i
Understanding and mitigating ageing in nuclear power plants
© Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
ii
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Woodhead Publishing Series in Energy: Number 4
Understanding and mitigating ageing in nuclear power plants Materials and operational aspects of plant life management (PLiM) Edited by Philip G. Tipping
Oxford
Cambridge
Philadelphia
New Delhi
© Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
iv Published by Woodhead Publishing Limited, Abington Hall, Granta Park, Great Abington, Cambridge CB21 6AH, UK www.woodheadpublishing.com Woodhead Publishing, 525 South 4th Street #241, Philadelphia, PA 19147, USA Woodhead Publishing India Private Limited, G-2, Vardaan House, 7/28 Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi – 110002, India www.woodheadpublishingindia.com First published 2010, Woodhead Publishing Limited © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010 The authors have asserted their moral rights. This book contains information obtained from authentic and highly regarded sources. Reprinted material is quoted with permission, and sources are indicated. Reasonable efforts have been made to publish reliable data and information, but the authors and the publisher cannot assume responsibility for the validity of all materials. Neither the authors nor the publisher, nor anyone else associated with this publication, shall be liable for any loss, damage or liability directly or indirectly caused or alleged to be caused by this book. Neither this book nor any part may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, microfilming and recording, or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from Woodhead Publishing Limited. The consent of Woodhead Publishing Limited does not extend to copying for general distribution, for promotion, for creating new works, or for resale. Specific permission must be obtained in writing from Woodhead Publishing Limited for such copying. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation, without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978-1-84569-511-8 (print) ISBN 978-1-84569-995-6 (online) ISSN 2044-9364 Woodhead Publishing Series in Energy (print) ISSN 2044-9372 Woodhead Publishing Series in Energy (online) The publisher’s policy is to use permanent paper from mills that operate a sustainable forestry policy, and which has been manufactured from pulp which is processed using acid-free and elemental chlorine-free practices. Furthermore, the publisher ensures that the text paper and cover board used have met acceptable environmental accreditation standards. Typeset by Replika Press Pvt Ltd, India Printed by TJI Digital, Padstow, Cornwall, UK
© Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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Contents
Contributor contact details
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Woodhead Publishing Series in Energy
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Foreword
xxv
Y. Dou, Shanghai Nuclear Energy Research and Development Institute (SNERDI), P. R. China
Executive summary
xxix
Ph. G. Tipping, Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant, Switzerland
Part I Introduction to plant life management (PLiM), safety regulation and economics of nuclear power plants 1
Introduction to nuclear energy, and materials and operational aspects of nuclear power plants
Ph. G. Tipping, Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant, Switzerland
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
Introduction Age as a relative term The importance of nuclear energy Learning from experience to continually improve safety in nuclear power plants (NPPs) Global situation of the status of installed nuclear power in 2010 The importance of keeping nuclear power plants (NPPs) operating safely and reliably Political and climate change issues and disposal of radioactive waste Energy resources: a comparison
1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
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3 4 5 7 8 10 10 11
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Contents
1.9 1.10
Further ageing aspects in nuclear power plants (NPPs) Historical evolution of nuclear power and some materials aspects Overview of two important materials issues in older design nuclear power plants (NPPs) Conclusions Sources of further information References
1.11 1.12 1.13 1.14
12 13 14 16 17 17
2
Key elements and principles of nuclear power plant life management (PLiM) for current and long-term operation
Ph. G. Tipping, Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant, Switzerland
2.1 2.2
Introduction Nuclear power plant ageing terminology and associated definitions Overview of ageing and its effects in nuclear power plants Overview of systems, structures and components (SSC) safety classes Setting up and scoping ageing degradation and surveillance programmes in nuclear power plants (NPPs) Safety culture and human factors and knowledge management Trends and issues in nuclear power plant (NPP) life management Past, current and future nuclear power plant (NPP) concepts and designs Conclusions Sources of further information Acknowledgements References
47 52 53 54 54
3
Safety regulations for nuclear power plant life management and licence renewal
56
A. Alonso, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Spain
3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5
Introduction Safety review/licence renewal Surveillance, operation and maintenance programmes Integration of plant life management Ageing degradation mechanisms, and time-limited structures, systems and components
2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11 2.12
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19 22 24 31 34 39 41
56 57 65 70 72
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3.6
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Main areas of concern for plant designers, operators and regulators Future trends References
76 80 85
4
Probabilistic and deterministic safety assessment methods for nuclear power plant life management
88
P. Contri and A. Rodionov, European Commission DG-JRC Institute for Energy, The Netherlands
4.1
Introduction – plant safety assessment in a plant life management (PLiM) framework The plant life management (PLiM) problem – definitions and selected experience cases A unified proposal for a plant life management (PLiM) model integrating maintenance optimization Probabilistic safety assessment of components and systems Impact of ageing effects at system and plant level Conclusions References
103 108 109 113 114
5
Assessing the socio-economic impacts of ageing and plant life management (AM-PLiM) programmes for long-term operation (LTO) of nuclear power plants (NPPs)
117
Ph. G. Tipping, Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant, Switzerland
5.1
Nuclear power as part of the global energy mix: energy demand, environmental issues and manpower Aspects of current and future nuclear fuel supply and its impact on the viability of nuclear power Economic overview of the nuclear power plant (NPP) lifecycle Cost drivers of nuclear power plant (NPP) operation Basic economic requirements for sustainable operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) Assessing the costs and economics of nuclear power plant (NPP) operation and the impact of ageing and plant life management (AM-PLiM) programmes for long-term operation (LTO) Conclusions Sources of further information and advice Acknowledgements References
3.7 3.8
4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7
5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6
5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10
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117 119 120 122 123
124 126 127 127 127
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Part II Ageing degradation of irradiated materials in nuclear power plant systems, structures and components (SSC): mechanisms, effects and mitigation techniques 6
Failure prevention and analysis in nuclear power plant systems, structures and components (SSC): a holistic approach
Ph. G. Tipping, Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant, Switzerland
6.1 6.2
Introduction Reducing failure probablility and consequences thereof in nuclear power plant (NPP) systems, structures and components (SSCs) Latent failure conditions (LFCs) and failure terminology Holistic approach to analysing nuclear power plant systems, structures and components (NPP SSC) failure events Discussion Conclusions Sources of further information References
138 141 142 143 144
7
Impact of operational loads and creep, fatigue and corrosion interactions on nuclear power plant systems, structures and components (SSC)
146
M. Bakirov, Center of Material Science and Lifetime Management Ltd, Russia
7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5
Introduction Nuclear power plant (NPP) equipment materials Medium and corrosion Stress-corrosion cracking Evaluation of impact of thermo-mechanical loading on strength of equipment materials Equipment condition monitoring, prediction and testing Conclusions and future trends Acknowledgements References and further reading
164 176 184 185 185
8
Microstructure evolution of irradiated structural materials in nuclear power plants
189
M. Hernández-Mayoral, CIEMAT, Spain and M. J. Caturla, University of Alicante, Spain
8.1
Introduction
6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8
7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9
131
131 133 136
146 149 151 158
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8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.10
Structures and materials affected Environmental and other stressors Changes in the microstructure and degradation mechanisms Mitigation paths Application of research and operational experience to the practical solution of problems Acknowledgements Definitions Sources of further information and advice References
9
Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of austenitic stainless steels in high temperature light water reactor (LWR) environments
P. L. Andresen, GE Global Research Center, USA
9.1 9.2 9.3
Introduction Historical problems and structures affected Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) dependencies – introduction Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) dependencies – materials and water chemistry Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) dependencies – cold work, stress intensity factor and irradiation Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) dependencies – miscellaneous Mechanism of stress corrosion cracking (SCC) Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) mitigation Prediction of stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC) Future trends Sources of further information and advice References
9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 9.8 9.9 9.10 9.11 9.12 10
Void swelling and irradiation creep in light water reactor (LWR) environments
F. A. Garner, Radiation Effects Consulting, USA
10.1 10.2
Introduction to void swelling and irradiation creep Potential for swelling and irradiation creep in light water cooled reactors (LWRs) Predictions of void swelling and associated uncertainties Potential swelling/creep consequences Second-order effects associated with or concurrent with void swelling
10.3 10.4 10.5
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236 236 238 243 257 270 281 291 294 296 299 302 302 308 308 318 332 338 340
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10.6 10.7
Conclusion References
349 349
11
Irradiation hardening and materials embrittlement in light water reactor (LWR) environments
357
M. Brumovsky, Nuclear Research Institute Rez plc, Czech Republic
11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6 11.7
Introduction Irradiation conditions Nature of radiation damage Irradiation hardening and embrittlement Main factors Predictive formulae Detection and measurement of irradiation hardening and embrittlement 11.8 Conclusions 11.9 Sources of further information and advice 11.10 References 12
Reactor pressure vessel (RPV) annealing and mitigation in nuclear power plants
M. Brumovsky, Nuclear Research Institute Rez plc, Czech Republic
12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5
Introduction Structures and materials affected Main mitigation measures Mitigation mechanisms including microstructure changes Application of research and operational experience to the practical solution of problems Conclusions Sources of further information References
12.6 12.7 12.8
Part III Analysis of nuclear power plant materials, and application of advanced systems, structures and components (SSC) 13 Characterization techniques for assessing irradiated and ageing materials in nuclear power plant systems, structures and components (SSC)
357 358 359 362 365 367 368 371 371 372 374 374 375 375 379 381 385 385 385
389
S. Lozano-Perez, University of Oxford, UK
13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4
Introduction Non-destructive techniques Destructive techniques Recent advances, future trends and new techniques
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13.5
References
412
14
On-line and real-time corrosion monitoring techniques of metals and alloys in nuclear power plants and laboratories
417
L. Yang and K. T. Chiang, Southwest Research Institute, USA
14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 14.7
Introduction General corrosion monitoring Localized corrosion monitoring Electrochemical potential (ECP) monitoring Conclusion Acknowledgements References
417 418 431 443 448 450 451
15
Multi-scale modelling of irradiation effects in nuclear power plant materials
456
L. Malerba, SCK.CEN, Belgium
15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 15.5 15.6 15.7 15.8 15.9 15.10 15.11 15.12
Introduction An overview of radiation effects Multi-scale modelling Nuclear- and atomic-level interactions Atomic-level modelling Microstructure evolution modelling Mechanical property modelling Example of application: the PERFECT example Discussion Conclusion Acknowledgements References
456 459 474 478 483 495 503 512 519 523 524 524
16
Development and application of instrumentation and control (I&C) components in nuclear power plants (NPPs)
544
H. M. Hashemian, Analysis and Measurement Services Corporation, USA
16.1 16.2
Introduction Instrumentation and control (I&C) components in nuclear power plants (NPPs) Key instrumentation and control (I&C) components Ageing and instrumentation and control (I&C) Mitigating ageing in instrumentation and control (I&C) components Online monitoring (OLM)
16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6
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16.7 16.8 16.9 16.10
Online monitoring (OLM) methods and ageing management 573 Future trends 575 Sources of further information and advice 578 Bibliography 579
17
Development and application of nano-structured materials in nuclear power plants
W. Hoffelner, Paul Scherrer Institut, Switzerland
17.1 17.2 17.3
Introduction Ferritic-martensitic 9–12% Cr steels Dispersion strengthened ferritic and ferritic-martensitic steels Other routes for nano-particle strengthening Mechanical properties Components Application of research and operational experience to the practical solution of problems (relation to plant life management, PLiM) Conclusions References
17.4 17.5 17.6 17.7 17.8 17.9
581 581 584 586 587 590 594 596 601 602
Part IV Plant life management (PLiM) practices in nuclear power plants 18
Plant life management (PLiM) practices for pressurized light water nuclear reactors (PWR)
Ph. G. Tipping, Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant, Switzerland
18.1 18.2
Introduction Ageing-related terminology and descriptions of major pressurized water reactor (PWR) components Overview of fuel and control of core power in pressurized water reactors (PWR) Discussion Conclusions Sources of further information References
18.3 18.4 18.5 18.6 18.7 19
Plant life management (PLiM) practices for water-cooled water-moderated nuclear reactors (WWER)
T. J. Katona, Paks Nuclear Power Plant Ltd, Hungary
19.1
Introduction
609
609 612 623 624 627 628 630
633 633
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19.2 19.3 19.4 19.5 19.6 19.7 19.8 19.9 19.10 19.11 19.12 19.13 19.14
Description of water-cooled water-moderated nuclear reactors (WWERs) Plant life management (PLiM) policy of water-cooled water-moderated nuclear reactor (WWER) operators Mechanical components relevant for safe long-term operation Structures and structural components relevant for safe long-term operation Electrical, instrumentation and control equipment relevant for safe long-term operation Regulatory requirements for continued operation Integration of plant life management (PLiM) programmes for water-cooled water-moderated nuclear reactor (WWERs) Feedback of operational experience Research needs in area of ageing of water-cooled watermoderated nuclear reactor (WWER) components Role of international organizations and programmes Future trends Sources of further information References
20
Plant life management (PLiM) practices for boiling water nuclear reactors (BWR): Japanese experience
N. Sekimura, University of Tokyo, Japan and N. Yamashita, Tokyo Electric Power Company, Japan
20.1 20.2
Introduction Features and types of boiling water reactors – boiling water reactor (BWR) and advanced boiling water reactor (ABWR) 20.3 Major ageing mechanisms significant for boiling water reactor (BWR) systems, structures and components (SSCs) 20.4 Ageing management practices against major significant ageing mechanisms 20.5 Major component replacement/refurbishment programmes 20.6 Technical subjects to be facilitated for ageing management 20.7 Current direction for more effective and systematic ageing management programmes 20.8 Knowledge management and research and development (R&D) 20.9 References 20.10 Abbreviations
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635 639 647 657 666 673 675 693 695 696 701 702 702 706
706 708 709 714 720 723 723 726 730 730
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Plant life management (PLiM) practices for pressurised heavy water nuclear reactors (PHWR)
732
R. K. Sinha and S. K. Sinha, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, India and K. B. Dixit, A. K. Chakrabarty and D. K. Jain, Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd., India
21.1 21.2
Introduction Pressurised heavy water reactor (PHWR)/Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) 21.3 Critical components of Indian pressurised heavy water reactor (PHWR) 21.4 Reactor ageing issues: pressure tube, end shields and calandria tube 21.5 Reactor ageing issues: reactivity mechanisms and fuel handling systems 21.6 Reactor ageing issues: feeders, secondary side piping, steam generators and heat exchangers 21.7 Reactor ageing issues: civil structures, cables and sea water systems 21.8 Regulatory issues associated with plant life management (PLiM) 21.9 Application of research and operational experience to find the practical solution to problems 21.10 Future trends 21.11 Acknowledgements 21.12 References 22
Plant life management (PLiM) practices for sodium cooled fast neutron spectrum nuclear reactors (SFRs)
B. Raj, P. Chellapandi, T. Jayakumar, B. P. C. Rao and K. Bhanu Sankara Rao, Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research, India
22.1 22.2 22.3 22.4 22.5
Introduction Sodium cooled fast neutron spectrum reactors (SFRs) Design approach Safety and regulatory perspective In-service inspection (ISI) and robotics in life assessment based on research and development (R&D) and applications 22.6 Life extension aspects of international sodium cooled fast neutron spectrum reactors (SFRs) 22.7 Future trends 22.8 Conclusion 22.9 Acknowledgements 22.10 References
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795 796 805 812 813 820 826 834 834 835
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23
Plant life management (PLiM) practices for gas-cooled, graphite-moderated nuclear reactors: UK experience
G. B. Neighbour, University of Hull, UK
23.1 23.2
Introduction UK gas-cooled reactor types (Magnox and advanced gas-cooled reactor (AGR)) 23.3 Nuclear graphite 23.4 Effects of reactor environment on the graphite moderator 23.5 The UK nuclear regulatory regime 23.6 Maintaining the safety of graphite moderator cores 23.7 Regulatory requirements for continued operation 23.8 Future trends 23.9 Sources of further information 23.10 Useful websites 23.11 References
xv
838 838 840 848 852 860 862 868 870 871 872 872
24
Outlook for nuclear power plant life management (PLiM) practices – summary, conclusions, recommendations
Ph. G. Tipping, Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant, Switzerland
24.1 24.2
876
24.6 24.7
Introduction Further elements to consider for nuclear power plant ageing and plant life management (PLiM-AM) Discussion Current and projected requirements of the nuclear power industry List of topical issues of current and future relevance to nuclear power plants (NPPs) Conclusions References
Index
889
24.3 24.4 24.5
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877 879 880 881 885 888
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Contributor contact details
(* = main contact)
Chapters 1, 2, 5, 6, 18 and 24 Ph. G. Tipping Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant – NE&MC CH 5200 Brugg Switzerland E-mail:
[email protected]
Chapter 3
Chapter 7 M. Bakirov Center of Material Science and Lifetime Management Ltd Office 5 Kirova str. 7 Lubertsy City Moscow Region 140002 Russia E-mail:
[email protected]
A. Alonso Universidad Politécnica de Madrid Departamento de Ingenieria Nuclear Rafael Calvo 3 2F 28010 Madrid Spain E-mail:
[email protected]
Chapter 4 P. Contri* and A. Rodionov European Commission, DG-JRC Institute for Energy Safety of Current Reactors Unit PO Box 2 1755 ZG Petten, The Netherlands Westerduinweg 3 1755 LE Petten The Netherlands
Chapter 8 M. Hernández-Mayoral Division of Structural Materials Department of Technology CIEMAT 28040 Madrid Spain E-mail:
[email protected]
M. J. Caturla* Department Fisica Aplicada Facultad de Ciencias, Fase II Universidad de Alicante 03690 Alicante Spain E-mail:
[email protected]
E-mail:
[email protected] © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
xviii
Contributor contact details
Chapter 9
Chapter 14
P. L. Andresen GE Global Research Center One Research Circle CE2513 Schenectady, NY 12309 USA
L. Yang and K. T. Chiang Department of Earth, Material, and Planetary Sciences Southwest Research Institute® (SwRI®) 6220 Culebra Rd San Antonio, TX 78228 USA
E-mail:
[email protected]
Chapter 10
E-mail:
[email protected]
F. A. Garner Radiation Effects Consulting Richland, WA 99354 USA
Chapter 15
E-mail:
[email protected]
Chapters 11 and 12 M. Brumovsky Nuclear Research Institute Rez plc, Division of Integrity and Technical Engineering 250 68 Rez Czech Republic E-mail:
[email protected]
L. Malerba Structural Materials Group Institute of Nuclear Materials Science Studiecentrum voor Kernenergie ∑ Centre d’Etude de l’Energie Nucléaire (SCK ∑ CEN) Boeretang 200 B-2400 Mol Belgium E-mail:
[email protected]
Chapter 16
Chapter 13 S. Lozano-Perez Department of Materials University of Oxford Parks Road Oxford OX1 3PH UK
H. M. Hashemian Analysis and Measurement Services Corporation AMS Technology Center 9111 Cross Park Drive Knoxville, TN 37923 USA E-mail:
[email protected]
E-mail: sergio.lozano-perez@materials. ox.ac.uk
© Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
Contributor contact details
xix
Chapter 17
Chapter 21
W. Hoffelner Paul Scherrer Institut CH-5232 Villigen PSI Switzerland
R. K. Sinha* and S.K. Sinha Reactor Design and Development Group Bhabha Atomic Research Centre Mumbai India
E-mail:
[email protected]
Chapter 19
E-mail:
[email protected]
T. J. Katona Paks Nuclear Power Plant Ltd P.O. Box 71 Paks 7031 Hungary
K. B. Dixit, A. K. Chakrabarty and D. K. Jain Engineering and Procurement Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited India
E-mail:
[email protected]
Chapter 22
Chapter 20 N. Sekimura* Department of Nuclear Engineering and Management University of Tokyo 7-3-1 Hongo Bunkyo-ku 113-8656 Tokyo Japan E-mail:
[email protected]
N. Yamashita Reactor Mechanical Maintenance Group Maintenance Department (Unit 3&4) Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station Tokyo Electric Power Company 22 Kitahara Ottozawa Ohkumamachi Futaba-gun, 979-1301 Fukushima Prefecture Japan
B. Raj, P. Chellapandi, T. Jayakumar, B. P. C. Rao and K. Bhanu Sankara Rao Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research Kalpakkam TN – 603 102 India E-mail:
[email protected]
Chapter 23 G. B. Neighbour Materials and Process Performance Department of Engineering University of Hull Hull HU6 7RX UK E-mail:
[email protected]
E-mail:
[email protected]
© Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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Woodhead Publishing Series in Energy
1 Generating power at high efficiency: Combined cycle technology for sustainable energy production Eric Jeffs 2 Advanced separation techniques for nuclear fuel reprocessing and radioactive waste treatment Edited by Kenneth L. Nash and Gregg J. Lumetta 3 Bioalcohol production: Biochemical conversion of lignocellulosic biomass Edited by K. W. Waldron 4 Understanding and mitigating ageing in nuclear power plants: Materials and operational aspects of plant life management (PLiM) Edited by Philip G. Tipping 5 Advanced power plant materials, design and technology Edited by Dermot Roddy 6 Stand-alone and hybrid wind energy systems: Technology, energy storage and applications Edited by J. K. Kaldellis 7 Biodiesel science and technology: From soil to oil Jan C. J. Bart, Natale Palmeri and Stefano Cavallaro 8 Developments and innovation in carbon dioxide (CO2) capture and storage technology Volume 1: Carbon dioxide (CO2) capture, transport and industrial applications Edited by M. Mercedes Maroto-Valer 9 Geological repository systems for safe disposal of spent nuclear fuels and radioactive waste Edited by Joonhong Ahn and Michael J. Apted
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Woodhead Publishing Series in Energy
10 Wind energy systems: Optimising design and construction for safe and reliable operation Edited by John D. Sørensen and Jens N. Sørensen 11 Solid oxide fuel cell technology: Principles, performance and operations Kevin Huang and John Bannister Goodenough 12 Handbook of advanced radioactive waste conditioning technologies Edited by Michael I. Ojovan 13 Nuclear reactor safety systems Edited by Dan Gabriel Cacuci 14 Materials for energy efficiency and thermal comfort in buildings Edited by Matthew R. Hall 15 Handbook of biofuels production: Processes and technology Edited by Rafael Luque, Juan Campelo and James Clark 16 Developments and innovation in carbon dioxide (CO2) capture and storage technology Volume 2: Carbon dioxide (CO2) storage and utilisation Edited by M. Mercedes Maroto-Valer 17 Oxy-fuel combustion for power generation and carbon dioxide (CO2) capture Edited by Ligang Zheng 18 Small and micro combined heat and power (CHP) systems: Advanced design, performance, materials and applications Edited by Robert Beith 19 Hydrocarbon fuel conversion technology: Advanced processes for clean fuel production Edited by M. Rashid Khan 20 Modern gas turbine systems: High efficiency, low emission, fuel flexible power generation Edited by Peter Jansohn 21 Concentrating solar power (CSP) technology: Developments and applications Edited by Keith Lovegrove and Wes Stein 22 Nuclear corrosion science and engineering Edited by Damien Féron
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Woodhead Publishing Series in Energy
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23 Power plant life management and performance improvement Edited by John Oakey 24 Direct-drive wind and marine energy systems Edited by Markus Mueller 25 Advanced membrane science and technology for sustainable energy and environmental applications Edited by Angelo Basile and Suzana Nunes 26 Irradiation embrittlement of reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) Edited by Naoki Soneda 27 High temperature superconductors (HTS) for energy applications Edited by Ziad Melhem 28 Infrastructure and methodologies for the justification of nuclear power programmes Edited by Agustín Alonso Santos
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© Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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Foreword Y. D ou, Shanghai Nuclear Energy Research and Development Institute (SNERDI), P. R. China
The development and commercial use of nuclear energy in the form of costcompetitive electricity and district heating was one of the most significant industrial achievements of the 20th century. The 21st century is now approaching its second decade, and global energy consumption continues to grow rapidly, and projections show a doubling of world electricity demand by 2030, creating the need for considerable amounts of newly installed generating capacity (of all origins) in the next 25 years. The current global nuclear energy capacity is about 367 GWe, and between 524 GWe and 740 GWe is expected to be needed before 2050. This will necessitate building between 200 and 400 new nuclear power plants (NPPs) worldwide to just replace the lost capacity of electrical power from decommissioned NPPs and to provide the new capacity that will be necessary by 2050, not only to satisfy the needs of growing energy consumption, but also to ease environmental pressure by reducing dependence on fossil-based energy. For example, in China, where the economy has continuously increased by 9% per year, on average, over the past 30 years, the current portion of nuclear-generated energy is only around 2%, which is a relatively small percentage in comparison with the world’s current nuclear-generated energy portion of about 16%. To satisfy the demand for energy in an environmentally friendly way, free from greenhouse gas emissions, China is thus launching an ambitious nuclear power plan to raise the portion of nuclear energy by 4–5% by the year 2020. That means that 40–60 new NPPs of 1000 MWe should be built in a decade or more. Such ambitions for new-build requirements for NPPs create considerable logistics and planning tasks, having due regard for the industry’s overall current and projected ability to supply the heavy equipment required for NPPs (e.g. pressure vessels, quality alloys for piping, steam generators, core shrouds, pumps, high quality cement for containment buildings and cooling towers, etc.). Furthermore, action must be taken now to ensure that sufficiently trained, educated and experienced personnel are available to operate the plants and to regulate them. Also, the need to have fossil-fuel free low ‘greenhouse gas’ energy sources puts the focus squarely on the nuclear option, as long as it can remain safe.
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Foreword
Two crucial and decisive factors to sustain long-term operation of nuclear power plants are their safety and profitability, which can be achieved through a combination of applying optimum management strategies with an understanding of the ways in which the safety-related systems, structures and components (SSCs) perform and interact in their respective operating environments. The SSCs are made of various materials (e.g. metals, alloys, concrete, plastics) and it is the behaviour of materials due to their operational conditions (e.g. temperature, pressure, loading, irradiation, coolant chemistry) that can lead to ageing degradation with attendant impact on NPP availability, SSC reliability, or a lessening of safety margins and possible attendant operational constraints. It is the duty of NPP operators to ensure that their NPPs are safe as well as profitable. Operators can be assisted in achieving these goals by using ageing management and plant-life management approaches, based on science and technology and global experience. Ageing management and plant-life management covers various aspects of knowledge on SSCs, such as information on requirements of design basis, manufacture, installation, commissioning and operation, understanding of material degradation mechanisms, inspection programmes, evaluation and robust implementation of associated methodologies for assessing SSC fitness-for-service, use of database techniques, etc. For those countries having various designs and types of NPP, the available experts and plant personnel may need information or have to deal with tasks or problems from the different units synchronously. It is therefore extremely useful to have a single book which provides a wide range of the most recent information covering all types of NPPs on ageing and plant-life management techniques and also gives insights and guidance on how to keep NPPs operating safely and reliably. This is facilitated by understanding how ageing degradation occurs in SSCs and then by using this knowledge to develop scientifically based methods to mitigate or eliminate it. This book has been produced through a multinational team of globally recognized experts in their respective fields. The scope of this modern book is therefore immense and records the knowledge and experience gained with materials in NPPs over the last 50 or so years of nuclear power development. The suggestions for further reading and the references provided give the reader access to even more information. Accordingly, this book is a practical and technical manual for engineers, technologists and specialists involved in all aspects of NPP operation. Students and younger technologists studying nuclear technology, or those just embarking on their careers in nuclear power, will find here a source of inspiration and current information to help them achieve their academic and career goals. Furthermore, this book is a record of the current knowledge and experience that needs to be kept for future generations. This is even more so now, due to the gradual but steady loss of the “pioneer” generation of nuclear technologists and researchers, as
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they go into retirement. External organizations, including design institutes, technical supporters, sub-contractors of nuclear steam supply systems, materials suppliers and regulators will also find valuable information in this book to enable them to carry out their respective tasks. In a word, this book is essential reading for anyone associated with nuclear power. In China we have a proverb, namely, ‘Experience is the best teacher’. I believe that this book will act as one of the best teachers currently available, since it is based on the cumulative experience of more than 750 personyears when the career years of all the contributing authors are taken into consideration. It remains to be seen what the next generation of NPPs will demand in terms of specialist knowledge and operational practices. One thing is certain: as new knowledge is obtained, it must also be recorded in a book such as this.
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Executive summary P h. G. T I P P I N G, Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant, Switzerland
Overview of the book This reference book is a comprehensive state-of-the-art, science and technology record of the current knowledge base concerning materials ageing degradation (AD), and its mitigation and elimination in systems, structures and components (SSCs) used in commercially operated nuclear power plants (NPPs). Accordingly, it covers a wide range of subjects relating to NPP SSCAD, and so the phrase ‘from atoms to zirconium’ could be a fitting one when attempting to capture the very essence of this book. It traces the historical development of commercial nuclear power, while illustrating the way our understanding and mitigation of SSC-AD has continually increased through basic and applied research approaches. The effectiveness and integration of validated SSC-AD mitigation methods (which have been largely furnished by basic research efforts) into the daily operation of NPPs is exemplified throughout. The necessity for always keeping SSCs ‘fit-for-service’ is a vital safetyrelated aspect, but it is also an important commercial requirement as well, since NPPs may thereby retain the technological basis, and thus the regulatory possibility (in satisfying licence requirements), to continue safe and reliable operation, even in excess of their original design life. The chance that this ‘long-term operation’ (LTO) can be realized is significantly enhanced when NPP plant life management (PLiM), ageing management (AM), ageing surveillance programmes (ASPs) and standard operational practices (OPs) are optimized, and when plant-specific and worldwide lessons learned are continually and robustly integrated into the operational management of NPPs. The effectiveness of PLiM, AM, ASPs and OPs is also shown to depend significantly on the level of safety culture prevailing in the NPP’s workforce, as well as on efficient plant knowledge management (KM) and associated job succession and training strategies for personnel. These essential themes are discussed throughout the book. Each chapter may be regarded as a ‘stand-alone’ contribution, providing in-depth information concerning the specific subject matter dealt with. The
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authors responsible have provided concise abstracts, summaries, conclusions, references and further information sources regarding SSC-AD, PLiM, AM and ASPs from their perspectives. The book is structured to allow the reader to select specific subject areas on the topic of interest in order to provide detailed information on SSC-AD, and also to give a perspective on the commercial nuclear power industry as a whole.
Overview of Part I Part I reviews the role of nuclear power in the global energy mix, and the importance and relevance of plant life management (PLiM) for the safety regulation and economics of nuclear power plants. In Chapter 1, by Tipping, a strong argument for the use of commercial nuclear power is provided with respect to its role as a non-fossil based energy source. Accordingly, aspects concerning the world’s climate, and the part nuclear power has in providing safe, cost-effective, and low environmental impact energy, are presented. Owing to climate and carbon dioxide emission issues, current and future use of nuclear power is considered to be a vital factor in the global effort to improve on the Earth’s environmental ‘balance of health’. (Viewed relatively, the carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere is currently about 70% more than it was 40 years ago, and this trend is continuing.) Comparison is made between nuclear and other forms of energy, not only in terms of carbon footprint and greenhouse gas aspects, but also in terms of costs and availability of fuels. Attention is brought to the finite nature of fossil-based fuel resources compared to nuclear fuel cycles that can ‘breed’ further fuel. Cost-competitive fissionable materials suitable for fuel in current and future fission-based nuclear technology are conservatively estimated to be sufficient for at least the next 500 years at projected usage rates/requirements estimates. Features and characteristics of next generation NPPs have also been provided to introduce the reader to this evolving aspect of commercial NPP development, and fusion-based nuclear power, although beyond the scope of this book, is also briefly addressed in terms of a future fossil-fuel free energy source. The key elements, principles and approaches to NPP-PLiM for plant designs most commonly in current use are explained in Chapter 2, by Tipping. Goals and essential features of PLiM, AM, ASPs and standard OPs are shown to be the result of logical and safety-based approaches to ensure that resources are primarily invested into the most important SSCs to maintain adequate safety margins and to continuously increase safety levels. Common NPP SSC-AD terminology and definitions are listed. Many SSCs can be routinely maintained or replaced, but it is the condition of the large, passive SSCs, which are deemed irreplaceable (due to practical and cost issues), that will ultimately decide the operational life of a NPP. Failures in
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NPP components, systems, machinery and structures can occur. Similarly, administrative and operational oversights can also take place and potentially contribute to a failure. However, most NPP-SSC failures cannot cause a direct threat to safety or operation, since extensive defence-in-depth (DID) design principles, redundant/back-up systems and tested accident/emergency management strategies are in place. The DID and accident management approaches are explained to give the reader an appreciation of the extent designers, operators and regulators interact to ensure, and assure, the highest levels of safety, even under accident/emergency conditions. Safety awareness, appropriate safety training courses and questioning attitudes of all NPP personnel are vital to the overall operational success of NPPs. It is shown that PLiM, AM, ASPs and OPs, based on understanding of SSC-AD mechanisms, and their mitigation, are a way to cost effectively achieve all these goals for both current and long-term operation. Safety in the operation of NPPs always has first priority. Specific safety regulations, regulatory requirements and licensing aspects of NPPs obviously vary with the country in which the plants are operating. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, by Alonso, while national structures of regulation and the way legally binding requirements are implemented/enforced may differ in detail, they share overall objectives in common, i.e. to ensure that the use of nuclear power does not affect the population or environment at any time. The main areas of concern for plant designers, operators and regulators are identified as neutron irradiation embrittlement, stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC). International activities and research efforts are addressed, as well as aspects and methods for integration of PLiM into operating plants. Plant safety assessment for nuclear power plants, and in particular the development and application of probabilistic and deterministic methods for NPP and SSC safety assessment, are explained in Chapter 4, by Contri and Rodionov. The chapter provides definitions of terms commonly used, and highlights the main issues of SSC-AD. The field of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is explained with reference to the evaluation of time-dependent ageing effects. The importance of having a robust NPP organizational structure for supporting PLiM is discussed in depth. The socio-economic impacts of ageing and PLiM programmes for NPPLTO are discussed in Chapter 5, by Tipping. The importance of nuclear power in the world’s energy resource mix is presented and fuel availability and pricing is examined for current and long-term operation. Cost drivers of NPP operation are analysed, since the business case has to be adjusted to accommodate costs associated with possible (unforeseen) additional regulatory burdens/restrictions, procurement of large, expensive SSCs (e.g. steam generator replacements) and the business case necessity to amortize the plants before they are phased out of service. Significant investments in
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replacement SSCs, systems upgrading/modernization and back-fitting costs can be more readily amortized if the NPPs go into LTO. Power uprates and associated issues are explained and identified.
Overview of Part II Part II reviews the mechanisms and effects of ageing degradation of materials in nuclear power plant systems, structures and components (SSC), as well as routes taken to characterize and analyse the degradation of materials and mitigate degradation effects. Chapter 6, by Tipping, presents a holistic approach to failure analysis of NPP-SSCs, and is given as a guide to researchers, designers, operators, investigators and regulators for formulating appropriate questions to ultimately explain why failures occurred and to facilitate a logic-based methodology to determine their root causes and thereby to provide routes to take to avoid such failures in future. The phenomenon of latent failure conditions (LFCs) is outlined to provide a further concept in understanding the root causes of SSC failures. Understanding how failures occur in SSCs, and how they impact NPP operation and safety, is shown to be a many-faceted challenge, since the interaction of man-machine and human factors may contribute in subtle ways to SSC-AD types, rates and levels. Chapter 7, by Bakirov, explores the impact of operational loads and AD interactions on SSCs. Creep, fatigue and corrosion interactions are examined in depth, as well as equipment condition monitoring, prediction and testing routes used to confirm whether SSCs are in the optimum physical and chemical condition to fulfil their technical specifications, and to check that they remain resistant to the continuing operational stressors they are subjected to. In particular, the most efficient in situ (specimen-free) nondestructive monitoring and testing methods to detect levels of SSC-AD are identified Chapter 8, by Hernández-Mayoral and Caturla, reviews the evolution of microstructures in reactor pressure vessel (RPV) steels and other reactor internal structural materials, describing this evolution in terms of the physical and chemical processes taking place due to the effects of operational stressors and stresses, time and temperature. A comparison is made between ferritic/ martensitic and austenitic steels with regard to the damage processes that occur. Tools available to study irradiation-induced damage are described. Practical measures that can be taken to mitigate the effects of neutron irradiation damage are identified, being the result of robust integration of research results to the solution of problems in NPPs. Chapter 9, by Andresen, reviews stress corrosion cracking (SCC) in light water reactor (LWR) environments, covering in particular austenitic stainless steels and nickel-base alloys. This AD mechanism is examined
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in depth, and the highly complex interaction between the materials, their heat treatment, microstructure, level and type of residual stress and specific operating environment (water chemistry of coolant, neutron fluence) is explained. Furthermore, comparison is made between product forms (e.g. wrought austenitic stainless steel and cast ferritic or martensitic stainless steels) in terms of their SCC propensity in LWR coolant and environments (i.e. in boiling and pressurized water reactors (BWRs and PWRs)). Corrosion fatigue and operating environmental effects on fracture are also discussed, since they are related forms of AD. Chapter 10, by Garner, reviews the mechanisms and effects of void swelling (VS) and irradiation creep (IC) in LWR environments. The phenomena of VS and IC have the potential to cause distortion in internal structural components, and since neutron fluences increase with operational time and swelling and creep depend, among other things, on the actual level of neutron irradiation damage present, it is expected that these AD mechanisms will become significant issues in future, especially when NPPs go into LTO. Owing to lower neutron flux levels in BWRs, the problems of VS and IC appear less of an issue compared to the situation in PWRs. The development of VS is identified as being non-linear with neutron dose, thus an acceleration of this effect is expected with LTO. Predictive equations regarding deformation levels for AISI 304 austenitic stainless steel are discussed. Chapter 11, by Brumovsky, outlines examples taken from practice to illustrate how ferritic low alloy reactor pressure vessel (RPV) steel and welds may embrittle to varying degrees, depending on impurity levels (e.g. copper, phosphorus) or alloying constituents (e.g. nickel, manganese), irradiation temperature and the level of neutron fluence. The effect of tensile yield stress and hardness increase as a result of RPV alloy and weld matrix hardening through neutron irradiation induced point defects and precipitate formation is discussed, as is the concomitant loss in fracture toughness levels (Charpy notch impact or other fracture toughness measures) in susceptible RPV materials. The importance of well-characterized irradiation conditions for creating databases is highlighted. The issue of neutron irradiation induced embrittlement in RPVs is extended in Chapter 12, by Brumovsky, which explains the principles and the approaches to RPV annealing and other procedures used for mitigating and managing embrittlement rates and levels. Methods such as fuel management and RPV shielding are explained. In particular, the practical annealing of RPVs, and selection of the optimum time-at-temperature heat treatment schedule are examined in depth. The rate of re-embrittlement of RPVs has generally been shown to be less after annealing and re-irradiation, thus allowing the so-called ‘lateral shift’ approach to be adopted.
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Overview of Part III Part III reviews analysis, monitoring and modelling techniques applicable to the study of NPP materials, as well as the application of advanced systems, structures and components in NPPs. Chapter 13, by Lozano-Perez, presents science-based approaches used to detect and understand irradiation damage and related ageing in NPP-SSC materials. The distinction is made between non-destructive and destructive methods available to researchers. Aspects of both volumetric and surface techniques are also provided, so that the optimum choice of method and approach can be made to study the various AD mechanisms. The microstructures and chemical compositions of aged/irradiated materials, even at the 100 nm scale, are shown to be a key to better understanding SSC-AD. Advances in specialized tools allow atomic resolutions in two or three dimensions. Chapter 14, by Yang and Chiang, provides information concerning on-line and real-time corrosion monitoring techniques of metals and alloys in nuclear power plants and laboratories. The underlying principles and applications of general or localized corrosion monitoring are explained in detail, and the variety of tools available are described and discussed in depth. Advantages and disadvantages of different monitoring methods are critically reviewed. Specifically, the importance of accurately measuring the electrochemical potential (ECP) of alloys in the actual NPP environment of high pressure and temperature coolant is discussed, and the range of suitable electrodes that may be used is presented. Chapter 15, by Malerba presents multi-scale modelling of irradiation effects in NPP materials. Irradiation effects are treated as a multi-scale problem, and microstructural features are linked to mechanical property changes. Computer-based multi-scale modelling approaches at the atomic, microstructural and mechanical property levels are explained, and an example of practical application of modelling is provided. In particular, irradiation induced hardening and embrittlement effects in steels used in NPPs are discussed. Chapter 16, by Hashemian, discusses the significant developments in, and applications of, advanced instrumentation and control (I&C) in NPPs, as exemplified in the adoption of digital signal-based systems to replace the original analogue ones in older NPPs. The transition from analogue to digital I&C has generally enhanced safety levels and shortened response times for operational correctional procedures or emergency actions, for example. Temperature sensors, pressure transmitters, neutron detectors and associated cables are key I&C components, and may be subject to ageing. Both high and low frequency methods for on-line monitoring (OLM) are examined. However, attention is brought to the possible corruption of data and signals, and wilful interference/tampering aspects that could be an issue
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with digital-based technologies, if robust counter-measures and back-up systems are not in place. The development and application of nanostructured materials in nuclear power plants is traced and discussed in Chapter 17, by Hoffelner. Both fusion and fission-based future NPPs will operate at higher temperatures and pressures than currently operating NPPs, and the development of specially tailored alloys to resist ageing degradation is a key aspect. High temperature alloy properties include the need to resist creep, and the way to manufacture oxide-dispersion strengthened (ODS) materials is explained. The mechanical properties of ODS alloys, created by various routes – ceramic oxide dispersion, carbo-nitrides (with thermo-mechanical treatment) and internal oxidation – are discussed in depth.
Overview of Part IV Part IV reviews the particular ageing degradation issues, plant designs, and application of plant life management (PLiM) practices in a range of commercial nuclear reactor types. All reactor types operate under conditions dictated by their design concepts and engineered systems, and their SSCs are thus subjected to system-specific conditions and stressors. Some materials used in SSCs are found in all types of NPP-SSCs, but they may perform quite differently according to the specific operational conditions and environments they are exposed to. From both safety and technical standpoints, the overwhelming majority of the world’s current fleet of NPPs will be able to continue operation in excess of their original design lifetime (i.e. LTO). This is a direct consequence of effective PLiM, AM, ASPs, and OPs and focussed attention to SSC repairs, replacements or back-fitting, as required. Management of ageing effects in large, irreplaceable SSCs logically lies at the centre of NPP operational and commercial strategies, and to this end, coverage of the application of knowledge management strategies as a vital elemental aspect of overall NPP operations is also provided. The designs, plant-specific PLiM, AM, ASPs needs, and standard OPs for the main commercially operating nuclear reactor types are reviewed, including: pressurized water reactors, with PWRs covered in Chapter 18, by Tipping, and WWERs covered in Chapter 19, by Katona; boiling water reactors (BWRs), as covered in Chapter 20, by Sekimura and Yamashita; pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs), as covered in Chapter 21, by Sinha, Sinha, Dixit, Chakrabarty and Jain; sodium-cooled fast neutron spectrum reactors (SFRs), as covered in Chapter 22, by Raj, Chellapandi, Jayakumar, Rao and Rao, and gas-cooled graphite-moderated reactors (Magnox, AGRs), as covered in Chapter 23, by Neighbour. All of these chapters show that, irrespective of NPP type, safety and integrity of NPP-SSCs
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are closely connected to commercial viability, since SSCs are kept within design specifications and regulatory requirements, which are precursors to reliable and continuous operation. The longer a NPP can operate (i.e. free from prolonged maintenance shut-downs or forced outages), the more electrical energy (or district heating) can be sold. A NPP which has well-maintained SSCs (i.e. kept within their design and technical specifications and with sufficient safety margins), and has a good safety culture and vigilance in its workforce will, de facto, have a good safety record and a high availability and reliability.
Concluding remarks: Quo vadis nuclear power? The information in this book shows the immense amount of work done to date to understand, and mitigate, NPP SSC-AD. Indeed, thanks to PLiM, AM, ASPs, OPs and materials research, many older NPPs are now in the position to move into the LTO phase of their lives. This is the true value of such programmes, since both safety and economic aspects are optimized. As outlined in Chapter 24, by Tipping, by building on what is known today, it is expected that next generation NPPs will greatly benefit in terms of lessons learned concerning design, manufacture, choices of materials, inspection/monitoring methods and operational practices, to give just a few examples. Notwithstanding this, PLiM, AM, ASPs and OPs will still be essential for assuring safe, long and reliable operation of next generation NPPs. However, until these new NPPs come into service, it remains essential to closely follow, understand and mitigate the effects of SSC-AD in the current fleet of NPPs, as well as managing other less conventional ageing phenomena (e.g. retirement of experienced personnel, requirement to update documentation). A list of topical current and future NPP SSC-AD aspects and issues for NPPs is provided to focus on the main areas that require further research, monitoring and continued attention by designers, operators and regulators. With optimized PLiM, AM, ASPs and OPs in place, owners and operators will continue to provide their customers with environmentally clean and reliable energy at competitive prices whilst protecting their overall investment and will concomitantly provide licensing authorities with the proof that their plants are always being operated safely, irrespective of their chronological age.
