i
Understanding and mitigating ageing in nuclear power plants
© Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
ii
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Woodhead Publishing Series in Energy: Number 4
Understanding and mitigating ageing in nuclear power plants Materials and operational aspects of plant life management (PLiM) Edited by Philip G. Tipping
Oxford
Cambridge
Philadelphia
New Delhi
© Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
iv Published by Woodhead Publishing Limited, Abington Hall, Granta Park, Great Abington, Cambridge CB21 6AH, UK www.woodheadpublishing.com Woodhead Publishing, 525 South 4th Street #241, Philadelphia, PA 19147, USA Woodhead Publishing India Private Limited, G-2, Vardaan House, 7/28 Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi – 110002, India www.woodheadpublishingindia.com First published 2010, Woodhead Publishing Limited © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010 The authors have asserted their moral rights. This book contains information obtained from authentic and highly regarded sources. Reprinted material is quoted with permission, and sources are indicated. Reasonable efforts have been made to publish reliable data and information, but the authors and the publisher cannot assume responsibility for the validity of all materials. Neither the authors nor the publisher, nor anyone else associated with this publication, shall be liable for any loss, damage or liability directly or indirectly caused or alleged to be caused by this book. Neither this book nor any part may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, microfilming and recording, or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from Woodhead Publishing Limited. The consent of Woodhead Publishing Limited does not extend to copying for general distribution, for promotion, for creating new works, or for resale. Specific permission must be obtained in writing from Woodhead Publishing Limited for such copying. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation, without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978-1-84569-511-8 (print) ISBN 978-1-84569-995-6 (online) ISSN 2044-9364 Woodhead Publishing Series in Energy (print) ISSN 2044-9372 Woodhead Publishing Series in Energy (online) The publisher’s policy is to use permanent paper from mills that operate a sustainable forestry policy, and which has been manufactured from pulp which is processed using acid-free and elemental chlorine-free practices. Furthermore, the publisher ensures that the text paper and cover board used have met acceptable environmental accreditation standards. Typeset by Replika Press Pvt Ltd, India Printed by TJI Digital, Padstow, Cornwall, UK
© Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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Contents
Contributor contact details
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Woodhead Publishing Series in Energy
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Foreword
xxv
Y. Dou, Shanghai Nuclear Energy Research and Development Institute (SNERDI), P. R. China
Executive summary
xxix
Ph. G. Tipping, Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant, Switzerland
Part I Introduction to plant life management (PLiM), safety regulation and economics of nuclear power plants 1
Introduction to nuclear energy, and materials and operational aspects of nuclear power plants
Ph. G. Tipping, Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant, Switzerland
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
Introduction Age as a relative term The importance of nuclear energy Learning from experience to continually improve safety in nuclear power plants (NPPs) Global situation of the status of installed nuclear power in 2010 The importance of keeping nuclear power plants (NPPs) operating safely and reliably Political and climate change issues and disposal of radioactive waste Energy resources: a comparison
1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
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3 4 5 7 8 10 10 11
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Contents
1.9 1.10
Further ageing aspects in nuclear power plants (NPPs) Historical evolution of nuclear power and some materials aspects Overview of two important materials issues in older design nuclear power plants (NPPs) Conclusions Sources of further information References
1.11 1.12 1.13 1.14
12 13 14 16 17 17
2
Key elements and principles of nuclear power plant life management (PLiM) for current and long-term operation
Ph. G. Tipping, Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant, Switzerland
2.1 2.2
Introduction Nuclear power plant ageing terminology and associated definitions Overview of ageing and its effects in nuclear power plants Overview of systems, structures and components (SSC) safety classes Setting up and scoping ageing degradation and surveillance programmes in nuclear power plants (NPPs) Safety culture and human factors and knowledge management Trends and issues in nuclear power plant (NPP) life management Past, current and future nuclear power plant (NPP) concepts and designs Conclusions Sources of further information Acknowledgements References
47 52 53 54 54
3
Safety regulations for nuclear power plant life management and licence renewal
56
A. Alonso, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Spain
3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5
Introduction Safety review/licence renewal Surveillance, operation and maintenance programmes Integration of plant life management Ageing degradation mechanisms, and time-limited structures, systems and components
2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11 2.12
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19 22 24 31 34 39 41
56 57 65 70 72
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3.6
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Main areas of concern for plant designers, operators and regulators Future trends References
76 80 85
4
Probabilistic and deterministic safety assessment methods for nuclear power plant life management
88
P. Contri and A. Rodionov, European Commission DG-JRC Institute for Energy, The Netherlands
4.1
Introduction – plant safety assessment in a plant life management (PLiM) framework The plant life management (PLiM) problem – definitions and selected experience cases A unified proposal for a plant life management (PLiM) model integrating maintenance optimization Probabilistic safety assessment of components and systems Impact of ageing effects at system and plant level Conclusions References
103 108 109 113 114
5
Assessing the socio-economic impacts of ageing and plant life management (AM-PLiM) programmes for long-term operation (LTO) of nuclear power plants (NPPs)
117
Ph. G. Tipping, Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant, Switzerland
5.1
Nuclear power as part of the global energy mix: energy demand, environmental issues and manpower Aspects of current and future nuclear fuel supply and its impact on the viability of nuclear power Economic overview of the nuclear power plant (NPP) lifecycle Cost drivers of nuclear power plant (NPP) operation Basic economic requirements for sustainable operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) Assessing the costs and economics of nuclear power plant (NPP) operation and the impact of ageing and plant life management (AM-PLiM) programmes for long-term operation (LTO) Conclusions Sources of further information and advice Acknowledgements References
3.7 3.8
4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7
5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6
5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10
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117 119 120 122 123
124 126 127 127 127
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Part II Ageing degradation of irradiated materials in nuclear power plant systems, structures and components (SSC): mechanisms, effects and mitigation techniques 6
Failure prevention and analysis in nuclear power plant systems, structures and components (SSC): a holistic approach
Ph. G. Tipping, Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant, Switzerland
6.1 6.2
Introduction Reducing failure probablility and consequences thereof in nuclear power plant (NPP) systems, structures and components (SSCs) Latent failure conditions (LFCs) and failure terminology Holistic approach to analysing nuclear power plant systems, structures and components (NPP SSC) failure events Discussion Conclusions Sources of further information References
138 141 142 143 144
7
Impact of operational loads and creep, fatigue and corrosion interactions on nuclear power plant systems, structures and components (SSC)
146
M. Bakirov, Center of Material Science and Lifetime Management Ltd, Russia
7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5
Introduction Nuclear power plant (NPP) equipment materials Medium and corrosion Stress-corrosion cracking Evaluation of impact of thermo-mechanical loading on strength of equipment materials Equipment condition monitoring, prediction and testing Conclusions and future trends Acknowledgements References and further reading
164 176 184 185 185
8
Microstructure evolution of irradiated structural materials in nuclear power plants
189
M. Hernández-Mayoral, CIEMAT, Spain and M. J. Caturla, University of Alicante, Spain
8.1
Introduction
6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8
7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9
131
131 133 136
146 149 151 158
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8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.10
Structures and materials affected Environmental and other stressors Changes in the microstructure and degradation mechanisms Mitigation paths Application of research and operational experience to the practical solution of problems Acknowledgements Definitions Sources of further information and advice References
9
Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of austenitic stainless steels in high temperature light water reactor (LWR) environments
P. L. Andresen, GE Global Research Center, USA
9.1 9.2 9.3
Introduction Historical problems and structures affected Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) dependencies – introduction Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) dependencies – materials and water chemistry Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) dependencies – cold work, stress intensity factor and irradiation Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) dependencies – miscellaneous Mechanism of stress corrosion cracking (SCC) Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) mitigation Prediction of stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC) Future trends Sources of further information and advice References
9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 9.8 9.9 9.10 9.11 9.12 10
Void swelling and irradiation creep in light water reactor (LWR) environments
F. A. Garner, Radiation Effects Consulting, USA
10.1 10.2
Introduction to void swelling and irradiation creep Potential for swelling and irradiation creep in light water cooled reactors (LWRs) Predictions of void swelling and associated uncertainties Potential swelling/creep consequences Second-order effects associated with or concurrent with void swelling
10.3 10.4 10.5
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236 236 238 243 257 270 281 291 294 296 299 302 302 308 308 318 332 338 340
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10.6 10.7
Conclusion References
349 349
11
Irradiation hardening and materials embrittlement in light water reactor (LWR) environments
357
M. Brumovsky, Nuclear Research Institute Rez plc, Czech Republic
11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6 11.7
Introduction Irradiation conditions Nature of radiation damage Irradiation hardening and embrittlement Main factors Predictive formulae Detection and measurement of irradiation hardening and embrittlement 11.8 Conclusions 11.9 Sources of further information and advice 11.10 References 12
Reactor pressure vessel (RPV) annealing and mitigation in nuclear power plants
M. Brumovsky, Nuclear Research Institute Rez plc, Czech Republic
12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5
Introduction Structures and materials affected Main mitigation measures Mitigation mechanisms including microstructure changes Application of research and operational experience to the practical solution of problems Conclusions Sources of further information References
12.6 12.7 12.8
Part III Analysis of nuclear power plant materials, and application of advanced systems, structures and components (SSC) 13 Characterization techniques for assessing irradiated and ageing materials in nuclear power plant systems, structures and components (SSC)
357 358 359 362 365 367 368 371 371 372 374 374 375 375 379 381 385 385 385
389
S. Lozano-Perez, University of Oxford, UK
13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4
Introduction Non-destructive techniques Destructive techniques Recent advances, future trends and new techniques
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13.5
References
412
14
On-line and real-time corrosion monitoring techniques of metals and alloys in nuclear power plants and laboratories
417
L. Yang and K. T. Chiang, Southwest Research Institute, USA
14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 14.7
Introduction General corrosion monitoring Localized corrosion monitoring Electrochemical potential (ECP) monitoring Conclusion Acknowledgements References
417 418 431 443 448 450 451
15
Multi-scale modelling of irradiation effects in nuclear power plant materials
456
L. Malerba, SCK.CEN, Belgium
15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 15.5 15.6 15.7 15.8 15.9 15.10 15.11 15.12
Introduction An overview of radiation effects Multi-scale modelling Nuclear- and atomic-level interactions Atomic-level modelling Microstructure evolution modelling Mechanical property modelling Example of application: the PERFECT example Discussion Conclusion Acknowledgements References
456 459 474 478 483 495 503 512 519 523 524 524
16
Development and application of instrumentation and control (I&C) components in nuclear power plants (NPPs)
544
H. M. Hashemian, Analysis and Measurement Services Corporation, USA
16.1 16.2
Introduction Instrumentation and control (I&C) components in nuclear power plants (NPPs) Key instrumentation and control (I&C) components Ageing and instrumentation and control (I&C) Mitigating ageing in instrumentation and control (I&C) components Online monitoring (OLM)
16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6
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16.7 16.8 16.9 16.10
Online monitoring (OLM) methods and ageing management 573 Future trends 575 Sources of further information and advice 578 Bibliography 579
17
Development and application of nano-structured materials in nuclear power plants
W. Hoffelner, Paul Scherrer Institut, Switzerland
17.1 17.2 17.3
Introduction Ferritic-martensitic 9–12% Cr steels Dispersion strengthened ferritic and ferritic-martensitic steels Other routes for nano-particle strengthening Mechanical properties Components Application of research and operational experience to the practical solution of problems (relation to plant life management, PLiM) Conclusions References
17.4 17.5 17.6 17.7 17.8 17.9
581 581 584 586 587 590 594 596 601 602
Part IV Plant life management (PLiM) practices in nuclear power plants 18
Plant life management (PLiM) practices for pressurized light water nuclear reactors (PWR)
Ph. G. Tipping, Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant, Switzerland
18.1 18.2
Introduction Ageing-related terminology and descriptions of major pressurized water reactor (PWR) components Overview of fuel and control of core power in pressurized water reactors (PWR) Discussion Conclusions Sources of further information References
18.3 18.4 18.5 18.6 18.7 19
Plant life management (PLiM) practices for water-cooled water-moderated nuclear reactors (WWER)
T. J. Katona, Paks Nuclear Power Plant Ltd, Hungary
19.1
Introduction
609
609 612 623 624 627 628 630
633 633
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19.2 19.3 19.4 19.5 19.6 19.7 19.8 19.9 19.10 19.11 19.12 19.13 19.14
Description of water-cooled water-moderated nuclear reactors (WWERs) Plant life management (PLiM) policy of water-cooled water-moderated nuclear reactor (WWER) operators Mechanical components relevant for safe long-term operation Structures and structural components relevant for safe long-term operation Electrical, instrumentation and control equipment relevant for safe long-term operation Regulatory requirements for continued operation Integration of plant life management (PLiM) programmes for water-cooled water-moderated nuclear reactor (WWERs) Feedback of operational experience Research needs in area of ageing of water-cooled watermoderated nuclear reactor (WWER) components Role of international organizations and programmes Future trends Sources of further information References
20
Plant life management (PLiM) practices for boiling water nuclear reactors (BWR): Japanese experience
N. Sekimura, University of Tokyo, Japan and N. Yamashita, Tokyo Electric Power Company, Japan
20.1 20.2
Introduction Features and types of boiling water reactors – boiling water reactor (BWR) and advanced boiling water reactor (ABWR) 20.3 Major ageing mechanisms significant for boiling water reactor (BWR) systems, structures and components (SSCs) 20.4 Ageing management practices against major significant ageing mechanisms 20.5 Major component replacement/refurbishment programmes 20.6 Technical subjects to be facilitated for ageing management 20.7 Current direction for more effective and systematic ageing management programmes 20.8 Knowledge management and research and development (R&D) 20.9 References 20.10 Abbreviations
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635 639 647 657 666 673 675 693 695 696 701 702 702 706
706 708 709 714 720 723 723 726 730 730
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Plant life management (PLiM) practices for pressurised heavy water nuclear reactors (PHWR)
732
R. K. Sinha and S. K. Sinha, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, India and K. B. Dixit, A. K. Chakrabarty and D. K. Jain, Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd., India
21.1 21.2
Introduction Pressurised heavy water reactor (PHWR)/Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) 21.3 Critical components of Indian pressurised heavy water reactor (PHWR) 21.4 Reactor ageing issues: pressure tube, end shields and calandria tube 21.5 Reactor ageing issues: reactivity mechanisms and fuel handling systems 21.6 Reactor ageing issues: feeders, secondary side piping, steam generators and heat exchangers 21.7 Reactor ageing issues: civil structures, cables and sea water systems 21.8 Regulatory issues associated with plant life management (PLiM) 21.9 Application of research and operational experience to find the practical solution to problems 21.10 Future trends 21.11 Acknowledgements 21.12 References 22
Plant life management (PLiM) practices for sodium cooled fast neutron spectrum nuclear reactors (SFRs)
B. Raj, P. Chellapandi, T. Jayakumar, B. P. C. Rao and K. Bhanu Sankara Rao, Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research, India
22.1 22.2 22.3 22.4 22.5
Introduction Sodium cooled fast neutron spectrum reactors (SFRs) Design approach Safety and regulatory perspective In-service inspection (ISI) and robotics in life assessment based on research and development (R&D) and applications 22.6 Life extension aspects of international sodium cooled fast neutron spectrum reactors (SFRs) 22.7 Future trends 22.8 Conclusion 22.9 Acknowledgements 22.10 References
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795 796 805 812 813 820 826 834 834 835
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23
Plant life management (PLiM) practices for gas-cooled, graphite-moderated nuclear reactors: UK experience
G. B. Neighbour, University of Hull, UK
23.1 23.2
Introduction UK gas-cooled reactor types (Magnox and advanced gas-cooled reactor (AGR)) 23.3 Nuclear graphite 23.4 Effects of reactor environment on the graphite moderator 23.5 The UK nuclear regulatory regime 23.6 Maintaining the safety of graphite moderator cores 23.7 Regulatory requirements for continued operation 23.8 Future trends 23.9 Sources of further information 23.10 Useful websites 23.11 References
xv
838 838 840 848 852 860 862 868 870 871 872 872
24
Outlook for nuclear power plant life management (PLiM) practices – summary, conclusions, recommendations
Ph. G. Tipping, Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant, Switzerland
24.1 24.2
876
24.6 24.7
Introduction Further elements to consider for nuclear power plant ageing and plant life management (PLiM-AM) Discussion Current and projected requirements of the nuclear power industry List of topical issues of current and future relevance to nuclear power plants (NPPs) Conclusions References
Index
889
24.3 24.4 24.5
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877 879 880 881 885 888
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Contributor contact details
(* = main contact)
Chapters 1, 2, 5, 6, 18 and 24 Ph. G. Tipping Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant – NE&MC CH 5200 Brugg Switzerland E-mail:
[email protected]
Chapter 3
Chapter 7 M. Bakirov Center of Material Science and Lifetime Management Ltd Office 5 Kirova str. 7 Lubertsy City Moscow Region 140002 Russia E-mail:
[email protected]
A. Alonso Universidad Politécnica de Madrid Departamento de Ingenieria Nuclear Rafael Calvo 3 2F 28010 Madrid Spain E-mail:
[email protected]
Chapter 4 P. Contri* and A. Rodionov European Commission, DG-JRC Institute for Energy Safety of Current Reactors Unit PO Box 2 1755 ZG Petten, The Netherlands Westerduinweg 3 1755 LE Petten The Netherlands
Chapter 8 M. Hernández-Mayoral Division of Structural Materials Department of Technology CIEMAT 28040 Madrid Spain E-mail:
[email protected]
M. J. Caturla* Department Fisica Aplicada Facultad de Ciencias, Fase II Universidad de Alicante 03690 Alicante Spain E-mail:
[email protected]
E-mail:
[email protected] © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
xviii
Contributor contact details
Chapter 9
Chapter 14
P. L. Andresen GE Global Research Center One Research Circle CE2513 Schenectady, NY 12309 USA
L. Yang and K. T. Chiang Department of Earth, Material, and Planetary Sciences Southwest Research Institute® (SwRI®) 6220 Culebra Rd San Antonio, TX 78228 USA
E-mail:
[email protected]
Chapter 10
E-mail:
[email protected]
F. A. Garner Radiation Effects Consulting Richland, WA 99354 USA
Chapter 15
E-mail:
[email protected]
Chapters 11 and 12 M. Brumovsky Nuclear Research Institute Rez plc, Division of Integrity and Technical Engineering 250 68 Rez Czech Republic E-mail:
[email protected]
L. Malerba Structural Materials Group Institute of Nuclear Materials Science Studiecentrum voor Kernenergie ∑ Centre d’Etude de l’Energie Nucléaire (SCK ∑ CEN) Boeretang 200 B-2400 Mol Belgium E-mail:
[email protected]
Chapter 16
Chapter 13 S. Lozano-Perez Department of Materials University of Oxford Parks Road Oxford OX1 3PH UK
H. M. Hashemian Analysis and Measurement Services Corporation AMS Technology Center 9111 Cross Park Drive Knoxville, TN 37923 USA E-mail:
[email protected]
E-mail: sergio.lozano-perez@materials. ox.ac.uk
© Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
Contributor contact details
xix
Chapter 17
Chapter 21
W. Hoffelner Paul Scherrer Institut CH-5232 Villigen PSI Switzerland
R. K. Sinha* and S.K. Sinha Reactor Design and Development Group Bhabha Atomic Research Centre Mumbai India
E-mail:
[email protected]
Chapter 19
E-mail:
[email protected]
T. J. Katona Paks Nuclear Power Plant Ltd P.O. Box 71 Paks 7031 Hungary
K. B. Dixit, A. K. Chakrabarty and D. K. Jain Engineering and Procurement Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited India
E-mail:
[email protected]
Chapter 22
Chapter 20 N. Sekimura* Department of Nuclear Engineering and Management University of Tokyo 7-3-1 Hongo Bunkyo-ku 113-8656 Tokyo Japan E-mail:
[email protected]
N. Yamashita Reactor Mechanical Maintenance Group Maintenance Department (Unit 3&4) Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station Tokyo Electric Power Company 22 Kitahara Ottozawa Ohkumamachi Futaba-gun, 979-1301 Fukushima Prefecture Japan
B. Raj, P. Chellapandi, T. Jayakumar, B. P. C. Rao and K. Bhanu Sankara Rao Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research Kalpakkam TN – 603 102 India E-mail:
[email protected]
Chapter 23 G. B. Neighbour Materials and Process Performance Department of Engineering University of Hull Hull HU6 7RX UK E-mail:
[email protected]
E-mail:
[email protected]
© Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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Woodhead Publishing Series in Energy
1 Generating power at high efficiency: Combined cycle technology for sustainable energy production Eric Jeffs 2 Advanced separation techniques for nuclear fuel reprocessing and radioactive waste treatment Edited by Kenneth L. Nash and Gregg J. Lumetta 3 Bioalcohol production: Biochemical conversion of lignocellulosic biomass Edited by K. W. Waldron 4 Understanding and mitigating ageing in nuclear power plants: Materials and operational aspects of plant life management (PLiM) Edited by Philip G. Tipping 5 Advanced power plant materials, design and technology Edited by Dermot Roddy 6 Stand-alone and hybrid wind energy systems: Technology, energy storage and applications Edited by J. K. Kaldellis 7 Biodiesel science and technology: From soil to oil Jan C. J. Bart, Natale Palmeri and Stefano Cavallaro 8 Developments and innovation in carbon dioxide (CO2) capture and storage technology Volume 1: Carbon dioxide (CO2) capture, transport and industrial applications Edited by M. Mercedes Maroto-Valer 9 Geological repository systems for safe disposal of spent nuclear fuels and radioactive waste Edited by Joonhong Ahn and Michael J. Apted
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Woodhead Publishing Series in Energy
10 Wind energy systems: Optimising design and construction for safe and reliable operation Edited by John D. Sørensen and Jens N. Sørensen 11 Solid oxide fuel cell technology: Principles, performance and operations Kevin Huang and John Bannister Goodenough 12 Handbook of advanced radioactive waste conditioning technologies Edited by Michael I. Ojovan 13 Nuclear reactor safety systems Edited by Dan Gabriel Cacuci 14 Materials for energy efficiency and thermal comfort in buildings Edited by Matthew R. Hall 15 Handbook of biofuels production: Processes and technology Edited by Rafael Luque, Juan Campelo and James Clark 16 Developments and innovation in carbon dioxide (CO2) capture and storage technology Volume 2: Carbon dioxide (CO2) storage and utilisation Edited by M. Mercedes Maroto-Valer 17 Oxy-fuel combustion for power generation and carbon dioxide (CO2) capture Edited by Ligang Zheng 18 Small and micro combined heat and power (CHP) systems: Advanced design, performance, materials and applications Edited by Robert Beith 19 Hydrocarbon fuel conversion technology: Advanced processes for clean fuel production Edited by M. Rashid Khan 20 Modern gas turbine systems: High efficiency, low emission, fuel flexible power generation Edited by Peter Jansohn 21 Concentrating solar power (CSP) technology: Developments and applications Edited by Keith Lovegrove and Wes Stein 22 Nuclear corrosion science and engineering Edited by Damien Féron
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Woodhead Publishing Series in Energy
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23 Power plant life management and performance improvement Edited by John Oakey 24 Direct-drive wind and marine energy systems Edited by Markus Mueller 25 Advanced membrane science and technology for sustainable energy and environmental applications Edited by Angelo Basile and Suzana Nunes 26 Irradiation embrittlement of reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) Edited by Naoki Soneda 27 High temperature superconductors (HTS) for energy applications Edited by Ziad Melhem 28 Infrastructure and methodologies for the justification of nuclear power programmes Edited by Agustín Alonso Santos
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© Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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Foreword Y. D ou, Shanghai Nuclear Energy Research and Development Institute (SNERDI), P. R. China
The development and commercial use of nuclear energy in the form of costcompetitive electricity and district heating was one of the most significant industrial achievements of the 20th century. The 21st century is now approaching its second decade, and global energy consumption continues to grow rapidly, and projections show a doubling of world electricity demand by 2030, creating the need for considerable amounts of newly installed generating capacity (of all origins) in the next 25 years. The current global nuclear energy capacity is about 367 GWe, and between 524 GWe and 740 GWe is expected to be needed before 2050. This will necessitate building between 200 and 400 new nuclear power plants (NPPs) worldwide to just replace the lost capacity of electrical power from decommissioned NPPs and to provide the new capacity that will be necessary by 2050, not only to satisfy the needs of growing energy consumption, but also to ease environmental pressure by reducing dependence on fossil-based energy. For example, in China, where the economy has continuously increased by 9% per year, on average, over the past 30 years, the current portion of nuclear-generated energy is only around 2%, which is a relatively small percentage in comparison with the world’s current nuclear-generated energy portion of about 16%. To satisfy the demand for energy in an environmentally friendly way, free from greenhouse gas emissions, China is thus launching an ambitious nuclear power plan to raise the portion of nuclear energy by 4–5% by the year 2020. That means that 40–60 new NPPs of 1000 MWe should be built in a decade or more. Such ambitions for new-build requirements for NPPs create considerable logistics and planning tasks, having due regard for the industry’s overall current and projected ability to supply the heavy equipment required for NPPs (e.g. pressure vessels, quality alloys for piping, steam generators, core shrouds, pumps, high quality cement for containment buildings and cooling towers, etc.). Furthermore, action must be taken now to ensure that sufficiently trained, educated and experienced personnel are available to operate the plants and to regulate them. Also, the need to have fossil-fuel free low ‘greenhouse gas’ energy sources puts the focus squarely on the nuclear option, as long as it can remain safe.
