U.S.-China Educational Exchange: State, Society, and Intercultural Relations, 1905-1950

U.S.-China Educational Exchange U.S.-China Educational Exchange State, Society, and Intercultural Relations, 1905–195...

Author: Hongshan Li

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U.S.-China Educational Exchange

U.S.-China Educational Exchange State, Society, and Intercultural Relations, 1905–1950

Hongshan Li

Rutgers University Press New Brunswick, New Jersey, and London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Li, Hongshan. U.S.-China educational exchange : state, society, and intercultural relations, 1905–1950 / Hongshan Li. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8135-4199-0 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Educational exchanges—United States. 2. Educational exchanges—China. 3. United States—Relations—China. 4. China—Relations—United States. I. Title. LB2376.3.C6L5 2008 370.116'—dc22 2007008408 A British Cataloging-in-Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. Perms t/k Copyright © 2008 by Hongshan Li All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the publisher. Please contact Rutgers University Press, 100 Joyce Kilmer Avenue, Piscataway, NJ 08854–8099. The only exception to this prohibition is “fair use” as deﬁned by U.S. copyright law. Visit our Web site: http://rutgerspress.rutgers.edu Manufactured in the United States of America

Contents

Acknowledgments

vii

Introduction: Educational Exchange and the Visible Hand 1 Emerging as Facilitator

1 7

2 Tearing Down the Barriers

34

3 Qinghua: The First Joint Experiment

60

4 From Central Administration to Party Control

92

5 Maintaining the Educational Front

122

6 From Expansion to Termination

148

7 A Historical Perspective

176

Epilogue: Restoring Educational Relations with the Visible Hand Appendix 209 Notes 217 Bibliography 253 Index 273

v

202

Acknowledgments

The completion of this book has ﬁnally given me an opportunity to express my gratitude to at least some individuals and institutions that have provided invaluable assistance at different stages of this project. First of all, I want to thank Professors Liu Xuyi, Wu Yujin, and many other outstanding scholars at Wuhan University, the People’s Republic of China, who have ignited my interest in educational exchange between the United States and China with their own experiences and successes as American returnees, and helped eventually propel me across the Paciﬁc as an exchange participant. Their teachings and writings about the United States and world history not only opened a window to the outside world for many Chinese to look through when the nation was still pretty much isolated, but also inspired me to start and complete this study of U.S.-China educational exchange in the twentieth century, which has dramatically changed their lives and altered the lives of many other people, including mine. My thanks also go to Robert Collins, Jerry Barrier, Noble Cunningham, Herbert Tillema, Susan Benson, David Roediger, William Kirby, and Stephen Averill, who have offered constructive feedback on the whole or part of the earlier version of the manuscript. Gerard Clarﬁeld deserves a special thank-you since he is the one who has given me unwavering encouragement, generous support, and wise advice that have kept me devoted to the completion of this project and free from many errors. The insightful comments and savvy suggestions from two outside reviewers were also extremely helpful in the ﬁne tuning of the book. As a researcher, I owe a great deal to numerous unsung heroes in many research institutions and archives. From the Library of Congress, National Archives, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Harvard University Library, and Yale University Library in the United States, to the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, the National Historical Center, and the Central Library in Taipei, and to the University Archives at vii

viii

Acknowledgments

Qinghua University in Beijing, archivists have offered most generous assistance in my research, guiding me through the sea of historical documents in English as well as Chinese. Librarians at the University of Missouri–Columbia and Kent State University have been most efﬁcient in helping me get all sorts of research materials through interlibrary loans and other venues. Finally, I am indebted to Kimberly Watt, who offered me most generous technical and clerical assistance, and to Carol Mace, who helped me in proofreading the endnotes and bibliography. I have also greatly beneﬁted from professional advice and friendly guidance from Kendra Boileau, my acquisition editor at Rutgers University Press. They have helped make the publication of this book an enjoyable and rewarding experience.

U.S.-China Educational Exchange

Introduction

Educational Exchange and the Visible Hand

T

he most striking phenomenon in the relations between the United States and China in the twentieth century was the emergence of educational exchange as the strongest tie despite sharp differences in their cultural, political, and economic systems. Originating as part of American missionary enterprise in China, educational exchange between the two nations drastically expanded beginning around 1900. By the end of the 1940s, China had sent more students and scholars to the United States than to any other country for higher education and advanced training. At the same time, the United States devoted more attention and resources to expanding and maintaining educational interactions with China than with any other nation in the world. As a result, the United States and China became chief partners in educational exchange, a status that had never been achieved in the commercial or military relations between the two nations. Although educational exchange came to a complete stop after the United States and China entered the Korean War on opposite sides, the two nations began to rebuild their educational ties by following the patterns established in the earlier decades when they reestablished diplomatic relations at the end of the 1970s. Within two decades, educational exchange reemerged as the strongest tie between the two nations, as hundreds of thousands of students and scholars crisscrossed the Paciﬁc, creating the most massive ﬂow of educational personnel between any two different civilizations in world history. Both the dramatic expansion and the abrupt termination of educational exchange in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century hold the key to a better understanding of U.S.-China relations in particular and intercultural interactions in general. However, neither has received adequate attention from scholars on either side of the Paciﬁc. Most traditional studies of U.S.-China relations have focused on economic, political, and military aspects. Although there has been increasingly strong desire among Chinese scholars to widen the scope of their studies of U.S.-China relations, “politics and political economy have remained 1

2

U.S.-China Educational Exchange

the focus of most scholars’ studies.”1 More American scholars, as William Kirby recognized, have made an effort to address the “subject outside the realm of high politics.”2 However, most of them have kept their focus either on missionary schools in China, or on personal experiences of Chinese students in the United States, overlooking the crucial role played by the government.3 When government, on rare occasions, is put in the center of study, the focus has always been on the American side, leaving an impression that the expansion of educational relations between the United States and China was achieved singlehandedly by Washington.4 The continuing inattention to the crucial role played by the government and the dichotomous treatment of educational relations from just one side have made an accurate and comprehensive understanding of U.S.China relations extremely difﬁcult, if not impossible. This book offers a comprehensive examination of the crucial role played by both governments in the expansion and the termination of educational ties between the United States and China in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century. Based on careful study of the actions taken by the visible hand, the governments of both nations, I will argue that the drastic expansion as well as the abrupt termination of educational relations between the two nations in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century were largely the result of unprecedented intervention from the American and Chinese governments; that the purpose of their deep and direct intervention was to deal with various problems in domestic politics and crises in diplomatic relations; and that their intervention effectively transformed educational exchange from a private enterprise into a state function, which helped reshape the development of both societies and relations between the two nations. If the large-scale expansion of educational exchange proved that knowledge and ideas could be diffused and shared by peoples in different civilizations with assistance from the visible hand, I also want to point out that the complete termination of educational interactions revealed that both governments could break all ties between the two nations to achieve short-term political or diplomatic goals. The drastic expansion of educational relations between the United States and China, and the increasingly deep government intervention all have further proved that international relations, as Akira Iriye has eloquently argued, are in essence intercultural relations.5 While trade, travel, and even war all can carry cultural messages, educational exchange is most effective in spreading knowledge and ideas across the civilizational divide, as it does within national borders. Although formal education, as the core component of high culture, was only rarely integrated as part of international relations prior to the nineteenth century, the value and effectiveness of educational exchange had always been fully appreciated by peoples of different civilizations. As the Greeks and Romans traveled far and wide for educational purposes about two millennia ago, the Koreans and Japanese sent their students to attend schools in China between the sixth and eighth centuries CE. However, educational interactions in ancient times were generally small in scale and limited to adjacent geographic areas.

Introduction

3

It is only in the past couple of centuries that large-scale educational exchanges between peoples from different civilizations and faraway places have become possible and popular. The United States and China have become the best examples since they have built the strongest and most enduring educational ties despite great physical distances and sharp differences in their cultural, political, and economic backgrounds. Educational interactions between the United States and China began with the arrival of American missionaries in Guangzhou (Canton) in 1830. The development of educational relations between the two nations in the following years could be divided into three distinct phases. In the ﬁrst phase, 1830–1844, educational interactions were purely a by-product of American missionaries’ religious effort in China. Only a few missionaries were involved in learning and teaching because the Chinese government continued to ban foreigners from engaging in any educational activities in China and the United States government was unable to do anything about it. The second phase, 1844–1904, saw signiﬁcant growth of educational interactions between the two nations under the protection of treaties signed by both governments. Although an increasingly large number of American missionary schools were built in China and more Chinese students were sent to the United States for education, Western-style education remained marginal in China since it was incompatible with the traditional Chinese educational system supported by the Qing Court. The rest of the twentieth century constituted the third phase, which was marked by the deep and direct government intervention largely responsible for the dramatic expansion and abrupt termination of educational interactions between the two nations. The ﬁrst half of the twentieth century will be the focus of this study since it was during this period that government permanently replaced missionaries and private institutions as the major promoter, sponsor, regulator, and coordinator for educational exchange. The large-scale expansion of educational exchange between the two nations and deep intervention from both the American and Chinese governments in educational interactions in the twentieth century was anything but accidental. Despite great physical distance and profound cultural differences, both the Americans and the Chinese people valued education as the core component of their culture and society, and the governments of both nations had a long history of promoting and supporting education at home and exchange activities abroad. As early as the mid-seventeenth century, many colonial New England legislatures adopted laws to establish schools in towns and villages to meet their religious as well as practical needs. Once the United States was born, offering education to all American children became a clear goal for government at all levels in order to build a democratic and prosperous new nation. By the midnineteenth century, “common schools” funded by tax revenues and regulated by state government had become the norm of American education. The federal government, while generally staying away from the day-to-day management of schools, intensiﬁed its support for education by granting land to states for

4

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schools and colleges, establishing a special ofﬁce in the federal government, and running schools for Native Americans.6 The central government got involved in education much earlier and deeper in China. It is well known that the government ran most schools (xue zai guanfu) in the Shang (1775–1122 BCE) and Western Zhou (1122–771 BCE) Dynasties. Although private schools began to appear in the Eastern Zhou Dynasty (771–221 BCE) and offered education for most Chinese students, the central government was able to reestablish and maintain effective control over education by designating Confucianism as the only ofﬁcial philosophy in the Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) and installed the civil service examination system in the Sui (581–618) and Tang (619–896) Dynasties. As a result, Confucian classics were taught at all government and private schools to pass down the teachings of ancient saints and prepare students for civil service examinations. The government awarded students ofﬁcial degrees of xiucai (budding talent), juren (elevated man), and jinshi (advanced scholar) if they passed examinations at county, provincial, and national levels, respectively. Most government ofﬁces were offered to those with higher degrees until the end of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911). Educational exchanges with neighboring nations, such as Korea and Japan, were generally supported by the government as long as the foreigners came to China only as students and had their activities there subject to government control.7 The shared views on the importance of education and the strong tradition of government intervention made it extremely easy for both the American and the Chinese governments to resort to educational exchange as a new and more effective way to cope with various political challenges and diplomatic crises that they had to confront in the twentieth century. Faced with constant foreign encroachment and continuing political and economic pressure at home, the Chinese government, from the Qing Court to the Nationalist regime, was forced to modernize Chinese education and send an increasingly large number of students abroad for advanced education and training. It hoped that students trained in foreign countries with government sponsorship would not only bring back knowledge and skills needed for the construction of a strong and prosperous nation, but also become its staunchest political supporters. While the Chinese government was making great efforts to send more students abroad, Washington felt the strong need to educate more Chinese students in the United States because of constant problems and crises in its relations with China. Unable and unwilling to solve all the diplomatic challenges with “hard power,” including military threats and force, as it had done in the nineteenth century, or abandon parts of its China policy that were extremely unpopular among the Chinese people, Washington sought to change Chinese views and attitudes toward the United States and its policy through offering education to Chinese students in American colleges and universities, the key component of America’s “soft power.”8 The convergence of the needs on the part of both governments provided very fertile soil for the rapid growth of educational exchange between the two nations.

Introduction

5

The possibility of a dramatic expansion of educational relations between the United States and China was turned into reality in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century because both governments were able to put more institutional, administrative, and ﬁnancial resources at their disposal. With the establishment of modern schools beginning around 1900, China was soon capable of sending thousands of qualiﬁed students abroad for higher education. As China was modernizing its elementary and secondary schools, the United States saw the phenomenal expansion of its higher education in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The number of four-year colleges and universities jumped from 563 in 1870 to 977 in 1900, and then soared to 1,708 in 1940.9 As a result, the United States became one of the few industrialized nations, if not the only one, that could offer quality higher education to a large number of Chinese students during this period. The biggest supplier of international students and greatest provider of international higher education were effectively connected when both governments were willing to provide the strongest administrative and ﬁnancial support for educational exchanges. Special ofﬁces were established by the American and Chinese governments to be in charge of educational and cultural relations. At the same time, huge amounts of government funds coming from various sources were injected into numerous exchange programs, providing generous support for thousands of students and scholars. The impact of expanded educational exchange on both the American and Chinese societies and on the relations between the two nations cannot be exaggerated. Since the United States offered higher education to more Chinese students than any other nation in the world, it was only natural for an unmatched number of students returned from America to become leading ﬁgures in almost all ﬁelds in China. These American-educated students brought with them not only precious knowledge and skills, but also new ideas and values when they returned to China. They helped China adopt a new educational system modeled after American schools and make Mr. “D” (Democracy) and Mr. “S” (Science) household terms in the 1910s and 1920s. The new school system and new ideas laid the foundation for reforms as well as revolutions in China throughout the twentieth century. Although fewer American scholars and students went to China, the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century did see Americans begin to study the Chinese people and culture from scholarly perspectives with scientiﬁc methods, which allowed them to gain systematic, comprehensive, and balanced knowledge of China. As a result, at least some American ofﬁcials and scholars with educational experiences in China were able to have an accurate understanding of complex political and social conditions in China during and after World War II and make appropriate policy recommendations. Their effort to promote better mutual understanding among the American people was assisted by Chinese students and scholars, especially those who chose to stay permanently in the United States during the Cold War. As the ﬁrst large group of Chinese students who turned themselves into immigrants in a foreign country, they made great contributions to the development of American science, technology, economy, and especially the ﬁeld of Chinese studies.

6

U.S.-China Educational Exchange

Despite its great contribution to the enhancement of mutual understanding between the two peoples and to the social and economic development of both nations, educational exchange was brought to a complete stop right at its peak. All exchange programs between the United States and Mainland China were terminated, and no students or scholars were allowed to cross the Paciﬁc for education or research for over two decades from the beginning of the Korean War. The ﬁrst complete breakdown of educational relations between the two nations was designed and implemented by the two governments for strategic and political purposes. It had little to do with the differences between the two cultures or peoples. American policy makers calculated that the severing of educational ties would help keep American-trained students and scholars from returning to China and serving the newly established Communist regime. For Communist China, ceasing to send students and scholars to the United States was an important step to complete the revolution for an independent and powerful new nation. It was the determined actions taken by both the American and Chinese governments that made the sudden and complete break of educational relations between the two nations possible. The destructive role played by government caused great damage to mutual knowledge and understanding between the two peoples during the Cold War years. As the Cold War between the two nations drew to an end, the American and Chinese governments began to rebuild their educational relations in the late 1970s. Within a decade, the United States and China rose as chief partners and world leaders in educational exchange again. The reestablishment of educational interactions as the strongest tie between the two nations proved one more time that peoples from different civilizations could share knowledge, ideas, and values and live together peacefully. Having learned some lessons from their experience in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, both Washington and Beijing have tried not to allow the ups and downs of their political relations to affect educational exchanges between the two nations. As a result, the expansion of educational relations received little interruption from numerous political or diplomatic crises, such as the Tiananmen incident in 1989 or the mid-air collision of military airplanes in April 2001. The tightened security measures adopted by Washington after September 11, 2001, did reduce the number of Chinese students admitted to American colleges and universities for the ﬁrst time since the end of the 1970s. However, the strenuous public relations effort made by the Department of State and the simpliﬁcation of the visa review process adopted by the Department of Homeland Security reversed that downward trend in 2005. This recent ﬂuctuation has provided another strong testimony to the power that government has over educational exchange. The long history of educational exchange between the United States and China has proved that the growth and expansion of intercultural relations depends not only on close interaction between the two peoples, but also on the constructive role played by both governments.

Chapter 1

Emerging as Facilitator

T

he arrival of the Empress of China in Huangpu (Whampoa), an anchorage of Guangzhou (Canton), in August 1784, marked the beginning of U.S.-China relations. The early contact between the two peoples was limited mostly to commerce with little intervention from either the American or the Chinese government. The diversiﬁcation of the bilateral relations only began to take place when American missionaries set foot in China in the 1830s. However, they had to conduct their religious and educational activities either among their own countrymen in China’s only open port or with the local Chinese in secrecy. Educational and cultural interactions between the two peoples only became legal after the ﬁrst treaty was signed by the United States government and the Qing Court in 1844. It was under the protection of treaties signed by both governments in the second half of the nineteenth century that American missionaries established more schools in China than in any other nation and the Chinese sent their ﬁrst educational mission to the United States. Despite the legal protection provided by the government, the expansion of educational exchange continued to face numerous barriers. As a result, educational interactions between the two nations remained mostly a private enterprise, small in scale, low in level, and marginal in impact during this period.

Diversifying U.S.-China Relations U.S.-China relations were kept largely one-dimensional for decades after the Empress of China’s historical trip to Guangzhou. Although the proﬁtable China trade had attracted an increasingly large number of American merchants and sailors, contact between the two peoples continued to be limited. While the Qing Court did everything it could to minimize the interaction between the two peoples, the Americans involved in the China trade showed little respect for or interest in the Chinese people or culture. Foreign traders, as C. Y. Hsü accurately described, were allowed in China not because there was any need 7

8

U.S.-China Educational Exchange

for their goods, but because the Chinese emperors wanted to use it “as a mark of favor to foreigners and as a means of retaining their gratitude.”1 In order to keep foreigners under tighter control in China, the Qing Court issued a decree in 1759 to make Guangzhou the only port open for foreign commerce. By restricting international trade to the remote southern city, the Qing Court attempted to minimize contact between foreigners and the Chinese people as well as between itself and foreign governments. As part of its effort to limit contact between foreigners and the local Chinese, the Qing Court had set strict rules to regulate foreigners’ movement and activities in Guangzhou. American merchants and sailors had to work and live in the American factory, a facility rented from Chinese merchants for residential and business purposes, during their stay in the port. Their free movement was limited to one hundred yards from the factory and their visits to the garden and temple across the river were set on three particular dates each month. Their stay in Huangpu was made even harder because they were not allowed to bring their families or any other women with them or to freely communicate with the local Chinese other than their sponsoring merchants and servants. Foreigners were banned from buying Chinese books and learning the Chinese language so as to make their contact with the local people difﬁcult if not impossible. As a result, few Americans were willing or able to stay in Guangzhou for an extended period. For those who had to extend their stay in Huangpu during the trade season, they, as Tyler Dennett put it, became “voluntary prisoners.”2 Despite all the restrictions, most Americans were generally happy with the Guangzhou trade system and careful in following Chinese rules. Since foreign trade in Guangzhou was monopolized by a dozen or so private Chinese ﬁrms, known as hang (hong), American merchants needed to deal with only a few Chinese hang merchants, who helped sell all the American goods in Guangzhou and purchase Chinese products for the return trip. Samuel Shaw, the supercargo for the Empress of China, told his countrymen that doing business at Guangzhou “appears to be as little embarrassed, and is, perhaps, as simple as any in the known world.”3 As law-abiding traders, American merchants got along well with their Chinese counterparts. If there were any disputes, they were usually settled by the merchants peacefully without any government intervention. Prior to 1840, the Chinese government intervened only once, in a case involving an Italian sailor working on an American ship who accidentally killed a Chinese woman. When the sailor was handed over to the Chinese authority on October 23, 1821, trade between the two nations returned to normal.4 This incident, according to Li Dingyi, did not cause any signiﬁcant damage to the American image as the “most obedient” foreigners in China.5 American merchants and sailors had limited contact with the local people also because of their lack of interest in Chinese culture and language. Shaw commented in his diary that Chinese merchants were knavish, the government oppressive, and the people idolatrous and superstitious. Having observed a few Chinese artists painting during his brief stay in China, he came to the conclusion

Emerging as Facilitator

9

that “the Chinese, though they can imitate most of the ﬁne arts, do not possess any large portion of original genius.”6 Harboring all kinds of negative perceptions, no American merchants or sailors made any effort to learn the local language or study Chinese culture. As a result, the American trade at Guangzhou, as Tyler Dennett pointed out, “was conducted for more than forty-ﬁve years before there was even one American citizen there who could read, write, understand, or speak Chinese with any certainty.”7 Happy with the smooth growth of the China trade, the United States government did not see a need for much intervention. Congress did “elect” Samuel Shaw as the ﬁrst American consul at Guangzhou before his second trip back to China. However, the position was more of a tribute to Shaw personally than an effort to promote trade. Since the position remained unpaid until the mid-1850s, it was merely a side job for Shaw and his successors. Fully aware of their status, the Qing Court saw the American consuls merely as the chief “tai-pans” (supercargo) and refused to give them any ofﬁcial recognition. Unhappy with the lack of diplomatic representation in China, some merchants petitioned that the consul should be a full-time government ofﬁcial paid at $3,000 a year with a residence. However, their demands were ignored by the United States government.8 The one-dimensional relations between the United States and China were no longer acceptable to many Americans during the Second Great Awakening. As a response to drastic social, economic, and political changes caused by industrialization and the westward expansion, many missionary societies were organized in New England, sending numerous missionaries to western frontiers to save the souls of the perishing “Heathens.” In the ﬁrst decade of the nineteenth century, the eastern and northeastern revivals had “produced a conscious desire on the part of the religiously oriented middle class,” as Murray Rubinstein pointed out, “to change not only their own society but also the world that lay beyond their nation’s shores.”9 The Americans showed their early interest in missionary work in China through providing moral and ﬁnancial support for Robert Morrison, a member of the London Missionary Society. Unable to obtain a free voyage to China from the East India Company, Morrison came to the United States for help in 1807. He found open doors to churches on the east coast and generous endorsements from merchants engaged in the China trade. Even Secretary of State James Madison wrote a letter to the American consul at Guangzhou, instructing him to do all that he could to assist the missionary.10 Morrison was warmly welcomed by the American consul and allowed to stay in the American factory for months after his arrival in Guangzhou on board an American ship in September 1807. Providing support for an English missionary in China soon became inadequate for enthusiastic church leaders and young students in New England. The leading members of the Congregational clergy attending the meeting of the General Association in June 1810 established the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Within a couple of years, the American Board grew into a national organization and sent its ﬁrst group of missionaries to India.11 At

10

U.S.-China Educational Exchange

the same time, it began to prepare for missionary work in the Central Kingdom with help from Morrison, who believed that the time was right for Americans to have “a plan for the evangelization of China.”12 Such an effort received strong support from D.W.C. Olyphant, a successful American merchant and close friend of Morrison, who promised that he would provide free passage, lodging, and board for any missionaries sent by the American Board to China.13 With Olyphant’s help, the American Board and the Seamen’s Friend Society were able to send Elijah C. Bridgman, a seminary student from Belchertown, Massachusetts, and David Abeel, a young Dutch Reformed minister from New Brunswick, New Jersey, to China. Arriving at Guangzhou on February 25, 1830, the two missionaries started to work with Morrison the next day. As a veteran minister who had worked in New York and the Virgin Islands, Abeel began to serve as the seamen’s chaplain immediately. Bridgman, however, had to “return to his earlier role as a student” before he could do any missionary work with the Chinese.14 He began his study of Guangdong dialect on February 28, 1830, with help from Morrison, who gave him a copy of Vocabulary of the Cantonese Dialect, a Chinese Bible, all compiled and translated by Morrison himself, and the Four Books, a set of Chinese classics used by all Chinese students. He started to have hour-long lessons every day with the Chinese teacher who had taught Morrison. Bridgman worked very hard on the language since he knew clearly that only with good command of the Chinese language could he then be able to preach, evangelize, produce tracts and books, and prepare the way for an open China and an expanded Protestant mission enterprise.15 Having devoted most of his time to studying Cantonese in the ﬁrst eight months, Bridgman decided to add Mandarin, a more popular form of Chinese language spoken by government ofﬁcials and intellectuals throughout the country. His grasp of Mandarin would prove extremely helpful in later years. Once rudimentary language skills were acquired, Bridgman began to spread the Gospel among the Chinese close to him. He ﬁrst gave a Bible and several other religious books to his Cantonese teacher and the teacher’s father. Then he offered lessons to the younger brother of the house comprador and the son of Liang Fa, Morrison’s ﬁrst Chinese convert. In order to keep in constant contact with his audience, Bridgman set up a small school of six students at the beginning of 1831. Teaching the Chinese students out of the Scriptures every day immediately became the most important part of his work. When he went to Macao for summer break in 1831, Bridgman took all his students with him so that he could continue their instruction and have the students help him in translating the Scriptures into Chinese.16 Rigorous training in the Chinese language soon became a tradition for many American missionaries working in China. Abeel also realized that the “language is to be acquired before anything can be attempted” in China and that those “who have not been toiling for years at the language, are not qualiﬁed for such an undertaking.” Through his close contact with the local people and study of Chinese culture, Abeel discovered that it was a Chinese tradition to value schooling

Emerging as Facilitator

11

and education, and revere books and other written texts. He thus called the Chinese “a reading and reﬂecting people.” He believed that if works on all important subjects were translated into Chinese and made available throughout the empire, “the good effected would, in all probability, be incalculable.”17 When Abeel left for Southeast Asia, he was replaced by Edwin Stevens, a Yale graduate. Arriving in China in October 1832, Stevens took over the services for seamen and began to study Chinese immediately. Ira Tracy, an ordained minister, and Samuel Wells Williams, a lay printer, did the same thing when they joined Bridgman and Stevens in Guangzhou in 1833. In mid-January 1834, Bridgman observed that Tracy had gained a footing in Mandarin while Williams had learned it the most easily of all the missionaries. By the end of that year, all the missionaries were working toward ﬂuency in Cantonese and improving their ability to read traditional Chinese (guwen). Taking advantage of their newly acquired skills, they began to revise an older Chinese version of the Bible.18 With improved language skills, American missionaries became more conﬁdent about expanding their activities in China and less tolerant of restrictions imposed by the Chinese government. When Lord Napier, the new British trade supervisor in China, arrived in Guangzhou and demanded free trade in July 1834, American missionaries immediately offered their support. Bridgman reiterated in his letter to the American Board that “free intercourse with China is of great interest to us,” and the “immediate success of this mission depends on it.”19 However, the strong reaction from the Qing Court dealt a heavy blow to Lord Napier as well as the American missionaries. In response to the British demand, the chief magistrate of the Nanhai District issued a clear order to reiterate the traditional Chinese policy that prohibited heterodox works and the promulgation of sectarian faith. In fear of severe punishment from the government, all Chinese students and teachers left the American factory in early August. Local ofﬁcials arrested Liang Fa and conﬁscated all the tracts. Although released within a few days, Liang Fa was forced to remove his family from Guangzhou to Singapore for safety reasons.20 In response to the tense situation in Guangzhou, the American mission set up its Chinese press in Singapore and Peter Parker, the ﬁrst medical missionary, also went there to study Chinese since no one dared to risk his life to teach him the language in Guangzhou. The American missionaries became more cautious with their religious activities in Guangzhou beginning in the mid-1830s and put greater emphasis on educational and medical efforts. Long planned as part of their campaign to increase access to the local community, an ophthalmic hospital was opened by Peter Parker in Guangzhou on November 4, 1835, right after his return from Singapore. Over one thousand Chinese patients received treatment from Parker within a few months. In order to better serve an increasingly large number of Chinese patients, Parker rented a larger building and reopened it as the Hospital of Universal Love in spring 1836. Even some Chinese ofﬁcials, including Lin Zexu, the Royal Commissioner sent by the Qing Court to ban the opium trade, and their family members sought medical advice and treatment there. Parker’s

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hospital was welcomed by the local people and tolerated by government ofﬁcials mainly because Western medicine was proving effective and offered free to the Chinese. More importantly, Parker did not use his hospital openly for religious activities.21 Inspired by Parker’s success in medical work in Guangzhou, American missionaries resumed their effort to reach the Chinese youth through schools and publications. Once the situation became calm enough, they managed to recruit some young boys as students and offered them free education. While Protestantism was included in the instruction, more attention was paid to the introduction of Western history, literature, politics, technology, and science. Many American missionaries also joined the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, which was founded in November 1834 to “publish such books as may enlighten the minds of the Chinese, and communicate to them the arts and sciences of the west.”22 Serving as the society’s Chinese secretary, Bridgman contributed numerous articles to its journal, The Chinese Magazine, and published A Brief History of the United States of America (Meilige Heshengguo Zhilüe) in 1838. As the ﬁrst systematic survey published in Chinese, the book covered history, agriculture, industry, government, law, population, education, literature, and defense of the United States, and became the most important source for Chinese students and scholars to get to know the young republic in the mid-nineteenth century.23 The most remarkable educational program carried out by American missionaries in China in the early years was the establishment of the Morrison Memorial School. Bridgman, as the senior missionary in Guangzhou after the death of Robert Morrison, organized the Morrison Education Society in 1835. In memory of Morrison, the society set out to “establish and support schools in China, in which native youth should be taught, in connection with their own, to read and write the English language; and thru this medium, to bring within their reach all the varied learning of the Western world.”24 Unwilling to openly challenge the Chinese authorities, Bridgman decided to set up the school in Macao, where Christian religion could be safely taught. His dream came true when Samuel R. Brown, a Yale graduate of 1832, arrived in Guangzhou with his wife in February 1839. The ﬁrst thing Brown did was to study both the written and spoken forms of Chinese. He wanted to master the language so that he could know the Chinese mind and conduct “his pedagogics in the most philosophical and effective manner.”25 Having studied the Chinese language for over half a year, Samuel Brown ﬁnally opened the Morrison Education Society School in Macao on November 4, 1839. Only six students applied and entered the ﬁrst class. With one exception, all the boys came from villages outside of Macao. They had to stay at the school all year round except for a month of vacation during the Chinese New Year. Brown used his study as the schoolroom and students were “therefore constantly under supervision.” He conﬁned the students to the premises of the school so that they could enjoy sports and stay away from “many inﬂuences abroad which would injure their manners and morals.” The purpose, according

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to Brown, was to “attach them to the school” and to “lay the foundation of a long course of instruction.” What he did at the school, Brown explained in his report, was to achieve the ultimate objects of the Morrison Education Society, which “is not merely a teaching, but an education society,” aiming at “the training of the entire man, physical, intellectual, and moral.”26 It was not easy to run a missionary school even in Macao. Although the Morrison School managed to enroll six new students the next year, there were only ﬁve students left when Yung Wing entered the school with ﬁfteen new classmates in 1841.27 Despite all the challenges, Samuel Brown was determined to keep the school in China. Having paid a visit to Southeast Asia, he told his colleagues at the third annual meeting of the Morrison Education Society on September 29, 1841, that the founders had “selected the best spot for the sphere of their operations.” He emphasized that “if we should hope to effect any great change in the system of education prevalent in China, it must mainly be done by efforts made in China itself.”28 He declared that “the post for us is here” and “our point of attack, all friendly as it is, should be in China and nowhere else.” Completely agreeing with Brown, the board of trustees passed a unanimous resolution at the meeting to increase subscribing members and donations to the funds of the society so that an additional teacher could be procured to prepare for the desired “extension of pupils.”29 When Hong Kong was ceded to England in 1842, the school moved to the island at the end of the year. Once in the new location, the school was ﬁnally able to recruit an increasingly large number of qualiﬁed students. By 1844, it had thirty-two students, making it easily the largest missionary school in China.30 As the American Board continued to expand its activities in China, beginning in the mid-1830s, many other Christian denominations in the United States turned their attention to the most populous nation. With the constant arrival of American missionaries, the United States soon surpassed Britain, counting for over 70 percent of Protestant missionaries in China.31 Despite the sharp increase in number, American missionaries were unable to convert a signiﬁcant number of Chinese or establish a church among the local people in the ﬁrst decade. Their most noticeable achievement during this period was the grasp of basic language skills, the establishment of schools, and the translation and publication of religious as well as educational materials in China. In other words, they were more successful as students, teachers, and translators than preachers in China in the early years. As the ﬁrst American students and teachers in China, they helped expand relations between the two peoples from the exchange of material goods to the dissemination of knowledge, ideas, beliefs, and values across the civilizational divide.

