. It was a long-overdue order to send the regiment ashore on a permanent basis—and of course immediately, if not sooner. It seems that the American consul, Mr. Clarence E. Gauss, had finally approved the landing of Ma-

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rines. The Municipal Council had declared an emergency and had requested the assistance of all foreign troops at once. It appears it sensed real trouble ahead. It even called up the volunteers. This would provide an additional though modestly trained force which the Council could utilize when in distress. They at least could plug some holes, and there were plenty of holes that needed plugging. Within a few hours the 4th Marines was on duty within its two designated areas. The men believed that they were ready for anything. In Chapei there had been an uprising of the Chinese Communist Workers Militia against a warlord occupying much of Shanghai. The workers had anticipated the early arrival of Chiang’s Nationalist forces and expected their assistance. Meanwhile, a fierce struggle was going on. Rifle fire could easily be heard within the settlement; the communists were getting the better of the battle. About 1,000 armed Chinese from the warlord’s forces tried to escape by entering the British-held sector along the Range Road. The Durham Light Infantry opened fire upon them with machine guns, slaughtering hundreds before the unfortunates laid down their arms. At that point the survivors were rounded up and interned. A particularly fierce engagement was going on at the Shanghai North Station, not far from the British position. A White Russian contingent, fighting from an armored train for the same warlord, resisted bitterly against the Communists, and it wasn’t until 1800 on 22 March that it finally surrendered. Upon its arrival Chiang’s army took over positions from the Communist militia in Chapei. Gen. Pai Tsung-hsi, the Nationalist commander in the Shanghai area, issued an order on the 22d accepting responsibility for the maintenance of order in Shanghai. When queried, he denied that his troops would use force to recover China’s sovereign rights in the settlement—not yet at least. The allies didn’t take Pai’s message very seriously. They initiated a curfew for all Chinese residents and tightened their grip upon the many Chinese transients within the settlement, who were restricted and ordered to be off the streets after 2200 and before 0400. The 4th Marines, like all the other foreign troops, braced itself for an attack by the Nationalist forces upon the perimeter. Fortunately, it never came. Whatever Chiang’s plans to discontinue extraterritorial rights for the foreigners in Shanghai, the Nationalists had come to stay, and the foreigners had better make peace with them. ARRIVAL OF THE 3D MARINE BRIGADE Meanwhile, the Commandant, Maj. Gen. John A. Lejeune, had concluded that in order to provide a sufficient safety net for civilians and Marines, his forces in China must be built up to a brigade. He also decided that Smedley D. Butler, now a brigadier general, was just the man to run

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it. Butler, with several staff officers, left San Francisco for China on 6 March as the commander of the newly formed 3d Brigade. He was to assume command of the 4th Marines, already in China, and the 6th Marines, which had recently been reactivated and would soon be shipped. The 6th had been hurriedly reorganized at Philadelphia with personnel drawn from various Marine Corps posts in the eastern part of the country. It had then been rushed by rail to San Diego, where it was to embark as soon as possible. General Butler with his headquarters, a battery of artillery, and service troops arrived at Shanghai on 25 March. In his usual vigorous manner, Butler immediately assumed command ashore. After reviewing the situation, his first move was to issue an order clarifying the mission of the 4th Marines. As we know, his orders were clear. The Marines were not to defend any of the settlement, including the American portion. They were only to protect American citizens, not their property, and certainly not to become a “cat’s paw” for the foreign interests.36 Butler realized that Colonel Hill had already acted contrary to that directive when at General Duncan’s request he had allowed Major Vandegrift’s battalion to take up perimeter defense. However, Butler agreed with what Hill had done and quietly continued the same line of action. He ordered Hill and his regiment to support the perimeter if necessary to prevent a breakthrough. That, of course, was the only logical thing to do if the Marines were to complete their mission: to protect Americans and their property. The next situation he tackled was the extensive foot-patrol system the 4th Marines had initiated. Until then the area covered had been much too large for the limited number of Marines that were available; according to the official history of the regiment, they were being “run ragged.” Even with patrols reduced to as few as four men, some Marines were on duty as long as twenty-four hours at a stretch. Butler found that the municipal police and the Shanghai Volunteer Force were doing thorough jobs of patrolling the interior. He therefore decided that in each area the foot patrols would be replaced with Marines mounted in trucks as an instant reserve force, able to go where needed in very short order. In other words theirs was not to go on the defense but to be proactive, always the best course for any Marine force. Each truck had an officer, one noncommissioned officer, eight Marines with their usual complement of weapons, plus a Browning automatic rifle and a Thompson submachine gun. In case of a breakthrough, local Marine commanders were authorized to commit up to 50 percent of their commands to defend the perimeter, holding the balance in reserve. On 7 April 1927, the 6th Marines, less the 3d Battalion, arrived. It was accompanied by the 3d Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company, the Service Company, and a battery of 75 mm. tractor-drawn artillery. On 2 May a squadron of scouting, amphibian, and pursuit planes also arrived

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in Shanghai.37 Col. Harold C. Snyder was in overall command of the newly arrived units. The two regiments and their support units, including an air service, became the 3d Brigade. This was a very different kind of Marine Corp operation—no warship landing team this trip. The 3d Brigade was fully equipped and ready for anything. It was a military force of consequence, not the usual formation of light colonial infantry. This kind of brigade had not been seen before by anyone, anywhere. It was a fully balanced fighting unit with modern weapons and aircraft, and it would soon include tanks. In addition, it was led by the best man that the Corps had, to solve its sometimes very complicated and difficult political problems. He had been doing it for nearly thirty years, and doing it exceedingly well. He was the right man for the right job. The terrible excesses of the Boxer Rebellion, mostly against non-Chinese people, were still on every Caucasian’s mind. Some of the military people in China had served in Tientsin and Peking during those dreadful times. To them especially went the task of trying to comfort and convince their own nationals. Reassuring American residents in Shanghai was part of every Marine officer’s responsibility. Americans who lived in the French concession, where Marines were not allowed, were especially fearful. On 15 April the Safety Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai called upon General Butler for reassurance. Butler told it that in the event of real danger the Marines would go wherever necessary and take whatever steps were essential to protect American lives. That message seemed to settle the contentious point once and for all. All knew Butler or his reputation. In other words, nobody was going to keep the Marines out if they needed to enter the French concession. Butler would see to that if the time came. It isn’t clear whether the French government was aware of what to expect, but if the time came it wouldn’t be long before it would be. On 27 March Butler, in one of his confidential letters to Lejeune, candidly stated that the French “have acted throughout the whole affair as if they were most suspicious of our actions.” About a week later, in another letter, he said that if “we have the opportunity to save the lives of any foreigners we will do so; in fact we will save the lives of anybody.” Reports filtered through to Colonel Hill that the Nationalists were entering French territory. It appeared that they might be aiming to enter the rest of the International Settlement. Hill ordered Major Vandegrift to man all crossroads along Avenue Foch, the southern French boundary, located in his battalion’s zone. Vandegrift directed Capt. Ray A. “Torchy” Robinson to take his 21st Company and block all intersections with squadsized posts. Secor of the 3d Battalion sent Vandegrift his 25th Company as reinforcements. The Marines worked through the cold rainy night to fill and place sandbags with which to reinforce what had been a British defensive position. Butler inspected the battalion’s positions at 1900 and was upset at “the

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sight of these tired men, out along these empty streets, with everything quiet as a grave. . . . [It] irritated me very greatly.” He brought the whole situation to an end the next morning: he contacted Admiral Williams with his complaint. Williams in turn contacted Duncan and the latter in turn canceled the entire alert. The 25th Company went to the 1st Battalion, and the 21st Company went back to regular patrolling. Smedley didn’t waste time or motion. As always, when and where possible, his men’s welfare and comfort came first. In an early May letter, Butler told his mother how bad things were and how the foreigners illtreated the Chinese. He especially noted that “the British are brutal with the Chinamen but I won’t permit our people to even touch them—we must be gentle but firm—and the funny thing is we control our police district much more easily than do the other and rougher foreigners.” No conflict or collision, few marks or scars of violence, few wounds to heal. . . .”38 By this time, Chiang’s Nationalists had defeated their former Communist allies in Shanghai, and now the situation looked graver than ever before for foreigners there. Additional Marine reinforcements were sent to China to bolster those units already there. More Marines from San Diego included the remainder of the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 4th Marines, the 3d Battalion of the 6th Marines, the 10th Marines [artillery], a light tank platoon, an engineer company, and another aviation unit. The reinforcements were dispatched on 17 April to the Philippines, where they all arrived on 4 May 1927. A few weeks after their arrival at Olongapo, the 1st Battalion of the 10th Marines, the 5th Company of Engineers, and the light tank platoon were shipped to reinforce the 6th Marines; they would arrive at Shanghai on 25 May. The two battalions of the 4th and that of the 6th Marines were formed into a provisional regiment in the Philippines before being transshipped to Shanghai.39 With the arrival of this large number of Marines, every American in China believed that “something would happen very soon.” But as Smedley Butler later correctly stated, “Any attempt to solve [by the foreign governments] the Chinese tangle would have been shadow boxing.” Therefore the American Marines interfered as little with the Chinese as was humanly possible. Their only job was to protect American lives and property. In June it was announced that Adm. Mark Bristol, USN, was to be Admiral Williams’s replacement, effective 9 September 1927. That was a very important change. Bristol was a much different kind of leader, and this would greatly affect the Marines on station. Bristol had been ashore in Turkey as a diplomat and would attempt to carry on in China the same kind of policies that had been developed there. It did not work well. In early September, the officers and men of the 4th Marines would be severely shaken by a tragedy that afflicted them all. Col. Charles Sanderson Hill, affectionately known as “Jumbo” because of his size, blew his brains

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out with his own .45. Thereupon, his executive officer, Lt. Col. Fred Kilgore, under great duress himself, temporarily assumed command of the regiment.40 As always, the Marine Corps wept its own tears and without further comment went about its business and didn’t look back. But not all was gloom. Sometime in November 1927 the American business community, urged on by its members within the American Company and Troop of the Shanghai Volunteer Company, presented musical instruments to the 4th Marines. It had all started during the summer when Kilgore sat with Mr. Joseph Keegan, an American businessman, at a boxing match in Shanghai. A Marine was paired against a British bluejacket and the former was getting life beat out of him. But the Marine stayed the route, even though he was bloody; he eventually tired out his opponent sufficiently to win the match. Keegan, in glee, told Kilgore that the Marine reminded him of the painting of The Spirit of ’76, and the conversation led to the renowned British drum corps. One thing led to another until Keegan announced that the Marines should have a drum corps of their own. A few days later Keegan told Kilgore that the American business community was willing to provide the equipment if Kilgore could get permission to accept it. Letters requesting approval were sent to General Butler and Admiral Bristol. The request was okayed by both, and the “weapons” were forthcoming—one bass drum, eight side drums, ten fifes, and two piccolos. With them came an offer from Lt. Col. McCall, who commanded the British regiment known as the Green Howards in Shanghai, to provide instruction in the art of playing fifes. That offer was duly forwarded to Lt. Cleghorn Foot, officer in charge of the 4th Regiment’s band, who accepted it with alacrity. Bandmaster Francis of the Howards worked with the Marine fifers, and by 17 November the band was ready with one selection for the sponsors and an assembled crowd. The gathering was composed of some very distinguished guests. Included were Admiral Bristol of the Asiatic Fleet; Mr. Cunningham, the American consul general; both the American Troop and American Company of the Volunteers; the Green Howards, and of course the 4th Marines. The band played without fault, and that was the beginning of another tradition for the Corps. Incidentally, the unit was named for Mr. Sterling Fessenden, American businessman and chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council, who attended that first performance.41 Shortly after his arrival at Shanghai, Butler realized that serious warfare around Shanghai had run its course. In the summer of 1927, Chiang’s and the many warlords’ armies were mostly in north China. It was quite obvious to the observant Butler that he and his troops should also be in the north. Butler requested and received permission from Lejeune for the move. He had the 6th Marines and most of the provisional troops under his command transferred north to Tientsin. He was still in “daily” contact with his boss, and in most of his letters during this period he concentrated on the importance of keeping the U.S. Army out of China. In one he com-

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mented acidly upon MacMurray’s recent letter requesting a regiment of army troops for Shanghai: “It would have been suicide for our Corps [if it had been approved] . . . and we [had been] put on a ship and sent home.” He added that if any more Marines were landed, “the Consul-General and other Americans will insist on their staying, as they like large numbers of troops around.” In another letter he described MacMurray as a “nervous wreck,” worried about being trapped in Peking. Butler told Lejeune that he would like “nothing better than a hell of a good dash to Peking followed by a number one siege with lots of scrapping.” He added that he believed that a dangerous situation would be created if the legation remained “too long in Peking.” Butler moved Colonel Snyder and his 6th Marines (less the 3d Battalion). He also shipped the 1st Battalion of the 10th Marines under Col. Harry Lay, one light tank platoon, and the 5th Engineers (less one platoon). All went from Shanghai by ship to Taku, Tientsin’s port of entry.42 The transfer began on 2 June; Butler and his command staff began their own transfer on 21 June. Admiral Williams provided the cruiser USS Richmond to carry Butler and his staff northward, which pleased him very much. It was a swift and comfortable ride to Taku. The 4th Marines were left behind at Shanghai, and there they would remain for fourteen more years. TO NORTH CHINA A private of the 15th Infantry later waggishly described the arrival of the Marines at Tientsin: A tug brought up the first three lighters of marines and lodged them, with much banging and clattering, against the concrete rim of the Bund. Lines were thrown ashore and made fast. The lighters were swarming with young Americans in forest-green uniforms, very dirty, very disheveled. Each man wore a steel helmet and carried a pack, a horseshoe shaped blanket roll, a Springfield rifle with bayonet fixed, a cartridge belt jammed with shiny .30– 06 ammunition clips, and an extra bandoleer thrown over his shoulder. The three lighter loads of marines emptied onto the Bund; there was nothing to stop them. They had only to leap ashore; the lighters were parallel to and tied to the concrete ramp.43

Finney goes on in a more serious vein to say that the Marines were loaded for bear; their lighters were loaded with machine guns, mortars, and 27 mm howitzers. He tells how the Marines unloaded sandbags to form horseshoe-shaped emplacements for themselves and their weapons. Of course there were no enemy forces facing them as they landed, and the soldiers made much sport of that. But he added that “they did it quickly, efficiently, seemingly without effort, as do well trained teams.” He adds

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that there were a number of army officers in attendance, and most made disparaging remarks about how the Marines would soon notify the world that instead of an easy landing, that they had had to fight their bloody way ashore. He indicates that the enlisted soldiers were a bit more impressed with the Marines’ performance, however little “professionalism” was needed under the circumstances. Finney also tells how a Marine lieutenant colonel “knew exactly what he was doing”: “It seemed at first glance to be nothing but confusion compounded. But it wasn’t that at all. It was a well-planned procedure, economically and beautifully executed. Even our critical officers began to be impressed.”44 Shortly after arrival in Tientsin, Butler and Brig. Gen. Joseph C. Castner, commanding the 15th Infantry, paid a courtesy call upon Maj. Gen. Toyoki Takata, the local Japanese commander. Butler said, “He was very polite. He asked me many questions and I escaped without telling anything worth knowing. . . . I dodged all definite answer.” Butler added that Takata adopted “the usual Japanese tactics of flattery, telling me what a great soldier I was, etc. To this I replied that he was talking applesauce.” At first the Japanese general couldn’t figure out what Butler was getting at, but eventually it dawned on him, and he was greatly amused. Afterward, whenever he and Butler saw each other, Takata would point his finger and say “Applesauce,” then laugh.45 During the stay of the 6th Marines in north China, limited activity and consequent boredom was to be their lot. As Gen. William Jones tells us in his history of the regiment, “the duty turned out to be watchful waiting. Officers embarked on a routine of drills, exercises, demonstrations, gymkhanas, anything to fine-polish the troops and keep them happy.”46 Butler kept his men active in order to keep their enforced idleness from reducing their effectiveness and morale. Shortly after his arrival in China, Butler had set the Marines not only to polishing all their equipment but nickel-plating their bayonets and scabbards. This was to out-dazzle even the Coldstream Guards, who were “swanking down the streets of Shanghai.”47 The Marine air service had, by agreement with the Chinese government, a swath four miles wide over the railway lines in which to fly. The flyers were called upon to provide aerial intelligence and occasionally to overfly small Chinese military formations that seemed to be closer to the railway than was desired by the Marine command. Aviation, a new tool not completely understood by most military officers and often not even considered by them, was heavily utilized by Butler. Always the showman, Butler had the flyers take their planes up for special demonstrations over Tientsin to amaze the natives and satisfy the Americans. One such had a singular climax: During an exhibition of stunting, Captain James T. Moore zoomed over the crowds, went into a spectacular climbing roll, lost both wings off his plane

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and parachuted into a moat in front of the stands. “Trust Smedley,” a lady spectator was heard to comment, “He always puts on a wonderful show.”48

The future 27th commandant of the Marine Corps, 2d Lt. David M. Shoup, kept a diary of his time in China. Shoup candidly wrote of his experiences with the Chinese.49 His very observant memory was made less agreeable by its very racist bent, which was all too common at that time. He tells about how “Charlie, my boy, turned out to be quite a character.” Shoup insisted upon calling him “Charlie in spite of the Chinese servant’s protests.” The derogatory “Chink” fell from his pen frequently but was probably commonly used by all the other Marines in China at that time. His experiences and attitudes while in China were, most likely, characteristic of those of all members of the 3d Marine Brigade. Other observations concerned the lack of incoming mail for one unlucky young lieutenant—himself. He noted also the angry responses of several lieutenants to mail from girlfriends or wives; at least one threatened to stop an allotment and another auctioned off the many gifts he had purchased. Another officer was absurdly angry because his wife had mentioned Charles A. Lindbergh several times before announcing that she had no more time to write: she was going to the dock to welcome “Lindy” home. The problems facing those junior officers of seventy years ago seem rather ho-hum now, but they were very serious to the victims at the time. Butler’s wife joined him in Tientsin, and he showed her around the town.50 He seemed to remember it quite well, even though the city had changed greatly since his last appearance on the scene more than 25 years before. He had some difficulty locating various landmarks, but they managed to find the hotel to which he had been brought following his leg wound in 1900. Butler even found the exact spot where his cot had been in those troubled times; he had the hotel owner set up their dinner table over the spot. But he didn’t let pleasure interfere with carrying out his duty. Butler remained active everywhere there were Marines in north China. A Marine flying field had been established about ten miles from the PeiHo River in an open area next to the Standard Oil Company compound. Butler frequently flew over the exciting scenes of yesteryear, engaging in on-site observation and reconnaissance. Even though an agreement had been worked out, Chinese officials protested the flights. As noted, the agreement allowed the Marines to fly over the entire railroad route between Peking and the sea. In fact so far they had flown over only the short stretch between Tientsin and the sea. The Chinese protests were considered nothing more than “showing the flag” and were ignored. Actually, the Chinese government ministers admitted to feeling safer with the American planes overhead; if any warlord or Nationalist armies were in the neighborhood, they would know well in advance and could prepare accordingly. Still, the Chinese refused to establish an agreement with British aviation. Regardless,

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the British had a sizeable air force in north China and flew where they wanted to. There were many Chinese protests, but nothing hampered the British. They did exactly what they wished to do in China and the Devil be damned. Butler later admitted to having had suspicious thoughts about what the Japanese military and diplomats were up to in northern China in 1927; “Even then it seemed to me that Japan was only waiting for a favorable opportunity to gain complete control of Manchuria.”51 In his letters to his father, Cong. Thomas S. Butler, he told of being invited by his friend General Takata [old applesauce] to Japanese Army maneuvers at Nogoya, Japan, on—of all dates—10 November (the “Marine Corps Birthday”) 1927. Unfortunately, even though his trip was approved and he received $100 to defray his costs, he was unable to make the trip. One of his subordinates, “Sunny Jim” Vandegrift, went instead. The 3d Brigade was heavily engaged in training exercises all during this northern trip. In late December Butler and his force practiced rapid movement to and from Peking to ensure the removal of all or most Americans in the event of need. But the first fighting for these Marines happened at Christmas 1927, when the Standard Oil plant in Tientsin caught fire and ignited a million pounds of candle grease. Within 10 minutes of the alarm a battalion of Marines was fighting the fire. The Marines found that another plant filled with gasoline drums and a second with six three-milliongallon gas tanks nearby were dangerously near to the spreading fire.52 A call was issued for another thousand Marines to come immediately, if not sooner. As Butler relates it, “By the middle of the afternoon we had two thousand Marines fighting like—well like Marines.” The oil company lost an estimated million dollars, but the Marines saved it at least another four million. Officials of the company lauded the Marines for their skills and courage in defending their property, as well they should have. In 1928 Marine engineers rebuilt a bridge destroyed by a flood. It was on the main highway between Peking and Tientsin. Butler also had the Marines rebuild the road leading to it. Five hundred Marines plus thousands of Chinese peasants and assorted equipment, some created especially for the task at hand, completed 16 miles of road. This delighted the Chinese officials; Butler and his Marines had cultivated goodwill that would be beneficial for the American China policy for many years to come. This was at the time in which Butler was awarded his first “blessed umbrella.” His story of how he was awarded a second is worth retelling. He was driving his car along bumpy roads. On a narrow village street, he saw mobs of frightened Chinese coming toward him, fleeing from a band of soldiers from a Chinese warlord army that was raiding and looting this particular suburb of Tientsin. The engine of my car, with the muffler off, was making an infernal racket. The approaching raiders thought my exhaust was a machine gun popping.

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When some of them saw my car blocking the narrow street, they believed I had an army back of me. They beat it, along with the rest of their column, and the suburb was saved from a bandit brigade of looters.53

He tried to refuse the second umbrella, telling the town elders that he hadn’t really saved their town.54 The Chinese scoffed at him and said they didn’t care how and why the bandits had retreated; he was the cause of their doing so. Butler gave a speech when the Chinese made the award; he mentioned that the last time he had been in their town he and his fellow Marines had been shot at vigorously by Boxers from within the town. The solemn hosts appeared to be embarrassed at this, and they discussed the matter with some of the other Chinese elders. They finally told him that several of the older men in the village who were now honoring him had been shooting at him from that same town on that day of which he now spoke. It appears that when Butler departed, all past differences had been resolved between him and his hosts. At least they weren’t shooting at him or his Marines. In January 1928, Chiang got his Nationalist forces into motion again and headed farther north. In a series of battles he defeated all the northern warlords. On 4 June he entered the city of Peking. Contrary to the foreigners’ expectations, the behavior of the conquerors was completely correct. There were no attacks upon foreign persons, nor was there any looting of foreign property. On 10 October 1927 Chiang had been proclaimed president of the republic, and the city of Peking had been renamed Peiping; the capital of the nation became Nanking. Recognizing that American citizens would probably not be harmed by Chiang’s Nationalist government, the U.S. government decided to begin withdrawal of its forces in China. At about this time Butler began having difficulty with his “boss.” Admiral Bristol was anxious to release some of the Marines in China, but neither Butler nor the minister, MacMurray, was in agreement. Bristol was a firm believer in “treading softly,” as was Butler, but the latter argued that there were barely enough American troops in north China to protect their charges. To reduce the present force would make their task so difficult as to completely reduce their total effectiveness in an emergency. Another factor that concerned Butler was the reaction of the Chinese military to a weakening of what was now a force for Chiang and the warlords to reckon with. Butler feared as much for his sorely reduced Marines as he did for all other Americans in danger. To him, it would be better to bring all Marines out, so as not to place a few in danger of being overwhelmed. He was particularly afraid that what had happened in Nicaragua might be repeated in China.55 In May and early June there was a great deal of activity in north China. Two warlord generals and their armies, with physical support from the Japanese, were maneuvering and encountering the KMT. Shortly after, Japanese troops engaged Chiang’s KMT, around Tsinan and Tsingtao. Butler’s

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air force was constantly in the air, observing everyone. He personally flew several sorties as an observer, which gave him a decided advantage over any potential adversaries. Chiang retreated. There was a hue and cry from the impotent League of Nations; the Japanese ceased and desisted, and the situation settled down. But by mid-1928, Admiral Bristol had made the decision to remove the 6th Marines from northern China. Butler wished to leave the 6th in Tientsin and withdraw the 4th Marines from Shanghai. But it was decreed by the navy decision makers that if Tientsin remained the point of departure, it might be impossible to relieve immediately any force protecting American citizens in north China.56 Remaining in Shanghai would allow U.S. naval forces adequate access and the ability to remove Americans, if they were concentrated there in time of trouble. Concentrating citizens around Shanghai was considered less difficult than the approach to Peking might be. So Shanghai was the scene and the 4th Marines were the chosen few to remain in China for the next dozen or more years. Although he had been somewhat reluctant to see his brigade reduced six months before, by now Butler was of much the same opinion as Bristol. THE 3D BRIGADE GOES HOME, THE 4TH MARINES REMAIN In September 1928 the 3d Brigade began its withdrawal from China, a process that took about five months. The brigade as a unit was finally disbanded on 13 January 1929, and ten days later the last of the Tientsin Marines left China. Butler tells us, “When the Marines were leaving Tientsin, great electric signs were erected, flashing China’s last word to us: ‘Goodby and Good Luck, Marines.’ ” Butler added, “The Chinese have a proverb, He who treads softly goes far.” Back in the United States, Butler aptly phrased the thought in a speech he delivered to a group of American businessmen and scholars in July 1929: It became our job (in China) to see that not one hair of an American’s head was harmed. Nobody shot; to go through with this, live on foreign soil, live in the territory of a foreign nation which protested our presence, and not fire a shot, and come away with their good will. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the 5,600 Marines who went out there, all went to do a lot of shooting. A man doesn’t go into the Marine Corps for any purpose in the world but killing, and our reputation has been more or less founded on our success in spilling blood. I know that in certain parts of the world, women and children would run when they see Marines coming along, even though they are on a peaceful mission, just as chickens run when a dog enters a chicken yard. They believe we’re all killers—and it is well for a nation to support a few killers—if they act expertly, without involving the government.57

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The Honorable Chao-Chu Wu, Chinese minister to the United States in 1929, followed Butler on the podium. In a carefully worded speech, he admitted that Butler and his Marines had truly been on their good behavior while in his country. He alluded in a jocular tone to the fact that Butler, who had received two “Umbrellas of Ten Thousand Blessings” when it was almost unheard of for a foreigner to receive even one, had complained that he had to pay duty on them when he left China. Butler is reported to have smiled at that remark.58 But Butler wasn’t just moving in the banquet circuit. From his final report of his time and experiences in China with the 3d Brigade, the Marine Corps Gazette extracted notes relative to staff activities. They appeared in the June 1929 issue and were very comprehensive. He stated in his first paragraph that his brigade had been “extremely fortunate in the matter of replacements.” But he was perturbed that the brigade had had no hand in promotions: A Brigade Commander wants an efficient Brigade and is responsible to Headquarters, Marine Corps, for that efficiency. If he wants competent men to maintain that efficiency he must reward them. This is done by robbing the units of certain promotions and attaching them to Brigade Headquarters. Many commanders allow the unit commander the promotion then assign the promoted man to Brigade Headquarters for temporary duty. This is worse than denying the unit the promotion. Brigade Headquarters cannot do otherwise unless they control the promotions and see that the total within the Brigade is not exceeded.

Another field commander could have said the same words, but undoubtedly without an appreciable impact. By January 1929 all Marines, save the 4th Marines and the 500 men left at Peking, had been removed from China. Most of the men were returned to the United States, except for those used as replacements in the Philippines, Guam, or the Asiatic Fleet. As I have said, the 4th Marines would remain at Shanghai, in the International Settlement, for a number of years. The regiment would also retain its format of two battalions, and its men would live the proverbial “life of Riley.” That went on until November 1941, when, by orders of the U.S. State Department, the regiment was finally withdrawn to the Philippines. Even though they had to work once in a while, the Marines had a hell of a time while they were there. Much of the balance of this story will be devoted to that decade and to the lives the Peking Marines led, both official and unofficial. The 6th Marines would return in 1937, but it was for so limited a time that they couldn’t really be considered “China Marines.”59 It was the men of the 4th Marines and the Peking Guard who were the few chosen to live the grand life and bear that distinctive title.

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NOTES 1. Commandant of the Marine Corps Annual Report to the secretary of the navy, 1901. 2. Dennis L. Noble, The Eagle and the Dragon: The United States Military in China, 1901–1937 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990). Noble states, “Rockhill apparently thought the Marines presented a better military appearance, were better disciplined, trained for legation duty, and could be reinforced quickly, without command squabbles, from ships of the Asiatic Fleet or from the Marine force in the Philippines.” 3. Lee was later to become famous as commanding officer (CO) of the 6th Marines in France as the replacement for a wounded A. W. Catlin. Holcomb was CO of the 2d Battalion in the same regiment in the same war, and he was further honored by being selected to be the 17th Commandant of the Marine Corps. Lee would remain at Peking until January 1907, whereas Holcomb had an extended tour there as well as an additional assignment for study of the Chinese language, remaining in China until May 1914. 4. See appendix F for a chronological history of the detachment and its commanders. 5. The latter were in residence because after British troops had been pulled out in 1914, Japan had requested that the United States absorb that responsibility. 6. Kemp Tolley, Yangtze Patrol: The U.S. Navy in China (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1971), p. 69. 7. In 1920, Turner, nicknamed “Terrible Tommy,” would replace Maj. Alfred A. Cunningham, the founder of Marine aviation. Turner “ranked” Cunningham and remained as head of Marine aviation until 1925. He was to be killed in Haiti in 1931 at age 49. 8. It was withdrawn because U.S. relations with Japan were rapidly deteriorating; the Department of State did not want to provide any excuses or hostages in an already tense situation. The 15th was withdrawn, but 230 Marines from the Peking legation guard replaced it in Tientsin. That group would become prisoners of the Japanese on the same day as the Peking Guard. 9. John K. Jodon, My Four Years in the Marines. (New York: Vantage Press, 1970). He was assigned to Company A. 10. This was the beginning of the famed Mounted Platoon in Peking, more frequently referred to in the Corps as the “Mounted Detachment.” 11. There will be more references to the Mounted Detachment in the next section. 12. The author has chosen to identify the 4th Marine Regiment by the unofficial name “4th Marines.” In reality, it wasn’t until 13 February 1930 that the designation changed from 4th Regiment to 4th Marines. 13. Excellent descriptions of these activities can be gleaned from several books, notably Robert H. Williams, The Old Corps: A Portrait of the U.S. Marine Corps between the Wars (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982), and Yangtze Patrol, by Rear Adm. Kemp Tolley, USN. 14. We have to conclude that many of those sailors served in the famous 4th Battalion, 4th Marines on Corregidor, the Rock. It was claimed that this was “the

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highest paid battalion in the world,” most of the navy men having grades much higher than the usual Marine privates in the other battalions. In all, 841 bluejackets served as Marines in that largest of all Marine regiments. 15. Martin was a former enlisted Marine who was quite advanced in age, 33 when he was commissioned, in September 1919. He retired a captain in 1929. 16. Roy Swink commanded the 73d Machine Gun Company, 6th Marine Regiment at Belleau Wood in June 1918. He was the recipient of a Silver Star and a Croix de Guerre. Dan Daly was his first sergeant. 17. Retired a first lieutenant in 1931 after 10 years’ service. 18. Kieren, a member of the 5th Marine Regiment in World War I, retired in 1935 as a lieutenant colonel. He had some peculiarities, and he is widely mentioned in Clark, Devil Dogs: Fighting Marines of WWI. 19. Tienanmen Square and Gate was in 1989 the scene of a slaughter by the communist government of China of several hundred protesters. 20. This is undoubtedly an unfair allegation, although to a private it may have seemed that way. Little had a long and very distinguished career as a Marine. He entered that service in July 1899, serving in the Philippines and later as part of the China relief expedition. From that time on he shifted around, aboard ship or in trouble spots before returning to Peking as a language-officer trainee in 1917. Little arrived at Peking a month before Rose did and left in 1927. He commanded a brigade in Haiti and later was assistant to Commandant Russell. His most notable work was as CO of the Marine base at San Diego and as commander of the Fleet Marine Force from 1937 to 1939. He retired as a major general in 1942. 21. The author of the article, Col. Charles J. Quilter II, added that Rose was killed at age 83 while riding his motorbike. He was celebrating after having led his lawn bowling team to victory. 22. The various officers—Stent, Schwerin, Wilson, Richards, and Pfeiffer—each went on to careers in the Corps. Stent became a colonel in World War II; Schwerin, a former enlisted Marine, as a 2d Lieutenant commanded a platoon in the 6th Machine Gun Battalion during World War I, earning two Silver Stars at the MeuseArgonne; Richards retired as a lieutenant colonel in 1940; Pfeiffer, who became a brigadier general, was still on active duty as late as 1945. 23. They were sent to Chinwangtao to aid the 15th Infantry in defending the passage from Peking down to the sea for Americans who might need to escape from the interior of north China. The detachment stayed at Chinwangtao until November 1927. 24. Chiang fought the Communists and, infrequently, the Japanese invaders. His main object was to entice foreign intervention (the United States, Britain, or even the Soviet Union) and preserve his army to defeat the Reds. He only enticed the United States, and he lost to Mao anyway. 25. For all his “bad press,” Coolidge made a number of important foreign policy decisions while president. One was to send a brigade of Marines into Nicaragua in 1927. The small available manpower of the Corps precluded many such expeditions. Regardless, as we shall witness, 1927 was a year of major commitment for the Marines in China as well. 26. These were the 88th, 89th, 90th, and 91st Companies, under the command of Maj. Samuel P. Budd. They left Cavite aboard the USS Pecos, landing at Shanghai.

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27. That restriction was modified after an exchange between MacMurray and Secretary of State Frank Kellogg in Washington. MacMurray argued that the Marines shouldn’t be withdrawn from the International Settlement if the Chinese should attack. It was “imperative that the U.S. stand with the other nations.” He emphasized that “our honor” required us to stay. MacMurray was sufficiently persuasive, and Kellogg was receptive. The restriction was altered, and the Marines would henceforth help with the defense. 28. In 1925 the 1,666 Marines were concentrated heavily in the Pacific area, spread among Peking, Shanghai, Guam, and the Philippines. Of course, small detachments were stationed aboard various vessels of the Asiatic Fleet, and they frequently had been called upon to support the U.S. Navy and the foreign policy of the United States in many places along the China coast. As an example of the shortage of Marines in 1925, when Admiral Washington wanted a force aboard ship at Shanghai, it was necessary to transfer Marines from Guam to Cavite and then from Cavite to China. 29. Hill entered the Corps on 8 April 1899. He was appointed to the Naval Academy from New Hampshire and served in the Philippines during the insurrection, followed by fleet duty, Portsmouth, NH, Cuba, and recruiting duty, as well as the Naval War College and the other regular line Marine duties of that period. He was able and steady, not colorful. 30. The battalion was cleaning up its railroad mail-guard duties, which the regiment had been actively engaged in. There probably wasn’t a group of Marines anywhere in the world that was more disappointed at being left behind than the 2d Battalion. 31. Secor retired in 1931, at the rank held in 1927. Vandegrift is too well known to add anything more. 32. See appendix C for a complete breakdown of the names of those volunteer units. 33. This area is indicated on a later map, dated 1937, as part of Sector A, under the control of Japan. 34. The 1st Battalion, 4th Marines was responsible for the easternmost part and the Provisional Battalion for the western portion, as far as Hongchew Creek. 35. Fassett was a colonel and Ferguson a lieutenant colonel, as of 1945. Greer retired as a major in 1937. 36. That primarily meant the British. 37. E. C. Johnson, Marine Corps Aviation: The Early Years (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1977), p. 54. This was Fighting Squadron 3 (VF3M) with nine officers, 48 enlisted men, and eight FB-1s. It sailed from San Diego for Shanghai on 17 April 1927 to join the 3d Brigade, also on its way to Shanghai. VO-5M, a newly formed observation squadron organized in China, was sent with four officers and 94 men from Guam and six O2B-1s shipped from San Diego. The 75 mm French-style guns and two caissons were drawn by a five-ton Holt tractor, which mounted a .30-caliber machine gun for defense. 38. All phrases were used by Butler in various letters concerning the treatment of the Chinese by the Marines. 39. This provisional regiment, composed of the two battalions, and the 2d Bn, 4th Marines, would become the 12th Marines, which would later be shipped to

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Tientsin. In addition, the provisional battalion attached to the 4th Marines in Shanghai would be deactivated, further reducing the garrison at Shanghai. 40. There were unfortunate remarks made at that time, and after, suggesting that Hill was distraught over problems he was having with his brigade commander. Butler had previously been unfairly tainted with the drunk-driving death of a colonel in California prior to his assignment to China. Hill, in line for the prestigious post of commanding officer of the Peking detachment, was passed over by the Commandant, John A. Lejeune. An August letter from Butler to Lejeune explained how hard Hill was taking the rejection: “You have mortally wounded Charlie Hill and I am sorry.” 41. The Fessenden Pipes remained in China for some years. I remember an organization of that name as part of the World War II Marine Corps. 42. Snyder retired in 1936. A member of 4th Brigade staff, Lay earned a Navy Cross in France, at Soissons, on 18 July 1918. He was in the forefront of the 5th Marines as they attacked and captured Vierzy. With six enlisted men he took over 800 German prisoners to the rear and then returned to the front, adding to his already enviable reputation. His citation stated that he displayed extraordinary heroism, above and beyond the call of duty. 43. Charles G. Finney, The Old China Hands (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961), p. 153. 44. Ibid., p. 154. 45. Venzon, p. 276. 46. William K. Jones. A Brief History of the 6th Marines (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1987), p. 25. 47. Butler, p. 290. 48. Robert Sherrod, History of Marine Aviation in World War II (Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, 1952), p. 28. 49. Shoup, David M., The Marines in China, 1927–1928: The China Expedition Which Turned Out to Be the China Exhibition, ed. Howard Jablon (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1987). 50. Mrs. Ethel “Bunny” Butler, “a very lovely lady,” according to Butler’s adjutant, William A. Worton, came to China in 1927 and again in 1928. She and her husband both were heavily involved in public relations endeavors while in China. Both attended various Chinese affairs and dinners, sometimes being the only nonChinese in attendance. These attendances, urged by the naval commander, Adm. Mark Bristol, were of course meant to strengthen U.S.-Chinese relations. They did. See mention of the “umbrellas.” 51. This was published just a year or so after Japan had launched an attack against northeastern China, including Manchuria. By 1932 it was in complete command of that resource-rich area. So the writing may be directly affected by what had happened. Regardless, most Americans with a reasonable level of common sense could see what was coming. Only those in Washington were blind. 52. Thomas, p. 295. 53. Butler, p. 297. 54. This was somewhat similar to his reaction to his first Medal of Honor for Vera Cruz. He had vainly tried to refuse it because he believed that he and all the other Marine officers who were awarded the medal had been “just doing their duty.”