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Foreword
Two crucial and decisive factors to sustain long-term operation of nuclear power plants are their safety and profitability, which can be achieved through a combination of applying optimum management strategies with an understanding of the ways in which the safety-related systems, structures and components (SSCs) perform and interact in their respective operating environments. The SSCs are made of various materials (e.g. metals, alloys, concrete, plastics) and it is the behaviour of materials due to their operational conditions (e.g. temperature, pressure, loading, irradiation, coolant chemistry) that can lead to ageing degradation with attendant impact on NPP availability, SSC reliability, or a lessening of safety margins and possible attendant operational constraints. It is the duty of NPP operators to ensure that their NPPs are safe as well as profitable. Operators can be assisted in achieving these goals by using ageing management and plant-life management approaches, based on science and technology and global experience. Ageing management and plant-life management covers various aspects of knowledge on SSCs, such as information on requirements of design basis, manufacture, installation, commissioning and operation, understanding of material degradation mechanisms, inspection programmes, evaluation and robust implementation of associated methodologies for assessing SSC fitness-for-service, use of database techniques, etc. For those countries having various designs and types of NPP, the available experts and plant personnel may need information or have to deal with tasks or problems from the different units synchronously. It is therefore extremely useful to have a single book which provides a wide range of the most recent information covering all types of NPPs on ageing and plant-life management techniques and also gives insights and guidance on how to keep NPPs operating safely and reliably. This is facilitated by understanding how ageing degradation occurs in SSCs and then by using this knowledge to develop scientifically based methods to mitigate or eliminate it. This book has been produced through a multinational team of globally recognized experts in their respective fields. The scope of this modern book is therefore immense and records the knowledge and experience gained with materials in NPPs over the last 50 or so years of nuclear power development. The suggestions for further reading and the references provided give the reader access to even more information. Accordingly, this book is a practical and technical manual for engineers, technologists and specialists involved in all aspects of NPP operation. Students and younger technologists studying nuclear technology, or those just embarking on their careers in nuclear power, will find here a source of inspiration and current information to help them achieve their academic and career goals. Furthermore, this book is a record of the current knowledge and experience that needs to be kept for future generations. This is even more so now, due to the gradual but steady loss of the “pioneer” generation of nuclear technologists and researchers, as
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they go into retirement. External organizations, including design institutes, technical supporters, sub-contractors of nuclear steam supply systems, materials suppliers and regulators will also find valuable information in this book to enable them to carry out their respective tasks. In a word, this book is essential reading for anyone associated with nuclear power. In China we have a proverb, namely, ‘Experience is the best teacher’. I believe that this book will act as one of the best teachers currently available, since it is based on the cumulative experience of more than 750 personyears when the career years of all the contributing authors are taken into consideration. It remains to be seen what the next generation of NPPs will demand in terms of specialist knowledge and operational practices. One thing is certain: as new knowledge is obtained, it must also be recorded in a book such as this.
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Executive summary P h. G. T I P P I N G, Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant, Switzerland
Overview of the book This reference book is a comprehensive state-of-the-art, science and technology record of the current knowledge base concerning materials ageing degradation (AD), and its mitigation and elimination in systems, structures and components (SSCs) used in commercially operated nuclear power plants (NPPs). Accordingly, it covers a wide range of subjects relating to NPP SSCAD, and so the phrase ‘from atoms to zirconium’ could be a fitting one when attempting to capture the very essence of this book. It traces the historical development of commercial nuclear power, while illustrating the way our understanding and mitigation of SSC-AD has continually increased through basic and applied research approaches. The effectiveness and integration of validated SSC-AD mitigation methods (which have been largely furnished by basic research efforts) into the daily operation of NPPs is exemplified throughout. The necessity for always keeping SSCs ‘fit-for-service’ is a vital safetyrelated aspect, but it is also an important commercial requirement as well, since NPPs may thereby retain the technological basis, and thus the regulatory possibility (in satisfying licence requirements), to continue safe and reliable operation, even in excess of their original design life. The chance that this ‘long-term operation’ (LTO) can be realized is significantly enhanced when NPP plant life management (PLiM), ageing management (AM), ageing surveillance programmes (ASPs) and standard operational practices (OPs) are optimized, and when plant-specific and worldwide lessons learned are continually and robustly integrated into the operational management of NPPs. The effectiveness of PLiM, AM, ASPs and OPs is also shown to depend significantly on the level of safety culture prevailing in the NPP’s workforce, as well as on efficient plant knowledge management (KM) and associated job succession and training strategies for personnel. These essential themes are discussed throughout the book. Each chapter may be regarded as a ‘stand-alone’ contribution, providing in-depth information concerning the specific subject matter dealt with. The
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authors responsible have provided concise abstracts, summaries, conclusions, references and further information sources regarding SSC-AD, PLiM, AM and ASPs from their perspectives. The book is structured to allow the reader to select specific subject areas on the topic of interest in order to provide detailed information on SSC-AD, and also to give a perspective on the commercial nuclear power industry as a whole.
Overview of Part I Part I reviews the role of nuclear power in the global energy mix, and the importance and relevance of plant life management (PLiM) for the safety regulation and economics of nuclear power plants. In Chapter 1, by Tipping, a strong argument for the use of commercial nuclear power is provided with respect to its role as a non-fossil based energy source. Accordingly, aspects concerning the world’s climate, and the part nuclear power has in providing safe, cost-effective, and low environmental impact energy, are presented. Owing to climate and carbon dioxide emission issues, current and future use of nuclear power is considered to be a vital factor in the global effort to improve on the Earth’s environmental ‘balance of health’. (Viewed relatively, the carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere is currently about 70% more than it was 40 years ago, and this trend is continuing.) Comparison is made between nuclear and other forms of energy, not only in terms of carbon footprint and greenhouse gas aspects, but also in terms of costs and availability of fuels. Attention is brought to the finite nature of fossil-based fuel resources compared to nuclear fuel cycles that can ‘breed’ further fuel. Cost-competitive fissionable materials suitable for fuel in current and future fission-based nuclear technology are conservatively estimated to be sufficient for at least the next 500 years at projected usage rates/requirements estimates. Features and characteristics of next generation NPPs have also been provided to introduce the reader to this evolving aspect of commercial NPP development, and fusion-based nuclear power, although beyond the scope of this book, is also briefly addressed in terms of a future fossil-fuel free energy source. The key elements, principles and approaches to NPP-PLiM for plant designs most commonly in current use are explained in Chapter 2, by Tipping. Goals and essential features of PLiM, AM, ASPs and standard OPs are shown to be the result of logical and safety-based approaches to ensure that resources are primarily invested into the most important SSCs to maintain adequate safety margins and to continuously increase safety levels. Common NPP SSC-AD terminology and definitions are listed. Many SSCs can be routinely maintained or replaced, but it is the condition of the large, passive SSCs, which are deemed irreplaceable (due to practical and cost issues), that will ultimately decide the operational life of a NPP. Failures in
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NPP components, systems, machinery and structures can occur. Similarly, administrative and operational oversights can also take place and potentially contribute to a failure. However, most NPP-SSC failures cannot cause a direct threat to safety or operation, since extensive defence-in-depth (DID) design principles, redundant/back-up systems and tested accident/emergency management strategies are in place. The DID and accident management approaches are explained to give the reader an appreciation of the extent designers, operators and regulators interact to ensure, and assure, the highest levels of safety, even under accident/emergency conditions. Safety awareness, appropriate safety training courses and questioning attitudes of all NPP personnel are vital to the overall operational success of NPPs. It is shown that PLiM, AM, ASPs and OPs, based on understanding of SSC-AD mechanisms, and their mitigation, are a way to cost effectively achieve all these goals for both current and long-term operation. Safety in the operation of NPPs always has first priority. Specific safety regulations, regulatory requirements and licensing aspects of NPPs obviously vary with the country in which the plants are operating. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, by Alonso, while national structures of regulation and the way legally binding requirements are implemented/enforced may differ in detail, they share overall objectives in common, i.e. to ensure that the use of nuclear power does not affect the population or environment at any time. The main areas of concern for plant designers, operators and regulators are identified as neutron irradiation embrittlement, stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC). International activities and research efforts are addressed, as well as aspects and methods for integration of PLiM into operating plants. Plant safety assessment for nuclear power plants, and in particular the development and application of probabilistic and deterministic methods for NPP and SSC safety assessment, are explained in Chapter 4, by Contri and Rodionov. The chapter provides definitions of terms commonly used, and highlights the main issues of SSC-AD. The field of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is explained with reference to the evaluation of time-dependent ageing effects. The importance of having a robust NPP organizational structure for supporting PLiM is discussed in depth. The socio-economic impacts of ageing and PLiM programmes for NPPLTO are discussed in Chapter 5, by Tipping. The importance of nuclear power in the world’s energy resource mix is presented and fuel availability and pricing is examined for current and long-term operation. Cost drivers of NPP operation are analysed, since the business case has to be adjusted to accommodate costs associated with possible (unforeseen) additional regulatory burdens/restrictions, procurement of large, expensive SSCs (e.g. steam generator replacements) and the business case necessity to amortize the plants before they are phased out of service. Significant investments in
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replacement SSCs, systems upgrading/modernization and back-fitting costs can be more readily amortized if the NPPs go into LTO. Power uprates and associated issues are explained and identified.
Overview of Part II Part II reviews the mechanisms and effects of ageing degradation of materials in nuclear power plant systems, structures and components (SSC), as well as routes taken to characterize and analyse the degradation of materials and mitigate degradation effects. Chapter 6, by Tipping, presents a holistic approach to failure analysis of NPP-SSCs, and is given as a guide to researchers, designers, operators, investigators and regulators for formulating appropriate questions to ultimately explain why failures occurred and to facilitate a logic-based methodology to determine their root causes and thereby to provide routes to take to avoid such failures in future. The phenomenon of latent failure conditions (LFCs) is outlined to provide a further concept in understanding the root causes of SSC failures. Understanding how failures occur in SSCs, and how they impact NPP operation and safety, is shown to be a many-faceted challenge, since the interaction of man-machine and human factors may contribute in subtle ways to SSC-AD types, rates and levels. Chapter 7, by Bakirov, explores the impact of operational loads and AD interactions on SSCs. Creep, fatigue and corrosion interactions are examined in depth, as well as equipment condition monitoring, prediction and testing routes used to confirm whether SSCs are in the optimum physical and chemical condition to fulfil their technical specifications, and to check that they remain resistant to the continuing operational stressors they are subjected to. In particular, the most efficient in situ (specimen-free) nondestructive monitoring and testing methods to detect levels of SSC-AD are identified Chapter 8, by Hernández-Mayoral and Caturla, reviews the evolution of microstructures in reactor pressure vessel (RPV) steels and other reactor internal structural materials, describing this evolution in terms of the physical and chemical processes taking place due to the effects of operational stressors and stresses, time and temperature. A comparison is made between ferritic/ martensitic and austenitic steels with regard to the damage processes that occur. Tools available to study irradiation-induced damage are described. Practical measures that can be taken to mitigate the effects of neutron irradiation damage are identified, being the result of robust integration of research results to the solution of problems in NPPs. Chapter 9, by Andresen, reviews stress corrosion cracking (SCC) in light water reactor (LWR) environments, covering in particular austenitic stainless steels and nickel-base alloys. This AD mechanism is examined
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in depth, and the highly complex interaction between the materials, their heat treatment, microstructure, level and type of residual stress and specific operating environment (water chemistry of coolant, neutron fluence) is explained. Furthermore, comparison is made between product forms (e.g. wrought austenitic stainless steel and cast ferritic or martensitic stainless steels) in terms of their SCC propensity in LWR coolant and environments (i.e. in boiling and pressurized water reactors (BWRs and PWRs)). Corrosion fatigue and operating environmental effects on fracture are also discussed, since they are related forms of AD. Chapter 10, by Garner, reviews the mechanisms and effects of void swelling (VS) and irradiation creep (IC) in LWR environments. The phenomena of VS and IC have the potential to cause distortion in internal structural components, and since neutron fluences increase with operational time and swelling and creep depend, among other things, on the actual level of neutron irradiation damage present, it is expected that these AD mechanisms will become significant issues in future, especially when NPPs go into LTO. Owing to lower neutron flux levels in BWRs, the problems of VS and IC appear less of an issue compared to the situation in PWRs. The development of VS is identified as being non-linear with neutron dose, thus an acceleration of this effect is expected with LTO. Predictive equations regarding deformation levels for AISI 304 austenitic stainless steel are discussed. Chapter 11, by Brumovsky, outlines examples taken from practice to illustrate how ferritic low alloy reactor pressure vessel (RPV) steel and welds may embrittle to varying degrees, depending on impurity levels (e.g. copper, phosphorus) or alloying constituents (e.g. nickel, manganese), irradiation temperature and the level of neutron fluence. The effect of tensile yield stress and hardness increase as a result of RPV alloy and weld matrix hardening through neutron irradiation induced point defects and precipitate formation is discussed, as is the concomitant loss in fracture toughness levels (Charpy notch impact or other fracture toughness measures) in susceptible RPV materials. The importance of well-characterized irradiation conditions for creating databases is highlighted. The issue of neutron irradiation induced embrittlement in RPVs is extended in Chapter 12, by Brumovsky, which explains the principles and the approaches to RPV annealing and other procedures used for mitigating and managing embrittlement rates and levels. Methods such as fuel management and RPV shielding are explained. In particular, the practical annealing of RPVs, and selection of the optimum time-at-temperature heat treatment schedule are examined in depth. The rate of re-embrittlement of RPVs has generally been shown to be less after annealing and re-irradiation, thus allowing the so-called ‘lateral shift’ approach to be adopted.
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Overview of Part III Part III reviews analysis, monitoring and modelling techniques applicable to the study of NPP materials, as well as the application of advanced systems, structures and components in NPPs. Chapter 13, by Lozano-Perez, presents science-based approaches used to detect and understand irradiation damage and related ageing in NPP-SSC materials. The distinction is made between non-destructive and destructive methods available to researchers. Aspects of both volumetric and surface techniques are also provided, so that the optimum choice of method and approach can be made to study the various AD mechanisms. The microstructures and chemical compositions of aged/irradiated materials, even at the 100 nm scale, are shown to be a key to better understanding SSC-AD. Advances in specialized tools allow atomic resolutions in two or three dimensions. Chapter 14, by Yang and Chiang, provides information concerning on-line and real-time corrosion monitoring techniques of metals and alloys in nuclear power plants and laboratories. The underlying principles and applications of general or localized corrosion monitoring are explained in detail, and the variety of tools available are described and discussed in depth. Advantages and disadvantages of different monitoring methods are critically reviewed. Specifically, the importance of accurately measuring the electrochemical potential (ECP) of alloys in the actual NPP environment of high pressure and temperature coolant is discussed, and the range of suitable electrodes that may be used is presented. Chapter 15, by Malerba presents multi-scale modelling of irradiation effects in NPP materials. Irradiation effects are treated as a multi-scale problem, and microstructural features are linked to mechanical property changes. Computer-based multi-scale modelling approaches at the atomic, microstructural and mechanical property levels are explained, and an example of practical application of modelling is provided. In particular, irradiation induced hardening and embrittlement effects in steels used in NPPs are discussed. Chapter 16, by Hashemian, discusses the significant developments in, and applications of, advanced instrumentation and control (I&C) in NPPs, as exemplified in the adoption of digital signal-based systems to replace the original analogue ones in older NPPs. The transition from analogue to digital I&C has generally enhanced safety levels and shortened response times for operational correctional procedures or emergency actions, for example. Temperature sensors, pressure transmitters, neutron detectors and associated cables are key I&C components, and may be subject to ageing. Both high and low frequency methods for on-line monitoring (OLM) are examined. However, attention is brought to the possible corruption of data and signals, and wilful interference/tampering aspects that could be an issue
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with digital-based technologies, if robust counter-measures and back-up systems are not in place. The development and application of nanostructured materials in nuclear power plants is traced and discussed in Chapter 17, by Hoffelner. Both fusion and fission-based future NPPs will operate at higher temperatures and pressures than currently operating NPPs, and the development of specially tailored alloys to resist ageing degradation is a key aspect. High temperature alloy properties include the need to resist creep, and the way to manufacture oxide-dispersion strengthened (ODS) materials is explained. The mechanical properties of ODS alloys, created by various routes – ceramic oxide dispersion, carbo-nitrides (with thermo-mechanical treatment) and internal oxidation – are discussed in depth.
Overview of Part IV Part IV reviews the particular ageing degradation issues, plant designs, and application of plant life management (PLiM) practices in a range of commercial nuclear reactor types. All reactor types operate under conditions dictated by their design concepts and engineered systems, and their SSCs are thus subjected to system-specific conditions and stressors. Some materials used in SSCs are found in all types of NPP-SSCs, but they may perform quite differently according to the specific operational conditions and environments they are exposed to. From both safety and technical standpoints, the overwhelming majority of the world’s current fleet of NPPs will be able to continue operation in excess of their original design lifetime (i.e. LTO). This is a direct consequence of effective PLiM, AM, ASPs, and OPs and focussed attention to SSC repairs, replacements or back-fitting, as required. Management of ageing effects in large, irreplaceable SSCs logically lies at the centre of NPP operational and commercial strategies, and to this end, coverage of the application of knowledge management strategies as a vital elemental aspect of overall NPP operations is also provided. The designs, plant-specific PLiM, AM, ASPs needs, and standard OPs for the main commercially operating nuclear reactor types are reviewed, including: pressurized water reactors, with PWRs covered in Chapter 18, by Tipping, and WWERs covered in Chapter 19, by Katona; boiling water reactors (BWRs), as covered in Chapter 20, by Sekimura and Yamashita; pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs), as covered in Chapter 21, by Sinha, Sinha, Dixit, Chakrabarty and Jain; sodium-cooled fast neutron spectrum reactors (SFRs), as covered in Chapter 22, by Raj, Chellapandi, Jayakumar, Rao and Rao, and gas-cooled graphite-moderated reactors (Magnox, AGRs), as covered in Chapter 23, by Neighbour. All of these chapters show that, irrespective of NPP type, safety and integrity of NPP-SSCs
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are closely connected to commercial viability, since SSCs are kept within design specifications and regulatory requirements, which are precursors to reliable and continuous operation. The longer a NPP can operate (i.e. free from prolonged maintenance shut-downs or forced outages), the more electrical energy (or district heating) can be sold. A NPP which has well-maintained SSCs (i.e. kept within their design and technical specifications and with sufficient safety margins), and has a good safety culture and vigilance in its workforce will, de facto, have a good safety record and a high availability and reliability.
Concluding remarks: Quo vadis nuclear power? The information in this book shows the immense amount of work done to date to understand, and mitigate, NPP SSC-AD. Indeed, thanks to PLiM, AM, ASPs, OPs and materials research, many older NPPs are now in the position to move into the LTO phase of their lives. This is the true value of such programmes, since both safety and economic aspects are optimized. As outlined in Chapter 24, by Tipping, by building on what is known today, it is expected that next generation NPPs will greatly benefit in terms of lessons learned concerning design, manufacture, choices of materials, inspection/monitoring methods and operational practices, to give just a few examples. Notwithstanding this, PLiM, AM, ASPs and OPs will still be essential for assuring safe, long and reliable operation of next generation NPPs. However, until these new NPPs come into service, it remains essential to closely follow, understand and mitigate the effects of SSC-AD in the current fleet of NPPs, as well as managing other less conventional ageing phenomena (e.g. retirement of experienced personnel, requirement to update documentation). A list of topical current and future NPP SSC-AD aspects and issues for NPPs is provided to focus on the main areas that require further research, monitoring and continued attention by designers, operators and regulators. With optimized PLiM, AM, ASPs and OPs in place, owners and operators will continue to provide their customers with environmentally clean and reliable energy at competitive prices whilst protecting their overall investment and will concomitantly provide licensing authorities with the proof that their plants are always being operated safely, irrespective of their chronological age.
Acknowledgements I would like to acknowledge and thank the international team of experts who have assisted me in creating this comprehensive book on how to understand ageing and degradation issues in nuclear power plants. The authors have
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made hereby a signal contribution to science and technology, exemplified by the high quality of the work they provided. Accordingly, this book will serve as a valuable reference and guide for all those currently involved with nuclear power generation and regulation, as well as those contemplating, or just starting, a career in nuclear power plant technology or nuclear materials research. Without the spirit of openness, the professional approaches taken and the collaboration between all contributing experts from around the world, this book could never have been written. My thanks also go to Mr Ian Borthwick (Commissioning Editor) for his encouragement, advice and support in creating this book, and to Mrs Diana Gill, Ms Ceridwen McCarthy and Ms Nell Holden, all of Woodhead Publishing Limited, for their highly competent assistance in the development and handling of this book project.
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Part I Introduction to plant life management (PLiM), safety regulation and economics of nuclear power plants
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Understanding and mitigating ageing in nuclear power plants
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Introduction to nuclear energy, and materials and operational aspects of nuclear power plants
P h. G. T i pp i n g, Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant, Switzerland
Abstract: The importance of nuclear power is presented in terms of its significant contribution to the world’s overall generating capacity, and its essentially ‘carbon-free’ nature is highlighted. The age distribution of the current fleet of nuclear power plants (NPPs) is explained and also the need for ensuring safety in operation, irrespective of the NPP’s age or design. Global resources of nuclear fuel and comparison with other energy carriers are discussed and attention is drawn to the requirement to condition and dispose of radioactive waste correctly. Stress corrosion cracking and neutron irradiation embrittlement issues are taken as two examples of ageing degradation that have occurred in NPPs. Key words: nuclear power plants, climate change, safety, nuclear fuel, radioactive waste, stress corrosion cracking, neutron embrittlement.
1.1
Introduction
This book contains more than 750 person-years of experience in all aspects of commercial nuclear power, basic research and applied technology. The contributing authors have various backgrounds, including engineering (civil, electrical, mechanical), physics, chemistry, metallurgy, radiology and safety regulation, for example. Specialist areas within the above general categories of science and technology have evolved over the years to address issues concerned with nuclear power generation, and specifically, this book deals with key aspects of research into how structural materials used in nuclear power plants (NPPs) behave and age in operation. The book also identifies and analyses many other important issues that have continued to dominate and shape the commercial nuclear power industry during its development, evolution and regulation since the mid-1950s. The world’s political and environmental situation has changed drastically over this time, reflecting global concerns about dwindling supplies of fossil-based energy resources (oil, gas and coal) and the possible impact their use has on climate and pollution levels in the atmosphere. The importance of nuclear energy, which currently supplies about 16% of the global electrical power capacity, is further 3 © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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highlighted in terms of its low carbon footprint (CF) and no greenhouse gas emissions (GGEs) in operation. Recognizing that many NPPs constructed in the 1965–80 nuclear power ‘boom-era’, have already reached, or are approaching, the end of their original design lives, the publication of this book at this point in time appears fortuitous. However, the information in this book is not concerned with the shutting down, decommissioning, dismantling and final disposal of NPPs; on the contrary, it deals with how these older NPPs may still continue to operate safely and reliably, benefitting from lessons learned, good operational and standard maintenance practices plus the robust implementation of system, structure and component (SSC) ageing surveillance programmes (ASPs), ageing management (AM) and plant-life management (PLiM) programmes. This book has an underlying goal, namely to record relevant and updated knowledge concerning how ageing degradation (AD) in NPP-SSCs occurs, and how it may be effectively detected, avoided, eliminated or mitigated to facilitate safe, reliable and profitable current operation, and even long-term operation (LTO) (i.e. operation of NPPs in excess of their original design lives). Consequently, this book will furnish all those involved in any sector of commercial NPP operation and regulation, with a deeper understanding of the many facets and issues concerning nuclear power technology as a whole. The topics and issues addressed in this book are experience and sciencebased sources of modern information concerning the commercial nuclear power industry, and its regulation. Safety, operational reliability and profitability of NPPs will all benefit when such information is robustly implemented as technically perfected (and regulatory approved) methodologies and remedies for SSC-AD. It is expected that all NPPs, irrespective of their design or age, that are operated by a qualified workforce, who conscientiously apply all the tenets of safety culture and diligently ensure that standard operational practices (OPs), ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes are followed, will be safe, reliable and profitable to operate at every stage of their lives, including LTO, and until, at the very end of their chronological lives, decommissioning, dismantling and disposal eventually become necessary.
1.2
Age as a relative term
The design life of a NPP has generally little in common with its real-life operational safety status and fitness-for-service, and thus the amount of years it can operate until the true end of operational life (EOL) is reached. Barring political or public acceptance issues, for example, the NPP’s EOL will be reached when safety requirements can no longer be satisfied or, alternatively, despite having a good safety status, it is simply no longer profitable to continue operation. Specifically, good standard plant OPs, ASPs, AM and
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PLiM programmes make it possible to delay significantly this point in time, since both safety and profitability of NPPs are maintained and optimized. Again, NPP personnel safety culture attitudes will be significant in assuring the degree of effectiveness of the above-mentioned programmes. Depending on various aspects, NPPs may possess several types of ‘lifetime’, for example: ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
operational lifetime (when power is being produced safely and reliably and can be sold at a profit); political/legal lifetime (operation ends when there is no more public acceptance or when legally binding international agreements to shut down particular NPPs have to be respected); business/economic lifetime (operation ends when the overall NPP running costs can no longer be covered by sales of electricity); technical lifetime (operation ends when SSC refurbishment and repairs are no longer technically feasible, or possible); conceptual lifetime (operation ends when the NPP can no longer be kept at the state-of-the-art, science and technology, since it has far too many outdated and obsolete SSCs); safety lifetime (operation ends when statutory and regulatory requirements for continuing operation (fulfilment of licensing conditions) are too extensive, expensive or not possible to implement practically); the chronological lifetime of a NPP may be taken as the time-span between site selection, constructing and operating the NPP, ceasing operation, removing the fuel and finally decommissioning and dismantling it, and returning the site back to ‘greenfield’ status.
Irrespective of their age, NPPs that have benefitted from continual improvement in management and operational practices (MOPs), maintenance, monitoring technologies, inspections, repairs, refurbishing or replacement of SSCs, and have cost-effectively upgraded plant control and safety systems in full accordance with regulatory requirements, are in good overall condition to continue operation and go eventually into the LTO phase.
