Transition and Globalization in a Muslim State
YILDIZ ATASOY
II.B.TAU RIS
P u b l i s h e d i n 2 0 0 5 by L B . T a...
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Transition and Globalization in a Muslim State
YILDIZ ATASOY
II.B.TAU RIS
P u b l i s h e d i n 2 0 0 5 by L B . T a u r i s & C o L t d 6 Salem Road, London W 2 4 B U 175 F i f t h A v e n u e , N e w Y o r k N Y 10010 w w w . ibtauris .com
For m y parents, F a t m a a n d M e h m e t N e d i m Atasoy, A n d for m y husband, Kenjalowica, W i t h love a n d gratitude
In the U n i t e d States o f A m e r i c a a n d C a n a d a distributed by P a i g r a v e M a c m i l l a n a d i v i s i o n o f St. M a r t i n ' s Press 175 F i f t h A v e n u e , N e w Y o r k N Y 10010
C o p y r i g h t © 2005 Y i l d i z A t a s o y
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Contents
List of Tables
ix
Acknowledgements
xi
1
I s l a m i n G l o b a l P o l i t i c s : T h e o r e t i c a l Perspectives
1
2
A S e c u l a r Vision
3
T h e Islamist S e a r c h for S e l f h o o d
60
4-
T h e C o l d W a r a n d the C r e a t i o n o f a N a t i o n a l Bourgeoisie
85
5
T h e Islamist N a t i o n a l V i e w
115
6
C o s m o p o l i t a n Islamists a n d G l o b a l i z a t i o n
146
7
T u r k i s h Islamists i n the P o s t - C o l d W a r State System
177
of Modernity
23
References
191
Index
215
List of Tables
Ï.
T h e Ethnic Distribution of Capital and Labour in Large O t t o m a n M a n u f a c t u r i n g industries. 1915
51
2.
Exports, Imports, T r a d e Balance, and Worker Remittances
112
3.
External Debt
114
4.
D i s t r i b u t i o n by R e g i o n o f the Largest P r i v a t e I n d u s t r i a l C o r p o r a t i o n s , 3 980
5.
U S M i l i t a r y A s s i s t a n c e , 1950-1980
118
130
6. Imam-Hatip L y c é e G r a d u a t e s W h o H a v e T a k e n J o b s i n the C l e r i c a l Professions
157
Acknowledgements
D u r i n g m y g r a d u a t e e d u c a t i o n a n d subsequent research it b e c a m e i n c r e a s i n g l y clear h o w i m p o r t a n t
it is t o
understand
world
h i s t o r i c a l context
and
to
overcome the l i m i t a t i o n s o f c o n v e n t i o n a l ways o f t h i n k i n g about social liiè. It was w h i l e w r i t i n g m y d i s s e r t a t i o n at the U n i v e r s i t y o f T o r o n t o that I first h a d an o p p o r t u n i t y to integrate these insights into m y w o r k . A t t h a t t i m e , I b e c a m e deeply engaged i n e x a m i n i n g t r a n s n a t i o n a l ^ l i n k e d , yet l o c a l l y d i s t i n c t , Islamist practices. A s I d e v e l o p e d m y thoughts o n the subject, m y w o r k c a m e to reflect a particular theory o f Islamic politics with a historical, comparative, and global perspective. M v c o n t e n t i o n is that I s l a m i c p o l i t i c s embodies h i s t o r i c a l l y situated social relations that express the m a t e r i a l a n d discursive c o n d i t i o n s associated w i t h b o t h domestic a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l power d y n a m i c s . M a n y people have c o n t r i b u t e d to m y i n t e l l e c t u a l g r o w t h . T h e w r i t i n g s of G i o v a n n i A r r i g h i , F r e d B l o c k , H a r r i e t F r i e d m a n n , P h i l i p M c M i c h a e i , K e e s v a n der P i j l , a n d C h a r l e s T i l l y were p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t to the development of m y ideas. I a m g r e a t l y i n d e b t e d to H a r r i e t F r i e d m a n n , m y thesis supervisor at the U n i v e r s i t y o f T o r o n t o , w h o helped me w i t h the p r e l i m i n a r y research a n d d i r e c t e d me to m a n y p r e v i o u s works o f p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y a n d h i s t o r i c a l c o m p a r a t i v e analysis. S p e c i f i c a l l y , K a r l Polanyi's The Great Transformation F r e d B l o c k ' s The Origins of International
and
Economic Disorder were c e n t r a l to the
overall project. T h e s e texts enabled me to fashion a research
strategy
that
incorporates the s e e m i n g l y d i s p a r a t e d y n a m i c s o f p o l i t i c a l I s l a m into a l a r g e r structural
framework
for
understanding
the
u n d e r l y i n g process
of global
transformations. I a m also i n d e b t e d to P h i l i p M c M i c h a e i o f C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y , w h o has p r o v i d e d m e w i t h i n s i g h t f u l c o m m e n t a r y o n m y work. T h i s book was w r i t t e n w h i l e I was t e a c h i n g , a d v i s i n g g r a d u a t e students, a n d c o m p l e t i n g a n o t h e r p r o j e c t on M u s l i m women's v e i l i n g i n C a n a d a a n d T u r k e y . T h e support
of m y
colleagues at S i m o n Fraser U n i v e r s i t y m a d e
it
possible for me to p u s h a h e a d w i i h the b o o k despite the d e m a n d s o f reaching. I n the p l a n n i n g stages o f the b o o k I benefited f r o m the suggestions o f R o b e r t B r y m of the U n i v e r s i t y o f T o r o n t o , W i l l i a m K . C a r r o l l o f the U n i v e r s i t y o f V i c t o r i a , a n d G e r a r d o O t e r o o f S i m o n Fraser University. I also owe m a n y thanks to the M u s l i m intellectuals a n d students w h o m I met d u r i n g m y research i n T u r k e y . T i l ™ VinHKj sh^rpH tVir-^ir v i e w s fin ïsiamisf nolitics i n the m a n v fascinating"
Xll
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
I w o u l d like to thank J a n e S p r i n g e r for her helpful comments o n the i n i t i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the text. I a m also grateful to Lesley C a m e r o n for copy e d i t i n g
1
the m a n u s c r i p t a n d to W i l s o n N a m for his t e c h n i c a l assistance i n typesetting. I n a d d i t i o n , I have benefited from the c o m m e n t s o f several a n o n y m o u s reviewers.
Islam in Global Politics: Theoretical Perspectives
P o r t i o n s o f C h a p t e r 6 were first p u b l i s h e d i n Studies in Political Economy ( V o l u m e 7 1 / 7 2 A u t u m n 2 0 0 3 / W i n t e r 2004). Parts o f C h a p t e r 7 have been previously p u b l i s h e d i n Global Shaping and Its Alternatives,
edited by Y i l d i z A t a s o y a n d
W i l l i a m K . C a r r o l l ( A u r o r a a n d B l o o m f i e l d : G a r a m o n d Press a n d K u m a r i a n Press, 2003). W i t h o u t K e n J a l o w i c a , m y h u s b a n d , I c a n o n l y wonder w h e n this b o o k w o u l d have been completed. I a m very grateful for his willingness to spend
f
I
<(he 11 S e p t e m b e r 2001 attacks o n the W o r l d T r a d e C e n t e r a n d Pentagon
o f this work, w h i l e he
1
u n l e a s h e d a g l o b a l f u r o r over the 'terrorist' activities o f the a i - Q a e d a
h i m s e l f was v e r y busy teaching at K w a n t l e n U n i v e r s i t y C o l l e g e . K e n gave freely
Jt
network
countless hours r e a d i n g a n d e d i t i n g m u l t i p l e drafts
and
the
T a l i b a n . President
Bush
i m m e d i a t e l y identified
o f his t i m e to discuss m a n y h i g h l y c h a l l e n g i n g issues a n d helped me to express
m e m b e r s o f these groups as ' w i c k e d evildoers' w h o represent a grave threat to
m y ideas m o r e clearly. H i s patience, enthusiasm, a n d faith i n this project were
the U n i t e d States. A w o r l d w i d e c a m p a i g n was l a u n c h e d against t e r r o r i s m a n d
remarkable.
a i l those w h o are, as B u s h p u t it, 'against us'. J o u r n a l i s t s , p o l i t i c i a n s , p o l i c y
M y greatest debt is to m y w o n d e r f u l parents, F a t m a a n d M e h m e t N e d i m
makers, scholars, a n d the g e n e r a l p u b l i c became engaged i n a fierce debate over
A t a s o y . T h e y sent me out into the w o r l d to experience it for myself a n d have
islamists a n d their i d e o l o g i e s . It has become c o m m o n p l a c e for c o m m e n t a t o r s
always g i v e n me their u n c o n d i t i o n a l support. T h e A t a gecekondu district i n
to p o r t r a y Islamists as v i o l e n t fundamentalists c o m m i t t e d to e l i m i n a t i n g l i b e r a l
D i k m e n , A n k a r a where
d e m o c r a t i c institutions a n d
I was raised deserves
special m e n t i o n . F r o m
my
i n d i v i d u a l freedoms
i n favour o f a n t i W e s t e r n
c h i l d h o o d , the inhabitants o f this s h a n t y t o w n n e i g h b o u r h o o d have inspired me
theocracies. T h e o n g o i n g d e b a t e is intense a n d e m o t i o n a l l y c h a r g e d . ' M i l i t a n t
w i t h their w o r k ethic a n d e n d u r i n g spirit. T h e i r u n w a v e r i n g d e t e r m i n a t i o n to
Islam', ' I s l a m i c t e r r o r i s m ' , a n d I s l a m i c f u n d a m e n t a l i s m ' are a m o n g the terms
achieve the best for themselves a n d their c h i l d r e n , despite b e i n g m a r g i n a l i z e d
now
a n d i m p o v e r i s h e d , motivates me to this day.
p o l i t i c a l movements.
frequently used to d e s c r i b e I s l a m as one o f the world's most
dangerous
S c h o l a r s w h o study I s l a m i c politics c a n be r o u g h l y d i v i d e d into t w o groups. O n e g r o u p is h i g h l y pessimistic about the role o f I s l a m i n M u s l i m societies (Afshar 1998; M o g h a d o m
1991). Influenced b y the m i s e r a b l e r e c o r d
o f I s l a m i c regimes i n I r a n a n d A f g h a n i s t a n , this g r o u p argues that Islam has instigated a n a n t i - m o d e r n d e s i r e to return to the past. I n order to c o n t a i n this movement, they believe, M u s l i m societies must pursue p r o g r a m m e s
directed
towards W e s t e r n conceptions o f p o l i t i c a l l i b e r a l i s m , c i t i z e n s h i p , a n d s e c u l a r i s m . T h e other group is m o r e s c e p t i c a l o f the u n i f o r m a p p l i c a t i o n o f W e s t e r n m o d e r n i t y to n o n - W e s t e r n societies, a r g u i n g that I s l a m is a n expression o f l o c a l indigenous cultures ( A h m e d
1992; H o o d f a r 1997; M e r n i s s i 1991). F o r these
scholars, I s l a m represents a d i s t i n c t culture that u n d e r p i n s m o r a l i t y , lifestyle choices, a n d , ultimately, resistance to Western d o m i n a t i o n . A l t h o u g h the two groups display divergent r e a c t i o n s to Islamic politics, b o t h analyse i s l a m i n terms o f the d i l e m m a s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of n o n - W e s t e r n p o s t - c o l o n i a l societies. T h e y p o i n t to the p o w e r struggles a n d conflicts over m o d e r n i z a t i o n , its r e l a t i o n to westernization, a n d Islam's relevance to l o c a l cultures ( B o z d o ğ a n a n d K a s a b a 1997; Chatterjee 1993; P r a k a s h 1995). I s l a m i n n o n - W e s t e r n societies appears to be caught i n a n i d e o l o g i c a l
2
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D
ISLAM m
DEMOCRACY
3
G L O B A L POLITICS
project o f 'authenticity'. T h i s recalls the dichotomous view o f culture between
terms o f a n intense c u l t u r a l e n c o u n t e r between I s l a m i c a n d W e s t e r n relations
global a n d l o c a l posited i n social theory. For example, B a r b e r (1995) expects
( T i b i 1998). T h e y insist that there is o n l y one t r u e I s l a m , that it is applicable
local
Western
to a l l times a n d places, a n d that it is one o f the p i l l a r s o f a n e m e r g i n g g l o b a l
m o d e r n i t y . F o r R i t z e r (2000), these cultures w i l l disappear u n d e r the conditions
system w i t h its o w n c o n c e p t i o n o f u n i v e r s a l i s m . H u n t i n g t o n (1996) goes so
of greater global i n t e g r a t i o n . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , for E s c o b a r (1995), l o c a l cultures w i l l
far as to suggest t h a t i s l a m e p i t o m i z e s those p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c ideologies that are
p r o v i d e the basis for a n e m a n c i p a t o r y politics against g l o b a l i z a t i o n . F o r G u i a l p
u n d e r m i n i n g the l i b e r a l d e m o c r a t i c aspirations o f W e s t e r n c i v i l i z a t i o n a r o u n d
(1997) a n d M a j i d (2000), the m o b i l i z a t i o n o f local cultures is a f o r m o f identity
the globe. F r o m this perspective, I s l a m is a n e x a m p l e o f a n E a s t e r n c i v i l i z a t i o n
politics. F o r A h m e d (1992) a n d M e r n i s s i (1991;, these cultures are sources o f
that
alternative m o d e r n i t i e s .
h o m o g e n i z i n g tendencies o f g l o b a l i z a t i o n .
cultures
to
form
a
reactionary
counter-movement
against
seriously threatens
Western
cultural
dominance
and
the
culturally
It is u n d e n i a b l e that I s l a m i c p o l i t i c a l movements now challenge the ideas,
i n contrast, H a l l i d a y f 1994; dismisses as nonsense a n y c l a i m that I s l a m
practices, and p o l i t i c a l d o m i n a n c e o f w e s t e r n i z i n g p o l i t i c a l elites. Some Islamist
constitutes a challenge to the West. I s l a m i c politics is 'not about inter-state
groups c l a i m to locate their activities w i t h i n the r e a l m o f ' a u t h e n t i c a l l y ' M u s l i m
relations at a l l , but about h o w these I s l a m i c societies a n d states w i l l o r g a n i z e
c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s . D o e s this m e a n that Islamic politics represent a counter-
themselves a n d w h a t the i m p l i c a t i o n s of such o r g a n i z a t i o n for relations w i t h the
c u l t u r a l assertion o f Islamic principles a n d identities against the Western idea o f
outside w o r l d w i l l be* ( H a l l i d a y 1994: 92}. R e c e n t p o s t - c o l o n i a l t h e o r y has elaborated o n the i m p o r t a n c e o f l o c a l
m o d e r n i z a t i o n ? A r e we e x p e r i e n c i n g a clash o f world-views? M a n y c o m m e n t a t o r s view the I s l a m o f today as a p o l i t i c a l
movement
that aspires to replace E n l i g h t e n m e n t p r i n c i p l e s . E v e n t h o u g h ' c a p i t a l i s m
1
c u l t u r a l specificities i n the quest for a n alternative n o n - W e s t e r n m o d e r n i t y . Proponents
o f this p o s i t i o n
question
the
E u r o c e n t r i c bias i n notions
of
Cold
m o d e r n i z a t i o n ( R i s t 1997) a n d h i g h l i g h t the possibility o f c o m b i n i n g l o c a l
War, both a d h e r e d to the u n i v e r s a l c o n c e p t i o n o f m o d e r n i t y a n d progress that
cultures w i t h W e s t e r n c u l t u r e i n i n s t i t u t i n g another concept o f m o d e r n i z a t i o n
emerged f r o m the E n l i g h t e n m e n t . H o b s b a w m (1994) argues that C o l d W a r
( E s c o b a r 1995; P i g g 1992). T h e y r e g a r d I s l a m as d i v e r t i n g m o d e r n i t y away
m o d e r n i z a t i o n projects c o n t a i n e d ' i n d i g e n o u s ' cultures w i t h i n the concept o f a
f r o m its association w i t h W e s t e r n cultures ( A h m e d 1992; N a r a y a n 1997). T h i s
' u n i v e r s a l m o d e r n i t y ' . H o w e v e r , the e n d o f the C o l d W a r i n 1991 exposed the
emphasis o n l o c a l / n a t i o n a l differences i n p o l i t i c o - c u l t u r a l experience decentres
i n t e r n a l tensions w i t h i n nation-states between t r a d i t i o n a l local a n d m o d e r n
our
universal c u l t u r a l values. V a r i o u s c u l t u r a l l y framed i n f r a n a t i o n a ! movements
(1995) argues that the d o m i n a n t project o f m o d e r n i t y is n o t h i n g short o f the
emerged. Nation-states n o w find themselves p u l l e d i n opposite directions b y
g l o b a l i z a t i o n of W e s t e r n w a y s . H e sees the m o b i l i z a t i o n o f 'indigenous' l o c a l
the u n i v e r s a l i z i n g forces o f the global economy a n d l o c a l i z i n g i n f r a n a t i o n a !
cultures a n d experiences as essential to d e v e l o p i n g alternative conceptions. I n
and
' s o c i a l i s m : were
antagonistic m o d e r n i z a t i o n projects
d u r i n g the
understanding
o f m o d e r n i z a t i o n f r o m its E u r o p e a n
origins. Escobar
political
d i r e c t i n g o u r attention to I s l a m i c movements i n the m o r e ' m o d e r n i z e d ' M u s l i m
p r o g r a m m e o f m o d e r n i t y based o n the l i b e r a l ideology o f progress ("Wallerstein
countries o f I r a n , E g y p t , a n d T u n i s i a , E s p o s i t o (1992} argues thai Islam projects
2000;. A t a time w h e n we are witnessing the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n o f a u n i v e r s a l
a n alternative v i s i o n for m o u l d i n g society a n d the state, a l t h o u g h the question of
modernity, religious f u n d a m e n t a l i s m constructs an ideology w i t h a c l a i m to the
w h a t constitutes that v i s i o n m a y be d i s p u t e d .
movements
(Gill
1992).
T h i s points
to
the
disintegration
of a
'authentic' local c u l t u r e o f the past. W e live i n a n era o f great uncertainty. A t present there are no effective international m e c h a n i s m s to c o n t a i n anti-modern political movements and r i v a l fundamentalist strategies. W e do little more than label these newly e m e r g i n g politics as dangerous,
a n t i - m o d e r n forms o f religious f u n d a m e n t a l i s m . I s l a m
is undoubtedly a new factor i n global politics. B u t h o w exactly is a n Islamic political movement constituted? Does i s l a m formulate a clear p o l i t i c a l strategy? Is it a n aggressive, anti-Western, a n d xenophobic religion? Is its goal to eventually replace a universal conception o f modernity? These arc a m o n g the questions that surround a m e a n i n g f u l analysis o f the political significance o f I s l a m . T h e r e are different I s l a m i c movements, a n d r a d i c a l Islamist groups makeup o n l y one variety. T h e s e groups frame the rise o f i n f r a n a t i o n a ! movements i n
H o w do Islamists a c t u a l l y situate themselves between the u n i v e r s a l i t y o f W e s t e r n m o d e r n i t y a n d the l o c a l i t y o f c u l t u r a l authenticity? I respond to this question by e x a m i n i n g I s l a m i c politics i n T u r k e y . M y hope is to u n r a v e l the tensions and conflicts that m a r k the interplay between l o c a l cultures a n d g l o b a l projects o f m o d e r n i z a t i o n . M y a r g u m e n t is that I s l a m i c movements c a n n o t be a n a l y z e d without h i s t o r i c a l l y c o n t e x t u a l i z i n g them i n the w i d e r relations o f g l o b a l politics. P o l i t i c a l I s l a m is v e r y m u c h e m b e d d e d i n the processes o f active i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f W e s t e r n m o d e r n i t y into l o c a l c u l t u r a l practices. T h i s assumes ' h y b r i d ' patterns o f social c h a n g e thai r e p o s i t i o n cultures w i t h i n interactive processes that c a n no longer be defined as exclusively authentic or i n a u l h e n t i c . T h e present w o r k breaks d o w n the r i g i d categorizations o f ' W e s t e r n ' versus
4
5
I S L A M IN G L O B A L POLITICS
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
l o c a l ' a n d considers the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f this for situating I s l a m i n the global
share m o d e r n values a n d lifestyles. T h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the global e c o n o m y is
p o l i t i c a l economy.
p a r t o f the c u l t u r a l c o m p l e x i t y that is constitutive o f g l o b a l i z a t i o n . T h e i s l a m i c
T h e r e is no doubt that I s l a m plays an i m p o r t a n t role i n the l o c a l cultures
p o l i t i c a l m o v e m e n t in T u r k e y has attracted a g r o w i n g n u m b e r o f engineers,
a n d lifestyles o f M u s l i m s . It is also m o b i l i z e d as a n anti-Western p o l i t i c a l
business people, industrialists, teachers,
ideology that challenges the c u l t u r a l foundations o f a W e s t e r n - d o m i n a t e d global
w h o m are not o n i v graduates o f reputable universities i n T u r k e y but also h o l d
system. H o w e v e r , r a d i c a l Islamists a n d Western commentators o n the 'Islamic
postgraduate degrees from universities i n western E u r o p e a n d the U n i t e d States.
threat' have b o t h got it w r o n g . T h e r e is no u n c h a n g i n g ' I s l a m ' that exists as a
T h e i r central goal is to r e p o s i t i o n themselves m the highly competitive relations
single entity outside of history. T h e r e are b r o a d i d e o l o g i c a l differences a m o n g
o f the national a n d g l o b a l e c o n o m y , w o r k i n g alongside, a n d sometimes
v a r i o u s Islamist groups. M e m b e r s o f these groups include h i g h l y educated
c o a l i t i o n w i t h , secular p o l i t i c a l elites. T h i s locates Islamist groups as participants
professionals, teachers,
in a culturally polycentric world.
engineers, lawyers, bureaucrats,
a n d scientists. T h e y
are i m m e r s e d i n the world o f m o d e r n science a n d t e c h n o l o g y a n d want to formulate a competitive strategy for a c h i e v i n g social t r a n s f o r m a t i o n
through
bureaucrats,
a n d lawyers, m a n y of
m
S u c h an interpretation o f I s l a m i c politics is, o f course, controversial. It breaks
the
l o n g - s t a n d i n g i d e o l o g i c a l c o n n e c t i o n between
Western cultural
the a c q u i s i t i o n o f state power. T h i s p o w e r is necessary for Islamists to become
patterns a n d the capitalist e c o n o m y established by M a x W e b e r i n his e x p l a n a t i o n
p o l i t i c a l l y engaged i n the g l o b a l economy, such that the West represents a
o f the o r i g i n s o f c a p i t a l i s m i n western E u r o p e . R a t h e r t h a n assuming t h a t
competitive p a r t n e r rather t h a n a c u l t u r a l m o d e l for e m u l a t i o n (Atasoy 2003a).
cultures are d o m i n a n t sites o f c o n f l i c t that p r o d u c e a 'clash o f c i v i l i z a t i o n s ' , I
1 take issue w i t h the l o n g t r a d i t i o n i n Western thought o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g
argue that we s h o u l d grasp the c o n t i n g e n c y , variety, a n d indeed the ' m o d e r n i t y '
between the global or m o d e r n a n d the local or t r a d i t i o n a l . I n the context o f
of i s l a m i c politics i n the r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the global economy. It seems to m e
scholarship d e a l i n g w i t h Islamic movements this d i v i s i o n between the l o c a l -
that the key question is how I s l a m i c politics enters into the process.
global and t r a d i t i o n a l - m o d e r n has come u n d e r i n c r e a s i n g scrutiny { A b u - L u g h o d 1997;
Al-Azmeh
1993V Nonetheless, current social theory still leeds on this
d i c h o t o m o u s c o n c e p t i o n . R i t z e r (2000), for example, expects a n increasingly h o m o g e n i z e d w o r l d a n d the disappearance o f a consumer
o f the local u n d e r the influence
culture e m e r g i n g a r o u n d globally p r o d u c e d a n d
A s for the question o f w h o participates i n a n I s l a m i c movement,
my
starting p o i n t w o u l d be to r e v i s i t theories o f m o d e r n i z a t i o n that elaborate
the
question o f agency i n terms o f a c o n t e x t - b o u n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f m o d e r n i t y a n d the self. F o r the moment, let us c o n s i d e r the v i e w o f the m o d e r n a n d the I s l a m i c
consumed
as c u l t u r a l opposites. S u c h a v i e w seeks to e x p l a i n Islamic politics in terms of a
c o m m o d i t i e s . B o t h B a r b e r 14995) and H u n t i n g t o n (1996), o n the other h a n d ,
t r a d i t i o n a l opposition o f lower classes against the m o d e r n i z i n g influences o f a
expect a c u l t u r a l contestation p i t t i n g local against g l o b a l . T h e y sec Islam as an
capitalist market economy. H e r e I s l a m becomes the repository o f l o c a l traditions
aspect o f l o c a l M u s l i m cultures that counteracts g l o b a l h o m o g e n i z a t i o n . A h m e d
e x p e r i e n c e d by r u r a l a n d u r b a n l o w e r classes a n d other m a r g i n a l segments i n
(1992) also sees Islam as a source o f authentic l o c a l culture a n d
society. T h e s e classes a n d m a r g i n a l groups u n d e r s t a n d
alternative
their
disadvantaged
practices to W e s t e r n ways. S u c h conceptualizations o f culture w o u l d have us
position i n life as resulting f r o m the r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t r a d i t i o n a l society a r o u n d
believe that there is a g r o w i n g c u l t u r a l clash between I s l a m and W e s t e r n ways.
the p r i n c i p l e o f market c o m p e t i t i o n . T h e y feel a loss o f c o m m u n i t y a n d c u l t u r e ,
I
argue that it is untenable
to conceptualize I s l a m as
representing
and h a r b o u r a sense o f a n x i e t y a n d insecurity. P o l i t i c a l l y , these sentiments
are
t r a d i t i o n a l l o c a l values, a n d g l o b a l i z a t i o n as h a v i n g a m o d e r n i z i n g i m p a c t on
expressed i n the f o r m o f o p p o s i t i o n based o n l o c a l c u l t u r a l values. T h i s is the
' t r a d i t i o n a l ' societies. M a n y social scientists argue that ' a l l cultures are more
essence o f the m o d e r n i z a t i o n t h e o r y that b e c a m e the d o m i n a n t p a r a d i g m o f
fragmented t h a n coherent, a n d that the W e b e r i a n i m a g e o f culture p r o v i d i n g
post-war scholarship.
a systematic set o f ideas and values b y w h i c h people orient their b e h a v i o u r is fundamentally
m i s l e a d i n g ' ( G n s w o l d 2 0 0 4 : 44). A c c o r d i n g to A b u - I . u g h o d
M o d e r n i z a t i o n theory t r i e s to relate I s l a m to the c u l t u r a l anxieties o f the lower classes but Islam is not r e s t r i c t e d to the politics o f the m a r g i n a l i z e d a n d
CI997; and K a n d i y o t i a n d Saktanber (2002), W e s t e r n culture figures i n Islamist
e c o n o m i c a l l y weak. I n c r e a s i n g n u m b e r s o f well-educated professionals are n o w
t h i n k i n g i n more c o m p l e x ways than a reference to g l o b a l a n d l o c a l differences
part o f the p r o - I s l a m i c p o l i t i c a l m o v e m e n t i n T u r k e y , using I s l a m as a strategic
enables us to c o m p r e h e n d . Islamists are quite capable o f p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the
resource for b u i l d i n g frames o f reference a n d cross-class alliances. It therefore
competitive relations of the global economy.
m a k e s no sense to even t r y to d e s c r i b e t h e i r p o l i t i c s as a resistance
movement
I study I s l a m i c politics i n broader terms, as a n element o f g l o b a l i z a t i o n
based o n c u l t u r a l traditions t h a t oppose the g l o b a l capitalist economy. M a x
w h e r e i n g l o b a l a n d local d y n a m i c s interact a n d interconnect (Atasoy 2003a).
W e b e r has shown i n his study o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p between Protestant beliefs
Islamists t h i n k o f themselves as b e l o n g i n g to a global system w i t h i n w h i c h they
a n d the advent o f c a p i t a l i s m i n western E u r o p e that culture as a systematic
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D
DEMOCRACY
7
ISLAM IN G L O B A L POLITICS
set o f ideas a n d values mediates e c o n o m i c activity. I w o u l d depart f r o m this
c o n t i n u u m between a u t h e n t i c - t r a d i t i o n a l a n d g l o b a l - m o d e r n tells us r e m a r k a b l y
interpretation a n d suggest that s t u d y i n g I s l a m i c politics i n functional terms
little about the a c t u a l content o f their ideas, their c o n s t r u c t i o n , a n d their p o l i t i c a l
does not p r o v i d e evidence o f a significant l i n k between changes i n state power, class politics, a n d r e l i g i o n i n regenerating m e a n i n g s for a c t i o n w i t h i n the g l o b a l p o l i t i c a l economy.
d i r e c t i o n . T h e r e are m a n y different i s l a m i s t groups t h r o u g h o u t the M u s l i m w o r l d w i t h diverse interests a n d goals. T h e y act i n different, c h a n g i n g contexts, a n d face new challenges a n d choices. T h i s range o f expression compels us to
T h e electoral success story o f the p r o - I s l a m i c p a r t y compels us to study
r e t h i n k I s l a m a n d its e x i s t i n g e c o n o m i c a n d p o l i t i c a l relations.
the ways i n w h i c h Islamists interact w i t h the deployment o f state p o w e r to affect
S o c i a l theory often tends to reduce a complex social reality to a single
the shape o f that p o w e r a n d to influence e c o n o m i c strategy. I n the n a t i o n a l
essence. B y grossly d i s t o r t i n g the complexities o f Islamic politics, this tendency c a n
elections o f N o v e m b e r 2002 the p r o - I s l a m i c A K P (the Justice a n d D e v e l o p m e n t
negatively influence our p e r c e p t i o n and u n d e r m i n e our u n d e r s t a n d i n g of other
P a r t y founded i n 2001 a n d the s i x t h p r o - I s l a m i c p a r t y to be established i n
people's struggles for a better life. T h e r e is n o t h i n g n a t u r a l or inevitable i n the
T u r k e y since the late 1960s) w o n a m a j o r i t y government by o b t a i n i n g close to 35
association between I s l a m i c beliefs a n d protest movements. I a m c o n v i n c e d that
p e r cent o f the p o p u l a r vote. T h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u r t s have closed d o w n four
political parties a n d the p o l i t i c a l elite, i n c l u d i n g c i v i l a n d m i l i t a r y bureaucrats,
p r o - I s l a m i c parties, i n 1971, 1980, 1998, a n d 2001. T h e r e is c u r r e n t l y one other
actively forge these connections. Sufi religious orders, such as the N a q s h b a n d i ,
p r o - I s l a m i c p a r t y actively c o m p e t i n g w i t h the A K P , the P r o s p e r i t y P a r t y {Saadet
and religious c o m m u n i t i e s , s u c h as the Nurcu cernaati a n d Fethullahcikr, are also
Partisi).
actively involved i n creating c u l t u r a l repertoires for steering p o l i t i c a l action.
I n total, 20 parties entered the 2002 elections but o n l y the intensely
secular R e p u b l i c a n People's P a r t y has b e e n able to o b t a i n
parliamentary
Choices that are m a d e b y state managers, political parties, Sufi orders, and other
representation. T h e A K P succeeded i n f o r m i n g a majority government for the
religious c o m m u n i t i e s shape the m a i n features o f a n i s l a m i c culture that binds
first time i n T u r k e y after eleven l o n g years o f h i g h l y fragile coalitions. It. is a
various groups to the p o l i t i c a l project o f social justice.
p a r t y o f y o u n g Islamists w h o define themselves as m o d e r n a n d p r o - W e s t e r n . T h e i r leader prefers the A K P to be k n o w n as a ' d e m o c r a t i c conservative' p a r t y on the centre-right o f the p o l i t i c a l s p e c t r u m .
I
argue for the
understand
development
o f new c o n c e p t u a l models to help
us
I s l a m a n d the c o m p l e x relations o f c o n t e m p o r a r y g l o b a l i z a t i o n .
G l o b a l p o l i t i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c conditions are t r a n s f o r m i n g h u m a n experience
T h e emergence o f this new p a r t y presents us w i t h a different picture o f
throughout
the w o r l d
a n d i n f l u e n c i n g the l o c a l c o n d i t i o n s o f life. A t the
I s l a m i c politics. T h e A K P supports Turkey's m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e w i t h the U n i t e d
same t i m e , g l o b a l relations a r e b e i n g transformed b y the p e n e t r a t i o n o f l o c a l
States, promises to advance Turkey's c l a i m to E u r o p e a n U n i o n m e m b e r s h i p ,
influences. I s l a m is constitutive o f a global politics w h e r e i n g l o b a l and l o c a l
a n d pledges to b u i l d a r a p p r o c h e m e n t w i t h G r e e c e . Yet it is at odds w i t h T u r k e y ' s
d y n a m i c s interact a n d i n t e r c o n n e c t .
powerful" m i l i t a r y b u r e a u c r a c y a n d the official state ideology o f s e c u l a r i s m . Islamists are actively r e c o n f i g u r i n g their position i n the economy a n d state structure. T h e v e r y name of the A K P , Justice a n d Development, invokes principles of social justice a n d connotes
a response
It m a y be easy for some t o describe Islamists as f u n d a m e n t a l i s t 'evildoers'. But
M u s l i m s , like everyone
disappointments.
Only
a
else i n the w o r l d , have aspirations, fears, handful
o f scholars,
including M a r d i n
and
(1997),
to economic inequality a n d state
S a k t a n b e r (2002), a n d W h i t e (2002), have e x a m i n e d I s l a m i c politics from the
oppression. Isiam is i n part a p o l i t i c a l protest movement expressing the grievances
p o i n t o f v i e w o f those w h o e m b r a c e it. C . W r i g h t M i l l s (1959) alerted us m a n y
o f the poorest a n d most m a r g i n a l segments o f the p o p u l a t i o n as well as a newly
years ago to the i m p o r t a n c e o f a n a l y s i n g a social p h e n o m e n o n i n r e l a t i o n to b o t h
e m e r g i n g fraction o f the m i d d l e classes. These groups believe they are excluded
global conditions o f m a t e r i a l existence and i n d i v i d u a l s ' o w n p e r s o n a l histories.
from the benefits o f economic development a n d power positions i n society (Onis
O n e c a n o n l y assume that I s l a m i s t s , like other social groups, go t h r o u g h a
1997). W h y is it then that I s l a m i n p a r t i c u l a r , rather than other forms o f protest
process o f d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d self-reflection before they develop a p o l i t i c a l project.
such as leftist movements or p o p u l a r n a t i o n a l i s m , w o u l d appeal to these groups?
A n i n q u i r y into i s l a m i c p o l i t i c s , therefore, should i n c l u d e a n investigation o f the
T o answer this question, I b e g i n by referring to S e r i f M a r d i n ' s (1997)
interplay between societal a n d p e r s o n a l histories. I d o not d w e l l p r i m a r i l y o n
assertion o f a c o n n e c t i o n between p o l i t i c a l protest a n d religious beliefs. M a r d i n
the p e r s o n a l narratives a n d p r a c t i c e s o f Islamist i n d i v i d u a l s , but I do refer to
argues that I s l a m is a social b o n d a n d a strategic resource for a v a r i e t y o f
their life stories f r o m t i m e to t i m e i n order to g a i n a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f how
groups that, despite h a v i n g different goals, are a l l seeking some f o r m o f social
I s l a m i c i d e o l o g i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n s are c o n f i g u r e d .
justice. T h i s multifaceted role, however, is not i n s c r i b e d w i t h i n the a h i s t o r i c a l c o n c e p t i o n o f I s l a m held by c o m m e n t a t o r s w h o speak o f a n authentic culture f r o m an earlier golden age. T h e p o s i t i o n i n g o f cultures o n opposite poles o f a
T h i s b o o k aims to a n s w e r the f o l l o w i n g question: H o w d o Islamists situate themselves a n d t h e i r politics w i t h i n the p o l i t i c a l context o f T u r k e y a n d the general conditions o f global t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ?
8
T U R K E Y . ISLAMISTS A N D
DEMOCRACY
I S L A M I N G L O B A L POLITICS
I s l a m and T u r k i s h politics
Why
9
should I s l a m even be a choice? For c e n t r e - p e r i p h e r y theorists, the
T u r k i s h attempt to b r i n g a b o u t m o d e r n i z a t i o n b y i m p o s i n g a westernization M u c h current s o c i a l theory seeks to answer the above question by e x a m i n i n g
project d i d not c a r r y the masses a l o n g w i t h it. S e r i f M a r d i n (1973). the m a i n
the discordance between I s l a m a n d W e s t e r n ways. H o w e v e r , this leaves serious
proponent o f this perspective, argues that w e s t e r n i z i n g m o d e r n i t y failed to w i n
students o f I s l a m i c politics dissatisfied. O n the w o r l d stage T u r k e y occupies
the hearts o f M u s l i m s because o f state repression a n d the abuse of power by
a strategic l o c a t i o n , situated between the West a n d the Islamic w o r l d . A n
w e s t e r n i z i n g bureaucrats.
i m p o r t a n t player i n the N o r t h A t l a n t i c T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n ( N A T O ) a n d i n
c o m m e r c i a l classes, c i v i l a n d m i l i t a r y bureaucratic cadres constitute the centre
the r e g i o n a l alliances o f the M i d d l e East, it has also f o r m a l l y a p p l i e d to j o i n
i n Turkey, w i e l d i n g state p o w e r over a w e a k ' p e r i p h e r y ' . T h i s p o l i t i c a l structure
the E u r o p e a n U n i o n ( E U ) , a n d stands at the crossroads o f almost every issue
was i n h e r i t e d f r o m the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , a legacy that perpetuates intense
o f i m p o r t a n c e to the U n i t e d States a n d the E U o n the E u r a s i a n continent. A n
c u l t u r a l encounters
interesting consequence o f these p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y relations is that T u r k e y
I s l a m thus becomes a strategic t o o l for p e r i p h e r a l forces i n the development o f a
is the o n l y M u s l i m country that has been integrated into W e s t e r n p o l i t i c a l ,
critical v i e w o f the state as a source o f repression.
e c o n o m i c , a n d c u l t u r a l structures. O n the other h a n d , T u r k e y differs f r o m other M u s l i m countries i n its domestic politics. U n l i k e I r a n , A l g e r i a , a n d E g y p t . T u r k e y has a c h i e v e d a p o l i t i c a l c o m p r o m i s e between
secular a n d I s l a m i c
p o l i t i c a l elites by i n c o r p o r a t i n g I s l a m into the secular state structure (Atasoy 2003a: 134). i n short, T u r k e y is b o t h a M u s l i m a n d a W e s t e r n country. Because of its u n i q u e p o s i t i o n i n global affairs, T u r k e y offers us a n o p p o r t u n i t y to m o v e b e y o n d a simplistic v i e w o f I s l a m as possessing distinct c u l t u r a l characteristics that stand i n o p p o s i t i o n to global m o d e r n i t y .
Turkey: modernization,
the differences,
centre-periphery,
embedded
in
and
world
systems.
Despite
there is an impressive s i m i l a r i t y i n these approaches.
m o d e r n i z a t i o n theorists, m o d e r n cultural
traits,
a n d t r a d i t i o n a l characteristics are
and
the
between
bureaucrats
a n d p e r i p h e r a l groups i n society.
T h i s a p p r o a c h is useful i n d i r e c t i n g attention to the c u l t u r a l - i d e o l o g i c a l forms o f state d o m i n a t i o n t h a t generate feelings o f resentment, estrangement, a n d hostility i n the ' p e r i p h e r y ' . M a r d i n (1986) e x p l a i n s I s l a m i c politics as h a v i n g emerged f r o m a p a r t i c u l a r path o f m o d e r n i z a t i o n followed i n T u r k e y since the f o u n d i n g o f the T u r k i s h R e p u b l i c i n 1923. K e m a l i s m , n a m e d after the founder o f the r e p u b l i c , M u s t a f a K e m a l , is the official i d e o l o g y o f the T u r k i s h state a n d c e n t r a l to T u r k i s h m o d e r n i z a t i o n projects. K e m a l i s m encourages a w e s t e r n i z i n g p o p u l i s m to r e p l a c e t r a d i t i o n a l social arrangements, often t h r o u g h
T h r e e major theoretical perspectives e x p l a i n the rise o f I s l a m i c politics in
I n the absence o f p o l i t i c a l l y d o m i n a n t l a n d e d a n d
modern/traditional
For
deeply
dichotomy
is
synchronistic w i t h a n u r b a n / r u r a l a n t a g o n i s m . R u r a l p o p u l a t i o n s are seen to
abusive b u r e a u c r a t i c power. H o w e v e r , this u n d e r m i n e s c o m m u n i t y a n d culture, resulting i n acute feelings o f i n s e c u r i t y a m o n g the masses. M a r d i n argues that K e m a l i s m has p r o v i d e d n o v i a b l e means to m a k e life m e a n i n g f u l for the majority o f the p o p u l a t i o n . It has failed to create a social ethos that appeals to the heart as w e l l as to the m i n d . Nonetheless, for M a r d i n (1991), I s l a m does not represent a n a n t i - m o d e r n
be religious a n d resistant to c u l t u r a l patterns that o c c u r i n W e s t e r n societies.
reactionary movement
Urbanites,
provides a ' w o r l d - v i e w ' . R e l i g i o u s groups take the task o f f o r m u l a t i n g a w o r l d -
i n contrast,
are
c o s m o p o l i t a n , literate,
and
open
to
cultural
transformations o r i g i n a t i n g i n the West.
for t h e
insecure a n d disoriented masses.
R a t h e r , it
v i e w seriously a n d m a k e I s l a m i c teachings accessible to the masses w i t h o u t
M o d e r n i z a t i o n theory treats w e a l t h creation a n d a c c u m u l a t i o n as
a
e m p t y i n g t h e m o f t h e i r e n c h a n t i n g , m y s t i c qualities. T h i s m a y be a very
technologically and
eloquent i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , but it does not tell us h o w a n d w h y these disillusioned
c u l t u r a l l y superior values o f m a r k e t c o m p e t i t i o n . N o n - W e s t e r n societies must
i n d i v i d u a l s r a l l y a r o u n d r e l i g i o n as a response to t h e i r c u l t u r a l i m p o v e r i s h m e n t .
therefore
adopt Western values a n d institutions i n order to shake o f f t h e i r
T h e c e n t r e - p e r i p h e r y a p p r o a c h also fails to appreciate the fact that I s l a m i c
c u l t u r a l backwardness. D a n i e l L e r n e r (1958), for example, believes that the
politics is not restricted to a s m a l l religious g r o u p o n the p e r i p h e r y o f society.
a d o p t i o n o f E n l i g h t e n m e n t ideals is necessary to create a m o d e r n psyche. T h e s e
Islam has instead b e c o m e i n t e g r a l to the p r o d u c t i o n o f a new sector o f h i g h l y
ideals include efficiency, i n s t r u m e n t a l rationality, preparedness for change,
educated
p h y s i c a l a n d social mobility, energetic enterprise, alertness to opportunities,
o b t a i n state c o n t r o l .
u n i q u e l y W e s t e r n process, p r e s u m a b l y
rooted
i n the
i n d i v i d u a l i s m , a n d self-reliance. A c c o r d i n g to m o d e r n i z a t i o n theory, M u s l i m s a p p e a r to be 'sleeping beauties', w a i t i n g for Western c u l t u r a l values to a w a k e n t h e m to the process of m o d e r n i z a t i o n . T h e y must choose between m o d e r n i t y a n d I s l a m , between the e m u l a t i o n o f t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y superior W e s t e r n ways a n d the i d e a l i z a t i o n o f a t r a d i t i o n a l culture.
and Islamically-oriented political and
e c o n o m i c elites s t r i v i n g to
A l t h o u g h superior to the m o d e r n i z a t i o n a p p r o a c h , w h i c h essentially views religiously oriented people a n d r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n s as b a c k w a r d a n d ignorant, the c e n t r e - p e r i p h e r y p e r s p e c t i v e still leaves i m p o r t a n t questions unresolved. It assumes a h o m o g e n e i t y w i t h i n the bureaucratic cadres a n d p e r i p h e r a l forces, w h i c h i n t u r n suggests a n e c e s s a r i l y c o n f i i c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the state
10
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D
I S L A M IN G L O B A L POLITICS
DEMOCRACY
11
and the p e r i p h e r y . T h i s makes it very difficult to r e c o g n i z e the realitv o f diverse
m o d e r n i z a t i o n . Implicit i n this suggestion is the view that state managers are
interests a n d d e m a n d s a r i s i n g from w i t h i n both the p e r i p h e r y a n d the centre.
independent o f societal influences a n d unified a r o u n d progressive aspirations.
T h i s a p p r o a c h falls short o f e x p l a i n i n g the p o l i t i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n o f peripheral
Unfortunately, this state-centred
' m a r g i n a l i t y ' a n d the entrance o f these m a r g i n a l s into the p o l i t i c a l process.
b u r e a u c r a c y the role o f p o l i t i c a l tutelage over society: but the centre-periphery
v i e w assigns the secular segments o f state
T h e strength o f I s l a m lies not m e r e l y i n its ability to p r o v i d e a sense o f social
a p p r o a c h has a l r e a d y s h o w n t h a t this has h i s t o r i c a l l y led K e m a l i s t bureaucrats
justice for the c u l t u r a l l y i m p o v e r i s h e d masses, but also i n its ability to facilitate a
to'abuse state p o w e r and. repress segments o f l a r g e l y r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n s .
negotiated consensus a m o n g v a r i o u s segments o f the p e r i p h e r y and bureaucratic
T h e c u l t u r a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n brought about b y the m o d e r n i z i n g m i s s i o n
cadres. I believe the politics s u r r o u n d i n g the f o r m a t i o n o f a p o l i t i c a l category o f
o f K e m a l i s m has p r o f o u n d i m p l i c a t i o n s for the r e c o n f i g u r i n g o f Islam.. Islamists
m a r g i n a l i t v is a c e n t r a l issue i n the study o f c o n t e m p o r a r y I s l a m .
do not represent a g r o u p o f u n e d u c a t e d , ' b a c k w a r d ' elements i n society. T h e r e
W o r l d systems theory focuses o n the p e r i p h e r a l position o f T u r k e y i n the
are m a n y M u s l i m capitalists, business people, a n d educated professionals w h o
w o r l d capitalist system, a n d the e c o n o m i c a n d p o l i t i c a l conditions that produce
are perfectly i n tune w i t h a n d adept at p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the g l o b a l economy.
u n e m p l o y m e n t , poverty, constant economic crises, high-level r u r a l m i g r a t i o n ,
T h e i r b e h a v i o u r is completely consistent w i t h W e s t e r n notions o f i n s t r u m e n t a l
a n d p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m . B u i l d i n g o n these negative consequences
of
r a t i o n a l i t y a n d efficiency d i r e c t e d towards the goal o f capital a c c u m u l a t i o n
the
(Atasoy 2003a). W h a t does f u r t h e r w e s t e r n i z a t i o n a n d m o d e r n i z a t i o n m e a n then
E n l i g h t e n m e n t ideals o f progress. K e y d e r (1997) argues that the Islamist strategy
i n p o l i t i c a l terms? W h o benefits a n d w h o loses? D o different categories of people-
i n T u r k e y grows out o f the failures o f the state i n i m p l e m e n t i n g the l i b e r a l
benefit f r o m these projects i n the same way? T h e w o r l d systems perspective o f
p r i n c i p l e s o f the E n l i g h t e n m e n t . F r o m its b e g i n n i n g i n the 1920s, the state has
T u r k e y seems to r e m a i n silent o n the Islamist creation o f cross-class alliances
d e l i m i t e d the scope o f m o d e r n i z a t i o n a m o n g the masses a n d , therefore, failed
a n d the p o p u l i s t p o l i t i c a l p r o g r a m m e o f economic a n d social justice.
capitalist development, Islamists advance
a critique o f m o d e r n i t y a n d
to achieve the g o a l o f e m a n c i p a t i n g its c i t i z e n r y f r o m the i n e r t i a of t r a d i t i o n a l religious culture. T h e result is a p o l i t i c a l void r e a d i l y filled by I s l a m . W o r l d systems theory suggests that Islamists appeal to the urban p o o r
N o n e o f the three theories has p r o d u c e d a satisfactory answer to o u r question on the role o f I s l a m i c politics i n global affairs. T h e y a l l fail, i n m y view, because they r e g a r d a c e r t a i n pattern o f development taken by E u r o p e a n
by e m p h a s i z i n g the p r i n c i p l e s o f equality, justice, a n d freedom. Islamists have
states as a u n i v e r s a l m o d e l to b e e m u l a t e d by Turkey. These theories identify
successfully o r g a n i z e d a coherent ideology o f o p p o s i t i o n to e x p l a i n the causes o f
the distinctive features i n the E u r o p e a n pattern a n d then p r o c e e d to e x p l a i n
poverty. T h e y p o i n t to the dependent position o f T u r k e y i n the w o r l d economy,
the causes o f v a r i a t i o n w i t h i n the T u r k i s h experience. E v e n t h o u g h the centre-
the lack o f n a t i o n a l independence, a n d the influence o f W e s t e r n i m p e r i a l i s m . But
periphery approach
there is n o t h i n g u n i q u e l y I s l a m i c about these issues. T h e Left also invokes t h e m .
T u r k e y , a c o m p a r i s o n b e t w e e n T u r k i s h a n d western E u r o p e a n experience is the
A c c o r d i n g to K e y d e r , t h o u g h , Islamists appear to be m o r e successful t h a n the
d o m i n a n t feature o f the a n a l y s i s .
Left i n u s i n g ' a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t ' rhetoric because the state systematically represses
acknowledges
the h i s t o r i c a l a n d c u l t u r a l specificity o f
In a l l three theories the rise o f I s l a m i c politics results f r o m a d e p a r t u r e
the Left. Islamists are thus able to take on the role o f bearers o f a nationalist
in the T u r k i s h experience f r o m a Western trajectory o f change. I n
critique o f W e s t e r n i m p e r i a l i s m a n d c a p i t a l i s m . T h e Islamist f o r m u l a t i o n o f a
terms this means that w h e n these theories analyse Islamic politics they refer
culture of o p p o s i t i o n against the w e s t e r n i z i n g m i s s i o n o f K e m a l i s m displaces the
to it as a d e v i a t i o n f r o m a n i d e a l m o d e l o f m o d e r n i z a t i o n . Y e t this elevates a
secular a n d m o d e r n i z i n g ideologies o f the Left. H o w e v e r , one obvious question
h i s t o r i c a l l y specific E u r o p e a n p a t t e r n
r e m a i n s : H o w do Islamists translate these issues o f social justice, equality, a n d
e x p l a n a t i o n . A h i s t o r i c a l p r o c e s s e x p e r i e n c e d i n western E u r o p e becomes a
n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e into specifically I s l a m i c p o l i t i c a l projects?
t o t a l i z i n g e x p l a n a t i o n o f g l o b a l affairs. I f social theory is to contribute to a n
M o s t discussion a r o u n d this question is speculative, r e v e a l i n g a strong fear that I s l a m threatens the very survival o f the secular nation-state. T h i s fear
o f change
concrete
to the level o f a general
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f I s l a m i c p o l i t i c s , it must c h a r t a range o f c u l t u r a l possibilities for reconstituting society.
results from the supposed link between Islamic ideas a n d the ignorance o f r u r a l
T h e r e is now a sizeable b o d y o f literature devoted to f o r m u l a t i n g an
p o p u l a t i o n s a n d the u r b a n poor. These masses are subject to exploitation bv their
a p p r o a c h to p o l i t i c a l struggles about c u l t u r a l 'identity' ( G o l e 1996; G u l a l p
p a t r o n l a n d l o r d s , the bourgeoisie, right-wing p o l i t i c a l parties, a n d conservative
1997: N a v a r o - Y a s h i n 2 0 0 2 ; W h i t e 2002). It responds to the inadequacies o f the
religious leaders, to the extent that they develop a false consciousness a r o u n d
three theories a n d e x a m i n e s the resurgence o f Islam i n the 1980s a n d 1990s.
a n Islamist ' f a b r i c a t i o n ' o f c u l t u r a l empowerment. T o prevent the spread o f
W h i l e scholars delineate p a r t i c u l a r domestic p o l i t i c a l , e c o n o m i c , a n d c u l t u r a l
I s l a m a m o n g these p o p u l a t i o n s , K e v d e r proposes further westernization a n d
circumstances, as well as i n t e r n a t i o n a l events, these factors most c o m m o n l y
12
T U R K E Y . ISLAMISTS A N D
DEMOCRACY
13
I S L A M IN G L O B A L POLITICS
a p p e a r as b a c k g r o u n d forces that, i n d i v i d u a l l y or i n c o m b i n a t i o n , contribute
A c c o r d i n g to N a v a r o - Y a s h i n (2002), a consensual I s l a m i c politics of
to the rise o f I s l a m i c identity politics. G o l e (19961 e x p l a i n s Islamic identity
identity is built into the process o f c o n s u m e r i s m . Islamists are reshaping their
politics i n terms of opposition to a p o l i t i c a l l y i m p o s e d W e s t e r n modernity. She
c u l t u r a l b e i n g t h r o u g h the
differentiates
distinct from those used b y secularists. F o r N a v a r o - Y a s h i n , the emergence o f
between p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l orientations towards an Islamic
m e d i u m o f the m a r k e t by c o n s u m i n g p r o d u c t s
lifestyle. P o l i t i c a l I s l a m advocates a complete t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f society a n d
a n i s l a m i c c u l t u r a l context o f c o n s u m e r i s m contributes to the
the seizure o f p o l i t i c a l power. C u l t u r a l I s l a m formulates a n Islamic identity
of a counter-hegemonic
by asserting the m e a n i n g s and world-views o f society a n d its i n d i v i d u a l s . T h e
Islamist middle-class lifestyles a n d tastes into the n o r m a t i v e d o m a i n o f the
Islamists i n G o l e ' s study are veiled w o m e n engaged i n c u l t u r a l I s l a m . T h e y are
devout p o p u l a r classes d i s e n f r a n c h i z e d by n e o l i b e r a l g l o b a l i z a t i o n . N a v a r o -
h i g h l y e d u c a t e d , y o u n g , u r b a n , u p w a r d l y m o b i l e , a n d activist. T h e i r v e i l i n g
Y a s h i n argues that this does n o t p r o d u c e a n alternative i m a g e o f society, but
a c t i v i t y helps t h e m to distance themselves from t r a d i t i o n a l i s m a n d customary
highlights c o m m o n a l i t i e s b e t w e e n the seemingly diverse elite projects of I s l a m i c
I s l a m w h i l e at the same time c h a l l e n g i n g Western m o d e r n i t y a n d the p o w e r
a n d secular c u l t u r a l i d e n t i t y a r o u n d the creation o f a m a r k e t for c o n s u m p t i o n .
d o m a i n ofKemaJist elites. T h e G o l d e n A g e o f Islam, w h i c h existed d u r i n g the r e i g n o f the first four caliphs, provides the reference p o i n t for these w o m e n i n their a d o p t i o n o f a u n i q u e l y Islamic w a y o f l i v i n g . T h e v e i l integrates their quest for a distinct self w i t h a n I s l a m i c lifestyle.
construction
i m a g e o f I s l a m i c c o m m u n i t y . T h i s process
expands
For m c , social t h e o r y m u s t p r o v i d e m o r e t h a n the c l a i m that Islamists take p a r t i n the formation a n d e x p a n s i o n of a m a r k e t economy. I s l a m i c politics d i d n o t suddenly emerge d u r i n g the 1980s a n d 1990s u n d e r the conditions o f n e o l i b e r a l g l o b a l i z a t i o n . It has roots i n the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d has b e e n i n c o r p o r a t e d
G u l a l p (1997) situates Islamic identity formation a n d the transformation o f
into the secular structure o f t h e T u r k i s h state i n ways far more c o m p l e x t h a n is
d o m i n a n t n o r m a t i v e standards w i t h i n the Islamist critique o f m o d e r n i z a t i o n . H e
often assumed. I f social t h e o r y is to contribute to a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f h i s t o r i c a l
argues that the failure of m o d e r n i t y to realize the promises o f the E n l i g h t e n m e n t
possibilities o f change, it m u s t give us a systematic account of h o w a n Islamist
p r o m p t e d a ' p o s t - m o d e r n ' search for alternatives to the h o m o g e n i z i n g tendencies
c o n n e c t i o n between c u l t u r e a n d the s o c i a l w o r l d is formed b y the relations
o f global c a p i t a l i s m . Islamic identity politics is a p o s t - m o d e r n c u l t u r a l reaction
between the market e c o n o m y a n d the state.
to m o d e r n i t y , r o o t e d i n the failure o f the state to deliver e c o n o m i c prosperity a n d equality. T h e result is resentment a n d d i s a p p o i n t m e n t on the part o f the lower classes
over the
m o d e r n i z a t i o n project. Islamists
transform
popular
resentment of the p o o r and m a r g i n a l i z e d segments o f society into a counterh e g e m o n i c critique of the destructive effects o f Western c a p i t a l i s m o n the h u m a n soul a n d the n a t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t . G u l a l p ' s study o f the w r i t i n g s of a s m a l l g r o u p o f Islamist intellectuals reveals t h a i disenchanted groups often generate m e a n i n g s , a n d m a k e sense of their existence, by reference to the G o l d e n A g e
W o r l d systems theory m a k e s a useful contribution to our understanding o f Turkey's experience on the m a r g i n s o f the capitalist world economy and the i m p a c t oi global systemic pressures o n T u r k e y ' s class structure and political regimes. However, this explanation still does not p r o v i d e the analytical tools necessary for c o m b i n i n g the unique realities of T u r k e y w i t h the general regularities of its w o r l d context. W o r l d systems theory expects a unit)' o f experience i n T h i r d W o r l d societies given their dependent position in a capitalist w o r l d economy. But the domestic context o f e a c h state is unique a n d each state is uniquely situated w i t h i n the state system. T u r k e y
1
o f I s l a m . T h i s , a c c o r d i n g to G u l a l p , parallels the ' p o s t - m o d e r n r e c o g n i t i o n o f local c u l t u r a l diversity a n d the right to m u l t i p l e paths of m o d e r n i t y . Islamists challenge the c e n t r a l i t y o f W e s t e r n m o d e r n i t y as a m o d e l to be replicated elsewhere a n d reassert the specificity and distinctiveness o f I s l a m .
occupies a p r i m a r y position i n terms o f m i l i t a r y and political-strategic relations i n the state system, although it is m a r g i n a l i n its economic significance Its strategic importance i n the M i d d l e East a n d N A T O produces results for Turkey's domestic politics, i n c l u d i n g Islam, w h i l e at the same time its distinct national dynamics are o f
W h i t e (2002) argues that a n Islamist; attempt to distance a specifically I s l a m i c m o d e r n i t y from Western m o d e r n i t y a n d c u s t o m a r y M u s l i m practices
crucial significance for the emergent patterns o f global power. T h e interplay between d o m e s t i c a n d international politics creates both
opens the w a y for a n alternate path. B u t Islamists are not a homogeneous group:
opportunities a n d constraints
they hold different views on what is uniquely i s l a m i c . S o c i a l class differences,
involved i n negotiating consensus, w h i l e s h a p i n g the demands
c u l t u r a l practices, a n d cleavages i n r u r a l and u r b a n lifestyles, as well as gender
various social groups along the w a y . T h i s possibility presupposes active p o l i t i c a l
issues, affect t h e i r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f Islamic identity. Nevertheless, there does
engagement o n the p a r t o f state managers, social classes, a n d p o l i t i c a l factions
seem to be a b r o a d consensus o n what constitutes a n I s l a m i c lifestyle. F o r
involved i n the r e m a k i n g o f a p o l i t i c a l culture. S u c h a possibility is not fixed
W h i t e , the Islamist elite plays a d o m i n a n t role i n
w i t h i n a universal account o f a W e s t e r n pattern or a T h i r d W o r l d experience, but
formulating
a
consensus
politics. H i g h l y educated, u r b a n , u p w a r d l y m o b i l e , y o u n g activists facilitate the process— a n d are supported by the newly e m e r g i n g Islamist capitalist classes.
for various political projects. G o v e r n m e n t s
are
a n d desires o f
is constantly negotiated w i t h i n a specific conjuncture of geopolitical events i n the w o r l d economy. T h e
nrespnt wnrk
p v r . l a i n i Hrvw Tclarmi-
„„„™,.„J
14
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS AND
15
ISLAM IN GLOBAL POLITICS
DEMOCRACY
i n the links between p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n global structures o f power a n d the m o r a l
6) I f these forms o f p o w e r succeed, w h a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l shapes could they
claims o f different groups i n society. Indeed, it argues that b e h i n d Islamic ideas
take? W h a t forms o f rule are p r e f i g u r e d by present I s l a m i c politics? W o u l d the
arc political strategies for m e d i a t i n g domestic and international politics.
idea o f a nation-state svstem s t i l l a p p l y in revised f o r m to a w o r l d governed b y
1 believe it is i m p o r t a n t to reveal historical specificity rather than a s s u m i n g
t r a n s n a t i o n a l Islamist parties a n d , presumably, other transnational forces?
a theoretical d i v i d e between a u n i v e r s a l m o d e r n i t y a n d I s l a m . M y w o r k recounts
I argue that I s l a m i c p o l i t i c s must be u n d e r s t o o d i n terms o f the m a t e r i a l
the e x i s t i n g relations o f p o w e r that have played a major role i n the emergence of
relations o f g l o b a l c a p i t a l i s m , the r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f states, p o l i t i c a l alliances,
Islamist groups. A s w o r l d systems t h e o r y has s h o w n , the position o f the state i n
a n d cultures. T h e s e factors are c r u c i a l to u n d e r s t a n d i n g the h i s t o r i c a l l y specific
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r is c r i t i c a l , but o n l y i n so far as it creates the
reinterpretation
necessary opportunities for, a n d constraints against, the a r t i c u l a t i o n o f distinct
are m a n y c o m p l i c a t e d c u l t u r a l effects that result from i n t e g r a t i n g a u n i q u e l y
p o l i t i c o - c u l t u r a l projects. T h e centre-periphery perspective's c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n
W e s t e r n p a t t e r n o f social c h a n g e w i t h the specific l o c a l arrangements o f Turkey.
of the state as a source o f coercive p o w e r is also useful i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g the
L o c a l a n d g l o b a l relations are m u t u a l l y constitutive. Therefore, rather t h a n
power o f I s l a m as a day-to-day discourse o f the powerless. M y o w n p o s i t i o n is
g i v i n g s u p p o r t to a r g u m e n t s t h a t bear on g l o b a l c u l t u r a l h o m o g e n i z a t i o n , or, alternatively, theories that v i e w the local a n d the g l o b a l as c u l t u r a l opposites,
not a synthesis o f the e x i s t i n g literature. C u r r e n t scholarship r a r e l y reveals the discontinuities, recurrences, resolutions i n capital a c c u m u l a t i o n arrangements,
o f I s l a m a n d the r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n o f Islamic politics. T h e r e
and
the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f states
a n d p o l i t i c a l alliances, a n d the c u l t u r a l d y n a m i c s that help us understand the patterns a n d outcomes o f I s l a m i c movements. Clearly, I s l a m i c politics is p a r t o f exceptionally c o m p l e x , multifaceted h i s t o r i c a l events. A closer e x a m i n a t i o n o f
we s h o u l d e x a m i n e the c o m p l e x i t y that emerges f r o m the d y n a m i c s o f Islamist i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f W e s t e r n w a y s into specific p o l i t i c a l projects. I f we w i s h to u n d e r s t a n d the p o s i t i o n o f Islamists i n relation to global p o l i t i c a l economy, we must look at history f r o m a different perspective a n d question the relevance o f the d i s t i n c t i o n between W e s t a n d non-West.
these events reveals different aspects o f global processes that have resulted i n the
T h e present w o r k is a n a c c o u n t o f the l o c a l a n d g l o b a l d y n a m i c s o f
disintegration o f empires, o p e n e d the w a y for the emergence a n d c o n s o l i d a t i o n
power. It e x a m i n e s t h e i r p o i n t s o f intersection t h r o u g h a n analysis o f e c o n o m i c ,
of n a t i o n a l states, and p r o d u c e d further c r i t i c a l changes i n the state system.
c u l t u r a l , p o l i t i c a l , a n d m i l i t a r y factors. T h i s process shapes the r e o r g a n i z a t i o n
W h a t c a n n o t be e m p h a s i z e d e n o u g h is that these changes do not present a
of major s o c i a l classes a n d t h e i r relations to the state. It also significantly affects
'fixed' p o l i t i c a l role for I s l a m that repeats itself from one historical p e r i o d to
strategies e m p l o y e d by the w i e l d e r s o f state power, the opposition they face,
the next. W h a t is more, there are no sharply defined categories o f ' I s l a m i c '
a n d the p o l i t i c a l struggles t h a t result. V a r i o u s ideas about what makes sense i n
a n d 'secular', n o r are there w i l d swings between secular a n d I s l a m i c p e r i o d s
society influence the balance o f p o w e r a m o n g c o m p e t i n g groups. I n a d d i t i o n ,
i n T u r k i s h history. R a t h e r , there is a c o m p l e x r e w o r k i n g a n d b l u r r i n g o f b o t h
people's u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e i r social p o s i t i o n i n society influences the w a y
W e s t e r n a n d I s l a m i c ways that makes such rigid categorizations impossible.
they m o b i l i z e themselves to r e a l i z e c e r t a i n goals. It is not e n o u g h , therefore, to
I consider the f o l l o w i n g range o f questions i n developing an alternative e x p l a n a t i o n o f Islamic politics w i t h i n the global system:
speculatively construct u n i v e r s a l c u l t u r a l categories o f m o d e r n i t y against w h i c h we can m e a s u r e I s l a m i c p o l i t i c s .
1) H o w do various domestic motives, historical legacies, a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l processes enter into the f a s h i o n i n g o f I s l a m i c projects a n d h o w do they change
S i t u a t i n g I s l a m : the r e l e v a n c e o f the W e s t
over rime? 2) W h a t are the c h i e f forms o f d o m i n a t i o n (economic a n d n o n - e c o n o m i c )
In the Great Transformation, K a r l P o l a n y i (1944) develops a h i s t o r i c a l critique o f
taken by the state as c r e d i b l e i d e o l o g i c a l devices for the c o m m o n people? W h y
the ' u n i v e r s a l m o d e r n i t y thesis. T h e concept o f ' u n i v e r s a l m o d e r n i t y ' suggests
a n d h o w d o these forms change?
that the self-regulating m a r k e t e c o n o m y is inevitable and n a t u r a l . H o w e v e r ,
3) W h a t determines the responsiveness of the state to the needs, d e m a n d s ,
1
P o l a n y i insists that h u m a n e c o n o m i c activity is a l w a y s e m b e d d e d i n the s o c i a l
a n d desires o f its citizens? H o w does this responsiveness interact w i t h c o m p e t i n g
a n d c u l t u r a l a r r a n g e m e n t s o f society (Block 1990). T h i s is significant because
c l a i m s a n d conceptions o f c i t i z e n s h i p as p o l i t i c a l projects contend for power?
it helps to r e d i r e c t o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f I s l a m i c politics b e y o n d a dichotomous
4) H o w does the heightened fear o f ' I s l a m i c f u n d a m e n t a l i s m ' , especially since 11 S e p t e m b e r 2001, influence this process? 5) W h a t n o n - n a t i o n a l or non-state forms o f p o w e r are contesting the r u l e
conception of local-traditional a n d universal-modern. P o l a n y i explains the r i s e o f fascism i n E u r o p e as a protective counterm o v e m e n t against the m a r k e t p r i n c i p l e . T h e nineteenth-century
conditions o f
16
17
I S L A M IN G L O B A L P O L I T I C S
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS AND D E M O C R A C Y
p o l i t i c a l interaction between a n a t u r a l i z e d v i e w of the market e c o n o m y and the
p a r t i c u l a r p e r c e p t i o n o f the W e s t . I n the process o f such a n i m a g i n i n g , Islamic
alternative v i e w o f the economy's c u l t u r a l embedment p r o d u c e d two o p p o s i n g
ways b e c o m e either c o m p a r a b l e or o p p o s e d to those e x p e r i e n c e d i n the West.
movements. T h e first was laissez-faire, w h i c h sought to free e c o n o m i c a c t i v i t y
There
f r o m p o l i t i c a l r e g u l a t i o n . T h i s caused widespread insecurity a n d s o c i a l anxiety.
alternative
is another to
the
approach
to situating I s l a m i n global politics,
c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a theoretical
d i v i d e between
an
'universal
T h e second was the spontaneous counter-movement of social forces d e m a n d i n g
m o d e r n i t y ' a n d I s l a m . T h e v e r y a r t i c u l a t i o n o f culture i n a P o l a n y i a n sense is
p r o t e c t i o n f r o m the market. D i v e r s e social groups fearful o f a destructive market
constitutive o f the economy. T h e e c o n o m y as a n instituted process is o r g a n i z e d
w i l l i n v a r i a b l y resist the unrestricted penetration of capital relations a n d press
w i t h i n the l a r g e r relations o f p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y , a n d i d e o l o g i c a l processes.
the state for protection. T h i s helps e x p l a i n the social bases o f fascism i n E u r o p e .
I m p l i c i t here is the idea that the state distils the tension between i n t e r n a t i o n a l
F o l l o w i n g a s i m i l a r l i n e o f r e a s o n i n g , some m a y also interpret I s l a m i c politics as
a n d domestic relations
representing M u s l i m claims for p r o t e c t i o n against the h o m o g e n i z i n g influence
c o m p r o m i s e s i n the state structure. T h e state modifies the i m p a c t o f global
o f the global m a r k e t economy. T h e suggestion is that I s l a m is a repository o f
e c o n o m i c , p o l i t i c a l , a n d g e o - m i l i t a r y forces o n domestic politics by r e s p o n d i n g
l o c a l traditions that spontaneously fashions a protective response
to g l o b a l
m a r k e t forces. S u c h a n a r g u m e n t once a g a i n posits an u n c h a n g i n g I s l a m that exists outside o f politics a n d history, a v i e w that essentially conflates i d e o l o g y a n d history.
o f p o w e r . T h i s reflects
to the needs a n d d e m a n d s o f v a r i o u s social groups. T h i s v i e w o f the state allows
This
belies
any
suggestion
that
the
the spread
global
market
economy
is
o f a u n i v e r s a l conception o f
W e s t e r n m o d e r n i t y . M o r e specifically, it refutes the n o t i o n that l o c a l religious
politics must be situated i n the nexus between n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l strategies a n d
traditions
shifting patterns i n the global e c o n o m y o f capitalism. C u l t u r a l
against the process o f h o m o g e n i z a t i o n . Instead,
movements,
political
us to c o n c e p t u a l i z e I s l a m i c p o l i t i c s as a r e l a t i o n a l p h e n o m e n o n .
h o m o g e n i z i n g the w o r l d t h r o u g h
W h a t is i m p o r t a n t for o u r purposes is Polanyi's insistence that c u l t u r a l
e v o l v i n g domestic
spontaneously
consolidate
into protective
movements
mobilized
this a p p r o a c h sees Islamic
i s l a m i s t or otherwise, are not 'autonomous' agents o f social change o p e r a t i n g
politics as e n t e r i n g i n t o the d o m e s t i c p o l i t i c a l c o m p r o m i s e s a c h i e v e d w i t h i n the
i n a v a c u u m . T h e y are e m b e d d e d i n the d y n a m i c interplay between domestic
state, b e c o m i n g a player i n the r e t h i n k i n g o f l i n k s b e t w e e n n a t i o n a l space a n d
p o l i t i c a l strategies a n d global relations o f power. D o m e s t i c strategies are p a r t
the outside w o r l d .
a n d p a r c e l o f the state-to-state relations involved i n d e f i n i n g a n d m a n a g i n g a
time-specific i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r
(Block
1977; v a n der
Fiji
1984).
The
P o i a n y i formulated
his ideas o n the
rise
o f a spontaneous
protective
response i n the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y to the conditions o f a n emergent
market
o r g a n i z a t i o n o f a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l order is always p a r t i a l a n d unstable because
e c o n o m y i n western E u r o p e . I n a n o n - W e s t e r n context, the issue is that o f a
o f the o n g o i n g p o l i t i c a l struggles w i t h i n the boundaries o f each state. O n the
p e r i p h e r a l state e m b r a c i n g W e s t e r n m i l i t a r y a n d e c o n o m i c p o w e r i n instituting
other h a n d , shifting patterns i n the state system w i t h regard to p r o d u c t i o n ,
a w o r l d capitalist m a r k e t e c o n o m y . W e k n o w f r o m P o i a n y i that state policies
trade, a n d m i l i t a r y relations present opportunities a n d constraints for domestic
must b a l a n c e domestic p o l i t i c a l concerns w i t h those i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l order,
p o l i t i c a l struggles a n d c u l t u r a l movements. T h e s e struggles take place w i t h i n
For T u r k e y , a c o u n t r y s t r a t e g i c a l l y located o n the m a r g i n s o f western E u r o p e
the h i s t o r i c a l l y specific conjuncture o f the p o l i t i c a l a n d g e o - m i l i t a r y events that
a n d the M u s l i m w o r l d , the e c o n o m i c , p o l i t i c a l , a n d m i l i t a r y - s t r a t e g i c encounters
g o v e r n the capitalist w o r l d e c o n o m y ( M c M i c h a e l 2000).
between the West a n d n o n - W e s t are key to u n d e r s t a n d i n g I s l a m i c politics.
T h e state is a n i m p o r t a n t element i n these interactions. States are the
W e c a n n o t , however, d i s t i n g u i s h between the W e s t a n d i s l a m i n terms
i n s t i t u t i o n a l manifestations o f the l i n k between global relations o f p o w e r a n d the
of a c i v i l i z a d o n a l d i v i d e , t r a c e a b l e to u n c h a n g i n g c u l t u r a l essences. G e l l n e r
domestic p o l i t i c a l a n d c u l t u r a l responses to it. D o m e s t i c p o l i t i c a l c o m p r o m i s e s ,
(1983) has p o i n t e d out that c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n involves a r b i t r a r i l y chosen,
a c h i e v e d w i t h i n the state structure t h r o u g h various forms o f multi-class p o p u l i s t
even f a b r i c a t e d , c u l t u r a l p r e m i s e s . A n d e r s o n (1991), o n the other h a n d , argues
a l l i a n c e s , mediate
link. T h i s active p o l i t i c a l process involves constant
that cultures c a n n o t be d i s t i n g u i s h e d by t h e i r falsity or genuineness, but o n l y
negotiation, b a r g a i n i n g , a n d c o m p r o m i s e w i t h i n the specific conjuncture o f
by the style i n w h i c h they are i m a g i n e d . H e has s h o w n that they are actually
w o r l d h i s t o r i c a l events. State p o l i c y must balance domestic p o l i t i c a l c o m p r o m i s e s
constituted t h r o u g h capitalism's h i s t o r i c a l trajectory o f g e o g r a p h i c a l expansion.
the
w i t h those f o r m e d i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l order (Block 1986). T h i s b a l a n c i n g
W h a t matters is the s o c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n o f c u l t u r a l traits that are real a n d
act structures m a n y o f the opportunities for a n d constraints against c u l t u r a l
p o w e r f u l e n o u g h to create a s t r o n g sense o f b e l o n g i n g i n a c o m m u n i t y . T h i s
movements. I n a M u s l i m context, a p o l i t i c a l i m a g i n i n g o f the links between
solidarity is also a n i d e o l o g i c a l device that creates apprehensiveness
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the g l o b a l structures o f p o w e r a n d c u l t u r a l c l a i m s hinges on a
others w h o h a p p e n to be outside o f this p a r t i c u l a r ' i m a g i n e d c o m m u n i t y ' . T h e
towards
18
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
19
I S L A M IN G L O B A L POLITICS
c o n c e r n here is w i t h figuring out h o w 'the West a n d non-West' operates i n a n
to the p r o m o t i o n o f n a t i o n a l interests t h r o u g h reform measures. H e believed
Islamist i m a g i n i n g o f domestic a n d global politics.
this was essentia] for e n h a n c i n g the position o f a M u s l i m state w i t h i n
the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. H i s ideas f o r m the basis o f I s l a m i c m o d e r n i s m . Despite differences i n strategy, m o d e r n i s t a n d r a d i c a l strands o f the I s l a m i c m o v e m e n t
T h e Islamist encounter with Western dominance
agreed o n the d o m i n a n t m o t i f o f E u r o p e a n c o l o n i a l c o n t r o l o f M u s l i m societies.
I s l a m does not possess a c u l t u r a l essence outside history. It is a category for understanding
politics, society, a n d history, d r a w i n g o n themes c o m m o n l y
B o t h h a d a n i m p e r i a l i s t i m a g e o f the West, a t t a c h i n g great i m p o r t a n c e to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system i n d e t e r m i n i n g M u s l i m s u b o r d i n a t i o n w i t h i n it. I s l a m i c m o d e r n i s m r e s p o n d s to the challenge o f W e s t e r n i m p e r i a l i s m
encountered i n populist a n d nationalist ideologies. A c c o r d i n g to E d w a r d S a i d (1995), the idea o f ' i s l a m a n d the West' corresponds to powerful ways o f each k n o w i n g the other, w h i c h E u r o p e a n colonial powers historically structured not o n l y t h r o u g h political a n d economic d o m i n a t i o n but also through the production o f knowledge i n philosophy, literature, art, a n d colonial administration. T h e West, in large measure, implies a detached superiority for a handful o f values a n d ideas, none o f w h i c h has m u c h m e a n i n g outside the history o f conquest (Said 1993). B o t h the West a n d Islam k n o w themselves as essentially different from each other,
by r e f o r m i n g M u s l i m societies. A c c o r d i n g to A b d u h , reform has to come f r o m w i t h i n I s l a m , not f r o m e m u l a t i n g W e s t e r n ways ( H a d d a d 1994). M o r e o v e r , Islam, correctly understood the
instrumental
reason
and
interpreted,
of modern
science
is perfectly and
compatible
technology,
with
i n order
to
strengthen M u s l i m societies, M u s l i m s must first recognize the scientific a n d e c o n o m i c d y n a m i s m o f W e s t e r n societies, a n d then use this p o w e r themselves to reformulate I s l a m i n s u c h a w a y that they c a n counter W e s t e r n d o m i n a n c e . T h i s means m a k i n g I s l a m r e l e v a n t to m o d e r n ideas a n d institutions. F o r A b d u h ,
but i n ways that assume the superiority o f the West.
I s l a m is a r e l i g i o n w i t h s t r o n g r a t i o n a l elements that c a n serve as the basis for T h e issue for Islamists, therefore, concerns the ways i n w h i c h W e s t e r n economic
and
political-military dominance
was
established
over
M.uslim
societies a n d h o w they c a n respond to these c l a i m s o f W e s t e r n superiority. Islamists have developed two alternatives
to W e s t e r n
domination-—Islamic
m o d e r n i s m a n d I s l a m i c r a d i c a l i s m — w h o s e roots lie i n the c o l o n i a l history o f the A r a b w o r l d a n d the I n d i a n subcontinent
o f the late nineteenth
and
early twentieth centuries. J a m a l a l - D i n a l A f g h a n i (1839-97), b o r n i n I r a n a n d educated i n I r a n a n d B r i t i s h I n d i a , was a pioneer o f i s l a m i c m o d e r n i s m a n d r a d i c a l i s m . H e was a modernist i n that he believed i n the necessity o f r e f o r m i n g I s l a m so that M u s l i m societies c o u l d resist the West a n d restore their independence
( K e d d i e 1994). H e was also a r a d i c a l a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t activist
w h o w a n t e d to o r g a n i z e a t r a n s n a t i o n a l Islamist l i b e r a t i o n m o v e m e n t
o f the K o r a n ' s m e a n i n g w o u l d
m a k e I s l a m the c h a m p i o n o f progress a n d development. A b d u h argues t h a t M u s l i m s should not s i m p l y f o l l o w t r a d i t i o n b l i n d l y but should use t h e i r reason i n interpreting I s l a m . T h e y s h o u l d t h i n k creatively about the revelation a n d become knowledgeable a b o u t t h e laws a n d p r i n c i p l e s that g o v e r n the universe. T h i s would provide a
foundation
for the e m p o w e r m e n t a n d r e v i v a l o f M u s l i m
societies. I s l a m i c m o d e r n i s m , t h e n , must lead the way i n p l a y i n g 'catch-up' 5
w i t h E u r o p e a n powers t h r o u g h a ' m o d e r n i z i n g reform p r o g r a m m e . A b d u h was greatly impressed w i t h E u r o p e a n progress ideology and the a p p l i c a t i o n o f i n s t r u m e n t a l reason ( B r o w n 2 0 0 0 ) , but his p r i m a r y g o a l was to redefine I s l a m for the twentieth century r a t h e r t h a n b l i n d l y emulate W e s t e r n ways.
against N e i t h e r I s l a m i c m o d e r n i s m n o r the r a d i c a l i s m o f the nineteenth
Western encroachment. A c c o r d i n g to A f g h a n i , the reassertion o f I s l a m i c identity a n d s o l i d a r i t y was essential for the s u r v i v a l o f M u s l i m s . A f g h a n i
life i n the m o d e r n w o r l d . A r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
believed that
Muslim
s o l i d a r i t y was essential at b o t h the n a t i o n a l a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l levels for the restoration o f M u s l i m independence a n d self-sufficiency. H i s ideas c o n t r i b u t e d to the p a n - I s l a m i c p r o g r a m m e o f O t t o m a n S u l t a n A b d u l h a m i t II (1878-1908), a l t h o u g h it was N a m i k K e m a l , a n O t t o m a n M u s l i m intellectual, who first wrote o n the i m p o r t a n c e o f I s l a m i c u n i t y against W e s t e r n i m p e r i a l i s m . A b d u l h a m i t p r e f i g u r e d a t r a n s n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l I s l a m u n d e r the p o l i t i c a l leadership o f the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T h e Islamists o f today continue to find appeal i n A f g h a n i ' s ideas o n M u s l i m self-sufficiency a n d u n i t y against W e s t e r n d o m i n a t i o n .
century
advocated a r e t u r n to a g o l d e n age o f the past. B o t h , however, a c k n o w l e d g e d the need for change o n the b a s i s o f the c u l t u r a l legacy o f I s l a m . I n c h a l l e n g i n g Western d o m i n a n c e , they d e n i e d that I s l a m implies a fixed c u l t u r a l essence that is i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h c h a n g i n g s o c i a l conditions. T h e s e ideas, w h i c h c a m e a b o u t i n the nineteenth c e n t u r y d u r i n g the e x p a n s i o n o f a capitalist m a r k e t e c o n o m y into the n o n - W e s t e r n w o r l d , p r o d u c e d a long-lasting legacy for I s l a m i c politics. T h e c o m p a t i b i l i t y o f I s l a m a n d m o d e r n i t y is not a n issue here. M o s t Islamists w o u l d acknowledge the a c c e p t a b i l i t y o f I s l a m i c reform ( C o o p e r et a l 2 0 0 0 ; H a s s a n 2002). Islamists w o u l d disagree, however, over the m e a n i n g o f Western influence for a M u s l i m society. T h e y have very different views r e g a r d i n g the d i r e c t i o n , m e t h o d , a n d d e g r e e o f change necessary for r e o r g a n i z i n g society.
E g y p t i a n - b o r n S h e i k h M u h a m m e d A b d u h (1849-1905) was a follower o f A f g h a n i but departed f r o m transnationalist p a n - I s l a m i s m . A b d u h gave p r i o r i t y
T h i s difference o f o p i n i o n m a k e s sense i n the i d e o l o g i c a l context o f a p o l i t i c a l
20
T U R K E Y , İSLAMIS'I S A N D
21
I S L A M IN G L O B A L POLITICS
DEMOCRACY
m o v e m e n t w h i c h has some members who advocate a c c o m m o d a t i o n w i t h the
appears to be a c u r r e n t "resurgence o f Islam' is actually a p o l i t i c a l struggle
W e s t a n d others who push for self-sufficiency a n d independence.
over the future d i r e c t i o n a n d s o c i a l m e a n i n g o f I s l a m i c culture i n r e o r g a n i z i n g
D u r i n g the height o f the G o l d W a r some Islamist thinkers came to question a u n i v e r s a l conception o f i s l a m i c politics. A l t h o u g h they developed a critique o f Western i m p e r i a l i s m , capitalism, a n d m a t e r i a l i s m i n relation to i s l a m i c values, their critique reflects the possibility of choice o n h o w to use existing forms o f
M u s l i m societies. T h i s is a struggle that brings the relevance o f I s l a m to the current processes o f g l o b a l i z a t i o n , i t incorporates the u r b a n poor, r u r a l masses, a n d other m a r g i n a l i z e d segments o f society into the r e w r i t i n g o f a n e w history o f M u s l i m culture İn the p o s t — C o l d W a r international system.
state power. F o r example, the r a d i c a l I s l a m i s m o f M a w l a n a M a w d u d i (1903¬
C o m p e t i n g c o n c e p t i o n s o f society and related p o w e r struggles enter i n t o
79), founder o f the J a m a a t - I I s l a m i movement o n the I n d i a n subcontinent, and
the a r t i c u l a t i o n o f a n I s l a m i c i d e o l o g y that imagines society either as p a r a l l e l to
S a y y i d Q u t b 1,1906-66), a major figure o f the M u s l i m Brotherhood o f E g y p t ,
or distant f r o m W e s t e r n w a y s . T h a t Islamic politics takes a p a r t i c u l a r form at
regards I s l a m as a unique world-view that must be distinguished from other belief
a p a r t i c u l a r t i m e reflects a process o f m e d i a t i o n and shifting domestic p o l i t i c a l
systems. T h i s includes a rejection of n a t i o n a l i s m a n d the nation-state, w h i c h
alliances r e s p o n d i n g to the pressure o f global relations o f p o w e r w i t h i n
M a w d u d i believed misied M u s l i m s a n d u n d e r m i n e d M u s l i m unity. Consequently,
conjuncture o f g e o p o l i t i c a l events. It is never a n outcome p r e d e t e r m i n e d by the
the writings o f these radical Islamists took o n a more c o m m u n i t a r i a n tone. T h e i r
i d e o l o g i c a l content o f i s l a m o r the West. A s I have demonstrated, i s l a m takes a
vision was one of total self-sufficiency guided by p o l i t i c a l organizations such as the
v a r i e t y o f i d e o l o g i c a l forms i n its dealings w i t h m o d e r n i t y a n d the West. The
M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d and the J a m a a t - I I s l a m i .
well-educated
Islamist
engineers,
industrialists,
and
the
business
T h e Islamic modernism o f A H Shariati (1933-77) o f Iran, o n the other h a n d ,
groups w h o emerged as a n e w fraction o f capitalists i n the p o l i t i c a l context
accepted m u c h from the West, i n c l u d i n g the Enlightenment principles of freedom,
o f the 1980s a n d 1990s are s t r u g g l i n g to reposition themselves i n the h i g h l y
equality, justice, and progress. For Shariati, the national space o f the state was the
competitive relations o f the g l o b a l economy. T h e i r ideas a n d aspirations
can
arena of a historical struggle between justice and injustice. I n the quest to free societv
h a r d l y be g r o u p e d w i t h i n a ' T h i r d W o r l d i s t perspective that, d u r i n g the C o l d
from repressive political regimes and the injustices o f a capitalist economy, Shariati
w a r , p o p u l a r i z e d notions o f n a t i o n a l self-sufficiency a n d d e c o u p l i n g from the
expected
revolutionary national liberation
capitalist w o r l d economy. T h i s new g r o u p o f islamists possesses a c u l t u r a l
movements ( R a h n e m a 1994; Shepard 1987). H i s writings were an attempt to
disposition o f openness to the w o r l d based o n an I s l a m i c m o r a l i t y that facilitates
formulate a n Islamic ideology o f freedom, equality, a n d justice by articulating
their p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the g l o b a l economy.
Islamic intellectuals to
spearhead
Islam's compatibility with other revolutionary ideologies, i n c l u d i n g socialism. T h e r a d i c a l I s l a m i s m of M a w d u d i a n d Q u t b involves a complete r e b u i l d i n g and
reorientation
of Muslim
society. M a w d u d i ' s writings reflect a
preference for a transnational M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y a n d a dislike o f n a t i o n a l i s m . H i s w o r k emphasizes the u n i v e r s a l i s m o f I s l a m a n d the comprehensiveness of i s l a m i c life. M a w d u d i envisions a form o f g l o b a l i z a t i o n i n w h i c h Islamic u n i t y is severed f r o m a l l local c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l ties w i t h n a t i o n a l states. For h i m , the conflict is between Islam a n d the n o n - I s l a m i c , w h i c h consists o f the West a n d the l o c a l c u l t u r a l traditions practised i n M u s l i m societies. T h i s struggle between I s l a m a n d the n o n - I s l a m i c w o u l d eventually c u l m i n a t e i n an I s l a m i c revolution a n d the c r e a t i o n o f a n Islamic state. A g r a d u a l I s l a m i z a t i o n o f society t h r o u g h I s l a m i c e d u c a t i o n w o u l d facilitate such a r e v o l u t i o n , e l i m i n a t i n g the need for a v i o l e n t p o l i t i c a l uprising. A n I s l a m i c m o d e r n i s t like S h a r i a t i , o n the other h a n d , w o u l d o n l y refashion M u s l i m society a n d the nation-state. T h e I s l a m i c m o d e r n i s t stand i n relation to westernization is nationalist, w i t h independence a n d e c o n o m i c development as its i d e o l o g i c a l foundation {Piscatori 1986). B o t h r a d i c a l a n d modernist Islamic ideologies were put forward more forcefully
in
the
Cold
W a r era.
when
other
Third
Word
O r g a n i z a t i o n o f the b o o k
strong
independence
movements also m o b i l i z e d against Western i m p e r i a l i s m a n d d o m i n a t i o n . W h a t
T h i s b o o k views i s l a m as a
m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l construct
i n w h i c h politics,
ideology, a n d the e c o n o m y f o r m a n interrelated whole. A b r o a d h i s t o r i c a l m o d e l is used to a r t i c u l a t e these dimensions at the g l o b a l , r e g i o n a l , and l o c a l levels, thereby a l l o w i n g us to interpret the n a t i o n a l d y n a m i c s o f the p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y a n d culture o f the T u r k i s h state a n d I s l a m . T h e analysis is o r g a n i z e d around
three themes:
1) g l o b a l relations
o f power i n c l u d i n g
development
strategics a n d p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y relations that govern the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the global e c o n o m y ; 2) d o m e s t i c p o l i t i c a l - c u l t u r a l responses to these relations; a n d 3) opportunities a n d c o n s t r a i n t s presented to citizens w i t h i n these larger mechanisms
o f change.
The
book
draws
these themes f r o m
the
double
m o v e m e n t a r g u m e n t o f K a r l P o l a n y i (1944). It suggests that v a r i o u s forms o f multi-class p o p u l i s t alliances i n the state structure mediate the l i n k
between
global power relations a n d d o m e s t i c responses to t h e m . T h i s d y n a m i c p o l i t i c a l process incorporates d a i l y life e x p e r i e n c e into the negotiations a n d c o m p r o m i s e s that take place w i t h i n a s p e c i f i c conjuncture o f global events.
22
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
T h e b o o k provides a n o v e r v i e w o f the p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y o f a d e c l i n i n g O t t o m a n E m p i r e i n the nineteenth c e n t u r y a n d the subsequent p o l i t i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c changes o f the T u r k i s h state, from its f o u n d i n g a r o u n d the K e m a l i s t
2
p r i n c i p l e s o f s e c u l a r i s m i n the 1920s to the current era. A l l o f this is e x a m i n e d i n the context o f a c h a n g i n g global system.
A Secular Vision of Modernity
T h e o r d e r i n g o f the seven chapters enables us to explore the h i s t o r i c a l l y v a r i a b l e a r t i c u l a t i o n o f Islam in T u r k e y i n relation to the exercise of state power. B y e x p o s i n g the p o w e r f u l forces confronting the state, a f r a m e w o r k is developed for i n t e r p r e t i n g the d y n a m i c s o f I s l a m w i t h i n c o n t e m p o r a r y T u r k e y . A l s o i l l u m i n a t e d are the h i s t o r i c a l forms o f capital fractions a n d
political
interests, i n c l u d i n g patterns o f elite formation, a n d their i n c o r p o r a t i o n into the state. F i n a l l y , each chapter provides e m p i r i c a l evidence for the a r t i c u l a t i o n o f I s l a m not o n l y by the p o l i t i c a l elite, i n c l u d i n g the m i l i t a r y , but also b y M u s l i m s c o n f r o n t i n g changes i n their day-to-day activities. W e see h o w I s l a m becomes a c r i t i c a l resource for the state a n d for M u s l i m s themselves i n r e c o n f i g u r i n g specific social relations a n d frames o f reference, rather t h a n merely a m o r a l force for p r e s c r i b i n g social b e h a v i o u r .
M
y review o f the l o n g history o f I s l a m i c politics i n T u r k e y traces the debate o n the role o f I s l a m back to the second h a l f o f the nineteenth century. D u r i n g the T a n z i m a t p e r i o d (1839-76) O t t o m a n reformers
u n d e r t o o k a series o f policies to restructure the O t t o m a n state a l o n g secular principles. In their m i n d s , the t e r m 'secular' d i d not constitute s o m e t h i n g w h o l l y independent
from
I s l a m i c referents.
Islamists opposed
the
'secularization'
project o f the T a n z i m a t . T h e y a d v o c a t e d the a d o p t i o n o f Western technology,
O n e t h i n g is c e r t a i n : T h e most appropriate question to ask i n relation to
but not its culture. Islamists a r g u e d that a n a t i o n that t u r n e d its back on its o w n
research on I s l a m i c politics is not whether I s l a m constitutes a fundamentalist
culture c o u l d only p r o d u c e a rootless i m i t a t i o n . F o r t h e m , this was a call for
rejection o f the West a n d m o d e r n ways o f l i v i n g . R a t h e r , we should ask: W h a t
disaster. Nevertheless, Islamists were not w h o l l y against the adoption ol W e s t e r n
lies b e h i n d the d y n a m i c s o f I s l a m i c ideology c o n s t r u c t i o n , w h o constructs it,
ways. T h e y reworked the r e l a t i o n s h i p between W e s t e r n and I s l a m i c culture so
h o w is it shaped over time, a n d h o w does it enter into the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the
t h a i the O t t o m a n E m p i r e c o u l d r e g a i n its c o m p e t i t i v e power. T h e controversy
g l o b a l economy? T h i s b o o k describes a pattern o f recurrence i n the s h a p i n g o f
was settled t e m p o r a r i l y d u r i n g the formative years o f the T u r k i s h nation-state
I s l a m i c politics i n T u r k e y . T h e central l i n k is straight-forward: I s l a m i c politics is
i n the
a p r o d u c t o f interactions between domestic a n d g l o b a l p o l i t i c a l economy. T h i s
a n y possibility o f o p p o s i t i o n . F o r t h e m , development r e q u i r e d the wholesale
i n t e r a c t i o n depends o n the domestic p o l i t i c a l alliances f o r m e d w i t h i n the state.
a d o p t i o n o f W e s t e r n c u l t u r a l values.
But h o w do changes i n state strategies a n d the w i d e r m i l i t a r y a n d e c o n o m i c relations o f p o w e r relate to e a c h other? W h a t are the outcomes? T h e rise o f p o l i t i c a l I s l a m is one possibility, but Islamists figure i n T u r k i s h politics i n c o m p l i c a t e d ways and are u n d o u b t e d l y m a k i n g a l o n g - t e r m difference to the history o f the T u r k i s h state. C l e a r l y , the l i n k s between the p o w e r configurations of the state, p o l i t i c a l regimes, a n d I s l a m v a r y significantly f r o m one p e r i o d to the next. E x a c t l y how a n d w h y I s l a m appears to be a credible i d e o l o g y over such a l o n g p e r i o d o f t i m e is discussed i n later chapters.
1930s, w h e n the f o u n d i n g leaders o f the T u r k i s h R e p u b l i c e l i m i n a t e d
T h e ' s e c u l a r i s m ' project o f the early r e p u b l i c a n p e r i o d reflects a synthetic a p p r o a c h to W e s t e r n m o d e r n i t y as a m o d e l for e m u l a t i o n , but a comprehensive analysis o f O t t o m a n history reveals a n attempt to elevate a specific western E u r o p e a n experience to a l e v e l o f u n i v e r s a l l y replicable ' m o d e r n i t y ' . T h e l o n g s t a n d i n g debate over the m e a n i n g o f m o d e r n i t y informs the d y n a m i c interplay between I s l a m i c a n d secular p o l i t i c s i n a w a y that translates i n t o the r h y t h m s o f class
formation,
new c o n f i g u r a t i o n s o f p o w e r , a n d interstate r i v a l r i e s . V i a
p o l i t i c a l a n d c u l t u r a l struggles, E s t e v a and P r a k a s h (1998) w r i t e , m o d e r n i t y is defined by a capacity to a p p l y the W e s t e r n culture of progress, science. a n d technology to the m a r k e t - e c o n o m i c credo. A u n i q u e l y western E u r o p e a n experience thus becomes t r a n s f o r m e d into a u n i v e r s a l belief i n modernity. O t t o m a n reformers h a d considerable experience i n c o m b i n i n g I s l a m i c a n d W e s t e r n ways, a n d any r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f their efforts as a matter o f m e r e l y c h o o s i n g between t w o c o m p e t i n g sets of practices misses the point. T h e s e reformers were r e s p o n d i n g to the i n s t i t u t i o n o f a g l o b a l market economy, a n d t h e i r response was tied to a s p e c i f i c i m a g e o f the West.
24
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
25
A S E C U L A R VISION OT M O D E R N I T Y
W h a t exactly are 'the W e s t ' a n d the 'Western modei'? Perhaps i f we
A l l Young Ottomans
were c o n c e r n e d
about the disintegration of the
acknowledge the challenge o f other states c o n t e n d i n g for d o m i n a n c e i n E u r o p e
Ottoman
i n the late nineteenth
i n c o r p o r a t e d into a n i s l a m i c t h e o r y o f the state ( M a r d i n
century, as we grant B r i t a i n the status o f d o m i n a n t
E m p i r e a n d b e l i e v e d that E u r o p e a n l i b e r a l ideas needed
to
be
1962). T h e y saw
w o r l d p o w e r İn the eighteenth century, we m i g h t see that the West cannot be
this i n t e g r a t i o n as necessary to strengthen the O t t o m a n state i n the face o f
c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a n u n p r o b l e m a t i c entity. Fierce h i s t o r i c a l struggles i n each
W e s t e r n e n c r o a c h m e n t onto M u s l i m lands. T h e u n i f y i n g theme a m o n g Y o u n g
state c u l m i n a t e d i n the emergence o f various trajectories o f state f o r m a t i o n i n
Ottoman
E u r o p e ( T i l l y 1990). T h e i r outcomes i n p r o d u c i n g the W e s t e r n m o d e l were
I s l a m i c lines, even though they were i n s p i r e d b y W e s t e r n l i b e r a l ideals ( T u n a y a
intellectuals was r e f o r m for O t t o m a n s , b y O t t o m a n s ,
and
along
far from obvious ( Z n b a i d a 1994). S t i i l , the O t t o m a n elite v i e w e d the West
1952: 94). T h e y h o p e d to institute c o n s t i t u t i o n a l rule a n d to create a n ideology
as a largely u n c h a l l e n g e d homogeneous n o t i o n that i m p i n g e d o n a project o f
o f O t t o m a n u n i t y u n d e r I s l a m . W h a t they envisaged was a consultative a n d
' m o d e r n i t y ' i d e a l i z i n g E n l i g h t e n m e n t principles. T a n z i m a t i m a g e r y contrasted
responsible government that derives its p o w e r f r o m G o d , t u r n e d into a W e s t e r n
the O t t o m a n - I s l a m i c legacy w i t h a newly constructed knowledge o f the West.
t h e o r y o f government that emphasizes p o p u l a r representation a n d sovereignty.
