Turkey and the European community

Schriften des Deutschen Orient-Instituts

Ahmet Evin/Geoffrey Denton (Editors) Turkey and the European Community

Ahmet Evin Geoffrey Denton (Editors)

Leske + Budrich, Opladen 1900

Gedruckt mit Unterstützung der Fritz-Thyssen-Stiftung

Preface

The history of relations between the Europan Community and Turkey has been a sad story, on both sides. Unrealism has been the keynote throughout. What was long overdue by the end of 1987 was to sweep away the past contradictions and tergiversations, and try to make a new start on a more realistic basis. Turkey has now applied formally to resume as a full member of the Community. However, as several chapters of this Report show, there are oni_both si4j^r^tj-eAe.rY3lions a¬ bout membership, unless this were intended to take place only many years ahead. Politically, the ^ r ^ t i œ ^ ^ bg£w6fi11.th€ Commiioj.^-^ ^- -^tl^J?™^dani^^Jby..tiieX^prMS and ^Aegean pr^km^^weenJTurkey and Greece; It beganjo break down already in 1964, and the preach was widened by the events of 1974 in Cyprus, by Greece's subsequent rapid ac- cessJpatpjM and bydie militarytake oyer in Turkey in 1980.. Since 1980 there has been a sW^rocess^of restoration of relations, marked by new elections in November 1983, and a ^ r l ( i ^ . ^ h j B & i ^ o n . p J T ^ k e ^ s ^position in the Council of Europe by 1986, as Turkey ItroveVre-establish its credentials âs a democratic state.-. Economically there were serious complaints on both sides about the working of die Association Agreement. In the Community it was felt that the economic policy of Turkish go- _ vernments prior to 1979 was in contradiction with the purposes of the Agreement. The Turlysh authorities complained that agreements made by th^ Community with other coun¬ tries riuUifiedme a d v ^ TUrkey was supposed tq Je.nve from the Agreement, and the Community countries put obstacles in the way of Turkish exports. An Additional Protocol of 1970, referring to the possibility of full membership by Turkey by 1995, reflected euphoria for a larger Community rather than progress towards political and economic rapprochement. During the 1970s the political situation in Turkey was confused, and there was no serious effort to formulate a policy leading towards membership. This allowed the Community countries to avoid having to contemplate seriously the full political implications of Turkish membership in foreseeable future. Global economic developmejttSr^witlu-RcessiQn and growing protectionism following the OPEC-iriauced oil price shopks of 1973 and 1979 served to intensity the difficulties m economic relations between the E C and Turkey. 1

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081485 CIP-Titelaufhahme der Deutschen Bibliothek Turkey and the European Community/Ahmet Evin; Geoffrey Denton. ~ Opladen: Leske u. Budrich, 1990 Schriften des Deutschen Orient-Instituts) ISBN: 3-8100-0646-7 NE: Evin, Ahmet [Hrsg.] © 1990 by Leske Verlag + Budrich GmbH, Opiaden Druck und Verarbeitung: Druckpartner Rübeimann, Hemsbach Printed in Germany N

What then of the future of relations between Turkey. and,the.Commum^Ti^yé thejrobi- " guities of the last 25 years to be repeated over the next 25 years? Or should it be accepted^! thâfTûikey will inevitably grow apart from WëstéHBurope,.abandon its European identity, an3 seek its culturai,.poïitiçal arid economic development elsewhere? Not necessarily. There are still opportunities for realistic co-operation and close and friendly relations between the Community and Turkey if the truly common interests are

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sensibly pursued on both sides in an atmosphere of mutual respect and abnegation of unrealiSicTdemands. Politically, and strategically, the common interests of nations that are all members of NATO (except for Ireland) remain as powerful as they have, ever been. The whole European Com­ munity, but above all Greece, has a vim interest in a stable and democratic Turkey remain­ ing attached to the Western Alliance, as a pÙÎàf against the threats of Soviet expansion out ofthe Black Sea, and of Arab and Iranian turmoil in the Middle East. For.TUrkey, the Western European connection remains the ultimate guarantee of freedom toVursuê the democratic way to peace and prosperity. Economically, the logic of the customs union envisaged as long ago as 1963, and specifi­ cally targeted in 1970, remains as strong as ever, on both sides. And here there is at last real hope of progress. The economic strategy pursued by Turkish governments since January 1980 is consistent with the objective of external economic liberalisation; finally, domestic policy is in line with the stated external policy. While 1995 may be too near for the full cus­ toms union to be completed by the original target^datejrcertamly progress could now be made on a new timetable. Assuming that the European Community achieves its current objectives of controlling agricultural spending, re-structuring the budget, reforming the institutions-and completion of theinternal common market, the way would be open on that side for p new dialogue with Turkey^ i f meanwhile the Ôzaj_goyernment has succeeded in c o i i ^ n r u ^ ^ bow fîtes, wîulè" maintaimngthe stability created since 1980, the way will also be opengn the Turkish .side:-An easingôffhTwôrïd* economic crisis could also create more favourable conditions for removing economic irritants.

Regardless of the Turkish application for full membership, the Council of Association, in reviewing Turkey's relations with the Community, could have as its immediate objective the restoration of economic co-operation on a realistic basis covering the customs union, conditions for migrant workers, capital flows and aid to Turkey. If the Community's politi­ cal co-operation machinery could at the same time be brought to bear not only on distant matters such as the Middle East, Afghanistan of Central America, but on other problems closer to home in the Aegean and Cyprus, political as well as economic relations could be put on a new footing. Progress on all these issues, over a period of some years, would create a sound basis for success in negotiations on full membership. This Report was written before Turkey applied for full membership. The intention was to explore the history of Turkey-EC relations, including the Association Agreement. If the E C should respond negatively to the application, the work will not have been wasted. For whether Turkey joins the E C or not, it will not go away, and relations with Turkey, in or out of the Community, will remain important for the member states. This exploration of the va¬ , rious ftspecjts of relations between, Turkey and theJBÇ may therefore be regarded either, as a ctanncltiôn of the issues to be résolve^ m%e^tia'<ïc¥s%r entry, or as a guide to future relations between the E C and a Turkey which is not a member. In either case, the authors believe that the political, economic and strategic issues examined are of the greatest impor­ tance both to Turkey and to the European Community. \ Geoffrey Denton

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Contents

Goeffrey Demon Preface Ahmet Evin Introduction

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Part Ï: Political Issues , Chapter 1 , ^ Cultural Issues i n Relations. Between Turkey and Europe ..J Şerif Mardin European Culture and the Development of Modern Turkey Ahmet O. Evin Communitarian Structures, Values and Cultural Behaviour Chapter 2 Selim ilkin A Short History of Turkey's Association with the European Community Chapter 3 Roswitha Bourguignon A History of the Association Agreement Between Turkey and the European Community Chapter 4 ..Options for Future Relations Bernard Burrows Options for Future Relations between Turkey and the E C Seyfi Ta§han The Case for Turkish Membership Geoffrey Denton Negotiating Turkish Membership: A Summary of Papers Submitted to the Study Group

f « ^ • • • 24

X

35

51

0 5

65 7

7

1

9

Chapter 5 Tuğrul Ansay Constitutional and Legal Implications of Membership Chapter 6 Relations between Greece and Turkey Andrew Mango Introduction: Turkish Foreign Policy Matthias Esche A History of Greek-Turkish Relations

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Introduction

85 i / 95 95 101

Chapter 7 Maurizio Cremasco The Strategic Importance of Relations between Turkey and the European Community 117 Part II: Economic Issues Chapter 8 William Hale Turkish Agriculture and the Commom Agricultural Policy

141

Chapter 9 ^ William Hale Turkish Industry and the Common Market

153

Chapter 10 Harun Gümrükçü The Turkish Labour Market and Migration

167

c

Chapter U ismet Ergün • The Problem of Freedom of Movement of Turkish Workers in the European Community

Ig3

Chapter 12 Geoffrey Denton Economic Implications of Turkish Membership for the Community

195

Acknowledgements

203

Contributors

204

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Trying to get a perspective on Turkeyjsrelationship with the European Community has been a difficult task, somewhat like attempting to paint landscape on a fast moving train: the^œiâ^ywould change before a particûTâTsëtting could be caplured with its significant detàîTTând each new vista that came into view would appear in a différent light. TheconstànTsntfts ot tocus mat characterise the lon^msiQrTTîf^ with the ComrtHMtnyiiave™b^eTrr^^icatedriolessby factorsexteroaltothisrelation^pTRarr^seemifig inaiÏÏîy^of^îetwo^ides to develop a ciéaf^fënàTôTmutual concerns. It is true that both" sides were informed byâ^ffeTèlû^eToTconcerns right fTOhTOîè^îêgmhmg. Turkey's under­ standing of the Community was as defective as the Community's perception of Turkey, and reciprocal misunderstandings remained the source for a long time of divergent views and attitudes. Moreover, the Turkish decision-makers on the one hand, and the Community leadership on the other, have had different considerations and caveats in mind regarding Turkey's association with the Community and its potential for eventual membership. These differences stood in the way of obtaining a coherent framework within which to consider Turkey's role as an associate member and an eventual partner of the Community. But the evolution of the relationship has been affected even to a greater extent by the rap­ idly changing political and economic situation both in Europe and in Turkey. Expecially over the the past fifteen years, the Community and Turkey have undergone enormous trans­ formations. The Community, which began as a Common Market of Six, has successfully implemented several Enlargements and has made a great deal of progress towards becoming a politically and administratively coherent entity of Thirteen. It has, though, in the mean­ time experienced periods of economic crisis as well as political tension and uncertainty. The economies of the E C member states, for example, expecially those of the northern ones among the original Six, sustained deep shocks in the wake of the oil prices hikes of 1973 and 1979, reuslting in severe imbalances and a loss of confidence. The austerity programmes to battle inflation created increased unemployment, which in turn diminished the capacity of E C countries to absorb migrant workers. In the political sphere, too, major shifts that occurred in the arena of siiper-power compe­ tition, from détente to confrontation for instance, often put the European leadership in a di­ lemma. At such times, the differences between Europeanist and Atlanticist policies and priorities would emerge in sharp relief, making it difficult to reach a consensus on a uni­ form European strategy. Threatened with potentially divisive attitudes and faced with the 9

danger of a weakened political will as a result, the Community as a whole, as well as its member states individually, would shift their focus to immediate European concerns and would be forced to make policy adjustments in keeping with their own priorities. Similarly, domestic political constraints in Turkey have more than once adversely affected Turkey's relationship with the Community. TJig^dditional Protocoljo--iaitiatei:he-sec"ond transitional stage of the A s s o d a t w j ^ among "ilîëTu f kîsh'poîîtïcârpâ^ié^ memsiï^e49TOsrAs-disçUls^ by Roswifha Bourguignon in this volume, the terms of the Protocol were difficult enough to negociate, given the wide discrepency between the demands put forth by Turkey and the concessions the E C was willing to make. But the domestic political situation weakened the government's political will and robbed it of its ability to negociate from a position of strength. Having little room left in which tojnanêouïer, negotiators under successive w e a k ^ tufes and that, in turn, had the effect of d i n u m s f i n g T u r ^ candidate for membership. ' ™ " " ™ " " Between 1978 and mid-1980 Turkey's relationship with the Community suffered two major setbacks that were brought about chiefly by factors external to the relationship. The regidities stemming from a lack of consensus among political parties, described in Selim Ilkin's contribution to this volume, and the rapid deterioration of Turkey's economy which belatedly sustained the shocks of the 1973 oil price hikes, led to a request in 1978 for a five-year freeze of Turkey's commitments under the Additional Protocol. The social-democrat Ecevit government, which did not have a majority in the parliament, may not have been the most enthusiastic supporter of Turkey's accession to an economic community whose principles of free trade and competition stood in sharp contrast with the time-honoured system of protectionism perpetuated in Turkey for decades; but Ecevit also knew all too well that it could not survive the attacks of the opposition if he were perceived to be making unpopular concessions to the EC. Even more dramatic were the tribulations of the Demirel government in 1979-80, whose foreign minister was forced to resign over the conduct of Turkey's E C policy. In a situation where political polarization and economic crisis fed on one another to create immobilisme, the issue was how to topple the government rather than how to deal with the Community; the E C question merely provided the opposition parties with a convenient excuse to launch an attack on the government. The embattled Demirel government did not have a chance to turn the tables once more. With a deadlocked parliament unable to elect a president, public life disrupted by anarchy, and the economy severely constrained by draconian measures to combat runaway inflation, the military stepped in on September 12, 1980. It is the periodic military interventions in recent Turkish history |hat have been most prominent among the factors affecting the relations with the Community. Négociations were halted on account of the 1960 intervention less than a year after Turkey's application for association, and the Agreement thus delayed could eventually be signed on September 12, 1963. The 1980 intervention occured on the seventeenth anniversary of the 1960 coup. The first reaction of the E C Council was not to freeze the existing agreements but allow the regime time to restore democratic order. Initially, the European Parliament also reacted in a similar fashion, urging a fast return to democracy, but emphasised at the same time that continued suspension of democratic rule would be tantamount to Turkey's reneging its international commitments and obligations, including the Association Agreement. It repeated 10

its concerns in a more strongly worded statement as late as April 10, 1981, demanding a time-table for return to democracy. The military r e g i m e ^ ^ that Turkexahjauld apply for full membership in the E C as s o C T i a M ^ B Q g B i i ^ ^ was restored, and had mstructedjovernment agendje^-to-be^in-pj^arations. However, because of de"TayTmuieTTansitS the regime's increasingly tough stand on law and order, and stiff sentences handed by military courts, the Ass^daiipn-AgreemeHt was.suspended on or

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_JanuaryAJa8Z The European Parliament's, and particularly the Commission's unequivocal position regarding human rights and democracy in Turkey reflected the Community's deep concern with the affairs of an associate member state. The Commmikyjsj^acj^^ ments in Turkey clearly indicated that Brussels did not view Turkey ^ejajne^ay-as-rrieoked^jpraTaiiyl?^^ or South"American_cou^^ C^mmmrity's own standards in judgingthe political developmentsjheilAluiara, however, responded by turn4ng-a-co1d-sliorila^ attempted to interfere unjustifably and rudely in Turkey's domestic affairs. It could do so with a certain air of nonchalance, because it had developed a special relationship with the Reagan administration as the stable strategic outpost of the free world, bordering on the "evil empire". Talking to cross purposes, each side had become increasingly inflexible. It tpjjkjlyejiearsj^ .thjw- indie relationship. When on April 14, 1987, thje.£g>ujarly-eta pr jseOTfus!eTsl)y~su^^ ]^wasT^^B^'^^^^a^ the policy decision majejearjjgx^jhe military regime. The^piTcaliorrrmcTCOT^ resultofjheji^ grafnme~wfficT the- econor mic major-dolrioTnugEjh^^ 1980 and 1982-,—^ ^ucn~m3^iheia^iorsthat account for the unsteady evolution of Turkey's association with the EC. Due to the emergence of new sets of constraints at different times, priorities and policies of both Brussels and Ankara have often changed, affecting their relationship as well as their perception of one another. The relations, as a result, have remained somewhat fragile and, until recently, subject to sudden reverses, with periodes of co-operation and good will alternating with those of disagreement, misunderstanding and even apprehension. At each turn, issues got blurred and assessments made tended to reflect immediate rather than long-term considerations. Though the present volume derives from contributions originally made in connection with a research project conducted between 1981 and 1983, it addresses issues that remain currently relevant. Outstanding questions regarding Turkey's potential for membership are taken up within the framework of longer-term considerations. The research project was undertaken with a view to presenting options for the Community and for Turkey regarding the future of their relationship. As such, it was designed to address the following questions: Is there sufficient compatibility between the social and cultural backgrounds of Turkey and the member states of the Community to make a reality of Turkish membership? How would integration and co-operation with the Community affect Turkey's economy, and which aspects of Turkey's economy would benefit from accession to the Community? Can the Turkish economy be developed to a point at which it can benefit from full membership of the Community and withstand the rigours of industrial competition from western Europe and countries outside the E C benefitting from the

11

commom external tariffs? What are the implications for the Community with regard to (a) competition from Turkey's agricultural production, (b) the flow of Turkish workers to western Europe and (c) involement in new dimensions of foreign political relationships arising from Turkey's relations with Greece and its common frontiers with the Soviet Union and Arab states. If any of these problems seem to pose serious difficulties for the achievement of full membership within a reasonable time, what other kind of relationship short of full membership could be envisaged either for a fairly long preparatory period, or for a more indefinite future?

The project, which provided a forum for debate among scholars, researchers and decision-makers from both Turkey and the European Community, was conducted as an enquiry rather than with the aim of formulating a set of recommendations. As a result, the volume combines a range of scholarly and informal opinion representing the views of individual contributors, an asset which is rarely found in commissioned studies on current affairs. By presenting what has once more become a timely topic within the broader context of its ramifications, this collection is hoped to provide a useful background for those who need to follow a large number of technical studies, assessments and analyses that are produced by specialized agencies and institutes. It also attempts to fill a gap in the literature concerning Turkey's adaptability to the E C , by providing cultural and historical perspectives, and by identifiying major problems, both real and perceived.

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12

Cultural Issues in Relations between Turkey and Europe Chapter 1 Serif Mardin

European Culture and the Development of Modern Turkey

The "Duality" of the Ottoman Empire Even though modern Turkey has been built on the core component of the Ottoman Empire, the relationship of the Turks of the Turkish Republic to their Ottoman ancestry are complex. Turks in the Ottoman Empire did not emphasise their identity since the term "Turk" was used to denote only one component of a multi-ethnic Empire. It is also difficult to state who would have been a "real" Turk in the Empire. Should the Bosnian who had converted at an early age and entered state service, acquiring a mastery of the Turkish lan¬ guage and rising to be grand vizier, be taken to be more of a Turk than the Turcoman tribesman who had little role to play in the decision-making process of the Ottoman Empire? Turks were also only one section of the Muslim population of the Empire, which comprised, in an arc starting in the north-west and proceeding eastwards and southwards: Bosnians, Albanians, Anatolian Turkish peasants (settled for some centuries), Turcoman nomads, Circassians, Kurds and Arabs. None of these labels had the identifying force that they have acquired over the last century, and all the populations enumerated above would probably have answered "Muslim" to a hypothetical survey asking them to identify themselves. Ethnic Turks, as well as some sections of the Arab population, were also heterogeneous in religious terms. They were divided into orthodox Sunni and heterodox Alevi (Shi'i being only an approximate rendition of this term). The point was not what culture one belonged to, but whether or not one was willing to live by the rules that applied in the Empire. It is true that in the diffuse set of laws governing the constitution of the Ottoman Empire, Muslim citizens were a preferred segment as compared to non-Muslims, but the balance of rights and privileges was extremely complex. Muslims figured as the political elite but with possibilities of recruitment from converts, while non-Muslims specialised in a number of arts and trades which they also controlled. Ottoman society was thus not only "plural" (composed of a variety of segments), but also "pluralistic" (based on an equilibrium of these segments). To the extent that this structure also involved populations such as Greeks, Hungarians and Wallachians, who continued to maintain contacts with Christian kingdoms, and since Ottoman statesmen — some of them converts themselves — were involved in the affairs of these states, the Empire could be characterised as "cosmopolitan". Despite all these aspects, which introduced different degrees of "Ottomanness", there did exist an Ottoman identity which drew its strength from a consciousness of the achievement of the Ottoman state. This pride was strongest among high Ottoman officialdom, and both Muslims and converts who were brought into the ruling institution were propelled by the 13

same feelings of solidarity and cohesion. Indeed the Ottoman state mechanism was an intri­ cate and sophisticated machine specifically designed to overcome problems of government that had caused the demise of earlier Muslim empires.' One major task the Ottomans had confronted was to establish effective government in a setting which comprised a large variety of religious communities, ethnic groups and sub­ cultures ensconced in ecological niches. They had to make nomads and city dwellers con­ tribute to a common purpose transcending their individual interests; they had to reconcile the demands of imperial taxation with the autonomy of local magnates; they had to find a means of integrating millions of Christians into a Muslim Empire. The Ottomans created a class of military and administrative officials whose unstinting allegiance, in theory and often enough in practice, was to the Ottoman dynasty. Sometimes the officials would even give precedence to the State over the dynasty. They established a network of judicialadministrative positions staffed by district judges ( W i ) trained in Muslim law. They de­ vised means of mobilising the land resources of the Empire, which were integrated with a system of taxation and with military organisation. They elaborated complex sets of regula­ tions for commerce, and established control over a network of roads linking garrisoned cit­ ies. However, the settlement of the civil concerns of the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire was delegated to their own ecclesiastical authorities. What emerges from this framework is the dual nature of the Ottoman Empire, composed of a "mosaic" -like social structure on the one hand, and a core governmental "centre" on the other. In the starker "mosaic" context of Iran, where the fragmentation of the social structure was pervasive, the shah has been described as a "grand manipulator", always set­ ting one of the pieces of the structure against the other so that an equilibrum could be reach­ ed which favoured the centre. The Ottomans were far ahead of this in the centralising game, but a reminder that the Empire was a plural structure appears in the continued arbi­ tral role of the centre. The Ottoman sultan did not need to be a "grand manipulator", but neither did he enforce his rule through the heavy machinery of centralisation associated with the creation of the nation-state in Western Europe. Contrary to general views of Otto­ man rule as an "Oriental despotism", the sultan had to assume the role of a referee among the various components of the mosaic to make his influence last. 2

What we have here, then, is a civilisation which can be placed side by side with that of Western Europe as a particular species of civilisation. Civility had crystallised around the institutions of civil society in Western Europe — the civilisation of autonomous burghers. Civility was also present but took a different form in the Ottoman Empire. While the auto­ nomy of the town was the core datum of Western civility, equity and justice in the linea­ ments of the State were the core of values of Ottoman civilisation. This contrast, which helps to explain the difficulties the Ottomans had in coming to tefms with the essentially commercial and industrial civility of Western Europe, has survived in a much modified form. In more modern times, "survivals" of these core Ottoman values may be seen in the continued demand that executive power assume an arbitral role and in the ease with which re-distributive ideologies have been able to elicit a favourable response among Turks.

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Early Military and Educational Reforms As the Empire lost ground and receded after a series of military defeats, the necessity for the military modernisation of the Empire became the prime preoccupation of Ottoman statesmen. The military decline of the Ottoman Empire could be explained in terms of the fact that the plural state did not allow it to face the problem of resource mobilisation as effi­ ciently as in the emerging western nation-states. Although proud of their achievements, Ottoman officials were also pragmatic in their attitude towards other civilisations which they encountered. Thus, at the time of its nadir, the Ottomans had no compunction about having their guns cast to Italian specifications. The first systematic attempts to understand the difference between the Ottoman military system and the that of the West dates from the beginning of the eighteenth century. A Hu­ guenot named de Rochefort seems to have written the first project to this effect. In the 1730s Ibrahim Müteferrika, a Transylvanian Unitarian who had converted to Islam, became the first person to try to give a comprehensive exposé of the new strength of European king­ doms. He was also the first person to obtain a license to operate a printing establishment with Arabic characters. The Frenchman, the Comte de Bonneval (1645 - 1747), was asked to organise Ottoman artillery in the 1730s. About the same time the first technical school for the training of gunners was established. Towards the end of the century, during the reign of Selim II (1789 - 1807), French officers were requested from the Convention as advisers. In 1792, a School of Military Engineering began to function. In the 1790s an effort was made to establish the army on an entirely new basis with disciplined troops replacing the janissaries who had acquired the characteristics of a de-professionalised militia. The West­ ern view that the army was an instrument of the State rather than an organic part of the State was one of the stumbling blocks to reform/ By 1826, Sultan Mahmud H had eliminated the janissaries and established the core of a new professional army. 3

The process of modernisation, however, was much more comprehensive than can be gathered from a survey of purely military reforms. In fact, between 1839 and 1908 reform was increasingly a civilian matter and consisted of the revamping of the civil and political institutions of the Ottomans. Beginning in 1795 the Ottomans had established permanent diplomatic missions in a number of European capitals. Young diplomats attached to these missions began to play a major role in the process of reform. The model which they took was that of enlightened des­ potism. "Cameralism" was the school of political science which had taken upon itself to build a systematic theory of enlightened despotism, and this provided those observers with their basic terminology, although there is no specific mention of "Cameralism" in the re­ formist literature of the time. A key word in this terminology was sivilizasyon, transcribed from the original French. What this meant for the new officials became clear when in 1839 the Sultan proclaimed a reform charter inspired and largely drafted by his Minister of For­ eign Affairs, Mustafa Reşid Paşa. The Charter, known as the Tanzimat Charter, provided for the protection of "life, property and honour" and stated that government was in future to be based on "fundamental laws".

15

The Tanzimat

With this Charter was initiated a reform policy which affected the entire subsequent history of the Ottoman Empire. It can be claimed, in fact, that no sultan, including Abdiiihamid II, who was usually reviled for his autocratic tendencies, was able to turn back the clock with regard to institutional reform. The mechanism set in motion by the reform movement worked at a number of levels, but concentrated on three main areas: provincialadinin^tration, education, andjh^judiciary,wjfhj3dicyj^ The movement was initiated i n a number of councils established at thecêntre of^ovèTHment. One of its major successes was the establishment of a system of provincial administration modelled on that of France (1867 - 1871). The district judge, kadi, whose functions were part administrative and part judicial, was replaced by the administrative official trained in the new School of Political Science, established in 1859. The judiciary was now much expanded by a new system of civil, commercial and criminal courts. The entire system was eventually attached to a Ministry of Justice. The educational reforms of the Tanzimat down-graded the religious personnel who had staffed the overwhelming majority of educational institutions, replacing them by civil teachers trained in teacher training schools. The muallim, a figure similar to the French instituteur, replaced the hoca, the religious instructor. The main educational success of the Tanzimat was the Riisdiye, a three to four-year stint after primary school, aimed at forming middle-level officials. In the 1880s provincial capitals began to possess the Ottoman equivalent of the lycée. The model for these had been the Lycée of Galatasaray established in 1868 through the efforts of the French Minister of Education, Victor Duruy. At Galatarasay courses were given in French and many generations of Turks came to see sivilizasyon, the ultimate aim of the founding fathers of the Tanzimat, through French eyes. What we have here is an adumbration of the leitmotif of the Turkish Republic of the 1920s, namely an earlier version of its slogan, my.asizjnedeniyet (contemporary cjvilisatioa)-aSLihe^oal. Nevertheless, the westernism of the Turkish Republic was in one respect fundamemaUyjii^ roach western cmîisatiolTfib^thêjir^tion of a nation which claimed equality with other Eu^rop^ajijnatrons. The evblution of this stance whîch~is still of p T i t n o ^ understanding Turkey's attitude towards Western Europe, is a theme which is worth treating in detail. During the Tanzimat era, too, a whole set of contacts with Western Europe were initiated in the military sphere. Graduates of the Military Academy proper (established in 1834) were sent abroad to complete their military training regularly from/the 1840s onward. The first modern Ottoman medical school was established as a military institution. The military secondary schools were the first to provide a programme of instruction that attempted to provide training equivalent to that of the lycée for underprivileged students from a rural background. Again, students with this type of background entered the ranks of the Young Turks. One of the first results of the lycée (Riisdiye) education was the gradual formation of an intelligentsia. This seems to have been connected with the transition from the old system of education, where personal contact played a major- role in instruction, to the new system in which book-learning was highlighted. Book-learning created an audience attuned to the to16

tality of book-learned information, and explains both the new intelligentsia and its increasingly important role in a Turkey where mass media were beginning to spread outward from the capital. From now on reform proposals would not be of the traditional Ottoman adaptivepragmatic type, but increasingly well rounded "projects" with some underlying rationale for Ottoman society as a whole. The specific demands of the first generation of protestors against the Tanzimat reforms were for constitutional government and a parliamentary democracy built upon an Islamic philosophical infrastructure. Their proposals were described in newspapers published in exile in London and Paris, and their propaganda was a major contribution to the dethroning of Sultan AbduTaziz in 1876. The army, the navy, and to a certain extent higher civilian officials, and even seminary students, all had a hand in this development, which was followed by the proclamation of a constitution soon to be prorogued by Sultan Abdulhamid II. From this intelligentsia, known as the Young Ottomans, a critique developed for the first time, of the subordinate and dependent position assumed by the Ottoman Empire in its new and increased contacts with Western Europe. Sultan Abdiilhamid's reign had been one during which some of the controversial political information published in Europe had been banned. Nevertheless, literature flourished and French literature, especially, was avidly followed. It is to the ubiquity of the book that we owe another development: the gradual upgrading in the teaching of science. This occurred first with the biological sciences and its centre was the Military Medical School. The ideas of Dr. Claude Bernard as well as those of Ludwig Buchner took hold in the revamped medical school of the 1890s, and materialism permeated and shaped the thinking of a new generation of doctors, who provided the nucleus of the Young Turk movement. In retrospect Sultan Abdulhamid II, with all his obvious despotic tendencies, was nevertheless a much maligned ruler. The Sultan had a remarkable record in continuing the policies of the Tanzimat. The programme of administrative improvement and state infrastructural development, which he showed to the British ambassador at his accession to the throne, seems to have been almost entirely implemented during his reign. The expansion of the civil court system and of the new educational system continued during his reign. The Ottoman civil service as such took shape in the last years of the nineteenth century. Military education became highly efficient in preparing new officers during his reign. Freiherr Von der Goltz, the author of a manual espousing total mobilization, Das Volk in Waffen, took this responsibility in 1883. In another sense, too, the Sultan, despite his anti-democratic tendencies, was in the mainstream of his predecessors. LikgJhe...YbungJllGQm^ believed that mode^ni^ cultural values.—. Religion played a central role in his projects. The basis for the renewed weight given to religion was the need to give the mass of the Ottoman population a means of participating ! in the process of pulling oneself by one's own bootstraps. It is in this "Japanese" approach to modernization, that is the conservation of traditional values along with the adoption of modern technology, observed both in the Young Ottoman and the Hamidian versions, that some of the major quandaries of a meeting between East and West would surface.

17

Dilemmas in Cultural Relations with the West

One of the questions raised was the extent to which European or western civilisation is an indivisible whole. For such Tanzimat statesmen as Saffet Paşa, as well as for Kemal Ata­ türk, western civilisation was of one cloth and had to be adopted as a unit or not at all. For both, the definition of western civilisation seems to have consisted of a world view, "science", and the civil institutions of ]^stemEurgpe. To the extent that it was realised that these civil institutions were shaped by a special development of the economy, ne\y^cmiomic institutions had also to be brought to Turkey. To what extent it was understood that this also meant the acceptance of the b^mfeoígíe is not clear. Every time the question came up, whether in the nineteenth century or in the twentieth, the idea of equality as a fundamental value of the Ottoman system emerged as one which competed with the idea of an untrammeled bourgeoisie. This is possibly one of the subtlest strains of "survivals" which cannot be neglected in considering the position of Turkey vis­ a-vis Western Europe. In the nineteenth century one of its manifestations was the disappro­ ving attitude of much of the Ottoman middle- and lower-class population towards the be­ haviour of westernised Tanzimat statesmen. Ottoman grandees who had borne the respon­ sibility and the risk of initiating new policies had also developed Western European con­ sumption patterns. Crinolines, pianos, dining tables and living-room furniture were new ideas which the official class soon adopted, and these were often seen as foolish luxuries by the section of the population that had lived on the modest standards imposed by traditio­ nal values. 5

A more important consequence of modernisation was the obvious subordination of those societies which were "joiners" to the closed coterie of "initiators". As a result, many Otto­ mans felt that Europeanisation was tantamount to accepting economic exploitation by Euro­ pean states and that various commercial treaties signed between the Ottoman Empire and individual European powers underlined this subordination. With time this feeling that west­ ernisation amounted to subjugation acquired new dimensions and the attempt to escape this status became a fundamental aim of many who also accepted the general goal of modernisa­ tion. Thus the westernism of the Turkish Republic was in one respect fundamentally differ­ ent from that of the Tanzimat: R^ubjİcaıwşform attempted to approach western civilisatjojLfromji^^ . The evolution of thísotaneéis j t i l l ^ p r m i e importance in Turkey's attitude towards Western Europe. " " ~"~ " — -^TTtmal twist in the question of how involved one could or should be with Western Europe while pursuing a policy of modernisation was that of interpreting the set of signals that ema­ nated from the West. Simply stated, these could be divided into two: on one hand there was the universalistic theory of humanism, which looked to the eventual brotherhood of man; on the other hand there was Realpolitik, which contradicted these aims. Which one then represented the "true" Europe? European social theorists of the end of the ninetheenth century, like Pareto, who were faced by the same interpretive task, decided that the theories were simple masks for less well known tendencies of western societies. A number of Turks reacted in similar fashion, but this had not been the stand of Tanzimat statesmen who believed that the humanitarianevolutionistic promise would slowly materialise. Many Turks educated in the new system 18

were of the same opinion and, as a result, encountered repeated disillusions, but their atti­ tude did not have the same root as those of Pareto and Mosca. The Turkish "realistic" reaction was essentially one which derived from the traditional understanding that "human nature does not change and is explained by egoism". On the oth­ er hand, the "idealistic" reaction seems to be best described as "millenial", that is, it can be derived from undercurrents of western history which have come forth with a repeated promise that the Kingdom of God on earth will be realised. There is an equivalent set of beliefs in Islam, although orthodox Islam does not view it with much sympathy. The "Mahdi", the elect of God, is to appear some time and is to bring the reign of heaven to earth. The reason for which Muslim theologians did not stress the idea of a Mahdi, however, is linked with the conceptions that he will appear at the end of historical time at the moment appointed for him by God. Theories which presented this stage by stating that the Mahdi would appear during historic time were, therefore, a difficult issue for theologians to grapple with. Self-appointed Mahdis were treated as charlatans. The Christian idea of the millenium is much more clearly an idea of radical changes occurr­ ing within historic time. InJlH&s^ns^Jh^We^^ of the "internal dynamics" or "stages" of historyandtherefore of its unpredictable,çontingénuŒ directionality was veryjïôw İçLdİY^

™~

~

Thus, the perception of the West among Muslims as a cultural cluster rather than a dyna­ mic movement: western civilisation is not an evolving, intricate blending of divergent and contradictory elements constantly being re-shaped by historical conditions, but the West it­ self is a mixture of "good" and "bad" values, and one's task is to separate the "bad" from the "good". One of the distinctive qualities of Kemal Atatürk, which separated him from his prede­ cessors, was his ability to see "stages" in history. Sometimes the concept of history as a succession of moments — each one of them providing an opportunity for action but with no specific directionality — would seem to be the outcome of a somewhat schematic know­ ledge of history. The best of Rüşdiye fare was not of a quality to form the decisions of a statesman in charge of the fate of the Ottoman Empire. It is no coincidence that Atatürk was trained in military schools after a complete revamping of the curriculum of history, intro­ duced in the 1870s and much improved later where the "stages" figured prominently. It also is no coincidence that he was an avid reader of history, among others of the volumes in the collection L'Evolution de l'Humanité, authored by a number of Durkheim's former stu­ dents. It was during the Young Turk era that Western European books on politics and social thought appeared in Turkey after having been suppressed during the Hamidian rule. Two French schools of social thought in particular, marked the era. One of these emanated from Durkheim, the other from Le Play and Emile Demolins. Le Play was the theoretician adop­ ted by groups which set themselves against the bureaucratic cast of the Ottoman govern­ ment and tried to reverse this trend by supporting individual initiative. This point of view was shared by forces contending with what the Ottomans had cherished as their most exal­ ted achievement: the formation of a centre able to keep the pieces of the social mosaic together. No wonder, then, that the military, the men influenced by positivism, and the Young Turks, who believed that they were fighting a world-conspiracy to destroy the Otto­ man Empire, saw this theory as tantamount to treason. The Young Turks, on their part, 19

were experimenting both with Abdülhamid's Islamic card and with a new Turkish national­ ism. Dürkheim provided a new solution which would keep the social mosaic together: solidarism based on the organic solidarity of a society differentiated according to profes­ sions, not according to ethnicity or religion. The Turkish Republic Dürkheim was taken over by the Turkish Republic and its skogajiJ3ej;ajne^Science isthe truest gûîïéTHmlïeed, many of the reforms undertaken after the prociamation"oflhe Re~ put5Iic~wêTe concerned with the secularisation of Turkish society. With the large losses of territory and population that the Ottoman Empire suffered at the end of World War I, the most salient component of the old pluralistic Ottoman society dis­ appeared. Except for a few large towns, Anatolia, the remaining territory of the Empire, was overwhelmingly Muslim. The Turkish nationalist leaders took advantage of the sense of Islamic identity in organising Anatolian resistence to the Treaty of Sevres, and to the occupation of Anatolia by Greece. The nationalists invoked the thesis that the sultan in Istanbul was a prisoner of the allied forces and that Ankara was fighting for the preservation of the sultanate and the caliphate. In contrast, the sultan felt that the Ankara movement was leading Turkey on a disaster course initiated by the Young Turks when they joined the Cen­ tral Powers during World War I, and had his highest religious official denounce the Ankara movement as "rebel bandits". The Ankara regime emerged victorious from its confronta­ tion with the Greeks, and on 1 November 1922 announced the abolition of the sultanate, al­ leging that the Sultan had discredited his authority by siding with the enemy. On 29 October 1923 Republic was proclaimed, and upon the suggestion of Mustafa Kemal, the caliphate was abolished as a necessary consequence of the abolition of the sultanate. On the same day that it abolished the caliphate, the Assembly passed a law assigning reg­ ulation of all matters of religious belief and ritual, as well as the administration of religious institutions, to a Directorate of Religious Affairs and a Directorate of Pious Foundations. These Directorates were to be attached to the Prime Minister's office so that the State would control all training for religious offices as well as the salaries and appointments of ail reli­ gious officials. Other steps taken to secularise the Republic during the 1920s and 1930s included the aboli­ tion of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations (4 March 1924), abolition of the remaining religious courts 03 April 1924), proscription of the fez and other "uncivilized" headgear (25 November 1925), dissolution of the dervish orders (30 November 1925), reform of the calendar (1 January 1926), adoption of the Swiss Civil Code<17 February 1926), dis­ establishment of the state religion (10 April 1928); adoption of the Latin alphabet (1 Novem­ ber 1928), and the "Turkicization" of the Islamic call to prayer (3 February 1932). Education was as resolutely secularised as other aspects of life. Law Number 430, dated 3 March 1924, gave the Ministry of Education of the Turkish Republic control over educa­ tional institutions. The government defined its attitude toward religion as "laicism", an in­ tellectual inheritance from the French Third Republic. Laicism itself was quite clearly de­ fined: in its statutes of 9 September 1923, the Republican Peoples Party (RPP), the founding party of the Republic, cited as one of its most important principles "to separate religion and the world in matters relating to the state and the nation". 20

The combination of secularisation and laïcisation brought dramatic changes in the Tur­ kish socio-political structure, particularly in view of the fact that the Republic showed a clear distaste for religion. One of the typical enactments of the Republic was, for example, that there would be only one mosque allowed for all persons living within a radius of 500 metres. Any mosque which violated this standard was torn down or rented out as a ware­ house. One of the major anti-religious propaganda themes emphasised in courses on Otto­ man history was the obscurantism of the ulema, and overall, the thrust was on replacing superstition with science, an intellectual emphasis derived from the secular currents em­ anating from France, particularly the views of Auguste Comte and Léon Bourgeois. it İs not surprising that the Republic's new approach toward religion left some gaping holes in the fabric of society. In Ottoman society, the Islamic religion defined for many indi­ viduals the means by which they handled their encounters with daily life. It served to crystalize their identities and to regulate psychological tensions. Socially, as folk Islam, it provi­ ded modes of communication, mediation, and community leadership. But the Republic was not able to replace these functions with new doctrines or world views with one exception— the cult surrounding Kemal Atatürk. However, the personal veneration attached to Atatürk was not bolstered by any coherent, related ideology. There was an attempt to fill the ideological vacuum with new values through the cultiva­ tion of certain elements of ancient Turkish, or Central Asian, culture, but the appeal of these new doctrines was primarily limited to recent graduates of the secularised schools and universities. The plain fact remained that neither Kemalism nor its associated doctrines could replace Islam in the lives of the peasantry and the provincial and lower-class popula­ tions. The only aspect of Kemalism that was espoused by all classes was Turkish nationa­ lism. As could be expected, there were a number of religious outbreaks in Turkey during the 1920s and 1930s which bore the clear imprint of reactionary clerics responding to the Republic's laicisation efforts. In 1925, Sheik Said, a tribal chief and leader of Nakshibendi sect in the Piran region, utilised his hereditary status and religious charisma to lead a rebel­ lion in East Turkey. The Government was alerted by the Sheik Said rebellion to the fact that religious movements had to be dealt with swiftly. Thereafter the smallest move that could be interpreted as an effort to revive the old religious order led to immediate and strong measures by the authorities.

The Post-World War II Period

Shortly after the end of World War II, Turkey made the transition to a multi-party system, a development which profoundly affected the interrelationship between religion and poli­ tics. A schism developed between those political factions which demanded a revival of reli­ gious values and those which defended the official laicism of the Turkish Republic. The so­ cial mobilisation accompanying the political changes added momentum and importance to the restructuring of religious issues in Turkey. The first political party to establish itself in opposition to the RPP was the Democrat Party (DP), founded in January 1946. Soon to become the main rival of the dominant RPP, the D P had as one of the planks in its programme the liberalisation of government policies 21

toward religion. The reaction to the RPP's policy of laicism culminated when the Democrat Party was elected to power in 1950. The new Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, stated that Turkey was a Muslim country and would remain so. But this cautiously vague official statement proved remarkably difficult to implement, as individual party members found during subsequent years. By 1953, talks began concerning formation of a common front between the D P and R P P in order to help stem the now seemingly uncontrollable tide of religious reaction. The continued laicist cast of the Republic's government was clearly demonstrated by the dissolution of the Turkish Nationalist Association (April 1953), an organisation espousing a clearly nationalistIslamic ideology; in July of the same year a law proscribing the use of "religious sentiment" in the pursuit of "political or personal influence" was passed. In short, little was done to change the basic cast of laicism during the 1950s when the Democrat Party held power but religion continued to maintain considerable strength among the rural masses and in provincial towns. Part of the mass media in Turkey viewed such religious movements and the issues they raised as a form of backsliding from the laicism of the early Republic. In 1960 a group of officers toppled the Menderes regime, stating their intent to "establish an impartial administration guided by the principles of Atatürk." It was decided that a new constitution was needed, one which would more solidly embody the principles of Kemalist reform than the Constitution of 1924. Yet, despite the preparation of the new laicised Constitution, the role of religion in Turkey remained too complex to be shaped by legal considerations alone. The religious revival of the 1950s demonstrated that there were more subterranean and sociological aspects to the role of Islam than those admitted by the ideologists of the RPP. Turkej/coi^ to know about the latest developments in the West during the Republican era./Cultural contacts were redoubled, many Turks smdied âb and the ge&ersHine of diplomacy has been one in which Turkey saw itself as one of the European democracies .jA large programme of translations from the western classics was undertaken in the 1920s and 1930s, and Turkish universities were stamped with the indelible mark of a generation of refugees from Hitler's Germany who devoted themselves to creating a Turkish university of high quality. The years following the World War IT resulted in an even wider opening to the West. Not only did Turkey join the various international institutions^ which were being created specifically for the defence of western Europe, such as NATO, ^ J but it also participated in the OECD. However, new elements have been introduced into the pattern of Turkey's relations with Europe since the internal political changes that began in the 1950s. The elections of May 1950 brought to power a party which had contested the main ideology of the Republic's architects. One way of expressing this radical turn in politics would be to say that ideology of Le Play had triumphed over that of Durkheim. A more pertinent assessment would be that the forces of the Ottoman periphery, those elements that had composed the Ottoman "mosaic", had finally acquired the political clout for which they had been searching for so long. One of the consequences of this change was that attitudes and behaviour patterns, in the past which had to be shaped by the State before they were allowed full rein, acquired a new legitimacy. "Freedom", a word which had already existed in the Turkish vocabulary for a century acquired a new dimension; it came mean the freedom of the individual Turkish communities to shape their future. For even though the Democrat Party, which stood 22

for individualism, provided the means for the expression of individual preferences, these preferences could only be ones that were shaped within a given culture and a set of values. For the sake of brevity, we may call these preferences the culture of the periphery. In a sense, then, the individual was given the means to organise in economic patterns that had been proscribed under the Republic. But in another sense this new economic organisational development was underpinned by a cultural pattern that we may choose to call "traditional". The economic development which followed from this new liberalisation, between 1950 and 1960, has many features similar to the development of civil society in Western Europe. The commercial links between cities, the growth of organised economic expansion, the multiplication of enterprises, are all parallels which come to mind. However, in one respect this growth of civil society was different from what it had been in Europe. There, European culture had grown in parallel with the growth of civil society. The same was not true for Turkey. The everyday culture of the rural areas, and particularly religion, had been barely tolerated enclaves in the Turkish Republic. The rethinking of cultural premises made possible by the new regime of the 1950s, therefore, required first a return to the pattern of culture as it had lain undisturbed since 1923. Rethinking did follow, but the main tendency was a defensive reaction. The 1950s had in the end facilitated the preservation of certain elements of traditional culture, which, together with the growth of party politics has had a momentous effect in shaping the political and social development of Turkey since then. Sectarian movements have grown; much religious conservatism has been in evidence. The strong pressures for the establishment of the economic bases of a civil society have therefore been paralleled by a search for a field of action for this new civil society that would provide congenial cultural bases for development. On the other hand, the Turkey of today cannot be explained solely in the context of a rebellion against the values of the RPP. The permanent structures created by the Turkish Republic are strongly outlined in modern Turkey. Very large groups, among them the entire profession of the judiciary, are organically integrated into a system which takes its inspiration from basically western conceptions. The educational establishment similarly is formed and strongly influenced by basic western or "universal" values. The military establishment shares the same western values. Modern Turkey, therefore, is no Iran despite everything which has been written and said about Islamic revival. It is nevertheless, a country where complex forces are at work and in which no simplistic assessment can isolate "lines of force" that look to the future.

23

Ahmet O. Evin

Communitarian Structures, Values and Cultural Behaviour in Turkey

Differing Perceptions of the Cultural Problem The prospect of Turkey's entry into the European Community has once more brought into the forefront the topic of cultural differences between western Europe and Turkey. A l though cultural issues would ordinarily seem to be far less significant than economic and political ones in the consideration of E C membership, in the Turkish case they are perceived to be important and they have loomed large in debates concerning whether Turkey can be considered as an integral part of Europe. TJie-iprestiSHTtf^^ taken up in relatjonjo the "Europeanness^ of die^gjrmjurjity and^in this respect, the possible inclusion of Turkey within the E C is viewed in certain quarters as somewhaTol^arrano^" maTyr~~ ~~~~ ' " " " ~~—Oddly enough, during the early stages of the negotiations with the original Six leading to the Association Agreement of 1963, Turkey's cultural and geographical distance from Brussels was not as prominent an issue as it would later become. One explanation is that the Community wished to enhance its international stature by increasing its sphere of influence in those early days, and hence, welcomed the initial application from Greece and Turkey to enter into Association Agreement. A more likely explanation is that economic issues pre-empted all others, and given the state of Turkey's economic underdevelopment at that time, it is doubtful that anybody seriously entertained the idea of Turkey joining the Community in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the signing of the Association Agreement on 12 September 1963 was proclaimed as an affirmation of Turkey's being a part of Europe by a person of no lesser stature than President Hallstein of the Commission. 1

7

8

Yet in the following two decades views to the contrary gained broader currency. No doubt that the Turkish Gastarbeiter presence, particularly in Germany, and the resulting integration problems sensitised the public opinion to cultural differences. The recession in the wake of oil price increases in 1973 and rising unemployment in Europe exacèrbated the sit-' uation, as Turkish workers ceased to be welcome. Later in the decade the global economic crisis severely affected Turkey, leading to political déstabilisation. On the one hand the polarisation and factionalism of competing groups in Turkey began to spill over to migrant worker communities in Europe, on the other hand Turkish nationals began asking for political asylum in Europe, first during these anarchic years and then after the 1980 military intervention as well. To Western Europeans who felt burdened by it, the Turkish problem seemed to be a cultural one in origin, reflecting the lack of any means for conflict resolution in Turkish society. This state of affairs led to further doubts about the possibility of Turkish integration within the E C . Moreover, negative attitudes towards the Turkish presence in Europe were reinforced by received notions about Turkey. In Europe, Turkey seems to have retained some of the mystique it evoked in earlier centuries due to the persistence of the rich imagery and the rather engaging mythology associa24

ted with the Ottomans. Much of the popular attitude in northern Europe towards Turkey seems still to be conditioned by historical factors going back to the Turkenfurcht of the Suleimanic age. The myth of the "terrible Turk" can be said to be a cultural problem resting more with European perceptions than with Turkish realities. But the fact that Turkey is basically an Islamic nation often raises doubts as to whether there could be adequate cultural compatibility between Turkey and the rest of the EC. In certain quarters the merits of considering a country with an Islamic population among the western family of nations are greeted with scepticism. In recent years, the European perception of Turkey has changed significantly as a result of Turkey's return to a democratic regime along with improved political and economic relations with the EC. At the same time, however, there has been an increased awareness in Europe about cultural coherence. The Southern Enlargement of the Community, for example, has brought a new focus to the notion of European cultural borders. To those who emphasise a "European" cultural identity as distinct from a Mediterranean one, even the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal simply meant that the "Europeanness" of the Community was being compromised. The Turkish application for membership coming right after the Enlargement brought renewed attention to the "otherness" of Turkey, whose inclusion in the E C would extend the Community into further territories beyond even the geographical bounderies of Europe. In contrast to such varied concerns on the European side, there are very different perceptions on the Turkish side. Turkey's eventual integration into the E C is seen not only as the sole viable option, but as the end result of a long process of westernisation. Politically, Turkey has developed closer ties with Europe ever since the Ottoman Empire was admitted into the European concert of nations at the Congress of Vienna. Beginning with the nineteenthcentury reforms, Turkish educational, administrative, political and legal systems have been adopted from the West. The modern Turkish nation-state was established with a western orientation. Turkish reformist leaders and intellectuals over the last century and a half have stressed the necessity of catching up with "contemporary civilisation", which refers to material aspects of European advancement. In addition, politically Turkey has been fully integrated into the western system since World War II. Given the socialisation and background of the Turkish leadership, the cultural distance between Turkey and Europe seems much shorter when viewed from Ankara than the other way around. It is true that in the course of the last two decades several Turkish politicians voiced opposition to membership, but those who did so for reasons other than economic ones represented a small minority on the radical fringe. Economically, the relations have often been strained due mosdy to the Turkish perceptions that the Community deliberately discriminates against Turkey, particularly by ignoring its export needs. Nevertheless, none of the Turkish governments have adopted a policy to, reverse the course of Turkey's association with the EC. The fact that the application for accession has been made by a government which has often stressed the value of Turkey's Islamic heritage shows how insignificant cultural differences are perceived to be from the Turkish side. ^ The difference in perceptions can be'explained and reconciled through a historical survey of relationships and attitudes, but such an exercise would not help to establish criteria to evaluate the degree of social and cultural compatibility. Obsession with perceptions has often got in the way of observing reality, giving rise to polemical discussions concerning Turkey's entry into the EC. Insofar as historical background is concerned, it is important to put 25

into perspective the cultural and institutional changes attending the Turkish modernisation process. This task has been fulfilled in the first part of this chapter by Şerif Mardin, who discusses the intellectual and ideological background of Turkish reformist thought, and identifies the way in which western institutions came to be adopted in Turkey. While historical considerations will help to explain the nature and the extent of Turkish westernisation, cultural issues remain to be defined and analysed with a view to assessing rationally whether they constitute a significant barrier in the way of Turkey's ability to function as part of the EC. The following discussion, therefore, will first focus on some prevelant characteristics of Turkish social structure in terms of the historical conditions in which they evolved, so as to shed light on certain features of cultural behaviour determined by the social structure. Then an attempt will be made to relate this socio-cultural map to the experience of Turkish migrant communities with a view to assessing their adaptability to an alien cultural envionment. Through this approach it is also hoped to gain a clearer per­ spective on both the integration problems encountered by Turkish workers in Europe and the problems of polarisation that disrupted life in Turkey only a decade ago. Historical Background At the root of these problems lies the persistence in Turkey of communitarian structures and a strong tendency toward small group solidarity. In European social history the word "community" (Gemeinschaft) is associated with the socio-political order of medieval feud­ alism. One of the chief characteristics of medieval political life was "that certain persons and groups were exempted from direct obedience to the commands issued by, or in the name of, the ruler. This Immunity' guaranteed that within the delimited sphere of their authority these persons and groups were entitled to exercise the legal powers of govern­ ment. .. .This system of negative and positive privileges (which may be called 'immunities' or 'autonomous jurisdictions') became the legal foundation of representative govern­ ment." Thus the community structure in Europe contained from medieval time, the very elements which would propel it to the next stage of development towards "society" (Gesell¬ schaft), characterised by impersonal law, voluntary association and individualism. The existence of the notion of reciprocal rights and privileges enabled the formation of corpo­ rate bodies with autonomous jurisdiction (Rechtsgemeinschaften), and facilitated the devel­ opment of a legal system of adjudication to mediate between the potentially conflicting in­ terests amongst them. The acknowledgement of autonomy and an established legal-con­ tractual basis for obligations constituted the foundation on which civil society was built. As " the transformation from feudalism to modern economy led to ^ocial differentiation ac­ cording to function, voluntary associations based on occupational interdependence evolved as viable social units, and solidarity based on mutual interest gradually came to replace "community" based on kinship or proximity, and governed by a set of rigid, normative codes. Each era ushered in by a major economic change, such as mercantilism, industriali­ sation and urbanisation, saw a redistribution of status and power in society, attended by changes in outlook and values, and these processes prevented the perpetuation of com­ munitarian structures. 9

In Turkey, on the other hand, the persistence-of communitarian structures is the result of long historical tradition. As has been discussed elsewhere, the Ottoman principles of state 26

i \ ; i

and government did not allow autonomous jurisdictions. Instead, all parts of the Empire as well as the status of subjects and even their economic functions were placed directly un¬ der the jurisdiction of the centre, which issued laws, edicts and regulations, governing provinces, estates, vocational and confessional groups. The notion of protection and obedience rather than reciprocal rights and privileges governed the relationship between the rulers and the subject. The idea of economic autonomy was also not consistent with these princi­ ples, and the system did not tolerate the formation of a land-based aristocracy or of any group which aspired to control resources independently of the centre. Ottoman principles of social organisation were in large measure dictated by an obsessive concern with the dan­ ger of potentially rival groups to the centre, and the policies to enforce these principles aim­ ed to suppress voluntary associations and corporations as well, thus preventing the devel­ opment of the very institutions that constitute an essential bridge for the passage from tradi­ tional to modern society. Ottoman patrimonialism required a clear-cut distinction between the ruling classes, which served military, administrative and judicial functions, and other subjects who ful­ filled economic functions. The former, especially the military-administrative classes, com­ posed largely of non-Muslim born slaves, were given special education and socialised as members of the ruling elite to uphold the principles of the Ottoman state. The top-level judi­ cial officials who came from the ranks of the Muslim learned hierarchy would also be ex­ pected to profess loyalty to the State. The ruling classes were distinguished by their "Ottomanness", which superseded differentiation according to ethnic or confessional back­ ground, and they were imbued with a sense of belonging to the high culture of the centre. Ordinary subjects, on the other hand, were differentiated according to ethnicity and reli­ gion, with each collectivity steeped in its own local value culture and its social life governed by received normative codes. The wide cultural gap between the elite and non-elite groups increased the distance between the centre and the periphery. 10

In addition, some'aspects of Ottoman administrative practices had the effect of reinfor­ cing the characteristic pattern of separate communities, distinguished along ethnic and con­ fessional lines, in both rural and urban areas, in Anatolia such a pattern came into existence in the wake of Turkish migrations from Asia, prior to the rise of the Ottoman state. Turco­ man tribes and other groups that fled from the Mongol invasion were among the early rural settlers. Their nomadic background, and the range of heterodox beliefs and practices they had, stood in sharp contrast with the orthodox culture of Muslim townsfolk. The villages they built were interspersed among those of various Christian communities, and all these groups came to co-exist side by side with little or no cultural exchange. When Anatolia was consolidated under Ottoman rule, it consisted of many separate communities each of which retained its own customs and values. This pattern continued as a result of the Ottoman policies of settling nomads. Nomadic tribes were forced to settle in one place for the purposes of tax collection as well as of main­ taining law and order. These policies were enforced with varying degrees of success depen­ ding on the area, but they led to the establishment of new villages, each one populated by a single tribal group. More significant was the principle of compulsory resettlement of newly conquered terri­ tories in determining the spatial organisation of communities." Rebellious populations would be broken up into small groups and deported to different areas. To restore agricultu­ ral production, farmers from different regions with different ethnic backgrounds would be '27

settled around newly conquered cities so that each group would produce what it was accus­ tomed to producing in its own region. Even wealthy merchants and craftsmen would be re­ settled in such cities so as to revive the economy. As a result, spatial differentiation in urban areas was even more striking, as streets and quarters were populated according to confes­ sional and vocational groupings, in most cases the two went handin hand, since some pro­ fessions and crafts were allocated to particular ethnic groups. Settlement patterns based on ethnic, vocational and religious differentiation led to the rise of urban, communities with a high degree Of affinity and self-regulative tendencies. In contrast to the ruling classes which demonstrated a high degree of individualism, the productive and tax-paying estates were thus divided into closed communities, the cellular structure of which was reinforced by spatial organisation. Although the Ottoman Empire underwent major transformations between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, the re­ sulting decline of central power did not affect the culture of the periphery. Instead, a num­ ber of developments in the periphery had the effect of strengthening the communitarian structures. In the provinces there appeared a number of local dynasts, who emulated the centre. These dynasts often belonged to the military estate, and hence, did not have much affinity with the local culture. Both the dynasts and tax-farmers began putting a great deal more pressure on the peasant than the agents of the central government had previously done. The result was an increasing alienation of rural communities, which developed an even higher degree of small group solidarity as a defensive measure against the local dynast. Two other factors played an important role historically in inhibiting horizontal integra­ tion in Anatolia until recently. One is the fact that in the Ottoman social system wealth led to power "only after passing through the filter of status" and that it was the prerogative of the State to confer status, which also indicated a proximity to the culture of the centre. Hence, the Anatolian local notable who aspired to a position of high status tended to dis­ tance himself from the local culture. Such a process created a perpetual vacuum in the strata where middle classes would be normally expected to develop. The second factor is that until the present century the means of communication in Anatolia remained limited on account of the lack of hard-surface roads. Though perhaps a relatively minor factor as compared to social and political ones, the physical impediment to circulation also contributed to the iso­ lation of communities.

that specific functions in each new urban quarter would be taken over by migrants from one village. Wherever a rural migrant would find a job and settle, others from the same village would follow him as if members of a clan were following a leader. Particularly noticeable has been a pattern established in providing porters for apartment buildings. A villager, hav­ ing found one such job, would recruit a fellow villager for a similar job in the vicinity. With the rapid urban expansion since the 1960s, entirely new quarters were created in cities, with porters, grocers and petty merchants in each quarter coming from one particular area if not the same village. In this respect, the process of migration into urban areas was not attended by a significant change in traditional forms of social cohesion. A more striking example of small group solidarity has been that of the rural migrants who have built squatter settlements (gecekondus) in the urban periphery. Again, each of these settlements was originally built as a collective enterprise by people from the same region, whose affinity was reinforced by the fact that they collectively claimed land which they did not legally possess. The gecekondu process was initially not one of urbanisation, but one which simply entailed the transposition of rural local value cultures into urban areas. The contrast between the gecekondu and modern, urbanised Turkish society was sharp. Over­ whelmed by the social, economic and cultural gap that stood between them and their newly adopted environment, gecekondu dwellers became more protective of their traditional val­ ues. The clan-like cohesion obtaining in each gecekondu settlement was not weakened until the settlement itself was engulfed by urban expansion and transformed into a properly built neighbourhood. But even then, particularistic tendencies in such uncosmopolitan urban ex­ tensions have continued to reveal survivals of traditional local value culture.