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55. He was referring to what happened when the Marines left Managua in 1926. Perhaps it is a rather weak reference, since that was just a rather small legationguard detachment. 56. The experiences of 27 years before helped to make what later proved to be the correct decision. 57. Speech delivered to the delegates before the annual American Academy meeting in July 1929, reproduced from the journal The Annals vol. 144, July 1929 reprinted by Brass Hat, Foster, RI, in 1982. The Chinese minister’s speech was a follow-up to Butler’s speech, lauding Butler and the Marines for their decency while in China. 58. The two umbrellas were, at least until recently located in a center hall in the Butler family home in Westchester, Pennsylvania. They are huge, several stories high, and are still in fair condition, though not especially well cared for. Butler’s youngest surviving son, “Tom Dick,” recently died. 59. The legation guard was in reality nearly a battalion in strength. During the years before December 1941, some of the best officers and enlisted Marines in the Corps served in that station.

Group of Marine and Navy Officers at Peking, June 1900. From left: Naval Cadet Charles E. Courtney, Capt. Newt H. Hall, Capt. Bowman McCalla, Paymaster Henry Jewett, Asst. Surgeon Thomas McC. Lippett, Capt. John T. Myers. U.S. Marine Corps.

Posed group of 43 Marines and one sailor in Peking, possibly the remaining men from the original 50 who manned Peking’s walls for 55 days. It isn’t definite, but I believe the Marine standing by himself at right is the legendary Dan Daly. U.S. Marine Corps.

Capt. John T. Myers after the siege in Peking. U.S. Marine Corps.

Chien Men Pagoda, c. 1910. Author’s collection.

Four Marines aboard mules, possibly c. 1908, location unknown. Author’s collection.

Group of Marine gunners going through exercises on what was to become the legation compound drill field. See Chien Men Pagoda at right rear, and ramp used by Myers’s Marines to mount the wall. Author’s collection.

Three Marine sergeants on leave visiting historical sites in the Peking area, c. 1910. Author’s collection.

Five Marine noncoms and one navy chief (possibly corpsman) aboard Mounted Platoon’s ornery nags, visiting sites in North China, c. 1913. Author’s collection.

The USS Chaumont, which brought the 4th Marines to Shanghai. They remained aboard for many weeks. It also brought the 6th Marines and later the 31st Infantry. Author’s collection.

General Butler inspecting the newly arrived 1/6, summer of 1927 in Shanghai. U.S. Marine Corps.

The 10th Marines parading in Shanghai pulling their 75s with Holt tractors. Note Marine insignia painted on seat support. U.S. Marine Corps.

Generals Butler and Joseph C. Castner, USA, CO of 15th Infantry, reviewing parading Marines at Tientsin. Note the large number of women. Author’s collection.

Cpl. James E. Kenny, 6th Marines, at Shanghai, 1927. Author’s collection.

Elements of the 6th Marines mounting trucks in Peking for travel to Tientsin and from there to board ships for the States. Winter 1929. U.S. Marine Corps.

Opening of Marine-constructed bridge at Peichang, north China, on 3 October 1928. Chinese police band lead the march across. U.S. Marine Corps.

4th Marine .30-caliber machine-gun emplacement on Soochow Creek, Shanghai, 1932. U.S. Marine Corps.

4th Marines parade, Shanghai, 1937. U.S. Marine Corps.

4th Marine machine-gun position on Soochow Creek, 1938. U.S. Marine Corps.

Col. DeWitt Peck assumes command of the 4th Marines, Shanghai, January 1940. U.S. Marine Corps.

6th MarDiv, Headquarters Company, 81 mm Mortar Platoon at Tientsin, 1945. U.S. Marine Corps.

4 The China Marines, 1930–1941

Warfare in China had simmered down somewhat with the defeat of the warlords and Communist factions by the KMT. But continued Soviet subversive activity caused a setback for the Nationalist government. In order to bring that to a screeching halt, Chiang began to make the environment unbearable for his Communist allies. The KMT strengthened its hold on territory already acquired and added to it areas previously held by the Communists. Consequently, the Soviet influence receded. As Chiang grew stronger, the entire nation settled down, and the threat to foreigners seemed reduced to almost nothing. Therefore, except for a brief period during 1931, the 4th Marines would be required just to watch and wait, and that is what the regiment mostly did for the next few years. However, because of KMT pressure, there was a decided increase in Communist banditry. The U.S. Navy was subjected to bandit attacks on the small rivers and around some of the seaport towns. As a result, it increased its waterborne patrols. But for Marines it was more or less a quiet time. Incidentally, it was during these years that Chiang Kai-shek changed the name of Peking to Peiping.1 It would be helpful to describe what kind of man the Marine Corps attracted, especially those that served in China, during the period we are covering. Marine officers were largely from the ranks (52 percent), with a bare 13 percent from the academies. But in 1929 not one of that 52 percent held a higher rank than captain. Most had been commissioned from the ranks during the First World War, then a common occurrence. During this

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period, all senior Marine officers in China had come straight from civilian life rather than from the Naval Academy. Officers listed places of birth that identified them as being largely from the Midwest (36 percent), with the South, surprisingly, a bit lower (27 percent). The average age of a second lieutenant was 27, a captain 39, a major 49, and a colonel 52. As far as their ages were concerned, the officers of the U.S. Army in China were practically the same. For some reason, naval officers were younger by many years. That was possibly because most were graduates of Annapolis. Mainly because of theft and alcohol, a fair number of Marine and Naval officers got into serious trouble in China. A number of them were returned to the States for disciplinary action. In an oral history, one Marine officer stated that when he arrived at Peking most of the officers were incompetent and were soon sent home. Another Marine officer claimed that many leaders “were not capable of carrying out their jobs.”2 One navy medical officer serving with Marines in China complained that “most of the Marines I served with never read a worthwhile book, and far too many knew all the bars.”3 In a letter to a lady friend in 1927, he also found fault with the chief of staff of the 3d Brigade, calling him a “p—k.”4 But there were many who kept their units at a reasonable degree of readiness, and they counterbalanced those few with serious faults. Many officers and enlisted men knew that war was coming—it was just a case of when. With that in mind, those professionals, the officers and noncoms who cared, didn’t allow themselves to be carried completely away with the easy life in China. Several Marine officers who were interviewed in later life told how hard the training was; one said “and (more) real training was accomplished than ever at Quantico.” In letters home, Capt. John S. Letcher emphasized that he and his brother officers commanding the detachment at Peking in the late 1930s regularly put their lads through the hoops. He praised the Japanese soldiers, but like the other Marines in China, he also constantly mentioned how much he hated them. Another claimed that the 4th Marines were “the finest outfit” in which he had ever served. So it was a matter of personal observation as to whether duty in China was professional or simply a chance to rest. Most likely, for most it was something in between. One thing is certain, though: many of the finest Marine officers were at one time or another with the 4th Marines at Shanghai, the Peking legation guard, or after 1938, at Tientsin. There aren’t many sources available to assess enlisted Marines in the same manner as the officers. From those few, it appears that most of the enlisted men were looking either for some travel and adventure in their lives before settling down, or for a job. The United States was in a severe depression, and the latter factor was a great encouragement to single men.5 But there were other reasons to join. In 1927, for example, Mr. George H. Cloud had occasion to be at a railroad station when a trooptrain loaded with Marines bound for China stopped for a few minutes. He conversed

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with some of the men. He later decided that being a Marine and in China might not be all that bad, at least for a short period of time, since he was then out of a job. Cloud later stated in an interview that the recruiting sergeant tried to talk him out of enlisting when he learned that Cloud had taken some college courses. The sergeant insisted that they could do nothing positive for him but would certainly be very negative to the men he would serve with (quite different from today’s recruiter, who encourages any male or female who shows promise). Cloud did enlist, and he stayed the route, retiring a major general. Before the 1930s, most enlisted men in all military services were ill educated, and many were foreign born. Many were recent Russian or Polish immigrants, and often they were Jewish. Most men entered the service very young and with few, if any, skills. The social gap that separated officers from enlisted men was very great indeed. Discipline meted out to enlisted men who got into trouble in the 1920s was exceptionally severe, and it served to help widen the gap. Punishment remained in the services, of course, but it was less harsh in the 1930s. Those who were then Marines had a much better time than their predecessors. But there was still a larger gap, perhaps an unscalable wall, between commissioned and noncommissioned Marines than would be the case in later years. When the war came along, there were few enlisted men from that era that knew their officers’ capabilities or, worse, trusted them when it was essential that they do so. As we know, most Marines did trust their officers who proved themselves when the time came. Prior to World War II, career enlisted Marines were characterized by Sam Griffith as “perennial privates with disciplinary records a yard long.” He went on to add, “Many had fought . . . French, English, Italian, and American soldiers and sailors in every bar in Shanghai, Manila, Tsingtao, Tientsin, and Peking.” Graves Erskine would recall that professionally the Marines stationed at Peking had by 1935 “dropped to a pretty low level.” Naturally, not all enlisted Marines fit this stereotyped and severe portrayal, which itself was part of the reason for the separation between the two groups. Most, especially the younger men, were probably confused and inhibited by what they saw going on around them, just as they would be if they were still at home in middle America. Certainly, not many could have been accused of being sophisticated. But the numerous vices available at their whim and for a few dollars “Mex” influenced many. They had plenty of money to engage in almost any activity that presented itself. More than likely, most were attracted to what was new and exciting, at least until they tired of it. Booze and women were one and two on the list of vices they desired to engage in, though it’s not possible to gauge which was number one and which two. Women probably were first since they were numerous in Shanghai and in Peking. But then, booze was easy to come by too. Many White Russian women were avail-

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able and were probably most desirable. Many of the “easy” Russian or Chinese women who were plying their age-old trade everywhere in the East were diseased. In the beginning, at least, the venereal disease rates for American servicemen in China were very high. As stated in the 4th Marines’ own history, “Shanghai was one of the worst places on earth to maintain a regiment in fighting trim.” Duty in China could be wonderful for those who were looking for an easy or exhilarating life, or even those who were searching for knowledge. China was an age-old cultural center with marvelous history in every city, town, or village. In addition, the products of artisans were desirable and inexpensive, even then by Depression-era American standards. Officers especially, even the second lieutenants, were able to purchase artifacts that would, in any other circumstance, be far beyond their reach. Indeed, the senior enlisted men could also afford things, and those who had brought their wives to China frequently saw their pay spent on fine linens and chinaware to take home when the tour ended. Possibly the best brief description of everyday life for a Marine in Shanghai during the early 1930s was that of Joseph E. Johnson, an enlisted man in the 4th Marines. The normal daily routine, from Monday through Wednesday, was colors at 0800, “troop and stomp,” followed by school in squad bays, then chow. The afternoon, other than in winter months, was devoted to athletics. On Thursdays the regiment would march to the Shanghai racetrack for parades. Fridays were devoted to “field days” (cleaning barracks) and Saturday to inspections. As far as “liberty” was concerned, noncommissioned officers had no restrictions, but the other enlisted Marines were divided into three classes: the first class could remain on liberty until 0100, those in second class until midnight, and third class until 2200. Only the first class was allowed to wear civilian clothes in town.6 Heavy emphasis was placed upon marksmanship. The Marines were expected to best every other military organization in China at the many matches that took place between the various units, foreign and American. According to records, only the 15th Infantry offered serious competition. The losers had to buy the beer, so you can well imagine what efforts all made to be declared winners. As R. H. Williams said, “The Corps made a cult out of the rifle.” Marines in Shanghai fired at the international range, while those at Peking fired at the small-bore range in town. For more serious firing, the Peking Marines spent up to a month at Chinwangtao, on the coast. The latter facility belonged to the 15th Infantry but was available for the use of legation Marines. DUTY IN PEKING DURING THE 1930s At Peking the size of the guard fluctuated, but mainly the legation was staffed by a small battalion. At Shanghai the 4th Marines retained two

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battalions most of the time the regiment was in China. In 1932, the Peking legation guard consisted of the headquarters detachment, the 38th, 39th, and 67th Companies, plus the Mounted Detachment (about a platoon in size), a signal platoon, and a U.S. Navy radio station. In addition there were the radio detachment and the post band. All officers and some noncoms were also attached to other services, such as the Quartermaster office, the power (and ice) plant, motor transport, post pay office, maintenance, post exchange, cooks and bakers, even the water-softener personnel. In addition, since 1900 a Mr. Chang Bon Shang had been the outstanding interpreter and purchasing agent for the Peking Marines. Last, but certainly not least, the U.S. Navy hospital detachment included three doctors (one a navy captain) and a dentist plus eight enlisted personnel, one of whom was a chief petty officer. The entire American contingent had a noncommissioned officers’ and a privates’ club, as well as the usual officers’ club. The American embassy building was located at the southwest corner of the legation quarter. It was bordered by Legation Street on the north, by Chien Men Street on the west, and the Tarter Wall on the south. Wall Street ran alongside the wall, and opposite it were the three American compound buildings—from west to east, the U.S. Marine compound, the embassy compound and finally the quartermaster compound. The overall area was about 150 yards wide by 450 yards long. By dint of an unwritten agreement, in the event of trouble the Marine commander at Peking would lead the defense of all the legations, foreign as well as American. For a long time the Marine Corps made sure that its CO in Peking was senior in rank to any other foreign detachment commander, in an attempt to ensure that he would command in the event of serious trouble. When Vandegrift was the commanding officer (CO) of the Peking detachment in the mid-thirties, he had some minor problems with the colonel commanding the Japanese detachment. As Vandegrift’s tenure at Peking was drawing to a close in 1937, the Japanese colonel was promoted to brigadier general. Vandegrift congratulated him and said, “I guess that makes you senior to me.” The other responded, “To be frank, Colonel Vandegrift, in case the need arose, I have always had a commission senior to yours in my safe.”7 The main weapons of the Marines were their personal Springfield .03s, a few Browning automatic rifles and .30-caliber machine guns, plus a few French 75 mms, at least until later years when the pack howitzer became standard issue. It appears that the men stood guard duty in “port and starboard” fashion, one on and one off, duty periods beginning at 1200 and ending at 1200 the following day. A captain or lieutenant stood duty as Officer of the Day and a sergeant as “Sergeant of the Guard,” with six “Corporals of the Guard.” The bottom of the barrel was the twelve privates, who did the work, four hours on and eight off. On duty the higher ranks carried pistols; privates carried .03s with fixed bayonets. The legation guard was never intended to do more than put up a token

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defense and then surrender, in order to give the United States something to protest. It was obvious that a battalion of Marines would not be able to defend against a Chinese army of many hundreds of thousands of men equipped with modern German and Soviet weapons. Nor did anyone seriously anticipate fighting a Japanese army in China. Most observers expected that the U.S. military and naval forces would be given enough warning to withdraw all Americans. They were dreamers. Upon his arrival at Peking, Graves “Bobby” Erskine complained of the “pretty low level” of training among the legation guard. There had been several deaths the previous winter, mainly due to pneumonia. At his urging, and with the help of several other officers, Erskine set up a “pretty stiff training schedule,” which included hikes in the bitter cold of a north China winter. Apparently the hikes worked; there was a marked decline in sick calls. In 1932, one young officer of the 38th Company remembered that his company commander, John W. Thomason, Jr., led a lengthy march from Peking.8 When the troops started to grumble, he ordered them to sing. In a later interview the junior officer, James P. Berkeley asserted that Thomason was checking to see “whether the new lieutenant could take it.” Berkeley lasted long enough to make lieutenant general; apparently he could handle most anything. During the early thirties, Col. James C. Breckinridge was commanding officer of the Peking Marines, and his executive officer was Maj. John M. Arthur.9 One of the officers with the Peking detachment who was becoming quite famous was the aforementioned Captain Thomason, “skipper” of the 38th Company. The 1931 Peking Annual reports that the 38th Company was very glad to have retained its commanding officer: Captain Thomason has taken a personal interest in his company. . . . [H]e has strived to keep it the best organization . . . always with the welfare of his men . . . in mind. Besides he has helped to instill into his men a knowledge of military tactics and warfare quite rare in any but veterans.

Thomason, by then the author of several notable works of fiction, especially Fix Bayonets, would later become known as the “Kipling of the Corps.” That same year, 1931, the Marines had several distinguished visitors. Douglas Fairbanks, Sr., still a popular movie star, said that he had never seen a finer body of men. Possibly his experience had been limited mainly to looking at finer bodies of women, but the sentiments were nice. Maj. Gen. John L. Hines, USA, then commanding the Department of the Philippines, was given the honors due his rank, a dress parade and review. He commented favorably on the appearance and bearing of the Marines, some of whom he had briefly commanded. His III Corps in World War I had contained the 2d Division, which included the 4th Marine Brigade. The commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet made a visit and got the same treatment.

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But possibly the biggest event was a visit by Will Rogers, then the most popular actor and humorist on the American scene. His going-away speech ended with the following droll statement: “Marines are America’s most ardent tourists. The American people [are] getting a brief glimpse of them from time to time as they pass through, going from China to Haiti and San Domingo.” He might have also added “Nicaragua,” but that wasn’t politically correct at the time. The 1931 issue of the Peking Annual had a lot of photos, most being quite unsatisfactory. But one of them was of special interest; it was of Thomason and 1st Lt. James P. S. Devereaux, both in civilian clothes and on horseback. Like all Marine officers, they were encouraged by Major Rupertus to engage in the “Paper Hunts.” Rupertus undoubtedly had been on duty at Peking but had been transferred when the annual was issued. The annual also had many advertisements, many of which are fascinating to read now. Several showed the signs of earlier German influence in that part of China. One for Hempel’s Butchery pictured a pig as representative of its end products.10 There were also plenty of ads for beer, booze, and the other things Marines always purchased. Most foreigners, including Americans who could afford to, hired Chinese “boys” to do everything they didn’t want to do—which included mostly everything they had been hired to do. Supposedly that excluded the care of rifles, but it is certain that the Marines and soldiers had servants clean their weapons. In his interview, Erskine mentioned that when their rifles were found dirty, some Marines would complain that their boy hadn’t done a decent job. According to Erskine, the Chinese did everything for them for so long that the Marines nearly forgot how to run their own mess halls.11 The legation guard regulations called for one servant for each of 16 men in a squad room, “one boy for every three sergeants, and 1 boy for every non-commissioned officer above the rank of sergeant.” The Chinese were paid a monthly wage, which were deducted from the Marines’ pay. Some Marines believed that the soldiers of the l5th Infantry had the best-trained Chinese servants. They complained that the Chinese frequently ignored the Marines when spoken to and refused to do certain tasks, like make beds, etc. But in fact, generally all that the Marines were required to do personally was stand formation. Their uniforms, rifles, brass, and shoes were all polished and cared for by the “boys.” Regardless of the apparent low esteem in which the two groups, Chinese and Marines, held each other, there were moments in which friendship transcended differences in station. The 4th Marines’ magazine Walla Walla reported the death of “Jimmy” in 1931. He had been able to do the manual of arms of the armed forces of Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China, and the United States.12 Obviously, he was a great loss to any military community.

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Some Marines volunteered to serve aboard the navy’s gunboats as landing party personnel. Probably most did so just to break the monotony of regular guard duty, or for the excitement they thought that duty might bring. The boats were plying their trade, showing the flag and trying to be where they were needed if called upon by the Americans, mainly missionaries, in China’s hinterlands. As expected, the old boats were unable to continue their runs without drawing upon the Chinese people for food and other necessities on a daily basis. They were forced to turn into villages and towns on the river to purchase food and occasionally coal, since they all lacked refrigeration and had old-fashioned coal-fueled boilers. Both limitations posed serious problems and restricted the freedom the gunboats should have had. DUTY IN SHANGHAI IN THE 1930s When the Marines first arrived in Shanghai in 1927, good quarters were at a premium. For the first few months the regiment lived in tents alongside the Bund, but by May efforts to locate housing finally bore fruit. Practically from the very beginning, the 3d Battalion (A. A. Vandegrift commanding) was luckiest. It had quarters in the more desirable western residential section. By 14 May the 1st Battalion (Theodore Secor, CO) found quarters in the same section. In the 1930s regimental headquarters for the 4th Marines were on Haiphong Road. The 4th Marines’ club was on Gordon Road, as was the headquarters of the 2d Brigade in 1937. In 1986 Robert Moskin wrote an article for Fortitudine about a trip he had made to Shanghai in which he tried to find some of the buildings or sites used by the 4th Marines during the 1930s. His Chinese hosts found the few that were identifiable. It was difficult, because the roads now have Chinese names, but he found traces of some of the locations occupied by the regiment during its stay in Shanghai. The bounds of the International Settlement, less the Japanese portion, were Soochow Creek on the north and the French concession on the south. The United States and Britain shared the defense of the portion running along the Soochow Creek on their northern boundary south to the French concession, which ran the length of both, above them. The Italians had a small sector just west of the Marines, and somewhat later the Japanese held a large sector, mainly along the Whangpoo River. A factor of importance until at least 1941 was that there were no docks at Shanghai. All movement between ships and shore had to be made by lighters. For obvious reasons, that was not conducive to good traffic patterns. During much of the period, problems also included interference the Japanese army or navy placed in the path of waterborne navigation. At times they provided a surfeit of them. There is absolutely no question that all foreigners were so afflicted, but because the United States remained in

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China longest, it became the special target of the Japanese. Japanese naval and military people were always doing whatever they could to annoy and harass, and they succeeded only too well. It can also be stated unequivocally that the Americans in China learned to hate them with a great passion. But there were pleasurable things awaiting the newcomers, navy and Marines. As soon as each transport ship docked, sampans crowded around and Chinese traders offered food and trinkets for sale. The usual beggars were also out in force, so passengers had to struggle just to make the shore without parting with all their lucre. Peking legation Marine replacements would remain aboard, and soon after discharging the passengers the transport, often the “Hendy Maru” (as the USS Henderson was commonly known) weighed anchor. The ship then made for the Taku roads or a bit farther north to Chinwangtao to unload the balance of its passengers. The story of in-and-out traffic in the busy Shanghai port changed little during the stay of the Marines in China. THE 4TH MARINES AND THE MUKDEN “INCIDENT,” 1931 But of course, all good things must come to an end, or at least be interrupted. In September 1931 there was an eruption in north China that would greatly affect the Far East and the Americans there for the next 15 years. Under the pretext of having been attacked by the Chinese army in Mukden, the Japanese army invaded Manchuria and took the Chinese province “under its protective wing.” In actual fact, the Japanese imperialists had been planning the annexation of Manchuria for some years. That huge northeastern section of China along the Yalu River was Japan’s second step; the first had been Japan’s annexation of Korea earlier in the century. The new move put Japan in the enviable position of being able to march beyond its Korean borders with little expectation of interference from the Chinese army—most of which was then located in the southerly portions of China. The overall plan, of course, was the eventual conquest and absorption of all China. That would require a very large mouth and even bigger appetite—neither of which Japan had. But because of the extreme arrogance of many senior army officers, it would take another 15 years to authenticate that deficiency. For some unknown reason, Chiang Kai-shek ordered his northernmost army to withdraw in the face of Japan’s invasion. That army, under Chang Hsueh-liang and about 150,000 strong, was ordered to offer no battle to the invader. Other, smaller units were quickly overrun by the rapidly advancing Japanese. No one knows what went on in Chiang’s mind, unless it was to offer the Red Chinese someone else to fight against. He was prepared to avoid battle with Japan but was willing to go head to head with Chinese Reds, who in turn were willing to fight the Japanese. Chiang

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refused to offer significant military resistance and in fact seemed to be expecting a Western response to Japan’s aggressiveness. It didn’t come until after 7 December 1941, and then it only peripherally affected China. He never did learn how to fight an invader, just other Chinese, and that he did very poorly. Something had happened to him since his early triumphs when fighting the warlords and Communists. It has been said that he feared losing any of his military forces so much that he never used them. On 18 February 1932 the former Manchuria, newly renamed Manchukuo, declared its “independence” from China. Henry P’u-i, a Japanese puppet, was installed as regent and later, in 1934, as emperor. He was the same Henry P’u-i that had abdicated the throne of China in 1912. As a result of this naked Japanese aggression, the U.S. secretary of state, Henry Stimson, sent a note to all signatories of the nine-power treaty of February 1922 stating that the United States would not recognize any gains achieved through the use of armed force. This was one more irritant in the already tenuous relationship between the United States and Japan, and more trouble would come. Stimson was superb at encouragement but not at the proper follow-up action. In response to the invasion of Manchuria, Chinese civilians in Shanghai launched a crippling anti-Japanese boycott that extended to everything from Japan. Financially, the Japanese suffered greatly during the boycott period. During the worldwide depression, which this period encompassed, China had been Japan’s main outlet for its manufactured goods, many Japanese stores and business closed, and many civilians were forced to return to Japan, because of the boycott. That was the excuse for the invasion of Shanghai in 1932 and the destruction that Japan employed to encourage the Chinese to back down and buy Japanese products again. That was a fine example of Japanese salesmanship. What became known as “the First Battle of Shanghai” lasted from 28 January to 2 March 1932. By 2 March, through an agreement, the boycott had been lifted. The final solution and agreement were satisfactory to the Japanese government in Tokyo, but the local Japanese naval commander felt no compunction in defying the decision of Japan’s foreign office. He landed his Marines (known as the Special Naval Landing Party), and they, with ships’ guns aiding them, tried to take the Chinese section of Shanghai, known as Chapei. It was not the first time, nor would it be the last time, that Japan’s military and naval leaders took upon themselves the formation and imposition of foreign policy, which frequently differed from that of Japan’s government in Tokyo.13 One bright Marine, D. R. “G. Whizz” Wolfe, got the idea of creating a medal for general issue to Marines during this Japanese onslaught. (Ask any Marine, and he will tell you that he and his comrades are always seeking new medals to adorn their chests.) Wolfe’s prescription was the

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Soochow Creek Medal, cast in the establishment of Tuck Chang of 67 Broadway, Shanghai, “dealers in fine jewelry.” The medal was restricted to Marines and sailors who’d been in Shanghai during the troubles. That included the entire 4th Marines and hospital personnel. Several versions were struck. For those who have never seen the finished product, following is a brief description: There were two distinct versions of the 1932 issue. The obverse of No. 1 showed a Chinese male pushing a loaded Honey wagon, with the words “Soochow” [across the top] and “Creek 32” across the bottom and just below the wagon the words “For Valor.” The reverse read “Presented to [name] For Bravery and Valor/ Battle of Soochow/ Creek/ Shanghai 1932.” The ribbon had a brown stripe on yellow. Sounds reasonable, doesn’t it?

The medal was issued again in 1937 with the same basics, except that some navy people had red, white, and blue ribbons instead of the “traditional colors.” Members of the 4th Marines didn’t need any official recognition; they made their own. During the “troubled period,” the Chinese built up their forces substantially, while the Japanese poured in over 50,000 troops to oppose them. A number of mis-directed bombs fell in the Marines sector but did not result in any casualties. The fighting came quite close to the Marines, and as a result they began to have a more positive opinion of the fighting spirit of the Chinese. From an occidental viewpoint, the best description of what transpired is told by John W. Thomason, Jr., a Marine then on duty in Peking but on special leave in Shanghai at that time.14 In effect, the Japanese pounded the Chinese and could have taken the Chinese portion of Shanghai with little further effort. The problem faced by the international community was, “What if Japan decides to take the entire city, including the International Settlement?” What would the military forces in the settlement do then? In the meantime, Great Britain and the United States protested, and each, as well as the other settlement occupants, rushed troops to the city. The settlement’s defense policy required all nations to defend their own sectors from the Chinese; now they had two potential antagonists to defend against, the Chinese and the Japanese. This was a horse of a different color. For five years the settlement’s defensive forces had followed the Shanghai Defense Council’s plan for an “emergency.” The plan had been devised for one adversary; now all had to adjust to the new circumstances. For five years the Marines had griped about the many dummy runs and practice marches they made through the American zone. Now that an emergency had actually come, the Marines reacted as though they had been trained to follow the newer plan. Within hours the Marines were establishing their defensive posts along their border on Soochow Creek, and in

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the interior of their part of the Settlement (See Map 4.1). Their defensive sector was now about 76 blocks in area. Maj. William C. Powers’s 3d Bn occupied the southeastern section, and Maj. George H. Osterhout’s 1st Bn the northwest.15 Since Chapei was directly across the river from the 4th Marines, many Japanese shells, as well as rifle and machine-gun bullets, landed in its sector. Of course, the Marines couldn’t fire back. Their job, which they accomplished, was to keep both elements out of the settlement, nothing more. Obviously, all members of the settlement were hard pressed. The Japanese had launched part of their attack through their own sector. This act compromised the entire settlement, since it was contrary to the spirit of the agreement that existed between the members. The job of continuing the status of strict neutrality was made that much harder. Therefore, the Japanese settlement was excluded from the defensive sector as agreed upon by all the other member states. The Chinese weren’t feared in the settlement; they had, without success, asked the League of Nations to halt the Japanese aggression and could not afford to offend the Western powers in any way, and they didn’t. Japan had just walked out of the League and obviously wasn’t about to pay it any attention. But the Japanese tried to utilize the neutrality of the Americans and British to suit their own ends. In an attempt to outflank the Chinese defenders, whose flank rested on Soochow Creek, the Japanese took advantage of their membership in the International Settlement to move their troops through British and American sections. About 500 members of the Special Naval Landing Force occupied a cotton mill owned by the Japanese but in the Marines’ sector. There they placed a number of machine guns facing the Chinese across the river. The Americans and British complained that Japan was using their sectors to launch attacks upon the Chinese (under the pretext of protecting Japanese property there). Orders prohibited the Marines from fighting with the Japanese, so all that could be done was a semiofficial protest. After several meetings, Baron Sambijima, the Japanese member of the Shanghai Defense Council, promised to withdraw almost all the Japanese troops from the International Settlement; only small security units would remain. There were several further obvious defections from their neutral position, such as using warning panels for aircraft attacks upon Chapei. Several complaints later, the Japanese finally agreed to allow U.S. Marines to provide security for Japanese property in the Marine sector. The tension between the Japanese and the Marines was lessened considerably by the withdrawal of Japanese forces. Although the Marines had been unable to stop Japanese troops from coming in, they were able to impede attempts to infiltrate Japanese civilians into the sector—two groups were arrested on 30 January. The prisoners told the Marines that they had been ordered by naval authorities to occupy one of the Japanese mills in the Marines’ sector. Col. Richard S. Hooker, then in command of the 4th

Map 4.1. 4th Marines Defense Sector, Shanghai, 1932

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Marines, told the leader of the Special Landing Force that his troops had orders to shoot armed civilians on sight within his sector.16 Japanese officials solemnly promised that no further attempts would be made to infiltrate Japanese civilians into the settlement. The Japanese already had a reputation for abusing civilians and captives, and this came to the forefront during this period. Verified reports were filtering into settlement authorities depicting Japanese soldiers as uncontrolled barbarians. They had been seen bayoneting captured Chinese soldiers for entertainment, and their physical abuse of Chinese women was unbelievably cruel. They would continue these atrocities in the later war, and they have never, to my knowledge, properly apologized to the few victims that survived. During this period, the USS Houston arrived with eight Marine officers and 326 enlisted Marines. Seventy, from Cavite, were from the transport Chaumont, and the rest were from Houston’s own detachment. With this addition, the total number of Marines in Shanghai increased to 1,625. In addition, the arrival of the Chaumont brought a very welcome 1,200 members of the 31st U.S. Infantry from Manila, plus more Marines from Cavite. The infantry immediately assumed responsibility for the section that had been covered by the Shanghai Volunteer Corps. With this additional support, the 4th Marines “turned to,” making their defensive positions stronger. They added sandbags and created 51 additional strung out points, plus 16 new machine-gun nests. Barbed wire was strung out at all strong points over the entire three and one-half mile area that the Americans now defended. Five hundred Americans held the line and every two days they were replaced by another 500. An additional 550 remained in billets to provide internal security within the regimental sector. After the initial attempts, neither the Chinese nor the Japanese made further efforts to penetrate the International Settlement. From that time onward the Americans could just sit and watch what was going on in the Chapei district, and as best they could, dodge falling metal. Marines of the 21st Company were doing guard duty in front of the Wing-on Cotton Mill on the Soochow Creek, and several Marines from the company were inside the mill, when two Japanese planes bombing just across Soochow Creek accidentally dropped two bombs on the mill. Five Chinese were killed and about 15 wounded, but miraculously no Marines were hurt. Even more of a miracle was the story of the seven Marines of the 25th Company who were living in a tent beside a wall near the Foo Foong Cotton Mill. The cold Marines decided to take cover in the building, where it was a bit warmer at night. They had just left the tent when a shell from a Japanese gun dropped into the area. It went through the wall, then ricocheted off the concrete floor, entered the tent, knocked over a couple of bunks, and went out through the back, ending no one knows where.