I n the m i n d s o f the reformers, the West was a source o f i n s p i r a t i o n , w h i l e the
H o w e v e r , this was a difficult task g i v e n that the Y o u n g O t t o m a n s lacked a
Ottoman
w o r k a b l e theory o f p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n and a clear distinction between state,
E m p i r e was a b u r e a u c r a t i c a l l y oppressive and e c o n o m i c a l l y a n d
m i l i t a r i l y weak.
i n d i v i d u a l , a n d c o m m u n i t y . A l t h o u g h they p r a i s e d the E n l i g h t e n m e n t idea o f
T h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the West is accurate i n so far as it points to the
progress for c o n t r i b u t i n g to m a t e r i a l advances i n E u r o p e , they still believed that
discursive p r i m a c y o f the West i n the fields o f science a n d t e c h n o l o g y ( K a n d i y o t i
the K o r a n was a f u n d a m e n t a l source o f s o c i a l cohesion a n d that it offered the
1996).
greatest g u a r a n t y o f i n d i v i d u a l freedom. F o r the Y o u n g O t t o m a n s , there was
Nevertheless,
the
characterization
overlooks c o m p l e x ,
multifaceted
encounters i n v o l v i n g trade, d i p l o m a c y , a n d w a r ( A r r i g h i a n d Silver 1999). T h e s e
'no d i s c r e p a n c y between the t h e o r y that the K i n g ' s p o w e r comes f r o m G o d a n d
encounters were entangled w i t h the search for a m o d e i that w o u l d strengthen the
the t h e o r y that it arose b y a c o n t r a c t w i t h the people' ( M a r d i n 1962: 401).
O t t o m a n state. A deeper u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the m i l i t a r y - d i p l o m a t i c engagements
T h e Y o u n g O t t o m a n s w e r e forerunners o f those who h o l d the idea that
a n d p o l i t i c a l struggles o f the late nineteenth a n d early twentieth centuries m i g h t
I s l a m i c culture is compatible w i t h W e s t e r n l i b e r a l principles. T h e i r emphasis o n
enable us to conclude, then, that we have good reason to subvert the b i n a r v
the c o m p a t i b i l i t y o f I s l a m with. E u r o p e a n m o d e r n i t y reappears i n the w r i t i n g s
v i e w o f the West a n d I s l a m .
o f I s l a m i c modernists such as A f g h a n i a n d A b d u h . A s patriots, the Y o u n g O t t o m a n s defended M u s l i m l a n d s f r o m the West. T h e y protested the abusive p o w e r o f r u l i n g b u r e a u c r a t i c c a d r e s but were not against the sultanate. T h e i r
T h e Ottoman merging of Islam and Western modernity
c o n c e r n was that 'the p e o p l e ' be protected f r o m b u r e a u c r a t i c abuses. ' T h e people', for the Y o u n g O t t o m a n s , were the l o w e r a n d l o w e r - m i d d l e classes w h o
A l t h o u g h ' p a n - I s l a m i s m ' is a n o l d concept referring to the u n i o n o f a l l M u s l i m s , it o n l y emerged as a p o l i t i c a l ideology i n the second h a l f o f the
nineteenth
r e c e i v e d few i f a n y o f the m a t e r i a l benefits p r o m i s e d b y the s e c u l a r i z i n g reforms o f the T a n z i m a t .
century. T h e Y o u n g O t t o m a n s , the earliest advocates o f p a n - I s l a m i s m , were p a r t o f a new u r b a n class o f literati from Istanbul, i n c l u d i n g S i n a s i (1826-71), A l l S u a v i (1839—78), a n d N a m ı k K e m a l (1840—88). i n a d d i t i o n to r e c e i v i n g a n I s l a m i c education, m a n y o f t h e m attended European-style schools, established d u r i n g the T a n z i m a t era, where they l e a r n e d foreign languages a n d c a m e u n d e r the influence o f E u r o p e a n l i b e r a l principles. M o s t Y o u n g O t t o m a n s h a d f a m i l y b a c k g r o u n d s i n the O t t o m a n b u r e a u c r a c y a n d w o r k e d for the government i n the T r a n s l a t i o n Office o f the S u b l i m e Porte. T h e T r a n s l a t i o n Office, founded in
1821, was the first e d u c a t i o n a l b o d y i n the O t t o m a n
Empire in which
T h e p r i n t m e d i a became the means by w h i c h Y o u n g O t t o m a n s disseminated their c r i t i c a l ideas. W h i l e i n e x i l e i n Paris a n d E o n d o n , they started newspapers such as the Muhbir and the Hurriyet. Because they sought to c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h the general p o p u l a t i o n i n the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , they wrote i n spoken T u r k i s h , a clear departure from the w r i t i n g style o f the O t t o m a n era—a m i x t u r e o f A r a b i c , Persian, a n d T u r k i s h . W h e n t h e y r e t u r n e d f r o m exile i n 1871 they continued t h e i r c r i t i c i s m i n Istanbul newspapers such as the Ibret a n d the Basiret, c o n t r i b u t i n g greatly to p o l i t i c a l debate in the e m p i r e (Turkone 1991).
( S o m e l 2001: 21).
Intellectuals from other M u s l i m lands also b e c a m e f a m i l i a r w i t h Y o u n g
W o r k i n g i n the T r a n s l a t i o n Office, the Y o u n g O t t o m a n s were w e l l a c q u a i n t e d
O t t o m a n w r i t i n g s , i n c l u d i n g M u s l i m refugees w h o came to Istanbul as a result
w i t h E u r o p e a n thought a n d E u r o p e a n p o l i t i c a l a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
o f the E u r o p e a n c o l o n i z a t i o n o f I n d i a ( O z c a n 1997). A f g h a n i was a m o n g the
government
officials received a Western-style e d u c a t i o n
S i n a s i , for example, studied p u b l i c finance a n d literature i n E u r o p e .
systems.
intellectuals most influenced b y the Y o u n g O t t o m a n idea o f c o m b i n i n g Islam w i t h W e s t e r n ways. Fie stayed i n I s t a n b u l d u r i n g 1870 a n d 1871 (Turkone 1991: 3 5 - 6 ) .
26
A
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
I I is n o t e w o r t h y thai, a n article p u b l i s h e d m Basiret on 12 A p r i l 1872 opened
27
S E C U L A R VISION OF M O D E R N I T Y
religious c o m m u n i t i e s . T h e v lived i n separate quarters o f the city under the
a discussion for the first t i m e o n the p o l i c y o f p a n - I s l a m i s m i n the O t t o m a n
headship o f their o w n r e l i g i o u s leaders who represented their c o m m u n i t y before
E m p i r e f O z c a n 1997: 3 5 - 8 1 . T h e article was followed by a general upsurge o f
the g o v e r n m e n t ( I n a l c i k 1994: 150-1). N o n - M u s l i m millets h a d n o right to access
Islamist activity. T h i s i n c l u d e d the w r i t i n g a n d d i s t r i b u t i o n o f pamphlets, letters,
r u l i n g positions i n the c e n t r a l b u r e a u c r a c y unless they converted to I s l a m .
a n d articles, the p u b l i c a t i o n o f a b o o k i n 1899 by Esat Efendi entitled Ittihad-
T h e y were also p r o h i b i t e d from s e r v i n g i n the m i l i t a r y , a l t h o u g h they h a d to
I Islam. ( U n i t y o f Islam), a n d the f o u n d i n g o f the Society for the G e o g r a p h y
pay an e x e m p t i o n tax. T h e Y o u n g O t t o m a n s believed that T a n z i m a t reforms
of M u s l i m E a n d s ( M e m a l i k - I s l a m i y e C o ğ r a f y a
C e m i y e t i ) by H o c a T a h s i n
granted e q u a l c i t i z e n s h i p rights to a l l , w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g special religious
E f e n d i . A l l e m p h a s i z e d the need for M u s l i m u n i t y a r o u n d the O t t o m a n s u k a n -
c o m m u n i t y privileges for n o n - M u s l i m s at the same t i m e ( M a r d i n 1962: 14-5).
c a i i p h i n c o n f r o n t i n g E u r o p e a n c o l o n i a l i s m . W h i l e these activities c a n n o t a l l
T h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n , Y o u n g O t t o m a n s a r g u e d , resulted f r o m the fact that foreign
be attributed to the Y o u n g O t t o m a n s , their w r i t i n g s c e r t a i n l y encouraged the
states i m p o s e d reforms o n t h e government, yet extended legal assurances to
general p o p u l a t i o n to become more enthusiastic about M u s l i m unity.
n o n - M u s l i m millets a n d n o n - M u s l i m mercantile groups affiliated w i t h E u r o p e a n
T h e Y o u n g O t t o m a n s generally, a n d N a m i k K e m a l İn p a r t i c u l a r , were ardent critics o f T a n z i m a t p e r i o d reforms. T h e y were not against the constitution
c o m m e r c i a l interests. N a m i k K c m a l was thus m o v e d to c a l l the reforms 'charters of concessions' to n o n - M u s l i m s (Turkone 1991: 68V
of a r a t i o n a l b u r e a u c r a t i c state ( F i n d l c y 1980), but they vehemently opposed the
T h e Y o u n g O t t o m a n o p p o s i t i o n to T a n z i m a t reforms underscores
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f the central state into a m o n o l i t h i c a n d a u t h o r i t a r i a n apparatus
d o m i n a n t role o f foreign p o w e r s i n d e s i g n i n g these reforms. F o r e x a m p l e ,
c o n t r o l l e d b y secular bureaucrats. M u c h o f their c r i t i c i s m was levelled against
d i p l o m a t i c pressure i m p o s e d by the B r i t i s h ambassador,
the g r a n t i n g o f e q u a l status a n d rights to n o n - M u s l i m s . T h e goal o f T a n z i m a t
Redcliffe, w a s i n s t r u m e n t a l i n this r e g a r d ( P a l m e r 1992). B r i t a i n favoured a
bureaucrats was to achieve a unified O t t o m a n n a t i o n t h r o u g h the concept o f
strong, c e n t r a l i z e d O t t o m a n state to curb the u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y o f future G r e a t
mass c i t i z e n s h i p , u n b r o k e n by creed, religious affiliation, or nationality. A s
P o w e r p o l i t i c s i n r e d r a w i n g t h e m a p o f E u r o p e . B r i t a i n h o p e d that the reforms
G o c e k (1996: 85) demonstrates, this u n i t y was o n l y r e a l i z e d to a l i m i t e d extent.
w o u l d strengthen the c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y o f the g o v e r n m e n t a n d undercut R u s s i a n
Nevertheless, T a n z i m a t reforms, at least i n theory, extended the p r i n c i p l e o f
influence i n the B a l k a n s o v e r S l a v i c - s p e a k i n g members o f the O r t h o d o x faith
e q u a l i t y before the l a w to cover areas o f e d u c a t i o n a l opportunity, government
( M a r r i o t 1924). It was also b e l i e v e d that the reforms w o u l d help c o n t a i n the
appointments, a n d the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f justice, as well as matters c o n c e r n i n g
expansionist a m b i t i o n s o f F r a n c e ( K a s a b a 19931.
t a x a t i o n a n d the m i l i t a r y ( D a v i s o n 1993: 64). T h i s is exactly what the Y o u n g
the
L o r d Stratford de
i t is not fair, however, t o c l a i m that the reformers were passive recipients of W e s t e r n - i m p o s e d p r e s c r i p t i o n s . T a n z i m a t bureaucrats were d e t e r m i n e d to
O t t o m a n s opposed. that
revivify the e m p i r e a n d fend o f f g r o w i n g foreign influence. O t t o m a n m i l i t a r y
they perceived to be a tool o f W e s t e r n i m p e r i a l d o m i n a t i o n i n the design
p o w e r h a d been w e a k e n e d b y B a l k a n insurrections a n d the O t t o m a n - R u s s i a n
a n d enforcement o f reforms. T h e y b e l i e v e d the government was c a t e r i n g to
wars o f 1768-74, 1787 9 2 , 1 8 0 6 , 1 8 0 9 - 1 2 , 1 8 2 8 - 2 9 . a n d 1 8 5 4 - 5 6 . P a r t i c u l a r l y
the expectations o f Western powers i n a m a n n e r that w o u l d define the rights
after the defeat o f the O t t o m a n a r m y by R u s s i a i n the C r i m e a n w a r o f 1 8 5 4 - 5 6 ,
o f its C h r i s t i a n subjects as distinct from those o f M u s l i m s . T h e 1839 reform
it became necessary to ' m o d e r n i z e ' the a r m y a n d navy. T h i s , i n t u r n , r e q u i r e d
p r o g r a m m e ( H a t t i - S h e r i f f o f G u l h a n e j , d i c t a t e d by the B r i t i s h , a n d the H a t t i
that O t t o m a n s accept the m i l i t a r y superiority o f guns, heavy artillery, a n d
H ü m a y u n o f 1856, i m p o s e d by the T r e a t y o f Paris, r e q u i r e d the
a r m o u r e d w a r s h i p s p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h the a p p l i c a t i o n o f techniques developed
The Young Ottomans
protested
against a n O t t o m a n
autocracy
Ottoman and
d u r i n g the I n d u s t r i a l R e v o l u t i o n . C o n v i n c e d o f the need to a c q u i r e Western
undertake a n u m b e r o f reforms to g u a r a n t e e t h e i r security. T h e 1861 treaty
scientific t h i n k i n g a n d c a t c h u p w i t h Western t e c h n o l o g i c a l advances, T a n z i m a t
extended foreign i n v o l v e m e n t i n O t t o m a n reforms a n d forced the g o v e r n m e n t
bureaucrats gave p r i o r i t y to W e s t e r n - s t y l e education.
government
to accept the religious privileges o f its C h r i s t i a n subjects
to r e c o g n i z e F r a n c e , for example, as the protector o f O t t o m a n C a t h o l i c subjects. S i m i l a r l y , R u s s i a c l a i m e d to be a protector o f the rights o f G r e e k a n d R u s s i a n W e s t e r n - s t y l e e d u c a t i o n i n the O t t o m a n E m p i r e
O r t h o d o x faiths a n d Slavic speakers i n the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , A c c o r d i n g to the Y o u n g O t t o m a n s , sharia l a w assured M u s l i m d o m i n a n c e i n the state (Turkone 1991). T h e r e were two m a i n millets, consisting o f M u s l i m s and
n o n - M u s l i m s . Regardless
dominant
o f language
differences,
M u s l i m s were
the
millet. N o n - M u s l i m s were the r u l e d millet, d i v i d e d into separate
T h e government opened the first Western-style educational institutions i n 1773, d u r i n g the m i l i t a r y e m e r g e n c y created by the O t t o m a n - R u s s i a n w a r of 1768¬ 74 (Some! 2001: 21-2). T h e s e were m i l i t a r y schools designed to t r a i n officers.
28
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
A S E C U L A R VISION OF M O D E R N I T Y
where students learned mathematics, geometry, and the n a t u r a l sciences. I n the 1830s the g o v e r n m e n t began to o p e n schools for c i v i l servants i n order to t r a i n a professional class o f c i v i l bureaucrats. T h e new educational policies resulted i n a significant increase i n the n u m b e r o f m i l i t a r y a n d c i v i l bureaucrats
graduating
f r o m Western-style, government-built schools. M a n y o f these officers a n d c i v i l servants, w h o m G o c e k (1996: 4 4 - 8 6 ) refers to as the O t t o m a n
bureaucratic
bourgeoisie, were O t t o m a n M u s l i m s . P r i o r to the
(Treaties o f M o r a l i t y ) was used between
1847
a n d 1876. W r i t t e n b y S a d i k R i f a t P a s h a , it sought to i n c u l c a t e the core values deemed necessary for a p u p i l ' s m o r a l education. T h e s e i n c l u d e d : religiosity, obedience, respect, c l e a n l i n e s s , d i s c i p l i n e , preservation o f h e a l t h , generosity, self-control, patience, g o o d m a n n e r s , benevolence, a n d duty. T h e Ahlak Risalesi was designed to ensure that students m a i n t a i n e d their religious devotion a n d patriotic fervour.
1830s, O t t o m a n e d u c a t i o n consisted m a i n l y o f religious
t r a i n i n g , w i t h K o r a n schools at the elementary level a n d medreses at the h i g h e r level. T h e s e were c i v i l educational institutions established for O t t o m a n M u s l i m s . T h e y were financed by vakifs (charitable endowments) a n d directed by members o f the lower ulema (Singer 2002). T h e rusdiyye p u b l i c schools, f o u n d e d i n 1839, were the first schools to p r o v i d e a m i x e d religious a n d p r a c t i c a l c u r r i c u l u m . T h e s e were a d v a n c e d p r i m a r y level schools attended
m a i n l y by M u s l i m s .
T h e i r graduates were seen as p o t e n t i a l c i v i l servants. T h e Y o u n g O t t o m a n intellectuals a n d m a n y f o u n d i n g members o f the T u r k i s h R e p u b l i c , i n c l u d i n g M u s t a f a K e m a l , received their e d u c a t i o n at the rusdiyye schools. N o n - M u s l i m s attended
b a c k e d textbook Ahlak Risalesi
29
Western-style
schools, founded
It is not a n e x a g g e r a t i o n to say that O t t o m a n s w e l c o m e d W e s t e r n l i b e r a l principles i n the h o p e o f s t r e n g t h e n i n g state power. B u t they were also suspicious of the wholesale a d o p t i o n o f W e s t e r n c u l t u r a l values. I n fact, they attributed the g r o w t h o f secessionist m o v e m e n t s a m o n g n o n - M u s l i m s to those values. N o n - M u s l i m s were not interested i n r e m a i n i n g i n the e m p i r e as equal citizens o f the state, n o r were t h e y interested i n b e i n g t r a i n e d for the c i v i l service i n sultan schools. T h e y o b j e c t e d strenuously to the p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l t a x a t i o n and the a b o l i t i o n o f a l l c o m m u n i t y privileges a n d exemptions (such as s e r v i n g i n the m i l i t a r y ) . F o r the first t i m e , n o n - M u s l i m s w o u l d have to p a y considerably higher taxes ( I n a l c i k 1994). A f t e r the O t t o m a n - R u s s i a n w a r o f 1877 a n d the
own
B e r l i n T r e a t y o f 1878, it was c l e a r that the C h r i s t i a n c o m m u n i t i e s o f G r e e k a n d
religious c o m m u n i t i e s , E u r o p e a n states, a n d missionaries, where they received
Slavic-speakers were not e v e n interested i n a k i n d o f federal e q u a l i t y w i t h the
a m i x e d education i n the m o d e r n sciences a n d the religious culture o f their
em pi re.
p a r t i c u l a r d e n o m i n a t i o n , i n e l i g i b l e for the
bureaucratic
by their
posts t r a d i t i o n a l l y
a l l o c a t e d to M u s l i m s , n o n - M u s l i m s d e v e l o p e d into a new social g r o u p , the O t t o m a n c o m m e r c i a l bourgeoisie ( G o c e k 1996: 86 116).
dead. G i v e n the increase i n t h e M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n o f the e m p i r e , the sultan
T h e 1856 reform package brought about a major shift i n educational p o l i c y . E q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y for a l l subjects was m a n d a t e d ,
Intellectuals a n d r u l i n g b u r e a u c r a t i c cadres c o n c l u d e d t h a t the T a n z i m a t project o f a c h i e v i n g O t t o m a n u n i t y a r o u n d secular p r i n c i p l e s o f citizenship was
thereby
began to p r o m o t e the i d e a o f M u s l i m unity. T h e e m p i r e lost most o f its B a l k a n
allowing
lands and the C h r i s t i a n p o p u l a t i o n but there was a massive i n f l u x o f M u s l i m
a d m i t t a n c e o f n o n - M u s l i m s to O t t o m a n c i v i l a n d m i l i t a r y schools. A l t h o u g h
refugees f r o m territories that h a d fallen under B r i t i s h , R u s s i a n , a n d F r e n c h r u l e
the e d u c a t i o n a l system was b e i n g s e c u l a r i z e d i n order to increase n o n - M u s l i m
in I n d i a , C e n t r a l A s i a , a n d N o r t h A f r i c a . A s a result, by the end o f the 1870s
presence i n the O t t o m a n bureaucracy, the reformers d i d not r i d education o f its
m o r e t h a n 70 p e r cent o f the p o p u l a t i o n i n the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was M u s l i m
I s l a m i c religious content. R a t h e r , they b e g a n to institute a m i x e d c u r r i c u l u m o f
( O z c a n 1997: 44). T h e sultan's p a n - I s l a m i c appeal was also p o p u l a r a m o n g the
i s l a m i c studies a n d m o d e r n sciences for M u s l i m students, w h i l e a c k n o w l e d g i n g
M u s l i m s o f C e n t r a l A s i a a n d I n d i a l i v i n g i n c o m m u n i t i e s u n d e r c o l o n i a l attack
the right o f every religious c o m m u n i t y to establish its o w n schools (Somel 2001:
by R u s s i a a n d B r i t a i n .
49). T h i s m a r k s the emergence o f a n O t t o m a n b r a n d o f e d u c a t i o n based on the perceived need for both scientific-technical k n o w l e d g e a n d religious m o r a l values. R e f o r m e r s saw such a n e d u c a t i o n a l p r o g r a m m e as essential for the g r o w t h o f a competitive O t t o m a n power-base w i t h the capacity to fend off foreign p o l i t i c a l a n d c u l t u r a l interference
(Fortna 2002). T h i s emphasis
on
i n c r e a s i n g O t t o m a n competitiveness t h r o u g h e d u c a t i o n became m o r e explicit d u r i n g the A b d u l h a m i t era o f p a n - I s l a m i s m . A s reforms unfolded after
T h e R u s s i a n w a r a n d the B e r l i n T r e a t y h a d reinforced the idea that O t t o m a n s h a d to rely o n t h e i r o w n resources a n d c o - a u t h o r t h e i r o w n trajectory of social change. S u l t a n A b d u l h a m i t undertook a p r o g r a m m e to e x p a n d the education o f M u s l i m s b y m e r g i n g Islamic r e l i g i o n w i t h m o d e r n science a n d technology. I n a d d i t i o n to t h e t r a d i t i o n a l K o r a n schools, n e w Western-style elementary level ibtidai s c h o o l s were built, as w e l l as a d v a n c e d p r i m a r y level rusdiyye a n d s e c o n d a r y level idadi schools. T h e n u m b e r o f new-style schools
1839, the c u r r i c u l u m o f the sultan's schools
constructed d u r i n g the A b d u l h a m i t r e i g n a p p r o a c h e d 10,000 ( F o r t n a 2002: 99).
c h a n g e d to a c c o m m o d a t e courses o n c o m m e r c e a n d the sciences as w e l l as
T h e secondary level idadi s c h o o l s , designed i n the t r a d i t i o n o f F r e n c h lycées,
I s l a m i c studies. Nevertheless, i s l a m a n d m o r a l education c o n t i n u e d to be a n
exposed i m p e r i a l b u r e a u c r a t i c cadres to western E u r o p e a n c u l t u r e a n d r a t i o n a l
i m p o r t a n t p i l l a r o f T a n z i m a t educational ideology. T h e earliest government-
scientific t h i n k i n g , but w i t h o u t neglecting the role o f I s l a m i c c u l t u r e a n d m o r a l
30
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS AND
31
A S E C U L A R VISION OF MODERNITY
DEMOCRACY
principles. I n 1868, the G a l a t a s a r a y L y c é e ( M e k t e b - I Sultani) was established
second characteristic is sohbel a n i n t i m a t e s p i r i t u a l conversation between master ;
i n I s t a n b u l by the F r e n c h for the education o f the bureaucratic elite. It set the
a n d disciple. T h e close r e l a t i o n between master a n d disciple reveals itself i n rabita
e x a m p l e for A b d u l h a m i t ' s idadi schools. U n d e r the d i r e c t o r s h i p o f A H S u a v i , the
( l i n k i n g the heart o f the f o l l o w e r to the heart o f the leader) a n d results i n the
G a l a t a s a r a y L y c é e shifted its c u r r i c u l u m to prevent students from b e c o m i n g
experience o f s p i r i t u a l u n i t y a n d p u r i f i c a t i o n . It is this system o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l
p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h W e s t e r n ideas and p h i l o s o p h y at the expense o f Islamic
linkages established for the exercise o f sohbets a n d dhikrs that distinguishes the
teachings.
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l strategy o f the N a q s h b a n d i a n d underpins its p o l i t i c a l success
A
Western-style
education
combining
knowledge
of
science
t e c h n o l o g y w i t h the precepts o f I s l a m was also advocated for the p o p u l a t i o n . T h e press, especially the Basmi,
and
general
the Sabah, a n d the Vakit, were a l l
m o b i l i z e d to p r o m o t e the idea o f M u s l i m u n i t y t h r o u g h education a n d m o r a l
(Mardin
1991). R e c o g n i z i n g the
tremendous
p o t e n t i a l i n the
Naqshbandi
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l strategy, S u l t a n A b d u l h a m i t encouraged N a q s h b a n d i disciples to a p p e a l to the hearts a n d m i n d s o f M u s l i m s throughout the empire a n d m o b i l i z e t h e m against Western e n c r o a c h m e n t .
g u i d a n c e . E d u c a t i o n for the general p u b l i c , however, a c t u a l l y meant education
T h e N a q s h b a n d i o r d e r also successfully used the p r i n t m e d i a that h a d
for M u s l i m m e n . T h e students b e i n g t r a i n e d i n these schools for positions i n state
been i n t r o d u c e d into the i n t e l l e c t u a l life o f O t t o m a n M u s l i m s d u r i n g the early
management
eighteenth century. T h e w i d e c i r c u l a t i o n o f letters a n d books has always been
were a h male. G i r l s began to receive e d u c a t i o n i n state schools
as early as the 1840s, but their education r e m a i n e d at the p r i m a r y level; very
a very important
few w o m e n entered state employment, a n d those w h o d i d w o r k e d as teachers
1975: 367). O t t o m a n N a q s h b a n d i S h e i k h G u m u s h a n e v i p u b l i s h e d his o w n
( Q u a t a e r t 2 0 0 0 : 66).
b o o k , Cami'ul-Usul, a n d m a n y j o u r n a l s were p r i n t e d a n d c i r c u l a t e d , i n c l u d i n g
U n d e r S u l t a n A b d u l h a m i t , education was given the highest p r i o r i t y i n order to develop skills i n p r a c t i c a l , religious, a n d m o r a l matters. T h e educational system was c e n t r a l to the p r o d u c t i o n o f c i v i l servants commercial
classes.
Reformers
redesigned
the
as well as
educational
system
Muslim so that
M u s l i m s c o u l d become competitive w i t h the n o n - M u s l i m c o m m e r c i a l classes
Ceride-I Sufiyye, Tasavvuf, Muhibban,
S u l t a n A b d u l h a m i t also m o b i l i z e d Sufi orders and sent M u s l i m clerics into the c o u n t r y s i d e to r a l l y M u s l i m support for religious a n d p r a c t i c a l education. 1870 o n w a r d s , there was a
sharp
increase i n the n u m b e r o f Sufi dervishes a n d other M u s l i m clerics t r a v e l l i n g back a n d forth between O t t o m a n a n d other M u s l i m lands. T h e N a q s h b a n d i order, i n p a r t i c u l a r , was m o b i l i z e d to organize p o p u l a r support for M u s l i m
b u i l d i n g a l i b r a r y , a n d o r g a n i z i n g conferences ( K a r a 1979: 17-20). S i m i l a r l y , the G u m u s h a n e v i convent b u i l t four libraries, purchased a p r i n t i n g m a c h i n e , a n d d i s t r i b u t e d books to M u s l i m s free o f charge ( G u n d u z 1983: 184-90). T h e N a q s h b a n d i e m p h a s i s o n Islamic education was c o m p l e m e n t a r y to of the p e r i o d , saw the roots o f E u r o p e a n e c o n o m i c and m i l i t a r y p o w e r i n the r a t i o n a l sciences, w h i c h they b e l i e v e d were i n e x t r i c a b l y tied to t e c h n o l o g i c a l achievement ( F o r t n a 2 0 0 2 : 8 7 - 1 3 0 ) . T h e substance of, a n d continuities between, the sultan's a n d the T a n z i m a t ' s goals o f e d u c a t i o n are clear: to create a n d m a i n t a i n a M u s l i m b o u r g e o i s i e e q u i p p e d w i t h the culture o f m o d e r n science a n d technology a n d capable o f f a c i n g a competitive market economy, a i l w i t h i n the r e g u l a t o r y function o f g o v e r n m e n t schools.
u n i t y ( G u n d u z 19831. T h e N a q s h b a n d i order h a d a strong o r g a n i z a t i o n a l structure. It
Despite the c o n t i n u i t i e s , there was also d i s c o n t i n u i t y w i t h the T a n z i m a t
formed
s m a l l c o m m u n i t y - b a s e d networks based o n p e r s o n a l relations a n d l i n k e d t h e m to a strong, c e n t r a l l y o r g a n i z e d structure. T h i s strategy also defined the w a y i n w h i c h k n o w l e d g e a p p l i e d to the task o f M u s l i m m o b i l i z a t i o n was to be a c q u i r e d ( A l g a r 1983). S u c h k n o w l e d g e — d e f i n e d as the p u r s u i t of self-purification— was to be g a i n e d t h r o u g h absolute c o n f o r m i t y to the teachings o f the s h e i k h r e s i d i n g i n one's c o m m u n i t y . I n N a q s h b a n d i thought there are three sources of k n o w l e d g e : the book, the m e m o r y , a n d the practice o f rabila.
Hitcmet, Mirsad, a n d Mihrab. A n association
A b d u l h a m i t ' s e d u c a t i o n a l p r o g r a m m e . T h e sultan, along w i t h l e a d i n g figures
schools o p e n e d by their religious leaders (Fortna 2002V
o f r a i l w a y s from about
of Naqshbandi political activism (Schimmel
k n o w n as C e m ' i y e t - I Sufiyye w a s f o u n d e d for the purpose o f p u b l i s h i n g b o o k s ,
who were a l r e a d y r e c e i v i n g a m i x e d education a b r o a d or i n the c o m m u n i t y
W i t h the spread
component
Acquiring
k n o w l e d g e is not seen as a solitary practice i n v o l v i n g o n l y the study o f religious texts. T h e s p i r i t u a l leader or master plays a c r u c i a l role i n the l e a r n i n g process. S c h i m m e l (1975: 366; writes that the centre o f N a q s h b a n d i education is the silent dhikr (recollection o f G o d i n the heart) i n s p i r e d by the s p i r i t u a l leader. T h e
project. T h e sultan's intense d e v o t i o n to M u s l i m u n i t y was part o f the selffashioning o f the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T h e O t t o m a n n a t i o n - b u i l d i n g that b e g a n with
the
Tanzimat's
secular
c i t i z e n s h i p concept
Abdulhamit, placing Ottomans
was
transformed
under
under Islamic moral regulation. Still, both
converge i n their a m b i v a l e n t response to W e s t e r n m o d e r n i t y : O t t o m a n s rejected W e s t e r n i m p e r i a l d o m i n a t i o n but d r e w from W e s t e r n l i b e r a l principles a n d c u l t u r a l values. A s G o r o n i l (1997) has observed i n relation to V e n e z u e l a , the nineteenth-century O t t o m a n project o f c o - a u t h o r i n g its o w n p a t h d é c e n t r e s the E u r o p e a n m o d e l o f social c h a n g e . To
understand
how
this
preoccupation
with
self-fashioning
shaped
the path o f O t t o m a n r e f o r m s , we must go b e y o n d simplistic conceptions o f
32
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
33
A SECULAR VISION OF MODERNITY
W e s t e r n i m i t a t i o n or rejection. G o i n g b e y o n d such d i c h o t o m o u s views is key to
i n refashioning their o w n h i s t o r i c a l trajectory. O t t o m a n reformers f o u n d the
u n d e r s t a n d i n g the emergence o f historical differences as products o f interrelated
state to be entangled i n a g l o b a l process that d e m a r c a t e d W e s t e r n from n o n -
histories. M o r e precisely, it is the history o f free trade i m p e r i a l i s m that put
Western in a hierarchical manner, w i t h Europeans dominating non-Europeans.
E u r o p e a n d the O t t o m a n E m p i r e o n separate trajectories o f social change.
R e f o r m e r s discovered t h a t t h e g l o b a l process was u n i t a r y a n d entailed constitution o f a m a r k e t
e c o n o m y . R a t h e r t h a n c o m i n g into conflict
the with
W e s t e r n progress i d e o l o g y a n d the c u l t u r e o f science a n d t e c h n o l o g y — p e r c e i v e d P e r i p h e r a l i z a t i o n o f the state: free t r a d e
to be keys to a d v a n c e m e n t — O t t o m a n s
decided to focus o n I s l a m i c m o r a l i t y i n
their a d a p t a t i o n to the m a r k e t e c o n o m y . T o better u n d e r s t a n d the politics o f T o the extent that states r e g u l a r l y interact w i t h each other a n d to the degree that their i n t e r a c t i o n affects the b e h a v i o u r o f e a c h state is w h a t makes state relations a system ( T i l l y 1990: 162). I n Polanyi's (1944) view, from the
1815
Peace o f V i e n n a u n t i l 1914, B r i t a i n fashioned a distinctive system o f states based on a balance o f p o w e r policy. T h e balance o f p o w e r system, established by the Peace o f W e s t p h a l i a i n 1648, became a n instrument o f B r i t i s h d o m i n a n c e i n the nineteenth c e n t u r y v i a the C o n c e r t o f E u r o p e . It g u a r a n t e e d consultation, c o - o p e r a t i o n , a n d thus the interdependence o f nations ( A r r i g h i a n d Silver 1999: 5 8 - 9 ) . T h e b a l a n c e o f p o w e r p o l i c y was integral to the B r i t i s h reorganization of the w o r l d e c o n o m y . T h e essential component o f this r e o r g a n i z a t i o n was overseas c o l o n i a l e x p a n s i o n , creating what M c M i c h a e l (2000: 18-23) has c a l l e d a d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r between raw m a t e r i a l a n d food p r o d u c t i o n i n the colonies and i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n i n E u r o p e . B y c o m b i n i n g c o l o n i a l e x p a n s i o n overseas w i t h i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n at home, B r i t a i n emerged as the d o m i n a n t w o r l d power. T h e a d o p t i o n o f the gold s t a n d a r d i n 1870 set the m o n e t a r y framework for the i n s t i t u t i o n o f a g l o b a l free-trade regime ( E i c h e n g r e e n 1996: 7 - 4 4 ) . T h e gold standard also fostered c o l l a b o r a t i o n between c e n t r a l b a n k s — u s u a l l y privately o w n e d i n s t i t u t i o n s — a n d governments.
It created a b a l a n c e i n great power
politics, or i n P o l a n y i ' s words, a h u n d r e d years' peace i n E u r o p e that secured open markets. T h e openness o f markets and the o p e r a t i o n o f the
colonial
d i v i s i o n of l a b o u r a l l o w e d B r i t a i n to recycle wealth from the colonies into capital investment a l l over the w o r l d . W h i l e the r e c y c l i n g o f w e a l t h e n h a n c e d L o n d o n ' s c e n t r a l position i n the global c i r c u l a t i o n o f finance c a p i t a l , it also supported the gold s t a n d a r d as a n adjustment m e c h a n i s m i n w o r l d trade. T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f a c h i e v i n g a balance i n p o w e r politics for the institution of a global market economy was most evident i n the Western i m p o s i t i o n of reforms on the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T h e T a n z i m a t project o f s e c u l a r i s m was premised on the formation o f a powerful central state. Its most novel aspect was the granting o f equal status and rights to n o n - M u s l i m subjects i n order to prevent their separation from the empire. T h e territorial u n i t y o f the empire was considered essential for
H o w e v e r , a careful ' u n p a c k i n g ' o f T a n z i m a t a n d subsequent O t t o m a n erases any
notion that the
empire was
a passive
S t a r t i n g w i t h the A n g l o - O t t o m a n C o m m e r c i a l C o n v e n t i o n o f 1838, the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a d o p t e d a n e c o n o m i c m o d e l based on free trade. T h e c o n v e n t i o n sought to r e d u c e
the a u t h o r i t y o f the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t
in
i m p o s i n g i m p o r t tariffs a n d c o n t r o l s that w o u l d i n h i b i t the free c i r c u l a t i o n o f goods i n the e m p i r e ( K a s a b a 1993). It a l l o w e d B r i t i s h merchants to purchase goods a n y w h e r e i n the e m p i r e w i t h o u t p a y i n g taxes or dues other t h a n a v e r y s m a l l s u m for i m p o r t / e x p o r t duties (Issawi 1980: 74-5). O t h e r E u r o p e a n states also became p a r t o f the C o n v e n t i o n , w h i c h led to the e x p a n s i o n o f c a s h - c r o p p r o d u c t i o n o n p l a n t a t i o n - l i k e farms for e x p o r t to the i n d u s t r i a l centres o f E u r o p e (Inalcik 1969: 115). i n the n a m e o f t r a d e l i b e r a l i z a t i o n a n d equality, most b a r r i e r s to t r a d e were r e m o v e d , e c o n o m i c concessions were g r a n t e d to E u r o p e a n s , a n d other treaties were i m p o s e d o n t h e
O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T h i s deeply p o l a r i z e d the
O t t o m a n p o p u l a c e . T a r i f f c o n c e s s i o n s exposed domestic handicraft p r o d u c t i o n to the c o m p e t i t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l l y m a n u f a c t u r e d E u r o p e a n goods. T h e i n a b i l i t y of g o v e r n m e n t to protect d o m e s t i c m a n u f a c t u r i n g hastened its d e c l i n e ( B a r k a n 1975). A t the
same t i m e ,
concessions
encouraged
the p r o d u c t i o n o f r a w
materials a n d foodstuffs for e x p o r t to E u r o p e . O t t o m a n M u s l i m s i n h a n d i c r a f t p r o d u c t i o n were t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o u n s k i l l e d l a b o u r (Inalcik 1987), w h i l e n o n M u s l i m O t t o m a n m e r c h a n t s a n d a g r i c u l t u r a l producers b e c a m e d o m i n a n t i n cash-crop p r o d u c t i o n a n d t r a d e w i t h E u r o p e a n business ( G o c e k 1996: 96-7). T h e b e g i n n i n g o f p r i v a t e o w n e r s h i p o f l a n d for cash c r o p p r o d u c t i o n a n d the e x p a n s i o n o f p l a n t a t i o n - l i k e farms, f o l l o w i n g a d o p t i o n o f the
Land
C o d e o f 1858, were c r u c i a l e l e m e n t s i n this process. T h e O t t o m a n state lost its t r a d i t i o n a l c o n t r o l over l a n d a n d its revenues. U n d e r these circumstances, it w a s n o longer possible for the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t to raise the funds r e q u i r e d for its wars f r o m i n t e r n a l sources. T h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e a l s o e x p e r i e n c e d a significant balance o f payments
the maintenance o f a p o w e r balance between E u r o p e a n states.
reforms
O t t o m a n reforms, we must c l o s e l y e x a m i n e the O t t o m a n r e w o r k i n g o f W e s t e r n ways, f r o m the T a n z i m a t p e r i o d o n w a r d s .
recipient o f a
W e s t e r n - l e d r e f o r m p r o g r a m m e . I n actual fact, the O t t o m a n s were engaged
deficit w i t h B r i t a i n a n d o t h e r E u r o p e a n stales. T h i s resulted not o n l y f r o m it b e c o m i n g a n exporter o f r a w materials
a n d foodstuffs
a n d importer of
m a n u f a c t u r e d goods ( K c y d e r 1987: 3 7 - 4 8 ) , but also f r o m the army's g r o w i n g need for cash to wage i n c r e a s i n g l y i n d u s t r i a l i z e d wars. T h e e m p i r e desperately
34
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
A
35
SECULAR VISION OF M O D E R N I T Y
needed to b o r r o w money. But the possibility of R u s s i a n m i l i t a r y advances into
T h e P D A m a r k e d a c r u c i a l t u r n i n g p o i n t i n O t t o m a n history, w i t h the
the M e d i t e r r a n e a n a n d C e n t r a l A s i a affected B r i t i s h and F r e n c h willingness
O t t o m a n state v i r t u a l l y r e l i n q u i s h i n g m u c h o f its e c o n o m i c sovereignty. T h e
to lend m o n e y to the empire ( M a r r i o t 1924). T h e O t t o m a n loss to R u s s i a i n
P D A was f o r m e d to p r o v i d e greater security for E u r o p e a n private investors
the C r i m e a n W a r (1854-56) was a t u r n i n g p o i n t i n the relationship between
h o l d i n g O t t o m a n bonds t h a n
private m o n e y - l e n d i n g networks i n L o n d o n a n d P a r i s a n d the O t t o m a n b a l a n c e
revenue from c u s t o m duties, taxes, a n d tobacco p r o d u c t i o n was designated as
o f payments deficit.
collateral i n l o a n negotiations, a n d foreign moneylenders were able to establish
B y c o n n e c t i n g O t t o m a n t e r r i t o r i a l security concerns to loans from L o n d o n a n d Paris-centred private capital groups, B r i t a i n governed the process o f O t t o m a n
that p r o v i d e d b y the government.
Ottoman
c l a i m s o n the future revenues o f the O t t o m a n government. T h i s effectively eroded the sultan s a b i l i t y to c l a i m a n d protect these revenue sources.
i n c o r p o r a t i o n into the w o r l d free-trading regime as a 'peripheral state'. T h e
Under
the
P D A , increased
revenues
generated
through
the
market
' R e p o r t o n the F i n a n c i a l C o n d i t i o n o f T u r k e y ' , written i n 1860 by L o r d H o b a r t
e x p a n s i o n o f cash c r o p p r o d u c t i o n were shifted to p r i v a t e E u r o p e a n creditors
a n d M r . Foster, a n d approved by the B r i t i s h Parliament, r e q u i r e d that die O t t o m a n
and
E m p i r e w i t h d r a w its paper m o n e y f r o m circulation and adjust its currency to the
acted as a n i n t e r m e d i a r y i n the reinvestment o f c a p i t a l by foreign r a i l r o a d
international gold standard ( K i r a y 1990: 255-6). T h e convertibility o f currency
c o m p a n i e s . It p a i d r a i l r o a d c o m p a n i e s w i t h the i n c o m e generated
was to rest on the further l i b e r a l i z a t i o n o f the O t t o m a n economv. L i b e r a l i z a t i o n
c o l l e c t i o n o f tithes, w h i c h the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t h a d assigned as pledges
was key to foreign investment a n d trade, and also provided stability for O t t o m a n
for a k i l o m e t r i c guarantee. T h e D e c r e e o f M o u h a r r e m a n d the capital from
balance o f payments vis-a-vis E u r o p e a n capital.
investors
as
Ottoman
debt
payments
(Pamuk
1987). T h e
P D A also from its
r a i l r o a d c o n s t r u c t i o n e n a b l e d the P D A lo c o n t r o l about one t h i r d o f the total
I n 1856 the O t t o m a n B a n k was established by a group o f L o n d o n bankers.
p u b l i c revenue o f the O t t o m a n state ( K e y d e r 1987: 40). M o r e significant t h a n
I n 1863 it was r e o r g a n i z e d w i t h the entry o f F r e n c h financiers as co-owners. T h e
the percentage o f revenues c o n t r o l l e d by the P D A was the fact that the l i q u i d
b a n k was a focal p o i n t for the h a r m o n i z a t i o n o f policies between the O t t o m a n
resources o f the O t t o m a n E m p i r e were i n its hands.
E m p i r e a n d its creditors. A c t i n g as a private central b a n k , it c h a n n e l l e d loans f r o m L o n d o n a n d P a r i s m o n e y markets to the empire a n d issued treasury bonds n
r
against gold r e s c u e s * c ^ c ^ ^ o e f b b
A m i d s t the c o m p l e x i t i e s o f nineteenth-century
p o w e r politics, O t t o m a n
reformers constantly s t r u g g l e d over the a l i g n m e n t o f the state w i t h the m a r k e t
1 1 1 1 5
economy. A l t h o u g h outcomes differed i n the T a n z i m a t a n d A b d u l h a m i t p e r i o d s ,
Between 1854 a n d 1875, 15 loans t o t a l l i n g 220 m i l l i o n B r i t i s h p o u n d s
reformers d i d not conceive o f secular a n d I s l a m i c approaches as o p p o s i t i o n a l
were issued. T h i s resulted i n a large O t t o m a n foreign debt w i t h a n average rate
forms o f m o d e r n i t y . R a t h e r , they b e l i e v e d it was possible to merge the t w o to
increase o f 5 m i l l i o n p o u n d s p e r y e a r (Baxter 1871: 71). T h e b u r d e n o f foreign
formulate a d i s t i n c t l y O t t o m a n b r a n d o f m a r k e t competitiveness. T h i s was
debt grew heavier w i t h a n n u a l service charge increases, from 10 per cent o f
their strategy to protect the e m p i r e from d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . R e f o r m e r s attempted lo
l o i a l g o v e r n m e n t revenues i n the earlv 1860s to 67 per cent i n 1874 i K i r a y
merge W e s t e r n culture a n d I s l a m i c referents u n d e r the conditions o f the g l o b a l
1990: 255k U n a b l e to pay off these b a n s , the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t defaulted
market economy.
on foreign debt charges i n 1875.
The
Tanzimat's
secularism
and
Abdulhamifs
pan-lslamism
were
B e t w e e n 1875 a n d 1881 the O t t o m a n E m p i r e became a p e r i p h e r a l debtor
b o t h examples o f the O t t o m a n r e w o r k i n g o f W e s t e r n m o d e r n i t y so that the
state. T o a d m i n i s t e r the O t t o m a n foreign debt, the D e c r e e o f M o u h a r r e m was
state c o u l d r e g a i n c o n t r o l o v e r the e c o n o m y a n d create a u n i l i e d O t t o m a n
negotiated i n 1881. I n 1882 the g o v e r n m e n t o f p a n - I s l a m i c S u l t a n A b d u l h a m i t
bourgeoisie out o f the h i g h l y p o l a r i z e d c o m m e r c i a l classes. I n their adaptation
a l l o w e d the establishment
o f W e s t e r n m o d e r n i t y , reformers
o f the P u b l i c D e b t A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ( P D A ) .
After
engaged
i n a refashioning of Islam
and
n e g o t i a t i n g a 56 per cent debt r e d u c t i o n , the O t t o m a n government ceded c e r t a i n
s e c u l a r i s m i n o r d e r to create a c o m m o n v i s i o n o f O t t o m a n society for different
state revenues to the P D A a n d g r a n t e d t h e m the right to administer, collect,
c u l t u r a l a n d religious groups. C e n t r a l to this t h e o r i z i n g , then, was a c o n c e p t i o n
a n d h o l d i n deposit these revenues for the s e r v i c i n g o f the debt (Blaisdell 1929:
of culture that s i m u l t a n e o u s l y r e p r o d u c e d b o t h W e s t e r n a n d I s l a m i c elements i n
8 0 - 9 3 ) . T h e P D A was a private t r a n s n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n representing private
the f o r m a t i o n o f an O t t o m a n bourgeoisie.
capital interests, negotiated b i l a t e r a l l y between the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t a n d the non-official representatives o f its creditors. It became a large independent b u r e a u c r a c y r u n by creditors, e m p l o y i n g some 5,000 officials u n t i l its demise i n 1928 (Quataert 2 0 0 0 : 71).
T h e p r o b l e m was that m a t e r i a l conflicts o f interest had already intensified a m o n g v a r i o u s religious c o m m u n i t i e s . N o t o n l y C h r i s t i a n s but also M u s l i m A r a b s i n the e m p i r e p u s h e d for separation, w h i l e O t t o m a n reformers
sought
n a t i o n h o o d , It was alter r e c o g n i z i n g the futility o f O t t o m a n u n i t y that a group of intellectuals k n o w n as the Y o u n g T u r k s developed w h a t they believed to be
36
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
37
A S E C U L A R V I S I O N OK M O D E R N I T Y
a solution. B r o a d l y s p e a k i n g , some Y o u n g T u r k s supported the e m u l a t i o n o f
M i d d l e E a s t , a n d give u p its a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f parts o f western A n a t o l i a . T h e
W e s t e r n ways w h i l e others m a d e reference to Islam i n m o d e l i n g the empire's
W a r of I n d e p e n d e n c e ( 1 9 1 9 - 2 2 ) , w a g e d against the d i s m e m b e r m e n t o f A n a t o l i a
future. A h m e t R i z a was representative o f the former group and M u r a t M i z a n c i
by the S è v r e s T r e a t v . a n d the m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y that resulted i n the L a u s a n n e
the latter. Y o u n g T u r k s also p r o m o t e d T u r k i s h n a t i o n a l i s m as a r i v a l ideology.
Peace T r e a t y ; I 9 2 3 L e n d e d the First W o r l d W a r for T u r k e y . T h e
T h e y l i n k e d the r e p r o d u c t i o n o f W e s t e r n m o d e r n i t y to the creation o f a unified
T r e a t y secured the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y o f A n a t o l i a a n d c o n f i r m e d the a b o l i t i o n
T u r k i s h bourgeoisie a n d e c o n o m y by c u r b i n g the economic p o w e r o f non-
o f capitulations that O t t o m a n governments h a d g r a n t e d to foreign powers, i n
M u s l i m s . Z i y a G o k a l p occupies a p i v o t a l role i n this formulation. A l t h o u g h
exchange for its sovereignty a n d the right to n a t i o n a l self-determination, the
G o k a l p never developed a n i d e o l o g y to completely eliminate I s l a m i c or O t t o m a n
g o v e r n m e n t o f the T u r k i s h R e p u b l i c renounced its r u l e over A r a b provinces a n d
Lausanne
referents, the future a d a p t a t i o n o f his thought by the founders o f the T u r k i s h
accepted the B r i t i s h a n n e x a t i o n o f C y p r u s . W i t h t w o exceptions, the L a u s a n n e
R e p u b l i c represents a break f r o m previous O t t o m a n i s t projects. O t t o m a n s h a d
Treaty
either refused the w r i t i n g o f a ' n a t i o n a l ' history or never defined the n a t i o n a l as
w o u l d r e m a i n p a r t o f I r a q u n d e r B r i t i s h m a n d a t e . A n d i n 1 9 3 8 a dispute w i t h
T u r k i s h history { Y i n a n c 1969).
F r a n c e over H a t a y - A l e x a n d r e t t a was resolved w h e n it was d e c i d e d that the
finalized
T u r k e y ' s present borders. I n 1 9 2 6 it was d e c i d e d that M o s u l
T h e Y o u n g T u r k s devoted themselves to the construction o f a m y t h o l o g y
region w o u l d r e m a i n i n T u r k e y . T h e 1 5 years o f M u s t a f a K e m a l ' s r e p u b l i c a n
f r o m w h i c h T u r k s w o u l d find their n a t i o n a l history. H u n g a r i a n anthropologist
presidency, from 1 9 2 3 to his d e a t h i n 1 9 3 8 , saw a series o f p o l i t i c a l a n d c u l t u r a l
V a m b e r y a n d the P o i i s h - b o r n M u s t a f a C e l a l e d d i n Pasha based this history o n
reforms, c a l l e d K e m a l i s m .
the belief that the T u r k s b e l o n g to a larger race o f people k n o w n as 'Turan. w h i c h
K e m a l i s m e n d e a v o u r e d to e n d the d u a l c h a r a c t e r o f O t t o m a n
reforms
also includes F i n n s , H u n g a r i a n s , a n d the T u r k i c people o f C e n t r a l A s i a a n d the
that oscillated between W e s t e r n m o d e r n i t y a n d I s l a m i c culture. T h e a b o l i t i o n
C a u c a s u s ( B e h a r 1992: 6 4 - 5 ) . G o k a l p added a l i n g u i s t i c n a t i o n a l i s m to Turan by
o f tiie sultanate i n 1 9 2 2 was f o l l o w e d by the a b o l i t i o n o f the caliphate i n 1 9 2 4 .
s y n t h e s i z i n g W e s t e r n m o d e r n i t y , I s l a m i c morality, a n d T u r k i s h history {Berkes
T h e sharia courts a n d office o f the S e y l f u l - I s l a m (the highest religious official i n
1959: 7 2 - 4 , 103, 2 8 4 - 5 ) . T h i s set the stage for the p r o d u c t i o n a n d r e p r o d u c t i o n
the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ) were a l s o closed. I n 1 9 2 8 the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l clause that
o f a distinct p o l i t i c a l culture for the emergent ' T u r k i s h ' bourgeoisie a n d the
p r o c l a i m e d I s l a m the state r e l i g i o n was repealed. T h e s e reforms
e c o n o m y . I n the 1930s n a t i o n a l i s m p l a v e d a n even greater role i n p r o v i d i n g a
the state structure,
v i s i o n o f u n i t y for the newly e m e r g i n g n a t i o n a l bourgeoisie i n T u r k e y .
altered the s y m b o l i c f r a m e w o r k o f social a n d c u l t u r a l life i n T u r k e y ( B o z d o g a n
The
global free-trade
regime
relegated
the
Ottoman
E m p i r e to
a
redirected
s o c i a l change
transformed
onto a secular trajectory,
and
and K a s a b a 1 9 9 7 ) .
p e r i p h e r a l p o s i t i o n i n the w o r l d e c o n o m y a n d intensified the divisions a m o n g
A t t e m p t s were m a d e to p e n e t r a t e the lifestyle a n d customs of the p o p u l a t i o n
O t t o m a n c o m m e r c i a l groups a l o n g c u l t u r a l and religious lines. K e m a l i s m ,
i n the hope o f eventually d i s p l a c i n g I s l a m from the p u b l i c sphere. Issues related
n a m e d after M u s t a f a K e m a l , the founder o f the T u r k i s h R e p u b l i c , put f o r w a r d
to choice o f c l o t h i n g , where a n d how to live, w h a t to eat, a n d w h a t k i n d o f music
a u n i f i e d c o n c e p t i o n o f the T u r k i s h state, national economy, a n d bourgeoisie.
to listen to were a l l subject to K e m a l i s t scrutiny. I n 1 9 2 5 the w e a r i n g o f caps
W h a t we have here is the case o f a p e r i p h e r a l state e m b r a c i n g the g l o b a l free-
a n d fezzes b y m e n was o u t l a w e d as these were c o n s i d e r e d s y m b o l s o f religious
trade regime at the very m o m e n t w h e n the framework for that e c o n o m y was
o b s c u r a n t i s m . I n the same y e a r , the religious brotherhoods were disbanded,
c o l l a p s i n g i n the 1920s a n d 1930s.
convents a n d sacred tombs c l o s e d , a n d religious titles such as s h e i k h a n d d e r v i s h abolished. I n 1 9 2 6 , the M u s l i m l u n a r c a l e n d a r was replaeed b y the G r e g o r i a n solar calendar, a n d Islam's sharia l a w was r e p l a c e d by the Swiss c i v i l c o d e
K e m a l i s t s e c u l a r i z a t i o n o f the state
a n d the I t a l i a n p e n a l code. I n 1 9 2 8 the L a t i n alphabet was a d o p t e d a n d the script c h a n g e d f r o m A r a b i c to L a t i n . A t t e m p t s were also m a d e to 'cleanse' the
T h e T u r k i s h nation-state was established after a near century-long journey o f t r i a l a n d e r r o r w i t h O t t o m a n reforms. T h e j o u r n e y ended on 29 O c t o b e r 1923 w h e n the G r a n d N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y d e c l a r e d T u r k e y a republic and M u s t a f a K e m a l was elected its first president. T h e declaration o f the T u r k i s h R e p u b l i c sealed the e n d o f the i m p e r i a l g o v e r n m e n t that had signed the T r e a t y o f S è v r e s i n 1920. T h e treaty r e q u i r e d the O t t o m a n state to surrender p o l i t i c a l sovereignty o f its territories, renounce its r u l e o f C y p r u s a n d the A r a b provinces i n tiie
T u r k i s h l a n g u a g e o f A r a b i c a n d Persian words. C o - e d u c a t i o n for girls and boys was i n t r o d u c e d i n 1 9 2 4 . R e l i g i o u s schools a n d institutes were closed, and the educational system was r e s t r u c t u r e d along strictly secular lines. T h e F a c u l t y of T h e o l o g y , w h i c h h a d p r e v i o u s l y been responsible lor h i g h e r education i n r e l i g i o n , was abolished, a n d t h e Institute o f I s l a m i c R e s e a r c h was established w i t h i n the b o d y o f the F a c u l t y o f A r t s at Istanbul U n i v e r s i t y . H i g h e r religious education was thus r e p l a c e d b y scientific research o n r e l i g i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , the
38
39
A S E C U L A R VISION OF MODERNITY
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
I s l a m i c c a l l to p r a y e r (czan) a n d the K o r a n were c h a n g e d from A r a b i c to L a t i n -
B y i n s e r t i n g p e r s o n a l ethics a n d m o r a l duty into the notion o f c i t i z e n s h i p ,
s c r i p t e d T u r k i s h . T h e legal code was a c t u a l l y c h a n g e d to p e r m i t three-month
K e m a l i s m defined a g o o d M u s l i m t h r o u g h the secular state.
j a i l sentences for those caught r e a d i n g the K o r a n i n A r a b i c ( T a r h a n l i 1993:
It should be noted that s e c u l a r i z i n g reforms w o u l d not have been successful
20). I n 1935 the w e e k l y holiday was shifted f r o m F r i d a y to Sunday, a n d i n 1937
t h r o u g h repression a n d legal enforcement alone. K e m a l i s t s were n o t i g n o r a n t o f
s e c u l a r i s m b e c a m e a constitutional requirement enforceable by law.
the role o f p u b l i c c e l e b r a t i o n i n e n s u r i n g people's loyalty to the new values a n d
T h e effect o f these reforms was far-reaching. I n a d d i t i o n to the legal
norms o f the r e p u b l i c . F o r e x a m p l e , r e p u b l i c a n day festivities were, a n d r e m a i n ,
enforcement a n d repression c a r r i e d out b y p u b l i c prosecutors and gendarmes, a
a m o n g the most celebrated i n T u r k e y , observed every y e a r o n 29 O c t o b e r . T h e
series o f p r o p a g a n d a c a m p a i g n s was l a u n c h e d to disgrace local representatives
celebrations include folk songs, dances, a n d t h a n k s g i v i n g festivities, followed b y
o f the O t t o m a n i m p e r i a l system ^Meeker 2002: 286). O n e p a r t i c u l a r letter
speeches from local a u t h o r i t i e s a n d teachers o n the role o f M u s t a f a K e m a l a n d
c a m p a i g n w a r n e d local kocas a n d kadis (Islamic sharia law judges) of the severe
his comrades i n s e c u r i n g T u r k e y ' s independence. S c h o o l c h i l d r e n also p e r f o r m
consequences for p r e a c h i n g against the r e p u b l i c . After r e c e i v i n g such a letter,
plays r e - e n a c t i n g the W a r o f Independence. Festivities continue u n t i l well after
one I s l a m i c scholar a n d kadi ol A y a s - a t o w n i n central A n a t o l i a n e a r A n k a r a -
nightfall w i t h folk dances p e r f o r m e d a r o u n d a large fire by l o c a l residents. T h e
d e c i d e d t h a i it was t i m e to retire from p u b l i c service entirely. H i s g r a n d s o n
r e p u b l i c a n day celebration is s u c h a n i m p o r t a n t event for the t o w n o f G u d u l — a
i n f o r m e d me i n a p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w that u n d e r the threat of persecution the kadi
s m a l l t o w n near A n k a r a — t h a t even former inhabitants w h o have m i g r a t e d to
destroyed a l l r e m n a n t s o f his allegiance to the O t t o m a n system by b u r n i n g the
nearby cities travel b a c k h o m e to participate i n the activities.
books he h a d w r i t t e n o n sharia law. T h e goal o f these i n t i m i d a t i o n c a m p a i g n s
T h e s e p u b l i c c u l t u r a l celebrations demonstrate the s i m i l a r i t y a n d k i n s h i p between the people o f T u r k e y a n d the W e s t e r n w o r l d . O n e s u c h celebration,
was clearly to dislodge M u s l i m O t l o m a n i s t s f r o m a l l p u b l i c activities. I n 1924 the D i r e c t o r a t e o f R e l i g i o u s A f f a i r s was established w i t h i n the
f a l l i n g o n 19 M a y , is d e d i c a t e d to y o u t h i n h i g h school. T h i s was the date i n 1919
office o f the p r i m e m i n i s t e r for the purpose o f establishing greater state c o n t r o l
w h e n M u s t a f a K e m a l a r r i v e d i n the B l a c k Sea p o r t city o f S a m s u n for the i n i t i a l
and regulated institution
c o o r d i n a t i o n o f a n a t i o n a l resistance to foreign o c c u p a t i o n . A n o t h e r celebration,
( T a r h a n l i 1993). A l l mosques were p l a c e d under its c o n t r o l , a n d a l l religious
for younger elementary s c h o o l c h i l d r e n , falls o n 23 A p r i l . O n this date i n 1920
personnel, imanis (prayer leaders) a n d hatips (preachers), became employees o f
the G r a n d N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y was opened i n A n k a r a . T h e 19 M a y a n d 23 A p r i l
the s l a t e — m e m b e r s
o f the secular bureaucracy. T h e D i r e c t o r a t e o f R e l i g i o u s
public performances e m p h a s i z e n a t i o n a l health a n d v i t a l i t y expressed t h r o u g h
Affairs illustrates t h a t s e c u l a r i s m was not a n issue i n v o l v i n g separation o f
sport a n d the a t h l e t i c i s m o f y o u t h . T h e s p o r t i n g events are a c c o m p a n i e d b y the
over r e l i g i o n . It was to be a government-funded
state a n d r e l i g i o n . It was about the creation o f an 'official Islam as part o f the
p l a y i n g o f W e s t e r n classical m u s i c . T h e s e festivities are designed to reveal the
secular state apparatus. T h e role o f the D i r e c t o r a t e o f R e l i g i o u s Affairs was to
naturalness o f a n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h secular culture expressed t h r o u g h sport.
1
encourage the development o f c i v i c responsibility a n d the loyalty o f the general
I r v i n g G o f f m a n ' s (1959) e x p l a n a t i o n o f the construction o f self t h r o u g h everyday
p o p u l a t i o n to secular state p r i n c i p l e s .
performance
D u r i n g the late 1920s a n d 1930s state-employed M u s l i m clergy wrote completely new versions o f religious textbooks. T h e directorate c o m m i s s i o n e d these books w i t h the intention o f p r o m o t i n g the idea that g o o d citizenship was b o t h a v i r t u e a n d a religiously sanctioned m o r a l duty. A c c o r d i n g to the new texts, a g o o d M u s l i m
f
is very a p p l i c a b l e to K e m a l i s t activities. Student
performances
demonstrate the e m b r a c e o f W e s t e r n c u l t u r a l artefacts w h i l e d i s c l o s i n g the i n c o n g r u i t y o f I s l a m i c elements i n the p u b l i c performance o f everyday life. Kemalists
displaced I s l a m from
the
public r e a l m w i t h
a
pervasive
secular l i f e — o n e that w o u l d i n c l u d e e v e r y t h i n g from m a n n e r s a n d c l o t h i n g to household articles a n d f u r n i s h i n g s . I n a 1937 p a r l i a m e n t a r y speech, the T u r k i s h M i n i s t e r o f I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s , S u k r u K a y a , stated: ' O u r a i m is to m a k e sure that 1
must love his country, respect the laws o f the r e p u b l i c , submit to the progressive guidance o f state officials, do his utmost to learn m o d e r n techniques, apply scrupulously the principles o f g o o d hygiene, consult a doctor i n case o f illness to a v o i d b e i n g the cause of e p i d e m i c s , a n d work energetically for the development o f the c o u n t r y ( D u m o n t 1987: 3).
religion w i l l not be p a r t o f m a t e r i a l life and w o r l d l y affairs ( T a r h a n l i 1993: 19). A l t h o u g h it cannot: be a r g u e d t h a t I s l a m framed a l l aspects o f O t t o m a n d a i l y life ( F a r o q h i 2000), the K e m a l i s t obsession w i t h its p r e s u m e d religious content— especially i n the case o f c l o t h i n g — f o c u s s e d on e l i m i n a t i n g a l l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h the empire. E m p t i e d o f its religious and O t t o m a n referents, the ' n a t i o n ' was n o w to be conceived in terms o f a collection o f i n d i v i d u a l s l i n k e d d i r e c t l y to the state t h r o u g h the concept o f mass p o l i t i c a l citizenship. T h e T u r k i s h H i s t o r i c a l Society (1931) a n d the T u r k i s h L i n g u i s t i c Society iJ932) were b o t h established
40
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
A S E C U L A R VISION OF M O D E R N I T Y
specifically to r e m o v e O t t o m a n - M u s l i m c u l t u r e f r o m the p u b l i c space o f the
41
E l i m i n a t i n g the o p p o s i t i o n
r e p u b l i c . T h e y advocated the ' T u r k i s h H i s t o r y T h e s i s ' a n d the ' S u n - L a n g u a g e T h e o r y ' to p r o v i d e the people o f T u r k e y w i t h a n entirely new foundation for
B e h i n d the K e m a l i s t r e p r o d u c t i o n o f W e s t e r n m o d e r n i t y was a n a l m o s t century-
u n d e r s t a n d i n g their history (Gologlu 1974).
l o n g process o f t r a n s f o r m a t i o n d u r i n g w h i c h the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was absorbed
Turan developed by the Y o u n g T u r k s , the
into Europe's p e r i p h e r y . I n t h e nineteenth c e n t u r y the w o r l d m a r k e t e c o n o m y
T u r k i s h H i s t o r y Thesis, presented at the F i r s t T u r k i s h H i s t o r y Congress i n
S i m i l a r to the idea o f the
was constituted as a free-trade r e g i m e , the stability o f w h i c h w a s ensured b y
1932, c l a i m e d that the T u r k s belonged to a 'race' o f people w h o first emerged
the international gold s t a n d a r d .
i n C e n t r a l A s i a a n d then established great c i v i l i z a t i o n s i n A n a t o l i a , the A e g e a n ,
a n d F r e n c h r i v a l r i e s , as e v i d e n c e d by the F i r s t W o r l d W a r a n d subsequent
a n d M e s o p o t a m i a (Behar 1992). T h e Hittites a n d S u m e r i a n s were also seen
conflicts w i t h i n the inter-state system, the nineteenth-century m a r k e t economy-
as T u r k i s h forebears (Seton-Watson 1977: 259). T h e S u n - L a n g u a g e T h e o r y ,
disintegrated into p r o t e c t e d i m p e r i a l zones ( A r r i g h i et a l 1999). I f we e x a m i n e
presented
W i t h the intensification o f A n g l o - G e r m a n
at the S e c o n d T u r k i s h H i s t o r y Congress i n 1937, argued that i n
this p e r i o d o f d i s i n t e g r a t i o n , we c a n reconceptualize K e m a l i s m as a double-
the o l d s h a m a n i s t i c religion o f T u r k s before the acceptance o f I s l a m , the sun
sided m o v e m e n t that b o t h m i t i g a t e d and obscured the centrality o f W e s t e r n
s y m b o l i z e d the p o w e r o f nature against that o f G o d . T h e evolution o f T u r k i s h
identification i n T u r k i s h state f o r m a t i o n .
c u l t u r e is thus seen as h a v i n g followed a p a t h based not o n I s l a m , but o n a
K e m a l i s t s greatly a d m i r e d W e s t e r n m o d e r n i t y . T h e y sought to g r o u n d
secular i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f nature (Besikci 1991: 131-69; G u n a l t a y a n d T a n k u t
their detachment f r o m the O t t o m a n s i n a perception o f the W e s t as sole b e a r e r
1938). T h e s e theories portrayed I s l a m as a n ethnic r e l i g i o n o f A r a b s associated
of m o d e r n i t y . Yet K e m a l i s t s also feared W e s t e r n d o m i n a t i o n o f n o n - W e s t e r n
w i t h the A r a b i c language a n d traditions ( L e w i s 1988). B o t h theories sought to
societies a n d
show that ancient T u r k i s h culture was congruent w i t h Western modernity. T h e
influenced the c r e a t i o n o f a u n i t a r y T u r k i s h nation-state i n ways t h a t i m p l i e d a
rejected
the
West's
'imperialistic' claims. T h i s
ambivalence
role o f the state, then, was to e l i m i n a t e the foreign traditions o f Islam from a
fundamental change i n the r e l a t i o n s between rulers a n d r u l e d , the techniques o f
T u r k i s h w a y o f life, a n d place T u r k i s h people b a c k o n their ' n a t u r a l ' trajectory.
p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l , a n d e c o n o m i c strategies.
R e m i n i s c e n t o f a thesis advanced by M a x W e b e r (1971), K e m a l i s t s believed that I s l a m was i n c o n g r u e n t w i t h m o d e r n i t y because o f a c u l t u r a l aversion to i n s t r u m e n t a l r a t i o n a l i t y a n d a capitalist economy.
T h e post-war t e r r i t o r i a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n o f i m p e r i a l d o m a i n s refrained the K e m a l i s t i m p e r i a l i s t i m a g e o f the West. T h e e n d o f the w a r brought B r i t a i n new opportunities to e x p a n d its overseas t e r r i t o r i a l empire. T o g e t h e r w i t h its
T h e K e m a l i s t s ' task was not easy, especially because o f a significant
E u r o p e a n rivals, the U n i t e d States also became an i m p o r t a n t p l a y e r i n the i n t e r -
increase i n the n u m b e r o f M u s l i m s l i v i n g i n T u r k e y d u r i n g the 1920s. M a n y
state system. C h i e f r i v a l r i e s w e r e focussed o n c o n t r o l o f trade routes a r o u n d the
M u s l i m s i m m i g r a t e d to T u r k e y f r o m the B a l k a n s d u r i n g the B a l k a n wars a n d
Suez C a n a l to a l l o w easy access to the I n d i a n O c e a n a n d o i l resources i n the
f r o m R u s s i a d u r i n g the B o l s h e v i k R e v o l u t i o n . C h r i s t i a n A r m e n i a n s suffered
M i d d l e East ( V e n n 1986).
f r o m c o m p u l s o r y m i g r a t i o n i n 1915, resulting i n a staggering loss o f lives i n 1914-15. I n
1930 p o p u l a t i o n exchange
agreements w i t h
A n u m b e r o f o i l concessions m a d e b y the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t between
Greece
1912 a n d 1922 granted m o n o p o l y rights to companies a p p o i n t e d by B r i t a i n
r e q u i r e d the d e p a r t u r e o f C h r i s t i a n Greeks from T u r k e y a n d the i m m i g r a t i o n
( Z a h l a n 1989: C h . 2). I n 1912 the T u r k i s h P e t r o l e u m C o m p a n y ( T P C ) was
o f M u s l i m s f r o m G r e e c e to T u r k e y ( K e y d e r 1987: 6 6 - 8 ) . A s a result, more
established w i t h a 50 per cent B r i t i s h share. It h e l d a m o n o p o l y over the M o s u l -
t h a n 9 0 p e r cent o f the people l i v i n g i n T u r k e y d u r i n g the 1920s were M u s l i m s
K e r k u k o i l fields. T h e F r e n c h d i d not share a n interest i n the T P C , but the
(Jaschke
1923 a n d
1972: 20). T h e y i n c l u d e d C i r c a s s i a n s , L a z e s , A r a b s , K u r d s , T u r k s ,
Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t o f 1916 a l l o w e d F r a n c e to engage i n e x p l o r a t i o n for
G e o r g i a n s , a n d a l l other T u r k i c a n d M u s l i m c u l t u r a l categories ( K i l i c A l i 1955).
M i d d l e East oik It d i d so b y e n v i s a g i n g the creation o f two A r a b states, one
F o r these people, l o c a l ties based o n k i n s h i p , village, or r e l i g i o n were often more
under F r e n c h p r o t e c t i o n a r o u n d D a m a s c u s , from n o r t h o f B e i r u t to south o f
i m p o r t a n t t h a n a general T u r k i s h identification ( L e w i s 1968: C h . 10). A l t h o u g h
T y r e , a n d the other u n d e r B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n , f r o m B a g h d a d to A q a b a . Palestine
it was r a t h e r easy to identify n o n - M u s l i m s as m i n o r i t y groups i n relation to their
w o u l d become the j o i n t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f F r a n c e a n d B r i t a i n ( P a l m e r 1992: 236).
religious affiliation, it was not easy to identify diverse M u s l i m c u l t u r a l groups as
T h e agreement was
T u r k s a n d d i r e c t t h e m to a path completely detached from an earlier O t t o m a n
per cent share o f t h e . T P C g o i n g to F r a n c e . I n return, B r i t a i n r e c e i v e d F r e n c h
finalized
i n 1920 at the S a n - R e m o C o n f e r e n c e , w i t h a 25
a n d M u s l i m orientation. T h i s detachment was the key foundational issue o f the
support for the establishment o f a m a n d a t e regime i n I r a q ( K e n t 1976: 137-57).
T u r k i s h state a n d strictly enforced d u r i n g the 1930s.
H o w e v e r , since the S a n R e m o C o n f e r e n c e did not i n c l u d e the interests o f U S companies, the U n i t e d States rejected the B r i t i s h m a n d a t e i n I r a q . M o r e o v e r ,
42
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
A SECULAR VISION O F MODERNITY
President W i l s o n delivered a p r o c l a m a t i o n o n the right to self-determination (Mejcher 1976: 110-2). It was o n l y after S t a n d a r d O i l b e g a n to extract o i l i n M o s u l and K e r k u k that the U n i t e d States decided to b a c k B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l endeavours i n the M i d d l e East a n d a b a n d o n the 'right to self-determination'. T h e U S government was more concerned w i t h s e c u r i n g a base for a U S oil c o m p a n y i n the region than rejecting B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l c o n t r o l i n the M i d d l e East. A s l o n g as B r i t a i n followed a l i b e r a l open d o o r p o l i c y for U S c o m p a n i e s , the U n i t e d States d i d not reject B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l d o m a i n s . B r i t a i n
therefore
granted S t a n d a r d O i l a 23.7 p e r cent share o f the T P C i n exchange for U S support o f its m a n d a t e i n I r a q (Boratav 1982: 28). I n a c o u n t e r m o v e , T u r k e y granted o i l concessions to another U S company, the Chester g r o u p . B u t , w i t h S t a n d a r d O i l ' s success i n s e c u r i n g a share o f T u r k i s h P e t r o l e u m , the Chester g r o u p b e c a m e obsolete. I n the end, T u r k e y lost M o s u l to B r i t a i n ( H e r s h l a g 1968: 25;.
43
for founding the G r a n d N a t i o n a l Assembly was not to detach T u r k e y from its O t t o m a n - I s l a m i c heritage but to ensure the independence of M u s l i m - T u r k i s h lands. T o p m i l i t a r y officials expected to carry o n w i t h their jobs i n the upper ranks o f the political hierarchy just as they d i d i n the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T h e ) ' organized and formed the Progressive R e p u b l i c a n Part)-. T h e Progressive R e p u b l i c a n P a r t y (1924-25 i was a l i b e r a l party that fought for the protection o f i n d i v i d u a l rights a n d freedoms against abusive state p o w e r ( T u n a y a 1952: 5 8 5 , 611—8). T h e party's support for freedom o f expression i n c l u d e d religious beliefs. T h i s support, however, was interpreted as creating a basis for I s l a m i c o p p o s i t i o n against state reforms, thereby threatening
the
security o f the state. I n p a r l i a m e n t , M u s t a f a K e m a l was p r o m p t e d to declare: ' W h a t is the outcome o f g r a n t i n g people v a r i o u s p o l i t i c a l liberties? People w i l l start to m a k e a fuss a n d noise o n the streets. Is this a desirable a i m ? N o l F i r s t , we s h o u l d grant the n a t i o n p r o t e c t i o n a n d independence f r o m enemies o f the
In s e c u r i n g its i m p e r i a l d o m a i n s , B r i t a i n also m o b i l i z e d groups that were i n f u n d a m e n t a l conflict w i t h the n a t i o n a l i z i n g reforms o f M u s t a f a K e m a l . T h e K u r d i s h tribes were a m o n g these groups ( Y i l d i z 1991). B u t B r i t a i n was m o r e successful i n p r o v o k i n g K u r d i s h - s p e a k e r s o f A l a v i a n d C h r i s t i a n faiths t h a n it was i n i n c i t i n g the majority S u n n i M u s l i m K u r d s ( M u m c u 1994a). T h e 1921 revolt by the A l a v i - K u r d i s h K o c k i r i tribe a n d the
1924 C h r i s t i a n - K u r d i s h
N a s t u r i revolt were c a r r i e d out w i t h B r i r i s h support f D u r u 1978: 160-1). T h e ievolts were s p o r a d i c a n d easily suppressed by the T u r k i s h m i l i t a r y but they nonetheless p r o v i d e d a n o p p o r t u n i t y for K e m a l i s l bureaucrats to consolidate
state before t h i n k i n g about i n d i v i d u a l liberties, gentlemen' (Betin 1951: 81-2). E n e m i e s o f the
state i n c l u d e d e x t e r n a l
a n d i n t e r n a l elements.
The
e x t e r n a l e n e m y was W e s t e r n states engaged i n fierce rivalries over the t e r r i t o r i a l r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n o f o i l fields i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t . T h e i n t e r n a l enemy was I s l a m i c groups. T h e W a r o f I n d e p e n d e n c e
was successful i n defeating the e x t e r n a l
threat: now was the t i m e to suppress the i n t e r n a l threat. P o l i t i c a l control came to be defined as the exclusion f r o m the p o l i t i c a l process o f any real, potential, or i m a g i n e d rivals to the p o l i t i c a l p o w e r o f M u s t a f a K e m a l a n d his close associates. P o t e n t i a l i n t e r n a l threats i n c l u d e d h i g h - l e v e l b u r e a u c r a t i c cadres o f the former
;
a n image o f the W est as ' i m p e r i a l i s t i c ' a n d to translate this i m a g e into the r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f relations between rulers a n d r u l e d , T h e g o v e r n m e n t adopted blatantly oppressive techniques of p o l i t i c a l control a n d d e p l o y e d coercive powers against those opposed to s e c u l a r i z a t i o n . T h e S h e i k h S a i d R e v o l t o f 1925 i n p a r t i c u l a r , led by a K u r d i s h - N a q s h b a n d i sheikh, was used as justification for the deployment o f the state's coercive power. T h e revolt also p r o v i d e d a rationale lor i m p o s i n g significant constraints o n opposition i n the G r a n d N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y a n d b r i n g i n g it u n d e r the d i r e c t p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l o f M u s t a f a K e m a l ' s party, T h e majority o f delegates i n the G r a n d N a t i o n a l Assembly were former topr a n k i n g O t t o m a n m i l i t a r y commanders and bureaucrats, professionals, u l c m a , a n d sheiks from various religious brotherhoods. I n fact, M u s t a f a K e m a l and his close associates were a m i n o r i t y i n the G r a n d N a t i o n a l Assembly. High-level bureaucrats included Eevzi C a k m a k (Chief o f the G e n e r a l Staff o f the O t t o m a n A r m y , who also served as the C h i e f o f Staff i n the W a r o f Liberation), R a u f O r b a y , A l t Fuat Cebesoy, K a z i m K a r a b e k i r , and Refet Bele. Neither M u s t a f a K e m a l nor his close associate I n o n u was i n the upper ranks o f the O t t o m a n a r m y hierarchy. H i g h r a n k i n g a r m y commanders were therefore resentful o f the greater concentration of political power i n the hands o f M u s t a f a K e m a l and Inonu ( K a n d e m i r 1955). A s noted bv K a r a b e k i r 0951), A r m y C o m m a n d e r of the Eastern Frontiers, the reason
O t t o m a n state a n d influential r e l i g i o u s figures (Atasoy 1986: C h . 3 a n d 4). T h e y were perceived as dangerous because o f t h e i r attempt to b r i n g the O t t o m a n M u s l i m ethos into the forefront o f the f o u n d i n g o f the T u r k i s h state. H o w e v e r , one o f these supposed threats, the C a l i p h A b d u l m e c i t , was h a r d l y a rival to the K e m a l i s t state-making project. H e was a quiet, artistic m a n , w h o spent most o f his t i m e p a i n t i n g . A b d u l m e c i t never i n v o l v e d h i m s e l f i n T u r k i s h politics, a n d the a b o l i t i o n o f the c a l i p h a t e i n 1924 h a d n o t h i n g to do w i t h his activities. R a t h e r , it s i g n a l l e d to the o p p o s i t i o n i n p a r l i a m e n t the b e g i n n i n g o f oppressive modernization in Turkey. i s l a m i c groups were not initial!)' i d e n t i f i e d as rivals to M u s t a f a K e m a l . T h e leader h a d even d e v e l o p e d ties w i t h N a q s h b a n d i sheikhs w h e n o r g a n i z i n g the W a r o f Independence. M a n y o f t h e m s u p p o r t e d the abolition o f the sultanate i n 1922 i n favour o f a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e g i m e , h o p i n g that the c a l i p h w o u l d be the ' n a t u r a l ' focus o f p o w e r i n l i b e r a t e d M u s l i m l a n d s ( M i s i r o g l u 1992). I n o n u went even further by m a k i n g assurances that 'the c a l i p h w i l l live i n I s t a n b u l u n d e r the protection o f free T u r k e y ' (Jaschke
1972: 119). T h e N a q s h b a n d i order's
support for the W a r o f I n d e p e n d e n c e was r o o t e d i n their belief that the conflict was a n I s l a m i c jihad d i r e c t e d against W e s t e r n encroachment. M u s t a f a K e m a l h a d also o r g a n i z e d the G r a n d N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y as a place where M u s l i m s
44
45
A SECULAR VISION OF MODERNITY
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
c o u l d gather to discuss strategies for the restoration o f I s l a m i c sovereignty. A t a
a n d i f they failed to a c c o m p l i s h that, they w o u l d pursue the establishment o f
E f e n d i , the N a q s h h a n d i s h e i k h o f the Ü s k ü d a r Ö z b e k l e r convent i n Istanbul,
a n independent K u r d i s h state u n d e r I s l a m i c law. W i t h S h e i k h S a i d as t h e i r
p l a y e d a c r u c i a l role i n the war. H e supplied money, arms, a n d i n f o r m a t i o n to
leader, the K u r d i s h I n d e p e n d e n c e
the nationalists a n d offered t h e m refuge i n his convent. E v e n Ismet I n o n u f o u n d
for a c h i e v i n g this g o a l ( M u m c u 1994a: 57-8, 123-40) but the revolt was l i m i t e d
refuge i n the Ö z b e k l e r convent and was assisted by A t a E f e n d i i n his efforts to
i n scope because not a l l K u r d i s h leaders p a r t i c i p a t e d (van B r u i n e s s e n 1992b).
j o i n the W a r o f Independence ( M i s i r o g i u 1992: 2 0 9 - 6 5 ) . S a i d N u r s i (founder
A n d even t h o u g h N a q s h b a n d i sheikhs p l a y e d a c r u c i a l role i n o r g a n i z i n g the
o f the Nurcu religious c o m m u n i t y ) a n d A b d u l h a k i m A r v a s i (the most influential
revolt, not a l l sheikhs s u p p o r t e d it. S a i d N u r s i d i d not support it, a n d there was
N a q s h b a n d i s h e i k h o f the period) also supported the W a r o f Independence.
v e r y little T u r k i s h p a r t i c i p a t i o n . T h e revolt evolved as a K u r d i s h nationalist
M u s t a f a K e m a l h i m s e l f invited S a i d N u r s i to take up m e m b e r s h i p i n the G r a n d
m o v e m e n t as m u c h as a n I s l a m i c jihad against the abolition o f the caliphate.
O r g a n i z a t i o n h o p e d to p r o v i d e the means
M u s t a f a K e m a l acted d e c i s i v e l y i n p u t t i n g d o w n the S h e i k h S a i d R e v o l t .
N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y (Sahiner 1988: 236 49). T h e outbreak o f the K u r d i s h S h e i k h S a i d R e v o l t i n 1925 p r o v i d e d the
The
government
quickly passed
the
L a w for the M a i n t e n a n c e o f O r d e r ,
f i n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n for c r u s h i n g a l l opposition. O p p o s i t i o n members were accused
w h i c h r e m a i n e d i n effect f r o m 3 M a r c h
o f i n c i t i n g the revolt, even t h o u g h no evidence was found l i n k i n g t h e m to it. T h e
gave the g o v e r n m e n t a l m o s t absolute power, exercised t h r o u g h special courts
S h e i k h S a i d R e v o l t was a direct response to the a b o l i t i o n o f the caliphate. Its
k n o w n as Independence
significance was threefold. After it was suppressed, opposition w i t h i n the G r a n d
r a d i c a l reforms that w o u l d o t h e r w i s e be resisted, not o n l y by the o p p o s i t i o n
N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y was v i r t u a l l y e l i m i n a t e d a n d the single p a r t y regime was
i n p a r l i a m e n t but also by the g e n e r a l p u b l i c , D u r i n g the first t w o years o f the
established. It signified the b e g i n n i n g o f m i l i t a n t s e c u l a r i s m i n T u r k e y . A n d the
L a w for the M a i n t e n a n c e o f O r d e r , the Independence
N a q s h b a n d i order, w h i c h h a d played a n i m p o r t a n t p o l i t i c a l role since S u l t a n
over 5 0 0 people to death. I n J u n e 1925, the Progressive R e p u b l i c a n P a r t y was
A b d u l h a m i f s i n c e p t i o n o f p a n - I s l a m i s m , was b a n n e d a n d forced u n d e r g r o u n d .
dissolved. W i t h the suppression o f the revolt i n 1925, M u s t a f a K e m a l silenced a l l
Naqshbandi
sheikhs
also began
to lose their leadership
role a m o n g
the
K u r d s . A c c o r d i n g to v a n B r u m e s s e n (1992a; 1992b), this created r o o m for the emergence o f e t h n i c K u r d i s h n a t i o n a l i s m i n the 1970s. T h i s p e r i o d also saw
1925 to 4 M a r c h
1929. T h i s l a w
T r i b u n a l s . K e m a l i s t s used the o p p o r t u n i t y to enact
T r i b u n a l s sentenced
opponents o f the r e g i m e a n d established a single p a r t y system i n T u r k e y w h i c h was to last u n t i l the e n d o f the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r . T h e religious intellectuals a n d orders were seen to be i n
fundamental
the rise o f a p o p u l a r f o r m o f I s l a m i n south-eastern A n a t o l i a , where most o f the
conflict w i t h K e m a l i s t efforts t o r e p r o d u c e the W e s t e r n concept o f m o d e r n i t y .
K u r d s i n T u r k e y live. T h i s version o f I s l a m h a d l o n g been a r t i c u l a t e d w i t h l o c a l
T h e ideas o f one o f these r e l i g i o u s intellectuals, the K u r d i s h S a i d N u r s i , continue
c u l t u r a l practices, constituting a b i n d i n g element i n the w o r l d - v i e w o f K u r d s .
to influence v a r i o u s currents o f I s l a m i s t thought throughout T u r k e y .
Significantly, the south-eastern provinces are the poorest i n T u r k e y . T h e cities o f M u s a n d A g r i , for example, have a per capita i n c o m e o f o n l y USSf 6 6 0 , w h i l e the m o r e affluent western provinces enjoy a per capita i n c o m e o f up to U S $
Said N u r s i and Western modernity
7,000 ( K a z g a n 1999: 3 5 9 - 6 0 ) . T h i s r e g i o n a l poverty has c o n t r i b u t e d to the e c o n o m i c a n d c u l t u r a l grievances o f K u r d s a n d has motivated K u r d i s h demands for greater e q u a l i t y a n d c u l t u r a l autonomy, although other groups l i v i n g i n the eastern p r o v i n c e s face considerable economic h a r d s h i p as w e l l . K u r d i s h I s l a m a n d p r o - I s l a m i c p o l i t i c a l parties have d r a w n o n p o p u l a r sentiments i n the r e g i o n since the 1970s. H o w e v e r , we cannot easily c o n c e p t u a l i z e K u r d i s h I s l a m as the p o l i t i c a l representation
o f an association between
Islam
and
e c o n o m i c d e p r i v a t i o n ; it has a m u c h longer gestation a n d embodies h i s t o r i c a l l y
S a i d N u r s i was a n O t t o m a m s t w h o b e l i e v e d that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was the last p o w e r f u l I s l a m i c state c a p a b l e o f u n i f y i n g a l l M u s l i m s u n d e r one n a t i o n , regardless o f l i n g u i s t i c differences ( S a i d N u r s i 3990a: 91-162; 1990b: 247). H e was also strongly c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t because he rejected the a r b i t r a r y p e r s o n a l g o v e r n a n c e o f rulers, whether s u l t a n s or r e p u b l i c a n presidents ( A l g a r 1979: 316¬ 7). S a i d N u r s i supported the r e p u b l i c a n f o r m o f the state as the best g u a r a n t e e o f I s l a m i c l a w free from a r b i t r a r y p e r s o n a l rule.
situated social relations i n c l u d i n g geopolitical d y n a m i c s . M y p o i n t here is that
F o r S a i d N u r s i , the n a t i o n is a religious c o m m u n i t y : ' O u r n a t i o n a l i t y
the p o l i t i c a l economies a n d associated p o w e r relations hastened the g r o w t h o f
is like a b o d y i n w h i c h the s p i r i t is I s l a m a n d the intelligence is the faith a n d
K u r d i s h n a t i o n a l i s m a n d p o p u l a r I s l a m . H o w e v e r , this i m p o r t a n t development
K o r a n (Said N u r s i n.d.). T h e K o r a n i c concept o f n a t i o n , he thought, w o u l d suit
a n d its i m p l i c a t i o n s for T u r k i s h politics are b e y o n d the scope o f this book.
the m o d e r n concept o f the t e r r i t o r i a l l y defined nation-state. T h e K o r a n states:
1
' W e created y o u from a single m a l e a n d female, a n d m a d e y o u into nations, that K u r d i s h N a q s h b a n d i leaders interpreted the a b o l i t i o n o f the caliphate as a n anti-religious act. T h e y w a n t e d to institute the sharia i n the state structure.
y o u m a y k n o w e a c h other ... i n o r d e r to help a n d not to hate a n d q u a r r e l w i t h
46
T U R K E Y . ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
47
A SECULAR VISION OF M O D E R N I T Y
each other' ( T h e K o r a n 49: 13). A c c o r d i n g to S a i d N u r s i , the nation refers to the
Said Nursi's reference to the ' T u r k i s h ' nation is a semantic one. H e h a d no
religious u n i t y o f various M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s w i t h i n the territorial boundaries
problem defining n a t i o n h o o d i n relation to language as l o n g as it was not detached
of the state. A c o m m o n language, c o m m o n r e l i g i o n , a n d loyalty to the state a l l
from Islamic cultural a n d m o r a l values. Sheikh Said's revolt, then, was a tribalist
play a n i m p o r t a n t role i n b r i n g i n g about that u n i o n . A c c o r d i n g to S a i d N u r s i
act and not a jihad. For S a i d N u r s i , 'jihad is a battle by M u s l i m s against the external
(n.d: 20 -1). ' I f the above elements arc u n i f i e d , the n a t i o n is truly strong. I f
enemies of Islam a n d against the egoistic desires o f the self. It is not -ijihad if the fight
:
any one o f these factors is missing, it w i l l be at the expense o f national u n i t y .
is directed against other M u s l i m groups w i t h i n the boundaries o f a M u s l i m stale'
F o r h i m , it was a mistake to focus o n l i n g u i s t i c a n d territorial unity without
( C a k i r 1990: 8 0 i . Since he rejected any form o f nationalism divorced from Islam,
i n c l u d i n g r e l i g i o n because it w o u l d p r o m o t e r a c i s m . A n d he believed K e m a l i s m
he sought to achieve a k i n d o f constitutional fedeiation i n T u r k e y that would unify
was m a k i n g just such a mistake.
various linguistic groups under the u m b r e l l a oisharia law.
S a i d N u r s i opposed the a b o l i t i o n o f the caliphate and conveyed this i n
W h i l e i n seclusion i n eastern A n a t o l i a , S a i d N u r s i was accused o f i n c i t i n g
a speech delivered to the G r a n d N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y i n 1923. H e a r g u e d that
rebellion a m o n g the K u r d s . H e was e x i l e d to B u r d u r i n western A n a t o l i a , w h i c h
n a t i o n - b u i l d i n g on the basis o f r a c i a l or l i n g u i s t i c grounds w o u l d cause p o l i t i c a l
gave h i m the o p p o r t u n i t y to separate h i m s e l f entirely f r o m active politics. A f t e r
divisiveness a n d internal conflict w i t h i n the country, resulting i n the
this, a n overtly I s l a m i c p o l i t i c a l movement went u n d e r g r o u n d .
exploitation o f M u s l i m s by foreign powers.
eventual
O n l y Islam could provide
the
K i s a k u r e k (1990) divides S a i d Nursi's political life into a n early p e r i o d
Western
(1873-1925) a n d a later p e r i o d (1926-60). Before 1925 he was actively involved in
e n c r o a c h m e n t . H e believed that M u s l i m s f r o m various linguistic c o m m u n i t i e s
politics; afterwards he w i t h d r e w completely from political life and began to write his
were also very interested i n h a v i n g state rulers devoted to I s l a m (Said N u r s i
males (short treaties), the collection of w h i c h is k n o w n i n T u r k e y as the
1939). T h i s was p a r t i c u l a r l y true for the K u r d s .
H e wrote i n T u r k i s h , but his T u r k i s h was very m u c h influenced by the O t t o m a n
necessary anti-imperialist sentiments to protect T u r k e y from future
M u s t a f a K e m a l was strongly opposed to S a i d Nursi's idea o f I s l a m i c
Risale-lNur.
language—a mixture o f T u r k i s h , A r a b i c , a n d Persian, written i n A r a b i c script.
solidarity, a n d S a i d N u r s i r e a l i z e d that M u s t a f a K e m a l was not to be persuaded.
D u r i n g his later p e r i o d . S a i d N u r s i devoted his time to the development of a new
Consequently, he left die G r a n d N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y a n d r e t u r n e d to V a n , his
Islamic theology, a n d the establishment o f a university for religious education. T h e
h o m e l a n d i n eastern A n a t o l i a , where he devoted h i m s e l f to the c u l t i v a t i o n o f
institution he envisioned was to be called the Medreset u z - Z e h r a . A l t h o u g h he
a n i s l a m i c i n n e r life. W h i l e S a i d N u r s i was i n eastern T u r k e y , the K u r d i s h -
pursued this project until 1951, his d r e a m was never realized (Algar 1979: 315).
N a q s h b a n d i revolt led by S h e i k h S a i d broke out i n 1925.
D u r i n g his years o f e x i l e i n B u r d u r , S a i d N u r s i began to expand
S a i d N u r s i never endorsed separatist K u r d i s h n a t i o n a l i s m . H i s p o l i t i c a l
his
network o f followers, i t b e c a m e k n o w n as the Nurcu cemaati (community;, also
activities were largely confined to p r o m o t i n g the educational, e c o n o m i c , a n d
referred to as the Risale-I Nur cemaati. T h e early followers were s m a l l - p r o d u c i n g
c u l t u r a l development o f the K u r d i s h p o p u l a t i o n (van Bruinessen 1992a: 141-3).
l o c a l industrialists, artisans, s m a l l c o m m e r c i a l groups, a n d m i d d l e peasantry.
H e was opposed to the f o u n d i n g o f a separate K u r d i s t a n . A c c o r d i n g to S a i d
P a r t i c u l a r l y after the 1950s, t h e cemaal began to attract a l l k i n d s o f people a n d
N u r s i , K u r d i s h n a t i o n a l i s m was a B r i t i s h strategy to divide M u s l i m solidarity
today constitutes a n i m p o r t a n t p o l i t i c a l faction i n T u r k e y . T h e F e t h u l l a h G u l e n
i n T u r k e y rather t h a n a movement that w o u l d benefit the development o f the
cemaati o f the presenl era
K u r d s . H e believed that n a t i o n a l i s m based on r a c i a l or linguistic u n i t y w o u l d
interprets the RisaleT Nur u n d e r the leadership o f a master, referred to as Nur
b r e a k I s l a m i c bonds and w e a k e n M u s l i m resistance to i m p e r i a l i s m (Said N u r s i
talebesi (Student o f N u r ) , w h o has understood
1990c: 3 0 3 - 5 ) . S a i d Nursi's response to S a y y i d A b d u l k a d i r (founding leader
study. T h r o u g h his w r i t i n g s , S a i d N u r s i wanted to demonstrate that the K o r a n
o f the
contained
Kurdish Liberation Organization
established
in
l&lfi.i on K u r d i s h
i n d e p e n d e n c e is revealing:
fellows
the Risale~I Mir. T h e Nurcu cemaati reads a n d its m e a n i n g t h r o u g h
knowledge g e n e r a t e d by the n a t u r a l
sciences.
extensive
H e developed
his
arguments, albeit rather c r u d e l y , t h r o u g h a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f the laws o f order a n d h a r m o n y found i n n a t u r e as i l l u m i n a t e d t h r o u g h K o r a n i c verse. I n contrast
A l l a h states i n the K o r a n that H e w i l l create a nation w h i c h loves
to the K e m a l i s t r e p r o d u c t i o n
A l l a h , and w h i c h Fie, i n return, w i l l love. I thought about this a n d
O t t o m a n Islamic t r a d i t i o n , S a i d N u r s i was t r y i n g to show the c o n g r u i t y o f
concluded that this nation is the T u r k i s h nation w h i c h has defended
I s l a m w i t h the idea of m a t e r i a l development a n d progress. T h i s aligns h i m w i t h
the Islamic flag o n behalf of the entire M u s l i m w o r l d for a thousand
the m o d e r n i s t - I s l a m i c t h i n k i n g o f A f g h a n i a n d A b d u h .
years. I don't support the separatism o f a few t r i b a l groups as opposed to serving this victorious nation (Sahiner 1988: 229).
o f Western m o d e r n i t y , a n d consistent w i t h the
F o r S a i d N u r s i , the K o r a n was the o n l y guide r e q u i r e d for the development of r a t i o n a l a n d scientific t h i n k i n g . H i s ideas contrasted s h a r p l y w i t h M u s t a f a
48
49
A SECULAR VISION OF MODERNITY
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
K e m a l ' s v i e w that m o d e r n i t y r e q u i r e d the wholesale a d o p t i o n o f W e s t e r n
Party, r e n a m e d the R e p u b l i c a n People's P a r t y ( R P P ) i n 1924. T h e R P P became
c u l t u r a l values. S a i d N u r s i believed that I s l a m i c values a n d W e s t e r n m o d e r n i t y
the bureaucratic m e a n s o f l i n k i n g the people d i r e c t l y to the state. It a i m e d to create s o l i d a r i t y a n d g u a r a n t e e the h a r m o n i o u s i n t e g r a t i o n o f the p o p u l a t i o n
n e e d e d to interact to constitute a n I s l a m i c b r a n d o f m o d e r n i t y . S a i d N u r s i identified h i m s e l f as a n imam i n v o l v e d i n religious renewal. I f M u s l i m s were to become ' m o d e r n ' there was n o place for the p e r s o n a l i s m a n d flexible reinterpretation o f a s h e i k h . H e stated: 'I a m not a sheikh, i am an
w i t h o u t g i v i n g rise to conflicts o f interest i n society ( G i r i t l i o g l u 1965: 96). T h e state h a d absolute
p o w e r i n society a n d the R P P was its close
subordinate. T h e M i n i s t e r o f I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s , for e x a m p l e , was also Secretary
imam, like I m a m - I G h a z z a l i a n d l m a m - I R a b b a n i . T h e time o f ours is not the
G e n e r a l o f the party, a n d l o c a l governors acted as chairs o f l o c a l p a r t y branches
t i m e for tariga, it is now the t i m e to save the faith' ( G a k i r 1990: 82). S a i d N u r s i
(Atasoy
saw h i m s e l f as a reviver o f the u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e s o f I s l a m i c knowledge. H e
associations were r e q u i r e d to receive p a r t y a p p r o v a l . I n fact, a l l citizens o f the
was c o m m i t t e d to a process o f M u s l i m engagement w i t h scientific t h i n k i n g a n d
c o u n t r y were r e q u i r e d to b e c o m e p a r t y members. T h o s e w h o d i d not were
m a t e r i a l progress. I n contrast to the N a q s h b a n d i t r a d i t i o n w h i c h places p r i m a r y
classified as dissidents a n d a c c u s e d o f i n c i t i n g o p p o s i t i o n . A s one o f the motions
i m p o r t a n c e o n a personal c o n n e c t i o n between s h e i k h a n d follower, S a i d N u r s i
of the S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l ( N . 2 6 2 , 22 A p r i l 1934, quoted i n A t a s o y 1986: 61)
c a l l e d u p o n M u s l i m men a n d w o m e n to liberate themselves f r o m static customs
stated: 'It is necessary to be w a t c h f u l against those w h o have not become p a r t y
a n d display a. willingness to adopt the values o f rationality, efficiency, a n d
members. F r o m n o w o n , they m u s t be seen as part o f the o p p o s i t i o n . '
progress. I n his proposal for the M e d r e s e t u z - Z e h r a , S a i d N u r s i
1986: 5 9 - 6 2 ) .