Acknowledgements I would like to acknowledge and thank the international team of experts who have assisted me in creating this comprehensive book on how to understand ageing and degradation issues in nuclear power plants. The authors have
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made hereby a signal contribution to science and technology, exemplified by the high quality of the work they provided. Accordingly, this book will serve as a valuable reference and guide for all those currently involved with nuclear power generation and regulation, as well as those contemplating, or just starting, a career in nuclear power plant technology or nuclear materials research. Without the spirit of openness, the professional approaches taken and the collaboration between all contributing experts from around the world, this book could never have been written. My thanks also go to Mr Ian Borthwick (Commissioning Editor) for his encouragement, advice and support in creating this book, and to Mrs Diana Gill, Ms Ceridwen McCarthy and Ms Nell Holden, all of Woodhead Publishing Limited, for their highly competent assistance in the development and handling of this book project.
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Part I Introduction to plant life management (PLiM), safety regulation and economics of nuclear power plants
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Understanding and mitigating ageing in nuclear power plants
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Introduction to nuclear energy, and materials and operational aspects of nuclear power plants
P h. G. T i pp i n g, Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant, Switzerland
Abstract: The importance of nuclear power is presented in terms of its significant contribution to the world’s overall generating capacity, and its essentially ‘carbon-free’ nature is highlighted. The age distribution of the current fleet of nuclear power plants (NPPs) is explained and also the need for ensuring safety in operation, irrespective of the NPP’s age or design. Global resources of nuclear fuel and comparison with other energy carriers are discussed and attention is drawn to the requirement to condition and dispose of radioactive waste correctly. Stress corrosion cracking and neutron irradiation embrittlement issues are taken as two examples of ageing degradation that have occurred in NPPs. Key words: nuclear power plants, climate change, safety, nuclear fuel, radioactive waste, stress corrosion cracking, neutron embrittlement.
1.1
Introduction
This book contains more than 750 person-years of experience in all aspects of commercial nuclear power, basic research and applied technology. The contributing authors have various backgrounds, including engineering (civil, electrical, mechanical), physics, chemistry, metallurgy, radiology and safety regulation, for example. Specialist areas within the above general categories of science and technology have evolved over the years to address issues concerned with nuclear power generation, and specifically, this book deals with key aspects of research into how structural materials used in nuclear power plants (NPPs) behave and age in operation. The book also identifies and analyses many other important issues that have continued to dominate and shape the commercial nuclear power industry during its development, evolution and regulation since the mid-1950s. The world’s political and environmental situation has changed drastically over this time, reflecting global concerns about dwindling supplies of fossil-based energy resources (oil, gas and coal) and the possible impact their use has on climate and pollution levels in the atmosphere. The importance of nuclear energy, which currently supplies about 16% of the global electrical power capacity, is further 3 © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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highlighted in terms of its low carbon footprint (CF) and no greenhouse gas emissions (GGEs) in operation. Recognizing that many NPPs constructed in the 1965–80 nuclear power ‘boom-era’, have already reached, or are approaching, the end of their original design lives, the publication of this book at this point in time appears fortuitous. However, the information in this book is not concerned with the shutting down, decommissioning, dismantling and final disposal of NPPs; on the contrary, it deals with how these older NPPs may still continue to operate safely and reliably, benefitting from lessons learned, good operational and standard maintenance practices plus the robust implementation of system, structure and component (SSC) ageing surveillance programmes (ASPs), ageing management (AM) and plant-life management (PLiM) programmes. This book has an underlying goal, namely to record relevant and updated knowledge concerning how ageing degradation (AD) in NPP-SSCs occurs, and how it may be effectively detected, avoided, eliminated or mitigated to facilitate safe, reliable and profitable current operation, and even long-term operation (LTO) (i.e. operation of NPPs in excess of their original design lives). Consequently, this book will furnish all those involved in any sector of commercial NPP operation and regulation, with a deeper understanding of the many facets and issues concerning nuclear power technology as a whole. The topics and issues addressed in this book are experience and sciencebased sources of modern information concerning the commercial nuclear power industry, and its regulation. Safety, operational reliability and profitability of NPPs will all benefit when such information is robustly implemented as technically perfected (and regulatory approved) methodologies and remedies for SSC-AD. It is expected that all NPPs, irrespective of their design or age, that are operated by a qualified workforce, who conscientiously apply all the tenets of safety culture and diligently ensure that standard operational practices (OPs), ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes are followed, will be safe, reliable and profitable to operate at every stage of their lives, including LTO, and until, at the very end of their chronological lives, decommissioning, dismantling and disposal eventually become necessary.
1.2
Age as a relative term
The design life of a NPP has generally little in common with its real-life operational safety status and fitness-for-service, and thus the amount of years it can operate until the true end of operational life (EOL) is reached. Barring political or public acceptance issues, for example, the NPP’s EOL will be reached when safety requirements can no longer be satisfied or, alternatively, despite having a good safety status, it is simply no longer profitable to continue operation. Specifically, good standard plant OPs, ASPs, AM and
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PLiM programmes make it possible to delay significantly this point in time, since both safety and profitability of NPPs are maintained and optimized. Again, NPP personnel safety culture attitudes will be significant in assuring the degree of effectiveness of the above-mentioned programmes. Depending on various aspects, NPPs may possess several types of ‘lifetime’, for example: ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
operational lifetime (when power is being produced safely and reliably and can be sold at a profit); political/legal lifetime (operation ends when there is no more public acceptance or when legally binding international agreements to shut down particular NPPs have to be respected); business/economic lifetime (operation ends when the overall NPP running costs can no longer be covered by sales of electricity); technical lifetime (operation ends when SSC refurbishment and repairs are no longer technically feasible, or possible); conceptual lifetime (operation ends when the NPP can no longer be kept at the state-of-the-art, science and technology, since it has far too many outdated and obsolete SSCs); safety lifetime (operation ends when statutory and regulatory requirements for continuing operation (fulfilment of licensing conditions) are too extensive, expensive or not possible to implement practically); the chronological lifetime of a NPP may be taken as the time-span between site selection, constructing and operating the NPP, ceasing operation, removing the fuel and finally decommissioning and dismantling it, and returning the site back to ‘greenfield’ status.
Irrespective of their age, NPPs that have benefitted from continual improvement in management and operational practices (MOPs), maintenance, monitoring technologies, inspections, repairs, refurbishing or replacement of SSCs, and have cost-effectively upgraded plant control and safety systems in full accordance with regulatory requirements, are in good overall condition to continue operation and go eventually into the LTO phase.
1.3
The importance of nuclear energy
As previously noted, nuclear energy is already an important contributor (about 16%) to the total global electricity requirement, and as demand for energy increases, the nuclear-generated share of the electrical power market is expected to rise correspondingly. Potentially, nuclear-generated power could provide up to 1.7 terawatts (TWe) of electricity to the world by 2050, but this will depend, among other things, on the number and capacity rating thereof of new generation NPPs coming on-line [1]. However, if the nuclear power industry is to maintain its current position, and wishes to increase its
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market share in the future, it must continue to be accepted by the public. A crucial aspect of this is that NPPs must remain a safe and reliable source of energy. Acceptance of nuclear-generated electrical power will also depend considerably on its perceived and real impact on the quality of life and the environment. It is therefore appropriate to introduce the concepts of ‘greenhouse gases’ and the ‘carbon footprint’ (CF) already here, since human activities are now frequently classed in terms of a CF, which is a measure of the amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) (a greenhouse gas) produced by the combustion of fossil fuels. The CF is often expressed as tonnes of CO2 or tonnes of carbon emitted, usually on an annual basis. However, it must be stated here that any activity requiring or generating energy (e.g. power plants (hydro, fossil-fuelled, solar, wind, nuclear), mining (extracting coal or uranium, pumping oil), manufacturing (refining metals, enriching uranium for nuclear fuel, production of solar panels or wind turbines, making cement), transport (petrol and diesel combustion), electrically driven motors (batteries charged via coal-fired electricity stations or solar panels)) will leave varying sizes of CF. Thus, although NPPs generate negligible direct carbon emissions, they nevertheless still have a finite CF. The method used to obtain a CF is the ‘life cycle assessment’ (LCA), which is accredited by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14000 standards. Calculating exact values for CFs is a fairly complex task, since basically every process and sub-process involved in the item under consideration must be assessed for its own CF and then added to get the CF total. However, taking all CF aspects (mining, fuel enrichment, manufacturing, decommissioning and disposal, etc.) into consideration, nuclear power generation may still be classed as having a very low CF, and thus nuclear energy remains an extremely low source of environmentally harmful greenhouse gases. For example, even if lower grade uranium-bearing ores (e.g. 0.03% content of fissionable 235U) will have to be used in future, necessitating more energy to extract and refine the fuel, this would only raise the current total CF emissions of the United Kingdom’s NPPs from 5 to 6.8 grams of CO2 equivalent per kilowatt-hour (CO2e/ kWh). This increase, however, would still keep nuclear power technology at a level comparable with other low-carbon power technologies, and will be anyway well below the CFs of fossil-fuelled power technologies [2]. (Note: The CO2e is the carbon dioxide equivalent. Each of the greenhouse gases addressed by the Kyoto Protocol (see later) can be identified in terms of its climate change impact relative to that of carbon dioxide.) The commonly used unit for emission reductions is one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent. Combined power plants using gas turbines and hydro-power produce 420, solar-photo-voltaic 62 and coal-fired ones about 900 (all in approximate gram-equivalent CO2e/kWh). It has been reported that a pressurized water reactor (PWR) NPP in Switzerland had a value of 3.04 CO2e/kWh, which is on a par with hydro-produced only electricity [3]. This value even included
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mining the uranium fuel and final disposal of the entire plant. Although electricity production in NPPs is esentially CO2 free, over the entire plant lifetimes about 6–8 CO2e/kWh is nevertheless expected to be generated through various processes. This is still very low compared to other energysupply systems, as exemplified above. Not only is nuclear-generated power environmentally benign, it is cheap: at a representative price of 5 US cent/ kWh (3.4 Euro-cent//kWh at the average exchange rate in October 2009), a cost-analysis gives roughly: 1.97 US cent (1.3 Euro-cent) for capital costs, 1.85 US cent (1.26 Euro-cent) for operating costs, 1 US cent (0.7 Eurocent) for decommissioning/disposal and 0.38 US cent (0.26 Euro-cent) for fuel. (It can be noted that if all fossil-fuelled power plants were to be replaced by NPPs (to get the same amount of energy), it would mean that the world’s NPP fleet would then have to number about 4316 by the year 2050 [4]. This is roughly ten times more than the number of NPPs operating in 2010.) A detailed analysis of CO2 issues is beyond the scope of this book, but it is worth mentioning that carbon capture and storage (CCS) and associated costs are currently (2009) running between 30 and 35 Euros per tonne, and this cost is likely to increase. For comparison, Norway currently levies a duty of about 44 Euros per tonne of CO2 released in the process of extracting oil from the North Sea. The European Energy Exchange, located in Leipzig, Germany, currently quotes prices between 20 and 30 Euros per tonne of CO2 [5]. In other words, just like nuclear waste, fossil-fuel-generated CO2 waste also has a price and sequestering (storage) of ‘carbon’ underground requires further environmental impact, site selection and viability assessments. From this, it can be seen that continued and increased use of nuclear power remains justifiable in terms of its low CF and GGE emissions profile, and it is in a favourable position to contribute significantly to both current and future global requirements for energy.
1.4
Learning from experience to continually improve safety in nuclear power plants (NPPs)
Creating and maintaining safety in operation of NPPs arises through many factors including good design, appropriate materials selection for SSCs, highest manufacturing standards and approved methods, quality assurance, operational practices, maintenance, inspection and human resource training and actions. However, continually improving safety at all levels lies in the necessity to learn constantly from our own, or others, experience. As mentioned in the Foreword, ‘Experience is the best teacher’, but when dealing with human and materials-related issues in NPPs, particularly those that have impacted safety, it is evident that ‘Detrimentum magister nos’ (‘Damage teaches us’). As with any other industry, it is necessary to put all lessons learned, including
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practical experience combined with analysis and inspections, robustly into practice to avoid future problems in the operation of NPPs and the SSCs in them. This facilitates continual improvement of safety, as well as reliable operation. Such actions taken in a NPP can not only serve the regulatory and corporate goals of safety and profitability respectively, but also may pave the way for continued operation even after the NPP’s original design life has been reached (LTO). The use of nuclear energy is subject to regulatory control, and licences to operate (or permission granted for continued operation) will be issued only when the safety case is clearly demonstrated. Thus, proof of safety remains a mandatory regulatory requirement for the current and LTO of existing NPPs, as well as for any future new-build NPPs. Lessons learned and experience gained with all types and designs of NPP over the last 55 years of using commercial nuclear power now serve to form a solid base of knowledge concerned with regulation, design, choice of materials, inspection, monitoring techniques and best operational practices, including nurturing a safety-oriented attitude in the workforce, namely the implementation of a good safety culture. Although the main scope and focus of this book is on understanding and mitigating SSC-AD mechanisms or issues which have arisen in the past and that have impacted safety, reliability and profitability of NPPs, a further goal is to provide guidance and information derived from research and operational experience, based on sound science and proven methods, to ensure that NPPs may continue to function in full accordance with their design specifications and to thus produce electricity as safely and as reliably as possible at a competitive price. Implementation of best possible practices and methods also has the potential to facilitate LTO operation of NPPs, since safety margins may be kept at sufficient and effective levels, and SSCs remain reliable. The way in which best practices and methods can be incorporated into the overall operation of NPPs is discussed in this book by drawing on experience gained and introducing the concepts, features and goals of ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes. Accordingly, this book also serves the broader goals of knowledge management, which is necessary for retaining both managerial and technical competence in the nuclear power industry, now and in the future.
1.5
Global situation of the status of installed nuclear power in 2010
The world’s fleet of NPPs currently has an average operational age of around 23 years. In June 2010 there were 438 NPPs operating in 30 countries, with an installed electric net capacity of about 370 GWe, and another 59 NPPs, with a planned capacity of 40 GWe, were in various stages of planning and construction, for example, 6 new NPPs were being built in mainland China
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and India. The currently installed capacity is expected to increase to at least 530 GWe by the year 2025 as new NPPs connect to the grid. The amount of installed nuclear power capacity, relative to other energy sources, varies between countries, as shown, as an example, in the following abbreviated list, which details the current situation (2010), in per cent installed nuclear power capacity relative to other sources (approximate values): ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
Belgium: 7 NPPs, 52%; Canada: 18 NPPs and 2 NPPs in refurbishment, 15%; Peoples Republic of China: 11 NPPs, <3% (>5% by 2020 is planned); France: 58 NPPs, 75%; Hungary: 4 NPPs, 20%; India: 17 NPPs; 3% (with the goal for 25% in 2050); Japan: 55 NPPs, 30%; Russian Federation: 32 NPPs, 16%; Sweden: 10 NPPs, 46%; Switzerland: 5 NPPs, 40%; United Kingdom: 19 NPPs, 19%; United States of America: 104 NPPs, 20%;
In June 2010 there were 195 NPPs in operation in continental Europe (with an installed electric net capacity of about 170 000 megawatt (MWe)) and 19 units were under construction with a projected net capacity of about 13 000 MWe; the new NPP constructions being in Bulgaria (2), Finland (1), France (1), Russian Federation (11), Slovak Republic (2) and Ukraine (2) [6]. Other countries within Europe currently have no commercial NPPs (e.g. Denmark, Greece). Countries outside Europe (e.g. Egypt) are keeping the nuclear power option open, whilst other countries (e.g. Iran) have already embarked on nuclear power schemes. Some countries are increasing their nuclear energy capacity (e.g. China, India, Russia, Finland and France), whilst, in contrast, Germany is planning to gradually phase out nuclear power. In February 2009, Italy and France agreed to the development, construction and initial set-up of four new generation European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) power plants in Italy, with the first one projected to start operation in 2020. Italy’s aim is to eventually produce 25% of the country’s electricity from nuclear energy. (Aspects of new generation NPPs, such as the EPR are discussed in Chapter 2 of this book.) Some countries (e.g. United Kingdom, Switzerland) are planning and assessing options to install new NPPs to replace the capacity of NPPs that could eventually be phased out. Despite the aforementioned international differences, political issues and goals, the overall global trend for nuclear power is seen as one of expansion. In June 2010, 149 new NPPs were in planning.
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1.6
Understanding and mitigating ageing in nuclear power plants
The importance of keeping nuclear power plants (npps) operating safely and reliably
A vital contribution to the overall level of nuclear generated power (irrespective of any new plants coming on-line in future, and the extra capacity presently being generated by NPP power uprates (PUs)), lies in assuring that the existing NPPs can continue to operate. This is, of course, with the requirement that they can do so safely and profitably, despite their chronological age or original design life. As will be shown later in this book, thanks to improved materials, maintenance, MOPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes and ageing degradation mitigation, these presently operating NPPs are still capable of fulfilling safety, technical and operational requirements. The question of whether a NPP may go to LTO is addressed through licensing procedures which require a priori proof of safety. It may be stated here that, despite different approaches in Europe and the USA, for example, the principles and goals are basically the same: first prove the safety case to the relevant regulatory authority and demonstrate that the overall plant practices are effective (e.g. maintenance, inspections, monitoring) and, if the business case is favourable (i.e. total market cost per kilowatt-hour (kWh) of nuclear generated electricity is competitive (or cheaper) compared to other sources, and profit margins remain favourable), and public acceptance remains high, continue operation.
1.7
Political and climate change issues and disposal of radioactive waste
Since the first ‘oil shock’ in the early 1970s it became clear that the world had become heavily dependent on this fossil-based fuel, and shortages in supply would quickly disrupt the world’s economies. Compounding this, oil prices have increased many-fold (a price is deliberately omitted here, due to the extremely volatile nature of the crude oil market) between 1970 and 2009 [7], and wildly fluctuating prices and shortages of supply have caused sharp inflation spikes and even civil protest. At the time of the first oil shock, there was generally a lack of global awareness concerning the possible harmful side-effects of burning fossil-based fuel and the production of GGEs with the attendant potential impact on the environment through pollution and global warming. Things have changed over the last 40 years, and environmental awareness and issues have now attracted increased public, political, energy policy-makers’ and media attention. The Kyoto Protocol [8] made provisions and pledges to reduce the signatory nations’ GGEs. As of February 2009, 183 states had signed and ratified the Protocol. Of these, 36 developed countries (plus the European Union, as a party in its own right) are required to reduce GGEs to specified levels. Some 137 developing
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countries have ratified the protocol, but they currently have no obligation beyond monitoring and reporting GGEs. As an example to focus attention on CO2 issues, it is noted that the concentration of CO2 was at a level of 372 parts per million in April 2005. This was higher than that calculated to have been present in the Earth’s atmosphere during the past 42 000 years. However, in September 2008 it was reported that scientists had thought that the general economic downturn would have slowed energy use, but instead, CO2 output actually jumped 3% from 2006 to 2007. This amount exceeds the most pessimistic outlook for emissions from burning coal and oil and related activities, as projected by scientists in 2007 [9]. It is worth noting that Great Britain has now pledged to cut CO2 emissions by at least 50% by 2050 and the ambitious new generation NPP construction scheme, currently now under plan, is seen as critical to achieving this target [10].
1.8
Energy resources: a comparison
The world’s demand for energy is increasing in pace with the growing human population (from approximately 1.5 billion in 1900, to about 6.7 billion in May 2009, and projected to reach about 9 billion by 2050 [11]), and with the emergence of more export-based economies in developing and industrializing nations. This means that the fossil-fuel based energy carriers (and these are finite resources) will eventually have to be replaced with alternatives that have lower environmental impact, are cheap and safe to use and, ideally, are ‘infinite resources’. Obvious such energy resources lie in harnessing hydro-, wind-, solar- (the sun shines on the earth about 35 000 times more power than the population uses daily, but presently only about 0.2% of the world’s energy comes from solar power) or direct tidal power. However, most of the world’s ideal hydropower sites have been used up, and environmental concerns and impact issues, such as flooding of marshlands and valleys and covering large land and sea areas with solar panels or wind turbines respectively may anyway preclude expansion, or restrict use, of these alternative sources in some cases. Costs of solar, wind and tidal energy are currently not competitive with nuclear energy (e.g. solar electricity is presently (2010) selling at a price six times more expensive than nuclear-generated electricity). So how does nuclear power really measure up? Uranium, a main source of nuclear fuel, is clearly also a finite quantity, but relatively little of the fissionable isotope 235U is actually needed for fuel and the current conservative estimate is that the resources are more than sufficient for at least the next 150 years, even allowing for increased demand through currently operating NPPs, including those in the LTO stage, and new NPPs projected to be operational in the next 5–40 years from now. Currently known uranium reserves, allowing extraction at a nominal benchmark price of US$130 per kilogramme of
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natural uranium metal (i.e. fuel enrichment price not included), or less, are estimated to be about 5.5 million tonnes. Consumption is about 66 500 tonnes per year. In total, about 35 million tonnes of uranium are probably available [12]. With advanced reactor and new fuel cycle technologies (breeder reactor technology), plus the eventual conversion of plutonium to fuel and reprocessing of spent fuel elements, the availability of nuclear fuel is likely to be assured for at least 1000 years [13]. Use of thorium as a breeder for fuel (discussed later) will potentially double the known reserves of fuel for the presently used fission-based reactor technology [12]. In the future, it is expected that other totally new ‘fossil-free’ or ‘virtually infinite’ energy sources will be further developed (e.g. fusion-based reactor technology, hydrogen-based fuels), and improved ways of energy utilization and distribution efficiency will anyway further conserve all other energy resources. Such developments will not take place in the near future, but prototype fast breeder reactors, for example, are currently being developed or under construction. Recognizing this situation, the only logical option left is to use low or zero GGE energy sources for as long as possible, whilst developing alternatives to fossil-based energy carriers in parallel. Although a NPP produces essentially no GGEs in operation, it does, however, create its own special waste products, but this radioactive waste (‘radwaste’) is not jettisoned into the environment; it is collected, sorted, conditioned and stored according to nationally approved practices and legislation. Aspects concerned with radwaste will be examined later, but radwaste treatment technology is already advanced and deemed capable of preventing environmental damage by keeping harmful substances out of the biosphere. It has to be remembered that radwaste must be handled, conditioned and disposed of so as to span very long geological, political and social time frames. Furthermore, by closing the nuclear fuel cycle, with the separation of minor actinides and long-lived radio-isotopes/fission products, the life span for unacceptable radiotoxicity and monitoring can be brought down to less than 1000 years.
1.9
Further ageing aspects in nuclear power plants (NPPs)
Nuclear power plants, just like any other industrial plants or transport systems (e.g. trains, aircraft, ships), are made of SSCs that undergo ‘ageing’, and this term may even be extended to include the personnel who operate them. Ageing effects may be seen as some finite rate of continuous, time-dependent mechanical, physical or chemical degradation of SSCs, level of personnel training, loss of knowledge (due to retirement of experienced personnel and inadequate succession planning), inadequacies in documentation (e.g. omission to follow exactly any modifications that have occurred in the NPP) and other
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aspects associated with mindsets and complacency. The effects of ageing can thus be seen to impact humans, plant procedures, practices and management, materials, computer software, hardware, documentation and machinery alike. Ageing degradation may occur at almost imperceptible or relatively rapid rates, depending on the specific subject area under consideration and the effectiveness of MOPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes in place. A key to safe operation of NPPs is to be aware of all the possible types of ageing that could take place, and to understand their root causes, and their potential impact on safety and reliability. Knowledge of the ways of how to eliminate or mitigate ageing degradation effects, as presented in this book, will then effectively ‘close the loop’, to create optimized NPP operation. While safe plant operation is vital for public acceptance, reliable operation is essential for the supply of competitively priced energy and thus profitability of the plant. These aspects will also be dealt with in this book, but it is important to mention here that the nuclear power industry is quite aware of SSC-AD and other ageing issues, and continues to implement strategies to address them. One important tool used to keep NPPs in a safe condition is to apply standard (routine) OPs, inspections, repairs and replacements, supported further by ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes. Their role and benefits will become increasingly apparent in the following chapters, but it is sufficient to mention here that such programmes not only protect the utilities’ business goals and investments, but also maintain safety at the highest level for a reasonable cost–benefit relationship and also pave the way for continued NPP operation, even after the original design life has been reached. This represents a significant financial incentive for utilities to invest resources in reliable and safe operation now to assure the future (LTO) of their plants.
1.10
Historical evolution of nuclear power and some materials aspects
On 20 December 1951, the Experimental Breeder Reactor EBR-1 in Arco, Idaho, USA, succeeded in supplying enough electricity to illuminate four low-power light bulbs. (The EBR-1’s task was, however, only to demonstrate the concept of a breeder reactor.) The Russian APS-1, 5 MWe reactor was the first to supply electricity to the national grid, on 26 June 1954. Not long after this, the nuclear power era gained considerable momentum when the world’s first commercial-scale NPP, ‘Calder Hall 1’, situated at Sellafield, England, was connected to the national electricity grid on 27 August, 1956. The Sellafield site eventually featured four Magnox-type reactors, each with a rated power of 50 MWe. (Apart from supplying power, the Magnox reactors also served to produce plutonium for military purposes.) The Magnox reactors were natural uranium metal fuelled, graphite moderated, and carbon dioxide gas cooled. They featured magnesium–aluminium
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(non-oxidizing – hence ‘Magnox’) alloy fuel cladding. The fuel cladding alloy had a low neutron capture cross-section, but limited the operating temperature to about 390 °C and thus also the thermal efficiency. The heat exchanger was outside the containment. Early Magnox reactors featured a steel containment, whilst later ones had a reinforced concrete one. The United Kingdom’s Magnox reactors were designed for 20 years of operation but the oldest one at Calder Hall actually achieved nearly 47 years of service before being shut down on 31 March 2003. Decommissioning of the Calder Hall site, to eventually return it to ‘greenfield’ status, is projected to take about 100 years to complete. By comparison, most NPPs operating today usually have a full power operation original design life of 30–40 years (with a relicensing or open-license situation for the option of operation of 60 years, and possibly more), produce between 220 and 1600 MWe, and, depending on the design or type, use either, for example, natural uranium, plutonium or uranium–plutonium mixed oxides or carbides as fuel, have zirconium alloy (e.g.‘Zircaloy-4’ (Zry-4) with 98.23 wt% zirconium, 1.45% tin, 0.21% iron, 0.1% chromium, and 0.01% hafnium (impurity hafnium very low, since it has a high neutron capture cross-section)) fuel cladding materials, and use either heavy water, light water, helium gas, carbon dioxide gas or molten sodium metal for coolant. The pressure vessels in light water cooled reactors (i.e. pressurized and boiling water reactors – PWR and BWR, respectively), for example, are made from tough, low alloy ferritic steel (cladded inside with austenitic stainless steel for corrosion protection). It can be seen that nuclear power systems technology, fuel and materials of SSCs have all evolved considerably over the last 55 years.
1.11
Overview of two important materials issues in older design nuclear power plants (npps)
Each type and design of NPP has its own special characteristics, and as operational experience was gained over the years, solutions to specific problems associated with SSC ageing degradation mechanisms had to be found. Design concepts and materials which had functioned well for other industries (e.g. in fossil-fuelled power plants, oil refining and chemical industries) were natural choices for the first commercial NPPs, but with time, it became clear that the nuclear environment presented other, and special, challenges to SSCs and the materials involved. For example, operational conditions and parameters such as temperature, pressure, neutron irradiation, coolant water chemistry (including radiolysis thereof) and other factors often combined to cause degradation in materials previously thought to be resistant to ageing degradation. Two examples of unexpected material degradation are given below.
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1.11.1 Stress corrosion cracking Despite a good service record in other industries, stress corrosion cracking (SCC) occurred in the well-known ‘Alloy 600’ (a nickel-base alloy approximately 72% Ni, 14% Cr and 10% Fe), used extensively for reactor pressure vessel (RPV) closure head penetrations cladding and steam generator (SG) tubing in pressurized water reactors (PWRs). Technical and engineering solutions were found to repair, plug, sleeve or surface-treat affected SG tubes, but when the so-called ‘plugging-rate value’ was reached (typically 10–20% of the total number of tubes in the SGs) it was no longer possible to operate at full power, having regard for emergency cooling requirements. Thus the balance between safety (emergency cooling capacity) and economic operation (power had to be reduced) eventually lead to the replacement of affected SGs. The action of ‘overplugging’ SGs is an alternative temporary solution to SG replacement, but necessitates a significant further reduction of plant power and this translates to the loss of even more money for each operational cycle: in other words, a natural limit is reached where it becomes economically attractive (i.e. cheaper in the long term) to replace the SGs. (Note: SCC degradation is dealt with extensively in Chapter 9 of this book.) New SGs usually feature tubing made from Alloy 690 TT (nickel-base alloy approximately 60% Ni, 30% Cr and 10% Fe), which is thermally treated (TT) to create a favourable microstructure and optimum mechanical properties, which has a much improved resistance to SCC in PWR coolant. It is noted here that, in general, nickel–chromium–iron alloys, such as Alloy 600, are quite resistant to corrosion, but if they contain high internal tensile stress (fabrication aspects), are not heat treated in an optimum way (microstructural effects) and are subjected to pressurized borated water (i.e. the coolant used in PWRs) at around 300 °C, primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) may occur, leading to costly repairs or eventual replacement of SGs and RPV closure heads. In some PWRs, the leakage of borated coolant water through PWSCC-affected head penetrations (for control rods and instrumentation) onto the external RPV closure head caused problems. In the most severe case discovered, boric acid crystals left on the external surfaces of the ferritic steel RPV head had caused extensive corrosion. The large area of corrosion (also known as ‘wastage’) had reached the stainless steel cladding of the RPV inner surface [14, 15]. It is interesting to note here that in the case mentioned, there were also managerial (human factor) inadequacies and ambitious power production goals that had also combined to aggravate the situation [16]. The NPP involved was the 873 MWe PWR ‘Davis-Besse’, situated at Oak Harbour, OH, USA. The forced outage lasted about two years and cost around US$600 million. The NPP underwent a successful recovery process, including purchase of a new RPV head, and
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also implemented comprehensive operational, monitoring and management strategies to avoid the problem in future. Replacement of RPV closure heads, usually featuring Alloy 690 TT penetration claddings, is an on-going task in many PWR-NPPs. Appropriate monitoring systems are also being implemented to detect if leakage should, nevertheless, occur.
1.11.2 Neutron irradiation embrittlement enhancement caused by impurities introduced during welding A further example of evolution of materials technology in NPPs can be found in the development of improved ferritic RPV alloys and welds. In the 1960s, NPPs were constructed using the current state-of-the-art welding technologies. However, there was no awareness about the effect copper (introduced into the weld material as an impurity via copper-coated welding rods) would have in increasing the RPV weld metal’s propensity to fast neutron embrittlement damage. The main embrittling mechanism, basically ‘age-hardening’ as matrix-coherent minute copper-rich particles come out of solid solution and block dislocation movement, coupled with atomic-scale point-defect damage, was researched extensively and now specifications for new RPVs limit the amount of impurities (e.g. copper restricted to <0.08 wt%) in materials in the beltline area of RPVs (opposite the core and thus highly irradiated with neutrons). (Various works are cited here to provide information on how research results may be used to understand neutron irradiation embrittlement and to provide practical solutions to mitigate it [17–22].) For some NPPs it became necessary to restore fracture toughness by thermal annealing the RPV beltline area (see Chapters 11 and 12 of this book).
1.12
Conclusions
It can be stated that developed countries depend on the reliable supply of safe and cheap energy to maintain vital industrial and socially based infrastructures, sustain economic growth and to maintain, or increase, living standards. Developing countries are striving to improve their standard of living and to become more commercially competitive, and they will also require energy if they are to be successful in these endeavours. Nuclear-generated power thus has a crucial role to play to provide cost-competitive energy, at a low CF and GGE penalty, to both developed and developing countries. Strategies to maintain, and even increase, the role of nuclear power and to assure sufficient energy supplies in the future must be instigated today, since new NPP construction times, depending on design, can take up to five or more years. It is also absolutely necessary to promote the training and
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qualification of personnel in nuclear power technology, and its regulation, so that sufficient human resources will be available to the industry in the future. With a cumulative operating experience exceeding 14 000 reactoryears (in 2010) and having supplied more than 64 billion kWh of electricity over this integrated time, the nuclear power industry is clearly a mature one and capable of supplying an important part of the current and future world’s clean energy requirements. Ongoing research and operational experiences continue to contribute to all aspects of maintaining safety and reliability in NPPs. Additionally, profitable current and LTO operation is expected to be a characteristic feature of NPPs having optimized MOPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes in place.
1.13
Sources of further information
Nuclear Power Plant Life Management and Longer Term Operation. OECD/ NEA, NEA No. 6105, 2006. PLEX: Information Around Plant Lifetime Extension, Austrian Ecological Institute (Oesterreichisches Ökologie Institut, Vienna, 2006–2007), see: http://www.ecology.at/files/berichte/E22.547-1.pdf.
1.14
References
1. World Energy Technology Outlook – 2050, European Commission: EUR 22038, 2006. 2. ‘Carbon Footprint of Electricity Generation’, Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology Postnote, Number 268, October 2006. 3. KKW Beznau: Kernkraftwerk mit ‘klimafreundlichstem Strom’, Aargauer Zeitung, Switzerland, Friday, 31 October 2008. 4. Nielsen, R., The Little Green Handbook, Picador, New York, 2006. 5. European Energy Exchange (EEX), ‘Carbon dioxide prices’, Leipzig, Germany (http:// www.eex.com/en/EEX/Cooperation%20EEX%20and%20Eurex/Background). 6. European Nuclear Society – ENS, ‘Nuclear Power Plants in Europe: Status in January 2009’ (http://www.euronuclear.org/info/maps.htm). 7. Energy Information Administration, Official Energy Statistics from the US Government (http://www.eia.doe.gov/neic/aboutEIA/aboutus.html). 8. Kyoto Protocol to the International Framework Convention on Climate Change. Adopted 11 December 1997 by 3rd Conference of the Parties, Kyoto, Japan, in force, 16 February 2005. 9. ‘Carbon dioxide output jumps to record level in 2007’, report from CNN-News AP, 25 September 2008. 10. Winnett, R., ‘Eight new nuclear power stations planned for England’, Telegraph, 13 July 2008. 11. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Bulletin 49–2, March 2008. 12. Schiermeir, Q., Tollefson, J., Scully, T., Wizte, A. and Morton, O., ‘Energy alternatives: electricity without carbon’, Nature, Vol. 454, Issue 7206, 14 August 2008. 13. Uranium 2007: Resources, Production and Demand. A Joint Report by the OECD
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14. 15. 16. 17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
Understanding and mitigating ageing in nuclear power plants Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency, OECD, Paris, 2008. US Nuclear Safety Commission, Bulletin 2002-01 ‘Reactor pressure vessel head degradation and coolant pressure boundary integrity’, January, 2002. NRC Information Notice 2002-11, ‘Recent experience with degradation of reactor pressure vessel head, 12 March 2002. ‘Material degradation and related managerial issues at nuclear power plants’, IAEAProceedings Series, STI/PUB/1260, 15–18 February, 2005, Vienna, Austria. Nanstad, R.K., Tipping, Ph., Kalkhof, R.D. and Sokolov, M., ‘Irradiation and postannealing re-irradiation effects on fracture toughness of RPV steel heat JRQ’, in Grossbeck, M.L. (ed.), ASTM Special Technical Publication on Effects of Radiation on Materials, 21st. International Symposium, ASTM STP 1447, 2003. Ghazi-Wakili, K., Zimmermann, U., Brunner, J., Tipping, Ph., Waeber, W. and Heinrich, F., ‘Positron annhilation studies on neutron irradiated pressure vessel steels’, Phys. Stat. Sol. (a), Vol. 102, pp. 153–163, 1987. Ghazi-Wakili, K., Tipping, Ph., Zimmerman, U. and Waeber, W., ‘Investigation of neutron irradiated Fe-0.8wt% Cu alloys by means of positron annhilation and microhardness measurements’, Zeitschrift für Physik B Condensed Matter, Vol. 79, pp. 39–45 (1990). Tipping, Ph., Waeber, W. and Mercier, O., ‘A study of the mechanical property changes of irradiation embrittled pressure vessel steels and their response to annealing treatments’, Int. Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping, Vol. 46, pp. 133–148, 1991. Tipping, Ph. and Cripps, R., ‘Annealing for plant-life management: hardness, tensile and Charpy toughness properties of irradiated, annealed and re-irradiated mock-up low alloy pressure vessel steel’, Int. Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping, Vol. 60, pp. 217–222, 1994. Tipping, Ph., ‘Isothermal annealing behaviour and Vickers microhardness of irradiated mock-up pressure vessel weld material’, PROMETEY/IAEA Third International Conference: Material Science Problems in NPP Equipment Production and Operation, Vol. 1, pp. 71–82, 17–22 June 1994, St. Petersberg and Moscow, Russia.
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Key elements and principles of nuclear power plant life management (PLiM) for current and long-term operation
P h. G. T i pp i n g, Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant, Switzerland
Abstract: Key elements and principles of nuclear power plant (NPP) life management for current and long-term operation (LTO) are presented. Concepts and methodologies of NPP ageing surveillance programmes (ASPs), ageing management (AM) and plant life management (PLiM) are discussed. Ageing degradation (AD) terminology concerning NPP systems, structures and components (SSCs) is provided. Safety classification of SSCs, precursors for scoping and applying optimum OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes, design requirements of NPPs, knowledge management, human factors, safety culture, radiological protection, SSC-AD mechanisms and AD mitigation, obsolescence in equipment, regulatory aspects, radioactive waste disposal and radiological protection are discussed. Concepts for future NPP designs and PLiM are introduced. It is shown that by implementing the stateof-the-art, science and technology into the existing standard plant operational practices (OPs), which include ASPs, and AM and PLiM programmes, SSCAD can be managed to keep the option open for NPPs to reach, and then exceed, their original design lives in a safe and profitable way. Key words: nuclear power plants, ageing and plant life management, long-term operation, design, structures, systems and components, reverse engineering, obsolescence, safety class, safety culture, knowledge management, regulatory aspects, radiological protection, power uprates, radwaste, future generation reactors.
2.1
Introduction
The following deals with NPPs using nuclear fission technology. The basic principles and features of standard OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes used to achieve NPP design life safely and economically, and then to potentially facilitate LTO, are generally valid no matter what design of NPP is under consideration. However, plant-specific aspects and features, as well as operational experiences reported from similarly designed and operated NPPs elsewhere in the world, will always necessitate objective assessments, adjustments and updates of plant life ageing and management programmes to ensure that the scope, focus, applicability and depth thereof remains at the state-of-the-art, science and technology. 19 © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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Nuclear power plants, irrespective of design, function in a conceptually simple way: they extract heat arising from the fission processes occurring in the fuel via a suitable medium (water, gas, liquid metal) and transfer this to heat exchangers (steam generators (SGs)), or directly as steam or very high temperature gas (e.g. helium), to drive turbines connected to generators to make electricity. Depending on the type and design, a NPP may be characterized by primary and secondary circuits and also a reinforced concrete and steel containment to ensure that any leakages arising from the primary circuit cannot cause radioactive contamination to the environment. A NPP is further characterized by having components that can be classed as passive and non-replaceable (e.g. reactor pressure vessel (RPV), containment) and thus are deemed ‘life determining’ since, conceptually and practically, it is virtually impossible to replace them or it is prohibitively expensive to do so. Nuclear power plants also have active but replaceable components (e.g. SGs, RPV closure heads, piping, pressurizers, core shrouds and pumps), which are conceptually and practically replaceable in nature, albeit at a cost. Other categories of components are those that are relatively easy to replace on a routine basis, or as the necessity arises (e.g. control rods/drives, pump impellers, seals, bolts, switches, cables, valves and fuses). Irrespective of the classification ‘plant life-determining’ or ‘replaceable’, safety relevant components obviously must have first priority in terms of inspection, monitoring, repair, replacement and assessment as far as ‘fitness-for-service’ is concerned. Furthermore, it may be very expensive to replace a major component, and the need to replace it will either be dictated directly by regulatory requirements or by the remaining projected plant operating life in order to assess the chance of amortizing the investment of the replacement SSC in question. Thus the business case analysis will determine the point in time where profitable operation of the NPP is no longer possible. The real cost of nuclear-generated electricity compared to other sources is a nominal value, since environmental costs must also be brought into the total equation if an objective comparison is to be made. Electricity price analysts usually use conservative assumptions about NPP construction costs, the length of construction time, delay penalties and then make projections on how efficiently (e.g. availability and operational and maintenance costs, etc.) the NPP would operate over its design life. Prolonged shutdowns, regulatory restrictions and unexpected operational factors will obviously affect such estimates. However, experience to date (mid-2010) shows that most NPPs can usually generate electricity at prices between 3 and 4 Euro cents (about 4–6 US cents) per kilowatt hour (kWh), but even if fossil power were marginally cheaper than nuclear-generated power, it still carries with it a far greater potential penalty concerned with greenhouse gas emissions (GGEs) and the associated environmental issues thereof. It is a generally recognized fact that humanity must drastically ‘decarbonize’ its electrical
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energy production if the currently perceived rate of global warming is to be reduced. It is therefore necessary to invest resources in NPPs, which are essentially GGE-free, and to keep safety-relevant SSCs, as well as passive, non-replaceable SSCs, in good functional condition. For example, items such as SGs in pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and core shrouds in boiling water reactors (BWRs) have been replaced or repaired due to stress corrosion cracking (SCC) issues, but it was expensive and difficult to do so. Core shrouds in BWRs have also been fitted with tie-rods to maintain mechanical integrity, despite the presence of SCC in the austenitic stainless steel material used. Furthermore, changes to water chemistry (e.g. hydrogen injection) have further been implemented to improve the BWR working environment conditions. However, it was worth the cost and effort for such plants affected, since they could then continue reliable operation at full power and with good prospects to amortize the investment. Furthermore, apart from the problems associated with SCC, which were not expected, the earlier designs of most NPPs did not take into account the scenario to allow for a future possible need to remove and replace massive components such as SGs, core shrouds and RPV closure heads. Replacement of SGs, for example, has generally necessitated major work tasks and planning to be done (i.e. containment access hole drilling, work scheduling and logistics, radiological protection planning, procurement of replacement SGs, storage of ex-service SGs and re-sealing and pressure-testing the containment). It is noted here that ease of replacement, or for that matter, inspection and repair, of SSCs will also facilitate that the radiation dose-penalties incurred by those personnel who carry out the work are ‘as low as reasonably acceptable/ achievable’ (ALARA-principle). It is a good practice to perform mock-up runs using dummy equipment to ensure that doses in the real situation remain ALARA. Doses can be efficiently reduced or practically eliminated by applying radiological protection principles (i.e. a person’s distance to the source should be as far as is practically possible, the time spent on the task should be as short as possible and lead shielding and remote tools should be used wherever practicable). The annual dose a worker in a NPP may acquire (person annual dose – PAD) is subject to national legal limits and regulation. Permitted occupational exposures, for nuclear workers and others (e.g. medical profession and researchers), are considerably higher than those for the general public. However, the ALARA principle still applies. For example, a maximum PAD of 20 millisievert (mSv) (1 mSv = 10–3 Sv) is allowed in Switzerland. It can be noted that even PADs of up to 100 mSv are not expected to cause health hazards, and so the above limit is conservative in nature. (Note: background doses for non-professionally exposed persons vary around the world due to altitude and presence or absence of natural uranium ores and the depth in the ground in which they are present, for
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example, but a PAD of 2 mSv is a commonly accepted average value.) A consequence of PAD limits is that when NPP personnel have reached their PAD, they will not be allowed to work in ionizing radiation fields for a year. Numbers of sufficiently trained/qualified reserve personnel in NPPs may be inadequate to cover for such eventualities, so ALARA planning is essential to ensure that PAD limits are not exceeded and that the available personnel will be sufficient to finish the task in hand in good time. Over the years, various ways and approaches have evolved to take into account AD effects in NPPs and how to implement experience gained into good practices through appropriate mitigation strategies. It is fortuitous that even in very early design NPPs, basic engineering principles had foreseen that conservative safety margins used for NPP-SSCs (dimensions and properties of materials), or the stipulated operational limits and conditions (e.g. temperatures, pressures, loading rates, coolant chemistry purity) would ensure inherently safe operation, even if significant levels of SSC-AD were present.
2.2
Nuclear power plant ageing terminology and associated definitions
The expressions ‘ageing management, ageing surveillance, plant life management and long-term operation’, which are defined below, are frequently used in nuclear power terminology [1]. Definitions ∑
Ageing management (AM): engineering, operational and maintenance actions to control, within acceptable limits, SSC-AD. Since AM is focused on keeping a high level of integrity in safety-related SSCs, it could be regarded as a quality assurance (QA) activity, because QA deals with quality systems focused on the relevant aspects. Thus, AM is a part of a total quality system. ∑ Ageing management programmes (AMP): any programme or activity that adequately manages the effects of ageing (e.g. maintenance programme, inspection or surveillance activities, all ageing mitigation strategies, repair, refreshment and replacement of SSCs). ∑ Ageing surveillance programmes (ASPs): these identify and document all known and possible SSC-AD and address the inspection, maintenance and mitigation aspects, as part of standard NPP-OPs. ∑ Plant life management (PLiM): a NPP programme integrating safety and non-safety issues, aimed at effective management of the NPP assets and resources. It is therefore the integration of AM and economic planning to:
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– maintain a high level of safety; – optimize the operation, maintenance and service life of SSCs; – maintain an acceptable plant performance (availability and reliability) level; – maximize return on investment over the entire service life of the NPP; – provide operating organizations and owners with the optimum preconditions for achieving long-term operation (LTO). (Note: within the context of this chapter, LTO means operation of the NPP in excess of its original design-life.)
