Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean (The Asam Series)

TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS The Security Dilemma in the Aegean

THE ASAM SERIES ISSN: 1740-3758 ASAM Series on International Affairs aims to publish scholarly monographs on global and regional problems with a multidisciplinary approach ranging from international relations to economics, religion, sociology and security. The ASAM series subscribes to no political or methodological identity and welcomes proposals dealing with topics with which the series is concerned. With its multidisciplinary approach, the series intends to re-evaluate conventional thinking on international relations and regional studies.

TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS The Security Dilemma in the Aegean

Editors

MUSTAFA AYDIN Ankara University

KOSTAS IFANTIS University of Athens

First published in 2004 in Great Britain by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor and Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Copyright collection © 2004 Copyright chapters © 2004 contributors All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. The publisher makes no representation, express or implied, with regard to the accuracy of the information contained in this book and cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Turkish–Greek relations: the security dilemma in the Aegean. – (The ASAM series) 1. National security – Greece 2. National security – Turkey 3. Greece – Foreign relations – Turkey 4. Turkey – Foreign relations – Greece 5. Greece – Foreign relations – 1974– 6. Turkey – Foreign relations – 1980– I. Aydin, Mustafa II. Ifantis, Kosta III. Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (Ankara, Turkey) 327.4'950561 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Turkish–Greek relations: the security dilemma in the Aegean / editors, Mustafa Aydin, Kostas Ifantis. p. cm. – (The ASAM series, ISSN 1740-3758) ISBN 0-7146-5272-5 1. Turkey–Foreign relations–Greece. 2. Greece–Foreign relations–Turkey. I. Aydin, Mustafa. II. Ifantis, Kostas. III. Series. DR479.G8T87 2004 327.4950561–dc22 2003065341 ISBN 0-203-50191-8 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-58155-5 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-7146-5272-5 (cloth)

To Sevim and Agapi

Contents

List of Tables Notes on Contributors Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations Introduction Mustafa Aydın and Kostas Ifantis

ix x xvi xix 1

Part I: From Conflict to Reconciliation? 1. Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations: Constraints and Opportunities Mustafa Aydın 2. National Perception of the ‘Other’ and the Persistence of Some Images Hercules Millas 3. The Greek-Turkish Conflict: Towards Resolution and Reconciliation Alexis Heraclides 4. Turning a New Page in Turkey’s Relations with Greece? The Challenge of Reconciling Vital Interests Tozun Bahcheli

21

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67

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Part II: Building a Security Regime? 5. Tension-Reduction and Confidence-Building in the Aegean Thanos P. Dokos 6. The Economic Imperative: Prospects for Trade Integration and Business Cooperation Panagiotis Liargovas 7. Crisis Management in Greek-Turkish Relations: A Political Economy Analysis since 1974 Ozay Mehmet 8. Environmental Security in the Aegean Sea Nesrin Algan

123 145

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Part III: Stabilizing Expectations? 9. Negotiation and Deterrence in Asymmetrical Power 213 Situations: The Turkish-Greek Case S. Gülden Ayman 10. Perception and Rapprochement: Debating a Greek Strategy 245 Towards Turkey Kostas Ifantis 11. Rapprochement on Non-Governmental Level: The Story 269 of the Turkish-Greek Forum Soli Özel Conclusion Mustafa Aydın and Kostas Ifantis

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Bibliography Index

303 347

List of Tables

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

Greek-Turkish trade Growth rates of Greek-Turkish trade Growth rates of EU-Turkish trade Greek and EU trade with Turkey Significance of individual Balkan countries in total Greek-Balkan trade Significance of individual Balkan countries in total EU-Balkan trade Greece’s bilateral trade with Turkey in agricultural products Greece’s bilateral trade with Turkey in raw materials Greece’s bilateral trade with Turkey in manufactured goods Gravity model for 29 countries and Greece Estimated potential Greek imports (exports) from (to) Turkey Comparative macro indicators for Greece and Turkey, 1980–2000 EU transfers to Greece, 1994–96 Threatened plant species of the Aegean Sea and Islands Threatened animal species of the Aegean Sea and Islands Loads of dissolved nutrients from major rivers discharging into the Aegean Sea Priority pollution hot spots in Greece and Turkey Human-originated environmental security issues in the Aegean Non-human-originated environmental security issues in the Aegean

146 146 147 148 150 151 152 152 152 155 156 164 173 197 198 199 201 204 205

Notes on Contributors

Nesrin Algan is Associate Professor of Environmental Science at the Faculty of Political Science, Ankara University. She graduated and also received her Ph.D. from the same university. She worked at the Turkish Ministry of Environment from 1984 to 1998. She also worked as the national focal point for UNEP’s Mediterranean Action Plan, and took part in a number of international negotiations and drafting committees, including the preparations of several regional and bilateral agreements and programmes on environmental cooperation during her tenure at the Ministry of Environment. Among others, she is the author of Mediterranean Action Plan and Sustainable Development (1998, in Turkish), Environmental Pollution in the Black Sea (1999, in Turkish), Short History of Turkish State’s Environment Policies (2000, in Turkish), Sensitive Sea Areas: A New Approach to the Protection of Environment in Turkish Straits (2000, with Özden Sav, in Turkish), The Significance of International Legislation in Coastal Zone Management (2000), Common International Commitments of Turkey and Greece on the Protection of the Aegean Sea with Special Reference to the Mediterranean Action Plan (2000), Problems of Regional Seas (co-editor with Bayram Öztürk 2001), Environmental Security in the Turkish Straits (forthcoming). Mustafa Aydın is Associate Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Political Science, Ankara University, as well as at the National Security Academy, Ankara, Turkey. He was Research Fellow at the Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

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(1998); UNESCO Fellow at the Richardson Institute for Peace Studies, Lancaster University, UK (1999); Fulbright Scholar at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (2002); and Alexander S. Onassis Fellow (2003). Among other works, he is the author of Turkish Foreign Policy During the Gulf War (1998), Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Year 2000 (1998, in Turkish), Central Asia and the Caucasus: Conflict and Security in the Post-Soviet Space (1999), and New Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus: Causes of Instability and Predicament (2000); and he is the editor of Turkey at the Threshold of the 21st Century (1998), Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present, Future (forthcoming, with Ç. Erhan); and Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A Changing Role in World Politics (2003, with T. Y. Ismael). S. Gülden Ayman is Associate Professor of International Relations at . the Faculty of Political Science, Istanbul University. She studied Political . Science at Bosphorous University and received her Ph.D. from Istanbul University. She was a Research Fellow at the Cesare Alfieri Institute of Social Sciences in Florence, Italy (1989–90), and worked as a foreign policy columnist in the Turkish daily Radikal (1996–98). She has published various articles on the dynamics of conflict and cooperation in Turkish-Greek relations. She is the author . of Conventional Arms Control (Istanbul: Alfa, 1994); A Case of Brinkmanship: S-300 Missile Crisis (Ankara: Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, 2000) and Power, Threat and Alliances: Greek Foreign Policy after the Cold War (Ankara: SAEMK, 2001), all in Turkish. Tozun Bahcheli is Professor of Political Science at King’s College, University of Western Ontario in London, Canada, where he teaches courses in international politics. During the past 25 years, he has conducted research and written on Turkish foreign policy, the Cyprus conflict, and other Greek-Turkish issues. He is the author of numerous journal articles and of Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955 (New York, Westview, 1990). Bahcheli has given interviews on CNN, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, and Voice of America. He holds a BA/MA in political science from the University of Western Ontario and a Ph.D. in International Relations from the London School of Economics. During the 1995–96 academic year, Bahcheli was a senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, DC. Currently he is preparing a book on ethnic conflict in Cyprus, and

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co-editing a volume with Barry Bartmann and Henry Srebrnik on de facto states in international society. Thanos P. Dokos has a Ph.D. from Cambridge University and has held research posts at the Hessische Stiftung Friedens und Konfliktforschung in Frankfurt (1989–90), and the Center for Science and International Affairs (CSIA) at Harvard University (1990–91). He served as the Director for Research, Strategic Studies Division, Hellenic Ministry of National Defence (1996–98) and as an Adviser on NATO issues to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1998–99). He was also a NATO research fellow for 1996–98. Since August 1999 he has been Director of Studies at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). His publications include Negotiations for a CTBT: 1958–1994 (University Press of America, 1995), ‘The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Mediterranean’, Mediterranean Politics (Fall 2000); Turkey’s Geostrategic Role in the PostCold War Era (in Greek, 2001), as well as a number of contributions in collective volumes on non-proliferation, Mediterranean security and Greek-Turkish relations. Alexis Heraclides is currently Associate Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science and History of the Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens. He has studied Political Science at Panteion and International Relations at University College, University of London (M.Sc.) and at the University of Kent at Canterbury (Ph.D.). He has served as counselloradviser for minorities and human rights in international organizations at the Greek Foreign Ministry (1983–97). His books include The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics (London, Frank Cass, 1991), The Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Problematique of Peaceful Resolution (Athens: Papazissis, 1991) [in Greek], Security and Cooperation in Europe: The Human Dimension, 1972–1992 (London: Frank Cass, 1993), Helsinki-II and its Aftermath: The Making of the CSCE into an International Organization (London: Pinter, 1993), International Society and Theories of International Relations: A Critical Review (Athens: I. Sideris, 2000) [in Greek], Greece and the ‘Threat from the East’ (Athens: Polis, 2001) [in Greek], The Cyprus Question: Conflict and Resolution (Athens: I. Sideris, 2002) [in Greek]. His papers have appeared in edited books and in periodicals such as International Organization,

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Journal of Peace Research, Journal of International Affairs, Paradigms, Security Dialogue, Journal of Modern African Studies, Nations and Nationalism, Millennium, The Review of International Affairs, Cahiers d’Etudes sur la Mediterranee orientale et le Monde Turco-Iranien, The Greek Review of Social Research and Elliniki Epitheorisi Politikis Epistimis [Greek Review of Political Science]. Kostas Ifantis is an Associate Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Athens, and Research Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). He studied law at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki and international relations at the University of Bradford, where he received his Ph.D. He worked as a Lecturer in International and European Politics at the universities of Bradford and Portsmouth, UK (1991–95). In 1997–98, he worked in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a Special Adviser on European Security Affairs. He was Research Fellow at the Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (1998), and Fulbright Scholar at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (2002). Among other works, he has published Greece in a Changing Europe (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996), NATO in the New European Order (London, Macmillan, 1996), and Theory and Reform in the European Union (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999); NATO and the New Security Paradigm: Power, Strategy, Order and the Transatlantic Link, Ankara Paper 4 (London, Frank Cass, 2002). Panagiotis Liargovas is an Assistant Professor of International Economics and Economic Policy at the Department of Economics, University of Thessaly, Volos; as well as at the Hellenic Open University, and Research Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). He has been a Fulbright Scholar (1987–91) at Clark University, Worcester, MA, and has worked as a Special Adviser to the Deputy Minister of Finance (1998–99). He has taught in many universities including Clark University, University of Bologna and the Universities of Athens, Patras and Crete as well as the Athens University of Economics and Business. He is the author of four books (in Greek) and editor of three books (two of them in English). He has written numerous articles in collected volumes and

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more than 20 articles in academic journals in areas such as international, European and regional economics. His articles appear in the following journals: Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Economic Analysis and Policy, Annals of Regional Science, Open Economies Review, The European Union Review, Current Politics and Economics of Russia, Central and Eastern Europe, Eastern European Economics, European Environment, Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, Journal of Economic Integration, Post-Communist Economies, Regional Studies, Small Business Economics, East-West Series in Economics, Business and the Environment, Economia Internazionale, International Review of Economics and Business, and Greek Economic Review. Ozay Mehmet is Professor of International Affairs, Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, and Visiting Professor of Economics, Eastern Mediterranean University, Gazimagusa, TRNC. Educated at the English School, Nicosia (1951–57); the London School of Economics (B.Sc., Econ.Hons., 1959–62); and the University of Toronto (MA, 1964 and Ph.D., 1968), Mehmet has taught economics at several Canadian universities. He has published more than a dozen books on economics, especially on development economics, and some 70 academic articles in scholarly journals. His books include: Islamic Identity and Development (1990), which has been translated into German; Westernizing the Third World (2nd edition, 1999), and Towards a Global Labor Market (2000). Mehmet has specialized in human capital and human resource development with special reference to Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore), and he has been consulted by several international development organizations, including the World Bank, UNDP, Asian Development Bank, ILO and WHO. . Hercules Millas is a civil engineer (M.S. Robert College, Istanbul) with a Ph.D. degree in Political Science (University of Ankara). From 1970 to 1986 he worked as an engineer in various countries; from 1990 to 1994 he taught Greek at the Department of Modern Greek Language and Literature of Ankara University, and is currently teaching Turkish and Turkish political thought at Aegean University in Rhodes, Greece. Among his publications are Tencere Dibin Kara … . (The Pot Called the Kettle Black) Istanbul, Amaç, 1987;. Yunan . Ulusunun Dogˇus¸u (The Birth of the Greek Nation), Istanbul, Iletis¸im,

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. 1999; Türk Romanı ve Öteki, Ulusal Kimlikte Yunan Imajı (Turkish Novels and the Other, The Image of Greek and National Identity), . Istanbul, Sabancı Univ. Publications, 2000 [all three in Turkish]; Eikones Ellinon kai Tourkon (The Images of Greeks and Turks – Textbooks, historiography, literature and national stereotypes), Athens, Aleksandria, 2001 [in Greek]; Do’s and Don’ts for Better GreekTurkish Relations, Athens, . Papazissis, 2002 (also in Greek; and in Turkish by Tarih Vakfı, Istanbul). He translated and published more than 15 volumes of Greek literary texts, mostly poetry, into Turkish as well as many articles in Turkish, in Greek and in English, on literary texts, historiography and national perceptions, all related to GreekTurkish relations. Soli Özel teaches international relations and political science at . Istanbul Bilgi University. He was senior fellow in 2002 at St Antony’s College, Oxford University, UK. He is the editor of the Turkish edition of Foreign Policy and Private View, the international journal of Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association. He has been a member of the Turkish-Greek Forum since November 1998.

Acknowledgements

Our idea to co-edit a volume on Greek-Turkish relations dates back to the summer of 1998 when we first met each other in the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. A generous USIS Research Fellowship Program on ‘US Foreign Policy’ enabled us to spend some time discussing Greek-Turkish problems in an open, friendly and relaxed way. The latest round of the GreekTurkish rapprochement, which started in autumn 1999, provided us with the necessary academic and political impetus to engage more actively in collaborative work in a way that sincere academic communication can be enhanced. Two years later, the first phase of the project came to fruition when between 7 and 8 December 2000, we organized a two-day workshop in Ankara, under the auspices of the Faculty of Political Science, University of Ankara, on ‘Turkish-Greek Relations: Escaping from the Security Dilemma in the Aegean’. The first rough outline for this volume was sketched during that conference meeting, when most of the ideas found in the following pages also emerged. The stimulating presentations and the positive experience of uninhibited closedsession discussions led to attractive interactions that definitely enhanced our understanding – at least. Since then, the process of cooperation with a continuously enlarged group of friends and colleagues accelerated. Preparing an edited volume is a long, difficult and, most of the time, frustrating task. As is usually the case with a project of this scope, there are many people and organizations to which we owe

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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much. Thanks are due to USIS, both in Athens and in Ankara. Without knowing, they brought us together in 1998. We would also like to extend our gratitude to those colleagues who attended the 2000 Conference and helped to set the context of the project, but were unable to contribute to this volume. Also, to Professor Celal Göle, Dean of the Faculty of Political Science, Ankara University, for his readiness and enthusiasm to host the event; to Ms Emel Üresin, former Liaison Officer for Turkey in NATO Information and Press Office, and Ambassador Ünal Maras¸lı, former head of the Strategic Research Center of Turkish Foreign Ministry, for their generous financial support of the conference; and to Çagˇrı Erhan, Kudret Özersay and the students of the Faculty of Political Science and members of the organizing committee, who so efficiently dealt with the day-to-day organization of the conference. Financial support from the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board and the Council for International Exchange of Scholars in Washington, DC was instrumental in bringing this project to completion. A generous grant under the Fulbright Aegean Initiative Program offered us the opportunity to work in the most stimulating environment of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Our debt to the amazing people of the Kokkalis Program on southeastern and east central Europe is enormous. We are sincerely grateful to Dimitris Keridis, Elaine Papoulias, Nicholas Yatromanolakis, Mikhala Stein and Nicole Stewart who not only put up with us, but also made us feel welcome. Mustafa Aydın would like to thank Sergei Konoplyov, Director of the Black Sea Security Program, Harvard University, for his friendship and readiness to make available the wonderful facilities of the Program. There, I was able to concentrate on the last-minute frantic correspondence with the authors. My thanks are also due to Professor Ersin Onulduran, Executive Director, and Gülesen Odabas¸ogˇlu, Turkish Programs Officer, of the Turkish Fulbright Commission in Ankara for their advice and support. Finally, a benevolent grant by the Alexander S. Onassis Public Benefit Foundation facilitated the last-minute updates and finalization of the text. Kostas Ifantis would like to thank Ms Artemis Zenetou, Executive Director, and Ms Sophia Cousoula, Greek Program Officer, as well as the rest of the staff of the Fulbright Commission in Athens for their support and kindness. Ms Helen Margiou, US Cultural Attaché in

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Athens as well as Ms Katerina Perentzi and Ms Georgia Galanopoulou also of the Cultural Division of the US Embassy in Athens have always been extremely helpful and supportive. I also wish to thank my colleagues in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Athens when they generously allowed me to take a short leave during the spring semester of 2002. Special thanks are due to the then Head of the Department, Professor Kostas Kostis. I am grateful to Panos Lambridis, an excellent doctoral student and good friend, as well as Georgia Astraka and Alexandra Stefanou, both of the Postgraduate Programme on Southeast European Studies, who took very efficient care of most of my Athens duties during my absence. I am also indebted to Professor Theodore Couloumbis for stimulating my thinking on Greek-Turkish relations, first as a teacher and more recently through a jointly taught seminar on Greek foreign policy at the University of Athens. His kind mentorship and commitment to the study of international politics have been and will continue to be formative for years to come. His generous and constant support will always be highly appreciated. Obviously, our gratitude goes to the friends and colleagues who have contributed to the volume. They dutifully and gracefully responded to our deadline reminders and never-ending queries and requests for revisions, necessitated by the fast-changing landscape of Turkish-Greek relations. We would also like to thank Dr Andrew Mango for his critical and very helpful comments on the final manuscript. Finally to our wives, Sevim and Agapi; our eternal gratitude for their understanding and support in allowing us to pursue our craft at great sacrifice to their own interests and priorities. To you we dedicate this volume. Mustafa Aydın Kostas Ifantis June 2003

List of Abbreviations

AHEPA AKP ATAF BATNA CAM CAP CBM CES CET CFE CFSP CIESIN CU EC ELIAMEP EMU ESDP EU FIR FYROM GEF GTF ICAO

American-Hellenic Educational Progressive Association Justice and Development Party Allied Tactical Air Force (NATO) Best Alternative To a Negotiated Settlement Crisis Avoidance Measures Common Agricultural Policy Confidence Building Measure Constant Elasticity of Substitution Constant Elasticity of Transformation Conventional Forces in Europe Common Foreign and Security Policy Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network Customs Union European Commission Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy European Monetary Union European Union and Defense Policy European Union Flight Information Region Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Global Environmental Facility Greek-Turkish Forum International Civil Aviation Organization

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ICJ IFOR/SFOR IMF KFOR LOS MAP NATO NGO NSC NSSG OECD OSCE PAG PASOK PKK PRIO RUSI SEE SUR TL TRNC UK UN UN/ECE UNDP UNEP US USIS WB WEU

International Court of Justice NATO Enforcement/Stability Force International Monetary Fund United Nations Kosovo Force Law of Sea Mediterranean Action Plan North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non-governmental organizations National Security Council National Statistical Service of Greece Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Political Analysis Group Greek Socialist Party Kurdish Workers Party Peace Research Institute of Oslo Royal United Services Institute State Economic Enterprise Seemingly Unrelated Regression Turkish Lira Turkish Republic of North Cyprus United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Economic Commission for Europe United Nations Development Program United Nations Environment Programme United States of America United States Information Service World Bank Western European Union

Introduction MUSTAFA AYDIN AND KOSTAS IFANTIS

I

For at least the last 40 years Greece and Turkey have been experiencing a relationship of Cold War-type, protracted conflict ‘disrupted’ by shorter or longer détente breaks. This situation has also been described as a relationship of manageable tension. Regardless of terminology, what does exist is a very disturbing potential for escalation, which can lead to a more serious crisis with alarming destabilizing effects at a regional level. The dispute has certainly been a major source of instability in the eastern Mediterranean and a major concern for Greece and Turkey’s NATO allies. Since the Cyprus crisis of 1974, the potential for a major clash between Greece and Turkey has been important for the regional security equation, albeit overshadowed for decades by Cold War dynamics. In the post-Cold War era, relations between Athens and Ankara have remained one of Europe’s most dangerous flashpoints. Even with tangible conflicts in the Balkans, western observers, especially in the United States, worried about the prospect of a wider confrontation pulling in Greece and Turkey. ‘This concern was a consistent theme of arguments for American intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo, despite the fact that Athens and Ankara have pursued distinctly moderate and multilateral policies in the Balkans – perhaps in acknowledgement of the risks of doing otherwise but also out of shared interest.’1 This shows vividly that there exists a multitude of factors in the Aegean that have been producing an intense security dilemma.

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This collection of essays seeks to address, in a rather modest way, the nature of the Greek-Turkish security dilemma as well as whether amelioration of it is feasible in the current international setting. The analytical framework is defined along clear neo-realist lines, where insecurity and conflict are caused by the inescapable self-help nature of the system and the emergence, thus, of threatening balance of power and/or power politics state behaviours. The neo-realist approach to international politics derives from two core assumptions: the centrality of autonomous states wishing to survive and the salience of international anarchy.2 Anarchy – the absence of any common sovereign – is the single most distinguishing feature of international relations. The anarchic structure of international politics, thus, shapes most international outcomes. Christopher Layne explains, that ‘anarchy’, rather than denoting chaos or rampant disorder, refers to the fact that international politics takes place within a self-help realm, and therefore states must rely on their own resources to protect themselves and further their interests.3 Under anarchy, states are dependent upon self-help for their security and must maintain and perhaps expand their military capabilities. International politics is fundamentally competitive. In such an environment, the state’s primary goal is survival. To attain security, states engage in both internal and external balancing tasks, for the purpose of deterring aggressive competitors, and of ‘neutralizing’ them should deterrence fail. In a realist world, whether states desire safety or opportunistic expansion, they are better served by superior, not equal, power. The imperative of survival in a threatening environment forces states to focus on strategies that maximize their power relative to their rivals.4 For this reason, statesmen are usually more concerned with relative advantages than with absolute gains. The problem of uneven gains giving advantage to one side or another makes international cooperation difficult to achieve and hard to maintain. The neo-realist paradigm is built on a fundamental belief in strong links between anarchy, security and relative gains. Though states are not in a constant state of war, anarchy means that nations must constantly fear enslavement or extinction. Because the consequences of a mistake can be catastrophic, states must be cautious in assessing the intentions of both foes and allies, since today’s friend may be tomorrow’s enemy.

INTRODUCTION

3

In the neo-realist perspective, therefore, the security dilemma refers to the notion that a state’s efforts to increase its security, by threatening another state which then responds with steps to increase its own security, paradoxically erodes the first state’s security.5 The two states, without intending to do so, thus find themselves in a spiral of mounting hostility and arms build-ups. The intensity with which the security dilemma operates depends upon a number of conditions: the degree of trust between states; the extent to which uncertainty and incomplete information produce misperceptions of intentions; whether offensive or defensive forces would have the advantage; and whether states can distinguish between others’ offensive and defensive armaments.6 The security dilemma follows from the inability of the two sides to observe each other’s intentions directly. Because military power is inherently offensive rather than defensive in nature, states cannot easily escape the trappings of the security dilemma; only if each side had perfect knowledge that the other was arming strictly for defensive purposes, would the potential spiral stop.7 But because states operate in conditions of less than complete information and of uncertainty, policies are almost always shaped in response to others’ capabilities. What one does to enhance one’s own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure. In an international system, where fear and distrust of other states is the normal state of affairs, the issue of relative power is of vital importance. Although ‘relative power is difficult to measure and is often subjectively appraised’, as Posen put it tactfully, ‘what seems sufficient to one state’s defence will seem, and will often be, offensive to its neighbors. Because neighbors wish to remain autonomous and secure, they will react by trying to strengthen their own positions. States can trigger these reactions even if they have no expansionist inclinations. This is the security dilemma.’ 8 The operation of the security dilemma is one of the key reasons that peace under anarchy may not be stable. Even if no states have explicitly aggressive intentions, anarchy fuels the security dilemma and can produce spirals that lead to growing hostility and, ultimately, to conflict. ‘The possibility that force may be used to settle disputes, even among peaceful, status-quo powers means that states cannot escape the security dilemma – an increase in one state’s security decreases the security of others.’9 Insecurity and the use of force, realists argue are enduring attributes of the self-help international

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system. In the broadest sense of the concept, the security dilemma is indeed understood to follow axiomatically from the anarchic structure of the international system. Although structure matters, in the absence of a rigid bipolar distribution of power in the wider international system, more attention should be paid to unit-level variables. When dealing with regional conflicts, like the Greek-Turkish competition, while structurelevel variables are extremely important, studying unit-level variables also becomes necessary. This means that, differences in state goals – whether states seek the minimum power required for security or additional power for goals other than security – have to be accorded an equal consideration along with anarchy and the distribution of capabilities. Discussion in the following chapters aims, inter alia, at helping us focus at micro/unit level so as to assess the prospects of ameliorating the security dilemma in the Aegean. At bottom, the concept of the security dilemma in international politics rests on the fundamental assumption that states are perceived by other states to be either currently harbouring aggressive designs, or that they may become aggressive in the future. The operation of the Greek-Turkish security dilemma is a case in point. On both sides of the Aegean, perception is a dynamic element. In both countries, there is strong belief that the other has been harbouring and pursuing revisionist policies. In this way, the security dilemma rests also on the inability both to know with certainty the intentions and abilities of the others, and to make credible commitments not to arm for offensive purposes that can drive the insecurity spiral. In general, the unique analytic core of the security dilemma lies in situations where one or more disputing parties have incentives to resort to pre-emptive use of force. The term is used to refer to these specific incentives. As Robert Jervis has noted, incentives to pre-empt arise when offensive military technologies and strategic preferences dominate the more defensive postures, thus offering the ‘attacker’ a strategic advantage. Offence is likely to dominate when there are important military benefits from surprise and mobility.10 Geography can also matter when the terrain seems to be giving an advantage. When offence dominates, ‘even status quo groups (and states), it follows, may be tempted to launch pre-emptive strikes to avoid a possibly even worse fate.’ 11 When incentives to use force preemptively are strong, the security dilemma takes hold and works its

INTRODUCTION

5

disastrous effects. Fearful that the other might pre-empt, a state has an incentive to strike first and negotiate later. In crisis situations, when pre-emption looks like offering a decisive advantage, a cycle of violence can seize even previously thought peaceful or status-quo actors, even as they seek nothing more than their own safety. These actors can be driven to become aggressors, destabilizing regional and international security arrangements.12 States behaving aggressively are motivated by expansion and zero-sum goals and are mainly responsible for power politics behaviours – instead of the more ‘benign’ security-seeking balancing behaviour – that can prevail in international relations. The aim of states perceived to act in a revisionist manner is ‘self-extension’, which often requires power enhancement. ‘Goals of self-extension generally place an extremely high premium on the resort to power as a means. The chances of bringing about any major change in the international status quo by means other than power or even violence are slim indeed. Because it is also true that self-extension is often sought passionately if not fanatically and by actors with various sorts of motivations, the tendency is toward frequent and intensive quests for enhanced power by nations belonging to this category.’ 13 States that behave aggressively, or are perceived by others to behave aggressively, trigger recurring power political turmoil (crises). Therefore, the level of system stability depends on unit-level variations, namely on the strength of revisionist (and status-quo) forces, however they are perceived by the actors involved. II

A look at the post-war history reveals that the Greek-Turkish entanglement has become over the decades an almost unqualified power politics relationship. Power politics makes a quite valid equation of the Hobbesian state of nature with international politics. Each state is, at least potentially, in the situation of a war against (all) others. State-to-state relations are dominated by conflict. The very basic assumption is the state quest for maximization of power. Thus, power is seen both as an end and as a means. Power is not only a crucial means for achieving security, but also a key objective for its own sake.14 According to the power politics perspective, states, wishing to maximize their power and seeking superiority, will

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embark on expansionist foreign policies and adopt offensive military doctrines. In times of crisis, such inclinations are likely to result in aggressive, or force-prone, behaviour.15 The popular image of GreekTurkish relations meets nicely the expectations of the power politics perspective concerning aggressive security and power-maximizing state behaviour. Given the anarchic nature of the international system as well as the exclusivist quality of the state as the dominant form of political organization, the security dilemma can be neither solved nor abolished, but only ameliorated.16 The collection of essays in this volume attempt to survey the overall security dilemma in the Aegean and to address questions related to its amelioration. Its ambition is to provide a fairly good – but by no means exhaustive – treatment of the terrain of the new Greek-Turkish rapprochement debate. It is not an attempt to confirm empirically the operation of the security dilemma in the Aegean and to determine its nature. On this, the interested reader would like to refer to the collection of articles in a special issue of the Études Helleniques/Hellenic Studies.17 As in that volume, in this collection individual analyses and assessments are in the vast majority of cases formed and/or influenced by diehard national perceptions. The editors themselves share these perceptions as can be seen by their individual contributions. However, they also share the conviction that cooperation and security in the Aegean can be achieved, if the two countries – governments and people – succeed in redefining their interests so as to allow a security regime to develop. Analyses like Heraclides’, Bahcheli’s, Mehmet’s, etc., seem to provide considerable insight into how this can be achieved. At a more analytical level, redefinition of interests can be the result of the two actors’ power location and capabilities as well as the domestic interplay in both sides of the Aegean. Following the popular reactions to the 1999 earthquakes and in the same year the EU Helsinki decision to grant Turkey candidate status, the domestic interplay has been – in both countries – more favourable than ever before. The success of Greece in joining the European Monetary Union – contrary to most predictions – helped the establishment of a more favourable bilateral balance-of-power arrangement vis-à-vis Ankara that made Athens more confident in its Turkish policy initiatives. Throughout the history of international relations, states, on the whole, have been operating in a rational manner. Miscalculations

INTRODUCTION

7

that call into question the rationality assumption do occur, especially when actors’ incentives are ‘contaminated’ by perceptions that have nothing to do with security-seeking and interest-satisfying. States respond to the rationality of the situation in which they find themselves. In many instances this may result in negative outcomes, from the breakdown of cooperation to outright war. However, it can also result in highly desirable cooperative outcomes. This is the advantage of the current rapprochement in the Aegean, and this is our argument. It is a situation whose rationality calls for a greater effort to cooperate. The case of the post-war European integration project is an example. The current rapprochement – with definite elements of an alliance-forming process – between the US (and NATO) and Russia is another case in point. Ameliorating perceptions about the ‘other’ and about the other’s intentions could lead to a state of affairs where a convergence of interests in the post-Cold War and post-11 September 2001 world is not only possible but desirable as well. Hercules Millas’ ‘National Perception of the “Other” and the Persistence of Some Images’, thus attempts to discuss the issues of perceptions and images related to Greek-Turkish relations. According to Millas, these relations are generally perceived as a series of political and military controversies. However, due to historical reasons, each party conceives the ‘other’ as a prospective threat or as a challenge to its identity and interprets each of his actions accordingly, creating a vicious circle where the national perceptions dictate the vigilant attitude of ‘ours’. The image of the ‘other’ in each country is portrayed and reproduced negatively: (a) in textbooks, where the most ‘official’ discourse is encountered; (b) in historiography, i.e., within the academic world; and (c) in literary texts where more widespread opinions are voiced. There are, however, a small number of historians and authors of literature who do not exactly follow this recipe. Their case is revealing. Greek writers who actually met and lived with the Turks portray a much more realistic picture of the ‘other’ relative to the authors who have never lived with the Turks and sketched an imaginary (abstract) ‘other’. The first category wrote mostly about recent times, about their experiences (1890–1950) and much less about ‘history’. Literary characters and events that are drawn from life, in other words heroes who are inspired by concrete personalities, are much more balanced. The same trend is noticed in Turkish literature too.

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Positive Greeks are encountered either, (a) in memoirs, where mostly concrete characters are portrayed, or (b) in literary texts based on actual experience and on real encounter with the ‘other’. The conjuncture that created the positive image of the ‘other’ in literary texts seems to be repeated in Greece and Turkey in the period of the earthquakes of 1999. For the first time the television screens in each home in the two countries presented the ‘other’ as he/she really is: concrete and alive (not historical). People appeared under the débris, in pain, as family members, as children, as old people. They looked human and not as a threat, the ‘other’ trying to save ‘us’ (not harm us), and to rejoice when successful, in tears when failed. The picture was a shock therapy of images. For Millas, it is still too early to say how permanent the friendly feelings that the earthquakes caused in the two communities will prove. It is safe to argue, however, that the overcoming of nationalistic dilemmas will have to be accomplished in two spheres: (a) combating on the cognitive sphere the typical traits of nationalism, i.e., xenophobia, insecurity, stereotypes, prejudices etc.; and (b) in practice, creating opportunities in which members of the two communities may meet the ‘concrete other’, i.e. increase the communication between the parties. The same line of argument is pursued by Mustafa Aydın, ‘Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations: Constraints and Opportunities’, who is confident that ‘the majority of long-standing disagreements between the two countries could have been overcome years ago had the leadership in both countries acted responsibly … and not turned a blind eye to the other’s needs and fears’. Instead they ended up ‘with a fearful state of “security dilemma” on the brink of war and with populations on each side thoroughly “educated” to distrust each other at every level’. The basic reason for this state of affairs, Aydın argues, is ‘living history’, in the sense that both Greece and Turkey refuse to let go of the past and ‘the past continues to live in the present’, which creates and refuels the distrust between them. Further, Aydın insists that despite the détente since 1999, Greece and Turkey have not yet reached the point where the ‘security dilemma’ would make way for a ‘security community’. The major obstacle in front of overall rapid reconciliation is the need to overcome years of distrust and prejudice, which requires a longterm commitment to a problem-solving approach, and cannot be

INTRODUCTION

9

solved easily and summarily. Therefore, Aydın argues, ‘magical formulas for rapid reconciliation’ in the short term would not work in the Aegean. In ‘The Greek-Turkish Conflict: Towards Resolution and Reconciliation’, Alexis Heraclides examines the 1999 détente between the two countries. He starts by posing the question whether reconciliation (as distinct from an ephemeral thaw) is at all possible and argues that the main issue is perceptual hence amenable to resolution and an overdue one at that. Then he examines how and why the recent détente seems to have come about, particularly from the Greek point of view. He also takes stock of the main tangible achievements so far in this novel, by Greek-Turkish standards, Mitrany-type low politics approach to peace. Then the main hurdles ahead are examined, those that cannot be wished away and need to be addressed forthwith lest the whole processes runs aground. The main emphasis is on the bilateral Aegean dispute, though Cyprus – hardly a bilateral question – is in fact the most daunting problem. Heraclides concludes by a series of suggestions, both practical and theoretical, of how to go about the task of cementing the reconciliation. For Tozun Bahcheli, in ‘Turning a New Page in Turkey’s Relations with Greece? The Challenge of Reconciling Vital Interests’, enduring suspicion and mistrust have made it very difficult to reconcile the mostly strategic interests that both countries have in Cyprus and the Aegean. It is probable that without the legacy of past conflicts, compromise solutions could have been found to both the Aegean and Cyprus disputes, leaving the two neighbours free to pursue other priorities. However, even as the two countries occasionally became embroiled in dangerous confrontations, raising the spectre of war against each other, they have also shown care to manage and stabilize their relations. Bahcheli points out that, although encouraged by such third parties as the United States and NATO to reconcile their differences over many decades, Ankara and Athens have been unable to make progress in resolving outstanding issues in the Aegean or Cyprus. The Aegean dispute has been essentially a bilateral problem between Turkey and Greece, and so far Ankara has succeeded in resisting Greek attempts to ‘internationalize’ and ‘Europeanize’ such issues. The Cyprus problem, on the other hand, in spite of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot wishes, has been an international issue for decades. Since 1974, Ankara and the Turkish

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Cypriot government have felt international pressure to end the partition of the island and negotiate a bi-zonal federation. Greek and Greek Cypriot successes in securing a commitment from Greece’s EU partners that the accession of Cyprus to the EU can be realized without a prior settlement between the Cypriot communities has upset Turkish (and Turkish Cypriot) planning. However, Turkey’s own interest in advancing towards EU membership has created a strong incentive to solve the Aegean issues and to help achieve a settlement in Cyprus. Talks have been conducted by Turkish and Greek officials on Aegean issues since early 2002. At the same time, Cypriot leaders on the island have engaged in a renewed effort to break the Cyprus log-jam. Previous failures in achieving solutions in the Aegean and Cyprus suggest that these new talks will not easily yield breakthroughs. However, there are numerous ideas for compromise that could help achieve progress in both issues. The rapprochement between Ankara and Athens that began in late 1999 and Turkish candidacy for EU membership have created a new window of opportunity for Turkey’s relations with Greece and Cyprus to enter a new, more hopeful era. Thanos Dokos in his contribution, discusses the current debate and process on ‘Tension-Reduction and Confidence-Building in the Aegean’. For Dokos, the burden of history and the ghosts of the past are the major causes of the lack of trust between Greece and Turkey. Indeed, historical animosities do play a significant role. Greeks and Turks are classic examples of rival peoples (one can think of several other examples, including French and Germans, or Russians and Germans); however, it is important to realize that such peoples cannot afford to be prisoners of the past and history should become their guide, not their prison. Suspicion concerning the other side’s motives is deep-rooted in both popular opinion and the media; this in turn affects, and at times even drives, the respective governments. This intense distrust on both sides of the Aegean prompts many observers to call for a reduction of mutual suspicion as the essential first step toward peace and stability. Unfortunately, this is easier said than done. Reduction of suspicion is a long-term process, and, as such, is beyond the horizon of serving governments. There is also a basic lack of mutual knowledge between Greeks and Turks on issues other than foreign and security policy, including culture, society and religion.

INTRODUCTION

11

According to Dokos, to have even a minimal chance of success, any effort for a substantial improvement of Greek-Turkish relations and, perhaps, the resolution of the fundamental problems between the two countries, should be as well prepared as possible. The cost of failure, in the case of a hastily and poorly prepared initiative, may be quite significant because of heightened expectations, leading to frustration. Therefore, a number of preconditions should exist. Among others, these include the avoidance of high expectations, as subsequent failure may have very negative consequences for bilateral relations; the exercise of strong leadership in both countries; a relative military balance; an active and balanced involvement of international actors in the confidence-building process; an understanding of the political and economic costs of the continued confrontation by both leaderships; an absence (or low importance) of domestic factors contributing to the continuation of the conflict; the political will on both sides to improve bilateral relations, and so on. Overall, Dokos does not think that, at least in the short term, expectations can be realistic. In any case, tension-reduction and CBMs are necessary – but not sufficient – prerequisites for the resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict. They could (and should), however, constitute integral parts of a limited security regime that could be adopted by Greece and Turkey, with the aim of managing both crisis-stability and arms-race stability, as well as avoiding the catastrophic losses of a war. In the latter part of his essay Dokos presents some practical and hopefully feasible ideas and suggestions for a longer-lasting reduction of tension between Greece and Turkey. Panagiotis Liargovas’ essay, ‘The Economic Imperative: Prospects for Trade Integration and Business Cooperation’, is an attempt to identify areas of convergence and shared interests between the two countries, and tries to shed some light on the prospects for trade and business cooperation between Greece and Turkey. It is first demonstrated that trade integration between Greece and Turkey is increasing fast and the Turkish share of total Greek exports reached 9 per cent by the year 2000, though in imports, the corresponding share has been much lower, around 3.5 per cent. Liargovas then investigates the future prospects for the development of bilateral trade with the use of a gravity model. Finally, the paper sheds light on economic cooperation in selected sectors of interest for both

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countries, such as tourism, sea fishing, pisciculture, industry, banking, local government and universities. Ozay Mehmet, on the other hand, in his paper on ‘Crisis Management in Greek-Turkish Relations: A Political Economy Analysis Since 1974’ identifies the more fundamental determinants of the profound national difference between Greece and Turkey in the field of crisis management. An explicit understanding of this national difference is important in analysing its consequences particularly in terms of promoting peace and cooperation between the Aegean neighbours. Mehmet focuses on the political crisis management in two key areas of Greek-Turkish relations, namely the disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean. He observes that in both cases, extreme nationalism has dictated policy design at home. But, externally Greece has sought to ‘Europeanize’ the disputes, whereas Turkey has opposed this approach, proposing direct bilateral dialogue between Athens and Ankara, preferring American to European mediation whenever Greek-Turkish relations took an explosive turn. The Cyprus dispute is, of course, the key to Greek-Turkish relations and that is where the most marked difference in conflict management between these two nations is manifest. In the second part of the paper, Mehmet is concerned with the economic costs and benefits of crisis management in Greece and Turkey. While Greece has managed to derive tremendous economic benefits from its membership in the EU, Turkey’s struggle with structural adjustment has been a story of successive rounds of crises. The Turkish economy has been undergoing stabilization and structural adjustment since 1980, designed largely in Washington. This long story does not have a happy ending because of extensive political corruption, which ultimately led to the banking and currency crisis of February 2001. Mehmet concludes by arguing that Greek-Turkish relations in future need to be efficiency-driven to maximize joint benefits. Nationalistic premises should be replaced by higher standards and criteria (such as the Copenhagen Criteria) in public policy that hold the key to future peace and cooperation across the Aegean. Nesrin Algan, in ‘Environmental Security in the Aegean Sea’, deals with an overlooked area of potential security concern, which by its nature cannot be addressed outside a bilateral – if not multilateral – framework. Environmental problems such as the ecosystems

INTRODUCTION

13

are transboundary and supranational. It is unlikely for traditional national sovereignty concepts to allow the protection and management of shared ecosystems and the global commons. Environmental threats due to environmental degradation and/or environmental resource scarcity may act as the structural reason for a conflict between countries or may act as a trigger or a catalyst for a conflict. A significant part of the environmental threats and stresses in the Aegean Sea threaten drastically to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants at its shores. Its particular geomorphologic structure, oceanographic, hydrographic, ecological and biological characteristics and relationships between its two coastal countries make the Aegean even more vulnerable. Both Turkey and Greece need a new political commitment that accepts the Aegean Sea as a common asset, and as the keepers of this common heritage, they should sensitively avoid policies and implementations likely to cause environmental conflicts. Gülden Ayman’s ‘Negotiation and Deterrence in Asymmetrical Power Situations: The Greek-Turkish Case’ argues that in order to understand one of the major sources of intractability of the TurkishGreek conflict and the problems related to the Aegean Sea, one needs to examine the overall asymmetrical perceptions of power, threat and strategic behaviours affected by these perceptions. Ayman’s argument is that in most international conflicts the behaviour of the parties vis-à-vis to each other is closely linked with the mutual perceptions of power and threat. Especially when the adversaries perceive themselves unequal in power, it is generally observed that mutually acceptable outcomes are difficult to obtain. However, it is not easy to determine the dynamics behind how relative power distribution contributes to the intractability of the international conflicts. Ayman tries to examine it in the Turkish-Greek conflict context related to the problems in the Aegean. In doing so, the analysis poses two sets of questions: (1) How do Turkish and Greek strategic elites cognitively construct power and threat?; and (2) How do these relative perceptions affect their strategic behaviour vis-à-vis each other? For Ayman, a detailed analysis of the Greek-Turkish conflict with a special emphasis on the Aegean problems could not only provide us with some clues about the dynamics of asymmetrical power conflicts, but may also help determine what might be done more constructively for their resolution. Like Ayman, Kostas Ifantis draws upon structural realism to

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analyse the relationship between the Greek national perception of Turkey and the current rapprochement process, while reflecting on the debate over Greek strategy towards Ankara. Ifantis acknowledges that in a security environment increasingly characterized by ‘transregional’ problems and ‘transsovereign’ challenges, from a western and, above all, an American perspective, Turkey is certainly a transregional partner par excellence. What in the early years of the twenty-first century seems to be less certain is the role Ankara will choose to play, and for that matter how Greek-Turkish relations will evolve. In the context of a – let us assume, durable – rapprochement process, will Turkey become a partner and a stabilizer or will it – rather aggressively, to the Greek mind – seek regional dominance? Given this uncertainty, the challenge to Greek policy is to find a posture that can encourage a positive evolution in Greek-Turkish relations and appropriately respond to negative developments in the short term, while also protecting Greece against the possibility that in the longer term, Turkey may embark on a rather hostile course. Ifantis explains that, although in Greece there is a dominant perception about Turkish behaviour and (revisionist) foreign policy aims, there is a lack of consensus on what strategy can best achieve national strategic purposes. The central question in the current postHelsinki debate (as with the post-Madrid one in 1997) is whether Greece should pursue, abandon or modify what seems to be a strategy of engagement. Many in Greece have argued that the engagement strategy currently pursued is doomed to fail. Some strongly believe that constraining or balancing the growth of Turkish power should become (again) the overriding focus of Greek strategy. In effect, they imply that Greece must move from engagement to an exclusively containment policy. Ifantis points out the profound polarization within the Greek policy-making and academic communities. The aim of Ifantis’s paper – in the overall framework of ameliorating the Greek-Turkish security dilemma, and through the dominant Greek perception of the bilateral relationship – is, first, to show that both strategies have serious limitations, which are the result of a profound misreading of the new international and regional strategic environment; and second, to point out the fundamental requirements for an effective strategy towards Turkey, a strategy that can effectively result in supporting Turkey’s modernization efforts, enhancing the process of stabilization and democratization at the

INTRODUCTION

15

wider regional level, and in strengthening Greek economic, political and above all military capabilities thus reinforcing a stabilizing balance of power arrangement in the Aegean. The objective of Greek policy-makers should be the gradual reduction and eventual abolition of the strategic competition between the two countries, and the advancement, at the same time, of cooperative and even integrative arrangements. The latter refers to reaching a stage – with time – where common assessments and common policies in an everexpanding issue agenda can be adopted. In that context, the discussion focuses on the central strategic question confronting Greece in its interaction with Turkey. What are the principal threats to Greek interests? How can those interests best be defended? What combination of economic, diplomatic, and other instruments should be used to protect and advance Greek interests? For Ifantis, these are the enduring questions that should shape the landscape of Greek strategic choices in the Aegean. Finally, Soli Özel’s elegant contribution demonstrates the importance of ‘second-track’ diplomacy. The story of the Greek-Turkish Forum shows how unofficial organizations, think-tanks and others could act as agents of change and provide an engine for policy learning and innovative policies. Unconstrained by established bureaucratic norms, rules and parameters, such organizations can attempt to redefine material interests, change the perceptions of groups and indeed promote social learning. In these times, the resources available to civil society in human, information, expertise and material terms make institutionalized second-track diplomacy an effective supplement to interstate relations, particularly in conflict situations. Perhaps more importantly, the practical lesson that one can draw from the Greek-Turkish Forum’s successful journey is that second-track initiatives need both a first-track opening in the background and a degree of official sanctioning that does not jeopardize their independence of thought and action. III

It is obvious that the essays included in this volume are not intended to provide a comprehensive overview of the Greek-Turkish conflict. This has been done – by Turkish, Greek and others – over the years many times, more or less successfully. Moreover, they do not cover

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all the issues raised in the debates, disputes and conflicts in the Aegean. And they do not attempt to evaluate the very well known claims of each side. The essays do, however, demonstrate that although national perceptions die hard, the security dilemma that has been at work between Turkey and Greece for at least four decades can be ameliorated. As Ifantis notes in his contribution, there can be little strategic rationale for premeditated conflict between two state actors like Greece and Turkey. Open conflict would pose enormous political risks for both of them, quite apart from uncertainties at the operational level. Yet the risk of an accidental clash remains, given the continuing armed air and naval operations in close proximity and the highly charged atmosphere surrounding competing claims. The Aegean and especially Cyprus are sensitive national questions par excellence. Moreover, with both countries modernizing their military capabilities, the potential for destructiveness and escalation is far greater today than in the past. Normalization, even at an embryonic level, represents a change in Greek-Turkish relations that is indeed strategic in nature. The Greek decision to support the offer of EU candidacy to Turkey at the December 1999 Helsinki summit – although emphasizing particular conditions favourable to Greek interests – reflected a new, strategic approach to the future of relations with Ankara, and it represents a major step towards dampening the sources of unintended spirals. The strategic motivations for the Helsinki compromise and the Greek-Turkish rapprochement were facilitated by a series of proximate factors. There was a perception on both sides in the wake of the Kardak/Imia crisis, the 1997–98 tension over the planned deployment of S-300 surface-to-air missiles on Cyprus, and the spring 1999 Öcalan affair, that brinkmanship had reached very dangerous levels. An accident or miscalculation in the Aegean could easily escalate to large-scale warfare. ‘This sense of peering over the brink, palpable in 1996, was arguably not unlike the effect of the Cuban missile on USSoviet relations more than 30 years earlier.’ 18 The Helsinki decisions proved to be instrumental in reversing the deterioration in EUTurkish relations that had followed the Luxembourg and Cardiff summits and offered a path toward closer Turkish integration in Europe, paving the ground for the most serious attempt towards reducing, and even abolishing the tension in the Aegean. In that

INTRODUCTION

17

sense, the future path of Turkish-EU relations will, to a great extent, determine the fate of the post-1999 rapprochement developments. The following discussion makes clear that reducing or even abolishing conditions of uncertainty should be a target and the overriding concern for all involved on both sides of the Aegean, and a source of vibrant but positive debates and policy innovations. The editors, having full knowledge of their modest effort, really hope that this collection stimulates additional debate, research, and ultimately better explanation and understanding.

NOTES 1. Ian O. Lesser, Stephen F. Larrabee, Michele Zanini and Katia Vlachos, Greece’s New Geopolitics (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), p. 20. 2. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). 3. Christopher Layne, ‘Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace’, International Security, 19, 2 (Fall 1994), p. 10. 4. Ibid. 5. See Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, 30, 2 (January 1978), pp. 167–214. 6. Ibid. and Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 58–113. 7. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, ‘Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict’, International Security, 21, 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 41–75. 8. Barry R. Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, in Michael Brown (ed.) Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 104. 9. Randall L. Schweller, ‘Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?’, in Benjamin Frankel (ed.) Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996), p. 116. 10. Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, pp. 169–89. 11. Lake/Rothchild, ‘Containing Fear’. 12. On this issue, see the very accurate critique of Panayotis J. Tsakonas of the work of the late Panayotis Kondylis [Theory of War (Athens: Themelio, 1997), in Greek]. Kondylis proposed a strategy of a massive first-strike, which is based on the false assumption ‘that a Greek-Turkish war would result in Greece’s destruction while peace will sooner or later turn Greece into Turkey’s satellite’. Panayotis J. Tsakonas, ‘The Security Dilemma in Greek-Turkish Relations: Theory and Practice’, Études Helleniques/Hellenic Studies, 9, 2 (Autumn 2001), p. 25. 13. Arnold Wolfers, ‘The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference’, in Arnold Wolfers (ed.), Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), as cited in Schweller, ‘Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias’, p. 99. 14. Kenneth Waltz, ‘Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory’, Journal of International Affairs, 44, 1 (Spring/Summer 1990), pp. 34–6. 15. Benjamin Miller, ‘Competing Realist Perspectives on Great Power Crisis Behavior’, in Benjamin Frankel (ed.) Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996), p. 328.

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16. Robert Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, International Organization, 36, 2 (1982), p. 178, as quoted in Tsakonas, ‘The Security Dilemma in Greek-Turkish Relations’, p. 6. 17. See Études Hellenique/Hellenic Studies, 9, 2 (Autumn 2001). The project is an attempt by a group of Greek and Turkish scholars to examine particular case studies, which fall into the three basic manifestations of the Greek-Turkish conflict: (a) arms race, (b) crises situations and (c) competitive alliance formation. 18. Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini and Vlachos, Greece’s New Geopolitics, p. 22.

PART I

FROM CONFLICT TO RECONCILIATION?

1 Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations: Constraints and Opportunities MUSTAFA AYDIN

INTRODUCTION

The Turkish-Greek problems are not new, are well-delineated and have proved unsolvable until very recently when a flurry of interrelated events brought them into the limelight once again: mutual understanding created by the earthquakes that hit both countries in late summer 1999; Turkish acceptance of the EU Helsinki Summit (1999) decisions, comprising acknowledgement of Turkey’s candidature, lifting of Greek veto and veiled Turkish acceptance of the Union’s relations with Cyprus; agreement to refer Greek-Turkish problems to the International Court of Justice should they not solve them by the end of 2004; EU’s promise at long last in the Copenhagen Summit to consider starting membership negotiations with Turkey at the end of 2004 or soon thereafter; imminent Greek Cypriot EU membership on behalf of the whole island; successful Greek efforts to involve the Union into the Cyprus problem; and finally a protracted plan by the UN Secretary-General to solve it within a timeframe concomitant with the EU enlargement agenda. However, it would be naive indeed if we attempt to understand the long-standing Greek-Turkish entanglement from the lenses of recent developments and fail to judge the impact of the not so recent past, marred with its frequent ups and downs, various attempts to solve the problems, and many odd incidents. A Turkish coaster named Figen Akat, for example, ran aground on 25 December 1995 over one of the hitherto unnoticed rocks in the Aegean, 3.8 nautical

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miles off the Turkish coast. At the time, nobody could foresee that this simple incident would start a series of events that brought two allies to the brink of war, which, thanks to US mediation, was only just avoided. This was only one of the recent occasions when Greece and Turkey almost went to war with each other. Judging by their size, the Kardak/Imia Rocks do not seem like much to fight over. But there were serious issues at stake and the incident might well have escalated to full-scale war between two allies. Though the whole affair took less than five days to be played out, the nature of the crisis over a couple of barren rocks, the speed by which it escalated, and the manner in which it was resolved, underscored the delicate state of relations between the two countries in the Aegean. The majority of long-standing disagreements between them could have been overcome years ago had the leadership in both countries acted responsibly by abandoning the policy of making use of those disagreements in domestic power struggles, and had they, with a nationalistic myopia, not turned a blind eye to the other’s needs and fears. However, as this has not been the case, we end up with a fearful state of ‘security dilemma’, on the brink of war and with populations on each side thoroughly ‘educated’ to distrust each other at every level. Although the thaw in relations since 1999 has provided renewed hopes for a comprehensive reconciliation, we have not yet reached the point where the ‘security dilemma’ can be overcome to make way to a peaceful coexistence, or better still to a creation of a ‘security community’ between the two states. The main reason for this, which is also the basic proposition of this paper, is that the existing disagreements and problems between the two states, further complicated by years of distrust and prejudice, require the creation of a comprehensive understanding between the nations, and which cannot be solved easily and summarily. Therefore, trying to create a general understanding and trusting environment between the two states and more importantly, between peoples, would have much better chances, in the long term, than running after magical formulas for rapid reconciliation.

Living History Among the obstacles that prevent not only the solution but even the discussion of the ‘real’ problems is the distrust between the two

CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES

23

nations created by their ‘living history’. In both Greece and Turkey, ‘history is not past; indeed, the past continues to live in the present’.1 This anomaly stems from the fact that both Turkey and Greece have obtained their national identities by fighting against, and interacting with, each other. Therefore, it would not be possible, for example, to understand modern Greek history without taking the ‘Turkish factor’ into account. Almost every corner of today’s Greece had been under Turkish rule for about four hundred years, and modern Greece was born out of the struggle against the Ottoman Empire. The popular Turkish image of Greek ‘Independence War’ is that of a rebellion, instigated and supported by the Great Powers of the nineteenth century, who ‘used’ the Greeks for their own purposes to break up the Ottoman Empire. In a similar fashion, modern Turkey earned its nation-state status only after defeating Greek occupation forces in Western Anatolia following World War I. For the Greeks, this struggle, which is revered as the ‘War of National Liberation’ by the Turks, is still remembered as the ‘Asia Minor catastrophe’.2 The fact that these two states earned their national identities by fighting each other has undoubtedly affected their subsequent relations. It also reinforced identity crises of both peoples. Both Turkey and Greece – maybe more so Turkey – have felt insecure about their situation between East and West. Though ‘they share a common heritage’, i.e. Ottoman-Levantine, neither Greece nor Turkey, for different reasons, wishes to acknowledge it. This creates an important problem as ‘neither state is at peace with itself, because, to deny one’s own past which lives on in the present, is to deny one’s own very identity’.3 In order to compensate for this denied common heritage, both nations have to remember their national struggles for independence unceasingly and cling to the best delineated parts of their identities, i.e. their nation-stateness, defined in terms of opposition to the ‘other’. In this way, they are not only pushing the common heritage into a forgotten past, but are also creating a living part of history by advancing confrontation and conflict to the forefront.4 This, then, only helps to reinforce and widen mutual mistrust. Therefore, as argued by Clogg, … even if a rapprochement between two governments is achieved, it would be a much more difficult and arduous process to overcome the mistrust between two peoples, mutual

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stereotypes and fears that are fundamental for existing confrontation. Until a fundamental change in mutual (mis)perceptions has been achieved, we will continue to see a mutual proclivity towards suspicion and crisis in the relations between two states.5 As is often the case between long-suffering neighbours, locked in chronicled enmities, the history of relationship between Greece and Turkey is littered with a long list of past failures and deceptions. However, the symbolic strength of this history in defining current and future relations is often misunderstood by outsiders, who usually trivialize the nature of the ‘love–hate’ relationship between the two countries. This then leads to leaving them alone, an act that helps prolong the disputes and makes them insoluble. Because, ‘although both sides stress their willingness to engage in dialogue to resolve outstanding grievances’, the danger is that, in the absence of an external threat or ‘encouragement’ to move closer, ‘neither lacks examples to cite of the other’s perceived intransigence or paranoia’.6 It is clear that threat perceptions on both sides of the Aegean have not been symmetric and will not be in the foreseeable future. Given the disparity between the two countries’ history, resources and population, the fact that most of the Greeks consider Turkey as a ‘threat’, and that in turn, most of the Turks do not attribute priority to a ‘Greek threat’ is understandable.7 However, distrust that has been created by the ‘living history’ is a sense that is shared and continually reinforced on both sides of the Aegean. Therefore, when dealing with Greek-Turkish relations, it is necessary first to take into account the lack of faith in each other’s reliability; then, in order to overcome such an overwhelmingly negative psychology, both sides have to be resolute in sustaining a long-term commitment to nonpolitical confidence-building measures. Such a determined effort has not been made so far by either side. Although the two foreign ministers have engaged for the first time in years in what seems to be a ‘dialogue’, and individuals and NGOs on both sides of the Aegean have created a lively atmosphere of cooperation and exchange of views, it is still too early to argue that these efforts have produced irreversible results. It is clear that, given the excessive baggage of distrust both sides bring to discussions and the effects of the importance of third-party related developments (especially Turkey’s relations with the EU) on bilateral relations, even the good-

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intentioned efforts on both sides would not be enough by themselves to ensure real harmony. The past record of ethnic conflicts throughout the world has shown that temporary measures ‘do not provide much hope for the eradication of wholesome memories of real or imagined past mistakes. Also, it is impossible to reduce the existing Greek-Turkish confrontation to mutual misunderstandings’.8 Therefore, only a sustained long-term effort and increased cooperation could heal the wounds of a living history and put it into its proper place – the past.

Exceptions That Prove the Rule Cooperation is very easy and tempting to advocate, but difficult to realize in Turkish-Greek relations. As even a rudimentary analysis of past record could easily demonstrate, the dominant trend in GreekTurkish relations is conflict and competition, and that cooperation is the exception. There have been two cooperative periods between Greece and Turkey in modern times: the 1930s and the first half of the 1950s. During the first period, there was a common threat from Italy’s Mare Nostrum policy and encouragement from England to cooperate against it, and the two countries were engaged in friendly relations culminating in the establishment of the Balkan Entente in 1934. During the second period, there was Soviet threat and American encouragement. Judging from these examples, we may conclude that Turkey and Greece, as a rule, could improve their harmony only when there is a common threat and, at the same time, they are encouraged to cooperate against this threat by an outside power that has a leverage over them.9 Accordingly, during the Cold War, both Greece and Turkey were able to cooperate under the NATO banner in putting away their disagreements and, in an effort to prove their loyalty to the Alliance, often ‘subordinated their own national interests to the dictates of alliance cohesion and the need for collective action’. In the 1960s and the 1970s, however, ‘as the security consensus that had characterized the early post-war period began to erode’, most of the old problems and tensions, coupled with new ones, re-emerged, ‘complicating relations with the US and NATO’.10 What initially tipped off the disagreements between the two states were the developments

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related to the 1963–64 Cyprus crisis and, over the next decade, when relations were exacerbated by a number of other events, ranging from the continental shelf to the treatment of national minorities. Since then the West has become a reference point in relations between the two states. Both sides have shown persistence in trying to explain their bilateral problems and complain about each other to the West, especially to the US. They have also quite consistently taken up positions that, instead of reflecting their strict national interests, have adopted those they thought would be favoured by the West. In this respect, Greece has been particularly attentive since it considered NATO membership as an insurance against Turkey, and tried to use its influence to curtail Turkey’s importance for the Alliance.11 Moreover, after obtaining its EC/EU membership on 1981, Greece had utilized all the assistance that the European institutions could provide against Turkey, which has become vulnerable and disadvantaged as it remained outside and wanted to be let in. On the other hand, one of the important consequences of accepting the West as a reference point in bilateral relations has been that both countries have attempted to utilize their bilateral disputes and confrontations in order to solidify their place within the western state system. In the early 1980s, for example, Greek Premier Andreas Papandreou, by exaggerating the threat perception that Greece had of Turkey, tried to obtain a better place in the western world for his country. His Turkish counterpart, Turgut Özal, on the other hand, tried to reach the same point from an opposite way. He affected a contemptuous attitude acting as if the existing problems between the two countries amounted to nothing, and thereby, while minimizing their importance, tried to create a favourable image in the western world both for himself and for Turkey. In short, the effects of external factors, especially western patronage and influence, on TurkishGreek relations and on the decision-making processes of both countries’ foreign and domestic policies are obvious.

BILATERAL ISSUES

Since 1974, Greek-Turkish relations have been handicapped mainly by two sets of issues: Cyprus and the Aegean. Although, politically and legally, they are quite separate issues, there is ‘an obvious

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psychological linkage between them in the sense that a resolution of one would have an important psychological impact on the resolution of the other’,12 because it is felt that a weakening of one’s position in one of the areas would have an effect in the other. Of the two, the dispute over the Aegean is more important because, unlike the Cyprus issue, it touches more directly on vital national interests concerning territorial sovereignty and security for both countries.13 Then, there are other thorny issues between the two countries such as the treatment of Greek population within Turkey and of Turkish minority within Greek borders, the Greek veto (until recently) of Turkish membership of the EU, and numerous other disagreements within NATO. Most of these issues are immensely complex, intertwined and hotly disputed. But, as much has been written on the issues involved and on the presentation of perspectives, only a simplified sketch of the disputes related with the Aegean and Cyprus will be attempted here, with some suggestions on how to deal with them.14

Confrontation in the Aegean The Aegean issue is, in fact, a set of four separate issues. These include: (1) delimitation of the maritime boundaries and continental shelf; (2) breadth of territorial waters; (3) control of the air space beyond the territorial waters; and (4) Greek militarization of eastern Aegean islands. Each of these is entangled with the general mistrust between the two nations and with their attempts to gain political advantage in settling outstanding differences. However, as the Aegean is a semi-closed sea with unique geographical features and equal strategic, economic and political importance for its two littoral states, in order to reach a long-term settlement particular attention should be paid to the establishment and maintenance of a balance between the interests of the two countries. The dispute over territorial waters relates to Greece’s claim that, though currently operating a 6-mile limit, it is entitled to a 12-mile territorial sea both for its mainland and for its islands in the Aegean. The Turks, however, feel differently about the matter because to them it represents an ‘age-old attempt by Greece to turn the Aegean into a Greek lake’. They point to the fact that if a 12-mile limit is implemented, then virtually all passage to high seas from Turkish

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Aegean and Black Sea ports would be through areas under Greek sovereignty and jurisdiction.16 Thus, in case of an extension, Turkey will be locked out of the Aegean and confined to its own territorial waters. While international law grants the right of innocent passage, Turkish officials feel that ‘Greece would be able to create artificial difficulties’.17 Moreover, as the territorial waters issue is very much interlinked with other Aegean disputes, any extension of Greek territorial waters will have a direct bearing on the settlement of those issues, as well.18 Hence, the Turkish governments have repeatedly declared that if Greece goes ahead with the unilateral adoption of 12mile territorial waters in the Aegean, it would represent a casus belli. It is obvious that an extension of territorial waters is not a practical necessity for Greece unless valuable mineral resources are found on the continental shelf and Greece feels that it could not protect them in any other way. Short of that, the only other motivation for the extension of the territorial waters would be political, in a sense that a weak government might find it useful to play this card in order to generate domestic popularity and support. However, the benefits that may be obtained in this way for the government must be weighed against the dangers of war with Turkey. The various Greek governments, therefore, have shown restraint so far by not extending territorial waters, thereby avoiding a dangerous confrontation. Consequently, the territorial waters dispute has stagnated and has been dormant for years. The continental shelf dispute is also related to the existence of oil in the Aegean, and complicated by the fact that Greece and Turkey have never had a delimitation agreement regarding maritime boundaries in the Aegean. It first became an issue of contention when the Greek government announced oil and natural gas discoveries in the area and went on to claim, in February 1974, most of the Aegean continental shelf. In order to prevent a fait accompli, Turkey proposed negotiations to demarcate the respective spheres of the Greek and Turkish continental shelves, but the then ruling Junta in Athens did not respond.19 Turkey, in return, sent a survey ship accompanied by warships, to the disputed areas, mainly to serve as symbol of Turkey’s interest in the Aegean seabed. Since then, the dispute has continued to poison relations as most of the other issues, in one way or another, are linked to the continental shelf issue. The Greeks argue that most of the Aegean continental shelf

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belonged to them with an attendant economic zone because of the numerous Greek islands, and deny any Turkish right in areas to the west of the Greek islands since this, according to Greece, would constitute a threat to its sovereignty. The Turks, on the other hand, have argued that much of the Aegean continental shelf is geologically an extension of the Anatolian mainland, or that it should be delimited on an equitable basis. Traditionally, Greece proposes taking the issue to the International Court of Justice, and in fact did so in August 1976. However, the Court’s decision was that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the Greek application. Later in November 1976, Greece and Turkey signed an agreement in Bern and decided to hold negotiations with a view to reaching an agreement. They also undertook to refrain from any initiative or act concerning the Aegean continental shelf. The talks between the two countries continued without a final agreement until 1981 when Greek Premier Papandreou decided to stop negotiations with Turkey. The problem is clearly more than a superfluous whim for both sides, as shown by the crises of 1976 and 1987 when explorations by one of the parties in the disputed areas led to confrontation and nearly war.20 In fact, the Greek discoveries turned out to have been much smaller than originally estimated, and the Turkish explorations located no oil.21 Thus, the existing resources are hardly worth fighting a war over, though the issue remains as the most contentious disagreement between the two countries. Air-space related problems are linked with territorial seas issue since, according to the 1944 Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation, the width of the latter determines the former. Greece, however, claims a 10-mile national airspace over its current 6-mile territorial waters. Turkey disputes this and frequently exercises ‘its right’ to fly over international airspace of the Aegean up to a distance of 6 miles to the Greek mainland, thus prompting regular protests from Greece on the ground that Turkey, yet again, violated Greek national airspace. Incidentally, Greece’s 10-mile airspace is not recognized by other states; including NATO countries which often ‘violate’ Greek airspace during NATO exercises in the Aegean. A related issue is the Flight Information Region (FIR) responsibility over the Aegean Sea. The existing FIR arrangement on the Aegean airspace, devised in 1952 by the International Civil Aviation

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Organization (ICAO), puts much of the Aegean beyond Turkish national airspace under Greek responsibility. The core of the conflict is the insistence of Greece, since 1974, to use its FIR responsibility as a means to monitor Turkish movements over the Aegean. In fact, the Aegean airspace between the two countries was a ‘no-go area’ for a long time after 1974 as Turkey, in the wake of the Cyprus intervention, had asked with Notam 714 to be notified of any aircraft approaching Turkey from the median line in the Aegean; and Greece responded by declaring the area unsafe for international civil aviation (Notam 1157). The flights between the two countries were resumed in late 1980 after the two states reciprocally withdrew their Notams. However, the problem still persists between the two countries in a sense that Turkey demands modification of the Aegean FIR responsibilities on the grounds of equity and national security, and Greece, while refusing this demand, insists that Turkish state aircrafts should file flight plans with Athens. Fearing that any kind of responsibility given to Turkey to the west of Greek islands might later lead to further demands regarding their sovereignty, Greece is adamant to preserve the status quo, while Turkey complains of Greece’s ‘abuse’ of its FIR responsibility and attempts to use it ‘as if this responsibility entailed sovereign rights’.22 Another problem that emerged in the aftermath of the 1974 Cyprus crisis has been the Greek decision to fortify those Aegean islands that were demilitarized by earlier international treaties.23 While Turkey accuses Greece of violating international legal obligations, Greece alternately either denies the validity of such obligations or the fact of violation. Beyond the legal arguments, however, after these islands had been fortified by Greece in practice, Turkey decided to establish its Fourth. Army, dubbed the ‘Aegean Army’ by Greeks, with headquarters in Izmir. This, in turn, increased Greek apprehensions about Turkish intentions in the Aegean. It is a ‘chicken and egg’ situation in which the Turks point to the need for such a force due to the Greek fortification of the islands and the Greeks talk of the need for fortification because of the ‘Aegean Army’. Again the dispute arises out of general mistrust. The Turkish intervention in Cyprus and attempts at oil exploration in the Aegean led the Greeks to fear Turkish ‘designs’ against their sovereign rights in the Aegean. Turkey, on the other hand, saw in the fortification of

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the islands disrespect for legality and an attempt to undermine the status quo between the two countries established by the Lausanne Peace Treaty, by changing the existing balance in the Aegean in Greece’s favour and then denying Turkey any rights in the area. In fact, neither the Greek fortification of the islands nor the Turkish Fourth Army represent significant military threats to the other side, because, in the case of war, it would be calamitous for Turks to attempt ‘island-hopping’ and quite impossible for Greeks to muster an offensive against the Turkish mainland from the islands. But, it only adds up to general mistrust and second-guessing of each other’s intentions. The two states also disagree on what are the problems in the Aegean and how to solve them. In general, Greece advocates that there is no problem in the Aegean between Turkey and Greece other than the delimitation of the continental shelf which should be resolved only through the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Against Greece’s ‘one problem-one solution’ position, Turkey traditionally argued that there exist various problems in the Aegean which should be solved through bilateral negotiations. However, since 1998, Turkey has broadened its approach and now agrees to employ a whole range of means for peaceful solutions as appropriate (including recourse to ICJ), though all the problems should be addressed as a whole. With the advent of the Simitis government to power in 1996, Greece, too, gradually decided to employ engagement with, instead of deterrence against Turkey. These moves have somewhat narrowed the gap between Greek and Turkish positions, though Greece still refuses to negotiate any issue other than the continental shelf and, in return, Turkey declines to discuss disputed issues separately. Although most of the bilateral disputes between Athens and Ankara have become intractable because the Cyprus conflict has forced the Greek and Turkish governments to become reluctant to compromise lest they are perceived as soft on national ‘issues’, they are not completely insoluble, as both countries have already shown the ability to contain these disputes and thereby raise the threshold of war. The 1987 near-war crisis and following conciliation is an example in point (see Note 20). Apart from the crisis that brought the two states close to an armed clash, the enormous burden of defence spending on the balance of payments and the long military service, which detracted from the government’s populist image, convinced

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the Greek Premier Papandreou that he needed to reduce the prospect of a possible outbreak of war with Turkey. Thus, in a significant deviation from PASOK’s earlier foreign policy line, he agreed to meet with Turkish Premier Özal in Davos in early 1988.24 Although some progress was made in developing a set of confidence-building measures regarding accident prevention in international waters of the Aegean, thus raising hopes that a true rapprochement might follow, the ‘Davos spirit’ gradually lost momentum as both leaders found themselves under increasing domestic pressure. This experience demonstrated clearly one of the main requirements of a genuine thaw in Turkish-Greek relations. The basic weakness of the ‘Davos process’ was its dependence on two leaders, both of whom were politically weakened with time, and with the ‘spirit’ waned. The self-evident truth which the ‘Davos process’ furnished us is that, for such a process to succeed over the long run, a broader consensus on each side of the Aegean ‘for increased cooperation over confrontation needs to be developed’.25 While doing this, the leaders and public opinion on both sides of the Aegean should keep in mind, and be reminded constantly if necessary, that both Greece and Turkey would be better off were they to reconcile their differences.