Even
the
directors
and
members
o f occupational
advocated
I n order to extend p a r t y control over r u r a l areas a n d facilitate p a r t y
Koranic
propaganda, 'people's houses' (halk evleri) were established (Atasoy 1986: 61—6).
k n o w l e d g e i n the fashioning o f a u n i q u e I s l a m i c discourse o n 'development'.
R e c e p Peker insisted that p a r t y m e m b e r s h i p i n the villages be increased and that
It is therefore not inaccurate to suggest that the O t t o m a n - T a n z i m a t project o f
organizations established outside the party be e l i m i n a t e d . A c c o r d i n g to Peker:
a t t i t u d i n a l change
a n d new e d u c a t i o n a l policies that w o u l d
use
r e p r o d u c i n g W e s t e r n m o d e r n i t y also p r e o c c u p i e d S a i d N u r s i . W e have become a w a r e o f some attempts to establish clubs c a l l e d the u n i o n o f y o u t h . I f those w h o w a n t to organize a u n i o n o f youth State o p p r e s s i o n
are not p a r t y m e m b e r s , it is necessary to insure that they establish m e m b e r s h i p i n the p a r t y , I f the purpose o f such activities is to
T h e K e m a l i s t project o f r e p r o d u c i n g Western m o d e r n i t y adopted
repressive
methods. Despite its declared intent to replicate Western experience, the absence o f p o l i t i c a l l i b e r a l i s m i n K e m a l i s m greatly strengthened
die power o f state-
r u l i n g bureaucrats. A c c o r d i n g to K e y d e r (1997), this u n d e r m i n e d the goal o f
organize opposition, we s h o u l d be i n f o r m e d about [it] a n d the youth unions should be e l i m i n a t e d . T h e people should be encouraged to w o r k w i t h i n the p a r t y (Secret M e m o o f the Secretary G e n e r a l N . 345, 16 A u g u s t 1934, q u o t e d i n A t a s o y 1986: 62).
westernization a n d modernization, p l a c i n g K e m a l i s m o n a n authoritarian path. Populist n a t i o n a l i s m was the o r g a n i z i n g i d e o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e o f K e m a l i s m a n d u n d e r p i n n e d the single-party r e g i m e . A c c o r d i n g to R e c e p Peker. Secretary G e n e r a l o f M u s t a f a K e m a l ' s R e p u b l i c a n People's P a r t y , ' p o p u l i s m i m p l i e d e q u a l i t y before the law a m o n g a l l citizens o f the state ... [It also meant] a c c e p t i n g the people as a unified whole w i t h i n the b o u n d a r i e s o f the state, w i t h n o c u l t u r a l difference a n d conflicting status or class interests a m o n g t h e m ' (Peker 1984: 54—5). F o r P r i m e M i n i s t e r I n o n u , a strong a n d unified n a t i o n r e q u i r e d that ' i n d i v i d u a l life be sacrificed for society' ( M e l z i g 1944: 190). T h e o n l y acceptable basis for differentiation w i t h i n society was o c c u p a t i o n a l . Populist
n a t i o n a l i s m was
the
most
distinguishing Turkish modernity from
the
important political
should ' c o n f o r m to the rules o f its n a t i o n a l chiefs' ( Y e t k i n 1983: 158). Tt is o n l y under the leadership o f a n a t i o n a l c h i e f that the masses o f i n d i v i d u a l s c a n be unified a r o u n d the state a n d b e c o m e one i n t h i n k i n g a n d a c t i n g . O n l y this c a n lead to a great i n d e p e n d e n t existence w i t h i n the f a t h e r l a n d ' (Peker 1984: 4 8 , 63). F o r Peker, the n a t i o n a l c h i e f must rule the n a t i o n b y d e m a n d i n g obedience a n d m a i n t a i n i n g a s t r o n g m i l i t a r i s t i c c o m m a n d structure. A n d for I n o n u , the leader's duty was to n e u t r a l i z e t h e v a r i o u s interests o f different groups i n order
i d e o l o g i c a l point
in
arrangements o f the
O t t o m a n E m p i r e . C o n t r a r y to the p o l i t i c a l a c c o m m o d a t i o n o f different c u l t u r a l categories w i t h i n the empire, the K e m a l i s t project asserted 1
A c c o r d i n g to Peker, the best w a y o f r e a l i z i n g h a r m o n i o u s relations i n society was to unite a r o u n d t h e p o l i t i c a l leader. Peker b e l i e v e d that a society
a u n i t y o f 'the
people . I n 1923, M u s t a f a K e m a l a n d his close associates established the People's
to keep state a u t h o r i t y safe (Inonu's speech o n 26 D e c e m b e r 1938, quoted i n K o p 1945: 20-1). T h e R P P w a s equated w i t h the state w h i l e the g e n e r a l p o p u l a t i o n was s y n o n y m o u s w i t h the n a t i o n . T h e security o f the state c a m e to m e a n the security o f the party, w h i c h was e q u i v a l e n t to the security o f the n a t i o n . T h e R P P p l a y e d
50
A
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
a strategic role in the m a i n t e n a n c e o f this e q u a t i o n between party-state a n d p e o p l e - n a t i o n . T h e d i v i s i o n between the r u l i n g elite a n d the masses was justified
51
SECULAR VISION OF MODERNITY
T a b l e I: T h e E t h n i c D i s t r i b u t i o n o f C a p i t a l and L a b o u r i n L a r g e O t t o m a n M a n u f a c t u r i n g Industries, 191.5
as p a r t o f a responsible authority structure. A t the same time, it excluded any opposition to the R P P a n d prevented the use o f politics as a n arena for power
Ethnicity
S h a r e i n C a p i t a l (%)
L a b o u r F o r c e (%)
struggles. E x c l u s i o n a r y politics was justified by reference to the alleged i n a b i l i t y Muslim-Turkish
15
15
Greek
50
60
became the d o m i n a n t force i n d e f i n i n g n a t i o n a l culture, a n d the concept o f a
Armenian
20
15
' n a t i o n a l security state* became the o r g a n i z i n g p r i n c i p l e i n K e m a l i s t modernity.
Jewish
5
10
T h e h i s t o r i c a l emergence o f a repressive K e m a l i s t m o d e r n i t y clearly c o i n c i d e d
Foreign
10
-
w i t h the S h e i k h S a i d revolt, but was not caused by it.
Total
100
100
o f the n a t i o n to sustain a p l u r a l i t y o f ideologies. C o n s e q u e n t l y , a l l o p p o s i t i o n parties were e l i m i n a t e d a n d I s l a m lost its p o l i t i c a l i m p o r t a n c e . T h e government
K a z g a n (1999: 66). T h e creation of a national economy B y the m i d 1920s the n o n - M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n h a d d e c l i n e d d r a s t i c a l l y a n d T h e r e were t w o aspects to the e c o n o m i c p o l i c y o f K e m a l i s t nationalists: to b u i l d
T u r k e y h a d lost most m e m b e r s o f its c o m m e r c i a l classes. T h i s t u r n e d m i l i t a r y -
a n a t i o n a l e c o n o m y , a n d to m a k e M u s l i m - T u r k i s h c o m m e r c i a l a n d i n d u s t r i a l
c i v i l b u r e a u c r a t i c cadres i n t o a m a j o r p o l i t i c a l power. F o l l o w i n g the K u r d i s h -
classes d o m i n a n t w i t h i n it. K e m a l i s t s believed that the O t t o m a n free-trade
I s l a m i c S h e i k h S a i d R e v o l t o f 1925, the bureaucratic class e x c l u d e d those w h o
m o d e l resulted i n the transfer o f a g r i c u l t u r a l e c o n o m i c surplus from the empire,
were identified w i t h I s l a m f r o m the c r e a t i o n o f a new c o m m e r c i a l bourgeoisie, as
t h r o u g h n o n - M u s l i m merchants, to Western ' i m p e r i a l i s t ' states. T h i s p o s i t i o n
well as those w h o belonged to o t h e r c u l t u r a l - e t h n i c c o m m u n i t i e s s u c h as K u r d s .
was forcefully m a d e i n 1923 at the I z m i r E c o n o m i c C o n g r e s s (17 F e b r u a r y - 4
T h e absence o f c o m m e r c i a l g r o u p s r e i n f o r c e d the v i e w that p o l i t i c a l p o w e r
M a r c h 1923;. C o n g r e s s p a r t i c i p a n t s advocated n a t i o n a l w e a l t h creation t h r o u g h
belonged to state-ruling b u r e a u c r a t s whose goal was to reproduce Western-style
export-oriented a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n by T u r k i s h farmers ( O k c u n 1968).
modernity i n Turkey.
T h e congress saw the n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f c o m m e r c i a l classes as a n essential
T h e official discourse o f the n a t i o n a l e c o n o m y was still l i b e r a l , however.
c o m p o n e n t o f T u r k i s h n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i c independence. E v e n t h o u g h n a t i o n a l
F r o m the outset, the concept o f T u r k e y as a n a t i o n was g r o u n d e d i n the creation
economic independence
presented
of a social class base believed n e c e s s a r y to c a t c h up w i t h W e s t e r n m o d e r n i t y . A s
a n a r g u m e n t s i m i l a r to that o f S a m i r A m i n (1976: 72 -8), H i s definition o f a
was p o o r l y defined, congress p a r t i c i p a n t s
a first step i n that d i r e c t i o n , the g o v e r n m e n t a p p r o p r i a t e d p r o p e r t y left by G r e e k
' n a t i o n a l e c o n o m y ' was the a r t i c u l a t i o n between the c a p a c i t y to p r o d u c e a n d the
a n d A r m e n i a n C h r i s t i a n s a n d s o l d it to n a t i v e - b o r n a n d i m m i g r a n t M u s l i m s
capacity to c o n s u m e i n the n a t i o n a l space. I n the h i g h l y p o l a r i z e d social class
( K e y d e r 1981: 23). O t h e r p o l i c i e s i n c l u d e d government
structure o f the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , n o n - M u s l i m s d o m i n a t e d m a n u f a c t u r i n g . A s
purchases, the supply o f f e r t i l i z e r s , a n d other a g r i c u l t u r a l inputs. I n 1922, there
s h o w n i n T a b l e 1 below, M u s l i m s held o n l y 15 p e r cent ot c a p i t a l invested i n
were o n l y three F o r d s o n t r a c t o r s i n the c o t t o n - p r o d u c i n g region o f A d a n a . B y
m a n u f a c t u r i n g a n d h a d o n l y a 15 per cent p a r t i c i p a t i o n rate i n the l a b o u r force.
the b e g i n n i n g o f the 1930s there w e r e 2,000 [Tezel 1982: 374).
C h r i s t i a n G r e e k s h e l d 50 p e r cent o f the c a p i t a l a n d m a d e up 60 per cent o f the
support for tractor
R a i l w a y c o n s t r u c t i o n w a s also a n i m p o r t a n t element i n the e c o n o m i c
l a b o u r force. F o r congress p a r t i c i p a n t s , n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f the manufacturing-
policy
i n d u s t r y w a s c r u c i a l for n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i c independence.
T h e largest p a r t o f the e x i s t i n g r a i l w a y network was concentrated i n western
o f K e m a l i s t nationalists
Anatolia. Constructed
from
wanting
concessions
to
organize
given by the
an
internal
Ottoman
market.
state,
the
network was designed lo l i n k w e s t e r n A n a t o l i a n raw materials w i t h western E u r o p e a n industry, a n d to p r o v i d e E u r o p e a n m a n u f a c t u r e d goods to wealthy A n a t o l i a n s . H o w e v e r , the
transportation
network between
grain-producing
regions o f A n a t o l i a a n d c o n s u m i n g cities was so p o o r l y developed that i m p o r t e d g r a i n was cheaper than g r a i n p r o d u c e d i n A n a t o l i a . T h e cost o f t r a n s p o r t i n g one tonne o f wheat from c e n t r a l A n a t o l i a to Istanbul i n 1924 w a s U S $ 8.8.
52
T U R K E Y . ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
A
53
S E C U L A R VISION OF MODERNITY
whereas it cost o n l y U S S 5 to transport it from N e w Y o r k to Istanbul. H e n c e it
c a p i t a l lost f r o m b a n i s h e d C h r i s t i a n m a n u f a c t u r i n g a n d c o m m e r c i a l groups.
seemed m o r e r a t i o n a i to feed the p o p u l a t i o n o f I s t a n b u l from I o w a rather than
T h i s w o u l d i n t u r n foster the rise o f T u r k i s h capitalists a n d p r o m o t e e c o n o m i c
A n k a r a a n d K o n y a (Boratav 1981: 165). T h e g o v e r n m e n t r a i l r o a d construction
development i n general. O n c e a g a i n , revenues necessary for i n d u s t r i a l j o i n t
p o l i c y a i m e d to reduce wheat i m p o r t s , w h i c h accounted for about 20 p e r cent o f
ventures were d e r i v e d f r o m e x p o r t a g r i c u l t u r e .
total i m p o r t e d goods i n 1925 ( M a c k i e 1939: 4 4 5 - 6 ) .
Industrialization was m a d e
T h e a b o l i t i o n of the tithe tax (tax p a i d i n k i n d ) i n 1925 was
synonymous with Turkish nationalism i n
another
the belief that this w o u l d l e a d the n a t i o n to e c o n o m i c independence. It is
measure taken b y K e m a l i s t nationalists i n a n effort to o r g a n i z e a n i n t e r n a l
significant that between 1920 a n d 1930, 201 T u r k i s h joint-stock companies were
market.
and
established, 66 o f w h i c h w e r e l a r g e l y financed by foreign c a p i t a l ( O k c u n 1971).
strengthen the m a r k e t p o s i t i o n o f large agriculturalists a n d c o m m e r c i a l groups
T h e s e companies were p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r o n g i n textiles, food p r o d u c t i o n , electricity
( H e r s h l a g 1968: 45). T h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f the tithe was p a r t i c u l a r l y helpful i n
p r o d u c t i o n , a n d the cement i n d u s t r y .
Their
g o a l was
to
c o m m e r c i a l i z e s m a l l - p r o d x i c i n g farmers
t r a n s f o r m i n g the a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n o f s m a l l farmers
from household
G i v e n the fact that there was v i r t u a l l y no T u r k i s h presence i n industry,
subsistence requirements to p r o d u c t i o n directed to the market, g i v i n g farmers
c i v i l - m i l i t a r y bureaucrats
the cash needed to p a y their taxes.
bourgeoisie to fill the v a c u u m left b y displaced n o n - M u s l i m s . M a n y reputable
transformed
themselves into a n a t i o n a l i n d u s t r i a l
S m a l l a g r i c u l t u r a l producers were d o m i n a n t i n g r a i n p r o d u c t i o n a n d
deputies a n d high-level state b u r e a u c r a t s p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the f o u n d i n g o f T u r k i s h
responsible for a p p r o x i m a t e l y 90 per cent o f a g r i c u l t u r a l activity. M o s t o f
joint-stock companies. F o r e x a m p l e , i n 1925 the T u r k i s h M a t c h C o m p a n y was
this g r a i n w a s c o n s u m e d by the family w h o p r o d u c e d it. Because o f the lack
established as a j o i n t venture, w i t h a B e l g i u m firm h o l d i n g a 51 p e r cent share.
o f t r a n s p o r t a t i o n networks l i n k i n g r u r a l areas to u r b a n centres, the g r a i n that
A m o n g the significant shareholders were P r i m e M i n i s t e r Ismet I n o n u , F i n a n c e
r e m a i n e d after f a m i l y c o n s u m p t i o n was sold l o c a l l y (Tekeli and I l k i n 1977:
M i n i s t e r C e l a l B a y a r , a n d d e p u t y C e m a l H u s n u (Boratav 1982: 21).
3 7 - 8 ) . T h e g o v e r n m e n t based its wheat p o l i c y o f the 1930s o n this segment of s m a l l p r o d u c e r s . B y b r e a k i n g the e x i s t i n g l i n k between f a m i l y subsistence food p r o d u c t i o n a n d the peasantry,
the g o v e r n m e n t c o u l d institute
T h e Business B a n k (Is B a n k a s i ) , f o u n d e d i n A u g u s t 1924, is
another
example. M u s t a f a K e m a l h i m s e l f f o u n d e d the b a n k , often d e s c r i b e d as the
another
' b a n k o f politicians'. T h e F i n a n c e M i n i s t e r C e l a l B a y a r was the b a n k director.
l i n k between the peasantry, n a t i o n a l markets, a n d export-agriculture. W i t h
A l t h o u g h it was established to p r o v i d e credit for T u r k i s h c o m m e r c i a l a n d
the g r o w t h o f a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n a n d the m a r k e t i n v o l v e m e n t o f s m a l l
i n d u s t r i a l groups, the b a n k g r a d u a l l y b e g a n to invest i n the l u m b e r i n d u s t r y ,
producers, K e m a l i s t s saw i n the l i b e r a l e c o n o m y a m e a n s to integrate T u r k e y
c o a l p r o d u c t i o n , sugar, textiles, a n d glass. It also p l a y e d a n i m p o r t a n t role i n
into the w o r l d e c o n o m y as a n a g r a r i a n state.
d e v e l o p i n g exports b y e s t a b l i s h i n g e x p o r t firms a b r o a d ( H e r s h l a g 1968: 9 0 - 1 ) .
T h e l i n k between export-oriented a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n a n d a g r o w i n g
S t a t e - r u l i n g bureaucrats a n d p o l i t i c i a n s g a i n e d n e w capacities i n r e l a t i o n
c o m m e r c i a l bourgeoisie was i n s t r u m e n t a l i n the c r e a t i o n o f a T u r k i s h i n d u s t r i a l
to their i n v o l v e m e n t i n the e c o n o m y . P o l i t i c a l struggles now centred m o r e t h a n
bourgeoisie. A g r i c u l t u r a l export earnings were used to purchase
machinery
ever o n the questions o f w h o h a d access to power, h o w decisions were m a d e ,
a n d other i n d u s t r i a l inputs for the expansion o f c o n s u m e r g o o d s - p r o d u c i n g
a n d w h o benefited f r o m the d e c i s i o n s . T h e repressive measures taken by state-
industries. I n d u s t r i a l input i m p o r t s increased f r o m 24 per cent to 35 per cent
r u l i n g bureaucrats s i g n a l l e d t h a t the state was the o n l y agent responsible for the
between 1924 a n d 1929, w h i l e textile, food, a n d other c o n s u m e r goods imports
institution o f the e c o n o m y a n d the a l l o c a t i o n o f resources. It was also the sole
d e c l i n e d f r o m 66 per cent i n 1924 to 51 p e r cent i n 1929. T h e same trend i n the
representative o f the n a t i o n . A n d the n a t i o n was u n i f i e d i n its struggle against
i m p o r t substitution o f consumer goods c o n t i n u e d i n the 1930s: T o t a l consumer
b o t h external a n d i n t e r n a l e n e m i e s o f the state, i n c l u d i n g the foreign powers
goods i m p o r t s d e c l i n e d from 42 per cent i n 1930 to 22 p e r cent i n 1938;
that occupied T u r k e y d u r i n g t h e w a r , as w e l l as the K u r d s a n d I s l a m i c groups
i n t e r m e d i a r y i n d u s t r i a l goods i m p o r t s increased d u r i n g the same p e r i o d from
w h o revolted against the s e c u l a r i z i n g policies o f M u s t a f a K e m a l . T h e K e m a l i s t
33 p e r cent to 40 per cent, a n d m a c h i n e r y a n d a u t o m o b i l e i m p o r t s increased
p o l i t i c a l regime u n d e r s c o r e d t h e dangers o f l s l a m , ethnicity, a n d class conflict,
f r o m 10 per cent to 23 p e r cent (Tezel 1982: 107-10).
w h i l e p r o m o t i n g the idea o f n a t i o n a l unity.
Despite
the
continuing
rhetoric
on
imperialism
and
national
I n the process o f c r e a t i n g p r i v a t e T u r k i s h c o m m e r c i a l a n d i n d u s t r i a l
i n d e p e n d e n c e , K e m a l i s t s d i d not oppose foreign c a p i t a l . I n fact, they supported
classes, bureaucrats
foreign investment and encouraged j o i n t ventures to stimulate T u r k i s h i n d u s t r i a l
development, a n i m p o r t a n l q u e s t i o n arises. Is this to be u n d e r s t o o d as a T u r k i s h
g r o w t h . A p p r o x i m a t e l y o n e - t h i r d o f the companies established between
emerged
as the d o m i n a n t group i n society. W i t h
this
1920
case o f P o l a n y i a n d y n a m i c s , i n w h i c h n a t i o n a l protection c a m e i n t o conflict
a n d 1930 were j o i n t ventures, t h r o u g h w h i c h K e m a l i s t s h o p e d to replace the
w i t h the global free-trading r e g i m e ? O r is this the case o f a n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c a l
54
55
A S E C U L A R VISION OF M O D E R N I T Y
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
reaction that u l t i m a t e l y stopped the destructive extension o f market forces into
the P r o t e c t i o n o f the V a l u e o f T u r k i s h C u r r e n c y . T h i s p o l i c y operated t h r o u g h
the economy? I w o u l d argue that to p o r t r a y the K e m a l i s t m o v e m e n t as a T u r k i s h
central b a n k i n t e r v e n t i o n ( T e k e l i a n d I l k i n 1981). In
response to a free-trade r e g i m e is m i s l e a d i n g . K e m a l i s m d i d not constitute a
1930, the
government
founded
the
C e n t r a l B a n k as a
national
protective response to the institutions o f laissez-faire, but p l a c e d T u r k e y o n a
b a n k , thereby e n d i n g the O t t o m a n Bank's m o n o p o l y i n issuing c u r r e n c y a n d
trajectory where the general p u b l i c came to recognize the state as the agent
c o n t r o l l i n g foreign e x c h a n g e . T h e C e n t r a l B a n k ' s c o n t r o l a l l o w e d the credit
responsible for the c r e a t i o n o f a n a t i o n a l economy. T h i s is a h i s t o r i c a l case o f
available from state b a n k s for c o m m e r c e a n d private i n d u s t r i a l activity to
a ' p e r i p h e r a l state' e m b r a c i n g the global m a r k e t e c o n o m y at the v e r y p o i n t
increase f r o m 28 p e r cent i n 1930 to 40 p e r cent i n 1938 (Tezel 1982: 226).
w h e n its g l o b a l f r a m e w o r k , centred o n the gold standard, collapsed. D u e to the
Because the g o v e r n m e n t d e c i d e d to avoid the depletion o f its exchange
displacement o f n o n - M u s l i m s a n d the absence o f T u r k i s h i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l ,
gold reserves, it stopped p a y i n g the O t t o m a n debt i n 1930. T h e
K e m a l i s t s a d o p t e d a p o l i c y o f greater bureaucratic involvement i n industry.
T r e a t y d i d not r e q u i r e T u r k e y to p a y w a r reparations, but it was supposed to
T h a t p o l i c y was clearly g r o u n d e d i n 'statism'. T o appreciate h o w the collapse
p a y O t t o m a n debts. I n 1928, u n d e r the brokerage o f the L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s ,
and
Lausanne
of the gold s t a n d a r d seriously affected K e m a l i s t s attempt to create a n a t i o n a l
T u r k e y p a i d t w o - t h i r d s o f the O t t o m a n debt, i n the a m o u n t o f 84,597,495 gold
e c o n o m y a n d a T u r k i s h bourgeoisie, we must e x a m i n e the rise o f b u r e a u c r a t i c
l i r a . W i t h the a d d i t i o n o f interest, T u r k e y was r e q u i r e d to pay 107,528,461 g o l d
5
power i n Turkey.
l i r a b e g i n n i n g i n 1929 ( H e r s h l a g 1968: 21-3). T h i s agreement was c o n c l u d e d w i t h the u n d e r s t a n d i n g that T u r k e y reserved the right to cease p a y m e n t i f the value o f T u r k i s h m o n e y d e c l i n e d . W i t h the 1929 e c o n o m i c crash, T u r k e y ceased
T h e untouchable bureaucracy
payments o n the O t t o m a n debt. N o p a y m e n t w a s m a d e between 1930 a n d 1933.
W i t h the e n d o f the L a u s a n n e customs sanctions i n 1928, a n d the establishment of g o v e r n m e n t m o n o p o l i e s o n the sale o f tobacco, salt, a l c o h o l , matches, sugar, o i l , a n d gasoline, T u r k i s h revenues increased, constituting a p p r o x i m a t e l y 23 per cent o f total g o v e r n m e n t i n c o m e i n 1929 ( H e r s h l a g 1968: 57; T e k e l i a n d I l k i n 1977: 70). T h e s e policies h a d significant consequences for Turkey's i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d i n g regime, a n d also affected its domestic social structure. T h e g o v e r n m e n t reduced the i m p o r t a t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l l y p r o d u c e d consumer goods a n d gave p r i o r i t y to n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t i o n v i a a n import-substitution i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n p r o g r a m m e . Shifts i n state p o l i c y o n n a t i o n a l c u r r e n c y a n d relative p r i c i n g a c c o m p a n i e d a l l these changes i n trade a n d the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f p r o d u c t i o n . B o t h paper a n d gold were used i n Turkey. P a p e r m o n e y was used mostly i n the western p r o v i n c e s w h i l e gold d o m i n a t e d i n the rest o f the country. D u r i n g the w a r years the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t h a d p r i n t e d some paper money. O n l y a s m a l l p o r t i o n o f it was convertible to gold, the rest h a d value o n l y i n relation to G e r m a n state bonds. W h e n G e r m a n y submitted its c l a i m over the O t t o m a n debt to the A l l i e d powers as p a r t o f its w a r indemnities, T u r k i s h paper m o n e y lost its value because it was not b a c k e d by c e n t r a l b a n k gold reserves. Since it was not convertible into g o l d , the v a l u e o f m o n e y was dependent o n increases i n exchange reserves f r o m foreign c a p i t a l i m p o r t s a n d e x p o r t revenues. U n d e r the conditions o f the G r e a t D e p r e s s i o n o f 1929 there were significant fluctuations i n exchange reserves. C o n s e q u e n t l y , the value o f c u r r e n c y d e c l i n e d . A l t h o u g h it d r o p p e d o n l y 5 p e r cent i n 1929, the government i m p o s e d exchange controls i n
In
order
bureaucrats
to
prevent
the
depletion
of gold
and
exchange
reserves
s h o w e d n o hesitation i n a p p l y i n g even a r b i t r a r y controls to the
trade structure. T h e O f f i c e for E x t e r n a l T r a d e , instituted i n 1934, reflected the p o l i t i c a l weight o f bureaucrats i n g i v i n g d o m i n a n c e to export agriculturalists a n d c o m m e r c i a l groups. I m p o r t e r s a n d s m a l l producers were left to the g o o d graces
of government
bureaucrats
who
imposed
quotas
and
established
b a r t e r i n g a n d c l e a r i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s for i n d i v i d u a l traders ( K e p e n e k 1984: 79¬ 80). B u r e a u c r a t i c i n t e r v e n t i o n resulted i n a surplus o f exchange reserves, e a r n e d p r i m a r i l y f r o m wheat exports to G e r m a n y between 1933 a n d 1938. T h e state p o l i c y that w o r k e d to the disadvantage o f i m p o r t e r s a n d the advantage o f exporters was m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h shifts i n g o v e r n m e n t pricingp o l i c y T h e p r i c e o f i m p o r t e d items was r a i s e d to decrease their c o n s u m p t i o n . T h e w o r l d m a r k e t p r i c e for s u g a r fell by 60 p e r cent between 1929 a n d 1935 but the p r i c e o f i m p o r t e d sugar i n T u r k e y o n l y decreased between 19.3 a n d 27.3 per cent (Tekeli a n d I l k i n 1977: 85). T h i s was c o m p l e m e n t e d by decreases i n the p r i c e o f d o m e s t i c a l l y p r o d u c e d e x p o r t crops w h i c h h a d fallen i n value by 6 0 to 75 per cent i n the w o r l d m a r k e t . T h e g o v e r n m e n t w a n t e d to increase exchange reserves by i n c r e a s i n g e a r n i n g s f r o m e x p o r t a g r i c u l t u r e t h r o u g h a l o w - p r i c i n g p o l i c y A s a result, T u r k e y i n c r e a s e d its exports by 4 0 p e r cent (Tekeli and I l k i n 1977: 89), w h i l e i m p o r t s d e c l i n e d i n 1933 to o n e - t h i r d o f 1928 levels. T h e r e was also a d e c l i n e i n i m p o r t e d c o n s u m e r goods, f r o m 52 p e r cent of i m p o r t s i n 1928 to 25 p e r cent d u r i n g the late 1930s (Tezel 1977: 201).
order to prevent future declines o n reserves. It also passed legislation i n 1930 o n G o v e r n m e n t p r i c i n g p o l i c y was also disadvantageous
for a g r i c u l t u r a l
producers. T h e most d i s a d v a n t a g e d group was s m a l l - p r o d u c i n g family farmers,
56
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
57
A S E C U L A R VISION OF M O D E R N I T Y
a l t h o u g h l a r g e - p r o d u c i n g farmers were also adversely affected. T h e government
be the m a i n source o f r e v e n u e for state i n d u s t r i a l firms. C h a n n e l l i n g resources
d i d not develop a p o l i c y to protect prices i n a g r i c u l t u r e . A s a result, the l i v i n g
to state firms sometimes took the f o r m o f g o v e r n m e n t a l a u t h o r i z a t i o n of i m p o r t
c o n d i t i o n s o f a g r i c u l t u r a l producers deteriorated. W h e a t prices were a l l o w e d
quotas for selective e x e m p t i o n s on precious i n d u s t r i a l r a w materials. T h e B a n k
to decline i n correspondence w i t h a d r o p i n w o r l d prices, w h i l e the price o f
o f I n d u s t r y a n d M i n e s (1925), the State Office o f I n d u s t r y (1930), a n d the State
i m p o r t e d goods was kept higher. Peasants h a d to exchange
approximately
I n d u s t r i a l C r e d i t B a n k (1930) were a l l effective i n c r e a t i n g opportunities for
eight kilos o f wheat to purchase one k i l o o f sugar i n 1931, w h i l e i n 1929 they
bureaucrats to g a i n access to v a l u a b l e resources. T h e s e institutions were f o r m e d
e x c h a n g e d o n l y three kilos o f wheat for one k i l o o f sugar { H a t i p o g l u 1936:
to p r o v i d e credit to state-run i n d u s t r i e s only. G i v e n these circumstances, it is not
52-7). H o w e v e r , the level o f a g r i c u l t u r a l taxes, to be p a i d i n cash after
the
s u r p r i s i n g that m o r e t h a n 50 p e r cent o f i n d u s t r i a l enterprises were state o w n e d
a b o l i t i o n o f the tithe tax, r e m a i n e d h i g h . T h e d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p r i c i n g policies o f
b y 1938 ( M a r d i n 1980: 39). T h e textile i n d u s t r y was the o n l y sector where
the g o v e r n m e n t were also a p p l i e d to i n d u s t r i a l inputs i m p o r t e d for a g r i c u l t u r a l
private investment e x p a n d e d ( H e r s h l a g 1968: 101-2), a fact o f some significance
p r o d u c t i o n . B y k e e p i n g the p r i c e o f i m p o r t e d o i l and m a c h i n e r y h i g h e r t h a n
for the later emergent i n d u s t r i a l bourgeoisie.
w o r l d market levels, the g o v e r n m e n t encouraged the use o f a n i m a l p o w e r i n f a r m i n g . T h i s was i n t e n d e d to keep a g r i c u l t u r a l prices l o w a n d p r o v i d e a greater incentive for e x p o r t - a g r i c u l t u r e . Bureaucrats Depression
and
acquired the
the
W i t h the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f bureaucrats dominance
ability to h o a r d
p o w e r due
to the
absence o f a c o m m e r c i a l bourgeoisie. T h e y
into i n d u s t r i a l capitalists, a n d ,
i n the absence o f o p p o s i t i o n parties able to affect state policy, bureaucratic was
assumed.
Moreover,
bureaucratic
power
enabled
state
Great
functionaries to exploit v a r i o u s i d e o l o g i c a l aspects o f the K e m a l i s t n a t i o n a l
became
project. B u r e a u c r a t s f o u n d t h e example o f fascist Italy useful for w i d e n i n g
v i r t u a l l y untouchable. T h e m o r e the state tightened its c o n t r o l over politics, the
l a b o u r repression a n d l o w e r i n g costs, w h i l e N a z i G e r m a n y p r o v i d e d a major
m o r e bureaucrats a p p e a r e d to be the e m b o d i m e n t o f power. 'Statism', accepted
i d e o l o g i c a l influence ( K o c a k 1986). A legal f r a m e w o r k for l a b o u r r e g u l a t i o n was
as one o f the f o u n d i n g p r i n c i p l e s o f M u s t a f a K e m a f s R e p u b l i c a n People's
a d o p t e d f r o m fascist Italy. I n fact, the government's 1936 l a b o u r law was based
P a r t y i n 1931, p r o v i d e d a n avenue for bureaucrats
on the 1935 I t a l i a n l a b o u r l a w ( Y e t k i n 1983: 102). "Workers were not p e r m i t t e d
to permeate the p o l i t i c a l
system. It f u r n i s h e d t h e m w i t h the o p p o r t u n i t y to decide whose taxes should
to strike or f o r m u n i o n s . I n 1938 the association l a w consolidated the labour l a w
be raised a n d whose benefits or social support p r o g r a m m e s s h o u l d be cut. A s
b y d e n y i n g b o t h the existence o f classes a n d the right to establish class-based
l o n g as o p p o s i t i o n parties were absent a n d p o p u l a r resistance r e m a i n e d weak,
o r g a n i z a t i o n s . W o r k e r s were t o l d to live i n ' h a r m o n y ' i n a society i n w h i c h their
bureaucratic d o m i n a t i o n o f the e c o n o m y persisted. T h i s b e c a m e v e r y evident
interests w o u l d be l o o k e d after b y the state.
after the suppression o f the K u r d i s h - I s l a m i c revolt i n 1925. Years o f repression h a d r e c o n c i l e d the general p o p u l a t i o n to the v i e w that bureaucrats
Technical and
financial
assistance for the statist i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n strategy-
represented
came f r o m the S o v i e t U n i o n . T u r k e y used Soviet financial support to purchase
T h e t e r m 'statism' was not a well-defined concept i n the 1930s a n d 1940s.
industries, W o r k e r s selected for sugar a n d textile p r o d u c t i o n travelled to the
Intellectuals w r i t i n g i n the T u r k i s h m a g a z i n e Kadro considered it a u n i q u e l y
Soviet U n i o n for t r a i n i n g , w h i l e Soviet experts c a m e to T u r k e y where they were
T u r k i s h strategy for the constitution o f a n i n d u s t r i a l economy. C e l a l B a y a r ,
e m p l o y e d i n the government's p r e p a r a t i o n o f the S e c o n d F i v e - Y e a r P l a n . T h e y
finance m i n i s t e r a n d d i r e c t o r o f the Business B a n k at the t i m e , c l a i m e d that
also p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f the F i r s t F i v e - Y e a r I n d u s t r i a l P l a n as
statism was a strategy to bolster private enterprise. S u k r u S a r a c o g l u , p r i m e
advisors a n d m a n a g e r s ( H e r s h l a g 1968: 64).
the interests o f a supposedly u n i f i e d n a t i o n .
the m a c h i n e r y a n d i n d u s t r i a l e q u i p m e n t
m i n i s t e r f r o m 1942 to 1946, defined statism as a n ' a d v a n c e d f o r m o f s o c i a l i s m ' (Karpat
1959: 70). Nevertheless, M u s t a f a K e m a l
a n d his close
needed
to b u i l d consumer
goods
T h e Soviets were also v e r y i n v o l v e d i n the development o f heavy industry,
associates
m i n i n g , a n d energy p r o d u c t i o n i n T u r k e y ( K u r u c 1970: 19). T h e first a n d
believed i n the eventual creation o f i n d u s t r i a l private c a p i t a l v i a state r e g u l a t i o n .
second five-year i n d u s t r i a l d e v e l o p m e n t plans e m b r a c e d i n T u r k e y d u r i n g the
D u r i n g the 15 l o n g years o f a single-party regime statism served to consolidate
1930s were s i m i l a r to those a l r e a d y i m p l e m e n t e d i n the Soviet U n i o n .
the p o l i t i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c p o w e r o f bureaucrats. P r i v a t e industrialists o n l y began to exploit significant opportunities d u r i n g the 1960s.
B u r e a u c r a t i c d o m i n a t i o n was r e a l i z e d t h r o u g h abusive state power, a n d . i n general, state m a n a g e r s e n c o u n t e r e d little i d e o l o g i c a l o p p o s i t i o n from the
A l t h o u g h there was a L a w for the E n c o u r a g e m e n t o f Industry, enacted
general p o p u l a t i o n . I n t e l l e c t u a l s o f the p e r i o d e l o q u e n t l y wove the K e m a l i s t
i n 1927 to assist private industrialists, i n r e a l i t y the law served the interests o f
v i s i o n a r o u n d the d e n i a l o f c o n f l i c t i n g class interests. A n i n t e l l e c t u a l w r i t i n g
large state-run i n d u s t r i a l firms. E x c h a n g e reserves saved t h r o u g h restrictions o n
for Kadro m a g a z i n e p r o c l a i m e d : ' T h e r e is no m e c h a n i s m i n v e n t e d to prevent
c o n s u m e r goods i m p o r t s a n d earnings from a g r i c u l t u r a l exports c o n t i n u e d to
class struggle i n countries w h e r e private enterprise is d o m i n a n t i n the economy.
58
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
59
A S E C U L A R VISION OF M O D E R N I T Y
S t a t i s m is a n o b l i g a t o r y strategy for T u r k e y to i n d u s t r i a l i z e a n d prosper without
security forces were a u t h o r i z e d to r e t u r n b y force those workers w h o left t h e i r
b e c o m i n g entangled i n class struggles' (quoted i n A t a s o y 1998: 170). Statism,
w o r k p l a c e ( B i a n c h i 1984: 121).
then, emerged as a m u t u a l l y reinforcing assemblage o f state power, bureaucratic c o n t r o l , a n d repression o f l a b o u r a n d s m a l l producers.
and
industrial
bourgeoisie t h r o u g h d i s c r i m i n a t o r y price a n d wage policies a n d
The
K e m a l i s t attempt
to create a n a t i o n a l e c o n o m y
repressive
O v e r a n d over again, the repressive legislation that outlawed labour u n i o n s
laws, built into T u r k i s h society what T i l l y (1998) calls 'durable i n e q u a l i t y ' . State
a n d strikes a n d lowered i n d u s t r i a l wages reinforced bureaucratic power a n d
p o w e r became identified w i t h v i g i l a n c e over Turkey's transformation into a
influenced a w i d e range of social processes. T h e government's i o w - a g r i c u l t u r a l -
' m o d e r n ' nation-state. M o r e precisely, the K e m a l i s t trajectory o f r e p r o d u c i n g
p r i c e p o l i c y c o m b i n e d w i t h l o w - p r i c e d wheat exports kept i n d u s t r i a l wages low.
Western-style m o d e r n i t y t o o k a repressive course i n r e g a r d to the shape o f
R e a l wages d e c l i n e d 25 per cent between 1984 a n d 1938, a n d another 40 p e r
domestic social structure, state power, a n d I s l a m . I n the process, segments o f
cent between 1938 a n d 1943. A l t h o u g h the cost o f l i v i n g went up by 247 per
private c a p i t a l , large- a n d s m a l l - p r o d u c i n g farmers, a n d c o m m e r c i a l groups
cent d u r i n g the same p e r i o d , wages increased by o n l y 114 p e r cent ( K e y d e r
became t h o r o u g h l y estranged f r o m r u l i n g bureaucrats.
1987: 104-5).
E t h n i c i t y also p l a y e d a n i m p o r t a n t role i n the estrangement o f private
T h e i n d u s t r i a l low-wage policy was closely l i n k e d to state control over the
capital groups
from the stale.
T h e C a p i t a l T a x o f 1942 was p a r t i c u l a r l y
food supply a n d the ideological coercion o f r u r a l producers. I n 1932 the C e n t r a l
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y against n o n - M u s l i m c o m m e r c i a l groups o f A r m e n i a n , G r e e k ,
Office for S o i l P r o d u c e ' T M O ) was established. W h e a t was purchased directly
a n d J e w i s h o r i g i n . It w a s d e s i g n e d to extract resources f r o m large l a n d o w n e r s ,
f r o m s m a l l family farmers at a price below w o r l d market levels. T h e functions
the private m a n u f a c t u r i n g b o u r g e o i s i e , b u i l d i n g owners, a n d r e a l estate brokers
o f the T M O were extended i n 1939 to include the purchase a n d marketing o f
w h o h a d a c q u i r e d t h e i r w e a l t h d u r i n g the w a r years ( A y d e m i r 1983: 4 6 0 - 1 ) .
barley, oats, a n d other grains ( H e r s h l a g 1968: 109). T h r o u g h the agency o f the
T h e estimated revenue f r o m the c a p i t a l tax was T L 4 6 5 m i l l i o n , 289 m i l l i o n
T M O the state was able to obtain g r a i n cheaply enough to sustain its low-wage
of w h i c h was to be c o l l e c t e d from m i n o r i t i e s (Avcioglu 1978: 4 7 5 - 6 ) . T h o s e
policy. R u r a l co-operatives, established i n a m a n n e r similar to that of Soviet-
w h o c o u l d not pay the t a x w i t h i n 15 days were subject to forced l a b o u r u n t i l the
style collectivization, extended the K e m a l i s t statist vision into the countryside,
c o m p l e t i o n o f p a y m e n t . A c c o r d i n g to then P r i m e M i n i s t e r R e f i k S a y d a m , the
c o m p l e m e n t i n g the policies o f the T M O . T h e a g r i c u l t u r a l credit co-operatives
state h a d an o b l i g a t i o n to establish exclusive c o n t r o l over v a l u e d resources, a n d ,
instituted under the control o f the A g r i c u l t u r a l B a n k h a d to finance programmes
w h e n necessary, to exclude others from p r o f i t - m a k i n g activities b y setting up
for the market expansion of wheat p r o d u c t i o n a n d break the financial and political
state m o n o p o l i e s (Avcioglu 1978: 475). S o m e m i n o r i t y merchants refused to p a y
control o f merchants
regional
the tax. J e w s w h o d i d m a k e l a r g e payments a r g u e d that the T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t
a g r i c u l t u r a l combines were legislated i n 1937 ( E r g i l 1975: 479), concentrating
was f o l l o w i n g a G e r m a n - s t y l e , a n t i - S e m i t i c p o l i c y ( A k t a r 19981. A l l i e d Powers
over s m a l l - p r o d u c i n g peasants. F u r t h e r m o r e , 1
r u r a l settlements a r o u n d 'centre villages to w h i c h the government would supply
also accused T u r k e y o f p l a n n i n g its post-war e c o n o m y w i t h the expectation of
all
a G e r m a n v i c t o r y c K o c a k 1 9 8 6 : 287-302). U n d e r p r e s s u r e f r o m A l l i e d Powers
necessary
infrastructure
and social services. A r o u n d
1.000
agricultural
combines were established d u r i n g the late 1930s. T h e y were later transformed into state farms d u r i n g the Second W o r l d W a r . A l l o f these innovations lent themselves to bureaucratic c o n t r o l over agricultural p r o d u c t i o n . A s a consequence, r u r a l i n c o m e was kept l o w w h i l e a l l other prices a n d taxes went up.
the g o v e r n m e n t d r o p p e d the c a p i t a l tax i n 1944. T h r o u g h o u t most o f the single-party p e r i o d , bureaucrats a n d private capital groups were i n v o l v e d i n a love-hate relationship. State b a c k i n g was essential for the creation o f a c o m m e r c i a l a n d i n d u s t r i a l bourgeoisie, but capitalists also
S m a l l - p r o d u c i n g peasants a n d i n d u s t r i a l l a b o u r were b o t h subject to state
feared a n image o f the state as an e m b o d i m e n t o f abusive and d i s c r i m i n a t o r y
repression for the sake o f establishing a relationship between state b u r e a u c r a c y
bureaucratic
a n d n a t i o n a l unity. T h e N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y L a w o f 1940 established obligatory
populations a n d workers was also an undeniable fact. These groups
p a i d w o r k for s m a l l - p r o d u c i n g peasants a n d wage labourers i n mines, r o a d
feared the deployment o f c o e r c i v e state powers. T h e n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l space was
c o n s t r u c t i o n , a n d industry. T h e peasantry was also subject to c o m p u l s o r y crop
fragmented
c o n t r i b u t i o n s a n d the confiscation o f a n i m a l s a n d household utensils i P a m u k
wage earners, and various g r o u p s o f private capital on the other. A closer look at
1988). I n 1944, a n a m e n d m e n t to the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y L a w created
practices.
The
widespread
discontent
of small-producing rural rightfully
between state r u l i n g bureaucrats o n the one h a n d , a n d peasants,
more
the actual negotiations b e t w e e n r u l i n g bureaucrats a n d these discontented groups
severe penalties for v i o l a t i n g c o m p u l s o r y l a b o u r legislation. C o m p u l s o r y l a b o u r
over their repositioning i n the state w i l l clarify h o w Islam b e c a m e a n i m p o r t a n t
c a m e to be v i e w e d as a n a t i o n a l duty c o m p a r a b l e to m i l i t a r y service, a n d
element i n the p o l i t i c a l life o f Turkey. C h a p t e r 3 examines the i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f Islam into the T u r k i s h e x p e r i e n c e after the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r .
61
T H E ISLAMIST S E A R C H FOR S E L F H O O D
new regime p e r m i t t e d c u l t u r a l discontent to be expressed w i t h i n a n d through the l e g a l - c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k o f the state. W h i l e firmly t y i n g a l l citizens to
3
the state, the T u r k i s h p o l i t i c a l system also integrated Islamic c u l t u r e into stateb u i l d i n g . I s l a m was n o w a c k n o w l e d g e d as an i n t e g r a l part o f people's d a i l y life
The Islamist. Search for Selfliood
experience, t h e i r f a m i l y relations, n e i g h b o u r h o o d ties, c o m m u n i t y solidarity, a n d customs. W h a t m a d e t h i s a plausible c u l t u r a l project was the i n c l u s i o n of u r b a n a n d r u r a l s m a l l p r o d u c e r s a n d lower classes into the state structure. W h i l e there is no n a t u r a l c o n n e c t i o n between I s l a m i c beliefs a n d the politics o f c u l t u r a l o p p o s i t i o n , specific choices m a d e by state managers a n d p o l i t i c a l elites framed the p o l i t i c a l space w i t h i n w h i c h Islamic m o r a l claims c o u l d be made.
I
n i lie i m m e d i a t e aftermath o f the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r T u r k e y experienced a shift f r o m a n exclusionary and a u t h o r i t a r i a n state to a more inclusive a n d
l i b e r a l one. T h i s change was reflected i n p o l i t i c a l l i b e r a l i z a t i o n a n d the
T h e C o l d W a r a n d the t r a n s i t i o n to a m u l t i - p a r t y r e g i m e
t r a n s i t i o n from a single-party p o l i t i c a l system to a m u l t i - p a r t y system. H o w e v e r ,
p o l i t i c a l l i b e r a l i z a t i o n was not the result o f societal opposition to a n oppressive state. It entailed a m o r e complex i n t e r a c t i o n between the state a n d c i v i l society. I n the C o l d W a r geopolitics that d i v i d e d states into two
antagonistic
m i l i t a r y blocs, a n t i - c o m m u n i s t a n d anti-capitalist rhetoric d o m i n a t e d . D u r i n g this p e r i o d ' p e r i p h e r a l ' areas were often considered testing sites for the W e s t e r n ideal o f m o d e r n i t y . T h e global r i v a l r y between c o m m u n i s m a n d c a p i t a l i s m also p r o d u c e d scepticism i n the w o r l d about the r e p l i c a t i o n o f Western experience. I n T u r k e y , the p o l i t i c a l twists and turns between l i b e r a l d e m o c r a c y a n d statea u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m are r o o t e d i n this scepticism. D u r i n g the transition to a m u l t i p a r t y system, b o t h secular and Islamic projects questioned the u n i v e r s a l i s m a n d r e p l i c a b i l i t y o f W e s t e r n ways. B y h i g h l i g h t i n g differences i n the d a i l y c u l t u r a l p o l i t i c a l experience o f i n d i v i d u a l s , we see h o w doubts about the pretensions o f a W e s t e r n v i s i o n y i e l d e d to p o l i t i c a l f a c t i o n a l i s m , one significant element o f w h i c h was I s l a m i c politics. A t the same t i m e , these doubts gave rise to state repression
Turkey. H e was the second president of the r e p u b l i c , i n office f r o m the d e a t h o f M u s t a f a K e m a l i n 1938 u n t i l the election o f the D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y (DP) i n 1950. i n o n u was m o t i v a t e d by the desire to position T u r k e y firmly w i t h i n the a n t i - c o m m u n i s t c a m p o f the C o l d W a r . T h e majority o f R e p u b l i c a n People's P a r t y ( R P P ) m e m b e r s was o p p o s e d to competitive politics a n d a m u l t i - p a r t y system. A s one R P P m e m b e r stated: T have always kept A t a t u r k ' s revolution a n d my leaders p a r a m o u n t i n rny life. P u t t i n g me i n the Situation of r e q u i r i n g the vote o f the people m e a n s t h a t Í am for sale, doesn't it?' ( B a r u t c u 1977: 277). H o w e v e r , I n o n u b e l i e v e d it was v i t a l that T u r k e y a p p e a r as a ' d e m o c r a t i c
1
c o u n t r y i f it w i s h e d to be a c c e p t e d w i t h i n the a n t i - c o m m u n i s t W e s t e r n c a m p (Ulus .Newspaper, 2 N o v e m b e r 1945). H e expressed the desire to r e d i r e c t T u r k i s h politics onto a n e w trajectory that was different from single-party politics o n a wide range o f p o l i c y issues. T h i s new trajectory i n c l u d e d p o l i t i c a l l i b e r a l i z a t i o n a n d the f o r g i n g of a n a l l i a n c e w i t h the U n i t e d States.
i n a n effort to preserve the strength a n d sanctity o f K e m a l i s m . It makes little sense, therefore, to p o r t r a y the relations between
It was ismet I n o n u w h o d e c i d e d to establish a m u l t i - p a r t y p o l i t i c a l system i n
secular
a n d I s l a m i c polities i n zero-sum terms. W h a t was o c c u r r i n g was not a n Islamist rejection o f K e m a l i s t secular principles p e r se. R a t h e r , Islamists were expressing t h e i r w i s h to r e m a i n connected to the I s l a m i c m o r a l - s p i r i t u a l universe w h i c h h a d l o n g f r a m e d t h e i r fashioning o f self a n d society. T h e politics o f ' c u l t u r a l discontent' that emerged w i t h the s e c u l a r i z i n g practices o f the state helps e x p l a i n what was h a p p e n i n g d u r i n g the early C o l d W a r between 1945 a n d the 1960s. I n this p e r i o d Islamists a n d secularists c o u l d v e r y w e l l have been p o l a r i z e d into two r i g i d categories o f c u l t u r a l opposition. H o w e v e r , the transition to a m u l t i - p a r t y system, along w i t h the c o m i n g to p o w e r o f the D e m o c r a t i c Party i n 1950, a l l o w e d for the g r a d u a l i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f r e l i g i o u s - m o r a ! sensibilities into the p o l i t i c a l system. I n a unique way, the m u l t i p a r t y regime p e r m i t t e d political parties to mediate relations between various
Inonu
was
well
aware
that political
l i b e r a l i z a t i o n was
a
necessary
c o n d i t i o n for T u r k e y ' s i n c l u s i o n i n the W e s t e r n a l l i a n c e . W h a t was c r u c i a l in this r e g a r d was whether o r not the Soviet U n i o n was seen as a d a n g e r to Turkey's security. B o t h d u r i n g a n d after the war, the Soviet U n i o n
demanded
the r e t u r n of two T u r k i s h p r o v i n c e s , K a r s a n d A r d a h a n , w h i c h were located near I r a n a n d the C a u c a s i a n o i l fields i n B a k u a n d B a t u m . T h e Soviet U n i o n w a n t e d to control these p r o v i n c e s largely because o f its a n x i e t y over I r a n i a n o i l fields ( H a l l i d a y 1979: 4 6 7 - 7 2 ) . T h e Soviets also h o p e d for a r e v i s i o n of the M o n t r e u x C o n v e n t i o n i n o r d e r to establish a m i l i t a r y base for light n a v a l a n d l a n d forces on the T u r k i s h straits o f the D a r d a n e l l e s a n d B o s p h o r u s ( K u n l h o l m 1980: 136-43). T u r k e y was v e r y a l a r m e d that the U S g o v e r n m e n t c o u l d have easily accepted the Soviet p r o p o s a l on the straits, especially w i t h Roosevelt s sympathies
towards
S t a l i n at
the time. D r a w i n g an a n a l o g y w i t h the U S -
62
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
63
T H E ISLAMIST SEARCH FOR SELFHOOD
C a n a d a border, Roosevelt stated: ' W e have a frontier o f over 3,000 miles w i t h
a n d I r a n . S a u d i o i l p r o d u c t i o n increased from 0.5 m i l l i o n l o n g tons in 1939
C a n a d a a n d there is n o fort a n d no a r m e d forces. T h i s situation has existed for
to 25.9 m i l l i o n l o n g tons i n 1950. D u r i n g the same p e r i o d I r a n i a n p r o d u c t i o n
over one h u n d r e d years. O t h e r frontiers i n the w o r l d w i l l eventually be w i t h o u t
increased from 9.6 m i l l i o n l o n g tons to 31.8 m i l l i o n l o n g tons ( H a l l i d a y 1979:
forts a n d a r m e d forces o n their national b o u n d a r i e s ' ( U S D e p a r t m e n t o f State
3 9 8 - 4 0 0 ) . U S c o m p a n y shares i n M i d d l e E a s t e r n o i l p r o d u c t i o n increased
1955:903-5).
f r o m 16 p e r cent i n 1939 to 31 p e r cent i n 1946 ( A r m s t r o n g et a l 1991: 30). the
Despite their g r o w i n g i m p o r t a n c e , U S companies were excluded from m a n y o i l
M o n t r e u x C o n v e n t i o n so that the straits w o u l d be open at a l l times to the
Moreover,
the
U S government
was
proposing modifications i n
concessions. T h e B r i t i s h - c o n t r o l l e d o i l r e g i m e r e q u i r e d n o n - B r i t i s h c o m p a n i e s
warships of B l a c k S e a p o w e r s — n a m e l y the Soviet U n i o n ( U S D e p a r t m e n t o f
to o b t a i n B r i t i s h consent for e x p l o r a t i o n rights i n the previously u n t o u c h e d
State 1947: 47). T h i s was consistent w i t h the Soviet p r o p o s a l for a joint Soviet-
territories o f the region ( V e n n 1986: 6 2 - 7 ) . U n d e r the influence o f oil companies
T u r k i s h defence o f the straits ( K u n i h o l m 1980: 256-7). I n o u u was apprehensive
such as C a l - T e x , w h i c h e v e n t u a l l y b e c a m e the A r a b i a n A m e r i c a n O i l C o m p a n y
a n d thought such changes w o u l d m a k e T u r k e y easy prey for the Soviet U n i o n .
\ARAMGO),
T h e U S p r o p o s a l d i d not m a k e sense to Turkey. I n the event o f a m i l i t a r y conflict
w i t h i n w h i c h U S interests c o u l d be
between T u r k e y a n d the Soviet U n i o n , T u r k e y could h a r d l y wage a w a r w i t h
80). T h i s i n v o l v e d b r e a k i n g p r e - w a r c o l o n i a l arrangements whereby the U n i t e d
the Soviets w h i l e k e e p i n g the straits open to Soviet warships. T u r k e y w a r n e d
States supported the d e c o l o n i z a t i o n process p r e s c r i b e d i n the
the U S a d m i n i s t r a t i o n that i f T u r k e y decided to o r g a n i z e a joint defence w i t h
C h a r t e r ( B r o m l e y 1991).
the Soviet U n i o n the provisions o f the M o n t r e u x C o n v e n t i o n o n m o r e restricted rights for warships w o u l d also be extended to U S warships. A l t h o u g h we c a n n o t k n o w whether
the U S g o v e r n m e n t
redefined a broader strategic firmly
framework
established ( K u n i h o l m 1980: 179 — 1941 A t l a n t i c
T h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f o i l interests i n the M i d d l e East is best e x p l a i n e d i n relation to the specific t i m i n g o f the extension o f the nation-state system to
S t a l i n was a c t u a l l y interested
in
the r e g i o n . T h e question o f w h e t h e r ' c o m m u n i s t s ' w o u l d be i n a position to
i n v a d i n g T u r k e y , there is evidence to support Inonu's fear that the Soviet U n i o n
ensure the security o f the t e r r i t o r i a l division o f states determined U S support
posed a threat to T u r k i s h interests T i a l e 2 0 0 0 : 110-31 it is also evident that
for d e c o l o n i z a t i o n ( G r a e b n e r
the T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t ma.de strategic p o l i t i c a l use o f the Soviet U n i o n ' s l a n d
Roosevelt regime, the T r u m a n D o c t r i n e o f 1947 established a U S p o l i c y o f
1970: 241). After
some hesitation u n d e r
the
c l a i m s m eastern T u r k e y a n d their d e m a n d for a m i l i t a r y base o n the straits.
'stern c o n t a i n m e n t ' towards the Soviet U n i o n ( A m b r o s e 1983; G a d d i s 1982).
Nonetheless, the U S a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was not interested i n a t e r r i t o r i a l dispute
T h a t said, the U S p o l i c y o f c o n t a i n m e n t in the M i d d l e East was not s i m p l y the
between the two countries ( K o l k o 1990: 5 8 6 . I n order to arouse U S interest i n
result o f successful T u r k i s h d i p l o m a c y over Soviet t e r r i t o r i a l c l a i m s o n T u r k e y ,
T u r k e y a n d o b t a i n a c o m m i t m e n t to its t e r r i t o r i a l security, T u r k i s h diplomats
i t was the 1946 S o v i e t - I r a n i a n oil agreement w h i c h was decisive i n m o b i l i z i n g
intensified t h e i r c l a i m s that the ' c o m m u n i s t threat' to the T u r k i s h straits a n d the
the U S a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a g a i n s t the ' d a n g e r ' to U S o i l interests posed b y the
B a l k a n s was v e r y r e a l .
Soviet U n i o n .
;
Turkey
reminded
the
US
administration
of
its
strategic
location
F r o m A u g u s t 1941, I r a n w a s u n d e r j o i n t m i l i t a r y o c c u p a t i o n by the Soviet
i n t e r l o c k i n g the B a l k a n s a n d the M i d d l e East and its i m p o r t a n c e as a defensive
U n i o n and B r i t a i n . T h e S o v i e t U n i o n d e m a n d e d that a j o i n t S o v i e t - I r a n i a n oil
shield against Soviet m i l i t a r y expansion i n the region. A f t e r lengthy hesitation
c o m p a n y be formed t h r o u g h w h i c h the Soviets w o u l d receive oil concessions
(Kuniholm
the
a n d 51 per cent o f the profits. I n 1946, the Soviet U n i o n agreed to w i t h d r a w us
strategic i m p o r t a n c e o f Turkey, but not by suddenly d e c i d i n g to protect its
troops from I r a n i n exchange for o i l concessions. H o w e v e r , u n d e r U S pressure,
1980:
109-18), the
U S government
overtly a c k n o w l e d g e d
t e r r i t o r i a l security from the Soviet U n i o n . T w o factors p l a y e d a decisive role i n the reversal o f U S p o l i c y towards T u r k e y : first, the greater g e o p o l i t i c a l need to protect U S o i l interests i n the M i d d l e East, a n d second, c o n c e r n over the i n t e r n a t i o n a l b a l a n c e o f p o w e r i n the e m e r g i n g C o l d W a r . F o r m e r S e c r e t a r y o f State, C o r d e l l H u l l , has stated: 'It was i n the interest o f the U n i t e d States that no great p o w e r be established o n the Persian G u l f opposite i m p o r t a n t A m e r i c a n p e t r o l e u m development i n S a u d i A r a b i a ' ( K u n i h o l m 1980: 160).
the I r a n i a n p a r l i a m e n t refused to ratify the oil agreement. I n M a y 1947, the U S a d m i n i s t r a t i o n p r o v i d e d I r a n w i t h U S S 25 m i l l i o n i n m i l i t a r y supplies to help t h e m e x p e l Soviet troops (The New York Times, 31 M a y , 21 J u n e , 22 O c t o b e r , 10 D e c e m b e r 1947). A l s o i n 1947, the p r o - B r i t i s h H a k i m i b e c a m e p r i m e m i n i s t e r of I r a n , r e p l a c i n g the p r o - S o v i e t Q u a v a m . T h e f o r m a t i o n o f a p r o - W e s t e r n g o v e r n m e n t was c r u c i a l i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r the Soviets w o u l d be capable o f e x e r t i n g
Increased U S interest i n the region was also tied to the p a r t i c u l a r c o l o n i a l
influence over I r a n i a n oil p o l i c y . O n the other h a n d , the U S a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
arrangements o f the B r i t i s h - c o n t r o l l e d o i l regime i n the M i d d l e East. D u r i n g the
felt that the B r i t i s h c o u l d e x c l u d e U S c o m p a n i e s from oil concessions. T w o
war. M i d d l e Eastern oil p r o d u c t i o n rose significantly, especially i n S a u d i A r a b i a
64
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
65
T H E ISLAMIST SEARCH FOR SELFHOOD
U S c o m p a n i e s , S o c o n y V a c u u m and S t a n d a r d O i i o f N e w Jersey, h a d been
T h i s shift i n U S foreign p o l i c y towards T u r k e y h a d several
important
r e c e i v i n g o i l concessions f r o m I r a n since 1943 ( E l w e l l - S u t t o n 1955: 108). T h e i r
i m p l i c a t i o n s . F i r s t , it m a r k e d t h e p o s i t i o n o f T u r k e y w i t h i n the W e s t e r n a l l i a n c e
share was m i n i m a l though; the B r i t i s h - o w n e d A n g l o - I r a n i a n O i l C o m p a n y
as strategically c r u c i a l to the security o f U S interests. S e c o n d , the T u r k i s h
( A i O C ) h a d a m o n o p o l y o n I r a n i a n o i l p r o d u c t i o n . H e n c e , for U S companies to
m u l t i - p a r t y system b e g a n to c o n s o l i d a t e w h e n I n o n u saw that U S sponsorship
prosper, reliance o n a p r o - U S government i n I r a n was c r u c i a l . W h e n M o s s a d e g h
went to governments w h i c h established 'free' institutions a n d o p p o s e d ' t e r r o r
b e c a m e p r i m e m i n i s t e r i n 1951 and sought to n a t i o n a l i z e not o n l y the A I O C
a n d oppression'. S t i l l , it is v e r y difficult to determine exactly how the e m e r g i n g
but also U S c o m p a n i e s , the C I A engineered a coup against h i m . A f t e r the C I A -
C o l d W a r influenced Inonu's d e c i s i o n to support the m u l t i - p a r t y system, i n o n u
a i d e d I r a n i a n a r m y overthrew M o s s a d e g h a n d p l a c e d the S h a h i n power, U S
was p r o b a b l y m o t i v a t e d m o r e b y t e r r i t o r i a l a n d security interests t h a n by a f i r m
o i l c o m p a n y shares i n I r a n i a n o i l p r o d u c t i o n increased from almost n i l to 4 0
c o m m i t m e n t to ' d e m o c r a c y ' . I n d i s m a n t l i n g the single-party regime he w a n t e d
p e r cent ( K e o h a n e 1984:167-9).
to ensure Turkey's a d m i s s i o n t o the W e s t e r n a l l i a n c e structure. H o w e v e r , there
T h e T r u m a n D o c t r i n e m a r k e d a t u r n i n g p o i n t i n the history o f the C o l d
is n o p r o o f that the U S a d m i n i s t r a t i o n r e q u i r e d T u r k e y to change its r e g i m e
W a r a n d T u r k e y ' s p o s i t i o n i n it. A s might be expected, T u r k e y . G r e e c e , a n d I r a n
a n d adopt l i b e r a l d e m o c r a c y . Nonetheless, b y presenting the w o r l d w i t h o n l y
d r e w the i n t e r n a t i o n a l security boundaries o f Soviet c o n t a i n m e n t a r o u n d the
t w o choices, 'freedom' or 'oppression', T r u m a n m a d e it clear t h a i T u r k e y h a d
eastern M e d i t e r r a n e a n , i n the process, the strategic m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n o f Turkey-
no alternative except to o r g a n i z e a n e w p o l i t i c a l regime. T h e s i g n i n g oi the U S -
was fully a c k n o w l e d g e d , a n d , accordingly, it received USft 100 m i l l i o n i n a i d .
T u r k i s h A i d A g r e e m e n t o n 12 J u l y 1947 was a key t u r n i n g point. T h a t same day
G r e e c e received U S $ 3 0 0 m i l l i o n .
President I n o n u endorsed the o p p o s i t i o n D e m o c r a t P a r t y and silenced the h a r d -
Despite considerable controversy over the g r a n t i n g o f a i d to T u r k e y , T r u m a n believed that U S a i d to G r e e c e a n d T u r k e y was v i t a l to
line statist faction w i t h i n the R P P that o p p o s e d l i b e r a l i z a t i o n .
prevent
'confusion a n d d i s o r d e r ' throughout the entire M i d d l e East ( K u n i h o l m 1980: 438). T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f Turkey's p r i m a r y strategic l o c a t i o n was clear. It was
T h e r e s e n t m e n t p o l i t i c s o f state o p p r e s s i o n
a Jand a n d water bridge between A s i a and E u r o p e , between E u r o p e a n d the M i d d l e East, a n d between the Soviet U n i o n a n d the M i d d l e East. T h e T r u m a n D o c t r i n e was about, ' k e e p i n g R u s s i a from the sea' (Herald Tribune, 18 J u l y 1947), a n d the T u r k i s h straits were a v i t a l element i n a c c o m p l i s h i n g this task. I n a
A l t h o u g h Inonu's decision to d i s m a n t l e the single p a r t y system was p r i m a r i l y g e o p o l i t i c a l , he was also u n w i t t i n g l y r e s p o n d i n g to those d e m a n d i n g greater l i b e r a l i z a t i o n i n T u r k e y . I n o n u c h a n n e l l e d p o p u l a r grievances i n the d i r e c t i o n o f established i n s t i t u t i o n a l p r a c t i c e s w i t h i n the state structure i n such a w a y
speech to C o n g r e s s o n 12 M a r c h 1947. T r u m a n e x p l a i n e d :
that the K e m a l i s t trajectory w o u l d not be endangered ( B a r u t c u 1977: 3 0 6 - 8 ) . H e c o n c e i v e d o f the m u l t i - p a r t y system as a m e c h a n i s m for the W e c a n not realize o u r objectives unless we are w i l l i n g to help free people to m a i n t a i n their free institutions a n d their n a t i o n a l i n t e g r i t y against aggressive movements that seek to impose u p o n t h e m t o t a l i t a r i a n regimes ... T h e time has come w h e n nearly every n a t i o n must choose between alternative ways o f life, one d i s t i n g u i s h e d by free institutions a n d the other by terror
and
oppression ... T u r k e y n o w needs o u r support. Since the w a r T u r k e y has sought f i n a n c i a l assistance from G r e a t B r i t a i n a n d the U n i t e d States for the purpose o f effecting that m o d e r n i z a t i o n necessary for the maintenance
containment
of p o l i t i c a l discontents w i t h i n K e m a l i s m . B y c h o o s i n g the m u l t i - p a r t y system, I n o n u largely p r e - e m p t e d the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a significant opposition movement. H e t u r n e d to w h a t he r e g a r d e d as a ' l o y a l opposition': a n o n - c o m m u n i s t a n d n o n - i s l a m i s t p o p u l i s t p a r t y t h a t d i d not vie for p o w e r by m a k i n g c l a i m s distinct f r o m those o f the R P P . T h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n Inonu's embrace o f the W e s t e r n a l l i a n c e a n d the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f a K e m a l i s t trajectory o f social c h a n g e is evident i n the
following
statement: 'It n e v e r h a p p e n e d i n m y life that 1 haven't t a k e n
e x t e r n a l p r o b l e m s into c o n s i d e r a t i o n as I was s o l v i n g i n t e r n a l p r o b l e m s , or vice v e r s a ( B a r u t c u 1977: 316;.
o f its national integrity. T h a t integrity is
essential to the preservation o f order i n the M i d d l e E a s t . . . It must be the p o l i c y o f the U n i t e d States to support free peoples w h o are resisting attempted subjugation bv a r m e d m i n o r i t i e s or b y outside
Inonu
believed
arrangements created
the
multi-party
during
the
system
1930s
to
be
would
allow
the
accommodated
domestic
within
e m e r g i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l order. A s he e x p l a i n e d o n 1 N o v e m b e r 1945:
pressure ( K u n i h o l m 1980: 4 3 4 ~ 9 L F r e e d o m o f e x p r e s s i o n , freedom o f speech a n d w r i t i n g , should not undo the limits i m p o s e d by the nation's o w n ability to support
the
66
T H E ISLAMIST SEARCH FOR SELFHOOD
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
67
itself. [Otherwise] this n a t i o n w o u l d face the danger o f a n a r c h y
the l i b e r a l element i n the R P P , broadened their c r i t i q u e o f the 'repressive' single-
a n d disorder. It is w i t h i n our m e m o r y , we experienced it i n the
party system. M u h i t t i n B a h a Pars was the first p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n to ask that the
past, that this c o u n t r y c a n absolutely not sustain the
weight
g o v e r n m e n t be answerable to p a r l i a m e n t . H e also p r o p o s e d that the government
o f excessive a n d i m m o d e r a t e speeches w h i c h cause the rise o f
allow the press to be present i n p a r l i a m e n t a r y discussions [Uhis Newspaper, 30
disorder i n society (Inonu 194-6: 3 9 7 - 4 0 0 ) .
M a y 1945). M e n d e r e s a c c u s e d the government o f not a c t i n g i n accordance w i t h the constitution:
F o r I n o n u , the state was u n a b l e to sustain a p l u r a l i t y o f c o m p e t i n g p o l i t i c a l c l a i m s for power. Therefore, there was a n absolute need to keep the o p p o s i t i o n
W e have accepted the C h a r t e r of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s i n accordance
p a r t y l o y a l to K e m a l i s t principles as a r t i c u l a t e d by the R P P d u r i n g the single-
w i t h o u r o w n c o n s t i t u t i o n . T h i s means that we cannot live i n a
p a r t y regime. A s P r i m e M i n i s t e r S u k r u S a r a c o g l u indicated: ' A n y k i n d o f
p o l i t i c a l r e g i m e t h a t is against the spirit o f o u r constitution i n
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y c a n develop i n o u r country, but o n l y i n a d i r e c t i o n d e t e r m i n e d
the first place. W e s h o u l d work t o w a r d the e l i m i n a t i o n of the d i s h a r m o n y between a c t u a l p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c e a n d constitutional
1
by the R e p u b l i c a n People's P a r t y (Vatan Newspaper, 5 September 1945).
requirements. (Vatan Newspaper, 16 A u g u s t 1945).
T h e establishment o f the D P i n 1946 was a rude a w a k e n i n g for K e m a l i s t bureaucrats. It became clear that the e m e r g i n g D P was a voice o f o p p o s i t i o n for those forced to b u r y their resentment o f state oppression d u r i n g the s i n g l e - p a r t y
T h e first act o f the o p p o s i t i o n was to present the j o i n t m o t i o n ( k n o w n as
era. A l t h o u g h a politics o f discontent was definitely m u t e d , the D P was t o y i n g
the dortlu tahúr) to p a r l i a m e n t o n 7 J u n e 1945. I n the m o t i o n , B a y a r . M e n d e r e s ,
w i t h the idea o f c o n s t r u c t i n g a n o p p o s i t i o n movement against the bureaucratic
K o p r u l u , a n d K o r a l t a n d e m a n d e d the restoration o f i n d i v i d u a l a n d p o l i t i c a l
control o f the e c o n o m y a n d m i l i t a n t s e c u l a r i s m (Atasoy 1986).
rights for a l l citizens as stated i n the constitution. T h e y also d e m a n d e d that the
In
the e c o n o m i c r e a l m , the
most i m m e d i a t e i n s p i r a t i o n for p o l i t i c a l
o p e r a t i o n a n d c o n t r o l o f g o v e r n m e n t be r e t u r n e d to p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s ( B u r c a k
opposition was the L a n d R e f o r m B i l l o f 1945. T h e R P P g o v e r n m e n t i n t r o d u c e d
1979:
the b i l l w i t h the intention o f r e d i s t r i b u t i n g a l l l a n d w o r k e d b y wage l a b o u r ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y the Vatan Newspaper, to collectively argue against state repression.
241-4), W h e n the m o t i o n was rejected, the o p p o s i t i o n used the press,
tenancy, a n d s h a r e c r o p p i n g to the i m m e d i a t e tillers. It p r o v i d e d for a l l l a n d e d
K o p r u l u insisted o n t h e separation o f powers between p a r l i a m e n t a n d
p r o p e r t y i n excess o f 5 0 0 donum {123.5 acres^ to be expropriated a n d r e d i s t r i b u t e d
g o v e r n m e n t and accused the government o f e x e r t i n g d i c t a t o r i a l p o w e r over
to landless a n d land-short peasants (Selekler 1945), T h e L a n d R e f o r m B i l l was
p a r l i a m e n t . Pie e x c l a i m e d : ' I a m a s h a m e d o f c a l l i n g m y s e l f a representative o f
strongly opposed by large l a n d o w n e r s , a n d after months o f debate i n p a r l i a m e n t ,
the n a t i o n i n this p a r l i a m e n t ' ( B a r u t c u 1977: 288). I n an article entitled ' T h e
lands
S p i r i t o f D e m o c r a c y " , p u b l i s h e d o n 19 S e p t e m b e r 1945 i n the Vatan Newspaper,
( B a r k a n 1945). T h e debate o n the L a n d R e f o r m B i l l demonstrated the deeply-
K o p r u l u defined the s i n g l e - p a r t y system as a dictatorship. H e stated that the
rooted p o l i t i c a l conflict w i t h i n the R P P . L a r g e landowners w h o received the
regime treated T u r k i s h c i t i z e n s like a flock o f sheep who were expected to
support o f private i n d u s t r i a l a n d c o m m e r c i a l classes were d i s t u r b e d by what
obey orders from b u r e a u c r a t s
they saw as ' a r b i t r a r y a n d unpredictable legislation' at the h a n d s o f R P P
D e m o c r a c y ' , p u b l i s h e d on
bureaucrats. T w o examples o f such legislation were the N a t i o n a l Defence L a w
accused the R P P g o v e r n m e n t o f being an enemy o f d e m o c r a c y :
the b i l l was m o d i f i e d to a l l o w o n l y for the r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f state-owned
o n c o m m a n d . I n another article, ' E n e m i e s o f
25 September
1945, K o p r u l u went further
of 1940 a n d the C a p i t a l T a x o f 1942. C e l a l B a y a r a n d A d n a n M e n d e r e s , w h o represented the l i b e r a l w i n g o f
T h e p r i m a r y objective o f the g o v e r n m e n t was [initially] to protect
the R P P , were a d a m a n t i n their o p p o s i t i o n to the L a n d R e f o r m B i l l . B a y a r was
reforms f r o m the p o s s i b i l i t y o f [Islamic] r e a c t i o n a n d to prevent
a businessman-banker a n d M e n d e r e s a c o t t o n - g r o w i n g l a n d l o r d . T h e i r c r i t i c i s m
the l i k e l i h o o d o f a n y social d i s t u r b a n c e i n the country. T h i s sort
was based o n two grounds: F i r s t , l a n d r e f o r m w o u l d violate the p r i n c i p l e o f
of r e a s o n i n g led to the enactment
private p r o p e r t y guaranteed by the constitution: a n d second, it w o u l d lead to a
that were totally a g a i n s t the spirit o f the constitution. A s a result,
decline i n p r o d u c t i o n ( K a r p a t 1959: 2 9 6 - 8 ) .
it b e c a m e i m p o s s i b l e for the p a r l i a m e n t to exercise its duty of
Inonu's desire to situate T u r k e y w i t h i n the W e s t e r n a l l i a n c e p l a y e d a major role i n s h a p i n g a l i b e r a l o p p o s i t i o n i n p a r l i a m e n t . T h e
government's
acceptance o f the C h a r t e r o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , for example, p r o v i d e d p o l i t i c a l opportunity. B a y a r , M e n d e r e s , K o r a l t a n , a n d K o p r u l u . w h o together represented
o f some v e r y restrictive laws
c o n t r o l l i n g the g o v e r n m e n t . T h e single p a r t y r e g i m e has totally d a m a g e d the spirit o f d e m o c r a c y i n T u r k e y . (Vatan Newspaper, 25 S e p t e m b e r 1945).
and
68
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D
DEMOCRACY
69
T H E ISLAMIST SEARCH FOR SELFHOOD
Because o f their bitter a n d g r o w i n g o p p o s i t i o n , M e n d c r e s , K o p r u f u , a n d
c o u l d u n d e r m i n e state p o w e r (Vatan Newspaper, 2 J u n e 1946). Consequently, he
K o r a l t a n were expelled f r o m the R P R F o l l o w i n g Bayar's resignation f r o m the
f o r m u l a t e d the c o n c e p t o f ' p o p u l a r p o w e r a m o n g citizens', to be expressed w i t h
R P P , the four m e n formed the D P o n 7 J a n u a r y 194-6, w i t h B a y a r as their leader.
the consent of, a n d i n h a r m o n y w i t h , the n a t i o n a l interest ( K a r p a t 1957: 311).
A close friend o f M u s t a f a K e m a l , B a y a r was m i n i s t e r o f the e c o n o m y i n 1924
T h e n o t i o n o f p o p u l a r p o w e r h e l p e d to reinforce a c o m m o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f
a n d 1932, founder o f the Business B a n k i n 1924, and p r i m e m i n i s t e r i n 1937.
p o p u l i s m , w h i c h l e d the D P a n d the R P P to n e u t r a l i z e class-based differences
A l t h o u g h the i m m e d i a t e reason for the establishment o f the D P was
a n d contentious c u l t u r a l c l a i m s . T h i s b e c a m e most evident after the newly-
opposition to the L a n d R e f o r m B i l l by large landowners, the D P was f o r m e d as
founded socialist p o l i t i c a l p a r t y was closed d o w n i n D e c e m b e r 1946. T h e D P
a p o p u l i s i party. It m o b i l i z e d not o n l y large landowners a n d private i n d u s t r i a l
a n d R P P also s h a r e d the v i e w that e c o n o m i c a n d c u l t u r a l tensions should be
interests
situated w i t h i n the state, r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g r o o t e d i n collective struggles that
but
also
the
s m a l l peasantry,
wage
earners, a n d
various
small
c o m m e r c i a l a n d m a n u f a c t u r i n g interests as w e l l . A l l were strongly opposed to government e c o n o m i c policies.
challenge the state. O n e w a y i n w h i c h the R P P a n d D P t r i e d to d i s t i n g u i s h themselves was
T h e passion expressed by D P founders against the repressive centralized
by a c c u s i n g one a n o t h e r o f b e i n g c o m m u n i s t or soft o n c o m m u n i s m . R P P
control of R P P bureaucrats was complemented by a vision that p r o m o t e d the
h a r d l i n e r s , for e x a m p l e , a c c u s e d the D P o f b e i n g ' i n the pocket o f M o s c o w '
h a r m o n i z a t i o n o f p o p u l a r grievances w i t h the u n i f y i n g p r i n c i p l e o f 'national
( Z u r c h e r 1993: 223). I n o n u b r o u g h t a halt to the accusations a n d silenced R P P
interest' ( D P P a r t y P r o g r a m , A r t i c l e 6 a n d 7). T h i s vision o f inclusive citizenship
h a r d l i n e r s o n the same day t h a t the U S - T u r k i s h A i d A g r e e m e n t was signed, 12
was based o n the Western libera! concept o f i n d i v i d u a l rights a n d freedoms. T h e
J u l y 1947. I n his d e c l a r a t i o n I n o n u stated:
founders o f the D P conceived o f a n opposition party as a vehicle for the political expression o f p o p u l a r discontent—in this p a r t i c u l a r case, against w h a t M e n d e r e s
T h e result I seek is the institution o f confidence between
called 'the t y r a n n y o f die R P P ' (Vatan Newspaper, I A p r i l , 30 A p r i l , 19 M a y 1946).
parties. T h i s is necessary for the security o f the country. T h e
T h e c r u c i a l question o f the day was h o w to determine the n o r m a t i v e grounds for expressing these
rights
a n d freedoms.
G i v e n that I n o n u
was
the
o p p o s i t i o n w i l l w o r k w i t h o u t the fear o f b e i n g closed d o w n b y the p a r t y i n power; the g o v e r n m e n t w i l l be secure that the o p p o s i t i o n
c o m m i t t e d to p o s i t i o n i n g T u r k e y as a ' d e m o c r a c y ' i n the W e s t e r n a l l i a n c e
demands
structure, the R P P m a d e a n u m b e r o f changes i n its by-laws to l i b e r a l i z e the
confident i n seeking t h e possibility o f the transfer o f p o w e r from
n o t h i n g b e y o n d its legal rights; the citizens w i l l be
regime (Atasoy 1986: 172-87). I n fact, ' i n d i v i d u a l rights' became part o f the
one p a r t y to another. I n order to o v e r c o m e the obstacles to this
p o l i t i c a l discourse. A n o t h e r strategic question that arose was h o w to facilitate
e n d , I ask for g e n u i n e c o o p e r a t i o n between the leaders o f the
the expression o f different types o f p o l i t i c a l belonging. F o r example, at the S i x t h
o p p o s i t i o n a n d g o v e r n m e n t parties. (Ulus Newspaper, 12 J u l y 1947)
Congress o f 1946, the R P P r e c o g n i z e d the existence o f v a r i o u s social 'groups' in society. It a c k n o w l e d g e d that these groups have different e c o n o m i c interests,
T h e p o s i t i o n i n g o f o p p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the state structure was a guarantee
yet it avoided u s i n g the concept o f social class. T h i s led, i n J u n e 1946. to the
that the m u l t i - p a r t y system w o u l d be instituted p e a c e f u l l y I n 1959 I n o n u stated
f o u n d i n g o f the T u r k i s h S o c i a l i s t W o r k e r s ' and Peasants' P a r t y by D r . Sefik
i n a n i n t e r v i e w that there w a s an 'absolute n e e d ' to a l l o w the o p p o s i t i o n to
H u s n u Degmer. B i t by bit, the R P P a d o p t e d measures that a c k n o w l e d g e d 'rights
f o r m their o w n p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s ( E r d e m i r 1962: 9). A n d i n a speech delivered
1
a n d freedoms based on social class, A t the Seventh Congress o f 1947 the R P P
i n p a r l i a m e n t i n D e c e m b e r 1 9 6 9 , I n o n u e x p l a i n e d w h a t he h a d meant: ' I f we
advocated free enterprise i n the e c o n o m y a n d m o d i f i e d the L a n d R e f o r m B i l l to
d i d not choose the m u l t i - p a r t y d e m o c r a t i c r e g i m e i n 1945, there might have
suit the interests o f large l a n d o w n e r s .
been a b l o o d y r e v o l u t i o n i n s o c i e t y ' ( B u r c a k 1979: 55). C o n c e r n e d w i t h security
Changes i n individual
rights
a n d freedoms
were also understood
in
a n d t e r r i t o r i a l interests, as w e l l as domestic p o l i c y considerations, I n o n u h o p e d
relation to p o p u l a r claims o f c u l t u r a l b e l o n g i n g and discontent. A t the Seventh
to c o n t a i n the contentious p o l i t i c s that
Congress o f 1947 the R P P d e c i d e d to p e r m i t religious education i n schools. T h i s
the c i v i l - m i l i t a r y b u r e a u c r a t i c
flourished
despite b r u t a l repression by
cadres. In o r d e r not to exhaust the p o l i t i c a l
represented a shift i n the R P P ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a n i n d i v i d u a l ' s relationship
f r a m e w o r k o f K e m a l i s m , he n e e d e d the assistance o f the D P a n d the c o o p e r a t i o n
to the collectivity. T h e issue o f religious education t u r n e d a r o u n d a p e r c e i v e d
o f R P P h a r d l i n e r s ( B a r u t c u 1977: 3 0 6 - 8 , 316). P r i m e M i n i s t e r S a r a c o g l u also
need to strengthen the sense o f b e l o n g i n g to a n a t i o n a l culture. Nevertheless,
shared Inonu's h o p e for the c o n t a i n m e n t o f p o l i t i c a l dissent: ' W e w a n t o n l y one
I n o n u was suspicious o f dissent, the expression o f diverse p o l i t i c a l
interests,
a n d the c u l t u r a l contestation o f secular principles, a l l o f w h i c h he believed
t h i n g . W e s h o u l d cooperate a g a i n s t a r e a c t i o n a r y m o v e m e n t . W e w a n t u n i t y i n politics' (Vatan Newspaper, 7 M a r c h 1946).
70
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
Despite b o t h parties'
shared
belief i n the need to keep
71
T H E I S L A M I S T S E A R C H FOR S E L F H O O D
contentious
from the p o l i t i c a l process. T h i s i n t u r n p r o v i d e d a m o r a l foundation for the
politics w i t h i n K e m a l i s r n , the D P was able to depict the p o l i t i c a l d o m i n a n c e
D P ' s r e w o r k i n g o f relations b e t w e e n the K e m a l i s t r e p r o d u c t i o n o f W e s t e r n
of b u r e a u c r a t i c cadres as i n i m i c a l to the interests o f the general p o p u l a t i o n . I n
ways and the d e v e l o p m e n t of a c o n c e p t of justice that i n c l u d e d the experience oi
d o i n g so, the D P a d v a n c e d c o m p e t i n g c l a i m s for a n o p p o s i t i o n a l politics. T h e s e
m a r g i n a l i z e d groups.
claims i n v o l v e d large numbers o f people whose values, interests, and way o f
T h e D P ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f personal rights a n d freedoms r e q u i r e d
the
life were e x c l u d e d from the K e m a l i s t reconstruction o f Western m o d e r n i t y i n
establishment o f a l i n k b e t w e e n access to rights and the creation o f a sense o f
Turkey. I n r e c o g n i z i n g the diverse a n d heterogeneous nature o f people's d a i l y
belonging. But the D P p o s i t i o n e d m a r g i n a l groups outside the state, as subjects
experience, the D P p r o v o k e d opposition b y c l a i m i n g entitlement for those i n
of the periphery. T h i s e x c l u d e d the idea o f class a n d class conflict f r o m its
m a r g i n a l or subordinate positions i n society. T h e p a r t y took on the responsibility
conception o f rights, f r e e d o m s ,
of c o n s t r u c t i n g a m o r a l p r o g r a m m e o f i n d i v i d u a l rights, freedoms, a n d c u l t u r a l
p e r i p h e r y were s i m p l y v i c t i m s o f the oppressed. A s B a y a r (1951: 124) stated:
b e l o n g i n g out o f the resentmem o f the general p o p u l a t i o n . According
to
D P leaders,
the
political
o f the
' O u r people have b e e n p u n i s h e d i n police stations a n d beaten up i n the villages. ruling
T h e s e examples expose the police-state character o f the existing regime ... O u r
bureaucratic elite, private capita! groups, a n d the peasantry, was a p o l i t i c a l
peasants have been forced to p a y taxes despite their i n a b i l i t y to pay'. A n d i n a
struggle between 'centre' a n d 'periphery'. T h e centre was e m b o d i e d i n r u l i n g
speech delivered at a D P r a l l y i n M i l a s i n N o v e m b e r 1946, M e n d e r e s (1967:
bureaucrats;
b y a c o l l e c t i o n o f people f r o m
35) a n n o u n c e d : ' T h e n a t i o n a l u n i t y achieved u n d e r the single p a r t y r e g i m e is
various s o c i o - e c o n o m i c categories. T h e D P saw the latter group as s h a r i n g a
n o t h i n g but a n e n c a m p m e n t b y the gendarmerie'. I n another speech d e l i v e r e d at
c o m m o n interest i n o p p o s i n g the centre. A l t h o u g h the D P r e c o g n i z e d class
the K u t a h y a P r o v i n c i a l C o n g r e s s o f the D P i n D e c e m b e r 1949, M e n d e r e s i l 967:
the p e r i p h e r y was represented
conflict
a n d justice. Consequently, m e m b e r s
between
the
differences w i t h i n the periphery, this d i d not d i s t i n g u i s h the f u n d a m e n t a l p o l i c y
203) c o n d e m n e d R P P r u l e as equivalent to a 'dictatorship o f intellectuals'—
of the D P f r o m the R P P . R a t h e r , the D P fashioned a strategy to u n i f y different
c l a i m i n g to be d o i n g g o o d t h i n g s for the people, but i n fact d o i n g things i n spite
class-based interests that v i e w e d the p e r i p h e r y as constitutive o f a c o m m u n i t y
of t h e m .
outside the state. T h e D P ' s n o t i o n o f a p e r i p h e r a l identity i n v o l v e d a c o n c e p t i o n of m o r a l i t y that i n c l u d e d judgements
about justice, rights, a n d freedoms.
It
i n c o r p o r a t e d private capital groups, peasants, a n d the w o r k i n g class w i t h i n a populist agenda m o b i l i z e d against state-induced injustices. O n the other h a n d , the R P P , i n c h o o s i n g to support the expression o f discontent w i t h i n the frame o f n a t i o n a l interest, a d v a n c e d a c o n c e p t i o n o f n a t i o n a l security rights defined by the state r u l i n g bureaucracy.
A c c o r d i n g to D P l e a d e r s , the secular basis o f T u r k i s h n a t i o n a l i s m w o u l d not be u n d e r m i n e d by a m o r e inclusive practice o f citizenship. T h e masses were responsible e n o u g h to enjoy t h e i r d e m o c r a t i c rights a n d freedoms w i t h o u t e n g a g i n g i n r e a c t i o n a r y m o v e m e n t s a n d rejecting the i d e o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n o f the state. K o p r u l u (1964: x x x ) d e c l a r e d : ' W e s h o u l d trust the determination
unshakable
a n d p a t r i o t i s m o f o u r people. T h e i r n a t i o n a l a n d
political
comprehension is greater t h a n that o f those w h o c l a i m to p r o v i d e t h e m w i t h guardianship".
C u l t u r a l r i g h t s a n d f r e e d o m s : I s l a m w i t h i n a s e c u l a r state
F o r the D P , I s l a m was a n i m p o r t a n t element o f p e r i p h e r a l folk culture, capable o f sustaining the s e n t i m e n t o f b e l o n g i n g to a n a t i o n a l society. H o w e v e r ,
T h e s i n g l e - p a r t y era d i v i d e d relations between the i n d i v i d u a l a n d the state i n a h i e r a r c h i c a l m a n n e r . It was essentially a d i v i s i o n between the m u c h larger p o p u l a t i o n o f the masses a n d a r u l i n g b u r e a u c r a t i c elite. T h e R P P v i e w e d the cultures o f r u r a l populations, the peasantry, the w o r k i n g class, a n d private capital groups as l a c k i n g the K e m a l i s t prerequisites for state-making. K e m a l i s t bureaucrats believed these groups h a d not a c q u i r e d the norms a n d practices r e q u i r e d for the secularization a n d westernization p r o g r a m m e o f K e m a l i s r n . Since they were seen as m a i n t a i n i n g beliefs a n d b e h a v i o u r s consistent w i t h I s l a m i c t r a d i t i o n , these groups and their cultures were thought to be a source o f r e a c t i o n a r y p o l i t i c a l activity. I n short, their ' b a c k w a r d n e s s ' was d e t r i m e n t a l to Turkey's westernization project. O n this basis, K e m a l i s r n justified their exclusion
I s l a m was suppressed b y the d o m i n a n c e o f the s e c u l a r i z i n g ' h i g h c u l t u r e ' oi state-ruling u r b a n b u r e a u c r a t s .
T h e D P a r g u e d that the h i g h culture o f the
r u l i n g elite h a d no relevance to the daily life experience o f the people, w h i l e the social norms a n d p r a c t i c e s o f I s l a m represented s o m e t h i n g very real i n t h e i r lives. T h e R P P was b u r d e n e d b y the social h i e r a r c h y a n d a u t h o r i t y relations o f the single-party system. T h e y r u l e d w i t h o u t the support o f the p e o p l e . H o w e v e r , the D P was able to spread w i d e l y a m o n g r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n s a n d s m a l l producers i n u r b a n areas by c r e a t i n g
a p o l i t i c a l framework
that tolerated
religious
experience. T h i s p r o v i d e d the D P w i t h a c u l t u r a l basis for s h a p i n g o p p o s i t i o n against the R P P ( M a r d i n 1957V Nevertheless, the D P ' s p r o m o t i o n o i ' r i g h t s a n d freedoms r e m a i n e d c o n n e c t e d to the secular practices and c u l t u r a l ethos o f
72
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D
DEMOCRACY
T H E ISLAMIST SEARCH FOR SELFHOOD
73
K e m a l i s m . I n other words, the D P was reshaping p e r i p h e r a l folk culture w i t h i n
o f foreign c u r r e n c y for p i l g r i m a g e s to M e c c a , the restoration, i n F e b r u a r y 1949,
the context o f the K e m a l i s t state-making project.
of religious i n s t r u c t i o n for p r i m a r y school students i n their fourth a n d fifth y e a r
T h e religiously oriented conservative faction of the R P P also r e a l i z e d
of education, the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f imani-hatip t r a i n i n g courses for a p e r i o d o f three
r e l i g i o n was a n i m p o r t a n t element o f p e r i p h e r a l folk culture. I n this regard,
years by the m i n i s t r y o f e d u c a t i o n , a n d , the o p e n i n g o f the F a c u l t y o f T h e o l o g y
b o t h the D P a n d religious conservatives developed a sensitivity towards I s l a m
at A n k a r a U n i v e r s i t y i n J a n u a r y 1949 ( A l b a y r a k 1991: 258-73).
that helped to promote feelings o f c u l t u r a l belonging. T h i s strengthened
the
T h e D P c a m e to p o w e r i n the election o f M a y 1950, w i n n i n g a 53.4
n a t i o n a l consciousness o f the younger generation i n a w a y that the oppressive
p e r cent share o f the vote a n d 4 0 8 seats against the R P P ' s 6 9 . T h e y strove
state actions o f police, the m i l i t a r y , a n d the courts c o u l d not (Vatan .Newspaper,
to generate intense feelings o f c u l t u r a l b e l o n g i n g i n the p o p u l a t i o n , a n d also
25 D e c e m b e r 1946). T a n r i o v e r , the most i n f l u e n t i a l p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n w i t h i n
expressed a n i n t e n t i o n to c o n n e c t the people to the state more f i r m l y t h a n ever.
the conservative faction o f the R P P , stated that r e l i g i o n w o u l d provide g o o d
T h i s was a c t u a l l y a n attempt t o complete the n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n process that h a d
p r o t e c t i o n f r o m the spread o f c o m m u n i s m a n d other ' d i v i s i v e ' foreign ideologies.
been initiated by M u s t a f a K e m a l . T h e D P a i m e d to integrate l o c a l p o p u l a r
Together w i t h other members o f the conservative faction, T a n r i o v e r d e m a n d e d
cultures into the secular p o l i t i c a l state. T h e i n c l u s i o n o f religious courses i n
a change i n state ideology that w o u l d reflect a synthesis between Islam a n d
f o r m a l secular e d u c a t i o n was t h e first step taken i n that d i r e c t i o n .
T u r k i s h n a t i o n a l i s m (Jaschke 1972: 8 3 - 1 0 0 ) . A l t h o u g h such a p l a t f o r m appealed
I n a d d i t i o n to l i f t i n g the b a n o n the recitation o f the c a l l to p r a y e r i n to p o p u l a r resentment o f secular
A r a b i c a n d p e r m i t t i n g the r e a d i n g o f the K o r a n over state r a d i o , efforts were
reforms, it d i d not constitute a n Islamist reaction to the secular foundations o f
made to increase the n u m b e r o f mosques a n d broaden the scope o f religious
the state. A c c o r d i n g to M e e k e r (2002: 337), p e r i p h e r a l c u l t u r a l practices were
education. D u r i n g the 1950/1 a c a d e m i c year, elective courses o n r e l i g i o n , w h i c h
elements o f the o l d state-society relations to be p l a c e d w i t h i n the new state
the. R P P g o v e r n m e n t h a d i n t r o d u c e d i n 1949, were i n c l u d e d i n the r e g u l a r
structure. L e a d i n g i n d i v i d u a l s arid p o w e r f u l families o f the p e r i p h e r y were
p r i m a r y school c u r r i c u l u m for a l l students.
merely interested i n r e p o s i t i o n i n g themselves i n the state a n d economy. F o r
T h e r e was a significant i n c r e a s e i n the n u m b e r o f imam-haiip schools as
t h e m , a n I s l a m i c p o l i t i c a l agenda was no m o r e a p p e a l i n g t h a n leftist politics.
w e l l . T h e M i n i s t r y o f E d u c a t i o n opened seven m i d d l e - l e v e l a n d lycee-level
T h i s was evident i n the electoral failure o f the N a t i o n P a r t y w h i c h tried to a l i g n
imam-hatip schools between 1951 a n d 1952. B y 1958, there were 18, w i t h 2,476
religious issues and opposition politics.
students. M o s t students i n these schools were f r o m the families o f u r b a n a n d
T h e conservative faction o f the R P P believed that s e c u l a r i s m as practised during
the
single-party
era
was
anti-democratic.
It
c l a i m e d that
'true'
r u r a l small-producers ( G o k c e et a l 1984: 123). A l s o o f note, i n 1959 the first H i g h e r I s l a m i c Institution was i n t r o d u c e d .
secularism h a d never been practised i n T u r k e y . B u r e a u c r a t i c cadres violated the
I n a d d i t i o n , the D P i n c r e a s e d the budget o f the D i r e c t o r a t e o f R e l i g i o u s
freedom o f conscience o f the M u s l i m majority i n the n a m e o f secularism a n d
Affairs from a p p r o x i m a t e l y 3 m i l l i o n T u r k i s h l i r a i n 1950 to a p p r o x i m a t e l y
then used this as a means to keep people u n d e r their c o n t r o l . T h i s was c o n t r a r y
40 m i l l i o n l i r a i n 1960. B e t w e e n 1950 a n d 1960, the years i n w h i c h the D P
to the very idea o f secularism a n d to d e m o c r a c y as w e l l (Basgil 1962: 145-50).
r u l e d , 15,000 new mosques w e r e b u i l t . B e t w e e n 1951 a n d 1954, a total o f 616
U s i n g a s i m i l a r rationale, the D P p r o p o s e d a n end to the p r o h i b i t i o n o n the
mosques a n d h i s t o r i c a l shrines w e r e r e p a i r e d . M o r e t h a n 5.5 m i l l i o n T u r k i s h
c a l l to prayer a n d the r e a d i n g o f the K o r a n i n A r a b i c . T h e D P believed these
l i r a were allotted to the D i r e c t o r a t e - G e n e r a l o f P i o u s F o u n d a t i o n s for the r e p a i r
prohibitions prevented people from w o r s h i p p i n g as they w i s h e d a n d therefore
of mosques a n d shrines ( T o p r a k 1981: 80-1).
violated their freedom to act a c c o r d i n g to their conscience ( T u n a y a 1962: 226).