Plant life management is a thus a methodology whereby all expenses are optimized to favour commercial profitability and competitiveness, while safe and reliable supplies of electric power are being produced. It can be noted here that throughout its development, the nuclear power industry has continuously implemented various programmes and strategies to control and mitigate SSC-AD. The traditional approach has been to adjust standard in-service inspection (ISI) and OPs and to focus monitoring, testing, repair, replacement and maintenance programmes to keep up with the state-ofthe-art, science and technology, as new knowledge and operational experience became available. The underlying reason for specific AM programmes is to have a better integration of existing programmes, driving the feedback from ISI to maintenance and vice versa, which may not be optimized in some cases. The ultimate objective of this feedback loop is to control and maintain the level of design and safety margins in SSCs to an acceptable level as operational time is accrued. A further facet and characteristic of AM is to address the impact of AD mechanisms on safety and reliability that were not addressed (or inadequately so) in the original design concept of the NPP, and to accordingly adapt ISI and maintenance activities to accommodate for them. For example, concrete creep and settling (structures), RPV and closure head bolt fatigue usage were addressed in original designs, but issues such as possible concrete carbonation, electrical cable ageing (embrittlement and loss of insulating properties) and certain SCC issues (e.g. intergranular and irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking in austenitic stainless steels (IGSCC and IASCC)) were not taken enough into account, since they had not yet manifested themselves in practice. The possibility of enhanced local piping erosion (wall thinning) was also not taken into full account in some cases. Other SSC-AD mechanisms may appear in future, so it is important to have in place a way to address them accordingly. Additionally, the AM programmes address the control of those environmental factors that have been identified to act as stressors assisting the SSC-AD. Thus AM programmes are tools to counter any deficiencies that have become evident in original NPP design assumptions and concepts.
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The goal of PLiM programmes is to facilitate an overall evaluation of the NPP’s assets. It integrates both safety and economic aspects. In particular, the economics aspects in the PLiM programme address such items as the management and procurement of spare parts and inventories thereof, and other fields within the PLiM deal with when to replace SSCs, fuel management, the possibility (and level) of power uprates (PUs), training of personnel and optimization of outage planning, for example. If they are not properly focused, scoped or managed, it is expected that AM and PLiM programmes, and even extended maintenance programmes, will bring with them extra cost burdens to the NPP’s operator. Therefore, a robust cost analysis of all AM and PLiM programmes and operation and maintenance costs, including ASPs, will be necessary to identify the real benefits to safety, reliability and overall profitability of the plant. To date, such analyses have shown all-round improvements to the safety, operational aspects and profitability, and have correspondingly encouraged operators to accept and implement such programmes.
2.3
Overview of ageing and its effects in nuclear power plants
All NPP types and their SSCs have undergone AD to varying degrees, since this is a natural phenomenon found in any engineered system, whether it is an aircraft, boat, chemical plant, oil refinery, bridge or building, for example. The nuclear environment, however, is characterized by special features whereby exposure of materials, especially to high energy neutrons (>1 MeV energy) arising from the fission processes in the fuel, can potentially cause some embrittlement in the ferritic RPV or IASCC in austenitic stainless steel core shrouds, for example. The coolant in PWRs and BWRs may also cause corrosion if specific material-coolant chemistry (electrochemical aspects, including water radiolysis), stress and flow-rate combinations and conditions are present. The reduction or mitigation of SSC-AD depends on understanding the often complex underlying mechanisms and synergies that act. This clearly depends on the results obtained from fundamental scientific research, whereby the interaction of the SSC materials with their respective stressors and operating environments may be understood in terms of the way they strive to achieve thermodynamic equilibrium. This underlines the importance of on-going research using realistic experimental parameters (i.e. equivalent to NPP conditions found in practice). This latter point is important since, apart from the convenience of simulated experiments, the goal of such research is to provide transferable data to the practical case and also to obtain regulatory acceptance of such results and the AD mitigation methods derived. Once the AD mechanism is understood, the appropriate actions can be robustly implemented to mitigate or even eliminate its effects.
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2.3.1 Concepts of defence-in-depth (DID) and common-cause failure (CCF) avoidance A requirement of the use of nuclear power is that it is of paramount importance to prevent harmful radioactive products from being released into the environment. It is for this reason that NPP designs have been conceived to function using the defence-in-depth (DID) principle. This multi-barrier approach can be likened to the cross-section of an onion, with each ring going out from the centre representing an engineered barrier. To achieve optimum safety, NPPs also feature multiple safety systems that supplement the natural features of the reactor core (e.g. negative void coefficient). Safety systems actually account for about one quarter of the capital cost of modern NPPs. The success and effectiveness of DID necessitate the highest quality in design principles and materials used and optimum construction principles. It also requires that equipment and layout thereof is installed to prevent operational disturbances or events from developing into more serious problems (i.e. avoidance of CCF). (Note: further aspects of DID, CCFs and latent failure conditions (LFCs) are discussed in Chapter 6.) Further features of DID are redundant and diverse systems to quickly detect problems, control damage to the fuel and prevent significant radioactive releases. Overall safety provisions thus feature physical barriers between the radioactive reactor core (or active materials storage facilities, such as the spent fuel pool) and the environment; they provide multiple safety systems, each with backup, and also have a concept to allow for human error. A robust severe accident management strategy will further support the DID principles and thus lessen the consequences of an accident should it occur. The engineered features and layered levels of protection behind DID designs obviously must take the safety classification and functions of the NPP-SSCs into account. From a logical and safety standpoint, the DID principle is a robust one, and OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes should also contribute to maintaining the integrity of DID barriers at all levels of operation, including design base accidents. It is fitting to mention here the final physical DID barrier, namely the reinforced concrete containment, which is designed to prevent the uncontrolled release of radioactive materials to the environment in the case of a severe accident. The containment is a life-limiting structure, as it is not practical to replace it and it is therefore also essential to ensure the overall economic and operational life of the NPP. As with any other material, reinforced concrete will also degrade with time when exposed to specific stressors. The effects of weather and pollution (acid rain) can cause degradation of concrete via chemical attack (e.g. carbonate formation, swelling, cracking and weakening). Cracks in the containment’s concrete can then allow moisture and corrosive chemicals to reach the steel reinforcement, which can then corrode, weakening
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the structure further or causing loss of leak-tightness. When water freezes it expands about 9% in volume and this can cause further damage due to spalling. Containment AD may be seen as discoloured patches (brown rust) or areas of white powder (calcium carbonate and other chemical species) on the surface. Severely weakened containments may not be able to withstand even design base seismic or impact events. Chemically weakened and severely physically degraded containments (cracks) may also lose some of their radiological shielding or retention capacity (leak-tightness). Repairs and refurbishments of containments, including attention to anchor bolts, tendons and auxiliaries, must be carried out during NPP outages for safety reasons.
2.3.2 Requirements on repair, replacement, inspection and monitoring of SSCs Ideally, whenever modifications to the NPP’s OPs are introduced, or when SSCs are repaired or replaced, the overall levels of reliability and safety should increase or, at least, be maintained. Accepting that some finite amount of SSC-AD will inevitably take place as a consequence of operating conditions, it remains to examine which SSCs are impacted for safety reasons and overall economic viability of the NPP. Also, the extent and rate of SSC-AD may be slower or faster in practice compared to that allowed for in the design provisions, including the safety and operational margins used. It is therefore the task of monitoring and testing systems to follow and quantify degradation rates, using appropriately sensitive and robust methods, and to thus determine the ‘margin of safety’ (e.g. degree of fatigue usage and thickness of pipewalls) or operational flexibility (e.g. RPV pressure-temperature limits for start-up/shut-down) still available in the SSCs. When this is known, it may be compared to design or regulatory requirements and realistic assessments made concerning ‘residual safe life’ of the SSC. Changes in operational parameters (e.g. coolant water chemistry, flow rate and temperature of coolant (the specific issues of PUs are dealt with later) and replacing SSCs with new designs and materials have a potential to influence degradation rates, and AM and PLiM programmes, including monitoring and inspection time schedules, have to be adjusted accordingly. Too frequent or in-depth inspections may not be necessary, but they will nevertheless cost money. In contrast, cursory checks or too lengthy time intervals between inspections may lead to spontaneous failure of a SSC. This will usually lead to even higher costs, since such forced outages, particularly those involving radiological contamination, will necessitate implementation of decontamination and associated radiation protection tasks, which can be time-consuming (thus costly) procedures. Thus it can be seen that inspection intervals, and the depths they go to (depending on safety class, importance to reliability, etc.) must be optimized, using the feedback from operational experience and results from the appropriate monitoring tools.
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2.3.3 Basic design principles, considerations and strategies in NPPs Before dealing with principles, strategies and goals of OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM in detail, it is necessary to first identify some basic design requirements of NPPs, since design impacts not only the way the plant functions, but also how the SSCs are accessible for monitoring, testing, inspection and, eventually, replacement. Nuclear power plant site selection is determined by many factors, including local and political acceptance thereof, hydrological (e.g. river flooding or consequences of any possible dam-break upstream of the NPP and tsunami threat) and environmental impact (e.g. heat pollution of rivers or availability of sufficient cooling water) issues. Seismic activity is also a prime consideration, and NPP designs must take earthquakes into account, even if the probability of earthquakes is statistically very low as derived from the seismic chronological record of the region under consideration. Design and, for that matter, operational concepts, should identify and robustly eliminate the possible creation of CCF paths (i.e. where a series of human errors/weaknesses in procedures or the failure of one SSC leads to a ‘domino’ or ‘knock-on effect’ of progressive malfunction or failures in other SSCs vital for safety or control of the plant). It serves no purpose to have procedures or SSCs that individually fulfil design and regulatory requirements, but then are prevented from doing so due to CCF paths. The same approach is valid for thwarting terrorist attacks or lessening the possibility and consequences of aircraft crashes onto NPPs. Experience has shown that some SSCs are difficult to inspect, monitor, repair or replace (e.g. vessel internals), so (future) ideal NPP designs should allow for ease of access in general. Ease of inspection and monitoring will also increase the quality of inspection data and results, thus facilitating objective decisions to be made regarding residual life and when to repair or replace SSCs. Dedicated tools, such as robotic crawlers with integrated video systems, have been developed for currently operating NPPs to facilitate inspection of otherwise inaccessible areas. Realistic operational lives of some NPPs currently operating are now being regarded as 60 or more years. Regarding operation, increased online monitoring, condition-based and risk-based approaches are gradually supplementing the traditional method of fixed interval periodic inspections, since they are cheaper to implement and excessive conservatism may be reduced, to benefit operational costs and enhance safety through better awareness of the SSC’s real-time state regarding fitness-for-service. Much money can be saved by avoiding replacement of components that are still sufficiently good (within design limits), just as a consequence of old established habits or practices [2].
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2.3.4 Precursors for successful implementation of ASPs, AM, PLiM programmes and achieving LTO The basic concepts, methodologies and goals of ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes, and the utilities’ wish to achieve safe and profitable current and LTO should be well established already at the design stage of a NPP, and before it goes into operation. Basic programmes, including standard OPs, must be regarded as ‘living documents’, being amenable to adjustment and flexible to take into account experiences gained and the response of the plant’s SSCs as operational time is accrued. The nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) and all associated SSCs should feature the best materials known at the time of design, manufacture and construction and design concepts should also foresee the possibility for easy repair or replacement of SSCs, if necessary. Whilst a utility/operator’s goal is to run a NPP safely, reliably and profitably, and thus protect the overall plant investment, a regulator’s goal is to protect the public and environment from any possible negative consequences arising from the use of nuclear energy. These goals are, per se, complementary to each other, since operational safety is an inseparable facet of reliability and fitness-for-service of NPP-SSCs, and reliable operation facilitates high NPP load and availability factors, meaning more electricity sold. As in any other large and relatively expensive industrial project, a NPP might only begin to make a real profit towards the latter part of its original design life. The point in time where this takes place obviously depends, for example, on the level of current and outstanding capital costs/debts, number and type of SSC replacements carried out to date, degree of exceptional costs caused by mandatory back-fitting requirements and modifications and upgrading of safety systems, as well as the overall level of NPP amortization. (Note: further aspects of the economics of nuclear power are dealt with in Chapter 5 of this book.) It is logical that all operational actions and practices should be focused to create conditions to maintain compliance with the NPP’s licence conditions, optimize OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes to reach the full original design life and then make possible the option of further operation (LTO) under the applicable national licensing legislation. However, independent of other factors such as political and public acceptance, a NPP which has had freedom from forced outages due to spontaneous failure of SSCs (which is a reflection of the level of success of monitoring, inspection, maintenance, standard plant OPs, including ASPs, and AM and PLiM programmes), and demonstrates a proactive approach to safety (safety culture and training of personnel aspects), will be well placed to obtain regulatory permission to continue operation and go to the LTO phase of its life. Programmes to manage any form of AD in NPPs will have an expected level of success, but in practice this can either exceed or fall short of the expectations, depending on the suitability of the routine and standard OPs,
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maintenance, replacements, repairs and the effectiveness of ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes used. The success of such programmes will thus depend to a great extent on the competence of the workforce involved in their creation and effective implementation. Actions taken within standard OPs, ASPs and AM and PLiM programmes should lead to reliable and quantitative detection and monitoring of SSC-AD. When SSC-AD is discovered, the actions of repair or replacement will be guided by safety and business-case requirements. Practical implementation of AD mitigation or elimination remedies will depend on the availability of well-proven technologies, usually coming from basic research. Despite some diversity with respect to their separate goals and concepts, the OPs, ASPs and AM and PLiM programmes create mutually supporting conditions to ensure that NPPs operate safely, reliably and cost effectively, whilst they attain their original design lives. Since the SSCs, including non-replaceable items (life-determining), are managed and kept sufficiently within specification (engineering, reliability and safety margin aspects), even for times potentially well in excess of their original design lives, LTO will become a real option, at least from the safety, reliability and engineering standpoints. The business case, however, will decide the economic viability of further operation, whilst the NPP’s safety record will greatly influence the degree of public and political acceptance thereof. Ageing degradation arises due to the presence of stressors such as stresses and strains (constant or varying), temperature (level, constant or rapidly fluctuating), irradiation (primarily high-energy neutrons, gamma rays) and coolant/operational environment characteristics (impurities, level of pH, flow velocities and turbulence) causing ageing mechanisms. Typical ageing mechanisms are creep (through mechanical loading at elevated temperature), fatigue (high or low cycle, mechanically or thermally induced), thermal ageing (change in microstructure with time at temperature as new metallic phases are formed or when diffusion of elements to, or from, grain boundaries in alloys occurs), relaxation of pre-tension levels, corrosion, irradiation damage, wear and flow-induced erosion-corrosion in piping, for example. Loss of electrical properties in insulators or conductors may also be traced to ageing mechanisms whereby plastics degrade through heat or exposure to ionizing radiation (e.g. polymers will decompose into smaller molecular fragments and carbon dioxide gas). Connectivity or signal quality may be affected through oxide formation on electrical contact points of switches. Degradation usually leads to loss of material, cracks, deformation/distortion, changes in physical, mechanical, electrical and chemical properties and a corresponding reduction in SSC reliability and, eventually, safety margins. Those NPPs that have been designed, operated and maintained with the tenets of safety-first and effective implementation of OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM in all areas will have the best chance of achieving safety, design life and economic goals and also LTO. Nuclear power plants that possess
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all original and comprehensive design documentation are in good basic condition, have no (or few) unresolved problems, have kept updated and relevant documentation on design features or SSC changes that have been implemented since start-up, have a true record of all design-base stressors that have occurred (e.g. transients, fast shutdowns (scrams) and fatigue usage on relevant SSCs), are ideally suited for focused AM and PLiM programmes. When original documentation is missing or inadequate, reverse engineering has to be performed to better serve the scoping, assessment and goals of OPs, ASPs, AM, PLiM programmes and, eventually, the possibility of LTO. Reverse engineering is the logic-based process of rediscovering and then documenting the technological principles of a device, object or system through analysis of its structure, function and operation. New RPV surveillance capsule specimens have, for example, been made from equivalent material and re-introduced into RPVs for irradiation damage studies in order to better quantify the extent and rate of degradation, since some original surveillance specimen sets were found to be inadequately documented or placed in an unfavourable irradiation position. Since NPP-AM and PLiM programmes, together with standard OPs and their ASPs may be regarded as management tools to achieve design life, optimized economic safe current and eventual LTO, and their goals are to deal with and manage all facets of SSC-AD in an efficient and cost-effective way, the extent and depth of such programmes must also take into consideration such further LTO-related aspects as the following: ∑
Any projected safety issues must be identified and analysed with respect to severity and the cost of implementing appropriate mitigation or upgrading methodologies. In LTO, the safety relevant and other SSCs will operate longer and perhaps under changed or more demanding conditions than were foreseen in the original design (e.g. when PU has been implemented). Nevertheless, safety margins must still be kept at a sufficient level. As a result of basic engineering and safety principles, SSC designs already feature conservative safety margins, thus allowing for the effects of design-life SSC-AD, as well as that expected, or projected, to arise in the LTO phase. ∑ The economic risk of a stranded investment when large, expensive SSCs are replaced or extensive back-fitting is carried out. As a result of the deregulation of electricity markets, a cost-benefit analysis will be an even more critical task to perform. However, safety must still have priority over economic aspects. The operator thus needs assurance that large investments (e.g. new SGs) will be amortized at least by the end of the NPP’s original design life, and that the regulatory climate will be favourable to allow LTO with relicensing or continued operation on the existing licence, as appropriate.
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∑
The availability of enough trained and qualified personnel to carry out the specialized tasks within the OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes for both current and LTO. It is no good having a state-of-the-art, science and technology NPP if there are insufficient or inadequately trained personnel to run it. Succession planning must be thought of well in advance to facilitate a smooth and efficient transfer of expertise. This is an aspect of knowledge management (KM). ∑ Identifying any additional SSCs for AM and PLiM that may be crucial for safety and economic viability of the NPP in the LTO phase. The focus of LTO-AM and PLiM programmes will not only be on managing and mitigating SSC-AD in large, passive ‘life-determining’ SSCs, but will also continue to address those SSCs vital for safe and reliable operation, which could be expensive to monitor, test, repair, maintain or replace. Furthermore, the safety principle of maintaining the engineered DID barriers must also be upheld in the NPP’s LTO phase. Future environmental and operational stressors must be identified (or anticipated, as far as possible), and their control or mitigation addressed in the standard OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes, respectively. ∑ Projected needs and capacity (both human and financial) for spent fuel (SF) storage management tasks, since increased quantities of SF are a natural consequence of LTO, final NPP decommissioning, dismantling, radioactive waste (radwaste) conditioning and disposal, and associated plant actions required (e.g. additional SF pool construction or modifications to increase the capacity of existing SF pools, and commissioning of plasma ovens for radwaste volume reduction) and to identify areas where additional safety barriers and controls (e.g. filters and radiological monitoring) and adjustments to OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes may be applicable.
2.4
Overview of systems, structures and components (ssc) safety classes
2.4.1 Safety classification of items and SSCs Safety classification is a vast, sometimes complex and always a time-consuming subject and requires comprehensive systems and engineering knowledge as well as a holistic approach to exactly capture the levels of safety importance and inter-dependencies of SSCs in NPPs. The following provides an overview of the subject, and gives some examples of safety classification of items and SSCs. The main source of information used here has been drawn from STUK [3]. Other supporting information may be obtained from appropriate references and sources of further information (e.g. Männisto, 2005) provided at the end of this chapter).
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Although certain commonalities and generic approaches exist, the scopes and depths of OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes are NPPspecific, reflecting the actual operating experiences and needs of the NPP, and design, under consideration. Correspondingly, safety classes of SSCs, although broadly similar for varying NPP designs, will reflect the diversity in function, operational modes and reactor control systems in NPPs. Whilst AM programmes are critical for safety, and detailed ageing management analysis is restricted to a few critical plant life-determining SSCs, the PLiM programmes address almost all SSCs in a NPP. The standard OPs, ASPs, maintenance, inspection, testing, repair and replacement programmes in NPPs are supplemented accordingly by AM and PLiM programmes. Operational conditions of NPP-SSCs necessitate that they possess certain levels of inherent good quality (e.g. works certification, sufficient design and safety margin features and regulatory approvals) and that they are suitable for use in the specified environment. Mechanical components can be conveniently placed into three basic groups: 1. those where integrity has to be guaranteed (e.g. RPV and shells and nozzles of SGs); 2. those where preventative maintenance is used to preserve the initial levels of quality and function (e.g. removal of sludge deposits in SGs to lessen stress corrosion cracking, sleeving and plugging of defect SG tubes); 3. those that may be allowed to fail (failure-based maintenance/run-tofailure), and then are repaired or replaced even on a routine basis to re-establish the initial quality (e.g. replacement of small diameter piping, switches/fuses, pump seals and bearings). Safety-relevant components and systems are in the first two groups, and these are also usually the subject of AM programmes. Safety classifications in NPPs have traditionally been focused at the system and component level of equipment. However, the evolving approach for currently operating NPPs is to focus more on areas that are important to their safe, reliable and profitable operation and also the effectiveness of maintenance used to keep the items and SSCs fit-for-service. The NPP current licensing basis (CLB) can be taken as a starting point to evaluate the NPP’s SSCs in terms of their importance to safety. Safety class 1 A key purpose of safety classification of items and SSCs in NPPs is to identify those which are potentially hazardous in nature or those that must maintain their integrity under design base accident scenarios and to ultimately focus OPs, ASPs, inspections, monitoring, testing, maintenance, repairs and replacements
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on these to ensure they are handled and maintained according to their design and regulatory requirements. Safety class 1 items would thus include the reactor fuel, since it is fissile, radioactive and toxic, and if misused has the potential to cause damage to the population, environment and to the NPP itself (contamination). Primary circuit components (PCCs) retain large and fast flowing volumes of gas, water or steam under high pressures and temperatures, and major breaks in such PCCs that lead to a loss of coolant, the extent of which being so great that it is impossible to compensate for it using the available supply of emergency make-up water, for example, must therefore be avoided. A RPV is a safety class 1 component, since its catastrophic (sudden) fracture could lead to conditions that exceed loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) design base allowances. However, not all PCCs are assignable to safety class 1, since their failure may be readily controlled. Such items are small diameter pipes (<20 mm inside diameter) and components integrally connected to the reactor coolant system by a passive flow-limiting device and which, even if ruptured, do not cause a leak any larger than that caused by the rupture of a 20 mm inside diameter pipe. Other PCCs, which in the event of failure can be rapidly and automatically isolated (multi-valve closure) from the reactor to facilitate normal shutdown and cooling, are not included in Safety class 1. Safety class 2 Safety class 2 items and components are those not assigned to Safety class 1. They cover items and SSCs needed for reactor trip, the systems to deal with emergency core cooling in case of a LOCA, boron supply to control core reactivity/criticality and decay heat removal, for example. Further examples are: steam and feed-water systems, reactor containment and systems needed to protect containment integrity in a postulated accident (e.g. containment spray, pressure relief and isolation valves), primary circuit supporting structures that protect Safety class 1 components (e.g. restraints, missile barriers) and RPV internals needed to support the fuel core or to facilitate the cooling thereof. Other Safety class 2 items include storage racks for new or spent fuel and electrical components and essential electrical power supply equipment to Safety class 1 and 2 items or SSCs. Safety class 3 Some typical systems in this safety class are: boron supply, reactor volume control (PWRs), parts of the emergency feed-water supply not in Safety class 2, primary circuit cooling and pressure relief, reactor and spent fuel decay heat removal and also those systems needed to start up or operate Safety class 2 and 3 items and SSCs. Other systems in this safety class are the reactor cooling water clean-up, treatment and storage for liquid wastes and
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radioactive gas treatment systems, nuclear fuel and handling systems that may cause fuel damage should they malfunction, for example. Further items are hoisting and transport systems for nuclear fuel, pools and tanks, reactor power limitation systems, monitors for reactor criticality when refuelling, primary circuit chemistry and leak monitors, and systems for controlling containment releases, as well as those to prevent formation of explosive oxygen–hydrogen gas mixtures. Safety class 4 This safety class contains the following items and SSCs: fire protection, turbine generator components (bearings, rotor trip valves, and oil systems), vibration monitors, hydrogen cooling, generator circuit and field breaker, turbine and generator protection systems. Various instrumentation and control (I&C) and computer systems for plant control and operation, safety significant information systems dealing with operation and maintenance. (Note: a comprehensive listing of typical safety classes is given in STUK [3]).
2.5 Setting up and scoping ageing degradation and surveillence programmmes in nuclear power plants (NPPs) The creation of SSC-AD surveillance and management methodologies in NPPs necessitates a comprehensive appreciation of the varied AD mechanisms that could occur. The approaches have to thus take into account the many types of SSCs present, the different materials used and the operational environments, as well as their significance to safety (safety classification), their impact on reliability, profitability and their relevance to the NPP for assuring attainment of the original design life and, eventually, LTO. Standard OPs, which include routine maintenance, monitoring, controls, repairs and replacements, as well as ASPs, are normally quite sufficient to address most issues that arise in the plant on a day-to-day basis. The standard OPs are generally based on written procedures and recommendations of the NPP manufacturer, having due regard for any additional tests, monitoring or other supplementary actions that are prescribed by the regulator. One approach to identify, characterize and document AD is to create dossiers which describe each specific component in a structure or system. Component-specific dossiers are a methodical way to document all phases of the component’s life. Such dossiers should contain details and information such as: ∑ Basic description of component, its function and location in the NPP. ∑ Manufacturer, supplier or sub-contractor.
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Materials used (e.g. alloys, ceramics, plastics, rubbers and cements) and, where relevant, applied heat treatments, surface conditioning (e.g. peening and protective coating). Works reports, including final quality assurance certificates, will be an integral part of the SSC ageing surveillence dossier. Particular details, such as approved lubricants to use must also be included. Where applicable, notes on the avoidance to exposure of the SSC material to chloride or sulphide ions (e.g. danger of stress corrosion cracking occurring in some austenitic stainless steels), or to other environmental conditions (e.g. excessive temperature, moisture, radiation), must be included and highlighted. Approved substances for SSC decontamination tasks must be listed. ∑ Assigned safety class of the item or SSC with regard to its function (e.g. no RPV fracture allowed, piping leak-before-break to be demonstrated, assurance of functionality in emergency situations, redundant systems and importance to DID) and supporting documentation. ∑ Specific operational environment (e.g. coolant (water, heavy water, borated water, hot gas and quality/purity thereof), steam, neutron irradiation, raw/service water). ∑ All known, or possible, AD mechanisms (drawn from plant’s own and global operational experiences, failure reports (root causes) and published research literature) relevant for the component and its materials in the specific operating environment. (The AM programme will address SSCAD issues that were unforeseen or inadequately addressed in the design concept.) ∑ Validated and approved AD mitigation actions relevant to the SSC being documented (some examples of which are given below): – neutron embrittlement: reduction of RPV neutron flux, hence fluence with time, either by ‘inside-out’ fuel management, whereby the older fuel elements are placed on the outside of the fuel core and the fresh elements are placed in the centre of the core, or by the use of dummy fuel elements situated on the periphery of the core; RPV beltline annealing, with parameters of time and temperature for recovery of properties, derived from tests on the plant’s own RPV surveillance programme materials, and any necessary supplementary test specimen programme to quantify fracture toughness levels (level of success of annealing), including provision to follow re-embrittlement trends as additional service time is accumulated; – water chemistry improvements (e.g. hydrogen injection into boiling water reactor coolant to lower the electrochemical potential of stainless steel in contact with it and thus lessen the propensity toward stress corrosion cracking in some austenitic stainless steels); – shot-peening (mechanical improvement process, MIP) (e.g. to introduce compressive stress in the surface to improve stress corrosion cracking resistance in Alloy 600); © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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– use of tie-rods (to enhance the structural stability in cracked austenitic stainless steel core shrouds in boiling water reactors, even if through-wall cracks are present); the necessity to use approved methodologies to check the integrity of such tie-rods and inspection intervals should be highlighted. ∑ The optimum inspection, measurement and monitoring methods for detecting the most probable AD mechanisms should be documented. Ultrasonic testing, dye-penetration, magnetic particle, X-ray and eddy-current (as non-destructive tools) and destructive testing of RPV surveillance capsule specimens (Charpy, tensile and fracture mechanical specimens) will have application in specific fields of SSC-AD detection, monitoring and testing. ∑ The frequency and depth of inspections required, based on the SSC safety class, the expected rate of AD and operational experience to date must be recorded. A physical graphical record could be included, showing, for example, pipe wall thickness change, obtained from periodic measurements, as a function of time. Computerized systems, using continuous wireless signals and direct data transfer to monitors, are also finding increasing application. Where necessary, references to Codes and obligatory (regulatory) procedures to be followed must also be provided in the dossier. ∑ Where applicable, any special requirements for personnel charged with inspection and testing of safety-related SSCs (e.g. licensing of personnel who perform work on such SSCs) must be highlighted in the dossiers and accompanied by supplementary documentation dealing with training, qualification and licensing of personnel. ∑ A chronologic record of the SSC operational experience (e.g. sporadic malfunction or spontaneous failure and root causes), and provision for keeping updated records of plant transients and ‘scrams’ (essential for RPV and bolt fatigue usage monitoring, according to design specification allowances) is an integral part of the SSC ageing surveillance dossier. The effect of PUs in NPPs requires a comprehensive systems analysis, and NPP-SSC modifications or changes that have become necessary on both primary and secondary sides of the NPP (e.g. adjustments to valve set-point values) must be duly documented. Any changes to standard plant OPs (e.g. frequency, depth and scope of inspections, monitoring, maintenance and periodic testing) have to be noted. Furthermore, the increased core-power density and higher coolant core-exit temperatures, as well as faster steam flow rates will influence the time schedules between SSC inspections in NPPs with PU. Documentation of adjusted operational prescriptions or emergency procedures relevant to the plant’s PU status is also necessary. The creation of comprehensive SSC-AD dossiers, in addition to the standard plant documentation on OPs, enables the plant personnel to recognize © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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possible SSC-AD issues objectively and to instigate appropriate measures to address them in a timely manner. Such dossiers also show a regulator that the NPP personnel are aware of SSC-AD and that a safety-oriented, pragmatic, science-based and quantitative approach is being used in the general operation and maintenance of the NPP. Depending on the country involved, there are different approaches to the NPP licence status and thus the permission to operate. In Europe, licences are mostly not time-limited, and are granted for as long as the NPP can operate safely, and the periodic safety review (PSR) [4], usually performed every 10 years by the NPP owners and controlled by the regulator, is the main tool used to provide proof of safety. In the United States, the licence is time-limited, necessitating a re-licensing process, after the NPP brings proof that all maintenance has been effective and all regulatory requirements have been fulfilled.
2.5.1 Living document nature of ASP, AM and PLiM programmes Despite rigorously applied standard OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes, SSCs may still fail unexpectedly, or become prematurely unfit for service, but it is then not only essential to find the reason why a given SSC fails, it is also necessary to determine how the circumstances arose that allowed it to do so. Failures in NPP-SSCs can be caused by incorrect human actions or they can be a result of direct physical and chemical causes, for example, but it is important, sometimes crucial, to identify if there are any underlying weaknesses in the original design and in the inspection, testing and monitoring programmes used. Only a full in-depth analysis, leading to root-causes, will lead to robust and fact-based actions to be taken in order to avoid a repetition of the failure in future operation. The standard OPs, ASPs, and AM and PLiM programmes, must then be adjusted accordingly to take into account the (usually) plant-specific new knowledge, in accordance with a ‘living document’ approach. Problems can also be caused through inadequately performed or neglected inspections (e.g. insufficient AD detection, low sensitivity of inspection tools used, or time interval between inspections being too long), inaccuracies in SSC monitoring equipment (e.g. calibration/signal drift of on-line monitors sends incorrect information to the plant control systems, thus misleading the operator concerning the real situation or threat to the plant’s safety) or incorrect maintenance procedures (e.g. wrong lubrication or decontamination procedure used, or excessive (or insufficient) torque applied to bolts). From the above examples, it can be seen that updated information exchange with the NPP’s manufacturer/SSC supplier and other operators with similar plants, as well as with regulators, is an essential part of an operator’s duties. Following published literature on
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all aspects of NPP technology, reportable events that have occurred and basic research into SSC-AD are further related tasks to perform to ensure OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes continually benefit from new knowledge, experience and lessons learned.
2.5.2 Important systems, structures and components in nuclear power plants Different designs of NPPs will feature their own specific SSCs that, despite accruing various levels and types of service-induced AD, still have to be kept functional within, and according to, their design specifications and regulatory requirements. Conservative operational design safety margins of SSCs are originally in place to counter AD, so the preservation of sufficient safety margins is a way to keep NPP-SSCs safely and reliably in operation. When OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes are optimized, and all SSCAD is effectively managed, mitigated or eliminated, and safety margins kept within specification, the NPP should reach its original design life in a safe and profitable manner. Thereafter, when the SSCs, including the containment and RPV (irreplaceable items), continue to fulfil their design and regulatory requirements, there are prima facie no technological or safety issues to prevent the NPP from going into LTO. A typical list of important SSCs that can undergo AD in Western-designed PWRs would feature the RPV and closure head, primary system large diameter pipes, steam generators, primary pump casings, pressurizer, control rod drive mechanisms, RPV internals (e.g. baffle plates), containment, turbine, generator, I&C, electrical cables and the cooling tower. For a BWR, the list would contain items such as the RPV, the vessel internals (core shroud, jet pumps and core spray and supports), reactivity control blades, containment, coolant recirculation piping, steam dryer, tanks and valves, as well as electrical equipment, I&C and cables. For the pressurized water Russian designed WWER-type of reactor, a typical list of SSCs would include the RPV and head closure, control and safety systems, piping, pumps, pressurizer, electrical circuits important for safety, I&C, safety valves, RPV internals and the emergency core cooling system. The Canadian designed CANDU reactor (heavy water cooled and moderated) would include fuel channels, zircaloy pressure tubes, steam generators, calandria vessel, reactor headers, vacuum building, containment, reactor building, calandria end shield and cooling system, cables and spent fuel bay.
2.5.3 Obsolescence and its consequences in SSCs Obsolescence, when applied to SSCs, means that the original manufacturer no longer makes the product and no other source of supply is available.
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The problem can be exacerbated due to limited industry capacity or a manufacturer’s reluctance to re-tool to produce a limited number of ‘outdated’ components. It is therefore good practice to identify critical (also potentially expensive) components in the frame of the PLiM programme, and to build up a strategic inventory of spare parts. The economics of such inventories must be evaluated against the risk of long outages of the NPP if no spare part is readily available. However, non-service ageing may become an issue if the storage conditions are not ideal, since elevated temperatures, dampness, ingress of chemical vapours, corrosion and incidental vibrations may still cause SSC-AD (e.g. set-point drift, change in resistance, loosening of clamps/ connections or oxidation of contacts). Nuclear power plants constructed in the 1960–90 period had mostly analogue I&C systems. These performed adequately, but as technology evolved and the digital era made itself felt in the nuclear industry, it seemed a natural development to implement digital I&C into NPPs, whilst classifying analogue technology as old and ‘obsolete’. However, the general area of ‘electronics’ is characterized by frequent modifications and modernization, creating challenges in assuring that functional equivalence is present. Both proof of quality assurance (QA) and functional equivalence are necessary to obtain regulatory approval for replacement (or new design) safety-relevant components. Use of new technologies and procedures used may also require regulatory approval. Obtaining approval may take time, thus creating reluctance in some operators to ‘modernize’, despite the advantages of digitally-based I&C. There are some special caveats involved with replacing old technology with new. Some components, for example in the electronics sector, may fulfil the specifications to provide a given actuation voltage, but reaction time allowances/windows to actuate timers, relays or switches involved may be reduced compared to that in the replaced component and this new characteristic may be intolerant to the system it is a part of, causing erratic behaviour. Variations such as this arise due to small differences in (sub) components coming from various manufacturers. It is therefore necessary to quality control and validate all component characteristics, including tolerance bands for generated signals and their possible effect on other components and systems.
2.6 Safety culture and human factors and knowledge management 2.6.1 Importance of safety culture and human factors in NPP operation The term ‘safety culture’ can be used to convey the way in which a NPP (or in fact any other plant) is operated with respect to safety. It may be defined as
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the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety management. Nuclear power plants with a good safety culture are characterized by communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety and by confidence in the efficacy of preventive measures. It is thus of paramount importance in NPP operation to have in place an appropriate safety culture, whereby openness to, and for, communication, questioning attitudes, adherence to written procedures, the necessity to analyse and understand the immediate and later consequences of actions performed and a pride in the work done, all have high standing within the workforce. For example, the pressure of electricity production targets must never be allowed to create conditions under which short-cuts in established OPs or mandatory procedures may be contemplated. Apart from legal aspects, such personnel actions may unknowingly put the NPP in an immediate or future dangerous condition (i.e. creation of latent failure conditions, LFCs). The tools of OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes, combined with a trained workforce instilled with the core values of safety culture, create the best possible conditions for safe current and future NPP operation. It is therefore an important task for NPP management staff to create a strong enabling environment for safety culture development and efficient implementation thereof.
2.6.2 Importance of knowledge management The plant’s management strategy to identify where (specialist) pools of knowledge lie within the NPP’s workforce, to acquire and document it, to efficiently disseminate it and to thus preserve this valuable asset, even when the original specialists have left, is called knowledge management (KM). In fact, KM can be associated with elements of safety culture, since the corporate asset of a NPP’s experienced and technologically specialized workforce is also a key to safe operation. Explicit or generic knowledge from manuals or reports is usually adequately available, but ‘hands-on’ teaching of new personnel, who are accompanied by a senior specialist for the requisite amount of time, is often a more efficient way to disseminate know-how, especially when the work processes are then documented and rationalized in ways which are transparent, logical and easy to understand. This implicit knowledge is based on experience, which has usually been accrued by an individual or team, perhaps over many years, and it is mostly plant-specific and thus extremely valuable to the NPP concerned. An important tool in KM is the exact documentation of all NPP-SSCs (especially those relevant to safety and the NPP’s operational life) reflecting the operational history (e.g. transients, fatigue usage, nature and type of repairs and for what reason). Such sources of information may be readily obtained from the
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component-specific dossiers featured in the ASPs, or given deeper focus in AM and PLiM programme documentation. It is opportune to mention here the necessity for KM within the NPP, even when outsourcing is required, i.e. when external specialist companies are called in to perform specific tasks. The NPP’s own personnel should be involved as much as possible, and be ready to learn new skills. Such ‘home-grown’ and acquired knowledge creates a competent workforce, and those involved have the potential to develop their careers further as specialists. This increases motivation and safety culture in the NPP. Documentation must be kept on all safety-relevant issues and events that arise. This is usually done under the provisions of regulatory requirements concerning reportable events. The details leading up to, during and after the event should provide a clear analysis of the main and contributory factors. The analysis will show, for example, whether the OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes have any inherent weaknesses to address, or if SSCs have been inadequately inspected, repaired or replaced, or if the supplier of the SSCs changed some detail, originally thought to be irrelevant, or whether human factors were involved. All this information must be used to ensure a similar event does not occur again. Lessons learned (root causes of problems) are a part of KM and provide valuable feedback for enhancing the QA and effectiveness of OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes.
2.7
Trends and issues in nuclear power plant (NPP) life management
In order to address future issues and trends in NPP life management, it is necessary to first examine past political situations and technological events that have shaped the industry until now. Both the national and international safety record of nuclear power will continue to be a yardstick used by energy policy-makers to assess the justification, or not, for using nuclear power. The international dimension is introduced here to emphasize the collective responsibilities of all involved to operate their NPPs safely, and to highlight the fact that releases of radioactive source terms (contamination) simply do not respect international boundaries. The accidents in Chernobyl (26 April 1986, Ukraine) [5] and Three Mile Island (March 28 1979, Pennsylvania, US) [6], caused widespread rejection of nuclear power and a general distrust in nuclear technology. Since then, much confidence has been restored in nuclear power, thanks to improvements to designs, safety culture and continued freedom from major accidents. With uncompromising vigilance, questioning attitude (safety culture aspects), implementation of effective OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes and following the current state of knowledge, sharing experiences (open discussions with other operators and regulators), and by using validated good practices and applying lessons learned, safe current and
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LTO operation of NPPs should be facilitated. However, utilities and operators have to prepare, plan and invest for LTO at least five years in advance of reaching the NPP’s original design life, even if political and public support could change in the future, due to other unforeseeable circumstances. This is a challenge to the business case, even if the regulatory climate should remain favourable. In other words, regulators can implement operational and safety rules and can verify that a NPP is in compliance with these, but they are not involved with national energy policies or private sector business goals. Furthermore, many utilities are aiming to keep their NPPs operating for 60 or more years, and this will need increased regulatory capacity (re-licensing aspects) and oversight. A potential future problem may arise due to regulatory capacity being stretched, especially when new NPP designs and associated new operational practices have to be approved and construction of new NPPs starts. Thus, the nuclear power industry and its regulators must ensure that sufficient numbers of suitably trained personnel will be available in both currently operating and future NPPs. It is necessary to implement relevant courses in technical colleges and universities in a timely manner, provide young technicians and engineers with the prospect of a life-career and to realize that basic training and qualification may require two to three years, with some specialist areas (doctorate level at university) requiring up to five or more years. Expertise in decommissioning NPPs, radwaste conditioning and radiological protection will also be needed in future. Training of future radiation protection experts and technicians in ways to plan jobs using the ALARA principle should be given due attention, bearing in mind the time needed to train and qualify such personnel. The prospect of a career for life in an expanding and vital industry, plus the pride and responsibility in working for the benefit of the environment and humanity should be seen as good incentives for the coming generation of nuclear technologists.
2.7.1 Role of NPPs currently in operation Past history shows that despite economic recessions and associated reduction in industrial output and changing political situations, the world will, overall, need more energy as it progresses further into the twenty-first century. This will be against a background of increased environmental awareness concerning the use of fossil-based fuels and possible shortages thereof. In contrast, nuclear energy represents an economically sensible, reliable and environmentally responsible path to follow. Over 300 NPPs (from a current world total of 438 in June 2010) are now approaching, have reached or have already exceeded half of their original design lives, and almost all NPPs in the US have plans to apply for licence renewal, when the time comes. This clearly indicates the renaissance of nuclear power in the US. In Europe, most NPPs will have the possibility to continue operation on their current
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licensing basis through successful completion of the PSR procedure. Even allowing for new NPPs being constructed now and in the future, a significant quantity of the generated capacity in the next 20 years, or so, will still have to come from NPPs that have operated for 30 or more years. These older NPPs generally possess improved safety and economic status compared to when they first went into service, due, in part, to replacements of SSCs, back-fitting and refurbishments and implemented mitigation methods against SSC-AD. Furthermore, OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes, and monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance would have all contributed significantly to the relicensing and LTO of these NPPs [7].
2.7.2 Contribution of power uprates Power uprates (PUs) are an on-going activity in many NPPs, and they are already a valuable contribution to the total of global nuclear energy produced [8]. In the US, for example, up to 5 GW of electrical power could be added to the total nuclear capacity via PU between 2005 and 2010 [9]. Uprating the power output of nuclear reactors is a highly economically attractive source of additional generating capacity. By modifying the existing turbo-generator (e.g. increasing steam intake capacity) or installing a new turbo-generator, and by taking advantage of existing design margins and installing digital I&C, plant output can be readily increased by up to 15–20%. Power uprates are done for both BWR and PWR. The necessary increase in the fuel core power is achieved in BWRs by increasing the core feed water flows and steam flows. Either the rate of coolant recirculation is kept constant, thus creating larger core steam volumes, or steam volumes are held the same via an increased recirculation rate. A combination of these measures is also possible. In PWRs it is necessary to increase the core coolant flow rate or to raise the mean coolant temperature rise across the core, or both. The secondary steam volume is increased, which is then converted to more electrical power via the turbo-generators. It is usually quicker, easier and cheaper to make the adjustments necessary for PU than to build a new NPP. Using a simple example, if a country operates five similarly rated NPPs and each one was given a 20% PU, the equivalent power generated after PU completion would then correspond to having 6 NPPs in operation. This could be an attractive alternative to building a new NPP, or as an effective and cost-efficient measure to ‘bridge-over’ energy requirements whilst waiting for a new NPP to be built and to connect to the supply grid. There are three categories of PU: measurement uncertainty recapture (MUR) uprates; stretch power uprates (SPU); and extended power uprates (EPU). The MUR uprates are typically no more than 2% and are obtained by improved calculation of the reactor power. The SPU leads generally to
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a maximum of 7% increase and is characterized by altering set-points in the instrumentation. The EPU can be used to obtain up to a 20% increase in power. This, in contrast to the previous PU methods, requires significant changes to the OPs and equipment of the NPP, including a higher power density core, generator renewal or modification, systems to deal with the steam or coolant flow rate increase and focused monitoring and inspection on piping and steam dryers, etc). The NPP balance of plant usually addresses the secondary side situation (i.e. turbines and all else not in the primary side). Although PUs are done within the design tolerances, they can pose new and special challenges to the operation of the NPP, since higher volumes of coolant and steam arise and flow rates increase. Furthermore, the nuclear core is usually modified to create the extra energy via more enriched fuel. Higher core power, increased flow rates, temperatures and pressures not only have the potential to affect AD rates in SSCs (e.g. vibration-induced cracks in steam dryer cover plates in BWRs [10]), but also new operational guides and rules have to be implemented to allow the plant’s personnel time to act accordingly in cases of emergency (i.e. a PU also necessitates an analysis of human factors and operator’s actions, especially under anomalous or transient conditions in the newly configured NPP. Times available for operator action/ intervention may be shorter relative to before the PU was implemented). The possible effects of PU on reliability and safety margins of SSCs must be analysed and proof brought that they remain within regulatory prescriptions [11].