Forever Cyprus Beyond the disagreements in the Aegean, the conflict of interests over Cyprus also remains an important stumbling block to a broader Greek-Turkish rapprochement.26 During the summer of 1992, there were signs that the Cyprus problem might, with US help, be moving closer to resolution. A breakthrough was achieved in the intercommunal negotiations, drawing up the details of a transitional arrangement towards a new form of federal government for the whole island. However, another deadlock set in shortly as the Greek Cypriots, encouraged by the EU’s acceptance in July 1993 to consider their application for membership, suddenly started to entertain aspirations to return to the status quo ante of July 1974; and Turkish Cypriots, enraged and frustrated by the EU decision, became less cooperative and started to entertain ideas of recognition of the existence of two states in the island prior to the solution of the problem. What followed was almost ten years of inactivity with occasional exchange of accusations, and failure to achieve a

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substantial progress in the intercommunal talks. With the everincreasing involvement of the EU, the dispute has moved into another dimension which brought the leaders of the two Cypriots communities, Denktas¸ and Clerides, back to the negotiating table in early 2002. On the Turkish side, the death of President Özal in 1993 removed one of the few proponents of a speedy resolution of the conflict. Moreover, as the country has been more occupied with the economic downturn, Islamic revivalism, and the Kurdish insurgency, it was unlikely that various weak coalition governments, until the 3 November 2002 general elections, would have attempted any new initiative on Cyprus. However, this has changed with the advent of pro-Islamic-turn-conservative Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP – Justice and Development Party) to power, with a comfortable parliamentary majority. The new government promises changes in Turkey’s policy vis-à-vis Cyprus, though it is not clear yet where the current (February 2003) stand-off between the traditional foreign policy-making elite of the country and the AKP leadership would lead over Turkey’s Cyprus policy. On top of these, additional stress was brought to Cyprus with the Greek Cypriot plan to acquire Russian medium-range S-300 surfaceto-air missiles. Turkish policy-makers interpreted this plan, which was thought necessary by the Greeks to enhance their security by amending the disadvantageous balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean, as a challenge by the Greek side to change the island’s dormant 25-year status quo, as well as an attempt to encircle Turkey. When considered with its defence pact with Greece, Cyprus’s missile purchase plans were signs of a government that is eager to consolidate its military position along with its likely political position within the EU.27 Thus Turkey responded to these moves by stating that deployment of the missiles and Greek Cypriot entrance into the EU before Turkey would be grounds, respectively, for ‘serious conflict’ on the island and ‘further integration’ of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) with Turkey. As far as the S-300 missiles were concerned, after emotional statements were exchanged and excitement abated somewhat, Greek Cypriots, increasingly realizing the seriousness of Turkey on this account, decided to let Greece acquire and deploy them to the island of Crete instead of Cyprus. This effectively ended the confrontation

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in Cyprus and the danger of ‘serious conflict’ against which Turkish officials had warned. However, the second part of the warning that Turkey would move towards ‘further integration’ with the TRNC, matching EU’s integrative moves with the Republic of Cyprus, remained credible until the EU Copenhagen Summit in December 2002 decided to accept Cyprus as a full member by the spring of 2004, without the northern part of the island if necessary, and gave Turkey a specific date to review its membership status. It is clear that the EU’s stand has gradually changed regarding the Cyprus issue since late 1980. The Community, which adopted a ‘hands-off ’ and ‘non-involvement’ policy on Cyprus until 1980, had to face complications after Greece formally became a full member in 1981. Since then, while the TurkeyEU relations have experienced frequent ups and downs, relations between Greek Cypriots and the EU got closer and Cyprus started to appear on the EU agenda more often. In the meantime, Greek Cypriots had worried that the UN reunification plan drafted in 1993 implicitly recognized Turkish Cypriot selfrule while outwardly supporting Greek Cypriot claims to overall sovereignty. The proposal for a ‘bi-communal, bi-zonal federation’ of north and south was viewed by Greeks as the ‘de jure recognition of a de facto partition’.28 Thus, with the help of the prospective EU membership, they tried to back down from the long-agreed positions of bi-communality and bi-zonality. The Turkish side, on the other hand, has been trying, since the EU decision to consider the Greek application, to get back into the process as an equally recognized partner. Thus, when the EU Helsinki Summit of December 1999 stated that it will take all the relevant factors into account when deciding with the full membership of Cyprus by the end of 2002,29 it only added to the sense of urgency, mainly on the Turkish side, to solve the problem. The so-called ‘Annan Plan’, submitted to both sides by the UN Secretary-General in November 2002, under the clear instigation by the EU, to solve the problem before the approaching EU Summit in Copenhagen, did not produce any result. The revised plan and deadline (28 February 2003) failed again to produce the desired solution in the island, despite strong EU pressure on the Turks, because the Greek and Turkish Cypriots still entertained rather incompatible views regarding the question of how sovereignty was

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going to be shared between the two communities. Thus, although the intercommunal talks have contributed to the bridging of the gaps on some issues, many diplomatic initiatives conducted by the UN, the US, NATO and the EU have all, so far, run aground on the same thorny issue, while the status quo has solidified, making any return to the status quo ante more difficult. Although a settlement of the Cyprus problem can provide a necessary catalyst for an improvement in Greek-Turkish relations, even the priorities that the Turkish and Greek governments attach to the Cyprus issue are significantly divergent. Turkey, considering the status quo achieved in Cyprus after 1974 ‘advantageous to its interests’, has not been in a hurry for years ‘to reach an agreement that would entail surrendering some of the gains from the 1974 intervention’,30 though the involvement of the EU has somewhat changed this perception. Greece, on the other hand, has been adamant that the resolution of the Cyprus issue should precede the solution of bilateral differences in the Aegean. In this context, Turkey has long been argued that the Cyprus problem was not a dispute between Greece and Turkey, but an intercommunal dispute between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, and that it should therefore be resolved through intercommunal talks with UN mediation. During the negotiations, the Turkish Cypriots have increasingly emphasized a solution which would keep the two communities essentially separate in a loose bi-zonal federation of two autonomous republics that restricts contact between the two communities. Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, favour a unitary state, but seem ready to embrace a tightly knit federation between two zones, emphasizing the three freedoms anywhere on the island. However, the Turks, arguing that the implementation of these freedoms would render the idea of bi-zonality meaningless and could lead to Greek Cypriot domination once again, are reluctant to accept them.31 On the other hand, the events of 1974 and developments since then have highlighted the enmity between Greece and Turkey and created a psychological block to true reconciliation. Furthermore, ‘a mixed society that has been destroyed by force once cannot be reconstituted, at least not until ethnic hatred has subsided and the wounds of separation have been healed’.32 It may be overcome, but it will take a very long time. In the meantime, a de facto settlement

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has emerged in Cyprus. Therefore, ‘the idea that Greeks can be resettled’, any time soon, ‘among the Turks of northern Cyprus is quite impracticable’, for such an attempt might result in a renewal of the bloodshed that ceased in Cyprus with the effective separation of the two communities in 1974. In the absence of an overall settlement, and more importantly rapprochement in views and feelings, it would be a mistake to push for a settlement that has no chance of succeeding, as ‘recreating an ethnically mixed Cyprus under a federal government’ might only help to ‘multiply points of friction between Greeks and Turks’.33 On the other hand, should Greece and Turkey continue to improve gradually their relations over a wide range of issues, they could also come up with a temporary solution in Cyprus until a more durable settlement is put in its place, which would in the short term allow Cyprus to be associated with the EU without jeopardizing the Turkish or Turkish Cypriot connection. Based on this acceptance, Greece and Turkey can then gradually improve their understanding over Cyprus as both parties would see the uselessness of undermining each other on the wider international stage.

MANOEUVRING IN THE EU AND NATO

As the disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean were contained, both countries have attempted to outflank each other in the EU and in NATO as well as in their bilateral relations with other Balkan states. Although the EU had, in the past, declared that it would not be a party to the Greek-Turkish disputes and would not allow them to shadow its relations with Turkey, it has gradually, and perhaps inevitably, shifted from this stance since Greece’s membership in 1981.34 Until the late 1980s it seemed that the Community lacked the political will to go beyond verbal clichés in order to play a more substantive role in efforts to resolve the Greek-Turkish dispute. It looked as if the Community was unable to harmonize the perceptions and interests of its members with regard to these issues. As a result, the EC launched no initiatives of its own to further the resolution of either the Aegean or the Cyprus disputes. Instead, it confined its actions to occasionally expressing hope, satisfaction or

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dissatisfaction in the UN Secretary-General’s efforts concerning these problems, and endorsing related UN resolutions. In short, the EC avoided declarations on the causes of these disputes, limiting itself to occasional statements acknowledging the need for a ‘peaceful, fair and viable settlement’ of existing problems.35 More complications started to emerge after Greece formally applied for the EC membership on 12 June 1975. While afraid of becoming entangled in the fiery Greek-Turkish friction, the Community felt obliged to dispel any impression that it was prepared to favour Greece. After all, if the EC looked as if it were leaning toward Greece, Turkey could have perceived itself as being alienated. Thus, in its Opinion on Greece’s membership, the European Commission, while stating clearly that it would not become involved in the controversy between Turkey and Greece, also called for a preaccession period for Greece.36 However, the Council of Ministers rejected the Commission’s Opinion apparently under political influences, convinced perhaps that, as a member of the Community, Greece might become more amenable to solving its problems with Turkey. Consequently, negotiations for Greece’s membership were completed on 3 April 1979, and the signature of a Treaty of Accession in Athens on 28 May 1979 led to Greece becoming the tenth Community member on 1 January 1981. While negotiations were underway for Greece’s entry, Community members further tried to subdue Turkish fears that if Greece became a member before Turkey, she might deny the latter’s right to membership or make it conditional to concessions received from Turkey on the Aegean or Cyprus. Consequently, statements were issued from various EC officials to the effect that the EC would not allow itself to be drawn into the Greek-Turkish disputes over the Aegean and Cyprus. Hence, the Community’s ‘hands-off ’ policy was being supplemented by a more active yet still ‘balanced’ stance on the Greek-Turkish dispute, apparently intending to reflect an overall sense of equidistance from the both sides. However, after Greece joined the then EC in January 1981, a dramatic shift occurred in the position of the two states. It is clear now that Greek membership has profoundly altered the Community’s relations with Ankara, a development long dreaded by Turkey. Greece now has the political and economic weight of the Community behind her, and the EU has found itself increasingly at

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odds with Turkey because of a variety of ways Greece has tried to utilize the Union’s backing in its disputes with Turkey. While Turkey cannot regain its earlier position vis-à-vis Greece in the EU until it obtains full membership, it is not completely without influence in other Europe-related theatres such as NATO and OSCE. In the case of NATO, it enjoyed a temporary advantage between 1974, when Greece withdrew from the NATO military structure, and October 1980, when it was allowed to reintegrate under the Rogers Plan. According to this plan, it was agreed that two new headquarters . (6th and 7th ATAF) were to be established respectively in Izmir and Larissa, and command and control responsibilities in the Aegean would then be shared between them. However, Greek Premier Papandreou, after taking over the government in 1981, refused to proceed with the establishment of the command until the operational responsibilities of the two headquarters had been agreed. Later on, he declared the pre-1974 command and control delimitation as ‘nonnegotiable’.37 What followed was a period of cross-vetoes in NATO, employed by both sides to the detriment of NATO’s structural development plans in the region. This bickering ended partly with the Yılmaz– Papulias agreement, signed on 27 May 1988 during the temporary thaw in relations after the Davos meeting between the two premiers. Among the agreed principles was the partial removal of reciprocal vetoes on NATO infrastructure plans. A major breakthrough was achieved when both sides finally agreed to allow the establishment of . Larissa (with a Greek Commander and Turkish Chief of Staff) and Izmir (with Turkish Commander and Greek Chief of Staff) commands in September–October 1999.38 However, since then, the NATO command and control-related disagreements have remained as one of the minor grounds of dispute between the two countries, even after the recent thaw as demonstrated during the Dynamic Mix-2000 manoeuvres. The present disagreement appears to centre around the Greek insistence and Turkish refusal to file reports with the Greek command for state aircraft leaving Turkish airspace, and Greek attempts and Turkish protests to assign to NATO the Greek forces based on the Island of Limnos, which, according to Turkey, would amount to the acceptance of the militarization of the Aegean islands by Greece. It should also be remembered that both countries’ relations with

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NATO have undergone change from the Cold War through détente to the post-Cold War era. During the Cold War, the southern periphery was a source of instability and turmoil. Many western policy-makers, in fact, initially questioned whether it was wise to accept Greece and Turkey into NATO.39 In the first decade after their entry, however, these doubts significantly diminished as both countries vigorously cooperated with the Alliance, putting their national interests behind Alliance cohesion. Accordingly, NATO had more leverage then the EC over both countries during the Cold War, and, unlike the EC, put considerable pressure on them to reach a settlement. Again unlike the EU, NATO proved to be a valuable forum for conflict resolution and mediation, as well as a safety valve for various tensions. However, in the post-Cold War era, a number of extraregional issues in contiguous areas and a growing potential for instability in the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus have affected the threat perceptions of both countries. Most importantly, the collapse of the Soviet Union reduced the sense of threat felt by Turkey and Greece from the North. This sense of reduced threat, in turn, underscored ‘the centrifugal trends on the southern periphery, which … have made both countries … less willing to contribute to collective defence’.40 In addition to NATO and the EU, the WEU (and later European Security and Defence Policy – ESDP) has become a playground for Greek-Turkish disagreement. Greece’s application to join the WEU at the end of 1988 was motivated mainly by its aim to gain greater west European support for its position vis-à-vis Turkey.41 However, it was asked by the WEU at a 1991 summit to provide ‘guarantees that it will never invoke some of the security provisions in this organization, a requirement at best contradictory and at worst downright insulting against a full EC member’.42 Moreover, the EC’s decision at Maastricht that Article 5 of the modified Treaty of Brussels – which provides a security guarantee in case of attack on members – should not be applied between member states of NATO and the WEU (in fact, the only conceivable future scenario that a conflict might occur between the members of the two institutions was that of a conflict between Greece and Turkey) caused considerable irritation in Athens and has somewhat diminished the importance of WEU membership from Greece’s point of view.43

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With the moves from EU to incorporate WEU into its ESDP, a new strain was brought to bear on both Turkey’s European connection and on Greek-Turkish relations. Being a member of NATO but not of the EU, Turkey’s position vis-à-vis ESDP (and later Common Foreign and Security Policy – CFSP) has been rather ambiguous, as it argued for the indivisibility of security, meaning that NATO should be the main organ for European security, and tried at the same time to avoid the possibility of the planned EU force being used in any way to endanger Turkish interests. Thus Turkey demanded a more influential position within the ESDP, holding up the process by refusing to allow indiscriminate use of NATO sources by the EU. Greece, on the other hand, in an attempt to keep its options open, refused to accept Turkish reservations, a move that was interpreted in Turkey as yet another attempt by Greece to involve the EU into Greek-Turkish relations, trying to use it against Turkey as leverage in the Aegean or Cyprus to obtain concessions. However, as the issue was hardly a bilateral one, the involvement of the EU and the US in the negotiations had considerably eased the process, and finally an agreement between Turkey and the EU (thus Greece) was reached in time for the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, moving one more thorny issue out of the way.44 Paradoxically, Greece has a stake in the success of Turkey’s European aspirations, because ‘the process would tend to strengthen the latter’s democratic institutions and minimize its assertiveness in its relations with its Western neighbor’.45 Although Turkey’s entry into the EU has been postponed until 2005 at the earliest, Greece should continue to support Turkish entry, as Greece’s political and economic interests would be more easily served by a Turkey in the EU than a Turkey outside it.

BALKAN CONNECTION

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, both Turkey and Greece have sought to improve their relations with the other Balkan countries and have shown an interest in increased regional cooperation. Beyond the fairly usual political, military and economic reasons, however, their earlier aim in pursuing an active policy in the Balkans appeared to gain support for their policy

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objectives in their bilateral dispute and to avoid being outflanked by each other.46 With their general efforts to increase security in the region, Greece appeared to prefer multilateral relations while Turkey leant more towards bilateral contacts. Although the intensive struggle of the Greek and Turkish leaders to gain the support of their neighbours for their own positions did not produce comparable returns, bilateral and multilateral cooperation, nevertheless, has motivated and helped to bring about increased contact between Greece and Turkey which, in the longer term, paradoxically enhanced the prospect of mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries. While this does not guarantee a speedy solution to the Greek-Turkish disputes, it at least outlines the areas of common interests, thereby helping to narrow the gap between them. However, the past record of both countries on regional cooperation shows that even though they have been allies since 1952, they usually evaluate proposals for collaboration primarily with the ‘other side’ in mind, and in time move into a zero-sum game.47 The crisis caused by the break-up of the former Yugoslavia has offered a unique example of how their mutual competition affects their foreign and security policy-making. It was argued that the pro-Serbian policies of Greece during the Bosnian crisis was in part affected by its perception of how the evolving situation might or might not work to Turkey’s advantage.48 Although close ties between the Greeks and Serbians have deep historical roots, including a shared Orthodox heritage, the collapse of the former Yugoslavia has given these traditional ties a new dimension. First of all, Greece was uneasy about the idea of a new Muslim state almost on its border. The possibility of such an entity encouraged worst-case scenarios ‘because of the Greeks’ foregone conclusion that a Muslim state, with positive roots in Ottoman history, would be friendly to Turkey’.49 Moreover, both Greece and Serbia shared a common concern about the emergence of an independent Macedonia as well as a desire to prevent the expansion of Turkish influence in the Balkans. Accordingly, Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs were supported by Greece. Similarly, Greece’s later detachment from Serbians also in part represented a lessening of fears that Turkey would destabilize the balance of power in the Balkans through ties to Muslim and Turkish populations in the region.

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The rapprochement between Bulgaria and Turkey after the advent of the Union of Democratic Forces to power in Bulgaria provided another example of the regional alignments that have emerged with the end of the Cold War. Since 1989, relations between Turkey and Bulgaria have improved to unprecedented levels, as highlighted by the signing in May 1992 of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. This rapprochement, on the other hand, had contributed to a temporary cooling of Sofia’s relations with Athens. Although relations have improved since then, Athens remains suspicious about the possibility that, at some point, Bulgaria, with Turkish support and encouragement, might raise claims against Greek territory. Greece has, therefore, viewed the Bulgarian-Turkish rapprochement with some misgivings. During the Cold War, Turkey generally maintained a low profile in the Balkans which were largely regarded as of secondary importance in its foreign and security policies. However, the end of the Cold War has dramatically altered Turkey’s strategic environment and she has started to play a more active role in Balkan affairs, as well as in the Caucasus and Central Asia.50 One of the earlier indications of Turkey’s newly found interest in the Balkans was the Black Sea Economic Cooperation initiative, which was basically Turkey’s response to its feeling of loneliness at the end of the Cold War, after being ‘abandoned’ by the West (i.e. Europe). On the other hand, the war in Bosnia has also increased the pressures on Ankara to play a more active role in the Balkans. Though Bosnia is several hundred miles from Turkey’s borders and the Bosnian Muslims are not ethnic Turks, it seemed that Turkish public opinion had developed a feeling of kinship and responsibility for the Muslims left behind by the retreating Ottoman Empire from the Balkans after around five hundred years of domination. Moreover, the existence of a substantial number of Bos¸nak, Turkish citizens of Bosnian origin, estimated at about four to five million, in Turkey further increased the identification of Turkish people with the Bosnian Muslims. As a result, Turkey lent strong political and moral support to the Bosnian Muslims and also stepped up military cooperation with Albania. These moves reinforced fears in Athens of the emergence of an ‘Islamic arc’ in the Balkans on Greece’s northern border. Although both Greece and Turkey had declared in the wake of the

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Cold War that they aimed for a strategic balance in the Balkans, their earlier moves in the region were taken with one eye on the other. As they moved with the perception that the other side enjoyed a strategic advantage in the region, they invariably felt the need to amend this imagined strategic imbalance. As a result, both countries worked to achieve a favourable strategic foothold in the Balkans over the contested area, and the break-up of former Yugoslavia gave their efforts a sense of urgency while at the same time complicating matters. For example, Greece objected to the deployment of Turkish soldiers in Bosnia to join the IFOR/SFOR forces out of fear that their presence would ‘dangerously [destabilize the] balance of power in the region’, then did not allow Turkish aircraft to fly over Greece on their way to join the NATO force against Serbia.51 However, a diminution of Balkan conflicts and an understanding that both countries have legitimate interests in the Balkans and that they are not trying to undermine or circumvent the other in the region, have allowed matters to cool down.

GREECE AND TURKEY; CAN THEY BE RECONCILED?

Greek-Turkish differences are not new, but as long as they remain unresolved there is a chance that some unforeseen incident could touch off a conflict. Continuing disputes over Cyprus, over the Aegean, over membership of and association with the EU, in relations with NATO and in areas of bilateral and multilateral relations with the other states, all have the potential to threaten bilateral and regional security. Yet, none of the issues outlined above is really insoluble; what makes them appear so obstinate is that ‘both sides bring to the problem all their susceptibility to real or imagined humiliations. When a nation’s very being is staked on every detail, and every issue is infused with the collective memory of past hurts, even the bestmeant efforts may be doomed to failure’.52 The actual situation in Cyprus, for example, though far from ideal, represents a sort of uneasy modus vivendi which lessens the likelihood of direct military confrontation between Greece and Turkey. The Aegean disputes are also soluble, ‘barring any major discoveries of oil’.53 The resolution of the air traffic control dispute in 1980 showed that they can cooperate

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when rationality rules. Today, the two countries can agree to disagree, particularly because few material interests are involved and some disputes have become less important with the ending of the Cold War. Thus, it should be recognized by both sides that a military confrontation cannot bring about desired results and is not worth any potential gain either side may make. Irrationality, of course, is always a present element and war may still break out between the two countries or relations may deteriorate sharply. In this context, the experience of January 1996, when the two countries almost came to blows over tiny and uninhabited Aegean rocks, has not only raised concerns about the two countries’ ability to prevent differences from escalating into a major crisis, but also their ability to resolve them without engaging in direct military confrontation.54 Yet, current trends, despite frequent flare-ups, tend to indicate that the two countries are doomed to cooperate, though breaking the deadlock in the Greek-Turkish dispute will not be easy. In this effort, it might be a good idea to follow the path suggested by Greek Foreign Minister George. Papandreou in his letter of 25 June 1999 to his Turkish counterpart Ismail Cem, responding to his call for dialogue: ‘I strongly believe that we must adopt a realistic approach which will allow outstanding issues to be dealt with in sequence creating thus both a strengthening sense of confidence in our relations and a perspective of further steps along the way.’ 55 Obviously, Turkey is not as preoccupied by Greece as Greece is by Turkey. Indeed, the feud with Greece is peripheral to Turkey’s main concerns, among which implementing economic, political and structural reforms to catch up with European standards and finding ways to come to terms with Kurdish nationalism at home now assume a greater prominence.56 The general belief in Turkey, both among decision-makers and people at large, is that a bilateral dialogue is necessary, and the issues are not irreconcilable, provided Greece is able to acknowledge Turkey’s legitimate fears and rights in the Aegean and is ready to engage in a dialogue with Turkey without, at the same time, trying to score some point against her in the EU, NATO, the UN or in any other forum when Turkey temporarily relaxes its vigilance. For the Turkish government, the basic parameter is the Treaty of Lausanne for any reconciliation in the Aegean. Turkey’s belief in this regard is that the Lausanne Treaty established a delicate balance

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between the two countries in the Aegean, and that Greece has been trying for years to change that balance in its favour through unilateral acts. ‘It is clear that if one of the littoral states unilaterally extends its jurisdiction in the Aegean and deprives the other coastal state from exercising its existing rights, it is no longer possible to speak of the Lausanne balance in the Aegean.’ 57 According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the fundamental source of tension between Turkey and Greece ‘is the Greek perception to regard the entire Aegean as a Greek sea in total disregard of Turkey’s legitimate rights and vital interests’.58 On more practical issues, Turkish arguments are usually a mixture of legal and political views with frequent appeals to the principle of equity. In the worst-case scenario of Turkish decision-makers, if Turkey feels that it will be boxed in because of any Greek extension of territorial waters beyond six miles, then there will be war; at best, the Aegean could become ‘an area of fruitful cooperation between Greece and Turkey to their mutual benefit’.59 In general, the sovereignty of Greece in the Aegean is not challenged by Turkey, though the argument that the Greek sovereignty is not absolute as it is limited by international agreements is stated frequently.60 However, Greece does not appear prepared to admit that Turkey might have a case, or something to fear. Greek fears, on the other hand, are based on the concern that its sovereignty over its numerous Aegean islands could be circumscribed significantly by Turkish claims for equity, and are encouraged by conscious or unconscious misapprehensions about Turkey’s ‘aggressiveness’ against Greece.61 It is obvious that, justified or unjustified, the fear of Turkey rules the minds of Greeks. Thus, instead of trying to come to an understanding with Turkey on the basis of mutual equity and reciprocity, Greeks try to cling to a vigorous defence of their positions in legal arguments. This, however, creates a suspicion in Turkey that Greece does not wish to negotiate with Turkey; that its main aim is to enlarge its hold on the Aegean; and that it is continually trying to undermine Turkey’s relations with other countries, especially in Europe; thus actually creating a more dangerous environment for both countries. So, we are back again to mutual suspicion and mistrust. How we can break this vicious circle is not clear, though the unfortunate incidents of earthquakes helped, as they created ‘human’ instead of ‘enemy’ images of the ‘other’. In the past, constraints,

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imposed on both countries primarily by NATO and the US, have helped to prevent hostilities between the two rivals. In general, ‘as long as security in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East continues to be high on the NATO agenda, Greece and Turkey will still be under pressure not to jeopardize the solidarity of the Alliance’s southern flank’.62 However, it is generally accepted on both sides of the Aegean that the existing problems between the two countries cannot be solved easily or soon, so both sides have to learn to live with them. In the meantime, it is obvious that the problems must be taken up with a new and realistic approach, by isolating them from the emotions stemming from history and the constraints imposed by temporary considerations. Otherwise, there is no ground for optimism as long as the biggest achievement of efforts to solve the problems is to set up frequent summit meetings without obtaining any concrete results. Leaders on both sides have to strive with new methods and imaginative ideas to overcome current bottlenecks and to make sure that ‘dialogue’ does not mean ‘cacophony’. What is needed is a ‘means of exploring the problems in a nonnegotiating, non-coercive, problem-solving framework so that there are not winners and losers, but only winners’.63 In this context, the development of Greek-Turkish economic relations may be the most important element in the long-term improvement of relations. These then can lay the groundwork for a broader political dialogue at a later date (see Liargovas’ contribution to this volume). It is clear that the improvement of Greek-Turkish relations depends on mutually sustained efforts of both sides. Although in the past, one or the other side seemed reluctant to rise to the challenge, either because it considered the existing status quo to be in its favour or was constrained by domestic and/or international pressures, it is time now to move beyond traditional suspicions and fears toward a more favourable atmosphere of understanding and reconciliation. In this context, the groundwork has already been laid down by the improvements in relations since 1999. The positive tone that Greece adopted in its foreign policy in general after the establishment of the Simitis government in January 1996 had enabled Turkey to hope for some improvement in relations. Since then the somewhat aggressive image and tone of contemporary Greek politics, embodied by the late Andreas Papandreou,

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together with his strident nationalistic and confrontational remarks, have been changing, and with them many obstructive aspects of the country’s domestic and foreign policy.64 Behind this change lies the understanding in Greece for the first time that it is part of Europe and that its political and economic success is ‘wholly dependent on the extent to which it chooses to cultivate its relationship with the European Union’.65 This realization has eased Greece’s perceived insecurity over its identity crisis between Europe and the East, which created a defensive and sometimes antagonistic attitude towards its regional neighbours. As a result, Greece avoided using its veto to prevent Turkish candidature for full EU membership at the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, opening the way for rapprochement between the two countries. Greece has continued its policy of engagement since then and was among the few EU states, during the EU Copenhagen Summit of 12–13 December 2002, that supported Turkey’s bid for a date to begin accession negotiations. Similarly, it is the same differences that in part postpone Turkey’s hopes for obtaining full EU membership. When one considers the developments in western Europe since Greece became an EU member in 1981, the inescapable conclusion is that, in terms of power politics, the relationship between Greece and Turkey has been changing to the advantage of the former (see Mehmet’s contribution to this volume). Thus, many in Turkey now realize that it has to overcome its fear of ‘giving-in’, thus ‘losing-out’, on issues of national importance. As a result, Turkey now appears to be determined to adapt EU Copenhagen criteria, including improving its relations with neighbouring countries. The widespread changes of Turkish legislature since the autumn of 2002 represent Turkey’s determination and provide further hopes for the enhancement of GreekTurkish rapprochement. There is a responsibility for Greece, too, to keep Turkey within the European domain, if nothing else, simply because a Turkey inside Europe constitutes a lesser threat for Greece than a Turkey outflanked and left outside. It is clear that ‘the exclusion of Turkey from the perspective of European unification does not secure even one of Greece’s strategic interests’.66 On the contrary, the geostrategic position of the two countries overlaps with regard to security and stability in the region; thus, they are weakened if both countries do not share common aims.

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Although the domestic political upheaval in Turkey in the second half of 2002 somewhat stalled the dialogue between the two countries, which remained low key until the advent of the AKP into power in November 2003, significantly the talks ‘without an agenda’ between experts that started on 12 March 2002, have continued unimpeded. After the elections, the conciliatory approach of the AKP leadership towards Greek-Turkish relations and solving the Cyprus problem was warmly welcomed in Athens, though the party has not yet been able to provide Turkish public opinion with the necessary conviction that it would find ways to further Turkey’s relations with Greece without actually harming its national interests in the Aegean or Cyprus. It is clear that the fundamental interests of both countries lie in peace and cooperation, not confrontation. It is literally absurd to have the sky over the Aegean Sea shadowed by military aircraft while both countries stand to benefit from developing friendly and goodneighbourly relations. Thus, they have to overcome the memories of past injustices. History is history and there are reasons for everything. But in this day and age, when not just a century but a millennium has come to an end, the way to proceed should be forward, not backward.

NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 10.

. . S¸ükrü Sina Gürel, Tarihsel Boyut Içinde Türk-Yunan Ilis¸kileri, 1821–1993 (Turkish-Greek Relations in Historical Context, 1821–1993) (Ankara: Ümit, 1993), p. 10. See for example, Peter Kincaid Jensen, ‘The Greco-Turkish War, 1920–1922’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 10, 4 (1979), pp. 553–65. A. J. R. Groom, ‘Cyprus, Greece and Turkey: A Treadmill for Diplomacy’, in John T. A. Koumoulides (ed.), Cyprus in Transition, 1960–1985 (London: Trigraph, 1986), p. 152. . . Gürel, Tarihsel Boyut Içinde Türk-Yunan Ilis¸kileri, p. 11. Richard Clogg, ‘The Troubled Alliance: Greece and Turkey’ in Richard Clogg (ed.), Greece in the 1980s (New York: St Martin’s, 1980), p. 141. Claire Spencer, Turkey between Europe and Asia, Wilton Park Paper (London: HMSO, 1993), p. 17. In mid-1980s, ‘90% of the Greeks believed that Turkey threatens Greece’. See Panayote E. Dimitras, ‘Greece: A New Danger’, Foreign Policy, 58 (Spring 1985), p. 137. Moreover, 63 per cent of the Greeks expressed distrust of Turks. See Jean Catsiapis, ‘L’attitude de la Grèce face a le demande d’adhésion de la Turquie aux Communautés Européennes’, CEMOTI, 8 (1989), p. 116. See also Ifantis’, Chapter 10 this volume. Clogg, ‘The Troubled.Alliance: Greece and Turkey’, p. 143. . Gürel, Tarihsel Boyut Içinde Türk-Yunan Ilis¸kileri, p 13. Stephan F. Larrabee, ‘The Southern Periphery; Greece and Turkey’, in Paul S. Shoup

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11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16.

17. 18.

19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

49

(ed.), Problems of Balkan Security: Southeastern Europe in the 1990s (Washington: Wilson Center Press, 1990), p. 175. For Greece’s NATO policies see Van Coufoudakis, ‘Greek-Turkish Relations, 1973–1983: The View from Athens’, International Security, 9, 4 (1985), p. 212. Larrabee, ‘The Southern Periphery; Greece and Turkey’, p. 188. Ibid., p. 89; Aurel Braun, Small State Security in the Balkans (London: Macmillan, 1983), p. 237. As the discussion of these issues will be crudely simplified here, for more detailed and detached review see Andrew Wilson, The Aegean Dispute, Adelphi Paper, No. 155 (London: IISS, 1980). For the presentation of the positions taken by Turkey and Greece on their bilateral disputes see Duygu B. Sezer, Turkey’s Security Policies, Adelphi Paper, No. 164 (London: IISS, 1981); Thanos Veremis, Greek Security: Issues and Politics, Adelphi Paper, No. 179 (London: IISS, 1982); Theodore A. Couloumbis, The US, Greece and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle (New York: Praeger, 1983); and Tozun Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955 (Boulder: Westview, 1990). Marcia Christoff Kurop, ‘Greece and Turkey: Can They Mend Fences?’, Foreign Affairs, 77, 1 (January–February 1998), p. 8. Under the present 6-mile limit, Greece holds approximately 43.5 per cent of the Aegean Sea and Turkey 7.7 per cent, the remaining 49 per cent being high seas. Should the 12-mile limit be applied, the Greek territorial waters in the Aegean will increase to 71.5 per cent whereas Turkey’s share will increase to 8.7 per cent, and the area of high seas will be drastically reduced to 19.7 per cent, which will also be fragmented due to the existence of Greek islands. See Wilson, The Aegean Dispute, pp. 36–7. For the official Turkish view on this issue see Turkish Foreign Ministry’s home page at [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/ege.html], p. 3. The Aegean territorial waters issue is also linked with Cyprus in the sense that in case of Turkey’s inability to use its principal harbours in the Aegean because of ‘enemy control’ of the Aegean Sea, Turkish ships could still reach to open seas from eastern Mediterranean ports so long as the island of Cyprus, which could block the navigation in the area, is controlled by a friendly government. Hence, the very same fear, which prompted Turkey to declare the extension of Greek territorial waters in the Aegean as casus belli, also encouraged its resistance to Enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece) since 1950s. US Congress, Senate, Turkey’s Problems and Prospects: Implications for US Interests. Report prepared by the CRS of the Library of Congress, 3 March 1980, p. 53. In late February 1987, Greece announced it would take control of the Canadian-led international North Aegean Petroleum Consortium, which had drilling permits in northern Aegean. Later on, when Greece ordered the National Oil Company to start drilling outside Greece’s territorial waters, a controversial move in Turkey’s view, Turkey, too, issued permits to the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Company for soil exploration in a number of disputed regions, including the Gulf of Saros and the areas near the Greek island of Lesvos. The then Greek Premier Papandreou responded by warning that Greek armed forces would ‘teach the Turks a hard lesson’. Turkey reacted by declaring that any Greek attempt to harass a Turkish research vessel would meet retaliation. The controversy was defused when Turkish Premier Özal restricted the research to Turkish territorial waters and Papandreou returned to the status quo ante, but not before the dispute led the two countries to the brink of war for the first time since 1974. Wilson, The Aegean Dispute, pp. 4 and 30; Couloumbis, The US, Greece and Turkey, p. 118. See [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/ege.html], p. 8. The islands concerned are the Eastern Aegean Islands of Lemnos, Samothrace, Lesvos, Chios, Samos and Ikaria in addition to the 12 Dodecanese islands. Veremis, Greek Security: Issues and Politics, pp. 123–4. Larrabee, ‘The Southern Periphery; Greece and Turkey’, p. 190.

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26. A detailed discussion of the Cyprus issue is beyond the scope of this paper. For a comprehensive background study, see Robert McDonald, The Problem of Cyprus, Adelphi Paper, No. 234 (London: IISS, 1988–89); and Chapter 4 of this volume, pp. 95–120. 27. Kurop, ‘Greece and Turkey; Can They Mend Fences?’, p. 9. 28. Quoted from Van Coufoudakis, ibid. 29. Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999, Article 8b states: ‘The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors.’ 30. Veremis, Greek Security: Issues and Politics, p. 130. 31. See Ellen B. Laipson, Cyprus: Status of UN Negotiations (Washington: CRS, Library of Congress, 1990). 32. Andrew Mango, Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role (Washington: Praeger, 1994), p. 127. 33. Ibid. 34. Given its direct relationship with all the parties concerned, it is no small wonder how the EU had been kept out of entanglement in the complicated issues surrounding the island of Cyprus and the Greek-Turkish disputes. Greece became an associate member of the then EC in November 1962 and has been a full member since January 1981. Turkey and the ‘Cyprus Republic’ are associate members, having signed agreements with the Community in December 1964 and December 1972, respectively. A customs union protocol between Greek Cypriots and the EC was signed in 1987 and between Turkey and EU in March 1995. Cyprus is due to become a full member in spring 2004. 35. Constantine Melakopides, ‘Cyprus, Greece and Turkey from the European Community Perspective’ in Christos P. Ioannides (ed.), Cyprus: Domestic Dynamics, External Constraints (New York: de Caratzas, 1992), p. 67. 36. ‘In the view of the Commission, specific steps will need to be taken … [to ensure] that the examination of the Greek application for membership will not affect relations between the Community and Turkey and that the rights guaranteed by the Association Agreement with Turkey would not be affected thereby.’ Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement, 2/76, p. 7. 37. For Papandreou’s speech in Athens Home Service, 5 December 1985, see BBC, SWB, 11 December 1985, C/4. 38. See . Güven Özalp, ‘Yunanistan’da Türk Generali’, Milliyet, 4 October 1999; and Murat Ilem, ‘Yunanistan’da Bir Türk Komutan’, Cumhuriyet, 6 Ekim 1999, p. 8, at: [http://www.nato.org.tr/pressreleases/pressreleases/reflagging.htm]. 39. Larrabee, ‘The Southern Periphery; Greece and Turkey’, p. 175. 40. Ibid., p. 177. 41. Larrabee, ‘The Southern Periphery; Greece and Turkey’, p. 181. 42. Jonathan Eyal, ‘A Force for Good in a Cauldron of Turmoil’, The European, 3–6 September 1992. 43. Veremis, Greek Security: Issues and Politics, p. 125. 44. Turkey essentially secured a commitment that the European rapid reaction force, planned to be established in 2003, will not be involved in the Aegean and Cyprus, and will obtain NATO approval on case by case when it plans to use NATO assets. Ankara obtained this concession only after it clearly threatened to block the development of CFSP connection to NATO. 45. Veremis, Greek Security: Issues and Politics, 129. 46. Larrabee, ‘The Southern Periphery; Greece and Turkey’, p. 91; Braun, Small State Security in the Balkans, p. 246. 47. Duygu Sezer in Vojtec Mastany and Craig R. Nation (eds), Turkey Between East and

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West: New Challenges for a Rising National Power (Boulder: Westview, 1996), p. 83. 48. Ibid., p. 84. 49. Ibid. 50. For an analysis of the Turkish position in the Balkans after the end of the Cold War, see Gareth Winrow, Where East Meets West: Turkey and the Balkans (London: Alliance Publishers, 1993). 51. Danopoulos, ‘Turkey and the Balkans: Searching for Stability’, p. 217. 52. Norbert Kohlhase, ‘The Greco-Turkish Conflict from a European Community Perspective’, The World Today, 37, 4 (April 1981), p. 130. 53. Braun, Small State Security in the Balkans, p. 248. 54. Danopoulos, ‘Turkey and the Balkans: Searching for Stability’, p. 214. 55. For the texts of both letters see [http://www.greekturkishforum.org/documents.htm]. 56. Mango, Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role, p. 122; Groom, ‘Cyprus, Greece and Turkey: A Treadmill for Diplomacy’, p. 147. 57. See [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/agean.html], p. 1. 58. See [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/ege.html]. 59. Groom, ‘Cyprus, Greece and Turkey: A Treadmill for Diplomacy’, p. 148. 60. Ibid., p. 147. 61. Ibid. 62. Danopoulos, ‘Turkey and the Balkans: Searching for Stability’, p. 214. 63. Groom, ‘Cyprus, Greece and Turkey: A Treadmill for Diplomacy’, p. 147. 64. R. J. Gutman, ‘Greek Foreign Policy’, Europe, 370 (October 1997), p. 16; Daniel N. Nelson, Balkan Imbroglio: Politics and Security in Southern Europe (Boulder: Westview, 1991), p. 97. 65. Kurop, ‘Greece and Turkey; Can They Mend Fences?’, p. 7. 66. Theodore Psalidopoulos, ‘The Hour of Truth and Responsibility in a Changing World; Greek-Turkish Relations after Luxembourg’, Perceptions, 3, 2 (June–August 1998), p. 111.

2 National Perception of the ‘Other’ and the Persistence of Some Images HERCULES MILLAS

The problems in Greek-Turkish relations are generally perceived as a series of political and military controversies directly or indirectly connected to economic interests and to security concerns. True as this observation may be, there is still a more complex framework in which the bilateral relationships can be envisaged and which can also provide an explanation for the persistence of these unresolved disputes: due to historical reasons each party conceives the ‘other’ as a prospective threat or as a challenge to its identity and interprets each of his actions accordingly, creating a vicious circle where the national perceptions and the negative images concerning the ‘other’ dictate the vigilant attitude of ‘ours’ and which in turn also aggravates the attitude to the ‘other’. As John W. Burton has written ‘Conflict, like all relationships, is a perceived relationship.’ 1 This chapter will try to demonstrate how the image of the ‘other’ in each country is constructed and reproduced in three different spheres: (1) in textbooks, where the most ‘official’ discourse is encountered, (2) in historiography, i.e. within the academic world, and (3) in literary texts and more specifically in the novels of the two countries where more widespread opinions are voiced. The image of the ‘other’, its development in time, its variants and its peculiarities, give information with respect to the conflict, to the perceptions of its participants and to the expected future behavior of the parties. This knowledge will be used to make some suggestions for the improvement of the bilateral relations.2

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TEXTBOOKS AND NATION BUILDING

The founding of the two nation-states, Greece in 1831 and Turkey in 1923, also marked the beginning of a new mission in educating the citizens in accordance with the targets of these new states. The presentation of the ‘other’ as the national enemy was quite an easy and a persuasive task since in both cases the liberation war was fought against the ‘other’. One of the targets was the strengthening of national identity and the ‘historical enemy’ played a decisive role: united ‘us’ against the ‘other’. The enmity can be traced back a few decades, but still education played its role in reinforcing it. All studies on Greek textbooks show that up to very recent times these books recreated a negative image of the neighbouring nation, the Turks. The ‘other’ is an ‘enemy’ with barbaric characteristics – rude warriors, uncivilized, invaders, etc. – an anathema that caused the slavery of the nation for many centuries. The students are presented with acts of violence (massacres, forced conversion to Islam, etc.) performed by the Turks, described in very vivid language. The Turks are also unethical: sneaky, dishonest, etc. The Greeks are the opposite of all these: almost the perfect race. Alexis Heraclides, who conducted the first study on Greek textbooks and the image of the Turks in 1980, concludes that this ethnocentric approach creates national stereotypes that harm the students and renders difficult the solution of bilateral relations.3 Turkish textbooks are almost a mirror image of the above: the Turks are perfect and the Greeks, who hate and massacre the Turks, carry many negative characteristics: they are unreliable, unfaithful, cunning, insatiable, etc.4 A major metaphor is voiced directly or insinuated in all Turkish textbooks. Turkish rule in the Christian lands was magnanimous but the Greeks did not appreciate the tolerance shown to heterodox minorities, revolted and eventually established a state, the main target of which is to create a wide empire, the ancient Byzantine Empire anew at the expense of Turkish lands. This Greek project is known in Turkey as the Megali Idea and its name is derived from the nationalistic ideal that aroused an irredentist ideology among the Greeks especially in the years 1904–1922.5 The past is used to explain the present but also to make predictions for the future. The similarities are easier to detect. The Manichaean dualism of ‘we are good and superior; the other is malicious’ seems to

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run through all nationalistic parlance. The peculiarities, however, point to what is special and worth discovering in each case. The differences bring forth the traits out of which each nation is made. The dissimilarities distinguish one nation from the other, not only on an ‘us–other’ basis – which in actuality is the outcome of other parameters, not the cause of the distinction but a side effect of it – but on a basis of different perceptions of the environment, past and present. The Greek community seems to face a query with respect to Tourkokratia, the centuries-long Turkish rule (‘occupation’ in Greek), and the extended ‘slavery’ of the nation. This prolonged ethnic subjugation is justified by exaggerating the size and the violent aspect of the dominating ‘other’: Turks normally are pictured as ‘barbaric hordes’. The war of independence is an act of resurrection of the nation, a transition from darkness to light. The existence of a negative ‘other’ appears as indispensable both to justify the revolution for ‘liberty’ and to vindicate the ‘slavery’. The Turkish side, on the other hand, faces insecurity with respect to sovereignty rights. The modern Greeks – and the western historiography in general – developed a thesis according to which modern Greeks are shown as the reborn ancient Greeks and Byzantines, and, for some, therefore the heirs of their lands. Turkish textbooks developed a series of defence lines based on various interpretations of historical past. In the 1930s, a ‘Turkish History Thesis’ was developed and publicized mostly through the textbooks, claiming that all the nations of Eurasia, the ancient Greeks included, were evolved from ancient Turks.6 Later this thesis was attenuated and only the people of Anatolia were presented as ancestors of the present Turks. Thus the Turkish textbooks present the Ionians devoid of any Greek characteristic. The history of the Byzantine Empire, which lasted over a thousand years in Anatolia and the lands and the people of which the Ottomans inherited, are almost completely passed over in these textbooks. The Greeks seem to develop a historical consciousness where the ‘other’ is constantly brought to mind in order to justify the past and foster the present national identity, and the Turks seem to silence a great part of history to strengthen the legitimacy of national sovereignty. In both cases uneasiness, doubt and fear become apparent especially when the recent major changes that occurred in these

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textbooks are critically examined. The negative attributes of the ‘other’ have been drastically reduced; adjectives such as ‘murderers’ and ‘fanatics’ do not appear in the textbooks any more, probably mostly due to the criticism that came from third parties. However, the general approach with respect to the past and to the ‘other’ has not changed. Both sides still do not attribute any positive characteristics to the neighbouring nation, or anything negative to their own part, and the narrative is egocentric. The Turkish side, in the last few years, stresses even more the dangers that the country faces due to irredentist plans of neighbouring countries (mostly without specifying names). The ideological paradigm of a thousand-year-old superior nation of ‘ours’ is still paramount, though can now be traced only in frequent hints. Students would have to complete the missing part from other sources that the community provides: historiography, literature, oral history, media, movies, etc.

HISTORIOGRAPHY CONSTRUCTS A NATIONAL PAST

The historiography of the two nation-states in question, especially during the dawn of the ‘nation’, is not much different from the storytelling of history textbooks. In fact, there are cases where an almost perfect harmony is noticed between the textbooks and the ‘officially’ and usually ‘academically’ accepted historiography. The main difference is encountered mostly in the style and in the mode of expression rather than in the essence of what is inferred. The textbook is a simple version of a more detailed history thesis or, inversely, historiography is an extended version of a text that appeared first in a textbook. The historiography can be broadly classified as ‘popular’ when the authors are semi-professional historians or ‘academic’ when the writers stick closer to the requirements of the academic community. Naturally, the discourse varies, some are clearly advocates of a national thesis, of an ethnic credo; others adhere to academic norms, and then a more reserved language is used and the characterizations are kept to the minimum. Competence, both in research and in expression, varies according to individual capacity. Greek and Turkish historians who produce works on GreekTurkish relations, except some rare cases, are annoyingly predictable. The conclusion and the message are almost always the same: ‘we’

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had a historic course that was in general fair and honourable, contrary to the ‘other’s’. As I tried to demonstrate on another occasion, four Greek and four Turkish eminent historians, who wrote on the situation in the Balkans during the Ottoman advance in the fifteenth and sixteenth century reached completely opposite conclusions: the Turks claimed that the Ottomans were well received by local Christians, ‘as saviours’, the locals were treated with justice and tolerance, and after the conquest the economy of the area developed and the people were satisfied or happy (depending on the degree of enthusiasm the historian chooses to express his views). The Greeks, on the contrary, reached the ‘scientific conclusion’ that the locals reacted to the invasion, revolted repeatedly against the intruder who resorted to harsh measures and that the economy deteriorated causing suffering and even starvation of the Christian and Greek population.7 When the narration approaches more recent events, the discrepancy increases, as for example is the case with the Cyprus problem. A closer examination of the texts brings to light the manner (the system) with which the historians manage to reach such contradictory results. Actually the Greeks prefer to propound the situation during the conquest and of the later periods, when the Ottoman State faced economic problems and revolts. The Turkish side ‘notices’ and considers as ‘typical’ the peaceful periods of the ‘classical period’. Another example of this system of selective (and national) historiography is noticed when the status of the millets, i.e. the non-Muslim communities, is considered. The Turkish side points to the ‘laws’ and ‘principles’ that were laid down by the state to protect the well-being and the rights of the millets; accepting that there were cases where the dignitaries or the masses violated the ‘laws’ and harmed the millets. The Greeks evaluate the same situation by changing the criteria for judging a situation. They say that the dignitaries and the Muslim masses could at any time harm the non-Muslims even though there were some rights but only on a ‘theoretical’ base. Irrespective of whether this approach is chosen consciously or not, the end result does not change: each side develops a national historiography and two diametrically different past periods. There are two small categories of historians and writers of history of other disciplines, such as political scientists, economists, and sociologists, etc. who differ. They are critical of ‘our’ history and

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especially of the state apparatus and to its practices. Traditionally some Marxists who mostly appeared in the second quarter of the twentieth century in Greece and in the third quarter in Turkey, on the one hand, and some liberal historians much later, distanced themselves from the official and traditional academic approach.8 Even though few, they have been influential. Their common starting point is the modern interpretation of the nation. Accepting the relatively recent appearance of the nations they enabled themselves, (1) to distance their present community and themselves from all real or imaginary controversies of the distant past, (2) to feel innocent of and irresponsible for the past wrongdoings of ‘ancestors’, since for them the continuity of the nation did not have a major significance, (3) to consider the ‘other’ innocent of the unhappy past too, since he is also a member of a new community, and finally (4) not to refrain from criticizing the wrongdoings of ‘our’ (imagined) side since the identification is not immediate any more. Some of these academics developed various common projects with their counterparts of the ‘other’ country.9 Here, however, we will deal only with the main trend in each country since this main trend determines largely the course of Greek-Turkish relations.

NOVELS REVEAL COMMUNAL VISIONS

The first Greek novel circulated in 1834, five years after the establishing of the Greek national state, whereas the first Turkish novel in 1872, three decades prior to the dawn of the Turkish nationalist movement of Young Turks and fifty years before the establishment of the Turkish national state.10 The first consequence of this incongruity of nationalism and of the novel becomes apparent in the way the ‘other’ is portrayed in the literary texts of the two respective communities. In the first Greek novels the ‘Turks’ are presented as (meaning they are perceived as) a nation, stereotypically, with common negative characteristics and as the historical enemy. In the first Turcophone novels however, i.e. when national identity was not dominant within the Ottoman society, the Greeks did not appear as a political issue and whenever some Greeks appeared they were not identified as members of a nation, as the ‘other’, but only as (‘neutral’) citizens of the Ottoman state.11 Some Turkish novelists who did not

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exhibit a negative ‘other’ in their texts are ¸Semsettin Sami, Ahmet Mithat, Halit Ziya and Recaizade Ekrem.12 Greek authors, such as I. Pitsipios, Gr. Palaiologos, St. Ksenos, D. Vikelas and A. Papadiamantis, portrayed a negative Turk who is in confrontation with ‘us’ right after 1834. On the Turkish side, the first writers to portray a negative ‘Greek’ were Ömer Seyfettin, Halide Edip and Yakup Kadri, and who started publishing their works in the second decade of the twentieth century. This tendency persisted throughout the twentieth century in both countries. From there on, nationalism existed not only as an ideology and as a political movement but also as a rhetoric that ran across all kinds of texts: textbooks, historiography, literature, newspapers, etc. This national discourse undertook to legitimize all military and/or political actions against the ‘other’, who was portrayed stereotypically as an enemy, as a source of various political problems (a threat to ‘our’ freedom), as very different from ‘us’ and as a negative character (dishonest, violent, etc.). During periods of better bilateral relations and within a more relaxed international milieu the negative image of the ‘other’ is relatively improved, while still preserving his/her main traits. However, a closer inspection reveals that even this positive ‘other’ is a character who is completely assimilated and has become one of ‘us’; he has actually lost his ethnic identity: he thinks, feels and behaves like ‘us’. I call these characters ‘naively positive’ because naiveté characterizes the concept of a positive ‘other’, who actually no longer exists.13 This naively positive ‘other’ is especially in abundance when the ‘other’ appears as a woman. Women play a special role in nationalistic discourse. They do not directly participate in the interethnic fights and therefore they are perceived acting as criteria that indicate the righteous side. Their preference counts. They normally fall in love with ‘us’ and prefer ‘our men’. In the novels of the two countries – in real life of course the case is different – among 200 cases of love affairs between Greeks and Turks, it is always the women of the ‘other’ who prefer to unite with ‘our men’. Cases to the contrary are – according to my findings – completely absent.14 Among the various reasons that may exist for this sensitivity with respect to our/their women may be the fact that traditionally the wars were marked with the enslavement of the women of the ‘other’ ending up being the

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wives of the ‘other’, as war trophies. Symbolically the marriage of ‘our woman’ to the ‘other’ may be a sign of defeat. Whatever the reason, the role assigned to women in nationalistic rhetoric is directly associated with national identity and it reveals this identity more than any other parameter. The political situation and the wars between the two countries (the war of 1897, the Balkan Wars of 1912–1914, the Greek-Turkish clash of 1919–1922) are not enough to explain the negative image of the ‘other’. The literary texts do not ‘take a photograph’ of the actual environment of the writers but ‘sketch’ the ‘other’ in accordance with a nationalist ideology and a constructed past, irrespective of personal experiences. A comparison of the image of the ‘other’ in the memoirs and in the novels of three Turkish authors is revealing. In their memoirs, where real and concrete events are narrated, the Greeks are almost all ‘normal’ and positive personalities, whereas in the novels, written by the same authors and at the same period, they are all, almost without exception, extremely negative.15 This negative image is in harmony with the images of the ‘other’ encountered in textbooks and historiography. There are, however, as it is also the case with the historians, a small number of authors who do not exactly follow the recipe. Their case is revealing. It helps in understanding the dynamics that create and reproduce the stereotypes. Greek writers who actually met and lived with the Turks portray a much more realistic picture of the ‘other’ relative to the authors who sketch an imaginary ‘other’.16 Some Greek writers, who lived in Asia Minor within the Ottoman lands and closer to the Turks, were I. Venezis, Str. Mirivilis, N. Politis and M. Iordanidou. These authors wrote mostly about recent times, about their experiences (1890–1950). Writers who lived only in Greek lands, e.g. M. Karagatsis, Th. Kastanakis, P. Prevelakis, and distanced from Turks, wrote about ‘historical’ Turks, about imagined Turks and ‘old times’ (sixteenth to early nineteenth century). Literary characters and events that are drawn from ‘life’, in other words heroes who are inspired by concrete personalities, are much more balanced and portray complex and realistic characters. It should be remembered that the same trend is noticed in Turkish literature too. Positive Greeks are encountered either in memoirs, where mostly ‘real’ characters are portrayed, or in literary texts based on actual experience and on concrete encounter with the ‘other’, as is the case of Sait

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Faik, of Res¸at Nuri Güntekin, Demir Özlü, Sevgi Soysal and many others. These writers do not present ‘historical’ characters but modern and real characters.17

JUDGEMENTS ARE PERCEPTIONS

In practice, the bearers of stereotypes, of prejudices, of perceptions, of ideological bias, naturally do not perceive them as such – if they had done so, they would have abandoned them – but as sound judgements, as knowledge, as a result of analysis, as realistic evaluations, etc. The addressees of the textbooks, of historiography, of literature mentioned above, experience these as a source of information. They do not simply believe in them, they perceive ‘truth’ in terms of the paradigm created by them. Each nation has its own interpretation of the past, and more precisely, each community that has a particular view with respect to its (imagined) past, forms its separate nation. The fact of being in harmony with these texts, but also with other commonly accepted sources, such as newspapers, films, etc.18 which are dominant in a community, signals an identity, in our case a Greek and a Turkish national identity. Those who do not fully comply with the communally accepted ‘truths’ either have not yet acquired a national consciousness, try to introduce a new paradigm (a new frame of relationships), or because they are bearers of another national identity. Both Greek and Turkish societies have an understanding of the ‘other’ which manifests itself in various texts, as shown above. Textbooks are primarily instruments of education and, as such, they show the intentions and the frame of understanding of the states and governments; but at the same time they are documents that exhibit national perceptions. So are historiography and literary texts. The ‘other’ in both the Greek and in the Turkish case is, in general, negative, even though there are various cases that prove the opposite. The general trend is to see the ‘other’ as an unreliable neighbour. The ‘other’ is perceived and portrayed either as an enemy, as an invader, as a potential danger; or, as a product of wishful thinking, as a ‘domesticated other’, as a ‘naively positive other’. All indications point to the existence of some psychological problems in each society with respect to the image of the ‘other’. The

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problems seem to exist with the parties as well and not only ‘between the countries’. Various other studies and some opinion polls confirm these findings.19 Individuals and nations do not behave ‘rationally’ but according to socially determined feelings and perceptions. Communal identities influence these perceptions that operate as judgements, which in turn, in a vicious circle, are used to evaluate the behaviour and the views of the ‘other’ negatively, not allowing the overcoming of the ‘security dilemmas’ and of bilateral controversies. With the above in mind, there are two groups of questions to be dealt with. First, since our perceptions limit and direct our judgements, is it possible for Greeks and Turks to perceive the ‘other’ positively or neutrally? How do we explain the friendly manifestations between Greeks and Turks that appeared after the earthquake of 1999 and the rapprochement of Papandreou-Cem? How can they be interpreted? Second, how can the cases in literary texts where Greeks and Turks perceive a really positive ‘other’ be explained? Can these cases disclose the pathway leading away from stereotypes and all related paraphernalia? How will nationalistic dilemmas be overcome?

OVERCOMING SECURITY AND ‘OTHER’ DILEMMAS

The friendly feelings between Greeks and Turks that inspired the two societies right after the earthquake in Turkey in August 1999 came as a surprise to many. Individuals and NGOs showed unprecedented signs of affection and amiable feelings. Mutual visits increased considerably. In the same period the foreign ministers of the two countries started a policy of détente and decreased the political tension to a considerable degree. There are two schools of thought in each country (it makes four in total!) that advance an optimistic and a pessimistic interpretation of the phenomenon respectively. The pessimists are more cynical and closer to traditional evaluations. They see only a political manoeuvre and the masses only responding, as obedient subjects, to the green light given by the politicians. For them, the two states saw the atmosphere of the earthquakes – the misery that moved the citizens;

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the heroic acts of the ‘other’ saving ‘our’ people, etc. – as an opportunity to advance their tactics. The (pessimist) Greeks believe that Turkey took advantage of this manoeuvre and made one more decisive step towards joining the European Union without making any concession; and the (pessimist) Turks believe that Greece managed to transfer the Greek-Turkish disputes to the EU forum having Turkey confronting the whole Union instead of only Greece. Naturally both of these groups are not happy with these so ‘friendly’ relations and they see them either as romantic exaggerations or as sneaky traps of the ‘other’. Some other Turks perceived Greece as having regretted her past policy and, seeing the earthquakes occasion as an opportunity, trying now to comply with Turkey’s ‘reasonable’ demands. These Turks soon started feeling disappointed. Naturally there are Greeks who perceived the Turkish side in the same way and soon felt that ‘the Turks never actually change and insist on their traditional political lines’. Some saw the Greeks sharing a sense of superiority given the opportunity of helping the ‘enemy’ who is clearly in need. In short the pessimists saw only self-interest in a zero-sum game in every single action of the ‘other’. Some Turks might have expressed their admiration for the Greeks but only to criticize and irritate their own state dignitaries: ‘Even the Greeks behaved so nicely helping us, whereas you …’ The optimists (even though they may accept that most of the above is correct) gave attention to the positive atmosphere created between the two communities and much less to the immediate and short-term political consequences. The improvements in this sphere in the long term would bring only positive results to both parties. The trust created, the changing image of the ‘other’, the decrease of xenophobia, of paranoia, of phobias on national security have liberating effects on the citizens. The less the tension, the better the thinking. As for the explanation of the phenomenon – the views vary. Some, mistakenly, see the ‘other’ eventually recognizing ‘us’ as worthy of appreciation, esteem and love. In other words they see ‘naively positive others’, those who ‘love us because we deserve it’. Others believe that all the mishaps were caused by the politicians (of the ‘other’ side). The politicians changed, so the situation has changed.

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Others remembered that ‘people are good at heart’ or that the common enemy, the earthquake, united ‘us’. All of the above may have played their part. However, it should not escape our attention that the conjuncture that created the positive image of the ‘other’ in literary texts seems to be repeated in Greece and Turkey in the period of the earthquakes. Namely, for the first time the television screens in each home in the two countries presented the ‘other’ as he/she is: real, concrete and alive (not historical). People appeared under the debris, in pain, crying, desperate, as family members, as children, as old people (whereas the ‘other’ until then appeared as aggressive middle-aged people, mostly in uniform). They looked ‘human’ and not as a threat. The ‘other’ never before appeared like that. Even the players of football, of basketball, etc. before, were by definition the rivals, the obstacle. The citizens of the two countries, in each and every house saw – surprised, I assume – the ‘other’ trying to save ‘us’ (not harm us), and to rejoice when successful, in tears when failed. All the work of textbooks, of historiography and literature, together with what the society up to that moment had produced with respect to the ‘other’ contradicted the pictures on the television screens, which, according to the perceptions of the spectators, transmitted nothing but the truth: a shock therapy of images. It is still too early to say how permanent the friendly feelings that the earthquakes caused in the two communities will prove. It is safe to argue, however, that the overcoming of nationalistic dilemmas will have to be accomplished in two spheres: (1) combating in the cognitive sphere the typical traits of nationalism, i.e. xenophobia, insecurity, stereotypes, prejudices etc., and (2) in practice, creating opportunities in which the members of the two communities may meet the ‘concrete other’, i.e. increase the communication between the parties. The first way seems practically difficult. Few are bothered by the effects of nationalism and even fewer notice the negative aspects of it. However, ‘practice’ itself, i.e. meeting with the real, existing, current (not historical) ‘other’ may improve the image of the ‘other’ and the capability of ‘ours’ in evaluating the international situation and indirectly overcoming security and ‘other’ dilemmas. Still, everything is interconnected; much will be determined by who is in power: the ‘pessimists’ will hold back the meetings with the ‘other’, the ‘optimists’ will support them.

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NOTES 1. John W. Burton, ‘Resolution of Conflict’, International Studies Quarterly, 16, 1 (1972), p. 18. 2. The main ideas presented here appeared in various publications of the author in Turkish and in Greek. Two major publications that incorporate most .of the findings are Hercules Millas, Türk Romanı ve ‘Öteki’ – Ulusal Kimlikte Yunan Imajı (Istanbul: Sabancı Yayınları, 2000); and Ikones Ellinon kai Tourkon-scholika vivlia, istoriografia, logotechnia kai ethnika sterotypa (Athens: Alexandria, 2001). 3. Alexis Heraclides, ‘Socialization to Conflict’, National Centre of Social Research, 38 (1980). 4. Hercules Millas, ‘History Textbooks in Greece and Turkey’, History Workshop, 31 (Spring 1991). 5. The Turks interpret the coup d’état of the Greek colonels against Makarios, head of Cyprus in 1974, as a manifestation of a Greek (permanent) wish to extend their country’s borders, disregarding agreements and against Turkish interests (thus Greece is irredentist, unreliable, sneaky, followers of Megali Idea), and the Greeks interpret the Turkish intervention as a practical demonstration that the Turks never lose an opportunity to capture Greek lands and keep them under different pretexts, by ethnic cleansing and eventually by enslaving the Greeks (thus the Turks are sneaky, invaders,. disrespectful of international law, followers of Ottoman practices). 6. Büs¸ra . Ersanlı, Iktidar ve Tarih, Türkiye’de Resmi Tarih Tezinin Olus¸umu, 1929– 1937 (Istanbul: Ada, 1992); Hercules Millas, ‘Türk Ders Kitaplarında Yunanlılar: Bütünles¸tirici Bir Yaklas¸ım’, in Tarih Egˇitimi ve Tarihte Öteki Sorunu (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998); Millas, Ikones; and Etienne Coupeaux, Türk Tarih Tezinden . . Türk-Islam Sentezine (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1988). 7. For a general review. of Turkish . historiography on Greece see Hercules Millas, Yunan Ulusunun Dogˇus¸u (Istanbul: Iletis¸im, 1994), pp. 201–43; and Hercules Millas, ‘NonMuslim Minorities in the Historiography of Republican Turkey: The Greek Case’, in Fikret Adanır and Suraiya Faroqhi (eds), The Ottomans and the Balkans: a Discussion of Historiography (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 155–91. For a comparison of Greek and Turkish historiography and the related discourse on the ‘other’ see Millas, Ikones, where the texts of the four Greek and four Turkish historians are also given. The. eight historians are: K. Paparrigopoulos, A. Vakalopoulos, G. Kordatos, N. Svoronos, I. H. Uzunçars¸ılı, . K. Karpat, H. Inalcık and M. Kunt. 8. For analysis of their works, see Millas. ‘Non-Muslim Minorities in the Historiography of Turkey’, pp. 183–7; and Millas, Ikones, pp. 311–27. 9. A good example of these projects is the study jointly conducted by Greek and Turkish historians, political scientists, anthropologists, etc., mostly members of Panteion and Sabancı universities, about the incidents surrounding ‘the fire of Smyrna in 1922’ and the national interpretations that followed. A second example is of course the present book. 10. Conventionally Leandros by Panayotis Soutsos and Taas¸uk-ı Tal’at ve Fitnat by S¸emsettin Sami are considered the first Greek and Turkish novels respectively. 11. Millas, Türk Romanı, pp. 18–35. 12. Only 40 years before the appearance of the first Greek novel, in the decade of 1790, the image of the ‘Muslim Ottoman’ or the ‘Turk’ in Grecophone literature was not negative either, nor was he perceived as a member of a distinct nation, as can be readily noticed in the politically oriented poems (and other writings) of Rigas Velestinlis and of other Grecophone intellectuals. See Millas, Yunan Ulusunun, pp. 87– 122, 257–94. 13. An example of a naively positive Turkish hero in Greek literature is Moskof Selim in the novelette of 1895 that bears the same name, written by Georgios Viziinos. Selim is presented as a ‘mature and balanced’ person who declares that the Turks should leave Anatolia to the Greeks and go back to the East, to Asia, from where they once

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14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

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came. Naively positive Greeks appear very often in Turkish novels, too, e.g. in the works of Kemal Tahir, Halikarnas Balıkçısı and in many others. These Greek heroes are happy to welcome the Turkish conquerors, fighting against the Christians on the side of the Turks, accepting the ‘superiority’ and ‘magnanimity’ of the Turks; the best among them are willingly converted to Islam. Hercules Millas, ‘Les Romans, Les Femmes et Les Relations Gréco-Turques’, Genèse/Olus¸um, 60–61 (May/August, 1999), pp. 46–64. Hercules Millas, ‘The Image of Greeks in Turkish Literature: Fiction and Memoirs’, in Oil on Fire? Textbooks, Ethnic Stereotypes and Violence in South-Eastern Europe (Hannover: Verlag Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1996), pp. 79–87. Damla Demirözü, I kona tov Tourkov sti genia tov ‘30, unpublished Diss. (University of Athens, 1999); and Millas, Ikones. Millas, Türk Romanı, pp. 173–212. For . Greek.and Turkish newspapers see L. Dogˇan Tılıç, Utanıyorum, Ama Gazeteciyim (Istanbul: Iletis¸im, 1998). For Greek newspaper and the image of Turkey see, Hercules Millas, ‘1998. Yunanistan Basınında Türkiye’, in Bilanço 1923–1998, Siyaset, Kültür, . Uluslararası I lis¸kiler (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 2000), pp. 341–50. See for example: Anna Frangoudaki and Thalia Dragona, Ti ein’i patrida masEthnokentrismos stin ekpedevsi (Athens: Alexandreia, 1997); Alexis Heraclides, I Ellada kai o’ex Anatolon Kindynos (Athens: Alexandreia, 2001). For opinion polls see the poll carried out jointly by PIAR of Turkey and ICAP (GALLUP) of Greece in 1989.

3 The Greek-Turkish Conflict: Towards Resolution and Reconciliation ALEXIS HERACLIDES

Throughout the twentieth century, relations between Greece and Turkey (and the Ottoman Empire) followed a chequered course, from bitter armed conflict and tense relations to cordial relations. Poised as we are at the dawn of the twenty-first century, let us take a glimpse at the record of the previous century. From 1901 until 2000, leaving out the years 1914–16 and 1940–44 for obvious reasons, there are seven years of armed conflict (1912, 1917–18, 1920–22, 1974), 15 years of strained relations with occasional outbursts of violence, all on or with regard to Cyprus (late 1954–58, December 1963–73), 42 years of strained relations or cold war (1901–11, 1919, 1923–28, 1975–87, 1990–February 1999), and almost 30 years (29 and a half years to be exact) of cordial relations (1929–39, 1945–early 1954, 1959November 1963, 1988–89 and March 1999–2000).1 There are almost 30 years of détente as opposed to almost 70 years of war, conflict or cold war and strained relations. Clearly competition and rivalry have been the dominant themes.2 Is this to be taken as a clear indication that antagonism is more characteristic of Greek-Turkish interaction? Or could one draw the opposite conclusion, that the some 30 years of stability, almost one year out of three, is hardly a meagre harvest and an indication that reconciliation is achievable. One remembers the well-known platitude, ‘Greece and Turkey are destined by geography to be friends.’ But as Richard Clogg has retorted ‘they are condemned by history to be enemies and where history and geography come into conflict then history tends to prevail’.3

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IS RECONCILIATION POSSIBLE?

Reconciliation Unrealistic The assumption that reconciliation is impossible is based on the premise that ‘the other’ is a threat (for the Greeks the great threat) and the historical enemy par excellence. Consequently, reconciliation is inconceivable. The two neighbours have no other realistic choice; they are destined to remain at loggerheads. Put in less extreme terms, détente or reconciliation is extremely difficult to achieve; if and when it takes off, it is rickety and tends to be ephemeral. It is more likely to be a marriage of convenience, a respite that as time goes by is bound to serve the purposes of the enemy and thus has to be abandoned so as not to jeopardize the national interest.4 What is to be done? Obviously no less than constant alert; a credible deterrence-containment strategy, as argued by many foreign policy analysts, diplomats and politicians in either country; resolve and readiness to exploit any advantage on the horizon to inflict damage to the other side; willingness to fight if need be; and militarization, counter-balancing alliances and an offensive on all diplomatic fronts to ‘enlighten’ and sensitize ‘uninformed’ international public opinion about the ways of its ‘audacious’, ‘provocative’ and ‘unscrupulous’ neighbour. In addition, Greeks are prone to argue that it is very difficult to live peacefully and comfortably with Turkey nearby, with its ‘perennial political and social instability’, its ‘problematic democracy’, its daunting military prowess and its ‘readiness to resort to the use of military might’ with little regard to the exigencies of international law. In view of its threatening and assertive posture, Turkey’s relations with most of its neighbours have been cool for most of the time and it would be ridiculous to argue that all the others are to be blamed for the strained relations (as Ankara has often done). Ankara’s ‘tough stance’ on Cyprus, its ‘clear threat’ to Greece’s sovereignty in the Aegean as well as in Thrace and its general comportment as a ‘hegemonic power’ in the region, leave little doubt about its true intentions vis-à-vis its western neighbour.5 Turks for their part point to Greece’s adventurism on the Cyprus question, particularly from 1955 until 1974, in what was a far-fetched drive ‘to annex’ an island only 40 miles away from the Turkish shores and a thousand miles from the Greek mainland; Greece’s ‘creeping

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extension of territory’ in the Aegean, starting with the increase of territorial waters from three nautical miles (in the Lausanne Treaty) to six, the ‘illegal’ ten miles in the airspace, and, more recently, contemplating to expand the territorial waters to 12 miles, when it is obvious that this would be very disadvantageous for Turkey (as it will then be completely surrounded); and there is said to be ‘clear evidence’ of moral encouragement as well as tangible support to the PKK, Turkey’s most implacable foe, whose aim is not less than the country’s dismemberment. Greece has repeatedly frustrated Turkey’s closer links with the EC/EU, a preposterous act, for no state can legitimately dictate another state’s chosen international orientation.6 A telling Greek argument worth mentioning is that Turkey is after all the more powerful neighbour and as a consequence can hardly feel threatened by Greek statements or by its armed forces and military hardware. It is fairly well established that Turkey is not constantly preoccupied by Greece and that ‘the vast majority of the Turkish people do not place as much importance on a Greek threat’.7 If this is indeed the case, why has Ankara been so reluctant to initiate gestures of goodwill through the years? A predictable Turkish counter-argument is that Turkey has made repeated attempts at opening a dialogue on all the outstanding matters for years, with the most celebrated instance being the overtures made by Turgut Özal, which paved the way for the Davos process. Yet most of the time the reaction has been negative, as seen with Andreas Papandreou’s well-known stand that ‘Greece has nothing to discuss save the Cyprus issue’ or the line that it is for the International Court to decide and only on the continental shelf issue. Greece may indeed not be a real threat militarily, but it has constantly tried to defame and belittle Turkey.8 More far-fetched denunciations have also surfaced for decades, at least since the UN General Assembly of 1954, such as the famous accusation that Athens has once again embarked upon the Megali Idea project (Megalo Idea as it is known in Turkey) or that it is always on the alert for the opportunity ‘to stab its neighbour and ally in the back’ or assist Turkey’s enemies (e.g. the PKK).9 The Megali Idea bogey may appear absurd;10 however, if coupled with deeply ingrained distrust and the well-known Turkish ‘Sèvres syndrome’, then it appears plausible at least to the eyes of many a Turkish beholder. At this juncture it is worth remembering a well-known dictum in

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conflict studies that conflictual relations are stable over time, as they tend to elicit the same type of social relationship (the same applies, incidentally for cooperative relations).11 Any friendly gesture on the part of the adversary, even the most sincere attempts at initiating a substantial dialogue leading to eventual reconciliation, are deemed a devious ploy, not worth taking seriously under any circumstances. In any event, the worst cost/case scenario, always prevalent among avowed adversaries, leaves little leeway for reciprocating a cooperative gesture. The Greek-Turkish landscape is replete with such occurrences, on both sides of the fence. The predictable outcome is that initiators of sincere friendly gestures are left deeply frustrated and bitter. They are convinced more than before of the mauvaise fois and implacable animosity of their adversary. The prestige factor and national honour have also played a role in the difficult Turkish-Greek relationship. Ankara for instance is at pains not to be seen (internally as well as internationally) as giving in to a smaller power and ‘an insolent’ one at that. By the same token Greece does not want to be seen as giving in to its ‘haughty’ neighbour, who knows ‘only the language of military prowess and bullying’ and is still under the influence of high-handed ‘imperial’ comportment. To conclude, from the point of view of traditional strategic thinking and its various more simplistic versions that smack of ‘patriotic moralism’ (i.e. the ‘good against the evil’),12 as they are more readily understood by diplomats, politicians and the military in both countries, there is only one pragmatic strategy available: a credible deterrence vis-à-vis the encroaching neighbour. As for striving for peace and security, the only available realistic prospect is a ‘no-war situation’ which calls for efficient crisis management on either side when a dispute arises. Yet no crisis management, however adroit and coolheaded can rule out the possibility of armed confrontation between the two countries. The irrelevance of war is simply in the minds of ‘idealists’ and other ‘utopians’, who by wishing away armed conflict in fact make it more likely, unpredictable and more disastrous should it come about.