Engaging the Visible Hand Although frustrated by the restrictions imposed by the Qing Court on their movement and activities, American missionaries did not seek any favor from the Chinese government, at least in the ﬁrst half of the 1830s. In its instructions

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to Peter Parker in May 1834, the Prudential Committee of the American Board made it very clear that the “Christian missionary is not, therefore, to expect, and he is not to seek, the sanctions of heathen governments to his efforts to extend the gospel, but he is to go, with its heavenly message, directly to the people, wherever he can ﬁnd them.” The committee expected missionaries in the early years to persevere in proclaiming the message of salvation to any receiving people, though “laws and magistrates forbid, and at the expense of liberty and life.”32 However, American missionaries in China began to abandon the traditional tactics in the late 1830s as their effort to preach to the Chinese people directly without any regard for Chinese law had proved unsuccessful. They came to realize that, in a country like China, successful proselytization did require the favor, at least the legal protection, of the government, and that the best way to get it was through assistance from Washington. The need to get Washington more deeply involved in China became urgent as the tension and confrontation between China and Britain was aggravated over the opium trade at the end of the 1830s. Both American merchants and missionaries saw the necessity and opportunity to expand their activities there when the power of Qing China was under serious challenge from the British Empire. Deeply concerned about the lack of protection of their interests, a group of merchants petitioned Congress in January 1839 to send an ofﬁcial agent to China with the authority to negotiate a treaty. This, they believed, would protect Americans in China from “acts of violence and aggression” on the part of Chinese ofﬁcials.33 Missionaries were also anxious to get government involved. They published numerous letters and articles in church newsletters, praising English military actions in China as “the use of the strong arm of civil power to prepare the way for his [God’s] own kingdom.”34 They also lobbied in Washington for more government support during their home visits. Peter Parker returned to the United States at the end of 1840 to marry Harriet Webster, a relative of Daniel Webster, the newly appointed Secretary of State. Parker took advantage of his reputation as a medical missionary and his new social connections resulting from the marriage to meet with many top government ofﬁcials and lawmakers in Washington, including outgoing President Martin Van Buren and President-elect William Harrison. In a written proposal sent to Daniel Webster, he suggested the United States should send, without delay, a strong force and an American minister plenipotentiary to China. He argued that having an American minister in China could help bring about a peaceful solution, restore trade, stop the opium trafﬁc, and strengthen the American position.35 The aggressive lobbying effort made by missionaries and merchants aroused serious attention at home. The House of Representatives called upon President Van Buren for “information respecting the conditions of the citizens of the United States doing business during the past year in China” on February 7, 1839.36 After war broke out between China and Britain, Washington, in response to the joint demand from missionaries and merchants, sent the East India Squadron, led by Commodore Lawrence Kearny, to Guangzhou to protect

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American interests in 1842. When the Treaty of Nanking was signed between China and Britain on August 29, 1842, Kearny immediately sent a note to Chinese ofﬁcials, demanding most-favored-nation status for the United States so that American merchants would be able to trade in those ports newly opened to the British.37 The British victory in the Opium War forced many in Washington to reexamine American policy toward China. They began to realize that, once the British had occupied Hong Kong, the problem of Asia had become “political” rather than “purely commercial.”38 Caleb Cushing, an inﬂuential member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, wrote a letter to President John Tyler on December 27, 1842, proposing to send a diplomatic mission to China. Three days after receiving Cushing’s letter, President Tyler sent a message to Congress requesting that a commissioner be sent to China to obtain through a formal treaty the same privileges that Britain had just gained through the war.39 Once Edward Everett, then the American minister to Britain, refused to accept the appointment as the ﬁrst commissioner to China, Caleb Cushing, a close friend of President Tyler, was awarded the position. In order to guarantee his success in the negotiations for the treaty, Cushing left for China on the USS Missouri, a newly constructed steam-powered warship. When the new ship caught ﬁre on the way, Cushing continued his trip on another warship, the USS Brandywine. As the American ship arrived at Macao on February 24, 1844, the Chinese immediately noticed that it had over ﬁve hundred sailors and sixty-four cannons. Three days after his arrival, Cushing sent a letter to Cheng Jucai, the governor of Guangdong Province, requesting a meeting with the Chinese emperor to deliver a presidential letter and discuss a treaty.40 The original objective of the mission was to secure the entry of American ships into the Chinese ports newly opened to British merchants on the same favorable terms. That goal had actually been achieved while Cushing was still on his way to China. On October 8, 1843, the Chinese government had signed the Treaty of the Bogue with Britain, clearly providing that all foreign merchants who had traded at Guangzhou would be allowed to engage in trade in Fuzhou (Fuchow), Xiamen (Amoy), Ningbo (Ningpo), and Shanghai “on the same terms as the English.”41 American merchants were extremely satisﬁed with the Chinese decision. Edward King, an American resident merchant serving as the United States consul in Guangzhou, told the State Department that it was not necessary to send a commissioner to China for a new treaty since Americans “have now all the privileges granted to the British and the feelings of the government and people of China continue to be favorably disposed toward Americans.”42 Even after Caleb Cushing’s arrival at Macao, one American merchant in Guangzhou was still strongly opposed to Cushing’s negotiations with the Chinese government because the American merchants were “now on very best terms possible with the Chinese.” He was worried that “a very few of his [Cushing’s] important airs will make us hated by the Chinese and then we lose all the advantages we now have over the English.”43

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Unlike the merchants, American missionaries were far from satisﬁed with the new open-port policy adopted by the Chinese government. According to the Treaty of the Bogue, foreign merchants and their families were allowed to reside in all open ports and foreign consuls were granted the power to punish those who went beyond the city borders. However, missionaries and their rights were not even mentioned in any of the treaties signed between China and Britain in 1842 and 1843.44 In other words, missionaries and their activities were still not legally protected in the newly opened ports in China. This overt, if not deliberate, neglect, while consistent with British tradition, was extremely disappointing to American missionaries. Therefore, they continued to push Cushing to sign a formal treaty with the Qing Court so that their activities in China would be protected. Neither the generous provisions of the Treaty of Bogue, nor the strenuous arguments made by Chinese ofﬁcials could persuade Cushing to leave China without a formal treaty. With frequent threats of going to Beijing on board his warship, Cushing succeeded in forcing the Qing Court to negotiate with him and sign the ﬁrst formal treaty in Wangxia (Wanghsia), a small village near Macao, on July 3, 1844.45 With thirty-four articles, the Treaty of Wanghsia had not only a greater length, but also wider scope than the Treaty of Nanking. While obtaining all the commercial privileges enjoyed by the British, the Wanghsia Treaty provided Americans with many new “rights.” These “rights” would allow the Americans, as citizens of the “most favored nation,” to enjoy any additional privileges that China might concede to any other countries in the future; to obtain, rent, and construct houses, hospitals, churches, and cemeteries, making missionary presence and activities legal for the ﬁrst time in China’s open ports; to employ Chinese to teach any of the languages of the empire and to purchase any kinds of books in China; and to be tried in a court run by the American consul according to American law.46 Cushing’s success was made possible with enthusiastic and capable assistance from American missionaries in China. With little knowledge of Chinese culture, history, or language, Cushing appointed Bridgman and Parker as Chinese secretaries of the mission right after his arrival at Macao. Fully aware of the historical signiﬁcance of the position, Parker rushed to Macao to join Cushing upon receiving the appointment despite ill health and mounting work at his hospital.47 The two missionaries tutored Cushing before the negotiations. Since no one in the Chinese delegation was able to speak English or any other European languages, Bridgman and Parker worked together with Fletcher Webster in drafting all the original forty-seven articles of the treaty, including the provisions on religious and educational activities.48 Although seeking special protection for missionary activities in China was not mentioned in the original instructions from the State Department, Cushing had no problem accepting all the articles regarding the missionaries. He believed that he went to China on behalf of civilization and his purpose was to open the doors of three hundred million Asiatic laborers to the Americans, including missionaries. He would be

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happy to see the Americans “become the teachers of our teachers” and for “the reﬂuent tide of letters and knowledge to roll back from the West to the East.”49 The inclusion of provisions aimed at protecting missionary activities in China caused serious concern among Chinese ofﬁcials. Qi Ying, the commissioner assigned by Emperor Daoguang to handle the treaty negotiations, managed to turn down about ten “absolutely unacceptable” demands in the American draft and reworked the rest into thirty-four articles. He also tried to get rid of all the articles related to the missionaries, but was forced to give up when Cushing insisted that Americans be allowed to have places to pray when they were alive and to be buried when they died in China since they did not have a territory like Hong Kong, as the English did. Qi Ying reluctantly agreed to allow missionaries to hire Chinese teachers and buy Chinese books since he believed they had already done so for quite some time and it would be impossible to stop them.50 Similar concerns were expressed by other high-ranking Chinese ofﬁcials in Beijing during their review of the treaty. Mu Zhanga, the prime minister (Junji Dachen and Da Xueshi), objected strongly to the articles that would allow foreigners to hire Chinese teachers and buy Chinese books. He believed this break with tradition would cause much trouble in the future. Unable to reject the treaty, he proposed that the Court issue an order requiring those who were hired by foreigners as teachers to register with the local government before they could start teaching and those who sold books to foreigners to report the titles and prices of the books bought by foreigners at the end of each year. He also recommended that local ofﬁcials be instructed to do everything possible to prevent Chinese from accepting and practicing foreign rituals and religions.51 Despite grave concerns among Chinese ofﬁcials over the articles on religious and educational activities, the Treaty of Wanghsia was approved by both governments and became effective at the end of 1844. As the ﬁrst treaty between the two nations, it not only laid the foundation for U.S.-China diplomatic relations for many decades, but also started a new trend that made cultural and educational interactions a unique dimension in U.S.-China relations. Unlike most other foreign powers, which expended their greatest efforts to gain trade privileges or grab territory from China, the United States was the ﬁrst to secure legal protection for missionary activities and the only power for a long time to include educational exchange in its treaties with China. The unique characteristics of U.S.-China treaty relations reﬂected the increasing breadth and depth of relations between the two peoples. Once the precedent was set, more treaties were signed by Washington and the Qing Court in the following decades to conﬁrm and expand the protection for religious activities and educational interactions. Taking advantage of the new defeats suffered by China in the Second Opium War with Britain and France, William Bradford Reed, the American commissioner to China, managed to force the Qing Court to sign the Treaty of Tientsin (Tianjin) on June 18, 1858.52 Asserting the moral high ground of Christian religion, Article XXIX provided that those who quietly profess and teach Christian doctrines “shall not

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be harassed or prosecuted on account of their faith,” and those, whether citizens of the United States or Chinese converts, who “according to these tenets peaceably teach and practice the principles of Christianity shall in no case be interfered with or molested.”53 The inclusion of the article was the result of the strenuous effort made by W.A.P. Martin and Samuel Wells Williams, missionaries serving the American legation as interpreters. Martin offered his services to make sure that the American commissioner would not “neglect the interests of missions and the safety of native Christians.” When the ﬁrst draft was rejected, the missionaries called upon the Chinese ofﬁcials, forcing them to make concessions. The article was reluctantly accepted by Qing ofﬁcials only hours before the signing ceremony.54 Signed on July 28, 1868, by Anson Burlingame, the former American minister to the Qing Court and the leading envoy of the ﬁrst Chinese diplomatic delegation sent to the West, and William Seward, the Secretary of State, the Additional Articles to the Treaty of Tientsin comprised the third major treaty between the two nations.55 While guaranteeing “free migration and emigration” of the citizens and subjects of the two nations, the new treaty for the ﬁrst time included one whole article dealing speciﬁcally with schools, education, and educational exchange. According to Article VII, the Americans and the Chinese “shall enjoy all the privileges of the public educational institutions under the control” of each other’s government and “may freely establish and maintain schools” in each other’s country.56 By opening public educational institutions to each other, the Burlingame Treaty sought to push educational exchanges between the two nations to a new level. Once treaties were signed, Washington was serious in enforcing them. In September 1872, a few Chinese were arrested in Hangzhou because of their property deals with American missionaries. Believing that their religious and educational activities in that city were threatened by the local authorities, missionaries asked for help from the American consul at Ningbo. On receiving the call, the American consul rushed to Hangzhou and put pressure on the local ofﬁcials, forcing the release of all the Chinese and assurances of the rights of American missionaries to stay and continue their religious and educational activities there.57 While always ready to protect missionary activities in China’s open ports, Washington generally opposed their efforts to extend their activities to the interior of China prior to 1890. Secretary of State Hamilton Fish agreed with Frederick F. Low, the American minister at Beijing, that “missionaries have no right to reside permanently away from the open ports,” and hoped that the Hangzhou case would make missionaries realize “the risk which they incur by establishing stations in inland places and the embarrassment which follows the assumption of privileges which cannot be claimed or defended under the treaty.”58 Washington began to abandon its strict interpretation of the treaties and become a more aggressive supporter of missionary activities in the interior of China in the early 1890s. This shift in Washington’s policy was largely the result of continuous pressure from the missionaries as well as its own increasing

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interest in overseas expansion. While pressing American diplomats in China for stronger protection, missionaries sent petitions directly to policy makers in Washington, demanding “a new treaty be made distinctly afﬁrming their right to reside and hold property in the interior.”59 With increasing appreciation of missionary activities, diplomats in China and policy makers in Washington began to show stronger support for missionary demands. Charles Denby, the American minister to Beijing, pointed out in his report to the State Department in March 1895 that the missionaries, “inspired by holy zeal, go everywhere, and by degrees, foreign commerce and trade follow.”60 Agreeing with his evaluation, the State Department instructed Denby to inform American missionaries in China that when the occasion arose in cases of purchases of real property by them, he would “take advantage of the provision of French arrangement and claim this privilege” for them.61 Washington’s protection for missionaries culminated in its participation in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. When the rebels gained momentum, Washington ﬁrst sent more warships to China to show its determination to protect the treaty rights granted to the Americans. Then it joined the allied forces in the expedition to Beijing to relieve foreign diplomats under siege. Having defeated the Boxers and occupied the capital, Washington teamed with other powers in demanding severe punishment for Chinese prorebel ofﬁcials and a huge amount of indemnity, $25 million, to cover the losses suffered by American missionaries and the costs of sending military forces to China.62 Washington’s actions in 1900 clearly demonstrated that it was willing to protect the treaty rights of missionaries and other Americans with force if it was necessary. Taking advantage of the new defeat suffered by China, Washington signed the Commercial Treaty with the Qing Court in 1903. While taking care of American commercial interests in China, the new treaty offered even stronger protections for missionaries. According to Article XIV, both governments agreed that the “principles of the Christian religion, as professed by the Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches, are recognized as teaching men to do good.” Therefore, any person, whether a citizen of the United States or Chinese convert, who “peaceably teaches and practices the principles of Christianity shall in no case be interfered with or molested therefore.” The article also provided that “missionary societies of the United States shall be given the permission to rent and lease in perpetuity, as the property of such societies, buildings, or land in all parts of the Empire for missionary purposes.”63 American missionaries ﬁnally received the legal sanction to conduct religious and educational activities throughout the whole of China.

Taking Advantage of the Treaties Although the treaties signed by Washington and the Qing Court after the Opium War put most emphasis on promoting and protecting trade, missionaries

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were much more aggressive and efﬁcient than merchants in expanding their activities in China. They usually were the ﬁrst Americans moving into the newly opened ports and setting up permanent stations there. One of the ﬁrst things they did after their arrival in a new community was to establish schools for Chinese children. By the end of the nineteenth century, they had established more schools and enrolled more Chinese students than missionaries from any other nations. Despite its strong resentment and distrust of missionary activities in China, the Qing Court experimented with some Western learning courses in a few government schools, hired American teachers, and dispatched its ﬁrst educational mission to the United States as part of its self-strengthening effort. As a result, educational exchanges began to grow at a much faster pace than any other dimensions in U.S.-China relations in the second half of the nineteenth century. Despite the strong protections offered by the treaties, American merchants were relatively slow in moving into the newly opened port cities or expanding their activities there. By the end of the nineteenth century, there were less than ﬁfty American ﬁrms operating in China, way behind Great Britain and Japan.64 American trade with China increased somewhat in terms of absolute value, from $9 million in 1850 to $19 million in 1890.65 However, its weight in total U.S. foreign trade declined from 3.15 percent in 1860 to 1.75 percent in 1894.66 American trade with China was not only far less than that with European nations and Canada, but also falling behind Japan in the 1890s. Like trade, American investment in China remained small during this period. In 1902, American investment in China totaled $19.7 million, counting for only 1.2 percent of American overseas investment in that year.67 American merchants and investors showed much less interest in China because they, in Warren Cohen’s words, “consistently preferred the surer proﬁts to be found elsewhere.”68 Just like merchants and businessmen, few politicians or diplomats showed strong interest in building close relations with China. Although the Treaty of Wanghsia had established formal diplomatic ties between the two nations and the Treaty of Tientsin had allowed the American minster to stay permanently in Beijing, Washington had difﬁculties in ﬁnding qualiﬁed candidates to serve as minister to China because of the “inadequacy of the compensation.”69 As a result, Washington had to rely heavily on missionaries and merchants in stafﬁng its diplomatic ofﬁces in China, as it had done in the past. Among all Americans, missionaries were the most aggressive in expanding their religious and educational activities in China. Having learned Fujian dialects from Chinese immigrants in Southeast Asia, David Abeel and William Boone followed the English army to Gulangyu in 1842 and then relocated across the sea to Xiamen when the port was ofﬁcially opened to foreigners in 1843. During his stay in Xiamen, Abeel came into contact with Xu Jiyu, a high-ranking ofﬁcial and a scholar. Abeel offered materials and guidance in Xu’s study of world history. Xu later published Yinghuan Zhilüe (A Brief History of the World), the ﬁrst Chinese book on world history, geography, and political systems.70

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As soon as the Treaty of Wanghsia was signed in 1844, D. B. McCartee, a missionary sent by the American Presbyterians, arrived in Ningbo, Zhejiang Province. He organized a Presbyterian church and set up a school for boys the next year. In 1847, a school for girls was established.71 William A. P. Martin, another young missionary from Indiana, joined McCartee in 1850. Martin started to learn Chinese immediately after his arrival. Once he had grasped some basic skills in the Chinese language, including both the local dialect and Mandarin, Martin set up two day schools. These schools, each with an attendance of about twenty, employed various religious materials and some books on secular subjects written by Martin and other missionaries.72 In order to help his students learn Chinese writing systems more quickly, Martin even developed a method to romanize the Ningbo vernacular. The romanization was so effective that it was adopted by all other missionary schools in Ningbo.73 Judson Collins, a Methodist missionary from Michigan, reached Fuzhou, another port city in Fujian Province, in1846. Having studied local dialects for over a year, he opened a boys’ school in 1848 with the assistance of his fellow missionary Moses White. They were soon joined by Robert Maclay and his wife, who ﬁrst opened a day school for girls in 1850 and then established a boarding school for boys in 1856. By 1853, the American Board alone had four schools with about one hundred students in the city.74 According to an incomplete list compiled by Xiong Yuezhi, American missionaries established twentyﬁve schools in open ports between 1845 and 1860, counting for three-quarters of all missionary schools in China.75 Education continued to be the focus of missionary activities in China because schools remained the most effective way to penetrate Chinese communities. Although they were free to proselytize among the Chinese under the treaties, it took missionaries about a decade to baptize the ﬁrst convert in Fuzhou. By 1860, they only managed to convert sixty-six Chinese in the city. A similar situation could be found in all other open ports during this period. Unable to attract a large number of Chinese to their churches, missionaries turned to schools for help. Stephen Johnson, one of the pioneering American missionaries in Fuzhou, recognized schools “as a means of procuring permanent Sabbath congregations.” C. C. Baldwin, another missionary in the same city, confessed that the schools provided an opportunity for “preserving application of truth to the same minds from day to day and week to week.” By keeping students in school for an extended period, missionaries, Baldwin believed, were able to “pass the barriers which excluded them from carefully guarded Chinese households and exert there an abiding inﬂuence, which will long be felt.” Similar conclusions were reached by John Livingston Nevius, an American missionary who had worked at schools in Ningbo between 1854 and 1861. Missionary schools, Nevius pointed out, supplied the churches with more than half of the converts in Ningbo while costing only one-quarter of the mission’s budget.76 Fully aware of their importance, American missionaries did everything possible to make missionary schools acceptable and attractive. In addition to

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students from poor families, missionary schools, especially those in large cities, took in a large number of homeless children and offered them free education. This allowed missionaries to put their schools in the category of benevolent school (yixue), which was a traditional venue to help poor and homeless children in China. When Shanghai County surveyed benevolent schools in 1869, missionary schools were included.77 Claiming the status of benevolent school helped reduce the resentment and resistance from the Chinese and make missionary schools acceptable at least to the people at the margin of Chinese society in the earlier years.78 In order to attract and retain more students, missionaries offered many other incentives. Some gave a bowl of rice after class, which was irresistible to starving children. Others paid each student ten cents each day for their attendance at the school.79 With concerted effort from missionaries, their schools kept growing in the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1850, there were only a few hundred students in a dozen or so missionary schools located mainly in major open ports. By the mid-1870s, there were forty-one American Protestant Missions in China running 294 schools with 5,227 students. The American emphasis on education became more impressive when compared with the British missions in China. Despite the fact that the British had slightly more missions in China at the time, the British only had 146 schools, less than half of those run by the Americans, with 4,428 students, about 18 percent less than those in American schools.80 When foreign missionaries held their conference again in 1890, there were 9,757 Chinese students in schools run by American missionaries, representing an increase of 86.7 percent in thirteen years.81 By 1904, thirty American missionary societies were running 944 day schools and 186 institutions of higher learning in China. The number of students in all schools totaled about sixty thousand.82 As the number of students in elementary schools increased, American missionaries began to put greater emphasis on offering secondary and even higher education for the Chinese beginning in the 1880s. Calvin Mateer and his wife opened the Dengzhou (Tengchou) School upon their arrival in 1864. In the early 1870s, the school was divided into primary and secondary departments. In 1882, it changed its name to Dengzhou College and adopted a new curriculum for six-year education.83 Thus, Mateer became the founder of the ﬁrst Christian colleges in China. Following Dengzhou College, which later became a part of the Shandong Christian University, or Qilu (Cheeloo) University, the Methodist Mission opened Peking University in 1888. The next year, the American Congregationalists set up North China College in Tongzhou (Tungchow), a city near Beijing. Besides the three colleges in the North, two more colleges were opened in the South by the end of the nineteenth century. The American Episcopalians established St. John’s College in Shanghai in the 1880s, with Samuel Schereschewsky as its ﬁrst president, and founded the Hangzhou Presbyterian College in the 1890s. At the same time, some junior colleges were set up by missionaries in Guangzhou, Fuzhou, and Nanjing. Many of them evolved

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into full collegiate institutions in the early years of the twentieth century. Although belonging to different denominations, all these colleges were founded by American missionaries, further demonstrating their unmatched interest in Chinese education.84 American missionaries began to send some of their students to the United States for education in the 1840s. The ﬁrst group of Chinese students was brought to the United States by Reverend Samuel Brown, who was forced to leave China because of his poor health. He and his three students, Yung Wing (Rong Hong), Wong Foon (Huang Kuan), and Wong Shing (Huang Xin), landed in New York City in April 1847. After a brief stay in Manhattan, Yung Wing and his schoolmates entered Monson Academy in Massachusetts. As Wong Shing returned to China because of illness in 1848 and Wong Foon went to study medicine at the University of Edinburgh, Yung Wing entered Yale College and graduated in 1854 with distinction. He thus became the ﬁst Chinese student to receive an undergraduate degree from a distinguished college in the United States.85 After Yung Wing, more Chinese students, including women, were sent by missionaries to the United States for education.86 Although unhappy to see American missionaries expand their educational activities in China, the Qing Court, taking advantage of the existing treaties, hired American teachers for government schools and sent the ﬁrst group of government-sponsored students to the United States for education. Having suffered numerous defeats by foreign powers since the Opium War, some reformminded Chinese ofﬁcials were forced to take extraordinary steps to defend and strengthen their motherland. In addition to the building of modern arsenals, factories, and shipyards, Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, and Zuo Zongtang, leaders of the self-strengthening movement, began to see the practical signiﬁcance of Western education. Guo Songtao, a high-ranking Qing ofﬁcial, suggested in his memo to the emperor on February 26, 1859, that a special school be established to teach students foreign languages.87 However, Guo’s proposal received little attention until the Second Opium War, when the Qing Court suddenly realized that it could not ﬁnd even one ofﬁcial who was able to write a letter in English to propose a peace talk with the British and French commanders.88 Tongwenguan, a foreign language school aimed at training interpreters and diplomats, was ﬁnally established after the war. According to the Treaty of Tientsin, signed by China with Britain and France in 1860, all ofﬁcial communications and documentations should be in English and French, and foreign diplomats would have permanent residency in Beijing.89 In order to train the desperately needed ofﬁcials who could communicate with foreign diplomats, the Court quickly approved the establishment of Tongwenguan and put it directly under the newly established Zongli Yamen (Tsungli Yamen), the Foreign Affairs Ofﬁce, headed by Prince Gong.90 Unable to ﬁnd capable Chinese to teach foreign languages, Zongli Yamen hired J. S. Burdon, an English missionary, as the ﬁrst teacher.91 Burdon gave the ﬁrst lesson to the ﬁrst class of ten students on June 11, 1862. Dr. John Fryer, another English missionary, replaced Burdon in