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A young Lt. Thomas M. Ryan, from the 27th Company, had a somewhat different experience. He was walking along Soochow when a shell buried itself deep into the mud in the creek. The explosion brought forth the undesirable material lying within the creek and splattered the young lieutenant’s uniform. This in turn brought forth from Ryan an explosion of choice expletives that made even some old hands turn and stare in wonderment and appreciation. Capt Thomas A. Tighe, skipper of the 22d Company, later told about the high morale in his crowd. It seems that the 22d was out on duty from the very beginning and for three days stayed upon the creek, with no baths, not much sleep (they dropped onto their racks without eating—that’s how tired they were), and continually filling sandbags. The orders were three days on, six days off. They had just finished filling the bags and arranging everything to their liking when they were relieved. That meant that their reliefs could savor the arrangements having done nothing toward making them that way. That isn’t liked by Marines. As tired as they were, they let out a howl. It was only when they were promised that they would be able to come back after they had taken a bath and freshened up a bit that Tighe and his “fighting” 22d could finally be induced to leave. At times like those, even bandsmen were ordered to drop their “weapons” and pick up their rifles to do duty on the line. One Marine bandsman named Hanvey did his duty, as would be expected. He was on a post near headquarters and was all alone. Suddenly, several shots whanged over his head, and smart Marine that he was, he dropped in place for cover. A few moments later eight Japanese dressed in civilian clothes, but well armed, came toward him and his post. Hanvey jumped up, pointed his rifle in their direction, and demanded their surrender. Amazingly they did just that. He marched them into headquarters, where they were disarmed and then turned over to the police. On 3 March the Chinese, unobserved by their enemy, retired in perfect order. It was obvious to observers they were learning the tricks of the war trade. Their retirement put an end to the hostilities, thereby making the defense of the sector less tiring, requiring fewer Marines. The state of emergency that had been declared ended on 13 June 1932. The 31st Infantry was withdrawn and returned to the Philippines. When the Chinese left the city, Rear Adm. Shiozawa ordered his forces to cease firing and to hold their positions. Three months later a League of Nations committee finally worked out an agreement between the two sides. On 5 May the Japanese agreed to withdraw to positions held as of 28 January, and the Chinese forces agreed to remain where they were and not attempt to come closer to the city. This created a neutral zone. Encouraged by the League’s recognition of its conquest of Manchuria, in May 1932, Japan then began an additional campaign aimed at intimidating the Chiang

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government even further. From then on, until their defeat at the end of World War II, Japan continued its undeclared, but obvious, campaign to dismember China and bring it entirely under its control. The state of emergency declared by the Municipal Council was revoked on 13 June, and the 4th Marines and all the other troops engaged in holding the “line” abandoned their defensive positions. As we have witnessed, during the Sino-Japanese troubles at Shanghai the 4th Marines had been engaged in manning barricades and, when things got back to nearly normal, performing ceremonial and interior guard duty. Theirs was to “watch and wait,” not “do or die.” The Commandant, Maj. Gen. Ben H. Fuller, sent a “well done.” In his annual report for 1932 he wrote, “The nature of the operations was such as to call for the highest discipline and forbearance on the part of the rank and file and sound judgment on the part of the commander. The highest traditions of the Marine Corps were upheld during the operations at Shanghai.” Recognizing that he needed more Marines to defend his sector of the settlement, Colonel Hooker requested that the missing 2d Battalion be formed and made part of his defense force. Ben Fuller took little time to grant that request. Maj. Lyle H. Miller was placed in command of the newly raised battalion. It was composed of the 9th, 10th, and 31st Companies, plus the 32d Machine Gun Company.17 The regiment now totaled about 1,800 officers and men. But personnel shortages in the Corps in this deepest part of the Depression didn’t allow this level to be maintained for very long. Less than a year later, on 19 December 1934, the 3d Battalion and Companys C and G were disbanded. This reduced the level of personnel to 1,073 officers and men.18 What personnel remained of the 4th Marines settled down to do what they liked to do best, which was nothing much. The regimental history tells us that extracurricular activities were again taken up, including an active sports program, band concerts, etc.—nothing that would likely strain anyone’s back. For this they were paid, but still not very well. LEGATION GUARD DUTY IN PEKING, LATE 1930s In 1934, Col. Presley M. Rixey commanded the Marine detachment at Peking.19 First Lt. Evans F. Carlson was post adjutant and editor in chief of the annual that year. One photo shows a man in “civvies” boarding a train, with a caption reading, “Lt. Puller leaves to join USS Augusta.” There are several notable features about the photographs, especially that nearly all the privates look like they were at least forty or more years of age, and few of the officers pictured attained importance in the later Marine Corps. One officer, Capt. Francis S. Kiernan, had been a captain with the 4th Brigade in 1918, sixteen years before; in 1945 he would be listed as having retired in 1935 with permanent rank as captain. Kiernan would be called

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back to active duty during the Second World War, but as a lieutenant colonel. Archie Vandegrift arrived at Peking in 1934 to become the executive officer of the guard detachment. He and Rixey were old friends and understood each other quite well. When Rixey had a severe malaria attack and was ordered to the coast to recuperate, Vandegrift, with Graves Erskine’s help, effortlessly filled in as CO. He and Erskine immediately embarked upon a heavy training program, which extended into the harsh winter months. Exposure was something that Rixey had avoided, in order to prevent illness. By the following winter Rixey had returned to the United States, and Vandegrift, having made full colonel, was his permanent replacement. In his memoir he mentions that he had three company commanders who made names for themselves in the Corps—“Joe Burger, John Bemis and Bob Luckey”—and a platoon officer named Shoup, who had returned to China once again. He tells us that “young Shoup was a fine officer, an earnest and conscientious person not easily persuaded from a course he thought correct.” In July 1935, Capt. Gerald “Jerry” Thomas became “skipper” of B Company and proceeded at once to improve it. He dropped his first sergeant for an enterprising unnamed private first class.20 His company didn’t do as well at the rifle range as Thomas thought it should. Whereas 80 percent was the norm, the percentage of his men that qualified was only seventythree. According to Allan R. Millett, Thomas was “irritated.” Company B had been trained as artillerymen as well as infantry, but on “museumquality” navy three-inch landing guns. Still, in discussions with the men of Company A and C, the enlisted men of B proudly attested to the value of their antique guns. Company A had Browning .30-caliber machine guns, and C had 81 mm mortars. The dual training for combat roles that each company engaged in caused some problems in training and guard duty. But overall, by diligence and effort on the part of the officers and men of the various companies, the training was managed well enough. The Chinese nation was in a constant state of turmoil, and the Marines were more or less blind where intelligence was concerned. Because the Marines could no longer rely upon intelligence garnered by other sources, including the Office of Naval Intelligence, they were compelled to formulate their own intelligence programs. This not only included instructing information gatherers but also evaluating and disseminating what was collected, political and economic intelligence, as well as military intelligence. Few Marine officers or noncommissioned officers had ever had any training in this specialty; therefore, they had to learn while doing, and most likely they learned from the British, who were acknowledged leaders in the pursuit of intelligence.21 Lt. Evans F. Carlson was selected to fill the billet of intelligence officer for the 4th Marines. As was his wont, Carlson set out to do the job assigned to the best of his ability. His biography tells a compre-

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hensive story of how he started and when, and his learning experiences along the way. Shortly after his first assignment, he was sent to Nicaragua but in 1933 returned to the 4th Marines as their intelligence officer. In 1935 he was recalled to the United States and found himself commanding the Marine guard detachment assigned to protect Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt at his “little” White House at Warm Springs, Georgia. At the president’s clandestine direction, Carlson was shipped back to China in 1935 but this time as practically the president’s personal intelligence agent. It was at this period that he began his long-term affection for and attachment to the Chinese Communists, for their organizational ability, as compared to their opposite numbers, in the KMT. A Marine radio station was established at Shanghai in the early 1930s, in order to monitor Japanese signals. Secretary of State Henry Stimson, who once declared, “Gentlemen don’t read other gentlemen’s mail,” soon after closed the station down. It was reopened somewhat later after Stimson left State and “gentlemen” again read “gentlemen’s” mail. Capt. William A. Worton, who was a Chinese language expert, posed as an American businessman in Shanghai’s International Settlement.22 He managed to recruit agents, who were sent into Japan to gather information about the Japanese fleet. While a member of the intelligence staff of the American minister, Nelson T. Johnson, Worton was dispatched to the headquarters of a warlord to investigate the killing of two Chinese farmers. The Chinese language student used the most polite Chinese he was capable of as he tried to tell the general why he was there: He listened and listened and said nothing. Finally tea was brought in signaling the end of the interview. After finishing tea, Worton prepared to depart. I bowed very politely from the waist, bringing my hands together in the old custom. The general escorted the Marine to the door and then, in perfect English, said, “Sometime when you’re not so busy, ride over here again and maybe we can split a bottle of whiskey together.” Worton was taken aback and asked the general why he allowed him to struggle for three hours with the Chinese language since he spoke perfect English. The warlord replied “Major, congratulations to your teacher. I haven’t heard such polite terms in Chinese since my grandfather’s day. I just enjoyed every minute of it.” The general then informed Worton that he had attended Purdue University.23

Other various enterprises, especially the pursuit of pleasure, were what the officers and men mainly engaged in during their sojourn in China. Shanghai, being a very cosmopolitan city, could provide many and different pleasures for those who could afford them. American military and naval personnel were in the enviable position of being able to afford most everything China had to offer. This situation did not do much for international goodwill; in comparison, the British, especially, were greatly underpaid, as

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were the French, Italians, and all the rest. Until things sort of settled down, there were many brawls between the various factions, and mostly in “their own” watering holes.24 Other than drinking and wenching, sports included baseball (mostly between companies and battalions) and football. Additional sports included swimming, golf, bowling, boxing, and wrestling matches between Marine units as well as foreign opponents. The Marines soon dominated rugby, a game the British taught them. For several years the 4th took from the British the Spunt Cup, symbol of and awarded by the Shanghai Rugby Club. We can only guess how popular the 4th Marines was among the British residents after that. The 4th Regiment’s band was very popular. It played for parades and reviews and gave concerts for the Marines and their guests. Its dance orchestra was also much in demand, not only by the Marines but foreign military and civilian groups as well. As we have already seen, the American Company and Troop of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps had provided the 4th Regiment’s band with a set of fifes and drums, which made it unique among Marine bands. There wasn’t another like them in the Corps. The band of the Green Howards, a British regiment in Shanghai, provided the instructions for the Fessenden Fifes, and soon they were functioning quite satisfactorily at parades and other occasions.25 In a later period the Fessendens became quite as famous in the Corps as they had been at Shanghai. On 25 November 1933, the 4th Marines assumed an additional duty: it was given the responsibility for guarding the vessels of the Yangtze Rapid Steamship Company. As a young officer, Gen. R. H. Williams commanded several trips of armed Marine guards up the Yangtze during the 1933– 1935 period. He later recalled that the reason for service aboard commercial ships was to defend passengers against marauding bandits firing from shore or from small craft on the river. One officer and usually four Marines were assigned staterooms on the main deck. It was a pleasant and undemanding duty for the Marines. They could comfortably watch rural China glide by until they reached the limits of inner China, usually, in decent weather and tides, at Chungking. The duty was frequently dull. Generally there would be a single Marine on daytime duty and two at night. Occasionally the officer would spell the daytime guard. Food was good and plentiful, and best of all, it was provided by the Steamship Company, free of cost. For officers, that was a big plus, because that meant there were no mess fees, and most could save a modest amount of money. Another high point of the duty was the opportunity of meeting officers of different branches of the service, mainly navy men, or on occasion foreigners, such as British sailors who also had gunboat duty. One such event was a polo game played between the officers of a U.S. Navy gunboat and a British gunboat. Each side had three officers, one of whom was Marine Lt. Robert H. Williams, and there was a bare modicum of ability and experience on either side. The polo clubs were made aboard the American

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boat and the British bought untrained Mongolian ponies to ride. It must have been some game. With the reduction to nearly 50 percent of the regiment, the strain of maintaining the armed guards was more than the regiment could stand. They were withdrawn from “sea duty” on 1 July 1935. Back in Peking, the legation guard was doing its duty, and the situation was still well in hand. The duties of the Mounted Detachment were much as they had been when the unit was first formed back in 1912. Its main job, should there have been serious distress in or near Peking, was to go out and locate Americans that might be at risk, then assist them into the legation proper. The mounted troopers’ responsibility, in normal times, was occasionally to trek out and confirm that Americans in the outlying districts were safe. Duty required that they maintain a current listing of the residence of American citizens. That was especially important for the night patrols. Although members of the detachment were familiar with the streets of the city and location of all the important legation buildings, nightfall could drastically change appearances. The horse Marines were generally mounted upon small Mongolian ponies. Reports tell of animals no more than 800 pounds and 12 hands at the withers; others state 1,750 pounds and 131⁄2 hands. Obviously one is less correct than the other, but the former makes more sense. They were small animals that, because of their strength, were able to transport a fullsized Marine. The Marine would be wearing a blue woolen uniform (in winter), jodhpurs, and the necessary tools of his trade: a Springfield .03 rifle in a leather boot on the saddle and a Colt .45-caliber pistol in a holster at his side. In more difficult times, some men would carry a Thompson submachine gun. The outfit later added eight Browning automatic rifles and even a small mounted machine-gun section. These weapons never had to be used, but they were always there if needed. In addition to the firearms each man carried a cavalry saber, which all had to be able to handle well; all attended regular classes in the art of slashing. In winter, members of the guard wore fur hats with a red diamond in the center front, emblazoned, of course, with the Marine emblem. Two leaders of the Mounted Detachment later became famous: 1st Lt. James P. S. Devereaux and 1st Lt. Lewis B. Puller, the former at the defense of Wake and the latter for his command presence and five Navy Crosses. Still, it was Harles L. Wilkinson, a former army cavalryman and now a sergeant in the Corps, who trained the detachment and made it a “polished equestrian unit.” Capt. John W. Thomason, Jr., always an astute observer, described the detachment’s presence in the weekly parade—and how the crowd would go wild when the band played “Pop Goes the Weasel” as the Mounted Detachment crossed the field at a trot: “They always stole the show.” Vandegrift also mentioned that the local Chinese in attendance

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enjoyed that moment—howling with delight whenever the band began the tune. In 1938, when the 15th Infantry left for the States and a part of the Peking guard was transferred to Tientsin, the horse Marines dismounted and went with the transferees. Their final commander, 2d Lt. DeWolfe Schatzel, and thirty Marines joined the infantry guard companies.26 There was gloom in “Mudville” that night and for several more to come. There is no grander feeling for any horseman than to mount and ride. The loss of that privilege must have been keenly felt by those “Horse Marines.” Nonetheless, as the situation in China settled down, the military and naval forces began to succumb to the indolent routines that China duty tempted them with. Their “boys” did most of the work, in some instances more than expected. Marines in Peking had mobilization drills on a fairly regular basis, but in one instance the officer in command, counting noses, found that there were more Chinese on hand than Marines.27 Recreation was the order of the day for both officers and enlisted men, in Peking as well as in Shanghai. Marine officers, even captains, could and did own four or five polo ponies. Hunting and even horse races were engaged in by officers, some of who rode their own horses rather than hiring jockeys. Officers and enlisted men were able to travel in China, unless trouble of a serious nature was brewing, and many journeyed far and wide while on duty there. Some, like Ivan Buster and three other enlisted men, made a hunting trip in 1933 into Outer Mongolia (then a Soviet state). That group returned after 30 days with 100 or more pieces of game. Buster made, in all, four trips through the Great Wall. One officer, William P. Battel, would go to Manchuria for a few weeks at a time, as often as he could, to hunt tigers. “Buzz” Letcher continually desired to go hunting “up north,” but the Japanese army always seemed to be in his way. (At that period, 1938–1939, the Japanese were riding rough-shod over northern China, making life miserable for the inhabitants and not doing much to please the U.S. Marines.) Sam Griffith would describe how he and three companions made a two-week walking tour from Peking to near Shansi Province, spending nights in temples and little inns. Of course, he was a Chinese language student, and that would have made their journey somewhat easier. Money, then as now, was a problem for Marines. A first lieutenant’s income in 1931, $1,500 a year, was exactly the same as it had been in 1901. During the worst of the Depression, all annual salaries were reduced by 15 percent, down to $234.15 for a private and to $1,971.00, including allowances, for a second lieutenant. Officers were allowed to take a month’s leave without pay, instead of the pay reduction, and some did. It isn’t clear what difference that made except for those Marines who didn’t take the month off. Shooting pay and the re-enlistment bonus were curtailed. By 1937 a private’s earnings had increased to approximately

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$252.00 per year. But still, as we have seen, overall the American military man was much better paid than a service person in any other foreign army or navy was at that time. Consequently for Americans, China duty was better than any other place on earth. There were even institutions of pleasure that had signs stating that no military personnel were allowed “except Americans.” When the United States went off the gold standard, the exchange rate between American and Chinese money dropped, but for some reason the actual value of U.S. money increased.28 In China, the system of debt payment was, to say the least, quite unusual. Nearly every service or product was covered by the “chit” system. That meant that Americans and Europeans signed a chit, a promise to pay on payday. The custom was already in place when the 4th Marines arrived. Because Americans quickly adapt, the Marines were soon spending all kinds of money, most of which they would never have. Many of you have read of the variety of names used by Marines and others to avoid paying their debts. Lincoln and Washington were very common signatures, as in 1927–1929, so was “Smedley Butler.” But the system worked itself out, and by the 1930s the Marines were doing the honorable thing, paying their debts. Some Marines were always in debt, and some never got completely out of it. When individual Marines were to be transferred back to the States, the chit holders somehow always managed to know and to be on hand to collect. Most Marines took care of their debts when they were paid off, probably so as to not ruin the system for the Marines to come. Perhaps some were even honest. In whatever land or situation, Marines had their own who loaned ready cash to the less frugal. In China the practice was known as “jawboning.” Ivan Buster remembered another Marine named Gegan who was always the big winner in poker games. Gegan, according to Buster, had a threegallon can that was filled with silver dollars for anyone to use. The rule was to pay it back on payday, apparently with no fee. Without a doubt, others must have collected their “ounce of flesh” in addition to the amount loaned. It would have been a very unusual period and people if that didn’t happen. One second lieutenant at Peking later recalled how he and his wife rented a house that included three servants, including a cook and helper. They also hired an amah for his wife, another to care for their clothes, one for the baby, another two for the children, and even one to care for his horse. That totaled nine servants in all. They never had it so good, before or after, and all on an annual salary of less than $2,000. Although Captain Letcher complained in his letters home of being nearly poverty stricken, he and his wife bought everything that they took a fancy to. Some of the officers, and perhaps also some enlisted men, had their own automobiles while in China. Getting rid of that article when leaving China didn’t seem to be as difficult as one would imagine. There were plenty of other Americans with money

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to spend and, interestingly, many Chinese as well. Single officers generally rented a hotel room; frequently, several officers would rent an apartment together. The social life was extensive and expensive for the officers. Parties were frequent, and all but single officers were expected to repay invitations. An invitation obligation required at least a gift for the hostess. Erskine gives an excellent overview of the social whirl he found in Peking: Many times . . . there’d be some sort of reception at 10 o’clock. You might go to the Italian Embassy . . . and over there you would drink and end up with champagne. You had about all you needed for a whole day there, but then this was followed by something over at the British Embassy . . . you were invited there. And it seemed that if you declined these invitations, the person that invited you would have his feelings hurt. It was not an excuse. So we’d go to the British Embassy and drink gin until you were so tight you could hardly eat your lunch. Then from there we had a cocktail hour, maybe and that was followed by a dinner which kept you up at least till midnight.

Obviously, he exaggerated a little bit—although Brooke Astor, whose father, John H. Russell, had been the commanding officer of the Peking guard in 1919, tells of her parents going out socially for thirty-six consecutive nights. Naturally, not everyone drank or partied. Many officers and enlisted men enjoyed the culture China had to offer. There were many who purchased the relatively inexpensive artifacts available in the varied shops. Those included objects of art, crystal, superlative jade, chinaware and other fine things that most wives and husbands could never afford in the United States on an officer’s salary. In Letcher’s letters he gives a blow-by-blow account of what he and his wife had been buying, and most of it was fine crystal or jade. Social life for enlisted Marines, except the married men in the three top ranks, was mainly bars and women, frequently both at the same time. Marriage wasn’t for the lower ranks, though a few were married. Those that were most often lived in a state of poverty—even in China, where their pay went so much further. Venereal diseases were a common malady, because of the promiscuous behavior of the rank and file. Beginning with the early 1930s, VD was greatly reduced, primarily because the new Marines were somewhat more intelligent individuals. Additionally, the unmarried Marines were surreptitiously encouraged to “shack up” and remain with clean women all the while they stayed in China. In the early 1930s a huge influx of White Russians moved into Shanghai and soon provided a source of relatively clean women for the American servicemen, although there were occasional Marines who still preferred Chinese women. Often a Marine would take up with a Russian woman and end up supporting her entire family as well. Some Marines tried to marry them, but most weren’t allowed to by their commanding officers. In at least one such case, the colonel

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of the 4th Marines had a man incarcerated in the brig for three weeks until he was rotated back to the States, with no charges preferred. As reported by Walla Walla, there were other esoteric kinds of Marine activity. In 1933, Cpl. Cecil R. Bates, Service Company, played the thenchess champion, Dr. Alckhine, to a draw at the Foreign YMCA. Flagpole sitting was a rage in the States at the time; naturally, the Marines had to get into that act; the same magazine reported that PFC John J. Andress sat aloft on a pole in Shanghai for six hours and 45 minutes. Stated briefly, the men undertook a variety of off-duty activities, proving that they were not just a bunch of wenching, drunken louts, although the majority probably were. In 1985, a former Marine, Andy Senlick, told Leatherneck what life was like during the 1936–1938 period when he was stationed in Peking. Senlick, a native of Philadelphia, had enlisted in the Marines in May 1934. “Jobs were tough . . . so I figured I’d join the Marines for a regular paycheck.” In January 1936 he arrived at Peking and was assigned to Lt. Col. Alexander A. Vandegrift as his orderly. “I was a gopher[:] . . . gopher this or gopher that.” His duties were not very heavy, so to kill time he learned to be a file clerk and also to run the mimeograph machine. While he was in China, the Japanese attacked the Yangtze gunboat USS Panay, and he was given a letter of protest to take to the commander of the Imperial Japanese forces in north China. As he attempted to hand the message to a young Japanese lieutenant, the officer yelled something in Japanese, and the soldiers began fixing their bayonets. Scared, Senlick peddled his bike back to the legation. The senior Marine officer on duty called the Japanese and reamed them out for picking on a lone, unarmed Marine who was just doing his duty. Senlick was told to return, and he did. An English-speaking Japanese lieutenant welcomed him and accepted the proffered letter without further question. Later he met and married Nina, a Russian woman. She had been born in China of White Russian parents and consequently was a Chinese citizen. He was a corporal by this time and not very well off. Somehow he obtained his CO’s permission to be married. When American dependents were evacuated, his wife and son John should have been included, but because she was still a Chinese citizen she was not among the first to leave. He also tells of the Japanese giving some Americans a bad time, about 1938 he believes, just outside the American legation. One of the women was Pearl Buck, the then-famous author of books about China and the Chinese. A group of Marines in uniform and under arms arrived to “sort out” the problem. The Japanese backed off. Senlick was sent back to the States, and not long afterward Nina managed to get to Japan with their son. When his wife was to leave Peking, Col. Hal Turnage sent his car to pick her up and deliver her to the docks, to be sure that she got aboard; she was a member of the Marine family

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and as such deserved special attention. Incidentally, when this story was written they had been married forty-seven years. In the 1930s both the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps were making serious efforts to stop long-term service in China. Everyone realized how debilitating it was and how drastically it was affecting the overall morale of both services. Members of the Corps stationed elsewhere recognized the great advantages the China Marines had and many resented never having been out there themselves. Others just resented the benefits and special treatment they believed that their fellow Marines were receiving, and that they weren’t. One Marine officer was quoted as saying, “I remember when I got out there, there was a movement going on. . . . I can remember Jerry Thomas . . . Erskine and Vandegrift talking in the office and saying ‘we’ve got to start weeding out these guys’ [who have been in Peking too long].”29 Some American servicemen elected to remain in China after their tours of duty ended. Their fellow Marines accused them of “going Asiatic.” But some Americans had very strong positive feelings about China. One Marine who had to leave China dejectedly said, “Home, hell, this is my home, I’m going to a foreign country.” And it wasn’t just Marines who rejected the idea of leaving a place where, for various reasons, life was so much more pleasant than in the United States during much of that period. Even some Marines officers talked of staying in China, though no record names any that did so. There were many and diverse reasons why men wanted to stay in China. The common idea was, and is, that they wanted to continue to be filled with booze and saturated with loose women. In fact, however, those that did stay had solid reasons for doing so. Some Marines wanted to start businesses in Shanghai. A former editor of Walla Walla took a position on the Shanghai Mercury Press; another joined the advertising department of the China Press. A former private named Campbell joined another former Marine on the staff of the radio station XGKO in Shanghai. A number of others stayed for other reasons. As we have seen, Frank Gowen married into the German Hempel family in Peking and took over the direction of the family’s business, which became a favorite hangout of the Marine Legation Guard. It was at Hempel’s that Gowen, along with several other Marines, established the tradition of the “Knight’s of the Round Table.” In 1929 such a table was built of oak especially for the group. Each member who could drink a liter of beer in one quaff was allowed to have a silver plate, engraved with his signature, set into the tabletop. At least 80 percent were Marines, but other members included such foreigners as Germans, British, Japanese, a French sous-officier, and an elderly Chinese man. The group even had its own flag, a red pig on a white field. As late as 1972, Frank Gowen, by then returned to the United States, had the table in his possession. It had been sent to him by a Marine who found it in north China— shipped collect, of course.

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For five years, 1932 to 1937, the situation in China did not change a great deal. The Nationalist forces defeated the Communist forces in the south. That forced 80,000 to 100,000 Reds to make the famous “Long March” to the far north of China. It took them from October 1934 until October 1935, and only 7,000 to 8,000 arrived, They had marched 7,500 miles, over 18 mountain ranges and through 11 provinces, subjected to harassment by the KMT during the entire trip. But their will was never overcome. Also, trouble was still brewing between Japan and China. The former had grabbed more Chinese territory in the north, first the province of Jehol in 1933 and then Chahar province in June 1936. Fighting between Chiang and his cronies versus the Communists led by Mao Tse-dong continued, but neither was doing much about the invading Japanese. Meanwhile, Col. Charles F. B. Price, CO of the 4th Marines since May of 1936, was anxious to stabilize his forces as best he could, to revitalize his somewhat lethargic command.30 In February 1937 he wrote the new commandant, Thomas Holcomb, requesting that “younger, more inspiring officers” be sent to “replace the old-timers with ‘go-getter’ types.” He also requested permission to buy “[pith] helmets to ameliorate the hot weather conditions for his men.” Obviously, the regiment was not in the best shape, and it would get worse; Price, at least, was trying to improve conditions. THE SECOND “INCIDENT,” 1937 Chiang and his forces were capable of breaking the strength of the Reds, but the Japanese were still actively placing sections of China under their control. For some reason Chiang didn’t contest them in the field until 7 July 1937, when Japanese and Chinese troops finally clashed at the Marco Polo Bridge, just miles outside Peking. By August, fighting had broken out in Shanghai between the Chinese army and the Japanese Special Naval Landing Force. On 9 August several Japanese civilians were killed; within a few days, 32 Japanese warships arrived and when in position began firing. There was a veritable exodus from Chapei; not wanting to be caught up again in fighting, Chinese civilians left by the thousands. On 12 August 1937, Colonel Price consulted with the American consul general, Clarence Gauss, and Brigadier A.P.D. Telfer-Smollett, commanding the British Shanghai Area Force, concerning the renewed fighting in Shanghai. The Municipal Council mobilized the Shanghai Volunteer Corps and requested support from the American and British garrison troops.31 At 0130 on 13 August, the 4th Marines was ordered to occupy positions in their sector in support of the Municipal Police, who had already closed gates leading into the settlement from the north. The orders were to leave all civilian matters to the police but to handle any excursion into their sector (Map 4.2) by Chinese or Japanese soldiers—but under no circumstances were the Marines to clash with the Japanese. Meanwhile, antici-

Map 4.2. 4th Marines Defense Sector, Shanghai, 1937

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pating orders to execute “Plan A,” the Marines rushed to fill sandbags and erect barbed wire in their area.32 Of great concern to Price and Gauss was whether the two belligerents would honor the sacrosanct neutrality of the International Settlement. Ambassador Johnson (the Peking diplomatic post was now an embassy) approached Chiang Kai-shek and requested a guarantee of no Chinese incursion into the settlement; it was accepted as long as the Japanese also agreed. The 4th Marines intelligence officer, Capt. Ronald A. Boone, was informed by Commander Moriji Takeda of the Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF) that the Japanese government had no intention of passing troops through the settlement to attack the Chinese, as had happened in 1932. True to his word, on the 14th all Japanese troops in the American sector were withdrawn. Colonel Price assured Takeda that the Marines would protect Japanese citizens and property in their sector. That promise was also kept. That same afternoon, Adm. Harry E. Yarnell, Asiatic Fleet commander, cruised into the Whangpoo River aboard his flagship, the USS Augusta, and conferred with Colonel Price. At 1600 he ordered Price to execute Plan A. Literally within minutes, all previously selected positions along the Soochow Creek were occupied and strengthened. Yarnell also gave instructions to Price that armed Chinese and Japanese were not to be allowed into the American sector of the settlement: “Prevent the entry of armed combatants by means other than rifle fire, such as tear gas. As a last resort, to prevent the actual entry, [small arms] fire may be opened.” Unarmed Chinese soldiers would be allowed to enter but would be placed under guard. As the Marines were moving to their assigned posts, tragedy struck the settlement. Two Chinese bombers attempting to bomb the Japanese cruiser Idzumo instead dropped two bombs in Nanking Road, near the Bund. Another two were dropped on the French concession, which was very crowded with people at the time. The carnage was terrible. The 4th Marines positions were as follows (see Map 4.3). Lt. Col. William H. Rupertus, commanding the 1st Battalion, was on the left, and Lt. Col. Roswell Winans, in command of the 2d Battalion, was on the right.33 There were 58 sandbagged strong points stretched across the 7,200-yard main line of resistance (MLR) Twenty-nine machine guns were arranged so as to give interlocking fire, and there were reserve lines to which the battalions could remove themselves if the situation required it. On 12 August, the muster rolls affirm, the 4th Marines had 59 officers and 1,013 enlisted Marines organized into two rifle battalions and headquarters, service, and motor transport companies. The rifle battalions each had two rifle companies and one machine-gun company. Companies B and E each lacked one platoon; that of B Company was acting as a regimental military police (MP) platoon. Each battalion had in reserve a platoon of howitzers, detached from the machine-gun company. Emplacements for the howitzers

Map 4.3. Defense Sectors in Shanghai, 1937

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were staked out but were never occupied. In the absence of the 3rd Battalion, the regimental reserve was composed of the MP platoon and a platoon derived from the headquarters, service, and motor transport companies. Fortunately, the cruiser Augusta landed her 50 Marines plus 57 bluejackets to reinforce the regimental reserve. In addition, on the 19th a rifle company made up of two officers and 102 Marines arrived from Cavite and was added to the 1st Battalion as Company C. This was the slapdash American way of war in the 1930s—but has it changed much since then? All Americans were urged to leave, especially the women and children. All Marine dependents did leave. The first group left Shanghai on 17 August bound for the Philippines aboard the liner President Jefferson. Because of the fighting around the settlement, the liner didn’t come up the Whangpoo; the passengers had to be transported down the river aboard lighters to the anchorage at Woosung. Marine armed guards accompanied each lighter downriver, adding to their already heavy load of work on the perimeter. Luckily, nothing ever came of those “boat rides.” There were no incidents and no casualties. The SNLF, badly outnumbered and roughly handled by its opponents, was forced back into a pocket, its back to the Whangpoo. Fortunately for it, the Japanese army made an amphibious landing on 24 August. By 29 August the Japanese had pushed the Chinese back and had penetrated another seven miles. But at that point the Chinese held, and the fighting became stalemated. Of course, the Marines were in a ringside seat. As one could expect, stray shells and bullets came zinging by them. At the regimental hospital on 17 August, an almost spent antiaircraft round wounded Pharmacists’ Mate Floyd Arnold. A few other Americans were slightly wounded, but none seriously. Mostly it was watching and waiting. More welcome reinforcements for the 4th Marines came on 19 September, when the USS Chaumont made port carrying 2d Brigade Headquarters, brigade troops, and most importantly, the 6th Marines.34 After conferring with Col. Charles Price, Brig. Gen. John C. Beaumont, the brigade commander, decided to relieve the 4th Marines of MLR duty. The 4th which had been on duty continually for forty days, passed into brigade reserve. The 25 September 1937 issue of Walla Walla has a cover photo of Beaumont and Price greeting each other. The same issue gives a short biographical sketch of Beaumont. He had been CO of the 4th Marines in 1933 and in 1936 had been relieved by Charles F. B. Price.35 Beaumont was back, and he was now Price’s chief. What comes around, goes around. The 6th Marines, with auxiliary units, totaled 1435 officers and men. A Dollar Company tender brought them in, and their landing was greeted by the drum and bugle band of the Royal Welch Fusiliers. Their arrival brought the total of the 2d Brigade to 2,536 personnel. Of course, Walla Walla then became the 2d Brigade newsweekly.36 Col. Thomas S. Clarke commanded the 6th Marines during their stay in Shanghai.37

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As soon as the 6th Marines took over the positions established by the 4th it made “changes” that infuriated many members of the 4th Marines. The Marines of the 6th tore down and rebuilt the sandbagged machine-gun positions to satisfy their own professional tastes. This and constant criticism irritated Maj. “Red Mike” Edson, plans and training officer of the 4th. He was especially bothered by the lack of friendly cooperation.38 But by 3 October the two regiments were both on line, the 6th in the western portion and the 4th in the eastern portion of the American settlement. Each regiment maintained one battalion on line and one in reserve. This continued until the Chinese withdrew from Shanghai in late November. Admiral Yarnell was a fighter. He was constantly getting into scrapes with the State Department by taking matters into his own hands when it wished he wouldn’t. He was ceaselessly in hot water because he could not learn to keep his mouth shut. One after another, messages went from Yarnell to the local Japanese authorities establishing procedure and deciding issues that Secretary Cordell Hull believed were his prerogatives, not those of an admiral on the scene. Yarnell was unwilling or unable to desist during his tenure in Asia. In October 1937 he sent Hull a copy of a message he had issued to his command, one that would churn the secretary’s bile once again. It read as follows: “In case of attack on the defense forces (Marines) or noncombatants in the United States sector by planes of any nationality (Japanese) fire may be open on such planes in self defense.”39 Hull went up into the air over that one. It was a “public” message, and the “folks back home,” many of whom were against getting involved in any confrontation with any nation, were reading it in the clear. Of course, Yarnell made it available to the media; that was his primary mistake. This is also indicative of how little control the American military had over events in China during that period. When Japanese officers decreed policy and carried it out, regardless of the consequences, the government in Tokyo did and said nothing. That meant, of course, that a shooting war could begin at any time and at any place. When that happened, the American soldier, sailor, or Marine on the scene always had at least one hand tied behind his back.40 It was tied in this case by Washington decision makers, who appeared to be using the 4th Marines as a scapegoat. Perhaps, and more likely, to entice the Japanese into blundering? With the cessation of hostilities in Shanghai on 9 November 1937, the frontline strength of the two regiments dropped to one rifle company and one machine-gun platoon each. How the regiments interacted with each other in social matters after the above-mentioned faux pas isn’t on record. Conceivably members of the 6th didn’t appreciate the appellation “Pogeybait 6th.” Perhaps the “salty” members of the 4th Marines were less than respectful to their mates. Another, and most unusual, unit that came into being at this time was

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the 4th Marines Auxiliary, composed of American civilian volunteers. As reported in the Walla Walla of 6 November 1937; Major Ralph E. West of the Regimental Staff organized the group as the “Fourth Marines Auxiliary” and arranged for their equipment and basic instruction under the supervision of Captain George H. Cloud of H. Company. The volunteer unit received its training from First Sergeant John A. McBee, Sergeant Donald M. Beeson and Sergeant Ralph H. Gilb. Instruction consisted of a modified Marine Corps recruit training with particular attention to a thorough basic knowledge of the use of the bayonet and the rifle, including .22 caliber gallery practice.

In an interview, Major General Cloud recalled his duty with the FMA and noted that most of the training was conducted in the evening after business offices closed. A member remembered that the training received included classroom lectures on patrolling, handling of mobs, etc. Because it was a very “unofficial” appendage to the regiment, its members weren’t issued any Marine clothing but purchased their own khaki trousers and shirts that at least resembled uniforms. When the 6th Marines arrived it was no longer necessary to expect assistance from any non-Marine unit; consequently, the FMA was dissolved. At the end of November, Admiral Yarnell decided that it would be proper to relieve the 6th Marines and send it home. The fighting between Chinese and Japanese forces had moved westward up the Yangtze; there were no serious problems in or about Shanghai, nor were any expected. In fact, the majority of the Stateside American public desired a withdrawal of all military and naval forces from China. The Panay incident had persuaded public opinion that it would only be a matter of time before the United States was dragged into another conflagration should U.S. forces be in a foreign country that was engaged in war with another. That view was a sore that festered all during the 1930’s and would continue to have some adherents even after Pearl Harbor, though not so many as on 6 December 1941. In early December, Beaumont wrote to Holcomb describing the scene as he observed it. He told how Yarnell was “bias[ed] in favor of returning all Marines except the 4th Regiment from Shanghai.” He added that the British were planning on pulling out or at least would “reduce their garrison.” The general advised the commandant that he was in favor of leaving only one battalion in Shanghai, with the other in the Philippines. The war was over in Shanghai, and it had bypassed Peking, at least for the present. Still, according to “Buzz” Letcher, the detachment was refused permission by the Japanese to move beyond the Peking city limits. “For your own safety” was the excuse used. In Shanghai, Japan controlled every street and alley except the International Settlement and the French concession, which was galling to them. On every bridge and street of importance,

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the Japanese had built barricades or even concrete blockhouses, which were manned by their sentries. An estimated 300,000 to 500,000 Japanese soldiers and a formidable fleet controlled the city and its approaches. In addition, the Japanese had a strong air force to help impose their will upon the local Chinese—and, should they choose to take that step, the foreign settlements as well. Because the majority of nations recognized the Nationalists as the legitimate government of the land, they refused to allow the Japanese to interfere with official Chinese business within the settlement. That, of course, infuriated the Japanese even more, because they were forced to stand by and watch as the legitimate Chinese government continued doing business throughout the settlement, collecting duties and other income that was essential to its continuance. It was income that the Japanese were very anxious to get their hands on. The “war” was costing the Japanese government much more than had been anticipated, and for a much longer period of time. Somehow, it needed to recover all or most of the revenue. Otherwise it might have been forced to remove its forces and, worst of all, lost face by doing so. Everyone agreed that should the Japanese decide to impose its will upon the foreign community, its relatively small military force wouldn’t be able to resist them. The 6th Marines had been withdrawn (17 February 1938) from China, leaving only about 1,000 officers and men of the 4th Marines behind. The 2,500 British troops were withdrawn on 26 August 1940. The French, who always stood alone, had 4,000, but after the fall of France in 1940 they were of negligible value. There were an additional 750 Italian troops, but Italy was allied with Japan, so they were in fact a liability insofar as the defense of the settlement was concerned. In 1938 and 1939 Japan could have overrun the settlements but apparently didn’t wish to antagonize the United States, Britain, or France unnecessarily. There were many reasons, but primarily it seems they didn’t feel sufficiently threatened by the Americans and Europeans in their rampage in China.41 JAPAN RAISES THE ANTE From this point in time, the 4th Marines and their allies in the settlement were in a very difficult and nebulous position. In order to maintain the International Settlement, they had to offer the Japanese no provocation whatsoever. As day followed day, it got worse instead of better. Examples of the provocative actions of the Japanese include the staged “victory parade” through the settlement on 3 December 1937, which the Municipal Council protested. The streets in the entire compound were cleared of Chinese that day in order to avoid confrontations. One got through the cordon and threw a hand grenade into the middle of the marching men. Three soldiers and three members of the Municipal Police were wounded. A Chinese constable immediately shot and killed the assassin.