Reconciliation a Realistic Alternative In the Greek-Turkish dyad, the more detached observer is bound to spot a textbook security dilemma.13 For both countries the threat

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comes exclusively from the other side and is indisputable; ‘we’ could not possibly pose a threat, for ‘us’ it would be contre nature; ‘we’ are simply pursuing our legitimate right to arm ourselves for purely defensive reasons; we have no other choice if we want to deter such an unscrupulous foe. Curiously, until very recently, the security dilemma line though more than obvious, was not entertained as a useful analytical tool to scrutinize the Greek-Turkish discord.14 The impossibility of reconciliation, the thesis of perennial eternal confrontation between the two countries, is self-fulfilling.15 Such attitudes legitimize the existing situation of conflict. The prospect of change, indeed contemplating change from conflict to reconciliation, is killed in the bud, as it has been persuasively argued in the International Relations literature by sound criticisms of traditional realism, emanating from liberalism and pluralism and, more recently, from reflectivist strands, but also from milder shades of realism.16 In the final analysis, there is nothing more practical than good theory.17 The opposite also applies: far too narrow or militant theory gives rise to impracticable policies and dead-ends. As it is increasingly suggested in recent years, conflict resolution and peace research have far more to offer in dealing with the Turkey-Greece conundrum. Recent trends in strategic studies (now security studies) are of considerable value, not least with the abandonment of one-sided ‘ethnocentric strategy’ and their emphasis on ‘common security’ and ‘security community’.18 Equally, some trends in the post-positive International Relations literature, especially those dealing with geopolitics, security and self-other identity are essential reading in the deconstruction of the permanence of the Greek-Turkish antagonism. Let us see, in a nutshell, why other perspectives critical of traditional strategy have more to offer, analytically as well as practically, in the search for a self-standing resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict. For one, in the Greece-Turkey debacle, under the antagonism, even in its milder form of mutual deterrence and ‘no-war’, armed conflict and the threat of force is in no way expunged (as readily accepted even by the advocates of the ‘no-war’ approach). It remains a distinct possibility so long as the relationship is founded on threat perceptions, enemy images, arms races and adversarial posturing. Furthermore, it is abundantly clear that both countries have more to lose from the continuation of the antagonism on all fronts; and

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alternatively, that they have far more to gain from cooperating and burying the hatchet.19 The conflict has been a considerable drain on their economies, with the arms procurements (the highest in Europe as a percentage of GNP, around 5 per cent) not permitting social development and more adequate education. Probably the only tangible gain is the diversionary (scapegoat) tactic,20 which supposedly reinforces internal cohesion and national we-feeling vis-à-vis the enemy (along the well-known Simmel-Coser hypothesis). Cohesion of this kind is usually flimsy and more likely to be extremely costly in the longer term. It reinforces the hand of the uncompromising hawks and nationalists who have a vested interest in the continuation of the Greek-Turkish cold war at all costs. This powerful lobby stands resolutely in the way of any attempt at reconciliation and is always on the alert to exploit any opportunity to mar reconciliation attempts, as seen, for instance, with the recent détente. For several decades now the Greek-Turkish discord, though difficult, is hardly zero-sum (win-lose) as a whole or in its various parts. This is in sharp contrast to the state of play in the first decades of the twentieth century. At that time the discord could not be settled peaceably as long as Greek irredentism could not be abated and the Ottoman Empire could not turn overnight into a secular culturally pluralistic democracy. The various imaginative approaches from intellectuals and politicians on both sides, for a bi-national democratic Turkish (or Ottoman)-Greek federation, where not a realistic prospect, for the ‘Western Question’, as Arnold Toynbee had put it, that is nationalism (the idea of the mono-ethnic state) had come to stay in the region.21

The Crux of the Problem: The Subjective Dimension of the Conflict In our days what makes the Greek-Turkish conflict appear intractable is above all its subjective dimension, the awesome psychological barrier of years of antagonism and enmity: total lack of mutual confidence, suspicion bordering on paranoia, demonization of the other, political cost (the fear of being seen as selling out) and, of course, the great influence of the nationalists in both countries.22 Greece and Turkey, though neighbours, have strikingly little knowledge or understanding of each other.23 Indeed, until the earthquakes of 1999, they had shown markedly little interest in each other.

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Within the ambit of the subjective dimension, the main stumbling bloc to a genuine rapprochement is arguably the national historical narrative and the resultant national identity, an essential ingredient of which is the need to belittle and demonize ‘the other’. In this context not only the solution but even the discussion of existing outstanding disputes is hampered by the distrust between the two peoples created by their ‘living history’.24 In both Greece and Turkey ‘history is not past, the past continues to live in the present’.25 Of course their national historical narratives could hardly have been otherwise. After all, both ‘have shaped their “nation-state” identities through struggle against and interaction with each other’.26 Greece and Turkey became independent states by fighting each other, in what could plausibly be portrayed – and in many respect was – a valiant struggle for cultural and physical survival as a nation and state. The essence of the Greek-Turkish conflict is the clash of historical narratives; it is these very narratives cum resultant collective identities that are irreconcilable as they stand today. Thus if attempts at rapprochement between the two countries are to make any real headway, a painful scrutiny of the historical record is in order by nonnationalist historians and other social scientists. Such interpretations of history will give us a very different and far more varied picture than the one peddled by the various ethnocentric and anachronistic versions of national history. This process is already under way among the academic community in Greece and Turkey and will, hopefully, be reflected in new school history textbooks in both countries. However, any change in the realm of attitudes towards the past is fraught with difficulties, for clearly a friendlier, civilized and likeable ‘other’, worthy of respect, puts into question the cherished but insecure self-image and collective identity. The trick is to be able to attain a sense of collective self-worth that is selfstanding and far more self-confident and not dependent on belittling ‘the other’. Some would argue that this is simply impossible (the innate or socially induced discrimination approaches). The only thing that can be done is a slight change in the extreme we– other polarization. But even this would be a gain in Turkish-Greek interaction.

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THE RECENT THAW: PROBING THE EVIDENCE27

A widely held popular view in both Greece and Turkey is that it was the earthquakes of August-September 1999 that brought about the considerable change in relations. If this popular view is an accurate depiction of reality, then we are faced with the phenomenon of public opinion swaying reluctant governments. This is not uncommon in Greek-Turkish relations but with a major difference: it has swayed them in the very opposite direction, towards conflict and animosity rather than towards reconciliation and peace. In view of this experience, would it not have been more likely for the Greek public to be unimpressed with the difficulties faced by its ‘enemy’? Leaving aside for the moment political encouragement, if any, I would offer four possible explanations of the uncharacteristic attitude of the Greek public: the salience of human suffering and disaster; the sense of common fate before insurmountable natural forces;28 the vivid image of the concrete ‘other’ which contrasted sharply with what is expected of him/her as a representative of a merciless foe;29 and in the Greek case at least, the exceptional levels reached by the nationalist rhetoric, of a presumed unending confrontation along deterministic and existential lines à la Carl Schmitt (‘Friend-Foe’) with no conceivable way out of the quagmire save perhaps in a final showdown. This latter view may have convinced several more optimistic segments of the Greek public, perhaps even the silent majority, to be more receptive and ready for any sign of breakthrough from the impasse. However, in the explosive Greece-Turkey realm, where vital national interests are at stake, can there be any real move forward between the two peoples without state encouragement? The answer, as we shall see, is probably yes and no. Major crises between countries have been known to have sobering effects, leading to attempts at dialogue to defuse the situation. This has occurred in Greek-Turkish relations on several occasions, from 1974 onwards in particular. Thus, following the Imia/Kardak crisis of February 1996 which brought the two countries to the brink of war, attempts were made by the moderate Greek and Turkish governments of Kostas Simitis and Mesut Yılmaz to ease the tension, as seen with the Madrid Joint Statement of July 1997. But there was

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little move forward, as the mainstream in both countries was under the sway of the traditional adversarial approach.30 In any event, during the period 1996–1998 one cannot detect any clear signal to civil society, the media or the wider public by the two states to, say, prepare the ground for an eventual reconciliation. The starting point should probably be found elsewhere. The Imia/Kardak crisis introduced an important new dimension not present on other occasions, at least not in Greece. It set forth an unprecedented mobilization by one section of Greek civil society, which previously had been strikingly silent or had expressed its views with the greatest of caution when it came to relations with Turkey. Various NGOs, comprising leading intellectuals, noted retired ambassadors, veteran politicians and several journalists sprang up; existing NGOs were revitalized making their voices heard more than ever before in the last 30 years.31 Similar, if more cautious, developments took place in Turkey. Joint Greek-Turkish NGOs appeared as well as committees within international NGOs. There was the revitalization of the previously dormant Greek and Turkish business councils (founded in 1988 within the evanescent Davos spirit) and the establishment of the Greek-Turkish Forum (in 1998), which is engaged in cautious Track-Two diplomacy, or perhaps ‘One and a Half-Track Diplomacy’.32 Worth mentioning also is the consistent encouragement of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to the supporters of reconciliation in both countries.33 Another turning point was the 1999 Kosovo crisis. It was not until this event that the two governments made a decisive entry as clear supporters of détente. The common fear of destabilization in the region and, most of all, the threat of a possibility of change of boundaries in the vicinity by the threat or use of force, intensified the contacts between the two worried sides.34 In the wake of the .crisis, the two ministers exchanged letters. Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem suggested reconciliation, but only after sorting out the terrorism question, a sensitive issue for Turkey, particularly in view of, as he put it, ‘what is perceived in Turkey as links that exist in Greece with terrorist organizations and their systematic encouragement’.35 Thus Turkey could be credited as having been the initiator of the resultant détente between the two countries. However, the way the initiative was formulated could have had adverse effects on the receiving

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end, for it implied that Greece had to admit, however indirectly, its involvement in the Öcalan issue (read condoning or even encouraging the unsavoury PKK). The explosive element in Cem’s letter was defused by Greek Foreign Minister G. Papandreou, who, in his answering letter of 25 June, outlined a whole range of issues of common interest on which there could be dialogue: cooperation on culture, tourism, environment, crime, economic cooperation and ecological problems, placing terrorism under a wider rubric, namely that of ‘organized crime, drug trafficking, illegal immigration and terrorism as a priority for Greece and Turkey’.36 For lack of other evidence, it would seem that Greece initiated a particular kind of reconciliation procedure: suggesting concentrating on the issues where agreement was in sight on the basis of common interest and thus bringing in business, civil society and the media, rather than trying to tackle head-on the difficult issues, soon ran into trouble, as had been the case in all previous attempts at reconciliation from 1975 onwards.37 After the exchange of letters, the two ministers met in New York, on 30 June 1999 (in the margins of a UN meeting on Kosovo), and agreed to initiate a dialogue on bilateral cooperation on issues of ‘limited antagonism’, as it was curiously put. The earthquakes were, of course, the next obvious turning point. But without one more crucial decision by Athens vis-à-vis Ankara, the whole edifice of the Greek-Turkish thaw would probably have collapsed, the earthquake spirit notwithstanding. This was the need to withdraw the Greek veto for Turkey’s admission as an EUcandidate state at the EU summit of Helsinki in early December 1999.38 For Athens it appeared at the time as a close decision. But it is arguable whether this was indeed the case in view of the conviction of the prime minister and foreign minister that the previous stonewalling strategy was the wrong policy and was leading nowhere. Be this as it may, without the reigning earthquake spirit, it is doubtful whether any Greek government would have summoned the courage for such a volte-face. It is worth pointing out that the idea that the various Greek vetoes were the wrong policy had been in the air since the early 1990s and apparently had been adopted (in private at least) by many a major political figure. Yet no Greek government dared budge but moved along as if in a trance, dreading the political cost of appearing ‘to appease aggressive-expansionist Turkey’.39

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In conclusion, the 1999 rapprochement can be seen as a process which started with the shock of the Imia/Kardak crisis, which mobilized influential segments of civil society as never before and to a lesser extent the two governments (they were still under the sway of the hawks on both sides). Then came a dangerous twist in their relations, with the Öcalan crisis that momentarily caused a virtual ‘black-out’ in their interaction.40 From then onwards the two foreign ministers, with the Kosovo crisis as the springboard, joined the rapprochement attempt and took the lead, initiating the low politics process. This was followed by the earthquake spirit which made the rapprochement more widely popular and in so doing freed the hands of the Greek government to add the final essential touch to the new scenery of Turkish-Greek relations: lifting the Greek veto on Turkey’s candidacy to the EU. In other words, we have here a case of enlightened civil society playing an important role in the first instance and presenting a credible alternative to perennial antagonism; the decisive role played by the two foreign ministers, who were genuinely convinced and committed to such a process; and the unexpected earthquakes, which had one positive effect, the involvement of the wider public, this time wanting peace and friendship.

MAIN INROADS SO FAR

The various tangible gains in the two and a half years of the new spirit in Greek-Turkish relations can be distinguished into activities and contacts at the level of civil society (cultural, scientific, etc.), profit-making (business, trade, investment, economic integration etc.) and official interstate interaction. The first category is a novelty in Greek-Turkish relations. Suffice to say that the sheer volume and variety of interaction in this domain is unprecedented and cannot be compared with any similar previous experience from 1923 onwards. As such it could make the difference, provided it retains its momentum. As for trade and business transactions, they were previously negligible, due of course to the climate reigning between the two countries for decades. However, they picked up steadily, though not impressively, from 1990 until 1998.41 In 1998 businessmen came together and tried to bring to life the Greek-Turkish and the

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Turkish-Greek business councils, but could make little headway. The opportunity to cover lost ground came with the earthquakes in Turkey, when Greek businessmen associated with the Greek-Turkish Council came to the assistance of their economically stricken colleagues.42 The dividends of these overtures were soon obvious, starting with impressive conferences of Greek and Turkish businessmen. By 2000 the exports-imports between the two countries had more than doubled to over 900 million dollars; investment had gone up by 775 per cent from 2.4 million dollars in 1999 to 14.7 in 2000. The joint ventures in both countries and elsewhere abroad are also apparently impressive though it is difficult to access their magnitude.43 As to developments at the state-to-state level, until June 1999 official relations were cool, minimal and very formal. Real dialogue simply did not exist. From mid-1999 onwards the intergovernmental landscape looks very different from the cool and formal level of the past. In June 1999 the two sides agreed to hold meetings on issues concerning tourism, culture, the environment, trade and commerce, multilateral cooperation, mainly in the Black Sea region and the Balkans as well as organized crime, illegal immigration, drug trafficking and terrorism. They covered the ground swiftly and came up with no less than nine bilateral agreements by early 2000 (all by now ratified):44 (1) cooperation on customs administration, (2) economic cooperation, (3) promotion and protection of investments, (4) cooperation on environmental protection, (5) cooperation on tourism, (6) maritime transport, (7) science and technology, (8) cultural cooperation, (9) combating crime, especially terrorism, organised crime, illicit drug trafficking and illegal immigration.45 With the nine agreements, the two countries now have a fairly adequate and more up-to-date institutional-legal framework on matters of low politics.46 In addition, the two governments have signed a protocol on the re-entry of illegal refugees; they have decided to draft an agreement on sea and air transportation and to address the outstanding question of double taxation, which hampers economic transactions. Interestingly, the Steering Committee of the two foreign ministries with its six working groups, that had been set up to draft the nine agreements, did not dissolve once its task was concluded, but continued to hold periodic meetings, overseeing implementation, in what seems to be an ongoing process of consultations. This is in itself

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of considerable value and has helped in breaking the ice further and promoting much needed understanding. Worth mentioning also is the Task Force on cooperation on matters of the EU that was decided by the two countries in Ankara in January 2000 (following a Greek suggestion). The object of the exercise is to provide Turkish functionaries with EU know-how. A series of seminars in Turkey and Greece have been organized, apparently with success, on matters such as customs and financial issues, judicial questions involving EU law, agricultural matters, police cooperation, etc., and there are more to follow. It would seem that the Task Force mechanism together with the Steering Committee and its six working groups functions as a kind of confidence-building device.47 Within confidence-building one could place the agreement of the two countries to ban anti-personnel land-mines on the basis of the relevant Ottawa convention, the practical implications of which would be dismantling and destroying the mines along the river Evros/Meriç border between the two countries.48 The decision of both countries to establish a direct red telephone line between the two foreign ministers can also be seen within the confidence-building spirit. Predictably, Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) per se are also a matter that has preoccupied the two countries since autumn 2000. They have agreed to discuss three categories of CBMs: (1) CBMs within the framework of the five set in the 1988 Papoulias-Yılmaz Memorandum of Understanding; (2) nine ‘Tension Reduction Measures’; and (3) three ‘Measures of Good Neighbourliness’, all regarding the Evros/Meriç river border between the two countries.49 Until the end of 2001, four CBMs had been adopted: the exchange of information on the scheduled military exercises on a yearly basis; invitations to officers to attend one military exercise per year; the possibility of heads of staff meeting in the margins of intergovernmental sessions; and cooperation aimed at averting the pollution of then Evros/Meriç river within the sustainable development of the region.

THE HURDLES AHEAD

The process inaugurated in 1999 by the two countries seems to follow David Mitrany’s blueprint for peace, the functional approach against

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war: a web of mutually functional transactions (particularly at the non-state level) that will eventually make boundaries irrelevant and the use of military force for political ends inconceivable.50 Its ambitious goal is to open a new page in Greek-Turkish relations. Of course it is still very early to determine whether it can hold and withstand the rugged road that inevitably lies ahead, in view of the still existing major disputes that divide them and put them on edge. As we have seen, the process so far has made several inroads. They are clearly far more than those achieved following two previous attempts at rapprochement, notably the one of 1959-1963 and the 1988 Davos process. The differences from Davos with which it is more comparable, is the low as distinct from the high politics strategy; the scale of activity in business transactions; the involvement of civic society and not least cultural activities; and perhaps above all the frame of mind. The Davos attempt, which in fact lasted less than a year (though technically it remained in force until the spring of 1989) also appreciated that business, contacts, tourism, cultural exchanges and so on, should be brought in. Thus it encouraged the formation of the economic councils and, at the interstate diplomatic level, it established the Economic Committee to promote trade and tourism and to work in parallel with the Political Committee that was to tackle the difficult questions. However, business and cultural exchanges made little headway. Perhaps the most noteworthy change was a rise in tourism that lasted for a while. The whole policy of rapprochement was a decision from above; in fact exclusively at the level of Turgut Özal and Andreas Papandreou. It found little sympathy not only among the two publics but also among influential diplomats, the military and other government and administrative cadres. In the Greek case, in particular, there was no forewarning of the volte-face or a previous in-depth study based on recommendations by diplomats or other advisers. In both Greece and Turkey it did not present a real break from the past, probably not even at the level of the two main initiators. It was a new strategy within old mindsets founded on the traditional zero-sum outlook, now re-framed as self-restraint and avoiding crises that could lead to messy situations.51 The ensemble of Greek-Turkish differences is widely known. Its basic areas of major dispute are the Aegean (namely continentalshelf, territorial waters, airspace, militarization-fortification of the

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eastern Greek islands, civil aviation region) and the Cyprus question,52 which, strictly speaking, is not a bilateral Greek-Turkish conflict, even though Greece and Turkey have often seen it in such terms. Indeed had it been a purely Greek-Turkish issue, it would not have been as impervious to settlement as it has been until now. Other points of friction include the minorities question, Turkey’s process towards the EC/EU, the encouragement and tangible support which Greece, according to Ankara, has afforded the PKK, and a recent addition to the Aegean dispute, the ‘grey areas’ dispute which is linked with the wider problem of lack of clear demarcation of the territorial borders on water between the two countries.

The Aegean Dispute A fundamental difference between the Cyprus and the Aegean dispute is that, in the first case, Turkey strongly favours the existing de facto status quo, which, however, is not accepted by Greece (or the Greek Cypriots) who regard it as unjust as well as illegal on the basis of international law and UN resolutions. In the Aegean case, maintaining the legal and de facto status quo is the almost nonnegotiable position of the Greek side. Turkey calls for its revision for it regards the existing situation as unfair and discriminatory.53 The heart of the problem in the Aegean is above all perceptual, namely mutual suspicion of the true intentions of the other side, largely deeply ingrained threat perceptions associated with the other side. There is on the one hand the ‘Greek lake’, ‘choking Turkey’, ‘creeping sovereignty’ feared by Turkey; and on the other the ‘half the Aegean’, ‘grabbing islands or rocks at will’, ‘surrounding the islands by Turkish continental shelf ’ dreaded by Greece. What is beyond doubt is the sincerity of the perceived threat to vital and legitimate interests. The Greeks for instance are horrified at the possibility of ‘island hopping’ with the use of the Turkish Fourth . Army based in Izmir; while the Turks regard the militarization of the Greek islands a transparent threat in the form of ‘daggers’ to their exposed and very extended Aegean coastline.54 In the case of Greece, for which we are in a better position to comment upon, two schools of thought have dominated public debate from the mid-1970s onward, on how to cope with the Aegean disputes: what could be called the negative political approach and

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the legal line. The negative political approach is associated with the late Andreas Papandreou (Greek premier, 1981–89, 1993–1995). Papandreou maintained that Athens has nothing to discuss let alone negotiate since after all it was satisfied with the existing status quo in the Aegean Sea. It was Turkey who was striving for the revision of the status quo at Greece’s expense, hence any initiation of a dialogue with Ankara was bound to be damaging. The evasive Papandreou line was skilfully presented to the Greek public as an adroit handling of the situation. But it hardly made the conflict disappear. In fact it exacerbated the Turkish-Greek antagonism in the Aegean as well as over Cyprus. Yet it is not without merit as ‘a first line of defence’,55 if seen as an initial bargaining posture within a process of dialogue and negotiations, since, after all, Greece is not the demandeur in most of the issues of the Aegean. The Greek legal viewpoint can be distinguished into the restrictive line and various more flexible approaches. The restrictive line, the official position of Athens from 1996 onwards, is that the most appropriate venue for resolving the conflict is the International Court of Justice as regards the one and only, according to most Greeks, outstanding legal dispute, namely the continental shelf dispute. Another dispute that could be included is the ‘grey zones’ issue raised by Turkey. This stance is too cautious and smacks of legalistic pettifogging. However, it is not unjustifiable, again as a starting point. On both issues Greece feels it is in a comfortable, though far from unassailable, position from the point of international law. Another possible reason for clinging so steadfastly to the juridical procedure may be that Greek governments are afraid to face their public, which is under the erroneous impression that a resounding legal victory is assured. The court will no doubt hand over a substantial portion of the seabed to Turkey. But a decision from a court, however painful, would in all probability be more palatable to the Greek people than anything, even a better deal that comes out of bilateral negotiations.56 The more open legal approaches include other issues in the juridical procedure of The Hague, not least in view of the fact that several of them are interconnected and inseparable, notably the territorial waters and the continental shelf questions. As to what could be called the positive political approach, namely opening the road to extended direct negotiations, with or without

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adjudication as an auxiliary method, it has been entertained as well, though cautiously and not publicly, particularly by premier Constantine Karamanlis in the late 1970s and also by Papandreou himself not only during the brief Davos séjour but also upon his rise to power in 1981-1982.57 By and large, however, the Greek side is apprehensive of negotiations. The legal mind still dominant in Greek decision-making is not at ease with such processes and does not seem to appreciate that it has more benefits as a procedure than international adjudication.58 Another reason for avoiding talks is the great influence of the more traditional realist approach, which understands negotiations only as a zero-sum win-lose framework, whereby the stronger party, in this case Turkey, is bound to win negotiation-wise, by the sheer fact that it is a more powerful party (as if the two sides were negotiating a peace treaty where Turkey was victorious). Very few Greeks realize that even if it were possible to convince Turkey to accept the competence of The Hague court, any clear Greek victory would be of little real worth and would be unlikely to further reconciliation. Turkey would no doubt be furious and consider the court decision biased (‘Greece the spoiled child of Europe’) and unjust. Only a win-win solution in the Aegean is viable and indeed reasonable, and this can be achieved by way of negotiations with adjudication perhaps as an auxiliary road within parameters set previously in meticulous talks between the two parties.

Coping with the Difficulties Ahead: Some Suggestions What can be done to cope with the ominous clouds that have not disappeared from the Greek-Turkish horizon? According to one view there is no need to rush to the difficult issues, at least not for the time being.59 They can learn to live fairly peacefully side by side with the outstanding disagreements not necessarily or automatically marring relations; they may ‘agree to disagree’ as it were and at the same time deepen their interaction at all levels. Thus with the passage of time and with the greater volume and quality of interaction, the new unprecedented web of transactions à la Mitrany could make war and brinkmanship after a time unthinkable and so costly that they would not be entertained by any serious government in Ankara or Athens. However, this course can work for a while provided the two parties

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are crystal clear and in full agreement on the following basic point: that they can solve their outstanding difficulties when the time is ripe, only by way of dialogue and through peaceful means and not, under any circumstances, by the threat or use of force and by various forms of adversarial posturing (i.e. through rival alliances and rival axes, attempts at encirclement, arms races, etc.). This optimistic scenario may be realizable – though with difficulty – for the Aegean dispute and other bilateral questions. But how about Cyprus? Cyprus cannot wait, in view of the prospect of entry into the EU, which has given rise to heated debates from Ankara to Brussels. Any conciliatory line either by Athens or Ankara on Cyprus, however careful, may amount to political suicide. Indeed, both states could become hostages of the uncompromising Greek-Cypriots or the uncompromising Turkish-Cypriots respectively, who until recently (until the unexpected 5 December 2001 private meeting among Klerides and Denktas¸ in the latter’s home which led to the closed talks of 2002 under UN auspices) appeared to hold sway in both communities of the island. The key is for the two communities to reach their own solution, with the gentle push and encouragement of a Greece and a Turkey fully committed to their own reconciliation, and to enter the EU together in a united loosely federated Cyprus. But let us go back to the bilateral questions. So long as the Aegean disputes remain in a state of limbo, they offer ample ground for severe misunderstanding and tension. And more generally, can one speak with confidence of a stable Greek-Turkish rapprochement as distinct from a more ephemeral and shaky détente, without a serious if protracted dialogue on the difficult issues that continue to divide and haunt them? At this juncture we will emphasize five points, the aim being to sustain the dynamic of the recent détente, which by 2002 has lost its momentum, and make of it a real rapprochement and reconciliation. For a start, the two governments could well point out to the more nervous segments of their publics, that they have indeed ameliorated their relations without on the other hand ‘giving in an inch’ on the major issues. Good relations have not meant abandoning or compromising their national interests. The process has been costless so far and can continue to remain so in the hands of moderate governments who believe that tension does not pay.

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Furthermore, several aspects of the Greek-Turkish conflict appear in a different light within the new cordial atmosphere. Some have almost disappeared, such as the Turkish minority issue in Greece (Thrace) as well as the putative Greek encouragement or aid to the PKK, and of course the European orientation of Turkey that had previously been in various ways (to be more exact in almost every conceivable way) frustrated by Greece. Another obvious development is that, under the spirit reigning between the two countries, the prospects for a crisis and tension have been drastically curtailed and new uncharted territory for peaceful coexistence, transactions and communication has opened. But more is needed. They must gradually come to realize – or to be more precise their wider public should comprehend – something that is widely known among more detached analysts: that the various Aegean differences are not zero-sum and even less when placed within a wider Aegean package deal, provided of course that the two sides do not cling to their maximalist positions (occasionally set forth mainly for negotiation purposes or for internal consumption).60 It is to be noted that more recently, even the very cautious Greek-Turkish Forum has come with a useful – if mainly procedural – proposition of how to go about the settlement of the Aegean conflict.61 More generally, tension and bitter relations are no longer considered a given by a rising number of Greeks and Turks. The fact that the two peoples are condemned by geography to live side by side as friends rather than as enemies is becoming somewhat more acceptable and desirable. Peace and security between the two countries is now a ‘cognitive alternative’ for more people than ever before since the Venizelos-Atatürk rapprochement – and this time with a difference; it has wider support in the two countries (at least from late 1999 until early 2002). At a more analytical level, in addition to the Mitrany approach mentioned above, at least three other avenues are of relevance: superordinate goals, negotiation strategy and conflict transformation. Superordinate goals are vital needs of two adversaries that cannot be met as long as the conflict continues unabated. They require a joint effort by the two parties and this process, once initiated, can gradually smooth their wider differences.62 A joint effort, such as the

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co-exploitation of the Aegean, wholly or partially, could be an answer as far as the continental shelf is concerned.63 The negotiation strategy from the easier to the more difficult issues may create a dynamic of its own, as a level of mutual confidence is established, making the image of the enemy and the prisoner’s dilemma mentality less pivotal than before. As in other protracted conflicts, there are at least three ways of going about the task of dialogue and eventual negotiations. One is to put the emphasis on tangible interests and try to pin-point manageable negotiable issues to be placed within a cost-benefit calculus by comparison to the cost and benefits of the ongoing clash. A deal could be struck by splitting the difference. Here it is important for both parties to reach the conclusion that the other side also sacrifices its goals and is taking great risks in order to achieve the final agreement. In conflicts such as the one between Greece and Turkey, however, where issues of perceptions and collective identity are omnipresent, the emphasis on tangible interests on their own is not likely to make much headway. Thus it is also necessary to address at the same time or in parallel, mutual attitudes, notably enemy images and the resultant extent of misunderstanding of the other, without forgetting a fundamental source of bias and demonization, namely group identity as shaped by national history. As Richard Clogg had concluded, almost two decades ago, ‘even if a Greek-Turkish rapprochement is achieved at official level, the changing of the popular attitudes, reciprocal stereotypes and mutual fears that underlie the present antagonism will be a much more protracted and difficult process’.64 Turning now to the third way of going about negotiating the peace process, the aim is to try to resolve the conflict as a common problem as in the ‘problem-solving’ approach.65 It seeks to promote an integrated solution by the parties themselves, not so much by way of hard bargaining and negotiations, but by discretely inducing a redefinition of the conflict by dwelling into its deep underlying causes, by trying to understand the other’s needs and concerns in an attempt to reach, creatively, a mutual acceptance solution. The solution may be unique to each situation and positive-sum in its outcome. As A. J. R. Groom has argued in this context, what is needed is an extended dialogue between Greece and Turkey, where the two adversaries explore ‘the problems [of the Aegean] in a non-negotiating, noncoercive, problem-solving framework so that there are no winners

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and losers, but only winners’.66 This is after all the stuff of good relations which served the European Community, now the EU, from its very first steps, making the French-German historic antagonism a thing of the past.67 What is known as ‘conflict transformation’68 is also of relevance in Greek-Turkish relations and could open new avenues for resolution. It includes all kinds of changes, particularly as regards vital aspects of the two actors or of their environment (regional and global) in instances where the conflict appears intractable, as has been the case most of the time with the Cyprus question, from 1950 onwards. Changes in leadership, regime, political system or ideology, a shift in international orientation and alignments, a distinct change in the regional or international system and so on can present a window of opportunity for meaningful talks. In the Greek-Turkish case as on previous occasions, leadership changes did play a role, as for instance the switch from Papandreou (who was a hardliner on everything regarding Turkey for most of the time, but for his 1988 volte face) to Simitis in the mid-1990s. Clearly the role of the two foreign ministers, Cem and Papandreou, was crucial for the process of rapprochement in its early phase. The greater relevance of the EU is also of great importance for conflict transformation on the bilateral issues and even more with Cyprus. But it could also be a source of great frustration and may not act, as the much needed deus ex machina.

IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION

I will conclude with a list of prerequisites and goals for Greek-Turkish conflict resolution and reconciliation. I would argue that a final historical compromise between Greece and Turkey would succeed if it incorporates most, or preferably all, of the following concerns and goals:69 1. If the resultant agreement or agreements are the outcome of the free will of the two parties. 2. If it is the end result of a sincere, careful and protracted dialogue and negotiation between them, with no external parties involved other than as facilitators or informal diplomats (Track-2).

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3. If no party aims to impose its will or its preferred solution on the other side, be it by pressure, ruse, outwitting or otherwise. 4. If both parties realize that attempting to impose their will on their erstwhile adversary is simply unrealizable, a loss of time and effort. It is in one way or another self-defeating. 5. If both abandon their respective maximalist initial positions, namely ‘Greek lake’ and ‘half the Aegean’ as regards the Aegean conflict; and ‘Cyprus is Greek’ and ‘the Cyprus issue was resolved in 1974’ as regards Cyprus. 6. If the gains for both as a result of the settlement in the making appear to exceed the profits from the ongoing conflict and its non-resolution. 7. If the two sides come to realize that a zero-sum outlook is of very little value even within a scrupulous ‘split the difference’ approach. 8. If they realize that at the end only striving for positive sum outcomes (win-win) can lead to viable solutions, to an Aegean and a Cyprus of peace, stability and cooperation. 9. If the overall agreement (the package deal) is regarded as sensible and just, and certainly not as unfair, replete with unbearable compromises (by the two parties as to the Aegean and the four parties as to Cyprus). 10. If with the set of solutions reached, the vital needs and interests of Greece and Turkey are met and served, in particular security (common security), territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers, lack of any expansionist or threatening stance in the future, the continuing European orientation of both countries, development and modernization, the deepening of pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and as far as their bilateral relations are concerned, mutual respect and mutually legitimized relations. The ten above prerequisites are undoubtedly a demanding ensemble, difficult to achieve overnight, even with the best of intentions. In fact the two parties could proceed having a list of this kind as a measuring rod. Yet as things gradually fall into place within a new spirit, a reciprocal paradigm shift is far from impossible. It is not

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inconceivable in our day and age, not least in the otherwise difficult twenty-first century that we have embarked upon, which once again finds the two countries in the same camp, craving to be part of the zone of peace and stability.

NOTES 1. For a review of Greek-Turkish relations see Richard Clogg, ‘The Troubled Alliance: Greece and Turkey’, in Richard Clogg (ed.), Greece in the 1980s (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 123–49; Theodore A. Couloumbis, The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle (New York: Praeger, 1983); Tozun Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955 (Boulder: Westview, 1990); Süha Bölükbas¸ı, ‘The Turco-Greek Dispute: Issues, Policies and Prospects’, in Clement H. Dodd (ed.), Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects (London: The Eothen Press, 1992), pp. 27–54; Dimitri Constas (ed.), The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s (London: Macmillan, 1991); Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds), Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization (Herndon, Virginia: Brassey’s, 2001). 2. ¸Sükrü S. Gürel, ‘Turkey and Greece: A Difficult Aegean Relationship’, in Canan Balkır and Allan M. Williams (eds), Turkey and Europe (London, New York: Pinter, 1993), p. 163. 3. Clogg, ‘Troubled Alliance: Greece and Turkey’, p. 125. 4. This thinking is very much along the lines of classic realism and in particular Varuch Spinoza’s thesis on the evanescence of international agreements. See Steven Forde, ‘Classical Realism’, in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (eds), Traditions of International Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 77. 5. See e.g. Athanassios Platias, ‘Greece’s Strategic Doctrine: In Search of Autonomy and Deterrence’, in Constas, The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s. 6. See e.g. Hüseyin Pazarcı, La delimination du plateau continental et les îles (Ankara: SBF Yayınları, 1982); and Aslan Gündüz, ‘Greek-Turkish Disputes: How to Resolve Them?’, in Keridis/Triantaphyllou, Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization, pp. 81–101. 7. Gürel, ‘Turkey and Greece’, p. 163. 8. As Mehmet Ali Birand has put it recently, ‘to the Greeks Turkey was the “Evil Empire” whose sole aim was to rob Greece of territory. To the Turks, Greece was a nuisance that wasted no chance to defame and belittle Turkey’. See Mehmet Ali Birand, ‘Efcharisto File (Thank You, Friend)’, at [http://www.greekturkishforum.org]. 9. In 1996, a far-fetched scenario has been put forward in all seriousness by a distinguished former ambassador and academic, S¸ükrü Elekdagˇ, namely that Greece could coordinate an attack with another unfriendly neighbour, namely Syria. See S¸ükrü Elekdagˇ, ‘21⁄2 War Strategy’, Perceptions, 1, 1 (March–May 1996). 10. Clogg, ‘Troubled Alliance: Greece and Turkey’, p. 126. 11. Morton Deutsch, ‘Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution’, in Raymo Vayrynen (ed.), New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation (London: Sage, 1991), p. 31. 12. Forde, ‘Classical Realism’, p. 63. 13. Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, 30, 2 (January 1978); Alan Collins, ‘The Security Dilemma’, in M. Jane Davis (ed.), Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996). 14. See on this Panayotis J. Tsakonas, ‘The Security Dilemma in Greek-Turkish Relations’, Hellenic Studies, 9, 2 (Autumn 2001). 15. The Cyprus conflict in particular, as it evolved from 1963 to 1974 can be seen in selffulfilling terms particularly as far as Greece and the Greek-Cypriots are concerned.

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16.

17. 18.

19.

20. 21. 22.

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

29. 30. 31.

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See Alexis Heraclides, To Kypriako: Sygkrousi kai epilysi (The Cyprus Question: Conflict and Resolution), (Athens: I. Sideris, 2002). For the liberal-pluralist line on this see John W. Burton, International Relations: A General Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965); Robert L. Rothstein, ‘On the Costs of Realism’, in Michael Smith, Richard Little and Michael Shackleton (eds), Perspectives on World Politics (London: Croom Helm, 1981 [1972]); John A Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: A Critique (London: Pinter, 1983). For the postpositivist criticism see Richard K. Ashley, ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’, and Robert W. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Robert B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Kurt Lewin’s expression in Henry Tajfel and Colin Frazer, Introducing Social Psychology (London: Penguin Books, 1978), p. 12. Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998); Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.) On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). Gürel, ‘Turkey and Greece’, p. 186; Mehmet Ali Birand, ‘Turkey and the “Davos Process”: Experiences and Prospects’, in Constas, The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s, pp. 29–30; On the Greek side this point has been made on several occasions by retired ambassador Byron Theodoropoulos. See his Oi Tourkoi kai Emeis (The Turks and Us), (Athens: Fitrakis, 1988). Jack S. Levy, ‘Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique’, in I. Manus and L. Midlarsky (eds), Handbook of War Studies (Boston: Unwin-Hyman, 1989), pp. 259–88. Arnold Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, 2nd edn (New York: Howard Fertig, 1923). In Turkey the nationalists are very visible as a group in the Nationalist Action Party (MHP: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi). In Greece the nationalist lobby is active in almost all political parties. Towards the end of the 1990s its influence and numbers fell but it is still a force to reckon with in the Greek political arena. Clogg, ‘Troubled Alliance: Greece and Turkey’, p. 142. Mustafa Aydın, ‘Cacophony in the Aegean: Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations’, Turkish Review of International Relations, 28 (1997), p. 111. . . S¸ükrü S. Gürel, Tarihsel Boyut I çinde Türk-Yunan I lis¸kileri, 1821–1993 (TurkishGreek Relations in Historical Context, 1821–1993), (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993), p. 10. Gürel, ‘Turkey and Greece: A Difficult Aegean Relationship’, p. 161. See also Clogg, ‘Troubled Alliance: Greece and Turkey’. For more details on this chapter see Alexis Heraclides, ‘Greek-Turkish Relations from Discord to Détente: A Preliminary Evaluation’, The Review of International Affairs, 1, 3 (2002). In the sub-field of conflict resolution there have been discussions regarding traumatic experiences and the need to suffer but also to acknowledge the suffering of the other. See e.g. Vamık D. Volkan, The Need to Have Enemies and Allies (Northvale: Jason Aronson, 1988); Joseph V. Montville, ‘The Healing Function in Political Conflict Resolution’, in Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van den Merwe (eds), Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993). For an experiment with Soviet radio broadcasts which were able to alter, in part at least, extreme anti-Soviet attitudes, see Don D. Smith, ‘Mass Communications and Image Change’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 17 (1973), pp. 116–29. Ekavi Athanassopoulo, ‘Blessing in Disguise? The Imia Crisis and Turkish-Greek Relations’, Mediterranean Politics, 2, 3 (1997), pp. 76–101. See paper by Soli Özel in this volume. And Dimitris Keridis, ‘Domestic Developments

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32.

33.

34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39.

40. 41. 42. 43.

44.

45. 46.

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and Foreign Policy: Greek Policy towards Turkey’, in Keridis/Triantaphyllou (eds), Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization, p. 16. This is in view of the level of participation, particularly of the members of its Political Analysis Group, all of whom have close links with the higher echelons of government. The ‘One and a Half ’ expression was coined by a leading Greek politician. Interview by the author with Paulina Lampsa, member of the Political Analysis Group. Patriarch Athinagoras had made similar attempts in the 1950s, but his efforts were swept aside by Turkey within the Cyprus conundrum. See Alexis Alexandris, The Greek Minority in Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1983), pp. 244–56. . See George Papandreou’s letter to Ismail Cem on the Kosovo crisis opportunity, at: [http://www.greekturkishforum.org]. Cem’s letter to Papandreou, at: [http://www.greekturkishforum.org]. Papandreou’s letter to Cem, at: [http://www.greekturkishforum.org]. It is clear that George Papandreou had prepared the ground for the thaw in the Greek foreign ministry (not without difficulty) well before the exchange of the letters. Author’s interviews with officials of the Greek Foreign Ministry. . For the importance of this move see interview of Ismail Cem to Anni Podimata, in To Vima, 13 January 2000, also in English at [http://www.greekturkishforum. org]. Equally the interview of George Papandreou to Nuri Çolakogˇlu and Alkis Kourkoulas, broadcast in NTV, 21 January 2000; also printed in English at [http:// www.greekturkishforum.org]. See also Giorgos Papandreou, ‘Oi Ellinotourkikes sheseis apo ti syngrousi sti synergasia kai tin oikodomisi tis Evropis tou 21ou aiona’ (The Greek-Turkish Relations from conflict to cooperation and the building of Europe in the twenty-first century), Anaskopisi Amyntikis kai Exoterikis Politikis (Review of Defence and Foreign Policy), (Athens: Eliamep, 2000), pp. 27–8. Note that autumn 1999 had seen a backlash of the nationalist anti-Turkish bloc in Greece, whose thrust was that Turkey was simply availing itself of this unique opportunity to pocket gains at no cost. Interestingly, similar fears were voiced in Turkey, in what is one more instance of mirror imagery between the two sides. Author’s interview with Hercules Millas. Maria Berberidou, ‘I ellino-tourkiki oikonomiki synergasia: provlimata kai prooptikes’ (Greek-Turkish economic cooperation: problems and prospects), Agora Horis Synora, 7, 1 (2001), p. 5. Ibid., pp. 3–14. See also the papers by Panagiotis Liargovas and Ozay Mehmet in this volume. Author’s interview with the Greek Chairman of the Greek-Turkish Council and Chamber, Panayotis Koutsikos. Berberidou, ‘I ellino-tourkiki oikonomiki synergasia’, pp. 6–10; Panayotis Koutsikos, in an internal document for use by the Greek-Turkish Business Council, entitled ‘Information Document for the Activities of the GTBC’, undated; Panayotis Koutsikos, ‘Elinotourkiki filia: prokliseis kai prooptikes sti nea hilietia’ (Greek-Turkish Friendship: Challenges and Prospects in the New Millennium), Anaskopisi Amyntikis kai Exoterikis Politikis (Review of Defence and Foreign Policy), (Athens: ELIAMEP, 2001), pp. 63–9. There were some sticking points and difficulties here and there, but the instructions from above to the drafters were to be as flexible as possible and not permit minor difficulties to mar the whole enterprise. Author’s interviews with Greek officials. For the full texts of the agreements see National Bank of Greece, Greek Business Almanac (Athens: National Bank of Greece, 2001), pp. 35–82. The existing institutional framework (the 1951 cultural agreement, the 1970 agreement on road transport, the 1979 tourist cooperation and some others) was dated and of little use.

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47. See in this context G. Papandreou’s interview to Çolakogˇlu and Kourkoulas, Broadcast on NTV, 21 January 2000, at: [http://www.greekturkishforum.org]. 48. Panayotis J. Tsakonas, ‘Turkey’s Post-Helsinki Turbulence: Implications for Greece and the Cyprus Issue’, Turkish Studies, 2, 2 (2001), p. 26. 49. For details see ibid., p. 26 and note 109 in p. 39. 50. David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943). 51. Bölükbas¸ı, ‘The Turco-Greek Dispute’, pp. 45–7; Richard Clogg, ‘Greek-Turkish Relations in the Post-1974 Period’, in Constas, The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s, pp. 19–22; Birand, ‘Turkey and the Davos Process’, pp. 27–39; Geoffrey Pridham, ‘Linkage Politics Theory and the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement’, in Constas, The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s, pp. 78–86; Van Coufoudakis, ‘Greek Political Party Attitudes towards Turkey: 1974–89’, in Constas, The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s, pp. 40–55. 52. See Mustafa Aydın’s paper in this volume. 53. Groom, ‘Cyprus, Greece and Turkey’, pp. 147–8. 54. Andrew Wilson, ‘The Aegean Dispute’, Adelphi Papers (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979/1980), pp. 1, 13, 27–9; Aydın, ‘Cacophony in the Aegean’. 55. Groom, ‘Cyprus, Greece and Turkey’, pp. 147–8. 56. See on this point Wilson, ‘The Aegean Dispute’, pp. 13–14. 57. See for such approaches Theodoropoulos, Oi Tourkoi kai emeis; Theodore A. Couloumbis and Louis J. Klarevas, ‘An Outline of a Plan Toward a Comprehensive Settlement of the Greek-Turkish Dispute’, in Vangelis Calotychos (ed.), Cyprus and its People: Nation, Identity, and Experience in an Unimaginable Community, 1955–1997 (Boulder: Westview, 1998), pp. 121–34. 58. For a thorough listing of the disadvantages of the legal procedures, see Richard B. Bilder, ‘Adjudication: International Arbitral Tribunals and Courts’, in William I. Zartman and Lewis Rasmusen (eds), Peacemaking in International Conflict (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), pp. 175–8. 59. Voiced in Greece, among others, by Theodore Couloumbis. 60. Wilson, ‘The Aegean Dispute’, pp. 1, 13, 27–9; Theodoropoulos, Oi Tourkoi kai Emeis, pp. 324–5. Couloumbis/Klarevas, ‘An outline of a Plan Toward a Comprehensive Settlement of the Greek-Turkish Dispute’, pp. 121–34; Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, pp. 129–30, 152–9, 192–3; Bölükbas¸ı, Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus, pp. 28 and 49; A. J. R. Groom, ‘Cyprus, Greece and Turkey: A Treadmill for Diplomacy’, in John T. A. Koumoulides (ed.), Cyprus in Transition, 1960-1985 (London: Trigraph, 1986), pp. 147–8; Richard Haass, Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes (New Haven, London: 1990), pp. 59–64; Monteagle Stearns, Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), pp. 134–44. See also Alexis Heraclides, I Ellada kai o ‘ex Anatolon Kindynos’ (Greece and ‘the Threat from the East’), (Athens: Polis, 2001), pp. 242–50. 61. See Political Analysis Group, ‘Issues in the Aegean: Openings and Possibilities’, at: [http://www.greekturkishforum.org]. 62. Mujafer Sherif, Conflict and Co-operation (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966). 63. Heraclides, I Ellada kai o ‘ex Anatolon Kindynos’ (Greece and ‘the Threat from the East’), p. 244. 64. Clogg, ‘Troubled Alliance: Greece and Turkey’, p. 141. 65. John W. Burton, Conflict and Communication: The Use of Controlled Communication in International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1969); Edward A. Azar and John W. Burton (eds), International Conflict Resolution (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1986). 66. Groom, ‘Cyprus, Greece and Turkey’, p. 147. 67. Ernst Haas, International Political Communities (New York: Anchor Books, 1966), pp. 94–100.

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68. Raymo Vayrynen, ‘To Settle or to Transform: Perspectives on the Resolution of National and International Conflicts’, in Raymo Vayrynen (ed.), New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation (London: Sage, 1991), pp. 4–6. 69. This is a reworking of this author’s last lines in Heraclides, I Ellada kai o ‘ex Anatolon Kindynos’ (Greece and ‘the Threat from the East’), p. 331.

4 Turning a New Page in Turkey’s Relations with Greece? The Challenge of Reconciling Vital Interests TOZUN BAHCHELI The relaxation of tensions between Turkey and Greece since late 1999, the improved prospects for Turkey’s accession to the European Union (EU), as well as new diplomatic initiatives to solve the Cyprus issue, constitute the most hopeful developments in recent TurkishGreek relations. To be sure, it is far from certain that the recent improvement in Turkish-Greek relations will yield the kind of progress that eluded Turkish and Greek leaders in the past. As their interests clashed in Cyprus for nearly half a century and in the Aegean since the early 1970s, rivalry and deep mistrust have been the hallmarks of Turkish relations with Greece for decades. Although periods of détente between the two countries have not been uncommon, they have also succumbed to sporadic crises: on three occasions since the 1970s, they nearly went to war against each other. Given this background, reconciling vital Turkish and Greek interests will present a formidable challenge. In spite of these reservations, the conditions for sustaining Turkish-Greek détente in the early years of the new millennium appear promising. In Turkey and Greece public opinion responded warmly when both countries reacted to each other’s earthquake tragedies in the latter half of 1999 with dispatch and generosity. Even before the earthquakes, former Turkish foreign minister Ismail Cem and his Greek counterpart, George Papandreou, had begun a tentative dialogue and cooperated in providing humanitarian aid to Kosovo during the North Atlantic (NATO) military campaign against Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999. With the mutual aid during the

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earthquakes energizing bilateral dialogue, Greece lifted its veto on Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership at the EU’s Helsinki Summit in December 1999. During the subsequent EU summit in Copenhagen of 12–13 December 2002, Greece was among a few EU states that supported Ankara’s bid for an early date to begin accession negotiations with Brussels. Since 1999, bilateral meetings between Turkish and Greek officials have yielded more than a dozen agreements on largely noncontroversial issues related to economic and cultural ties, border security, terrorism and cross-border crime. There has been a virtual explosion of contacts between Turkish and Greek non-governmental groups. In addition, Greek and Turkish businesspeople have increased their contacts, and trade between the two countries has risen.

BETWEEN WAR AND MANAGED RIVALRY

That Turkey and Greece were adversaries for long periods in their history has deeply influenced their relationship and the political reactions of their leaders to disputes. The mistrust traditionally exhibited is a product of an acrimonious historical legacy. Nevertheless, Greeks and Turks have shown that they are not entirely prisoners of memory. Their history of conflict has not ruled out periods of peace and reconciliation, or even close and interdependent relations. Only eight years after their last war (1919 to 1922), which was fought with great ferocity and bitterness, Greece and Turkey began a period of détente. Greek-Turkish reconciliation was introduced in 1930 by the powerful, visionary leaders, Kemal Atatürk and Eleftherios Venizelos. It yielded agreements in the political, economic and security spheres and weathered occasional irritants. After the Second World War prospects for closer relations were further enhanced when they both joined the western alliance system and simultaneously became NATO members in 1952. Amid these auspicious developments, Cyprus emerged as an arena where Greek and Turkish interests clashed, beginning in the mid-1950s. Turks depicted their policy in Cyprus (and the Aegean) as consistently reactive. From their viewpoint, it was Greece and the

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Greek Cypriot leadership that repeatedly forced open the issue of sovereignty over the island, even after the Zurich-London agreements created Cypriot independence in 1960. In the Aegean, Ankara accused Athens of wanting to bring about unilateral changes to the status quo by claiming the right to extend its territorial seas from six to 12 miles. While these disputes seriously damaged relations, and even brought them to the brink of war on several occasions, the two neighbours also showed a capacity to cool tempers and to adopt measures that would discourage future confrontations. The Aegean confrontation of 1976 ushered in a period of calm and the adoption of the Berne Declaration, which brought a decade of peace and quiet. Another Aegean confrontation in 1987 had a profoundly sobering effect and led to the short-lived dialogue known as the ‘Davos process’. But these respites of relative stability failed to yield any sustained negotiating process. In fact, again in January 1996, the two neighbours briefly confronted each other over Imia/Kardak – an uninhabited islet – without, however, any subsequent improvement in the climate of relations until the latter half of 1999. Moreover, the UN-sponsored Cyprus negotiations – to which Greek leaders attached a much higher priority than Ankara – failed to achieve progress and remained unhelpful in advancing overall TurkishGreek relations. Indeed, more often than not, tensions over Cyprus preoccupied the two countries. Just in the years 1997–99, these were fed by such events as violence along the line separating the communities, Cyprus’s bid for accession to the EU, and – before its cancellation in 1999 – the proposed deployment of Russian-made S-300 surface-to-air missiles in Greek Cyprus. These events kept Greek-Turkish relations strained through most of the 1990s. Even as relations between Turkey and Greece warmed in late 1999 and beyond, the climate in the relations between the two Cypriot communities remained tense until late 2001 when the decision to start a new round of intercommunal negotiations raised hopes of a settlement on both sides of the Green Line. These expectations have been apparently boosted by the receptivity of AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi – Justice and Development Party) government and Athens as well as the Greek Cypriot leadership to the peace plan for Cyprus that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan submitted to the parties on 11 November 2002, a month before the EU summit in Copenhagen.

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However, at the time of writing (July 2003) the opposition of Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas¸ to the plan has cast doubts that the long-standing Cyprus conflict might finally end with an agreed settlement.

THE AEGEAN: TURKEY’S APPROACH AND INTERESTS

Many Greeks, who have feared Turkish expansionism for decades, would be surprised to hear Turkish officials argue that Greece has been an expansionist power in the Aegean, at Turkey’s expense. These Turkish contentions refer to historical maps of the Aegean that show the remarkable expansion of Greek sovereignty over Aegean islands since Greece attained independence. Turkey’s boundaries with Greece were established under the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. The treaty granted all of the 2,200 Aegean islands and islets to Greece, with the exception of Gökçeada, Bozcaada and the tiny Rabbit Islands at the entrance of the Dardanelles. These largely Greek-inhabited islands, which had been ruled by the Ottoman Empire for centuries had, in any case, passed to Greek control during the Balkan wars of 1912–13. It was also decided, however, that Turkey’s security concerns warranted the demilitarization of the eastern Aegean islands. The equilibrium established by the Lausanne Treaty in the Aegean did not pose any large problems for the two neighbours for half a century. No Turkish-Greek controversy over the Aegean surfaced even when the Cyprus issue created strains and bitterness in both Turkey and Greece in the late 1950s and the 1960s. Since the early 1970s, however, Turkish and Greek differences in the Aegean, related mostly to sovereign rights, have seriously damaged their relations. Most of the quarrelling has been over the entitlement of each to the Aegean continental shelf. In addition to this, Ankara and Athens have had serious disagreements on the limits of the territorial sea, sovereign airspace, the control of the military and civil air traffic control zones, and the militarization of the Greek islands in the eastern Aegean (see Aydın’s chapter in this book). To the great disappointment of Turkish leaders, international maritime laws have been modified seemingly in Greece’s favour in recent decades. Article 3 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention

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provides for the right of states to establish territorial seas of ‘a maximum breadth of twelve miles from the baselines’.1 Greece was one of the first signatories, but Turkey has not signed it. Nevertheless, Greece thus far has refrained from extending its territorial sea in the Aegean beyond six miles. While most of the Aegean quarrelling centred on the continental shelf, the territorial sea issue is the one that is most vital for Turkey. The two issues are not unrelated. All of the shelf claimed by Greece would lie within its prospective 12-mile territorial claim. Greek extension of its Aegean would make Turkey’s access . territorial waters . to its major ports, Istanbul and Izmir, more difficult. As Andrew Wilson pointed out in his 1980s study The Aegean Dispute, ‘already the application of the six-mile limit restricts Turkey to only three places where shipping may enter or leave Turkish territorial waters from international waters’.2 Thus Ankara has repeatedly declared that an extension to 12 miles would constitute a casus belli, that is, a justification for war. After the Greek Parliament ratified the International Law of the Sea on 1 June 1994, the Turkish Parliament followed on 8 June with a resolution authorizing the government to use all measures to protect Turkey’s rights in the Aegean. The access issue applies also to aircraft, as Turkey feels similarly confined by the airspace of Greece’s islands. Ankara’s challenges with its military aircraft to Greece’s ten-mile airspace over its six-mile territorial waters are usually countered by Athens’ responds with its own aircrafts (see Chapter 1). These aerial challenges have long worried their NATO allies, but Athens and Ankara have thus far managed to prevent mock dogfights from escalating into more serious exchanges. Ankara has also occasionally quarrelled with Athens over lesser issues related to flights in the Aegean by repeatedly accusing Greece of abusing its purely technical Flight Information Region (FIR) responsibilities to gain sovereign rights. Again, like the US and other NATO states, Turkey does not accept the Greek claim that it is obliged to notify Greek authorities when its military aircraft enter Aegean airspace. While the FIR issue has been an irritant, the stakes for both Turkey and Greece have been greater in the Aegean continental shelf. The shelf – comprising the seabed and sub-soil of the submarine area beyond the territorial sea, to the point where the land mass is deemed to end – has proved to be one of the most difficult and potentially

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explosive issues facing the Aegean neighbours. Athens has stated that delimitation of the continental shelf is the sole Aegean issue and that the problem must be adjudicated by the International Court of Justice at The Hague. Greek leaders assert that their islands are surrounded by continental shelf beyond that of the Greek mainland. In the Turkish view, the Greek Aegean islands lie within Turkey’s continental shelf as a natural extension of the Anatolian peninsula. While both countries have generally avoided serious provocations in the Aegean, mutual suspicions sometimes create tensions and even provoke confrontations. A case in point was Ankara’s consternation following Greek attempts to populate remote Aegean islands in 1995.3 But Athens accused Ankara of a greater transgression in challenging Greek sovereignty over an unpopulated islet off the Turkish coast (known as ‘Imia’ to Greeks and ‘Kardak’ to Turks). Indicating a hardened policy, Turkish leaders announced a new position that there are more than a hundred uninhabited Aegean islets whose legal status is unclear, and thus represent ‘grey areas’ of uncertain sovereignty. This departure sowed new doubts in the minds of Greek leaders concerning Turkish intentions. Unlike Athens, which apparently feels confident about its legal position, Ankara fears that its case on the issues discussed thus far is weaker and demurs on the desire of Athens to pursue a court decision. However, Turkish leaders do feel confident on the issue of demilitarization of Greece’s eastern Aegean islands, and they have periodically brought up the issue to demonstrate Greece’s seeming contravention of the treaties of Lausanne (1923) and Paris (1947). Nevertheless, Ankara’s approach to resolving its Aegean problems is driven by a general strategy of avoiding the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague, or indeed any other third-party adjudication or arbitration, except ‘as a last resort’. Turkish leaders calculate that they can obtain better terms from Greece through bilateral negotiations. In accordance with this approach, Ankara strongly resists Greek attempts to ‘internationalize’ (and ‘Europeanize’) Aegean issues. Turkish leaders traditionally react angrily to Athens’s attempts to enlist the support of its EU partners and warn those states not to take Greece’s side. On the other hand, Ankara has periodically signalled to Athens that it did not rule out third-party mediation, including recourse to the ICJ. In an appeal to Greece on 24 March 1996, not long after Turkey and Greece nearly went to war

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over Imia/Kardak, Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz announced Turkey’s willingness to accept third-party mediation. Upon returning to the prime ministry in the following year, Yılmaz urged that the two countries ‘resolve everything possible through negotiations and leave the rest to international arbitration and, as a last resort, to the International Tribunal in The Hague’.4 Turkey has periodically tried to induce Greece into bilateral negotiations on Aegean issues (see Chapter 9). Greece has occasionally accepted these overtures, but the ensuing talks did not yield any significant agreements and were essentially exploratory. For instance, there were intermittent talks on Aegean and other issues, particularly after the adoption of the Berne agreement in 1976. These ended with the election of the first PASOK government under Andreas Papandreou in 1981. Talks concerning Aegean issues were briefly revived during the ‘Davos process’ in 1988–89, but these too proved inconclusive. A dialogue on Aegean issues between Ankara and Athens was launched in early 2002. However, at the time of writing (July 2003), no progress was reported in bridging the gap between Turkish and Greek positions on the major Aegean disputes.

THE CYPRUS ISSUE The Cyprus issue has bedevilled Turkey’s relations with Greece for almost half a century and has inflicted more damage on Turkey’s relations with Greece than any other problem. Unlike the Aegean which has remained an essentially bilateral problem, due to Greek and Greek Cypriot efforts – and against Turkish wishes – Cyprus has been an internationalized issue for decades. This has adversely affected not only Turkey’s relations with Greece but also those with such important allies such as the United States and Britain. Moreover Cyprus has assumed an increasing importance as an issue in TurkishEU relations. Though heavily engaged on the island and supportive of its ethnic kin, Ankara has often found itself (as has Athens) reacting to, rather than initiating, events by one or the other of the two Cypriot communities. Ankara has long been frustrated that it has not been able to convert the position of strength it acquired with its military intervention in 1974 to secure Turkish and Turkish Cypriot interests on

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the island in a manner which it deems necessary. Above all other factors, the proximity and strategic significance of Cyprus has been a key consideration for Turkey. Fed by media reports over many years that Greek and Greek Cypriots victimized Turkish Cypriots and threatened Turkish interests, most Turks harbour bitter memories of such conduct. It is unsurprising, therefore, that Cyprus has long been elevated to the status of a ‘national cause’ championed by practically every political party. With national interests and honour at stake, the issue has lent itself ideally to nationalist mobilization and populist stances. These attributes have helped forge multi-party consensus in Turkish politics, but have also burdened any government in Ankara contemplating a compromise settlement with Greek Cypriots and Greece. Charges of ‘selling out’ have been commonly levelled against governing parties whenever a compromise or conciliatory steps concerning Cyprus have been contemplated in Ankara. It is worth recalling that Cyprus first became a disputed TurkishGreek issue in 1955, 18 years before the continental shelf issue first emerged in the Aegean in 1973. Turkish-Greek relations had suffered over Cyprus during the preceding years, thus complicating settlement prospects for the Aegean problems. Turkey’s relations with Greece were tranquil when Greek Cypriot leaders began their Enosis (union with Greece) campaign in the mid-1950s against the British administration on the island. At the time, both Ankara and the Turkish community in Cyprus were content to see a continuation of British rule. The presence of a sizeable Turkish community, a legacy of three centuries of Ottoman rule (1570–1878) in Cyprus, made it almost certain that Turkish interest would be aroused by any developments affecting its kin. More problematic for Turkish leaders, however, was that Greek Cypriots and Greece contested the sovereignty of the island. In spite of the post-war improvements in Turkish-Greek relations, Turkish leaders still had strategic concerns vis-à-vis Greece. Already feeling hemmed in by Greek islands in the Aegean, Turkish leaders felt that Greek sovereignty over Cyprus – 40 miles from its southern coast – would .enable Athens to control access to its southern ports of Mersin and Iskenderun. This concern was at the heart of the Turkish objection to Enosis. In the mid-1950s, Greek backing for the Greek Cypriot insurgency for union with Greece, and Turkish backing for the Turkish Cypriot struggle against Enosis seriously strained Turkish-Greek relations. To

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counter Enosis, Ankara adopted partition as a goal. But Greek Cypriots and Athens rejected this. Clashes between Turkish and Greek Cypriots claimed hundreds of lives, and poisoned the relationship of the two communities, leaving a poor legacy for future communal relations on the island. Three years of Cypriot disturbances (1955–58) and the clash of goals about the future of Cyprus nearly undid the progress that Ankara and Athens achieved in their relations during the preceding 30 years. Nevertheless Turkish and Greek diplomacy succeeded in preventing their relations from getting any worse, by taking the lead in drawing up a settlement based on independence for Cyprus. In negotiating the Zurich-London agreements that created the Republic of Cyprus, Ankara did well in securing Turkish Cypriot and Turkish rights. The agreements created a power-sharing constitution for the island, providing numerous safeguards for the protection of the Turkish community from the more numerous Greek Cypriots. The principal benefits for Turkey were that, in accordance with the treaties of Guarantee and Alliance,5 it became a guarantor of Cypriot independence (along with Greece and the United Kingdom), and was authorized to station a small number of troops on the island. However, Turkish satisfaction turned to disenchantment and dismay as the Turkish and Greek communities quarrelled over the application of constitutional provisions, particularly those related to separate municipalities and the 30 per cent Turkish Cypriot representation at every grade of civil service employment. From the Turkish Cypriot and Ankara’s point of view, the Greek Cypriot leadership refused to apply the provisions of the 1960 Constitution, and violated the independence agreements by reviving the Enosis call. Both Turkish Cypriots and Turks view the period between the collapse of the bi-communal government on the island in late 1963 up to the Turkish military intervention of 1974 as a period of great adversity for the Turkish community. Greek Cypriot successes in the civil war that began in 1963 had reduced the Turkish community from the status of partner-in-government to a harassed community, with Turkey hard-pressed to intervene without provoking a war with Greece. Ankara was not just angered by the Greek Cypriot abuse of Turkish Cypriots, but also at the support Greek governments gave Makarios while the latter altered the constitutional order that Turkey

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and Greece had bequeathed for the island. Turkish anger turned to outrage when Greek leaders lent their support to the resurrected call for Enosis. It was one thing to want Enosis, however, and another to achieve it in the face of a war threat by Turkey. This was well understood by Makarios and most Greek leaders who were careful not to provoke the intervention of Turkey. However, in an unexpected twist of events, Greek junta leader Brigadier Ioannidis unwittingly handed Ankara the pretext for military intervention on the island. This happened when Ioannidis engineered a coup against Makarios in July 1974, in an apparent bid to bring Cyprus under Greek control. When Ecevit dispatched Turkish troops to Cyprus in July 1974, he did so by citing Turkey’s rights of intervention as provided by the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.6 By aborting the Greek junta’s attempt to unite the island with Greece, Turkey had acted in accordance with treaty requirements. But the Treaty of Guarantee authorized the three guarantor powers (Turkey, Greece and Britain) to intervene in order to restore the 1960 constitution that established the island’s independence. The Ecevit government had no intention of allowing this to happen. Instead, using Turkey’s new position of strength, and working closely with Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas¸, it helped create the basis of a new settlement on the island based on the physical separation of the two communities. As a consequence of the war of 1974, 160,000 Greek Cypriots (a third of the Greek community) became refugees, as did 45,000 Turkish Cypriots (representing nearly 40 per cent of the Turkish community). The forced movement of people resulted in the creation of two homogeneous ethnic entities on the island. Most Greek Cypriots fled or were forced to leave the Turkish Cypriot-administered area in the north and moved to the south; virtually all Turkish Cypriots moved from the south to the north. In a bid to enhance the demographic balance in favour of Turkish Cypriots, Ankara arranged for tens of thousands of its citizens to settle in northern Cyprus.7 Turkish leaders exploited the Greek junta’s blunder in 1974, and turned the tables on Greek Cypriots and Greece on the island. With 37 per cent of the island’s territory under their control, including some (such as the uninhabited resort town of Varosha) that could be bargained away in a settlement, Turkish Cypriots could negotiate from a position of strength. For almost two decades, the Turkish

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Cypriot leadership called for the creation of a loose federation, and argued in favour of retaining Turkey’s rights as a guarantor as well as the indefinite stationing of Turkish troops on the island. By about the mid-1990s this position hardened with the demand that Greek Cypriots recognize Turkish Cypriots’ right to self-determination. Later, in 1999, with Ankara’s support, the Turkish Cypriot leadership called for a confederation based on the union of two sovereign states, one Turkish Cypriot and the other Greek Cypriot. Greek Cypriot leaders have rejected these demands, arguing instead for a unified state with a single sovereignty, though structured as a bi-zonal federation. They have also sought safeguards against Turkey’s intervention in the future. In spite of the Island’s de facto partition for more than a quarter century, and Turkey’s undoubted military superiority, Ankara has been unable to compel the Greek Cypriots to accept Turkish/Turkish Cypriot terms. That is because, in spite of their considerably weakened position in 1974, Greek Cypriots – bolstered by Greece – have enjoyed several advantages. First, even though a separate Turkish Cypriot state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (hereinafter TRNC), was established in 1983 and recognized by Ankara, the international community has continued to recognize the Greek Cypriot-controlled Republic of Cyprus as the legitimate government of the whole island. Acting in tandem with Athens, the Greek Cypriot leadership has used its legitimacy advantage by internationalizing the dispute and putting pressure on Turkey to withdraw its troops. Second, the Greek Cypriot government succeeded in imposing an economic embargo on the Turkish Cypriot-administered area since 1974. As a result of successful Greek Cypriot pressures, European governments do not permit scheduled flights to the TRNC, thus handicapping the promising tourism sector in the Turkish Cypriot economy. Third, Greek/Greek Cypriot lobbying in Washington has regularly caused problems for Ankara by generating critical congressional resolutions, and impeding US arms transfers to Turkey. In Europe, too, European Parliament resolutions criticizing Turkey’s Cyprus policy have been commonplace. Furthermore, in a major blow to Ankara, in a ruling dated 28 July 1988, the European Court of Human Rights held Turkey (rather than the Turkish Cypriot government) responsible for barring a Greek Cypriot refugee’s access to her property in northern Cyprus, and ordered the Turkish government to pay her compensation.

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Athens has used its EU membership to exert pressure on Turkey. Until the warming of Greek-Turkish relations in the latter half of 1999, Athens repeatedly vetoed the release of aid that the EU agreed to provide Turkey as part of the association and customs union agreements. More importantly, it persuaded its EU partners in Brussels to commence accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriot-controlled Republic of Cyprus, in spite of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot objections. While releasing its veto on granting of EU membership status to Turkey at the Helsinki summit in 1999, Greek lobbying secured a pledge that the accession of Cyprus to the EU would proceed even without a prior settlement between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. At its summit in December 2002 the EU affirmed that Cyprus will become an EU member in the next round of enlargement in May 2004.

PROGRESS ON OTHER FRONTS

Ankara and Athens have taken prudent steps since 1999 by tackling issues that have damaged their relations in recent years. Apart from Cyprus and the Aegean, Ankara’s biggest grievance against Greece in recent years has been the alleged support of the latter for the separatist PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) insurgency. The discovery that Greece has sheltered PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in its embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, enraged the Turks, whose leaders had long accused Athens of supporting PKK terrorism against Turkey. Turkish threats of retaliation in early 1999 during the Öcalan debacle seem to have had a sobering effect on the Simitis government, and future Greek governments may be wary of provoking Turkey on an issue of such existential importance to Turkey. If the PKK armed struggle does come to an end, as its leadership has pledged, the Kurdish issue will likely fade as a bilateral bone of contention. Compared to the PKK controversy, which became an explosive issue in a short period of time, Greek treatment of the Turkish community in Western Thrace (numbering an estimated 125,000) has been a long-standing irritant in Turkish-Greek relations. Thracian Turks have accused the Greek government of neglecting their economic and educational needs, as well as restricting their rights in a number of areas, including the freedom to choose their muftis

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(religious leaders).8 Until 1999, Athens refused even to call this group ‘Turks’ insisting instead on the terminology of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, which designates them as ‘Muslims’. The Greek government has generally denied applying a policy of discrimination against its Turkish minority. Moreover, it . accuses Turkey of having forced out most of the Greek minority in Istanbul. Whereas the population of the Turkish community in Thrace has . been constant, that of the Greek community in Istanbul has diminished drastically over the decades, from roughly 120,000 in 1923 to about . 3,500 in 1999. Ankara found that the virtual disappearance of the Istanbul Greeks substantially reduced its leverage vis-à-vis Athens regarding the Thracian Turks. Still, the discriminatory treatment meted out to this community is widely reported in the Turkish media. Ironically, while resisting pressures from several EU countries regarding its own human rights practices, Turkey sought additional leverage against Greece by using European forums such as the Council of Europe to publicize the plight of Thracian Turks. To some extent, this approach has worked. It was European, rather than Turkish, pressure that prompted Greece to abolish the controversial Article 19 of its constitution on 11 June 1998. This law had effectively deprived many Thracian Turks of their Greek nationality when they travelled to Turkey or to other countries.9 In recent years Athens has taken numerous measures to improve the economy of Greek Thrace, which remains the country’s poorest region. With the help of EU funds, investments were made in large projects to boost employment prospects, thus benefiting the Turkish community. The end of official restrictions on assertions of Turkish ethnicity – as of July 1999 – was welcomed by Turkey. Nevertheless, both the Thracian Turks and Ankara contend that the Greek government should adopt further measures to improve the economic status and educational opportunities of the minority and allow it to allow it to elect its own muftis.