1.3
The importance of nuclear energy
As previously noted, nuclear energy is already an important contributor (about 16%) to the total global electricity requirement, and as demand for energy increases, the nuclear-generated share of the electrical power market is expected to rise correspondingly. Potentially, nuclear-generated power could provide up to 1.7 terawatts (TWe) of electricity to the world by 2050, but this will depend, among other things, on the number and capacity rating thereof of new generation NPPs coming on-line [1]. However, if the nuclear power industry is to maintain its current position, and wishes to increase its
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market share in the future, it must continue to be accepted by the public. A crucial aspect of this is that NPPs must remain a safe and reliable source of energy. Acceptance of nuclear-generated electrical power will also depend considerably on its perceived and real impact on the quality of life and the environment. It is therefore appropriate to introduce the concepts of ‘greenhouse gases’ and the ‘carbon footprint’ (CF) already here, since human activities are now frequently classed in terms of a CF, which is a measure of the amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) (a greenhouse gas) produced by the combustion of fossil fuels. The CF is often expressed as tonnes of CO2 or tonnes of carbon emitted, usually on an annual basis. However, it must be stated here that any activity requiring or generating energy (e.g. power plants (hydro, fossil-fuelled, solar, wind, nuclear), mining (extracting coal or uranium, pumping oil), manufacturing (refining metals, enriching uranium for nuclear fuel, production of solar panels or wind turbines, making cement), transport (petrol and diesel combustion), electrically driven motors (batteries charged via coal-fired electricity stations or solar panels)) will leave varying sizes of CF. Thus, although NPPs generate negligible direct carbon emissions, they nevertheless still have a finite CF. The method used to obtain a CF is the ‘life cycle assessment’ (LCA), which is accredited by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14000 standards. Calculating exact values for CFs is a fairly complex task, since basically every process and sub-process involved in the item under consideration must be assessed for its own CF and then added to get the CF total. However, taking all CF aspects (mining, fuel enrichment, manufacturing, decommissioning and disposal, etc.) into consideration, nuclear power generation may still be classed as having a very low CF, and thus nuclear energy remains an extremely low source of environmentally harmful greenhouse gases. For example, even if lower grade uranium-bearing ores (e.g. 0.03% content of fissionable 235U) will have to be used in future, necessitating more energy to extract and refine the fuel, this would only raise the current total CF emissions of the United Kingdom’s NPPs from 5 to 6.8 grams of CO2 equivalent per kilowatt-hour (CO2e/ kWh). This increase, however, would still keep nuclear power technology at a level comparable with other low-carbon power technologies, and will be anyway well below the CFs of fossil-fuelled power technologies [2]. (Note: The CO2e is the carbon dioxide equivalent. Each of the greenhouse gases addressed by the Kyoto Protocol (see later) can be identified in terms of its climate change impact relative to that of carbon dioxide.) The commonly used unit for emission reductions is one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent. Combined power plants using gas turbines and hydro-power produce 420, solar-photo-voltaic 62 and coal-fired ones about 900 (all in approximate gram-equivalent CO2e/kWh). It has been reported that a pressurized water reactor (PWR) NPP in Switzerland had a value of 3.04 CO2e/kWh, which is on a par with hydro-produced only electricity [3]. This value even included
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mining the uranium fuel and final disposal of the entire plant. Although electricity production in NPPs is esentially CO2 free, over the entire plant lifetimes about 6–8 CO2e/kWh is nevertheless expected to be generated through various processes. This is still very low compared to other energysupply systems, as exemplified above. Not only is nuclear-generated power environmentally benign, it is cheap: at a representative price of 5 US cent/ kWh (3.4 Euro-cent//kWh at the average exchange rate in October 2009), a cost-analysis gives roughly: 1.97 US cent (1.3 Euro-cent) for capital costs, 1.85 US cent (1.26 Euro-cent) for operating costs, 1 US cent (0.7 Eurocent) for decommissioning/disposal and 0.38 US cent (0.26 Euro-cent) for fuel. (It can be noted that if all fossil-fuelled power plants were to be replaced by NPPs (to get the same amount of energy), it would mean that the world’s NPP fleet would then have to number about 4316 by the year 2050 [4]. This is roughly ten times more than the number of NPPs operating in 2010.) A detailed analysis of CO2 issues is beyond the scope of this book, but it is worth mentioning that carbon capture and storage (CCS) and associated costs are currently (2009) running between 30 and 35 Euros per tonne, and this cost is likely to increase. For comparison, Norway currently levies a duty of about 44 Euros per tonne of CO2 released in the process of extracting oil from the North Sea. The European Energy Exchange, located in Leipzig, Germany, currently quotes prices between 20 and 30 Euros per tonne of CO2 [5]. In other words, just like nuclear waste, fossil-fuel-generated CO2 waste also has a price and sequestering (storage) of ‘carbon’ underground requires further environmental impact, site selection and viability assessments. From this, it can be seen that continued and increased use of nuclear power remains justifiable in terms of its low CF and GGE emissions profile, and it is in a favourable position to contribute significantly to both current and future global requirements for energy.
1.4
Learning from experience to continually improve safety in nuclear power plants (NPPs)
Creating and maintaining safety in operation of NPPs arises through many factors including good design, appropriate materials selection for SSCs, highest manufacturing standards and approved methods, quality assurance, operational practices, maintenance, inspection and human resource training and actions. However, continually improving safety at all levels lies in the necessity to learn constantly from our own, or others, experience. As mentioned in the Foreword, ‘Experience is the best teacher’, but when dealing with human and materials-related issues in NPPs, particularly those that have impacted safety, it is evident that ‘Detrimentum magister nos’ (‘Damage teaches us’). As with any other industry, it is necessary to put all lessons learned, including
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practical experience combined with analysis and inspections, robustly into practice to avoid future problems in the operation of NPPs and the SSCs in them. This facilitates continual improvement of safety, as well as reliable operation. Such actions taken in a NPP can not only serve the regulatory and corporate goals of safety and profitability respectively, but also may pave the way for continued operation even after the NPP’s original design life has been reached (LTO). The use of nuclear energy is subject to regulatory control, and licences to operate (or permission granted for continued operation) will be issued only when the safety case is clearly demonstrated. Thus, proof of safety remains a mandatory regulatory requirement for the current and LTO of existing NPPs, as well as for any future new-build NPPs. Lessons learned and experience gained with all types and designs of NPP over the last 55 years of using commercial nuclear power now serve to form a solid base of knowledge concerned with regulation, design, choice of materials, inspection, monitoring techniques and best operational practices, including nurturing a safety-oriented attitude in the workforce, namely the implementation of a good safety culture. Although the main scope and focus of this book is on understanding and mitigating SSC-AD mechanisms or issues which have arisen in the past and that have impacted safety, reliability and profitability of NPPs, a further goal is to provide guidance and information derived from research and operational experience, based on sound science and proven methods, to ensure that NPPs may continue to function in full accordance with their design specifications and to thus produce electricity as safely and as reliably as possible at a competitive price. Implementation of best possible practices and methods also has the potential to facilitate LTO operation of NPPs, since safety margins may be kept at sufficient and effective levels, and SSCs remain reliable. The way in which best practices and methods can be incorporated into the overall operation of NPPs is discussed in this book by drawing on experience gained and introducing the concepts, features and goals of ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes. Accordingly, this book also serves the broader goals of knowledge management, which is necessary for retaining both managerial and technical competence in the nuclear power industry, now and in the future.
1.5
Global situation of the status of installed nuclear power in 2010
The world’s fleet of NPPs currently has an average operational age of around 23 years. In June 2010 there were 438 NPPs operating in 30 countries, with an installed electric net capacity of about 370 GWe, and another 59 NPPs, with a planned capacity of 40 GWe, were in various stages of planning and construction, for example, 6 new NPPs were being built in mainland China
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and India. The currently installed capacity is expected to increase to at least 530 GWe by the year 2025 as new NPPs connect to the grid. The amount of installed nuclear power capacity, relative to other energy sources, varies between countries, as shown, as an example, in the following abbreviated list, which details the current situation (2010), in per cent installed nuclear power capacity relative to other sources (approximate values): ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
Belgium: 7 NPPs, 52%; Canada: 18 NPPs and 2 NPPs in refurbishment, 15%; Peoples Republic of China: 11 NPPs, <3% (>5% by 2020 is planned); France: 58 NPPs, 75%; Hungary: 4 NPPs, 20%; India: 17 NPPs; 3% (with the goal for 25% in 2050); Japan: 55 NPPs, 30%; Russian Federation: 32 NPPs, 16%; Sweden: 10 NPPs, 46%; Switzerland: 5 NPPs, 40%; United Kingdom: 19 NPPs, 19%; United States of America: 104 NPPs, 20%;
In June 2010 there were 195 NPPs in operation in continental Europe (with an installed electric net capacity of about 170 000 megawatt (MWe)) and 19 units were under construction with a projected net capacity of about 13 000 MWe; the new NPP constructions being in Bulgaria (2), Finland (1), France (1), Russian Federation (11), Slovak Republic (2) and Ukraine (2) [6]. Other countries within Europe currently have no commercial NPPs (e.g. Denmark, Greece). Countries outside Europe (e.g. Egypt) are keeping the nuclear power option open, whilst other countries (e.g. Iran) have already embarked on nuclear power schemes. Some countries are increasing their nuclear energy capacity (e.g. China, India, Russia, Finland and France), whilst, in contrast, Germany is planning to gradually phase out nuclear power. In February 2009, Italy and France agreed to the development, construction and initial set-up of four new generation European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) power plants in Italy, with the first one projected to start operation in 2020. Italy’s aim is to eventually produce 25% of the country’s electricity from nuclear energy. (Aspects of new generation NPPs, such as the EPR are discussed in Chapter 2 of this book.) Some countries (e.g. United Kingdom, Switzerland) are planning and assessing options to install new NPPs to replace the capacity of NPPs that could eventually be phased out. Despite the aforementioned international differences, political issues and goals, the overall global trend for nuclear power is seen as one of expansion. In June 2010, 149 new NPPs were in planning.
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1.6
Understanding and mitigating ageing in nuclear power plants
The importance of keeping nuclear power plants (npps) operating safely and reliably
A vital contribution to the overall level of nuclear generated power (irrespective of any new plants coming on-line in future, and the extra capacity presently being generated by NPP power uprates (PUs)), lies in assuring that the existing NPPs can continue to operate. This is, of course, with the requirement that they can do so safely and profitably, despite their chronological age or original design life. As will be shown later in this book, thanks to improved materials, maintenance, MOPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes and ageing degradation mitigation, these presently operating NPPs are still capable of fulfilling safety, technical and operational requirements. The question of whether a NPP may go to LTO is addressed through licensing procedures which require a priori proof of safety. It may be stated here that, despite different approaches in Europe and the USA, for example, the principles and goals are basically the same: first prove the safety case to the relevant regulatory authority and demonstrate that the overall plant practices are effective (e.g. maintenance, inspections, monitoring) and, if the business case is favourable (i.e. total market cost per kilowatt-hour (kWh) of nuclear generated electricity is competitive (or cheaper) compared to other sources, and profit margins remain favourable), and public acceptance remains high, continue operation.
1.7
Political and climate change issues and disposal of radioactive waste
Since the first ‘oil shock’ in the early 1970s it became clear that the world had become heavily dependent on this fossil-based fuel, and shortages in supply would quickly disrupt the world’s economies. Compounding this, oil prices have increased many-fold (a price is deliberately omitted here, due to the extremely volatile nature of the crude oil market) between 1970 and 2009 [7], and wildly fluctuating prices and shortages of supply have caused sharp inflation spikes and even civil protest. At the time of the first oil shock, there was generally a lack of global awareness concerning the possible harmful side-effects of burning fossil-based fuel and the production of GGEs with the attendant potential impact on the environment through pollution and global warming. Things have changed over the last 40 years, and environmental awareness and issues have now attracted increased public, political, energy policy-makers’ and media attention. The Kyoto Protocol [8] made provisions and pledges to reduce the signatory nations’ GGEs. As of February 2009, 183 states had signed and ratified the Protocol. Of these, 36 developed countries (plus the European Union, as a party in its own right) are required to reduce GGEs to specified levels. Some 137 developing
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countries have ratified the protocol, but they currently have no obligation beyond monitoring and reporting GGEs. As an example to focus attention on CO2 issues, it is noted that the concentration of CO2 was at a level of 372 parts per million in April 2005. This was higher than that calculated to have been present in the Earth’s atmosphere during the past 42 000 years. However, in September 2008 it was reported that scientists had thought that the general economic downturn would have slowed energy use, but instead, CO2 output actually jumped 3% from 2006 to 2007. This amount exceeds the most pessimistic outlook for emissions from burning coal and oil and related activities, as projected by scientists in 2007 [9]. It is worth noting that Great Britain has now pledged to cut CO2 emissions by at least 50% by 2050 and the ambitious new generation NPP construction scheme, currently now under plan, is seen as critical to achieving this target [10].
1.8
Energy resources: a comparison
The world’s demand for energy is increasing in pace with the growing human population (from approximately 1.5 billion in 1900, to about 6.7 billion in May 2009, and projected to reach about 9 billion by 2050 [11]), and with the emergence of more export-based economies in developing and industrializing nations. This means that the fossil-fuel based energy carriers (and these are finite resources) will eventually have to be replaced with alternatives that have lower environmental impact, are cheap and safe to use and, ideally, are ‘infinite resources’. Obvious such energy resources lie in harnessing hydro-, wind-, solar- (the sun shines on the earth about 35 000 times more power than the population uses daily, but presently only about 0.2% of the world’s energy comes from solar power) or direct tidal power. However, most of the world’s ideal hydropower sites have been used up, and environmental concerns and impact issues, such as flooding of marshlands and valleys and covering large land and sea areas with solar panels or wind turbines respectively may anyway preclude expansion, or restrict use, of these alternative sources in some cases. Costs of solar, wind and tidal energy are currently not competitive with nuclear energy (e.g. solar electricity is presently (2010) selling at a price six times more expensive than nuclear-generated electricity). So how does nuclear power really measure up? Uranium, a main source of nuclear fuel, is clearly also a finite quantity, but relatively little of the fissionable isotope 235U is actually needed for fuel and the current conservative estimate is that the resources are more than sufficient for at least the next 150 years, even allowing for increased demand through currently operating NPPs, including those in the LTO stage, and new NPPs projected to be operational in the next 5–40 years from now. Currently known uranium reserves, allowing extraction at a nominal benchmark price of US$130 per kilogramme of
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natural uranium metal (i.e. fuel enrichment price not included), or less, are estimated to be about 5.5 million tonnes. Consumption is about 66 500 tonnes per year. In total, about 35 million tonnes of uranium are probably available [12]. With advanced reactor and new fuel cycle technologies (breeder reactor technology), plus the eventual conversion of plutonium to fuel and reprocessing of spent fuel elements, the availability of nuclear fuel is likely to be assured for at least 1000 years [13]. Use of thorium as a breeder for fuel (discussed later) will potentially double the known reserves of fuel for the presently used fission-based reactor technology [12]. In the future, it is expected that other totally new ‘fossil-free’ or ‘virtually infinite’ energy sources will be further developed (e.g. fusion-based reactor technology, hydrogen-based fuels), and improved ways of energy utilization and distribution efficiency will anyway further conserve all other energy resources. Such developments will not take place in the near future, but prototype fast breeder reactors, for example, are currently being developed or under construction. Recognizing this situation, the only logical option left is to use low or zero GGE energy sources for as long as possible, whilst developing alternatives to fossil-based energy carriers in parallel. Although a NPP produces essentially no GGEs in operation, it does, however, create its own special waste products, but this radioactive waste (‘radwaste’) is not jettisoned into the environment; it is collected, sorted, conditioned and stored according to nationally approved practices and legislation. Aspects concerned with radwaste will be examined later, but radwaste treatment technology is already advanced and deemed capable of preventing environmental damage by keeping harmful substances out of the biosphere. It has to be remembered that radwaste must be handled, conditioned and disposed of so as to span very long geological, political and social time frames. Furthermore, by closing the nuclear fuel cycle, with the separation of minor actinides and long-lived radio-isotopes/fission products, the life span for unacceptable radiotoxicity and monitoring can be brought down to less than 1000 years.
1.9
Further ageing aspects in nuclear power plants (NPPs)
Nuclear power plants, just like any other industrial plants or transport systems (e.g. trains, aircraft, ships), are made of SSCs that undergo ‘ageing’, and this term may even be extended to include the personnel who operate them. Ageing effects may be seen as some finite rate of continuous, time-dependent mechanical, physical or chemical degradation of SSCs, level of personnel training, loss of knowledge (due to retirement of experienced personnel and inadequate succession planning), inadequacies in documentation (e.g. omission to follow exactly any modifications that have occurred in the NPP) and other
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aspects associated with mindsets and complacency. The effects of ageing can thus be seen to impact humans, plant procedures, practices and management, materials, computer software, hardware, documentation and machinery alike. Ageing degradation may occur at almost imperceptible or relatively rapid rates, depending on the specific subject area under consideration and the effectiveness of MOPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes in place. A key to safe operation of NPPs is to be aware of all the possible types of ageing that could take place, and to understand their root causes, and their potential impact on safety and reliability. Knowledge of the ways of how to eliminate or mitigate ageing degradation effects, as presented in this book, will then effectively ‘close the loop’, to create optimized NPP operation. While safe plant operation is vital for public acceptance, reliable operation is essential for the supply of competitively priced energy and thus profitability of the plant. These aspects will also be dealt with in this book, but it is important to mention here that the nuclear power industry is quite aware of SSC-AD and other ageing issues, and continues to implement strategies to address them. One important tool used to keep NPPs in a safe condition is to apply standard (routine) OPs, inspections, repairs and replacements, supported further by ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes. Their role and benefits will become increasingly apparent in the following chapters, but it is sufficient to mention here that such programmes not only protect the utilities’ business goals and investments, but also maintain safety at the highest level for a reasonable cost–benefit relationship and also pave the way for continued NPP operation, even after the original design life has been reached. This represents a significant financial incentive for utilities to invest resources in reliable and safe operation now to assure the future (LTO) of their plants.
1.10
Historical evolution of nuclear power and some materials aspects
On 20 December 1951, the Experimental Breeder Reactor EBR-1 in Arco, Idaho, USA, succeeded in supplying enough electricity to illuminate four low-power light bulbs. (The EBR-1’s task was, however, only to demonstrate the concept of a breeder reactor.) The Russian APS-1, 5 MWe reactor was the first to supply electricity to the national grid, on 26 June 1954. Not long after this, the nuclear power era gained considerable momentum when the world’s first commercial-scale NPP, ‘Calder Hall 1’, situated at Sellafield, England, was connected to the national electricity grid on 27 August, 1956. The Sellafield site eventually featured four Magnox-type reactors, each with a rated power of 50 MWe. (Apart from supplying power, the Magnox reactors also served to produce plutonium for military purposes.) The Magnox reactors were natural uranium metal fuelled, graphite moderated, and carbon dioxide gas cooled. They featured magnesium–aluminium
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(non-oxidizing – hence ‘Magnox’) alloy fuel cladding. The fuel cladding alloy had a low neutron capture cross-section, but limited the operating temperature to about 390 °C and thus also the thermal efficiency. The heat exchanger was outside the containment. Early Magnox reactors featured a steel containment, whilst later ones had a reinforced concrete one. The United Kingdom’s Magnox reactors were designed for 20 years of operation but the oldest one at Calder Hall actually achieved nearly 47 years of service before being shut down on 31 March 2003. Decommissioning of the Calder Hall site, to eventually return it to ‘greenfield’ status, is projected to take about 100 years to complete. By comparison, most NPPs operating today usually have a full power operation original design life of 30–40 years (with a relicensing or open-license situation for the option of operation of 60 years, and possibly more), produce between 220 and 1600 MWe, and, depending on the design or type, use either, for example, natural uranium, plutonium or uranium–plutonium mixed oxides or carbides as fuel, have zirconium alloy (e.g.‘Zircaloy-4’ (Zry-4) with 98.23 wt% zirconium, 1.45% tin, 0.21% iron, 0.1% chromium, and 0.01% hafnium (impurity hafnium very low, since it has a high neutron capture cross-section)) fuel cladding materials, and use either heavy water, light water, helium gas, carbon dioxide gas or molten sodium metal for coolant. The pressure vessels in light water cooled reactors (i.e. pressurized and boiling water reactors – PWR and BWR, respectively), for example, are made from tough, low alloy ferritic steel (cladded inside with austenitic stainless steel for corrosion protection). It can be seen that nuclear power systems technology, fuel and materials of SSCs have all evolved considerably over the last 55 years.
1.11
Overview of two important materials issues in older design nuclear power plants (npps)
Each type and design of NPP has its own special characteristics, and as operational experience was gained over the years, solutions to specific problems associated with SSC ageing degradation mechanisms had to be found. Design concepts and materials which had functioned well for other industries (e.g. in fossil-fuelled power plants, oil refining and chemical industries) were natural choices for the first commercial NPPs, but with time, it became clear that the nuclear environment presented other, and special, challenges to SSCs and the materials involved. For example, operational conditions and parameters such as temperature, pressure, neutron irradiation, coolant water chemistry (including radiolysis thereof) and other factors often combined to cause degradation in materials previously thought to be resistant to ageing degradation. Two examples of unexpected material degradation are given below.
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1.11.1 Stress corrosion cracking Despite a good service record in other industries, stress corrosion cracking (SCC) occurred in the well-known ‘Alloy 600’ (a nickel-base alloy approximately 72% Ni, 14% Cr and 10% Fe), used extensively for reactor pressure vessel (RPV) closure head penetrations cladding and steam generator (SG) tubing in pressurized water reactors (PWRs). Technical and engineering solutions were found to repair, plug, sleeve or surface-treat affected SG tubes, but when the so-called ‘plugging-rate value’ was reached (typically 10–20% of the total number of tubes in the SGs) it was no longer possible to operate at full power, having regard for emergency cooling requirements. Thus the balance between safety (emergency cooling capacity) and economic operation (power had to be reduced) eventually lead to the replacement of affected SGs. The action of ‘overplugging’ SGs is an alternative temporary solution to SG replacement, but necessitates a significant further reduction of plant power and this translates to the loss of even more money for each operational cycle: in other words, a natural limit is reached where it becomes economically attractive (i.e. cheaper in the long term) to replace the SGs. (Note: SCC degradation is dealt with extensively in Chapter 9 of this book.) New SGs usually feature tubing made from Alloy 690 TT (nickel-base alloy approximately 60% Ni, 30% Cr and 10% Fe), which is thermally treated (TT) to create a favourable microstructure and optimum mechanical properties, which has a much improved resistance to SCC in PWR coolant. It is noted here that, in general, nickel–chromium–iron alloys, such as Alloy 600, are quite resistant to corrosion, but if they contain high internal tensile stress (fabrication aspects), are not heat treated in an optimum way (microstructural effects) and are subjected to pressurized borated water (i.e. the coolant used in PWRs) at around 300 °C, primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) may occur, leading to costly repairs or eventual replacement of SGs and RPV closure heads. In some PWRs, the leakage of borated coolant water through PWSCC-affected head penetrations (for control rods and instrumentation) onto the external RPV closure head caused problems. In the most severe case discovered, boric acid crystals left on the external surfaces of the ferritic steel RPV head had caused extensive corrosion. The large area of corrosion (also known as ‘wastage’) had reached the stainless steel cladding of the RPV inner surface [14, 15]. It is interesting to note here that in the case mentioned, there were also managerial (human factor) inadequacies and ambitious power production goals that had also combined to aggravate the situation [16]. The NPP involved was the 873 MWe PWR ‘Davis-Besse’, situated at Oak Harbour, OH, USA. The forced outage lasted about two years and cost around US$600 million. The NPP underwent a successful recovery process, including purchase of a new RPV head, and
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also implemented comprehensive operational, monitoring and management strategies to avoid the problem in future. Replacement of RPV closure heads, usually featuring Alloy 690 TT penetration claddings, is an on-going task in many PWR-NPPs. Appropriate monitoring systems are also being implemented to detect if leakage should, nevertheless, occur.
1.11.2 Neutron irradiation embrittlement enhancement caused by impurities introduced during welding A further example of evolution of materials technology in NPPs can be found in the development of improved ferritic RPV alloys and welds. In the 1960s, NPPs were constructed using the current state-of-the-art welding technologies. However, there was no awareness about the effect copper (introduced into the weld material as an impurity via copper-coated welding rods) would have in increasing the RPV weld metal’s propensity to fast neutron embrittlement damage. The main embrittling mechanism, basically ‘age-hardening’ as matrix-coherent minute copper-rich particles come out of solid solution and block dislocation movement, coupled with atomic-scale point-defect damage, was researched extensively and now specifications for new RPVs limit the amount of impurities (e.g. copper restricted to <0.08 wt%) in materials in the beltline area of RPVs (opposite the core and thus highly irradiated with neutrons). (Various works are cited here to provide information on how research results may be used to understand neutron irradiation embrittlement and to provide practical solutions to mitigate it [17–22].) For some NPPs it became necessary to restore fracture toughness by thermal annealing the RPV beltline area (see Chapters 11 and 12 of this book).
1.12
Conclusions
It can be stated that developed countries depend on the reliable supply of safe and cheap energy to maintain vital industrial and socially based infrastructures, sustain economic growth and to maintain, or increase, living standards. Developing countries are striving to improve their standard of living and to become more commercially competitive, and they will also require energy if they are to be successful in these endeavours. Nuclear-generated power thus has a crucial role to play to provide cost-competitive energy, at a low CF and GGE penalty, to both developed and developing countries. Strategies to maintain, and even increase, the role of nuclear power and to assure sufficient energy supplies in the future must be instigated today, since new NPP construction times, depending on design, can take up to five or more years. It is also absolutely necessary to promote the training and
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qualification of personnel in nuclear power technology, and its regulation, so that sufficient human resources will be available to the industry in the future. With a cumulative operating experience exceeding 14 000 reactoryears (in 2010) and having supplied more than 64 billion kWh of electricity over this integrated time, the nuclear power industry is clearly a mature one and capable of supplying an important part of the current and future world’s clean energy requirements. Ongoing research and operational experiences continue to contribute to all aspects of maintaining safety and reliability in NPPs. Additionally, profitable current and LTO operation is expected to be a characteristic feature of NPPs having optimized MOPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes in place.
1.13
Sources of further information
Nuclear Power Plant Life Management and Longer Term Operation. OECD/ NEA, NEA No. 6105, 2006. PLEX: Information Around Plant Lifetime Extension, Austrian Ecological Institute (Oesterreichisches Ökologie Institut, Vienna, 2006–2007), see: http://www.ecology.at/files/berichte/E22.547-1.pdf.