2.7.3 Safety regulation and anticipating future changes Regulatory and safety requirements expected for new types of NPP will be, in principle, no different from those for current NPPs, namely that all plants must be operated from ‘greenfield-back-to-greenfield’ (total life cycle) such that no harm occurs to the public and environment. The traditional approach of NPP regulation has focused on verifying that the safety and operation of NPPs always conforms to their current licence requirements. This pragmatic approach implies that the best possible NPP designs are used from the start of operations, that safety systems upgrades and SSC replacements are implemented as necessary, the DID barriers are kept functional, the OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes are effective in their respective goals, and the workforce is correspondingly qualified and safety oriented. This is a ‘state-of-plant’ approach. In future, this approach will also be important, but a growing trend is for regulators to verify that the organizational arrangements in place at the NPP can ensure safe operation at all times. The organizational arrangements and OPs obviously cover a multitude of activities within the NPP, and these, in turn, are based on established codes and guidelines and the implementation of lessons learned and good practices. The OPs, ASPs,
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AM and PLiM programmes for new NPPs should clearly reflect a sciencebased approach, backed up with sound engineering principles with a primary goal of safety. Assuring the integrity of primary pressure boundaries (e.g. RPV, SGs, pressurizer and piping) remains a priority task, but DID barriers and robust severe accident management procedures must nevertheless be available to limit any consequences of SSC failure [12]. Risk-based maintenance and inspection methods are also taking on more significance, and the use of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is an increasingly valuable tool used for plant-specific assessment of risks to safety. Core damage frequency (CDF) is a term used in PRA. It is a way of expressing how probable it is that an accident would cause damage to the nuclear fuel core. The CDF number is a useful tool for managing the level of risk of core accidents. The CDF is obtained by estimating the frequency of design base accidents that may cause damage to a nuclear reactor fuel core (PRA Level 1). In Western European NPPs, the theoretical CDF is calculated to be around 5 ¥ 10–5 per reactor year (which would be once in 20 000 reactor years). In the US, reactor designs must fulfil a theoretical CDF criterion of 1 event in 10 000 years, but current designs are superior in this respect, and are usually projected to have a CDF of 1 in 100 000 years. However, NPPs commonly have a CDF of about 1 in 1 million years. New generation NPPs (Generation III, III+ and IV) feature many passive safety systems and the theoretical CDF is estimated to be about 1 in 10 million years. It should be noted that nuclear core damage accidents do not necessarily mean the release of radiotoxic substances to the environment, as was shown to be the case for the Three Mile Accident in the US [6]. The value of PRA approaches will increase as methods for PRA Level 2 (addressing plant source-term release) and PRA Level 3 (assessment of injury and economic loss due to release of radioactivity) are further refined. The impacts of external events on the safe operation of a NPP (e.g. seismic, flood, aviation accident, terror attack and hurricane) require continued analysis. Safety regulation in NPPs is applied in a national way, but it has its roots also in internationally derived and approved approaches. Proven design principles and engineering codes and practices also provide input to assist the regulation and assessment of safety in NPPs. Safety regulation can have basically either a prescriptive or a ‘goal-seeking’ character. As time evolves, it is likely that the latter approach will find increased use as the principle of ‘The operator is responsible for safety’, becomes even more firmly established. It is opportune to mention here that electricity markets are becoming increasingly deregulated, thus creating market opportunities but also potential impact on safety levels. Changes in NPP operational procedures (e.g. in order to save time/money/increase output) must first be analysed, and officially approved if safety may be affected.
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A basic principle used in the regulatory field is to ensure that NPPs are kept at the current state-of-the-art, science and technology, and sufficient safety margins are present in safety-relevant SSCs irrespective of the NPP’s chronological age. This principle will be valid also for future (new generation) NPPs, thus assuring that new knowledge and technology will continually benefit the goals of safety-first.
2.7.4 Issues concerning waste arising from the operation of nuclear power plants The operation of a NPP produces radioactive waste (‘radwaste’) and radwaste management has to take into account the low, medium and high level types arising. It is evident that the longer a NPP operates, the more waste and spent fuel it will produce. Thus, even well before the NPP’s LTO phase is entered into, sufficient capacity to store, condition and dispose of the projected amounts of radwaste must be planned for, or already be available. For example, construction of large items such as new spent fuel storage pools (or modifications to existing ones) must be undertaken, and corresponding strategies evolved to enable storage of the fuel elements whilst avoiding criticality accidents. Spent fuel storage pools are a very important part of NPPs since they must ensure that the spent fuel’s decay heat is removed efficiently, they shield personnel from radiation and provide a barrier against radioactive releases. Correspondingly, they must also be continually monitored and maintained chemically (i.e. sufficient boration must be present in the water to absorb neutrons emitted by decays in the fuel) to prevent spontaneous criticality of the fuel [13]. Spent fuel can be re-processed to extract remaining quantities of fissionable materials (e.g. uranium and plutonium) and to separate non-fissionable, but radioactive materials, which can be processed and then encased in suitable containers for storage or final disposal. The overall strategy used for radwaste management is to concentrate or vitrify it as appropriate, reduce its volume and to confine and contain it for as long as it may present environmental or health hazards. High-level waste (HLW) may contain several billion Becquerel (Bq) per cubic centimetre compared to a few tens of Bq per cubic centimetre in low-level waste (LLW). (One Bq is equivalent to 1 radioactive decay per second.) It is important to realize that the volume of HLW (mostly from spent fuel) is small and it can be stored relatively easily, until final disposal is possible. The HLW tends to be short-lived due to its greater radioactivity, whereas LLW could present much longer-term hazards. It is the current generation’s moral obligation to ensure that future generations are not burdened with radwaste issues. The future will demand national political solutions to address the final disposal of radwaste, since technical issues regarding managing, conditioning and packaging have been largely
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resolved. Radwaste and other materials arising from decommissioning and dismantling NPPs may be disposed of finally in deep (400 m) repositories or could be stored in such a manner that the option remains to monitor or even retrieve it even after several hundred years. This may be a viable option when new methods are developed to transmute long-lived isotopes into shorterlived ones or even non-radioactive ones [14]. Although an expensive option, nuclear transmutation of transuranium elements (actinides) such as isotopes of plutonium, neptunium and curium can potentially reduce the inventory of these elements and thus facilitate easier radwaste management. It can be mentioned here that earlier NPP designs often used components made from hard cobalt-containing alloys for applications such as rollers and pins in control rod systems that require very high resistance to wear and freedom from sticking through friction. However, when irradiated with neutrons, 59Co (the stable form) may become activated to form the relatively long-lived isotope 60Co, which is a gamma-radiation emitter with a half-life of 5.27 years. Thus, due to ALARA principles and to lessen activity inventories, Co-containing alloys have now been gradually replaced with other materials not so susceptible to activation. This is an example where experience gained with radiological aspects (and not SSC-AD) has led to the phasing-out of Co-containing alloys used for some components in NPPs.
2.8
Past, current and future nuclear power plant (NPP) concepts and designs
Since Generation I NPPs have been mostly phased out, and Generation II NPPs are discussed in detail elsewhere in this book, the following will deal only with salient features, characteristics and special aspects of some Generation III NPPs and those projected to come into commercial service further along the timescale until about 2030. Since the Generation IV NPPs are a group of theoretical NPP designs for next-generation technologies projected to be available after about 2030, they are beyond the scope of this book. However, those currently under study are the gas cooled fast reactor (GFR), the very high temperature reactor (VHTR), the supercritical water cooled reactor (SCWR), the sodium cooled fast reactor (SFR), the lead cooled fast reactor (LFR) and the molten salt reactor (MSR). Nuclear power plants may be categorized as follows, reflecting their historical evolution and technical development and it should be noted that quite different reactor types exist within each reactor generation: ∑
Generation I (1950s–1970s) NPPs. These were essentially the early prototypes of todays operating NPPs. With the current exception of the United Kingdom (with their carbon dioxide cooled, graphite moderated Magnox-type reactors, currently scheduled to be shut down by 2010), none are in operation elsewhere in the world. © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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∑
Generation II (1970s–1990s) NPPs. Reactors from this era comprise the majority of commercial NPPs operating today, and some of these NPPs were even constructed using modified nuclear submarine propulsion systems and associated technologies, for example, the PWR. Other designs in this Generation II category are the BWR, CANDU (CANada Deuterium Uranium), WWER (sometimes called VVER) Russian designed PWR, RBMK (Russian designed channel-type graphite moderated reactor) and the advanced gas-cooled reactor (AGR). ∑ Generation III (1990s–2010) NPPs. These reactors have benefitted widely from lessons learned from older NPP types, designs and technologies. They thus may be classed as being at the current state-of-the-art, science and technology and advanced in concept. The EPR, System 80+, AP 600 and ABWR NPPs are examples of the light water-based Generation III NPPs (see below for some further details). ∑ Generation III+ (2010–2030) NPPs. These reactors will have shorter construction times and lower capital costs. They have evolutionary designs and will operate even more efficiently, thus more economically than currently operating NPPs. Examples of this generation are the Westinghouse, AP 1000, APWR and ESBWR NPPs (see below for some examples). ∑ Generation IV (from around 2030 onward) NPPs. Most of the designs are still in the conceptual stage. The NPPs will be characterized by lower construction and operating costs (generically-based and standardized approach), they will have enhanced safety systems, many of them passive, and due to the innovative fuel cycles they will be resistant to proliferation issues and will generate less volumes of radwaste.
2.8.1 Generation III and III+ NPPs The 1600 MWe European pressurized water reactor (EPR) is a Generation III type of NPP, meaning it is derived from the present designs of NPPs, but features evolutionary improvements in design (standardized), including many passive safety systems, better fuel efficiency and materials having high resistance to AD. The EPR features a 1.5 m thick concrete outer wall and a substantial inner containment. Another Generation III design is the advanced boiling water reactor (ABWR), four of which have actually operated in Japan since 1996 and two more are under construction there. The ABWR design is licensed in the US, Japan and Taiwan (with two currently under construction in Taiwan). Since the ABWR is based on many years of BWR experience, it has benefits concerning the construction time (e.g. 39 months from first concrete to first fuelling, reduced operation and maintenance costs and improved safety and operability features, for example.
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The economic simplified boiling water reactor (ESBWR) is a Generation III+ NPP and is a further development on the ABWR, featuring natural circulation with no recirculation pumps or their associated piping. As its name implies, the ESBWR is simplified (e.g. 25% fewer pumps) and presumably more economical to construct and operate due to a projected short (36-month) construction time. These designs can remain safe in accident conditions without the use of any active control components. In principle, it is better to have passive safety features, not depending on other systems, because gravity feeds, evaporation and natural circulation, for example, cannot be affected by inadequate human actions or procedures during an emergency situation. Designs also even feature improved capability to deal with the unlikely rare occurrence of severe accidents, such as when the nuclear fuel core melts through the RPV and gains entry into the containment. The so-called ‘corium’ or fuel-containing material, a mixture of fuel, debris and molten metal, can fall onto a ‘core catcher’ and be thus spread out efficiently and cooled so that its progression is stopped and the containment remains tight, thus maintaining its DID design requirement to prevent the uncontrolled release of radioactive substances to the environment. Depending on the type, the new generation of NPPs are designed to have higher fuel enrichment (5% uranium oxide or mixture with uranium–plutonium oxide) and thus have a higher electrical power output (e.g. the 1600 MWe EPR) compared to earlier design NPPs (e.g. typically 220–1000 MWe WWER, PWR and BWR, with the exception of the Generation II 1500 MWe RBMK NPPs which were operated at Ignalina, Lithuania until December 2009).
2.8.2 Advanced reactor technologies: the pebble bed reactor A possible future NPP will be the ‘helium cooled pebble bed reactor (PBR)’, which has been studied and developed further in South Africa since 1993. A pioneer PBR operated for 21 years in Germany [15]. Future PBRs will use the equivalent of about 450 000 tennis ball-sized mini-reactor cores contained in a vessel. The nuclear fuel is enclosed in pyrolytic graphite, which acts as a moderator, and the fuel (e.g. uranium, plutonium as oxides or carbides) is made of micro-particles, coated with silicon carbide for structural integrity. Other coolants can be nitrogen or carbon dioxide. The high temperature PBR will have increased thermal efficiency (about 50%), compared to that usual in water-moderated NPPs (about 35%). Helium flows through the ‘pebble-bed’, extracting heat, and then the heated gas is directed onto turbines to produce electricity. The helium cools down and is recycled back to the reactor. Compared to the 1600 MWe EPR, these PBRs are of low power, typically 110 MWe. Operating risks are deemed to be very small, due to the low power density and inherent passive safety
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features. Since it works at high temperature (approximately 900 °C), the PBR can cool itself via natural circulation and withstand accident scenarios up to at least 1600 °C. The PBR is classed as a type Generation IV very high temperature reactor (VHTR).
2.8.3 Future reactors: an example from the United Kingdom The UK’s current fleet (2010) of 19 NPPs of various ages, designs and capacities supply about 16% of the country’s total electricity. However, the majority of Magnox and AGRs are now nearing the end of their original design lives, and about half of the NPP fleet are already in, or planning, decommissioning. Up to 35% of the total supplied electrical power may have to be replaced by 2020; by this date the share of nuclear-supplied power will have dropped to about 7% unless the construction of Generation III and III+ reactors is implemented before this time. This is a medium-term possibility, since in contrast, Generation IV reactors are a longer-term prospect (probably available from 2030 onwards). The Generation III+ reactors will feature modular construction, simplified design, passive safety (use of gravity, natural circulation and evaporation, instead of pumps, motors and valves) and the overall construction costs should be low. The Generation III+ reactors will be more efficient and produce much less radwaste compared to earlier NPPs. By July 2007, four designs had been approved for further assessment, namely, the European AREVA-EPR (pressurized water), the US Westinghouse AP 1000 (pressurized water – a feature of the AP 1000 reactor is that the core coolant is forced into the core by gravity and natural convection recirculates it), the Canadian CANDU ACR 1000 (heavy water reactor) and the US General Electric ESBWR (boiling water) reactor. However, on 4 April 2008, the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) Company, responsible for the ACR 1000 design, announced that it was withdrawing their CANDU ACR 1000 from the prelicensing process (called ‘Generic Design Assessment, GDA’). The design had successfully completed Step 2 of the GDA (initial assessment carried out by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the Environment Agency) in the UK, but the announcement stated that the decision to withdraw would allow the AECL to focus its marketing and licensing resources on the Canadian market [16]. On 12 March 2008, the UK’s HSE and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) signed an agreement to renew co-operation between the two countries. The five-year agreement covers the exchange of technical information and the development of safety standards. It also allows the two organizations to exchange personnel, information and training. It is noted that two of the new reactor designs under consideration, and being taken through
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GDA in the UK, are from the US, being the General Electric ESBWR and the Westinghouse AP 1000. On 27 March 2008 the French and UK governments announced that they would be working together to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of nuclear development projects, including safety and pre-licensing (GDA) [17]. In particular, the collaboration would also address matters regarding the regulatory assessment of EPRs which are currently (2010) being constructed in France and Finland and undergoing GDA in the UK. It can thus be seen that the UK is collaborating closely with both European and US designers of the future NPPs.
2.8.4 Future AM and PLiM programmes applied to new generation NPPs As new generation NPPs go into operation, it can be expected that even their SSCs will also undergo some level of AD. It is, however, not expected that well-known AD mechanisms such as neutron embrittlement of the RPV beltline material or stress corrosion cracking in steam generators or vessel head penetrations will pose any significant problems, since appropriate design, manufacturing processes, material and operational aspects and lessons learned will have been implemented. The new generation NPPs will generally feature higher working temperatures, greater power rating, higher flow rates of coolant but less reliance on engineered safety features due to the passive design concepts present. For example, as temperatures will be much higher in the helium-cooled PBR, ageing mechanisms such as creep and evolution of microstructures, carburization, decarburization, oxidation and the effect of particulate-laden gases in causing corrosion erosion must all be items to monitor and control in ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes. Research work should continue to investigate the mechanisms acting and how best they can be mitigated or eliminated. Special surface treatments could conceivably reduce ingress of impurities and associated AD. Concerning microstructure effects, it is known that some grades of duplex cast austenitic stainless steel (CASS) used for pump casings and piping may suffer thermal embrittlement due to the development of metallic phases over time within a given temperature range [18]. It is therefore important to allow for such a possibility in new NPPs using appropriate monitoring and surveillance programmes. New tools may need to be developed or existing ones improved upon, to detect microstructure evolution with time and to correlate this with the propensity to corrode or embrittle. Other aspects concerning new generation reactors will be to determine how far risk-based inspection procedures may be used and what level of regulatory acceptance they will find. Risk-based inspection is still being developed for the current fleet of NPPs, so it remains to be seen how far this can be applied to the new generation of NPPs.
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Increased reliance on computerized plant control will necessitate the highest QA of computer programmes and sensors. Sensors must supply the correct information to computer-controlled functions to allow correct operational decisions to be made, and AD monitoring must be extended to cover these technologies. Ageing and obsolescence of sensors and issues of equivalent QA replacements must be included in the OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes as appropriate. Plant personnel will have to be trained not only to respect electronically supplied plant information, but also not to have total reliance on it, and to question seemingly anomalous signals and plant response and to be able to instigate cross-checks for verification of the true situation [6]. Trust in instrument readings is good, but intelligent human control is better. There has been a gradual decline in the numbers of qualified workforce to regulate, construct and operate NPPs since the mid-1980s, and many pioneer nuclear power workers are already in, or going into, retirement. However, it remains problematic to find and recruit young qualified people to replace them, since corresponding courses have become less available in many universities, thus compounding the problem. The young generation of nuclear power workers are now being faced with the task of keeping current NPPs operating safely, whilst confronting the challenge to build and operate new generation NPPs. The standard OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes for the new generation NPPs may well have their basic principles based on established and well-proven approaches and methodologies, but this should not nurture complacency. Each new NPP type will require analysis and specific OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes tailored to suit. However, the new NPPs are going to be constructed on a modular and generic basis, thus facilitating, in principle at least, the direct transfer of basic knowledge and operational principles.
2.9 Conclusions 1. Ageing management and associated programmes assist integration between existing NPP standard operational practices (e.g. maintenance, repairs, replacements and ISI) and also address potentially insufficient conservative design assumptions that have become evident over a NPP’s operational time; AM programmes are basically more safety-oriented in nature. 2. Plant life management (PLiM) programmes facilitate a comprehensive evaluation of the NPP assets and contain elements of both safety and economics; PLiM programmes are basically more economically oriented in nature. 3. It is vital to assign the various NPP-SSCs to their respective safety classes to obtain a focused and objective approach to the OPs, ASPs,
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AM and PLiM programmes, and that resources are used where they are most needed. 4. System, structure and component ageing surveillance dossiers are living documents, to be updated whenever new knowledge becomes available regarding SSC-AD. 5. Diverse AD effects have been observed in all types of NPP SSCs. Understanding the mechanisms and causes of degradation allows implementation of robust mitigation methods. The information from ISI, testing, normal and exceptional maintenance and research remain key to achieve this. 6. Changes to the NPP, such as power uprating, must be assessed in terms of their holistic impact on OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes, including provision for adjusted emergency procedures. 7. Obsolescence in SSCs and replacements and strategic reserves thereof must be addressed in the PLiM programme in a timely manner. Depending on safety class or reliability issues, new types of SSCs will require qualification for functional equivalence. Owners, operators and regulators must be aware of non-service (storage) AD, and optimum management, elimination or mitigation thereof. 8. New generation NPPs feature many passive safety features and improved designs and materials, but knowledge from current OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes, modified as necessary, will still provide a basis to achieve these NPP’s design lives safely and profitably and lay the foundations for their LTO. 9. Safety culture and knowledge management enhance the effectiveness of standard OPs and ASPs, and AM and PLiM programmes. 10. Risk-based inspection methods and probabilistic approaches will continue to supplement deterministic methods and their further development is necessary to achieve the overall goal of operating NPPs safely and reliably.
2.10 Sources of further information NEA/CNRA/R, ‘Regulatory aspects of ageing reactors’, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, CNRA Special Issue Meeting, June 1998. NEA/CNRA/R (99) 1, March 1999. IAEA, ‘Safety aspects of nuclear power plant ageing’, IAEA-TECDOC-540, Vienna, 1990. IAEA, ‘Cost drivers for the assessment of nuclear power plant life extension’, IAEA-TECDOC-1309, Vienna, September 2002. Penny, R.K. (ed.), Ageing of Materials and Methods for the Assessment of Lifetimes of Engineering Plant, CAPE ’97, A.A. Balkema, Rotterdam, Brookfield, 1997.
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Penny, R.K. (ed.), Risk, Economy and Safety, Failure Minimization and Analysis, Failures ’98, A.A. Balkema, Rotterdam, Brookfield, 1998. USNRC, ‘generic ageing lessons learned (GALL) report’, USNRC-NUREG1801, Volume 1, July 2001. IAEA, Site selection and evaluation for nuclear power plants with respect to population distribution: a safety guide’, IAEA Safety Series No. 50SG-54, STI/PUB/569, 1980, IAEA, Vienna, 1980. Major Projects Association, ‘A new generation of uk nuclear power plants – are we ready?’ Seminar No. 123, held at the Institution of Civil Engineers, London, February 2006. IAEA, ‘Periodic safety review of nuclear power plants – safety guide’, Safety Standards Series No. NS-g-2.10, IAEA, Vienna, 2003. Tjernlund, R.M. and Manacsa, G.C., ‘Guidelines for the safety classification of systems, components and parts used in nuclear power plant applications (NGCIG-17)’, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, EPRINP-6895, OSTI ID: 6372758, 1 February 1991. Männisto, I., ‘Risk-informed classification of systems, structures and components in nuclear power plants’, Master’s Thesis, Helsinki University of Technology, Department of Engineering, Physics and Mathematics, Espoo, 2005. (available at: http://www.sal.hut.fi/Publications/pdf-files/ TMAN05.pdf). Radiation Dose Management in the Nuclear Industry, proceedings of the conference organized by the British Nuclear Energy Society, Windemere, Cumbria, 9–11 October 1995, Thomas Telford, London, 1995. IAEA, ‘Severe accident management programmes for nuclear power plants – safety guide No. NS-G-2.15’, IAEA, Vienna, July 2009.
2.11
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank B. Raj of the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research, Kalpakkam, Tamil Nadu, India, for his help and suggestions, and for reviewing this chapter. Thanks are due also to P. Contri of JRC-Petten/ NL for his valuable comments regarding safety classification and the roles of OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes.
2.12
References
1. IAEA, Plant life management for long term operation of light water reactors. Principles and guidelines, TRS 448 IAEA, Vienna, Austria, October 2006. 2. Bond, L., ‘Economics of plant life management’, Second International Symposium on Nuclear Power Plant Life Management, Shanghai, China, IAEA, 15–18 October 2007. 3. STUK – Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority of Finland, Nuclear power plant systems, structures and components and their safety classification, 26 June 2000
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(source extracted from STUKLEX, http://www.edilex.fi/stuklex/en/lainsaadanto/ saannosto/YVL2-1). 4. IAEA Safety Standards Series: Periodic Safety Review of Nuclear Power Plants, Safety Guide No. NS-G-2.10, STI/PUB/1157, IAEA, Vienna, Austria, August 2003. 5. Medvedev, G. (1989). The Truth about Chernobyl. VAAP. First American edition published by Basic Books, New York, in 1991. 6. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Fact Sheet on the Three Mile Island accident. Annual report – 1979 NUREG–0690. 7. 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants. 8. Tipping, Ph., ‘Some power up-rate issues in nuclear power plants’, Nuclear Engineering and Technology, Vol. 40, No. 4, 2008, pp. 251–4. 9. The New Economics of Nuclear Power, World Nuclear Association (WNA) Report (http://www.uic.com.au/neweconomics.pdf). 10. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ‘Failure of a steam dryer cover plate after a recent power up-rate’, Information Notice IN 2002-26, September 2002. 11. IAEA, ‘Implications of power up-rates on safety margins of nuclear power plants’, Report of a IAEA and OECD/NEA Technical Meeting, Vienna, Austria, 13–15 October 2003, IAEA-TECDOC-1418, IAEA, Vienna, 2004. 12. IAEA, ‘Overview of training methodology for accident management at nuclear power plants’, IAEA-TECDOC-1440, IAEA, Vienna, 2005. 13. Title 10, ENERGY, Chapter I: Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Part 70 – Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear material, subpart d – License applications, 70:24 ‘Criticality accident requirements’, paragraph 50.68. 14. Takibayev, A., Saito, M., Artisyuk, V. and Sagara H., ‘Fusion-driven transmutation of selected long-lived fission products’, Progress in Nuclear Energy, Vol. 47, 2005, pp. 354–60. 15. Association of German Engineers (VDI), AVR – Experimental High-Temperature Reactor, 21 Years of Successful Operation for a Future Energy Technology, The Society for Energy Technologies, Dusseldorf, VDI Verlag, 1990, pp. 9–23. 16. AECL, ‘CANDU-ACR-1000 withdrawn from the generic design assessment’, reported at http://www.aecl.ca/NewsRoom/News/Press 2008/080404/.htm?ebul=newreactor/1may-2008&cr=2. 17. UK Health and Safety Executive, ‘UK–French collaboration on generic design assessment for EPR’, reported at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/newreactors/communique. htm?ebul=newreactor/1-may-2008&cr=3). 18. Pohl, M., Storz, O. and Glogowski, T., ‘Effect of sigma phase morphology on the properties of duplex stainless steels’, Microscopy and Microanalysis Volume 11 (Supplement 2), 2005, pp. 230–1.
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Safety regulations for nuclear power plant life management and licence renewal
A. A l o n s o, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Spain
Abstract: This chapter presents current regulations to ensure safety and reliability of ageing nuclear power plants. Management of ageing in structures, systems and components requires an understanding of ageing mechanisms and how to detect and control them through surveillance, feedback of operating experience and maintenance programmes. Nuclear power plants’ longer-term operation needs to be addressed by designers, plant operators and regulators within the umbrella of international organizations to implement, complete and augment research and enact new regulation. Key words: nuclear safety regulations, ageing mechanisms, life management, longer-term operation, role of international organizations.
3.1
Introduction
Nuclear power plant (NPP) longer-term operation (LTO) has to demonstrate compliance with the current licence basis and be founded on a completely robust and satisfactory set of regulations. Compliance with such regulations has to be proven by the applicant and verified by the regulatory organization through well-established licensing procedures. Those activities will be first described for some representative cases. Such regulations require the establishment and conducting of a specific plant life management programme (PLiM), which is based in the understanding, monitoring and management of the ageing processes in structures, systems and components (SSCs). Furthermore, PLiM programmes are continually being improved upon. Although ageing processes may have a generic nature and affect similar designs, the ageing status of each single nuclear power plant, and the corresponding remaining safe life, should be known through plant surveillance, operating experience feedback, maintenance and inspection programmes considering the specific design, operational history and the functional experience of each individual plant. The ageing processes are considered on an introductory basis, as they will be described in detail in other chapters of this book. Different ageing mechanisms shorten the life of the SSCs. Some of those will be part of the safety envelop, while others will be installed in the non-nuclear side. The first will receive major attention without neglecting the others, mainly when they may affect the safety and reliability of operations. PLiM mainly 56 © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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concerns not only operators, but also designers and regulators. Old designs did not properly consider all possible ageing mechanisms; in fact, on average, a new significant ageing effect has appeared every seven years or so. The ageing of such plant has to be managed while in service to keep the required safety level at all times and also during LTO, while new designs can prevent some of the known ageing mechanisms and facilitate improved managerial procedures. The major areas of concern are related to neutron fluence and stress corrosion cracking, which will be presented in brief, as they will be considered in depth in later chapters. PLiM and LTO are still evolving, so more research is still needed to understand and prevent ageing mechanisms. Information networks, to be discussed later on, have been created globally to evaluate and apply worldwide operating experience and research results. Periodic examination will gradually be substituted by the more effective on-line surveillance; improved digital technology will help in that endeavour. This and other future trends will be presented. A list of references and identification of sources for further information are offered to the reader.
3.2
Safety review/licence renewal
Original NPP designs were created using the deterministic approach based on the defence-in-depth principle, as defined by the International Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG, 1996). Although economic considerations, rather than technical reasoning, were the basis for determining the lifetime of nuclear power plants, pessimistic early approaches limited the operation of light and heavy water reactors to 30–40 years. The regulatory authorities of supplier countries formally established such limits in their operation licences. In the USA 40 years was the standard, while in the USSR 30 years was the limit. Such restrictions where generally copied by the importing countries of such technologies. In other supplier countries such restrictions were not formally applied. In Germany, for example, the plants could operate as long as they could prove their required safety level. The concept of periodic safety review (PSR), to be conducted every ten years on average, started to take root in Germany as well as in many other countries, notably in Spain. That concept did not put any formal life limit to the power plants, provided they could show their safety at any time and after the PSR. The analysis of operating experience clearly showed that the early fatigue considerations in metallic components were not a matter of concern even after 40 years of operation. At the same time, new ageing mechanisms started to appear. Some of them, mainly new forms of corrosion and embritlement by neutron irradiation, clearly indicated that the operating life of some components would have to be limited unless proper corrective actions were taken. These experiences initiated new activities related to surveillance, maintenance and
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operational experience feedback, which later on were integrated in PLiM. This was not only for safety reasons, but also to improve the performance and economics of the plants. Thus the economical advantages of keeping such plants in operation beyond the formally established lifetime soon became evident. Under the pioneering effort of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), those countries with old designs started PLiM activities and the regulatory organizations commenced developing regulations for LTO. International institutions, mainly the International atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organisation for economic Development/Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/ NEA) established working groups to consider PLiM and LTO.
3.2.1 IAEA guidance on longer-term operation The IAEA has performed valuable work on PLiM and it is providing guidance on ageing-related regulatory aspects through its Safety Standards Series and Technical Report Series (IAEA, 1992). Although the IAEA has no regulatory authority, it has the statutory function of establishing standards for the protection of individuals, society and the environment in the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes; such standards could form the basis and guide regulatory development in Member States. So far, LTO has been briefly included in the on-going revision of the IAEA requirements for safety in operation (IAEA, 2000). A current revision of such requirements (IAEA, 2008) includes a new chapter on longer-term operation, equipment qualification and ageing management. The new document defines LTO as: ‘The operation beyond an established time frame set forth in design standards licence and/or regulations that is justified by safety assessment considering processes and features that may limit the life of SSCs’. It adds that: ‘… it shall use the results of periodic safety review (PSR) and approved by the regulatory body on the basis of the analysis of the ageing management program that will assure plant safety during its extended life time’. The reference to PSR is of particular importance because many countries have established such regulatory practice as a means to license current and longer-term operation. The document further requires the establishment and implementation of a comprehensive LTO programme to be presented and approved or agreed to by the regulatory body. The LTO programme shall include such aspects as the current licensing basis (CLB); safety upgrading and verification and operational programmes, scoping and screening of SSCs with respect to degradation and ageing; re-validation of safety analysis that use time-limited assumptions; review of the management programmes, and the implementation of a new ageing management programme for the expected LTO period. As the IAEA document belongs to the requirements category, it should be expected that its contents will be developed into more specific safety guides.
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In the absence of more detailed guidance, the IAEA understands that PSRs provide a comprehensive methodology for reviewing the safety of the plant, including ageing effects and regulatory changes, technical progress and technological obsolescence. The IAEA has addressed such reviews (IAEA, 2003a): The objective of a PSR is to determine by means of a comprehensive assessment of an existing nuclear power plant: the extent to which the plant conforms to current international safety standards and practices; the extent to which the licensing basis remains valid; the adequacy of the arrangements that are in place to maintain plant safety until the next PSR or the end of plant lifetime; and the safety improvements to be implemented to resolve the safety issues that have been identified. The guide recognizes that the PSR can be the basis for acceptability of longer-term operation. It also recognizes that compliance with the current safety standards may not always be possible, but suggests that: ‘practicable improvements should be made as steps towards meeting them’ and ‘that the risk associated with the shortcomings be assessed and that a justification for continued plant operation be provided’. Many countries have adopted this formal regulatory path, although they are also considering the more detailed practices established by the US NRC.
3.2.2 Regulations for longer-term operation in the United States Regulations for longer-term operation have been fully developed and practised in the United States and they have set the examples for other countries. The US NRC decided to limit to 40 years the operating licence of NPPs, based on economic and antitrust considerations. The technical design was based on the assumed lifetime of the plant using very conservative assumptions to cover the then fragmentary knowledge on the expected behaviour of SSCs in service. Further safety analyses based on research results and operating experience feedback have clearly demonstrated that NPPs could operate safely and reliably well beyond the established formal licence limit. After recognizing this fact, the US NRC decided to enact 10 CFR Part 54 (NRC, 2006) to cover up 20 additional years of operation. Plants with 20 or more years of operation are candidates for licence renewal up to a total of 60 years. As of May 2009, there were 104 NPPs licensed to operate in the Unitted States, 52 units had received new licences, 14 units were under review and letters of intention to apply for a new licence were submitted to the US NRC for 52 units. It is expected that a very limited number of operating plants will not apply for a new licence due to individual unfavourable cost–benefit analyses or other causes.
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10 CFR Part 54 requires the licensee to submit some new documents: ∑ ∑
an integrated plant assessment (IPA); changes in the current licence bases (CLB), taken place during the NRC review of the application; ∑ an evaluation of time-limited aging analyses (TLAA); ∑ a supplement to the final safety analysis report (FSAR).
The interest of the regulator is based in the applicant knowing, managing and maintaining ageing within the plant safety envelope. The IPA must identify a complete list of those structures and components requiring ageing management justification for LTO. They are structures and components that perform their intended safety function without moving parts. The regulations include, but are not limited to, a lengthy list of long-lived structures and metallic, electric and electronic components, such as the reactor pressure vessel, the steam generators, pipes, supports and seismic Category 1 structures and cables, among others. It will be necessary to prove that those structures and components could perform their intended safety functions during LTO in the way established within the CLB. The applicant is obliged to submit changes to the CLB that may have taken place during the NRC review of the application. Submissions of such changes must take place each year after the application for a new licence and three months before the scheduled completion of the NRC review. All changes in the CLB of the facility affecting the contents of the new licence must be included in such amendments. TLAA includes the observations, calculations and analyses that the licensee has conducted to predict the effects of ageing on SSCs considered relevant and included in the CLB. It has to be proven that the analyses remain valid, have been projected for the period of additional operation or the effects of ageing can be managed and will not limit the safety functions. Among others, typical TLAA include metal fatigue, environmental qualification and neutron embrittlement. The FSAR supplement must describe the programmes and activities for managing the effects of ageing and the evaluation of TLAA for the new period of operation included in the IPA and in the ageing analyses. The applicant must also include any change or addition to technical specifications of the plant, with the appropriate justification, which may be necessary to manage the effects of ageing. Enacting any new basic regulation, as in this case, requires from the regulator the development of detailed procedures for better compliance. To that effect, the US NRC published Regulatory Guide 1.188 (NRC, 2005a) describing in more detail an acceptable format and content of the documents that justify the application. The Guide endorses a previously developed industry guidance document prepared by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI).
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The Regulator also edited a Standard Review Plan to License Renewal (NRC, 2005b) explaining how the US NRC staff should perform the evaluation to ensure that all the items have been properly considered and that the affected SSCs will perform their safety functions as expected during the period of longer-term operation. This document also serves to assure quality and uniformity in the review process. The Regulator has also published an additional document on the generic lessons learned, the so-called GALL report (NRC, 2005c). It includes the technical basis for the Standard Review Plan based on a systematic compilation of ageing information in nuclear power plants. The Gall report constitutes a helpful document to the applicants, since it contains recommendations on those existing ageing programmes that should be augmented for licence renewal. It also serves as a reference for the US NRC review process, and such a review is not necessary when the applicant’s ageing programmes follow those given in the GALL report.
3.2.3 Longer-term operation in other countries Most countries with nuclear power plants have a common approach to regulatory requirements related to PLiM and LTO. Although only a few have established time limits to the operation licence, others have not formally established such limits. The countries who have not established a limited lifetime have enforced PSR, about every ten years, which in many cases, as in Spain, are linked to a formal operation licence for the next ten-year period with no formal limit on the number of renewals. There are also countries with formal operation time limits that also practise PSR; in such cases, the review is reinforced by ageing management programmes (AMPs) and TLAAs. Despite the different models, in all countries the responsible licensee also maintains a continuous evaluation of the safety level of each plant under close supervision from the national regulator. Table 3.1 indicates how LTO is managed in some representative countries. Countries using PSR as the formal way to justify longer-term operation may differ in some specific aspects, but within a core of fixed principles such as: compliance with the current national safety requirements and guides and international recommendations; identification of improvements required to achieve or justify compliance; revision of the PLiM programme to ensure safe and reliable operation during the next ten-year period and definition of the necessary surveillance, maintenance and ageing mitigation measures. The Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA) has studied the level of harmonization of safety regulations followed in 17 countries (WENRA, 2006); by referring to the IAEA reference levels as guidance, it has concluded that only half of them have established formal requirements for PSR and ageing management, although the majority of them implement
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Foreseen life extension (y)
Main regulations for licence renewal
Use of periodic safety review
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Argentina Plant dependent Undetermined
Canadian regulations applied to Embalse NPP
Canada 40 10–20
CNSC Draft, 6-360, ‘Life Extension of Nuclear Power Plants’ IAEA TECDOC 1503, PliM, Guidelines for HWRs
Practised, but not directly linked to LTO, based on: IAEA ‘Periodic Safety Reviews of Nuclear Power Plants’ NS-G2.10 (2003)
Czech Republic As given in the Undetermined Technical Certificate
Proposed development of regulatory requirements based on US NRC practices and IAEA recommendations
PSR applied, based on IAEA NS-G-2.10
France No legal limit 10+
Industry procedures based on IAEA and NEA documents presented to regulatory authority for groups of standard plants
Practised by groups of standard plants and linked to licence operation. Part of the TSN Act
Germany No legal limit Not foreseen
Utilities have initiated AM programmes in accordance with RSK recommendation (2004) KTA 2301, Ageing management of NPP
Based on periodic safety reviews Requires deterministic and probabilistic analyses
Hungary 30 20 Regulations based on 10 CFR Part 54
Practised but not part of licence renewal. PSR based on IAEA NS-G-2.10
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Table 3.1 Regulatory requirements for LTO in different countries
Coordinating Committee Practised, linked to licence on Ageing Management renewal (Industry, Academy, Regulator)
Mexico 30 Under consideration Adoption of US NRC regulations. Participation in EPRI BWR-VIP and in IAEA co-ordinated research projects © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
Netherlands 30 60 No specific policy on LTO (Borssele) IAEA AMAT Review
Practised every 10 years, weakly linked to licence renewal
Russia 30 5+10
NP-017-2000, ‘The main requirements for extension of the operating life of a NPP unit’ NP-24-2000, ‘Requirements for Not considered substantiation of possibility of extension of the operating life of nuclear facilities and installations’
Slovak Republic 60
Safety guide BNS 1.9.2/2001, ‘Ageing Management of NPPs’ Requirements’
Practised
Practised and linked to licence renewal. Based on IAEA 50-SG-012
South Korea No legal limit. 10 + (unlimited) Enhanced PSR developed in 30 y considered MOST Bulletins 2005-31 acceptable In depth review of 11 safety indicators (NUREG-1801)
Practised (since 2000) and linked to licence renewal, based on IAEA 50-SG-012
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Slovenia 40 10+ Regulations based on 10 CFR Part 54
Safety regulations for nuclear power plant life management
Japan 30 10+
Foreseen life extension (y)
Main regulations for license renewal
Use of periodic safety review
KINS/GE-N8 Safety review guidelines for PWR
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Spain 40 10+ Regulations based on 10 CFR Part 54
Prastised and linked to licence renewal. Instruction IS-22
Sweden 40 Not foreseen
SKIFS 2004:1, ‘Regulations concerning safety in nuclear facilities’ ‘SKIFS 2005:2, ‘Regulations concerning mechanical components in nuclear facilities’
USA 40 20
10 CFR Part 54, ‘Requirements Not practised for Renewal of Operating License for Nuclear Power Plants’, amended 2006
Note: This table has been constructed mainly from information presented by licensees and regulators in the IAEA 2nd International Symposium on Nuclear Power Life Management, Shanghai, 15–18 October 2007.
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Table 3.1 Continued
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such practices. In 2007, as a counterpart to WENRA, the European utilities holding nuclear power licenses decided to create the European Nuclear Installations Safety Standards (ENISS) to contribute to the harmonization efforts by providing comments and suggestions to WENRA’s activities. In Spain, for example, the nuclear safety regulatory authority, Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear (CSN) has enacted Instruction IS-22 (CSN, 2009) as the guiding document for PSR. The Guide explicitly recognizes: ∑
the importance of the feedback from national and international operating experience and how has it been applied to the plant to be analysed; ∑ the need to contemplate regulatory changes in the country of origin of the project or new requirements suggested by international organizations and their applicability to the plant in question; ∑ the full understanding of the ageing mechanisms and how to manage their effects on the SSCs to ensure the proper accomplishment of their safety functions; ∑ the value of any design or operational change, either already performed or in planning, to improve safety; and ∑ the potential use of the probabilistic methodology, which is also recommended in the IAEA PSR guidance.
3.3
Surveillance, operation and maintenance programmes
The early observations on SSC ageing determined the premature establishment of specific surveillance, operation and maintenance programmes that have been later integrated into PLiM. Surveillance starts with equipment verification and includes monitoring the behaviour of SSCs as well as regulatory inspection and peer reviews. Operation includes training and the feedback of operating experience; while maintenance, mainly risk informed maintenance, constitutes a substantial part of the ageing management programme, AMP. The most significant aspects of these activities are described in this section.
3.3.1 Surveillance of structures, systems and components Equipment verification is a key factor in the TLAA required by US NRC 10 CFR Part 54 and similar standards in other countries. Its importance was soon recognized by INSAG. In an early report (INSAG, 1988) the Group states: ‘Safety components and systems are chosen which are qualified for the environmental conditions that would prevail if they were required to function. The effects of ageing on normal and abnormal functioning are considered in design and qualification’.
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In an IAEA report (IAEA, 1998), recommendations are given for equipment qualification programmes. Safety-related equipment must be qualified not only for normal operating conditions but also for the so-called ‘harsh environments’ such as the ones created by postulated initiating events (PIEs). Such events may create conditions very different from those occurring during normal operation and affect an individual component or different components with the potential of causing common-cause failures in equipment experiencing ageing effects during normal operation. Equipment qualification is measured by using the concept of ‘qualified life’ or ‘qualified condition’ established by equipment qualification. Qualified life is the ‘period of time during normal operation when ageing does not prevent satisfactory performance during a subsequent PIE’. Before the end of its qualified life, the equipment has to be replaced, life-limiting components renewed or a new longer qualified life established. The qualified condition of equipment ‘is expressed in terms of a measurable condition indicator(s) for which it has been demonstrated that the equipment will meet its performance requirements’. The reactor pressure vessel (RPV) is the major component needing a surveillance programme to monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties of ferritic materials in the vessel beltline region which result from its exposure to neutron irradiation and possibly, but to a lesser extent, from the thermal and chemical environment. The US NRC promptly established a comprehensive surveillance programme (NRC, 2008a) based on standards published by the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), which is now common to other light water reactors (LWRs) and heavy water reactors (HWRs). Fracture toughness test data are obtained from material specimens exposed in surveillance capsules, which are withdrawn periodically from the reactor vessel and tested to examine the evolution of the mechanical properties of the vessel material. For each individual vessel a databank has been created on fracture toughness that permits the expected life of the said vessel to be forecast with a good level of certainty. In 1996 the IAEA created a worldwide database to store the results from national RPV surveillance programmes. To date, results from surveillance programmes from 10 countries are included in this database. Access to the database is controlled by agreements with the IAEA.