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A halfhearted effort was launched by Japanese officers to move in and take over some of the settlement, but Colonel Price squashed that through immediate warnings, which defused the rapidly escalating emergency. His warnings were taken quite seriously by the Japanese leaders, but were they more than rhetoric? Apparently not. It appears now as though it was mainly audacity and bluff on his part. Whatever cards he played, his actions prevented what could have been an earlier outbreak of war between Japan and the United States. The Japanese commander, Lt. Col. Yuki Fukabori, apologized to Price and then caught hell from his superiors for apologizing. (Price kept Holcomb well apprised of what was going on while he commanded the 4th Marines. His replacement, Col. Joseph C. Fegan, was better yet.) The “little affair” of the victory parade just wouldn’t go away. In January Price would again write Holcomb and complain that the “press had blown it all out of proportion.” He believed that the Japanese had actually done the bomb throwing themselves, to start an incident. Price also wanted Holcomb to let State know that he was not a “fire-eater.”42 Col. Thomas Clarke, who brought the 6th Marines to Shanghai, was relieved on 13 January 1938 by Lt. Col. James L. Underhill and returned to the United States.43 In March 1938 an exchange of letters between Yarnell and Holcomb became quite heated and incriminating. Yarnell accused Holcomb of having every “recommendation vis-a-vis the Marines rejected.” The latter tried to explain that he had only so many Marines to work with but was especially anxious to add more to the Fleet Marine Force. He did accept Yarnell’s suggestion that a battalion of Marines might serve better at Olongapo on Luzon than in Shanghai; nothing ever came of that suggestion. In that same month he also received informative letters from Col. John Marston, commanding the legation guard in Peking. One concerned an officer named Pyzick, who complained about not being selected for promotion. It seems that Pyzick wanted to change the selection method used by the Marine Corps. He went so far as to offer to testify before a naval panel in Washington. During this period each Marine command in China suffered reductions; Marston and Price continually complained about how that was affecting their respective commands. Marston said “it will hurt training the most.” During the next year or more, there were many efforts by the Japanese to push the other foreigners as far as they could and as much as they would take. One that got much coverage in the United States at the time, and seemed likely to force both countries to war, was the sinking of the United States Navy gunboat Panay on 12 December 1937. The Japanese government, obviously not prepared for what had happened, apologized and made restitution for the loss of men and the boat. Later investigation showed that the local Japanese naval commander had ordered the attack and that it had indeed been as much of a surprise to Japan as to the United States. But the attack was indicative of what could and probably would happen

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should some Japanese soldier or sailor of rank decide to put the United States to a test. It would get worse as the Japanese grew more confident and became willing to take on all foreign nations in China at once. In December there was an exchange of letters between Beaumont, Holcomb, and Yarnell about why Lt. Col. James F. Moriarty, an intelligence officer at Shanghai, had been transferred. Holcomb was initially miffed that Beaumont transferred him without his OK. It appears that Moriarty was a superb IO but that Yarnell didn’t want him there. Moriarty was a Russian language specialist, and Yarnell did not want such a high-ranking IO on his staff—colonel was “too high a rank to perform intelligence duty.” To please the senior naval officer on station, Beaumont did what had to be done.44 In March 1938, three months after the Panay was sunk, and to avoid further provocation to the Japanese, the 15th Infantry, stationed in Tientsin since 1912, was recalled “home.” Two hundred thirty Marines from Peking, under the command of Lt. Col. William C. James, were sent to Tientsin to protect the escape route to be used by Americans in north China. With the possibility of attack by the Japanese, this was more essential than ever. The Tientsin Marines quickly assumed the life of American military forces in a very nice old city that had many foreign characteristics. The army left behind quite a few “shack-ups,” and the Marines weren’t slow on the uptake. Although it wasn’t until 1938 that the Marines became a definite presence in Tientsin, they ran into pretty much the same problems that the 15th Infantry had. The March 1928 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette printed an article that described what officers could still expect in Tientsin ten years later. Presumably it was directed to the 15th Infantry, but it covered much of what the Marines ran into as well. The unidentified author stated that one could expect to pay, if one could get a house at all, about $434 Mex for a furnished home. The Mex exchange varied somewhat, but at that time it was the equivalent of about one U.S. dollar to $2.10 Mex. So the rented home cost about $220 dollars for junior officers, who were earning just about that amount. A hotel room for two, with board, was about the same, boarding houses were about half that amount. Three meals daily for two would cost about $130 Mex; gasoline, if one had a car, was “very expensive,” at 78 cents Mex. Though he didn’t give figures for Peking, we can safely assume that costs were as high or even higher in the imperial city. Housing in Shanghai was a bit cheaper in most cases, but it could run as high as in Tientsin. But the water supply in both places, and also Peking, was terrible. Water had to be boiled, or else. That was a daily part of every non-Chinese person’s existence. What was worse in all three cities was the climate. The normal climate in Peking was terrible. Mostly it was abnormal—a hundred degrees in summer and terribly cold, well below zero, in winter. Shanghai weather was

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much like San Francisco, except in summer when the latter was cool and the former was hot. Tientsin was a copy of both, with all the minuses. In Shanghai the Japanese were insistent that the Marines needed help in maintaining order within the Marines’ own sector; of course Price told them that he didn’t. One such incident on 13 August 1938 caused the arrest of four Japanese who were threatening a Chinese who had a Nationalist flag flying over his home on Robinson Road. One of the more famous of the old-time China Marines, Gunnery Sgt. Milton C. “Slug” Marvin (the boxing coach of the 4th Marines, among other duties) was leading a street patrol from Company H when he came upon the incident.45 Marvin and his Marines rushed up just as one of the four Japanese, at the point of his pistol, was forcing the Chinese man to lower flag and hand it over. Marvin arrested the Japanese and insisted that the three others turn over their arms to him. One resisted; Marvin had him persuaded with a rifle butt to the head. Colonel Price arrived at about this time and ordered the Municipal Police to take the four to the police station. Price then notified the Japanese authorities that their men had been arrested while disturbing the peace in Sector C. A Japanese officer came to the station and signed the register to free his men, who were then released into his custody. Surprisingly, and most unusually, the incident was closed without further commotion or confrontation by the Japanese. Meanwhile, Price was unhappy that he was being relieved, in the normal course of duty. In a letter to “Archie” Vandegrift, Holcomb’s military secretary, he had the temerity to complain about Holcomb’s decision and his performance as commandant. Shortly afterward he apologized to Holcomb, saying that he would go wherever “Tommy” wished him to. Col. Joe Fegan was to be his replacement, and that was final. Fegan replaced Price on 24 October 1938. In a very short time his letters were giving Holcomb information that had been sadly lacking for some years.46 In one of his first, he described how Evans Carlson aggressively went out and assessed military situations in the field “rather than staying in the cities.” Fegan summarized that he believed that although the 4th Marines didn’t have any problems, it and the Corps would be much better off at home making “a lasting contribution.”47 In a lengthy letter dated 9 January 1939, he was quite upset because the city was clogged “with refugees from all over China, Russia and even German Jews.” That had caused a spiraling inflation in Shanghai, which in turn had forced some married NCOs to move to low-cost housing. Additionally, he mentioned that a recent U.S. loan to Chiang’s government had cooled relations with the Japanese. Later, he mentioned that he believed that the Japanese were going broke; he strongly recommended that the Chinese send them peace feelers so that they could get out of the mess they were in. He also was convinced that the Japanese were doing everything they could to force a “loss of face” upon the British in the eyes of the Chinese.

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Many acts of terrorism were perpetrated by the Chinese against Chinese puppets of the Japanese regime—most were murdered in the International Settlement. The Japanese requested that the Municipal Council give them approval to send police patrols into the settlement to “maintain order.” Yarnell reacted swiftly and protested to the council that it must not allow the Japanese into the Marines’ sector. The next day the council refused the Japanese request but agreed that members would cooperate with the Japanese in the suppression of terrorism in the settlement. The Japanese reaction to what should have been an amicable offer was to move into the British zone and establish a police office in the Shanghai Hotel. The following day, two members of the Japanese police attempted to arrest a Chinese civilian in the American settlement. Colonel Fegan reacted to this with a strong protest, but the Japanese failed to respond to his message. Several days later, another provocation took place when three members of the Japanese police attempted to arrest four Chinese employees of a local business concern. Fegan was about to write another letter of protest, but this time the Japanese gendarmerie commander called upon Fegan. He apologized for the incidents of both days and promised that nothing like them would ever happen again, and they didn’t. The assistant U.S. naval attache´, Maj. James M. McHugh, USMC, cabled to the Navy Department on 23 August that he had: reliable information that members of the orange [Japanese] army, navy, and consular service of this area [Shanghai] are now in the fatherland with detailed plans to blockade the local concessions. . . . [A]ll the river traffic [is] to be stopped at Woosung. . . . The military people estimate that sufficient troops can be gathered together in 24 hours to effectively cut off the Settlement. . . . Two thousand Nips arrived Shanghai via railroad from Nanking during the last 48 hours. French have reports total eight transports due here next few days.48

The Japanese were working overtime to disestablish the settlement. Their efforts included suggestions to the Municipal Council of various plans to change the portions now occupied by the British, French, and Americans so as to increase the territory held by the Italians and Japanese. The council turned down each attempt, and no changes were made. Another bid to take over the settlement occurred when the Japanese-controlled Shanghai Special City Government Municipal Police started sending patrols of as many as 25 men into the settlement, thereby interfering with the Municipal Settlement Police. The 4th Marines put a stop to this by apprehending anyone in that uniform in their sector and escorting them out of the territory. Colonel Fegan refused to meet with the complaining commanders of the puppet police. If you are of the opinion that current regulations governing smoking and

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smokers have gone beyond the pale, you would have been overwhelmed by Fegan’s regulations. As part of those issued by him in 1939, an entire page was devoted to restrictions mainly concerned with the purchase of cigarettes. 34–2. . . . Regimental Exchange stores may sell a single package to visiting officers and men of the United States Naval Service, not members of this command, when in uniform or properly identified, but not more than one package (20 cigarettes) will be sold to any such individual on any one date.49

There were many more in a similar vein—some made sense then and now, but in today’s society most would be stultifying. Perhaps they shouldn’t be laid at Fegan’s door. They might very well have been mandated by headquarters in Washington. But many have the look of a hidebound bureaucrat, possibly a regimental sergeant major gone berserk. Fegan developed some health problems that forced Holcomb to recall him in November 1939 and to send Lt. Col. DeWitt Peck as his replacement. The commandant sent a letter of apology to Adm. Thomas Hart, now commander of the Asiatic Fleet, because of the hiatus in the assignment of a full-time CO of the 4th Marines. Peck arrived in late December 1939 and assumed command on 3 January 1940. On 10 May 1940, Italy joined with Germany in making war upon France and Britain. That created another myriad of problems, since Britain and Italy had common borders in the settlement. Once again, the 4th Marines was dragged into a delicate international situation in which it was not overly willing to have a hand. Col. DeWitt Peck called upon the British and Italian commanders and urged them to respect the international character of the settlement.50 Both agreed and even came to terms as regarded the policing of the liberty areas frequented by both parties. Peck got them to agree to a common patrol under American command. Even the Japanese kept themselves out of trouble with the 4th Marines— that is, until 7 July 1940. That was the anniversary of the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War, and the Japanese military and naval authorities in Shanghai made arrangements to hold special affairs. One included a tour of inspection in the settlement by the commander of Japanese forces in central China, Gen. Juzo Nishio. A detail of Marines accompanied by an officer was assigned by Colonel Peck to escort the general during his visit. Shortly afterward, Peck received a plea for assistance from the Municipal Police to assist in rounding up some suspicious Japanese who were loitering on Bubbling Well Road. This prompted Peck to send Lt. Col. Eugene F. Collier and 25 Marines from his 1st Battalion to pick up 16 armed Japanese in the Marines’ sector.51 The Japanese resisted arrest. Some refused to surrender their arms, and others had to be loaded bodily into the truck being used to transport them. At headquarters, the men were identified as Japa-

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nese gendarmes who had been assigned to the general’s route to provide protection for him. The final outcome was that Maj. Gen. Saburo Miura, the gendarmerie commander, came to Colonel Peck to discuss the matter and apologize for the intrusion. The men were subsequently released in his custody. But the matter was still not over. The Japanese army press spokesman released a statement accusing the Marines of physically mistreating the gendarmes while in custody. Colonel Peck wrote to Miura stating that he had conducted a full investigation and found that the Marines had behaved in a responsible manner toward their prisoners. The statement was accepted, and the matter was again, and finally, closed. This was not an example of everyday confrontation, but such things happened frequently and forced the Marines to be always on their guard. On 26 August, the British entirely withdrew their forces from the settlement, leaving the Italians and Americans as the only foreign garrisons in the International Settlement. The Japanese made it clear that they wanted to take over the British sector. An agreement was reached with the Japanese, after some additional squabbling. That was when the Japanese finally learned that neither Peck nor his Marines were going to be pushed out of Shanghai. It was less than a year and one half before “der Tag,” and the pushing and shoving kept increasing.52 THE “PEACEFUL” NORTH In Tientsin, the Marines were well ensconced. They had even established their own magazine, the Tientsin Marine, which issued a very high-quality issue monthly. The magazine began publication sometime in 1938, just after Marines replaced the 15th Infantry in that city. Col. William G. Hawthorne, commanding the Peking detachment in 1939, was remembered in that magazine a year later for an order that forbade Marines to leave the compound by boat without a written command. There was nothing to explain why that had been so important at the time. The commander of the Tientsin detachment in 1940 was Lt. Col. Ray A. “Torchy” Robinson.53 In 1940 the detachment had numerous replacements, some of whom would make themselves widely known in the Marine Corps community. Maj. Luther A. Brown was well known even then as the author of the recently issued Marine’s Handbook. Another man, a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, 2d Lt. James D. McBrayer, who would eventually retire a colonel, would become a captive of the Japanese when the war began. McBrayer had been in Tientsin for only a month when he became the editor of the magazine. (He has recently written and published an interesting memoir of that time.) Capt. John A. White also wrote a book about his experiences in north China and his POW existence. He and his wife arrived

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at Tientsin in September 1940, where he took command of Company A. She got away, he didn’t. Gone with the Wind was appearing at the Grand Theater, and at the Majestic there was The Road to Singapore, with Bob Hope, Bing Crosby, and that ever-lovin’ Dorothy Lamour. A dozen or more Chinese establishment’s were eager to serve the Marines, like Kessling and Bader’s Cafe´Restaurant, an obvious holdover from when Germany controlled the area; M. Le´vy was anxious to repair your watch or, better yet, sell you a new one. The Marines’ Club tried to swing the business its way instead of to the W. V. Restaurant and Cafe´, whose proprietor, Mrs. Bertha Steurwald, promised “Lovely Hostesses” and that “there won’t be a dull moment”— but nothing by way of a description of what more could be expected. The detachment turned out an honor guard for, in turn, the Italian consul, the British consul, and in December the American consul. On a Sunday afternoon in July, the American baseball club “entertained” the Japanese club from the Tientsin garrison, General Masaharu Homma (who in 1942 would seize the Philippines) commanding. The crack Japanese club clubbed the life out of the Marine club, 14–1. The winners were good sports, though; they entertained the losers at the Japanese Officers’ Club. The centers of attention were two American players, Tobin and Dillow. “They held long and interesting conversations with their newly found Japanese friends, even if they didn’t understand what each other was saying.” Tientsin’s Marine baseball club got even. It beat the Peking Marine team on 31 August, 17 to 7, but lost the next day, 7 to 5. Apparently the Peking Marines weren’t having any trouble with the Japanese army, except for playing baseball against them. That would change dramatically a little over a year later. JAPAN GETS TOUGHER IN SHANGHAI Back in Shanghai, things weren’t quite the same. Admiral Hart warned Colonel Peck that his 4th Marines would “soon” be withdrawn. He had already made changes in his fleet, withdrawing all but the Yangtze River gunboats from China and its coastline. Colonel Peck ordered all Marine dependents sent home in December. In January, after congratulating him on his performance at Shanghai, Holcomb confidentially let Peck know that he was bringing him home to Washington soon “to fill an important position.” He also decided to bring Hal Turnage back and put “Torchy” Robinson in total command of forces in north China. Holcomb had already made his decision as to who would replace Peck at Shanghai—Col. Samuel L. Howard. When Hart learned what Holcomb had in mind, he nearly went ballistic. His attitude was that Peck was more important at Shanghai than he would be as aide to the Chief of Naval Operations. On 14 May

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1941, notwithstanding, Sam Howard assumed the burden of control over the 4th Marines.54 In the meantime, President Roosevelt made the decision to stop shipments of war material to Japan. Further Japanese expansion in Southeast Asia prompted the Americans, Australians, British, Canadians, and Dutch to make plans in case Japan started a war with any one of the five. In the event of a Japanese attack, which Peck recognized as being almost guaranteed, 1,000 Marines would have little chance against the nearly halfmillion Japanese in Shanghai. His plans were to mount his Marines in all trucks and automobiles under his control, break through any roadblocks, and head for the closest territory controlled by Chiang Kai-shek. At least he was trying to protect the 4th Marines, which didn’t seem an important part of the U.S. government’s interests at the time. President Roosevelt, on 26 July 1941, in an act of war without the formal declaration, froze all Japanese assets that were then under American control.55 That immediately placed all the American forces in the Pacific in a dangerous position. From that time on they would be directly in the line of fire should the Japanese decide to take immediate action. They didn’t, but it was apparent to many Americans, including members of the 4th Marines, that war with Japan was not very far off. The situation was especially awkward for the Marines in Shanghai: the Japanese were less active in Peking and Tientsin. Colonel Howard in Shanghai took a quick look at his position and gasped. He urged Rear Adm. William A. Glassford, commanding the Yangtze River patrol, and the American consul, Frank B. Lockhart, to support him in having the 4th Marines withdrawn from its now untenable position in the settlement. Admiral Hart naturally concurred, since he had been urging the withdrawal for over a year. The Navy Department advised the supplicants that it would discuss the matter with the State Department a couple of weeks later. At that session Hart reiterated his position, stating “it was not a question that could be delayed for weeks but must be acted on immediately.” Finally on 10 November, an appropriate day, permission was finally granted, and two liners were chartered for the purpose. THE 4TH MARINES LEAVE SHANGHAI Colonel Howard planned to embark half his command, the 2d Battalion, half of Headquarters and Service Company, and half the regimental hospital aboard the Madison on 27 November. The ship left that evening for the Philippines. Howard would embark his 1st Battalion, plus the balance of the service functions, the following day. He had planned to wait until 30 November, but Admiral Hart had told him to speed the withdrawal up. The Japanese tried to stall the evacuation by closing bridges to delay Marines trucks, having puppet Chinese custom officials insist upon passing all

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supplies through customs before departure, and making other minor but infuriating attempts to force a showdown. Maj. Reginald H. Ridgely, Jr., regimental quartermaster, ignored the Japanese and began loading anyway. The Japanese even instigated three strikes among the Chinese stevedores. In spite of the interference, Marines loaded the Harrison on the 28th of November. It almost seemed as though the Japanese (and the Americans) had an inkling that war loomed very close, perhaps just days rather than weeks away. At 0900 on 28 November the 1st Battalion of the 4th Marines formed up outside its barracks and marched down Bubbling Well and Nanking Roads to the dock on the Bund. Thousands of people waving Chinese and American flags lined the route. At the Bund the Marines were met by an assembly of civilians, including the Municipal Council, foreign consuls, military representatives, including the Japanese; all were gathered to give the Marines a well-deserved send-off. Possibly only the Japanese were truly pleased at their going. At 1400 the ship cast off and headed down the Whangpoo, bound for the Philippines. The duty of the 4th Marines had ended in China, for ever and a day. The Marine embassy guard at Peking and its detachment at Tientsin were now all the Marines that remained in China. In a few short days they would wish they had also taken a ship bound for someplace else. They were going to ship out, but because there were only sufficient transport to move the 4th Marines at one time, the Peking guard and the Marines at Tientsin had to wait their turn; it never came. Efforts were made to make their egress from China easier, like moving to Chinwangtao and Camp Holcomb so as to be available when the ships returned.56 The Japanese controlled the railroads; the Marines had been assured that there would be freight cars to ship their goods, but when it came time, “We are very sorry but no cars are available.”57 Maj. Luther Brown, “an energetic and resourceful officer,” interceded with the local Japanese commander, and freight cars were miraculously found. In early December all gear, less each man’s weapon and a bandoleer of ammunition, was shipped to the coast. The USS Harrison was scheduled to pick up the north China Marines on or about 10 December, but on 8 December all the rules changed. That morning orders were received to destroy all codes and other intelligence material. Capt. John White, executive officer of the Tientsin detachment, took it upon himself to have all the material lugged by a Chinese servant to the local coal furnace. He pitched each book and paper into the fire, ensuring that none would ever reach Japanese hands. That same Monday morning, Captain White received a phone call: “The Imperial Japanese Army will take over the British Concession this morning by force. We do not wish any trouble with the United States Marines. Major Omura will call on you soon.” Almost at once a breathless Marine burst into his room

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and showed him a radio message marked URGENT. It read, “Execute WPL [War Plan] 46 against Japan,” followed by “Japanese have bombed Honolulu.” Cordell Hull, the secretary of state, had signed the dispatch. White immediately informed Major Brown, now the detachment commander, who directed that White notify Admiral Hart at once and bring Major Omura to his office when he arrived. Omura showed up at 0900 with a pack of other Japanese officers and was ushered into Brown’s office. When he arrived, Omura presented a document that demanded the immediate surrender of all Marines in Tientsin and Chinwangtao by 1300 that day. Brown demanded that if he surrendered his Marines, they be treated according to the Boxer Protocol, which meant that the U.S. Marine Guard were members of the embassy staff and were to be accorded the same courtesies and care. Omura had to place a call to his superior, who agreed to look into the matter as requested and asked that Brown call his superior, Col. William W. Ashurst in Peking, to obtain permission to surrender.58 The call went through, and a reluctant Ashurst told Brown to surrender. With that, Brown dictated and signed a short statement agreeing to the Japanese demand. He turned to White and said, his voice choked with emotion, “Do you know that this is the first time a United States Marine command has been surrendered without a fight?” Second Lt. Richard Huizenga, officer in charge at Camp Holcomb, sent a message that he had machine guns set up and that he believed his 21 Marines had “a chance to stand them off. Request instructions.” The reply sent said “Do not, repeat, not resort to fire except in self defense. Comply with demand of Japanese Army Forces.” At 1300 the weapons carried by the detachment were assembled and taken away by the enemy. White told a teary-eyed Sgt. Robert A. Smith, “This is a sad day, Smitty.” Smith pointed toward the Japanese red-ball flag flying overhead where the Stars and Stripes had flown for forty years: “Look what’s up there now, a flaming red asshole.” In Peking, Ashurst elected to surrender his own 200 men as well, rather than have them obliterated with no chance of success. Ashurst had strong hopes that his men would be considered embassy personnel and be sent home in an exchange program. That was not to be; all Marines in north China went into prison camps. Since 1900, America, among other nations, had maintained a garrison upon foreign soil contrary to the “host” nation’s wishes. Never again would permanent occupation be possible in China. It would be four years before the Marines returned to China, following the successful termination of the war with Japan. They would return, but not for long—just long enough to get shot at by the Chinese Reds while repatriating Japanese troops and civilians from north China and “protecting” territory for Chiang’s Nationalist forces, which were hurrying northward to occupy it. That story will be the subject of the next chapter.

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NOTES 1. For the sake of consistency, we will continue using Peking. 2. Lt. Gen. James P. Berkeley, in a 1969 interview. Maj. Gen. Joseph C. Burger was the second man. 3. Noble, 53. 4. Lt. Col. Ellis B. Miller, whom Smedley Butler called “the best Chief of Staff I have had,” and who was reckoned by Maj. A. A. Vandegrift to be “one of the sternest disciplinarians in the Corps.” Vandegrift added that Miller “held a reputation from Marine Corps Schools as a pioneer thinker and planner in embryonic amphibious doctrine. . . . [He] was a crusty old devil but he worked hard to teach younger officers what he knew, which was a lot,” Forty years later, Ray A. “Torchy” Robinson, one of Butler’s favorite Marines, remembered Miller as “the only fellow I ever disliked in the Marine Corps.” See Allan R. Millett, In Many a Strife: General Gerald C. Thomas and the U.S. Marine Corps (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. 111, and Schmidt, p. 189. Ellis retired a colonel in 1936. 5. Undoubtedly, it is very difficult for younger people to understand the effect the Great Depression had upon so many Americans. The few who could enter any branch of service, the restrictions being quite severe, benefited far more than can now be imagined. 6. Noble, p. 92. There is no quantitative breakdown as to how the degrees were arrived at or of how the Marines were selected for each. 7. Vandegrift, p. 86. 8. Actually, by this time the companies were now lettered rather than numbered, and the 38th was now D. The Marine Corps changed the system in 1931. 9. Breckinridge attained the rank of lieutenant general. During World War II Arthur became a colonel. 10. Hempel’s was then owned by a former Marine who had taken his discharge while in China. According to the story, a German named Hempel, who was his father-in-law, talked him into coming into partnership, which he did. When the old man died this Marine became sole owner. The entire establishment included a bar, hotel, restaurant, and a very important table which will be discussed in its proper place. 11. If you have seen that fine movie Sand Pebbles (or read the novel of the same name by Richard McKenna upon which it was based), you will remember how the Chinese did just about everything aboard the San Pablo and how, when they left, the American sailors were hard pressed to do their jobs again on a regular basis. 12. Walla Walla, 2 May 1931, pg. 4. The name of the magazine was not taken from the famous resort town in the state of Washington. Instead, it was the result of a contest held by the staff of the magazine in 1927 or 1928, which Capt. Clifton Cates won. It is Chinese and roughly translates to “Lots of talk, little meaning.” 13. Examples abound, but the USS Panay incident in 1937 was a perfect example of the “man on horseback” syndrome common in the Japanese army and navy. 14. John W. Thomason, Jr., Notes on the Shanghai Incident (repr. Pike, NH: Brass Hat, 1988). Evidently Thomason was hired to write, or was expecting to be paid for, this piece by one of the many American news-gathering firms then in China. It doesn’t appear to have been commercially published before this. It was

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taken from some handwritten pages and transcribed by the publisher. Its detail is beyond the scope of this work. 15. Powers and Osterhout were both majors in 1919. Powers entered the Corps in 1906 and retired in 1936 as a lieutenant colonel; he was recalled and promoted to full colonel in 1944. Osterhout was Commanding Officer of the 23d Company, 6th Machine Gun Battalion during the war and later became CO of the battalion. 16. Hooker retired in 1941, probably as a colonel. He entered the Corps in 1900 and served in Haiti during the world war. 17. Lyle H. Miller was appointed a 2d lieutenant on 1 July 1914, and he retired from the Corps in 1945 as a brigadier general. He was awarded the Legion of Merit for the period April 1942 to March 1944. 18. The numerically designated company became a thing of the past in January 1931. Before the reduction, in the 1st Battalion the 25th Company became A, the 26th B, the 27th C, the 28th D; in the 2d Battalion, the 10th Company became E, 29th Company F, 31st G, and the 32d H; in the 3d Battalion, the 19th I, 21st K, 22d L, and the 24th M. 19. Rixey, son of the former surgeon general of the U.S. Navy, joined the Corps in 1900. He had the usual career path for Marine officers of his period—the Philippines, Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Santo Domingo. In World War I for a period he commanded the 11th Marine Regiment, 5th Brigade. Later he commanded the 163d U.S. Infantry, and yet still later the Army Classification Camp. He had a son with the 4th Marines in Shanghai and another at the Naval Academy. He retired as a colonel in 1942. A. A. Vandergrift tells us in his memoir, “Rixey was one of the most gracious officers in the Corps.” 20. It was probably 1st Sgt. Emmanuel Yalowitz, with whom he was dissatisfied. 21. The Corps had to rely upon naval intelligence, which was an excellent service but didn’t extend much help to the Marines, at home or in China. It appears that all information that Marine officers thought might be of value to the Corps was routed through the commandant’s office and passed on to whoever seemed to be the likely person to need it. A few years later several officers besides Worton, were selected to gather information in China. Evans Carlson was the most noted, and a Maj. James M. McHugh, a Chinese-language specialist, was the designated recipient of all intelligence gathered by U.S. Marines in China. Other men included Capt. Charles C. Brown, Maj. Edward G. Hagen, and Maj. Ronald A. Boone, intelligence officer of the 4th Marines in 1937. 22. In fact, Worton had to “resign” from the Marines Corps to undertake this mission. The director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Capt. William D. Puleston, USN, asked the commandant, Maj. Gen. John Russell, for the “services” of Major Worton and Captain Brown, both Chinese language experts, for “certain urgent work” in the Far East. His report is still classified, at Worton’s request. I’ve read it, and it should be released for general consumption. Worton’s fear, in 1969, that the Chinese Communist Party might take revenge on Chinese who had helped him and Brown must be considered negated by this date (2001). 23. Maj. Gen. William A. Worton interview. 24. Each unit, even down to battalions, and perhaps even companies, had its “own place”—which meant, don’t enter if you value your life. Of course that often happened, and the inevitable fights or brawls occurred. Mostly the fighting was between foreigners and Americans, though often enough, in certain areas, when

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there was no one else, it took place between Marines and American sailors or soldiers. Of course, the Marines weren’t always selective as to where they went, either. 25. The Green Howards (Alexandra, Princess of Wale’s Own Yorkshire Regiment), formerly the 19th Foot. 26. Mr. Norman “Vern” McLean generously provided me with a copy of his article about the Peking Mounted Detachment, “The Horse Marines.” 27. Lt. Gen. James P. Berkeley oral interview. 28. Perhaps an economist can explain why that was so? 29. Lt. Gen. Robert B. Luckey interview. 30. Price, born in Germany, joined the Corps on 30 December 1905 and held the usual posts during his career, eventually becoming a major general. 31. See appendix C for a breakdown of the 23 units that composed the SVC. 32. Plan A was developed to defend the American sector should any attempt be made to invade it by any group external to the settlement. 33. Rupertus is well known to former members of the 1st Marine Division in World War II. Winans, as a first sergeant, earned a Medal of Honor at Santo Domingo in 1916. He was promoted to lieutenant during World War I and served as a platoon leader and the 17th Company “skipper” before being wounded at Belleau Wood. He retired as a brigadier general in 1946. 34. Upon arrival, the 6th acquired the nickname “Pogeybait 6th,” as far as I know, it has not been freed of that appellation since. (“Pogeybait” refers to candy.) Almost every Marine knows the basic story of why and how the name came into being. But for those who might not, there are at least two stories. One: the regiment loaded at San Diego so fast and with so little planning that the topmost items, first to be removed, were candy bars, with soap at the bottom of the hold. Second: The post exchange at San Diego loaded hurriedly and inadvertently included several thousand candy bars but only one case of soap. Take your choice. 35. Beaumont entered the Corps in 1900 and followed the usual sequence duties and stations of his time. He was in the Philippines and with Butler in Nicaragua in 1912. His service aboard ships was lengthy. He retired in 1942. 36. See appendix E for the location of each unit of the 2d Brigade at this time. 37. Clarke joined the Corps in 1909. His service in 1920 was with the 2d Provisional Brigade in Santo Domingo. 38. Jon T. Hoffman, Once a Legend: “Red Mike” Edson of the Marine Raiders (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1994), p. 115. A superb biography. 39. James H. Herzog, Closing the Open Door: American-Japanese Diplomatic Negotiations, 1936–1941 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973), p. 19. 40. This is not to suggest that military personnel should make national policy. However, it is important that the State Department listen to advice from those on the scene, especially those whose necks are sticking out. 41. For a detailed study of a very complicated period, see Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind; The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1941–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978) esp. pp. 3–90. Reasons for Japan’s reluctance to start a war with the occidental nations are well covered. 42. Price was referring to the bombast of newspapers that were “proudly announcing” that the Marines would not stand for any nonsense from the Japanese. He, of course, was trying to slow things down, not stir up more flames.

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43. Underhill joined the Marines in 1913 and following the First World War served at the legation in Managua, Nicaragua. He was a major general in 1942. 44. Moriarty didn’t take it lying down. He wrote a letter to a naval officer friend complaining of his ill treatment. The letter was passed along to the commandant, but there it died. 45. Marvin, an officer during the Second World War, was killed on Guam in July 1944. He was posthumously awarded the Navy Cross. His name appeared many times, mostly in a humorous vein, in Walla Walla and Leatherneck over the years. 46. Fegan was a major general in 1946. 47. What Fegan was referring to was more men for the slowly developing Fleet Marine Force. Holcomb was hamstrung for lack of sufficient manpower. 48. Quoted in Kenneth W. Condit and Edwin T. Turnbladh, Hold High the Torch: A History of the 4th Marines (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1960), pp. 184–185. McHugh was a personal favorite of both Chiang and his wife. A Naval Academy graduate, class of 1922, he spent twenty years in China, serving in nearly every capacity, which included intelligence activity of the highest order. See also Robert E. Mattingly, Herringbone Cloak—G. I. Dagger: Marines of the OSS, Occasional Paper (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps., 1989), pp. 57–61, for a superlative, though brief, biographical sketch. 49. Regimental Regulations, Fourth Marines: Shanghai, 1939, Reprint (Foster, RI: The Brass Hat, 1980). 50. Peck had a long and honorable career. A graduate of the Navel Academy who became 2d Lt. in 1915, he had numerous decorations, which included a Legion of Merit and a personal commendation. During World War I he commanded the 55th Company at St. Mihiel and Blanc Mont. He had some trouble there and lost his command. He later served as the intelligence officer for 2d Battalion, 5th Marines at Blanc Mont. A major general in 1945, he commanded the 1st Marine Division in China. 51. Collier entered the Corps in 1917 and served in France with the 4th Brigade. He was a platoon leader with the 20th Company, 3/5 and was wounded on 1 November 1918 at the Meuse-Argonne. He was a colonel in 1945. 52. At this time there was plenty of pressure on State to withdraw the 4th Marines from China, so as to not present a “sacrificial lamb” to the Japanese and to utilize the men for different and, to many, more important duties elsewhere. 53. Robinson, a brigadier general in 1943, had earned Smedley Butler’s confidence and his friendship as well. He served with Butler in 1927 as an aide to the then-CO of the 3d Brigade. He had enlisted in the Corps in October 1917 and served in France with the 5th Brigade. 54. Howard joined the Corps 11 May 1914. He had a rather undistinguished career until he was forced to surrender a Marine regiment at Corregidor on 6 May 1942. He earned the Navy Cross in the Philippines, 7 December 1941–6 May 1942. He was the unluckiest of all Marine officers. 55. This action would force Japan either to cease its aggression in Asia or declare war upon the United States. For the time being it did neither, but it was very evident that the situation was untenable for Japan; no one knew when the “other shoe would drop.” You might believe that officials in Washington weren’t aware of what

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the Japanese were doing. Upward of 70% of the nation at that time was isolationist and against getting into the war for any reason. 56. The camp was named after the then-commandant, Thomas Holcomb. 57. John A. White, The United States Marines in North China (Milbrae, CA: private printing, 1974) p. 7. 58. After his release from a POW camp at the end of the war, Ashurst continued in the service. He received a Legion of Merit for service between February 1942 and June 1945. After a suitable leave he was shipped to north China for duty. His previous service included being a platoon leader in the 18th Company, 5th Marines in France during World War I. For that service he was awarded a Silver Star and the French Croix de Guerre.

5 Back to China, 1945–1949

Within 48 hours of the end of the Second World War, orders were dispatched to the III Marine Amphibious Corps (IIIAC) to prepare to land at Shanghai on or about 1 October 1945. But within one week of that order, Admiral Nimitz advised Gen. Roy S. Geiger, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, that plans were being developed to send IIIAC to north China instead. There the Marines were to accept, for the Chinese central government, the surrender of the Japanese forces in the area. Following that, U.S. Marines were to supervise the reparation of the Japanese soldiers and civilians occupying that part of China. The IIIAC elements included the 1st U.S. Marine Division and the 6th U.S. Marine Division. Two other divisions, the 3rd on Guam and the 4th at Maui, were to act as back-ups should help be required. The divisions selected had the following tables of organization and equipment: III Marine Amphibious Corps (MAC) (50,000 troops on/about November 1945) 1st Division (17,456) Division Troops 1st, 5th, 7th Marines (infantry) 11th Marines (artillery) 6th Division (17,456 less*) Division Troops

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22nd, 29th Marines (infantry) (4th Marines in Japan) 15th Marines (artillery) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) Wing Supporting Units Marine Aircraft Groups (MAGs) 12, 24, 25, 32 Three Marine Fighter Sq., (VMF), Two Marine Observation Sq. (VMO) One Marine Scout Bomber Sq. (VMSB), One Marine Torpedo Bomber Sq. (VMTB), Two Marine Transport Sq. (VMR) *Less the 4th Marines in Japan

Corps headquarters and corps troops, together with the 1st Marine Division (MarDiv) would occupy positions in Tangku (near the Taku Bar), Tientsin, Peiping, and in the Chinwangtao area.1 All of these are located in Hopeh Province. In fact, when the deed was done, the 1st MarDiv infantry would be extended far to the north of Peiping and west of Tientsin—mainly along rail lines, and in contact with the Communist forces, later known as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The 6th MarDiv (less the 4th Marines) would move into Tsingtao in Shantung Province, where it would meet the 1st MarDiv coming south.2 The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing would move its planes and men to airfields in the Tsingtao, Tientsin, and Peiping areas. Should the north become untenable, Shanghai would be the Marines’ alternative assignment location. North China was in great turmoil, as it had been for the past twenty or more years. Tentative plans were issued on 29 August setting 15 September as the mounting-out date. The reader may well ask why, after fighting a long, bloody war to defeat an implacable enemy, Japan, the United States would intervene in the affairs of another Asian nation, especially since the American civilian population wanted the “boys home” as soon as possible, or even earlier. Millions of drafted soldiers and some Marines felt pretty much the same way, especially those that had numerous demobilization “points.”3 While several U.S. Army units suffered grave, organized, and widespread disaffection, it appeared that no Marine unit was guilty of such unmilitary action.4 The unofficial reason why U.S. troops, the Marine Corps in this instance, were sent to China is as follows: the Communist military forces were very strong in the north of China, enough to grab and hold a huge chunk of that nation before the Nationalist forces (former KMT, now Chinese Nationalist Party or CNP) could get that far north.5 Also the PLA was then receiving, and obviously would continue to receive, support from the Soviet Union. The PLA was physically present in the north, and it was feared by the U.S. government that if U.S. forces weren’t sent, the Soviets would fill the vacuum. Ostensibly the Marines were to assist the “government in charge” by helping to remove the many Japanese still there (about

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2,200,000) and send them home. That was what the average “Joe Tanaka” in the ranks also wanted, so with a little assistance and no interference, China would soon be “Japanese free.” Essentially, the big mistake of the U.S. government was electing to butt in between two warring factions and decide which was to control China. It was a mistake of major proportions and would continue to haunt our foreign policy for generations to come. It was a tough, dirty period, one that placed the U.S. Marines in dangerous territory. The inhabitants of north China were always fighters, and this period would not be any different. That the Marines came out “smelling like a rose” is due only to the fact that they are capable of duty “above and beyond” without smelling like something else. Only now, a half-century later, can we exchange pleasantries with Communist China without at the same time attempting to cut each other’s throat. The overall request for U.S. aid came from Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek through Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA, Gen. Joseph Stilwell’s successor. Because the United States had supported Chiang during the war, he assumed, correctly, that it would do so again during civil strife. Wedemeyer realized that the situation was delicate. He wanted the Nationalists to take charge of north China, if for no other reason than to stop the incursion of Soviets, but not if a major U.S. military action was required to ensure it. Therefore he tried to influence the State Department, now led by James Byrnes, somehow to avoid taking sides between the two factions. Yet he originally called for six or seven U.S. divisions for duty in China; it seems that Wedemeyer was talking out of both sides of his mouth. There was more of that kind of political confusion on the part of diplomats as well as senior military commanders. It certainly screwed up our “China policy.” Several old “China hands” at State were well aware of Chiang’s severe weaknesses and emphasized caution. But because Congress still favored Chiang, the personnel at State who were engaged in the issue took decisive positions in favor of the generalissimo and his do-nothing party. The Marines, probably unbeknownst to any of them, were the instruments chosen by State to interfere in long-standing civil strife in a foreign country— shades of 1927. When the Marines landed in north China to expedite the removal of Japanese troops, Wedemeyer realized that time and the developing situation were against the United States. In other words, the Marines would be doing something no responsible civilian, or even military, chief wanted—making numerous enemies in the most populous nation on earth. Still, one good thing did come out of the whole mess. The pre–Joint Chiefs of Staff, a group that gathered on an ad hoc basis, impressed the civilians at State that a land war in Asia was unthinkable. Unfortunately, a few years later one president, a military genius of no great proportions, reversed that intelligent policy and did interfere. He commenced a land

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campaign in Korea that still hasn’t been decided because no permanent settlement is yet in sight. Loads of well-meaning Americans still believe he was our greatest president because he was a common man.6 Meanwhile, back to reality: According to plan, the Hopeh expedition got under way first. Troops began loading at Guam on 11 September, and loading was completed on 19 September. The IIIAC chief of staff, Brig. Gen. William A. Worton, departed by air from Guam with an advance party.7 Worton reported at Shanghai to Lieutenant General Wedemeyer, the commander of the China theater, and proceeded to Tientsin to prepare for the reception of the Marine occupation forces. We have the record of Walter J. P. Curley, an on-site reporter and aide to Gen. Worton, who described the origin and arrival of the general’s party. He tells of the aerial voyage from Guam to Okinawa and finally to Shanghai: Some Chinese officials met us. The General [Worton] whipped off in a Chinese Army car for the Cathay Hotel. . . . [W]e passed hundreds of Japanese soldiers afoot and on horseback—just sauntering around at will. Imagine our surprise and concern! . . . we were billeted in the Palace Hotel and [Worton] in the Cathay . . . just across . . . [from] each other.8

Curley goes on to described their grand meal in the hotel, which was both shabby and genteel: “filet mignon and other long-forgotten delicacies. My meal cost $190,000. Inflation is appalling.” It was; that bill amounted to far, far less than it might seem. The exchange rate was something like $10,000 Chinese dollars to $1.00 U.S., which would make the meal about $19.00. He further described his group’s “disolute” [sic] existence: “The orchestra was top-notch and the dancing marvelous. There were Germans, Greeks, French, Hungarians, Dutch, English and Eurasian women, not to mention the ravishing White Russian women and the better class of Chinese women.” After the next day’s work, which included dining with some just-released British prisoners who happened to be old friends of General Worton, they went “night-clubbing on the town.” Curley mentions that for their drinking they went to the French “town” (presumably in the old French concession). There he and his friends met “a really fascinating White Russian girl named Nadja. . . . [S]he couldn’t speak English but was perfect in Japanese. Shanghai is truly the Paris of the Far East.” The next day he and the rest of the advanced team finally set down to work; as he emphasized to his parents, “our mission was top-secret.” That evening after conferences with U.S. Army and Chinese officials they had cocktails in the Palace Hotel lounge. The following day the American party flew to Tientsin, the first Allies to arrive in north China. When the Americans reached their destination, there were only twenty

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of them in all. Curley recalls that he and the others were somewhat queasy with all those armed Japanese troops around. As you probably know, the Japanese have not formally surrendered here in North China. . . . The Japs are still in control of Tientsin. . . . [W]e felt uneasy coming in here in Jap-occupied territory—not knowing exactly what to expect. There is the Communist trouble, the Chinese bandits, the Puppet troops, the Central Chinese forces, and the Japanese forces. The situation is critically complex. (We landed in Tientsin about 15 miles from town.)