12

Although the last decades of the nineteenth century witnessed faster growth of urban cen­ tres, this development was not paralleled by a transformation to a more integrated and im­ personal type of society. Like, many other things, the urbanisation process in Turkey was sui generis. From the very beginning the growth of Ottoman Istanbul was chiefly caused by fac­ tors other than commerce and industry. People migrated from Anatolia due to rural un­ employment and the inability of the underdeveloped agrarian economy of the hinterland to absorb increasing population/The fact that the State itself was the largest consumer and the chief employer in the capital city provided an added incentive to seek one's fortune in Istan­ bul. Later, large numbers of people left the Balkans as refugees in the wake of the collapse of the Empire and flocked to the capital. Because the nineteenth-century expansion of the cities was largely due to dislocation, their growth was not paralleled by a rise of an urban ethos. Until recently, the settlement patterns of the newly urbanised groups in Turkey curiously recalled the spatial arrangements under the Ottoman system. A common pattern has been 28

Cultural Behaviour, Adaptation and Integration In the light of this brief survey, it is possible to address several of the issues that have been raised earlier. The first one relates to the response of Turkish migrant workers to the Euro­ pean environment. Especially when they first began coming to Europe in substantial num­ bers, Turkish workers distinguished themselves as being more of an isolated group than mi­ grant workers from other Mediterranean countries. They tended to live close together and to socialise exclusively with one another, showing little interest in the public and social life of their host country. It was hastily inferred from their introverted attitude and from their tendency to form small solidarity groups that they were hostile to the idea of integrating into their new environment because of fundamental cultural differences between Europe and Turkey. Cultural differences between where workers happened to come from and the environ­ ment in which they found themselves certainly did not facilitate any form of adaptation. But the fact that they constituted closely knit communities of their own was not so much the re­ sult of cultural differences between Europe and Turkey as it was of the received pattern of social groupings in Turkey. Migrant worker communities simply displayed the same ten­ dency toward communitarism in Europe as the first generation of gecekondu dwellers have done in the Turkish urban environment. Though the group solidarity of the workers stood in sharp contrast with the highly individualistic environment of northern Europe, it did not prevent a pattern of co-existence from emerging, a pattern somewhat reminiscent of the way İn which different communities have been able to co-exist side by side throughout Turkish 29

history. In short, what the Turkish workers brought with them was a deep-seated way of initiation into a new cultural milieu whether in their own country or abroad, and their experience in Europe should be considered to be following the same pattern of integration, or, initially, a lack of integration, as the newly urbanising groups have displayed in Turkey. There have certainly been factors other than group consciousness which have impeded their fuller participation in the social life of their environment. The language barrier, preferred forms of recreation, habits, customs, economic considerations, and even nostalgia have been important factors in reinforcing group solidarity among dislocated elements, and such elements have little reason to make an effort to integrate themselves socially with their environment if they consider that environment to be a temporary one. This was the case with several generations of Turkish migrant workers whose outlook was shaped by an awareness of their temporary status as workers. There was also a strongly nationalistic inculcation coming from the Turkish side as if to prevent them from entering into a melting pot. The popular press appealed to the workers' sense of nostaglia for their homeland by dwelling almost exclusively on the hardships of being in alien and unwelcoming surroundings. A n image was created in the Turkish public opinion of the migrant workers as self-sacrificing volunteers posted in hardship zones and labouring under adverse conditions, all for the benefit of their kindred and country. The message reaching the workers clearly pointed to the importance of national solidarity and service to one's country, while the notions of adaptation and integration were at best neglected and, in some quarters, discouraged. Moreover, the Turkish government sent a stream of teachers to give instruction to workers' children in language, culture and religion, which was part of an effort to help the migrant worker community to maintain its identity. Many of the teachers themselves came from non-cosmopolitan backgrounds, and even those who did not were hardly equipped to deal with issues such as values and identity in a transcultural context. They took their task as a mission to help the migrant worker community to preserve its Turkishhess. As all the foregoing examples illustrate, separateness based on identity was thus a phenomenon reinforced by the circumstances and, as later developments would show, it did not militate against a potential adaptation to the European environment. In fact, it now appears that Turkish communities in Europe have begun adopting and even integrating successfully into the social environment, particularly in Germany. One reason is that a great majority of the current residents have" been living in Europe for a longer period of time than was the case with migrant workers in the 1960s and 1970s. Due to the recruitment stop in 1973, the number of newcomers from Turkey was sharply curtailed, and those who did not go back adopted the environment as their own, taking advantage of what that environment had to offer. A significant number among them accumulated savings or put their entrepreneurial skills to use and began their own businesses, thereby becoming anchored in the German socio-economic context. In the process, the Turkish community bis become differentiated and stratified, on the whole showing more interest in reaping benefits from the German system than maintaining a distance from it. In this regard, the passage of time has shown all too clearly that there is nothing instrinsic in Turkish cultural conditioning that would impede adaptation; quite to the contrary, the recent record of the Turkish presence demonstrates a high potential for adaptation, particularly into different economic environments. Another factor that accounts for the recently visible patterns of integration is the coming of age of a new generation of guest-worker children who grew up in Europe. Children born in Germany, for example, or those who were brought there at an early age have come to be 30

c

j f!

I

f

socialised into the environment. Many of them grow up with a feeling that they are a part of that environment and behave as such; and, at the same time, they do not seem to develop a tendency to suppress their Turkish identity. This kind of cosmopolitan fit constitutes yet another indicator showing that integration into German society is not incompatible with maintaining a Turkish cultural identity, provided that what is meant by cultural identity is not defined strictly by a particular local value culture which would impede integration into any kind of cosmopolitan setting. But then, the point has to be made again that even those who are steeped in a local value culture to begin with do adapt to a cosmopolitan environment through exposure over time, and those who do not, refrain from doing so more for ideological than cultural reasons. A third factor has been the changed outlook of the Turkish expatriate community itself in the wake of the rapid transformations that took place in Turkey in the 1980s. A broad internationalist approach gradually came to be adopted following the extroverted economic policies put into effect in 1980 to open up the Turkish economy to the world markets. The government saw expatriates as an important resource for helping to bolster Turkey's international linkages and recognised that their potential for doing so would increase in proportion to their status and influence abroad. Expatriates began to be encouraged to integrate into the social and political life in the countries of their residence, and even to become citizens so as to wield greater influence. As a result of this change of attitude, psychological barriers against integration would be to a large extent removed, which in turn would help facilitate adaptation processes. The patterns of adaptation so far discussed and the factors that have begun to facilitate adaptation indicate that cultural differences by themselves do not constitute a barrier in the way of integrating into the social environment, or into the economic and political system. However, it is also to be noticed that adaptation takes time for those who come from particularistic backgrounds in remoter parts of Turkey. Though there now exists a collective experience and a more conducive environment to facilitate the adaptation of newcomers, there are limits to how many newcomers a society can support. The European concern with the possibility of large numbers of immigrants arriving, should free circulation be implemented, is real and justified, considering especially the size of Turkey's population and its high rate of unemployment. The issue of cultural compatibility, on the other hand, has recently become somewhat of an obsession in Europe where there is a new emphasis on cultural integration in addition to economic as well as political integration. Arguments are put forth with the underlying assumption that cultural differences between Turkey and Europe are such that they would constitute an insurmountable obstacle for Turkey's accession to the Community. In this context, what is meant by cultural integration needs to be clarified. If the criterion for cultural integration is total conformity to the tastes and values of the adopted environment, this is not likely to occur. It is as unlikely for a Turkish taxi driver in Düsseldorf to enjoy a Bach fugue more than a popular Turkish song as it is for a Greek driver to enjoy it more than a Greek song. But if the criterion is good citizenship in a culturally varied environment, this has been achieved by a significant proportion of expatriates who initially arrived as guest workers. The second major question to be addressed is that of social equilibrium in Turkey. The extent to which the country was polarised in the late 1970s, bringing it to the verge of total chaos, is too recent to be overlooked as a dangerous sign of instability. What happened in 31

Turkey only a decade ago also has its roots in the long tradition of Ottoman patrimonialism and it is best to gain a clearer perspective of its causes before attempting to speculate on prospects for future stability. It has been mentioned that a characteristic aspect of Ottoman patrimonialism was to make a clear distinction between the centre and the periphery and to establish strict limits within which peripheral groups were allowed to operate. Beyond that, the State did not interfere with the ways in which peripheral groups governed their social life, provided that those did not come into conflict with the governing principles of the State. The communitarian struc­ tures that flourished within this framework impeded the integration of the periphery into a coherent political community. Moreover, by suppressing any demand on the system that would originate from the periphery, the State prevented the development of political sociali­ sation among the peripheral groups. A similar pattern continued throughout the period of Ottoman modernisation and the early Republic, as the centre continued to define a set of values which were not as vivid and immediate as the local value culture in which the peripheral groups were steeped. With the transition to democracy and the inception of competitive party politics, the periphery found itself in a position to make demands on the system, but these demands reflected the particu­ laristic tendencies of different groups. Political parties, too, began making their appeal of different peripheral groups in the hope of gathering votes. The result was too high an ag­ gregation of demands in several conflicting directions for the system to cope with. The economic crunch coming at a time when expectations were rising led to increased frustra­ tion, and the periphery's lack of integration resulted in its polarisation along ideological lines. The question, once again, relates to the prevelant tendencies in social structure. Small/ group solidarity can often reinforce polarisation and thus pave the way for violence. More­ over, communitarian structures facilitate the formation of clans which in turn develop a ten­ dency to identify with a cause, be it the support of a soccer team or a political ideology. Since the military coup of 1980, existing political parties were closed and new ones were founded. Though this has initially caused a rupture in the political arena, it now appears that new parties are seeking a broad based consensus on issues and they refrain from appealing to particularistic interests. Another important development is the extension laissez-faire approach to the issue of religion which has elicited mixed reactions. There has been some concern over whether the ruling Motherland Party would go so far as to compro­ mise the secular principles of the Republic in allowing a free rein to all kinds of religious movements. On the other hand, some observers have welcomed this approach as reflecting a truly democratic and populist attitude and thus putting an end to a tradition of elitist inter­ ventions on behalf of the state. Regardless of these contradictory assessments, the laissez-faire approach to religion is hoped to disperse the ideological polarisation around this issue. A l l these developments, taken together, point to a process whereby the periphery may be integrated into a coherent system of competitive politics. If a broad based consensus is indeed achieved, then an optimistic projection could be made regarding future stability, since such a system would be expected to provide room for negotiation among groups with particularistic demands. However, the economic dimension should not be ignored, expecially with the increasing demands that will be made by an in­ creasing and young population. Should there arise once more a sitation whereby rising ex32

pectations cannot be met, such as the situation that obtained İn the 1970s, then frustrations may easily lead to social unrest magnified by polarisation along ideological lines. On the cultural side, however, a central question that comes to mind is whether eastern Anatolia is compatible, for example, with Holland. Here again an appropriate criteria must be established to define compatibility. If by compatibility is meant close similarity in behav­ iour, values, tastes and outlook, then it is highly unlikely that those criteria can be achieved. But then cultural uniformity could not be the Community's goal for integration, as there are salient differences, for example, between Hamburg and Naples. If, on the other hand, by cultural integration is meant the ability to function within an orderly, democratic environ­ ment under the rule of law, then Turkish society has a chance of achieving it and can achieve İt only if the enormous tasks that lie ahead are fully recognised and relentlessly pursued. Notes 1

2 3 4 5

6

7 8 9 10

U 12

Ibn Khaldun, the North African sociologist has provided a model of this succession of dynasties and worked out its dynamics. The model worked as follows: tribal federations which acquire a solidarity based on kinship, crystallised by a new religious fervour, conquer the town and its inhabitants and de­ stroy the ruling dynasty. A new dynasty then emerges which is drawn from the conquerors. This new dynasty then sinks into well-being and luxury. It can no longer draw support from its subjects: solida­ rity has evaporated among tribesman taken into the civilisation of city dwellers. The entire urban enter­ prise then becomes prey to another federation of tribes and so on ad infinitum. Ibn Khaldun mentioned an exception to this cyclical pattern, that of dynasties established on large scale agricultural land with no menacing tribal groups. Though the predecessors of the Ottomans, the Seljuks, established in Anatolia an even more favourable ecology than that described by Ibn Khaldun, they were nevertheless destroyed by quasi-Khaldunian developments. The Ottomans had transcended this pattern by what they considered to be the excellence of their governmental arrangements and they took pride İn having escaped this wheel of'fate. Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton, 1982), see especially pp. 1 - 18. For de Rochefort, Müteferrika and de Bonneval, see Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal, 1964), pp. 30 - 50. Cf. Berkes, pp. 62 - 63. The lavish style of Ottoman statesmen at the time of the Ottoman Empire was often symbolic of the posi­ tion occupied by the official, and was accepted as such. The new 19th century state of affairs and the scandalous expenditures it brought with it were represented in the image of the westernised fop which appears in so many of the Turkish novels of the time. Cf. Şerif Mardin, "Super Westernization in Tur­ key in the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century", in P. Benedict, et.al., ed., Turkey: Geographical and Social Perspectives (Leiden, 1973). While Atatürk was fighting what he himself labeled as "western imperialism", he did not lose faith in the promise of what he called "contemporary civilization". Nevertheless, his attitude is exceptional and much of the contemporary Islamic attitude towards modernization has to be explained in terms of the "survival" of the a~historical attitude. Mehmet Ali Birand, Türkiye'nin Ortak Pazar Macerası (Istanbul, 1985), pp. 55 ~ 182, provides a com­ prehensive survey of EC-Turkey negotiations, 1959 - 63. Ibid., p. 175. Reinhard Bendix, "Social Stratification and the Political Community", in Embattled Reason; Essays on Social Knowledge (New York, 1970), p. 232. The discussion of the historical factors behind community structures in Turkey is derived from my ear­ lier essay, "Communitarian Structures and Social Change", in Ahmet Evin, ed., Modern Turkey: Con­ tinuity and Change (Opladen, 1984). Halil inalcık, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest", Studia Islamica II (Paris, 1954). Şerif Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire", Comparative Studies in So­ ciety and History 11 (June, 1969), p. 266.

33

Chapter 2 Selim Ilkin

A History of Turkey's Association with the European Community

A Note on the Basic Agreements, Favourable and Unfavourable Reactio and the Process of Negotiations

The purpose of this chapter is to review the agreements Turkey has signed since 1962, in relation to its attempt at becoming a member of the European Community. It will focus on how certain clauses of these agreements were reflected in the various Plans that are the guiding documents of economic development. Also, an attempt will be made to summarise, as concisely as possible, the reactions made public by the government agencies, universities, Chambers of Commerce and Industry and such private sector or­ ganisations as the Economic Development Foundation (iktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı) and the opinions voiced in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Turkish press. Turkey's Application to the EC, Negotiations, and the Agreement Turkey applied for membership in the E C on July 31, 1959, following a similar applica-j i/ tion by Greece of June 9, 1959. The main objectives of the application can be summarisedf as follows:' The basic reason underlying Turkey's application was largely political. Turkey's wester­ nisation efforts after the War of Independence were continued during the post-war period with the aim of strengthening her ties with the West by participating in its political, econo¬ mic, and military institutions. The popular expression of the period, "sharing a common J~ destiny with the West", reflected this view. The following statement by ismet inönü, the lea­ der of the main opposition party at the time, was its clear expression; Being à member of the western world and in view of our regime, from the start we were always enthusiastic about the EC. We want to join the Community. 2

f

\

Moreover, the E C accounted for more than 35 per cent of Turkey's exports. To be left out­ side the Community could jeopardize the future of these exports. Also, joining the E C , would open up this enormous market for further Turkish exports. Furthermore, the flow of j / foreign capital into Turkey would accelerate and as a result of the opportunity to export labour, the unemployment problem in Turkey would be alleviated. Another factor which speeded up Turkey's application to the E C was the application by Greece, because if the latter were to become a member of the E C , Turkey's political as well as economic interests would be hurt, economic interests on account of the competitive nature of the exports of the two countries. \

t

L

35

The acceptance by the E C of the applications by Greece and Turkey was also largely political in nature. The applications by these countries coincided with the heating up of the competition between the E C and the EFTA. The acceptance of these applications would ipand the sphere of influence of the E C and would demonstrate that the E C was open to developments in other areas as well. It would also provide support to the view of de Gaulle, one of the main ideologues of the E C , of "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals". Moreover, in this way, it would be demonstrated that the E C was not a "rich men's club" and was sensitive to the problems of its neighbours. Statements such as the following aimed at strengthening the favourable climate which these applications created: The main characteristic of Europe is its diversity. The European integration movement has respected this diversity and will continue to do so in the future. If this respect for diversity is disregarded for the purpose of integration, the glitter and the effectiveness of Europe will diminish.. . 3

'

Furthermore, the expanding Turkish market and its cheap labour pool were regarded as positive factors by the E C in evaluating Turkey's application. A l l these reasons account for the warm reception which these applications met in various E C commissions. The negotiations with the E C took quite a long time. The lack of experience of the E C in formulating a model appropriate for dealing with Greece and Turkey, two countries at a level of development significantly below that of the original Six, and the almost total lack of preparatory studies on the subject in these two countries were the main reasons for the . retardation of this process. The model agreed upon was a form of "association" which was developed by somewhat stretching the Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome. It envisaged to facilitate the integration of the said countries in a rather long period through the provision of economic aid, trade concessions, etc. f The Agreement between Turkey and the E C could finally be signed on September 12, i 1963. The delay was due partly to the signing of the Treaty with Greece on July 9, 1961, t / 'which was to serve as a model for Turkey, and partly to the uncertainties following the milit a r y coup in Turkey on May 27, 1960y^he Turkish press called the agreement "historical", referring to it as: / 4

5

6

the most permanent and productive step in Turkey's efforts of the last 150 years to westernise and become an equal member of the Western world.

\

7

Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Feridun Cemal Erkin, in his speech at the signature ceremony, however, used a more cautious language: We are aware of the difficulty of the task which awaits us. We know that signing this agreement is not sufficient for the attainment of its objectives and we are conscious that the targetted goals can be reached at the cost of great sacrifices and hard work. However, we are determined to overcome all the difficulties and have faith that we will reach our goals. 8

In fact, Turkey was entering into a very difficult period.

\

36

The Period of the Ankara Agreement: 1964 -1973 The principal objective of the Ankara Agreement, which constituted the first step towards Turkey's accession to the E C , was stated as follows in the Agreement: The object of this Agreement shall be to promote the continuous and balanced strengthening of commercial and economic relations between the Parties, taking fully into account the need to ensure the accelerated development of the Turkish economy and to raise the level of employment and the standard of living of the Turkish people... (Art. 2(1)). This objective was not only an end in itself but also a means of ensuring that the links, either existing or to be established, between the E C and Turkey would be permanent, leading eventually to Turkey's full membership in the EC. This objective was to be achieved "by the progressive establishment of a customs union" (Art. 2(2)) which would be realised in three stages: (1) a preparatory stage, (2) a transitional stage, and (3) a final stage. The purposes of the preparatory stage were spelled out as follows: ... Turkey shall, with the help of the Community, strengthen her economy in order to be able to take the obligations which will devolve on her during the transitional and final stages (Art. 3). During this stage the Community alone was to make commercial concessions and provide financial aid to Turkey. In return, Turkey undertook to strengthen her economy so as to be able to fulfill the obligations that would arise from the progressive establishment of j / a customs union. This was of prime importance, especially since the passage from the preparatory to the transitional stage was not automatic, but subject to a decision by the contracting parties as to the advisability of such a decision in view of the prevailing economic conditions in Turkey. The minimum duration of the preparatory stage was five years (Art. 3/2), the maximum being eleven years (Art. 1/3 of the Provisional Protocol). With the Agreement's entry into force, the E C agreed to introduce preferential tariff quotas in Turkey's favour for four major agricultural products: tobacco, raisins, dried figs and, hazelnuts. The volume of these quotas could be extended from the second year, and Council was given authority to take measures to help sales of other Turkish products in the E C markets from the third year after the entry into force of the Ankara Agreement. Besides these commercial concessions, E C granted 175 million dollars which would be put at the disposal of Turkey in the form of loans to be spent over five years. This fund was \ ^ to be disbursed by the European Investment Bank (E.I.B.) to particular projects which would fit into the framework of the Turkish Development Plan and contribute towards reaching the goals of the Ankara Agreement (Art. 1, Financial Protocol). Once the change-over was agreed upon by the contracting parties, the Association would enter the transitional stage. This would coincide with the gradual introduction of a customs union proper. During this period, the imttoe*g[mjtur^^ dis- ^ appear and the contracting parties would assume reciprocal and balanced obligationsjpwardTëac^^ measuresjo be adoptedduringthis stage would invoTvennoFo^jhe aÇoptîÔn]re necessary to bring about the harmonisation of the economic policies of Turkey with the 9

10

37

^Community (Art. 4(1». The details of the arrangements for the transitional stage were to be fixed at the time of future negotiations. This stage was envisaged to take twelve years "subject to any exceptions provided by common agreement." (Art. 4(2)) At the end of the transitional stage, Turkey would reach the final stage of the Association. This would take place in seventeen years at a minimum and twenty-two years at maximum. This stage would be based upon the customs union and entail intensification of coordination of the economic policies of the Contracting Parties (Art. 5). If during this final stage it appeared that Turkey was in a position to accept all the obligations of the Treaty of Rome and expressed the political will to join the Community, the contracting parties would examine the possibility of Turkey's accession to the Community as a full member (Art. 28). Since the Ankara Agreement fixed no time limit for this final stage, the sooner the conditions were right for Turkey to enter the Community the shorterthe-^nat-stage would be. The most noteworthy aspect of the deliberations of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on the Agreement was that it was hailed as a "great s u c c e s V i ^ y ^ i m o s ^ was welcomed with joy. This sentiment, however, was based on the conviction that the requirements imposed by the Agreement on Turkey could be met, and was in no way an abstract expression^ success. The members evaluated the preparatory stage, "as a period of intensive efforts to be spent to restructure and reorder the Turkish economy"." \ It was added that if, at the end of this seemingly long preparatory stage, we cannot create another (Japanese) or (German) miracle, our efforts to join the E C , to get together with the most developed countries of the world and our efforts to be side by side with the most developed economies of the world would have been spent in vain. 12

Interestingly enough, the worries and warnings expressed in the G N A were almost completely ignored in the Five-Year Development Plans prepared during the period. While in the First Five-Year Development Plan (1963 - 67), whose implementation began the same year as the signing of the Agreement, it was stated that "the probable consequences of the Common Market were taken into account," there was no clarity on the problem of pre- \ / paration for membership. Even the effects of the envisaged policy of import substitution on the relations between Turkey and the E C were ignored.' However, one reason underlying this neglect could be that the completion of negotiations on the Agreement coincided with the end of preparation of the Plan. In the Second Five-Year Development Plan (1968 - 72), whose implementation began in 1968, the question of the E C was again treated in a general manner, similar to the way in which it was treated in the previous Plan. It is not possible to observe how the desire to promote the relations with the E C affected the model and the priorities of the Plan.' During this period the E C , in addition to raising the quotas for four commodities accorded preferential treatment, made new concessions for some other commodities like citrus fruits, hand-made carpets, some textile products, etc. The most noteworthy consequence of / the Ankara Agreement in the field of trade was that, despite all these concessions, Turkey'sl / trade deficit vis-à-vis the Community was continuously growing. As a corollary of this, the\ ratio between Turkey's exports to and its imports from the E C was continuously declining. \ (It fell from 71 per cent in 1966 to 54 per cent in 1973.) Furthermore, this decline was sharp- \ er compared with the general picture of Turkey's exports and imports. This can partly be \ explained by the limited nature of the concessions granted by the EC. Only 6 per cent of \ Turkish manufacturing products were benefitting from the concessions while 22 per cent ] of agricultural and industrial products benefitted from partial concessions. The long-term E.I.B. loan with low interest charges was used by Turkey to finance 44 — projects. Out of the total, $ 105.9 million (60.5 per cent) were utilized for infrastructure and ^ / $69.1 million (39.5 per cent) for industrial projects. It is highly instructive to observe that some of these industrial projects supported by the E.I.B. were in textiles whose products were later to meet with high tariff and non-tariff barriers in the E C markets. However, export of labour proceeded at a faster pace than expected, leading to an increase in workers' remittances. The latter rose from $ 8.1 million in 1964 to $ 740.2 million ^ in 1972. The efforts to draw up a legal framework for labour affairs also began during this period. Frequent news items concerning the expansion of commercial concessions granted and loans extended by the E C notwithstanding, the Ankara Agreement was almost totally forgotten after its ratification. It is difficult to find any comprehensive study or discussion on the problem prior to May 16,1967, when Turkey expressed its desire to enter the second ^ phase of thé Agreement. One can hardly say that Turkey had prepared itself for membership in the EC. Therefore, the desire to enter the second phase was based, by the Prime Minister S. Demirel, not on previous preparations but on the future potential of the country: 17

8

(

9

20

The Agreement was ratified almost unanimously in the Assembly with one "nay" and one abstention, while there were only three abstentions and one "nay" in the Senate where -v it passed without any deliberation. j The Agreement was received very favourably by all the business circles, including the M l Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Even the sole labour organisation of the period, Turk-I§, was very favourable and issued the following statement: f

13

History will show whether [this Agreement] will be beneficial for our country or not... It constitutes the latest and maybe the most important one of all the opportunities of westernisation since Tanzimat which we have not made good use of up to now. If we properly use this opportunity, Turkish workers will be the first to rejoice. 14

The only opposition came from the Turkish Workers' Party, which was not represented in the Grand National Assembly. The following statement was included in the declaration put out for this occasion: For an underdeveloped country like Turkey to join such a Community and to expect to benefit from it is no different from the false dream of a lamb ready to be eaten by a wolf... We say no to the Common Market! We want Turkey to develop and progress by making use of its own resources and its own means as an independent entity.' 5

However, there was strong reaction to this declaration from many quarters including the Grand National Assembly ( G N A ) . " 16

v

21

22

23

24

...Turkey, which has great economic potential, aims at making use of this potential, thereby accelerating its own development, as well as being beneficial for the Community. It aims to make a positive contribution to the Community and to benefit from it to the extent of its contribution. 23

38

39

The Additional Protocol — A New and Stormy Phase in Turkey's Relations with the EC: 1974 -1982

of a declaration addressed to Turkish tradesmen, industrialists and craftsmen which stated that in the event that Turkey joined the Common Market, "Our country will become an open market for foreign giants and the Turkish nation will no longer be able to retain its eco­ nomic, social and finally political independence," and that Turkey's proper place in the world was within the "Middle East and the realm of the Turkic people." The standard bearer of the Left in opposing the E C was the Labour Party of Turkey. This party was " a hundred per cent against the Common Market which will hinder our economic development and condemn Turkey to living in semi-colonial conditions.. [The party was] determined to uphold the customs barriers to protect our industry, that is still in its infancy, against foreign oppression." The most powerful labour organization of the left wing, DISK, was also against Turkey's membership in the E C which it regarded as the "economic exploitative network of imperialism." Furthermore, some left-wing student unions took to chanting in protest demonstrations against the Annexed Protocol a slogan created through replacing the intend­ ed meaning of the word "Ortak" (Common) in the popular name of the Community — Or­ tak Pazar — with the second meaning (Business Partner): "They are business partners, we are their market". They also proclaimed "Say No to the Common Market" just like their counterparts in the right wing. Another body of the left wing, the Chamber of Mechanical Engineers, announced that it regarded the E C to be "the greatest threat to Turkey" and ur­ ged the members of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey to act as keenly as their prede­ cessors had done at the time of the country's War of Independence and to oppose "the quiet invasion of Turkey". 31

The basic reasons underlying Turkey's application for entering the second (transitional) stage were predominantly political. The Turkish Government then believed that Turkey could secure greater concessions from the E C if only it could precede the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway in becoming a member. Furthermore, the military coup in Greece that had caused the Community to freeze its relations with that country appeared to have eliminated an important obstacle in Turkey's course. Turkey could now assume its place in Europe. Some economic reasons were also urging the Turkish Government to move the country into the second stage. Among these can be mentioned the need to further increase the al­ ready large volume of manpower exports so as to reduce unemployment in the country as. well as to increase the inflow of foreign currency earnings of Turkish workers abroad, so as to cover part of the country's foreign trade deficit; to rectify the insufficient concessions for agricultural products during the initial stage; to export industrial products; and to meet the need to secure a larger volume of credit. At the outset, the E C did not seem willing to respond favourably to Turkey's request which it regarded as "bold" , on the grounds that Turkey did not utilize the preparatorystage properly and that the country was not prepared to bear the burden of the second stage. However, the Community was compelled to change its initial attitude and assume a favour­ able one especially when Turkey started putting forth its political weight. f ^The application for entering the second stage of the Agreement abruptly ended the si| lence over the E C issue and Turkey-EC relations suddenly became one of the major topics i of the Left-Right debate that had begun to heat up a little earlier. A n interesting feature of this debate was that, although the two sides had different reasoning, different jargons and different objectives, they agreed, incredible as it may seem to the students of recent Turkish history, on one point: entering the second stage would cause great damage to the Turkish economy, particularly to the industrial sector. The standard-bearer of the Right was M r . Necmeddin Erbakan, then the leader of the religion-oriented National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi), who brought up the issue the Grand National Assembly. His claims to the effect that the Common Market was "a scheme to assimilate Islamic Turkey within Chri­ stian Europe" aside, Mr. Erbakan's real reasons for objecting are clearly reflected in a book he wrote on the subject: 26

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Today, there is a newly budding industry in our country. We are obliged to facilitate its development by attending to all its problems with extreme care, let alone opening the doors [for European Competition] by means of this protocol. [Otherwise] none of the industries established so far will have any chance of survival. 30

Therefore, M r . Erbakan argued, assuming full membership in the Common Market would lead to Turkey becoming "a colony and a servant of the West." Turkey should aim at founding an Islamic Common Market along with other Muslim countries rather than joining the E C , for the former was the only p&ssible way for Turkey's economic develop­ ment. Another right-wing organisation, Ülkü Ocakları Birliği, had initiated a "Say No to the Common Market" campaign which involved, among other activities, the publishing 40

32

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On the other hand, the two entities that spent the greatest effort to have Turkey join the E C were the iktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı (IKV — Economic Development Foundation), estab­ lished in 1965 in order to study and specialise in the Turkey-EC relations, and the Türkiye işveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (TİSK — Confederation of Employers' Unions of Tur­ key). They were joined in their pro-EC platform by the Chambers of Commerce and some segments of the industry. The I K V was not the least bit vague in its eagerness to see Turkey as an E C member. It declared straightforwardly that the Additional Protocol would create great possibilities for Turkish industry because of the wider market, the inflow of new technology and other means it provided for. The Turkish industrial sector would be able to adjust itself to the new situation within the time the Protocol allowed for this purpose. If our industry cannot become competitive within the transition period, it is better and preferable from the standpoint of our national interests to dissolve it right away. It is inevitable that consumers will revolt against an industry that can survive only with the protection of customs barriers. 36

The opposition raised against these views by certain industrial circles headed by the Eski­ şehir Chamber of Industry destroyed the monopoly of the employers' circles that was an outstanding feature of the days of the Ankara Agreement. The Eskişehir Chamber of Indus­ try was of the opinion that "the membership in the Common Market conflicts with our de­ sire for industrialisation ... Therefore, as industrialists with social awareness, we must use our influence [to prevent such membership]." Differences in the appraisal of the Additional Protocol by different sectors according to its impact on some present and potential interest is something quite understandable. What 37

41

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j is difficult to understand is the atmosphere of controversy and mutual obstruction in the / bureaucracy that continued for many years and went far beyond what is explicable by differ/ ences of opinion. The two opposing nuclei in this controversy were the State Planning Organisation (SPO) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A report prepared by the SPO, which stated that the Turkish industry could open its doors to the outer world only after it had advanced to a certain stage, has provided the basic philosophy of this organisation throughout the debate. The level of advancement prescribed by the SPO for this purpose is, 38

i '

[

when sufficient foundations for such basic industries as metal, machinery production, oil and chemicals have been laid ... [and when ] ... the economy ... has a structure of such strength, from a standpoint of quality, then it may adopt some basic structural characteristics peculiar now to the West European and North American countries.

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The agreement thus signed was forwarded by the beginning of 1971 to the G N A for consideration and ratification. However, the domestic problems of Turkey that led to the Memorandum of March 12, 1971, delivered by the Chief of General Staff and the Commanders of the Armed Forces to the government in office, hindered a thorough public discussion of the Additional Protocol. It is worth noting that, while the members of the "Joint Committee" which studied the Additional Protocol before it was taken up by the G N A were keen enough to invite and hear the representatives of more than twenty-five institutions concerned in one way or another with the Additional Protocol, they did not bother to ask the. SPO for its views. The main supporter of the Protocol in the parliament was the Justice Party, which was in power at the time it was signed. The Justice Party, announced its reasons for signing the Protocol as follows: For many years, Turkey has implemented a closed and introverted economic policy. Turkey cannot afford to continue with such an economic policy any longer... It is compulsory to change the identity of the economy and open it up to the rest of the world. 42

42

The Justice Party felt that this was the only way to save the Turkish consumer from living with "the hand of the Turkish industrialist in his pocket". Another party, the National Reliance Party, joined the Justice Party in supporting the Additional Protocol for reasons that were mainly political. The Republican People's Party, on the other hand, adamantly claimed that they were against the Additional Protocol only, and not the Ankara Agreement. The reasoning this party would offer for such a stand was concerned largely with the industrialisation of Turkey: 44

On the other hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in its desire to see Turkey as an E C 'member as soon as possible, was assigning greater importance to political factors. Furthermore, it was advocating a more selective approach to industry after stressing that "we cannot take pride in an industry we were unable to improve in twenty-seven years." tg^*- This discrepancy between the major government agencies could never be eliminated, owing at the outset to the sensitive balance of powers supporting the political party in power and later to the "delicate balances" in the coalitions that followed. On the contrary, the distance between the two opposing poles grew when the SPO drew the Ministry of Industry to its side as an ally, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs retaliated by recruiting the support of the Ministry of Commerce. It was this conflict between the government agencies which, when compounded with some other factors, such as the lack of proper research and preparatory work by the Turkish side as a whole, and the reluctance of the E C as well as the slowness of its decision-making mechanism, caused the negotiations that commenced in 1968 to drift on until November 23, 1970, when an agreement could finally be signed. This result was possible only because the government's anxiety, that any increases in membership while Turkey dragged its feet might weaken the country's bargaining position, had forced it to adopt the viewpoint of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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. . . i f we advocate that Turkey should establish its own national market to cater properly to a mass of thirty-five million people [i.e. Turkey], this will not be possible lor many years to come... |We must accept that] industrialisation and development may be possible only with a wide market. 43

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It is without doubt, the Justice Party conceded, that such an opening up would bring about some structural change and consequently "discomfort" to some sectors. But, it said,

If we fail to protect our economy, especially at its moment of birth or adolescence, with some protective measures, we shall soon find ourselves in the position of people who repeatedly suffer the loss of their offspring... The calculations made in Turkey indicate the present status of the Turkish economy as an economy that is still at the stage where protection is imperative... So, what sense does it make to claim that an economy [the product of] which is expensive and low-quality, which is still in the process of establishment, and which has no previous experience with foreign competition, can develop better under competitive conditions?" 45

Another point closely related to the above argument which the RPP especially emphasized, was that the concessions obtained from the E C were "insufficient". The concessions received in relation to agriculture, manpower and financial aid did not match those given in the field of industrial products. The standpoint of the RPP was based largely on the work of the SPO. Therefore one may say that the opinion of the SPO regarding the Additional Protocol, though not sought by the Joint Committee, was nevertheless reflected very thoroughly in the G N A . Throughout the G N A debate of the Additional Protocol, the RPP first proposed to have the Preparatory Stage prolonged and the Additional Protocol revised for a better deal for Turkey, and when this was rejected, it resorted to claims of discord with the Constitution to force a revision. During the G N A sessions, the Democratic Party, which was an offspring of the Justice Party with a claim for its most right-wing votes, the left-wing Labour Party of Turkey, and a member of the National Unity Group with a leftist stand were observed to oppose the Additional Protocol on almost identical grounds, asserting that the proposed membership in the E C would "destroy the Turkish Industry" and "mortgage the future of the Turkish economy". Most of the members who took the floor during the discussions built their criticism on the basis provided by the SPO paper which asserted that proper research and preparatory work had been neglected and consequently some of the possible concessions could not be secured. As a result of this, Mr. Osman Olcay, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had to admit that not all that was sought in concessions could be obtained in the negotiations with the E C and to promise that the Additional Protocol would be amended in the coming years: 43

As is usual in all negotiations, we were not able to get all we wanted. But we, as the government, feel that the Additional Protocol, despite its shortcomings, bears great importance from the economic and political viewpoints. The economic aspects of the transitional period will be improved by using all possible means even in the preimplementation period. 46

When the debate was over and votes were to be cast, many of the members must have felt that in the atmosphere of uncertainty dominating the country as a result of the military intervention on March 12,1971, the support of European democracies might be vital, for quite a number of the members of the two houses who initially pointed to many shortcomings and inconveniences of the Additional Protocol nevertheless chose not to vote against it. The results of the voting were 151 yeas and 68 nays with 7 abstaining and 218 absent in the National Assembly, and 107 yeas 25 nays with 2 abstaining and 48 absent in the Senate of the Republic. Thus, the Additipnal Protocol was ratified. The Additional Protocol then had to be ratified by the parliaments of the E C countries to /become effective, and this process took until January 1, 1973, to be completed. However, the provisions pertaining to trade were put into effect on September 1, 1971, in the form of a "provisional agreement". On the day before the provisional agreement went into effect, Turkey raised its customs rates to compensate the effects of the reductions it had to announce on the following day. This incident alone should be sufficient as an indicator of how unprepared Turkey was for partnership with the E C . Nor was the E C at that time keen on upholding the benefits promised to Turkey by the Additional Protocol. Turkey was not admitted into the system of "general preferences" that went into effect on July 1, 1971, granting tariff reductions and immunities to 91 underdeveloped countries. This meant a large scale "erosion" of the benefits which Turkey was to receive within the framework of the Additonal Protocol. Such an assessment, compounded with the information that Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway were soon to become members in the E C (Norway later abstained from membership when the people voted against it in a referendum), created grave misgivings in Turkey, leading many to beJieye that even greater "erosions" were not impossible. - — A t the outset, two major Chambers of Commerce — Istanbul and Izmir — and the I K V ~^3M not share those misgivings. However, the optimistic attitude of these organisations was "based, to a certain extent, on the hope that the Additional Protocol could eventually be amended in a manner that suited them. 47

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In October 1971, less than three months after the ratification of the Additional Protocol by the G N A , Turkey asked the E C for new concessions on the grounds that the recent increases in Community membership had led to "erosions" in Turkey's benefits. In reality, the new concessions demanded far more than what was necesary to compensate for the "erosion" in question.

main factor underlying Turkey's signing of the Supplementary Protocol was again the "political" objectives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather than the few and limited improvements the Protocol would bring about. A final point of interest in a study of the atmosphere in which Turkey approached membership in the E C is the impact of the process on the country's development plans. In 1972, while the official talks aimed at ending the vagueness about Turkey's standing with the E C were going on, the Third Five-Year Development Flan was being finalised. Both the Plan and the Aditional Protocol were to go into effect on January 1, 1973. Therefore, it was theo- / retically necessary to take into consideration the basics of the Additional Protocol, which/ had been sanctioned earlier by the parliament. This requirement was met, though only in appearance. The government conceded that "the Additional Protocol makes a review of the development strategy an absolute necessity" , and adopted a new, 22-year strategy that extended up to the year 1995, of which the Third Five-Year Development Plan would constitute the first segment. The strategy aimed at increasing the country's G N P in 1995 to a level equal to that enjoyed in 1973 by Italy, which at the time was the least developed member of the EC. The necessity of industrialisation in order to attain this objective was emphasised as follows:

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The provisions of the Additional Protocol... stipulate the gradual realisation of the Customs Union between Turkey and the E C until 1995. In that year the final phase of the relations of Turkey with the E C will begin, and Turkey will be ready to discuss with the E C member countries the conditions of her admission as a full member. In the meantime, Turkey would have to concentrate all her means at a certain focal point. This focal point would be "the batilefront of industrialisation, and a full scale offensive would be launched is this sector Turkey has become familiar with in the past, one which has gained the approval of the Nation." [italics by the Author]. Despite the inclusion in the text of such statements as "measures to facilitate [the country] adapting itself to international conditions, especially to those of the E C [will be taken] into consideration", the Plan dictated a rigid import substitution policy until the year 1995. And the use of such terms as "improvement" and "enhancing the flexibility" in describing the nature of the industrialisation effort prescribed for the period implied that substantial changes in the Additional Protocol were being contemplated. in brief, the Additional Protocol which was to regulate Turkey's gradual transition into full membership in the E C over the 22-year period between 1973 and 1995 did in fact clash with the country's new development strategy covering the same period. 54

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Conclusions

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In 1973 the EC, in addition to expanding its boundaries by the joining of three members, ' went on to increase its relations with the rest of the world through a series of trade agreements. It thus became more urgent than ever to clarify Turkey's relationship with the EC. On June 30, 1973, at the end of a long series qf negotiations with the EC, Turkey signed a Supplementary Protocol, again without the consensus of the Turkish government agenr cies that had earlier displayed great differences of opinion over the Additional Protocol. The 5

44

First, it can be said that the European Community has regarded its relations with Turkey as a matter subject to fluctuation in relation to political and economic change, rather than a process at the end of which a structural integration would be achieved. It has feigned to be enthusiastic for strengthening such relations whenever it has felt necessary to demonstrate that it is an "open community", and whenever the conditions of member countries' economies have made it urgent to import cheap foreign labour. Apart from these instances, the Community, especially after the number of its member countries increased and when 45

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/economic crisis spread around Europe, has tended to approach Turkey's menbership with / a negative attitude, thus causing the conflict to grow. ( Second, instead of bringing forward a set of consistent proposals supported by the opin\ ions of experts, Turkey has participated in the negotiation processes with proposals that j combine roughly the contending views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State | Planning Organisation, the two government agencies that have conducted the negotiations j on behalf of Turkey. Moreover, from time to time either the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or those of the State Planning Organisation have become dominant over the other in accordance with the developments and fluctuations in internal politics. This inconsisten­ cy has made a clear expression of Turkey's objectives rather difficult, and hence made it ^ easier for the Community to abstain from responding duly to Turkish proposals and even to exploit discrepencies. Third, in all the agreements and the related negotiations pertinent to Turkey's member­ ship in the European Community, the country's industrialisation has been the major issue. The attitude of the Turkish government regarding this subject has been most clearly ex­ pressed in the Third Five-Year Development Plan (19734977) and the New Development Strategy adopted along with it. The Strategy aimed at increasing the country's G N P in 1995 to a level equal to that enjoyed in 1973 by Italy, the least developed member of the EC, at that time. The necessity of industrialisation to reach this target was also emphasised. In essence, this strategy had been based on the assumption that when Turkey attained a more viable economic structure through industrialisation, the country would have a greater bargaining power and therefore would be able to extract greater concessions in the final agreement to be made with the EC. Yet the industrialisation experiment throughout the 1973-1982 period did not provide the country with a more viable structure. The structure that prevailed in the early 1980s was not viable at all, but vulnerable. Therefore, it would be wiser for Turkey to reconsider the underlying assumptions of its industrialisation policies. Fourth, the reaction of the Turkish public, with respect to Turkey's relations with the E C , has changed in both directions over time. The Ankara Agreement that brought about some obligations only to the E C was received favourably by almost all segments of the society. On the other hand, the Additional Protocol that brought about some obligations to the Turk­ ish side was criticised by those segments whose present and future benefits would be curtailed by the implementation of policies to meet these obligations. The most severe of the negative reactions has been that from the industrial sector. The provisions of the Additional Protocol regarding industry caused the emergence of a front composed of a variety of highly dissident components representing widely different social bases and ideologies that could hardly, if ever, come to a consensus over any other issue. Rightists, aiming to push Turkey into greater involvement with the Islamic world under the pretext of "Heavy Industry Movement"; left wingers hoping to induce Turkey to part from [ the Western world by using such slogans as "Theyare the panners^wejxe tbs&market". and "We wanta Sovereign Turkey": i n d j ^ i a i l s ^ e a l i s m j ? & ^ able to enjoy owing tojhe "import substitution" policy woujd^no^ex^os^ible any longer; alidThteJJi^ kept insisting that development couldje possible only through e j t a t W ^ j w ^ sjydjhanhe support­ ers ofaTese'views failed to see the political significance of the Ejl^d^tieiigcjfed the dynamic long-term implications of such an integration..

On the other hand, positive reaction mostly came from certain groups which believed that the solution to such problems as the termination of unemployment and the establish­ ment of a civilian democracy would be achieved only as a result of integration into the EC. The segments of the society that shared this view were the commercial circles; some em­ ployers' unions; the "liberal" movement which reduced the issue of the establishment of Western institutions in the country simply into one of eliminating the customs barriers; and some leftist movements which exaggerated the importance of the centre vis-à-vis the peri­ phery, underestimating the role of any autonomous development realised locally. For the advocates of this view it may well be said that they failed to see the possible burden of inte­ gration on the Turkish economy, at least in the short-term. However, there was largely a mixed reaction, pursuant to the enactment of the Additional Protocol, whereby some provisions were praised and some were criticised, rather than standing for or against the protocol as a whole. It may be possible to regard this attitude as a natural consequence of the different impact that the different provisions of the Protocol would make on each sector. However, it must be noted that this attitude has been carried to an extent so as to create double standards. A typical example of this may be the different postures of the two major confederations of labour unions. Both confederations criticised harshly those provisions of the Protocol concerning industry, using such terms as "crush­ ing, destructive, exploitative". Similarly, they opposed the admission of foreign (EC) capi­ tal freely into the country by advocating "the imposition of limitations and the exercise of strict control" (Turk-I§) or "complete prohibition of the importation of foreign capital and the nationalisation of that already in the country" (DISK). Nevertheless both confedera­ tions preferred to ignore the fact that over one million Turkish workers were being "con­ trolled" or "exploited" by European capital and insisted that this number be increased. For a realistic evaluation of the prospects of the partnership of Turkey and the E C , and the formulation of the amendment proposals, a great deal of meaningful research needs to be done — especially in view of the fact that what has been done to this date on the subject is far from being sufficient. Finally, if Turkey is to become a full member — and the National Security Council has expressed its determination to realise this — it is not possible to claim that the 1962-1982 period has been utilized properly and that the structure of the Turkish economy at the end of the said period is likely to facilitate the transition. Furthermore, the difficulties hindering integration have been enhanced by the recent erosion in the concessions granted to Turkey in the textile and food sectors, the country's two most developed sectors even according to the E C standards.

Notes

1

Stephen J. Ettinger, "The Association of Greece and Turkey with E E C " , Public and International Af­ fairs 1(1965), pp. 130-161; Tevfik Saraçoğlu, Türkiye ile Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu Araslnda Bir Or­ taklık Yaratan Anlaşma: 1959-1963, Kitap I (istanbul : IKV, 1981); Mehmet Ali Birand, Bir Pazar Hikây­ esi: Türkiye-AET ilişkileri (istanbul, 1978), pp. 1-61; T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Müşterek Pazar ve Tür­ kiye, 19574963 (Ankara, 1964). 2 Abdi ipekçi, Liderler Diyor ki (istanbul, 1969), p. 79.

47 46

3 4

Avrupa Topluluğu, lürkiye-AET ilişkileri- (Ankara, n.d.), p- 234, Tevfik Saraçoğlu, op.cİt., pp.I0-43; Mehmet A l i Birand, op.cit., pp. 71459; T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, op.cil., pp. 60 -116; Ali Kazancıgİl, "LAssociatİon de la Turquie à la Communauté Economique Euro­ péenne", thèse. Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, (Paris, 1967), mimeographed. 5 Selim ilkin "A.E.T.'yle iktisadi İlişkiler Çerçevesinde Türk Sanayi Yapısına Yönelik Araştırmalar", Ekonomik Yaklaşım 1 (No. 3, 1980), pp. 185 - 230. 6 Ayla Yardaş, EEC and Association Status under Anide 238, Ph.D. thesis, June 1966, mimeographed. 7 "Tarihi Anlaşma Ankara'da imzalandı". Hürriyet, 13 September 1963; Mehmet Ali Birand, op.cit., pp. 159 - 178. 8 Avrupa Topluluğu, op.cit, p. 230. 9 Tevfik Saraçoğlu, op.cit.. Kitap II, pp. 5 - 69; Ayla Yardaş, op.cit. 10 E C have decided to make special resources available to the E.I.B. distinct from the Bank's own capital. Banque Européenne d'Investissement, Rapport Annuel (Brussels, 1964), p. 5. 11 Millet Meclisi, Tutanak Dergisi, B: 32, 14 January 1964, p. 85. 12 Cumhuriyet Senatosu, Tutanak Dergisi, B: 109, 17 September 1963. 13 Vehbi Koç "Müşterek Pazar", Vatan, 10 October 1963. 14 "Ortak Pazar Üyesi Olduk", Türk-Iş Dergisi, 7 (September, 1963). 15 Türkiye isçi Partisi, "Ortak Pazara Hayır", (Ankara, 1963), mimeographed. 16 Cumhuriyet Senatosu, Tutanak Dergisi, B: 109, 17 September 1963. 17 T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilâtı, Kalkınma Planı, Birinci Beş Yıl (1963 - 67) (Ankara, 1962), p. 510. 18 See Mustafa Renksizbulut, "ithalatı ikame Edici ve Döviz Tasarrufu Sağlayıcı Yatırımlar Hakkında Not", (Ankara; SPD, 1962), mimeographed. 19 T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilâtı, Kalkınma Planı: ikinci Beş Yıl (1968- 72) (Ankara, 1967), s. 123. 20 Vural Savaş, "Ortaktık ilişkisi Açısından AET'ye Yönelik ihracatımız," mimeographed. 21 Tevfik Saraçoğlu, op.cit., Kitap II, pp. 99 - 108; "Türkeye'de Sanayi Kalkınma Sorunları." Ulus, 9 Au­ gust 1966. 22 Ali Sait Yüksel, Ortak Pazarla ilişkilerimiz Ne Durumda, Nereye Gidiyor? (Ankara: Eskişehir Sanayi Odası, 1971), p. 23. 23 Mehmet Ali Birand, Bir Pazar Hikâyesi, p. 181. 24 Selim ilkin, op.cit., pp. 188-189. 25 Süleyman Demirel, Türkiye — AET Ortaklık Konseyi'nde Yapmiş Oldukları Konuşma Metinleri (Brus­ sels, 1967), p. 9. 26 Mehmet Ali Birand, op.cit., pp. 201-248; Mehmet Ali Birand, "Turkey and the European Commu­ nity", The World Today (February, 1978), pp. 54-55. 27 Emil Noël, AET-Türkiye Ortaklığı Hazırlık Döneminin Bilançosu ve Geçiş Dönemi Şartları, (istanbul: IKV, 1969), p. 3. 28 Mehmet Ali Birand, Bir Pazar Hikâyesi, p. 55 29 Metin Toker, Ortak Pazar mı, Ortak Tuzak mı? (istanbul: IKV, 1970). 30 Necmeddin Erbakan, Türkiye ve Ortak Pazar (izmir, 1971), pp. 99-100. 31 Sabahaddin Zaim, Ortak Pazar ve Türkiye (istanbul: istanbul Ülkü Ocakları Birliği, 1970), p. 13; for more detailed analysis see Jacob M . Landau, "Politics, Economics and Religion: TAirkey and the Euro­ pean Common Market", Oriento Moderno L X (No. 1-6, 1980), pp. 163-171. 32 Türkiye isçi Partisi Programı (istanbul, 1964), p. 108. 33 DISK, Çalışma Raporu: 1968-1970, 1971, p. 63. 34 Makina Mühendisliği Öğrenci Birliği, Ortak Pazar ve Montaj Sanayii, (Ankara: O.D.T.U., 1968), Day­ anışma Kurulu, "Bildiri", 23 December 1968. 35 Makina Mühendisleri Odası, Ortak Pazar ve Türkiye (Ankara, 1970), pp. 252-254. 36 Behçet Osmanağaoğlu, Avrupa Toplulukları (Ortak Pazar) ve Türkiye Ortaklığı (istanbul: IKV, 1969). 39 DPT, TUrkiye'nin Ortak Pazar Tam Üyeliği Hazırlayıcı Sanayileşme ihtiyacı: Gerekçe (Ankara, Í968).

40 ihsan Sabri Çağlayangil, "Ortak Pazar'ın Geçiş Dönemine Girerken", istanbul Sanayi Odası Dergisi 4 (No. 46, 1969), p. 11. 41 M . Ali Birand, Bir Pazar Hikâyesi, pp. 249-326. 42 Millet Meclisi, Tutanak Dergisi, B: 323, i July 1971, pp. 134-135. 43 Ibid.,, p. 144. 44 Ibid.,, pp. 129-133. 45 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Senatosu, Tutanak Dergisi, B:91, 21 July 1971, pp. 86-87. 46 Millet Meclisi, Tutanak Dergisi. 1 July 1971, p. 170 47 Mehmed Ali Birand, Pir Pazar Hikâyesi. For details on this incident which Birand describes as "the most bizarre operation in history", seep. 347; for a detailed picture of the characteristics of that period, see: Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Turkiye-AET Ortaklığının Geçiş Dönemi (Ankara 1971), pp. 17-20, mimeo­ graphed. 48 Mehmed Ali Birand, Bir Pazar Hikâyesi, pp. 348-50. For details on Turkey's losses, see: D ı ş Ekono­ mik ilişkiler Bakanlığı, AET'nin Genel Preferanslar Sistemi Çerçevesinde Gelişme Yolundaki 91 Mem­ lekete 1 Temmuz 1971 Tarihinden itibaren Tanımış Olduğu Tek Taraflı Tavizler ile Katma Protokol ile Tanınmış Tavizlerin Mukayesesi Hakkında Not (Ankara, September 7, 1971), mimeographed. 49 IKV, Ortak Pazar'da Türkiye, istanbul 1971; Ertuğrul Soysal, "Ortak Pazar'da Türk Sanayü'nİn Sorun­ ları", Son Havadis, 7 March 1971; "Türk Sanayii'nin 9 Sorunu", Cumhuriyet, 10 February 1971; "Bü­ yük Sanayi Odaları Geçişi Destekliyor", Milliyet, İ4 April 1971. 50 "Olcay, Ortak Pazar'dan Taviz istedi", Milliyet, 26 October 1971; "AET'den Alman Tavizlerin Genişle­ tilmesi", Cumhuriyet, 8 December 1971. 51 When Norway decided not to take membership in the E C on the basis of the results of a referendum, only Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland joined. 52 Birgen Keleş, Türkiye AET ilişkileri (Ankara: SPO, 1981), p. 25; M . Ali Birand, op.cit., pp. 371-378; Hasan Cemal, "Dışişleri-Planlama Arasında Ortak Pazar Kavgası", Cumhuriyet, 24-30 March 1971. 53 Başbakanlık DPT, Yeni Strateji ve Kalkınma Planı: Üçüncü Beş Yıl (¡973-1977) (Ankara, 1973), pp. 971-1004. 54 State Planning Organisation, Third Five-Year Development Plan (1973-1977): Growth Model and its Solutions, DPT:64, IPD:21 (Ankara, 1972), mimeographed; K.S. Gill and Hikmet Çetin, Üçüncü Beş Yıllık Planın Bazı Stratejik Yönleri, DPT:52-IPD:İ3 (Ankara, 1971), mimeographed. The view that the Plan model did not take the relations with E C into consideration was also discussed in the Plan Collo­ quium. For details see: DPT, 3. Plan Modeli Uluslararası Kalkınma Kollokyumu, DPT:122HPD:336 (Ankara, 1972). 55 Osman Okyar, "Turkish Industrialisation Strategies: The Plan Model and E E C " , Economic Relations Between Turkey and EEC, O. Okyar and O. Aktan, eds. (Ankara, 1978), pp. 14-57.

\

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Chapter 3 Roswitha Bourguignon

The History of the Association Agreement between Turkey and the European Community

Since the Association Agreement of 1963, Turkey's relationship with the European Community has been fraught with disappointments and disillusionment. After having high expectations in the early 1960s, many Turks came to view the Association more as a liability than an asset, especially during the economic crises that Turkey underwent in the late 1970s. The original intention to seek swift accession to the Community could not be pursued in the wake of the 1980 military coup. Turkey's full membership is now being regarded as a long-term goal. This chapter analyses the problems encountered between Turkey and the E C since the Turkish application in 1959. Some of the major questions with regard to why the Ankara Agreement of 1963 and the Additional Protocol of 1970 did not result in progress towards full membership are as follows: 1. Have Turkish governments misunderstood the situation, by regarding the Agreement as promising full membership automatically, while the Community assumed that eventual full membership would be conditional on Turkey being able to assume all the obligations of membership? 2. Were the goals and the instruments of the Treaty and the Additional Protocol incoherent? Was the transitional period introduced too quickly for political reasons? 3. Are the Treaty instruments sufficient to lead Turkey into full membership, or was it necessary for the Community to implement further measures from the beginning? 4. What role was played by subsequent political and economic events, notably the oil crisis, the Greek-Turkish conflicts, and the military coup of 1980? 5. Has the Community itself followed a coherent policy with regard to Turkey, especially in its global Mediterranean policy and the negotiations on the southern Enlargement in the 1970s? Did the priorities of the E C concerning Turkey change? 6. How significant has the strategic value of Turkey been as a corner-stone of the southeastern NATO flank? 7. What were the consequences of the Turkish tendency to view its relations with the Community primarily in the context of its rivalry with Greece? 8. Can the history of the Association be summarised by saying that, starting in the position of a third country in a special relationship with the EC, Turkey has now become merely one Mediterranean country among others?

51

) Thus application for the Association came in a period when political and economic circumstances in both Europe and Turkey were favourable.

Motivations of the Association Treaty The Turkish application for associate membership on 31 July 1959 was politically rather than economically motivated. The decision to seek associate membership was not based on comprehensive studies of the implications for the Turkish economy and development strategy of the envisaged customs union. For Turkish policy-makers, the Association initially had greater importance as a step towards the realisation of Turkey's long-range aspiration to become an integral part of Europe. 1

This approach was in line with the Western-oriented foreign policy in the post-war period which had taken Turkey into the Council of Europe, NATO and the OECD. However, the Turkish government would have taken more time over a decision about Turkish-EC relations, if Greece had not applied for associate membership two months earlier. Nevertheless, the step to develop closer ties to the European Community can be regarded as consistent with Turkey's long-standing European aspiration. The application in 1959 was based n wider political considerations, particularly the East-West conflict in the 1950s, the danger of a political vacuum in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the fact that Turkey was confronted by the Soviet Union and the Arab world. The government's decision appeared sensible in the context of economic crisis in Turkey, and a deterioration in Turkish-American relations and economic co-operation. Improving economic relations with Western Europe was an obvious alternative. 2

3

4

From the economic point of view, Turkey looked for guaranteed access to important export markets for traditional exports such as hazelnuts, tobacco, raisins and dried figs. The Turkish government considered the application as a first step towards an eventual customs union. A n association agreement with the Community could promote economic development and industrialisation, and participation in the prosperity of the other European countries. Eventual Turkish membership in the E C was consistent with Turkey's traditional European vocation. The Community for its part accepted this choice for political reasons. The western European countries were interested in preventing any withdrawal by southern European members of NATO. Moreover, after the breakdown of the first membership negotiations with the United Kingdom some compensation seemed to be opportune to prevent the Community giving the impression of being a "closed shop". Moreover, the E C member states aspired to the principle of political balance in their relations with states in the eastern Mediterranean, and this meant agreeing to the Turkish as well as the Greek applications. Last,, but not least, the E C member states believed that Association with the E C was a logical consequence of Turkey's membership of the Atlantic Alliance. On the other hand, the protracted negotiations before the Association Agreement was signed in September 1963 also showed the reservations on the part of certain European countries, especially France, which had a different assessment of Turkey's strategic significance in the eastern Mediterranean from other member states such as West Germany. In addition, France and other E C countries also showed some reservations on the "cultural" issue as to whether Turkey was really part of Europe. . The American point of view was determined\by U.S. national security interests, defined by the Truman doctrine of 1947. The United States agreed with any initiative that would help to guarantee Turkey's contribution to Western security. 5

(-•'

6

7

v

g

y

52

The Ankara Agreement of 1963

Turkey signed the Treaty of Ankara on 12 September 1963. The overall objective was to strengthen commercial and economic relations between the contracting parties. Another long-term goal was to establish a customs union including the possibility of eventual membership once Turkey was able to assume all obligations of membership. The Agreement also included the principles of freedom of establishment (Art. 20), freedom to provide services (Art. 20), and free movement of workers (Art. 12). Three stages were foreseen. First, in the preparatory stage, Turkey would benefit from commercial advantages and financial aid from the Community in order to strengthen its economy. A series of tariff concessions would be given to Turkish agricultural and industrial exports and financial assistance of 175m. units of account would be provided under the First Financial Protocol. Turkey was not required to make reciprocal concessions. After this first stage, which would in principle last five years, the two parties had to decide about the following stage, during which the customs union would be progressively established (Art. 4). At the end of the second transitional stage which would last twelve years, both sides were to decide about the possibility of Turkish membership, provided that Turkey was able to assume all obligations of membership (Art. 28). Full membership was not automatically fixed by the Agreement, but was dependent on concrete conditions being achieved, and on a political decision of the contracting partners. The international .political and economic situation seemed to offer favourable conditions for Turkish-EC relations in the late 1950s and early 1960s. However, opinions about the success or failure of the first stage were mixed. Some observers characterized this as a positive period during which trade would increase and credits from the European Investment Bank would be successfully applied to infrasfructural and industrial projects. There was a large increase in the number of Turkish workers in the Community, and a rapid growth of Turkish industry. The Turkish government believed that with the opening of the E C market to Turkish industrial products, new financial aid, and free movement of workers, the Turkish economic infrastructure would be quickly improved. They, therefore, requested that the transitional stage should begin in 1967, before the five-year term of the preparatory phase had ended. However, political motives were again important: Turkey hoped for better terms from the Community following the military take-over in Greece, and believed that the economic balance of EC-Greece and EC-Turkey relations could be /restored. Closer ties with the Community were also considered desirable following the CyI prus crisis of 1963-67, and the disagreement with the United States, caused by Turkey's disappointment with lack of diplomatic support on that issue. 9

The Community was cautious about the Turkish request, believing that a move to the transitional stage at that time was premature. However, political reasons were decisive in leading the E C member states to accept the Turkish request. The Community had followed a policy of "benign neglect" which can be explained by its focus on internal development of the E C in the 1960s. Turkey had followed a policy of laissez-faire, failing to take the 53

1

measures necessary to establish the sound economic structure needed for entry into a customs union. In any case it was unrealistic to expect that the measures to be taken in the preparatory stage could have been sufficient. The tariff concessions for Turkish agricultural exports (hazelnuts, tobacco, raisins and dried figs) had no great influence on the development of trade. With little increase in Turkish agricultural exports and an equally slow increase in Turkish imports from the EC, the expected development of economic relations was not achieved. The Turkish government also had difficulties in absorbing the financial aid available for industrial investments. The overly optimistic views expressed in this period prevented a realistic diagnosis of the formidable economic problems. These became all too obvious in the 1970s: 10

The' international monetary and energy crises, which developed from 1974 onwards showed that Turkey had not been able to exploit its subterranean resources or to develop its industrial infrastructure or to establish a competitive industry less dependent on foreign countries, or to diversify the range of agricultural products destined for export."