A l t h o u g h the changes u n d e r t a k e n by the D P h a d a l r e a d y been i n i t i a t e d
T h e R P P followed suit. A t the R . P P Seventh P a r t y Congress i n 1947,
by the former R P P g o v e r n m e n t , the D P ' s most significant c o n t r i b u t i o n was to
I n o n u stated: ' W e have to take n a t i o n a l realities into account. W e have to be
create a tolerant p o l i t i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t for religious e d u c a t i o n ( R e e d 1954: 281).
responsive to the m o r a l needs o f the n a t i o n a n d relieve the people from a feeling
T h e D P government e n a b l e d I s l a m to be taught i n a w a y that w o u l d a l l o w the
o f b e i n g neglected by the g o v e r n m e n t ' ( B a r u t c u 1977: 326-7). A s a result, the
state to extend its r u r a l i n f l u e n c e , p r o v i d e d I s l a m i c institutions r e m a i n e d w i t h i n
Seventh P a r t y Congress a m e n d e d the m e a n i n g o f s e c u l a r i s m to include a clause
the state structure ( D o d d 1979: 76). T h e p r o g r a m m e o f r e l i g i o u s education
o n respect for religion. R e l i g i o u s expression was n o w a matter o f personal
forged a l i n k between r e l i g i o n a n d the state by offering a blend o f I s l a m i c a n d
conscience. T h e R P P also undertook to protect worshippers from p o l i t i c a l
secular courses. T h e state m a i n t a i n e d strict c o n t r o l over a l l religious e d u c a t i o n .
threats a n d interference (Jaschke 1972: 8 5 ~ 6 , 9 8 , 100). F o i l o w i n g this congress.
Students w h o became p r a y e r l e a d e r s a n d preachers were e m p l o y e d exclusively
R P P governments initiated a n u m b e r o f changes. T h e s e i n c l u d e d the a l l o c a t i o n
by the state.
74
T H E ISLAMIST S E A R C H FOR S E L F H O O D
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
75
school levels was seen as a d i r e c t threat to s e c u l a r i s m . H e also argued that
I s l a m i s t m o o r i n g s a n d the s e l f
a n I s l a m i c dress code was better suited to the d i g n i t y a n d modesty o f M u s l i m T h e specific h i s t o r i c a l conjuncture o f the C o l d W a r not o n l y u n d e r m i n e d the
w o m e n t h a n i m p o r t e d W e s t e r n fashion. In his c o u r t defence S a i d N u r s i asked
single-party p o l i t i c a l system, it also m a d e it possible to envision different ways
the p r o s e c u t i o n whether it was necessary for w o m e n to expose their bodies a n d
of t h i n k i n g about m o r a l i t y . A m u l t i - p a r t y system p r o v i d e d the requisite p o l i t i c a l
for c h i l d r e n to grow up i g n o r a n t of r e l i g i o n i n order to preserve the state. I f the
space for the
answer was yes, then d i d s u c h a state deserve preservation? H e declared that
a r t i c u l a t i o n o f contested
projects. F r e y offers
an
interesting
metaphor to suggest that the rise o f Islamic politics was also a distinct possibility
the t r i a l was a n i n d i c a t i o n o f h o w s e c u l a r i s m was being used to mask h o s t i l i t y
i n the expression of contentious politics. '(One) m i g h t merely propose that the l i d
towards r e l i g i o n ( A l g a r 1979: 323). S a i d N u r s i was acquitted, but he was also
w h i c h h a d been put o n the pot was lifted at this time a n d that some people were
forced
surprised a n d a l a r m e d to see c e r t a i n parts o f the stew still b u b b l i n g ' (Frey 1964:
on the p u b l i c a t i o n a n d d i s t r i b u t i o n o f his w o r k , collected under the title o f the
to take up residence i n E m i r d a g i n western A n a t o l i a . A b a n c o n t i n u e d
223), A c c o r d i n g to F r e y , the stew's ingredients were I s l a m i c c u l t u r a l practices
Risale-I Nur. Possession o f the c o l l e c t i o n w a s a n offence u n t i l 1965 because it
a n d social arrangements, a n d the bubbles were the religious orders a n d Islamist
was w r i t t e n i n A r a b i c script. D u r i n g this t i m e , its d i s t r i b u t i o n was restricted to
intellectuals w h o s u r v i v e d state repression, w o r k i n g u n d e r g r o u n d
h a n d w r i t t e n and m i m e o g r a p h e d copies ( A l g a r 1979: 323; M a r d i n 1989: 1011
outside o f
After 1956 it was possible to d i s t r i b u t e the Risale-I M/r o n a w i d e r scale than cver
state c o n t r o l . T h e Sufi orders, w h i c h h a d gone u n d e r g r o u n d after the suppression o f the S h e i k h S a i d R e v o l t o f 1925, experienced significant g r o w t h from 1950 to
before. D r . T a h s m T o l a , a follower o f Said N u r s i a n d a p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n for the D P , m a n a g e d to lift the b a n o n p r i n t i n g the b o o k i n L a t i n script.
1960. W h i l e the D P was i n power, there was also a n increase i n the n u m b e r o f
B o t h the R P P a n d D P governments h e l p e d shape a n emergent politics o f
private K o r a n schools a n d organizations formed to oversee the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f
discontent. I n the process, p u b l i c politics b e c a m e more inclusive, largely due
new mosques ( R o b i n s o n 1971). T h e n u m b e r of private o r g a n i z a t i o n s established
to the m u l t i - p a r t y system i n i t i a t e d at the b e g i n n i n g o f the C o l d W a r . A r a n g e
by the religious orders increased f r o m 95 i n 1949 to 251 i n 1951, r e a c h i n g
o f i d e o l o g i c a l positions g r e w o u t o f this m o r e m a t u r e p o l i t i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t ,
5,104 by 1960. T h e r a t i o o f private religious organizations to a l l other private
i n c l u d i n g a desire o n the p a r t o f Islamists to be m o o r e d to a n Islamic m o r a l -
organizations i n c r e a s e d f r o m 5.5 per cent i n 1949 to 10 p e r cent i n 1951, a n d to
s p i r i t u a l f o u n d a t i o n . Islamists sought a p l a c e i n society w i t h secure rights,
29.7 per cent by 1960 (Yucekok 1971: 133}. T h i s g r o w t h was p a r t l y a result o f
freedoms, a n d principles o f j u s t i c e . T h e y were also searching for a discourse
the D P ' s tolerance for religious orders. I n return, S a i d N u r s i a n d his followers
d r a w n from their daily social lives that w o u l d engender feelings o f m e a n i n g f u l
supported the D P i n the 1954 a n d 1957 elections.
attachment a n d b e l o n g i n g — f e e l i n g s not generated by K e m a l i s m .
A l t h o u g h S a i d N u r s i h a d i n the past described M e n d e r e s as The c h a m p i o n of I s l a m ' ( K i s a k u r e k
1990:
148-;)1), M e n d e r e s , w h o was p r i m e
minister
T h e quest for a u n i q u e l y I s l a m i c m o r a l outlook has roots g o i n g b a c k to the b e g i n n i n g o f the O t t o m a n accession to W e s t e r n m o d e r n i t y i n the nineteenth
f r o m 1950 to 1960, was not about to p e r m i t the rise o f a n y t h i n g r e s e m b l i n g
century -
a n i s l a m i c c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n against
a p e r i o d that s t i m u l a t e d c u l t u r a l d u a l i s m i n intellectual a c t i v i t y
1951
between secularists a n d Islamists ( B u l a c 1983). I n contrast to the secularist
the D P passed a l a w ( P L 5816) m a k i n g it a c r i m e to attack the p e r s o n a l i t y o f
wholesale a d o p t i o n o f W e s t e r n c u l t u r a l values, Islamists advocated the a d o p t i o n
A t a t u r k a n d A t a t u r l r i s m ( m e a n i n g M u s t a f a K e m a l a n d K e m a l i s m respectively)
o f W e s t e r n science a n d t e c h n o l o g y but not its culture. F o r them, W e s t e r n c u l t u r a l
( T a r h a n ) i 1993: 28). O n the basis o f this law. m e m b e r s o f the T i c a n i order were
practices a n d social a r r a n g e m e n t s were e m b e d d e d
h a n d e d severe j a i l sentences. P i l a v o g l u , the sheikh o f the order, was sentenced
of m e a n i n g , p e r c e p t i o n , and
secular K e m a l i s t p r i n c i p l e s . I n
i n an integrated
system
ontology. T h e K e m a l i s t practice of e m u l a t i n g
to 15 years' i m p r i s o n m e n t a n d e x i l e d to an A e g e a n i s l a n d for the rest o f his
W e s t e r n ways i g n o r e d the t r u e n a t u r e o f c u l t u r a l experience, a c c o r d i n g to
life ( T u n a y a 1962: 231). N e c i p F a z i l K i s a k u r e k , a n I s l a m i c i n t e l l e c t u a l , was
Islamists w h o v i e w e d culture as a unified w h o l e . Islamists e x a m i n e d the n o t i o n
i m p r i s o n e d for n i n e m o n t h s because o f a n article he p u b l i s h e d i n the
o f m o d e r n i t y by insisting o n t h e n e e d to fully explore its c o n c e p t u a l content.
BuyukDogu
(Great East) p e r i o d i c a l that was deemed offensive to s e c u l a r i s m . S a i d N u r s i , w h o h a d been accused m a n y times o f e s t a b l i s h i n g a p o l i t i c a l l y m o t i v a t e d secret religious order ( A l g a r 1979; M a r d i n
1989), was arrested i n
1952 for the f o u r t h t i m e . T h e charges against h i m were based o n the p u b l i c a t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n o f a section o f the RisakT
Mir entitled ' G u i d e for Youth* ( A l g a r
1979: 321-3). H i s support for women's v e i l i n g a n d religious i n s t r u c t i o n at a l l
For t h e m , a n a t i o n that t u r n e d its b a c k o n its o w n culture c o u l d o n l y reproduce a rootless i m i t a t i o n . O f utmost i m p o r t a n c e was the need to c h a r t a p a t h based on a w o r l d - v i e w e m b e d d e d i n day-to-day c u l t u r a l m e a n i n g s . T h i s p a t h h a d to be consistent w i t h the m o r a l l y i n s p i r e d rights a n d freedoms r e q u i r e d to counter the d o m i n a n c e o f bureaucrats
a n d repression o f the periphery. A m o n g these
76
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
T H E ISLAMIST SEARCH FOR SELFHOOD
Islamists was N e c i p Faziî K i s a k u r e k (1904—83), one o f the most outstanding T u r k i s h poets.
77
T h e early p o e m s w r i t t e n by K i s a k u r e k , before his m e e t i n g w i t h S h e i k h A r v a s i , were
secularly o r i e n t e d . A m o n g
them
were
' S p i d e r W e b ' (1925),
' S i d e w a l k s ' (1928), a n d ' i a n d B e y o n d ' (1932). H i s later poetry, ' C a r a v a n to E t e r n i t y ' (1955), ' S u f f e r i n g ' (1979/1962), a n d ' M y P o e m s ' (1969) reveal his Necip F a z i l K i s a k u r e k : a n Islamist poet
Islamist orientation m o r e c l e a r l y . Suffering (die) i n p a r t i c u l a r occupies a special p l a c e i n terms o f its I s l a m i c message. I n the w o r k , K i s a k u r e k p u b l i c l y rejects a l l
K i s a k u r e k was b o r n into a h i g h l y educated family i n Istanbul, H i s father a n d grandfather were high-level bureaucrats i n the O t t o m a n j u d i c i a r y . K i s a k u r e k was
his earlier poems, b e l i e v i n g t h e m u n w o r t h y for not clearly demonstrating his attachment to G o d . I n the preface to Suffering. K i s a k u r e k (1979: 7) writes:
educated i n the O t t o m a n school system, w h i c h offered courses o n both r e l i g i o n a n d the m o d e r n sciences. A f t e r g r a d u a t i n g from the O t t o m a n N a v a l A c a d e m y (the M e k t e b T F u n u n ) , he studied literature i n P a r i s i n 1924 a n d 1925, where he enjoyed a b o h e m i a n lifestyle ( K i s a k u r e k 1978). K i s a k u r e k ' s g r a n d m o t h e r h a d already exposed h i m to F r e n c h literature d u r i n g his c h i l d h o o d . After r e t u r n i n g from P a r i s , he w o r k e d i n the Business B a n k (Is B a n k a s ı ) until 1938. Between 1938 a n d 1941 he taught literature at the F r e n c h S c h o o l ; the S c h o o l
I f I a m the o w n e r o f t h e property, It must be k n o w n that I neither w a n t t h e m nor r e c o g n i z e t h e m . I n o w t h r o w t h e m into the trash . . . T h i s [Suffering] is m y b o o k o f p o e t r y , this is a l l ; none o f the other p o e m s that I have w r i t t e n before this b o o k c a n be attributed to me, to m y n a m e , a n d m y soul.
of F i n e A r t s i n Istanbul; A n k a r a C o n s e r v a t o r i e ; the A m e r i c a n R o b e r t C o l l e g e ; a n d the F a c u l t y o f L a n g u a g e s , H i s t o r y , a n d G e o g r a p h y at A n k a r a U n i v e r s i t y .
K i s a k u r e k ' s w r i t i n g s focus o n the meaninglessness a n d emptiness o f the
K i s a k u r e k established his o w n p e r i o d i c a l , the Buyuk Dogu (Great East), where he
s e c u l a r i z a t i o n discourse i n T u r k e y . T h r o u g h his p o e t r y he urged readers to
published his essays a n d l i t e r a r y work. T h e Buyuk Dogu was shut d o w n several
create the c l i m a t e for a m e a n i n g f u l c o n n e c t i o n between self a n d society. I n
times between its f o u n d i n g i n 1943 a n d the m i l i t a r y coup o f 1971. F o r m o r e
' S u f f e r i n g ' K i s a k u r e k (1979: 14—6) writes:
t h a n a quarter o f a c e n t u r y it served as a n effective vehicle for t r a n s m i t t i n g a n I m o v e d a r o u n d for m o n t h s , shattered a n d p e r p l e x e d ,
Islamic message to a large, a n o n y m o u s audience o f readers. K i s a k u r e k was a nationalist w h o believed that i s l a m was a n indispensable element i n the s h a p i n g o f a n a t i o n a l identity. Pie assigned I s l a m a p o l i t i c a l role, a r g u i n g that it c o u l d p r o d u c e a coherent c u l t u r a l orientation a n d strengthen the
M y soul is a c a u l d r o n a n d m y intellect a l a d l e , W i t h i n ear-shot o f the v i l l a g e o f lunatics, E a c h a n d every i d e a is a p a i r o f handcuffs w i t h i n me.
emotional attachment o f i n d i v i d u a l citizens to the T u r k i s h nation-state. K i s a k u r e k formulated his I s l a m i c message against, the b a c k g r o u n d o f increased a n x i e t y over the meaninglessness o f a state-imposed secular culture i n T u r k e y ( K i s a k u r e k 1976; 1979). H e insisted that the complete m o r a l development o f a n i n d i v i d u a l r e q u i r e d a coherent c u l t u r a l orientation w i t h i n a c o m m u n i t y ,
T i m e a n d t i m e a g a i n t h e s c o r p i o n s t u n g m y soul, I m o v e d f r o m season to season i n t h a t way. I r e a l i z e d neither i n fire n o r i n the g o u g i n g o f flesh Is there a greater t o r t u r e t h a n the suffering o f the m i n d .
strong interpersonal relations, a n d adherence to a strict m o r a l code. H o w e v e r , T u r k i s h accession to W e s t e r n ways h a d b r o k e n the integrated pattern o f c u l t u r a l practices i n T u r k e y . T h i s process, w h i c h started w i t h the T a n z i m a t , reached its peak d u r i n g K e m a l i s t s e c u l a r i z a t i o n . T h e westernization project u n d e r m i n e d the e m o t i o n a l c o n n e c t i o n between the self a n d the m o r a l c o m m u n i t y , p r o d u c i n g
D i c t i o n a r y , give a n a m e to describe m e ; A n a m e that e v e r y b o d y w i l l r e c o g n i z e ! M y o l d clothes h o l d m y h a n d ; M i r r o r s tell me w h o I a m . ( M y translation)
rootlessness w i t h i n the general p o p u l a t i o n . K i s a k u r e k ' s poems reflect the sense o f c u l t u r a l d i s l o c a t i o n created b y the major social changes
experienced i n
K i s a k u r e k ' s p o e t r y expresses
the deep p a i n caused by a n absence o f
T u r k e y since the T a n z i m a t . A m e e t i n g w i t h S h e i k h A r v a s i o f the N a q s h b a n d i
c u l t u r a l b e l o n g i n g a n d the r e j e c t i o n o f I s l a m as a w a y o f life, H e writes: ' M y
religious order i n 1934 was p i v o t a l i n f o r m i n g K i s a k u r e k ' s v i e w o f c u l t u r a l
b r a i n has become the shelter o f deep a n x i e t y about the "absolute t r u t h " ...
derangement. H e identified Sheik A r v a s i as his 'saviour'. K i s a k u r e k described
M y soul is like a n a c h i n g tooth ... E v e n i f the O c e a n s were made o f i n k , i f a l l
his life before m e e t i n g A r v a s i : ' F o r the whole t h i r t y years m y w a t c h m o v e d , I
the trees constituted o n l y one p e n , they w o u l d still not suffice to express m y
stopped; U n a w a r e o f the sky, I flew m y kite' (quoted İn D o g a n 1983: 43).
suffering i n d e p t h ' (quoted i n A t a s o y 2 0 0 3 b : 68). F o r h i m , this e m o t i o n a l a n d intellectual p a i n b o r n o f the s e c u l a r i z a t i o n process was c o m m o n l y e x p e r i e n c e d
78
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
subjects.
T H E I S L A M I S T S E A R C H FOR S E L F H O O D
79
These
the
throughout T u r k e y . I n Ahsap Konak (wooden mansion), K i s a k u r e k expresses his
subordinate
feelings o f m o r a l derangement t h r o u g h the i m a g e o f a deplorable house. T h e
K e m a l i s t representation o f c u l t u r a l b e l o n g i n g , K i s a k u r e k (1976) thus locates the
subjects
view themselves
as b e i n g outside
konak is where he spent his c h i l d h o o d d u r i n g the later years o f the O t t o m a n
I s l a m i c c o n f i g u r a t i o n o f a n i n t e g r a t e d self i n the reconstitution o f society.
E m p i r e . It symbolizes the m o r a l disintegration experienced u n d e r the influence o f s o c i a l change i n T u r k e y . K i s a k u r e k writes:
S a i d N u r s i a n d the r e c o n s t i t u t i o n of s o c i e t y
E v e r y floor o f this three story Ahsap Konak is a different w o r l d :
I n a m a n n e r a k i n to t h a t o f K i s a k u r e k , S a i d N u r s i p r o m o t e d the strengthening
T o p floor: m y g r a n d m o t h e r c r y i n g w h i l e h o l d i n g prayer beats
o f i n d i v i d u a l m o r a l i t y w i t h i n a framework o f faith set out i n the K o r a n . H e
M i d d l e floor: m y m o t h e r d a n c i n g w i t h her lovers
was not interested i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a religious order but i n c u l t i v a t i n g a n I s l a m i c
D o w n s t a i r s : M y sister s c r e a m i n g at the t o m - t o m beats.
c u l t u r a l c o m m u n i t y t h r o u g h a ' r e t u r n to the K o r a n ' m o v e m e n t . H i s w r i t i n g s
L i k e the m a g g o t y cheese that I cut t h r o u g h from the m i d d l e ,
reveal a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the K o r a n w h i c h he h o p e d w o u l d serve as a guide
Please come a n d see it t h r o u g h its floors, here, m y home!
for the p e r s o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t o f his followers. S a i d N u r s i used the p r i n t m e d i a
W h a t k i n d o f a pathetic tree that is, s u r r o u n d i n g m y entire vision,
to deliver his message a n d s t r e n g t h e n the resolve o f the faithful, but he did not
its roots are honesty, its branches
w i s h his followers to focus o n h i m s e l f as The master'. H i s emphasis o n the use o f
are i m i t a t i o n , its fruits
are
p r o s t i t u t i o n (quoted i n K a b a k l i 1983: 4). ( M y translation)
p r i n t e d books for g u i d a n c e underscores the i m p o r t a n c e he gave to r e i n t e r p r e t i n g the K o r a n as a m e a n s o f
T h e Ahsap Konak illustrates a w o r l d fundamentally shaped by dissonant
finding
'solutions' to c o n t e m p o r a r y p o l i t i c a l a n d
e c o n o m i c concerns.
social context. T h e home represents a. fragmented social space a n d the cognitive
S a i d N u r s i ' s w r i t i n g s focus o n p o l i t i c a l d e m a n d s for justice, equality, a n d
emptiness i n the minds o f individuals. T h i s disorientation was created by the
freedom. T h e lack o f s o c i a l j u s t i c e a n d d e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e s he described was
forerunners o f the westernization project w h o m K i s a k u r e k called 'spurious heroes'.
s y m p t o m a t i c o f the disint e g r a t i n g m o r a l framework caused by the r e p l i c a t i o n o f
A c c o r d i n g to h i m , a l l Western-oriented intellectuals a n d rulers from the T a n z i m a t
Western ways i n a M u s l i m society. H e f i r m l y b e l i e v e d i n the c u l t u r a l - s y m b o l i c
p e r i o d of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e to present-day
opposites o f I s l a m a n d the W e s t . T h e ' i m m o r a l i t y ' he a s c r i b e d to the social
T u r k e y are spurious
heroes,
M u s t a f a K e m a l included. T h e scholastic, overly formalistic, a n d ,?Aiiri«-influenced
arrangements o f the W e s t is v e r y evident i n his w o r k . H e writes:
structure o f the Islamic educational system was also responsible for the spiritual estrangement that, a c c o r d i n g to K i s a k u r e k , l e d the religious establishment into inertia d u r i n g the Western challenge to the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . Kisakurek's writings cannot
be
classified as 'fundamentalist'
[ T h e West's] support
is founded
o n force a n d aggression; its
a i m is benefit a n d self interest; its p r i n c i p l e o f life is conflict; its any
tie between c o m m u n i t i e s is r a c i s m a n d negative n a t i o n a l i s m ; its
religious sense. R a t h e r , his w o r k reflects a desire to r e c l a i m a sense o f s p i r i t u a l
in
fruits are s t i m u l a t i o n o f the appetites o f the soul a n d i n c r e a s i n g
resonance i n the c u l t u r a l lives o f i n d i v i d u a l s . H i s goal was to create a new type
the needs o f h u m a n k i n d ... It is because o f its f o u n d i n g principles
o f self a n d a new type o f society i n the process. H e n c e , the title o f one o f his
as such that W e s t e r n c u l t u r e has negated the happiness o f h u m a n
plays is To Create a Self, a n d the title o f his manifesto w r i t t e n for y o u t h is The Web
k i n d . B e c a u s e , [it] has b r o u g h t b a d consequences for h u m a n k i n d
of Ideology (Ideolocya Orgusu).
such as wastefulness, p o v e r t y , idleness, a n d egoism, it has cast the
T h e i n c o n g r u i t y between the i n d i v i d u a l self a n d society w h i c h K i s a k u r e k understood
to be caused b y the w e s t e r n i z a t i o n project underscores
a view
great majority, some 8 0 p e r cent o f h u m a n i t y into wretchedness (quoted i n A t a s o y 2 0 0 3 b : 6 9 - 7 0 ) .
o f c o g n i t i o n that stresses a h i g h l y self-contained i n d i v i d u a l still very m u c h i n f l u e n c e d b y social context. G e o r g e H e r b e r t M e a d (1934) has suggested that the 1 a n d the M e are two interrelated aspects o f the self u n i t e d w i t h i n a n i n d i v i d u a l . S i m i l a r l y , K i s a k u r e k points to the significance o f social i n t e r a c t i o n for a complete u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the self as a n entity situated w i t h i n a broader context. T h e context i n this case is o p p o s i t i o n a l , created by the tension between the subjects o f the oppressed a n d the oppressing cadres o f the westernization Droiect. T h e a s y m m e t r i c p o w e r relations shape the cognitive reactions o f
H e b e l i e v e d that i n d i v i d u a l s s h o u l d reflect u p o n the s o c i a l structure o f the society i n w h i c h they live. H e was c o n v i n c e d that Western c u l t u r a l patterns negate principles o f s o c i a l j u s t i c e because they are e m b e d d e d i n the p e r p e t u a l creation o f social h i e r a r c h i e s o f d o m i n a t i o n .
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T H E ISLAMIST SEARCH FOR SELFHOOD
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
81
W e s t e r n c i v i l i z a t i o n as it stands today has acted c o n t r a r y to divine
P o l i t i c a l parties o f the c e n t r e - r i g h t w h i c h e m p h a s i z e d the i m p o r t a n c e o f
law. Consequently, its evils have been greater than its benefits.
religious e d u c a t i o n r e c e i v e d the support o f S a i d Nursi's followers. I n the 1950s
T h e r e a l goal o f c i v i l i z a t i o n , w h i c h should be understood as the
the D P was one o f these p a r t i e s . T h e i r i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f I s l a m i n t o the state
general well b e i n g a n d happiness o f everyone i n this w o r l d , has
educational system w a s h e l p f u l o v e r the l o n g term i n b o l s t e r i n g M u s l i m faith. I n
b e e n u n d e r m i n e d . Wastefulness
the 1960s a n d 1970s, the J u s t i c e P a r t y , w h i c h i n 1961 b e c a m e the successor to
a n d vice have
predominated
the D P , enjoyed the s u p p o r t o f t h e Mcrcu cemaaii.
over frugality a n d contentment, a n d laziness and comfort have p r e v a i l e d over w o r k a n d service. T h i s has made
humankind
S a i d N u r s i t r i e d to l i n k the idea o f an ' i n t e r n a l jihad' to an external one.
w r e t c h e d b o t h i n b o d y a n d spirit (quoted i n A t a s o y 2003b: 70).
Internal jihad involves the d e v e l o p m e n t o f a m o r a l self t h r o u g h knowledge o f the K o r a n , a n d the p r a c t i c e o f I s l a m i c m o r a l i t y i n everyday life. T h e concept
S a i d N u r s i a r g u e d that Western ways were not congruent w i t h h u m a n
o f 'external jihad'
refers
to t h e
collective struggle o f M u s l i m s against
the
happiness a n d were therefore unsustainable. T h e collapse o f W e s t e r n culture
d o m i n a t i o n o f m o r a l l y c o r r u p t values f r o m the West. F o r S a i d N u r s i , internal
was inevitable a n d w o u l d result f r o m the a w a k e n i n g o f h u m a n k i n d a n d the
a n d external jihads were i n t e r r e l a t e d ; both were essential for the integration o f
r e a l i z a t i o n that a n alternative c u l t u r a l g r o u n d c o u l d be created t h r o u g h I s l a m
self a n d society. Interestingly, it seems that S a i d N u r s i d e v e l o p e d his v i e w of the
(Said N u r s i 1990a). H e held f i r m l y to his b e l i e f that I s l a m should be the central
social at the same t i m e t h a t he c a m e to appreciate the i m p o r t a n c e o f reversing
element o f a c u l t u r a l framework for e n h a n c i n g social justice a n d democracy.
Turkey's p e r i p h e r a l l o c a t i o n w i t h i n the capitalist w o r l d e c o n o m y .
H e identified westernization as the c h i e f source o f injustice a n d m o r a l decay i n
Although
Said N u r s i was
o p p o s e d to the w e s t e r n i z a t i o n project,
he
society a n d b e l i e v e d that the p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f conspicuous c o n s u m p t i o n was clear
was unable to e x p l a i n the h i g h - l e v e l o f i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n a c h i e v e d by western
evidence o f h u m a n i t y ' s regression. H e states:
E u r o p e a n states a n d the U n i t e d States w i t h o u t reference to c u l t u r e as b e i n g constitutive o f the e c o n o m y . I n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h the m o d e r n i s t I s l a m i c v i e w that
W h i l e i n the p r i m i t i v e state o f n o m a d i s m , people needed o n l y
developed i n I n d i a a n d E g y p t ( M o a d d e l 2001: C o o p e r et a l 2 0 0 0 ) , S a i d N u r s i
three or four things. A n d those w h o c o u l d not o b t a i n these three
tried to show the c o n g r u i t y o f I s l a m w i t h rationalist t h i n k i n g a n d m o d e r n science.
or four things were t w o out o f t e n . T h e present t y r a n n i c a l Western
H e argued that the K o r a n reveals the laws o f nature as the w o r k o f G o d , a n d
c i v i l i z a t i o n has encouraged c o n s u m p t i o n , abuse a n d wastefulness.
that their d i s c o v e r y is to be m a d e t h r o u g h a rationalist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . For S a i d
Ceaseless
essentials.
N u r s i , then, W e s t e r n progress i d e o l o g y , formal r a t i o n a l i t y , and faith i n m o d e r n
T h i s s o - c a l l e d c i v i l i z e d person is n o w i n need o f twenty things
science a n d t e c h n o l o g y were n o t o n l y acceptable but i n complete c o n f o r m i t y
instead o f four. Yet he c a n o n l y o b t a i n t w o o f these twenty. H e
w i t h the K o r a n . T h e task for M u s l i m s was to g a i n scientific k n o w l e d g e b y u s i n g
still needs eighteen. Therefore, W e s t e r n c i v i l i z a t i o n impoverishes
the sole authority o f the K o r a n , a n d to then l i n k that k n o w l e d g e to, amongst
h u m a n k i n d (quoted i n A t a s o y 2 0 0 3 b : 70),
other things, the r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the economy. I n short, S a i d N u r s i sought to
appetites
have
made
nonessentials
into
realize his v i s i o n o f 'progress' t h r o u g h the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f I s l a m i c p r i n c i p l e s . I n this b i n a r y view o f I s l a m a n d the West, m o r a l i t y appears as
the
f u n d a m e n t a l source o f c u l t u r a l conflict. T o counter the m o r a l hegemony o f W e s t e r n culture o n the self, S a i d N u r s i p r o p o s e d the reconstitution o f M u s l i m society. T h i s c o u l d o n l y be a c h i e v e d by c u l t i v a t i n g i n d i v i d u a l faith t h r o u g h the
first
prerequisite for r e a l i z i n g social justice i n a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y . T h e establishment
in
order to counter the K e m a l i s t v i e w that westernization was the route to scientific advancement. S o m e w h a t r e m i n i s c e n t o f W e b e r (1971), S a i d N u r s i assumed that a n existing c u l t u r a l o p e n i n g w a s necessary for the d e v e l o p m e n t o f i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l i s m . U n l i k e W e b e r , h o w e v e r , he believed that I s l a m represented
r e a d i n g o f the K o r a n a n d interpretative w r i t i n g s such as the Risale-1' Nur. A c c o r d i n g to S a i d N u r s i , faith at the i n d i v i d u a l level was the
H e offered a rationalist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the K o r a n t h r o u g h the RisaleTNur
just
such an o p e n i n g for the c u l t i v a t i o n o f r a t i o n a l thought a n d g r o w t h o f m o d e r n scientific technology.
oisharia l a w was the second r e q u i r e m e n t for reconstituting I s l a m as a w a y o f life. T h e t h i r d requirement was the u n i f i c a t i o n o f a l l M u s l i m s against the ' m o r a l regression' o f the West. T h i s final r e q u i r e m e n t referred to the global integration
The Naqshbandi order
of M u s l i m s as a cemaat (ummak) b e y o n d the t e r r i t o r i a l limits o f nation-states. H o w e v e r , unless the first task o f strengthening faith was successfully completed, the second a n d t h i r d tasks c o u l d not be u n d e r t a k e n .
After the a b o l i t i o n o f religious o r d e r s i n 1925, N a q s h b a n d i sheikhs were unable to revive t h e m , i t was o n l y i n the 1930s that S h e i k h A b d u l h a k i m A r v a s i emerged
82
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
83
T H E ISLAMIST S E A R C H FOR S E L F H O O D
as a successor w o r t h y o f the great O t t o m a n N a q s h b a n d i S h e i k h G u m u s h a n e v i ,
w i t h S a i d N u r s i , K o t k u d i s p l a y e d a modernist Islamist stand i n regard
A l t h o u g h A r v a s i was h i g h l y influential a m o n g his followers, the N a q s h b a n d i
t e c h n o l o g i c a l progress.
o r d e r e x p e r i e n c e d a break from active p o l i t i c a l engagement between 1925 a n d
K o t k u also b e l i e v e d t h a t a devout M u s l i m
should develop a n
to
active
1950. W h e n the h a r s h secular measures o f the single-party era were moderated
interest i n n a t i o n a l p r o b l e m s a n d assist i n the i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n o f the c o u n t r y .
by D P rule between 1950 a n d 1960, the N a q s h b a n d i order, along w i t h the Murcu
F o r e x a m p l e , he e n c o u r a g e d P r o f e s s o r N e c m e t t i n E r b a k a n to design a m o d e l
cemaati, b e c a m e m o r e assertive i n the shaping o f a n Islamist a g e n d a i n Turkey.
i n d u s t r i a l p l a n t a n d establish it o n a n a t i o n a l level ( M a r d i n 1991: 134). N a t i o n a l
T h e r e are h u n d r e d s o f branches o f the N a q s h b a n d i order throughout the
i n d u s t r i a l development w a s necessary to counter p e r i p h e r a l i z a t i o n , w h i c h K o t k u
w o r l d . A l t h o u g h some are loosely connected, there is no o v e r a r c h i n g structure
(1984a) referred to as ' c o l o n i a l status'—something
of global N a q s h b a n d i governance
since the T a n z i r n a t era. K o t k u ' s followers, w h o w o r k e d i n the State P l a n n i n g
or 'supreme" leadership. M o s t
operate independently. A m o n g the hundreds
o f m i n o r branches,
branches there
are
O r g a n i z a t i o n d u r i n g the
1960s a n d
Turkey h a d
experienced
1970s, devised heavy i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n
three major strands o f the N a q s h b a n d i i n Turkey. T h e s e evolved d u r i n g the
strategies for T u r k e y . I n the 1980s a n d 1990s K o t k u ' s enthusiastic support for
1950s after the death o f A r v a s i . A n i m p o r t a n t b r a n c h o f the N a q s h b a n d i that
t e c h n o l o g i c a l development was t a k e n up by his successor, Professor C o s a n , f r o m
followed the G u m u s h a n e v i l i n e was founded by M e h m e t Z a h i d K o t k u , who
the F a c u l t y o f T h e o l o g y at A n k a r a U n i v e r s i t y .
b e c a m e the s h e i k h o f the order i n 1952. A n o t h e r strand o f the N a q s h a n d i
K o t k u ' s v i e w o f n a t i o n a l i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n stressed I s l a m i c a l l y defined
emerged f r o m the followers o f two sheiks: A r v a s i (1865-1943) a n d S u l e y m a n
c o n s u m p t i o n n o r m s . I s l a m i c e d u c a t i o n , he reasoned, especially for the y o u n g e r
H i l m i T u n a h a n (1888-1959), T h i s strand was founded i n the 1940s a n d k n o w n
generation, must be sensitive t o the i m p o r t a n c e o f teaching students to a v o i d
as the Suleymancilar, after its founder S u l e y m a n H i l m i T u n a h a n . K e m a l K a c a r ,
Western c o n s u m e r goods, p a r t i c u l a r l y food a n d c l o t h i n g . It is significant t h a t
T u n a h a n ' s son-in-law, is the current leader o f the Suleymancilar. T h e
hikcilar
Islamist industrialists a n d c o m m e r c i a l groups o f the 1980s a n d 1990s adopted
constitute the t h i r d s t r a n d o f the N a q s h b a n d i . It was n a m e d after its founder,
K o t k u ' s idea o f l i n k i n g i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n to a n I s l a m i c lifestyle. T o d a y i n
Sheik H u s e y i n H i l m i Isik, a follower of S h e i k h A r v a s i . The. current leader of the
Turkey, Islamist capitalists are m a k i n g c u l t u r a l c l a i m s by d i s t i n g u i s h i n g their
hikcilar is E n v e r O r e n , Isik s son-in-law.
products from those that reflect the p r e v a i l i n g c o n s u m p t i o n norms e m b e d d e d i n
M e l i m e n t Z a h i d K o t k u became the N a q s h b a n d i sheikh while he was the imam
a W e s t e r n lifestyle ( N a v a r o - Y a s h i n 2002). A s w i l l be seen i n later chapters, these
of the U m m u g u l s u m M o s q u e i n Istanbul. H e was appointed to the position by the
c a p i t a l groups are s t r u g g l i n g t o r e p o s i t i o n themselves i n the h i g h l y competitive
Directorate o f Religious Affairs. I n 1958 he was transferred to the Iskenderpasha
relations o f a capitalist m a r k e t e c o n o m y . In this struggle they appeal to I s l a m i c
M o s q u e i n Istanbul a n d worked there as a state employee until his death i n
c u l t u r a l standards a n d p r a c t i c e s to create I s l a m i c a l l y defined c o n s u m p t i o n
1980. T h e mosque where he h a d officially worked as a prayer leader became the
patterns for devout M u s l i m s .
N a q s h b a n d i centre for his teachings ( M a r d i n 1991). K o t k u became what one might 1
T h e Suleymancilar b r a n c h o f the N a q s h b a n d i order focuses on religious
call a 'grand sheikh i n Turkey. H e emphasized the role o f sohbet (oral teaching)
education. T h e founder o f the b r a n c h , S u l e y m a n H i l m i T u n a h a n , was educated
i n b u i l d i n g an Islamic society from small-scale community-based networks. H i s
i n the S u l c y m a n i y e T h e o l o g i c a l S c h o o l , a n d w o r k e d as a preacher i n I s t a n b u l
followers, who strove to embody Islamic principles, were students, university
i n the earlv 1920s. D u r i n g the 1930s he quit his w o r k as a preacher a n d b e g a n
professors, educated professionals, and members of the bureaucracy. A m o n g those
to offer private i n s t r u c i i o n on the K o r a n at his f a r m . A l t h o u g h K o r a n schools
i n his inner circle were Professor N e c m e t t i n E r b a k a n , who later became leader o f
were outlawed, T u n a h a n c o n t i n u e d to operate them i n a l l k i n d s o f places,
the p r o - I s l a m i t party a n d p r i m e minister o f Turkey; T u r g u t O z a l , former prime
i n c l u d i n g shops a n d barns. H e t o o k it upon h i m s e l f to b u i l d a network o f K o r a n
minister a n d president of Turkey; and K o r k u t O z a l , H a s a n Aksay, and F e h m i A d a k ,
schools throughout T u r k e y . H i s followers c o n t i n u e to extend the network i n
ministers o f various coalition governments d u r i n g the 1970s.
T u r k e y a n d a b r o a d , p a r t i c u l a r l y for T u r k i s h m i g r a n t s l i v i n g i n G e r m a n y T h e s e
S h e i k h K o t k u encouraged his followers to take advantage o f the moderate
schools oppose the state-led r e l i g i o u s education found i n imam-hatip
schools.
ideological c l i m a t e u n d e r a m u l t i - p a r t y r e g i m e . H e r a l l i e d his supporters to
T h e Suleymancilar believe that imam-hatip
p r o m o t e I s l a m i c education a n d establish K o r a n schools i n T u r k e y , b e l i e v i n g
m i n d s o f the y o u n g e r g e n e r a t i o n , thereby p r o v i d i n g a n abridged a n d 'subverted'
that both
version o f I s l a m . Despite t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n to s e c u l a r i s m , the Suleymancilar have
were
essential for strengthening
I s l a m i c faith. H e also showed
r e m a r k a b l e success i n f o l l o w i n g the ' e c o n o m i c development' discourse o f secular intellectuals. F a i t h , a c c o r d i n g to K o t k u , needed to be h e l d i n t a n d e m w i t h a c u l t u r a l openness to rational thought
a n d scientific i n n o v a t i o n . Consistent
schools are designed to secularize the
supported centre-right p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s since the 1950s. T h e hikcilar
b r a n c h o f the N a q s h b a n d i order opposes s e c u l a r i s m a n d
I s l a m i c m o d e r n i s m . It. hopes to restore the works o f classical scholars o n S u n n i
84
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
I s l a m to a p o s i t i o n o f unquestioned authority (Algar 1983). Followers o f the Isikcilar adhere strictly to S u n n i beliefs a n d oppose any reform o f I s l a m . T h i s
4
group is c u r r e n t l y c o m p o s e d o f some o f the wealthiest Islamist business groups, i n c l u d i n g the Ihlas H o l d i n g C o . established by E n v e r O r e n . T h e p o l i t i c a l l i b e r a l i z a t i o n experienced i n T u r k e y after 1945 opened up
The Cold Wax" and the Creation of a National Bourgeoisie
a p o l i t i c a l space for the emergence o f intellectual a c t i v i t y from writers such as N e c i p F a z i l K i s a k u r e k , movements like the Risale-I JVur, a n d religious orders such as the N a q s h b a n d i . T h e r e also emerged a n I s l a m i c p o l i t i c a l agenda that was supportive o f W e s t e r n progress ideology a n d w o r k e d to strengthen Islamic faith a m o n g M u s l i m s . A n overview o f the history o f the Islamist agenda helps to e x p l a i n w h y i s l a m b e c a m e a salient p o l i t i c a l s y m b o l i n the 1970s. A s the development strategies o f the p e r i o d generated new sources o f conflict, concerns over rights, freedom, a n d justice b e c a m e closely tied to I s l a m .
A
lthough the
post-war
era
has
generally been
seen
as a p e r i o d o f
divergence f r o m the K e m a l i s t trajectory o f state-led e c o n o m i c g r o w t h , it was a c t u a l l y p a r t
o f a single h i s t o r i c a l development
of T u r k i s h
accession to W e s t e r n ways set o u t by the T a n z i m a t . T h e p r o g r a m m e established i n T u r k e y d u r i n g the G r e a t D e p r e s s i o n to b u i l d a n a t i o n a l e c o n o m y a n d create a n a t i o n a l bourgeoisie a c c e l e r a t e d i n the C o l d W a r p o l i t i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t o f the w o r l d economy. I n effect the C o l d W a r presented new opportunities
for
f u r t h e r i n g the i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n process that h a d b e g u n i n the 1930s, T h e p o l i c y debate o f the post-war years a l t e r n a t e d between the l i b e r a l market
economy
a n d state-led g r o w t h m o d e l s , b u t the positions converged a r o u n d the T n i x e d e c o n o m y ' i n r e g a r d to state r e g u l a t i o n o f the n a t i o n a l economy. T h e m i x e d e c o n o m y c o m b i n e d the m a r k e t p r i n c i p l e w i t h state intervention i n such a w a y that these t w o seemingly d i s p a r a t e models were compatible. I n contrast to the statist trajectory o f K e m a l i s m w h i c h e m b r a c e d the collapse o f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l economy, post-war state i n t e r v e n t i o n integrated domestic p r o g r a m m e s into the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l system a r o u n d the C o l d W a r , thus k e e p i n g open the r o a d to w e s t e r n i z a t i o n . In
relation to p o l i t i c a l
support,
the
c o n n e c t i o n between
the
mixed
e c o n o m y m o d e l a n d the p o l i t i c a l f o r m u l a chosen to a c c o m m o d a t e the m o d e l was r i d d l e d w i t h tension. A n analysis o f the twists a n d turns o f Turkey's i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n p o l i c y helps e x p l a i n the shift i n the p o l i t i c a l response to the effects o f the w o r l d e c o n o m y o n the inequalities that emerged d u r i n g the p e r i o d . T w o parties d o m i n a t e d : the R e p u b l i c a n People's P a r t y ( R P P ) , i n power f r o m 1961 to 1965, a n d the J u s t i c e P a r t y (JP), w h i c h rose to p o w e r i n the 1965 general election. T h e J P r u l e d T u r k e y e i t h e r alone o r i n c o a l i t i o n for most o f the 1970s. T u r k i s h d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t w i t h t h e U n i t e d States over the C u b a n - T u r k i s h missile crisis a n d C y p r u s l e d b o t h p a r t i e s to a d o p t a stronger nationalist stance a n d to follow a p o l i c y o f p a r t i a l d i s e n g a g e m e n t f r o m U S C o l d W a r politics. T h e r e was great d e m a n d for a ' n a t i o n a l a p p r o a c h ' to the constraints o f the C o l d W a r w o r l d e c o n o m y o n specific g o v e r n m e n t a l policies. For example, T u r k e y p u r s u e d a foreign p o l i c y agenda that i n c l u d e d closer ties w i t h the E u r o p e a n E c o n o m i c C o m m u n i t y , i t was b e l i e v e d t h a t s u c h a p o l i c y c o u l d facilitate the strengthening
86
T H E C O L D W A R A N D T H E C R E A T I O N OF A N A T I O N A L BOURGEOISIE
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS AND D E M O C R A C Y
87
politics. B u t , as w i l l be seen i n the next chapter, the p r o - I s l a m i c p a r t y g r e w out
N o t o n l y the r e c o v e r y o f western E u r o p e a n economies was o f c o n c e r n to
of a p o l i t i c a l d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t w i t h the economic development projects o f the
the U S g o v e r n m e n t , but the f o r m this recovery w o u l d take—whether it w o u l d
period.
be co-operative or c o m p e t i t i v e w i t h the U S e c o n o m y ( K o l k o a n d K o l k o 1972: 3 3 7 - 8 ) . I n his speech at B a y l o r U n i v e r s i t y o n 6 M a r c h 1947, T r u m a n m a d e it clear that U S firms must not b e forced into c o m p e t i n g w i t h state-owned or state-
A m a r k e t e c o n o m y a n d the d e v e l o p m e n t i d e a l
p l a n n e d e c o n o m i e s . T h e r e w a s no p l a c e i n the w o r l d for a diversity o f e c o n o m i c systems; it was either c o m m u n i s m or free-enterprise c a p i t a l i s m ( F l e m i n g 1961:
T h e p r i m a r y p o l i t i c a l objective o f the U n i t e d States i n the i m m e d i a t e aftermath
4 3 6 - 7 ) . T h e g r a n t i n g o f m i l i t a r y a n d e c o n o m i c a i d t h r o u g h the M a r s h a l l P l a n
of the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r was to o r g a n i z e a n open', m u l t i l a t e r a l t r a d i n g system
was a first step i n the project o f l i n k i n g e c o n o m i c recovery p r o g r a m m e s to a
under its c o n t r o l . H o w e v e r , there is clearly some diversity i n n a t i o n a l economies,
p o l i c y o f a n t i - c o m m u n i s m ( T r u m a n 1955). W i t h i n this framework, U S efforts
social structures, a n d p o l i t i c a l systems. T h e r e is a m u l t i p l i c i t y o f ways to o r g a n i z e
to l i b e r a l i z e trade were c o o r d i n a t e d with the n a t i o n a l policies o f other states
a p a r t i c u l a r f o r m o f n a t i o n a l economy, depending o n the social-political context
(van der P i j l 1984).
of the n a t i o n a l space. T h i s presented the U n i t e d States w i t h a considerable challenge i n its efforts to o r g a n i z e a specific international order. T h e U S p o l i c y g o a l at the end o f the w a r was to l i n k each state w i t h i n a new i n t e r n a t i o n a l framework. T h i s r e q u i r e d a p l a n whereby various aspects o f labour, p r o d u c t i o n , a n d finance w o u l d be c o o r d i n a t e d to evolve along c o m p l e m e n t a r y lines. T o that e n d , a v i t a l institution was created i n 1944 based o n the c o n v e r t i b i l i t y o f the U S d o l l a r to gold at a fixed p r i c e — t h e B r e t t o n W o o d s m o n e t a r y system. N a t i o n a l currencies c o u l d then be converted into U S dollars at a set exchange rate (Block
T h e M a r s h a l l P l a n e n v i s a g e d two different strategies for the e c o n o m i c r e s t r u c t u r i n g o f western E u r o p e a n d states o f the emergent ' T h i r d W o r l d ' ( W o o d 1986). F o r western E u r o p e , the strategy was to restore i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i v e capacity t h r o u g h a Fordist. e c o n o m i c m o d e l based o n mass p r o d u c t i o n and mass c o n s u m p t i o n . T h i s was to be m e d i a t e d b y full e m p l o y m e n t a n d a high-wage p o l i c y ( A g l i e t t a 1979; L i p i e t z 1987). For states o f the emergent ' T h i r d W o r l d ' , the M a r s h a l l P l a n a d o p t e d a strategy that g r o u n d e d the r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e i r economies i n the i d e o l o g y o f ' d e v e l o p m e n t ' .
1977). T h e t e r m ' T h i r d W o r l d ' was not used officially i n the M a r s h a l l P l a n , It is well k n o w n that at the end o f the w a r E u r o p e a n countries (and most of the w o r l d , for that matter) h a d neither gold nor d o l l a r reserves. T h e E u r o p e a n d o l l a r shortage c o u l d have been r e m e d i e d by m a i n t a i n i n g o l d b i l a t e r a l t r a d i n g arrangements and other forms o f national-protectionist p l a n n i n g ( M i l w a r d 1984). H o w e v e r , U S p o l i c y - m a k e r s believed that once a n o p e n , m u l t i l a t e r a l system was restored, E u r o p e w o u l d be able to export its w a y out o f the d o l l a r shortage ( E i c h e n g r e e n 3996: 99). T h e International M o n e t a r y F u n d ( I M F ) , the I n t e r n a t i o n a l T r a d e O r g a n i z a t i o n ( I T O ) , a n d the G e n e r a l A g r e e m e n t o n T r a d e a n d Tariffs ( G A T T ) were negotiated, and, w i t h the exception o f the I T O , created i n order to establish n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t o r y trade practices t h r o u g h a general r e d u c t i o n i n tariffs. T h e y also a i m e d to restore exchange stability a r o u n d the B r e t t o n W o o d s m o n e t a r y system. M u l t i l a t e r a l i s m r e q u i r e d that the U n i t e d States a n d E u r o p e open their protected domestic markets.
and
c o n t r a d i c t i o n . E u r o p e a n states a n d the U S a d m i n i s t r a t i o n were u n w i l l i n g to reduce their o w n t a r i f f barriers. F o r their part, U S p o l i c y - m a k e r s were m o r e interested i n o p e n i n g up new markets, b o t h to export U S surplus p r o d u c t s a n d to increase private investment by U S corporations a b r o a d . T h e y also w a n t e d to protect their o w n domestic m a r k e t from imports. T h i s was very evident i n food p r o d u c t i o n ( F r i e d m a n n 1993).
the
concept
of 'underdeveloped'
or
'undeveloped'
(Sachs
1992).
Nevertheless, the concept o f " T h i r d W o r l d ' was used to describe those states that were either E u r o p e a n c o l o n i e s , mandates i n A s i a a n d A f r i c a , or newly founded i n d e p e n d e n t nation-states. T h e s e states were a l l situated w i t h i n the E u r o p e a n sphere o f t r a d i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s to some degree. T h e creation of a p o l i t i c a l category k n o w n as T h i r d W o r l d ( E s c o b a r 1995) c o i n c i d e d w i t h the i n v e n t i o n of 'underdevelopment', as p o v e r t y was ' d i s c o v e r e d ' a n d came to be seen as a d e f i n i n g feature o f c o l o n i a l , p o s t - c o l o n i a l , a n d n e w l y founded states o f the T h i r d W o r l d . A c c o r d i n g to E s t e v a (1992: 6-7), the era o f development b e g a n on 20 J a n u a r y 1949 w h e n T r u m a n became president o f the U n i t e d States. I n his i n a u g u r a t i o n speech T r u m a n d e c l a r e d : ' W e must e m b a r k o n a b o l d p r o g r a m for m a k i n g the benefits o f our scientific advances a n d i n d u s t r i a l progress available for the i m p r o v e m e n t a n d g r o w t h o f u n d e r d e v e l o p e d areas' ( G o w e n a n d Shenton
Despite these developments, the process o f restoring a l i b e r a l p r i n c i p l e i n the w o r l d e c o n o m y was not a n easy one. i t was subject to conflict
n o r was
1996: 7). T h e post-1945
understanding
of underdevelopment
i m p l i e d a failure
of the capitalist i n d u s t r i a l e c o n o m y to r e p r o d u c e itself i n the T h i r d W o r l d . A s S h a n i n (1997: 65) has e x p l a i n e d , the appeal o f development is rooted i n the e x p e c t a t i o n o f a n i r r e v e r s i b l e advance from a n endless diversity o f nations t o w a r d s a w o r l d u n i f i e d a r o u n d a single-market e c o n o m y credo. T h e i d e o l o g i c a l impetus b e h i n d this m o v e m e n t is a b e l i e f i n the c u l t u r a l capacity to apply the ideas o f progress, science, a n d technology (Esteva a n d P r a k a s h 1998). I n
88
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
T H E C O L D W A R A N D T H E C R E A T I O N OF A NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE
89
e x p l a i n i n g the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the nineteenth-century market economy, P o l a n y i
U S a d m i n i s t r a t i o n complete c o n t r o l over the T u r k i s h government's use of a i d
(1944} highlights the i m p o r t a n c e o f deliberate political intervention. M a r k e t s
for the n a t i o n a l a r m e d forces ( S a n d e r 1979: 27).
exist by v i r t u e o f state-made rules a n d state-enforced agreements that create the impression that they are self-regulating (Atasoy 2003c).
T u r k e y h o p e d that U S a i d w o u l d reduce its m i l i t a r y expenses, a l l o w i n g T u r k e y to use
T h e E u r o p e a n , l i n e a r p e r c e p t i o n of t i m e i m p o s e d a fixed pattern o n
its w a r t i m e
thereby
savings for n a t i o n a l i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n
( A y d e m i r 1979: 3 9 7 - 4 1 9 ) . H o w e v e r , the U S government was not w i l l i n g to
history, expressing a b e l i e f i n progress t o w a r d a greater g o o d ( S h a n i n 1997).
e x t e n d M a r s h a l l e c o n o m i c a i d i f T u r k e y p l a n n e d to use it for
T h e idea o f progressive h i s t o r i c a l change fostered a n i m a g e o f development as
i n d u s t r i a l development projects rather than contribute to the E u r o p e a n recovery
state-planned
a necessary process i n w h i c h t r a d i t i o n a l societies move o n to m o r e a d v a n c e d
p l a n . T o be c o n s i d e r e d for a i d , T u r k e y was a d v i s e d to change its e c o n o m i c
stages o f g r o w t h . T h i s idea was most evident i n the writings o f U S development
p o l i c y towards p r o d u c i n g foodstuffs
studies scholars (Leys 1996). P a r a l l e l w i t h the w o r l d w i d e e x p a n s i o n o f the
16 J a n u a r y
for E u r o p e a n markets
(Ulus Newspaper,
1948). A r e p o r t w r i t t e n at the Paris Conference, convened o n 27
market economy, development scholarship presented the values o f d e m o c r a c y
J u n e 1947, tied c o n d i t i o n s for the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f U S a i d to the e l i m i n a t i o n o f
a n d freedom as key to b r i d g i n g the gap between the 'developed' West a n d the
nationalist p l a n n i n g p r o g r a m m e s . It b e c a m e o b v i o u s at the P a r i s Conference
'underdeveloped' non-West. D u r i n g the G o l d W a r these values were identified as
that the
b o t h virtuous a n d consistent w i t h the a i m s o f U S foreign p o l i c y — a p o l i c y w h i c h
blocs. T h e S o v i e t U n i o n , a p a r t i c i p a n t in the conference, w i t h d r e w from the
at the time was largely d i r e c t e d at c o m b a t i n g c o m m u n i s m ( G e n d z i e r 1985).
p r o c e e d i n g s o n 2 J u l y 1947, f o r c i n g a l l east E u r o p e a n states to w i t h d r a w as w e l l .
What
is significant about
Truman's
speech
of
1949,
according
d i s t r i b u t i o n o f Marshall
aid w o u l d divide Europe
into m i l i t a r y
to
T h e Soviets c l a i m e d that e c o n o m i c i n t e g r a t i o n u n d e r the M a r s h a l ] P l a n w o u l d
C o w e n a n d S h e n t o n (1996: 7), is that he tied the idea o f development to state
strengthen the p o s i t i o n o f p r o - W e s t e r n c a p i t a l groups i n eastern E u r o p e ( S m i t h
sovereignty. D e c o l o n i z a t i o n was necessary for the c o m p l e t i o n o f the n a t i o n -
1963: 31). A f t e r w i t h d r a w i n g f r o m the P a r i s C o n f e r e n c e , the Soviet U n i o n
state system a n d the constitution o f a n open w o r l d e c o n o m y because it p r o v i d e d
c a l l e d o n a l l c o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s to oppose the M a r s h a l l P l a n a n d establish a
greater assurance that o l d e c o n o m i c ties between western E u r o p e a n states a n d
formal
the colonies w o u l d be broken. Yet, i n their support for n a t i o n a l
Bureau). A special conference
independence
organization
known
as
the
Corninform
(Communist
Information
o f eastern E u r o p e a n c o m m u n i s t parties h e l d
movements, U S p o l i c y - m a k e r s h a d to c o n t a i n emergent nationalist regimes so
on 2 2 - 2 3 S e p t e m b e r
that U S . d o m i n a n c e w o u l d not be threatened. M u c h o f this was dependent o n
S o v i e t leadership. T h e U n i t e d States r e s p o n d e d b y
whether a free-enterprise
C o r n i n f o r m a n d N A T O c a m e t o personify the antagonistic relationship between
capitalist system or a c o m m u n i s t e c o n o m i c m o d e l
p r e v a i l e d i n n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i c p o l i c y decisions. Turkey had
already
established
itself as a n independent
1947 b e c a m e the f o u n d a t i o n for c o m m u n i s t u n i t y u n d e r founding
N A T O i n 1948.
capitalist a n d socialist systems. state.
The
T h e T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t considered its i n c l u s i o n i n the M a r s h a l l P l a n a i d
government's m a i n c o n c e r n was b u i l d i n g a n a t i o n a l e c o n o m y a n d a n i n d u s t r i a l
p r o g r a m m e a n i m p o r t a n t step i n c o n f i r m i n g T u r k e y ' s status as a ' d e m o c r a t i c '
bourgeoisie. G i v e n the lack o f private a n d p u b l i c investment
capital o n a
country. O n 18 M a r c h 1947, t h e Ulus Newspaper stated that 'for T u r k e y , E u r o p e
large scale, the inflow o f foreign c a p i t a l was considered v i t a l for i n d u s t r i a l
is not o n l y a g e o g r a p h i c a l a r e a o f interest, but a s y m b o l o f l i b e r a l d e m o c r a c y
development. T h e n President i n o n u was w i l l i n g to l i b e r a l i z e the e c o n o m y a n d
i n the new w o r l d order'. O n 19 A p r i l 1948, the same newspaper c l a i m e d that
c o m m i t T u r k e y to the W e s t e r n security structure as a ' d e m o c r a t i c '
country
'to not be i n c l u d e d i n the M a r s h a l l P l a n w i l l leave T u r k e y alone a n d isolated
i f foreign c a p i t a l c o u l d be attracted. T h e s e were the e c o n o m i c a n d p o l i t i c a l
i n E u r o p e a n polities'. S e c u r i t y concerns a n d g e o p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n i n g w i t h i n a
circumstances that d e t e r m i n e d T u r k e y ' s place i n a n integrated post-1945 w o r l d
E u r o - A m e r i c a n a l l i a n c e b e c a m e p a r a m o u n t for T u r k e y ; n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l over
economy.
the i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n process b e c a m e secondary.
H a v i n g become p a r t o f the Tree w o r l d ' after the transition to a m u l t i -
D u r i n g the
1930s T u r k e y a c h i e v e d significant i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n u n d e r
p a r t y p o l i t i c a l system, T u r k e y b e c a m e eligible for U S a i d . T h e first agreement
the i d e o l o g i c a l g u i d a n c e o f statist-nationalist p l a n n i n g . Nevertheless, by v i r t u e
o n a i d was signed by the R P P government o n 12 J u l y 1947 a n d was m i l i t a r y
of its i n c o r p o r a t i o n into the U S a i d p r o g r a m m e i n 1948, it was r e q u i r e d to
related. I n the agreement, based o n the T r u m a n d o c t r i n e o f containment,
adopt a n a g r i c u l t u r e - b a s e d d e v e l o p m e n t strategy ( U S E G A 1949: 2-3). W i t h
T u r k e y p r o m i s e d that U S a i d w o u l d be used to c o n t a i n the ' c o m m u n i s t threat'
the s i l e n c i n g o f the h a r d l i n e f a c t i o n w i t h i n the R P P , w h i c h insisted o n state-
i n Turkey, i n r e t u r n , the U n i t e d States guaranteed that it w o u l d p r o v i d e m i l i t a r y
led heavy i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n p r o g r a m m e s ,
p r o t e c t i o n to T u r k i s h territories, i n c l u d i n g the straits, from the Soviet threat.
attention
T h e most controversial aspect o f the agreement was A r t i c l e 4, w h i c h gave the
be s t r u c t u r e d a l o n g the lines suggested b y development economists who saw
to a g r i c u l t u r a l d e v e l o p m e n t .
the R P P a n d the D P t u r n e d Both
parties
wanted
their
agriculture
to
90
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D
DEMOCRACY
T H E C O L D W A R AND T H ECREATION
OF A NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE
91
Turkey's c o m p a r a t i v e advantage in the g r o w t h o f a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n . A
considered investment i n a g r i c u l t u r e to be a matter o f c o r r e c t i n g the social
W o r l d B a n k report written i n 1949 argued that the i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n effort d i d
'injustice' previously p e r p e t r a t e d by the R P P against r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n s ( P a m u k
not i m p r o v e the general w e l l - b e i n g o f T u r k i s h citizens. Alternatively, the report
1988). U n d o i n g this s o c i a l injustice, P r i m e M i n i s t e r M e n d e r e s (1967: 116;
a r g u e d , T u r k e y should increase its p r o d u c t i v e a g r i c u l t u r a l capacity a n d invest
a r g u e d , d i d not only involve g o v e r n m e n t support for a g r i c u l t u r a l g r o w t h ; it also
i n r o a d c o n s t r u c t i o n , infrastructure, a n d agriculture-based i n d u s t r i a l projects
r e q u i r e d the i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f r u r a l producers into the ' d e v e l o p m e n t ' process
( T h o r n b u r g et a l 1949: 91, 141-2). T h e report reinforced the economic, p o l i c y
a n d the r e c o m p o s i t i o n o f s o c i a l life i n v i l l a g e c o m m u n i t i e s . M e n d e r e s o u t l i n e d
p o s i t i o n o f the D P , a n d was entirely consistent w i t h the development p l a n o f
his vision i n a speech d e l i v e r e d i n 1950:
1947 f o r m u l a t e d by the R P P government, as w e l l as the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s o f the Istanbul E c o n o m i c C o n g r e s s o f 1948.
W h a t e v e r needs to b e done by a c i v i l i z e d n a t i o n , we w i l l do it. N o roads? W e w i l l b u i l d t h e m ! T h e l a n d is not fertile? W e w i l l
P e a s a n t s a n d r u r a l m i g r a n t s : the n e w p l a y e r s i n c o a l i t i o n p o l i t i c s
m a k e it fertile! W e w i l l distribute l a n d to the landless v i l l a g e r s . N o houses? N o c e m e n t , factories or food? Inadequate clothing?
The
D P government's p r i m a r y task i n the 1950s was to b u i l d and m a n a g e a
n a t i o n a l economy. S t a r t i n g w i t h a p o l i c y shift away from
state-led
heavy
N o electricity? N o schools? W e w i l l b u i l d them! W e w i l l m a k e t h e m available to o u r v i l l a g e r s ! A y d e m i r 1969: 2 2 8 - 9 ) .
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n to export-oriented a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n , the D P g o v e r n m e n t serious
S u p p o r t e d b y M a r s h a l l a i d funds that lasted u n t i l 1952, the D P g o v e r n m e n t
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n p r o g r a m m e w o u l d have to start w i t h capital a c c u m u l a t i o n
i m p o r t e d a large n u m b e r o f tractors from the U n i t e d States. T h e government's
t h r o u g h market-oriented a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n . T h e p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n o f
cheap-credit p o l i c y a l l o w e d these to be p u r c h a s e d o n credit. B y 1957, 44,144
this was that the 'development' project was l i n k e d to the m o b i l i z a t i o n o f r u r a l
tractors h a d been i m p o r t e d , u p f r o m only 1,750 i n 1948 ( H a l e 1981: 95). T h e
producers.
i n t r o d u c t i o n o f tractors to T u r k e y resulted i n the release o f sharecroppers from
proceeded
to
implement
economic
liberalization
policies.
Any
A v e r y c o m p l e x set o f geopolitical a n d w o r l d e c o n o m i c d y n a m i c s m e d i a t e d state m a n a g e m e n t
o f the n a t i o n a l e c o n o m y a n d the r u r a l c o m m u n i t i e s o f
a g r i c u l t u r a l producers. U S m i l i t a r y a n d e c o n o m i c aid played a n i n t e r v e n i n g role i n the c r e a t i o n o f a new interest structure by d i r e c t l v d e t e r m i n i n g Turkey's e c o n o m i c policy, thereby r e f r a i n i n g p o l i t i c a l alliances in the state structure. T h e R P P ' s earlier adherence to the development ideal o f U S experts i n relation
large farms - m o r e t h a n 7 9 , 0 0 0 by 1960 (Singer 1977: 206). I n contrast to the massive displacement o f peasants w h i c h o c c u r r e d throughout the T h i r d W o r l d ( M c M i c h a e l 2 0 0 0 : 4 3 - 7 6 ) , the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f tractors i n T u r k e y d i d not result i n the development o f large-scale capitalist farms nor i n the deterioration o f the peasant economy. U n d e r the
D P government, independent s m a l l - p r o d u c i n g
family farmers c o n s o l i d a t e d t h e i r position i n T u r k i s h a g r i c u l t u r e .
to Turkey's a g r i c u l t u r a l policy, i n exchange for a i d , d e t e r m i n e d the domestic
Even t h o u g h the D P w a s opposed to l a n d reform, it was responsive to the
p o l i t i c a l framework w i t h i n w h i c h the D P was able to m o b i l i z e r u r a l voters
demands o f peasants w h o h e l d little or no land ( P a m u k 1988). Its resettlement
against the R P P government a n d subsequently w i n the 1950 elections. T h e new
p r o g r a m m e i n c l u d e d c a r v i n g out a d d i t i o n a l lands for a g r i c u l t u r e from state-
partners i n D P c o a l i t i o n politics were the l a r g e - a n d s m a l l - p r o d u c i n g farmers
o w n e d c o m m u n a l properties. T h e government redistributed state lands to the
f r o m r u r a l areas.
landless a n d least-propertied s m a l l producers. I n this m a n n e r the a m o u n t o f
Under
the
D P government,
market-oriented
agricultural production
resulted i n differentiation w i t h i n the c o u n t r y s i d e based o n the a m o u n t o f l a n d c u l t i v a t e d , tractor o w n e r s h i p , a n d access to credits a n d loans. L a r g e landowners e x p a n d e d their p r o d u c t i o n and e x p o r t earnings, yet this differentiation d i d not produce class p o l a r i z a t i o n , nor d i d it increase the p o w e r p o s i t i o n o f large l a n d o w n e r s against s m a l l - p r o d u c i n g farmers. T h e D P was supportive o f b o t h large- a n d s m a l l - p r o d u c i n g farmers. T h e D P established massive state subsidies a n d cheap credits to farmers as w e l l as a h i g h - p r i c e policy for a g r i c u l t u r a l products. T h e p a r t y also e x p a n d e d l a n d under c u l t i v a t i o n , a n d increased m e c h a n i z a t i o n i n a g r i c u l t u r e . T h e D P
l a n d u n d e r c u l t i v a t i o n i n c r e a s e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y 67 per cent ( M a r g u l i e s a n d Y i l d i z o g l u 1987: 281). F a r m l a n d was also increased t h r o u g h deforestation by b u r n i n g . T h i s c o m m o n strategy for increasing arable l a n d a c c o u n t e d for 22 p e r cent o f total c u l t i v a t e d l a n d i n 1948 (Tekeli 1977: 30). B e t w e e n 1950 a n d I960 the p r o p o r t i o n o f l a n d l e s s families decreased f r o m 16 to 10 p e r cent. A n d between 1950 a n d 1963 the n u m b e r o f s m a l l - p r o d u c i n g f a m i l y farms increased 30 p e r cent from 2.3 m i l l i o n t o 3.1 m i l l i o n ( K e y d e r 1987: 131). I n the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f g o v e r n m e n t credits, s m a l l loans m a d e up 8 8 per cent of a l l loans and represented 42 per cent o f total credit d i s t r i b u t e d b y the A g r i c u l t u r a l B a n k . L a r g e l o a n s constituted 15 per cent o f total credits and were given to o n l v 0.48 oer cent o f farmers (Koksal 1971: 4-99-5281 W h a t is
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T H E C O L D W A R A N D T H EC R E A T I O N OF A NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE
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93
most i m p o r t a n t about the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f these credits is that t h r o u g h t h e m
D P policies facilitated the e m e r g e n c e o f r u r a l producers as c o a l i t i o n partners
a g r i c u l t u r a l m a c h i n e r y was m a d e available to a wider group o f producers, not
i n politics. T h e s e p r o d u c e r s
just large l a n d o w n e r s . T h i s was the case despite the fact that l a n d cultivated
from u r b a n dwellers. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , this c u l t u r a l ' d i v i d e ' was r e i n f o r c e d by
by the use o f a n i m a l s o n s m a l l f a m i l y farms increased 40 per cent d u r i n g the
the government's r o a d - b u i l d i n g efforts i n the 1950s. B e t w e e n 1950 a n d 1954
1950s (Tekeli 1977: 15). A l l o f these changes were c o m p l e m e n t e d by a 16 per
there was a 255 p e r cent i n c r e a s e i n c a p i t a l investment i n T u r k e y a n d r o a d
cent increase i n the government purchase price o f wheat (Avcioglu 1979: 620).
c o n s t r u c t i o n was a key e l e m e n t o f this (Zurcher 1993: 235). T h e D P g o v e r n m e n t
were very aware
of their c u l t u r a l difference
the
increased h a r d - s u r f a c e d r o a d s f r o m 1,600 k m to 7,500 k m , a n d e x p a n d e d the
m e c h a n i z a t i o n o f agriculture, the D P endeavoured to increase yields as well.
loose-surfaced r o a d n e t w o r k f r o m 3,500 k m to 61,000 k m , a l l w i t h i n a ten-year
H i g h - y i e l d seed varieties a n d c h e m i c a l fertilizers were i m p o r t e d u n d e r
the
p e r i o d ( H a l e 1981: 90). R o a d c o n s t r u c t i o n was followed by a m u s h r o o m i n g o f
M a r s h a l l a i d p l a n , factors that enabled T u r k e y to significantly increase its food
bus a n d transportation c o m p a n i e s . T h e D P ' s r o a d development projects o p e n e d
a n d cash crop p r o d u c t i o n . B e t w e e n 1950 a n d 1953 the c o u n t r y experienced a
up the villages o f A n a t o l i a for the first t i m e i n T u r k i s h history, b r i n g i n g r u r a l
In
a d d i t i o n to increasing l a n d u n d e r
c u l t i v a t i o n a n d extending
and u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n s closer together. P a r a d o x i c a l l y , the e x p a n s i o n o f the r o a d
p h e n o m e n a l e c o n o m i c g r o w t h rate o f 13 per cent a year. T u r k e y s export earnings r e a c h e d a peak i n 1953, w h e n a g r i c u l t u r a l exports rose a p p r o x i m a t e l y 50 per cent ( K e y d e r 1987: 294). B y the early 1950s, T u r k e y was a g r a i n exporter w i t h three-quarters o f the increase i n p r o d u c t i o n
network gave rise to tensions r e l a t e d to class a n d culture. W i t h the large-scale m i g r a t i o n from r u r a l to u r b a n areas, r u r a l m i g r a n t s a n d u r b a n dwellers c a m e to discover significant differences i n their lifestyles. B y the second h a l f o f t h e
o c c u r r i n g i n central A n a t o l i a ( M a n n 1980: 198).
1950s it was clear that T u r k i s h cities were
T h e D P ' s r u r a l a n d a g r i c u l t u r a l development strategy w o r k e d well u n t i l
not e q u i p p e d to receive l a r g e numbers o f villagers i n p e r m a n e n t residential
1954. F a l l i n g wheat prices i n w o r l d markets a n d a sudden 20 p e r cent drop i n
settlements. M i g r a n t s b e g a n t o b u i l d their o w n houses o n u n u s e d p u b l i c or
overall a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n i n 1954 u n d e r m i n e d this strategy ( K r u e g e r
private lands o n the outskirts o f the city. T h e s e e m e r g i n g settlements
1974: 8). A l t h o u g h p o o r c l i m a t i c conditions were the i m m e d i a t e cause for the
essentially shantytowns,
or as
were
they are c o m m o n l y referred to i n T u r k i s h ,
d r o p i n T u r k i s h p r o d u c t i o n , the fall i n world-wheat prices was the p r i m a r y
gecekondus, w h i c h l i t e r a l l y m e a n s ' b u i l t at night', i n these s p r a w l i n g gecekondu
reason T u r k e y became a wheat i m p o r t e r a g a i n after 1954. T h e price decline
n e i g h b o u r h o o d s , m i g r a n t s i m i t a t e d village life by g r o w i n g fruits a n d vegetables,
was due to subsidized U S exports i n the f o r m o f food a i d to the ' T h i r d W o r l d '
a n d r a i s i n g chickens, sheep, a n d cows i n t h e i r b a c k y a r d s . T h e y kept close
under P u b l i c L a w 4 8 0 ( F r i e d m a n n 1982). C o m b i n e d w i t h the decreased level
ties w i t h their villages, r e c e i v i n g most o f t h e i r staple f o o d (wheat flour, beans,
o f foreign c a p i t a l i n f l o w after the e n d o f the M a r s h a l l P i a n i n 1952, f a i l i n g
chickpeas, lentils, a n d
g r a i n prices signalled the end o f the D P ' s development i d e a l based o n capital
A l t h o u g h the gecekondus l a c k e d a n i n f r a s t r u c t u r e — t h e y h a d no water, electricity,
generation f r o m a g r i c u l t u r a l export p r o d u c t i o n .
roads,
D e p e n d e n c e o n wheat i m p o r t s was not u n i q u e to T u r k e y but experienced by a l l states throughout the T h i r d W o r l d ( F r i e d m a n n 1992). T h i s dependency was a c c o m p a n i e d by a change i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the w o r l d e c o n o m y w i t h a shift i n e c o n o m i c p o l i c y from a g r i c u l t u r a l g r o w t h to import-substitution industrialization
(ISI).
The
reorganization
o f the
world
economy
that
or sewers-—their
rice)
from
family members
inhabitants
were
who remained
resourceful.
A n d despite
behind. being
m a r g i n a l i z e d a n d i m p o v e r i s h e d , gecekondu dwellers d i d not present a n i m a g e o f poweriessness. T h e y m a i n t a i n e d a n d u p g r a d e d t h e i r n e i g h b o u r h o o d s
by
investing their e a r n i n g s a n d a g r i c u l t u r a l savings i n the i m p r o v e m e n t o f t h e i r houses. Gecekondu i n h a b i t a n t s
s o o n r e a l i z e d that
the
development
ideal
had
a c c o m p a n i e d the crisis i n agriculture p r o m p t e d the rise o f new social classes
overlooked their interests i n r e l a t i o n to m u n i c i p a l services, h e a l t h , e d u c a t i o n ,
t h r o u g h a massive relocation o f l a b o u r from r u r a l to u r b a n areas. Turkey's
wages, a n d e m p l o y m e n t p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I n time, gecekondu dwellers emerged as
a g r i c u l t u r a l crisis was also l i n k e d to a n i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n process that was
a distinct faction i n the c o a l i t i o n politics o f the development project. T h e y
mediated by the movement o f large n u m b e r s o f r u r a l labourers to u r b a n areas.
d e m a n d e d that the g o v e r n m e n t deliver m u n i c i p a l services, c i v i c amenities, a n d
F o r e x a m p l e , the percentage o f people l i v i n g i n villages d e c l i n e d f r o m 81.5 per
l a n d entitlements. A s the gecekondu p o p u l a t i o n o f large cities s w e l l e d , it became a
cent i n 1950 to 74.8 per cent i n i 9 6 0 (Yasa 1966: 25). B e t w e e n 1950 a n d i 9 6 0
p o l i t i c a l force that no p o l i t i c i a n c o u l d afford to ignore.
the p o p u l a t i o n o f the four largest cities i n T u r k e y increased b y 75 per cent, as one out o f every ten villagers m i g r a t e d to u r b a n areas.
T h e gecekondus o f T u r k e y reflect the tense encounter between middle-class urbanites a n d lower-class r u r a l m i g r a n t s . H o w e v e r , this encounter has been l a r g e l y
N o t surprisingly, this process created c u l t u r a l 'fragmentation' i n u r b a n
misconstrued. F o r e x a m p l e , O z y e g i n (2001) presents it i n terms o f a conceptual
areas. D u r i n g the early 1950s the emphasis given to a g r i c u l t u r a l g r o w t h by
dichotomy between the ' m o d e r n i t y ' o f u r b a n professionals or bureaucratic groups
94
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D
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T H E C O L D W A R AND T H E C R E A T I O N OF A NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE
95
a n d the ' t r a d i t i o n ' o f r u r a l migrants. K a r p a t (1976) defines gecekondu dwellers
i m p o r t restrictions o n c o n s u m e r
as ' u n - u r b a n i z e d peasants'. T h e s e views ignore the fact that the inhabitants of
the establishment o f p r i v a t e i n d u s t r i a l firms that p r o d u c e d consumer goods
goods, the
government
acted to
support,
•gccekondus arc neither silent nor passive and u m n v o l v e d i n u r b a n affairs. Rather,
domestically. A 1960 survey o n the history o f 126 private i n d u s t r i a l companies
they are actively engaged i n efforts to render their city life more meaningful. T h e
i n T u r k e y reveals that a p p r o x i m a t e l y 60 per cent o f them were founded between
story o f gecekondu residents transcends urban and r u r a l as c u l t u r a l opposites a n d
1946 a n d 1960 ( B u g r a 1999: 69). A n o t h e r survey o f the 405 largest p r i v a t e
refocuses our attention o n the conjunction between class a n d culture.
i n d u s t r i a l firms presently o p e r a t i n g i n T u r k e y shows that 49 o f these firms were
I was b o r n a n d raised i n a gecekondu n e i g h b o u r h o o d i n A n k a r a , T u r k e y , a n d I have h a d the o p p o r t u n i t y to observe these migrants first-hand. M y parents
established between 1950 a n d 1959. O n l y n i n e were founded between 1940 a n d 1949 a n d o n l y four between 1930 a n d 1939 ( T U S I A D 1989V
are a m o n g them. M y observations strongly suggest that gecekondu inhabitants
T h e founders o f m a n y o f these p r i v a t e firms h a d their roots in the state
have been i n a constant, c o m m i t t e d struggle to reposition themselves in the city
bureaucracy. M e r c h a n t s were the second largest g r o u p i n v o l v e d i n the e x p a n s i o n
a n d establish a sense o f b e l o n g i n g .
of private industry. T h o s e w h o p r e v i o u s l y h e l d positions i n the state b u r e a u c r a c y
I c a n n o t e n v i s i o n a more d r a m a t i c e x a m p l e o f this process o f b u i l d i n g a
m a d e up 24.41 p e r cent o f p r i v a t e industrialists; merchants constituted 20.83
new life i n the city t h a n that o f m y mother. In 1986 I was a research assistant at
per cent. O n l y 3.14 per cent o f these industrialists were large landowners ( B u g r a
the M i d d l e East T e c h n i c a l U n i v e r s i t y ( M E T U l i n A n k a r a , w o r k i n g for Professor
1999: 72), most o f t h e m i n v o l v e d i n the textile i n d u s t r y due to their success i n
Sencer A y a t a . H e was c o n d u c t i n g a study o n gecekondus i n the A t a district o f
cotton p r o d u c t i o n ( S e r i n 1963: 2 2 8 - 3 0 ) . T o a large extent, private industrialists
D i k m e n , A n k a r a . M y f a m i l y a n d 1 lived i n this n e i g h b o u r h o o d o f 150,000
were o f T u r k i s h - M u s l i m o r i g i n (83 p e r cent), w h i l e j e w s made u p 9 p e r cent a n d
people, a n d I i n t e r v i e w e d 250 m e n a n d w o m e n there for the study. A s m y parents
G r e e k s 7 p e r cent i P a y a s l i o g l u 1961: 19-22).
a n d g r a n d p a r e n t s were a m o n g the first people i n the n e i g h b o u r h o o d , almost
M o s t o f the newly
founded
c o n s u m e r g o o d s - p r o d u c i n g industries were
everyone I i n t e r v i e w e d k n e w of m y family. O n e o f the questions I asked m y
funded by the I n d u s t r i a l .Development B a n k o f T u r k e y , established under the
respondents was h o w the Ata gecekondu district o f D i k m e n r e c e i v e d its m u n i c i p a l
auspices o f the I B D R a n d the W o r l d B a n k ( I D B T ) ( R o z a l i y e v 1978: 2 9 4 - 3 0 7 ) .
services. M a n y o f t h e m told me that. I needed to ask m y m o t h e r this question
T h e I n d u s t r i a l D e v e l o p m e n t B a n k was created as a j o i n t venture
because she was the person p r i m a r i l y responsible for o r g a n i z i n g residents to put
T u r k i s h a n d foreign
pressure o n the city to p r o v i d e s e r v i c e s — i n this case, r u n n i n g water. T h i s was
investment projects. B y 1956 i t a l l o c a t e d U S $ 145 m i l l i o n o f credit to 131 new
the first t i m e I h a d h e a r d o f m y mother's involvement i n n e i g h b o u r h o o d politics.
i n d u s t r i a l investment firms. A b o u t a t h i r d o f this credit came f r o m I M F loans
She c o n f i r m e d the story, but i n d i c a t e d modestly that she d i d not do m u c h .
( S a n a y i O d a s i B u l t e n i , 15 A p r i l 1956). Most" o f the bank credits were allocated
' S o m e m e n were a l r e a d y e m p l o y e d by the city d o i n g this k i n d o f work', she said.
to the largest consumer g o o d s - p r o d u c i n g p r i v a t e industries. T h e textile i n d u s t r y
'I just asked t h e m to get a move o n a n d help their neighbours*. ' W e need to
received 22.6 per cent o f b a n k funds, the cement and glass industry 20.6 per
have access to r u n n i n g water', m y mother told them. ' E v e r y b o d y else i n the city
cent, the c h e m i c a l industry 17.2 p e r cent, a n d food industries 13.1 per cent
has it. W h a t is w r o n g w i t h us? A r e n ' t we also citizens? Isn't it our right to have
{ U y g u n e r 1959).
what others h a v e ? ' M y mother c o n v i n c e d the m e n to d i g the trenches necessary for l a y i n g the water pipes. O n c e the d i g g i n g was finished, she o r g a n i z e d the n e i g h b o u r h o o d w o m e n to petition the m a y o r to send the pipes, a n d then, after some effort, to get the water t u r n e d o n .
financial
between
firms to supervise and f u n d private i n d u s t r i a l
Turkey's e x p o r t p e r f o r m a n c e h a d d e c l i n e d after the 1954 crisis, so the g o v e r n m e n t h a d l i m i t e d resources for i n d u s t r y . D i r e c t foreign investment was also very l i m i t e d . N o m o r e t h a n 30 foreign firms invested i n T u r k e y a n d they never exceeded 1 per cent o f t o t a l private investment (Zurcher 1993: 235). A s a
T h i s c a n h a r d l y be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a conflict b e t w e e n u r b a n m o d e r n i t y
result, the government d e c i d e d to rely h e a v i l y o n foreign loans a n d grants, the
a n d t r a d i t i o n a l ways o f life. It represents a sustained effort o n the part o f active,
most i m p o r t a n t source o f c a p i t a l b e i n g the U n i t e d States (Bulutoglu 1974: 118¬
i n f o r m e d m e n a n d w o m e n seeking full citizenship rights.
9; H a r r i s 1972: 182). A f t e r t h e e n d o f the M a r s h a l l P l a n , the m a i n source o f U S aid to T u r k e y was food a i d u n d e r P L 4 8 0 . B e t w e e n 1954 and 1962, USJf 351.2 m i l l i o n was o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h the P E 4 8 0 ( K e p e n e k 1983: 103). T h e T u r k i s h
A private industrial bourgeoisie
l i r a equivalent o f the U S s u b s i d i z e d wheat s h i p p e d to T u r k e y was deposited i n the C e n t r a l B a n k a n d the g o v e r n m e n t used this money to support i n d u s t r i a l
A l t h o u g h p r i o r i t y was given to a g r i c u l t u r a l g r o w t h projects, the D P g o v e r n m e n t p r o c e e d e d w i t h d i e idea o f c r e a t i n g a private i n d u s t r i a l bourgeoisie. B y i m p o s i n g
investment.
96
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
Although
the
D P focussed o n private i n d u s t r i a l investment,
T H E C O L D W A R A N D T H EC R E A T I O N OF A NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE
97
it also
b a r g a i n i n g power for more a i d . I n the process, the D P made it clear that they
supported state-owned industries (SEEs) t h r o u g h foreign funds. S E E s were
w o u l d serve U S interests i n the region. I n addition to sending troops to K o r e a a n d
intended to p r o d u c e c a p i t a l a n d i n t e r m e d i a r y goods so that private i n d u s t r y
b e c o m i n g a member of N A T O i n 1952, the government used the Suez crisis of 1956
c o u l d produce finished consumer goods. T h e g o v e r n m e n t adopted this strategy
to highlight Turkey's m i l i t a r y i m p o r t a n c e to U S interests i n the M i d d l e East.
to m a k e up for the lack o f private sector investments. B e t w e e n 1950 a n d 1960, the share o f the state sector i n total i n d u s t r i a l investment increased from 57 per cent to 60 per cent. It reached 78 per cent i n 1962 (Kepenek 1983; 115-6). State-
T h e 1956 S u e z c r i s i s
l e d enterprises established by the D P as the backbone o f its i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n strategy i n c l u d e d i r o n a n d steel p r o d u c t i o n , the m a c h i n e a n d c h e m i s t r y industry, the fertilizer industry, the cement a n d nitrogen industries, a n d the p u l p a n d
W i t h g o v e r n m e n t support, industry's share i n the gross n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t 1955 increased from a n average o f 10 per cent to 14 p e r cent, w i t h
agriculture's share d r o p p i n g from 49 to 43 p e r cent ( K e y d e r 1987: 134). D u r i n g the 1950s, o v e r a l l i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n increased 77 p e r cent, at a n a n n u a l rate o f 7.7 p e r cent ( O z g u r 1976: 192). T h i s strengthened the p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n of private industrialists vis-a-vis the bureaucratic
v i e w W e s t e r n security interests on a g l o b a l level. T h e U S a d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a d i n i t i a l l y thought o f T u r k e y ' s p o s t - w a r i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o s i t i o n w i t h i n a M i d d l e
p a p e r industry.
after
W i t h the outbreak o f the K o r e a n W a r i n 1950, the U S g o v e r n m e n t b e g a n to
cadres. Plowever, it d i d
not signify a f u n d a m e n t a l change i n the c o a l i t i o n politics o f the development
E a s t e r n context. T u r k e y ' s a p p l i c a t i o n for N A T O
ties to the state ( Y a l m a n 2002: 34). T h e government also c o n t i n u e d w i t h the K e m a l i s t e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n established d u r i n g the 1930s by strengthening the
therefore
the U S defence budget to U S ? 50 b i l l i o n i n 1950/1 ( H a l e 2 0 0 0 : 137), p r o m p t e d the U S a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to r e c o g n i z e that T u r k e y ' s strategic l o c a t i o n was v i t a l to W e s t e r n security interests. T h e D P g o v e r n m e n t c o n f i r m e d Turkey's loyalty to the W e s t by s e n d i n g 2 5 , 0 0 0 troops to K o r e a . I n r e t u r n , T u r k e y secured U S support for N A T O m e m b e r s h i p i n 1952. The
project. M o s t o f these private industrialists were former bureaucrats w h o h e l d h i g h positions i n the state b u r e a u c r a c y a n d h a d no intention o f w e a k e n i n g their
m e m b e r s h i p was
rejected i n 1950. H o w e v e r , the outbreak o f the K o r e a n W a r , w h i c h increased
D P government
saw Turkey's N A T O
membership
not o n l y
as
i n s u r a n c e against Soviet aggression but also 'as g u a r a n t e e i n g the flow of W e s t e r n a i d and loans' ( C e l i k 1999: 37). A c c o r d i n g to P r i m e M i n i s t e r M e n d e r e s , T u r k e y , for strategic a n d m i l i t a r y reasons, was o f p r i m a r y i m p o r t a n c e to N A T O a n d the defence o f the M i d d l e E a s t — s o m u c h so t h a t the U S a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was b o u n d
linkage between statist policies a n d a l i b e r a l orientation.
to p r o v i d e T u r k e y w i t h e c o n o m i c assistance ( O k y a r 1962: 16). T h i s strategy o f T h e D P ' s support for i n d u s t r i a l projects was fraught w i t h difficulty. I n a d d i t i o n to l i m i t e d direct foreign investment a n d a lack o f domestic investment capital, foreign a i d was not enough to meet the D P ' s c a p i t a l demands
e x c h a n g i n g m i l i t a r y concessions for ' a i d ' b e c a m e w e l l established d u r i n g the S u e z crisis o f 1956.
for A l t h o u g h it is difficult
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . I m p o r t s a n d exports h a d b o t h d e c l i n e d since 1954. I n order to increase its i m p o r t capacity the D P government followed a n i n f l a t i o n a r y finance policy. T h e D P could have solved at least, some o f its financial p r o b l e m s by t a x i n g r i c h l a n d o w n e r s , who e a r n e d m o r e t h a n one-fifth o f the G D P yet p a i d only 2 p e r cent o f total tax revenue. H o w e v e r , this was not a p o l i c y o p t i o n for the D P . Instead, it b o r r o w e d m o n e y from the C e n t r a l B a n k o f T u r k e y , w h i c h meant p r i n t i n g m o r e money. A s a result, inflation rose f r o m 3 p e r cent i n 1950 to 20 per cent i n 1958 ( Z u r c h e r 1993: 239). E c o n o m i c g r o w t h fell from 13 p e r
surplus
equipment.
Combined with
international framework of the C o l d W a r for much-needed U S capital. T h e D P promoted Turkey's new strategic position i n N A T O to increase the government's
m
crisis. It is not accurate, h o w e v e r , to l i n k T u r k e y ' s i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h the U n i t e d
deficits {World B a n k 1975: 345).
1983: 103). T h e D P ' s strategy was to exchange m i l i t a r y concessions w i t h i n the
a p p r o x i m a t e l y U S S 2,080 m i l l i o n
projects, even t h o u g h its e x p o r t e a r n i n g s d e c l i n e d after the 1954 e c o n o m i c
financial
1960, Turkey's total debt, including interest, was 33 per cent o f exports (Kepenek
from
e c o n o m i c a i d , the T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t was able to sustain its i n d u s t r i a l g r o w t h
States-led W e s t e r n defence
of this was a 410 per cent increase i n foreign debt between 1950 and 1960. In
m i l i t a r y aid
received close to U S $ 2,271 m i l l i o n i n m i l i t a r y a i d , plus U S S 328 m i l l i o n i n
cent to a r o u n d 4 p e r cent, and T u r k e y experienced a huge b a l a n c e o f p a y m e n t
T h e D P also borrowed money from foreign governments. T h e consequence
to c o m p l e t e l y differentiate
e c o n o m i c a i d , H a l e ( 2 0 0 0 : 123) estimates t h a i between 1948 a n d 1964 T u r k e y
structure
solely to the
government's
desire for
a i d . T h e g o v e r n m e n t also w a n t e d to establish a n i m a g e o f T u r k e y as a
E u r o p e a n state. A l t h o u g h B r i t a i n a n d F r a n c e were reluctant to v i e w T u r k e y as E u r o p e a n , the U n i t e d States w a s w i l l i n g to do so as l o n g as T u r k e y served U S interests i n the region. T h e British considered the Suez C a n a l , a n d hence E g y p t , as v i t a l to the integrity o f the B r i t i s h E m p i r e ( B r o m l e y 1994: 4 6 - 8 6 , 106-7). W i t h
the
accelerating C o l d W a r , B r i t a i n w a n t e d to f o r m a counterweight to the Soviet
98
T H E C O L D W A R A N D T H E C R E A T I O N or A N A T I O N A L B O U R G E O I S I E
T U R K E Y . ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
U n i o n i n the M i d d l e East that was independent of U S power (Gorst and J o h n m a n
T h e Soviet d e l i v e r y o f a r m s to E g y p t a n d S y r i a after the S u e z crisis a n d the
1997: 9-27). B r i t a i n assumed that A r a b governments w o u l d regard their major
S y r i a n d e s t r u c t i o n o f the I P C o i l p i p e l i n e intensified Turkey's fear o f c o m m u n i s t
interests as identical to those o f B r i t a i n ( H o u r a n i 1991: 357). T h i s assumption
penetration i n the M i d d l e E a s t ( F l e m i n g 1961: 8 1 5 - 2 8 ) . Consequently. T u r k e y
proved to be unfounded, because I I S a n d Soviet opposition to colonialism had
p l a c e d 50,000 troops on the
already given nationalist movements a n impetus towards independence.
S y r i a n borders
(Petran
1978:
123). The
US
The
g o v e r n m e n t b a c k e d T u r k e y ' s m i l i t a r y move. Secretary o f State D u l l e s declared
E g y p t i a n R e v o l u t i o n i n 1952 a n d Mossadeq's rise to power i n I r a n in the early
that a S o v i e t attack o n T u r k e y w o u l d trigger U S r e t a l i a t i o n ( F l e m i n g 1961: 890).
1950s made it clear that g r o w i n g n a t i o n a l i s m i n the M i d d l e East w o u l d not
I n response, K h r u s h c h e v t h r e a t e n e d T u r k e y by s a y i n g that the Soviet U n i o n
m a k e it easy for these states to back B r i t a i n . Rather, the nationalists w a n t e d to
was p r e p a r e d to use m i l i t a r y force i f necessary: ' W ' h e n the guns begin to fire,
t h r o w off Western control and consolidate their rule infernally. B r i t a i n therefore
the rockets w i l l b e g i n f l y i n g a n d then it w i l l be too late to t h i n k about it' (The
saw g r o w i n g nationalism i n the M i d d l e East as the central problem, especially
New lark Times, 10 O c t o b e r ¡ 9 5 7 ) . A l t h o u g h K h r u s h c h e v d i d not persist i n his
E g y p t i a n antagonism to British d o m i n a t i o n i n the A r a b M i d d l e East.
threats, the Turkish-American M u t u a l S e c u r i t y A c t , signed i n 1959, contained
B r i t a i n wanted to organize a M i d d l e East Defence O r g a n i z a t i o n ( M E D O ) to c o n t a i n nationalist movements. T h e U S government was more interested i n
a clause o f assurance t h a t the U n i t e d States w o u l d c o m e to Turkey's defence even i n the case o f ' i n d i r e c t c o m m u n i s t aggression'.
o r g a n i z i n g a northern c h a i n o f defence i n the i m m e d i a t e southern frontier o f the
T h i s caused heated debate i n the T u r k i s h P a r l i a m e n t , centred o n the
Soviet U n i o n . Despite its decolonization rhetoric, the U n i t e d States also opposed
suppression o f leftist p o l i t i c a l movements and the possibility o f U S m i l i t a r y
indigenous nationalist forces congesting B r i t i s h a n d French colonial control. I n
i n t e r v e n t i o n i n T u r k e y . T h e m a n n e r in w h i c h the T u r k i s h state was engaged
response to Nasser securing p o w e r i n E g y p t a n d g r o w i n g nationalism i n I r a n ,
i n the U S - l e d W e s t e r n s e c u r i t y alliance u n d e r s c o r e d the fact that b o t h factors
the U S government supported a m o n a r c h y i n S a u d i A r a b i a , the Shah's regime
represented a threat to n a t i o n a l independence (UlusNewspaper,
i n Iran, and H a s h e m i t e rule i n I r a q . H o w e v e r , the U n i t e d States did not need to
1958 a n d I, 3 A u g u s t 1958). T h e LIS m i l i t a r y h a d intervened i n L e b a n o n a n d
become involved i n the British-led M E D O . T h e y shifted their emphasis to the
J o r d a n u s i n g the I n c i r l i k air base i n T u r k e y without the consent of the T u r k i s h
'northern tier' concept, assembling Turkey, I r a n , Iraq, a n d Pakistan into a defence
government ( H a r r i s 1972: 67). T h e so-called U - 2 crisis a n d the placement o f
pact. T u r k e y played a significant roie in the formation o f this pact, but the U n i t e d
nuclear weapons i n T u r k e y i n the form o f 15 J u p i t e r missiles also reinforced
18, 23, 27, 3 0 J u l y
States was not a member. After the B r i t i s h entered, this alliance came to be k n o w n
the belief that state p o w e r h a d d i m i n i s h e d . O n I M a y 1960, a n A m e r i c a n U - 2
as the B a g h d a d Pact (1955). Turkey's role was to extend U S m i l i t a r y influence i n
intelligence plane f l y i n g f r o m i n c i r l i k c a r r i e d out a reconnaissance m i s s i o n a l l
the M i d d l e East, but the A r a b w o r l d , especially E g y p t , resisted the pact because it
the w a y f r o m P a k i s t a n , across the Soviet U n i o n , to N o r w a y . It took photographs
was seen as the continuation o f Western i m p e r i a l i s m in the region.
of i n d u s t r i a l centres, a i r f i e l d s , missile bases and other m i l i t a r y installations i n
T h e tripartite aggression o f B r i t a i n , F r a n c e , a n d Israel against. E g y p t in
1956 c o n f i r m e d that the
B a g h d a d P a c t was a n instrument
of Western
i m p e r i a l i s m . A s a result, E g y p t a n d S y r i a were pushed into a closer a l l i a n c e w i t h the Soviet bloc. T h e Soviet U n i o n d i d not care m u c h about i n d i g e n o u s nationalist movements a n d was more supportive o f p r o - c o m m u n i s t movements
the Soviet U n i o n . O n 9 M a y K h r u s h c h e v w a r n e d T u r k e y a n d other neighbours of the Soviet U n i o n t h a t ' i f t h e y a l l o w others to fly f r o m t h e i r bases to our territory we s h a l l hit those bases' ( F l e m i n g 1961: 1003). T h e opposition party i R P P ) accused the D P o f m a k i n g T u r k e y a n i m m e d i a t e target o f Soviet missile attacks (Cumhunyet Newspaper, 18 M a y 1960).
that presented alternative models to A r a b n a t i o n a l i s m (Bromley 1994). In
1957
the
Eisenhower
Doctrine
was
developed
to
contain
the
T h e T u r k i s h development ideal: a historical account
' c o m m u n i s t c a m p a i g n o f i n d i r e c t aggression' against conservative regimes i n the M i d d l e East. It was based on a U S c o m m i t m e n t to provide e c o n o m i c a i d a n d m i l i t a r y protection to any state i n the region thai m i g h t be under d i r e c t or ' i n d i r e c t c o m m u n i s t aggression' ( G o n l u b o l et al 1987: 287-901. T h e n o t i o n o f ' i n d i r e c t c o m m u n i s t aggression', a l t h o u g h imprecise, was used to include anynationalist a n d leftist movements, i n p r a c t i c a l terms, the ' i n d i r e c t c o m m u n i s t aggression' clause a l l o w e d the U S m i l i t a r y to intervene i n the i n t e r n a l politics o f any state for the purpose o f suppressing opposition movements—as i n the case of L e b a n o n a n d j o r d a n i n 1958.