1.14
References
1. World Energy Technology Outlook – 2050, European Commission: EUR 22038, 2006. 2. ‘Carbon Footprint of Electricity Generation’, Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology Postnote, Number 268, October 2006. 3. KKW Beznau: Kernkraftwerk mit ‘klimafreundlichstem Strom’, Aargauer Zeitung, Switzerland, Friday, 31 October 2008. 4. Nielsen, R., The Little Green Handbook, Picador, New York, 2006. 5. European Energy Exchange (EEX), ‘Carbon dioxide prices’, Leipzig, Germany (http:// www.eex.com/en/EEX/Cooperation%20EEX%20and%20Eurex/Background). 6. European Nuclear Society – ENS, ‘Nuclear Power Plants in Europe: Status in January 2009’ (http://www.euronuclear.org/info/maps.htm). 7. Energy Information Administration, Official Energy Statistics from the US Government (http://www.eia.doe.gov/neic/aboutEIA/aboutus.html). 8. Kyoto Protocol to the International Framework Convention on Climate Change. Adopted 11 December 1997 by 3rd Conference of the Parties, Kyoto, Japan, in force, 16 February 2005. 9. ‘Carbon dioxide output jumps to record level in 2007’, report from CNN-News AP, 25 September 2008. 10. Winnett, R., ‘Eight new nuclear power stations planned for England’, Telegraph, 13 July 2008. 11. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Bulletin 49–2, March 2008. 12. Schiermeir, Q., Tollefson, J., Scully, T., Wizte, A. and Morton, O., ‘Energy alternatives: electricity without carbon’, Nature, Vol. 454, Issue 7206, 14 August 2008. 13. Uranium 2007: Resources, Production and Demand. A Joint Report by the OECD
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14. 15. 16. 17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
Understanding and mitigating ageing in nuclear power plants Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency, OECD, Paris, 2008. US Nuclear Safety Commission, Bulletin 2002-01 ‘Reactor pressure vessel head degradation and coolant pressure boundary integrity’, January, 2002. NRC Information Notice 2002-11, ‘Recent experience with degradation of reactor pressure vessel head, 12 March 2002. ‘Material degradation and related managerial issues at nuclear power plants’, IAEAProceedings Series, STI/PUB/1260, 15–18 February, 2005, Vienna, Austria. Nanstad, R.K., Tipping, Ph., Kalkhof, R.D. and Sokolov, M., ‘Irradiation and postannealing re-irradiation effects on fracture toughness of RPV steel heat JRQ’, in Grossbeck, M.L. (ed.), ASTM Special Technical Publication on Effects of Radiation on Materials, 21st. International Symposium, ASTM STP 1447, 2003. Ghazi-Wakili, K., Zimmermann, U., Brunner, J., Tipping, Ph., Waeber, W. and Heinrich, F., ‘Positron annhilation studies on neutron irradiated pressure vessel steels’, Phys. Stat. Sol. (a), Vol. 102, pp. 153–163, 1987. Ghazi-Wakili, K., Tipping, Ph., Zimmerman, U. and Waeber, W., ‘Investigation of neutron irradiated Fe-0.8wt% Cu alloys by means of positron annhilation and microhardness measurements’, Zeitschrift für Physik B Condensed Matter, Vol. 79, pp. 39–45 (1990). Tipping, Ph., Waeber, W. and Mercier, O., ‘A study of the mechanical property changes of irradiation embrittled pressure vessel steels and their response to annealing treatments’, Int. Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping, Vol. 46, pp. 133–148, 1991. Tipping, Ph. and Cripps, R., ‘Annealing for plant-life management: hardness, tensile and Charpy toughness properties of irradiated, annealed and re-irradiated mock-up low alloy pressure vessel steel’, Int. Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping, Vol. 60, pp. 217–222, 1994. Tipping, Ph., ‘Isothermal annealing behaviour and Vickers microhardness of irradiated mock-up pressure vessel weld material’, PROMETEY/IAEA Third International Conference: Material Science Problems in NPP Equipment Production and Operation, Vol. 1, pp. 71–82, 17–22 June 1994, St. Petersberg and Moscow, Russia.
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Key elements and principles of nuclear power plant life management (PLiM) for current and long-term operation
P h. G. T i pp i n g, Nuclear Energy and Materials Consultant, Switzerland
Abstract: Key elements and principles of nuclear power plant (NPP) life management for current and long-term operation (LTO) are presented. Concepts and methodologies of NPP ageing surveillance programmes (ASPs), ageing management (AM) and plant life management (PLiM) are discussed. Ageing degradation (AD) terminology concerning NPP systems, structures and components (SSCs) is provided. Safety classification of SSCs, precursors for scoping and applying optimum OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes, design requirements of NPPs, knowledge management, human factors, safety culture, radiological protection, SSC-AD mechanisms and AD mitigation, obsolescence in equipment, regulatory aspects, radioactive waste disposal and radiological protection are discussed. Concepts for future NPP designs and PLiM are introduced. It is shown that by implementing the stateof-the-art, science and technology into the existing standard plant operational practices (OPs), which include ASPs, and AM and PLiM programmes, SSCAD can be managed to keep the option open for NPPs to reach, and then exceed, their original design lives in a safe and profitable way. Key words: nuclear power plants, ageing and plant life management, long-term operation, design, structures, systems and components, reverse engineering, obsolescence, safety class, safety culture, knowledge management, regulatory aspects, radiological protection, power uprates, radwaste, future generation reactors.
2.1
Introduction
The following deals with NPPs using nuclear fission technology. The basic principles and features of standard OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes used to achieve NPP design life safely and economically, and then to potentially facilitate LTO, are generally valid no matter what design of NPP is under consideration. However, plant-specific aspects and features, as well as operational experiences reported from similarly designed and operated NPPs elsewhere in the world, will always necessitate objective assessments, adjustments and updates of plant life ageing and management programmes to ensure that the scope, focus, applicability and depth thereof remains at the state-of-the-art, science and technology. 19 © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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Nuclear power plants, irrespective of design, function in a conceptually simple way: they extract heat arising from the fission processes occurring in the fuel via a suitable medium (water, gas, liquid metal) and transfer this to heat exchangers (steam generators (SGs)), or directly as steam or very high temperature gas (e.g. helium), to drive turbines connected to generators to make electricity. Depending on the type and design, a NPP may be characterized by primary and secondary circuits and also a reinforced concrete and steel containment to ensure that any leakages arising from the primary circuit cannot cause radioactive contamination to the environment. A NPP is further characterized by having components that can be classed as passive and non-replaceable (e.g. reactor pressure vessel (RPV), containment) and thus are deemed ‘life determining’ since, conceptually and practically, it is virtually impossible to replace them or it is prohibitively expensive to do so. Nuclear power plants also have active but replaceable components (e.g. SGs, RPV closure heads, piping, pressurizers, core shrouds and pumps), which are conceptually and practically replaceable in nature, albeit at a cost. Other categories of components are those that are relatively easy to replace on a routine basis, or as the necessity arises (e.g. control rods/drives, pump impellers, seals, bolts, switches, cables, valves and fuses). Irrespective of the classification ‘plant life-determining’ or ‘replaceable’, safety relevant components obviously must have first priority in terms of inspection, monitoring, repair, replacement and assessment as far as ‘fitness-for-service’ is concerned. Furthermore, it may be very expensive to replace a major component, and the need to replace it will either be dictated directly by regulatory requirements or by the remaining projected plant operating life in order to assess the chance of amortizing the investment of the replacement SSC in question. Thus the business case analysis will determine the point in time where profitable operation of the NPP is no longer possible. The real cost of nuclear-generated electricity compared to other sources is a nominal value, since environmental costs must also be brought into the total equation if an objective comparison is to be made. Electricity price analysts usually use conservative assumptions about NPP construction costs, the length of construction time, delay penalties and then make projections on how efficiently (e.g. availability and operational and maintenance costs, etc.) the NPP would operate over its design life. Prolonged shutdowns, regulatory restrictions and unexpected operational factors will obviously affect such estimates. However, experience to date (mid-2010) shows that most NPPs can usually generate electricity at prices between 3 and 4 Euro cents (about 4–6 US cents) per kilowatt hour (kWh), but even if fossil power were marginally cheaper than nuclear-generated power, it still carries with it a far greater potential penalty concerned with greenhouse gas emissions (GGEs) and the associated environmental issues thereof. It is a generally recognized fact that humanity must drastically ‘decarbonize’ its electrical
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energy production if the currently perceived rate of global warming is to be reduced. It is therefore necessary to invest resources in NPPs, which are essentially GGE-free, and to keep safety-relevant SSCs, as well as passive, non-replaceable SSCs, in good functional condition. For example, items such as SGs in pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and core shrouds in boiling water reactors (BWRs) have been replaced or repaired due to stress corrosion cracking (SCC) issues, but it was expensive and difficult to do so. Core shrouds in BWRs have also been fitted with tie-rods to maintain mechanical integrity, despite the presence of SCC in the austenitic stainless steel material used. Furthermore, changes to water chemistry (e.g. hydrogen injection) have further been implemented to improve the BWR working environment conditions. However, it was worth the cost and effort for such plants affected, since they could then continue reliable operation at full power and with good prospects to amortize the investment. Furthermore, apart from the problems associated with SCC, which were not expected, the earlier designs of most NPPs did not take into account the scenario to allow for a future possible need to remove and replace massive components such as SGs, core shrouds and RPV closure heads. Replacement of SGs, for example, has generally necessitated major work tasks and planning to be done (i.e. containment access hole drilling, work scheduling and logistics, radiological protection planning, procurement of replacement SGs, storage of ex-service SGs and re-sealing and pressure-testing the containment). It is noted here that ease of replacement, or for that matter, inspection and repair, of SSCs will also facilitate that the radiation dose-penalties incurred by those personnel who carry out the work are ‘as low as reasonably acceptable/ achievable’ (ALARA-principle). It is a good practice to perform mock-up runs using dummy equipment to ensure that doses in the real situation remain ALARA. Doses can be efficiently reduced or practically eliminated by applying radiological protection principles (i.e. a person’s distance to the source should be as far as is practically possible, the time spent on the task should be as short as possible and lead shielding and remote tools should be used wherever practicable). The annual dose a worker in a NPP may acquire (person annual dose – PAD) is subject to national legal limits and regulation. Permitted occupational exposures, for nuclear workers and others (e.g. medical profession and researchers), are considerably higher than those for the general public. However, the ALARA principle still applies. For example, a maximum PAD of 20 millisievert (mSv) (1 mSv = 10–3 Sv) is allowed in Switzerland. It can be noted that even PADs of up to 100 mSv are not expected to cause health hazards, and so the above limit is conservative in nature. (Note: background doses for non-professionally exposed persons vary around the world due to altitude and presence or absence of natural uranium ores and the depth in the ground in which they are present, for
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example, but a PAD of 2 mSv is a commonly accepted average value.) A consequence of PAD limits is that when NPP personnel have reached their PAD, they will not be allowed to work in ionizing radiation fields for a year. Numbers of sufficiently trained/qualified reserve personnel in NPPs may be inadequate to cover for such eventualities, so ALARA planning is essential to ensure that PAD limits are not exceeded and that the available personnel will be sufficient to finish the task in hand in good time. Over the years, various ways and approaches have evolved to take into account AD effects in NPPs and how to implement experience gained into good practices through appropriate mitigation strategies. It is fortuitous that even in very early design NPPs, basic engineering principles had foreseen that conservative safety margins used for NPP-SSCs (dimensions and properties of materials), or the stipulated operational limits and conditions (e.g. temperatures, pressures, loading rates, coolant chemistry purity) would ensure inherently safe operation, even if significant levels of SSC-AD were present.
2.2
Nuclear power plant ageing terminology and associated definitions
The expressions ‘ageing management, ageing surveillance, plant life management and long-term operation’, which are defined below, are frequently used in nuclear power terminology [1]. Definitions ∑
Ageing management (AM): engineering, operational and maintenance actions to control, within acceptable limits, SSC-AD. Since AM is focused on keeping a high level of integrity in safety-related SSCs, it could be regarded as a quality assurance (QA) activity, because QA deals with quality systems focused on the relevant aspects. Thus, AM is a part of a total quality system. ∑ Ageing management programmes (AMP): any programme or activity that adequately manages the effects of ageing (e.g. maintenance programme, inspection or surveillance activities, all ageing mitigation strategies, repair, refreshment and replacement of SSCs). ∑ Ageing surveillance programmes (ASPs): these identify and document all known and possible SSC-AD and address the inspection, maintenance and mitigation aspects, as part of standard NPP-OPs. ∑ Plant life management (PLiM): a NPP programme integrating safety and non-safety issues, aimed at effective management of the NPP assets and resources. It is therefore the integration of AM and economic planning to:
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– maintain a high level of safety; – optimize the operation, maintenance and service life of SSCs; – maintain an acceptable plant performance (availability and reliability) level; – maximize return on investment over the entire service life of the NPP; – provide operating organizations and owners with the optimum preconditions for achieving long-term operation (LTO). (Note: within the context of this chapter, LTO means operation of the NPP in excess of its original design-life.)
Plant life management is a thus a methodology whereby all expenses are optimized to favour commercial profitability and competitiveness, while safe and reliable supplies of electric power are being produced. It can be noted here that throughout its development, the nuclear power industry has continuously implemented various programmes and strategies to control and mitigate SSC-AD. The traditional approach has been to adjust standard in-service inspection (ISI) and OPs and to focus monitoring, testing, repair, replacement and maintenance programmes to keep up with the state-ofthe-art, science and technology, as new knowledge and operational experience became available. The underlying reason for specific AM programmes is to have a better integration of existing programmes, driving the feedback from ISI to maintenance and vice versa, which may not be optimized in some cases. The ultimate objective of this feedback loop is to control and maintain the level of design and safety margins in SSCs to an acceptable level as operational time is accrued. A further facet and characteristic of AM is to address the impact of AD mechanisms on safety and reliability that were not addressed (or inadequately so) in the original design concept of the NPP, and to accordingly adapt ISI and maintenance activities to accommodate for them. For example, concrete creep and settling (structures), RPV and closure head bolt fatigue usage were addressed in original designs, but issues such as possible concrete carbonation, electrical cable ageing (embrittlement and loss of insulating properties) and certain SCC issues (e.g. intergranular and irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking in austenitic stainless steels (IGSCC and IASCC)) were not taken enough into account, since they had not yet manifested themselves in practice. The possibility of enhanced local piping erosion (wall thinning) was also not taken into full account in some cases. Other SSC-AD mechanisms may appear in future, so it is important to have in place a way to address them accordingly. Additionally, the AM programmes address the control of those environmental factors that have been identified to act as stressors assisting the SSC-AD. Thus AM programmes are tools to counter any deficiencies that have become evident in original NPP design assumptions and concepts.
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The goal of PLiM programmes is to facilitate an overall evaluation of the NPP’s assets. It integrates both safety and economic aspects. In particular, the economics aspects in the PLiM programme address such items as the management and procurement of spare parts and inventories thereof, and other fields within the PLiM deal with when to replace SSCs, fuel management, the possibility (and level) of power uprates (PUs), training of personnel and optimization of outage planning, for example. If they are not properly focused, scoped or managed, it is expected that AM and PLiM programmes, and even extended maintenance programmes, will bring with them extra cost burdens to the NPP’s operator. Therefore, a robust cost analysis of all AM and PLiM programmes and operation and maintenance costs, including ASPs, will be necessary to identify the real benefits to safety, reliability and overall profitability of the plant. To date, such analyses have shown all-round improvements to the safety, operational aspects and profitability, and have correspondingly encouraged operators to accept and implement such programmes.
2.3
Overview of ageing and its effects in nuclear power plants
All NPP types and their SSCs have undergone AD to varying degrees, since this is a natural phenomenon found in any engineered system, whether it is an aircraft, boat, chemical plant, oil refinery, bridge or building, for example. The nuclear environment, however, is characterized by special features whereby exposure of materials, especially to high energy neutrons (>1 MeV energy) arising from the fission processes in the fuel, can potentially cause some embrittlement in the ferritic RPV or IASCC in austenitic stainless steel core shrouds, for example. The coolant in PWRs and BWRs may also cause corrosion if specific material-coolant chemistry (electrochemical aspects, including water radiolysis), stress and flow-rate combinations and conditions are present. The reduction or mitigation of SSC-AD depends on understanding the often complex underlying mechanisms and synergies that act. This clearly depends on the results obtained from fundamental scientific research, whereby the interaction of the SSC materials with their respective stressors and operating environments may be understood in terms of the way they strive to achieve thermodynamic equilibrium. This underlines the importance of on-going research using realistic experimental parameters (i.e. equivalent to NPP conditions found in practice). This latter point is important since, apart from the convenience of simulated experiments, the goal of such research is to provide transferable data to the practical case and also to obtain regulatory acceptance of such results and the AD mitigation methods derived. Once the AD mechanism is understood, the appropriate actions can be robustly implemented to mitigate or even eliminate its effects.
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2.3.1 Concepts of defence-in-depth (DID) and common-cause failure (CCF) avoidance A requirement of the use of nuclear power is that it is of paramount importance to prevent harmful radioactive products from being released into the environment. It is for this reason that NPP designs have been conceived to function using the defence-in-depth (DID) principle. This multi-barrier approach can be likened to the cross-section of an onion, with each ring going out from the centre representing an engineered barrier. To achieve optimum safety, NPPs also feature multiple safety systems that supplement the natural features of the reactor core (e.g. negative void coefficient). Safety systems actually account for about one quarter of the capital cost of modern NPPs. The success and effectiveness of DID necessitate the highest quality in design principles and materials used and optimum construction principles. It also requires that equipment and layout thereof is installed to prevent operational disturbances or events from developing into more serious problems (i.e. avoidance of CCF). (Note: further aspects of DID, CCFs and latent failure conditions (LFCs) are discussed in Chapter 6.) Further features of DID are redundant and diverse systems to quickly detect problems, control damage to the fuel and prevent significant radioactive releases. Overall safety provisions thus feature physical barriers between the radioactive reactor core (or active materials storage facilities, such as the spent fuel pool) and the environment; they provide multiple safety systems, each with backup, and also have a concept to allow for human error. A robust severe accident management strategy will further support the DID principles and thus lessen the consequences of an accident should it occur. The engineered features and layered levels of protection behind DID designs obviously must take the safety classification and functions of the NPP-SSCs into account. From a logical and safety standpoint, the DID principle is a robust one, and OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes should also contribute to maintaining the integrity of DID barriers at all levels of operation, including design base accidents. It is fitting to mention here the final physical DID barrier, namely the reinforced concrete containment, which is designed to prevent the uncontrolled release of radioactive materials to the environment in the case of a severe accident. The containment is a life-limiting structure, as it is not practical to replace it and it is therefore also essential to ensure the overall economic and operational life of the NPP. As with any other material, reinforced concrete will also degrade with time when exposed to specific stressors. The effects of weather and pollution (acid rain) can cause degradation of concrete via chemical attack (e.g. carbonate formation, swelling, cracking and weakening). Cracks in the containment’s concrete can then allow moisture and corrosive chemicals to reach the steel reinforcement, which can then corrode, weakening
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the structure further or causing loss of leak-tightness. When water freezes it expands about 9% in volume and this can cause further damage due to spalling. Containment AD may be seen as discoloured patches (brown rust) or areas of white powder (calcium carbonate and other chemical species) on the surface. Severely weakened containments may not be able to withstand even design base seismic or impact events. Chemically weakened and severely physically degraded containments (cracks) may also lose some of their radiological shielding or retention capacity (leak-tightness). Repairs and refurbishments of containments, including attention to anchor bolts, tendons and auxiliaries, must be carried out during NPP outages for safety reasons.
2.3.2 Requirements on repair, replacement, inspection and monitoring of SSCs Ideally, whenever modifications to the NPP’s OPs are introduced, or when SSCs are repaired or replaced, the overall levels of reliability and safety should increase or, at least, be maintained. Accepting that some finite amount of SSC-AD will inevitably take place as a consequence of operating conditions, it remains to examine which SSCs are impacted for safety reasons and overall economic viability of the NPP. Also, the extent and rate of SSC-AD may be slower or faster in practice compared to that allowed for in the design provisions, including the safety and operational margins used. It is therefore the task of monitoring and testing systems to follow and quantify degradation rates, using appropriately sensitive and robust methods, and to thus determine the ‘margin of safety’ (e.g. degree of fatigue usage and thickness of pipewalls) or operational flexibility (e.g. RPV pressure-temperature limits for start-up/shut-down) still available in the SSCs. When this is known, it may be compared to design or regulatory requirements and realistic assessments made concerning ‘residual safe life’ of the SSC. Changes in operational parameters (e.g. coolant water chemistry, flow rate and temperature of coolant (the specific issues of PUs are dealt with later) and replacing SSCs with new designs and materials have a potential to influence degradation rates, and AM and PLiM programmes, including monitoring and inspection time schedules, have to be adjusted accordingly. Too frequent or in-depth inspections may not be necessary, but they will nevertheless cost money. In contrast, cursory checks or too lengthy time intervals between inspections may lead to spontaneous failure of a SSC. This will usually lead to even higher costs, since such forced outages, particularly those involving radiological contamination, will necessitate implementation of decontamination and associated radiation protection tasks, which can be time-consuming (thus costly) procedures. Thus it can be seen that inspection intervals, and the depths they go to (depending on safety class, importance to reliability, etc.) must be optimized, using the feedback from operational experience and results from the appropriate monitoring tools.
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2.3.3 Basic design principles, considerations and strategies in NPPs Before dealing with principles, strategies and goals of OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM in detail, it is necessary to first identify some basic design requirements of NPPs, since design impacts not only the way the plant functions, but also how the SSCs are accessible for monitoring, testing, inspection and, eventually, replacement. Nuclear power plant site selection is determined by many factors, including local and political acceptance thereof, hydrological (e.g. river flooding or consequences of any possible dam-break upstream of the NPP and tsunami threat) and environmental impact (e.g. heat pollution of rivers or availability of sufficient cooling water) issues. Seismic activity is also a prime consideration, and NPP designs must take earthquakes into account, even if the probability of earthquakes is statistically very low as derived from the seismic chronological record of the region under consideration. Design and, for that matter, operational concepts, should identify and robustly eliminate the possible creation of CCF paths (i.e. where a series of human errors/weaknesses in procedures or the failure of one SSC leads to a ‘domino’ or ‘knock-on effect’ of progressive malfunction or failures in other SSCs vital for safety or control of the plant). It serves no purpose to have procedures or SSCs that individually fulfil design and regulatory requirements, but then are prevented from doing so due to CCF paths. The same approach is valid for thwarting terrorist attacks or lessening the possibility and consequences of aircraft crashes onto NPPs. Experience has shown that some SSCs are difficult to inspect, monitor, repair or replace (e.g. vessel internals), so (future) ideal NPP designs should allow for ease of access in general. Ease of inspection and monitoring will also increase the quality of inspection data and results, thus facilitating objective decisions to be made regarding residual life and when to repair or replace SSCs. Dedicated tools, such as robotic crawlers with integrated video systems, have been developed for currently operating NPPs to facilitate inspection of otherwise inaccessible areas. Realistic operational lives of some NPPs currently operating are now being regarded as 60 or more years. Regarding operation, increased online monitoring, condition-based and risk-based approaches are gradually supplementing the traditional method of fixed interval periodic inspections, since they are cheaper to implement and excessive conservatism may be reduced, to benefit operational costs and enhance safety through better awareness of the SSC’s real-time state regarding fitness-for-service. Much money can be saved by avoiding replacement of components that are still sufficiently good (within design limits), just as a consequence of old established habits or practices [2].
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2.3.4 Precursors for successful implementation of ASPs, AM, PLiM programmes and achieving LTO The basic concepts, methodologies and goals of ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes, and the utilities’ wish to achieve safe and profitable current and LTO should be well established already at the design stage of a NPP, and before it goes into operation. Basic programmes, including standard OPs, must be regarded as ‘living documents’, being amenable to adjustment and flexible to take into account experiences gained and the response of the plant’s SSCs as operational time is accrued. The nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) and all associated SSCs should feature the best materials known at the time of design, manufacture and construction and design concepts should also foresee the possibility for easy repair or replacement of SSCs, if necessary. Whilst a utility/operator’s goal is to run a NPP safely, reliably and profitably, and thus protect the overall plant investment, a regulator’s goal is to protect the public and environment from any possible negative consequences arising from the use of nuclear energy. These goals are, per se, complementary to each other, since operational safety is an inseparable facet of reliability and fitness-for-service of NPP-SSCs, and reliable operation facilitates high NPP load and availability factors, meaning more electricity sold. As in any other large and relatively expensive industrial project, a NPP might only begin to make a real profit towards the latter part of its original design life. The point in time where this takes place obviously depends, for example, on the level of current and outstanding capital costs/debts, number and type of SSC replacements carried out to date, degree of exceptional costs caused by mandatory back-fitting requirements and modifications and upgrading of safety systems, as well as the overall level of NPP amortization. (Note: further aspects of the economics of nuclear power are dealt with in Chapter 5 of this book.) It is logical that all operational actions and practices should be focused to create conditions to maintain compliance with the NPP’s licence conditions, optimize OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes to reach the full original design life and then make possible the option of further operation (LTO) under the applicable national licensing legislation. However, independent of other factors such as political and public acceptance, a NPP which has had freedom from forced outages due to spontaneous failure of SSCs (which is a reflection of the level of success of monitoring, inspection, maintenance, standard plant OPs, including ASPs, and AM and PLiM programmes), and demonstrates a proactive approach to safety (safety culture and training of personnel aspects), will be well placed to obtain regulatory permission to continue operation and go to the LTO phase of its life. Programmes to manage any form of AD in NPPs will have an expected level of success, but in practice this can either exceed or fall short of the expectations, depending on the suitability of the routine and standard OPs,
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maintenance, replacements, repairs and the effectiveness of ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes used. The success of such programmes will thus depend to a great extent on the competence of the workforce involved in their creation and effective implementation. Actions taken within standard OPs, ASPs and AM and PLiM programmes should lead to reliable and quantitative detection and monitoring of SSC-AD. When SSC-AD is discovered, the actions of repair or replacement will be guided by safety and business-case requirements. Practical implementation of AD mitigation or elimination remedies will depend on the availability of well-proven technologies, usually coming from basic research. Despite some diversity with respect to their separate goals and concepts, the OPs, ASPs and AM and PLiM programmes create mutually supporting conditions to ensure that NPPs operate safely, reliably and cost effectively, whilst they attain their original design lives. Since the SSCs, including non-replaceable items (life-determining), are managed and kept sufficiently within specification (engineering, reliability and safety margin aspects), even for times potentially well in excess of their original design lives, LTO will become a real option, at least from the safety, reliability and engineering standpoints. The business case, however, will decide the economic viability of further operation, whilst the NPP’s safety record will greatly influence the degree of public and political acceptance thereof. Ageing degradation arises due to the presence of stressors such as stresses and strains (constant or varying), temperature (level, constant or rapidly fluctuating), irradiation (primarily high-energy neutrons, gamma rays) and coolant/operational environment characteristics (impurities, level of pH, flow velocities and turbulence) causing ageing mechanisms. Typical ageing mechanisms are creep (through mechanical loading at elevated temperature), fatigue (high or low cycle, mechanically or thermally induced), thermal ageing (change in microstructure with time at temperature as new metallic phases are formed or when diffusion of elements to, or from, grain boundaries in alloys occurs), relaxation of pre-tension levels, corrosion, irradiation damage, wear and flow-induced erosion-corrosion in piping, for example. Loss of electrical properties in insulators or conductors may also be traced to ageing mechanisms whereby plastics degrade through heat or exposure to ionizing radiation (e.g. polymers will decompose into smaller molecular fragments and carbon dioxide gas). Connectivity or signal quality may be affected through oxide formation on electrical contact points of switches. Degradation usually leads to loss of material, cracks, deformation/distortion, changes in physical, mechanical, electrical and chemical properties and a corresponding reduction in SSC reliability and, eventually, safety margins. Those NPPs that have been designed, operated and maintained with the tenets of safety-first and effective implementation of OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM in all areas will have the best chance of achieving safety, design life and economic goals and also LTO. Nuclear power plants that possess
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all original and comprehensive design documentation are in good basic condition, have no (or few) unresolved problems, have kept updated and relevant documentation on design features or SSC changes that have been implemented since start-up, have a true record of all design-base stressors that have occurred (e.g. transients, fast shutdowns (scrams) and fatigue usage on relevant SSCs), are ideally suited for focused AM and PLiM programmes. When original documentation is missing or inadequate, reverse engineering has to be performed to better serve the scoping, assessment and goals of OPs, ASPs, AM, PLiM programmes and, eventually, the possibility of LTO. Reverse engineering is the logic-based process of rediscovering and then documenting the technological principles of a device, object or system through analysis of its structure, function and operation. New RPV surveillance capsule specimens have, for example, been made from equivalent material and re-introduced into RPVs for irradiation damage studies in order to better quantify the extent and rate of degradation, since some original surveillance specimen sets were found to be inadequately documented or placed in an unfavourable irradiation position. Since NPP-AM and PLiM programmes, together with standard OPs and their ASPs may be regarded as management tools to achieve design life, optimized economic safe current and eventual LTO, and their goals are to deal with and manage all facets of SSC-AD in an efficient and cost-effective way, the extent and depth of such programmes must also take into consideration such further LTO-related aspects as the following: ∑
Any projected safety issues must be identified and analysed with respect to severity and the cost of implementing appropriate mitigation or upgrading methodologies. In LTO, the safety relevant and other SSCs will operate longer and perhaps under changed or more demanding conditions than were foreseen in the original design (e.g. when PU has been implemented). Nevertheless, safety margins must still be kept at a sufficient level. As a result of basic engineering and safety principles, SSC designs already feature conservative safety margins, thus allowing for the effects of design-life SSC-AD, as well as that expected, or projected, to arise in the LTO phase. ∑ The economic risk of a stranded investment when large, expensive SSCs are replaced or extensive back-fitting is carried out. As a result of the deregulation of electricity markets, a cost-benefit analysis will be an even more critical task to perform. However, safety must still have priority over economic aspects. The operator thus needs assurance that large investments (e.g. new SGs) will be amortized at least by the end of the NPP’s original design life, and that the regulatory climate will be favourable to allow LTO with relicensing or continued operation on the existing licence, as appropriate.