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1864. When Fryer resigned in 1865, the Zongli Yamen turned to Anson Burlingame, the American minister to Beijing, for more devoted teachers.92 Minister Burlingame willingly offered his assistance by recommending W.A.P. Martin. The young missionary accepted the position as the ﬁrst American instructor at the Tongwenguan in 1865 after Burlingame convinced him that he could “make it great.” However, he turned in his resignation within a few months because of the low pay, small classes, and limited subjects being taught at the school. Unwilling to lose another foreign teacher, two high-ranking Chinese ofﬁcials from Zongli Yamen had a long meeting with Martin. He ﬁnally decided to stay after he received promises from the Chinese ofﬁcials that the number of students would increase in the future and began to believe that his position at Tongwenguan would “open a ﬁeld of inﬂuence much wider than I could ﬁnd in the wayside chapels of Peking.”93 Two years later, Martin became an instructor in international law. After returning from a year’s study of international law at Yale, he was appointed zong jiaoxi (head instructor or provost) of Tongwenguan in 1869 and remained in that position until 1894.94 It was during Martin’s tenure as provost that Tongwenguan experienced a major expansion. With enrollment reaching one hundred, many new subjects such as mathematics, physics, chemistry, astronomy, navigation, international law, political science, world history, world geography, and translation were added by 1876.95 In order to accommodate the extended offerings, W.A.P. Martin abandoned the old two-year program for language training and established two longer programs to allow students to study various subjects. The eight-year program enrolled younger students, who studied both foreign languages and other subjects in Western learning. The ﬁve-year program took in older students, who studied only the nonlanguage subjects.96 As a result, Tongwenguan turned itself from a mere language school into a modern comprehensive college focused on Western learning. Most of its graduates, ﬁve hundred in total, occupied signiﬁcant positions in government ofﬁces, especially those in foreign affairs. Among all the envoys sent abroad by the Qing Court between 1892 and 1911, thirteen, about one-third of the total, were graduates of Tongwenguan. A much larger number of its graduates served as consuls or interpreters. Two students from Tongwenguan began to teach Guangxu Emperor English in 1891. By 1898, there were at least twenty-ﬁve Tongwenguan graduates teaching at modern schools.97 In 1902, Tongwenguan was merged into Jingshi Daxuetang (Capital University), which would later become Beijing University. The establishment and expansion of Tongwenguan in Beijing and similar schools in Guangzhou and Shanghai marked the ofﬁcial recognition of the value of Western learning by the Qing Court.98 In order to expand the experiment in modern education, in 1871 the Qing Court approved the daring proposal initiated by Yung Wing and endorsed by Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang, sending the ﬁrst Educational Mission to the United States.99 These reform-minded Chinese ofﬁcials were clearly aware that sending students abroad was “an unprecedented move by the Chinese and unheard of undertaking in China’s history.”100

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However, they strongly supported the endeavor because they believed that was the only way to allow Chinese students to grasp the knowledge and skills in military affairs, shipbuilding, mathematics, and manufacturing that would help China become a strong and powerful nation. In order to appease conservative ofﬁcials, students were also required to study Chinese classics while attending schools in the United States. Chen Lanbin, a member from the Hanlin Yuan who had successfully passed the highest level of civil service examinations, was appointed as the commissioner of the Chinese Educational Mission. Yung Wing was named only as the vice-commissioner.101 Following Yung Wing’s plan, the Qing Court sent 120 students to the United States in four installments between 1872 and 1875. The students were supposed to stay in the United States for ﬁfteen years so that they could complete education from elementary school to college. Given the length of the program, the Court tried to recruit young students between twelve and twenty years of age. However, despite the generous ﬁnancial support from the Qing Court, few families were willing to see their boys leave the country for ﬁfteen years. Yung Wing had to lower the minimum age to ten and go to Guangdong to get enough students for the mission. In the end, most students, eighty-four of them, came from Guangdong Province. The average age of all the students was twelve and a half years old.102 Although the American minister to Beijing expressed his welcome to the Chinese students, there was no formal cooperation or coordination between the Qing Court and Washington. Since China did not have an embassy in the United States, or in any foreign countries at that time, Yung Wing had to leave China one month earlier to make arrangements for the ﬁrst group of thirty Chinese students and his colleagues. Having spent almost all his years as a student in New England, Yung Wing went directly to Hartford and met with Mr. B. G. Northrop, the Commissioner of Education for Connecticut. After discussion with Mr. Northrop, Yung Wing decided to build the headquarters of the Chinese Educational Mission in Hartford. Before the building was completed, Chinese students were placed with families around Springﬁeld, Massachusetts, in order to be close to Dr. A. S. McClean, an old friend of Yung Wing. In January 1875, the Chinese Educational Mission moved into its new headquarters on Collins Street, Hartford. The magniﬁcent building had ofﬁces as well as classrooms specially designed to offer Chinese courses for students. It was designed by Yung Wing to “have the educational mission as deeply rooted in the United States as possible.”103 The Chinese Educational Mission was anything but permanent. From the very beginning, Yung Wing’s arrangements received strong criticism from Chen Lanbin, who was deeply concerned when he saw Chinese students living in American homes, playing with American children, wearing Western-style clothes, and going to church with their host families. He was so worried about the Americanization of the students that he supported the construction of the big Mission headquarters, which would give him enough space to teach students Chinese all year

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round.104 Similar concerns were shared by most of Chen’s successors. Commissioner Wu Zideng (Woo Tsze Tung) issued strict orders in April 1880, requiring students to study Chinese for six weeks at the Mission headquarters during the summer; continue to practice Chinese writing and composition during the regular school year; stop taking classes “useless” for Chinese students, such as American geography, piano performance, and composition of English poems; and turn in the titles of textbooks for approval before purchase. Unsatisﬁed with the implementation of his orders, Wu proposed the termination of the Educational Mission since it was almost impossible to prevent students from becoming “demoralized” in the United States. Many ofﬁcials in Beijing also strongly recommended the recall after hearing that many students had become Christians.105 Besides the increasing concern over the “corruption” and “demoralization” of Chinese students, Chinese ofﬁcials were deeply hurt by the rising antiChinese sentiment in the United States. In the original proposal presented to the emperor, it was clearly stated that the president of the United States should be informed of the purpose of the mission and that once Chinese students reached the required level of knowledge they should be admitted to the military and naval academies based on their ability.106 To Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang, having students trained in those academies was the main, if not the only, goal for the Educational Mission to the United States. Therefore, when some students were advanced enough for college education, Yung Wing sent their applications for the Military Academy at West Point and the Naval Academy at Annapolis to the State Department in 1878. Their applications were turned down and Yung Wing was told that there was “no room for Chinese students.” Disgusted by the overt racial discrimination and violation of the Burlingame Treaty, Yung had to report his failure to Li Hongzhang. From Li’s angry reply Yung was convinced immediately that “the fate of the Mission was sealed.”107 A total recall of all students in the United States was ﬁnally issued by the Qing Court in June 1881. By the early fall, all but a handful of students left for China in three groups. At that time, only two students had completed their college education. Over sixty were still in college while the rest were in high school.108 Although China’s ﬁrst Educational Mission was not completed as Yung Wing originally planned, most students were able to use whatever they had learned in the United Sates to serve their motherland. Most rose to become leading ﬁgures in various ﬁelds in China. Among the recalled students, one became the prime minister, one foreign minister, two ambassadors, eleven diplomats, two university presidents, sixteen navy ofﬁcers, including four admirals, twenty railroad managers, including four division directors, ten senior managers in the telegraph industry with four bureau chiefs, and seventeen entered business and industry. Despite the fact that none of them attended the Naval Academy at Annapolis, six recalled students participated in the naval battle with the French, mostly as weapons ofﬁcers, in 1884. Four of them lost their lives. Ten years later, eleven recalled students participated in the naval battle with Japan. Three of them were killed.109

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Besides the educational experiment, the Educational Mission led to the establishment of the ﬁrst permanent Chinese embassy in a foreign country and the ﬁrst educational program on Chinese language and literature in the United States. Although the Qing Court had sent some ofﬁcials abroad on two different tours in the 1860s, China did not keep diplomatic representatives in any foreign countries. When Yung Wing arrived in United States in summer 1872, he became the ﬁrst Chinese government ofﬁcial to be permanently stationed in a foreign nation. Soon both Chen Lanbin and Yung Wing were ordered to investigate the conditions of Chinese laborers in Cuba and Peru, respectively, since they were the only Chinese ofﬁcials close to those countries.110 In December 1875, the Qing Court appointed Chen as the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States, Cuba, and Peru. Yung Wing was given the position of Deputy Minister. Chen took his new ofﬁce in September 1878. Yung Wing joined Chen in Washington, DC, with great reluctance since he had to give up his daily involvement in the Educational Mission.111 Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to say that the Chinese Educational Mission gave birth to the Chinese embassy in the United States. While devoting himself to the education of Chinese students in the United States, Yung Wing made a great effort to promote the teaching and study of Chinese language and literature at Yale. In February 1877, Yung Wing wrote a letter to A. Van Name, the director of the library of Yale College, proposing the establishment of a chair professorship in Chinese language and literature. He promised that once the chair professorship was established, he would donate all his Chinese books to the Yale Library. He kept writing to Mr. Van Name and other people at Yale for over a year. Finally, Yale decided to hire Samuel Wells Williams as the ﬁrst Chair Professor of Chinese Language and Literature in 1878. Fulﬁlling his promise, Yung Wing immediately sent over twelve hundred volumes of Chinese books to the Yale Library. Largely because of Yung Wing, Yale established the ﬁrst chair professorship for Chinese studies and obtained the “nucleus of a respectable Chinese library.”112 Under the protection of the treaties, educational exchange between the two nations did grow signiﬁcantly in the second half of the nineteenth century. While continuing their efforts to study Chinese language and culture, American missionaries brought modern, Western-style education to China through various schools and colleges. The United States also attracted the ﬁrst groups of Chinese students sent by American missionaries as well as the Qing Court. Although the recall of all the government-sponsored students brought the ofﬁcial Educational Mission to the United States to an end, educational exchanges between the two nations continued as a dominantly private enterprise under the protection of the treaties.

Facing the Barriers Despite its growth, educational exchange between the United States and China remained small and sporadic until the beginning of the twentieth century.

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The resistance came mostly from cultural traditions as well as government policies. In the second half of the nineteenth century, most Chinese scholars and students still believed that China was the center of the universe and the Chinese were the only civilized people in the world. Therefore, they strongly opposed the establishment of missionary schools in China and the spread of Western learning among Chinese students. While the popular opposition created great challenges, stronger barriers to the expansion of educational exchange were actually erected by the Chinese as well as the United States government. Their conservative educational policies, difﬁcult ﬁnancial conditions, and discriminative immigration laws made signiﬁcant and lasting expansion of educational exchange between the two nations extremely difﬁcult, if not impossible. The expansion of U.S.-China educational interactions was impeded by the strenuous effort made by the Qing Court to preserve traditional Chinese education and civil service examination systems. The establishment of missionary schools marked the ﬁrst close contact between two fundamentally different educational systems in China. With completely different objectives, curriculum, organization, and methods, missionary schools presented great challenges to the Chinese educational system, the strongest pillar of Chinese culture, society, and state. The strong religious tone permeating missionary schools and the lack of respect demonstrated by American missionaries for Chinese culture and authorities caused great alarm and strong resentment among the Chinese ofﬁcials and literati. They worked together to preserve the traditional Chinese education, which pushed students to study Confucian classics, pass the examinations given by the state, and receive appointments to government ofﬁces. The traditional Chinese education was most effectively protected by the continuation of the Chinese civil service examinations. Impressed by the practical usefulness of Western learning, Li Hongzhang and some other reform-minded ofﬁcials sent numerous proposals to the Qing Court, requesting that mathematics and natural sciences be included as part of government examinations. They believed that if the proposed changes were approved the entire examination system could be placed on a new basis that would “inaugurate an intellectual revolution whose extent and results would be difﬁcult to predict.”113 However, the Qing Court turned down their proposals and kept Chinese civil service examination largely unchanged in the second half of the nineteenth century. As a result, few students were interested in attending Western-style schools. Tongwenguan was actually forced to abandon its plan to enroll students with ofﬁcial degrees in 1866. Students who did attend the Tongwenguan had to prepare themselves for traditional civil service examinations in order to qualify for government positions even though much of their study was focused on Western languages and sciences. By 1894, thirteen Tongwenguan graduates passed provincial- and national-level examinations, moving one step further toward successful careers through the traditional venue.114 Since Western learning was not included in civil service examinations, it became extremely difﬁcult, if not impossible, for graduates from missionary

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schools and students returned from the United States to receive either recognition or ofﬁce appointments from the Qing Court. Without ofﬁcial degrees, graduates from missionary schools were usually banned from serving in the government. Students returned from foreign countries might have opportunities to work for the government. However, they were usually given the lowest positions, especially in the earlier years. For example, students who were recalled to China by the Qing Court in 1881 were assigned various government positions with a minimal pay of four taels of silver a month despite the fact that over half of them were already college students and two of them had received bachelor’s degrees in the United States. After four years of hard work and repeated evaluations, they were ﬁnally rewarded with ofﬁcial ranks in accordance with the strong recommendations from Li Hongzhang in 1885. Most of them were promoted to cong jiuping (associate, ninth degree) and bazong (platoon leader), the lowest ranks for civil and military services, respectively.115 With such strong resistance from the Qing Court, the expansion of educational exchange between the two nations was greatly limited. Missionaries could build many schools and colleges. However, neither the modern education offered in those schools nor the degrees granted to their graduates were recognized by the Chinese government. As a result, missionary schools, as Marianne Bastid accurately pointed out, were only “a kind of appendix to the traditional education system, without ever being properly integrated into it or being able to substitute for any of its functions.”116 For the same reason, schools in the United States were not attractive to most Chinese students in those years either. Yung Wing had to go to Hong Kong in order to get enough students to send to the United States in the 1870s.117 Until the beginning of the twentieth century, most Chinese students still had to pursue traditional education and pass civil service examinations in order to have successful careers in China. While traditional Chinese education and civil service examinations provided little incentive for Chinese students to attend missionary schools in China or colleges in the United States, anti-Chinese immigration laws made it difﬁcult, if not impossible, for Chinese students to be admitted into this country for education beginning in the early 1880s. The Chinese, like all other peoples, enjoyed free immigration to the United States in the early years. Their right of free immigration was further guaranteed by the Burlingame Treaty of 1868.118 However, an anti-Chinese frenzy, emerged ﬁrst in California in the early 1870s, became a popular movement across the nation by the end of the decade. In May 1882, Congress passed An Act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relating to Chinese, suspending the immigration of Chinese laborers, skilled and unskilled, for ten years.119 The Chinese Exclusion Act was amended in 1884, expanded in 1888, renewed for another decade in 1892, and extended indeﬁnitely in 1904.120 As a result, the Chinese became the ﬁrst people whose entrance to the United States was denied based solely on their race. Although Chinese students, like ofﬁcials, teachers, merchants, and travelers, were allowed to enter the United States by law, their admission was often

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rejected by immigration ofﬁcers at American ports. The most difﬁcult time came when Terence Powderly, the former leader of the Knights of Labor, was appointed the Commissioner General of Immigration in August 1897. During his tenure, Powderly time and again asked Congress to pass laws to exclude all Chinese. He also defended the Bureau of Immigration’s ill treatment of Chinese and placed in key posts, as Mary Coolidge put it, “ignorant and narrow-minded men whose idea of effective enforcement was simply to shut out more Chinese, no matter of what class, by constant severity, suspicion, and intimidation.”121 Powderly’s efforts to keep as many Chinese people, including students, as possible out of the United States were sanctioned by his bosses in the Department of the Treasury. The Secretary of the Treasury, through the State Department, instructed the American consuls in China in 1899 that they should only issue student visas to those who were younger than twenty-one, had actually been attending school for some time immediately prior to the date of their application, and could and did designate the school or college they intended to attend in the United States.122 In mid-1900, the Treasury Department issued a more comprehensive ofﬁcial deﬁnition for Chinese students. It stipulated that Chinese students may only pursue higher education in the United States that is not available in China, have adequate ﬁnancial support, and return to their homeland upon graduation.123 The tough new deﬁnition gave American consuls in China and immigration ofﬁcers at American ports a free hand in rejecting Chinese students who were seeking education in the United States. The American consulate at Guangzhou issued over forty visas to Chinese students in July 1900. When the ofﬁcial deﬁnition of eligible Chinese students reached the consulate in August, only thirteen student certiﬁcates were issued that month. After August, the American consuls became very reluctant to grant any student visas to Chinese applicants.124 Immigration ofﬁcers at American ports did everything they could to deny or delay the admission of Chinese students to the United States. Yip Wah, arriving in San Francisco on October 28, 1900, was denied the right to land as a student even though immigration ofﬁcers could not ﬁnd anything wrong with his travel documents. On October 21, 1901, Tong Tseng, another Chinese student, was forced to return to China because he told the Collector of the Customs that he was going to pursue his education ﬁrst at the Chinese-American school in Honolulu instead of going to college immediately.125 The most notorious case involved the admission of Fei Qihe (Fu Chi Ho) and Kong Xiangxi (Kung Hsiang Hsi). Having attended missionary schools in China and saved many American missionaries during the Boxer Rebellion, they were sent by their American teachers to attend Oberlin College in Ohio. Arriving in San Francisco on September 12, 1900, they were ﬁrst denied the right to land because their passports were issued by Li Hongzhang, the Chinese prime minister, rather than a local port ofﬁcial, and there were minor mistakes and omissions in the English translations made by the American consul at Tianjin. Later, through the intercession of an inﬂuential friend, they were allowed to land, but they were sent to the detention shed, known as “China Jail,” on Angel

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Island, to wait for a decision by the Treasury Department. They stayed there for an entire week before being released at the request of a prestigious doctor on the grounds that the suffering they experienced in the “Jail” was too great for their physical endurance.126 The Chinese consul general in San Francisco was required to put up a bond of two thousand dollars to guarantee their good behavior. It took a year and a half before they were ﬁnally allowed to enter the country and start their schooling.127 The rejection and mistreatment of Chinese students provoked a strong protest from the Qing Court. Wu Tingfang, the Chinese minister to Washington between 1898 and 1903, sent numerous letters to Secretary of State John Hay, repeatedly challenging the ofﬁcial deﬁnition of Chinese student issued by the Treasury Department. He reminded Hay that the Treaty of 1894 between the United States and China “expressly stipulates that students, without qualiﬁcation, are to be admitted.” He also clearly pointed out that “this deﬁnition of student with its various conditions reads very strange in contrast with the simple phrase of the Treaty” and that no Chinese students could get admitted to the United States simply because there were many institutions in China in which instruction in almost every branch of knowledge was given either in Chinese or in English.128 Thus, he warned that if the Treasury Department’s deﬁnition of Chinese student was allowed to stand, it would mean “a virtual nulliﬁcation of the Treaty” and the closing of “the doors of American universities and colleges” to the Chinese race.129 Wu Tingfang tried to get President Roosevelt involved so as to reverse the decision made by immigration ofﬁcials in San Francisco and sustained by H. A. Taylor, assistant secretary of the Treasury, regarding Yip Wah. However, Hay told him that the president did not have the power to interpose in the matter and the Treasury Department decision was ﬁnal.130 Many American missionaries, educators, and businessmen strongly criticized the harsh exclusion laws and regulations. One missionary in Shantou (Swatow) wrote to Hay in March 1900, telling him that missionaries in China were bothered by the exclusion of Chinese students. He argued that getting Chinese students into the United States would not only give the country an educational ascendancy there in China, but also increase American prestige and stimulate commercial as well as intellectual intercourse.131 An American educator in Shanghai submitted a written statement to a Senate committee, complaining about the difﬁculties that they had experienced in sending students to the United States. He told the committee that his college had a strong desire to send selected Chinese students to complete their education in the United States. However, they, instead, had to send their graduates, many of whom would become leaders of China in the future, to England because of the restrictions placed on Chinese students by Washington. He predicted that “these young men will grow up full of English prejudices and notions, and at all events they will be entirely lacking in the American predilection which they would otherwise be obtained [sic].”132 On June 20, 1902, the International Missionary Union adopted a resolution asking the Secretary of the Treasury to modify the regulations so as

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to remove any “unnecessary obstacle” placed in the way of Chinese students and preachers of the Gospel coming to this country.133 The Boston Chamber of Commerce and Merchants Association also passed resolutions in January 1902, asking Congress to let the Chinese exclusion laws expire in 1904, because the Treasury Department’s deﬁnition of “student” was “absolutely inconsistent with the present treaty” as well as any deﬁnition of the word “accepted in any civilized nations in the world.”134 However, the criticism and demands were generally ignored by Washington and it remained difﬁcult for Chinese students to pursue education in the United States during this period. The lack of cooperation between the two governments and their difﬁcult ﬁnancial circumstances also prevented educational interactions between the two nations from further expansion. Despite its generous land grant for schools and colleges right after the American Revolution and during the Civil War, the United States government generally stayed away from the day-to-day management of schools in the United States and from educational interactions with other nations during this period. China did have a long history of training foreign students. However, the Chinese government had no experience of sending students abroad. Having always treated education as a purely domestic issue, the Qing Court sought no assistance from Washington when it sent its ﬁrst Educational Mission to the United States in the 1870s. Instead of contacting federal ofﬁcials, Yung Wing made arrangements for the Chinese students directly with state and local ofﬁcials and friends in Connecticut. With little understanding of the real purpose of the Chinese Educational Mission, Washington refused to admit Chinese students to military academies, forcing China to recall all its students. President Arthur did try to keep the Chinese students. However, his effort was too little and too late. The setback suffered by the ﬁrst Educational Mission had a lasting impact on U.S.-China educational exchanges. No Chinese students were sent to the United States for the rest of the 1880s and throughout the 1890s. When China ﬁnally began to value modern education after its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, it sent thousands of students to Japan between 1896 and 1903.135 Although few received higher education, students returned from Japan exerted tremendous inﬂuence on China’s political life and educational reform. Under their leadership, the Qing Court adopted a modern educational system patterned after the Japanese model in 1902.136 When the Qing Court became concerned about Japan’s overwhelming inﬂuence in the early 1900s, it began to divert students to European nations. For example, Zhang Baixi, the superintendent of the Capital University, sent four students to each of the four major European nations, including Britain, France, Germany, and Russia in 1903. However, none was sent to the United States.137 The lack of strong ﬁnancial support from either public or private sources further limited educational interactions between the two nations. Although missionaries and private foundations were all deeply committed to educational exchanges, neither had adequate resources to support a large number of students

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pursuing education across the Paciﬁc. The situation was no better for either government in the second half of the nineteenth century. Short of resources and authority, the United States government was unable to support any meaningful educational exchanges with foreign nations during this period. The Qing Court was willing to send more students at the end of the 1890s. However, the Boxer Rebellion drew the nation into a military confrontation with all major foreign powers in 1900 and the Qing government was further weakened both politically and ﬁnancially by another humiliating defeat. Having been beaten by Japan and the Eight-Power Alliance, the Qing Court was forced to pay two hundred million taels of silver to the former in 1895 and four hundred million taels to the latter in 1901. Indemnity payments created huge holes in the Qing Court’s budget every year beginning in the mid-1890s. Half of the Qing Court’s annual revenues had to go to the payments for indemnities and other debts after the Boxer Rebellion.138 Heavily burdened by all those payments, the Qing Court was no longer able to support a large number of students studying abroad for a long period. It had to appeal to provincial governors for more assistance. Unfortunately, ﬁnancial conditions for most Chinese provinces were not much better during this period. Although some provincial governors, like Zhang Zhidong and Duan Fang, were known as strong supporters of study abroad, paying one thousand dollars a year for every student in the United States was too heavy a burden on them, too. In a memo sent to the Court in 1903, Duan Fang, governor of Hubei Province, reported that it would cost over ﬁfty thousand taels annually to support the twenty-three students sent abroad by the province. He had to order all departments to make every effort to tighten their budgets so that money could be saved for this important enterprise.139 In some cases, provincial governments had to recall their students from abroad when they were ﬁnally unable to come up with the necessary funds. In 1900, the Fujian Shipyard terminated its study abroad program and withdrew its students from Europe because of ﬁnancial difﬁculties.140 In order to save money, many provinces sent their students to Japan since it was closer to China and the cost was only one-third of that in the United States. Therefore, the Qing Court’s lack of ﬁnancial resources not only put more control of study abroad in the hands of provincial governors, but also directed more students to Japan instead of the United States.141 By signing a series of treaties, government became a facilitator for educational exchanges between the United States and China beginning in the mid-1840s. Under the protection of the treaties, missionary schools proliferated in China and many Chinese students sailed across the Paciﬁc for education. However, the visible hand, while offering legal protection for educational interactions between the two nations, was still responsible for the existence of a number of major barriers to their further expansion. These barriers not only made the educational exchange of a large number of students and scholars impossible, but also led to a major crisis in U.S.-China relations around the turn of the twentieth century, which would require further adjustment in government roles and policies.

Chapter 2

Tearing Down the Barriers

A

ny substantial expansion in educational interactions between the United States and China depended very much on government since almost all major barriers were set up by the visible hand. The devastating defeats suffered by China and the serious crisis that emerged in U.S.China diplomatic relations around the turn of twentieth century forced the Qing Court as well as Washington to make some changes in their domestic and foreign policies. While the Qing Court took steps to abolish the traditional Chinese civil service examination system and establish modern schools, Washington began to stop its ofﬁcials from mistreating Chinese students at American ports and negotiated the return of a large portion of the Boxer Indemnity to China for the education of Chinese youth in the United States. These government actions, all begun in 1905, helped remove or at least lower all the major institutional, legal, and ﬁnancial barriers to the development of strong educational interactions between the two nations. The unprecedentedly deep government intervention not only paved the road for a drastic expansion of U.S.-China educational exchange, but also brought fundamental changes in its nature and function.

Abolishing the Traditional Civil Service Examination System The traditional Chinese civil service examinations had served the state rather effectively in two capacities since the Sui and Tang Dynasties. One was to select qualiﬁed candidates for government ofﬁces. The other was to provide guidelines for educators and students, who saw passing the examinations and service in the government as their ultimate success. It was through the civil service examinations that the Chinese government was able to make sure that only Confucian classics were taught in school and in appropriate ways. Therefore, no serious reforms could take place in Chinese education until the traditional civil service examination system was changed or terminated. As modern education and new schools were ﬁnally seen as the key to its survival, the Qing Court 34

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decided to abolish the civil service examinations in 1905 so that it could adopt a new and modern educational system in China. With thousands of new schools shooting up all over China and Western learning integrated as part of the new curriculum, there was a desperate need to have more Chinese students trained in foreign countries. As a result, Western educational experience and diplomas replaced traditional examinations and degrees as a new short-cut to successful careers for Chinese students. The rise of modern schools presented the greatest challenge to the Chinese civil service examination system. Although American missionaries were pioneers in introducing modern education to China, the strongest driving force behind revolutionary changes in China’s educational system came from reform-minded Chinese ofﬁcials and intellectuals. Having suffered humiliating defeats by foreign powers in the nineteenth century, some ofﬁcials saw the study of Western learning as the only way to enrich the nation and build powerful military forces (fuguo qiangbin). In order to have engineers, technicians, and ofﬁcers trained to build warships, command a modern army and navy, and establish transportation and communication enterprises, they sent some students abroad and set up a number of modern schools beginning in the 1860s. In addition to Tongwenguan and Jiangnan Zhizaoju, several military academies, such as Naval Academy of the North Sea (Beiyang Shuishi Xuetang) and Tianjin Military Academy (Tianjin Wubei Xuetang), were founded between the late 1870s and the mid-1890s. By the eve of the Sino-Japanese War, there were about twenty-ﬁve modern schools run by the Chinese with an enrollment of two thousand.1 However, these early schools were narrowly focused on a few military-related subjects and run like a traditional Chinese academy. Their impact on China’s traditional education or the civil service examination system was minimal. The demand for modern schools and signiﬁcant reforms in civil service examinations surged after China’s defeat in the war against Japan in 1895. The Japanese victory clearly demonstrated the power of modern science, technology, industry, and education. In order to catch up with Japan, more modern schools were established throughout the nation. In 1896, the Public College of South Sea (Nanyang Gongxue) was established by Sheng Xuanhuai in Shanghai. With American-style textbooks, it was the most comprehensive modern school established by the Chinese.2 In the following two years, ﬁfty-eight modern schools opened their doors in China.3 Zhang Zhidong, one of the highest-ranking Han Chinese ofﬁcials in the Qing Court, published Persuasion for Education (Quanxue Pian) in 1898, proposing that universities should be established in the national and provincial capitals, middle and high schools in seats of prefectures, and primary schools at the county level. The curriculum, Zhang recommended, should include both Chinese and Western learning, with Chinese as the essence and Western knowledge providing the tools (zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong). He also demanded that old eight-leg essays (bagu) be replaced by tests on current events and common knowledge in national examinations.4 Although similar

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proposals might have been presented by other reformers before, Zhang was the ﬁrst to provide a comprehensive national plan for educational reform.5 Modernizing Chinese education was made a center issue in the Hundred-Day Reform (Bairi Weixin) in 1898. Sharing Zhang’s view that Western practical knowledge could be learned and practiced while following traditional Chinese principles, Guangxu Emperor ordered the establishment of new schools, including the ﬁrst national university, the Capital University (Jingshi Da Xuetang), the replacement of traditional academies with modern primary, middle, and high schools, and a ban on the use of the eight-leg essay format in ofﬁcial examinations. Intended as a model for new schools throughout China, the Capital University was established in 1898. Sun Jianai was appointed as the Superintendent of Education (Guanxue Dachen), responsible for the establishment and management of the new university.6 In order to show the new emphasis on Western learning, Sun appointed W.A.P. Martin, the former American missionary and provost of Tongwenguan, as the ﬁrst provost (zong jiaoxi) for the Capital University.7 Following the example of the Capital University, over one hundred new schools were founded and many students were enrolled within a few months.8 While supporting the establishment of a new National University, Li Duanfen recommended to the Court in a memorandum on June 12, 1898, that qualiﬁed graduates from modern schools be sent abroad for education. Li’s proposal was so well received in the Court that it was incorporated in the Bylaws of the Capital University (Jinshi Da Xuetang Zhangcheng) in July 1898.9 Although educational reform received setbacks after Emperor Guangxu was placed under house arrest in September 1898, Empress Cixi was unable to bring about a complete reversal. Despite her orders to stop building new schools and to revive the use of the eight-leg essay format in ofﬁcial examinations, new schools kept growing in China. A machinery school was established in Hubei in November 1898, teaching students how to operate steam engines and lathes, as well as other special skills. Modern education offered in new schools also became more popular among Chinese students. When the Nanyang Gongxue announced its plan to admit seventy new students in 1900, over one thousand students applied for admission.10 Even Empress Cixi changed her policy after another humiliating defeat in 1900. Right after signing the humiliating Treaty of 1901 (Xinchou Heyue) with eleven foreign powers, the Qing Court ordered all provinces to establish military academies to train ofﬁcers in modern science and technology. In another order issued on August 2, 1901, the Qing Court instructed that all traditional academies in provincial capitals should be turned into universities, and that prefectures and counties should establish modern middle and primary schools. At the same time, the eight-leg essay format was ﬁnally banned in examinations for good. In order to encourage students to attend modern schools, the Qing Court issued a new regulation in October 1901, awarding traditional degrees of gongsheng, juren, and jinshi to students at modern schools after passing graduation tests there.11