3.3.2 Operation and operating experience feedback The importance of operation experience (OE) and its feedback (OEF) has been recognized since the early 1970s within the NEA/OECD Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI). Such a Committee started to share between the participants of NEA Member States information on the construction and operation experience of nuclear power plants. The value of such an exercise was promptly recognized and offered to the IAEA to
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cover a wider audience. In 1980, the IAEA, in collaboration with the NEA, initiated the formal creation of a databank on operating experience, the so-called Incident Reporting System (IRS) (IAEA/NEA, 1980) with the participation of all IAEA Member States. Every country acquires and shares operating experiences in accordance with well-established procedures. The cited international organizations are responsible for the analysis of such experiences to determine tendencies or to understand root causes behind relevant incidents. Periodically the NEA publishes a report analysing the major experiences and any foreseeable tendencies. The last published report (IAEA/NEA, 2006) covers the large number of recent incidents involving corrosion on secondary side piping and recommends that more attention should be given to these ageing-related events. On its side, the industry also has its own programmes for OEF. The World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) and the US Institute on Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) have also established similar banks on OE and OEF, including a larger spectrum of incidents. Moreover, there are also national programmes for OE and OEF mainly in those countries operating a significant nuclear power fleet. More recently, INSAG has expressed its high consideration for OEF in a recently published document (INSAG, 2008) where it has suggested that improvements should be established in the international programmes and the need to improve the IAEA/NEA IRS databank. In the report, INSAG states: ‘The focus of OEF should therefore be shifted from mere reporting of safety significant events to a more comprehensive OEF system aimed at capturing even early signs of deterioration in safety. The key criterion should not be whether the safety event is significant, but rather whether the safety lesson is significant.’ It is also recognized that OEF is of paramount importance on drafting reactor operation standards and their revisions. Any new knowledge coming through OEF is used, on one side, to reduce uncertainties and in cases to simplify standards; on the other side, new phenomena may be discovered requiring new standards; this has been mainly the case with the ageing of SSCs. Experience shows that detailed technical standards have to be revised frequently to cover such new discoveries and observations. To help the Member States in establishing a national system for OEF, the IAEA has published a safety guide (IAEA, 2006a) which also emphasizes the advantages in participating in the IRS system. On its side, the US 10 CFR Part 54 was based on the analysis of more than 500 research and operating experience documents related to the behaviour of SSCs in operation. One of the most effective systems to monitor continuously nuclear plant operation has been recently introduced by the US NRC and followed in other countries. The reactor oversight process (ROP) (NRC, 2000b) covers reactor safety, radiation safety and safeguards. For each area some cornerstones have
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been determined against which the performance of the plant is compared. A satisfactory comparison gives a reasonable assurance of plant safe operation. From the safety point, the three major cornerstones are the initiating events, the mitigating systems and the integrity of the defence-in-depth barriers. Any departure from normal conditions is closely analysed to determine root causes. A colour code has been established to give an intuitive pictorial representation of the safety level of the plant. The Spanish Regulatory Authority, CSN, has established a similar process for plant operation supervision (CSN, 2006). Experience has proven that up to 80% of industrial incidents and accidents are due to human error and 20% to equipment failure. This is the accepted 80:20 rule. Moreover, almost 50% of the human errors are linked to poor or non-existing appropriate training on the related matter. The analysis of the Three Mile Island 1979 accident revealed that there were deficiencies in the way that personnel were trained to perform their duties. The Kemeny report recommended the creation of an Institute on Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) to deal with such matters, among other subjects. First INPO, and later on the IAEA and other national and international organizations, created and developed the so-called systematic approach to training (SAT), and recommended that such an approach should be considered as an international standard for nuclear training. The application of such methodology has improved human performance considerably and so increased the safety and reliability of operating nuclear power plants. The IAEA has issued a safety guide on recruitment, qualification and training of nuclear power plant personnel (IAEA, 2002a). In such a document, SAT is considered as the most effective policy for personnel training and gives clear indication on how such a policy should be included within the national training programmes. More recently, the IAEA has recognized that SAT should also be included in all the phases in the life of a nuclear power plant, including PLiM and LTO. These later considerations are in the course of being developed.
3.3.3 Maintenance programmes It was soon recognized that an efficient and complete NPP maintenance programme is necessary to ensure that the current accepted design assumptions and safety margins are maintained and not unacceptably degraded through ageing mechanisms. To support LTO, it was believed that new maintenance programmes should be established to include: the verification of the performance goals, the root cause analysis of failures and the feedback from maintenance experience. To that effect, in 1991, the US NRC enacted the so-called maintenance rule (MR) (NRC, 1991). The NRC has developed guidance for monitoring the effectiveness of the application of the rule (NRC, 1997) in accordance with programmes previously developed by the
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Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) (1993). Later on, the US NRC has applied risk informed regulation to the MR (NRC, 2000a) to facilitate its application and to make it more effective, requiring that risk evaluation should be performed in maintenance activities. The MR became effective in Spain in April 1999 when it was included as one of the requirements in the NPP operation licences. Finland, Slovenia and Hungary have also implemented at least part of the MR at their NPPs, while others are thinking about future implementation of the MR or have already developed equivalent methodologies. In any case, the engineering rationale behind the MR makes it attractive to other countries. The IAEA has developed requirements for maintenance, testing, surveillance and inspection of SSCs important to safety. Such requirements have been further developed into a safety guide (IAEA, 2002b), which contains specific references to ageing. The licensee is made responsible for determining which additional maintenance, surveillance and inspections will be necessary as the plant ages. The maintenance, surveillance and inspection programmes should be capable of identifying and monitoring ageing mechanisms of SSCs. The safety reviews will determine which additions to the maintenance, surveillance and inspection programmes should be necessary, particularly the preventive maintenance programme, or when any specific ageing SSC should be replaced or backfitted. In 2003, the European Joint Research Centre, Institute for Energy (JRC-IE) launched a network on the Safety of European Nuclear facilities (SENUF); a working group within SENUF was dedicated to assist Eastern European countries on NPP maintenance with the objectives of reviewing maintenance issues, promoting well-designed maintenance plans for SSCs, supporting the implementation of advanced maintenance approaches and assisting in its implementation. A benchmark study conducted in 2004, collected and evaluated the available and applied maintenance programmes in the European countries, as well as the Russian Federation and Ukraine. It served the basis for a SENUF workshop held in Madrid on maintenance rules and maintenance effectiveness, reported by Contri (2006). The development of the probabilistic methodology and the value of its results have also been used to optimize plant maintenance. One of such approaches is the reliability centred maintenance (RCM) subject which is receiving increasing technical interest. However, it is recommended to take an integrated approach based on the complementary use of deterministic and probabilistic considerations. The probabilistic methodology could serve to improve plant performance and enhance safety levels by ensuring higher reliability and availability of plant equipment and to optimize the maintenance cost by focusing maintenance on SSC in a manner commensurate with their safety significance. The SENUF network, in collaboration with the IAEA, organized a second workshop, held in Petten, on advanced probabilistic
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methods to optimize maintenance programmes. A summary report was produced by Ranguelova and Contri (2006). It is widely recognized that the application of the probabilistic methodology to maintenance requires a probabilistic safety analysis report (PSA) of great quality. The IAEA has given a framework to assure the quality of a PSA for different applications (IAEA, 1999). The American Society of Mechanical Engineers has also published standards for PSA applications in NPPs (ASME, 2003).
3.4
Integration of plant life management
Ageing management has been defined by the IAEA (2007a) as: Engineering, operations and maintenance actions to control within acceptable limits the ageing degradation of structures, systems and components. Examples of engineering actions include design, qualification and failure analysis. Examples of operations actions include surveillance, carrying out operating procedures within specified limits and performing environmental measurements. Therefore, PLiM integrates a series of policies and activities aiming for safe and reliable plant operation. The IAEA has a new standard on ageing management (IAEA, 2009). The IAEA standard addresses both physical ageing of SSCs and technical obsolescence in comparison with present knowledge, current standards and up-to-date regulation. It also covers all stages in the life of a power plant, i.e. design, construction, commissioning, operation, including LTO and decommissioning. The guide recognizes that effective ageing management is in practice accomplished by co-ordinating maintenance, in-service inspection and surveillance, operations, periodic safety evaluation, feedback of operating experience, research and development. The guide includes a systematic approach to the ageing management process based on the known plan-do-check-act (PDCA) wheel, as given in the mentioned guide and summarily represented in Fig. 3.1. The Guide promotes a proactive attitude towards ageing management during every stage in the life of the plant and recommends that regulatory requirements and guides for ageing management should be established and updated, and that compliance should be verified as well as enforced, when necessary. The Guide clearly indicates that the operating organization should be responsible for demonstrating that the relevant issues of ageing that are specific to the plant are clearly identified and documented in the safety analysis report. New designs will have ample opportunities to prevent and mitigate ageing when the plant comes into operation. The Guide gives suggestions on how to manage ageing during design, construction and fabrication and commissioning. For instance, the designers should consider relevant experience
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Plan Ageing Management Programme
Improve AMP
Act Corrective maintenance
Correct unacceptable degradation
ageing science and technology
Check Survey and assess ageing
71
Minimize expected degradation
DO Preventive measures
Check degradation
3.1 The plan-do-check-act wheel in ageing management.
and research results, the use of advanced materials, the need to incorporate on-line monitoring to assist in the forewarning of degradation, new plant layouts and SSCs design that facilitate inspectability, maintainability and easy access. The operating organization should ensure that manufacturers are well informed on the factors affecting ageing management, fabrication of SSCs takes into account current knowledge about relevant ageing degradations and possible mitigation measures, baseline data are collected and documented, and surveillance specimens for specific ageing monitoring programmes are available and installed. Commissioning should be used to know the real plant conditions and to identify and measure all parameters that can influence ageing degradation during operation. Data collection and record keeping should be established early in the life of the plant in accordance with well-established procedures (IAEA, 1991). To obtain the desired quality and quantity of ageing-related data, maintenance and engineering personnel responsible for operation, systems health, maintenance and training should be involved in the record keeping system. The screening approach should focus resources on those SSCs that can have a negative impact on the safety of the plant and are susceptible to ageing degradation. Also those SSCs that are important to safety systems and influence reliability are to be considered.
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PLiM should also be integrated with economic planning. It is said that a plant must be safe but its operation needs to be economical, therefore PLiM has the potential of integrating safety and economical operation. In the last ten years the safety and operational indexes of many nuclear power plants worldwide have experienced and are maintaining relevant safety and operation improvements. It is now well accepted that the safest nuclear power plants are also the top performing plants economically. A typical measure of the safety and reliability of nuclear power plants is related to the annual rate of significant events or reportable events that the licensee must communicate to the regulator. A significant event is broadly defined as any occurrence that challenges a plant’s safety system. These procedures are country dependent, but they can give an idea of the safety in operation and on the reliability of the plant, as they are related to equipment failures or to violations of operating, maintenance or testing and calibration procedures that challenge the plant protection system. The IAEA Principle 3, on Leadership and management for safety in its Fundamental Safety Principles (IAEA, 2006b) requires that: ‘Effective leadership and management for safety must be established and sustained in organizations concerned with, and facilities and activities that give rise to, radiation risks’. Compliance with such principle requires that due consideration should be given to human performance, including systematic training, safety culture and operating experience feedback. Not following this principle could lead to significant and reportable events. The US NRC publishes a yearly Information Digest giving details of the performance of the operating plants. The average number of significant events per reactor and year has declined from 0.90 in 1989 to 0.05 in 2005 (NRC, 2009). In fact, the average number of significant events has remained at or below 0.10 since 1996. The average number of significant events is now below 0.07 per reactor and year. The IAEA also publishes details on nuclear power plant incidents through the Incident Reporting System and its Incident and Emergency Centre. Regulatory authorities also publish data on the safety performance of the national nuclear fleet.
3.5 Ageing degradation mechanisms, and timelimited structures, systems and components There is a long list of ageing degradation mechanisms, the root causes of which can be classified into two major groups: environmental and operational. Environmental agents include radiation, chemicals in coolant and coolant/ moderator fluids and in the environment and physical parameters such as temperature, pressure and humidity. The operational factors include thermal and pressure gradients produced by transients, flow-induced vibrations, chemical stability of materials, seismic displacements and extreme meteorological or
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hydrological natural events. Most of those agents can also be found in other industries, with radiation being particular to the nuclear industry. Licence renewal regulations required that analyses of the different ageing processes should be applied to a long list of structures and components in what has been called time-limited ageing analysis (TLAA). It is therefore necessary to identify each structure and component relevant to safety, subjected to ageing mechanisms, which were designed for a specific lifetime, and to perform analyses to prove that the item in question will perform the assigned safety function as foreseen in the CLB during the additional operation time. Therefore, TLAA has been defined as: ‘those licensee calculations and analyses that involve structures, systems and components within the scope of the licence renewal, consider the effects of ageing and involve time-limited assumptions defined by the current operating terms’. Basic regulations, such as the US 10 CFR Part 54 (NRC, 2006), gives selection criteria for SSCs that should be the object of TLAA; it also includes a long list of potential candidates for analyses. Such a list can be subdivided into groups as summarized in Table 3.2, where the corresponding major ageing processes are also incorporated. The first group includes components of the pressure boundary. The most relevant is the reactor pressure vessel (RPV), where the major ageing stressor is neutron irradiation producing embrittlement in the ferritic steel, mainly in PWRs. Embrittlement also occurs in boiling water and heavy water reactor RPVs, but generally it is of lesser importance due to the existing larger water gap attenuating the neutrons. Stress corrosion cracking has been found in PWR reactor vessel head Alloy 600 clad penetrations and in BWR reactor vessel bottom around control rod penetrations, as well as in pipe welds of dissimilar metals. Irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC) has been found mainly in some BWR stainless steel internals. Changes in dimensions due to void swelling are possible in stainless steels and nickel-rich alloys. Significant deformations have been found in coldworked Zr-2.5Nb pressure tubes channels in the Candu PHWRs due to thermal creep, irradiation growth and irradiation creep forcing the substitution of such components in some of those reactors. Significant growth is also typical of graphite moderated reactors, mainly when the graphite irradiation takes place at low temperatures. Thermal stresses in graphite blocks have produced longitudinal cracks in UK gas-cooled graphite moderated reactors. Wear and corrosion have been found in the pipes, pump casings, valve bodies and steam generator tubes of many reactors. Mechanical vibration fatigue in small pipes and in socket welds may occur due to pressure pulses produced by pumps. Circumferential cracking in the steam generator tubes in Westinghouse Model 3D steam generators, due to wear produced by fluid induced tube vibrations, was a major rapid ageing mechanism discovered in the 1980s, first in Ringhals and later in the Almaraz plants. This design
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Table 3.2 Major components and structures subjected to time-limited ageing analyses and their ageing mechanisms Major candidates for TLAA
Typology of analyses
Reactor vessel, internals and reactor coolant system
Reactor vessel neutron embrittlement Changes in dimensions due to void swelling Metal corrosion allowance Granular and intergranular stress corrosion cracking Radiation enhanced stress corrosion cracking Cumulative fatigue damage
Engineered safety features
Metal corrosion allowance Cumulative fatigue damage Granular and intergranular stress corrosion cracking
Auxiliary systems
Metal corrosion allowance Reduction of neutron-absorbing capacity and loss of material due to general corrosion in spent fuel pools Cracking due to stress corrosion cracking and cyclic loading
Steam and power conversion system
Containment, structures and component supports
Electrical and instrumentation and control
Cumulative fatigue damage Loss of material due to pitting, crevice, and microbiologically influenced corrosion, and fouling Wall thinning due to flow-accelerated corrosion Reduction of strength of concrete due to elevated temperature Loss of metal containment material due to general, pitting and crevice corrosion Loss of tendon prestress due to relaxation, shrinkage, creep and elevated temperature Loss of leak tightness due to mechanical wear of locks, hinges and closures Reduction in foundation strength, cracking, differential settlement due to erosion of porous concrete corrosion Reduced insulation resistance and electrical failure due to thermal, radiolysis, photolysis and chemical mechanisms Degradation of insulation quality due to presence of salt deposits and surface contamination Conductor fatigue due to ohmic heating, thermal cycling, electrical transients, vibration, chemical contamination, corrosion and oxidation
defect has forced the substitution of the affected steam generators. Thermal fatigue may occur in pipes due to fluid thermal stratification caused by defective closure of isolation valves or the seepage of a fluid at different
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temperatures. A well-studied case occurred in one of the units of the Oconee NPP in the United States in 1997 in the junction of a small water make-up pipe and the main recirculation pipe unprotected by a thermal sleeve. A large leaking crack was produced but pipe fracture did not occur, demonstrating the validity of the leak before fracture approach. The second group includes the engineered safety features, mainly the emergency core cooling systems, the containment spray and isolation components and the standby gas treatment in BWRs, which are exposed to cumulative fatigue damage. The emergency core cooling system and the containment spray systems in PWRs include vessels, heat exchangers and pipes containing corrosive chemicals, mainly boric acid and sodium hydroxide, so that the losses of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion are to be expected with the possibility of reducing the heat transfer capacity in heat exchangers due to fouling. The many auxiliary systems in the nuclear power plant belong to the third group. The most salient systems include new and spent fuel storage and handling facilities and related cooling and cleanup systems, the compressed air system, the residual heat removal and coolant cleanup systems, the closed and open cooling water systems and the ultimate heat sink, the ventilation system and emergency diesel generators. As in the previous case, the different systems remain in contact with different chemicals and environments that may produce loss of material by corrosion, including stress corrosion cracking, and material fatigue due to cycling loading. A case of particular importance is the reduction of neutron-absorbing capacity in the spent fuel storage pool due to the loss of the absorber (boron) produced by general corrosion of the supporting structures. Another case is the external corrosion of pipes in the open circuit cooling system recently discovered in the Spanish Vandellós 2 plant (CSN, 2004, p. 16). The steam and power conversion system also includes the main steam system, steam extraction, steam turbine, blowdown system, condenser, feedwater and the auxiliary feedwater systems. Components in the steam and power conversion system are exposed to steam and condensate water and include a variety of pressures, temperatures, fluid regimens in different metals; therefore, metal fatigue and corrosion are the main ageing agents. Containments, structures and component supports include a large variety of equipment. The most relevant part is the reactor containment, its main safety function being to prevent the release of radioactivity to the environment in the case of accidents. This function requires that the integrity and leak tightness of the containment must be ensured. Containments generally include a large metal vessel and a thick concrete cover providing shielding and protection against external man-made and natural events. The major concerns are linked to corrosion of the metallic parts, mainly in inaccessible areas, the long-term behaviour of concrete at high temperatures and the
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loss of leak tightness due to mechanical wear of locks, hinges and closures. Loss of tendon prestress due to relaxation, shrinkage, creep and elevated temperature are of particular importance for the PWR containments using that technology. NUREG-1800 (NRC, 2005b) defines nine groups of structures and seven groups of component supports. Those structures and component supports may be affected by loss of bond and loss of material due to corrosion of embedded steel, increase in porosity and permeability, cracking due to aggressive chemical attack, expansion and reaction with aggregates, cracks and distortion due to increased stress levels from settlement, reduction in foundation strength and cracking and differential settlement due to erosion of porous concrete sub-foundation, among other causes. The most typical electrical, instrumentation and control components include cables, metal enclosed buses, fuse holders, high voltage insulators, transmission conductors and connections and switchyard buses and connections. The major concerns are to be found in degradation of insulators due to salt deposits, surface contamination and loss of material due to mechanical wear, as well as fatigue due to ohmic heating, thermal cycling, electrical transients, frequent manipulation, vibration, chemical contamination and oxidation.
3.6
Main areas of concern for plant designers, operators and regulators
From the discussion in Section 3.5, it becomes clear that plant designers, operators and regulators should be concerned with ageing mechanisms for both already operating plants and new designs. There are many aspects to be considered. Neutron irradiation and the different types of corrosion and wear are considered of major concern to plant designers, operators and regulators. The science and technology of such phenomena are amply considered in other chapters in this book.
3.6.1 Neutron irradiation The interactions between neutrons and the atomic nucleus of crystalline metallic structures have the potential to displace the atom from its normal position in the lattice creating the so-called Frenkel pairs – interstitials and vacancies – which mainly determine the changes in the physical properties of the irradiated material. When stress is applied to such materials substantial mechanical effects appear. Most present and future reactors will include crystalline metallic materials in their core and its proximities, where irradiation by high energy neutrons (>1 MeV) may be substantial. Internals and the pressure vessel belt line are typical examples of components subjected to high energy neutron fluences. The mechanical properties of relevance include:
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∑
hardening, an increase in the yield stress and tensile strength and a reduction in ductility and fracture toughness, more pronounced in bodycentered cubic crystal ferritic steel; ∑ embrittlement, a reduction in the amount of plastic or creep deformation that occurs before rupture – a ductile fracture requires appreciable plastic deformation prior to and during the propagation of a crack, while a brittle fracture implies a rapid rate of crack propagation; and ∑ radiation enhanced stress corrosion cracking, an increase in the corrosion potential of the material.
The importance of embrittlement of RPV materials was soon recognized and regulated (NRC, 1998). Irradiation hardening and embritlement need to be under control to prevent the RPV from ever suffering a brittle fracture when subjected to over-pressurization and to avoid pressurized thermal shock (PTS), i.e. rupture when at pressure by the addition of feed or emergency cold cooling water. Pressurized thermal shock should also be avoided during start-up and shut-down of the reactor. The Charpy V-notch impact test has been the most common way to measure the transition from ductile to brittle fracture. Another chapter in this book is dedicated to assess the embrittlement in ferritic components. The device measures the energy required to fracture a normalized specimen and determines the type of fracture by observing the resulting surfaces. For a given material, tests are performed at different temperatures and a plot is obtained relating the energy absorbed in producing the fracture, generally measured in joules, versus the temperature of the specimen. Figure 3.2 illustrates such relation for a typical RPV material. The plot delimits the brittle and ductile regions of the material. The temperature at which the inflexion of the curve takes place is called the nil ductility temperature (NDT). At high temperatures, the energy absorbed to produce fracture tends to an asymptotic value, which is called the upper shelf energy (USE). When the material is irradiated by fast neutrons there is a change in the above-mentioned parameters. The corresponding Charpy plot shifts towards higher NDTs, there is also a reduction in the USE and the slope of the curve is reduced; moreover, these effects increase with increasing neutron fluence and are also a function of the type of steel and its impurities, mainly sulphur, phosphorous and copper, which have to be limited as much as possible. The temperature shifts could surpass 100 °C for neutron fluences above a few times 1019 n/cm2 . The Charpy tests do not provide a sharp temperature transition from ductile to brittle behaviour; a reference NDT temperature, RTNDT , should be defined for regulatory purposes; it is defined as that temperature at which fracture initiates with essentially no prior plastic deformation. The temperature at which a Charpy V-notch specimen breaks with a fixed amount of energy, generally 41 J, is often considered as the reference temperature.
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Energy absorbed, E(J)
Unirradiated 80 Duse 60 Irradiated 40 DT 20
0 –100
0 100 Temperature, T(°C)
200
3.2 Charpy V-notch tests showing the transition temperature and upper shelf energy shifts in neutron irradiated ferritic steels.
Regulations define the acceptable decrement in the USE and the allowable increment in the NDT. The first is a general measure of the fracture toughness of the material, while the second is vital in the prevention of PTS in PWRs. Regarding the USE, Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 (NRC, 2008b) states that: Reactor vessel beltline materials must have Charpy upper-shelf energy in the transverse direction for base material and along the weld for weld material according to the ASME Code, of no less than 102 J initially and must maintain Charpy upper-shelf energy throughout the life of the vessel of no less than 68 J, unless it is demonstrated … that lower values of Charpy upper-shelf energy will provide margins of safety against fracture equivalent to those required by Appendix G of Section XI of the ASME Code. Appendix G also gives screening criteria to prevent PTS. It is based on a specific reference temperature for PTS, RTPTS, which is equal to the RTDNT evaluated at the location where the material receives the highest neutron fluence. Such temperature is limited to 132 °C for plates, forgings and axial weld materials, and 149 °C for circumferential weld metals. A revision in the PTS rule is being considered to reduce the conservatism included. Should the vessel reach the limit, it can be annealed to recover the mechanical properties of the material. It is globally recognized that the Russian developments on pressure vessel science and technology and the improvements they have introduced in design, material selection, fabrication and surveillance of such vessels are based on
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a deep understanding of the physical effects of irradiation and other agents on the vessel materials. They have also developed a valid methodology for annealing to restore the fracture toughness of vessels affected beyond the accepted limits for service. Such information can be found in a Russian monograph published by the American Nuclear Society (Alekseenko et al., 1997).
3.6.2 Stress corrosion cracking Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) is the premature cracking of an alloy in the presence of a tensile stress and a corrosive environment. It was soon recognized that alloys used in nuclear technology were susceptible to SCC and that the intensity of the corrosion depended on the reactivity of the environment and on the presence of tensile stress. SCC reduces the strain to failure as well as the maximum stress, it can be intergranular or transgranular in nature, and susceptibility to SCC is generally high when overall corrosion rates are low. SCC requires an incubation period for crack initiation; it is followed by steady state crack propagation and ends in a failure. SCC was early observed in nickel-rich Alloy 600 used in steam generator tubes, control rod drive mechanism nozzles, pressurized instrument penetrations and heater sleeves and hot leg penetrations. In many steam generators it was observed that the cumulative fractional number of tubes failed started to increase after some ten effective full power years. The case was analyzed and although there were other causes of failure, SCC was predominant after the incubation period. The tube failure rates increased rapidly and many steam generators had to be replaced by new ones made from alloys with less SCC susceptibility (e.g. Alloy 690TT). Was (2007) includes a good analysis of thermodynamics, kinetics and mechanism of SCC; references to examples of SCC in nuclear power plant are found in the IAEA Tecdoc-1361 (IAEA, 2003b). SCC in austenitic stainless steels is considered in depth in other chapters in this book.
3.6.3 Irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking Irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC) was observed in the early 1960s. It mainly affected stainless steel fuel element cladding, instrument tubes, control rod followers and other core devices or internals. The most important experience appeared in the early 1990s, mainly in the BWR recirculation loops and core shrouds, the last with weld residual stresses, and PWR baffle former bolts, receiving high neutron fluence. The IASCC mechanism is not yet fully known; Was (2007) indicates that existing theories fall into five categories:
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∑ radiation induced grain boundary chromium depletion, ∑ radiation hardening, ∑ localized deformation, ∑ selective internal oxidation and ∑ irradiation creep. A recent study conducted at the Argonne National Laboratory by Chunk and Shack (2005) on 27 commercial and model laboratory austenitic stainless steel heats irradiated in the Halden reactor under BWR conditions has demonstrated that, in 304 or 316 stainless steel, sulphur atoms play a deleterious effect in IASCC, which could be compensated by an increase in carbon content. For instance, when the material has experienced some three displacements per atom, the sulphur content should be <0.002 wt% S; for such materials to be IASCC resistant under BWR conditions, the carbon content should be >0.03 wt% C. A two-dimensional map has been created in which the susceptibility to IASCC in said materials is shown as a function of S and C content. The authors have developed an IASCC model based on Ni and S segregation and preferential oxidation of chromium and iron atoms over nickel atoms, among other aspects. That research effort will define the materials to be used in future water reactors.
3.7
Future trends
It is foreseeable that future trends will aim at improving the knowledge on ageing through additional research and feedback from operating experience. Such knowledge will serve to develop more effective and scientifically-based regulation for present and future designs. In a recent OECD/NEA study (NEA, 2006) it is found that ‘there are no significant technical challenges which would prevent nuclear plant lifetimes being extended to 50 or 60 years’. Nevertheless, the document adds that: ‘it must always be recognized that there is the possibility of unknown ageing mechanisms, as well as the expected development of a known ageing mechanism, emerging during longer term operation’. Solid fundamental research and effective operating experience feedback are the two cornerstones for gaining new knowledge. Nevertheless, operating experience extended beyond 40 years is not yet available and substantial research is not yet finished. Therefore strong international co-operation is needed in sharing operating experience and in conducting research. The end products of such efforts have to be consolidated in harmonized standards and regulations jointly developed by designers, plant owner operators and regulatory authorities. All this effort has to be based on high level trained human resources. Related international activities and some relevant research efforts are described in brief.
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3.7.1 Activities in the International Atomic Energy Agency The IAEA has created a safety knowledge base for ageing and long-term operation of nuclear power plants (SKALTO). It is a framework for sharing information on PLiM and LTO. It provides documents and information related to these thematic areas created by the IAEA and other national or international organizations. It includes safety standards published by the IAEA and regulatory authorities in other countries, as well as INSAG documents. It also includes IAEA review services; international conferences, meetings and national activities related to the safety aspects of ageing and LTO; IAEA co-ordinated and national research programmes, as well as education and training programmes on the matter. All these activities constitute the backbone for future developments. In 2003 the IAEA created an Extrabudgetary Programme on Safety Aspects of Long Term Operation of Water Moderated Reactors (SALTO), with the objectives of: ‘Reviewing existing national approaches, practices and experience that need to be considered during LTO decision-making; developing guidance for regulators on the identification of the applicable safety criteria and on the establishment of guidelines for plant operators’ LTO submittals; and providing guidance for plant operators on the process and practices related to support safe LTO’. The final report of the programme was published in 2007 (IAEA, 2007b); the programme will be incorporated, together with SKALTO, into a comprehensive knowledge base on LTO and PLiM. SALTO is also providing peer review services on LTO tailored to the specific requests of Member States; one of those services is Ageing Management Assessment Team (AMAT).
3.7.2 Activities of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency Two Committees in the Nuclear Energy Agency are involved in nuclear power plant ageing activities. The Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) constitutes a forum for the exchange of technical information between organizations which contribute in research, development, engineering and regulation. It also reviews the state of knowledge on selected topics of nuclear safety technology and safety assessment, including operating experience and research on ageing. The Working Group on Integrity of Components and Structures (IAGE), and its subgroups, conduct studies and analyse research results on ageing in NPPs. The Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA), made up primarily of senior nuclear regulators, is a forum for the exchange of information and experience among regulatory organizations and for the review of developments which could affect regulatory requirements, including PLiM and LTO. Both Committees are composed of Working Groups
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that have made comparative studies, celebrated symposia and workshops and have made suggestions on needed research efforts and regulatory activities. The present Strategic Plan for both Committees, covering 2005–9, can be found in NEA (2005). The CNRA held a Special Issue Meeting in June 2000 on the topic of ‘life extension and upgrading’. The published report (NEA/CNRA, 2001a) includes the synthesis of the responses received from Member States and the results and conclusions of the CNRA discussions. At the time of the report most members with operating reactors had already developed, or were developing programmes on longer-term operation (NEA/CNRA, 2001b) Based on the many technical and regulatory issues treated by the CSNI and the CNRA, the Committee for Technical and Economic Studies on Nuclear Energy Development and the Fuel Cycle, known as the Nuclear Development Comittee, NDC, decided to take a holistic view on the matter which resulted in the creation of an ad hoc Expert Group on Nuclear Power Plant Life Management. The Expert Group expressed its considerations and recommendations in a report (NEA, 2006). The Group suggests that research and development capacities have to be kept alive for studying material degradation and unknown phenomena. The activities of the NEA are equally needed to ensure a proper scientific and technical development on ageing and related issues to serve as a basis for regulatory requirements.
3.7.3 The research effort Fundamental research is performed nationally and within international organizations. The European Union is sponsoring relevant research, the IAEA is also maintaining international co-ordinated research activities, the NEA is serving valid efforts on common research efforts, and some national institutions, such as the US Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), have offered their research efforts to foreign participants. EURATOM research on ageing science and technology started early. In 1993 the Ageing Materials Evaluation and Studies programme (AMES) was established within the Framework Programme 4, FP-4, to bring together the European expertise on nuclear materials ageing. The strategies within AMES were based on understanding the embrittlement causes and thus improve the prediction of irradiated material fracture toughness. In 2001 the European Commission (EC) defined the ageing mechanisms, their potential effects and the available identification and mitigation methods that needed to be explored (EC, 2001). The Concerted Action VERSAFE, as part of the Euratom 5th Framework Programme, FP-5, aimed at an overview on the comprehensive approaches to PLiM in general terms and plant-specific issues of VVER-440 plants. In the Euratom 6th Framework Programme, FP-6, PERFECT was the most significant project. The aim was to build two ‘virtual reactors’ to
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simulate the effect of irradiation on reactor pressure vessels and on internal structures, thus reducing the need for experimental data. The resulting four numerical tools were integrated in a Software Integration Platform. In 2006 a new European Network of Excellence was started under the title Nuclear Plant Life Prediction, NULIFE, to integrate safety-oriented research on materials, structures and systems and to exploit results of this integration through the production of harmonized NPP lifetime assessment methods. An account of this network has been presented by Rintamaa et al. (2007). In December 2006 the European Council approved the 7th Framework Programme, FP-7, for the period 2007–11 (EC, 2006). The document decided to commend: ‘Research to underpin the continued safe operation of all relevant types of existing reactor systems (including fuel cycle facilities), taking into account new challenges such as life-time extension and development of new advanced safety assessment methodologies’. Safety of Ageing Components in Nuclear Power Plants (SAFELIFE) has been the project of reference. SAFELIFE aims at establishing best practices based on deterministic and risk-informed methods for assessing the structural safety of key components in both Western and Russian nuclear power plant designs. The most salient goals are: Provide a scientific and technical basis for harmonization of European codes and standards on key primary components of light water reactors through developing and disseminating best practices. Support long-term EU policy needs on PLiM and advanced reactor concept through enhancing JRC R&D competence and capabilities in nuclear safety technology. Integration of R&D efforts in line with European Research Area (ERA) principles by linking our R&D to utilities, manufacturers, R&D organizations and regulators through continuing exploitation of networks and collaborating with EC and international organizations. Implementation of an effective plan for training, mobility, dissemination and knowledge management and development of competitive activities. Since the early 1990s, the IAEA has conducted a series of co-ordinated research projects, (CRPs), covering the managing of ageing of RPV primary nozzles, motor operated isolation valves, in-containment I&C cables and concrete containment buildings. The IAEA has also conducted up to nine CRPs on irradiation embrittlement of RPV steels; the most significant ones are related to the application of the master curve approach (IAEA, 2005a), the RPV surveillance programmes and their analysis and application (IAEA, 2005b) and the nickel effects in radiation embrittlement of RPV materials (IAEA, 2005c). The Nuclear Energy Agency administers a series of international research programmes suggested by the Member States. The most significant one, going on at present, is the Project on Stress Corrosion Cracking and Cable Ageing
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(SCAP), which is supported by 14 NEA member countries. The project began in 2006 and the current mandate ends in 2010. It has been described by Yamamoto et al. (2007). The project’s main objectives are to: ∑
establish two complete databases with regard to major ageing phenomena for stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and degradation of cable insulation respectively, through collective efforts by OECD/NEA member countries; ∑ establish a knowledge base by compiling and evaluating collected data and information systematically; and ∑ perform an assessment of the data and identify the basis for commendable practices which would help regulators and operators to enhance ageing management. The present near-term (2008–9) EPRI research portfolio includes five major projects related to materials ageing: Boiling Water Reactor Vessel and Internals (BWRVIP); Pressurized Water Reactor Materials Reliability Programme; Primary System Corrosion Research; Steam Generator Management Programme (SGMP) and Water Chemistry Programme. Of particular interest is the corrosion programme in the primary system aimed at analysing IASCC in PWRs and BWRs under a co-operative international research programme. BWRVIP will try to develop effective countermeasures for mitigating stress corrosion cracking of reactor internal components in BWRs, such as using hydrogen water chemistry and noble metal chemical application on fuel, and other advanced mitigation technologies. The programme will also provide acceptable design criteria and unique solutions to repair or replace reactor internals and piping. It will also provide understanding of materials performance exposed to high neutron fluence, weldability of irradiated materials and crack growth rates on IASCC and ISCC. Items of special interest deal with X-750 high strength materials which have been used to repair jet pump beams and core shrouds in BWRs and the susceptibility of the pressure vessel bottom head drain line to flow assisted corrosion; a specific User Group under BWRVIP is developing inspection and repair tools for such components. The Pressurized Water Reactor Materials Reliability Programme aims at optimizing the addition of hydrogen and zinc to mitigate primary water stress corrosion cracking. The programme also tries to better understand the crack initiation and propagation processes and environmental corrosion in the reactor coolant system components and develop better predictive and mitigation technologies. It also addresses IASCC using irradiation samples in PWR conditions. The Primary System Corrosion Research programme includes an internationally sponsored co-operative programme. It aims at a better
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understanding of the crack initiation and early propagation processes involved in SCC and IASCC in nickel base alloys and stainless steels used in PWRs and BWRs. Extensive international collaboration ensures that research findings reflect a wide range of nuclear technologies, operating conditions, and service environments. In SGMP, research is conducted to ensure the safe and economic operation of steam generators in PWRs. Research activities target identification and mitigation of various forms of steam generator degradation, replacement steam generator specifications, water chemistry guidelines, in-service inspections and tube integrity. The Water Chemistry Programme develops and updates water chemistry guidelines for nuclear reactors based on industry research and plant experience. The programme also develops water chemistry optimization tools to mitigate corrosion, achieve and maintain design fuel performance standards, and minimize plant radiation fields.
3.8
References
Alekseenko N S, Amaev A, Gorynin I, Nikolaev V A (1997), Radiation damage of nuclear power plant pressure vessel steels, Russian Materials Monograph Series, La Grange Park, American Nuclear Society. ASME (2003), Standard for probabilistic risk assessment for nuclear power plant applications, RA-S-2002, New York, ASME. Chunk H M and Shack W J (2005), Irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking in austenitic stainless steels applicable to LWR core internals, NUREG/CR-6892, ANL04/10, Washington DC, US NRC. Contri P (2006), Workshop on ‘Maintenance rules: Improving maintenance effectiveness’. Summary report, EUR 22603 EN, Luxembourg, EC Publications. CSN (2009), Revisiones periódicas de seguridad de las centrales nucleares, Instruction IS-22, Madrid, CSN. CSN (2004), Informe del Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear al Congreso de los Diputados y al Senado, INF-01.04, Madrid, CSN. CSN (2006), Sistema Integrado de Supervisión de Centrales Nucleares-SISC, Madrid, CSN. EC (2001), Safe management of NPP ageing in the European Union, CE/DG X, EUR 19843 EN, Luxembourg, EC Publications. EC (2006), Council decision concerning the seventh framework programme of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) for nuclear research and training activities (2007 to 2011), Official Journal of the European Union L 460 of 30 December 2006, Luxembourg, EC Publications. IAEA (1991), Data collection and record keeping for the management of nuclear power plant ageing, Safety Series 50-P-3, Vienna, IAEA. IAEA (1992), Methodology for ageing management of nuclear power plant component important to safety, Technical Report Series No. 338, Vienna, IAEA. IAEA (1998), Equipment qualification in operational nuclear power plants: Upgrading, preserving and reviewing, Safety Report Series No. 3, Vienna, IAEA.
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IAEA (1999), Framework for a quality assurance programme for PSA, TECDOC-1101, Vienna, IAEA. IAEA (2000), Safety of nuclear power plants, Safety Standards Series NS-R-2, Vienna, IAEA. IAEA (2002a), Recruitment, qualification and training of personnel for nuclear power plants, Safety Standards Series ND-G-2.8, Vienna, IAEA. IAEA (2002b), Maintenance, surveillance and in-service inspection in nuclear power plants, Safety Standards Series NS-G-2.6, Vienna, IAEA. IAEA (2003a), Periodic safety review of nuclear power plants, Safety Standards Series NS-G-2.10, Vienna, IAEA. IAEA (2003b), Assessment and management of ageing of major nuclear power plant components important to safety, TECDOC-1361, Vienna, IAEA. IAEA (2005a), Guidelines for application of the MasterCurve approach to reactor pressure vessel integrity in nuclear power plants, Technical Report Series No. 429, Vienna, IAEA. IAEA (2005b), Application of surveillance programme results to reactor pressure vessel integrity assessment, TECDOC-1435, Vienna, IAEA. IAEA (2005c), Effects of nickel on irradiation embrittlement of light water reactor pressure vessel steels, TECDOC-1441, Vienna, IAEA. IAEA (2006a), A system for the feedback of experience from events in nuclear installations, Safety Standards Series NS-G-2.11, Vienna, IAEA. IAEA (2006b), Fundamental safety principles, Safety Standards Series SF-1, Vienna, IAEA. IAEA (2007a), IAEA Safety glossary: Terminology used in nuclear safety and radiation protection, 2007 edition, Vienna, IAEA. IAEA (2007b), Safety aspects of long term operation of water moderated reactors, IAEA-EBP-SALTO, Vienna, IAEA. IAEA (2008), Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation, Safety Requirements Draft, DS413, Vienna, IAEA. IAEA (2009), Ageing management for nuclear power plants, Safety Standards Series Na NS-6-214, Vienna, IAEA. IAEA/NEA (1980), Incident Reporting System (IRS), Using operational experience to improve safety, Vienna, IAEA. IAEA/NEA (2006), Nuclear power plant operating experience 2002–2005, No. 6150, Paris, OECD Publications. INSAG (1988), Basic safety principles for nuclear power plants, INSAG-3, Vienna, IAEA. INSAG (1996), Defence in depth in nuclear safety, INSAG-10, Vienna, IAEA. INSAG (2008), Improving the international system for operating experience feedback, INSAG-23, Vienna, IAEA. NEA (2005), Joint CSNI/CNRA strategic plan and mandates, 2005–2009, NEA 6034, Paris, OECD Publications. NEA (2006), Nuclear power plant life management and longer term operation, NEA 6105, Paris, OECD Publications. NEA/CNRA (2001a), Regulatory aspects of life extension and upgrading of NPPs. NEA/ CNRA/R (2001)1, Paris, OECD Publications. NEA/CNRA (2001b), CNRA Special Issue’s Meeting 2000, Member Countries responses to the questionnaire, NEA/CNRA/R (2001)2, Paris, OECD Publications. NRC (1991), Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants, 10 CFR Part 50.65, Washington DC, US NRC. © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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NRC (1997), Monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants. Regulatory Guide 1.160, rev. 2, Washington DC, US NRC. NRC (1998), Radiation embrittlement of reactor vessel materials, Regulatory Guide 1.99 rev. 2, Washington DC, US NRC. NRC (2000a), Assessing and managing risk before maintenance activities at nuclear power plants, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.182, Washington DC, US NRC. NRC (2000b), NRC Reactor Oversight Process, ROP, NUREG-1649 rev. 3, Washington DC, US NRC. NRC (2005a), Standard format and content for applications to renew nuclear power plant operating licenses, Regulatory Guide 1.188 rev. 1, Washington DC, US NRC. NRC (2005b), Standard review plan for review of license renewal application for nuclear power plant, NUREG-1800 rev. 1, Washington DC, US NRC. NRC (2005c), Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) Report, NUREG-1801, Vol. 1 & Vol. 2, rev 1, Washington DC, US NRC. NRC (2006), Requirements for renewal of operating license for nuclear power plants, 10 CFR Part 54, amended 2006, Washington DC, US NRC. NRC (2009), Information Digest 2009–2010, NUREG-1350 vol. 20, Washington DC, US NRC. NRC (2008a), Reactor vessel material surveillance program requirements, Appendix H (as amended) to 10 CFR Part 5, Washington DC, US NRC. NRC (2008b), Fracture toughness requirements, Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50, Washington DC, US NRC. NUMARC (1993), Industry guideline for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants, NUMARC 93-01, Washington DC, NEI. Ranguelova V and Contri P (2006), Workshop on ‘Advanced methods for safety assessment and optimization of NPP Maintenance’, Summary report, EUR 22604 EN, Luxembourg, EC Publications. Rintamaa R, Aho-Mantila I, Heikinheimo L and Taylor N (2007), European research network aiming at harmonized plant life prediction procedures, IAEA-CN-155-001, in Shanghai International Symposium on PLiM. Was G S (2007), Fundamentals of radiation materials science, New York, Springer. WENRA (2006), Harmonization of reactor safety in WENRA countries, Reactor Harmonization Working Group. Yamamoto A, Huerta A, Gott K and Koshy T (2007), The NEA Project on Stress Corrosion Cracking and Cable Ageing (SCAP), NEA News, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 18.
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Probabilistic and deterministic safety assessment methods for nuclear power plant life management
P. C o n t r i and A. R o d i o n o v, European Commission DG-JRC Institute for Energy, The Netherlands
Abstract: This chapter addresses safety assessment methods in relation to ageing effects and develops an integrated safety and economic plant life management system able to effectively manage ageing effects at nuclear power plants. After a short summary with definitions and framework, a reference Plant Life Management (PLiM) model is discussed, as background for a detailed analysis of the main issues related to component and system degradation. A Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) approach where timedependent ageing effects are considered is also discussed, with emphasis on the evaluation of time-dependent component reliabilities. Some case studies on component reliability calculation are described where ageing considerations have a strong impact, providing suggestions on how reliability and data analysis for active components can be carried out in an effective way and incorporation of age-dependent reliability and data into PSA models can be implemented. Key words: ageing, plant life management, probabilistic safety assessment, component reliability, operation safety.