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∑
The availability of enough trained and qualified personnel to carry out the specialized tasks within the OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes for both current and LTO. It is no good having a state-of-the-art, science and technology NPP if there are insufficient or inadequately trained personnel to run it. Succession planning must be thought of well in advance to facilitate a smooth and efficient transfer of expertise. This is an aspect of knowledge management (KM). ∑ Identifying any additional SSCs for AM and PLiM that may be crucial for safety and economic viability of the NPP in the LTO phase. The focus of LTO-AM and PLiM programmes will not only be on managing and mitigating SSC-AD in large, passive ‘life-determining’ SSCs, but will also continue to address those SSCs vital for safe and reliable operation, which could be expensive to monitor, test, repair, maintain or replace. Furthermore, the safety principle of maintaining the engineered DID barriers must also be upheld in the NPP’s LTO phase. Future environmental and operational stressors must be identified (or anticipated, as far as possible), and their control or mitigation addressed in the standard OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes, respectively. ∑ Projected needs and capacity (both human and financial) for spent fuel (SF) storage management tasks, since increased quantities of SF are a natural consequence of LTO, final NPP decommissioning, dismantling, radioactive waste (radwaste) conditioning and disposal, and associated plant actions required (e.g. additional SF pool construction or modifications to increase the capacity of existing SF pools, and commissioning of plasma ovens for radwaste volume reduction) and to identify areas where additional safety barriers and controls (e.g. filters and radiological monitoring) and adjustments to OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes may be applicable.
2.4
Overview of systems, structures and components (ssc) safety classes
2.4.1 Safety classification of items and SSCs Safety classification is a vast, sometimes complex and always a time-consuming subject and requires comprehensive systems and engineering knowledge as well as a holistic approach to exactly capture the levels of safety importance and inter-dependencies of SSCs in NPPs. The following provides an overview of the subject, and gives some examples of safety classification of items and SSCs. The main source of information used here has been drawn from STUK [3]. Other supporting information may be obtained from appropriate references and sources of further information (e.g. Männisto, 2005) provided at the end of this chapter).
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Although certain commonalities and generic approaches exist, the scopes and depths of OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes are NPPspecific, reflecting the actual operating experiences and needs of the NPP, and design, under consideration. Correspondingly, safety classes of SSCs, although broadly similar for varying NPP designs, will reflect the diversity in function, operational modes and reactor control systems in NPPs. Whilst AM programmes are critical for safety, and detailed ageing management analysis is restricted to a few critical plant life-determining SSCs, the PLiM programmes address almost all SSCs in a NPP. The standard OPs, ASPs, maintenance, inspection, testing, repair and replacement programmes in NPPs are supplemented accordingly by AM and PLiM programmes. Operational conditions of NPP-SSCs necessitate that they possess certain levels of inherent good quality (e.g. works certification, sufficient design and safety margin features and regulatory approvals) and that they are suitable for use in the specified environment. Mechanical components can be conveniently placed into three basic groups: 1. those where integrity has to be guaranteed (e.g. RPV and shells and nozzles of SGs); 2. those where preventative maintenance is used to preserve the initial levels of quality and function (e.g. removal of sludge deposits in SGs to lessen stress corrosion cracking, sleeving and plugging of defect SG tubes); 3. those that may be allowed to fail (failure-based maintenance/run-tofailure), and then are repaired or replaced even on a routine basis to re-establish the initial quality (e.g. replacement of small diameter piping, switches/fuses, pump seals and bearings). Safety-relevant components and systems are in the first two groups, and these are also usually the subject of AM programmes. Safety classifications in NPPs have traditionally been focused at the system and component level of equipment. However, the evolving approach for currently operating NPPs is to focus more on areas that are important to their safe, reliable and profitable operation and also the effectiveness of maintenance used to keep the items and SSCs fit-for-service. The NPP current licensing basis (CLB) can be taken as a starting point to evaluate the NPP’s SSCs in terms of their importance to safety. Safety class 1 A key purpose of safety classification of items and SSCs in NPPs is to identify those which are potentially hazardous in nature or those that must maintain their integrity under design base accident scenarios and to ultimately focus OPs, ASPs, inspections, monitoring, testing, maintenance, repairs and replacements
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on these to ensure they are handled and maintained according to their design and regulatory requirements. Safety class 1 items would thus include the reactor fuel, since it is fissile, radioactive and toxic, and if misused has the potential to cause damage to the population, environment and to the NPP itself (contamination). Primary circuit components (PCCs) retain large and fast flowing volumes of gas, water or steam under high pressures and temperatures, and major breaks in such PCCs that lead to a loss of coolant, the extent of which being so great that it is impossible to compensate for it using the available supply of emergency make-up water, for example, must therefore be avoided. A RPV is a safety class 1 component, since its catastrophic (sudden) fracture could lead to conditions that exceed loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) design base allowances. However, not all PCCs are assignable to safety class 1, since their failure may be readily controlled. Such items are small diameter pipes (<20 mm inside diameter) and components integrally connected to the reactor coolant system by a passive flow-limiting device and which, even if ruptured, do not cause a leak any larger than that caused by the rupture of a 20 mm inside diameter pipe. Other PCCs, which in the event of failure can be rapidly and automatically isolated (multi-valve closure) from the reactor to facilitate normal shutdown and cooling, are not included in Safety class 1. Safety class 2 Safety class 2 items and components are those not assigned to Safety class 1. They cover items and SSCs needed for reactor trip, the systems to deal with emergency core cooling in case of a LOCA, boron supply to control core reactivity/criticality and decay heat removal, for example. Further examples are: steam and feed-water systems, reactor containment and systems needed to protect containment integrity in a postulated accident (e.g. containment spray, pressure relief and isolation valves), primary circuit supporting structures that protect Safety class 1 components (e.g. restraints, missile barriers) and RPV internals needed to support the fuel core or to facilitate the cooling thereof. Other Safety class 2 items include storage racks for new or spent fuel and electrical components and essential electrical power supply equipment to Safety class 1 and 2 items or SSCs. Safety class 3 Some typical systems in this safety class are: boron supply, reactor volume control (PWRs), parts of the emergency feed-water supply not in Safety class 2, primary circuit cooling and pressure relief, reactor and spent fuel decay heat removal and also those systems needed to start up or operate Safety class 2 and 3 items and SSCs. Other systems in this safety class are the reactor cooling water clean-up, treatment and storage for liquid wastes and
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radioactive gas treatment systems, nuclear fuel and handling systems that may cause fuel damage should they malfunction, for example. Further items are hoisting and transport systems for nuclear fuel, pools and tanks, reactor power limitation systems, monitors for reactor criticality when refuelling, primary circuit chemistry and leak monitors, and systems for controlling containment releases, as well as those to prevent formation of explosive oxygen–hydrogen gas mixtures. Safety class 4 This safety class contains the following items and SSCs: fire protection, turbine generator components (bearings, rotor trip valves, and oil systems), vibration monitors, hydrogen cooling, generator circuit and field breaker, turbine and generator protection systems. Various instrumentation and control (I&C) and computer systems for plant control and operation, safety significant information systems dealing with operation and maintenance. (Note: a comprehensive listing of typical safety classes is given in STUK [3]).
2.5 Setting up and scoping ageing degradation and surveillence programmmes in nuclear power plants (NPPs) The creation of SSC-AD surveillance and management methodologies in NPPs necessitates a comprehensive appreciation of the varied AD mechanisms that could occur. The approaches have to thus take into account the many types of SSCs present, the different materials used and the operational environments, as well as their significance to safety (safety classification), their impact on reliability, profitability and their relevance to the NPP for assuring attainment of the original design life and, eventually, LTO. Standard OPs, which include routine maintenance, monitoring, controls, repairs and replacements, as well as ASPs, are normally quite sufficient to address most issues that arise in the plant on a day-to-day basis. The standard OPs are generally based on written procedures and recommendations of the NPP manufacturer, having due regard for any additional tests, monitoring or other supplementary actions that are prescribed by the regulator. One approach to identify, characterize and document AD is to create dossiers which describe each specific component in a structure or system. Component-specific dossiers are a methodical way to document all phases of the component’s life. Such dossiers should contain details and information such as: ∑ Basic description of component, its function and location in the NPP. ∑ Manufacturer, supplier or sub-contractor.
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Materials used (e.g. alloys, ceramics, plastics, rubbers and cements) and, where relevant, applied heat treatments, surface conditioning (e.g. peening and protective coating). Works reports, including final quality assurance certificates, will be an integral part of the SSC ageing surveillence dossier. Particular details, such as approved lubricants to use must also be included. Where applicable, notes on the avoidance to exposure of the SSC material to chloride or sulphide ions (e.g. danger of stress corrosion cracking occurring in some austenitic stainless steels), or to other environmental conditions (e.g. excessive temperature, moisture, radiation), must be included and highlighted. Approved substances for SSC decontamination tasks must be listed. ∑ Assigned safety class of the item or SSC with regard to its function (e.g. no RPV fracture allowed, piping leak-before-break to be demonstrated, assurance of functionality in emergency situations, redundant systems and importance to DID) and supporting documentation. ∑ Specific operational environment (e.g. coolant (water, heavy water, borated water, hot gas and quality/purity thereof), steam, neutron irradiation, raw/service water). ∑ All known, or possible, AD mechanisms (drawn from plant’s own and global operational experiences, failure reports (root causes) and published research literature) relevant for the component and its materials in the specific operating environment. (The AM programme will address SSCAD issues that were unforeseen or inadequately addressed in the design concept.) ∑ Validated and approved AD mitigation actions relevant to the SSC being documented (some examples of which are given below): – neutron embrittlement: reduction of RPV neutron flux, hence fluence with time, either by ‘inside-out’ fuel management, whereby the older fuel elements are placed on the outside of the fuel core and the fresh elements are placed in the centre of the core, or by the use of dummy fuel elements situated on the periphery of the core; RPV beltline annealing, with parameters of time and temperature for recovery of properties, derived from tests on the plant’s own RPV surveillance programme materials, and any necessary supplementary test specimen programme to quantify fracture toughness levels (level of success of annealing), including provision to follow re-embrittlement trends as additional service time is accumulated; – water chemistry improvements (e.g. hydrogen injection into boiling water reactor coolant to lower the electrochemical potential of stainless steel in contact with it and thus lessen the propensity toward stress corrosion cracking in some austenitic stainless steels); – shot-peening (mechanical improvement process, MIP) (e.g. to introduce compressive stress in the surface to improve stress corrosion cracking resistance in Alloy 600); © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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– use of tie-rods (to enhance the structural stability in cracked austenitic stainless steel core shrouds in boiling water reactors, even if through-wall cracks are present); the necessity to use approved methodologies to check the integrity of such tie-rods and inspection intervals should be highlighted. ∑ The optimum inspection, measurement and monitoring methods for detecting the most probable AD mechanisms should be documented. Ultrasonic testing, dye-penetration, magnetic particle, X-ray and eddy-current (as non-destructive tools) and destructive testing of RPV surveillance capsule specimens (Charpy, tensile and fracture mechanical specimens) will have application in specific fields of SSC-AD detection, monitoring and testing. ∑ The frequency and depth of inspections required, based on the SSC safety class, the expected rate of AD and operational experience to date must be recorded. A physical graphical record could be included, showing, for example, pipe wall thickness change, obtained from periodic measurements, as a function of time. Computerized systems, using continuous wireless signals and direct data transfer to monitors, are also finding increasing application. Where necessary, references to Codes and obligatory (regulatory) procedures to be followed must also be provided in the dossier. ∑ Where applicable, any special requirements for personnel charged with inspection and testing of safety-related SSCs (e.g. licensing of personnel who perform work on such SSCs) must be highlighted in the dossiers and accompanied by supplementary documentation dealing with training, qualification and licensing of personnel. ∑ A chronologic record of the SSC operational experience (e.g. sporadic malfunction or spontaneous failure and root causes), and provision for keeping updated records of plant transients and ‘scrams’ (essential for RPV and bolt fatigue usage monitoring, according to design specification allowances) is an integral part of the SSC ageing surveillance dossier. The effect of PUs in NPPs requires a comprehensive systems analysis, and NPP-SSC modifications or changes that have become necessary on both primary and secondary sides of the NPP (e.g. adjustments to valve set-point values) must be duly documented. Any changes to standard plant OPs (e.g. frequency, depth and scope of inspections, monitoring, maintenance and periodic testing) have to be noted. Furthermore, the increased core-power density and higher coolant core-exit temperatures, as well as faster steam flow rates will influence the time schedules between SSC inspections in NPPs with PU. Documentation of adjusted operational prescriptions or emergency procedures relevant to the plant’s PU status is also necessary. The creation of comprehensive SSC-AD dossiers, in addition to the standard plant documentation on OPs, enables the plant personnel to recognize © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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possible SSC-AD issues objectively and to instigate appropriate measures to address them in a timely manner. Such dossiers also show a regulator that the NPP personnel are aware of SSC-AD and that a safety-oriented, pragmatic, science-based and quantitative approach is being used in the general operation and maintenance of the NPP. Depending on the country involved, there are different approaches to the NPP licence status and thus the permission to operate. In Europe, licences are mostly not time-limited, and are granted for as long as the NPP can operate safely, and the periodic safety review (PSR) [4], usually performed every 10 years by the NPP owners and controlled by the regulator, is the main tool used to provide proof of safety. In the United States, the licence is time-limited, necessitating a re-licensing process, after the NPP brings proof that all maintenance has been effective and all regulatory requirements have been fulfilled.
2.5.1 Living document nature of ASP, AM and PLiM programmes Despite rigorously applied standard OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes, SSCs may still fail unexpectedly, or become prematurely unfit for service, but it is then not only essential to find the reason why a given SSC fails, it is also necessary to determine how the circumstances arose that allowed it to do so. Failures in NPP-SSCs can be caused by incorrect human actions or they can be a result of direct physical and chemical causes, for example, but it is important, sometimes crucial, to identify if there are any underlying weaknesses in the original design and in the inspection, testing and monitoring programmes used. Only a full in-depth analysis, leading to root-causes, will lead to robust and fact-based actions to be taken in order to avoid a repetition of the failure in future operation. The standard OPs, ASPs, and AM and PLiM programmes, must then be adjusted accordingly to take into account the (usually) plant-specific new knowledge, in accordance with a ‘living document’ approach. Problems can also be caused through inadequately performed or neglected inspections (e.g. insufficient AD detection, low sensitivity of inspection tools used, or time interval between inspections being too long), inaccuracies in SSC monitoring equipment (e.g. calibration/signal drift of on-line monitors sends incorrect information to the plant control systems, thus misleading the operator concerning the real situation or threat to the plant’s safety) or incorrect maintenance procedures (e.g. wrong lubrication or decontamination procedure used, or excessive (or insufficient) torque applied to bolts). From the above examples, it can be seen that updated information exchange with the NPP’s manufacturer/SSC supplier and other operators with similar plants, as well as with regulators, is an essential part of an operator’s duties. Following published literature on
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all aspects of NPP technology, reportable events that have occurred and basic research into SSC-AD are further related tasks to perform to ensure OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes continually benefit from new knowledge, experience and lessons learned.
2.5.2 Important systems, structures and components in nuclear power plants Different designs of NPPs will feature their own specific SSCs that, despite accruing various levels and types of service-induced AD, still have to be kept functional within, and according to, their design specifications and regulatory requirements. Conservative operational design safety margins of SSCs are originally in place to counter AD, so the preservation of sufficient safety margins is a way to keep NPP-SSCs safely and reliably in operation. When OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes are optimized, and all SSCAD is effectively managed, mitigated or eliminated, and safety margins kept within specification, the NPP should reach its original design life in a safe and profitable manner. Thereafter, when the SSCs, including the containment and RPV (irreplaceable items), continue to fulfil their design and regulatory requirements, there are prima facie no technological or safety issues to prevent the NPP from going into LTO. A typical list of important SSCs that can undergo AD in Western-designed PWRs would feature the RPV and closure head, primary system large diameter pipes, steam generators, primary pump casings, pressurizer, control rod drive mechanisms, RPV internals (e.g. baffle plates), containment, turbine, generator, I&C, electrical cables and the cooling tower. For a BWR, the list would contain items such as the RPV, the vessel internals (core shroud, jet pumps and core spray and supports), reactivity control blades, containment, coolant recirculation piping, steam dryer, tanks and valves, as well as electrical equipment, I&C and cables. For the pressurized water Russian designed WWER-type of reactor, a typical list of SSCs would include the RPV and head closure, control and safety systems, piping, pumps, pressurizer, electrical circuits important for safety, I&C, safety valves, RPV internals and the emergency core cooling system. The Canadian designed CANDU reactor (heavy water cooled and moderated) would include fuel channels, zircaloy pressure tubes, steam generators, calandria vessel, reactor headers, vacuum building, containment, reactor building, calandria end shield and cooling system, cables and spent fuel bay.
2.5.3 Obsolescence and its consequences in SSCs Obsolescence, when applied to SSCs, means that the original manufacturer no longer makes the product and no other source of supply is available.
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The problem can be exacerbated due to limited industry capacity or a manufacturer’s reluctance to re-tool to produce a limited number of ‘outdated’ components. It is therefore good practice to identify critical (also potentially expensive) components in the frame of the PLiM programme, and to build up a strategic inventory of spare parts. The economics of such inventories must be evaluated against the risk of long outages of the NPP if no spare part is readily available. However, non-service ageing may become an issue if the storage conditions are not ideal, since elevated temperatures, dampness, ingress of chemical vapours, corrosion and incidental vibrations may still cause SSC-AD (e.g. set-point drift, change in resistance, loosening of clamps/ connections or oxidation of contacts). Nuclear power plants constructed in the 1960–90 period had mostly analogue I&C systems. These performed adequately, but as technology evolved and the digital era made itself felt in the nuclear industry, it seemed a natural development to implement digital I&C into NPPs, whilst classifying analogue technology as old and ‘obsolete’. However, the general area of ‘electronics’ is characterized by frequent modifications and modernization, creating challenges in assuring that functional equivalence is present. Both proof of quality assurance (QA) and functional equivalence are necessary to obtain regulatory approval for replacement (or new design) safety-relevant components. Use of new technologies and procedures used may also require regulatory approval. Obtaining approval may take time, thus creating reluctance in some operators to ‘modernize’, despite the advantages of digitally-based I&C. There are some special caveats involved with replacing old technology with new. Some components, for example in the electronics sector, may fulfil the specifications to provide a given actuation voltage, but reaction time allowances/windows to actuate timers, relays or switches involved may be reduced compared to that in the replaced component and this new characteristic may be intolerant to the system it is a part of, causing erratic behaviour. Variations such as this arise due to small differences in (sub) components coming from various manufacturers. It is therefore necessary to quality control and validate all component characteristics, including tolerance bands for generated signals and their possible effect on other components and systems.
2.6 Safety culture and human factors and knowledge management 2.6.1 Importance of safety culture and human factors in NPP operation The term ‘safety culture’ can be used to convey the way in which a NPP (or in fact any other plant) is operated with respect to safety. It may be defined as
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the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety management. Nuclear power plants with a good safety culture are characterized by communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety and by confidence in the efficacy of preventive measures. It is thus of paramount importance in NPP operation to have in place an appropriate safety culture, whereby openness to, and for, communication, questioning attitudes, adherence to written procedures, the necessity to analyse and understand the immediate and later consequences of actions performed and a pride in the work done, all have high standing within the workforce. For example, the pressure of electricity production targets must never be allowed to create conditions under which short-cuts in established OPs or mandatory procedures may be contemplated. Apart from legal aspects, such personnel actions may unknowingly put the NPP in an immediate or future dangerous condition (i.e. creation of latent failure conditions, LFCs). The tools of OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes, combined with a trained workforce instilled with the core values of safety culture, create the best possible conditions for safe current and future NPP operation. It is therefore an important task for NPP management staff to create a strong enabling environment for safety culture development and efficient implementation thereof.
2.6.2 Importance of knowledge management The plant’s management strategy to identify where (specialist) pools of knowledge lie within the NPP’s workforce, to acquire and document it, to efficiently disseminate it and to thus preserve this valuable asset, even when the original specialists have left, is called knowledge management (KM). In fact, KM can be associated with elements of safety culture, since the corporate asset of a NPP’s experienced and technologically specialized workforce is also a key to safe operation. Explicit or generic knowledge from manuals or reports is usually adequately available, but ‘hands-on’ teaching of new personnel, who are accompanied by a senior specialist for the requisite amount of time, is often a more efficient way to disseminate know-how, especially when the work processes are then documented and rationalized in ways which are transparent, logical and easy to understand. This implicit knowledge is based on experience, which has usually been accrued by an individual or team, perhaps over many years, and it is mostly plant-specific and thus extremely valuable to the NPP concerned. An important tool in KM is the exact documentation of all NPP-SSCs (especially those relevant to safety and the NPP’s operational life) reflecting the operational history (e.g. transients, fatigue usage, nature and type of repairs and for what reason). Such sources of information may be readily obtained from the
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component-specific dossiers featured in the ASPs, or given deeper focus in AM and PLiM programme documentation. It is opportune to mention here the necessity for KM within the NPP, even when outsourcing is required, i.e. when external specialist companies are called in to perform specific tasks. The NPP’s own personnel should be involved as much as possible, and be ready to learn new skills. Such ‘home-grown’ and acquired knowledge creates a competent workforce, and those involved have the potential to develop their careers further as specialists. This increases motivation and safety culture in the NPP. Documentation must be kept on all safety-relevant issues and events that arise. This is usually done under the provisions of regulatory requirements concerning reportable events. The details leading up to, during and after the event should provide a clear analysis of the main and contributory factors. The analysis will show, for example, whether the OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes have any inherent weaknesses to address, or if SSCs have been inadequately inspected, repaired or replaced, or if the supplier of the SSCs changed some detail, originally thought to be irrelevant, or whether human factors were involved. All this information must be used to ensure a similar event does not occur again. Lessons learned (root causes of problems) are a part of KM and provide valuable feedback for enhancing the QA and effectiveness of OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes.
2.7
Trends and issues in nuclear power plant (NPP) life management
In order to address future issues and trends in NPP life management, it is necessary to first examine past political situations and technological events that have shaped the industry until now. Both the national and international safety record of nuclear power will continue to be a yardstick used by energy policy-makers to assess the justification, or not, for using nuclear power. The international dimension is introduced here to emphasize the collective responsibilities of all involved to operate their NPPs safely, and to highlight the fact that releases of radioactive source terms (contamination) simply do not respect international boundaries. The accidents in Chernobyl (26 April 1986, Ukraine) [5] and Three Mile Island (March 28 1979, Pennsylvania, US) [6], caused widespread rejection of nuclear power and a general distrust in nuclear technology. Since then, much confidence has been restored in nuclear power, thanks to improvements to designs, safety culture and continued freedom from major accidents. With uncompromising vigilance, questioning attitude (safety culture aspects), implementation of effective OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes and following the current state of knowledge, sharing experiences (open discussions with other operators and regulators), and by using validated good practices and applying lessons learned, safe current and
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LTO operation of NPPs should be facilitated. However, utilities and operators have to prepare, plan and invest for LTO at least five years in advance of reaching the NPP’s original design life, even if political and public support could change in the future, due to other unforeseeable circumstances. This is a challenge to the business case, even if the regulatory climate should remain favourable. In other words, regulators can implement operational and safety rules and can verify that a NPP is in compliance with these, but they are not involved with national energy policies or private sector business goals. Furthermore, many utilities are aiming to keep their NPPs operating for 60 or more years, and this will need increased regulatory capacity (re-licensing aspects) and oversight. A potential future problem may arise due to regulatory capacity being stretched, especially when new NPP designs and associated new operational practices have to be approved and construction of new NPPs starts. Thus, the nuclear power industry and its regulators must ensure that sufficient numbers of suitably trained personnel will be available in both currently operating and future NPPs. It is necessary to implement relevant courses in technical colleges and universities in a timely manner, provide young technicians and engineers with the prospect of a life-career and to realize that basic training and qualification may require two to three years, with some specialist areas (doctorate level at university) requiring up to five or more years. Expertise in decommissioning NPPs, radwaste conditioning and radiological protection will also be needed in future. Training of future radiation protection experts and technicians in ways to plan jobs using the ALARA principle should be given due attention, bearing in mind the time needed to train and qualify such personnel. The prospect of a career for life in an expanding and vital industry, plus the pride and responsibility in working for the benefit of the environment and humanity should be seen as good incentives for the coming generation of nuclear technologists.