His story continues in Tientsin, with observations about how serious the situation could have been, what with former enemies now in some instances next-door neighbors. Apparently his life (and of course those of the others as well) involved more than just work. He describes meeting various occidental people who had somehow survived very well in the midst of war. He was given orders to “move” a German family of means out of their spacious quarters so that the Marines could commandeer them. “The Germans must get out. . . . [T]hey are attractive people. [The general] detailed me to do the job . . . [to tell them to move].” He went to meet them and became quite enamored of their daughter Gisela, who spoke Chinese “like a native.” He added, “We work like dogs [it certainly appears so] during the day. It is fascinating but grueling. It would take me three tons of paper to go into detail.” Worton had a meeting in Peiping with the Communist general, Chou EnLai, who was the top man in wartime truce negotiations between Chungking (CNP) and Yenan (PLA). Chou let Worton know quite clearly that his government would fight like hell if the Marines tried to take Peiping. Worton let Chou know that the Marines would take Peiping anyway. He advised his adversary that IIIAC was a battle-hardened unit that would have superior aerial support and would plow right through its opponents, should it come to that. It was a stormy, hour-long meeting, which ended in an inconclusive diatribe. Chou promised that he would get the Marines’ orders changed. It was obvious to Worton and later his superiors that not all would be well in this operation. Maj. Gen. Keller E. Rockey, IIIAC’s commanding officer, sailed from Guam for Okinawa.9 There he rendezvoused with Maj. Gen. DeWitt Peck, the officer commanding the 1st Marine Division.10 Two days later, on 26 September, the leading elements of IIIAC sailed for Taku Bar. Tientsin was an obvious choice for IIIAC headquarters. From an economic viewpoint, it was the most important city in north China. Located 36 miles from the nearest port, Taku on the Gulf of Chihli, it was an important railhead for Peiping and points north and south. Although Tientsin had an adequate airport, it was certainly inferior to the excellent air facilities at Peiping,

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where two superior landing fields could handle most any air traffic. (See Map 5.1.) Before daybreak on 30 September, the convoy dropped anchor off the mouth of the Hai River. At dawn, and from out of nowhere, swarms of Chinese sampans manned by enthusiastic crews sculled close to the transports. They wanted to welcome the return of the “Malines” and, almost incidentally, to sell them trinkets. Brig. Gen. Louis R. Jones, the 1st MarDiv assistant division commander, and his staff boarded craft to lead a procession of LCTs carrying men of the 7th Marines over Taku Bar and into the narrow channel that led upriver to the Tangku docks.11 All day and far into the night the Chinese lined the river bank to cheer each boatload of Marines. A Marine captain recalled their arrival: “Only a small party reached Tientsin the first day. Other troops remained overnight at Tangku, and when they reached Tientsin the next day by train and truck convoy they received a welcome that must have outshone, outshouted and outsmelled any welcome given to troops any time, any place and anywhere during the war.” On the third day, there was a parade in honor of the Marines. At 1030 General Jones met port officials to complete arrangements begun by Worton to arrange for transportation and billeting of the Marines. The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines (Lt. Col. Stephen V. Sabol) arrived in Tientsin from the Tangku docks, but the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (or “2/7” Lt. Col. Charles T. Hodges) bivouacked in the warehouse area beside the docks. The tumultuous reception that the 3d Battalion engendered upon its arrival at Tientsin was repeated and reinforced the following day, when the CO of 1st Marines, Lt. Col. James M. Ranck, Jr., plus Lt. Col. John D. Muncie, the CO of division headquarters battalion, arrived. Boisterous and cheering Chinese and European expatriates lined the streets waving flags, sometimes making passage nearly impossible for the Marines endeavoring to reach their destination. In some instances trucks and marching Marines had to force their way through to the former foreign concessions and their assigned billets. The Marines were impressed, and many felt that their reception was grander than any other, at any time or any place, ever before.12 Upon arrival at their new home, the Marines found devastation. The Japanese, in acts of frustration, had destroyed the plumbing and heating systems and fouled the water supplies. Although the billets were in tough shape, there was a marvelous world outside. Marines who just a few months before had been fighting for their lives on Okinawa were now able to find “wine, women, and song” if they were so inclined. Undoubtedly, most were. Steaks were available at low cost, as were silks and jewelry. Chinese restaurant owners soon found out that Marines weren’t terribly keen on Chinese food and began advertising “steak and eggs” instead—a culinary bad habit the Marines had picked up in Australia and New Zealand.13

Map 5.1. North China: Amphibious Corps Operations Area

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On 1 October 1945, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (Reinforced), under Lt. Col. John J. Gormley, arrived at Chinwangtao by ship.14 Gormley and his men halted the fighting between Communist regular and guerrilla forces and former Japanese puppet troops. As Gormley wrote, “All factions, civilian and military, were anxious to cooperate with our troops.” That was true, at least on a temporary basis. The Marines replaced the puppet troops at their perimeter defenses. Even the local Communist chief promised that he had no designs on any territory occupied by the Americans. That promise lasted very few days. Before the end of the month the PLA was sabotaging rail lines and firing on Marine-guarded trains. Major General Rockey accepted the surrender of the 50,000 Japanese troops in the Tientsin-Tangku-Chinwangtao area on 6 October. On that day the headquarters of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Maj. Gen. Claude E. “Sheriff” Larkin, commanding, was established at the former French arsenal.15 This was located near the village of Changkeichuang, about seven miles east of Tientsin. The field was named after the village, but no one could spell its name, possibly including the native inhabitants. The field was terrible; because of poor drainage the one paved landing-strip was scarcely better than the two that weren’t. As bad as it was, that airfield was the home base of Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 32 and would be the official aerial port of entry for north China. General Larkin, who reported to Rockey of IIIAC, had operational control of the squadrons at Changkeichuang, Tsangkou (near Tsingtao), and the two fields around Peiping. Headquarters and service squadrons of the wing and its aircraft group, with aircraft and other equipment, arrived in China during the month. Flight echelons staged into their assigned airfields near Tsingtao, Peiping, and Tientsin as facilities became ready for them. A very destructive typhoon that raged over Okinawa from 9 to 11 October destroyed or damaged much of the heavy equipment of wing units stopping off there en route to China. This was sufficient to impair severely effective Marine air operations in north China for the balance of 1945, the most crucial time. The Chinese central government (Nationalists) took advantage of the increasing Marine ground presence and control in north China almost immediately. Fifty thousand Chinese soldiers of the 92d and 94th Chinese National Armies were airlifted to Peiping from south and central China by the U.S. 14th Air Force. The 92d remained in the Peiping area, while the 94th moved to Tientsin, Tangku, Tangshan, and Chinwangtao. For obvious reasons this became a sore point between the Americans and the PLA. In fact, the reason for the American presence in north China had been mainly to ensure that the PLA wouldn’t be able to take over the important cities or Japanese weapons before the Chinese National Army did. The gradually increasing PLA anti-Marine activity was identified in the IIIAC war diary by the following entry: “Movement of these armies [CNA] was

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facilitated by our forces, in that lines of communication . . . were kept open by our [Marine] guards.” With the initial deployment of the 1st MarDiv, the scope of rail-guard activities increased dramatically. Railroad stations between principle rail centers were the first to be occupied. Next, outposts were established at strategic intermediate points between. Finally, vital coal and supply trains were guarded. In order to disrupt the flow of train traffic as much as possible after the PLA or irregulars had destroyed the tracks or beds, attacks were made upon Chinese rail repairmen. Therefore, Marines had to protect those men as well. Even though the CNA forces made the PLA, specifically the 8th Route Army, more cautious, they did not prevent frequent incursions into areas where destruction of bridges or tracks would be most damaging. Marines walked a tightrope in the following years, making every effort to appear “neutral,” even though their every action benefited the CNA. The State Department had once again put the Marines in a no-win situation; it hadn’t done so purposely, it just appeared that way. The Japanese undoubtedly were happy to be free of the incessant ambushes and sabotage inflicted upon them by the PLA. The Marines noticed that the Japanese feared the PLA, and it was apparent that they were more than willing to leave the country. Meanwhile, Japanese in the outlying districts were issued orders to remain at their posts until their relief by Marines could be effected. Soldiers that they were, the Japanese obeyed American orders. At no time after their surrender did the Japanese army act other than appropriately toward the victors. After Japan’s defeat, most of the Chinese and Manchurian puppet soldiers working for the Japanese transferred their allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek and were given official status within the Nationalist army. But not all did that; some went over to the PLA, and the mayors of Peiping and Tientsin hired some to be their own personal armies. It was a very chaotic situation, and it was only the strength of the Marines that made a temporarily stable environment for peace. Col. William N. Best, 6th MarDiv quartermaster, preceded the main convoy of the division to Tsingtao to secure billets and obtain information relative to the military and political situation in the area. In order to confer with Chinese officials, the commanding general of the 6th MarDiv, Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., and a small staff arrived on 10 October, a day before the scheduled landing.16 The original plan had been to arrive on the 10th, because it was the anniversary of the establishment of the Chinese republic. Unfortunately, the transport fleet had been tossed about at the edge of the terrible typhoon, and consequently he was a day late. During the early afternoon of 11 October, when the transports tied up at Tsingtao’s wharfs, the division reconnaissance company landed first and moved through streets lined with a cheering and flag-waving throng. Their objective—in which they were successful—was to secure the Tsangkou air-

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field, about 10 miles from the city. The balance of the division landed amid the din of enthusiastic applause. Meanwhile, on 12 October, Marine observation aircraft of Observation Squadron (VMO) 6 were launched from the escort carrier Bougainville, safely landing at the Tsangkou airfield the next day. On 13 October, the 6th MarDiv’s command post was opened at Tsingtao. Immediately after Rockey had accepted the surrender of the Japanese at Tientsin, he had left for Chefoo, on the Shantung Peninsula. Chefoo, the objective of the 29th Marines, had been captured by the PLA, which had already installed one of its own as mayor. Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid, commander of the Seventh Fleet, requested that the PLA withdraw before the arrival of the Marines, but it was understandably unwilling. Therefore, Vice Adm. Daniel E. Barbey, Commander, Amphibious Force, recommended that the landing be temporarily postponed. Rockey concurred and on 9 October passed the orders that the 29th would land with the rest of the division at Tsingtao. An emissary from the PLA commander in Shantung arrived at Shepherd’s headquarters on 13 October with a letter to the general. The message stated simply that the PLA wished to cooperate with the Marines in “destroying the remaining Japanese military forces and the rest of the traitor (puppet) army,” in order to “best establish local peace and order.” Further, it said, PLA troops would be sent into Tsingtao with the expectation that the Marines would not oppose them. It noted that the CNA was preparing to enter Tsingtao with American help for the express purpose of attacking the PLA. The PLA general hoped “that our both [sic] armies continue to maintain friendly relations.” General Shepherd responded in the negative—not about the friendly relations, but the first part. The emissary went back with a short note in which Shepherd stated that the mission of the 6th MarDiv was a peaceful one and did not include the destruction of any military force. He also indicated that it was not desirable for the PLA to enter Tsingtao, as the city was quiet and peaceful, and his force of well-trained combat veterans could handle any disturbance that came its way. According to the division’s war diary, the general further stated, “On my own behalf, however, I can say without reservation that it is my determination that the Sixth Marine Division will in no way assist any Chinese group in conflict against another.” On 25 October the 10,000-man Japanese garrison at Tsingtao formally surrendered to Maj. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC, and to Lt. Gen. Chen Pao-Tsang, CNA, the latter acting for the Chinese central government. The men took the surrender on the city’s racecourse before the assembled troops of the 6th Marine Division. The Marines assumed complete responsibility for disarming, subsisting, and repatriating the Japanese within their area of control. The primary mission of the Marines in China,

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according to the Secretary of the Navy, was “to accomplish the disarmament of the Japanese and to provide for their repatriation up to the point [General Wedemeyer] considers that the Chinese Nationalist government troops can alone carry out this mission.” Prospects for the future were not good. The prognosis for a short term of duty for the Marine forces in and around Tsingtao were not good either. The Marines would have their work cut out for them before the CNA could arrive. They had to take over the entire Shantung area, release the Japanese from their role of guarding rail lines, and finally gain control of the interior of the province. But with all the hard work there was ample play. Tsingtao stadium supported touch football all through the fall season. A Thanksgiving Day’s “Rice Bowl” game brought in 10,000 fans; on the field, the 22d and 29th Marines teams were studded with famous college players. Basketball took over during the winter season and also featured college stars on each team. An enlisted men’s club officially opened on 3 November, when General Shepherd presented the key to the club to PFC Joseph W. Stadrawa, the first man to enter the building. Radio station XABU began service on 10 November, the Corps’s birthday. On Christmas Eve, the enlisted club featured an unlimited supply of Stateside beer for the first time. The enormous task of repatriating the 630,000 Japanese soldiers mainly fell to IIIAC. But the process was well on its way by the end of October, and it appeared that it would continue if the Japanese could make their way to American-controlled territory. However, both Chinese sides were anxious to retain the expertise and technical know-how of the former enemy, and serious efforts were made to recruit Japanese into each of the Chinese armies. The major Japanese embarkation point was to be Tsingtao. Therefore, the problems above became more apparent there. Adherents of Chiang Kaishek, backed by local armed irregulars, had seized Tsingtao and were running it with the recognition of the central government.17 The PLA, which held most of the Shantung Province, controlled the countryside to the outskirts of the Tsangkou airfield. The Japanese army and its puppet troops held the rail routes leading into the interior. Until CNA units arrived at Tsingtao in sufficient numbers to replace the Japanese, there was little hope of rapid repatriation. In fact there were constant clashes between the PLA and puppet or Japanese troops. At General Shepherd’s request, MAG 32 started regular reconnaissance patrols on 26 October, to check the status of the rail lines and their Japanese guards and to ensure adequate warning of any attempt by the PLA to move against Tsingtao. General Shepherd realized that his men, although doing a commendable job repatriating the Japanese, were not being kept busy enough. Even fine troops were likely to lose their edge if not sufficiently occupied. Additionally, his men were not all veterans of the late war. As a result, in mid-

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November Shepherd instituted a six-week training program, stressing “the basics,” those specifics military men tend to forget when the going is relatively easy. The course required that each unit have at least ten hours of classroom and practical work each week. The key is training and retraining, and when that is completed, more training. All during the month of October and well into November, encounters between Marines and the PLA became increasingly common. On 5 October, Marine reconnaissance parties proceeding from Tientsin to Peiping found 36 unguarded Communist roadblocks scattered along the route. Jeeps were the only vehicles that could get through. The following day Marine engineers, guarded by a rifle platoon, were sent to clear them. About 22 miles northwest of Tientsin the group was fired upon by 40 to 50 Chinese troops. The PLA was finally forced to withdraw, but three Marines were wounded in the clash. This was the first major contest between Marines and Chinese Communist forces in north China. Engineers went back the next day, but this time with a company from the 1st Marines, a platoon of tanks, and carrier air cover. All roadblocks were completely dismantled, and the road was cleared for normal traffic. Regular patrols were initiated in order to keep the road open. A convoy of 95 vehicles belonging to the 5th Marines made the passage to Peiping, joining other members of the regiment who had already arrived by train. The 5th Marines was lucky in not being subjected to the attention of the PLA. Mainly its responsibility was to guard airports in and near Peiping. For the 5th the quiet would last until April 1946, when then things would really change. Col. Julian N. Frisbie was relieved of command of the regiment and reassigned as chief of staff of the 1st MarDiv.18 At about the same time, General Louis Jones assumed command of the newly established and officially called “Peking Group,” which was to control Marine activities in Peiping. Firing upon trains, especially the Peiping-to-Mukden line, was a regular activity of the PLA during the month of October. On 18 October a train was ambushed between Langfang and Peiping by an unknown number of PLA troops. There were no Marine casualties, but six members of the PLA were killed and an unknown number wounded. Jeep patrols were also fired upon, and three Marines were wounded in this way during this same period. Two more men of the 7th Marines were wounded on 19 October when the jeep they were riding in was ambushed in the Tangshan vicinity, which is partway to Chinwangtao. Another man from the 5th Marines was wounded when his jeep was ambushed in the vicinity of Peiping on 29 October. That day the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines was moved southward to Tangku to guard the railhead there, and to Taku, the main port of entry for north China. It was attached to the 11th Marines (Col. Wilbur S. Brown), which had security responsibility for the road, rail, and stretch of river from Tangku to Tietnsin.19 Tangku had been established as the main

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storage area for IIIAC. On 15 October, the III Amphibious Corps Service Brigade was disbanded, and its duties were assumed by the 7th Service Regiment (Col. Harold E. Rosecrans).20 At that point the regiment was declared the responsible and accountable supply agency for all units of IIIAC. On 30 October the IIIAC ordered the 6th MarDiv to provide a reinforced infantry battalion for duty in the Chinwangtao area. On that same day, Maj. Gen. Louis E. Woods, USMC, arrived in Tientsin to relieve Larkin and assume command of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Larkin was being returned to the United States because of illness. Woods had formerly commanded the 2d Wing at Okinawa.21 Because of ground fire, the altitude of Marine reconnaissance overflights had to be increased substantially to lessen risk to pilots and planes. There is no question that the flyers desired to repay in kind, but restrictions imposed wouldn’t allow that. This level of annoyance continued well through the winter and following spring. Although the Marine scout planes would often land peppered with holes, no substantial or severe damage resulted. But the slugs were too close for comfort. Perhaps a bit of napalm might have evened things out just a bit? In the meantime, beginning on 15 October, trenches appeared that hindered the progress of any traffic on the Tientsin Peiping road. When the word was passed on to farmers in the neighborhood that all soil used to fill the gaps would come from their fields, the digging miraculously ceased. A motor patrol of the 7th Marines was ambushed by a group of irregular Chinese forces at a village about three miles north of Tientsin on 2 November. There were no Marine casualties, but one Chinese guerrilla was killed and an unknown number wounded. Despite the troublesome activity in north China, Walter Curley, whom we met earlier, was now seriously dating Gisela Jannings, even though fraternization with the enemy was still Verboten—if, that is, anyone can imagine that a good-looking young girl could possibly be an “enemy.” He and General Rockey’s aide, Capt. Frank Gorman, who dated another cutie (the former German ambassador’s daughter Ullie Ott), were kept busy socially. They all dined on Peking duck, and Curley raved about the meal. (Note the name of the dish—that hadn’t changed.) It seems that the very rich Jannings, whom Curley had kicked out of their Tientsin home, also owned another beautiful house in Peiping. On the Corps’s birthday Curley wrote his parents that he along with Generals Rockey and Worton, plus several aides, flew up north to observe the Great Wall by air. Included in the party were “some French ladies (Gen. Rockey’s gals).” That makes one wonder if Major Keller Rockey of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines in the 4th Brigade met some lovelies while in France, or were these new friends? The positioning of IIIAC in Hopeh placed it squarely astride the route along which Chiang moved his armies in order to gain the rich northeastern provinces. U.S. ships unloaded the 13th Chinese Nationalist Army on 30–

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31 October, and a steady stream of Manchuria-bound troops traveled through the Marine-held area. Their debarkation point was safe, but the Nationalists had to travel through Communist-held, therefore dangerous, territory, and their lines were anything but secure. From the Great Wall to Mukden and on to Changchun, every mile of track, every bridge, and every switch was at the mercy of Communist attacks. The railroads were the main targets, and the PLA used that target to its own best advantage. Wedemeyer had warned Chiang that he should control north China effectively before moving into Manchuria, but the Nationalist leader thought otherwise. The Japanese with their massive forces had been unable to control the Communist guerrillas, but Chiang ignored that valuable lesson, as he did so many others. From Shantung and Hopeh he drained his interior troops for his push on Manchuria. Consequently vast areas of the interior easily fell to the Communist forces. Less than three years later Chiang and the remnants of his forces were decisively defeated and driven from the mainland specifically because he had ignored Wedemeyer’s advice. The Marines, unwilling participants for the most part, were being dragged into a mess between the two warring factions that they neither initiated nor wished to continue. In other words, it was a civil war—the worst kind of war and in a far away country where the Americans were considered intruders and, it might be added, really didn’t belong. It would be a long, unpleasant period before the last Marines finally left Tsingtao in the spring of 1949. The situation really began to heat up in mid-November 1945. On the 14th of that month, a train carrying Maj. Gen. DeWitt Peck and an inspection party was ambushed en route from Tangshan to Chinwangtao. An irregular firefight ensued between the Marine guards and a Communist force of unknown size near Kuyeh. It was fought in a village about 500 yards north of the tracks and lasted for over three hours. Peck requested, and Rockey approved, air support. Because the village was inhabited and the target not clearly identifiable, the planes flew over on a simulatedstrafing run. As directed, no fire upon the village emanated from the planes. One company from the 7th Marines which was sent to aid its beleaguered comrades arrived late on the afternoon of the 14th and found that the hostiles had melted away. The train returned to Kuyeh after dark. There were no Marine casualties; it isn’t known if the Chinese had any, because they always removed their dead and wounded. The next day the general’s train was again halted in the same area, by a break in the track, and again the train was taken under fire. During the night, about 400 yards of track had been torn up, and when some Chinese rail hands tried to repair the section they were killed or injured by mines. When he learned that the repairs would take two days, Peck gave up. He boarded a light observation plane and flew to Chinwangtao. That incident clearly demonstrated that the Chinese Nationalist forces

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would have to clear the area so that train traffic could again roll without interference. Rockey gave Peck permission to arrange directly with Tu Liming, the CNA general in command of northeast China, to drive back the guerrillas, avoiding Marine positions while so doing. In return the Marines would take over the guarding of all rail bridges between Tangku and Chinwangtao, a distance of approximately 135 miles. Peck had agreed to add a great deal more to the “meal” the 7th Marines was trying to digest. He hoped it wouldn’t get a stomachache before it was finished. Rockey recognized the problem and had already, on 30 October, made arrangements with Shepherd to send a reinforced infantry battalion to the Chinwangtao area on 6 November. Upon arrival, 1/29 (1st Battalion, 29th Marines) came under the jurisdiction of Lt. Col. Richard P. Ross, Jr., the commander of the 7th Marines. It was “welcomed” into the normal routine—bridge guards being attacked, tracks blown, train derailments, and of course, ambuscades. The Marine command was particularly unhappy with the continued exposure and losses, small though they were in comparison to what they had received in the recent island conflicts. The war was supposed to be over, but here the men were, even farther from home and still at risk. Regardless of the low casualty totals, the numbers loomed large to those who manned the trains and isolated guard posts. Although their commanders made arrangements to “spell” those whose duties kept them up at danger points, it wasn’t for long enough to count. It was just a matter of a day or two, and then back they went to the rails or bridges. By comparison, duty in the cities was quite good, though it would never be the same as the coveted China duty of the prewar 1930s. Nothing would ever again be that grand. Coal delivery to places like Shanghai was of paramount significance to the Chinese; therefore the protection of coal was of the utmost importance. If Chiang’s armies hadn’t been trying to oust the PLA in the far north, they could have replaced the Marines in those duties, nasty as they were. The senior officers realized this, but probably not the Marines on the trains or bridges, standing out in the bitter winds coming down from Manchuria. Enlisted men were not considered to be on the informational pipeline. What they knew came directly from that most important and reliable source: “scuttlebutt,” rumors. The U.S. government was working ceaselessly to effect a rapprochement between the various factions in China. But even the intervention of Gen. George C. Marshall was unsuccessful. Neither the Nationalists nor the PLA could overcome its distrust of the other—and, it might be added, for good reason. The obstacles and differences were too high even for the United States to work out satisfactorily. Marshall did manage to get both parties to sit down and work out an agreement in January 1946, but it was oh, so short-lived. Basically it called for both parties to cease hostilities and

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movement of troops in north China. But it included an exception: the CNA was allowed to continue to move into Manchuria and effect control there. Japan had officially taken Manchuria from China in 1931—it was “official” because the League of Nations had sanctioned it. Japan had been working hard for many years to develop that area with investments and the settling of Japanese civilians. It had been quite successful, and Manchuria was a most desirable area to have and control. Meanwhile, though the hit-and-run tactics let up a bit, Marines were still at risk. The treaty didn’t last long, and the recalcitrants were soon back at it. General Marshall was insistent that only army personnel be part of the truce teams being established. Specifically and clearly, no Marines were wanted. Marshall’s belief was that since Marines were part of a very ambiguous control unit helping the CNA, they should be divorced from any settlement group. That sounds correct, but wasn’t quite what the army thought of the Marines at that and previous times. By early March it became obvious that there were insufficient U.S. Army personnel available for the job, so Marshall reversed his stance somewhat. A very few Marine officers were selected, but with the proviso that when army personnel became available the Marines would depart. Six senior Marine officers were selected; they included Cols. Theodore A. Holdahl and Orin K. Pressley and Lt. Cols. Gavin C. Humphrey, Leroy P. Hunt, Jr., Maxwell H. Mizell, and Jack F. Warner.22 On the 18th of March, the first Marine-directed teams were sent into the field. There is no proof, but we can assume that they provided reasonably good service; otherwise they would have been removed, posthaste, and they weren’t. The experience of all the teams was much the same. The Americans, army as well as Marine led, always had to take the initiative. Neither the Nationalists nor Communists ever seemed to get over their extreme mutual antagonism enough to make worthwhile suggestions. All in all, it was a waste of time and effort for the American members. They traveled far and wide and lived rather badly in the field. The entire group was constantly in danger of being shot at; also, poor food, plus mail, had to be dropped by air during their far-ranging treks into the backwoods of China. The fruitless effort went on for about three months before the Marines were relieved. Even though a pretense of negotiations was going on, clashes between both Chinese groups continued, and neither side was blameless. By March the country was split asunder as the fighting between the two parties grew progressively worse. But in late March and early April the PLA had to assume the major blame in the breakdown. It started moving forces from Shansi and Hopeh into Manchuria, with the connivance of the occupying Soviet forces, which withdrew when the PLA arrived. The Soviets left behind huge stockpiles of Japanese weapons and equipment, which helped to greatly strengthen the PLA’s military position during the cease-fire period.

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This was somewhat similar to what the United States was doing for the CNA. Attacks upon American Marines continued all during the truce period. In the Anshan vicinity, on 4 December 1945, one Marine was killed and another wounded while on a hunting party. On 8 January 1946, at a bridge near Anshan, a Marine bridge guard was attacked by about 30 Chinese irregulars; there were no Marine casualties, and the number of enemy casualties is unknown. A week later, two Marines were wounded in a truck ambush near Tangshan. Even though the cease-fire was in effect, the last month of the old year and first month of the new were dangerous for Marines in China. The same could easily be said of all the other months as well. Meanwhile, Marine units in China were affected greatly by the postwar reduction in U.S. military strength. By December 1945, thousands of Marines in IIIAC were eligible to return to the States due to having earned significant demobilization points during the war. This would continue monthly, as many more became eligible. Some Marines were remaining in the Corps, but many more were leaving, and since the various Marine units were scattered it wasn’t always possible to transfer to China those that were staying. To add to the overall problem, the U.S. Navy was going through the same reduction in force, and as a result, ships carrying returning troops weren’t fully manned. As you have read above, there was stirring in the ranks, especially in the various army units, but there was also some rattling of cages in IIIAC. It is reported that there were near mutinies in which army protestors carried signs that read, “No boat, no vote. We want to go home.” As Colonel Aplington reported, “the Marine Corps fared better, in part because of strong leadership but even more because of the psychology of Marines, a sort of inverted snobbery. Anything the ‘Doggies’ did or had was not for Marines. If the Army protested, they (the Marines) would not.”23 But all was not well with the “duration plus” crowd. In one of Walter Curley’s letters home he said: A few months back I had faint hopes of being home by Xmas, but little did I imagine that our government would permit us to get so permanently involved in the “fouled-up” situation out here in China. At first it was downright interesting—but now it is thoroughly peeving, maddening and dangerous. Every Marine in China is fed up. They all want to go home, and a great percentage of them are high-point men who deserve to go home, but no provision is being made to send replacements, or release the transportation facilities; there are 1,000’s of transports (empty) lying off the China coast and Japan—with no assigned mission. [Emphasis in original.]

He continued by blasting the members of the State Department, including “Undersec’y Gates and Ambassador Pauley who just rushed through and

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now are on their way back to see the president,” and ended by stating, “General Worton and General Rockey are both fine; they send their love. It is marvelous to be with them [emphasis added].” Presumably neither general was “bitching,” as was at least one of their aides. In the early spring General Peck called in his staff and senior commanders and announced to them, “Gentlemen, the Marine Corps is an oldfashioned military organization and until we hear to the contrary from Washington there will be no mutiny in the First Marine Division.” According to Colonel Aplington, though there was some dissatisfaction, “there was a lot of self-discipline among our rank and file.”24 Already, on 13 December 1945, General Wedemeyer had given IIIAC permission to disband the 6th Marine Division. It would shrink to a reinforced brigade, with its infantry component reorganized around a skeleton-sized 4th Marines, whose headquarters was then in Japan. On 24 December, in a flashy ceremony and with the division band playing “Auld Lang Syne,” Maj. Gen. Archie B. Howard relieved Shepherd of command of the 6th Division. Howard had formally and briefly been Inspector General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific. Shepherd, who returned to the States, had commanded the division ever since September 1944, when it was formed on Guadalcanal. In January the IIIAC terminated its major responsibility, repatriation and subsistence of the Japanese. Part of the agreement by which the CNA assumed that responsibility allowed the CNA to absorb the vast stocks of Japanese weapons and stores of munitions. But Wedemeyer directed that American forces in the China theater furnish supervisory assistance in processing, staging, and loading out repatriates, possibly to protect them from Chinese revenge. In addition, Marines would continue to provide guards for the American-manned repatriation ships. At the end of January 1946 there were still approximately 300,000 Japanese, civilians and military personnel, waiting to go home. The repatriation was an extensive operation that would take much more time, expense, and commitment by all parties involved. Operation Plan 1–46, which IIIAC issued on 14 February, envisioned the further reduction of Marine personnel because “the work load of the Corps has been materially reduced.” The plan outlined the scope of the reorganization of IIIAC and its program to release eligible personnel. It was anticipated that 12,000 Marines could and would be released in February and March, and shipping for those numbers was already on its way to China. In addition, plans were promulgated to overhaul and regroup 6th MarDiv headquarters and service troops at all levels of command. The plans also included disbanding of the 29th Marines, as well as the elimination of the third battalion of each regiment and the last lettered battery of each artillery battalion in the 1st MarDiv. The 4th Marines, backbone of the proposed brigade at Tsingtao, would be the only infantry regiment in the Marine

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Corps to retain its World War II organization of three rifle battalions. Temporarily, the “new” 4th in China consisted only of the 3rd Battalion, and that was commanded by Lt. Col. Fred Beans until he too left for the States at the end of January 1946—which left 2d Lt. Paul W. Stone, regimental adjutant, in command of Headquarters, 4th Marines at Tsingtao.25 In addition, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was to return the headquarters and service squadrons of MAG 12, as well as Marine Fighter Squadron (Night Fighter), or VMF(N) 541, and Marine Torpedo Bomber Squadron, or VMTB 134, to the United States, and to turn control of the south airfield at Peiping to the Army Air Forces units supporting the executive headquarters. At Tsingtao, on 1 April, the remaining elements of the 6th Division became the 3d Marine Brigade. The 6th was the last of the wartime Marine divisions formed and the last deactivated. Uniquely, during its 19 months of existence it had never seen service in the United States. The 3d Brigade consisted of headquarters, service, medical, and artillery battalions in addition to the remnants of the 4th Marines, now commanded by Col. William J. Whaling.26 On 17 April, Brig. Gen. William T. Clement relieved General Howard as brigade commander.27 The 1st MarDiv completed its last ordered deactivation on 15 April, and the IIIAC staff and units were pared down to skeleton strength. Another hunting party of Marines was attacked on 7 April in the vicinity of Lutai, with one Marine killed. Lutai was located along the railway lines about 25 miles north of Tangku. Headquarters, 5th Marines, was now established at Tangshan, with the 1st Battalion in Tangku (still commanded by Lt. Col. John H. Masters) and 2/5 (Lt. Col. Edwin C. Godbold) at Linsi. There was a radio relay at Lutai. The two battalions of the 7th Marines were still in and about the north, where they been since shortly after arrival. Lt. Col. James D. Hittle now commanded 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, and it was manning the important bridges and stations from Lei-chuang to Chang-li. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, Lt. Col. Russell N. Honsowetz commanding, went all the way to Chinwangtao, another 30 miles farther north and into no-man’s-land.28 Later that month, on 16 April, Marines guarding a bridge near Lutai were attacked by irregular forces of unknown strength. There were no casualties among the Marines, enemy casualties if any, not known. Though they were now fewer in number, the Marines’ responsibilities didn’t decrease proportionately. They were kept very busy. Gen. Roy Geiger and staff from FMFPac visited China between 12 and 22 May to determine how IIIAC could best be reorganized with anticipated continued reduction in forces. Geiger’s people had developed a plan before they had left Pearl Harbor. It eliminated both corps headquarters and troops plus 3d Brigade headquarters and troops leaving, only “old George,” the 1st MarDiv (Reinforced) behind in North China.29 Over 6,000 personnel were to be returned to the States.30

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Actually, this only served as a working plan. After conferences with Adm. Charles M. Cooke, commander of the Seventh Fleet, and General Rockey, the two staffs, FMFPac and IIIAC, managed to work out plans that would better fit the situation. Cooke gave his approval and on 24 May, upon his arrival, submitted it to General Marshall, who also gave his assent. When the revised plan took effect on 4 June, General Rockey became Commanding General, 1st MarDiv (Reinforced) and Marine Forces, China. Worton moved from corps chief of staff to assistant division commander. Other staff personnel from the headquarters and service battalion, a total of 600 officers and men, were added to the division. The service battalion was eventually to be transferred from its division to the United States. It was DeWitt Peck’s chance to get out, and he finally did, after more than thirty years as a Marine. In order to relieve north China of an excessive amount of Marines, the 3d Brigade was also reduced. It went down to one regiment, the new 4th Marines (Reinforced), which became Marine Forces, Tsingtao. In addition to the infantry, the other units of the new Task Force included VMO 6 (Capt. Richard B. Cropley), the 12th Service Battalion (Lt. Col. Paul W. Russell), and the 96th Naval Construction Battalion. The total manpower of the 1st MarDiv (Reinforced) was set as 25,252 officers and men, which included 2,517 naval personnel. At the urging of Cooke and Marshall, Brigade General Clement was retained as commanding officer of the units remaining at Tsingtao. It was thought that having a Marine general in command at Tsingtao was very important, since “face” was all-important in the Far East. The air wing also had a change; Brig. Gen Lawson H. M. Sanderson replaced Louie Woods on 25 June. In the meantime the grunts on the ground were being kept busy disputing the PLA wherever it became necessary, and that was nearly everywhere in north China. At a bridge near Hanku on 5 May, one Marine was wounded when the guards were attacked by an unidentified force with mortars. On 7 May a Marine sentry was attacked and wounded at Lutai. A Marine reconnaissance party was attacked on 21 May by upward of 75 irregular troops at a village about 10 miles south of Tientsin. Two Chinese were killed, whereas one Marine was killed and another wounded in the encounter. A bridge guard was attacked near Peitaiho on the 1st of June by an enemy force of unknown strength. No Marine casualties reported, but five Chinese were killed. The Marines continued as sitting ducks for the guerrillas—it was that kind of peacekeeping. Headquarters III Amphibious Corps was deactivated on 10 June, and most of its staff functions and personnel were reassigned to duties on the 1st Marine Division staff. The new organization, with an authorized strength of 24,252, was designated Marine Forces China, Maj. Gen. Keller E. Rockey, commanding. At Tsingtao the headquarters and supporting

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troops of the 3d Marine Brigade were merged with those of the 4th Marines. In one of his reports to the commandant Rockey stated that in his opinion, “conditions will operate to keep Marines in North China for a considerable period, at least during the remainder of this calender year.” He added that the “CNA is spread thin in Manchuria. They do not appear to have the necessary troops to relieve us.” Tired of staff functions, Hank Aplington moved from staff to replace James D. “Don” Hittle in command of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (2/7). He was relieved by Lt. Col. William K. “Willy” Enright, who had been Corps G-3. Maj. Louis G. Ditta, Aplington’s executive officer, spelled the two men for four days until Hank arrived at Peitaiho, his new place of repose. But he didn’t get much of that. Things began cracking almost as soon as he arrived. According to his memoir, he was looking forward “to a return to troops. In the personnel turmoil of the summer of 1946 it would not be an easy job but I would have a battalion with all that entailed and the ‘big picture’ of the last eight months could be forgotten.” He says he was never sorry that he finally got out from under administrative duties, but even though he could sense that Peitaiho was the place to be, he wasn’t overly impressed with the place in the summer of 1946. The town had formerly been a summer resort for wealthy Europeans and their embassies, later for Japanese civilians. Hank paid his duty call on Col. Paul Drake, his regimental commander. Drake said “welcome aboard” and began outlining Lou Ditta’s excellent qualifications. Actually, Ditta had been with the 7th Marines since joining as a brand-spanking-new second lieutenant before Guadalcanal, and he had held every position from platoon leader to acting battalion commander, the latter for just four days. Aplington tells us that when he arrived he found that three of his four companies were at the compound. Fox Company was covering about 30 miles of track, with headquarters at Anshan, just south of Chang-Li. It was responsible for guarding seven bridges, the largest being number 66. We will get back to Fox Company and its activity shortly. The new battalion commander got a full report from Ditta. The report emphasized what Hank already knew. Cuts in staff had affected each unit, and his was no exception. Let him describe it: The G-Series called for an aggregate of 996, 33 officers and 958 men. On the rolls of 2/7 were 31 officers (25 USMCR) and 1126 enlisted (291 USMCR). Of the officers two were on “permanent” emergency leave in the States, leaving twenty-nine present for duty. Lou pointed out the hooker, 9 officers and 256 enlisted were “high-pointers” awaiting detachment for separation as soon as shipping arrived at Tang-ku. Since shipping arrived in an irregular manner and the orders to get them to Tang-ku were “ASAP, but not later than yesterday” they had been closed out as far as possible prior to

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the last minute and for all practical purposes were not available for any but the most cursory duties. So we were really talking about 20 officers and 870 men (and of these many were dangerously close to coming within the everdropping point scores).