DOMESTIC FACTORS

Except during short periods of détente, the image of Greece portrayed in most of the Turkish media is usually that of a country whose leaders and people harbour perpetual enmity toward the

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Turkish nation. During the period leading up to the most recent Turkish-Greek rapprochement, the press regularly carried news stories and articles highly critical of Greek policies concerning Cyprus, the Aegean, EU-Turkish relations and the PKK. This helps explain the ease with which nationalist feelings were mobilized during the Imia/Kardak episode. When the issue of contested sovereignty over the uninhabited islet first emerged, both Ankara and Athens discussed the matter quietly for weeks. However, once the story was leaked to the Greek press, the media of both countries turned it into a cause célèbre. Aroused public opinion constrained both governments, making it difficult for the leaders to end the confrontation without losing face. Given the vital security issues involved in disputes between Ankara and Athens, key matters relating to Greece (and Cyprus) are deliberated within Turkey’s National Security Council (NSC), which is dominated by top military officers. During the 1990s, particularly with short-lived coalitions serially serving in office during 1991 to 2002, military influence in Turkish decision-making increased. Turkey’s military establishment is obviously keen to influence the Greek-Turkish military balance. While Middle Eastern adversaries such as Syria became weaker, Greece continued to use its diplomatic and military assets, as well as the Greek lobby in Washington, to check Turkish power. Policies toward Greece and Cyprus ordinarily enjoy considerable support across the political spectrum. But governments that take the public for granted could provoke much unwelcome criticism. Such was the case in early November 2001 when former prime minister Ecevit and foreign minister Cem warned that Turkey was prepared to make ‘great sacrifices’ if the EU proceeded to admit Cyprus, against the wishes of Turkey.10 These remarks unleashed an intense debate in Turkey regarding official policy on Cyprus. Many Turkish columnists and media commentators, together with some nongovernmental groups, questioned the wisdom of the government’s approach to the issue; they feared that Ankara might forsake Turkey’s EU membership for the sake of its Cyprus policy. Turkish Cypriot leader Denktas¸ too was widely criticized, particularly over his lengthy boycott of UN-sponsored talks with his Greek Cypriot counterpart. Criticism of Denktas¸ became commonplace in the mainstream Turkish media due to his refusal to endorse the UN plan

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for the island’s reunification before the EU summit decision in December 2002 regarding Cypriot accession. His critics berated him for his inflexible stance, by emphasizing the UN plan’s favourable terms for Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, namely, political equality and a wide measure of autonomy for the Turkish community in a loose bi-zonal federation, the reaffirmation of the Treaty of Guarantee, and the endorsement for stationing thousands of Turkish troops on the island. Nevertheless, in spite of the apparent receptivity of the AKP government to the UN blueprint, it was unable to overcome the combined opposition of Denktas¸, the Turkish military and senior officials of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the terms of the UN plan. During the 1990s, weak coalition governments in Ankara shuffled in and out of office at the average rate of one per year. Eleven governments, including nine coalitions, and 11 different foreign ministers held office in Ankara during the decade. This made any major policy changes toward Greece most unlikely, since only a strong government backed by the military could undertake bold policy departures. It is not a coincidence that one major effort for rapprochement took place during the leadership of Turgut Özal, whose party enjoyed a solid majority in Parliament during 1983–1991. Keen on securing the accession of Turkey to the EU, for which his government applied in 1987, Özal initiated the ‘Davos process’ together with Greek prime minister Andreas Papandreou following their meeting in Davos, Switzerland, in early 1988. But the Davos initiative failed to yield any major breakthroughs, and momentum was lost by 1989. The domestic political weakening of both leaders soon afterwards spelled the end of the ‘Davos spirit’.11

THE US FACTOR

The United States has long been involved in managing GreekTurkish differences, particularly since the onset of civil strife on Cyprus in 1963. This has not been an easy task, and US actions have sometimes caused strains in Washington’s relationship with both Turkey and Greece. The arms embargo the US Congress imposed on Turkey in 1975 is a case in point, as is the famous letter from President

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. . Lyndon B. Johnson to Prime Minister Ismet Inönü in 1964, warning him against a military intervention in Cyprus. Both caused much bitterness in Turkey and strained relations for several years. Adding to its anger over the effect of anti-Turkish lobbies in Washington, Ankara resented the 7:10 ratio applied by Congress (usually against White House’s wishes) to aid provided to Greece and Turkey, respectively, since 1980. At 65 million, Turkey’s population is six times that of Greece and its armed forces are considerably larger.12 Turkish leaders contend that Turkey offers more strategic assets to the US and NATO than does Greece, thus resent the Congressional move to link the assistance to Turkey to Greek needs, as it give Greece leverage over Turkish security. Greece, on the other hand, saw the ratio as vital for maintaining the balance of power in the Aegean and regarded any attempt to eliminate it as an obvious American favour for Turkey. As the military aid programme ended in the 1999 fiscal year, the issue has died out, though Ankara continues to be unhappy about the activities of pro-Greek groups in Washington, including some Greek-American legislators and others with large Greek-American constituencies, to limit any other American move favouring Turkey. Turkey faces more obstacles in Washington than those posed by lobbies and the US Congress. Successive US administrations have routinely called upon Ankara to remain committed to solving its problems with Greece and to helping settle the Cyprus issue. In Turkish eyes, the handling of these issues by Washington is less offensive than that of European governments, but still unwelcome. In spite of these difficulties, Turkish leaders attach great importance to relations with the US. Defence and political cooperation with Washington remains as much a core interest for Turkey as it was during the Cold War. Ankara appreciated US efforts to help bring Turkey closer to Europe, particularly representations of Washington to the EU states in favour of Turkish membership. Turkish initiatives to transport oil from the Caucasus have been bolstered by US support for the proposed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline in preference to proposals favoured by Russia, Iran, Greece and Bulgaria. Moreover, US support has been crucial in the multi-billion dollar stabilization programme negotiated between Ankara and the International Monetary Fund when a severe economic crisis gripped Turkey in 2001. In many important respects Turkey needs the US to cope with the Greek

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‘threat’ as well. About 80 per cent of Turkey’s military weapons are of US manufacture.13 Ankara also counts on Washington’s reliance on Turkey in pursuit of policies in the regions abutting Turkey to get the White House help in neutralizing the pro-Greek tilt in Congress. Unlike the EU, which is often beholden to Greece and takes positions on Greek-Turkish issues that upset Ankara, the US has pursued a more nuanced policy on such disputes. This evokes more respect among Turkish leaders than do the policies of EU states. In some respects, US policy on a number of Aegean issues lends indirect support to Turkey. A case in point is the US position that the sovereign airspace of a state corresponds to its territorial seas, a position identical with that of Turkey. Moreover, by discouraging any unilateral move to alter the territorial status quo in the Aegean, Washington may also be said to bolster indirectly the Turkish position on the sixmile territorial-sea limit. Washington’s close relations with both Ankara and Athens, together with the NATO link, have given the US considerable leverage in stabilizing the Turkish-Greek relationship and in exploiting opportunities to help resolve disputes. There is, after all, a shared general interest between Washington, Ankara and Athens in avoiding crises and confrontations in the Aegean. But moving beyond crisis prevention to the settlement of disputes has been a daunting task. Since Ankara and Athens have rejected US involvement in the possible resolution of their Aegean disputes, Washington has expended a good deal more effort in trying to settle the Cyprus issue. It has been hoped in Washington – indeed in many capitals in the West – that a breakthrough in Cyprus would pave the way for substantially improving Turkish-Greek relations and enhance the prospects for settling Aegean disputes. Washington has strongly supported the United Nations Secretary-General’s Cyprus plan issued on 11 November 2002, and has lobbied all of the main actors in a bid to secure a settlement. A recurring concern for the US and its allies has been the perennial threat that Turkish-Greek tensions pose to NATO cohesion, even to the point of potential collapse of the southern flank. Indeed, NATO has been preoccupied with these quarrels throughout much of its existence. It is hard to assess the contribution of NATO, especially as distinct from that of the US, in moderating Greek-Turkish conflicts

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over the years. NATO meetings have afforded opportunities for Ankara and Athens to discuss their problems in a forum where their allies have encouraged them and offered ideas for the bridging of their differences. On the other hand, it has been argued that the Alliance has unwittingly exacerbated conflicts between Greece and Turkey. According to political scientist Ronald Krebs, their membership in the Alliance has destabilized relations by, in effect, contracting out their national security and thus allowing each power to pursue its regional interests with reduced vulnerability.14 In this connection, questions have been raised concerning the destabilizing effect of arms transfers by the allies to Turkey and Greece. The huge transfer in the early 1990s under the ‘cascade’ programme of the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty enabled each country to bolster its arsenal. As a result of the transfer, through ‘cascading’ of material that exceeded the CFE limits of their NATO allies, Turkey and Greece received thousands of tanks, combat helicopters, fighter aircraft and other equipment. These transfers, together with ongoing major purchases, have fuelled an arms race. As one concerned observer asserted: ‘Until now, the two could only fight it out in the Aegean, but things are changing rapidly. The emphasis on both sides is on “force multipliers” such as smart standoff missiles, avionics, radar, and air-to-air refuelling capabilities.’15

THE EU FACTOR

In keeping with the Kemalist vision that Turkey’s rightful place is within the western family of nations, the Turkish secular establishment has pursued closer European ties for many years. Turkey’s associate EU membership – attained in 1963, a year later than Greece – envisioned eventual full membership. Although Turkish leaders did not apply for membership when Greece did in 1975, they sought and received assurances from the EU that Turkish interests and membership prospects would not be affected by the full membership of Greece.16 Credible or not at the time, these assurances proved hollow. In the eyes of Turks as well as many EU members, Greece for years used its membership to impede progress in EU-Turkish relations. In the aftermath of the EU’s Luxembourg Summit of 12–13

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December 1997, which rejected the Turkish bid to be included among the countries eligible for EU membership, Ankara vented its anger against Greece (and Germany) for its active role in the decision. Turkish bitterness was compounded by the EU’s decision to bend to Greek pressure and place Cyprus on a fast track for EU accession, in spite of Ankara’s insistence on a prior settlement between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Turkish leaders were additionally upset that, instead of placing the onus for settlement of bilateral problems jointly on Athens and Ankara, EU members called upon Turkey to settle its disputes with Greece ‘in particular by legal process, including the International Court of Justice’.17 From the Turkish point of view, the EU’s Helsinki Summit of December 1999, although overall more pleasing than Luxembourg in its acceptance of Turkey as an EU membership candidate, nevertheless was similarly problematic in endorsing recourse to the ICJ and for its statement on Cyprus. In the words of the Helsinki communiqué: The European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate states to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004. The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors.18 While tilting toward Greece, the Helsinki Summit communiqué also seemed to acknowledge Turkish interests. Thus, the EU statement called for the resolution of ‘any outstanding border disputes

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and other related issues’, in seeming acknowledgement of Ankara’s position that there are Aegean issues unrelated to maritime boundaries (e.g. the militarization of Greece’s eastern Aegean islands) that require resolution. Moreover, the communiqué called on candidate states to make ‘every effort’ to resolve disputes; Ankara will argue that this underscores the necessity for bilateral negotiations in the resolution of its Aegean disputes with Greece prior to any recourse to the ICJ. As much as Ankara has been upset by EU states’ episodic involvement in Greek-Turkish disagreements, it should be recognized that European governments have usually preferred to steer clear of bilateral Greek-Turkish disputes, as well as of the Cyprus issue. However, Greece’s membership has made this very difficult. When its EU partners have disagreed with its policies, Athens has often used its veto powers, as shown by its blocking of EU aid earmarked for Turkey under the 1963 association agreement and the 1995 customs union agreement. Athens lifted its veto in 1995 against the customs union, but only as a quid pro quo for the EU to begin negotiations with Cyprus for full membership. As noted, Greece secured a similar trade-off (concerning Cyprus and the Aegean) in December 1999 at the Helsinki Summit when it lifted its veto to allow the EU’s assignment of candidate status to Turkey. Furthermore, Athens’ threat to veto the EU’s expansion into eastern Europe was instrumental in winning EU support for the Greek Cypriot bid for the island’s EU accession. Even though the EU partners defer to Athens in many instances, in the area of paramount concern to Turkish security, the security arm of the EU, they have resisted Greek pressures on several occasions and have accommodated Turkish concerns, though after Ankara clearly threatened to use its NATO membership to veto the development of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (see Chapter 1). The issue of Cyprus’ EU membership may yet create lasting difficulties for both Turkish-Greek and Turkish-EU relations if no settlement of the island’s dispute proves attainable by the time Cyprus (in effect, the Greek-Cypriot controlled territory) joins the EU in 2004. Before losing the elections on 3 November 2002, the coalition government led by Bülent Ecevit took a hard line on the Cyprus issue, warning that Turkey might annex the TRNC and close

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the doors permanently to any hope of re-unifying the island if (Greek) Cypriot accession is allowed prior to a settlement. However, although the EU summit of 12–13 December endorsed Cypriot membership, several factors ensured that Turkey’s relations with Greece remained intact, at least in the short term. Ankara appreciated Athens’ support for its bid to secure an early date for the start of Turkey’s accession talks with Brussels. Also, senior members of the government of the Justice and Development Party (elected on 3 November 2002 with a solid parliamentary majority) have considered the UN plan of 11 November 2002, as acceptable as a basis for negotiations. Although the plan calls for substantial territorial adjustments in favour of Greek Cypriots by the TRNC, it also provides political equality for the two communities, as demanded by Turkish Cypriots. Justice and Development Party leader Tayyip Erdogˇan, and other senior members of the government, have encouraged Turkish Cypriot leader Denktas¸ to strive to reach a settlement before Cyprus is admitted as an EU member in May 2004. This represents a notable departure from the hard-line policy of former prime minister Bülent Ecevit who championed separate Turkish Cypriot statehood and often stated that the Cyprus issue was resolved in 1974 when Turkey’s intervention partitioned the island. Unlike its predecessors, the Justice and Development Party appears committed to pursue a reformist agenda and to secure Turkish entry into the EU, and furthermore, to remove the Cyprus issue as an impediment to Turkish accession.

POSSIBLE COMPROMISES?

While officially expressed positions indicate a wide gap in the Turkish and Greek positions in the Aegean, there is considerable room for compromise on key issues by both parties. In recent years, numerous ideas have been floated by retired diplomats, academics and others, that are suggestive of the type of compromise solutions in the Aegean that would go a long way to satisfy Turkish and Greek needs, and allay their anxieties. Turkey’s greatest anxiety has been to avert the Aegean becoming a ‘Greek lake’, by Athens’ extension of its territorial waters in the Aegean from six to 12 miles. There have been numerous unofficial

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indications that Athens is prepared to accept a six-mile territorial sea in much of the Aegean in order to allay Turkish concerns. In turn, Ankara would be expected to match this major concession by safeguarding the interests of Greece, particularly by accepting a legal settlement mechanism for the continental shelf issue. Would Turkish officials be anxious that Greece would receive the lion’s share of the continental shelf by virtue of the Greek islands’ entitlements to the shelf if the issue is taken to the International Court of Justice at The Hague or be adjudicated by a legal tribunal? Or would Ankara look toward legal adjudication confident that it would be granted a fair share of the shelf? There are reportedly contending views among Turkish officials regarding the wisdom of accepting a legal recourse.19 According to some sources, there is considerable scope for compromise in the official Turkish position that claims half of the Aegean continental shelf. Retired Turkish diplomat Yalım Eralp underscored the critical importance of Athens and Ankara reaching agreement on a compromise to be presented to the ICJ, and speculated that Turkey would be entitled to roughly 20 per cent of the Aegean continental shelf.20 Ultimately, provided that Turkish-Greek relations make sustained progress, it should be possible to create a balanced regime in the Aegean that both meets vital Turkish and Greek interests and is saleable to public opinion in both countries. As Alexis Heraclides aptly argued, ‘only a win-win solution in the Aegean is viable’ and will be possible ‘if both abandon their maximalist initial positions, namely “Greek lake” and “half the Aegean”’.21 Another observer of Greek-Turkish relations, Monteagle Stearns, has described the broad outlines of a Turkish-Greek compromise in the Aegean in the following terms: … a regime in the Aegean that respects the sovereignty of Greece over its islands, that satisfies Turkish concerns over freedom of navigation, that enables both countries to explore and exploit the resources of the Aegean shelf on an equitable basis, and that assures third parties that their rights of innocent passage will not be jeopardized by hostilities between Greece and Turkey.22 In the case of Cyprus, although Turkey and Greece are central actors, it has been the Cypriot communities that have conducted the

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negotiations for a settlement. To be sure, Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders collaborate with their respective counterparts in Athens and Ankara, and no Cyprus settlement is possible without the consent of Turkey and Greece. Over the years, Ankara has endeavoured to use its military presence – consisting of over 30,000 troops in 2002 – as a bargaining chip to secure Turkey’s strategic interests on the island. In addition, having invested so much of its resources and prestige to sustain its ethnic kin on the island,23 Ankara has insisted that any future settlement provides adequate safeguards to protect Turkish Cypriots from Greek Cypriot domination. This is the logic behind Ankara’s support for the Turkish Cypriot demand that the TRNC be recognized as having sovereign rights, and to enjoy equal status in any future union with Greek Cypriots. In August 1988, Ankara supported Denktas¸’s call for a two-state confederation. However, since the EU summit’s offer of a date for the beginning of accession talks with Turkey, and the almost simultaneous presentation of the Annan Plan in late 2002, the AKP government has indicated a willingness to settle for a Cyprus solution that provides a loose federation, rather than insisting on the acceptance of a sovereign Turkish state.

CONCLUSION: A NEW WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY?

Practically all writers who have addressed Greek-Turkish issues have argued that a lasting improvement in their bilateral relations requires the resolution of their major disputes in Cyprus and the Aegean. Given the active third-party mediation process in Cyprus, and the certainty of EU membership for the island regardless of a settlement, efforts to improve Turkish-Greek differences in recent decades have focused mostly on Cyprus rather than the Aegean. Although Turkish leaders have long resisted Greek and other external pressures for Turkish/Turkish Cypriot concessions on the island, they have also been aware that Turkey’s EU membership cannot be achieved without a settlement in Cyprus.24 But if the prospects of Turkey’s EU membership were uncertain, no Turkish government was likely to take great domestic political risks by endorsing important concessions (such as abandoning the claim of Turkish Cypriot sovereign statehood) to achieve a Cypriot settlement.

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The convergence of a few developments during the last two months of 2002 enhanced Turkish receptivity toward a Cyprus settlement. The first was the election in Turkey on 3 November 2002, of the AKP with a comfortable parliamentary majority, marking an end to 11 years of short-lived coalition governments in Ankara; the party’s commitment to a reformist agenda in order to achieve EU membership set it apart from its predecessors. Secondly, and more importantly, by offering Ankara a date (December 2004) for the start of accession negotiations, the EU summit of 12–13 December 2002, marked a crucial step in advancing Turkey’s EU prospects. Moreover, Greek support at the summit for the Turkish bid for an early date to start accession negotiations helped in assuaging Turkish disappointment over EU endorsement of the Greek Cypriot bid for Cyprus’ EU membership. The boost to Turkey’s EU membership hopes in late 2002 has created prospects for real progress in Greek-Turkish relations since the short-lived ‘Davos process’ of 1988–89. It is worth remembering that the Davos initiative by former Turkish leader Turgut Özal and Greek prime minister Andreas Papandreou to attain lasting improvement in Turkish-Greek relations, failed in part because they could not achieve progress in settling the Cyprus issue. Whereas Turkey’s EU membership was merely a distant possibility during the Özal era, it has seemingly become a realizable goal since the EU’s Copenhagen summit of December 2002. More than any other reason, this factor will provide the strongest incentive for the Turkish government to reach a compromise settlement in Cyprus. A Cyprus settlement could in turn create a momentum for settling Turkey’s disputes with Greece in the Aegean.

NOTES 1. Tozun Bahcheli, Greek Turkish Relations since 1955 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p. 142. 2. Andrew Wilson, The Aegean Dispute (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), p. 27. 3. ‘Economist Intelligence Unit Report’, Turkey, 1st Quarter, 1996, p. 17. 4. Interview with Yılmaz, El Pais (Madrid), 25 November 1997, as reported in FBIS-WEU, 25 November 1997. 5. For the text of the treaties of Alliance and Guarantee, see Conference on Cyprus Documents Signed and Initialled at Lancaster House on 19 February 1959 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1964).

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6. The Turkish government relied on the following provision of the Treaty of Guarantee: ‘In the event of any breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey undertake to consult together, with a view to making representations, or taking the necessary steps to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty.’ Ibid. 7. Although there are no reliable figures on the number of Turkish settlers, many observers estimate that they constitute about half of the population in north Cyprus. 8. Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Turks of Greece, Helsinki Watch Report (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1990). 9. Bahcheli, Greek Turkish Relations, p. 182. 10. Middle East International, 23 November 2001. 11. Geoffrey Pridham, ‘Linkage Politics Theory and the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement’, in Dimitri Constas (ed.), The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences (Basingstoke, London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 84–6; Also see Chapter 1 of this volume, pp. 21–51. 12. See The Military Balance, published annually by the Institute of International Strategic Studies in London. 13. Alan Makovsky, ‘The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy’, SAIS Review, 19, 1 (Winter–Spring 1999), p. 106. 14. Ronald R. Krebs. ‘Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict’, International Organization, 53, 2 (Spring 1999), p. 369. 15. Tassos Kokkinides, ‘Turkey-Greece: Two Nations Arming for Peace’, Inter Press Service, 10 October 1997. 16. Constantine Stephanou and Charalambos Tsardanides ‘The EC Factor in the GreeceTurkey-Cyprus Triangle’, in Constas, The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s, p. 210. 17. Luxembourg European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 12–13 December 1997, paragraphs 31–6, at: [http://www. europarl.eu.int/dg7/summits/en/lux1.htm]. 18. Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 10–11 December 1999, at: [http://www.europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99/_en.pdf]. 19. This is based on the author’s interviews in Turkey with some retired and current Turkish diplomats during May 2001. 20. Haberturk, Internet edition, 10 March 2002. Jon Van Dyke, a legal scholar who has written widely on the Aegean issues confronting Turkey and Greece, has conjectured that ‘… the ICJ would probably adopt a solution that allocated to Turkey somewhere between 20 and 41 percent of the Aegean’s Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf …’ See Jon Van Dyke ‘Marine Limitation in the Aegean Sea’, in Bayram Öztürk . (ed.), The Aegean Sea 2000 (Istanbul: Turkish Marine Research Foundation, 2000), p. 168. A Greek legal scholar, however, has argued as follows: ‘With respect to the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, given the geographical locations, circumstances, and measurements, any adjustments of the median line (championed by Greece) for reasons of equity (relied upon by Turkey), would not significantly extend the Turkish share beyond the Turkish territorial waters except in some small areas in the northern Aegean.’ See Phaedon John Kozyris, ‘The Legal Dimension of the Current Greek-Turkish Conflict’, in Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization (Virginia: Brassey’s, 2001), p. 106. 21. See Alexis Heraclides’ chapter in this volume (Part I, Chapter 3). 22. Monteagle Stearns, ‘The Security Domain: A U.S. Perspective’, in Keridis/ Triantaphyllou, Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization, p. 244. 23. Turkey’s aid to the TRNC was given as 100 million dollars in 1998; in addition ‘under a separate protocol … Ankara has pledged to provide the Turkish Cypriots with an additional 250 million dollars to support several infrastructure projects’, Agence France Press, 24 December 1998. Turkey has invested in several infrastructure projects

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in the TRNC, and has provided credits and other forms of development aid. It was Turkey, too, that assumed the large costs associated with re-exporting Turkish Cypriot citrus and clothing when the European Court of Justice ruled in 1994 that EU countries could not receive goods from northern Cyprus without the health safety certificates issued by the Republic of Cyprus. More recently, in 1998, Turkey began to alleviate chronic water shortages experienced by Turkish Cypriots by shipping water to the TRNC; these shipments will be accelerated with the planned construction of a water pipeline from Turkey to northern Cyprus. 24. In a reminder of the linkage between the Cyprus issue and Turkey’s EU prospects, Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis warned that ‘it is wrong of them to believe that just because the date Turkey was given was 2004, the Cyprus problem can wait as well … the farther we get from the current juncture, the weaker the possibilities for resolving the Cyprus problem, and consequently Turkey’s EU prospects will get’. Interview with Simitis, To Vima, 5 January 2003, as reported in FBIS-WEU, 7 January 2003.

PART II

BUILDING A SECURITY REGIME?

5 Tension-Reduction and Confidence-Building in the Aegean 1

THANOS P. DOKOS

The eastern Mediterranean has historically been a troubled and turbulent region. During the second half of the twentieth century, it was the stage of a chain of ‘hot wars’ between Israel and its Arab neighbours and a ‘cold war’ between Greece and Turkey (with at least one hot confrontation in Cyprus in 1974, as well as several serious crises in the Aegean). The Mediterranean was a secondary area of competition between the US/NATO and the USSR, but its geostrategic importance is steadily increasing in the post-Cold War era, as NATO’s Southern Flank is where the sources for several of the risks and challenges mentioned in the new Strategic Concept of the Alliance, adopted in the Washington summit meeting in April 1999, are to be found. The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact have not led to greater cohesiveness within the surviving alliance (NATO), or to a reduction in intra-alliance tensions. In fact, the opposite has occurred. Relations between two allies, Greece and Turkey, continued to be tense in the post-Cold War era, and both countries still maintain, despite the recently announced reductions, a high level of defence expenditures compared with other NATO members. Most of the 1990s has been a difficult period for Greek-Turkish relations. This dark picture started changing during the Kosovo conflict, when the two governments reached an understanding that an improvement of relations was necessary. Greek Foreign Minister . George Papandreou and his Turkish counterpart Ismail Cem, prepared the ground for an official rapprochement that was enhanced

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by two unexpected events: the catastrophic earthquakes in Turkey and Greece in August and September 1999, respectively. The swift Greek reaction to the Turkish tragedy spectacularly changed the mood and led to a similar Turkish reaction after the Athens earthquake. Both countries, either through official channels or through private initiative, dispatched medical supplies, equipment and rescue teams to alleviate the plight of earthquake-torn Turks and Greeks. In December 1999 EU Summit in Helsinki, Greece took a decision that was described by other EU states and the US as courageous. Athens accepted the granting of EU candidate status to Turkey, attaching only two conditions. Firstly, Turkish claims concerning grey zones in the Aegean and the continental shelf had to be submitted to the International Court of Justice in The Hague by 2004, if all other efforts toward settlement failed, and secondly, that the accession of Cyprus to the EU would not require as a prerequisite the settlement of the problem. This decision was, of course, based on Greece’s national interest; however, it should be noted that there were strong domestic reactions and a considerable political cost for the Greek government. Helsinki and its aftermath demonstrated what should have been clear a long-time ago: that Greece is not the major obstacle to Turkey’s EU accession path. The major sceptics are to be found in some other European capitals and inside Turkey itself. In fact, under certain circumstances, Greece could become the strongest supporter of Turkey’s effort to secure EU membership. In January and February 2000, Foreign Ministers Papandreou and Cem visited each other’s capitals and signed a total of nine bilateral agreements on ‘low politics’ or ‘low confrontation’ issues. These agreements concerned tourism, culture, the environment, trade and commerce,2 multilateral cooperation (especially with regard to the Black Sea and southeast Europe regions), organized crime, illegal immigration, drug trafficking and terrorism.3 However, the current rapprochement between Greece and Turkey remains weak and fragile. Both countries have not moved from their firm positions regarding ‘high politics’ issues. The Cyprus problem and issues related to the Aegean Sea, most of which are perceived by Greece as unilateral Turkish revisionist claims, are nowhere near resolution.

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THE CONSEQUENCES OF GREEK-TURKISH MILITARY COMPETITION: SOME THOUGHTS

Both sides need to understand fully the possible consequences of a Greek-Turkish military conflict. One cannot emphasize enough that a war between Greece and Turkey, whether it involves Cyprus or not, would be a disaster for NATO and the West. In a military conflict both sides stand to suffer substantial damage. Furthermore, a limited, 24or 48-hour conflict should not be seen as the most probable scenario. Crises have their own dynamic and are very difficult to control and contain. An escalation would be more likely than not. Even if Greece or Turkey were to secure some marginal territorial or military gains, a chain of revanchist conflicts would surely follow, classifying both countries as high risk zones with a devastating impact on their economies and societies. An armed conflict between Greece and Turkey could lead to the collapse of NATO’s Southern Flank and would severely disrupt the Alliance’s efforts to play a meaningful role in the post-Cold War world.4 Furthermore, in that case, one has to ask the question: ‘If an armed conflict between two NATO member-states were to erupt, what kind of example would that constitute for NATO’s prospective members and partners in Eurasia and the Mediterranean?’ The Cyprus problem and the Greek-Turkish conflict are also matters for serious concern for the European Union (EU). All parties involved to the conflict have some form of association with the EU: Greece is a member of the EU, Cyprus has begun membership negotiations as of 1998 and could become a member of the Union as early as 2003 or 2004, and Turkey is an associate member and a candidate for full membership. Finally, the Aegean Sea is a very important shipping route, connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean and a major transit route for the transportation of energy products (after the construction and operation of pipelines from Central Asia and the Transcaucasus). Therefore, it is in the interest of all parties involved to move toward the reduction of tension and the establishment of stability in the Aegean and the settlement of disputes on the basis of respect of international treaties and the principles of international law. In addition, a policy that would prepare the ground (i.e. create the necessary conditions) in order for high-politics issues to be

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successfully addressed is also needed. Such a policy could be facilitated by the CBM measures proposed in this chapter.

DEFENCE EXPENDITURES

Where are the consequences of the existing Greek-Turkish ‘security dilemma’ reflected? Mainly, in an arms build-up, which has very much gone against the European trend. Neither country has benefited from the so-called ‘peace dividend’ after the end of the Cold War. As a result of the Turkish announcement in April 1996 of a tenyear $31 billion armament programme (and of an earlier announcement of a $150 billion programme for 30 years), Greece responded in November of the same year with a $14 billion programme for the next five years, 1996–2000.5 It is worth mentioning that Greek defence expenditures have for the past 15 years been at the level of approximately 5.5 per cent of GNP ($5 billion per annum), the highest proportion among NATO members, while Turkey’s are approximately 4.5 per cent of GNP ($8–10 billion).6 Of course, in the eyes of some people, paying for the survival of defence industries in the US, western Europe, Israel and Russia may be a ‘humanitarian’ action. The majority would agree, however, that the current level of defence expenditures is pure foolishness for all sides involved in the Greek-Turkish imbroglio: Cyprus, Turkey and Greece. One cannot ignore economic imperatives without paying the price, perhaps not in the short term, but certainly in the mid and long term. Economic realities dictate that Greece and Turkey, and also Cyprus, should reduce their defence spending, not to mention the diplomatic and economic costs (of missed opportunities) as each side continuously tries to undermine the other in what is seen as a ‘zerosum’ game. Defence expenditures constitute a heavy burden for the Greek economy, at a time when Greece has just joined the European Monetary Union (EMU), but needs to implement a series of vital structural changes to strengthen its economy.7 Defence expenditures are, to a certain extent, responsible for the country’s budget deficit, as well as for Greece’s lower than desired level of social services. Similarly, the bilateral arms race places a very heavy burden on Turkey as well, faced as it is with chronic high inflation and

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considerable social and political problems, which contributed in the past to the increase of popular support for the Islamic Refah (Virtue) Party and more recently helped one of its successors, Adalet and Kalkınma (Justice and Development) Party to obtain parliamentary majority in the November 2002 general elections. As a result of the 2001 economic crisis in Turkey, and under tacit pressure from the IMF and other international financial organizations, Ankara decided to reduce its defence expenditures by $19.5 billion over the next 2–3 years. This will probably be achieved by postponing or extending the procurement process rather than cancelling the acquisition of some weapon systems.8 In an earlier unrelated move, as a result of the higher than predicted cost of the Athens 2004 Olympic Games and the obligations imposed by its membership to the EMU, Athens too decided to reduce its defence expenditures by $2.5 billion over the next 2–3 years. Over the past 45 years there have been three major crises in Cyprus (1963/4, 1967, 1974), another three in the Aegean (1976, 1987, 1996), and a number of ‘hot’ incidents: for example the 1995 casus belli over the possibility of the extension of the Greek territorial waters to 12 miles according to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, the aborted plan to deploy S-300 surface-to-surface missiles in Cyprus, the arrest of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in the Greek Embassy in Kenya. Those events have increased mutual distrust and suspicion. The burden of history and the ghosts of the past are the major causes of the lack of trust between Greece and Turkey. Indeed, historical animosities do play a significant role.9 Greeks and Turks are classic examples of rival peoples (one can think of several other examples, including French and Germans, or Russians and Germans); however, it is important to realize that such peoples cannot afford to be prisoners of the past, and history should become their guide, not their prison. Suspicion concerning the other side’s motives is deep-rooted in both popular opinion and the media;10 this in turn affects, and at times even drives, the respective governments. This intense distrust on both sides of the Aegean prompts many observers to call for a reduction of mutual suspicion as the essential first step toward peace and stability. Unfortunately, this is easier said than done. Reduction of suspicion is a long-term process, and, as such, is beyond the horizon of serving governments. There is also a basic lack of mutual

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knowledge between Greeks and Turks on issues other than foreign and security policy, including culture, society and religion. In a modest effort to address this problem, the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) has published a volume in Greek on contemporary Turkey, with contributions from Turkish, Greek, American, Israeli and French authors.11 To have even a minimal chance of success, any effort for a substantial improvement of Greek-Turkish relations and, perhaps, the resolution of the fundamental problems between the two countries should naturally be as well prepared as possible. The cost of failure, in the case of a hastily and poorly prepared initiative, may be quite significant because of heightened expectations, leading to frustration. Therefore, a number of preconditions should exist. These include: 1. The avoidance of high expectations, as subsequent failure may have very negative consequences for bilateral relations. 2. The exercise of strong leadership in both countries. This does not necessarily mean a repetition of the Venizelos-Atatürk era, but at least ruling coalition governments with a comfortable majority, a relatively small number of partners, and a degree of ideological homogeneity. 3. A relative military balance. 4. The active and balanced involvement of international actors (mainly the United States, NATO, EU) in the confidence-building process. 5. The absence (or skilful diplomatic handling) of certain types of regional disputes which, by default, might drag the two countries into opposite camps (for example, in the Balkans). 6. An understanding of the political and economic costs of the continued confrontation by both leaderships. 7. The lack (or low importance) of domestic factors contributing to the continuation of the conflict, such as serious domestic political, economic and social problems that cannot be dealt with efficiently by each government, which might then be tempted to resort to a ‘foreign policy adventure’ to deflect attention from domestic problems.

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8. Finally, the political will on both sides to improve bilateral relations,12 which is the sine qua non for the success of all such endeavours. Despite the spectacular change in people’s feelings, as a result of the Greek response to the disastrous earthquake that hit Turkey and the similar Turkish response to the earthquake that hit Athens shortly after, the permanent settlement of disputes is, unfortunately, not perceived as realistic in the short term (mid-term prospects for a settlement will be discussed at the end of the chapter). In any case, steps in the following three categories are necessary, but not sufficient, prerequisites for the resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict.13 1. Tension reduction measures, without a formal agreement. Such measures could be agreed upon without extensive negotiations and might include transparency and some restraint CBMs. 2. Formal military confidence-building measures, which would include restraint and limitation measures. 3. Soft security confidence-building measures, with emphasis on the so-called ‘bottom-up approach’ or ‘people-to-people’ contacts. It is the author’s belief that a set of the above-mentioned types of measures could constitute integral parts of a limited security regime that could be adopted by Greece and Turkey, with the aim of managing both crisis-stability and arms-race stability, as well as avoiding the catastrophic losses of a war.14 Steps towards these measures are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict, though it seems probable to many analysts that any improvement in relations between the two and the implementation of any of these measures will remain hostage to another incident in the Aegean or on Cyprus. Every prudent strategist or national security official would plan on the basis of capabilities, not on the basis of nice, but often empty words. The American expression ‘talk is cheap’ would fit nicely into such a situation. I would, therefore, like to present some practical and, hopefully, feasible ideas and suggestions for a longer-lasting reduction of tension between Greece and Turkey.

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TENSION-REDUCTION AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES 15

Such measures could be agreed upon without extensive negotiations and might include transparency and some restraint CBMs.16 1. A ‘hot line’ between prime ministers and perhaps chiefs of staff of the three branches of the armed forces (although not between chiefs of general staff, because of the different levels of authority). A direct line between foreign ministers has been in principle agreed upon by Papandreou and Cem in spring 2001. This might not solve any problems or play a role in avoiding or de-escalating a crisis, but it certainly cannot hurt. The establishment of mutually acceptable (or mutually understood) crisis-management procedures also needs to be considered. 2. Implementation of the Papoulias-Yılmaz Agreement and use of it as a basis for further discussions. 3. In the context of this agreement, extension of the summer moratorium on exercises in the Aegean to four months.17 4. Demonstration of additional goodwill by both sides when discussing the NATO Secretary-General’s proposals on CBMs or other ideas about CBMs.18 5. Annulment of casus belli statements for reasons other than clear violation of territorial integrity.19 It is difficult to imagine a genuine rapprochement and meaningful progress in relations between the two countries with the threat of a casus belli hanging in the air. 6. Cessation of bellicose and provocative statements by all officials. Both sides engage in such activities. However, while Greek statements are infuriating to the Turkish side, some statements from Turkey are perceived as challenging or even threatening Greece’s territorial integrity. It should be pointed out in this context that claims on rocks and islets poison the atmosphere unnecessarily and that claims on inhabited islands ring alarm bells for even the most moderate Greeks.20 7. NATO’s new command structure has been established and has been successfully functioning since 2000. A spirit of goodwill and

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reason from all parties involved should be demonstrated in the future to avoid ‘Destined Glory 2000’-type of incidents. 8. Reduction of intelligence activities in each other’s territory, as well as other low-intensity conflict activities, if such activities indeed take place. Also, limitation of behind-the-scenes role of consulates in sensitive regions. 9. Reinforcement and, if possible, institutionalization of the tacit agreement between navies and air forces on incident-prevention in the Aegean. 10. Finally, the agreement for the establishment of a multinational Balkan peacekeeping force, with the participation of units from both Greece and Turkey, is a positive development and a step in the right direction. However, it is rather premature to take it for granted, and it remains to be seen whether the concept of such a multinational force, with all the practical problems and issues of minor or major importance, can be successfully implemented. In the meantime, both governments should give strong support to this effort. Based on this model, the two sides should contemplate the creation of a joint Greek-Turkish or Balkan disaster relief unit.

Formal Military CBMs These would include constraint CSBMs: 21 1. Limitation of land and air forces might be unacceptable to Turkey, as its current relations with its eastern neighbours are rather uneasy. However, naval arms control should be more acceptable, as the only serious naval ‘opponent’ for the Turkish navy is the Greek navy. As there is a general balance between the two navies today, the two sides could conceivably agree to a ceiling of large surface units (for example, 15) and submarines (for example, 7–8).22 2. Turkey’s landing fleet, which is deployed at arm’s length opposite the Greek Aegean islands, can easily be moved or reduced without any significant impact on Turkish security or military capability. Turkey could move the bulk of the fleet to the Black Sea, and, at the same time or after an agreed period of time, numerically reduce it.

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3. In Cyprus, a number of CBMs could be discussed in the framework of the military dialogue promoted by the UN, along with the issue of the demilitarization of the island and the political solution of the Cyprus problem.

Soft Security CBMs (Track-II Diplomacy) The emphasis here would be on the so-called bottom-up approach, or people-to-people contacts. It is worth mentioning at this point that a series of soft security confidence-building measures are already included in some of the bilateral agreements on ‘low politics’ signed in Ankara and Athens, in January and February 2000.23 However, the list of soft security CBMs could be further broadened with the following: 1. The further promotion and strengthening of the already numerous bottom-up approaches: regular meetings between professional associations, labour unions, businessmen, journalists, academics and ordinary citizens, especially those living near the borders. 2. Discussion of the role of the press and mass media, and their impact on bilateral relations. 3. Continuation of the extremely delicate and difficult, but potentially rewarding, exercise of discussing the possible change of history books. 4. As a consequence of the successful implementation of some of the measures outlined in all three categories, Greece should continue to actively support Turkey’s candidacy for membership in the EU. Also, the Greek lobby in the United States should adopt a more flexible attitude towards Turkey. The issue of minorities is also quite significant. The fate of the . Greek community of Istanbul and the islands of Imvros and Tenedos (Gökçeada and Bozcaada) in the post-Second World War era, and especially the events of 1955 and 1964 (and, of course, the 1942–43 Varlık tax) have been traumatic experiences for Greeks. The GreekOrthodox minority in Turkey shrank from 112,000 to less than 2,500 people, mainly older persons. Greece made its own grave mistakes

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regarding the Muslim minority in Thrace (a reaction, to a certain extent, to what many had interpreted as Turkish secessionist rhetoric and the role of the Turkish Consulate in Komotini), but there was never any physical violence, and successive Greek governments have been trying in earnest since the early 1990s to correct any past injustices and have, by the admission of the US, the EU, international human rights organizations, and the members of the minority itself, made considerable progress.

RESOLVING THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

Because the détente structure is currently not strong enough to withstand a possible crisis over the forthcoming accession of Cyprus to the EU, it is urgent to start thinking about crisis management methods. Greece can hardly retreat from its basic diplomatic position of support for the accession of Cyprus to the EU as soon as the country fulfils the Copenhagen criteria. Therefore, the only realistic option is to make quick progress towards a solution of the Cyprus problem. One of the major obstacles for the resolution of the Cyprus problem is the existence of deep suspicion between the two sides.24 Normally, a confidence-building process that would last several years would be a prerequisite for the resolution of the conflict. In this case, however, the clock is ticking. With the decisions taken in Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, Cyprus is included in the group of new members in EU’s latest phase of enlargement, to be finalized gradually until May 2004. Turkey, through its foreign minister and other high officials has warned in the past that its reaction would be ‘unlimited’, suggesting that it would be strong or even violent. The annexation of ‘Northern Cyprus’ has been among the Turkish options discussed. Even if one dismisses those threats of a very strong reaction, as this author does, and assumes that this rhetoric is directed to a domestic audience in Turkey, and that Ankara will most probably accept the new realities, it is possible, if Turkey is still in the middle of a political and economic crisis when the decision for the admission of Cyprus to the EU is made, that the Turkish government may not be able to resist populist calls for a strong reaction. In this case, there

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will be serious repercussions for Turkey’s relations with the EU and with Greece. An acceptable solution to both sides would be along the following general lines:
Both communities should be willing to make a sincere effort to live peacefully together, despite the shrinking numbers and influence of the Turkish Cypriots vs. the Turkish settlers.
It should be accepted by a majority of Turkish Cypriots that admission to the EU, along with Greek Cypriots, would solve their economic problems. There is concern, however, about their equal status and to an extent, about their physical security.
The Greek Cypriots must realize that such concerns are not totally unfounded. Even if the atrocities committed by Greek Cypriots in the 1960s were more limited than those of the Turks, and were for the most part acts of individuals rather than the government of Cyprus, they left, however, their scars on the average Turkish Cypriot. An official admission and an apology by the Cypriot government would have a beneficial effect.
At the same time, however, Mr Denktas¸ should acknowledge the violent actions of the Turkish Cypriot Organization TMT, the largescale atrocities of the Turkish forces during the 1974 invasion, apologize for the loss of the 1,619 missing persons and offer specific information on their whereabouts. There is a significantly smaller number of missing persons on the Turkish Cypriot side. The government of Cyprus should in turn make public any available information in those cases. The psychological benefit may be spectacular.
The two sides could agree on a loose federal system (based on the so-called Belgian model). Agreement to such a solution, which would also involve significant return of territory by the Turkish Cypriots along the lines of the Ghali Plan, would render EU admission relatively trouble-free.
The fundamental principle would be that of subsidiarity. If the EU is moving to the direction of a ‘Europe of peripheries’ with a strong central bureaucracy in Brussels, then we should be able to apply this model to Cyprus even earlier than in the rest of the European

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Union. A comparatively greater proportion of important functions (e.g. economic, foreign and security policies) of the new federal state of Cyprus would be delegated upward to Brussels, whereas everyday issues would be handled at the communal/local government level.
The security issue would be resolved by the withdrawal of the Turkish and Greek forces from the island and the dismantling of the Greek Cypriot National Guard. They could be replaced by a NATO force (CFOR or CYFOR) involving American, British, Greek, Turkish and other mutually acceptable national contingents. The benefits for Turkey would be obvious and significant: it would salvage its relationship with the EU, enhance its international prestige as producer, not consumer of security; save some much-needed money from subsidies to Northern Cyprus; strengthen the détente process with Greece; challenge the wrong perception/allegation that the EU is a Christian club; and, in a very symbolic development, render Turkish into an [active] official language of the EU. The above analysis is probably an oversimplification of the situation. It leaves a number of questions unanswered: for instance, when will the freedom of movement, of labour and acquisition of property be applied? Could economic sanctions applied to Turkish Cypriots be terminated to facilitate late-stage negotiations for a solution? Finally, it should be emphasized that the people of Cyprus, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, will make the final decision regarding their fate. Mainland Greeks and Turks and other interested parties, the UN, the EU, British, Americans, Russians, etc. can only try to facilitate the conflict resolution process by offering some ideas and suggestions.The plan submitted by UN SecretaryGeneral Anan on 11 November 2002 is a rather balanced proposal, demanding compromises by both sides. If accepted and implemented in good will, it could lead to the re-unification of the Island at last.

PROSPECTS FOR GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS

Overall, the two countries are much better off today in terms of bilateral relations than they were two years ago. Having said that, it

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should be emphasized that there has been no progress so far in resolving, or even addressing, the fundamental differences between the two countries (probably intentionally in recognition of the extreme difficulty of the task). This rapprochement – by instalments – had a very low cost as neither side had to give up its vital interests. The next phase, however, will be a considerably more difficult and complicated undertaking. Should we expect a Davos-III (or more appropriately a CampDavid or Oslo-style meeting) between Greece and Turkey anytime soon? Is the international context reasonably favorable for such a comprehensive rapprochement? One should not be terribly optimistic. The EU is not yet speaking with a single voice on EU-Turkey relations or on Greek-Turkish relations and therefore lacks the diplomatic clout to promote a solution. Moreover, because of Greece’s membership, it is not perceived by Turkey as an objective actor. As for the United States, there is a new administration, with the war against international terrorism, Iraq and the other members of the ‘Axis of Evil’, missile defence and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts as its top priorities. Is the domestic context in Greece and Turkey favourable to a rapprochement? In Greece, Prime Minister Simitis’ top priority is the further improvement of the economy, the resolution of some key socio-economic problems and Greece’s continued and full participation in the EMU and CFSP. After his re-election in April 2000 by a very thin majority, there was no fundamental change in the policy of rapprochement with Turkey, despite certain disillusionment among Greek politicians and government officials due to the lack of a Turkish reciprocal ‘goodwill gesture’ to the Greek position at Helsinki. George Papandreou maintains the foreign affairs portfolio and his good personal relationship with his Turkish counterpart (as long as Ismail Cem remained in his post) facilitated efforts for rapprochement. It should be also mentioned that, in principle, Greece’s conservative party (New Democracy) supports the improvement of relations with Turkey, although it often disagrees with the government’s handling of the issues at the tactical level. During 2001–2 there have been a number of setbacks for the governing party, which is currently (early 2003) lagging behind the main opposition party, New Democracy, in opinion polls. This limits considerably the freedom of manoeuvre on both

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domestic and foreign policy issues for the Greek government, especially as the general elections approach, in late 2003 or early 2004.25 In Turkey, there is a severe economic crisis, with serious political repercussions, the impact of which at this point (early 2003) on the crisis on Greek-Turkish relations is rather unclear. Furthermore, it is far too early for any predictions about the impact of the rise to power of the moderate-Islamic Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party), both for the domestic and the foreign policy scene in Turkey. Generally, however, this author is rather pessimistic about the probability of formal military confidence-building measures or – an even more remote possibility – the resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict in the immediate future. On the other hand, there are signs that the Turkish military leadership wishes to avoid high tension in Greek-Turkish relations (although the real intentions of the Turkish military leadership on relations with Greece have traditionally been extremely difficult to decipher),26 and concentrate on the perceived domestic Islamist problem and, perhaps, potential external problems on Turkey’s eastern borders. Given the considerable influence of the military in Turkey, this would facilitate agreement on some tensionreduction proposals, such as those outlined here. And, of course, the two sides can always continue to engage in bottom-up or people-topeople activities. On the other hand, the possibility that a negative reaction of the Turkish military to changes necessary for Turkey’s European accession or a serious crisis over the accession of Cyprus to the EU might sweep away the prospects for Greek-Turkish rapprochement cannot be excluded.27 What does the analysis presented here suggest about the prospects of an agreement on CBMs between the two antagonists and the role of international actors in this? CBMs could pave the way for eventual discussion of ‘high politics’. ‘Gentle’ pressure from the United States, the European Union and NATO, especially on the noncooperating party, would, under certain circumstances, facilitate the negotiating process. Despite, however, the relative pessimism expressed above, the resolution of the Cyprus problem might radically transform the situation and open the way for the full normalization of Greek-Turkish relations. As a final conclusion, I would like to provide ten considerations:

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1. Before we move into high politics, we should prepare the ground by implementing agreements already signed. To this end, the proposed CBMs have a catalytic role to play. 2. Is it feasible to de-couple the Aegean and Cyprus? This might be possible in theory, at least to a certain extent, in terms of implementing agreed CBMs, but the situation in the Aegean has a direct impact on the situation in Cyprus, and vice-versa. It is rather unlikely that fundamental progress towards a comprehensive Greek-Turkish settlement (i.e. the establishment of a comprehensive security regime) will be achieved without a just, lasting and mutually acceptable solution of the prickly Cyprus problem. A ‘European’ solution for both Cypriot communities, along the general lines of the November 2002 United Nations plan, would probably be the optimum solution. 3. The political and economic costs of the Greek-Turkish conflict for the chief protagonists (Cyprus included), as well as NATO, the EU and the United States, are considerable, especially after the 11 September events and the US-led war against international terrorism. 4. To quote a highly experienced Greek diplomat, Ambassador (ret.) Byron Theodoropoulos, ‘If I was a Turkish decision-maker, I would look at the map and conclude that having to live with what is perceived in Turkey as “difficult” neighbours on the eastern borders, I would rather close other fronts, such as the “Aegean” one.’ 28 5. Certain Confidence-Building Measures between Greece and Turkey would contribute significantly to the reduction of tension and to the probability of accidental war and, most importantly, to a further improvement in Greek-Turkish relations, but will not address the underlying causes of the Greek-Turkish conflict. The two sides should therefore agree that the fundamental principle guiding Greek-Turkish relations is respect for international law and agreements, i.e. the Treaty of Lausanne and other international treaties. For any other bilateral differences concerning issues not covered by those treaties, especially those of a territorial nature, Greece and Turkey could resort to The Hague. Indeed, going to the International Court of Justice and accepting its verdict would constitute definite proof that Turkey has no

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expansionist aims and would effectively address Greek concerns about Finlandization.29 6. It is much easier for the stronger side in a conflict to make the first substantive move, especially if this is the side that appears unhappy with the status quo. To ease concerns about unilateral moves, this could be a largely symbolic and certainly retractable gesture. Having said this, the other side should be prepared to quickly recognize such a gesture and respond in kind, without any delay. 7. Let us try in earnest to move away from stereotypes and perceptions of zero-sum game between Greece and Turkey.30 8. There are significant internal and external challenges for Greek and Turkish security and prosperity. In the case of Turkey, economic and social development, progress to EU accession, traditional security threats, especially on Turkey’s eastern borders; in the case of Greece, instability along its northern borders and successfully competing in an increasingly interdependent, but also highly antagonistic international economic system. Common threats include organized crime, environmental pollution, etc. Both countries will need all available national resources to deal with such problems. Using such resources in a GreekTurkish competition looks today very much like a waste of effort and resources. 9. Athens does not wish a ‘lone wolf ’ Turkey. It is in Greece’s interest that Turkey remains firmly anchored in the western harbour and engaged in a political, economic and social modernization process. Whatever the short-term course of the rapprochement process, relations with Turkey will continue to remain a top priority concern for Greek foreign and security policy well into the twenty-first century. 10. At George Papandreou’s initiative in early 2002, Greece and Turkey engaged into a so-called ‘Pre-negotiating dialogue’ intended to address the fundamental issues between the two countries and prepare the ground for submission to the International Court of Justice in The Hague (according to the provisions of the Helsinki Agreement). Prospects for a successful outcome for this effort are highly uncertain, partly as a result of

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the domestic situation in Turkey. However, a successful resolution of the Cyprus problem would greatly enhance efforts for a negotiated Greek-Turkish settlement. Therefore, there is a window of opportunity for Greece and Turkey to erase a hot spot from the global map of conflicts. Let us hope that this opportunity will not be wasted. NOTES 1. I would like to thank Professor Theodore Couloumbis and Dr Panayotis Tsakonas for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. All errors are, of course, the author’s responsibility. 2. There has been a 30 per cent increase in bilateral trade over the last two years, bringing it to its 1995 level. The improvement is not spectacular, but there is potential for economic cooperation, especially in joint ventures in the Balkans and the Black Sea. However, political relations will remain the key factor. 3. There has also been an extension of bilateral cooperation in the fields of agriculture and energy. A Protocol of Cooperation on Agriculture was signed in June 2000 and two additional agreements are now under negotiation. In the field of energy, both countries are interested in connecting electricity and gas pipeline networks. 4. See Theodore Couloumbis and Louis Klarevas, ‘Proposals for a Greek-Turkish Reconciliation’, in Tozun Bahcheli et al., Greek-Turkish Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: US Institute for Peace, 1997), p. 36. 5. See the White Paper of the Hellenic Armed Forces: 1996–7 (Athens: Hellenic Ministry of National Defence, 1997), p. 107. According to this document, ‘1.95 trillion drachmas are expected to be disbursed until 2000, immediately after the placing of orders, and the remaining according to deliveries’. 6. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Defence Planning Committee, Enhancing Alliance Collective Security: Shared Roles, Risks and Responsibilities in the Alliance: A Report by NATO’s Defence Planning Committee (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1988), p. 13 and 50; Van Coufoudakis, ‘The Essential Link – Greece in NATO’, Southeast European Yearbook 1988 (Athens: ELIAMEP, 1988), p. 19. 7. For the implications of the enormous defence expenditures on investment expenditure as a share of Greece’s Gross Domestic Product, see Christos Kollias and Anastasios N. Refenes, ‘Modelling the Effects of Defence Spending Relations Using Neural Networks: Evidence from Greece’, Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, 3, 2 (Winter 1996), pp. 1–12. 8. According to Panayotis Tsakonas, ‘Turkey’s Post-Helsinki Turbulence: Implications for Greece and the Cyprus Issue’, Turkish Studies, 2, 2 (2001), ‘Several examples can indicate the confrontation within the Turkish elite due to economic turbulence following the Helsinki Summit. First, the military … was confronted with the condition to “trim the budget for the armed forces”. To this end, the Turkish military announced the postponement of … defence procurement programs worth $19.5 billion, although the Turkish General Staff had carefully avoided detailing which programs had actually been postponed … The Turkish decision to shelve some of the proposed contracts followed the unilateral postponement by the Greek government of … $4.5 billion purchase of about 60 … new generation Eurofighter planes, aiming to use those funds to overhaul Greece’s outdated pension and welfare system. However, such a move by the Generals should be seen less as a sincere effort to provide “more butter” for Turkey (something that other parts of the Turkish elite are in favour of), and more as an attempt to further advance their position by denouncing

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9.

10.

11. 12. 13.

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pledges of defence cutbacks according to IMF conditions as well as by reviving major procurement programs as bailout money flows from global lending organizations.’ For statements made by the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, Gen. Hüseyin Kıvrıkogˇlu, who denied that in Turkey’s Letter of Intent to the IMF there were references to the military cutbacks Turkey should make in order for economic aid to be granted, see ‘Turkey denies any pledges on military cutbacks’, Middle East Newsline, 11 April 2001, at: [http://www.menewsline.com/stories/2001/april]. In addition, Kıvrıkogˇlu stated that Turkey suspended or postponed (but not cancelled) lesser priority procurement programmes, and that the General Staff will revive those programmes once the economic situation improves. See ‘Contractors see hope in Turkish IMF bailout’, Defense News, 14 May 2001. As a Carnegie Endowment Discussion Paper, Carnegie Forum on the United States, Greece and Turkey (Washington, DC: CEIP, 1997), p. 3, describes the situation: ‘For Greeks and Turks, the past involves a pervasive underlying historical legacy of nationalistic, ethnic and religious emotions drawn from: A millennium of MuslimOrthodox conflict; 400 years of Ottoman rule over Greece; and a century of bitter fighting and cruel atrocities from Greece’s declaration of independence in 1821 through to the battles in Asia Minor in 1922. From the sweep of this history come stereotypes of alleged ethnic behaviours, Greeks and Turks locked in ‘age-old’ enmity and the clash of their civilizations.’ Major events in the modern Greek-Turkish relations include the Lausanne Treaty (1923); the Venizelos-Atatürk détente (1930s); the 1930 Friendship Treaty and the Naval Arms Control Protocol; NATO membership (1952); Balkan Pact (1954); the emergence of the Cyprus issue in the mid-1950s; attacks on Greeks of Istanbul in September 1955, which, together with the events of 1964 led to the reduction in number of the Greek minority in Turkey; the ZurichLondon agreements to create an independent federal state in Cyprus; the Cyprus crises of 1963–64, 1967 and 1974, when an abortive coup – an act of incredible stupidity, combined with incompetence – staged by the Greek junta against the president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, offered Turkey a pretext to ‘invade’ the island and keep it divided for the past 28 years; the closure of the Halki Theological School, creating serious problems for the survival of the Ecumenical Patriarchate; the dispute on the delimitation of the continental shelf which led to the 1976 and 1987 crises; and the unsuccessful 1988 rapprochement effort in Davos between Andreas Papandreou and Turgut Özal, which, however, . produced the Papoulias-Yılmaz agreements, better known as the Vouliagmeni and Istanbul Memoranda, establishing general principles on Confidence-Building Measures in the Aegean, neither of which was ever fully implemented. To give one very pertinent example, Turks should realize that Megali Idea (‘Great . Idea’ of Greek irredentism) is a thing of the past; what is there to take back? Istanbul/ Constantinople? Even if it was offered to us, we would have to refuse. How could we possibly accommodate 12–13 million Turks in a city with a shrinking community of 1–2,000 Greeks? ELIAMEP, Contemporary Turkey: Politics, Economy, Society, Foreign Policy (in Greek), (Athens: Papazissis Publishers, 2002). Even today, after two years of low tension and close to ‘normal’ relations with Turkey, the majority of Greek analysts question Ankara’s willingness to improve its relations with Greece. Although not the central theme of this paper, a short reference to the roots of the Greek-Turkish conflict is necessary. The sources of conflict between Greece and Turkey, not necessarily in order of importance, include the following: 1. Competition for regional influence in the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean, and to a lesser extent, the Black Sea; 2. The burden of history, one of the major causes of the current lack of trust between Greece and Turkey; and 3. Turkey’s revisionist policy in the Aegean as manifested by statements of Turkish political leaders, actions and the order of battle of the Turkish Armed Forces. On this one, I am writing, of course, from a

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14.

15.

16.

17. 18.

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Greek perspective; obviously, Turkish scholars might have a different perception. It is important to emphasize, however, that Greece’s major airfields are situated on the mainland. Any major attack would give sufficient warning time to Turkey. However, air-refuelling aircraft and the proximity of Turkish airfields to the Greek islands give Turkey the capability for a surprise attack. Furthermore, Greek forces on the islands have a purely defensive order of battle and no power projection capability whatsoever. A limited security regime can be very useful after its establishment, particularly during periods of relatively unconstrained rivalry, because it can provide regulation; encourage and institutionalize cooperative outcomes; play a moderating role; codify mutual vulnerability (the link between offence and defence) and parity, rather than military superiority, as the pillars on which arms cooperation would rest; solve the defection problem, due to improvement on each side’s information about the behaviour of the others; provide and promote balanced and reciprocal agreements; aid in the negotiation of cooperation in another issue-area; and last, but not least, intensify the learning process in the conflict which, in turn, will allow each side to change its mode of thinking, redefine its goals and means in the conflict, and, most importantly, change its attitude toward war, by dismissing the use of war as a legitimate political means to accomplish its incompatible objectives in a conflict. See Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); and ‘Reciprocity in International Relations’, International Organization, 40 (Winter 1986); Peter Haas, Saving the Mediterranean (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); John S. Duffield, ‘International Regimes and Alliance Behavior: Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels’, International Organization, 46, 4 (Fall 1992), pp. 819–55; and ‘Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: The Contributions of Regional Security Regimes’, Review of International Studies, 20, 4 (October 1994); Stephen Krasner, ‘Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables’, in Stephen Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). See also, Thanos Dokos and Panayotis Tsakonas, ‘Continuity and Change in GreekTurkish Relations’, in Christos Kollias and Gülay Gülnük-S¸enesen (eds), Greece and Turkey in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation. The Political Economy Perspective (London: Frank Cass, forthcoming); Panayotis Tsakonas and Thanos Dokos, ‘GreekTurkish Relations at the Dawn of the Twenty First Century. A View from Athens’, in Lenore Martin et al. (eds), The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002). As mentioned in the Carnegie Forum on the United States, Greece and Turkey, pp. 6–7; ‘Some have suggested that CBMs be viewed as measures that concede principle or would reduce pressure to go to the negotiating table. In fact, however, certain CBMs (sometimes referred to as “military” CBMs) are designed to avoid incidents or conflict in ways that scrupulously preserve principle for both sides. They reduce political pressure only in the sense that they take the sides out from “under the gun”, thus creating a sounder, more acceptable basis for negotiating. Such “conflict avoidance” CBMs can provide emergency communication capabilities, agreed rules of the road, and transparency; in sum, measures to avoid miscalculation and expedite negotiation.’ Suggestions No. 2 and 3 are currently included in the agenda of issues discussed between the political directors of the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministries. Turkey proposed certain bilateral military CBMs during the visit of the Turkish . Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem to Athens, in February 2000. Greece did not accept those measures because it felt they touched upon the country’s sovereign rights. Yet Greece responded positively to other measures proposed by Turkey. Greece has insisted, however, that any military CBM should be based on the 1988 Papoulias-Yılmaz agreements and discussed within the framework of NATO. After several official meetings between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Greece and Turkey have agreed to consider a series of measures included in the following categories of

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19.

20.

21.

22. 23.

24.

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CBMs: (a) Measures within the framework of the Papoulias-Yılmaz Memorandum of Understanding (Athens, 27 May 1988), (b) Measures of Tension Reduction and (c) Measures of Good Neighbourliness. The Permanent Representatives of both countries to NATO will discuss the measures included in the first category, while the measures included in the other two categories would be examined by the Political Directors of each country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Finally, of particular significance in confidence-building was the joint statement made by the Greek and the Turkish Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Ankara on 6 April 2001, which stated that the two countries would initiate procedures needed to make both countries party to the 1997 Ottawa Convention regarding the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel land mines and their destruction. Since September 1994, and shortly before the entry into force of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, which calls for a territorial waters width of up to 12 miles, the then Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller and other senior government officials explicitly and repeatedly stated that such an extension by Greece would be considered a casus belli. This then became official policy through a resolution of the Turkish National Assembly in June 1995. As one analyst points out, ‘Turkish official declarations, usually making headlines in Greek mass media, have been intensifying Greek fears. For instance, Turkish Prime Minister Demirel stated in 1975, “half the Aegean is ours. Let the whole world know that this is so … We know how to crush the heads of our enemies when the prestige, dignity and interests of the Turkish nation are attacked’’. Turkish officials’ references to a “growing Turkey” and to the twenty-first century as the “era of Turkism” have further escalated concern. Moreover, direct challenges (e.g. “The group of islands that are situated within 50 km of the Turkish coast … should belong to Turkey”), as well as indirect questioning of Greek sovereignty over the Aegean islands, have been viewed with great alarm.’ See Yannis Valinakis, Greece’s Security in the Post-Cold War Era (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 1994), p. 30. Also see Athanassios Platias, ‘Greece’s Strategic Doctrine: In Search of Autonomy and Deterrence’, in Dimitri Constas (ed.), The Greek Turkish Conflict in the 1990s (London: Macmillan, 1991) p. 93. Constraint CSBMs constitute a category of arms control measures. Since they actually limit military operations, as opposed to the ‘transparency’ CSBMs, which merely subject these operations to prior notification or observation, they are more intrusive and inherently more difficult to negotiate. See Lynn M. Hansen, ‘The Evolution from Transparency to Constraints’, Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations, 13, 3 (1990), pp. 61–76. In 1930, Venizelos and Atatürk signed a Protocol limiting naval armaments. The bilateral agreements signed include inter alia the establishment of an Educational Committee of experts with the aim of examining the history books to reflect a more balanced account of the two countries’ history and relations; the promotion of educational exchanges and cooperation in tourism; the promotion of cooperation between police forces against organized crime, drug trafficking, and migration; environmental cooperation in the Aegean, etc. See Theodore Couloumbis and Tanos Dokos (eds), Yearbook of Foreign and Defence Policy 1999–2000 (in Greek), (Athens: ELIAMEP, 2000), pp. 425–67. Cyprus is a very painful story, with ‘angels’ and ‘devils’ on both sides. The Greek side made its grave mistakes, with the 1974 coup d’état being the most serious one. It is believed, however, by Greek Cypriots that the Turkish Cypriot leadership never tried in a sincere way to make the bi-communal system work and that the results of the 1974 Turkish invasion were much more catastrophic than anything that happened in the pre-1974 period. Furthermore, among the real victims were the Turkish Cypriots themselves who, as a result of the large numbers of settlers from Anatolia, began feeling like strangers in their own land, with large numbers emigrating to western Europe.

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25. If no substantial improvement in bilateral relations takes place, Greece’s strategy will continue to be a mix of internal balancing (the strengthening of its armed forces through increased emphasis on quality, with the adoption of a modern strategic and operational doctrine; emphasizing combined/joint operations; improved personnel training and acquisition of modern weapons systems, including smart weapons and, especially, force multipliers) and external balancing (its membership in the European Union), with the aim of effectively deterring the perceived Turkish threat. 26. However, some Greek analysts claim that recent moves, such as the increase of violations of the Greek airspace by Turkish fighter aircraft and statements about a Turkish ‘reaction’ in Cyprus demonstrate exactly the opposite. 27. For the impact of Turkey’s domestic turbulence on its foreign policy vis-à-vis Greece and the Cyprus issue, see Panayotis J. Tsakonas, ‘Post-Helsinki Turbulence: Implications for Greece and the Cyprus Issue’, Turkish Studies, 2, 2 (2001). 28. Byron Theodoropoulos, ‘Hreomenoi Logismo Aftokratori’, Anaskopisi (Yearbook) 2000 (Athens: ELIAMEP, 2000), p. 143. 29. One should also note the very interesting memorandum of 10 March 2000, submitted initially to the EU officials in Brussels, and later sent to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Greece and Turkey, in which the Greek-Turkish Forum (GTF) set out the issues in relations between Turkey and Greece. The GTF’s preferred methodology is to start not from legal or political positions and arguments, but from an assessment of interests. Acknowledging the existence of common interests in areas of contention between the two countries can be a useful starting point in the search for solutions to existing problems. It is also necessary, of course, for each government to clarify its aims and to comprehend its neighbour’s particular interests. Recognizing common interest makes the search for solutions a mutual exercise: understanding each state’s separate interests is a necessary component of a sustainable agreement. Common interests between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean include: a fundamental interest in freedom of navigation; an interest in cooperation on environmental protection, on search and rescue, and policing; an interest in cooperation in promoting tourism; an interest in ensuring there is no use or threat of force in the pursuit of attempted settlement of differences; an interest in understanding each other’s attitude as to whether when and how the issue should go to the International Court of Justice. Two other very interesting points should also be mentioned. Discussions in the GTF have made it clear that the underlying issues are overlaid by perceptions of threat and of prestige. Were all other issues in the Aegean settled, and were the GreekTurkish rapprochement making progress on other key questions, the GTF suspects that the salience of the issue of the effects of treaty restrictions on the militarization of certain Greek islands would decline sharply. For the full text of the memorandum see [http://www.eliamep.gr]. 30. Indeed, the ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’ mentality has been a dominant one in both countries for the past two decades. Turkish automatic recognition of FYROM as Republic of Macedonia, for example, was not very well received in Greece and has actually reinforced this zero-sum game mentality. One can think of other examples such as Greek or Turkish policies vis-à-vis Armenia, Syria, Albania, etc., although it would certainly be an oversimplification to attribute such policies to the mentality described above, as there are respective ethnic and religious links and affinities with some of those countries.

6 The Economic Imperative: Prospects for Trade Integration and Business Cooperation PANAGIOTIS LIARGOVAS

INTRODUCTION

Economic cooperation between two partners can take various forms, but most of them are expressed through trade and businesses. Greece and Turkey represent two neighbouring countries whose economic relations have undoubtedly been affected by the bilateral political problems, and which used to create a climate of tension and uncertainty between them. Attempts to enhance the stability of relations between the two countries were not successful, but a new opportunity is at hand. If this is taken up, then trade and business cooperation will flourish. It will be interesting to know the future prospects of such cooperation. The purpose of this chapter then is to fill this gap. The next section of this study analyses the current stage of trade integration. The following section then investigates the future prospects for the development of bilateral trade with the use of a gravity model. The third section aims to shed light on the economic cooperation in selected sectors of interest for both countries, such sectors are tourism, sea fishing, fish culture, industry, banking, local governments and universities. THE CURRENT STATE OF TRADE INTEGRATION

Trade integration between Greece and Turkey might manifest itself in numerous ways, including rising growth rates of exports and imports and rising shares in total Greek trade.

33,499.8

51,223.5

1995 85,357.2

1996 119,021.1

1997 102,004.8

1998

1999

2000

30,579.6

27,997.4

31,771.7

41,397.0

48,581.9

56,053.8

81,338.7

109,128.1

111,395.6

142,003.0

5% 25%

34% 25%

Turkey Total Greek exports

Rate of imports Turkey Total Greek imports

–8% 14%

32% 19%

1992

13% 13%

34% 3%

1993

Source: National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG)

1991

Rates of exports

30% 3%

–2% 18%

1994

17% 13%

53% 11%

1995

15% 17%

67% 12%

1996

45% 8%

39% 7%

1997

Table 2 Growth rates of Greek-Turkish trade

34% 2%

–14% –12%

1998

2% 14%

0% 20%

1999

27% –52%

95% –31%

2000

21.0% 5.7%

31.0% 7.2%

1991–00

3,137,524.0 3,921,522.0 4,484,059.0 5,050,531.0 5,206,797.0 5,908,368.0 6,905,019.0 7,433,230.0 7,612,026.7 8,687,058.7 10,156,798.7

22,893.4

2,218,917.7

34,029.2

1994

1,267,506.0 1,579,967.0 1,880,763.0 1,933,422.0 2,288,289.0 2,540,891.0 2,855,837.0 3,044,640.0 2,679,582.5 3,212,362.9

25,430.0

1993

198,936.0

19,95.0

1992 102,221.1

18,195.0

1991

Source: National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG)

Greek imports from Turkey Total Greek imports

Greek exports to Turkey Total Greek exports

1990

Table 1 Greek-Turkish trade (in million drachmas)

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Table 1 presents evidence as regards total exports and imports of Greece to and from Turkey over the period 1990–2000. Table 2 shows the growth rates of both exports and imports of Greece to and from Turkey during the relevant period. For comparison we also present the growth rates of both exports and imports of EU to and from Turkey during the relevant period 1991–2000 (Table 3). The information in these tables confirms that Turkey represents an increasingly dynamic export market for Greek products. The average annual growth rate of Greek exports to Turkey over the period 1990–2000 is 30.9 per cent and it is mainly due to the recent steep increase. It far outweighs the average growth rates of total Greek exports of around 7.2 per cent as well as the average growth rate of EU exports to Turkey of around 5.6 per cent. Its importance in the near future is likely to increase, as those Greek firms that find it difficult or unprofitable to place their products in the competitive EU markets, will have an easy outlet in Turkey. Imports also accelerate at a fast rate. The average growth rate of Greek imports from Turkey over the period 1990–99 is 21 per cent. They accelerate faster compared to the average growth rate of total Greek imports of around 5.7 per cent. For the EU as a whole the average increase in imports from Turkey was only 6.7 per cent on average over the period 1991– 2000. However, it far outweighed the average growth of total EU imports of around 5 per cent over the same period. Table 3 Growth rates of EU-Turkish trade Rates of exports

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

1991–00

Turkey Total EU exports

3.9% 5.9%

27.9% –8.5%

–23.7% 14.5%

59.5% 22.1%

27.8% 2.7%

10.8% 1.0%

–5.8% 6.7%

–7.9% 3.1%

24.3% 2.8%

13.0% 5.6%

Rates of imports

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

1991–99

Turkey Total EU imports

8.1% 4.2%

–8.3% –15.1%

16.6% 13.7%

16.4% 20.6%

3.8% 0.9%

6.5% 2.3%

6.5% 10.7%

10.0% 4.6%

1.1% 0.2%

6.7% 4.7%

Source: National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG)

The contribution of the increase in exports to total Greek-Turkish trade is reflected in the exports-to-imports ratio (Table 4). For GreekTurkish trade this ratio increased from 79.2 per cent in 1990 to 152.3 per cent in 1996. It then declined but increased in 2000 to 14.1 per

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TURKISH- GREEK RELATIONS

Table 4 Greek and EU trade with Turkey Greece-Turkey 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 EU-Turkey 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

X

M

X–M

X/M(%)

RX

RM

R

B

18,195 19,195 25,430 34,029 33,500 51,224 85,357 119,021 102,005 102,221 198,936

22,893 30,580 27,997 31,772 41,397 48,582 56,054 81,339 109,128 111,396 142,003

–4,698 –11,385 –2,567 2,258 –7,897 2,642 29,303 37,682 –7,123 –9,175 56,933

79.5% 62.8% 90.8% 107.1% 80.9% 105.4% 152.3% 146.3% 93.5% 91.8% 140.1%

1.4% 1.2% 1.4% 1.8% 1.5% 2.0% 3.0% 3.9% 3.8% 3.2% 9.0%

0.7% 0.8% 0.6% 0.6% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 1.1% 1.4% 1.3% 3.4%

0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 0.9% 1.0% 1.2% 1.4% 1.9% 2.1% 1.8% 5.4%

–0.11 –0.23 –0.05 0.03 –0.11 0.03 0.21 0.19 –0.03 –0.04 0.17

X

M

X–M

X/M(%)

SX

SM

S

B

10,784 11,202 14,332 10,932 17,441 22,290 24,692 23,254 21,416 26,610

8,242 8,908 8,165 9,522 11,084 11,501 12,250 13,048 14,352 14,511

2,542 2,294 6,167 1,410 6,357 10,789 12,442 10,206 7,064 12,099

131% 126% 176% 115% 157% 194% 202% 178% 149% 183%

0.7% 0.7% 1.0% 0.7% 0.9% 1.1% 1.2% 1.0% 0.9% 1.1%

0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6%

1.3% 1.3% 1.6% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.8% 1.6% 1.6% 1.7%

0.13 0.11 0.27 0.07 0.22 0.32 0.34 0.28 0.20 0.29

X=exports, M=imports, R=share in total Greek trade, S=share in total EU trade, B=(X–M) /(X+M) Source: NSSG

cent, turning a trade deficit with Turkey into a trade surplus. The EUTurkey trade increased from 131 per cent in 1991 to 183 per cent in 2000, thereby increasing its trade surplus with Turkey. Trade integration between Greece and Turkey is increasing fast. The Turkish share in total Greek exports had reached 9 per cent by the year 2000. With regard to imports, the corresponding share is much lower, around 3.5 per cent. However, there is an increasing trend not only for Turkish exports but for Turkish imports as well. For example, the share of imports in total Greek imports was 0.7 per cent in 1993 and 1.3 per cent in 1998. For the EU-Turkish trade the total trade share is around 1.7 per cent and its evolution is much more moderate compared to Greek-Turkish trade. Finally, Greek competitiveness vis-à-vis Turkey (measured by the index B=(X–M)/(X+M),

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where X=exports, M=imports) is very volatile and improved in 2000. This is reflected in the rise of the index, compared to the previous years of 1998 and 1999. In addition, it is interesting to note the position of Turkey in Greek and EU trade with the Balkans. As seen in Table 5, Turkey is the second most important supplier of Greece in its trade with the Balkans. The Turkish import share accounts for 29.3 per cent. As far as exports are concerned, Turkey with a share of 24.1 per cent is the most important trade partner of Greece with the Balkans. Turkey is also the most important Balkan partner of the EU (Table 6). The aggregate picture as regards the bilateral trade between the two countries could be complemented with a more disaggregated analysis. To this end, we analyse the bilateral trade between Greece and Turkey as regards three sectors: agricultural products (SITC 0,1 and 4), raw materials (SITC 2 and 3) and industrial products (SITC 5–8). The results are shown in Tables 7–9. It can be seen that the bilateral trade between Greece and Turkey has been developed in favour of the former in the case of primary products. On the contrary the bilateral trade of agricultural and industrial goods between Greece and Turkey has been developed at the expense of Greece.