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With unprecedented sanction and promotion from the Qing Court, the growth of modern schools picked up speed after 1901. In order to provide guidelines for modern schools in the country, the Qing Court approved a series of regulations drafted by Zhang Baixi, the new Superintendent of Education, in July 1902. According to these regulations, all schools, from primary schools to universities, were required to teach mathematics, science, geography, and physical education, among other subjects.12 As a result, Western learning was ofﬁcially included in the new curriculum for all schools in China. In November 1903, Zhang Zhidong and Zhang Baixi drafted a more comprehensive set of regulations and plans, spelling out a universal curriculum for Chinese schools at all levels. The Qing Court approved the requirements and regulations immediately and ordered instant implementation by all provinces.13 Despite the strong endorsement from the Qing Court, the establishment of modern schools did not go as smoothly or rapidly as expected. The reformminded ofﬁcials soon realized that the development of modern education was blocked by the traditional civil service examination system. In a memo sent to the Court on March 13, 1903, Yuan Shikai and Zhang Zhidong reported that most provinces were slow in establishing new schools. While recognizing ﬁnancial difﬁculties and the lack of qualiﬁed teachers faced by all provinces, they pointed out that the greatest obstacle was the traditional civil service examination system. They argued that as long as students were rewarded through traditional examinations, it would be almost impossible for modern schools to be widely established in China.14 In another memo sent to the Court on January 13, 1904, Zhang Baixi, Rong Qing, and Zhang Zhidong emphasized that the continuation of civil service examinations made it impossible to raise money for new schools since local elites were still watching.15 It had become increasingly clear that modern education could not be ﬁrmly established in China until the traditional civil service examination system was removed. A number of the highest-ranking ofﬁcials, including Zhang Zhidong, Yuan Shikai, Zhang Baixi, and Rong Qing, ﬁrst recommended gradual reduction and eventual elimination of the imperial examination system in 1903 and 1904.16 However, a more urgent memo was sent to Empress Cixi on September 2, 1905, recommending immediate abolition of all traditional examinations in order to promote the development of modern schools. Yuan Shikai and Zhang Zhidong argued that their original plan to eliminate the imperial examination system in ten years was too slow and too costly for China. They pointed out that if China waited for another ten years to abolish the imperial examination system, it would have to wait for over twenty years before a large number of graduates from modern schools could be employed by the government and private enterprises. They reminded the Court that China could not afford to waste another twenty years while so many foreign powers were casting their greedy eyes on her. They strongly argued that a powerful and prosperous China could only be built after the traditional examination system was abolished and modern schools were established everywhere in the nation. Despite opposition from

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some ofﬁcials and many intellectuals, the Qing Court approved the recommendation and ended traditional civil service examinations in 1905.17 The abolition of the civil service examinations ﬁnally made revolutionary changes in China’s educational system possible and drastic expansion of educational exchange necessary. As traditional civil service examinations were terminated and natural sciences and Western learning became an integral part of education, modern schools ﬁnally prevailed in China. By 1907, there were 33,605 primary schools and 398 middle schools with about one million students.18 Anyone who wanted to have a successful career now had to attend new schools and study both Chinese classics and natural and social sciences. As thousands of new schools were established, they needed a huge number of teachers and administrators with modern educational backgrounds and experience. Unable to train all the instructors and administrators in China, the Court directed that more teachers and administrators should be sent abroad for education and observation.19 As early as 1903, the Capital University sent thirty-one students to Japan and sixteen students to Europe to be trained as future instructors for the university.20 Other schools and many provincial ofﬁcials also sponsored students for education in foreign countries in order to meet the needs of new schools. The establishment of the Ministry of Education made it possible for the Chinese government to exert centralized control over educational exchanges. In order to continue government control over education, Zhang Zhidong and several other high-ranking ofﬁcials repeatedly recommended the establishment of the Ministry of Education in 1903 and 1904. They proposed that a Minister of Education (Zongli Xuewu Dachen) should be appointed to supervise new schools in all provinces, set up the curriculum, evaluate school regulations, review and approve textbooks, and oversee all other educational matters. He should be assisted by a ministry staffed with competent ofﬁcials in six sections. One of them should be the Section of Studying Abroad.21 The Qing Court approved the establishment of the Ministry of Education in November 1905, right after the abolition of the civil service examinations. Rong Qing was appointed the ﬁrst Minister of Education. When he organized the new ministry in 1906, the Section of Special Affairs, one of the ﬁve sections in the ministry, was assigned to handle all matters related to study abroad.22 Once the new ministry was established, it started to assume a central role in promoting and regulating study abroad programs in China. Emphasizing the importance of learning from the Western nations in China’s educational reform, the Ministry of Education required all Superintendents of Education at the provincial level to take a three-month tour abroad prior to reporting to their ofﬁces. Later, it also instructed all provinces to send selected capable ofﬁcials overseas to observe teaching and management of schools before appointing them to education ofﬁces or new schools.23 In order to get more students interested in study abroad and make better use of the students returned from foreign countries, the ministry began in 1905 to give ofﬁcial examinations to those who had received education overseas. By 1911, the ministry had given seven examinations and

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awarded degrees to 1,388 returnees. All returned students who had successfully passed the examinations received government appointments.24 Yan Huiqin, a graduate from Virginia University who won second place in the examination in 1906, clearly felt that they had received much better treatment than those who returned to China in 1881.25 Chinese students returned from the United States did extremely well in these examinations. In the examination given in 1906, seven out of the eight top scorers were returnees from America. Between 1906 and 1909, thirty out of thirty-six American-educated Chinese students who participated in the four examinations received the highest grades. However, their number was small when compared with students returned from Japan. During the period, 376 Chinese students trained in Japan passed the examinations.26 This disparity clearly demonstrated that the United States lagged far behind in educational exchanges with China at the beginning of the twentieth century. The Ministry of Education also took action to guide China’s study abroad programs through setting qualiﬁcation requirements and directing students to different nations. Although more Chinese students sailed to Japan than to any other countries in the early years of the twentieth century, the Chinese government and educators were not impressed by either the quality of the Chinese students or the education they received there.27 Deeply concerned by the fact that most Chinese students sent to Japan had attended only language or elementary schools, Yang Shu, the Chinese minister to Japan, recommended that a national policy be adopted to cope with the problem.28 Responding to Yang’s recommendation, the Ministry of Education issued an order in 1906, requiring students seeking education in foreign countries to be graduates of middle school, ﬂuent in foreign languages, and of proven good character and health.29 The implementation of the new regulations effectively slowed down the ﬂow of Chinese students to Japan.30 In 1908, the Ministry of Education joined with several other ministries in sending a memorandum to the Court, recommending that an imperial decree be issued to order various ministries and all provinces to send students abroad for specialized education. Attached to the memo was a list of subjects for students to choose from, including machinery manufacturing, navigation, guns and riﬂes, business, mining, and agriculture. Sharing the concerns, the Qing Court ordered the provinces to send more students to European countries and the United States as early as 1902 to correct the over-concentration of Chinese students in Japan. Following the order, many provinces began to send students to Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium in 1903. While France attracted more students than other European countries, Belgium, although small, got an disproportionately large share because of its outstanding schools, lower tuition fees, and equal treatment of Chinese students. By 1905, there were about sixty Chinese students in Belgium.31 Compared with Japan and many European countries, the United States took in a very small number of Chinese students during this period. Most of them were sponsored by either Christian churches or provincial ofﬁcials. In 1901, Sheng Xuanhuai sent nine graduates from the Beiyang Xuetang to the

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University of California at Berkeley. Dr. John Fryer was appointed as the supervisor for the students. They were the largest group of Chinese students to enter American colleges since 1876.32 In 1903, Governor Duan Fang of Hubei Province sent ten students to the United States. The next year, about twenty Chinese students from a number of modern schools in the city of Tianjin and Hunan Province entered American schools.33 The lack of promotion and support from the central government, Qu Lihe argued, kept the number of Chinese students sent to the United States much smaller than that to Japan and Europe.34

Revising Immigration Policy toward Chinese Students The rapid growth of new schools and the increasing demand for educational interactions with foreign nations, including the United States, made Washington’s anti-Chinese immigration laws and regulations even more unacceptable to Chinese ofﬁcials as well as students. While Qing ofﬁcials continued to lodge their strong protests, students in modern schools, including those run by American missionaries, began to play a more active role in organizing grass-roots movements against American immigration policy toward China. The most powerful movement led by students and merchants was the national anti-American boycott in 1905. The possibility of losing the China market, and more importantly, the hearts and minds of the future Chinese leaders, forced Washington to take serious steps to make sure that students, merchants, and other exempt classes of Chinese could be admitted smoothly into the United States. Although his efforts to have the anti-Chinese immigration laws repealed ended in failure, President Theodore Roosevelt did manage to stop overt abuse and mistreatment of Chinese students by American ofﬁcials through a series of strict executive orders in 1905. Once clear rules and procedures for admission of Chinese students were established, it became relatively easy for an increasingly large number of Chinese students and scholars to attend colleges and universities in the United States. Washington continued to strengthen its anti-Chinese immigration laws and regulations at the beginning of the twentieth century. In early 1902, the Treasury Department reafﬁrmed Washington’s policy toward Chinese immigrants through the publication of A Compilation of Laws, Treaties and Regulations and Rulings of the Treasury Department Relating to the Exclusion of Chinese. Wu Tingfang, the Chinese minister to the United States, immediately sent a long note to John Hay on May 19, 1902, demanding the modiﬁcation of several regulations in order to make sure that only laborers would be prohibited from entering the United States. Wu particularly requested the immediate abolition of the ofﬁcial deﬁnitions of students and merchants speciﬁcally designed for the Chinese. He even warned Hay that “if the regulations enforced lately by the Immigration Bureau be continued, the Chinese Government, in due reciprocity, would be expected to prohibit the coming into China of all missionaries, whether clergymen or laymen, of all bankers, of all civil and mining engineers, of all railroad contractors,

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builders, or operators, of all commercial brokers, and of all merchants who did not have an established place of business.”35 The State Department did present Wu’s demands to President Theodore Roosevelt and transmit them to the Department of the Treasury. In his reply to Wu, David J. Hill, acting secretary of the Treasury Department, defended every regulation of his department and declared that he was “unable to make any desired modiﬁcations.”36 Angered by Washington’s refusal to revise any of its anti-Chinese immigration laws or regulations, the Qing Court became more reluctant to send students to the United States and more determined to terminate the Gresham-Yang Treaty, which was signed in 1894 to extend the suspension of the admission of Chinese laborers to the United States for another ten years. The American legation noticed that the Qing Court sent students to Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and Belgium in 1903. When the legation asked why the United States did not receive any, the Qing Court replied that there was no need to send students to both Britain and the United States since they all spoke the same language.37 The real cause, of course, was its concern over possible rejection and mistreatment of Chinese students in the United States. That concern was validated again by a petition sent by ﬁfty-six thousand Chinese immigrants in the United States, reporting insults and humiliations suffered in America and demanding the termination of the Gresham-Yang Treaty at the end of its term in 1904.38 Backed by popular support, Prince Qing (Ch’ing) sent a note to Minister Conger in Beijing on January 24, 1904, informing him that the Chinese government would not extend the existing immigration treaty, which allowed Washington to set a temporary ban on Chinese laborers.39 Since 1904 was an election year, China soon offered to extend the treaty for another year so as to avoid undue inﬂuence on a political campaign.40 Unwilling to give up the existing treaty, Hay ask the Qing Court to withdraw the expiration notice and warned that if the new treaty did not come into force before the old one expired there would be nothing to stop Congress from passing even harsher exclusion laws against the Chinese.41 Hay’s warnings had little impact on Chinese ofﬁcials. Prince Qing, while keeping open the one-year offer, resolutely refused to allow the treaty to be extended for another ten years. The Court, he announced, had to listen to appeals from the Chinese in the United States. They, he believed, had suffered so much that things could not be worse for them even if the existing treaty did expire. China would like to negotiate a more favorable treaty before the existing one elapsed. However, if a new treaty could not be signed in time, the Chinese government preferred to let the existing treaty die.42 The Chinese ofﬁcials believed that all Chinese should be admitted to the United States freely under the terms of the Burlingame Treaty of 1868 if the current immigration treaty should expire. They warned that if any Chinese were delayed or maltreated at American ports, the United States government would be held responsible for the losses involved. Liang Cheng, the new Chinese minister to Washington, even designed and distributed a form for those who had encountered trouble on entering the United States so that he could seek reparation for them from Washington. In

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order to address serious problems faced by Chinese in the United States, Liang Cheng sent the Chinese draft of the treaty to the State Department in August 1904, providing a clear deﬁnition of laborers and allowing all Chinese except laborers to enter the United States freely.43 The negotiation of the new treaty did not go very well from the beginning. Unimpressed with the Chinese draft, the State Department rejected all the major articles proposed by China and insisted that only ﬁve exempt classes of Chinese could come to the United States.44 Unwilling to accept Washington’s counterproposal, Liang Cheng sent a strong note to the State Department, warning that, if reciprocity was applied, almost all Americans would be excluded from China and commerce between the two countries would be paralyzed. Thus, he asked the State Department to “reexamine the negotiations with a view to securing a better basis for our treaty relations than that proposed in the amended draft.”45 Hay transmitted Liang Cheng’s note to Victor Metcalf, Secretary of Commerce and Labor, who was responsible for the enforcement of the exclusion laws. Metcalf refused to make any signiﬁcant changes in the American position. As a result, the difference between the two sides remained so great that the negotiations came to a stop. In order to break the stalemate, the State Department decided to shift the negotiations from Washington to Beijing. Many American policy makers believed that Liang Cheng’s toughness in the negotiations was unauthorized and that it would be easier to deal with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing. Hay ordered William Rockhill, the new American minister to China, to ask permission for American immigration ofﬁcials to work in American consulates in China to verify and issue certiﬁcates for Chinese seeking to enter the United States. Other terms of the treaty were not to be discussed at that time. Hay’s decision to shift the talks to Beijing not only antagonized Liang Cheng, but also alarmed Chinese merchants, students, and intellectuals on both sides of the Paciﬁc Ocean. Distrusting the weak Qing government, Chinese merchants and students believed that they had to do something to prevent another unfavorable immigration treaty from being forced on China. On May 10, 1905, the board of directors of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce held a meeting and passed two resolutions. One urged the Chinese government not to sign a new treaty with the United States that might continue the exclusion of Chinese laborers. The other warned Washington that it had to either modify its exclusion laws within two months to guarantee equal treatment for Chinese, or face a boycott in China. The proposed boycott would stop the purchase and use of all American products, cancel the employment of American ships in transporting goods, keep workers from American ﬁrms and merchants, and withdraw all Chinese students from American schools and colleges in China. In order to guarantee the success of the boycott, the board sent telegrams to twenty-one cities, urging them to join the movement.46 A boycott was nothing new in U.S.-China relations. White American settlers in the West had frequently used the method to drive their Chinese neighbors

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out of the communities shared by both in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The longest anti-Chinese boycott took place in Silver Bow County, Montana. Thousands of white Americans in the county were organized to boycott Chinese shopkeepers, launderers, chefs, servants, and laborers from 1876 to 1901.47 In 1902, the miners’ union in Ouray, Ouray County, Colorado, organized a boycott to drive the Chinese out of that town. The union stationed persons around Chinese stores, warned anyone who intended to deal with Chinese, and circulated threatening notices demanding the departure of all Chinese within a ﬁxed period. Some Chinese moved out of the town because of fear, but most could not move since they had property, merchandise, and vested interests there.48 In both cases those Chinese who were affected by the boycotts had to appeal to Wu Tingfang, the Chinese minister in Washington, for help.49 Having suffered from anti-Chinese boycotts in the United States, Chinese-Americans began to advocate the use of the method as a weapon against the exclusion laws. In 1903, Yikan Chen, the editor in chief of the Xinhua Bao (New China Newspaper) in Honolulu, supported an anti-American boycott because it could put real pressure on Americans while breaking no treaty commitments.50 In order to win support for his proposal, Chen traveled throughout the United States to make speeches among the Chinese. Similar speeches were also given by his followers to merchants and students in China. Therefore, the seeds for the national anti-American boycott in 1905, Zhang Cunwu argued, were imported from the United States.51 Using the boycott as a tool to ﬁght against Washington’s Chinese exclusion laws was well received among at least some Chinese government ofﬁcials. Both Wu Tingfang and Liang Cheng believed that China needed to take a stronger stand against the exclusion policy in order to “regain the respect for the country and redress the grievances of the Chinese people.”52 In early 1905, Liang Cheng reported that Chinese-Americans were talking about a boycott against American products. He supported the idea because he believed that a boycott would threaten America’s lifeline, cause fear among Americans, and lead to the immediate modiﬁcation of the Chinese exclusion policy. At the very least, he argued, it would help China in negotiating a new treaty with the United States. Aware of the concerns of other government ofﬁcials, he pointed out that it would be easy for the government to reject any American complaints since the boycott was organized by merchants. Several high-ranking ofﬁcials in the Ministry of Commerce shared similar views. After a meeting with leading merchants in May, Yang Shiqi, Deputy Minister of Commerce, sent a telegram to urge the ministry to persuade the Foreign Ministry not to sign the immigration treaty with Washington, and wait to allow the boycott to take effect. The Ministry of Commerce immediately sent a note to the Foreign Ministry, asking it to consider the merchants’ demands and follow Yang’s suggestions.53 Although the anti-American boycott was formally initiated by merchants, Chinese students, with their unparalleled dedication, determination, and ability, soon emerged as the most active and effective leaders of the movement. To a

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large extent, they were responsible for turning the boycott from a plan on paper into a mass movement on the ground.54 Students in Shanghai were among the ﬁrst to show their absolute support for the boycott. On May 22, students shut down several schools to protest the American exclusion policy. The dean of the Fong-wang-tu Academy (Fanwangdu Shuyuan) was forced by students to cable the American government demanding the abrogation of the Gresham-Yang Treaty.55 Five days later, over one hundred students, representing twenty-seven Shanghai high schools and colleges, met to discuss boycott strategies. The representatives signed a declaration pledging that their schools would not buy any American products. They also formed a liaison committee that would work with the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, print pictures of the suffering Chinese in the United States, raise funds for the boycott, and teach consumers how to identify American goods.56 Similar actions were taken by students in many other cities throughout China. On June 2, 1905, over 250 students in the Anglo-Chinese school in Fuzhou forced the principal to send messages to President Theodore Roosevelt, the State Department, and some Congressmen, demanding the repeal of unfair articles in the Chinese exclusionist laws. They promised to quit the school if no positive response was heard from Washington.57 Students in Beijing wrote letters to their fellow students and merchants in other cities promoting the boycott, investigated American products and brands for future action, and donated money for boycott activities so as to “enhance the dignity of the Chinese.”58 Guangzhou students not only participated in all the planning and agitation of the boycott movement, but also took the ﬁrst boycott action in the area. Following the resolutions passed at a meeting held at the Guangji (Kwang Chi) Hospital on May 27, students took action to identify the trademarks and brands of American goods, published a list in the newspapers, and stopped buying American goods themselves.59 On June 15, 1905, students in Tianjin urged everyone in schools not to buy American products and demanded that their teachers instruct students in how to recognize American products as part of classroom teaching. Very soon, no American products could be found in schools in these cities.60 As organizers, leaders, and participants, students were more determined and devoted than merchants in the boycott. When Yuan Shikai sent police to stop any preparation for the boycott in Tianjin, most local merchants followed the order with little resistance. But students in Japan sent a telegram to the Qing Court demanding the execution of Yuan. When Rockhill, the new American minister to Beijing, proposed that the boycott should be postponed at least to October so as to give Congress some time to revise the Chinese exclusion policy, some merchants were willing to grant the American request. 61 It was the students who were vehemently against such a delay. On July 19, the Shanghai Student Association (Hu Xue Hui) organized a rally to make sure that the nationwide boycott would start on time. All 1,450 attendees, mostly students from twenty-one schools, agreed that the two-month waiting period had come to an end and the boycott of American products should start immediately.62 It was

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under pressure from students that the vast majority of members of the Chamber of Commerce voted against the delay on July 20. As a result, the boycott ﬁnally started as scheduled.63 Once the boycott got started, students worked even harder to make sure that it would continue until all their goals were achieved. While some merchants kept selling and ordering American products to avoid immediate or future ﬁnancial losses, students took action to completely stop their importation and sale. In Guangdong, they went from store to store persuading merchants to sign the covenant promising not to buy or sell American products. They wanted to deal a heavy blow to the American government so that the Chinese exclusion laws would be abolished completely and all Chinese, including laborers, would be treated fairly and equally in the United States.64 Female students at Wuben School in Shanghai adopted a resolution right after the boycott started to encourage men and women in their families to participate in the boycott until a successful end.65 After the Qing Court issued a decree to stop the boycott, students from the Capital University sent telegrams to Zeng Zhu and anti–exclusion policy associations throughout the country, urging them to continue the boycott. They tried to convince the merchants and other people that the Qing Court was only concerned about possible riots associated with the boycott. As long as they used peaceful methods, they should be able to continue the movement.66 When an increasingly large number of merchants deserted the boycott and resumed trade with the United States, students replaced them as leaders of the diminishing boycott movement. The differences between Chinese students and merchants, and the shift of leadership from the latter to the former, did not escape the observing eyes of American diplomats in China. Following instructions from President Roosevelt, they sent frequent and detailed reports back to Washington on the “Chinese Exclusion Treaty agitation” and the role played by Chinese students in it. In those reports, American diplomats showed clear concern about the strong anti-American feelings among Chinese students.67 Julius Lay, the American consul general at Guangzhou, repeatedly told the State Department that Chinese merchants were calculating businessmen who would not give up a single dollar and were not likely to sustain a boycott for any length of time. But the students, who were interested in having the exclusion laws and regulations modiﬁed or repealed, were entirely different. He observed that it was not the “importers of American goods but literati, or college students who exert a strong inﬂuence among the people and ofﬁcials” at an important meeting held on June 27.68 Similar observations and reports were made by James L. Rodgers, the American consul general at Shanghai. In a memo sent to the State Department a week after the boycott ofﬁcially began, Rodgers reported that the views and actions of Chinese students were “less conservative and their intentions much more hostile.”69 About two weeks later, Rodgers cabled the State Department again to inform it that the Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai was very anxious to stop the boycott and students were “responsible for continuance.”70 In a follow-up telegram,

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Rodgers conﬁrmed that the Chinese Chamber of Commerce was powerless and that Chinese students controlled the boycott situation.71 The strong anti-American sentiment among Chinese students and the leading role played by them in the boycott also caused deep concern among American missionaries, educators, and businessmen. In November 1904, over 230 Americans in China signed a petition and sent it to the State Department through John Goodnow, the American consul general at Shanghai. These Americans urged that “the Treasury Regulations be so amended to foster the desire of the bona ﬁde Chinese students to come to the U.S., by removing the humiliations which they consider are inﬂicted on them by the present method of enforcing the Exclusion Acts.”72 Goodnow, sharing their view, reported that there were at least ﬁfty bona ﬁde students, to his own knowledge, who had gone to Europe mainly because they did not want to submit themselves to humiliating American entrance examinations. On May 19, 1905, all American members attending the annual conference of the Educational Association of China in Shanghai wrote a letter to President Theodore Roosevelt. They claimed that their teaching in China had begun to suffer from the mistreatment of Chinese students in the United States. The strong resentment of Chinese students, they observed, had become increasingly widespread. As more and more Chinese students began to seek education overseas, most of them, they noticed, chose to go to other countries instead of the United States because of the difﬁcult admission process at American ports. As a result, over ﬁve thousand Chinese students went to Japan, with three thousand receiving government scholarships. Since most of the students came from upper-class families, they would deﬁnitely become future leaders of China. If the United States intended to maintain its inﬂuence and position in China’s politics, commerce, and education, the American educators argued, it had to win the goodwill of Chinese students and scholars. In order to achieve this goal, they argued, Washington needed to not only remove the harsh and unreasonable articles in the immigration policy, but also extend a warm and courteous welcome to Chinese students.73 American diplomats in China shared the same concerns and views. Fully aware of the confusion and resentment among the Chinese students, Julius Lay put the blame squarely on immigration ofﬁcers backed by Sargent, the Commissioner of Immigration, who interpreted “the law, treaty, and the vague regulations in such a way that practically every one [of Chinese origin] is excluded.” He demanded that the immigration regulations should be made clear and immigration ofﬁcers should cooperate with diplomats in China. He warned that there would always be bad feelings among the Chinese unless there was a “complete understanding between us.”74 William W. Rockhill, the new American minister to Beijing, made the demand even more explicit. Shortly after arriving in Beijing, Rockhill cabled Washington urging that all Chinese persons who were not laborers should be allowed to enter and reside in the United States. He emphasized that “all Americans in China advocate strongly liberal treatment” for the Chinese.75

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The disturbing reports from China also caused serious concern among many educators and businessmen in the United States. Presidents of many prestigious universities wrote to President Roosevelt demanding better treatment for Chinese students. A group of businessmen, representing a large segment of corporate interests in the country, visited Roosevelt at the White House on June 12, 1905. They delivered a prepared statement asking him to change the Chinese exclusion policy.76 A New York Times editorial made the even more radical suggestion that “the best possible policy of our government would be to repeal the oppressive features of our laws which are in contradiction to our treaty pledges.”77 Under the heavy pressure from missionaries, business leaders, and the media, and faced with the possibility of losing the huge China market and antagonizing a whole generation of young Chinese, American policy makers were forced to make some changes in the Chinese exclusion policy. In his letters to Theodore Roosevelt, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge emphasized that the exclusion of Chinese and Japanese laborers should be done “discretely and reasonably.”78 In a speech given at the eighty-ﬁrst commencement of Miami University at Oxford, Ohio, on June 15, 1905, William Howard Taft, the Secretary of War, asked his audience to consider whether it was “just that for the purpose of excluding one hundred Chinese coolies from slipping into this country we should subject an equal number of Chinese merchants and students of high character to an examination of such an inquisitorial, humiliating, insulting, and uncomfortable character as to discourage altogether the coming of merchants and students?”79 Having been pushing for an Open Door in China, Secretary of State John Hay believed that the implementation of harsh Chinese exclusion laws had impeded the expansion of commercial and cultural ties with China and undermined his China policy. Thus, he wanted the president to “put a stop to the barbarous methods of the Immigration Bureau.”80 John Hay’s concern was shared by President Roosevelt. Although Roosevelt had been a staunch supporter of Chinese exclusion laws, he cared very much about America’s trade with China and wanted to keep the door of the China market open to American commercial and industrial interests. Only a few months ago, Roosevelt had delivered his Annual Message to Congress, urging it to send a commission to China to investigate its market and to set up a permanent display of American products in commercial centers there.81 The last thing Roosevelt wanted to see was the loss of the China market because of the harsh administration of the exclusion laws and regulations. Well informed of the developments in China and fully aware of students’ role in the organization of the anti-American boycott, President Roosevelt sent a letter to Victor Metcalf, the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, on June 16, 1905, ordering him to “issue speciﬁc and rigid instructions” to the ofﬁcials of the Bureau of Immigration that no discourtesy or harsh treatment in connection with Chinese merchants, travelers, or students would be tolerated. He made it clear that American consuls in China were responsible for certifying those Chinese immigrants who were not laborers

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and that these certiﬁcates must be taken as prima facie evidence unless there was the clearest possible ground for overriding them.82 In order to deny MetCalf any opportunity for delay, Roosevelt wrote him again three days later, telling him that he “must arrange for a circular of instructions sufﬁciently drastic to prevent the continuance of the very oppressive conduct of many of our ofﬁcials toward Chinese gentlemen, merchants, travelers, students, and so forth.”83 Once the boycott formally began in July 1905, Roosevelt worked even harder to bring it to a quick end. On one hand, he put heavy pressure on the Chinese government, forcing it to take action to stop the boycott. Rockhill sent a note to the Chinese government on August 28, pointing out that it was Beijing’s responsibility to stop the boycott and to protect Americans in China. He urged the Qing Court to severely punish Zeng Zhu and warned that it would be held responsible for any American damages.84 Roosevelt even considered the possibility of using military force to end the boycott.85 On the other hand, he began a strenuous effort to make serious adjustments to the Chinese exclusion policy. In a letter sent to Rockhill on August 22, 1905, Roosevelt emphasized that he had taken “a far stiffer tone with my own people than any President has ever yet taken,” and that he intended “to do the Chinese justice.” However, he insisted that his chance to get favorable action by Congress would be “greatly interfered with by the failure of Chinese to do justice themselves in such important matters as the boycott and the Hankow concession.”86 In addition to executive actions, he made strong appeals to the public and Congress. In a speech given in Atlanta on October 20, 1905, Roosevelt admitted that the “chief cause of bringing about the boycott of our goods in China was undoubtedly our attitudes towards the Chinese who came to this country.” He insisted that it was right to exclude Chinese laborers. However, he wanted to see the American laws and treaties “be so framed as to guarantee to all Chinamen, save of the excepted coolie class, the same right of entry to this country, and the same treatment while here, as is guaranteed to citizens of any other nation.”87 In order to bring the Chinese exclusion laws in line with his views, Theodore Roosevelt asked Congress to take action. In his State of the Union Message of 1905, he confessed to Congress that “grave injustice and wrong have been done by this nation to the people of China,” and that “the main factor in producing this boycott has been the resentment felt by the students and business people of China.” Thus, he asked Congress to pass a new law that “should be penned, not so as to put people in the exempt classes, but to state that we will admit all Chinese, except Chinese of coolie class, Chinese skilled and unskilled laborers.”88 His recommendations were included in a bill introduced by David J. Foster, a Congressman from Vermont. However, the Roosevelt administration was forced to withdraw its support for the bill under pressure from western states and union leaders. Without strong support from the president, the Foster bill died in the Foreign Affairs Committee. Although the Chinese government refused to renew the Gresham-Yang Treaty, the United States continued to enforce all the anti-Chinese immigration laws without treaty permission until World War II.89

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Despite his failure to repeal all the Chinese exclusion laws, President Roosevelt managed to put a quick end to the boycott and keep the American door open for Chinese students. Pressed by Washington, the Qing Court issued a decree on August 31, 1905, ordering businessmen to stop the boycott, and local ofﬁcials to punish those who would disobey the order. The murder of ﬁve American missionaries in Lianzhou (Lienchow), Guangdong Province, in October, 1905, gave Washington another opportunity to put even heavier pressure on Beijing. In early 1906, Cheng Cunxuan, the governor of Guangzhou and a sympathizer with the boycott, was removed from ofﬁce and many leaders of the movement were arrested. As a result, the boycott lost its momentum by the beginning of 1906 and came to a ﬁnal collapse at the end of the year.90 At the same time, the strict executive orders from President Roosevelt put an effective check on the “the harsh treatment of and unwarranted discrimination against the Chinese in or seeking admission to our country,” and brought about “a more reasonable enforcement of the laws and regulations.”91 Following the president’s order, the Bureau of Immigration, as Adam McKeown pointed out, “backed away from its aggressive reforms in which the success was measured by number of rejections and deportations” and put more emphasis on the need for courtesy and fair treatment. As a result, the rejection rate for Chinese seeking admission to the United States was reduced from 15–20 percent a year prior to 1905 to about 5–6 percent a year between 1905 and 1924.92 Another major obstacle to broader educational interactions between the two nations was thus lowered, if not completely removed. Taking advantage of the more amicable conditions created by President Roosevelt’s executive orders, more Chinese students, including governmentsponsored ones, began to come to the United States for education in 1905. By the end of the year, about forty students from Guangdong and Shanghai were sent to the United States.93 The Capital University ﬁnally sent its ﬁrst group of four students to the United States in 1906 and four more in the following year. By 1908, about four hundred students, an unprecedented number, were sent to the United States by Chinese central and provincial governments. 94 Following the government’s lead, many privately sponsored students also came to the United States. By the end of 1906, over one hundred self-sponsored students had reported to the Chinese embassy in Washington, DC.95 Although the Chinese exclusion laws and regulations remained in effect for the following decades, President Roosevelt’s executive orders did make the admission of Chinese students less problematic and the expansion of educational exchange legally possible.