Was there any chance of replacements? Lou hoped so. But when? Who knew? At that point he decided to have a good look at Fox Company. Hank managed to obtain the use of a train, or at least a locomotive with a caboose, the latter painted green and emblazoned with American flags on one side and “Command Post, Peiping-Mukden, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division” on the other. Down the road they went, toward bridge 66. Hank and his train stopped at Anshan “to pick up Chuck Kenneday” and head to 66.31 The Marine post must have been similar to most of the others on the rail lines in north China. Everyone, satisfied with the minute inspection, returned to their home base. On 13 July something happened that did not fit well into the plans of Hank Aplington, or of the rest of the 1st MarDiv either. Against direct orders, seven Marines from 1st Battalion had left their post at bridge 109 near Lin-Shou-Ying to go into the village. It was midsummer, the weather was as hot as blazes, and most appalling, their beer was getting warm. The men, who included at least one NCO, had loaded up a trailer with ice. All of a sudden—surprise, surprise! A large detachment of PLA surrounded them and their jeep. The six Marines were immediately disarmed and taken away by their captors. Fortunately one Marine had left his rifle in the ice locker and had returned to get it; he was the only witness to the Marines’ disgrace. As the word spread throughout the entire division area, there must have been several darkened faces. Lt. Col. Norman E. Sparling had taken over 1/7 just a few days before and possibly wasn’t anywhere near the area, but it was “his baby.” Something had to be done, and it was. Search teams from the 7th Marines area were formed, from both the 1st and 2d Battalions. Then out went the Marines, looking for their irresponsible brothers. Sparling’s men formed a patrol and went in the direction he believed that the PLA had gone. If you listen intently you can almost hear, over fifty years later, Col. Sparling’s teeth grinding. Aplington was directed to take over some of 1/7’s area to relieve more Marines for search parties. Colonel Drake got dramatic—he announced that “if necessary he would take the field with his regiment until the Marines were freed or rescued or until every house in Hopei had been searched.” Colonel Aplington was called to Drake’s quarters and told to take the field the following morning. That Monday morning the 2d Battalion was on its way. The battalion personnel, probably those of both battalions, were not in very good physical shape. Aplington decided that it was important not to press his men until they had regained their conditioning,

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which he anticipated would be several days. Many of his men did drop out but enough continued to enable 2/7 to continue in the field and complete its mission. On 24 July, after more than 10 days, the Communists finally agreed to release the men, with the proviso that the United States admit their guilt in being where they weren’t supposed to be. The United States did accept the terms, but with a strong protest. We cannot be sure of what happened to the seven men afterward but can imagine that it wasn’t a pleasant experience for any of them, nor should it have been. There was still time for PLA fun and games. Only their “fun and games” were neither fun nor games for the poor Marine privates standing their watches. A Marine sentry at Hangku was attacked and wounded on 21 July. The details are not available, but presumably none of the Communists were hurt. It was just eight days later that a Marine motor patrol was ambushed at Anping, between Tientsin and Peiping. Because of its importance to the role of the Marines in north China during this period, we will cover this action in some detail. On 29 July a motorized patrol from the 11th Marines engaged in escorting a supply convoy intended for the Marine garrison at Peiping was ambushed by about 300 PLA near Anping. The patrol escort was commanded by 2d Lt. Douglas A. Corwin and consisted of 31 men from 1st Battalion and a 10-man 60 mm mortar section from the 1st Marines. In addition to the guard unit there was a contingent of Marine replacements for the Peiping detachment and several U.S. Army staff cars with army personnel also bound for Peiping. The convoy had two jeeps carrying tactical TCS radios, but they had ranges of only a few dozen miles. Consequently there was a considerable period in which the convoy lacked contact with either its destination or point of origin. It left Tientsin at 0915, and by 1105 the TCSs were useless. At a point about 40 miles from Tientsin (see Map 5.2) the convoy encountered a line of rocks across the road. Threading its way through, it next spotted a roadblock of oxcarts. The men in the lead jeeps stopped, got out, and made their way forward. Just then a dozen grenades were tossed at them from a clump of trees to their left. Corwin and most of the men with him were killed or wounded. The main body of the column halted, and the occupants took cover where they were engaged, about a 100 yards back. Most of the truckers were not armed, so they could only take cover and hope they wouldn’t also become casualties. Almost as soon as the main body came under attack, the rear also took heavy fire from the rear, left, and right. It was at about this moment that the second in command, Platoon Sgt. Cecil J. Flanagan, took over and directed return fire, moving up and down the column. The 60 mm mortars were set and began firing, which upset the Communists’ plans somewhat. Several attempts to attack the Marines were put down by the fire. Flanagan directed the mortars upon any concentration of the enemy which effectively curtailed any forward movement by them.

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Map 5.2. Anping Ambush, 29 July 1946

This also gave three Marines at the rear of the column a breather so that they could maneuver a jeep around and make a successful break for help. The attacking force, estimated at about 300 Chinese with rifles and automatic weapons, decided to give up the unequal fight at about 1530 and began making their way out of the line of fire. The senior officer of the U.S. group, an army major, ordered the men to gather up the wounded, and covered by Flanagan’s rear guard the survivors made their way to Peiping, arriving at 1745. The results of this contest were the death of four Marines and the wound-

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ing of 12, all of whom were from 1/11. Chinese casualties amounted to 12 killed and an unknown number wounded. According to the PLA the, “more than 60 U.S. soldiers were fighting shoulder to shoulder with eighty Kuomintang troops.” As far as can be determined, that was totally incorrect; no CNA forces were in the immediate vicinity. No matter how many Chinese Communists were killed, it certainly wasn’t worth the lives of the four Marines. The three Marines who escaped were in a great hurry and consequently careless. They overturned their jeep, and two of the men were injured. They managed to spread the word by commandeering a passing vehicle. There was air response; an observation plane flying overhead by 1730 counted 15 bodies in PLA uniforms lying dead on the ground. Five Corsairs of MAG 24 reached the site at about 1900, but they found nothing, not even the dead Communists. A relief force of 400 men from the 11th Marines backed up by two 105 mm howitzers arrived at 2045 after a “hellish, reckless ride” to find that everyone, living and dead, had vanished. There was a great deal of activity within the Marine Corps and the American official community to determine why and how that very successful ambush could have happened. Some improvements were made as a result. Air response time was cut from two hours to 15 minutes, and patrols were substantially increased. More powerful radios were made available, and of course more training. How the air support would affect ground engagements isn’t clear, since there is no clear evidence that they would have been allowed to fire upon anyone on the ground. What really concerned American observers, like General Marshall, was the obvious fact that the PLA was targeting Marines as though the Americans were “in bed with the CNA.” For the rest of the summer and into the fall the PLA continued its harassment of Marines. It wasn’t daily, but it was continuous and often bloody. Obviously the “good times and good manners” had passed on, never to be witnessed again. The attacks would get tougher and concentrate more upon Marines on outpost duty. This forced a tightening of Marine positions and withdrawal from the entire Hopeh area. On 1 August, 1st MarDiv directed that Marine forces in Tsingtao be reduced to a reinforced infantry battalion and that the 4th Marines be returned to the United States. Only 3d Battalion, was to remain, and they were assigned as a separate unit under the navy’s control at Naval Port Facilities, Tsingtao. Confusion reigned. By 1 September only Tsingtao remained as a duty station for Marines in China. After 6 September the Marines’ duties were further reduced; they were now assigned solely to guard trains on which U.S. personnel and supplies were traveling. But the Marines were still being bothered by the Reds. The attacks continued even though the Marine presence nearly disappeared. Marines at Hsin-Ho, located near Tangku, were attacked by a PLA raiding party on 5 April, without Marine casualties. Chinese casualties are un-

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known (Map 5.3). About two miles north of Lutai, a coal train was derailed and ambushed on 9 August by about 50 PLA troops. Again, there were no Marine casualties, but four “ChiComs” were wounded, and an unknown number were killed—but not enough to solve the overall problem. There was another action at Hsin Ho on 12 August. There the Marines and an unknown number of raiding PLA engaged in a firefight, with no Marine casualties, and possibly none to their opponents. In mid-1946 the quality of Marine forces in north China began to break down. General Sanderson, commanding the 1st Marine Air Wing, reported that his organization had dropped far below its wartime standard. He declared that “only 35% of the present enlisted strength . . . can be considered to have any qualifications other than basic.” He added that he had only one experienced mechanic for every four planes; therefore, MAG 24 could only perform at 20 percent aircraft availability. The 1st Division shared with the wing the same personnel problems, brought on by the downsizing of the Marine Corps. The division was reporting that its efficiency levels were between 25 and 35 percent, which translated to “barely adequate to do the job at hand.” Unfortunately, regardless of the accuracy of those facts, there was no reduction in the commitment of the Corps in China. By mid-September most of the draftees and reserves were on the high seas, headed home. But as a counterpoint, new recruits and regulars with some tenure in the Corps were headed to China to fill the gaps. For the next few months it was a proverbial swinging door. Some newcomers continued to arrive, and “oldgoers” continued to leave. There was only one solution, and that was a partial withdrawal from the many stations the Marines were trying to cover. The most important place to protect was the various Seventh Fleet shore installations. General Rockey was relieved on 18 September 1946 by Maj. Gen. Samuel L. Howard. General Howard had spent three-plus years as a prisoner of the Japanese, and at this late date was finally coming into his own. It was he who had suffered the agony of being the only Marine to ever surrender a regiment of Marines—at Gen. Jonathan Wainwright’s orders on Bataan in 1942. Howard soon learned that his China Marines were not finished with the Communist attacks. One target proved to be a magnet for the PLA, immediately and for the near future as well. On the night of 3–4 October 1946 a force of over 100 PLA launched another attack at the Hsin Ho dump. Their main intent was to steal ammunition for continued raids on that and any other spot that would discombobulate the Americans. The territory was guarded by 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. The lone Marine guard on duty immediately responded to the assault, exchanging rifle fire with Chinese who made it into the reserve area. A rescue party from the guardhouse was on the scene within minutes, disembarked from its truck, and developed a firing line in seconds. The driver of the truck was wounded before he could get out of the way. The Marines forced the enemy to

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disengage, and they took off for parts unknown. Although they were able to make off with several cases of ammo, they left behind one dead and one wounded—and most of the boxes were recovered the next morning. The wounded man who had been left behind confirmed that he and his comrades were members of the Communist regular forces. For the balance of 1946 the small but destructive engagements continued. At this point in time the Communists weren’t doing very well and were blaming the U.S. presence for the upset in the nation. Neither side was willing to work with General Marshall, and he was becoming decidedly disenchanted with the whole process. For a change, Nationalist China was doing quite well in Manchuria and north China, but it was becoming dangerously overconfident and overextended. For some reason Chiang’s advisors couldn’t see that fact; the CNA refused to negotiate in good faith, making Marshall’s task more difficult. Their failure to do so caused the ultimate disaster to the CNA’s cause in 1949. Finally, in January 1947, the efforts by George Marshall to bring peace and stability to China were declared completely unsuccessful, null, and void; military personnel, which included Marines, were ordered home by President Truman. However, it would be a while yet before they all managed to make the voyage. The 1st MarDiv was directed to provide tactical and logistical support for the U.S. Army during its withdrawal from Peiping. For the first quarter of the year, Marine units were shifted around and about north China. The last 1st Marine Division company still on guard duty at the Chinwangtao port was relieved by the 1st Reconnaissance Company on 17 March, and two days later control of 1st Recon passed to the 1st Marines. Company E, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines was ordered to Tsingtao on 17 March to augment 3d Battalion, 4th Marines so that this enlarged battalion could relieve all naval personnel who were guarding naval installations there. The night of 4–5 April 1947 saw the worst and final major conflict between the 5th Marines and the PLA. An attack was launched by an estimated two companies of PLA, about 350 men, once again at the Hsin Ho dump (see Map 5.3). The night’s silence was broken by a bugle call that preceded the assault. That sound would become very familiar to Marines in Korea some three years later. Five Marines were killed in the initial firefight, and eight others were wounded as the guard detachment attempted to beat back the penetration of its post. Anticipating a quick reaction and reinforcements for the few Marine guards at one of the dump sites, the PLA commander had laid an ambush and mined the approach road. As a truck bearing men from Company C arrived, the lead truck hit the mine, and the ambush party fired. Down off the trucks the relief went. On the ground the men immediately took up firing positions. It wasn’t long after that the ChiComs got to within grenade range, and for a few minutes the situation was very much touch and go. Finally the Marines drove off

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Map 5.3. Attack on Hsin Ho, 5 April 1947

the PLA, but not before the latter had taken some of the ammunition cases that they’d come for and blown up all that they couldn’t take. In fact, their plans were well laid; the leader of the Communists had even brought up horse-drawn carts to carry the loot back. Although some men of Company C pursued the retiring enemy for upward of eight miles, the PLA managed to escape. On the following morning, overflights discovered no pattern for the escape. The Chinese were

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gone—disappeared completely. Marine casualties were relatively heavy for the numbers engaged. Five Marines had been killed and 16 wounded, most of them undoubtedly by the mine explosion. The enemy casualties amounted to six killed and an estimated 25–30 wounded carried away. Like most of the 1st MarDiv, the 5th Marines would be withdrawn five weeks later, but that was somewhat late for those Marine casualties. In the meantime, on 21 April, Company C was withdrawn from the dump when the CNP, long overdue, took over responsibility for it. When the newly created Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific (FMFWesPac) was activated on 1 May at Tsingtao, Brig. Gen. Omar T. Pfeiffer assumed command. The command included the Headquarters and Service Battalion; 3d Battalion, 4th Marines; 2d Battalion, 1st Marines; 12th Service Battalion; and Air (FMFWesPac). The latter included Wing Service Squadrons VMF 211 and VMR 153. The mission of FMFWesPac was to provide security for U.S. naval training activities. On 9 May the rear echelon of MAG 24 closed out at South Field, Peiping, and three days later the 5th Marines, all but 1st Battalion, left for Guam. The Marines were leaving, but ever so slowly. On 13 May, a train bearing over 500 Marines safely passed, before a long stretch of rail line about three miles long was destroyed between Shanhaikwan and Peiping. Two days later a small detachment of Marines from the 7th Service Regiment on duty at the Hsin Ho ammo dump was withdrawn to Tientsin. It had gathered up all serviceable ammunition that remained there after the fight in April. On 20 May the 1st Marines (less 1/1) joined FMFWesPac at Tsingtao. The lone battalion remained as a guard force to protect the rear echelon of the 1st MarDiv. May 18 the PLA raided Chang-Li, and a large party of occidental civilians, including about 66 Americans, were rescued by a Marine landing party at Peitaiho Beach. By 21 June most of the 1st MarDiv was gone. There was just a division command post remaining and that was aboard the USS Renville, anchored in the bay at Taku. After this, only General Pfeiffer and his force would continue as an American presence in north China. Their main job now was the protection of American nationals, who were still scattered over most of eastern China. Pfeiffer’s orders included maintaining one infantry battalion at all times to be flown anywhere if needed to rescue Americans. From that time forward, training in instant alerts became the most important activity of the few remaining China-based Marines. Additionally, sailors from the various ships in the harbor were periodically trained by the Marines in the art of landing to provide support, if needed, for the Marines—shades of the nineteenth century. Clashes between the Marines and Chinese Communists continued. On 27 August a landing party of unknown strength attempted to destroy a crashed Marine plane on the north shore of the Shantung Peninsula. There were no Marine casualties, and the enemy’s identity was unknown. They

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probably were guerrillas, obviously sea-borne, but from what ship can’t be answered. The last of 1st MarDiv embarked and left Tientsin on 1 September 1947. Tsingtao was the last remaining Marine duty station in China. Shortly thereafter, the remaining, disparate Marine units all became parts of the no-longer-available 1st Marine Division. They accordingly assumed the names, battle honors, and traditions of the regiments of division. The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines was now the 1st Marines, the whole thing. The 3d Battalion, 4th Marines now became the 3d Marines. In addition, in the parlance of the trade, the entire 4,000-man organization at Tsingtao became the Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific. It certainly wasn’t the first time, nor would it be the last, that the Marine Corps suffered from a lack of personnel and utilized understrength “paper” organizations and added grandiose titles to fill in blank spaces. Brig. Gen. Gerald C. Thomas arrived at Tsingtao in early August 1947 and within two weeks took over from the outgoing Pfeiffer. He had brought his family with him, and soon it was settled in a very comfortable home overlooking the bay. But, as Millett tells us, Thomas hadn’t arrived in China just to live well. He had a very difficult job ahead of him— managing and directing an ever-decreasing force while its tasks increased. The population of the city dramatically increased as the Reds closed in, and theft from American supply depots grew proportionally even more. The decreasing Marine and Navy personnel were now finding their tasks of guarding those posts ever more difficult, thus creating a morale problem. One of Thomas’s major plans was to keep his force in a constant state of training. But training suffered from lack of personnel. Infantry units were more often than not on guard duty or assigned as working parties, and consequently there was frequently no one to train. Some paper units were not even staffed, such as the two six-gun 105 mm howitzer batteries. The lone tank platoon, which was assigned to guard the airfield, was understaffed and, like the infantry, had no time for anything like training. But somehow Thomas managed to squeeze in some rather important training, even in that very cold winter—and Thomas, endowed with common sense, always concentrated on what could be accomplished rather than what couldn’t. To somewhat counteract these problems, the men now enjoyed generous liberty, and the various entertainments plus recreation facilities provided a safe outlet for their off-duty pent-up energies. Programs of local studies and correspondence courses were initiated, encouraged, and implemented to entice the men and officers to spend their time in self-improvement rather than with “booze and broads.” There was even a small effort to reunite families by allowing some dependents to come from the United States; except for the few who were beneficiaries, it was not a resounding success. The fighting between the two adversaries, the Communists and Nation-

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alists, grew more violent, bitter, and steady, and the Marines were still in the middle. On Christmas Day 1947, at 0930, five Marines on a hunting trip crossed over into Communist-held territory at Wang Tan Yeun and disappeared. It wasn’t until mid-February 1948 that the American government was notified that they were alive and where they were located. One of the Marines, PFC Charles J. Brayton, Jr., was reported to have been fatally wounded. The other four would be held until the United States apologized for their “participation in a civil war.” The four remaining Marines, Cpl. William L. Pollard, PFCs Thomas Kapodistria and Carrol W. Dickerson, plus Pvt. Robert Hart, were all released on April 1 1948. The navy was quite unhappy with the way General Thomas handled the kidnaping and resulting negotiations. He had promised not to deal directly with the PLA under any circumstances, but he renounced that vow to get his Marines released. Ten days later, a Marine transport plane from VMR 153 made a forced landing at Hung Shih Yai, and the crew was taken prisoner by the Communists. The four were 1st Lt. Harold W. Hawkins, Master Sgt. Thomas J. Shaw, Technical Sgt. Robert C. White, and Cpl. Robert R. Lewis. On 2 July, three months later, they were returned to American control. Fighting was still going on between Marines and ChiComs. A patrol of Marines was pinned down near the Tsangkou airfield on 31 January, but it suffered no losses. Marine transports were sent to Tsinan on 3 March to evacuate American and foreign civilians who were between the fighting CNA and PLA. This type of rescue would happen more frequently as the conflict escalated. Also in March, Marines assisted Chinese in fighting a fire resulting from a huge explosion at warehouses on the Shan Ho Road. Afterward they helped tend the 700 Chinese that were injured. As 1948 proceeded, the Communists forces were giving the Nationalists a real whipping. Most of north China was held by the former, and American consular personnel in Mukden were living within an ever-shrinking perimeter. By February their desperately needed supplies had to be dropped by U.S. Marine planes, and of course those became subject to ground fire. Few planes were brought down, but that didn’t lessen the pressure upon the crews so engaged. Vice Adm. Oscar C. Badger, USN, who had relieved Admiral Cooke in February, ordered Thomas to prepare evacuation plans that would have his command ready to mount up and be out on 30 days notice. Initially, the plan was to leave a small working force to clear up any supplies that had to be left behind. This was immediately rejected as impossible by an inspector general’s review. The contention was that no modest force of Marines could keep the destitute and starving city population from taking whatever was left behind. Thomas decided that with a notice of 30 days, plus adequate shipping, he could complete his mission. Major-general stars clearly loomed ahead, ever more brightly.

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Thomas had his companies from the 1st and 3d Marines, recently engaged in winter training exercises, practice deployment with Admiral Badger’s amphibious forces. As the Reds continued advancing in all quarters, the problems inherent in protection of Americans, civilian and servicemen, became more acute. The Marines continued their training exercises through the month of July, always in readiness for a call. In the meantime, the seriousness of the rapid PLA advances everywhere in China promoted some alternative planning. The Communists took Tsinan, the capitol of Shantung, on 24 September and the CNA major Manchurian supply center at Chinchow on 15 October. The large contingent of American civilians still in China, especially in the Yangtze Valley, and the seeming inability of “Jerry” Thomas’s reduced force to handle these extended areas prompted a real reversal of thinking. Instead of pulling all Marines out of China, more would have to be sent. Guam was the likely spot to find them, and the 1st Provisional Brigade was on hand. Moving it by air was seriously considered, but it was finally decided that transport by sea would be more practical and effectively speedier. Between 1 and 15 November the American embassy issued the following precautionary statement: “In as much as later evacuation on an emergency basis may be impossible, American citizens who do not desire to remain in North China should plan to leave at once by United States Naval vessel from Tientsin.” Almost at once, Marines, all of whom had been transferred to Tsingtao, began work assisting evacuees. On 14 November, one Marine officer with a rifle squad and five communications men flew into Tientsin from Tsingtao, while another group landed at Peiping. Between this time and the end of the month, several groups of consular personnel were shipped out from Taku aboard naval transports. American civilians could make their own decisions to remain in China or not, but military dependents were ordered out and sent to places of safety. By the end of the month the 9th Marines was shipped out of Guam and headed to north China to preserve the escape route for the last of the Marines still there. Shortly after arrival at Tsingtao, the 9th Marines, now Battalion Landing Team 9, was ordered by Admiral Badger to standby for transshipment to Shanghai. On the 16th of December he ordered it to proceed. Upon arrival, it was directed to remain aboard ship until and unless needed to protect Americans ashore. Four collecting points in the city were set up, from which the 9th would provide protection until the evacuees arrived at U.S. Navy’s dock, from where they would be ferried down the Whangpoo River to the fleet anchorage—shades of November 1941. What goes around, comes around. By 1 February the U.S. Marine Corps Air Facility at Tsingtao had been disbanded; the ground equipment had been removed, and the planes of VMF 211 had all been landed on board their new home, the escort carrier Rendova. The entire body of FMFWesPac, except Company C, 3d Marines,

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was aboard ship by 3 February. Company C was acting as shore patrol to protect and police the limited area still authorized for liberty area to military personnel, while Company B was sent to bolster the remnants of the 1st Marines still at Tsingtao. In mid-March to late April Battalion Landing Team 3 stood off shore, ready to airlift the balance of American citizens from Shanghai. Time was getting very short. On 25 May 1949, Company C, 7th Marines, the last Marine unit there, departed Tsingtao. Two days later the U.S. Navy announced the withdrawal of all USN fleet and shore units from north China. This was the end. The Communists were soon to overwhelm the badly beaten and disorganized armies of Chiang Kai-shek, which would retreat to the island of Taiwan. There they would remain as a constant irritant to the Reds. The Marines would never again touch down in China, and that is as it should be. But what a fascinating experience it all was.32 Semper Fidelis, always. NOTES 1. “Peiping” was more correct in 1945 than was the previously used “Peking,” by now long in disuse. 2. The 4th Marines was an amalgamation of all the former Raider battalions and had been reactivated only on 1 February 1944, a year and nine months since Colonel Howard was forced to surrender the “old” 4th at Corregidor. 3. The “point system” was a means to bring home those men who had served longest and in many battles before the younger, more recently arrived men. 4. There are stories of soldiers at Manila parading with signs demanding to be sent home. I can find no record of any such action on the part of any Marine, by individual or unit. I was there and never heard of or saw any. What may be of interest is Maj. Gen. DeWitt Peck’s response to the overall situation, below. An informant tells me that “several [Marine] N.C.O.’s” at Pearl “started a movement which lasted just as long as it took ‘Howlin Mad’ Smith to put them on a plane to Iwo [Jima].” 5. It wouldn’t be until the following July 1946 that the Communists changed the name of their armies to the People’s Liberation Army, but that is how they will be identified in this book. 6. He hated the U.S. Marine Corps, which, in my eyes, made him very typical. Later, in 1950, when Truman decided to enter Korea, the then-Joint Chiefs of Staff fully agreed with his intervention. Later, they and other military and civilians would change their positions. 7. Worton was an “Old China Marine,” having served in various intelligence capacities during much of the 1930s. He was originally from Massachusetts, had been second a lieutenant in the Massachusetts naval militia, and had gone to France with the 79th Company. He was wounded at Belleau Wood on 6 June 1918. 8. Taken from W[alter] J. P. Curley, Jr., Letters from the Pacific, 1943–1946 (New York: private printing, 1959). Curley had previously been a lieutenant in the 5th Marine Division at Iwo Jima. 9. Rockey had also served in China before World War II. He joined the Marines

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in 1913 and after several years aboard ships he was adjutant of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines while in France. In the Belleau Wood battles he was awarded a Navy Cross and Distinguished Service Cross plus a Silver Star citation. During World War II, Rockey commanded the 5th Marine Division, then III Amphibious Corps. When the latter was deactivated, he assumed command of the 1st MarDiv at Tientsin. He retired on 1 September 1950. 10. Peck has been covered in regard to a prior era, when he commanded the 4th Marines between January 1940 and May 1941. He was a reluctant participant. Peck had already made overtures that he wanted to retire; ill health was the main cause. But the commandant urged him to fulfill this one last duty for the Corps. 11. Jones had been a brigadier general since 1942. He joined the Corps in September 1917 and served in France as skipper of the 83rd and 75th Companies. He was wounded at Verdun but returned for Soissons and St. Mihiel, where he was awarded three Silver Star citations and a Croix de Guerre. In World War II he commanded the 23d Marines, 4th MarDiv at Roi-Namur and on Tinian. 12. Undoubtedly there were many civilians in the crowd who well remembered the spending habits of Marines of bygone days. 13. During one Pacific campaign, as the Marines were boarding landing craft, one navy doctor complained that “in a few hours we’ll have to try to sew up those bellies with the terrible steak and egg mixture falling out of them.” 14. He was another in that long list of officers who joined the Corps in 1937. He commanded 1/7 on Peleliu and Okinawa. He was awarded a Legion of Honor with an oak leaf cluster. 15. “Sheriff” Larkin—his nickname was famous throughout the Corps—joined in 1915 and was commissioned in 1917. He was a lieutenant colonel and MAG 21 commander at Ewa (Pearl Harbor) when it was attacked on 7 December 1941. His car was strafed by Zeros. He took the trouble of preparing a special afteraction report, which he gave to James Roosevelt for delivery to his father. The report was extremely critical of the aircraft (the Brewster) the Marines would be forced to fly, and die in, at Midway. He spent some time in England studying RAF night-fighter procedures and tactics. Larkin commanded 1st Marine Aircraft Wing at the war’s end. 16. He joined the Corps in 1917 and served in France with the 55th Company, 2/5. Wounded three times, he was decorated for his actions at Belleau Wood with a DSC and Navy Cross. In addition he received three Silver Star citations and a Croix de Guerre. He commanded the 9th Marines and in 1943 was assistant division commander, 1st MarDiv, then was CO of the 1st Provisional Brigade. He earned a Distinguished Service Medal (a gold star in lieu of a second) and promotion to Major General. Shepherd commanded the 6th MarDiv on Okinawa and in China and became the 20th commandant of the Marine Corps on 1 January 1952. 17. Obviously with the concurrence of the Marine command. 18. Frisbie earned a Silver Star on Guadalcanal and a Navy Cross at Cape Gloucester on New Britain. At the latter he commanded the 7th Marines in the assault and in securing the initial beachhead. Obviously, he was well qualified as a combat leader. He is disguised as “the Chief” in Henry Aplington’s memoir. Frisbie, a former football player of the “Smedley Butler era,” took out his frustration and anger on all and sundry. He was accused by many of “stopping too many rushes through the line with his head.”

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19. Brown was popular and well known throughout the Corps. He addressed a meeting of division staff members by telling them of his promotion: “I have been notified of my appointment as a permanent colonel. From now on I want some respect and to be referred to as ‘Colonel W. S. Brown’ and not as ‘Big Foot,’ that old Son of a Bitch.’ ” According to Aplington, that brought the house down. 20. Rosecrans was awarded a Silver Star for his handling of 2/5 on Tulagi in August 1942. 21. Woods was the recipient of a Distinguished Service Medal for his command of the “Cactus” Air Force at Guadalcanal and in the Solomon Islands generally during 9 November to 27 December 1942. He later commanded the Tactical Air Force on Okinawa. 22. Hunt was the son of the hero of Blanc Mont and the Meuse River crossing. Dad was a major general by this time. 23. Henry Aplington II, Sunset in the East: A North China Memoir 1945–1947 (Warner, NH, unpublished memoir, 1985). He served as G-3, 1st MarDiv, 31 March to 30 June 1946. 24. Ibid, p. 47. 25. Stone remained in command until 7 February 1946 when he was relieved by 2d Lt. Lawrence H. Guthart, Jr., who retained command until relieved by Col. William J. Whaling on 7 March 1946. It was heady times for young lieutenants— commanding a regiment of Marines. 26. Whaling had commanded 2/5 on Guadalcanal, the 1st Marines on Cape Gloucester, and the 29th Marines on Okinawa, where he was awarded a Navy Cross. He started his career with Headquarters, 6th Marines and received a Silver Star citation at St. Mihiel. General Twining noted in his book that Whaling, a marksman of the highest order, helped to develop and train the scout-snipers on the “Canal.” 27. Clement was awarded a Navy Cross for his actions on Bataan as the Fleet Marine Officer, Asiatic Fleet. He was assistant division commander of 6th MarDiv on Okinawa and received the surrender of Yokosuka from Admiral Totsuka. 28. Neither Masters nor Godbold made any significant noise in or impact on the Corps, other than being competent officers. Hittle became part of the famed “Chowder Society” and later, after Bikini, famous as a postwar amphibious doctrine planner. For years his name has been in the forefront of the list of thinking men of the Corps. Honsowetz earned a Legion of Merit with Gold Star in Korea in 1952. 29. The term “Old George” was in common use as a nickname for the 1st Marine Division during World War I. Frequently it was also “Let George Do It” when a situation became sticky, which happened often enough. 30. The breakdown was 391 officers and approximately 5,700 enlisted men. Eventually the numbers were reduced to 125 officers and 1,417 enlisted, after Geiger reconsidered Rockey’s objections. 31. 1st Lt. Charles D. Kenneday, who commanded Fox Company. A former NCO who reverted to enlisted status post-war. 32. It has been reported to me by one who was there “that ‘The Old China Hands’ couldn’t grasp it, even in ’47 with all that had happened they still believed that ‘These people can’t get along without us.’ ” It was the end of a century of domination.

Conclusion

Perhaps we can best see the entire period of occupation in China in a reversed perspective. Suppose at some time in the near future China establishes a naval patrol off the North American continent and forcibly implants Chinese marines in a part of San Francisco. She might also force Great Britain to accept opium, and if refused, declare war and invade. Settlement might include the forcible retention of the Isle of Man to be used as a permanent Chinese naval base. Buddhist missionaries might be forced upon an unwilling France, and China might seize Russian far eastern territory with a long-term lease. Additionally, it might implant military legation guards in each foreign capital. Who would scream loudest? With the imposition of the so-called “Open Door” policy in the nineteenth century, foreigners began to impose naval forces along the coast of China. Soon they were taking liberties with Chinese islands and rivers, and then cities. They also began to use landing parties of bluejackets and marines to enforce “correct behavior” upon the Chinese public. The more the foreigners spread into the eastern part of China, the more the Chinese reacted with riots, upset, and destruction of foreign goods and sometimes people. All the while, U.S. Marines were a part of the problem. They didn’t make policy, but they were the instruments used to carry it out. The more Marines, the more problems—the more problems, the more Marines. It was sort of a “Catch-22” long before Joseph Heller arrived at his conclusions—and this was even before serious disturbances in China began. The outbreak of the so-called “Boxer Rebellion” was the culmination of years of frustration and abuse visited upon the average Chinese citizen.

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That “rebellion” was truly serious, and the foreigners never quite got over the shock of what had nearly happened to them. Forty years later some still hadn’t forgotten. It was decided that a legation guard was an absolute necessity, and not just a guard but a guarantee of access to the port of Tientsin as an escape route. That fact should have been sufficient to cause the intruders to pull out of a country in which they were considered one step below devils. But no; none, including the United States, had the virtue and intellect to get out while the getting was good. Profitable trade was the real reason each nation hung on, although each used the additional excuse that they were bringing Christianity to the Chinese masses—so long as it didn’t get in the way of profits. The Boxers changed the way foreigners dealt with China. They and the government dared to fight back; they were crushed physically and financially, but doom loomed darkly for the intruders, as only a few could see. All in all, it created 40 years of problems for everyone involved, and eventually the entirety, including the Japanese, was forced out, just like an unwilling tenant who refused to pay rent. But in the meantime, protection of the foreigners required more inroads, and so another settlement of troops was assembled in Peking. The U.S. government tried using U.S. Army troops in addition to Marines to keep open access to Tientsin. It didn’t make a bit of difference—just a different uniform. In the 1920s another revolution started in southern China and quickly moved northward to the settlements in Shanghai. That scared the hell out of all the foreigners, and the United States made a formal, extensive military response. This time it sent a brigade to protect American citizens and left a Marine regiment behind as a permanent occupier of a portion of Chinese sovereign territory. It wasn’t alone, of course. The British continually had six or seven times those numbers as occupying forces in China. So, just in case, the United States imposed a force of Marines not only as legation guards but as protection against any eventuality that might occur in China. But these were never enough to do the job required of them. After the KMT defeated the warlords, a sort of peace reigned. Chiang gave every appearance of not intending to abuse foreigners; had anyone at the State Department been thinking, that would have been the time to pull all Americans out of China, if only to save their necks. If the revolutionary Chinese didn’t try to get the Occidentals, it was obvious that the very aggressive Japanese soon would. If the government in Washington really wanted to avoid a confrontation, that is what it would have done, especially after the Panay incident. It was almost too late after the Japanese began their second aggression against China in 1937. Someone in authority had sense enough to pull the 15th Infantry out, so why not the 4th Marines? It is my impression that the 4th Marines was bait left behind for the Japanese: “We dare you to hit them.” Was the U.S. Marine presence necessary in China? Of course, especially after the State Department, along with its cohorts, pushed the Chinese to

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the wall, protection for nationals was essential. Walking in a tough neighborhood uninvited requires a police escort. But the question is, who made it a tough neighborhood? Regardless, it did happen, and except for the meddling in Chinese politics in the postwar period, the U.S. Marines were generally speaking as correct in their behavior as anyone could expect an occupying military formation to be. Because the United States and the legitimate government of China were allies during World War II, all fences could and should have been easily mended. Unfortunately, once again the United States backed the wrong horse and tried to reimpose its will upon a sovereign nation. That time it backfired, causing a serious breach that took many years to heal. Today, in reality, neither country yet trusts the other, and undoubtedly for good reason.