2.7.1 Role of NPPs currently in operation Past history shows that despite economic recessions and associated reduction in industrial output and changing political situations, the world will, overall, need more energy as it progresses further into the twenty-first century. This will be against a background of increased environmental awareness concerning the use of fossil-based fuels and possible shortages thereof. In contrast, nuclear energy represents an economically sensible, reliable and environmentally responsible path to follow. Over 300 NPPs (from a current world total of 438 in June 2010) are now approaching, have reached or have already exceeded half of their original design lives, and almost all NPPs in the US have plans to apply for licence renewal, when the time comes. This clearly indicates the renaissance of nuclear power in the US. In Europe, most NPPs will have the possibility to continue operation on their current
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licensing basis through successful completion of the PSR procedure. Even allowing for new NPPs being constructed now and in the future, a significant quantity of the generated capacity in the next 20 years, or so, will still have to come from NPPs that have operated for 30 or more years. These older NPPs generally possess improved safety and economic status compared to when they first went into service, due, in part, to replacements of SSCs, back-fitting and refurbishments and implemented mitigation methods against SSC-AD. Furthermore, OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes, and monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance would have all contributed significantly to the relicensing and LTO of these NPPs [7].
2.7.2 Contribution of power uprates Power uprates (PUs) are an on-going activity in many NPPs, and they are already a valuable contribution to the total of global nuclear energy produced [8]. In the US, for example, up to 5 GW of electrical power could be added to the total nuclear capacity via PU between 2005 and 2010 [9]. Uprating the power output of nuclear reactors is a highly economically attractive source of additional generating capacity. By modifying the existing turbo-generator (e.g. increasing steam intake capacity) or installing a new turbo-generator, and by taking advantage of existing design margins and installing digital I&C, plant output can be readily increased by up to 15–20%. Power uprates are done for both BWR and PWR. The necessary increase in the fuel core power is achieved in BWRs by increasing the core feed water flows and steam flows. Either the rate of coolant recirculation is kept constant, thus creating larger core steam volumes, or steam volumes are held the same via an increased recirculation rate. A combination of these measures is also possible. In PWRs it is necessary to increase the core coolant flow rate or to raise the mean coolant temperature rise across the core, or both. The secondary steam volume is increased, which is then converted to more electrical power via the turbo-generators. It is usually quicker, easier and cheaper to make the adjustments necessary for PU than to build a new NPP. Using a simple example, if a country operates five similarly rated NPPs and each one was given a 20% PU, the equivalent power generated after PU completion would then correspond to having 6 NPPs in operation. This could be an attractive alternative to building a new NPP, or as an effective and cost-efficient measure to ‘bridge-over’ energy requirements whilst waiting for a new NPP to be built and to connect to the supply grid. There are three categories of PU: measurement uncertainty recapture (MUR) uprates; stretch power uprates (SPU); and extended power uprates (EPU). The MUR uprates are typically no more than 2% and are obtained by improved calculation of the reactor power. The SPU leads generally to
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a maximum of 7% increase and is characterized by altering set-points in the instrumentation. The EPU can be used to obtain up to a 20% increase in power. This, in contrast to the previous PU methods, requires significant changes to the OPs and equipment of the NPP, including a higher power density core, generator renewal or modification, systems to deal with the steam or coolant flow rate increase and focused monitoring and inspection on piping and steam dryers, etc). The NPP balance of plant usually addresses the secondary side situation (i.e. turbines and all else not in the primary side). Although PUs are done within the design tolerances, they can pose new and special challenges to the operation of the NPP, since higher volumes of coolant and steam arise and flow rates increase. Furthermore, the nuclear core is usually modified to create the extra energy via more enriched fuel. Higher core power, increased flow rates, temperatures and pressures not only have the potential to affect AD rates in SSCs (e.g. vibration-induced cracks in steam dryer cover plates in BWRs [10]), but also new operational guides and rules have to be implemented to allow the plant’s personnel time to act accordingly in cases of emergency (i.e. a PU also necessitates an analysis of human factors and operator’s actions, especially under anomalous or transient conditions in the newly configured NPP. Times available for operator action/ intervention may be shorter relative to before the PU was implemented). The possible effects of PU on reliability and safety margins of SSCs must be analysed and proof brought that they remain within regulatory prescriptions [11].
2.7.3 Safety regulation and anticipating future changes Regulatory and safety requirements expected for new types of NPP will be, in principle, no different from those for current NPPs, namely that all plants must be operated from ‘greenfield-back-to-greenfield’ (total life cycle) such that no harm occurs to the public and environment. The traditional approach of NPP regulation has focused on verifying that the safety and operation of NPPs always conforms to their current licence requirements. This pragmatic approach implies that the best possible NPP designs are used from the start of operations, that safety systems upgrades and SSC replacements are implemented as necessary, the DID barriers are kept functional, the OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes are effective in their respective goals, and the workforce is correspondingly qualified and safety oriented. This is a ‘state-of-plant’ approach. In future, this approach will also be important, but a growing trend is for regulators to verify that the organizational arrangements in place at the NPP can ensure safe operation at all times. The organizational arrangements and OPs obviously cover a multitude of activities within the NPP, and these, in turn, are based on established codes and guidelines and the implementation of lessons learned and good practices. The OPs, ASPs,
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AM and PLiM programmes for new NPPs should clearly reflect a sciencebased approach, backed up with sound engineering principles with a primary goal of safety. Assuring the integrity of primary pressure boundaries (e.g. RPV, SGs, pressurizer and piping) remains a priority task, but DID barriers and robust severe accident management procedures must nevertheless be available to limit any consequences of SSC failure [12]. Risk-based maintenance and inspection methods are also taking on more significance, and the use of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is an increasingly valuable tool used for plant-specific assessment of risks to safety. Core damage frequency (CDF) is a term used in PRA. It is a way of expressing how probable it is that an accident would cause damage to the nuclear fuel core. The CDF number is a useful tool for managing the level of risk of core accidents. The CDF is obtained by estimating the frequency of design base accidents that may cause damage to a nuclear reactor fuel core (PRA Level 1). In Western European NPPs, the theoretical CDF is calculated to be around 5 ¥ 10–5 per reactor year (which would be once in 20 000 reactor years). In the US, reactor designs must fulfil a theoretical CDF criterion of 1 event in 10 000 years, but current designs are superior in this respect, and are usually projected to have a CDF of 1 in 100 000 years. However, NPPs commonly have a CDF of about 1 in 1 million years. New generation NPPs (Generation III, III+ and IV) feature many passive safety systems and the theoretical CDF is estimated to be about 1 in 10 million years. It should be noted that nuclear core damage accidents do not necessarily mean the release of radiotoxic substances to the environment, as was shown to be the case for the Three Mile Accident in the US [6]. The value of PRA approaches will increase as methods for PRA Level 2 (addressing plant source-term release) and PRA Level 3 (assessment of injury and economic loss due to release of radioactivity) are further refined. The impacts of external events on the safe operation of a NPP (e.g. seismic, flood, aviation accident, terror attack and hurricane) require continued analysis. Safety regulation in NPPs is applied in a national way, but it has its roots also in internationally derived and approved approaches. Proven design principles and engineering codes and practices also provide input to assist the regulation and assessment of safety in NPPs. Safety regulation can have basically either a prescriptive or a ‘goal-seeking’ character. As time evolves, it is likely that the latter approach will find increased use as the principle of ‘The operator is responsible for safety’, becomes even more firmly established. It is opportune to mention here that electricity markets are becoming increasingly deregulated, thus creating market opportunities but also potential impact on safety levels. Changes in NPP operational procedures (e.g. in order to save time/money/increase output) must first be analysed, and officially approved if safety may be affected.
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A basic principle used in the regulatory field is to ensure that NPPs are kept at the current state-of-the-art, science and technology, and sufficient safety margins are present in safety-relevant SSCs irrespective of the NPP’s chronological age. This principle will be valid also for future (new generation) NPPs, thus assuring that new knowledge and technology will continually benefit the goals of safety-first.
2.7.4 Issues concerning waste arising from the operation of nuclear power plants The operation of a NPP produces radioactive waste (‘radwaste’) and radwaste management has to take into account the low, medium and high level types arising. It is evident that the longer a NPP operates, the more waste and spent fuel it will produce. Thus, even well before the NPP’s LTO phase is entered into, sufficient capacity to store, condition and dispose of the projected amounts of radwaste must be planned for, or already be available. For example, construction of large items such as new spent fuel storage pools (or modifications to existing ones) must be undertaken, and corresponding strategies evolved to enable storage of the fuel elements whilst avoiding criticality accidents. Spent fuel storage pools are a very important part of NPPs since they must ensure that the spent fuel’s decay heat is removed efficiently, they shield personnel from radiation and provide a barrier against radioactive releases. Correspondingly, they must also be continually monitored and maintained chemically (i.e. sufficient boration must be present in the water to absorb neutrons emitted by decays in the fuel) to prevent spontaneous criticality of the fuel [13]. Spent fuel can be re-processed to extract remaining quantities of fissionable materials (e.g. uranium and plutonium) and to separate non-fissionable, but radioactive materials, which can be processed and then encased in suitable containers for storage or final disposal. The overall strategy used for radwaste management is to concentrate or vitrify it as appropriate, reduce its volume and to confine and contain it for as long as it may present environmental or health hazards. High-level waste (HLW) may contain several billion Becquerel (Bq) per cubic centimetre compared to a few tens of Bq per cubic centimetre in low-level waste (LLW). (One Bq is equivalent to 1 radioactive decay per second.) It is important to realize that the volume of HLW (mostly from spent fuel) is small and it can be stored relatively easily, until final disposal is possible. The HLW tends to be short-lived due to its greater radioactivity, whereas LLW could present much longer-term hazards. It is the current generation’s moral obligation to ensure that future generations are not burdened with radwaste issues. The future will demand national political solutions to address the final disposal of radwaste, since technical issues regarding managing, conditioning and packaging have been largely
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resolved. Radwaste and other materials arising from decommissioning and dismantling NPPs may be disposed of finally in deep (400 m) repositories or could be stored in such a manner that the option remains to monitor or even retrieve it even after several hundred years. This may be a viable option when new methods are developed to transmute long-lived isotopes into shorterlived ones or even non-radioactive ones [14]. Although an expensive option, nuclear transmutation of transuranium elements (actinides) such as isotopes of plutonium, neptunium and curium can potentially reduce the inventory of these elements and thus facilitate easier radwaste management. It can be mentioned here that earlier NPP designs often used components made from hard cobalt-containing alloys for applications such as rollers and pins in control rod systems that require very high resistance to wear and freedom from sticking through friction. However, when irradiated with neutrons, 59Co (the stable form) may become activated to form the relatively long-lived isotope 60Co, which is a gamma-radiation emitter with a half-life of 5.27 years. Thus, due to ALARA principles and to lessen activity inventories, Co-containing alloys have now been gradually replaced with other materials not so susceptible to activation. This is an example where experience gained with radiological aspects (and not SSC-AD) has led to the phasing-out of Co-containing alloys used for some components in NPPs.
2.8
Past, current and future nuclear power plant (NPP) concepts and designs
Since Generation I NPPs have been mostly phased out, and Generation II NPPs are discussed in detail elsewhere in this book, the following will deal only with salient features, characteristics and special aspects of some Generation III NPPs and those projected to come into commercial service further along the timescale until about 2030. Since the Generation IV NPPs are a group of theoretical NPP designs for next-generation technologies projected to be available after about 2030, they are beyond the scope of this book. However, those currently under study are the gas cooled fast reactor (GFR), the very high temperature reactor (VHTR), the supercritical water cooled reactor (SCWR), the sodium cooled fast reactor (SFR), the lead cooled fast reactor (LFR) and the molten salt reactor (MSR). Nuclear power plants may be categorized as follows, reflecting their historical evolution and technical development and it should be noted that quite different reactor types exist within each reactor generation: ∑
Generation I (1950s–1970s) NPPs. These were essentially the early prototypes of todays operating NPPs. With the current exception of the United Kingdom (with their carbon dioxide cooled, graphite moderated Magnox-type reactors, currently scheduled to be shut down by 2010), none are in operation elsewhere in the world. © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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∑
Generation II (1970s–1990s) NPPs. Reactors from this era comprise the majority of commercial NPPs operating today, and some of these NPPs were even constructed using modified nuclear submarine propulsion systems and associated technologies, for example, the PWR. Other designs in this Generation II category are the BWR, CANDU (CANada Deuterium Uranium), WWER (sometimes called VVER) Russian designed PWR, RBMK (Russian designed channel-type graphite moderated reactor) and the advanced gas-cooled reactor (AGR). ∑ Generation III (1990s–2010) NPPs. These reactors have benefitted widely from lessons learned from older NPP types, designs and technologies. They thus may be classed as being at the current state-of-the-art, science and technology and advanced in concept. The EPR, System 80+, AP 600 and ABWR NPPs are examples of the light water-based Generation III NPPs (see below for some further details). ∑ Generation III+ (2010–2030) NPPs. These reactors will have shorter construction times and lower capital costs. They have evolutionary designs and will operate even more efficiently, thus more economically than currently operating NPPs. Examples of this generation are the Westinghouse, AP 1000, APWR and ESBWR NPPs (see below for some examples). ∑ Generation IV (from around 2030 onward) NPPs. Most of the designs are still in the conceptual stage. The NPPs will be characterized by lower construction and operating costs (generically-based and standardized approach), they will have enhanced safety systems, many of them passive, and due to the innovative fuel cycles they will be resistant to proliferation issues and will generate less volumes of radwaste.
2.8.1 Generation III and III+ NPPs The 1600 MWe European pressurized water reactor (EPR) is a Generation III type of NPP, meaning it is derived from the present designs of NPPs, but features evolutionary improvements in design (standardized), including many passive safety systems, better fuel efficiency and materials having high resistance to AD. The EPR features a 1.5 m thick concrete outer wall and a substantial inner containment. Another Generation III design is the advanced boiling water reactor (ABWR), four of which have actually operated in Japan since 1996 and two more are under construction there. The ABWR design is licensed in the US, Japan and Taiwan (with two currently under construction in Taiwan). Since the ABWR is based on many years of BWR experience, it has benefits concerning the construction time (e.g. 39 months from first concrete to first fuelling, reduced operation and maintenance costs and improved safety and operability features, for example.
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The economic simplified boiling water reactor (ESBWR) is a Generation III+ NPP and is a further development on the ABWR, featuring natural circulation with no recirculation pumps or their associated piping. As its name implies, the ESBWR is simplified (e.g. 25% fewer pumps) and presumably more economical to construct and operate due to a projected short (36-month) construction time. These designs can remain safe in accident conditions without the use of any active control components. In principle, it is better to have passive safety features, not depending on other systems, because gravity feeds, evaporation and natural circulation, for example, cannot be affected by inadequate human actions or procedures during an emergency situation. Designs also even feature improved capability to deal with the unlikely rare occurrence of severe accidents, such as when the nuclear fuel core melts through the RPV and gains entry into the containment. The so-called ‘corium’ or fuel-containing material, a mixture of fuel, debris and molten metal, can fall onto a ‘core catcher’ and be thus spread out efficiently and cooled so that its progression is stopped and the containment remains tight, thus maintaining its DID design requirement to prevent the uncontrolled release of radioactive substances to the environment. Depending on the type, the new generation of NPPs are designed to have higher fuel enrichment (5% uranium oxide or mixture with uranium–plutonium oxide) and thus have a higher electrical power output (e.g. the 1600 MWe EPR) compared to earlier design NPPs (e.g. typically 220–1000 MWe WWER, PWR and BWR, with the exception of the Generation II 1500 MWe RBMK NPPs which were operated at Ignalina, Lithuania until December 2009).
2.8.2 Advanced reactor technologies: the pebble bed reactor A possible future NPP will be the ‘helium cooled pebble bed reactor (PBR)’, which has been studied and developed further in South Africa since 1993. A pioneer PBR operated for 21 years in Germany [15]. Future PBRs will use the equivalent of about 450 000 tennis ball-sized mini-reactor cores contained in a vessel. The nuclear fuel is enclosed in pyrolytic graphite, which acts as a moderator, and the fuel (e.g. uranium, plutonium as oxides or carbides) is made of micro-particles, coated with silicon carbide for structural integrity. Other coolants can be nitrogen or carbon dioxide. The high temperature PBR will have increased thermal efficiency (about 50%), compared to that usual in water-moderated NPPs (about 35%). Helium flows through the ‘pebble-bed’, extracting heat, and then the heated gas is directed onto turbines to produce electricity. The helium cools down and is recycled back to the reactor. Compared to the 1600 MWe EPR, these PBRs are of low power, typically 110 MWe. Operating risks are deemed to be very small, due to the low power density and inherent passive safety
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features. Since it works at high temperature (approximately 900 °C), the PBR can cool itself via natural circulation and withstand accident scenarios up to at least 1600 °C. The PBR is classed as a type Generation IV very high temperature reactor (VHTR).
2.8.3 Future reactors: an example from the United Kingdom The UK’s current fleet (2010) of 19 NPPs of various ages, designs and capacities supply about 16% of the country’s total electricity. However, the majority of Magnox and AGRs are now nearing the end of their original design lives, and about half of the NPP fleet are already in, or planning, decommissioning. Up to 35% of the total supplied electrical power may have to be replaced by 2020; by this date the share of nuclear-supplied power will have dropped to about 7% unless the construction of Generation III and III+ reactors is implemented before this time. This is a medium-term possibility, since in contrast, Generation IV reactors are a longer-term prospect (probably available from 2030 onwards). The Generation III+ reactors will feature modular construction, simplified design, passive safety (use of gravity, natural circulation and evaporation, instead of pumps, motors and valves) and the overall construction costs should be low. The Generation III+ reactors will be more efficient and produce much less radwaste compared to earlier NPPs. By July 2007, four designs had been approved for further assessment, namely, the European AREVA-EPR (pressurized water), the US Westinghouse AP 1000 (pressurized water – a feature of the AP 1000 reactor is that the core coolant is forced into the core by gravity and natural convection recirculates it), the Canadian CANDU ACR 1000 (heavy water reactor) and the US General Electric ESBWR (boiling water) reactor. However, on 4 April 2008, the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) Company, responsible for the ACR 1000 design, announced that it was withdrawing their CANDU ACR 1000 from the prelicensing process (called ‘Generic Design Assessment, GDA’). The design had successfully completed Step 2 of the GDA (initial assessment carried out by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the Environment Agency) in the UK, but the announcement stated that the decision to withdraw would allow the AECL to focus its marketing and licensing resources on the Canadian market [16]. On 12 March 2008, the UK’s HSE and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) signed an agreement to renew co-operation between the two countries. The five-year agreement covers the exchange of technical information and the development of safety standards. It also allows the two organizations to exchange personnel, information and training. It is noted that two of the new reactor designs under consideration, and being taken through
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GDA in the UK, are from the US, being the General Electric ESBWR and the Westinghouse AP 1000. On 27 March 2008 the French and UK governments announced that they would be working together to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of nuclear development projects, including safety and pre-licensing (GDA) [17]. In particular, the collaboration would also address matters regarding the regulatory assessment of EPRs which are currently (2010) being constructed in France and Finland and undergoing GDA in the UK. It can thus be seen that the UK is collaborating closely with both European and US designers of the future NPPs.
2.8.4 Future AM and PLiM programmes applied to new generation NPPs As new generation NPPs go into operation, it can be expected that even their SSCs will also undergo some level of AD. It is, however, not expected that well-known AD mechanisms such as neutron embrittlement of the RPV beltline material or stress corrosion cracking in steam generators or vessel head penetrations will pose any significant problems, since appropriate design, manufacturing processes, material and operational aspects and lessons learned will have been implemented. The new generation NPPs will generally feature higher working temperatures, greater power rating, higher flow rates of coolant but less reliance on engineered safety features due to the passive design concepts present. For example, as temperatures will be much higher in the helium-cooled PBR, ageing mechanisms such as creep and evolution of microstructures, carburization, decarburization, oxidation and the effect of particulate-laden gases in causing corrosion erosion must all be items to monitor and control in ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes. Research work should continue to investigate the mechanisms acting and how best they can be mitigated or eliminated. Special surface treatments could conceivably reduce ingress of impurities and associated AD. Concerning microstructure effects, it is known that some grades of duplex cast austenitic stainless steel (CASS) used for pump casings and piping may suffer thermal embrittlement due to the development of metallic phases over time within a given temperature range [18]. It is therefore important to allow for such a possibility in new NPPs using appropriate monitoring and surveillance programmes. New tools may need to be developed or existing ones improved upon, to detect microstructure evolution with time and to correlate this with the propensity to corrode or embrittle. Other aspects concerning new generation reactors will be to determine how far risk-based inspection procedures may be used and what level of regulatory acceptance they will find. Risk-based inspection is still being developed for the current fleet of NPPs, so it remains to be seen how far this can be applied to the new generation of NPPs.
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Increased reliance on computerized plant control will necessitate the highest QA of computer programmes and sensors. Sensors must supply the correct information to computer-controlled functions to allow correct operational decisions to be made, and AD monitoring must be extended to cover these technologies. Ageing and obsolescence of sensors and issues of equivalent QA replacements must be included in the OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes as appropriate. Plant personnel will have to be trained not only to respect electronically supplied plant information, but also not to have total reliance on it, and to question seemingly anomalous signals and plant response and to be able to instigate cross-checks for verification of the true situation [6]. Trust in instrument readings is good, but intelligent human control is better. There has been a gradual decline in the numbers of qualified workforce to regulate, construct and operate NPPs since the mid-1980s, and many pioneer nuclear power workers are already in, or going into, retirement. However, it remains problematic to find and recruit young qualified people to replace them, since corresponding courses have become less available in many universities, thus compounding the problem. The young generation of nuclear power workers are now being faced with the task of keeping current NPPs operating safely, whilst confronting the challenge to build and operate new generation NPPs. The standard OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes for the new generation NPPs may well have their basic principles based on established and well-proven approaches and methodologies, but this should not nurture complacency. Each new NPP type will require analysis and specific OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes tailored to suit. However, the new NPPs are going to be constructed on a modular and generic basis, thus facilitating, in principle at least, the direct transfer of basic knowledge and operational principles.
2.9 Conclusions 1. Ageing management and associated programmes assist integration between existing NPP standard operational practices (e.g. maintenance, repairs, replacements and ISI) and also address potentially insufficient conservative design assumptions that have become evident over a NPP’s operational time; AM programmes are basically more safety-oriented in nature. 2. Plant life management (PLiM) programmes facilitate a comprehensive evaluation of the NPP assets and contain elements of both safety and economics; PLiM programmes are basically more economically oriented in nature. 3. It is vital to assign the various NPP-SSCs to their respective safety classes to obtain a focused and objective approach to the OPs, ASPs,
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AM and PLiM programmes, and that resources are used where they are most needed. 4. System, structure and component ageing surveillance dossiers are living documents, to be updated whenever new knowledge becomes available regarding SSC-AD. 5. Diverse AD effects have been observed in all types of NPP SSCs. Understanding the mechanisms and causes of degradation allows implementation of robust mitigation methods. The information from ISI, testing, normal and exceptional maintenance and research remain key to achieve this. 6. Changes to the NPP, such as power uprating, must be assessed in terms of their holistic impact on OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes, including provision for adjusted emergency procedures. 7. Obsolescence in SSCs and replacements and strategic reserves thereof must be addressed in the PLiM programme in a timely manner. Depending on safety class or reliability issues, new types of SSCs will require qualification for functional equivalence. Owners, operators and regulators must be aware of non-service (storage) AD, and optimum management, elimination or mitigation thereof. 8. New generation NPPs feature many passive safety features and improved designs and materials, but knowledge from current OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes, modified as necessary, will still provide a basis to achieve these NPP’s design lives safely and profitably and lay the foundations for their LTO. 9. Safety culture and knowledge management enhance the effectiveness of standard OPs and ASPs, and AM and PLiM programmes. 10. Risk-based inspection methods and probabilistic approaches will continue to supplement deterministic methods and their further development is necessary to achieve the overall goal of operating NPPs safely and reliably.
2.10 Sources of further information NEA/CNRA/R, ‘Regulatory aspects of ageing reactors’, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, CNRA Special Issue Meeting, June 1998. NEA/CNRA/R (99) 1, March 1999. IAEA, ‘Safety aspects of nuclear power plant ageing’, IAEA-TECDOC-540, Vienna, 1990. IAEA, ‘Cost drivers for the assessment of nuclear power plant life extension’, IAEA-TECDOC-1309, Vienna, September 2002. Penny, R.K. (ed.), Ageing of Materials and Methods for the Assessment of Lifetimes of Engineering Plant, CAPE ’97, A.A. Balkema, Rotterdam, Brookfield, 1997.
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Penny, R.K. (ed.), Risk, Economy and Safety, Failure Minimization and Analysis, Failures ’98, A.A. Balkema, Rotterdam, Brookfield, 1998. USNRC, ‘generic ageing lessons learned (GALL) report’, USNRC-NUREG1801, Volume 1, July 2001. IAEA, Site selection and evaluation for nuclear power plants with respect to population distribution: a safety guide’, IAEA Safety Series No. 50SG-54, STI/PUB/569, 1980, IAEA, Vienna, 1980. Major Projects Association, ‘A new generation of uk nuclear power plants – are we ready?’ Seminar No. 123, held at the Institution of Civil Engineers, London, February 2006. IAEA, ‘Periodic safety review of nuclear power plants – safety guide’, Safety Standards Series No. NS-g-2.10, IAEA, Vienna, 2003. Tjernlund, R.M. and Manacsa, G.C., ‘Guidelines for the safety classification of systems, components and parts used in nuclear power plant applications (NGCIG-17)’, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, EPRINP-6895, OSTI ID: 6372758, 1 February 1991. Männisto, I., ‘Risk-informed classification of systems, structures and components in nuclear power plants’, Master’s Thesis, Helsinki University of Technology, Department of Engineering, Physics and Mathematics, Espoo, 2005. (available at: http://www.sal.hut.fi/Publications/pdf-files/ TMAN05.pdf). Radiation Dose Management in the Nuclear Industry, proceedings of the conference organized by the British Nuclear Energy Society, Windemere, Cumbria, 9–11 October 1995, Thomas Telford, London, 1995. IAEA, ‘Severe accident management programmes for nuclear power plants – safety guide No. NS-G-2.15’, IAEA, Vienna, July 2009.
2.11
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank B. Raj of the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research, Kalpakkam, Tamil Nadu, India, for his help and suggestions, and for reviewing this chapter. Thanks are due also to P. Contri of JRC-Petten/ NL for his valuable comments regarding safety classification and the roles of OPs, ASPs, AM and PLiM programmes.