As a sop to the critics, not only in the opposition parties, but also in academic circles and particularly in the State Planning Organisation, the Turkish Government demanded greater powers to protect Turkish industry, which was threatened further by the Enlargement of the Community from Six to Nine on 1 January 1973. While some commercial provisions were adjusted under two Interim Agreements which took effect in 1972 and 1973, a wider Supplementary Protocol was not ratified. Among academics and policy-makers, criticism of the Turkish-EC relationship continued. For example, in 1976 the State Planning Organisation drew the following conclusions: For Turkish-EEC relations to attain an open, continuous structure and a balance commensurate with the levels of development of the parties, there is need for radical changes in the existing relationship... The necessary changes in the relationship can be effected either within the framework of the Association Agreement or by considering new alternatives outside an Association Agreement... there are alternatives such as a Preferential Trade Agreement, a Non-preferential Trade Agreement, and an Agreement on Commercial and Economic Co-operation. The advantages and disadvantages of these alternatives should be carefully examined. 13

The Additional Protocol of 1970 The Additional Protocol, intended to implement the second stage of the Association Agreement, was signed on 23 November 1970, and came into force only on 1 January 1973. On the basis of reciprocal and equal obligations, the Community eliminated customs duties, made some provisions for the harmonisation of policy and legislation, and proposed a gradual achievement of free movement of labour between the contracting parties. Because of the difference in the level of Turkey's economic development, the Community agreed to establish the transitional period in such a way as not to hinder Turkey's economic development. The Community was to eliminate customs tariffs on imports of industrial products from Turkey at once (Art. 9), except for certain petroleum and textile products. Turkey had to remove customs duties over a normal period of twelve years, or an exceptional period of 2 years (Arts. 10 and 11). Quantitative restrictions on imports into Turkey were to be reduced by a liberalisation list covering 35 per cent of Turkish imports. For agricultural products, Turkey had to accept "those measures of the Common Agricultural Policy which must be applied in Turkey if free movement of agricultural products between it and the Community is to be achieved" (Art. 33). Article 86 of the Protocol stated that the free movement of workers should be realised progressively between 1976 and 1986. A second Financial Protocol for 195 m. units of account was signed with the Additional Protocol. At the end of a 22-year period the Association Council would take further decisions on completing the customs union. However, from the date of the entry into force of the Additional Protocol, Turkey's ' disenchantment with the Community became increasingly acute. The reasons for growing opposition and criticism were many. They were articulated already in 1970 by M r . Erbakan (later to become NSP leader), who declared: Turkey ought not to be in the Common Market of Western states but in the Common Market of Eastern nations. Turkey is backward in relation to the Westerners, but advanced in relation to the Easterners. If Turkey enters the Common Market under today's conditions it will become a colony. 12

54

The criticism and irritation was the result of a number of specific external and internal factors affecting the EC-Turkish relations in the 1970s. Among the external factors were not only the first Enlargement of the Community in 1973, but also the development of the Community's Global Mediterranean Policy and the prospect of the second, southern, Enlargement. Turkey was deeply worried about the political and economic repercussions that could follow. Fxnnrts from countries like Spain, Portugal and Greece would compete with those from Turkey, particularly in the agriculturaLsector (Mediterranean products such as citrus fruits, grapes, other fruits and vegetables)>v.Turkey also anticipated adverse effects on the opportunities for the employment of Turkish workers, especially on account of migration from Portugal. Furthermore, after the oil crisis in 1973 the Community was intensifying its links with third-world countries, to secure its energy supplies and increase its industrial exports. The consequence was a speedy reduction of the preferences Turkey had obtained in the Additional protocol. The oil crisis itself also affected relations with the Community. Turkey became more and more hesitant concerning its capacity to secure a better deal in negotiations with the Community, given the major adverse impact of the oil price on its balance of payments. 14

16

17

) In addition to these adverse developments, the Cyprus conflict and Aegean dispute with Greece had far-reaching consequences on relations with the member states of the Community and other NATO allies, and particularly with the U. S., which suspended military aid for four years. The embargo, which finally ended in 1978, strained relations with the U.S. .and adversely influenced relations with the allies in Europe. Disappointed with the lack of sufficient recognition of Turkish rights on Cyprus and in the Aegean, Turkey was particularly concerned with the French policy, which began to tilt in favour of the Greek position after the fall of the Greek Junta in 1974. The Community's approval of Greece's application for membership in 1975 caused the Turkish Government to express fear that Greece might veto a future Turkish application for membership. Specific problems in the implementation of the Additional Protocol also contributed to the difficulties. Turkish government stressed that the extension of the range and level of agricultural concessions to Mediterranean countries during the 1970s prejudiced the com55

petitive position given to Turkey by the Additional Protocol, and demanded that the preferences be improved, particularly in view of the fact that Turkey had commited itself to a strict time-table of tariff removal. The Community tried to mollify its association partner by contending that Turkish interests would be served better by exploring avenues of cooperation than by emphasising tariff concessions. Community maintained that Turkey should concentrate on improving agriculture, modernising marketing, an establishing agro-industry. A further persistent irritant for Turkey lay in the quantitative restrictions on her textile exports to the E C market. After the U. K . had introduced unilateral measures against Turkish exports of cotton yarn in 1974, the Community in 1977 negotiated agreements with 34 important textile suppliers for limitations on textile imports to the E C market. The Community also requested a reduction in the level of export rebates for Turkish cotton yarn. While the Community felt justified in maintaining these restrictions, the Turkish government considered them, with great bitterness, as an unacceptable discrimination.- < The social security provisions for Turkish workers in the Community, and the question of free movement, strained the Turkish-EC relationship further. The Additional Protocol provided for the free movement of workers to be secured in progressive stages between December 1976 and December 1986. Since access of Turkish workers to the E C had helped Turkey to cover her trade deficit for several years, migrant workers became more and more important for Turkey. But in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis and the recession that followed, the Community, and particulary West Germany, took various measures to reduce the number of Turkish migrant workers. These questions were discussed during Association Council meetings in 1975-76 when relations between the contracting parties reached a deadlock. Agreement came only with the Council of Association of 20 December 1976. This meeting, originally scheduled to convene in July, was postponed twice, because there was no hope of reaching a compromise. Turkish officials and politicians discussed the freezing of the existing association. i9ï

20

21

The Turkish Prime Minister, Mr. SuTeyman Demirel, had rejected the package of the Nine, presented to Ankara in 1975, as totally inadequate. The Turkish government prepared a list of about 80 agricultural commodities and requested concessions which would make these products competitive with those of third-world countries. The Commission made a counter offer which in Turkey's view offered concessions for commodities it did not in practice produce, or restricted the concessions to certain months in which Turkey could not export. With regard to the migrant workers, the government insisted on some firm commitments, particulary that Turkish workers be given priority over those of non-member countries and equal opportunity for employment as other E C nationals. During the visit to Ankara, in September 1976, of the Dutch Foreign Minister, M a x vanner Stoel, then President of E C Council of Ministers, the Turkish position was once again explained in detail. Turkey expected the fullfillment of the following obligations: First and foremost, Turkish agricultural products should be given meamngful preferences. The Turkish requests in this matter are well defined and calculated, and claims that Turkey's position in this respect is not specific, or arguments that should they be granted they would have minimal impact on the Turkish balance of payments, cannot be tenable. Second, but no less important, is the implementation of Article 12 of the Ankara Agreement and Article 38 of the Additional Protocol concerning the free movement of workers 56

... Turkey wants this principle to be reaffirmed politically, and the conditions in which this will be carried out should be laid down. —^ Thirdly, Turkey wishes the Community's commitment to Turkey's rapid economic development by means of substantial financial assistance to be honoured in a way suited to the special character and the ultimate purpose of the mutual relationship. 12

After several months of strained relations between Brussels and Ankara, Turkey accepted - a package of measures at the EC-Turkey Association Council meeting on 20 December 1976. The measures went some way to meet Turkey's demands, but on the whole they were far from satisfactory as far as Turkey was concerned. The new concessions offered better access for some Turkish agricultural exports as well as slightly improved status for Turkish workers in the EC. They also introduced the concept of a second priority for Turkish workers, whereby Turkey would be given priority if vacancies could not be filled by Community nationals. Turkey was deeply disappointed with the E C over the new terms of the Association Agreement, and was confronted with difficult external and domestic circumstances which strained bilateral relations. Turkey's dissatisfaction led to a situation in which no further Association Council meetings could take place for three years after that of 20 December 1976, nor were any Political Co-operation sessions held. In view of increasing economic difficulties, Turkey was not able to implement the scheduled tariff reductions after 1977. These developments came to a head in October 1978, when the Ecevit government officially requested a five-year freeze in Turkey's commitments under the Additional Protocol. 23

24

The Community did not react before May 1979. The E C then agreed to a new financial protocol, providing 600m. units of account over the following five years, plus emergency aid of 75 m. units of account. However, the Ecevit government found the offer made by the Community inadequate. The return to office of M r Demirel in November 1979 marked a clear shift in Turkish policy compared with that of the former Ecevit government. The change in the Turkish attitude was the result of several factors. Apart from the external developments causing concern in Ankara, there was a feeling in Turkey that the request for a freeze had allowed the Community to ignore important questions concerning free movement. Another argument was that Turkey should apply immediately for membership before Greece and other Mediterranean countries became members. Is was argued that Turkey would have a better chance as part of the second Enlargement rather than applying seperately later. Moreover, the new economic policy of liberalisation implied closer links with the Community. The formal meeting of the Association Council for more than three years took place in Brussels on 5 February 1980. The joint communiqué stressed unequivocally that eventual Turkish membership in the Community was one of the goals envisaged by the Ankara Agreement, and added that the enlargement of the E C would not affect its relations with Turkey. The Community prepared a package which was accepted at the second Association Council meeting on 30 June - 1 July, 1980 in Brussels. The Community's offer was the result of a confidential report, prepared three months before by the EC's External Relations Commissioner, William Haferkamp, stressing the need for additional economic aid to Turkey after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the revolution in Iran. The report pointed out that the Community had interest in stabilising Turkey, in supporting "pro-Western forces" in the country, and "in giving Turkey the feeling that it belongs to the European 25

26

27

57

family and has privileged relations with the Community". (The Community's aid to Turkey was accompanied and completed by financial support from the OECD, the European Investment Bank and, notably, by the West German government.) The Communiqué covered three main areas: 28

1. The Community would phase out customs duties on imports of agricultural products from Turkey over a six-year period. Tariff dismantling would start on 1 January 19S| and duties would be totally abolished by 1987. 2. Turkish workers who have had jobs in'the E C for a year would have the right to renew their work permits provided they stayed with the same employer. After three years of regular employment, workers would have second priority, and after four years, they would have free access to any job of their choice in the country of residence. 3. Economic and technical co-operation was agreed in the field of industry, energy, agriculture, and education. A special loan of 75 m. units of account was confirmed, pending the Fourth Financial Protocol coming into force. The Fourth Financial Protocol would come into force on 1 November 1981, with an appropriation of 600 m. units of account (350 m. for loans on special terms, 50 m. in grants, and 200 m. in normal loans from the European Investment Bank). However, some member states, especially West Germany, did not agree with the proposal to implement an earlier agreement allowing free access for Turkish workers. The Germans insisted that no target date was politically acceptable at that moment. The common proposals were also endangered by France and Italy who expressed reservations concerning the abolition of customs duties on Turkish agricultural imports. The principle of free movement was also called into question again by the decision of France, Germany and the Benelux countries to reimpose visas for Turkish visitors. After the military coup in Turkey in 12 September 1980, both sides stated their desire for continuing in the Association relationship. On 15 September 1980 the Foreign Ministers of the Community decided to maintain the co-operation in the hope that the Turkish Junta's stated intention to restore parliamentary democracy would soon be a reality: 29

They took note with preoccupation of the evolution of the political situation in Turkey. They noted the assurance given by the military authorities regarding the speedy reestablishment of democratic institutions, respect for human rights a i d guarantees concerning the treatment of persons in public life under house arrest. They entertain the firm hope that these declarations will soon be put into effect in full. It is in this frame of mind that the Community will continue its co-operation with Turkey. 30

However, the European Parliament, which had criticised the limitation of human and civil rights in Turkey several times in the past, called on the Commission in April 1981 to freeze the Financial Protocol. After the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Ecevit at the end of 1981, Turkey-EC relations deteriorated so much that the Commission decided not to recommend the Fourth Financial Protocol to the European Council. This meant the temporaray suspension of financial aid from the E C to Turkey. Problems multiplied also on trade and tariff questions. On 3 December, 1981 the Commission decided to impose a provisional antidumping duty of 16 per cent on imports of Turkish cotton yarn, since Turkish cotton yarn had taken 9.3 per cent of the Community 58

market (6.6 per cent in 1980), and an anti-dumping duty of 12 per cent was confirmed in April 1982. The Turkish government retaliated by imposing an additional 15 per cent dutyon imports of Community steel products. The Commission further accepted a request fromFrance and Italy to apply safeguard measures on certain textile imports from Turkey. France was authorised to suspend temporarily imports of shirts and T-shirts, and Italy, cotton cloth. In addition the Commission introduced a quantitative restriction of 75,000 tonnes in 1982 on Turkish cotton yara exports to the Community. Finally, in August 1982, Turks agreed to respect a minimum price for yarn exports to the EC, which allowed the abolition of the anti-dumping duty imposed on imports of Turkish cotton yarn since 4 April 1982. The Fourth Protocol, with 600m. ECUs, is still suspended as of this time of writing. The Commission reserved 10 m. E C U s for exceptional aid, but Greece has been trying to block the use of these funds through recourse to the European Court of Justice. 31

32

33

34

35

Turkey's request for accession to the EC: a historic moment at the wrong time? When the Turkish Minister of State for European Affairs, A l i Bozer, made the official application for full membership on 14 April 1987, he declared that this day was an "historic moment for Turkey". The answer of the current President of the E C Council of Ministers, Leo Tindemans, was brief and cool. He announced that the Community agreed to apply the EEC-Treaty to the Turkish request without discrimination. On 27 April 1987 the foreign ministers of the Twelve put the Commission in charge of considering the application. As has been the case with prior applications, the Commisssion has two years to consider the application and present a report. The Council of Ministers will then vote on whether to enter negotiations. The member states were reserved but did not react negatively, except for Greece who repeated its point of view that as long as the problems between Greece and Turkey concerning Cyprus and the Aegean are not resolved, the Greek government would not be willing . to accept Turkish membership in the EC. Scepticism and reservations on the part of other member countries stem from different reasons. First of all the budget of the Community has reached a breaking point after the second Enlargement of the EC, and the difference between the prosperity of old members and that of newcomers has increased significanUy. It is feared that the gap will become even larger after the completion of the European Common Market in 1992. In_yi«u/ of the fact that the Turkish economy is not only below the average of other European members, but even below that of Portugal, the poorest member of the E C , it was not surprising that the Turkish request was regarded as having been wrongly timed. In any case Turkish membership would create certain difficulties especially with regard to common agricultural prices and the realisation of regional policy. It would add to the problems of excess agricultural produce, particularly of citrus fruits, vegetables, olive oil and tobacco. The Community estimates the additional burden to be 2 b. ECUs per year. There is also the fear that other countries such as Norway and Morocco would be encouraged to apply for membership, if the Community set a precedent in the case of Turkey. 36

37

On the other hand, no one can ignore the economic development in Turkey, which has significantly improved during the last six years. In this period exports have trebled, and the rate of inflation has fallen from 100 per cent in 1980 to 29.8 per cent in 1986. With regard to the growth rate, Turkey is the leading O E C D country. Indeed efforts towards modernisation of industry and liberalisation of the international market are remarkable and promising. 38

59

Nevertheless one can still ask whether these encouraging steps are really sufficient. The answer has less to do with fluctuating economic indicators than whether time is ripe for Turkey's membership. In view of the fact, that neither the E Q n o r Ankara have yet met the obligations of the Association Agreement, is Turkey's membership an act of putting the cart before the horse? For example, as far as establishing a customs union or implementing guiding E C rules and decrees are concerned, Turkey is far behind satisfying the preconditions for membership. Yet it would certainly not be wise to treat Turkey, an important partner in the Western Alliance and an member of O E C D and the Council of Europe, as an optional third-world country. Europe's appeal to Ankara, after the military coup in September 1980, to restore parliamentary democracy as soon as possible should be regarded as a convincing sign that European countries consider Turkey as a part of Europe. On the other hand, there is the unavoidable fact that Turkey is also a part of the Middle East. Not without reason in the past has Ankara emphasised its role as a bridge between the West and the Middle East. The pressure arising now from the Islamic revolution is only one expression of the traditional links between two worlds. But as forces of westernisation and Islamisation come into sharper conflict in the region, it would be difficult for the Turkish government to implement a policy of modernisation, forcing the European model. It might therefore be more useful to strengthen relations between Turkey and the Community step by step in the framework of the Association Agreement and its realities, i This pragmatic option should not be interpreted by Turkish authorities as an act of discriWnation, but as an attempt to sustain the course of modernisation and democracy, without ignoring the social and cultural identity of the Turkish population. For this reason it is necessary for western European countries to spell out clearly how they think the Association Agreement should be improved. Moreover, the E C and its member states must meet their obligations concerning full membership of Turkey in the future,. Turkey's membership, however, is not a matter of concrete dates but of concrete signals. The fact that the Association Council met in September 1986 for the first time in six years cannot be construed by Turkey as a sufficient gesture on the part of the E C toward discharging its obligations; nor for that matter the measure proposed by the Commission at the end of 1986 concerning the new scheme applicable to Turkish workers in the Community. These proposals limited free circulation solely to Turkish workers who already belong to the regular labour market of a member state. Ankara had admitted the possibility of a compromise but only with a view to achieving future accession to the Community. Finally, the psychological dimension is very important. The Community had to make Turkey feel a welcome partner in the Western world. There is no denying the fact, which the Turkish Foreign Minister, Vahit Halefoglu, stressed in 1986, that relations between Turkey and Europe cannot be divided into different sectors, they have to be regarded as one. This applies to Ankara as well. Turkey must adhere to tbfe rules in the same way, particularly in respect of its commitment to parliamentary democracy and human rights, as well as to solving its bilateral conflicts with Greece. These issues are probably more significant than economic ones with regard to Turkey's relationship with the Community and the option of its future membership. Progress in these fields first of all depends on Turkey itself and its capability of looking for bilateral solutions in its dispute with Greece. In this context the exchange of letters between Ozal and Papandreou might be an encouraging step. On the other hand, the Community's attitude of not becoming involved in the internal problems of its member states could create a situation incompatible with the rules and the 39

40

60

philosophy of the EC. There is no provision in the Treaty of Rome for dealing with such a situation, but the Community has the opportunity of discussing such problems within the framework of EPC and its working groups. Conclusions The Ankara Agreement of 1963 and the Additional Protocol of 1970 were based on the goal of integrating Turkey into the Community. However, the evolution of both agreements has encountered significant and increasing difficulties. Three main periods can be distinguished in the relationship between Turkey and the Community: 1. The optimistic period in the 1960s. In the 1960s both political and economic circumstances were favourable on both sides. However, undue optimism prevented the diagnosis of the real economic problems. The Turkish application for accelerating the transitional stage at the end of the 1960s was premature. The main causes of failure in the 1960s were the Community's policy of benign neglect, and the Turkish policy of laissez faire in the economic field. The Turkish attitude towards the Community was based on a fundamental misconception of the Agreement, interpreting the Association as a basis for automatic full membership, while the E C member states accepted full membership only on the assumption that all conditions and obligations of membership had been fulfilled. 2. The period of incoherence and disillusionment in the 1970s. The politically and economically motivated period of high expectations in the 1960s was followed by a period of incoherence in using the instruments of the Agreements. From the Community side little was done to face up to the practical economic implications of membership. The Additional Protocol of 1970 was inadequate to form the basis of an effective evolution of the Association with a view to full membership. The attitude of the Community changed from regarding Turkey originally as a country with special relations to the E C , to the status of only one among many Mediterranean countries. The Turkey-EC relationship had to withstand not only the challenge of developments within the Community (the southern Enlargement, the global Mediterranean Policy, the Greek application in the 1970s) and within Turkey, but also the impact of other events, notably the Greek-Turkish conflicts V concerning Cyprus and the Aegean, the oil crisis in 1973, and the Afghanistan conflict and the Iranian revolution at the end of the 1970s. The last two events, though lying outside both i the E C and Turkey, were decisive in bringing about a further change in the attitude of the/' Community towards Turkey. So far neither side rigorously pursued the Association's goais^ 3. Turkey's application for full membership after the period of standstill in the 1980s. The 1980s began with efforts to revive the Turkey-EC Association. A new agreement restored the flagging relationship, although it was doubtful whether it would result in further development of the Association. The blocking of the Fourth Protocol after the military coup meant, in practice, the suspension of financial aid from the E C to Turkey and a standstill in the development of the Association agreements for six years. After Turkey's recent application for full membership, the CoirimunTtyisT^ adequate alternative. It is 61

necessary to look for a form of co-operation, bearing in mind the perspective of full mem­ bership without ignoring the limitations of a developing country. For that reason the Com­ munity ought to prepare a set of indicators which would define the state of readiness for membership, and a package of measures that should include means of institutional linkages in the framework of the Association Council and the EPC, as well as forms of co-operation in certain policy issues, particularly in the areas of industry, energy and agriculture. The package of indicators and policies could be combined in a further protocol. But the likeli) hood for this development occurring is not very good since the Turkish application. Look­ ing at tne de facto veto role of Greece in the Community, Ankara's step in putting the cart before the horse might have been a historical mistake not only with regard to the Turkish perspective on achieving full membership but also with regard to the revitalisation of the Association Agreement.

Notes 1

Tosun Bahçeli, "Turkey and the E E C : The Strains of Association", in Revue d'Intégration Euro­ péenne/Journal of European Integration 3 (No. 2, January 1980), pp. 221-237; especially p. 222. 2 SeeM. A . Birand, " Turkey and the European Community", in World Today 34 (No. 2, February 1978), pp. 52-62. 3 See Chapter 1 of this book. 4 See Heinz Kramer, Die Türkei: Gefährdeter Partner der Westlichen Allianz: Ansatzpunkte für Beiträge zur wirtschaftlichen, socialen und sicherheitspolitischen Stabilisierung, (Ebenhausen: SWP, 1981), p. 103. 5 See Yıldırım Keskin, "The Turkey-ECC Association and its Problems", in Werner Gumpel ed., Die Türkei auf dem Weg in die EG (München/Wien, 1979), pp. 65-72. 6 See Dankwart A . Rustow, "The Roses and Thorns", in The Mediterranean Challenge V: Turkey and the Community, Sussex European Papers 10 (1981), pp. 1-40; especially, p. 35. 7 See Elfriede Regelsberge and Wolfgang Wessels, European Concepts for the Mediterranean Region: Alienated Neighbours, Partners or a "Mare Nostrum"? Working Paper for the Conference on "Grow­ ing Economic Interdependence and the Future of Security in the Mediterranean" (Castel Gandolfo, Rome: September 6-9, 1982). 8 See Heinz Kramer, Die Türkei, p. 105. 9 See Yıldırım Keskin, "The Turkey-EEC Association and its Problems", p. 66. 10 See Heinz Kramer, Die Türkei, p. 107. U See Yıldırım Keskin, "The Turkey-EEC Association and its Problems", p. 66. 12 Dankwart A . Rustow, "The Roses and the Thorns", p. 31. 13 Ibid., p. 33. 14 See the arguments of the former Turkish Foreign Minister, ihsan S. Çağlayangil, "Die Türkei und die Europäische Gemeinschaft: Probleme und Anliegen im Hinblick auf die Süderweiterung", in Europa¬ - Archiv 32 (No. 21, 1977), pp. 753-759. 15 See Alfred Tovias, The Mediterranean Challenge III: EEC Englargemerk - the Southern Neighbours, Sussex European Papers 5 (1979). 16 See Heinz Kramer, Die Türkei, p. 128. 17 See Tosun Bahçeli, "Turkey and the E E C " , p. 22. 18 Ibid. 19 See Gian Paola Papa, "Relations between the European Community and Turkey", in Werner Gumpel ed., Die Türkei auf dem Weg in die EG, pp. 47-53. 20 See 20th meeting of the EEC/Turkey Association Council on 19 August 1975; 21st meeting on 16 Sep­ tember 1975, in 9. Gesamtbericht über die Tätigkeit der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (1975), pp. 290-291; 22nd meeting of the EEC/Turkey Association meeting on 1-2 March 1976; 23rd meeting on

62

J 20 December 1976, in 10. Gesamtbericht über die Tätigkeit der Europäischen pp. 286-287.

Gemeinschaften (1976)

21 See the conclusion drawn by the State Planning Organisation in 1976: Financial Times, 13 October 1976. 22 "Relations between Turkey and E E C " , in Turkish Foreign Policy Report 17 (Ankara: Ministry of Fo­ reign Affairs, 1976), pp. 19-20. 23 See The Times, 21 December 1976. 24 See 12. and 13. Gesamtbericht über die Tätigkeit der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (3978 and 1979). 25 See Trevor Penrose: "Is Turkish Membership Ecconomically Feasible?", in The Mediterranean Chal­ lenge V, pp. 41-96, especially pp. 67-68. 26 See 14. Gesamtbericht über die Tätigkeit der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (1980), pp. 291-292. 27 Ibid. 28 See Financial Times, 7 May 1980. 29 See The Economist, 5 July 1980. 30 Declaration of the Nine on 16 September 1980. 31 See Association Council meeting on 3 April 1982, Bulletin der Europäischen No. 4, pp. 47-48.

Gemeinschaften. 1982,

32 See Agence Europe, no. 3352, 17 April 1982 and no. 3402, 1 July 1982. (French imports of T-shirts in rose from 449,000 items in 1980 to 841,000 items in 1981, those of Turkish shirts from 549,000 items in 1980 to 1.95 million items in 1981. During the first four months of 1982, imports of Turkish shirts into France had increased by some 345 per cent in comparison with the corresponding period in the previous year.) 33 Turkish exports of cotton cloth into Italy during the first quarter of 1981 had reached 125 per cent of the exports during the whole of 1981, and amounted to a 435 per cent increase in relation to the first quarter of 1981. 34 See VWD, 19 August 1982. 35 See Agence Europe, no. 4385, 11 September 1986. 36 See Turgut Özal, "Ziel ist Festigung der Demokratie und der Menschenrechte", in Türkische Wirt­ schaft 3 (April 1987), pp. 7-8. 37 See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 April 1987. 38 See Turgut Özal, "Auf .einem vernünftigen Weg", in Süddeutsche 39 See Agence Europe, no. 4441, 1-2 December 1986. 40 See Vahit Halefoglu, "Die Türkei und Europa", in Südosteuropa

Zeitung, 27 April 1987. Mitteilungen, 26 (No. 4, 1986), p. 5.

63

Options for Future Relations Chapter 4 Bernard Burrows

Options for Future Relations between TYirkey and the European Community

Broadly speaking, the options for future Turkey-EC relations can be divided into three classes: those which would foresee, and would be intended to lead towards Turkish membership of the Community; those which would incorporate a quasi-permanent and wideranging relationship short of membership; and a third kind of relationship involving partial membership, or participation in a self-contained activity such as political co-operation, without other aspects of membership. The present arrangement set up by the Association Agreement falls clearly into the first category. Itsjygted objectives are to promote the strengthening of trade and economic relations betweénthe European Community and Turkey, while also helping to ensure the development of meJQnjys¥economy and the social conditions of the^lUfkish people. Butjhe projxarnme has as its final phajyLâ^steriUiasmxm^^ and co^orïïination of economic polides^-mnjioj^ the possihilityjgf Turkish acceslsBrTas soon asjiïïrkêy can~accept all Community^ligafimis^Xhe Agreement is therefore clearly intended to crealeTdynamic process l e ^ n g to~eventuaT^riembershijj. Several other optionTlaTTTnto the same category. For example, it has from time to time been suggested that Turkey might wish to make an early application for membership, as was done by Greece, without waiting for the completion of the period of 22 years foreseen in the Additional Protocol of 1970. Alternatively there could be a proposal that membership should be accepted by a fixed date. In the light of the delay in completing negotiations with Portugal and Spain, it must be anticipated that there could be several years of negotiations between acceptance in principle and accession. There would certainly be in addition a period of transition between accession and the full implementation of Community rules and obligations, as in the case of Britain, Denmark and Ireland in 1973 - 77, and Greece which has a 5 - 7 year transitional period. The spectrum of options of this kind would include the following: 1. Completion of the programme of the 1963 Association Agreement plus the Additional Protocol of 1970 providing for progressive harmonisation towards the customs union and freedom of movement. According to the Additional Protocol this would require 22 years from 1970. Thus the possibility of membership could be examined after 1992, assuming that the agreements had been satisfactorily implemented by that date. 2. Lengthening this process while leaving the framework unchanged, perhaps naming in advance a fixed date after which examination of the possibility of membership would take place. 3. Shortening this process while leaving the framework unchanged, perhaps naming in ad65

vance a fixed date before which examination of the possibility of membership would take ,, place. 4. Short-circuiting the 1970 Protocol, early acceptance of membership in principle, with accession to take place as soon as certain preparatory stages had been completed, to be followed if necessary by a post-accession transitional period. 5. Considering without delay an application for early membership without a long preparatory stage, to be followed by a (long) transitional period. The second main type of option, not looking to future membership, would be similar to agreements made with other states such as Yugoslavia, Cyprus and the Maghreb countries. The object of the Association Agreement with Cyprus is the progressive elimination of obstacles to trade. The agreements with the Maghreb countries are known as Co-operation Agreements. They are of unlimited duration and provide for trade co-operation (free access to the European Community of non-CAP products) and industrial co-operation (development of production and financial investment). With Yugoslavia a non-preferential agreement of 1973 was superseded by a Co-operation Agreement of 1980, of unlimited duration, and having the same objectives as the Maghreb agreements. The tariff arrangements provide that most Yugoslav industrial production can enter the European Community free of duty and quantitative restrictions, but there are some exceptions. For agricultural trade there are specific tariff concessions on fruit, spirits, wine and tobacco. European Community exports to Yugoslavia receive most favoured nation treatment, with some possibility of exceptions. There is also co-operation in the fields of labour, industry, technology, etc., and provision for finance from the European Investment Bank (EIB). The terms of such agreements can of course be reviewed from time to time and a Co-operation Council is set up to oversee them, but there is no provision in any of them for moving towards membership at any time in the future. It has occasionally been suggested that Turkey and the European Community could negotiate a third, hybrid, arrangement in which Turkey could benefit from a limited number of the aspects of membership without having to accept the full range of Community obligations, or at least without doing so for a considerable period. The provisions of membership which might be of greatest value to Turkey are the free movement of labour, political cooperation and participation in the Regional and Social Funds. A small step in this direction was taken when an offer was made of limited information or consultation in relation to the political co-operation process. However, any extension of this idea into areas which fall within the Treaties of Accession of the existing member states has been strongly objected to as providing a precedent for the more general introduction of the "two (or more)-tier Community", or "Europe a la carte". Although this concept is anathema to Community purists, it cannot be altogether excluded that other difficulties and controversies may lead to its being re-examined, and in that case an application to the Turkish situation might be considered. On the other hand it is clear from the Yugoslav agreement that labour market policy and financial assistance (though not specifically through the Regional and Social Funds) can be included in agreements between the Community and associated states while not raising the possibility of ultimate full or partial membership. In this connection it should be stressed that one of Turkey's complaints about the operation of the Association Agreement in the 1970s was that its trade provisions were not so favourable as some of the agreements made by the Community with other countries which were not prospective members. 66

This seemingly anomalous situation raises an important issue in the consideration of options for Turkey's relationship with the European Community. Is the essential difference between a process leading towards the possibility of membership, such as Turkey now has in the Association Agreement, and a Co-operation Agreement, such as those with Yugoslavia arid the Maghreb states, primarily political? Bearing in mind the heavy and in some respects unpredictable burdens of membership, would not the negotiation of a mutually satisfactory Co-operation Agreement for trade, financial assistance and labour movement suit Turkey very well, except for the very important political difference between membership and non-membership? This difference is symbolised by full participation in the political cooperation process, through which an attempt is made to form a common foreign policy between member states, and which may possibly be extended in the direction of a common security policy. But it is also of a more general character, exemplified by the widespread recognition that the applications for membership by Greece, Portugal and Spain were made, and were accepted in principle, very largely on political grounds, while economic problems, particularly with Spain, subsequently caused delay about the implementation of the decision. The admission of Portugal and Spain to membership was agreed because political considerations were held to be paramount, as in the case of Greece. Thus the choice among the options for Turkey / E C relations will have to find a similar balance between the economic and political considerations, which, on either side, may sometimes appear to be pulling in different directions. There is no advantage in concealing that serious objections will be raised in the-existing member states against any proposal for early Turkish membership of the European Community, and in some quarters even against eventual membership at a distant future date. The objections will fall roughly into three categories:

N

1) The ignorance among many West Europeans of the existing European and western orientation of Turkey's social and political structure, criticism of the alleged limitation of human rights in Turkey, and Greek and Armenian anti-Turkish influence and propaganda. 2) The argument that the Community must solve its own internal problems before trying to absorb another large country whose agricultural production and regional imbalances will add greatly to some of those problems. This argument was used in France with regard to Spanish entry, and would apply even more strongly against Turkey. 3) The peculiar awkwardness of some of Turkey's characteristics, such as: its large and rapidly growing population which would lead to extreme pressure for employment in more prosperous Community countries; and its extremely low G N P per head compared with Community countries, coupled with marked regional imbalance between western and eastern Turkey which would lead to pressure on the Regional and Social Funds, and on finance from the E.I.B. In view of the probable importance of the political factor in membership and of the political objections which would have to be overcome before a Turkish application for membership would even be considered, it makes sense to consider some of the other political options said to be available, which could be combined with an economic Co-operation Agreement on the Yugoslav model. These other political options include: — reliance on a specially close relationship with the United States, based on common strategic interests; 67

— an intensification of the special relations already existing with West Germany, as the principal European provider of financial assistance, military aid and jobs for Turkish workers; — an attempt to re-create a Balkan grouping; — closer relations with some Middle East states; — continuation of the status quo, relying on NATO for security, IMF/World Bank for economic assistance, and the Council of Europe for membership of the European community, (small c) >

The last option especially, but also probably some of the others, would not imply a final decision on either side against an eventual application for membership of the European Community. This possibility could be kept open and reconsidered from time to time in the light of developments both in the Community and in Turkey. Since the political objections to early accession to the Community are all too wellarticulated, it is sensible also to assess briefly the acceptability to the Community of Turkey choosing one of the other options. It seems likely, on present forecasts of Turkish policy, that Turkey would only accept a non-membership arrangement on the lines of the Yugoslav or Cyprus agreements as a pis alter if a membership application were rejected. In these circumstances Turkey might be a reluctant and dissatisfied partner in any such arrangement and might seek instead to reinforce its links with Middle East countries, the non-aligned group, or even the countries of Eastern Europe. Member states of the Community who are also members of NATO would have to consider how far a change in Turkey's political orientation might endanger her continued membership of NATO, and if so how much damage this would do to the defence of Western security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. The answer might be that it would very seriously prejudice these interests. For example, a neutralist Turkey might be unwilling or unable to maintain the restrictions imposed by the Montreux convention or the use of the Turkish straits for military purposes by the Soviet Union, or to refuse overflights of Turkish territory by Soviet military aircraft. There could be another disadvantage. With Greece inside the Community and Turkey permanently outside, there would be continuing attempts by Greek governments to press the Community to espouse the Greek cause in the various disputes between the two countries. To the extent that the Community gave in to such pressure, this would tend to drive Turkey still further away from its other Western associations and so increase the danger to western security interests. These factors would have to be weighed very carefully against any advantages that might appear to be obtained by member states from Turkey's non-membership. The more important of these would probably be the comparatively greater possibility of resisting Turkish pressure for free movement of labour, for free trade in textiles anS some classes of agricultural exports which might be inconvenient to producers in other Mediterranean countries. Much of the discussion about possible Turkish membership is likely to turn on the question of timing, and this paper therefore concludes with a review of the often divergent considerations relating to this. On the Turkish side, the government democratically elected under the 1983 constitution will probably wish to take early action on Community membership, for two main reasons. The first aim would be to signify and consolidate the return to parliamentary government (as in the case of the Greek, Spanish and Portuguese applications), and to reaffirm Turkey's 68

v

European and Western vocation. The other motive would be to limit so far as possible a period of uncertainty about the ultimate destination of the Turkish economy. The advance planning of investment and trgde policy would clearly be affected by the questions whether Turkey was likely to be a member of the Community, and if so, at roughly what date, and what kind of pre-accession and/or transitional period would be agreed. The advantages of delay unfortunately appear quite as clear to most of the existing member states as those of an early (and positive) decision to the Turks. There was a strong consensus that the negotiations with Portugal und Spain had to be concluded before any new application would be entertained. It is now widely felt that a further period is required in order to absorb the new entrants. There was some questioning in certain countries of the democratic nature of the new Turkish Constituion, but the assumption by Turkey of the Presidency of the Council of Europe in 1986 appears to show that these doubts have been overcome. There could be a time-lag in the appreciation by some member states of the extent of Turkish economic recovery (assuming this continues). In any case it could be argued that the question of Turkish membership would be easier to handle if, over some years, the gap between the Turkish and the Community G N P per head could be significantly reduced. Two conclusions suggest themselves. First, if the Turkish Government decides to apply for membership, a considerable oolitical campaign will be required, not only with the -erjmrnuhTJy^ but even more w i t i i i r j e ^ and opinioniormers of the exi-" sting member states. Without such a will-organised political effort, an announcement of ^HTfecislonTo apply could have the opposYfeefie^t^ lhai intended. Sccondlyran-approach by Turkey should seek so far as possible to reconcile in advance the Turkish desire for early —deetsion-with the propensity to delay which will be found in the existing member states. -One way to do' this would be to seek early agreement on the principle of a firm but long time-table culminating in membership. The difference between this and the time-table already incorporated in the 1970 Protocol to the Association Agreement would be that, whereas the existing time-table requires a decision at the end of the process as to whether or not Turkey should be allowed to become a member, the new version would stipulate that the steps in the time-table, including Turkey's final accession to the EC, would be implemented at fixed dates unless a change were agreed by both parties to the agreement. In other words a new agreement could provide for a lengthy but fixed pre-accession period, followed by accession, followed if necessary by a transitional period as agreed for other new extrants, before the complete Community regime was applicable.

69

•M

Seyfi Taşhan

f The case for^TurMsh jtnemJteı^Kigı

c

4

Until the nineteenth century Turkey's relations with Europe were of adversary character accentuated by differences in their religious identities and devotions. With the beginning of the Turkish reform movements early in the nineteenth century, civil contacts between Turkey and European powers grew fairly rapidly^Following the alliance between Turkey, Britain and France during the Crimean war, Turkey was included in the Concerte Européen İn the Paris conference of 1856. Thereafter, Turkey's relations with Europe came to be influenced less by the issue of reli­ gion and were affected more by security and commercial considerations. Yet, despite the fact that Turkey had been recognised formally as a European power, due to its failure to modernise and secularise its structures and institutions, it was considered the "sick man of Europe" and in effect treated.as an alien body within the cultural structureof Europe. Although among the European powers, Germany had maintained closer relations with Tur­ key, Turkey was nevertheless part of the "Orient" for Germany as well. Evidence of Turkey being considered alien is seen in the fact that, following Turkey's defeat in World War I, the Allies not only imposed the harshest terms but accepted to completely eliminate Turkey from the map by dividing among themselves the most attractive parts of its land and giving the rest to Greeks and Armenians. Such a treatment was not even contemplated for any "European" nation defeated in that war. Modernization of Turkey's institutions under Kemal Atatürk had several objectives among which a principal one was to ensure the survival of Turkey by making the country an effective member of the international European system and integrating Turkey within the institutions of this system—not only formally but also organically. In spite of the im­ mense challenges he faced, his reforms, followed by the pluralistic system of government introduced after World War II, took Turkey a very long way from being an Islamic state ruled by a Caliph in the direction of becoming a secular governmental system. This opened a unique path towards modernisation. After World War II Turkey sought to take part in every integration movement that would make it part of the international system, particularly in Europe. The institutional moderni­ zation and democratization, which stemmed from the aspirations of the Turkish nation, were promoted to facilitate Turkey's participation in the Western international system. As a result Turkey entered the Council of Europe at its inception in 1949, became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1952 and in 1963 joined the E E C , as it was then called, as an associate member, with the understanding that it would eventually be-

i:

71

come a full member. Turkey's European vocation and a positive European response continued smoothly and progressively until the mid-1970s. In fact, the Supplementary Protocol with the E C establishing deadlines for various stages in the development of Turkey's association, came into force in 1973. Two simultaneous developments which took place in the mid-1970s may be considered to be responsible for the deterioration of Turkey's relations with Western Europe and the United States.

it must attempt to do so at a time when the international terms of trade are very unfavourable. — .Turks have to maintain a high level of economic growth — much higher than that of European countries — in order to attain a reasonable standard of living, as well as to lay the basis for economic integration into the European Community. — Turks have to bring about all these economic and socio-structural changes without endangering their democratic order and without infringing human rights.

The first seems to be the Cyprus crisis and Turkish intervention on the island. After all peaceful efforts to reach a settlement were frustrated by the administration of Archbishop Makarios on the one hand and by the Colonels in Athens on the other, a coup was perpetrated on the island to achieve the union of Cyprus with Greece. The Turkish response resulted in the resurrection of some of the old animosities between Greece and Turkey as well as the creation of some new problems in the Aegean Sea. The second was the oil crisis and the Western response to it. When industrialised countries decided to reduce their economic growth as a result of sharply higher energy prices, increased unemployment became inevitable. Germany, too, felt that a slowing down of the economy was required, with the inevitable consequence of increased unemployment. The decision was made that the time had come for the "guest workers" to go home. Unfortunately, by that time, a great many of Turkish workers had brought their families to Germany and had actually began to consider themselves as residents of the Federal Republic. Looking in retrospect at the developments of the 1970s, one cannot but observe that western Europe, for the first time since World War I, had begun to feel that the Turks had become self-assertive and insensitive to European feelings. The European Community responded by including Greece in its club, freezing Turkey's association, restricting Turks' access to Europe by the imposition of visa requirements in complete disregard of the Council of Europe's principles and objectives, and by recognising the unilaterally proclaimed Greek administration in Cyprus as the legitimate government of the island. The mismanagement of the Turkish economy and deteriorating social conditions did not help to improve the negative image of Turkey that was building up in Europe. Yet, owing to the fact that Turkey did not have any significant bi-lateral problems with any of the western European countries except Greece, it was difficult for Turks to comprehend the growth of anti-Turkish sentiment in the European fora and in public opinion in many European countries.

I believe that Turks are meeting these challenges with courage and determination. Nonetheless, in Europe today various arguments are advanced to delay or thwart Turkey's accession. I would respond to the worries expressed by the European Community members in the folbwmg„manneri ~~ (^yÊcc^miçMQbkmSJJX is argued that with the extension of the European Community to encompass Greece, Spain and Portugal, the Community has already overstretched itself and Turkey is not a small country to "digest", the wording in itself being unfortunate. It is said that Turkey's participation in the Community will create new and sizeable pressures on the Common Agricultural Policy, Regional Development Funds, and the European Investment Bank resources, not to mention endangering several European industries which might not survive Turkish competition. These arguments presume that Turkey's accession will not provide valuable economic advantages to the Community countries, in addition to those already secured by way of bilateral trade and in economic relations, which are already good and expanding. Although these arguments have certain validity, they do not consider short-term and longterm advantages which will accrue to Europe with Turkish participation. Common Agricultural Policy has no relation today to the realities of the world markets for agricultural products; whether Turkey participates or not, the CAP has to be revised. There will be certain demands on the Regional Development Funds, but these investments will be more than offset very quickly. Turkey's use of E.Ï.B. sources were already foreseen in the Association Agreement and Turkey's full membership will not change the picture substantially. If certain European industries will suffer with Turkey's acceptance as a full member, Turkey will also lose some of its uncompetitive industries to European firms. The result will be more competitive industries in a larger market.

— Let me now outline some of the factors that, in addition to the circumstances mentioned above, affect the position of Turkey vis-a-vis Europe: — Turks have to provide defence at the forward line of southern Europe for NATO. If Turkey falls, there is practically nothing else to stop the Warsaw Pact from encircling Europe. Turkey feels that it has to maintain a very large army, today nearly one million men, to provide a reasonable defence structure in the fece of modern equipment shortages. — At a time when Europe had built most of its infrastructure, Turks were still struggling to maintain a far flung empire. Having neglected their homeland in the nineteenth century, the Turks must now belatedly engage in the costly effort to catch up with European progress in this area. One aspect of this problem is that Turkey has to transform a basically rural agricultural society into an urban industrial society. — Turkey has to increase its exports in order to be able to service its large foreign debt as well as to pay for arms imports and the needed inputs for a developing economy, and 72

It is a commonly mentioned hyrwthesjs^to ifTurkey can m a m ^ J t e e c ^ in the same trend it followed jn the 1970 1986 period, within a,few.decades.the.Turkish 'economy in terrns.pf gross-national..product will exceed the largest national economy, in •Western Europe and, assuch, it will have an enormous competitive power. Its competitive power is already better than that of two or three Community members. With Turkey's large and growing internal market, the proximity and attractiveness of Middle Eastern markets and the need of the socialist countries for the trade conditions which Turkey can offer, according to one view, Turkey's accession to the Community may not be a necessity for its economic progress. Instead, Turkey could well turn out to be another Japan all by itself, as asserted by the Turkish Prime Minister. Furthermore, the problems of Turkey's adaptation would have been substantially attenuated had it been possible to create the necessary institutions and fulfill the terms of the Association beginning with the Association Agreement. Already under the existing Association Agreement, it is incumbent upon both the Community countries and Turkey to strive to :

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bring about a compatibility between Turkish and European Community economies. This is a mutually agreed target that has to be achieved. Therefore, Turkey has to look to existing economic problems not pessimistically, as if they were insurmountable hurdles, but as a challenge which was accepted twenty-five years ago, when the economic conditions of Tur­ key were relatively much worse than now. Among the Turkish business community a great ^confidence prevails that economic issues can be resolved without very great dislocations. (^Migration: It is claimed that if Turkey becomes a member of the European Community, Turkish workers will invade Europe. Let us examine the roots of this question. Between the early 1960s and the late 1970s due to agricultural mechanisation there was an exodus from villages in Turkey. Coinciding with this exodus, while Turkish urban population swel­ led, there was a clear requirement for unskilled labour in the fast growing German eco­ nomy which was partly met by the employment of Turkish villagers. In the 1960s these guest workers operated on contracts of up to four years and rotated back to Turkey. After the 1970s, in order to receive children's allowances they were required to bring their families to Germany. Having their families with them and being employed in comparatively wellpaid jobs in Germany, these workers lost the incentive to go back to Turkey, and a Turkish community grew in Germany, now a community of a sizeable population. With second and third generations in this Community having a more German upbringing than a Turkish one, a large portion of these "Turks" are becoming culturally German, and are German citizens. Compatibility problems may be eliminated in not too distant a future, and it seems likely that names of Turkish origin may become a permanent feature of German society. It should not be forgotten that Turkey is itself a country of immigrants, many ethnic and national groups forming its structure. It is currently providing shelter to over a million Iranians, who have the right to travel to Turkey without a visa. Therefore, it is difficult for Turks to understand why they should not be employed when and where there are employers to use their services. Hence also the strong Turkish reaction to the imposition of visa obli­ gations on Turkish citizens travelling to Western Europe and its rigid, almost cruel imple­ mentation. Over the history of their industrialisation, all European countries have, at one time or other, exported populations until their processes of industrialisation were com­ pleted. Turkey is passing through this stage now. Viewed from a long-term perspective, Turkey's size and natural resources are adequate to support comfortably a population well over one hundred million as Tongas the present development programmes are vigorously pursued. The huge infrastructure investments that are being carried out in Turkey are pro­ viding more and more job opportunities, not only for Turks but also for European industry; and in the not too distant future, there will hardly be any incentives for Turkish workers to emigrate. Turks are not anxious to leave their home country so long as th^ey have decent jobs and a reasonable standard of living; and certainly not anxious to send their manpower to areas where it is not needed or welcome. The optimal way for the resolution of the free circula­ tion already foreseen in the Association Agreement should not be unilateral and high-handed action. There is no doubt that when an earnest negotiation process for Turkey's admission to the Community is established, arrangements for regulating migration can be worked out. Meanwhile the bureaucracy which tortures the would-be visitors to Europe at the consulate doors and frontiers serves no purpose other than creating resentment and alienation. ^RdigioxumdXMiure: Turkey, having lived.thrgugh the bitter experience of religious rule foj; centuries,^ TurkT^h~pe6pTe"o'f a l l walkTof 74

life are determined to preserve this particular Atatürk reform which may be considered the most important part of his legacy. Today Western observers, possibly somewhat influenced by their historic image of the Turk as "the scourge of Christendom", consider enlarged free­ dom of expression and the visibility of Islam in Turkey, which results from an enhanced right of freedom of expression there, and among Turkish community in Germany, as a de­ viation from secularism. Far from this being the case, Turkish society permits greater reli­ gious freedom, resulting in greater visibility of religion, because it feels that secularism is firmly rooted. Turkish secularism is a valuable asset, and, because it has been a successful social tool, it attracts both the antagonism of Islamic fundamentalists, and the admiration of moderate intellectuals in the Middle East. The current prominence of discussions of Islam in Turkey is related to the climate of free­ dom there, and the fact that the rural-agrarian population, now in the process of adjusting to urban culture, practices religion and religious rites with much more zeal than estab­ lished, educated urban classes. After an initial increase in Islamic consciousness, one would expect this to decrease in proportion to the progress of the urbanisation and educa­ tion processes. I have always maintained that the common religious denominator of modern Western so­ cieties, including Turkey, is secularism. The secular approach to the role of religion, be it in a Christian or Islamic environment, is the only way to bring about an understanding among Islamic and Christian societies of Europe. I would like to assume that Islamic funda­ mentalism in the Middle East has not caused a fundamentalist Christian reaction to it, but only a secular one, in which case Turkey and the Community will be of the same mind. Much is said about cultural differences between Turkey and Western Europe. Itjs claim¬ ed that European culture is Judeo-Christian anjdjiumar^^ "culture is considered to be ' I s l a n u ? ! ^ ^ TiiaTâîmï^ revolution to talk about supposedly immutable cultu­ ral differences among industrialized societies is anachronistic. While I admit that the folk­ lore in different regions of the world preserves native characteristics, I am convinced that we are being fed uniform cultural values by mass-media. Efforts to challenge this tide by those who advance the supremacy of "Mittel-Europäische Kultur" or by the proponents of Turco-Islamic cultural values in Turkey are doomed to failure. The concern is the speed with which rural populations will adopt the mainstream cultural values of the West be they in Turkey, Sicily or Crete. Furthermore, each and every region of the West — including Turkey — has something to contribute to the common cultural values. ^ ^MMîİSİİ It is said that democracy and respect of human rights in Turkey are not up to European norms, so that Turkey's integration in the Community's political structure will present difficultues. Those who have studied the history of Turkey would recall that aw tempts to introduce pluralist democratic system in the multi-national Ottoman Empire be­ gan as early as 1908. The process was interrupted by wars and social upheavals. Further­ more, Turkey has had problems of external threats from forces inimical to its independence. The West considers Turkey as an asset for the defence of the free world to which Turkey be­ longs, but there are others who wish to detach Turkey from the West or to dismantle it. To obtain this, Turkish pluralist democratic rights have sometimes been used and abused as tools of subversion. To ensure the survival of Turkish democracy against such subversion, there have been military interventions, which have been of temporary character. After each intervention Turkish democracy has been restored with greater strength than before. 75

The Turks, having been convinced through experience of the democratic aspirations of the Turkish Armed Forces, never understood the extreme reaction shown by the European Community and its parliament to the events that took place in Turkey in the early 1980s. Do we not have difficulties in the implementation of democracy and human rights in Turkey? We certainly do. Because of dangers perceived nationally, Turkey has banned communism, religious fundamentalism and separatism from the Turkish political system/Current Turkish attitudes are the result of an historical process. After the Turkish Empire began its decline in the eighteenth century, the Turks critically analysed their system in search of a national consensus that would prevent the collapse of their State in the face of rising imperialism in the North and in the West. Ideas of the Turkish polity ranged from European type monarchism to Pan-Turkism to Pan-Islamism until the empire totally crumbled at the end of World War I. Finally, Ataturk's Turkey chose a path of modernism, based on successful Western institutional paradigms. The new Turkish nationalism conceptually discarded all forms of racism or Pan-Turanism, concepts which might have made the creation of a modern national in Turkey impossible. Turkey also rejected religious fundamentalism of any sort as detrimental to pragmatism, rationality and progress. Thirdly, Turkey rejected Marxist dogma as contrary to all the values which Turks espoused. The ban against these three dogmas is still regarded as an important requirement for the security and functioning of the Turkish institutional democracy^ Some people in Turkey claim that the de facto relaxation of these bans was responsible for the chaos and anarchy in the 1970s which culminated in the military intervention of 1980. These bans, which were initially introduced to defend and uphold democracy and the nation-state, nowadays paradoxically have become sources of accusation by some of our West European friends who consider them "undemocratic". There is no doubt that these bans will be reduced and lifted in Turkey as and when they cease to be considered by the Turkish people as threats to Turkish democracy and national integrity. Increasing solidarity with our European partners and the sense of belonging to the European community will no doubt help in this process. The European norms for human rights are those which are defined in the European Convention on Human Rights, to which Turkey is a party. States which consider that Turkey has violated these rights have the right to bring a complaint against Turkey in the Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe. Turkish citizens also enjoy the right of individual application to the Commission. While these avenues are open for real and effective defence of human rights, raising a campaign against Turkey for alleged systematic violation of human rights in the European Parliament and other fora where Turks are not present or unable to defend themselves, cannot be considered as compatible with our mutual desire to promote understanding and solidarity among European nations. * Among the political factors that need be pointed out, one is that Turkey is the only European country which has land boundaries with Middle Eastern countries. Turkey as a member of Europe is in a position to extend European interests to this part of the world and is already acting as a factor of moderation and stability in the region. Turkey's participation in the European political co-operation will no doubt contribute to the formation of more realistic European policies in the Middle East and at the same time provide some significant help in the execution of such policies. It is sometimes claimed that by the time Turkey becomes a full member of the European Community it will have the largest number of seats in the European Parliament given 76

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to any nation. Turks do not see this as an awkward situation since Turkey already has a land surface of about 770,000 square kilometers, which is approximately 30 per cent of the Community surface now, and its population is over 15 per cent of that of the Community. Turkey also provides the largest number of troops for the defense of the Western A l liance in Europe and by the time it achieves full integration it will have a very sizeable economy. When Turkey joined NATO, there were some voices in Western Europe saying that the inclusion of Turkey, which is in a highly vulnerable area, would create weakness rather than strength in the Alliance. History proved them wrong. But in recent years, with the possibility of an American decoupling from Europe, we begin to hear similar parochial arguments being advanced, and in fact, we see certain preparations made to consider a de¬ fence system for Europe without Turkey. Turkey and other members of the Alliance in Europe have a security interdependence. Any strategist working on the defence plans of Europe cannot ignore Turkey in any equation. Yet, there seems to be a trend to prepare European plans that would involve Turkey and Turkish Armed Forces without consulting Turkey. This is not acceptable for the Turks. Furthermore, as repeated by the Turks many times, the effectiveness of "the Alliance defence is a function of its multi-dimensional integration. Turkey cannot be kept out of the European economic and political integration while it is expected to contribute to European defence. The Turks, having considered the issue for more than a century, have chosen to unite their destiny with that of Western Europe. They have done this not because there are no alternative directions, but because Turkish aims, standards and interests were perceived to lie in the westernization of the country. However, Turkey cannot accept to be treated only as a formal member of Europe as it was in 1856 or according to the arbitrary implementation of the Association Agreement. Turkey is determined to become a full member of the new Europe which is in the process of creation. The consensus favouring that objective is so overwhelming in the Turkish public opinion that failure to achieve it in a reasonable space of time will most likely have terrible consequences, ones that must be of the greatest concern to any Turkish government. Therefore, Turkey is ready to take six steps to meet the Community while it would expect its partners to take no more than one step forward to meet it.