Prime
Minister
development.
Menderes's
p r i m a r y concern
H e was less c o n c e r n e d w i t h the
was to
encourage
industrial
implications of exchanging
m i l i t a r y concessions for f o r e i g n a i d . T h e m i l i t a r y - s t r a t e g i c conditions under w h i c h T u r k e y e x p e r i e n c e d its i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n resulted i n the subversion o f the n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e p r i n c i p l e i m p l i c i t i n the post-war ' d e v e l o p m e n t project spelled out b y President T r u m a n h i m s e l f i n his i n a u g u r a t i o n speech o f 20 J a n u a r y 1949.
100
T U R K E Y . ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
The
I M F - i m p o s e d economic
stabilization programme
T H E C O L D W A R A N D T H E C R E A T I O N OF A N A T I O N A L BOURGEOISIE
of
1958
101
was
T u r k e y closer to the E E C . O n the e c o n o m i c front, the i n c r e a s i n g competitiveness
another i n d i c a t i o n o f the subversion o f n a t i o n a l independence. T h e I M F m a d e
of E u r o p e a n economies w i t h t h e U n i t e d States created positive conditions for
the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f foreign a i d c o n d i t i o n a l o n the government's acceptance o f a
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n efforts i n T u r k e y . M i g r a t i o n f r o m r u r a l to u r b a n areas, b o t h
stabilization p r o g r a m m e that d e v a l u e d the T u r k i s h l i r a , reduced budget deficits,
n a t i o n a l l y a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y , also facilitated the process o f i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n .
restricted m o n e t a r y g r o w t h , i n c r e a s e d the price o f S E E products,
decreased
In a d d i t i o n , T u r k e y benefited f r o m the export o f l a b o u r a b r o a d a n d the inflow
government spending, c u r t a i l e d the role o f the state i n economy, a n d l i b e r a l i z e d
of workers' remittances. L a b o u r m i g r a t i o n a i d e d the T u r k i s h e c o n o m y by easing
i m p o r t s . T h e inflow o f foreign a i d was also c o n d i t i o n a l u p o n the government's
the i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l p r o b l e m s c a u s e d by u r b a n u n e m p l o y m e n t .
support o f i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n based on private investment (Szyliowicz 1991: 76). M o r e o v e r , I M F experts urged the T u r k i s h government to adopt more p l a n n i n g i n order to b r i n g some degree o f c o n t r o l over p u b l i c s p e n d i n g a n d the a l l o c a t i o n
P l a n n e d i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n : T u r k e y , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , a n d the E E C
o f foreign exchange. A l t h o u g h a p l a n n i n g b o a r d was formed i n 1959, the transition to a p l a n n e d i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n strategy d i d not b e g i n u n t i l the m i l i t a r y
I n the 1950s the M a r s h a l l P l a n facilitated c o - o p e r a t i o n between the U n i t e d States a n d western E u r o p e a n states. T h e 1960s saw this relationship become
coup i n 1960 ended D P governance. T h e D P was p o p u l a r a m o n g r u r a l producers a n d u r b a n i n d u s t r i a l and w o r k i n g classes. M e n d e r e s was a well-respected c h a r i s m a t i c leader, but he c o u l d not g a i n full control over the m i l i t a r y bureaucracy. H i s i n a b i l i t y to secure the loyalty o f high-level m i l i t a r y bureaucrats c o n t r i b u t e d to his o v e r t h r o w i n the coup o f 27 M a y 1960. After the coup, the D P was shut d o w n a n d M e n d e r e s was executed, a l o n g w i t h his ministers o f finance, i n t e r n a l affairs, a n d external affairs. W i t h the overthrow o f the government, m i l i t a r y bureaucrats h o p e d to regain c o n t r o l over the course o f the development process. T h e type o f populist
one of c o m p e t i t i o n a n d r i v a l r y as these countries adjusted to their c h a n g e d positions i n the w o r l d . I n o r d e r to integrate E u r o p e i n t o the A t l a n t i c capitalist economy, U S p o l i c y - m a k e r s e n c o u r a g e d western E u r o p e a n u n i f i c a t i o n a r o u n d a t r a d i n g b l o c ( B l o c k 1977). I n
o r g a n i z a t i o n b e c a m e k n o w n as the E u r o p e a n U n i o n ( E U ) . U S p o l i c y - m a k e r s thought o f the E E C as a n i n s t r u m e n t for the flow o f goods a n d c a p i t a l between E u r o p e a n d the U n i t e d States, a n d between t h e m a n d the T h i r d W o r l d . H o w d i d T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t s reconcile domestic p o l i c y objectives w i t h
a l l i a n c e that the D P cultivated a m o n g r u r a l producers a n d private industrialists
shifting patterns i n the w o r l d e c o n o m y ? It b e c a m e clear that T u r k e y c o n t a i n e d
h a d clearly b r o k e n the b u r e a u c r a t i c t r a d i t i o n o f governance i n Turkey. I n the process o f r e a l i z i n g development goals, n a t i o n a l p o l i c y - m a k i n g was increasingly l o c k e d into the c o m p l e x b a r g a i n i n g process o f C o l d W a r d i p l o m a c y . B u r e a u c r a t i c cadres questioned the soundness o f the government
1958 the E u r o p e a n E c o n o m i c C o m m u n i t y
( E E C ) was f o r m e d to increase the v o l u m e o f i n t r a - E u r o p e a n trade. I n 1993 this
submitting
to a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutional a n d i d e o l o g i c a l framework that was expressed i n the very policies a n d procedures o f n a t i o n a l p o l i c y - m a k i n g , i n the v i e w o f m i l i t a r y bureaucrats, successful i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n necessitated a return to strong bureaucratic supervision o f the economy. M i l i t a r y coup bureaucrats instituted a centrally p l a n n e d i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n p o l i c y to be supervised by the State P l a n n i n g O r g a n i z a t i o n ( S P O ) . T h i s opened up possibilities for the emergence o f new p o l i t i c a l alliances, but. the focus o n state-planned i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n c a r r i e d w i t h it a bias against agriculture. T h e result was a novel h i s t o r i c a l c o m p r o m i s e based
a
powerful
political
faction
that
favoured
heavy
industrialization.
But,
however strong t h e i r support for i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n o n domestic grounds, heavy industrialization compelled governments
to p l a y out transatlantic
tensions
between the U n i t e d States a n d the E E C over e c o n o m i c a n d m i l i t a r y relations. T h e U S a d m i n i s t r a t i o n p l a c e d a high p r i o r i t y o n the e c o n o m i c integration of the T h i r d W o r l d i n t o the investment by t r a n s n a t i o n a l spreading
throughout
the
Atlantic economy through
private i n d u s t r i a l
c o m p a n i e s . A t the same t i m e , n a t i o n a l i s m was Third
World.
Notable
examples
include
pan-
A r a b i s m i n the M i d d l e East, e s p e c i a l l y after the Suez crisis, a n d South A s i a n r e v o l u t i o n a r y m o v e m e n t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n V i e t n a m , I n d o n e s i a , the P h i l i p p i n e s , a n d M a l a y a ( G o o d w i n 2001). U S p o l i c y - m a k e r s were then faced w i t h a ' T h i r d W o r l d p r o b l e m ' , r e s u l t i n g f r o m the difficulty o f b a l a n c i n g global economic
on a c o a l i t i o n between bureaucrats a n d large private i n d u s t r i a l capital.
i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h p o l i t i c a l n a t i o n a l i s m . T u r k e y ' s situation i n v o l v e d a h i g h l y T h e stability o f the p o l i t i c a l c o a l i t i o n between bureaucrats a n d private i n d u s t r i a l capitalists depended
o n the international
large
conjuncture
of
g r o w i n g rivalries i n N A T O between western E u r o p e a n d the U n i t e d States o n the one h a n d , and Greece a n d T u r k e y o n the other. E c o n o m i c a n d p o l i t i c a l ties
c o m p l i c a t e d i n t e r p l a y o f e c o n o m i c , p o l i t i c a l , a n d m i l i t a r y factors. B y v i r t u e of its g e o p o l i t i c a l l o c a t i o n , T u r k e y was able to cultivate close relations w i t h the E E C , the Soviet U n i o n , a n d M u s l i m countries o f the M i d d l e East. It also a l l i e d itself w i t h the U n i t e d States w h i l e p r o m o t i n g n a t i o n a l i s m .
w i t h the E u r o p e a n E c o n o m i c C o m m u n i t y ( E E C ) a l l o w e d T u r k e y to follow a state-led i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n policy. T h e political-strategic conflict between T u r k e y a n d the U n i t e d States over the C u b a n - T u r k i s h missile crisis a n d C y p r u s brought
T u r k e y was an i d e a l a l l y d u r i n g the 1950s, but i n the face o f r i s i n g U S criticism against
the g o v e r n m e n t ' s
p u b l i c s p e n d i n g , and the I M F - i m p o s e d
102
'TURKEY, ISLAMISTS A N D
stabilization programme,
DEMOCRACY
Tilt'. C O L D W A R A N D T H E C R E A T I O N O F A N A T I O N A L B O U R G E O I S I E
P r i m e M i n i s t e r M e n d e r e s decided to seek Soviet
103
g r a n t i n g o f sizable investment a n d export incentives. I n d u s t r i a l projects w h i c h
e c o n o m i c assistance ( K u c u k 1984: 536). Nevertheless, the government's effort
private i n d u s t r y d i d not
to establish closer relations w i t h the Soviet U n i o n was thwarted by the m i l i t a r y
sector. F o r large projects, w h i c h c o u l d not be u n d e r t a k e n by the private sector
c o u p o f 27 M a y 1960. T u r k i s h generals d e c l a r e d that they were not interested
alone, the m i x e d enterprise a p p r o a c h was preferred over w h o l l y state-owned
find
attractive were to be undertaken i n the p u b l i c
i n i m p r o v i n g relations w i t h the Soviet U n i o n . I n fact, the leader o f the coup,
enterprise. T h e t h i r d p l a n gave p r i o r i t y to investment i n intermediate-
G e n e r a l G u r s e l . rejected K h r u s h c h e v ' s offer o f US% 5 0 0 m i l l i o n i n economic
capital-goods p r o d u c i n g i n d u s t r i e s such as metallurgy, petrochemicals, i r o n ,
a n d t e c h n i c a l a i d ( G o n l u b o l 1971: 336).
steel, a n d m a c h i n e r y . T h i s p l a n e m p h a s i z e d m o r e vigorous state p a r t i c i p a t i o n
T h e m i l i t a r y coup was actually i n s t r u m e n t a l i n p a v i n g the way for the p o l i t i c a l c o a l i t i o n o f bureaucratic cadres
a n d a n i n d u s t r i a l bourgeoisie
and
i n industry. D e v e l o p e r s o f the p l a n s d e t e r m i n e d that the g r o w t h rate o f the gross n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t s h o u l d be 7 p e r cent per year.
a r o u n d a p l a n n e d i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n strategy. T h e State P l a n n i n g O r g a n i z a t i o n
T h e g r o w t h rate i n m a n u f a c t u r i n g was c a l c u l a t e d at m o r e than 10 p e r
( S P O ) was created three months after the coup i n September 1960, P l a n n e d
cent. Since n o n - d u r a b l e p r o d u c i n g textile a n d processed food industries h a d
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n became
that
already been developed, a n d g i v e n that consumer markets had g r o w n w i t h the
the i n d u s t r i a l bourgeoisie c a r r i e d little weight i n the T u r k i s h economy and
p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f s m a l l - p r o d u c i n g peasants, the first a n d second plans targeted
that o r g a n i z e d l a b o u r was yet to be discovered, the goal o f the S P O was to
the p r o d u c t i o n o f c o n s u m e r d u r a b l e s for domestic c o n s u m p t i o n . T h i s i n c l u d e d
prepare t h e m to b e c o m e d o m i n a n t players i n society. T h e key p r i n c i p l e of this
cars a n d household a p p l i a n c e s . M o s t o f the foreign exchange necessary for
p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y m o d e l was to m a n a g e i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n t h r o u g h p o l i t i c a l
i n d u s t r i a l investment w o u l d b e o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h the O E C D a n d E E C i n the
c o m p r o m i s e — a n a c c o m m o d a t i o n between private industrialists, a g r i c u l t u r a l
form o f loans.
groups,
commercial
a constitutional requirement
capital, a n d
bureaucratic
i n 1961. G i v e n
cadres—such
that
private
industrialists w o u l d eventually emerge as the l e a d i n g g r o u p .
The
implementation
o f the
S P O plans
became
a major
source
of
contention between the U n i t e d States a n d T u r k e y . T h e U S g o v e r n m e n t used a planners
report p r e p a r e d by the e c o n o m i s t K e n n e t h B e r r i l from C a m b r i d g e to argue that
out o f a c o n v i c t i o n that bureaucratic c o n t r o l a n d supervision o f the e c o n o m y
C o u p leaders tried l o transfer p o l i t i c a l p o w e r to development
a 7 per cent g r o w t h rate i n gross n a t i o n a l product was too high a n d u n r e a l i s t i c
was necessary for i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . H o w e v e r , there was n o consensus between
for T u r k e y . M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , the U S government w a n t e d T u r k i s h p l a n n e r s to
bureaucrats a n d private industrialists on a concrete p l a n for i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n .
give p r i o r i t y to p r i v a t e i n v e s t m e n t i n consumer g o o d s - p r o d u c i n g industries.
M o r e o v e r , i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n plans d i d not c o n f o r m to the interests o f small
T h e y also insisted o n the e l i m i n a t i o n o f state e c o n o m i c enterprises ( K e p e n e k
producers. T h i s new p e r i o d witnessed constant p o l i t i c a l a n d ideological tension
1984: 330-1). It s h o u l d be n o t e d that T u r k i s h - U S relations c o u l d not be l i m i t e d
between p o l i t i c a l parties over the a l l o c a t i o n o f scarce resources and i n c o m e
exclusively to e c o n o m i c p o l i c y , since p o l i t i c a l , d i p l o m a t i c , a n d m i l i t a r y issues
d i s t r i b u t i o n . I w i l l return to this argument later.
were also i m p l i c a t e d . I n fact,
the d i s t i n c t i o n between
economic, political,
T h e State P l a n n i n g O r g a n i z a t i o n p r e p a r e d three consecutive development
a n d m i l i t a r y concerns was a n i l l u s i o n . T h e C u b a n missile crisis o f 1962 a n d
plans, each of t h e m for a five-year p e r i o d . A l l were p a r t o f two 15-year timetables.
the C y p r u s question o f 1964 p r o v i d e d ample evidence to c o n v i n c e T u r k i s h
T h e first a n d second plans were p a r t of the first strategy o f import-substitution
governments that the U n i t e d States was not a reliable ally. C o n v i n c e d that the
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . T h e t h i r d p l a n was an a p p l i c a t i o n o f the second strategy to
U n i t e d States was m o r e i n t e r e s t e d i n its o w n n a t i o n a l interests t h a n the n a t i o n a l
be followed over the next 15 years. T h e first p l a n c o v e r e d the p e r i o d between
security o f its N A T O allies, T u r k e y began to cultivate closer relations w i t h the
1963 a n d 1967, the second p l a n between
E E C a n d to shift its foreign p o l i c y from a u n i d i m e n s i o n a l N A T O p o l i c y to a
1968 a n d 1972, a n d the t h i r d p l a n
between 1973 and 3977. T h e r e was also a fourth p l a n to be followed between
m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l one.
1979 a n d 1983. D u e to the I M F - i m p o s e d s t r u c t u r a l adjustment p r o g r a m m e o f 1979, it was not applied. In fact, after the t h i r d p l a n , the very idea o f p l a n n e d T h e 1962 C u b a n - T u r k i s h m i s s i l e c r i s i s
d e v e l o p m e n t i n T u r k e y lost its i m p o r t a n c e . A l l e c o n o m i c development plans a i m e d to achieve a complete system o f n a t i o n a l i n d u s t r y t h r o u g h protection from i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m p e t i t i o n . N a t i o n a l
T h e C u b a n missile crisis a n d subsequent S o v i e t - U S strategic d i a l o g u e over the
i n d u s t r y consisted o f three m a i n b r a n c h e s — c o n s u m e r
future o f nuclear-headed m i s s i l e s i n C u b a a n d T u r k e y l e d lo a
goods,
intermediate
rapprochement
goods, a n d investment goods p r o d u c t i o n . T h e first a n d second plans r e q u i r e d
between the U S a n d S o v i e t g o v e r n m e n t s . K h r u s h c h e v sent a letter to K e n n e d y
the g o v e r n m e n t
on 27 O c t o b e r 1962, stating t h a t the Soviet U n i o n w o u l d remove Soviet missiles
to assist the private sector i n project preparation
and
the
104
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
T H E C O L D W A R A N D T H E C R E A T I O N OF A N A T I O N A L BOURGEOISIE
105
f r o m C u b a a n d respect the n a t i o n a l sovereignty o f T u r k e y i f the U n i t e d States
C y p r u s state was established i n 1960 ( E h r l i c h 1974: 37-8). A s a N A T O p o l i c y
w o u l d g u a r a n t e e the same for C u b a a n d remove J u p i t e r missiles from T u r k e y
c o m p r o m i s e , G r e e c e was to g i v e up the idea ai enosis a n d B r i t a i n was to renounce
( C o u n c i l o n F o r e i g n Relations 1962: 3 9 6 - 7 ) . I n the event o f a U S invasion o f
c o l o n i a l c o n t r o l o f C y p r u s . B o t h G r e e c e a n d T u r k e y accepted the p r i n c i p l e o f
C u b a , o n the other h a n d , the Soviet U n i o n w o u l d retaliate by i n v a d i n g T u r k e y
a n independent C y p r u s i n w h i c h G r e e k a n d T u r k i s h c o m m u n i t i e s w o u l d share
a n d a t t a c k i n g their N A T O m i l i t a r y bases. I n response, the U S government
p o w e r ( H a l e 2 0 0 0 : 131).
decided to a b a n d o n its J u p i t e r nuclear missile project i n T u r k e y i n exchange for Soviet w i t h d r a w a l o f missiles from C u b a . Despite
the
fact
that
Turkey
refused
The
1960 T r e a t y
of G u a r a n t e e
made Turkey, Greece,
and
Britain
g u a r a n t o r powers w i t h the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f p r o h i b i t i n g a l l activity that d i r e c t l y US
or i n d i r e c t l y p r o m o t e d u n i o n w i t h G r e e c e o r p a r t i t i o n i n g o f the i s l a n d . I n the
government proceeded to remove the missiles f r o m T u r k e y . T u r k e y was not
(Vali
1971:
128-9),
the
event o f a b r e a c h o f treaty, g u a r a n t o r powers reserved the right to take a c t i o n
i n c l u d e d i n S o v i e t - U S negotiations a n d interpreted this as a direct U S v i o l a t i o n
after consultation w i t h e a c h o t h e r . A c c o r d i n g to the T r e a t y o f A l l i a n c e , G r e e k
o f its sovereignty rights. It was suddenly confronted w i t h the question o f what
and T u r k i s h governments w e r e e m p o w e r e d to protect C y p r u s m i l i t a r i l y . T h i s
NATO
a
i n c l u d e d the establishment o f a p e r m a n e n t m i l i t a r y headquarters stationed w i t h
transatlantic m u t u a l assistance treaty into an integrated m i l i t a r y alliance r u n by
950 G r e e k a n d 650 T u r k i s h t r o o p s . T h e T r e a t y o f Establishment, o n the other
the U n i t e d States. T h e decisive weapons for N A T O ' s defence were not subject
h a n d , stipulated that B r i t a i n w o u l d r e t a i n sovereignty over two m i l i t a r y b a s e s -
to i n t e g r a t i o n , but were under direct U S c o n t r o l ( C a l i e o 1970: 28). T u r k e y
a n area t o t a l l i n g 99 square m i l e s ( H a r t 1990: 343-58).
membership
meant. T h e reality was that N A T O
evolved from
interpreted the U S h a n d l i n g o f the missile crisis as the assertion o f U S n a t i o n a l self-interest over Turkey. Consequently, the restoration o f national principles outside o f U S m i l i t a r y c o n t r o l b e c a m e a n urgent c o n c e r n (Sander 1979: 198¬
T h e J o h n s o n letter a n d the A c h e s o n p l a n
203). U S u n i l a t e r a l i s m i n N A T O r e d u c e d Turkey's strategic i m p o r t a n c e for U S C o l d W a r p o l i c y i n the M i d d l e East, w h i l e S a u d i A r a b i a a n d I r a n became m o r e i m p o r t a n t . T u r k e y proceeded to increase its b a r g a i n i n g power w i t h the U n i t e d States by i m p r o v i n g p o l i t i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c relations w i t h the E E C , the Soviet U n i o n , a n d M u s l i m states in the M i d d l e East. T h e tension w i t h i n N A T O between T u r k e y a n d G r e e c e over C y p r u s b e c a m e a n o t h e r issue that illustrated the i m p o r t a n c e for T u r k e y o f m a i n t a i n i n g the n a t i o n a l sovereignty p r i n c i p l e .
T h e C y p r u s question r e - e m e r g e d i n 1963 w h e n the G r e e k leader a n d President of C y p r u s , M a k a r i o s , s u s p e n d e d the Z u r i c h - L o n d o n agreements a n d d e c i d e d to revise the constitution. H i s i n t e n t i o n was to p u r s u e the independence o f C y p r u s under exclusive G r e e k r u l e . F o r this, he sought support f r o m the Soviet U n i o n a n d the n o n - a l i g n e d states o f t h e B a n d u n g Conference ( K i t c h e n s 1984: 5 7 - 6 0 ) . T h e U S a n d T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t s were not supportive o f a n independent C y p r u s . T h e U S g o v e r n m e n t w a s u n h a p p y w i t h M a k a r i o s ' s close relations w i t h the Soviet U n i o n and E g y p t , as w e l l as his c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h the c o m m u n i s t A K E L p a r t y i n C y p r u s ( U S C o n g r e s s 3980). A c c o r d i n g to U S U n d e r s e c r e t a r y of State G e o r g e W . B a l l , C y p r u s h a d i m p o r t a n t strategic i m p l i c a t i o n s for N A T O
T h e C y p r u s question
defence. H o w e v e r , because o f t h e e t h n i c ties o f C y p r i o t s to G r e e c e a n d T u r k e y , U n t i l its independence was granted i n 1960, C y p r u s h a d been a formal B r i t i s h
a n d the c o m p l i c a t e d treaty s t r u c t u r e o f the Z u r i c h - L o n d o n agreements, the
1925
C y p r u s conflict h a d the p o t e n t i a l to u n d e r m i n e the stability o f N A T O ' s southern
L a u s a n n e Peace Treaty. D u r i n g the 1950s, G r e e c e shifted its p o l i c y a n d b e g a n
flank defences. T h e U S g o v e r n m e n t was w o r r i e d that the C y p r u s conflict c o u l d
to c a m p a i g n for the end o f B r i t i s h r u l e i n C y p r u s a n d the u n i f i c a t i o n o f C y p r u s
b r i n g the Soviet U n i o n i n t o t h e strategic eastern M e d i t e r r a n e a n ( A d a m s a n d
a n d Greece. T h e G r e e k i d e a l o f u n i t i n g C y p r u s w i t h G r e e c e is k n o w n as enosis
C o n t t r e l l 1968: 4).
c o l o n y — a status accepted by b o t h T u r k e y a n d G r e e c e as part o f the
( C o u i o u m b i s 1983).
C o n c e r n e d w i t h the fate o f T u r k i s h C y p r i o t s , the T u r k i s h government, led
U n d e r the strong p o l i t i c a l influence o f U S a n d B r i t i s h diplomacy, the
by the R P P , d e c i d e d to i n t e r v e n e m i l i t a r i l y i n C y p r u s to prevent the a b o l i t i o n o f
U N decided i n 1957 that the C y p r u s p r o b l e m s h o u l d be solved by negotiations
all p a r t n e r s h i p rights a n d p r o t e c t the a u t o n o m y o f the T u r k i s h m i n o r i t y ( G e l i k
between B r i t a i n , Turkey, a n d G r e e c e . A d a m s a n d C o n t t r e l l 1964: 72-83). I n
1999: 48). P r i m e M i n i s t e r I n o n u i n f o r m e d the U S government o f his intention.
1959, t h r o u g h N A T O m e d i a t i o n , the Z u r i c h a n d L o n d o n agreements were
T h e U S response was spelled o u t i n a letter w r i t t e n b y President J o h n s o n o n
negotiated between
5 J u n e 1964 ( H a r t 1990: 1 6 3 - 7 5 ) . President J o h n s o n t o l d I n o n u that T u r k i s h
Greece, Turkey, B r i t a i n , a n d the leaders o f G r e e k a n d
T u r k i s h c o m m u n i t i e s i n C y p r u s . F o l l o w i n g these agreements a n
independent
i n t e r v e n t i o n i n C y p r u s w o u l d l e a d to a w a r between T u r k e y a n d G r e e c e . A w a r
106
T H E C O L D W A R A N D T H E C R E A T I O N OF A N A T I O N A L BOURGEOISIE
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
between N A T O countries was 'literally u n t h i n k a b l e ' . J o h n s o n was blunt i n his
107
T u r k e y a n d the E E C
assertion that N A T O a n d the U n i t e d States w o u l d not be obliged to protect T u r k e y , since they 'have not h a d a chance to consider whether they have a n
T h e r e was general consensus a m o n g p o l i t i c a l parties that it was i n Turkey's best
o b l i g a t i o n to protect T u r k e y against the Soviet U n i o n i f T u r k e y takes a step
interest to m a i n t a i n a balance i n relations b e t w e e n E u r o p e and the U n i t e d States
w h i c h results in Soviet i n t e r v e n t i o n ' ( H a l e 2 0 0 0 : 149). President J o h n s o n also
i n o r d e r to m a x i m i z e f l e x i b i l i t y w i t h i n N A T O . T h e D P government a p p l i e d for
told I n o n u that T u r k e y was not to use any U S - s u p p l i e d m i l i t a r y e q u i p m e n t
E E C m e m b e r s h i p o n 31. J u l v 1959. G r e e c e h a d a p p l i e d two weeks earlier a n d
for purposes other t h a n those i n v o l v i n g N A T O interests w i t h o u t U S consent,
T u r k e y d i d not w a n t to be left b e h i n d ( B i r a n d 2000). A l t h o u g h disrupted by
Johnson's u l t i m a t u m - l i k e letter caused bitter p a r l i a m e n t a r y debate a n d deep
the m i l i t a r y c o u p , m e m b e r s h i p negotiations resulted i n the A n k a r a T r e a t y o f
c o n c e r n over the U S a n d N A T O c o m m i t m e n t to Turkey's security. F o r I n o n u ,
A s s o c i a t i o n b e i n g signed i n 1963. G r e e c e h a d s i g n e d its association agreement
a n a l l i a n c e that i g n o r e d its contractual obligations a n d its c o m m i t m e n t
i n 1961.
to
m e m b e r s ' security was u n i m a g i n a b l e ( H a r t 1990: 163-72V T h e J o h n s o n letter was interpreted
as an a b a n d o n m e n t
T h e p e r i o d d u r i n g w h i c h T u r k e y ' s m e m b e r s h i p i n the E E C was negotiated and
betrayal
o f T u r k e y . A s a result. a n t i - A m e r i c a n sentiments grew and h e l p e d to foster nationalist fervour i n T u r k e y . I n o n u a n n o u n c e d
that 'our friends a n d
coincides w i t h the p e r i o d w h e n i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n plans were conceived subsequently
applied.
The
Ankara
Treaty
and
the
subsequent
and
Brussels
our
S u p p l e m e n t a r y P r o t o c o l o f 1970 shaped the first t w o i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n plans o f
RPP
T u r k e y ( l i a l k i r ¡ 9 9 3 1 . B o t h the A n k a r a T r e a t y a n d the supplementary p r o t o c o l
' w o u l d be useless for
stipulated a schedule for a ' p r e p a r a t o r y p e r i o d ' (1964—73), to be followed b y a
T u r k e y i f [our] allies c h a n g e d their c o m m i t m e n t s to the defence o f m e m b e r
' t r a n s i t i o n a l p e r i o d ' (1973-95). A g r a d u a l r e d u c t i o n o f trade barriers a n d the
states' (Ecevit ¡ 9 6 5 ) . T h e T u r k i s h press started to call for a revision o f Turkey's
e l i m i n a t i o n o f tariffs w o u l d c u l m i n a t e i n a customs u n i o n for T u r k e y by 1995,
enemies
have j o i n e d hands against
us' ( V a l i
1971: 132). E c e v i t , the
S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l , d e c l a r e d that N A T O m e m b e r s h i p
foreign p o l i c y . For e x a m p l e , C e t i n A l t a n urged the g o v e r n m e n t to follow a
thus c r e a t i n g d i e p o s s i b i l i t y o f T u r k i s h accession to the E E C ( K a l e 2 0 0 0 : 175).
n o n - a l i g n m e n t p o l i c y (Milliyet Newspaper, H J u l y 1964). A b d i i p e k c i c a l l e d for
T u r k i s h i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n p l a n s were designed to p r e p a r e T u r k e y for free trade
a n i m p r o v e m e n t i n relations w i t h the Soviet U n i o n [Milliyet Newspaper, 5 A u g u s t
w i t h i n the customs u n i o n .
1964), a n d the W o r k e r s ' P a r t y o f T u r k e v became h i g h l y v o c a l i n expressing' a n t i A m e r i c a n sentiments, c a l l i n g for Turkey's w i t h d r a w a l from N A T O .
Turkish
planners
accepted
import
substitution
as the
most
suitable
strategy for i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . It was assumed that c a p i t a l goods i m p o r t s w o u l d
R i s i n g a n t i - A m e r i c a n i s m was further intensified by a p r o p o s a l from former
g r o w w i t h i n d u s t r i a l d e v e l o p m e n t . E x p o r t s o f a g r i c u l t u r a l goods were expected
U S Secretary o f Stale D e a n A c h e s o n i n 1964 to p a r t i t i o n C y p r u s ( K i t c h e n s
to increase very slowly, a n d i n d u s t r i a l exports, it was believed, w o u l d emerge
1984: 5 8 " 6 0 L T u r k e y and G r e e c e b o t h rejected the p l a n . Johnson's response to
o n l y w i t h great difficulty. P e s s i m i s m r e g a r d i n g exports was based on the l i m i t e d
Greece's rejection o f the p l a n was to w i t h d r a w N A T O a i d from G r e e c e . P r i m e
w o r l d d e m a n d for T u r k i s h a g r i c u l t u r a l goods. T h e r e f o r e , e c o n o m i c plans o f the
M i n i s t e r G e o r g e P a p a n d r e o u , i n t u r n , decided to r e t h i n k G r e e k m e m b e r s h i p i n
p e r i o d d i d not include p r o g r a m m e s for a g r i c u l t u r a l g r o w t h ( K e p e n e k
N A T O . J o h n s o n r e p l i e d w i t h a blatant threat to G r e e k sovereignty:
1.59). P l a n n e r s h o p e d that the i m p o r t substitution strategy w o u l d eventually l i m i t
1984:
the trade deficit r e s u l t i n g f r o m h i g h i m p o r t a n d l o w e x p o r t levels. H a v i n g thus Fuck your parliament a n d your constitution. A m e r i c a is a n elephant. C y p r u s is a flea. Greece is a flea. I f these two fellows continue i t c h i n g the elephant, they m a y just get whacked by the elephant's trunk, w h a c k e d g o o d ... I f y o u r P r i m e M i n i s t e r gives me talk about democracy, parliament a n d the constitution, he, his parliament and his constitution m a y not last very long (Kitchens 1984: 61—2).
a c k n o w l e d g e d the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f large gaps i n trade balance, T u r k i s h planners r e l i e d o n the flow o f foreign c a p i t a l to fill the t r a d e gap. W i t h the A n k a r a A g r e e m e n t , the E E C c o m m i t t e d itself to p r o v i d i n g T u r k e y w i t h
financial
aid
f r o m the E u r o p e a n Investment B a n k ( E I B ) . B e t w e e n 1964 a n d 1969 T u r k e y obtained
175 m i l l i o n E C U t o
finance
project investment. I n 1970 the E E C
a g r e e d to p r o v i d e T u r k e y w i t h a n o t h e r 220 m i l l i o n i n credit, to be used between 1973 a n d 1976 (Karluk 1990: 248-51). T h e b u l k o f E E C aid was allocated to
T h e T u r k i s h response to U S belligerence was also one o f d i s m a y a n d d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t , l e a d i n g to a m o r e independent foreign policy that w o u l d allow T u r k e y greater ties to the E E C .
flexibility.
T h e search for independence brought w i t h it closer
p u b l i c sector investments i n i n t e r m e d i a r y a n d c a p i t a l goods p r o d u c t i o n , as w e l l as energy related investments. T u r k i s h p l a n n e r s h o p e d that import-substitution i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n w o u l d p r o d u c e a b a l a n c e d trade regime that w o u l d eventually result i n a r e d u c e d need for f o r e i g n
financing.
108
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
T h e E E C was founded to increase the volume o f i n t r a - E u r o p e a n trade t h r o u g h t a r i f f cuts. Therefore, Turkey's integration w i t h the E E C r e q u i r e d
60 a n d 80 p e r cent o f p r o d u c t cost ( W o r l d B a n k 1982: 302). A s a result, the terms o f i n t e r n a l trade c o n t i n u a l l y i m p r o v e d i n favour o f a g r i c u l t u r e .
changes i n the state p l a n n i n g o f i n d u s t r i a l g r o w t h a n d a move away from protective i m p o r t - s u b s t i t u t i o n i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . H o w e v e r , the statist w i t h i n the R P P , a l o n g w i t h S P O bureaucrats
109
T H E C O L D W A R A N D T H E C R E A T I O N OF A NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE
I n the 1950s p r o d u c t i o n increases were due to the expansion of the a r e a
faction
under c u l t i v a t i o n . G r o w t h i n a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n i n the 1960s and 1970s
a n d newly e m e r g i n g Islamist
was a result o f increases i n y i e l d . T h i s was a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h the i n t r o d u c t i o n
groups, were o p p o s e d to reductions i n tariffs and other trade barriers. T h e
of i m p r o v e d m e t h o d s o f c u l t i v a t i o n , e x p a n s i o n o f the area u n d e r i r r i g a t i o n ,
p e r i o d between 1964 a n d 1979 i n T u r k e y was therefore m a r k e d by p o l i t i c a l
increased use o f c h e m i c a l f e r t i l i z e r s , i m p r o v e d pest a n d disease control, and the
tension
trade l i b e r a l i z a t i o n . A s successive J P
development o f a n efficient m a r k e t i n g system. I n 1973, 57.8 p e r cent o f f a m i l y
governments o f the p e r i o d i m p l e m e n t e d policies for the g r a d u a l r e m o v a l o f
farmers used insecticides, 30 p e r cent of the total i r r i g a b l e l a n d was i r r i g a t e d ,
between
protectionism
and
trade barriers, o p p o s i t i o n to the J P became more vociferous. Although
E E C countries
reduced
customs
duties
a n d 85 p e r cent o f farmers used a c o m b i n a t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l inputs i n their on
a
number
c o m m o d i t i e s i m p o r t e d f r o m T u r k e y , a g r i c u l t u r a l concessions were
of
p r o d u c t i o n ( K e p e n e k 1984: 2 4 2 - 9 1 . T h e n u m b e r o f tractors also increased m o r e
limited.
t h a n tenfold, r e a c h i n g a ratio o f one tractor p e r 37 hectares. T h e capital-output
Tariffs d i d not d i s a p p e a r a n d the E E C C o m m o n A g r i c u l t u r a l P o l i c y ( C A P ) kept
ratio i n a g r i c u l t u r e rose from 1.9 p e r cent between 1966 and 1968 to 4 per cent
a g r i c u l t u r a l i m p o r t prices very low. Turkey's chances o f i n c r e a s i n g exports to the
between 1973 a n d 1978 ( W o r l d B a n k 1982: 29).
E E C were very l i m i t e d . Nonetheless, Turkey's imports from the E E C increased
The
rapid expansion
o f c o m m e r c i a l a c t i v i t y i n agriculture d i d
not
f r o m 29 per cent i n 1963 to 42 p e r cent i n 1972 ( K a r l u k ¡"990: 2 1 3 - 4 , 2 3 4 - 8 ) .
result i n class p o l a r i z a t i o n a m o n g r u r a l p r o d u c e r s . I n fact, peasant o w n e r s h i p
Consequently, the foreign trade deficit increased from U S $ 147.5 m i l l i o n i n
was c o n s o l i d a t e d . G o v e r n m e n t s refrained f r o m i m p o s i n g any direct taxes o n
1960 to US8 3,338 m i l l i o n i n 1975 ( H a t i p o g l u 1978: 114). T h i s was largely due
a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o p e r t y a n d i n c o m e . T h e y also c o n t i n u e d to subsidize a g r i c u l t u r a l
to the fact that the C A P a n d the free movement o f a g r i c u l t u r a l products a m o n g
inputs a n d increase support p r i c e s for most crops. W i t h government
E E C m e m b e r stales i n v o l v e d the diversion o f i m p o r t s away f r o m other countries
peasants constituted a n i m p o r t a n t c o n s u m i n g segment for domestic industry.
to full members. I n a d d i t i o n , other M e d i t e r r a n e a n countries such as S p a i n ,
They
P o r t u g a l , a n d G r e e c e , whose products were s i m i l a r to those o f Turkey, a n d a n
fertilizers, T V sets, cars, a n d tractors. A l t h o u g h the level o f m i g r a t i o n f r o m
consumed
domestically produced
support,
textiles, c l o t h i n g , processed
food,
i n c r e a s i n g n u m b e r o f countries from Europe's former M e d i t e r r a n e a n colonies,
r u r a l to u r b a n areas was h i g h , this was n o t because o f the r u r a l push factor
were also used to i m p o r t substitute T u r k i s h exports ( K a z g a n 1976: 331-41).
r e s u l t i n g f r o m landlessness a n d poverty. It was state p o l i c y i n order to create
T h e consequence
cheap l a b o u r for industry.
o f this trade regime was that u n - e x p o r t a b l e a g r i c u l t u r a l
c o m m o d i t i e s were d u m p e d i n domestic markets at low prices w h i l e foreign exchange earned from a g r i c u l t u r a l exports r e m a i n e d low. Industry Agriculture
T h e cornerstone o f the d e v e l o p m e n t strategy was to transform the productive structure
from
consumer
goods-producing
industries
to
investment
and
Despite the l i m i t e d o p p o r t u n i t i e s for i n c r e a s i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l exports, T u r k i s h
i n t e r m e d i a r y g o o d s - p r o d u c i n g industries. P l a n n e r s h o p e d that the structural
governments o f the p e r i o d c o n t i n u e d to support a g r i c u l t u r e , just as the D P
changes i n i n d u s t r y w o u l d r e d u c e T u r k e y ' s dependence o n foreign b o r r o w i n g
h a d i n the 1950s. T h e s e governments a i m e d to achieve self-sufficiency i n food
a n d facilitate the country's full Integration w i t h the E E C i n relation to trade.
p r o d u c t i o n a n d to increase the p r o d u c t i o n of a g r i c u l t u r a l e x p o r t items. B y 1977
H o w e v e r , the A n k a r a A g r e e m e n t o f 1964 a n d the Brussels S u p p l e m e n t a r y
the value o f support extended to farmers was equivalent to 22 per cent o f that
P r o t o c o l o f 1970 anticipated
year's total a g r i c u l t u r a l output ( K e y d e r 1987: 158). G o v e r n m e n t s also r e g u l a r l y
domestic industry. T a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s were to take p l a c e a c c o r d i n g to a 12-
increased t h e i r purchase prices. I n the case of wheat, government
g r a d u a l reductions i n protective measures for
purchase
y e a r a n d 22-year timetable. F o r c o n s u m e r goods, 69 p e r cent o f the value o f
prices increased from 4.5 p e r cent i n 1972 to 34.0 per cent i n 1977. C o t t o n prices
p r o d u c t i o n was subject to 22 y e a r s o f p r o t e c t i o n , w h i l e 31 per cent was protected
rose from 7.9 per cent i n 1967 to 19.8 per cent i n 1977. G o v e r n m e n t credits to
for 12 years. F o r intermediate goods, the figures were 58 per cent and 42 per
a g r i c u l t u r e also i n c r e a s e d , from 10.74 per cent i n 1963 to 62.16 per cent i n 1975
cent, a n d for c a p i t a l goods 63 p e r cent a n d 37 p e r cent respectively ( O k y a r 1976:
i K e p e n e k 1984: 243, 254). I n 1979, subsidies for fertilizers a m o u n t e d to between
38j. i n the course o f meeting the r e q u i r e m e n t s o f the supplementary p r o t o c o l ,
no
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D
T H E C O E D W A R A N D T H E C R E A T I O N or A N A T I O N A L B O U R G E O I S I E
DEMOCRACY
111
T u r k e y r e d u c e d tariffs o n i m p o r t s . T h e average i m p o r t tax rate was reduced
shortage was especially acute i n West G e r m a n y w h e n the B e r l i n W a l l shut off
to 55 p e r cent i n 1970 a n d then to 40 p e r cent i n 1973. T h e tariff rate was at its
the labour supply from East G e r m a n y . D u r i n g the 1960s a n d early 1970s at least 15 m i l l i o n workers m i g r a t e d f r o m southern E u r o p e a n d the M e d i t e r r a n e a n to
lowest i n 1974, at a p p r o x i m a t e l y 30 p e r cent ( K o r u m 1976: 192). T h e five-year development plans a n d integration w i t h the E E C constituted aspects o f the official
industrialization strategy of Turkey. T h e question o f
E u r o p e . I n G e r m a n y , m i g r a n t workers comprised 10.3 per cent o f the total l a b o u r force. In F r a n c e in 1974 the figure was 10.8 per cent (Atasoy 2003b: 611.
whether or not they were compatible u n d e r p i n n e d the political tension between
A l t h o u g h T u r k e y was a late starter in e x p o r t i n g l a b o u r c o m p a r e d to other
protectionism a n d trade liberalization as expressed by the R P P a n d pro-Islamists
countries o f the M e d i t e r r a n e a n ( K r a n e 1979: 146-220), high-levels o f r u r a l
of the p e r i o d . I n 1976, die R P P government stopped tariff reductions a n d froze
m i g r a t i o n to the cities p r o d u c e d a significant n u m b e r o f p o t e n t i a l
T u r k i s h - E E C relations until after 1987. T h i s decision was made out of a conviction
Development managers encouraged
that E E C integration was incompatible w i t h Turkey's development plans.
high-wage p o l i c y to create a n i n d u s t r i a l w o r k i n g class. T h e 1961 constitution,
T h e difficulty o f financing i m p o r t s for i n d u s t r i a l g r o w t h was b e h i n d the government's
decision to freeze relations w i t h the E E C . E x p o r t p u r c h a s i n g
p o w e r was lowest between
1970 a n d
1977 ( W o r l d B a n k 3980a: 46).
The
e c o n o m i c recession i n E u r o p e d u r i n g the 1970s, w h i c h resulted from the o i l p r i c e shock a n d collapse o f the Bretton W o o d s m o n e t a r y system, further weakened the e x p o r t p u r c h a s i n g p o w e r o f T u r k e y . A s e x p l a i n e d below, the recession In E u r o p e ended the T u r k i s h export o f l a b o u r a n d r e d u c e d the inflow o f workers' remittances. financial
The
resulting l a b o u r surplus
in Turkey placed an
enormous
b u r d e n o n the government, w h i c h was unable to create enough jobs to
absorb u r b a n unemployment. I n the context of the u n f o l d i n g f i n a n c i a l crisis, the g o v e r n m e n t r e c o g n i z e d that trade l i b e r a l i z a t i o n was unsustainable. It therefore
urban
adopted after the m i l i t a r y c o u p , granted workers the right to f o r m u n i o n s a n d to strike. T h e s e rights were i n t r o d u c e d to allow workers to b a r g a i n for h i g h e r wages through collective b a r g a i n i n g . A s a result, real wages i n the o r g a n i z e d sector of large i m p o r t substituting industries rose by 5 to 7 per cent a n n u a l l y between 1963 a n d 1971. T h i s further s t i m u l a t e d m i g r a t i o n to u r b a n areas, especially for those released f r o m f a r m i n g b y a g r i c u l t u r a l m e c h a n i z a t i o n . H o w e v e r , i n d u s t r i a l j o b creation was n o t as successful as development m a n a g e r s h o p e d . T h e first development p l a n forecast 7 p e r cent g r o w t h i n i n d u s t r i a l e m p l o y m e n t , but the a c t u a l increase a m o u n t e d to o n l y 58 per cent o f the target (Paine 1974: 33). T h e second development p l a n also p r o d u c e d considerably less i n d u s t r i a l e m p l o y m e n t t h a n expected. I n 1972 the u n e m p l o y m e n t rate reached
13.3 p e r cent o f a n
e c o n o m i c a l l y active p o p u l a t i o n o f 15 m i l l i o n . It appears that the
suspended T u r k e y ' s t a r i f f reduction obligations.
migrants.
rural migration and adopted an
state-planned
high-wage p o l i c y that e n c o u r a g e d high-levels o f r u r a l m i g r a t i o n was p r o d u c i n g a w a g e - e a r n i n g class i n u r b a n l a b o u r markets that was p o t e n t i a l l y u n e m p l o y a b l e . T h e e x p o r t o f l a b o u r to E E C c o u n t r i e s
E x p o r t i n g excess u r b a n l a b o u r abroad was thus a n attractive p o l i c y for r e d u c i n g u r b a n u n e m p l o y m e n t a n d easing p o t e n t i a l p o l i t i c a l p r o b l e m s . T h i s was experienced
i n a d d i t i o n to the e c o n o m i c benefits resulting f r o m the inflow o f e x p o r t workers
significant l a b o u r shortages, j a p a n also faced a s i m i l a r p r o b l e m . W h i l e Japanese
In
the
course
of rapid
post-war
economic
growth
Europe
savings a n d remittances. T u r k e y ' s u n e m p l o y m e n t figures also r e m a i n e d lower
firms
chose to invest i n the T h i r d W o r l d , E u r o p e a n capitalists systematically
t h a n they w o u l d have o t h e r w i s e . T h e increase i n e m p l o y m e n t a b r o a d was slightly
r e c r u i t e d workers from the T h i r d W o r l d . W i t h the p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f m i g r a n t
m o r e t h a n o n e - t h i r d o f the i n c r e a s e i n domestic n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l e m p l o y m e n t —
l a b o u r , E u r o p e a n countries restructured their economies a n d achieved strong
about the same as the n u m b e r o f jobs created b y T u r k e y ' s i n d u s t r i a l sector
e c o n o m i c g r o w t h rates. T h e y were also able to increase their export c a p a c i t y
( T U S I A D 1982). I n the early 1970s G e r m a n y absorbed nearly 100,000 T u r k i s h
a n d a c c u m u l a t e capital at a faster rate t h a n the U n i t e d States ( A r m s t r o n g et
workers a year fAtasoy 2 0 0 3 b : 6 0 ) . B y 1976 there were 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 T u r k i s h workers
al 19911. E u r o p e i m p o r t e d l a b o u r t e m p o r a r i l y w i t h the u n d e r s t a n d i n g
that
abroad, i n a d d i t i o n to a p p r o x i m a t e l y one m i l l i o n f a m i l y members. T h e i n f l o w
m i g r a n t s w o u l d return to their c o u n t r y o f o r i g i n after this p e r i o d h a d elapsed.
o f remittances from these w o r k e r s increased foreign exchange e a r n i n g s so that
In West G e r m a n y , the migrants were defined as guest workers. T h e v were m e n
T u r k e y c o u l d i m p o r t c a p i t a l g o o d s a n d raw materials for its i n d u s t r y w i t h o u t
u n d e r the age o f 40 w o r k i n g o n 12-month contracts a n d l i v i n g i n dormitories
entering into a debt crisis. B y t h e early 1970s, workers' remittances added 1 p e r
a n d hostels o n a short-term, r o t a t i n g basis ( K o l i n s k y 1996: 80). E u r o p e met its labour needs b y i m p o r t i n g workers from N o r t h A f r i c a n , southern E u r o p e a n , and other M e d i t e r r a n e a n countries. France received m i g r a n t l a b o u r from its N o r t h A f r i c a n colonies of A l g e r i a and T u n i s i a . G e r m a n y recruited workers from Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, P o r t u g a l . S p a m , a n d Italy. T h e l a b o u r
cent to the a n n u a l g r o w t h o f t h e G N P (Paine 1974). T h e i n f l o w o f remittances to T u r k e y a m o u n t e d to U S $ 1 b i l l i o n a n n u a l l y {Hale 2 0 0 0 : 176V T h e energy
crisis o f 1973 a n d the
e c o n o m i c recession that followed
directly affected E u r o p e ' s c a p a c i t y to absorb m i g r a n t labour. B e g i n n i n g i n 1973, E E C countries t e r m i n a t e d f u r t h e r recruitment o f foreign labour. T h e l a b o u r
112
T U R K E Y . ISLAMISTS A N D
T H E C O L D W A R A N D T H E C R E A T I O N OF A N A T I O N A L BOURGEOISIE
DEMOCRACY
¡13
r e c r u i t m e n t b a n was a c c o m p a n i e d by a p r o g r a m m e o f financial incentives to
b e c a m e a serious p o l i t i c a l p r o b l e m as a n i n c r e a s i n g n u m b e r o f ' u n - e x p o n a b l e '
encourage workers to return to t h e i r c o u n t r y o f o r i g i n . Between 1974 and 1975
workers j o i n e d the i n f o r m a l
the n u m b e r o f foreign workers e m p l o y e d i n industry fell by more than 20 p e r
affiliation,
cent ( L e i t b a u s e r 1988: 179V W i t h l a b o u r m i g r a t i o n c o m i n g to an end, T u r k e v
investment i n the p u b l i c sector. T h e i r hope was to create sufficient employment
governments
sector o f the economy. R e g a r d l e s s o f p o l i t i c a l
o f the
p e r i o d responded
by i n c r e a s i n g i n d u s t r i a l
e x p e r i e n c e d a threefold increase i n u n e m p l o y m e n t between 1974 a n d ¡ 9 7 8 . B y
to offset that lost from
the e n d o f the 1970s the u n e m p l o y m e n t rate was almost 16 per cent fAtasoy
i n c r e a s i n g trade deficit, state investment i n industry was m a i n t a i n e d only by
2 0 0 3 b : 61V T h e decline i n E u r o p e a n d e m a n d for m i g r a n t labour d u r i n g the
d r a i n i n g foreign e x c h a n g e reserves a n d b o r r o w i n g i n short-term c r e d i t markets
mid-1970s resulted i n a significant d e c l i n e i n Turkey's foreign exchange earnings
f r o m private banks.
from workers' remittances. R e m i t t a n c e s d r o p p e d from U S $ 1.4 b i l l i o n i n 1974 to U S $ 982 m i l l i o n i n 1977. T h i s seriously c o n s t r a i n e d the external financing o f i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n plans i n T u r k e y .
State
economic
l a b o u r exports. W i t h d e c l i n i n g remittances and a n
enterprises
(SEEs)
of i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n ( S z y l i o w i c z
undertook
a
significant
portion
1991). Despite the fact that they were
consistently i n a trade deficit s i t u a t i o n , governments s u b s i d i z e d S E E s w i t h higher credit rates from the C e n t r a l B a n k at very l o w interest. M e a n w h i l e , S E E s were
Table 2: Exports, Imports, Trade Balance, and Workers' Remittances ( M i l l i o n U S $ )
protected f r o m i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m p e t i t i o n by protective tariffs a n d a n o v e r v a l u e d T u r k i s h l i r a . T h e C e n t r a l B a n k c o m p e n s a t e d for the foreign exchange losses o f
Exports
Manufacturing Exports
Imports
Trade Exports/ Workers' Overall Balance Imports Remittances Balance
state enterprises bv p r i n t i n g m o r e money. T h i s p r o d u c e d a r e c o r d h i g h inflation rate i n T u r k e y , r i s i n g f r o m 10.1 per cent i n 1975 to 85 p e r cent i n 1979 ( U S
(%)
Congress 1980: 33). 1963
368
65
688
-320
53.5
-
-30
G o v e r n m e n t support for i n v e s t m e n t i n the state sector d i d not succeed i n
1964
411
76
537
-126
76.5
9
40
c r e a t i n g j o b s for the u r b a n u n e m p l o y e d . T h i s p r o b l e m was further c o m p o u n d e d
¡965
464
82
572
-108
81.2
70
82
by a substantial d r o p i n p r i v a t e sector m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n v e s t m e n t s — d o w n 10.2
1966
490
79
718
-228
68.2
115
8
per cent between 1979 a n d 1 9 8 0 . P u b l i c sector investment also fell, from 17.7
1967
523
75
685
-162
76.4
93
55
per cent i n 1963 to 4.7 per cent i n 1977 ( T U S I A D 1982: 13V T h e s e declines i n
1968
496
66
764
-268
64.9
107
-16
investment resulted i n a d r a s t i c a l l y r e d u c e d capacity for g o v e r n m e n t to create
1969
537
99
801
-264
67.0
141
28
j o b s for those who c o u l d not be e x p o r t e d a b r o a d or kept i n r u r a l areas.
1970
588
109
948
-360
62.0
273
144
1971
677
149
1171
-494
57.8
471
223
governments i n T u r k e y b o r r o w e d f r o m private b a n k s o n a short-term basis to
As
workers'
remittances
declined and
the
trade
deficit
increased,
1972
885
243
1563
-678
56.6
740
267
g a i n access to foreign e x c h a n g e f o r j o b creation. T h i s p o l i c y was unsustainable
1973
1313
443
2086
-769
63.1
1133
917
a n d resulted i n a debt crisis. B e t w e e n 1975 a n d 1978 m e d i u m - a n d long-term
1974
1532
600
3777
-2245
40.6
1462
-461
debts were three times h i g h e r t h a n they were between 1970 a n d 1975. Short-
1975
1401
503
4730
-3329
29.6
1312
-1301
t e r m b o r r o w i n g , w h i c h was a l m o s t non-existent i n the early 1970s, a m o u n t e d
1976
1960
596
5129
-3169
38.2
982
-1766
to 60 p e r cent o f the total debt i n 1977. T h e t e r m structure o f m e d i u m - a n d
1977
1753
586
5797
-4044
30.2
982
-1908
l o n g - t e r m debts also w o r s e n e d . C o n s e q u e n t l y , T u r k e y w a s u n a b l e to repay its
1978
2288
621
4599
-2311
49.7
983
-388
debt. T h e debt-service r a t i o i n c r e a s e d from 7 per cent i n 1975 to 20.2 per cent i n 1977, r e a c h i n g 26.7 per cent i n 1978. A l t h o u g h the debt-service ratio does not
S o u r c e : H a l e 1981: 230; O E C D 1983: 69
reflect the b u i l d - u p o f a r r e a r s o n the short-term debt, it does reveal that postw a r development projects i n T u r k e v entered i n t o crisis i n the late 1970s.
A d e t e r i o r a t i n g trade balance a n d d e c l i n i n g workers' remittances pushed T u r k e y into a foreign exchange crisis between 1975 a n d 1979. In 1978, then P r i m e M i n i s t e r D e m i r e l a n n o u n c e d that the C e n t r a l B a n k s disposable cash reserves for
financing
i n d u s t r i a l i m p o r t s a m o u n t e d to onlv U S $ 30 m i l l i o n ,
sufficient for just two days ( C o l a s a n 1983: 2 5 - 7 ) . W i t h the reduced capacity to finance
industry, T u r k e y experienced a d r a m a t i c s l o w d o w n i n job creation. T h i s
114-
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D
DEMOCRACY
T a b l e 3: E x t e r n a l D e b t ( M i l l i o n US3Í)
D e b t o u t s t a n d i n g a n d disbursed
1970
1972
1975
1977
1978
5 The Islamist National View
1911
2538
4724
11405
14126
M e d i u m a n d long-term
1896
2519
3336
4805
6657
P u b l i c sector
1854
2450
3176
4326
6100
42
69
160
478
557
15
19
1398
6600
7469
P r i v a t e sector Short t e r m Trade
financing
Banks Others
-
-
-
2433
2209
15
19
1011
2500
3671
-
-
387
1275
1589
T e r m s o f b o r r o w i n g o n loans
A v e r a g e m a t u r i t y (years) G r a n t element (%) D e b t / s e r v i c e ratio
•""throughout the 1970s p o l i t i c s i n T u r k e y was m a r k e d by t w o o p p o s i n g I
voices: one expressed t h e nationalist i m a g i n i n g s o f T u r k i s h development,
"
the other c o n v e y e d i m p e r i a l i s t images o f W e s t e r n d o m i n a n c e i n the
w o r l d economy. After a l o n g p e r i o d o f rather m u t e d politics i n the 1950s a n d
to the p u b l i c sector A v e r a g e interest (%)
r
3.6 18.0
4.4 22.1
7.3 13.4
7.6 12.7
6.9 14.8
policy. T h e p r o - I s l a m i c party, founded i n 1970, p r o m o t e d
a n a t i o n a l v i e w i d e o l o g y that s t i m u l a t e d debate o n the erosion o f n a t i o n a l
18.3 18.8
1960s, Islamists h a d b e c o m e v o c a l i n their d e m a n d for a nationalist o r i e n t a t i o n i n government
13.1
7.0
20.2
26.7
sovereignty. T h e p a r t y offered a c r i t i q u e o f the relationship between T u r k e y ' s a d o p t i o n o f W e s t e r n m o d e r n i t y a n d the h i s t o r i c a l relations o f poverty
and
w e a l t h creation. T h e n a t i o n a l v i e w was formulated to p r o b l e m a t i z e the p o w e r
Source: "World B a n k 1980a: 31; W o r l d B ank 1980b: 161
relations constructed i n the c r e a t i o n o f a n a t i o n a l bourgeoisie. T h i s v i e w also T h e e n o r m o u s p r i c e increases i n o i l i n 1974 a n d a g a i n i n 1978 further intensified Turkey's debt crisis. Turkey's o i l b i l l increased f r o m US$
124 m i l l i o n
i n 1972 to U S S 1.2 b i l l i o n i n 1977 a n d then to U S S 3.86 b i l l i o n i n 1980. It was financed
largely by i n c r e a s i n g short-term external debt. A s a direct result, the
s p u r r e d m o r a l claims for s o c i a l j u s t i c e , rights, a n d freedoms by those adversely affected by the u n d e r l y i n g e c o n o m i c relations. T h e pro-Islamic party
argued
that Turkey's e c o n o m i c a n d
political
activities were maladjusted to the idea o f n a t i o n a l development. T h e e x i s t i n g
cost o f a l l i m p o r t s doubled between 1977 a n d 1980. T h i s i n t u r n triggered a
e c o n o m i c arrangements a l l o w e d large i n d u s t r i a l capitalists p r i v i l e g e d access to
40 p e r cent d r o p i n Turkey's i m p o r t i n g capacity ( T U S I A D 1981: 138). It also
scarce resources. H o w e v e r , g o v e r n m e n t s c o u l d not sustain the p o l i t i c a l g r o u n d
c o n t r i b u t e d to a sharp d e c l i n e i n government j o b creation efforts.
necessary for large i n d u s t r i a l i s t s to b e c o m e d o m i n a n t players i n the economy.
T h e debt crisis of the late 1970s l e d governments to give p r i o r i t y to capital-
M o r e o v e r , this was not i n the interests o f r u r a l a n d u r b a n s m a l l producers a n d
intensive a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y a d v a n c e d i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n projects. Nevertheless,
m e d i u m - s i z e d capital groups. T h u s , the entire p e r i o d o f the 1970s witnessed
i n the context o f the w o r l d economic crisis of the 1970s, the p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y
s h a r p e n e d grievances a m o n g s o c i a l classes a n d the fragmentation o f multi-class
conjuncture o f detente, a n d Turkey's conflicts w i t h G r e e c e over C y p r u s , T u r k e y
populist alliances in the i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n project. T h e p r o - i s l a m i c p a r t y built o n
became a m a r g i n a l state i n its relations w i t h the U n i t e d States a n d the E E C .
the idea that the overall d e v e l o p m e n t trajectory r e q u i r e d a major
readjustment.
U n a b l e to m o b i l i z e its g e o p o l i t i c a l i m p o r t a n c e to solve its e c o n o m i c difficulties,
P r o t e s t i n g against the i n e f f i c i e n c y o f e x i s t i n g strategies, the p r o - I s l a m i c
T u r k e y sought a solution f r o m another source. A p o l i c y o f r a p p r o c h e m e n t w i t h
p a r t y a r g u e d that n a t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t m i g h t still be achieved i f the n a t i o n
the Soviet U n i o n and M u s l i m countries i n the M i d d l e East aroused domestic
c o u l d c o n t r o l its o w n destiny. It p o p u l a r i z e d the theme o f ' W e s t e r n i m p e r i a l i s m '
p o l i t i c a l passion for the creation o f a national a p p r o a c h , one that w o u l d t u r n o l d
a n d questioned the p r e s u m e d u n i v e r s a l i t y o f a W e s t e r n m o d e l . It also r e v i v e d
Toes' into new friends. A s I w i l l demonstrate i n the next chapter, the appeal for
the debate over culture a n d t e c h n o l o g y that h a d been a d v a n c e d by O t t o m a n
a n a t i o n a l a p p r o a c h c a m e , i n p a r t i c u l a r , from the Islamists.
pan-Islamists. F i n a l l y , the n a t i o n a l v i e w was developed to redirect the country's n a t i o n a l history b y r e i n t e r p r e t i n g the relationship between M u s l i m c u l t u r a l values a n d the economy. This
chapter
outlines
the
argument
that p o l i t i c a l
Islam in Turkey
116
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
117
T H E ISLAMIST NATIONAL VIEW
was i m p o s e d and the domestic imbalances generated by the C o l d W a r w o r l d
Anatolian
commercial groups
and
industrialists were
the
strongest
economy. Its objective was to reconstitute Turkey's s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l terrain. T h i s
supporters o f state p r o t e c t i o n . C o n c e r n e d w i t h the adverse effects o f a customs
r e q u i r e d r e a l i g n i n g p o l i t i c a l opposition a r o u n d the c o m p l e x relations created by
u n i o n w i t h the E E C , they a r g u e d t h a t the T u r k i s h e c o n o m y w o u l d not s u r v i v e
Turkey's e c o n o m i c a n d p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r y rapprochements w i t h the Soviet U n i o n
E u r o p e a n c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h o u t s u c h state p r o t e c t i o n (Barkey 1990: 115). T h e
a n d M u s l i m states i n the M i d d l e East. T h i s was a multi-tiered transnational
E s k i s e h i r C h a m b e r o f C o m m e r c e stated that it w o u l d do e v e r y t h i n g in its p o w e r
process that also integrated T u r k i s h m i g r a n t l a b o u r i n G e r m a n y into
to prevent a customs u n i o n b e t w e e n T u r k e y a n d the E E C . A n a t o l i a n - b a s e d
the
c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d reinforcement o f a n a t i o n a l v i e w ideology.
c h a m b e r s o f c o m m e r c e r e a c t e d b y strenuously l o b b y i n g against the r e m o v a l o f i m p o r t restrictions a n d customs duties r e q u i r e d by the 1970 Brussels P r o t o c o l . L a r g e industrialists f r o m the I s t a n b u l region w h o were i n v o l v e d i n the
Conflicts between regions a n d capital groups T h e private
sector
consisted
o f five
major
assembly p r o d u c t i o n o f c o n s u m e r durables for domestic markets favoured a.
groups:
agricultural
interests,
c o m m e r c i a l interests, c o m m o d i t y brokers, industrialists, a n d small artisans a n d shopkeepers. These groups were o r g a n i z e d into q u a s i - p u b l i c organizations. T h e U n i o n o f A g r i c u l t u r a l C h a m b e r s o r g a n i z e d a g r i c u l t u r a l interests, w h i l e the C o n f e d e r a t i o n o f T r a d e s m e n a n d A r t i s a n s o r g a n i z e d artisans a n d shopkeepers. T h e T u r k i s h U n i o n o f C h a m b e r s ( T O B ) o r g a n i z e d r e g i o n a l chambers commerce,
industry,
and
commodity
exchanges
(Bianchi
1984:
of
134-8).
F o u n d e d i n 1950 as a n u m b r e l l a o r g a n i z a t i o n , the T O B was responsible for a d m i n i s t e r i n g government economic p o l i c y w i t h i n the private sector. I n 1971 large
c a p i t a l groups
founded
the
Turkish
Industrialists
and
Businessmen
A s s o c i a t i o n ( T U S I A D ) to represent, together w i t h the T u r k i s h C o n f e d e r a t i o n o f
T h e T O B r e m a i n e d a n o r g a n i z a t i o n for s m a l l - a n d m e d i u m - s i z e d private i n d u s t r i a l a n d c o m m e r c i a l firms. It connected development managers from the State P l a n n i n g O r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h private capital groups i n v o l v e d i n i m p o r t 1970s w h e n the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f
c u r r e n c y was extremely tight, government generated
a l l o c a t i o n o f foreign
foreign
exchange
intense c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g various private-sector groups seeking
to influence government p o l i c y {Eralp 1990). Industrialists were i n favour o f c o n t i n u i n g state p r o t e c t i o n , a l t h o u g h there was a divergence o f interests w i t h i n this g r o u p . A n a t o l i a n industrialists w h o a d v o c a t e d intermediate
foreign. A 1973 survey o f 89 i n d u s t r i a l firms i n the assembly i n d u s t r y shows t h a t 42 per cent o f the total c a p i t a l o f these firms b e l o n g e d to foreign capital groups. T h e ratio o f i m p o r t e d goods i n t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n process was a very h i g h 38 percent. A l t h o u g h o n l y 3 p e r c e n t o f t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n value came from exports, the n u m b e r o f g o v e r n m e n t c r e d i t s a l l o c a t e d to t h e m was equal to 4 4 per cent o f t h e i r total c a p i t a l ( A k g u l 1976: 13). A n a t o l i a n industrialists v i e w e d g o v e r n m e n t support o f assembly p r o d u c t i o n as support for foreign firms t h r o u g h j o i n t ventures w i t h large i n d u s t r i a l i s t s . T h i s practice was considered d i s c r i m i n a t o r y against s m a l l e r T u r k i s h firms. C h a n g e s i n the b a n k i n g system further
intensified the divergence o f
interests w i t h i n private c a p i t a l . P r i o r to 1973, b a n k i n g laws p r o h i b i t e d b a n k s
E m p l o y e r s ' U n i o n ( T I S K ) , the largest i n d u s t r i a l a n d c o m m e r c i a l interests.
substitution i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . I n the
m o r e o p e n i m p o r t r e g i m e . A s u b s t a n t i a l p o r t i o n o f their investment capital w a s
and
capital goods p r o d u c t i o n were supportive o f p r o t e c t i o n , w h i l e those i n v o l v e d
from l e n d i n g m o r e t h a n 10 p e r cent o f their c a p i t a l to a n y single firm. B y the mid-1970s, however, b a n k s w e r e a l l o w e d to l e n d u n l i m i t e d sums to firms t h a t o w n e d m o r e t h a n 25 p e r cent o f t h e i r equity ( O n c u 1980: 472). T h i s change was i n i t i a t e d by the I s t a n b u l C h a m b e r o f I n d u s t r y ( I S O ) , w h i c h c l a i m e d t h a t b a n k s p r o v i d e d its m e m b e r s w i t h o n l y a s m a l l n u m b e r o f credits at h i g h interest, whereas p u b l i c e c o n o m i c a c t i v i t y r e c e i v e d the majority o f b a n k credits ( G e v g i l i 1973: 462). C h a n g e s i n the b a n k i n g system a l l o w e d large industrialists a n d h o l d i n g corporations to c o n t r o l t h e b a n k i n g i n d u s t r y , w h i l e s m a l l - a n d m e d i u m sized i n d u s t r i a l c o m p a n i e s h a d l i m i t e d or n o access to b a n k credits (Tekeli a n d M e n t e s 1978: 16-45).
Istanbul
S m a l l firms received o n l y 2.7 per cent o f total b a n k credits i n 1974,
r e g i o n were not ( Z e y t i n o g l u 1981: 31). C o m m e r c i a l groups were also d i v i d e d
a l t h o u g h they were responsible f o r 25 p e r cent o f total i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n a n d
in
consumer
durables
p r o d u c t i o n i n the
assembly plants
o f the
i n relation to the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f state protection i n the economy. T h e s m a l i -
88.3 p e r cent o f the t o t a l m a n u f a c t u r e o f footwear, other a p p a r e l , a n d textile
a n d m e d i u m - s i z e d c o m m e r c i a l firms from s m a l l A n a t o l i a n cities engaged i n
goods. T h i s represented o n l y a 1.5 p e r cent increase i n credits a l l o c a t e d to s m a l l
domestic c o m m e r c e w e l c o m e d a protective strategy. T h e i r m a i n competitors
firms from the 1963 level. T h e c r e d i t rate increase for other i n d u s t r i a l firms was
durables
11 p e r cent, r i s i n g from 18 p e r c e n t i n 1963 to 29 p e r cent i n 1974. A g r i c u l t u r a l
p r o d u c i n g large industrialists ( T O B 1978). A s most i m p o r t e r s were located i n
a n d c o m m e r c i a l credits either d e c l i n e d or r e m a i n e d stagnant over the same
Istanbul, t h e i r opposition to protectionist state p o l i c y was centred there.
p e r i o d ( T I B 1978: 112, 117-9).
were i m p o r t e r s whose interests were closely a l i g n e d w i t h consumer
T h e diversification o f interests s m a l l - to m e d i u m - s i z e d i n d u s t r i a l
a m o n g l a r g e - h o l d i n g corporations firms
w a s p l a y e d out t h r o u g h
and
regional
118
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
119
T H E ISLAMIST NATIONAL V I E W
conflicts between the Istanbul a n d A n a t o l i a n chambers o f c o m m e r c e . A s Table
more t h a n
4 illustrates, the M a r m a r a region c o n t a i n e d the greatest percentage o f large
c o r p o r a t i o n s ( N a t i o n a l P r o d u c t i v i t y C e n t e r 1973: 12-3). L a r g e firms interpreted
¡ 0 0 workers c o m p r i s e d o n l y 1.9 per cent o f total m a n u f a c t u r i n g
i n d u s t r i a l corporations a n d the largest percentage of corporate turnovers i n
the i n c r e a s i n g n u m b e r o f s m a l l firms as a sign that their position i n the T O B
Turkey. Istanbul h e l d the most p r i v i l e g e d position i n this area a n d received the
w o u l d eventually be w e a k e n e d .
lion's share o f foreign exchange a n d credits. T h i s became the major source o f
T o defend t h e i r o w n class interests m o r e effectively, large industrialists
conflict between A n a t o l i a n a n d I s t a n b u l industrialists.
and c o m m e r c i a l groups broke away from the T O B a n d established T U S I A D in
T a b l e 4: D i s t r i b u t i o n by R e g i o n o f the Largest Private I n d u s t r i a l C o r p o r a t i o n s ,
government a l l o c a t i o n o f foreign exchange but o n the general e c o n o m i c policy
1980
o f Turkey. T U S I A D a d v o c a t e d a move a w a y f r o m p r o t e c t i o n i s m i n favour o f
1971. T h e establishment o f T U S I A D h a d f a r - r e a c h i n g effects, not only on the
export p r o m o t i o n , i n contrast N o of F i r m s
% o f Finns
% of Turnover
to A n a t o l i a n industrialists w h o continued to
support p r o t e c t i o n i s m (Cuinhuriyet Newspaper, p r o m o t i o n r e m a i n e d a h i g h l y contentious
8,
11, 19 A p r i l
1979). E x p o r t
issue given that the interests oi
l a r g e - h o l d i n g firms were f r a g m e n t e d between i m p o r t e r s a n d exporters ( O n c u
Marmara
283
67.2
70.3
Istanbul
253
60.1
61.7
1980V T h o s e p r o d u c i n g for d o m e s t i c markets favoured protection, w h i l e others p r o d u c i n g for e x p o r t favoured openness i n the trade r e g i m e .
Aegean
65
15.4
11.6
Mediterranean
29
6.9
10.3
North Central
34
8.1
6.5
customs u n i o n w i t h the E E C . For example, the A e g e a n C h a m b e r o f l n d u s t r y
South C e n t r a l
9
2.1
1.4
President, S i n a s i E r t a n , s u p p o r t e d a customs u n i o n w i t h the E E C to increase
B l a c k Sea
1
0.2
0.0
Turkey's foreign
These
conflicts o f interest
currency
resulted
earning
i n c o n t r a d i c t o r y approaches
capacity.
Industrialists
i n the
to a
Aegean
East C e n t r a l
C h a m b e r o f l n d u s t r y h o p e d t o benefit f r o m the e x p o r t o f textiles, leather, hide
Northeast
products, a n d processed food. E r t a n was therefore c r i t i c a l o f the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f
Southeast
b a n k credits to i m p o r t i n g i n d u s t r i a l i s t s w h o were not e a r n i n g foreign exchange from exports (Gumkuriyet Newspaper, 28 M a y 1969). O n the other h a n d , V e h b i
Source: Istanbul C h a m b e r o f l n d u s t r y 1981
K o c , the l e a d i n g i m p o r t substituting i n d u s t r i a l i s t i n Turkey, argued for the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f credits i n favour o f those industrialists w h o p r o d u c e d for domestic
T h e T O B became the focus o f p o l i t i c a l struggles over the state a l l o c a t i o n
markets.
A l t h o u g h K o c was
not
against
E E C membership,
he
supported
of funds. T h e T O B ' s official role was to prepare a n d distribute government-set
p r o t e c t i o n i s m a n d defended t h e credit d i s t r i b u t i o n system. H e m a d e the c l a i m
i m p o r t quotas for industrialists a n d c o m m e r c i a l importers v i a its constitutive
that ' K O C H o l d i n g saves a lot o f foreign e x c h a n g e by p r o d u c i n g F I A T cars i n
chambers of c o m m e r c e a n d i n d u s t r y . It was also responsible for m o n i t o r i n g a n d
this c o u n t r y ' ( B a r k e y 1990: 117).
v e r i f y i n g the i m p o r t prices c l a i m e d by i m p o r t e r s . G o v e r n m e n t s allocated foreign
W h e n P r i m e M i n i s t e r B u l e n t Ecevit froze relations w i t h the E E C i n 1976,
currency and credits o n the basis o f i n f o r m a t i o n o b t a i n e d from T O B reports.
he was r e s p o n d i n g to p o l i t i c a l pressure f r o m the State P l a n n i n g O r g a n i z a t i o n ,
T h e s e reports i n d i c a t e d the capacity figures a n d i m p o r t needs o f i n d i v i d u a l
the
enterprises. A m o n g T O B members, s m a l l - a n d m e d i u m - s i z e d h r m s were o n
Industry. T U S I A D c a l l e d this decision foolish a n d d e c l a r e d the
the losing end, as governments supported large industrialists a n d c o m m e r c i a l
incapable o f defending T u r k e y ' s n a t i o n a l interests. T h e o r g a n i z a t i o n became
groups. T h e smaller cities o f A n a t o l i a c o n t a i n i n g m o r e modest i n d u s t r i a l a n d
highly political and publicly
c o m m e r c i a l interests also e x p e r i e n c e d d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .
TUSIAD
Despite evidence to the contrary, large industrialists a n d c o m m e r c i a l groups held the v i e w that the T O B supported smaller firms. T h i s p e r c e p t i o n
Anatolian-based chambers
placed an
o f industry, a n d
c r i t i c i z e d the
editorial in a number
the
Istanbul
government's
C h a m b e r of government
actions. I n
of leading daily
1979,
newspapers,
defending free trade a n d s t a t i n g that excessive state i n t e r v e n t i o n was the source of T u r k e y ' s e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s .
was rooted i n the i n c r e a s i n g o v e r a l l n u m b e r o f smaller firms i n T u r k e y and
T U S I A D a n d T I S K b e g a n to see w o r k i n g - c l a s s wage demands as a threat
the n u m b e r o f small firms h o l d i n g T O B m e m b e r s h i p . T h e n u m b e r o f small
to e c o n o m i c g r o w t h . B o t h b l a m e d the g o v e r n m e n t for not d o i n g enough to
firms e m p l o y i n g fewer t h a n 50 workers rose from 93 per cent o f the total i n
support private industrialists. A c c o r d i n g to T I S K , the i n c r e a s i n g p o w e r of trade
1963 to 98.1 per cent i n 1968. T h e n u m b e r o f large i n d u s t r i a l firms e m p l o y i n g
unions was responsible for i n f l a t i o n a n d the p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y i n the country.
120
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
121
T H E ISLAMIST NATIONAL V I E W
T h e o r g a n i z a t i o n further a r g u e d that a high-wage p o l i c y h i n d e r e d private sector
a n d exporters, a n d between Istanbul-based a n d A n a t o l i a n - b a s e d c o m m e r c i a l
profits a n d prevented investment i n industry. T U S 1 A D and T I S K
groups a n d industrialists r e s u l t e d i n the near d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the J P .
demanded
substantial wage decreases. U n t i l the
T h e stage was n o w set for the r e a l i g n m e n t o f c o a l i t i o n politics i n T u r k e y .
1980 m i l i t a r y coup, w h i c h drastically c u r t a i l e d trade u n i o n
A n a t i o n a l v i e w f r a m e w o r k g r e w out o f the TP's i n a b i l i t y to c o n t a i n o p p o s i n g
activities i n Turkey, p u b l i c sector wages consistently increased i n contrast to
forces i n the economy. It presented a n Islamist p r o g r a m m e for r e c o n f i g u r i n g
those i n the private sector. W i t h i n the private sector, wages i n large private
social classes a n d r e f o r m u l a t i n g i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c y , one that appealed to Islamic
i n d u s t r i a l firms were h i g h e r t h a n i n smaller firms ( B a d e m l i 1978: 17-27). T h e
m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s o f justice a n d equality a n d e q u i p p e d smaller capital groups
catalyst for wage increases was u n i o n i z a t i o n , w h i c h rose from 10.8 p e r cent i n
w i t h a sense o f entitlement to state resources a n d incentives,
1963 to 46 per cent i n 1977 (State P l a n n i n g O r g a n i z a t i o n 1977: 323). I n smaller
N e c m e t t i n E r b a k a n , e l e c t e d leader o f the T O B i n 1963, was i n s t r u m e n t a l
firms e m p l o y i n g ten workers or fewer, where u n i o n i z a t i o n was low, the average
i n w i d e n i n g the c r a c k w i t h i n the p o p u l i s t i d e o l o g y o f the J P. A c c o r d i n g to
wage was a p p r o x i m a t e l y 40 p e r cent o f that i n large u n i o n i z e d firms e m p l o y i n g
E r b a k a n , w h o b e c a m e leader o f the p r o - I s l a m i c N a t i o n a l O r d e r P a r t y i n 1970,
100 workers or more. T h e average wage i n firms w i t h less t h a n 50 workers was
the T O B h a d represented
50 per cent higher t h a n i n firms w i t h less t h a n ten workers ( K e y d e r 1987: 175).
M a s o n i c m i n o r i t y ' centred i n I s t a n b u l , to the d e t r i m e n t o f smaller A n a t o l i a n
A s far as T U S I A D a n d T Í S K were c o n c e r n e d , h i g h wages i n stateo w n e d a n d large private firms were d i v e r t i n g state funds from private industry
the
class interests o f a n o n - M u s l i m
'comprador-
i n d u s t r i a l firms a n d c o m m e r c i a l groups. E r b a k a n w a n t e d the T O B to favour the interests o f these s m a l l e r A n a t o l i a n firms ( S a r i b a y 1985: 9 8 - 9 ) .
a n d i n h i b i t i n g the competitiveness o f large industrialists. L a r g e industrialists
E r b a k a n (1972) was o p p o s e d to a customs u n i o n w i t h the E E C . H e argued
b l a m e d the government for not p r e v e n t i n g l a b o u r disputes. A c c o r d i n g to the
that large i n d u s t r i a l a n d c o m m e r c i a l interests i n the Istanbul region w o u l d
T u r k i s h C o n f e d e r a t i o n o l E m p l o y e r s A s s o c i a t i o n , there were 51 strikes a n d 3
benefit f r o m a customs u n i o n , as t h e i r class interests w o u l d be integrated w i t h
m i l l i o n workdays lost to strikes i n 1977 ( W o r l d B a n k 1980a: 142). T h e n u m b e r
E u r o p e a n c a p i t a l groups. S m a l l capital groups, however, a c c o r d i n g to E r b a k a n ,
o f workdays lost between 1977 a n d 1980 was three times greater t h a n the days
r e q u i r e d state p r o t e c t i o n to g a i n access to the new t e c h n o l o g y a n d state credits
lost between 1973 and 1976 ( K e y d e r 1987: 191-2).
necessary for their success. E r b a k a n ' s insistence o n a. coherent n a t i o n a l v i e w i n
T h e large capital groups that b e c a m e h i g h l y v o c a l t h r o u g h
TUSIAD
were the first to leave the social c o a l i t i o n of the national i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n p r o g r a m m e . H o w e v e r , no capital group emerged as p o l i t i c a l l y d o m i n a n t from this fragmentation o f class alliances.
government p o l i c y also c o n c e a l e d his desire to p r o m o t e closer e c o n o m i c a n d p o l i t i c a l ties w i t h M u s l i m c o u n t r i e s i n the M i d d l e East. S o c i a l democrats
shared
E r b a k a n ' s c a l l to support
smaller A n a t o l i a n
interests. A c c o r d i n g to E s k i ş e h i r C h a m b e r o f I n d u s t r y President Z e y t i n o g l u (1981: 121j, the difference b e t w e e n Istanbul a n d A n a t o l i a n i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l groups was the former group's d i r e c t ties w i t h western E u r o p e a n capitalists a n d
T h e break-up of political alliances
the latter group's dependence o n the merchants o f I s t a n b u l for their p r o d u c t i o n
U n d e r the leadership o f S ü l e y m a n D e m i r e l , t h e J P became the l e a d i n g centreright p a r t y between 1961 a n d 1980, It was founded in 1961 to replace the D P . w h i c h was shut d o w n after the 1960 m i l i t a r y coup. T h e very n a m e o f the partycame to s y m b o l i z e the u n d o i n g o f 'injustices"' brought by the m i l i t a r y u p o n M e n d e r e s a n d the D P . D e m i r e l was a 'development p o l i t i c i a n ' w h o p r o m i s e d to deliver the benefits o f i n d u s t r i a l development without fear o f a c c u m u l a t i n g a large foreign debt ( M a n g o 1994: 18). T h e J P ' s populist agenda presented
the
:
i m a g e o f a p a r t y of the people' a n d c l a i m e d to i n c o r p o r a t e a l l sectors o f private c a p i t a l , s m a l l - p r o d u c i n g peasants, a n d w o r k i n g classes into a n a t i o n a l p l a t f o r m . H o w e v e r , i n the context o f the 1970s e c o n o m i c crisis, t h e J P c o u l d no longer subsume the diversity o f interests w i t h i n a p o p u l a r n a t i o n a l u n i t y
agenda.
Interest cleavages between s m a l l , m e d i u m , and large firms, between i m p o r t e r s
a n d c o n s u m p t i o n . I n their o w n way, both social d e m o c r a t i c a n d p r o - I s l a m i c groups a d v a n c e d
a n e c o n o m i c strategy
smaller i n d u s t r i a l a n d
that w o u l d support a n d reposition
c o m m e r c i a l groups
i n the
economy. T h i s
strategy
i n v o l v e d o p p o s i t i o n to a c u s t o m s u n i o n w i t h the E E C . I n the u n f o l d i n g h i s t o r y o f T u r k e y ' s m a r g i n a l i z a t i o n w i t h i n N A T O , no government was p o l i t i c a l l y s t r o n g enough to c o n t a i n the o p p o s i n g interests of private capitalists a n d v a r i o u s s o c i a l classes i n r e l a t i o n to e c o n o m i c p o l i c y a n d the issue o f customs u n i o n . W i t h i n this context, the p r o - I s l a m i c party b e g a n to question the desirability o f a single o r i e n t a t i o n to W e s t e r n ways. It raised the p o s s i b i l i t y o f another p a t h — o f c u l t i v a t i n g ties w i t h M u s l i m states i n the M i d d l e East. S u c h a n a l t e r n a t i v e emerged as a n i d e o l o g y that c o u l d mediate the different interests o f class a n d c a p i t a l fractions a n d b u i l d a multi-class populist a l l i a n c e based o n a n Islamic m o r a l framework.
122
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
123
T H E ISLAMIST NATIONAL VIEW
T k e Islamist national view
It w o u l d be i n c o r r e c t , h o w e v e r , to associate I s l a m solely w i t h a n a n t i leftist politics, i n the 1970s, p o l i t i c a l i s l a m emerged to r e o r g a n i z e the e x i s t i n g
F o l l o w i n g the 1964 C y p r u s crisis, w h e n the government adopted a multifaceted
social, p o l i t i c a l , a n d c u l t u r a l a r r a n g e m e n t s i n T u r k e y . Islamists b e g a n to give
foreign p o l i c y a p p r o a c h . T u r k i s h politics e x p e r i e n c e d a n ideological p o l a r i z a t i o n
a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l a n d i d e o l o g i c a l content
between centre-left a n d centre-right. W h i l e the R P P identified itself as left-of-
c r i t i c i z e d the oppressive a n d m e g a l i t a r i a n nature o f the i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n project
centre, the J P a d o p t e d a centre-right stance. T h e Left positioned itself w i t h i n
a n d the conditions u n d e r w h i c h W e s t e r n m o d e r n i t y was i m p o s e d .
a strong K e m a l i s t orientation ( C u l h a o g l u 2002:
179), thereby
g a i n i n g the
r e p u t a t i o n o f b e i n g anti-religious, b u r e a u c r a t i c , a n d elitist ( C a k i r and C i n e m r e 1991). T h e J P , o n the other h a n d , established itself as a protector o f religious freedoms a n d g u a r d i a n o f M u s l i m beliefs a n d practices i n Turkey.
to I s l a m . M o s t notably,
they
T h e N a t i o n a l O r d e r P a r t y ( N O P ) , founded i n 1970, was T u r k e y ' s first p r o - I s l a m i c party. Its p o l i t i c a l p r o g r a m m e was k n o w n as the N a t i o n a l V i e w (Mill! Gorus). T h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u r t b a n n e d the N O P f r o m politics after the 1971 m i l i t a r y coup, but the n a t i o n a l view c o n t i n u e d to define the ideological
W h i l e the R P P found itself entangled in the single-party era legacy o f state oppression, the J P sought to g r o u n d its p o l i t i c a l p o w e r base in the struggle
framework
of pro-Islamic
political
parties.
These
i n c l u d e d the
National
Salvation P a r t y ( N S P ) , f o u n d e d i n 1972; the Welfare P a r t y ( W P ) , founded i n
(or m o r a l rights a n d freedoms—a struggle by 'the people' against bureaucratic
1983 (after the N S P was b a n n e d by the 1980 m i l i t a r y coup): a n d the V i r t u e
oppression. A l t h o u g h i n the
Party ( V P ) ,
1970s the
R P P adopted
a democratic
leftist
founded
i n 1997 (with the e x p e c t a t i o n that the W P w o u l d be
o r i e n t a t i o n a n d came to v i e w I s l a m as a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f national culture, the
b a n n e d , w h i c h o c c u r r e d i n 1998). I n 2001, the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u r t closed
p a r t y c o n t i n u e d to be tainted by allegations t h a t it was anti-religious.
d o w n the V P . E r b a k a n was the leader o f a l l these p o l i t i c a l parties u n t i l 1998, at
S u s p i c i o n over the R P P ' s motives intensified after
the J P deployed a
p r o p a g a n d a c a m p a i g n designed to associate the R P P w i t h ' c o m m u n i s m
1
w h i c h t i m e the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u r t banned h i m from r u n n i n g for office. A f t e r
and
the V P was b a n n e d , the p r o - I s l a m i c party movement split into two p o l i t i c a l
'anti-religiosity'. T h e R P P was definitely populist, but h a r d l y c o m m u n i s t or
entities, the P r o s p e r i t y P a r t y (PP) l e d b y R e c a i K u t a n , but a c t u a l l y c o n t r o l l e d
anti-religious. A l t h o u g h there was a n i l l e g a l T u r k i s h C o m m u n i s t P a r t y ( T C P ) ,
by E r b a k a n f r o m b e h i n d the scenes, a n d the Justice a n d D e v e l o p m e n t P a r t y
w i t h its headquarters i n East B e r l i n , the T C P ' s role i n T u r k i s h politics was
( A K P ) , led b y R e c e p T a y y i p E r d o g a n . W h i l e the P P continues to be situated
negligible a n d not connected to the R P P . S i n c e the f o u n d i n g o f the Directorate
w i t h i n the n a t i o n a l v i e w p r o g r a m m e
of R e l i g i o u s Affairs i n 1924, a state-interpreted 'official I s l a m ' has been part
twist. After the A K P c a m e to p o w e r i n N o v e m b e r 2 0 0 2 , w i n n i n g 35 p e r cenl o f
o f T u r k e y ' s secular identity. T h e R P P c o n t i n u e d to support a state-controlled
the p o p u l a r vote a n d 365 seats i n p a r l i a m e n t , the P P a n d n a t i o n a l v i e w ideology
version o f I s l a m .
of the N O P , the A K P acids a giobalist
seem to have lost g r o u n d . T h e A K P has n o w d e p a r t e d f r o m the n a t i o n a l v i e w ,
A l l variants o f the Left were subject to a n 'anti-religious c o m m u n i s t '
w h i c h fashioned p r o - I s l a m i c p a r t y ideology i n T u r k e y for m o r e t h a n 30 years
p r o p a g a n d a c a m p a i g n . T h e y drew support from the newly o r g a n i z e d u r b a n
f C a k i r and C a i m u k 2001). It n o w views I s l a m as a m o r a l - c u l t u r a l value i n the
w o r k i n g class a n d gecektmdu dwellers, e n j o y i n g their strongest m o m e n t w h e n the
competitive relations o f the g l o b a l e c o n o m y (Atasoy 2003a).
W o r k e r s ' P a r t y o f T u r k e y ( T I P ) was founded i n 1961 ( C u l h a o g l u 2002). T h e establishment o f the C o n f e d e r a t i o n o f R e v o l u t i o n a r y L a b o u r U n i o n s ( D I S K ) i n 1967 also c o n t r i b u t e d to increased leftist p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s m . T h e R e v o l u t i o n a r y Y o u t h (Dev-Genc) movement o f the late 1960s a n d the R e v o l u t i o n a r y P a t h (DevTot) o f the 1970s were also h i g h l y influential i n s t i m u l a t i n g leftist activity. I n a d d i t i o n to the 1971 m i l i t a r y coup i n w h i c h coercive p o w e r was used to persecute leftists, a n u m b e r o f state sponsored organizations launched a n t i leftist
campaigns.
T h e y included the A s s o c i a t i o n for the
Struggle A g a i n s t
C o m m u n i s m , the T u r k i s h Nationalist Y o u t h Society, a n d the N a t i o n a l Y o u t h F o u n d a t i o n . T h e n u m b e r of such organizations i n c r e a s e d from only n i n e i n 1963 to 141 i n the early 1970s (Yucekok 1972: 150). Together w i t h the u l t r a right Idealist Y o u t h (UMtuculer), these o r g a n i z a t i o n s were h i g h l y influential i n p r o m o t i n g M u s l i m beliefs a n d practices and d i r e c t i n g t h e m against the Left.
F o r the N O P a n d its successor,
the N S P , I s l a m was a social project
intended to stimulate i n d u s t r i a l development. T h e n a t i o n a l v i e w was a n antidote to b o t h the Left a n d l i b e r a l i s m ( L a n d a u 1976: 2), w h i c h , as variants o f W e s t e r n developmentalist ideology, a c c o r d i n g to E r b a k a n , were ineffectual i n b r i n g i n g about n a t i o n a l development. A n Islamist emphasis on the ' n a t i o n a l ' i n v o l v e d the r e - e v a l u a t i o n o f c u l t u r e a n d the role o f the state, a n d a r e t h i n k i n g o f the possibilities for r e o r g a n i z i n g l i f e f r o m a n o n - W e s t e r n standpoint. E r b a k a n p r o m o t e d h i m s e l f as the sole representative of the national v i e w . H e denounced D e m i r e l , l e a d e r of the J P , as a l i b e r a l 'freemason' w o r k i n g for large business interests.
A n d he c o n d e m n e d E c e v i t , the leader of the R P P ,
as a c o m m u n i s t u p h o l d i n g a n unjust state over a 'silenced M u s l i m majority'. E r b a k a n w a n t e d to spread i d e o l o g i c a l doubts about the possibility of a c h i e v i n g equality a n d justice w i t h i n t h e e x i s t i n g relations o f the economy. H i s ideas found suoDort a m one the s m a l l - a n d m e d i u m - s i z e d fractions o f private capital
3 24
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
125
T H E ISLAMIST NATIONAL V I E W
groups who were adversely affected by the w o r l d economic crisis o f the 1970s.
a theologically centred p o l i t i c s , but he d i d l o n g to refashion s e c u l a r i s m by
T h e u r b a n gecekondu neighbourhoods i n p a r t i c u l a r proved to be a fertile g r o u n d
injecting social life w i t h g r e a t e r m o r a l strength.
for the g r o w t h o f n a t i o n a l v i e w ideology ( T o p r a k 1931: 104-21). T h e anti-
K o t k u was c o n v i n c e d that s e c u l a r i s m h a d devalued the m o r a l - e t h i c a l
i m p e r i a l i s t a n d anti-Western stand o f the n a t i o n a l view also became p o p u l a r
d i m e n s i o n o f s o c i a l e x i s t e n c e . E r s i n G u r d o g a n (1991: 11) has defined K o t k u ' s
a m o n g m a r g i n a l u r b a n a n d r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n s , as well as university students
teachings
w h o were c h i l d r e n o f modest lower-middle-class families i n small A n a t o l i a n
i n d i v i d u a l life i n I s l a m t h r o u g h a process o f self-purification. A c c o r d i n g to
cities a n d villages.
K o t k u , this process s h o u l d t a k e place away f r o m the negative m o r a l a n d c u l t u r a l
I n the
1973 n a t i o n a l elections the N S P o b t a i n e d 11.8 per cent o f the
as a n i n v i s i b l e
u n i v e r s i t y , the p u r p o s e
o f w h i c h was to g r o u n d
influences engendered b y the state's secular e d u c a t i o n a l institutions.
p o p u l a r vote a n d 10.6 p e r cent o f seats i n p a r l i a m e n t , w i t h m u c h o f its support
K o t k u (1995: 17-46) c l a i m e d that a c h i e v i n g m o r a l - s p i r i t u a l m a t u r i t y is
c o m i n g f r o m s m a l l e r cities i n central a n d eastern A n a t o l i a . I n the 1977 elections
the most difficult task for a n i n d i v i d u a l , r e q u i r i n g a total redefinition o f life.
it received 8.5 per cent o f the p o p u l a r vote a n d 5.5 per cent o f seats i n p a r l i a m e n t
F o r h i m , unless ' f a i t h i n G o d ' a n d a ' w i l l i n g n e s s to w o r k for the w e l l - b e i n g
( B u g r a 2002: 111). A l t h o u g h its support d e c l i n e d , die N S P emerged as a real
o f M u s l i m s ' are c o m b i n e d i n the m o r a l m a k e - u p o f the self, a social life i n
p o w e r b r o k e r w i t h p a r l i a m e n t a r y representation throughout the 1970s, w h e n
need o f t r a n s f o r m a t i o n c a n n o t even be i m a g i n e d . K o t k u l o c a t e d his politics
n o p o l i t i c a l party was able to w i n a clear majority i n parliament. T h e r e was
i n the creation a n d d i s s e m i n a t i o n o f an I s l a m i c m o r a l discourse t h r o u g h the
a succession o f no less t h a n ten c o a l i t i o n a n d m i n o r i t y governments f r o m the
N a q s h b a n d i practices o f sohbet a n d dhikr, as well as i n the study o f the K o r a n . For
1973 elections to the m i l i t a r y coup o f 1980. A t first, the N S P formed a c o a l i t i o n
h i m , the K o r a n is the u l t i m a t e e d u c a t i o n a l tool available to h u m a n i t y . K o t k u
g o v e r n m e n t w i t h the left-of-centre R P P . E c e v i t was p r i m e m i n i s t e r a n d E r b a k a n
(1995: 110) states: ' W e look at the m i r r o r a n d t r y to beautify ourselves. W e
his deputy. Later, the N S P f o r m e d right-of-centre coalitions w i t h the J P a n d a
a r r a n g e our cloths a c c o r d i n g l y . W e wash o u r bodies to be c l e a n . B u t our bodies
n u m b e r o f other smaller parties, w i t h D e m i r e l as p r i m e minister.
are the p r o p e r t y o f the e a r t h . It is the soul that u l t i m a t e l y must be beautified.'
T h e Nurcu cemaati a n d the N a q s h b a n d i order s u p p o r t e d the N O P a n d the
K o t k u (1994) a p p r e c i a t e d
the difficulty o f resisting a n d escaping from
N S P ( C a k i r 1990: 214-22; G e n e 1971: 230-307). H u s r e t H o c a , then leader o f
i m m o r a l i t y , given that M u s l i m s were l i v i n g under a n unrestrained
the Nurcu cemaati, actively p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e i r founding. T h e N S P ' s secretary
social system. K o t k u (1995: 8 5 - 1 0 1 ) argued that cultivation o f the
general. S e v i l g e n , was a n open follower o f the Ruale-1 Nur movement o f S a i d
conditions for a n I s l a m i c life r e q u i r e s M u s l i m s to insulate themselves from secular
N u r s i . H o w e v e r , the support o f the Nurcu cemaati was shortlived. Husret H o c a
orientations a n d pressures, a n d depart from un-Islamic ways. T h i s is reminiscent
w i t h d r e w his support w h e n the N S P f o r m e d a c o a l i t i o n government w i t h the
o f the ideological politics o f t h e M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d , founded i n E g y p t i n 1928
R P P . A group of Nurcu p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s then resigned from the N S P to protest
(Esposito 1987: 130-42;, a n d the j a m a ' a t - I Island, founded i n Pakistan i n 1941
the government's
(Nasr 1993). These groups c a l l for the eradication o f un-Islamic
legislation on an amnesty
that the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u r t
capitalist
appropriate
governments
extended to a l l prisoners o f conscience c o n v i c t e d under P L 141 a n d 142 o f the
a n d secular lifestyles t h r o u g h a n o r g a n i z e d political movement. U n t i l that goal
P e n a l C o d e iSevilgen 1980: 1 0 9 - 5 4 ) . T h e Nurcu faction of the N S P interpreted
is r e a l i z e d , M u s l i m s i n n o n - I s l a m i c contexts must isolate themselves by l i v i n g
the amnesty as a concession to alleged c o m m u n i s t s c o n v i c t e d u n d e r the m a r t i a l
i n Islamic enclaves. K o t k u (1994) argues that Islamic education is key to the
l a w a d m i n i s t r a t i o n set up after the 1971 m i l i t a r y coup. After the p a r l i a m e n t a r y
e m b o d i m e n t o f I s l a m i c m o r a l i t y a n d essential for a v o i d i n g the m o r a l distress
resignations, the Nurcu cemaati gave its support to the centre-right J P ( D e m i r e l et
induced by the u n f o l d i n g h i s t o r y o f capitalist development.
a l 3977), l e a v i n g the N S P to be supported by the N a q s h b a n d i order. Some o f the most influential members
K o t k u c a u t i o n e d his f o l l o w e r s about the conspicuous d i s p l a y o f wealth
o f the N S P were N a q s h b a n d i
affiliates. A m o n g t h e m were N e c m e t t i n E r b a k a n , leader o f the p a r t y ; K o r k u t Ozal,
minister
o f agriculture
i n various
c o a l i t i o n governments
found i n c o n s u m e r i s m , w h i c h he b e l i e v e d to be the source o f this m o r a l distress. K o t k u warns:
between
1973 and 1980; A b d u l k a d i r P a k s u , m i n i s t e r o f l a b o u r ; a n d S a l i h O z c a n , a
D o n ' t love this w o r l d ! T h e w o r l d is arable l a n d for the afterworld.
parliamentarian.