4.1
Introduction – plant safety assessment in a plant life management (PLiM) framework
According to IAEA (2002a), the aim of a nuclear power plant (NPP) safety assessment should be to establish and confirm the design basis for the items important to safety and to ensure that the overall plant design is capable of meeting the prescribed and acceptable limits for radiation doses and releases for each plant condition category. In the case of an operating plant, the safety analysis developed at the design stage is replicated/updated at regular time intervals or every time a major change is made to the plant, in order to provide for the safety justification of a proposed design modification. In this framework, it is necessary that the plant design models and data (which are essential foundations for the safety analysis) are kept up-to-date during the design phase and throughout the lifetime of the plant, including decommissioning. This should be the responsibility of the designer during the design phase and then of the operating organization over the life of the plant. 88 © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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The safety analysis should formally assess the performance of the plant under various operational and accident conditions (according to definitions in IAEA, 2002a), against goals or criteria for safety and radiological releases as may have been established by the operating organization, the regulatory body, or other national or international authorities, as applicable to the plant. Moreover, the safety analysis should support safe operation of the plant by serving as an important tool in developing and confirming plant protection and control system set points and control parameters. It should also be used to establish and validate the plant’s operating specifications and limits under normal and off-normal operating conditions, procedures used, maintenance and inspection requirements, and verify normal and emergency procedures. In particular, the safety analysis should assess whether: ∑
sufficient defence-in-depth has been provided and the levels of defence are preserved in that potential accident sequences are arrested as early as possible ∑ the plant can withstand the physical and environmental conditions it would experience, including extremes of environmental and other conditions ∑ human factors and human performance issues have been adequately addressed ∑ long-term ageing mechanisms that could affect the plant’s reliability over the plant life are identified, monitored and managed (i.e. by upgrade, refurbishment or replacement) so that safety is not affected and risk does not increase.
4.1.1 Deterministic and probabilistic approaches According to IAEA (2002a), the achievement of a high level of safety should be demonstrated primarily in a deterministic way. However, the safety analysis should incorporate both deterministic and probabilistic approaches. These approaches have been shown to complement each other and both should be used in the decision-making process on the safety and ability of the plant to be licensed. The probabilistic approach provides insights into plant performance, defence-in-depth and risk that are not provided by a deterministic approach. The aim of the deterministic approach should be to address plant behaviour under specific predetermined operational states and accident conditions and to apply a specific set of rules for judging design adequacy. The probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) should set out to determine all significant contributors to risk from the plant and should evaluate the extent to which the design of the overall system configuration is well balanced, there are no risk outliers and the design meets basic probabilistic targets. The PSA should preferably use a best estimate approach.
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4.1.2 Probabilistic plant safety assessment considering ageing effects According to the above-mentioned generic statement, the periodic review of the plant safety assessment should include the assessment of potential time-dependent effects. Concerning this aspect, INSAG-12 (1999) states the safety goal of a probabilistic safety assessment of a nuclear installation and provides references for consideration of time-dependent effects: The target for existing nuclear power plants consistent with the technical safety objective is a frequency of occurrence of severe core damage that is below about 10–4 events per plant operating year. Severe accident management and mitigation measures could reduce by a factor of at least ten the probability of large off-site releases requiring short-term off-site response. In addition to that generic statement, the worldwide tendency to apply riskinformed regulations and procedures to optimize, among others, inspections and maintenance tasks, assigns to the PSA a key role, even in the decisionmaking phase, as shown in Fig. 4.1 (US-NRC, 2002). The possible impact of ageing phenomena on SSC reliability and on overall plant safety is illustrated in the risk–barrier–target diagram in Fig. 4.2. Each of the ‘barriers’ used to decrease or to avoid the impact of ageing on safety is covered in some way by the risk-informed regulation approach. Deterministic analysis
1. Define change
PSA
2. Perform engineering analysis
3. Define implementation/ monitoring
4. Submit a proposal
4.1 Principal elements of risk-informed, plant-specific decision making (US-NRC, 2002). Barrier
Risk
Operating loads + Environmental stressors
SSC degradation due to ageing
• • • • •
Design Qualification Test/Monitoring Maintenance Operating feedback
4.2 Ageing effect on unit/SSC reliability and safety.
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Presently, ageing evaluation-related activities have been or are being carried out as part of the following programmes: ∑ periodic safety review ∑ ageing management ∑ maintenance optimization ∑ operation after the original design life (also called ‘long-term operation’, LTO). There are many national and international standards and guidelines available, but all of them are based on a deterministic approach and describe very limited PSA application. The PSA could be incorporated more into these programmes as a safety evaluation tool to help identify and prioritize ageing issues and optimize ageing management activities. In general, to apply PSA in a risk-informed approach, PSA should be as realistic as practicable and appropriate support data should be available for the review. This would also apply to identifying potential risks associated with ageing effects. In conclusion, the following methodological issues have to be addressed in the attempt to develop time-dependent PSA analysis able to cover ageing effects: ∑ Could PSA be applied to ageing assessments? ∑ How realistically do PSA models reflect important ageing issues? ∑ Are PSA methods and models sensitive enough? ∑ Are any modifications or revisions of PSA assumptions needed to apply a PSA approach to risk-informed decision making with regard to ageing evaluation? ∑ What data are available and how representative are they with regard to important ageing issues? This chapter makes reference to the previous chapters concerning the deterministic assessment of the integrity of the main components, while it addresses methods and procedures for PSA models where ageing effects are explicitly included, making the periodical safety assessment a process fully integrated with the plant ageing evaluation. In particular, an overview is presented of the different PSA phases where ageing considerations have a significant impact, such as: selection of systems, structures and components (SSCs) to be considered, reliability and data analysis for active components and incorporation of age-dependent reliability parameters and data into PSA models. For consistency, a reference PLiM model is described first, as a background for the proposed probabilistic safety assessment approach.
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The plant life management (PLiM) problem – definitions and selected experience cases
4.2.1 Setting the problem The plant life management (PLiM) problem was raised some years ago when it became clear that technological, safety, regulatory, human and economic issues had to be addressed simultaneously for the overall management of the plant assets (IAEA, 2006; EU, 2007). It is a fact that new global approaches have been triggered in recent years by a combination of factors such as: ∑
the generic trend towards plant life operation beyond the original design life, in order to exploit the plant design to the maximum level ∑ the market economy, which is pushing for a more stringent management of the economic assets ∑ the detection of significant ageing phenomena, which may be challenging the original design assumptions ∑ the need for timely preservation of the human knowledge, particularly in countries with growing opposition to nuclear power expansion ∑ the more stringent regulatory requirements in terms of safety assessment and monitoring. However, the PLiM models developed in recent years differ from each other because of national frameworks and regulations and therefore a generalization sometimes appears difficult. Interesting attempts were carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency in a series of technical documents and papers (see list in EU, 2007), to identify common drivers among the different national programmes, but the discipline was never indeed regulated by binding documents on its Member States, by presenting commonly accepted principles, recognized by all the interested parties. Nevertheless, a large number of IAEA documents are available on basic safety concepts that could be relevant to life management programmes (IAEA, 1992, 1997a,b, 2000a,b,c, 2001, 2002a,b, 2004a,b). In particular, a generic misunderstanding still exists in the engineering community among objectives and content of the different programmes put in place in the different countries which developed experience in the PLiM field. Programmes such as Licence Renewal (LR), Long Term Operation (LTO), Plant Life Extension (PLEX), Periodic Safety Review (PSR), Ageing Management Programme (AMP), for example, were shown to share many technical tasks, but also to meet different objectives and to follow different regulatory frameworks. The European Commission, through its Joint Research Centre at the Institute for Energy (JRC-IE) has spent some research effort in recent years in the clarification of the many issues addressed by the European countries’ programmes and developed some unified models, which received
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very high consensus in many engineering communities and particularly in the research network of European countries interested in this discipline, SENUF (Safety of European-type Nuclear Facilities) (JRC, 2008). A number of scientific papers were also published in order to foster feedback from the engineering community (JRC, 2006; Contri, 2007a,b; Contri et al., 2007a,b; Vaisnys et al., 2007). As an outcome of this effort, a list of generic considerations can be drawn as support to the development of a more unified approach to the common issue of managing the plant assets in time, while meeting the highest safety standards: 1. The PLiM programme appears the type of programme most suitable to address long-lasting safety and economical issues and to present the most comprehensive approach to the plant asset management. 2. The PLiM programme is neither necessarily related to operational plant life after the original design life, nor to license extension of any plant. It is a logical framework on which strategic thinking may find the appropriate answers in relation to safety, economy and human asset management. 3. Related programmes such as LR, AMP, PSR, each with its own objective, may find in the PLiM framework the answers and the background information that they need to meet their specific objectives; however, they definitely represent separate programmes, different from PLiM itself. 4. The PLiM programme is crucially based upon a strong integration of many existing programmes at the plants, such as asset management, plant life beyond design, ageing management, configuration control, predictive maintenance, etc., that share common assumptions and contribute to the same overall objectives. 5. Some special features are required in standard programmes and also some specific programmes are needed to be in place at NPPs in order to supply necessary input to a PLiM programme adequately. These features/programmes create the pre-conditions for a PLiM programme to be successfully applied, that is, the maintenance programme should be mostly reliability based, while the ISI programme should be risk informed, in nature, a fuel management programme should be in place, an outage optimization programme should make available all data in relation to the economic implications of the outage duration, a knowledge management programme should be in place, public acceptance analysis should be available, etc. 6. In order to manage the very complex structure of a PLiM programme, specialized software tools and databases are highly recommended, also for the management of daily work, due to the huge amount of data to be processed and stored. © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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One example of an approach to PLiM is shown in Fig. 4.3, taken from Finnish practice (JRC, 2008). In this example, the PLiM programme aims at demonstrating that during the design and possibly the continued plant operational life (LTO) (JRC, 2006): 1. the safety and ageing analyses remain valid and could be projected to the end of intended operational lifetime 2. the effects of ageing on the intended safety function(s) are adequately managed for the entire envisaged lifetime 3. there is a mechanism to deal with unexpected ageing mechanisms that may appear 4. there is a pro-active process for decision making, also involving nonsafety equipment significant to plant availability 5. there is a programme to manage human resources and knowledge 6. plant economic assets are properly managed. In this framework certain programmes play a crucial role, namely: ∑ the ageing management programme (AMP) ∑ the maintenance, surveillance and inspection (MS&I) programme ∑ the knowledge management programme (KM) ∑ the asset management programme ∑ major plant upgrading programmes (if in place, such as power uprating, modernization, etc.). In particular, the AMP is a transversal programme (JRC, 2006) cross-cutting maintenance, surveillance, and in-service inspection programmes and other operation-related programmes. It addresses ageing mechanisms prevention, control and consequence mitigation. The operating experience shows that
Safety and licensing
Continuous safety upgrading
Life management of critical SSCs
Production and economy
Strategic key issues: prerequisites for success
50 years operation
Long-term personnel plan Human resources
Long-term investment plan
4.3 Examples of approach to component life management (JRC, 2008).
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active and short-lived SSCs are in general addressed by existing maintenance programmes. Conversely, the performance and safety margins of the passive long-lived SSCs are assumed to be guaranteed by design. However, the analysis of the operating experience worldwide has shown that unforeseen ageing phenomena may occur either because of shortcomings in design, manufacturing or by operating errors, calling for a refined, self-improving programme. The maintenance programme for a nuclear power plant covers all preventive and remedial measures that are necessary to detect and mitigate degradation of a functioning SSC or to restore to an acceptable level the performance of design functions of a failed SSC (IAEA, 1997b). In this sense, the integration with surveillance and in-service inspection is crucial, as the most advanced types of maintenance do integrate the three programmes, which have a common objective: to ensure that the plant is operated in accordance with the design assumptions and within the operational limits and conditions. Therefore in the following, MS&I will address all the three programmes in an integrated form. It is clear that the MS&I programme is a crucial part of PLiM, being by far the main contributor to both operating costs (after operation) and operation planning. However, in order to support a PLiM framework, MS&I should have a specific list of attributes, making both safety assessment and cost optimization possible. In conclusion, the implementation of an AMP and a predictive MS&I (maintenance, surveillance and inspection) programme is definitely a condition for the operation within the limits of design or licensed lifetime and is a condition for a PLiM as well. Knowledge management and asset management are traditionally isolated programmes from MS&I and AMP. PLiM recognizes the need for their integration and sets an overall optimization framework.
4.2.2 Countries’ generic experience with PLiM Thanks to the large survey on countries’ practice carried out at the JRC (JRC, 2008), also through the organization of many international events, it was possible to summarize the most relevant aspects of some countries’ practice in the field of PLiM, with special emphasis on the relationship with other programmes being used in European Union (EU) countries and outside. ∑
The United Sates, Canada, Spain and some other countries accumulated valuable experience in recent years in PLiM issues and related programmes. The interest of the international community of plant operators on reliabilitybased approaches to PLiM and maintenance optimization in particular, is increasing. The US approach is codified in the INPO (2004), which is also closely followed by some European countries (such as Spain and Hungary).
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∑
Other European countries, such as Finland, are more in favour of integrated approaches to PLiM, with a more explicit control of the component degradation and a clear day-to-day basis for the decision makers on replacement, maintenance and operation. ∑ In many European countries, PLiM is accompanied by a periodic safety review (PSR) programme. The combination is not surprising, as PLiM is typically a utility-driven programme, while PSR is driven by the safety authorities. Many technical tasks (those safety related) are similar, but objectives, time frame and regulatory implications are definitely different, even if in some countries the PSR is the time when LTO tasks are carried out. ∑ Some pre-conditions for PLiM in many countries include maintenance optimization, RI-ISI, fuel management, outage optimization, knowledge management, public acceptance, seismic upgrading, etc., sometimes making the programme very complex. In all cases they are assisted by complex software tools and databases, also for the management of daily work. ∑ The relationship among PLiM and the other programmes running at the NPPs is now quite clear in the EU countries: well-known programmes such as component integrity, ageing management (AMP), life extension (PLEX), periodic safety review (PSR) and plant life management (PLiM) are in fact well connected, but definitely not interchangeable. Despite the different names, mostly derived from the national regulatory and engineering frameworks, there is a clear hierarchy among them. In particular, component integrity is a basic science dealing with the failure modes of the different components, their detection and their control. The AMP is an operational programme in place at any NPP, which integrates maintenance, ISI and organizational issues aiming at controlling the component degradation. PLiM addresses safety as well as economics, knowledge management as well as decision making, and provides an overall framework to keep the whole plant in a safe and economically sustainable condition.
4.2.3 PLiM at the design stage for new reactors The comparison of the approach to PLiM among other technology areas suggests some interesting considerations. For example, in the aerospace industry the maintenance and ageing management programme (considered among the most crucial components in PLiM) are optimized at the design phase, in part because of the large number of similar aircraft; in nuclear power practice, time is needed to accumulate statistics and to develop confidence in the optimization procedures. Many types of NPP are operating and generic approaches have limited application, except, maybe in France, where many
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NPPs of similar design are in service. However, it is common judgement that PLiM should be applied already at the design phase of the NPPs, possibly based on the lessons learned from operating fleets. In this sense, practice could be assimilated in a similar way to that in other industrial technologies, as mentioned above. Up to today, the development of standards and design rules for the new generation reactors is lagging behind. This delay also makes the certification of the new reactors problematic. At the same time, also the safety assessment methods and the quality assurance (QA) rules for construction and operation need to be revised. The role of both licensee and regulators is still to be defined in many countries. This generic statement is applicable to all PLiM relevant aspects that deserve an early understanding at the design phase. In particular, ageing considerations should be addressed already at the design stage, for example to provide inspectability, replaceability and access to the most sensitive components and a solid basis for the control of their degradation. Ageing should also be addressed at the beginning of operation, in order to make available a broad range of data for trending and optimization goals. In particular, the following PLiM/ageing relevant issues should be addressed in the pre-design or pre-licensing phase of new reactors: ∑ choice of materials ∑ major drawings ∑ operating conditions ∑ collection of relevant data ∑ monitoring, surveillance ∑ ISI: inspectability/access/ease of replacement of SSCs ∑ radiation protection of workers (as low as reasonably acceptable (ALARA) principles). For example, in the Areva/EPR, the following design actions have been taken in order to improve the PLiM performance (Areva, 2007): ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
accessibility of the reactor building during normal operation to perform maintenance tasks and inspections, but also to start refuelling seven days before reactor shutdown and to continue demobilization three days after reactor restart improved main coolant loop cool down, depressurization and vessel head opening after shutdown bringing the standard outage time to 16 days very low radiation level to workers some modifications in steam generators (SGs) or pressurizer or reactor vessel internals (RVIs) improvements to nozzles and tees for thermal fatigue reduction in general FU factors (unavailability factor) have to be less than 0.5 for limited ISI in operation.
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In the Westinghouse AP1000 (Westinghouse, 2007) the following design actions intend to address the PLiM issues: ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
large use of passive features, also to reduce MS&I tasks variable speed in the main reactor coolant pump, to shorten start-up and shutdown times special design of the digital instrumentation and control (I&C) which reduces the I&C surveillance testing large use of component standardization to reduce parts inventory and training scope of personnel built-in testing capabilities is provided for many critical components easy access for MS&I tasks and lifting devices few nuclear grade equipment very low radiation level to workers.
4.2.4 The maintenance programme in the LTO perspective: why PLiM needs an optimized maintenance programme In 2003 the JRC-IE carried out a preliminary investigation of the priorities in European countries in relation to the PLiM programmes. The conclusion was that the nuclear power community is generally convinced that the maintenance programme should have specific attributes in order to support a long-term operation (LTO) programme for the plant. In this sense, the international standards (e.g. the IAEA), but also the national experience of the United States, Spain and Hungary, etc., provided confirmation of this. More specifically, the maintenance programmes based on standard preventive maintenance (time-based), not oriented to the monitoring of its effectiveness and to the prediction of damage, are not considered suitable to support LTO programmes. Crucial attributes for maintenance programmes in order to support LTO are considered to be: the verification of the performance goals, the root cause analysis of failures, the feedback from maintenance to the ISI programme, and the feedback on the operational limits and conditions (OLC). All countries implementing a LTO programme applied extensive modifications to their requirements on maintenance as a first step, setting up mechanisms to monitor the effectiveness of the maintenance activities, which is seen as a pre-condition for entering LTO programmes (see, for example, the new requirements for maintenance in the United States contained in the 10 CFR 50-54 document). In particular, the following features are believed to be indispensable for a maintenance programme in a PLiM framework: ∑
monitoring the performance of the SSCs which may have an impact on safety and reliability during all operational statuses of the plants;
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assessing and managing the risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activities in terms of planning, prioritization and scheduling.
In order to implement these requirements, some issues have to be addressed, namely: ∑
The identification of the scope of the condition-based maintenance rules: typically the countries choose the safety-related SSCs, SSCs that mitigate accidents or transients, SSCs interacting with safety-related SSCs, and SSCs that could cause scram or actuation of safety-related systems. Therefore, many non-safety-related SSCs may see the application of such maintenance rules, with augmented efforts in monitoring their performance and planning their reparation. ∑ The setting of performance goals for every component in the scope of the maintenance rules, ranking them according to their risk significance to plant safety. This task may end up very challenging as, when industry experience is not available, either dedicated PSA tasks have to be developed (with special requirements on PSA quality) or special qualification programmes for the evaluation of the component reliability. ∑ The performance monitoring techniques for the very broad categories of SSCs in the scope of the rules. ∑ The assessment of safety during implementation of maintenance actions. ∑ The feedback from the result of the monitoring of the component reliability back into the inspection, surveillance and maintenance procedures. Root cause analysis, equipment performance trend analysis and corrective actions have to be developed on a case-by-case basis. In this sense, for example, the experiences of the United States and Spain (where a LTO programme is well established), Hungary, and Finland (where a PLiM model is in place at the Loviisa NPP) are a confirmation of this generic statement: all these countries modified their regulatory requirements or practice on maintenance, in the direction mentioned above, as one of the preconditions for the operation of their plants after reaching the original design life. As summary of the country practice in the field of maintenance optimization, a quick questionnaire was run by the JRC-IE at one international event organized in 2007 on maintenance optimization issues (JRC, 2008). The results are summarized in Table 4.1. Furthermore, Ukrainian, Slovenian, Czech and Russian representatives expressed on many occasions (Contri and Bieth, 2007) their interest in adopting a maintenance rule (MR) type approach in their countries, even starting on a voluntary basis, most probably closer to the ‘equipment reliability’ model (INPO, 2004). Many of them have already created some training centres,
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Scope of optimized MS&I (no. of systems)
M Cost Reduction Reduction Optimization issues in M cost in CDF process included? after M in place optimization
Reduction in outage duration (%)
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SFW used for M planning/ optimization
Network of spare parts available
No. of Risk indicators monitor on M available
Utility level
10
no
10
Russian Federation – RBMK1000
plans
Desna/ Primavera
Hungary
CBM
Passport/?
CBM
5%
yes
5%
no
40–28
Slovakia CBM <10% RCM - yes 10–15% n.a. 45–26 Arsoz/ EMO CBM Primavera
With 30 Bohunice with big parts
Ukraine
no
Bulgaria – diagnostic VVER1000
plans
plans
Primavera
Circ. plans no 51–45 Primavera With Pumps, Temelin containment, etc.
Czech Rep. CBM Adaptive yes expected - Dukovany maintenance model, RCM, cost benefit, use of PSA, etc.
Overall decrease 48% in outages duration From 2 to 3 types
Yes on living PSA
no Not no systematically
Passport/ yes Primavera/ MNT Graph, use of safety monitor system
Yes on living PSA
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Country Type of non-time- based M
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Table 4.1 Summary of the experience in selected European countries on specific PLiM-related issues
50% (all safety related)
CBM analysis
No, plans
32–22, Passport plans for 20 (every two years)
Few cases 10 with Candu owners
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Lithuania - CBM <10% CBM no 10% no 10% Fobos no ~15 Ignalina analysis (IFS)/ Primavera Note: M: Maintenance CBM: Condition-Based Monitoring RCM: Reliability-Centred Maintenance CDF: Core Damage Frequency (per reactor/year)
Yes based on living PSA Yes, only for pipes (300 mm), main circulation circuits
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Romania - CBM Cernavoda
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which are developing procedures in this direction. In conclusion, in relation to the operating cost reduction as a consequence of the kind of maintenance optimisation programme, the following reductions (Contri and Bieth, 2007) in maintenance costs/tasks were recorded: ∑ In Sweden, 10–20% of the effort, especially for I&C calibration intervals. ∑ In Spain, 20% in work, 30% in number of tasks. ∑ In Hungary, expected, not quantified. ∑ In Czech Republic, 30% on a restricted number of systems selected for a benchmark (according to a pilot project implemented at the Dukovany NPP). ∑ In Slovakia, expected, not quantified. It was noted that the ‘equipment reliability’ programme is not mandatory in most of the countries (including the United States). However, it is gaining growing interest due to its systematic approach to the management of plant safety. In particular, the correlation among the many existing safety-related programmes and the consistent classification of items (important, critical, run-to-failure) seems to be very attractive and practical. The main goals of the maintenance programme in the framework of PLiM can be summarized as follows: ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
assure plant safety maintain optimal plant availability optimize operation and maintenance costs assure and develop industrial safety comply with codes, legislation and regulation decrease failures of safety and availability of critical components find and implement performance improvements increase the reliability and maintainability of the machinery and the performance of maintenance support ∑ increase the economic service life of equipment and plant. A precondition for a MS&I programme to be effectively inserted into a PLiM structure is that the maintenance programme is continuously optimized on the basis of the risk importance of any SSC, controlling the overall reliability of operation and preventing functional failures. One way of achieving this goal is the implementation of a rigorous SSC classification and the selection of the most appropriate maintenance tasks (and periodicity) for each type of equipment. The classification should be based on the importance to safety and operation, requirements of nuclear regulations, replacement costs, environmental risks and maintenance experience. Classification can be changed based on operation and maintenance experience. The maintenance unit should be responsible for executing and
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planning normal maintenance work, carrying out the work in refurbishment and investment projects, carrying out inspections and periodical tests, managing spare parts, organizing personnel training and enforcing an appropriate QA system.
4.3
A unified proposal for a plant life management (PLiM) model integrating maintenance optimization
4.3.1 Introduction Previous sections highlighted the main issues behind the development of a PLiM model, its main features and the experience of a few European and nonEuropean countries in this effort. As a consequence, the JRC-IE researchers developed a new version of a new PLiM model that they believed could significantly improve the performance of the nuclear plants. A first draft of this model is available at JRC (2008). The model was subsequently validated at one European plant that is believed to have one of the most advanced PLiM models in place. It is summarized in the following sections.
4.3.2 PLiM objectives PLiM can be defined as a programme (or even a combination of programmes and procedures) aiming at a safe and cost-effective operation of a nuclear power plant over the longest possible time period, including plant long-term operation (LTO). In this sense, it represents a framework for optimized, day-to-day decision making aiming at a plant LTO with optimum utilization of resources. In other words, the objective of PLiM is the development of a consistent framework programme at the plant that enables the plant to produce electricity in a safe and responsible way by continuously improving the power plant operation and safety. This objective is typically achieved with co-ordination of some key programmes at the plant, such as operation, asset management, maintenance surveillance and inspection (MS&I), ageing management, knowledge management and nuclear safety.
4.3.3 Approach to PLiM In order to achieve the goals set up in the previous section, the PLiM programme has to consider the following main components: 1. Nuclear safety and licensing. 2. Production and economy (including fuel and waste management). 3. Human resources.
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The long-term investment plan is the basic tool for managing the investment portfolio where all the technical programmes provide input. The generic PLiM structure is the result of the integration of selected existing programmes at the plant and the development of suitable links and feedback loops. In particular, the following programmes are directly coordinated by PLiM: ∑
maintenance, surveillance and inspection (MS&I), including control of human factors ∑ ageing management, component obsolescence and plant configuration control ∑ knowledge management ∑ asset management and investment planning. Plant modernization, power uprating and fuel management may also be part of PLiM, but they are not necessarily implemented at all plants. This concept is described in Fig. 4.4, where the four main components of PLiM are highlighted in the central programme, the input and the output are in the vertical lines and other programmes are listed in the lateral boxes. These programmes should also meet specific preconditions on their main features, as discussed above and summarized in Fig. 4.5. Other programmes represent a generic background for PLiM, and exchange data with PLiM, but they are not explicitly part of it, such as operation, nuclear safety, fuel management, waste management, licensing (including the continuous updating of the Safety Analysis Report), engineering, etc. Market trends
Other programmes Operation Nucl. safety Licensing Fuel man. Waste man. Safety analysis Etc.
Plex-LR-PSR
Safety regulations
Internal operating experience
R&D Maintenance, surveillance & inspections Ageing management
PLIM
Component integrity Thermal Hydraulics
Asset management
Safety assessment Human resources
Investment plan
Etc.
Plant upgrading
4.4 Approach to PLiM and interfaces with related programmes.
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Reliability-based Optimized
Long-term trends Environmental variables Obsolescence
Outage optimization Fuel management Spare part management
Maintenance, surveillance & inspections
Ageing management
PLIM
Asset management
Human resources
Knowledge management, in time Human reliability programme Public acceptance
4.5 Preconditions for the key programmes to be part of PLiM.
Finally, important programmes may be based upon PLiM, but they are not part of it, such as plant life maintenance and assurance after design life, licence renewal, periodic safety review, plant upgrading (including power uprating), public acceptance, etc. From the technical standpoint, the approach to plant life management consists of: ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
identification of critical systems, structures and components (SSCs) from the standpoint of the plant operation and safety classification of the identified SSCs identification of operational loadings, stressors and ageing mechanisms development of method for the lifetime prediction identification and implementation of applicable ageing countermeasures feedback to MS&I programmes and other relevant programmes development of the investment planning and business case aspects.
4.3.4 PLiM scope – component classification A consistent application of PLiM suggests the use of a dedicated component classification, where safety, availability and cost issues contribute to form the
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criteria. All structures, systems and components at the plant, regardless of their safety relevance, should be covered by such classification. According to the classification, a suitable grading of measures may be applied and therefore different levels of MS&I and AMP, economic analysis, etc., may be assigned. A proposal (see also JRC, 2008) may group different classes as in the following: ∑
Class A: critical components and structures directly limiting the plant life with their availability/integrity, and essential non-replaceability. Examples include reactor pressure vessel, steam generator (SG are replaceable … but expensive), pressurizer, main coolant pump, containment structures and main buildings. Those items are in principle replaceable, but the impact on both business interruption and budget would be huge, so it is best to discourage their consideration in the list of is replaceable items. Example of MS&I strategy: full scope monitoring and analysis of the degradation. ∑ Class B: critical components, systems and structures from the standpoint of their importance to safety and their cost of replacement/reparation. Examples include primary circuit, high and low pressure safety injection systems, feedwater system, condensers, turbine, generators, diesels. Example of MS&I strategy: condition-based MS&I. ∑ Class C: sensitive components, from both safety and economics standpoint, systems and structures. Examples include nuclear intermediate cooling, sprinkler, drainage and vents, main steam line, residual heat removal, circulating and service water systems, condenser cooling system. Example of MS&I strategy: preventive (time-based) MS&I. ∑ Class D: other components and structures. Examples include condenser purification system, auxiliary boiler plant, drinking water supply, sewerage. Example of MS&I strategy: run-to-failure. It is noted that such an approach is still quite heterogeneous, as it mixes various components, systems and special equipment. Therefore, the proposed classification may be reviewed to provide a more homogeneous approach that would make the interfaces with the maintenance classification or spare part classification much easier and traceable. For components in classes A, B and C, a type of component ‘health certificate or dossier’ is recommended for continuous review and upgrading by the system engineers. The dossier should make reference to the design basis and should collect the results from the AMP, the operation and the ISI programmes, including the pending issues detected whilst previous tasks (e.g. inspections, monitoring) were being performed.
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4.3.5 The organizational structure that supports the PLiM – the system engineers The PLiM programme requires important changes in the traditional plant organization. In particular, the following preparatory organizational tasks should be implemented: ∑ ∑
development of a PLiM supervision and co-ordination unit nomination of system engineers, in full-time charge of selected systems, especially for Class A ∑ identification of research and engineering specialists in different disciplines either at the plant or at the technical support organization (TSO), ready to co-operate with the system engineers to address methodological issues, interpretation of results, interfaces with the scientific and engineering community, etc. System engineers are the main interpreters of the PLiM programme at the plant; they should be responsible for the life management of a particular system, structure or component. They represent the system ‘owners’. These engineers are typically responsible for the following tasks (JRC, 2008): ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
preparation and control of inspection, monitoring and maintenance activities related to life management of systems, structures and components critical to safety detection and assessment of ageing mechanisms and effects preparation and implementation of improvements in the field of proactive maintenance. maintain and be proactive in the the life management system update the information in the long range planning system keep updated records of the component/system health status in the reference documentation system guarantee the reporting.
Some interfaces between the system engineers and other groups/departments are particularly important in the PLiM framework, namely: 1. The operators: plant technical specifications (TS) and operational limits and conditions (OLC) may be discussed and changed (with the due authorizations) as a consequence of detailed analysis of the operating experience and of the MS&I outcome. 2. The MS&I technicians: objectives, periodicity, scope and other attributes of the programmes may be agreed and modified. 3. The safety specialists (either on-site or at the TSO): they are responsible for the plant safety analysis and therefore all the acceptance criteria for ageing and degradation should be agreed and reviewed with them. 4. The technical support group: the decision to repair/replace/maintain a
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component or structure is taken jointly and approved by the management group of the PLiM.
4.4
Probabilistic safety assessment of components and systems
4.4.1 Applicability to different SSCs When a living PSA has to include ageing effects, the first task is the selection of the SSCs to be scoped. As a generic process, ageing could affect the performance and reliability of all NPP SSCs. However, differences in design, maintenance, operation stressors and environmental conditions make ageing kinetics and effects very different from one component to another. In addition, the risk associated with and the safety importance of the SSCs is not the same. To identify and prioritize SSCs potentially sensitive to ageing, the following technique is proposed: ∑
prioritize the SSCs which are modelled in PSA using risk importance factors ∑ perform trend analysis of available reliability data ∑ use qualitative assessment or ageing failure modes and effect analysis (AFMEA) for a limited number of components. All three steps are consecutive and complementary. Prioritization by risk importance is an effective way of reducing the list of SSCs under consideration. Application of Fussell–Vesely (or risk decreasing) and risk increasing factors has been demonstrated via case studies (Nitoi and Rodionov, 2008, Poghosyan et al., 2008). Trend analysis helps to identify SSCs where failure intensity (failure rate) increases with time. This could be a direct indication of ageing. Given a large population of SSCs and a consolidated collection of operating experience data, statistical methods could be applied. One basic task of statistical analysis is to investigate whether the SSC failure rate is approximately constant. Various statistical tests could be used to validate or to refute the assumption of constant failure rate. Some of them are discussed, for example, in Atwood et al. (2003). Depending on the statistical technique used, they can be divided into three groups: ∑ graphs (visual evaluation) ∑ non-parametric hypothesis tests ∑ parametric hypothesis tests. Currently, most nuclear utilities have a good reliability data collection system and a large amount of data on safety-important components from probabilistic safety assessments. This data could be used as a basis for ageing analysis.
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Several case studies have been performed by the scientific community to develop and demonstrate the applicability of statistical methods (see, for example, Rodionov et al., 2008, Antonov et al., 2009 and Kelly et al., 2008). Qualitative assessment or AFMEA is aimed at identifying and characterizing the link between the potential ageing mechanism and failure modes, and to demonstrate both the effect of failure on system reliability and the effectiveness of the surveillance strategy. In addition, the results of the analysis help to postulate assumptions concerning the periodicity and degree of component renewal after maintenance. This assessment could cover SSCs initially neglected in PSA models and SSCs for which there is not enough failure data for trend analysis. The main problem of qualitative assessment is that it is very time-consuming and resource-intensive. Some case study results demonstrating the quantitative assessment approach are presented in Nitoi et al. (2008) and Poghosyan et al. (2008).
4.5
Impact of ageing effects at system and plant level
4.5.1 Setting up a sample case A sample case can be developed to demonstrate how to integrate time-dependent reliability parameters into a PSA study and to calculate the impact of ageing on the risk profile as a function of time. Such a case study was developed in Rodionov et al. (2008), where it was proposed to use core damage frequency (CDF) as the average value at one-year intervals calculated for different age points, for example for 10, 20, 30 and 40 years in operation. A three-loop PWR PSA model for a large loss of coolant accident (LLOCA) initiating event was considered for this purpose. The model consisted of four event trees developed for full power operation and hot shutdown reactor states. The set of ‘virtual’ reliability data was prepared on the basis of the results of case studies, available generic data sources and expert opinions. The data included time-dependent reliability models for certain mechanical, electrical and I&C components of low pressure safety injection (LPSI) and containment spray systems (CSS). For most components, the relative increase in failure rate (probability) proved not very significant (see example in Fig. 4.6), while a strong ageing behaviour was considered for one component type – pump motors (see Fig. 4.7). In this case, for the best fitted log-linear model (p-value = 0.98), the relative increase in failure probability was more than three orders of magnitude towards the end of the design lifetime. At the same time, the Weibull model, which fits with a significance level of 0.96, gave a relative increase by a factor of 20 towards the end of the design lifetime.
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‘As bad as old’ preventive maintenance was considered in all cases. Quantification has been calculated for a reference value (no ageing effects considered) and age points of 10, 20, 30 and 40 years.
4.5.2 Effects at the system level The results of calculations performed for the CSS fault tree show that system unavailability increases with time by more than one order of magnitude with regard to the reference value (see Fig. 4.8). Up to the age of 30 years, the main contributor to unavailability (Fig. 4.6) is the failure in the level sensors in the reactor water storage tank (RWST), which provides a signal to switch the CSS to containment sump recirculation. But at the age of 40, the dominant impact on system unavailability is failure of the CSS pump motors. Thus, a rapid and sharp increase in unavailability due to the pump motors
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Css unavailability
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can be explained by the choice of the log-linear model for the failure rate. As mentioned in the previous section, this model provides more conservative extrapolation results. For comparison purposes, two contributors, with constant failure probability, are presented in Fig. 4.9: human error (20% fractional contribution to the reference value) and CSS pumps fail to start (2% contribution to the reference value). As can be seen from the graph, their contribution to the total system unavailability gradually decreases with time.
4.5.3 Effects at the plant level Figure 4.10 shows the impact of the ageing of selected components on CDF. The result of risk extrapolation is an increase in CDF from 6.58 ¥ 10–8 at
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10 years to 6.19 ¥ 10–7 at 40 years. In comparison with the reference value (7.18 ¥ 10–8) the increase is by a factor of 8.6 by the end of the designed lifetime. Once the most sensitive components (low pressure safety injection (LPSI) and CSS pump motors and level sensors) are in the minimum cut sets of dominant sequences, the relative contribution of the sequences to the total risk of LLOCA remains approximately the same with age. The same picture can be seen for contributions to the risk associated with the different reactor states and location of the pipe break. Figure 4.11. shows the results of the sensitivity analysis of the reliability model chosen for the most sensitive components, i.e. pump motors. For this component in the reference case, the log-linear model was considered. As mentioned in previous sections (see Fig. 4.7), the Weibull model provides quite different values for extrapolation of failure probability to the end of the design lifetime than the sensitivity analysis.
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The generic conclusion from this analysis is the need to examine the accuracy of several model alternatives before applying any given one to PSA. For the reference case, an analysis of risk importance measures was performed. Figure 4.12 shows the variation of Fussell–Vesely importance for the main contributors to CDF. The nature of the curves is about the same as for the fractional contribution of the failure of a particular component to system unavailability shown in Fig. 4.9. For components not sensitive to ageing, the Fussell–Vesely importance monotonically decreases with time (see LPSI valves or human errors (HE) on RWST sensors). For components sensitive to ageing, the behaviour of the measure could differ according to rate of ageing (see, for example, LPSI pumps and CSS pump motors). In this example, the most dramatic changes in component importance take place between 30 and 40 years for the most sensitive components. The risk increasing factor monotonically decreases with time for all the main contributors to CDF (see example of LPSI valves (not sensitive to ageing) and CSS pump motors (very sensitive to ageing) in Fig. 4.13). However, the most sensitive components remain the same. This behaviour makes the risk importance factor less informative from a decision-making point of view. The basic conclusion is that ageing can alter the risk importance values for particular components and failure modes. This has to be taken into account when applying these measures for component prioritization (for operation or maintenance optimization). The sample case discussed above provides useful insights for a development of a time-dependent PSA study, where ageing effects are properly included.
4.6
Conclusions
Ageing effects may negatively impact plant safety in time. The deterministic assessment of these ageing effects has to refer to the design basis of components 1.80E-01 1.60E-01 1.40E-01 1.20E-01 1.00E-01 8.00E-02 6.00E-02 4.00E-02 2.00E-02 0.00E+00
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4.12 Fussel–Vesely importance measure.
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and systems and provides information to owners and operators on the need for changes in OLC and/or component replacement. A well-integrated model for PLiM, integrating safety and non-safety programmes, is essential to provide a framework for such assessment and for an effective management of the plant assets in time. Guidelines are proposed for development of those models, adapted to the national context. The proposed probabilistic approach, though more complex from the computational standpoint, provides direct measurement of the effects of ageing on the plant CDF, the dominant accident sequences and contributors to CDF, and the component risk importance measures. Considering ageing effects in PSA, and reliability analysis in general, can help in the selection and prioritization of SSCs and in planning optimum ageing management and maintenance measures as part of a risk-informed decision-making process. The main concerns, which may limit a broad application of the proposed methods, are still related to methodology complexities, data and resource availability. However, the methods presented in this chapter provide some insights and suggest extrapolation techniques for the reliability parameters that may reduce the computational effort and provide reliable, ready-to-use results.
4.7
References
Antonov, A., Chepurko, V., Polyakov, A., Rodionov, A. (2009), ‘Application of generalised linear model for time-dependent trend assessment – a case study for the ageing PSA network’. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 94 (6), 1021–1029. AREVA (2007), EPR, 2007, www.areva-np.com Atwood, C., LaChance, J.L., Martz, H.F., Anderson, D.J., Englehardt, M., Whitehead, D., Wheeler, T. (2003), Handbook of Parameter Estimation for Probabilistic Risk Assessment, NUREG/CR-6823, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC. © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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Contri, P. (2007a), ‘Plant life management models with special emphasis to the integration of safety with non-safety related programs’, PLiM Conference, Shanghai, 15–18 October 2007. Contri, P. (2007b), ‘Maintenance issues in long term operation of nuclear power plants’, ENC 2007, Brussels, 19 September 2007. Contri, P., Bieth, M. (2007), ‘A plant life management model as support to plant life extension programmes of nuclear installations – effective integration of the safety programmes into an overall optimization of the operating cost’, joint research center institute for energy. Contri, P., Debarberis, L., Taylor, N. (2007a), ‘Needs in R&D Supporting Nuclear Power Plant Life Management’, PLiM Conference, Shanghai, 15–18 October 2007. Contri, P. et al. (2007b), ‘Maintenance optimisation issues in the EC’ - ISEM 2007, Lansing, 10 September 2007. EU (2007), Work programme 2007, Euratom for nuclear research and training activities, European Commission C (2007) 564 of 26.02.07. IAEA (1992), Safety Related Maintenance in the Framework of the Reliability Centred Maintenance Concept, IAEA-TECDOC-658, IAEA, Vienna. IAEA (1997a), Regulatory Surveillance of Safety Related Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA-TECDOC-960, IAEA, Vienna. IAEA (1997b), Good Practices for Cost Effective Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA-TECDOC-928, IAEA, Vienna. IAEA (2000a), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation Requirements, Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2, IAEA, Vienna. IAEA (2000b), Technologies for Improving Current and Future Light Water Reactor Operation and Maintenance: Development on the Basis of Experience, IAEA-TECDOC1175, IAEA, Vienna. IAEA (2000c), Advances in Safety Related Maintenance, IAEA-TECDOC-1138, IAEA, Vienna. IAEA (2001), Applications of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA-TECDOC-1200, IAEA, Vienna. IAEA (2002a), Safety Assessment and Verification for Nuclear Power Plants, Safety Guide, Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-1.2, IAEA, Vienna. IAEA (2002b), Maintenance, Surveillance and In-Service Inspection in Nuclear Power Plants; Safety Guide, Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-2.6, IAEA, Vienna. IAEA (2004a), Management of Life Cycle and Ageing at Nuclear Power Plants: Improved I&C Maintenance, IAEA-TECDOC-1402, IAEA, Vienna. IAEA (2004b), Guidance for Optimizing Nuclear Power Plant Maintenance Programmes; IAEA-TECDOC-1383, IAEA, Vienna. IAEA (2006), Principles and Guidelines on Plant Life Management for Long Term Operation of Light Water Reactors, IAEA Technical Reports Series 448, IAEA, Vienna. INPO, (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations) (2004), Equipment Reliability Process Description, INPO AP-913, Atlanta. INSAG-12 (1999), Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants, 75-INSAG-3, Rev. 1, IAEA, Vienna. JRC (2006), EUR 21903 EN: ‘Optimization of maintenance programmes at NPPs – benchmarking study on implemented organizational schemes, advanced methods and strategies for maintenance optimization - Summary report’, January. JRC (2008), EUR 23232 EN, ‘A plant life management model including optimized MS&I programme – Safety and economic issues’, JRC EUR report, January.
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Kelly, D., Rodionov, A., Klugel, J-U. (2008), Practical Issues in Component Aging Analysis. Proceedings of PSA’2008 International Topical Meeting, Knoxville, USA, 7–11 September 2008, ANS, La Grange Park. Nitoi, M., Rodionov, A. (2008), Qualitative approach for selection of Systems, Structures and Components to be considered in Ageing PSA, EUR23446EN. Petten: EC DG JRC Institute for Energy. Poghosyan, Sh., Malkhasyan, A., Rodionov, A. (2008), Components Selection for Ageing PSA of Armenian NPP Unit 2. Proceedings of PSA’2008 International Topical Meeting, Knoxville, USA, 7–11 September 2008, ANS, La Grange Park. Rodionov, A., Atwood, C., Kirchsteiger, Ch., Patric, M. (2008), Demonstration of statistical approaches to identify component’s ageing by operational data analysis – A case study for the ageing PSA network. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 93, 1534–1542. US-NRC (2002), An approach to using probabilistic risk assessment in risk-informed decisions on plant-specific changes to the licensing basis. US NRC Regulatory Guide 1.174. Rev.1. US NRC, Washington, DC. Vaisnys, P., Contri, P., Biéth, M. (2007), Monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance programs through the use of peformance indicators, ENC 2007, 19 September 2007, Brussels. Westinghouse (2007), AP1000, www.AP1000.westinghousenuclear.com.