THE FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR TRADE INTEGRATION

The future prospects of trade integration between Greece and Turkey will definitely depend on the bilateral political stability between the two countries. If we make the assumption that the political framework will not allow any tension, uncertainty and distrust to appear between the two partners, then we can make a forecast regarding the evolution of the bilateral trade. To this end we can utilize our knowledge regarding gravity models. The gravity model has been one of the most popular models in the international trade literature aiming at explaining the proportion of bilateral trade flows.1 This model relates bilateral trade from origin (i) to destination (j) with economic forces at the flow’s origin, economic forces at the trade destination, and economic forces either aiding or resisting the flow’s movement from origin to destination. The following specification is proposed:

23.4%

100.0%

14.1% 23.8% 1.8%

34.6%

25.7%

100.0%

27.0%

100.0%

1990

11.7% 17.8% 2.0%

45.0%

23.5%

100.0%

Greek imports from:

Romania Bulgaria Albania FYROM Yugoslavia Slovenia Croatia Turkey Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbia-Montenegro Balkans

Source: NSSG

35.5%

42.4%

1991

18.8% 19.5% 2.7%

14.0% 12.5% 4.2%

Romania Bulgaria Albania FYROM Yugoslavia Slovenia Croatia Turkey Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbia-Montenegro Balkans

1991

1990

Greek exports to:

100.0%

14.3% 35.1% 3.7% 1.3% 13.4% 0.5% 1.1% 30.0% 0.6%

1992

100.0%

19.9% 31.0% 7.6% 2.9% 12.5% 0.4% 0.2% 24.7% 0.8%

1992

100.0%

12.9% 39.0% 3.0% 5.7% 0.0% 2.7% 3.4% 27.2% 6.1%

1993

100.0%

1.2% 1.0% 17.7% 1.8%

10.6% 36.1% 15.0% 16.6%

1993

14.2% 48.2% 5.4% 0.7% 0.0% 3.2% 2.1% 25.9% 0.3% 0.0% 100.0%

1994

0.8% 1.1% 15.5% 0.1% 0.0% 100.0%

10.5% 46.5% 24.0% 1.6%

1994

14.5% 52.2% 4.0% 1.6% 0.0% 3.2% 1.5% 22.6% 0.1% 0.1% 100.0%

1995

3.6% 1.1% 17.9% 0.0% 1.8% 100.0%

14.6% 36.3% 21.2% 3.5%

1995

15.3% 39.6% 3.9% 4.2% 0.0% 2.8% 1.1% 24.7% 0.1% 8.2% 100.0%

1996

0.8% 0.9% 22.2% 0.1% 10.6% 100.0%

10.9% 19.7% 20.3% 14.6%

1996

2.0% 0.6% 25.1% 0.1% 11.3% 100.0%

17.3% 35.4% 3.1% 5.1%

1997

1.1% 1.6% 25.5% 0.2% 11.8% 100.0%

10.3% 18.7% 14.7% 16.0%

1997

Table 5 Significance of individual Balkan countries in total Greek-Balkan trade

2.1% 1.0% 31.0% 0.2% 8.1% 100.0%

16.5% 33.1% 3.1% 5.0%

1998

1.3% 1.1% 20.5% 0.4% 11.1% 100.0%

12.0% 26.2% 11.5% 15.9%

1998

2.0% 2.7% 32.1% 0.3% 5.3% 100.0%

18.4% 30.7% 3.3% 5.2%

1999

1.2% 1.4% 18.8% 0.8% 6.4% 100.0%

12.0% 23.1% 12.4% 23.9%

1999

1.7% 1.8% 29.3% 0.4% 6.0% 100.0%

22.6% 29.9% 3.1% 5.2%

2000

1.0% 1.0% 24.1% 0.6% 5.1% 100.0%

16.9% 20.1% 11.2% 20.1%

2000

150 TURKISH- GREEK RELATIONS

42.2%

42.0%

100.0%

47.0%

38.8%

100.0%

Source: IMF trade statistics.

9.5% 5.9% 0.3%

9.1% 4.8% 0.4%

Romania Bulgaria Albania FYROM Yugoslavia Slovenia Croatia Turkey Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbia-Montenegro Balkans

1992

100.0%

1991

100.0%

45.8%

EU imports from:

46.0%

7.5% 5.8% 0.9% 0.0% 40.0%

Romania Bulgaria Albania FYROM Yugoslavia Slovenia Croatia Turkey Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbia-Montenegro Balkans

1992

10.9% 6.7% 1.6% 0.0% 34.8%

1991

EU exports to:

21.1% 11.6% 46.2% 0.2% 0.0% 100.0%

11.9% 6.8% 0.5% 1.7%

1993

20.3% 10.5% 42.8% 0.1% 0.0% 99.3%

15.1% 7.0% 0.7% 2.8%

1994

19.0% 14.3% 40.6% 0.5% 0.5% 100.0%

15.6% 9.8% 53.0% 0.4% 0.2% 100.0%

1994 12.5% 7.9% 1.9% 2.8%

10.8% 6.4% 1.8% 1.9%

1993

20.0% 8.9% 39.4% 0.1% 0.1% 95.1%

16.0% 7.2% 0.7% 2.6%

1995

17.2% 12.6% 44.8% 0.5% 0.6% 99.7%

12.5% 7.0% 1.8% 2.6%

1995

19.2% 7.8% 40.2% 0.3% 1.7% 95.1%

16.3% 6.7% 0.9% 1.9%

1996

14.0% 10.9% 49.1% 1.4% 2.9% 99.0%

12.4% 4.5% 2.1% 1.7%

1996

17.6% 7.3% 40.4% 0.6% 3.4% 95.0%

17.0% 6.4% 0.7% 1.6%

1997

13.0% 11.1% 50.8% 1.8% 3.6% 98.3%

11.7% 4.0% 1.0% 1.3%

1997

Table 6 Significance of individual Balkan countries in total EU-Balkan trade 1998

18.8% 7.0% 41.8% 0.8% 3.3% 100.0%

18.5% 6.8% 0.8% 2.2%

1998

14.4% 10.1% 47.8% 2.0% 3.8% 100.0%

14.5% 4.8% 1.3% 1.4%

1999

17.6% 6.5% 44.9% 1.1% 1.8% 100.0%

17.9% 6.4% 0.8% 3.0%

1999

14.9% 9.6% 46.7% 2.5% 3.1% 100.0%

14.4% 5.7% 1.6% 1.6%

2000

16.6% 6.6% 43.2% 1.3% 2.0% 100.0%

19.7% 7.3% 0.7% 2.4%

2000

13.0% 8.2% 50.6% 2.2% 3.5% 100.0%

14.1% 5.4% 1.5% 1.5%

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TURKISH- GREEK RELATIONS

Table 7 Greece’s bilateral trade with Turkey in agricultural products (SITC 0, 1, 4) 1998 Exports Imports Balance B

8,697.3 10,560.4 –1,863.0 –0.10

1999

2000

5,465.8 1,233.4 –6,767.6 –0.38

10,703.9 12,427.5 –1,723.6 –0.07

Source: NSSG

Table 8 Greece’s bilateral trade with Turkey in raw materials (SITC 2, 3) 1993 Exports Imports Balance B

53,037.3 4,293.5 48,743.8 0.85

1994 63,296.5 3,564.1 59,732.4 0.89

1995 139,161.2 5,005.7 134,155.5 0.93

Source: NSSG

Table 9 Greece’s bilateral trade with Turkey in manufactured goods (SITC 5, 6, 7, 8)

Exports Imports Balance B

1993

1994

1995

40,089.5 92,270.3 –52,180.8 –0.39

34,043.8 97,955.4 –63,911.6 –0.48

50,509.8 12,397.2 –73,460.4 –0.42

Source: NSSG

˜ á\it O ˜ âjt Äa˜´g- Ut (Trade)´g-t = Á O ˜ \it and O ˜ jt stand for purchasing power of country of origin where O a˜ and destination respectively and Ä ´g- denotes the distance between the two countries. Ut is an error term. Under this framework, an exporting country’s income can be interpreted as the country’s production capacity, while an importing á

â

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country’s income is the country’s purchasing power. The above is the reduced form equation resulted from a general equilibrium model of world trade where consumers are assumed to share a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility function and the producers use an internationally immobile production factor according to a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) production function. For the purpose of the present work we also emphasize the ‘law of one price’ or the Purchasing Power Parity model and the significant effects of price changes on the volume of the traded goods. To this end, we incorporate the nominal exchange rate to the standard gravity model. In attempting to make inferences about the Greek-Turkish trade we have to take into consideration the economic and political environment of the two countries. The frequent tensions between them make it difficult to estimate on the basis of extrapolation from historical levels the size of trade likely to prevail. For this reason we attempt to extrapolate information for the trade developments by using as basis the trade patterns between Greece and a reference group of countries that are assumed to exhibit ‘normal’ trade relationships. In order to estimate the trade potential between Greece and Turkey, we adopt a two-stage approach. At the first stage, we estimate the gravity coefficients of the implemented trade between Greece and 30 selective trade partners at various years. This set (see Appendix) consists mainly of countries from the EU, Asia, Africa and America. The sample includes both developed and developing countries. In this way the model avoids producing results that are solely of trade flows between countries with specific characteristics. The idea behind this method is that the estimated coefficients will manage to incorporate both the effects of favourable trade conditions between EU countries and also the effects of unfavourable trade conditions. Across this framework the variety of destinations and origins also ensures that the estimated coefficients point out both manufactures-driven and resources-driven trade. At the next step, we obtain the potential trade volumes by applying the coefficient estimates derived from the reference group to Turkey. Specifically, we implement a research exercise by incorporating the estimates parameters to a gravity equation of Greece and Turkey.

154

TURKISH- GREEK RELATIONS

MODEL SPECIFICATION AND RESULTS

For the purpose of the present work we use cross-section data to estimate the trade effects and relationships for a particular time period. By keeping the observations of each time period separate, we obtain four equations for each specification, as follows: ln(exports)t = á +âéô(yit)+ â2ô(yGRt) +âéô(Di) +âéô(eit) ln(trade)t = á +âéô(yit)+ â2ô(yGRt) +âéô(Di) +âéô(eit) Where t=1985, 1990, 1995, 1998 and yit , yGRt stands for the logarithmic transformation of per capita gdp of the trade pattern and per capita gdp of Greece respectively. Di denotes the logarithmic transformation of the miles’ distance between the capital cities and eit denotes the logarithmic transformation of the exchange rate expressed in terms of USD. We estimate these four cross-section equations jointly using the method of Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR).2 In this way we allow for correlation between the error terms since, for example, the errors for Greece-Germany may be related with the errors of GreeceFrance (see in the Appendix the correlation coefficients across the SUR residuals). Furthermore, in order to improve the efficiency we constrain all coefficients (except the constant term) to be equal across time. The data of international trade is withdrawn from the Greek National Statistical Service for the year 1985, 1990, 1995, 1998, and the data of GDP per capita real GDP Per Capita in constant dollars (international prices, base year 1985).3 The exchange rate data is taken from International Financial Statistics of IMF over various years. Since we take the logarithmic transformation the zeros have been substituted by the number 0.001. Taking into account the evident heteroscedasticity (using the Bruce Pagan test we can reject the null of no heteroscedasticity at any significance level) we compute regression standard errors and covariance matrix allowing for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of the residuals (robust errors). One can argue that the use of pooled data into a time series and cross-sectional framework could derive more sensible estimate coefficients. But is seems not clear whether one should apply a random

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effect or a fixed effect in order to derive a unique vector of coefficients. On the other side, we should also take into consideration that two of the explanatory variables – the distance variable and the per capita GDP of Greece – both have one dimension and consequently the panel techniques cannot derive sensible estimators. Initial estimates indicated that it makes a difference whether we use bilateral exports, imports or trade (the sum of exports and imports) as the dependent variable.4 We report the results using exports from Greece to third country (Table 10) and imports from third country to Greece. In line with other studies we find that the basic gravity model has a high explanatory power given the high values of R2 for the SUR model. When considering a set of seemingly unrelated regression equations the standard R2 is an unambiguous measure. One possibility for a measure of a goodness of fit is the R2 obtained by applying least squares to the whole system. The estimated R2 varies from 85–96 per cent across the three specifications. Among the three SUR specifications the smallest statistic used is F=27.4, which significantly exceeds the critical value of F(12,60)= 3.5 at the 1 per cent level. According to the derived results,5 the estimated coefficients on Table 10 Gravity model for 29 countries and Greece

Regresses

Constant GDP trade partner GDP Greece Distance Ex-Rate R2 F-statistic

Exports

Imports

Estimated Coefficients

Estimated Coefficients

0.853 0.225 0.438* 2.210 0.479* 2.080 –0.526* –2.003 –0.001 –0.36 0.85 31.2 (0.000)

The t-stat in parentheses estimated using heteroscedasticity robust errors. * Denotes statistical significance at 5 per cent

–0.863 –0.319 0.52* 3.35 0.62* 3.08 0.356 1.204 –0.0009 –0.134 0.96 30.8 (0.000)

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GDP in all cases are significant at the 5 per cent level and have the expected sign.6 An increase in the GDP of Greece by one unit leads to increase in lnexports by 0.479 and in lnimports by 0.62. The oneunit increase in the GDP of the trade partner results in 0.726 increase of total lntrade, in 0.479 increase Greek lnexports (imports of other partner) and by 0.56 of Greek lnimports (exports from other countries). The coefficients of the GDPs are quite close to those found in other studies, as is the coefficient of distance. In contrast, the derived coefficients for exchange rates are not statistically significant. One potential explanation relates to the irresponsiveness of international trade to exchange rate fluctuations. The important issue, which must be considered in the trade flows-exchange rate relationship, is the time needed for trade flows to be adjusted to nominal exchange rates due to sunk cost. The time lag gives rise to the notion of hysteresis. The variable distance enters significantly into the equation of trade and exports. Finally, the constant is significant only in trade equation. It is also worth mentioning the insignificance of distance in the imports regression. A proposed rationalization is related to the geographical distance of Greece from the main import partners (Japan, USA). According to the statistical data of 1998 approximately 20 per cent of Greek imports come from destinations at an average distance of 3,452 air miles. In Table 11, we compare the trade volumes predicted on the basis of the gravity coefficients with actual flows for 1998 for the reference group. This gives us an indication of trade flows that would have prevailed between Greece and Turkey if there were normal bilateral relations between the two countries. It appears that Greece is ‘under-trading’ with Turkey. Undertrading is more pronounced in the case of imports where the actual trade represents only 48 per cent of the potential. For exports the corresponding percentage is 71 per cent. Table 11 Estimated potential Greek imports (exports) from (to) Turkey (million $)

Imports Exports

Estimated

Actual

Actual/Estimated

680.7 420.997

327.34 300.6

0.48 0.710

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PROSPECTS FOR BUSINESS COOPERATION

In addition to trade, economic cooperation between Greece and Turkey can be beneficial for both countries. Sectors which might be of interest are tourism, sea fishing, pisciculture, industry, banking, local governments and universities.

Tourism Sector Economic cooperation in the tourist sector can be beneficial for Greece given that: 1. The distance between the Greek islands and the Turkish coasts is very short and therefore a regular connection would be a first step towards tourist development. 2. The cost of transportation in the islands is usually 30–40 per cent higher compared to the corresponding cost on the mainland. Sometimes it is even 200 per cent higher. For example, the transportation cost of one tonne of cargo between Piraeus and Lesvos, which is a distance of 346 km, is more than three times the cost of land transportation. 3. The difficulties in transportation are sometimes due to shortcomings in communication and other infrastructure. Greek authorities should aim at: 1. simplifying the bureaucratic procedures for visitors (issuing of visas, yachting); 2. making cooperation between businessmen easier; 3. enlarging the tourist market by increasing the tourist and cultural attractions on offer; 4. reviving the interest in historical heritage; 5. highlighting and showing historical periods; 6. allowing the easier attraction of tourists from the two countries; 7. encouraging special types of tourism (e.g. ecological, agro tourism); 8. building new infrastructure (tourist offices, exhibitions).

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Fish Culture Both Greece and Turkey have already developed the culture of fish. The two countries are characterized by similar conditions, and they have similar prospects as regards fish culture. Greek companies have already expressed their interest for bilateral agreements and joint actions with Turkish ones. A necessary step for the success of Greek-Turkish cooperation in this sector is the protection of the invested funds and profits by Turkey. An agreement as regards the guarantee of re-exporting the funds and profits in the currency in which they were imported would be helpful. The avoidance of double taxation is another important precondition. Import levies should also cease. Joint strategies in the sector might include the efforts of marketing in the EU (patented names, products of origins, etc.) as well as standardization (common standards) and improvement of quality.

Sea Fishing Both sides have a benefit in seeking the diffusion of the results of Mediterranean cooperation for the protection of fisheries in the area. The development of joint research in the sea eco-system and the investigation of common solutions to any problems found is necessary. Currently the efforts for the harmonization of fishing laws and methods of fishing at the Mediterranean level are still open. It would be useful for Greece to encourage the harmonization of Greek and Turkish laws as regards technical measures. Today technical measures concern Greek fishing boats only, not Turkish ones.

Industrial Cooperation According to recent data (Hellenic-Turkish Business Association) there are 32 Greek companies in Turkey. Most of these are involved in services and trade and only six in industry.7 Greek businessmen have also a presence in Turkey through European joint ventures in Turkey. In Greece there are around 40 Turkish firms. With the improvement of the political climate between the two countries, a large number of Greek businessmen are interested in cooperation with Turkish firms. The Greek daily papers have frequent references

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to initiatives taken by Greeks who want to invest in Turkey. Greek and Turkish companies could create joint ventures not only in Turkey and Greece but in third countries as well. It could be possible that Greek construction companies work together with Turkish ones with the aim of investing in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where Turkish companies have a significant presence. For example, in Uzbekistan Turkish companies execute 40 per cent of the infrastructure work. Greek construction firms could offer know-how, as well as opportunities to Turkish companies in countries where they have presence (e.g. Black Sea).

Banking Greek banks expect to gain a lot if they will cooperate with Turkish banks. The area of cooperation concerns mostly investment banking and capital markets. The first bank having a presence in Turkey is the National Bank of Greece, the biggest Greek bank. The bank will be operating from Istanbul.8 At the same time, the National Bank of Greece in cooperation with the Turkish Guarantee Bank and J. P. Morgan will create a venture capital with initial funds of 45 billion dollars. Interest for Turkey has also been expressed by another Greek bank, Alpha Bank.9

Local Governments and Universities In this sector there are many prospects of economic cooperation. This is because local governments and institutions are closely related to EU projects. Cooperation between the two countries could refer to sectors such as protection of environment, energy, city management, social issues, local taxation, culture etc. Specific measures should aim at:
the creation of task forces within local governments;
transfer of know-how;
communication and information;
seminars, conferences, symposia. Greek local government bodies have already obtained useful experience with the country’s northern neighbours (e.g. Bulgaria, Albania).

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Universities and research centres could also develop common research projects. The Universities .of the Aegean and of Xanti and the Universities of the Marmara or Istanbul, for example, could also take advantage of the proximity of the two countries. Projects could include the environment, technology, health, renewable sources of energy, city culture and rural development.

NOTES 1. See Jeffrey Bergstrand, ‘The Gravity Equation in International Trade: Some Microeconomic Foundations and Empirical Evidence’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 67, 3 (1985); and Jeffrey Frankel, Ernesto Stein and Shang-jin Wei, ‘Trading Blocks and the Americas: The Natural, the Unnatural, and the Super-Natural’, Journal of Development Economics, 47 (1995), pp. 61–95. 2. A similar approach is taken by Shang-jin Wei, ‘Intra-national versus International Trade: How Stubborn are Nations in Global Integration?’, NBER Working Paper, 5531 (1996); and Spiros Bougheas, Panicos Demetriades and Edgar Morgenroth, ‘Infrastructure, Transport Costs and Trade’, Journal of International Economics, 47 (1999). 3. We derived similar results by using GDP in dollar terms, instead of real GDP per capita. 4. This idea is further supported by the variance covariance matrix. The estimations are available upon request. 5. We perform a two-sample test assuming that the means of the estimates represents measures of the means of the true distribution of the estimators and the difference between the means should follow a normal distribution with zero mean and deviation (s 12 /n1 + s 2 2 /n2 ) where s 1 is the standard error of the coefficient derived from the model i and n is the sample size. According to this test we reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of the explanatory variables of trade, imports and exports are different. 6. We also attempted to derive the coefficients of the gravity equation by using the crosssection data, OLS, at a particular time. There exist two sorts of problems related with this proposed method. The first is associated with the quality of the estimated coefficients since most of them are statistical insignificant. Constraining the coefficients of the SUR system to be equal across time we gain efficiency. The second problem is associated with the magnitude of each coefficient that differs across the examined periods, creating selection problems. In any case the OLS estimations are available from the authors upon request. 7. One of the biggest investments is ‘Kapniki’, a tobacco company. Another one is ‘Yiotis’, a food company. 8. See ‘National Bank of Greece in Turkey’, To Vima, 26 June 2000. 9. ‘Greek Banks penetrate the Turkish market’, Ependitis, 1–2 July 2000.

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APPENDIX

Countries Used for the SUR estimations Argentina, Austria, Belgium + Luxemburg, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Egypt, Spain, Finland, France, UK, USA, Ireland, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, N. Korea, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey and USA.

Residuals Correlation Matrix This is a square table with covariance on and below the diagonal and correlation above the diagonals. Covariance\Correlation Matrix of Export Residuals

EX98 EX90 EX95 EX98

EX98

EX90

EX95

EX98

2.444191895616 0.243078762099 1.849273506889 2.412631072733

0.0976020578 2.537702946453 0.564957866255 0.262794750327

0.8282898656 0.2483387653 2.039399463771 1.832430271048

0.9986305325 0.1067524538 0.8303436721 2.388013917975

Covariance\Correlation Matrix of Imports Residuals

IM98 IM90 IM95 IM98

IM98

IM90

IM95

IM98

1.928204617018 1.946856815740 1.951196013347 1.955252884096

0.9998430267 1.966306710622 1.970773911233 1.974861515899

0.9997652287 0.9999651423 1.975388973341 1.979509380498

0.9997429392 0.9999377992 0.9999843912 1.983700308174

7 Crisis Management in GreekTurkish Relations: A Political Economy Analysis Since 1974

1

OZAY MEHMET

INTRODUCTION

Both Greece and Turkey are crisis-prone countries, not only because they are located in a highly volatile region but also because national policy-making tends to be more emotional than rational. A good part of the explanation for this fact stems from two factors in particular: the psychoanalytical similarities between Greeks and Turks and shared historical traumas; 2 and the differences in their understandings of the status quo in bilateral relations.3 These factors, in turn, generate major contrasts in the Turkish and Greek approaches to political and economic crisis management. Whereas Greece tends to appeal to Europe to solve political and economic crises, in contrast, Turkey has looked beyond the Atlantic to the USA. These differential responses create further problems in Greek-Turkish relations, exposing vulnerabilities that third parties often exploit to the disadvantage of Greeks and Turks themselves, especially in a long-term context. In the shorter term, however, the Greek approach seems to have been the more successful, as will be documented in the following pages. This is reflected on the basis of some macro indicators shown in Table 12: GNP/capita has risen faster in Greece since 1979, and Greeks have enjoyed significantly higher Human Development Index, ranking 25th in the UNDP list, almost three times better than Turkey’s rank. What is the explanation behind these trends in crisis management during economic and political development? At a superficial level, it

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Table 12 Comparative macro indicators for Greece and Turkey, 1980–2000 Indicator

Turkey

Greece

GNP/cap. in US $ 1979 1999

1330 2900

3960 11770

Central Government Deficit as % of GDP: 1990 1998

–3.0 –8.4

–23.2 –8.4

Human Development Index 1992 (Rank) 1998 (Rank)

0.732 (85/150) 0.739 (68/173)

0.875 (25/150) 0.874 (25/173)

Source: Economic data from World Bank, World Development Reports, HDI from UNDP Human Development Reports.

can be argued that the Greek response and relative success stems from the fact that Europeans have historically been pro-Hellenic compared with centuries of enmity against the Ottoman Turks. By contrast, the distant Americans, located beyond the Atlantic, have had no wars with the Turks, and historically have had a relatively sympathetic response to modern Turkish nationalism and state building.4 The US has generally adopted an even-handed policy between Greece and Turkey despite the powerful Greek lobbies always attempting to inject a Greek ethnic bias into American foreign and military policy in the eastern Mediterranean.5 But there must be some more fundamental determinants of this national difference in crisis management. Why are the Greeks more inclined to look to Europe in problem solving, while the Turks look across the Atlantic? And equally significantly in terms of outcomes, are the payoffs equally rewarding? Or are there better win-win options? An explicit understanding of these national differences is important in analysing consequences particularly in terms of promoting peace and cooperation between the Aegean neighbours. That, broadly, is the objective of this chapter. At the outset, it is useful to note some remarkable similarities between Greek and Turkish policy environments. In particular, both countries have a tradition of a highly centralized system of subsidy

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politics, i.e. fiscal policy has been viewed as simply an extension of politics. Thus, as shown in Table 12, both countries have suffered from fiscal deficits, although Greece has managed to reduce its deficit significantly during 1990–98, whereas the Turkish deficit over the same period rose sharply. In both countries, politics are often managed by highly nationalistic elites that periodically exploit chauvinism for war-threats across the Aegean, which has aptly been described by one American diplomat as an ‘accident waiting to happen’.6 This chauvinism has been largely responsible for the marked ignorance amongst Greeks about modern Turkey and, to a lesser extent, vice versa. Thus, it is only in the very recent past that Greek scholars have begun objective study of Turkish foreign and security policies,7 matching earlier Turkish scholarship.8 In strategic resources such as oil and natural gas, both Greece and Turkey are poor. But in economic policy management, there is one major difference: unlike Greece, Turkey has lacked an independent central bank and has suffered from an inadequate supervision of commercial banks. This has resulted in a politically managed monetary policy, and a weak Turkish balance of payments. Thanks to partly an effective central bank, Greek macro-economic indicators during 1980–2000 have been far more impressive than Turkish indicators. The chapter is organized into four main parts, the first of which is the Introduction. The second part focuses on political crisis management in two key areas of Greek-Turkish relations, namely, the disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean. In both cases, extreme nationalism has dictated policy design at home. But externally Greece has sought to ‘Europeanize’ the disputes, whereas Turkey has opposed this approach, preferring direct bilateral dialogue between Athens and Ankara, and, as a last resort, opting for American (sometime via NATO) rather than European mediation whenever Greek-Turkish relations took an explosive turn. The Cyprus dispute may illustrate the national differences in conflict management between these two nations. The Greek loss in Cyprus in the summer of 1974 was undoubtedly a national humiliation for Hellenism, just as the same event was a major triumph of Turkish nationalism. But, creative external policy management in Athens turned this loss ultimately into dividends. Within a couple of decades, Greece was able to transform its humiliation in Cyprus into a political and economic success. In the short term, this national humiliation obliged Greece to replace

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a military dictatorship with a return to democracy. In the years following, the Greek democratic transition has been consolidated, thanks to Athens’ readiness to adopt European norms and practices as the price for closer integration with Europe. In particular, the Greek state went a long way toward modernizing and democratizing itself after winning membership in the EEC/EU in 1980. By contrast in Turkey, the 1974 Cyprus operation, while militarily a success, led to political stagnation and instability at home, culminating in the second coup d’etat of 1980, and a series of crises in Turkish external relations with both Europe and the USA. The third part of the paper is concerned with the economic costs and benefits of crisis management in Greece and Turkey. While Greece has managed to derive tremendous economic benefits from its membership of the EU, Turkey’s struggle with structural adjustment has been a story of successive rounds of crises. Unlike the European insistence on domestic reform as the price for Greek integration in Europe, American aid for Turkey came with no similar preconditions for Turkish reform. Consequently, Turkish stabilization and structural adjustment since 1980 is not a story with a happy ending. Why? The primary responsibility must rest with Ankara’s management of the economy. The fourth part of the paper suggests political corruption as the major determinant of economic mismanagement. In 1980 both Greece and Turkey shared similar forms of highly centralized and corruption-ridden bureaucracy and economic management. Since joining the EU, while Greece moved closer to European norms and standards in its political and economic management, culminating in its success to join the European Monetary Union in 2000, Turkish political corruption became more entrenched and institutionalized, ultimately leading to the banking and currency crisis of February 2001. The concluding part of the paper offers a brief comparative analysis of future prospects in crisis management in the relations of two Aegean neighbours in the age of globalization. It is argued that Greek-Turkish relations in future need to be efficiency driven to maximize joint benefits. Nationalistic premises should be replaced by higher standards and criteria (such as the Copenhagen Criteria) in public policy that hold the key to future peace and cooperation across the Aegean.

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GREEK-TURKISH POLITICAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT SINCE 1974

July 1974 marks a turning point in modern Greek-Turkish relations because this is when the Turkish troops landed in Cyprus to prevent Enosis in the wake of a Greek Junta-inspired coup against the Makarios regime on the island.9 The events, as well as their interpretation and the terminology employed, constitute the critical elements of the diametrically opposed perceptions as seen from Greek and Turkish lenses, and as such, they provide the essential clues to the differential response to crisis management between Turks and Greeks, not just as regards the Cyprus dispute itself but in the larger field of Greek-Turkish relations as well. In nationalistic terms, what happened in the summer of 1974 was a Greek-Turkish war in Cyprus, which the Greeks lost. But one must look beyond extreme nationalistic sentiments, which, after all, should be transient, giving way to peaceful relations as happened, for example, between Atatürk and Venizelos in 1930. Seen in this context, it is really perplexing that subsequent Greek-Turkish relations have been managed, or rather mismanaged, on the basis of irrational or chauvinistic premises. In the summer of 1974, when the Greek Junta engineered an antiMakarios coup in Nicosia, Ankara had no choice but to act to prevent Enosis, as provided under international treaties. The coalition Turkish government then in power, led by a much younger and dynamic Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, termed the Cyprus intervention a ‘Peace Operation’, deliberately planned as a limited military action.10 It was justified as an ‘intervention’ under Article 4 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, which designated Greece, Turkey and UK as the three guarantors of the Cyprus Republic. The purpose of the Turkish military intervention was twofold: to prevent Enosis about to be declared by Nicos Sampson who had violently succeeded Makarios; and to restore constitutional power-sharing between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots which had been systematically destroyed by Makarios during the preceding decade as a result of violent expulsion of the Turkish Cypriots from the partnership Republic created in 1960.11 The Greeks, of course, saw the Cyprus landings as an illegal occupation, not warranted by the Treaty of Guarantee.12 Some even saw an American-inspired conspiracy,13 although some Greek authors,14 and none other than Makarios himself, towards the end of

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his life, confessed openly to a Norwegian reporter: ‘It is in the name of Enosis that Cyprus has been destroyed’.15 Whatever its nature or justification, a war took place in Cyprus and Greek and Turkish soldiers fought and died in the summer of 1974. In this war, the Turks won and the Greeks were humiliated all the more because the ultra right, under the direction of the Junta in Athens, had started the violence in the first instance.16 There were several far-reaching and immediate results in Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and beyond. In Cyprus, the 1960 Republic was dead, and in its place two zones were created, with Turkish Cypriots in the northern one-third of the island. In Greece the Junta lost power and democracy was restored with the return from Parisian exile of the elder statesman Karamanlis. In Athens anti-Americanism exploded into violence, Greece formally left the military structure of NATO, and a decisive decision was taken to move closer to Europe. None of these were unexpected outcomes. What followed in Turkey, however, was most surprising: Ecevit, hailed by the Turkish nation as the ‘Hero of Cyprus’, was unable to cash in on his popularity and win outright power at the polls. The complexity of the constitution, and most significantly, intense personal rivalry with such political personalities as Süleyman Demirel, prevented early elections. Ideological battles on the street between left and right ensued, and Turkey entered a period of political instability, followed by economic bankruptcy, as a result of embargoes and external shocks, ultimately leading to the second military intervention in September 1980.17 In Athens, the 1974 Cyprus tragedy revolutionized Greek domestic and foreign policy. It forced Greece to become a modern state, closely integrated with Europe then evolving from EEC toward EU. Anti-Americanism was, of course, the trigger that pushed Greece into Europe, and despite all odds, Athens (like Spain and Portugal) won full membership of the EU in 1981, ostensibly in order to consolidate nascent democracy. In 1981 Karamanlis became President, and the Pan-Hellenic Socialist leader Andreas Papandreou as Prime Minister took control of Greece, and despite Papandreou’s confusing and, at times quixotic European policies, Athens remained committed to European ideals. Papandreou reformed the Church–State relations, organized Greek lobbies in the USA, forged Greek alliances with the Soviets and its Balkan neighbours, and redefined Greek-Turkish relations by adopting a hard-line policy on the Aegean and Cyprus.

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On the Aegean, while accusing Turkey of expansionism, he initiated measures to increase the Greek territorial sea to 12 miles, an act, which Ankara had previously and repeatedly declared to be a casus belli.18 On Cyprus, Papandreou indulged in creative diplomacy, ignoring the 1960 Constitutional partnership state on the island, and redefining the Cyprus problem as a post-1974 problem of ‘occupation’ by an ‘expansionist’ Turkey. He vowed not to normalize relations with Ankara until the departure of all Turkish soldiers from the island, totally ignoring the provision for political power-sharing between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Papandreou, paradoxical and eccentric to the end, relented, at least briefly. Before his death, he made an about-face and met, in January 1988, the Turkish Prime Minister Özal at Davos, Switzerland, and opened a short-lived and unfruitful episode of Greek-Turkish relations, ostensibly to demonstrate his capacity as a world-class leader. Subsequent Greek prime ministers, such as the Conservative leader Constantine Mitsotakis and the Socialist Costas Simitis, have followed a strongly European policy reshaping fiscal and monetary policies in line with European norms. In effect, Greece submitted itself to a restructuring and stabilization process, made in Europe in contrast to Washington, in fact not only modernizing its economy but its entire political and bureaucratic institutions as well. Turkey, for its part, did not democratize in return for aid from Washington because the US merely wanted Turkey to be a loyal ally. What has been the Greek response and recovery after the 1974 Cyprus war? National loss was converted into economic gain. Major financial gains in the form of subsidies and credits from the EU budget helped to modernize and democratize the Greek state. Greek farmers benefited from huge subsidy programmes available to Greece under the Common Agricultural Policy, whereas regional development funds and infrastructural projects financed under several EU programmes refurbished Greek transportation, communication and tourism industries. In the 1990s Greece successfully followed an economic diplomacy towards the Balkan neighbours, achieving rapid expansion of its foreign trade in new markets, even in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macadonia, the country whose international recognition was held up for several months by Greek opposition.19 Economic benefits from the EU and other donors flowed to Greek

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Cyprus as well, helping rehabilitate Greek Cypriots moving from the North. At the same time, Athens deftly piloted a strategy of ‘Europeanizing’ the Cyprus dispute,20 realizing, quite realistically, that the UN negotiations under the Secretary-General’s good offices were unproductive.21 Therefore, taking advantage of the Greek presidency of the EU, starting with the Corfu Summit of EU leaders in 1994, hosted by Papandreou, Athens was able to ‘sell’ its version of the Cyprus dispute to its fellow EU members. Henceforth, Greek ‘blackmail’22 ensured that, regardless of constitutionality or legality of the matter, it became EU policy to include Cyprus [i.e. Greek Cypriot side representing the whole of the island] in the next round of enlargement.23 Full membership for Greek Cypriots thus became de-linked, as far as the EU was concerned, from prior settlement on the island with Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, the prospect of such one-sided membership, well ahead of Turkey’s own membership, presented the Greek Cypriot side with a potentially powerful veto against Ankara. Many observers, however, doubt that if Greek Cypriots acquired a veto in addition to Athens’ own in the EU, Turkey will ever become a full member of the Union. Moreover, if the EU admits Greek Cyprus but excludes Turkey, this will seriously increase tensions and instability in the region.24 Concerned with this prospect of instability in the region, Athens seems to have made a major shift in its Turkish policy in the days leading to, and following the Helsinki EU Summit in December 1999 when Turkey’s formal ‘candidate’ status was approved. It appears that Athens now has decided that it might derive positive gains from ‘pushing Turkey deeper into the European integration process’.25 There are several reasons for this strategic shift. First and foremost, within the relatively short space of one or two decades, Greece has been able to transform its humiliation in Cyprus into a major political and economic success, thanks to its closer integration with Europe and its ability to modernize and democratize itself. Secondly, the end of the Cold War also helped Greeks, along with other East European peoples, to show greater appreciation of the ‘economic as well of the political market’.26 While these two reasons tend to account for a greater Greek sense of confidence within EU and regionally, the most telling explanation for the recent shift, detailed at length by Tsakonas, lie in the terms that Athens has successfully wrested from its EU partners to protect Greek national interests in Cyprus and on other

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issues. What this implies clearly is that Greek EU membership has paid off handsome dividends for Athens. By contrast, in Turkey, the 1974 Cyprus operation failed to energize domestic politics. Neither did it foster economic development in North Cyprus where in particular Turkish private businessmen distinguished themselves with their reluctance to invest in a comparable manner with Greek investors in the South. Turkish political instability and a series of foreign exchange crises culminated in the second coup of 1980, and a series of crises in Turkish external relations with both Europe and the USA. The economic costs of these crises have been high. We now examine these costs.

ECONOMIC CRISIS MANAGEMENT SINCE 1980

Immediately after the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, the American Congress, acting in large measure in response to pressure from the powerful Greek American lobby, AHEPA, imposed a long and devastating arms embargo on Turkey. Ankara responded by shutting down American bases in Turkey. It took years of diplomacy to mend Turkish, Greek and American relations. In the end, some degree of normalcy was restored when in 1978 the US Congress voted to lift the military embargo on Turkey and Greece returned to the NATO fold with Ankara’s acquiesce in Greek readmission.27 Turkey’s relations with Europe also worsened, especially after the military coup in 1980 when Turkey’s membership in the Council of Europe was suspended. Greece, now an EU member, utilized its influence to the maximum in sustaining a hostile posture, accusing Turkey of ‘occupying the territory of the small Cyprus Republic’, of following an expansionist policy in the Aegean, and of violating the human rights of its Kurdish citizens. Ankara’s reaction to these Greek diplomatic misinformation campaigns was inept and inadequate. Subsequently, Turkish foreign policy lost ground in the diplomatic war in Europe. While Greece achieved membership of the EEC, Turkey’s 1963 Association Agreement, foreseeing phased membership following a customs union and providing, inter alia for free mobility for Turkish workers in Europe, was put on ice. Ankara failed to assess the deterioration in its relations with Europe. In this negative environment and to almost everyone’s astonishment, President

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Turgut Özal decided in 1987 to apply for EU membership, arguing that Turkey had strong European credentials historically and culturally.28 The surprising element of this application was that it came without any prior diplomatic effort to prepare the ground. It resulted in an embarrassing initial rejection of Turkey’s application followed by long waits and often bitter and acrimonious relations between Ankara and Brussels. In 1990 Özal decided, again in a highly personal manner, to join the US-led Gulf War against Saddam Hussein, overnight terminating a highly lucrative $7 billion Turkish export market in Iraq (a huge cost for which no compensation has been received from the US, and only a minimal amount from the UN). A minor political payoff, however, was realized when, thanks to American diplomacy in Europe on behalf of Ankara, Turkey was finally able to win a Custom Union (CU) agreement with the EU in 1995, by which time Greece had successfully placed Greek Cyprus on the path to eventual membership. As a concession for the CU, the chief Turkish negotiators were obliged to consent to the start of membership negotiations between Brussels and Greek Nicosia. The CU, however, quickly resulted in a huge bilateral trade deficit with the EU: in 1994, Turkish net imports from the EU amounted to about $4 billion; within five years they jumped threefold to over $12 billion. The clear implication here is that Turkey did not gain economically from the CU, which resulted in a worsening trade deficit that contributed to the foreign exchange crisis of February 2001 (see below). The full economic costs of the American embargo and failures within the European Union for Turkey have been great, but impossible to quantify. For one thing, the Turkish economy has been in a state of restructuring and stabilization ever since 1980 so that in this crisis mode it would be difficult to clearly establish cause and effect. For another, and objectively evaluated, external costs have paled in comparison with the cost of missed opportunities in terms of GNP growth and waste and inefficiency in domestic resource allocation. To give just one example, the Turkish share of labour in agriculture is still 45 per cent of the total labour force, thanks in large measure to costly state subsidies that perpetuate extremely low productivity in rural areas. Greece has managed to derive significant economic benefits from the EU, receiving some US$4–5 billion transfers annually, enough to more than cover the entire Greek current account deficit over 1994–96 (Table 13). What is especially significant about these EU

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Table 13 EU transfers to Greece, 1994–96

EU Transfers Current account deficit

1994

1995

1996

4.3 0.1

5.0 2.8

5.1 4.5

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report on Greece, 2nd quarter 1997.

transfers to Greece is that they are essentially grants, unlike Turkish loans from New York-based international financial institutions. While Greece has managed to derive tremendous economic benefits and grants from the EU, Turkey’s struggle to finance structural adjustment with loans and high-interest bearing external borrowing has been a story of successive rounds of crises and missed opportunities. Until 1980, the Turkish economy was a ‘closed’ economy in which the ratio of foreign trade to GNP was a mere 4 per cent. This closed economy was also highly statist built according to Kemalist principles since the 1930s,29 in which state economic enterprises (SEEs) operated as state monopolies, dominating every sector. The development of a competitive private enterprise sector started relatively late, and even then it required huge state subsidies in a highly political environment of a ‘rent-seeking’ society.30 Since 1980 the Turkish economy has been liberalizing, relying heavily on advice and credit from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). The major elements of this restructuring are the standard neo-liberal IMF-WB prescriptions, known as the ‘Washington Consensus’,31 requiring de-regulation, privatization, the elimination of state subsidies, tax reform and financial liberalization with a floating exchange rate. During 1980–2001, various Turkish governments have signed a total of 18 structural adjustment and stabilization agreements with IMF-WB. The overall aim of these agreements was economic restructuring, eliminating chronic inflation running at about 100 per cent annually, restoring fiscal discipline, stabilizing the balance of payments by encouraging exports and foreign investment in Turkey, and making the Turkish economy generally more efficient and competitive. The last austerity and stabilization programme with the IMF prior to the February 2001 crisis was aimed at reducing inflation to single digit level within two years, and it targeted a maximum

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monthly devaluation of the Turkish lira (TL) within a band of 2.5 per cent against a basket of hard currencies, principally the US dollar and the German mark. In return for financial and technical support from the Fund, the Turkish government undertook to push through over a three-year term a wide-ranging series of reforms in the banking sector, such as granting independence to the Central Bank, along with enabling legislation to facilitate the privatization of SEEs. The three-party coalition, made up of Social Democrats, Nationalists and Conservatives, failed to deliver on these promised reforms in the stipulated time-frame. At the same time, the IMF prescription of targeted 2.5 per cent monthly devaluation, without first curing the underlying excess demand for foreign exchange, resulted in a steadily over-valued TL. Imports shot up, while exports lagged. As a result, Turkey experienced a sudden foreign exchange crisis in November 2000, occasioned by a worsening trade deficit. This mini-crisis ought to have served as a wake-up call both for the Turkish government and the IMF. It was glossed over thanks to an emergency relief aid from the Fund and inertia on the part of the Turkish government. None of the underlying reforms were enacted or implemented. Monetary and fiscal policies remained hostage to coalition politics in Ankara. The uppermost concern of the coalition in power was self-preservation, oblivious to widespread corruption within party echelons especially in the award of big government contracts. Each of the three parties in the coalition government controlled a state bank (Ziraat Bank, Emlak Bank and Halk Bank – the State Agricultural Bank, the Housing Bank and the People’s Bank, respectively). The party bosses seemed happy to accumulate huge operational debts in these state banks in their effort to buy votes. One significant achievement in this period was the steady decline in the inflation rate to a respectable 30–35 per cent level by the end of 2000. However, this gain was at the cost of increasing public debt as the government relied on domestic borrowing to pay civil servants and meet its other fiscal obligations, while using IMF credits supplemented by shortterm commercial loans from European money markets to service its growing external debt. Domestic borrowing represented a classic example of overcrowding, stifling private investment as rates of interest exceeded 100 per cent. Interest payments on government debt represented well over 90 per cent of all public expenditure. In the end, this unsustainable system collapsed suddenly in

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February 2001 when a row between the Prime Minister and President over corruption during a routine National Security Council meeting exploded into the open, creating havoc on the financial markets. Within hours, a huge capital flight followed and some US$7 billion (i.e. a third of official reserves) was transferred out of Turkey, and overnight inter-bank lending rates briefly hit astronomical levels of 7,000 per cent. The austerity programme and the managed peg agreed with the IMF were destroyed. The TL was let to float freely in order to preserve whatever reserves remained in possession of the Turkish Central Bank. In the days following this devastating crisis, the Turkish currency was immediately devalued by 40 per cent, and in subsequent months further devaluations eroded more than half the pre-crisis purchasing power of the Turkish Lira. The coalition government hung on to power, simply because the alternative of early elections offered little prospect of a breakthrough since all political parties were now discredited. The Turkish government invited Kemal Dervis¸, a Vice-President at the Word Bank, to come and join the government as a Minister in charge of the economy. With Dervis¸ installed as Economy Minister, and backed by the Bank and the Fund as well as by the US, came some US$15.7 billion emergency line of credit from the IMF and WB to help Turkey ride through the crisis. At the end of summer 2001, it appeared that Dervis¸ had managed to enact most of the essential reforms, notwithstanding strong opposition from nationalist politicians, and to contain the worst aspects of the crisis. With a boom in tourism and some improvement in the trade balance, the Turkish economy, at the end of summer 2001, showed some early signs of recovery, which was consolidated throughout 2002, although with inflation running at over 60 per cent, real wages declining, and excess capacity in real sectors, unemployment and poverty levels have risen sharply and a positive growth of GNP is still some way off.

THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION

Up till 1980 both Greece and Turkey shared highly centralizedlevel politics and bureaucracy managed by nationalistic elites. Political corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency were endemic. Since joining the EU, Greece moved closer to European norms and

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standards in economic management. Successive Greek governments, led by leaders from Karamanlis to Simitis have steadfastly followed pro-European policies,32 modernizing the country’s political institutions and economic policy in line with EU norms and criteria. Large transfers of subsidies have helped this process, but to their credit, the Greek authorities utilized these financial inflows with relative efficiency, although at times Greek corruption made headlines. In the 1990s the Greek inflation rate and the budget deficit have been resolutely reduced to meet EU standards. Most notably, the Greek Central Bank followed an independent and strict monetary policy, successfully enabling Greece to join the European Monetary Union in 2000. By contrast, Turkish fiscal and monetary policy management became tools of political corruption. The level of corruption in Turkey since 1980 did not decline; it worsened, ultimately leading to the banking and currency crisis of February 2001. The issue of political corruption in Turkish politics is not a new problem. Anne Krueger’s classic paper on ‘Rent-Seeking Society’ was, after all, based on personal experience gained in Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s.33 The Turkish system of political corruption is one of the most institutionalized in the world. In the heyday of the SEEs in 1960s and 1970s, collusion between politicians and businessmen was standard practice whereby the politicians would get support and campaign funding in exchange for lucrative government contracts preferentially allocated.34 Several political party bosses rose to prominence and eventual leadership thanks to their business partnerships.35 In the coalition government prior to the crisis of February 2001, the image formed by the public at large was that, while the Prime Minister himself had a reputation as a clean leader, almost every Ministry operated as a ‘fiefdom’, with loyal appointees strategically placed, answerable only to the relevant Minister. The ‘fiefdom’ worked as a classic example of what Mancur Olson has termed ‘distributional coalitions’36 whose principal rationale is to shift income distribution to the privileged members of the ‘fiefdom’. The root cause of the February 2001 crisis is political corruption, disclosing a systemic case of the domestic version of a moral hazard problem whereby public benefit is subordinated to the private gain

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of the decision-makers, due, among other things, to lack of information about the decision-making process and the actors involved in it. This, in return, reflects failure to modernize and democratize the Turkish state and get rid of its corporatist, patron-client and mono-centric structures.37 Could the February 2001 crisis have been avoided? In a strictly technical sense it could have been avoided; however, it was inevitable, given the institutionalized corruption that existed in Ankara. To elaborate, if Turkish macroeconomic management had been in the hands of professional, technically competent experts, not subject to political pressure and manipulation, it would have been possible to put into effect an early warning system. The signals, such as a rapidly worsening current account deficit and an overvalued TL, were self-evident for both the IMF and the Turkish technical experts to see, and, no doubt, technical analysts did see the warning signals. But neither the IMF, nor the Turkish authorities took preventive action, primarily because those in charge of Turkish fiscal and monetary policies were not independent. Not only did the political leaders fail to enact and implement the reforms as part of the austerity programme but, they put political expediency ahead of fiscal and monetary prudence and ignored the economic danger signals. In short, the Turkish monetary crisis of 2001, as those in previous years (e.g. 1994, 1978/9) was fundamentally political in nature, resulting directly from the deficiencies of the old Ottoman tradition of a centralized state founded on patrimonialism and collectivism. In this centralized political system there are no checks and balances, and no clear boundary between politics and economics. Business elites are closely tied to political elites within an institutionalized system of ‘distributional coalitions’.38 These coalitions work on the basis of rent-seeking behaviour, far removed from market efficiency, through a political party system that shelters corruption while promoting loyalty to the leader at all costs. There is little democracy within parties, which concentrate decision-making power in the hands of the leader. Loyalty to the leader is prized above efficiency or merit. The Turkish state has yet to evolve into a fully functioning civil society, shedding its Ottoman roots. In the Ottoman state tradition, the interest of the Sultan was supreme, and all other interests (such as the economic welfare of subjects) were subordinated to the

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Sultan’s. In the Republican era the Ottoman state tradition has been recast in nationalistic terms as the omnipotent Devlet (the state), and popularly labelled Devlet Baba (the Father State), similar to a head of family. While the state authority physically resides in Ankara, the rest of Turkey essentially being a periphery, the exercise of state authority is centrist, patrimonial and authoritarian. The military occupy a special, vanguard role in Devlet,39 generally playing a moderating role both in restraining religious extremism and excessive political corruption. That is why the military, as an organization, always commands a high rating in public esteem. Past modernization efforts in Turkey have not established a clear boundary between economic management and politics. The former require technical expertise, while strong leaders running weak political parties dominate politics in Turkey. Turkish political parties reward loyalty to the leader, not creativity or ideas. In this political environment, it is difficult to safeguard the rule of law. The 1982 Constitution, drafted after the military coup d’état of 1980, has transplanted onto an Ottoman state tradition elements of both the American principle of the separation of powers, dividing authority between the executive, judicial and legislative branches; at the same time it also has significant elements of the highly centralized French system with a powerful President and Prime Minister. Though unelected by the citizens, the Turkish President has extensive powers, including ratifying key appointments and vetoing legislation. The present incumbent, who was the president of the Constitutional Court, has, since his appointment by Parliament about two years ago, vowed to uphold the rule of law. In the process, he has collided on numerous occasions first with the three-way coalition government until 3 November elections and, since then, with the Justice and Development Party leadership. In February 2001, after being called by the President on the sensitive issue of corruption, the PM Ecevit went public telling his row with the President. The currency crisis, waiting to happen, burst into the open, plunging the country into economic chaos. The row between the President and the Prime Minister was, of course, the tip of the iceberg. The coalition government has been marked by economic mismanagement, as demonstrated by its failure to stick to the original austerity programme agreed with the IMF and

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undertake the promised reforms in fiscal and monetary policy in a timely manner. On the political front, it has been slow in improving human rights, in dealing with vision on Kurdish rights and in doing its part to enhance relations with the EU so as to speed the preaccession phase. This inaction at home had a further cost in that it strengthened the hands of anti-Turkish and Greek nationalist lobbies, supported by such groups as the Armenian and Kurdish groups operating abroad, to create a poor external image of Turkey. Domestically, the coalition government’s popularity has been damaged by persistent and widespread news of high-level graft and corruption; indeed, a number of ministers were forced to resign on various corruption charges. In one notorious case that occurred in the autumn of 1996,40 political corruption at high levels seems linked to underground criminal elements. This case is yet to be resolved in the Turkish courts and in the meantime there are perceptions of an official cover-up. In this system of political corruption, the loser is clearly the Turkish citizen because the state system fails to distribute public goods efficiently and equitably. Instead, the system works for the greatest benefit of the few enjoying power and privilege at the centre. Nothing demonstrated these truths in modern times more clearly than the. terrible earthquake of 17 August 1999 in the industrial heartland of Izmit, killing more than 18,000. Stephen Kinzer, the perceptive correspondent of the New York Times in Istanbul and author of a recent best-seller on Turkey, has done a superb job of exposing the inherent failure of the Turkish state in responding to this human tragedy.41 In the Turkish system what made things worse is the indirect election system under which MPs are appointed, not elected. The citizens cast their votes for parties, not individual candidate MPs, and party bosses in turn appoint MPs on the basis of the party’s share of the popular vote. Under this system, accountability toward the citizens is minimal, whereas unquestioned loyalty of the rank and file to the party leader is paramount. The system empowers the leader, and in Turkish politics, party leaders tend to hold office for life! The system contributes to the excessive centralization in Ankara, where rewards are maximized when politics and economics are integral, inseparable elements of one and the same game.

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CONCLUSION AND LESSONS FROM THE GREEK-TURKISH CRISIS MANAGEMENT

As national economies are integrated within the global economy, external shocks and destabilization risks increase, making these economies more vulnerable to financial crisis. By joining regional groups or blocs such as the EU, the costs of crises can be minimized, while membership in a regional bloc also generates political and strategic benefits. Greece has successfully modernized and democratized itself since the Cyprus humiliation in 1974. This sharply contrasts with Turkey’s efforts at reform and restructuring aided and guided by advice from across the Atlantic. However, the chief explanation for comparative Turkish failure here is political corruption. The Turkish experience with political corruption provides a number of major lessons for the management of crises in the global economy. Foremost is the moral hazard problem (of subordinating public interest to personal gain) that suggests that foreign exchange crises tend to originate first in the economy. In the Turkish example, the economic crisis started in the balance of payments, as the foreign exchange shortage grew out of control. An economic crisis, however, quickly becomes a political inertia problem as politicians ignore early warning signals, hoping that these unfavourable signals would disappear. Instead, political indifference deepens the economic crisis, and it becomes cumulatively more critical the less clear is the dividing boundary between politics and macro-economic policy management. At the root of political inertia lie political corruption as the chief explanation for the budget deficits and foreign exchange shortages. Therefore, a clear boundary between politics and economic policy management should be the basis of democratizing and modernizing the political process. Just as the Turkish elites in Ankara insist on a clear separation between politics and religion, so too, there must be a parallel and equally transparent demarcation line between economic policy and party politics. Accordingly, in countries such as Turkey undergoing structural adjustment and stabilization designed by the IMF and WB, there must be a solution to the moral hazard problem. A clear boundary between politics and economics is an essential ingredient of the technical prescription (i.e. fiscal and monetary reform programme). For, in the end, the success of the programme will depend on the

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political will to modernize and democratize the institutions implementing public policies. How can modernization and democratization of institutions and policies be achieved in a developing society? There must be will at home, first demonstrated by the political leadership itself, but external support is critical as well. These conditions enabled Greece to modernize and democratize after 1974, although the Greek state of 1974 was in a more serious crisis compared to Turkey. However, policy-makers in Athens managed to cope with the crisis better. They chose to look to Europe for external support to modernize and democratize the country. In the process, the Greek State significantly overcame the Greek version of the moral hazard problem. As a result, its resource allocation capability became increasingly more efficient, enabling the creation of a modern and democratic state. When Turkey, however, entered its crisis from the late 1970s, it looked to Washington, not just to the USA government, but equally importantly to the IMF-WB for support. While some of the blame for past economic policy failures can be attributed to external actors, the primary responsibility for the lack of greater achievement in Turkish modernization and democratization must be attributed to the failure of the ruling elites in Ankara to overcome the moral hazard problem. Indeed, this problem got progressively worse. In the politics of crisis management of Greek-Turkish relations, several comments are worth making. First, and foremost, it is remarkable how much passion, and how little reasoned reflection, prevail in the bilateral relations between these two Aegean neighbours. Clearly, history and cultural differences are major explanatory variables here, but at the same time, there are significant social-psychological similarities, in particular a ‘hot’ temper and high ethno-nationalistic perceptions. Greeks tend, on the whole, to demonize Turks, and this fact not only distorts their vision of reality about Turks and Turkey, it also undermines Athens’ ability to conduct an independent Turkish policy; thus Greeks naturally tend to prefer to see Turkey and Turks through European lenses, not directly and openly across a small sea to the east. For their part, Turks bear historical hurt and anger toward the Greeks as the first ethnic group to revolt against the Ottoman state and, even more deeply, for pursuing the Megali Idea, of which Enosis in Cyprus is seen as one manifestation. In the age of post-modernism, these outmoded perceptions and

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fears belong to history. Hopefully, in the aftermath of the 1999 earthquake diplomacy, and the Helsinki decision, and now in the wake of the terrorist attack on the USA unleashed on 11 September 2001, common interests42 between Greece and Turkey will prevail ever more strongly in the political, economic, security as well as in social-psychological dimensions. Much will depend on how Europe handles Greek-Turkish relations in the next two years. To date, sadly, the EU can only show a poor track record.

NOTES 1. Comments on an earlier draft by Mustafa Aydın, Tozun Bahcheli and Marc Baudouin are gratefully acknowledged with the usual disclaimer that the author alone is responsible for statements and opinions in the paper. 2. Vamık Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, The Turks and Greeks: Neighbours in Conflict (Huntingdon: Eothen Press, 1994). 3. See Aslan Gündüz, ‘Greek-Turkish Disputes: How to Resolve Them?’, in Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds), Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization (Herndon, Virginia: Brassey’s, 2001). 4. Ferenc A. Váli, Bridge Across the Bosporus, the Foreign Policy of Turkey (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1971); and Roger R. Trask, The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914–1939 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1971). 5. See for example, Van Coufoudakis, ‘US Perspectives of Security and Regional Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean’, paper presented at the HellenicCanadian Federation of Ontario Meeting, 5–7 February 1999, Toronto. 6. For an extended discussion of the Aegean dispute, see Tozun Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955 (Boulder: Westview, 1990), esp. Chapter 5. 7. A good example is Keridis/Triantaphyllou, Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization. Even here some distorted perceptions linger. For example, Dimitrios Trinataphyllou, ‘Further Turmoil Ahead?’, p. 59, argues; ‘Turkey used force repeatedly in Cyprus in 1964 and 1974 and is now threatening to use force against Greece.’ Another sweeping statement is to be found in Andreas Theophanous’ article, titled ‘The Cyprus Problem and Its Implications for Stability and Security in the Eastern Mediterranean’, p. 194: ‘Turkey has a huge democratic deficit and a negative record in its foreign policy with Greece and Cyprus.’ These two examples can easily be multiplied. However, on the other hand, and citing from the same book, there are more balanced opinions as well. For example, Dimitris Keridis, ‘Domestic Developments and Foreign policy: Greek Policy toward Turkey’, p. 13, explains the recent softening of Athens rigid stance vis-à-vis Turkey in the following terms: ‘(P)olicy makers in Athens have realized that time is not on their side … The policy of (Greek) obstructionism and disengagement was no longer safe.’ Likewise, Kalypso Nicolaidis, ‘Europe’s Tainted Mirror: Reflections on Turkey’s Candidacy Status after Helsinki’, p. 277, realistically acknowledges in her assessment of the possible exclusion of Turkey from EU, that: ‘If that were the case, the bigger loser would be the EU.’ 8. E.g. works by Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955; Volkan/Itzkowitz, Turks and Greeks. 9. The Cyprus Problem began, not in 1974, but in 1963, when, on Christmas Eve, the Greek Cypriot forces launched an offensive against the Turkish Cypriots and, by force, destroyed the partnership Republic. See the works cited such as Glafkos

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10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

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Clerides, Cyprus, My Deposition, Four Volumes (Nicosia: Alithea Press, 1989); J. Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986); Clement Dodd (ed.), Cyprus, the Need for New Perspectives (London: Eothen Press, 1999); Relations Since 1955. Volkan/Itzkowitz, Turks and Greeks; Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish . Mehmet A. Birand, 30 Sıcak Gün (30 Hot Days), (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1975). Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, esp. Chapter 4. Clerides, Cyprus, My Deposition, esp. Vol. 4. Brendan O’Malley and Ian Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion (London: Tauris, 1999). Zenon Stavrinides, The Cyprus Conflict, National Identity and Statehood (Nicosia: n.p., 1975). See also Zenon Stavrinides, ‘Greek Cypriot Perceptions’, in Dodd, Cyprus, the Need for New Perspectives. Quoted in Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus, p. 80 Costas M. Constantinou and Yiannis Papadakis, ‘The Cypriot State(s) in situ: Crossethnic Contact and the Discourse of Recognition’, Global Society, Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations, 15, 2 (April 2001), p. 13. Ozay Mehmet, ‘Turkey in Crisis: Some Contradictions in the Kemalist Development Strategy’, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 15, 1 (1983), pp. 47–66. Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, pp. 141–3. Charalambos Tsardanidis and Evangelos Karafotakis, ‘Greece’s Economic Diplomacy toward the Balkan Countries’, Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs, 5, 3 (November 2000), p. 82. Of course, Greek Cypriots cleverly promoted their cause in other international arena without any Turkish presence (e.g. the Commonwealth). Süha Bölükbas¸ı, ‘The Cyprus Dispute and the United Nations: Peaceful NonSettlement Between 1954–1996’, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 30 (1998), pp. 411–34. This is the language used in a recent article by The Economist, ‘The Case for Federation’, 29 November 2001: ‘… the EU should refuse to be blackmailed by the Greeks into letting in Greek Cyprus willy-nilly.’ Christopher Brewin, ‘Turkey, Greece and the European Union’, in Dodd, Cyprus, The Need for New Perspectives. Atila Eralp, ‘Turkey and the European Union’, in Mustafa Aydın (ed.), Turkey at the Threshold of the 21st Century, Global Encounters and/vs Regional Alternatives (Ankara: International Relations Foundation, 1998), p. 146. Panayotis J. Tsakonas, ‘Turkey’s Post-Helsinki Turbulence: Implications for Greece and the Cyprus Issue’, Turkish Studies, 2, 2 (Autumn 2001), p. 1. Theodores Psalidopoulos, ‘Alternatives for Turkey’s International Position; A Greek View’, in Aydın, Turkey at the Threshold of the 21st Century, p. 176. This, by the way, contrasts sharply with the subsequent Greek veto over EU-Turkey relations prior to Helsinki Summit in 1999 when Turkey was declared a candidate country. Turgut Özal, Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey (Lefkos¸a: K. Rustem & Bros, 1991). William Hale, The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey (London: Croom Helm, 1981). For a critical assessment, see Mehmet, ‘Turkey in Crisis’. See Williamson in L. Emerij (ed.), Economic and Social Development in the XXIst Century (Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 1997). Andreas Papandreou might be regarded as an exception in terms of his EU relations, but nevertheless he was a strong modernizer. Anne Krueger, ‘The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking Society’, American Economic Review (June 1974). Bertil Walstedt, State Manufacturing Enterprise in a Mixed Economy, the Turkish Case (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980). Ziya Önis¸ and Umut Türem, ‘Business, Globalization and Democracy: A

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36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

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Comparative Analysis of Turkish Business Associations’, Turkish Studies, 2, 2 (Autumn 2001). Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s (Berlin: de Gruter, 1988). Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations. Heper/Evin, State, Democracy and the Military; Stephen Kinzer, Crescent & Star, Turkey Between Two Worlds (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), pp. 26–8. This is the infamous Susurluk case. See Kinzer, ibid., pp. 96–9. Ibid., Chapter 8. These common interests can be modelled on the Atatürk-Venizelos rapprochement of 1930s, when years of war and conflict were suddenly replaced, thanks to visionary leadership, by shared peace and cooperation. Now, similar cooperation and friendly relations within an EU framework may be fostered in such fields as tourism, trade and investment across the Aegean.

8 Environmental Security in the Aegean Sea . NESRIN ALGAN

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS

The pressures on the environmental resources and the problems due to the irreversible destruction of the natural resource base have escalated to globally threatening levels for the future of humanity. Transboundary environmental problems such as climatic change, desertification, decline in biodiversity, acid rains, environmental migrations, illegal trade of hazardous wastes affect all humanity alike. The scarcity of natural resources due to disruption of ecological balances creates risks for fundamental life-support systems. Environmental problems like the ecosystems are transboundary and supranational in quality, hence they require complex solution methods due to the interconnected structure of environmental pressures and often lead to local, national and international consequences. Owing to the general characteristics of environmental problems, counteraction necessitates cooperation not only among various social actors at national level but also among various states. Protection of the global commons is also a prominent reason for international environmental cooperation. It is unlikely for traditional national sovereignty concepts to allow the protection and management of shared ecosystems and the global commons such as the space, the oceans and the migratory species. This magnitude of the environment issues requires the development of multi-directional cooperation mechanisms among the countries at various levels. Countries prefer to build environmental cooperation on a legal basis that

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include the conclusion of various multilateral or bilateral, regional or global international agreements, as well as activities by many international organizations such as the United Nations, OECD and the European Union to create special units for the environment and develop common policies, actions and guidelines for their membership. The potential of all these to produce national and international instability, disputes and even armed conflicts has compelled governments to develop common policies and introduce legal regulations in order to prevent and eliminate such problems. The United Nations Stockholm Conference on Human Environment 1972, the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development Report (Our Common Future) published in 1987, and the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development organized in Rio in 1992 may be regarded as the primary milestones for the development of international environment policies. The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg between 26 August–4 September 2002 was expected to evaluate the decade since the Rio Conference of 1992 and adopt new resolutions for future common action pertaining to a number of issues including poverty eradication, changing unsustainable patterns of consumption and production, protecting and managing the natural resource base of economic and social development, sustainable development in a globalizing world, and health and sustainable development. The attitude of developed countries in the meetings held during the preparatory process for this Summit was criticized by the NGOs as deviating from the principles and policies agreed in Rio. Unfortunately, the outcome illustrated that the criticisms were justified since this first environmental summit of the century was probably a disappointment rather than a significant step forward in rendering the poverty eradication as the fundamental principle of international environmental policies. Though the funding resources and mechanisms for the adopted Plan of Implementation for the World Summit on Sustainable Development still remains ambiguous, the number of global treaties concluded between 1970 and 2000 for international cooperation in respect of the environment has exceeded fifty. Moreover, there are also certain principles and guidelines created by jurisprudence and common law practices. A significant portion of these arrangements involves norms in respect of the

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protection of the seas, biodiversity and natural resources. In this context, it can be argued that the quantity and quality of international legal arrangements for the purpose of protecting environmental security in the Aegean Sea are sufficient.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY CONCEPT

As environmental problems became globally effective from 1970s onwards, various debates have taken place towards redefining the concept of national security to include environmental issues. The globally felt impact of the oil crisis in the 1970s led to the understanding that resources are limited/exhaustible and that scarcity of resources might reach threatening dimensions not only in economic security but also energy security. In the literature it is argued that Richard Falk’s 1971 work This Endangered Planet is a landmark pointing to the bond between the environment and security.1 Lester R. Brown’s ‘Redefining National Security’,2 published in 1977, is another study that suggests that the traditional security concept needs to be expanded in order to fight against the security problems caused by the degradation of planet’s fundamental life-support systems. Later, in ‘Redefining Security’, published in 1983, Richard H. Ullman defined the environmental security concept as follows: A threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that: 1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for inhabitants or a state, or 2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.3 Norman Myers, another advocate of this view, states in the same vein that: … national security is no longer about fighting forces and weaponry alone. It relates increasingly to watersheds, croplands, forests, genetic resources, climate, and other factors rarely

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considered by military experts and political leaders, but that taken together deserve to be viewed as equally crucial to a nation’s security as military prowess. The situation is epitomized by the leader who proclaims he will not permit one square meter of national territory to be ceded to a foreign invader, while allowing hundreds of square miles of topsoil to be eroded away each year.4 The first noteworthy international organization document that addresses the relations between the environment and security is the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development Report called Our Common Future.5 It introduced the concept of sustainable development to the agenda of the governments and the international community, and provided for a global transformation of environment policies. This new approach that emphasizes the relation between poverty and the environment and underscores the understanding of justice between generations and regions was influential in directing international environment policies. Another significant feature of the report was its addressing the interaction between the environment, peace and security. Our Common Future also called for … recognition that security was partly a function of environmental sustainability. The Commission highlighted the causal role environmental stress can play in contributing to conflict while also stating that a comprehensive approach to international and national security must transcend the traditional emphasis on military power and armed competition.6 According to Barnett, ‘Because it identifies with the earlier Brant and Palma reports, it is not surprising that Our Common Future made much of the links between environmental degradation and security.’ 7 In the report Common Security: A Program for Disarmament, published by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues in 1982, the ‘comprehensive security’ concept was used for the first time, and the changing quality of global security was noted. Introduced to the global agenda with this report, the concept of ‘comprehensive security’ involves many threats such as poverty, global environmental problems and nuclear war. A notable increase in security literature is observed towards the

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end of the 1980s. The period also marked the end of the Cold War, which is also characterized by the increasing interest of international organization in environmental issues that used to be limited to the scholarly community. By the early 1990s concepts such as food security, environmental security, ecological security and human security were gradually developed in international relations, while there was also an increasing trend in the number of activities in the field in organizations such as the United Nations and its affiliates, OSCE and NATO. The United Nations Development Program (1993) Human Development Report reads ‘The concept of security must change from an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater stress on people’s security, from security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial security to food, employment, and environmental security.’ 8 In 1995, the United Nations Global Governance Commission report Our Global Neighborhood 9 added the ‘planet security’ concept to this new security approach. According to the report, global security must expand the traditional focus of state security concept to cover human and planet security. The redefinition of NATO’s security concept to include the element of environment after the end of the Cold War may be interpreted as the most notable indicator to the international adoption of the environmental security concept. ‘The Alliance (NATO) is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognizes the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defense dimension.’ 10 In the same period, environmental security began to be considered as one of the critical components of some countries’ national security strategies. It is a common knowledge that some states such as the USA, the Russian Federation and Canada have followed a similar approach by including these phenomena as an integral compound of the security concept in the redefinition of their national security policies and strategies. Turkey has adopted, as well, this new notion of security in the OSCE Military Doctrines Seminar (Vienna, 1998), during which the Chief of General Staff had referred to environmental threats as one of the recent risks and threats jeopardizing the world security.11

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According to a report released in 1999 by the OECD Environment Policy Committee Working Party on Economic and Environmental Policy Integration, the term environmental security … used most often to address national security issues and threats of military action that are caused entirely or partly by environmental problems. For example, Gorrissen (1993) identified several avenues through which national security interests could be adversely affected by environmental issues: transboundary environmental issues as problems for external relations; environmental degradation as a cause of regional conflict; destruction of global ecosystems that precipitate interstate conflict; environmental issues in international law; environmental degradation caused by military activity; ecological consequences of conflict; and destruction of the environment as an instrument of war.12 The same report includes the following remarks about the definition of the environmental security concept: The various descriptions of environmental security that are offered in the literature converge around four broad issues. One is environmental (or resource) degradation. Environmental degradation may then result in economic losses and/or increased international economic competition. Environmental and economic problems can escalate into political conflict within and among nations. If these political conflicts become severe enough, military conflict may ensue … For example, biodiversity is still largely an environmental issue, water pollution is mainly an economic question, and climate change is now a political problem. Whether any current environmental security issue poses real threats of military action is debatable. Other ways of classifying environmental security issues include their geographic scope (global, regional or local), or whether they are ‘environment-based’ (climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, air and water quality, biodiversity, oil spills, microorganisms) or ‘resource-based’ (water quantity, minerals, land degradation and fisheries).13 Within the framework of this approach, the principal environ-

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mental security issues facing OECD nations are grouped according to the geographic scope of the question: Climate change (global), Stratospheric ozone depletion (global), Biodiversity (global), Viruses, micro-organisms (global), Fisheries (global, regional and local), Transboundary air pollution (regional), Transboundary water pollution (regional), Land degradation and desertification (regional), Water scarcity (regional), Nuclear power plants (regional), Oil, natural gas and mineral deposits (regional), Introduction of alien species (regional and local), Natural disasters (regional and local), Disposal of hazardous wastes (local), Oil and other spills (local, regional).14 In addition, intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and Global Environmental Facility (GEF), such national agencies as the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Center for Environmental Security, US Central Intelligence Agency, US Department of Defense, US Department of State, and Bureau of Oceans and International and Scientific Affairs, and nongovernmental and scientific institutions including the Bellona Foundation, Cambridge University Global Security Program, Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), International Security Network Center for Security Studies, University of Toronto, Project on Peace and Conflict Studies, Woodrow Wilson Center, Environmental Change and Security Project, World Resources Institute, and Worldwatch Institute are considered active in environmental security research. Environmental threats or stresses due to environmental degradation and/or environmental resource scarcity may act as the structural reason for a conflict between countries or may act as a trigger or a catalyst for a conflict. In this context, it is natural that different environmental stresses and/or threats have different effects on security. Thus, it is not possible to assess each environmental problem as a security issue. Each environmental threat should be dealt within its particular context in view of its specific qualities and extent, the affected geographical area, and the socio-economic, political and demographic consequences. In any case, it is clear that in the coming years, environmental security will have a more prominent place on the agendas of national governments and international organizations.