W h a t e v e r y o u sow h e r e y o u w i l l reap it there. B e
T h e N a q s h b a n d i S h e i k h K o t k u played a significant role i n the formulation
generous,
charitable, a n d b e n e v o l e n t . D o n ' t waste y o u r m o n e y for sinful
o f the n a t i o n a l view. S h e i k h K o t k u ' s sohbeu (oral teachings! contributed to the
things. D o n ' t b e c o m e lost i n loose a n d dissolute ways o f l i v i n g . But
Islamist r e t h i n k i n g o f social experience by referring to secular c u l t u r a l meanings
y o u should love this w o r l d . W h y ? [Because] W e w i l l go to heaven
a n d d a i l y life practices. T h e r e is no evidence to sueijest that K o t k u p r o m o t e d
f r o m here. W e w i l l e a r n m o n e y here. W e w i l l look after the p o o r
126
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
a n d needy w i t h this money. W e w i l l live here i n
127
T H E ISLAMIST N A T I O N A L V I E W
accordance
or not there was a n I s l a m i c state w i t h i n T u r k e y . Further, the national view's
w i t h the k n o w l e d g e [of the K o r a n ] , a n d educate others. D o n ' t
conception
care m u c h for amusement. D o n ' t take delight i n voluptuousness.
scientific discovery a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l i n n o v a t i o n . T h i s negated the d o m i n a n t
E n g a g e i n practices that w i l l lead you to heaven ( K o t k u 1995:
development ideology based o n the i m i t a t i o n o f W e s t e r n c u l t u r a l norms. I n a n
73-4).
o f development
i n c l u d e d the
c u l t i v a t i o n o f a m o r a l ethos o f
effort to steer T u r k e y away f r o m a c e n t u r y - l o n g pattern o f i m i t a u n g W e s t e r n ways, the p r o - i s l a m i c p a r t y p l a n n e d to decentre the Western m o d e l . In its place,
K o t k u b e l i e v e d that M u s l i m s c o u l d b r i n g about social change a n d he encouraged those i n ' h i s sohbet circles to engage i n politics. H e a r g u e d that i f the correct state policies were pursued, it was possible to a w a k e n a broader social consciousness a n d steer development towards a truly M u s l i m society ( K o t k u
I s l a m was to be p o s i t i o n e d as a m o r a l - c u l t u r a l value i n the technological a n d industrial advancement of Turkey. T h e development
i d e a w o u l d d r a w f r o m the p u b l i c ethos of I s l a m i c
m o r a l i t y . It w o u l d not i n v o l v e a n a u t h o r i t a r i a n e m b o d i m e n t o f I s l a m but w o u l d
1994: 119-34). B u t for this to take place, p o l i t i c a l leaders must possess h i g h
use d e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e s . T h e p r o - I s l a m i c p a r t y i m a g i n e d ' d e m o c r a c y ' to be a
m o r a l s t a n d i n g i f they are g o i n g to create effective social p o l i c y o n h u m a n
p o l i t i c a l system that w o u l d l e a d to the election o f those most capable of i n s t a l l i n g
rights
a n d justice.
a 'rights a n d justice' discourse i n the social r e a l m . A s for the means to inculcate
T o that end, the n a t i o n a l v i e w p r o g r a m m e s u m m o n e d the emotions a n d
the m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s necessary to sustain such a discourse, the party b e l i e v e d
sentiments s u r r o u n d i n g a m o r a l , religious conception o f ' n a t i o n a l ' thought. I n
that o n l y the n a t i o n a l e d u c a t i o n a l system c o u l d m a i n t a i n the required m o r a l
his b o o k Milli
Gorus ( T h e N a t i o n a l V i e w ) (1975), E r b a k a n also u n d e r l i n e d the
f r a m e w o r k for future generations. I n short, a n a t i o n a l educational system c o u l d
role o f the state i n m a n a g i n g m o r a l i t y a n d d e - l i n k i n g society from the i m i t a t i o n
create the c o n d i t i o n s for n u r t u r i n g a correspondence between I s l a m i c culture
o f Western themes. T h i s r e q u i r e d changes i n both n a t i o n a l education p o l i c y
a n d e c o n o m i c development.
a n d the mass m e d i a . T h e n a t i o n a l view, then, presented a m o r a l critique o f
E r b a k a n (1975: 51-6) a r g u e d that the d o c t r i n e of i m i t a t i o n relegated I s l a m
d o m i n a n t s o c i a l n o r m s , a n d a n assertion o f I s l a m i c c u l t u r a l m e a n i n g s as c r u c i a l
to a p o s i t i o n o f o b s c u r a n t i s m a n d b a c k w a r d n e s s , h a v i n g failed i n relating itself
to h u m a n c h a r a c t e r f o r m a t i o n .
to the m o d e r n techno-scientific w o r l d . S e c u l a r i s m b e c a m e an instrument o f state
K o t k u (1984a) associated the t e r m 'development' w i t h ' c o r r u p t i o n ' . T h i s
bureaucrats for u n d e r m i n i n g the p u b l i c ethos o f M u s l i m s t h r o u g h a systematic
finds its i d e o l o g i c a l basis i n the M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d o f E g y p t a n d t h e j a m a ' a t -
'oppression
I I s l a n d o f the I n d i a n subcontinent.
foundation
A c c o r d i n g to S a y y i d Q u t b , the
major
o f believers'. A s
a result, T u r k e y lacked the
necessary
moral
f r o m w h i c h it c o u l d d r a w i n s p i r a t i o n a n d creativity to develop i n
theoretician for the M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d , there are o n l y two choices open to
the t e c h n o l o g i c a l a n d c u l t u r a l r e a l m s ( E r b a k a n 1975: 2 9 - 4 0 ) . E r b a k a n b e l i e v e d
h u m a n i t y i n c o n s t i t u t i n g a society. T h e s e are jahiliyya
the state itself must take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for i n d i v i d u a l m o r a l regeneration a n d the
(ignorance) a n d I s l a m
(Atasoy 2003e). Q u t b argues that M u s l i m s c a n either imitate W e s t e r n models or embrace I s l a m . H e defines the c o n d i t i o n i n w h i c h M u s l i m s t u r n away f r o m
reconstitution of justice i n society. T h e n a t i o n a l v i e w focus o f the p r o - I s l a m i c p a r t y was essentially a r e v i v a l
I s l a m as jahiliyya., a n d promotes I s l a m as the superior choice i n a l l respects for
o f the
righteous l i v i n g . M a w d u d i , o f the Jama'at-I i s l a m i , was deeply c o m m i t t e d to
westernization d u r i n g the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . I n order to re-establish a strong
the d o c t r i n e o f tawhid ( u n i t y ) — ' O n e G o d , O n e Prophet, a n d O n e B o o k ' . H e
position i n the state system, as the O t t o m a n E m p i r e h a d d u r i n g its classical era,
saw I s l a m as a u n i v e r s a l ideology not subject to t e r r i t o r i a l n a t i o n a l i s m . H e
T u r k e y w o u l d have to r e g a i n its consciousness as a M u s l i m n a t i o n . For this, the
also h e l d that the acceptance o f inappropriate foreign i n n o v a t i o n s by m a n y
state w o u l d be r e q u i r e d to establish the p r i m a c y o f M u s l i m m o r a l culture a n d
M u s l i m s , a n d consequent
d e v i a t i o n f r o m I s l a m , was the p r i m a r y cause o f
s p i r i t u a l i t y i n the n a t i o n a l consciousness as w e l l as i n the character of i n d i v i d u a l s
their e x p l o i t a t i o n b y W e s t e r n i m p e r i a l i s t states. T h e M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d a n d
( K a r a h a s a n o g l u 1975: 114). I t w o u l d f a l l to the state educational system to
J a m a ' a t - I I s l a m i p o p u l a r i z e d the ideological schism between I s l a m a n d the West
rejuvenate the 'glorious past o f one thousand years' (Tanju 1978: 112). E r b a k a n ,
as a c i v i l i z a t i o n a l d i v i d e . T h e defeat o f Nasser i n the 1967 A r a b - I s r a e l i W a r
therefore, gave the state a p i v o t a l role i n m a n a g i n g the economy, i n order to re-
contributed greatly to the rise İn p o p u l a r i t y o f this idea o f M u s l i m u n i t y against
e m b e d it i n a network o f social relations g o v e r n e d by Islamic m o r a l i t y .
W e s t e r n i m p e r i a l i s m . W a l l e r s t e i n (2000: 359) describes the current institutional i n c a r n a t i o n o f this i m p e r i a l i s t power as U S hegemony. Proponents
o f the
national
v i e w i n T u r k e y espoused
nineteenth-century
pan-Islamic
p h i l o s o p h y that rejected
wholesale
P r o - I s l a m i c sensitivity to I s l a m i c m o r a l a n d c u l t u r a l practices
linked
the e c o n o m y to the state r e g u l a t i o n o f p r o d u c t i o n a n d c o n s u m p t i o n n o r m s . spiritual
S h e i k h K o t k u e n c o u r a g e d t h e development o f I s l a m i c a l l y regulated patterns
transformation o f i n d i v i d u a l s through I s l a m i c principles, regardless o f whether
the
of c o n s u m p t i o n as a way o f r e s t o r i n g M u s l i m m o r a l i t y . H e argued that the
128
129
T H E ISLAMIST NATIONAL VIEW
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
I s l a m i c s h a p i n g o f the e c o n o m y depended o n the forging o f p o l i t i c a l alliances
b o u n d a r i e s . R a t h e r , he believes i n s t r e n g t h e n i n g Turkey's m a r k e t position by
between the state b u r e a u c r a c y a n d private industrialists. W h i l e the development
f o r g i n g a M u s l i m c o m m o n m a r k e t . A c c o r d i n g to E r b a k a n , a M u s l i m c o m m o n
managers o f the state b u r e a u c r a c y w o u l d take care o f the establishment o f
market would counterbalance
large c a p i t a l g o o d s - p r o d u c i n g i n d u s t r i a l plants, private firms w o u l d produce
e c o n o m y i n w h i c h p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y relations are governed by the U n i t e d
the
' c o n d i t i o n i n g situation' w i t h i n the w o r l d
consumer goods ( G u r d o g a n 1991: 5 7 - 9 , 88, 93-130). H o w e v e r , it was i m p o r t a n t
States. T h e foreign p o l i c y i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the C y p r u s W a r are a case i n point, a
that consumer goods p r o d u c t i o n be regulated by the state, to ensure that
subject to w h i c h 1 n o w r e t u r n .
I s l a m i c n o r m a t i v e standards p r e v a i l e d . T h e relationship between the e c o n o m y a n d Islamic m o r a l i t y was to be m e d i a t e d by extensive state c o n t r o l over both p r o d u c t i o n a n d c o n s u m p t i o n n o r m s . It w o u l d therefore be the responsibility o f a
The Cyprus War
p o l i t i c a l l y strong state to reconfigure the s o c i o - c u l t u r a l r e a l m , regulate relations a m o n g v a r i o u s segments o f society, a n d reorganize Turkey's relations w i t h other states i n the state system. H o w e v e r , a c c o r d i n g to K o t k u , a p o w e r f u l state could
T u r k e y i n v a d e d C y p r u s i n 1974. T h e U S government, already weakened b y the V i e t n a m W a r a n d the W a t e r g a t e s c a n d a l , was unable to mediate between T u r k e y a n d Greece. It was also p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h M i d d l e East peace negotiations
only materialize i f morally upright individuals ruled.
after the 1973 A r a b - I s r a e l i W a r . O n 15 J u l y 1974, a G r e e k j u n t a engineered a K o t k u v i e w e d ' c o r r u p t i o n ' as a sign o f the state's d i m i n i s h e d capacity to formulate a n d i m p l e m e n t policies i n accordance w i t h the interests o f society as a whole. T u r k e y ' s i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o W e s t e r n security alliances d i s e m p o w e r e d the state a n d u n d e r m i n e d its c a p a c i t y to introduce effective s o c i a l p o l i c y for the welfare o f peasants, w o r k i n g classes, a n d s m a l l producers. K o t k u b e l i e v e d that Western d o m i n a n c e i n the w o r l d e c o n o m y was i n d u c i n g powerlessness i n the T u r k i s h state—the result o f structural i m b a l a n c e s created by the w o r l d capitalist e c o n o m y between 'core' W e s t e r n states a n d ' p e r i p h e r a l ' states o f the
Third
W o r l d . T h e n a t i o n a l v i e w l i n k e d the p r o b l e m o f class i n e q u a l i t y a n d social injustice to the o p e r a t i o n o f the w o r l d economy. Consequently, it p r o m o t e d a n a t i o n a l o r i e n t a t i o n i n e c o n o m i c a n d social policy. K o t k u insisted that the successful r e a r r a n g e m e n t
o f the e c o n o m y a n d society r e q u i r e d a d e c o u p l i n g
f r o m W e s t e r n models a n d r a p p r o a c h e m e n t w i t h M u s l i m states.
c o u p d ' é t a t a n d r e m o v e d M a k a r i o s f r o m p o w e r i n an attempt to unify C y p r u s a n d G r e e c e ( B o l u k b a s i 1988:
167-9). W h e n negotiations to restore p o l i t i c a l
stability a n d prevent gnosis f a i l e d , T u r k i s h m i l i t a r y forces l a n d e d i n n o r t h e r n C y p r u s o n 20 J u l y 1974, c a p t u r i n g 7 per cent o f the i s l a n d . T h e Soviet U n i o n d i d not contest the T u r k i s h m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n (Ecevit 1976: 65) but the U S a d m i n i s t r a t i o n v i e w e d it as a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n o f T u r k e y ' s defiance. T h e G r e e k j u n t a , quite u n p r e p a r e d for the T u r k i s h m i l i t a r y operation, c o l l a p s e d o n 23 J u l y 1974. T h i s also l e d to the failure o f the coup i n C y p r u s ( H a l e 2 0 0 0 : 157). A l t h o u g h the de facto existence o f autonomous G r e e k a n d T u r k i s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s was agreed u p o n i n the peace d e c l a r a t i o n o f 30 J u l y
1974
( C o u l o u m b i s 1983: 96), G r e e k s a n d G r e e k C y p r i o t s were not eager to accept the T u r k i s h p r o p o s a l for a loose b i z o n a l or a m u l t i c a n t o n a l federation i n C y p r u s . T u r k i s h troops c a r r i e d out a s e c o n d m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n o n 12 A u g u s t 1974 i n order to forcibly i m p l e m e n t t h i s p r o p o s a l . T h e m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n was actually s y m p t o m a t i c o f p o l i t i c a l t e n s i o n w i t h i n the g o v e r n m e n t o f T u r k e y between the
T h e n a t i o n a l v i e w : t r a n s c e n d i n g state t e r r i t o r y
centre-left R P P a n d the p r o - I s l a m i c N S P . S o c i a l d e m o c r a t E c e v i t (1976: 8 3 , E r b a k a n ' s reference to a n I s l a m i c global project also i n v o l v e d c h a n g i n g the
95) w a n t e d to have a t e r r i t o r i a l federation w i t h i n the independent R e p u b l i c
s t r u c t u r a l p o s i t i o n o f T u r k e y i n the w o r l d e c o n o m y f r o m a p e r i p h e r a l to a
o f C y p r u s . P r o - I s l a m i c E r b a k a n (1975: 389) favoured its p a r t i t i o n i n g . U n a b l e
p r i m a r y l o c a t i o n . H e a r g u e d for a c o m m o n market w i t h M u s l i m states i n w h i c h
to c o n t a i n this difference o f o p i n i o n w i t h i n the government, E c e v i t resigned,
T u r k e y c o u l d strengthen its i n d u s t r i a l capacity a n d also emerge as a stronger
thereby t r i g g e r i n g a collapse o f the c o a l i t i o n g o v e r n m e n t o n 7 N o v e m b e r 1974.
state. F o r E r b a k a n , a strong state w o u l d assure the market p o w e r o f its n a t i o n a l
T h e C y p r u s crisis h a d i m p o r t a n t l o n g - t e r m consequences for Turkey's
bourgeoisie. H e stated: ' A s o p p o s e d to struggling w i t h the E E C to be able to
relations w i t h the U n i t e d States. P r i m e M i n i s t e r K a r a m a n l i s w i t h d r e w G r e e c e
sell some parsley . . . W e should sell our a g r i c u l t u r a l a n d m a n u f a c t u r e d goods
f r o m the m i l i t a r y c o m m a n d
to M u s l i m states [and] b u i l d their industries [and] their roads' ( E r b a k a n 1975:
g o v e r n m e n t o f b e i n g u n w i l l i n g to react to the T u r k i s h use offeree i n C y p r u s . I n
2 6 6 - 8 ) . E r b a k a n ' s n a t i o n a l v i e w is reminiscent o f the ' d e p e n d e n c y ' theory o f
order to b r i n g G r e e c e b a c k i n t o the N A T O m i l i t a r y c o m m a n d , a n d largely due
the
requires d e - l i n k i n g
to the efforts o f a s t r o n g G r e e k l o b b y in the U S C o n g r e s s , the U S government
f r o m the w o r l d capitalist system ( A m i n 1976), but E r b a k a n departs f r o m this
i m p o s e d a n e m b a r g o o n m i l i t a r y a i d to T u r k e y o n 5 F e b r u a r y 1975 { U S
theory. H e does not argue that development should be c o n f i n e d w i t h i n n a t i o n a l
C o n g r e s s 1980, 1981, 1983). T h e T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t responded by c l o s i n g a
1970s, w h i c h
i m a g i n e d that n a t i o n a l development
of N A T O ,
accusing both N A T O
a n d the U S
130
131
T H E ISLAMIST NATIONAL V I E W
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
n u m b e r o f U S m i l i t a r y bases i n Turkey. T h e U S arms embargo lasted until 1978,
5 6 6 , 0 0 0 m e n , w h i c h a m o u n t e d to 5.1 per cent o f its G N P ( U S Congress 1980:
w i t h the start o f the I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n a n d the Soviet-engineered c o u p
15). T h e e m b a r g o f o r c e d T u r k e y to purchase m i l i t a r y equipment,
i n A f g h a n i s t a n . B o t h o f these events increased Turkey's strategic i m p o r t a n c e i n
a n d spare parts w i t h h a r d c u r r e n c y payments. C o m b i n e d w i t h the decline i n
the region.
workers' remittances a n d e c o n o m i c isolation w i t h i n the E E C . the a r m s e m b a r g o
Supporters of the embargo used a combination o f legal and arguments.
T h e basis o f the legal argument
strategic
was that Turkey had used U S
weapons,
pushed the e c o n o m y i n t o a n e v e n deeper crisis. Greece's a p p l i c a t i o n for E E C m e m b e r s h i p also adversely affected
arms a n d equipment to invade C y p r u s , w h i c h was contrary to the U S F o r e i g n
T u r k i s h governments'
the
a b i l i t y to receive l o n g - t e r m loans from E u r o p e . After
Assistance A c t o f 1961 [ P L 87-195), a n d the M i l i t a r y Sales A c t o f 1968 ( P L 90¬
w i t h d r a w i n g f r o m N A T O ' s m i l i t a r y c o m m a n d i n 1975, G r e e c e a p p l i e d for full
629). These acts stipulated that any a r m s or services provided to a country were to
E E C m e m b e r s h i p . T h e r e was u n a n i m o u s acceptance o f the G r e e k a p p l i c a t i o n
be used o n l y for internal security a n d self-defence purposes ( U S Congress 1981).
i n 1976 a n d G r e e c e b e c a m e a f u l l E E C m e m b e r i n J a n u a r y 1980 (Featherstone
T h e further strategic argument was that the Soviet U n i o n d i d not represent a n
1989: 1 8 8 - 9 0 ) . It is w e l l k n o w n that Greek d i p l o m a c y was successful i n i s o l a t i n g
i m m e d i a t e threat to Turkey and that the eastern M e d i t e r r a n e a n and Turkey were
T u r k e y i n E u r o p e b y l i n k i n g t h e C y p r u s p r o b l e m to T u r k e y ' s status vis-a-vis the E E C . E r a l p (1993) suggests t h a t Turkey's i n a b i l i t y to extricate itself from the
secondary to N A T O ' s overall m i l i t a r y p l a n n i n g ( U S Congress 1977). T h e a r m s embargo resulted i n a d r a m a t i c shift i n U S m i l i t a r y aid p o l i c y towards T u r k e y . F r o m the days o f the M a r s h a l l P l a n u n t i l the a r m s embargo, U S m i l i t a r y a i d to T u r k e y was mostly i n the f o r m o f grants. W i t h the i n t r o d u c t i o n
C y p r u s p r o b l e m p r o v i d e d E u r o p e w i t h a n excuse for refusing to p r o v i d e T u r k e y w i t h f i n a n c i a l assistance. Financial the
problems,
d i p l o m a t i c tension,
powerlessness
o f the
Turkish
and state.
the
arms
Together,
embargo these
all
of the e m b a r g o , m i l i t a r y grants were d i s c o n t i n u e d a n d loans became the o n l y
reflected
factors
f o r m o f U S a i d available to T u r k e y .
reinforced the p e r c e p t i o n t h a t T u r k e y was u n a b l e to m a i n t a i n c o n t r o l over its i n t e r n a l a n d e x t e r n a l spheres o f national sovereignty. T h i s p r o m p t e d T u r k i s h p o l i c y - m a k e r s to d e v e l o p c l o s e r relations w i t h the Soviet U n i o n a n d M u s l i m
'fable 5: U S M i l i t a r y Assistance, 1950-1980 ( M i l l i o n USS)
states i n the M i d d l e E a s t . T h e Islamic n a t i o n a l view p r o g r a m m e based Grant
Loan
Total
the
e m p o w e r m e n t o f the T u r k i s h state o n a general M u s l i m disengagement f r o m the West. T h e process o f e m p o w e r m e n t itself was to take place i n the midst o f
1950 to 1970 1971
3,406.6
3,406.6
204.0
204.0
1972
164.4
15.0
179.4
1973
186.7
20.0
206.7
1974
117.7
75.0
192.7
changes i n S o v i e t - M i d d l e E a s t relations w h i c h c u l m i n a t e d i n the g r a d u a l ref o r m i n g o f global I s l a m i c ties.
Turkish-Soviet rapprochement
1975
20.4
75.0
1976
-
125.0
125.0
-
1960s i n exchange for T u r k e y ' s neutrality i n the r e g i o n . I n 1961 a n offer o f U S $
1977
125.0
125.0
5 0 0 m i l l i o n was e x t e n d e d to t h e m i l i t a r y government, w h i c h President G e n e r a l
•
95.4
T h e S o v i e t U n i o n presented offers of e c o n o m i c a i d to T u r k e y f r o m the early
1978
.2
¡75.0
175.2
G u r s e l refused ( G o n l u b o i et a l 1987: 336). A n o t h e r U S $ 4 0 0 m i l l i o n was offered
1979
5.3
173.0
180.3
to I n o n u w h e n he b e c a m e p r i m e m i n i s t e r o f the c i v i l i a n c o a l i t i o n g o v e r n m e n t
¡980
3.4
250.0
253.4
i n 196!. I n o n u also refused. D e m i r e l was the first to accept Soviet e c o n o m i c a i d , w o r t h U S S 2 0 0 m i l l i o n i n 1967 ( A r c a y u r e k 1984: 262 1). B y the e n d o f
Total
4,108.7
1,035.0
5443.7
the 1970s T u r k e y h a d b e c o m e one o f the largest recipients o f S o v i e t a i d outside the W a r s a w Pact b l o c ( R u b i n s t e i n 1979). T h i s i n c l u d e d U S $ 2 8 0 m i l l i o n for the
S o u r c e : U S Congress 1980: 17
Iskenderun i r o n a n d steel p l a n t under a ten-year e c o n o m i c agreement i n v o l v i n g a s u m o f U S S 1.3 b i l l i o n by 1977 ( G o l a n 1990: 253). A n o t h e r agreement i n 1979
A f t e r the U n i t e d States. T u r k e y h a d the largest s t a n d i n g a r m y i n N A T O . D u r i n g the 1960s T u r k e y r a n k e d s i x t h a m o n g all aid recipients (Tuncer 1975: 206-24). I n 1979, T u r k e y spent U S $ 2.6 b i l l i o n on its active a r m e d forces o f
w o r t h U S S 3.8 b i l l i o n was for the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f mostly energy-related projects ( N o r t o n 1992: 106). B y the b e g i n n i n g of 1980 M o s c o w was p r o v i d i n g
financial
132
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
133
T H E ISLAMIST NATIONAL VIEW
support for 4 4 different development projects i n Turkey, i n a d d i t i o n to s u p p l y i n g
plant i n T u r k e y that c o u l d p r o d u c e spare parts for the aeroplanes and tanks
a p p r o x i m a t e l y 7 m i l l i o n barrels o f crude oil a n n u a l l y (Boll 1979; 623). Soviet
previously s u p p l i e d by the U S g o v e r n m e n t (GunaydinNewspaper,
e c o n o m i c assistance was to be p a i d back by a g r i c u l t u r a l exports on barter terms ( G o l a n 1990: 253).
I n 1978, T u r k e y a n d t h e
28 A p r i l 1978).
Soviet U n i o n also signed a ' T r e a t y on
the
P r i n c i p l e s o f G o o d N e i g h b o u r l y a n d F r i e n d l y C o o p e r a t i o n ' . A l t h o u g h it was
j o i n t investment projects i n c l u d e d the O r h a n e l i t h e r m a l power
station
not a non-aggression
paet, the treaty was a b r e a k t h r o u g h
for Soviet relations
(with a capacity to p r o d u c e 200 m i l l i o n watts o f electricity) a n d the C a n t h e r m a l
w i t h a N A T O c o u n t r y . T h e a g r e e m e n t i n c l u d e d a m u t u a l p r o h i b i t i o n clause
p o w e r station
o n the use o f their territories for aggressive o r subversive actions against each
(with a capacity o f 6 0 0 m i l l i o n watts) (Milliyet Newspaper, 27
O c t o b e r 1978). T h e Soviet U n i o n also c o m m i t t e d itself to b u i l d i n g a n u m b e r
other. T h e literal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
o f large i n d u s t r i a l facilities i n c l u d i n g the iskenderun I r o n a n d Steel M i l l , the
facilities a l o n g the s t r a t e g i c a l l y i m p o r t a n t
S e y d i ş e h i r A l u m i n u m Smelter, a n d the I z m i r A l i a g a O i l R e f i n e r y ( R u b i n s t e i n
621). F r o m the S o v i e t point o f v i e w , the treaty was m e a n t to prevent T u r k e y ' s
1982: 27). T h e o i l refinery, i r o n a n d steel complex, a n d a l u m i n i u m smelter were
high-level i n v o l v e m e n t i n N A T O . F r o m the T u r k i s h perspective, it represented
completed w i t h Soviet credits w o r t h U S $ 1 b i l l i o n .
a diversification o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y a n d Turkey's disengagement f r o m the W e s t e r n
T u r k e y a n d the Soviet U n i o n h a d already established closer ties i n 1964
o f this clause w o u l d p r e c l u d e U S surveillance T u r k i s h - S o v i e t b o r d e r ( B o l l 1979:
a l l i a n c e ( H a l e 2 0 0 0 : 162). It w a s o n l y after the U S g o v e r n m e n t lifted the a r m s
assistance i f
e m b a r g o a n d r e s u m e d e c o n o m i c assistance to T u r k e y i n the w a k e o f the I s l a m i c
T u r k i s h intervention i n C y p r u s p r o v o k e d a Soviet m i l i t a r y response. L a t e i n
R e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n a n d events i n A f g h a n i s t a n that T u r k i s h foreign p o l i c y entered
1964 the T u r k i s h M i n i s t e r o f F o r e i g n A f f a i r s a n d a group o f p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s
a new phase o f r e - e n g a g e m e n t w i t h the Western a l l i a n c e .
after President J o h n s o n w a r n e d T u r k e y not to expect N A T O
visited M o s c o w . P r i m e M i n i s t e r U r g u p l u also m a d e a trip to M o s c o w i n 1965 ( U l m a n a n d D e k m e j i a n 1967: 779). Soviet President P o d g o r n y
reciprocated
w i t h a visit to Turkey, followed by a visit from G r o m y k o , Soviet M i n i s t e r o f
Turkish-Middle East relations
F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , i n M a y 1965. P r i m e M i n i s t e r K o s y g i n visited i n J a n u a r y 1967 F r o m the f o u n d i n g o f the r e p u b l i c i n 1923 u n t i l the C y p r u s crisis o f 1964,
( R u b i n s t e i n 1982: 20). . These visits resulted i n a d e c i d e d l y lower level o f C o l d W a r
rhetoric
between the t w o countries. T u r k e y c a n c e l l e d its p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a
NATO
m u l t i l a t e r a l nuclear force a n d b a n n e d A m e r i c a n U - 2 flights from T u r k e y i n December
1965 ( A r c a y u r e k 1984: 3 0 9 - 1 0 ) . T h e government also refused
an
U S request i n 1966 to dispatch T u r k i s h troops to V i e t n a m (Ton, 25 F e b r u a r y 1966). M o s t significant o f a l l was Turkey's d e m a n d that N A T O
agreements
be m o d i f i e d to include a n e x p l i c i t statement on the organization's
defensive
character ( U l m a n a n d D e k m e j i a n 1967: 780). D u r i n g the 1967 a n d 1973 A r a b Israeli wars, T u r k e y d i d not a l l o w the U n i t e d States to use N A T O m i l i t a r y bases i n T u r k e y for refuelling, reconnaissance, direct combat or logistical support ( R u b i n s t e i n 1982: 38). H o w e v e r , the Soviet U n i o n was allowed to c a r r y out n a v a l transit a n d m i l i t a r y deployments, as w e l l as flights over T u r k i s h airspace
traditions o f the M u s l i m M i d d l e East. A s the o n l y N A T O between the M i d d l e E a s t a n d
country
situated
E u r o p e , T u r k e y chose to p r o m o t e
Western
interests i n the r e g i o n a n d l i n k A r a b states o f the M i d d l e E a s t into a W e s t e r n m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e . W h e n the C y p r u s crisis revealed the l i m i t a t i o n s o f Turkey's p r o - W e s t e r n a l i g n m e n t , T u r k e y ' s M i d d l e East p o l i c y ceased to be a function o f competitive East-West C o l d W a r politics. T o institute a f r i e n d l i e r
approach
towards the A r a b s , T u r k e y b e g a n to support A r a b resolutions at the U N . F o r e x a m p l e , it voted for U N R e s o l u t i o n 242, w h i c h p r e s c r i b e d the
withdrawal
of Israeli forces f r o m t e r r i t o r y o c c u p i e d d u r i n g the A r a b - I s r a e l i W a r o f 1967 ( R o b i n s 1991: 7 4 - 9 ) . I n 1975, T u r k e y also r e c o g n i z e d the P L O as the exclusive representative o f P a l e s t i n i a n s a n d i n 1979 p e r m i t t e d the P L O to o p e n a n office in Ankara.
a n d the straits ( G o l a n 1990: 251-4). A s T u r k i s h a n d Soviet relations w a r m e d , a T u r k i s h m i l i t a r y delegation was p e r m i t t e d to observe G e o r g i a n a n d A r m e n i a n m i l i t a r y manoeuvres i n 1976 (Günaydın Newspaper, 28 F e b r u a r y
governments i n T u r k e y a l l w a n t e d to break away f r o m the c u l t u r a l a n d p o l i t i c a l
1978). A second m i l i t a r y delegation
t o u r e d g r o u n d , n a v a l , a n d a i r units i n M o s c o w , L e n i n g r a d , and V o l g o g r a d m i l i t a r y districts (Milliyet Newspaper, 4 J u n e 1976). A Soviet m i l i t a r y delegation visited T u r k e y i n the c o m p a n y o f G e n e r a l O g a r k o v , Soviet First D e p u t y Defense M i n i s t e r a n d C h i e f o f Staff. T h e p u r p o s e o f the visit was to discuss possible m i l i t a r y a i d to Turkey. Discussions i n c l u d e d plans for the b u i l d i n g o f a n a r m s
B y establishing f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h M u s l i m states i n the M i d d l e East, T u r k e y h o p e d to ease its e c o n o m i c difficulties. T h e 1973 o i l shock h a d increased the p r i c e o f T u r k i s h o i l i m p o r t s fivefold from U S $ 207 m i l l i o n i n 1973 to U S $ 1.2 b i l l i o n i n 1977. A s a result, t h e trade deficit, w h i c h was a m a n a g e a b l e U S i ? 45 m i l l i o n i n 1973, s k y r o c k e t e d to U S $ 893 m i l l i o n four years later ( R o b i n s 1991: 101). T h e second o i l shock o f 1979 raised T u r k e y ' s oil i m p o r t b i l l to over U S | 3.86 b i l l i o n by 1980 ( O E C D
1982: 7, 43). F r o m the 1970s o n w a r d s , T u r k i s h
governments t r i e d to facilitate
the formation o f r e g i o n a l business
networks,
134
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
T H E ISLAMIST NATIONAL V I E W
135
w h i c h r e q u i r e d heavy reliance o n g o v e r n m e n t support o f investments by T u r k i s h
b u i l d - u p o f m i l i t a r y strength w a s reflected i n Iraq's dealings w i t h the I r a n i a n -
c o n t r a c t i n g c o m p a n i e s i n o i l - e x p o r t i n g countries.
supported K u r d i s h r e b e l l i o n i n the o i l - p r o d u c i n g areas a r o u n d K e r k u k a n d
In
1978 there were 22 T u r k i s h c o n t r a c t i n g companies i n the
Middle
M o s u l , a n d i n its conflict w i t h I r a n over the I r a n i a n takeover o f three islands i n
E a s t . B y 1981 there were 113 ( R o b i n s 1991: 105). T h e i r first major
success
the H o r m u z Strait. Iraq's s u p p r e s s i o n o f K u r d i s h o p p o s i t i o n also c o n t r i b u t e d to
was in L i b y a where i n 1977 the A r a b - T u r k i s h B a n k was established as a j o i n t
a convergence o f interests b e t w e e n I r a q a n d T u r k e y .
venture. K u w a i t j o i n e d the venture sometime later (Ihsanoglu 1996: 83). T u r k e y
I n 1973, I r a q r e c e i v e d a USÎS 224 m i l l i o n Soviet l o a n for the c o n s t r u c t i o n
also b e c a m e a n i m p o r t a n t transshipment route for I r a q i o i l . I n 1977, the first
of a n o i l refinery a n d t w o o i l p i p e l i n e s across T u r k i s h territory. T h e l o a n w a s to
T u r k i s h - I r a q i o i l p i p e l i n e was completed to e x p o r t o i l from K e r k u k to E u r o p e
be r e p a i d i n o i l ( F r e e d m a n 1978: 50). I n 1972, w i t h Soviet t e c h n i c a l assistance
t h r o u g h the T u r k i s h p o r t o f Y u m u r t a l i k . T h e K e r k u k - Y u m u r t a l i k o i l p i p e l i n e
a n d f i n a n c i a l a i d , I r a q was also able to n a t i o n a l i z e the I r a q P e t r o l e u m C o m p a n y
h a d a c a p a c i t y o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 barrels p e r d a y ( R o b i n s 1991: 59).
( G o l a n 1990: 167).
W i t h the start o f the I r a q - I r a n W a r i n 1980, I r a q also e x p o n e d large amounts o f o i l v i a T u r k e y i n tanker trucks.
Soviet influence over L i b y a was very slight. Qaddafi's c o u p d ' é t a t o f 1969, considered one o f the earliest manifestations o f I s l a m i c revolution ( A n d e r s o n
T h e T u r k i s h r a p p r o c h e m e n t w i t h M i d d l e E a s t e r n countries was a i m e d at
1983), clashed w i t h b o t h S o v i e t a n d U S interests. F o r Q a d d a f i , there was no
reversing m i l i t a r y dependence o n the U n i t e d States. I n response to the a r m s
difference between the S o v i e t U n i o n , western E u r o p e or the U n i t e d States i n
e m b a r g o , the T u r k i s h p a r l i a m e n t passed the R E M O defence a p p r o p r i a t i o n b i l l
terms of i m p e r i a l i s t designs.
i n 1975. It r e q u i r e d T u r k i s h self-sufficiency i n a r m a m e n t s a n d export weapons
T h e I s r a e l i - E g y p t i a n p e a c e a g r e e m e n t that followed the 1973 w a r b r o u g h t
w i t h i n a n d outside N A T O (Cumhuriyet Newspaper, 30 J u n e 1975). T h e b i l l also
L i b y a a n d I r a q closer to the S o v i e t U n i o n , w i t h T u r k e y p r o v i d i n g a strategic
stipulated the terms o f r e g i o n a l arms p r o d u c t i o n . I n 1975, T u r k e y s i g n e d a
l i n k . T h e 1973 w a r created a n e n v i r o n m e n t c o n d u c i v e to A r a b u n i t y against
five-year e c o n o m i c agreement w i t h I r a n to establish a j o i n t defence i n d u s t r y
the U n i t e d States a n d Israel. L i b y a , S a u d i A r a b i a , K u w a i t , Q a t a r , B a h r a i n ,
(Hurriyet Newspaper, 11 J u n e 1975). T h e e x p a n s i o n o f the T u r k i s h t a n k i n d u s t r y i n
a n d D u b a i cut off a l l o i l e x p o r t s to the U n i t e d States o n 19 O c t o b e r 1973. T h e
K i r i k k a l e was also p l a n n e d w i t h I r a n i a n f i n a n c i a l assistance [Hurriyet Newspaper,
p r i c e o f o i l increased f r o m U S $ 2.59 per b a r r e l i n J a n u a r y 1973 to U S $ 5.12
18 N o v e m b e r 1975), I n a d d i t i o n , T u r k e y u n d e r t o o k a series o f joint i n d u s t r i a l
by O c t o b e r 1973 ( V e n n 1986: 199). H o w e v e r , the break with U S foreign policy
ventures
with
Libya.
T h i s i n c l u d e d the
establishment
of an
ammunition
by A r a b states d i d not i m p r o v e t h e i r a b i l i t y to exert greater e c o n o m i c a n d
factory i n T u r k e y , the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f four s u b m a r i n e s for L i b y a , a n d the sale
p o l i t i c a l influence i n the r e g i o n . F o l l o w i n g a n E g y p t i a n - I s r a e l i peace agreement
o f light a n d h e a v y m a c h i n e guns, a r t i l l e r y pieces a n d shells to the L i b y a n a r m y
on 19 M a r c h , m a j o r o i l - p r o d u c i n g A r a b states l e d by S a u d i A r a b i a lifted the
(Gunaydin Newspaper, 28 F e b r u a r y 1978).
o i l e m b a r g o . Nevertheless, o i l p r i c e s c o n t i n u e d to rise to between U S $ 16 a n d U S 8 20 p e r b a r r e l i n D e c e m b e r 1973. B y 1980 the p r i c e r e a c h e d U S $ 4 0 p e r b a r r e l . T h e I r a n i a n I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n a n d subsequent I r a n - I r a q w a r
T r a n s n a t i o n a l I s l a m i c ties
had
reduced the v o l u m e o f o i l a v a i l a b l e to w o r l d markets b y between 4 m i l l i o n a n d 6 m i l l i o n barrels ( V e n n 1986: 202). Regardless, the S a u d i - l e d t e r m i n a t i o n o f the
I n the p e r i o d between the n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f the Suez C a n a l i n 1956 a n d the I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n i n 1978-79, the Soviet U n i o n a c h i e v e d its greatest influence i n the M i d d l e East. D u r i n g this time, Turkey, I r a n , E g y p t , S y r i a , I r a q ,
o i l e m b a r g o created d i s u n i t y a m o n g A r a b states a n d isolated L i b y a , I r a q , a n d S y r i a i n the M i d d l e East. T h i s further c i r c u m s c r i b e d Soviet entanglements i n the r e g i o n .
a n d A l g e r i a received large amounts o f Soviet e c o n o m i c a n d m i l i t a r y a i d . E g y p t ' s debt to the S o v i e t U n i o n , for example, was estimated to be U S $ 11 b i l l i o n by the
W h i l e new p o l i t i c a l relations b a c k e d b y the U n i t e d States developed a l o n g
early 1980s ( D a w i s h a 1982: 11). After Nasser's death a n d Sadat's rise to p o w e r ,
the S a u d i - E g y p t i a n axis, the S o v i e t U n i o n stepped up support for b o t h I r a q
E g y p t a n d S a u d i A r a b i a became closer, w i t h the latter e m e r g i n g as the strongest
a n d S y r i a . T h e Soviets also i m p r o v e d relations w i t h L i b y a . T h e Soviet U n i o n
U S ally i n the region, M e a n w h i l e , Soviet interests i n I r a q a n d L i b y a increased.
needed access to M i d d l e E a s t o i l , even t h o u g h it was a major o i l - p r o d u c i n g
A l t h o u g h S o v i e t - I r a q i relations were not based o n a n i d e o l o g i c a l a l l i a n c e , the Soviet U n i o n supported I r a q i n its conflict w i t h I r a n over the Shatt a l - A r a b w a t e r w a y i n 1973 and 1974. Between 1972 a n d 1975 I r a q was able to double the size o f its a r m e d forces by d o u b l i n g its p r o c u r e m e n t o f Soviet arms supplies. T h i s
country. W a r s a w Pact e c o n o m i c p l a n n i n g r e q u i r e d the Soviet U n i o n to p r o v i d e 50 m i l l i o n tons o f o i l to its P a c t p a r t n e r s between 3971 a n d 1975, a n d 70 m i l l i o n tons a y e a r after that [The Economist, 22 J u l y 1972: 82). Unless it r a i s e d the p r i c e of its o i l or found a d d i t i o n a l sources of supply, the Soviet U n i o n was not g o i n g to benefit from the i n c r e a s e d o i l prices o f 1973-74. I n 1974 the Soviet U n i o n
136
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
137
T H E ISLAMIST NATIONAL VIEW
decided to raise the price o f its o i l to w o r l d market levels a n d d e m a n d that
Egypt, Syria, J o r d a n , T u n i s i a , L i b y a , Turkey, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh
W a r s a w Pact countries pay for it i n h a r d c u r r e n c y (Sodaro 1990: 254). T h i s was
once each, a n d several other M u s l i m countries i n A f r i c a . I n the same p e r i o d ,
a p i v o t a l t u r n i n g p o i n t i n S o v i e t - W a r s a w Pact relations, p u s h i n g W a r s a w Pact
24 M u s l i m religious delegations f r o m 20 M u s l i m countries visited the M u s l i m
allies into a b i l a t e r a l relationship w i t h W e s t e r n governments, private banks, and
republics o f the Soviet U n i o n ( B e n n i g s e n et a l 1989: 4 3 - 9 ) . T h e most active
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e n d i n g agencies i n order to secure e c o n o m i c a i d {The Economist
Soviet M u s l i m j o u r n a l at this t i m e was Muslims of the Soviet East.
6
J a n u a r y 1973: 28). A t the same time, it pushed the Soviet U n i o n deeper into the shifting p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y alliances o f the M i d d l e East.
I n O c t o b e r 1970, B a b a k h a n o v o r g a n i z e d the first o f m a n y i n t e r n a t i o n a l conferences w i t h the theme o f ' U n i t y a n d C o o p e r a t i o n A m o n g M u s l i m Peoples
T h e Soviet U n i o n centred its strategic t h i n k i n g o n the Islamic ties between M u s l i m states. K h r u s h c h e v 4 9 5 3 - 6 4 ) h a d already e m p l o y e d this strategy w h e n
i n the Struggle for Peace'. O f f i c i a l representatives from 24 M u s l i m
countries
a n d 100 Soviet M u s l i m f u n c t i o n a r i e s attended the conference. I n N o v e m b e r
he cautiously m o b i l i z e d Soviet M u s l i m intellectuals i n the M i d d l e East i n a n
1973, the Tashkent conference
effort to p r o m o t e the idea o f I s l a m i c u n i t y against ' W e s t e r n i m p e r i a l i s m a n d
Support
Israeli aggression'. Soviet M u s l i m s w h o were o r g a n i z e d a r o u n d the A f r o - A s i a n
Aggression'. B a b a k h a n o v c h a i r e d the meeting, i n A u g u s t 1974 a
S o l i d a r i t y C o m m i t t e e and the Peace Partisans assembled several conferences i n
to c o m m e m o r a t e
the M i d d l e E a s t . K a z a k h w r i t e r M u h t a r A u e z o v , a m e m b e r o f the C o m m u n i s t
the Soviet U n i o n . T h i s conference attracted high-level M u s l i m officials f r o m
P a r t y o f K a z a k h s t a n , was v i c e - c h a i r o f the A f r o - A s i a n S o l i d a r i t y C o u n c i l . S a r a f
27 M u s l i m countries, i n c l u d i n g the D e p u t y D i r e c t o r o f the M u s l i m
R a s h i d o v , First Secretary o f the C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e o f the C o m m u n i s t P a r t y o f
L e a g u e . In 1979 a s y m p o s i u m w a s o r g a n i z e d o n ' T h e C o n t r i b u t i o n o f M u s l i m s
the J u s t Struggle
was h e l d w i t h the theme of ' S o v i e t M u s l i m s
o f the
A r a b People
against
Israeli
Imperialist conference
the life a n d w o r k o f I m a m I s m a i l a l - B u k h a r i . was h e l d i n World
U z b e k i s t a n , l e d the C a i r o conference o f the A f r o - A s i a n S o l i d a r i t y C o m m i t t e e
F r o m C e n t r a l A s i a , the V o l g a a n d C a u c a s u s to the D e v e l o p m e n t o f Islamic-
i n D e c e m b e r 1957 a n d J a n u a r y 1958. A n d S o v i e t - M u s l i m M i r s o T u r s u n Z a d e
T h o u g h t , the Cause o f Peace a n d S o c i a l Progress'. It attracted delegates f r o m
led the B a g h d a d conference o f Peace Partisans i n A p r i l 1959 (Bennigsen et a l
30 M u s l i m countries, as w e l l as the S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l o f the M u s l i m W o r l d
1989: 2 9 - 3 4 ) .
L e a g u e , I n a n u l l a h K h a n ( B e n n i g s e n et a l 1989: 5 0 - 2 ) . D r . K a r a c a z m a l i f r o m
D u r i n g the B r e z h n e v era (1964-80), the Soviet U n i o n intensified its
the D i r e c t o r a t e o f R e l i g i o u s A f f a i r s represented T u r k e y at this conference. F o r
appeal to I s l a m i n the face o f Nasser's failure to unite A r a b s . T h e Soviet M u s l i m
his p a r t , F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r S a ' u d a l - F a i s a l expressed gratitude for 'the positive
religious establishment and M u s l i m s from C e n t r a l A s i a a n d the Caucasus began
Soviet stance towards A r a b causes' ( C h u r b a 1980: 355).
to act as 'ambassadors' to the M u s l i m M i d d l e East. T h e Soviet M u s l i m religious establishment,
represented by four M u s l i m s p i r i t u a l boards, was a n effective
T h e Soviet i n v a s i o n o f A f g h a n i s t a n i n D e c e m b e r 1979 was a significant setback for the Soviet a n t i - W e s t e r n a n d anti-Israeli I s l a m i c strategy. A l l M u s l i m
instrument for a d v e r t i s i n g the 'freedom' offered to believers o f I s l a m i n the
states, w i t h the e x c e p t i o n o f L i b y a , S y r i a , a n d S o u t h Y e m e n ,
Soviet U n i o n ( B e n n i g s e n et a l 1989: R o ' i 1984). T h e boards p r o m o t e d the idea
the Soviet i n v a s i o n at the O r g a n i z a t i o n o f the I s l a m i c C o n f e r e n c e
that the Soviet U n i o n , w i t h a M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n o f 50 m i l l i o n , was the best
convened i n I s l a m a b a d
friend a n d p a r t n e r o f the M u s l i m w o r l d . A t the R a w a l p i n d i I s l a m i c Conference
d e c l a r e d the Soviet U n i o n 'the greatest S a t a n o f a l l time'. T h e leaders o f S a u d i
i n N o v e m b e r 1968, the S o v i e t - M u s l i m delegation l e d b y B a b a k h a n o v , head
A r a b i a saw the i n v a s i o n as p a r t o f a g r a n d Soviet strategy l o u l t i m a t e l y c a p t u r e
M u f t i o f the M u s l i m S p i r i t u a l B o a r d o f Tashkent, strongly protested U S , Israeli,
the o i l - r i c h P e r s i a n G u l f ( G o l d b e r g 1984: 268).
and B r i t i s h i m p e r i a l i s m i n the M i d d l e East and presented the Soviet U n i o n as a ' M u s l i m c o u n t r y ' (Bennigsen et al 1989: 39).
hosting o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l conferences.
a n d M a y o f 1980. K h o m e i n i
meetings publicly
W i t h the o c c u r r e n c e o f the I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n a n d the S o v i e t invasion o f A f g h a n i s t a n , Islamic: u n i t y b e g a n to assume a different p o l i t i c a l
In the 1970s, Islamic activity became increasingly c o n n e c t e d o n a global level t h r o u g h the informal exchange o f intellectuals a n d preachers, a n d
in January
condemned
and
economic m e a n i n g
than
the
' a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s m ' o f the
Soviet I s l a m i c
the
strategy. T h e U S government a l s o switched its foreign p o l i c y f r o m a p r o - I s r a e l i
D u r i n g this p e r i o d , there was also a n
p r e o c c u p a t i o n to a positive e n g a g e m e n t w i t h M u s l i m s . I n a d d i t i o n to c o n c e r n s
increase i n the v o l u m e a n d intensity o f exchanges l i n k i n g the Soviet U n i o n a n d
that the g r o w i n g p o w e r o f p o l i t i c a l I s l a m i n the P e r s i a n G u l f m i g h t deny U S
M u s l i m M i d d l e East. T h e S o v i e t - M u s l i m r e l i gious establishment focussed its
access to resources, the U S g o v e r n m e n t was m o t i v a t e d by a desire to render
activities o n I s l a m i c conferences i n the Soviet U n i o n , visits to the M i d d l e East,
the Soviet I s l a m i c strategy less effective. M o r e o v e r , the U n i t e d States h o p e d to
a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l j o u r n a l publications. Between 1973 a n d 1979, official Soviet
combat leftist p o l i t i c a l factions i n p r o - W e s t e r n states o f the M i d d l e East, a n d to
M u s l i m - r e l i g i o u s delegations visited 20 M u s l i m countries. T h e y visited S a u d i
end the Soviet o c c u p a t i o n o f A f g h a n i s t a n . I n the process, T u r k e y was able at
A r a b i a seven times, N o r t h Y e m e n a n d A l g e r i a twice, the G u l f states, I r a q ,
138
139
T H E ISLAMIST NATIONAL VIEW
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
this t i m e to restore its geo-strategic i m p o r t a n c e i n the U S - c e n t r e d p o l i t i c a l a n d
D e v e l o p m e n t (1975), located i n J e d d a h ; the I s l a m i c C e n t r e for the D e v e l o p m e n t
economic c o n f i g u r a t i o n o f the M i d d l e East.
of T r a d e (1981), located i n C a s a b l a n c a : and the I s l a m i c C h a m b e r o f C o m m e r c e , Industry a n d C o m m o d i t y E x c h a n g e (composed o f n a t i o n a l chambers situated m m e m b e r countries o f the O I C ) , l o c a t e d i n K a r a c h i . T h e s e organizations foster
T b e O r g a n i z a t i o n o f the I s l a m i c C o n f e r e n c e
trade, investment, a n d l a b o u r m i g r a t i o n a m o n g m e m b e r states o f the O I C . T h e r e were earlier attempts to unite M u s l i m s a r o u n d a n o r g a n i z a t i o n ,
T h e O r g a n i z a t i o n o f the I s l a m i c Conference ( O I C ) was founded i n 1972 as a transnational framework for an e m e r g i n g Islamic bloc o f M u s l i m states u n i t e d on the basis o f a c o m m o n r e l i g i o n . T b e First Islamic S u m m i t Conference o f K i n g s a n d Presidents f r o m 24 M u s l i m countries was held i n R a b a t , M o r o c c o , i n September
1969. Conference attendants agreed that M u s l i m s should p r o m o t e
m u t u a l assistance i n the e c o n o m i c , scientific, c u l t u r a l , a n d s p i r i t u a l spheres. It was also decided that a p e r m a n e n t secretariat w o u l d be established to foster cooperation a m o n g m e m b e r states. A t the first Islamic Conference o f F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s held in J e d d a h , S a u d i A r a b i a , i n 1970, decisions were m a d e about the appointment o f a secretary general. T h e T h i r d Conference o f F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s held i n 1972 a p p r o v e d its c h a r t e r a n d d e c l a r e d the n a m e o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n to be the O r g a n i z a t i o n o f the I s l a m i c Conference ( A l - A h s a n
1988:
18-49).
T h e O I C consists o f 57 m e m b e r states w i t h a total c o m b i n e d p o p u l a t i o n o f
p r i o r to the f o u n d i n g o f the O I C . F r o m 1965, K i n g F a i s a l o f S a u d i A r a b i a h a d w a n t e d M u s l i m s to unite as a n umman - one c o m m u n i t y ' b e l i e v i n g i n A l l a h . H i s Prophet a n d H i s laws' ( A l - A h s a n 1988; 17). H i s calls aroused little excitement, however, as A r a b states were d i v i d e d between the p r o - W e s t e r n
conservative
m o n a r c h i e s o f S a u d i A r a b i a , J o r d a n , K u w a i t , a n d L i b y a , a n d the nationalist a n d p r o - S o v i e t r e v o l u t i o n a r y regimes o f E g y p t , I r a q , S y r i a , A l g e r i a , a n d Y e m e n . E g y p t i a n s a n d I r a q i a n d S y r i a n nationalists h a d rejected Faisal's call for a n ummah. b e l i e v i n g that it represented a n i m p e r i a l i s t plot to take territorial control of A r a b states out o f the e x c l u s i v e framework o f nation-stales ( M o i n u d d i n 1987: 70-1). W i t h the A r a b defeat i n t h e 1967 A r a b - I s r a e l i W a r , the loss o f j e r u s a l e m , a n d the attempted a r s o n at the a l - A q s a M o s q u e i n 1969, K i n g Faisal's I s l a m i c u n i t y i d e a gave w a y to the establishment o f the O I C , supported
financially
by
S a u d i A r a b i a t h r o u g h the R a b i t a t a l - A l a m a l - l s l a m i .
approximately one b i l l i o n people. M e m b e r s are spread over an area o f 26 T h e R a b i t a t a l - A l a m a l - l s l a m i (also k n o w n as the M u s l i m W o r l d League)
m i l l i o n square kilometres e x t e n d i n g f r o m West A f r i c a to Southeast A s i a .
is a S a u d i - b a s e d t r a n s n a t i o n a l T h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l structure o f the O I C consists o f the I s l a m i c S u m m i t Conference o f K i n g s a n d H e a d s o f States a n d G o v e r n m e n t s , the Conference o f F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s , a n d the G e n e r a l Secretariat. T h e I s l a m i c S u m m i t determines general policies o f the O I C , a n d the Conference o f F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s functions as the m a i n d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g body. T h e Genera] Secretariat is the executive organ. T h e G e n e r a l Secretariat
1962. It was established
financial
i n s t i t u t i o n , founded i n M e k k a h i n
to c o v e r the cost o f I s l a m i c educational
centres,
places o f w o r s h i p , t r a i n i n g courses, seminars, a n d I s l a m i c conferences. It also provides funds to p a y the salaries o f i m a m s a n d t r a v e l l i n g preachers throughout the
world. T h e
Muslim
Brotherhood and
the Jamat-1 I s l a n d provide
an
i d e o l o g i c a l liaison that connects R a b i t a t a l - A l a m a l - l s l a m i funds to I s l a m i c organizations w o r l d w i d e . P a r t i c u l a r l y after the 1973 o i l price hikes, w h e n S a u d i
works t h r o u g h various subsidiary organs.
Its
A r a b i a e m e r g e d as a
financial
giant, the I s l a m i c S o l i d a r i t y F u n d , the I s l a m i c
financial subsidiaries i n c l u d e the i s l a m i c S o l i d a r i t y F u n d (ISF) (1974)
and
D e v e l o p m e n t B a n k , a n d the R a b i t a t a l - A l a m a l - l s l a m i b e c a m e very i m p o r t a n t
the I s l a m i c D e v e l o p m e n t B a n k (1DB) (1975). B o t h are located i n j e d d a h
and
to the e x p a n s i o n o f I s l a m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n a l networks throughout the w o r l d .
p r o v i d e M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s throughout the w o r l d w i t h financial support for the social, c u l t u r a l , a n d p o l i t i c a l e m p o w e r m e n t o f M u s l i m s . Between 1976 a n d 1990, the I D B distributed funds t o t a l l i n g 2,013.64 m i l l i o n d i n a r s (one d i n a r was equivalent to U S $ 1.35 i n J u l y 1990) (Ihsanoglu 1996: 83~4). I n the c u l t u r a l field,
the secretariat works t h r o u g h the R e s e a r c h C e n t r e for I s l a m i c H i s t o r y ,
A r t a n d C u l t u r e , as well as the I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o m m i s s i o n for Islamic Fleritage. B o t h were founded i n 1980 a n d are centred in Istanbul. T h e purpose o f these research institutes is to reveal I s l a m as a complete way o f life. T h e R a b i t a t al~ A l a m a l - l s l a m i , the i S F , a n d i D B provide their funding. I n the c o m m e r c i a i . f i e l d , there are a n u m b e r o f s u b s i d i a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s . A m o n g t h e m are the S t a t i s t i c a l , E c o n o m i c a n d S o c i a l R e s e a r c h a n d T r a i n i n g C e n t r e for I s l a m i c C o u n t r i e s (1977), located i n A n k a r a ; the I s l a m i c F o u n d a t i o n for Science, T e c h n o l o g y a n d
T h e O I C declares that ' c o m m o n b e l i e f constitutes rapprochement
a strong factor i n
a n d s o l i d a r i t y a m o n g M u s l i m peoples, t r a n s c e n d i n g
ethnic/
r a c i a l a n d n a t i o n a l differences' ( A r t i c l e 2 o f the O I C C h a r t e r ) . R e l i g i o n is the basis for m e m b e r s h i p . H o w e v e r , O Î C m e m b e r s are nation-states, not i n d i v i d u a l s or n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s . T h e O I C defines a M u s l i m state in terms of the n u m b e r o f M u s l i m s l i v i n g w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r i a l boundaries o f that state, but there is no consistent rule or policy. N o i a l l o f the citizens o f m e m b e r states are M u s l i m s . A l s o , M u s l i m c i t i z e n s o f a n o n - m e m b e r
state are not i n c l u d e d
w i t h i n the structure o f the O I C . T h e Soviet U n i o n , w i t h a m i n o r i t y M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y 5 0 m i l l i o n , h a d presented itself as a M u s l i m society a n d p a r t i c i p a t e d i n O I C m e e t i n g s a n d conferences t h r o u g h the Soviet M u s l i m establishment.
However, a number
o f countries
with a Muslim
majority,
140
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
141
T H E ISLAMIST NATIONAL V I E W
i n c l u d i n g A l b a n i a , the I v o r y C o a s t , a n d T a n z a n i a have not become p a r t o f
6) T h e five p r i n c i p l e s o f I s l a m should be m e m o r i z e d by a l l p r i m a r y
the O I C . A n d , although the majority o f its p o p u l a t i o n is n o n - M u s l i m , U g a n d a
school students.
has become a member. B u t B u l g a r i a , the former Y u g o s l a v i a , a n d other states
7} S e c o n d a r y school students must l e a r n the entire K o r a n .
w i t h substantially larger M u s l i m populations have not become i n v o l v e d i n
8) I n order to p r o m o t e these goals, I s l a m i c educational institutions
O I C activities. T h e U n i t e d States a n d C a n a d a are not m e m b e r states; neither
must be established i n e a c h country.
Farakhan's N a t i o n o f i s l a m n o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y 10 m i l l i o n M u s l i m s l i v i n g i n
9) I n order to create i s l a m i c unity, a l l M u s l i m states should first
the U n i t e d States a n d C a n a d a have been i n c l u d e d i n the O I C — b u t T u r k i s h -
r e c o g n i z e a n d accept t h e i r I s l a m i c attributes a n d then establish
C y p r i o t s a n d the M o r o F r o n t o f the P h i l i p p i n e s have observer status. A n d ,
a c o n f e d e r a t i o n u n d e r the g u i d a n c e o f a c o m m o n l y elected c a l i p h
although a sizable n u m b e r o f its citizens are M u s l i m s , the O I C has c a n c e l l e d the m e m b e r s h i p o f I n d i a { A l - A h s a n 1988: 45-55}.
( M u m c u 1994b: 174-5). In
a
related
development,
the
Third
I s l a m i c S u m m i t o f the
OIC
T h e F i r s t I s l a m i c S u m m i t Conference established that every ' M u s l i m
was c o n v e n e d i n M e c c a i n 1981. It issued a d o c u m e n t k n o w n as the ' M e c c a
state is eligible to join the O r g a n i z a t i o n o f the Islamic Conference p r o v i d e d it is
D e c l a r a t i o n ' , i n w h i c h m e m b e r states a f f i r m e d t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s to promote
p r e p a r e d to adopt the c h a r t e r ( A r t i c l e 8}. T h e O I C charter accepted the I s l a m i c
solidarity o n the basis o f the
notion o f ummah as the foundation for s o l i d a r i t y a m o n g M u s l i m countries ( A l -
tolerance, a n d c o m p a s s i o n . T h i s d o c u m e n t
A h s a n 1988). T h e K o r a n refers to ummah not o n l y as a g r o u p o f people b o u n d
I s l a m a n d I s l a m i c p r i n c i p l e s as a w a y o f life constitutes the greatest protection
tightly together by a. c o m m o n belief, but also to the b e l i e f itself ( T h e K o r a n 6:
for M u s l i m s against the d a n g e r s w h i c h confront t h e m ' (Ihsanoglu 1996: 90).
38; 10: 19; 16: 93; 43: 22-3; 16: 120: 7: 159; 11: 8; 28: 23; 7: 160; 2: 143; 5: 48).
M e m b e r states also c o n f i r m e d their c o m m i t m e n t to the principles a n d aims
Ummah represents the religious u n i t y found a m o n g a l l i n d i v i d u a l s who accept
of n o n - a l i g n m e n t . T h e T h i r d I s l a m i c S u m m i t e n c o u r a g e d M u s l i m e c o n o m i c
Islam as a w a y o f life, regardless o f the t e r r i t o r i a l division o f M u s l i m s by n a t i o n a l
integration, a n d created a ' S t a n d i n g C o m m i t t e e for C o m m e r c i a l a n d E c o n o m i c
1
I s l a m i c p r i n c i p l e s o f justice, equality, liberty, states that 'strict adherence
to
states. T h i s poses interesting questions for countries w i t h secular constitutions or
C o o p e r a t i o n ' ( C O M C E C ) . C O M C E C was based o n a process o f bilateral a n d
v a r i e d religious compositions. T u r k e y , a constitutionally secular state, has not:
m u l t i l a t e r a l trade l i b e r a l i z a t i o n a m o n g O I C m e m b e r states. I n essence,
ratified the charter, but continues to participate in O I C activities as a de facto
O I C ' s emphasis o n trade l i b e r a l i z a t i o n c o n n e c t e d M u s l i m states to the neo¬
member.
l i b e r a l s t r u c t u r i n g o f the w o r l d e c o n o m y as p r o c l a i m e d b y the U N d u r i n g the
T h e charter does not r e q u i r e O I C m e m b e r states to legislate I s l a m i c
the
T h i r d Development Decade (1980-90).
principles or the sharia l a w i n t h e i r constitutions. R a t h e r , the O I C m a i n t a i n s
A s M o i n u d d i n (1987: 108) suggests, the M e c c a D e c l a r a t i o n solidified the
a loose structure that relies o n m e m b e r states to apply its r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s
role o f I s l a m as a s t r o n g m o r a l influence o n M u s l i m c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h i n the
voluntarily. I n order to f u r n i s h the O I C w i t h legally b i n d i n g power, S a u d i
O I C f r a m e w o r k . T u r k i s h P r i m e M i n i s t e r U l u s u saw the M e c c a D e c l a r a t i o n
A r a b i a has tried to establish the s u p r e m a c y of sharia i n O I C activities. T o w a r d
as reflecting the religious v a l u e s a n d p r i n c i p l e s s h a r e d b y M u s l i m s throughout
that end, the R a b i t a t a l - A l a m a l - l s l a m i o r g a n i z e d a n I s l a m i c conference i n
the w o r l d but reiterated that s e c u l a r i s m w a s a n u n c h a n g e a b l e component o f
P a k i s t a n i n 1976. A t this m e e t i n g , also k n o w n as the I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Sharia
the T u r k i s h constitution. H e a l s o stated t h a t T u r k e y w o u l d r e m a i n w i t h i n the
Congress, T u r k e y was represented by the M i n i s t e r o f State, H a s a n A k s a y , a
W e s t e r n security a l l i a n c e . Nevertheless, T u r k e y has r e l i e d on I s l a m as a m o r a l
m e m b e r o f the p r o - I s l a m i c N S P . T h e congress adopted the f o l l o w i n g p r i n c i p l e s
value i n s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c life. It continues to use the n o t i o n o f I s l a m i c
to establish a legally b i n d i n g framework for the O I C :
solidarity, not as a n alternative to its W e s t e r n o r i e n t a t i o n but to strategically
1) T h e constitutional frameworks o f M u s l i m countries s h o u l d be restructured
a c c o r d i n g to I s l a m i c principles a n d
the
Arabic
language should be spread a m o n g M u s l i m people. 2) C i v i l laws should be r e p l a c e d by the sharia. 3) W o m e n should obey I s l a m i c restrictions. 4) A l l necessary e c o n o m i c a n d p o l i t i c a l steps should be taken to establish m o d e r n I s l a m i c states based o n the sharia. 5} A t every level o f e d u c a t i o n a l t r a i n i n g , I s l a m s h o u l d be taught as a m a n d a t o r y subject.
enlarge its foreign p o l i c y o p t i o n s a n d c o m p l e m e n t its relations w i t h the E E C a n d the U n i t e d States. A s a result, T u r k e y has striven f r o m the early 1980s to become a l e a d i n g c o u n t r y i n t h e e c o n o m i c a n d t r a d e relationships o f M u s l i m states t h r o u g h C O M C E C . T h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f t r a n s n a t i o n a l I s l a m i c ties strengthened
Erbakan's
n a t i o n a l vision o f T u r k i s h d i s e n g a g e m e n t f r o m a single W e s t e r n orientation. A t the same t i m e , c o n t i n u e d c o n t a c t between T u r k i s h m i g r a n t l a b o u r i n G e r m a n y a n d h o m e l a n d politics further n a t i o n a l borders.
r e i n f o r c e d I s l a m i c a c t i v i t y b e y o n d Turkey's
142
143
T H E ISLAMIST NATIONAL VIEW
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
Turkish-language
Turkish migrant labour and Islam
n e w s p a p e r s and television channels
closely
connect
migrants to h o m e l a n d p o l i t i c s . I n fact, some o f the major T u r k i s h newspapers A l t h o u g h G e r m a n y b a n n e d l a b o u r recruitment i n 1973, the overall n u m b e r o f
have been p r i n t e d a n d d i s t r i b u t e d i n E u r o p e since the 1970s. A m o n g t h e m are
T u r k i s h workers i n G e r m a n y c o n t i n u e d to increase. Those who c o u l d obtain
HurriyeL w i t h a n a t i o n a l i s t l i b e r a l orientation; Miliiyei,
w i t h a s o c i a l democratic
permission from the G e r m a n authorities to stay brought their family members
focus; Miili
Gazete, w i t h a p r o - I s l a m i c perspective; a n d Tercumnn, w i t h a strong
w i t h t h e m . I n a d d i t i o n to f a m i l y reunions, m a r r i a g e s w i t h partners from T u r k e y
nationalist focus. T h e s t a t e - o w n e d T u r k i s h R a d i o T e l e v i s i o n N e t w o r k ( T R T ) has
a n d a h i g h b i r t h rate have c o n t r i b u t e d to a n increase i n the n u m b e r o f T u r k i s h
a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l c h a n n e l a n d is available o n cable. A m o n g the p r i v a t e channels
citizens i n G e r m a n y . A f t e r the l a b o u r ban the T u r k i s h p o p u l a t i o n i n G e r m a n y
based i n T u r k e y are E u r o S h o w , E u r o Star, E u r o D , E u r o A T V , T G R T , K a n a i
nearly d o u b l e d , r e a c h i n g 30 p e r cent o f the G e r m a n foreign workforce by the
7, and H B B , a l l received o n c a b l e o r via satellite i n E u r o p e . T h e s e
early 1990s. W i t h a p o p u l a t i o n o f more t h a n 2 m i l l i o n , T u r k i s h residents are
broadcast news p r o g r a m m e s f r o m Turkey a n d p r o d u c e p r o g r a m m e s specifically
now the largest m i n o r i t y group i n G e r m a n y . T w o out o f three T u r k s in G e r m a n y
for T u r k i s h m i g r a n t c o m m u n i t i e s i n E u r o p e . T h e y also offer old T u r k i s h movies,
are u n d e r the age o f 30. the majority o f w h o m are G e r m a n - b o r n ( K u r s a t - A h l e r s
comedy shows, m u s i c , a n d sports for entertainment. TRT-International
1996: 119). A p p r o x i m a t e l y 60 p e r cent o f the new a r r i v a l s f r o m T u r k e y w h o j o i n
plays
a
significant
role
in
migrants'
channels
ability
to
establish c l a i m s o f c u l t u r a l b e l o n g i n g . T h e station holds 47 p e r cent o f the
their families are u n d e r 18 years o l d ( K o l i n s k y 1996: 83, 89). G e r m a n y does not accept i m m i g r a t i o n as a sufficient basis for g r a n t i n g
T u r k i s h audience ( K a y a 2 0 0 1 : 97) a n d has b e c o m e successful by b r o a d c a s t i n g
G e r m a n c i t i z e n s h i p . It also refuses to l i n k c i t i z e n s h i p to place o f b i r t h . A s a
p r o g r a m m e s that b l e n d K e m a l i s t principles o f westernization a n d s e c u l a r i s m
result, even those c h i l d r e n b o r n i n G e r m a n y are given the nationality o f their
w i t h I s l a m i c m o r a l values. T h e T G R T
parents. T u r k i s h migrants, then, live i n G e r m a n y as 'foreign' citizens. A b o u t 38
connections to the p r o - I s l a m i c p a r t y i n T u r k e y a n d attempt to depict d a i l y
per cent o f these m i g r a n t s live i n p o v e r t y ( K u r s a t - A i d e r s 1996: 122j, but most do
social life t h r o u g h a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the K o r a n a n d S u n n a . T h e first t r a n s n a t i o n a l
not seek p u b l i c assistance for fear o f d e p o r t a t i o n . T h e y live i n ethnic enclaves,
and K a n a l
7 channels have close
ties l i n k i n g T u r k i s h politics to G e r m a n y were
segregated f r o m the larger society, u n c e r t a i n o f their status a n d residency rights,
established almost 30 years ago. T h e r e are n o w social d e m o c r a t i c , conservative,
and subject to d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . T u r k s i n G e r m a n y have experienced significant
and religiously oriented i m m i g r a n t organizations i n G e r m a n y . S o c i a l d e m o c r a t i c
ethnic hostility a n d x e n o p h o b i c violence, especially after the 1973 recruitment
and
b a n . T h e m u r d e r o f T u r k s i n M o l l n a n d S o l i n g e r i n 1992 a n d 1993 is indicative
facilitating i n f o r m a l talks b e t w e e n
of h o w extreme such hostility c a n be.
organizations also p r o m o t e T u r k e y ' s m e m b e r s h i p i n the E U a n d encourage the
M a n y o f G e r m a n y ' s T u r k i s h residents neighbourhoods
prefer
to live i n either m i x e d
(53 p e r cent) or i n p r e d o m i n a n t l y G e r m a n
neighbourhoods
(33 p e r cent) ( K u r s a t - A h l e r s 1996: 125). It appears that most do not w i s h to be isolated i n ethnic enclaves. H o w e v e r , G e r m a n y provides migrants w i t h no i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d channels o f access to the p o l i t i c a l process, apart from the h i g h l y m a r g i n a l foreigners' c o u n c i l s ( K o o p m a n s a n d S t a t h a m
1999: 6 6 5 - 6 ) .
conservative
organizations
function
as networks
for state d i p l o m a c y ,
T u r k i s h and G e r m a n p o l i t i c i a n s . These
integration o f T u r k s into G e r m a n society as a c u l t u r a l l y distinct g r o u p . T h e r e are about 2,000 T u r k i s h I s l a m i c organizations i n G e r m a n y w i t h a n estimated m e m b e r s h i p o f h a l f a m i l l i o n p e o p l e ( K a r a k a s o g l u 1996: 1.68). T h e religions groups are diverse a n d d i v i d e d between private a n d state-run organizations. Despite their differences, a l l a i m to locate i m m i g r a n t culture w i t h i n the context ot Islam.
o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a n d social exclusion i n G e r m a n y ,
T h e F e d e r a t i o n o f S o c i a l D e m o c r a t i c People's A s s o c i a t i o n s was founded
a n d the lack o f citizenship rights have created a n d reinforced conditions for
i n B e r l i n i n 1977 a n d c u r r e n t l y represents a p p r o x i m a t e l y 40 o r g a n i z a t i o n s . It
m i g r a n t identification w i t h h o m e l a n d p o l i t i c s . A significant aspect o f this is the
promotes K e m a l i s t p r i n c i p l e s o f secularism a n d is closely connected to the left-
p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f T u r k i s h I s l a m i c associations i n E u r o p e .
of-centre R e p u b l i c a n People's P a r t y ( R P P L Indeed, one o f its leaders, E r e a n
The
p o l i t i c a l context
A s L e v i t t (2001) has demonstrated i n the case o f D o m i n i c a n R e p u b l i c a n s
K a r a k a s , has represented the
R P P i n the T u r k i s h p a r l i a m e n t .
Germany's
l i v i n g i n the U n i t e d States, m i g r a n t s m a i n t a i n f a m i l i a l , religious, and p o l i t i c a l
A t a t u r k i s t T h o u g h t A s s o c i a t i o n , a close affiliate o f the Federation o f S o c i a l
connections across n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s — b e t w e e n the c o u n t r y o f o r i g i n a n d c o u n t r y
D e m o c r a t i c People's A s s o c i a t i o n , has been o r g a n i z e d to counter the spread o f
of destination. T h e s e connections p r o v i d e the m e a n s t h r o u g h w h i c h m i g r a n t s
Islamic politics a m o n g T u r k i s h migrants, A n d the L i b e r a l T u r k i s h G e r m a n
f o r m their c u l t u r a l representation a n d exercise their g r o u p rights. L i k e w i s e , the
Friendship Association, founded
T u r k i s h residents of G e r m a n y configure c l a i m s to c u l t u r a l c o m m u n i t y
associations i n G e r m a n y ( O s t e r g a a r d - N i e l s e n 2003: 5 2 - 5 ) . It is closely connected
t h r o u g h their ties to T u r k e y .
rights
i n 1979 i n B o n n ,
represents 55 T u r k i s h
to conservative p o l i t i c a l parties s u c h as the Justice P a r t y a n d its successors.
144
145
' E H E ISLAMIST NATIONAL V I E W
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
T h e Suleymancilar b r a n c h o f the N a q s h b a n d i order, the .Nurcu cemaati,
Affairs i n 1982, the D I T I B h a s 740 m e m b e r associations c o m p a r e d w i t h the
a n d the A s s o c i a t i o n for a N e w W o r l d V i e w i n E u r o p e ( A M T G ) are the most
A M T G ' s 262 ( K a r a k a s o g l u 1996: 169). It oversees 775 mosques a n d prayer
i m p o r t a n t privately r u n religious groups i n G e r m a n y . T h e y are a m o n g the
centres ( O s t e r g a a r d - N i e l s e n 2 0 0 3 : 56). Leaders o f the D I T I B are
first i m m i g r a n t religious o r g a n i z a t i o n s founded i n the c o u n t r y i n the early
of the T u r k i s h state, a p p o i n t e d on a five-year basis a n d p a i d b y the T u r k i s h
employees
1970s. T h e A M T G has ties to the p r o - i s l a m i c N a t i o n a l S a l v a t i o n P a r t y a n d its
government. M a n y d o not k n o w G e r m a n a n d p r o v i d e religious i n s t r u c t i o n i n T u r k i s h u s i n g course m a t e r i a l s d e v i s e d by the M i n i s t e r o f E d u c a t i o n i n T u r k e y .
successors. 1960s, w h e n T u r k i s h workers were r e c r u i t e d as guest workers,
W h i l e the T u r k i s h state s u p p o r t s religious expression b y T u r k s i n Germany-
I s l a m i c religious practice was considered a private matter. Pious T u r k i s h
t h r o u g h the D I T I B , it does s o w i t h the express purpose o f b l e n d i n g I s l a m i c
m i g r a n t s s i m p l y used available r o o m s i n their hostels or factories as places o f
sentiments w i t h T u r k i s h s e c u l a r n a t i o n a l i s m .
I n the
w o r s h i p . Prayers were often led by someone i n the c o m m u n i t y who took o n
P r i v a t e l y r u n I s l a m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s promote
M u s l i m i n t e g r a t i o n into
the role o f a n imam. I n the 1970s i m m i g r a n t s began to move out o f t e m p o r a r y
G e r m a n society a n d w o r k to i m p r o v e the social a n d legal p o s i t i o n o f M u s l i m s
hostels to live w i t h their wives and c h i l d r e n as p e r m a n e n t residents i n houses
i n G e r m a n y . T h e y take a n a c t i v e stand o n issues relevant to m i g r a n t s ' d a i l y life
a n d flats. T h e y also began to b u i l d mosques a n d o p e n religious schools offering-
experience, such as r a c i s m a n d d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n h o u s i n g and e m p l o y m e n t . T h e
i n s t r u c t i o n o n the
1,350
p r o g r a m m e s o f private I s l a m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s cover a w i d e variety o f leisure a n d
mosques a n d prayer centres i n G e r m a n y . T h e Suleymancilar a n d the Nurcu cemaati
social support activities i n c l u d i n g h o l i d a y c a m p s , sports clubs, a m a t e u r r a d i o
oversee the o p e r a t i o n o f 3 0 0 o f t h e m a n d the A M T G 275 (Ostergaard-Nielsen
courses, c o m p u t e r t r a i n i n g , h a n d i c r a f t s , h o m e w o r k assistance for students, legal
2 0 0 3 : 56).
a i d , school a n d w o r k - p l a c e s u p p o r t p r o g r a m m e s , translation services, a n d sex
K o r a n ( K a r a k a s o g l u 1996). T h e r e
are c u r r e n t l y
T h e Suleymancilar founded the A s s o c i a t i o n o f I s l a m i c C u l t u r a l in and
1973 i n C o l o g n e . T h e o r g a n i z a t i o n , w h i c h has some 1,300 student dormitories t h r o u g h o u t
1,700
Centres
associations
G e r m a n y , places great
emphasis
education. T h e private I s l a m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n G e r m a n y m a k e c u l t u r a l c l a i m s o n the basis o f p r i n c i p l e s o f e q u a l i t y a n d i n d i v i d u a l rights a n d freedoms (Soysal
on religious education t h r o u g h private K o r a n courses (Turkish Daily News. 28
1997). W h e n these o r g a n i z a t i o n s establish claims u s i n g u n i v e r s a l referents to
September 2002). L i k e w i s e , the Nurcu cemmti, f o u n d e d i n C o l o g n e i n 1979,
h u m a n rights discourse, they a r e not suggesting a b e l o n g i n g to a u n i t a r y n a t i o n -
has established a p p r o x i m a t e l y 2 0 0 schools i n G e r m a n y where the Risale-I Nur
state of c o u n t r y o f o r i g i n and. residence. R a t h e r , they are i d e n t i f y i n g w i t h a
o f S a i d N u r s i is studied a n d disseminated. T h e Nurcu cemaati has about 50,000
t r a n s n a t i o n a l I s l a m i c c o m m u n i t y o f ummah. T h i s is consistent w i t h the content o f the M e c c a D e c l a r a t i o n o f the O I C , w h i c h states that l o y a l t y to I s l a m i c principles
followers i n G e r m a n y ( O s t e r g a a r d - N i e l s e n 2 0 0 3 : 141). I n 1976, the A s s o c i a t i o n for a N e w W o r l d V i e w i n E u r o p e ( A M T G ) was founded i n B e r l i n w i t h the direct i n v o l v e m e n t o f N e c m e t t i n E r b a k a n , p r o I s l a m i c N a t i o n a l S a l v a t i o n P a r t y leader. I n
1997 its m e m b e r s h i p
is the greatest p r o t e c t i o n for M u s l i m s l i v i n g i n ' n o n - I s l a m i c ' e n v i r o n m e n t s . Suleymancilar,
Nurcu
cemaati.
and
the
AMTG
provide
funds
for
the
exceeded
construction o f mosques, r e l i g i o u s schools, student residences, b o a r d i n g schools,
160,000, w i t h m o r e t h a n 57,000 mosque m e m b e r s . T h e A M T G ' s o r g a n i z a t i o n
a n d K o r a n courses t h r o u g h o u t E u r o p e a n d N o r t h A m e r i c a . M e m b e r s h i p fees
for w o m e n has a m e m b e r s h i p o f 74,000. T h e A T M G publishes the m o n t h l y
are their p r i m a r y source o f i n c o m e . T h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s also receive
newsletter National
support from Saudi-based
European
View and Perspectives. T h e association has also founded the
Mosque Construction and
Support
C o m m u n i t y to
administer
financial
financial
institutions such as the R a b i t a t a l A l a m
a l - l s l a m i a n d the I s l a m i c D e v e l o p m e n t B a n k o f the O I C t h r o u g h special funds allocated for M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s a b r o a d . T h e p r i n c i p a l g o a l o f these
m e m b e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d p r o p e r t y o w n e d b y the A M T G . T h e A M T G does not have a n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l presence i n Turkey. M a n y o f
organizations a n d f u n d i n g agencies is the r e f a s h i o n i n g o f h o m e l a n d politics a n d
its leaders are second generation, b o r n a n d educated i n G e r m a n y ( K a r a k a s o g l u
the w o r l d w i d e p r o m o t i o n o f I s l a m as a w a y o f life. T h e ties established t h r o u g h
1996: 169). Nevertheless, the leadership
workers' remittances
maintains
strong ties to h o m e l a n d
politics. A t present, the A M T G ' s secretary general is Erbakan's nephew, M e h m e t
a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l leaders p l a y a key role i n l i n k i n g
h o m e l a n d politics to g l o b a l I s l a m i c formations. T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t r a n s n a t i o n a l
S a b r i E r b a k a n . Several members o f the A M T G have been candidates i n T u r k i s h
economic forces a n d t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h I s l a m i c beliefs is the subject o f the
p a r l i a m e n t a r y elections; two o f them were elected i n 1995 a n d one i n 1999.
following chapter.
T h e T u r k i s h government has also established its o w n religious o r g a n i z a t i o n in
G e r m a n y , the
D i y a n e t Isleri T u r k I s l a m B i r l i g i
(DITIB).
An
official
religious o r g a n i z a t i o n founded by the T u r k i s h state's D i r e c t o r a t e o f R e l i g i o u s
COSMOPOLITAN
147
ISLAMISTS A N D GLOBALIZATION
T h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the g l o b a l e c o n o m y
6
B e g i n n i n g i n the 1970s the g l o b a l e c o n o m y e x p e r i e n c e d a major restructuring o f the e c o n o m i c a n d p o l i t i c a l a r r a n g e m e n t s that h a d l o n g been identified w i t h the
Cosmopolitan Islamists and Globalization
o v e r w h e l m i n g d o m i n a n c e o f the U n i t e d States. T h e r i s i n g strength of western E u r o p e a n d J a p a n , the i m p a c t o f the V i e t n a m W a r , a n d the unwillingness o f c e r t a i n countries i n the T h i r d W o r l d to accept s u b o r d i n a t i o n — a m o n g t h e m V i e t n a m , C h i n a , a n d C u b a — a l l c o n t r i b u t e d to the w e a k e n i n g o f U S hegemony (Wallerstein 2000). I n 1971, the i n t e r n a t i o n a l m o n e t a r y system became m u c h m o r e unstable w h e n the N i x o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n u n i l a t e r a l l y a b a n d o n e d the g o l d
I
n earlier chapters,
I described h o w the T u r k i s h m o d e r n i z a t i o n
project
s t a n d a r d by d e v a l u i n g the d o l l a r (Block 1977). T h i s c o i n c i d e d w i t h the collapse
s u b o r d i n a t e d s m a l l - and m e d i u m - s i z e d fractions o f private capital to large
of the Bretton W o o d s system a n d the w o r l d w i d e e c o n o m i c recession. I n c r e a s i n g
i n d u s t r i a l interests. I also e x a m i n e d the transformation o f w h e a t - p r o d u c i n g
p r o t e c t i o n i s m between
western
E u r o p e a n d the U n i t e d States u n d e r m i n e d
peasants into a n u r b a n w a g e - e a r n i n g class a n d m a r g i n a l workers. T h e s e groups
A t l a n t i c i n t e g r a t i o n (van d e r P i j l 1989a). T h e A t l a n t i c capitalists responded to
were often the source o f p o l i t i c a l conflict i n Turkey, w h i c h v a r i o u s governments
d e c l i n i n g profits by r e l o c a t i n g i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n from western E u r o p e a n d
were able to c o n t a i n w i t h i n the favourable conditions o f the C o l d W a r . D u r i n g
N o r t h A m e r i c a to the n e w l y i n d u s t r i a l i z i n g countries o f southern E u r o p e , L a t i n
détente, and under
A m e r i c a , a n d Southeast A s i a ( H o o g v e l t 1997: 4 6 - 7 ) .
the i m p a c t o f a debt crisis a n d subsequent economic
recession, p o l i t i c a l conflict a m o n g the groups seeking to influence government
Industrial relocation became
a c r i t i c a l feature i n the
reconstruction
a l l o c a t i o n o f scarce resources became c o m m o n p l a c e . T h e m i l i t a r y c o u p i n 1980
of patterns o f g l o b a l c a p i t a l a c c u m u l a t i o n . It represented
suppressed p o l i t i c a l dissent, a n d subsequent c i v i l i a n governments subordinated
development projects o f T h i r d W o r l d countries, away from import-substitution
smaller fractions o f private capital, r u r a l populations, a n d l a b o u r w i t h i n a n
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n towards e x p o r t - o r i e n t e d i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ( E O I ) (Troebel et a l
a reversal i n the
export-oriented e c o n o m i c policy. T h i s chapter examines the restructuring o f
1980). E O I l a i d the f o u n d a t i o n for the r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the global e c o n o m y
the e c o n o m y f r o m the t i m e o f the m i l i t a r y coup. It explores the emergence o f a
around
new g r o u p o f Islamist capitalists w i t h i n the e c o n o m y a n d their relative position
t r a n s n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s integrate countries at diverse levels o f development
w i t h one another, different c a p i t a l groups, a n d the p r o - I s l a m i c p o l i t i c a l party.
into c o m m o d i t y c h a i n s to p r o d u c e p a r t o f a n o v e r a l l product for m a r k e t sale.
T h e f o l l o w i n g analysis highlights the c o n n e c t i o n between p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n
The
a
'global m a n u f a c t u r i n g
financial
system'
(Gereffi
1994). I n
this
system,
resources r e q u i r e d to o r g a n i z e the system were o b t a i n e d f r o m
the global e c o n o m y a n d I s l a m i c beliefs. M a x W e b e r (1971), w h o was interested
transnational
i n the effects o f the Protestant ethic o n the advent o f c a p i t a l i s m i n E u r o p e , has
generated from oil price hikes i n the 1970s ( H o o g v e l t 1997: 4 9 - 5 0 ; 163).
s h o w n the i m p o r t a n c e o l c u l t u r a l practices i n m e d i a t i n g e c o n o m i c activity. H o w e v e r , the study o f I s l a m i c politics i n f u n c t i o n a l terms does not
banks
eager to r e c y c l e E u r o a n d A r a b p e t r o d o l l a r
surpluses
T h e r e c y c l i n g o f funds r e s u l t e d i n the a c c u m u l a t i o n o f massive debt
allow
loads for T h i r d W o r l d c o u n t r i e s . B y the end o f the 1980s that debt r e a c h e d
us to u n c o v e r a m u c h stronger l i n k that exists between changes i n the p o w e r
U S S 1 t r i l l i o n ( H o o g v e l t 1997: 5 0 ) . A s the n u m b e r o f countries unable to repay
configurations o f the state, p o l i t i c a l regimes, a n d r e l i g i o n . Islamists interact w i t h
increased, m u l t i l a t e r a l agencies'—notably the I M F a n d W o r l d B a n k — i n s t i t u t e d
the d e p l o y m e n t o f state power, affecting the shape o f that p o w e r a n d e c o n o m i c
a g l o b a l debt m a n a g e m e n t r e g i m e to reschedule T h i r d W o r l d debts ( M c M i c h a e l
strategy. T h i s i n t e r a c t i o n is based o n the relationship between n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l
2 0 0 0 : 113-46). T h e s e agencies tied debt r e s c h e d u l i n g to the restructuring o f
strategies a n d s h i f t i n g patterns i n the global e c o n o m y o f c a p i t a l i s m . I n this light,
p r o d u c t i o n priorities a n d g o v e r n m e n t p r o g r a m m e s i n debtor states—all w i t h i n
the present chapter focusses o n the s h a p i n g of a n Islamic ideology. It does so by
the intensively integrated g l o b a l m a n u f a c t u r i n g system.
c o n s i d e r i n g the p o l i t i c a l choices made by state r u l i n g elites'—including c i v i l a n d
T h e process o f g l o b a l d e b t m a n a g e m e n t i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d the authority o f
m i l i t a r y bureaucrats, a n d p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s ' — w i t h i n the context created after the
the I M F a n d W o r l d B a n k w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d behaviour o f states. A s a
I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n a n d the Soviet invasion o f A f g h a n i s t a n .
consequence, state p o l i c y o r i e n t a t i o n s have shifted away f r o m the social goals of full e m p l o y m e n t , welfare p r o v i s i o n , a n d p u b l i c investment to debt-payment obligations. A l t h o u g h there is n o agreement o n the role of slates ( A r r i g h i 1999; M c M i c h a e l a n d M h y r e 1991; Sassen 1996), n a t i o n a l slates and cultures
148
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
149
C O S M O P O L I T A N ISLAMISTS AND GLOBALIZATION
have become s u b o r d i n a t e d to w o r l d capitalist p r o d u c t i o n a n d its structure o f
( D I S K , H a k - I s , a n d M I S K ) ( S a k a i h o g l u 1991: 57-69). T h e 1982 C o n s t i t u t i o n
class d o m i n a t i o n (Atasoy 2003c: 4). These changes have also i n t r o d u c e d the
concentrated
n i g h t w a t c h m a n ' state o f classical l i b e r a l i s m , w i t h a new emphasis o n the state's
freedoms o f i n d i v i d u a l s . It also restricted the activity o f trade unions a n d
police powers a n d other c o n t r o l structures {van der Pijl 1989b).
political power
i n the
executive
a n d l i m i t e d the
rights
and
other associations. A s a result, the g o v e r n m e n t was able to change Turkey's
T h e r e m a k i n g o f the global economy has been as m u c h a c u l t u r a l a n d
development trajectory w i t h v i r t u a l l y n o scrutiny from its citizens.
p o l i t i c a l operation as an e c o n o m i c one. T h e assertion that market i n t e g r a t i o n
U n d e r O . a l ' s g o v e r n m e n t , the T u r k i s h e c o n o m y shifted f r o m a state-
is inevitable reflects an i d e o l o g i c a l 'consensus' formation that s i m p l y 'accepts'
d o m i n a t e d a n d heavily p r o t e c t i o n i s t e c o n o m i c model to a neoliberal market
g r o w i n g extremes i n wealth a n d poverty as inevitable ( C a r r o l l 2003). H o w e v e r ,
orientation. T h e n e o l i b e r a l r e s t r u c t u r i n g o f the T u r k i s h e c o n o m y substantially
this consensus must c o n t i n u a l l y be renewed, defended, a n d m o d i f i e d (Williams
c h a n g e d the structure o f r e l a t i v e p r i c i n g a n d i n c o m e d i s t r i b u t i o n i n society.
1977: 112). M a r k e t consensus exists o n l y by v i r t u e o f the p o l i t i c a l decisions o f
B e t w e e n 1979 a n d 1985 there w a s a 40 p e r cent r e d u c t i o n i n real wages a n d a
state m a n a g e r s i n response to domestic a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l , economic,
17 p e r cent r e d u c t i o n i n a g r i c u l t u r a l incomes (Boratav 1990). C o m b i n e d w i t h
a n d c u l t u r a l pressures.
the u n e m p l o y m e n t rate, w h i c h rose to 16.1 p e r cent i n 1983, sharp reductions i n
I n T u r k e y , the total foreign debt rose from U S S 13.5 b i l l i o n i n 1980 to
wages a n d i n c o m e p u s h e d m a n y i n t o poverty. W i t h the r e s t r u c t u r i n g o f society,
USif 104.5 b i l l i o n i n 1999, more t h a n 50 per cent o f the gross domestic product
the majority o f citizens f o u n d t h e i r s o c i a l welfare policies taken away, while o n l y
( K a z g a n 1999: 224, 270). B e g i n n i n g i n 1978, the I M F i m p o s e d a debt repayment
a s m a l l m i n o r i t y o f large e x p o r t e r s benefited f r o m the changes.
p r o g r a m m e , transferring short-term private loans, w h i c h then constituted m o r e
T h e 1980 A c t o n F o r e i g n T r a d e C o m p a n i e s redefined large e x p o r t i n g
than 60 p e r cent o f the total debt, into long-term p u b l i c loans. C o n s i d e r i n g that
c o m p a n i e s that surpass a p r e - s p e c i f i e d e x p o r t target as foreign trade companies.
more t h a n 75 p e r cent o f the short-term loans were private loans, the state's
It also offered extensive t a x a n d
ability to r e p a y its debt was further d i m i n i s h e d .
exclusive t r a d i n g rights. I n 1 9 8 5 , there were between 24 a n d 30 large e x p o r t i n g
credit incentives, export-tax rebates, a n d
W i t h the I M F r e s c h e d u l i n g debts a n d the W o r l d B a n k p r o m i s i n g foreign
companies, many o f w h o m w e r e subsidiaries o f Turkey's largest i n d u s t r i a l -
loans, T u r k e y a d o p t e d the 2 4 J a n u a r y measures i n 1980 to shift its development
h o l d i n g c o m p a n i e s ( I i k i n 1991). T h i s resulted i n a spectacular g r o w t h i n exports
m o d e l to one e m p h a s i z i n g export-oriented
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . Turkey's debt
between 1980 a n d 3987 ( W o r l d B a n k 1987), a v e r a g i n g 25 per cent a n n u a l l y
rescheduling a c c o u n t e d for nearly 70 p e r cent o f the total v o l u m e o f debt
( K i r a y 1990: 261). E x p o r t s rose i n value f r o m U S S 2.3 b i l l i o n i n 1979 to U S $
1978 a n d 1980 {Celasun
10.2 b i l l i o n i n 1987, a c c o u n t i n g for 14.9 p e r cent o f the G N P i n 3985. B y the e n d
a n d R o d r i k 1991: 193). B e t w e e n 1980 a n d 1984 T u r k e y negotiated a three-
o f the decade, the large f o r e i g n t r a d e c o m p a n i e s accounted for a p p r o x i m a t e l y
y e a r standby agreement o f 1.2 b i l l i o n S D R (Special D r a w i n g Rights) w i t h the
50 p e r cent o f T u r k i s h e x p o r t s . S t i l l , the subsidy effect o f g o v e r n m e n t incentives
I M F a n d five structural adjustment
equalled r o u g h l y 55 per cent o f the value o f exports (Milliyet Newspaper, 20 J u n e
renegotiated by a l l T h i r d W o r l d countries between
loans t o t a l l i n g U S S 1.6 b i l l i o n w i t h
the
W o r l d B a n k . D u r i n g this time, T u r k e y became a B a k e r P l a n country. T h e p l a n was n a m e d after then Secretary o f the U S T r e a s u r y J a m e s Baker, w h o tied debt r e s c h e d u l i n g to I M F - a n d W o r l d B a n k - i m p o s e d s t r u c t u r a l
adjustment
p r o g r a m m e s . T h r o u g h the B a k e r P l a n , T u r k e y received a i d w o r t h
1985). I n a l l o w i n g the r e c y c l i n g o f funds a n d debt rescheduling p r o g r a m m e s o f the I M F a n d W o r l d B a n k to r e s t r u c t u r e T u r k i s h society, the state consolidated
between
the p o l i t i c a l p o w e r o f the p r i m e minister's office a n d high-level bureaucrats,
U S S 10 b i l l i o n a n d U S S 15 b i l l i o n over a five-year p e r i o d b e g i n n i n g i n 1979
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n relation to t h e g o v e r n m e n t a n d the legislature. F o r example,
( U S Congress 1979: 5 6 3 3 - 1 ) . T h e s e funds were intended to accelerate Turkey's
the U n d e r s e c r e t a r y o f the T r e a s u r y a n d F o r e i g n T r a d e , created by the p r i m e
process o f structural adjustment to a market-oriented e c o n o m i c m o d e l .
minister's office, significantly w e a k e n e d the powers o f both the m i n i s t r y o f
T h e m i l i t a r y regime (1980-83) a n d subsequent c i v i l i a n government o f
finance
a n d the
m i n i s t r y o f c o m m e r c e ( O n c u a n d G o k c e 1991). W i t h o u t
measures.
control over the treasury, the m i n i s t r y o f finance's role was reduced to a general
T h e m i l i t a r y leadership consolidated the market-orientation o f the e c o n o m y
directorate o f customs a n d t a x a t i o n , a k i n to a d e p a r t m e n t o f i n t e r n a l revenue.
a n d , as E v a n s (1985) has a r g u e d i n relation to other T h i r d W o r l d states, this
S i m i l a r l y , the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p o w e r of the m i n i s t r y o f c o m m e r c e d e c l i n e d w i t h
i n v o l v e d strengthening the bureaucratic capacity o f the state. T o w a r d s that
the severing o f foreign t r a d e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . O t h e r newly created departments
end. the m i l i t a r y c o u p successfully e l i m i n a t e d o p p o s i t i o n to the 24 J a n u a r y
included
measures. A l m o s t i m m e d i a t e l y , coup leaders b a n n e d a l l p o l i t i c a l parties, a n d ,
Investment and E x p o r t P r o m o t i o n a n d I m p l e m e n t a t i o n , a l l created b y the p r i m e
w i t h the exception o f T u r k - I s , shut d o w n a l l three trade u n i o n confederations
minister's office. T h e s e d e p a r t m e n t s held the powers o f a m i n i s t r y , but r e m a i n e d
O z a l ' s M o t h e r l a n d P a r t y (1983-87) i m p l e m e n t e d the 24 J a n u a r y
the
Department
o f F o r e i g n Investment,
a n d the
Department
of
150
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
151
C O S M O P O L I T A N ISLAMISTS AND G L O B A L I Z A T I O N
n o n - c a b i n e t posts headed by an a p p o i n t e d technocrat answering d i r e c t i v to the
laws ( M u m c u 1994b: 183). T h e politically i m p o r t a n t a n d N a q s h b a n d i - a f f i l i a t c d
p r i m e minister. M a n a g e r i a l bureaucrats were largely independent o f p o l i t i c a l
capital groups m e d i a t e d the f o u n d i n g o f these Saudi-based finance institutions i n
a n d intra-bureaucratic
pressures. A s a result o f these o r g a n i z a t i o n a l changes
T u r k e y . F a i s a l F i n a n c e o f T u r k e y was established w i t h the active involvement o f
i n the state structure, funds were spent at the discretion o f the p r i m e m i n i s t e r
p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s such as S a l i h O z c a n a n d A h m e t Tevfik P a k s u ( M u m c u 1994b:
w i t h o u t the p r i o r a p p r o v a l o f the government a n d parliament. E x t r a b u d g e t a r y
180-3). T h e A l - B a r a k a T u r k w a s founded as a joint venture w i t h K o r k u t O z a l
l u n d s spent i n this w a y by the p r i m e minister's office reached 11.2 p e r cent o f
a n d E y m e n T o p b a s . K o r k u t O z a l is a p r o m i n e n t N a q s h b a n d i , a former N S P
p u b l i c investment i n 1988 ( O n i s 1991: 33).
p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n a n d m i n i s t e r o f a g r i c u l t u r e . H e also w o r k e d as a consultant for the I s l a m i c D e v e l o p m e n t B a n k . E y m e n T o p b a s is a former c h a i r p e r s o n o f the M o t h e r l a n d Partv's I s t a n b u l p r o v i n c i a l b r a n c h . B y the early 1990s the A l -
C h a n g i n g geopolitical relations and Islam
B a r a k a T u r k a n d F a i s a l F i n a n c e o f T u r k e y held a n estimated one-tenth o f a l l domestic b a n k deposits ( M o o r e 3990).