Returning the Excessive Part of the Boxer Indemnity The termination of the civil service examination system and the establishment of clear rules and regulations for admitting Chinese students helped remove the institutional and legal barriers and demonstrated the willingness of the

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Qing Court and Washington to expand educational exchanges between the two nations. However, more ﬁnancial resources were still needed for any signiﬁcant expansion of educational interactions. Since Chinese students could only draw on limited resources from their families, schools, and other private institutions, ﬁnancial support from government became the key for the expansion of educational exchanges. The surplus part of the Boxer Indemnity paid by China to the United States offered a possible solution. After long negotiations, China agreed to accept Washington’s return of the excessive part of the indemnity and to use it to educate Chinese students in the United States. With tens of millions of dollars ﬂowing back to China, the Boxer Indemnity remission became the biggest single source of ﬁnancial support for educational exchanges between the two nations for decades to come. More importantly, the remission of the Boxer Indemnity for educational purposes pushed both the United States and the Chinese government to transform their role from a facilitator into a sponsor, regulator, and supervisor of educational exchanges. Neither the Qing Court nor Washington had the resources to provide meaningful ﬁnancial support for educational exchange between the two nations at the beginning of the twentieth century. In a memo sent to the Qing Court in September 1906, the Ministry of Education reported that it needed at least half a million taels each year to run the schools directly under its jurisdiction and support students abroad. However, it could only get about one hundred thousand taels from the provinces each year. As a result, the ministry had to ask for help from provincial governors like Yuan Shikai and Duan Fang directly to cover its expenses in 1906. In order to guarantee minimum revenue for the future, the ministry proposed to have large provinces send in ﬁfty thousand taels and small provinces twenty thousand taels each so that it could have a budget of six hundred thousand taels each year.96 The ministry’s dependence upon provincial government for ﬁnancial support clearly revealed its limited ability to implement educational reforms and to send students abroad. Washington’s situation was not much better. Although it did give land to support education in the past, the federal government had never provided direct ﬁnancial assistance to schools or students, especially foreign ones. Therefore, Washington had to look for ﬁnancial resources beyond its regular revenues and budget. Washington found it in the overpayment made by the Qing government for the Boxer Indemnity. As an ally in the Chinese Relief Expedition of 1900, the United States joined other major powers in demanding a huge indemnity from the Chinese government in 1901 to cover the losses and expenses caused by the Boxer Rebellion. Like all other foreign powers, Washington tried to get as much money from the weak Qing Court as possible. When Minister Conger received the telegram from Hay instructing him to ask for $25 million for the United States, he thought that the ﬁgure must be a mistake because it was obviously excessive for American diplomats and generals in Beijing.97 He sent a telegram to Hay seeking veriﬁcation. Conger only ofﬁcially presented the ﬁgure after receiving Hay’s conﬁrmation.98 Hay did instruct Conger to seek the reduction of the

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total of the indemnity and cut the American demand by half if all other powers would do the same. However, Hay’s effort failed because of strong opposition from Germany and other powers who believed that Hay was being hypocritical on the issue.99 Eventually, China had to pay 450 million taels to foreign powers and the United States got 32,939,055 taels, equivalent to $25 million, about 7.32 percent of the total. As claims came in over the next year, Hay began to realize that he had asked too much from China. Somewhat embarrassed by the excessive demand, Hay promised that Washington might return part of the indemnity after covering all losses and costs.100 The possible return of the surplus part of the Boxer Indemnity resurfaced when the immigration treaty between the United States and China was about to expire and the negotiation of a new treaty went nowhere. In order to ﬁnd ways to reduce the tension between the two countries and jump-start the negotiation, Hay informed Liang Cheng on November 25, 1904, that the United States, while insisting on accepting only gold as the indemnity payment, might consider the possibility of returning a portion of the Boxer Indemnity to China.101 Three days later, Hay went through the American draft of the immigration treaty written by the Department of Commerce and Labor. He immediately realized that the American draft “departs so far from the Chinese draft that it cannot possibly be negotiated before Dec. 7 when the old treaty expires.”102 Handing the American draft to Liang Cheng a few days later, Hay asked him to see Victor Metcalf, the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. Hay was sure that “[t]here will be trouble on the 7th December unless we can sign a modus vivendi.”103 Predicting trouble in the treaty negotiations, Hay decided to take some positive steps to keep Liang Cheng in the process. At the Cabinet meeting on December 2, Hay proposed that Liang Cheng should be informed that “we are contemplating a reduction in the indemnity” and that a recommendation would be sent to Congress to “release China from one half of the portion coming to us.”104 Having received a mostly positive response at the meeting, Hay instructed William Rockhill to prepare a document that would be presented to Congress by the president, asking for the return of part of the Boxer Indemnity.105 When Liang Cheng met Hay on December 5, and complained about the American draft of the treaty, Hay made no defense. Instead, he tried to make Liang Cheng believe that “we would before long announce our purpose to give them important relief in the indemnity matter.”106 Obviously, Hay was trying to tie the negotiation of the new immigration treaty with the return of part of the indemnity. He knew that the Chinese government was struggling to come up with enough money to make the indemnity payments and thought that it might be possible to use the remission as a leverage to seduce the Chinese government into making some concessions or, at least, to keep it from going too far in its actions against the exclusion policy. Hay’s tactics appeared to have some immediate effect. When Liang Cheng went to see Hay again on December 19, he talked more about the remission than the treaty. Liang Cheng’s tone was so mild that Hay thought that he might be making some progress with Metcalf.107

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The talk on the indemnity remission continued in early 1905. However, the two sides had quite different focuses. While the Chinese government wanted to receive the return of the indemnity from the United States immediately so as to reduce its ﬁnancial burden, Washington was more concerned about how the returned money would be used by the Chinese government. During meetings with Liang Cheng, Rockhill, the newly appointed minister to China, kept reminding Liang that President Roosevelt wanted to know how the money would be used. Regarding the future use of the returned Boxer Indemnity as China’s internal affair, Liang Cheng openly objected to the American interference. Rockhill had to explain to him that President Roosevelt could make a stronger appeal in Congress for the remission if he knew how the money would be used by the Chinese government ahead of time. He also hinted that the president wanted China to use the money for educating Chinese youth in the United States.108 While insisting that the use of the returned money was a Chinese domestic decision and that he would not make an advance declaration, Liang Cheng, a skilled diplomat with educational experience in the United States, liked to see the returned money be used for educational purposes. In his report to the Foreign Ministry, he recommended that China should inform Washington of its decision to use the returned money to establish schools in China and send students to the United States for education. Liang Cheng supported the educational use of the returned money himself because it would help get the money back sooner, beneﬁt China through training a large number of experts in American colleges and universities, and prevent the returned money from being pocketed by Chinese local ofﬁcials.109 However, Liang’s proposal was not well received among all Qing ofﬁcials. Immediately after receiving Liang’s report, Yuan Shikai, the Commissioner of the Northern Seas (Beiyang Dachen), sent a memo to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rejecting the educational plan. He argued that the returned indemnity money would be better spent in developing mines and building railroads and that only the proﬁts from these endeavors should be used to support modern schools in China.110 Yuan’s recommendations were positively received in the Foreign Ministry. Believing that education did not need such a huge amount of money, the ministry instructed Liang to present the essence of Yuan’s proposal if conditions were favorable in Washington. Otherwise, he should tell the Americans that the money would be used for various kinds of meaningful “new deals” (xinzheng).111 Before Liang could go further on the issue, the negotiations over the Boxer Indemnity remission were interrupted, ﬁrst by the Hankou-Guangzhou (Hankow-Kuangchow) railroad incident and then by the boycott of 1905. On December 22, 1904, Liang Cheng sent a formal note to Hay informing him that the Chinese government had decided to “cancel and annul the agreements made with the American China Development Company,” which allowed that company to build a railroad from Hankou to Guangzhou. He defended the Chinese action on the grounds that the American company had violated the agreement by transferring the rights to Belgians, proved incompetent with the construction of only

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twenty-eight miles of track in seven years, and allowed its foreign employees to recklessly murder many Chinese with ﬁrearms.112 Although President Roosevelt worked hard to keep the concession in the hands of American companies, J. P. Morgan and other business leaders accepted the Chinese offer of $6.75 million and sold the rights back to the Chinese.113 Roosevelt was so angry about the loss of the Hankou railroad concession that he decided to discontinue the negotiations over the Boxer Indemnity remission. The beginning of the boycott movement gave Roosevelt another excuse to stop the negotiations. On July 12, 1905, Rockhill wrote to Roosevelt from Beijing reminding him of Hay’s desire to return the excessive portion of the Boxer Indemnity to China. He suggested that 75 percent of the indemnity be returned and that the money should not be used for the Chinese currency reform.114 Roosevelt disapproved of Rockhill’s proposal “on account of the action, or its [China’s] inaction, in the matter of the boycott and in the matter of this Hankou railway concession.”115 A week later, Roosevelt again wrote to Rockhill, telling him that he was “very much dissatisﬁed with the Chinese attitude” and “in very great doubt how far to go in returning the indemnity to China.”116 Obviously, Roosevelt was trying to use the indemnity remission to force the Chinese government to make concessions on both the Hankou railroad and the boycott. Following Roosevelt’s instructions, Rockhill met with Chinese ofﬁcials on several occasions, telling them that no part of the Boxer Indemnity could be returned to China so long as the boycott continued. The suspension of the negotiations over the Boxer Indemnity remission helped press the Qing Court to issue a decree on August 31, 1905, prohibiting the boycott and restoring normal commercial relations with the United States.117 Despite the strong action taken by the Qing Court to suppress the boycott, the negotiations over the return of the Boxer Indemnity were further delayed by the Lianzhou (Lienchou) incident, in which ﬁve American missionaries were killed in November 1905. Obviously upset by the news, Roosevelt discussed the incident with W.A.P. Martin on November 16, 1905. He strongly believed that the Lianzhou incident was related to the boycott. Based on such a belief, he announced that the continuation of the boycott and the killing of missionaries had made the remission of the Boxer Indemnity impossible, at least for the moment.118 The negotiations over the return of the surplus portion of the Boxer Indemnity ﬁnally resumed in early 1906. Roosevelt approved the resumption of the negotiations for several reasons. First, more details about the activities of the American China Development Company were revealed, which helped justify the Chinese cancellation. Second, the Chinese government took swift action in handling the aftermath of the Lianzhou massacre, thus satisfying most Americans. Third, the Qing Court adopted increasingly severe measures to stop the boycott, including another edict, issued in March 1906, which prohibited students from organizing anti-American meetings and agitation. Fourth, having failed to secure moderate exclusion legislation from Congress, Roosevelt

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desperately needed something else to appease the Chinese students and merchants, who were forced by their government to stop the boycott. Therefore, when Dr. Arthur Smith, a prominent missionary in China, recommended that part of the Boxer Indemnity be returned to China for the education of Chinese youth in the United States, Roosevelt was quick to promise that he would take it up with Secretary of State Elihu Root.119 Once the negotiations were restarted, how the money might be used became the focus again. The Roosevelt administration went back to its original stand that the returned funds should be used to educate Chinese students in the United States. The American position was best articulated by Rockhill, who had the full support of Roosevelt, and other high-ranking ofﬁcials in the government. Although the negotiations over the return of the indemnity money were interrupted after his arrival in Beijing, Rockhill never gave up hope and followed China’s educational reform very closely. While in Beijing, he requested and received translations of all imperial decrees regarding education from Yuan Shikai. He strongly believed that China’s people “must have education on modern lines, which alone can insure them independent existence.”120 At the same time, ofﬁcials in Washington shared the view that the United States would gain a great deal from educating Chinese youth in this country since they would become leaders after their return to China. The educational use of the returned money also received strong support from educators as well as missionaries. Arthur Smith, a veteran missionary in China, was one of its staunchest supporters. Fully aware of the educational reform China was undergoing and the effect of the Chinese exclusion policy on Chinese students, Smith, at his meeting with President Roosevelt at the end of 1905, strongly recommended that the excessive part of the Boxer Indemnity be returned to China. He also insisted that Washington should “propose to the Chinese government to use this sum (which will fall due annually for a generation to come), or at least a part of it, in educating Chinese students in the United States.” He believed that if the money was handed back to China without conditions the funds “would at once be applied to purposes which would distinctly endanger the peace of the world.”121 American educators began to take more concrete actions in the wake of the anti-American boycott. In February 1906, presidents of Harvard, Yale, and Wellesley announced that their institutions would offer ten, twelve, and three four-year scholarships to Chinese students, respectively. The editors of the Outlook highly praised such generous offers. They believed that “nothing has yet been done in this country which will have a greater or more lasting effect in persuading the Chinese that Americans are friendly and not hostile to them.” They also hoped that similar offers could be made by “every American educational institution which has the ability to carry it out.” Drawing from the experience of the ﬁrst Chinese Education Mission, the editors believed that “[e]very Chinese student to whom we can now give a fairly complete university course would be, not only a promoter of friendship between America and China, but a guide and inspiration to China’s new civilization.” 122

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No other American educator had made the importance of educating Chinese students in the United States clearer at the beginning of the twentieth century than Edmund J. James, president of the University of Illinois. In a privately circulated memorandum submitted to President Roosevelt in early 1906, James recommended that the United States government should send an educational commission to China. The purpose was to extend, through the Chinese authority, to the young Chinese “a formal invitation on the part of our American institutions of learning to avail themselves of the facilities of such institutions.” He believed that “[t]he nation which succeeds in educating the young Chinese of the present generation will be the nation which for a given expenditure of effort will reap the largest possible returns in moral, intellectual, and commercial inﬂuence.” Blaming the Chinese exclusion policy and the unfriendly spirit in administering the Chinese exclusion laws and regulations for the loss of Chinese students to Japan and European countries, James was conﬁdent that the United States could win over the goodwill of the Chinese in a large and satisfactory way with only a very small effort. The small effort that should be made by the United States, James insisted, was to “treat the Chinese student decently, and extend to him the facility of our institutions of learning.” Once the attendance of Chinese students at American colleges and universities was secured, James felt certain that wholly beneﬁcial results “would ﬂow from such an opportunity to inﬂuence the entire current of their thoughts and feelings.”123 Although James did not mention the use of the Boxer Indemnity remission in his memo, he did show his strong conﬁdence in American education and his willingness to get Washington involved in enlarging educational exchange with China. With strong support from missionaries and educators, and approval from President Roosevelt, Rockhill made great efforts to get the Chinese government to commit itself to the use of the returned money for educational purposes. He managed to defeat all other proposals presented by some Americans and Chinese ofﬁcials and businessmen who supported the use of the returned money for different purposes. One was the proposal made by Professor Jeremiah Jenks of Cornell University, who wanted to use the indemnity remission to assist the Chinese in their currency reform. In order to stop Jenks, Rockhill sent two memos to President Roosevelt denouncing the scheme as impracticable.124 Another plan was put forth by Willard Straight, a former American consul general at Shenyang (Mukden), who advocated that the money be used to set up a bank in that region. He tried to obtain support directly from President Roosevelt through Secretary of War William Taft. However, Taft had difﬁculties selling the bank scheme to Roosevelt and Root. Straight’s superiors in the State Department warned him not to meddle in the matter any further.125 The most challenging plan was initiated by Fleming D. Cheshire, the incumbent American consul at Shenyang. His proposal won hearty support from Secretary of State Elihu Root, who sent a letter to Shelby M. Cullom, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on May 8, 1906, asking that a portion of the indemnity remission be used to build American consulates in East Asia. Although Root’s recommendation

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was endorsed by the Foreign Relations Committee, it died in the Appropriations Committee.126 By mid-1906, having defeated these competing American plans for different uses of the returned Boxer Indemnity, Rockhill could concentrate on handling challenges from the Chinese. The opposition to the educational use of the returned Boxer Indemnity among some Chinese ofﬁcials was at least as strong and persistent. In addition to Yuan Shikai, Xu Shichang (Hsu Shi-ch’ang), governor general of Manchuria, and Tang Shaoyi (T’ang Shao-i), governor of Fengtian (Fengtien) Province, both tried to convince the Court as well as Washington to use the returned money for the establishment of a bank in Manchuria. In order to sell their plan, Tang paid a visit to Rockhill in Beijing in early 1908. Unimpressed by Tang’s presentation, Rockhill rejected the plan outright.127 The greater challenge for Rockhill was to “persuade” the Qing Court to make an explicit and permanent commitment to the use of the returned indemnity for educating Chinese youth in the United States. His task was made difﬁcult since the Court favored Yuan Shikai’s proposal. Although disappointed with the lack of Court support for the educational use of the returned Boxer Indemnity, Liang Cheng followed the instructions and asked Washington to allow China to determine the use of the returned money.128 His strategy was to be vague on the use of the Boxer Indemnity while actively pursuing the return of the indemnity from Washington. When negotiations ﬁnally resumed in 1907, Liang Cheng and his successor, Wu Tingfang, both focused more on the technical issues of the return. The usage of the returned money was intentionally avoided.129 While keeping pressure on the Qing Court for open commitment to the educational use of the returned money, Rockhill took steps to make sure that American control over the funds would last even after the return. As early as July 1905, Rockhill urged President Roosevelt to see to it that the money was returned in “annual installments.” In this way, Rockhill pointed out, “we would retain our full interest in the indemnity and our rights” and “resume in position to exercise a beneﬁcial and restraining inﬂuence whenever necessary, both on China and the beneﬁciary powers.” In addition to control of the purse, Rockhill sought to require the Chinese government to accept American advice and assistance in selecting and sending Chinese students to the United States. To guarantee direct American control over the education projects, Rockhill insisted that Americans should be appointed to key positions from which they could control the educational mission.130 Rockhill’s efforts were, of course, fully supported by his superiors in Washington. As a former lawyer, Secretary Root strongly believed that the United States should have the right to control the use of the indemnity money returned to China because the money was “given as our money and not as China’s money or as money to which we have a doubtful title.”131 Huntington Wilson, Assistant Secretary of State, agreed that “[t]he return of the indemnity should be used to make China do some of the things we want. Otherwise I fear her gratitude will be quite empty.”132 Such a view was fully represented in Roosevelt’s

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State of the Union Message sent to Congress on December 3, 1907. While requesting Congressional authorization to return the excessive part of the Boxer Indemnity, Roosevelt clearly indicated that the returned funds would be used for educational purposes and that sending Chinese students to the United States would be one of the ways. He argued that educating a large number of Chinese in this country would help the vast and populous Chinese empire “adapt itself to modern conditions” and become a more attractive market for American commercial interest.133 Although Chinese ofﬁcials were vague on the future use of the returned indemnity, they had never openly rejected the idea of using the money for educational purposes. That was enough for Theodore Roosevelt to formally ask Congress to return the excessive part of the Boxer Indemnity to China in December 1907. As the return of the money became imminent from the beginning of 1908, Rockhill began to put more pressure on the Chinese government. In April, he warned the Foreign Ministry that any actions on the part of China that might indicate a disposition to ignore its assurance for the educational use of the returned indemnity money “might indeﬁnitely delay ﬁnal action in the matter.”134 In order to show that he was serious about this, Rockhill refused to take any action after Congress passed the special resolution for the return of the Boxer Indemnity on May 25, 1908. Instead of informing the Qing Court of the passage of the resolution or recommending the start of the remission, he held a meeting with Chinese ofﬁcials, reminding them of the conditions of the remission. Rockhill only ofﬁcially informed the Qing Court of the resolution on July 11, 1908. At the meeting, he told the Chinese ofﬁcials that the Secretary of State was authorized by Congress to decide when and how the money should be returned to China and that he was instructed to ﬁnd out how the money would be spent before any further action might be taken.135 Realizing the seriousness of the matter, the Qing Court ﬁnally decided to make the commitment demanded by Washington so that the return of the Boxer Indemnity would not be further delayed. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a reply to Rockhill on July 14, expressing its gratitude for the friendly action taken by Washington and pledging to send a large number of students to the United States for education.136 In order to meet speciﬁc demands from Rockhill, the Foreign Ministry attached to its memo a supplemental letter, elucidating the Chinese plan. The letter clearly spelled out that the Chinese government would send one hundred students to the United States every year in the ﬁrst four years after the remission started and at least ﬁfty students every year until all the returned money was exhausted. Foreseeing difﬁculties in sending such an unprecedentedly large number of students to the United States, the Foreign Ministry sought personal advice from Rockhill on selecting Chinese students, locating appropriate housing and schools, and obtaining ofﬁcial assistance from Washington.137 The clear and detailed reply from the Chinese government was well received in Washington. Deputy Secretary Bacon instructed Rockhill to express

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Washington’s appreciation for the Qing Court’s willingness to send a large number of students to the United States. He also wanted to assure the Chinese that they could “count on the entire sympathy and hearty cooperation of the United States in this most commendable undertaking.”138 In another telegram sent to Rockhill, Secretary Root had extremely high praise for the Chinese plan to send students to the United States beginning with the ﬁrst remission of the Boxer Indemnity. He regarded the Chinese plan as a new indication of trust and friendship.139 While enjoying the successful handling of the return of the Boxer Indemnity to China, Rockhill was ready to do anything to prevent anyone from derailing the process. When he learned that Tang Shaoyi was appointed as a special envoy to Washington to express China’s gratitude and expected to continue his efforts on behalf of a Manchurian bank, Rockhill warned Root and other highranking ofﬁcials in Washington not to cooperate with Tang. He pointed out that “the carrying out of the educational mission is, in the long run, an inﬁnitely more valuable return for the money than the wildcat schemes it would be employed by the ‘Manchurian Bank.’”140 Rockhill’s strong and clear argument received wide support in the State Department. Having succeeded in preventing Tang from sabotaging his educational plan, Rockhill forced the Chinese government to openly declare that the indemnity would deﬁnitely be used to send students to the United States and that it would not alter that commitment no matter what happened in the future.141 In order to prevent any other possible distractions, Rockhill pushed the Qing Court to work out a more comprehensive and concrete plan to start sending Chinese students to the United States. Responding to Rockhill’s request, the Foreign Ministry completed a draft of Proposed Regulations for Students to Be Sent to America (Xuansong Xuesheng Liumei Zhangcheng) in October 1908. While conﬁrming the number of Chinese students to be sent to the United States, as it had promised, the Chinese document stipulated that “[t]he ofﬁcials appointed by the Board of Foreign Affairs and the American legation will be jointly responsible for the selection of the students who were to be sent to America and for their distribution in American educational institutions.”142 It also called for the establishment of a school in Beijing to train students to be sent to the United States. The document was sent to Rockhill for consultation. After careful review, Rockhill corrected some “errors” and then sent the document back to the Foreign Ministry with some recommendations.143 Only one of Rockhill’s proposals was partially rejected. The Foreign Ministry insisted on appointing a Chinese rather than an American superintendent for Chinese students in the United States. However, it promised to give the ofﬁce only to those who had “graduated from an American university.”144 Having completed the revision, the Foreign Ministry sent the Proposed Regulations ofﬁcially as a Supplementary Note to the American minister in October 1908. Happy with the comprehensive plan, Rockhill pronounced it “perfectly satisfactory” and took action to start the remission of the Boxer Indemnity. Attaching a translation of the Chinese plan to his report to the State Department,

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he recommended that “the remission of the indemnity should begin from January 1 next.” He believed that the Chinese government could start implementing the plan immediately and send the ﬁrst group of Chinese students to the United States for the next fall semester if the State Department approved his recommendation.145 The Chinese plan and Rockhill’s recommendation were both well received in Washington. President Theodore Roosevelt issued an executive order on December 28, 1908, initiating the return of the excessive part of the Boxer Indemnity to China.146 According to Roosevelt’s order, the Boxer Indemnity would be reduced from $24,440,778 to $13,655,492, the exact amount paid to cover all losses and expenses incurred during the Boxer Rebellion. About $12 million should be returned to China, according to the plan. However, since Congress decided to hold $2 million for possible future claims, only $10 million would be returned to China, beginning in 1909. Authorized by the law, Roosevelt decided that China would have to make monthly rather than bi-annual payments to the United States at the full amount set by the International Protocol of 1901, ranging from 1 to 1.6 million U.S. dollars a year until 1940. The United States government would accept $539,588.67 each year and return the rest to China. Since the annual payment varied from year to year, China would receive $483,095 beginning in 1909, $790,196 each year between 1916 and 1931, and $1,380,378 annually from 1932 to 1940.147 (See Appendix A.) This special arrangement for the return of the excessive part of the Boxer Indemnity did not reduce a penny of the payment for all American claims or lighten the ﬁnancial burden for the Chinese government since it had to make the same amount of payment each month. However, it did provide the largest single source of ﬁnancial support for educational exchanges between the two nations and laid the foundation for direct government intervention and cooperation in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century. If the removal of the institutional and legal barriers made the expansion of educational exchanges possible, the return of the Boxer Indemnity made direct and deep government intervention necessary. With such a huge amount of public funds in hand, the government was able to launch the largest-scale and longest-lasting exchange programs between the two nations. The unprecedented government intervention and cooperation also marked the beginning of the transformation of educational exchange from a predominantly private enterprise into a largely state function. Educational interactions between the United States and China were ready for their most drastic expansion in the following decades.

Chapter 3

Qinghua: The First Joint Experiment

T

he ﬁrst Boxer Indemnity remission check was delivered by an American diplomat to Chinese ofﬁcials in Beijing in January 1909, marking the beginning of the ﬁrst joint experiment in educational exchanges conducted by the American and the Chinese governments. With hundreds of thousands of dollars in hand, Beijing and Washington worked together to make sure that large groups of qualiﬁed students were selected and admitted to colleges and universities in the United States without any incidents. Begun as a training school to prepare Chinese students for education in the United States, Qinghua received the most resources and attention from both the Chinese and the American governments, and sent thousands of Chinese students to the United States for higher education within two decades. Although Qinghua completed its transformation from a preparatory school into a national university and forced Washington out of its direct management at the end of the 1920s, educational exchange programs sponsored by government continued to expand. China and the United States became chief partners in the area of education within a couple of decades. It was during this period when government replaced missionaries and other private institutions as major sponsor, regulator, and supervisor of educational exchange between the two nations.