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ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN REGIONAL SEAS

The adverse effects of global environmental pressure and degradation are also observed on a regional level. The degradation of shared ecosystems like the seas, lakes and/or forest areas as well as transboundary waters have adverse effects primarily at a regional level and hence solutions are mostly possible through regional cooperation. Problems caused by development activities emerge sooner in water basins than in the other ecological areas, and often cause harder to reverse and more complicated environmental degradation. The environmental stress and degradation in various water basins such as the Danube, Rhine, Mediterranean, Black Sea, Caspian, Aral and Baltic Seas constitute concrete examples to this situation. Environmental stress in water basins requires a holistic evaluation of all human activities in the circumferences and the hinterland of such water basins for measures to be taken and plans to be implemented for those lands. A regional approach can be considered as the most effective and efficient method in sustainable use and management of common environmental resources and ecosystems as well as preventing transboundary environmental problems. The resolutions of the 1972 Stockholm Conference cover the fundamental principles in respect of the efforts to protect with a regional approach the oceans and seas that cover 70 per cent of the earth’s surface. Recommendation No. 92/b of the Stockholm Conference, which provides that nations take efficient measures on the national level in order to control all significant sources, including land-based sources, that pollute the sea, and to coordinate and focus such activities at a regional and, where necessary, international level, played a guiding role for the systematic and institutionalized development of common protection policies for regional seas. As a matter of fact, one of the decisions taken in the First Meeting of the Governing Council of UNEP in 1973 concerns the definition and prevention of all threats that adversely affect marine health, and the efforts of the Executive Director for concluding regional agreements to that end. The principal purpose of establishing a Regional Seas Programme under UNEP in 1974 was to protect the oceans with a regional approach.15 The ‘Regional Sea’ concept does not fit in any clearly defined legal

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category. There are a number of locations and expansion areas expressed by this concept that cover marine areas exposed to serious degradation threats and that require urgent and imminent measures. The geographical scope definition of many seas that are protected under the name ‘regional seas’ is sometimes limited to seas that are under national sovereignty, sometimes include open seas, and in some examples cover the coastal areas and internal waters.16 Some regional seas are enclosed or semi-enclosed (e.g. the Mediterranean Sea including the Aegean, Black Sea, Red Sea, Baltic Sea), whereas some others are open seas and even a part of an ocean (e.g. East and Central Africa Region, Southeast Pacific Region, South Asia Region).17 On the other hand, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) includes arrangements to strengthen developments for the regional handling of the efforts for protection of the seas. Article 197 of the Convention states that in consideration of their regional characteristics, states should cooperate to create and adopt internationally recommended practices and procedures in accordance with this Convention as well as the rules and principles to protect and preserve the sea environment universally and where necessary regionally, directly or through competent international organizations. Article 122 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas defines enclosed and semi-enclosed seas as follows: ‘A gulf, sea basin or sea surrounded by two or more states, connected with another sea or ocean via a narrow strait or comprising territorial waters or exclusive economic zones of two or more states.’ 18 Rio Summit Agenda 21 is the most recent arrangement adopted on a global scale for the protection of common seas with a regional approach. The programme areas under Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 (Protection of The Oceans, All Kinds of Seas, including Enclosed and Semienclosed Seas, and Coastal Areas and The Protection, Rational Use and Development of Their Living Resources) that define the national, subregional, regional and global activities to be carried out by contracting states are defined as follows: a) Integrated management and sustainable development of coastal areas, including exclusive economic zones; b) Marine environmental protection; c) Sustainable use and conservation of marine living resources of the high seas; d) Sustainable use and conservation of marine living resources under national

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jurisdiction; e) Addressing critical uncertainties for the management of the marine environment and climate change; f) Strengthening international, including regional, cooperation and coordination; g) Sustainable development of small islands.19 In Chapter 17 of Agenda 21, under the programme area ‘Marine environmental protection’ management-related activities are classified in two groups: ‘Prevention, reduction and control of degradation of the marine environment from land-based activities’ and ‘Prevention, reduction and control of degradation of the marine environment from sea-based activities’. Sea-based activities recommend actions specifically addressing sea-based pollutants, i.e. shipping, dumping, offshore oil and gas platforms and ports.20 The regional approach offers significant opportunities to build efficient cooperation mechanisms amongst neighbouring countries, aiming at an integrated approach to environmentally rational management for protection, improvement and development. As a matter of fact, the ongoing activities for the protection of the seas under the United Nations Environment Programme’s Regional Seas Programme constitute outstanding examples of regional plans of action that regard the marine environment and coastal areas from the point of view of inter-sectorial relations and assess environmental degradation not only in respect of its consequences but also its reasons. Each environmental action plan conducted within the framework of this cooperation movement that includes approximately 140 countries and 12 regions (including the Mediterranean) of the world is officially adopted in intergovernmental meetings held by the regional countries concerned. These are holistic plans that perceive environmental problems as a whole. The most developed among these is the Mediterranean Action Plan, which has been implemented since 1975 and covers the Aegean Sea. On the other hand, although not included in the UNEP Regional Seas Programme, the Aral Sea Basin Programme, also a regional cooperation programme, has clearly adopted the national security related significance of ensuring environmental security in the regional seas. The Almaty Declaration adopted in 1997 by the governments of the coastal states of the Aral Sea, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, notes that environmental security is a strategic component of national security and is vital in

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protecting the priorities and interests of the countries in the region. The Declaration specifically underlines the need for creating a region free from nuclear tests and arms, and for fighting against leakage from nuclear technology and raw materials in the region that requires a comprehensive programme to ensure environmental security in Central Asia, including the Aral problem.21

GEOGRAPHICAL AND ECOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AEGEAN SEA

The Aegean Sea constitutes the northeast section of Eastern Mediterranean. Located between 35°–41° north and 23°–27° east longitudes, the Aegean Sea has a surface area of 2105 km2, and a volume of 7,4104 km3.22 Situated between Turkey and Greece, the length north to south of the Aegean Sea is 660 km, and its width east to west is approximately 270 km in the north, 150 km in the centre, and 400 km in the south. The southern boundary of the Aegean Sea starts from Elafonisos in the west, through Crete and Rhodes, and ends at River Dalaman on Turkish mainland in the east. In the north, it is connected to the Black Sea via the Çanakkale Strait, Marmara Sea . and the Istanbul Strait. Bearing the characteristics of an inland sea, the Aegean … has a special position in the Mediterranean ecosystem thanks to its regional location, geomorphologic structure, and hydrographic and ecological properties, and has a specific structure owing to its oceanographic and biological characteristics. As a matter of fact, its northern section is under the influence of the relatively cold and low salinity of the Black Sea waters, whereas its south is under the influence of the warm and salty Mediterranean waters. Thus (in hydrographic terms) it is divided into three subsections as the north, the center and the south.23 On the other hand, although there are 2,962 m and 3,150 m deep gorges in the south of the Aegean, the deepest abyss does not exceed 1,000 metres. With a form similar to the letter ‘S’, the Halkidikya gorge starts in the Saros Bay and extends down to the shores of Crete as a valley, dividing the Aegean Sea into two plateaus. The deep-sea areas

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outside of this gorge and crevasses consist of quite shallow sections no deeper than 500 m. Mostly the depth ranges between 100 m and 500 m, with an average depth of 350 m. With this structure, it looks like a high plateau between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, which have an average depth of 1,300 m and 1,500 m respectively. Due to its geomorphologic structure, the coastline of the Aegean Sea is long and curved. There are numerous islands and islets extending from the mainland of the two coastal states in the Aegean Sea that exhibits continental seabed characteristics and has a complex terrestrial bottom structure. Its continental shelf and side boundaries are not definite due to recent tectonic movements.24 This structure of the Aegean Sea reflects also on its biological features that are divided into two subsections despite the relatively small marine area. In oceanographic terms, it combines the cold waters of the north and the warm waters of the south, thus constituting a meeting basin for marine living resources that biologically prefer cold waters and those that prefer warm waters. Therefore, the Aegean Sea is rich in biodiversity. Even though it forms a rich part of the Mediterranean ecosystem in terms of the diversity of species, the narrow continental shelf and complex topographical structure have adverse effects on fisheries. Although production-wise it can be considered poor due to its bottom structure, the creatures living in the basin have a high economic value. In addition, it is one of the most suitable basins in the world for water products production owing to its innumerable islands, islets, rocks, gulfs and bays, which render the region even more important. Approximately 400 algae, 5,000 invertebrate and 300 fish species were identified living in the Aegean Sea basin,25 which is also very rich in coastal and pelagic seabirds. Coastal breeding Seabirds occurring in the Aegean are, gulls, terns, grebes, cormorants, pelicans, flamingo, ducks, rails and coots, shorebirds. Marine sites (rocky islands and islets) are [home to] yellow-legged Gull Larus cachinnans, Audouin’s Gulls Larus audouinii. The pelagic seabirds are the Shag Phalacrocorax desmarestii, Hydrobates pelagicus, Cory’s Shearwater Calonectris diomedea and the Mediterranean Shearwater.26 Furthermore, the Aegean displays specific importance in respect of marine mammals. The endangered Mediterranean Monk Seal

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Monachus Monachus with very few survivors in the Mediterranean basin is the most significant. Although very few in number, dolphins (Tursiops trucatus, Delphinus delphis, Stenella coeruleoalba, Grampus griseus) and whales (Balaenoptera physalus, Physeter macrocephalus) also inhabit this sea.27 A large majority of the fauna and flora in the Aegean Sea and on its islands are today threatened species. These species, which are endemic to the Aegean and the Mediterranean, are largely vulnerable, rare and/or endangered due to environmental degradation caused by human activities. Table 14 and Table 15 give lists of the threatened species in the Aegean Sea basin.

ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS

Like all other marine areas, it is possible to list the general reasons that cause pollution in the Aegean Sea as follows: dumping from ships and aircraft, pollution from land-based sources and activities, pollution by oil and other harmful substances in cases of emergency, airborne pollution, illegal shipping and discharge of hazardous

Table 14 Threatened plant species of the Aegean Sea and Islands Species *

Status

Major risk

Cymodocea nodosa Zostera marina Zostera noltii Posidonia ocenica*

R E E E

Caulerpa olivieri* Cystoseira spinosa* Cystoseira zosteroides Lithophyllum lichenoides Tenarea undolusa

V V V V V

†Coastal development and coastal fisheries †Turbidity, set net fisheries †Turbidity, set net fisheries †Set net fisheries, coastal fisheries, anchoring and coastal degradation Coastal development Habitat destruction Turbidity Oil pollution Oil pollution

Source: Öztürk/Öztürk, ‘Problems related to fisheries and …’, pp. 37–8. Based on the criteria of the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 1994. Abbreviations for the status are: V: vulnerable; R: rare; E: endangered. *Mediterranean endemic species. †Under protection in Turkey according to the Fisheries Law, No. 1380.

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Table 15 Threatened animal species in the Aegean Sea and Islands Species

Status

Major risk

Axinella polypoides

V

Set nets and sport divers

Axinella verrucosa

V

Set nets and sport divers

Gerardia savaglia

E

†Set nets and sport divers

Eunicella singularis

V

Set nets and sport divers

Homarus gammarus

V

Overfishing

Palinurus elephas

V

Overfishing

Scyllarus latus

V

Overfishing

Scyllarus arctus

V

Overfishing

Maja squinado

V

Overfishing

Charonia tritonis

E

†Shell collectors

Pinna nobilis

V

†Set nets

Tonna galea

E

†Shell collectors

Asterina pancerii*

V

†Sport divers

Acipencer sturio

CE

†Overfishing

Huso huso

CE

†Overfishing

Hippocampus hippocampus

V

†Sport divers

Epinephelus marginatus

V

Spearfishing

Caretta caretta

E

†Coastal degradation, by-catch, pollution

Monachus monachus

CE

†Loss of habitat, deliberate killing

Tursiops truncatus

DD

†Loss of habitat, bycatch, food shortage

Delphinus delphis

DD

†Loss of habitat, bycatch, food shortage

Stenella coeruleoalba

DD

†Loss of habitat, bycatch, food shortage

Grampus griseus

DD

†Loss of habitat, bycatch, food shortage

Ziphius cavirostris

DD

†Loss of habitat, food shortage

R R

†Loss of habitat, food shortage †Loss of habitat, food shortage

Balaenoptera physalus Physeter catodon

Source: Öztürk/Öztürk, ‘Problems related to fisheries and …’, pp. 37–8. Based on the criteria of the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 1994. Abbreviations for the status are: V: vulnerable; R: rare; E: endangered; CE: critically endangered; DD: data deficient. *Mediterranean endemic species. †Under protection in Turkey according to the Fisheries Law, No. 1380.

wastes, and pollution resulting from exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf and the seabed and subsoil. The chemical and bacterial contamination caused by all these sources in the Aegean includes the spread of pathogenic microorganisms and eutrophication from rivers, semi-enclosed gulfs,

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untreated sewage, coastline industrial plants and the very heavy marine traffic in the basin. The rapid growth of tourism constitutes an additional threat to the marine environment, the sensitive ecosystems of coastal areas and biodiversity. One of the principal threats, eutrophication, is caused by the insufficient treatment infrastructure of the coastal cities of both littoral countries in the Aegean, . particularly Izmir and Thessaloniki. ‘Due to eutrophication, red tides occur in the Aegean Sea, which result in mortality of marine organisms due to lack of oxygen. It may also cause bloom of toxic dinoflagelates. Moreover, turbidity increases as water is eutrophicated, then light diminution affects sea grass and algae’.28 Many of these adverse effects are due to the nutrients and pesticides carried by the waters of rivers that discharge into the Aegean. According to UNEP Mediterranean Action Plan data, pollution caused by rivers discharging into the Aegean from both countries is listed in Table 16. In accordance with the regional studies conducted within the framework of the UNEP Mediterranean Action Plan, the contracting parties of the Barcelona Convention were asked to identify the priority pollution hot spots in the Mediterranean basin. A significant number of such hot spots that are identified and reported to UNEP/ MAP by Turkey and Greece are on the Aegean coasts. The Aegean Table 16 Loads of dissolved nutrients from major rivers discharging into the Aegean Sea Rivers

Evros/Meriç Axios Büyük Menderes† Strymon Gediz† Aliakmon Nestos Pinios

Flow km3/year

Nitrate (N-NO3*) mg/l

6.80 4.90 0.40 2.59 – 1.177 1.03 0.672

1.9 1.584 0.75 1.236 1.18 0.395 1.24 2.32

Ammonium Phosphate (N-NH4*) (P-PO4*) mg/l mg/l 0.05 0.065 0.33 0.053 0.005 0.05 0.071 0.167

0.36 0.48 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.10 – –

Country

Greece/Turkey Greece Turkey Greece Turkey Greece Greece Turkey

Adapted from UNEP/MAP, Protecting the Mediterranean from land-based pollution (Athens: 2001), pp. 19–20. *Estimates of actual discharge from ‘Rosetta’ and ‘Damietta’ branches †Average values in 1996, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of Turkey

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hot spots reported to UNEP/MAP by Greece are as follows: Elefsis Bay, Heraklion Gulf, North Western Saronic Gulf, Inner Saronic Gulf, Thermaikos Gulf and Pagasitikos Gulf; moreover Turkey reported the Bodrum Area (Bodrum, Marmaris and Datça). The pollution statuses of these hot sports are summarized in Table 17. In addition to these important land-based pollutants, Black Sea water, which enters the Aegean Sea through the Çanakkale Strait, also contributes to the enrichment of the Aegean Sea’s nutrients. Critically challenged by environmental risks, the Black Sea is exposed to substantial transboundary pollution. The Danube River crosses industrialized countries and dense settlement areas, and conveys one-third of the pollution produced by continental Europe to the Black Sea. In the period 1970 to 1990, the accumulated nitrogen and phosphorus load carried by the Danube increased 2.5 and 3.8 times respectively. Moreover, petroleum discharged to the Black Sea via the Danube is calculated at 53,300 tonnes/year. Accordingly, the oil wastes attributable to the Danube River correspond to nearly half of the total wastes in the Black Sea, and 48 per cent of total oil pollution. In addition, after the opening of the Rhine-Main channel, the Danube has started to carry pollution to the Black Sea from the Baltic Sea and the Rhine, the coasts of which are densely occupied by industrial plants.29 Given that the Aegean Sea is connected with the Black Sea via Marmara and the Turkish Straits, it is only natural that this transboundary pollution affects the Aegean. On the other hand, ship-based pollution as well as accident risks have increased due to the addition of the Baltic-Rhine-Danube-Black Sea traffic to the already heavy marine traffic in the Aegean Sea, which is a very important waterway, not only for Turkey and Greece but also for the coastal countries of the Black Sea. Ship accidents in this semienclosed basin with heavy marine traffic not only cause ecological disasters but also damage tourism, and so harms the economies of the coastal countries. Since 1980, ten significant accidents (more than 500t of petroleum discharged into the sea) have occurred in different regions of the Aegean. Pollution from petroleum has led to observation of tar balls along almost every coastline. The wide range of polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbon (PAH) concentrations measured in the Aegean indicates that the most

Municipal, industrial Municipal, industrial Municipal, industrial Industrial

Industrial

Inner Saronic Gulf Plagasitikos Gulf Heraklion Gulf

North Western Saronic Gulf

Bodrum Marmaris Datça

Bodrum Area

1

3

3 3 2

3

2 2 2

1

1

1

3

3

1

1

6

6

3 3 3

2

2

3

4

3

3

6 6 6

1

1

3

3

4

4

5 5 5

2

3

2

2

4

4

3 3 2

5

6

4

4

5

6

17.8 17.8 16.1

11.2

12.6

12.9

13.7

18.8

19.5

72.35 72.35 65.44

57

65

66

70

96

100

Public Drinking Aquatic Recreation Other Welfare Weighted Relative health water life beneficial and total importance quality use economy index

L L L –

Expansion of plant – Industrial feasibility studies Industrial feasibility studies

SW SW+WWTP SW+WWTP

L

Expansion of plant & industrial feasibility studies Secondary treatment

F, B, L, P, H F, B, L, P, H F, B, L, P, H

–

Transboundary aspect(s)

Nature of investment

Adapted from UNEP/MAP Identification of Priority Pollution Hot Spots and Sensitive Areas in the Mediterranean, MAP Technical Report Series No. 124 (Athens, 1999), pp. 41 and 53. WWTP: Wastewater treatment plant; SW: Solid waste; F: Fisheries; B: Biodiversity; L: Reduction of regional value of Mediterranean tourism; P: Public Health; H: Habitats (1 no effects, 2 slight effects, 3 moderate effects, 4 major effects, 5 severe effects, 6 extreme effects)

Main cities

Name

Turkey

Elefsis Bay

Municipal, industrial

Type

Thermaikos Gulf

Name

Greece

Table 17 Priority pollution hot spots in Greece and Turkey

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significant pollution remains restricted to near the shore and to enclosed areas.30 Furthermore, it is clear that the environmental security problems in the Aegean will be even heavier due to the plans to ship Central Asian and Caucasian petroleum and natural gas to the world via the Black Sea, the Turkish Straits and the Aegean. ‘In case these plans are implemented the figure of approximately 5 millions tons/year of crude oil passing through the Straits today will increase to perhaps 80–100 million tons/year.’ 31 Even when this crude oil reaches the Aegean via pipelines through Thrace rather than the Turkish Straits, threats to the sensitive Aegean ecosystem will not diminish. Another factor that threatens environmental security in the Aegean Sea is the destruction of habitat. Concentrated population in coastal areas, urban settlements, industry, ports, tourism and expanding power plants constitute the major reasons of destruction of habitat in the Aegean, as in the entire Mediterranean basin. Natural habitats of such species as Caretta caretta, Monachus monachus are lost or contaminated due to pollution and coastal erosion attributable to human activities besides the occupation of the coasts by human populations. On the other hand, exotic species, decline of fisheries and aquaculture activities threaten environmental security in the Aegean. The fisheries, historically the principal sources of income for the Aegean basin inhabitants, suffer the damages caused not only by pollution and degradation but also over-fishing in both coastal countries. According to scientific researches: … the decline of the commercial fish stocks, such as sardine, spratt, mackerel, and horse mackerel … In regard to migratory species like tunas and swordfish, the stocks [have] drastically declined mainly due to over-fishing … Sponge fishing, traditionally in the Aegean Sea, was greatly affected by an epidemic in the 1980s.32 The decline in fish stocks cannot be regarded just as an economic loss for fisheries. The adverse effects of this decline are pronounced very intensively in respect to a sustainable ecological balance in the basin and the protection of biodiversity. For instance, the inhabitants of this sea, the Mediterranean monk seal, Monachus monachus, as well

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203

as the ceataceans are affected by this decline, and lose their basic food sources. As a result, especially Monachus monachus attacks fishing nets to find fish and are frequently killed by fishermen, thus their already low number in the entire Mediterranean basin drops further. Another problem attributable to fisheries is the rapidly growing aquaculture activities on both sides of the Aegean. ‘By marine aquaculture, Turkey produces 15,000t of fish and Greece 35,000t in the shallow bays in the Aegean Sea.’ 33 The unplanned and uncoordinated development of this production brings about eutrophication in enclosed or non-circulating bays where aquaculture fisheries are placed, and on the other hand has adverse effects on tourism. ‘Particularly, remains of food and chemicals cause unpredictable harm to native fauna and flora in the entire basin.’34 The exotic species problem is relatively new in the Aegean just as in the Mediterranean. Most of the common exotic species are from the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal and [are] called Lessepsian species … 40 Lessepsian species have reached the Anatolian coast, Rhodes, Cyprus and Crete-Santorini areas … ship ballast water also carries exotic species to the Aegean Sea. One of the examples is blue crab, Callinectes sapidus, found in Turkey and Greece. The Aegean Sea fauna and flora are under the threat of the comb jellyfish Mnemiopsis leidyi that reached firstly the Black Sea from the North Atlantic in tanker ballast water in 1987 and damaged the ecological balance there. This species has been found also in the Aegean … Another risk is presented by Caulerpa taxifolia and Caulerpa racemose. These two algae species may cause harm to the Aegean Sea native flora.35 ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN THE AEGEAN SEA

A significant part of the environmental threats and stresses in the Aegean Sea threaten drastically to degrade the quality of life of the inhabitants. In the Aegean Sea, potential dangers caused by natural disasters such as earthquakes may also qualify as environmental security issues. There is concrete evidence to this potential problem including the seismic location of the basin and recent earthquake disasters on both sides of the Aegean. On the other hand, climate

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change, stratospheric ozone depletion, desertification, erosion emerging as a consequence of the cumulative changes or modifications caused by various forms of human activity, may be considered medium to long-term environmental security issues for the Aegean Sea. Based on the relatively long-term potential risks of the latter, one may argue that there is a risk of an increase in the environmental security threatening factors in the Aegean. Besides, it should not be forgotten that the environmental degradation threatening the quality of life of the human inhabitants of the Aegean basin directly eradicates the right to life for non-human inhabitants. In accordance with eco-centric and not anthropocentric ethics, the lives and well-being of all creatures are viewed as individually valuable. This perception requires environmental security to be guaranteed not only for humankind but also for all living beings alike. In this context, the existing and potential environmental security issues in the Aegean Sea could be outlined as in Table 18 and Table 19. Evidently, wars constitute the most critical threat to environmental security. Although not indicated in Tables 18 and 19, the primary human-based risk that may completely destroy environmental security in the Aegean Sea is war. The potential of military activities creating environmental security problems should not be overlooked. Military activities which are likely to affect the environment include the construction and operation of military bases, the Table 18 Human-originated environmental security issues in the Aegean Geographic scope Climate change Stratospheric ozone depletion Water quality Biodiversity Habitat destruction Oil spills Exotic species Marine accidents Water scarcity in the islands Coastal erosion Desertification Fisheries Marine aquaculture

Regional

Local

Term of effect

x x x x x x x x

x x x x x x x x x x x x x

Long-term Long-term Short-term Short-term Short-term Short-term Short-term Short-term Medium-term Medium-term Long-term Short-term Short-term

x x

ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN THE AEGEAN

205

Table 19 Non-human-originated environmental security issues in the Aegean Geographic scope Naturally caused climate change Natural disasters (such as earthquakes)

Regional

Local

Term of effect

x x

x x

Very long-term Short-term

production of military equipment and weapons, the undertaking of military exercises, disposal of toxic materials and pollution resulting from toxic material spills during the transport of military goods. Accidental oil spills or the use of weapons with depleted uranium in a marine environment during military manoeuvres may also create irreversible catastrophes. Military exercises disturb fish-spawning grounds and natural habitats of birds and other marine fauna. The usage of nuclear, chemical, biological or conventional weapons during military exercises, too, contributes significantly to environmental degradation and genetic mutation, creating illnesses, gradual destruction and the death of marine living resources. Some coastal areas that are used for military activities are around, or close to, important roosting or breeding areas for endangered bird species. An intensive use of these areas for target practice and training flights by military aircraft can cause considerable disturbance for the birds. Moreover, military exercises with warships, fighter planes, tanks and artillery can have negative impacts on whales, monk seals, marine turtles and dolphins, such as disruption of vital biological behaviours, temporary or permanent hearing loss, destruction of breeding areas and even death. Finally, it should be underlined that the high percentages of military spending in budgets restrict the resources needed for environmental policies. All the above-mentioned threats are present for the Aegean Sea too. But, the political conflicts between Turkey and Greece add to it and make those problems unsolvable.

CONCLUSIONS: THE WAY FORWARD?

The environmental security problem observed in many enclosed and/or semi-enclosed regional seas is also valid for the Aegean Sea. However, one may as well argue that environmental security in the

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case of this particular sea is far more sensitive. Its particular geomorphologic structure, oceanographic, hydrographic, ecological and biological characteristics make the Aegean even more vulnerable. Moreover, the problems may become chronic if environmental protection policies are regarded as ‘soft policy’ issues that can be easily neglected or compromised especially in cases of regional instability and tension. On the other hand, the chances of finding a common solution to the environmental issues are restricted due to the dispute over national sovereignty rights of this marine arena between the two heirs to the Aegean Sea, Turkey and Greece. It is known that, from time to time, states tend to use the environment as a political tool for their national interests in sovereignty disputes. In such circumstances, environmental security issues as trigger factors have the potential risk of changing into national security issues. For instance, it is sometimes difficult to make a distinction between activities that are supposedly conducted for environmental protection purposes and activities pursued to extend domination in disputed geographical areas. In this context, Greece’s proposal to the EU to establish bird-watching stations and nature sanctuaries on 14 disputed formations in the Aegean was interpreted by the Turkish media as using the environment as a tool in the dispute on sovereignty issues.36 When it coincided with the Kardak/Imia crisis, Greece’s claim that it had filed an application with the EU in order to nominate these areas as bird protection zones under the EU Habitat Directives and Natura 2000 activities,37 was interpreted in the Turkish press as a preparation to take hold of such islets through ‘environment games’.38 Similarly, the pollution monitoring programme conducted in the Aegean since 1987 by the Turkish Ministry of Environment with the scientific research ship Piri Reis was challenged by the Greek diplomatic community which claimed that ‘Ankara used the said research ship for fabricating a crisis in 1987.’39 Despite all these negative aspects, it is not over-optimistic to suggest that environmental security in the Aegean Sea may help the rapprochement of the two coastal countries. The environment inherently encourages solidarity and cooperation between states, peoples and individuals. A state cannot possibly solve global, regional and/or transboundary environmental problems singlehandedly. In fact, all international legal instruments on the

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environment contain many provisions for encouraging multilateral or bilateral cooperation. Some of these conventions serve directly or indirectly for the protection of the Aegean Sea. International legal arrangements to which Turkey and Greece are parties and that help eliminate environmental insecurity can be examined in three categories, namely global, regional and bilateral agreements. There are a number of global international conventions or nonbinding international instruments with relevance to the protection of marine environment to which Turkey and Greece are both parties, such as the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, the IMO International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (as modified by the Protocol of 1978 /MARPOL 73/78, and its Annexes), the United Nations Declaration on Environment and Development and Agenda 21, the Convention on Biological Diversity and its Jakarta Mandate. At the regional level, the most important legal arrangements which can contribute to the protection of the Aegean Sea are the Bern and Barcelona Conventions. The Council of Europe Bern Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (1979) has a significant role in protecting the wildlife and natural habitats in the Aegean, since the Aegean still enjoys the privilege of being a habitat for endangered species. The Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution40 and its related protocols, which encourage the strengthening of sub-regional and bilateral cooperation in the basin, offer an adequate legal framework for the protection of the Aegean Sea. The Mediterranean Action Plan adopted and enforced by the Mediterranean coastal states and the European Economic Community in 1975 for the purpose of implementing the Barcelona Convention was subjected to a series of amendments in 1995. Currently, these activities, pursued by 20 coastal countries and the European Union with the title ‘MAP Phase II/Action Plan for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Sustainable Development of the Coastal Areas of the Mediterranean’, also cover the Aegean Sea and its coastal areas. Since its initiation, Turkey and Greece have been standing as active contributors to the MAP that acts as the principal tool for ensuring environmental security in the Aegean Sea thanks to its encouraging effect for sub-regional and bilateral cooperation

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between contracting parties, although it is basically a multilateral cooperation plan.41 Environment is one of the subjects in the recently developing cooperation between Turkey and Greece. The Memorandum of Understanding Between the Republic of Turkey and the Hellenic Republic Concerning Cooperation on Environmental Protection (MOU) and its Annex signed on 20 January 2000 in Ankara, is the major legal instrument which may be useful for the protection of the Aegean Sea marine environment. According to the Annex of this MOU, 11 items are identified as possible areas for cooperation. Among these 11 items, combating marine pollution and land-based sources of pollution are directly related to the protection of the Aegean Sea. In the meetings held between the official boards of the two countries after signing the MOU, five of the 11 issues were determined as the priority cooperation areas. However, the issue of combating marine pollution and land-based sources of pollution that would directly contribute to the protection of the Aegean Sea is not within those priority areas yet. Hence, in addition to the existing multilateral environmental cooperation between the two coastal countries at global and regional levels, the initiation of bilateral cooperation is an important step forward.42 In order to prevent and eliminate environmental insecurity in the Aegean Sea, both parties need a new political commitment that accepts the Aegean Sea as a common asset uniting the two countries rather than separating them. And to eliminate the potential of the environment to create a new conflict or instability, this new political notion must be the basis for the development of cooperation. The potential for reconciliation inherent in the environment enables the development of peaceful relations and can thus present new opportunities to both countries for the protection of human and environmental security in the Aegean.

NOTES 1. Jon Barnett, The Meaning of Environmental Security; Ecological Politics and Policy in the New Security Era (London and New York: Zed Books, 2001), p. 37. 2. Lester Brown, ‘Redefining National Security’, Worldwatch Paper No. 14 (Washington, DC: Worldwatch, 1977). 3. Richard Ullman, ‘Redefining Security’, International Security, 8, 1, 1983, p. 133. 4. Norman Myers, Ultimate Security, The Environmental Basis of Political Stability

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(Washington, DC: Island Press, 1996), p. 21. 5. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). 6. OECD, State-of-the-Art Review of Environment, Security and Development Co-operation, Working paper, February 2000, p. 19. 7. Barnett, The Meaning of Environmental Security, p. 41. 8. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 2. 9. See, Türkiye Çevre Vakfı, Küresel Koms¸uluk, Küresel Yönetim Komisyonu’nun Raporu (Ankara: Çevre Vakfı, 1996). 10. Gülnur Aybet, ‘NATO’s Developing Roles In Collective Security’, SAM Papers No. 4/99 (Ankara: Strategic Research Centre, June 1999), p. 89. 11. Nesrin Algan and Özlen Künçek, ‘Transboundary Population Movements: Refugees, Environment and Politics’, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, No. XXVIII, 1998, p. 83. According to the AC/UNU Millennium Project Report, ‘Few countries have an official definition of environmental security that unifies thought and action. Among the countries that do have definitions are: the Russian Federation and the Commonwealth of Independent States; and the United States which has several working definitions and a DoD Directive which includes a programmatic definition. Embassy representatives from Argentina and India indicated that their countries did have an official definition, but the text had not been received at the time of writing. Respondents in China, Australia and Hungary said their governments were currently creating a definition. China considers environmental security under the umbrella of environmental protection.’ See, [http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/ Senate/4787/millennium/es-exsum.html], 12 March 2001. 12. OECD, ENV/EPOC/GEEI (98) 3/FINAL, Paris, 3 February 1999, p. 4. 13. Ibid., p. 5. 14. Ibid., pp. 5–14. 15. UNEP/GC 6/7, 24 May 1978, p. 393. 16. Maguelonne Dejeant-Pons, ’Les Programmes des Mers Régionales: Plan d’Action Pour la Méditerranée’, Droit Méditerranéen de l’Environnement (Paris: Economica, 1988), p. 85. 17. Idem. . . 18. See Aydog ˇan Özman, Birles¸mis¸ Milletler Deniz Hukuku Sözles¸mesi (Istanbul: Istanbul Ticaret Odası, 1984). 19. United Nations, Report of the UNCED, A/Conf.151/26, Rio de Janeiro, 3–14 June 1992, pp. 130–66. 20. Idem. 21. United Nations, General Assembly Fifty-second Session, Doc. No. A/52/112, 18 March 1997. 22. [Http://archimedes.civil.auth.gr/krestenitis/en/aegean.html], (08.02.2003). 23. Erdog ˇan Güven, Sibel Çolak and Adem Çolak, ‘Ege Denizi’nde Deniz Balıkları Yetis¸tiricilig ˇi ve Yeni Türler’, in Bayram . Öztürk and Veysel Aysel (eds), Ulusal Ege Adaları 2002 Toplantısı Bildiriler Kitabı (Istanbul: Türk Deniz Aras¸tırmaları Vakfı, 2001), p. 206. 24. Ibid., p. 207. 25. Idem. 26. John G. Walmsley, ‘Biodiversity of the Aegean Islands with Special Reference to Seabirds and their Habitats’, in International Symposium on Aegean Sea 2000, 5–7 May . 2000, Bodrum (Istanbul: TÜDAV, 2000), p. 77. 27. Idem. 28. Bayram Öztürk and Ayaka Amaha Öztürk, ‘Problems related to fisheries and threatened marine species in the Aegean Sea’, in International Symposium on Aegean Sea, p. 35. 29. Nesrin Algan, ‘Türk Bog ˇazları’nda Çevresel Güvenlik’, Mülkiye, 26, 234 (2002), pp. 21–34.

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30. ‘Environmental Problems of Greece from a Chemical Point of View’, Chemistry International, 22, 1, January 2000, at: [http://www.iupac.org/publications/ci/2000/ january/greece2.html], 1 May 2002. 31. Tulio Scovazzi, ‘New Turkish and IMO Regulations for the Turkish Straits’, ICCOPS Newsletter, No. 4, January 1995, p. 14. 32. Ibid., p. 34. 33. Ibid., p. 36. 34. Idem. 35. Ibid., pp. 35–6. 36. Mümtaz Soysal, ‘Kus¸severlik ve Elenseverlik’, Milliyet, 22 May 1998, p. 13. 37. Athens News Agency Bulletin, No. 55, 11 March 1996. 38. ‘Ege’de Kus¸ Krizi’, Milliyet, 21 April 1998, p. 3. A comment at the time from the Greek government spokesman Dimitris Reppas that ‘the [EU] Commission’s decision confirms Greek sovereignty over islands Turkey may contest. It strikes two birds with one stone’, clearly indicated that the Turkish media was not too wide of the mark about the real intention behind Greece’s newly-found enthusiasm for the protection of wild life. As Greece ‘didn’t seem to care much about birds until after the 1996 crisis’, even the director of the World Wildlife Fund’s Athens Office, Dimitris Karavelas, questioned ‘whether the government’s commitment to endangered species is as great as its political interests’. See, Time International, 27 April 1988, p. 26. 39. ‘Ege’de Piri Reis Krizi’, Hürriyet, 31 May 2001, at: [http://arsiv.hurriyetim.com.tr/hur/ turk/01/05/30/dunya.htm]. 40. Came into force in 1978 and has been amended as ‘Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Region of the Mediterranean in 1995. 41. See Nesrin Algan, ‘Common International Commitments of Turkey and Greece on the Protection of the Aegean Sea with Special Reference to the Mediterranean Action Plan’, in International Symposium on Aegean Sea 2000, pp. 240–4. 42. Ibid., pp. 246–7.

PART III

STABILIZING EXPECTATIONS?

9 Negotiations and Deterrence in Asymmetrical Power Situations: The Turkish-Greek Case S. GÜLDEN AYMAN

Though Cyprus is often mentioned as the main source of tension between Turkey and Greece, and the total normalization of the relations is unlikely without achieving a durable peace in the island, it has not been the Cyprus problem but the Aegean Sea disputes that seem to be intractable between the two countries; especially if we take into account the fact that the parties have neither achieved a common definition of the problem areas nor agreed upon the ways to resolve them. Despite the recent rapprochement between the two countries, the delineation of continental shelf of the Aegean, the extent of Greece’s air space and territorial waters, the militarization of the Aegean islands in the eastern Aegean and the ownership of uninhabited islets are the problems in the Aegean that still carry the potential of dangerous confrontation between Turkey and Greece (see Aydın and Bahcheli’s chapters, this volume). In March 1987 the long-running problem over the location of the continental shelf and by extension rights to exploit potential oil reserves under the sea bed had led to a crisis and brought the Davos Agreement to end the crisis. Though both governments agreed in principle to pursue a series of confidence-building measures (CBM’s – see Appendix 1), designed to reduce immediate tensions in the Aegean and to provide a conflict resolution process, these efforts remained largely unconsummated. Relations were further strained by the end of 1995 after the Greek parliament ratified the United Nation’s Law of Sea (LOS) Resolution. Turkey has not recognized

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LOS, stressing that the implementation of this resolution would turn 70 per cent of the Aegean into Greek sovereign territory and unacceptably restrict freedom of navigation.1 Turkey and Greece again came to the brink of an armed conflict on 28 January 1996, as a result of a crisis regarding the status of the Kardak/Imia Rocks,2 a mere 3.8 miles off the coast of Turkey in the Aegean Sea. After the crisis, diplomatic efforts to reduce tension in the Aegean gained a new momentum and, after months of negotiations, on 4 June 1998, Turkey and Greece agreed to a limited set of CBMs proposed by the NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana. Both the Memorandum of Understanding signed in Athens on 27 May 1988, and the Guidelines for the Prevention of Accidents and Incidents on the High Seas and International Airspaces signed in . Istanbul on 8 September 1988 (see Appendix 2), oblige the two countries to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and recognize their rights to use the high seas and international airspace of the Aegean. They have also agreed to allow NATO a role in monitoring air sorties over the Aegean. However, similar to the previous attempts, although both sides agreed to implement these declarations, they were not complied with. Therefore, this article will argue that in order to understand one of the major sources of intractability of the Turkish-Greek conflict and the problems related to the Aegean Sea,3 one needs to examine the overall asymmetrical perceptions of power, threat and strategic behaviours affected by these perceptions.

POWER ASYMMETRY AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

In most of the international conflicts the behaviour of the parties visà-vis to each other is closely linked with the mutual perceptions of power and threat. Especially when the adversaries perceive themselves unequal in power, it is generally observed that mutually acceptable outcomes are quite difficult to obtain.4 However it is not easy to determine the dynamics behind how relative power distribution contributes to the intractability of the international conflicts. In this article, I shall try to examine it in the Turkish-Greek conflict context related to the problems in the Aegean. In doing so, I shall pose two questions: How do Turkish and Greek strategic elites 5

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cognitively construct power and threat; 6 and how do these relative perceptions affect their strategic behavior vis-à-vis each other?7 A detailed analysis of the Greek-Turkish conflict with a special emphasis on the Aegean problems could not only provide us with some clues about the dynamics of asymmetrical power conflicts, but may also help to determine what might be done more constructively for their resolution.

Perception of Power In Turkish-Greek relationships, both the Greek and the Turkish strategic elite understand and interpret power in the same way. Their conceptualization of power is fundamentally based on what we define as the ‘classical components’ (or ‘tangible dimensions’) of power. They tend to associate power primarily with military power, size of country and its population. Though economic power comparisons have also been used in some strategic analyses, especially in the 1990s, they have not yet been taken into the consideration to the same extent as military power or population. In terms of the classical components of power, Greece and Turkey do not enjoy the same power status. Furthermore, Greece’s position viewed by Turkey and by the Greeks themselves is as a ‘low power status’ state or a ‘small state’, while Turkey seems to have a higher power status vis-à-vis Greece.8 In this regard, Greek strategists often stress Greece’s smaller population compared with that of Turkey’s, and Greece’s geography and its comparatively meagre economic resources. While Turkey’s population is approximately 67 million, that of Greece is 10 million. Above all, long-term demographic trends are more disturbing for Greece. According to a Greek projection, made for 2025, Greece is estimated to have about 10,500,000 people while Turkey will have 98,700,000. More importantly, Greece’s young population is decreasing.9 In this light, the perspective of Turkey’s admission to the European Union was a critical subject of projections and debate in the Greek press: We are a nation which is slowly dying. And if we continue at this pace, in fifty years we will be an extinct species. Whereas Turkey has a population boom. And it will need no war in order to re-occupy the whole of Greece. Because, simply, there is a

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prospect of Turkey’s admission to the European Union. This means a right to free settlement for millions of Turks in the European region that will be called ‘Greece’, but only in the geographical sense. No longer in the ethnic sense … If the Turkish political leadership did not have so many internal problems to consider necessary for it to preserve Greek-Turkish tensions for internal consumption, Turkey would have neither threatened nor provoked Greece. On the contrary, it would have done its best to persuade [the international community] that it was eligible for inclusion in Europe’s enlargement at the next stage, or even at the stage after, and to exploit the advantage of free movement and settlement. Among other things, in order to swallow, in the most painless as well as safe manner, Thrace and our islands, and Greece as a whole.10 Especially, when Turkey’s vast numerical superiority is taken as an indicator of sheer manpower, Turkey is perceived as a powerful country, which is able to maintain a huge standing army and consequently as a potential threat. In explaining Turkish military threat, Greek strategists argue that manpower limitations make Greece vulnerable to surprise attack and to extended strategies of attrition.11 In addition to the asymmetry in terms of population, it is argued that certain characteristics of Turkey’s geographical configuration affect Greek perceptions: Greek geography hardly lends itself to defensive arrangements. This absence of strategic depth in the east (and the north) and the tremendous relative length of the border have plagued Greek strategists for a long time. Geography creates problems for Greece in all possible theatres of war with Turkey. Cyprus lies 600 miles away from Greece, but only 60 miles from Turkey. Furthermore, major Greek islands are very close to the Turkish mainland. Important Greek population centers and military installations are within Turkish artillery range.12 Greek disparity of economic resources relative to Turkey is another dimension of existing asymmetric power perceptions. In this regard, Greece’s small GNP and uneven economic growth as opposed to Turkish growth rate has been a major concern of the Greek strategic elite,13 but these kinds of perceptions seems to have

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been alleviated due to Greece’s economic improvement as opposed to the sharp economic crisis that Turkey has confronted in recent years. According to Economic Intelligence Unit statistics, while Turkey’s GDP has grown on average by 4 per cent per year since 1980, Greece’s has grown by 2 per cent. However, since 1997 growth in Greece has picked up speed to 3.5 per cent exceeding the EU average. The description of Keridis and Triantaphyllou of Greece and Turkey as ‘the strongest nations in the South Eastern Europe’ could be given as an example of a more confident Greek approach with regard to economic power comparisons.14 Only from the point of intangible dimensions of power, Greece has been considered more powerful than Turkey.15 In this respect, particularly two aspects of power have critical importance. The first one is the ‘social integrational power’ and the second one is the ‘relational power’. In terms of the social integrational power, which refers to a sense of social and ethnic homogeneity of a country, Greece’s perception of its power is based upon the belief that Greek society is more homogeneous and less prone to internal conflict. On the other hand, Greeks perceive Turkey, just the opposite of themselves, as a country that bears sharp divisions and social cleavages such as Islamists/Laicists and Turks/Kurds. Thus, Turkey is often portrayed as a thoroughly fragmented society and ‘a vulnerable state’, suffused with problems: ‘“Turkey is one and indivisible”, say the authorities in Ankara under the influence of the success of Öcalan’s arrest. Behind this seeming homogeneity which has become a dogma, however, there lives a multi-ethnic, contradictory and vulnerable country … which is confronted with multifarious decline.’ 16 Late foreign minister Dimitrios Bitsios went even further to state that, ‘Turks have complexes towards Greece. They cannot accept that Greeks progress, and distinguish themselves; that they are Greeks, while they themselves are mere Turks.’17 It is interesting to note that this way of thinking has never been shared by the Turkish strategic elite. In this vein, the Turkish strategic elite tend to believe that, ‘Greek policy towards Turkey is based upon; a) Dividing Turks on the basis of religion, faith and race; b) Turning Islam into a political issue; [and] c) Impairing Turks’ unity of power by inciting struggles among brothers … .’18 The Turkish strategic elite, thus, interprets Greece’s rivalry with Turkey as a cure for its domestic

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political strife and hence tends to view Greece as a country that provokes ethnic divisions with the aim of dividing the Turkish homeland. It should be stressed that this view has been further strengthened with the Abdullah Öcalan affair. Of particular note was, the discovery that Greece sheltered the separatist PKK leader in its embassy in Nairobi – a clear indicator of Greek ‘secret designs’ to divide Turkey in the minds of the Turkish society and its strategic elite.19 The second important dimension of intangible power where Greece has been considered more powerful than Turkey is Greece’s ‘relational power’, which derives from its well-established relationship especially with the western world. From the Turkish perspective, Greece is perceived as more powerful than Turkey in this dimension, which is formulated in the minds of Turkish elite as ‘Greece’s ability to activate alliances at the expense of Turkey’s national interests even when it has no right to be defended’.20 The Turkish strategic elite bases this type of reasoning upon the history of the loss of Crete after the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Crete had been granted self-rule by the Ottoman Empire. Soon afterwards the Turkish population of Crete was either massacred or forced to flee and Crete united with Greece. According to Denktas¸, ‘The Cretan struggle’ was taken as a model for the ‘Cyprus struggle’ as envisaged by the Greek Orthodox Church. Denktas¸ quotes Archbishop Makarios’ statement on 8 November 1966: ‘Cyprus always draws her inspiration from the struggles and sacrifices of Crete. The eternal desire of Cyprus is to unite with motherland Greece and fight for Greece. Our only and invariable aim is Enosis.’ 21 Thus, in the Turkish collective memory ‘the loss of Crete’ constitutes a hidden trauma and it is often mentioned to remind, ‘How Turkey may lose more land even if she wins a battle as long as the interference of outside powers persists to support Greeks’.22 What is observed here is the use of an historical analogy that seems to affect the Turkish strategic elite’s understanding of the evolution of the Turkish-Greek conflict. Today, because of the tendency of the international community to recognize the Greek-ruled Cyprus Republic as the sole government of the whole island, and its encouragement to enter the EU as opposed to the 1960 accords that forbid Cyprus ‘to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any state’,23

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the above reasoning among the Turkish strategic elite seems to be reinforced once more. According to the Turkish perception, by accepting the Greek Cypriot unilateral application, the EU has taken away from them any incentive to reach an accommodation with the North24 and the Greek Cypriot admission to EU would constitute an Enosis (union with Greece) under a new name. While Turkey and TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) have strongly objected to the realization of Greek Cypriot membership before a durable resolution is found, Greece and the Greek Cypriots have seen EU membership as ‘an opportunity to reverse the balance of power by engineering a situation where Turkey is occupying EU territory’.25 The meaning of Greece’s EU membership could better be grasped when one examines the discussions held in the Greek press with regard to the Greek cultural superiority: ‘One of the main reasons for the psychic loss of Ankara is the fact that it is conscious of Greek superiority. Greece is not only a member of Europe. It is Europe. And without its consent, Ankara will never be able to pass the threshold of Europe.’26 The second element of relational power is the parties’ relationship with the United States. Paradoxically both Greece and Turkey raise complaints about the United States not favouring them as much as the other. While Turkish grievances seem to be deriving from not having a well-integrated group of Turkish-Americans who would act as a strong lobbying force in the United States, Greeks express their dissatisfaction or disappointment with regard to USA because of not attributing to Greece the same level of strategic value that has been granted to Turkey or because the US is trying to pursue a policy of equal distance. As an example of the Greek view, Platias argues that: External factors have a substantial impact on Greek-Turkish relations in various direct and indirect ways. The most important external actor is the US, which has had a strong interest in both sides. It seems however, that Turkey is systematically considered more important than Greece in the American order of priorities. The American involvement is therefore asymmetrical; in other words, the US tilts in favor of Turkey in almost every crisis.27 However, according to Conalis-Kontos, the problem is not favouring one against the other, but seeking to achieve a delicate balance

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between the two: ‘The United States continued to pursue the ostensible objective of win-win in its relations with Turkey and Greece. Preferring a policy that would not overtly choose one (Turkey) over the other (Greece), the Americans aimed to have their cake, but eat it too.’28 The relational power assessments have gained new insights in the post-Cold War era. While Greece’s membership of the EU becomes a deeper strategic concern for Turkey in the phase of enlargement, Turkey’s relations with the US in the Middle East,29 Caucasus and Central Asia has created anxiety among Greeks. Greeks express their envy and worry about the post-Cold War developments that seem to strengthen the United States’ strategic ties with Turkey. Greek ‘uneasiness’ stems from the fact that Turkey as a strategic partner of the United States would have much more ability to bargain with Greece and realize its goals. In this regard some Greek academics argue that Turkey is behaving like a police force for US global dominance: especially Constas’ views Turkey as a ‘client’ of the ‘hegemonic patron’ who is ready to act for the realization of the patron’s goals: Turkey, America’s secular Islamic ally, came as a natural choice of a client state willing to serve as the U.S. policeman in the area, provided that such a joint venture promised to meet economic, strategic, and policy objectives of both client and patron. Unlike bipolarity, the current international system of unipolycentrism or creeping multipolarity strengthens the client’s bargaining power, especially when a weak state’s position and policies are important for the maintenance of the overall balance of power.30

Perception of Threat In international conflicts, predisposition to perceive threat could be traced to a variety of sources. In the Turkish-Greek case, the deep roots of perceptions of threat are very much linked with how the common history of both parties evolved in the past. Whereas Greece had gained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1830, the Anatolian Muslims gained their national identity during their struggle with Greek forces that occupied Anatolia in 1922. At the time of its independence in 1830, Greece consisted of the

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Peloponnesus and the adjacent islands in the Aegean Sea and parts of the continental land as far north as Thessaly. From 1849 to 1922, the integration of all lands with a significant Anatolian Greek population into the newly founded state became the driving force behind irredentist Greek foreign policy, which was called in those days the Megali Idea. Expansion was initiated in 1864 when Great Britain granted Greece the Ionian Islands. Greece annexed Thessaly in 1881, half of Macedonia, South Epirus and Crete at the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. The Turkish elite perceive this mode of expansion, which took place in the past, as evidence of how Greece could enlarge its borders at the expense of Turkey. The maps drawn by the Turkish strategists still stress the fact that Greece in one century grew eight times, as much as the initial size of the Greek Kingdom in 1830.31 However, at this point, it would be wrong to assert that threat perceptions related to Turkish-Greek conflict are automatically determined by memories of the past. On the contrary, in the era of Atatürk and Venizelos, Turkish-Greek relations experienced a relatively peaceful coexistence in the inter-war period. This atmosphere was an outcome of both countries’ needs to recover from the damages of war, restore their economies and build their respective nationstates. Furthermore the emergence of new enemies in the European political arena in the inter-war period helped Turkey and Greece to find ‘a common cause’ to act together. However, even though the two charismatic leaders perceived the need for peace and took steps to settle their problems and no major crisis was experienced in that era, the conditions for an enduring peace were hardly created.32 As Bar-Tal stresses, the formal termination of a conflict begins with the elimination of the perceived incompatibility between opposing parties through negotiation.33 Yet, the establishment of durable peaceful relations between the opposing parties depends on a successful reconciliation process. Such a successful reconciliation process requires a change of the ‘conflicting ethos’ and formation of the ‘alternative peace ethos’, especially with respect to societal beliefs about one’s own goals, about the adversary, about the in-group, about inter-group relations, and about the nature of peace.34 What we observe in the Turkish-Greek relations in the inter-war period is the absence of the evolution of an ‘ethos of peace’ which is a political, social, cultural and educational process involving all the societal institutions and channels of communication.

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Like an illness which erupts again in times of weakness, all uneasy feelings of Turks and Greeks towards each other that were kept under control in the inter-war period came out as a result of what happened in Cyprus from the late 1950s onward. British rule in Cyprus was ended in 1960 by the new constitution that vested sovereignty jointly in the two communities.35 However, as many Greek Cypriots regarded the settlement as biased against them, in 1963 they drove the Turks out of their positions in the government. As intercommunal violence flared, Turkish Cypriots called on the guarantor powers to intervene. Turkey as a guarantor power appealed to Greece and Great Britain to join it in a concerted effort to end the bloodshed in the island. Greece, being deeply involved in the Greek Cypriot leaders’ plot aimed at destroying the bi-communality of the state and abrogating the agreements which had created that state, refused to help. Great Britain, with her large British community of residents in predominantly Greek areas and her military bases at stake, did not wish to intervene. In 1974, supporters of Enosis staged a coup. When Britain did not want to get involved, Turkey intervened in the island. Turks and Greeks draw different lessons from the Cyprus conflict that have a deep impact on their present strategic behaviours. For Turks, what happened in Cyprus was the most important proof of the fact that Megali Idea was not dead, and that Greeks will exploit any window of opportunity in order to expand their borders. Since then Turkish strategy focused on preventing Greek attempts, aiming at taking territorial concessions from Turkey. While for the Turks, the Greek threat is mostly associated with unprovoked acts aiming at realizing ‘the secret designs’ related to Megali Idea, for the Greeks the Turkish threat is primarily defined as a direct ‘military threat’.36 When the ethnic clashes and an aborted coup designed by the Greek military Junta in Cyprus resulted in Turkish military intervention, it was perceived by the Greeks as an evidence of Turkey’s aggressive intentions and her military capacity of carrying out these intentions (see Heraclides and Bahcheli’s chapters). In defining the Turkish military threat, Greek analysts also refer to Turkish military expenditures and armament acquisitions as an indicator of Turkish aggressive intentions, though Greece is not the only quarter for which Turkish military build-up is designed. However, as Papasotiriou correctly stresses in accordance with the Turkish

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military scenarios, Greece is one of the potential enemies at which the military plans are directed: Turkish armaments are motivated in part by factors extraneous to Greek-Turkish relations, being largely aimed at deterring the Syrian threat to Turkey and fighting the Kurdish insurrection in Southeast Turkey. It is thus by no means the case that the increasing Turkish military spending is exclusively motivated by the Greek-Turkish disputes. Greek military spending, by way of contrast, is primarily driven by the growth of Turkish armaments and the need to limit Turkish military superiority vis-àvis Greece.37 In addition to this, it is important to note that Greece’s threat perceptions do not simply derive from military power comparisons made between Turkey and Greece, but they are also the result of an inevitable outcome of the imbalance between Greek and Turkish power in general. A closer look at Greek concerns may even lead us to think that all the elements of Turkish power are likely to be perceived as a threat to Greece. Foremost of all, in the Greek perception of the Turkish threat, the size of the population is a critical issue. In the definition of threat what we also observe is that while Turkish concerns are mostly related to ‘further loss of land’ and ‘encirclement’, Greek threat perceptions could be summarized as a fear of Turkish ‘occupation’. This could be interpreted as the parties’ attribution of different level of intensities to their conflict. For Greece, the Turkish threat is a threat directed to her ‘survival’, for Turkey, the Greek threat is to her ‘territorial integrity’. Nonetheless it is quite important to note that the power asymmetries held by Turkey are not automatically translated into a strong sense of security for Turkey. Despite these differences in the definition of threat, what we observe in the Turkish-Greek case is that both sides perceive each other as intending to disrupt the status quo whenever a window of opportunity appears. Similar to Turkish strategic thinking, Greek analysts also tend to think that Turkey is likely to adopt a fait accompli diplomacy against Greece when the following two preconditions are fulfilled: 1) the opening of the ‘window of vulnerability’ for Greece, that is, when Greece will not be capable or willing to resist Turkish encroachment; and 2) the opening of the ‘window of opportunity’

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for Turkey, that is, when it is unlikely that major powers with interests in the region will oppose a Turkish invasion.38

STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR 39

The strategic behaviour of Turkey and Greece is closely related to their perceptions of power and threat. To overcome the threats perceived, while Turkey relies on her own capabilities to deter Greece, for Greece empowerment through allies is the most fundamental element of its strategy against Turkey.40

Turkish Strategy Turkish strategy towards Greece is mainly twofold. On the one hand, it is based on maintaining a strong military deterrence to overcome the Greek efforts to challenge the status quo. In this respect, we observe that the Kardak/Imia crisis has further reinforced Turkish strategic behaviour patterns. The crisis ended when Greece faced the choice to wage war or to reach a political solution. As Greece decided to withdraw its forces from the rocks after Turkish commandos had landed on the islet, ‘coercive diplomacy’ has gained further credibility in Turkish eyes. On the limits of territorial waters, Turkey has similarly adopted a clear deterrent strategy by warning that an extension of territorial limits from a 6-mile to a 12-mile would constitute a casus belli. On the other hand, Turkish strategy is also grounded on continuous efforts to find durable solutions through negotiations.41 It is frequently stated that Turkey is ready to enter into negotiations with Greece, with a view to determine the possession of small islands, islets and rocks in the Aegean and to find lasting solutions to all problem areas in the Aegean that are closely interlinked with each other.42 Aslan Gündüz clarifies what Turkey means by the term ‘interlinked’: The outcome of one would necessarily affect that of the others. For example, a judicial settlement of the continental shelf dispute alone is likely to affect the future of other differences. If the continental shelf dispute and the territorial waters dispute are

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not addressed as a package, any further extension of the territorial waters in the Aegean by one party (read Greece) would considerably diminish the area of the continental shelf to which the other party may be entitled to make a claim (read Turkey). Extension of Greek territorial waters would adversely affect the position of the parties with regard to the other disputes. For example, this would affect the future of fishery rights or exclusive economic zone rights over the continental shelf of another state …43 Turkey also suggests that the parties should, in the meantime, refrain from any unilateral act that would aggravate the situation in the region. In contrast, Greece advocates that there is no problem in the Aegean between Turkey and Greece other than the delimitation of the continental shelf, which should be resolved only through recourse to the International Court of Justice.44 Contrary to Greek view, Turkey argues that the present tension in the Aegean cannot be explained only with the existence of the continental shelf problem as argued by Greece. Therefore, Turkey opposes the Greek acknowledgement of only one of these problems and neglect of the others, as well as Greece’s support of only one means for a solution in a selective manner. According to the Turkish view, this is not a viable option for the peaceful settlement of all these issues. Turkey believes that all problems should be addressed ‘as a whole’ together ‘within the whole range of means’ for their peaceful solutions. In this vein, Turkey proposes that all of the Aegean problems should be addressed as soon as possible to work out mutually agreed methods for their solution. They should therefore approach together the whole range of procedural solutions without prejudice (see below). These means are enumerated in Article 33 of the UN Charter, namely, negotiation, good offices, conciliation, mediation, arbitration and recourse to the International Court of Justice. Turkey considers each of these means referred to by international law as being equally acceptable.

Greek Strategy What is common to both states’ perspectives is the dominance of the logic of deterrence that is closely linked with possessing strong

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military power. While for Turkey, the only means to stop the bloodshed in Cyprus, for example, is to prevent its annexation (i.e. Enosis) to Greece, and the way to deter Greek attempts of a similar character is to have a strong military deterrence; for Greeks, the only way to encounter Turkish military threat is to extend Greece’s military deterrence to Cyprus.45 Whereas for Turkey ‘security’ means something to be attained through ‘deterrence’ based on coercive power, for Greece, this power itself is the essence of the threat that is perceived. However, since ‘security could not only be achieved by the internal efforts alone, thus empowerment of Greece through allies becomes a serious necessity’. As Stearns points out, ‘the major preoccupation of Greek foreign policy since independence has been to improve her strategic position relative to that of Turkey … Greece perceived a strong need for allies and has taken no major initiative that was not directly or indirectly, intended to create a more favorable balance of power with Turkey’.46 Greece’s search for allies has gained new dimensions in the postCold War era as the two adversarial blocs disappeared. On the one hand, the disappearance of the Soviet Union created a more flexible atmosphere for Greece to develop strategic alignments with powers previously viewed as the enemies of the western block. Greece’s efforts to build strategic alignments, particularly with Syria, Iran and Armenia, however, have become important security concerns for Turkey.47 Greece’s reliance on building alliances to counter Turkey’s power is very much in line with the assumptions put forward on the behaviour of ‘small states’ by the neo-realist theory. Accordingly, it is more important for the small states to join alliances because they cannot attain their central values alone, and their success in achieving their aims depends less on their own capabilities than on the strength of an alliance. In this context, it is assumed that even though small states are generally incapable of fully controlling and transforming institutional agendas, they endeavour to persuade the Alliance to adopt their perspective of the struggle.48 Greece’s assistance to the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) could also be discussed in the same context as another strategy of small powers. As Kaminaris underlines, the purpose of this assistance aimed at equalizing the power balances between Greece and Turkey and gaining concessions from a weakened Turkey.49 As opposed to Greek

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efforts to move the Greek-Turkish issues into the contexts of Greece’s relationships with other countries in an attempt to balance out Turkey, the latter keeps on trying to engage Greece alone with a continuous effort to achieve mutual satisfactory solutions.

Turkish Initiatives Turkey has been exerting numerous efforts to reach a common understanding on the Aegean problems and to develop its relations with Greece. The recent initiatives of Turkey regarding the Aegean Sea are as follows:
Turkish Premier’s opening to Greece in 1996 in which Turkey accepts third-party solutions, to be based on mutual consent, for the overall settlement of all Aegean issues.
The Turkish appeals to start contacts on all levels and to initiate cooperation with Greece.
The support that Turkey has rendered to the Group of Wise Men established between the two countries, in May 1997 for the purpose of seeking possible solutions for all Aegean issues in an informal and non-binding manner.
Turkey’s efforts for the realization of the Madrid Declaration of 8 July 1998.
Turkey’s proposal to fully implement the 1988 confidencebuilding measures (CBMs) package in the Aegean and to further supplement them with the new CBMs (see Appendix 1).
Turkey’s favourable approach to the US, Dutch and Luxembourg initiatives, formulated to settle all the Aegean issues.
Turkish proposals to Greece in February and March 1998.

Yılmaz’s Initiative in March 1996 On 23 March 1996, Turkey’s Prime Minister, Mesut Yılmaz, announced that he wanted to see a ‘Peace Process’ launched to resolve the tensions between Greece and Turkey; it was immediately turned down by the former Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos, who, when asked about his reaction to Prime Minister Yılmaz’s offer for a dialogue said; ‘The call for dialogue, in general, is rubbish!’ 50

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This was not the first time that Turkey has made a démarche to Greece over the Aegean. In 1985, the late President Turgut Özal formulated an opening towards Greece, suggesting that the two countries should find areas on which they could cooperate and try to place their disputes on the back burner. The initiative, which was much more elaborate than any of its predecessors, aimed at creating a new approach for the improvement of Turkish-Greek relations in the longer term. The important dimensions of this initiative were as follows:
Mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Turkey envisaged a whole range of possible instruments for a peaceful settlement. It was not ruling out any third-party settlement.
A Political Framework. Turkey wished to see the two sides produce a common document, which could serve as the basis for a friendly working relationship. According to Turkey this could be achieved in the form of a Political Document or Declaration to be finalized by the two countries or through an Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation.
A New Security Framework to help define military and defence aspects of the relationship between Turkey and Greece. It was thought of as a programme of confidence-building measures for military activities.
A Code of Conduct that would lay down the ground rules for the day-to-day activities of the two sides. According to this, each side would refrain from statements or actions likely to generate hostile emotions and would encourage an atmosphere of cooperation to develop. From Turkey’s point of view, the démarche to Greece over the Aegean in 1985 was one of the most radical Turkey had taken in relations with Greece for nearly three decades. Turkey’s stance has been that problems with Greece should be resolved through dialogue and direct negotiations. With this initiative Turkey was accepting the fact that the use of ‘third-party methods’ may also have a role to play. What is equally important is that Turkey was trying to create a ‘pre-negotiation process’. Instead of beginning this process with formal negotiations, Turkey was proposing that at the initial stage,

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the two sides could hold non-binding exploratory talks to develop a working relationship and narrow the differences between them. This process was thought to define the areas and issues under dispute, review the range of third-party mechanism available for each particular issue, and decide whether a ‘global’ approach is possible or whether different mechanisms would be required, and identify the precise results which may be expected from each third-party mechanism and consider fully the legal aspects and other consequences of resorting to particular third-party mechanisms. Other Turkish Proposals Most recently, on 12 February 1998 Turkey, through a verbal note presented to the Greek government, called for the settlement of all the Aegean problems by peaceful means and proposed to convene a high-level meeting between the two Foreign Ministries before the end of March 1998.51 The UN Secretary-General, the SecretaryGeneral of NATO and the NATO members were informed about this initiative. The proposal contained the following:
Jointly identifying the Aegean problems between the two countries.
Formalizing the ‘Madrid Declaration’ of 8 July 1997, which was agreed upon by Turkey and Greece with the initiative of the US Secretary of State, Mrs M. Allbright.
Developing and mutually implementing the ‘Confidence-Building Measures in the Aegean’ with the collaboration of the NATO Secretary-General.
Jointly initiating the Personalities Group process, composed of respected Turkish and Greek personalities assigned to come up with proposals concerning the resolution of bilateral problems between the two countries.
Upon the positive reply from the Greek government to the Turkish initiative, convening a high-level meeting between the two Foreign Ministries to discuss these proposals, before the end of March 1998, either in Ankara or in Athens.52 Following up its first initiative, Turkey presented a second verbal note to the Ambassador of Greece in Ankara on 11 March 1998. It

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brought the ‘Turkish government’s constructive approach for initiating a process of peaceful settlement of disputes between Turkey and Greece’ to the attention of the Greek government once again.53 . On the same day, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ismail Cem, also sent a letter to his Greek counterpart and invited him to Ankara to take up certain issues that could lead to a first step in resolving the problems between the two countries. Greece initially adopted a negative attitude by rejecting these proposals through the letter of the Greek Foreign Minister on 19 March 1998.54 Though Turkey has prepared detailed proposals about the mechanisms, which might be set up in order to create an effective dialogue between the two countries, Greece has always been reluctant to enter into negotiations with Turkey until recently when it seemed to change its policy. Turkish offers in this sense tend to remain fruitless, as Greece had thought that the very acceptance of negotiations meant a concession from its sovereign rights, like ‘accepting a defeat right from the beginning’. However, after the rise of G. Papandreou to power in the Greek foreign ministry, and especially after the devastating earthquakes which hit both countries one after another, Greece has been gradually shifting its line of argument. In fact, Papandreou’s acceptance of Cem’s latest proposals, after presenting it back to Cem in a slightly different way in his letter of 25 June 1999, started the latest rapprochement process, which in fact, is in line with the 1985 Özal proposals.

Third-Party Involvement One way of dealing with intractable conflicts, like the Turkish-Greek case, could be the mediation of a third party. US efforts to mediate Greek-Turkish conflict increased after the Kardak/Imia crisis brought the two countries to the brink of war. American diplomacy was not only involved actively in crisis diplomacy in order to prevent the parties from waging an unintended war, but also tried to lead a process of reconciliation between Greece and Turkey. Finally, at the NATO Summit in Madrid in July 1997, the United States was able to set up a top-level meeting between Greece and Turkey resulting in a declaration of intentions. The rapprochement engineered by the US aimed at creating a ‘pre-negotiation process’ by creating an atmosphere of confidence-building and enhancing

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mutual understanding. A six-point goodwill declaration was signed which included the commitment to ‘refrain from unilateral acts on the basis of mutual respect’ and ‘to settle disputes without the threat of force’: 1. A mutual commitment to peace, security and the continuing development of good neighbourly relations. 2. Respect for each other’s sovereignty. 3. Respect for the principles of international law and international agreements. 4. Respect for each other’s legitimate, vital interests and concerns in the Aegean which are of great importance for the parties’ security and national sovereignty. 5. Commitment to refrain from unilateral acts on the basis of mutual respect and willingness to avoid conflicts arising from misunderstanding. 6. Commitment to settle disputes by peaceful means based on mutual consent and without the use or threat of force.55 The Madrid declaration is a guiding document that contains a commitment to refrain from unilateral acts and the threat of force; hence it is directly related to the preservation of the 6-mile territorial waters until an agreement is reached between Turkey and Greece. When Greece promises to refrain from unilateral acts, Turkey has no need to stress the casus belli, which has incorrectly been interpreted as a threatening stance. The Madrid declaration, like all previous attempts aimed at improving perceptions of security across the Aegean Sea, had been short-lived.56 One explanation of the failure of third-party efforts is that, in the Turkish-Greek case, as seen in most of the intractable conflicts, parties are more likely to accept a negotiation process under the guidance of a third party whenever a mutually ‘hurting stalemate’ exists.57 In the Turkish-Greek case ‘hurting stalemate’ has important implications for third-party mediation efforts because only during crisis periods is the urgent need for American involvement felt strongly. As soon as the critical moment is over, the willingness to invite the US to guide a peace process disappears. This is especially valid for Greece as it is more suspicious of American

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mediation, since Greece believes that this mediation is biased, and that therefore it will work for the benefit of Turkey. If we take Greek complaints about the emergence of a unipolar world into consideration,58 then it would be more understandable why American mediation is not perceived sufficient for reassuring Greece. Secondly, Greece does not support American mediation because it perceives better alternative ways of defending its interests.59 Contrary to the Turkish tendency to argue that Turkish-Greek differences could better be overcome under the auspices of NATO rather than by direct US mediation, Greece prefers to discuss the Aegean problems in EU platforms, where Turkey is not a member. During the discussions on the Turkish-EU partnership document, Greece demanded the inclusion of terms it wants used regarding the Aegean and Cyprus issues. Since the role of a third party as a ‘mediator’ is quite limited, the real impetus for a change in the conflict situation has to come from the parties to conflict. In this context, in dealing with conflicts that contain asymmetrical power situations, it is largely assumed that it would be more appropriate for the party that has been perceived as having a high power status to take some initiatives in order to create an atmosphere of conciliation because it experiences more confidence. Regarding the Aegean problems, Turkey has been trying such an approach for a long time without much success. Although some of her gestures received the sympathy of the Greek public, the effects of these initiatives were limited.