T h e escalation o f the w a r m V i e t n a m precipitated crises i n relation to U S m i l i t a r y p o w e r a n d the l e g i t i m a c y o f C o l d W a r ideology. T h e w a r i n V i e t n a m a n d d é t e n t e both weakened a n t i - c o m m u n i s t sentiments a n d m a r k e d a rise i n T h i r d W o r l d nationalist movements. H o w e v e r , the I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n a n d the Soviet i n v a s i o n o f A f g h a n i s t a n represented a t u r n i n g p o i n t for the U S government's m i l i t a r y power. D u r i n g what E l a l l i d a y (1984) has c a l l e d the second C o l d W a r , between
1978 a n d 1982, the U n i t e d States intensified its m i l i t a r y
c a p a c i t y to c o n t a i n latent a n d g r o w i n g challenges to U S hegemony. W i t h the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f the C a r t e r D o c t r i n e i n J a n u a r y
by m i l i t a r y force i f necessary
(Kuniholm
1986). T h e
Finance
of
Turkey,
the
Al-Baraka
Turk,
and
the
Islamic
c o m p a n i e s . W e l l over 90 p e r c e n t o f their funds were used to finance trade o n the basis o f n o n - i n t e r e s t - c h a r g i n g I s l a m i c b a n k i n g methods. T h e s e methods include a p r o f i t / l o s s s h a r i n g p a r t n e r s h i p w i t h a client, a n d mwabaha ( B a l d w i n 1990: 32). T h e c o m m o n l y used murabaha m e t h o d involves a b a n k p u r c h a s i n g goods t h a t a trader wants a n d then s e l l i n g t h e m at a n agreed m a r k - u p p r i c e ( K h o u r i 1987: 18). I n the early 1980s, the I s l a m i c D e v e l o p m e n t B a n k held o n l y 0.67 per cent
1980, the
U n i t e d States m o v e d to reassert its m i l i t a r y might. In the Persian G u l f region, the d o c t r i n e r e q u i r e d the protection of Western o i l a n d security
Faisal
D e v e l o p m e n t B a n k ( I D B ) c o n t r i b u t e d to the e x p a n s i o n o f N a q s h b a n d i - a f f i l i a t e d
interests,
U n i t e d States also
endeavoured to create a moderate S u n n i I s l a m i c bloc i n the M i d d l e East u n d e r
o f total foreign investments i n T u r k e y . Between 1979 a n d 1983, T u r k e y received an average o f U S § 75 m i l l i o n p e r year f r o m the I D B . It received U S S 3 b i l l i o n f r o m the "World B a n k d u r i n g the same p e r i o d ( K a z g a n 1988: 331). Despite its relatively s m a l l c o n t r i b u t i o n , S a u d i capital a n d investment i n the b a n k i n g sector h e l p e d to strengthen newly e m e r g i n g p r o - I s l a m i c business groups i n T u r k e y .
the leadership o f S a u d i A r a b i a , w i t h ties to N A T O through T u r k e y ( C h u r b a 1980). T h e O r g a n i z a t i o n o f the I s l a m i c Conference ( O I C ) p r e p a r e d the p o l i t i c a l a n d t e c h n i c a l g r o u n d for a n i s l a m i c e c o n o m i c u n i o n a m o n g m e m b e r states (Moinuddin
1987: 120-7). T h e c i r c u l a t i o n o f huge amounts o f S a u d i m o n e y
a m o n g M u s l i m states i n the M i d d l e East h e l p e d to strengthen e c o n o m i c ties w i t h i n the O I C . S a u d i A r a b i a accounted for 42 per cent o f the U S S 450.5 b i l l i o n p e t r o d o l l a r surplus hefd by O P E C members (Atasoy 2003b: 64). T h e R a b i t a t a l A l a m a l - I s l a m i , the D a r a l - M a a l a l l s l a m i , a n d the A l B a r a k a G r o u p c i r c u l a t e d S a u d i petrodollars a m o n g O I C states, a l o n g w i t h the Islamic D e v e l o p m e n t B a n k , a subsidiary o f the O I C .
B y t a k i n g a d v a n t a g e o f the
overabundance
o f p e t r o d o l l a r funds
in
i n t e r n a t i o n a l markets, T u r k e y was able to c o n n e c t w i t h g l o b a l c i r c u i t s o f c a p i t a l . Set against the p o l i t i c a l b a c k d r o p o f the U S government's crisis m a n a g e m e n t philosophy, T u r k e y f o u n d its n i c h e w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f I s l a m i c solidarity. T h e large e x p o r t i n g c a p i t a l groups o r g a n i z e d a r o u n d T U S I A D
and newly
e m e r g i n g Islamist capitalists c a m e to appreciate the i n c r e a s i n g possibilities for prosperity i n the M i d d l e E a s t . T u r k e y intensified its e c o n o m i c ties w i t h I r a n , I r a q , L i b y a , a n d S a u d i A r a b i a — c o u n t r i e s that were responsible for 45.5 petcent o f the total g r o w t h i n T u r k e y ' s m a n u f a c t u r e d exports between 1980 a n d 1985 (Senses 1990: 6 4 - 5 ) . F u e l l e d also by the outl^reak o f the I r a n - I r a q w a r i n
W i t h T h e second C o l d W a r , T u r k e y regained the geopolitical advantage that was u n d e r m i n e d d u r i n g d é t e n t e a n d the C y p r u s W a r . T h e r e w a r d for
1980, T u r k e y ' s exports to the M i d d l e East rose h i g h e r t h a n its exports to E E C countries.
T u r k e y ' s renewed status as an i m p o r t a n t M i d d l e East player was the p r o v i s i o n of a i d . T h e r e is no doubt that O z a l ' s M o t h e r l a n d P a r t y government used official a i d funds to l i n k Turkey's structural adjustment measures to the O I C . T h e O z a l government a l l o w e d Saudi-based Faisal F i n a n c e a n d the A l B a r a k a G r o u p to establish themselves i n T u r k e y . Together w i t h the I s l a m i c D e v e l o p m e n t B a n k , they were given special exemptions from T u r k i s h b a n k r u p t c y
T h e i n f l o w o f foreign
currency from Turkish contracting
companies
o p e r a t i n g i n the M i d d l e East, a n d the workers' remittances f r o m T u r k i s h l a b o u r e m p l o y e d by these c o m p a n i e s , represented T u r k e y ' s largest gains i n revenue. B y the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s , there w e r e more t h a n 300 T u r k i s h c o n t r a c t i n g companies i n the M i d d l e East, w i t h s o m e o f the largest
revenues generated i n L i b y a ,
S a u d i A r a b i a , a n d I r a q . I n 1 9 8 6 , the c u m u l a t i v e value o f t h e i r contracts was
152
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
153
C O S M O P O L I T A N ISLAMISTS A N D G L O B A L I Z A T I O N
a p p r o x i m a t e l y U S | 17 b i l l i o n ( O r h o n 1989: 89-91). Between 1980 a n d 1986,
a c c u m u l a t i o n . T u r k e y has l o n g been in pursuit o f the status o f a truly W e s t e r n
the total n u m b e r o f T u r k i s h m i g r a n t workers i n A r a b countries
increased
state, but this has b e e n c o n d i t i o n a l o n its p l a y i n g a subordinate role. H o w e v e r ,
over 210 p e r cent, r e a c h i n g 207,696. S a u d i A r a b i a a n d L i b y a alone absorbed
there are n o w groups w i t h i n the I s l a m i c m o v e m e n t i n T u r k e y that y e a r n to
72.7 per cent o f these workers. B y 1985, S a u d i A r a b i a h a d the second largest
find strength
n u m b e r o f T u r k i s h m i g r a n t workers i n the w o r l d ; o n l y West G e r m a n y h a d
i n c l u d e Islamist, engineers, business groups, a n d industrialists. T h e y m a i n t a i n
m o r e . A s a result, T u r k e y e x p e r i e n c e d a sharp increase i n the i n f l o w o f workers
1
t h r o u g h I s l a m i n the global p o l i t i c a l economy. T h e s e
historically rooted
ambiguities
towards
Western
dominance
i n the
groups global
remittances, from U S $ 983 m i l l i o n i n 1978 to U S $ 2,187 m i l l i o n i n 1982 {State
system, but t h e i r ideas are s h a p e d as m u c h by W e s t e r n ideology as by I s l a m i c
P l a n n i n g O r g a n i z a t i o n 1985: 351). T h i s m a d e up 35.8 per cent o f Turkey's total
references. T h e s e I s l a m i c g r o u p s c a l l for the u n i o n o f M u s l i m states a r o u n d a
e x p o r t i n c o m e i n 1982 ( W o r l d B a n k 1984).
c o m m o n m a r k e t i n the M i d d l e East, the C a u c a s u s , C e n t r a l A s i a , a n d Southeast
H o w e v e r , the collapse o f oil prices i n 1986 adversely affected Turkey's
A s i a . Nonetheless, they s u p p o r t Turkey's p r o p o s e d m e m b e r s h i p i n the E U .
exports a n d its c o n t r a c t i n g c o m p a n i e s i n the M i d d l e East, as Turkey's o i l e x p o r t i n g trade partners b e c a m e debtor states. A l t h o u g h T u r k e y benefited from a n o i l b i l l that fell by over U S $ 1.5 b i l l i o n i n 1986, its exports d e c l i n e d some
T u r k i s h - I s l a m i c synthesis ideology
30 per cent, and the value o f its contracts d r o p p e d considerably, r e a c h i n g o n l y US$
18.5 b i l l i o n by 1990. I n 1987, the s l o w d o w n caused a 27 p e r cent r e d u c t i o n
i n the n u m b e r o f workers e m p l o y e d by these companies ( R o b i n s 1991: 109-10). W o r k e r s ' remittances as a share o f total export i n c o m e also fell to 21.2 p e r cent
groups a n d y o u t h w h o c a m e t o p l a y a n i m p o r t a n t role i n the g r o w t h o f p o l i t i c a l tension d u r i n g the 1970s. T h i s r e q u i r e d the suppression o f every manifestation of i d e o l o g i c a l p o l i t i c s , e s p e c i a l l y leftist activity. T h e m i l i t a r y p r o m o t e d I s l a m
b y 1991 ( O n g u n 2002: 79). W i t h the w e a k e n i n g economies o f o i l e x p o r t i n g countries after T u r k e y p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the
T h e p r i n c i p a l g o a l o f the m i l i t a r y regime was to d e p o l i t i c i z e u r b a n m a r g i n a l
creation o f M u s l i m sub-regional
3986,
arrangements.
T h e s e i n c l u d e d the R e g i o n a l C o o p e r a t i o n for D e v e l o p m e n t (Turkey,
Iran,
a n d Pakistan), the A s s o c i a t i o n o f S o u t h East A s i a n N a t i o n s ( M a l a y s i a a n d Indonesia), the B a n g k o k A g r e e m e n t (Bangladesh), the A s i a n C l e a r i n g U n i o n (Bangladesh, I r a n , Pakistan), a n d the E c o n o m i c C o o p e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n (Turkey, K a z a k h s t a n , A z e r b a i j a n , K y r g y z s t a n , T u r k m e n i s t a n , U z b e k i s t a n , a n d Afghanistan). T h e s e r e g i o n a l arrangements put together countries c o m p r i s i n g m o r e t h a n 25 per cent o f the world's M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n . B y c u l t i v a t i n g ties w i t h M u s l i m countries, T u r k e y has demonstrated its c o n t i n u i n g interest i n the idea o f ' I s l a m i c u n i t y ' a n d has r e c o g n i z e d Islam as a n essential i n g r e d i e n t i n its struggle for competitive advantage i n the capitalist w o r l d economy. T h i s has b e e n the case for a n u m b e r o f successive governments i n c l u d i n g the m i l i t a r y regime (1980-83), a n d subsequent c i v i l i a n governments
o f the M o t h e r l a n d
P a r t y (1983-91), the T r u e P a t h P a r t y — i n c o a l i t i o n w i t h the S o c i a l D e m o c r a t Populist P a r t y (1991-95), a n d the p r o - I s l a m i c Welfare P a r t y - - i n c o a l i t i o n w i t h
w h i l e r e s t r u c t u r i n g state o r g a n s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g n e o l i b e r a l policies m Turkey. T h e m i l i t a r y also b e l i e v e d the I s l a m i c c o n c e p t o f ummak was a p a n a c e a for c o n t a i n i n g the L e f t . S i n c e the m i l i t a r y was suspicious o f m o r e r a d i c a l manifestations o f I s l a m i c p o l i t i c s , ummah was p l a c e d u n d e r state c o n t r o l . T h u s , the m i l i t a r y r e g i m e sought to c o m b i n e T u r k i s h n a t i o n a l i s m w i t h I s l a m by u s i n g the i d e o l o g y o f a T u r k i s h - I s l a m i c synthesis. C i v i l i a n governments
also later
adopted this a p p r o a c h . A f t e r c o m i n g to p o w e r i n 1983, the M o t h e r l a n d P a r t y ( M P ) gave the T u r k i s h - I s l a m i c synthesis i d e o l o g y its p a r t i c u l a r
form.
A l t h o u g h not a n I s l a m i s t party, the M P ' s ideology, u n d e r the
unique
leadership o f T u r g u t O z a l , represented a m i x t u r e o f e c o n o m i c l i b e r a l i s m a n d n a t i o n a l i s m , w i t h some I s l a m i c elements. A c c o r d i n g to O n i s (1997: 757), it was O z a l ' s p e r s o n a l i t y a n d his a b i l i t y to combine a l i b e r a l W e s t e r n orientation w i t h a strong a t t a c h m e n t to I s l a m t h a t h e l d the l i b e r a l a n d I s l a m i c factions o f the p a r t y together a r o u n d the cause o f e c o n o m i c l i b e r a l i z a t i o n . U n d e r O z a l ' s leadership the M P m a n a g e d to e s t a b l i s h a broad-based c o a l i t i o n a n d p r o m o t e the v i e w that T u r k e y ' s e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t projects s h o u l d rest o n the m o r a l / c u l t u r a l l e g i t i m a c y o f I s l a m ( C a k i r 1 9 9 3 : 3 3 , 38). A f t e r O z a l ' s w i t h d r a w a l from active
the T r u e P a t h (1995-97).
p a r t y politics, the i d e o l o g i c a l o u t l o o k o f the p a r t y shifted to the centre-right. T h e collapse o f the Soviet U n i o n i n 1989-91
transferred
the global
d y n a m i c s o f p o l i t i c a l economy. D e v e l o p m e n t strategies, class interests,
the
role o f the state, a n d geopolitics have a l l been changed. T h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f these changes for the p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r i n g o f c a p i t a l i s m are b y no means clear ( H o b s b a w m 1994). A s the U S government persists i n its desire to create a new w o r l d order, T u r k e y w i l l continue its struggle to find a niche w i t h i n this order i n terms o f its strategic relevance to the c h a n g i n g e c o n o m y o f capitalist
T h e presence o f a s t r o n g p r o - I s l a m i c faction w i t h i n the p a r t y was a c r u c i a l d i m e n s i o n o f the strategy that forged a l i n k between M u s l i m c u l t u r a l values a n d e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . A holy a l l i a n c e (kutsal ittifak) was
formed
between l i b e r a l a n d p r o - I s l a m i c groups w i t h i n the M o t h e r l a n d P a r t y , pressing for the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f a T u r k i s h - I s l a m i c synthesis i n the state structure (Turkish Daily News, 20 25 J u n e 1988). G r e a t emphasis was p l a c e d o n the rote
154
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
155
C O S M O P O L I T A N ISLAMISTS A N D GLOBALIZATION
o f r e l i g i o n w i t h i n the state educational system i n c e m e n t i n g c o n f l i c t i n g societal
1970s' e c o n o m i c crisis, T u r k e y c o u l d no longer e x p o r t 'excess' l a b o u r to E u r o p e .
demands. A m o r e tolerant approach to the Sufi orders was also part o f the
T h e s e workers entered i n t o u r b a n class politics as m a r g i n a l s m a k i n g a l i v i n g i n
n a t i o n a l consensus project.
the i n f o r m a l u r b a n e c o n o m y ( K i i i c 2002). For t h e m , r a d i c a l ideologies, leftist m
T h i s new formulation o f official
state ideology settled
one
persistent
p a r t i c u l a r , b e c a m e strategic resources for p o l i t i c a l and e c o n o m i c e m p o w e r m e n t .
question i n the p o l i t i c a l debate over the role o f l s l a m i n d e f i n i n g the nation. T h e
A n d for leaders o f the m i l i t a r y coup, state-run religious e d u c a t i o n b e c a m e a
debate dates b a c k to the second h a l f o f the nineteenth century w h e n O t t o m a n
strategic means for c o n t a i n i n g the r a d i c a l i z a t i o n o f these groups.
reformers i n i t i a t e d a wholesale westernization p r o g r a m m e to restructure the O t t o m a n state a l o n g secular principles. Islamists opposed the secularization project, a n d , as previously noted, advocated the adoption o f Western technology
Islamic education
but not its culture. H o w e v e r , f o u n d i n g leaders o f the T u r k i s h nation-state believed that t e c h n o l o g y and culture were constituent
elements o f a u n i f i e d
In 1983, the State P l a n n i n g O r g a n i z a t i o n p r e p a r e d a Report on National
Culture.
whole, i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , then, w o u l d require the wholesale adoption o f Western
T h e report stated that the crisis o f the
1970s was due to the c o r r u p t i o n o f
c u l t u r a l values. W i t h the establishment o f the m u l t i - p a r t y regime i n 1945 a n d
Turkish m o r a l a n d c u l t u r a l values by 'divisive foreign' ideologies (State P l a n n i n g
the rise to p o w e r o f the D P i n 1950, the intellectual debate o n I s l a m re-emerged.
O r g a n i z a t i o n 1983). A c c o r d i n g to the report, these foreign ideologies p r o m p t e d
B y i n c o r p o r a t i n g r u r a l producers
n a t i o n a l e c o n o m y the D P also
T u r k i s h y o u t h a n d i n t e l l e c t u a l s to imitate W e s t e r n c u l t u r a l v a l u e s — a process
integrated their M u s l i m beliefs a n d practices. D u r i n g the 1970s, the debate over
destructive to n a t i o n a l c u l t u r e . P r e s e r v a t i o n o f the nation's culture was a duty o f
culture versus technology was revived w i t h i n the p r o - i s l a m i c N S P . T h e n a t i o n a l
the state, a n d n a t i o n a l c u l t u r e , a c c o r d i n g to the report, was the s u m o f t r a d i t i o n
v i e w i d e o l o g y o f the N S P p o p u l a r i z e d the theme o f W e s t e r n i m p e r i a l i s m
a n d belief c u l m i n a t i n g i n r e l i g i o n .
into the
a n d questioned the presumed universality o f a W e s t e r n m o d e l . U n d e r O z a f s
R e l i g i o u s courses
have
been
mandatory
i n the school c u r r i c u l u m i n
leadership d u r i n g the 1980s, the T u r k i s h - I s l a m i c synthesis ideology o f the M P
T u r k e y since the
integrated İ s l a m as a m o r a l c u l t u r a l value into the strategy o f a competitive
level h i g h schools, a n d i y c é e s . R e l i g i o u s i n s t r u c t i o n i n the e d u c a t i o n a l system
e x p o r t - o r i e n t e d e c o n o m i c m o d e l . M P ideology also connected I s l a m to a l i b e r a l
reflects b o t h the m i l i t a r y ' s c o m m i t m e n t to c r e a t i n g a new n a t i o n a l c u l t u r e a n d
W e s t e r n orientation. T h e c o m b i n e d effect o f these i d e o l o g i c a l shifts was that the
the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the state to regulate the practice o f l s l a m . G e n e r a l E v r e n ,
West was n o longer perceived as a coherent c u l t u r a l unit o f m o d e r n i t y but a n
leader o f the 1980 m i l i t a r y c o u p , e x p l a i n s the i m p o r t a n c e o f stale c o n t r o l over
e c o n o m i c p o w e r w i t h i n the larger space o f global c o m p e t i t i o n .
religion:
It is indisputable
that Islam has
been
a permanent partner i n
1982 C o n s t i t u t i o n . T h i s includes p r i m a r y schools, m i d d l e -
the
i d e o l o g i c a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n o f c u l t u r a l politics since 1945. T h e strategy o f the state has been to c o n t a i n real or potential leftist a n d r a d i c a l Islamist opposition w i t h i n a m o d e r n i s t assertion o f l s l a m i n the state structure. H o w e v e r , this has not prevented the rise o f a n Islamic movement i n n a t i o n a l politics i n w h i c h older
Families
should
not
give
religious
education
to
children.
T h i s w o u l d be i m p r o p e r since it m a y be taught i n c o r r e c t l y , incompletely, or t h r o u g h
the family's o w n point o f v i e w ... I
ask y o u ... not to s e n d y o u r c h i l d r e n to illegal K o r a n schools ...
I s l a m i c Sufi orders a n d other religious c o m m u n i t i e s are m a i n players. W h a t
r e l i g i o n w i l l b e t a u g h t to our c h i l d r e n b y the state i n state schools
is especially interesting is their engagement w i t h the process o f g l o b a l i z a t i o n
(Evren 1991: 301).
a n d their search for a way to participate i n n e w markets u s i n g innovative T h e i n c r e a s i n g i m p o r t a n c e o f im.avi-hatip schools (for p r a y e r leaders a n d
technologies w i t h o u t b e c o m i n g Western. T h e p o l i t i c a l decision to develop a religious e d u c a t i o n a l system played a significant role i n the creation o f a new genre o f M u s l i m professionals e m p l o y e d mainly
as
engineers
i n the
state b u r e a u c r a c y
and
private
sector.
These
professionals were the c h i l d r e n o f religiously m i n d e d r u r a l s m a l l producers a n d u r b a n lower classes. T h e intention was never to subvert e x i s t i n g hierarchies but to m o r e effectively articulate a c u l t u r a l l i n k between the state a n d M u s l i m s f r o m r u r a l a n d u r b a n lower classes. T h e c u l t u r a l a r t i c u l a t i o n o f these groups w i t h i n the state structure was a n urgent matter for leaders o f the m i l i t a r y coup. A f t e r the
preachers) and K o r a n schools underscores
the role o f I s l a m i c e d u c a t i o n i n
Turkey. I n 1951 -52, there w e r e o n l y seven m i d d l e - l e v e l a n d lycee-level imamhahp schools; by 1980 there were 588. F r o m 1980 to 1986 the n u m b e r o f imamhatip schools increased by 22 p e r cent to 717. T h e n u m b e r o f students e n r o l l e d m these schools also i n c r e a s e d b y 34 p e r cent, from 178,000 to a p p r o x i m a t e l y 240,000. I n the 1 9 8 5 / 6 a c a d e m i c year there were 5.600 official general h i g h schools ( i n c l u d i n g m i d d l e - l e v e l schools a n d lycees) i n T u r k e y w i t h 2.4 m i l l i o n students. T h e
ratio o f imam-hatip
students to general h i g h school students
156
COSMOPOLITAN
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS AND D E M O C R A C Y
i n c r e a s e d from one i n 37 i n the 1965/6 a c a d e m i c year to one i n ten by 1985/6
T a b l e 6: hnam-Hatip
(State Institute o f Statistics). T h e r e are now 4-46,429 students, most from u r b a n
Professions
lower-class a n d r u r a l families, a t t e n d i n g m i d d l e - l e v e l a n d lvcée-level
ISLAMISTS AND GLOBALIZATION
L y c é e G r a d u a t e s W h o H a v e T a k e n j o b s i n the C l e r i c a l
imam-
hatip schools. T h e s e schools provide t h e m w i t h alternative channels o f u p w a r d
N u m b e r o f graduates
N u m b e r o f graduates
Yea rs
m o b i l i t y ( G o k c e et a l 1984: 1231. The
o r i g i n a l purpose
157
employed by the D i r e c t o r a t e o f R e l i g i o u s Affairs
o f these schools was to meet the d e m a n d for
educated religious personnel, but this appears to be o f secondary i m p o r t a n c e 0
today. A l t h o u g h founded as vocational-religious institutions, imam-hatip schools
1980-1981
4393
were integrated into the secondary e d u c a t i o n a l system i n 1973 by the c o a l i t i o n
1981-1982
9865
0
g o v e r n m e n t o f the centre-left R P P a n d p r o - I s l a m i c N S P . T h i s has transformed
1982-1983
11222
2238
t h e m into a n alternative educational system that trains students to p e r f o r m
1093-1984
14347
3876
religious services and also prepares them for higher education. M o s t graduates
1984-1985
18467
3444 4039
c o n t i n u e their education i n various university departments
for careers i n
1985-1986
15257
e n g i n e e r i n g , law, and m e d i c i n e . T h e y enter the j o b market as professionals a n d
1986-1987
15971
7432
c i v i l servants. I n 1987, nearly 40 per cent o f students i n the P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
1987-1988
17758
7281
D e p a r t m e n t o f A n k a r a University's prestigious F a c u l t y o f Political Science
1988-1989
16640
5917
were graduates o f imam-hatip lycées (Cumhunyet Newspaper, various issues, 1987). The
only institution not affected by this t r e n d is the m i l i t a r y . M i l i t a r y schools
Source: D i r e c t o r a t e o f R e l i g i o u s A f f a i r s Statistics (1990)
reject imam-hatip graduates. Nevertheless, the Sufi orders a n d Nurcu cemaati t r y to recruit y o u n g students w h o enter the m i l i t a r y lycées by p r o v i d i n g them w i t h I s l a m i c i n s t r u c t i o n i n their homes o n weekends.
T h e r e is n o d a t a to suggest a link between the graduates o f these schools a n d islamists. W e do not k n o w h o w m a n y M u s l i m professionals have
imam-
o f religious education
hatip school d i p l o m a s . H o w e v e r , it is well k n o w n that these schools create a n
i n imam-hatip schools. T h e c u r r i c u l u m offers a b l e n d o f religious a n d secular
attachment b e t w e e n y o u n g , u p w a r d l y m o b i l e , a n d religiously educated M u s l i m s ,
courses so that students are able to g a i n e m p l o y m e n t i n areas outside
and the secular values a n d i d e o l o g y of the state.
The
government
strictly regulates
the-content
the
religious profession. T h e schools are s i m i l a r IO private C a t h o l i c schools i n N o r t h
K o r a n schools are also p a r t of the state-led I s l a m i c e d u c a t i o n a l system
A m e r i c a . A study conducted by A k s i t (1986) found that imam-hatip students
in Turkey. T h e r e are 4,925 K o r a n schools w i t h 176.892 r e g u l a r and 52,028
expressed preferences for courses i n mathematics, physics, literature, E n g l i s h ,
e v e n i n g students. I n
a n d A r a b i c , as w e l l as courses i n the K o r a n . M o s t o f these students express a
these state-controlled s c h o o l s (Ayata 1996: 47). T h e Sufi orders a n d r e l i g i o u s
desire to continue their university education i n e n g i n e e r i n g , m e d i c i n e , law, a n d
c o m m u n i t i e s have also e s t a b l i s h e d unofficial private K o r a n schools a n d y o u t h
p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ; only a few p l a n to b e c o m e prayer leaders a n d clerics. I n
hostels, largely outside the o f f i c i a l sphere o f state c o n t r o l . T h e i r m i s s i o n is to
fact, only 10 per cent of imam-hatip graduates are e m p l o y e d as prayer leaders
p r o v i d e private i n s t r u c t i o n i n I s l a m to y o u t h w h o have c o m e f r o m s m a l l e r
a n d preachers (Directorate o f R e l i g i o u s Affairs 1990). O n e - s i x t h o f t h e m are
u r b a n a n d r u r a l areas for a n e d u c a t i o n i n state schools. F e t h u l l a h Gulen's nur
female. F e m a l e clergy are not yet accepted i n I s l a m , so most o f these w o m e n
evlen (light houses) a n d the Suleymanci schools are the b e s t - k n o w n e x a m p l e s o f
are u n e m p l o y a b l e i n their professions. T a b l e 6 presents data o n the n u m b e r o f
private K o r a n schools a n d hostels.
graduates f r o m imam-hatip lycées w h o have o b t a i n e d j o b s i n religious professions f r o m 1980 to 1989.
1996,
1,326.443 c h i l d r e n attended s u m m e r courses i n
T h e r e is n o p u b l i c l y a v a i l a b l e data o n the exact n u m b e r o f these p r i v a t e schools or their student e n r o l m e n t a n d m a n a g e m e n t . T h e r e is also n o i n d i c a t i o n from the literature o n w h e t h e r there is interaction between the two types o f I s l a m i c education i n s h a p i n g a n I s l a m i c m o d e o f t h i n k i n g i n T u r k e y . In order to g a i n insight into the possible influence o f private religious schools o n the I s l a m i c education o f students i n s t a t e - r u n schools. I c o n d u c t e d 18 i n t e r v i e w s i n A n k a r a d u r i n g 2003, I also i n t e r v i e w e d the p r i n c i p a l o f a Suleymanci y o u t h hostel m a s m a l l T u r k i s h t o w n i n 2 0 0 2 . T o m a i n t a i n the a n o n y m i t y o f m y interviewees.
158
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D
i refer to t h e m o n l y as 'respondents'.
DEMOCRACY
COSMOPOLITAN
ISLAMISTS A N D
159
GLOBALIZATION
M y interviews offer insight into h o w
T h e mutevellis forward the m o n i e s raised to the abiler/ablalar to be distributed as
students i n private Islamic schools become attuned to the norms a n d values o f
scholarships a n d for household expenses. O n e Fethullaha w o m a n told me that
devout M u s l i m s w h i l e p u r s u i n g higher education i n the state-controlled secular
her husband gives about U S S 6 0 0 a year to their l o c a l mutevelli in equal m o n t h l y
e n v i r o n m e n t o f universities.
instalments. T h e s u m is d e t e r m i n e d by the mutevellis o n the basis o f one student's m o n t h l y spending needs. T h e mutevelli I i n t e r v i e w e d said that they decide on students' eligibility for scholarships after carefully e x a m i n i n g their parents' socio-
N u r evleri
economic b a c k g r o u n d . I n p a r t i c u l a r , they try to assist lower-class students f r o m smaller towns w h o have m o v e d to the city for their schooling.
T h e nur evleri are student houses affiliated w i t h Nurcu cemaati that operates under the leadership o f F e t h u l l a h G u l e n . T h e cemaat has a h i e r a r c h i c a l order a n d G u l e n
rigidly
structured
is its sole leader. T h e mutevellis ( c o m m u n i t y
organizers), Abiler (elder brothers), a n d ablalar (elder sisters) r u n cemaat activities at the n e i g h b o u r h o o d level. T h e i r exact n u m b e r is not k n o w n , but as the cemaat has e x p a n d e d t h r o u g h o u t T u r k e y , the n u m b e r o f those w h o supervise
and
oversee cemaat activities has also increased. Mutevellis are those g i v e n a h i g h r a n k m the cemaat h i e r a r c h y . T h e y are selected f r o m the most educated a n d dedicated Risale-FNur
students a n d receive a d v a n c e d education f r o m an even higher rank
k n o w n as the Nur talebesi. T h e i r e d u c a t i o n is based o n studies o f the
Koran
a n d the Prophet's S u n n a , as well as the Risale-I Nur collection o f S a i d N u r s i , a n d F e t h u l l a h G u l e n ' s books. T h e mutevellis p e r i o d i c a l l y hold w r i t t e n a n d oral e x a m i n a t i o n s . Abiler a n d ablalar are positioned i n the lower ranks of the cemaat hierarchy a n d have l i m i t e d knowledge o f the activities o f higher ranks.
Students b e c o m e a w a r e of these houses a n d generally ask for
T h e y also seek support t h r o u g h t h e i r parents' n e i g h b o u r h o o d cemaai activities and w h i l e they are a t t e n d i n g dersanes before university. Dersanes are privately run
schools that offer students p r e p a r a t i o n
of charge or for a s m a l l fee. T h e courses are taught by upper-level university student abiler a n d ahlalar. T h e abiler/ablalar sometimes take these students w h o are p r e p a r i n g for university entrance e x a m s to their mtr evleri. O n e o f m y respondents told me that she spent two m o n t h s i n a nur evi p r e p a r i n g for her exams. A n o t h e r respondent
i n d i c a t e d t h a t her parents c o u l d not atford
the
dersane fee w h e n she was p r e p a r i n g for the e x a m s , but t h r o u g h the help o f one o f her h i g h school teachers she w a s able to e n r o l m a Fethullahci dersane i n A n k a r a U n i v e r s i t y and is now w o r k i n g v o l u n t a r i l y for the dersane.
students, and situated close to students' schools. Abiler operate the flats for m a l e students w h i l e ablalar are responsible for the fiats o f female students.
Abiler/
ablalar are also students w h o live i n the nur evleri, a n d are h i g h l y self-disciplined i n the practice o f I s l a m . T h e r e are no clearly stated rules w h i c h determine one's status as a n abi or abla. T h e h i g h e r r a n k e d mutevellis assign appointments i n terms o f one's level o f k n o w l e d g e a n d degree o f m a t u r i t y w i t h i n the cemaat. M y I a m aware
that men operate i n a different m a n n e r but have v e r y l i m i t e d d a t a r e g a r d i n g their activities. For security reasons, mutavellis reveal their identity o n l y w i t h i n trust-based networks. I was able to meet a female mutavelli t h r o u g h the personal connections o f one o f my respondents. M y l i m i t e d d a t a o n m a l e mutavellis is due to m y lack o f connections to such networks. T h e mutevclH.s connect students w i t h M u s l i m
courses for university entrance
e x a m i n a t i o n s . T h e Fethullahci cemaati often offers courses i n their dersanes free
for free. She has since g r a d u a t e d f r o m the D e p a r t m e n t o f C h e m i s t r y at A n k a r a
T h e nur evleri are single-sex rented apartment fiats, each h o u s i n g seven
i n f o r m a t i o n here is l i m i t e d m o s d y to the activities o f w o m e n mütevelli
financial
support t h r o u g h their i n f o r m a l connections w i t h other students i n the schools.
A c c o r d i n g to one o f m y respondents, the nur evleri also often function as d o r m i t o r i e s or hostels for out-of-town u n i v e r s i t y students from modest lower a n d m i d d l e class families i n s m a l l A n a t o l i a n cities or towns. T h e y prefer these flats because they k n o w that t h e i r d a i l y activities w i l l have a moral-religious focus. T h e y o r g a n i z e d a i l y r e l i g i o u s sohbets u n d e r the supervision o f the household abi/ abla, a n d r e a d a n d discuss t h e Risale-l Nur c o l l e c t i o n o f S a i d N u r s i , as w e l l as the books o f F e t h u l l a h G u l e n . T h e s e students are also m i n d f u l o f their d a i l y prayers a n d endeavour to live t h e i r lives i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the norms e x p e c t e d o f a b e l i e v i n g M u s l i m . T h e respondents w h o m I i n t e r v i e w e d are p u r s u i n g their university education i n the n a t u r a l sciences a n d v a r i o u s technical subjects. T h e y firmly
believe that I s l a m w i l l p r o v i d e a s p i r i t u a l foundation for them, w h i c h ,
w h e n c o m b i n e d w i t h the values o f T u r k i s h n a t i o n a l culture, w i l l allow t h e m to business
groups
through
b e c o m e successful as they v e n t u r e into the competitive relations of the economy.
monies collected for student scholarships. I n general, male mutevellis collect funds from business groups, while female mutevellis organize fairs and other fundraising activities. T h e fairs, in w h i c h w o m e n sell homemade food and handcrafts,
are
A Suleymanci youth hostel near A n k a r a
h i g h l y successful. M y respondent i n f o r m e d me that approximately U S S 25.000 was raised d u r i n g one month's fundraising alone. Mutevellis also collect the r e q u i r e d
I n 2 0 0 2 , i n a s m a l l t o w n n e a r A n k a r a , I i n t e r v i e w e d the p r i n c i p a l o f a y o u t h
material for the goods they sell free o f charge from M u s l i m c o m m e r c i a l groups.
hostel r u n by Meymancilar.
I also i n t e r v i e w e d a p r o m i n e n t a n d w e l l - i n f o r m e d
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T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D
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C O S M O P O L I T A N ISLAMISTS A N D
t o w n resident. T h e s e sources p r o v i d e d me w i t h valuable i n f o r m a t i o n o n the i m p o r t a n c e o f religious e d u c a t i o n i n Turkey.
are
small family
farmers
involved
professions. T h e i n t e n t i o n here was to prevent the g r o w t h of imam-hatip schools as an alternative e d u c a t i o n a l system for students w i s h i n g to continue their
T h e y o u t h hostel is i n Gudul, a t o w n o f 3,000 S u n n i M u s l i m inhabitants. Many
161
GLOBALIZATION
i n wheat,
fruit,
and
vegetable
p r o d u c t i o n . G u d u l is w e l l k n o w n for the h i g h q u a l i t y o f its cherries a n d grapes.
u n i v e r s i t y education i n fields unrelated to r e l i g i o n . T h i s is i r o n i c , however, because m i l i t a r y generals
h a d initially supported
the spread o f
imam-hatip
schools a n d K o r a n courses i n T u r k e y after the 1980 m i l i t a r y coup.
T h e t o w n has lost m a n y o f its y o u n g e r people to A n k a r a , where they have found
T h e Süleymancı
y o u t h hostel was o p e n e d i n G u d u l i n 1994 as a private
e m p l o y m e n t i n s m a l l businesses established by former G u d u l residents. T h o s e
residential school to serve students t r a v e l l i n g b a c k a n d forth every day from
who
t h e i r villages to t o w n to attend the state-run l y c é e a n d p r i m a r y schools. T h e
stay b e h i n d are generally older. G u d u l also receives some new migrants
from smaller villages nearby, but there is no m i g r a t i o n f r o m G u d u l to E u r o p e . T h e former residents o f G u d u l who have m i g r a t e d to A n k a r a m a i n t a i n
28 F e b r u a r y process p r o h i b i t e d p r i m a r y s c h o o l students f r o m staying i n private residential schools a n d hostels. C o n s e q u e n t l y , the hostel o n l y accepts
lycée
close ties w i t h e a c h other. M a n y are co-fbunders o f the A s s o c i a t i o n for the
students. It operates i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the rules a n d regulations set out b y the
D e v e l o p m e n t o f G u d u l , a g r o u p that organizes various fundraising activities.
M i n i s t r y of National Education.
T h e associaiion is s m a l l but ties between its members are strong, especially for
self-employed members
T h e Süleymancı
hostel has a capacity o f 86 students. A t the time o f my
o f the c o m m u n i t y . M e m b e r s o f the associaiion
interview there were 31 students between 14 a n d 18 years of age residing there
are a m o n g the s m a l l - a n d m e d i u m - s i z e d segments o f private c a p i t a l groups i n
a n d three full-time certified teachers w o r k i n g voluntarily. C h i l d r e n who stay at
A n k a r a . T h e y are self-employed, mostly i n the p r o d u c t i o n a n d sale o f fresh
the hostel are from lower-class peasant families a n d are not charged a residency
fruits and vegetables, as w e l l as the a n i m a l hide trade a n d leather-processing
fee w h i l e attending the lycée.
industries. T h e s e m i g r a n t s , some o f w h o m are quite wealthy, m a i n t a i n close
T h e p u b l i c e d u c a t i o n a l system i n T u r k e y has suffered f r o m cuts i n state
attachments to their h o m e t o w n a n d are considered t h e i r c o m m u n i t i e s ' most
s p e n d i n g since the a d o p t i o n o f n e o l i b e r a l e c o n o m i c policies i n the 1980s. State-
p r o m i n e n t , successful residents. M a n y p r o v i d e the t o w n w i t h
run
financial
assistance
schools n o w have d o u b l e t i m e i n s t r u c t i o n , the n u m b e r o f students per
t h r o u g h c o m m u n a l f u n d r a i s i n g activities a n d private donations w h e n necessary.
classroom has i n c r e a s e d , a n d e x t r a - c u r r i c u l a r activities have been cut ( A c a r a n d
I n short, they have g a i n e d great respect as trusted, h i g h l y v a l u e d members o f
A v a t a 2002: 102-3). Nonetheless, students still receive i n s t r u c t i o n i n 14 different
the G u d u l c o m m u n i t y .
subjects r a n g i n g f r o m m a t h e m a t i c s , literature, history, the n a t u r a l sciences, a n d
W h a t is p a r t i c u l a r l y interesting about this t o w n is its school system, T h e
foreign languages, to p h y s i c a l e d u c a t i o n , m u s i c , a n d fine arts. M y respondent
n u m b e r o f school-aged inhabitants i n G u d u l is v c r v s m a l l , but the town acts
f r o m the Suleymanci hostel r e p o r t s thai the e d u c a t i o n received i n the hostel
as a central a d m i n i s t r a t i v e u n i t for s u r r o u n d i n g villages, thereby
attracting
complements and upgrades t h e q u a l i t y o f e d u c a t i o n p r o v i d e d by the public lycée.
numerous students. G u d u l has two p r i m a r y schools and one p u b l i c lycée r u n by
H e points to the low level of university e n r o l l m e n t a m o n g p u b l i c - l y c é e graduates
the state, as well as a private y o u t h hostel r u n by Süleymancılar.
c o m p a r e d to graduates o f p r i v a t e f o r e i g n - l a n g u a g e schools a n d the
It also once h a d
reputable
a m i d d l e - l e v e l imam-hatip s c h o o l , w h i c h was closed d o w n i n 1998 after the so-
A n a d o l u a n d science lycées. A c c o r d i n g to m y respondent, graduates o f the p u b l i c
called 28 F e b r u a r y process, a repressive military c a m p a i g n against Islamists.
lycées c a n n o t compete w i t h the graduates f r o m these prestigious schools i n the
T h e 28 F e b r u a r y process led to the resignation i n 1997 o f the c o a l i t i o n
competitive, n a t i o n a l l y a d m i n i s t e r e d u n i v e r s i t y entrance e x a m i n a t i o n s . A s a
government o f the p r o - i s l a m i c W e l f a r e Party. T h e m i l i t a r y c h a r g e d that the
result, he argues, the c o m p l e m e n t a r y e d u c a t i o n offered by the hostels is essential
Welfare P a r t y was b e h i n d the g r o w t h o f reactionary religious forces directed
i f these students are e x p e c t e d to move o n to h i g h e r education, t i e states:
against the secular r e g i m e . T h e p a r t y was consequently closed d o w n a n d its leader E r b a k a n b a n n e d from politics for life. T h e m i l i t a r y ' s m a n o e u v r e is 1
There
are
1,430,000
students w h o w i l l w r i t e their university
generally r e g a r d e d as a 'soft m i l i t a r y c o u p because it d i d not a c t u a l l y result
entrance exams but o n l y 18 per cent o f t h e m w i l l be accepted into
in the o v e r t h r o w o f the g o v e r n m e n t by force. Nevertheless, it was decisive i n
the universities. T h e successful ones are most likely graduates of
firmly
establishing tutelage over c i v i l i a n governments. T h e 28 F e b r u a r y process
these elite schools. T h e s e c h i l d r e n c o m p l e m e n t their education
also banned all m i d d l e - l e v e l imam-hatip schools. L y c é e - l e v e l imam-hatip schools
w i t h private lessons to prepare for the university entrance exams.
were a l l o w e d , but c o u l d o n l y operate as ' v o c a t i o n a l a n d t e c h n i c a l ' schools
T h e y are the c h i l d r e n o f r i c h families w h o c a n afford to pay for
lor the t r a i n i n g o f religious personnel. T h e n u m b e r o f recruits was to be kept
private lessons. L o w - i n c o m e families c a n n o t afford such lessons a n d
low a n d not exceed the n u m b e r o f expected j o b vacancies i n various religious
their c h i l d r e n w i l l r e m a i n h i g h school graduates, w i t h n o chance o f
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T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D
C O S M O P O L I T A N ISLAMISTS A N D
DEMOCRACY
163
GLOBALIZATION
going to university. T h e y w i l l be left without the necessary skills
helped themselves. N o t a b i g deal, I thought—only a few cherries.
for employment i n w e l l - p a y i n g jobs. In m y hostel we educate these
But I was w a i t i n g so patiently for them to ripen. So 1 was curious
students to be ready for the university entrance examinations. W e
and w a n l e d to find out who did it. I asked around a bit, mentioned
are helping them to improve their chances i n life. T h e y deserve it.
this incident i n the l o c a l coffee house, and then simply forgot about it. N o t exactly a serious matter. It turns out that the p r i n c i p a l oi the
T h e hostel provides a d i s c i p l i n e d e n v i r o n m e n t for religious a n d secular
hostel happened to be i n the coffee house that day. A few days later
education. Students are expected to review the lessons they have learned d u r i n g
two s c h o o l c h i l d r e n c a m e to ray home and apologized. T h e y told me
the d a y m the lycée. T h e hostels p r i n c i p a l a n d three teachers regularly attend
they saw the cherries o n their way to school and decided to indulge.
these review sessions, w h i c h take a p p r o x i m a t e l y two hours iti the afternoon a n d
T h e y also told me that their teacher h a d sent t h e m to m y house to ask
two hours after dinner. I n a d d i t i o n , students are r e q u i r e d to live i n accordance
- what k i n d o f p u n i s h m e n t I believed appropriate for their behaviour
w i t h I s l a m i c p r i n c i p l e s . T h e y recite the K o r a n , l e a r n about the life a n d practices
[At this point m y respondent was so touched he was crying.] O f
of P r o p h e t M o h a m m e d , a n d fulfil the daily requirements o f their r e l i g i o n . M y
course, I h a d no intention o f punishing them. I told the students at
respondent i n d i c a t e d that the hostel offers a m i x e d c u r r i c u l u m e m p h a s i z i n g (he
once that they were forgiven. Y o u k n o w what . . . they were from the
i m p o r t a n c e o f both scientific t e c h n i c a l k n o w l e d g e a n d I s l a m i c religious a n d
Süleymancı school. T h e i r p r i n c i p a l h a d obviously made inquiries and
m o r a l values. T h i s is reminiscent o f the educational p r o g r a m m e adopted i n the
the 'guilty' students i m m e d i a t e l y admitted that they h a d eaten the
O t t o m a n E m p i r e d u r i n g the A b d u l h a m i t era. A c c o r d i n g to m y respondent, this
cherries. After the c h i l d r e n left, I was again m o v e d to tears. İ thought
holistic type o f education empowers students. In his words:
to myself, that hostel is teaching them good m o r a l values. A n d what is w r o n g w i t h that? D o you think that the children o f the state lycee
State-run
schools generate a feeling o f powerlessness
among
the c h i l d r e n o f p o o r families. T h e y have no chance o f g o i n g to university. O u r g o a l is to create a feeling o f e m p o w e r m e n t
w o u l d do the same thing? I don't think so. Q u i t e the contrary, they most likely w o u l d have 'talked back' to me, a n d called me a stingy old m a n .
a m o n g t h e m that w i l l continue throughout their lives. T h e y w i l l l e a r n how to become devout p r a c t i c i n g M u s l i m s , and develop
T i n s respondent
is a devout M u s l i m , but not a supporter o f the p r o -
a g e n e r a l i z e d orientation to I s l a m i n their lives. T h e y w i l l also
Islamic party. T o his w a y o f t h i n k i n g , the Süleymancı
l e a r n to connect their actions to m o r a l judgements a n d principles.
education a n d teaches values that are desirable w i t h i n the general culture.
T h i s w i l l be their source o f success.
The
Suleymanci
hostel
hostel offers a solid religious
receives monies raised
by the
A s s o c i a t i o n for
the D e v e l o p m e n t o i ' G u d u l , as w e l l as charitable donations from
successful
M y respondent adds: ' T h e hostel a i m s to counteract the degeneration o f
members o f the G u d u l c o m m u n i t y now l i v i n g i n A n k a r a . T h e s e donations are
J u r k i s h youth's m o r a l a n d c u l t u r a l values under the influence o f a television
p a r t i c u l a r l y generous d u r i n g the M u s l i m m o n t h o f R a m a d a n a n d the Festival
culture that transmits loose a n d dissolute ways o f u n - I s l a m i c , n o n - T u r k i s h
of Sacrifices. H o w e v e r , the e x a c t a m o u n t a n d source o f monies raised for the
l i v i n g . T o achieve this g o a l , the hostel supervises students' daily activities inside
Süleymancı
a n d outside the hostel. It also encourages students to be d i s c i p l i n e d i n their
p u b l i c l y a v a i l a b l e d a t a to c l e a r l y establish e x t e r n a l
b e h a v i o u r a n d act i n ways consistent w i t h Islamic m o r a l teachings. It appears
is evidence, however, i o suggesl that remittances f r o m T u r k i s h m i g r a n t workers,
1
hostel a n d other p r i v a t e religious schools is not k n o w n . T h e r e is no financial
connections. T h e r e
that the i n h a b i t a n t s o f G u d u l are keenly aware o f this k i n d o f m o r a l i n s t r u c t i o n ,
especially those i n G e r m a n y , have funded a n e v e r - g r o w i n g n u m b e r o f private
a l t h o u g h the p r o - I s l a m i c p a r t y does not receive any support f r o m G u d u l . O n e
K o r a n schools a n d y o u t h hostels o r g a n i z e d by religious orders. D u r i n g the
of the residents o f G u d u l w h o m I i n t e r v i e w e d , a 6 5 - y e a r - o l d m a n , e x p l a i n e d on
1980s, S a u d i c a p i t a l w a s also a source of f u n d i n g for these schools a n d hostels.
the basis o f his o w n personal experience h o w the hostel teaches students to act m a morally disciplined manner: Saudi capital a n d I s l a m i c education I have cherry trees in m y garden. O n e day last summer, I realized that some o f the nearly ripe cherries from one tree suddenly disappeared. J u d g i n g from the pils scattered about, I realized that someone h a d
T h r o u g h F a i s a l F i n a n c e o f T u r k e y and the A l - B a r a k a T u r k , S a u d i capital has played a significant role i n t h e f o u n d i n g o f several vakifi (religious c h a r i t y a n d
164
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
educational foundations)
a n d private
Koran
165
C O S M O P O L I T A N ISLAMISTS A N D GLOBALIZATION
schools. N a q s h b a n d i - a f f i l i a t e d
D u r i n g the
1980s, they c a m e
to h o l d h i g h l y strategic positions o f power
members o f the new a n d g r o w i n g M u s l i m business sector p r o v i d e d the liaison
w i t h i n the state b u r e a u c r a c y . M u c h o f their u p w a r d s o c i a l m o b i l i t y was due
(Atasoy 1998), A m o n g these vakifs are the Bereket V a k f i a n d the O z b a g Vakfı.
to significant a c h i e v e m e n t i n t e c h n i c a l education. W e d o not k n o w how many-
The
Bereket V a k f i provides
education, organizes conferences, publications.
For
example,
students w i t h
scholarships for religious
a n d offers financial support for religious
Al-Baraka
Finance
supplied
the
pro-Islamic
engineers have imam-hatip
d i p l o m a s , but some do have such a b a c k g r o u n d .
W h a t is w e l l k n o w n , h o w e v e r , is that their Islamist orientation is largely related to t h e i r family b a c k g r o u n d a n d education i n private K o r a n schools.
newspaper Türkiye w i t h 833 tonnes o f paper between 1984 a n d 1985 { M u m c u
T h e i r b i o g r a p h i e s c l e a r l y illustrate the presence o f a very strict M u s l i m
1994b: 194). T h e O z b a g V a k f i was established to b u i l d new mosques, open
m o r a l i t y i n t h e i r w o r k e t h i c — a n i m p o r t a n t factor i n the struggle o f these
K o r a n schools, p r o v i d e
Islamists to reposition themselves as a distinct c a p i t a l f r a c t i o n , c o m p e t i n g i n
financial
assistance to students r e c e i v i n g a religious
education, a n d support research. T h e r e is no
firmly
both n a t i o n a l a n d g l o b a l c i r c u i t s o f capital. I offer two illustrative quotations
established l i n k between the imam-hatip schools a n d
transnational I s l a m i c institutions. H o w e v e r , it has been d o c u m e n t e d that from
from
Gole's b i o g r a p h i c a l s t u d y o f these engineers. T h e first pertains to a
m a n a g e r from a n I s l a m i c b a n k i n g institution.
1982 to 1984, the Saudi-based f i n a n c i a l institution R a b i t a t a l - A l a m a l - I s l a m i p a i d m o n t h l y salaries o f U S $ 1100 to T u r k i s h imams w o r k i n g i n western E u r o p e .
I a m 42 years o l d . I was b o r n i n E s k i s e h i r , a n d c o m p l e t e d m y
T h e s e religious leaders were state employees appointed by the D i r e c t o r a t e o f
secondary education
R e l i g i o u s A f f a i r s ( M u m c u 1994b: 171-3). B e t w e e n 1984 a n d 1987, S a u d i
finance
family, i n a M u s l i m e n v i r o n m e n t . A t the university, I studied
was also used to pay the salaries o f m a n y T u r k i s h university instructors t e a c h i n g
m e c h a n i c a l e n g i n e e r i n g . T h e n I attended a one-year postgraduate
A r a b i c i n Turkey. T h e I m a m M o h a m m e d Ibn-Saud Islamic University of Saudi
p r o g r a m m e i n business a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . I spent a y e a r a n d a h a l f
A r a b i a supplied the funding, i n a d d i t i o n , the Saudis have contributed to the
i n E n g l a n d a n d , for three years, taught at a u n i v e r s i t y i n S a u d i
construction o f m a n y new mosques o n u n i v e r s i t y campuses.
A r a b i a . T h e n , for f o u r years, I w o r k e d as a n expert at the S P O .
1 should note that these schools constitute h a l f o f the a n t i n o m y i n the
there ... I was b r o u g h t up i n a
Muslim
N o w I a m w o r k i n g i n a private c o m p a n y ( G o l e 1993: 207-8).
emergence o f Islamist alternative s c h o o l i n g . T h e schools have also become a n effective means for the state to g a i n m o r a l c o n t r o l over the r u r a l a n d u r b a n lower classes t h r o u g h a f o r m a l c u r r i c u l u m that articulates I s l a m i c a n d secular
T h e second q u o t a t i o n relates to a n engineer w h o also has a c o m b i n e d religious a n d secular e d u c a t i o n .
education. T h i s is a c o m p e l l i n g finding. It demonstrates that religious e d u c a t i o n allows students to c o m b i n e a secular l i n e o f thought, as advocated by the state,
I was b o r n i n M a r a s . I a m the first engineer i n m y family.
w i t h Islam—thus s u p p o r t i n g m y earlier contention that I s l a m a n d m o d e r n /
Since the t i m e o f m y grandfather,
global c u l t u r a l values cannot a c c u r a t e l y be seen i n opposition to one another.
has b e e n w e l l e d u c a t e d . B u t they a l l studied r e l i g i o n
every m e m b e r o f m y family [through
A c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of the role o f I s l a m i c education i n creating congruence
private lessons]. It w a s o n l y I who studied the 'profane sciences'.
between I s l a m a n d the m o d e r n / g l o b a l w o u l d be incomplete i f it failed to take
I g r a d u a t e d f r o m the E n g i n e e r i n g F a c u l t y o f I s t a n b u l T e c h n i c a l
i n t o account the position o f newly e m e r g i n g M u s l i m professionals i n the post-
University, a n d ran
1980 n e o l i b e r a l g l o b a l i z a t i o n era.
taught at a u n i v e r s i t y . I resigned f r o m m y post at the u n i v e r s i t y on
a n e n g i n e e r i n g project c o m p a n y . T h e n 1
17 S e p t e m b e r 1983, a n d became a f o u n d i n g m e m b e r o f the M P ( G o l e 1993: 208). Islamist engineers and Western m o d e r n i t y A n e x a m i n a t i o n o f the biographies o f a g r o u p o f professional Islamist engineers Illustrates h o w their education bridges the presumed divide between Islamic a n d m o d e r n ways. T h i s group is actively i n v o l v e d i n the assertion o f cultural meanings i n an effort to reposition itself i n the global circuits o f the w o r l d economy. Interestingly, most o f the n e w e n g i n e e r i n g managers come from modest l o w e r - m i d d l e class families i n s m a l l A n a t o l i a n cities a n d towns (Gole 1993).
T h e s e engineers p l a y e d a p r o m i n e n t role i n f o r m u l a t i n g Turkey's new export-oriented i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n m o d e l . T h e y c l a i m that their logical-scientific approach, m a t h e m a t i c a l r e a s o n i n g , a n d access to t e c h n i c a l l a n g u a g e
enable
them to p r o v i d e better s o l u t i o n s to T u r k e y ' s p r o b l e m s . T h e M u s l i m engineers d o not have a p r e c o n c e i v e d , stereotypical i m a g e of the West. R a t h e r , t h e i r v i e w reflects a give-and-take r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h i n a strategy o f e c o n o m i c c o m p e t i t i o n . T h e West, a c c o r d i n g l y , does not pose a threat
16G
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS AND
DEMOCRACY
C O S M O P O L I T A N ISLAMISTS A N D
GLOBALIZATION
167
to the m o r a l - c u l t u r a l integrity o f M u s l i m s , a n d I s l a m ceases to be a n i d e o l o g i c a l
strategy n o w b e i n g used i n the c o m p e t i t i v e class politics o f various capita!
force i n o p p o s i t i o n to Western ways. T h e s e engineers see n o c o n t r a d i c t i o n or
groups.
conflict between I s l a m i c values a n d competitive p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the
opportunities for Islamists to a d v a n c e new d e m a n d s w i t h i n the state structure.
market
economy. O n e engineer clarifies this point:
The
blending of Islam
with
secular
t h i n k i n g i m p l i e s increased
It also suggests that they are u s i n g this o p p o r t u n i t y to produce w e l l - a r t i c u l a t e d e c o n o m i c strategies a n d to s e a r c h for a w a y to participate i n new
T h e r e are several d y n a m i c s w h i c h shaped
the West. First o f
markets
without b e c o m i n g subordinate t o the West o r W e s t e r n lifestyles.
a l l , there is i h e idea expressed by D o s l o y e v s k y i n his b o o k The Brothers Karamazov, n a m e l y : ' I f G o d does not exist e v e r y t h i n g is Islamic political economy i n Turkey
permissible'. S i n c e the p e r i o d o f the E n l i g h t e n m e n t , there is a n a p p r o a c h w h i c h o n l y accepts the reality o f the five senses o f
Islamists, like other devout M u s l i m s i n Turkey, root their individual and collective
h u m a n beings. A n o t h e r d y n a m i c is the one that deifies the w i l l
social lives in religious beliefs a n d values. Islamist groups who are a m o n g the small,
of the i n d i v i d u a l , w h i c h comes from l i b e r a l i s m a n d is identified w i t h the f o r m u l a , laissez-faire, laissez-passer.
And
finally,
m e d i u m , and large capital fractions also refer to their Islamic faith and cultural
the
community. M e m b e r s o f large capital fractions in particular strive to increase their
a s p i r a t i o n to engage i n c o n s u m p t i o n — t h a t is the ultimate goal
competitiveness in the global economy. T h e y are highly educated professionals adept
o f these societies; to c o n s u m e means to be happy. O n e o f the
at using new technology. H o w e v e r , they are not fully incorporated into the political
alternatives to this m a t e r i a l c i v i l i z a t i o n is I s l a m (Gole 1993: 214),
structure of the state. Nevertheless, their reference to Islamic m o r a l principles o f For M u s l i m engineers, I s l a m does not r e q u i r e a complete rejection o f the West. R a t h e r , I s l a m is seen as a c u l t u r a l component o f the e c o n o m i c activity that these engineers promote. It is p a r t o f a n effort to strengthen their entrance into
justice and equality equips t h e m w i t h a sense o f entitlement. Similarly, Islamists o f small- and m e d i u m - s i z e d c a p i t a l fractions hope to increase their economic opportunities and their access to state resources and incentives. I s l a m appears to help c o n s t r u c t cross-class alliances. It b r i n g s small- a n d
the competitive relations o f the economy. A s another M u s l i m engineer states:
m e d i u m - s i z e d Islamist c a p i t a l fractions W e have to be an open society. W e have to leave b e h i n d the dogmas
M o r e o v e r , the I s l a m i c e d u c a t i o n o f M u s l i m c h i l d r e n who attend
of the Left a n d R i g h t , a n d keep an atmosphere of debate. Turkey
competitive relations o f m a r k e t c a p i t a l i s m .
between 30 and 35 years old, i n blossom. T h e y are the ambitious and
state-run
religious or secular schools h e l p s b u i l d bridges between I s l a m i c values a n d the
is, i n fact, b e g i n n i n g to display vitality. T h e r e is a new generation, y o u n g professionals w h o speak two foreign languages
together w i t h globally competitive
Islamist professionals u n d e r the u n i f y i n g r u b r i c o f social justice a n d equality.
It is i m p o r t a n t to u n d e r s c o r e the fact that there is no unified c o m m u n i t y
are
o f Islamists, n o r is there one coherent I s l a m i c ideology. P o l i t i c a l I s l a m i n Turkey-
impatient to e x p a n d towards the w o r l d market (Gole 1993: 216j.
c a n m o r e accurately be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as consisting o f i n t e r n a l cleavages between M u s l i m engineers articulate a n Islamist position that combines M u s l i m c u l t u r a l values, p r a g m a t i s m ,
and
the
competitive logic o f the g l o b a l i z e d
the p r o - I s l a m i c p o l i t i c a l party, S u f i orders, professionals, and intellectuals. T h e f o l l o w i n g section offers a n a n a l y s i s o f the p r o - I s l a m i c p a r t y i n T u r k e y .
economy. I n c o n c e r t w i t h other Islamist groups, they argue that the T u r k i s h e c o n o m y c o u l d be a m o n g the most d y n a m i c i n the w o r l d economy i f the
Pro-Islamic parties
y o u n g e r generation was given a knowledge o f n a t i o n a l culture based o n their M u s l i m heritage. T h i s p o s i t i o n explicitly incorporates I s l a m i c references i n the
T h e changes i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the e c o n o m y a n d the state structure i n the
integration o f the T u r k i s h e c o n o m y w i t h M u s l i m countries of the former Soviet
1980s a n d 1990s transformed T u r k e y into a c o u n t r y o f disillusioned citizens,
U n i o n , the B a l k a n s , and the M i d d l e East.
repressed
T h e fusion o f Islam a n d the m o d e r n gives a distinctive character
workers, neglected
r u r a l communities, and disempowercd small
to
producers. E x c l u d e d f r o m g o v e r n m e n t incentives, smaller companies either w e n t
T u r k i s h society. It highlights the g r o w i n g i m p o r t a n c e o f Islamist capitalists i n
b a n k r u p t or were s w a l l o w e d u p b y mergers. T h e p o l i t i c a l suppression o f s m a l l
the e c o n o m y . B u t the b l e n d i n g o f I s l a m a n d the m o d e r n is not o n l y a general
capital interests a n d l a b o u r r e s u r f a c e d as the p r o - I s l a m i c p a r t y a r t i c u l a t e d a n
consequence
o f a p a r t i c u l a r I s l a m i c education. It depends o n a p o l i t i c a l -
e c o n o m i c context thai stimulates such a fusion. T h a t context has shaped
a
agenda o f social justice based o n I s l a m i c m o r a l i t y . T h e c o a l i t i o n politics o f the M o t h e r l a n d P a r t y fragmented as some m e m b e r s o f the I s l a m i c faction joined the
168
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
C O S M O P O L I T A N ISLAMISTS A N D
169
GLOBALIZATION
Welfare Party, w h i l e other members o f the l i b e r a l faction m o v e d to the centre-
in the economy. D u r i n g the
right T r u e P a t h . E v e n t h o u g h the I s l a m i c movement c a n n o t be reduced to a
involvement i n heavy i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n projects
single i d e o l o g i c a l orientation, o v e r a l l it g a i n e d considerable m o m e n t u m d u r i n g
advocated the a d o p t i o n o f a n e x p o r t - o r i e n t e d e c o n o m i c m o d e l s i m i l a r to that
1970s, the N S P ' s emphasis was on active state (Erbakan
1975). T h e
WP
the late 1980s a n d 1990s. T h e W e l f a r e P a r t y ( W P ) emerged as a n oppositional
o f Southeast A s i a n countries ( E r b a k a n 1990). T h i s difference is related to the
movement i n response to a p a r t i c u l a r strategy designed to integrate T u r k e y
fact that the W P t r i e d to a c c o m m o d a t e the interests o f newly e m e r g i n g Islamist
w i t h i n the g l o b a l economy. It shared the n a t i o n a l v i e w ideology o f former p r o -
capitalists i n its p a r t y p r o g r a m m e . R o t h parties, however, shared the belief t h a t
I s l a m i c parties.
e c o n o m i c g r o w t h is f a c i l i t a t e d b y e d u c a t i o n i n m o d e r n sciences a n d a d v a n c e d
T h e W P , w h i c h arose i n the 1980s, and then the V i r t u e P a r t y o f the
technology. T h e y also s h a r e d
a Third
W o r l d i s t perspective
on
economic
late 1990s, a r t i c u l a t e d a strategy that elevates the p r o t e c t i o n o f small- a n d
' i m p e r i a l i s m ' a n d the global s p r e a d o f W e s t e r n c u l t u r a l values. T h e N S P a n d
m e d i u m - s i z e d c a p i t a l interests to a position of central i m p o r t a n c e i n T u r k i s h
W P p r o m o t e d an I s l a m i c w o r l d - v i e w and rejected the a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f E u r o -
politics. T h e I s l a m i c p o l i t i c a l movement has favoured the p r o t e c t i o n of smaller
A m e r i c a n values, customs, a n d fashions (Atasoy 2003b: 6 7 - 8 ) . T h e two parties
capital interests a n d l a b o u r against a g l o b a l i z a t i o n project based on the free
further
trade economy. T h i s is evident i n the p u b l i c statements delivered by E r b a k a n
a n d s p i r i t u a l values o f d a i l y life experience. T h i s reflects the Islamist desire to
(1990), leader o f the party. T h e r e is no h a r d evidence that the p r o - I s l a m i c party
be m o o r e d to an I s l a m i c m o r a l - s p i r i t u a l universe i n the social r e a l m . 1 have
supports reinstatement o f a theologically-centred politics, but there is a basis
e x a m i n e d the significance o f t h i s earlier i n m y coverage o f the ideas o f N e c i p
for a r g u i n g that the p r o - I s l a m i c p a r t y cultivates an i d e o l o g y based o n m o r a l
F a z i l K i s a k u r e k , S a i d N u r s i , a n d the N a q s h b a n d i order.
responsiveness to s m a l l e r capital interests.
a g r e e d that n a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s are e n h a n c e d
by the I s l a m i c m o r a l
T h e f o l l o w i n g analysis o f Islamist business covers the e c o n o m i c a c t i v i t y
T h e p r o - I s l a m i c p a r t y b l a m e d the development m a n a g e r s o f the state,
a n d i d e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n o f the Sufi orders, M u s l i m business associations, a n d
w h o m they defined as corrupt, for a p p r o p r i a t i n g the nation's w e a l t h a n d w a s t i n g
Islamic
it o n a s m a l l n u m b e r o f large-private industrialists from the I s t a n b u l region. I n
these Islamists relative to a p a r t i c u l a r I s l a m i c ideology advocated b y the p r o -
a d d i t i o n to h a v i n g concerns over W e s t e r n i m p e r i a l i s m , the just e c o n o m i c order
I s l a m i c p a r t y — o n e based o n t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f s m a l l c a p i t a l interests.
financial
institutions. I p a y s p e c i a l attention to the differences a m o n g
rhetoric o f the W P focussed great attention o n m o r a l a n d c u l t u r a l issues related
It is v e r y difficult to differentiate Islamist c a p i t a l groups f r o m secularists.
to i m p r o v i n g the m a t e r i a l p o s i t i o n o f the p o o r ( O n i s 1997: 753). T h i s was the
Islamists are a n i n t e g r a l p a r t o f the l a r g e r T u r k i s h economy, a n d are subject to
WP's
the rules established by the s e c u l a r state. T h e r e are n o specifically I s l a m i c rules
response to the negative i m p a c t of n e o l i b e r a l e c o n o m i c restructuring for
the masses i n T u r k e y .
o f conduct to d i s t i n g u i s h I s l a m i s t activities f r o m other secular business groups.
A c c o r d i n g to State P l a n n i n g O r g a n i z a t i o n statistics (1996), the wealthiest 20 p e r cent
o f the p o p u l a t i o n i n T u r k e y increased their share o f i n c o m e
E v e n the I s l a m i c p r o h i b i t i o n o n p a v i n g or r e c e i v i n g interest is not strictly observed by a l l Islamists ( B u g r a 1998). T h e r e f o r e . I have restricted m y analysis
d i s t r i b u t i o n from 49.9 per cent i n 1987 to 54.9 per cent i n 1994. T h e i n c o m e
to those business groups w i t h ties to religious c o m m u n i t i e s a n d the
of the poorest 20 per cent o f the p o p u l a t i o n decreased f r o m a very low 5.2 p e r
associations i n w h i c h I s l a m is u s e d as a n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l strategy.
business
cent o f total incomes i n 1987 to 4.9 p e r cent i n 1994. W h i l e 80 p e r cent of the population
(excluding the wealthiest segment!
experienced
i n c o m e decline
between 1987 a n d 1994, the incomes o f the wealthiest 20 per cent increased.
Islamist business
M i d d l e class incomes d e c l i n e d from a share o f 35 p e r cent i n 1987 to 31 p e r cent i n 1991. T h e r e were also regional differences i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f incomes; cities i n c e n t r a l a n d eastern T u r k e y fared m u c h worse t h a n Istanbul a n d the s u r r o u n d i n g area. W h i l e the just e c o n o m i c order rhetoric o f the W P was built o n these consequences o f neoliberal r e s t r u c t u r i n g in the T u r k i s h economy, the p a r t y did not see a n y c o n t r a d i c t i o n between a social just ice-oriented d i s t r i b u t i o n a l p r o g r a m m e a n d private wealth a c c u m u l a t i o n . S u c h w e a l t h a c c u m u l a t i o n was seen as perfectly consistent w i t h basic Islamic principles (Atasoy 2003b: 67). Despite a c o m m o n l y held p r i n c i p l e o f social justice in redistributive Dolicies. the N S P a n d W P diverged i n their a p p r o a c h to the role of the state
T h e N a q s h b a n d i order a n d t h e Nurcu cemaaii direct Islamic ethical
thought
strategically towards the establishment o f entitled groups that recognize M u s l i m s as members o f a previously m a r g i n a l i z e d c u l t u r a l category. T h i s is consistent w i t h the ideological position o f the p r o - I s l a m i c party vis-a-vis small capital groups. A s c i v i l society-based movements ( O z d a l g a a n d Persson 1997), religious communities prepare these entitled groups to p a r t i c i p a l e in the global economy. R e l i g i o u s c o m m u n i t i e s e m p h a s i z e the m o r a l self-renewal o f i n d i v i d u a l s , but this has not influenced I s l a m i s t s to r e t h i n k the global e c o n o m y or to ways of reversing it. W h i l e
interest
i n re-establishing a
connection
find with
170
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
community-based
l i v i n g is evident
i n the
general
C O S M O P O L I T A N ISLAMISTS A N D G L O B A L I Z A T I O N
critical scholarship
171
on
I s t a n b u l . E r d o ğ a n , h a d stated that: ' T h e minarets are our bayonets, the domes
g l o b a l i z a t i o n ( M a n d e r a n d G o l d s m i t h 1996), a critical a p p r o a c h to g l o b a l i z a t i o n
our helmets, a n d the mosques o u r barracks'. F o r G u l e n , these words represented
is l a r g e l y absent w i t h i n i s l a m i s t t h i n k i n g , w i t h the exception o f a few M u s l i m
an attempt to b r i n g d o w n a d e m o c r a t i c a l l y elected government a n d u n d e r m i n e
intellectuals. A l i B u l a c (1978, 1983) a n d Ismet O z e i (1976) are two o f the
a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y g r o u n d e d p o l i t i c a l system.
exceptions w h o are h i g h l y c r i t i c a l o f c a p i t a l i s m . For the most part, however,
G u l e n , w h o received b o t h a secular a n d religious education i n his t r a i n i n g
religious orders a n d c o m m u n i t i e s play a n active role i n p r e p a r i n g Islamists to
as a n imam, shows a r e m a r k a b l e ability to fuse i s l a m w i t h Western modernity. I n
venture into t r a n s n a t i o n a l p o w e r relations i n business. T h e invisible universities
a m a n n e r reminiscent o f W e b e r ' s Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Gulen's
o f the religious orders increase the p o w e r o f Islamists to respond to the h i g h l y
(1997ı ideas can be aptly described as an e x a m i n a t i o n o f the Islamic ethic and the
competitive relations w i t h i n the global e c o n o m y i ' G u r d o g a n 1991). I n d i v i d u a l
spirit o f global capitalism. H o w e v e r , i n contrast to Weber's (1947j belief that Islam
self-renewal is d i r e c t e d towards d e v e l o p i n g a n Islamic work ethic a n d e n h a n c i n g
leads to m y s t i c a l c o n t e m p l a t i o n or otherworldly asceticism, Gulen's Islamism is
the c u l t u r a l c a p a c i t y to t h i n k above a n d b e y o n d c o m m u n i t y - b a s e d e c o n o m i c
not built o n the W e b e r i a n idea o f tension between mysticism a n d asceticism. I n
activity. T h i s vision does not include alternative principles and practices to the
fact, G u l e n sees n o c o n t r a d i c t i o n between I s l a m a n d a market economy. Rather,
present m a r k e t economy, industry, a n d technology. R a t h e r , it actively promotes
he envisions a n e c o n o m i c m o d e l based o n continued capital a c c u m u l a t i o n
Islamists' involvement w i t h i n the g l o b a l economy. A s a result, the n u m b e r o f
t h r o u g h scientific a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l i n n o v a t i o n . F o r G u l e n , the worldly affairs o f
large companies w i t h direct connections to religious orders a n d c o m m u n i t i e s
the e c o n o m y should not be conflated w i t h the s p i r i t u a l rules of religion; they are
has increased.
separate, although e c o n o m i c a c t i v i t y should not go against the spirit o f religion. to
T h e Fethuliah G u l e n cemaati m o b i l i z e s small- a n d m e d i u m - s i z e d business groups
constitute the core o f Islamist-led large c a p i t a l groups. H o l d i n g companies a n d
based largely i n smaller A n a t o l i a n cities. T h i s e x p a n d i n g group of export-oriented
f i n a n c i a l institutions w i t h direct links to these movements are now e x p a n d i n g
capitalists exerts pressure o n the state to increase their access to resources, thus
B y the
m i d - 1 9 8 0 s , the
N a q s h b a n d i a n d Mtrcu
movements
began
Albania,
a l l o w i n g t h e m to compete w i t h large industrialists a n d c o m m e r c i a l groups. G u l e n
B o s n i a , R u s s i a , the M u s l i m republics o f the former Soviet U n i o n , the M i d d l e
argues that ways must be found to m o b i l i z e the h i d d e n wealth ot devout M u s l i m s
East, G e r m a n y , a n d the U n i t e d States. T h e N a q s h b a n d i order has p i a y e d a
i n support o f these business g r o u p s a n d to establish large-scale firms capable o f
significant role i n the wealth a c c u m u l a t i o n o f Islamist families w i t h trade a n d
entering foreign markets. H e f u r t h e r emphasizes the i m p o r t a n c e of'self-discipline'
into
global markets
and
have
invested
in Bulgaria,
Romania,
investment ventures i n the M i d d l e East—most notably, the O z a l a n d T o p b a s
and h a r d work to the success o f these firms. I n Ahin .Nesil (Golden Generation)
families ( M u m c u 1994b). T h e Server H o l d i n g C o m p a n y , w h i c h comprises 38
published i n 1978, G u l e n stresses the need for y o u n g T u r k s to learn about m o d e r n
firms o p e r a t i n g i n various sectors o f the economy, is directly affiliated w i t h the
science a n d technology, a n d t o c o m b i n e this secular knowledge w i t h Islamic
N a q s h b a n d i order fBulut 1999: 75-6). A n o t h e r business group affiliated w i t h
m o r a l i t y for the purpose o f c o n t r i b u t i n g to the
a p a r t i c u l a r b r a n c h o f the N a q s h b a n d i order is the l h i a s H o l d i n g C o m p a n y ,
is k n o w n as hizmet (service) to one's country, w h i c h G u l e n (1996) believes is the
p a r t o f the Isikcilar c o m m u n i t y o f E n v e r O r e n . It has e c o n o m i c investments i n
most i m p o r t a n t w a y to g a i n G o d ' s favour a n d a place i n paradise. However, hizmet
the m e d i a , the automotive industry, m a r k e t i n g a n d finance, i n s u r a n c e , e l e c t r i c a l
c a n o n l y be met t h r o u g h d i s c i p l i n e a n d perseverance i n the h i g h l y competitive
appliances, m a c h i n e r y , food, c o n s t r u c t i o n , a n d foreign trade.
relations o f the capitalist global economy.
financial
power of the state. T h i s
A n o t h e r religious c o m m u n i t y affiliated w i t h the Nurcu cemaati operates
T h e G u l e n group a p p e a r s to be a m o n g the richest o f Islamist groups a n d
u n d e r the leadership o f F e t h u l i a h G u l e n . G u l e n is a retired imam w h o p r e v i o u s l y
the fastest g r o w i n g o f a l l c a p i t a l fractions i n T u r k e y , w i t h about 5 0 0 affiliated
w o r k e d as a state employee for the D i r e c t o r a t e o f R e l i g i o u s A f f a i r s . H e has a
firms. I n 1996, it also f o u n d e d A s y a F i n a n c e a n d Isik Insurance. A s y a F i n a n c e
large g r o u p o f followers k n o w n as the Fethullahnlar, w h i c h b e g a n to increase i n
raises funds for investment i n t h e T u r k i c republics o f the former Soviet U n i o n .
and
G u l e n is p a r t i c u l a r l y interested i n f o u n d i n g schools a b r o a d , as well as i n Turkey.
combines T u r k i s h n a t i o n a l i s m w i t h I s l a m i c values to f o r m a l i b e r a l b r a n d o f
T h e G u l e n g r o u p has established m o r e t h a n 250 m i d d l e - a n d lycee-level schools
size after the 1980 m i l i t a r y coup. G u l e n ' s a p p r o a c h to Islam is moderate
T u r k i s h I s l a m (Aras a n d C a h a 2000). G u l e n views Islam as a private matter
i n the C e n t r a l A s i a n r e p u b l i c s o f the former S o v i e t U n i o n a n d the B a l k a n s .
a n d wants to create a M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y that opposes p o l i t i c i z e d I s l a m . H e has
A s y a F i n a n c e acts as a n i n t e r m e d i a r y between the G u l e n schools a n d the funds
frequently c r i t i c i z e d the policies o f the W P for creating a p o l i t i c a l crisis situation
collected f r o m M u s l i m business groups by the mutevellis. These schools p r o v i d e
that threatens the secular system i n T u r k e y . I n 1996, G u l e n rejected c o m m e n t s
h i g h - q u a l i t y e d u c a t i o n i n E n g l i s h a n d therefore
m a d e hv P r i m e M i n i s t e r R e c e o T a v v i p E r d o s a n , w h o was then m a y o r o f
and h i g h - l e v e l government officials i n C e n t r a l A s i a . I was told bv a mütevelli
attract c h i l d r e n o f the elite
172
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D
DEMOCRACY
173
C O S M O P O L I T A N ISLAMISTS A N D G L O B A L I Z A T I O N
that the teachers i n these schools are f r o m T u r k e y and w o r k i n g a b r o a d o n a
o f M U S I A D m e m b e r s (523 i n total), but most o f the firms are located i n smaller
v o l u n t a r y basis. T h e G u i e n schools promote c u l t u r a l identity formation a m o n g
cities. T h e largest sectors o f c o n c e n t r a t i o n for these c o m p a n i e s are construction
T u r k i c - M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n s on the basis o f a T u r k i s h - I s l a m i c synthesis m o d e l .
and c o n s t r u c t i o n m a t e r i a l s , t e x t i l e a n d leather, a n d food a n d beverages (Bulut
A c c o r d i n g to O z d a l g a (1999;, students w h o graduate from these schools are
1999: 102).
suitably p r e p a r e d to hold i m p o r t a n t positions i n their countries. G u i e n wants
M U S I A D has i n general a r t i c u l a t e d a class strategy f a v o u r i n g the s m a l l -
his schools to contribute to the development o f p o l i t i c a l elites i n the M u s l i m
business interests
countries o f C e n t r a l A s i a a n d the B a l k a n s , countries that view T u r k e y as their
that M U S I A D 'activates a n d spreads e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l spirit based o n the free
state m o d e l . T h e r e are n o w more t h a n 20,000 schools founded by the G u i e n
i n i t i a t i v e ' o f its members. N o n e t h e l e s s . M U S I A D ' s p o s i t i o n i n relation to a free
g r o u p i n T u r k e y . In a d d i t i o n to t e a c h i n g moral-religious values, these schools
trade e c o n o m y is not clearly established c o m p a r e d to the secularist T U S I A D .
use the same c u r r i c u l u m as state schools a n d operate under state regulation. T h e
L o o k i n g at the relative p o s i t i o n o f large Islamist c o m p a n i e s w i t h i n M U S I A D ,
o f less a d v a n t a g e d
cities. Its m i s s i o n statement indicates
G u i e n g r o u p operates seven universities, five a b r o a d a n d two i n T u r k e y ( B u l u t
the degree to w h i c h s m a l l c a p i t a ! interests are i n c o r p o r a t e d into M U S I A D ' s
1999: 57, 8 3 - 6 , 300). It publishes a m o n t h l y j o u r n a l , Sizinti (Disclosures), a n d
strategy also seems less clear. T h e n u m b e r o f large c o m p a n i e s w i t h i n M U S I A D
t w o a c a d e m i c j o u r n a l s , Teni Um.it ( N e w H o p e ) and the Fountain. It also organizes
e m p l o y i n g over 100 w o r k e r s is significant. T h e v e r y largest companies include
n a t i o n a l a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l conferences
K o m b a s s a n H o l d i n g , Y i m p a s H o l d i n g , the U l k e r G r o u p , Saray Biscuits, a n d
i n w h i c h participants discuss issues
related to I s l a m a n d science, d e m o c r a c y , modernity, a n d religious tolerance. T h e F e t h u l l a h G u i e n cemaati publishes a daily newspaper a n d operates a T V a n d r a d i o station as w e l l .
Al-Baraka Turk. K o m b a s s a n . for e x a m p l e , w a s established i n 1988 by a school teacher i n K o n y a , a s m a l l A n a t o l i a n city. T h e b i o g r a p h y o f its founder, H a s i m B a y r a m ,
B o t h the F e t h u l l a h G u i e n g r o u p and the N a q s h b a n d i - a s s o c i a t e d - h o l d i n g
resembles that o f other A n a t o l i a n I s l a m i c capitalists w h o came from s i m i l a r l y
c o m p a n i e s , a l o n g w i t h their affiliated agencies, c o m b i n e a n Islamic sensibility
modest f a m i l y b a c k g r o u n d s . B a y r a m was b o r n i n t o a v e r y p o o r family i n a
with
the
village n e a r K o n y a . H i s f a m i l y o w n e d a s m a l l plot o f l a n d that was used to g r o w
protection o f newly e m e r g i n g c a p i t a l groups a n d e x p a n s i o n into the markets o f
g r a i n for household c o n s u m p t i o n . H i s father was often u n e m p l o y e d . B a y r a m
a strong
nationalist
ideology. T h i s strategy
is directed
towards
the former S o v i e t U n i o n a n d the B a l k a n s , It makes effective use o f Islam as a n
received his religious e d u c a t i o n i n the private K o r a n school o f his v i l l a g e a n d
e t h i c a l instrument for m o b i l i z i n g Islamist e c o n o m i c activity i n the competitive
f r o m his f a m i l y . H i s u p w a r d s o c i a l m o b i l i t y was l a r g e l y due to his education
relations o f the m a r k e t economy.
i n state schools a n d the s u p p o r t o f his father, w h o w o r k e d for some time as a j a n i t o r . B a y r a m g r a d u a t e d f r o m university as a c h e m i s t r y teacher, and then c o n t i n u e d his studies i n c h e m i c a l e n g i n e e r i n g . In the i m m e d i a t e aftermath o f
T h e Association of Independent Industrialists a n d
Businessmen
(MUSIAD)
the 1980 m i l i t a r y c o u p he r e s i g n e d f r o m t e a c h i n g after b e i n g demoted to the position o f j a n i t o r because o f h i s p r o - I s l a m i c p o l i t i c a l orientation. After being u n e m p l o y e d for a few years, h e w o r k e d as a teacher i n a private
M U S I A D , w h i c h presents a n alternative class strategy to that formulated by the A s s o c i a t i o n o f T u r k i s h Industrialists a n d Businessmen ( T U S I A D 1 , is a n o n governmental u m b r e l l a o r g a n i z a t i o n ,
founded
i n 1990 by a group o f y o u n g
businessmen. I n 1996, there were close to 4,000 member firms. T U S I A D , w i t h
dersane—a
school d e s i g n e d to p r e p a r e students for their u n i v e r s i t y entrance e x a m i n a t i o n s . B a y r a m then opened his o w n p r i v a t e dersane w h e r e he i m p r o v e d his financial a n d business skills. I n 1988, he f o u n d e d K o m b a s s a n w i t h the encouragement o f a friend w o r k i n g i n the State P l a n n i n g O r g a n i z a t i o n ( D i n c e l 1999: 151-65).
a membership o f approximately 4 0 0 , represents the largest industrialists a n d advocates a n open-trade regime, as well as integration w i t h E U markets (Ilkin
K o m b a s s a n b e g a n b y p r o d u c i n g paper p r o d u c t s a n d then e x p a n d e d i n t o
1993). M U S I A D , on the other h a n d , has a different membership base w i t h w i d e r
t o u r i s m , t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , finance, a r e t a i l sales c h a i n , a n d v a r i o u s m a n u f a c t u r i n g
regional representation
interests. W i t h 60 factories a n d
from smaller A n a t o l i a n cities. It aims to sustain a n d
100 firms, K o m b a s s a n n o w employs almost
improve its members' competitive capacity in national and international markets.
3 0 , 0 0 0 people i n T u r k e y . It has investments i n the B a l k a n s , the C e n t r a l A s i a n
It also promotes closer e c o n o m i c tics between M u s l i m countries. M o s t M U S I A D
republics o f the former Soviet U n i o n , G e r m a n y , a n d the U n i t e d Stales ifiulut
m e m b e r firms were established d u r i n g the 1980s a n d v a r y greatly i n size, M U S I A D generally represents s m a l l e r firms e m p l o y i n g fewer t h a n 50 workers. In terms o f g e o g r a p h i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n , Istanbul has the highest n u m b e r
1999: 3 0 2 - 4 ) . K o m b a s s a n has m o r e t h a n 4 0 , 0 0 0 shareholders, none o f w h o m is a l l o w e d to h o l d m o r e than a 1 p e r cent stake i n the c o m p a n y ( M o r r i s 1999). T h e source o f the investment funds is the ' h i d d e n ' w e a l t h that pious M u s l i m s keep 'under t h e i r Dillows'. i r e a u e n t l v i n the f o r m o f eoid iewellerv. a n d Darticularlv
174
175
C O S M O P O L I T A N ISLAMISTS A N D G L O B A L I Z A T I O N
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
the bracelets w o r n by M u s l i m w o m e n . For m a n y devout M u s l i m s , depositing
T h e s e companies represent n e w l y e m e r g i n g A n a t o l i a n s m a l l - t o w n c a p i t a l In
m o n e y i n c o n v e n t i o n a l banks is sacrilegious, since they believe that e a r n i n g
c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l business establishment i n Istanbul.
interest is against the teachings o f the K o r a n , B a y r a m estimates that T u r k e y has
MUSIAD
has c o n s t r u c t e d
a c u l t u r a l - p o l i t i c a l category o f Mushmne.ss
as m u c h as U S $ 4 0 0 b i l l i o n i n such ' i d l e ' wealth ( D i n c e l 1999: 163). B y o p e n i n g
to describe those w h o are m a r g i n a l i z e d i n the T u r k i s h economy. It does not
up its c o m p a n i e s to p u b l i c investment, K o m b a s s a n mobilizes this h i d d e n wealth.
d e m a n d that their m e m b e r s
A c c o r d i n g to unofficial estimates, several b i l l i o n dollars have been
invested
be believers. O n e c o m m o n t h e m e discussed i n M U S I A D ' s p u b l i c a t i o n Homo-
i n M u s l i m c o m p a n i e s i n this m a n n e r . T h e other major source o f capital is the
Islamicus (1993-97) is h o w to reassert Islam as a source o f m o r a l i t y w i t h i n the
remittances f r o m T u r k i s h workers i n G e r m a n y , a l t h o u g h there is no h a r d data
competitive relations o f the e c o n o m y , and h o w to l i n k it to m o d e r n technology.
on the transfer o f workers' remittances from E u r o p e to islamist corporations
MUSIAD
in T u r k e y . T h i s k i n d o f capital movement is mostly funnelled through
the
successful i n the markets w i t h o u t sacrificing Islamic m o r a l i t y . T h i s is seen as
i n f o r m a l channels o f religious c o m m u n i t i e s . E n o r m o u s investment funds have
a f o r m o f w o r s h i p , as it is c a r r i e d out i n the service o f G o d . W r i t i n g against a
been m o b i l i z e d f r o m abroad i n this way. B a y r a m , for example, visited T u r k i s h
c e r t a i n association o f I s l a m w i t h the mystical r e a l m , E r o l Y a r a r (n.d: 3j, the
m i g r a n t c o m m u n i t i e s i n E u r o p e and received monies from them. A l t h o u g h he
first president o f M U S I A D , slates: ' O n e m o u t h f u l f o o d , one short coat was
does not reveal his connections to religious c o m m u n i t i e s i n E u r o p e , B a y r a m has
misconceived a n d o p e n e d
stated that T u r k i s h workers i n E u r o p e constitute the largest group o f K o m b a s s a n
t o w a r d the w o r l d was lost completely.'
shareholders. It. is also w e l l k n o w n that the A s s o c i a t i o n for a N e w W o r l d V i e w
urges Islamist
b e active practitioners o f I s l a m , but they
businessmen
the
to
do
e v e r y t h i n g necessary
must
to
be
way to sluggishness. A s a result, m o t i v a t i o n
T h e Islamist e n c o u r a g e m e n t o f wealth a c c u m u l a t i o n , as I have illustrated
in E u r o p e — A M T G — ( t h e n a t i o n a l v i e w o r g a n i z a t i o n i n Europe) collects cash
through
donations from m i g r a n t s i n the mosques a n d sends them to I s l a m i c corporations
c o m m u n i t i e s , leads to the f o l l o w i n g question. T o w h a t extent is the Islamist
by private c o u r i e r ( B o l u g i r a y 2 0 0 0 : 127-48).
desire for w e a l t h a c c u m u l a t i o n f r a m e d w i t h reference to the d i s t i n c t i o n between
M U S I A D has i d e o l o g i c a l ties to the p r o - I s l a m i c p a r t y a n d other Islamist
the
examples
of M U S I A D ,
the
Sufi
orders,
and
other
religious
the West a n d non-West i n t h e competitive relations o f the g l o b a l economy?
groups i n T u r k e y . It w o u l d be w r o n g , however, to assume that a l l s m a l l - a n d
I s l a m i c projects
m e d i u m - s i z e d c o m p a n i e s that have
the c o m p é t i t i v e logic o f the g l o b a l e c o n o m y a n d the major features o f global
a n I s l a m i c orientation are
represented
u n d e r the u m b r e l l a o f M U S I A D . L a r g e firms affiliated w i t h M U S I A D
do
i n T u r k e y p r o m o t e the i d e a that I s l a m is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h
culture. T h i s is also evident i n the c o s m o p o l i t a n a p p r o a c h Islamist
engineers
have a n I s l a m i c outlook, but a c c o r d i n g to O m s (1997: 759), o n l y a fraction o f
have adopted to u n d e r l i n e t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l orientation. H e r e the relevance o f
h i g h l y successful s m a l l - a n d m e d i u m - s i z e d firms w i t h an I s l a m i c orientation
the non-West is p l a y e d out w i t h respect to the p r o m o t i o n o f I s l a m i c s o l i d a r i t y
are affiliated w i t h M U S I A D . T h e representation o f smaller firms that have a n
a m o n g M u s l i m nations, b o t h t o secure markets a n d to strengthen Turkey's ties
I s l a m i c orientation is not unique to M U S I A D . T h e r e are other organizations i n
w i t h M u s l i m countries such as M a l a y s i a and Indonesia ( M U S I A D 1996). Y a r a r
T u r k e y , such as T O B , t h a t have such firms w i t h i n their m e m b e r s h i p . A c c o r d i n g
opposed any k i n d o f trade relations w i t h E u r o p e a n U n i o n countries, as w e l l as
to B u g r a (1998: 5 2 8 - 3 0 ) , what is u n i q u e to M U S I A D is its use o f Islam as a
the customs u n i o n a g r e e m e n t i n t o w h i c h T u r k e y entered i n 1996. A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,
basis for co-operation a n d solidarity a m o n g business groups. F o r M U S I A D ,
he advocated a n e c o n o m i c u n i o n w i t h I s l a m i c a n d C e n t r a l A s i a n countries. In
I s l a m has become a means to create secure market niches a n d sources o f
1996, M U S I A D p r o p o s e d t h a t a cotton u n i o n be established a m o n g T u r k e y ,
investment
P a k i s t a n , U z b e k i s t a n , a n d T u r k m e n i s t a n (Atasoy 2 0 0 3 b : 74),
finance,
as well as a way o f c o n t a i n i n g p o t e n t i a l social unrest a n d
labour militancy. MUSIAD
In organizes
conferences
on
political
and
economic
issues,
this
chapter, I h a v e
s h o w n that various
fractions
within
newly
e m e r g i n g Islamist c a p i t a l g r o u p s use Islam as a strategic resource for c a p i t a l
arranges
a c c u m u l a t i o n . T h e r e is also a n i n c r e a s i n g n u m b e r o f e c o n o m i c a l l y m o b i l e a n d
i n t e r n a t i o n a l fairs i n T u r k e y a n d a b r o a d . I n a l l o f these efforts M U S I A D a i m s
m o r a l l y m o t i v a t e d Islamist c a p i t a l groups. T o be sure, some Islamists, especially
to e n h a n c e the s o l i d a r i t y o f its members. It is also c o m m i t t e d to p r o v i d i n g its
those o r g a n i z e d w i t h i n the p r o - I s l a m i c p o l i t i c a l party, focus o n p r o t e c t i n g s m a l l
establishes
members
s p e c i a l commissions a n d professional committees,
and
w i t h access to i n f o r m a t i o n o n recent t e c h n o l o g i c a l innovations,
capital groups a n d l a b o u r f r o m the negative effects
m a r k e t i n g , a n d g l o b a l p r o d u c t i o n and trade patterns. I n general, I s l a m is
H o w e v e r , the strategies of t h e
used as an i m p o r t a n t resource i n M U S l A D ' s class strategy to create a sense o f
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the
u n i t y a m o n g smaller capital groups. T h i s strategy is intended to p r o m o t e the r.f larurr romnanies raoable o f comDetinsr i n external markets.
global e c o n o m v . T h e s e
disposition o f openness to the
o f market c o m p e t i t i o n .
newly r i c h Islamist groups
are
Islamists formulate
directed
at
a cultural
w o r l d rooted i n an I s l a m i c m o r a l i t y through
w h i c h I s l a m i c culture e m b r a c e s international e c o n o m i c competitiveness.
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T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D
DEMOCRACY
T h e Islamist focus o n competitive engagement w i t h the global economy breaks the i d e o l o g i c a l c o n n e c t i o n between the c u l t u r a l arrangements ol the
7
West, as described by Weber, a n d the economy. Islamists view M u s l i m values as a distinct element i n the competitive strategy. T h i s reflects a p o l i t i c a l desire
Turkish Islamists in the Post-Cold War State System
to emerge as a competitive force i n b o t h the n a t i o n a l and global circuits o f the economy. T h e West n o w represents a competitive partner, a n d not a m o d e l for
e m u l a t i o n i n the c u l t u r a l r e a l m . T h i s d i m e n s i o n o f the Islamist project
expresses a n u l t r a m o d e r n i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y that is caught between w e s t e r n i z i n g s o c i a l practices a n d global e c o n o m i c c o m p e t i t i o n . H e r e i n lies the ambivalence i n v o l v e d i n I s l a m i c p o l i t i c s — b u y i n g into W e s t e r n ways w h i l e c h a l l e n g i n g the West's c l a i m to general c u l t u r a l superiority. T h e issue m a v prove to be more c o m p l e x a n d contentious t h a n merely i d e n t i f y i n g the relevance o f Islam to the global economy. T h i s is related to
I
n the previous c h a p t e r I d e m o n s t r a t e d that even i f the Islamist critique aims to graft M u s l i m m o r a l a n d c u l t u r a l practices onto e c o n o m i c activity, it does not represent a n alternative
the s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f c u l t u r a l values a n d practices to the requirements o f the m a r k e t economy. P o l a n y i describes the emergence o f political movements for
competitive engagement w i t h the global economy. I n fact, Islamists a p p e a r
self-protection as being e m b e d d e d i n the cycles between the market e c o n o m y
to be a d o p t i n g elements o f n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y
a n d the l o c a l space o f territorial states. D r a w i n g from P o l a n y i , one c a n argue
scientific knowledge. T h a t k n o w l e d g e engenders the m o d e r n m y t h o f a universal
that i s l a m i c politics shapes a strategy for p r o t e c t i n g a n d strengthening those
m o d e r n i t y b u i l t a r o u n d w h a t P o l a n y i has c a l l e d the 'self-regulating market'.
who
are adversely affected by global m a r k e t forces. T h i s reflects a n Islamist
economy. R a t h e r ,
Islamists
are
to a n e o l i b e r a l way o f o r g a n i z i n g
the
f o r m u l a t i n g a c u l t u r a l disposition for evolutionary thought based o n
M o r e o v e r , Islamist g r o u p s have emerged as c o n t e n d i n g forces struggling
desire to g a i n better access to resources w h i l e m a k i n g a competitive p r i n c i p l e i n
to shape the p o l i t i c a l
class politics s p i r i t u a l l y acceptable. S u c h a P o l a n y i a n interpretation o f I s l a m i c
connect I s l a m i c p o l i t i c s to the
agenda.