The Indemnity Students Once Washington began to return part of the Boxer Indemnity, the Chinese government had to take concrete steps to select and send students to the United States as it had promised. Concerned more about the possible Americanization of Chinese students, ofﬁcials in the Ministry of Education insisted that only a limited number of adult students with ﬁrm grasp of Chinese literature and language should be sent to the United States for a short period. In sharp contrast, ofﬁcials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led by Liang Dunyan, one of the child students who had studied in the United States in the 1870s, wanted to send 60

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a large number of young students who could really grasp the English language and Western learning. With strong resentment toward students returned from Japan, who had usually studied political science and law, Liang and many of his colleagues insisted that students sent to the United States should focus more on science, engineering, agriculture, and business so that they could make real contributions to China’s reform and reconstruction.1 Such deep divisions among Chinese ofﬁcials made it difﬁcult, if not impossible, for them to work out a plan acceptable to both sides. Impatient with the prolonged debate and inaction among the Chinese ofﬁcials, William Rockhill decided to intervene. He openly disapproved of the stand taken by ofﬁcials in the Ministry of Education, urged the Qing Court to accept the plan drafted by the Foreign Ministry as soon as possible, and demanded that he be allowed to become involved in the matter. In a note sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in May 1909, Rockhill informed the Chinese government that he had appointed the Chinese secretary of the legation to assist in student selection and other related matters. He also informed the foreign minister that the American government had ordered the Commissioner of Education to help Chinese students in choosing and entering American schools and universities.2 Encouraged by Rockhill, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs went ahead, presenting its draft of the Outline of the Regulations on Selecting and Sending Students to the United States (Qianpai YouMei Xuesheng Banfa Dagang) to the Throne on May 29, 1909. While the Court was still waiting to hear from the Ministry of Education, the American legation sent another note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in early June, demanding that the Chinese government should begin selecting and sending students to the United States immediately. It warned that further delay would prevent the students from entering American universities in the fall of 1909.3 Under the American pressure, the Ministry of Education ﬁnally co-signed the memorandum drafted by the Foreign Ministry and re-presented it to the Qing Court on July 10, 1909. The Outline received approval from the Court on the same day.4 The Chinese plan was succinct and comprehensive. Believing that sending students to the United States was important “not only to express our gratitude to America, but also to train more useful talents for ourselves,” the ofﬁcials wanted to set up Youmei Xuewuchu, the Ofﬁce of the China Educational Mission to America (OCEMA), in Beijing. Staffed with ofﬁcials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Education, the OCEMA would be in charge of testing and selecting students, and supervising them while they were in the United States. According to the plan, 80 percent of students sent to the United States should be required to major in agriculture, engineering, business, and mining. The rest could study law, political science, natural sciences, and education. With such a large number of students in the United States, a superintendent would be assigned to manage their ﬁnances, supervise their activities, and provide care for them. The number of students from each province should be determined by its contribution to the Boxer Indemnity payment. In order to make sure that educational

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exchange could be carried out smoothly and efﬁciently, the OCEMA was instructed to consult with American diplomats in Beijing.5 The real focus of the Chinese plan was on the establishment of Yiyeguan, a preparatory school for students to be sent to the United States. The new school would be located in a suburb of Beijing with one hundred students enrolled in both upper and lower divisions through strict examinations given in the provinces as well as in the capital. The upper division would admit students twenty years old or younger with ﬂuent Chinese and adequate knowledge of English as well as science equivalent to that of college freshmen in the United States. The lower division would enroll students ﬁfteen years old or younger with ﬂuent Chinese and special abilities. All subjects should be taught by American teachers and the school should be run like an American school so that its graduates could easily enter American colleges and universities. After brief training, about a year, and rigorous assessment, ﬁfty students from each division would be selected and sent to the United States every year.6 Once the Court’s approval was received, the Foreign Ministry took swift action to implement the plan. Its ﬁrst step was to appoint Zhou Ziqi, one of its deputy ministers, as the director (zongban) to head the OCEMA in July 1909. Within ten days, Zhou set up his ofﬁce in a rented house in the eastern section of the city and completed a plan to select the ﬁrst group of students to be sent to the United States through a series of qualiﬁcation examinations. Pressed for time, Zhou proposed to immediately select the ﬁrst group of students from the upper-division candidates applying in Beijing and recommended by provinces. Accepting Zhou’s plan, the Foreign Ministry sent telegrams to each province instructing ofﬁcials there to select and send upper-division candidates to Beijing immediately for qualiﬁcation examinations.7 In late August, Tang Guoan and Fan Yuanlian were appointed by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Education respectively as deputy directors of OCEMA.8 The appointment of Zhou and Tang, both with educational experience in the United States, made it clear that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would have a greater say in the management of educational exchange with the United States and that it wanted to proceed with the program as fast as possible. The Qing Court’s decision to send more students to the United States received great attention and support from provincial ofﬁcials, who saw it as a good opportunity to train the experts to meet their own needs. In order to take advantage of the grandest exchange program sponsored by the central government in modern Chinese history, Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces sent a joint memorandum to the Ministry of Education, urging it to adopt and publicize the regulations on the selection of students to be sent to the United States so that they could start their selection process. As the most developed provinces along the East Coast, Jiangsu and Zhejiang showed the greatest appreciation for sending students for education in the United States. While accepting the principle that the number of students sent by each province should be determined by its contribution to the Boxer Indemnity payment, they made it clear that they could

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provide more students if the less developed inland provinces could not ﬁnd enough qualiﬁed candidates.9 Fully aware of the concerns of the provinces, the OCEMA adopted the Rules for Student Selection (Kaoxuan Xuesheng Banfa) and sent them to the Bureaus of Education in all the provinces in summer 1909. According to the Rules, all students in upper and lower divisions would be selected through examinations. The former had to take examinations in Chinese, English, history, geography, mathematics, physics, German, or French. All tests would be given in English except those for Chinese, German, or French. The latter would be examined in Chinese, English, history, geography, and mathematics at a lower level. The enrollment of the training school was set at four hundred in order to provide enough qualiﬁed students to be sent to the United States. While the number of upper-division students was not limited, each province was assigned a quota for the lower division based on the contribution made by the province to the Boxer Indemnity payment. Jiangsu Province, with the largest annual contribution, could send twenty-six candidates to the school, while Yunnan and Guizhou Provinces could only send two each. The OCEMA also made some changes, including adopting a four-year curriculum for both the upper and lower divisions and awarding diplomas to those who successfully completed each curriculum.10 By offering a combined eight-year curriculum, the school could easily evolve later into a full-blown institution providing education at secondary and junior college levels. The selection of the ﬁrst group of students to be sent to the United States was organized by the OCEMA in Beijing in mid-August 1909. Over six hundred upper-division applicants took the tests. The ﬁrst tests were on the Chinese and English languages. Only those who had passing scores were allowed to take the second round of tests on natural sciences, other foreign languages, and foreign history and geography. While sixty-eight students survived the ﬁrst round of tests, only forty-seven were able to pass the ﬁnal round, less than half the number of students intended to be sent to the United States that year. Because of the emphasis on English language and foreign history and geography, students with educational experience in modern schools, including missionary schools, had a great advantage in the examinations. As a result, about two-thirds of the qualiﬁed students came from Jiangsu (twenty-one) and Zhejiang (nine) Provinces.11 Although fewer than expected, these forty-seven students still broke the record as the largest single group of Chinese entering the United States. As the ﬁrst group of Chinese sponsored by the government with the Boxer Indemnity remission, the students left Shanghai for San Francisco on board the China in October 1909, under the supervision of Tang Guoan, deputy director of OCEMA. Arriving in Washington, DC, on November 13, the students were too late to be enrolled in colleges and universities for the fall semester. Tang took all the students to Springﬁeld, Massachusetts, where Tang and his fellow students had spent most of their years in the United States three decades ago. Working with Rong Kui, a former classmate and the newly appointed superintendent for

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Chinese students in the United States, Tang managed to send most students to universities and high schools to take preparatory lessons. All of them were able to enter colleges and universities the next year.12 Recipients of government scholarships, the indemnity students (Gengkuansheng) followed instructions and requirements from the Qing Court closely. A vast majority of the students chose to study science, engineering, agriculture, and mining. Only three students majored in humanities, one in political science, and one in educational psychology. More importantly, all the students, except one who died of disease in the United States, were able to earn academic degrees from American colleges and universities, including Harvard, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Princeton, Columbia, Cornell, the University of Wisconsin, and the University of Illinois.13 Therefore, they became the ﬁrst large group of Chinese who were able to complete higher education in the United States. Besides their painstaking efforts, the success of the Chinese students was made possible by the generous support from and close cooperation between the American and Chinese governments. With the returned indemnity money, the Chinese government was able to cover all expenses for each student, including clothing, transportation, tuition, and medical insurance. In addition, each student also received a monthly stipend of $64 to cover their food and lodging. Government support could last for at least ﬁve years and extension was possible if it was needed to complete education and training.14 With annual stipends higher than the annual wages of average American workers, these students were able to concentrate on their studies and complete their education on time.15 The smooth admission of such a large group of Chinese students to the United Sates should also be credited to the special arrangement made by Washington. In order to make sure that the ﬁrst group of Chinese students could enter this country without any trouble, the State Department proposed to the Chinese government that they should be sent as diplomatic and consular ofﬁcials.16 The Qing Court gladly accepted the proposal and issued special ofﬁcial certiﬁcates to the students. This cautious arrangement made by both governments not only guaranteed the safe admission of Chinese students, but also served as the strongest testimony to the ofﬁcial nature of this new exchange program.

From Yiyeguan to Qinghua School The inability to send enough qualiﬁed students to the United States in 1909 gave more urgency to the establishment of the preparatory school. Even before the ﬁrst group of indemnity students left for the United States, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a memorandum to the Throne on September 28, 1909, reporting the seriousness of the lack of qualiﬁed students to be sent to America and the urgent need to open the preparatory school in the coming spring or summer. In order to have the school opened as soon as possible, the Foreign Ministry requested that the Qinghua Garden, a piece of royal property located in a northwestern suburb, be granted as its campus. With about four hundred mu, just under

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seventy acres, the Qinghua Garden was ideal for the school because of its available buildings and space, beautiful environment, and easy access.17 The request was approved by the Court on September 30, and the Qinghua Garden was taken over by the OCEMA on October 25. Happy with the campus site, the OCEMA immediately started to build new classrooms, dormitories, and ofﬁces, and repair the old buildings so that the school could be ready for students the next year.18 Expecting the completion of the construction work by the coming fall, the OCEMA decided to select more students through examinations in 1910. Following the format established a year ago, it ﬁrst gave two rounds of examinations to applicants for the advanced division (diyige) in July. Although there was more time to get the examinations publicized, the OCEMA was still unable to get one hundred students qualiﬁed for education in the United States. In the end, seventy students with passing grades were sent to the United States in August as the second group of indemnity students.19 Through the same examinations, sixty-three students who had received lower grades were chosen as alternate candidates. After taking some brief courses, they became the third group of indemnity students, who were sent to the United States in July 1911.20 The OCEMA was unable to open the new training school in 1910 because of a labor dispute and the late arrival of American teachers. However, it did take steps to change the name, scale, and even the nature of the school during the waiting period. Instead of Youmei Yiyeguan, Preparatory School for Students to Be Sent to the United States, the new school was named Qinghua Xuetang, or Qinghua Academy, in December 1910. The name change, the OCEMA argued, would pay tribute to the emperor who granted the royal garden to the school and reﬂect the changed nature of the new school. In its new vision, the school would have an enrollment of ﬁve hundred, offering advanced education for upper-division students in accordance with an American university curriculum. The advanced training at the school would not only allow the graduates to enter American universities and graduate schools, but also prepare a larger number of students who could not go to the United States to work as experts in various ﬁelds in China. The new name and goal for the school were approved by both ministries and the Court in April 1911. Zhou Ziqi was appointed the superintendent (jiandu) of the Qinghua Academy and his two associates, Fan Yuanlian and Tang Guoan, were appointed vice-superintendents (fu jiandu).21 These changes aroused little concern from Washington since the academy was still expected to send a large number of Chinese students to the United States. The arrival of American teachers in early 1911 ﬁnally allowed the Imperial Qinghua Academy (Diguo Qinghua Xuetang), an ofﬁcial English translation used by the Qing government, to open its doors. With help from the United States Bureau of Education and the Young Men’s Christian Association, the academy hired sixteen American teachers. Arriving in Shanghai on February 11, 1911, they received a warm welcome from Shanghai’s mayor (daotai), Y. C. Tong.22 When they reached Beijing on February 22, the American legation noted that they had aroused “interest among foreigners and natives throughout the

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country in the practical monopoly which America is securing in the matter of educating the Chinese youth, both in China and in America.” Proud of the expansion of educational exchanges, the American chargé at the legation conﬁdently predicted that “the inculcation of American ideals and ideas in the minds of the coming men of China cannot fail to bring the two countries into closer and more friendly relations, and which will increase tremendously our prestige in China.” The Qinghua Academy ofﬁcially opened with 468 students on April 1, 1911. While the middle division (zhongdeng ke), which replaced the lower division at the Ministry of Education’s request, had 325 students, the advanced division had 143 students.23 With such a large enrollment, American teachers had to focus on teaching students in the advanced division, while twenty Chinese teachers were hired to instruct in most subjects for all middle-division students.24 Although American diplomats and teachers liked to treat Qinghua solely as a preparatory school for students to be sent to the United States, Chinese ofﬁcials continued their efforts to build the school as a modern educational institution with a broader mission. According to the Regulations for the Qinghua Academy (Qinghua Xuetang Zhangcheng) drafted by the OCEMA and approved by the Court in 1911, the mission of the academy was to train all-round talents and enhance the national power. To Chinese ofﬁcials, sending students to the United States was only part of its function. Modeled after middle and high schools in China as well as the United States, the academy changed the schooling for the two divisions from four years each to three years for the advanced division and ﬁve years for the middle division. Students were selected through special examinations and all costs were covered by the government except for books and gym uniforms. Adopting the credit-hour system popular in the United States, the academy offered courses in over a dozen ﬁelds, including philosophy, literature, art, music, history, political science, math, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, geometry, geography, and physical education. Since some graduates from the advanced division might not have the opportunity to go to the United States, the academy planned to establish special departments to meet their needs for further education at home.25 Once established, the Qinghua Academy immediately became the new center for educational exchanges between the United States and China. It quickly took over the responsibilities from the OCEMA in selecting students through examinations, offering education for students at different levels, and sending graduates to the United States for higher education. The third group of indemnity students actually spent about ten weeks at the Qinghua before they sailed for San Francisco in August 1911. However, the ofﬁcial transition of responsibility from the OCEMA to Qinghua was interrupted by the Revolution of 1911. With the country gripped by war, most students went back home for safety. At the same time, the Qing government used that year’s remission to cover part of its expenses in suppressing the rebellion. With neither students nor money, Qinghua Academy was shut down on November 9, 1911, and remained closed until May 1, 1912.26

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The transition was ﬁnally completed after Qinghua reopened its doors in May 1912. In a memorandum sent to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Education of the new Republic of China, the OCEMA recommended that the ofﬁce be terminated immediately since the Qinghua Academy was able to take care of all exchange matters. The termination of the ofﬁce, the OCEMA pointed out, could also streamline the administration and reduce the cost.27 The recommendation was accepted by both ministries without any hesitation. Having issued an order to terminate the ofﬁce, they sent a memorandum to Mr. Huang and Mr. Zhang, the representative from the Foreign Ministry and the superintendent of Chinese students in the United States, on May 23, 1912, instructing them to report to the Qinghua Academy in the future for all business matters.28 Qinghua thus became the sole institution responsible for selecting, preparing, dispatching, and supervising Chinese students involved in educational exchange with the United States funded by the Boxer Indemnity remission beginning in mid-1912. Qinghua assumed all these responsibilities in a difﬁcult time. Right after reopening its doors, Qinghua had to send the fourth group of indemnity students to the United States as speciﬁed in the original plan. Although it managed to select a few dozen students, the group was only able to go as far as Shanghai. The political and ﬁnancial chaos in the aftermath of the 1911 Revolution forced them to return to Beijing. They had to wait two more years before they could leave for the United States with Qinghua graduates of 1913 and 1914.29 The lack of qualiﬁed students and the political turmoil made it impossible for China to send one hundred students each year in the ﬁrst four years as it had agreed upon. However, the ﬁrst three groups of students sent to the United States, totaling 180, already exceeded the total number of Chinese students sent to the United States in the 1870s by 50 percent. Older and much better prepared, the indemnity students were able to go to colleges and universities in the United States directly and ﬁnish their college education within a few years. They were the pioneers of a new era in educational exchange between the United States and China. The establishment of the Republic of China after the Revolution of 1911 brought signiﬁcant changes to the nation as well as Qinghua. As part of its educational reform effort, the new Ministry of Education ordered all the elementary and secondary educational institutions to change their names from academy (xuetang) to schools (xuexiao). Following the order, Qinghua changed its name again from Qinghua Xuetang to Qinghua Xuexiao in October 1912. Although Qinghua School is a more accurate translation in English, Qinghua College was more commonly used in an English context. Besides the name, Qinghua saw its ﬁrst major change in leadership. After the 1911 Revolution, Zhou Ziqi was appointed governor of Shandong Province and Fan Yuanlian the Minister of Education. As Zhou and Fan left Qinghua, Tang Guoan became the ﬁrst president of the Qinghua School. Zhou Yichun, another high-ranking ofﬁcial from the Foreign Ministry with a master’s degree from the University of Wisconsin, was appointed as vice-president. With no ofﬁcials from the Ministry of Education working in Qinghua, Fan decided that his ministry would no longer be involved

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in the management of the Qinghua School.30 The withdrawal of the Ministry of Education, the emergence of new leadership, and the broad mission of the school made the rapid growth of Qinghua possible after 1911.31

Building an American School in China The most remarkable growth of Qinghua began after the collapse of the Qing Court. In winter 1913, Qinghua obtained the neighboring Jinchun Garden from the government, doubling the size of the campus. After purchasing another two hundred mu of land, Qinghua expanded to twelve hundred mu, equivalent to two hundred acres, within a few years.32 With more land and money at hand, Qinghua was able to add new buildings and new equipment. In 1917, Qinghua launched the construction of four major buildings, the gymnasium, library, auditorium, and science building. At the same time, Qinghua began to offer more junior college–level courses to its students. The expansion of Qinghua during this period had a very clear goal: building an American-style school in China. The goal was achieved with the joint effort made by the Chinese and American governments. For many Chinese ofﬁcials, especially in the earlier years, it was necessary to make the educational experience at Qinghua as much like that in the United States as possible since almost all graduates were sent to the United States for higher education. Therefore, Tang Guoan (May 1912–August 1913) and Zhou Yichun (October 1913–January 1918), the ﬁrst two presidents of Qinghua, hired more American teachers, adopted an American-style curriculum, used American textbooks, applied American teaching methods, and introduced American extracurricular activities to Qinghua students. Zhou Yichun even ordered chairs, blackboards, and chalk from the United States. When the wellknown English philosopher Bertrand Russell visited Qinghua in 1919, he told his host that he saw a grand American school transplanted in China.33 The Americanization of Qinghua was also the result of the direct intervention and close supervision from the American policy makers in Washington and diplomats in Beijing. With a tight grip on the purse strings and backed by clear ofﬁcial agreement, the United States government exerted direct control over the operation of Qinghua School in almost every aspect from the very beginning. In the earlier years, the Chinese secretary of the American legation was designated to represent the American minister in handling all issues related to Qinghua, especially the use of the returned indemnity funds. In 1914, the American legation persuaded the Chinese government to establish the Qinghua College Committee (Qinghua Xuexiao Weiyuanhui), on which the legation was represented again by its Chinese secretary. The purpose of that committee, as the American minister Paul Reinsch (1913–1919) stated, was to enable “the Legation to keep in touch with the ofﬁcials concerned and to discuss with them from time to time the general policy of [the] development [of Qinghua College].”34 The committee was charged to discuss and decide on all important issues related to Qinghua.

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While the Chinese secretary served as the front man for American control over Qinghua, the American minister to Beijing was the true ﬁeld commander. In order to carry out Washington’s instructions, the minister never hesitated to involve himself directly in handling important issues related to Qinghua. Every now and then he would meet with high-ranking Chinese ofﬁcials and the president of Qinghua to make sure that the school was run according to American standards. Of course, he would report all important issues to the State Department and follow the department orders closely. As a result, Washington was able to efﬁciently manage its educational relations with China through the existing ofﬁces and personnel. Extremely happy with the operation of Qinghua, Paul Reinsch took action to make certain that the school would never be dismantled or fall into other hands. In early 1915, he urged the Chinese ofﬁcials to begin “an endowment fund which would ultimately make the institution independent after the annual return payments of indemnity money shall cease.”35 Reinsch’s suggestion was approved by the Chinese government. The Foreign Affairs Ministry appointed ten ofﬁcials to form the Preparatory Committee on Qinghua School Endowment in August 1917.36 Within two weeks, the committee drafted the bylaws for the new board of directors of Qinghua College, eliminated a number of projects, and cut budgets for others. In order to save money, the committee also limited monthly expenditures for Qinghua School and the student supervisor’s ofﬁce in the United States to $29,000 and $30,000, respectively. With these measures, the committee projected that the Qinghua endowment could accumulate $10 million from the Boxer Indemnity remission in the next twenty-two years.37 The Foreign Ministry accepted all the recommendations made by the committee and appointed all ten committee members as directors of the new board to safeguard the endowment.38 While fully supporting the establishment of the Qinghua College endowment, Washington strongly opposed the appointment of an all-Chinese board of directors for Qinghua. Worried about the emasculation of the power of the Qinghua College committee, which was under American inﬂuence, Reinsch called on the Chinese foreign minister in January 1918, protesting the interference in educational activities at Qinghua by the newly created board and demanding the American legation’s representation on the board if it would continue to function. Offended by Reinsch’s protest, Wang Daxie, the Chinese foreign minister, responded that the American legation had no right to interfere in the management of Qinghua. Extremely unhappy with Wang’s answer, Reinsch, backed by a recent clear policy statement from the State Department, replied with equal clarity and ﬁrmness that the advisory capacity of the legation, agreed upon by both governments, was not conﬁned to the initial stage of the college and should continue in the future.39 Unable to dispute Reinsch’s position regarding Washington’s role in educational exchanges funded with the Boxer Indemnity remission, the Foreign Ministry backed down. In the subsequent meetings, the foreign minister assured

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Reinsch time and again that the newly organized board would only be responsible for the auditing of Qinghua accounts and the investment of any surplus as an endowment, and that it would not concern itself with matters of educational administration and policy. In a meeting with Reinsch in April 1918, the foreign minister further declared that the “informal committee composed of the ViceMinister, the President of Qinghua College, and the Chinese Secretary of the American Legation, served so useful a purpose in facilitating interchange of views upon [Qinghua] College questions that there was no idea to suggest its discontinuance.”40 Thus, the Qinghua College committee continued to play a crucial role in the management of the college while the function of the board of the Qinghua College endowment was very much limited. In January 1920, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reorganized the board of directors of the Qinghua College endowment, leaving it with only three members, two Chinese ofﬁcials from the Foreign Ministry, and the Chinese secretary from the American legation. While the number of directors was reduced, the power of the board grew drastically. In addition to budgetary matters, it now had the power to nominate the president of the college and assist him in handling everything. Since any decision made by the board had to be unanimous, the American director thus had veto power over every issue.41 In order to further safeguard the Qinghua endowment, a new Committee on the Preservation of the Endowment for Qinghua School and Educational Mission in the United States was established in 1921. The committee also had three members, including the minister and the vice minister of the Foreign Ministry, and the American minister to Beijing.42 In addition to the safekeeping and proper investment of the Qinghua endowment, the committee had the power to ask the board of directors of Qinghua to investigate the use of the endowment and other matters.43 With its members’ higher status, the Committee on the Preservation of the Endowment had the highest authority over Qinghua and the related exchange matters. Thus, Qinghua’s organizational chart had been drastically changed. The president of Qinghua, who used to have the highest authority, was put under the board of directors and the Committee on the Preservation of the Endowment.44 In order to make sure that Qinghua would always be run like an American school, Washington insisted from the very beginning that only those who had educational experience in the United States could become its president. Zhou Ziqi, the director of the OCEMA and superintendent of Qinghua Academy, and Tan Guoan and Zhou Yichun, the ﬁrst and second presidents of the Qinghua School, received no objection from Washington since they all met that criterion. When the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to have Fan Yuanlian, the former Minister of Education, take the ofﬁce after Zhou Yichun was forced to resign in early 1918, Paul Reinsch strongly opposed the nomination because Fan had received education in Japan instead of the United States.45 Reinsch’s opposition was strongly supported by Washington. In its instructions to Reinsch, the State Department told the minister to demand that the legation “be consulted in regard

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to the selection of Dr. [Zhou’s] successor,” and to “urge the importance of this upon the Foreign Ofﬁce.”46 Besides Fan’s educational experience, the department could not forget the fact that Fan and his friends had tried several years ago to place Qinghua under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education so that they could establish complete control over the school. With strong support from Washington, Reinsch stepped up the pressure on the Chinese government. In his meeting with the Chinese foreign minister on January 16, 1918, he insisted that Zhou’s successor should be trained in American educational methods. Although Chinese ofﬁcials believed that the American legation did not have any right to interfere with the appointment of the president of Qinghua College, they could not afford to antagonize the legation. As a gesture of compromise, the Foreign Ministry offered to send Fan to the United States for a month to acquire knowledge of the American system of popular education. Reinsch welcomed the proposal, believing that it would provide an opportunity for the United States to inﬂuence Chinese education. He suggested that the State Department provide all possible assistance to Fan and assign an expert to accompany him during his stay in the United States.47 While welcoming Fan’s visit to the United States, the State Department was still unwilling to endorse the appointment of Fan as Qinghua president. Washington’s continuing opposition forced the Foreign Ministry to abandon Fan and nominate Zhang Yuquan for the position. Reinsch immediately approved the new nomination since Zhang had received his college education at the University of California and got a master’s degree from Yale.48 As a result, the tradition set at the beginning of Qinghua was able to continue. Among twelve ofﬁcials who ran Qinghua between 1911 and 1928, eleven had received education in the United States. The only person who did not have this kind of educational experience was Wang Wenxian, who graduated from the University of London. He was only able to run Qinghua brieﬂy between 1921 and 1922 as an executive ofﬁcer without the formal title of president.49 (See Appendix B.) Qinghua presidents had to receive the approval of the American government not only in the selection process, but also throughout their tenures. No president could hold his ofﬁce long at Qinghua without the support of the American legation. In 1920, Qinghua students demanded that President Zhang Yuquan be replaced because of his interference in the establishment of the student union.50 Despite a massive demonstration and strike organized by students, the Foreign Ministry refused either to meet Qinghua student representatives, or to dismiss Zhang. However, Zhang’s handling of Qinghua, especially the student issues, caused strong resentment among American teachers. Having heard the concerns of the American teachers, the legation turned quickly to the Chinese government, demanding the removal of Zhang Yuquan. It was under pressure from the American legation that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ﬁnally agreed to let Zhang resign.51 Besides its direct dealings with the Chinese government over major ﬁnancial and personnel decisions at Qinghua, the American legation managed to

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exert its inﬂuence on curriculum development and campus construction through American teachers at the school. With unfailing help from the legation and their dominant role in Western learning courses, American teachers had a big say in Qinghua’s curriculum from the very beginning. Immediately after the Qinghua School reopened in mid-1912, Hu Dunfu, the ﬁrst provost, proposed that Qinghua should put more emphasis on science and engineering. But his proposal met strong resistance from American teachers, especially P. I. Wold, who insisted that students should take more courses in English, American literature, history, and geography. When neither side was willing to give up their positions, they appealed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Backed by the American minister to Beijing, the American teachers won the battle and Provost Hu was forced to resign.52 As a result, more emphasis was put on non-science courses, which were taught mostly by American teachers in the morning hours, when students were fresh and concentrated. Chinese courses were few in the 1910s and usually scheduled in the afternoon, when students were exhausted from the morning courses. Students would lose the opportunity to go to the United States if they failed to pass any Western study courses, including physical education.53 Fully appreciating the crucial role played by the American teachers in maintaining American inﬂuence and control over Qinghua, the American legation worked hard to make sure that there was a large number of Americans teaching at the school. In its communications with the Chinese government, Washington insisted that the president of Qinghua should have “the advice and assistance of the American Minister” in the selection of teachers for the college and that “the proportion of American teachers should remain approximately as heretofore.”54 Partly because of Washington’s intervention, Qinghua kept a large number of American teachers throughout the 1910s and ﬁred no Americans no matter how unpopular or unqualiﬁed they were. For example, E. K. Smith was regarded by many students as a bad English teacher. They did not want to take his courses and desired to see him out of Qinghua. However, the school did nothing and let him stay for thirteen years until he left China voluntarily.55 The American legation was concerned not only with what should be taught at Qinghua, but with what Qinghua should look like. Under pressure from the American legation, American architects were hired to design all the major new buildings, including the auditorium, the library, the classroom building, the gymnasium, the science hall, and even living quarters for the American teachers. The houses built for the American teachers were so much like those in the United States that they were called “American Land (Meiguo Di)” by the Chinese at Qinghua. In order to make the new buildings truly American, most construction materials and equipment, such as wood ﬂoors, chairs in the auditorium, glass for the skylights, sports equipment for the gymnasium, steel bookshelves, staircases, and thick glass ﬂoors in the library, were all imported from the United States. These American-style buildings cost Qinghua dearly. It had to pay over one million U.S. dollars for the construction of its ﬁrst four major buildings: the auditorium, the library, the gymnasium, and the science hall.56 The

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open and direct intervention from the American legation, as Su Yunfeng pointed out, did contribute to the rapid growth of Qinghua and protect it from disorder and destruction during the warlord period.57 At the same time, it aroused such strong resentment from Chinese students, teachers, and administrators that they began to take action to get rid of American interference and complete control over the school in the late 1910s.