A NEW ERA IN TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS

Greek-Turkish relations were strained further when Abdulah Öcalan, leader of the PKK, was captured after sheltering in Greece’s embassy in Kenya in February 1999. However, the Öcalan affair contributed in an important way to the shift in Greek policy. First it highlighted the failure of Greece’s policy towards Turkey and consequently it gave more important room for manoeuvre to those within the Greek government who believed that Greece’s political profile could be improved more by following legal rules and norms governing international relations. This new approach favoured conciliation to defend Greece’s rights and interests vis-à-vis Turkey. It led to the resignation of Foreign Minister Theodore Pangalos and to the

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emergence of a new leadership in the Foreign Ministry headed by the former alternate Foreign Minister George Papandreou. While Turkey was debating how Greece’s support for the PKK could be brought up in international platforms, the Simitis government moved fast to clean the debris of the Öcalan affair. A relaxation in relations with Turkey was immediately needed, first because of the Turkish accusations related to the Greek support of terrorism, and secondly because Simitis was seeking to repair Greece’s relations with the EU and to make Greece’s entry into the Economic and Monetary Union a top priority. Only eight months after Greece was accused by Turkey of supporting terrorism, Athens decided to lift its opposition to Turkey’s EU candidacy. Helsinki represented a carefully balanced package of benefits because, in return for its more accommodating stance toward Turkey, Greece achieved two important foreign policy objectives. First, the EU agreed that a Cyprus settlement would not be a precondition for Nicosia’s accession to the EU, and, secondly, the EU stated that all candidates must take any territorial disputes to the International Court of Justice and at The Hague if the parties fail to resolve their disputes by 2004. However, it is not possible to explain Turkish-Greek rapprochement only by rational calculations based on interest. The creation of a new era in Turkish-Greek relations was also a product of the mutual suffering that was felt after the devastating earthquakes. When Turkey was hit by an earthquake in August 1999, Greece was quick to join international efforts to provide rescue and help the victims, and Turks did the same when Greece was struck in September 1999. As both parties had sent rescue teams to help each other, their gestures were greeted by waves of ecstatic publicity and popular emotion in the press and among the masses. Intractable conflicts usually require two interdependent processes of reconciliation. The first is the formal termination of the conflict, which begins with the elimination of the perceived incompatibility between opposing parties through negotiation. The second is the psychological process, which requires the formation of a new web of relations of peaceful coexistence based on mutual trust, cooperation and consideration of each other’s needs. What we observe in the Turkish-Greek case is the initiation of a psychological phase of reconciliation before the formal termination of the conflict, as a result of the earthquakes that hit both countries during 1999.

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It is interesting to note that none of the conciliatory actions previously taken by either side was capable of creating such an atmosphere of ‘empathy’ as the earthquakes have achieved. In an atmosphere where conciliatory actions could not be easily attributed to self-interest (hence perceived as sincere and voluntary), they were more easily reciprocated.60 In this vein, what is also important to note is that the Turkish-Greek empathy has developed in a situation where the pre-existing images did not fit the actual reality. Particularly, the desperate situation of the Turks seems to pave the way towards a mutual understanding and sharing of the pain. Many Greeks saw Turks, for the first time, not as a ‘powerful enemy’ but as human beings. While Turks were more easily treated as ‘friends’ when they appeared on TV as ‘victims’, equally Greeks suddenly became most beloved friends of Turks when they ran to their help in difficult times.

A Fragile Peace Though both countries benefited highly from the rapprochement process which followed the earthquakes, relations became tense again by a new crisis during NATO’s Destiny Glory 2000 Military Exercises, which was planned to be carried out in Dogˇanbey and Saros Bay in the Aegean Sea, Western Anatolia and Eastern Mediterranean between 9 and 25 October 2000. The disagreement stemmed from the intent of Greek planes to fly in the air corridors over the Limnos and Ikaria islands. Turkey opposed this by arguing that these islands should have a demilitarized status in accordance with the Lausanne Treaty, thus, the air corridors around the islands should be left out of the manoeuvres. As Greek jets entered this air space, Turkish planes took off to intercept them. Ankara warned that such incidents could lead to unwanted consequences. Upon this warning, Greece requested that the NATO manoeuvres be cancelled. When NATO refused, Greece unilaterally withdrew its planes and other forces just as the manoeuvres were concluding.61 Turkish authorities believe that Greece tried to use this manoeuvre as an opportunity to have its position on the islands’ status, one of the Aegean issues, accepted de facto. Thus, Ankara’s harsh reply was aimed at preventing this, showing that Turkey will not allow a fait

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accompli.62 In essence, this new crisis was a result of the fact that although Turkey and Greece are experiencing a de-escalation period, none of the core problems have been resolved yet between them and therefore the relations could again deteriorate very easily. As the relations became tense again, the Greek government toyed with the idea of freezing a series of agreements (focused on cooperation against terrorism and organized crime, cooperation in tourism, encouragement of mutual investments, cooperation in environmental protection, cooperation in science and technology, assistance between the Customs Administrations, cooperation in maritime trade, economic and cultural cooperation), which had been submitted to the Greek parliament. However, the idea was dropped quickly after the two foreign ministers met in Budapest in May 2001, decided to continue with the dialogue, and agreed to bring the confidence-building measures on their agenda that would be implemented under the supervision of NATO. Furthermore, Greece and Turkey set 12 March 2002 as the starting date of their dialogue process aimed at solving the Aegean disputes after the two foreign ministers, . Ismail Cem of Turkey and George Papandreou of Greece had . declared in February 2002 in Istanbul that they had agreed upon talks. Greek Foreign Ministry spokesman Panos Beglitis described the talks as being an exchange of views ‘without an agenda’, and specified that they would not be negotiations.63 . However, with the resignation of Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem, one of the strong proponents of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement, and appointment of hawkish S¸ükrü Sina Gürel for ministry, shortly before the country plunged into domestic political upheaval leading up to general elections in November, the dialogue between the two countries slackened. Although the new government established by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) after the elections has seemed welcoming further conciliation with Greece, both in the Aegean and Cyprus, last-minute hectic diplomacy for Turkey’s EU membership before the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, and the raising crisis over Iraq’s future since then, have distracted Turkey from due attention to its dialogue with Greece. Thus, the low-key dialogue between foreign ministry bureaucrats, though continued, has not produced substantial results as of February 2003.

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CONCLUSION

Research on mutual perceptions and other psychological processes in international conflict has generally focused on parties who enjoy equal or close to equal power relations. An underlying assumption of many studies is that whatever social psychological dynamics apply to one party, applies to the other as well. Usually, it is assumed that the enemy perceptions held by one party and the psychological processes that support them are the mirror image of the other side. However, an examination of differential power situations, as in the Turkish-Greek conflict, does not support this thinking fully, as each party brings to the conflict different motivations, concerns, perceptions and analyses. What is interesting in the Turkish-Greek case is the emergence of an ‘incomplete mirror image’. The factors that are perceived as indicators of a threat in Greece (i.e. Turkey’s military power, size of Turkish population, etc.) reassure Turkey against what is perceived in Turkey as Greek secret designs, aiming at further division of Turkish land. The factors that threaten Turks on the other hand (e.g., Greek support for PKK, Greece’s alliance with Syria and Armenia) hardly matter for the Greeks. The Turkish-Greek case shows us that the differential power status affects the perceptions of power, threat and the intensity of conflict, thus to a certain extent determining the strategic behaviour of the parties in conflict. For Turkey it encourages enhancement of power to deter Greece, whereas for Greece, it reinforces quest for allies and indirect ways of weakening the power of its adversary. Greece is reluctant to deal with Turkey directly round a negotiating table, and attempts resolve issues by making their bilateral problems the problems of her allies. On the other hand, as Turkey’s feeling of security is strongly linked with its military power, and as Turkey believes that Greece tries to encircle it, it tends to rely and invest more in its power to deter multiple threats and this in turn may become a greater source of threat perception for Greece. Besides, what is interesting to observe in the Turkish-Greek case is that particular efforts to redress asymmetric power distribution further complicates the problems between Turkey and Greece by introducing new dimensions, as in the case of the

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Greek government’s support for PKK, and Greek-Syrian and GreekArmenian cooperation. Power asymmetry is a characteristic generally considered nonconducive to negotiation as the weaker party tries to prevent a faceto-face confrontation. Yet, in the Aegean case it is not clear whether the assumed existence of an asymmetry or a BATNA blocks the negotiation process. What we observe is the presence of a ‘vicious circle’ that is not easy to get rid of, even with the involvement of the main actor of the international system. In the Turkish-Greek case, related to the Aegean, only in crisis situations when a mutual ‘hurting stalemate’ is felt, is there room for an American involvement. Though American diplomatic initiatives may avert war between Turkey and Greece, such limited crisis management tactics cannot be relied upon to resolve the Turkish-Greek conflict. Adopting a comprehensive set of CBMs may decrease the likelihood of an accidental outbreak of hostilities. However, the disagreements in the Aegean would still continue to induce violence and cause instability if the problems were not defined and resolved permanently.

NOTES 1.

2.

3.

4.

. See, Yüksel Inan, ‘Introduction: The Effects of the Entry into Force of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention on 12 Miles Territorial Sea Limit’, in Seyfi Tas¸han (ed.), Aegean Issues: Problems – Legal and Political Matrix (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, September 1995); Hüseyin Pazarcı, ‘Ege Denizindeki Türk-Yunan Sorunlarının . Hukuki Yönü’, in Semih Vaner (ed.), Türk-Yunan Uyus¸mazlıgˇı (Istanbul: Metis, 1989), pp. 106–26; Aydogˇan Özman, ‘Ege’de Karasuları Sorunu’, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, XIII (July–December 1988), pp. 176ff.; S¸ule Günes¸, ‘12 Mil Sorunu ve Ege’nin Yarı-Kapalı Statüsü’, Dıs¸ Politika, VI, 1 (April 1995), pp. 73–95; Tozun Bahcheli, ‘Turkish Policy towards Greece’, in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds), Turkey’s New World (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001), pp. 131–52. For analyses of Kardak/Imia crisis, see Gülden S. Ayman, ‘Bir Krizin Anatomisi: Kardak’, Foreign Policy (Turkish edition), 2 (1998), pp. 111–12; Gülden S. Ayman, ‘Kardak (Imia) Crisis and Turkish-Greek Relations’, Etudes Helleniques/Hellenic Studies, 9, 2 (Automne/Autumn, 2001), pp. 49–72. I prefer to use the term ‘conflict’ rather than ‘dispute’ for Turkish-Greek relationship to stress the intractability of the problems. As John Burton argues, disputes are situations in which the issues are negotiable, there can be compromise, and therefore, do not involve consideration of altered institutions and structures. Conflicts, on the other hand, are problems that are likely to be ‘intractable, and to lead to behaviors that seriously prejudice the physical and psychological security and the future development of individuals, groups, societies or nations concerned’. John Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Prevention (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1990), p. 2. See, Louis Kriesberg, Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflicts, 1990–1991

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5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

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Annual Report (Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 1991). The term ‘strategic elite’ is different from that of ‘decision making elite’ in the sense that it does not only comprise the government and the bureaucrats but also academics and experts that both reflect and influence the state’s vision. This article will examine the sense of threat that parties to conflict experience, not necessarily threats that parties make or use. See, Nadim N. Rouhana and Suzan Fiske, ‘Perception of Power, Threat, and Conflict Intensity in Asymmetric Inter-group Conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, XIL, 1 (March 1995), pp. 49–81. Especially, according to the dominant Greek strategic evaluation, any comparison in terms of the capabilities between Turkey and Greece is sufficient to put Greece into ‘small states’ category. See, Dimitri Constas, ‘Systemic Influences on a Weak, Aligned State in the Post-1974 Era’, in Dimitri Constas (ed.), The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 57–72. Michael C. Geokas, ‘The Demographic Problem in Greece’, Point of View, at: [http://www.saeamerica.org/view/geokas/demographic.html]. Adesmeftos Typos, 13 September 1997, in Mariana Lenkova, ‘Positive and Negative Stereotypes of Internal Minorities and Neighboring Peoples in the Greek Press’, Balkan Neighbours Newsletter, 6 (1997), p. 46. See, Athanassios G. Platias, ‘Greece’s Strategic Doctrine: In Search of Autonomy and Deterrence’, in Constas, The Greek-Turkish Conflict, pp. 91–105. See Athanassios G. Platias, ‘Greek Deterrence Strategy’, at: [http://www.idis.gr/ people/platias.html]. As an example, see Charalambos Papasotiriou, ‘The Dynamics of Greek-Turkish Strategic Interaction’ at: [http://www.idis.gr/people/papasot.html], pp. 2–3. Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, ‘Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalization’, in Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds), Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization (Virginia: Brassey’s, 2001), pp. xvi–xxii. For economic indicators and measures for structural economic reform in the Greek economy, see Greece in the World, A Global View of Foreign and Security Policy (Athens: Greek Ministry of Press and Mass Media, 1999), pp. 21–4. As Zartman points out, tangible dimensions of power constitute ‘the most narrowly structuralist definition of power seen as a possession, something a party “has” and therefore something easily portrayed in distribution’. See William I. Zartman, ‘The Structure of Negotiation’, in Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.), International Negotiation, Analysis, Approaches, Issues (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1991), p. 68. However, if we are going to examine power relationship among international actors as it happens in the Turkish-Greek case, we need to consider all types of power that seem to be affecting parties in conflict. Ta Nea, 8 March 1999, in Dia Anagnostou, ‘Positive and Negative Stereotypes of Internal Minorities and Neighboring Peoples in the Greek Press’, Balkan Neighbors Newsletter, 9 (1999), p. 23. Kathimerini, 9 May 1995, in Panayotis Dimitras, ‘Image of Balkan Peoples in Greek Press’, Balkan Neighbours Newsletter, . 3 (1995), p. 7. Yücel Aktar (eds), Türk-Yunan I lis¸kileri ve Megalo-Idea (Ankara: Genel Kurmay Bas¸kanlıgˇı Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüd Bas¸kanlıgˇı, 1975). For a Turkish view. of the Greek support for terrorism, see Cem Bas¸ar, The Terror Dossier and Greece (Istanbul: International Affairs Agency, 1993); and Greece and PKK Terrorism (Ankara: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999). Manisalı, expresses current Greece’s diplomatic capacity in these words: ‘Especially, after Turkey had signed the Customs Union Agreement with the European Union, Greece got a chance to play cat and mouse with Turkey … It would be a big mistake if we perceive Greece as a country with a population of 10.5 million living under the threat of Turkey. If we take its political, social and cultural and its commercial

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21. 22. 23.

24.

25.

26. 27. 28.

29.

30.

31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

36.

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influence all around the world, it would be much fairer to evaluate it as a Mediterranean country which has the same influence as a country of 50 million.’ See, Erol Manisalı, ‘Türkiye Sertles¸meli’, Yeni S¸afak, 25 Ekim 1997, p. 9; and Erol Manisalı, ‘Yunanistan Krizi Neden Tırmandırıyor?’, Cumhuriyet, 4 October, . 1997, p. 8. For a comprehensive .analysis of Greece’s national power, see Türk-Yunan I lis¸kilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını (Istanbul: Harp Akademileri Komutanlıgˇı Yayını, 1994), pp. 129–49. Rauf R. Denktas¸, The Cyprus Triangle (New York: The Office of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 1988), p. 19 and p. 161, footnote 2. As an expression of this view see,. Mümtaz Soysal, ‘Kıbrıs Sorununa Yönelik Çözüm Önerileri’, in Kıbrıs Sempozyumu (Istanbul: Harp Akademileri Basım Evi, 1998), p. 214. The clear wording of the second paragraph of Article 1 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee prohibits inter alia, the participation of the Republic of Cyprus ‘in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever’. See A. P. Blaustein and G. H. Flanz, Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Cyprus (New York: Oceana Publications, 1972). At the beginning of the 1990s the outlines of a deal began to emerge: Turkish Cypriots would relinquish some territory in return for recognition as equal partners in a bizonal federation. But, once the Greek Cypriots realized they could treat with the EU on their own, they lost interest in the talks. Brussels has been bullied into accepting this problem by Greece’s threat to veto any enlargement of the EU. This once again reinforced the Turkish view that Greece’s alignment with European powers was and still is an important source of concern and anxiety for Turkey. Eleftheros Typos, 4 December 1997, in Christina Rougheri, ‘Positive and Negative Stereotypes of Internal Minorities and Neighboring Peoples in the Greek Press’, Balkan Neighbours Newsletter, 7 (1998), p. 47. Platias, ‘Greek Deterrence Strategy’. Marialena Conalis-Kontos, ‘U.S. Foreign Policy in the Settled Post-War Period: The Cases of Greece and Turkey’, in Christodoulos K. Yiallourides and Panayotis J. Tsakonas (eds), Greece and Turkey after the End of the Cold War (New York, Athens: Caratzas, 2001), pp. 385–406. For a Greek view, see Marios L. Evriviades, ‘Hegemonic Alliances and Destabilization in the Middle East’, in Yiallourides/Tsakonas, ibid., pp. 101–20; and Theodoros . Katsoufros, ‘Ege Deniziyle Ilgili Türk-Yunan Uyus¸mazlıkları’, in Vaner, Türk-Yunan Uyus¸mazlıgˇı, pp. 76–106. Dimitri Constas, ‘Challenges to Greek Foreign Policy’, in Dimitri Constas and Theofanis G. Stavrou (eds), Greece Prepares for the Twenty-first Century (Washington: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), p. 84. For the original use of ‘patron-client relationship’ regarding the expansion of manoeuvrability and bargaining power of small states in the post-Cold War era, see Panayotis Ifestos, ‘Patron-Client Relations in the Emerging Security Enviroment’, Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 4 (June 1992), pp. 35–47. As . ‘1964–1974 Yılları Arası Türk-Yunan . an example of this view see, Hasan Köni, Ilis¸kileri Algılama Analizi’, in Türk-Yunan I lis¸kileri, Üçüncü Askeri Tarih Semineri (Ankara: Genel Kurmay ATASE Yayını, 1986), pp. 81–93. See Gülden S. Ayman, ‘Settling a Conflict: Greco-Turkish Relations in the Inter-War Period’, CIDC Insight, 16 (May 1998), pp. 93–101. See Daniel Bar-Tal, ‘From Intractable Conflict through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis’, Political Psychology, 21, 2 (2000), pp. 351–65. Ibid. The 1960 Accords provided for a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vicepresident, both with veto powers. Cyprus was forbidden to unite with any other state and these accords were guaranteed by Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. For accords, see Blaustein, Constitutions of the Countries of the World. Daphne Papahadjopoulos, ‘Greek Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era:

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Implications for the European Union’, CEPS Paper, 72 (1998), p. 30. 37. See Papasotiriou, ‘The Dynamics of Greek-Turkish Strategic Interaction’. 38. See Platias, ‘Greece’s Strategic Doctrine’. 39. Analyses in this section are based on behaviour and strategies of both sides before the recent thaw in relations. Although attitudes on both sides seem to evolve towards a new approach, it is still too early to argue that this approach has become wellaccepted and a norm in relations between the two countries. 40. For Greece’s internal (defence spending) and external efforts to balance Turkey, see Thanos Dokos, ‘Greek Security in the Post-Cold War Era’, Thesis (Summer 1998), at: [http://www.hri.org/MFA/thesis/summer98/index6.html]. . 41. See Gülden S. Ayman, ‘Türk-Yunan Ilis¸kilerinde . Güç ve Tehdit’, in Faruk Sönmezogˇlu (ed.), Türk Dıs¸ Politikasının Analizi, 2nd ed (Istanbul: Der, 1998), pp. 543–55; Gülden S. Ayman ‘Türkiye’nin Ege Politikasında . Müzakere ve Caydırıcılık’, in Gencer Özcan and S¸ule Kut (eds), En Uzun On Yıl (Istanbul: Boyut, 1988), pp. 285–325. 42. See Sevin Toluner, ‘Some Reflections on the Interrelation of the Aegean Sea Disputes’, in. Bayram Öztürk, Proceedings of the International Symposium on the Aegean Sea (Istanbul: Turkish Marine Research Foundation, 2000), pp. 121–38; Sevin Toluner, ‘Which Straits Regime in the Aegean Sea’, in Bayram Öztürk and Nesrin Algan (eds), . Problems of Regional Seas 2001 (Istanbul: Turkish Marine Research Foundation, 2001), pp. 139–57. 43. Aslan Gündüz, ‘Greek-Turkish Disputes: How to Resolve them’, in Keridis/ Triantaphyllou, Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization, p. 95. 44. See Angelos M. Syrios, ‘Greek-Turkish Disputes; Recourse to the International Court of Justice and Stability in the Aegean’, in Yiallourides/Tsakonas, Greece and Turkey After the End of the Cold War, pp. 286–7. 45. The doctrine of extended deterrence is presented as a ‘corrective measure’ in which it aligns the military and diplomatic aspects of Greece’s strategy. According to Greek experts by adopting such a strategy Greece aimed at being proactive rather than reactive in the framework of Greek-Turkish conflict and at the same time reinforcing the bargaining position of Greek Cypriots. The doctrine of extended deterrence is being implemented through increasing defense expenditures on the part of Cyprus, acquisition of military systems by Cyprus which is compatible with those of Greece, joint strategic and operational planning, joint military exercises and creating a joint command, control and communication mechanism between the armed forces of Greece and Cyprus. See Christodoulos Yiallourides, ‘The Doctrine of Extended Deterrence as a Strategy of Containing Turkish Expansionism’, The Yearbook of the Institute of International Relations (Athens: Sideris, 1996); and Yiallourides, ‘The External Orientation of the Cypriot Republic’, pp. 352–3. 46. Montegle Stearns, ‘Greek Foreign Policy in the 1990’s: Old Signposts, New Roads’, in Constas/Stavrou, Greece Prepares for the Twenty-first Century, pp. 59–71. 47. See Gülden S. Ayman, .Neo-Realist Bir Perspektiften Sogˇuk Savas¸ Sonrası Yunan Dıs¸ Politikası: Güç, Tehdit ve I ttifaklar (Ankara: SAEMK, 2001). 48. See Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 163 and 168. 49. See Spiros Kaminaris, ‘Greece and the Middle East’, Meria Journal, 3, 2 (June 1999), at [http://www.meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue2/kaminaris.pdf]. . . 50. Murat Ilem, ‘Pangalos Ikili Oynuyor’, Cumhuriyet, 22 July 1997, p. 8. 51. For the text see [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/ade/adec/07.htm]. 52. See [http://mfa.gov.tr/GRUPH/release/1998/07.htm]. 53. [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPH/Release/1998/14.htm]. 54. [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPH/Release/1998/19.htm]. 55. [http://www.hri.org/MFA/thesis/summer97/section.html]. 56. See R. J. Gutmann, ‘Greek Foreign Policy’, Europe, October 1997. 57. Mutually hurting stalemate occurs when the parties perceive that they are suffering in their current deadlock: they cannot ignore the conflict and cannot escalate their

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60. 61. 62. 63.

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way unilaterally to victory at an acceptable cost. While such mutual perceptions of conflict can come at any level in a conflict, they are generally associated with relatively intense conflict behaviour. See William I. Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Richard Haass, Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes (New York: Yale University Press, 1990). As an example, see ‘Simitis: Only One Superpower Can’t Secure World Peace’, Xinhua, 12 June 1999. One of the sources of intractable conflicts is the presence of strong BATNA’s (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). If one or more of the parties to a conflict has a BATNA that they consider to be better than a negotiated agreement, they will not settle. See Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (New York: Penguin Books, 1981). See Gülden S. Ayman, ‘Springtime in the Aegean’, Private Review (Spring 2000), pp. 56–60. [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupb/ba/baa20/october/#bm08]. Ibid. See Alexis Papahelas, ‘Dıs¸ Politika Aksıyor’, Radikal, 2 March 2002; Yorgo Kırbaki, ‘Ege’de Diyalog Devri’, Radikal, 30 January 2002; ‘Umut Rüzgarı Getirdi’, Radikal, 20 January 2002; Deniz Zeyrek, ‘Yunanistan’la Ege’de Gizli Pazarlık’, Radikal, 19 January . 2002; Yorgo Kırbaki, ‘Yunan Elçiden Ilginç Rapor’, Milliyet, 22 . March 2002; ‘Greece and Turkey Discuss Aegean’, BBC, 12 March 2002; ‘Ege Için Diyalog Bas¸lıyor’, NTVMSNBC, 29 January 2002; ‘Protopapas Comments on Greek-Turkish Affairs’, ANA, 1 February 2002; ‘FM Papandreou Tells Ecevit Solutions “Legal” and not “Political” Ones’, ANA, 19 January 2002; ‘Diriöz: Search for Dialogue Between Turkey and Greece Should Cover All Problems’, Anatolian Agency, 30 January 2002.

APPENDIX 1: THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES (1988)

By the Memorandum of Understanding on Confidence-Building Measures (Athens, 17 May 1988) Turkey and Greece have agreed on the following confidence-building measures: Both parties recognize the obligation to respect the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of each other and their rights to use the high seas and international airspace of the Aegean. In conducting national military activities on the high seas and in the international airspace, the two parties shall endeavour to avoid interfering with smooth shipping and air-traffic as ensured in accordance with international instruments, rules and regulations. This would contribute to the elimination of unwarranted sources of tension and reducing the risks of collision. The two parties have agreed that the planning and the conduct of national military exercises on the high seas and in the international airspace which require the promulgation of a NOTAM or any other

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notification or warning should be carried out in such a way as to avoid also to the maximum extent possible the following: (a) the isolation of certain areas; (b) the blocking of exercise areas for long periods of time and their conduct during the tourist peak period (1 July–1 September, for 1988, 7 July–1 September) and the main national and religious holidays. It is understood that the planning and execution of all national military activities will be cancelled out in accordance with the existing international rules, regulations and procedures. With the view to achieving the above, and without prejudice to the existing international regulations and procedures, the two sides will proceed, when required, to due communication through diplomatic channels. The provisions of this memorandum of understanding shall have effect and be implemented in full conformity with the provisions of the Davos Joint Press Communique.

APPENDIX 2: GUIDELINES FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS ON THE HIGH SEAS AND IN INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE, ISTANBUL, 8 SEPTEMBER 1988

The military and other activities carried out by the ships and aircraft of both countries on the high seas and in international airspace will be conducted in accordance with international law and international custom, instruments, rules, regulations and procedures. In accordance with the above: A. The naval units of the parties will abide by the following guidelines: ii(i) They will refrain from acts of harassment of each other while operating in the high seas in accordance with international law and custom. i(ii) They will act in full conformity with international law, rules, regulations and procedures as well as military custom and courtesy.

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(iii) Naval units engaged in the surveillance of ships of the other party during firing operations and other military activities in accordance with international law shall maintain a position which would not hamper their smooth conduct. B. The air force units in conducting military activities in the international airspace will abide by the following guidelines: ii(i) They will act in full conformity with international law and in particular international custom, instruments, rules, regulations and procedures. i(ii) Pilots of the aircraft of the parties shall display utmost caution when in proximity of aircraft of the other party and shall not manoeuvre or react in a manner that would be hazardous to the safety of the flight and/or affect the conduct of the mission of the aircraft. To promote the climate of confidence whenever there are claims of acts contrary to above, the sides will in the first place inform each other through diplomatic channels prior to releasing official statements.

10 Perception and Rapprochement: Debating a Greek Strategy Towards Turkey KOSTAS IFANTIS

INTRODUCTION

Turkey’s status as a regional power is beyond doubt. Its economic potential, the size of its territory and population and its geopolitical location all make it likely that Turkey will remain a key player in the regional scene for some time to come. In a security environment increasingly characterized by ‘transregional’ problems and ‘transsovereign’ challenges, from a western and, especially, an American perspective, Turkey is certainly a transregional partner par excellence.1 What in the early years of the twenty-first century seems to be less certain is the role Ankara will choose to play and for that matter how the Greek-Turkish relations will evolve. In the context of a – let us assume, durable – rapprochement process, will Turkey become a partner and a stabilizer or will it – rather aggressively to the Greek mind – seek regional dominance? Given this uncertainty, the challenge to Greek policy is to find a posture that can encourage positive evolution in Greek-Turkish relations and respond appropriately to any negative developments in the short term, while also protecting Greece against the possibility that in the longer term, Greek-Turkish relations may return to a rather unstable course. In Greek public debate, although there is a dominant, deep-rooted perception about Turkish behaviour and (revisionist) foreign policy aims, there is a lack of consensus on what strategy can best achieve national strategic purposes. The central question in the current postHelsinki debate (as with the post-Madrid debate in 1997) is whether

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Greece should pursue, abandon or modify what seems to be a strategy of engagement. Many in Greece have argued that since no progress has been made in Cyprus, the Aegean and in Ankara’s human rights record, the engagement strategy, especially as practised by the Kostas Simitis government is doomed to fail. Some strongly believe that Turkey will never stop being a major threat to Greece and that constraining or balancing the growth of Turkish power should become (again) the overriding focus of Greek strategy. In effect, they imply that Greece must move from engagement to an exclusively containment policy. However, the Greek government after Helsinki in 1999, seems to remain committed to a process of ‘step-by-step’ engagement. Foreign Minister George Papandreou and the great majority of the cabinet believe that this strategy will produce many benefits by moderating the Greek-Turkish interaction, increasing opportunities for trade and investment and improving the situation in Turkey itself through its modernizing ‘struggle’ with European integration challenges. It is rather obvious to any student of Greek foreign policy and GreekTurkish relations that the policy-making and academic communities in Greece have been and remain polarized because they approach Greek-Turkish relations through the competing prisms of containment and engagement. The aim of this chapter – in the overall framework of ameliorating the Greek-Turkish security dilemma, and through the dominant Greek perception of the bilateral relationship – is, first, to show that both strategies have serious limitations, which are the result of a profound misreading of the new international and regional strategic environment. Neither is adequate for dealing with Turkey, which in the framework of Greek perception, is still a power characterized by a profound democratic deficit – by western standards – in its internal workings, which at times pursues policies that Greeks believe to be aggressive in nature, and whose future orientation remains uncertain; and second, to point out the fundamental requirements for an effective strategy towards Turkey: a strategy that can effectively result in supporting Turkey’s modernization efforts, enhancing the process of stabilization and democratization on the wider regional level, and in strengthening Greek economic, political and above all military capabilities, thus reinforcing a stabilizing balance of power in the Aegean. Such a balance-of-power arrangement is a sine qua non

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factor for the steady advancement of the normalization process in the short and medium run. The overall objective of Greek policymakers should be the gradual reduction and eventual abolition of the strategic competition between the two countries, and the advancement, at the same time, of cooperative and even integrative arrangements. The latter refers to reaching a stage – with time – where common assessments and common policies in an ever-expanding issue agenda can be adopted. In that context, the discussion focuses in turn on: first, the identification of the fundamental characteristics of Turkish-Greek relations as they have been shaped since the early 1990s. Greek-Turkish problems and their historical development are very well known and, thus, the focus is on the impact of the systemic change on the international and regional role, position and behaviour of the two actors as well as on the transitional constellations of power. Second, the central strategic question confronting Greece lies in its interaction with Turkey. What are the principal threats to Greek interests? How can those interests best be defended? What combination of economic, diplomatic and other instruments should be used to protect and advance Greek interests? These are enduring questions of Greek strategy, even if they are often obscured by political-partisan rhetoric and heated debate over particular military policies and defence programmes.

TURKEY AND GREECE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SETTING

The current phase in the development of Turkish-Greek relations is marked by the monumental events of the late 1980s and early 1990s. When the Cold War ended Turkey and Greece found themselves in a new strategic situation. With the end of the bipolar structure of East-West competition, Europe’s morphology was transformed and, with it, the nature of the bilateral Turkish-Greek balance. Both countries began – more or less successfully – to consider their new strategic options in a radically different security environment. In order to assess the evolution of the relationship in the 1990s and likely future trends and patterns of behaviour, several questions should be answered: how did the international and regional positioning and behaviour of Turkey and Greece change as a result of

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systemic transformation? Has the bilateral constellation of power been affected by the new security setting and, if so, how?

Greece: Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration? In the past, the advent of multipolarity stimulated policy repositioning. States were expected to readjust their alignments and change the course of their national security policies to accommodate shifts in the hierarchy of world power. The challenge for Greece has been similar. What was the impact of the system-level structural change on the country’s international position, power location and foreign policy array of options? While for many commentators, the collapse of the Soviet pole meant the triumph of the western paradigm of pluralist democracy, free market economy and their institutional safeguards (NATO, EC, GATT, IMF, etc.), for Greece world transformation represented a grave need to learn and re-adjust. Cold War stability was replaced by post-Cold War uncertainty and turbulence affecting the country’s northern neighbourhood. Less than orderly political transitions, bankrupt economies, sharp ethnic conflicts and border disputes on Greece’s northern periphery threatened and still challenge regional stability and vital national interests. Throughout the post-1974 period, Greece’s national strategy was based on containing the Turkish threat. The end of the Cold War added to the problem of the ‘danger from the east’ by ending a static regional environment. Greece could not remain indifferent to these developments. The disintegration of Yugoslavia clearly resulted in potential dangers to Greece’s territorial integrity and to its social and political order. Athens had to deal with the complex issues of the region brought about by the end of the Cold War. Greek strategy often seemed hesitant and uncertain. Events are well known, as is the failure of Greek governments to formulate a coherent and effective Balkan policy and thus play an important role in the resolution of the crisis. Instead, to a certain extent, Greece became part of the problem.2 Of course, the problems in the Balkans were not the result of Greek actions. But the failure of the Greek governments appeared on two levels: first, an inability to grasp the complexity of the situation – a situation, which apart from the problem of ethnic, political and social disorder, was aggravated by the involvement of

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third regional and non-regional powers that pursued divergent policies, and whose interests were not always compatible. The complexity of actors, roles, policies and perceived interests partly explains why the crisis in Yugoslavia was bound to cascade into neighbouring countries not directly involved, like Greece. Undoubtedly, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) quest for statehood and nationhood as well as the incoherent Albanian attempt to create a new ideological identity in the place of a bankrupt Stalinist model, resulted in a considerable security uncertainty in Greece which led to policy without basic direction and well-assessed goals. Although Greece was well equipped to deal effectively with negative Balkan conditions, Athens was caught in a vicious cycle of reacting to individual events, rather than understanding, evaluating and keeping ahead of them. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Greek response to the Balkan changes was a victim to the conflict within the New Democracy Party both at government and party levels, as well as the government-opposition confrontation that found expression in an oral nationalist competition, the focus of which was the ‘Skopje problem’. Therefore, Greek foreign policy in (at least) the first half of the 1990s found itself in a state of Balkan ‘suffocation’. The situation reversed itself, with the advent to power of the Simitis government in 1996. Greece seemed to be rediscovering its role and unfolding its capabilities to respond successfully to regional challenges. Cultural and economic ties to the peoples of the region, in conjunction with Greece’s privileged location at the crossroads of three continents, created the potential for Greece to become an efficient gateway to emerging regional markets. Greece has started to realize this potential by promoting free-market principles and securing democratic institutions. It became the first country to draw up a comprehensive Reconstruction Plan for the Balkans. Over the 2000–2005 period, Greece has pledged a total of almost 300 million Euro for the reconstruction of Kosovo, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and FYROM. A look at the business front shows the considerable increase in the number of Greek enterprises in the countries of the region.3 In the post-Dayton era, Greek foreign policy-makers have been attempting to play a stabilizing role in the Balkan region by formulating a comprehensive and cooperative approach to the region’s problems. The endeavour to define and pursue an appropriate

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strategy continued, with considerable success, in the Kosovo crisis as well as in the 2001 Yugoslav internal developments that led to the dramatic ‘change of guard’ in Belgrade, a change that seems to be opening up prospects of full democratization of that country and its fast return to international legitimacy. Greece’s upgraded role in Southeastern Europe is based on its strong economic performance. Solid progress over the second half of the 1990s guaranteed Greece’s participation in the European Monetary Union – the ‘hard core’ of the European integration process – as well as a constructive and continuing presence on the regional scene. A stable and dynamic economy is broadening its foreign policy perspectives and enhancing its capabilities as a partner in stabilization. At the same time, the perception of the Turkish ‘threat’, a heritage of the years since 1974, has taken on a different and more complex form given the new geopolitical realities affecting Turkey’s international position and its internal development as well as the nature of the challenges the two countries face in their bilateral relations. For more than twenty-five years Greeks have perceived the external threat as emanating from a single ‘source’ – Turkey. Military and diplomatic deterrence was indispensable to the concept of Greek survival. To Greek policy-makers the stakes seemed extremely high; successful deterrence generated at best an uneasy peace, whereas failure would mean the transformation of Greek islands and Cyprus into battlefields. Ironically, although the end of the Cold War resulted in the overnight transformation of the military situation in Europe, no other country experienced the change less intensely than Greece. The ‘new world order’ did not change the basic parameters as these have been consistently articulated by both Greek elites and public opinion. The Greek point of view consistently treats Greece as ‘status quo’ country, and Turkey as an adversary that has never stopped pursuing revisionist policies in Cyprus, the Aegean and Thrace, as well as aiming at altering the balance of power and interests in the region.

Turkey: External Anxieties and Internal Uncertainties Since the collapse of the Cold War order, Turkey has been deeply affected by changes on the domestic, regional and global levels. Over the years, Turkey has been able to exploit effectively its strategic

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position in order to obtain all types of assistance from the US, NATO, the EU, individual western countries, the USSR, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. At the same time, Turkey has been ‘accusing’ the West of not being responsive to its needs despite Turkish contributions to the western security effort. Turkey has attributed this to the activities of the Greek-American lobby in Washington and to EU’s discriminatory attitude towards its Muslim identity.4 In addition to using its strategic leverage, Turkey since the early 1980s, has ‘exploited’ the dominant neo-liberal economic policies in the US, Britain and (to lesser extent) the rest of western Europe to obtain additional economic benefits. The country’s political and economic elites took a strategic decision to limit traditional statist practices in favour of more free market economic policies. Thus, the Turkish message became ‘trade and investment’ rather than ‘aid’, which was unlikely to come to any significant amounts anyway.5 In the 1990s, the changing international structure left Turkey in a state of anxiety, because the prospect of losing its traditional Cold War leverage vis-à-vis the West and the USSR was considered – inside as well as outside the country – as real. According to Duygu Sezer, the collapse of the USSR ‘has had enormous adverse repercussions on an entirely different front: cohesion in the western world. For Ankara, this has meant less confidence in the willingness and ability of major NATO allies to continue business as usual with Turkey’.6 Developments in the East had outpaced whatever meagre prospects Turkey might have enjoyed in western European eyes.7 In sum, the changing geopolitical environment in the late 1980s and early 1990s presented Turkey with many new challenges. These included a fragmentation of power along its northern and northeastern borders following upon the strategic withdrawal of Soviet/Russian power; the multiplication of political actors in the wider Eurasian region; the emergence and, in some cases, intensification of local conflicts with the potential of escalating into larger regional conflicts; and the absence of an easily conceived and articulated threat, ‘further isolating Turkey from mainstream European political and economic developments’.8 At that time, the quest for a new role, that of peacemaker and regional stabilizer began. President Özal went on to define Turkey as a model for the region by its being Islamic, democratic, secular and, above all, stable in the centre of a disintegrating world from the

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Balkans, to the former USSR, to the Middle East. The Gulf War simply revalidated Turkey’s self-definition and role in the region.9 Security debates in the US and Europe acknowledge Turkey’s geopolitical significance and the need to reinvigorate relations with Ankara. In this context, special reference must be made to the concept of Turkey as a ‘pivotal state’. Turkey’s international position is directly linked with the evaluation and geopolitical assessment produced mainly in Washington. Turkey’s importance for the US has not changed after all. As has already been mentioned, many observers in Turkey and the West anticipated that Turkey would be a leading casualty of strategic neglect after the Cold War. Although the longerterm implications of developments in Europe, central Asia and the Middle East for Turkey’s interests and geopolitical orientation are not clear (yet), the Gulf War and subsequent developments have repositioned Turkey to the strategic front rank.10 For the US, the Middle East remains an area of vital importance. Turkey’s growing significance is much more powerfully defined by its centrality to a region of major instability and conflagration. Moreover, Turkey’s significance lies not so much in its geostrategic value, as in the destabilization and uncertainty that the (even remote) possibility of its decline might produce.11 The regional balance and for that reason the geopolitical value and role of Turkey depends and will continue to depend on a number of factors, which seemingly would contribute – not evenly – to either enhancing or diminishing Turkey’s role in regional and world politics, in the framework of the US foreign policy and security interests.12 These factors include the following: the relations between USA/ West and Iran; the Syrian-Israeli relations which are directly linked with the future strategic orientation of the former; the relations between USA/West and Iraq; the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East; the relations between the West and Russia as well as the general foreign and security policy goals of Moscow; Turkish-Russian relations, especially in the strategic environment of the Caucasus and central Asia; the continuation and intensification of the conventional arms race in the region and the horrifying prospect of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the stability prospects of the central Asian countries and the security of the oil routes; the security and welfare of the Muslim populations in the Balkans; the value and

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position of Turkey in the club of the big emerging markets; the more general American interest in the wider region; the issue of the control of water resources; the evolution of European integration, especially in the field of foreign, security and defence policy; the future of the EU-Turkish relations and the prospects of membership; and finally the issue of Turkish national power itself, with reference not only to the military dimension but mainly to the political, economic and social development of the country. The latter is of paramount importance and it has to do, mainly, with the management of internal uncertainties. As Ian Lesser has pointed out, the future conduct of Turkish foreign policy, and the future of Turkey as a security partner for the West ‘will be driven to a great extent by internal developments. Even if the overall direction of Turkish policy remains steady and pro-western, Turkey’s ability to play an active role in adjoining regions … will depend on political stability in Ankara’.13 The 1999 general elections produced a nationalist coalition of the right and the left, with a sharp decline in support for centrist parties and for Islamic political agents. The consolidation of military influence in defence of the secular state, which started with the removal of the Refah Party from power and its banning from Turkish politics, also means that, more than ever the Turkish military is a key interlocutor on foreign and security policy issues.14 In general, there has been relatively little progress in defining what a new agenda for strategic cooperation between Turkey and the West should include. It seems that the relationship between Turkey and the West still lacks a clear sense of direction. Uncertainty remains as to what big issues the two, together, can work for, or against, in a new strategic environment. Moreover, a set of anxieties has arisen directly linked with what has been an unusually poor (for Turkish diplomacy) perception of national capabilities and post-Cold War opportunities. For the first time in Turkey’s post-Ottoman history, the country’s foreign policy elites attempted to revise the traditional Kemalist precepts regarding the dangers of international activism. This attempt was largely in accordance with many analysts’ suggestions. According to Lesser, for almost 40 years, Ankara’s geostrategic ‘reach’ was largely limited to its place within NATO’s Southern Region. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and turmoil in the Balkans, Ankara was poised to play a leading role across a vast

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region, from eastern Europe to western China. This assumption emanates directly from a US analysis based on geostrategic projections which include expectations that Turkey will contain Iran in the East and Syria in the South, stand up against Russia in the North, and help stabilize the Balkans in the West.15 However, this attempt to establish new spheres of influence has so far not lived up to expectations. According to Kuhnhardt, that has to do with the fact that Turkey’s ability to project the necessary power as a regional force d’ordre is relative: ‘Not only has Russia returned to the region of its direct South, in an attempt to demonstrate what the geopolitical notion of a “near abroad” could mean to a wounded, yet relevant, world power, but the Western world has begun to discover the Caucasus and Central Asia on their own terms.’ 16 This development may imply a limited interest in the region or it may suggest that western actors have not yet clearly defined their individual interests, and thus not yet determined how to deal strategically and economically with it, which is more likely. This does not imply that Turkey does not have an important role to play in the region. Rather, it means that this role is analogous to its position as a fundamental and irreplaceable NATO partner in an area of volatility and unstable transformation. In the exclusive framework of western interests, this fact could assign an extremely important standing to Turkey. Those who seek to redefine Turkey’s role in world politics in terms of multiple options may credibly do so ‘only as long as they root their logic in the irretrievable fact that NATO membership is the single most important factor defining Turkey’s standing in the Western camp’.17 NATO membership is the basis for any Turkish strategic or operational outreach. In this context, the US (and NATO) has a powerful interest in security cooperation with Turkey for power projection in adjacent areas of critical importance – the Caucasus and the Caspian, the Levant and the Gulf.

THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE

In the context of the effects that systemic transformation had on Turkey and Greece, a central question is the extent to which change has been cyclical or cumulative. The general course of events is well

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known as also are the policy problems. What we need to assess here are the implications of the new structural changes that have occurred. What is and how important is the role of the USA? Given Turkey’s potential to pose a political-military challenge to Greece, as well as the uncertainty about the future course it will follow, how should Greece deal with it? What Greek actions can both encourage Turkey to follow a more cooperative policy and prepare Greece for the possibility that it will not? To the extent that these two objectives may come into conflict, how should Greece strike a balance between them?

Conditions and Actors Objectively, there can be little strategic rationale for premeditated conflict between Greece and Turkey. Open conflict would pose enormous political risks for both of them, quite apart from uncertainties at the operational level. Yet the risk of an accidental clash remains, given the continuing armed air and naval operations in close proximity and the highly charged atmosphere surrounding competing claims.18 The Aegean and especially Cyprus are sensitive national questions par excellence. Moreover, with both countries modernizing their military capabilities, the potential for destructiveness and escalation is far greater today than in the past. A GreekTurkish clash would have profound implications for Turkey and the West. It would also have operational consequences for the US. In strategic terms, a conflict under current conditions might result in an open-ended estrangement of Turkey from the West, since the Cold War imperatives that argued for restraint in sanctions against Turkey in 1974 are absent today. More broadly, a Greek-Turkish conflict might encourage ‘civilizational’ cleavages in the West.19 The risk of a clash and the likely strategic and operational consequences make risk reduction an imperative for the US (and NATO). The same is true for the EU. The relative stagnation in EU-Turkish relations, despite the decisions taken at the 1999 Helsinki Summit, has also contributed to the sense of disappointment and uncertainty, and has made Turkish behaviour towards Greece more unpredictable and perhaps harder for the US to control. If Turkey cannot strengthen its relationship with the EU – in the context of future membership – it cannot successfully

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pursue its legitimate foreign policy goals. For the EU it would be a disaster to ‘lose’ Turkey, but how to properly bind it to Europe seems not very clear even after Helsinki. EU-Turkish relations have always been complex. For many decades, Turkey has been a critical part of the European system, that is, part of the pattern of European political, economic and security relations. The question of whether Turkey is part of the European integration project is far less clear. ‘Despite a strong preference for a European orientation since the founding of the Republic, Turkey’s own sense of identity in this regard has varied with time.’ 20 The sense of ambiguity and ambivalence in EU-Turkish relations remains even after Helsinki. Helsinki raises as many questions as it resolves. Is the EU serious about the prospect of Turkish membership? Can the EU deal effectively with the economic, political, and ‘scale’ challenges posed by such an enlargement? Is Turkey really prepared for the enormous sovereignty compromises that integration implies? The policy implications for Greece are that the longer the relationship between Turkey and the EU remains overshadowed by uncertainties, the more the US remains ‘the only and undisputed’ arbiter in an essentially balance of power game. The (potential) deterioration of Turkey’s ties with the EU will further increase the importance of strong ties to the US. The US is generally seen by Turkey as being more supportive of Turkey’s security concerns than Europe. Washington has strongly backed Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership and has lent strong political support to Ankara’s security efforts. The nature of the European integration process has all the systemic properties needed to fundamentally alter the exclusive geopolitical, ‘zero-sum-game’ quality of the Greek-Turkish conflictual relationship. However, the challenge for Turkey is enormous. So far, Turkish elites have not had to confront the dilemma posed by a strong nationalist tradition and a powerful attachment to state sovereignty, on the one hand, with the prospect of integration in a sovereigntydiluting EU, on the other. Even short of full membership, candidacy implies a great institutionalized scrutiny, convergence and compromise. From the least political issues (e.g. food regulations) to high politics, a closer relationship with formal EU structures will pose tremendous pressures on traditional Turkish concepts of sovereignty

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at many levels. It is a process that has been difficult for all member states of the EU. Surrendering sovereignty has been one of the most fundamental elements of the European integration success. For an EU member state, pursuing nationalist options outside the integration context has become extremely difficult, if not impossible. If there is a ‘Helsinki spirit’, that more than anything else reveals the need – for both countries – for a more strategic approach towards each other. Both countries have a longer-term strategic interest in seeing Turkey’s EU vocation succeed. Such a success has the potential of changing Greece’s perception of threat, and fostering political and economic reform in a Turkey reassured about its place in Europe. The US and Europe will benefit from a more effective and predictable strategic partnership with Turkey. A key task for US foreign policy elites will be to make sure that Greek-Turkish brinkmanship no longer threatens broader interests in regional détente and integration. The stakes of bringing to fruition this strategy of reciprocal accommodation are extremely high. Lasting rapprochement would yield enormous benefits for everybody involved.21 However, such a rapprochement remains fragile (and to a certain degree nascent) for three main reasons. First, the strong view in Athens is that most of the changes have come on the Greek side. There has been no major shift in Turkish policy. Without a Turkish gesture to match Greece’s lifting of its veto to Turkey’s EU candidacy, it may prove difficult for Athens to maintain domestic support over the long run. The issue of the European Rapid Reaction Force is revealing.22 Indeed, the Greek government operates with the benefit of the doubt even within its own party confines. Second, so far the rapprochement has been limited to less-controversial areas such as trade, the environment and tourism. The really sensitive issues have yet to be addressed. The current climate will prove its durability only when these issues are included in the reconciliation agenda. Finally, there is the issue of Cyprus. While Cyprus is technically not a bilateral dispute, it is an integral element of the broader fabric of the relationship and cannot be ignored. Although there is a politically costly effort to downplay the linkage by Athens, without progress on Cyprus the current rapprochement will be impossible to sustain over time.23

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The Role of the USA To the extent that Turkish incorporation into the EU remains an open question for years to come, the Turkish-US-Greek entanglement becomes even more complex. The issue here is the extent to which US strategy as far as the management of the Greek-Turkish conflict is concerned will remain the same. We have already identified strong elements of continuity in US foreign policy in general. In the context of Greek-US relations, the analysis was in the past shaped predominantly by the Greek-Turkish debate. This was appropriate given the pre-eminent perception of the Turkish threat in Greece since 1974, but the rhetoric of this debate continues to shape both Greek and American thinking and strategy. As a result, the issue of US leadership – whether the US can continue to fulfill a balancing role or whether there should be a different American approach and subsequently a different Greek response – is given continuing prominence. The overall American strategic interests in the area have almost inevitably drawn the US into the dispute. The Washington approach was always a pragmatic one, since no American initiative has succeeded in achieving the normalization of Greek-Turkish relations. That is why the US has not been involved as actively as one might have expected in the search for a solution. Moreover, during the Cold War, successive US administrations felt that the Aegean issues were not as acute as some others, and therefore were placed well down in the list of Washington’s priorities. Although the dispute was recognized as posing a threat to NATO’s southeastern flank, the primary objective of US foreign policy elites was to control Greek-Turkish tensions and the implications of the problem for the function of the Alliance.24 Since 1980, what does exist between the two countries is a low intensity conflict, disrupted by shorter or longer détente breaks. It can be described as a relationship of manageable tension. It is, however, a situation that has the disturbing potential of escalating to a more serious crisis with alarming destabilizing effects on a regional level. It has already been pointed out that successive Greek governments have conceptualized the problem in fundamentally different ways. For Greece, the issue has always been one of a Turkish revisionist threat, and any attempt to normalize bilateral relations is

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inevitably conditioned not only by the thesis that Ankara should stop pursuing any anti-status quo policies, but also by the need to find a viable solution to the Cyprus problem, acceptable to both communities. The policy traditionally pursued by Greece had two dimensions: it has been both a policy of deterrence, and a policy of political de-escalation. This twin character has been compatible with the crisis prevention policy of the US, and has enabled Athens and Washington to converge on the specific issue of relaxation of tension in the Aegean. For decades, a major failure of US foreign policy has been its inability to get its two allies astride the Aegean to settle their differences through compromise and cooperation. Washington’s efforts have not, of course, been entirely fruitless. In January 1996, American diplomatic intervention prevented a major crisis from escalating into violent conflict. President Clinton, as Bush before him, repeatedly pledged to prioritize the solution of the Cyprus problem at the top of the US foreign policy agenda. However, succeeding administrations have been unable to exert the pressure needed to produce lasting results. The passing of time has done nothing to reduce the gulf that divides the island’s two communities or the suspicion with which Athens and Ankara view each other.25 At the same time, Turkey’s domestic political and social grievances have served to make it more inflexible and to aggravate Turkey’s relations with the EU and to a lesser extent the USA. In the framework of NATO, the augmented emphasis placed on Mediterranean stability necessitated, more than ever, a cohesive southeastern flank free from the Greek-Turkish impasse. In what appeared to be a critical step in easing an extremely strained relationship – after the 1996 crisis – the US in the margins of the Madrid NATO Summit in 1997 pressured the two countries to sign the Madrid Joint Declaration, whereby they committed to engage themselves to a peaceful and consensual settlement of their differences. ‘If both sides indeed adhered to it, the communiqué portended a significant step in advancing stability and security in the eastern Mediterranean.’26 But the expected shifts in relations did not follow. Cyprus, not specifically alluded to in the Madrid Declaration, offered the setting for new–old tensions during the same year. Joint Greek and Greek Cypriot military exercises a few months later were ‘enriched’ by intense and quite alarming dogfights in the Greek and Cypriot airspace.

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Although there is guarded optimism, the prospects for GreekTurkish relations remain uncertain. The Aegean and Cyprus will remain potential flashpoints and pose a continuous problem of crisis prevention for the US (and Europe). The Greek sense of insecurity in relation to a neighbour of continental scale and uncertain strategic orientation has been sustained by issues like the Turkish threat that a Greek declaration of a 12-mile territorial sea limit would be a causus belli. Of course, this is not a new development. Successive Turkish governments have employed such a threat since 1974. The new element is that Turkey found itself overburdened – being a pillar of stability in an ocean of troubles, on the one hand, and seeking to project its concepts of stability, cooperation and order in an enormous land mass, on the other. It was an exaggerated role with the potential of undermining its domestic stability and cohesion. In this context, US policy-makers face an enormous challenge to continue being successful in defusing any new tension in the Aegean.

THE REALM OF GREEK STRATEGY

As has been pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, Greek foreign policy and academic elites as well as public opinion are polarized because they approach Greek-Turkish relations through the competing prisms of containment and engagement. On the basis of the above structural and systemic assessment of the two countries’ positioning and power location in the new international setting, and given the deeply rooted belief in Greece that reconciliation passes through Turkey’s policy responses and internal reform, it is clear that neither strategy serves the key Greek objective, which should be to encourage Turkey to become more democratic and cooperative, while at the same time protecting Greek interests in case Turkey becomes more hostile.

Engagement as a Strategy In principle, engagement seeks to maintain and enhance relations with Turkey as much as possible in the various policy realms. Strictly speaking, engagement is a tactic rather than a policy. It refers to the means – increasing contact and producing a rather dense network

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of relationships – rather than objectives. However, in practice it embodies some assumptions about how such a tactic will achieve certain objectives. Engagement has had three elements. With respect to economics and trade, engagement has meant seeking an expansion of relations and a growth of exchanges. Politically, engagement has meant seeking to maximize bilateral contacts at every level, while pushing traditional disputes to the back of the stage. Under this approach, Athens has agreed to the Turkish candidacy for EU membership, a major political risk for the Greek government. Militarily, Greece has agreed to a policy of enhancement of military-to-military relations in the framework of NATO, with the specific aim of increasing mutual confidence and reaching an agreement on ‘rules of the game’. Engagement rests on the hope that growing economic, political and military contacts and cooperation will either transform Turkey into being more democratic (with the functional impetus of the EU) and cooperative, or, at a minimum, bring some kind of interest convergence. For Greece, enmeshing Turkey in the European integration system can socialize the (powerful) sceptical part of the Turkish elites into European norms of behaviour and increase their stake in a reforming course. The more Turkey is integrated into the European system, the less likely it will be to use force. Rather, it will act as a prudent and responsible member of the system, once it becomes accustomed to the ‘rules of the game’ and understands the benefits that it can bestow. For some, this is a bold assumption: that continued contact will eventually affect Turkish behaviour towards Greece in a positive direction. In the meantime, it is a fact that Greek (and European) engagement is helping Turkey develop economically. Thus, should GreekTurkish relations remain hostile, the engagement approach will merely have made Turkey into a potentially more threatening adversary. The problem is that engagement does not have any positive suggestions on what should be done when things go wrong. At most, engagement indicates what should not be done. It does not indicate how Greece should respond when Turkish actions come into conflict with Greek interests, as for example when according to the Greek interpretation, Ankara attempted to use the mid-October 2000 NATO ‘Destined Glory’ exercise to press home its demand for the demilitarization of the eastern Aegean islands. For many in Greece, the

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incident indicated yet again that the ‘much-vaunted Greek Turkish rapprochement is far more problematic than some officials in Athens think’.27 The majority view in Greece is that the Greek government does not have an alternative policy or, at a minimum, no parallel responses are available, which means it is ‘trapped’, ‘when Ankara’s standard expansionist policy is applied’.28 In the context of this kind of criticisms, it may be very difficult for any Greek government to obtain and sustain domestic consensus for such a strategy.

Containment as a Strategy Some have suggested that a containment strategy would be a more realistic way to deal with Turkey. The goal of such a policy would be to avoid an increase in Turkey’s political, economic and diplomatic power relative to that of Greece. This would include efforts to slow down the development of Turkey’s relations with the EU, thus limiting its expansion of influence. Containment assumes that allowing Turkey to expand its relations with Europe will not change its behaviour but rather it will embolden its leadership, making an eventual clash with Greece even more likely. Thus, even modest progress of the EU-Turkish relations should be resisted. Under containment, all elements of Turkish-Greek relations would be subordinate to the goal of preventing the growth of Turkey’s European (and international) standing. Couloumbis has described vividly this school of thought: Greece should abandon wishful thinking, trust less the so-called solidarity of its EU partners, and embark on an international crusade condemning Turkey for its poor human rights record and for its reliance on force to attain its foreign policy objectives.29 At the same time, Greece should continue to upgrade its military capabilities, and increase its military access to Cyprus in order to be in a position to thwart any potential aggression. Greece should, also, forge bilateral alliances. Without them, containment would be less effective. A policy of containment assumes that the impasse in TurkishGreek relations will remain. The argument is that Turkey, given its political tradition of Kemalism, is unlikely to democratize, or that even if it did, its policy would not become less bellicose, since it would have to respond to the nationalist passions of a large part of both its elites and populace. Therefore, Greece should both demonstrate its

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resolve to deter Turkey and take steps to prepare for a conflict should deterrence fail. Obviously, shifting to an exclusively containment strategy is even more troublesome and self-defeating. Such a strategy assumes that Turkey will ultimately become even more hostile, giving short shrift to the possibility that Greek-Turkish relations could evolve in a more cooperative direction. In any case, such a policy might very well cause Turkey to become more hostile than it otherwise would be by intensifying the already hard security dilemma in the Aegean. The underlying prediction of hostility can become a self-fulfilling prophecy, setting the stage for a confrontation where none would otherwise have occurred. Forging alliances will not only make Greece appear as a rogue state, thus, isolating it from its American and European partners, but it would turn an already dangerous neighbourhood into chaos. In general, containment seems to accept a fatality that does not appear to be inevitable.

For an Alternative Strategic Option With this in mind, Greek policy should transcend both containment and engagement. The best strategic option must be able to accomplish three things: preserve the hope inherent in engagement policy, while deterring Turkey from becoming hostile and hedging against the possibility that a strong Turkey might challenge Greek interests. Such a strategy could be called ‘balancing engagement’. It would continue to try to bring Turkey into the European integration orbit while giving equal attention to deterrence and preparing for a possible Turkish challenge to the bilateral arrangements, while seeking to convince the Turkish leadership that such a challenge would be difficult to prepare and extremely risky to pursue. In the post-Helsinki era, such a policy is not only desirable but also possible. It is possible because the insertion of the EU in the Greek-Turkish relations is a factor arguing for an optimistic view, a view that supports pursuing such a policy. Three points should be made: First, as Turkey successfully modernizes under EU benevolent tutelage, the Turkish leadership could further develop an emphasis on the importance of good relations with Greece and Europe. The modernization process will not have a clear-cut end point, and the

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Turkish elites as well as the Turkish society may still feel the need to ‘catch up’. The Greek example is illuminating. Second, the opening of Turkey to Europe increases the possibility of a transformation of the Turkish polity in a more democratic direction. The best idea may win out. Although the process of modernization could still produce aggressive external behaviour, the growth and consolidation of a genuine liberal democracy could lead Turkey to pursue peaceful and cooperative relations with other democracies. Third, successful EU-Turkish engagement is a definite ‘relativegain’ project for Turkey (vis-à-vis Europe). As such, Turkish elites and public opinion would feel that the arduous course of reform and modernization clearly pays off. That greatly contributes to the attractiveness and popularity of the European orientation in Turkey. At the same time, under a strategy of ‘balancing engagement’, Greece should enhance economic, political, military-to-military relations and cultural ties at all levels. This may help curb any tendencies towards military adventurism that might crop up from time to time. Since there is potential for conflict with Turkey over issues such as Cyprus and the Aegean, and since Ankara might seek regional hegemony, as a hedge Greece should ‘aggressively’ move on four fronts:
Push Turkey deeper and deeper into the difficult but modernizing alleys of the integration process.
Lead the way for a stable and democratic regional (Balkan and Mediterranean) sub-system.
Lock Turkey into various strong multilateral regimes that have been created to accommodate and satisfy needs.
Seek to strengthen Greek economic, political and, above all, military capabilities, thus making the risk of escalation – following a possible Turkish fait accompli (for example in Cyprus) – extremely high for Ankara. It should be indicated that such a strategy is agnostic about some of the key judgements about Turkey’s future – for example, whether Turkey’s enmeshing in the European integration system will modify its long-term objectives and behaviour, enhance the process of

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democratization, or whether Turkey will inevitably pursue an aggressive policy and challenge the status quo – as perceived by Greeks – in the Aegean. Instead, this strategy can sharpen the fundamental choice faced by a country at a time of its peril, in the post-Helsinki era – to cooperate for achieving mutual accommodation, partnership and, eventually, friendship.

CONCLUSION

Greek-Turkish differences are not new, but as long as they remain unresolved, there is a chance that some unforeseen incident could touch off an open conflict. Continuing disputes over Cyprus, over the Aegean, over European-Turkish relations, in relations with NATO (as, for example, the disagreement during the 2000 ‘Destined Glory’ exercise), and in areas of bilateral and multilateral relations with other regional actors, all have the potential to threaten bilateral and regional security and stability.30 Couloumbis and Lyberopoulos wrote in 1998: Judging by its size, the tiny Aegean island of Imia/Kardak does not seem like much to fight over. Yet in January 1996, two of the most heavily armed countries in Southern Europe nearly did just that. Without quick and effective intervention from the United States, the incident might well have escalated into a fullscale war between Greece and Turkey.31 The history of the two countries’ bilateral relations shows that such a situation might repeat itself more easily than many think. It is therefore of paramount importance for all involved to prevent the (re)appearance of similar, conflictual conditions. The crises of the second half of the 1990s show the ease with which a state of protracted tension between the two countries may degenerate into large-scale violence and warfare. Political elites in both countries should pursue a strategy that aims at reducing the risks and remove the possibility of armed conflict altogether, not only because war would result in an isolation of both from their western institutional affiliations, but because, even if they were ‘to secure some marginal territorial gains after some initial battles, a chain of revanchist

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conflicts would surely follow, classifying both countries as high-risk zones’,32 with devastating consequences for their economic and social development. The differences are not intractable, especially if there is a political incentive on both sides to see them resolved, and given the fact that there is a measure of goodwill among individuals – as the public response to the tragedy of the earthquakes revealed – that is not usually found in similar long-term conflicts. Greece would gain everything that is associated with stability and cooperation, first of all, an – at least – 1 per cent or even 1.5 per cent of a fast-growing GDP that now goes to defence spending. For Turkey, the gains should be even greater. However, the state of relations between the two countries is a product of the attitudes and perceptions of ruling elites and general publics, operating within global and regional settings. To the extent that Turkish policies or claims are perceived as ‘revisionist’ and challenging the bilateral status quo by Greece, Athens has no alternative but to pursue the strategy outlined above: a mix of consistent engagement and prevention, making it as clear as possible that its ultimate goal is a historic, lasting and viable reconciliation in the functional framework of European integration.

NOTES 1. Ian O. Lesser, ‘Western Interests in a Changing Turkey’, in Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian O. Lesser and Stephen Larrabee, The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), p. 48. 2. See among others, Harry J. Psomiades and Stavros B. Thomadakis (eds), Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing International Order (New York: Pella, 1993); Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis (eds), Greece in a Changing Europe: Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration? (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996); Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (eds), Greece and the New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities (New York: Pella, 1999); Graham T. Allison and Kalypso Nicolaidis (eds), The Greek Paradox: Promise vs. Performance (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997). 3. By the end of the 1990s, there were more than 1,200 Foreign Direct Investments of Greek interest in central and eastern Europe: 82 per cent of these are in three countries: Bulgaria (41 per cent), Albania (20.5 per cent) and Romania (20.5 per cent). These investments focus principally on trade (47 per cent), and to a lesser extent on industry (36 per cent), while the clothing sector accounts for 48 per cent and food and drink for 26 per cent. Greek foreign investments show the importance of geography in the sense that they are centred on neighbouring countries (Albania, Bulgaria and Romania) and especially in terms of their distribution within each country (i.e. in the south, close to Greece). On a bilateral basis, Greece is the second

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4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

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largest investor of foreign capital in Albania, and the third largest foreign investor in Bulgaria. Greece is the most important trading partner of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It ranks first among foreign investors in terms of invested capital and in the number of investing groups. In Romania, Greece ranked eighth in terms of invested capital and fourth in terms of established enterprises. See Lois Labrianides, ‘The Economic Consequences of Greek Business relocating in the Balkans: Thoughts on a possible new role for Greece in the International Division of Labour’, Defensor Pacis, 7 (January 2001), pp. 77–88. Van Coufoudakis, ‘Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and the United States in the Changing International Order’, in Harry J. Psomiades and Stavros B. Thomadakis (eds), Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing International Order (New York: Pella, 1993), p. 393. Ibid. Duygu B. Sezer, ‘Turkey in the New Security Environment in the Balkan and Black Sea Region’, in Vojtec Mastny and Craig R. Nation, Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power (Boulder: Westview, 1996), p. 74. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 74–5. Coufoudakis, ‘Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and the United States’, p. 394. Ian O. Lesser, ‘Bridge or Barrier?’, in Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser (eds), Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China (Boulder: Westview, 1993), p. 99. Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy, ‘Pivotal States and US Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, 75, 1 (January–February, 1996). Thanos Dokos, ‘The Geostrategic Role of Turkey’, in Yearbook 1996 (Athens: Ministry of Defence, 1996), pp. 144–7. See Ian O. Lesser, NATO Looks South: New Challenges and New Strategies in the Mediterranean (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), pp. 27–8. Ibid., p. 28. See Fuller/Lesser, Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China. Ludger Kuhnhardt, ‘On Germany, Turkey, and the United States’, in Dennis L. Bark (ed.), Reflections on Europe (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1997), p. 104. Ibid, p. 105. Lesser, NATO Looks South, p. 32. Ibid. See Khalilzad/Lesser/Larrabee, The Future of Turkish-Western Relations, p. 2. Charles A. Kupchan, ‘Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: Strategic Interests and High Stakes’, The Strategic Regional Report, 5, 2 (February 2000), p. 9. Turkey did not accept the accord on EU-NATO relations that every other member of NATO – including the US – approved in December 2000. The EU’s response is that Turkey should be involved in the shaping of decisions and the management of operations, when Turkish forces participate; but that because Turkey is not a member of the EU, it cannot claim the right to veto autonomous EU actions that do not involve Turkey. Because of this blockage, the EU does not have guaranteed access to NATO planning facilities at SHAPE. Furthermore, NATO has to approve any formal contact between EU and NATO officials on a case-by-case basis. This can have a hampering effect on the EU’s efforts to build up its military organization. Ankara’s chief argument is that the EU might intervene in an area of strategic interest to Turkey – such as Cyprus, the Aegean or the Balkans. Here lied the Greek uneasiness with the Turkish position. Overall, if the EU wanted to borrow NATO assets or command structures for an operation, all NATO members would have to give their approval on a case-by-case basis, which meant that Turkey would have the power of veto. But it worried about the prospect of autonomous missions, which it would not be able to veto. The issue remained unresolved until November 2002. In the Brussels extraordinary Summit a compromise was reached in which the original agreement between the United States, Britain and Turkey was modified, incorporating decisions taken in the European Council at Seville in June 2002. However its overall spirit

268

23. 24.

25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30. 31. 32.

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remains the same. Ankara will have a say on the European Rapid Reaction Force given that this will not have its own adequate defense infrastructure and will use – in most cases – NATO assets instead. Steven F. Larrabee, ‘Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: Is it Durable?’, The Strategic Regional Report, 5, 4 (May/June, 2000), p. 15. See Ronald R. Krebs, ‘Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict’, International Organization, 53, 2 (Spring, 1999), pp. 343–77. Also, J. Alford (ed.), Greece and Turkey: Adversity in Alliance (Aldershot: Gower, 1984); James Brown, Delicately Poised Allies, Greece and Turkey: Problems, Policy Choices, and Mediterranean Security (London: Brassey’s, 1991); Theodore A. Couloumbis, The United States, Greece and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle (New York: Praeger, 1983); Monteagle Stearns, Entangled Allies: US Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992). John O. Iatrides, ‘The United States, Greece and the Balkans’, in Coufoudakis, Psomiades and Gerolymatos, Greece and the New Balkans’, pp. 292–3. Victor S. Papacosma, ‘NATO, Greece, and the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era’, in Coufoudakis, Psomiades and Gerolymatos, Greece and the New Balkans’, pp. 61–2. ‘War of nerves in Athens-Ankara rapprochement’, Kathimerini (Athens daily), 23 October 2000, English edition, p. 6. Ibid. Theodore A. Couloumbis, ‘Turkish Challenge and European Opportunity: Greek Foreign Policy Priorities in a Post-Cold War Setting’, in Steve J. Blank (ed.), Mediterranean Security into the Coming Millennium (n.p.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999) pp. 259–60. See Mustafa Aydın, ‘Cacophony in the Aegean: Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations’, in The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, XXVII (1997), p. 134. See also Aydın’s contribution in this volume. Theodore A. Couloumbis and Takis Lyberopoulos, The Troubled Triangle: Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, Occasional Paper 98.06 (Athens: ELIAMEP, 1998), p. 1. Ibid., p. 2.

11 Rapprochement on Non-Governmental Level: The Story of the Turkish-Greek Forum . SOLI ÖZEL Relations at many different levels between Greeks and Turks and dialogue between different groups never really came to a full stop even at the worst of times. Businessmen conducted their affairs and quite often acted as intermediaries between political actors. Municipalities organized get-togethers. Many Greek citizens, either originating from Turkey or from different parts of Greece itself, visited their neighbour after the lifting of the visa requirement for Greek citizens in 1985. At the darkest periods of the relations there were many attempts, mostly inconclusive, to have a sustained political or conflict resolution venue that was not official. Although there always remained a level of communication, dialogue and constructive engagement between a wide range of groups and individuals, some meaningful and some not, no opening was able to generate its own sustainable momentum. In the prevailing atmosphere of insecurity, mistrust and intimidation that defined the 1990s, particularly after the Imia/Kardak crisis of 1996, many concerned Greeks and Turks from different walks of life looked for a workable ‘second-track’ diplomatic route. Arguably, a majority of such efforts proved to be in vain for a variety of reasons. The political or conflict resolution groups, as opposed to cooperative endeavours between municipal authorities of the Aegean islands and the Aegean coast, were mostly ad hoc, and the commitment in time, resources and follow-up could not always be taken for granted. In the best of circumstances the disconnectedness of the process undertaken by private initiative from official

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circles rendered it a dead-end track. Many initiatives suffered from the fact that the usual suspects appeared in most of them, whether these were academic gatherings, NGO meetings, professional conferences or panel discussions. Whereas all these efforts undoubtedly played a role as building blocks in the critically necessary process of confidence building between two peoples, for far too long immersed in their own myth-making and mutual vilification, no progress could be registered in resolving the outstanding problems between the two states. There was also the fact that unlike the Palestinian-Israeli problem, no incentive existed for the officialdom of both parties to search for new informal institutional arrangements for the resolution of bilateral issues. After all, Turkey and Greece were both mature states, allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, shared membership in different organizations and had fully accredited diplomats present in one another’s capitals. Whether they admitted it or not, there was as much reason for cooperation between the two in places like southeastern Europe as there was for rivalry. There was no state of war between the two countries in spite of an endless flow of recriminations, accusations and projections that at times may have bordered on the absurd. In the seemingly zero-sum game they were engaged in, the two parties took advantage of all opportunities to score against one another, keeping the rhetoric up, developing doctrines of war, looking for encircling alignments. There is no need to enumerate all the issues between the two countries, as they are dealt with in much greater detail in the articles that make up this book. It took the absurd crisis over two pieces of uninhabited rocks that brought the two allies/neighbours/rivals, once more since 1987,1 literally to the brink of war, to change the perception on both sides that this game of brinkmanship and escalation was not without a substantive cost. The atmosphere was then ripe for an opening on second-track diplomacy. Under such circumstances there would have to be recognition, on the part of officialdom and civil actors alike, that there is a role to play for informal actors in decision-making processes. These should go beyond the historically well-tested practice of using private individuals, businessmen, journalists who have extensive connections on both sides to act as intermediaries and message carriers. Unofficial organizations, think-tanks and others could act as agents of change

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and provide a propeller for policy learning and innovative policies. Unconstrained by established bureaucratic norms, rules and parameters, such organizations can attempt to redefine material interests, change the perceptions of groups and indeed promote social learning. In these times, the resources available to civil society in human, information, expertise and material terms make institutionalized second-track diplomacy an effective supplement to interstate relations, particularly in conflict situations.