2.12
References
1. IAEA, Plant life management for long term operation of light water reactors. Principles and guidelines, TRS 448 IAEA, Vienna, Austria, October 2006. 2. Bond, L., ‘Economics of plant life management’, Second International Symposium on Nuclear Power Plant Life Management, Shanghai, China, IAEA, 15–18 October 2007. 3. STUK – Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority of Finland, Nuclear power plant systems, structures and components and their safety classification, 26 June 2000
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(source extracted from STUKLEX, http://www.edilex.fi/stuklex/en/lainsaadanto/ saannosto/YVL2-1). 4. IAEA Safety Standards Series: Periodic Safety Review of Nuclear Power Plants, Safety Guide No. NS-G-2.10, STI/PUB/1157, IAEA, Vienna, Austria, August 2003. 5. Medvedev, G. (1989). The Truth about Chernobyl. VAAP. First American edition published by Basic Books, New York, in 1991. 6. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Fact Sheet on the Three Mile Island accident. Annual report – 1979 NUREG–0690. 7. 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants. 8. Tipping, Ph., ‘Some power up-rate issues in nuclear power plants’, Nuclear Engineering and Technology, Vol. 40, No. 4, 2008, pp. 251–4. 9. The New Economics of Nuclear Power, World Nuclear Association (WNA) Report (http://www.uic.com.au/neweconomics.pdf). 10. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ‘Failure of a steam dryer cover plate after a recent power up-rate’, Information Notice IN 2002-26, September 2002. 11. IAEA, ‘Implications of power up-rates on safety margins of nuclear power plants’, Report of a IAEA and OECD/NEA Technical Meeting, Vienna, Austria, 13–15 October 2003, IAEA-TECDOC-1418, IAEA, Vienna, 2004. 12. IAEA, ‘Overview of training methodology for accident management at nuclear power plants’, IAEA-TECDOC-1440, IAEA, Vienna, 2005. 13. Title 10, ENERGY, Chapter I: Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Part 70 – Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear material, subpart d – License applications, 70:24 ‘Criticality accident requirements’, paragraph 50.68. 14. Takibayev, A., Saito, M., Artisyuk, V. and Sagara H., ‘Fusion-driven transmutation of selected long-lived fission products’, Progress in Nuclear Energy, Vol. 47, 2005, pp. 354–60. 15. Association of German Engineers (VDI), AVR – Experimental High-Temperature Reactor, 21 Years of Successful Operation for a Future Energy Technology, The Society for Energy Technologies, Dusseldorf, VDI Verlag, 1990, pp. 9–23. 16. AECL, ‘CANDU-ACR-1000 withdrawn from the generic design assessment’, reported at http://www.aecl.ca/NewsRoom/News/Press 2008/080404/.htm?ebul=newreactor/1may-2008&cr=2. 17. UK Health and Safety Executive, ‘UK–French collaboration on generic design assessment for EPR’, reported at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/newreactors/communique. htm?ebul=newreactor/1-may-2008&cr=3). 18. Pohl, M., Storz, O. and Glogowski, T., ‘Effect of sigma phase morphology on the properties of duplex stainless steels’, Microscopy and Microanalysis Volume 11 (Supplement 2), 2005, pp. 230–1.
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Safety regulations for nuclear power plant life management and licence renewal
A. A l o n s o, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Spain
Abstract: This chapter presents current regulations to ensure safety and reliability of ageing nuclear power plants. Management of ageing in structures, systems and components requires an understanding of ageing mechanisms and how to detect and control them through surveillance, feedback of operating experience and maintenance programmes. Nuclear power plants’ longer-term operation needs to be addressed by designers, plant operators and regulators within the umbrella of international organizations to implement, complete and augment research and enact new regulation. Key words: nuclear safety regulations, ageing mechanisms, life management, longer-term operation, role of international organizations.
3.1
Introduction
Nuclear power plant (NPP) longer-term operation (LTO) has to demonstrate compliance with the current licence basis and be founded on a completely robust and satisfactory set of regulations. Compliance with such regulations has to be proven by the applicant and verified by the regulatory organization through well-established licensing procedures. Those activities will be first described for some representative cases. Such regulations require the establishment and conducting of a specific plant life management programme (PLiM), which is based in the understanding, monitoring and management of the ageing processes in structures, systems and components (SSCs). Furthermore, PLiM programmes are continually being improved upon. Although ageing processes may have a generic nature and affect similar designs, the ageing status of each single nuclear power plant, and the corresponding remaining safe life, should be known through plant surveillance, operating experience feedback, maintenance and inspection programmes considering the specific design, operational history and the functional experience of each individual plant. The ageing processes are considered on an introductory basis, as they will be described in detail in other chapters of this book. Different ageing mechanisms shorten the life of the SSCs. Some of those will be part of the safety envelop, while others will be installed in the non-nuclear side. The first will receive major attention without neglecting the others, mainly when they may affect the safety and reliability of operations. PLiM mainly 56 © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
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concerns not only operators, but also designers and regulators. Old designs did not properly consider all possible ageing mechanisms; in fact, on average, a new significant ageing effect has appeared every seven years or so. The ageing of such plant has to be managed while in service to keep the required safety level at all times and also during LTO, while new designs can prevent some of the known ageing mechanisms and facilitate improved managerial procedures. The major areas of concern are related to neutron fluence and stress corrosion cracking, which will be presented in brief, as they will be considered in depth in later chapters. PLiM and LTO are still evolving, so more research is still needed to understand and prevent ageing mechanisms. Information networks, to be discussed later on, have been created globally to evaluate and apply worldwide operating experience and research results. Periodic examination will gradually be substituted by the more effective on-line surveillance; improved digital technology will help in that endeavour. This and other future trends will be presented. A list of references and identification of sources for further information are offered to the reader.
3.2
Safety review/licence renewal
Original NPP designs were created using the deterministic approach based on the defence-in-depth principle, as defined by the International Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG, 1996). Although economic considerations, rather than technical reasoning, were the basis for determining the lifetime of nuclear power plants, pessimistic early approaches limited the operation of light and heavy water reactors to 30–40 years. The regulatory authorities of supplier countries formally established such limits in their operation licences. In the USA 40 years was the standard, while in the USSR 30 years was the limit. Such restrictions where generally copied by the importing countries of such technologies. In other supplier countries such restrictions were not formally applied. In Germany, for example, the plants could operate as long as they could prove their required safety level. The concept of periodic safety review (PSR), to be conducted every ten years on average, started to take root in Germany as well as in many other countries, notably in Spain. That concept did not put any formal life limit to the power plants, provided they could show their safety at any time and after the PSR. The analysis of operating experience clearly showed that the early fatigue considerations in metallic components were not a matter of concern even after 40 years of operation. At the same time, new ageing mechanisms started to appear. Some of them, mainly new forms of corrosion and embritlement by neutron irradiation, clearly indicated that the operating life of some components would have to be limited unless proper corrective actions were taken. These experiences initiated new activities related to surveillance, maintenance and
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operational experience feedback, which later on were integrated in PLiM. This was not only for safety reasons, but also to improve the performance and economics of the plants. Thus the economical advantages of keeping such plants in operation beyond the formally established lifetime soon became evident. Under the pioneering effort of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), those countries with old designs started PLiM activities and the regulatory organizations commenced developing regulations for LTO. International institutions, mainly the International atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organisation for economic Development/Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/ NEA) established working groups to consider PLiM and LTO.
3.2.1 IAEA guidance on longer-term operation The IAEA has performed valuable work on PLiM and it is providing guidance on ageing-related regulatory aspects through its Safety Standards Series and Technical Report Series (IAEA, 1992). Although the IAEA has no regulatory authority, it has the statutory function of establishing standards for the protection of individuals, society and the environment in the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes; such standards could form the basis and guide regulatory development in Member States. So far, LTO has been briefly included in the on-going revision of the IAEA requirements for safety in operation (IAEA, 2000). A current revision of such requirements (IAEA, 2008) includes a new chapter on longer-term operation, equipment qualification and ageing management. The new document defines LTO as: ‘The operation beyond an established time frame set forth in design standards licence and/or regulations that is justified by safety assessment considering processes and features that may limit the life of SSCs’. It adds that: ‘… it shall use the results of periodic safety review (PSR) and approved by the regulatory body on the basis of the analysis of the ageing management program that will assure plant safety during its extended life time’. The reference to PSR is of particular importance because many countries have established such regulatory practice as a means to license current and longer-term operation. The document further requires the establishment and implementation of a comprehensive LTO programme to be presented and approved or agreed to by the regulatory body. The LTO programme shall include such aspects as the current licensing basis (CLB); safety upgrading and verification and operational programmes, scoping and screening of SSCs with respect to degradation and ageing; re-validation of safety analysis that use time-limited assumptions; review of the management programmes, and the implementation of a new ageing management programme for the expected LTO period. As the IAEA document belongs to the requirements category, it should be expected that its contents will be developed into more specific safety guides.
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In the absence of more detailed guidance, the IAEA understands that PSRs provide a comprehensive methodology for reviewing the safety of the plant, including ageing effects and regulatory changes, technical progress and technological obsolescence. The IAEA has addressed such reviews (IAEA, 2003a): The objective of a PSR is to determine by means of a comprehensive assessment of an existing nuclear power plant: the extent to which the plant conforms to current international safety standards and practices; the extent to which the licensing basis remains valid; the adequacy of the arrangements that are in place to maintain plant safety until the next PSR or the end of plant lifetime; and the safety improvements to be implemented to resolve the safety issues that have been identified. The guide recognizes that the PSR can be the basis for acceptability of longer-term operation. It also recognizes that compliance with the current safety standards may not always be possible, but suggests that: ‘practicable improvements should be made as steps towards meeting them’ and ‘that the risk associated with the shortcomings be assessed and that a justification for continued plant operation be provided’. Many countries have adopted this formal regulatory path, although they are also considering the more detailed practices established by the US NRC.
3.2.2 Regulations for longer-term operation in the United States Regulations for longer-term operation have been fully developed and practised in the United States and they have set the examples for other countries. The US NRC decided to limit to 40 years the operating licence of NPPs, based on economic and antitrust considerations. The technical design was based on the assumed lifetime of the plant using very conservative assumptions to cover the then fragmentary knowledge on the expected behaviour of SSCs in service. Further safety analyses based on research results and operating experience feedback have clearly demonstrated that NPPs could operate safely and reliably well beyond the established formal licence limit. After recognizing this fact, the US NRC decided to enact 10 CFR Part 54 (NRC, 2006) to cover up 20 additional years of operation. Plants with 20 or more years of operation are candidates for licence renewal up to a total of 60 years. As of May 2009, there were 104 NPPs licensed to operate in the Unitted States, 52 units had received new licences, 14 units were under review and letters of intention to apply for a new licence were submitted to the US NRC for 52 units. It is expected that a very limited number of operating plants will not apply for a new licence due to individual unfavourable cost–benefit analyses or other causes.
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10 CFR Part 54 requires the licensee to submit some new documents: ∑ ∑
an integrated plant assessment (IPA); changes in the current licence bases (CLB), taken place during the NRC review of the application; ∑ an evaluation of time-limited aging analyses (TLAA); ∑ a supplement to the final safety analysis report (FSAR).
The interest of the regulator is based in the applicant knowing, managing and maintaining ageing within the plant safety envelope. The IPA must identify a complete list of those structures and components requiring ageing management justification for LTO. They are structures and components that perform their intended safety function without moving parts. The regulations include, but are not limited to, a lengthy list of long-lived structures and metallic, electric and electronic components, such as the reactor pressure vessel, the steam generators, pipes, supports and seismic Category 1 structures and cables, among others. It will be necessary to prove that those structures and components could perform their intended safety functions during LTO in the way established within the CLB. The applicant is obliged to submit changes to the CLB that may have taken place during the NRC review of the application. Submissions of such changes must take place each year after the application for a new licence and three months before the scheduled completion of the NRC review. All changes in the CLB of the facility affecting the contents of the new licence must be included in such amendments. TLAA includes the observations, calculations and analyses that the licensee has conducted to predict the effects of ageing on SSCs considered relevant and included in the CLB. It has to be proven that the analyses remain valid, have been projected for the period of additional operation or the effects of ageing can be managed and will not limit the safety functions. Among others, typical TLAA include metal fatigue, environmental qualification and neutron embrittlement. The FSAR supplement must describe the programmes and activities for managing the effects of ageing and the evaluation of TLAA for the new period of operation included in the IPA and in the ageing analyses. The applicant must also include any change or addition to technical specifications of the plant, with the appropriate justification, which may be necessary to manage the effects of ageing. Enacting any new basic regulation, as in this case, requires from the regulator the development of detailed procedures for better compliance. To that effect, the US NRC published Regulatory Guide 1.188 (NRC, 2005a) describing in more detail an acceptable format and content of the documents that justify the application. The Guide endorses a previously developed industry guidance document prepared by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI).
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The Regulator also edited a Standard Review Plan to License Renewal (NRC, 2005b) explaining how the US NRC staff should perform the evaluation to ensure that all the items have been properly considered and that the affected SSCs will perform their safety functions as expected during the period of longer-term operation. This document also serves to assure quality and uniformity in the review process. The Regulator has also published an additional document on the generic lessons learned, the so-called GALL report (NRC, 2005c). It includes the technical basis for the Standard Review Plan based on a systematic compilation of ageing information in nuclear power plants. The Gall report constitutes a helpful document to the applicants, since it contains recommendations on those existing ageing programmes that should be augmented for licence renewal. It also serves as a reference for the US NRC review process, and such a review is not necessary when the applicant’s ageing programmes follow those given in the GALL report.
3.2.3 Longer-term operation in other countries Most countries with nuclear power plants have a common approach to regulatory requirements related to PLiM and LTO. Although only a few have established time limits to the operation licence, others have not formally established such limits. The countries who have not established a limited lifetime have enforced PSR, about every ten years, which in many cases, as in Spain, are linked to a formal operation licence for the next ten-year period with no formal limit on the number of renewals. There are also countries with formal operation time limits that also practise PSR; in such cases, the review is reinforced by ageing management programmes (AMPs) and TLAAs. Despite the different models, in all countries the responsible licensee also maintains a continuous evaluation of the safety level of each plant under close supervision from the national regulator. Table 3.1 indicates how LTO is managed in some representative countries. Countries using PSR as the formal way to justify longer-term operation may differ in some specific aspects, but within a core of fixed principles such as: compliance with the current national safety requirements and guides and international recommendations; identification of improvements required to achieve or justify compliance; revision of the PLiM programme to ensure safe and reliable operation during the next ten-year period and definition of the necessary surveillance, maintenance and ageing mitigation measures. The Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA) has studied the level of harmonization of safety regulations followed in 17 countries (WENRA, 2006); by referring to the IAEA reference levels as guidance, it has concluded that only half of them have established formal requirements for PSR and ageing management, although the majority of them implement
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Foreseen life extension (y)
Main regulations for licence renewal
Use of periodic safety review
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Argentina Plant dependent Undetermined
Canadian regulations applied to Embalse NPP
Canada 40 10–20
CNSC Draft, 6-360, ‘Life Extension of Nuclear Power Plants’ IAEA TECDOC 1503, PliM, Guidelines for HWRs
Practised, but not directly linked to LTO, based on: IAEA ‘Periodic Safety Reviews of Nuclear Power Plants’ NS-G2.10 (2003)
Czech Republic As given in the Undetermined Technical Certificate
Proposed development of regulatory requirements based on US NRC practices and IAEA recommendations
PSR applied, based on IAEA NS-G-2.10
France No legal limit 10+
Industry procedures based on IAEA and NEA documents presented to regulatory authority for groups of standard plants
Practised by groups of standard plants and linked to licence operation. Part of the TSN Act
Germany No legal limit Not foreseen
Utilities have initiated AM programmes in accordance with RSK recommendation (2004) KTA 2301, Ageing management of NPP
Based on periodic safety reviews Requires deterministic and probabilistic analyses
Hungary 30 20 Regulations based on 10 CFR Part 54
Practised but not part of licence renewal. PSR based on IAEA NS-G-2.10
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Table 3.1 Regulatory requirements for LTO in different countries
Coordinating Committee Practised, linked to licence on Ageing Management renewal (Industry, Academy, Regulator)
Mexico 30 Under consideration Adoption of US NRC regulations. Participation in EPRI BWR-VIP and in IAEA co-ordinated research projects © Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2010
Netherlands 30 60 No specific policy on LTO (Borssele) IAEA AMAT Review
Practised every 10 years, weakly linked to licence renewal
Russia 30 5+10
NP-017-2000, ‘The main requirements for extension of the operating life of a NPP unit’ NP-24-2000, ‘Requirements for Not considered substantiation of possibility of extension of the operating life of nuclear facilities and installations’
Slovak Republic 60
Safety guide BNS 1.9.2/2001, ‘Ageing Management of NPPs’ Requirements’
Practised
Practised and linked to licence renewal. Based on IAEA 50-SG-012
South Korea No legal limit. 10 + (unlimited) Enhanced PSR developed in 30 y considered MOST Bulletins 2005-31 acceptable In depth review of 11 safety indicators (NUREG-1801)
Practised (since 2000) and linked to licence renewal, based on IAEA 50-SG-012
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Slovenia 40 10+ Regulations based on 10 CFR Part 54
Safety regulations for nuclear power plant life management
Japan 30 10+
Foreseen life extension (y)
Main regulations for license renewal
Use of periodic safety review
KINS/GE-N8 Safety review guidelines for PWR
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Spain 40 10+ Regulations based on 10 CFR Part 54
Prastised and linked to licence renewal. Instruction IS-22
Sweden 40 Not foreseen
SKIFS 2004:1, ‘Regulations concerning safety in nuclear facilities’ ‘SKIFS 2005:2, ‘Regulations concerning mechanical components in nuclear facilities’
USA 40 20
10 CFR Part 54, ‘Requirements Not practised for Renewal of Operating License for Nuclear Power Plants’, amended 2006
Note: This table has been constructed mainly from information presented by licensees and regulators in the IAEA 2nd International Symposium on Nuclear Power Life Management, Shanghai, 15–18 October 2007.
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Table 3.1 Continued
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such practices. In 2007, as a counterpart to WENRA, the European utilities holding nuclear power licenses decided to create the European Nuclear Installations Safety Standards (ENISS) to contribute to the harmonization efforts by providing comments and suggestions to WENRA’s activities. In Spain, for example, the nuclear safety regulatory authority, Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear (CSN) has enacted Instruction IS-22 (CSN, 2009) as the guiding document for PSR. The Guide explicitly recognizes: ∑
the importance of the feedback from national and international operating experience and how has it been applied to the plant to be analysed; ∑ the need to contemplate regulatory changes in the country of origin of the project or new requirements suggested by international organizations and their applicability to the plant in question; ∑ the full understanding of the ageing mechanisms and how to manage their effects on the SSCs to ensure the proper accomplishment of their safety functions; ∑ the value of any design or operational change, either already performed or in planning, to improve safety; and ∑ the potential use of the probabilistic methodology, which is also recommended in the IAEA PSR guidance.
3.3
Surveillance, operation and maintenance programmes
The early observations on SSC ageing determined the premature establishment of specific surveillance, operation and maintenance programmes that have been later integrated into PLiM. Surveillance starts with equipment verification and includes monitoring the behaviour of SSCs as well as regulatory inspection and peer reviews. Operation includes training and the feedback of operating experience; while maintenance, mainly risk informed maintenance, constitutes a substantial part of the ageing management programme, AMP. The most significant aspects of these activities are described in this section.
3.3.1 Surveillance of structures, systems and components Equipment verification is a key factor in the TLAA required by US NRC 10 CFR Part 54 and similar standards in other countries. Its importance was soon recognized by INSAG. In an early report (INSAG, 1988) the Group states: ‘Safety components and systems are chosen which are qualified for the environmental conditions that would prevail if they were required to function. The effects of ageing on normal and abnormal functioning are considered in design and qualification’.
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In an IAEA report (IAEA, 1998), recommendations are given for equipment qualification programmes. Safety-related equipment must be qualified not only for normal operating conditions but also for the so-called ‘harsh environments’ such as the ones created by postulated initiating events (PIEs). Such events may create conditions very different from those occurring during normal operation and affect an individual component or different components with the potential of causing common-cause failures in equipment experiencing ageing effects during normal operation. Equipment qualification is measured by using the concept of ‘qualified life’ or ‘qualified condition’ established by equipment qualification. Qualified life is the ‘period of time during normal operation when ageing does not prevent satisfactory performance during a subsequent PIE’. Before the end of its qualified life, the equipment has to be replaced, life-limiting components renewed or a new longer qualified life established. The qualified condition of equipment ‘is expressed in terms of a measurable condition indicator(s) for which it has been demonstrated that the equipment will meet its performance requirements’. The reactor pressure vessel (RPV) is the major component needing a surveillance programme to monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties of ferritic materials in the vessel beltline region which result from its exposure to neutron irradiation and possibly, but to a lesser extent, from the thermal and chemical environment. The US NRC promptly established a comprehensive surveillance programme (NRC, 2008a) based on standards published by the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), which is now common to other light water reactors (LWRs) and heavy water reactors (HWRs). Fracture toughness test data are obtained from material specimens exposed in surveillance capsules, which are withdrawn periodically from the reactor vessel and tested to examine the evolution of the mechanical properties of the vessel material. For each individual vessel a databank has been created on fracture toughness that permits the expected life of the said vessel to be forecast with a good level of certainty. In 1996 the IAEA created a worldwide database to store the results from national RPV surveillance programmes. To date, results from surveillance programmes from 10 countries are included in this database. Access to the database is controlled by agreements with the IAEA.
3.3.2 Operation and operating experience feedback The importance of operation experience (OE) and its feedback (OEF) has been recognized since the early 1970s within the NEA/OECD Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI). Such a Committee started to share between the participants of NEA Member States information on the construction and operation experience of nuclear power plants. The value of such an exercise was promptly recognized and offered to the IAEA to
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cover a wider audience. In 1980, the IAEA, in collaboration with the NEA, initiated the formal creation of a databank on operating experience, the so-called Incident Reporting System (IRS) (IAEA/NEA, 1980) with the participation of all IAEA Member States. Every country acquires and shares operating experiences in accordance with well-established procedures. The cited international organizations are responsible for the analysis of such experiences to determine tendencies or to understand root causes behind relevant incidents. Periodically the NEA publishes a report analysing the major experiences and any foreseeable tendencies. The last published report (IAEA/NEA, 2006) covers the large number of recent incidents involving corrosion on secondary side piping and recommends that more attention should be given to these ageing-related events. On its side, the industry also has its own programmes for OEF. The World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) and the US Institute on Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) have also established similar banks on OE and OEF, including a larger spectrum of incidents. Moreover, there are also national programmes for OE and OEF mainly in those countries operating a significant nuclear power fleet. More recently, INSAG has expressed its high consideration for OEF in a recently published document (INSAG, 2008) where it has suggested that improvements should be established in the international programmes and the need to improve the IAEA/NEA IRS databank. In the report, INSAG states: ‘The focus of OEF should therefore be shifted from mere reporting of safety significant events to a more comprehensive OEF system aimed at capturing even early signs of deterioration in safety. The key criterion should not be whether the safety event is significant, but rather whether the safety lesson is significant.’ It is also recognized that OEF is of paramount importance on drafting reactor operation standards and their revisions. Any new knowledge coming through OEF is used, on one side, to reduce uncertainties and in cases to simplify standards; on the other side, new phenomena may be discovered requiring new standards; this has been mainly the case with the ageing of SSCs. Experience shows that detailed technical standards have to be revised frequently to cover such new discoveries and observations. To help the Member States in establishing a national system for OEF, the IAEA has published a safety guide (IAEA, 2006a) which also emphasizes the advantages in participating in the IRS system. On its side, the US 10 CFR Part 54 was based on the analysis of more than 500 research and operating experience documents related to the behaviour of SSCs in operation. One of the most effective systems to monitor continuously nuclear plant operation has been recently introduced by the US NRC and followed in other countries. The reactor oversight process (ROP) (NRC, 2000b) covers reactor safety, radiation safety and safeguards. For each area some cornerstones have
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been determined against which the performance of the plant is compared. A satisfactory comparison gives a reasonable assurance of plant safe operation. From the safety point, the three major cornerstones are the initiating events, the mitigating systems and the integrity of the defence-in-depth barriers. Any departure from normal conditions is closely analysed to determine root causes. A colour code has been established to give an intuitive pictorial representation of the safety level of the plant. The Spanish Regulatory Authority, CSN, has established a similar process for plant operation supervision (CSN, 2006). Experience has proven that up to 80% of industrial incidents and accidents are due to human error and 20% to equipment failure. This is the accepted 80:20 rule. Moreover, almost 50% of the human errors are linked to poor or non-existing appropriate training on the related matter. The analysis of the Three Mile Island 1979 accident revealed that there were deficiencies in the way that personnel were trained to perform their duties. The Kemeny report recommended the creation of an Institute on Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) to deal with such matters, among other subjects. First INPO, and later on the IAEA and other national and international organizations, created and developed the so-called systematic approach to training (SAT), and recommended that such an approach should be considered as an international standard for nuclear training. The application of such methodology has improved human performance considerably and so increased the safety and reliability of operating nuclear power plants. The IAEA has issued a safety guide on recruitment, qualification and training of nuclear power plant personnel (IAEA, 2002a). In such a document, SAT is considered as the most effective policy for personnel training and gives clear indication on how such a policy should be included within the national training programmes. More recently, the IAEA has recognized that SAT should also be included in all the phases in the life of a nuclear power plant, including PLiM and LTO. These later considerations are in the course of being developed.