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Geoffrey Denton

Negotiating Turkish Accession: A Summary of Papers Submitted to the Study Group

In this concluding section of Chapter 4, the question of whether and how Turkey might become a full member of the Community is investigated. The Turkish position on applying for membership was examined on the basis of discussions within the Study Group, and the attitudes of the various member s|ates of the E C towards a possible Turkish application were reviewed on the basis of con'tributionV by members of the Study Group from different countries, and by several "correspondents'j.^Lessons were considered from earlier Enlargement negotiations which could be relevant in the case of a Turkish application. Finally, a possible timetable for developments leading to Turkish accession is examined, which also emerged from discussions in the Study Group. The Turkish argument why early membership of the E C would be beneficial is both political and economic. The threat perceived to come from the Soviet Union requires alliance with the West, and specifically NATO membership. Non-alignment, or links with Arab and other countries of the Middle East, offer no tenable alternative form of security, owing to the instability and lack of economic development of those countries. However, membersruD of NATO k in itself not enough due to the well-known tensions, and therefore fragility' or bilateral links with the US. Turkey needs a more permanent and far-reaching affirmation of itsWestern and European orientHionTand that is bestjprovided by E C membership. With the Community~once~m^ between Greece and Turkey, a solution to the problems in the Aegean and in Cyprus should be easier to find. On the economic side, Turkexi&iuJe^^^ in urgent need of flows of investment from abroad. Such flows will be assured by E C membership, which will attract both more official aid mrougti grants from trie regional and social funds, and access to the European Investment Bank, and more private flows of capital as multi-national and otherXirms are convincedby Turkey's paTtlclpaiion in a^^ger free m ^ be assured maiklTt^ Competition from the Community will alsojn^rease_ the efficiency of Turkish industry. ~ —~ ^ T h e Turks would expect a favourable Community response to a Turkish application, since they b e l i e y j e f J j e x c a n i ^ U h ^ large and growing^mliirjret^anaj^ . Assessing the likely responses of Community member states and institutions to a possible Turkish applicationis difficult, since there is little knowledge of or interest in Turkey. What^ interest there is has been conditi6TieTin~reoenf j i a r s l ^ ^ difficult process of the return to ajnore democratic regirne. It is particularly difficult to foresee (

how J ï C member^states.will react when a decision may need to be made about accepting turkey as a full member. y ^ ^ a s s ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ e ^ i y and could therefore be expectedjo react more favoaMyihanjptj^rjnember.sjates. However, German attitudes have been soured in re< cent years by serious social problems with the Gastarbeiter, as both the German economic situation and the nature of Turkish immigration have changed. German opinion is also affected by the perception of Germany as the Zahlmeister of the Community, and there is a tendency to argue that other pressing problems of the EC, suchjtsJhose.pe^ to agricultu^ tiie-Budget and the entry of Spain and Portug^ large burdèns^can! be contemplated,^Zflfirwk *CXT'O«-••„.. Y In Britain, Turkish immigration is not a problem and the main economic threat from Turkish membership appears to be that of Turkish exports of textiles and clothing. Like Germany, Bntajnje^dx& before any further erUarge^ The C^nsejcyatiye Government tends to take a' relaxed •view cTthe poiiticaï nature of the_.Turki_sh regjme. The Labour Opposition is more proGreek, partly because of substantial Greek and Greek Cypriot minorities in some constituencies, andjakesa_critiç^^ Turkeylsjecord onhumajnjighjÈTOn E C membership as such, they have been too absorbed in the question of Britain's relations with the Community to pay much attention to Turkish membership. V Fr^teJiasjendedjQ^^ the Aegean and Cyprus question, and the personal relationship between the former President Giscard d'Estaing and Mr. Karamanlis was crucial in the decision of the E C to accept Greece as a member in advance of Turkey. France is also œ n c e m e d a b o u t competition from Turkish textiles. ..and, the burden of Turk i s h ^ m b e r s Ï Ï i p of the Community Bud^ especially in view of Spanish membership. ?- j\rjmemaifi^^^^ though acts of terrorism by Armenians in FranceThày"Bavé reduced their popularity. In the Socialist Government between 1981 and 1986, especially while it included Communist members, the perception of Turkey, even when not under military dictatorship, as a right-wing regime closely tied to the US, meant that Frjmch_polic^ was not particularly welcoming.towards Turkey. More recently relations, hayejmproved. ----¬ •y The Netherlands has a preference for a more open EC, but its attitude towards a Turkish application for membership is likely to be determined above all by whether the regime appears sufficiently democratic and shows respect for human rights. The Netherlands has a highly dejnocra^ed^reign.policy, which giyes priority to foese^ilsues over the political and.economicinterests thaf^pre^commonly determine the^^fojejgnj^olicies of national sjates.|The Netherlands strongly opposed^reek membership in the CouncifofEurope before l^,_.but_smtched to being a keen supporter of Greek membership of fheJiC once a democratic regime had been ratored^Tfiey are likelyto_react_ina similar way to events jriJDjikey. / ~~ '"" "' ~ -p Denmark has taken a strongly negativeJlinejowards Turkey on theJiumar^ights jssues, k^dmgTt^^ Although there was some understanding of the background to tfiê military take-over, there^ wasJittliLpati^e with the policies of the regime, and the MayVm^IfUling^ts r e m i s e of a return to democracy. Denmafk'rwith Greece; has blocked the impïem^ntaiion of the Fourth Protocol for financial assistance to Turkey. Denmark is therefore likely to regard very critically any Turkish application for E C membership. " ~~~ ;

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It isclear that Greece would not welcome Turkish mernbershjp^si outjif the Community increases tEe "possibliity oFGreece using influence, within EC to strengthen its position against Turkey. However, it is understood that Greece gave as- ^ surances, during' its riegotiatiohs for E C entry, that. i t j \ o j i l ^ ^ Turkey becoming a member. Greece would naturally take the opportunity of an application by Turkey to seekto gain advantages in its disputes' wlthfTurkey. The E C for its part would have to consider whether it was better to try to handle GreekTurkish questions within the EC, or with one of the parties outside the Community. FrancoGerman reconciliation within the Community could be regarded as a precedent. Greece might try to counter-balance the greater weight which Tuxkey^s^Jarge-country, would have inside the EC's institutions by seeking simultaneous, membership^ fo Cyprus. Hqw„- _ ever, it is not certain that the (Greek) Cyprus goyernmentcould.accept this, since E C membership could be regarded as inconsistent with its desired status as a non-aligned state. Greece wpuldalso fear, so products would compete with Greek exports to the Community, and Turkey would be a formidable competitor for the limited funds available from the regional and social funds. The attitudes adopted within the two relevant parliamentary institutions, the European Parliament and the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, naturally reflect the attitudes expressed in the member states but with a greater emphasis on the political and human rights issues, expecially in the Council of Europe Assembly. In a paper submitted to the study group, entitled: "Some Lessons from Enlargement Negotiations", Geoffrey Edwards examined the earlier negotiations on enlargement of the Community in order to derive some lessons for Turkey. The points made can be summarised as follows: u

1. Becoming a member is a difficult and protracted affair. The relative ease and speed with which Greek membership was arranged between 1975 and 1980 was exceptional. More typical were the delays in the case of the British negotiations, which were repeated in the case of Spain and Portugal. 2. The existence of an Association Agreement, even one which appears to point towards future membership, is no guarantee that the Community will take a favourable view. There is much scope for the E C to argue that various terms of such an agreement have not been properly fulfilled. 3. The examples with regard to preparatory or pre-accession periods are confused. A Commission attempt to insert such a period in the Greek case was rejected by the member states, and the attempt was not repeated for Portugal and Spain, though Portugal may be regarded as having enjoyed a pre-accession phase owing to the extensive aid forthcoming from the Community before accession. It is certainly possible, given the special problems in the case of Turkey, that the Community may insist on a long pre-accession period, or alternatively use the two-tier solution. 4. There is great flexibility regarding the length of the transitional period. Although Greece followed the British (and Danish and Irish) precedents of a 5-year period, the French insisted on a 7-year period of transition to full membership for Greek exports of some agricultural products, and the Germans on a similarly long transition to free movement of labour. In the Spanish case periods of 3, 8 or even 10 years were discussed for the length of the transition, with the Spanish demanding a longer period for industry and shorter for agriculture, while the Community position was the reverse. 81

5. The Community has not been impressed by threats, explicit or implicit, that if membership is rejected an applicant country might make alternative political and economic arrangements adverse to the Community. The normal, and so far safe, assumption has been that the applicant country has no real alternative, the economic and political advantages of membership being so great. 6. The E C has shown an unnerving habit of continuing to act toughly with applicant countries even while negotiations have been going on. Trade sanctions, and the establishment of new policies contrary to the interests of applicant countries, have been imposed right up to the last moment before a new member officially joins. 7. Individual member states of the E C have used enlargement negotiations as a means of insisting on some change in Community policy to their own advantage. This is perhaps most marked in the French demands for a Mediterranean package of assistance to agriculture in the context of the Spanish and Portuguese applications. 8. Such demands by individual member states, together with other issues of current policy inside the Community, provide many opportunities to delay negotiations for enlargement. As one such issue is resolved, it is easy to invent others. 9. it is not easy to follow the obvious course of agreeing to terms in broad principle, and then seeking to re-negotiate in detail once inside the Community. The E C is in a position to insist on acceptance of the acquis communautaire, and this is a highly detailed set of policies, leaving little scope for later bargaining. The British, and the Greeks, have some experience of negotiating changes in the terms of membership after entry, but neither would claim that this represented a good way to solve the problems of negotiations. 10. There is considerable evidence that the road to membership is opened up above all by close personal relations between heads of government. This applied in the British case (Heath-Pompidou) and the Greek case (Karamanlis-Giscard). Links between political parties may also be important as in the case of the Social Democratic parties of Portugal (Soares) and Germany (Schmidt). 11. There is a great need for continuous education and preparation of public opinion for membership in the applicant countries. This is necessary both to ensure that the negotiations are conducted skilfully, and to carry the public along and avoid any surprise rejection of the negotiated Treaty, as in the Norwegian case. Û. France appears to play a key role in determining whether new members are allowed tÔ'join the Community. France certainly played such a role in first rejecting, and later allowing, British membership. French support was also vital to the early and rapid entry of Greece, ahead of the other Mediterranean applicants. However, it would be wrong to conclude that France could always determine the result.

Turkey can draw a number of conclusions from these comments on earlier enlargement negotiations. Turkeyunust be patient„,j:ecogmsmg that entry wilfja^j^ears^ofjte^ady and consistej^egca^iion, and must not rely on the fact of thé earlier Association to assume that membership is a fait accompli. Turkey should accept that^jo^g^pje^ccession period is likely to be imposed, and that this maybe followed by ajransjtjonal period of varying length for different purposes. Theïhrëàt that turkey may "seek other r^fitical and economic ties if the negotiations should not succeed is unlikely to be effective, given earlier precedents, though each applicant is in a unique geographical position. Turkey m u « expect and 82

guard against the E C continuing to act toughly on trade matters and other policies during negotiations^ m u s t ê ^ of the negotiations to obtam additionai advanfâges There will be manyTnfunating delays in negotiations, both as individual states try to obtain such advantages, and because the existing members will have great difficulty in arriving at a common mandate for negotiations. Reliance on altering the terms of membership after entry js^dange_ro.usLgame _and-unlikely toliaveajood outcome. Close personal relations need to be established with the key politicaTTî^urëTinside the Community to ease the way into the Community. It may be especially necessary, given the close ties between France and Greece, to develop better relations with France, as well as with Germany. In the case of Turkey, it is necessary to ensure that, in the face of much provocation in the course of the negotiations, public opinion is carried along so that the terms are finally accepted by the National Assembly or in a referendum. In disc_ussing^jK>jss^ it must bejindexstpjQ^^ would need two .or, .three s sponje^hich would invoLve the C reacting to it and coming to an agreiSnTaTto whether or not to open negotiations. Thus nego^alTonTcoiild open oiilyTn"l9~89, at the earliest. ' — Negotiations could take anything from three to six or seven years, according to earlier precedents, and therefore would not be concluded before about 1991 to 1995. It would indeed be unrealistic, given the many difficulties involved in a Turkish application, to expect that they would be completed in the shorter, rather than the longer time-span indicated. TheCojrmujnit^^ before $p formaTmembe^ip/rhis could be a period following the successful conclusion of negotiations, or it could overlap with them if, on deciding to open negotiations, the E C also determined on a set of pre-accession measures to^prepare.Turjcey for membership. Thus_apreaccessipn period, wWçhJs-urdiikely. .tobè less than K)_years in duration, could start, say, in 1991, or possibly not until 1996. ' FoTinlLljR^ P i ]y_5Pl.M Mii20J)6. Even after^ajengthy preparatory stage", the E C isjikely; to insist on the normal transitional period o f î ^ ^ ^ p h m w o orjnore additional years for sensitive items, such as complete freedom for Turkish a g r i c û t a r a f ë ) ^ with Turkey fully assimilatedjntojj^ to 2015. ' ' " ' T

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This timetable may appear to be ridiculously extended. Certainly, if it is correct that such a prolonged process must be envisaged, it must be recognised that the possibility of forecasting is itself subject to enormous uncertainty. Many events could occur, meanwhile, inside Turkey, inside the Community^or^in theouteidelvorld.lhlu^ or speed up, therpfocess or make i f è ^ should make Turkey, which is likely to bè" impatient in the face of such a scenario, adopt a more patient attitude. First, the time scale may be long, but it is not entirely out of line with the timetable for other Community enlargements. From the moment in 1955 when Brjtainjirst was engaged in discussion with the Six about the creation of the EC, to the completion of British membership in 1978, it was a period of23j^ars (25 years if the slight derogation from full application of the budget rules until 19~8^1smcluded in the transitional period). Secondly, 83

Turkey itself requires in some areas a long period of adjustment to full membership. Even if many of the long delays are inserted into the process to suit the existing members' reser­ vations, Turkey can at the same time exploit them to protect its own vulnerable sectors while gradually developing its capacity to compete with the more efficient industries of the Community.

Chapter 5 Tuğrul Ansay

Constitutional and Legal Implications of Membership

Introduction This chapter discusses the legal implications of Turkey becoming a full member of the European Community. The first part explains briefly the purpose and institutions of the Community and its law-making functions. The second and main part deals with the legal implications of Turkish participation. References throughout this Chapter are basically to the Rome Treaty of 25 March 1957 establishing the European Economic Community (and not to the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, signed in Paris on 18 April 1951, and the Euratom Treaty, signed in Rome on 25 March 1957). General Background

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As expressed in the preamble of the Treaty of Rome, the original signatories were deter­ mined to establish the foundations of an even closer union among the European peoples. This is more precisely formulated in Art. 2 of Treaty of Rome: "The Community shall have ; as its task, by establishing a common market and progressively approximating the econo- j mic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious and J* balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of standard of living and 1 closer relations between the states belonging to it". Activities of the Community shall m) elude reaching common policies in the sphere of agriculture, transport, customs and others (Art. 3). Member states shall co-ordinate their respective economic policies to the extent necessary to attain the objectives of the Treaty (Art. 6). To accomplish the common objectives, theoriginal member states created by the Treaty jsf^ojnj^ajiu^^ existafice;Tiïke"a society OT organs. Having a legal iden­ tity, the E C possesses treaty-making power and enjoys international diplomatic representa­ tion. It can enter into legal transactions; it can be a party in a court process; it has liability to tort; it may own property. Above all, it has legislative, executive and judicial powers within the limits of the objectives stated in the Treaty of Rome. „ The member states have delegated a portion of their sovereign rights to the Community, the most significant of which is perhaps the law-making power. Some legal rules made by the Community are directly applicable within the member states; to these rules not only the states but individuals also are subject, in the field of the administration of justice the member states recognise the authority of the Community Court of Justice over matters and persons in their territory falling within the jurisdiction of that Court. These have caused 85

lengthy discussions whether the status of the Community should be compared with that of a federal state. Contrary to what would happen in a federal state, the institutions of the Community have no general competence to take whatever measures would prove necessary to reach the assigned economic objectives. It should also be mentioned that the Community has no law enforcement power in the real sense of the word; the obligation of member states to assure the supremacy of Community law is not accompanied by effective sanctions. In spite of the powers given to the institutions of the Community, the decisive influence remains with the member states. Furthermore, as described below, vital decisions require the unanimous assent of the member states. The Community has also its own institutions which are similar to the basic institutions of an independent state. These two main categories or "organs" as they are sometimes called, fall into two main categories. First, there are institutions vested with a variety of political, executive, legislative and administative functions and powers. These are the Commission and the Council. In contrast to full separation of powers as in a classical democracy, here the executive and legislative organs are not wholly separate from each other. It is a special characteristic of the European Community that the institutions cannot be said to be wholly executive, administrative or political, but each possesses more than one of these attributes. In functional terms the Treaty of Rome expects that these institutions should not only co-operate but work closely together as a team. The European Parliament (or Assembly) has a rather limited function, mainly consultative with only small powers mainly in the budgetary area. Finally, the Court of Justice fulfils the function of the highest judicial organ in an independent state. The formation and the functions of the organs are briefly as follows: 1. The Council is made up of one representative government minister from each of the member states, who meet at regular intervals. It has the power to take decisions, in areas such as Community legislation, finance and international agreements. It is thus not only an executive organ, but fulfills also the traditional law-making role of a parliament. It enacts Community legislation through regulations, decisions, and directives. On vital matters the Council must act unanimously. Otherwise decisions are reached by a "conditional" majority of its members, using a weighted voting system (larger countries having more votes). A gentlemen's agreement among the member states (the 1966 Luxemburg Agreement) however, usually allows member states to veto any decisions they do not approve, so in practice unanimity is a far wider requirement than the Treaty provides. Unanimity is, of course, harder to achieve as the number of the member states increases. * 2. The Commission consists of members chosen by, but not representing the member states; its members are sworn to pursue and express the political will and interests of the Community as a whole. In contrast to the Council, where the Ministers represent the interests of their own countries, at the Commission it is expected that the representatives of the member states should act indepedently. According to the Treaty, the Commissioners must be persons whose independence can be fully guaranteed. They are required to act in the performance of their duties solely in the interest of the Community and they must neither seek nor take instructions from any national government or other body. The Commission has the task of ensuring the proper functioning and development 86

of the Community. To accomplish this task the Commission ensures that the provisions of the Treaty and the measures decided by the institutions are implemented. It has the power to initiate new proposals for decision by the Council, and to formulate recommendations to deliver opinions on matters dealt with in the Treaty. The policies of the Commission are reached by majority vote, with a weighting in favour of the larger countries (France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom) which each have two Commissioners, while the smaller countries have only one each. The Commission functions as a collective body in the sense that the Commission as a whole bears the responsibility for the acts of the Commissioners. 3. The Court of Justice is the judicial organ of the Community for solving disputes relating to the application of the Rome Treaty and the laws prepared by the Council or Commission. It has the duty of ensuring observance of the law and can review the legality of acts of the Council and Commission. It also interprets Community law, and thus acts also as law-maker, and contributes to the incorporation of Community legislation into the international law of the member states. The Court of Justice has ten justices, one from each country. It is a court in the first and only instance. 4. The Parliament consists, since 1979, of members directly elected from the member countries. Although it is normally called the European Parliament, its official title is the "Parliamentary Assembly". It is by no means similar to national parliaments in classical democratic states, since it has no legislative power. It is rather a secondary organ with advisory and consultative functions. As an advisory body the most important of the Parliament's powers lie in its right to be consulted over major policy proposals. The Parliament can also exercise some degree of supervision over day-to-day activities of the Community through its power to ask questions; the Commission has to reply orally or in writing to questions put to it by the Parliament or by its members. If a motion of censure is carried by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, and representing a majority of the members of the Parliament, the members of the Commission have to resign (Art. 140, 144 (2)). The Parliament also has some powers in the adoption of the Community Budget. Since the first direct elections in 1979 the Parliament has been gaining more power within the E C . Community Law: In addition to the Treaty of Rome, which is the primary source of law, the organs of the Community issue secondary instruments of Community law, consisting in administrative and judicial acts emanating from the Commission and the Council. Administrative acts are regulations, directives and decisions made by the Council in order to carry out its task in accordance with the Treaty (Art. 185). Regulations correspond to parliamentary statutes in a state; they are binding in their entirety and are directly applicable in all member states (Art. 189(2)). Both the Council and the Commission are empowered to make regulations. Decisions are the acts of the Council or the Commission (addressed either to member states or to individuals or corporations, and are binding in their entirety upon those to whom they are addressed (Art. 189(4)). Unlike a regulation, a decision is binding upon the addressee only. In the case of decisions directed at member states, normally the member state would, i f necessary, enact national legislation to bring them into direct effect within 87

the national state, in principle decisions could be invoked by individuals even if they were addressed to member states. Directives, on the other hand, are general formulations and are binding in terms of the result to be achieved, upon each of the member states to which they are addressed. Each member state must change its internal laws to bring them into accord with the general framework stated in the directive (Art. 189(3)). Recommendations and opinions of the organs have no binding force (Art. 189(5)). It is therefore questionable whether these can be regarded as sources of the Community law. Judicial acts are mainly the decisions of the Court of Justice. This Court, while doing its duty of ensuring observance of the law, may explain and complement the Treaty of Rome and the subordinate Community rules. The decisions of the Court are not only binding on the parties, but they form a case law. It seems the Court is using its power, to some extent due to the possibility of deciding by majority vote, to expand the original area of jurisdiction stated in the Treaty. ;' 2, Legal Problems for Turkish Membersh^___ So, The legal problems involved in becoming a full member of the Community are primarily constitutional. The admission of an external law to the territory of a state raises the constitutional problem of transmission and supremacy in the case of a conflict with the national law. There are other legal implications such as the method of integration of the Community law into the internal law of the member states. ConstitutionalProblems Like any other international treaty, the Treaty of Rome must be ratified by the Turkish j Grand National Assembly: In contrast to ordinary international treaties, however, the TreaI ty which established the E E C has a dynamic nature. Furthermore, it has also a comparatively extensive content. It is dynamic in the sense that it develops over time within the general limits set down in the preliminary articles and in the Preamble of the Treaty. Several provisions in the Treaty allow the development of the institutions and policies through the decisions and other acts of authorised organs. Its extensive content covers vital areas of economic life, and conflicts with the traditional areas of national sovereignty, such as the lawmaking power, administration of justice, and the exercise of power by state executive organs. The Treaty further includes provisions dealing with the (so-called) basic human rights of individuals. 4 A l l of these areas are regulated in the new Turkish Constitution, so approval of the Treaty of Rome would not be as simple a matter as parliamentary approval of a normal treaty. The parliament of a member country must not only approve a single treaty of accession when it votes to accede to the Community, but also give its consent to all components of the Treaty of Rome. A l l previous laws prepared by the authorised organs of the Community, become, . immediately or within a transitional period, r^ptthe.intexnai.fe.of..the member.country. ' Approval of the Treaty by the Turkish Grand National Assembly would also.mean-conjsenting to future legislation of me'CbmmM transferthe law ;making power"of the T u r l a ^ R ^ 88

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the executive organ of an independent state is bound by the policy decisions of the authorisedorgans of the Communitpfes in the case of agricultural or external commercial policies) TjiTsuch areas the actions of thenational executive body must remain within the stated common policy. In order to reach the ultimate aim of creating a harmonious common market, the member states are obliged to co-operate and refrain from any damaging acts/The monopoly of a state to administer justice would also cease to exist due to the powers of the Court of Justice, to which the nationals of member states may in certain cases directly appeal, and which has the position of a higher court (a court of last instance), above the internal courts of the member states. /iTis doubtful if this transfer of sovereign right^eyen if it is only apartial transferjs compatible^ with Article 6 of the new Turkish ColisTmTtion. wnlchTItales._tliatj^^^ Jong^mconditionally to the nation/or with Article 7 and those following. It is, on the other TiandT true that Turkey is alreadyamember of some other international organisations whose policy decisions have so far been followed by Turkey. There are also many cases where Turkey has recognised the jurisdiction of extraterritorial tribunals. This is particularly true in the field of private international law. The Rome Treaty furthermore includes provisions on basic rights which normally constitute an important part of modern constitutions of independent states. Article 7, for example, speaks of the equal treatment of all individuals. In Article 222 the property right is mentioned. Economic freedom is also mentioned as a basic principle. A problem might arise when Treaty provisions contradict those basic rights stated in the Turkish Constitution. /Du^tojhesjmrema^of Commumtylaw, the unconstitutionality of Community legislation mav not blTquesriohftd berofe~tIieT:onsfitnHnnq1 C p nf a member sf*tp/Thigl« a well-established practice in the member states. However, one interesting development involving the Federal Republic of Germany should bementioned. The German Federal Constitutional Court held in a case that the Basic Law entrenched in the German Constitution must prevail over Community law so long as the Community lacked a list of basic rights and a directly elected parliament to which the other Community institutions were fully responsible. ' Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome gives power to the Community institutions to conclude) international agreements. Under the Turkish Constitution (Art. 90) agreement with foreign J states or international organisations require the approval of parliament. Yet statutory authorisation may be granted to conclude international agreements of an economic, commercial, technical or administrative nature, if these agreements do not modify Turkish internal statutory provisions (Art. 90(3) and (4)). An additional constitutional problem seems to be the lack of parliamentary control of the government's Community policy, a problem that has troubled Denmark most notably among the existing member states. A subsequent control by questions and votes of no confi-, dence would cause the fall of the government, but this would be too late as far as the v a l i d i ^ / of the Community act is concerned. m

How may theyonstitutional problems be solved? The constitutional problems related to the ratification of the Treaty may not be solved under Article 90 of the new Turkish Constitution. This Article states generally, without making any distinction, that treaties should be approved by the Grand National Assembly 89

through the enactment of ail law. The treaties indicated in the Constitution are traditional ones and do not apply to a treaty such as the Treaty of Rome: A comprehensive, continuous and dynamic treaty, and above all a treaty which takes away part of the sovereign rights of a state may not be approved by a simple majority in the parliament. It would necessitate more specific authorisation, t h e expe^nce-ofjOijier-^^ -a-sohmeflr These states have solved similar constitutional issues either within the general framework and spirit of their basic laws or through their modification, as well as submitting the matter by way of a referendum to the approval of the nation. To avoid the constitutional problems that might be raised by the functioning of a supranational organization, the Netherlands amended its Constitution. In its present form the Dutch Constitution^provides that legislative, administrative and judicial powers may be conferred on international organizations by a treaty (Art. 67). Such a treaty may deviate from certain provisions of the Constitution, in which case it must be approved by a twothirds majority of the parliament (Art. 63). Moreover, the decisions of such organizations are given a status equal to the treaty itself; consequently these acts, like treaties, also prevail over internal law (Art. 67). Under Art. 66 national legislation is denied effect in so far as its application would be incompatible with the provisions of any treaty to which the Netherlands is a party (LQR 1977, 360). To provide a constitutional basis for acceding to a supranational organization without a constitutional amendment, the Danish Constitution of 1953 provides that powers vested in Danish authorities under the Constitutions may, "to such extent as shall be provided by statute, be delegated to international authorities set up by mutual agreement with other states for the promotion of international rules of law and co-operation". Such a statute may be adopted either by a five-sixths majority of the parliament or by a specified popular referendum procedure. The Greek Constitution contains similar provisions to facilitate the integration of Greece into the Community. As Article 28 (2) and (3) put it: For the purpose of serving an important national interest and promoting co-operation with other states, it is possible to confer, by way of treaty or agreement, powers defined by the Constitution on bodies of international organizations. The Act ratifying the treaty or agreement shall be passed by a majority of three-fifths of the total number of deputies. Greece shall be free to accept restrictions, pursuant to an Act passed by a majority of the total number of deputies, on the exercise of national sovereignty provided that this is imposed by an important national interest, that it does not infringe on human rights and the foundations of the democratic regime, and is carried out on the basis of the principle of equality and subject to the conditions of reciprocity. 4

making power; a statement that the unconstitutionality of the Treaty of Rome and Community legislation should not be raised as an issue in Turkish domestic courts. Many of the constitutional issues lose their significance in real situations. This is mainly because most important policy decisions and administrative or legislative acts of the Community organs are decided unanimously in meetings where all member states are represented: see, for example, Art. 238 on treaty-making. There is also a gentlemen's agreement to this effect, as mentioned above. The main exception to this unanimous action is the decision of the Court of Justice. In fact, the representative of any member state may refuse to give his consent at the Community level if he thinks that the executive or legislative act of the Community is at variance with the basic laws of his country and would cause parliamentary disapproval. Tojivoidpossible repercussions, some countries, such as Denmark, have established co-ordinating institutions to act as an intermediary between their national parliaments and law-making organs at the Community level. OtherJegajJmpJications.. The incorporation of Community law into the national law of a member state not only requires clearing away the constitutional obstacles, but it also requires changes in internal laws. According to Article 5 of the Treaty of Rome, member states must "take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising from the Community". This would happen in two directions. Some internal rules conflicting with the provisions of the Treaty of Rome are not applicable as far as the member states or the nationals of these states are concerned. On the other hand, like any other member state, Turkey must remove internal legal barriers to the creation and the working of the Community, and adapt and modify internal laws in order to bring about harmony within Community law. The laws to be changed, modified or repealed include the areas within the general sphere of the Treaty of Rome such as customs duties, movement of goods, persons, services and capital, agriculture and fisheries, transport, state aid to industry, taxation, and competition and restrictive trade practices. Here again two situations must be distinguished; the internal laws would not be applicable, or would be changed or modified because of the Treaty or any Community legislation existing at the moment of becoming a member; or such changes would become necessary due to future Community acts, ^considerable number of Turkish legal provisions might conflict with the already existing primary and secondary Community layyin the following only a few examples are given from the many Turkish internal legal rules which are not consistent with Community law. Article 7 of the Rome Treaty prohibits within the scope of application of the Treaty of Rome "any discrimination on grounds of nationality". Turkish internal law includes, however, various provisions discriminating against foreigners. Foreigners, for example, have limited right to own real property within Turkey; foreign legal persons have no such right at all . Similarly, in the area of freedom of establishment by undertaking work from a permanent base in Turkey, Turkish internal laws might not be in accord with the provisions of the Treaty which basically regulates the issue in Arts. 52 and 53. Although foreign nationals may enjoy freedom to form business associations under Turkish law, they may not be members and founders of those associations which include businesses restricted to nationals. The Treaty also orders the abolition of restrictions on the setting up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any member state established in the territory of any other 2

The politically and technically most feasible method, similar to those mentioned above, should be selected to avoid constitutional barriers. The new Turkish Constitution makes it possible to refer a matter to the approval of the public by way of a referendum. But a constitutional amendment to Article 90, which deals with international treaties, or the inclusion of a new provision either naming the Treaty of Rome or using general terms, would be more practical. Such an amendment must specify at least three main points: the authorisation of the adoption of the Treaty of Rome ôr similar treaties; the authorisation of the direct effect of the future acts of such a supra-national organisation, including its treaty90

91

member state. Turkish internal law involves some restrictive provisions on setting up agencies, as well as on forming branch offices or subsidiaries (Commercial Code, Arts. 42,126f; Law of Foreign Corporations, other Foreign Stock Companies and Insurance Companies of Nov. 30, 1915; Banking Law etc.) Under Article 58 of the Treaty, companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a member state and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the Community shall be treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of member states. This double criterion again requires some amendments in the Turkish Statute on International Private and Procedural Law of November 21, 1982 and other relevant laws. Turkish law restricts the rights of foreigners to work in specified areas. Many rules restrict the entry of foreigners into Turkey, their sojourn and travel within the country and require work permits for those who wish to work. The Law No. 2007 forbids certain jobs to foreigners. A l l these and similar restrictions should be abolished on a reciprocal basis for the nationals of the member states. In the area of price control there might be a basic conflict between Turkish and Community laws. As the European Court has stated, fixed maximum prices for consumer goods are incompatible with the Community law (D. Wyatt, Eur. L. R. 1976, 339). Turkish statutes, regulations or executive resolutions to this effect would not be allowed in case of membership in the Community. Inconsistency may also exist in the rulesmd regulations'] issued in connection with the Law of the Projection of^he The/ lawjtseif.a¿ notS compatible wjfhjhe Treaty and with its Chapter on movement of cajjitaj^ and excj^ajge^or^ \ trol (Arts. 67 fif.). State monopolies would be another area of attention, not to mention cus-"" toms duties, taxation and social security. Member states "shall progressively adjust any state monopolies of a commercial character" so that nó discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed exists between nationals of member states (Art. 37 (1)). The same provision would apparently cause additional difficulties in nationalising certain industries. (An Italian law nationalising the electric power industry was found incompatible with the Treaty, E N E L case, MLR 1971, 489 f.). Special attention is given in the Treaty of Rome to the conditions of free competition. By its anti-trust provisions the Treaty especially emphasises the danger of joint actions of enterprises to create monopolies in the market. The regulations already issued, with their somewhat detailed provisions, are aimed to control this delicate area. This is an area which has not been subject to serious consideration in Turkey until now. Article 167 of the new Turkish Constitution, however, recognised the importance of the problem and obliges the state to prohibit informal or contractual monopolies and cartels. There are also areas of Turkish law which should be harmonised with secondary Community law. Article 99 of the Treaty states that the Commission should "consider how the legislation of the various member states concerning turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect taxation" could be harmonised "in the interest of the common market". Based on this rule a series of directives has been issued in this matter pursuant to which the member states have already introduced systems of value-added tax. There have been considerable efforts to harmonise Community law affecting individuals in the context of freedom of establishment which enables effective free movement for selfemployed persons and businesses. As required in Article 54(3)(g) some directives have been issued to enable the approximation of company laws in the member states. The first Directive, 68/151, in this field lays down general guidelines to effect the co-ordination of 92

safeguards for third persons dealing with companies, and affords uniform protection to a person belonging to one member state who becomes a shareholder of companies in other member states. The second Directive, 77/91, co-ordinates the formation of publicly owned corporations and the maintenance and alteration of capital. The third Directive, 78/660, deals with the protection of interests both of shareholders and outsiders as regard the structure and contents of annual balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. The fourth, 78/855, deals with the merger of publicly held corporations. Directive 79/279 is aimed not only at the co-ordination of conditions for the admission of securities to the official stock exchange listing in order to provide better protection for investors through guarantees and disclosure of information, but also to establish an interpénétration of national securities markets. Part of these guidelines were already stated in Turkish statutes, but many of them reflect new developments and should find an echo in Turkish internal law. Although neither consumer protection nor protection of the environment are specifically mentioned in the Treaty itself, because of their importance to competitive conditions in the member states the Community has issued some directives in this field, Articles 172 and 56 of the new Turkish Constitution, which oblige the State to take necessary measures to protect and inform the consumer as well as to protect the environment, open the way to prepare new rules on consumer and environmental protection consistent with the E C Directives. 4

Conclusions _.. There have been successful examples in the past of the adoption of foreign laws to develop the Turkish legal system and to modernise society. Adopting foreign laws is by no means a new phenomenon for the Turks; in the field of business relations in particular, it goes back to the 1850s. The industrial age not only has brought different cultures into closer contact, but also has forced co-operation and, as a result, harmonisation in the legal field. In this process the laws of those countries which had earlier experience of modern business life are being used as models to develop the laws in other states. Community law would no doubt serve this end, ana! might^e^o^deserve a qualified welcome even without full membership. ^ ^'Consideration is needed for the techniques of incorporation of Community law into Turkish internal law. As early as possible Turkey must be made aware of the areas where and to what extent internal laws lose their validity and which laws should be repealed, amended or modified due to membership. A n approximation process need not wait until the formal ultimate date of accession. A n early start is desirable not only for a healthy evaluation of the conditions before entering the Community, but will also be useful in reforming Turkey's internal laws^ The law-making bodies in member states are not always keen to change their internal laws. Different methods have so far been developed in the member states to combat such reluctance. In France the government may be authorised to make ordinances by statute, usually of a limited duration but subject to renewal (Constitution, Art. 37). The government of France may also refer a matter to the Conseil Constitutionnel for a ruling whether a particular Regulation of the Community would be against the French Constitution (Lasok 283). In countries where the Constitution does not authorise the law-giving authority to transfer its powers to the executive to make laws, a different system of delegation of powers has been developed. This implies parliamentary approval of the acts of the government which, in practice, is often granted retrospectively. A system of specific delegation of legislative power prevails in Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany. Article 80 (1) of the German Con93

stitution provides for the delegation of legislative power to the executive by statute. The sta­ tute determines the context, purpose and extent of the delegation. The new Turkish Constitution seems to follow the model under which the parliament by statute empowers the executive to issue ordinances having statutory effect. This authorising statute shows the purpose, the extent and duration of the authorisation and also whether the ordinance may be issued only once or several times (Art. 91). But such ordinances should subsequently be submitted to the parliament for its approval, to avoid creating some kind of consultative committee consisting of members of the parliament to act as an inter­ mediary between the executive and the parliament.

Relations between Greece and Turkey Chapter 6 Andrew Mango -

Turkish Foreign Policy

Multinational Conventions Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome emphasises the unification of laws through multina­ tional conventions in those areas enumerated in the same Article. The Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Corporate Bodies on February 29, 1968 and the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments of Sep­ tember 27,1968 (in force since 1969) are two examples to which Turkey would be required to join if it becomes a full member of the Community. There are other conventions which are not yet in force. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations of June 19, 1980 has been opened to signatures. The Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market of December 15,1975, on the other hand, deals with matters which are outside the scope of A r ­ ticle 220, but nevertheless within the Treaty of Rome. It introduces a new method of harmonization of laws among the member states (Lasok 94). In view of Article 90 of the new Turkish Constitution, to ratify such conventions would cause negligible legal problems. ''""TS~summarize the main points, therefore, it can be assessed that full membership in the Community would necessitate the amendment of the Turkish constitution. A special draft law on solving legal problems of membership, especially for the incorporation of Community law into Turkish internal law should be prepared. Additionally it would be necessary to estab­ lish a specific institution in order to overcome the practical problems arising from member­ ship. Moreover, internal legal barriers to the creation and working of the Community should be phased out and attempts on legislative adjustment should be initiated. Finally, harmoni­ zation of Turkish law with the laws of the member states should begin without delay. Notes 1

2 3

94

The point at issue in the case was whether the system of deposits requiredffor export licenses under the common organisation of the market in cereals breached the principle of proportionality, that is, exceeded what was necessary for its purpose. The European Court of Justice repeated what it had said in another case in which it had alleged that certain Community legislation, forbidding the planting of new vineyards for a limited period, infringing upon the right of property guaranteed under the German Constitution (Compare Art. 65, last paragraph, of the present Constitution of the Turkish Republic.) Village Law, No. 442, Art. 87; Land Registration Law, No. 2644, Art. 35. To a great extent such approximation or harmonisation attempts require unanimous action, for example, Art. 84 (2) on sea and air transport.

c

The field of foreign policy (leaving aside Turkish-Greek relations) is probably the area in which fewest problems would arise if Turkey were to join the E C . There are few conflicts of interest and a long history of co-operation (which can be traced back to 1856 when the Ottoman Empire was admitted to the European concert); and, on the personal level, the Turkish Ministery of Foreign Affairs is a bulwark of pro-European feeling, together with a wider western orientation. The Turkish Republic emerged after World War I, despite the loss of the imperial provin­ ces in the Middle East, as a territorially contented state. There were, it is true, some unre­ solved problems: the Turkish claim to Mosul, where Turkish interests clashed with those of British-protected Iraq; the claim to the Sanjak of Alexandretta (later Hatay), where there was a similar clash of interests with French-protected Syria; the Turkish intention to regain full control over the Dardanelles, where there was a clash of interests above all with the Soviet Union. But the Turkish Republic relied on diplomacy to further its interests in these and other matters: the claim to Mosul was renounced, Hatay was regained, and the Straits were returned to Turkish control with the agreement of the parties concerned, obtained through negotiations. Foreign Minister Tevfık Rüştü Aras said in 1933: "We Turks are basically antirevisionist. We do not want anything of anyone ... We believe that respect for the substance of agreements is the best foundation for international relations." The main concern of Turkish foreign policy has thus been the defence of the national ter­ ritory and and its independence, and the preservation of peace as the prerequisite of econo­ mic development. "The defence of rights" was the slogan of Turkish national resistance after World War I; "Peace at home and peace in the world" that of Atatürk after the founda­ tion of the Republic. The Turkish Republic has consistently sought allies to further these aims, while avoiding unnecessary entanglements and adventures. Its foreign policy has always been independent, inside and outside alliances, but never neutralist. As a country interested in the preservation of the status quo, Turkey can co-operate with similarly-minded European countries. Where the status quo is disturbed, Turkey, like Europe, wishes to see the dangers circumscribed and the transition to a new equilibrium effected as smoothly as possible. Turkey's carefully defensive relations with the Soviet Union do not differ materially from those maintained by the principal western European states. Perhaps the main difference is that while the West aids Russia economically, Turkey is, on a small scale, aided by Russia. One should not exaggerate the scope of either transaction; but both establish a vested inter95

est in the preservation of peace based on the status quo. in any case, common membership of NATO ensures that the eastern policies of Turkey and of Western European countries are concerted. Nor do Turkey's interests in, and relations with, the Arab world differ significantly from those of Europe. Ever since the withdrawal of Britain and France as peacekeepers among the Arabs, Turkey has sought to promote stability through local arrangements, although its part in them was both smaller and more prudent that the West sometimes wished. After World War II Turkey evinced little enthusiasm for a Middle East Defence Organisation, advocated by some western statesmen; recently it shed few tears over the demise of the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), which it joined largely in order to please the West and in exchange for western aid. The fact that Turkey is a country of Muslims does not make for a significant difference between its Arab policy and the Arab policy of Christian European states. The experience of World War I inspired in the authors of Turkish diplomacy the firm belief that religion is not an efficient factor in international relations. Pan-Islamic policies, tried halfheartedly both by Abdiilhamid II and the Young Turks, and specifically renounced by Atatiirk, stand no chance of revival unless the internal political situation in Turkey is radically altered. Another tenet of Turkish diplomacy is that the regimes, and therefore the policies, of Arab states are governed largely by personalities; that consequently no lasting arrangements are possible with them; but that the best possible relations should be cultivated with those who happen to be in power. Like Europe, Turkey needs Arab oil, and has fewer means to pay for it. It therefore has at least as great an interest as Europe in cultivating Arab good will. Moreover, as a land bridge between Europe and the Middle East, Turkey has a vested interest in the development of trade between the European Community and the Muslim countries of the Middle East. Some European trade already goes overland across Turkey, and a pipeline brings Iraqi oil to Europe also through Turkey. The construction across Turkey of further pipelines, and, above all, gas-lines from Iran and as far afield as Qatar, would bring considerable benefits both to Turkey and to the European Community, which would see its sources of supply diversified, and whose construction companies would be profitably involved in these large engineering projects. Turkey's relations with Israel show both the extent and the limits of concessions which Turkey is willing to make to Arab sentiment. Turkey has proclaimed its opposition to "the acquisition of political or territorial advantages through the use of force", and therefore to the occupation of the West Bank and the old city of Jerusalem; it has reduced its representation in Tel Aviv to the minimum, but it continues to maintain relations with Israel, which it was prompt to recognise. The P L O office in Ankara has diplomatic status, but is watched with care lest it should become a centre of subversion inside Turkey. In any case, Syrian irredentism in Hatay sets its own limits to Turkish-Arab understanding. Two other factors specific to Turkey in the field of Arab relations deserve mention. First, Turkey and Iraq have a common interest in containing Kurdish nationalism, and there is consequently a rapport between Ankara and Baghdad. Turkey's accession to the E C would lead to European involvement in the growing problem of Kurdish nationalism, which affects Turkish relations not only with Iraq, but also with Syria and Iran. But the problem posed by ethnic minorities is not unknown in the EC, and European experience might help Turkey to contain, if not to eliminate, the threat. 96

Secondly, there is an historical romantic link with Libya, where Turks are remembered as defenders against Italian encroachment. However, other European countries also have special relationships with some or all Arab countries, so that those of Turkey do not stand out by any particular closeness. Turkey's recent emphasis on good relations with the Arabs, and the increase of Turkish-Arab trade, result from the access of wealth to Arab oilproducing states, which has affected Arab-European relations in a similar way. More recently still, when the oil price and, consequently, the revenues of oil-producing countries decreased, Turkey's trade with other Muslim countries diminished, and its interest in greater access to Europe increased correspondingly. Unlike the Arab countries and Iran, Europe is Turkey's safe trading partner; vice versa the same is true for the E C . Turkey's relations with the Third World generally are insubstantial, and a tiers-mondiste orientation of Turkish foreign policy, often advocated by left-wing intellectuals, makes little practical sense. Most Turkish diplomats would agree with this verdict of retired Ambassador Zeki Kuneralp on the efforts made by the Ecevit Government in 1979 to widen Turkey's links: "We needed support — effective, authentic and urgent support. We sought it right and left; we embraced one lot, then hugged another, but at the end we had to knock at the usual door, and the door was not in Cuba, nor in Mecca, nor in Moscow, but in the West." In one of his reports to Ankara, Ambassador Kuneralp said: "A country's foreign policy ... is a function of two factors: first, the country's geographical position, and second, its internal regime." The conclusions drawn by Turkish diplomats from their country's geographical position have been consistent with European interests. Turkey's past choice of western models for the ordering of its internal affairs has reinforced geo-political considerations. Ataturk said: "Foreign policy is largely affected by and is based on the internal organisation of the state. Foreign policy must correspond to internal organisation." Can one assume that the internal organisation of Turkey will continue to engender a pro-European, and eventually a European, foreign policy? Theoretically, a seizure of power in Turkey by left-wing radicals could lead to experiments in neutralism, or even to a reversal of alliances (although geography would be in the way, as some left-wing Greek radicals are recognising). Similarly a seizure of power by right-wing radicals could result in adventurous policies: for example, exposing Turkic nationalism inside the Soviet Union or northern Iraq and Iran (although Pan-Turanism was specifically renounced by Ataturk, who, similarly, renounced Pan-Islamism). This danger would persist if Turkey continues to be in Europe, but not of it. While Turkey is not alone in harbouring anti-European radical tendencies, the cultural, social and economic differences between it and the countries of the E C are greater than those within the Community. But it is the secondary influence of internal factors on Turkish foreign policy, rather than Turkish foreign policy per se which could create difficulties. Moreover, if the past is any guide, the difficulties are unlikely to be critical, for, in the recent past at least, Turkish foreign policy has by and large been perfectly compatible with the interests of Europe. There is one direction in which Turkish foreign policy has posed problems for the West .in general, and for Europe in particular. The accession of Greece to the E C has made for closer European involvement in Greek-Turkish antagonism. One should therefore try to determine whether Greek-Turkish antagonism is a permanent factor, and one which at best would make it difficult, and at worst impossible, for Turkey to join the E C . As will be discussed in the following article, the historic antagonism between the two countries diminished gradually after the Treaty of Lausanne and seemed to have been fi97

nally resolved after World War II. Antagonism reappeared in the mid-1950s, because the process of dividing contentious territory had to be applied to new areas (Cyprus, the waters, continental shelf, and air space of the Aegean), and because the Russian threat seemed to" diminish. Few material interests are involved in the Aegean, although mutual fears and prestige certainly are. The problems are not intractable. Turkey is not the only country vitally interested in freedom of navigation in the Aegean, and Turkish fears of losing free access to the country's western ports can be set at rest either by an ad hoc convention (on the lines of the Mon¬ treux Convention) or by other international contractual arrangements (supplementing or deriving from the new law of the sea), irrespective of any extension of the six-mile limit to twelve miles for territorial waters; This access is in any case protected by current provisions governing narrow seas. The continental shelf dispute will have to be settled by international judgement or arbitration on the basis both of positive international law and of equity, without which no international company will venture into the disputed area to exploit such resources as it may contain. Finally, control of the air space is an administrative matter which has been temporarily, and could be finally settled without loss of security or prestige. Turkey has stated repeatedly that it has no territorial ambitions in Greece, and the assurance would be made doubly sure if both countries were inside the European Community. Cyprus is more difficult. The island was divided in 1974 in the same way that territories in dispute between Greece and Turkey were divided after World War I. But whereas both countries accepted the earlier division, Greece does not accept that in Cyprus. Given the Greek will to negotiate a settlement, not only would an adjustment of territory be possible in favour of Greek Cypriots, but the political and economic damage caused by division could be palliated by a loose federation or confederation which could lead to closer cooperation between the two parts of the island. Such a solution would remove an area of friction between Turkey and the EC. However, even in its absence, the partial friction of Cypriot independence could be used to isolate the problem from Greek-Turkish and TurkishE C relations. The persistence of the Cyprus problem in any case should not bar Turkey's accession to the Community, any more than the Gibraltar problem stopped Spain's accession. It is a problem, but not an insuperable one. a The Cyprus crisis of 1974 and tension over the Aegean raised the q%stion of what kind of role the European Community could play in helping to resolve coniiicts between Turkey and Greece. While both countries had a similar status as Associated States, the Community could hope to act as an even-handed mediator. Following the Greek application for membership, and its eventual accession on 1 January, 1981, it became more difficult for the Community to play such a role. At first there was a common hope that the reaction of the Nine jo the coup on the island by the Greek Junta on 0 July, 1974 could be an opportunity to demonstrate that political cooperation could work. But after Turkey's response to the coup by means of a military intervention in northern Cyprus on 20 July, the establishment of the new Greek government under Karamanlis, and the collapse of the Geneva talks in August 1974, the management of the crisis by the Nine began to falter, because these events deprived the Nine of their previous consensus on the issue. Neither the démarches which France had made in the name of the Nine to the Greek and Turkish governments, nor bilateral initiatives, could avoid the renewal of hostilities in Cyprus. The French President expressed his disappointment that the Community had been incapable of preventing a conflict between its two associated members. ' 98

The ability of the Nine to manage the crisis was limited to declarations. For example, in February 1975 the Foreign Ministers announced: that they continue to regard as highly desirable the search, by way of consultation between the two communities in Cyprus, for a negotiated solution which would be both durable and equitable; "and" that to facilitate the realisation of this objective, the Nine are ready to hold discussions with representatives of all the interested parties." The position of the Nine on Cyprus has remained almost the same since 1974, in support of mediation efforts by the United Nations. The acceptance by the Community in 1975 of the Greek application for membership increased the tensions and friction between Turkey and Europe with respect to the Cyprus problem. The Turkish Government was unhappy with the E C states, feeling that they supported the Greek standpoint without sufficient recognition of Turkish rights on the island. In the late 1970s Turkey welcomed the moderate and balanced tone of the Nine, but still feared that the Europeanisation of the problem could diminish her position. The Turkish Government under Bulent Ecevit therefore advocated the view that Greece and Turkey should solve their problems by their own devices. The military government under General Evren continued the same line, supporting the intercommunal negotiations held under the aegis of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. So did the civilian government which Turgut Ozal formed in 1983, and which persuaded the Turkish Cypriot administration to accept the basis proposed by the Secretary General for a solution in January 1985 and then in March 1986. Following Greek accession to full membership in 1981, the Community is not only involv e d ^ the Cyprus and Aegean crises, but is also a party to these conflicts. This means that -the Community could no longer intervene through the European Political Co-operation (EPC) machinery even as a neutral adviser. Thus, after November 1980 the EPC working group on the Mediterranean did not meet again, because the Ten wanted to avoid the Cyprus, and Aegean problems becoming E P C topics. Turkish membership in the E C and the EPC could contribute to a solution of the Cyprus ^problem. As both countries would then have equally strong ties with the E C and EPC, the question of Greece being favoured at Turkey's expense would not arise and the European role as adviser and even mediator would in principle be strengthened. However, the E C / E P C has so far been extremely wary of involving itself in political disputes between member states, as for example, in the Irish question. Similar considerations to those involved in the Cyprus problem could arise concerning the Aegean problem. However, the disputes about the waters of the Aegean, its continental shelf and air space, and the consequences of the new codification of the law of the sea have not arisen in the EPC framework so far. If Turkey were to join the EC, they could and should come within its purview. To avoid recurrent crises in Greek-Turkish relations, crises which preoccupy the E C , a dialogue must be established. EPC could help to bring about what the two countries have been unable to establish by their unaided efforts.

99

Matthias Esché

A History of Greek-Turkish Relations

Both Greece and Turkey pose problems to the European Community, and each country, considered separately, presents a set of different problems. The main problems with Greece, a full member of the European Community since 1 January, 1981, are not so much those that pertain to the controversial and apparently insoluable economic and trade policy issues. Also, the often viewed apprehension that the socialist government of Andreas Papandreou, which came to power as a result of the landslide victory of the PASOK at the polls on 18 October 1981, might revise its predecessor's firm commitment to join Europe proved to be unfounded. Regardless of the different views aired when PASOK was in opposition, after the Papandreou government came to power it confined itself to pursuing certain goals to create an equitable balance in the regional levels of development within the EC, with special consideration given to the economic and geographical characteristics of Greece. To this end, a Greek memorandum, drafted in a moderate tone, was presented to the Council of Ministers of the European Community on 23 March, 1983 and it was considered to be entirely worth negotiating. On 29 March, 1983 the E C passed a finance plan especially designed for Greece, covering the period 1985 1991, which to a larger extent took into account the Greek proposals for improved terms. it might well be that the sense and purpose of the Greek membership in the European Community has not been seriously called into question by the Papandreou government in recent years as a result of the extensive financial aid provided by the E C since 1983. 1

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The main area of disagreement between Greece and its European partners is in the field of foreign policy, and this indeed became so once Papandreou came to power. Both Greece's deviation from the common E C defence policy and the refusal of the Greek representative during the E C Foreign Minister's Conference of 12 September, 1983 to condemn in a joint resolution the shooting down of a Korean passenger aircraft by a Soviet military plane, are notable examples of wilful independence that the Papandreou government has shown in pursuing a separate foreign policy line. On 13 September, 1983, Greek Foreign Minister G. Charalambopoulos adamantly declared that his country would not follow the E C foreign policy line in every case, and that membership in the European Community did not mean adhering to a joint foreign policy. In the words of an American diplomat, Greece having a "foreign policy like a roller coaster", sums up the various problems Papandreou's policies have presented to the West. The Reagan administration might have been particularly aggravated with Papandreou cultivating friendly relations with the United States' main adversary, Colonel Ghadafi of 4

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Libya, while the US was engaged in conflict with him. Greece is the only E C member which has diplomatic relations with the PLO. The Greek administration did not even hesitate in letting a Jordanian suspected of terrorism leave the country, while they deported a C I A agent who was investigating the suspect. In April 1986 Papandreou condemned the US air raid before the Greek Parliament and without diplomatic reserve called it "a blow against international legal procedure". It remains to be seen whether Greece will remain not only a difficult partner in NATO but a constant source of irritation in the course of the European integration as well. The European Community's problems with Turkey are of a quite different nature but no less difficult. The legal status of Turkey with regard to the E C is that of an associate member with a view to possible full membership. However, concern and doubt in Brussels prevail as to whether Turkey's full membership (regardless of the security policy aspect which is not to be underestimated) would not, after all, dangerously tax the E C resources necessary for development and co-operation — particularly in view of the recent southern Enlargement. The structure of the Turkish economy — particularly the chronic trade deficit, the internationally poor standing of industry, the considerable need for financial aid and the extremely high labour emigration — make such fears quite understandable. The concern about economic issues regarding Turkey's integration is overshadowed in most capitals of the Commurnj^by the question of whether Turkish society and political culture can guarantee the l o ^ t e r m stability of a pluralistic-democratic order which, after all, is considered imperative for full membership in the EC. The E C reinforced its desire for the restoration of a democratic political system in Turkey by freezing, to a large extent, the Community's financial aid after the seizure of power by the Turkish military on 12 September, 1980. The victory of liberal conservative economic expert T. Ozal in the elections of 6 November, 1983 could be considered a ray of hope. Even before this election, the political commission of the European Council in mid-September 1983 refused to admit Turkish delegates as members to the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council after the planned elections, on the grounds that the majority of the Turkish parties were excluded from taking part in the elections. . This difficulty has been subsequently overcome. The Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council indeed approved a resolution some months later in which it was stated that Turkey had made progress towards democratic normalisation, but was still far from a true democratic order. The Turkish authorities were asked to continue their efforts to overcome all conditions that infringe upon human rights, to respect the rights of the minorities, and to cease persecuting political refugees and their families remaining in Turkey. , How slowly the normalisation of the relationship between the E C and Turkey makes progress can also be gathered from the fact that only as late as September 1986 did the Association Council EC-Turkey meet again on a ministerial level. * These various differences causing friction in the relationship between Greece and its partners in the E C on the one hand, as well as Turkey and the E C on the other, must not obscure the overriding problem, namely the Greek-Turkish conflict. It is the key to an overall understanding of the Greek as well as the Turkish attitude to the European idea of integration. The full membership of Greece has been affected by this conflict and the full membership of Turkey, which is being considered, would fully introduce this conflict into the Community. Just how potentially dangerous this^conflict would be for the E C can be gathered from the fact that over the last thirty years the two NATO partners, Greece and Turkey, 6

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have been directly involved in armed conflict five times: in 1955, 1964, 1974 on account of Cyprus, and in 1974 as well as in 1976 because of bilateral issues mainly involving the mineral resources in the Aegean Sea. The prospect of having two hostile members within the European Community which adversely affect the work of the Community, and which may further complicate the difficult task of European integration, is an oppressive one. The following discussion will attempt to show the main stages of development of the Greek-Turkish conflict, and to clarify the resulting dangers and challenges to Europe. \ Greek-Turkish Understanding between the Wars (1923 — 1934) At present Greek-Turkish relations seem to have come to a hopeless standstill, but it is important to remember the hopeful attempts at reconciliation between the wars. After fierce fighting between Greeks and Turks subsequent to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and the devastating defeat in 1922 of the Greek forces that had advanced far into Anatolia in order to realize the dreams of power of a Greater Greece, it appears little short of a miracle that only a few years later arose a policy of good neighbourliness between the two states that was to last for more than three decades. Two events that marked turning points towards an understanding were the Treaty of Lausanne of 24 July, 1923" that finally settled the borders between Greece and the newly risen Turkish national state, and, in particular, the previous agreement signed between Greece and Turkey on 30 January, 1923 regarding the exchange of populations. . By this agreement 388,000 Turks from Macedonia were to be resettled in Central Anatolia, while 1.25 million Greeks from Central Anatolia and the Black Sea coast were to move to Greece. As a result 'of this population exchange, unique in its contractual form, the respective national minorities diminished to 100,000 Greeks in Turkey, mainly in Istanbul, and a Turkish population in Western Thrace of a similar order. Thus, a potentially important area of conflict, namely complaints regarding the treatment of minorities, were reduced to a minimum. 12

No doubt it is due to Kemal Ataturk's foreign policy, whereby he carefully upheld the status quo, as well as to the pointedly anti-revisionist foreign policy of E . Venizelos, who for decades shaped Greek political life, that, starting with the Peace Treaty, a reciprocal rapprochement could be accomplished. The crowning event of this policy of mutual understanding was the Neutrality, Reconciliation and Arbitration Agreement of 30 October, 1930 as well as the Treaty of Friendship of 14 September, 1933, which was signed three years later. Over and above a policy of bilateral co-operation, the Balkan Entente of 9 February, 1934 between Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Rumania clearly expressed the wish of the Greek and Turkish governments for a common security policy in the region. The considerable political and diplomatic success of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement in the period between the wars must not, however, obscure the fact that the old antagonisms had not been overcome. This psychological dimension might explain why in the 1950s, triggered by new areas of conflict, deeply rooted mistrust, prejudices forged by hatred, and an idea of the enemy which was presumed to be long overcome, should become virulent again and could introduce, once more, the old "sworn enmity" most dangerously into the political sphere. 13

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Integration into the Western Alliance and Regional Co-operation (1945 - 1954) Renewed resentment in Greece against its eastern neighbour became apparent after Italy's attack on Greece on 28 October, 1940, when none of the partners of the Balkan Entente, not even Turkey, effectively came to the aid of the harried Greeks. The disappointment increased further when, in April 1941, the Turkish government watched, with apparent indifference, as the Wehrmacht occupied the Greek mainland within a matter of three weeks. Nevertheless, relations between the Greek government in exile and Turkey during the years of the Wehrmacht occupation from May 1941 until the liberation in 1944 could at least be called correct. The government in exile had to be interested in agreeable relations if for no other reason than the fact that important lines of communication into occupied Greece went via T u r k e y ^ v However, Greek-TJfrldsn relations were affected by the changes in Europe resulting from World War II. The rise of the Soviet Union as a world power and the advance of the Red Army into Eastern and South-Eastern Europe created a totally new pattern of power relationships. Greece as well as Turkey was threatened by the Soviet Union. In the autumn of 1946, internal opposition in Greece between the civil government and the communistheaded resistance organisation escalated into civil war after a fragile peace arrangement at the beginning of 1945. The rebels were materially supported by the People's Democracy of Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and politically by the Soviet Union. After 1945, Turkey found itself increasingly exposed to Soviet pressure and attempts at intimidation. Stalin, for example, not only demanded the revision of the 1936 Montreux Convention regarding the Straits but also asked Turkey to cede the eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan. In addition he proposed a Soviet military base not far from the Dardanelles . 16

The commonly considered threat by the gradually forming Eastern Bloc under the leadership of the Soviet Union at this stage came to be a connecting link overcoming all antagonism between the one-time adversaries in the Eastern Mediterranean. Common interests to have a regional security policy found obvious expression in the promise of the "Truman Doctrine" of 12 March, 1947 to assist Greece and Turkey in their fight for freedom and independence. Just to what extent Greek-Turkish relations during the first post-war years were determined by their identical interests in this security policy can be seen primarily in the fact that no objections were raised in Ankara when, as part of the Paris Peace Treaty, Greece was adjudicated the Dodecanese Islands that had been under Italian occupation since 1913. A further 25,000 Turks thus came under Greek rule. A few years later such a reserved silence would have been unthinkable. In this connection the thesis cannot be completely denied that, considering the difficulties with which Turkey was faced from the north, the British Crown Colony of Cyprus could, without any problems, have been adjudicated to Greece. . 17

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The predominance of common interests also explains the astounding similarity in the way in which both states turned to the West. Like "Siamese twins" Greece and Turkey pushed into all international organisations of the Western world. The highlight of this development was the acceptance of both into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on 15 February, 1952. 19