Appendix A: Boxer Rebellion

Members of the legation of the United States of America and of the legation guard present during the siege of the legations in Peking, 31 May to 14 August 1900. Members of the Legation Edwin C. Conger, Minister H. G. Squiers, First Secretary William E. Bainbridge, Second Secretary Fleming D. Cheshire, Chinese Secretary Members of the Legation Guard Capt. John T. Myers, USMC, Commanding Guard (wounded) Capt. Newt Hall, USMC, and Assistant Surgeon T. M. Lippett, USN (wounded) Marines, USS Oregon

Marines, USS Newark

Sgt. E. A. Walker

Sgt. John Fanning (killed)

Cpl. J. O. Dahlgren

Drummer J. A. Murphy

Cpl. Martin Hunt

Pvt. J. O. Ammann

Pvt. E. J. Boydston

Pvt. R. M. Barratt

Pvt. John Butts

Pvt. Gottlieb Brosi

Pvt. Harry Fisher (killed)

Pvt. W. L. Carr

Pvt. Charles Greer

Pvt. Daniel Daly

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Pvt. John Herter

Pvt. H. W. Davis

Pvt. C. B. Hobbs

Pvt. E. J. Donovan

Pvt. W. G. Horton

Pvt. W. F. Donovan

Pvt. Herman Khem

Pvt. G. P. Farrell

Pvt. C. B. King (killed)

Pvt. L. R. Gaiennie

Pvt. F. D. Moody (wounded)

Pvt. H. C. Galligher

Pvt. Albert Moore

Pvt. Harry Gold (wounded)

Pvt. M. L. M. Mueller (wounded)

Pvt. T. F. Hall (wounded)

Pvt. C. C. Mullen

Pvt. John Kennedy (killed)

Pvt. G. F. O’Leary

Pvt. A. J. Kuhn

Pvt. H. I. Preston

Pvt. J. J. Lavin

Pvt. Richard Quinn

Pvt. J. C. A. Martin

Pvt. D. J. Scannell

Pvt. J. H. Schroeder (wounded)

Pvt. R. E. Thomas (killed)

Pvt. Francis Silva (wounded)

Pvt. A. A. Turner (killed)

Pvt. F. J. Tinkler

Pvt. O. J. Upham

Pvt. J. W. Tutcher (killed)

Pvt. C. R. White

Pvt. William Zion

Pvt. F. A. Young

SAILORS FROM THE USS NEWARK Chief Machinist’s Mate T. Peterson, Gunner’s Mate I. C. J. Mitchell (wounded), Seaman J. Sjorgeen, Seaman A. Westermark, Hospital Apprentice R. Stanley (wounded). Following is a listing of those Marines, and sailors serving with the Corps, who earned the Medal of Honor during the China Relief Expedition. Marines and Sailors at Peking

Marines in Relief Expedition

Pvt. Erwin J. Boydston

Sgt. John M. Adams

Pvt. William L. Carr

Cpl. Harry C. Adriance

Cpl. John O. Dahlgren

Cpl. Edwin N. Appleton

Pvt. Daniel J. Daly

Pvt. James Burnes

Pvt. Harry Fisher

Pvt. Albert R. Campbell

Pvt. Louis R. Gaienne

Pvt. James Cooney

Pvt. William C. Horton

Sgt. Alexander J. Foley

Pvt. Martin Hunt

Pvt. Charles R. Francis

Gunner’s Mate Joseph Mitchell

Sgt. Harry Harvey

Pvt. Albert Moore

Pvt. Henry W. Heisch

BOXER REBELLION

Drummer John A. Murphy

Pvt. Thomas W. Kates

Chief Machinist’s Mate Carl E. Petersen

Pvt. Clarence E. Mathias

Pvt. Herbert I. Preston

Pvt. William H. Murray

Pvt. David J. Scannell

Pvt. Harry W. Orndorff

Pvt. Francis Silva

Cpl. Reuben J. Phillips

Pvt. Oscar J. Upham

Gunnery Sgt. Peter Stewart

Sgt. Edward J. Walker

Sgt. Clarence E. Sutton

Pvt. William Zion

Pvt. Frank A. Young

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The Medals of Honor issued to United States servicemen during the China relief expedition totaled 60. Of that number, four went to soldiers of the 9th Infantry and one to a member of the 14th Infantry, five in all. Twenty went to members of the U.S. Navy who were not serving with Marine units, and two more to those that were, 22 in all. The Marines earned 34, 16 at Peking and 18 with the relief column. In other words, 57 percent of the medals issued went to Marines, which of the three services had the fewest participants in the expedition and defense of Peking. Eighteen Marines were killed in action. Their names are Capt. A. R. Davis; Sgts. John Fanning, C. J. Kolleck; Cpl. Thomas Kelly; Pvts. J. F. Lanigan, J. C. Hunter, Henry Morris, J. K. Miller, W. H. Nichols, J. H. Schroeder, Harry Fisher, C. B. King, A. A. Turner, R. E. Thomas, J. W. Tutcher, John Kennedy, I. W. Partridge, and James McConkey. Additionally, 13 Marines died in China. Their names are: Quartermaster Sgt. H. J. Chisholm; Sgt. N. P. Nelson; Cpls. Thomas Brophy, D. F. Wetherell; Pvts. G. R. Stephenson, G. P. Farrell, Stephen Fisher, James Sayers, J. P. Sullivan, G. T. Leach, W. F. Fenton, A. R. Wood, and E. P. Provensal. On 20 August 1900 a copy of a resolution passed and approved by the American missionaries besieged in Peking was transmitted by Edwin Conger to Maj. W. P. Biddle. Conger added, “I most heartily and sincerely join in this expression, and beg you to communicate to both officers and men my personal commendation of and gratitude for their heroic and faithful services.” Headquarters First Regiment of Marines Peking, China, August 23, 1900 Respectfully forwarded to the brigadier-general, commandant, United States Marine Corps Headquarters, Washington, D.C. W. P. Biddle, Major, U.S.M.C., Commanding. Peking, Saturday, August 18, 1900. Dear Sir,———At a meeting of the American missionaries held this morning at 8:30 the following resolution was unanimously adopted; and it was further voted that the resolution be drafted and presented to you: “The Americans who were besieged in Peking desire to express their hearty appreciation of the courage, fidelity, and patriotism of the American marines, to whom we so largely owe our salvation. “By their bravery in holding an almost untenable position on the city wall

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in the face of overwhelming numbers, and in cooperating in driving the Chinese from a position of great strength, they made all foreigners in Peking their debtors, and have gained for themselves an honorable name among the heroes of their country.” For the meeting: Arthur H. Smith, Chairman. Charles E. Ewing, Secretary. Hon. E. H. Conger, Minister of the United States of America.

Appendix B: Boxer Rebellion, Reports

Major Waller’s report was, as always, laudatory of the officers and men that served under his command, and it was true of those that served on the road to Peking. He starts on 27 June, in which he tells of: Sending a force with Commander Craddock, R. N. of 2d Lt. Jolly and 40 Marines, with his adjutant, Harding acting as a volunteer. The enemy . . . had about 7000 men at this point. Our men charged over the parapet with a British company, being the first in this part of the fight. Our loss was one wounded and Lt. Jolly overcome with the heat, but not before he had brought his men back to quarters. Harding captured an Imperial flag which he has presented to me. Our men have marched ninety-seven miles in five days, fighting all the way. They have lived on one meal a day for six days, but have been cheerful and willing always. Waller wrote to Admiral Kempff recommending for proper reward the following officers: Lieutenant Smedley D. Butler, for the admirable control of his men in all the fights of the week, and for saving a wounded man at the risk of his own life under a very severe fire. Lieutenant A. E. Harding, for conspicuous gallantry in action, for saving wounded at the risk of his own life under heavy fire. Second Lieutenant W. L. Jolly, for the same risk and for leading a fine charge over two parapets in the face of a heavy fire. Lieutenant Leonard, for saving life under fire and for admirable control and direction of the fire.

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APPENDIX B

Lieutenant Powell, for working and managing a Colt gun under a fierce fire and without support, after the crew had been shot down; Lieutenant Wynne, for his steadfast courage and [the] encouragement of his men. Butler, Leonard and Wynne each received commissions as captains, and Harding and Powell were breveted to captain. Jolly was promoted to first lieutenant. All got their promotions because of Waller’s recommendations. Waller himself was breveted to lieutenant colonel. Seven Marine officers were breveted during the China relief expedition, later receiving the brevet medal, which was issued to those still living on 10 November 1921. Of those seven, one was a major general, two were brigadier generals, and four were colonels. Their names are: Maj. Gen. Littleton T. W. Waller; Brig. Gens. Smedley D. Butler and George Richards; Col. Carl Gamborg-Andresen, Newt H. Hall, John T. Myers, and William G. Powell.

FROM MAJOR BIDDLE’S REPORT TO MAJ. GEN. ADNA CHAFFEE, AUGUST 20, 1900 Sir: in obedience to your order of the 17th instant I have the honor to report that the First Regiment United States Marines, China relief expedition, left Tientsin the afternoon of August 4, 1900, as part of your column. The following was the composition: Maj. W. P. Biddle, commanding; Maj. George Richards, commissary; Capt. W. B. Lemly, quartermaster; First Lieut. D. D. Porter, regimental adjutant; Surg. G. A. Lung, U.S.N.; P. A. Surg. G. D. Costigan, U.S.N.; Asst. Surg. J. C. Thompson, U.S.N.; Sergt. Maj. J. F. Lawler, regimental sergeant-major; Quartermaster-Sergt. Robert Johnson; Hospital Apprentices Thomas Ball and G. D. Stillson, U.S.N. First Battalion.—Maj. L. W. T. Waller, commanding; First Lieutenant A. E. Harding, adjutant. Company A.—First Lieut. S. D. Butler, commanding; First Lieut. R. F. Wynne, Second Lieut. C. C. Carpenter; 74 enlisted. Company C.—First Lieut. R. L. Dunlap, commanding; Second Lieut. F. M. Wise, Second Lieut. W. C. Harllee; 74 enlisted. Company H.—Capt. P. M. Bannon, commanding; First Lieut. J. F. McGill, First Lieut. William Hopkins; 73 enlisted. Second Battalion.—Capt. F. J. Moses, commanding; First Lieut. J. H. A. Day, adjutant. Company D.—Capt. G. C. Long, commanding; First Lieut. A. J. Matthews, Second Lieut. W. McCreary; 73 enlisted. Company I.—Capt. W. C. Neville, commanding; Second Lieut. S. A. W. Patterson, Second Lieut. D. W. Blake; 87 enlisted. Company F.—Capt. H. B. Fuller, commanding; First Lieut. W. H. Clifford, Second Lieut. L. McC. Little; 68 enlisted. Strength of the regiment leaving Tientsin, 29 commissioned, 453 enlisted; total, 482. The strength of the regiment today [20 August 1900] in Pekin is: Maj.

BOXER REBELLION, REPORTS

177

W. P. Biddle, commanding; Maj. George Richards, commissary; Capt. W. B. Lemly, quartermaster; First Lieut. D. D. Porter, regimental adjutant; Surg. G. A. Lung, U.S.N.; P. A. Surg. G. D. Costigan, U.S.N.; Asst. Surg. J. C. Thompson, U.S.N.; Sergt. Maj. J. F. Lawler, regimental sergeant-major; Quartermaster-Sergt. Robert Johnson; Hospital Apprentices Thomas Ball and G. D. Stillson, U.S.N. First Battalion.—Maj. L. W. T. Waller, commanding; First Lieutenant A. E. Harding, adjutant. Company A.—First Lieut. S. D. Butler, commanding; First Lieut. R. F. Wynne, Second Lieut. C. C. Carpenter; 45 enlisted. Company C.—Second Lieut. F. M. Wise, commanding; Second Lieut. W. C. Harllee; 40 enlisted. Company H.—Capt. P. M. Bannon, commanding; First Lieut. J. F. McGill, First Lieut. William Hopkins; 40 enlisted. Second Battalion.—Capt. F. J. Moses, commanding; First Lieut. J. H. A. Day, adjutant. Company D.—Capt. G. C. Long, commanding; First Lieut. A. J. Matthews, Second Lieut. W. McCreary; 69 enlisted. Company I.—Capt. W. C. Neville, commanding; Second Lieut. S. A. W. Patterson, Second Lieut. D. W. Blake; 69 enlisted. Total strength of regiment, 24 commissioned, 267 enlisted; total, 291. In addition to the number that marched out with the regiment from Tientsin, there were left in Tientsin as guards and in the hospital 6 commissioned, 2 surgeons, and 177 enlisted; total 185.

THE CASE OF NEWT HALL, CAPTAIN, USMC Capt. Newt Hall was awarded a brevet and later a medal, but he came in for some serious charges about his overall conduct during the siege. The night he relieved Myers was the occasion of a resounding Chinese success in erecting a barricade within a few feet of the American position. When Myers was wounded by a spear wound in his leg, on the night of 2–3 July, Hall was ordered by Ambassador Conger to not leave the wall “until you are absolutely driven out.” Severe charges against Hall were levied by an American named Pethwick, who was at the U.S. legation during the entire siege. His charge that Hall was a coward was published in a magazine article. Perhaps the most damning charge was brought by a London Times correspondent, G. E. Morrison, who played a leading role during the siege. His diary entry: 10 July—Today on the wall there were 13 men under Captain Hall. He is never put on the wall, his men have no confidence in his judgement [emphasis added]. He has no control over his men who get blind drunk and insult their NCO with impunity. One man was brought down mad drunk from his post where he had tried to kill a Russian NCO. . . . What punishment will he get? I asked. The captain [Hall] says when he gets him back to the ship he will give him a mighty rough time. . . . He will probably have his chew of tobacco stopped.

178

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Later Hall requested a court of inquiry to investigate the charges but was put off by Maj. Gen. Adna Chaffee, then in overall command of the American military presence in China. On 1 March 1901 a court convened in Cavite. After an investigation it determined that Hall had been guilty of “great caution” but cleared him “for the reasons that he has already suffered sufficiently for the world-wide publication and criticism of his conduct in Peking.” Curiously, Myers only mentions his second in command a few times in his otherwise generous report of 26 September 1900. Another charge is that Hall left a private, all alone, to hold the entire American position on the wall one night, not returning until the following morning. Hall recommended Private Daniel Daly in his report to Myers as follows: I respectfully invite the attention of the commanding officer to the courage and fidelity of Daniel Daly, private, U.S. Marine Corps, at all times, and to his conduct on the night of the 15th of July, 1900, when he volunteered to remain alone in the bastion under the fire of the enemy while I returned to the barricades for the laborers. I took Private Daly with me about 9:00 P.M., and went out to reconnoiter the bastion with the understanding [that] if we were not attacked the coolies were to come out with sandbags, under charge of Privates Carr and Upham ten minutes later. As the coolies did not come at the appointed time, Private Daly asked permission to remain in the bastion while I returned for the coolies. I did not wish to leave one man in the bastion as there were stray shots flying along the wall from the front and rear and the Joss temple west of the legation. Finally, feeling sure there was a misunderstanding in regard to the coolies, I left Private Daly and returned to the barricades for the coolies and found out that the interpreter first sent up with them could not understand English and that Mr. Dossberg, secretary of the Belgian legation had just arrived and was starting for the bastion in which I had left Private Daly. I sent out Privates Carr and Upham with the coolies and went back to our first barricade to send the rest of the men to the barricade built on the night of the 12th [emphasis added].

Appendix C: Third Brigade

3D BRIGADE (9 AUGUST 1927 TO 30 OCTOBER 1929) Brigade Headquarters (disbanded 19 January 1929). Consisting of: Brigade Service Company (disbanded 12 October 1928) 5th Company Engineers (transferred to San Diego, Calif., 19 January 1929) Light Tank Platoon (transferred to San Diego, 3 October 1929) Provisional Police Company (organized 10 October 1927, disbanded 6 August 1928) Provisional Regiment. Consisting of: 2nd Bn., 4th Regiment Headquarters Company; 10th Co.; 29th Machine Gun and Howitzer Co.; 31st Co.; 32d Co. 3d Bn., 6th Regiment Headquarters Company; 15th Machine Gun Co.; 82d Co.; 83d Co.; 84th Co. Provisional Regiment disbanded 4 October 1927, by change of designation to 12th Regiment. 4th Regiment. Consisting of: Headquarters Co. and Service Co. 1st Bn.; Headquarters Co. 25th Co.; 26th Co.; 28th Machine Gun and Howitzer Co.

180

APPENDIX C

3d Bn.; Headquarters Co. 19th Co.; 21st Co.; 22d Co.; 24th Co. 6th Regiment. Consisting of: Headquarters Co. and Service Co. 1st Bn.; Headquarters Co. 73d Co.; 74th Co.; 75th Co.; 76th Co. 2d Bn.; Headquarters Co. 78th Co.; 80th Co. (joined composite Bn. 22 November 1928 for transfer to San Diego); 81st Machine Gun and Howitzer Co. 12th Regiment. Consisting of: 1st Bn.; Headquarters Co. 15th Machine Gun Co.; 82d Co.; 83d Co.; 84th Co. As of 22 April 1928 these units joined the 6th Regiment, and the designation was changed to 3d Battalion, 6th Regiment. On 15 September 1928, the 3d Bn., 6th Regiment, joined the composite regiment for transfer to San Diego and was transferred 29 September 1928. The 6th Regiment was transferred to San Diego, 19 January 1929. 10th Regiment. Consisting of: 1st Bn.; Headquarters Battery and Service Battery. 1st Battery; 6th Battery (joined composite Bn. 21 November 1928 for transfer to San Diego and transferred 22 November 1928); 13th Battery. The 10th Regiment joined the composite regiment 15 September 1928 for transfer to San Diego and was transferred 19 September 1928. 1st Separate Battalion (organized 22 April 1928 and disbanded 11 July 1928). Consisting of: Headquarters Co. (disbanded 8 May 1928). 29th Machine Gun and Howitzer Co.; 31st Co. 12th Regiment (organized 4 October 1927, disbanded 22 April 1928). Consisting of: Headquarters Co.; Service Co. (organized 24 October 1927). 1st Bn. (designation changed to 3d Bn., 6th Regiment, 23 April 1928). Headquarters Co. 15th Machine Gun Co.; 82d Co.; 83d Co.; 84th Co.

THIRD BRIGADE

181

2d Bn. (designation changed to 1st Separate Bn., 22 April 1928). Headquarters Co. 10th Co. (disbanded 21 December 1927); 28th Machine Gun and Howitzer Co.; 31st Co.; 32d Co. (disbanded 21 December 1927). Aircraft Squadrons. Composed of the following: Headquarters Detachment (disbanded 29 September 1928) Fighting Plane Squadron 10 (changed to Fighting Plane Squadron 6-M, 1 July 1928); Observation Squadron 10 (joined Composite Bn. 21 November 1928 for transfer to San Diego and transferred 22 November 1928); Expeditionary Duty Detachment, VS 1-M (disbanded 31 January 1928); Fighting Squadron 6-M (joined Composite Regiment 15 September 1928 for transfer to San Diego and transferred 19 September 1928).

FOURTH MARINES (30 OCTOBER 1929 TO 31 AUGUST 1939) Headquarters and Headquarters Co.; Service Co.; Motor Transport Co. 1st Bn.; Headquarters and Headquarters Co. Company A (25th); Company B (26th); Company C (27th); (disbanded 17 December 1934, reorganized 20 August 1937, disbanded 5 May 1937); Company D (28th). 2d Bn.; Headquarters and Headquarters Co. Company E (organized 18 September 1932); Company F (organized 18 September 1932); Company G (organized 18 September 1932, disbanded 17 December 1934, reorganized 26 August 1937, disbanded 18 May 1938); Company H (organized 18 September 1932). 3d Bn.; Headquarters and Headquarters Co. (disbanded 9 December 1934). Company I (19th) (disbanded 19 December 1934); Company K (21st) (disbanded 19 December 1934); Company L (22d) (disbanded 19 December 1934); Company M (24th) (disbanded 19 December 1934).

COMMANDING OFFICERS, 4TH MARINES (CHINA) 1927–1941 Col. Charles S. Hill

28 June 1926–4 September 1927

Lt. Col. Fred D. Kilgore

27 September 1928–13 January 1929

Col. Charles H. Lyman

14 January 1929–20 November 1930

Col. Richard S. Hooker

21 November 1930–23 December 1932

Lt. Col. Emile P. Moses

24 December 1932–12 March 1933

Lt. Col. Fred D. Kilgore

13 March 1933–6 May 1933

Lt. Col. Emile P. Moses

7 May 1933–10 July 1933

Col. John C. Beaumont

11 July 1933–6 May 1936

182

APPENDIX C

Col. Charles F. B. Price

7 May 1936–23 October 1938

Col. Joseph C. Fegan

24 October 1938–3 December 1939

Lt. Col. Charles I. Murray

4 December 1939–2 January 1940

Col. DeWitt Peck

3 January 1940–13 May 1941

Col. Samuel L. Howard

14 May 1941–6 May 1942

PEKING LEGATION GUARD Headquarters detachment; 38th Co.; 39th Co.; 62d Co.

SHANGHAI DEFENCE FORCES (AS OF 1934) According to H. J. Lethbridge, foreign defenses in Shanghai are maintained by the Fourth Marines (American) of whom there are 1,900; the Second Battalion of the Worcestershire Regiment (British), to be replaced by the Inniskillings in the coming trooping season, numbering 1,600 men; the Japanese Naval Landing Party, 2,100; the French Forces, 1,600; and the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, just over 2,000. In addition to the military forces there are usually Italian, French, American, British, and Japanese naval forces in Shanghai. There were twenty-three units in the Shanghai Volunteer Corps: the Light Horse, American Troop; Shanghai Field Battery; Shanghai Light Battery; Shanghai Field Company; Armoured Car Company; A Company; B Company; American Company; Portuguese Company; Japanese Company; Chinese Company; Shanghai Scottish; Jewish Company; Philippines Company; American Machine Gun Company; American Reservists’ Company; Transport Company; Intercommunication Company; Interpreter Company; Air Defense Company; Public School Cadet Company; and the Russian Regiment. Most members of the Russian Regiment were paid men. All other units were voluntary.

Appendix D: Billets of the Second Brigade (1937)

Organization

Location

2d Brigade headquarters

65 Gordon Road

Brigade Headquarters Company

1051 Bubbling Well Road

Battery F, 2d AA Battalion

ditto

4th Marines Band

ditto

4th Marines headquarters

SW. Cor. Haiphong & Singapore Roads

Motor Transport

ditto

Maintenance

ditto

Communication

ditto

Quartermaster & Commissary

SW. Cor. Connaught & Ferry Roads

PX, Brig, MP Det., Post Office, Walla Walla office, Athletic Office

551 Ferry Road

Photographers Office

ditto

4th Marines Hospital

238 Gordon Road

Headquarters 1st Battalion

Ferry Road Avenue & Sinza Road

Headquarters Company

SW Cor. Haiphong Avenue & Seymour Roads

B & D Companies

Ferry Road Avenue & Sinza Road

A Company

SW Cor. Haiphong Avenue & Seymour Roads

184

APPENDIX D

C Company

SW Cor. Sinza & Ferry Roads

2d Battalion

NE Cor. Chengtu & Bubbling Well Roads

6th Marines headquarters

Connaught Road between Hart & Kiaochow Rd.

Headquarters & Service Company

ditto

Headquarters 1st Battalion

SE Cor. Singapore & Hart Roads

D Company

SE Cor. Singapore & Kiaochow Roads

A, B, & C Companies

SW Cor. Haiphong & Singapore Roads

Headquarters 2d Battalion

SE Cor. Sinza and Hart Roads

Headquarters & H Companies

ditto

E Company

SW Cor. Wutung and Ferry Roads

F & G Companies

North Side Sinza, between Seymour & Gordon Roads

Appendix E: A Brief Chronological History of the Peking Guard (1905–1934)

In September 1905, a detachment of 100 enlisted Marines, under the command of Capt. Harry Lee, with his assistant, 1st Lt. Thomas Holcomb, arrived in Peking, China. This was in accordance with orders from the president of the United States to relieve the 9th Infantry, then stationed at the legation. The Marines shipped from the Philippine Islands aboard the army transport Logan. This was only the beginning. The legation would become an embassy, and Marines would continue in this post until 8 December 1941. Eventually the guard became nearly a battalion in size, generally larger than any other guard at the capital. Between 1905 and 1911 there was little change in numbers other than the arrival of troops from other nations that also wanted their diplomats to be protected. Capt. William H. Clifford relieved Lee as commandant in April 1906, and he in turn was relieved by Capt. Louis M. Gulick. The latter was the only Marine officer to command at Peking on three separate occasions. On March 1908 a future commandant of the Marine Corps, George Barnett, relieved Gulick. In 1911, China went through the throes of a revolution, and as a result the legation guard was increased to near battalion size by 1912. In February 1912 the origins of the Mounted Detachment of horse Marines made their first appearance. The unit was formed for the purpose of protecting American citizens living in outlying districts. First Lt. David M. Randall was its first commanding officer. He was followed by 1st Lts. Julian P. Wilcox, Edwin N. McClellan, and David L. S. Brewster, among many others. Lewis Puller was another “skipper” of the horse Marines. Barnett was relieved by another future commandant, Maj. John H. Russell, who assumed command in 1910. Russell was also the first American Marine officer to assume the post of senior commandant of the international legation guards. In February 1912 the imperial family abdicated, and the following month a president of the new provisional republic, Yuan Shih-kai, was installed.

186

APPENDIX E

Between 1912 and 1913, several new buildings, necessitated by personnel increases, were added to the compound as the Marines dug in for an extended stay. Construction of new buildings or additions to pre-existing ones continued in the 1920s but tapered off during the Depression years. In 1918, radio masts were built upon the Tartar Wall, but they collapsed, killing four Chinese workmen. They were rebuilt, allowing broadened communication with the United States. In April 1912, Maj. Dion Williams arrived to become commanding officer and remained so until September 1915. Capt. Dickinson P. Hall was his replacement, but for only three months. In December 1915 another future commandant arrived to assume command. He was Lt. Col. Wendell C. Neville; he remained until he was ordered to France in October 1917 to command the 5th Marines. Maj. Charles C. Carpenter was his replacement, and Colonel Theodore P. Kane was his, in April 1918. Kane was followed by Maj. Epaminondas L. Bigler in May 1919. Colonel Gulick came back in June 1919 and remained until June 1921. Col. Lincoln Karmany was his replacement and commanded until March 1922. Maj. Samuel W. Bogan then came, staying but a few months, late March until mid-May 1922. Col. Robert H. Dunlap arrived and stayed a bit over two years. Maj. Frederick H. Barker relieved him for less than a month, mid-June to mid-July 1924. Col. Louis McCarty Little came and stayed for over three years, July 1924 to August 1927. His replacement was future commandant, Lt. Col. Thomas Holcomb, from August 1927 to January 1930. Col. James C. Breckinridge came in January 1930, and he stayed until March 1932. Louis Gulick came back for his third run on 13 March 1932, staying until 23 May 1933. He was followed by Lt. Col. William W. Buckley, who remained until 8 August 1933, when he was relieved by Col. Presley M. Rixey, Jr. The line is broken from Rixey on. We know that the following officers commanded, but not necessarily in this order: Maj. Archibald Vandegrift replaced Rixey when he became ill; Col. John Marston III commanded between January 1937 and May 1939, followed by Col. Allan Hal Turnage. Colonel William W. Ashurst was the final officer in command, in December 1941.

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Thomason, John W., Jr. Notes on the Shanghai Incident. Pike, NH: The Brass Hat, 1988. Thorne, Christopher. The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931–1933. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1973. Tolley, Kemp. Yangtze Patrol: The U.S. Navy in China. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1971. Tuchman, Barbara. Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–45. New York: Macmillan, 1971. U.S. Navy Department. Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1900–1940. Washington, DC: n.p., various dates. ———. Medal of Honor, 1861–1949: The Navy. n.p. [Washington, DC] n.d. [c. 1950]. U.S. Navy Department. Report of the Commandant of United States Marine Corps, 1898–1941. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, various dates. Vandegrift, General A[lexander] A., as told to Robert Asprey. Once a Marine— The Memoirs of General A. A. Vandegrift, United States Marine Corps. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1964. Venzon, Anne C. General Smedley Darlington Butler: The Letters of a Leatherneck, 1898–1931. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992. Weale, B. L. Putnam [Bertram Simpson]. Indiscreet Letters from Peking. Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1921. ———. The Truce in the East and Its Aftermath. New York and London: Macmillan, 1907. White, John A. The United States Marines in North China. Millbrae, CA: private printing, 1974. Williams, Robert H. The Old Corps: A Portrait of the U.S. Marine Corps between the Wars. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982. Wise, Frederic M. A Marine Tells It to You. New York: J. H. Sears, 1929. Yingling, James M. A Brief History of the Fifth Marines. Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1968.

MAGAZINE ARTICLES Fortitudine Various issues, limited material in many issues, mostly personal observations. Moskin, J. Robert. “Tracing the Footsteps of the 4th Marines in Shanghai.” Volume XVI, Number 3 (Winter 1986–1987): 13–16.

Leatherneck “Action in Tientsin, Russians & Marines vs. Boxers” (September 1942):42, 69. Bevan, James A. “From Filipinos to Boxers, 1900” (April 1935): 5–6, 65–66. ———. “With the U.S. Marines on the March to Peking, China—1900.” (June and July 1935): 5–7, 14–15, 50, 55–56. Burton, F. “News from the Shanghai Front” (April 1932): 13–14. Carlson, Evans F. “The Fessenden Fifes” (February 1928): 11, 51. ———. “Outline History of the American Legation Guard” (March 1934): 19–21. Daniels, J. A. “The Other Side of the War” (July 1938): 5, 69.

192

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McClellan, E. N. “With the Marines in China from 1841 to 1924” (January 1924): 1–2. Miller, A. B. “How the U.S. Marines ‘Saved Face’ in China” (July 1937): 5, 57– 58. ———. “Peiping’s Mounted Marines Disband” (April 1938):7, 64. Rentfrow, Frank. “ ‘In Many a Strife, We Fought for Life’ ” (July 1931): 11, 47– 48. ———. “The Mission of Major Leonard.” (February 1939):10–11, 55. Spaulding, A. “The Old Corps” (March 1945):26–27.

Marine Corps Gazette Asprey, Robert B. “Waller” (May and June 1961): 36–41, 44–48. “Boxer War.” (November 1965):36. Burks, Arthur J. “China Side, 1927” (April 1949):46–52. Butler, Smedley D. “Notes on Staff Activities of Third Brigade, U.S. Marine Corps, Serving in China” (June 1929): 95–108. Carlson, Evans F. “Marines as an Aid to Diplomacy in China.” (February 1936): 27–30, 41–53. Greene, Wallace M., Jr. “Shanghai, 1937” (November 1965):62–63. Griffith Samuel B., II. “North China, 1937” (November 1938):23–24, 46–53. Hargreaves, Reginald. “Comrades in Arms” (October 1964):50–55. (On American & foreign forces in China, 1900.) Heinl, Robert Debs, Jr. “Hell in China” (November 1959):55–68. Holbrook, Francis X. “Brave Hearts and Bright Weapons” (November 1973):56– 65. (On Tientsin in 1900.) Janual, Jack W. “Bill Horton and the Boxer Rebellion” (November 1971):29–32. “Living conditions in China” (March 1928):67–71. McClellan, Edwin N. “The Capture of the Barrier Forts in the Canton River, China” (September 1920):262–276. ———. “The Mysterious Peking Mutiny” (February 1936):41–42. Metcalf, Clyde H. “The Marines in China” (September 1938):35–37, 53, 58. Neville, Edwin L. “The Diary of Pvt. Sullivan.” (November 1968): 68–74. E. A. Ostermann. “Memories of the Old Corps” (November 1964): 48–52. (On the Marine detachment at Peking, 1909.) Shoup, David. “The China Expedition” (November 1965): 48–50, 54–55.

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings Davidson, W. C. “Operations in North China” (December 1900): 637–646. Myers, John T. “Military Operations and Defenses of the Seige of Peking” (September 1902): 541–551. Neufeld, Gabrielle M., and James S. Santelli. “Smedley Butler’s Air Corps: The First Marine Aviators in China” (April 1977): 48–59. Taussig, J. “Experiences during the Boxer Rebellion” (April 1927): 403–420.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

193

The American Legation Guard Annual Peiping, China, various dates, 1929 to 1941.

The Tientsin Marine Tientsin, China, magazine of the Tientsin Marine detachment, 1938 until 1941.

Walla Walla Shanghai, magazine of the 4th Marines, 1927–1941, various issues.

Other magazines Miller, Michael. “Marines in the Boxer Rebellion.” American History Illustrated (January, 1988): 38-47. Thomason, John W. Jr. “Approach to Peiping” National Geographic Magazine, LXIX (February, 1936): 275–309.

Index

Abarenda (USS), 59 Adamson, Pvt. (USMC), 6 Albany (USS), 55 Andresen, 1st Lt. Charles G. (USMC), 35 Andress, P.F.C. John J. (USMC), 106 Anglo-French forces, 11, 12 Anping, 153 Anshan, 147, 151–52 Aplington, Lt. Col. Henry, II. (USMC), 147–48, 151–52, 164 n.18 Armstrong, Comm. James (USN), 7, 17 n.8 Arnold, Lt. Clarence L. (USN), 50 Arnold, Phar. Mate Floyd (USN), 112 Arrasmith, Maj. James M. (USA), 52 Arrow (British warship), 11 Arthur, Maj. John M. (USMC), 88 Asheville (USS), 58, 59, 61 Ashuelot (US warship), 56 Ashurst, Col. William W. (USMC), 125, 130 n.58 Astor, Brooke (American civilian), 105 Attitude (bias toward and treatment of Chinese civilians), by: Americans, xiii, 3, 13, 41, 48–49, 53, 55–56,

69, 73–77, 89, 100, 103, 107, 136; British, xiv, xv, xvi, 2, 5, 11– 12, 66, 69; French, xiv, xvi; Japanese, xiv, 96; other nations, xiii, xiv, passim Augusta (USS), 98, 110, 112 Austrian Marines, 23 Badger, Vice Adm. Oscar C. (USN), 161–62 Baltimore (USS), 15 Bannon, Capt. Philip M. (USMC), 35, 40, 51, 52, 54 Barbey, Vice Adm. Daniel E. (USN), 140 Barrier Forts, 6–10; Fiddler’s Fort, 7, 9, 10, 17 n.10 Bates, Cpl. Cecil R. (USMC), 106 Battel, William P. (USMC), 103 Beans, Lt. Col. Fred (USMC), 149 Beaumont, Brig. Gen. John C. (USMC), 112, 117, 128 n.35 Beeson, Sgt. Donald M. (USMC), 114 Belgians, 24 Bell, Rear Adm. Henry H. (USN), 13, 18 n.14

196

INDEX

Bemis, Capt. John (USMC), 99 Berkeley, 2nd Lt. James P. (USMC), 88, 126 n.2, 128 n.27 Best, Col. William N. (USMC), 139 Biddle, Maj. William P. (USMC), 39, 45 n.42 Blake, 2nd Lt. Daniel W. (USMC), 39 Blessed Umbrella[s] (Butler), 74–77, 82 n.58 Boone, Capt. Ronald A. (USMC), 110 Boston (U.S. warship), 1 Bougainville (USS), 140 Bower, Colonel (British forces), 30 Boxer Protocol, 125 Boxer Rebellion, 19–45, 48–49, 68 Boxers (Ai Ho Tuan), xiv, xvi, 19, 24– 27, 30–33, 35, 41 n.1, 75 Boyce, Cpl. William (USMC), 10 Brandywine (U.S. warship), 2, Brayton, PFC Charles J., Jr. (USMC), 161 Breckinridge, Col. James C. (USMC), 88, 126 n.9 Bridge #66, 151–52 Bridge #109, 152 Bristol, Comdr. Mark L. (USN), 55 Bristol, Mark L., Adm. 69, 70, 75, 81 n.50 Brooklyn (USS), 14 Brooklyn Navy Yard, 10 Brown, Capt. Charles C. (USMC), 127 n.21 Brown, Col. Wilbur S. (USMC), 142, 165 n.19 Brown, Maj. Luther A. (USMC), 121, 124–25 Budd, Maj. Samuel P. (USMC), 61, 79 n.26 Bullard, Rear Adm. William H.G. (USN), 57 Burger, Capt. Joseph (USMC), 99, 126 n.2 Buster, Ivan (USMC), 103–4 Butler, Brig. Gen. Smedley D. (USMC), 66–69, 70–77, 126 n.4 Butler, Mrs. Ethel (American civilian), 73, 81 n.50

Butler, 2d Lt. Smedley D. (USMC), 26– 30, 36, 40, 43 n.16 Camp Holcomb, 124–25 Camp Nicholson, 51 Campbell, Pvt. Albert R. (USMC), 27 Canton (city), xiv, xv, 1, 3, 4, 6–7, 9, 10, 11, 16, 49; American Consul at, 6, 7 Canton (province), xvii Carlson, 1st Lt. Evans F. (USMC), 98– 99, 118, 127 n.21 Carpenter, 1st Lt. Charles C. (USMC), 39 Carpenter, Rear Adm. Charles C. (USN), 15 Carter, Pvt. (USMC), 27 Castner, Brig. Gen. Joseph C. (USA), 72 Cavite Naval Base, 39, 41, 61, 79 n.26, 96, 112 Chaffee, Maj. Gen. Adna (USA), 39– 41, 47 Chang Bon Shang (Chinese citizen), 87 Chang Hsueh-liang (general), 91 Chang Tso-lin (warlord), 57, 60 Changkeichuang, 138 Chang-li, 149, 157, 159 Chang-yi-mein (West Gate), 40 Chao-Chu Wu (Chinese Minister), 77 Chapei, 66, 94, 96, 108 Chaumont (USS), 62, 63, 65, 96, 112 Chefoo, 13 Chen Pao-Tsang, Lt. Gen. (CNA), 140 Chiang Kai-shek, Gen., xvii, 51, 60– 61, 66, 75, 83, 91, 108, 110, 123, 133, 144, 157, 163 Chien Men gate, 22, 40, 58 Chin Liang Cheng (Tian an Men), 28 China Hands, 133 China Relief Expedition, xvi; First Relief Column (Seymour’s), 24–26, 29; Second Relief Column (Chaffee’s), 39–40 China Sea, 1 Chinese (government representatives, all periods), 19, 20, 134