3.3.3 Maintenance programmes It was soon recognized that an efficient and complete NPP maintenance programme is necessary to ensure that the current accepted design assumptions and safety margins are maintained and not unacceptably degraded through ageing mechanisms. To support LTO, it was believed that new maintenance programmes should be established to include: the verification of the performance goals, the root cause analysis of failures and the feedback from maintenance experience. To that effect, in 1991, the US NRC enacted the so-called maintenance rule (MR) (NRC, 1991). The NRC has developed guidance for monitoring the effectiveness of the application of the rule (NRC, 1997) in accordance with programmes previously developed by the
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Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) (1993). Later on, the US NRC has applied risk informed regulation to the MR (NRC, 2000a) to facilitate its application and to make it more effective, requiring that risk evaluation should be performed in maintenance activities. The MR became effective in Spain in April 1999 when it was included as one of the requirements in the NPP operation licences. Finland, Slovenia and Hungary have also implemented at least part of the MR at their NPPs, while others are thinking about future implementation of the MR or have already developed equivalent methodologies. In any case, the engineering rationale behind the MR makes it attractive to other countries. The IAEA has developed requirements for maintenance, testing, surveillance and inspection of SSCs important to safety. Such requirements have been further developed into a safety guide (IAEA, 2002b), which contains specific references to ageing. The licensee is made responsible for determining which additional maintenance, surveillance and inspections will be necessary as the plant ages. The maintenance, surveillance and inspection programmes should be capable of identifying and monitoring ageing mechanisms of SSCs. The safety reviews will determine which additions to the maintenance, surveillance and inspection programmes should be necessary, particularly the preventive maintenance programme, or when any specific ageing SSC should be replaced or backfitted. In 2003, the European Joint Research Centre, Institute for Energy (JRC-IE) launched a network on the Safety of European Nuclear facilities (SENUF); a working group within SENUF was dedicated to assist Eastern European countries on NPP maintenance with the objectives of reviewing maintenance issues, promoting well-designed maintenance plans for SSCs, supporting the implementation of advanced maintenance approaches and assisting in its implementation. A benchmark study conducted in 2004, collected and evaluated the available and applied maintenance programmes in the European countries, as well as the Russian Federation and Ukraine. It served the basis for a SENUF workshop held in Madrid on maintenance rules and maintenance effectiveness, reported by Contri (2006). The development of the probabilistic methodology and the value of its results have also been used to optimize plant maintenance. One of such approaches is the reliability centred maintenance (RCM) subject which is receiving increasing technical interest. However, it is recommended to take an integrated approach based on the complementary use of deterministic and probabilistic considerations. The probabilistic methodology could serve to improve plant performance and enhance safety levels by ensuring higher reliability and availability of plant equipment and to optimize the maintenance cost by focusing maintenance on SSC in a manner commensurate with their safety significance. The SENUF network, in collaboration with the IAEA, organized a second workshop, held in Petten, on advanced probabilistic
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methods to optimize maintenance programmes. A summary report was produced by Ranguelova and Contri (2006). It is widely recognized that the application of the probabilistic methodology to maintenance requires a probabilistic safety analysis report (PSA) of great quality. The IAEA has given a framework to assure the quality of a PSA for different applications (IAEA, 1999). The American Society of Mechanical Engineers has also published standards for PSA applications in NPPs (ASME, 2003).
3.4
Integration of plant life management
Ageing management has been defined by the IAEA (2007a) as: Engineering, operations and maintenance actions to control within acceptable limits the ageing degradation of structures, systems and components. Examples of engineering actions include design, qualification and failure analysis. Examples of operations actions include surveillance, carrying out operating procedures within specified limits and performing environmental measurements. Therefore, PLiM integrates a series of policies and activities aiming for safe and reliable plant operation. The IAEA has a new standard on ageing management (IAEA, 2009). The IAEA standard addresses both physical ageing of SSCs and technical obsolescence in comparison with present knowledge, current standards and up-to-date regulation. It also covers all stages in the life of a power plant, i.e. design, construction, commissioning, operation, including LTO and decommissioning. The guide recognizes that effective ageing management is in practice accomplished by co-ordinating maintenance, in-service inspection and surveillance, operations, periodic safety evaluation, feedback of operating experience, research and development. The guide includes a systematic approach to the ageing management process based on the known plan-do-check-act (PDCA) wheel, as given in the mentioned guide and summarily represented in Fig. 3.1. The Guide promotes a proactive attitude towards ageing management during every stage in the life of the plant and recommends that regulatory requirements and guides for ageing management should be established and updated, and that compliance should be verified as well as enforced, when necessary. The Guide clearly indicates that the operating organization should be responsible for demonstrating that the relevant issues of ageing that are specific to the plant are clearly identified and documented in the safety analysis report. New designs will have ample opportunities to prevent and mitigate ageing when the plant comes into operation. The Guide gives suggestions on how to manage ageing during design, construction and fabrication and commissioning. For instance, the designers should consider relevant experience
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Plan Ageing Management Programme
Improve AMP
Act Corrective maintenance
Correct unacceptable degradation
ageing science and technology
Check Survey and assess ageing
71
Minimize expected degradation
DO Preventive measures
Check degradation
3.1 The plan-do-check-act wheel in ageing management.
and research results, the use of advanced materials, the need to incorporate on-line monitoring to assist in the forewarning of degradation, new plant layouts and SSCs design that facilitate inspectability, maintainability and easy access. The operating organization should ensure that manufacturers are well informed on the factors affecting ageing management, fabrication of SSCs takes into account current knowledge about relevant ageing degradations and possible mitigation measures, baseline data are collected and documented, and surveillance specimens for specific ageing monitoring programmes are available and installed. Commissioning should be used to know the real plant conditions and to identify and measure all parameters that can influence ageing degradation during operation. Data collection and record keeping should be established early in the life of the plant in accordance with well-established procedures (IAEA, 1991). To obtain the desired quality and quantity of ageing-related data, maintenance and engineering personnel responsible for operation, systems health, maintenance and training should be involved in the record keeping system. The screening approach should focus resources on those SSCs that can have a negative impact on the safety of the plant and are susceptible to ageing degradation. Also those SSCs that are important to safety systems and influence reliability are to be considered.
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PLiM should also be integrated with economic planning. It is said that a plant must be safe but its operation needs to be economical, therefore PLiM has the potential of integrating safety and economical operation. In the last ten years the safety and operational indexes of many nuclear power plants worldwide have experienced and are maintaining relevant safety and operation improvements. It is now well accepted that the safest nuclear power plants are also the top performing plants economically. A typical measure of the safety and reliability of nuclear power plants is related to the annual rate of significant events or reportable events that the licensee must communicate to the regulator. A significant event is broadly defined as any occurrence that challenges a plant’s safety system. These procedures are country dependent, but they can give an idea of the safety in operation and on the reliability of the plant, as they are related to equipment failures or to violations of operating, maintenance or testing and calibration procedures that challenge the plant protection system. The IAEA Principle 3, on Leadership and management for safety in its Fundamental Safety Principles (IAEA, 2006b) requires that: ‘Effective leadership and management for safety must be established and sustained in organizations concerned with, and facilities and activities that give rise to, radiation risks’. Compliance with such principle requires that due consideration should be given to human performance, including systematic training, safety culture and operating experience feedback. Not following this principle could lead to significant and reportable events. The US NRC publishes a yearly Information Digest giving details of the performance of the operating plants. The average number of significant events per reactor and year has declined from 0.90 in 1989 to 0.05 in 2005 (NRC, 2009). In fact, the average number of significant events has remained at or below 0.10 since 1996. The average number of significant events is now below 0.07 per reactor and year. The IAEA also publishes details on nuclear power plant incidents through the Incident Reporting System and its Incident and Emergency Centre. Regulatory authorities also publish data on the safety performance of the national nuclear fleet.
3.5 Ageing degradation mechanisms, and timelimited structures, systems and components There is a long list of ageing degradation mechanisms, the root causes of which can be classified into two major groups: environmental and operational. Environmental agents include radiation, chemicals in coolant and coolant/ moderator fluids and in the environment and physical parameters such as temperature, pressure and humidity. The operational factors include thermal and pressure gradients produced by transients, flow-induced vibrations, chemical stability of materials, seismic displacements and extreme meteorological or
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hydrological natural events. Most of those agents can also be found in other industries, with radiation being particular to the nuclear industry. Licence renewal regulations required that analyses of the different ageing processes should be applied to a long list of structures and components in what has been called time-limited ageing analysis (TLAA). It is therefore necessary to identify each structure and component relevant to safety, subjected to ageing mechanisms, which were designed for a specific lifetime, and to perform analyses to prove that the item in question will perform the assigned safety function as foreseen in the CLB during the additional operation time. Therefore, TLAA has been defined as: ‘those licensee calculations and analyses that involve structures, systems and components within the scope of the licence renewal, consider the effects of ageing and involve time-limited assumptions defined by the current operating terms’. Basic regulations, such as the US 10 CFR Part 54 (NRC, 2006), gives selection criteria for SSCs that should be the object of TLAA; it also includes a long list of potential candidates for analyses. Such a list can be subdivided into groups as summarized in Table 3.2, where the corresponding major ageing processes are also incorporated. The first group includes components of the pressure boundary. The most relevant is the reactor pressure vessel (RPV), where the major ageing stressor is neutron irradiation producing embrittlement in the ferritic steel, mainly in PWRs. Embrittlement also occurs in boiling water and heavy water reactor RPVs, but generally it is of lesser importance due to the existing larger water gap attenuating the neutrons. Stress corrosion cracking has been found in PWR reactor vessel head Alloy 600 clad penetrations and in BWR reactor vessel bottom around control rod penetrations, as well as in pipe welds of dissimilar metals. Irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC) has been found mainly in some BWR stainless steel internals. Changes in dimensions due to void swelling are possible in stainless steels and nickel-rich alloys. Significant deformations have been found in coldworked Zr-2.5Nb pressure tubes channels in the Candu PHWRs due to thermal creep, irradiation growth and irradiation creep forcing the substitution of such components in some of those reactors. Significant growth is also typical of graphite moderated reactors, mainly when the graphite irradiation takes place at low temperatures. Thermal stresses in graphite blocks have produced longitudinal cracks in UK gas-cooled graphite moderated reactors. Wear and corrosion have been found in the pipes, pump casings, valve bodies and steam generator tubes of many reactors. Mechanical vibration fatigue in small pipes and in socket welds may occur due to pressure pulses produced by pumps. Circumferential cracking in the steam generator tubes in Westinghouse Model 3D steam generators, due to wear produced by fluid induced tube vibrations, was a major rapid ageing mechanism discovered in the 1980s, first in Ringhals and later in the Almaraz plants. This design
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Table 3.2 Major components and structures subjected to time-limited ageing analyses and their ageing mechanisms Major candidates for TLAA
Typology of analyses
Reactor vessel, internals and reactor coolant system
Reactor vessel neutron embrittlement Changes in dimensions due to void swelling Metal corrosion allowance Granular and intergranular stress corrosion cracking Radiation enhanced stress corrosion cracking Cumulative fatigue damage
Engineered safety features
Metal corrosion allowance Cumulative fatigue damage Granular and intergranular stress corrosion cracking
Auxiliary systems
Metal corrosion allowance Reduction of neutron-absorbing capacity and loss of material due to general corrosion in spent fuel pools Cracking due to stress corrosion cracking and cyclic loading
Steam and power conversion system
Containment, structures and component supports
Electrical and instrumentation and control
Cumulative fatigue damage Loss of material due to pitting, crevice, and microbiologically influenced corrosion, and fouling Wall thinning due to flow-accelerated corrosion Reduction of strength of concrete due to elevated temperature Loss of metal containment material due to general, pitting and crevice corrosion Loss of tendon prestress due to relaxation, shrinkage, creep and elevated temperature Loss of leak tightness due to mechanical wear of locks, hinges and closures Reduction in foundation strength, cracking, differential settlement due to erosion of porous concrete corrosion Reduced insulation resistance and electrical failure due to thermal, radiolysis, photolysis and chemical mechanisms Degradation of insulation quality due to presence of salt deposits and surface contamination Conductor fatigue due to ohmic heating, thermal cycling, electrical transients, vibration, chemical contamination, corrosion and oxidation
defect has forced the substitution of the affected steam generators. Thermal fatigue may occur in pipes due to fluid thermal stratification caused by defective closure of isolation valves or the seepage of a fluid at different
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temperatures. A well-studied case occurred in one of the units of the Oconee NPP in the United States in 1997 in the junction of a small water make-up pipe and the main recirculation pipe unprotected by a thermal sleeve. A large leaking crack was produced but pipe fracture did not occur, demonstrating the validity of the leak before fracture approach. The second group includes the engineered safety features, mainly the emergency core cooling systems, the containment spray and isolation components and the standby gas treatment in BWRs, which are exposed to cumulative fatigue damage. The emergency core cooling system and the containment spray systems in PWRs include vessels, heat exchangers and pipes containing corrosive chemicals, mainly boric acid and sodium hydroxide, so that the losses of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion are to be expected with the possibility of reducing the heat transfer capacity in heat exchangers due to fouling. The many auxiliary systems in the nuclear power plant belong to the third group. The most salient systems include new and spent fuel storage and handling facilities and related cooling and cleanup systems, the compressed air system, the residual heat removal and coolant cleanup systems, the closed and open cooling water systems and the ultimate heat sink, the ventilation system and emergency diesel generators. As in the previous case, the different systems remain in contact with different chemicals and environments that may produce loss of material by corrosion, including stress corrosion cracking, and material fatigue due to cycling loading. A case of particular importance is the reduction of neutron-absorbing capacity in the spent fuel storage pool due to the loss of the absorber (boron) produced by general corrosion of the supporting structures. Another case is the external corrosion of pipes in the open circuit cooling system recently discovered in the Spanish Vandellós 2 plant (CSN, 2004, p. 16). The steam and power conversion system also includes the main steam system, steam extraction, steam turbine, blowdown system, condenser, feedwater and the auxiliary feedwater systems. Components in the steam and power conversion system are exposed to steam and condensate water and include a variety of pressures, temperatures, fluid regimens in different metals; therefore, metal fatigue and corrosion are the main ageing agents. Containments, structures and component supports include a large variety of equipment. The most relevant part is the reactor containment, its main safety function being to prevent the release of radioactivity to the environment in the case of accidents. This function requires that the integrity and leak tightness of the containment must be ensured. Containments generally include a large metal vessel and a thick concrete cover providing shielding and protection against external man-made and natural events. The major concerns are linked to corrosion of the metallic parts, mainly in inaccessible areas, the long-term behaviour of concrete at high temperatures and the
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loss of leak tightness due to mechanical wear of locks, hinges and closures. Loss of tendon prestress due to relaxation, shrinkage, creep and elevated temperature are of particular importance for the PWR containments using that technology. NUREG-1800 (NRC, 2005b) defines nine groups of structures and seven groups of component supports. Those structures and component supports may be affected by loss of bond and loss of material due to corrosion of embedded steel, increase in porosity and permeability, cracking due to aggressive chemical attack, expansion and reaction with aggregates, cracks and distortion due to increased stress levels from settlement, reduction in foundation strength and cracking and differential settlement due to erosion of porous concrete sub-foundation, among other causes. The most typical electrical, instrumentation and control components include cables, metal enclosed buses, fuse holders, high voltage insulators, transmission conductors and connections and switchyard buses and connections. The major concerns are to be found in degradation of insulators due to salt deposits, surface contamination and loss of material due to mechanical wear, as well as fatigue due to ohmic heating, thermal cycling, electrical transients, frequent manipulation, vibration, chemical contamination and oxidation.
3.6
Main areas of concern for plant designers, operators and regulators
From the discussion in Section 3.5, it becomes clear that plant designers, operators and regulators should be concerned with ageing mechanisms for both already operating plants and new designs. There are many aspects to be considered. Neutron irradiation and the different types of corrosion and wear are considered of major concern to plant designers, operators and regulators. The science and technology of such phenomena are amply considered in other chapters in this book.
3.6.1 Neutron irradiation The interactions between neutrons and the atomic nucleus of crystalline metallic structures have the potential to displace the atom from its normal position in the lattice creating the so-called Frenkel pairs – interstitials and vacancies – which mainly determine the changes in the physical properties of the irradiated material. When stress is applied to such materials substantial mechanical effects appear. Most present and future reactors will include crystalline metallic materials in their core and its proximities, where irradiation by high energy neutrons (>1 MeV) may be substantial. Internals and the pressure vessel belt line are typical examples of components subjected to high energy neutron fluences. The mechanical properties of relevance include:
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∑
hardening, an increase in the yield stress and tensile strength and a reduction in ductility and fracture toughness, more pronounced in bodycentered cubic crystal ferritic steel; ∑ embrittlement, a reduction in the amount of plastic or creep deformation that occurs before rupture – a ductile fracture requires appreciable plastic deformation prior to and during the propagation of a crack, while a brittle fracture implies a rapid rate of crack propagation; and ∑ radiation enhanced stress corrosion cracking, an increase in the corrosion potential of the material.
The importance of embrittlement of RPV materials was soon recognized and regulated (NRC, 1998). Irradiation hardening and embritlement need to be under control to prevent the RPV from ever suffering a brittle fracture when subjected to over-pressurization and to avoid pressurized thermal shock (PTS), i.e. rupture when at pressure by the addition of feed or emergency cold cooling water. Pressurized thermal shock should also be avoided during start-up and shut-down of the reactor. The Charpy V-notch impact test has been the most common way to measure the transition from ductile to brittle fracture. Another chapter in this book is dedicated to assess the embrittlement in ferritic components. The device measures the energy required to fracture a normalized specimen and determines the type of fracture by observing the resulting surfaces. For a given material, tests are performed at different temperatures and a plot is obtained relating the energy absorbed in producing the fracture, generally measured in joules, versus the temperature of the specimen. Figure 3.2 illustrates such relation for a typical RPV material. The plot delimits the brittle and ductile regions of the material. The temperature at which the inflexion of the curve takes place is called the nil ductility temperature (NDT). At high temperatures, the energy absorbed to produce fracture tends to an asymptotic value, which is called the upper shelf energy (USE). When the material is irradiated by fast neutrons there is a change in the above-mentioned parameters. The corresponding Charpy plot shifts towards higher NDTs, there is also a reduction in the USE and the slope of the curve is reduced; moreover, these effects increase with increasing neutron fluence and are also a function of the type of steel and its impurities, mainly sulphur, phosphorous and copper, which have to be limited as much as possible. The temperature shifts could surpass 100 °C for neutron fluences above a few times 1019 n/cm2 . The Charpy tests do not provide a sharp temperature transition from ductile to brittle behaviour; a reference NDT temperature, RTNDT , should be defined for regulatory purposes; it is defined as that temperature at which fracture initiates with essentially no prior plastic deformation. The temperature at which a Charpy V-notch specimen breaks with a fixed amount of energy, generally 41 J, is often considered as the reference temperature.
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Energy absorbed, E(J)
Unirradiated 80 Duse 60 Irradiated 40 DT 20
0 –100
0 100 Temperature, T(°C)
200
3.2 Charpy V-notch tests showing the transition temperature and upper shelf energy shifts in neutron irradiated ferritic steels.
Regulations define the acceptable decrement in the USE and the allowable increment in the NDT. The first is a general measure of the fracture toughness of the material, while the second is vital in the prevention of PTS in PWRs. Regarding the USE, Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 (NRC, 2008b) states that: Reactor vessel beltline materials must have Charpy upper-shelf energy in the transverse direction for base material and along the weld for weld material according to the ASME Code, of no less than 102 J initially and must maintain Charpy upper-shelf energy throughout the life of the vessel of no less than 68 J, unless it is demonstrated … that lower values of Charpy upper-shelf energy will provide margins of safety against fracture equivalent to those required by Appendix G of Section XI of the ASME Code. Appendix G also gives screening criteria to prevent PTS. It is based on a specific reference temperature for PTS, RTPTS, which is equal to the RTDNT evaluated at the location where the material receives the highest neutron fluence. Such temperature is limited to 132 °C for plates, forgings and axial weld materials, and 149 °C for circumferential weld metals. A revision in the PTS rule is being considered to reduce the conservatism included. Should the vessel reach the limit, it can be annealed to recover the mechanical properties of the material. It is globally recognized that the Russian developments on pressure vessel science and technology and the improvements they have introduced in design, material selection, fabrication and surveillance of such vessels are based on
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a deep understanding of the physical effects of irradiation and other agents on the vessel materials. They have also developed a valid methodology for annealing to restore the fracture toughness of vessels affected beyond the accepted limits for service. Such information can be found in a Russian monograph published by the American Nuclear Society (Alekseenko et al., 1997).
3.6.2 Stress corrosion cracking Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) is the premature cracking of an alloy in the presence of a tensile stress and a corrosive environment. It was soon recognized that alloys used in nuclear technology were susceptible to SCC and that the intensity of the corrosion depended on the reactivity of the environment and on the presence of tensile stress. SCC reduces the strain to failure as well as the maximum stress, it can be intergranular or transgranular in nature, and susceptibility to SCC is generally high when overall corrosion rates are low. SCC requires an incubation period for crack initiation; it is followed by steady state crack propagation and ends in a failure. SCC was early observed in nickel-rich Alloy 600 used in steam generator tubes, control rod drive mechanism nozzles, pressurized instrument penetrations and heater sleeves and hot leg penetrations. In many steam generators it was observed that the cumulative fractional number of tubes failed started to increase after some ten effective full power years. The case was analyzed and although there were other causes of failure, SCC was predominant after the incubation period. The tube failure rates increased rapidly and many steam generators had to be replaced by new ones made from alloys with less SCC susceptibility (e.g. Alloy 690TT). Was (2007) includes a good analysis of thermodynamics, kinetics and mechanism of SCC; references to examples of SCC in nuclear power plant are found in the IAEA Tecdoc-1361 (IAEA, 2003b). SCC in austenitic stainless steels is considered in depth in other chapters in this book.
3.6.3 Irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking Irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC) was observed in the early 1960s. It mainly affected stainless steel fuel element cladding, instrument tubes, control rod followers and other core devices or internals. The most important experience appeared in the early 1990s, mainly in the BWR recirculation loops and core shrouds, the last with weld residual stresses, and PWR baffle former bolts, receiving high neutron fluence. The IASCC mechanism is not yet fully known; Was (2007) indicates that existing theories fall into five categories:
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∑ radiation induced grain boundary chromium depletion, ∑ radiation hardening, ∑ localized deformation, ∑ selective internal oxidation and ∑ irradiation creep. A recent study conducted at the Argonne National Laboratory by Chunk and Shack (2005) on 27 commercial and model laboratory austenitic stainless steel heats irradiated in the Halden reactor under BWR conditions has demonstrated that, in 304 or 316 stainless steel, sulphur atoms play a deleterious effect in IASCC, which could be compensated by an increase in carbon content. For instance, when the material has experienced some three displacements per atom, the sulphur content should be <0.002 wt% S; for such materials to be IASCC resistant under BWR conditions, the carbon content should be >0.03 wt% C. A two-dimensional map has been created in which the susceptibility to IASCC in said materials is shown as a function of S and C content. The authors have developed an IASCC model based on Ni and S segregation and preferential oxidation of chromium and iron atoms over nickel atoms, among other aspects. That research effort will define the materials to be used in future water reactors.
3.7
Future trends
It is foreseeable that future trends will aim at improving the knowledge on ageing through additional research and feedback from operating experience. Such knowledge will serve to develop more effective and scientifically-based regulation for present and future designs. In a recent OECD/NEA study (NEA, 2006) it is found that ‘there are no significant technical challenges which would prevent nuclear plant lifetimes being extended to 50 or 60 years’. Nevertheless, the document adds that: ‘it must always be recognized that there is the possibility of unknown ageing mechanisms, as well as the expected development of a known ageing mechanism, emerging during longer term operation’. Solid fundamental research and effective operating experience feedback are the two cornerstones for gaining new knowledge. Nevertheless, operating experience extended beyond 40 years is not yet available and substantial research is not yet finished. Therefore strong international co-operation is needed in sharing operating experience and in conducting research. The end products of such efforts have to be consolidated in harmonized standards and regulations jointly developed by designers, plant owner operators and regulatory authorities. All this effort has to be based on high level trained human resources. Related international activities and some relevant research efforts are described in brief.
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3.7.1 Activities in the International Atomic Energy Agency The IAEA has created a safety knowledge base for ageing and long-term operation of nuclear power plants (SKALTO). It is a framework for sharing information on PLiM and LTO. It provides documents and information related to these thematic areas created by the IAEA and other national or international organizations. It includes safety standards published by the IAEA and regulatory authorities in other countries, as well as INSAG documents. It also includes IAEA review services; international conferences, meetings and national activities related to the safety aspects of ageing and LTO; IAEA co-ordinated and national research programmes, as well as education and training programmes on the matter. All these activities constitute the backbone for future developments. In 2003 the IAEA created an Extrabudgetary Programme on Safety Aspects of Long Term Operation of Water Moderated Reactors (SALTO), with the objectives of: ‘Reviewing existing national approaches, practices and experience that need to be considered during LTO decision-making; developing guidance for regulators on the identification of the applicable safety criteria and on the establishment of guidelines for plant operators’ LTO submittals; and providing guidance for plant operators on the process and practices related to support safe LTO’. The final report of the programme was published in 2007 (IAEA, 2007b); the programme will be incorporated, together with SKALTO, into a comprehensive knowledge base on LTO and PLiM. SALTO is also providing peer review services on LTO tailored to the specific requests of Member States; one of those services is Ageing Management Assessment Team (AMAT).
3.7.2 Activities of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency Two Committees in the Nuclear Energy Agency are involved in nuclear power plant ageing activities. The Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) constitutes a forum for the exchange of technical information between organizations which contribute in research, development, engineering and regulation. It also reviews the state of knowledge on selected topics of nuclear safety technology and safety assessment, including operating experience and research on ageing. The Working Group on Integrity of Components and Structures (IAGE), and its subgroups, conduct studies and analyse research results on ageing in NPPs. The Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA), made up primarily of senior nuclear regulators, is a forum for the exchange of information and experience among regulatory organizations and for the review of developments which could affect regulatory requirements, including PLiM and LTO. Both Committees are composed of Working Groups
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that have made comparative studies, celebrated symposia and workshops and have made suggestions on needed research efforts and regulatory activities. The present Strategic Plan for both Committees, covering 2005–9, can be found in NEA (2005). The CNRA held a Special Issue Meeting in June 2000 on the topic of ‘life extension and upgrading’. The published report (NEA/CNRA, 2001a) includes the synthesis of the responses received from Member States and the results and conclusions of the CNRA discussions. At the time of the report most members with operating reactors had already developed, or were developing programmes on longer-term operation (NEA/CNRA, 2001b) Based on the many technical and regulatory issues treated by the CSNI and the CNRA, the Committee for Technical and Economic Studies on Nuclear Energy Development and the Fuel Cycle, known as the Nuclear Development Comittee, NDC, decided to take a holistic view on the matter which resulted in the creation of an ad hoc Expert Group on Nuclear Power Plant Life Management. The Expert Group expressed its considerations and recommendations in a report (NEA, 2006). The Group suggests that research and development capacities have to be kept alive for studying material degradation and unknown phenomena. The activities of the NEA are equally needed to ensure a proper scientific and technical development on ageing and related issues to serve as a basis for regulatory requirements.
3.7.3 The research effort Fundamental research is performed nationally and within international organizations. The European Union is sponsoring relevant research, the IAEA is also maintaining international co-ordinated research activities, the NEA is serving valid efforts on common research efforts, and some national institutions, such as the US Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), have offered their research efforts to foreign participants. EURATOM research on ageing science and technology started early. In 1993 the Ageing Materials Evaluation and Studies programme (AMES) was established within the Framework Programme 4, FP-4, to bring together the European expertise on nuclear materials ageing. The strategies within AMES were based on understanding the embrittlement causes and thus improve the