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The fact that Greek-Turkish relations at the beginning of the 1950s seemed to point towards an encouraging future was also indicated, in their mutual security policy initiative on the Balkans. The Treaty of Ankara (28 February, 1 9 5 3 J " W the Treaty of Bled be2 2

tween Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, commonly known as the Balkan Pact, provided a further contractual link between Greece and Turkey and proved the willingness of both states to co-operate in ha>»ng Yugoslavia, a country that had been isolated since the Cominform conflict of 1948 - 49, under the protection of the whole of NATO by means of a military pact with two NATO partners, thus changing the status quo in the Balkans in favour of the West. However, owing to the rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and due to newly arising tensions between Greece and Turkey because of Cyprus, the Balkan Pact soon lost its original significance. Reappearance of Antagonism (1955 - 1958) At the end of May 1954 Greek Premier A . Papagos was still praising the stability of the Greek-Turkish friendship: "We believe that the Greek-Turkish friendship cannot be threatened or disturbed by the Cyprus issue." It was only a year later that this unity was shattered. The dispute on the future of Cyprus that was carried on with increasing bitterness had within only a matter of months poisoned the climate between the two allied countries. Cyprus, which during the Berlin Congress in 1878 had been leased to the British Crown by the Ottoman Empire, had been annexed by Great Britain in 1914. Two years later,.after the annexation had been recognised in the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, Cyprus was formally made a British Crown Colony in 1925, but had been in a state of continuous ferment since the 1930s. Inspired by nationalism, the Greek Cypriots who made up 78 per cent of the island's population, strove for unification with Greece. However, their battle cry of "Enosis" met with suspicion on the part of and, later on, with resistance by the TurkishCypriot minority who made up 18 per cent of the total population. Though the Greek government had acted with reserve on the occasion of the first great revolt of the Greek-Cypriots against the British Colonial power in 1931, the position of the government in Athens changed after the victory in the civil war in 1949, when the newly elected Archbishop and Ethnarch Makarios became spiritual and political leader of the Greek-Cypriots, and started a new campaign for the right of self-determination for Cyprus. At the beginning of February 1951, Greek Premier S. Venizelos, son of former Premier E . Venizelos, stated before parliament: "I am glad of the opportunity to advise from this official platform the House and the whole Greek nation of the request for a unification of Cyprus with its Greek mother. It is the most fervent wish of both nations, of the Cypriot and the Greek people". With tenacious perseverance the Greek government attempted to bring the Cyprus issue before the United Nations despite Great Britain's resistance. The growing Turkish displeasure with Greece's Cyprus policy became quite obvious during the deliberations of the First Political Committee of the U N on 14 December, 1954. The Turkish delegate pointed out that for historic, ethnic, economic and geographical reasons Cyprus should be considered part of the Anatolian region. When seen from this angle, the Greek-speaking population constituted a minority when compared with the overall population of the Anatolian peninsula. The British delegate indirectly seconded the Turkish desire to be heard as a concerned party by explaining that the present status of Cyprus under the Law of Nations had been laid down with Turkey in the Lausanne Treaty and that it would be quite unthinkable for the Treaty of Lausanne to be changed without Turkish agreement. 23

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The commencement of guerilla warfare by the Greek-Cypriot organisation E O K A under the leadership of the Greek general N . Grivas against the colonial power at the beginning of April 1955, and the failure of a British-Greek-Turkish foreign ministers' conference called by Great Britain in August of the same year, increased the Greek-Turkish antagonism. A bomb attack on the Turkish Consulate,™ Salonika on 5 September, 1955, in the course of which the house where Ataturjt-wts^iorn was damaged, increased the gravity of the situation. The next day saw anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and Izmir during the course of which some 600 persons were injured. Thereupon the government in Athens withdrew the Greek personnel from NATO Headquarters in Izmir, thus creating a precedent of suspending obligations to the alliance, a method that was to be frequently used in the coming decades as a means of political pressure. In the highly emotional atmosphere of those September days, there was imminent danger of war between Greece and Turkey for the first time since the great conflict of 1919 - 1922. The situation eased slightly only when, on 10 September, 1955, Turkish Minister of the Interior, N . Gedik, resigned, and two days later an official apology from the Turkish government arrived in Athens. 2 6

On Cyprus, however, the underground fighting against the colonial power continued, increasingly involving the Turkish Cypriot minority as well. At the beginning of 1957, the Turkish Cypriot underground organisation T M T was established. Their retaliatory acts towards those Cypriot Turks who supposedly or actually collaborated with the colonial power were no less cruel or brutal than those of the Greek-Cypriot underground fighters. A r med conflicts in Limassol, between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on 14 June, 1958 reached civil war proportions and illustrated clearly that the original dispute between Greece and Great Britain had long since escalated into a new Greek-Turkish conflict. In the summer of 1958 an early solution seemed hopeless: Turkey countered the Greek demand for "Enosis" with the uncompromising formula of division, "Taksim". 27

Rapproachement and Willingness to Reach a Compromise (1959 - 1962) It is due to the intensive efforts at reconciliation on the part of the controlling power of the Western Alliance that within only a matter of months after the crisis came to a head, British-Greek-Turkish negotiations could again be taken up on the occasion of the annual NATO Council of Ministers meeting. The results of these negotiations foreshadowed the subsequent compromise reached at the end of 1958: Greece would abandon the Enosis idea, and Turkey, the division of the island. Great Britain was to give the colony independence but would have the right to operate two military bases on the island, in order to keep its strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. On Cyprus itself, the rights of the minority were to be protected by means of a well-contrived proportion^ representation system. Great Britain, Greece and Turkey, as guarantor powers, were to safeguard^ the status quo thus outlined. After further intensive preliminary talks, joined later by Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives, a skeleton agreement, which became known as the "London Agreement", was reached on 19 February, 1959. However, another year and a half were to pass before all controversial items were to be settled, and, finally, on 16 August, 1960, the independence of Cyprus was formally proclaimed. . 28

29

At this time a further step was taken almost simultaneously by both Greece and Turkey toward closer connections with Europe when only a few months previously a rapproachement between them could hardly have been envisaged. On 8 June, 1959 the Greek govern106

ment applied for association with the European Economic Community (EEC). On 27 July, 1959 the foreign ministers of the E E C unanimously accepted this application. Six days later the Turkish government also made an application for association. There is no doubt that it was the Greek application which to a large extent prompted the Turkish government to take this step, in order to make sure that entry into the European Community would not be missed and Turkey not fall behind Greece. In view of the overriding political aspects, the Turkish application was also accepted although with reservations. If the Association Agreement with Greece already materialised after two years of negotiations on 9 July, 1961, , negotiations with Turkey had to be continued for considerably longer, owing to the difficulties caused by economic as well as internal political conditions in Turkey with the violent overthrow of the Menderes government at the end of May 1960. The Association Agreement was only signed on 12 September, 1963. The Association Agreements gave both countries the option of full membership after a flexible transitional period without legally binding promises to admit them as members. Even this open option was exceptional, one which was not contained in later similar agreements of the E C with other Mediterranean countries. In the summer of 1962 it actually seemed as if Greek-Turkish relations had settled down to what they had been between the wars or during the first post-war years, influenced by fears of external threat. The visit by the Greek Foreign Minister E . Averoff to Turkey at the beginning of August 1962 was considered a gesture of reconciliation between the two states. Averoff and his Turkish counterpart, F C . Erkin, agreed on all international and bilateral issues. The final communique of 5 August, 1962 referred to a "great cordiality in the exchange of views" and stated the desire on both sides to increase cultural, artistic and scientific co-operation. However, in less than a year the reconciliation that took so much effort to achieve was shattered, ruining the chance for hopeful and constructive attempts towards the solution of the Cyprus issue. 30

31

32

33

Relapse into Enmity (1963 - 1976) The difficulty of maintaining the formula for Cyprus became apparent in the course of a new crisis in 1963 - 64. The carefully devised proportional representation system of the 1960 constitution which included extensive rights of veto for the Turkish-Cypriot minority, could only function as long as both ethnic groups were willing to co-operate and reciprocal mistrust was reduced. On the contrary, problems were compounded. By 1962 all administrative and governmental activity was increasingly burdened by numerous disagreements, particularly about tax and finance legislation, but also about separate local government. The Turkish-Cypriot minority kept insisting on fully using the rights conceded to them in the constitution. When finally, on 30 November, 1963, President Makarios submitted to his Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President F. Küçük constitutional changes that considerably restricted the vested rights of the minority, these were rejected by the Turkish-Cypriots as well as the Turkish government, thus leading to an explosive state of tension. Transgressions that clearly originated from the Greek side escalated into civil war, into which the Greek and Turkish contingents stationed on Cyprus according to the provisions of the London Agreement were threatened to be drawn. With the aid of Great Britain, one of the gua34

35

107

rantor powers,^ precarious cease-fire was reached on 30 December, 1963, but a BritishGreek-Turkish conciliation conference held in London in mid-January 1964, to which representatives of the ethnic groups were also invited, failed to bring the parties any nearer to an agreement. The arrival of a U N peace force in March 1964 had only a negligible effect in diffusing tension on the island. When in the early spring of 1964 fighting between the ethnic groups flared up again, the Turkish government threatened to invade Cyprus. The realisation of this threk would probably have triggered a war between Greece and Turkey, particularly since thrGreek government had repeatedly assured President Makarios of assistance in the ever/of a Turkish attack. It was due solely to massive diplomatic intervention on the part of the United States that the Turkish government was dissuaded from carrying out its plan and that the scenario to be enacted a decade later was prevented. 36

The development towards a division of the island, however, could not be reversed. Provoked by an effective economic blockade on the part of the Greek-Cypriots, the TurkishCypriot minority was isolated into enclaves. The precarious cease-fire, kept up over the subsequent years with difficulty by the UN-peace force, was used to advantage by both sides to arm with the aid of the respective "mother countries" so as to be prepared for the next round. / Only a few weeks after a pitiful attempt at clearing up the Greek-Turkish differences at a summit meeting in mid-November 1967, direct armed conflict between the two NATOpartners became imminent. On 15 November, 1967 a unit of the Greek National Guard under the command of General Grivas attacked two Turkish Cypriot villages with armoured cars, mortars and field artillery, completely destroying them. Thereupon, the Ankara government mobilized the Turkish fleet and prepared for the invasion of the island. The West considered the situation so explosive that, independent from one another, three intermediaries initiated efforts to resolve the conflict: J. Rolz-Bennet as personal representative of U N General Secretary U Thant, NATO Secretary General M . Brosio and, as personal representative of the President of the United States, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, C. Vance. It was particularly owing to Vance's skill in negotiating that finally an agreement between Greece and Turkey could be reached, the most important results of which were: the Greek National Guard contingent, which over the past years had increased to more than 6,000 men, was to be reduced to 950, the figure set down in the London Agreement of 1959; General Grivas was to resign his command and leave the island; and all Turkish Cypriots who had been affected by Greek attacks were to be fully compensated. This crisis unmistakably resulted in a Greek setback. 37

38

39

As a result of this setback, the military junta in Athens, which had been in power since 21 April, 1967, was in no way dissuaded from pursuing "Enosis" with all available means. Since President Makarios was increasingly opposed to this adventurous policy and sought Cyprus' well-being in strict neutrality, he came to be an annoying obstacle for the Greek military junta. The Turkish Foreign-Minister's warning of 19 March, 1970, that in the event of a coup on Cyprus Turkish intervention would be forthcoming, was prophetic. Obviously, the Greek side did not take it seriously. The simmering conflict between Athens and Nicosia finally culminated in the putsch against Makarios on 15 July, 1974. ' Once again the NATO partners in the Eastern Mediterranean came to the brink of war. After the landing of the Turkish invasion forces on 20 July, 1974 on Cyprus, fighting between the armed forces of both states was already under

way. If the Turkish invasion and the conquest of the bridgehead on Cyprus might still be argued to be the wish of a guarantor power to re-establish the status quo, the pointedly provocative breaking-off of British-Greek-Turkish negotiations in Geneva, the renewed advance starting on 16 August, 1974 and the occupation of 38 percent of the island by Turkey, pointed to a coolly calculated strategy with the aim of taking advantage of the opportunity and to carry out the division of Cyprus, which had been a goal for four decades. The circumstances that were created in the summer of 1974 have remained valid to date. The effect of the 1974 Cyprus crisis on Greek-Turkish relations can only be called catastrophic, certainly as far as the Greek side is concerned. It resulted in a national crisis of consciousness due to the misery of the 200,000 Greek-Cypriot refugees from the Turkishoccupied north, whose impotence was considered to be humiliation, caused by the irresponsible policies of the military dictatorship which was in the meantime overthrown. Amongst a large proportion of the Greek population, feelings of hate towards the USA, accused of not having prevented the Turkish invasion, were mixed with revived fears of the Turks who were superior in number. The danger from the East became, once again, the main threat for the whole nation. The events on Cyprus inevitably aggravated the bilateral controversies that already strained the Greek-Turkish relations, particularly the issues of control over the Aegean air space, the delimitation of territorial waters and the controversy on the exploitation of the continental shelf. The increasing gravity of the disputes concerning the prospecting licence for the Aegean sea-bed was already apparent at the end of May 1974, when a Turkish research vessel, accompanied by 32 Turkish warships, undertook exploratory drilling in the area around Lesbos, an area laid claim to by Greece. Tensions reached a dramatic high when in the summer of 1976, exploratory work was once again taken up by the Turks in the northern Aegean Sea, extending to the continental shelf claimed by Greece. There is much to be said for the foresight of Greek Prime Minister K . Karamanlis, acclaimed saviour of the nation after his return from exile in Paris in 1974, in preventing the dispute from further escalating. Karamanlis, who pursued moderate policies both domestically and internationally, agreed to taking up negotiations with Turkish government representatives after recourse to the U N Security Council, as well as the International Court of Justice in The Hague after both of these attempts proved to be unproductive. The expert talks in Bern ended on 11 January, 1976 with the result that negotiations were to take place "in a candid, profound manner and led by goodwill" on an agreement regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries with the promise "to refrain from all initiatives or actions in the mutual relations that might discredit the other party". The so-called Bern Protocol was a sign of hope that henceforth the phase of rigid confrontation could be overcome in favour of a series of flexibly conducted negotiations on ail controversial issues regarding Greece and Turkey. 42

43

44

45

40

Negative Stability (1976 -1987)

4

108

This subtitle points to the fact that, since 1976, neither a great crisis has occurred between Greece and Turkey, nor has a break-through been reached as far as bilateral relations or the Cyprus issue are concerned. However, beyond the Bern Protocol of 11 November, 1976, 109

there was at least progress towards the normalisation of Greek-Turkish relations which had reached a low point in 1974. It is worth mentioning the resumption on 22 November, 1976 of telephone communications between the high commands of the Greek and Turkish A i r Force, which had ceased in 1974; the agreement on 23 February, 1980 concerning the clearance of airspace over the Aegean for civil a c t i o n which had been closed by Greece in 1974; the resumption of direct air links betweenGreece and Turkey as well as the re-opening on 14 July, 1980 of the ferry service between Rhodes and Marmaris; and finally, the return on 20 October, 1980 of Greece into the NATO military command structure, after an absence of six years. 46

The crucial change in the domestic Turkish situation during this period, namely a military coup in 12 September, 1980, had initially, no negative effect on Greek-Turkish relations. On 12 March, 1981 it was still possible for Greek Foreign Minister K . Mitsotakis to state in a press conference that the atmosphere between the two countries had improved considerably. However, the change of government in Greece shortly afterwards, with the election victory on 18 October, 1981 of the PASOK under the leadership of A . Papandreou was to become an obstacle to the emerging rapprochement. The first external repercussions of the new socialist government were felt during the meeting of the NATO Council of M i n isters in Brussels at the beginning of December 1981. Papandreou demanded from NATO a formal guarantee for his country against possible attacks by Greece's ally, Turkey.. This demand, with which the allies did not comply, was bound to poison relations between Greece and Turkey. Papandreou's propagandistically much-exploited .visit to Cyprus at the end of February 1982, the first visit by a Greek Prime Minister in office ever since the founding of the Republic, also seemed to be a provocation, particularly since Papandreou\ in his speeches on the island, maintained an insultingly radical tone. In March 1982, the old disputes flared up again over the apparent violation of airspace and delimitation of territorial waters in the Aegean. During press conferences, Papandreou and Turkish Prime M i n ister B. Ulusu launched heavy attacks on each other. At the end of March 1982, the Turkish Prime Minister responded to Papandreou's visit by going to the Turkish-occupied northern part of the island, an event condemned in Athens as a major provocation. 47

48

49

50

It has been said that Papandreou was a practical politician and, indeed, his signing of the Standstill Agreement with Turkey on 23 July, 1982 points to the fact that this assessment is correct. However, there still remains the question of whether it might not be irresponsible to provoke and rekindle deeply rooted hostilities that may take a long time to be overcome. The Standstill Agreement did not last long. On 6 November, 1982, the Greek Government cancelled the extensive NATO manoeuvre 'Apex Express 82" because of Turkish objections to include the island of Lemnos, 60 km north of the Dardanelles, which had been demilitarised in 1923 according to the provisions of the Lausanne Conference. Only a little later Athens postponed indefinitely the agreed Greek-Turkish negotiations on pending bilateral issues. 51

52

53

During a press conference on 21 January 1983 Turkish Prime Minister Ulusu found that his country's relations with Greece remained at a low. incidentally, Turkey was prepared to negotiate without pre-conditions. At the same time however, he cautioned the Greek government not to change the balance in the Aegean Sea. Thus it was, in August 1983, that a slight easing of tensions was again felt, after Creek and Turkish government representatives had agreed to negotiate on disputed issues in 1984. The European Community's 54

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110

hope that this progress was a step towards overcoming the deadlock in relations between the two states turned to disappointment after the proclamation of the Republic of Northern Cyprus and the decision on the part of the Greek government to freeze talks with the Turkish government on all levels. The Ozal government did indeed try to ease the strained relations with Greece even if controversial issues remained outstanding. The unilateral suspension of visa requirements for Greek nationals can be regarded as a gesture of good will. At the beginning of August 1984, Prime Minister Ozal surprised the public by a proposal that Turkey could deliver electricity to the Greek islands of the Eastern Aegean at concessionary rates. The Turkish offer of increasing economic co-operation was indignantly rejected by Greece. At a private meeting on the occasion of an international business leaders' meeting in Davos on 1 February, 1986, the two Prime Ministers, Ozal and Papandreou, failed to come any closer to resolving their differences. Papandreou again adhered to his point of view in a letter addressed to the governments of the eleven E C members, before the beginning of the E C Summit Meeting at the end of June 1986, that the Community should not be allowed to activate its relations with Ankara while Turkey maintained a "policy of menace and increasing aggresion" towards Greece, keeping one part of Cyprus occupied, and maintaining an internal regime that was to be regarded as oppressive. 56

57

58

59

Regardless of the negative stability with some variations in Greek-Turkish relations between 1976 - 1987, there has been a change in the status quo, the effects of which are significant to Greek-Turkish relations: namely, the full membership of Greece in the European Community since 1 January, 1981. During the years of military dictatatorship (1967 1974) relations between the Community and Greece were to a great extent frozen, while the association with Turkey was stressed, and despite considerable doubts about economic matters, an Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement was signed on 23 November, 1970*. Greece's return to democracy in 1974 led to a revival of relations between Greece and the European Community. On 12 June, 1975, keenly supported by France and the Federal Republic of Germany, the Greek government applied for full membership of the EC. The fact that this move was partially based on security considerations becomes apparent in a statement by the Greek Ambassador in Brussels, S. Stathatos, who in 1978 clearly expressed his expectation that the E C would intervene in the event of a Greek-Turkish conflict. 61

The Turkish government on its part felt uneasy. It saw the balance of both countries, in relation to the EC, shifting in favour of Greece and, moreover, feared that the countries in the European Community might give up their hitherto neutral status with regard to the Greek-Turkish disputes, and, from a feeling of solidarity for the new full member, might lean more toward Greece. The Turkish government was also dissatisfied that the Turkish status, as associate member, was increasingly being devalued by numerous co-operation agreements of the E C with other non-member countries, especially with those bordering on the Mediterranean. The southern Enlargement of the E C has become an item of constant worry to the Turkish side. Although the way to full membership for Greece considerably strained relations between the E C and Turkey, the Turkish government has held on to the option of full membership despite their occasionally diminished enthusiasm. In this context can be mentioned the resolution of the Association Council E C - Turkey, of 1 July, 1980, which called for revitalisa¬ tion and development of relations at the insistence of Turkey. 62

63

Ill

However, the close co-operation called for had to wait, since relations between the E C and Turkey were largely frozen after 12 September, 1980. The reserved rapprochement between the Community and Turkey on economic and political issuefe^fias already been treated elsewhere in this book. It remains to be seen how the relationship between Turkey and the E C will develop under the new government of T. Ozal, which became increasingly self-conscious after the EC-Commission rejected the freedom of movement to Turkish workers in the Community which was supposed to come into force on 1 December, 1986. . This means that the Association Agreement of 1963, including the Additional Protocol of 1970 have not been honoured. The consequences of renewed aggravation of the situation on Cyprus owing to the proclamation of independence of the northern Turkishoccupied part of the island on 15 November, 1983 must under no circumstances be underestimated. It cannot be ruled out that Greece might try to force a^uniform E C policy towards Cyprus in the wake of Turkey's application for full membership in the European Community, made at the beginning of 1987. The E C will have to be prepared for this possibility. Certain aspects, however, actually point to the fact that this important issue has not yet been worked into a uniform strategy in Brussels. 65

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67

The EC's Position Regarding the Graeco — Turkish Conflict (1974 -1987)

{

Until the introduction of the European Political Co-operation (EPC) in 1973 — which was an attempt to co-ordinate better the foreign policy programme practised by the E C member countries — a Community Foreign Policy Programme, as it were, did not exist. With regard to Greece and Turkey, however, the member countries have always pursued a mutually agreed policy of well-balanced, benevolent neutrality (with the exception of a few, insignificant nuances), but a policy which could not permanently satisfy either of the feuding NATO partners. A first attempt to establish the EC's increased political significance so as to present it as a mediating body, took place during the Cyprus crisis of 1974. This attempt was a complete failure. The decisive lines of communication passed through NATO channels but, above all, through the U S A during the crucial days. The incumbent President of the E C Council of Ministers, V. Giscard d'Estaing, was unable to conceal the deep disappointment over the failure of his mediation efforts. 68

69

70

From then on the E C limited itself to voicing general encouragement in settling bilateral disputes through negotiation. The Cyprus issue was to be settled through the continuation of discussions between ethnic groups as well. The European Community therefore maintained its role as neutral observer. The accusation, "Europe does not lift a finger", cannot be totally contradicted. In any case it would hardly be possible, to continue a policy of well meant neutrality — a policy which was made more difficult by Greece's accession to the Community on 1 January, 1981 — now that Turkey has submitted an application for full membership of the Community. It is not the purpose of this essay to reflect, in detail, upon whether or not Turkey — as an Islamic, developing country — actually does "belong to Europe". This has been stated repeatedly since the well-known speech by the Commission President, W. Hallstein, on the occasion of the signing of the Association Agreement with Turkey on 12 September, 1963, but it has been stated with considerably\Iess emphasis in the past years. At this point, the question may arise as to whether it seems bizarre that the European Political 71

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Union now being pursued — a corresponding resolution by the European Parliament of 15 September, 1983 reaffirms this expressly — is supposed to extend to the Elbe in Europe but reach all the way to Ararat in Asia? There is something to be said particularly from a long-term political perspective, for granting Turkey a privileged status, including working within the range of the E C instead of full membership. Such an option may be more likely to serve Turkey's long-term interests. No matter how the E C decides on a Turkish membership application, the Graeco-Turkish conflict would, in any case, remain a challenge for the Community. A positive response to an application by Turkey would very likely increase the necessity for a rapid solution of this issue. The prospect of having two disputing E C members block the European integration process in all of the Community's institutions — a process which is, in itself, burdened by numerous difficulties — would become very concrete. On the other hand, one can hardly agree to accept Turkey as a full member only on the condition that it suggest some type of solution to the conflict, since Greece was accepted into the Community on no conditions. In view of the dangers which can arise for European integration as a whole from the Graeco-Turkish conflict, the E C will, nevertheless, have to awaken from its conflict-shy passivity. It must use its influence more decisively than ever before so as to tactfully, yet persistently, reinforce any reciprocating will to compromise through discreet channels, pointing out the fact that there are superordinated, mutual interests. The full member, Greece, which is generally much better off economically and politically than Turkey — even considering Turkey's increased stability — should be advised to reduce its "mare nostrum" claim in the Aegean Sea, and to the Cyprus issue there should be increased recognition of reality although this is bound to be painful. Reinforcement of the status quo through the proclamation of the Republic of "Northern Cyprus" demonstrates, once again, that time is working against Greek Cypriots. Senseless insistence on justified legal status does not provide for long-lasting peace. On the other hand the rapid withdrawal of all Turkish troups from northern Cyprus — polemically called "Turkish Afghanistan" by Papalekas — appears to be indispensible. Such a gesture from the Turkish side would be a decisive initial step for an eventual solution by negotiation. It must be conceded, however, that the extraordinarily high level of psychological burden from the past, and the boundless mistrust in both countries as well as amongst ethnic groups on Cyprus, make a speedy understanding seem nearly impossible. Nevertheless, the E C will have to put forth more effort than before to contribute to the overcoming of the Graeco-Turkish "traditional enmity" on behalf of the Community's own, well understood, self-interest. Should a reconciliation be brought about, this would not only mean that a dangerous trouble spot in the eastern Mediterranean were defused but would, furthermore, be the required evidence — beneficial to European integration — of the EC's ability to act on foreign policy issues. In any case it would be distressing should future historians be forced to speak of a European failure to provide assistance towards a solution of this problem. 74

75

76

77

78

79

Notes 1

PASOK — Paneliiniko Sosialistiko Kinima (Panhellenic Socialist Movement).

2 3 4

Le Monde, 24 March ¡983. Neue Züricher Zeitung, I April 1983, below referred to as: NZZ. Frankfurter Rundschau, 15 September 1983.

113

5 6 7

Frankfurter Rundschau, 28 August 1984. Ta Nea, 25 Apriİ 1986 Basic formulations of the problems on this subject: H . Gsänger, Türkei-Europäische Gemeinschaft; Nationale Entwicklungspolitik und Annäherungsprozeß (Berini: Deutsches Institut fur Entwicklung­ spolitik, 1978); W. Gumpe!, ed., Die Türkei auf dem Weg in die EG. Möglichkeiten und Probleme einer Vollmitgliedschaft der Türkei in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. (Munich, .j&enna, 1979); Th. Kampffmeyer, Entwicklungsperspektiven der türkischen Außenwirtschafts-beziefnmgen — Konsequen­ zenftirdie westlichen Partnerländer (Berlin, Deutsches Institut fur Entwicklyfigspolätik, 1982); Th.D. Zotschew; "Die Türkei und die Europäische Gemeinschaft", in K.D. Grothusen, ed., Die Türkei in Europa (Göttingen, 1979), pp. 199 - 227. 8 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 20 September 1983, below referred to as SZ. 9 NZZ, 12 May 1984. 10 The Guardian, 16 September 1986. 11 League of Nations. Treaty Series 28.1924, Doc. 701-708, below referred to as: LoNTS. 12 LoNTS. 32.1925. Doc. 807. 13 LoNTS. 125.1931 - 1932. Doc. 2841. 14 LoNTS. 156.1934 - 1935. Doc. 3600. 15 LoNTS. 158.1934. Doc. 3514. 16 For a graphic map regarding the Soviet demands to Turkey seeB.R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War İn the Near East (Princeton, 1980), p.189. 17 J,C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. II (New York, 1972), pp. 273 - 275. 18 C M . Woodhouse, "The Problem of Cyprus", in Iñdiana Social Studies Quarterly 32 (1979), pp. 111-112. 19 K.D. Grothusen, "Außenpolitik", in K,D. Grodthusen, ed., Südosteuropa-Handbuch: Vol IV: Türkei (Göttingen, 1984). 20 Protocol on the Entry of Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty, dated 15 February 1952, in the United Nations Treaty Series. 126.1952. Doc. 541, (below referred to as UNTS). 21 Resmî Gazete, 23 May Í953: UNTS 167.1953. Doc. 2199. 22 Resmî Gazete, 23 February 1955; UNTS.211.1955. Doc. 2855. 23 To Vima, 30 May 1954. 24 L . Dischler, Die Zypernfrage, Doc. 33. (Frankfurt a . M . , Berlin, 1960), p. 28. 25 L . Dischler, pp. 30 - 31. 26 E O K A = Ethniki Organismos Kyprion Agoniston (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters). 27 T M T = Türk Müdafaa Teşkilâtı (Turkish Defence Organisation). 28 N . M . Ertekün, In Search of a Negotiated Cyprus Settlement (Nicosia, 1981), pp. 129 - 149. 29 For the text of the complete system of the contract constituting the Republic of Cyprus refer to: UNTS. 382.1960. Doc. 5475,5476; UNTS. 397.1961. Doc. 5712. 30 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (1963), p. 294, below referred to as: Abl. 31 Abl, 1964. p. 3687. 32 R. Morawitz, "Die Auswirkungen der Süderweiterung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft auf das Mittel­ meerbecken", in Europe-Archives 35 (1980), p, 188. 33 NZZ, 6.8.1962. 34' The text was printed in Ertekün, p. 175. ^ 35 N. Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece (London, 1978), p. 366. 36 The decisive letter by American President L . B . Johnson to Turkish Prime Minister I. inönü of 5 June 1964 and Inönü's reply to Johnson of 14 June 1964, expressing deep regret was printed in F.A. Valí, The Turkish Straits and NATO (Stanford, 1972), pp. 309 - 324. 37 P.G. Polyviou, Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation, I960 -1980 (London, 1980), p. 8. 38 Crawshaw, p. 372. 39 L . Stern, The Wrong Horse (New York, Toronto, 1977), pp. 53 - 54. 40 Crawshaw, p. 382. >, 41 On this subject a recent research contribution is H. Nowacki, Der Zypernkrieg 1974; Eine Analyse sei-

114

ner Ursachen. (Phil. Diss., Hamburg, 1982). 42 With regard to the dispute on the Aegean Sea, cf. A . Wilson, The Aegean Dispute (London: The Inter­ national institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), Adelphi Papers 155; also, from the Marxist point of view cf..P. Terz, "Zu völkerrechtlichen Hauptproblemen des Ägäis-Konfükts zwischen Griechenland und der Türkei", in Deutsche Außenpolitik 23 (1978), pp. 113 - 118; specifically regarding the air space issue see Ch.Z. Sanzanidis, "The Greco-Turkish Dispute over the Aegean Airspace", in Hellenic Review of International Relations 1 (no. 1, 1980), pp. 87 - 122. 43 Those regions öf the Aegean continental shelf claimed by Turkey for the allocation of licences for re­ search and exploitation are set out in Resmî Gazete, 1 November 1973, 18 July 1974. 44 For a similar assessment by the Karamanlis Government refer to N . Kohlhasse, "Der griechisch­ türkische Konflikt in der Sicht der Europäischen Gemeinschaft", in Europe Archives 36 (1986), p. 161. 45 The official text of the Bern Protocol is printed in Turkish Foreign Policy Report, No. 18. (Ankara, 1977), pp. 46 - 47. 46 On the course of the lengthy and difficult negotiations between the NATO and Greece regarding Greece's military re-integration into the Western Alliance, refer to R. Meinardus, "Griechenlands ge­ störtes Verhältnis zur NATO", in Europe Archives 37 (1982), pp. 105 - 114. 47 Le Monde, 14 March 1981. 48 Cf. Papandreou's speech before the Cypriot Chamber of Deputies on 28 February 1982, published in Public Inforamtion Office: House of Representatives. Press Release No. 41 (Nicosia, 28.2.1982). 49 NZZ, 16 March 1982; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 March 1982, (below referred to as: FAZ). 50 FAZ, 21 May 1982. 51 D. Schlegel, "Papandreou — ein Mehr an Berechenbarkeit", in Außenpolitik 33 (1982), pp. 406,, 422. 52 NZZ, 25/26 July 1982. 53 FAZ, 25 November 1982. 54 NZZ, 22 January 1983. 55 FAZ, 8 August 1983. 56 SZ, 18 November 1983. 57 Frankfurter Rundschau, 3 August 1984. 58 NZZ, 2 February 1986. 59 NZZ, 21 June 1986. 60 Abi L . 293, 29 December 1972. 61 Le Monde Diplomatique, October, 1978. 62 H . Kramer, Die Türkei: Gefährdeter Partner der westlichen Allianz: Ansatzpunkte ßr Beiträge zur wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und sicherheitspolitischen Stabilisierung (Ebenhausen, 1981), pp. 115, 125ff.; also cf. W. Gumpel, "Türkei und Europäische Gemeinschaft". 63 Cf. with Turkish Foreign Minister LS ÇağlayangiPs argument in: "Die Türkei und die Europäische Gemeinschaft: Probleme und Anliegen im Hinblick auf die Süderweiterung", Europe Archives 32 (1977), pp. 753 - 759. 64 Kramer, p. 125. 65 FAZ, 11 December 1986. 66 Cf. interview with the Turkish Prime Minister T. Özal in Der Spiegel 12 (1987), pp. 165 - 169. Özal unreservedly pointed to increasing the Greek-Turkish tensions in the event that Turkey's accession to the E C is delayed. 67 W. Gumpel, "Die Türkei vor den Toren der Gemeinschaft", FAZ, 19 March 1986. 68 Eg. B. Beutler, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft: Rechtsordnung und Politik (Baden-Baden, 1979), pp. 416 - 417. 69 P. Tsakaioyannis, "The European Community and the Greek-Turkish Dispute", in Journal of Common Market Studies 19 (no. 1, 1980), 36 - 39. 70 Le Monde, 28 August 1974. 71 H . Rumpf, "Zypern als internationaler Modell-Konflikt", in Außenpolitik 32 (1981), p. 182. 72 K. Liebe, "Das Zypernproblem —- eine europäische Frage", in Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen 20 (no. I, 1980), p. 43. 73 E.E.C. Information, Memo no. 8667/X/63-E, (Ankara, 12 September 1963).

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74 75 76 77

JVZZ, 16 September 1983. Die Umrisse eines denkbaren Sonderstatus, cf. Kampffmeyer, pp. 19-22. NZZ, 3 October 1986. W. Höpker, "Die gefährdete Südostflanke: Griechenland und die Türkei im Widerstreit", in Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen 3 -4 (1982), p. 98. . 78 J.Chr. Papalekas, "Geteiltes Zypern: Eine Herausforderung für den Westen", in SudoefeuropaMitteilungen 3 - 4 (1982), p. 121. T . 79 Cf. the interesting contribution by E . Turczynski, "Der Zypernkonflikt als Problem der r^ltionalismusforschung", in Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen 23 (1983), pp. 30 - 37.

Chapter 7 Uaurizio Cremasco

The Strategic Importance of Relations between Turkey and the European Community*

Introduction An analysis of the strategic relevance of relations between Turkey and the European Community presents special methodological and substantive difficulties. The European Community as an institution has no duty or responsibility to confront and deal with defense and security problems. The organization through which the European countries handle defense-related issues — strategy and tactics, doctrine and operational use of force, technical and logistical integration and standardization of armaments — is the Atlantic Alliance, of which Turkey has been a member since 1952. Not all the European countries which are members of the Atlantic Alliance are members of the European Community. Nor is the United States, which nevertheless plays a decisive role in Turkey's security. Notwithstanding the initiatives, the proposals and the indications that certain member countries are more aware of and willing to tackle the problem — the Colombo-Genscher document is a prime example — as things stand today the prospect of extending the Community's sphere of competence to include foreign policy and defense issues appears rather unrealistic and hardly realizable in the near or medium term. It is therefore difficult, and many might say incorrect, to link Europe's security problems to the political and economic issues connected with an enlargement of the Community. But the case of Turkey is emblematic of how it is just as difficult to draw a sharp line between the two series of problems because of the complexity of the interrelations and interactions which exist between political, economic and security factors. The Turkish case is emblematic for a number of other reasons too: the country's geographical position; its importance for the defense of NATO's southeastern flank and the Mediterranean theater in general; its intractable political, social and economic situation; and the important place held by Europe in the context of Turkey's foreign policy. Over the past twenty years the often dramatic evolution of Turkey's socio-political situation, the 1964 and 1974 Cyprus crises, the international events in the Middle East and southeast Asia have prompted Turkey to gradually review and redefine the basic parameters of its foreign policy. The revival of Islamism, which has deep roots in the country, and Turkey's heavy dependence on external sources of energy have lent new significance and new impulse to relations with the Arab world. A measure of disillusionment in its relations with *

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This analysis, presented to the study Group, was published earlier in International Spectator 18 (nos. 1-2, 1983), pp. 47-61.

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the United States has given rise to a more articulate and diversified policy toward the Eastern bloc, though one still conditioned by the awareness, sharpened by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, that the Soviet Union remains the highest potential risk factor in the Turkish security picture. Turkey's difficult relations with the Arab world (combined with the conscious rediscovery of the country's oriental roots) have raised questions as $p whether it is opportune to continue to pursue the traditional path of westernization and as to the feasibility Of a more "nationalistic" policy with a mainly regional projection and ob'i jectives. In many respects, the issue of the Community's Enlargement, especially after the accession of Greece, has become for Turkey a crucial test of the validity of its ties with the West, a touchstone of the effective willingness of the European countries to consider and accept Turkey, without reservations, as a truly "European" country. It is in this context that the security and defense issues enter into play: in the context of Turkey's perceptions of the importance of its political and economic ties with Europe in relation to its national security, and the Europeans' reciprocal perceptions. Hence, as a factor that will ultimately influence, directly or indirectly, choices whose content is basically political and economic. This analysis of the strategic relevance of relations between Turkey and the European Community is therefore addressed to answering two closely interrelated questions. If, how and to what extent the problem of Turkey's accession to the E C might affect relations between Ankara and the European members of the Atlantic Alliance. If, how, and to what extent the E C membership issue, as long as it is not resolved in terms acceptable to the Turkish government and public opinion, might prompt Turkey's government and public opinion to redefine, loosen or break its NATO ties, thus opening a dangerous gap in the fabric of European security and consequently in its defense capabilities. Obviously, the problem is not exclusively military. It is not only a matter of assessing the strategic and tactical advantages of having Turkey as a member of NATO in the event of an East-West conflict, as opposed to the disadvantages of a neutral or pro-Soviet Turkey (if the latter is a sustainable hypothesis). Nor is it simply a question of evaluating the military role Turkey might play in extra-NATO crises in which vital European interests are threatened. The political dimension of security is just as important in international situations in which, although a military confrontation between the two superpowers may seem improbable, the preservation of the stability of the regional balances has become essential for the maintenance of peace. It is therefore clear that an estrangement of Turkey from the European context, even if Ankara maintained those ties with the United States or NATO thatfit considered indispensable, would inevitably, even if only in the long run, have negative repercussions on European security. It is from this dual perspective, military and political, that I will attempt to respond to the questions posed above. European Perceptions Geographically, Turkey is only partly a European country. Its political and military positions as a "European" country are however, decisive for West European security. 118

Europe and Asia are sutured on its territory, making Turkey a concrete link between the two continents. The country is also at the center of the intersection between the East-West and the North-South arteries of the Middle East and Persian Gulf areas. Finally, Turkey serves as a barrier which hinders Soviet access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East, a characteristic which is enhanced by the fact that Turkey controls the Straits which are the only outlet to the Mediterranean for the Soviet Union's Black Sea naval forces. Over the past fifteen years a number of political and military developments have increased the importance of Turkey's functions as a "barrier" and a "bridge". 1. The increased activism of Soviet foreign policy toward the Middle East. The tendency became evident in the late 1960s and early 1970s with the Soviet Union's direct involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict and its defense of Egyptian territory, which included the deployment of Soviet military forces to the area. In 1970, Soviet military personnel in Egypt numbered about 20,000; the 4,000 military advisers already present on Egyptian soil were in fact joined by over 200 MiG-21 pilots, ground personnel for the maintenance of aircraft, and 12,000 - 15,000 technicians and specialists assigned to the radar centers and the SA-3 surface-to-air missile bases that were installed in increasing numbers to the west of the Suez Canal. Successively, after President Sadat's dramatic political turnabout, the expulsion of all Soviet military personnel in August 1972, and the abrogation of both the 1971 friendship and cooperation treaty and the agreement by which Soviet vessels operating in the Mediterranean were allowed to use the infrastructure of Egyptian ports (March 1976), the Soviets directed their efforts to the consolidation of relations with Syria. Military aid was intensified immediately after the Yom Kippur war, with the replacement of the arms and equipment lost; between the end of 1977 and the beginning of 1978, after the visits to Moscow of Syrian President Assad and the Minister of Defense Tlass; and also at the begining of the 1980s. The political ties were strengthened with the signing of a friendship and cooperation treaty in October 1980 whose prime objective, apart from implicitly guaranteeing Syrian security, seemed to be to reiterate the Soviet Union's unflagging interest in the Middle East situation and its determination to become once again a central figure in the region's difficult and complex political and diplomatic game. Military cooperation between the two countries was deepened, culminating in July 1981 with joint naval manoeuvres in the eastern Mediterranean and Soviet-Syrian amphibious landing operations on the Syrian coast. 1

2. The quantitative build-up and the qualitative enhancement of the Soviet fleet operating in the Mediterranean. With regard to quantity, the fleet grew from 1,800 ship-days in 1964 with an average daily presence of 5 units to about 17,000 ship-days in 1981 with an average presence of 46 units. In terms of quality, Moskva-class helicopter carriers have been added to the Mediterranean fleet and, starting in 1976, the typical composition of the Soviet fleet has occasionally been reinforced by the presence of a Kiev-class aircraft carrier. In addition, Backfire bombers assigned to the Naval Aviation and armed with air-tosurface missiles have been deployed at the Soviet air bases in the Crimean and southeastern Russia. 3. The "special" relationship the Soviet Union has established with Libya, to which it has supplied and continues to supply a mass of armaments that is superior in quantity and sophistication to the country's real defense needs, and to the Libyan armed forces' effec2

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tive capacity to use them or maintain them technically and logistica&y without external assistance. Another special feature of the Soviet-Libyan relationship is that, notwithstanding Libya's close military ties with the communist countries — the foreign military advisers, trainers and troops in the country come not only from the Soviet Union but supposedly also from East Germany and North Korea — and notwithstanding Qadhafi's outspoken and violent anti-Americanism, Libya cannot be considered an unequivocally pro-Soviet country. Just as Qadhafi's anti-Americanism has not prevented him from continuing to utilize U.S. oil technicians, his pro-Soviet attitude has not yet induced him to let Moscow establish military bases on Libyan territory. Nonetheless, the quantity and quality of Soviet weapons systems in the Libyan arsenal and the political constraints this could generate (though mitigated somewhat by the policy of diversification of the sources of military supplies which Tripoli began to implement some years ago), coupled with the substantially anti-western and "revolutionary" (and hence potentially highly destabilizing) policy that Qadhafi seems determined to pursue in the Mediterranean area and Africa, have induced many observers to consider the Libyan-Soviet links a potential threat to.European security. 4. The Soviet Union's increasingly evident tendency to intervene in the regional crises of the African continent, supplying considerable military aid, sending advisers and instructors, and deploying the "Cuban legion" (Angola 1975, Horn of Africa 1977). 5. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The operation was significant not only as a demonstration of the Soviet Union's military capabilities but also because it raised disturbing questions as to the expansionist intentions of Moscow's foreign policy and because, by polarizing in an East-West sense the volatile situation in southwest Asia, it inserted new elements of instability into the Mediterranean strategic equation — which is now more than ever closely linked to that of the Persian Gulf, being the obligatory rear front of any confrontation between the two superpowers in the region. The "barrier" function of Turkey's geographical position with respect to the eventual lines of Soviet political and military expansion toward the Mediterranean and the Middle East can be better appreciated if considered in the light of two particular circumstances: as a direct air route from the Soviet Union to the Middle East and African countries, and as the only maritime route between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. In the past, the Soviet Union has flown transport aircraft through Turkish airspace. This occurred during the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict when the Soviet Union organized an airlift of arms and spare parts to Egypt and Syria, and again in 1975 during the Angolan crisis with the airlifting of military equipment to the M P L A forces. ^ What interests us, however, is not so much the consequences of Turkey's allowing Soviet aircraft to fly over its territory, but rather the consequences in operational terms for the Soviet Union if Turkey refuses to grant overflight rights and if Moscow deems it inopportune to try and impose its will. In the two cases cited it would have been politically impossible for Turkey to deny overflight permission to the Soviet Union, among other things, because the airlift was effected using Aeroflot rather than military cargo planes. But the Soviet Union has no automatic rights or particular privileges. And there might^be cases in which Turkey, for evident reasons of security could decide to deny or delay the authorizations or could impose certain 120

restrictions regarding the number of flights, the type of aircraft, the norms for applying for permission or the flight procedures in such a way as to reduce the operational flexibility of Soviet transport operations. Moscow would then be confronted with the alternative of accepting the situation, and the attendant political and military constraints, or running the risks involved in attempting to force Turkey to cater to its wishes. True, it is difficult to imagine a Turkish-Soviet confrontation over the USSR's right to transit through Turkish airspace if not in defense of interests which Ankara considers vital. And it is just as true that such a threat is imaginable only if the Soviet Union were to attempt to supply arms and military equipment to a country in conflict with Turkey. Nonetheless, Turkish airspace is not unrestrictedly open to Soviet cargo planes. This fact alone, without considering further restrictions — even if hypothetical — which could be imposed, reduces the Soviet Union's strategic transport freedom in the event of an international crisis and consequently enhances, even if indirectly, the European countries' security. This advantage is available, however, only if Turkey remains strongly tied to the West. The filtering function of Turkish airspace would be extremely important to operations in the Mediterranean theater in the event of conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In fact, the most dangerous threat, above all to naval operations in the Mediterranean and especially in its eastern basin, comes from the Backfire bombers of the Soviet Naval Aviation. The Backfire, a medium bomber with advanced operational characteristics — radius of action from 2,000 to 6,000 km depending on the flight profile; capable of reaching supersonic speeds at low altitudes; equipped with sophisticated navigation and firing systems and with electronic countermeasure systems; armed with AS-4 and AS-6 air-tosurface missiles; capable of attacking in any kind of weather — can cover the entire Mediterranean sea and the territory of the countries of NATO's southern flank. Turkey's air defense system could perform two important missions. The first is an early warning mission: radar detection and control, with "cross-tell" tracking of approaching aircraft in coordination with the radar centers of the allied countries' N A D G E systems and naval forces operating in the Mediterranean. In particular, the cross-tell could be effected in tandem with the NATO AWACS planes and with the E-2C Hawkeye surveillance planes of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. The importance of early warning that supplies the essential data of an imminent attack — magnitude and nature of the threat, flight course and speed of the planes — is obvious. The second is an interception mission, aimed at harassing or neutralizing Soviet aircraft flying over Turkey toward the Mediterranean. If these missions are to be carried out effectively, Turkish air defenses will of course have to be improved. Radar coverage will have to be extended to cover low altitudes and overlapping will have to be increased so that the destruction of just one radar base will not open serious gaps in coverage; the command, control and communication system will have to be highly efficient and adequately protected and hardened; the fighter interceptors used by the Turkish A i r Force will have to have enhanced operational characteristics, all-weather interception capability and modern air-to-air missiles. A similar but strategically more significant filtering function is played by the Turkish Straits, the Dardenelles and the Bosphorus, with respect to maritime traffic. As already mentioned, the Turkish Straits are the only passageway available to Soviet naval forces and merchant ships travelling from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Transit 121

through the Straits is under Turkish control and is regulated by the Montreux Convention of 1936. In the 1940s the Soviets explicitly applied pressure to have the Straits regime modi­ fied. In June 1945, Moscow proposed that Turkey alldw it to establish military bases along__ the Straits. At the Potsdam and Yalta conferences, §klin tried to convince the Allies that a revision of the Montreaux Convention was necessary. Throughout 1946 the Soviet Union repeatedly asked Turkey to conclude an agreement for joint control and defense of the Straits. The Montreux Convention provides for the transit of warships through the Straits in peacetime, but sets precise conditions regarding the prior notification of passage, the num­ ber of transits allowed over a given period of time, the type of ships and the transit proce­ dure (for example, submarines are allowed to transit one at a time, emerged and during the day; and only if, having been built in foreign shipyards, they are directed to their bases in the Black Sea or are travelling toward shipyards outside the Black Sea for repairs or over­ hauls). Turkey thus evidently has the capacity to control navigation through the Straits and just as evidently has the legal right to impose respect of the provisions of the Montreaux Con­ vention, including Articles 20 and 21, which stipulate that in the event of imminent danger of war the transit of military naval units is left to the complete discretion of the Turkish government. There therefore exist precise constraints at the "technical" level which to a certain extent penalize the transit of Soviet warships through the Straits. The Soviet Union is fully aware of this, just as it is conscious of what it would mean in strategic terms if the Straits were totally closed, or even if the more restrictive limitations were imposed in such a way as to adversely affect the operability of its Mediterranean naval forces. These constraints are particularly binding because all the units of the Fifth Soviet Naval Squadron in the Mediterranean (except for the submarines from the North Sea Fleet) come from the Black Sea Fleet and depend mainly on the Black Sea bases for technical and logis­ tic support. In addition to these constraints, in peacetime, Turkey, and hence NATO, can control the flow of warships from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and thus remain continuously informed (by adding this information to that supplied by the Gibraltar NATO Command on the entry and exit of Soviet vessels) on the number and type of Soviet Fleet ships operat­ ing in the Mediterranean. In wartime, the closure of the Straits would isolate the Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean from its Black Sea bases, depriving it of all support — unless the Soviets were allowed to use the ports of North African littoral countries — thus reducing it to what is sometimes defined as a "one-shot navy". The Soviet Union has nonetheless demonstrated that, in the ev?nt of extra-NATO-Warsaw Pact crises, it is capable of rapidly increasing its fleet in the Mediterranean without violat­ ing the norms and procedures set down in the Montreux Convention. During the 1973 ArabIsraeli conflict, Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean increased from about 47 ships at the beginning of October to 80 units, including 26 warships and 16 submarines, by Octo­ ber 24, and to 96 units, including 34 warships and 23 submarines, by October 31. Moreover, there exist clear political constraints which condition Turkey's response to the Soviet Union's requests, in 1976, the Turkish government accepted the Soviet definition of the Kiev aircraft carrier built in the Black Sea shipyards as an antisubmarine cruiser and allowed it to pass through the Straits even though aircraft carriers are not included among 3

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the capital ships listed in Annexe 11 of the Montreux Convention. D. B. Sezer correctly pointed out that this is an evident example of the "interplay of the Soviet Union's global strategy with Turkish rights and security." He also underlined how it clearly illustrated "the Soviet Union's dependence on the Straits and the limits of Turkey's ability to influence the strategic environment and events despite the Montreaux Convention." Turkey's control over the Straits represents an even more fundamental factor than its con­ trol over airspace for European security in peacetime and in wartime. Even if this control must be exercised, taking into account the importance the Soviet Union attributes to free access to the Mediterranean and hence the limits to a rigid application of its rights in those crises that do not directly involve Turkey's vital interests. Another element that contributes to the global security of Europe is the possibility, again deriving from Turkey's geographical position, of gathering information on Soviet military activities. The information is of course of prime interest to Turkey in that it covers activities conduc­ ted in those military districts near to or bordering on Turkish territory; but i f the informa­ tion refers to the testing of new arms or serves for the verification of the SALT accords, then it is of interest to all the members of the Alliance. A U.S. Congressional Research Service report, prepared in 1977 by the Europe and Middle East subcommittee of the Committee on International Relations, mentioned five intelligence collection sites operating in Turkey with American military personnel: at Si­ nop and Samsun on the Turkish Black Sea coast for the collection of data on Soviet naval and air activities in the area around that sea; at Karamürsel on the southeastern coast of the Marmara Sea to control Soviet maritime traffic around and through the Straits; at D i ­ yarbakır in east-central Turkey for monitoring the Soviet missile tests conducted at the test­ ing sites of southern Russia; and at Belbaşı near Ankara for seismographic monitoring of Soviet underground nuclear explosions. Command responsibilities, the carrying out of activities, relations between U.S. and Tur­ kish military personnel and other points are regulated by a bilateral defense agreement, the Joint U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, which came into force for the first time in July 1969 and was successively renegotiated in March 1976 and, in its present form, in March 1980. Most of the intelligence material gathered is of special interest to Turkey and the United States. However, part of it is eventually recycled into the Alliance's intelligence system, be­ coming the common heritage of all NATO members and contributing to a more informed and accurate evaluation of the Soviet military "threat" to NATO's southern theater, particu­ larly with regard to the naval aspects. Finally, at the military level, the fact that Turkey is contiguous to Russia and is a member of the Atlantic Alliance obliges the Soviet Union to keep more forces in its southwestern military districts than would be necessary if Turkey were to adopt a neutral policy or estab­ lish closer ties with the Soviet bloc. According to the most recent estimates, 29 divisions are deployed in the three military districts which would presumably be engaged in NATO's southern theater in the event of conflict. Specifically: 6 motor rifle divisions, 1 airborne division and 1 artillery division are stationed in the Odessa Military District; 6 motor rifle divisions, 1 armored division and 1 artillery division in the North Caucasus M D ; and 11 motor rifle divisions, 1 airborne division and 1 artillery division in the Trans-Caucasus M D . 6

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If Turkey were not a member of the Atlantic Alliance, thesefdivisions, or at least some of them, could be redeployed to the central and northern fronts^iaking the numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces in those areas even more evident. But we must consider not only the positive contributions to European security provided by a "European" Turkey which is firmly anchored to the western military Alliance. The strategic importance of Turkey for the security of Europe can be appreciated still better, as Sir Bernard Burrows accurately observed, if we evaluate it in negative terms; that is, if we consider the strategic advantages the Soviet Union would enjoy if Turkey were a member of the Warsaw Pact. Among the most evident advantages cited by Sir Bernard Burrows are: "free and uncontrolled passage of Soviet ships between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean; open air and land passage to the Arab world over Turkey's frontiers with Syria and Iraq, an important additional threat to Greece over the Turkish-Greek frontier; and denial of Western monitoring facilities in Turkey." To which we might add the installation of Soviet radar stations and intelligence collection sites in Turkey to control NATO air and naval operations in the eastern Mediterranean. But even if Turkey's detachment from the Alliance did not culminate in a switch to the "other side", a hypothetical and highly improbable occurrence, but simply in the decision to assume a neutral or nonaligned position, this would have repercussions on European security just the same. It is difficult to predict the impact of such decisions, to estimate to what extent eventual Turkish neutrality might alter the strategic balance between East and West in the Mediterranean and Asia Minor, or anticipate how it might influence Soviet policy toward these regions, reawakening and sharpening old and dormant, but never dead, expansionist drives. In any case, in elaborating its foreign policy, Turkey cannot afford to ignore the fact that it shares borders with the "big neighbour to the North", not even if its relations with NATO were less problematic than they are now. There are a number of objective contraints which condition Soviet-Turkish relations and make political caution a must. And many of the political cautions which might be necessary if Turkey opted for neutrality would probably not be much different from those present today in Turkey's foreign policy toward Moscow. Nevertheless, in considering the realm of the "possible" Turkish political options and attitudes, if Turkey knew that it could count on concrete western support, it would probably make choices that contribute to European security; choices that might not be adopted i f the ties with the Alliance were severed or drastically reduced. A n analysis of the European countries' perceptions of the strategic importance of Turkey, and of the links between this importance and the need to establish and maintain firm and stable relations with Ankara, reveals a number of contradictory aspects. In the capitals of the major members of the European Community, the approach to the problem of the linkage between Turkey's association to the Community and its strategic importance for European security is influenced by political and social biases and prejudices which are hard to change, by remote and recent historical events, by the international ties with other Mediterranean countries which traditionally have been privileged with respect to Turkey, by economic and financial interests, and so on. Naturally, the foreign and defense ministers of the European countries evaluate and tackle the problem from different perspectives. The political parties tended to attribute greater importance to the issue of democratic compatibility (especially after the military seized power in 1980) and to economic and social 9

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factors, while public opinion (apart from the special case of the Federal Republic of Germany) appears more or less insensitive to the strategic implications of the Turkish issue. Generally speaking, governments, state administrations and the leaders of the major political parties explicitly refuse to link what Turkey could represent for European security in peacetime and even more in the event of an East-West crisis, with Turkey's place in the Community order and the political and economic questions of a further enlargement. The strategic importance of Turkey is usually recognized, though without attributing to it an absolute value and with a series of distinctions. In those countries in which the Soviet Union is perceived as the greatest threat — and not only in terms of possible Soviet military intervention in areas of vital western interest — the security of Turkey is seen, as an integral part of European security. For these countries, the strengthening of Turkish defenses is considered a factor which reinforces overall European defenses and is hence a necessity to which the Europeans must contribute politically and financially. In those countries where the Soviet "threat" is considered less probable, the role played by Turkey in European security is perceived in vaguer terms. It is true that, in recent years, the Soviet Union's increased international activism, culminating in the invasion of Afghanistan, and the relentless buildup of its military power have turned the Europeans' attention to Soviet intentions and have made them more conscious of the dangers of ignoring the factors which contribute to their security. But if détente is eventually revived with the conclusion of verifiable arms control agreements, the stabilization of the present crises in Europe, the Middle East and the Persian'Gulf, and a solution to the Afghan problem, the European countries' concern and attention will probably be focussed once again primarily on economic problems which have never really lost their priority position. In any case, in all the European countries there is a clear tendency to consider NATO as the institutional body responsible for European defense planning and the handling of the Alliance's military problems. It is in fact significant that the solution to the Greek-Turkish dispute over the 1974 crisis and Greece's re-entry into NATO, which involved not only special military issues but also political aspects of primary importance, was managed by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe, General Rogers. There is an equally evident tendency to attribute little credibility to the hypotheses of a direct political link between the Community's decisions on Turkey's entry and a more or less explicit and far-reaching shift in the country's foreign policy. That is, to the hypotheses that a European failure to meet Turkey's requests and requirements would accentuate Turkey's sense of estrangement from Europe and its lack of faith in the validity of the Kemalist policy which Ankara has traditionally pursued, engendering a progressive detachment from the European context which is bound to have negative repercussions on European security. It is difficult to say how these tendencies and the attendant European political attitudes might change if the international situation were transformed by a further deterioration in East-West relations or by a crisis involving the Gulf or the Mediterranean region or TurkishSoviet relations. However, even if changes do occur — which is not at all certain — there is reason to believe that they would have little impact on Community politics. If Turkish security were directly threatened, the West would respond through the political-military mechanisms of NATO and not with a greater European willingness to attribute more weight to the security factor provided by Turkey when making Community decisions. 125

t Under such circumstances, the stance taken by the United States, the weight of U.S. military power and the state of relations between Washington and Ankara would play the more important role in Turkish security considerations, just as they do now. In other words, it is unlikely that the strategic importance of relations between Turkey and the European countries will be an elernent which prevails over the other considerations (mainly economic and political) in arriving at a decision on whether to enlarge the Community to include Turkey. It is probable that in the Community debate on Turkey's entry, strategic considerations will not be lacking, just as it is probable that the arguments of a more strictly military nature advanced in the NATO context will be echoed. But this will not be enough to modify the parameters of a process to which security issues appear extraneous, being outside the Community's statutory area of competence. The block of economic, political and ideological factors will almost certainly outweigh strategic considerations in determining the Community's final decision on Turkey's membership. Nonetheless, security considerations do seem to have played a role in the European countries decisions to help Turkey both economically and militarily outside the Community framework. Turkish Perceptions Generally speaking, Turkey's situation and the problems that derive from it are linked to four main parameters. First, the geographic position and the orographic characteristics of Turkish territory. Second, the external "threats" as they are perceived, evaluated and ranked by the Turkish government (with a scale of priorities that may differ from that of NATO or the United States). Third, the internal problems, both those of an exclusively military nature in terms, of the efficiency of the armed forces and their effective capacity to defend the country, and those of a political nature which derive from the political, economic and social situation in the country. Fourth, the eventual repercussions, foreseen or unforeseen, of extra-regional events on the Turkish strategic equation. 1. The geostrategic factors Turkey's geographic position, which is at the root of its strategic importance for European security, is also at the root of the complexity and difficulties of Turkey's national security problems. Turkey is the only NATO country which borders directly on the Soviet Union for 610 km along its eastern frontier and indirectly for 1,500 km along the Black Sea coast. In addition, Turkey shares a 269 km border with Bulgaria, one of Moscow's most loyal Warsaw Pact allies. Finally, to the east and south it shares borders with Info, Iraq (331 km) and Syria (877 km). The latter two have signed bilateral treaties of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union which provide for consultations and reciprocal support in the event of military threats. A geostrategic analysis reveals a number of negative elements in terms of security. In the event of East-West conflict the Turkish armed forces would find themselves engaged on three separate fronts: the Turkish Thrace, the Straits and the Black Sea coast, and the eastern Turkish-Soviet border. These fronts ar^e distant from one another and particularly extensive, characteristics which complicate the problems of defense, deployment and 126

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movement of troops, especially since Turkey has an inadequate road and rail communications system and insufficient tactical airlift capacity. Moreover, it is not to be exluded — though the hypothesis seems improbable — that Turkey may also be engaged in combat on the southern front i f Damascus decides to take advantage of the situation to revive its claims on the Turkish province of Hatay (Alexandretta). There are, however, few beaches on the Turkish Black Sea coast that are suitable for massive amphibious operations, and advances toward the interior are made difficult by the Pontus mountain range. The terrain adjacent to Turkey's eastern border with the Soviet Union is largely inaccessible, with few practicable passes, among which the only relatively easy one leads to Erzurum. The terrain bordering on Syria is also particularly rough and mountainous, especially near Iskenderun. The weakest and most vulnerable area is the Thrace, along the border with Bulgaria, where there are easy lines of attack through the Vardar valley, the Struma pass and the plains that lead directly to the Aegean Sea and the Straits, only a few dozen kilometers away. The terrain is particularly suited to the use of armored and mechanized divisions, while the shallow depth prevents the adoption of tactical defense manoeuvres and makes advanced defense a necessity. The Straits can easily be closed to maritime traffic, while the Aegean Sea, from the Dardanelles to the island of Crete, is dotted with more than 3,000 islands which makes it easy to block traffic. No ship, alone or escorted, could pass without having to engage in battle. The geographic "barrier" function we referred to at length in the preceding chapter, control of the Straits, proximity to the Soviet Union and to the Middle East and Persian Gulf, and the disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, have obliged Turkey to direct special attention to the possible external "threats", both as elements of the traditional East-West conflict scenarios and as elements in scenarios of exclusively national conflict. 2. The Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria Historical reasons, physical proximity, and Russia's enormous superiority in military capabilities have obliged Turkey throughout history and now to concentrate primarily on the USSR's foreign policy intentions when evaluating its security requirements, especially on those expansionist tendencies toward the Mediterranean which have been a constant of Russian policy from the Czarist period to the Brezhnev era. The decision to join NATO was in fact dictated mainly by an acute sense of vulnerability with respect to the possible political and military initiatives of the "big neighbor to the North" and by the need to find a balancing factor, by formally tying itself to the U.S. superpower through its adhesion to the AÜantic Alliance. On the military level, the disparity in power and the potential Soviet threat appear particularly significant. As pointed out, 29 divisions (23 of which are motor rifle) are stationed in the three military districts of Odessa, North Caucasus and Trans-Caucasus. Most of these divisions are category 3, that is at a low level of combat readiness, and would therefore have to be reinforced before being brought into action. There are, however, airborne divisions that could play a decisive role in military operations aimed at occupying the Straits. Morever, the Soviet army is being equipped with an ever growing number of M i 24 "Hind" combat and transport helicopters which increases the possibilities of effecting eni0

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circling operations, thus partly eliminating the advantages which Turkey's inaccessible terrain offered for defending the territory. The air threat consists of more than 650 combat aircraft. The Black Sea Fleet has 26 submarines, 1 aircraft carrier, 10 cruisers, 22 destroyers, 41 frigates, 25 amphibious vessels, 240 minor surface units, 541 auxiliary and support ships, and 380 planes. The ground and air forces mentioned represent of course only that part of the Soviet defense system deployed in the three military districts which it is assumed would be assigned to combat against the forces of NATO's southern flank in the event of an East-West conflict. These forces could be strengthened, if need be, by other units from the military districts of Kiev, Moscow, the Volga or from the southern Turkestan Military District." The Bulgarian army has 8 motor rifle divisions, 5 armored brigades, 3 missile brigades equipped with Scud surface-to-surface missiles, 4 artillery regiments, 3 anti-aircraft artillery regiments, 1 battalion of Alpine troops and 2 reconaissance battalions. The air force consists of some 248 combat aircraft deployed in 6 fighter-bomber squadrons, 8 fighterinterceptor squadrons and 2 fighter-reconaissgnce squadrons equipped with Soviet-made MiG-17s, MiG-21s and MiG-23s (about 20 of the latter). Starting in 1974, these forces have been built up noticeably. New equipment has been assigned to the Army including armored vehicles, T-72 tanks and Mi-24 ,Hind-D' attack helicopters. The ASW Mi-4 "Haze" helicopter was introduced into the Navy's helicopter component. And in the Air Force there was a partial substitution of the MiG-17 with the "Flogger H " MiG-23 and of the MiG-21 with the "Flogger B " MiG-23. The MiG-23 was assigned to Bulgaria before the central European countries of the Warsaw Pact received it, breaking the practice of placing the southern countries of the Pact at the bottom of the list of priorities in modernization programs, often even behind certain Third-World countries. This would seem to indicate greater Soviet attention to the potential Greek-Turkish Thrace front, a trend made more evident by reports, not yet confirmed, that the Soviets have been setting up stores of military material in Bulgaria. In fact, the acquisition of Mi-14 "Haze" ASW helicopters makes operational sense only if they are to be deployed in the Aegean Sea; that is, only if they are to be used for an eventual Warsaw Pact attempt to conquer the Thrace and the Straits.