Beyond the Walls of Qinghua While establishing control over the operation and development of Qinghua, Washington made great efforts to extend its inﬂuence over education throughout the whole of China. Its ultimate goal was to reshape the national educational system in China. The method adopted by the American government during this period was to throw the Qinghua examinations open to students from all other schools and colleges, promoting and building a central library in Beijing, assigning academic emphases to different institutions of higher education in the capital, and getting more Chinese students admitted to the United States. Although part of its efforts ended with little success because of the lack of ability and interest from the Chinese government, Qinghua did become a model for modern Chinese schools, and educational exchanges between the two nations went far beyond the walls of Qinghua. Even when the educational use of the returned Boxer Indemnity was still under negotiation, American diplomats in China and ofﬁcials in the Bureau of Education in Washington were mobilized to get more Chinese students to the United States. Taking “deep interest in the progress and inﬂuence of American educational ideas among the Chinese people,” American diplomats in China sent frequent and urgent inquiries to the Bureau of Education under the Department of Interior, asking about “the opportunities open to Chinese students in American colleges and universities.”58 In response to their inquiries, Elmer E. Brown, the Commissioner of Education, requested John Fryer, a former missionary in China and a professor of Oriental literature and language at the University of California at Berkeley, to prepare an account of the educational advantages and opportunities offered to Chinese students by American colleges and universities. Based on survey results from about one hundred colleges and universities, John Fryer edited a book entitled Admission of Chinese Students to American Colleges, which was published by the Bureau of Education in 1909. As the ﬁrst and only government publication specially designed to attract students from a particular foreign country, the book was expected by Elmer Brown to “be widely useful in fostering the new educational relations between the American and the Chinese people.”59 While providing detailed information on American colleges and universities, the Bureau of Education used the book to promote and justify educational exchange between the United States and China. Having taken a trip to China in 1908, John Fryer reported in the book that there was a “‘wild craze’ for western

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learning prevailing [in] all classes of society,” and that there was a “want of competent Chinese teachers and suitable Chinese textbooks.” He supported China’s effort to send the most intelligent young men and women abroad, who, after their return, would prepare new textbooks in Chinese, ﬁll important positions in schools and colleges, and hold ofﬁces in various branches of the government. However, he disapproved of the Chinese practice of obtaining knowledge of Western learning indirectly from Japan. Fryer strongly advised that “it would be preferable for China also to get her knowledge from those countries (the United States and European countries) at ﬁrst hand.”60 He emphasized that many drawbacks that had existed in the past had fortunately been entirely removed and that leading colleges and universities in the United States had expressed their willingness to “receive Chinese students on the most friendly terms and aid them in every possible way.”61 In order to make his argument more convincing, Fryer included essays by Chinese students who testiﬁed that the American colleges and universities furnished “the Chinese youth the best chance” for Western-style higher education.62 The publication of the college guide was only part of Washington’s effort to expand educational exchanges with China beyond the walls of Qinghua. While continuing to give its full support for Qinghua, Washington wanted to make the returned Boxer Indemnity funds available for graduates, both men and women, from all other colleges and schools in China. In April 1911, Mrs. Burton St. John, a teacher at Tianjin Intermediate School, wrote a letter to President Taft, suggesting that part of the returned indemnity be used to educate Chinese women in the United States.63 Mrs. St. John’s suggestion received a positive response from the president and the Secretary of State. In his instructions, Secretary of State Philander Knox told W. J. Calhoun, the American minister at Beijing, that the American government would be glad to see some Chinese women educated in the United States. Since Knox believed that it would be inappropriate for the American government to make such a proposal directly, he instructed the minister in May 1911 to give Mrs. St. John “all the assistance she needs to have a hearing before Chinese authorities.”64 Upon receiving Knox’s instructions, Calhoun, who cared much less about the appropriateness of making demands upon the Chinese government, sent a note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately, urging the Chinese government to send women students to the United States.65 Although Chinese women had never been part of the ofﬁcial educational system and Qinghua only enrolled boys until the late 1920s, the Chinese government, clearly feeling the pressure from the American minister, had no choice but to agree to send ten women students selected from schools all over the country to the United States every other year as Qinghua scholarship recipients. The Chinese government set up a special program for women and sent the ﬁrst group of female students to the United States in 1914. While meeting the same strict academic requirements as male graduates from Qinghua, female students had to follow the rules specially designed for them. For example, female

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students had to be between eighteen and twenty-ﬁve years old and unengaged when they were sent to the United States. The subject ﬁelds for women students were limited to education, preschool education, physical education, home economics, and medicine. They had to attend colleges and universities chosen for them by Qinghua and their stay in the United States was limited to four years, while male graduates from Qinghua were allowed to attend colleges and universities chosen by themselves for ﬁve years with possible extended stays.66 However, many female students widened their choice of majors and extended their stay in the United States beginning at the end of the 1910s. Chen Hengzhe, one of the ﬁrst ten female students sent to the United States by Qinghua, spent six years at Vassar College to get her B.A., and then went to the University of Chicago to obtain her master’s degree.67 Deemed less important than other exchange programs, the scheme to send women students to the United States was extremely vulnerable to ﬁnancial difﬁculties and political changes at Qinghua. The program was postponed in 1920 and the number of female students sent to the United States was reduced from ten to ﬁve every other year from 1923. Under this program, a total of ﬁfty-three female students in seven groups was sent to the United States by 1927.68 The special program for female students was terminated as Qinghua ended its mission as a preparatory school at the end of the 1920s. As soon as the special program for women was up and running, Reinsch began to press the Chinese government to throw open the examinations for the selection of students to be sent to the United States to graduates from all other colleges in China so that educational exchanges between the two nations could be greatly broadened. During the autumn of 1915, Reinsch made repeated recommendations to the president of Qinghua that the selection of students to be sent to the United States should not be limited to just one school. He insisted that those who had graduated from other Chinese professional colleges should have the opportunity to continue their education in the United States if they could pass the examinations given by Qinghua.69 Reinsch’s proposal was not well received among the Chinese ofﬁcials. Although they were willing to send more Chinese students abroad, they wanted it done properly. They did not want to send too many students to any one country since it would give that country a dominant position in China. In order to use government funds, including the Boxer Indemnity remission, more efﬁciently and maintain China’s independence, the Chinese government contemplated, as early as 1914, to expand Qinghua from a high school to a four-year university so that students could have their undergraduate training at home. In this way, Qinghua students only needed to go to the United States for graduate education, which would save a lot of money and time.70 Washington did not like the plan to shorten Chinese students’ stay in the United States or transform Qinghua into a university. It continued to put pressure on the Chinese government to spend as much of the returned money as possible in supporting students in America. In the end, the Chinese government gave in,

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agreeing to send some advanced students from other colleges every other year to pursue postgraduate education in the United States. According to the regulations specially designed for them, those entering the professional student program had to be graduates from professional schools, such as for mining, electrical, mechanical, and civil engineering. They should have the academic capability to enter graduate schools (da xueyuan) in the United States and limit their stay to three years.71 The ﬁrst group of professional students (zhuanke xuesheng) were selected and sent to the United States in 1916. By 1929, nine groups of professional students, totaling sixty-seven, were able to pass the examinations and continue their education in America.72 Although the number of women and professional students sent to the United States was relatively small, this expanded selection process had a great impact on other schools and students throughout China. In order to give their students a better chance to pass the examinations, many schools adjusted their curricula to correspond more closely to that of Qinghua. By the end of the 1910s, it had become a great honor for any student who could pass the Qinghua examinations for study in the United States. While keeping a close eye on the operation of Qinghua, the American legation also tried to intervene in the educational and cultural development in Beijing. When Reinsch met with high-ranking ofﬁcials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the president of Qinghua College on January 2, 1915, he not only laid out his plan for the future development of Qinghua, but also made suggestions about the development of higher education in the Beijing area in general. Because the National University and the Union Mission University were to be located in Beijing, he suggested that “it would be wise to develop the [Qinghua] College in scientiﬁc and technical lines, leaving the National University to emphasize literature and legal training.” In order to assist the development of higher education in Beijing, Reinsch urged that, besides a working library at Qinghua, “the Chinese government should establish a large central library at [Beijing] and that arrangements should be made by which the students of all the different institutions located here could avail themselves of its advantages.”73 He also made it clear that the central library should be very much like the Library of Congress in Washington, DC, with a large collection of Western books and journals. The modern library project remained high on Washington’s list of priorities throughout the 1920s. The State Department even promised favorable “consideration to a plan to devote surplus sums of the returned Boxer Indemnity to the establishing of such a library.”74 However, the library project did not go anywhere because of the lack of interest from the Chinese government.75 Once more Chinese students came to the United States, Washington worked closely with the Chinese government and American institutions so those students could overcome ﬁnancial difﬁculties and complete their educational programs in this country. Suffering from political disorder and economic depression after World War I, many Chinese provincial governments and ministries in the central government had difﬁculty continuing their ﬁnancial support for students in the United States. In May 1919, the Ministry of Education asked

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for a loan from the State Department to help these students. Having never made such a loan, the State Department sent the Chinese request to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and suggested that the Chinese government deal with that organization directly. Reinsch, now retired from his minister’s position in Beijing, also sent a letter on behalf of the Chinese government to the Carnegie Endowment. Elihu Root, the former Secretary of State, was serving as the endowment’s chairman. With Root’s quick approval, the Chinese government got interest-free loans amounting to $70,000 from the Carnegie Endowment between February and August 1920.76 With help from the State Department, the Chinese government also secured loans from several banks, totaling over $180,000.77 These loans allowed the Chinese government to help hundreds of students overcome ﬁnancial difﬁculties and complete their education in the United States. Besides its cooperation with the Chinese government, the State Department worked hard to help American companies and individuals to bring more Chinese students to the United States. In the summer of 1919, some Seattle businessmen tried to get a large number of students from Shanghai to attend the University of Washington. As part of the agreement to help pay the costs, each student would work half-time for certain commercial ﬁrms in Seattle during their ﬁrst two years in the United States and full-time for two more years. The American consul general at Shanghai fully supported the arrangement and asked for permission to grant these Chinese students the Section Six visa, which was usually granted to the exempt classes of Chinese.78 The State Department passed the telegram to the Department of Labor for its approval. However, the Labor Department advised that no student visas should be granted to these young men because they could not be considered as students under the law.79 In a long note to the State Department at a later date, the Labor Department clariﬁed the deﬁnition of “student” by emphasizing that a student should be a person “for whose maintenance and support as a student in the United States adequate ﬁnancial provision has been made or satisfactorily assured.”80 The Labor Department further ruled that no Chinese students would be allowed to pursue any other occupation while in the United States unless approved by Immigration ofﬁcers. The response from the Labor Department received strong protests from American diplomats in Beijing. The American minister there sent a dispatch to Washington asking the department to reconsider the policy. Refusing to accept the decision from the Labor Department, Edwin S. Cunningham, the American consul general in Shanghai, continued to send dispatches to the State Department arguing for the admission of Chinese students into the United States with as few impediments as possible. On June 9, 1920, the consul informed the State Department that British subjects in Shanghai had organized the Anglo-Chinese Educational Committee to encourage the training of Chinese students in Great Britain. Warning that these students would likely become friends of British manufacturers, he urged the immigration authorities to give serious attention to the issue. He insisted that if Chinese students were allowed to work to pay

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part of their expenses, more Chinese students could come and “it would very materially assist in all Sino-American educational matters.”81 James Huston, the American vice consul in Hankou (Hankow), who was also aware of the British effort to train Chinese students in England, suggested that Washington send an educational mission to China to lay before the central as well as provincial governments the many opportunities that existed in the United States. In order to attract more Chinese students, he suggested that “the commission should consult with the Chamber of Commerce in various American industrial centers with a view to placing students during vacations.” He urged that, while excluding Chinese laborers, the United States should “treat the Chinese students decently and extend to them the facilities of all of our institutions of learning.” In this way, Huston argued, the United States could inﬂuence the future development of China “through the intellectual and spiritual domination of its leaders.”82 The strong appeals from diplomats in China ﬁnally produced a positive response from the Justice Department. On February 27, 1922, Harry M. Daugherty, the attorney general, ruled that a Chinese student could be allowed to come and stay in the United States if he worked only in order to provide funds to enable him to maintain his student status.83 The new ruling made it possible for at least some Chinese students to earn part of their tuition in the United States and have extended practical training after graduation. Having failed to pass the Qinghua examinations for professional students, Chen Lifu was able to come to the United States in 1923 with limited support from a relative because of the new ruling. He earned his tuition by working in Chinese restaurants and worked in coal mines in Pennsylvania for over a year after gradation.84 However, with the adoption of new discriminatory immigration laws in the 1920s and the strict enforcement of the exclusion laws, Chinese students did not receive legal permission to work until World War II. The State Department’s attempt to expand educational exchange with China through allowing Chinese students to work part-time while attending school failed.

The May Fourth Movement and the Second Remission Although some Chinese might not like the way in which the returned funds were used, the United States did gain some positive impression among the Chinese ofﬁcials and students since it was the ﬁrst foreign power that was willing to return part of the Boxer Indemnity.85 The positive image of the United States as a generous and just power was reinforced during World War I, especially by Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which emphasized national self-determination and equality among the nations. However, such a positive image was soon seriously damaged when President Wilson agreed to allow the Japanese to continue their control of China’s Shandong Province at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. As a result, the United States became the prime target of the national protest organized by Chinese students on May 4, 1919. In order to repair its relations with China, Washington decided to return the rest of the surplus Boxer

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Indemnity. Following the precedent, the second remission was to be used to improve educational and cultural exchanges between the two nations. Having entered World War I on the Allied side, China sought to regain its control over Shandong Province at the Paris Peace Conference. Immediately after the war broke out, Japan forced Germany to transfer to it the “entire leased territory of [Jiaozhou] which Germany had leased from China in 1898 for ninetynine years.”86 The Japanese control over Jiaozhou and later the greater part of Shandong Province was conﬁrmed through a treaty imposed on China in May 1915. Inspired by President Wilson’s peace plan, the Chinese believed that they could take back the control of Shandong with help from other allied powers, especially the United States, after the war. Many student organizations and intellectuals sent telegrams to the Chinese delegation in Paris supporting their effort to recover Shandong. A telegram sent by students at Beijing read, “11,500 students of institutions of higher learning in [Beijing] pledge themselves [to] support you defending our national rights. Desire you remain ﬁrm to end.” Another telegram from the Shandong Provincial Chamber, the Shandong Educational Association, and the Shandong Chamber of Commerce emphasized that secret agreements regarding Shandong directly violated President Wilson’s Fourteen Points and demanded that “China be saved from those perils into which traitors have betrayed her.”87 However, China’s hopes were soon crushed as all major powers at the Peace Conference, including the United States, gave in to the Japanese pressure. President Wilson abandoned his support for self-determination in order to save his grand plan for the League of Nations, when Japan threatened to withdraw from the Peace Conference if its conditions were not fully met.88 Despite the vehement opposition from the Chinese delegation, the Council of Three decided to endorse the Japanese position on April 30, 1919. When the humiliating news reached Beijing, the Chinese people, especially the young intellectuals and students, were shocked and angered. On May 4, 1919, a massive student demonstration was held in Beijing. Thousands of students gathered in Tiananmen Square and then marched toward the American legation to protest the American policy. Since the American minister was not in the ofﬁce, student representatives left a protest letter and continued their demonstration.89 This demonstration sparked a massive student movement throughout the country. In The Students’ Strike—An Explanation, a pamphlet published in English by the Shanghai Student Union, the students clearly expressed their disappointment in Woodrow Wilson and the United States. They had had great faith in Wilson’s promise of “supporting the weak and giving courage to the struggling,” and rejecting “all secret covenants and forced agreements.” However, nothing was done to help China at the Paris Peace Conference. The Chinese people “looked for the dawn of this new era; but no sun rose for China. Even the cradle of the nation was stolen.”90 Many Chinese students thus came to the conclusion that the United States, like other foreign powers, was selﬁsh and untrustworthy and that China “could no longer depend upon the principles of the so called great leader like Woodrow Wilson.”91

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The same resentment toward Washington’s decision on Shandong was shared by Qinghua students. Although absent from the May 4th demonstration because of the school’s remote location, all students at Qinghua were aroused once they heard the news and jumped into the movement immediately. On the evening of May 4, Wen Yiduo, a sophomore in the upper division, copied and posted a poem written by Yue Fei, a general in the Song Dynasty famous for his heroic defense of the nation, to express his determination to recover the lost territories.92 On the next morning, a meeting of all student leaders was held and a delegation was sent to the city to establish contact with students at other schools. At a rally held at Beijing University, Qinghua delegates declared that Qinghua students would join all other schools in protests.93 At a school-wide rally held in front of the gymnasium, Qinghua students passed a resolution calling for a strike to begin the next day. Students of the graduating class declared that they would not go to the United States until the Shandong problem was resolved. On May 9, all students agreed to send a telegram to Paris urging the Chinese delegates not to sign the Paris Peace Treaty. They swore that they would sacriﬁce their lives to protect the people, the land, and the sovereignty of the Republic of China.94 Woodrow Wilson’s endorsement of the Japanese position on Shandong troubled not only the Chinese people, but also many American leaders. Three out of ﬁve American Commissioners at the Peace Conference, Robert Lansing, Henry White, and Tasker H. Bliss, wrote Wilson expressing their disagreement with him immediately after he had made up his mind to support Japan on the Shandong question. Having denounced Japan’s position, the three Commissioners concluded their letter with these words: “It can’t be right to do wrong even to make peace. Peace is desirable but here are things dearer than peace, justice, and freedom.”95 The American minister in Beijing was sickened, disheartened, and deeply dejected when he received news of the Shandong settlement. He knew that the decision made at Paris would blast Chinese hopes and destroy their conﬁdence in the equity of nations.96 The rise of anti-American feelings among the Chinese people, especially students, and the decline of American inﬂuence in China disturbed many American policy makers, especially those who disapproved of Wilson’s actions at the Paris Peace Conference. Although they wanted to do something to improve the situation, they were too busy ﬁghting over the Paris Peace Treaty in 1920 and early 1921 to take any other action. When the battle over the Peace Treaty came to an end, Henry Cabot Lodge, a Republican senator and the archrival of Woodrow Wilson, believed that it was time to do something about China. On May 25, 1921, he sent a letter to Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, urging him to remit immediately the unclaimed portion of the $2 million of the Boxer Indemnity that had been held to cover further American claims for the losses incurred during the Boxer Rebellion.97 According to the Congressional resolution passed in 1908, the unclaimed part of the money should be remitted to China in one year.98 However, nothing was done for more than a decade. As the Congressman who had introduced the original resolution for the ﬁrst remission, Lodge

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believed that Americans had never done anything “that caused a better feeling toward us in China.” He was certain that the further remission of the Boxer Indemnity would be “a very good political move, and would strengthen still further our hold in China.” He offered to introduce a resolution and push it through both houses if the proposal was approved by the State Department. He reminded Hughes that there was a very friendly feeling toward China in Congress “owing to our sympathy with China in the Shandong business.”99 Lodge’s proposal was well received in the State Department. After studying the proposal for about two months, Hughes expressed his “heartily [sic] sympathy” and sent the senator a draft of a resolution to be introduced in the Senate.100 Lodge brought the bill to the Senate within a couple of days. Blaming the Germans for the punitive indemnity imposed upon China in 1901, Lodge called for a remission at the discretion of the president to assure its proper use. Although some lobbied for a more clearly stated condition attached to the remission, the resolution passed the Senate unamended on August 11, 1921.101 The resolution encountered strong resistance in the House of Representatives. The House Foreign Affairs Committee did nothing about the resolution for months. In order to ﬁnd out the reason for this inaction, John Van MacMurray, an ofﬁcial of the Far Eastern Affairs Section of the State Department, paid a visit to Stephen D. Porter, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on March 31, 1922. Porter explained that a further remission of the Boxer Indemnity was tactically inexpedient at that time because Washington was pushing all European countries to pay their war debt to the United States. Many representatives feared that further remission of the indemnity might send the wrong signal to those countries. Thus, he preferred delaying the action on the remission resolution until March 1923, hoping that by then the heat on the war debt problem would be reduced and that his colleagues could act with more freedom at the end of the session.102 Porter’s explanation and plan were not well received by the State Department. Secretary of State Hughes continued to urge Porter to act on the resolution without any delay. The department was anxious to push the resolution through mainly for two reasons. One was that Russia had formally repudiated its portion of the Boxer Indemnity when it established diplomatic relations with China in 1920. This caused deep concern in the State Department. It was feared that the Russian action might set a precedent for renouncing other treaty rights that Americans enjoyed in China, and draw China closer to Russia.103 A second remission, the State Department believed, would offer the United States a chance to kill two birds with one stone: separating China from Russia and setting an example in handling treaty rights. The other reason was that Great Britain, France, Japan, and a number of other powers were also contemplating the return of part of the Boxer Indemnities to China. The State Department wanted to reinforce the impression that the United States was the ﬁrst nation that started the return of the Boxer Indemnity. Hughes wanted Congress to take positive action immediately so that substantive discussion could be started in Beijing soon.104

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Porter was not convinced by Hughes. He told the Secretary of State that he would not take the resolution to the ﬂoor until its success was assured. He also warned that a defeat in Congress would be embarrassing to American prestige.105 Porter’s concerns were not unfounded. In addition to the fear that the further remission of the Boxer Indemnity would send the wrong message to European countries that owed huge debts to the United States, many Americans were divided on when the money should be returned and how it should be used. Some diplomats, like John Van MacMurray and Edwin Cunningham, believed that the returned money should be used on projects that would beneﬁt both China and the United States, such as the improvement of the Grand Canal and the Huai River, or the building of a railroad between Guangzhou and Beijing.106 Others, like Jacob Gould Schurman and Willys Peck, who resented the apparent indifference of the Chinese toward debts, suggested that the money be used to repay the huge debts that the Chinese government owed Americans.107 Without Porter’s support, the State Department did not have any chance to push the resolution for the second remission through the House of Representatives. While politicians were debating the timing of the second remission, many Americans involved in China entered heated discussions of the use of the returned funds. George Danton, an American teaching literature and German at Qinghua, wrote a letter to the State Department in the summer of 1920, supporting the educational use of the returned money and arguing that educational projects funded by the remitted indemnity were good business for the United States.108 J. C. Huston, the American consul general at Hankou, argued that “[t]he nation which succeeded in educating the greatest number of Chinese . . . will be the nation which for the minimum expenditure of effort will reap the greatest return in moral, intellectual and commercial inﬂuence.”109 Mary Elizabeth Wood, the librarian of Boone University at Wuchang, wanted to devote a part of the remission to establish a model public library in China. With the endorsement from the China National Association for the Advancement of Education, she visited Schurman, the American minister at Beijing, to advocate her plan. After the meeting, she traveled back to Washington and spent six months there lobbying for her plan. She visited eighty-two senators and talked to over four hundred representatives. Deeply impressed by her determination, Representative J. Charles Linthicum promised to amend the resolution to stipulate that the remission should be used for “educational and other cultural activities.”110 Although Americans might be divided on how the returned money should be used, they all agreed that the remission should be conditional. Aware of the fact that other powers were contemplating similar remissions, MacMurray preferred to maintain American control over the remission without openly stating it in the Congressional resolution. He believed that the conditional remission would set a precedent that other powers would use to obtain more control over China.111 Others, including diplomats in China, were less cautious than MacMurray. Willys Peck, the Chinese secretary of the American legation at Beijing, urged that any new remissions require a “tacit or explicit

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understanding” and deﬁnite American cooperation and supervision.112 Agreeing with Peck, Schurman warned the State Department that any unconditional remission “would almost certainly be used for military purposes or wasted on unjustiﬁable objects.” He recommended that the returned money be earmarked in order to prevent its misuse.113 After long debate, Washington ﬁnally took action to return the rest of the surplus part of the Boxer Indemnity to China. In December 1923, Lodge reintroduced the remission resolution in the Senate. Fulﬁlling his promise, Porter allowed an identical resolution to be introduced in the House.114 Following a spirited three-day hearing and debate in the House, the proponents of the educational and cultural use of the remission prevailed. Most witnesses told the House that American education was helping create a republic similar to the United States in China.115 Soon, the House passed the resolution amended by Congressman Linthicum, clearly stipulating that the returned money should be used for educational and cultural purposes. On May 12, 1924, the Senate passed the amended resolution without debate.116 However, President Coolidge refused to sign the executive order to implement the resolution until the educational and cultural use of the remission was secured. Dr. Paul Monroe, a professor at Columbia University, offered his help by proposing a scheme in January 1924. He suggested that the remission be paid to an independent and self-perpetuating board with nine to ﬁfteen Chinese and Americans members who would control the returned money and use it exclusively for educational purposes.117 Monroe’s plan could prevent the misuse of the money by the unstable Chinese government while making American involvement permanent. Therefore, it was well accepted by the State Department and MacMurray collaborated closely with Monroe in working out the details. Monroe’s plan was also approved by the Chinese government, though with some reluctance. The Chinese government accepted the plan for an independent board in order to get more money back as soon as possible. But it did not like to include Americans on the board. In his meeting with Jacob Schurman and Willys Peck on May 28, 1924, foreign minister Wellington Koo clearly showed his desire for complete Chinese control over the remission and mentioned no Americans when he talked about the organization of the board that would handle the remission.118 Under pressure from the American legation, however, the Chinese government ﬁnally agreed to commit the money to a Chinese-American foundation for the advancement of educational and cultural pursuits.119 Once the plan was accepted by the Chinese government, MacMurray worked with Monroe on a constitution for the foundation. Having ﬁnished a draft document, Monroe took a special trip to China. With help from the American diplomats, Monroe succeeded in selling his plan to the Chinese government. Based on the constitution drafted by Monroe, the Chinese president issued an order on September 17, 1924, creating the Chinese Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture (CFPEC). Ten Chinese and ﬁve Americans were appointed as the ﬁrst trustees.120

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Although the establishment of the CFPEC was approved by the State Department, Hughes concluded that its constitution was too broad to ensure the safety of the funds. Therefore, he sent Monroe back to China to revise the constitution. In order to make sure that the revision was taken seriously by the Chinese government, Hughes, following the advice of MacMurray, decided to delay any further action on the remission, waiting for new reports from Beijing.121 At the request of Washington, the CFPEC board of trustees held its ﬁrst meeting on June 3, 1925. At the meeting, the board unanimously adopted a resolution stating clearly that the remission should be “devoted to the development of scientiﬁc knowledge and to the application of such knowledge to the conditions in China through the promotion of technical training of scientiﬁc research, experimentation, and demonstration, and training in science teaching, and to the advancement of cultural enterprises of a permanent character such as libraries and the like.”122 The board also decided that secondary education should be its major focus.123 Having met all American demands, the Chinese minister in Washington went to the State Department on June 11, 1925, asking for the immediate remission of the indemnity. The State Department ﬁnally promised that it would start the second remission right after receiving the formal report from MacMurray in Beijing.124 On his arrival in Beijing, MacMurray, the new American minister, met with J. E. Baker, Roger Greene, C. R. Bennett, and Monroe, the American trustees of the CFPEC. After careful review of reports from the trustees as well as other documents relating to the CFPEC, MacMurray believed that all the demands of the State Department had been met. He then sent his report back to Washington on July 10, 1925, recommending that the remission be started as soon as possible.125 At the same time, MacMurray suggested that, in order to strengthen American control, the payments should be handled directly by the American minister in Beijing.126 MacMurray’s suggestion was immediately approved by both the Treasury and State Departments. The Treasury Department believed that, with the American minister transferring the funds directly, the American government would be able to detect any problem in payments immediately and put pressure on the Chinese government. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg immediately instructed the Shanghai Commissioner of Customs to send the monthly indemnity check to the American minister in Beijing, who would then endorse the check and deliver it directly to the CFPEC.127 President Coolidge ﬁnally signed the executive order and the ﬁrst check was handed to C. R. Bennett and Zhou Yichun, trustees of the CFPEC, on August 27, 1925.128 Some minor changes were made by the two governments later. According to the ﬁnal arrangement approved by the Chinese Maritime Customs and the United States Treasury Department, the National City Bank would draw two checks on the customs account to the American minister, who would then deliver them to Qinghua College and the CFPEC separately. 129 The new payment arrangement might help prevent the returned funds from being used by the Chinese government for noneducational purposes. However,

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the American effort to gain more control over the returned indemnity funds also aroused strong resentment among the Chinese people and ofﬁcials. Washington had expected to see a great outpouring of gratitude from the Chinese after the second remission began. Instead, MacMurray reported only apathy and apparent indifference on the part of the Chinese. Unlike the ﬁrst return of the Boxer Indemnity, the second remission never received any open gratitude from the Chinese government. When MacMurray tried to discuss the second remission with the Chinese foreign minister at a meeting, the latter ignored him and switched the conversation to other topics.130 Responses from students, intellectuals, and rebels were much less polite. Sun Yat-sen, the Nationalist leader based in Guangzhou, insisted that the real purpose of the second American remission was to undermine the inﬂuence of the Russian Revolution and counter the effect of the cancellation of Chinese debts by Soviet Russia.131 Minbao (People’s Newspaper), a popular newspaper in Beijing, ridiculed the American gift as an attempt to undermine the nationalist movement. It declared that “[t]he time when such a gesture could evoke an answering act of cordiality and gratitude is past and gone. . . . What we want,” the paper went on, “is not gold but Liberty.”132 Such a strong sentiment would later be translated into actions aimed at reducing American inﬂuence on China’s schools and educational exchanges.