INDEX

Chinese army: Imperial, 7–10, 15, 26– 30, 35–36, 40, 49–50; Kuomintang, xiv, 59–61, 66–70, 73, 75, 76, 83, 88, 91–94, 97, 108, 110, 113, 125; Nationalist (CNA), 125, 131–32, 135, 138–41, 143–44, 146–47, 155–57, 160–63; Nationalist Forces (CNP), 125, 131, passim, 163; Ninety-fourth Chinese National Army (CNA), 138; Ninety-second Chinese National Army (CNA), 138; Republic, 54, 59 Chinese Communist army (PLA), 132, 135, passim, 163 Chinese Communists, xiv, 66, 69, 91, 100, 125, 133, 138, 143, passim, 163 Chinese Kuomintang, political party (KMT), xiv, 51, 75, 100, 115, 118, 132 Chinese navy, 14 Chinese Revolution of 1911, 49–50 Ch’ing Dynasty, xiv–xvi, 4–5, 11, 12 Chinwangtao, 52, 60, 86, 91, 124, 132, 138, 142–45, 149, 157 Chits (method of payment), 104 Chou En-Lai, Gen. (PLA), 135 Chungking, 101, 135 Clarke, Col. Thomas S. (USMC), 112, 116, 128 n.37 Clement, Brig. Gen. William T. (USMC), 149–50, 165 n.27 Clifford, 1st Lt. William H., Jr. (USMC), 35 Cloud, Capt. George H. (USMC), 84, 114 Collier, Lt. Col. Eugene F. (USMC), 120, 129 n.51 Coltman, Dr. Robert, Jr., 20, 42 n.4 Commandant (U.S. Marine Corps.), 1, 45 n.42 Communist Workers Militia, 108 Conger, Edwin H. (American Minister), 16, 19, 22, 24, 31, 33, 43 n.12

197

Congress (U.S. warship), 1 Constellation (U.S. warship), 1 Cooke, Adm. Charles M. (USN), 150 Coolidge, Calvin (President), 60, 61, 79 n.25 Corregidor, 57, 78 n.14 Corwin, 2nd Lt. Douglas A. (USMC), 153 Cossacks, Russian, 24 Cowie, Paymaster, Thomas J. (USN), 15 Craddock, Comdr. (RN), 38 Cropley, Capt. Richard B. (USMC), 150 Cuddy, Pvt. William (USMC), 10 Curley, Capt. Walter J.P., Jr. (USMC), 134, 143, 147, 163 n.8 Cushing, Caleb, 2, 3 Daly, Pvt. Daniel (USMC), 39, 44 n.40 Davis, Capt. Austin R. (USMC), 35, 38 Day, 1st Lt. John A.H. (USMC), 35 Denby, Charles (American Minister to China), 15 Denney, Ens. Andrew D. (USN), 50 dependents (U.S.), xvii, 106, 112 Devereaux, 1st Lt. James P.S. (USMC), 89, 102 Dewey, Adm. George (USN), 16 Dickerson, PFC Carrol W. (USMC), 161 Disaffection of troops (U.S. Army or U.S. Marines), 147, 161, 163 n.4 Ditta, Maj. Louis G. (USMC), 151 Dorward, Brig. Gen. A.R.F. (British Army), 36 Dowager Empress of China (Tz’u-hsi), 15, 19, 42 n.2 Drake, Col. Paul (USMC), 151–52 Drew, Edward (Commissioner of Customs), 28, 29 Duncan, Maj. Gen. John (British army), 62–63, 65–69 Dunlap, 1st Lt. Robert H. (USMC), 35 Dutton, 1st Lt. Robert McM. (USMC), 16, 18 n.19

198

INDEX

East India Squadron (USN), 1, 3, 4, 12 Edson, Merritt A., Jr. (USMC), 113, 128 n.38 Eighth Route Army (PLA), 139 Elgin, Lord, 11, 12 Elliott, Capt. George F. (USMC), 15, 18 n.18 Ellis, Lt. Col. Ellis, B., 126 n.4 Emperor of China, 2 Enright, Lt. Col. William K. (USMC), 151 Erskine, Maj. Graves (USMC), 85, 88– 89, 99, 105, 107 Ever Victorious Army, xvi Extraterritorial rights, xvi, 3 “Factory” (warehouse), 3, 7 Fairbanks, Douglas (American actor), 88 Fanning, Sgt. John (USMC), 32 Farrell, Pvt. G.P. (USMC), 40 Fassett, Capt. Harold S. (USMC), 65 Fegan, Col. Joseph C. (USMC), 116, 118–20, 129 n.47 Fengtai, 20 Ferguson, 2nd Lt. Edward C. (USMC), 65 Fessenden, Mr. Sterling (American citizen), 70 Fessenden Fifes (Fourth Marines), 70, 81 n.41, 101 First Battle of Shanghai, the, 92 Flanagan, Plt. Sgt. Cecil J. (USMC), 153–54 Foot, Lt. Cleghorn (USMC, 4th Marines’ band-leader), 70 Foote, Comd. Andrew H. (USN), 6–7, 10n. 17 France: xiv, 2, 3, 11, 16, 107, 134; army, 54, 63, 101; navy, 21; U.S. Marines in, 57, 88, 130 n.58, 143 Francis, Pvt. Charles R. (USMC), 27– 28, 43 n.23 Frisbie, Col. Julian N. (USMC), 142, 164 n.18 Fukabori, Lt. Col. Yuki (IJA), 116 Fuller, Capt. Ben H. (USMC), 35–36, 45 n.48

Fuller, Maj. Gen. Commandant Ben H. (USMC), 98 Gauss, Clarence (American Consul General), 65, 108, 110 Geiger, Lt. Gen. Roy S. (USMC), 131, 149 Germany (Germans), xiv, 16, 34, 107, 134–35; army, 28; Legation, 20, 30; Marines, 23, 25–26, 30, 31, 32, 50 Gibson, Lt. John (USN), 16 Giers, M. de (Russian Minister), 41 Gilb, Sgt. Ralph H. (USMC), 114 Glassford, Rear Adm. William A. (USN), 123 “God Worshipers Society, The,” 4–5 Godbold, Lt. Col. Edwin C. (USMC), 149, 165 n.28 Gold, Pvt. Harry (USMC), 31 Gold Star (USS), 60 Gordon, Charles (aka “Chinese” Gordon), xvi Gorman, Capt. Frank (USMC), 143 Gormley, Lt. Col. John J. (USMC), 138 Gowen, Frank (American civilian), 107, 126 n.10 Great Britain (British), xiv–xvi, 1, 2, 11, 12, 15, 16, 34, 69, 93–94, 105, 107, 115, 118, 134; Coldstream Guards, 72; Durham Light Infantry, 66; Green Howards, 70, 101, 128 n.25; Indian Army, 35; Marines, 5–6, 21, 25–26, 35, 60; navy (naval brigade), xv, 5–6, 35, 38, 60, 101; Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 35–36, 112; sailors, 60; soldiers, 28, 29, 30, 32–33, 35–36, 52, 54, 63, 100–101, 108, 115 Great Wall of China, 103, 144 Green, Pvt. F.W. (USMC), 40 Greer, 1st Lt. John M. (USMC), 65 Griffith, Capt. Samuel (USMC), 85, 103 Guam, 58, 60–61, 77, 131, 134–35, 159, 162

INDEX

Guest, Lt. John (USN), 5 Gulf of Chihli, 135 Hagen, Maj. Edward G., 127 n.21 Hai River, 136 Hall, Capt. Newt H. (USMC), 21, 24, 30, 33–34, 39, 44 n.31 Hall, Pvt. Thomas F. (USMC), 33 Hangchow, 65 Hangku, 153. See also Hanku Hankow, 49, 50 Hanku, 150. See also Hangku Hanvey, Marine (bandsman), 97 Harding, Lt. Arthur E. (USMC), 26, 27, 38, 43 n.17 Harllee, 2nd Lt. William C. (USMC), 39 Harrison (US liner), 124 Hart, Adm. Thomas (USN), 122–23, 125 Hart, Pvt. Robert (USMC), 161 Hart, Sir R., 20 Hatamun Gate, 31 Hatamun Street, 30 Hawkins, 1st Lt. Harold W. (USMC), 161 Hawthorne, Col. William G. (USMC), 121 Heaton, GySgt. Horace D. (USMC), 39 Hempel’s Butchery, 89, 126 n.10 Hempel’s Knights of the Round Table, 107 Henderson (USS), 90 Henley, Capt. Robert (USN), 1 Heywood, Brig. Gen. Commandant Charles, 47 Hill, Col. Charles S. (USMC), 62–63, 67–69, 80 n.29, 81 n.40 Hines, Maj. Gen. John L. (USA), 88 Hittle, Lt. Col. James D. (USMC), 149, 151 Hodges, Lt. Col. Charles T. (USMC), 136 Holcomb, 1st Lt. Thomas, Jr. (USMC), 48, 78 n. 3 Holcomb, Maj. Gen. Commandant Thomas, 108, 114, 116–18, 122, 129 n.56

199

Holdahl, Col. Theodore A. (USMC), 146 Homma, Maj. Gen. Masaharu (IJA), 122 Hong Kong, xiv, xv, 2, 6 Hongchew Creek, 63 Honsowetz, Lt. Col. Russell N. (USMC), 149 Hooker, Col. Richard S. (USMC), 94, 98, 127 n.16 Hooker, Mary, 20, 34, 41, 42 n.7 Hoover, Herbert, 20, 28–29, 42 n.6 Hopeh Province, 132, 144, 146 Hopkins, 1st Lt. William (USMC), 35 Horton, Pvt. William C. (USMC), 22 Houston (USS), 96 Howard, Col. Samuel L. (USMC), 122– 23, 129 n.54 Howard, Maj. Gen. Archie B. (USMC), 148–49 Howard, Maj. Gen. Samuel L. (USMC), 156 Hsien Feng (emperor), 4 Hsi-ku Arsenal, 25, 27–29 Hsin-Ho, 155–58 Huizenga, 2nd Lt. Richard H. (USMC), 125 Hull, Cordell (Secretary of State), 113, 125 Humphrey, Lt. Col. Gavin C. (USMC), 146 Hung Hsiu-ch’uan, 4 Hunt, Cpl. Martin (USMC), 24 Hunt, Lt. Col. Leroy, Jr. (USMC), 146, 165 n.22 Huron (USS), 57–59 Idzumo (IJN), 110 Italian: sailors, 21; soldiers, 28 James, Lt. Col. William C. (USMC), 117 Japan: xiv, xvii, 2, 4, 13, 14–16, 18 n.16, 34, 49, 52, 55–56, 62, 74, 88, 92–94, 96, 106–8, 114–15, 119–20, 123–25, 131–32, 135, 146, 148; army, 14, 28, 35, 38, 63, 84, 88, 90–91, 93–94, 96,

200

INDEX

103, 106, 108, 112, 115–16, 119, 122, 124, 131, 135–36, 139–41; navy, 90, 97, 115 Japanese army (hatred of by other nations), 84, 90, 103 Japanese assets frozen by United States government, 123 Japanese puppet troops, 138–41 Japanese Special Naval Landing Force, 21, 92, 94, 96, 108, 110, 112 Jodon, Pvt. John (USMC), 53 Johnson, Nelson T. (American minister), 100, 110 Johnson, Pvt. Joseph E. (USMC), 86 Jolly, 2nd Lt. Wade (USMC), 26, 38 Jones, Brig. Gen. Louis R. (USMC), 136, 142, 164 n.11 Jones, 1st Lt. James H. (USMC), 6, 17 n.3, 72 Kapodistria, PFC Thomas (USMC), 161 Kates, Cpl. Thomas W. (USMC), 28, 43 n.23 Kawashima, Vice Adm. (IJN), 50 Keegan, Mr. Joseph (American citizen), 70 Kelly, Commander John (USN), 4, 5 Kempff, Rear Adm. Louis (USN), 21, 29 Kennedy, Pvt. J. (USMC), 33 Kentucky Island, 51 Khem, Pvt. Herman (USMC), 33 Kiangsi Province, 4 Kieren, Capt. Francis S. (USMC), 58, 79 n.18, 98 Kilgore, Lt. Col. Frederick D. (USMC), 65, 70 King, Pvt. C.B. (USMC), 31 Kinkaid, Adm. Thomas C. (USN), 140 Kirkland, 2nd Lt. William W. (USMC), 6, 9, 17 n.5 Knight, Francis P. (American consul), 12–13 Korea, 13–14, 55, 91, 133, 157 Kowloon, 12 Kuang-hsu, Emperor, 42 n.2 Kuyeh, 144

Lanchow, 52 Langfang, 25, 142 Lanigan, Cpl. J.F. (USMC), 28 Larkin, Maj. Gen. Claude E. (USMC), 138, 143, 164 n.15 Lay, Col. Harry (USMC), 71, 81 n.42 Lee, Capt. Harry (USMC), 48, 78 n.3 Lei-chuang, 149 Lejeune, Maj. General Commandant John A. (USMC), 66, 68, 70, 81 n.40 Lemly, Capt. William B. (USMC), 35, 36 Leonard, 1st Lt. Henry L. (USMC), 26, 28, 36, 43 n.22, 44 n.36, 48 Letcher, Capt. John S. (USMC), xvii, 84, 103–5, 114 Levant (U.S. warship), 6–7 Lewis, Cpl. Robert R. (USMC), 161 Li Hung-chang (Prime Minister), 13 Liaotung Peninsula, 15, 16 Lin Tse-hsu (Imperial Commissioner), xv Lin-Shou-Ying, 152 Linsi, 149 Lintin Island, 1 Linus, Cpl. James (USMC), 10 Lippitt, Surgeon Thomas McC. (USN), 21, 32 Liscum, Col. Emerson H. (USA), 35, 44 n.33 Little, Col. Louis McC. (USMC), 58, 79 n.20 Little, 2d Lt. Louis McC. (USMC), 35, 41 Lockhart, Frank B. (American consul), 123 Logan (USS), 48 Long, Capt. Charles G. (USMC), 35 Lowry, Dr. George, 32 Luckey, Capt. Robert (USMC), 99 Lungwha Junction, 65 Lutai, 149–50, 156 Ma San Yuen (Chinese general), 29 Macao, 2 MacDonald, Sir Claude (British Minister), 20, 23, 31, 41, 42 n.5

INDEX

MacMurray, J.V.A. (U.S. Minister), 61, 71, 75, 80 n.27 Madison (US liner), 123 Mahon, Pvt. Patrick (USMC), 10 Manchiapu railroad station, 22 Manchu Dynasty, xvii, 11–12, 50 Manchuria (aka Manchukuo), 74, 91– 92, 103, 144–46, 151, 157 Manila, 1, 96 Mannix, 1st Lt. Daniel P., Jr. (USMC), 13–14 Mao Tse-dong (Chinese Communist), 108 Marco Polo Bridge, 108 Marshall, Gen. George C. (USA), 145– 46, 150, 155, 157 Marston, Col. John (USMC), 116 Martin, Capt. Charles H. (USMC), 57, 79 n.15 Marvin, Gunnery Sgt. Milton C. (USMC), 118, 129 n.45 Masters, Lt. Col. John H. (USMC), 149, 165 n.28 Mathews, 1st Lt. Arthur J. (USMC), 35 Mathias, Pvt. Clarence E. (USMC), 27 McBee, First Sgt. John A. (USMC), 114 McBrayer, 2nd Lt. James D. (USMC), 121 McBride, Cpl. John (USMC), 10 McCall, Lt. Col. (British Army), 70 McCalla, Comdr. Bowman H. (USN), 21–26, 29 McCann, Thomas (USN), 10 McCaughtry, Capt. Walter E. (USMC), 60 McCluney, Capt. William J. (USN), 6 McCreary, 2nd Lt. Wirt (USMC), 35 McDougal, Cpl. William (USMC), 9– 10 McGill, 1st Lt. John F. (USMC), 35 McHugh, Maj. James M. (USMC), 119, 127 n.21, 129 McNeil, Pvt. Joseph (USMC), 10 Meade, Col. Robert L. (USMC), 35– 36, 39 Meifoo XIV (US motorship), 65

201

Melvin, Pvt. Patrick (USMC), 10 Merz, Capt. Carl F. (USMC), 60 Miller, Maj. Lyle H., 98, 127 n.17 Miller, Pvt. J.K. (USMC), 28 Miller, 2d Lt. Adolph B. (USMC), 50 Ming Dynasty, xvi Mississippi (U.S. warship), 12 Mitchell, Gunners Mate Joseph (USN), 38 Miura, Maj. Gen. Saburo (IJA), 121 Mizell, Lt. Col. Maxwell H. (USMC), 146 Moore, Capt. James T. (USMC), 72 Moriarty, Lt. Col. James F. (USMC), 117, 129 n.44 Morris, Pvt. W.H. (USMC), 28 Morrison, Dr. E.G. (British newspaperman), 39 Moses, Capt. Franklin J. (USMC), 39, 41 Muir, 1st Lt. John G. (USMC), 39 Mukden Incident, 91 Mullard, Pvt. (USMC), 6 Muller, Pvt. Martin L. (USMC), 31 Muncie, Lt. Col. John D. (USMC), 136 Myers, Capt. John T. (USMC), 21–23, 30, 32–34, 39, 44 n.31 Nagasaki, 15, 21 Nanking, 2, 50, 60–61, 75 Napier Island, 10 Neville, Capt. Wendell C. (USMC), 39, 45 n.42 Newark (USS), 21 Newchwang, 12 Nicholl, 1st Lt. William (USMC), 1 Nicholson, Capt. William C. (USN), 12 Nishio, Gen. Juzo (IJA), 120 Okinawa, 134–36, 138, 143 Old Betsy (Old Crock), 38, 45 n.43 Omura, Maj. (IJA), 124–25 Open-door Policy, 2, 16, 56 Opium trade, xv, 5 Opium wars: First Opium War, xv, 1; Second Opium War, xvi, 11 Oregon (USS), 21

202

INDEX

Osterhout, Maj. George H. (USMC), 94, 127 n.15 Outer Mongolia, 103 Pai Tsung-hsi (Chinese general), 66 Partridge, Pvt. (USMC), 36 Patterson, 1st Lt. Samuel A.W. (USMC), 39 Pearl River, xv, 3, 6, 9 Peck, Lt. Col. DeWitt (USMC), 120– 22, 129 n.50 Peck, Maj. Gen. DeWitt (USMC), 135, 144–45, 148, 150, 163 n.4, 164 n.10 Pei River, 30 Pei-Ho River, 21, 73 Peiping (Peking), 75, 83, 132, 135, 138–39, 142, 153, 157 Peiping airfields, 138, 142, 149, 159 Peitaiho, 150–51, 159 Peking (city), xvi, 11, 12, 15, 20, 22, 25, 40, 68, 70, 89, 114, 123; Forbidden City, 41; Tartar City, 40, 45 n.48; Tartar Wall, 87 Peking Annual, 88–89 Peking Legation(s), 16, 19–20, 22, 34, 38, 48, 50; American, 22–24, 47; Austrian, 31; British, 23–24, 30, 31; German, 30 Peking Legation Guard (all), xi, 15, 16, 47–48, 51–53, 57, 77, 78n. 8, 84, 86–87, 89, 91, 105, 116, 121, 124–25; Legation Guard Hospital, 87; Legation Guard Signal Detachment, 87 Peking Legation Guard (USMC): 38th Company, 87–88, 99; 39th Company, Machine Gun Company, 58, 87, 99; 67th Company, 87, 99; Ancillary Services, 87; clubs (Officer, NCO & Pvts.), 87; Headquarters Detachment, 87; Mounted Detachment, 53–54, 78 n.11, 87, 102–3; Post Band, 87, 102; Radio Detachment, 58, 87 Perry, Commodore Matthew C. (USN), 3–4 Perry (U.S. warship), 2

Pescadores Islands, 15 Peterson, Chief Machinist Mate Carl E. (USN), 23 Pfeiffer, Brig. Gen. Omar T. (USMC), 159–60 Pfeiffer, Capt. Omar T. (USMC), 59, 79 n.22 Philippines, xviii, 51–52, 59, 61, 69, 77, 112, 114, 123–24 Pichon, M. (French Minister), 20, 42 n.5 Plymouth (U.S. warship), 5 “Pogey-bait 6th,” 113, 128 n.34 Pollard, Cpl. William L. (USMC), 161 Polo, 101–3 Pootung, 65 Port Arthur, 15 Porter, 1st Lt. David D. (USMC), 35, 36 Portsmouth (U.S. warship), 6–7, 9 Powell, Lt. William G. (USMC), 26, 43 n.17 Powers, Maj. William C. (USMC), 94, 127 n.15 Powhatan (U.S. warship), 6 President Jefferson (USS liner), 112 Pressley, Col. Orin K. (USMC), 146 Price, Col. Charles F.B. (USMC), 108, 110, 112, 116, 118, 128 n.42 Protestant churches, 3 Protestant missionaries, 3, 19, 24, 50, 52 P’u-i, Henry (Chinese collaborator), 92 Puller, 1st Lt. Lewis B. (USMC), 98, 102 Pyzick, 2nd Lt. Frank P. (USMC), 116 Ragsdale, James W. (American consul at Tientsin), 16, 21 Rainbow (USS), 51, 55 Raleigh (USS), 16 Ranck, Lt. Col. James M., Jr. (USMC), 136 Read, 1st Lt. Jacob (USMC), 12 n.18 Reid, Lt. George (USMC), 26, 43 n.17 Rendova (USS), 162 Renville (USS), 159 Richards, Capt. William (USMC), 35

INDEX

Richards, Maj. George (USMC), 59, 79 n.22 Richmond (USS), 71 Ridgely, Maj. Reginald H., Jr. (USMC), 124 Rixey, Col. Presley M. (USMC), 98– 99, 127 n.19 Robinson, Capt. Ray A. (USMC), 68 Robinson, Lt. Col. Ray A., 121–22, 126 n.4, 129 n.53 Rockey, Maj. Gen. Keller E. (USMC), 135, 138, 140, 143–45, 148, 150– 51, 156, 163 n.9 Rockhill, William W. (American minister), 47, 49, 78 n.2 Rogers, Will (American actor), 89 Roman Catholic churches, 3 Roman Catholic missionaries, 3 Roosevelt, Franklin D. (President), 100, 123 Roosevelt, Theodore (President), 47, 49 Rose, Pvt. John (USMC), 58 Rosecrans, Col. Harold E. (USMC), 143 Ross, Lt. Col. Richard P., Jr. (USMC), 145 Rugby, 101 Rupertus, Maj. William H. (USMC), 89, 110, 128 n.33 Russell, Col. John H. (USMC), 105, 127 n.22 Russell, Lt. Col. Paul W. (USMC), 150 Russia (Russians), xiv, 11, 15, 16, 34, 55; sailors, 21–22, 30, 38; soldiers, 26–29, 32–33, 38, 55 Ryan, 2d Lt. Thomas M. (USMC), 97 Sabol, Lt. Col. Stephen V. (USMC), 136 St. Louis (U.S. warship), 2 Sambijima, Baron (Japanese civilian), 94 San Diego, 58, 62, 67, 128 n.34 San Francisco, 48–49, 117–18 San Jacinto (U.S. warship), 7 Sanderson, Brig. Gen. Lawson H.M. (USMC), 150, 156

203

Schatzel, 2d Lt. DeWolfe (USMC), 103 Schroeder, Pvt. John H. (USMC), 32 Schwerin, Capt. James P. (USMC), 59, 79 n.22 Second China Incident, 108 Secor, Maj. Theodore A. (USMC), 62, 90 Senlick, Cpl. Andrew (USMC), 106 Seoul, 14–15 Seymour, Vice Adm. Sir Edward (RN), 24 Shanghai, xiv, xvii, 5, 12, 13, 16, 56– 57, 59, 67, 70, 90, 114, 131; American Company & Troop, 70, 101; British Concession, 90, 115, 119; Defense Council, 93–94; French Concession, 62–63, 68, 90, 114, 119; International Settlement, xiv, xvii, 5, 61–62, 68, 90, 93, 100, 114–15; Italian Concession, 90; Japanese Concession, 90, 94; Municipal Council, 62, 66, 70, 98, 108, 115, 119, 124; Municipal Police, 67, 108, 115; Russian Concession, 49; United States Concession, 58, 62, 90, 94, 100, 110, 119; U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 68; Volunteer Force, 63, 67, 96, 108 Shanhaikwan, 159 Shansi Province, 146 Shantung Province, xiv, 55–56, 132, 140–41, 144, 159, 162 Shaw, Capt. Melville J. (USMC), 35 Shaw, M. Sgt. Thomas J. (USMC), 161 Shepherd, Maj. Gen. Lemuel C., Jr. (USMC), 139–41, 145, 148, 164 n.16 Shiozawa, Rear Adm. (IJN), 97 Shoup, 2nd Lt. David M. (USMC), 73, 99 Shufeldt, Comm. Robert W. (USN), 13, 18 n.15 Sikhs (Indian), 63 Silva, Pvt. Francis G. (USMC), 32 Simms, Capt. John D. (USMC), 7–9, 17 n.9 Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), 15

204

INDEX

Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), xviii, 108, 110, 112–15, 120 Smith, Comdr. William (USN), 6 Smith, Sgt. Robert A. (USMC), 125 Smith, William L.G. (American consul), 12 Socony Hill (oil company compound), 60 Solace (USS), 26 Soochow Creek, 90, 93–94, 96 Soochow Creek Medal, 93, 97 Soviets, 83, 132, 146 Sparling, Lt. Col. Norman E. (USMC), 152 Squiers, H.G. (First Secretary, U.S. Legation), 31, 33, 44 n.28 Stadrawa, PFC Joseph W. (USMC), 141 Standard Oil Company fire, 1927, 65, 73–74 Stemble, Lt. Roger N. (USN), 12 Stent, 1st Lt. Howard N. (USMC), 59, 79 n.22 Stilwell, Lt. Gen. Joseph (USA), 133 Stimson, Henry (U.S. secretary of state), 100 Stone, 2nd Lt. Paul W. (USMC), 149, 165 n.25 Strouts, Capt. (British Marine), 23, 31 Sun Yat-sen, xvii, 50–51, 60 Susquehanna (US warship), 56 Swink, Capt. Roy C. (USMC), 57, 79 n.16 Sword Rack Hoo, 13 Snyder, Col. Harold C. (USMC), 68, 71, 81 n.42 Taiping ideology and revolution (T’ai P’ing), xvi, 4–5 Taiwan Island, 15, 163 Takata, Maj. Gen. Toyoki (Japanese soldier), 72 Takeda, Comdr. (SNLF), 110 Taku, 11, 12, 13, 16, 20–21, 24, 26, 41, 57, 71, 91, 132, 135–36, 142 Tangku (also Tang-ku), 21, 132, 136, 138, 142, 151, 155 Tangshan, 52, 138, 142, 144, 147

Telfer-Smollett, Brig. (British army), 108 Thomas, Capt. Gerald (USMC), 99, 107, 126 n.4 Thomas, Pvt. (USMC), 33 Thomason, John W., Jr., xi, 48, 88– 89, 93, 102, 126 n.14 Thompson, Pvt. John G. (USMC), 9– 10 Thornton, 1st Lt. John F. (USMC), 58 Ticonderoga (U.S. warship), 13 Tientsin, 11–12, 15–16, 20–26, 27–29, 33, 34, 39, passim, 162; airfield, 138; Marine detachment, 121–22, 124; Taku Gate, 35; Walled City, 29, 35, 38 Tientsin Marine, 121 Tighe, Capt. Thomas A. (USMC), 97 Tokyo, 60 Tonghak, 14 torpedoes, 13–14 Townsend, Comdr. Robert (USN), 13 Treaty (AABCD), 123 Treaty (Sino-Japanese, 18 April 1885), 14 Treaty of 1844, 3 Treaty of 1845, 3 Treaty of 1868 (Burlingame), 48 Treaty of Nanking, 1842, 3 Treaty of Whanghia, 3 Triad Society, xvi, 13 Truce-teams (Marines), 146 Truman, President Harry, 133, 157, 163 n.6 Tsai Tsun, 29 Tsangkou airfield, 138–40, 161 Tsinan, 75, 161–62 Tsinghua College, 49 Tsingtao, 59, 75, 132, 139–41, 144, 148–50, 155, 159–60, 162–63; USMC air facility, 138 Tsungli Yamen (Chinese foreign office), 19, 20, 30 Tu Li-ming, Gen. (CNA), 145 Turnage, Col. Allen Hal (USMC), 106, 122 Turner, Capt. Thomas (USMC), 51, 78 n.7

INDEX

Turner, Pvt., 33 Tutcher, Pvt. J.W. (USMC), 31–32 Ty-Ho Bay, 6 Tyler, President John, 2 Tyler, 2nd Lt. Henry B. (USMC), 6, 17 n.7 Underhill, Lt. Col. James L. (USMC), 116, 129 n.43 United States (Americans), xiv, 11 United States Naval Academy, 84 United States Navy, xvi, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6– 10, 12 Asiatic Fleet, 12, 16, 48, 57, 59, 77, 110 Gunboats, 56, 90; Elcano, 50; Guam, 57; Helena, 50; Isabel, 57; Luzon, 57; Mindano, 57; Monocacy, 16, 21, 42 n.8, 56; Oahu, 57; Palos, 56; Panay, 57, 106, 114, 116, 117, 126 n.13; Pecos, 79 n. 26; Sacramento, 65; Tutulia, 57; Villalobos, 50; Wake, 57 Naval Port Facilities (USN, Tsingtao), 155 Navy/Marine landing force (U.S.), 9 96th Naval Construction Battalion, 150 Office of Naval Intelligence, 99 Seventh Amphibious Force (USN), 140 Seventh Fleet (USN), 140, 150 United States Navy Department, 3 United States State Department, 2, 16, 48, 61, 77, 113, 123, 128 n.40, 133, 139, 147, 168 U.S. Army, xviii U.S. Army (Ninth U.S. Infantry), 35– 36; First Battalion, 35; Reilly’s Battery (Fifth Artillery), 40; Second Battalion, 35 U.S. Army (Fifteenth U.S. Infantry), 48, 52, 57, 58, 71, 78 n.8, 79 n.23, 86, 89, 103, 115, 121; First Battalion, 48; Second Battalion, 52 U.S. Army (Thirty-first U.S. Infantry), 96–97

205

U.S. Marine Aviation (1927), 68, 72– 73, 75 First Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW), 132, 138, 143, 149, 156; Marine Air Group 12 (MAG-12), 132, 149; Marine Air Group 24 (MAG-24), 132, 155–56, 159; Marine Air Group 25 (MAG-25), 132; Marine Air Group 32 (MAG32), 132, 138, 141; Marine Fighting Squadron 211 (VMF211), 159, 162; Marine Fighting Squadron 541 (VMF[N]-541), 149; Marine Observation Squadron 6 (VMO-6), 140, 150; Marine Torpedo Bombing Squadron 134 (VMTB-134), 149; Marine Transport Squadron 153 (VMR-153), 159, 161 Second Marine Aircraft Wing (2nd MAW), 143 U.S. Marine Corps, 1, 2, 3, 4, passim 243; Fourth Brigade in France, 57, 88, 143 U.S. Marine Units Eleventh Marines (post-WWII), 142, 153, 155; First Battalion, 153–54 Fifth Marines (post-WWII), 142, 149, 157, 159; Company C, 157– 59; First Battalion, 142, 156, 159; Second Battalion, 159 First Marine Division (post-WWII), 131–32, 135, 138, 142, 148–50, 155–57, 159–60, 164 n.16 First Marine Expeditionary Force (1925), 58 First Marine Regiment (Boxer), 35, 39, 41; Company A, 35–36, 40; Company C, 35–36, 40; Company D, 35; Company F, 35; Company H, 40; First Battalion, 40–41; Second Battalion, 40–41; Third Battalion, 35 First Marines (post-WWII), 136, 142, 153, 157, 159, 162; 1st Reconnaissance Company, 157; Company E, 157; First Battalion,

206

INDEX

159–60; Second Battalion, 157, 159–60 Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPac), 159–60 Fleet Marine Force Western Pacific (FMFWesPac), 159–60, 162 Fourth Marine Division, 131 Fourth Marines (1927–41) xi, xvii, 56–57, 61–62, 67, 69–70, 77, 78 n.12, 84, 90, 93, 108, 112–14, 119–23; 9th Company, 98; 10th Company, 98; 19th Company, 62; 21st Company, 62, 68, 69; 22nd Company, 62, 65, 97; 24th Company, 62; 25th Company, 68–69, 96; 27th Company, 97–98; 31st Company, 98; 32nd Machine Gun Company, 98; 88th Company, 61; 89th Company, 61; 90th Company, 61; 91st Machine Gun Company, 61; First Battalion, 62–63, 67, 69, 80n. 34, 90, 110, 112, 123–24; Provisional Battalion (USMC, Willcox), 61, 63, 80 n.39; Second Battalion, 69, 80 n.30, 98, 110, 123; Third Battalion, 62, 68, 90, 98, 112 (After 1931) A Company, 122; B Company, 110; Band, 97, 101; C Company, 112; E Company, 110; H Company, 118; Headquarters & Service Company, 112, 123; Motor Transport Company, 112 Fourth Marines (post-WWII), 132, 148–49, 155, 157, 163 n.2; Headquarters & Service Battalion, 159; Third Battalion, 155, 157, 159–60 Ninth Marines (BLT-9), 162 Second Marines (1911–1925); Company B, 51; Company E, 51; Second Provisional Company, 59 Seventh Marines (post-WWII), 136, 142–44, 149, 152; Company C, 157–59, 163; Company F, 151; First Battalion (1/7), 138, 149, 152; Second Battalion (2/7), 136,

149, 151–52; Third Battalion (3/ 7), 136 Seventh Service Regiment, 143, 159 Sixth Marine Division, 131–32, 139– 40, 143, 148–49; First Brigade (Boxer Rebellion) China Relief, 41; First Provisional Marine Brigade (post-WWII), 162; Headquarters Company, 67, 84; Second Brigade (Boxer Rebellion), China Relief, 41; Second Marine Brigade (1937), 90, 112, 128n. 36; Service Company, 67; Third Brigade (postWWII), 149–50; Third Marine Brigade (1927), 67, 73 Sixth Marines (1927), 67, 69, 70– 72, 74, 76–77; First Battalion, 69; Light Tank Platoon, 71; Second Battalion, 69; Third Battalion, 67, 69, 71 Sixth Marines (1937), 112–15, 128 n.34 Tenth Marines (artillery-1927), 69, 71 III (Third) Marine Amphibious Corps (IIIMAC), 131, passim, 150 Third Marine Division, 131 Third Marines (post-WWII), 160, 162; Company B, 163; Company C, 162–63 Twenty-ninth Marines, (post-WWII), 140–41, 148; Twelfth Service Battalion, (postWWII), 150, 159; Fifth Company of Engineers [1927], 69 Twenty-second Marines (postWWII), 141 U.S. Marines, xiv, xvi, xviii, 1, 2, 3, 4, passim 193 Vandegrift, Maj. Alexander A. (USMC), 62–63, 68, 74, 87, 90, 99, 102, 106–7, 118 Veneral diseases, 105 Volstead Act, 58 Von Below, Otto, Secretary (German Legation), 20, 42 n.7

INDEX

Von Kettler, Baron (German Minister), 30 Von Rahden, Baron (Russian Commander at Peking), 34 Von Strauss, Capt. (German officer), 34 Wachusett (U.S. warship), 13 Walla Walla (4th Marines weekly), 89, 106–7, 112, 114, 126 n.12 Waller, Maj. Littleton W. T. (USMC), 26–27, 29, 35, 38, 40–41, 43 n.20, 45 n.47 Wang Tan Yeun, 160 War Between the States (U.S. Civil War), 12 War Plan-46, 125 Ward, Frederick Townsend, xvi Warlords, xvii, 57, 59–60, 66, 70, 74– 75, 83, 92, 100 Warner, Lt. Col. Jack F. (USMC), 146 Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert C. (USA), 133–34, 144, 148 Wei hei wei Regiment (British army), 30 West, Maj. Ralph E., 114 Whaling, Col. William J. (USMC), 149, 165 n.25 Whampoa Island, 3, 7 Whampoa River, 1, 3 Whangpoo River, 65, 90, 110, 112, 124, 162 White, Capt. John A. (USMC), 121, 124–25 White, TSgt Robert C. (USMC), 161 White Russians, 66, 85–86, 105–6, 134 Wildes, Capt. Frank (USN), 16 Wilkinson, Sgt. Harles L. (USMC), 102 Willcox, Maj. Julian P. (USMC), 61, 63 Williams, Col. Dion (USMC), 54 Williams, Rear Adm. Clarence S. (USN), 59, 62–65, 69, 71

207

Williams, 2d Lt. Robert H. (USMC), 86, 101 Wilson, Capt. Angus (USMC), 59, 79 n.22 Wilson, Woodrow, President, 55 Winans, Lt. Col. Roswell (USMC), 110, 128 n.33 Wise, 2nd Lt. Frederick M., Jr. (USMC), 35, 42 n.8 Wolfe, Pvt. D.R. (USMC), 92 Woods, Maj. Gen. Louis E. (USMC), 143, 150, 165 n.21 Woods, Pvt. (USMC), 33 Woosung, 112 World War One, 55, 143 Worton, Brig. Gen. William A. (USMC), 134–36, 143, 148, 150, 163 n.7 Worton, Capt. Richard A. (USMC), 81 n.50, 100, 127 n.22 Wu Pie-fu (warlord), 57 Wuchang, 49, 50 Wuhu, 56 Wu-long River, 13 Wurtsbaugh, Lt. Comdr. Daniel W. (USN), 55 Wynne, Lt. Robert F. (USMC), 26 Yalu River, 15, 91 Yangtsun, 40 Yangtze Rapid Steamship Company, 101 Yangtze River, 11, 60–61, 101, 114, 122, 162; patrol, xii, 50, 56, 61, 78n. 6, 122–23 Yarnell, Adm. Harry E. (USN), 110, 113–14, 116–17 Yeh (Chinese commissioner), 7 Yenan 135 Yuan Shih-k’ai, Gen. (China), 14, 50– 51 Zafiro (USS), 16

About the Author GEORGE B. CLARK served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1944 to 1947 and the U.S. Army from 1950 to 1952. He spent several years in the reserves for both services. Now retired, he was formerly Director of Research Administration and Research Technology Transfer at the University of Massachusetts Medical Center in Worcester, Massachusetts. His other publications include Devil Dogs: Fighting Marines of World War I (1999).