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In addition, in November 1978, the Soviets began a ferry service with large ships equipped to transport railroad cars from the Bulgarian port of Varna to the Soviet port of Ilichevsk near Odessa. From Varna there are 54 railroad lines connecting the port to the most important regions of Bulgaria. These ferries, among the largest in the world, eliminate the serious delays (up to four weeks) that are inevitable if the trains have to pass through Rumania to get to Bulgaria, and can easily be adapted for the transport of military equipment and supplies. In fact, each ferry can carry up to 108 railroad wagons or platform cars which means a maximum load capacity of approximately 150 T-62 tanks. T^he strategic importance of this ferry link is thus evident. It makes it possible to bypass Rumania, avoiding not only technical delays (Rumanian railways have a different gauge from that of the Soviet ones) but also the eventual political delays that would ensue if, in the event of a crisis, Rumania decided to restrict the transit of Soviet military convoys through its territory. 13

Finally, Bulgaria, like the other Warsaw Pact countries, has modernized its radar network by installing new and more advanced systems with greater coverage of low altitudes. It has strengthened its air defense with the acquisition of SA-6 and SA-9 missile systems. And it has enhanced its passive defenses by hardening its infrastructure and building more hangarettes at its airports. 128

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Turkey is conscious of the fact that in the event of East-West conflict it would not be in a position to face the threat alone given the present state of its armed forces' capabilities and efficiency. The Army (470,000 men) is made up of 16 divisions (2 mechanized, 14 infantry), 23 brigades (6 armored, 4 mechanized, 11 infantry, 1 paratrooper, 1 command) and 4 missile battalions with "Honest John" surface-to-surface missiles. The Navy has 16 submarines, 15 destroyers, 2 frigates and 13 fast attack craft armed with "Harpoon" and "Penguin" antiship missiles, plus a number of torpedo boats, large and coastal patrol boats, landing craft, mine-layers and mine-sweepers, and auxiliary units (depot and supply ships). The Air Force has 407 combat aircraft deployed in 18 fighter-bomber squadrons, 3 interceptor squadrons, 1 reconnaissance squadron and 6 transport squadrons, The type of aircraft: F-4E and RF-4E, F-5A/B, F-104G and F-104S, F-100C/D/F, RF-84F, C-130E and C-160 Transall, plus a number of different types of helicopters. If only the numbers are considered, the Turkish defense system might seem stronger than it actually is. A closer look reveals that 430 thousand of the 470 thousand men in the Army are conscripts. Most of the divisions and brigades are infantry (while most of the Soviet and Bulgarian units are armored or motor rifle). Almost all the tanks are old American M-47s and M-48s, which are technically and operationally obsolete. Most of the armored vehicles for the transport of troops are the outdated M-113s. The missiles are still of the old "Honest John" class that has been replaced by the "Lance" missile in the other NATO countries. Only recently have 2500 Milan missiles been ordered for the antitank systems. The air force still flies the old F-100. Effective all-weather interception capability is lacking and the air defence system suffers from inadequate coverage, especially at low altitudes, because of the technical backwardness of the radar system and the unreliability of the C system. In the Navy, all the destroyers, mostly of the "Gearing" and "Fletcher" class, are handdowns from the U.S. Navy, passed on to Turkey under the M D A P bill. The only really modern units are the four 209-type submarines and the "Dogan" and "Kartal"-class missile FAC. The current procurement programs and those planned for the future ("Leopard" tanks, Milan antitank missiles, 209-type submarines, Meko-200-class frigates, missile FAC, Harpoon antiship missiles, Super Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, F-16 and F-18 combat planes) will only partly meet Turkey's military requirements. In 1980 the Turkish government made public a detailed estimate of what would be needed to meet its NATO commitments for the 1981-86 period. The cost of the most urgent and priority needs was 4,442.3 million dollars. The Air Force needed 1,145.7 million dollars to procure F-4 and F-104 planes, spare parts and ammunition, equipment and material for air defense, etc. The Army needed 2,191.9 million dollars for tanks, antitank missiles, armored vehicles, communication equipment, helicopters, etc. The Navy needed 1,104.7 million dollars for submarines, fast attack craft, A S W helicopters, aircraft for maritime patrols, electronic warfare systems, antiship missiles, etc. It was estimated, however, that only 2,190 million dollars would be available for the 1981-86 period (from the Turkish defense budget, U.S. credits and West German aid). The shortfall of more than 2,200 million dollars could not be remedied by increasing the Tur3

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V kish military budget, nor could the Alliance partners be expected,to help fill the gap. The situation does not seem to have changed substantially since then, notwithstanding the increase in U.S. aid and in the Turkish defense budget. Turkey therefore depends on external reinforcements for its defense, especially in the Thrace area where the Turkish forces do not appear capable of driving back or halting a massive attack of armored units which would be facilitated by the flat terrain of the area. It is highly unlikely that Italian forces could be used in Turkey (except for the NATO A C E Mobile Force contingent). And it is unlikely that the Greek forces would be able to offer support to the Turkish forces on the Thrace front, except perhaps by trying to contain attacks on Turkey from the west. The United States appears to be the only ally that could supply external reinforcements. But it is uncertain how many air and ground units based in the United States would actually be available for deployment to NATO's southern front, considering the commitments in central and northern Europe; and there is also the problem of how long it would take the available units to intervene. The air force might be able to make it on the scene in a matter of one to seven days, but the ground forces — except for the Marine TF-69 normally stationed in the Mediterranean — would take much longer, up to thirty days. Moreover, the heavy equipment and supplies shipped by sea would have to cross the eastern Mediterranean where the Soviet forces, especially the air forces, enjoy greater freedom of manoeuvre thanks to the proximity of that area to the Crimean and southern Russia bases. 16

3. The Middle East and the Persian Gulf Iraq and Syria are a part of the Turkish security situation not so much because they represent a direct threat but because they are decisive parameters in the Middle East strategic equation and factors of regional instability. There are no open controversies or unresolved territorial disputes between Turkey and Iraq. Turkish-Syrian relations currently present no elements of particular tension and Damascus has not voiced claims to the Turkish province of Alessandretta since the early '60s. Moreover, Iraq, heavily engaged in a tough and bloody conflict with Iran which has closed the Shatt-al-Arab terminals from which Iraq formerly exported much of its oil (and which, incidentally, has also generated a further deterioration in its relations with Syria), now depends heavily on the pipeline that takes its crude from the Mosul wells to the gulf of Iskenderum in the eastern Mediterranean.' In addition, Ankara's gradual foreign policy shift toward a position of substantial nonalignment in the inter-Arab controversies, its explicit support for the Arab-Palestinian cause, its open participation in the Islamic Conferences (since they began in 1969), and its withdrawal from CENTO, have rid Turkey's posture of many of its more markedly prowestern aspects and have eliminated many of the previous elements of discord and tension which made its relations with the Arab world difficult. The Iraqi and Syrian armed forces are well equipped with modern armaments. Syria, for example, has more than 3,500 tanks (including 1,800 T-62s and T-72s), over 1,600 armored vehicles, Frog and Scud surface-to-surface missiles, SA-6 and SA-8 surface-to-air missiles, Su-20, MiG-23 and MiG-25 fighters. Iraq — before the war with Iran started — had over 200 tanks including 150 T-72s and some one hundred French-made AMX-30s, about 3,000 armored vehicles, Frog and Scud surface missiles, SA-9 surface-to-air missiles, Tu-22 Blinder medium bombers, MiG-23, Su-20 and Mirage F - l fighters. 7

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Nonetheless, Syria and Iraq do not represent a real military threat to Turkey since the latter's armed forces are clearly superior in terms of doctrine and combat tactics, technical and logistic capacity, discipline and training. Ankara's security concerns derive instead from the role the two countries could play in the event of an East-West crisis, complicating Turkey's defense planning; from the fact that both are tied to the Soviet Union by friendship and cooperation treaties; from the possibility of an eventual political and military union; from the close military cooperation ties between Moscow and Damascus; from the instability of the Middle East which tends to encourage the intervention of the superpowers in support of the countries of the region with which they have established ties; from the difficult situation Turkey would find itself in if, in the event of a crisis, the United States were to ask it to give a concrete show of support for its policy, of the type furnished for the 1958 landing operation in Lebanon. Turkey is just as worried about the consequences, in terms of security, of indirect involve¬ _ even if it does not require a decision to use its own military forces or give support to an external military power — as it is about the repercussions on its security which might be generated if the strategic equation in the Middle East and southwest Asia were upset. The Islamic revolution in Iran affected Turkish security in various ways. It increased Turkey's isolation. It gave new life and vigor to those political and religious movements that favor a reversal of the country's Kemalist march toward westernization and a return to Islamic values and a theocratic state. And, because of the unstable situation in Iran, it has increased the chances of a welding of Kurdish irredentism in Iran and Turkey. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan heightened Turkey's awareness of the implications of bordering on the "big neighbor to the North" and of Moscow's readiness to intervene with its own military forces outside the Warsaw Pact area for the first time since the end of World War II in a situation in which vital security interests did not appear to be directly threatened. The invasion threw new light on Soviet military capabilities, especially in terms of the number of men and the quantity of means deployed, and raised disturbing questions as to the future of the Gulf region. Soviet military intervention capabilities and the stability of the Persian Gulf area are two elements which are necessarily a part of the Turkish security picture, especially since any crisis in the region would inevitably lead to an East-West polarization and the risk of a direct conflict between the two superpowers, which would almost certainly involve their respective allies and friends. m

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4. Greece --^Because of the long-standing and . s f i l L u i » ^ l y £ d £ . y j r u ^

and the disputgs over

the Aegegn (division and control of airspace, the limits of territorial waters, sovereignty overThe continental shelf and the right to exploit the seabed, militarization of the Greek islands near the Turkish coast), Turkey is obliged to consider Greece_apotential,.external threat. ' ' ~~~ "tJBviously Turkey's perception of the threat does not include the hypothesis of unilateral aggression on the part of Greece, but rather the possibility of open conflict inherent in the difficulty of resolving diplomatically the problems that set the two countries against each other; problems that are rendered all the more intractable by recollections of ancient struggles and rivalries and by the more recent divergences at the political and ideological level. 18

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We have already mentioned the importance Ankara attributes to the issue of an extension of the territorial waters of the Greek islands from six to twelve miles. Equal importance is attributed to the problem of sovereignty over the continental shelf (which carries with it the right to explore for oil and exploit the mineral resources of the seabed). Turkey is almost totally dependent on external souces for its energy needs. The discovery of oil in the Aegean would reduce this dependence and would ease the enormous strain on its balance of payments which oil imports represent.

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Negotiations over the future of Cyprus are presently deadlocked. The fact that both countries are members of NATO does not seem to have helped make finding a solution to the controversies any easier. Their disputes have not been subordinated to a common view of regional security which includes their political and military cooperation. In fact, Turkey's increased flexibility, which ,in 1980 led to the removal of its veto on Athens' reentry into the military arm of the Atlantic Alliance, had little impact and served to improve Greek-Turkish relations only temporarily. Indeed, the successive victory of the Socialist party in Greece (which increased the ideological distance between the military regime in Turkey and the government in Greece) and Papandreou's more explicity nationalistic foreign policy have radicalized the positions, reignited old polemics and revived old mechanisms of confrontation. It is difficult to forecast how flexible and what margins of manoeuvre there will be in future Greek foreign policy toward NATO — since his electoral victory, Papandreou has toned down his opposition and no longer appears as determined to withdraw Greece from NATO — and toward Turkey. The Greek request at the December 1981 meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee for a formal Alliance guarantee in the event of Turkish aggression dampened hopes that Greek-Turkish relations might improve and naturally tended to accentuate the Turkish perception that security factors play a more than marginal role in its relations with Greece. At the military level, Turkey seems to be in a superior position, especially in terms of numbers and particularly with regard to ground troops. Because there is the possibility that the political controversies might lead to a military confrontation, Ankara feels obliged to keep an "Aegean fleet" — which Greece considers a possible external threat — and approximately 20,000 men on Cyprus, with a dispersion of its forces and a dysfuntional distribution of its resources that subtracts from NATO defense requirements. If a Greek-Turkish conflict were to eventually erupt, the military costs for Turkey — and for Greece — would certainly be very high, and would adversely affect its capacity to meet its other defense requirements for an unforeseeable period of time. These threats are credible to differing degrees, have more or less effective military weight and greater or lesser chances of materializing, but they are omnidirectional, a characteristic which tends to complicate Turkish defense planning. Turkey's vulnerability, accentuated by the country's strategic position, weighs not only on Ankara's military policy choices but on its foreign policy choices as well. 19

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The Convergences and the Role of the European Countries I The convergences _. The preceding analysis reveals that there are a number of convergent interests which could serve as the basis for elaborating a more articulate pattern of international relations between the European countries and Turkey and as the framework within which to formulate a program of concrete European initiatives aimed at assisting Ankara in its efforts to adequately meet its security requirements. The basic convergence lies in the fact that Turkey's security is fundamental to European security — a point which is often obscured by political and economic considerations despite the Europeans" keen awareness of its importance. From this root coincidence of interests derive a number of collateral convergences linked to those problems which most deeply affect the complex web of Turkish security perceptions. First of all, the Community and Turkey have a reciprocal interest in finding a political solution to the intractable Greek-Turkish dispute over the Aegean. Not only must the Europeans seek out mediation instruments that are truly efficacious for resolving the dispute and preventing an internationalization of the controversy; they must also be careful not to let the dispute become a pretext which in one way or another influences the procedures relating to Turkey's accession to the Community. Both parties also have an interest in seeing to it that Greece's membership in the Community is not interpreted as a factor which gives it not only "special" economic status but also a special political status which biases the European countries' individual or collective assessment of and attitude toward the dispute. In other words, it is in the common interest that Greek-Turkish relations be perceived as a problem that directly affects the security of Europe as a whole (the consequences at the military level of a Greek-Turkish conflict were mentioned above). The dispute must therefore be treated as an element which directly bears on European security, without ignoring the fact that Community initiatives and instruments, however impartial and finely tuned, may not be sufficient on their own to resolve the dispute or may not be accepted by one or both of the antagonists. In particular, European efforts should be directed at preventing the controversy from spreading beyond the regional sphere with the intervention of external powers (not necessarily, but most probably, the USSR) intent on acquiring political advantages (greater influence in return for support offered, attempts to weaken or destabilize the southern flank of the Atlantic Alliance, utilization of an eventual crisis for political gains at home, etc.). There is also a confluence of interests in providing unambiguous European support for Ankara's foreign policy whenever necessary in the context of Turkish-Soviet relations. There is a reciprocal interest in having Moscow perceive that Turkey's lies with Europe (and not only with the United States, even if the security guarantee provided by the latter appears more credible) are firmly rooted in solid terrain and that despite the ups and downs of Euro-Turkish relations, stemming partly from Turkey's internal situation, the European countries would invariably consider a direct threat to Turkey a threat to their own security. Obviously, Moscow's perception of the solidity of these ties depends not only on the European countries' attitude toward Turkey but also on Turkey's attitude toward Europe. The political limits of a convergence based mainly on security considerations should not of course be ignored or underestimated. But it would be just as erroneous to underestimate the importance of this link.

It could be argued that this convergence of interests has already been rendered operative through Turkey's membership in the Atlantic Alliance and that the Soviets, in formulating their foreign policy toward Ankara, base their evaluations on their perceptions of the significance and solidity of Turkey's NATO ties. It could also be argued that, in terms of security, a specifically European role would add very little to the ties which already exist within the Alliance framework. This is true. Yet a Community attitude which constantly and explicitly referred to Turkey as a European country and as a future member of the Community could give to the NATO ties a political and economic dimension of an importance not to be ignored. Finally, there is a convergence of interests, though not an identity of outlooks nor a coincidence of postures, in finding a way to stabilize the situation in the Middle East and a political solution to the Persian Gulf crisis. Dependence on external sources of energy, the negative repercussions on the entire Mediterranean area of another Arab-Israeli conflict (especially one involving the two superpowers) , and the risk of an extension of the Iran-Iraq war are elements which engender deep and common concerns in which security plays an important part. There is instead a less distinct convergence with regard to the political and military role Turkey could play in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Gulf regions either as an element which decisively contributes to the formulation of the Community's foreign policy and economic development strategies or as a continental platform endowed with extremely valuable infrastructure which would give the Allies a decisive geopolitical advantage in the event of an East-West crisis. The Europeans know how irreplaceable Turkish territory is from the geostrategic point of view. But they are also aware of the constraints that limit the range of military choices open to Ankara; constraints and limits that cannot be ignored or avoided even if Turkey becomes a full member of the Community. 2. The European role The convergences pointed to could serve as a frame of reference for shaping a more specific European role aimed at assisting Turkey in its efforts to adequately respond to its security needs, and at breaking the impasse created by the Europeans' reluctance or inability to concretely express their recognition of the importance of Turkey's contribution to their collective security in the political form considered most suitable and significant (especially from Ankara's point of view); Turkey's full membership in the European Community. We have already emphasized how difficult it is in many respects to include security as a factor which weighs on the member countries' evaluation of and consequent attitude toward a further enlargement of the Community. Extension of the Community's area of competence beyond the present limits of an economic association is a long-term prospect. It is therefore understandable that the member countries should telid to concentrate on more immediate difficulties in order to avoid overburdening the Community institutions with other, more ambitious goals. On the other hand, the more powerful members might decide that greater political and military integration of the Community, parallel to or following economic enlargement, should be realized gradually and should initially be restricted to integration only among the major members. In either case, Turkey's strategic importance will tend to play a very marginal role in the Community context while retaining its relevance as an essential factor with respect to operations in NATO's southern theater. 134

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And yet, in either case, an alternative solution could be found, one which could represent the first element of that European role referred to above. Whatever the timetable and procedures of Turkey's entry into the Community, a way should be found to permit it in the meantime to participate in what is today the major nucleus of "political" aggregation of the Community members: European Political Cooperation (EPC). In other words, political participation could precede economic integration, anticipating a "responsibilization" of Turkey in the Community's political choices; a responsibilization which has been rendered all the more necessary by the new strategic developments in southwest Asia and by the increasing probability of extra-NATO crises in the Mediterranean area which would require a European response which could not be given through the structures and decision-making mechanisms of the Alliance. In my opinion, this would be an extremely important step, representing a highly significant political choice for Turkey itself and serving to remove Ankara's doubts as to the importance of its European ties in the context of its foreign policy. A second element of fundamental importance, which would increase the country's deterrent capacity and hence its feeling of security, is the European contribution to the modernization of Turkey's armed forces. We mentioned earlier the enormous financial difficulties Turkey would encounter if it had to shoulder alone the extremely high cost of procuring the weapons and equipment considered absolutely necessary to meet its security requirements. We also mentioned how certain European countries have helped Turkey in its rearmament drive (especially during the U.S. arms embargo) by granting, credits, selling arms at convenient terms, passing on operationally valid, though not ultra-modern, weapons and equipment, etc. The assistance was provided mainly under bilateral accords endorsed and encouraged by NATO but undertaken outside the framework of its structures. What was lacking was coordination of the single initiatives within a European program of military aid aimed at reducing, if not reversing, the decline of the Turkish armed forces' operational capabilities provoked by the U.S. arms embargo. Obvious and understandable political considerations prevented a greater commitment on the part of the European allies. The situation was further complicated by the military takeover, which made a coordinated European effort an even more remote prospect. On the other hand, there had always been a privileged relationship between Turkey and the United States in this sphere — since the 1950s the United States had been practically Turkey's only arms supplier — also by reason of the agreements under which the Americans were allowed to use certain Turkish bases and infrastructure. As mentioned, the Federal Republic of Germany began to play an important role only in the 70s, granting credits for a considerable sum, supplying technologically sophisticated weapons systems, and allowing the Turkish arms industry to produce German arms and equipment on license (of particular significance are the licenses for producing submarines and seaborne missile units). It might again be argued that the European countries (and still more the Community as such) can play only a very marginal role, or none at all, limiting themselves to calling for (and fostering) a deeper commitment on the part of NATO and greater coordination among the allies with respect to the problems of the efficiency and operational readiness of Turkey's defense system. The thesis adopted throughout this paper is, however, that there does exist a specific sphere in which the European countries can legitimately operate. Few would beg to differ 135

with the argument that the various military aid programs should be coordinated by the or­ ganization set up to deal with Western defense problems, the Atlantic Alliance, with the participation of the United States. And it is easy to see that the Community is still too far away from achieving that degree of political integration which would justify such initia­ tives. It might even be conceded that all this has nothing to do with the issues involved in an enlargement of the Community. But by way of objection, it can also be argued that the Community cannot in any case afford to remain indifferent to developments in the field of industrial growth, economic cooperation and rationalization of production (even if limit­ ed to the arms industry), especially if the country concerned will eventually become a member of the Community and if, by strengthening its security, European security too will be reinforced, even if indirectly. What is needed is a coordinated European effort to enhance the Turkish arms industry's technological capabilities and to raise its output so as to favor, in a long-term perspective, the undertaking of joint ventures designed to increase the level of interoperability and stan­ dardization of the Turkish and the European military structures. Such an effort constitutes the third element of a possible European role in Turkish security. The 1979 accords between the Federal Republic of Germany and Turkey already included a series of measures providing German assistance to the Turkish arms industry: enlarge­ ment of the Kırıkkale light-arms factory; expansion of the output of the Elmadagi plant which produces Cobra-2000 antitank missiles on license; expansion of the capacity of the Arifiye plant which manufactures components and spare parts for armored vehicles; mod­ ernization of the Gölcük and Taşklzak shipyards; construction of new infrastructure for the plant producing aircraft engines at Eskiklzak. In this field a certain role could be played by the Independent European Program Group, which is not a NATO institution and of which Turkey is a member. Compatibly with the characteristics of its industrial structure, Turkey could be included in those joint ventures which would generate valuable technological fallout and offer Turkey the opportunity to modernize its defense system. 20

If Europe were to follow the course of action outlined above, the ties between the European countries and Turkey would be strengthened and proof would be given that Turkey, despite the problems and motives that may obstruct its rapid entry into the Community, is considered a European country and as such an essential element of the European security picture. Obviously, it will not be easy to assume this role in a collectively coordinated fashion. The European countries' differing evaluations and attitudes, the need to consider the reper­ cussions on relations with Greece, and the precarious state of the European economy are all constraints which limit progress in this direction. And Turkey too will have to do its part, favoring and integrating the European initiatives by stressing the "European connec­ tion" in its foreign and domestic policies and by not dramatizing an eventual European re­ luctance to respond favorably to Turkey's application for membership in the Community. Finally, since the major goal is enhanced security, the European role, even if motivated by diverse considerations and future prospects, should be coordinated with that of the Uni­ ted States (which has so far used a bilateral approach too). Moreover, though American support will continue to be indispensable, it appears to be in Ankara's own interest to avoid having the United States as its only security option. This chapter dealing with the convergences^ European and Turkish interests and the possible elements of a new European role concludes this analysis of the strategic impor136

tance of relations between Turkey and the European Community. It is logical that the need for a deeper understanding of the respective requirements, the reciprocal interests and the common aspirations should provide the principal element of the Community's future attir tude toward Turkey. Turkey constitutes an important link in European security. We can only hope that econo­ mic and political motives will not be attributed such preeminence as to alienate Turkey from Europe, opening a dangerous gap in its security. Conclusions The issue of Turkey's entry into the Community should be faced notonly injerms_af_^ thepjisjai^ also be evaluated instrategic terms, taldng^_into accoum tfiey p r e s e t capable of. mariagingjts own foreign^and militajvjrwUdes. """"European security requirements ca^motTIrTfact, be completely and credibly satisfied without Turkey's participation and contribution, which are in many respects essential. This is valid today, when it is NATO that performs the duties of planner and guarantor of European defense, and it will remain valid in the future — assuming that ideological an­ tagonism and political and military competition will continue to be the outstanding (but not the only) features of East-West relations for many years to come — when NATO may have ceased to exist in its present form, perhaps becoming the institution that manages the mili­ tary policies of a politically integrated European Community. The importance of strategic relations between Ankara and the European Community should therefore be viewed from a perspective which contemplates future developments as well, given that the process of Turkey's entry into the Community can be expected to extend over a long period, while at the same time being opportunely focussed on shorter-term se­ curity problems, too. It is logical that Ankara should tend to consider the Community's response to its applica­ tion for membership a crucial test of the Europeans' attitude which goes beyond the strictly economic issues and assumes political significance as a legitimation of Turkey's full appur­ tenance to Europe; that is, as a confirmation that Turkey is considered "European" not only when or because it participates in and integrates the European defense system. It is in fact unlikely that membership in NATO would be sufficient for the Turkish government to jus­ tify, internally, political and military choices invariably in line with European interests. It seems that Turkey's strategic importance will also have to weigh on relations with the European Community; not directly, in the sense of constraining a decision which must nec­ essarily be taken on the basis of economic considerations, but at least indirectly, in the sense of stimulating greater awareness of and attention to Turkish perceptions and requirements, and in the sense of promoting the adoption of political initiatives capable of preventing Tur­ kish perceptions from coagulating in a feeling of alienation and estrangement from Europe. In this context, perceptions — including of course the Community members' perceptions of Turkey's internal and foreign policies — play an important role whose impact should not be understimated. It is true that relations with the United States are more important for Turkey's security than relations with Europe. However, the former bear the characteristics typical of a rela137

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tionship between a medium power and a superpower. A more solid link with Europe could to a certain extent mitigate the negative effects, but only if it possesses a good dose of credibility. I have tried to indicate how this could be accomplished. Apart from what can be done (with greater commitment and better coordination of the various national programs) to help Turkey at the diplomatic level (mediation with Greece) and at the military level (participation in the effort to modernize the Turkish defense system), it seems essential to have Turkey participate politically in the Community in advance of its complete economic integration.

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In other words, Turkey should be invited to take part in European Political Cooperation while the long process of accession to the Community proceeds. The formal difficulties — whose existence and weight should not be ignored — could be overcome if there were t on the part of the Community members the necessary political will to do so. It might be objected that the analysis on which these conclusions are based is overly optimistic or, worse, lacking in objectivity. It might be accused of not taking into due account the limited impact Turkey's strategic importance can have on relations with the Community; of underestimating the Community's substantial indifference to security problems whose management has been delegated to NATO; of seeking to superimpose distant and uncertain future prospects on the present situation. In effect, it is undeniably difficult to imagine a politically and militarily integrated Europe at a time when the Community offers such an alarming picture of disintegration, protectionist tendencies, and diffused crisis. Yet, the international developments of the late '70s and early '80s and the projections as to the likely course of events throughout the present decade suggest that the major problem that will have to be faced and resolved by the European countries, apart from the economic crisis, will be security. A n adequate solution can be found to the security problems only if there is a collective effort and commitment. And it is essential that Turkey, because of its strategic importance, participate in this effort. It will be willing and able to do so, however, only if it feels that it is a European country and that it shares and participates in shaping Europe's destiny without having to deny or renounce those Islamic characteristics which make it a natural bridge between eastern and western civilization.

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Sir Bernard Burrows, "The security dimension for Western Europe", paper presented at the TEPSA/IEP Conference on Turkey and the Community, Bonn, 28 - 29 November 1980, p. 1. 10 The category 3 divisions are at a quarter of their full war strengh in terms of personnel, possibly complete with fighting vehicles (some obsolescent). Cf. The Military Balance 1982 -1983, p. 15. U The deployment of forces in these military districts is as follows: Kiev, 11 divisions (6 tank, 4 motor rifle, 1 artillery); Moscow, 7 divisions (2 tank, 4 motor rifle, 1 airborne); Volga, 3 motor rifle divisions; Turkestan, 6 divisions (5 motor rifle, 1 artillery). 12 13 14 15

Cf. Tlie Military Balance 1982 - 1983, p. 20. Cf. International Herald Tribune, 29 November, 1978. All data on the Turkish armed forces is from The Military Balance 1982 - 83, cit., p. 44. For the financial data and a complete list of the planned purchases, cf. Senate Delegation Report, Perspectives on NATO's Southern Flank, A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 3 - 13 April 1980 (Washington: USGPO, 1980), p. 16. 16 For the fiscal year 1981, the U.S. Congress approved 250 million dollars for the Foreign Military Sales Program and 200 million for the economic aid program and about 2 million for the International Military Education and Training (IME) program. For fiscal year 1982, the United States increased its aid to 700 million dollars (300 million in economic aid and 400 in military aid). Of the 400 million in military aid, 250 were provided at low interests rates. In addition, the aid for the IMET program was to be increased form 1.6 to 3.5 million dollars. Cf. International Communication Agency, Daily Wireless File, No. 53, 18 March 1981. 17 In the course of 1982 the Iraqi pipeline through Syria was frequently sabotaged. On Iraqi oil output, cf. Financial Times 4 January 1982, p. 1; 8 January 1982, p. 14; 1 June 1982, p. 3; and 3 December 1982, p. 3. 18 On the Greek-Turkish dispute over the Aegean, cf. Andrew Mison, The Aegean Dispute (London: IISS, Adelphi Papers No. 155, 1980). 19 Greece's insistence and the impossibility of finding a compromise formula prevented the formulation and issue of a final communique for the first time in the Alliance's history. 20 Cf. Der Spiegel, 4 February 1980, pp. 33 - 34.

Notes 1 2 3

In that period the Soviet Mediterranean fleet consisted of 53 units, the highest number since 1977. Cf. Maurizio Cremasco and Stefano Siivesti, IIBanco Suddella Nato (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1980), p. 81 The text of the Montreux Convention is reproduced in Appendix B of the book by Jesse W. Lewis, 771« Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean (Washington: American Eitferprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976).

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The exact size of the Soviet navy when the hostilities broke out has not been officially made public. For an estimate cf. R.G. Weinland, Superpower Naval Diplomacy in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War: A Case Study (Washington: Washington Paper No. 61, 1979) p. 76. Cf. Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch. A Memoir (New York: 1976), p. 447. Cf. Duygu B. Sezer, Turkey's Security Policies (London: HSS, Adelphi Papers No. 164, 1981), p. 15. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean, 95th Congress. 27 March 1977 (Washington: USGPO, 1977). \ Cf. The Military Balance ¡982 -1983 (London: IISS, 1982), p. 15.

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Chapter 8 William Hale

Turkish Agriculture and the Common Agricultural Policy*

Agriculture in Turkey's Economy and Foreign Trade Although Turkey's economic policies since the 1920s have put the main emphasis on industrial development, it has to be remembered that agriculture still plays a vital role in the Turkish economy, and is of some importance in the context of relations with the Community. The total area of the country is 77.9 million ha, of which 23 million ha, or 29.5 per cent, is counted as cultivated. Around 5.9 million ha, or some 25.5 per cent of the cultivated area is left fallow, but this still leaves Turkey with a very large agricultural area. Within the country, there is a wide variety of ecological conditions. As a result, Turkey is not just a major producer of Mediterranean crops (grapes, olives, tobacco, cotton and the like) but also of northern products, such as grain, orchard fruit, vegetables and meat. It is selfsufficient in most foodstuffs and normally has a substantial surplus of fruits, vegetables and industrial crops available for export. The main constraints affecting agricultural production are firstly, the harshness of the climate and terrain in many regions, and the unpredictability and paucity of rainfall; secondly, the backwardness of farming techniques; and thirdly, difficulties in transportation, marketing and packaging. However, many of these handicaps have been reduced over the last few decades. The area under irrigation has increased from around 360,000 ha in 1962 to over 3.2 million ha in 1984. Fertiliser use has risen from less than 300,000 tonnes in 1960 to just under 8.7 million tonnes in 1984, and the number of tractors from 42,000 to 556,000 during the same period. There has also been an impressive extension of the road network, and of modern marketing and packaging methods. In spite of the growth of industry, about 58 per cent of the working population in 1980 was counted as employed in agriculture: at around 10.5 million, this represented a fall of 1.2 million since 1975; unfortunately, an occupational breakdown of the 1985 census results was not available at the time of writing. This figure is exaggerated by the fact that the population census, on which it is based, counts all adult women in farming families as employed in agriculture, even though they may only spend part of their time in farm work. Allowing for this, as well as probable changes since 1980, it seems likely that agriculture still occupies about 45-50 per cent of the national workforce. Measured in constant prices, value added in agriculture increased at an average annual rate of 2.8 per cent between 1960 and 1986. However, the rapid growth of industry and services activities meant that its proportionate contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 1

*

This chapter is a revised version of the author's paper, "Turkish Agriculture an the EEC", published in Orient 26 (no 3, September 1985), pp. 360-375.

141

I fell from just under 38 per cent in 1962 to 22 per cent in 1986. Assuming that the Turkish economy resumes its growth path during the 1980s (and the signs are on the whole favour­ able) then it is likely that the share of agriculture in G D P will fall further. The current five year plan, for instance, predicts an annual growth rate of 3.6 per cent for agriculture during 1985-89, as against 7.5 per cent for industry and 6.3 per cent for GDP. The pattern of Turkey's foreign trade reflects the gradual industrialisation of the Turkish economy, The value of Turkey's agricultural exports rose from an annual average of around $ 350 million during 1963-67 to just under 1,331 million in 1986. However, their share of total exports fell from nearly 80 per cent in 1963-67 to around 23 per cent in 1986. This swing is artificially exaggerated by the fact that the Turkish statisticians count a number of agricultural products as "industrial", on the grounds that they have gone through some sort of processing. Moreover, many of Turkey's industrial exports (such as textiles and pro­ cessed foodstuffs) rely on raw materials drawn from the agricultural sector. Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that the general problems in Turkey's relationship with the Community are less exclusively agricultural than they were in the early days of her association\vith the E C in the 1960s. This change has been enhanced by a substantial increase in Turkey's exports of both agri­ cultural and industrial products to non-EC markets — in particular, the oil-producing coun­ tries of the Middle East. In 1986, states ranked by the Turkish statistical sources as "Islamic Countries" bought almost 38 per cent of Turkey's total exports, as compared to only 9.3 per cent in 1975. 2

3

rules provide for observance of an import price, application of the preferential tariff shall be subject to observance of the price in question" and that the "gradual elimination of the customs duties actually applied by the Community to imports from Turkey shall not preju­ dice the principles and machinery of the common agricultural policy". The effect of this would appear to be that in the case of those products where the Community applies a threshold or sluicegate price, such as meat, cereals, olive oil and sugar products, imports from Turkey would continue to pay a variable levy sufficient to raise the tax-paid price to the internal Community level (in some cases, imports from Turkey were granted specified reductions of the levy). 6

7

Trends in Turkey's Agricultural Exports In the Additional Protocol of 1970, Turkey undertook to give preferential treatment to the Community's agricultural exports to Turkey. However, these are generally slight, and the following notes therefore concentrate on Turkey's agricultural exports. These can be divi­ ded into two categories, (a) "traditional" exports, consisting of hazelnuts, dried figs, rai­ sins, tobacco and cotton, which have in the past accounted for the vast majority of the total, and (b) other "non-traditional" items, for which overseas markets have only recently been developed. As the figures in Table 1 show, the share of traditional items in both total exports and the agricultural sub-total has declined substantially since the early 1970s.

4

Table I; Shares of traditional agricultural exports in total exports

Turkey's Agreements with the EC The basis of Turkey's relations with the Community is laid down in two agreements, sign­ ed in 1963 and 1970. The first of these, the Association Agreement, outlined a three-stage process by which Turkey was expected to achieve full membership of the Community by 1995. The second agreement, referred to as the Additional Protocol, specified the steps to be taken during the transitional stage which was to run from 1973 until 1980 (at the earliest) or 1995 (at the latest). 5

The main aim of the Additional Protocol was the gradual elimination of tariffs and other barriers to free trade between Turkey and the Community. In the case of agriculture, Turkey undertook to "adjust its agricultural policy with a view to adopting at the end of [the transi­ tional] period, those measures of the common agricultural policy which must be applied in Turkey if free movement of agricultural products between it and the Community is to be achieved" (Article 32). In return, the E C granted Turkey a preferential zero tariff rate on products representing about 37 per cent of its agricultural exports to the Community in 1973, and partial preference for products accounting for a further 33 per cent of the total. 10 per cent of the total was in any case zero rated under the Common Customs Tariff, so that only about 17 per cent enjoyed no tariff preference. These preferences were further enlarged by an Association Council decision of Septem­ ber 1980 under which fixed customs duties on all imports of agricultural products from Tur­ key were to be eliminated by 1 January, 1987. In the case of products paying a duty of less than 2 per cent the elimination was to be completed by 1 January, 1981. For other products, duties would be reduced to zero in successive "stages between the beginning of 1981 and 1987. The agreement added, however, that "for products in respect of which the Community 142

1972 $m

%A

%T

Hazelnuts Dried Fruit Cotton Tobacco

116 47 192 131

19.1 7.7 31.6 21.6

13.1 5.3 21.7 14.8

Sub-total Total Agric. Exports Total Exports

486 607 885

80.1

54.9 68.6

•

1985 $m

%A

%T

255 107 195 330

20.3 8.5 15.5 26.3

3,9 1.7 3.0 5.1

887 1,256 6,459

70.6

13.7 19.4

Notes: %A = as percentage of total agricultural exports; %T = as percentage of total exports; Totals may not add exactly, due to rounding. Source- OECD Economic Surveys: Turkey,(Paris O E C D , April 1982} p. 61; Türkiye 15 Bankası, Review of Economic Conditions, 1986/11, (Istanbul, 1982), p. 32

Table 2 shows the main destinations of Turkey's agricultural exports by commodities, du­ ring 1979-81. Several points are worth noting. (1) With the (insignificant) exception of wine and the (significant) one of hazelnuts, the dollar value of ail items increased between 1979 and 1981 — in many cases, by very substan­ tial margins. (2) Except for dairy products, cotton, wine and tobacco, where the combined Middle East + EC-10 share was less than 50 per cent in 1981, the Community and Middle Eastern markets took the vast majority of all items. (The low Middle East + EC-10 share in dairy products was largely accounted for by a $9.2 million sale of butter to the USSR in 1981, which may well prove a "one-off item. In tobacco, the USA has traditionally taken the 143

/ lion's share of exports, and will probably continue to do so. The C O M E C O N countries are also an important market for Turkey's raw cotton exports). (3) In the case of 13 of the 19 products listed, the Community's share of total exports fell between 1979 and 1981. Only 2 of the 6 exceptions were significant items in Turkey's export list — dried figs and raisins, where the Community's share of the market increased slightly, and tobacco, where it remained constant. The signs are that this trend is only a recent one: calculations published by Hans Gsanger show that the Community's share for most agricultural exports was still on the increase during the mid-1970s (1973-76). Those commodities showing the fastest rates of growth are non-traditional items, for which the Middle East has become by far the most important market. The following pattern thus emerges: Turkey's main exports to the Community consist of luxury foodstuffs (figs, raisins and hazelnuts) and industrial raw materials (raw cotton and tobacco) for which markets are relatively stagnant. On the other hand, exports of basic foodstuffs (meat, vegetables, fresh fruit and cereal products) have expanded fast, especially to the Middle East. It will be noted that it is in the latter items that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) tends to apply higher rates of protection. This pattern reflects the overall situation of agricultural markets in the two regions. In the Community, granted the already high nutritional standards and low population growth, the demand for most foodstuffs has been stagnant, or rising only slowly. (In the case of "filler" foods, like bread and potatoes, consumption has actually fallen.) Rising productivity on European farms and the protection afforded by the C A P has also restricted food imports from non-member countries. In the Middle Eastern oil-producing states both population and incomes have been rising fast. Domestic food production has failed to keep pace, so food imports have boomed. Its geographical position puts Turkey in a strong position to sell more perishable crops to the Middle East. On the other hand, the total population of this group of countries is still much lower than that of the Community. The result is that the market for luxury foodstuffs in the Middle East is far smaller than in the E C . Nor do the oil states have substantial markets for Turkey's exports of industrial raw materials such as cotton and tobacco.

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Turkey's Agricultural Exports to the Community

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Data on Turkey's sales of her traditional agricultural exports to the Community are shown in Table 3. In the cases of dried figs and hazelnuts, Turkey already accounts for the vast majority of imports from non-members. The Common Customs Tariff (CCT) duty on hazelnuts is 4 per cent (all figures quoted for customs duty rates are as of 1 January, 1981). Turkey is exempt from this for a quota of 25,000 tonnes; export^ in excess of this pay the full duty (in fact, as Table 3 shows, the quota is normally exceeded by a wide margin). Its only competitor in the European market is Italy which exported around 11,000 tonnes in 1980, or less than a sixth of Turkey's total. Elimination of duties might provide for some expansion of Turkey's exports at the expense of Italian producers, but prospects are limited by the slow growth of consumption and the fact that Turkey already has the lion's share of the market. In the case of dried figs the CCT duty varies between 7-10 per cent, though Turkey benefits from complete exemption for figs in packages of less than 15 kg and 30 per cent reduction of duty for larger packages. Turkey's only effective competitor is Greece, whose ani-

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Table 3: Turkey: "traditional" exports to EC-9, 1978-80 Commodity

080330 080431 080439/40 080593 240165 240169 550190 550210

Dried figs Raisins Shelled hazelnuts Oriental tobacco Raw cotton

Table 4: Turkey: "non-traditional" agricultural'elsgorts to EC-9

(3) (4) . (2) (1) Turkish ex(2) as % (1) Ave.annual % Total EC-9 change in (1) imports from ports to EC-9 1978 - 80 non-members, ave., 1978-80 ave., 1978-80 (000 tonnes) (000 tonnes) 24,8

21,2

85,5

-

3,0

(a)

Meat (total) Sheepmeat Vegetables Fresh fruit Citrus fruit Soft wheat Hard wheat Other cereals
211,2 77,4

63,2 73,5

29,9 94,9

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Source: N1MEXE, 1978, 1979, 1980.

mal exports to EC-9 run at about 3,000 tonnes per year (Turkey: 21,000 tonnes). Without the prospective tariff reductions, Greece's accession to the Community would enable it to expand exports at Turkey's expense, so the concessions agreed to in 1980 have some significance. On the other hand, total consumption in the Community appears to be fairly static, and Turkey already accounts for over 85 per cent of the EC-9 imports from nonmembers. In raisins, Turkey's exports to EC-9 are generally exceeded by those of Greece, but Turkey already benefits from complete exemption from the CCT tariff of 4 per cent. The only other significant exporter to EC-9 is the USA. Granted Greece's accession, and the slow growth of consumption, it seems unlikely that Turkey can increase exports significantly, though it should be able to maintain the present level. ' In tobacco, Turkey is a specialist producer, since Turkish tobacco is nearly all of the "oriental" variety which has a minority share of the market. As we have already seen, the USA is Turkey's most important customer; however, the Community, especially W. Germany, is also a major buyer, taking around 20-24 per cent of Turkey's exports. In recent years, prices of oriental tobacco have been weak, due to over-production in Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia as well as Turkey. The Turkish authorities are now trying to reduce overall production and concentrate on growing high-quality leaf. On the other hand, the Community imports around three quarters of its total consumption from non-members, and imposes a high rate of duty under the external tariff (13-23 per cent), according to variety, plus a levy varying from UA 28-70 per 100 kg. Turkey enjoys complete exemption from the CCT duties, which has enabled it to expand its market share^t the expense of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and protects it against the advantages which Greece, its main competitor, would otherwise gain by accession. It may be able to continue this process in the future and it would undoubtedly gain enormously if it was able to produce Virgina varieties, granted that these account for over two-thirds of the Community's total imports, and that competitive producers have to surmount a high tariff barrier. The generally dominant role of the Middle Eastern market for Turkey's exports of other agricultural products should not obscure the fact that some of the items which Turkey has only recently begun to export on a large scaleNare of potential importance in its relations with the Community. Trends for the most important commodity groups are shown in Table 4. 10

1

12

146

(1) Ave. imports by EC-9, 1975-79 (000 tonnes)

Commodity

1,303^ 2 5 9

fi»

2,899 4,083 4,065 4,239 1,154 19,405

(d)

° (2) Ave. Turkish exports to EC-9 1978-79 (000 tonnes)

(3) (2) as % (1)

2.9 nil 4.5 6.4 10.3 290.2 199.5 70.3

0.2 nil 0.2 0.2 0.3 6.8 17.3 0.4

(4) Ave. selfsufficiency of EC-9 1975-79 (%) 96

w

640» 93 77 40 106 84 76

Notes: (a) From non-members; (b) 1976-79; (c) excluding citrus; (d) 1977/8-1978/9; (e) excluding rice. Sources: E C data from Commission of the European Communities, The Agricultural Situation in the Community, 1981 Report; data on Turkish exports from State Institute of Statistics, Ankara.

The recent sharp increase in meat exports (almost all of which consist of live animals) shown in the data in Table 2 is exaggerated by the fact that, until recently, there was an enormous amount of smuggling of animals into neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, the growth in trade is impressive. Thanks to Muslim dietary rules, meat is generally transported on the hoof from the point of production to the point of consumption. As a result, central and eastern Anatolia, which are the main livestock-raising regions in Turkey and are at the same time relatively close to consumption centres in Iraq, Iran and Syria, have an important advantage over producers in other meat-exporting countries. Turkey's export trade thus tends to flow south and east, rather than westwards to the Community. On the Community side, meat and dairy products represent a now notorious case of high protection and over-production. In spite of the surplus of beef, veal and milk, however, the Community is a major importer of mutton, in which output only reaches about two-thirds of consumption. Potentially this could be an important opportunity for Turkey, since sheep account for the vast majority of present exports. The Community's present sheep meat regime is, however, a complicated one, and limits the potential of Turkish exporters. For the time being it is likely that the Turks will continue to take the easier course of cultivating the market among their fellow Muslims. At the same time, Turkish data suggest that livestock herds have recently been in decline, thanks to relatively low prices compared to farmers' costs. This trend has to be set against a rising domestic demand for meat, and indicates that unless government agricultural policies are changed, future meat exports may be severely affected by supply constraints. Exports of fresh fruit and vegetables are subject to similar geographical considerations, due to the importance of rapid transport from producer to consumer. Turkey now has an important export trade in apples and tomatoes, for instance, but almost all of it goes to the Middle East and North Africa. Moreover, with Spain's accession, the Community will acquire a substantial surplus of tomatoes and other fresh vegetables, so that Turkey's relatively small exports of these crops to the E C will probably be eliminated. On the other hand, sales to the Community of dried vegetables (onions, chickpeas, beans, lentils, etc.) are substantial and rising fast (from $26 million in 1979 to $59 million in 1981). Exports of early season vegetables to Europe could also expand since this is a market in which nearby countries (such as Cyprus and Israel) have achieved success. 147

Turkey's output of citrus has grown fast and exports have increased pari passu (from 110000 tonnes in 1978 to 286000 tonnes in 1981). Until recently the C O M E C O N countries bought the vast majority of citrus exports, but their position has to some extent been taken over by the Middle East, which now accounts for about 80 per cent of exports of oranges, and about a quarter of mandarins. The Community buys a substantial quantity of lemons, but only takes about 9 per cent of total citrus exports. Citrus crops are the only major fruits in which the Community is notably deficient. About 80 per cent of imports from outside the nine come from Spain. The CCT tariff varies from 4 to 20 per cent according to the season, with tariff reductions applied to Turkey of 50-100 per cent. The elimination of import duties for Turkey's exports should be of value: however, with Spain's accession to full Community membership, the E C could become a net exporter of citrus fruits, so that Turkey's long-term prospects of increasing its small share of the market do not seem bright. Finally, cereals remain as the most imponderable item on the Turkish exports list. The essence of the problem can be stated as follows: Turkey is among the world's ten biggest cereals producers, with the total annual crop officially put at around 24-26 million tonnes in 1981¬ 84. The official data is widely regarded as unreliable: it is thought that the actual figure is somewhat below this. Nevertheless it seems reasonable to suppose that Turkey produces annually somewhere between 22 and 25 million tonnes of cereals, or around 15-16 million tonnes of wheat. Per capita consumption of wheat is particularly high, being put at 200 kg per year, according to a current estimate by the State Planning Organisation. In some years, Turkey has been able to make small wheat exports, balanced in other years by small imports. In other words, it would appear that supply and demand are currently in rough balance. The likely importance of cereals in Turkey's agricultural trade with the Community derives from the fact that although the area under wheat grew by only about 12 per cent between 1970 and 1983 (remaining virtually constant after 1975), the yield per hectare increased by around 3.9 per cent per annum. On the other hand, the population growth rate has fallen from à peak of over 2.8 per cent per annum in the late 1950s to 2.4 per cent per annum between 1975 and 1985. Assuming that these trends continue, then Turkey should have a larger surplus for export by the 1990s. The certainty of this prospect is however brought into question by the fact that meat consumption in Turkey is rising far faster than that of wheat. Moreover, as we have seen, Turkey has built up a substantial export trade in meat — mainly live sheep. Currently, most animals are fed on straw, rather than specially grown fodder, during the winter. However, an increase in stall-feeding with fodder crops would allow a substantial improvement in the quality of the animals as well as an increase in numbers. In the Community, about 60 per cent of the consumption of cereals is accounted for by animal feed, 33 per cent by human consumption, and the remainder by seed. No recent comparable estimates seem to be available for Turkey, but if we assume that most wheat is grown for human consumption and other grains (except rice) for animals, then we can assume that the proportions are roughly the reverse of those of the Community — around 66 per cent for human food and the remainder for fodder. The rising demand for meat in Turkey is likely to bring the proportions more towards the Community average. In these circumstances, farmers may be encouraged by the relative prices of wheat and meat to reduce the wheat acreage so as to retain a rough balance between internal supply and demand, eliminating the possibility of regular export surpluses. As already indicated, such a switch will be desirable anyway, granted recent trends in the domestic supply and demand for meat. 13

14

15

16

148

V. Implications of Community Membership for Agriculture The foregoing notes have concentrated oncurrent prospects, purely in the light of existing agreements. To assess possibilities within the perspective of Turkey's possible membership of the Community is a great deal more difficult — not least, because it is unlikely that Turkish industry would be capable of withstanding the cold winds of unhampered competition from Western Europe before about the end of this century. The present Turkish government appears to be ready to accept such a time-scale even assuming that its expected application for membership of the Community meets with a reasonably positive response from the present member states. By this stage, Community agricultural policy may well have been adapted to changing circumstances. Quite possibly, the degree of protection offered to Community farmers may have been scaled down by the mid-1990s, but one cannot assume that this will be so. In these circumstances, one's prognostications have to be highly speculative. It will be borne in mind that Turkish accession would involve Turkey allowing free entry for the Community's agricultural exports. It seems unlikely that Turkey would become a major importer of basic foodstuffs from the Community, but there might well be a market for imported food and drink at the luxury end of the market. Imported goods of any description have an immense snob value in Turkey, and one could imagine that prosperous Turkish families might get through impressive quantities of champagne, Scotch whisky and tinned coq-au-vin, given free trade with Western Europe. Apart from this, the Turkish government has recently permitted some imports of meat and vegetables from the Community — mainly in an effort to hold down prices for domestic consumers. However, it remains doubtful that such imports will become a major item in Turkey's total agricultural trade. On the positive side, it has to be said that integration into the Community could bring substantial financial benefits to Turkey. To put the case very crudely, a country with a large export trade in agricultural products can only gain by winning privileged access to a protected market — both in terms of the potential addition to the volume and value of exports, and the stimulus to greater agricultural production. At the same time, application of the CAP by Turkey would post some very serious problems, granted that it would almost certainly mean a sharp and substantial rise in food prices vis-a-vis those of other goods and services. Food accounts for a far higher proportion of the monthly expenditure of poor families than of the rich, so that this change would tend to worsen the already serious problem of real income distribution. It can also be predicted that if the present disparity between world and Community prices is maintained, then the application of the CAP would mean a very substantial injection of cash into the Turkish countryside. Many Turks (and not just those with vested interests in agriculture) would quite probably argue that this would be a welcome trend, that industry in Turkey has been over-protected at the expense of the consumer, and that insufficient money and other resources have been devoted to agriculture. On the other hand, it is far from certain that a crude increase in agricultural prices would be the best way of improving the situation. Within the Community, the present high price structure is just sufficient to keep poorer farmers in less favoured regions in business, but allows high profits for those with efficient farms in fertile and easily cultivable districts. In the Turkish case one could imagine that a similar effect would be produced, with the strengthening of existing regional disparities in income between eastern and western Anatolia. 149

—3»

Possibly, some of these problems could be avoided if, for instance, state purchasing agencies, which already exist for most agricultural products, were given monopoly rights to buy and export those products for which the CAP aims to maintain a target price. These agencies would then buy at the (relatively low) domestic price and either sell at the (high) Community price on the E C market, or to third countries. In the latter case, the agency concerned would benefit from the existing system of export "restitution", by collecting a refund from the Community to cover the difference between the world price and the Community price. The effect of this would be to hold down the prices paid to Turkish farmers and by Turkish consumers. The profits made by the agencies could then be invested in agricultural development projects. It is, however, very hard to see how such a scheme could be put into effect, without drastic alteration of the present Community rules. It would, for instance, run directly counter to the general principle that agricultural prices should be roughly equal throughout the Community, barring transport costs. Granting a state agency such monopoly rights would also vitiate the present principle that private traders and farmers are completely free to sell any product within the Community. Customs controls would have to be maintained, to prevent traders smuggling products from Turkey to the rest of EC. Nor is there any guarantee that the state will reinvest its profits in worthwhile agricultural projects, and not divert the funds to, say, covering a deficit in the general budget. i f we assume that such a strict state purchasing scheme could not be made to work in Turkey, and that prices would rise to Community levels if Turkey joined the E C , then serious problems could be created. At present, most basic foodstuffs are relatively cheap in Turkey and industrial wages are correspondingly low. The relative cheapness of labour helps Turkish industry to overcome the disadvantages of low labour productivity, high capital costs, difficulties of transport and the like. To preserve some degree of social justice, industrial wages would have to rise to allow for higher food prices. This, in turn, would erode the competitiveness of Turkish industry just when it would need to keep its costs low to cope with free competition from Western European industry. In other words, full application of the CAP could intensify, rather than reduce, the problems of industry in Turkey. For the Community, the main problem posed by Turkey's possible accession can be simply stated: how great a burden would Turkish agriculture be to Community funds for price support? The answer largely depends on the state of the Community price regime at the time of Turkish accession. However, it has to be remembered that at the moment a major part of the Guarantee Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) is spent on commodities produced in the northern countries of the Community — in particular, beef, cereals and milk products. Most of Turkey's exports are in the "Mediterranean" category — such as fruits, vegetables, tobacco and obtton, which receive relatively little support. This imbalance is a constant source of dispute within the Community, but it does reduce the potential cost of Turkish accession. In the case of agricultural products of which the present member states are not major producers, the E C operates a straightforward system of ad valorem import duties. This covers a substantial proportion of Turkey's present exports to the Community — in particular, dried fruits and nuts. Since the duties on these products are to be eliminated anyway by the beginning of 1987, Turkey's accession would not produce any additional burden for Community funds, or extra advantages to Turkish producers. This leaves us with the potential problem posed by those commodities for which full Community intervention applies. O f 150

these, wheat is easily the most serious, granted that the entry price exceeded the world price during 1976-80 by a ratio of 1.6-2.9:1 for soft wheat and 1.6-2.4:1 for hard wheat. Recent projections suggest that, by 1989, the E C will hVe an annual grain surplus of around 15 million tonnes. It is not clear whether this surplus is expected to include hard wheat: even if it does, however, it is likely that if Turkey follows its own "wheat surplus" strategy, then it will export substantial quantities of wheat to the Middle East. In this case, wheat traders (either state or private) will be entitled to claim considerable sums in export rebates from EAGGF. Support for other commodities will probably be less critical than for wheat, but adding the different items together, could amount to a fairly substantial amount. The main products involved are tobacco, cotton, sheepmeat and some fruit and vegetables. Fortunately for the Community, several products which enjoy high rates of protection under the CAP, such as beef, dairy products and pork, are not major items on the Turkish export list nor are they likely to be. In 1981, expenditures for tobacco, and fruit and vegetables accounted for 3 per cent and 6 per cent respectively of total expenditures from the Guarantee Section of EAGGF, but these proportions would probably rise if Turkey joined the Community since it is an important producer of both these crops. For geographical and religious reasons mentioned earlier it is likely that the Middle East would remain Turkey's most important market lor sheep. Even so, if the continental sheepmeat regime were applied to Turkey, then Turkish traders could also make substantial claims on Community funds, in the form of export refunds, assuming domestic meat production picks up. The extra burden placed on intervention funds is made more serious by the fact that Turkey would have large claims on Community resources for aid to backward areas. On the other hand, Turkey's contributions to the Community budget are likely to be limited by the fact that its imports of agricultural products are very low and likely to remain so. As a relatively poor country, its payments under the Value Added Tax rate will probably be slight. In other words, Turkey is likely to be a net gainer from the budget — a benefit to itself but an extra cost to the Community. Turkish officials and politicians are generally anxious to emphasise to their Western European colleagues that the expectation of payments under these headings is not the major reason for their decision to apply for Community membership, and to minimise the likely costs to taxpayers in the present Community states. Nevertheless, the prospect is that if the Community's present programmes for regional and agricultural support remain in place unaltered, then substantial costs could well be incurred. l7

18

To sum the discussion up, are the agricultural costs such as to undermine or destroy the argument for Turkish accession? It is likely that the answer hinges on the degree to which each side is willing to adapt. For the Community, a negative answer will probably rest on the assumption that the CAP is incapable of reform (in spite of numerous attempts to do so) and that Turkey's accession would therefore be too costly. A positive answer will be based on the proposal that the CAP should be, and can be, reformed anyway, and that this will, incidentally, make it easier to accept Turkish membership. There is a parallel case on the Turkish side, in the industrial sphere. Turkish anti-marketeers argue that Turkish industry can never be made sufficiently efficient to compete with Western Europe, and Turkey should therefore remain outside the Community. Pro-marketeers take the opposite line, that Turkish industry must be made internationally competitive anyway, that industries incapable of surviving without protection should be run down, and that this will incidentally make it easier for Turkey to become a full member of the EC. As so often, the question is likely to turn on political will, rather than pure economics. 151

Chapter 9

Notes

1

V. Bes Yıllık Kalkınma Planı, 1985-1989 (Ankara, State Planning Organisation, 1984), p. 96: Summary of Agricultural Statistics, 1984 (Ankara, State Institute of Statistics, 1986), p. 2. 2 William Hale, The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey (London: Croom Helm, 1981) p. 130; other data from Economic Press Agency, Ankara. 3 V. Bes Yıllık Kalkınma Planı, op.cit., p. 8. 4 For more detailed statistical information, see Chapter 9, Tables 1 and 2. 5 Texts of the Association Agreement and Additional Protocol appear in Official Journal of the European Communities, Information and Notices, Vol. 16, no. C 113, 24 December 1983. Statistical data from Turkey-EEC Relations, 1963-77 (Ankara: Office of the Commission of the European Communities, 1977) p. 70. 6 Decision no. i/80 of the Turkey-EEC Association Council of 19 September 1980, Arts 2-3. 7 For details see Mustafa Renksizbulut, Türkiye Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu Ortaklığında Tarım Tâviz­ leri, 1981 (istanbul: iktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı, n.d.). 8 Hans Gsänger, Turkey-European Community: National Development Policy and the Process of Rappro­ chement (Berlin: German Development Institute, 1979) p. 72. 9 ilbay Levent, "La situation du commerce extérieur de la Turquie avec la C E E entre 1970-1979, et ana­ lyse des effects de l'enlargissement sur les produits clés exportes par la Turquie vers la C E E " (Luxem­ burg, Direction Statistique de la C E E , mimeo, n.d.) p. 28. 10 Ibid., p. 33. 11 ibid., p. 29. 12 Ibid., pp. 35-36. See also Gülten Kazgan, "Agricultural Exports to the E C " İn Osman Okyar and Okan H . Aktan, eds., Economic Relations between Turkey and the EEC (Ankara: Hacettepe University, 1976), pp. 332-33. 13 Levent, op.cit., p. 39. 14 Summary of Agricultural Statistics, p. 3. 15 Ibid. 16 The Agricultural Situation in the Community, 1983 Report (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 1982) p. 36. 17 Guidelines for European Agriculture: Memorandum to Complement the Commission's Report of the Mandate of 30 May 1980, (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, mimeo, 1981), Annex 6. 18 Data for 1981, from ibid., pp. 34, 38. Chapter 8.

f

\

152

William Hale

Turkish Industry and the Common Market*

introduction The military regime which governed Turkey between September 1980 and December 1983 proclaimed on several occasions that, once democratic government had been restored, Turkey would submit an application for rapid accession to Community membership. In the election campaign of 1983, Mr. Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party appeared to soft-pedal the idea of immediate membership. Following the Motherland Party's election victory, Mr. Ozal's government programme mentioned full membership only as an "ultimate aim": in the meantime, he announced "we shall act in a spirit of considering the balance of interests as a basis at all stages".' However, by the beginning of 1987, Ozal's government appeared to be sufficiently satisfied by the economic progress it had made to be preparing to submit a formal application for membership during that year. On the other hand, the government, as well as the Turkish business community, evidently realised that the process of negotia­ tion would be a long one, and that time would be needed to prepare the Turkish economy for accession. In fact, the year 2000 was usually mentioned as the earliest date at which this could be achieved — even assuming all the other obstacles, both political and economic, could be overcome. This chapter has therefore been prepared on the assumption that Turkey will eventually wish to accede to full membership of the E C , but not until there appears to be a reasonable chance that its industry will be able to cope with free competition from western Europe. It has been assumed that the transitional stage of Turkey's progress towards accession will be with us for some years to come, and that its industry will therefore have some time to make the adjustments which will be required. The first section of this chapter outlines the role of industry in Turkey's economy gene­ rally, and particularly in foreign trade. The second section changes to a historical approach, by examining the main features of agreements between Turkey and the Community which affect trade in industrial products. In the third section, the prospects for Turkish industry in the light of existing agreements with the Community are discussed. This approach rests on the assumption that Turkey's accession would have a far greater impact on Turkish industry than that of the Community as a whole, and that it is at the Turkish end of this alignment that problems are most likely to occur.