H o w e v e r , it is not clear what it means
state, culture, a n d e c o n o m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n .
to
politics in T u r k e y adds a twist, i n terms o f p o l i t i c a l culture, to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g
It definitely leads us a w a y f r o m
a c o n v e n t i o n a l theoretical emphasis o n the
o f the state a n d economy. H o w e v e r , the p o t e n t i a l conflicts between locally a n d
resurgence
g l o b a l l y oriented Islamist groups m i g h t involve m o r e t h a n a process o f reshaping
capital a c c u m u l a t i o n , but it a l s o involves m o r e t h a n m e r e l y i d e n t i f y i n g the
o f t r a d i t i o n a l l o c a l c u l t u r e that rejects m a r k e t c o m p e t i t i o n a n d
relations between the n a t i o n a l state a n d a m a r k e t economy. W h e t h e r or not
relevance o f I s l a m to the g l o b a l e c o n o m y . T h e I s l a m i c p o l i t i c a l standpoint may
islamists w i l l solidify into a u n i f i e d position is u n c e r t a i n , but for the t i m e b e i n g
very well s i g n a l I s l a m i c c u l t u r a l entanglement i n the intensification o f global
they are engaged i n p r o m o t i n g I s l a m as a strategic resource in the class politics
capitalist rivalries. T h i s is a c o m p l i c a t e d issue. I n earlier chapters I illustrated
o f T u r k e y . T h i s may very well s i g n a l the b e g i n n i n g o f a new k i n d o f p o l i t i c a l
that Islamist groups i n T u r k e y a r e not offering qualitatively different ways o l
e c o n o m i c f o r m a t i o n e m e r g i n g out o f r e g i o n a l c u l t u r a l - p o l i t i c a l attachments.
o r g a n i z i n g e c o n o m i c a n d s o c i a l life. T h e y continue to a n c h o r their politics i n
T h e r e is no clear i n d i c a t i o n as to w h a t exact f o r m it w i l l take i n the near future.
the r e a l i z a t i o n o f m o d e r n i t y t h r o u g h E u r o p e a n progress ideology. A s Islamists
But it is quite clear that Islamists are r e p o s i t i o n i n g themselves. T h i s requires
act to reposition themselves i n s o c i e t y a n d the economy, they also m o v e away
r e t h i n k i n g the p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y o f I s l a m i c politics a n d its relationship to the
from univocal cultural interpretations.
m a r k e t a n d the state. A n d it c e r t a i n l y compels us to reconceptualize I s l a m b e y o n d a b i n a r y o p p o s i t i o n between the g l o b a l a n d c u l t u r a l l y local.
It is s u r p r i s i n g that some s c h o l a r s continue to p o s i t i o n I s l a m i c politics w i t h i n a b i n a r y v i e w o f ' I s l a m i c ' a n d ' W e s t e r n ' , thereby c l a i m i n g a n i d e o l o g i c a l a n d p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n between t h e two. A l t h o u g h we have seen a p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f publications o n I s l a m i n recent v e a r s , little sustained attention has been g i v e n to the m e a n i n g a n d c h a r a c t e r o f I s l a m i c politics i n the g l o b a l r e s h a p i n g of the post C o l d W a r economy. Interestingly, scholarly analysis occasioned by recent events such as the attacks o f 11 S e p t e m b e r 2001, a n d the U S w a r o n a l - Q a e d a , I r a q , a n d the T a l i b a n r e g i m e i n A f g h a n i s t a n , continues to c o n c e p t u a l i z e I s l a m i c politics i n a c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l m a n n e r . I f a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f I s l a m i n the current context o f g l o b a l p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y uncertainties is i m p o r t a n t , we must
178
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
179
T U R K I S H ISLAMISTS I NT H E P O S T - C O L D W A R STATE SYSTEM
p r o v i d e a clear h i s t o r i c a l account o f I s l a m , as well as an assessment o f its mass
V i e t n a m weakened its h e g e m o n i c p o s i t i o n , the I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n o f 1978-79 i n I r a n posed a greater challenge to U S d o m i n a n c e . B o t h these events underscored
appeal i n the w o r l d today.
the i n a b i l i t y o f the U n i t e d States to enforce its vision o f the geopolitical o r d e r i n g of the w o r l d . I s l a m a n d the global economy
It: was at this j u n c t u r e t h a t the U S g o v e r n m e n t began to focus o n w h a t
A c c o r d i n g to H o b s b a w m (1994), the end o f the C o l d W a r p r o d u c e d tremendous u n c e r t a i n t y i n the g e o p o l i t i c a l o r d e r i n g o f the w o r l d e c o n o m y . W a l l e r s t e i n (1995; has expressed a s i m i l a r view. H e believes present i n s e c u r i t y i n w o r l d politics is rooted i n the i d e o l o g i c a l confusion created by the e n d o f the C o l d W a r a n d the collapse o f l i b e r a l i s m ! T h e l i b e r a l ideal that emerged i n the aftermath o f the F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n t r i u m p h e d u n d e r U S d o m i n a n c e i n the post-1945 state system as a g l o b a l i d e o l o g y o f the w o r l d capitalist system. I n Wallerstein's view, the C o l d W a r h a d c o n t a i n e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l inequalities w i t h the p r o m i s e o f m o d e r n i z a t i o n a n d a m e a n s to 'catch u p ' w i t h W e s t e r n states. B u t m o d e r n i z a t i o n failed to achieve a d e m o c r a t i c a n d e g a l i t a r i a n s o c i a l - e c o n o m i c system i n n o n W e s t e r n societies. İ s l a m has n o w become a p o l i t i c a l project for those w h o w i s h to b u i l d s o l i d a r i t y i n the struggle to '"catch u p " a n d move to the head o f the l i n e ' (Wallerstein 1995: 7). .
According
to H u n t i n g t o n
H a l l i d a y (1984) has c a l l e d the second C o l d W a r . It started w i t h
President
C a r t e r ' s u n d e r m i n i n g o f the N i x o n - B r e z h n e v detente i n the late 1970s, a n d then deepened w i t h Reagan's S t a r W a r s i n i t i a t i v e i n the 1980s. T h e second C o l d W a r was also fought i n A f r i c a a n d A s i a t h r o u g h U S support o f moderate S u n n i Islamist groups ( G a d d i s 1982; R a s h i d 2000). I n i t i a l l y , the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was c o n c e r n e d about the possible u n s e t t l i n g effects o f the I r a n i a n I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n o n T u r k e y , I r a q , a n d the A r a b i a n P e n i n s u l a , O n e o f C a r t e r ' s senior advisors, Z b i g n i e w B r z e z i n s k i , e v e n l o b b i e d for m i l i t a r y intervention i n I r a n . After c o m i n g to p o w e r i n 1 9 8 0 , R e a g a n frequently referred to Islamists as r a d i c a l anti-Western extremists a n d b e c a m e i n c r e a s i n g l y confrontational w i t h t h e m . Nevertheless, both the C a r t e r a n d R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s saw the Soviet U n i o n , a n d not I s l a m , as the r e a l threat to the L ' n i t e d States a n d its allies i n the T h i r d W o r l d . T h e U S a d m i n i s t r a t i o n sought to solve a range o f r e g i o n a l 1
p r o b l e m s t h r o u g h its support o f m o n a r c h i c a l a n d conservative ' I s l a m i c regimes (1996), the m a i n
purpose
o f the West's
i n S a u d i A r a b i a , P a k i s t a n , a n d A f g h a n i s t a n . C I A support o f Islamist groups i n
u n i v e r s a l pretensions to c u l t u r a l superiority was to w i n over the p o l i t i c a l a n d
A f g h a n i s t a n was a n extension o f the U S C o l d W a r p o l i c y o f c o n t a i n i n g socialist
m i l i t a r y loyalty o f non-Western nations to the capitalist c a m p o f the N A T O
a n d nationalist movements i n t h e T h i r d W o r l d . T h e II S e p t e m b e r 2001 attack
a l l i a n c e . W i t h the e n d o f the C o l d W a r , Islam emerged as a n antithesis to the
appears to be a ' b l o w b a c k ' from the U S C o l d W a r p o l i c y o f fostering I s l a m as a
universality o f W e s t e r n c u l t u r a l practices a n d p o l i t i c a l d o m i n a n c e i n the state
strategic alternative to the g r o w t h o f Soviet influence a n d indigenous n a t i o n a l
system. In contrast to W a l l e r s t e i n , w4io believes I s l a m i c politics is rooted i n the
independence movements.
failure o f m o d e r n i z a t i o n , H u n t i n g t o n argues that the Islamic r e v i v a l is based on the g r o w i n g p o w e r o f n o n - W e s t e r n societies, w h i c h is b e i n g fostered b y the success o f m o d e r n i z a t i o n itself. E i t h e r way, W a l l e r s t e i n a n d H u n t i n g t o n b o t h c o n c e p t u a l i z e I s l a m i c politics as constituting the i d e o l o g i c a l b a t t l e g r o u n d i n the capitalist w o r l d e c o n o m y after the C o l d W a r . T h e confrontation is rooted i n the p o l i t i c a l response o f the non-Western I s l a m i c w o r l d to the d o m i n a n c e o f the U n i t e d States. T h e U n i t e d States has reacted to the challenge b y e m p l o y i n g m i l i t a r y force w h e n r e q u i r e d to protect the global status quo.
W i t h U S assistance, I s l a m i s t groups eventually drove the Soviets out o f A f g h a n i s t a n . B y 1991 the S o v i e t U n i o n h a d collapsed a n d the C o l d W a r w a s over. W i t h the election o f G e o r g e B u s h i n 1989, I s l a m i c politics was redefined i n r e l a t i o n to the upsurge o f r a d i c a l I s l a m against W e s t e r n d o m i n a t i o n o f the global system. A n u m b e r o f key events figures i n this redefinition. A t the r e g i o n a l level, these include the 1989 m i l i t a r y coup i n the S u d a n , w h i c h installed a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n allied w i t h the I s l a m i c N a t i o n a l F r o n t , a n d the 1991 electoral v i c t o r y o f the I s l a m i c S a l v a t i o n F r o n t i n A l g e r i a . I n the latter case, a subsequent
T h u s far, the U n i t e d States has s h o w n no sign that it w i l l r e f r a i n f r o m t a k i n g m i l i t a r y a c t i o n to assert its m i l i t a r y s u p r e m a c y a n d protect its g e o p o l i t i c a l
c i v i l w a r c l a i m e d 80,000 lives after the A l g e r i a n m i l i t a r y ' s a n n u l m e n t of the elections i n 1992 (Gerges 1999: 7 3 - 8 5 ) .
p o s i t i o n i n the n o n - W e s t e r n w o r l d . Since W W I I , the U n i t e d States has been at w a r m a n y times a n d i n m a n y places, i n c l u d i n g : C h i n a ( 1 9 4 5 - 4 6 , 1950-53); K o r e a (1950-53); G u a t e m a l a (1954, 1967-69); Indonesia \j958); C u b a (1959¬ 60); the B e l g i a n C o n g o (1964); Peru (1965); L a o s (1964-73); V i e t n a m (1961¬ 75;; C a m b o d i a (1969-70): G r e n a d a (1983); Libya (1986;: E l Salvador (1980s;: N i c a r a g u a (1980s); P a n a m a (1989); B o s n i a (1995): S u d a n (1998); Y u g o s l a v i a (19991; A f g h a n i s t a n (2001-presentj; a n d I r a q (1991-present;. A l t h o u g h defeat i n
T h e G u l f crisis o f 1990-91, t r i g g e r e d by Iraq's invasion of K u w a i t , represents a significant attempt b y the U n i t e d States to re-establish d o m i n a n c e over its allies i n the p o s t - C o l d W a r p e r i o d . T h e concept o f a new international order c o i n e d by President B u s h demonstrates the U n i t e d States' willingness to use m i l i t a r y force to solve conflicts i n a n d between n o n - W e s t e r n states. A n d yet, the L-S-led m i l i t a r y intervention by coalition forces i n I r a q , s i m i l a r to A n g l o - F r e n c h actions at Suez i n 1956, spurred the growth o f n a t i o n a l i s t opposition against Western interference
180
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
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T U R K I S H ISLAMISTS I N T H EP O S T - C O L D W A R STATE SYSTEM
i n the A r a b M i d d l e East. T h i s rise i n nationalism rapidly became entangled w i t h
states, p a r t i c u l a r l y I r a n . B u t T u r k e y has r e m a i n e d
Islamic sentiments a n d a new T h i r d W o r l d assertiveness.
W e s t e r n security a l l i a n c e . T h e W e l f a r e g o v e r n m e n t also retained m i l i t a r y a n d
K h o m e i n i i n I r a n , T u r a b i i n the Sudan, and the M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d i n
firmly
w i t h i n the U S - l e d
security c o o p e r a t i o n agreements w i t h Israel fAybak 2002: 224). Nevertheless,
E g y p t shaped their politics by perpetuating the idea of a p e r e n n i a l conflict w i t h
the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was u n c o m f o r t a b l e w i t h the p r o - I s l a m i c Welfare
the West. T h e n e w international order rhetoric o f U S policy-makers suggests
g o v e r n m e n t establishing ties w i t h I r a n a n d L i b y a .
that they expected this conflict to be revived at the end o f the C o l d W a r . I n
It is not credible, to t h i n k t h a t T u r k i s h r a p p r o c h e m e n t w i t h I r a n a n d L i b y a
reality, as previous chapters i n this book show, the invocation of Islam i n T u r k i s h
c h a l l e n g e d U S security interests i n the r e g i o n . E r b a k a n d i d not change
politics is not an outcome o f anti-Western attitudes embedded in a trans historical
foreign p o l i c y orientation o f T u r k e y ; he was a nationalist who h o p e d to m a k e
understanding o f what is 'Islamic' and what is 'Western'. R a t h e r , it coincides
T u r k e y the r e g i o n a l leader b y b a l a n c i n g T u r k e y ' s relations between W e s t e r n a n d
w i t h the emergence
o f national groups engaged
i n a struggle to reposition
the
M u s l i m states. T h e U S a d m i n i s t r a t i o n doubted that the p r o - I s l a m i c W e l f a r e
themselves i n society a n d the economy. I n their identification w i t h a n Islamic
g o v e r n m e n t c o u l d contribute to the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f U S m i l i t a r y a n d
financial
political perspective, these groups espouse a rights a n d freedoms
p o w e r i n the r e g i o n . Interestingly, w h e n the W e l f a r e g o v e r n m e n t
resigned
discourse
directed against state oppression, economic inequality, a n d external d o m i n a t i o n .
u n d e r pressure f r o m the T u r k i s h m i l i t a r y f o l l o w i n g the 28 F e b r u a r y process,
Interestingly, w h e n the U S a d m i n i s t r a t i o n backed Islamist groups i n A f g h a n i s t a n
the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a d a l r e a d y s h o w n a w i l l i n g n e s s to m a i n t a i n ties
a n d supported conservative regimes i n the region, it. inadvertently helped Islamic
w i t h a p r o - I s l a m i c g o v e r n m e n t t h a t d i d not t h r e a t e n U S interests i n the r e g i o n .
political factions to m o b i l i z e opposition movements. T h e appearance o f islamist
T h e U S strategy was to p a c i f y n a t i o n a l i s t challenges to its p o s i t i o n i n the global
groups on the front stage o f T u r k i s h politics also took place i n the context o f the
system, rather t h a n c h a n g i n g i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l regimes, I s l a m i c or otherwise.
second U S C o l d W a r , p a r t i c u l a r l y d u r i n g the G u l f W a r w h e n G e o r g e Bush a n d
T h e U n i t e d States does not r e q u i r e a n I s l a m i c 'enemy' to assert its p o s t - C o l d
T u r g u t O z a l established closer relations. F r o m the T u r k i s h p r o - I s l a m i c parties to
W a r hegemony. I n fact, the global e c o n o m y o f c a p i t a l i s m requires n o enemy at a l l ,
the E g y p t i a n M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d , these groups d e m a n d greater representation
whether it be c o m m u n i s m , I s l a m o r a n y t h i n g else ( H a l l i d a y 1999: 107-32). T h e
i n national politics. A l l are c o m m i t t e d to c h a n g i n g social a n d economic structures
weakness experienced i n the U S e c o n o m y since the 1970s has made the U n i t e d
that generate oppression a n d inequality.
States unable to use its leadership to deflect w o r l d e c o n o m i c crises. Nevertheless,
T h e C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n agreed w i t h the former B u s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
a faction w i t h i n the U S p o l i t i c a l elite continues
to use c o e r c i o n — m i l i t a r y ,
that Islam poses a challenge to the eentrality o f the U S role i n r e r o u t i n g w o r l d
economic, a n d p o l i t i c a l — a s the o n l y viable means for m a i n t a i n i n g the global
c a p i t a l i s m . T h e U n i t e d States d i d not have a coherent foreign p o l i c y to deal
status quo ( M c C o r m i c k 1989: 1 8 6 - 9 0 ) . T h e e n d o f the C o l d W a r e n v i r o n m e n t
w i t h the g e o p o l i t i c a l a n d ideological uncertainties o f the p o s t - C o l d W a r era.
has extended the U S m i l i t a r y a n d p o l i t i c a l capacity to r e a l i g n its international
Nevertheless, the fear o f what was interpreted as r e a c t i o n a r y a n t i - m o d e r n i s m
p o w e r by responding to challenges to its global leadership. F r o m this perspective,
b y Islamist terrorists l e d the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to closely follow Islamic
the ability o f the U n i t e d States to tie i s l a m i c regimes to the West is central to its
p o l i t i c a l activities i n the Persian G u l f , E g y p t , A l g e r i a , S a u d i A r a b i a ,
international position. T o this e n d , the U n i t e d States recruits subordinate allies
and
Turkey. A t the same t i m e , the U n i t e d States isolated I r a n , the S u d a n , a n d L i b y a for assisting i n t e r n a t i o n a l Islamic terrorism.
a n d enlists their support in times o f need. T h e C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n refashioned the g l o b a l p r e - e m i n e n c e o f the
T h e 1995 election v i c t o r y o f the p r o - I s l a m i c W e l f a r e P a r t y i n T u r k e y a n d
U S state t h r o u g h n e o l i b e r a l g l o b a l i z a t i o n ( P a n i t c h a n d G i n d i n 2003), w h i c h is
the formation o f the W e l f a r e - l e d c o a l i t i o n government i n 1996 were matters o f
essentially a p o l i t i c a l e x p e r i m e n t i n c o r p o r a t e r e g u l a t i o n . It sweeps away the
great c o n c e r n to the U n i t e d States. P r i m e M i n i s t e r E r b a k a n visited I r a n a n d
ability o f n a t i o n a l powers to r e g u l a t e capital a n d subordinates their cultures to a
L i b v a i n 1996 a n d signed a U S $ 20 b i l l i o n agreement w i t h I r a n to buy n a t u r a l
p r e s u m e d u n i v e r s a l W e s t e r n m o d e l o f m o d e r n i t y (Atasoy 2003c). I s l a m does not
gas. T h e gas deal c a m e just one week after the U S congress passed a n a n t i -
tell us whether or not devout M u s l i m s s h o u l d e m b r a c e n e o l i b e r a l g l o b a l i z a t i o n o r
t e r r o r i s m law fon 5 A u g u s t 1997) b a r r i n g other countries f r o m t r a d i n g w i t h
m o d e r n i z e a c c o r d i n g to a E u r o p e a n m o d e l . I n reality, I s l a m is best u n d e r s t o o d
I r a n a n d L i b y a , since they were seen as sponsoring i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e r r o r i s m
as a n attempt to realize E u r o p e a n
( C e l i k 1999: 84). E r b a k a n ' s desire to f o r m an Islamic c o m m o n w e a l t h c a l l e d
scientific k n o w l e d g e a n d p r o g r e s s ideology t^Gray 2003). I n order to enforce
the D e v e l o p i n g E i g h t ( D - 8 ) — i n c l u d i n g Turkey, I r a n , P a k i s t a n ,
its i n t e r n a t i o n a l power, suppress
Indonesia,
modernity through
the
application o f
o p p o s i t i o n a l movements, and r e c o n c i l e w i t h
B a n g l a d e s h , E g y p t , M a l a y s i a , a n d N i g e r i a — w a s interpreted as a s i g n that he
disputants, the U n i t e d States s u p p o r t s m o n a r c h i c a l a n d conservative regimes.
x-^c
T h i s is c e r t a i n l y the response o f the U n i t e d States to its fears o f a n I s l a m i c
CIAWKI
m n v i n c T u r k e v towards a n a n t i - U S a l l i a n c e w i t h r a d i c a l I s l a m i c
T U R K E Y . ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
182
TURKISH ISLAMISTS IN T H E P O S T - C O L D W A R STATE SYSTEM
assault o n the West. M c C o r m i c k (1989: 186) argues that A m e r i c a ' s capacity to
G e o r g e W . B u s h . Bush's u n i l a t e r a l i s m does not obliterate the t r e n d towards a n
act as a w o r l d police force works t h r o u g h the f o r m a t i o n o f s u b - i m p e r i a l i s m — t h e
open market e c o n o m y i n f a v o u r o f a policy favouring
use o f substitute secondary powers to act o n b e h a l f o f the d o m i n a n t power i n a
(Atasoy 2 0 0 3 d : 200). D e s p i t e g r o w i n g e c o n o m i c difficulties, the capitalist market
given region.
e c o n o m y is b r o a d e n i n g a n d d e e p e n i n g i n most p a r t s o f the w o r l d , i n c l u d i n g the
T u r k e y is a n i m p o r t a n t ally i n the r e g i o n a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n o f U S hegemony. T h e C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d i d not see the p r o - I s l a m i c Welfare
government
as aggressively anti-Western a n d it was not against its r e m o v a l f r o m p o w e r as
o n l y U S national interests
M u s l i m w o r l d . T h e new r h e t o r i c o f G e o r g e W . B u s h has redirected U S foreign p o l i c y towards i n t e r n a t i o n a l
c o m p e t i t i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , as C h i n a
becomes
more p o w e r f u l , the U n i t e d States, under the B u s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , is m o v i n g
l o n g as it d i d not involve a m i l i t a r y coup. I n light o f the tragic outcome o f the
away from a p o l i c y o p t i o n o f p r o m o t i n g p a r t n e r s h i p a n d , instead, e m b r a c i n g
B u s h administration's s a n c t i o n i n g o f the m i l i t a r y coup i n A l g e r i a (Gerges 1999:
strategic c o m p e t i t i o n . T h i s m o v e was centred o n the p r o b a b i l i t y o f a conflict
78;, U S p o l i c y - m a k e r s were w o r r i e d about a possible m i l i t a r y coup i n T u r k e y .
w i t h C h i n a over the T a i w a n S t r a i t . T h e B u s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n has i n i t i a l e d a
S e c r e t a r y o f State M a d e l e i n e A l b r i g h t s message was clear w h e n she stated:
new a r m s race w i t h C h i n a , c o i n c i d i n g w i t h the prospect o f a r m s sales, i n c l u d i n g
' W h a t e v e r changes people are t h i n k i n g about they [should pursue them] i n
the A e g i s missile r a d a r s y s i e m , to T a i w a n . T h e emergency l a n d i n g o f a U S
a d e m o c r a t i c context" {Gerges 1999: 216V T h e T u r k i s h military saw this as a
surveillance aircraft o n C h i n e s e soil after a m i d - a i r c o l l i s i o n w i t h a Chinese F 8
sign that the U S government was supportive o f the m i l i t a r y ' s concerted
efforts
fighter
plane i n 2001 has o n l y served to intensify this c o m b a t i v e stance. T h e
to pressure the nationalist E r b a k a n a n d the Welfare P a r t y to resign. W i t h the
B u s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n has also d i s t a n c e d itself f r o m E u r o p e a n d Europe's B a l k a n
f o u n d i n g o f the A K P i n 2001 the p r o - I s l a m i c party's references to c a p i t a l i s m
problems m M a c e d o n i a , K o s o v o , a n d B o s n i a . B r i n g i n g the A r a b - I s r a e l i conflict
assumed a more n e o l i b e r a l perspective, w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g a sensitivity to the
to an e n d was not o n the a g e n d a either.
p o w e r o f I s l a m i c c u l t u r a l practices.
O f course, the B u s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s
p o s i t i o n o n n a t i o n a l interest
is
T h e divergence o f the A K P from the I s l a m i c n a t i o n a l v i e w ideology o f
not confined to s t r a t e g i c - m i l i t a r y relations. I n a d d i t i o n to flexing its muscle
Erbakan represents a change i n the class relations o f Islamist c a p i t a l groups
w i t h C a n a d a a n d E u r o p e o v e r new missile defence proposals, a n d keeping
i n Turkey. N e w l y r i c h Islamist capitalists want to integrate into the processes
N o r t h K o r e a a n d I r a q i n focus as active enemies, the decision to p u l l out o f
of capital a c c u m u l a t i o n as a c u l t u r a l l y distinct group w i t h i n a global capitalist
the K y o t o P r o t o c o l a n d h o s t i l i t y towards the U N conference
economy. T h e y believe that the basic e c o n o m i c interests o f I s l a m i c enterprises
a m o n g the p o l i c y initiatives d e s i g n e d to p u s h the U S n a t i o n a l interest
w i l l thrive w i t h i n the global e c o n o m y I n contrast to the rhetoric o f the n a t i o n a l
f o r w a r d . A l l these examples a r e indicators o f U S u n i l a t e r a l i s m u n d e r the B u s h
view ideology, T u r k i s h islamists now raise the possibility that T u r k e y may
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . T h i s does n o t terminate
v e r y w e l l b e c o m e a n i n d u s t r i a l a n d e c o n o m i c powerhouse i n the r e g i o n , a n d
era.
p l a y a d o m i n a n t role i n c o n n e c t i n g the i s l a m i c w o r l d to the West as partners
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n twists m u l t i l a t e r a l i s m to suit U S interests. T h e 11 September
H o w e v e r , b y aggressively
projecting
o n r a c i s m are
the m u l t i l a t e r a l i s m o f the U S world
supremacy,
agenda Clinton
the
Bush
i n a global economy. T h e A K P ' s p u s h for Turkey's full m e m b e r s h i p i n the E U
2001 attacks o n the W o r l d T r a d e C e n t e r a n d P e n t a g o n have p r i v i l e g e d the U S
reinforces this as a p o l i t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y — t h a t Islamist capitalists be i n c o r p o r a t e d
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w i t h the ' r i g h t ' to deploy m i l i t a r y p o w e r a n d assert m i l i t a r y
i n t o a b r o a d e n i n g o f the p o l i t i c a l alliances o f corporate r e g u l a t i o n .
supremacy i n the g l o b a l system. When
the
air-strikes b e g a n
personified as e v i l i n c a r n a t e , T h e state s y s t e m a f t e r the C o l d W a r
system.
However,
its p o l i t i c a l
structure
was
that e v i l . T h e T a l i b a n c o l l a p s e d almost i m m e d i a t e l y d u r i n g the U S m i l i t a r y
T h e c o m p l e m e n t to n e o l i b e r a l g l o b a l i z a t i o n is a r e w o r k i n g o f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l state
on Afghanistan, O s a m a bin Laden
a n d the T a l i b a n were targeted for h a r b o u r i n g
is u n k n o w n .
The
Clinton
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n tried m u l t i l a t e r a l i s m as a means to reconstitute U S d o m i n a n c e i n the w o r l d capitalist economy. It redefined the i n t e r n a t i o n a l role o f the U n i t e d States i n m a n a g i n g the global e c o n o m y through the help o f the W o r l d T r a d e O r g a n i z a t i o n ( W T O ; , b y p r o m o t i n g a p o l i c y o f strategic
cooperation
and
p a r t n e r s h i p w i t h R u s s i a , C h i n a , a n d N o r t h K o r e a . T h i s p o l i c y alternative has shifted towards an aggressive u n i l a t e r a l i s m w i t h the current a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f
c a m p a i g n , but the w a r o n t e r r o r i s m d i d not e n d there. T h e U S a d m i n i s t r a t i o n developed w h a t a p p e a r e d to be a n open-ended list o f ' t e r r o r i s t ' targets, i n c l u d i n g groups such as H e z b o l l a h a n d H a m a s , a n d states such as I r a q . But it was a h i g h l y a r b i t r a r y list. S y r i a a n d I r a n were listed as terrorist states before
the
S e p t e m b e r 2001 attacks, but a c c e p t e d into the l o o p o f c o a l i t i o n b u i l d i n g against t e r r o r i s m . O n 9 O c t o b e r 2001 S y r i a was even elected a n e w m e m b e r o f the U N S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . I r a q was d e f i n e d as a terrorist state before its w a r w i t h I r a n , but taken off the list o f terrorist states d u r i n g the conflict. T h e n , after it i n v a d e d K u w a i t , I r a q was r e t u r n e d to t h e list [Atasoy 2 0 0 3 d : 196).
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
18+
185
T U R K I S H ISLAMISTS IN T H EP O S T - C O L D W A R S T A T E S Y S T E M
W h i l e w a r against I r a q was justified by claims that it possessed weapons
w o r l d today, the U n i t e d States has decided to rely on its m i l i t a r y p o w e r as the
of mass destruction, the w a r d i d not receive U N a p p r o v a l . A l t h o u g h the B u s h
p r i n c i p a l strategy for i n t e g r a t i n g the w o r l d economy, s u p p o r t e d by a h i g h l y
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n clearly sought to i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e the war, the fact r e m a i n s that
fragile c o a l i t i o n o f states i n E u r o p e a n d the M i d d l e East.
this conflict was w a g e d by the U n i t e d States and B r i t a i n p r i m a r i l y to i m p o s e
The
Bush
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was well
aware
that the
Iraq war
would
a 'friendly' regime and g a i n greater c o n t r o l over the region. Turkey's n e w l y
trigger w i d e s p r e a d hostilities against U S i b i c e s i n I r a q a n d U S allies a b r o a d ,
elected p r o - I s l a m i c A K P g o v e r n m e n t supports Turkey's m i l i t a r y alliance w i t h
i n c l u d i n g c i v i l i a n s . A t t a c k s o n a synagogue a n d H S B C b a n k i n Istanbul, a n d
the U n i t e d States but it does not support the U S w a r o n I r a q .
the b o m b i n g o f a B a l i n i g h t c l u b i n I n d o n e s i a a n d c o m m u t e r t r a i n i n S p a i n are
A t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l level, the question facing the B u s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
notable examples. W i t h the assistance of its ' c o a l i t i o n ' partners, the current B u s h T
is not how to p u n i s h Islamist terrorists a n d u n d e r m i n e their p o l i t i c a l strength.
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n is u s i n g t e r r o r i s m as a vehicle for asserting E S d o m i n a n c e i n the
W h a t is at stake here is the reputation o f the U n i t e d States as a b u l w a r k o f
w o r l d . T h i s was c l e a r l y reflected i n a statement m a d e shortly after 11 September
stability a n d its ability to govern the w o r l d capitalist e c o n o m y i n the face o f
2001 by T o n y B l a i r , p r i m e m i n i s t e r o f B r i t a i n a n d staunch a l l y o f the U n i t e d
challenges to its p o w e r (Atasoy 2 0 0 3 d : 197). T h e U S a d m i n i s t r a t i o n has put
States. I n a televised p u b l i c statement B l a i r said ' W e must re-order the w o r l d
its m i l i t a r y vision o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l d o m i n a n c e i n play by w a g i n g war, a n d the
a r o u n d us". T h e U S a d m i n i s t r a t i o n appears p r e p a r e d to wage a permanent w a r
terrorist attacks have created o p p o r t u n i t i e s for the U n i t e d States to exploit.
to reorient the w o r l d a r o u n d its power. President B u s h i n i t i a l l y c a l l e d this w a r a
T h e key issue for the U S g o v e r n m e n t is h o w to rearrange the p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r y
crusade, w i t h no forethought g i v e n to what the t e r m i m p l i e s . H e then c a l l e d it 'operation i n f i n i t e justice', w h i c h was not well thought out either, as he appeared
framework o f the global e c o n o m i c system to suit U S interests. I n The Grand Chessboard, Z b i g n i e w B r z e z m s k i (1997) explains that U S
to conflate U S m i l i t a r y m i g h t w i t h G o d ' s o w n d i v i n e justice. T h e
Pentagon
governments were never interested i n eradicating the political power o f Islamists
soon adopted a n o t h e r n a m e to describe the w a r against a l - Q a e d a : 'operation
i n M u s l i m countries. T h e real issue is the form that p o l i t i c a l Islam, or any
e n d u r i n g freedom'. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , the w a r i n I r a q was also c a l l e d 'operation
other nationalist movement, w i l l take a n d whether it w i l l be cooperative or
Iraqi F r e e d o m ' . T o n y B l a i r d i r e c t e d the w o r l d ' s attention to the 'necessity' o f
competitive w i t h U S interests. T h i s c o n c e r n is closely l i n k e d to the reconstruction
this w a r by stating that 'we w i l l either defeat it o r be defeated by it'. G e o r g e W .
of international political alliances w i t h moderate M u s l i m countries—alliances
B u s h has t r i e d to consolidate w o r l d order b y c o e r c i n g other states into m a k i n g
that favour the enhancement o f e c o n o m i c relations w i t h i n the global e c o n o m y
a choice between The forces o f e v i l a n d the forces o f freedom'. H e has also used
of capitalism. However, there is a danger that the war on terror w i l l foster anti-
the phrase y o u are either w i t h us or against us to b r i n g states into l i n e w i t h U S
A m e r i c a n feelings and create long-term instability i n the region. T h i s prospect,
interests (Atasoy 2 0 0 3 d : 201).
a n d the extent of U S power i n the region, depends o n U S alliances w i t h countries b o r d e r i n g I r a q — K u w a i t , S a u d i A r a b i a , J o r d a n , S y r i a . I r a n , and Turkey.
A p p a r e n t l y , the r e a l i g n m e n t
o f the w o r l d is to take p l a c e along an
i d e o l o g i c a l d i v i d e between the enemies of f r e e d o m , as B u s h has c a l l e d them, a n d
W i t h the exception o f K u w a i t , T u r k e y is by far the most co-operative o f I hese
the free w o r l d o f the U n i t e d States a n d its allies. H i s attempt to forge a w o r l d w i d e
countries towards U S interests, although the A K P government continues to be
p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e is built o n the a s s u m p t i o n that n o n - a l i g n m e n t is
uneasy w i t h the war. T h e A K P has p o l i c y differences a n d differences i n style a n d
i m m o r a l . T h i s is r e m i n i s c e n t o f the C o l d W a r r e - o r d e r i n g o f the w o r l d after the
image w i t h the former p r o - I s l a m i c parties l e d by E r b a k a n . It works to strengthen
S e c o n d W o r l d W a r . D u r i n g the C o l d W a r it w a s also d e e m e d i m m o r a l not to be
linkages between the U n i t e d States a n d T u r k e y far more t h a n Erbakan's national
a n ally o f the free w o r l d i n the battle against c o m m u n i s m . T o d a y it is i m m o r a l
view-oriented parties.
not to be a l l i e d against terrorists a n d the enemies o f freedom (Atasoy 2 0 0 3 d :
T h e A K P emphasizes
Turkey's full
integration
with
the E u r o p e a n U n i o n , a n d promotes greater involvement i n the w o r l d capitalist
202). T h i s sounds like a new g l o b a l w a r ( K a l d o r 2 0 0 2 : 176) o r g a n i z e d o n the
economy. It also embraces neoliberal ideology and wants to solidify W e s t e r n
premise o f H u n t i n g t o n ' s ' c l a s h o f c i v i l i z a t i o n s ' rhetoric a n d w a g e d to redefine
' i n d i v i d u a l rights and freedoms' discourse w i t h i n an Islamic political framework.
regional geopolitics based o n c o e r c i v e U S power.
T h e r e is no consensus o n the p o l i t i c a l shaping o f a g l o b a l i z e d future. T h e events o f 11 September 2001 have heightened the perception that the U n i t e d States no longer projects
an untarnished
image o f stability a n d
strength.
Turkey and US global s u p r e m a c y
T h e r e is no credible evidence to suggest that the terrorists were m o t i v a t e d by their hatred o f the freedoms enjoyed by A m e r i c a n s . W h a t the attack a c t u a l l y •
i - , n o _i„i.„i
;„ nr,i imiinril-ilf
Ac the onlv suneraower i n the
T h e new U S m i l i t a r i s m is r e f a s h i o n i n g the
politics of C e n t r a l Asia
and
r e d r a w i n g the m a p o f o i l f l o w i n g into E u r o p e (Atasoy 2 0 0 3 d : 2 0 3 - 3 ) . W i l l the
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
186
T U R K I S H ISLAMISTS IN T H E P O S T - C O L D W A R STATE SYSTEM
187
U n i t e d States be able to impose control i n the region? W h a t role w i l l T u r k e y play
pipeline w o u l d bypass R u s s i a a n d I r a n , c a r r y i n g C e n t r a l A s i a n o i l a n d n a t u r a l
as a n e m e r g i n g r e g i o n a l power? T h e s e are significant questions, the answers to
gas d i r e c t l y to E u r o p e .
w h i c h , w h i l e c o m p l e x , require our attention.
Russia
T h e C a s p i a n r e g i o n consists o f the states o f the former Soviet U n i o n
has
supported
the
Northern
Alliance
against the
Pakistani-
supported T a l i b a n since the e a r l y 1990s, a n d r e a r m e d them after 1 i S e p t e m b e r
i n the C a u c a s u s a n d C e n t r a l A s i a . It consists o f the world's largest a n d most
2001. H o w e v e r , the r e b e l l i o n i n C h e c h n y a has prevented R u s s i a from b u i l d i n g a
undeveloped
p i p e l i n e f r o m C e n t r a l A s i a i n t o R u s s i a n territory. W h i l e R u s s i a t r i e d to b r u t a l l y
sources o f o i l a n d
gas.
Geo-strategic
control o f this
region,
stretching f r o m A z e r b a i j a n through the C e n t r a l A s i a n states o f T u r k m e n i s t a n ,
suppress C h e c h e n
U z b e k i s t a n , K a z a k h s t a n , T a j i k i s t a n , a n d K y r g y z s t a n , represents a counterweight
insurgents i n order to d i s r u p t R u s s i a n oil pipelines. M e a n w h i l e , I r a n is w o r r i e d
rebels,
both
Pakistan
and
S a u d i A r a b i a supported
the
to the P e r s i a n G u l f o i l fields (Croissant a n d A r a s 1999: 250). T h e energy fields
that U S m i l i t a r y ties to the C e n t r a l A s i a n republics, a n d wars i n A f g h a n i s t a n
of the C a s p i a n r e g i o n are l a n d l o c k e d , w h i c h means that g a i n i n g access to gas
and I r a q , are p a r t o f a U S strategy to encircle a n d isolate I r a n . G i v e n this
a n d o i l requires b u i l d i n g thousands o f kilometres o f pipeline across m o u n t a i n s
situation, T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t s hope to raise Turkey's international s t a n d i n g to
a n d deserts.
that o f a r e g i o n a l p o w e r c a p a b l e o f c o u n t e r i n g r a d i c a l Islamic movements.
T h e r e has been intense c o m p e t i t i o n i n d e t e r m i n i n g the exact l o c a t i o n o f the pipelines a n d d e c i d i n g w h o w i l l b u i l d t h e m . I n the early 1990s the U n i t e d
Turkey, then, wants to
b e c o m e a r e g i o n a l p o w e r by e x t e n d i n g
the
i d e o l o g i c a l authority o f W e s t e r n m o d e r n i t y to the M u s l i m states o f the C a u c a s u s
States supported the T a l i b a n , h o p i n g that they w o u l d end the c i v i l w a r a n d
a n d C e n t r a l A s i a . A g a i n s t the s p r e a d o f r a d i c a l I s l a m i n the r e g i o n , T u r k e y is
ensure the safety o f pipelines l i n k i n g C a s p i a n oil to the P a k i s t a n p o r t o f K a r a c h i
p r o m o t i n g the coexistence o f m o d e r a t e Islam a n d m o d e r n i z a t i o n a c c o r d i n g to
v i a A f g h a n i s t a n . D u r i n g the A f g h a n c i v i l w a r the T a l i b a n received a r m s a n d
a E u r o p e a n m o d e l . It wants t o cultivate a p o l i t i c a l culture that is d e m o c r a t i c ,
f u n d i n g i n their struggle against the N o r t h e r n A l l i a n c e , a close ally o f b o t h
p r o - W e s t e r n , a n d secular yet M u s l i m , T h i s does not represent a d e p a r t u r e f r o m
R u s s i a a n d I r a n ( R a s h i d 2000). B u t the T a l i b a n never succeeded i n b u i l d i n g
Turkey's l o n g - s t a n d i n g
a stable, p r o - A m e r i c a n A f g h a n i s t a n . M o r e o v e r , R u s s i a a n d I r a n h a d a vested
complements its relations w i t h W e s t e r n allies.
interest i n m a i n t a i n i n g instability m A f g h a n i s t a n . B o t h countries w a n t e d
to
prevent P a k i s t a n from b u i l d i n g its T e r m e z - K a r a c h i pipeline, w h i c h w o u l d have
In
1992. the
desire to be part o f the E u r o p e a n U n i o n . R a t h e r , İt
Black
Sea
Economic Cooperation
Project
(BSEC)
was
founded to promote e c o n o m i c , p o l i t i c a l , a n d c u l t u r a l ties between states i n the
b r o u g h t C a s p i a n o i l across U z b e k i s t a n a n d A f g h a n i s t a n to Pakistan's A r a b i a n
Caucasus, the B a l k a n s , a n d t h e M i d d l e East. M e m b e r s include T u r k e y , A l b a n i a ,
Sea (Los Angeles Times, 28 N o v e m b e r 2001). Since the T a l i b a n were not able to
A r m e n i a , Azerbaijan, B u l g a r i a , Georgia. Greece, M o l d o v a , R o m a n i a , Russia,
stabilize A f g h a n i s t a n , the U S g o v e r n m e n t b e g a n i n 1996 to isolate T a l i b a n i n
a n d U k r a i n e . C o u n t r i e s g i v e n observer status i n the B S E C i n c l u d e P o l a n d ,
C e n t r a l A s i a . T h e T a l i b a n responded by t a k i n g a n increasingly a n t i - A m e r i c a n
S l o v a k i a , Italy, A u s t r i a , T u n i s i a , E g y p t , a n d Israel. T h e project was created to
stand a n d w e l c o m i n g O s a m a b i n L a d e n a n d a l - Q a e d a into A f g h a n i s t a n . T h e
foster d e m o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l systems and encourage market-based economies i n
U S a d m i n i s t r a t i o n believed that the T a l i b a n a n d a l - Q a e d a were s p o n s o r i n g
the region. The E c o n o m i c C o o p e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n ( E C O ) was also founded
I s l a m i c movements i n C e n t r a l A s i a , especially i n U z b e k i s t a n , a n d s t i r r i n g u p
i n 1992 to encourage greater c o o p e r a t i o n between Turkey, I r a n , a n d P a k i s t a n .
a n t i - W e s t e r n sentiments. I n the struggle to c o n t r o l C a s p i a n o i l , various powers have
T u r k e y was i n s t r u m e n t a l i n e n a b l i n g A z e r b a i j a n , K y r g y z s t a n , T u r k m e n i s t a n . disrupted
U z b e k i s t a n , a n d T a j i k i s t a n to j o i n the E C O . K a z a k h s t a n presently has observer
r i v a l p i p e l i n e projects a n d coalitions have shifted. T h e U S a d m i n i s t r a t i o n is
status. T u r k e y believes these o r g a n i z a t i o n s are v i t a l i f T u r k e y is to assert itself as
now t r y i n g to establish d o m i n a n c e by c u l t i v a t i n g p r o - A m e r i c a n alliances in
a regional s u p e r p o w e r c a p a b l e o f c o n n e c t i n g C e n t r a l A s i a a n d C a u c a s u s to the
the region. T u r k e y occupies a position o f c e n t r a l i m p o r t a n c e i n this strategic
M i d d l e East a n d E u r o p e .
a l i g n m e n t . T h e inhabitants o f oil r i c h A z e r b a i j a n a n d m u c h o f C e n t r a l A s i a
I n a d d i t i o n to e n c o u r a g i n g r e g i o n a l e c o n o m i c c o o p e r a t i o n , T u r k e y has
are T u r k i c people who share a language a n d culture w i t h T u r k e y . G i v e n that
intensified its effort to b r i n g a b o u t c u l t u r a l u n i t y i n the T u r k i c w o r l d . T o w a r d
T u r k e y is the o n l y M u s l i m N A T O m e m b e r a n d long-term ally o f the U n i t e d
that end it has o r g a n i z e d p a n - T u r k i c summits i n 1992 a n d 1994. It has also
States, it c o u l d b r i n g A z e r b a i j a n , T u r k m e n i s t a n , a n d U z b e k i s t a n into a close
installed telephone systems i n C e n t r a l A s i a and begun
co-operative relationship w i t h the U n i t e d States a n d western E u r o p e . T u r k e y
flights between A n k a r a a n d t h e C e n t r a l A s i a n capitals (Celik 1999: 125-7).
regularly
scheduled
wants oil to be p i p e d u n d e r the C a s p i a n S e a to B a k u i n A z e r b a i j a n w h e r e it
M o r e o v e r , the T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t has allocated m a n y scholarships for
c a n then flow to Turkey's M e d i t e r r a n e a n port o f C e y h a n . T h e B a k u - C e y h a n
students from C e n t r a l A s i a a n d a c c o m m o d a t e d 2,000 students f r o m each T u r k i c state. I n 1997 there were 6 , 4 3 9 C e n t r a l A s i a n students studying i n T u r k e y ,
188
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
T U R K I S H ISLAMISTS IN T H E P O S T - C O L D W A R STATE SYSTEM
189
c o m p a r e d to just 1,634 students i n 1993 ( B a l 2 0 0 0 : 90). T h e T u r k i s h M i n i s t r y
as C y p r u s , a n d ceded the p o s s i b i l i t y o f their eventual full m e m b e r s h i p , but no
o f E d u c a t i o n has also p r e p a r e d history textbooks to be adopted i n C e n t r a l A s i a ,
place was given to T u r k e y i n the accession queue. R e m a r k s were made at the
where the adopted T u r k i s h L a t i n alphabet n o w predominates rather t h a n A r a b i c
s u m m i t that the E U w a s a ' c i v i l i z a t i o n a l project', a n d E u r o p e a n u n i t y c a m e
script ( C e l i k ! 9 9 9 : 127-34). It is believed that the use o f the L a t i n alphabet w i l l
to be seen as a p o l i t i c a l / c u l t u r a l entity. T h e L u x e m b o u r g S u m m i t questioned
m a k e it easier for T u r k i c states to be connected to the Western world. S t r o n g
Turkey's E u r o p e a n n e s s o n t h e basis o f c u l t u r a l difference. T h i s created i m m e n s e
c u l t u r a l l i n k s are m a i n t a i n e d t h r o u g h state-run a n d private T V channels. T h e
u n c e r t a i n t y i n T u r k i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y ( A y b a k 2002: 232). Interestingly, f o l l o w i n g
state-run T u r k i s h R a d i o Television C o m p a n y transmits p r o g r a m m e s t h r o u g h
rejection by the E U , T u r k e y forged closer ties w i t h the U n i t e d States, Israel,
itsAvrasya (Eurasia) station, w h i c h lias been b r o a d c a s t i n g v i a satellite since 1992.
a n d C e n t r a l A s i a n states, t h o u g h it d i d not a b a n d o n the l o n g - t e r m objective o f
T h e c o m p a n y promotes T u r k e y as a m o d e l secular d e m o c r a t i c state a n d upholds
full E U m e m b e r s h i p . I n 1 9 9 9 the E U officially r e c o g n i z e d T u r k e y ' s c a n d i d a c y
T u r k i s h c u l t u r a l values a n d M u s l i m m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s .
at the H e l s i n k i S u m m i t a n d p l a c e d it w i t h i n the enlargement process. A t the
Since 1990, the T u r k i s h government has sent tens o f thousands o f copies
C o p e n h a g e n S u m m i t o f 2 0 0 2 the E U d e c i d e d to review T u r k e y ' s c a n d i d a c y
of the K o r a n to C e n t r a l A s i a t h r o u g h the D i r e c t o r a t e o f R e l i g i o u s Affairs. T h e
i n D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 4 . T h e E U ' s d e c i s i o n o n whether to open f o r m a l negotiations
directorate also supports mosque c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d religious education. W i t h i n
on Turkey's m e m b e r s h i p w a s contingent u p o n T u r k e y a c h i e v i n g progress i n
a year o f the Soviet U n i o n ' s collapse T u r k e y sent 68 imams into the T u r k i c
fulfilling E U expectations o n h u m a n rights, democracy, a n d the rule o f l a w — a s
world. I n a d d i t i o n , T u r k i s h schools have accepted more t h a n 6 0 0 students from
listed i n the so-called ' C o p e n h a g e n C r i t e r i a ' .
C e n t r a l A s i a a n d the B a l k a n s to study r e l i g i o n . I n 1992 the T u r k i s h government
In
its p u s h
towards
full
membership,
T u r k e y adopted
a
series
of
began to o p e n T u r k i s h schools i n the C a u c a s u s a n d C e n t r a l A s i a ; by 1996, there
constitutional a n d legislative reforms between 2001 a n d 2004. T h e s e changes
were eight i n U z b e k i s t a n , three i n T u r k m e n i s t a n , t w o i n K y r g y z s t a n , a n d one i n
were a i m e d at b r i n g i n g T u r k e y i n t o l i n e w i t h the E U . T h e y i n c l u d e d the
A z e r b a i j a n ( B a l 2 0 0 0 : 87-91.
i m p r o v e m e n t o f h u m a n right s standards a n d d e m o c r a t i c reforms, the i m p o s i t i o n
T h e r e are also private T u r k i s h schools i n C e n t r a ! A s i a . T h e F e t h u l l a h
of stiffer penalties for t o r t u r e , asserting greater government c o n t r o l over the
G u l e n cemaati plays an active role i n o p e n i n g these schools but do not receive
m i l i t a r y , a n d p r o v i d i n g a d d i t i o n a l religious freedoms
f i n a n c i a l support horn the state. T u r k i s h M u s l i m busmess groups
the
M o s t notable is the host o f m a j o r reforms i n t r o d u c e d to replace the 78-year-
schools t h r o u g h private donations c h a n n e l l e d to C e n t r a l A s i a by A s y a F i n a n c e .
old T u r k i s h p e n a l code, o r i g i n a l l y a d o p t e d i n 1926 from the I t a l i a n p e n a l code
T h e T u r k i s h state welcomes the s c h o o l - b u i l d i n g activities o f the F e t h u l l a h G u l e n
a n d the code o f c r i m i n a l p r o c e d u r e . O n 17 D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 4 leaders o f the 25-
cem.aati because they support the T u r k i s h state p o l i c y o f c o m b i n i n g s e c u l a r i s m
m e m b e r E U r e s p o n d e d p o s i t i v e l y to these efforts by finally d e c i d i n g to b e g i n
finance
a n d m i n o r i t y rights.
w i t h a moderate Islam. T h e group also stresses the i m p o r t a n c e of a c h i e v i n g
accession negotiations w i t h T u r k e y i n O c t o b e r 2005. Turkey's goal o f a c h i e v i n g
excellence i n m o d e r n science a n d technology.
full m e m b e r s h i p m a y take t e n to 15 years to realize, d u r i n g w h i c h t i m e the E U
Despite Turkey's p r o m o t i o n o f itself as a r e g i o n a l pow-erhouse a n d a
w i l l m o n i t o r the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f these reforms i n T u r k e y . N e g o t i a t i o n s c a n be
b u l w a r k o f stability against r a d i c a l I s l a m i c movements, it has not resulted i n
suspended i f E U m e m b e r states decide that there has been a T u r k i s h b r e a c h o f
the acceptance o f T u r k e y as a Western state. W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n states w a n t
democratic or h u m a n rights p r i n c i p l e s , i n w h i c h case T u r k e y w o u l d not succeed
to assert t h e i r Europeanness a n d not be d o m i n a t e d by the U n i t e d States. T h i s
i n j o i n i n g the E U .
has manifested itself not only i n F r e n c h a n d G e r m a n opposition to the U S w a r
T h e E U is d i r e c t l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h the future p o l i t i c a l , c u l t u r a l , a n d
o n I r a q but also i n the E U ' s rejection to date o f T u r k e y as a full member. T h e
m i l i t a r y c o m p o s i t i o n o f E u r o p e , as it seeks greater a u t o n o m y w i t h i n
U n i t e d States, however, supports Turkey's full m e m b e r s h i p i n the E U .
A t l a n t i c A l l i a n c e . W i t h the changes t a k i n g p l a c e i n the p o s t - C o l d W a r slate
the
T h e E U rejected Turkey's full m e m b e r s h i p i n 1987. Nevertheless, T u r k e y
system, c r u c i a l questions a r i s e over future relations between E u r o p e a n d the
intensified its efforts, c o n c l u d i n g a customs u n i o n w i t h the E U i n 1995. T h e
U n i t e d States, as w e l l as s i g n i f i c a n t changes to strategic alliances. I n the face
customs u n i o n began i n 1996 w h e n the p r o - I s l a m i c Welfare P a r t y came to
o f a g r o w i n g n u m b e r o f a l l i a n c e s i n A s i a a n d the M i d d l e East, consideration
power. T h e expectation was that this w o u l d expedite the process o f T u r k e y
o f Turkey's attempt to j o i n the E U s h o u l d not be confined to the question o f
b e c o m i n g a full E U m e m b e r ( B a l k i r 2001: 2 0 0 - 6 ) . H o w e v e r , i n 1997, a sense
whether T u r k e y c a n b e c o m e a W e s t e r n society. T h e relationship between the
o f crisis i n Turkey's relations w i t h the E U arose w h e n the E L S u m m i t i n
E U and the U n i t e d States is asvrnmetrieai a n d contains the seeds o f m u l t i p l e
L u x e m b o u r g excluded T u r k e y f r o m the enlargement process. A t the s u m m i t
tensions created by the p r e - e m i n e n t m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n o f the U n i t e d States i n
w i t h centra! a n d eastern EuroDean states, as w e l l
N A T O . Turkey's E U m e m b e r s h i p has the potential to contribute to the u n i t y o f
T
cv,i. i7t
r
^.^violnrlprl s u r r p p m p n t i i
190
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
N A T O vis-à-vis E u r o p e . I n r e l a t i o n to E U attempts to achieve greater E u r o p e a n a u t o n o m y from N A T O , Turkey's E U m e m b e r s h i p w o u l d counter its p o t e n t i a l m a r g i n a l i z a t i o n i n E u r o p e a n d enable it to actively participate i n the
future
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Index
Taurisj,
Magazines and newspapers Cjimhuriyet Newspaper Gunaydin Newspaper
A l i S u a v i 24, 30
Symbols
Llerald Tribune Hurriyet Newspaper
A n a t o l i a 37-38, 40, 4 4 , 46, 51, 75, 92¬ 11 S e p t e m b e r
Los Angeles Times
1, 14, 177, 179, 183¬
MilHyet Newspaper
1839 r e f o r m p r o g r a m m e
New York Times
24 J a n u a r y measures
T h e Economist
28 F e b r u a r y process 160-161, 181
26
148
1960s
C o n v e n t i o n 33 A n k a r a x i i , 38-39, 52, 73, 76, 8 3 , 94, 160,
LMus N e w s p a p e r . 1945-1966
Yon,
Anglo-Ottoman Commercial
107, 109, 133, 138, 156-157, 159¬
Turkish Daily News
V a t a n Newspaper , 1945-1950
93, 118, 124 A n a t o l i a n industrialists 116-117, 119
185, ¡ 8 7 . 192, 201
A
163,187
A n k a r a Treaty of Association
Abduh, Muhammed
18-19,25,47,
200 18, 28, 30-31, 3 4 - 3 5 , 4 4 ,
162
anti-Western
1-2, 4, 124, 137, 179,
a n x i e t y 5, 16, 61, 76-77 A r a b - I s r a e l i W a r 126, 133
159
abileı/ablalar
Armenians 158
40
arms embargo
a b o l i t i o n o f the c a l i p h a t e 37, 4 4 - 4 6 a b o l i t i o n o f the sultanate 37, 4 3 A f g h a n i , J a m a l a l - D i n a l 18, 2 5 , 47, " 202
130-131, 133-134
A r r i g h i , G i o v a n n i x i , 24, 32, 41, 147. 192 A r v a s i 4 4 , 76-77,81-82 A s s o c i a t i o n for a N e w W o r l d V i e w i n
Afghanistan
1, 130, 133, 137, 146,
150, 152, 177-180, 183, 186-187, 209
Europe ( A M T G )
144-145,174
A s s o c i a t i o n o f Independent Industrialists a n d Businessmen
agricultural production
50,52,56,
58, 9 0 , 92, 109 a g r i c u l t u r e 52-53, 5 5 - 5 6 , 8 9 - 9 2 , 9 6 , 100, 108-109, 124, 151 Ahlak Risalesi Ahşap Konak
29
(MUSIAD)
173 1, 177, 185-186
189-190
authentic 2-4, 6-7 authentic-traditional 7 authoritarian
150-151, ¡ 6 3 - 1 6 - 1 ,
172-175,206
Atlantic Alliance
authenticity
78
Al-Baraka Group al-Qaeda
1-2,9
182,186
Abdulhamit abı/abla
107
anti-modern
2-3 2 6 , 4 8 , 6 0 , 127
authoritarianism
10, 6 0
216
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
B Babakhanov
136
B a k u - G e y h a n o i l pipeline
186
balance o f p o w e r
C a r t e r D o c t r i n e 150, 204
Copenhagen Criteria
C a s p i a n region 186
corruption
cemaat 7 , 4 7 , 8 0 - 8 2 , 124, 144-145, 156,
c o s m o p o l i t a n v i i , 146, 192
eastern A n a t o l i a 44, 46-47, 124
credits 9 0 - 9 2 , 9 5 , 108, 117-119, 121,
E c e v i t , B u l e n t 106, 119, 123-124, 129,
158-159, 169-172, 188
b a l a n c e o f payments 34
C e n t r a l A s i a 29, 34, 36, 40, 136, 153,
15,32,62
172, 185-186, 188, 1 9 3 , 2 0 8
B a y a r , C e l a l 5 3 , 5 6 , 6 6 - 6 8 , 7 1 , 193
central b a n k 34, 54
Bayram, Hasim
centre-left
173-174, 196
b i n a r y v i e w 2 4 , 8 0 , 177
centre-right 6 , 8 1 , 8 3 , 120, 122, 124,
187
B l a i r , T o n y 185 break-up o f p o l i t i c a l alliances
120
B r e t t o n W o o d s m o n e t a r y system 86, 110
9, 11, 14
153,168 Chechnya
197
C r i m e a n W a r 34
e c o n o m i c c o m p e t i t i o n 165, 176
C u b a n - T u r k i s h missile crisis 8 5 , 100,
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO)
e c o n o m i c recession
c u l t u r a l discontent
e d u c a t i o n x i , 20, 24, 27-31, 37, 47, 68,
60-61
136, 179
B r i t a i n 24, 27, 29, 32, 34, 41-42, 63¬ 6 4 , 9 7 , 104, 184-185, 203, 207
C y p r u s 3 6 - 3 7 , 8 5 , 100, 103-106, 114,
C I A 64, 179
122, 129, 130-133, 150, 189, 191,
C I A support o f Islamist groups 179
194, 197, 2 0 0 , 206, 212
enemies o f freedom
c i v i l - m i l i t a r y bureaucratic cadres 69
D
E n l i g h t e n m e n t 2, 8, 10, 12, 20, 24-25,
debt crisis 111, 113-114, 146
gnosis 104-105, 129 e q u a l i t y 10, 12, 20, 26, 29, 33, 4 4 , 48,
166
clash o f civilizations 5, 185 classes 5-6, 9, 12-13, 15, 25, 30, 35, 50-51, 5 3 , 5 7 , 61, 66, 92, 100, 115,
decolonization
121, 128, 154, 164
deforestation
54, 58, 70, 8 2 , 9 5 - 9 6 , 100, 128, 154, 165
207
coercive 1 4 , 4 2 , 5 9 , 122, 185
7 5 - 7 6 , 9 6 , 100, 102, 108, 127,
C o l d W a r v i i , 2, 20-21, 6 0 - 6 2 , 6 4 - 6 5 , 74-75, 8 5 , 8 8 , 96-97, 100, 104,
B u s h , G e o r g e W . 183, 185 Bush a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
180, 182-183,
185
capitalist market e c o n o m y 5, 17, 19, 83,183 c a p i t a l fractions 22, 121, 167, 171 c a p i t a l groups 3 4 , 5 9 , 7 0 , 8 3 , 8 9 , 115¬ 117, 120-121, 123, 146, 151, 160, 167, 169, 172, 175, 182 capitulations 37
ethnic enclaves
39 ¡42
185, 189, 198, 200, 204-205
dersane 159, 173
E u r o p e a n - s t y l e schools 24
detente 114, 146, 150, 179
European Economic Community
3
D e v e l o p i n g E i g h t 180
( E E C ) 8 5 , 100-101, 103-104,
c o l o n i a l i s m 26, 98
development plans 57, 102, 110
106-111, 114, 117, 119, 121, 128,
c o m m e r c i a l activity i n a g r i c u l t u r e
development project
131, ¡ 4 1 , 151, 202-203, 207
93,96
development scholarship development trajectory
c o m m u n i s m 6 0 , 6 9 , 7 2 , 8 7 - 8 8 , 122,
C a p i t a l i s m 171, 192, 213
ethics
108, 120, 154, 205
eurocentric
109
C.Wright Mills 7
81-82, 8 9 - 9 4 , 96-97, 9 9 - 1 0 0 , 107¬ derangement 76, 78
8 3 , 8 7 , 98, 105
C
123, 170-171,
195
116, 132-133, 146, 150, 177-182, c o l o n i a l 1, 3, 18-19, 29, 32, 42, 6 2 - 6 3 ,
74,76,203
169, 180-182, 184, 197, 201, 2 0 6 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip
D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y 6 0 - 6 1 , 66, 6 8 - 7 5 ,
cognitive emptiness 78
E r b a k a n , N e c m e t t i n 8 2 - 8 3 , 121, 123¬ 124, 126-129, 141, 144, 160, 168¬
d e m o c r a c y i , i i i , 67, 193, 196, 199,
4 8 , 5 1 , 5 3 , 5 5 , 57, 59, 66-67, 70, 146,150
79, 121, 123, 141, 145, 167 112, 120, 123,
131
181-182
coercion 58, 181
bureaucrats 5 , 7 , 9 , 1 1 , 2 6 - 2 7 , 4 2 ,
88 91
Demirel, Süleyman
class formation 23 C l i n t o n administration
185
enemies-of the state 4 3 , 5 3
B u l a c , A l i 75, 170, 195 6, 11, 24, 27-28, 34, 38,
155-167, 169, 171, 173, 188 e m p o w e r m e n t 10, 19, 131, 138, 155, 162
citizenship 1, 14, 27, 29, 31, 38-39,
B r z e z i n s k i , Z b i g n i e w 179, 184, 195 bureaucracy
110-1II, 146-147
73, 8 1 - 8 3 , 9 3 , 125-126, 144-145,
c u l t u r a l d i s l o c a t i o n 76
187
187
c u l t u r a l d e r a n g e m e n t 76
68, 71, 94, 142
Brezhnev, L e o n i d
BuyukDogu
E
103
centre-periphery
Project ( B S E C )
189
126, 128, 155
132
122, 129, 156
B e r l i n T r e a t y o f 1878 29 Black Sea E c o n o m i c Cooperation
217
INDEX
E u r o p e a n m o d e l 31, 181, 187, 190
88
E u r o p e a n U n i o n ( E U ) 6, 8, 101, 175,
115,149
184, 187
dhikr 30-31, 125
181, 185
d i c h o t o m o u s 2, 4, 15, 32, 190
c o m m u n i t y 9, 13, 17, 20, 25, 2 8 - 3 0 , 4 4 - 4 5 , 47, 61, 70, 76, 79-80, 82,
Directorate of Religious Affairs
e x p o r t 33, 50, 52-56, 8 6 , 90, 92, 9 5 , 38,
97, 101, 103, 107-S08, 110-111,
85, 100-101, 139, 142, 144-145,
73, 82, 122, 137, 144, 156-157,
119, 134, 146- 149, 152, 154-155,
160, 163, 167, 170
164, 170, 188, 196
165, 169, 171
discriminatory price and wage
conspicuous c o n s u m p t i o n 80 consumerism
containment of p o l i t i c a l discontent contentious politics 69-70, 74
export-oriented agricultural
policies 59
13, 125 65
disengagement f r o m the West dortlu takrir 67
p r o d u c t i o n 50, 52, 9 0 131
e x p o r t - o r i e n t e d i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n 147¬ 148, 165
218
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
export of labour
101.110
e x p o r t P r o m o t i o n 14-9 ezan (call to prayer)
global-modern 7
intellectuals x i , 12, 20, 25, 28, 3 5 , 45,
g l o b a l i z a t i o n 2-5, 7, 13, 20-21, 154,
38
164, 168, 170, 1.81-182, 190 global debt m a n a g e m e n t 147
Faisal F i n a n c e
150-151, 163
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shana C o n g r e s s
181-182, 184, 190
idle wealth 174
Interstate
imam 48, 7 3 , 8 2 - 8 3 , 144, 155-157,
invisible university 125
g l o b a l m a n u f a c t u r i n g system
147
farmers 50, 52, 5 5 - 5 6 , 58-59, 90-91,
G o c e k , F. M u g e 26, 28, 33, 199
Fethullahcilar folk culture
7, 170
gold standard 32, 34, 41, 54, 147
71-72 87
foreign aid 96, 99-100 foreign debt 34, 9 6 , 120, 148 foreign loans 9 5 , 148 fragmented social space 78 F r a n c e 26-27, 37, 41, 97-98, 110-111 free-trading regime
34,53
G o l e , Nilüfer 1 1 - 1 2 , 1 6 4 - 1 6 6 . 1 9 9 government credits 108 G r a n d N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y 36, 39, 42-44, 46 G r e a t D e p r e s s i o n 5 4 - 5 6 , 85 G r e a t P o w e r politics 27, 32 G r e e c e 6, 4 0 , 64, 100, 104-108, 110, 114, 129, 131, 187, 196, 204, 212
10, 20, 25, 43, 65, 72, 79, 84,
G r e e k s 40, 50, 9 5 , 129 8 8 , 1 3 6 , 185
G u d u l 39, 160-163
free trade 32-33, 107, 119, 168, 173 F r i e d m a n n , H a r r i e t x i , 86, 92, 198
guest workers
Iran
160-161, 164-165, 170-171
G o k a l p , Z i y a 36, 194
Fordist e c o n o m i c mode)
freedom
3
G o f f m a n , I r v i n g 39, 199
159
207
ideology o f progress 2
global projects
108-109, 160
imam-hatip 7 3 , 8 3 , 155-157, 160-161.
G u l e n , F e t h u l l a b 47, 157-159, 170¬
115, ¡ 2 6 , 136-137, 154, 168-169,
General Evren
155
181,200
geopolitics 60, 152, 185
H a t t i H ü m a y u n o f 1856 26
G e o r g e H e r b e r t M e a d 78, 205
h i g h culture 71
G e o r g e W . Bush
historical trajectory
183, 185
G e r m a n y 5 4 - 5 5 , 5 7 , 8 3 , 110-111, 116,
H o b s b a w m , E r i c 2, 152, 178, 200
141-145, 152, 163, 170. 173-174,
hoca 26, 124
202-204, 207, 210
holding companies
global x i , 1-8, 11-18,21-23,32-33, 3 5 - 3 6 , 5 3 - 5 4 , 6 0 , 8 0 , 82, 97, 101, 123, 128, 131,136, 145-148, 151¬ 154, 164-165, 167-171, 174-179, 181-185, 190
149, 170. 172
H u n t i n g t o n , S a m u e l 3-4. 178, 185. 201
82
Islam v i i , x i , 1-28, 3 0 . 3 5 - 4 0 , 4 4 - 4 7 ,
82-84, 170
5 0 - 5 1 , 5 3 , 5 9 . 6 1 , 70-74, 76-77,
54, 92, 102, 107-108, 116, 147
79-81, 8 3 - 8 4 , 115, 1.22-123, 125¬
i n c o m e 35, 44, 54, 58, 102, 109, 145,
127, 136-138, 140-145, 150, 152¬ 159, 162, 164, 166-167, 169-172,
independence 10, 18, 20, 39, 4 3 . 4 6 . 50, 52-53, 8 8 , 9 8 - 1 0 0 , 104-106,
174-181, 134, 187-188, 190-198, 2 0 0 , 2 0 2 , 2 0 4 - 2 0 5 , 208-211 Islamic brand of modernity
179 18, 2 5 , 2 9 , 81, 137, 140, 206 1-3, 98, 179
Lhrion
136
I s l a m i c discourse o n development 98-99
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n 32, 5 4 , 57, 8 1 , 8 3 ,
125, 155, 157. 163-164, 166-167 Islamic fundamentalism
108, 110, 112, 114-116, 1 2 0 , 123,
I s l a m i c lifestyle 12, 83 Islamic m o d e r n i s m
i n d u s t r i a l bourgeoisie 5 2 - 5 3 , 57, 59, 8 8 , 9 4 , 102 57
Inonu, ismet 42-44, 4 8 - 4 9 , 5 3 , 61-62, 6 5 - 6 6 , 6 8 - 6 9 , 72, 8 8 , 1 0 5 - 1 0 6 , 131, 193, ¡ 9 7 , 201, 206 insecurity 5, 9, 16. 178 i n s t r u m e n t a l r a t i o n a l i t y 8, 1 1 , 4 0
48
I s l a m i c e d u c a t i o n 20, 24, 31, 8 2 - 8 3 ,
85, 89-90, 92, 9 6 , 9 9 - 1 0 2 , 107¬
i n d u s t r i a l development p l a n s
48
I s l a m i c conferences i n the Soviet
i n d u s t r i a l capitalists 57, 100, 115
hostels 110. 144, 157, 159, 161, İ 6 3
134
Isik, H ü s e y i n H i l m i
147 import-substitution i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n
147-148, 165, 169 17, 33
177-179, 183-185, 187-188, 190, 206
Isikcitar
indirect communist aggression H a l l i d a y , F r e d 3, 61, 6 3 , 150, 179,
2 0 0 , 204, 206, 209
107-108, 110-111, 116-119, 133,
indigenous
G a l a t a s a r a y L y c é e 30
1, 3, 8, 18, 20, 61, 6 3 - 6 4 , 9 8 , 104, 130, 133-135, 137, 146, 150¬
Iraq-Iran W a r
182 i m p o r t 33, 52, 54, 57, 9 2 , 9 5 - 9 6 , 102,
India H
140
23
I r a q 37, 41-42, 98, 134-136, 139, 151,
160-161, 164 i m p e r i a l i s m 10, 18-20, 32, 4 6 , 52. 9 8 ,
Independence T r i b u n a l s 45
G
rivalries
152, 179-181, 183- 184, 186-187,
164-165 imam-hatip schools 73, 8 3 , 155-156,
149, 152,161, 168
110. 144
172, 188, 192, 199, 210
gecekondu x i i , 9 3 - 9 4 , 122, 124
8 6 , 9 5 , 100-102, 147-149,203.
172
123, 146-148, 167-171, 175-178,
f a m i l y subsistence 52
Feihullahci
71, 74, 78, 82, 136, 155, 167, İ 7 0 International M o n e t a r y F u n d ( I M F )
idadi 29-30 identity 2, 11-13, 18, 70, 76, 122, 158,
global e c o n o m y 2 , 4 - 5 , 11, 16.21-22, F
219
INDEX
1, 14
18-20, 83
I s l a m i c modernist
20
Islamic modernity
12
I s l a m i c m o r a l c l a i m s 61 Islamic m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s 121, 167 Islamic political movement
2, 5, 47,
168 I s l a m i c politics x i , 1-9, 11, 13-17, 19¬ 23, 60, 74, 143, 146, 153, 176-179 Islamic projects
13-14, 6 0 , 175
220
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D
I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n i n Iran
130, 133¬
DEMOCRACY
K
L a w for the M a i n t e n a n c e o f O r d e r
134, 137, 146, 150
Left
I s l a m i c S a l v a t i o n Front i n A l g e r i a 179
kadi 38
158
Islamic Solidarity
54, 60, 6 5 , 69-70, 72, 74-75, 85
138-139
Kemalisl
45, 47-48, 50-54. 57-60, 6 5 - 6 6 ,
I s l a m i c terrorism
70-72, 74-76, 79, 81, 85-96, 122,
I s l a m i c w o r k ethic 170
143,
194
Kemalist modernity
Islamists i , i i i , v i i , 1 , 3 - 4 , 6 - 7 , 10-13,
K e m a l i s t r e p r o d u c t i o n o f Western
15, 1 8 - 2 3 , 6 0 , 75-76, 110, 114-115, 123, 146, 154, 157, 160, 165, 167,
K e m a l i s t trajectory
169-170, 175-177, 179, 182, 184,
Keyder, Cagdar
169,182 Islamist engineers 21, 153, 164, 175
84, 169, 203
Islamist industrialists 83
Kombassan
Islamist industrialists and c o m m e r c i a l
Koprulu,Fuat
g r o u p s 83
173-174 66-68,71,203
loss o f c o m m u n i t y 5
milligorus
low-wage p o l i c y 58
m i x e d economy
lyck 73, 155-156. 160-163. 171
modern
76, 8 2 - 8 3 , 90, 116-119, 121, 138,
M
188 modernist-Islamist
K u r d i s h 42, 4 4 - 4 6 , 51-56, 135
M a r d i n , S e r i f 6-7, 9, 25, 27, 3 1 , 57, 71, 74-75, 8 2 - 8 3 , 205
K u r d i s h Islam 44 K u r d i s h n a t i o n a l i s m 44, -16
191, 201
K u r d i s t a n 4 6 , 212-213
m a r k e t c o m p e t i t i o n 5 , 8 , 175, 177
10, 155 35
31-33, 35, 41, 54, 8 3 , 8 5 - 8 8 , 166, 170-172, 176.183
J jahiliyya
126
J a m a a t - I I s l a m i 20 jihad
4 3 , 45, 47, 81
justice 6-7, 10-11, 20, 26. 70-71, 75, 7 9 - 8 0 , 84, 115, 121, 123, 126-127, 141, 167-168. 185 Justice and Development Party A K P ) 6, 1 2 3 , 1 8 2 , 184 J u s t i c e P a r t y J P ) 8 5 , 108, 120-124
14, 32-33, 50, 57-58, 66, 86.
92, 101-102, 109-111, 113, 116,
9 3 - 9 4 , 115, 123, 154, 164, 173¬ 172, 177, 181, 187, 190
m a r k e t e c o n o m y 5, 13, 15-17, 1 9 , 2 3 , L
47
1 - 3 . 5 , 8 - 1 0 , 12, 14-15, 17,
4 5 , 4 7 - 4 8 , 5 0 - 5 1 , 5 9 - 6 0 , 70, 75,
m a r k e t competitiveness
50
modernity
19,21,23-25,31,35-37, 40-41,
151, 165, 168. 171-172, 175, 185,
labour
85
1-2, 4-9, 12, 15, 19, 22, 28¬
140, 164, 166, 169, 171, 175, 177,
K o t k u , M e h m e t Z a l i i d 82-83, 124¬
marginals
I z m i r E c o n o m i c Congress
123, 126, 197
2 9 , 3 1 , 3 8 , 4 5 , 4 8 , 5 9 , 7 6 , 8 1 , 127,
128, 203
24-25, 30, 37, 4 3 - 4 4 , 51-52,
120, 122-124, 146, 148, 154-155, 160-161, 170, 173, 179, 182
157, 163-165
136
m i l i t a r y coup 76, 100, 102, 107, 111,
millet 26-27
15
K o r a n schools 28-29, 74, 82-83, 155,
20.210
Israel 98, 135, 181, 187, 189 Istanbul
3 8 - 4 0 , 4 4 , 4 7 . 4 9 , 73, 159, 163, local-traditional
m i l i t a r y a i d 97, 129-130, 132, 134 m i l i t a r y blocs 60, 89
131, 148 local 1, 3-5, 7, 12, 15-17, 2 0 - 2 1 , 176-177
K i s a k u r e k , N e c i p F a z i l 47, 74, 76-79,
100, 102, 107, 111, 120, 124, 129, 131, 146, 148, 152-156, 182, 189
loans 34, 90-91, 9 5 , 97, 103, 114, 130¬
210
10. 40, 9 3 , 101, 109, 111¬
m i l i t a r y 22, 24, 26-27, 29, 37, 72, 76,
l i b e r a l p r i n c i p l e i n the w o r l d e c o n o m y
10, 33, 35, 40, 48,
198-203, 206-212 112,139, 160
86
59, 65, 85
121, 129, 13!. 133-138, 150-153.
migration
90, 108, 110, 141, 153
K h r u s h c h e v , N i k i t a 99, 102-103, 136,
Islamist capitalists 8 3 . 146, 151, 166,
Israeli aggression
l i b e r a l i z a t i o n 33-34, 6 0 - 6 1 , 6 5 , 84,
l i b e r a l e c o n o m y 52
5 1 , 5 8 , 9 1 - 9 2 , 96, 108, 120, 202
Islamist business 84, 169
Islamization
50
9 7 , 9 9 - 1 0 0 , 102, 120, 1 9 3 . 2 0 6 M i d d l e East iv, 8, 13, 37, 41-43, 62¬
166, ¡70, 180, 185, 187, 189-196,
Î78
m o d e r n i t y 41, 47
1 9 2 , 1 9 9 , 207
1,48, 123, 148. 153, 166,
l i b e r a l d e m o c r a c y 60, 6 5 , 89
I s l a m i c w o r l d 8, 14, 169, i78, 182
M e n d e r e s , A d n a n 6 6 - 6 8 , 71. 74, 91,
6 4 , 9 4 , 97-99, 101, 104. 114. 116,
153-154 Liberalism
11-12, 22, 36-37, 3 9 - 4 3 ,
i s l a m i c stale 2 0 , 4 5 , ¡27 1, 180
45
10, 122-123. 153, 166, 198
leftist 6, 7 2 , 9 8 - 9 9 . 122-123, 137,
Kemalism 9-11, 36-37, 39, 41, 46, 4 8 .
I s l a m i c schools
221
INDEX
modernization
1-3,5,8-12,43,48,
64, 146, 178, 187, 190 m o d e r n i z a t i o n theory 5, 8
M a r s h a l l P l a n 87. 89, 9 2 , 9 5 , 101, 130,213
M o n t r e u x C o n v e n t i o n 61-62 moral
14, 22, 28-31, 3 8 - 3 9 , 47. 6 0 - 6 1 ,
120, 124, 139, 142, 146, 15!. 155.
M a w d u d i , M a w l a n a 2 0 . 126
70-72, 75-76, 78-81, 115, 121-123,
168, 174-175
M c M i c h a e l , P h i l i p x i , ¡ 6 , 32, 9 1 , 147,
125-127, 141, 143, 153-155. 159.
labour recruitment
111,142
205
162-164, 166-169, 172, 177. 18S
l a b o u r r e g u l a t i o n 57
M e a d , George H . 78, 2 0 5
Land Reform Bill
meaningiessness 76-77
66,68
m o r a l i t y 1, 21, 33, 36, 70, 74, 79-81, 125-128, 165, 167, 171, 175
l a r g e - p r o d u c i n g farmers 56
Mecca Declaration
large agriculturalists a n d c o m m e r c i a l
mechanization i n agriculture
90
m e d i u m - s i z e d capital g r o u p s
115
groups 52 large i n d u s t r i a l capitalists
115
L a u s a n n e Peace T r e a t y 37. ¡ 0 4
medreses 28
141,145
m o r a l decay
80
mosques 38, 73-74, 144-145, 164, 171, 174 Mossadegh
64
M o s u l 37, 41-42, 135
222
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
M o s u l - K e r k u k o i l fields 41
N a t i o n a l S a l v a t i o n P a r t y Í N S P ; 123¬
O t t o m a n bureaucratic bourgeoisie
124, 129, 140, 151, 154, 156,
O t t o m a n commercial bourgeoisie
168-169
O t t o m a n E m p i r e 9, 13. 18, 22-27, 2 9 ,
M o t h e r l a n d P a r t y ( M P ) 148,150¬ 153,167 multi-class populist alliances 16. 21. 115
31-37, 4 1 , 4 3 , 4 5 . 4 8 , 50, 7 8 , 127,
n a t i o n a l sovereignty
162, 194, 198, 201-202, 2 0 8 , 210
104, 115, 131
128, 131, 154, 168, 174, 182, 184
74-75 Multilateralism
NATO
86
8, 13, 89, 96-97, 100, 103¬
107, 121, 129-134, 150, 178, 186,
Muslims of the Soviet East 137
182,208
M u s l i m c o m m e r c i a l classes 30
neoliberal restructuring
M u s l i m c o m m o n market
N i x o n administration
M u s l i m professionals
129
154, 157, 164
non-West
123, 127. 143, 162-163, 167-169, 174,182
O t t o m a n reforms
23, 3 3 , 3 5 , 154 26, 31-33, 36-37
O t t o m a n state 23-25, 27, 33, 3 5 - 3 6 ,
""181
O z a l , K o r k u t 82, 124, 151
protectionism
O z a l , T u r g u t 82, 148-150, 153-154,
protective counter-movement
186-187
156, 158,169-170
P Q u t b , S a y y i d 20, 126
nur evleri. 157-159
Peace o f W e s t p h a l i a 32
nur talebesi. 47, 158
p e a s a n t r y 47, 52, 5 8 . 6 8 . 70 peasants 56, 6 8 . 9 0
N 18,24,26-27 official i s l a m
122
81-84, 124-125, 144, 151, 164,
o i l interests i n the M i d d l e East
169-170, 172, 191, 205
o i l p i p e l i n e 99, 134
N a q s h b a n d i sheikhs nation
151
43-45,81
open w o r l d e c o n o m y
62-63
p e r i p h e r a l groups 9
rabita
p e r i p h e r a l state 17, 34, 36, , J 4
R a b i t a t a l - A l a m a l - I s i a m i 138-140,
p e t r o d o l l a r surpluses
¡47
P o l a n y i , K a r l x i , 15-17, 21, 3 2 , 88, 176-177, 208
88
Polanyian
opposition 5, 8, 10, 12, 15, 23, 25, 27,
2,10,15,20,23,26,31,36,
R
Peker, R e c e p 4 8 - 4 9 , 208
O
N a q s h b a n d i - a f f i l i a t e d companies
4 1 - 4 5 , 4 9 - 5 0 , 56-57, 6 0 - 6 1 , 6 5 ¬
p o l i t i c a l elite 7, 22, 181
r a t i o n a l sciences 31
p o l i t i c a l I s l a m 3, 12, 167, 195, 198,
67, 72, 7 5 - 7 6 , 8 0 , 8 7 - 8 8 , 91, 115,
135, 148, 154, 164, 166, 176-177,
political liberalization
127, 139, 145, 154-155. 168
179-180, 188
politics o f discontent 6 6 , 75
59, 63, 76, 8 8 , 1 4 5 , 154
65-66
oppression 6 , 4 8 , 6 4 - 6 6 . 122, 127,
n a t i o n a l i s m 6, 20, 36, 44, 4 6 - 4 8 , 53,
211
populism
180
p o p u l i s t n a t i o n a l i s m 48 p o s t - C o l d W a r v i i . 177 post-colonial
1, 3, 87
170,180
O r e n , E n v e r 8 2 , 8 4 , 170
post-modern
12
8 5 - 8 6 , 8 8 . 9 0 , 154 n a t i o n a l i n d u s t r i a l bourgeoisie N a t i o n a l i n d u s t r i a l development
O r g a n i z a t i o n o f the Islamic
poverty
Conference ( O I C ) 137-141, 145,
83
N a t i o n a l O r d e r P a r t y ( N O P ; 123-124
O t t o m a n brand o f education
48 28
171, 173, 188 r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f states 15 r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the w o r l d e c o n o m y 32, 92 9, 38-39, 56-58, 60, 67, 69,
74-75 repression o f l a b o u r a n d s m a l l
105-106, 132
1 0 8 - U O . 114, 118, 133, 135-136,
O t t o m a n - R u s s i a n w a r 27, 29 O t t o m a n - T a n z i m a t project
10. 44, 79, 87, 109, 115, 142,
p r i c e 5 5 - 5 6 , 58-59, 86, 90, 9 2 , 100,
O t t o m a n - I s l a m i c legacy 24
8 3 , 144, 155-156, 160, 163-164,
repression
148-149 President J o h n s o n
150, 191, 201 53
60-61,84
9,48.69
oppressive 24, 42-43, 60, 72, 123
n a t i o n a l e c o n o m y 36, 50-51, 54, 59.
r e l i g i o u s b r o t h e r h o o d s 37, 42 r e l i g i o u s e d u c a t i o n 37. 47, 68, 73, 81,
71-72, 79, 98, 101, 126, 145, 153, n a t i o n a l bourgeoisie 3 6 , 8 5 , 115, 128
150, 164 r a p p r o c h e m e n t w i t h the Soviet U n i o n r a t i o n a l i t y 8, 1 1 , 4 0 , 4 8 , 8 1
72, 8 3 , 9 8 - 9 9 , 108, 115-116. 121,
opposition movement
30-31
a n d M u s l i m states 114
17,53, ¡76
3 9 , 4 1 , 4 3 , 4 5 - 5 1 , 5 3 , 5 6 , 59, 63¬
nation-state 10, 15, 20, 23, 36, 41, 4 5 ,
15
Public Debt Administration (PDA)
180
O z e l , Ismet 170, 208
Nurcu 7, 44, 47, 81-82, 124, 144-145,
Naqshbandi 7, 3 0 - 3 1 . 42-46, 48, 76,
108, 110, 119, 147
34-35
M u s t a f a K e m a l 9, 28, 36-37. 39, 42¬
Namik Kemal
Progressive R e p u b l i c a n P a r t y 43, 45 progress ideology 19, 33, 81, 84, 177,
147
15, 17-18, 88, 175
Northern Alliance
mutevelli 158-159, 171
classes 50, 53 p r o - I s l a m i c p a r t y 6 , 8 2 . 8 6 , 115. 121¬
O t t o m a n reformers
14-9,168
M u s l i m state 19, 47, 139-140 4 8 , 53, 5 6 , 6 1 , 6 8 , 73-74. 78
123, 160 private commercial and industrial
4 3 , 51, 154
neoliberal g l o b a l i z a t i o n 13, 164, 181¬
139, 180
p r i v a t e capital, groups 34, 59, 70, 116,
O t t o m a n foreign debt 3 4
189-190, 194-195, 199, 212
M u s l i m bourgeoisie 31 M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d 20, 125-126,
28 28
n a t i o n a l security state 50 national view 115-116, 121-124, ¡26¬
m u h i - p a r t v system 6 0 - 6 1 , 6 5 , 69,
223
INDEX
139, 147. 151-152
producers repressive
58
20, 48, 50, 53, 58-59, 67¬
68,160 r e p u b l i c a n d a y 39
224
R e p u b l i c a n People's P a r t y ( R P P ) 49¬
secularism 1, 6, 22-23, 32, 35, 3 8 , 44,
t r a d i t i o n a l 2, 4 - 5 , 7-8, 10, 15, 29, 33,
state-induced injustices 70
50,61,65-73, 75,85,88-91,99,
66, 72, 74-75, 8 3 , 125, 127, 141,
state-led e c o n o m i c g r o w t h 8 5
105-106, 108, 110, 122-124, 129,
143, 188, 206
s t a t e - m a k i n g 4 3 , 70, 72
8 8 , 9 4 , 175, 177 trajectory. See also h i s t o r i c a l trajectory, K e m a l i s t trajectory,
secular culture 39, 76
state-run schools
r e w o r k i n g o f W e s t e r n ways 33
secular trajectory 37
state a l l o c a t i o n o f funds
rights iv, 26-27, 32, 41, 43, 62-63, 67¬
self 5, 7-8, 12, 15, 18, 2 0 - 2 1 , 2 9 - 3 1 ,
state e d u c a t i o n a l system 81, 127, 154
143, 156
225
INDEX
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
161-162
secular trajectory, Western
118
trajectory
7 1 , 7 5 , 84, 9 4 , 104-105, 111, 115,
37, 39, 4 2 , 4 7 , 6 0 , 74, 7 6 - 8 1 , 8 8 ,
state f o r m a t i o n 24, 41
t r a n s n a t i o n a l Islamic ties 141
122, 126-127, 142, 145, 149, 180,
104, 108, 125, 130, 134, 158, 160,
state i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n strategy 57, 9 6 ,
T r e a t y o f Paris 26
184,189
169-171, 176-177
male 47, 74-75, 8 0 - 8 1 , 84, 124, 144, 158-159, 192 Risale-lNur
47, 74-75, 8 0 - 8 1 , 84, 124,
144,158-159 r o a d - b u i l d i n g 93 r u r a l 5, 8-12, 21, 49, 52, 5 8 - 5 9 , 61, 70-71, 73, 9 0 - 9 4 , 100-101, 109, 111, 113, 115, 124, 146, 154, 156¬ 157, 164, 167 r u r a l migrants
90,93-94
rusdiyye 28-29
self-discipline 171
Stale P l a n n i n g O r g a n i z a t i o n ( S P O )
self-purification 3 0 , 125 self-regulating m a r k e t self-sufficiency
15,177
18, 20-21, 108, 134
self a n d society 6 0 , 77-78, 81 sense o f b e l o n g i n g
17,68,71,94
185, 1.87, 192, 201 sharia 26, 37-38, 44, 47, 78, 8 0 , 140 S h a r i a t i , A l i 20, 208 76-77,82
S h e i k h S a i d R e v o l t 4 2 , 4 4 - 4 5 , 51, 74
T r u m a n Doctrine 63-64
1 2 0 , 1 5 2 , 1 5 5 , 165, 168, 1 7 3 , 2 1 0
T u n a h a n , S u l e y m a n F i i l m i 82-83
state schools 30, 155, 157, 172-173 state system
1 3 - 1 6 , 4 1 , 6 3 , 8 8 , 127¬
short-term b o r r o w i n g 113 c;„,.r.:
i LJ
T u r k e y 3, 5-6, 8-11, 13, 15, 17, 22-23, 34, 36-37, 3 9 - 4 0 , 42-44, 46-47,
statism 54, 56
72,76, 7 8 , 8 1 - 8 2 , 8 4 - 8 5 , 89-90,
statist-nationalist p l a n n i n g 8 9
92, 9 4 - 9 5 , 9 7 - 1 0 4 , 106-107, 110¬
s t r u c t u r a l adjustment 102, 1 4 8 , 150,
112, 114-116, 118-119, 121-123, 127-135, 137, 140-141, 143-146,
194 s t r u c t u r a l adjustment loans 148 students f r o m C e n t r a l A s i a
182, 186-187
turan 3 6 , 40
5 1 - 5 5 , 5 7 , 5 9 - 6 3 , 6 5 - 6 6 , 6 8 , 70,
1 2 8 , 1 7 8 , 182, 189
Sheikh Gumushanevi 31,82
R u s s i a 26-27, 29, 34, 4 0 , 64, 170,
T r u e P a t h ( T P ) 152, 168
8 3 , 100, 102-103, 108, 116, 119- . state repression 9, 5 8 , 6 0 , 67, 74
September 11 1, 14, 177, 179, 183¬
Sheikh Arvasi
T r e a t y o f Sevres 36
100,102,110
187-188
s u b - i m p e r i a l i s m 182 S u e z C a n a l 4 1 , 9 7 , 134
149, 151-153, 155, 157-158, 160¬ 161, 163-168, 170-171, 173-177, 179, 181-182, 184, 186-191, 193¬ 214
S u e z crisis 97, 9 9 , 101
T u r k e y ' s security 61, 106
single-party regime 4 8 , 5 6 , 6 5 - 6 6
Suffering 77
T u r k i s h - I s l a m i c synthesis 153, 172
S a i d , E d w a r d 18
s m a l l - p r o d u c i n g farmers 52, 59, 9 0
Sufi orders 7 , 3 0 , 7 4 , 154, 156-157,
T u r k i s h accession to W e s t e r n ways
S a i d N u r s i 4 4 - 4 8 , 74-75, 79-81, 83,
s m a l l - a n d m e d i u m - s i z e d firms 118,
124, 144, 158-159, 169, 192, 2 0 5 ,
174
Suleymancilar
s m a l l producers 52, 5 5 , 5 8 , 61, 71, 73,
209 S a u d i A r a b i a 62, 9 8 , 104, 134-140,
sohbet 31, 82, 124-126, 159
187
sovereignty 25, 35-37, 44, 8 8 , 104¬ 151,163
science a n d t e c h n o l o g y 4, 19, 24, 29¬ 3 1 , 3 3 , 7 5 , 8 1 , 171, 188 second C o l d W a r 150, 179 S e c o n d W o r l d W a r 45, 5 8 - 6 0 , 8 6 , 185,190 secular 5 - 6 , 8, 10-11, 13-14, 23, 2 6 , 2 9 , 3 1 , 3 5 , 3 7 - 4 0 , 6 0 , 6 8 , 70-74,
8 2 - 8 3 , 144-145, 159-160
Sun-Language Theory 40
91, 102, 115, 128, 154, 167
150-152, 164-165, 179-180, 184, Saudi capital
167, 169, 175
T u r k i s h industrialists a n d T
Businessmen Association ( T U S I A D ) 9 5 , 111, 113-114, 116,
S o v i e t - M i d d l e East relations 131
Taliban
Soviet e c o n o m i c assistance 102, 132
T a n z i m a t 23-29, 31-33, 35, 4 8 , 76¬
146,150 136 Soviet U n i o n
1, 177, 183, 186
78,83, 85,202 T a r i f f concessions 33
Soviet M u s l i m religious establishment
tariqa 48 Third World
57,61-64,89,97-99,
119-120, 151, 172-173, 212 T u r k i s h Islamic organizations in G e r m a n y 143 T u r k i s h n a t i o n a l i s m 3 6 , 53, 71-72, 153, 170
1 3 , 8 7 , 9 1 - 9 2 , 101, 110,
T u r k i s h R e p u b l i c 9, 2 3 , 2 8 , 36
128, 147-148, 150, 179-180, 194,
T u r k i s h schools i n C e n t r a l A s i a 188
198, 206-207
T u r k i s h straits o f the D a r d a n e l l e s a n d
7 6 , 8 2 , 122, 124-125, 140, 145,
101-106, 114, 116, 129-137, 139,
1 5 4 , 1 5 6 - 1 5 8 , 1 6 0 , 1 6 2 , 164-165,
152, 166, 170-173, 179, 186, 188,
T i l l y , C h a r l e s x i , 24, 3 2 , 59, 211
167, 169-171, 187-188
196, 199, 2 0 6 , 209
t r a d e l i b e r a l i z a t i o n 33, 108, 110, 141
S t a l i n , J o s e p h 61-62
T u r k i s h capitalists 53 T u r k i s h H i s t o r y T h e s i s 40
106, 115, 131
Soviet invasion o f A f g h a n i s t a n 137,
76, 85 T u r k i s h bourgeoisie 3 6 , 54
trade u n i o n s
119, 149
B o s p h o r u s 61 Turkish U n i o n of Chambers ( T O B ) 116, 118-119, 121, 174, 211
226
INDEX
T U R K E Y , ISLAMISTS A N D D E M O C R A C Y
U
W a l l e r s t e i n , I m m a n u e l 2, 126, 147,
w o r l d - v i e w 9, 20, 44, 75, 169 W o r l d B a n k 9 0 , 9 5 - 9 6 , 109-110, 114,
178,213 U - 2 crisis 99
W a r o f Independence
ulema 28, 42
w a r o n terrorism
ummah 80, 139-140, 145, !53
wealth a c c u m u l a t i o n 168, 170, 175
36, 5 2 , 8 1 , 8 5 - 8 6 , 8 8 , 9 2 , 101,
underdeveloped
W e b e r , M a x 5, 40, 81, 146, 171, 176,
115-116, 128-129, 141, 152, 164,
87-88
183
10, 101, 310-112, 149
u n i l a t e r a l i s m 104, 182-183 8 1 , 8 5 - 8 8 , 9 1 , 9 5 , 9 7 - 1 0 1 , 103¬
176, 178, 180-182, 190, 193, 199, 201,210
15
Western
1-6, 8, 10-15, 17-21, 2 3 - 3 3 ,
35-37, 39-41, 43, 4 5 - 4 8 , 50-51,
u n i v e r s a l i s m 3, 20, 60
5 9 - 6 1 , 6 3 , 6 5 - 6 6 , 6 8 , 70-71,75¬
u n i v e r s a l m o d e r n i t y 2, 14-15, 17, 177
76, 78-81, 8 3 - 8 5 , 8 8 - 8 9 , 97-99,
u r b a n 5 , 8 , 10, 1 2 , 2 1 , 2 4 , 5 2 , 6 1 , 7 1 ,
115, 121,123-124, 126-128, 133,
73, 92-94, 100-101, 109-111, 113,
136-137, 139, 141, 150, 153-155,
115, 122, 124, 146, 153-157, 164
164, 166-169, 171, 176-182, 184,
u r b a n / r u r a l antagonism
8
186-190
u r b a n a n d r u r a l s m a l l p r o d u c e r s 61 U s k u d a r O z b e k l e r convent
44
U S a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 62-63, 6 5 , 8 6 , 89,
Western-style education westernization
24,27,30
1, 9-11, 20, 48, 70, 76,
78, 80-81, 8 5 , 127, 143, 154 97, 101, 129, 179-181, 183-186
W e s t e r n a l l i a n c e 6 1 , 6 5 - 6 6 , 6 8 , 133
U S C o l d W a r politics 85
Western domination
U S hegemony 126, 147, 150, 182
W e s t e r n e n c r o a c h m e n t 18, 25, 31,
1,18,41,179
43,46 western E u r o p e V
11,17,23,29,51,81,
87-88, 100-101, 121, 135, 147, 164, 186, 188, 206
mkif 28, 163-164
W e s t e r n progress ideology
V i e t n a m W a r 129, 147
W e s t e r n trajectory
V i r t u e P a r t y ( V P ) 123
wheat 52, 56, 58, 92-93, 95, 108, 146,
33,81,84
11
160 workers 59, 101, 110-113, 119-120,
W
131, 142, 144-146, 151, 155, 163, 167, 173-174
wage 33, 58-59, 62, 66, 6 8 , 87, 9 3 , 111, 119-120, 146, 149, 185
w o r l d systems 8, 10-11, 13-14, 192
97, 126, 131, 154, 165-167, 175¬
132, 134-135, 137, 140-142, 147, 150,170, 173, 178-186,188-190
208,213
West. 3-4, 8, 15, 17-25, 41-42, 79-81,
104, 106-107, 110, 114, 129-130,
universal-modern
10, 13, 16, 21, 32,
166, 178, 185, 190, 192, 195, 201,
Welfare P a r t y ( W P ) 152,123, 160, 168-170, 180, 182, 188, 207
U n i t e d States 1, 6, 8, 41-42, 61-64,
120, 147-149, 151,213 world economy
213
u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t 87 unemployment
37,39,43-44
workers'remittances
101, 110, 112¬
113, 131, 145, 151-152, 174
Y o u n g O t t o m a n s 24-25, 27 Young Turks
36,40
227