THE BIRTH OF THE FORUM

The idea to organize a gathering of prominent Greeks and Turks with the expectation that there would be a follow-up and that beyond this opening a diplomatic track could be launched, originated with Jamie Bruce-Lockhart. Bruce-Lockhart, a retired British Foreign Office veteran who worked as a press officer in Cyprus for four years, took charge of the Roberts Centre, in London, a private charitable fund. The Wills family that prospered in the tobacco business funded the Centre. Previously, it concentrated on confidence and peacebuilding initiatives particularly in South Africa in the 1980s and later in the Middle East. In the wake of the Imia/Kardak crisis that nearly brought Turkey and Greece to the brink of war, Bruce-Lockhart believed that his organization could help sponsor a second-track initiative in a conflict that needed it much but did not have one. After all, following the crisis, some confidence-building steps were taken between the two parties with the help of their allies. The plan could be successful, provided that organizations that were well established and could be trusted by both parties would be willing to associate themselves with the move. Bruce-Lockhart chose Wilton Park as the site of the first meeting and arranged Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) to host the follow-up sessions. Wilton Park had an excellent reputation around the world for hosting important meetings where sensitive issues could be discussed without reservations and links for further engagements could be formed between conflicting parties. RUSI, as the first established British defence academy and with its affiliation with NATO, of which both Turkey and Greece were members, had impeccable credentials for both sides. The presence of such reputable

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organizations made the cooperation of the diplomats of the two countries easier as well. Wilton Park consulted with the British Embassies in both countries to choose the candidates who would be suitable for an ongoing process. Bruce-Lockhart also obtained support from both countries’ ambassadors in London in preparing for the initial meeting. The most significant aspect of the meeting that took place in November 1997, where RUSI assumed the chairmanship, was probably the opportunity for the participants from both sides to clear the air and present their perspectives, lay out their suspicions and perhaps expose their prejudices. It did help the prospects of the meeting that at the June 1997 NATO Summit in Madrid the two antagonists also reached an agreement under the auspices of the United States on how to conduct their affairs in the future. Mindful of the recent, almost calamitous crisis, the participants agreed on the necessity not to make this meeting a one-off event and encouraged the organizers to carry on with the work. It was thus decided that Bruce-Lockhart would go to Ankara and Athens to speak with potential participants and prepare the groundwork for the next meeting. Encouraged by the proceedings of the Wilton Park meeting, Bruce-Lockhart arrived in Ankara on the day when the EU at its Luxembourg summit of 12–13 December 1997 decided to leave Turkey out of the list of candidate countries for membership. Without any doubt, this was the most inauspicious time imaginable for seeking official support for a second-track experiment in TurkishGreek relations as Greece (together with Germany) was universally seen in Turkey to be responsible for what constituted a most unwelcome summit conclusion for Turkey. In the event, the Turkish government decided to break off political relations with the EU and the country began to turn inwards. Contacted at that time to be the coordinator of the Turkish side in this process, retired ambassador Cem Duna as well as his would-be counterpart in Greece, the politically engaged businessman Costa Carras, suggested that the meeting scheduled for early spring 1998 be postponed. Despite the interruption, the search for appropriate coordinators and the teams that would participate in the meetings, continued. Based on his observations of and conversations with the participants at Wilton Park and on advice from a range of international academics,

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former diplomats, journalists and the British Embassies in Ankara and Athens, Bruce-Lockhart began to select the participants for the upcoming meeting. In April Costa Carras and Paulina Lampsa, a key figure who worked both in the Prime Ministry and the Foreign Ministry, proposed Professor Christos Rozakis as Greek coordinator of the first Forum meeting. Rozakis was a highly respected academic and a known dove, a confidant of Prime Minister Simitis and the Deputy Foreign Minister of Greece during the crisis over the islets. He was earlier one of the two official ‘wise men’ participating in discussions with their Turkish counterparts on bilateral issues concerning the Aegean. Through the efforts of journalist Mehmet Ali Birand, an old hand in Turkish-Greek relations and a personality who enjoys close relations with many power holders on both sides across the political spectrum, Bruce-Lockhart contacted retired admiral Güven Erkaya. At first sight, this was an odd choice since the late admiral, who was the commander of the Turkish navy during the Imia/Kardak crisis, was considered a hardliner and one of the primary forces behind Turkey’s tough posture then and on some other occasions. But Admiral Erkaya saw the advantages and benefits of such an undertaking since he, himself, had been active in establishing better communications with his Greek counterpart in order to defuse crises that might get out of hand. He wanted to pursue an agenda of confidence building between the two countries and needed a platform to do it. The incipient Greek-Turkish Forum appealed to him as a concept and a possible vehicle to bring about the changes that he sought in bilateral relations. With the sponsoring organization, the chairmanship and the coordinators in place for the next meeting to take place on 15–16 May 1998, a moderator was needed in order to ensure that the difficult process of sorting through a multitude of thorny issues during the following meetings would remain on track. This was the cue for Dan Smith, then director of Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO), to take his place on stage. Norway and Oslo’s think-tanks had been jealously admired by the rest of the think-tank communities around the world. This was engendered by the contribution made by FAFO (a social science research institute with links to the Norwegian Labour Party and trade unions) to the Israeli-PLO agreement in Oslo that led to the Declaration of Principles. The Oslo agreement then led to the historical Rabin-Arafat handshake on the White House

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lawn on 13 September 1993. Smith, an accomplished academic with a substantial body of writings and experience on conflict resolution, turned out to be the ideal moderator as the record of the next four years would show.

THE FORUM TAKES SHAPE AND ITS FIRST STEPS

The first meeting of the Greek-Turkish Forum took place on 15–16 May 1998 in London. In addition to the two coordinators, Rozakis and Erkaya, both sides were represented by a mixed group of journalists, academics, businessmen, retired diplomats and .politicians who held a wide spectrum of views between them. TÜSIAD chairman Muharrem Kayhan, journalist Süleyman Gençel, journalist Costas Iordanides, businessman Theodore Papalexopoulos, Members of the Turkish Parliament Bülent Akarcalı and Ali Dinçer, independent member of the Greek Parliament Stephanos Manos were among the participants. As the statement released to the press by RUSI at the end of the meeting summarized it, ‘the participants agreed to form a contact network without delay that would seek to maintain and enhance the dialogue between the two communities’. To carry out the work that needed to be undertaken as the Forum institutionalized itself, the following sub-groups were formed: web site, public opinion survey, press and editorial matters, academic exchanges and conferences, documentation and history, confidencebuilding measures. Of these sub-groups nothing of substance remained by the end of 2000 and many of their original coordinators have gradually dissociated themselves from the activities of the Forum. The web site was built and mastered by RUSI’s James Ker-Lindsay and it is still running. Some of the essential information concerning the Forum and its activities can be found at http://www.greekturkishforum.org. For a variety of reasons the Forum opted not to have links to other sites, and decided to be overly discriminating about the articles that it would post. The result is that the site’s current content leaves a lot to be desired. The Forum spent a considerable amount of time and energy to get the organization of simultaneous opinion polls, similar to the ‘eurobarometer’ surveys of the European Union, to be taken in both

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countries. The results were then going to be published on the same day in major national newspapers in each country. A Turkish and a Greek social scientist would each write an individual essay interpreting the results and these were also going to be published in both countries. Although the Hürriyet newspaper in Turkey and Kathimerini in Greece originally agreed to sponsor such a survey, in the wake of the capture of Abdullah Öcalan in Kenya after he left the residence of the Greek Ambassador, the deal fell through.2 Unhappy with the tone of the coverage of the event by Hürriyet, Kathimerini dissociated itself from the project and no suitable substitute was found even after the amelioration of relations between Greece and Turkey that started in the summer of 1999. Most of the other sub-groups did not really take off. There was already a plethora of academic gatherings, conferences and the like so that yet another one organized by the Forum could not have made a substantive contribution in that area. Although the Forum tried and to a degree succeeded in bringing together parliamentarians from both countries in its plenary meetings, such contacts did not lead to sustained relations. As the Forum gave up on having plenary meetings after the last one in March 2001, both because of financial constraints and the lack of tangible results, such contacts under its auspices had also come to an end. On the issue of engaging in the writing of history, there were better-equipped groups that had already begun to work on that matter or on reinterpreting the historical record.3 There was also no visible sign that any of the ongoing endeavours would be interested in accepting the Forum as an umbrella organization. The media were an important source of the problems between the two countries. At the very least, they did not, in general, make much of an effort to rid their headlines, coverage and most often their editorial statements from an approach that inflamed the prejudices of the publics on both sides of the Aegean. Yet in the wake of the Öcalan affair and the beginning of the closer and cooperative relations between the two foreign ministers, the situation began to change. Representatives from the media in both countries through their respective professional associations came together in a number of conferences and took some steps to put a lid on the prevailing chauvinistic discourse in the way they reported the news. Although there is yet much distance to be covered for a truly objective,

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informed and unbiased presentation of the ‘other side’ in the media, the Forum no longer concerns itself with that matter. In the early stages, therefore, the most productive and consequential sub-group of the Forum turned out to be the one concentrating on Confidence Building Measures (CBM). The Turkish side of the group was headed by Admiral Erkaya who was at the time ambassador-at-large and chief counsel to Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz. Admiral Erkaya was aided by Professor Hasan Ünal, a knowledgeable and increasingly hawkish specialist from Ankara’s Bilkent University. The two other members were Ali Dinçer, a Member of Parliament, and Captain Ziya Bülent, Admiral Erkaya’s aide-decamp. The Greek side was headed by Professor Rozakis, aided by Paulina Lampsa. The other two members on the Greek side were Professor Theodore Couloumbis from Athens University, and retired Ambassador Costas Zepos. Professor Couloumbis was an internationally renowned scholar of International Relations and one of the two ‘wise men’ on the Greek side designated to discuss Aegean matters with their Turkish counterparts. Ambassador Zepos was a highly respected diplomat, who negotiated Greece’s accession to the European Community and had been active in Turco-Greek affairs. James Ker-Lindsay of RUSI and Dan Smith of PRIO participated in the deliberations of the sub-group as well. The CBM sub-group held two substantive meetings after the May launch. The Turkish side came prepared to the meeting in Athens that took place on 19–20 September 1998 with a draft proposal on CBMs. The discussion that ensued was thorough, constructive, far-reaching and frank. The absence of a military person on the Greek side who could discuss the technical aspects of military CBMs was deemed by all participants to be unfortunate especially given the open and problem-solving . oriented nature of the discussion. The group met once more in Istanbul on 24–25 October 1998. By then Professor Rozakis had to leave the Forum as he was appointed to the European Court on Human Rights. Costas Zepos replaced him as the Greek party’s head in the CBM group. Costas Carras, with his boundless energy, assumed the role of the overall coordinator of the Greek party in the Forum. At the end of the deliberations the group prepared a report outlining the Suggested Confidence Building Measures and Crisis Avoidance Measures (CAMs), to be submitted to the plenary

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meeting that was scheduled to take place on 6–8 November at Delphi, Greece.4 The Report was never made public but it included proposals that covered three different areas: Non-Governmental, InterGovernmental and Peacekeeping and Military Related Proposals.5 The proposals that were made were characterized as either CBMs or CAMs. It specified by whom the measures would have to be implemented. For each proposal the question as to whether or not it needed governmental, non-governmental or a mixed approach was raised. Although the Report was never officially submitted to the two governments, undoubtedly the nature and content of the discussions were relayed to the relevant authorities. This may have contributed to the continuation of the more relaxed atmosphere between the two countries that began a year earlier and may have helped the containment of the frictions that erupted in the succeeding years either during NATO exercises or because of the dog fights over the Aegean. Following its second plenary in November, the critical threshold for the Forum was passed in the wake of the Öcalan affair and the group came into its own. The circumstances surrounding the apprehension of Öcalan unsurprisingly generated great tension between Turkey and Greece. Not only were the two governments seriously at odds with one another, but long-standing collaborative enterprises were also threatened. The Turkish-Greek Business Council’s meeting was cancelled because of the Turkish side’s unilateral decision. Individual Turks, long associated with favouring friendly relations between Turkey and Greece, took to recriminations. Suddenly, almost all efforts to build bridges between Greece and Turkey and Turks and Greeks came to a halt. It was to the credit of the Forum and the high point of its existence that under the blistering winds of the postÖcalan climate, its CBM sub-group met. in Athens in April 1999 and the plenary was convened in May in Istanbul.6 By then the ailing Admiral Erkaya was replaced as coordinator of the Turkish side by . former Foreign Minister Ilter Türkmen who had a long and distinguished career as a diplomat and also served as ambassador in Athens. The very fact that these meetings took place was an important landmark in the growth and maturing of the Forum. It was also

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widely agreed at that time, despite some strong dissent, that in addition to the CBMs the Forum in general and the CBM sub-group in particular had to involve themselves with political analysis as well. The shakedown in Greece following the Öcalan affair, the replacement of Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos by Yorgos Papandreou who had a significantly different temperament and approach to Turkish-Greek relations were considered to be positive developments. On the other hand, partially as a result of the apprehension of Öcalan, the April 1999 elections in Turkey recorded an upsurge of nationalism and brought to power a coalition government of the left and right nationalists along with a centre-right party, under the premiership of Bülent Ecevit. The spring of 1999 was also the time of the NATO intervention in Serbia that aimed at protecting the Albanians of the province of Kosovo. Whereas the Greek public vehemently opposed the intervention, the Turkish public was delighted that NATO, in whose operations the Turkish Air Force also participated, would not allow a repeat of Bosnia. The concerns that the Turkish government had, about potentially supporting a separatist movement, remained unarticulated. The Greek government trod a delicate line between its alliance obligations and the fury of its own public and managed to conduct a successful policy. It also transpired both before and during the Kosovo crisis that all the loose talk about this war eventually engulfing Turkey and Greece and possibly Bulgaria as well was just speculation. The two countries had a strong interest in making sure that the conflict remained contained, that the operation was finalized in a short time and that stabilization started immediately. It was partially because of the personnel change in Greece and partially because of the commonality of interests in southeast Europe, which became so evident by the recent crisis in Kosovo, that the icebreaking meeting of two foreign ministers took place in New York on 30 June 1999. Sensing that the turn of the mood in the relations provided an important opportunity, the Forum decided to come forward and present some of the conclusions from its work to date to the two ministers. The CBM group met in Athens to discuss the recent developments and to decide on the proper course of action. In a letter dated 7 July 1999, Admiral Cobbold from RUSI and Dan Smith from

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PRIO, two of the facilitators, wrote to Ministers Cem and Papandreou on behalf of the Greek-Turkish Forum. In the letter, after mentioning the two ministers’ recent exchange of letters and their meeting in New York, Cobbold and Smith presented ten proposals that were agreed upon at the Athens meeting. In the words of the letter: These ten proposals are not an exhaustive list of possible measures. They draw on the background of discussion over the past fourteen months. Participants selected them on the basis of practicality and the potential for quick implementation without extensive staff preparation. These relatively modest yet meaningful steps are aimed at addressing the five areas you discussed in your meeting in New York. The ten proposals are as follows: Peacekeeping
Arrange liaison and co-operation between Greek and Turkish contingents in KFOR [United Nations Kosovo Force].
Convene a conference for Greek and Turkish staff officers on the lessons learned from the experience of Operation Alba. Official Conduct and Communication
Authorize direct contact and communication between the ministers of the two governments who handle the issues highlighted in your meeting of June 30, specifically: Culture; Tourism; Trade; Public Order/Interior; [and] Environment.
Hold regular meetings of the Under-Secretaries of the two Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Business Cooperation
In order to strengthen the prospects for business and investment between the two countries, select and implement one of the existing proposals for the prevention of double taxation.
Implement the project on mutual restoration of monuments developed over several years by meetings of businessmen from Greece and Turkey

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Exchanges and Contacts
Encourage exchanges of lectures to university students by government ministers.
Facilitate special visa arrangements for journalists and businessmen.
Encourage local authorities of the two countries to work together to foster tourism.
Ensure that the encouragement given to contacts between local non-governmental organizations of both countries is endorsed through direct practical assistance. Given the feedback provided to the governments by some of the participants in Forum meetings, perhaps it was not at all surprising that this list of proposals and the list of the agreements signed between Greece and Turkey, including the pending agreement on double taxation, had a lot of items in common.7 In August and September 1999, the two countries were both literally shaken by strong earthquakes. The Greek public’s compassionate response and generous help in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake in Turkey on 17 August that claimed at least 15,000 lives broke the ice between the two societies. The Turks reciprocated with the full force of their emotions when Greece too was hit by an earthquake a few weeks later.8 With these lethal acts of nature, the two neighbouring peoples have rediscovered each other’s humanity and changed their attitude towards one another. The stage was truly set for a rapprochement that was expected to bear its first fruit at the Helsinki summit of the EU in December 1999. The circumstances were auspicious for the Forum to carry on its work and produce papers to address the tangible problems between the two countries. By the end of 1999, the CBM group became the Political Analysis Group (PAG) and effectively overtook the Forum whose plenary meetings would prove to be less and less useful. At the end of 2000 both RUSI and the Roberts Centre exited in accordance with an earlier decision to localize the process. The Foreign Ministries provided the financing for the PAG meetings that took . place six times a year, evenly divided between Athens and Istanbul. PRIO remained on board and Dan Smith continued as the facilitator with Jamie Bruce-Lockhart, retired from the Roberts Centre as well, assisting him as co-facilitator.

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THE WORK OF THE PAG

By the beginning of 2000, many of the original participants in the Forum had gone their way. The core group that would tackle the issue of formulating policy frameworks for the Aegean and possibly for Cyprus decided to try the European Union as well for recognition and funding consisted of the following individuals: Costas Carras, Costas Zepos, Theodore Couloumbis, Arghyris Fatouros (a wellrespected professor of law at the University of Athens who served as the Minister of Communications prior to the Greek elections in 2000, and currently a wise man on the Greek side for discussing the Aegean issues), Thanos Veremis (another well-respected professor from Athens University who wrote extensively on TurkishGreek relations) and Paulina Lampsa made up the Greek side. . Ilter Türkmen, Ziya Bülent, Cem Duna, Mehmet Ali Birand, Sami Kohen (the doyen of Turkish foreign policy commentators and a well-respected journalist), Muharrem Kayhan (an industrialist and former chairman of Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association, who left the group after the Aegean paper) and Soli Özel were the members of PAG on the Turkish side. Birand and Kohen could rarely participate in meetings because of schedule conflicts. In 2000 Özdem Sanberk, a seasoned diplomat who served as the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Turkish Ambassador in London when the Forum was being launched, joined the group. Üstün Ergüder, an eminent political scientist and the former rector . of Bogˇaziçi University, Istanbul, followed suit in 2001. Until RUSI officially withdrew from the Forum, Jonathan Eyal, a senior associate of RUSI, made invaluable contributions to the deliberations of the PAG. The members of the PAG hold a wide variety of views, and have different temperaments and negotiation styles. This fact both enriches the debate and complicates the progress of the discussions. The meetings usually open with a brief presentation by the two coordinators on Turkish and Greek political developments and the political calendar. The political calendar usually serves to determine what can or cannot be done at a specific date. There are differences of opinion, as would be expected between the two groups; but more interestingly there are also serious differences within each group as to the approach to certain topics or the best way to tackle a specific

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issue. The discussions usually take place within the bounds of civility and comity, in spite of the fact that all participants are fairly opinionated and express their views with passion. The occasional flare-up of tempers is well contained. What keeps the group disciplined is its concentration on the framework of common interests that it devised for itself. Dan Smith’s interventions and guidance also play a constructive part in keeping the group to its task. The group also proved considerably imaginative in finding ways to break gridlocks and move forward. The key to the exceptionally smooth operation of the PAG meetings, besides the presence of competent facilitators, is the fact that the members have weathered the worst period in TurkishGreek relations. Having met fairly regularly, in an engaged fashion, to discuss issues of mutual concern, they developed mutual trust, which enabled them as individuals to be as forthcoming as possible. The major achievement of the PAG/Forum to date has been the publication of its report entitled Issues in the Aegean: Openings and Possibilities (see Appendix). The report was the fruit of many months of discussions and most specifically two meetings, one in Athens, the . other in Istanbul, in April and June 2000 respectively, devoted entirely to drafting the paper. During these sessions the points that were agreed upon would be put in draft form by the facilitators and then debated, altered, contended and finally agreed upon. The finalized report was presented to both Foreign Ministers on 23 June 2000 by the co-coordinators, Carras and Türkmen. As the paper stated, its ‘preferred methodology is to start not from legal or political positions and arguments, but from an assessment of interests – common interests to start with, but each state’s particular interests as well’. Referring to an earlier memorandum submitted to the EU officials in Brussels during a visit in March 2000 and then to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of both countries, the Forum identified the following common interests of Greece and Turkey:
A fundamental interest in freedom of navigation [in the Aegean].
An interest in cooperation on environmental protection, on search and rescue, and policing.
An interest in cooperation in promoting tourism.
An interest in ensuring [that] there is no use or threat of force in the pursuit of attempted settlement of differences.

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An interest in understanding each other’s attitude as to whether, when and how the issue should go to the International Court of Justice. Discussions in the GTF (Greek-Turkish Forum) have made clear that the underlying issues are overlaid by perceptions of threat and prestige. Discussions in the GTF have identified the importance of both demystifying and unpacking the contentious issues over the Aegean. This may already be producing results: recently progress has been made towards settling the contentious issue of flight information procedures. Three key issues are:
Delimitation of the continental shelf.
Delimitation of territorial waters and air space.
The disputed interpretation of treaty restrictions on the militarization of certain Greek islands. The GTF then went on to propose a particular route in dealing with these issues and suggested a three-step approach. The first issue to be dealt with was the delimitation of the continental shelf in a twostage process. The first stage called for negotiations of a predetermined duration and the second stage called for the submission of all unsettled issues to the International Court of Justice. The GTF paper believed that the ‘issues of sea and air zones might be approached incidentally to the main issue, at either stage of the process, as primarily problems of interpreting treaties and precedent’. As for the third issue of demilitarization and disputed interpretations, the GTF paper believed that once the first two matters were brought to a successful conclusion, ‘the salience of this issue would decline sharply’. So it was best to leave it to the very end of the process. The GTF paper also suggested that this avenue would be viable if there is:
Informal agreement in advance by both sides that they will go through the procedures in 1 and 2 above in partnership:
A low-key, low-publicity approach on both sides, backed by a continuing dialogue that takes common interests as the starting point:

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Sensitivity by each government towards the concerns of and pressures by public opinion in the other country. After finishing and submitting the Aegean paper that was silently but well-received by the Ministries, the Forum had to set a new agenda for itself. After lengthy deliberations the Forum decided to undertake a study on Cyprus which most participants agreed was the core issue that poisoned Turkish-Greek relations. Not wishing to be presumptuous, the Forum decided to analyse the importance of solving the Cyprus issue from the perspective of the common interests of Greece and Turkey without dwelling on possible solutions to the problem. Although the initial plan was to just outline the common interests, once that task was finished the Forum decided to undertake a paper identifying the ‘Elements of a settlement in Cyprus’. After four PAG meetings which took place between December 2000 and June 2001, a text was finalized. However, because of objections of one member it was not adopted as a Forum paper. Nevertheless, the Forum remained determined to get involved in the Cyprus issue. The opening by Rauf Denktas¸ in December 2001 and the resumption of talks between Glafcos Clerides and Rauf Denktas¸ gave further impetus to the Forum. In April and July of 2002 the Forum sponsored, with the help of PRIO, two meetings, bringing together Greek and Turkish Cypriots from politics and business life and representing almost the entire political spectrum.9 These talks were fruitful and they enabled the parties to understand one another’s positions, appreciate each other’s difficulties and to be introduced to ideas and perceptions that might prove to be useful as the critical deadline of the EU’s Copenhagen Summit in December 2002 approaches. At that summit, the EU will make its decision on enlargement as well as whether or not Turkey will be given a date to start negotiations provided that it fulfills the so-called Copenhagen Criteria of 1993. Should Cyprus be admitted as a divided island, that is without an agreement with the Turkish side, most observers fear that deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations may prove to be inevitable. As a result of this concern the Forum also decided.to go public and present itself and its work to audiences in Ankara, Istanbul and Athens. The inspiration for this enterprise also came from a successful ‘road-show’ that Forum members performed at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in late March 2002.10 In a well-

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attended two-day conference, Forum members explained to the audience what the Forum was about and presented their personal views on Turkish-Greek relations, on Cyprus, on Greek and Turkish foreign policies.

ASSESSMENT OF THE FORUM

The Greek-Turkish Forum has turned into a successful second-track diplomacy effort. From the beginning, the Greek Foreign Ministry showed more interest and engagement in its activities than the Turkish one, although the latter continued to provide financial support for the Forum’s activities. It is essential to recognize that whatever success the GTF may have registered could not have been achieved without the tacit support of the two governments. Perhaps more importantly, the lesson that one can draw from the Forum’s journey is that second-track initiatives need both a first-track opening in the background and a degree of official sanctioning that does not jeopardize their independence of thought and action. Arguably, without the timid post-Kardak steps, the launch of the Forum would have met the fate of many other such initiatives. Without the post-Öcalan, post-earthquake rapprochement, the Forum could not have come of age. It is under these circumstances that the major accomplishment of the Forum, the paper on the Aegean, is treated as an important document that could provide a methodological basis for any future negotiations on these matters. The success of the Forum and its longevity may be the function of many factors. First among these is the fact that the Forum itself had been a CBM. Four years of, at times gruelling meetings, open discussions, opinionated arguments, brought about a degree of mutual trust between the two parties that was extraordinarily valuable. The emphasis on a political analysis of Greek and Turkish public affairs provided both parties with a better understanding of political developments, public moods and perceptions in each country. This appreciation made it possible to be careful about how to approach controversial topics, how to select the language of proposals and how to devise policy alternatives. It was also undoubtedly of critical importance that the Forum could benefit from the expertise, experience and the impartiality of

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reputed organizations and competent facilitators. The contributions of Bruce-Lockhart, Smith, Eyal, Cobbold at the initial stages of the gatherings when the structure was still very fragile was indispensable. As Bruce-Lockhart himself put it, ‘an umbrella of neutral imprimatur was needed in early days as GTF was finding its way forward and in times of mutual national hostility and tension – because of real fears of participants of being branded “traitor” and potential damage to personal career, standing or interests’. This observation perhaps addresses a most important concern about second-track processes. There is always a careful balance that must be observed between getting too far ahead of the curve on an issue or trailing behind official openings. In the case of the Forum, the record so far suggests that it managed to be just daring and imaginative enough to generate important openings and sensible enough not to venture to the realm of irrelevance. Ultimately, what made the Forum a relative success story was the devotion of the participants to the cause and work at hand. The willingness to spend endless hours around a table, at times in stuffy rooms with bad coffee and cookies, and to discuss issues of mutual concern with imagination until you find an opening is truly the sine qua non of any such endeavour. In a way a successful second-track initiative may be as much the result of stamina and stomach as it is of sense and sagacity.

APPENDIX: ISSUES IN THE AEGEAN: OPENINGS AND POSSIBILITIES11

In a memorandum of 10 March 2000, submitted initially to EU officials in Brussels, and later sent to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Greece and Turkey, the Greek-Turkish Forum (GTF) set out the issues in relations between Turkey and Greece on which it will focus some of its work for the coming period, and explained its methodology. The approach of the GTF is to attempt to facilitate the search for solutions and to indicate fruitful approaches. Our preferred methodology is to start not from legal or political positions and arguments, but from an assessment of interests – common interests to start with, but with each state’s particular interests as well. Acknowledging the

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existence of common interest in areas of contention between the two countries can be a useful starting point in the search for solutions to existing problems. It is also necessary, of course, for each government to clarify its aims and to comprehend its neighbour’s particular interests. Recognizing common interests makes the search for solutions a mutual exercise: understanding each state’s separate interests is a necessary component of a sustainable agreement. In the context of the differences over Aegean issues, the GTF’s March memorandum identified both general and specific common interests. The general point made is that ‘the common interest in integration emphasizes the importance of Turkey’s EU accession process’, in the framework of the Helsinki summit declaration. As to specific Aegean issues, the GTF’s earlier memorandum identified the following common interests of Greece and Turkey:
A fundamental interest in freedom of navigation.
An interest in cooperation on environmental protection, on search and rescue, and policing.
An interest in cooperation in promoting tourism.
An interest in ensuring there is no use or threat of use of force in the pursuit of attempted settlement of differences.
An interest in understanding each other’s attitude as to whether when and how the issue should go to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Discussions in the GTF have made clear that the underlying issues are overlaid by perceptions of threat and of prestige. The GTF is fully aware of and has reflected on the tone and contents of debate in both Greece and Turkey over the years, which have made these important issues so complex. However, the GTF has chosen not to go into that aspect of the Aegean issue here, because it seems to us that the longterm interests of both countries encourage settlement. If so, a fresh approach is required, and we have indicated above the common interests, both general and specific, which we believe should govern such an approach. Discussions in the GTF have identified the importance of both demystifying and unpacking the contentious issues over the Aegean. This may already be producing results: recently progress has been

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made towards settling the contentious issue of flight information procedures. Three key issues are:
delimitation of the continental shelf;
delimitation of territorial waters and air space;
the disputed interpretation of treaty restrictions on the militarization of certain Greek islands. The GTF recognizes that these issues are affected alike by important questions of interpretation of international law, or procedure, of concepts of national interest, and of attitudes and perceptions. To make progress, it is important that accurate information about both substance and procedure in these matters is publicly available. The GTF wonders whether the following route could be a helpful way to working towards a resolution of these problems. Any other issue that concerns territorial jurisdiction should be treated as a matter of treaty interpretation to be brought before the ICJ by the party raising it. 1. The delimitation of the continental shelf is an issue that may be entrusted to a two-stage process, these two stages to be determined by the two countries in advance, with a mutual undertaking that neither country will act to change the existing legal situation until the entire process has been completed. The first stage would be one of negotiation, of predetermined duration, which may lead either to an agreement on some or all substantive issues or to submission of any remaining issues to the ICJ through a compromis. The settlement of any issues which may occur at that stage shall be formally confirmed by relevant agreements, while any issues not settled at the first stage will then be submitted to the ICJ. The underlying premise of the entire process is that, at the start, both parties will have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ. 2. Issues of sea and air zones might be approached incidentally to the main issue, at either stage of the process, as primarily problems of interpreting treaties and precedent. An ICJ judgement on the continental shelf and agreed interpretation of the treaty regime in the Aegean would ensure the freedom of navigation each side requires, as also the exploitation of sea resources.

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3. The issue of the effects of treaty restrictions on the militarization of certain Greek islands is best left until last. Were all the other issues in the Aegean settled, and were the Greek-Turkish rapprochement making progress on other key questions, the GTF suspects that the salience of this issue would decline sharply. The GTF therefore concludes there is nothing to be gained by openly addressing this issue at this time. Following this avenue is viable if there is:
Informal agreement in advance by both sides that they will go through the procedures in 1 and 2 above in partnership.
A low-key, low-publicity approach on both sides, backed by continuing dialogue that takes common interests as the starting point.
Sensitivity by each government towards the concerns of and pressures by public opinion in the other country. The GTF regards it as possible that, undertaken in this way, a new approach to the Aegean issues would do a great deal to underpin the current improvement in bilateral relations. NOTES 1. For details of the crisis see Mustafa Aydın, ‘Cacophony in the Aegean: Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations’, Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 27 (1997), pp. 109– 40. 2. For details of the Öcalan affair and its effects on Greek-Turkish relations see S¸ahin Alpay, ‘After Öcalan’, Private View (Spring 2000), pp. 34–41. 3. As a result of the Agreement on Cultural Cooperation, signed between two foreign ministers in February 2000, an official working group was established to ‘co-operate on the presentation of history, geography, culture and economy of the other country, especially in the school textbooks … [and to] exchange and study school textbooks, with a view to propose the correction of inaccuracies’. For the full text of the agreement see [http://www.greekturkishforum.org/bilat_6.htm]. 4. For the text of the press release after the Delphi meeting see [http://www. greekturkishforum.org/pr_1.htm]. 5. For details of the ‘Report Outlining the Suggested Confidence Building Measures and Crisis Avoidance Measures Proposed by the CBMs Working Group’, see [http://www.greekturkishforum.org/rep_1.htm]. . 6. For the text of the press release after Istanbul meeting see [http://www. greekturkishforum.org/pr_2.htm]. 7. For the texts of the nine agreements signed between the two sides in January– February 2000 see [http://www.greekturkishforum.org/documents.htm]. 8. For an excellent analysis of the effect of the earthquakes see Gülden Ayman, ‘Springtime in the Aegean’, Private View (Spring 2000), pp. 55–61.

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9. For the participants and the press release of the later meeting see [http://www. greekturkishforum.org/pr_8.htm]. 10. See [http://www.greekturkishforum.org/pr_9.htm]. 11. Text is taken from Greek-Turkish Forum website, at [http://www.greekturkishforum. org/rep_2.htm]. The members of the Political .Analysis Group who worked on the text were Costas Carras (Greek Coordinator), Ilter Türkmen (Turkish Coordinator), Mehmet Ali Birand, Ziya Bülent, Theodoros Couloumbis, Cem Duna, Arghyris Fatouros, Muharrem Kayhan, Paulina Lampsa, Soli Özel, Özdem Sanberk and Costas Zepos.

Conclusion

MUSTAFA AYDIN AND KOSTAS IFANTIS I

Differences between Turkey and Greece are not new, but as long as they remain unresolved, there is a chance that some unforeseen incident could touch off open conflict and large-scale warfare. Continuing disputes over Cyprus, over the Aegean, over relations with the EU, in relations with NATO, and in areas of bilateral and multilateral relations with other regional and extraregional actors, all have the potential to severely threaten bilateral and regional peace, security and stability. The history of the two countries’ bilateral relations shows that such a situation might repeat itself more easily than many think. It is therefore of paramount importance for all involved to prevent the (re)appearance of similar, conflictual conditions. The history of crises in the Aegean shows the ease with which a state of protracted tension between the two countries may degenerate into large-scale violence and warfare. Our perspective remains fundamentally neo-realist. International politics is not a constant state of war, but it is a state of relentless security competition, with the possibility of war always in the background.1 The intensity varies from case to case, and can be moderated, to a great extent, by structural factors – in terms of a military clash, can even be abolished – as is the case of the EU member states. This rather dark view of international relations directly derives from realism’s three basic assumptions about the nature of the international system.

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The first is that the system is anarchic. This does not mean that it is chaotic or disordered. Of course, it is hard to perceive of an order without an orderer; 2 however, in this case, ‘anarchy’ is an ordering principle, which depicts the absence of formal relations of super- and subordination.3 The second assumption is that the most fundamental state concern is survival and security. Survival means first and foremost maintenance of sovereignty. In this drive, states think strategically. They ‘are instrumentally rational’,4 although miscalculations are not unusual, since the conditions under which they operate are inherently uncertain and information is imperfect. States can never be certain about the intentions of the other states, even when the ‘other’ strongly believes themselves to be reliably benign. Uncertainty about a state’s motives, or the belief that a state is motivated by greed rather than security concerns, will increase the other state’s insecurity. The third assumption is that in the absence of world governmental agents, and in an environment of uncertainty and unstable expectations, the international political process is shaped in a rather competitive way. Although the fundamental assumption dealing with state motives says that states merely aim to survive (which is a defensive goal), the inescapable truth, is that ‘political structures shape political processes’5 and determine outcomes. The natural state of affairs is that states in the international system fear each other. And that is what does trigger security dilemmas, under anarchy: the strong perception that exists among states that other (states) are most likely to behave in a predatory way. However, cooperation is possible and quite often does occur in many parts of the world. In general, it is not difficult to achieve, although it can be hard to sustain. Under a wide range of conditions, ‘adversaries’ can best achieve their security goals through cooperative policies, not competitive ones, and should, therefore, choose cooperation when these conditions prevail.6 This can be the case especially, under balance-of-power structures, with coordinated policies designed to avoid threatening arms races, and when they (states) manage to be attuned to absolute-gains logic, instead of relative-gains logic. Such a framework can be instrumental in enabling states to moderate causes of conflict that already exist or to avoid competition that would intensify these causes. When states are

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concerned about absolute gains, they need only to make certain that ‘the pie is expanding and that they are getting at least some portion of the increase, while states that worry about relative gains must care also about how the pie is divided’.7 The latter, ultimately, leads to zero-sum relationships, which terminates any cooperative efforts. Rightly formulated, in the bilateral realm, the ‘absolute gains’ logic refers to a profound increase in security. A state’s choice between cooperation and competition is highly conditional. This conclusion easily flows from realism’s core assumptions. In the introductory chapter, we attempted to advance the argument that a sincere and viable rapprochement status between Turkey and Greece can only be the outcome of a novel bilateral structural arrangement that would entail two fundamental elements. First, there should be a gradual and constant redefinition of the two countries’ national interests, which would allow a historic convergence of interest-based strategies. This process is possible considering the two actors’ current power locations, as well as the interplay at their respective domestic levels. That means that the presence of large socio-political majorities that favour the current process is vital and must be sustained at any cost. Second, it is imperative that for, at least, as long as the process of rapprochement remains fragile and weak, a ‘healthy’, transparent and thus stabilizing balance of power should remain the overarching principle of the bilateral structure. Such a structural constraint would, above all, make the cost of an even accidental clash extremely high, while adding, at the same time, value to the hard efforts of rapprochement. What underlies our argument is the certainty that when the risks of competition exceed the risks of cooperation, rational state-actors should direct their self-help efforts towards achieving cooperation. Although many of the authors in this volume do not share our realist conviction, they do deal with the issues in a way that clearly reinforces our argument about the premises of any cooperative effort between Greece and Turkey. Normalization of the bilateral relations promises to provide both states with greater security than the competitive alternatives. As an analytical matter, our framework does not distinguish between ‘good’ state and ‘bad’ state but essentially treats them like the famous Waltzian billiard balls. In principle, all states drive to get

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maximum relative power. An oversimplified realist interpretation of the Aegean disputes allows for no meaningful difference in the motives behind Turkish and Greek behaviour. Both sides are driven by concerns about the balance of power and do what is necessary to achieve a more favourable balance. Most Turks and Greeks would be disgusted by such a description of the Greek-Turkish relations, because they believe that their country has always been motivated by benevolent intentions while the other has not. Perceptions and historic grievances can be powerful determinants of policies, especially when they refer to structural arrangements, external and domestic. Ultimately, the choice for rapprochement and high levels of cooperation, under the right conditions and with the right motives, is an optimal ‘self-help’ strategy for both states, in a highly unstable Eastern Mediterranean.

II

The state of relations between the two countries is a product of the attitudes and perceptions of ruling elites and general publics, operating within global and regional settings. To the extent that one side’s policies or claims are perceived as ‘revisionist’ and challenging the bilateral status quo by the other, a lasting and viable reconciliation is hard to find. As Millas’ contribution demonstrates, stereotypes, prejudices, perceptions and ideological bias, have played and continue to play a decisive role in producing ‘knowledge’ and ‘evaluation’ in the sociology of the relations between Turks and Greeks. For Mehmet, it is rather remarkable how much passion, and how little reasoned reflection, prevail in the bilateral relations across these two Aegean neighbours. Clearly, history and cultural differences are major explanatory variables here, but at the same time, there are significant social-psychological similarities, in particular the high ethnonationalistic perceptions. For the people of the two countries, it is not just the burden of distant and more recent conflicts, but it is the ‘national truth’ which surrounds the past that fuels antagonism and insecurity and makes policies of rapprochement based on welldefined national interests hard to adopt and pursue. ‘Each nation has

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its own interpretation of the past, and more precisely, each community that has a very particular view with respect to its (imagined) past forms a distinct nation.’ Millas has shown the very high degree of ‘unhealthy’ nationalism that underpins Turks’ and Greeks’ perception of the ‘other’. The perception is in general quite negative. The ‘other’ is perceived almost exclusively as an enemy, as a constant source of evil, as a predator and an aggressor. At the dawn of the new century, despite guarded ‘postearthquake’ and ‘post-Helsinki’ optimism, the prospects for GreekTurkish relations remain uncertain. The Aegean and Cyprus will remain potential flashpoints and pose an ongoing problem of crisis prevention for the US and Europe. International anarchy and the security dilemma make cooperation among sovereign states – that on top of everything else ‘enjoy’ a history of competition and conflict, like Turkey and Greece – difficult. Greece and Turkey cannot easily escape systemic-structural impediments, but they could make an effort to achieve a relatively high level of cooperation by exploring the opportunities offered by the collective security environment of the EU. The challenge for the two countries is enormous. As Jervis notes, it is impossible to eliminate the security dilemma, but it can be ameliorated: ‘The ideal solution for a status quo power would be to escape from the state of nature. But escape is impossible. The security dilemma cannot be abolished, it can only be ameliorated.’8 As Tsakonas has indicated quoting Buzan: ‘The impact of the security dilemma can be mitigated through “improved anarchies” and by the development of a mature society of states.’9 Moreover, ‘Bonds of shared values and interests can be developed. If actors care about what happens to others and believe that others care about them, they will develop trust and can cooperate for mutual benefit.’ 10 The conditions that make collective security possible indeed ameliorate the security dilemma to a certain extent. Uncertainty about motives would be reduced. When the actors hold compatible views of an acceptable bilateral, regional and international order and share a minimum sense of political community, ideational change has already mitigated the suspicion and competitiveness that fuel the security dilemma. In 1982, the former US ambassador to Turkey, Robert StrauszHupe, pointed out during a discussion about the Cyprus problem that ‘governments may come and governments may go, but geography never changes’.11 According to Ross Norton, ‘Here was

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one immediate lesson in Ambassador Strausz-Hupe’s comments contrasting the tenuous state of governments with the constancy of geography: change your thinking and look at the geographic imperatives, not just the political ones. Using this premise helps to keep analysis of eastern Mediterranean issues focused on realities. Greece and Turkey share common land and sea borders and they both have extensive coastlines along the Aegean Sea. The geographic imperatives of both countries can moderate actions as well as provoke them.’ 12 These imperatives are long term and can transcend governments and ruling elites. They are also interconnected, so that if one imperative is altered it will probably affect others. Political elites in both countries should pursue a strategy that aims at reducing the risks and remove the possibility of armed conflict altogether. Not only because war will result in an isolation of both from their western institutional affiliations, but because, even if they were ‘to secure some marginal territorial gains after some initial battles, a chain of revanchist conflicts would surely follow, classifying both countries as high risk zones’,13 with devastating consequences for their economic and social development. The differences are not intractable, especially if there is political incentive on both sides to see them resolved. Overall, the two countries are much better off today in terms of bilateral relations than they were a few years ago. Under a (delicate) spirit of rapprochement reigning between the two countries, the prospects for a crisis and tension have been drastically curtailed and new uncharted territory for peaceful coexistence, transactions and communication has opened. Having said that, it should be emphasized that there has been no progress so far in resolving, or even addressing, the fundamental differences between the two countries. This can be unsustainable in the not too distant future. As Heraclides has emphasized, the longer the bilateral relations remain uncertain the easier it becomes to return to the dangerous pre-1999 Cold Warlike status. The difficult issues that continued to divide and haunt both countries should be addressed, sooner or later. It should be noted though, that good planning and patience are vital prerequisites. Nobody should expect that decades of animosity and hatred could be overcome quickly. Perceptions need to be changed, but this will happen gradually. Trust must be built, and bureaucracies and populations must be prepared for change.

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Nobody should forget that these are not issues for interested parties to experiment with, and it is counterproductive to pressure either country into taking too many risks without having a good expectation of the outcome. Stable relations have not meant abandoning or compromising national interests. The process has been rather costless so far and that means that in a well-planned and sincere strategic interaction, progress should be possible even when Athens and Ankara have not the strongest (politically) of governments. It is true that strong governments in both countries are expected to move faster towards normalization. Nevertheless, some limited but important steps can be taken even when this is not the case. Regardless of the relative strength of each government, the militaries of Greece and Turkey will continue to conduct exercises in the Aegean, pursue their national objectives, and protect their interests. This factor leads to a regular cycle of increased tensions and serious incidents, some of which involve loss of life and military equipment. Even weak governments want to keep such occurrences to a minimum. In such a context, the proposed and hopefully implemented CBMs can be of vital importance. Certain CBMs would contribute significantly to the reduction of tension and to the probability of accidental war and, most importantly, to further improvement in Greek-Turkish relations, but are not expected to address the underlying causes of the Greek-Turkish conflict; only – as Dokos notes – to pave the way for eventual discussion of ‘high politics’. In that respect, the ‘encouragement’ of the United States, the European Union and NATO, especially on the non-cooperating party, would, under certain circumstances, facilitate the negotiating process. The Aegean differences are not zero-sum, provided of course that the two sides define their national interests in a true ‘win-win’ arrangement and do not cling to threatening maximalist positions. The negotiation strategy from the easier to the more difficult issues has created a dynamic of its own, as the level of mutual confidence is established, making the image of the enemy and the prisoner’s dilemma mentality less pivotal than before. The essence of the process cannot be other than what Heraclides suggested as putting emphasis on tangible interests and try to pin-point manageable negotiable issues to be placed within a cost-benefit calculus by comparison to the cost and (perceived) benefits of the historical

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dispute. The political and economic costs of the Greek-Turkish conflict for the chief protagonists (Cyprus included), as well as NATO, the EU and the United States, are considerable, especially after the 11 September 2001 events and the US-led war against international terrorism. Hopefully, national interests will converge strongly in the political, economic, security as well as in social-psychological dimensions. Algan’s contribution demonstrates how there can be novel areas of major interest convergence, in an era where there is clearly a major international security paradigm shift. Since the end of the Cold War, we have witnessed an explosion of attention to and concern about environmental issues. They have become much more salient in public discourse, more prominent in media coverage, more visible and important in political deliberations, and ultimately they seem to be becoming a significant issue in international politics.14 In the Aegean, environmental problems and issues are definitely matters of relevance to national and regional security. As such, under the right conditions, they can generate high levels of cooperation and (even) integration. The reconciliation inherent in the environment can support the development of peaceful relations by presenting novel opportunities for the protection of human and environmental security in the Aegean. Bahcheli rightly points out that while officially expressed positions indicate a wide gap in the Turkish and Greek positions in the Aegean, considerable room for compromise on key issues has been identified. In recent years, numerous ideas have been floated by retired diplomats, academics and others, that are suggestive of the type of compromise solutions in the Aegean that would go a long way to satisfy Turkish and Greek needs, and allay their anxieties. Also, specific Greek-Turkish disputes should never be viewed in isolation. There is a delicate interconnection among them, even if they do not seem related. For example, Greece’s claim to a national airspace of ten nautical miles may appear to have nothing in common with Turkey’s pursuit of a ‘fair’ share of the Aegean seabed. Yet, no Greek government would consider changing its policy until there is a mutually agreed settlement on the delineation of the seabed. To do otherwise would be viewed as a sign of weakness and could thus adversely affect its negotiating position on the issue, or on any other bilateral issue. The same is true for Turkey.

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It is, however, important always to remember that Greece and Turkey do not view their differences in the same way. What is important to one may not be to the other. For example, for Greece, Cyprus is a priority that adversely affects a broad range of bilateral issues. For Turkey, Cyprus is a problem that is secondary to its access to the Aegean continental shelf. This means that at least two issues, one that is important to Athens and one that is important to Ankara, will have to be discussed simultaneously, or there will have to be agreement on the order in which they are discussed.15 As Bahcheli notes, the leaders of Turkey have realized that it is unrealistic to expect to advance towards EU membership without working towards solutions to its problems with Greece in the Aegean, and helping settle the Cyprus issue. It is rather unrealistic, also, to think that decoupling Aegean and Cyprus issues is feasible. As Dokos observes, to a certain extent, this might be possible in terms of implementing agreed CBMs, but the situation in the Aegean has a direct impact on the situation in Cyprus, and vice versa. It is rather unlikely that fundamental progress towards a comprehensive Greek-Turkish settlement will be achieved without a just, lasting and mutually acceptable solution of the Cyprus problem. For Dokos, a ‘European’ solution for both Cypriot communities would probably be the optimum solution. Indeed, a successful resolution of the Cyprus problem would greatly enhance efforts for a negotiated Greek-Turkish settlement. Redefining their national interests in a true realist fashion can be instrumental in both Turks and Greeks abandoning their maximalist initial positions. For example, Turkey’s greatest anxiety has been to avert the Aegean becoming a ‘Greek lake’, by Athens’ extension of its territorial waters in the Aegean from 6 to 12 miles. According to Bahcheli, there have been numerous unofficial indications that Athens is prepared to accept a 6-mile territorial sea in much of the Aegean in order to allay Turkish concerns. In turn, Ankara would be expected to match this major concession to safeguard the interests of Greece, particularly by accepting a legal settlement mechanism for the continental shelf issue. According to Bahcheli’s evaluation, there is considerable scope for compromise in the official Turkish position that claims half of the Aegean continental shelf. Ultimately, provided Turkish-Greek relations make sustained progress, it should be possible to create a balanced regime in the Aegean that both meets vital

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Turkish and Greek interests and is saleable to public opinion in both countries. At the end of the day, Heraclides is right when he suggests that realization of the very low benefit of a zero-sum strategy would almost certainly lead to the realization that the cost of keeping the ongoing clash is certainly higher than the cost of a settlement based on positive sum outcomes (win-win). In such a context, any agreement(s) should be the outcome of the free will of the two parties. It is important that no party aims at imposing its will or its preferred solution on the other side, be it by pressure or ruse. Such attempts ultimately lead nowhere and end up by being self-defeating. For Heraclides, only if an agreement is regarded as sensible and just, and certainly not as unfair, replete with unbearable compromises, can it lead to viable solutions, to an Aegean and a Cyprus of peace, stability and cooperation.

III

If the current process leads to a situation where the vital needs and interests of Greece and Turkey are met and served, in particular regarding (common) security, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers, then the two countries will probably find themselves operating in an environment conducive to peace and cooperation. In such an environment, the absence of expansionist, threatening, and destabilizing dynamics, the continuation of their European vocation, the enhancement of development and modernization tendencies, the deepening of pluralist democracy and true respect for human rights will have the very strong potential of becoming the order of the day in the Aegean. The European Union and its integrationist aegis are instrumental in this respect. Bahcheli emphatically demonstrates the fact of the Turkish political establishment being engaged in a critical bid to achieve the reform goals (namely those related to human rights) set by the EU as a prerequisite to commencing the accession negotiations of Turkey. Bahcheli is confident that the great majority of Turkish people want Turkey’s European vocation in the expectation that this would stimulate economic growth and prosperity in their country. Successive Turkish governments have pledged themselves not to miss ‘the EU

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train’, although they are aware of the enormity of the tasks ahead in achieving EU membership. The economic imperative can also be paramount. As national economies are even more integrated within the global capitalist system, external shocks and destabilization risks increase, making these economies more vulnerable to financial crisis. By joining regional groups or blocs such as the EU, the costs of crises can be minimized, while membership in a regional bloc also generates political and strategic benefits. Greece has been more or less successfully engaged in a continuous modernization and democratization process since the mid-1970s. According to Mehmet, this contrasts sharply with Turkey’s efforts at reform and restructuring aided and guided by advice primarily from the US. However, the primary responsibility for the comparative Turkish failure here belongs to Turkish elites. The EU, as a collective security entity, can ameliorate the security dilemma since by its nature it promotes and deepens cooperation. Over time, repeated acts of cooperation alter expectations and foster trust and confidence. As states come to expect each other to reciprocate concessions, rather than to exploit them, the wariness that fuels the security dilemma gradually subsides. Moreover, the EU engagement, by increasing transparency and thereby reducing uncertainty and the chances of misperception, decreases the likelihood of unintended spirals. Uncertainty is one of the key factors fuelling the security dilemma. Above all, the confidence in Ankara and Athens regarding both Greece’s successful entry into the EU’s EMU inner circle, and Turkey’s eventual EU membership, will dramatically reduce uncertainty and is bound to spur both Turkish and Greek leaders and people to proceed to a new era of cooperative security arrangements in the Aegean. NOTES 1. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds) The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995), p. 336. 2. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 89. 3. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 88. 4. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, p. 337.

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5. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 82. 6. Charles L. Glaser, ‘Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help’, in Brown, LynnJones and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, p. 378. 7. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, p. 339–40. 8. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 82. 9. Panayotis J. Tsakonas, ‘The Security Dilemma in Greek-Turkish Relations: Theory and Practice’, in Études Helleniques/Hellenic Studies, 9, 2 (Autumn 2001), p. 22. 10. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 82–3. 11. S. Ross Norton, ‘Geography Never Changes’, The Strategic Regional Report, 3, 4 (June/July, 1998). 12. Ross Norton, ‘Geography Never Changes’. 13. See Theodore Couloumbis and Louis Clarevas, ‘Proposals for a Greek-Turkish Reconciliation’, in Tozun Bahcheli, Theodore A. Couloumbis, and Patricia Carley, Greek-Turkish Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1997), p. 36. 14. Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, ‘Introduction’, in Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds), Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995), pp. 4–5. 15. Ross Norton, ‘Geography Never Changes’.

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Index

academic community 56 academics 132 Aegean region 1, 4, 22, 24, 35, 110, 288 Aegean Sea; co-exploitation 87; development of nature sanctuaries 206; environmental problems 298; exotic species 202, 203; geographical and ecological characteristics 195–203; importance of shipping route 125, 202; importance to marine mammals 196–7; natural gas 28; oil 28, 29, 30, 44; pollution 197; threatened animal species 198; threatened plant species 197 Aegean Sea disputes 10, 27, 31, 40, 95, 215, 258, 264, 286–8; airspace issue 27, 29, 30, 38, 111, 144n, 234; continental shelf issue 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 69, 80, 119n, 224–5; militarization of E. Aegean islands 27, 30, 80, 81, 98, 144n, 261; territorial waters issue 28, 45, 49n, 69, 80, 81, 119n, 260, 283 air traffic control dispute (1980) 44 airfields 142n Akarcali, B. 274 AKP (Justice and Development Party) 33, 48, 97, 115, 127, 137, 178, 235 Albania 43, 159, 249, 266n, 267n Algan, N. 12, 298 Allbright, M. (US Secretary of State) 229 Anatolia 55, 65n, 220 Anatolian mainland 29 Anatolian peninsula 100 Annan (UN) Plan 34, 97, 111, 115, 117, 135, 138 Aral Sea 192; Almaty Declaration (1997) 194, 195; Basin Programme 194 armed conflict 67 Armenia 226, 236 arms procurements 72

arms race 112, 126 Asia Minor 60; catastrophe 23 Atatürk, K. 96 Aydin, M. 8 Ayman, G. 13, 14 Bahcheli, T. 9, 118n, 222, 298, 299, 300 Baku-Ceyhan pipeline 110 Balikçisi, H. 66n Balkans 1, 36, 39, 41, 43, 51n, 57, 128, 149, 248, 252, 253; Entente (1934) 25; multilateral cooperation 78; Muslim populations 252; peacekeeping force 131; Wars (1912–4) 60, 98, 218, 221 Baltic Sea 192, 193 banking 12, 145, 159 banking and currency crisis (2001) 12, 127, 166, 172, 175, 176, 177, 178 Bar-Tal, D. 222 Barcelona Convention for protection of Mediterranean Sea 199, 207 Barnett, J. 188 Bartholomew (Ecumenical Patriarch): encouragement 75 BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Settlement) 237, 241n Beglitis, P. (Greek Foreign Ministry spokesman) 235 Berne Declaration (1976) 29, 97, 101 bilateral agreements 78, 96 biodiversity 187, 190, 191, 196 Birand, M.A. 273, 281 Bitsios, D. (Greek Foreign Minister) 217 Black Sea 192, 193, 195; Economic Cooperative initiative 42; multilateral cooperation 78 Bodrum 200 Bos¸nak (Turkish citizens of Bosnian origin) 42

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Bosnia 1, 43 Bosnian crisis 41, 42 Bosnian Serbs 41 Bozcaada 98, 132 Britain 101, 102, 103, 104, 119n, 135, 167; granting of Ionian islands 221; nonintervention in 1974 222; see also England Bruce Pagan test 154 Bruce-Lockhart, J. 271, 272, 273, 280, 286 Budapest meeting (2001) 235 Bülent, Z. 276, 281 Bulgaria 42, 110, 159, 249, 266n, 267n Burton, J.W. 53 Bush, G. (US President) 259 business cooperation: prospects 157–60 Buzan, B. 295 Byzantine Empire 54 Byzantines 55 Çanakkale Strait 195 Cardiff Summit 16 Carras, C. 272, 273, 281, 282 Caspian Sea 192 Caucasus 39, 42, 110, 159, 220, 252, 254 Cem, I. (Turkish Foreign Minister) 44, 62, 87, 91n, 95, 108, 142n, 230; resignation of 235 Central Asia 42, 220, 252, 254 Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation (1944) 29 Chios 50n Christians 54, 57, 66n Clerides, G. 33, 84, 284 Clinton, B. (US President) 259 Clogg, R. 23, 67, 86 Cold War 1, 5n, 7, 25, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 110, 247, 252, 258 Common Agricultural Policy 169 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 5n, 40, 136 Common Security: A Program For Disarmament (1982) 188 Conalis-Kontos, M. 219 Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) 11, 79, 142n, 143n, 227, 241, 276, 277; military 131–2; soft security 132 Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 153 Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) 153 Constas, D. 220 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (1990) 112 Copenhagen Criteria 12, 47, 133, 166 Couloumbis, T.A 262, 276, 281 Council of Europe 107, 113 Crete 34, 195, 221 crime 76 Crisis Avoidance Measures (CAMs) 276, 277 crisis management: conclusions and lessons

180–2; economic 171–5; political 167–71; political and economic 163–82 Cuban missile crisis 16 culture 76, 78, 124 customs union: Turkey 114, 238n Cyprus: EU membership 10, 84, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118, 218–19 Cyprus crisis (1963–4) 26 Cyprus crisis (1974) 1, 30, 104, 167–9, 171, 180, 222 Cyprus issue 9, 31–6, 50n, 67, 89n, 96, 213, 259–60; benefits of European solution 138, 299; EU concern 125; key strategic significance 102; resolving 133–5; tough stance of Turkey 68; United States involvement 111 Danube: River 192, 200 Dardanelles 98 Davis, K. (World Bank V-P.) 175 Davos process 32, 38, 69, 75, 118, 136, 169 Dayton Accord: post 249 Demirel, S. 168 Denktas¸, R.R. 33, 84, 98, 104, 108, 134, 218, 284 détente 1, 8, 9, 39, 62, 67, 75, 84, 95, 96, 107, 133 Devlet Baba (the Father State) 178 Dinçer, A. 274 Dodecanese Islands 50n Dokos, T. 10, 11, 297, 299 dolphins 197 drug trafficking 76, 78, 124 Duna, C. 272, 281 Dynamic Mix-2000 manoeuvres 38 earthquakes (1999) 6, 8, 46, 62, 73, 95, 96, 181, 230, 280 Eastern Mediterranean 123, 164; balance of power 33 Ecevit, B. (Turkish Prime Minister) 104, 108, 114, 167, 168, 178, 278 ecological problems 76, 185 economic cooperation 76 ecosystems 12, 13 Edip, H. 59 Ekrem, A. 59 Elefsis Bay 200 Endangered Planet (Falk) 187 England 25 Enosis (union with Greece) 49n, 102, 103, 104, 167, 168, 222, 226 environment 76, 78, 124, 159 environmental problems 12, 298 environmental security: in Aegean Sea 185–208; development of concept 187–92; in regional seas 192–5 Eralp, Y. 116 Erdogan, T. (Turkish Prime Minister) 115 Ergüder, U. 281

INDEX

Erkaya, G. 273, 274, 277 ethnic cleansing 65n Eurasia 55, 125 European Commission (EC) 36, 39; Opinion on Greek membership 37 European Court of Human Rights 105, 276 European Court of Justice 120n European Monetary Union (EMU) 6, 126, 127, 136, 166, 176, 233, 250, 301 European Rapid Reaction Force 50n, 257, 268n European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 39, 40, 114 European Union (EU) 12, 32, 43, 50n, 62, 69, 87, 300; Copenhagen Summit (2002) 21, 34, 47, 106, 118, 133, 235, 284; Corfu Summit (1994) 170; Greek membership 26, 106, 166, 168, 171, 175, 220; Habitat Directives and Natura 2000 Activities 206; Helsinki decision 6, 181; Helsinki Summit (1999) 16, 21, 96, 106, 124, 136, 140n, 287; lifting of Greek veto on Turkish membership 76, 77; Luxembourg Summit (1997) 112, 272; post-Helsinki debate 14, 245, 246; relations with Turkey 255–6, 262, 264; Turkish membership 27, 77, 80, 95, 120n, 215, 216, 253 Eyal, J. (RUSI) 281, 286 Faik, S. 61 Fatouros, A. 281 Figen Akat 21 films 61, 56 fire of Smyrna (1922) 65n fisheries 190, 191, 196, 202, 203 Flight Information Region (FIR) 29, 30, 99 fragility of peace 234–5 Gençel, S. 274 Germany 154, 272 Ghali Plan 134 Global Environmental Facility (GEF) 191 Gökçeada 98, 132 Greece: EU membership 26, 106, 166, 168, 171, 175, 220; identity crisis 47; sovereignty of Aegean islands 45; strategy towards Turkey 225–7; Treaty of Accession (1979) 37 Greek constitution: abolition of Article 19 (1998) 107 Greek Cypriot: EU membership 21; National Guard 135 Greek Independence War 23 Greek Junta: Cyprus coup d’état (1974) 65n, 104, 167–9, 222 Greek National Statistical Service 154 Greek Socialist Party (PASOK) 32, 101 Greek-Turkish clash (1919–22) 60, 96

349

Greek-Turkish Forum 15, 75, 85, 144n, 269–89; assessment 285–90; birth 271–4; first steps 274–81; political analysis group 91n, 280, 281–5 Green Line 97 Groom, A.J.R. 86 Group of Wise Men 227 Guidelines for the Prevention of Accidents and Incidents on High Seas and International Airspaces (1988) 214, 242 Gulf of Saros 49n Gulf War (1990) 172, 252 Güntekin, R.N. 61 Halkidikya gorge 195 Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) 128 Helsinki European Council 50n Heraclidis, A. 9, 54, 116, 222, 296, 297, 300 Heraklion Gulf 200 historians 56, 57 historiography 7, 53, 56, 57, 59, 61, 64, 65n; academic 56; popular 56 Human Development Index (HDI) 163 human rights 88, 246, 300 Hurriyet 275 Hussein, S. (Iraqi president) 172 Ifantis, K. 14, 15, 16 IFOR/SFOR (NATO stability) forces 43 Ikaria 50n illegal immigration 76, 78, 124 Imvros 132 Inalcik,H. 65n industry . . 12, 158 Inönü, I. (Turkish Prime Minister and later President) 110 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 30 International Court of Justice 21, 29, 69, 81, 124, 138, 144n, 225 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 110, 127, 140n, 154, 173, 174, 177 Ioannidis (Brigadier) 104 Ionians 55 Iordanides, C. 274 Iordanidou, M. 60 Iran 110, 226 Iraq 136, 235, 252 irredentism 54, 56, 72, 221 . Iskenderun 102 Islam 54, 217 Islamic arc 43 Islamic fundamentalism 252 Islamic revivalism 33 Israel 123, 126; Palestinian conflict 136 Issues in the Aegean: Openings and Possibilities (PAG) 282, 286–7

350

TURKISH- GREEK RELATIONS

Istanbul 99, 107, 132, 179 Italy: Mare Nostrum policy 25 . Izmir 30, 38, 81, 99, 199 Japan 156 Jervis, R. 4, 295 Johnson, L.B. (U.S. President) 110 journalists 132 Kadri, Y. 59 Karagatsis, M. 60 Karamanlis, C. (Greek Premier) 83, 168, 176 Kardak/Imia crisis 16, 22, 44, 74, 97, 100, 206, 237n Karpat, K. 65n Kastanakis, T. 60 Kathimerini 275 Kayhan, M. 274, 281 Kemalism 253, 262 Kemalist vision 112 Ker-Lindsay, J.(RUSI) 274, 276 Kinzer, S. (New York Times) 179 Kohen, S. 281 Kordatos, G. 65n Kosovo crisis (1999) 1, 75, 123, 278 Krebs, R. 112 Krueger, A. 176 Ksenos, S. 59 Kuhnhardt, L. 254 Kunt, M. 65n Kurds 217; groups 179; insurgency 33, 223; nationalism 44; rights 179 Kuwait 251 labour unions 132 Lampsa, P. 273, 281 land-mines: banning 79 Larissa 38 Lausanne Peace Treaty (1923) 31, 45, 69, 98, 100, 107, 138, 234 Layne, C. 2 Leandros (Soutsos) 65n Lesser, I. 253 Lesvos 49n, 50n Liargovas, P. 11, 46 Limnos: Greek forces 38 literary texts 7, 8, 53, 58, 60, 61, 62, 64 literature 7, 56, 59, 61, 64 local government 12, 145, 159 Luxembourg Summit 16 Maastricht 39 Macedonia 41, 144n, 169, 221, 249, 267n Madrid Joint Statement(1997) 14, 74, 227, 229, 230–1, 245, 259, 272 Makarios 65n, 103, 104, 167, 218 Manos, S. 274 maritime boundaries 27, 28, 114

Marmara Sea 195 Marxists 58 media 56 mediation: American 12, 109–12, 165, 230–2, 237, 256, 265; European 12, 112–15, 165, 295 Mediterranean 1; Action Plan (UNEP) 194, 199, 200, 207; monk seal 196–7, 202, 203, 205 Megali Idea 54, 69, 141n, 181, 221, 222 Mehmet, O. 12, 47, 294, 301 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 208, 214, 241 Mersin 102 Middle-East 39, 252 Millas, H. 7, 8, 294 millets (non-Muslim communities) 57 mineral resources 28 Mirivilis, S. 60 missing persons 134 Mithat, A. 59 Mitrany, D. 9, 79, 83, 85 Mitsotakis, C. (Conservative Party leader) 169 Moskof Selim (Viziinos) 65n movies 56, 61 muftis (religious leaders) 106–7 Muslim 41, 42, 57, 107, 133; identity of Turkey 251 Muslim Ottoman 65n Myers, N. 187 National Action Party (MHP) 90n National Bank of Greece: presence in Turkey 159 national minorities 26 National Oil Company 49n National Security Council (NSC) 108 nationalism 8, 12, 54, 59, 62, 64, 72, 165 nationalist 74, 91n, 262 nationalists 72: 89n NATO 1, 25, 35, 40, 50n, 95, 99, 128, 270; Destined Glory 2000 exercises 131, 234, 261, 265; impact of possible Turkey/Greece war 125; Washington summit meeting (1999) 123 natural gas: Aegean 28 near-war crisis (1987) 31 negotiations and deterrence 213–43 New Democracy Party 136, 249 newspapers 59, 61 NGOs 24, 62, 75, 270 North Aegean Petroleum Consortium 49n Norton, R. 295 Norway 273 Notam (714) 30 Notam (1157) 30 novels 53, 58, 59

INDEX

Öcalan affair (1999) 16, 76, 77, 106, 127, 232, 278, 289n oil: Aegean 28, 29, 30, 44 oil crisis 187 Olson, M. 176 Olympic Games (2004) 127 Operation Alba 279 oral history 56 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 190, 191 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 38, 189 organized crime 76, 78 Orthodox heritage 41 Ottawa convention 79 Ottomans 41,55, 57, 58, 65n Ottoman Empire 23, 42, 60, 72, 98, 102, 218, 220 Ottoman Turks 164 Ottoman-Levantine 23 Özal, T. (Turkish Premier and later President) 26, 32, 33, 49n, 69, 80, 172, 228, 251 Özel, S. 15, 281 Özlu, D. 61 Palaiologos, G. 59 Pangalos, T.(Greek Foreign Minister) 227, 232, 278 Papadiamantis, A. 59 Papalexopoulos, T. 274 Papandreou, A. (Greek Premier) 26, 29, 32, 38, 47, 49n, 50n, 69, 80 Papandreou, G. (Greek Foreign Minister) 44, 62, 76, 92n, 95, 123, 124, 130, 136 Paparrigopoulos, K. 65n Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) 273, 284 Peleponnesus 221 perception of threat 24, 220–4 Personalities Group Process 229 Piri Reis 206 pisciculture 12, 158 Pitsipios, I. 59 PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party) 69, 81, 85, 106, 108, 218, 226, 238n Platias, A.G. 219 political corruption 175–80 Politis, N. 60 ports: Black Sea 28; Turkish Aegean 28 Posen, B.R. 3 Prevelakis, P. 60 Pridham, G. 92n Rabbit Islands 98 Rabin-Arafat handshake 273 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands 207 Redefining National Security (Brown) 187 Redefining Security (Ullman) 187

351

Refah (Virtue) Party 127, 253 refugees: Greek Cypriot 104; Turkish Cypriot 104 Republic of Cyprus 34, 105; see also Cyprus Rhine, River 192 Rhodes 195 Roberts Centre 271, 280 Rogers Plan 38 Romania 249, 266n Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) 271, 272, 274, 280, 281 Rozakis, C. 273, 274, 276 Russia 110, 126, 135 S-300 missiles: tension 16, 33, 97, 127 Sami, S. 59 Samos 50n Samothrace 50n Sampson, N. 167 Sanberk, Ö. 281 Saudi Arabia 251 Schmitt, C 74 sea fishing 12 seabirds 196 September 11th tragedy 7, 182, 298 Serbia 41, 43 Sèvres syndrome 69 Seyfettin, O. 59 Sezer, D. 251 Simitis, K.: government 31, 47, 120n, 136, 169, 176, 223, 246 Simmel-Coser hypothesis 72 Sina Gürel, S. 235 Skopje problem 249 Smith, D. (Director of PRIO) 273, 276, 278–9, 280, 282, 286 Social Science Research Institute (FAFO) 273 Solana, J. (NATO Secretary-General) 214, 229 sovereignty: Aegean islands 45 Soviet Union 39, 40, 226, 251, 253; effect of collapse on Turkey 251; threat 25; see also Russia Soysal, S. 61 Stearns, M. 116, 226 Steering Committee 78, 79 strategic (security) studies 71 Strausz-Hupe, R. 295, 296 Svoronos, N. 65n Syria 89n, 226; alliance with Greece 236, 237; threat to Turkey 223 Taas¸uk-ı Tal’at ve Fitnat (Sami) 65n Tamir, K. 66n Task Force on EU cooperation 79 Tenedos 132 terrorism 75, 76, 78, 124, 136, 235, 238n textbooks 7, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 61, 73, 132 The Hague 82, 83

352

TURKISH- GREEK RELATIONS

Theodoropoulos, B. 138 Thermaikos Gulf 200 Thessalonoiki 199 Thessaly 221 third party involvement 230–2 Thrace 68, 85, 106, 107, 133, 216, 250 tourism 12, 91n, 124, 145, 235, 242, 279, 280, 282 Tourkokratia 55 Toynbee, A. 72 Track-II Diplomacy 132 trade 11, 124, 140n, 145, 149, 173; prospects for Greek-Turkish integration and cooperation 145–57 Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance (1959) 103, 104, 109, 119n, 167 Treaty of Accession (1979) 37 Treaty of Brussels (1948) 39 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (1992) 42 Tsakonas, P. 170, 295 Turkey: accord on EU-NATO relations (2000) 267n; Constitution (1982) 178; Custom Union agreement with EU 114, 172, 238n; economic crisis (2001) 127; EU membership 27, 77, 80, 120n, 215, 216, 287, 299; external anxieties and internal uncertainties 250–4; Fourth Army 30, 31, 81; geopolitical value and role 252–4; recent initiatives 227–30; second coup d’etat (1980) 168, 171, 178; strategy towards Greece 224–5 Turkish Cypriot Defence Organization (Türk Mukavemet Tes¸kilati, TMT) 134 Turkish History Thesis 55 Turkish Petroleum Company 49n Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) 33, 34, 105, 114, 115, 119n, 120n, 219 Turkish-Greek Business Council 277 Turkmen, I. 277, 281, 282 Unal, H. 276 Union of Democratic Forces 42 United Nations 35, 44, 108; Annan Plan 34, 97, 111, 115, 117, 135, 138; Charter 113, 225; Development Program Our Global Neighbourhood 189; Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE) 191; Environment Programme (UNEP) 192; Environmental Programme (UNEP) 191, 194; General Assembly (1954) 69; Johannesburg Conference on Sustainable Development (2002) 186; Law of the Sea Convention (1982) 98–9; 127; 193; 213; 214; 237n; Rio Conference on Environment and Development

(1992) 186, 193, 194; Secretary-General 21, 37, 111, 229; Stockholm Conference on Human Environment (1972) 186, 192; World Commission on Environment and Development Report (1987) 186, 188 United Nations Kosovo Force (KFOR) 279 United States of America (USA) 1, 7, 9, 26, 32, 35, 99, 111, 128; Congress’s arms embargo on Turkey 171; and Cyprus 111; encouragement 25, 297; future role of 258–60; Greek lobby 132, 168, 171, 251; mediation 22, 109–12, 165, 230–2, 237, 256, 265, 272, 295; perspective 14, 245; relationship with Greece and Turkey 219–20; trade 153, 156; Washington 108, 110, 173 universities 12, 145, 159 Uzbekistan 159 Uzunçars¸ılı, I. 65n Vakalopoulos, A. 65n Varlik tax (1942–3) 132 Varosha 104 Venezis, I. 60 Venizelos, E. 96 Venizelos-Atatürk rapprochement 85, 96, 128, 141n, 167, 184n, 221 Veremis, T. 281 Vikelas, D. 59 War of 1897 60 War of National Liberation (1920–22) 23 Warsaw Pact (1955) 123 Washington 108, 110 Washington Consensus 173 weapons of mass destruction 252 Western Anatolia 23 Western European Union (WEU) 39; importance of Greek membership 40 Wilson, A. 118n Wilton Park 271, 272 women: nationalistic discourse 59, 60 World Bank 173, 175, 180 World War One (1914–18) 23 World War Two (1939–45) 96 writers 7, 65n Yilmaz, M.: government 74, 101, 227, 276 Yilmaz-Papoulias agreement 38, 79, 130, 142n, 143n Young Turks 58 Yugoslavia 41, 43, 95, 248, 249 Zepos, C. 276, 281 Ziya, H. 59 Zurich-London agreements 103