* This Chapter is a revised version of the author's paper, "Turkish Industry and the EEC", published in Orient, 26. Jahrgang (no. 2, Juni 1985), pp. 168-180.

153

Table 1: Structure of Foreign Trade, 1973-86

Turkish industry and its role in foreign trade By the 1980s, Turkey could be classified as an inward-oriented newly-industrialising country: that is to say that its economy had moved away from the stage of total dependence on agriculture or other primary production, although its industry had not achieved the size or sophistication of the advanced industrialised states. On the other hand, industrial development policies had traditionally had an extreme degree of inward-orientation: in other words, Turkish industry had long been sheltered by high tariff barriers and quota restrictions on imports, and the goods it produced were mostly destined for the internal market with lhtTe regard for their international competitiveness. It is these two facts which constitute the crux of the problem of Turkey's economic relations with the E C in the industrial sphere. Since 1983, the Ozal government has taken important steps to liberalise the import regime, and to open up Turkish industry to international competition However, balance of payments constraints, as well as the technological backwardness of parts 01 mrKisn muusu^, have held back the rate at which this can be done. By Western European standards, the Turkish economy remains a relatively protected one, especially in the field of industrial products. v

Turkey's industrialisation effectively began during the 1930s with the development of simple consumer goods industries mainly processing home-produced raw materials, such as sugar, textiles, paper, cement and glass. Later, basic heavy industries such as iron, steel and some chemicals were added to the list. This process was extended and broadened during the post-war years so that, by the early 1960s, Turkey had obtained a fairly high degree of self-sufficiency in most of these products. During the next two decades, what might be called second generation import-replacement began: that is to say that Turkish industry expanded into technologically more sophisticated fields, such as chemicals, plastics, light and heavy engineering, and electronics. The overall effect of these changes was to raise industry's share of G N P from around 13 per cent in 1950 to just under 32 per cent by 1984. It has to be said that, on the whole the first stage of industrialisation proved more successful than the second. By the 1970s, firms producing textiles, leather goods, glass and construction materials had required substantial protection from overseas competition, so that their development did offer a pragmatic support for the "infant industries" argument for protectionism. The second generation industries, however, (as well as some of those of the first generation, such as basic metals) seemed some way from achieving this; in fact, some observers doubted whether these infant industries would ever manage to get up out of their prams, and stand on their own two feet, without either subsidies or high tariff protection. Over the last ten years, two important shifts in Turkey's foreign trade pattern have occurred: firstly, a significant increase in the share of manufactured goods in exports and, secondly, a significant rise in the share of other Middle Eastern countries in total foreign trade. These points are illustrated in Tables 1 and 2. Until the late 1960s, agricultural products (such as hazelnuts, dried fruit, cotton and tobacco) accounted for almost 80 per cent of total exports. Since then, however, Turkey has become an internationally competitive producer in those industries where the production technology is relatively simple and where the relative cheapness of labour is an important advantage. As an example, it has begun to export more textiles and ready made clothing in place of raw cotton. These products, besides leather goods, carpets, glassware and cement have now become important export items. Taken together, industrial products now account for over 70 per cent of total exports. 154

1963-7 Total Exports ($ra) of which: Agricultural (%) Mining (%) Industrial (%) Total imports ($m) of which: Crude Oil (%)


451 79.3 4.0 16.7 640 9.3

\

1973-7

(a)

1,684 60.1 5.6 34.2 4,305 22.3

1980

1983

Í986í

2,910 57.5 6.6 26.0 7,667 47.8

5,728 32.8 3.3 63.9 9,235 37.2

5,907 23.0 3.0 74.0 9,001 17

b)

Note: (a) Annual averages; (b) January - October. Sources: William Hale, The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 232-33; other data from Economic Press Agency, Ankara. Table 2: Foreign Trade by Region, 1975-86, per cent 1975 Region EEC Other O E C D Islamic Countries (Gulf Countries) Other Countries

1979 Exp.

Imp.

Exp.

Imp.

49.3 - 24.5 16.3 (13.1) 9.9

43.9 26.4 9.3 ( 6.3) 14.1

36.0 24.4 20.4 (15.2) 19.2

48.5 15.5 11.5 ( 6.4) 24.5

1982

1986 Exp.

Imp

Exp.

Imp.

27.9 22.2 43.0 (30.6) 6.9

30.5 13.9 47.9 (32.6) 7.7

41.4 23.9 19.2 (10.9) 15.5

43.5 11.8 37.5 (21.8) 7.2

Sources: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 7979(Ankara, DIE), pp. 325-26; Statistical Pocket Book ofTurkey, 1982 (Ankara, DIE), pp. 208-11; Economic Press Agency, Ankara. Data for 1986 are for January - October.

As Table 2 shows, the direction of foreign trade has also altered significantly in recent years. In the immediate post-war period, the United States was easily Turkey's most important trading partner. During the 1950s and 1960s, however, the lead was taken over by the countries of Western Europe ~~ in particular West Germany. In 1974 the E C member states supplied some 45 per cent of Turkey's imports, and bought almost 47 per cent of its exports. A second shift then began after the oil price explosion; the rising cost of oil and Turkey's growing oil imports led to a significant rise in the Middle Eastern countries' share of total imports. During the early 1980s the same countries also emerged as major customers for Turkey's exports, as Turkish firms began to capture Middle Eastern markets for consumer and intermediate goods. Since 1982, this trend has reversed, primarily due to the fall in oil prices, as well as the Iran-Iraq war, which has restricted the civilian imports of the two belligerent countries. As a result, the Community's share in Turkey's total foreign trade has recovered, underlining the point that Western Europe offers far more stable economic and political conditions than those in the Middle East. The fact remains, however, that the last twelve years have witnessed diversification of Turkey's foreign trade, both geographical, and in terms of the commodities traded.

155

Historical conspectus Agreements between Turkey and the Community: The Additional Protocol

The basic aim of the Additional Protocol of 1970, which was negotiated as part of the pathway laid down by the Association Agreement between Turkey and the E C of 1963, was the eventual establishment of a customs union. In reaching this agreement, both sides acted on the assumption that Turkish industry was not competitive with that of the Community, with a few exceptions; in other words, that the Community could afford to allow Turkey immediate free entry for alMfiit a few of her industrial products, whereas Turkey could only reciprocate in stagesfAt the time, only about one sixth of Turkey's exports to the Community could be clearly defined as industrial products; on the other hand, all but a tiny proportion of its imports from the E C was made up of manufactured goods. Accordingly, under Article 9 of the Protocol, the Community undertook that immediately on its entry into force on 1 January 1973, it would abolish all customs duties "and charges having equivalent effect" on imports from Turkey. In the event, this reduction was implemented fifteen months early, in September 1971. From the beginning, however, certain exceptions were made. In the first place, the Community retained the right to charge import duties on some oil products, over a fixed quota, and secondly, to implement a phased rather than immediate reduction of duties on imports of three textile products: cotton yarn not put up for retail sale, some woven cotton fabrics, and machine-made wool carpets. These were all products in which Turkish industry was already competitive, and in which Western European firms were feeling the pinch of Third-World competition. Article 24 provided that the Community would also abolish all quantitative restrictions on imports from Turkey. This concession was "consolidated"; that is to say, that the Community undertook not to reintroduce such restrictions in its trade with Turkey. In this case one minor exception was made in the case of silk-worm cocoons and raw silk. 2

3

4

5

For its part, Turkey undertook three basic commitments affecting its imports of industrial goods from the Community: firstly, to reduce duties and other charges on imports in measured stages; secondly, to widen the quota allocations gradually in favour of E C exporters; and thirdly, to adopt the Common Customs Tariff (CCT) of the Community, again in stages. The first two of these commitments foresaw the eventual removal of all tariff and quota restrictions on imports from the Community, while the third provided for almost free trade with the rest of the world, granted that the CCT duties on most industrial products remain very low. In fixing the timetable for tariff reductions by Turkey, its imports from the E C were divided into two lists. Those products in which it was thought that Turkey could achieve international competitiveness relatively early were placed on the 12-year list, so that duties on imports from the Community would be reduced to zero by 1985. Other products were put on a 22-year list, for which a customs union would not be achieved until 1995. To protect its infant industries, Turkey was allowed to move goods from the 12-year to the 22-year list, but only within fixed limits and within an 8-year period (1973-81). Apart from this, it was obliged to reduce other taxes, such as municipal levies which had the same effect as customs duties in accordance with the timetable. Customs duties "of a fiscal nature" could either be reduced, or replaced with an internal tax which did not discriminate between imported and home-produced goods. 6

156

The Additional Protocol also provided for the gradual removal of quota restrictions on Turkey's imports from the Community. A stated list of goods was to be placed by the Turkish authorities on what is known as the " E C Consolidated Liberalisation List" so that imports of these goods would be made relatively freely. From 1 September 1971, this was to include goods accounting for 35 per cent of Turkey's total imports from the Community, as of 1967. This proportion was to increase in successive stages, to reach 80 per cent by 1991. Since the Protocol envisaged the establishment of a full customs union by 1995, all quota restrictions would be eliminated by that date. The third main commitment undertaken in the Additional Protocol was the gradual adoption by Turkey of the Community's Common Customs Tariff (CCT). As in the case of the reduction of customs duties, a distinction was made between goods included in the 12-year and 22-year lists. Finally, we cannot leave the Additional Protocol without noticing that it had a potentially painful string in its tail. Article 47 contained an anti-dumping provision (though it did not say how "dumping" was to be defined). If either party decided that dumping was being practised by the other then it could, as a last resort, levy anti-dumping duties on the products concerned for a maximum of three months. Article 60 provided still wider scope for potential interruption of the process of liberalisation in that it stated that " i f serious disturbances occur in a section of the Turkish economy or prejudice its external financial stability, or if difficulties arise which adversely affect the economic situation in a region of Turkey, Turkey may take the necessary protective measures". Reciprocal rights were granted to the Community states. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Article 60 provides something of a catch-all loophole. The Association Council was to be notified of measures taken under this Article, but it did not have to agree to them. In effect, either party was able to put its own definition to phrases like "serious disturbances in a sector of the economy" or "prejudice external financial stability". If they wished to, both sides could ignore all the other commitments they had entered into, without breaking the letter of the Additional Protocol. 7

The implementation of the Agreements, 1973-86 During the first four years of the transitional period (1973-76), implementation of the Additional Protocol went ahead pretty much as planned. Turkey reduced its duties on products in the 12-year and 22-year lists by 10 per cent and 5 per cent respectively in September 1971, 15 months ahead of the date originally specified in the Additional Protocol. In accordance with the timetable, Turkey implemented a second round of tariff reductions in January 1976. In the relaxation of quota restrictions, the initial transfer of goods to the E C Consolidated Liberalisation List, which took place in September 1971, accounted for only about 31 per cent of Turkey's imports in 1967 from the Community as of January 1973, since it was calculated on the basis of imports from the Six rather than the Nine. However, this proportion was lifted to 40 per cent in accordance with the timetable, in January 1976. After 1976, however, the Turkey-EC relationship ran into serious problems. On the Turkish side, the economy was beset by chronic inflation, an enormous deficit in the balance of payments, and mounting foreign debts. Fragile coalition governments followed one another with dizzying rapidity, and the rising tide of political violence, strikes and energy 157

shortages crippled industrial output. In short, it seemed just the wrong time to open Turkish industry to the cold winds of further competition from Western Europe. In the Community, the two oil crises of 1973-74 and 1978-80 plunged the industrialised countries into a lengthy recession. During the period of sustained growth, the Community governments had been able to adopt a fairly openhanded policy towards the developing countries, such as Turkey. In the recession, however, cattTibr protectionism naturally become louder, They were especially strong in the textiles sector — a labour-intensive industry which was always likely to be vulnerable in the high-wage economies of the West. Between 1973 and 1980 the Community's textile and clothing industry shed about a quarter of its workforce: production stagnated, exports increased slightly, but imports more than doubled. The result of this deterioration was that, after 1977, the process of implementing the Additional Protocol came to a virtual standstill: if anything it slipped backwards. In January 1977, Turkey postponed the first step of its scheduled tariff alignment with the Common Customs Tariff. One year later, it also postponed the third round of tariff reductions, to be followed by further rounds which have been due since then. Instead of proceeding down the staircase agreed to in the Additional Protocol, the liberalisation process has, in effect, got stuck on the first landing. Meanwhile, the Community began to impose new restrictions on Turkey's exports of textiles and ready-made clothing as from 1978. Quota limitations and special customs levies have been continued, in various forms since then. Turkey has periodically replied with retaliatory restrictions on imports of iron, steel and plastic products from the EC. Since the Community imposed these quotas under the "emergency powers" granted in Article 60 of the Additional Protocol, there was little Turkey could do about them but protest. The retaliatory import surcharges seem to have had little effect in softening Western European attitudes. As a Community official bluntly put it: "The textile lobby is so much stronger than the Turkey lobby, we are just going to keep beating them on the head until they agree [presumably, to voluntary restraint]. But it might get quite unpleasant first". On the Turkish side, it was pointed out that such restrictions were quite contrary to the spirit of the Additional Protocol, and that some Western European industries, such as those exporting textile machinery and dyestuffs, have benefitted substantially from the expansion of the Turkish textiles industry. Turkey felt it was unfair to expect it to agree to restrain its exports, since this was putting it in the same category as countries like Hong Kong or Taiwan, which were not candidates for ultimate E C membership. There was quite wide-spread suspicion in Turkey that restrictions were being imposed for political rather than economic reasons, so that the argument became further confused by reference to such issues as the freezing of the Community's aid programme to Turkey after the military takeover of 12 Sep¬ . tember 1980, or Turkey's possible exclusion from the Council of Europe. In short, the relationship between Turkey and the Community had become botrl bitter and complex. Since 1983, relations have improved —- partly because the continued recovery of the Turkish economy has increased confidence on both sides, and partly because the gradual (though far from complete) démocratisation of the Turkish political system has tended to reduce political objections to a closer association on the part of Western European politicians. Nevertheless, the rather unhappy experiences of the late 1970s are bound to strengthen the misgivings felt by many in Western Europe as the prospective Turkish application for membership looms up. 8

Turkish Industry and its Prospects, in the Light of the Turkish-EEC relationship General factors affecting the competitiveness of Turkish industry 1. The resource base In general terms it can be said that Turkey's natural resource base is a reasonably wide and generous one. There are reserves of most of the main industrial minerals. The most serious shortfall is in energy. Turkey's oil reserves are small and production only meets about 14 per cent of consumption." There are some reserves of hard coal, but substantial deposits of lignite and a large hydroelectric potential. Although power supplies have improved in the last few years, the difficulty and expense of bringing non-oil energy resources on stream in the short run, plus the general shortfall of generating capacity has made power cuts and high electricity prices a bugbear for manufacturers. The fact that many valuable mineral deposits are located in remote regions adds to transport costs, and thus the delivered cost to industry. Turkey also produces a wide variety of agricultural raw materials, most notably cotton, tobacco, sugar beet, and fruits and vegetables. In human resources there is, as one might expect, no shortage of unskilled labour: skilled labour is in shorter supply, but here is a strong artisanal tradition in Turkey, and educational standards are reasonably high, compared with most developing countries. In general, Turks have shown that they can adapt fairly quickly to the demands of modern industry. The geographical location of their country, between two important consumption centres in Western Europe and the Middle East, is also an important bonus for the development of ex"5 port industries. 2. Labour costs

9

10

158

-

Such international comparisons as are available tend to show that Turkish labour costs are well below those of western Europe, but above those of South Asia or the Far East. A l though exact relative calculations of real wages are very hard to make, it seems fairly clear that Turkey's labour intensive industries seem the more likely to survive the rigours of freer competition with Western Europe. As the figures in Table 3 show, industries such as furniture-making, textiles, made-up garments and leather goods employ a good deal more labour per T L billion of output than most other sectors. These industries have also achieved the greatest success in external markets (expressed in this case as net exports, by value, as a percentage of total output).' Granted, however, that East Asian countries appear to have lower wage rates than Turkey, it seems unlikely that Turkish industry can rely entirely on relatively cheap labour as a means of overcoming other cost disadvantages. As a recent report of a special committee of experts of the Turkish State Planning Organisation suggests, "Turkey's comparative advantage is neither in highly labour-intensive products, nor those with a very low labour intensivity. Rather, it lies in a very wide group of products which are skill-intensive, in between these two extremes. At the same time, Turkey's closeness to Europe, the Middle East and North Africa provides an advantage for the export of goods which have a comparatively high weight-to-value ratio". 2

13

159

Table 3: Employment per TL billion of output, 1979, and net exports, 1982 Sector x

Furniture Made-up garments Textiles Fabricated metal products Leather goods Non-electrical machines Electrical machines' Rubber products Paper Vehicles Basic metals Petroleum products (c>

Employment per T L bn. of output (1979)

Net exports, as % of output (1982)

1,803 1,468 1,063 1,044 1,011 859 699 676 653 579 480 203

10.8 . 41.1 14.5 - 22.9 16.0 -118.0 - 61.5 7.2 - 17.8 - 19.3 - 13.6 0.04



Notes: (a) Exports minus imports by value. Minus figure = net imports; (b) includes all textiles, yarn and carpets; (c) includes ferrous and non-ferrous metals. Source: World Bank, and author's own calculations.

For some years before 1980, high costs in the state sector were masked by the fact that the government held down the prices of its products, and then made good the losses the enterprises incurred, mainly by means of loans from the Central Bank. However, this policy had highly inflationary effects. Accordingly, the package of economic reforms introduced in January 1980, allowed almost all the state economic enterprises freedom (in theory at any rate) to set their own prices, and abandoned the policy of deficit financing. The result was a sharp rise in the cost of state sector products in 1980, ranging from 400 per cent for fertilisers to 55 per cent for cement. Further price rises have inevitably followed since then. Clearly, the only long term cure for this problem will involve basic rationalisation of the state sector — including, quite possibly the closure of some plants which can never be made to pay their way at world prices. Some effective solution would seem to be essential if Turkey is eventually to implement a customs union with the Community. The present government is committed to the principle of privatisation of the public sector; this may well be achievable in some cases, but it is hard to see how private investors could be induced to take over the bulk of state economic enterprises, unless they were guaranteed high prices. This would in turn prolong the problems faced by other firms using their products, which might be able to achieve international competitiveness if they could buy inputs at world prices. Situation of particular industries

3. Size of firms It seems to be generally accepted that the relative smallness of firms in Turkey is a serious obstacle to greater efficiency, especially in those industries where there are substantial economies of scale, or where relative capital intensivity and technological sophistication give the larger firm a distinct advantage. Even excluding firms employing less than 10 workers, only 7 per cent of firms in the private sector in 1977 employed more than 200. Establishments in the state sector are generally larger, but are often well below optimum size. In view of this, it seems likely that free trade with the Community is likely to involve a good deal of rationalisation in Turkish industry, with mergers and takeovers of smaller firms and either modernisation or closure of the less efficient plants. On the other hand, some activities in which Turkey is already efficient (such as garments and leather goods) tend to have lower economies of scale, so that the present pattern of a large number of small firms may survive in these industries.

1, Processed foodstuffs

14

15

16

4. Cost of inputs A frequent source of complaint by Turkish industrialists is the high cost of intermediate goods which are needed for transformation into finished products, such as basic metal products and chemicals. Studies by the World Bank indicate that although domestic prices for such products as cement and textiles are close to world levels, industry is paying far more for copper, steel and chemical products than it would need to in free trade conditions. Apart from diseconomies of scale, already referred to, a major reason for this is that such products mainly originate in the state sector, which has been plagued by ill-directed investment, political interference and mismanagement for many years. In effect, inefficiencies in the state sector have been passed on to private firms which use its products. 160

Analysis of this sector is complicated by the fact that Turkish statistical sources rank some agricultural products — such as killed meat and flour — as "industrial products", on the grounds that they have undergone some processing. To avoid confusion, the following paragraphs concentrate attention on three products ~- olive oil, preserved vegetables, and fruit juices — which can be defined as "industrial products" for present purposes. Together, they account for around 40 per cent of Turkey's exports of processed foodstuffs. Since exports of these products to the Community have been affected by restrictions designed to protect Community producers, movement towards a customs union should, in principle, be of benefit to Turkey. However, the situation of each of these products is somewhat complicated, and deserves a brief discussion. Due to technical factors, Turkey's production of olive oil runs in two year cycles, with exports in even-numbered years at a much lower level than in odd-numbered years. Even before Spain's accession, the Community already accounted for around a third of world production (almost entirely in Italy) but needed to import about 20 per cent of its needs. Imports from non-member countries pay a variable levy, designed to bring the landed cost of imports up to Community levels. Removal of this levy would obviously represent an advantage to Turkish producers. However, the accession of Spain to the Community makes it likely that the E C will have a surplus of production, so export possibilities for Turkey are limited. Currently only about 15 per cent of Turkey's exports are destined for the Community market, and one can expect that this pattern will quite probably persist. In principle, Turkey should be able to export substantial quantities of canned fruit and vegetables, together with juice and extracts, since it produces large quantities of fresh vegetables and fruit. In practice, the industry is poorly developed, partly because of restrictions 161

in external markets (especially the EC) and partly because processing costs in Turkey are high. In particular, the price of tin cans is around 50 per cent higher in Turkey than in com­ peting Mediterranean countries. There has been serious over-investment in some sections of the industry (especially in tomato paste, the main product exported) with resulting un­ used capacity and high unit costs. Exports of tomato paste to the E C peaked in 1977 at around 18000 tonnes, out of a total of around 28000 tonnes. However, restrictions in the Community market reduced these totals to 4000 and 26000 tonnes respectively, by 1981, implying a major diversion to other markets, mainly in the Middle East. Under an agree­ ment with the Community of 1980, Turkey was to be allowed a quota of 16500 tonnes per year, on which duties were to be gradually eliminated by 1987. The Enlargement of the E C to include Spain and Portugal should reduce imports from non-member countries to around 25 000 tonnes, but, with its privileged access, Turkey should be in a position to meet a sub­ stantial proportion of this. At the same time, the reduction of processing costs remains an important, i f elusive, objective.

that their main effect is to sour the political atmosphere without giving more than a small degree of temporary protection to the European textile industry. X Glass, glassware and ceramics This is a second group of industries in which Turkey has achieved international competi­ tiveness, especially in the fields of flat glass and glassware. Over half the total output of the former was exported in 1982, and around 40 per cent of the latter: imports of other glass products are small, so the industry has a substantial positive foreign trade balance. In the Community market, imports of glass tableware from Turkey accounted for around one third of total imports from non-member countries İn 1981, Turkey's main rival being Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, Turkey has only a tiny share of the Community market in window glass: the vast majority of her exports are to the Middle East. In the ceramics industry, net exports represent about 10 per cent of total output. Turkey's output of these products is largely accounted for by three big firms — Türkiye Şişe ve Cam Fabrikaları in glass and glassware, Eczacıbaşı in sanitary products and Çanak­ kale in ceramics. Since they rely almost entirely on domestically produced raw materials, prospects for increasing exports are good, especially in the fields of sanitary ware and cera­ mics, of which production is mainly for the home market at present.

?

17

2. Clothing and textiles This is easily Turkey's most important export industry, accounting for over 35 per. cent of total industrial exports and 27 per cent of total exports to the Community in 1983. It also provides about 23 per cent of total employment in manufacturing industry. The indus­ try is quite strongly export-oriented in most products: over 63 per cent of the total output of leather clothing is exported, around 40 per cent of ready-made garments and carpets and around 30 per cent of cotton yarn. The wool textiles industry however, sells almost en­ tirely in the home market, and there are small net imports of other yarns and textiles. The Community market takes almost all Turkey's yarn exports, but only about half that of fabrics, for which alternative markets have been developed. In the case of cotton yarn, Turkey supplies about 38 per cent of the Community's total imports with substantial shares also in the case of leather clothing and woven carpets (kilims). In spite of the bitter dispute over Turkish exports of T-shirts to the Community, it appears that Turkey only accounts for about 7 per cent of the EC's total imports: among other non-Community countries, imports from Portugal, Hong Kong and the USA are a good deal higher than this. Clearly, the situation facing the Turkish textile industry is very different from that of many other industries, in the sense that full implementation of the Additional Protocol would be to the benefit of Turkish manufacturers, since it would prevent the Community re­ stricting imports from Turkey, and would reduce the cost of inputs, such as machinery, dyestuffs and the like. As such, it is extremely likely that the restrictions imposed by the Com­ munity are being evaded, possibly on a large scale. Businessmen have explained to the writ­ er how textiles and clothing exports to the E C could be routed via third countries, so as to be sold in the Community as products of that country. In some cases this process is disguis­ ed by finishing processes in third countries. In July 1983, for example, the Güney Sanayi textile firm was faced with a quandary, since it had contracted to sell $ 3 million worth of bed linen to importers in Holland, West Germany and France, but had only completed half the order when import restrictions were imposed by the EC. It solved the problem by send­ ing the linen to an unnamed third country for finishing, for onward despatch to the original importers. Such cases suggest that the import restrictions are difficult to enforce, and 18

4. Cement Turkey's exports of this product grew sharply during the early 1980s, to reach a value of " $ 207 million in 1982, from $ 9.2 million in 1977. However, exports are heavily dependent on a single market, Iraq, which accounted for about 70 per cent of total exports in 1981. By 1985, exports had fallen back $ 43.6 million. It appears that exports to Iraq, and thus total exports, had slumped badly, since the war with Iran forced the Iraqi authorities to cut back construc­ tion work sharply. On the other hand, should the war be ended, it can be assumed that this market would recover dramatically. Turkey would certainly be in a good position to supply it, provided there is sufficient slack capacity in the industry. The further lowering of trade barriers with the Community would probably make little difference to the Turkish cement in­ dustry, since the high cost of transport largely insulates the two markets from each other.

19

J

22

20

5. Iron and steel Most of the industries mentioned so far have achieved a degree of international competitiveness in Turkey. In the case of heavy industries, however, one enters the area which could be described as the Achilles' heel of the Turkish economy. Turkey's develop­ ment plans since the 1930s have put a good deal of emphasis on building up the iron and steel industry, but the domestic prices of most steel products are well above the landed cost of imported equivalents. In 1984, Turkey's steel industry succeeded in exporting about 1.8 million tonnes of products (mainly to Iran), but the industry has depended on tax rebates and the like to make exporting profitable: in any case the level of imports is more than double that of exports, so the industry has a heavily negative international trade balance. Most of Turkey's iron and steel industry is in the state sector, and as such suffers from the malaises which have been explained earlier. Over the past few years there have been

21

t -

162

5 163

some improvements in efficiency, as political conditions have stabilised. In particular, the General Manager of the Ereğli Iron and Steel Works (Erdemir) was able to claim in January 1984 that his enterprise had continued to work profitably in 1983, although finished steel prices had been increased by only 4.2 per cent •— well below the overall rate of inflation. In general, it was believed that high-quality and specialist steel producers would find it easier to survive in the face of freer competition from abroad than basic steel producers. Nevertheless, it was clear that the industry would need to undertake some painful costcutting and rationalisation if it is ever to meet the challenges posed by a customs union with the E C .

are unable to offer any institutional framework for collaboration which remotely approa­ ches that of the EC in its sophistication and stability. Their markets have expanded dramati­ cally over the last decade, but are still likely to be upset by unpredictable political and eco­ nomic changes. (The effects of the fall in oil prices and of the Gulf war on Turkey's foreign trade over the last five years serve as an apt illustration of this). The present position is well summed up by the present Tjrrjd^hjM^-Year Plan, which treats accession as an eventual aim. Nevertheless^asJbe^alan^documejiL^d^sT^as a result of accession to full membership of the EC, Turkey will have to take on board all the regulations of the Treaty of Rome re­ garding a customs union. However, in order to overcome the economic difficulties which may arise on accession, either in a given economic sector or a particular region, the possi­ bility of applying measures of a temporary character will be retained". In the industrial sphere, the signs are that those industries which have already achieved international competitiveness would probably gain rather than lose from Community mem­ bership, since it would oblige the Community states to dismantle barriers of which Turkish producers have long been complaining. The long term diversification of the structure of Turkey's export trade also suggests that, by the end of the century, Turkish firms should be able to hold their own in a free international market, even in such industries as light engi­ neering which have frequently been ranked as white elephants in the past. The major prob­ lems will almost certainly arise in the capital intensive heavy industries where the costs of production are still well above world levels. The fact that the majority of plants in these fields are either partly or wholly state-owned raises the whole problem of re-structuring Turkey's massive public economic sector, which the present government has only just start­ ed. In the broader sphere, also, the process of gradual alignment of the Turkish economy with that of the Community assumes that the government is willing to continue the more externally oriented economic strategy which has been adopted since 1980. Since this is one of the basic foundations of Prime Minister Ozal's policy, it can be expected to continue, at least until Turkey's next general elections. Granted a democratic political environment, however, the longer-term outlook still seems as unpredictable as it has been over the last two decades.

; j j ! ]

23

24

6. Engineering The development of engineering industries in Turkey has proceeded across a very broad front, so that the output of Turkish firms now includes such items as electrical appliances, motor vehicles and agricultural machinery, metal and wood processing machinery and electrical cables and machinery. However, the growth of the industry has been fundamen­ tally affected by the import replacement strategy of industrialisation. Its products are very largely destined for the home market, and Turkish firms have not needed to devote attention to achieving international competitiveness. Export markets have been won for some pro­ ducts — such as buses and refrigerators — but imports of engineering products have, pre­ dictably enough, vastly exceeded exports. During the 1960s, it was generally expected that technologically advanced industries, such as engineering, would find it extremely hard to compete in the face of free competition *> from Western Europe. The development of the industry has, however, brought something of a re-assessment. The prices of Turkish-made domestic appliances, for example, are not now wildly out of line with international levels. On the other hand, the range of choice cur­ rently offered to the Turkish consumer is generally very restricted. In other words, imports of consumer durables would almost certainly increase granted free trade with Western E u ­ rope, even if the imported goods had no particular price advantage. In these conditions, it is likely that Turkey's engineering industry could survive in competition with Europe, but only at the cost of some adaptation. In the case of motor cars, for instance, it is thought likely that, rather than produce complete vehicles, Turkish firms could concentrate on the production of certain components for export, and import finished vehicles in return. This implies close collaboration between Western and Turkish firms, and rapid transfer of tech- : nology. It will also mean rationalisation within the industry, and the elimination of duplica­ tion by state and private enterprises.

Notes

5

1 2

1 3

Conclusions and Prospects The fluctuations in the EC's share in Turkey's total foreign trade and the increase in that to the Middle Eastern countries which were noted in the first section of this chapter, have raised questions about the degree to which Turkey should still be committed to eventual Community membership. On the other hand, it has to be remembered that Turkey origi­ nally entered into the Association Agreement* for primarily political reasons, and that the political basis for this orientation still stands. For their part, the Middle Eastern countries 164

4 5 6 7 8

9

Statement at Özal's press conference of 7 January 1984. I.e., goods in Chapters 25-99 of the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature (B.T.N.), with the exception of cot­ ton: Turkey-EEC Relations 1963-1977 (Ankara: Office of the Commission of the European Communi­ ties, 1977) p. 46. The texts of the Association Agreement and the Additional Protocol appear in Official Journal of the European Communities, Information and Notices, Vol. 16, no. C. 133 (24 December 1973). Additional Protocol, Annexes 1 and 2. B.T.N, positions 50.01 and 50.02; Additional Protocol, Annex 2, Article 2. Additional Protocol, Articles 12 and 16. Ibid.. Articles 20-26. Taking 1973 as 100, the indices for 1980 were as follows: employment 74.6; output 95.3; exports 115.9; imports 212.2. Source: Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu (Ankara, State Planning Organisation, 1983), p. 59. Quoted in. Financial Times Survey, Turkey, 17 May 1983, p. XII.

165

10 See for instance the statement by Güngör Yener, Chairman of the Ankara Chamber of Commerce, quo­ ted İn Milliyet and Tercüman, 21 March, 1983. 11 Figure for 1983. BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 1984, (London: British Petroleum, 1984), pp. 4,7. 12 An exception is that of the metal products industry, which is labour-intensive but has fairly substantial net imports. This is probably due to the fact that this sector embraces a wide range of products, some of which are not produced in Turkey. Özel ihtisas Komisyonu Raporu, op.cit., pp. 52-53. Jbid., p. 45. Source: State Planning Organisation. See Bertil Walstedt, State Manufacturing Enterprise in a Mixed Economy: the Turkish Case (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, for World Bank, 1980), pp. 144-151, 330. 17 Source: World Bank

Chapter 10 Harun Gümrükçü*

The Turkish Labour Market and Migration

13 14 15 16

18 Calculated from Review of Economic Conditions, 1984/IV (Ankara: Türkiye Iş Bankası), p. 33 and NIMEXE, 1983. 19 Figures are for 1982; data supplied by State Institute of Statistics, Ankara 20 NIMEXE, 1981. 21 Hürriyet, 26 My 1983. 22 Another contributory factor was the revival of the domestic construction industry, and here of demand for cement: in fact, Turkey began to make small imports of cement in 1987. 23 Milliyet, 18 January 1984, 24 V. Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı, 1985-1989 (Ankara: State Planning Organisation, 1984), p. 48.

4

\

166

Introduction With the establishment of the E C Common Labour Market, foreign labour was classified into two groups as far as European labour migration is concerned. Workers from member countries were accorded equal treatment to a great extent with the adoption of Regulation No. 1612/63 by the E C Council on 15 October 1968. The labour force from Turkey was put in the same category as workers from non-member countries, whose access to the E C labour market is regulated by bilateral agreements. With the recruitment stop in the Federal Republic of Germany in November 1973, access for Tur­ kish workers to their main country of immigration was closed. Similar measures were also taken by the other E C countries. Since then not only a restrictive immigration policy is being conducted, but also, by way of various measures and incentives for repatriation, an attempt is being made to reduce the number of Turkish workers in the Federal Republic of Germany. In contrast to this policy, the Association Agreement of 23 December 1963, and the Sup­ plementary Protocol of Brussels of 23 November 1976, provide a step-by-step introduction of freedom of movement for Turkish workers by 1986. This has been and still is one of Tur­ key's most significant demands from the EC, since freedom of movement is essential for achieving fast improvement of the labour market. However, the EC, particularly Germany, has declared that the freedom of movement for Turkish workers beginning in 1986, as provi­ ded for in the Association Agreement, was not feasible for social and economic policy rea­ sons. The reasons for this dilemma in labour policy will be the first item discussed in relation to internal and external migration. Next, the current regulations on freedom of movement and the positions of the negotiating partners will be put into perspective. Then, the longterm policy of employment promotion will be examined in terms of how such strategies may contribute towards securing social peace in the original E C countries on a long-term basis, and how they might also facilitate the southern Enlargement by contributing to the econo­ mic, social and political stability of the newcomers. Finally, in the light of this discussion, an assessment will be made as to how far such long-term policies are worth promoting.

* The author would like to thank the Hans Böckler Foundation of the Confederation of German Trade Uni­ ons, Düsseldorf, for supporting his dissertation on "Beschäftigung und Migration in der Türkei unter Be­ rücksichtigung der Auswirkungen der Auswanderung auf die Volkswirtschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutsch­ land" , from which this paper has been developed.

167

Demographic Developments in Turkey

Until the mid-1960s, the population policy of the Turkish government was aimed at "protecting the people's existence" and promoting population growth, which had an annual rate of only 1.7 per cent. Thereafter, as was the case in almost all developing countries, the rate of increase jumped to between 2.4 and 2.8 per cent, owing to which more than three and a half times as many people were living in Turkey in 1985 than was the case in 1927. The low population increase until 1950 was a result of inadequate medical care and high rate of infant mortality. The growth rate peaked between 1950 and 1960, a period comparable to that of Western Europe a hundred years ago in terms of population trend." After 1960 a slight decline was observed, but according to the 1985 census results, contrary to expectations, population increase accelerated between 1980 and 1985, reaching an annual rate of 2.7 per cent. The State Institute of Statistics blamed largely an "organisational" error for this high figure, and as a result of further surveys and calculations made, it concluded that the real figure stood at 756,000 fewer people. Because both the allocation of parliamentary seats assigned to each province and revenue sharing with local governments at 10.3 per cent 1

2

3

Table 1; Population Trend: Census Results 1927 - 1985 and Estimates. Year of Census

1927 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985

Population (in thousands)

12,648 16,158 17,821 18,790 20,947 24,065 27,755 31,391 35,605 40,198 44,737 50,664***

Index*

100.0 118.4 130.6 137.7 153.4 176.3 203.4 230.0 260.0 295.6 329.2 372.5***

Average Annual Popuiation Increase (per thousand)

21.10 17.02 (19.52)* 10.59 21.73 27.75 28.53 24.62 25.19 25.00 20.65 24.88***

Estimates 1990 2000 2013

54,633 (56.941)**** 67,166 (73.029)**** 100,000*****

*

Index based on the author's calculations

**

In 1937 the Hatay Province was united with Turkey. Taking into account the population of the Province, the rate of growth would be 19.52 p.a. Revised 1985 Census figures. Calculation based on revised 1985 figures.

*** ****

***** Calculated on the basis of an average annual increase of 2.5 per cent. Sources: State Institute of Statistics, Census of Population by Administrative Division, Publication no. 954, (Ankara, 10 September 1981), p.15; Statistical Pocket Book of Turkey, Publication no. 1210, (Ankara: November, 1986).

168

of tax collected are based on resident population figures, the whole issue has been taken to court. Despite the outcome of the case, doubt has been cast on the ability of the State Institute of Statistics to provide reliable figures. Yet, given the lack of other sources, this study utilises the general census figures with these caveats in mind. The Turkish population trend is shown in Table 1. As Table 1 shows, Turkey is a long way from bringing the population growth rate down to the "reproduction level", and still maintains the highest rate in Europe, with the exception of Albania. (See Table 2) 5

Table 2: Population of the EC and Acceding Countries in 1970 and 1980 as well as Estimates until the Year 2000 Growth (per cent)

Population (in thousands) The Community of Ten

1970

2,000

1980

60,651 50,770 53,660 13,030 340 55,420 2,940 4,930 9,660 8,790

61,638 54,221 56,276 14,336 360* 55,830* 3,483 5,120 9,860* 9,790

1.6 6.8 4.9 10.0 5.9 0.7 18.5 3.0 2.1 11.4

61,000 59,000 58,000 15,000

Spain Portugal

33,780 9,040

37,935 10,056

12.3 11.2

42,000 11,000

Turkey

35,320 35,605**

46,312 44,137**

31.1 25.5**

73,000**

Germany France Italy Netherlands Luxembourg Great Britain Ireland Denmark Belgium Greece

—

57,000 6,000 5,000 10,000 10,000

Acceding Countries

* 1981. ** The figures in brackets are according to Turkish sources. See Table 1 of this essay. Source: United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics: Weltbank, Weltentwicklungsbericht (Washington, D . C . , 1985), pp. 238 f.

Within a decade Turkey had a population increase of 25.5 per cent and is projected to be the second most populous country in Europe, after the Soviet Union, by the year 2000. However, its natural population growth differs from region to region. While eastern Turkey records a very high birth rate of 7.4 children per woman, the economically more developed areas of western Turkey show similar patterns to Europe, with an average of 4.3 children. Thus population growth is increasingly shifting from west to east. As a result the Anatolian highlands have greater population surplus, although this area of Turkey is particularly underdeveloped. Industry has not yet been established and the labour market is mainly characterised by agricultural jobs. The rapid population growth has also affected the age structure in Turkey. While a good 55 per cent of the population is of employable age, those under fifteen years of age make up almost 40 per cent. Thus, compared with Europe, the population pyramid shows an ex169

tremely wide base and is typical of a developing country. Turkey has the youngest population among European countries and this has hardly changed in the last three decades. As in the other developing countries, the age structure is a serious obstacle for the improvement of the per capita income, since it has a negative effect on the accumulation of savings. When compared with the Europe of the nineteenth century, Turkey shows both quantitative and qualitative differences in its process of development. The rapid population increase in Europe was due to the transition of society from a static to a dynamic phase. In Turkey, on the other hand, the population explosion is an independent factor that impedes economic growth leading to cumulative under-development. A solution would be to establish a balance between population growth and the receptiveness of the economy for a growing population. Additionally, a decrease in population growth could be achieved by accelerating economic and social development in the under-developed areas as well as by improving the educational system. Only then could family planning have a chance of success. In other words, a "demographic solution" must be preceded by an "economic solution", with the aim of removing the economic and social obstacles connected with the high birth rate. However, in the medium-term Turkey cannot be expected to achieve a stationary population trend. 6

7

8

With regard to Turkey's possible E C membership, however, it is important that the demographic development approaches European standards. With social and economic development differences may begin to diminish so that by the 1990s the demographic situation in Turkey can approximate the present one in Spain and Portugal. (Table 2). Nevertheless, over the next 15 to 20 years, there will be a massive increase in the young adult population, therefore new ways have to be found and strategies developed to address unemployment in the short and medium term. The Working Population in Turkey since the Association Agreement

9

170

- Total .population - population of working age (15 years and more) - Proportion of population of working age to total population (%) - Total labour force - Proportion of labour force to population of working age (%) - Total number of gainfully employed - Proportion of gainfully employed to total population (%) - Total labour surplus - Total labour surplus (%)

1962

1967

1972

1977

29,144.7

33,001.5

37,294.2

41,835.0

17,076.9

19,186.8

21,955.8

25,448.0

58.59

58.14

58.87

60.82

13,460.0

14,246.6

15,451.1

16,887.2

78.82

74.25

70.37

66.37

12,525.5

13,263.6

14,036.9

15,121.3

43

40

38

37

1,371.5

1,553.0

1,814.2

2,005.9

10.52

11.28

12.13

12.24

Source: H . Gümrükçü, Beschäftigung und Migration in der Türkei unter Berücksichtigung der Auswirkungen der Auswanderung auf die Volkswirtschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Nürnberg, 1986), Table 7, p. 32.

During the planned period of Turkish economy (1962 - 1977) the number of gainfully employed persons increased from 12.5 million to 15.1 million, representing an annual increase of 1.2 per cent. By comparison the annual population growth was much more rapid at 2.5 per cent. Thus the labour supply during this period increased from 13.5 million to 16.9 million persons, resulting in a continuous increase in labour surplus. In this period the number of inactive persons increased from 3.6 million to 8.6 million, while the proportion of labour force to working-age population dropped from 78.8 to 66.4 per cent. Since 1950 this decrease has been occurring at an annual rate of 0.9 to 1 per cent. Also during the planned period there has been a continuous decrease in the number of gainfully employed in relation to the total population, falling from 43 per cent in 1962 to 37 per cent in 1977 (Table 3). During the planned period, employment increased by approximately 167,000 new jobs per annum as compared to the 1950 - 1957 period when the increase was 214,000 jobs annually. The sectorial distribution of employment also varied between the two periods. While in the 1950 - 1957 period 112,000 new jobs were created annually in agriculture, during the planned period the annual increase in this sector dropped to 13,000 per annum." This was in large part due to capital-intensive mechanisation in agriculture. By comparison industry and civil service annually offered 180,000 jobs, 130,000 of which were in the ter10

Table 3: The development of the labour force from 1962 to 1977 (in thousands)

tiary field . This was not, for instance, preceded by a boom that would have created these jobs, on the contrary, it was an attempt to reduce unemployment by means of a "work-for all policy", a social measure which governments adopted in the 1970s. The result was overstaffing in civil service and public enterprise. 12

Current Situation of the Labour Force Since 1978 the number of newly created jobs has dropped drastically, with industry offering no more than 6,000 new jobs per annum. At the same time, a further 72,000 were employed in the tertiary sector and in public administration under the "work-for-allpolicy" . But with the introduction of the Stabilisation Programme on 24 January 1980, this employment policy was renounced and from 1 January 1981 even a recruitment stop was imposed on the public sector. As a result of the new measures unemployment soared, the situation worsening due to an average annual loss of 12,900 jobs in agriculture as well. Between 1978 and 1982, only 68,100 new jobs (0,4 per cent increase) were offered. Unemployment figures between 1978 and 1982 are given in Table 4. 13

171

Table 4: Development of excess labour* in thousands from October 1978 to October 1982 1978 A, Overall Economy - increase in labour - increase in jobs - total excess labour B. Sectional Development - increase in jobs in agriculture ~ increase in jobs in all other sectors - total increase in jobs - increase in labour in agriculture - increase in labour in all other sectors

1979

1980

Table 5: Employment developmentfrom1977 to 1982. Situation as in October of each respective year age: 15 and over (in thousands)

1981

1982

252.9 128.0 144.9

265.1 - 10.7 255.8

277.4 -7.3 284.7

438.4 114.4 324.0

460.3 116.1 309.2

-8.6

-26.1

8.9

-8.5

-30.1

136.6 128.0

15.4 - 10.7

- 16.2 -7.3

122.9 114.4

146.2 116.1

20.0

-20.0

0

0

-35.0

124.9

275.8

284.7

324.0

344.2

* Gainfully employed persons of fifteen years of age or older. Source: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, Türkiye'nin Insangücü ve istihdam Raporu, 1982 (Ankara, 1982), Table 1, p. 8.

In 1983 a provisional increase of 0.9 per cent was achieved. On the other hand, the num­ ber of persons reaching working age increased by 2.5 per cent. Together with the cycleinduced unemployment and returning guest workers the total excess labour rapidly in­ creased from 2 million in 1977 to 3.2 million in 1982 and to 3.56 million in 1983 . However, since 1983 the statistical data used by the State Planning Organisation in mea­ suring unemployment have been modified so as to project diminished rates of unemploy­ ment. According to the State Planning Organisation, unemployment currently stands at 3,087,000, indicating a levelling off at 16.7 per cent. But there are no accurate calculations of the actual unemployment rate, except among registered workers. While the number of unemployed registered workers was 201,892 right after the 24 January, 1980 Stabilization Programme, it reached 1,076,309 at the end of 1986. Because the aggregate figures for nation-wide unemployed are unreliable, this study has not taken those into account. Thus, in spite of a 6 per cent migration among the labour force, unemployment in 1982 was three times as high as it was in 1950. (Table 5). 14

15

16

!7

The growth strategy adopted after World War II was accompanied by growing foreign de­ pendency of industry. Because the developing industry was targeted toward domestic con­ sumption, it inevitably resulted in a considerable deficit in the balance of payments. While the share of exports in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between 1970 and 1979 dropped from 4.4 to 3.9 per cent, the share of imports increased from 6.6 per cent to 12.9 per cent . More foreign exchange had to be raised for oil imports as well as imported indus­ trial goods, since the oil price rise was reflected on the price of industrial products. Meanwhile Turkey's export opportunities were constrained- In comparison with the Magreb countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia), Turkey was at a disadvantage. The E C conceded more extensive privileges to these countries than it did to Turkey. In 1975, for example, Turkey paid $ 2,338,22^0 for imports from E C countries, while only receiving $ 615,143 for its exports, the latter being approximately 27 per cent of the im18

19

172

A) Labour Market Development I. Civil labour supply JJ. Civil labour demand DX Labour surplus in the non-agricultural sector IV. Labour surplus in agricultural sector V. Total labour surplus V i . Total labour surplus in percent Sectioral distribution of employment Agriculture (including hidden unemployment) Mining industry Manufacturing trade Power, water and petrol Building Transport Trade Financial institutions, insurance business and real estate Other services

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

16,387.2 15,121.3

16,640.1 15,249.3

16,905.2 15,238.6

17,182.6 15,231.3

17,621.0 15,345.7

18,081.2 15,461.8

1,265.9

1,390.8

1,666.6

1,951.3

2,275.3

2,619.5

740 2,005.9

720 2,110.8

700 2,366.6

700 2,651.3

700 2,975.3

665 3,284.5

12.24

12.69

14.00

15.43

16.88

18.17

9,545.8 116.7 1,591.6 93.0 547.2 494.7 637,0

9,537.2 120.2 1,609.6 96.6 562.1 500.9 645.8

9,528.6 122.8 1,571.5 99.6 577.6 492.2 637.7

9,520.0 124.2 1,547.5 98.9 580.6 480.2 628.2

9,511.5 128.2 1,585.7 104.3 582.6 491.1 642.3

9,481.4

197.8 1,641.5

204.3 1,699.6

208.5 1,727.1

211.1 1,767.4

212.9 1,814.1

—

1,866.0

— —

—

Source: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, Türkiye'nin Insangücü ve istihdam Raporu, 1982, Table 1, p. 34.

ports. However, the ratio later shifted in favour of Turkey, amounting to 60 per cent in 1981, and 71 per cent in 1982 . Nevertheless, in spite of this trend, Turkey's trade deficit with the E C continued to accumulate and between 1965 - 1982 amounted to $ 13.9 billion. This accumulating debt contributed towards Turkey's serious economic crisis. In order to overcome the crisis, obligations within the framework of the "Turkey-aid" were dictated by representatives of O E C D and IMF. Private enterprise was assigned the primary role in bring­ ing about an economic upturn through a monetarist orientation. Amongst others the aim was to eliminate the chronic inflation by way of reducing the public sector deficit and removing subsidies from crude oil products. At the same time market mechanisms were to determine prices. In the face of competitive pressure, this meant not only modernisation by means of imported and expensive technology, but also a reduction in the public sector personnel. At the same time, the struggle against inflation and high interest rates caused a decrease in domestic demand. As a result, production fell well below capacity in spite of export pro­ motion. Furthermore, in order to increase hard currency receipts, an exchange rate policy was adopted, designed at undervaluing the Turkish Lira and making Turkish products com­ petitive in international markets. Moreover export obstacles were removed as well as ob20

173

stacles impeding free flow of cash into Turkey. Simultaneously import regulations were re­ laxed to a large extent and import stamp duty was cut down from 25 per cent to 1 per cent, thus causing further deficits in exchange revenues. In retrospect it can be said that the Economic Stabilization Programme missed its aim to a large extent and led to rapid impoverishment of the greater part of the Turkish population. It was not possible to activate the Turkish economic potential in order to secure an "accep­ table growth rate" . Between 1980 and 1983, the annual increase in the G N P amounted to no more than 2.6 per cent. The per capita income, however, dropped from $ 1,346 in 1979 to $ 998.30 in 1984 recovering to $ 1.116,60 in 1986Inflation was reduced from 125 per cent in 1980 to approximately 45 per cent by the end of 1983. Nevertheless, the aim to force it down to 25 per cent by 1983 failed. The infla­ tion rate stood at 45.4 per cent in 1984, 44.9 per cent in 1985 and 34.6 per cent in 1986. Some analysts expect it to exceed 40 per cent in 1987. From January 1980 until the end of 1982 consumer prices in Ankara almost doubled and reached six-fold from 1980 to June 1987. At the same time the export volume was increased, but this was accompanied by a steady rise in imports and thus, over the last three years, a deficit in the balance of payments of about $ 17.5 billion developed. This led to a steady devaluation of the Turkish currency: from T L 47.10 to T L 827.60 for $ 1 between January 1980 and June 1987. Apart from a few branches of industry such as fertilisers and automotive industry, no sec­ tor of the economy showed more than a 60 to 70 per cent capacity utilisation, foreshadowing further increase in unemployment. Since the labour supply annually increases by over 500,000, the same number of new jobs would have to be made available in order not to in­ crease unemployment further. The magnitude of Turkey's unemployment problem becomes clearer when considering what growth rate would be required in order to provide real jobs to entrants in the labour force. With a growth rate of 5 per cent, employment would only be increased by 1 per cent and with a growth rate of 4 per cent the number of jobs would only increase by 0.5 per cent. On the other hand, in order to keep the present situation, an increase in the employment quota of at least 1.7 per cent would be necessary. In the period from 1962 to 1977 the G N P increased by 6.5 per cent, creating a growth in employment of only 1.2 per cent. The average growth rate over the last few years of 3.6 per cent has led to a drastic decline in job supply, thereby causing a precipitous increase in excess labour. This negative devel­ opment has chiefly affected women, youth and older persons. Women, who represent 52 per cent of the agricultural work force with 5,431,451 employed, constitute the majority of workers even in this sector, although 92 per cent of them work with their family without any remuneration. As the total number of women employed stands at 6,257,015, 85 per cent of the women work in agriculture and only 15 per cent in industry and the tertiary sector. The employment data for younger and older population also snows a negative trend. The number of young people unemployed between the ages of 15 and 24 rose to 1.6 million from 1977 to 1981, a trend that is expected to continue throughout the 1980s. Furthermore there are 2,095,500 economically inactive persons over the age of 54. Since the Turkish Institute of Social Security has fixed the age of men at 55 and that of women at 50, these groups were exluded from Table 6. On the other hand, persons below 55, who have retired with statutory pension after 25 years of employment, have been included, as well as those who were dis­ abled early in life. 21

22

23

24

23

26

27

174

Table 6: Structure of the economically inactive population according to age and gender (in thousands) Age Structure

Economically Inactive

Women Therefrom

2,555.2* 1,530.2* 4,240.1 8,325.5

1,424.6 (approx. 60 %) 1,167.4 (approx. 76 %) 3,867.4 (approx. 91 %) 6,459.4 (approx. 78 %)

15-19 20-24 25-54 Total

* Also included in these two age groups are 1.4 million students; without them the figure would total 2.7 million. Source: Y. Hamurdan, "1981 Yılında "Türkiye'nin Nüfusu ve Emek Piyasasının Durumu", işgücü Dergisi 2 (nos. 5 - 6, 1981), p. 22. Table 7: Structure of total labour surplusfromOctober 1979 to October 1983 Situation as in October (in thousands) A. Development of excess labour a) Those looking for work and registered with DBK b) Those looking for work on private initiative 1. Total of those looking for work (sum of a) and b)) 2. Discouraged labour force I. Labour surplus outside of agriculture (sum of I and 2) IL Labour surplus in agriculture III. Total labour surplus (sum of I and H)

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

169.1

244.8

294.5

468.7

763.500 *

533.5

651.5

680.8

635.6

—

702.6

896.3

975.3

1,104.3

964.0

1,055.0

1,300.0

1,515.2

1,666.6

1,951.3

2,275.3

2,619.5

2,895 **

700

700

700

665

665

2,366.6

2,651.3

2,975.3

3,284.5

3,560

* Situation until June 1983. ** This figure is based on own calculations. Source: Devlet Planlama Teşkilâtı, Türkiye'nin Insangücü ve istihdam Raporu 1982 (Ankara, 1982), Table 2, p. 9; cflIBKBülteni (nos. 68 - 73,1982), p. 85; (nos. 74,75,76, 1983), p. 3; (nos. 77,78, 79,1983). p. 33.

The discouraged labour force, i.e. those who have ceased looking for employment, has also increased. According to Hamurdan it amounted to 1.3 million in 1982 (Table 7). Para­ llel to that the total excess labour has been increasing, as shown in Table 7. As a result of sustained high birth-rate, Turkey has been confronted with the most serious employment crisis since 1978. What is even more alarming is the fact that the rapid increase since 1950 in unemployment and underemployment has still not peaked and, according to mediumterm forecasts, a further increase is to be expected.