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5
Assessing the socio-economic impacts of ageing and plant life management (AM-PLiM) programmes for long-term operation (LTO) of nuclear power plants (NPPs)
P h. G. T i pp i n g, Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant, Switzerland
Abstract: This chapter provides a review of the manpower, fuel supply and economic considerations associated with ageing management (AM) and plant life management (PLiM) programmes in nuclear power plants (NPPs). The chapter underlines the sound economic value of implementing standard operational practices (OPs), ageing surveillance programmes (ASPs), AM and PLiM in a timely manner. These approaches are used not only to assure safe, profitable and reliable operation, but also to put NPPs in a favourable position to continue operation in excess of their original design lifetimes. The business case demands that the costs involved in investing in the repair, refurbishment, replacement of systems, structures and components (SSCs) will have to be amortized over the plant’s operation lifetime. Power uprates (PUs) in NPPs are shown as a way to further increase profits. Longterm operation (LTO) is identified as a sound economical way in which NPP stakeholders can amortize costs over a longer time period and make additional operational profits. Key words: new nuclear power plants (NPPs), economics aspects of AM, ASPs and PLiM for LTO, repair, refurbishment and replacement of SSCs, PU, amortization, full lifecycle, licence renewal, greenhouse gas emissions, radwaste, knowledge management, succession planning, nuclear-based fuel resources.
5.1
Nuclear power as part of the global energy mix: energy demand, environmental issues and manpower
In January 2009, British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL) and British Energy (BE) expressed the wish to develop and construct new NPPs to replace existing ones as they reach their true end-of-life status [1]. If we consider the fact that nuclear power currently accounts for about 19% of electricity generated in the UK, the urgency of the matter is clear; both companies argue that without the contribution of nuclear power, the UK will be unable to meet energy demands, or targets for cutting greenhouse gas emissions (GGEs). A report 117 © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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from the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution suggested that the UK should make 60% cuts in CO2 emissions by 2050, and 80% by 2100 if it is to play a significant role in overall efforts to counter global warming [2]. The UK government passed the Climate Change Act in 2008 (updated 2009), committing the UK to reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by at least 34% by 2020 and by at least 80% by 2050, relative to 1990 levels [3]. Nuclear power has a relatively low carbon footprint (CF), making the development of the nuclear power industry the only practical route to take in order to ensure a ‘lower-carbon’ future for the UK. When it was reported in April 2009 that a list of potential sites for new NPPs had been unveiled by the UK government, the UK Energy and Climate Change Secretary stated that it was an important step towards a new generation of nuclear power stations, as part of the low carbon future of [Great] Britain [4]. The UK government now plans to narrow the ‘electrical energy generation gap’ that will arise when existing NPPs (and coal-fired stations) are progressively taken out of service. Furthermore, the building of new NPPs has the potential to offer thousands of jobs to the UK, and multi-million pound opportunities to British businesses. By the year 2020, the European Union has also set a goal to reduce industrial CO2 emissions by 20%. This is an ambitious plan if safe, clean, reliable and economically competitive energy supplies are to keep pace with demand. The case for maintaining and developing nuclear-generated power has never been stronger, when we recognize that export-driven economies require cheap and ecologically benign energy to create products and jobs. Many of the environmental problems that humanity faces today have their origins in a time about 220 years ago, at the beginning of the fossilfuelled (coal, oil and gas) industrial revolution. Moreover, the Earth’s human population has increased nearly seven-fold since 1900, which has also caused an insatiable demand for food, as well as energy. The steady rise of ‘greenhouse gas’, especially CO2, in the Earth’s atmosphere since the 1900s bears witness to the fact that the processing and burning of fossil-based fuels to produce energy and provide transportation is most probably linked to the extreme effects of climate change being observed today. Additional environmental pollutants such as sulphur dioxide (SO2) also arise when fossil fuels are burned, which causes the formation of acid rain. Furthermore, increased methane gas emissions due to commercial-scale farming has a real potential for increasing the ‘greenhouse gas’ inventory [5]. Methane (CH4) has about 20 times the heat-trapping effect of an equivalent amount of CO2. If the currently observed rate of global warming continues, additional CH4 is likely to be released at increasing rates from underwater sources, such as lakes and oceans, thus further exacerbating the problem of climate change. It is a common moral obligation for both developed and developing
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countries to ensure that present human actions will not leave a chemically and heat-polluted planet as an untenable legacy to future generations. However, though nuclear power has a low CF and operates free from GGE, we cannot ignore the fact that it creates radioactive waste (radwaste). It is therefore of paramount importance to collect, condition and dispose of radwaste in an efficient and safe way. Nuclear power and disposal of radwaste must remain safe technologies in order to maintain a high level of public acceptance. Furthermore, as a mature industry with an ever-evolving future, the nuclear power industry will also create attractive career prospects for young technologists. The challenges presented by the replacement of decommissioned NPPs and increasing the share of nuclear power with new generation NPPs also includes the difficulty of providing sufficient numbers of well-trained engineers, technicians and operating personnel. It is here that NPP owners and operators, national and international organizations, colleges, universities and research institutes must provide environments that actively promote and impart expertise in all aspects of nuclear technology. The vast majority of pioneer and senior generation nuclear power plant designers, technologists, operators and regulators working between 1955 and 2010 have now retired. After the Chernobyl NPP accident in 1986, large numbers of young technology students no longer regarded nuclear science as a career path [6], and many educational institutions dropped nuclear power technology and engineering completely from their teaching syllabuses. The situation has now changed, since many countries now recognize that nuclear power still has a key role to play in the world’s ecological and economic future development. It is thus essential to the future of nuclear power to act now in order to capture the current knowledge concerning, for example, optimum NPP design and principles of maintaining safe operation, inspection and regulation in order that plant personnel are able to make sound judgements in the future. If the world is to develop further industrially, whilst acknowledging the significant GGE, CF and pollution issues associated with the use of fossilbased fuels, convincing arguments exist for the continued use and expansion of commercial nuclear power from both ecological and socio-economic points of view.
5.2
Aspects of current and future nuclear fuel supply and its impact on the viability of nuclear power
It is expected that pollution issues will increasingly influence our way of thinking about all forms of energy use in the future. At least for the next 100–150 years, fission-based (current technology) commercial nuclear power is expected to remain a valuable source of energy, particularly if
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the currently known uranium fuel resources are used efficiently. Continued and expanded use of nuclear power will still be significantly dependent on its public acceptance, and this requires that nuclear power remains a safe technology. At current and projected prices, nuclear fuel is likely to remain a very cost-effective energy carrier. For example, at 45,000 MWd per tonne burn-up, 1 kg of enriched uranium fuel (UO2) will produce about 360 000 kWh of electricity. When conversion, enrichment and fabrication costs are considered, this gives a fuel cost of only about 0.5 US cents per kWh (in 2009). Natural uranium resources suitable for converting into fuel are thought to be sufficient to cover the industries’ requirements for at least 150 years. Indeed, with other fuel cycles (fast breeder reactor concept), increased efficiency and reprocessing of spent fuel, as well as decreasing the degree of enrichment in some ‘high-enriched-uranium’ 235U fuels, it is thought that this could meet demand in excess of 1000 years. Thorium (Th) may also be used as a source of nuclear-based fuel, and, with easy-to-recover reserves of at least 4.4 million tonnes, it could be even more abundant than uranium [7]. Although not fissile itself, the isotope 232Th can absorb slow (thermalized) neutrons to ‘breed’ the isotope 233U, which is fissile and long-lived. An attractive aspect of using the thorium fuel cycle is that less plutonium and other transuranic elements are created when compared with the direct uranium fuel cycle. This has great potential for lowering plutonium inventories, and thus easing many radwaste and nuclear proliferation issues. (Note: The fuels used for nuclear fusion reactors (which are beyond the scope of this book) are isotopes of hydrogen (deuterium (2H) and tritium (3H)) and they are deemed to be practically inexhaustible. Fusion reactor concepts are currently under research and development, and may consequently only become a commercially viable reality towards the latter half of the present century.)
5.3
Economic overview of the nuclear power plant (NPP) lifecycle
NPPs are designed and operated to safely and reliably produce electrical power at a profit. They are particularly suited to the task of providing constant base-load power to the grid. This is particularly relevant if nuclear energy is only a part (e.g. up to about 20–30%) of the overall energy production mix of a country, and alternative sources of energy are available which can be readily adjusted to follow peaks and troughs in demand. In some countries where the majority of electrical power (e.g. about 75%) is nuclear generated, such as in France, the NPPs’ outputs have to be adjusted to follow demand as there is less scope for flexibility. By way of comparison, the UK (with about 19% nuclear-generated power), never designed, licensed or operated
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the first and second generation of NPPs to operate for following varying demands for power, and thus their role continues to be to provide the baseload to the grid [8]. The longer a NPP operates at its full allowable rated power, free from forced outages or safety-related operational restrictions, the more money it creates. Nuclear power plants are expensive to build, but relatively cheap to operate; it is usually only in the last years of their original design lives that they will approach amortization. Therefore, it makes good business sense to first reach the NPP design life, and, having respect for the ability of the NPP concerned to fulfil its licensing conditions (safety aspects), and continue operation. The ‘design life’ of a NPP may be regarded as a relative term, since it is broadly based on usually very conservative engineering assessments of SSCs and how sufficient safety margins thereof may be maintained for as long as possible. Furthermore, there are only a few items in a NPP that truly are life-determining, namely the large, passive SSCs that are practically, technically or economically impossible to replace. A significant focus of OPs, AM, ASPs and PLiM programmes to counter or mitigate ageing degradation (AD) (and to maintain sufficient safety margins) is naturally placed on these SSCs because the longer they are kept fit-for-service, the longer the NPP’s true operational life will be. This leads to a better chance to protect the overall plant investment. Furthermore, SSCs that can be replaced as a matter of routine also benefit from standard OPs, monitoring or maintenance, since they may be kept in service in excess of their nominal design lives if their true condition is known. Replacement costs may then be postponed to a later point in time, or even totally avoided. However, safety must have priority over economic aspects; any safety-related events can potentially become more costly than short-term savings made on delaying repairs or replacements of SSCs. Efforts to minimize AD have a cost, but minimizing contributors that cause premature or unnecessary replacement of SSCs represents avoided costs. The total cost of building and operating a NPP depends on many complex factors. Environmental impact qualification, location of site, access roads, the construction of power lines, land procurement, construction, commissioning, operation, radwaste treatment, radwaste disposal, and eventually decommissioning, are just a few. Other cost factors, apart from securing enough qualified personnel for all aspects of operation, include fuel, licence fees, additional expenditures associated with repairs and replacements of SSCs, and the inherent plant operational costs (e.g. cost of the OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes). Unusual or unforeseen costs may arise at any time during operation, such as the replacement of steam generators (SGs) and core shrouds, and even reactor pressure vessel (RPV) annealing. They are not only expensive items in themselves, but their replacement will also lead to extended outages and therefore low plant availability and consequently
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lost sales of electricity. For example, SG replacement caused by Alloy 600 tubing integrity issues has become a necessity for many older pressurized water reactors (PWRs). This is a major task and costs around US$150 million, depending on the design of the NPP involved. Such major investment costs are only likely to be recovered if the NPP concerned continues to operate and enters the LTO phase of its life. Re-licensing/licence renewal (LR) (e.g. US practice) or continued operation with periodic safety review (PSR) every 10 years (e.g. European practice) means that any such investment can then be amortized over a longer time period (e.g. 20 years) [9–12]. A typical cost of a LR procedure in the United States is about US$10–20 million. The present net value of LR, if all operating NPPs in the United States operate for 60 years, is approximately US$25 billion [13]. The LR process in the United States takes up to 5 years to perform, but the LR approach is becoming more streamlined as good practices and experience are continually implemented. It is recognized that LR is a relatively cost-effective way to maintain the supply of safe, clean energy, and by April 2009 the US regulator (US-NRC) had already re-licensed 52 NPPs (about half of the US fleet), and eventually up to 85 (from 104) NPPs could benefit from LR.
5.4
Cost drivers of nuclear power plant (NPP) operation
The largest unknown in determining the value of a NPP, particularly in the LTO phase, is the expected market price of electricity. This variable outweighs all other cost drivers, but it is practically impossible to accurately predict the supply–demand–price situation over 20 or more years into the future. However, existing NPPs with effective standard OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes have several practical and economical advantages over new-build NPPs. Apart from current operational profits, the projected future operation (i.e. LTO) will generate further turnover, income and profits. A NPP in the LTO phase benefits greatly from each extra kilowatt-hour of electricity sold. The overall economic situation is also more certain, since existing and currently operating NPPs are, among other things, free from construction permit delays and limits on heavy industrial capacity to supply new NPPs on time. Capital costs are also less, due to amortization and depreciation. Most utilities and operators have recognized this, and therefore keep their NPPs operating for as long as they remain safe. Financial considerations will decide when NPPs are no longer profitable to operate. However, when all options for SSC modifications, replacements, refurbishing are exhausted, and large, passive items such as containment, buildings and RPVs can no longer fulfil regulatory requirements, the real end of operational life of the NPP will be due to safety considerations. Ideally at this final stage, all
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remaining investments would have been amortized and decommissioning and radwaste disposal costs covered in order to return the site to a greenfield status.
5.5
Basic economic requirements for sustainable operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs)
There are three basic economic considerations that must be reviewed in the industry. These include the necessity of maximizing power generation/ sales (high plant availability and power sold at a market-competitive cost), minimizing operating costs (e.g. focused inspection, replacement of SSCs based on their actual condition and higher levels of fuel burn-up) and assessing the additional costs of operation. When large investments, such as SG replacement are necessary, a cost–benefit analysis must be made. This will take into consideration the projected remaining operating lifetime of the plant and the prospect of achieving complete amortization. Using a holistic approach, realistic economic targets must be identified and then weighed against the expected end-of-life of the plant (i.e. the full lifecycle) and any deductions for fixed and unexpected costs. This methodology is as follows: 1. Take into account current and projected safety issues, their ranking in importance and urgency, and the cost of implementing mandatory requirements for safety upgrade tasks. 2. Identify non-safety-related technical issues that may affect operational flexibility or power output and estimated costs. This may include SG replacement, secondary side equipment, turbine generator replacement or modification, instrumentation and control (I&C), including software, modernization and immediate costs associated with power uprate (PU) (if relevant to the plant). 3. Forecast the price evolution of electricity. 4. To counter the fact that parts may become obsolete, create a strategic inventory of functionally equivalent and qualified spare parts to minimize forced outage or replacement delivery times. 5. Plan for sufficient radwaste treatment and disposal facilities. 6. Consider the costs of decommissioning, in order to return the NPP site back to a greenfield status. (NB: plant dismantling/decommissioning costs are unevenly distributed over time, as they come at the true endof-life of the NPP. Such costs are dealt with by discounting methods, since their values are time-dependent.) Clearly, economic assessment of NPP and LTO operation is greatly influenced by factors that are relatively difficult to quantify or anticipate. However, we can assume that the demand for cheap, environmentally clean and reliable
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supplies of energy will increase with time. This provides a certainty in an otherwise complex economic situation.
5.6
Assessing the costs and economics of nuclear power plant (NPP) operation and the impact of ageing and plant life management (AM-PLiM) programmes for long-term operation (LTO)
Profitable operation of a NPP requires that the total income gained by selling energy (electrical/district heating) will exceed the total operational costs by a margin that covers all foreseeable economic risks. The situation is a difficult and dynamic one, since energy prices may increase or decrease. Furthermore, a NPP at the start of its operation will carry a large capitalcharge debt but will have relatively smaller operation and maintenance (O&M) costs to carry. Over the NPP’s operational life, the capital debt will decrease (e.g. debt repayment, depreciation), whilst the O&M costs will tend to increase through the replacement of SSCs, exceptional maintenance, increased regulatory requirements and monitoring/inspection due to SSC-AD. Furthermore, capital charges and O&M tasks will still cause costs even when the NPP is not generating money through energy sales. To ensure financial success it is therefore necessary to price the energy so as to sufficiently cover all costs. Avoidable costs consist of many factors such as the cost of routine O&M, fuel, future capital expenditure and improvements to the NPP SSCs in certain years. The NPP outage time (forced or planned) must also be factored into the replacement capacity required, charged at the current market price. When no improvements or changes to the NPP are necessary, the avoidable costs will be the sum of O&M and fuel costs. In order to judge the economic viability of NPP operation and PLiM programmes for LTO, three factors must be considered: the cost of continued operation (compared to NPP shutdown and costs of replacement energy), overall net present value (NPV) of any necessary improvement programme, and the internal rate of return (IRR) of the improvement costs. The IRR is the discount rate at which the NPV becomes zero. However, a utilities’ decision to carry out standard or special OPs, AM, ASPs and PLiM will be influenced primarily by safety considerations. It needs a commitment to invest resources for keeping SSCs safe and reliable, as the corporate goal must be to operate the NPP at the best achievable level of safety for at least as long as it takes to amortize such expenditures. Clearly, OPs, AM, ASPs and PLiM will also cause costs, but, according to general experience, freedom from forced outages due to unreliable SSCs will more than counter these expenditures. Regulatory requirements (or political issues) may, however, lead to an earlier than planned-for cessation of NPP operation, © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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thus causing financial loss. Due to their very nature, however, such aspects are virtually impossible to predict. Nevertheless, safely operated NPPs will also have the best prospects to go into LTO. In deregulated, competitive markets (increasingly the case for electrical power sales), a fully amortized NPP at the start of its new (LTO) licensed period after 35 years of operation is a valuable asset. Such a NPP can sell its power at marginal cost, and thus compete with alternative energy suppliers. The operating profit margin of the NPP will increase accordingly. The majority of countries embrace the option of continuing NPP operations after reaching the original design life, since it makes sound ecological and business sense. However, this option is clearly dependent upon national energy policies and relevant regulations/licensing conditions. Until the mid1990s, the industry, as a whole, tended to focus on achieving NPP design lives and then decommissioning the plants. Now, however, the focus has shifted towards ‘life-after-40’, since OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM strategies have been shown to pay real dividends from both safety and profitability standpoints. Furthermore, optimized OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes are favourable precursors to demonstrate to a licensing authority that the plants are operated and maintained to the highest level of safety, increasing the likelihood of being licensed to enter the LTO phase. Another consideration is whether a NPP’s owners will apply for licensing permission to uprate from the originally designed power rating. Power uprate (PU) has a relatively short payback time and can add further value to a NPP. However, NPP-AM, ASPs and PLiM, as well as OPs may require corresponding modification in order to accommodate possible PU-driven SSC-AD effects. Furthermore, it may be necessary to revise shut-down and emergency procedures associated with increased fuel core power and coolant flow rates relative to the pre-PU. All these tasks cost money, but the end result must show that the increased power output has been achieved costeffectively, with no negative effect on the safety level or environment. A candidate NPP for a PU will thus need a comprehensive review of its SSCs in order to assure their fitness-for-service under conditions of increased temperature, pressure or flow. Such increases bring possible environmental impact issues that must also be reviewed to ensure compliance with requirements. For example, radiation levels may increase somewhat, due to the higher power level of the reactor, or the temperature of plant-discharged water to an adjacent river may approach allowed maximum limits. Several trends and factors have favourably altered nuclear power’s economic position over the last 20 years. For example, operating costs of NPPs have steadily fallen as plant availability has increased. The overall steady increase in NPP’s availability, from 75 to 80% in the 1980s to 85 to 90% in 2009, is largely due to the positive effects of continually improving standards of OPs, AM, ASPs and PLiM programmes. Other cost-reducing factors include
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the reliability of the re-licensing process (especially in the United States) and lower than expected financing costs thereof, and increasingly efficient fuel cycles.
5.7
Conclusions
1. There are both financial and safety gains to be made when AM, ASPs and PLiM programmes are implemented along with standard OPs in NPPs since SSCs are more reliable, safety margins are maintained at sufficient levels, potential original design weaknesses are addressed, and both current and LTO is facilitated. 2. All costs associated with the NPP have to be recovered by depreciation and amortization before the end of the NPP’s original design life. When this is reached, LTO will further enhance the competitiveness and profit margins of the NPP. Equally, power uprates will increase the profitability of NPPs. Asset management is therefore a significant incentive for utilities to implement effective OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes. 3. No matter what type of NPP is under consideration, broad technical aspects remain the same. These include preventive maintenance, time-limited ageing analyses, maintenance of equipment, qualification of OPs, strategies to replace SSCs, strategies to combat original design inadequacies, mitigation or elimination of AD, and the robust implementation of stateof-the-art practices in all areas. A cost–benefit analysis will indicate the overall economic limits on proposed SSC repair, refurbishment, replacement and back-fitting actions, but regulatory safety requirements will dictate their extent. Safety must always have priority over economic considerations. 4. Power uprates (e.g. up to 20% relative to the original rating) are relatively cheap, and so may increase the profitability of NPPs. However, OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes may have to be modified to account for the new plant power rating status and configuration. 5. Since NPPs have relatively low power generation costs, there is a very strong economic incentive to maintain them with OPs, AM, ASPs and PLiM programmes and thus assure reliable current operation and to eventually facilitate LTO. 6. OPs, AM, ASPs and PLiM programmes have their own costs, but the economic benefit is high for current and long-term operation when OPs, AM, ASPs and PLiM are effective in achieving their respective goals. 7. Operational and business risks must be carefully assessed. Excluding a major accident, there are only two major risks to the overall operational life of a NPP to consider; namely when the non-replaceable SSCs can no longer fulfil their design and safety functions, and when major destruction and damage is caused by natural phenomena (e.g. seismic activity) or by terrorist attack. © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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Sources of further information and advice
Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply: Two Reports by the IAEA Director General. (Source: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index. cfm?fa=view&id=23256. Published 9 June 2009. Ayers, G., ‘Running nuclear power plants up to 50 years: economics and technology’, Nuclear Europe Worldscan, Vol. 11–12, 1996. Commissioning of Nuclear Power Plants: Training and human resource considerations, IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NG-T-2.2, STI/PUB/1334, IAEA, Vienna, 2008. Competency Assessments for Nuclear Industry Personnel, STI/PUB/1236, IAEA, Vienna, 2006. Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities: Training and human resource considerations, IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NG-T-2.3, STI/PUB/1332, IAEA, Vienna, 2008. Efremenkov, V.M., ‘Chemistry and technology of radioactive waste management – the IAEA perspective’, Czechoslovak Journal of Physics, Vol. 53, Supplement 1, Part II, pp. A579–A587, 2007. Managing Human Resources in the Field of Nuclear Energy, IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NG-G-2.1, STI/PUB/1397, IAEA, Vienna, 2009. Cost Drivers for the Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Life Extension. IAEA-TECDOC-1309, Vienna, September 2002. The New Economics of Nuclear Power, World Nuclear Association (WNA) report and press release from 1 December 2005. Economic Performance Indicators for Nuclear Power Plants. IAEA Technical Reports Series TRS-437, STI/DOC/010/437, IAEA, Vienna, 2006. Integrated Approach to Optimize Operation and Maintenance Costs for Operating Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA Technical Document 1509. Vienna, 2006.
5.9
Acknowledgements
The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful suggestions and guidance supplied by Dr B. Raj and Dr T. Jayakumar of the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR), Kalpakkam, India.
5.10
References
1. ‘Four potential sites for new nuclear power stations have been unveiled by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority’. Report by R. Prince, Political Correspondent, Telegraph, 23 January 2009. 2. Energy – The Changing Climate, Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution Twenty Second Report, Cm 4794, June 2000. 3. Climate Change Act 2008, Department of Energy and Climate Change: http://www.
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decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/legislation/cc_act_08/cc_act_08.aspx; accessed January 2010. 4. ‘Potential Nuclear Sites Unveiled’, Report in the Telegraph, citing E. Miliband (Energy and Climate Change Secretary), 15 April 2009. 5. Roosevelt, M., ‘Methane: The really scary greenhouse gas’, Los Angeles Times, 3 February 2009. Source taken from: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/02/23/ methane-the-really-scary_n_169059.html 6. ‘The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1’, IAEA Safety Series No. 75INSAG-7, Vienna, 1992. 7. ‘Our changing Earth’, IAEA-Vienna, Bulletin March 2008, 49–2. 8. Nuttall, W., ‘Why is nuclear power baseload?’, EU Energy Policy Blog, 1 July 2007 (source: http://www.energypolicyblog.com/?p=45). 9. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Requirements for Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants, 10 CFR Part 54, NRC, Washington, DC, 1995. 10. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, 10 CFR Part 50.65, NRC, Washington, DC, 1996. 11. Nuclear Energy Institute, Industry Guideline for Implementing the Requirements of 10 CFR Part 54, The License Renewal Rule, Rep. NEI 95–10, NEI, Washington, DC, 2001. 12. Periodic safety review of nuclear power plants, Safety Guide, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-2.10, IAEA, Vienna, 2003. 13. Plant life management for long-term operation of light water reactors – Principles and Guidelines, IAEA Technical Report Series No. 448, IAEA, Vienna, 2006.
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Part II Ageing degradation of irradiated materials in nuclear power plant systems, structures and components (SSC): mechanisms, effects and mitigation techniques
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6
Failure prevention and analysis in nuclear power plant systems, structures and components (SSC): a holistic approach
P h. G. T i pp i n g, Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant, Switzerland
Abstract: Requirements for NPP SSC quality, defence-in-depth (DID) and accident management are discussed within the context of avoiding SSC failures and, should they occur, limiting their consequences. The concept of latent failure conditions (LFCs) in systems is introduced. Questions to ask and aspects to consider when investigating and analysing failures in NPP SSCs are presented. The circumstances already prevailing in the NPP at the time of the failure, and that may have contributed to it, are examined holistically to show how a comprehensive way of understanding the complete event can be arrived at. The development of a systematic approach to guide and assist in the identification of key causative factors and to facilitate an objective SSC failure analysis is explained. Key words: failures in components, root cause identification, latent failure conditions, defence-in-depth, accident management, human factors, holistic approach.
6.1
Introduction
This chapter does not deal directly with how to physically examine failures in nuclear power plant (NPP) systems, structures and components (SSCs), but mainly describes a holistically based approach that may be used to address and analyse such failures. This type of methodology has the potential to provide in-depth information and give indicators and robust answers regarding how and why SSCs fail, and also to reveal any relevant contributing secondary circumstances to the failure, either within or external to the NPP concerned. Accordingly, the chain of events before, during and after the failure can be identified and the overall condition of the NPP may be obtained; this facilitates an appreciation of the sometimes complex human–machine interactions that have led to the SSC failure under consideration. Once root causes are known, corresponding corrective or mitigating actions can be implemented to avoid recurrence of the failure. (Detailed examples of actual failure analysis of materials used in NPP SSCs are given elsewhere in this book). New technology is constantly being added to existing processes (defined 131 © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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here as industrial plants (e.g. nuclear power, chemical manufacturing, oil refineries)) or other human activities (e.g. transport, construction) usually to improve, modernize or upgrade them in terms of safety, efficiency, reliability, simplification of process control and operation, to facilitate maintenance and to increase profitability. New technology is also added to take advantage of the latest scientific knowledge available concerning materials behaviour (e.g. ageing degradation (AD) aspects) and to combat obsolescence or conceptual ageing in industrial processes. However, this puts increased demands on both system and human reliability that may not always be evident, or sufficiently appreciated, at the time of the new technologies’ implementation [1]. Maximum limits of SSC operating conditions, but within prescribed safety margins, may, nevertheless, be more closely approached, and if SSC-AD effects have not been sufficiently monitored or mitigated, the relative probability of failure in a SSC could increase either insignificantly, tangibly or significantly. It is therefore essential to have in place effective standard plant operational practices (OPs), ageing surveillance programmes (ASPs) and ageing and plant life management programmes (AM and PLiM, respectively) to follow the condition of SSCs with respect to their ability to satisfy their design and safety requirements. The ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes must be checked and modified, if necessary, to address rates and types of AD, and to take into account changes in the NPP’s current operational conditions and configuration (i.e. with the new technology added). Thus, when any type of new technology is incorporated into existing plant, a comprehensive review and assessment of all relevant factors that may impact OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes or emergency procedures must be carried out to see whether the plant procedures have become outdated, insufficient or redundant to varying degrees. Advances in technology, if not sufficiently analysed for all their possible side-effects, can potentially result in a reduction in the level of human perceived risk, since automation, for example, may isolate personnel from reality. This is particularly so when absolute credence is given to plant parameter signals that may, in themselves, be erroneous or misleading in nature [2]. The NPP operating staff may thus become shielded from the real situation that has developed and therefore be unable to recognize and thus choose, and instigate, the right actions necessary. When failure happens in any industrial plant, transport system or building, for example, and damage to the environment, loss of life and large financial costs occur, the attention of the media, regulators, politicians and the public naturally focuses on who, or what, was responsible. With responsibility and causes established, the issues of compensation, litigation and even punishment in the form of fines or imprisonment will then follow [3]. It is therefore necessary to first define what constitutes failure and then to unravel the circumstances that were present and which contributed, no matter to what degree, to the event. ‘Failure’, within the general context
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of this chapter, may be regarded as a condition of inability of a NPP SSC to fulfil its safety, design/operational function sufficiently, as required by specification or regulatory requirements. However, identification of a SSC that is ‘out of specification’ (but before any event or accident occurs), can be taken as proof that the NPP’s overall OPs (e.g. testing, monitoring, repairs and replacement programmes) and associated programmes are effective. It should be noted that the condition and degree of SSC insufficiency may have developed gradually or may have remained below the detection limits of monitoring, inspection or testing procedures used at the time. The definition of failure may also be extended to also include growing human complacency with time, inability or inadequacy to detect or recognize a developing situation (training level inadequacies), a reduction in questioning attitude or the omission to take appropriate corrective actions once the event occurs. This may be generally classed as deterioration in plant safety culture. Experience shows that major accidents, irrespective in which area of human activity they occur, are usually the accumulation of many small deficiencies, errors or oversights that, individually, would not be capable of causing an accident. Physical failures of NPP SSCs and their consequences may have purely economic impact (e.g. forced plant outages, expensive component replacement [4] or even total loss-of-plant [5]) or safety consequences, or a combination of these to create financial ruin and long-lasting social and environmental issues. Particularly for NPPs, such failures and accidents will cause a loss of political and public acceptance of nuclear power.
6.2
Reducing failure probability and consequences thereof in nuclear power plant (NPP) systems, structures and components (SSCs)
6.2.1 Requirement for SSC quality Due to the very highest standards of manufacture, quality assurance, approval procedures/certification, materials choice, conservative design margins, operation, maintenance, inspection, repair, replacements, OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes, as well as regulatory requirements, spontaneous failures of major safety-relevant NPP SSCs are exceedingly rare occurrences, but when they happen, they have a large potential to destroy human life, inflict long-term damage on the environment and cause considerable financial losses [2, 4–6]. This ‘low probability of failure, but serious consequences if failure occurs’ scenario is also true for many other industrial plant or human activities, including, for example, chemical manufacturing, aviation, space exploration and mining [7–10]. However, despite using the best known design, manufacturing methods and OPs and principles, and adherence to regulations, NPP SSCs may still be subject
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to erroneous personnel actions or unusual operational stressors that could overcome a design principle or regulatory requirement when rare, unknown or very unusual combinations of circumstances, or demands on the plant, develop in the system. It can thus be stated that although the material quality per se of SSCs, including certification of mechanical, chemical and physical properties thereof, is one very important aspect, any inherent weaknesses, omissions or oversights in design, OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes, routine monitoring or inspection, or incorrect human actions, for example, may nevertheless contribute to a lessening of the overall reliability and safety of SSCs in service. Unexpected reactions between the materials and the environments they function in may lead to new AD mechanisms, or faster than expected rates of known AD, and this may bring the component into an operating regime whereby maximum limits of existing safety margins are approached and the relative probability of spontaneous failure could increase by some finite degree. Safety margins set the boundaries of acceptable risks at any construction, means of transport or a NPP, for example. That risk level determines what types of safety systems, including emergency procedures and accident management strategies, must be in place in case of accidents.
6.2.2 Defence-in-depth (DID) Nuclear power plant designs feature DID, whereby a series of independent barriers are placed between the radioactive nuclear fuel and the environment. It is clear that DID can only limit the extent and lessen the consequences of a SSC failure, but as a concept, DID itself cannot prevent any actual failure or functional loss of individual SSCs. The salient features of DID are primarily engineered physical barriers (e.g. reactor vessel and containment integrity, core-catcher, emergency core cooling systems, filtered containment venting, fuel cladding, redundant/back-up cooling systems) that, as far as possible, should not depend directly on human action to mitigate or contain the extent of radiotoxic releases or to slow down the rate of accident progression, and secondary measures to be implemented in the framework of the NPP’s accident and emergency management strategies (AEMS). The AEMS cover such items as the control of abnormal situations such as fires and plant emergency procedures, civil evacuation plans and the availability and distribution of prophylactic potassium iodide (KI) tablets to reduce the risk of thyroid gland cancer. (Note: taking KI tablets reduces the risk of thyroid cancer significantly, since the tablets cause the thyroid gland to saturate with respect to non-radioactive iodine, which means that no harmful radioactive iodine can be absorbed by the thyroid gland.)
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6.2.3 Example of the concept of probability The probability (p) scale ranges from 0 to 1; when p equals 0 an event (e.g. failure) will never happen; when p = 1, it certainly will. An underlying principle of DID may be understood as an application of the multiplication law of probability theory, i.e. the individual probabilities of failure in the various DID barriers are multiplied together. Depending on the condition/ fitness-for-service of the individual barriers (or procedures), which should be independent of each other to be able to fulfil their intended function (i.e. no common cause failure (CCF) path present), a usually very low value of probability of p (failure) will be present in the system. For example, when a system has a total of 5 DID barriers, each having a design probability of p = 0.5 of failing, then the probability of them all failing at the same time will be p = 0.03125. Typically, the individual DID barriers in NPPs all have values of p (failure) 0.5. When a system moves away from steady-state, normal operation conditions, seemingly unrelated factors can, however, contribute to some finite increase in the probability of a failure in one or more DID barriers. Nevertheless, the overall p (failure) value will still remain very low, providing the remaining (effective) DID barriers are in optimum condition and the DID concept present in the NPP remains robust.
6.2.4 Accident and emergency management strategies (AEMS) Any number of potential root causes for SSC failure and/or accident may be present within a NPP before an event occurs [11]. This is also true for any other type of industrial plant, transport or construction, but robust designs and DID, also including AEMS are in place as an integral part of the overall goals to ensure that the extent and consequences of any failures are limited as much as possible. Standard (routine) plant OPs, maintenance, monitoring, repairs and replacements of SSCs, plus ASPs, AM and PLiM all complement each other to varying degrees in order that potential inadequacies or failures in SSCs can usually be detected and remedied before they can occur. A vigilant, questioning attitude and good safety culture of the plant personnel will also play a vital role in the overall goal to maintain safety. Nevertheless, failures in NPP SSCs do occur, just as in any other industrial plants (e.g. chemical, mining), constructions (e.g. dams, buildings), equipment (e.g. cranes, hawsers, anchor bolts) or transport (e.g. aircraft, spacecraft and ships). However, failures of NPP SSCs do not necessarily mean that a serious accident will follow. Actions taken to prevent NPP SSC failures from developing into severe or serious accidents are addressed in AEMS, which are basically decision-making tools using logical-based sequential decisions
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to guide plant personnel in an optimum way to mitigate, limit and contain all consequences of plant equipment failures (i.e. within and outside plant), and to bring the NPP into a long-term, stable state. Rapid and effective use of AEMS will not only limit the consequences of the event, but may also limit the financial costs thereof.
6.3
Latent failure conditions (LFCs) and failure terminology
6.3.1 LFCs Latent failures or conditions can be regarded as system errors but may be better envisaged as hazards that have developed or have become unknowingly embedded within a system or process, rather than risks directly associated with human actions. The LFCs arise, for example, from unseen deficiencies residing within such areas as organization culture, management decisions or design of procedures or weaknesses in plant workforce training programmes. These insufficiencies resident in the system may, with the passage of time, translate into error-provoking conditions when certain conditions arise, or they can create dormant weaknesses in the plant’s defences, ready to contribute to the occurrence, or increase the severity of, an event, near-miss incident or accident when combined with active failures. An active (or functional) failure is a malfunction relating to a change in the operating mode of a component or its part. The operating environment (e.g. temperature, pressure, coolant chemistry) or stressors (e.g. vibration levels, radiation and mechanical loading) may be changed either intentionally or unknowingly, and can thus affect the functionality. Compared to the normal full-power operating condition of a NPP, the maintenance condition is, by its very nature, more complicated in character, since it is usually characterized by several, diverse activities being carried out by various individuals all at the same time. For example, NPPs undergo an annual (or 18-month) main revision, which includes refuelling, repairs, replacements and exceptional maintenance, where necessary. As a consequence of this sometimes intense and complex work-schedule and time-pressure to get the NPP back on-line as quickly as possible, human and work-related errors may be potentially less likely to be detected, and then they become unwittingly incorporated into the NPP’s system to contribute, at a later point in time, to a failure. These LFCs are thus hidden conditions that can be precursory to SSC failures. A SSC containing a latent failure can thus exist as a dormant, but unseen, threat to operation and safety of a NPP over an extended period of time. In a wider sense, even inadvertently built-in inadequacies in emergency procedures may only become evident when attempts are used to implement the plant’s AEMS in a real situation. The field
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of LFCs makes a significant contribution to understanding how systems fail, and LFCs are a common feature in sophisticated and extensively automated systems using high-level technology, such as that found in NPPs [12].
6.3.2 Failure terminology By the nature of them, weaknesses or insufficiencies in SSCs, or inadequacies in OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes and also AEMS, only become evident after the SSC failure event, and the accident, has taken place. This necessitates that a systematic failure analysis is performed, taking into account all available information, prior, during and after the event to obtain the root causes. The following provides some main definitions and terminology that may be used when dealing with NPP SSC failures and related events: ∑
∑
∑ ∑ ∑
∑
∑ ∑
An initiating event is a single event causing the NPP to deviate from its normal operational state. An initiating event for an accident can have on-site or off-site features such as a component failure, a natural phenomenon or a hazardous situation due to intentional or non-intentional human action (i.e. terror attack or aircraft accident, respectively). The diversity principle is where redundant systems or components are available to accomplish the same safety function in such a way that these systems or components have one different feature, such as an operating principle, a manufacturing method or physical parameters. An operator error is a single erroneous action committed while an operator attempts to perform a control action relating to a safety function. A passive failure is the loss of integrity of a component or structure, or the blockage of the flow path of a process, such as coolant supply. A hidden failure is an identified failure which does not activate an alarm and which is not detected in tests or inspections performed according to plans. This raises issues of personnel ability charged with inspection or testing, and the suitability/sensitivity of testing methods used. A random failure is a failure whose occurrence is statistically independent of the failure of other components of a similar type. Small statistical variations in material quality, manufacturing method and tolerances, operating conditions, maintenance and testing sensitivities may eventually cause a component to behave differently compared to other components of a similar type, but from a different batch of production. Quality assurance and component functional equivalence issues may be relevant factors to consider here. A safety system is any system performing safety functions. A common-cause failure (CCF) is the failure of several components or structures as a consequence of the same single initiating event or failure. © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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A single failure is a random failure plus its consequent effects, which are assumed to occur during either a normal operational condition or in addition to an initiating event and its consequent effects.
6.4
Holistic approach to analysing nuclear power plant systems, structures and components (npp ssc) failure events
The following outlines a holistic approach that can be used to analyse the total structure of failure events in NPP SSCs or, with appropriate modification, any other technological plant, construction or transport system. Specifically, knowing the overall sequence of events leading up to a NPP SSC failure plays an important role in facilitating robust assessment and identification of the root causes of failures. Seemingly small items, such as an ignored minimum amount of liquid weeping from a seal, a fragment of metal lying under a SSC, the necessity to change water or air filters more frequently than previously, gradual decreases in raw and service water intake flow rates or a radiation monitor that increasingly indicates an approach to maximum allowed limits, may all be precursors to more serious events. Hereby, the importance of the NPP’s workforce safety culture and a questioning attitude are highlighted.
6.4.1 Questions to ask A holistic approach to find the root cause of a NPP SSC failure would address the following items, through a series of questions to be raised, such as the following. (a) What was the NPP’s physical state prior to the failure? For example, the NPP may have been recently refurbished or re-fitted with new SSCs, a routine maintenance or exceptional repair may have just been carried out or a power uprating (PU) may have recently been implemented. Are all NPP SSC documents updated, noting and registering repairs, modifications or new operational practices? Was the plant indicating some unusual disturbances, such as increased pump vibration, coolant temperature instabilities or power excursions, before the failure occurred? Were the plant monitoring and control signals functioning correctly? Was SSC unreliability a rare, sporadic or frequent feature of the NPP’s operations to date? If frequent, are the same SSCs involved and is the supplier’s quality assurance sufficient? Have operational reliability problems increased since a change in SSC specification or supplier? Any change in NPP management or training practices? Do the NPP’s OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes need revision? Did the plant’s management decide to delay (or even cancel) the replacement of the SSC involved, to save money? How did the safety and reliablity assessments for
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the next period of operation of the now-failed SSC become inadequate? Were there any changes in the type, depth or scope of the SSC inspection or the time interval between the failed SSC inspections? All these aspects may be precursors and potential contributors to the overall final failure. (b) What was the NPP’s operational status when the failure under consideration occurred? For example, steady, upset, accident, shut-down for refuelling or maintenance, hot or cold standby, raising or sinking power or full allowable operational power. Were there any unusual circumstances prevailing that could have affected the workload or stress level of NPP personnel? (e.g. exceptional demand for (peak) power, flooding, severe climatic conditions, seismic activity or terror threat). What was the danger to the plant safety? The level of threat to safety is an important aspect of the failure event, e.g. near-miss, low, significant, serious, major. (c) What happened to the NPP after the SSC failure? For example, total loss of plant, radioactive contamination within or external to the plant (i.e. were DID barriers breached and, if so, in what manner), low, reduced or no power generated (also possible loss of emergency power if diesel generators affected – any CCF path?), significance to safety for personnel and environment. Did NPP shutdown and AEMS function smoothly, or were there difficulties in implementing them directly as a result of the failure? If applicable, to what are inadequacies in AEMS attributable? (d) What triggered the SSC failure event or what possible unusual stressors prevailed? The causes may lie in purely mechanical overload failure, physical (e.g. aircraft collision, fires), environmental (e.g. seismic, lightning strike), direct human actions (e.g. wrong valve pressure release setting), or any combinations of these. The final assessment will reflect the role, and to what extent, each factor has played. (e) Identification of the SSC directly involved (e.g. containment, reactor pressure vessel, pressurizer, pumps, piping, seals, control rods, emergency power generators/diesels, instrumentation and control). Was the operational history and reliability of the SSC involved satisfactory until the time of failure? Failure or accident progression mode: was the failure spontaneous in nature or did it progress at slow, medium or rapid speed? Were the methods and tools for SSC monitoring used correctly and at the state-of-theart, science and technology? (Qualified personnel are charged with safetyrelevant inspections, but work and time pressure in an ionizing radiation zone despite ‘as low as reasonably acceptable’ (ALARA) radiological protection procedures and non-optimized planning may affect the quality of results obtained.) Difficulties of access to certain SSCs, due to NPP design features, may compound inspection problems, despite the basic ability of an individual to perform the work according to requirements. (f) Were other SSCs involved (either as joint contributors or themselves affected in a secondary nature by the failure under consideration)? The
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identification of associated SSCs or possible CCF paths will be a vital task to perform, as appropriate, to upgrade the safety in future. For example, valve failures are recurrent problems having potential for causing CCFs. Was the availability of redundant safety and other systems (e.g. DID) nevertheless assured? Has the reliability of other SSCs possibly been affected as a result of the original failure? (i.e. have SSCs adjacent to the failed item been subjected to unusual temperatures, chemical contamination or radiation?). Have actions been taken to verify this? (g) What was the most probable cause of SSC failure? This question cannot usually be answered directly, since, depending on the type of failed SSC, it requires chemical, metallographic, mechanical and physical testing and control of all relevant supporting documentation. (h) How did the plant personnel react? Were the corrective actions taken the best possible to manage the situation? Were existing, validated procedures adhered to, or was it necessary to modify them ad hoc as the failure/accident situation developed? Was it feasible, in the practical situation, to implement the procedures? Was there a proactive approach to deal with the problem? Was there any evidence of lack of appreciation of what was actually happening? Was the personnel situation-awareness consistent with the degree of severity of the problem? Were the emergency procedures (AEMS) adequate and capable to address the situation as it developed and could limit the consequences effectively? (i) Are there any other aspects or features that may conceivably be involved with the sequence of circumstances that resulted in the SSC failure? (see under (d) above).