175

Employment and Migration

Table 8: Development of Turkey's external migrationfrom1961 to 1982 * Men

Year

Over the past three decades Turkey pursued a growth-oriented development strategy of the "unbalanced growth" type with the aim to realise, among others, full employment. However, while an annual growth rate averaging 5 to 7 per cent could be attained, employment, as already mentioned, remained below target. The increase in unemployment was in the main due to the limited capacity of urban industry to provide jobs, combined with a simultaneous shrinkage in agricultural jobs. Owing to international competitive pressure and close association with the E C countries, Turkey has been forced to introduce mostly capital-intensive production methods. As a result there developed regional disparities and antagonistic structures in urban and rural areas. This development initiated the emergence of a segmented labour market in the urban and rural areas as well as in different sectors. At the same time, as a result of promoting industry at the expense of rural development, urban industrial centres offered considerably higher paying jobs. This was a crucial factor for increased migration to cities, whose population expansion averaged 4.4 per cent per annum from 1950 to 1980. But, despite incentives such as favourable depreciation terms and tax reliefs, industry in urban areas is only capable of absorbing a part of the migrants into the labour force. The majority of the migrants enter the informal sector, and try to find casual labour. In most cases migrants cannot do anything but open their own handicraft or service businesses, thus increasing the number of under-employed workers. The share of the informal sector is 30 to 70 per cent of the urban population living in the vicinity of these towns, with the result that the saturation point has long been reached in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, where 21 per cent of Turkey's population lives. In this manner, hidden unemployment from the rural areas is being transferred to cities in the form of urban underemployment, which is a widespread phenomenon in Turkey and should be considered as serious a problem as unemployment.

'

1,47611,185 30,328 66,176 51,520 34,410 8,947 43,205 103,975 329,575 88,442 85,229 135,820 20,211 4,419 10,558 19,084 18,852 23,630 28,503 58,753 49,388 1,023,685

.

Turkish Migration and Freedom of Movement According to Article 12 of the Association Agreement of 23 December, 1963, both the E C and Turkey have committed themselves "to be guided by Articles 48,49 and 50 of the Treaty of the Foundation of the Community in order to establish step-by-step freedom of movement for workers" . Article 48 includes the abolishment of "all discriminatory treatment of workers on the grounds of nationality with regard to employment, wages and other working conditions". Furthermore, nationals of E C member states would have precedence in placement over those of non-member countries. At the same time, certain escape clauses are incorporated as per Articles 48 and 49 of the EEC-Treaty, by means of which this freedom of movement can be largely curtailed by administrative and economic measures. Employment with public authorities, for example, is reserved for nationals. Furthermore, freedom of movement may be limited to jobs actually offered. The right of freedom of movement may also be restrictively applied for reasons of public policy, security and health. Moreover, labour migration may be made dependent on a balance between labour supply and demand in any single geographic region or economic sector.

As against this background of mass unemployment since the end of the 1950s, migration of Turkish workers abroad can be considered an extension of internal migration. Migration of Turkish labour to Europe was triggered off by the demand for labour in the highly industrialised E C countries, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany. By sending qualified workers who had been selected by recruitment offices, Turkey sustained a loss in skilled labour , which adversely affected its economic development. Nevertheless the promotion of external migration became a policy measure since the pressure on the labour market could be relieved by extensive migration, until the recruitment stop in 1973. Access to the E C Labour Market could ensure relief for Turkey. As early as 1977, the Employment and Labour Bureau of Turkey (IIBK) stated that it had received 1,031,838 applications for employment abroad . The subsequent employment crisis must have further increased the number of those wishing to migrate. However, those prepared to migrate should not be considered in the same category as the unemployed. The gainfully employed persons who wish to migrate are on average more qualified than the under-employed and unemployed, 29

34

30

32

33

1

176

Total

Excluded from these figures are: a) Workers departing as tourists, who afterwards have taken on a job; b) Persons departing as members of a family of Turkish workers, who afterwards have found em-

ployment; c) Turkish re-migrants. Source: DBK, 1982 Istatistik Ydltp, Table 19, p. 26.

Turkish Migration and the EC Labour Market

31

*

46 532 2,577 4,176 11,179 9,763 3,533 11,341 20,765 20,776 14,200 18,654 27,035 1,330 402 372 535 485 342 460 403 188 •

1,430 10,653 27,751 62,000 40,341 24,647 5,414 31,863 83,210 108,799 74,242 66,575 108,785 18,881 4,017 10,186 18,549 18,367 23,288 28,043 58,350 49,200

1961 1962 • 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Total:

28

Women

ill

On the other hand, E C regulations based on these articles of the E E C Treaty also stipulate that freedom of movement is one of the fundamental rights of workers and their families. Recruitment stop, legal restrictions as well as "administrative reintegration" are incompatible with these stipulations. Likewise, migration cannot be determined only by the labour requirement of the accommodating economy. For this reason, freedom of movement has been one of Turkey's main requests from the EC, and it represents an essential labour policy measure, resulting from "unbalanced growth". Freedom of movement was entered into the Association Agreement, and was made concrete in the Additional Protocol signed in Brussels on 23 November, 1970. Under Article 36 of this Protocol, freedom of movement of workers would be implemented step by step between 1 December, 1976 and 1 December, 1986. However, at the meeting of the EC-Turkey Association Council on 20 December, 1976, when the regulations governing the first stage (1 December, 1976 -1 December, 1980) were determined, Turkey's non-member status was not changed regarding free circulation. Nor was it altered in the subsequent second stage. The main objective of the Agreement, namely freedom of movement, was not addressed in these resolutions. They were merely legal improvements for those Turkish workers already working in E C countries. However, equality with nationals of member states was not achieved. Though in principle Turkish workers are subject to work permits, in practice new entry visas with work permits are hardly issued. The Turkish public was exasperated with this attitude. There was talk of breach of confidence and failure to comply with contractual provisions. There were those who, for this reason amongst others, demanded to turn away from the EC. On the other hand, owing to an unemployment rate of 10 per cent and the so-called hostility towards Turks, the E C , and particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, is interested in evading the issue. So far the Federal Republic of Germany is merely prepared to make institutional improvements with regard to Turkish workers already living in the country. 35

36

37

While this conflict of interests continues, it is assumed that in the 1980s labour supply in the E C and in Turkey will increase significantly. However, according to forecasts, the demand for labour will only slightly increase in these countries until 1990. Based on current economic data, these forecasts do not, for example, take into consideration drastic measures that might be taken to fight unemployment and under-empioyment. Thus, accepting a stagnating labour demand, there remains only one alternative, namely, the prevention of full freedom of movement for workers from acceeding countries and from Turkey. However, socio-economic consequences of such barriers would be serious. Unless Turkey finds a way to increase occupational opportunities by way of external migration as well as through domestic economic measures, it will have to resign itself to having an immensely high structural underemployment and unemployment, and thereby, little stability in the future. Alternatives As mentioned, the serious problem of unemployment and under-employment that Turkey has been facing is in the main due to the policy of implementing capital-intensive production techniques despite labour surplus. So far there has been no serious attempt to use surplus labour as a growth potential, that is, giving an opportunity to the constantly increa178

sing working population" to use their working capacity productively. This can only be achieved by means of an increased employment rate over and above the growth rate of the population of working age. In Turkey, however, forecasts for increased employment lag behind the planned growth rate. Also the relief on the labour market through external migration will, in view of the employment problems in the E C countries, not be all that significant. Therefore other alternatives will have to be considered in order to decrease demographic as well as structurally induced unemployment. Two such alternatives consisting of measures to reduce labour supply and to increase labour demand are briefly presented. The measures to reduce labour supply, suggested below, centre around keeping young people and senior citizens away from the labour market. Since they would involve extremely high costs, their implementation would necessitate financial support from the EC. — Extend compulsory education from 5 to 8 years and increase in enrolment quota. — Develop and expand technical and trade schools so as to relieve unemployment and to meet the demands of industry for specific skills. — Develop a social security system to achieve a decrease in the number of gainfully employed senior citizens as well as in the work-force of rural and informal sectors. Measures to increase labour demand should be based on a consistent and independent employment policy and include the following measures, even if those are incompatible with development programmes adopted to date. — Subsidy of such labour-intensive production methods as may have potential economic advantages. — Increasing employment through preferential treatment of small industries and trade. — Abandoning measures for promoting mechanisation in agriculture. The savings achieved here could be used for subsidising investments to create new jobs in rural areas. — Development and product diversification in the fishing industry. — Regional product diversification and decentralisation of industry. — Creating government-sponsored jobs for young people between 15 and 25. Distributed on a regional basis, such a programme can be implemented without high administrative overheads. — Step-by-step reduction of annual working days from 275 to 240, and a reduction in weekly working hours from 45 to 40 in industry. — Development of part-time work opportunities. — Reduction of the trade deficit by means of increased exports into E C countries. In this connection it would be necessary to drastically reduce the E C protectionist measures towards Turkish exports. In order to achieve full employment, however, in addition to long-term family planning, structural reforms in agriculture as well as industry would be necessary, keeping employment, development and growth in tandem. A n extensive agrarian reform must be complemented by a programme of rural infrastructure, which at the same time should avoid triggering a sweeping industrialisation in rural areas by utilising returns of sales. Rather, a decentralised policy should be implemented in rural regions so that each region is gradually integrated into the economy and a long-term adjustment of regional differences in development is made possible. With such a plan, industrialisation is not seen as an exclusive alter179

20 21 22 23 24 25

native to the development of agrarian production. Rather, on a long-term basis the employ­ ment problem can only be overcome by co-ordinating both sectors. If, on the other hand, isolated strategies are adopted, pitching industrialisation against agricultural development, the result would be a stark failure to address employment problems.

Notes 1 2

3 4 5 6

7 8

9

10

11

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

Statistical Yearbook of Turkey (1983), calculated from Tables 305 and 306. With a 6.5 per cent annual growth rate unemployment would probably remain stable. Devlet istatistik Enstitüsü, Statistical Pocket Book of Turkey, Pub. no. 1210 (Ankara, 1986), p. 11¬ TÜSIAD, 1987 Yılma Girerken Türk Ekonomisi (istanbul 1987), p. 69. TÜSIAD, 1986 Yılına Girerken Türk Ekonomisi (istanbul 1986), p. 36 HBK, Is ve işçi Bulma Hizmetleri, Pub. no. 148, (Ankara, 1982), p. 21. IIBK (Labour and Labour Placement Services) estimate that only a quarter of the 500,000 young people entering the job market annually will be able to find employment.

26 "Imperatives of Employment Creation", p. 4. 27 Devlet istatistik Enstitüsü, 1980 Census of Population, Social and Economic Characteristics of Popula­ tion, 1 % Sample Results, Pub no. 962 (Ankara, September, 1981), Table 10, p. 14; Table 13, p. 19.

A . Önder, "Das türkische Strafrecht", in E . Metger and A . Schönke,eds., Das ausländische Strafrecht der Gegenwart, vol. 4 (Berlin, 1962), p. 573. Cf. A . Önder and G. Endruweit, "Neue Entwicklungen im türkischen Strafrecht", in Zeitschriftßrdie gesamte Strafwissenschaft 78 (1966), p. 326; N. Ayiter, "Nüßs ve Hukuk", in Türkiye'nin Gelişmesinde Nüßs Olgusu (Ankara: Aile Planlaması ve Ana Çocuk Sağlığı Genel Müdürlüğü, 1983), pp. 38ff. H . Gümrükçü, "Die Auswirkungen der exponentiellen Bevölkerungsentwicklung in der Türkei zwi­ schen 1980 und 1985: Eine Kritische Betrachtung der Bevölkerungszählung von 1985", Forum 2 (1987). Between 1813 and 1885 the population in western Europe showed a precipitous increase. The English population increased from 9 million to 36 million, and the German from 24 million to 46.8 million. Defined as the number of births (approx. two children for each couple) at which the population of a country remains constant. Cf. E . Alkin, "Sosyo-Ekonomik Kalkınma ve Nüfus", in Türkiye'nin Gelişmesinde Nüßs Olgusu, p. 73. According to Alkin, in Turkey 8 per cent of value added is spent on demographic investments; the share of total investments compared to value added amounts to 20 per cent. The second phase of the population growth in Turkey was not due to any change in the reproduction rate but to exogenous factors such as better hygiene and medical care. In Europe the process of industrialisation started at a low level. Technical development meant replace­ ment of manual work by machines. Industrialisation in underdeveloped countries no longer simply means replacement of manual labour by highly developed and complicated machines, but rather that these machines are a precondition for certain products. Production costs respectively increase as tech­ nical know-how and specialists are required for expensive maintenance. Therefore simple parallels can­ not be drawn between the process of industrialisation of European countries and that of the underdevel­ oped countries today. See "Imperatives of Employment Creation and Economic Growth, Turkish Case, 1983 - 1988", Offi­ cial Report presented by the Council of Europe at the Second Conference of European Ministers of La­ bour on Employment (Paris, 3 - 5 May, 1983), pp. 1 - 2. Cf. Y. Hamurdan: "Türkiye' de Beşeri Kaynak Kullanımı, 1923 - 2000 ve Teknoloji Seçiminin istih­ dam Politikasındaki Yeri", in Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 2. Türkiye iktisat Kongresi: III. Sosyal Ge­ lişme ve istihdam Komisyonu Tebliğleri (izmir, 2 - 7 November 1982), pp. 109 - 132. H . Gümrükçü, Beschäftigung und Migration in der Türkei unter Berücksichtigung der Auswirkungen der Auswanderung auf die Volkswirtschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ph. D. Dissertation, Uni­ versity of Hamburg (Nürnberg, 1986), pp. 31ff. Hamurdan, pp. 116ff. f Ibid, p. 117. "Imperatives of Employment Creation", pp. 1 -3. The number of returning workers is stated to be around 70,000 - 80,000 persons annually. (1982: 87,000, 1984: 130,000). Cf. Devlet Planlama Teşkilâtı, Türkiye'nin Insangücü ve istihdam Raporu, 1982 (Ankara: February, 1982), Table 1, p. 34. Milliyet, 20 September 1983. Devlet istatistik Enstitüsü, Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, Pub. no. 1040 (Ankara: December, 1983), calculated from Table 304, p. 355. s T. C. Resmi Gazete, 31 January 1976, p. 30.

28 1980 Census of Population, Table 3, p. 16. 29 External migration is effected either in two steps (from the rural areas to the urban-industrial sector and from there abroad), or as direct migration (from rural areas abroad). 30 According to the Federal Employment Office in 1971, a total of260,300 foreign workers underwent me­ dical examinations in the foreign missions of the Federal Republic of Germany. 37,900 (14.6 per cent) of the applicants were refused placement in the Federal Republic of Germany for health reasons. Bun­ desanstalt für Arbeit, Ausländische Arbeitnehmer Beschäftigung, Anwerbung, Vermittlung — Erfah­ rungsbericht 1971 (Nürnberg, 1972), pp. 46ff. 31 The percentage of Turkish workers with professional qualification placed by the offices abroad of the Federal Employment Office in 1971 was 46.3; in 1972,30.3, and in 1973, 29.7 per cent of the respective placement figures. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, Ausländische Arbeitnehmer 1972/73: Beschäftigung, An­ werbung, Vermittlung, (Nürnberg, 1974), pp. 58ff, and Table 54. 32 According to statements by R. IbrahimogTu, Secretary General of the Turkish Employers' Association, Turkish economy fell short of approximately 500,000 specialists in 1981. 33 Progress Report by the General Directorate of the Turkish Labour and Labour Placement Office, regar­ ding labour placement abroad, 1961 - 1978: IIBK Genel Müdürlüğü (Ankara, 9 February 1978). 34 Official Gazette of the European Community (ABI) 217 (29 December 1964); BGBI (1964) II, p. 509. The agreement came into force on 1 December 1964. 35 BGBI (1972) II, p. 385. 36 Resolution 2/76 of the EC-Turkey Association Council on Article 12 of the Ankara Agreement. 37 Resolution 1/80 of the EC-Turkey Association Council on the development of the Association.

• .3

180

I

181

!'

Chapter 11 Ismet Ergiin

The Problem of Freedom of Movement of Turkish Workers in the European Community Introduction

v

The relations of Turkey with the E C play a most important role in Turkish economic life. Recently, however, these relations have been weighed down by considerable problems, the solution of which is of paramount importance for Turkey's future relationship with the Community. One of the gravest problems is employment, and specifically the freedom of movement of Turkish workers in the countries of the Community. The actual coming together of millions of Turks with Europeans has by no means aided harmonious relations between Turkey and the E C ; on the contrary, it has put serious strains on the relationship. However, the employment of Turkish workers in the E C could be a way of improving economic co-operation between the two partners. What are the provisions in the founding treaties of the E C , and in the agreements establishing an association between the E C and Turkey with regard to freedom of movement? What have been the effects so far of the migration of labour in the recipient countries? 7- Is it possible to achieve freedom of movement? Shouldthat not be the case, what could Turkey demand from the EC in the form of compensation for its economic disadvantages? The present paper attempts to answer these and similar questions. The main emphasis will be on economic factors; social and cultural issues of labour migration are the subject of other papers in this volume. Approximately 75 per cent of the Turkish population living abroad is in the Federal Republic of Germany and more than 60 per cent of Turkish expatriate labour is employed there. Therefore, the question of freedom of movement of Turkish workers is literally a question of migration into the Federal Republic of Germany, which will be the focal point of the following discussion.

3

Historic Development of Worker Migration Worker migration has always been determined by economic developments, and especially by industrial development. With increasing levels of economic development and of real wages, the tendency to emigrate is considerably reduced. The employment of Italians within the E C is a good example. The industrialisation of Italy has brought about a return migration of workers and has reduced further emigration. The initial expectation of an inundation of the other five original E C countries with Italian workers did not take place. Similar developments are already observed with regard to Greeks. Employment of foreign workers in Europe, and specifically in Germany, is not a new phenomenon. Great European migratory movements occurred prior to World War I. In the eighteenth century and towards the end of the nineteenth, Polish and Italian workers came 183

to Germany in order to work in railway and canal construction, excavation work and min­ ing, but also in agriculture. Particularly during the period of industrialisation before World War I, a considerable number of foreign workers came to the Ruhr district from the Medi­ terranean countries and from Eastern Europe. Employment of foreign labour in Germany until World War II is shown in Table 1. Table 1; Employment of foreign labour in Germany from 1880 to 1939 Year 1880 1900 1907 1910 1939

Number of foreign workers (000s) 146 505 950 691 302

Source: Economy and Statistics (1965, No. 2), page 93.

What is striking in this table is that the import of labour is chronologically related to the industrialisation of Germany. During the reconstruction period in the Federal Republic af­ ter World War II, Germany again imported much foreign labour. The Federal Republic of Germany began recruiting labour in 1952. Fast economic devel­ opment and increase in exports made labour import necessary. In the beginning the demand was covered by Italy alone but towards the end of the 1950s this no longer sufficed. At this time North African states as well as other Mediterranean countries, Greece and Turkey, also began exporting labour. E C states signed bilateral agreements with these countries. Towards the end of the 1950s, foreign labour imports had reached their first high of the post­ war period. The establishment of the European Economic Community facilitated movement of la­ bour, since free movement within the Community is a basic element of the Agreement. In the beginning of the 1960s, labour migration accelerated, until the recession of 1966 - 67 in the Federal Republic; in 1966 half a million expatriate workers left the country. In 1968 foreign labour was again being imported, and in 1973 immigration reached a record high. After 1973, owing to the world-wide energy crisis and stagnation, the Federal Republic of Germany temporarily prohibited import of labour from outside the EC. The number of for­ eigners slightly decreased from 1973 onwards. Nevertheless in 1974, 4.1 million foreigners were living in the Federal Republic of Germany, compared with only 690,000 in 1961. In the mid-1970s restrictions on the establishment of residence for members of the fam­ ily were suspended, causing a new wave of migration as family members joined workers already in the Federal Republic. * The number of foreigners in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1985 was estimated at approximately 4.4 million, about 1.6 million of whom were Turks. The percentage of aliens to the German population is 7 per cent or 1 in 15. A high concentration of foreigners is to be found in the big cities, which intensifies the problem.

184

Table 2: Percentage of foreigners in selected cities Percentage of foreigners

City

21.4 21.2 20.2 19.3 17.3 17.0

Frankurt/M Rüsselsheim Bietigheim Offenbach Stuttgart Munich

Source: G. Endruweit, "Foreign Workers between Turkish Identity and German Integration," in E Alman­ ya'da Çalışan Turk isçilerinin Toptu Dönüşleri ve Türkiye ile E Almanya'da Uyum Sağlamaları (Bursa: Uludağ Üniversitesi, 1982), p. 94.

Amongst the foreign population the Turks represent the largest group, 31 per cent. Even after the end of recruitment in 1973, the number of Turks increased from 1 million to 1.5 million between 1974 and 1985, the main reasons being the migration of families from Tur­ key, the high birth rate amongst Turks, and an influx of persons asking for political asylum. Approximately 550,000 of the 1.5 million Turkish residents are employed, 250,000 are unemployed, and the remainder is made up of non-employed family members. The number of Turkish children has also reached considerable proportions: 43 per cent of all foreign children under the age of 16 are Turkish (1980). Roughly 635,000 Turkish children under the age of 18 were living in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1981.' In 1980 alone the number of Turkish children under the age of 16 increased by almost 130 per cent from about 226,000 to 520,000. Approximately 50,000 children of foreign workers join the Ger­ man labour market each year. According to estimates of the Labour Market and Professional Research Institute of the Federal Employment Office, 7 million foreigners will be living in the Federal Republic of Germany in the year 2000, even if the recruitment ban is maintained. Since the birth rate in the Federal Republic of Germany has been falling for many years, it is estimated that the German population will fall by 4 million during the same period and thus the percentage of the foreign population will continue to increase. Economic Effects of Foreign Labour

3

1. In Turkey The most significant effect is the foreign exchange remittances, which contribute towards the Turkish balance of payments. The greatest part of these transfers comes from Turkish workers in the Federal Republic of Germany. In Table 3, workers' remittances are compared to Turkey's trade deficit, which underscores the significance of these transfers. It cannot, however, be claimed that the foreign exchange received was appropriately in­ vested. Most of the remittances go to consumption, and thus have an inflationary effect. Another effect is the relief of the Turkish labour market. However, Turkish foreign labour represents only a small proportion of the unemployed in Turkey. About 1 million children reach working age every year, and an estimated 600,000 press onto the labour market; Tur­ key's export of labour into the E C has only reached comparable figures over a period of twenty years. 185

Table 3: Comparison of remittances by emigrant workers and the trade deficit in Turkey Year

1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986

Trade Deficit $ m.

126 108 228 162 268 264 360 494 678 769 2,245 3,338 3,168 4,043 2,310 2,802 5,000 4,230 3,097 3,507 3,623 3,385 3,648

Foreign Exchange by Emigrant Labour $m

As % of Trade Deficit

8.1 69.8 115.3 93.0 107.3 140.6 273.0 471.3 740.1 1,183.2 1,426.2 1,312.3 982.7 981.7 983.0 1,694.4 2,071.1 2,490.0 2,187.0 1,513.0 1,807.0 l',774.3 1,597.0

6.4 64.6 50.6 57.4 40.0 53.3 75.8 95.4 109.2 Î53.9 63.5 39.3 31.0 24.4 42.6 60.5 41.4 59.0 71.0 43.1 49.9 52.4 43.8

Source: Turkish Ministry of Commerce.

Third, the propensity to save on the part of the Turkish workers is relatively high. Their savings in the Federal Republic of Germany are estimated at D M 20-30 billion. Attempts to mobilise these savings for the development of the country, however, have been unsuccessful owing to a lack of confidence. A pilot project for re-integration of Turkish workers and their savings has so far not had any success. Forth, an economic self-help initiative by Turkish workers abroad is to invest their sav­ ings in ' 'foreign labour companies'', in Turkey. As can be seen in Table 4, until 1980 these "employees' companies" had approximately 234,000 members (104,000 of whom were foreign workers) and had started 180 projects, 100 of which were realised. The total number ofjobs to be created by realising all of the projects is estimated to be about 20,000, but taking into consideration secondary employment effects, this figure Wild be approximately 40,000. To what extent these companies will promote the development process in Turkey depends on their success. To date-, however, the majority of the "employees' companies" have failed due to poor management and marketing, unfavourable location, and too little in­ vestment capital.

186

2. In the Federal Republic of Germany Turkish employees noticeably relieve the German labour market and the bottlenecks ex­ isting there. Even with 2 million unemployed, the German economy cannot do without Tur­ kish labour in many sectors. Moreover, the inflow of foreign labour has promoted the relatively undisturbed growth of the German economy. In the main, Turkish labour is employed in branches of industry in which jobs are considered unattractive by German workers, but which are nevertheless indispensable for a modern economy, such as the building industry, mining, or garbage col­ lection. Table 4: The Structure of the Employee's Companies (1980) Number of companies

Registered capital (İn million TL)

Investment (in million TL)

Members a) total b) foreign labour

Total of gainfully employed

100

3,555

8,289

a) 162,129 b) 78,775

10,942

Projects m the investment Phase

63

2,000

7,728

a) 65,854 b) 25,549

8,143

Projects in the planning Phase

17

169

2,401

a) 6,463 b) 449

1,668

180

5,724

18,418

a) 234,446 b) 104,773

20,753

Realized projects (companies)

Total

Source: T . C . Çalışma Bakanlığı, Yurtdışı işçi Sorunları 1981 (Ankara, 1981), p. 33.

Third, foreign labour supply has made employment more elastic, curbing wage increases and thus maintaining competitiveness in exports. Without foreign labour, the tendency to in­ flation existing in almost all countries would most probably have spread considerably in Germany. Fourth, on the other hand, the possibility of employing unlimited numbers of foreign wor­ kers has removed the incentive to invest capital for rationalisation purposes and thereby hin­ dered the increase in productivity. Freedom of Movement in the EC Apart from tree mobility of goods and capital, full economic integration also requires freedom of movement of workers. A common market without inter-state freedom of move­ ment of persons would be inconceivable. To raise basic objections in this matter would mean to disapprove the idea of an economic community and to replace it by the narrower idea of a customs union. The legal foundations for the freedom of movement of workers within the E C are laid down in the Treaty of Rome, Articles 48-50. According to the Treaty, freedom of movement 187

of workers means "the abolition of any differentiated treatment of workers of member states based on nationality with regard to employment, remuneration and other working conditions". Freedom of movement, however, may be limited for reasons of public policy, security and health. Migration of workers from non-member countries is regulated by bilateral agreements between the individual member states of the Community and non-member countries. These agreements provide for collective migration regulated by governmental commissions. Thus individual migration is not possible. The details regarding freedom of movement are laid down in the so-called E C regulations. The particular phases of development of the freedom of movement of workers are indicated therein. 4

5

6

1) Regulation No. 15/1961

7

The regulation provides direct, established law for all member states. The jurisdiction for this no longer remains with the national states but with the institutions of the EC. The most significant articles of the regulation are: — Every worker of a member state is entitled to carry out paid employment in another member state, if, within a period of three weeks, no national applicant has been found (Art. 1). —- In the case of proper employment the applicants, after a period of one year, are entitled to the extension of their work permit for the same job, after a period of three years for another job within their scope of knowledge, and after a period of four years they are entitled to any job under the same conditions that apply for national employees (Art. 6). — Spouses as well as children under the age of 21 may join the employee i f he can prove adequate living quarters (Art. 11). 2) Regulation No. 38/1964

8

This regulation enlarges the freedom of movement for workers within the Community. According to this regulation the priority for the domestic labour market is abolished and workers from other member states have a right to a work permit. This permit is not dependent on the above-mentioned period of three weeks (Art. 1). However, the abolishment of the priority for the domestic labour market can be annulled in the event that there is an excess supply of labour in a particular profession or in a specific sector (Art. 2). The principle of equality of treatment was enlarged by granting the same rights and privileges as nationals hâve in obtaining accommodation (Art. 10). The work permit is aot regionally limited and may not, with the exception of the first year, be limited to one particular employer. 3) Regulation No. 16Î2/1968

9

With this regulation, complete freedom of movement of workers within the Community was realised before the end of the transitional period (31 December 1969): — The obligation to seek jobs through labour exchanges is lifted. Article 1 states: "Every national of a member state is entitled to carry out a job within the wage and salary condi188

tions in the territory of another member state in accordance with the legal and administrative provisions applicable to employees in the said state." The exception is the sector of public administration, as per Article 48/4 of the E E C Treaty. — For the purpose of finding a job, applicants are entitled to remain in another member state for a period of three months without a residence permit. In the event that the applicant finds employment, he will be given a residence permit for a period of five years (exceptions are only possible for reasons of public policy, security or health). — A work permit is no longer necessary. However, proof of accommodation is still necessary for the reunification of families. Also in those cases where, as a result of disturbances in the labour market, if serious danger to the standard of living and employment arises, suitable information measures must be taken in accordance with Article 20, in ^, order that nationals of the other member states do not seek employment in a particular area or profession. — The principle of equal treatment was again enlarged upon and now includes, among others, remuneration, improvements, professional training and re-training, social and tax benefits, etc. The regulation regarding freedom of movement was supplemented by further regulations, namely 1251/1970, 1407/1971 and 574/1972. Thus formal obstacles to migration on the labour markets within the Community were essentially abolished and considerable progress toward integration was achieved. But there are still unresolved problems, and in order to solve these, increased co-ordination of employment policy will be needed by the Community. Provisions of the Law on the Freedom of Movement of Turkish Workers Labour migration from Turkey into the E C has lately become the most serious problem between Ankara and Brussels. The Association Agreement of 1963 between the E C and Turkey provided that the partners "be guided by Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the EEC-Treaty, in order to establish step-by-step freedom of movement of workers" (Article 12). The Agreement also provides for lifting the restrictions on freedom of establishment and freedom to perform services between Turkey and the E C (Articles 13 and 14). However, the inflow of Turkish workers into the E C which started in the 1960s, was, to a large extent, independent of the Association Agreement. Turkey's labour export was based solely on the bilateral agreements between Turkey and the individual E C states. In the negotiations concerning entry into the transition phase of the Association Agreement, the regulations on the freedom of movement of Turkish workers were of great importance. Article 36 of the Additional Protocol states that "the freedom of movement of workers between the member states of the Community and Turkey will be established step by step between the end of the 12th and the 22nd year of the coming into effect of said Agreement in accordance with the principles of Article 12 of the Association Agreement". Also, with regard to working conditions, remuneration and social security, Turkish workers were to be treated in the same manner as citizens of the member states. Article 37 of the Additional Protocol lays down that "each member state provides a regulation for workers of Turkish nationality employed in the Community that working conditions and remuneration show no discrimination of workers who are not nationals of other member states owing to nationality". 189

Admittedly, at the beginning of the 1970s the problems of foreign labour became quite obvious in the Federal Republic of Germany. These problems led to a recruitment stop of foreign labour from non-member countries at the same time as the Additional Protocol came into effect. Thus the realisation of the regulations of the Additional Protocol was jeopardised. Turkey considers this measure a violation of the spirit of the Association Agreement. Already in 1976 the Turkish government wanted to start the realisation of the freedom of movement provided in the Additional Protocol. After the meeting of the Association Council had been twice postponed, both parties reached an agreement. This agreement provided a first four-year step for the realisation of Article 36 of the Additional Protocol. However, during this period (until 20 December, 1980) the measures to be taken were limited in that only the situation of Turks already working in the Community could be improved. In further intensive negotiations between the E C and Turkey in 1979 and 1980, the problem of labour was again the central issue. The initial position on either side, however, had not changed and therefore no progress was made during the negotiations with regard to the stepby-step realisation of freedom of movement of labour. As a result, the opening of the German and the wider European labour market for Turkish labour did not materialise. 10

In the meantime the basic policy on the freedom of movement of labour was revised, particularly on the insistence of the Federal Republic of Germany, but the other member states of the E C tacitly endorsed this policy. Freedom of movement as promised in the agreements and protocols seems to be out-dated owing to the changes in the world economy. Alternatives and priorities, however, have not yet been established. Economic Development in the European Community and the Federal Republic of Germany. From the foundation of the E C until the oil crisis of 1973-74, the Community was able to record a fast growth. These times seem to belong to the past: growth of G N P has since slowed down. At present there are over 12 million unemployed in the Community; the Federal Republic of Germany has recorded the greatest increase. Companies had to reduce their capacities and some E C countries experienced record deficits in the balance of trade. The late 1970s was also a period of high inflation. Youth unemployment in the Community is one of the most significant problems. There are 4 million young people among the unemployed, approximately 40 per cent of the total. Although numerous special measures have been introduced to fight youth unemployment, young people remained the primary victims of the recession period. Youth unemployment will remain a problem until the E C succeeds with its macroeconomic measures to bring about an improvement of the general economic and employment situation." The most significant cause of all this negative development is the fact that the economies of the E C countries had difficulty in adapting to new world economic conditions. The changes in world economic conditions were caused in the main by the rise in crude oil prices (in particular by the energy import prices), by the world-wide inflation, and the international monetary fluctuations that impaired investment activity. In fact, the macroeconomic measures introduced by the E C did manage to achieve some of the targets. A slight improvement in the international economic climate in 1983-1985 could not be overlooked. Prices in most E C countries no longer rose as quickly as they did two years previously; in 1986 inflation declined further; interest rates everywhere are lower 190

Table 5: Ratios of Economic Development in Selected Industrial Countries 1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1984

1983

a) Industrial production — proportional changes in comparison with the previous period, per cent. Belgium FRG France Netherlands EC-10 USA Japan

2.4 2.0 1.6 0.9 2.5 5.7 6.2

4.3 5.5 4.7 2.8 4.9 4.4 8.4

-1.0 -0.8 -0.7 0 -0.8 -3.6 7.1

-2.9 -1.4 -2.3 -1.8 -2.2 2.7 3.2

0 -2.4 -1.5 -2.7 -1.6 -8.2 1.0

2.0 0.6 0.8 2.1 0.9 7.8 3.6

2.5 3.0 2.3 5.2 2.8 12.4 11.1

b) Rate of unemployment — as percent of civil working population. Belgium FRG France Netherlands EC-9 USA Japan

8.4 3.9 5.2 4.1 5,4 6.0 2.2

8.7 3.4 6.0 4.1 5.4 5.8 2.1

9.4 3.4 6.4 4.7 6.0 7.1 2.0

11.6 4.8 7.8 7.2 7.9 7.6 2.2

13.7 6.9 8.8 10.0 9.5 9.7 2.4

14.3 8.4 8.8 14.3 10.4 9.6 2.7

14.4 8.4 9.9 14.5 10.9 7.5 2.7

4.5 4.1 10.7 4.3 10.2 11.3 3.6

6.6 5.5 13.6 7.0 14.1 13.5 8.0

7.6 5.9 13.4 6.9 12.6 10.3 5.0

8.7 5:3 12,0 5.9 10.7 6.2 2.6

7.7 3.3 9.6 2.7 8.3 3.2 1.9

6.4 2.4 7.3 3.2 7.2 4.3 2.2

-2,064 8,939 -6,194 -2,622 •22,961 -27,146 -5,574

-4,993 3,615 -16,948 -2,981 -47,829 -26,113 -7,700

-5,418 i 1.239 -17,283 1,320 -32,034 -35,538 7,831

-3,082 21,599 -24,457 3,500 -28,344 -43,518 7,034

-2,435 18,501 -15,628 4,499 -20,422 -77,969 23,072

c) Consumer prices — annual increase, per cent. Belgium/Luxemburg FRG France Netherlands EC-10 USA Japan

4,5 2,7 9.1 4.2 7.6 7.6 3.8

d) Trade balance, in million E C U , Belgium/Luxemburg FRG France Netherlands EC-10 USA Japan

-2,890 1,5967 -4,081 -2,198 -5,782 -31,014 14,285

-4,S91 24,136 -13,130 4,740 -24,086 -15,628 42,599

Source: E C Commission, Directorate General of Economy and Finance, European Economy: Supplement A, no 3 (March, 1983); Supplement A , no 1 (January, 1986); Supplement A , no 2 (February, 1986).

than in 1981; most countries have managed to check their deficits in the budget; a number of E C countries took steps to reduce their public spending; oil has become cheaper; wages do not rise as fast as they did previously. In some of the Western countries the economy has recovered. For 1986 the following growth rates were projected: Federal Republic of Germany 3.3 per cent, England 2.3 per cent, USA 2.7 per cent and Japan 3.5 per cent. Progress can also be seen in the recapitalisation of the E C net visible and invisible exports. In 1986 the trade balance was expected to profit from the relative development of the export and import volume as well as from an improvement in the terms of trade. These improvements, however, cannot hide the dimensions the economic problems have assumed. The old, well-proven remedies do not work any longer. The exchange rates of the 12

191

key currencies fluctuate considerably and add a further element of uncertainty. Protectionist developments in world trade do not cease. Interest rates have dropped but when deducting the rate of inflation from the interest rates, there still remains an extremely high real rate of interest. When interest rates are high everywhere, it is nevertheless attractive to invest money in papers yielding high interest instead of using the money for buying capital goods for creating new jobs. Thus it is obvious that it will be difficult to reduce unemployment in the E C countries to any great extent, as long as the rate of interest remains high. Also it cannot be said with absolute certainty that the measures undertaken by the E C will suffice to make possible a lasting and self-sustaining recovery. The economy of the Federal Republic of Germany is also in the process of adapting to new conditions: payment of taxes on oil, high interest policy of the United States, more increase in wages than in productivity (cost-push inflation), weak German competitive ability, etc. Although the economy has slightly recovered and the balance of payments shows once more a surplus, there are at present 2.3 million unemployed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Unemployment has become the number one subject. Unemployment in the Federal Republic of Germany is of a structural nature, reflecting the after-effects of the years with a high birth-rate (beginning of the 1960s) on mass unemployment, particularly amongst the young people. In 1985, for example, more than 180,000 young people remained without training and work. About 200,000 new workers per annum from the high birth-rate years will still be pressing into the labour force until 1990, 150,000 of them German and a further 50,000 foreign labour. The latest forecasts of the Institute of Labour Market and Professional Research refute the hope that soon there will be an improvement of the labour market situation. According to these forecasts gaps amounting to several million jobs are expected oyer the next ten years. This result, however, would be modified if different growth rates were assumed. In this connection the individual results of the findings by the Institute are of interest. Apart from demographic situation and economic growth, the most important factors that determine labour supply and demand are productivity and working hours. Taking these into consideration, the Institute of Labour Market and Professional Research has developed three scenarios based on growth rates and different policies regarding labour migration. These are as follows. Scenario 1: The number of foreign gainfully employed persons increases by 55,000 per annum, by the moving up of the second generation of foreigners as well as by further migration of foreigners. In view of the southern Enlargement of the E C , a further additional migration of foreigners to the tune of 30,000 persons per annum is expected in 1988. a) If economic growth in the coming years comes to an average of 2-2.5 per cent, then the demand for labour will steadily decrease. In this case the number of unemployed in the Federal Republic of Germany will be about 4.4 million in 1990,4.5 million in 1995, and approximately 4 million in 2000. b) Should economic growth in the coming years average 3 per cent, then it is expected that the demand for labour will remain unchanged. The number of unemployed will increase at first (until 1990) and then drop, according to tendency, and will then reach today's figure again only in the year 2000 (2.5 million unemployed). Scenario 2: No migration of foreigners. The growth of gainfully employed foreigners will only be the result of those foreigners born in the Federal Republic of Germany (the second generation of foreigners reaching working age). 13

14

15

192

a) Should economic growth amount to an average of 2-2.5 per cent, then there will be about 3.9 million unemployed in 1990, 3.1 million in 1995, and in the year 2000, 3 million unemployed in the Federal Republic of Germany. b) If economic growth amounts to 3-3.5 per cent, then unemployment is not removed but under control. At the close of the century full employment could be achieved. c) Should the economic growth amount to 4-4.5 per cent, then the labour market problem will just about retain its present dimensions until 1990. During the 1990s full employment could be achieved. Scenario 3: The number of foreign labour remains constant (2.5 million). However, this could only be possible by repatriating a portion of second generation of foreigners reaching working age. In this case the labour market situation would be improved in all three growth variants. At a growth rate of 3-3.5 per cent full employment would be achieved towards the close of the century, at a rate of 4-4.5 per cent, already prior to 1995. In either case labour supply would even exceed labour demand at the turn of the century. Some significant results can be deduced from the calculations of the Institute for Labour Market and Professional Research. 1. There is no fool-proof remedy for the elimination of mass unemployment. Apart from low growth rate, world-wide recession, automation and rationalisation hinder the reduction in unemployment. Furthermore the increase in foreign population in the Federal Republic of Germany and the expansion of the E C aggravate the employment problem. Therefore new strategies are needed to fight mass unemployment. 2. At an economic growth rate of under 3 per cent, the target of full employment will in no case be reached in the Federal Republic of Germany in this century. What is more, in this case the difference between supply and demand will increase. 3. In the event that the growth rate over the next years reaches an average of over 4 per cent, then full employment could be achieved in the 1990s. Since the population of the Federal Republic of Germany has been decreasing since the 1970s, recruitment of foreign labour would, in such a case, be unavoidable, unless the gap would be filled by automation and rationalisation. Conclusion The discussion so far has shown that the Federal Republic of Germany in particular has reached its absorbtion capacity limit as far as foreigners are concerned. The Federal and Länder governments have even decided that the foreign population in the Federal Republic of Germany may not increase, not even in the event that the labour market situation should happen to improve again. That means that the freedom of movement of Turkish workers within the E C planned for 1986 cannot be realised in Germany under the present conditions. On the other hand, the step-by-step realisation of the freedom of movement was contractually guaranteed to Turkey. We have not investigated what compensations the E C could offer in the event of non-performance of the regulations of the Association Agreement and the Additional Protocol. This will be an important item in future negotiations between Turkey and the EC. Renunciation of the freedom of movement will have to be accompanied by economic compensations. 193

The problem of foreign labour reveals itself as a complicated, difficult and serious prob­ lem not only in the host countries but also in Turkey. The present stagnation in the relations between Turkey and the E C gives pause for thought. Solutions have to be found, but there are many questions and few answers. As regards these problems, experts from both governments should work out a concept as quickly as possible, which, on the one hand, would relieve the Federal Republic of Ger­ many from the pressure of Turkish workers, and, on the other, would properly get Turkey started on finding a solution to its economic and social problems. Even the universities and research institutes of both countries should seriously look into these problems and make constructive suggestions for the solution of these problems. Until the problem of the free­ dom of movement has been cleared, the Federal Government should not take unilateral measures and should always discuss the question of Turkish workers with the Turkish go­ vernment. It is of the utmost importance that Turkish workers are not forcefully sent home and that no pressure is applied in this direction, since such a policy would gravely strain German-Turkish relations. It should also be noted that the Federal Republic of Germany be­ ars particular responsibility for those foreign workers who migrated before recruitment was halted in 1973.

Notes

1 2 3 4 5 6

7 8 9 10 11 ' 12 13 14

15

Cf. A . Barışık, Turquie — OCDE: Systeme d'observation permanante des migrations (Ankara, 1982), p. 7ff. Avrupa Dergisi (Ankara: Eylül, 1982), p. 31. in connection with this problem cf. F . Voigt, "Die volkswirtschaftliche Bedeutung der ausländischen Arbeitskräfte", m Das Gastarbeiterproblem (München: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1975), pp. 17. Art. 48 (2) of the EEC-Treaty. Art. 48 (3) of the EEC-Treaty. Cf. H . Werner, "Freizügigkeit der Arbeitskräfte und die Wanderungsbewegungen in den Ländern der E G " , reprint from Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt' und Berufsforschung, vol. 6 (Stuttgart, 1973), p. 327. EC Gazette, no. 57 of 26 August 1961. EC Gazette, no, 62 of 17 April 1964. EC Gazette, no. L . 257 of 19 October 1968. Cf. H . Kramer, Die Türkei: Gefährdeter Partner der Allianz: Ansatzpunkte för Beiträge zur wirt­ schaftlichen, sozialen und sicherheitspolitischen Stabilisierung (Ebenhausen, 1981), p. 124. Cf. E C Commission, Directorate General of Economy and Finance, European Economy, Supplement A-No. 3 (March, 1983), p. 7. * Union of the Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Maritime Trade and Commodity Exchanges of Tur­ key, Economic Report 1986, p. 230, Table 112. Cf. L . Kippers, "Integrationspolitik aus Landessicht", in F. Almanya'da Çalışan Türk işçilerinin Toplu Dönüşleri Semineri (Bursa: Uludağ Üniversitesi, 1982), p. 163. The findings of the Institute for Labour Market and Professional Research have been taken from E . Rossberg's "Das Thema Nummer 1", in Scala 9 (1983), p. 15ff; D. Martens, "Zukünftig keine Vollbe­ schäftigung mehr?" Der Spiegel, no. 49, 6 December 1982, p. 34. It is supposed that productivity in the coming years will be poorer than in the past and that the working hours will continue to show the same trend, wifh-an annual reduction averaging about one per cent.

194

Chapter 12 Geoffrey Denton

Economic Implications for the Community of Turkish Membership

Assessments^ implications of Turkish membjasbipj^ .shji^TXirkeyj^ ' It involves forecasting a¬ bout 15-20 years ahead the economic development of the EC, the economic development of Turkey, and the development of Community membership and policies. Some guidance can be obtained from looking at the current impact on the E C if Turkey were to become a member now, but those indications must be second-best. The forecasting problems are also exacerbated by the very uncertain state of the world economy, given the great changes in technology, in the distribution of industrial production, and in world trade flows that are occurring. This paper will therefore attempt to assess the economic impact by using a com­ bination of current assessment and forecasting of the future developments. Section 1 will outline some existing facts about the structure of the Turkish economy and its trade and other relations with the EC, with special reference to comparisons with the states involved in the second Enlargement of the EC, Greece, Portugal and Spain. Section 2 will outline a scenario for the future shape of the E E C and its policies in 2000. Section 3 will make some guesses about the development of the Turkish economy between 1983 and 2000. Sec­ tion 4 will then attempt to combine the previous three sections to outline the impact Turkish membership may have on the EC, on the assumption that Turkey may join the Community about 2000. The assessments will all cover the four major economic areas that are relevant: industry, agriculture, budgetary and financial questions, and labour movements. 1. The Structure of the Turkish Economy as it affects the EC The Turkish population of 45m (1980) makes it one of the larger European countries, ran­ king with Germany, France, Italy and the U K in the EC-Ten, and with Spain among the pre­ sent Applicants for membership. The Turkish economy is, however, much smaller than that of the major E C countries. The G D P in 1980 was $54 billion compared with $280 billion for the U K and $620 billion for Germany. The G D P per capita in 1980 was only $1,200, compared with £ 5,000 in the U K and $ 9,580 for Germany. Even allowing for the normal problems of comparability of G D P statistics, the contrasts are so enormous that they imme­ diately reveal the crucial question about Turkish membership of the EC. While the size of the Turkish economy may be reassuring from the point of view of its potential for industrial competition with the existing members, its low income per capita is alarming because of the potential burden on the financing of E C regional and social policies. 2

195

The following list provides basic economic data for Turkey, with comparisons, where possible, with the EC-Nine, Greece, Portugal and Spain (GPS), and the EC-Twelve. There is no need for detailed verbal description of these statistical comparisons, but a few comments may pick out salient features. 1. Turkey has many features of an L D C at an early stage of the industrialisation process. Its GDP per capita is less than one quarter of the EC-Nine average, only two-fifths that of the poorest major country of the EC-Twelve (Spain, $ 2,900). 2. Turkey is a largely self-sufficient economy, except for dependence on oil, so far as visible trade is concerned. Its proportion of G D P traded (15 per cent) is lower than for most LDCs. These statistics are particularly unreliable, however, because oil price movements since 1973 have had a large impact on annual import values and the trade deficit and unofficial exports and imports go unrecorded but are thought to be massive. (Hale, 1981).' 3. Trade with the E C is lower as a percentage of total trade than for GPS, but is still substantial. (Imports from the EC-Nine, 29 per cent; exports to the EC-Nine, 43 per cent of total trade.) These statistics of E C trade dependence are, however, also strongly affected by the significance of oil in total imports, the increase in oil prices after 1973, and the consequential development of exports to and worker's remittances from the Middle East and North Africa. It is not certain how long this oil effect on reducing the proportion of Turkey's trade with the E C will continue, and for the longer term trade with the E C may be much more significant to Turkey than recent trends suggest. 4. Exports to the E C have a relatively simple structure. The major agricultural export, cotton, is not a competitor with existing EC-Nine, or GPS production. The second major export, hazelnuts, competes only with a very small Spanish export (in 1978). Dried grapes and figs, and oriental-type tobacco, compete with substantial exports from Greece to the EC-Nine. 5. Textiles are by far the most significant industrial product exported to the EC. Most tex¬ - tiles exports are classified as "sensitive", and they compete with exports from GPS, as well as with exports from many other countries, and with EC-Nine production. 6. The existing potential for Turkish competition in E C markets can be assessed on the basis of an index of "export similarity" as used by Donges (1982) . The index is defined as the percentage of exports of one country which is matched by another country's exports to the same market. Donges' results for the five most valuable Turkish exports to the EC-Nine were indices with respect to competition with Spain of 71.4; with Greece of 40.5, and with Portugal of only 6.6. (The overlap with Greece in exports of dried fruit and tobacco is apparent in Donges' tables. The explanation of the high index for trade with Spain is not.) 7. On the side of manufacturers, Turkey's concentration on the export of textiles, especially those classified as sensitive, indicates a high degree of export similarity with GPS, and with the EC-Nine's own production. Turkish exports of these products have been subjected to restrictions, despite the Association Agreement. 2

2. The European Community in 2000 To forecast the future of an institution like the E C thirteen years ahead is extremely difficult. This can be shown by reference to some surprising developments in the previous history of the Community, which could not have been forecast. Who would have believed in 1957, at the signing of the Treaty of Rome, that by 1966 a national veto would have been established with respect to any declared vital interest? Who, in 1960, or in 1963, would have forecast that by 1973 Britain and Denmark would have left EFTA and joined the EC? To describe the state of the EC in 2000 is to indulge, therefore, in speculation of the most airy kind. Nevertheless, it must be done if one is to provide any kind of basis for considering what kind of Community Turkey may be joining, or developing its Association with, by that year. The starting point must be a general appreciation of the political and economic situation in the world at large, since this must determine the pressures on the member states either to develop, or to run down the Community, or to allow it to stagnate. Politically, one must expect that the pressures that have in recent years caused a substantial development of political cooperation among the member states, even if outside the formal Community framework, will .continue. The power and influence of the US will continue to decline in comparative terms, while the dichotomy between the military strength and the political and economic weakness of the Soviet bloc will intensify. Political and economic instability in the Middle East, in Latin America and elsewhere must be expected to continue. The need for Western Europe to increase its co-operation in order to protect its interests in a rapidly evolving world order will be stronger than ever. Political co-operation may develop much more toward a common foreign policy, and this should lead to defence co-operation (common procurement, etc.) and to technological and industrial common policies. These in turn would require development of the Community's economic and financial structure and of its institutions. Economically, we should expect that the relative strength of the E C , together with that of the US and probably the Soviet bloc, will diminish relatively to the newly industrialising countries in East and South Asia, in Latin America, and in the Middle East. The recent easing of pressures in the markets for energy and other commodities may prove to be shortlived, and competition for both supplies of raw materials and markets for finished products, will intensify. High levels of unemployment will persist in the E C countries throughout the 1980s, but by the early 1990s we should expect that labour markets will have adjusted, with many and far-reaching social changes, so as to restore a new kind of reasonably full employment, but at lower levels of hours of work, longer holidays, earlier retirement, etc. Even if economic growth resumes at reasonably rapid rates, it will be different in kind from growth in the 1960s and early 1970s, emphasising services, using less energy and materials, and very economical in its demands on labour. The member states will find the E C institutional framework essential in co-ordinating their adaptations to the new work situation, in restoring full employment, avoiding the worst excesses of inflation, and maintaining a common external policy to secure their imports of energy and raw materials and the "orderly" marketing of their exports to third countries and imports from third countries into the EC. Thus for both political and economic reasons we must anticipate that the E C will be developing further in the direction of economic and political union during the period to 2000. There will of course be substantial resistance to this development. At various times the external pressures will lead to irrational and unhelpful "beggar-my-neighbour" poli-

196

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cies, such as the present "recapturing of the national market" that is popular in some member states. Not only the British Labour Party may persuade itself that a chauvinistic approach would be to the national advantage. But common sense must lead Western European nations to understand that the Community is even more important during a difficult economic period than it was during the period of rapid and stable growth in the 1960s; and that similarly the political and strategic benefits are most marked when the world scene is unsettled and the protection of the US "umbrella" has been diminshed. Although the accession of Portugal and Spain will have exacerbated the difficulties of the C A P by adding new dimensions of Mediterranean-type production and of net imports by poor countries of high-priced northern produce, the agricultural problems will have been ameliorated by another thirteen years of adaptation, including further massive outflows of labour from the land, notwithstanding the labour market problems that will thereby be exacerbated. The pressure of net importing countries to reduce the surpluses by maintaining lower intervention prices will have been strengthened by Portuguese and Spanish accession, while the resistance from the agricultural lobbies will have been weakened by the further reduction in the numbers of farmers. With increasing adaptation required of industrial workers, the priority given to farmers in the Rome Treaty, and since largely maintained, must be diminished. We may therefore expect that the CAP will take a smaller proportion of the E C Budget, and that more emphasis will have been placed on national measures, in so far as some national governments wish to provide support which other governments are not prepared to finance through the common policy. Industrial, including R & D, policy will be taking a larger share, as will regional and social policy, especially labour market policy. With such marked shifts in the emphasis of Community policies and financing, there will have been an increase in the VAT rate, despite the reluctance which will have been overcome by the late 1980s, as the problems or structural adaptation overtake those of stabilisation on governments' lists of priorities. These developments and changes in the balance of E C policies will have required substantial institutional changes. The national veto will have been more closely defined, and limited to the really vital areas, leaving scope for majority decision-making on many of the details of policy. The Council of Ministers will have improved its functioning by coordinating decisions of the Agriculture and other Ministers better with those of the Finance Ministers (on the Budget) and with the Foreign Ministers (on external political) including political-economic affairs. The Council Secretariat and the Permanent Delegations will have developed into a more satisfactory permanent "Cabinet Office" for the Community. The Parliament will have extended to some extent its powers, both over many of the new areas of policy in which its deliberations will have been important in determining common policies, and over the increased size and more balanced and varied scope of the Budget. The Commission will not have developed so much its role as legislative initiator, but will increasingly operate as an executive to handle the increasing load of responsibility for implementing Community policies. Vie Development of the Turkish Economy to 1995 The Turkish population was still growing at a rate of over 2 per cent per annum in 1975-80. Assuming that growth continues at aVate not much lower than this, the population by 2000 would be around 65 million. Since population in other E C countries will be grow198

ing much slower, if at all, Turkey will probably be more populous by the last years of the century than any other EC-Twelve member state except Germany. To forecast any other developments than the demographic ones requires some assumptions,, which are at least as formidable as those needed in Section 2 to assess the future development of the E C and its policies. However, if developments in the Turkish economy are unfavourable, membership of the E C in 2000 will be out of the question. Therefore the only relevant assumptions are those that would create the conditions in which Turkey could be in a position actively to seek E C membership, and to be accepted by the EC-Twelve. The Turkish economy has in the last decades been growing much faster than that of the EC-Nine or the EC-Twelve. Real G D P rose 5 1/2 times between 1950 and 1980. Since population more than doubled, per capita growth was lower, but even so per capita G D P rose more than 2 1/2 times in the same thirty years. Rates of economic growth were higher than the German, and twice as high as the U K growth rates. These typical statistics for a developing country in the "take-off phase were matched by other indicators; literacy rates doubled from 19 to 41 per cent of the total, proportion of GDP contributed by agriculture fell from 41 to 27 per cent, while that contributed by industry grew from 13 to 28 per cent. Extrapolation of these data to 2000 is not possible. A progressive slowing down in rates of growth and structural change is a normal statistical feature of economic development. Moreover, many changes in Turkey, and in the world economy could affect its economic development. However, the best assumption, and one that matches the condition that Turkey must develop if membership of the E C is to be a live issue, is that growth rates will continue to be faster than those in the more mature EC-Twelve economies. The growth of industry and decline of agriculture as percentages of the working population and of the G D P will continue, though at a lower rate. The G D P should continue to grow at a formidable rate, to 2000. Both such developments will increase the significance of Turkey as a market for E C exports and a competitor in E C markets. The increase in GDP per capita relative to that of other E C countries will reduce the gap between Turkish and EC-Twelve social standards, while at the same time the growth of population will increase the numbers for whom that gap may have to be filled by E C policies. On the side of agricultural trade, the probability is that investment in Turkish agriculture will develop new competitive products for which the Turkish climate provides an adequate basis. These could include, for example, citrus fruits, in which Spanish membership already raises problems, and there are other important Mediterranean producers such as Israel . On the side of industrial trade, the Turkish economy will move into more efficient production, and export to the EC, of a more diversified range of products. These could include more clothing and other finished textiles, but also footwear and labour intensive goods such as electronics components and consumer durables, which are already exported to non-EC markets. On the side of Turkish imports, the demand for capital goods, machinery etc. should continue to grow with the further industrialisation of the economy. Demand for consumer goods should grow less rapidly, since the channelling of resources into development will continue to hold down personal disposable income. The effects of Turkish industrial competition in the markets of the EC-Twelve will be uneven. The strongest competition will be with the Mediterranean countries, especially Greece, Portugal and Spain. Among the existing members of the EC-Nine, it will also af199

feet most strongly those economies, such as the British, that have been slow to adapt their industrial structures to higher technology, less labour intensive production. Meanwhile, the opportunities to exploit the growing market in Turkey for capital goods will go to those economies, such as the German, which have concentrated on those kinds of production. The unevenness in the impact of Turkish competition will create problems mainly for the poorer, rather than for the richer E C countries. The Impact of Turkish membership on the EC-Twelve Since Turkey in 2000 will have a population close to that of Greece, Portugal and Spain (GPS) taken together, but with a G D P per capita still much lower, it must be expected to add more to the budgetary burden on the E C than the net total of GPS. Application of C A P common prices to Turkish production of northern agricultural products, especially wheat, assuming existing policies are not made much cheaper by reforms between 1983 and 2000, will be very costly. Successful agricultural development could well make Turkey a consistent and major net exporter of cereals. Application of more generous policies than those currently in operation to Mediterranean-type agriculture, would be costly to apply to existing Turkish production, which will be expanded both by internal agricultural policies and by the stimulus of C A P support. As a still backward agricultural producer, however, Turkey would also expect a large share in the CAP'S Guidance Fund. Turkey's poverty and wide discrepancies in development between western and eastern regions will qualify it for a large share in the Regional Fund. Unemployment problems in Turkey remain more pressing even if the 1990s see a restoration of full employment in the E C , therefore calls on the Social Fund will be large. Meanwhile, on the revenue side, relatively low proportions of imports to G D P will keep down the Turkish contributions of duties, and of levies, to the Budget, while the low level of G D P per capita will mean VAT revenue contributions will be less than proportionate to Turkey's share in E C population. The impact on the E C Budget will therefore be almost entirely "negative", and raise financial problems at least as great as those provoked by the accession of GPS. The distribution of these budgetary burdens among the EC-Nine will however be the inverse of the distribution of the burden of increased Turkish competition in industrial and agricultural trade. Assuming that the poorer members of the EC-Twelve (GPS, Ireland, Italy) are able to maintain a position of net beneficiaries from the EC, and that they are not expected to contribute much if at all to carrying the budgetary burden of Turkish membership, the main budgetary impact would fall on the richer countries (Germany, France, Denmark, Netherlands and Belgium).

as the natural source of aid in soiving payments problems. Turkish membership of an E C monetary union which may have been created by 2000 would probably be delayed still further, but eventual membership of such a union, or association at least with exchange rate management^schemes such as the E M S , would "internalise" Turkey's financial problems witn n me EC. Labour mobility has been an important means of improving Turkey's unemployment situation, while at the same time emigrants' remittances have been making a

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^ °' ° P y ' P e m s . Social problems in the richer industrialised EC-Twelve countries are likely to continue to impose some constraints on the flow of migrant workers. More seriously, in the 1980s the high levels of unemployment will mean there is little demand for migrant workers, and the flow is likely to be very small With the expected (hoped for) restoration of full employment in the 1990s, and the application of the principle of free movement of labour to Turkey after membership, some flow of workers is likely to resume. If conditions are such that this flow is recreated, it would not be a burden but a contribution to the economies of the E C member states that must have a demand for it if it is to exist. E C policy is likely to be put off full freedom of movement to the end of a long transition period, say to 2010 (assuming 2000 as the date of accession). However, the demand for migrant workers in the more industrial member states is likely to be a far more important determinant of the flow than policy, 1 0

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Notes

1 2

William Hale, The Political and Economic Development of Modem Turkey (London 1981) J.B. Dönges, et.al., The Second Enlargement of the European Community (Tübingen, 1982).

Although the budgetary impact will probably be the most transparent, as for the Second Enlargemant, the question of financial flows to Turkey will have even greater significance than for GPS. Turkey has already received substantial financing from the European Investment Bank (EIB) under the first three Financial Protocols to the Association Agreement, and implementations of the Fourth Protocol will extend this financial aid. Although Turkey has also been the recipient of much financial aid from other sources, including the O E C D , IMF, and private multinational banks, it must be assumed that it will continue in the 1990s to make large demands on E C sources. This will be both because its payments problems and debt service ratio difficulties must be expected to be more prolonged than those of GPS, and because if E C membership is to become a real issue, E C financial assistance will be seen 200

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