6.4.2 Acquiring further information and other tasks to do After an initial holistic assessment of the events, which may have already provided deeper insights and information concerning the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the failure event, more specific tasks will have to be performed to find the root cause. A wide range of tools exist to facilitate this. For example, classical metallographic examination will provide information on the failed material’s microstructure, the crack morphology and orientation, and the AD or failure mechanism itself (e.g. transgranular or intergranular stress corrosion cracking, fatigue). Care is needed when removing specimens from failed components, since vital information may be lost if, for example, surface cracks are polished over or the composition of chemical deposits is contaminated. Metallurgical or chemical analysis may be supplemented by mechanical tests (e.g. determination of tensile, hardness and fracture mechanical properties). Results of such tests may then be compared to the SSC supplier’s specification certificates for the SSC in question. Other examinations may include verification of the material’s chemical composition
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(also to be compared with delivery documents) and obtaining an X-ray of a deeply seated flaw, for example. Observing where a crack was initiated will often show the presence of stress raisers in the form of sharp corners (design weakness) or a non-metallic inclusion (material quality). Furthermore, the features of the crack surface will indicate whether corrosion, fatigue, sudden overloading or combinations of these were present. The operating environment (e.g. coolant) and loading history of the item (e.g. number of pressurizations), if applicable, will furnish further supporting information. Analysis of any possible human factor contribution should also be undertaken. Global checks should be made to see whether similarly designed NPPs have experienced the same problems with the SSC under investigation. (Note: Plant-owners associations such as Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) and Boiling Water Owners Group (BWOG) have a system for rapid notification of problems in place, and regulatory notices also inform plant operators and owners on specific or generic problems.) Similarities or differences in OPs between such NPPs should be identified and their significance examined with respect to identifying any possible contributory aspects.
6.5
Discussion
Failures may be divided conveniently into two areas, namely, ‘materials’ and ‘human’ failures. Materials failures are defined here as those materialrelated events that have occurred in the operation of SSCs (e.g. ruptured pipe, corrosive attack resulting in leakage, loss of electric control signals and isolation), and human failures are defined here as those that have occurred in SSCs as a direct result of human actions (e.g. failure to detect weaknesses in design, errors of commission, inappropriate maintenance or accident management actions taken and failure to report an anomaly, i.e. errors of omission). Discovery of a SSC in a degraded condition, before it has chance to fail, can be regarded as proof of effectiveness of OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM methodologies. Despite conservative engineering design approaches, good OPs, monitoring, repair and replacements, ASPs and AM and PLiM programmes, the SSCs in NPPs can, nevertheless, undergo AD to the extent that they can no longer fulfil their safety or operational function and fail, particularly if weaknesses are present in the detection, monitoring or inspection schedules, for example. Failure analysis (FA) is performed to understand what happened and to prevent the failure from happening again. The FA must therefore fulfil several goals, all of which will eventually lead to the identification of the root cause of the SSC failure event. When the root cause is unequivocally identified, corresponding strategies and actions can be implemented. Design weaknesses, material unsuitability, OPs and human actions that have either directly contributed to or exacerbated the failure will have to be eradicated.
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In some cases, radical changes have to be undertaken, not only on the SSCs, but also the way they will be inspected, maintained and monitored in the future. Managing operational safety is a major component in overall NPP operations, and avoiding failure in any aspect of operation will contribute to this goal. One element of operational safety is therefore the feedback of operational experiences and implementing lessons learned in the most effective way possible. Irrespective of how it happens, where it takes place and its extent (e.g. NPP, chemical plant, aircraft), spontaneous failure of SSCs in operation, with corresponding loss of life and environmental damage, is direct proof that weaknesses must have existed a priori in, for example, the design, OPs, inspections, monitoring, routine maintenance, human actions, including management strategies, preventative maintenance and, where applicable, AEMS used at the time. Specifically, NPPs are complex social-technical systems, relying on the best available design and featuring SSCs made to the highest standards of materials and a competent, safety-motivated workforce to operate them according to prescriptions. It is also necessary to ensure that management strategies and operational procedures used in NPPs are always at the current state-of-the-art, science and technology. This necessitates continuous implementation of changes as they become necessary. This may entail modifications to SSCs or possible adjustment to inspection schedules and the extent thereof, for example, to satisfy regulatory requirements. Several human and physical-mechanical aspects must therefore unite to achieve the common goal of safe, reliable operation and freedom from spontaneous SSC failure. However, when an adverse conjunction of several diverse causal sequences unite, each one a necessary contributor, but none individually sufficient to breach the system’s defences, a SSC failure and attendant accident may occur. It is evident that a challenge lies in being able to predict or identify such highly unlikely, but potentially serious, contributors to failures and accidents. But herein lies the problem: if the existence of such contributors was known, they would have already been addressed and eliminated in the NPP’s overall OPs, inspection and maintenance activities, or their potential to cause problems correspondingly documented in the ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes before the failure had had a chance to occur. (Note that this observation is also generally valid for aviation, space exploration, shipping or chemical accidents that have occurred.)
6.6
Conclusions
1. A holistic approach is a methodology to assist other tools in analysing why and how SSC failures occur in NPPs. 2. The analysis of failures presents an opportunity to learn from mistakes
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3. 4.
5. 6.
7.
8.
9. 10.
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and to implement the appropriate measures to improve safety and reliability in future NPP operation. Addition of any type of new technology to an existing NPP requires a thorough analysis of its impact and effects on the total plant operations and personnel training and actions. Revision of OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes and adjustments, repairs or replacements to SSCs must be all documented to enable tracking of future SSC safety performance and reliability, and also to provide data for analysing any future failures. Awareness of maintenance-related LFCs will be increased by a questioning attitude and good safety culture in the NPP’s workforce; any CCF paths that can be identified must be rigorously eliminated. The NPP’s personnel should continue to be trained with regard to appreciating the potential significance of reporting (seemingly irrelevant) observations or small, but unusual, plant operating parameter and signal deviations. Spontaneous failures of SSCs, which may lead to accidents, usually cost much more than regular monitoring, inspection, repair or replacement of them. Appropriate inspection, testing and monitoring procedures must be applied, and updated as the technologies evolve (e.g. improving crack detection rates and obtaining better resolution of crack dimensions with state-of-the-art ultrasonic test instruments). Accident and emergency management strategies (AEMS) are in place to control and limit the consequences if NPP SSCs should fail. Regular training of personnel and control of procedures should be an integral part of plant operational management and operational practices. Emergency exercises, using realistic scenarios, are ideal tools to detect weaknesses in NPP AEMS. The necessary goal to operate NPPs safely is mostly facilitated by robust and tolerant design, DID, standard OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes. The overall safety culture in a NPP (e.g. questioning attitude, willingness to report anomalies) is an essential facet of operations and potentially can have as much importance regarding reducing the probability of SSC failure as do inspections, monitoring and testing thereof.
Sources of further information
OECD NEA (1995), ‘Chernobyl Ten Years On: Radiological and health impact – 2002 update’. OECD NEA, Paris. IAEA (1996), ‘Ten Years after Chernobyl: What do we really know?’, IAEA/ WHO/EC conference, IAEA, Vienna. IAEA (2006), ‘Environmental Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident and their Remediation: Twenty Years of Experience’, IAEA, Vienna. © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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Anon. (2002), ‘Potassium iodide for thyroid protection in a nuclear accident or attack’, The Medical Letter, Vol. 44 (W1143C), 11 November, pp. 97–98 (source: http://www.urgencenucleaire.qc.ca/documentation/ potassiumiodide.pdf). Kletz, T. (1998), What Went Wrong: Case Histories in Process Plant Disasters, 4th edn. Gulf Publishing Company, Houston, TX. Lapierre, D. and Moro, J. (2002), Five Past Midnight in Bhopal, Warner Books, New York. IAEA (1991), ‘Safety culture’ Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-4. IAEA, Vienna. IAEA (1991), ‘Reviewing operational experience feedback’, IAEA-TECDOC596. IAEA, Vienna. Becker, W.T. and Shipley, R.J. (2002), ASM Handbook: Volume 11: Failure Analysis and Prevention, 10th edn. ASM International, Materials Park, OH. Colangelo, V. and Heiser, F. (1987), Analysis of Metallurgical Failures. John Wiley & Sons, New York. Moroney, M.J. (1969), Facts from Figures, 3rd edn. Pelican Books, London. Tipping, Ph. (1996), ‘How materials ageing and human factors can lessen safety margins and cause failures’, in Penny, R.K. (ed.), Risk, Economy, and Safety, Failure Minimisation and Analysis, Balkema, Rotterdam, pp. 23–32. Petroski, H. (1999), ‘The Britannia Tubular Bridge: A paradigm of failuredriven design’, in Addis, W. (ed.), Structural and Civil Engineering Design, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Aldershot, pp. 313–324.
6.8
References
1. Holnagel, E., Human Reliability Analysis Context and Control, Academic Press, London, 1993. 2. Report on the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant Accident: US Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC Annual Report – 1979, NUREG-0690. 3. Varley, J., Who was to blame for Chernobyl? INSAG’s Second Thoughts, Nuclear Engineering International, Vol. 5, pp. 51–52. 4. US Nuclear Safety Commission, Bulletin 2002-01 ‘Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity’, January, 2002. 5. IAEA, Environmental Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident and their Remediation: Twenty Years of Experience. IAEA, Vienna, 2009. 6. Wani, T. and Bessho, Y., Summary of the interim report on the secondary system pipe rupture at Unit 3, Mihama nuclear power plant, in Proceedings Series Material Degradation and Related Managerial Issues at Nuclear Power Plants, Proceedings of a technical meeting organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, Vienna, 15–18 February, 2005. STI/PUB/1260. Printed September 2006. 7. Surviving Bhopal 2002: Toxic Present Toxic Future, report published January 2002 by the Fact-Finding Mission on Bhopal (FFMB). © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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8. Aircraft accident report 92-11: El Al Flight 1862, Boeing 747-747-258F 4X-AXG Bijlmermeer, Amsterdam. 9. Space shuttle ‘Challenger’ STS 51-L Accident, NASA, updated on 30 March 2009, source: http://history.nasa.gov/sts51l.html. 10. All Mining Fatalities By State, US Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration, 15 January 2007. 11. Guidelines for the Review of Accident Management Programmes in Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA Services Series No. 9, IAEA-SVS-09, IAEA, Vienna, May 2003. 12. Holnagel, E., Latent Failure Conditions and Safety Barrier Integrity, Joint OECD/ NEA Symposium on Human Factors and Organization in NPP Maintenance Outages: Impact on Safety, 1–8, Stockholm, Sweden, 19–22 June 1995.
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7
Impact of operational loads and creep, fatigue and corrosion interactions on nuclear power plant systems, structures and components (SSC)
M. B a k i r o v, Center of Material Science and Lifetime Management Ltd, Russia
Abstract: The operational lifetime of a nuclear power plant (NPP) is determined mostly by the actual condition of the materials from which the main equipment is made. This chapter addresses the impact of main operational effects (i.e. temperature, stresses, medium present) in causing ageing degradation in the NPP equipment. It also addresses the main mechanisms involved causing damage (e.g. corrosion, fatigue and creep) related to current and long-term operational effects and proposes experimentcalculated approaches to evaluate their impact on the integrity of equipment. Results of work on the analysis of ageing in systems, structures and components (SSCs) in Russian NPPs are presented as specific examples. The most efficient methods of in-situ (specimen-free) non-destructive monitoring and testing to detect ageing degradation are recommended. Key words: mechanisms of metal damage, creep, fatigue, corrosion, thermomechanical loading, ageing, equipment lifetime.
7.1
Introduction
The operational lifetime of a nuclear power plant (NPP) depends significantly on the physical condition of the SSCs and thus their ability to fulfil their design function. The lifetime (fitness-for-service) of nuclear power equipment must be demonstrated in accordance with the relevant standards of NPP equipment and pipelines strength analysis. In Russia, the standard is PNAE G-7-002-86 Strength Calculation Norms, and it is based on characteristics of fracture resistance under static and cyclic loading, taking into account the steel grade, process features of manufacturing and operating conditions. Thus the basic mechanical properties are assumed as guaranteed normative values or values as stated in the delivery certificate of the metal alloy used for the equipment under investigation. This approach to facilitate estimation of the equipment condition can only be absolutely acceptable if the mechanical properties of materials do not change in the course of time/operation. However, NPP operation causes thermo-mechanical loads, the coolant contacts the SSCs 146 © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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and interacts with them and ionizing radiation is present, all depending on the location of the SSC under consideration. Over time, these operational stressors cause changes in the physical and mechanical properties in the SSCs, namely ageing degradation/effects. Such ageing may impact the structural integrity of the SSCs, and particularly so in those areas where the stressors are severe. Ageing degradation can thus affect designed safety margins and lead to failures, if not detected and mitigated in a timely manner. Globally, there is more than 40 years of experience in commercial NPP operation. This has resulted in a vast accumulation of information on how SSCs react in their respective operating environments and especially how ageing degradation may affect them. Such information provides a basis for establishing the main factors that govern the true lifetime of NPPs (see Fig. 7.1). If very large safety margins were already implemented at the design stage, the equipment should not fail during its operational lifetime, assuming no severe manufactured defects are present. This would be so, since, theoretically, quality control (e.g. crack detection, X-ray) would detect such defects before they could be used in the NPP. Furthermore, if large safety margins were present, they would also counter ageing degradation over the projected lifetime of the NPP. Nevertheless, despite quality assurance and control, there is no equipment that can be guaranteed to be absolutely defect-free. For visual presentation of the causes behind the reduction of equipment operational reliability due to ageing of materials, see Fig. 7.2. If the ordinate axis is the size of a minimum actual (target) defect referred to as atarget crack size in the figure (a defect resulting from manufacturing or that has occurred in the course of operation) and the size of a maximum defect referred to as acritical crack size in the figure (a defect postulated in the design), and time of equipment operation is on the abscissa axis, the essence of equipment Ageing factors
Ageing mechanisms
Consequences
Environment
Embrittlement
Structural damage
Temperature Stress-strain Material
Creep Corrosion Fatigue
Degradation of mechanical properties Cracking Deformation Material loss
7.1 Main ageing factors affecting the lifetime of NPPs.
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aacceptable crack size
Safety margin
Contribution of additional damaging impacts as a result of ultra long-term operation (high- and hyper-cycle fatigue, hydrogenation, medium)
Rupture
atarget crack size
Subcritical crack growth Manufacturing
Design service life Time of the NPP lifecycle
7.2 Diagram for analysis of the lifetime of NPP equipment.
Lifetime extension
Physical life
Crack size, a
Actual growth of the target defect size due to operational influence – fatigue, stress-strain, corrosion, creep (in-service inspection and monitoring)
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Reduction of the critical defect size due to structural damage and mechanical properties degradation (operational history, codes and standards)
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lifetime management activities will consist in following the way in which these defects evolve over operational time. During operation, on the one hand, the size of the actual target defect grows (the lower ascending solid curve), while, on the other hand, the size of the maximum defect decreases (the upper descending solid curve) due to ageing and, as a consequence, the mechanical properties of the equipment’s material, including fracture resistance, decrease as well. The distance between these curves shows the boundaries of equipment strength margin (safety margin in the figure) or, alternatively, the residual strength lifetime. The shape of the curves is determined by experiment-calculated monitoring on the basis of the pertinent industry regulatory documents. Regulatory documents (e.g. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1995) contain special tables of defect sizes acceptable during operation, and specify methods for their assessment by calculation. The most universal characteristic of material fracture resistance covering calculation in the quasi-elastic and elasto-plastic fields is the J – integral and its critical value JIC. However, its determination is time consuming and for many tough steels used for NPP reactor pressure vessels, for example, the JC value is unknown considering the actual operational level of degradation. For this reason, many regulatory documents use approximate and conservative estimates and require only ordinary mechanical properties (e.g. tensile, Charpy impact test). To assess the kinetics of defect development in operation, it is necessary to perform periodic non-destructive inspection to determine the actual dimensions of defects. Afterwards, it is necessary to acquire data on actual loads experienced by various SSCs. Finally, it is required to perform an analysis of the experimental data regarding the actual defect growth rates related to the various operating conditions. It should be noted that NPP SSCs in the long-term operation (LTO) mode, defined here as NPP operation after the original design life, may experience significant ageing levels due to vibration, high-cycle and hyper-cycle fatigue, chemical reaction with the medium and radiation. The current situation (2009) is that the possible contribution of LTO to increasing ageing levels in SSCs, even if it is deemed to be relatively insignificant, is not yet taken into consideration in regulatory documents (see dashed lines in Fig. 7.2). Accordingly, only the quantitative measures of various parameters of material operational damage mechanisms provide for a confident prediction of NPP safe operation limits. This prediction is impossible without periodical evaluation of the rate of properties degradation at the most loaded areas of the SSC under consideration.
7.2
Nuclear power plant (NPP) equipment materials
Good design, as well as optimum choice of NPP equipment/SSC materials is the basis of current and future reliable operation. Materials are characterized by © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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specific values of chemical composition, type of structure and corresponding physical, chemical and mechanical properties. The choice of materials is based on the analysis of chemical and mechanical resistance to ageing, under current and during LTO conditions. For SSCs, including piping, of Russian and other NPPs, various materials are used: heat resistant, high-temperature resistant, corrosion resistant (stainless) and other materials find application. For the fabrication of reactor plant piping, carbon and low alloy steels of grades 10, 20, 20K, VSt3Sp5, 16GS, 17GS, and their foreign analogs AISI C1010, AISI C1020, DIN C10, C22, St 52-3, etc., are used. Their properties depend on the carbon content and alloy additives and heat treatments performed (Anon., 1990; Beskorovainy et al., 1995). These steels are almost free from hot and cold cracking susceptibility caused by welding. Owing to this, piping made of these steels can be welded without any complication by any welding method at both low and high rates of energy input and corresponding rates of heating and cooling down within a broad range of values (Kearns, 1978; Livshits, 1979). Analysis of these steels’ operational performance has shown that the dominating degradation mechanism was erosion-corrosion and this depended on the chemical composition and parameters of the medium, chemical composition and structural properties of the steel and component geometry and features of the circuit in creating turbulence in the coolant. In view of the strict requirements placed on nuclear reactor structural materials, of which the most important are requirements on ultimate tensile and yield stresses, low sensitivity to stress raisers, high hardenability and low sensitivity to temper brittleness, the use of plain carbon (non-alloyed) steels in NPP SSCs is quite limited. In contrast, the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) is typically a low-alloy ferritic steel structure, cladded on the inside with stainless steel. RPVs are heat treated to create a ferritic-bainitic microstructure and maintain high toughness, even if some level of neutron embrittlement has occurred over the service life. For large volume items, such as the RPV and reactor vessel head, heat exchangers and other SSCs, ferritic-pearlitic and various alloyed steels having higher hardenability and better mechanical properties are widely used. Thus, the required mechanical properties can be achieved throughout almost any section thickness. Furthermore, ferritic-pearlitic structured steels are not prone to intergranular corrosion or corrosion cracking in the medium used in pressurized and boiling water reactors. From the point of view of high-temperature strength (having creep-rupture strength as one of its criteria) the heat resistant steels are ranked at the bottom of reactor structural materials. However, taking into account the combination of physical and mechanical properties at low and moderate temperatures, manufacturability and price, their use in NPP SSCs becomes economically feasible.
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Corrosion resistant austenitic steels (e.g. for Russian-designed WWER and RBMK reactors – 08Ch18N10T and for European/US designed pressurized water reactors (PWR) and boiling water reactors (BWR) – AISI 304, 321) are the main structural materials for manufacturing of NPP SSCs operating in contact with primary circuit water. The reason for their extensive use in water-cooled reactors is their high resistance to general surface corrosion. In Russian NPPs, chromium-nickel steels, on the basis of 18% chromium-8% nickel (wt%) classical composition, weld-decay stabilized by titanium, and having generally an austenitic structure are most widely used. Titanium is used as an alloying element in order to increase the hightemperature strength of the steels through the formation of fine-scale strengthening phases of various types (carbides, carbonitrides and intermetallic phases). Additionally, titanium addition is used as a stabilizer in order to reduce the austenitic steel’s tendency to suffer intergranular corrosion by means of carbon binding to form special titanium-based carbides in preference to chromium carbides, thus leaving the corrosion resisting chromium available in the matrix (Beskorovainy et al., 1995). These corrosion resistant austenitic ‘stainless’ steels combine a medium strength (ultimate tensile stress Rm = 550 MPa at room temperature) with relatively high plastic deformation (e.g. relative elongation A5 = 50%). Carbon has no significant effect on the mechanical properties of titanium stabilized 18-8 austenitic steel if present below 0.15 wt% and in the absence of the ferritic a-phase. Furthermore, in order to increase the resistance of non-stabilized austenitic stainless steel to intergranular corrosion, the carbon content has to be low (e.g. < 0.03 wt%). The combined effects of high residual and operational stresses, high aggressiveness of stagnant coolant water in cracks (i.e. ‘chemical hide-out’), heat treatments that have increased the hardness and reduced plasticity, or thermal ageing during operation can all be implicated in the causes of cracking of NPP components made of these steels and having the nature of intergranular corrosion cracking.
7.3
Medium and corrosion
Corrosion degradation of NPP equipment represents the main type of damage sustained in the course of current and long-term operation and, in such a way, it directly affects the remaining lifetime of the NPP. (The large, passive, irreplaceable components dictate the true lifetime of a NPP, but SSCs that are replaceable, but expensive, may impact the profitability of the NPP.) Corrosion types and rates of attack of a given alloy depend on many factors, including the characteristics of the medium the alloy is in (Saji, 2009). The term ‘medium’ here means the coolant water located in ionizing radiation fields of various intensities in a wide range of temperatures, pressures and flow rates/turbulence. © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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The significance of water-chemical composition parameters of the medium is stipulated for a variety of reasons. First of all, water and water compositions used in the process and cooling circuits of NPPs are universal solvents. When flowing in the primary circuit, the process water and water solutions change their temperature (e.g. in the primary circuit of WWER, and PWR), aggregate state. The term ‘aggregate state’ implies that water passing through the secondary circuit undergoes changes from water-steam mixture in the turbine to water after the condenser. In the primary circuit of a PWR, water does not change its aggregate state – it does not boil. RBMKs and BWRs actually have only one circuit – water is heated in the reactor, boils and steam separated from the water-steam mixture goes to a turbine. The aggregate state is important for consideration if erosive corrosion of carbon steels (e.g. in the pipelines of regenerative heating) is under consideration, where steam contents in the water-steam mixture play a significant role in the erosion wear processes, e.g. in the secondary circuit of WWER and PWR and in the main circulation circuit of RBMK and BWR. In this case, the intensity of the processes of interaction changes between the coolant (or working medium) and the equipment’s material. Intensity of interaction also changes in the case where the amounts of impurities and their composition changes, for instance with chemical dosing and filter efficiency change. The major parameters affecting the NPP SSC corrosion-based lifetime are conductance (i.e. purity) of coolant water, pH and the concentration of chemically aggressive corrosion products in the coolant. The interconnection of these parameters is now explained, using as an example the RBMK-1000 NPP. Due to physically stipulated links to periodically controlled values of all water chemistry parameters, the integrated sum of all iron corrosion products present in RBMK coolant circuit for a year can be used as a parameter for coolant contamination magnitude (Kritsky et al., 2000). In Fig. 7.3 the correlation between the number (ni) of defective RBMK-1000 SSC pieces (modules of steam separators, plugs of instrumentation channels, fuel assemblies, collective doses accumulated during tasks, activity of I-131 in the coolant) and the amount of iron corrosion products (xi) being transferred through the feed water and which have appeared in a reactor is presented. In Fig. 7.3 conventionally three areas can be identified and interpreted as follows: I
the area of high purity of the coolant; owing to that, an effect of coolant characteristics on the NPP equipment lifetime is insignificant, and the equipment lifetime in operation is determined mainly by the original material properties of the equipment and the level of loading fixed by the design; II the area of correlation between the changing of the equipment lifetime characteristics and the coolant characteristics;
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153
^ n i
0.6 0.4
III
0.2 0
II
–0.2 –0.4 –0.6
I
–0.8 –0.8 –0.6 –0.4 –0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Xi 0.8
Plugged modules of steam separators Activity of I-131 in RBMK coolant Refuels owing to steaming of process tube plugs Refuels on replacement of untight fuel assemblies Collective dose at capital repair Collective dose at usual operation
7.3 Correlation between normalized reliability values of RBMK equipment, collective dozes and normalized values of iron corrosion products transferred through feedwater.
III the area of inadmissible reduction of the NPP equipment lifetime; in this case the NPP personnel implement active measures for replacement of the affected/defective equipment. The structural material or equipment construction are being changed. It is necessary to note that areas I and III are only outlined and are not clearly defined. The reason for this is that it is difficult to maintain the coolant high purity, and the encroachment towards area III means a potential violation of the prescribed regulations. This, in effect, can lead to significant personnel radiation dose aspects and also to economic losses, i.e. increase of repair scope, augmentation of collective doses, etc. If an individual RBMK NPP is considered, it should be noted that the equipment lifetime depends on the reliability of the steam turbine piping (condensers), as well as on the salt content in the cooling water for the condenser tubing. The type and rate of corrosion is also influenced by anodic reactions and degree of oxidation, cathodic reactions and the degree of reduction, efficiency of corrosion inhibition, polarization, presence and types of oxides (adherent or loose), type of galvanic cells, concentration of corrosive substances, structure and condition of metal (e.g. internal tensile stresses). Especially hazardous is the interaction of corrosion with other mechanical stressors such as fatigue cycling or wear which can result in spontaneous failure of equipment. In nuclear power engineering, the following types of corrosion
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are present, to varying degrees and severity (Collins, 1984; Uhlig and Revie, 1985): chemical, galvanic/electrical, crevice, pitting, intergranular, erosion-corrosion, cavitation corrosion, stress-corrosion cracking, hydrogen embrittlement (caused by hydrogen atoms, generated through corrosion processes, diffusing into the metal lattice). A brief review of these corrosion types is presented below. Chemical (equal-rate) corrosion is a widespread type of corrosion when the surface of a metal in contact with a corrosive environment oxidizes evenly. The corrosion rate is assessed by simple laboratory or full-scale in-situ experiments (on test samples) by measuring the loss of weight of coupons, for example. With regard to resistance to equal-rate surface corrosion, the steels and alloys of primary circuit equipment shall belong to materials of resistance groups 1–3, i.e. to have a corrosion rate not more than 0.01 mm/ year (GOST 9.908-85). Regarding NPP equipment, this type of corrosion does not represent any great hazard. There are many methods used to provide protection against this type of corrosion. Electrochemical corrosion takes place when two dissimilar metals are connected through an electrolyte (external medium). Two similar metals, but having different levels of internal stress, may also be affected. The physics of the phenomenon is similar to that in a galvanic cell. Quantitatively, this process is described by Faraday’s law, namely: the weight of reacting metal is equal to K · I · t, where I is current, t is time and K is a constant called the electrochemical equivalent. More precisely, the metal (electrode) acting as the anode suffers a loss in weight (corrodes) and the metal acting as the cathode gains metal or acts in a passive way. Usually accelerated electrochemical corrosion proceeds most intensively at the junction of the two metals. Based on results of tests of many metals, the electrochemical or galvanic series are plotted, usually against a standard reference electrode (e.g. hydrogen standard electrode) (Anon., 1983). There are metals having no galvanic interaction at all since it is possible to select two metals having almost the same (or close) potentials to minimize or exclude the occurrence of corrosive interaction processes between them. Electrochemical corrosion can be countered by the following means: ∑ selection of pairs of similar materials; ∑ electrical insulation of one of the materials (e.g. paint or oxide layer); ∑ provision of a small ratio of cathode surface area and anode surface area (if a large cathode area and small anode area are in electrical contact, the anodic current density is high, which induces high local corrosion rates at the anode; alternatively, a large anode and small cathode area means that the corrosion process is generally under cathodic control (balance of charge must be maintained) and the overall corrosion of the anodic area is low);
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∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
155
application of coatings, including creation of high-quality adherent oxide films; application of inhibitors for reduction of medium aggressiveness; application of cathodic protection; sacrificial electrodes of, e.g., zinc to supply electrons to the cathode and ensure a reduction process to inhibit oxidation; impressed external voltage; maintenance of pH level of coolant at temperature of importance; cleaning of the metal surface to remove deposits that have excessive concentration of salts, chlorides and sulfates. The most efficient measure for the reduction of corrosion damage in important equipment is to use corrosion resistant austenitic steels in the NPP primary circuit.
The steels most widely used in Russian NPPs are austenitic 18% chromium-8% nickel steels stabilized by titanium. The steels most widely used in PWR and BWR reactor plants are austenitic steels of series 300 (e.g. non-stabilized steels 304, 310, 316 and stabilized steels 321, 347, 348). They typically contain 16–26% Cr, 8–22% Ni and 2–3% Mo as the main alloying elements. Crevice corrosion is a localized process of accelerated corrosion in crevices, cracks and under layers of deposits or sediments. Crevice corrosion is usually characterized by a long-term incubation period. It can be reduced by means of periodic removal of contaminating sediments on the surfaces, which are also present in crevices. Sediment removal is usually performed using alkaline solutions or by means of mechanical treatment, elimination of stagnant spaces by mixing and aeration of the medium, implementation of cathodic protection with a polarization up to the value of corrosion potential of the active metal in the crevice. Pitting corrosion is observed in cases when the corrosion rate at some local areas is higher than that on the whole surface. The mechanism is the same as crevice corrosion. Corrosion pits are formed for various reasons, starting from defects of the metal surface, and finishing with the disruption of the protective passive oxide films resulting from temperature and water chemistry conditions. Chemically active (corrodants) sediments can accumulate in corrosion pits, thus provoking their growth. Corrosion pits usually grow in the direction of the force of gravity, since for their active growth they require the presence of relatively concentrated acid or alkaline solution. Pitting corrosion can be reduced by means of maintenance action during NPP outages, elimination of stagnant areas with sediments, reduction of oxygen content in chloride-containing medium and addition of extraneous inhibiting anions (OH- or NO–3). Pitting damage often occurs in NPP equipment manufactured of steels of different grades. The pitting depth is characterized by the pitting factor. It represents a relation of the maximum observed pitting depth to the average
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depth of general surface corrosion. A pitting factor equal to one corresponds to equal-rate corrosion. Intergranular corrosion is a local corrosive destruction along areas on, or adjacent to, metal grain boundaries resulting in loss of strength and plasticity (Chigal, 1969). When a metal crystal structure is deformed, the accumulated deformation energy is higher at the boundaries of the metal grains than in the grains themselves. These high-energy areas of grain boundaries have higher chemical activity than the grains. The small area of inter-grain/grain boundary material acting as an anode, is in contact with a large surface of grains representing a cathode. The corrosion, driven by a large cathode area to small anode area ratio (high anodic current density) proceeds relatively quickly, depending on the medium and other parameters acting. The corrosion attacks and penetrates the metal over time, leading sometimes to catastrophic results. In particular, 18-8 type austenitic steels, of which RBMK piping are made, become subject to intergranular corrosion after sensitization by heating to 500–800 °C. This results in chromium depletion of the metal matrix near to the grain boundaries as a consequence of chromium carbide precipitation in, and adjacent to, the boundaries. Operation of local galvanic cells provokes corrosion at areas with chromium depletion and grains crumble from the boundaries of the matrix. This effect is called weld-decay. In order to minimize the susceptibility of austenitic stainless steels to intergranular corrosion the content of carbon has to be controlled (it should not exceed 0.03%), and stabilizers must be added to prevent chromium depletion near to grain boundaries (for example, addition of molybdenum for 18-8 steel of grade 316). For SSC equipment in operation, the procedure of in-situ recovery heat treatment (i.e. austenitizing of areas prone to intergranular corrosion) has been proven to be very efficient. As a rule, these areas are welded joints of pipelines. Such heat treatment results in the resolution of chromium carbides in the affected areas, thus returning chromium back to the austentic matrix as chromium carbide is dissolved. The technology of in-situ recovery heat treatment was developed in Russia and successfully applied on RBMK austenitic pipelines for the life prolongation of piping that were prone to intergranular stress corrosion cracking. Erosion corrosion occurs due to the action of coolant flow with speeds exceeding the laminar flow parameters at the surface of the metal under consideration (Preece, 1979). At such speeds, the passive film (or corrosion products film) is disrupted and transported away from the surface, thus causing an increase of corrosion rate in these areas. Erosion corrosion causes section-thinning over large areas, and is called erosion-corrosion wear. This type of damage occurs everywhere in operation of all types of NPP equipment manufactured of carbon steels. Initially, it is typically observed on internal surfaces of valves and pumps and, certainly, in pipelines of secondary circuits in areas where changes in flow and turbulence occur.
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This type of corrosion is dangerous since it causes spontaneous catastrophic failures (Anon., 2005). For equipment potentially susceptible to erosion-corrosion wear, the following compensatory actions can be recommended: periodic in-service inspection and measurement of piping wall thickness at potentially affected areas, introduction of experimentally-calculated methods of wear rate prediction, timely performance of repair works at damaged areas, with replacement of metal sections in these areas with carbon steels having a higher content of chromium (≥ 0.5%), since such contents of chromium in steel provide for an effective reduction of the rate of erosion-corrosion wear, implementation of online monitoring with support of calculative codes, e.g. Checkworks, Wathec, Dasy, Comsy, etc. (Shah et al., 1997; IAEA-TECDOC1260). Liquid-particle erosion is another type of degradation. This type of erosion affects the blades of NPP turbines. In steam turbines, the working medium is superheated steam at high pressure. This saturated steam passes through the turbine blades to turn them, and then, after performing the thermomechanical work, it cools down and transforms into low pressure steam. During the expansion process, its temperature decreases below the dew point and as a result, water droplets of 100–200 mm diameter are formed. The front edges of rotating blades collide with these water drops with impinging speeds close to the linear speed of the blades. Owing to this, cavities are caused on the turbine blade edges, and this has consequences for the necessary aerodynamic characteristics and balance of the blades. At very moist steam conditions, containing, at the last stages of the low pressure turbine, more than 10–15% of water (wt%), the drop cavitation erosion can cause significant damage of blade edges so that their replacement is necessary. Cavitation corrosion is observed in turbines, pumps and pipelines owing to the collapse of steam bubbles near to the surface in high pressure areas of the system (Bogachev et al., 1974). At the disappearance of steam bubbles, shock waves of high pressure, of up to 1000 MPa, can occur, thus locally deforming metal and destroying protective oxide film on the surface. As a consequence, the corrosion processes are accelerated locally. Corrosion fatigue is characterized by the cracking of a metal under the action of a periodically applied tensile stress in a corrosively active environment. If this stress does not exceed the critical value, called the endurance limit strength (sometimes fatigue limit strength), the metal not exposed to the corrosive medium will not break under any duration of operation. The true endurance limit strength is not usually achieved in a corrosion medium, because the metal breaks after a certain number of cycles, regardless of the stress. If the metal subjected to constant tensile stress in a specific corrosion medium or coolant cracks after loading during a certain time, then this degradation
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and failure is due to stress-corrosion cracking. Stresses in equipment can be caused by residual stresses after machining, heat treatment, grinding and welding, for example, or can have external origins. The cracks can be either intergranular or transgranular in nature, depending on the properties of metal involved and corrosion medium acting. Degradations of this type have fundamental differences from intergranular corrosion that do not depend on whether or not the metal is in a stressed condition.
7.4
Stress-corrosion cracking
Stress-corrosion cracking represents a very important type of degradation mechanism since it may occur in many various alloys (Scully, 1990). This type of damage is characterized by the formation of multiple cracks in a metal under the simultaneous action of a tensile stress and a corrosion medium. Most of the metal surface is free from any traces of damage, but inside the matrix, a system of intergranular and intragranular cracks may be propagating over time. The stress levels typical for stress-corrosion cracking are considerably lower than the yield stress of the material, so the damage can be caused by both applied and residual stresses. Low stress levels usually mean a longer time for crack incubation and growth. Apparently there is a certain threshold stress, below which the corrosion cracking does not take place. For NPPs with RBMK reactor plants, this type of damage is of great importance since the pipelines of the forced circulation coolant circuit of the installation are made from welded austenitic stainless steel of the type 08Ch18N10T (the foreign analog is AISI 304). This steel is not prone to other types of corrosion, but it is sensitive to stress-corrosion cracking in the presence of chloride-ions Cl and oxygen O2. The severity of the corrosion cracking depends on stress, composition of alloy, environment, temperature and condition of the surface, as well as the oxide film condition. Obviously, the spreading of cracks proceeds irregularly. Growth of cracks at statically loaded sections takes place at the interface between the mechanical deformation at the crack tip and the chemical corrosion processes in the crack tip area (Bakirov et al., 2003). The maximum value of the stress intensity factor under plane strain conditions in the corrosion medium, at which crack does not grow, is designated as KI SCC and it is called the threshold value of the stress intensity factor for corrosion cracking. Depending on the corrosive medium present and tensile loading, austenitic steel, is especially sensitive to corrosion cracking when it is in a sensitized state. Uhlig and Revie (1989) have obtained data on the influence of heat treatment duration and temperature on the susceptibility of austenitic steel to intergranular corrosion. Experiments showed that several minutes of heating
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at temperatures about 700 °C are equivalent to several hours of heating at lower or higher temperatures. Intergranular corrosion is caused by the slow cooling of the alloy and its transition through a range of sensitizing temperatures during heat treatment, as well as by welding causing also the alloy to pass through the sensitizing range. With electric arc welding, the damage rate rises with the increase of heating time, especially when welding massive section components. Hazardous (sensitizing) temperatures are attained several millimeters from the welding area where the metal is heated to the melting point or higher. Hence, at contact with an aggressive medium, the destruction of the welded joint does not occur in the weld itself, but in the adjacent heat affected zone. It is well known that stress-corrosion cracking in austenitic stainless steels is highly dependent on the content of chlorides and oxygen in water. As an example, Fig. 7.4 shows at what ratios of chlorine ions and oxygen concentration the corrosion cracking takes place, and at what ratios it does not occur (Uhlig and Revie, 1989). In Russia, special research on corrosion cracking of austenitic steel in the initial and sensitized conditions and of austenitic steel welded joints was carried out (Nikitin, 1980). The tests were performed on tubular samples at temperature of 300 °C. The samples were loaded by axial tensile load, and the initial and accumulated deformation was measured. The working medium selected for the tests was a solution containing 100 mg/kg of Cl ions and 100 mg/kg of dissolved O2. As usual
Concentration of O2, mg/l
100
10 Cracking 1
0.1
0.01 0.1
No cracking
1 10 100 Concentration of Cl, mg/l
1000
7.4 Effect of chlorides and oxygen contents in water on stresscorrosion cracking of 18-8 austenitic stainless steel working in a contact with steam phase and periodically dampened by water having pH = 10.6, 50 mg/l concentration of PO43–, at a temperature of 242–260 °C.
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for corrosion cracking conditions, destruction of the samples occurred with very small plastic deformation, typically some hundredth or tenth parts of a percent. As an example, Fig. 7.5 presents diagrams of corrosion cracking of samples as a function of time before destruction from the applied stress (Nikitin, 1980). As the presented data show, the steel 08Ch18N10T (AISI 304) in the initial condition (austenitizing and high-temperature tempering) is characterized by small sensitivity to corrosion cracking, in spite of high aggressiveness of the medium. The conventional limit of corrosion cracking on the basis of 105 hours is 370 MPa, which is considerably higher than the yield stress (256 MPa) and is close to the ultimate stress (439 MPa). The criterion reflecting the resistance against corrosion cracking can thus be written as follows:
RCC – RP 0.2 RB – RP 0.2
7.1
where RCC is the conventional limit of corrosion cracking; RP0.2 is yield stress; and RB is ultimate stress. The criterion [7.1] for the described case results in a rather large value – about 60% of which is specific for high resistance to corrosion cracking (Nikitin, 1980). Sensitizing heat treatment of the steel (650 °C for 1 hour) considerably increases the sensitivity of the steel to corrosion cracking. In this state, the conventional limit of corrosion cracking on the basis of 105 hours is 300 MPa. Although higher than the yield stress of the steel, it is not significantly so. The heat affected zones of the welded joint are more sensitive to corrosion cracking. Kinetic dependence crosses the yield stress level at t = 3000 hours, s, MPa 700 600 500
1
400
2
300 3 200
100 100
101 102 103 104 1 – initial state; 2 – sensitized material; 3 – welded joints
t, h
7.5 Diagram of 08Ch18N10T steel corrosion cracking in water solution (with 100 mg/kg concentration of Cl– and O2) at temperature 300 °C.
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and the conventional limit of corrosion cracking, on the basis of 105 hours, shows a value of 200 MPa. Metallographic analysis showed that cracks, as a rule, formed in the heat affected zone of the welded joint. During the initial stage, the cracks usually grow along the lines normal to the surface, and cross grains and their boundaries. However, as they go deeper into the metal, they begin to develop in an intergranular way, mainly demonstrating a clear tendency to splitting. In general it can be stated that corrosion cracking of welded joint heat affected zones has, in principal, intergranular nature. Figure 7.6 presents data on the rate of corrosion cracking development based on results of the referenced work (Anon., 1986). In contrast to the above-stated results, the data has been processed on the basis of fracture mechanics parameters and provides for the evaluation of the rate of crack development. However, in this case, it is not clear how long the incubation period is before formation of the main crack. So, for practical calculations, research continues with sub-division of the destruction process into at least two stages: crack formation stage and 10–3
Rate of crack growth, ¥ 25.4 mm
Curve A
10–4
Curve B
10–5
10–6 0
10 20 30 40 Stress intensity factor, ¥ 1.1 MPa·m1/2
50
Curve a – material subjected to provoking thermal treatment in the oven (oxygen content is 0.2 ppm) Curve B – material sensitized at welding (oxygen content is 0.2 ppm)
7.6 Rates of crack growth at stress-corrosion cracking for austenitic stainless steel.
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crack development stage. For separation of the stages, special experiment methods have to be used. The most promising of the methods appears to be the acoustic emission method. Taking into account the great practical need for the development of robust engineering methods for corrosion cracking kinetics evaluation, it is hoped that in the next few years (or decades) this research will continue and result in practical calculations. In summary, there is a large accumulated practical experience and knowledge about the conditions for the occurrence of corrosion cracking for NPP equipment materials (effect of the medium, properties of materials, admissible stresses) (Azbukin, 1983; Azbukin et al., 1997; Bieniussa and Reck, 1997; Bogoyavlensky, 1984; Pogodin and Bogoyavlensky, 1970; see Scott, 2000). With reference to PWRs, the most typical corrosion damage in nickelbased alloys (Alloy 600, X750), corrosion-resistant steels (steels 304 and 316) and high-strength corrosion-resistant steels (A 286, A 410) have been reviewed (see Scott, 2000). The main causes of cracking are joint action of high residual and operational stresses, high aggressiveness of water coolant in crevices, use of heat treatment increasing the hardness and reducing the plasticity, or thermal ageing due to long-term operation. Steels 304 and 316 are successfully used in the deoxygenated water coolant in PWR primary circuit but are nevertheless subjected to corrosion cracking due to initial contamination of the surface of components, accumulation of sludge admixtures (e.g. chlorides, sulphates) and air ingress into dead-end crevices (e.g. canopy seals) at refuelling. A common problem in PWRs is the cracking and leaking of coolant at RPV head penetration areas, where the seals of casings for control rod drive mechanisms are located. The issues of power equipment corrosion damage are covered widely and in detail in monographs (Pogodin and Bogoyavlensky, 1970; Azbukin, 1983; Bogoyavlensky, 1984) and reviews (Scott, 1987; Hanninen and Torronen, 1987) for the period from 1970 to 1987. The incidences of corrosion damage to structural elements, taken from experience of NPP operation in Russia, analysis of their causes and implemented mitigative actions are given in Azbukin et al. (1997). The NPP items most susceptible to corrosion cracking are as follows: steam generator tubing, primary circuit pipelines and parts of the reactor pressure vessel internals. As regards the tubing, since the steam generators have a considerable reserve of thermal power, the loss of tightness of single tubes is not regarded as an emergency situation. In a period of planned preventive maintenance, the damaged tubes are usually plugged. In-service damage of pipelines, caused by corrosion cracking, mainly occur in boiling water NPPs (i.e. RBMK and BWR). The common aspect for all cases of pipeline degradation made of steel 18-8 is that the intergranular cracks occurred either in heat-affected areas, in which the metal was sensitized at
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welding, or resulted from a sensitizing heat treatment of pipeline components during equipment manufacture. In NPP operation abroad (e.g. USA, Germany and Japan) this problem is ranked as a top priority (Danko and Stahlkorf, 1984). When analysing the operational experience of 21 light water cooled reactors in Germany, it was noted that the cracking mechanism appeared in pipeline systems made of stabilized austenitic corrosion-resistant steels. Review of corrosion damage of German light water reactors over 20 years is given in Bieniussa and Reck (1997). The analysis of pipeline failures at 14 German PWRs revealed that during 20 years of operation only a small amount of corrosion damage occurred in the base metal and then only in small diameter pipelines of niobium-stabilized austenitic steel. The cause was chloride-induced transcrystalline cracking, owing to the absence of circulation of the medium in cracks (i.e. chemical hide-out). During 20 years of operation of German BWRs there were detected about 30 instances of corrosion damage related to the mechanism of intergranular stress-corrosion cracking. The damage occurred in pipelines of small (up to 25 mm) and large (250 mm and more) diameter made of steels 1.4550 and 1.4551 (Ti-stabilized) mainly in the areas of welded joints (on large size pipes). The damage was caused by corrosion caused by a combination of residual stresses, material sensitization and oxygen in the coolant plus manufacturing defects or shortcomings such as undercuts and displacement of butt-edges in welded joints. The damage was found in residual heat removal systems, coolant cleanup system, sealing and flushing water