From a Preparatory School to a University One of the effective ways adopted by Chinese students, educators, and ofﬁcials to reduce American inﬂuence on Chinese education and exchanges was to transform Qinghua from a preparatory school into a university. Despite Qinghua’s success in preparing students for higher education in the United States, Chinese students and educators had deep concerns for its future as well as strong resentment of American control and Qinghua’s status and image as a preparatory school. The ﬁrst attempt to turn Qinghua into a university was made at the inception of the school. However, the ofﬁcial transformation did not begin until 1925 when the second remission of the Boxer Indemnity started. If the lack of ﬁnancial support from the second remission made the transformation necessary, the rising nationalist sentiment among Chinese students, educators, and ofﬁcials made the transformation inevitable. Although Qinghua started as a small school designed to prepare Chinese students to be educated in the United States, its leaders contemplated growing it into a university from its very early years. As soon as Zhou Yichun became the president of Qinghua in 1913, he announced his intention to upgrade the school academically. In the summer of 1916, Zhou sent a formal memorandum to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, outlining his plan to enlarge the enrollment and turn Qinghua into a university. He listed three reasons for his plan. First of all, transforming Qinghua into a university would allow it to send students directly to American graduate schools, which would not only raise the education level of students at Qinghua, but also reduce the cost by shortening their stay in the

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United States. Secondly, receiving undergraduate education at home would help students keep in touch with their own society, a necessary condition for successful careers in the future. Thirdly, building a university now, Zhou argued, would allow Qinghua to survive after the Boxer Indemnity remission stopped in 1940. If Qinghua built all the necessary infrastructure for a university by that time, it could continue its operation with donations from numerous graduates returned from the United States for a long, long time.133 Zhou’s plan, while gaining support from the Ministry of Education, received strong opposition from the United States government. Washington wanted Qinghua to maintain its status as a preparatory school for as long as possible so that its graduates had to come to the United States for their higher education. Therefore, Reinsch openly disapproved of Zhou’s plan, insisting that “the enlargement of the College into a university should be a gradual growth rather than a plan to be publicly announced at this time.”134 Without support from Washington, the transformation of Qinghua into a university remained only a plan among Chinese ofﬁcials and educators for many years. Washington’s opposition, while successful in putting the formal transformation on hold, failed to prevent Qinghua administrators like Zhou Yichun from adopting a high standard in updating its curriculum, hiring its faculty, constructing its classroom buildings, laboratories, and library, and purchasing equipment in the second half of the 1910s and the ﬁrst half of the 1920s.135 Partly because of his ambitious expansion of Qinghua, Zhou received strong criticism and had to leave Qinghua in 1918. However, when all four major buildings were completed by 1921, Qinghua did have the basic facilities for a university.136 Many students found out after their arrival in the United States that Qinghua’s facilities were at least as good as many ﬁrst-rate American colleges and universities. The effort to build Qinghua as a college continued under Zhang Yuquan, the new president of the school. Less concerned about American opposition in the wake of the Paris Conference, Zhang appointed a University Planning Committee (Daxue Choubei Weiyuanhui) and sent the transition plan proposed by the committee to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 1920. In his report to the ministry, Zhang argued that eight years after the establishment of Qinghua there was no need for Qinghua to continue the offering of middle school–level education since a huge number of graduates at that level could be produced in all provinces. Following the committee’s proposal, Zhang recommended that the enrollment of middle school–level (zhongdeng ke) students be reduced and stopped so that the saved money could be used to increase the enrollment of high school–level (gaodeng ke) students. A new university section (daxue bu) should be established at Qinghua to take in graduates from the high school section.137 Having received approval from the Foreign Ministry, Qinghua stopped admitting middle school–level students in 1920, and renamed seniors in the high school section as freshmen of the university section. As a result, Qinghua ﬁnally had its ﬁrst university-level classes. However, the nature of Qinghua was

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not completely changed since it continued to send most of its graduates to the United States, just with more advanced education than before.138 The ofﬁcial transformation of Qinghua from a preparatory school into a university ﬁnally took place during Cao Yunxiang’s tenure as the president. Entering the ofﬁce in 1922, Cao appointed an investigation committee to study all matters related to the transformation. In 1923, a curriculum committee was organized to work out concrete plans and steps for the transformation. In February 1924, Cao invited ﬁve nationally known educators and scholars, including Hu Shi, Fan Yuanlian, Zhang Boling, and Ding Wenjiang, as advisors (guwen) for the founding of the Qinghua University. The University Preparation Committee came up with its ﬁrst draft of An Outline for the Operation and Organization of Qinghua University (Qinghua Daxue Gongzuo Ji Zuzhi Gangyao [Caoan]) in October. A revised version was approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 1925. Following the Outline, a Temporary Committee of University Affairs was organized immediately and the ofﬁcial transformation of Qinghua began.139 In accordance with the Outline, Qinghua was reorganized into three sections: university, preparatory, and graduate studies. The University Section (Daxuebu) was formally established in May 1925. It enrolled ninety-three students in its ﬁrst freshman class in the fall. The Preparatory Section (Liumei Yubeibu) included all students admitted to Qinghua prior to 1925. Since it stopped enrolling any students in 1925, the section would be eliminated in 1929 after the last class left school for the United States. In the future, students to be sent to the United States on Qinghua scholarships would be selected through a national examination open to all university graduates in China.140 On the recommendation of Hu Shi and other scholars, Qinghua established a section for graduate studies in August 1925. Since the most important subject for a Chinese university must be the Chinese classics (guoxue), Hu insisted that Qinghua’s graduate section should ﬁrst focus on the ﬁeld of Chinese classics and even recommended Wang Guowei, one of the most prominent scholars in Chinese classics, as an adviser (daoshi). With the full support of Cao Yunxiang and diligent work of Wu Mi, the Graduate Section was able to hire, besides Wang, Liang Qichao, Chen Yinke, and Zhao Yuanren, the four best-known scholars in China, as its advisers. Over thirty graduate students were accepted through examinations in July.141 Qinghua’s transformation from a preparatory school into a university marked fundamental changes in its mission, curriculum, operation, and management. The new Qinghua was no longer merely a preparatory school for students to be sent to the United States. Instead, it became a comprehensive university aimed at training badly needed experts and leaders in all ﬁelds in China. As a university, Qinghua originally offered three levels of training: general, special, and graduate. The general section (putongke) was established in 1925 and students were required to spend two to three years on general studies once they entered Qinghua. Since it failed to generate any serious interest among students, Qinghua had to eliminate the general section and reduce the required general

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studies to just one year in 1926. Students were assigned to departments for specialized training in the second year. They could earn baccalaureate degrees after receiving at least four years of undergraduate education at Qinghua.142 Dramatic changes also could be seen in the new curriculum for undergraduates. The most noticeable one was the sharp reduction of English and increase of Chinese lessons for undergraduate students. Only preparatory students continued much of the tradition, taking English lessons for about one-sixth of the total class hours each week and half as many hours for Chinese lessons. Undergraduate students in the university section began to have an equal number of units, two each, for both languages. With eighteen units in a week, each counted for three hours of teaching and self-study. Therefore, university students at Qinghua only spent one-ninth of their time on English language and literature, a 50 percent reduction from the past. Although the history of the United States was included as part of the world history course, it was no longer listed as a fourhour course required for all students. More pragmatic courses like machinery technology, contemporary Chinese issues, and sociology were added to the new curriculum. In addition to regular physical education classes, freshman undergraduate students were required to take military training in the second semester.143 All these changes were made to train future leaders for China, not just high school students to be sent to the United States. Besides the changes in the mission and curriculum, Qinghua tried to reorganize the administration of the school and give more power to its faculty. In September 1925, an Administrative Committee of College Affairs (Xiaowu Guanli Weiyuanhui) was appointed by Cao Yunxiang to help run the school. With four of its ten members from the faculty, the committee marked the beginning of faculty participation in the administration of Qinghua. In early 1926, the Qinghua School Reorganization Committee (Qinghua Xuexiao Gaizu Weiyuanhui) was organized by Cao Yunxiang. After a number of meetings, the committee adopted the Bylaws of Qinghua University (Qinghua Daxue Zuzhi Dagang), offering the roadmap for the reorganization of Qinghua.144 The Bylaws gave more power to the newly organized Senate (Pingyihui) and the Faculty Council (Jiaoshouhui). The former, with the president, provost, and seven senators elected by the Faculty Council as its members, had the power to set educational policy for the school, establish and eliminate academic and administrative departments, formulate all regulations for the school, award degrees, and discuss and decide on the appointment and dismissal of professors, lecturers, and heads of administrative departments. They also had the power to review and approve the budget for the school. Sharing the power with the Senate was the Faculty Council. With all professors and directors of all administrative departments as its members, the Council had the power to elect Senate members and the provost, determine the curriculum, discuss and determine the matters needed to be presented to the Senate, and decide on other teaching-related matters.145 All these reforms, as Su Yunfeng convincingly argued, gave professors at Qinghua more power than government regulations had stipulated and marked the drastic change of Qinghua from a

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school run mostly by staff members to a school run mostly by the professors (jiaoshou zhixiao).146 At the same time, they made American interference in the management of Qinghua very difﬁcult, if not impossible. The transformation of Qinghua that took place in the 1920s was made possible by a conﬂuence of many forces. One of them was the rapid growth of higher education in China in the ﬁrst quarter of the twentieth century. The rise of many new colleges and universities put huge pressure on Qinghua, which kept its status as a preparatory school despite its world-class facilities and unmatched resources. In 1912, only four Chinese colleges and universities were in operation. By 1925, there were forty-seven universities in China with over twenty thousand students. Cao Yunxiang clearly realized that if Qinghua did not grow into a university, it would deﬁnitely lag behind and lose its validity as a model modern school in China. In order to remain competitive with other educational institutions and maintain its inﬂuence in China, Qinghua, as most students, educators, and administrators agreed, had to ﬂow with the tide.147 Another factor was the increasingly strong criticism of the operation of Qinghua and the educational mission to the United States in the mid-1920s. Some scholars and ofﬁcials believed that Qinghua was wasting money by spending so much as a middle/high school while all other universities and colleges were suffering from tight budgets. With only about six hundred students, Qinghua’s annual budget was usually several times larger than that of other Chinese universities, including Beijing University and Southeastern University, which had two or three times more students. The average educational cost for a Qinghua student was 1,300 yuan in 1916, 1,722 yuan in 1918, and 2,000 yuan in 1925. In the same years, the average educational cost for a student at Beijing University was 299, 388, and 500 yuan, respectively, less than a quarter of the cost for a Qinghua student.148 Criticism of the extremely high cost of sending Qinghua students to the United States was even stronger. By the mid-1920s, Qinghua sent about one thousand students to the United States at a cost of about twenty million yuan. Averaging twenty thousand yuan per student, Qinghua again exceeded the average cost of sending a student to the United Stats by about four times. (See Appendix C.) Since most Qinghua students enrolled in undergraduate programs rather than enter graduate schools directly, they, not only prolonged their stay in the United States, the critics claimed, but also reduced their contributions to China’s advanced research in science and technology. Therefore, Qinghua should turn itself into a university and send more graduate students to the United States in the future.149 The increasing resentment toward American inﬂuence and control was the third major force that pushed Qinghua onto the road of becoming a university. With the rise of nationalism in China in the 1910s, there came a strong movement aiming at recovering China’s educational sovereignty. Chinese educators openly expressed their resentment toward American inﬂuence on Chinese education, especially its control over the use of the returned Boxer Indemnity. At the tenth annual conference of the Chinese Educational Association, held at

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Kaifeng, Henan Province, in October 1924, Chinese educators passed several resolutions regarding the future of foreign schools in China and the management of the Boxer Indemnity remission. In Resolution No.7, the association demanded that the government take over all existing foreign schools and colleges and that foreigners should not be permitted to establish educational agencies in China thereafter.150 Responding to the popular sentiment, the Chinese government issued orders in 1924 and 1925 to require all missionary schools to register with the government, appoint Chinese as their presidents or vice presidents, stop requiring students to take religious courses in the schools, and make Chinese the majority on boards of trustees.151 In another resolution, educators demanded a change in the name, rules, and bylaws of the CFPEC so that the Chinese could have complete control of the foundation and the money. They also requested that three boards of directors should be established to handle the Boxer Indemnity funds and that 90 percent of the funds should be apportioned mainly among the provinces, which would have the sole power to decide how the funds should be used in education.152 The resentment against American control was rising among Chinese students and faculty members at Qinghua after the May 4th movement. Although most Qinghua students were still eager to pursue higher education in the United States, they wanted to reduce or, better yet, eliminate American intervention in Qinghua. They became more concerned with current political affairs and the management issues of the school beginning in 1919. Like students in many other schools in China, they organized more than ﬁfty student societies on campus and the Student Association began to play an active role in the administration of Qinghua. They managed to force President Zhang Yuquan to resign in December 1921 for his opposition to the Student Association, and drive Jin Bangzheng, Zhang’s successor, out of ofﬁce on similar grounds.153 In December 1923, the secretary of the Qinghua Student Association sent an article to the Peking Leader, an English newspaper in Beijing, protesting the American interference in the management of Qinghua. He was especially angry about the fact that a secretary from the American legation had more power and prestige than the president of Qinghua simply because he was a member of the board of directors.154 Students’ protests against American control at Qinghua received the strongest support from Chinese faculty members. Since the late 1910s, Qinghua hired an increasingly large number of Chinese teachers with master’s or doctoral degrees from prestigious colleges and universities in the United States. In 1914, there were only seven Chinese teachers in the Western learning section (Xixuebu). By 1924, the number jumped to thirty-three, with sixteen Qinghua graduates returning from the United States. Among these Chinese teachers, there were four doctoral, fourteen master’s, and seven bachelor’s degree holders.155 With better educations and higher degrees than most of the American teachers at Qinghua, these young Chinese faculty members were capable of teaching all major courses at the school. They strongly believed that Qinghua could be

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run as an American-style university without depending on American teachers or American intervention. Therefore, they strongly supported the transformation of Qinghua and the recovery of complete Chinese control over the school. To them, turning Qinghua into a regular four-year university would not only enhance its prestige, reduce cost, and shorten students’ stay in the United States, but also gave them a bigger say and better treatment at Qinghua.156 As students, faculty, and administrators began to share the same vision for Qinghua, Washington’s direct intervention in the management of the school faced its ﬁrst serious challenge. However, the fate of the university and Washington’s role in its future development had to be determined by the interaction between the two governments since Qinghua was, after all, their ﬁrst joint experiment.

Chapter 4

From Central Administration to Party Control

T

he expansion of U.S.-China educational interactions was shaped not only by the diplomatic relations between the two nations, but also by political and social forces within each country. In China, the development of education as well as educational exchanges with foreign countries was, to an even greater extent, determined by the central government. Although strenuous effort was made by all Chinese regimes in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, only the Nationalist government managed to build an effective central control over education as well as all the study abroad programs. Taking advantage of its control over schools and educational exchanges, the Nationalist government included its party doctrines in qualiﬁcation examinations required for study abroad, forced students and scholars to join the Nationalist Party (Guomindang) before leaving the country, and imposed close supervision on students and intellectuals in China as well as in the United States. As a result, educational exchanges were turned into an integral part of state as well as partybuilding efforts by the Nationalist Party. If the effective central administration helped keep China’s educational interactions with the United States growing until the Japanese invasion, the Nationalist effort to exert thought control increasingly alienated the Chinese students and scholars.

Taking Over Qinghua University Having purged the Communists in mid-1927, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kaishek) continued the Northern Expedition with his Nationalist army. With help from the military forces led by Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan, the Nationalist army entered Beijing in June 1928, forcing Zhang Zuolin, a major warlord, to ﬂee back to his home base in Manchuria. When Zhang Xueliang, the young marshal who took over the control of Manchuria after Zhang Zuolin was killed in an explosion engineered by the Japanese army, pledged his allegiance to the Nationalist government in August, China was largely uniﬁed under Jiang.1 92

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Faced with challenges from dissident politicians and rebellious “new warlords,” as well as threats from the Communists and the Japanese militarists, the Nationalists made great efforts to consolidate their power through the establishment of a modern state apparatus and reforms in China’s ﬁnance, education, communication, defense, and light industry. In order to meet the need for highly trained experts and specialists in various ﬁelds, further expansion of educational exchanges with foreign countries, especially the United States, became essential to the survival and success of the Nationalist regime. Qinghua, as a unique institution in China’s higher education and international educational exchange, was the prime target for political control and educational reform under the new Nationalist regime. However, its early effort to impose tight control over Qinghua was impeded by inﬁghting among competing government ofﬁces. Legally, the University Council (Daxueyuan) had authority over all educational institutions in China, including Qinghua. The Foreign Ministry, claiming its special historical ties, refused to give up its control over the school completely. Unwilling to damage his relations with the Foreign Ministry or interrupt students’ education at Qinghua, Cai Yuanpei, the director of the University Council, agreed to put Qinghua under joint jurisdiction. Recognizing the concession made by Cai, the Foreign Ministry allowed the University Council to play a major role in managing Qinghua.2 Once the agreement was reached, the two ofﬁces began to work on the reorganization of Qinghua immediately. By the end of July 1928, the Bylaws of the National Qinghua University (Guoli Qinghua Daxue Tiaoli) were completed, providing a new framework for Qinghua. The Nationalist reform effort at Qinghua was not well received in Washington. Tang Yueliang, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, did contact John MacMurray before the new Bylaws were made public. However, MacMurray refused to give his support because he believed that all the drastic changes were made without consulting the American legation and that the request for his approval was done “apparently as a matter of courtesy.” Unwilling to give up American inﬂuence and control over Qinghua so easily, MacMurray tried to press the Chinese government, as he and many of his predecessors had done in the past, to alter its decisions. He deplored the abolition of the old board of directors of Qinghua College and warned that if the proposed changes were implemented by the Nationalist government, he would consider it a “violation of the understanding upon which the American government was giving the money month by month” and reconsider “whether the Board thus set up by the national government was in fact the same legal entity as that to which I am, for my part, authorized to pay the monthly installment.” MacMurray urged Tang to contact Dr. Wang Zhengting (C. T. Wang), the foreign minister, “explaining the matter and asking him to proceed slowly and to do whatever might be possible to avoid the presentation of such an issue, with the appearance of having slapped in the face of those who have desired to be helpful to China.”3 MacMurray’s warning had little effect on the new Nationalist government. Tang told the American minister that the Government Council (Zhengfuyuan)

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had committed itself and would not withdraw from the position it had taken.4 Infuriated by Tang’s response, MacMurray took steps to increase pressure on the Nationalist regime. On August 1, 1928, he sent a note to Tang, denouncing the elimination of the old board of directors of Qinghua and declaring that he would not sit on the board of trustees of the Qinghua Endowment Fund, as the new Bylaws provided.5 A few days later, MacMurray also revealed his discontent over the appointment of Luo Jialun (Chia Lun Lo), a former secretary of Jiang Jieshi and deputy provost of the Central Party School (Zhongyang Dangwu Xuexiao) of the Nationalist Party, as the new president of Qinghua University by refusing to express any opinion on the issue.6 Caring little about MacMurray’s opposition, the Nationalist government went ahead, announcing the appointment of Luo Jialun in mid-August, and issuing the new Bylaws a couple of weeks later.7 According to the new Bylaws, the school was renamed as the National Qinghua University (Guoli Qinghua Daxue) and would be run jointly by the University Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a national university, its mission was to “seek the independent development of Chinese scholarship for the construction of a new China.” Since the American minister refused to serve on the board of trustees for the Qinghua Endowment Fund, the Bylaws did not include it as part of the organizational structure of Qinghua. The management of Qinghua was put in the hands of a new board of directors composed of nine Chinese members appointed by the University Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.8 Despite the absence of endorsement from the American legation, Luo Jialun was sworn in as the ﬁrst president of Qinghua University appointed by the Nationalist government on September 18, 1928. The ceremony was attended by numerous high-ranking Nationalist ofﬁcials and ofﬁcers. In his inaugural speech, Luo told his audience that the goal of the Nationalist revolution was to obtain independence, freedom, and equal status for China. In order to gain such a status, Luo continued, China’s academia had to be independent and free ﬁrst. It was for that purpose, Luo explained, that Qinghua was changed into a national university. He formally declared that “Qinghua’s life as a preparatory school for Chinese students to be educated in the United States has come to an end and its life as a complete and comprehensive national university has started.” As a national university, Luo emphasized, Qinghua should naturally be devoted to the study and development of Chinese culture. Studying sciences and Western culture was important to Luo. However, he believed that it could be done more effectively through inviting top-ranked scholars from the West to teach at Qinghua.9 With strong support from the Nationalist government, Luo started his reform of Qinghua right after the inauguration. Within a few months, he managed to reorganize many departments and administrative ofﬁces, increase enrollment, require all students to pay tuition fees, revise the curriculum, start military training for all students, and raise salaries for professors, especially those with national reputations. Besides organizational and curricular changes, Luo terminated all employment contracts signed by the old Qinghua School. New oneyear contracts were issued by the university to all faculty members, including

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American teachers, on October 29, 1928. Although the step was taken to make sure that only qualiﬁed teachers would be hired to teach at the new national university, it effectively ended the guaranteed employment enjoyed by American teachers at Qinghua.10 As a result, the number of American teachers dropped from twenty-ﬁve in 1918 to about a handful in 1928. Like their Chinese counterparts, American teachers had to have college degrees, preferably a master’s or doctorate.11 With the reduction in number, the inﬂuence and power of American teachers at Qinghua quickly declined. Besides the immediate changes, Luo worked out a comprehensive and long-term reform plan for Qinghua. In order to turn Qinghua into a real national university, Luo wanted to add science labs, enlarge the library, build more dormitories, and buy more books and experimental instruments. The huge amount of money needed for the expansion, according to Luo, should come from Qinghua’s exchange programs with the United States. He proposed to reduce the number of students sent to the United States each year between 1929 and 1931 to ten and to limit their stay in the United States to three years. Whether any students would be sent to the United States after 1931 was a decision that would be made later. Unhappy to see that three-ﬁfths of Qinghua’s annual revenue was spent to support a huge number of students in the United States, Luo wanted to limit the budget for educational exchanges to $480,000 a year. To Luo, cutting the exchange program with the United States would not only help the current transformation of Qinghua, but also secure a solid ﬁnancial foundation for the future of the university.12 Luo’s plan to expand Qinghua at the expense of educational exchanges with the United States was vehemently opposed by the board of directors. Dominated by members appointed by the Foreign Ministry who deeply cared about China’s relations with the United States, the board did not want to further antagonize Washington right after throwing the Americans out of the management of Qinghua. Openly rejecting Luo’s expansion plan, the board refused to approve the Qinghua Endowment funds for construction projects at its ﬁrst meeting in Nanjing on November 29, 1928.13 Unable to get any support from the board of directors, Luo had to get loans from banks to build the desperately needed dormitory, biology hall, library addition, and the weather station.14 Unhappy about Luo’s insistence on expansion and his planned reduction of exchange programs, the board decided to cut the university’s budget at its second meeting, in April 1929, so that Qinghua could send thirty students to the United States every year.15 The board’s decisions, aimed at maintaining amicable relations with Washington, deeply antagonized professors and students at Qinghua, who believed that the future of the university was threatened. As soon as they heard the rumor that half of Qinghua’s funds had fallen victim to mismanagement and graft, Qinghua students and faculty launched a movement demanding the abolition of the board of directors, an audit of all Qinghua accounts, and termination of the administrative supervision by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On

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April 6, the Faculty Council met and decided to resign collectively to protest the board’s rejection of the development plan approved by the faculty and to urge the reorganization of the board of directors. On the next day, Qinghua students held a meeting, making similar demands. In addition to the abolition of the board of directors, the students asked the government to give the complete charge of Qinghua to the Ministry of Education, which had replaced the University Council in October 1928. They believed that placing the university under the control of the Ministry of Education would make American interference almost impossible and make Qinghua a completely Chinese institution.16 The Senate articulated its concerns at a meeting on April 8, insisting that faculty should have the power to run the university and sending two professors to Nanjing to petition the government.17 Luo Jialun showed his indignation at the board’s decision by turning in his resignation in April 1929. In his resignation letter and his interview with reporters in Shanghai, Luo continued his attack on the drastic budget cut, the confusing afﬁliation of Qinghua under both Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Education, and the mismanagement of Qinghua funds by the Foreign Ministry and the American legation.18 Luo’s open criticism further intensiﬁed the debate over the future of Qinghua. The Ministry of Education gave its sympathy and support to the anti-board movement. Jiang Mengling, the Minister of Education, issued an order on April 20, 1929, praising the reforms made by Luo at Qinghua and asking him to stay in ofﬁce. In order to have Luo withdraw his resignation, Jiang promised to review Qinghua’s budget with the Foreign Ministry and make sure that Qinghua would have enough funds to add buildings and equipment. Jiang especially emphasized that the reforms at Qinghua should be carried out according to Luo’s original plan.19 Greatly encouraged by the support from the Ministry of Education, Luo Jialun took his case directly to the top Nationalist leaders. It was with the approval of the National Affairs Council (Guowu Weiyuanhui), the highest government ofﬁce, with Jiang Jieshi, Dai Jitao, and Chen Lifu among its members, that Qinghua was ﬁnally put under the sole jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education on May 10, 1929. Once in control, the Ministry of Education took immediate steps to complete the transformation of Qinghua. It ﬁrst formally abolished the board of directors, removing the obstacle to further reforms at Qinghua. Secondly, it transferred the Qinghua Endowment to the CFPEC, with Washington’s reluctant approval. Thirdly, it ﬁxed the budget for Qinghua at 1.2 million Chinese yuan a year and limited the number of Qinghua students in the United States to forty after 1934 so as to safeguard funds for Qinghua. On August 20, 1929, as the transfer of the Qinghua Endowment funds was completed, the board of trustees of the Qinghua Endowment was abolished.20 With the abolition of these two boards, Washington could no longer exert any direct control over Qinghua. Although unhappy with what was happening at Qinghua, the American diplomats and ofﬁcials had to recognize and accept the changes. MacMurray complained that what happened in Qinghua was lawless and anarchical,

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believed that the chaos in Qinghua was condoned and supported by government ofﬁcials, and worried that Washington would lose all of its inﬂuence on Qinghua if many American faculty members resigned.21 The State Department was unhappy with MacMurray’s handling of the matter and questioned his earlier decision to refuse serving on the board of trustees of the Qinghua Endowment.22 However, when the mechanism for direct American intervention in the management of Qinghua was removed in May 1929, the Division of Far Eastern Affairs agreed with MacMurray that the United States government “could not avoid being placed in the embarrassing position of having to assume responsibility without being able to exercise any real inﬂuence” over developments at Qinghua. It therefore recommended that the State Department abandon the “attempts to interfere in the enterprises of education maintained by the use of the 1908 indemnity remission” and that “participation by the Legation in matters related to the 1908 indemnity remission should be conﬁned to the actual mechanics of the remission, unless the Chinese authorities themselves should consult the Legation or the Department in regard to some unusual circumstances.”23 The Division of Far Eastern Affairs made its recommendations with great reluctance and deep consideration. It was forced to give up the “right” that Washington had held so dear for two decades for several strong reasons. First, it recognized that with twenty years of experience in handling the remissions, the Chinese no longer needed the State Department to provide its advice and assistance. Second, it had become more difﬁcult for the State Department, especially in more recent years, to provide such advice and assistance without provoking strong resentment and even protest from Chinese educators, students, and ofﬁcials because of the rising nationalism in China. Third, the Chinese government wanted to reduce the number of students to be sent to this country because “the policy initiated in 1908 of sending young Chinese students to the United States had not, in the opinion of many persons, proved of advantage to China.”24 The division’s analysis and explanation were so convincing that they were accepted by the State Department immediately and completely. Qinghua ofﬁcially ended its mission as a preparatory school in 1929 and began its rapid rise as one of the most prestigious national universities in China. Although much of the concern and criticism from some Chinese educators and students on the educational use of the returned Boxer Indemnity were well founded, the signiﬁcance of the ﬁrst joint experiment carried out by the United States and Chinese governments should not be overlooked. With the return of the Boxer Indemnity and the support from both governments, educational exchanges between the two nations expanded to an unprecedented level within two decades. Qinghua was able to send 1,289 students, including 180 indemnity students, 53 female students, and 67 graduate students to the United States between 1909 and 1929.25 It also provided scholarships for another 1,876 private students who were studying in the United States to help them complete their education.26 In other words, Qinghua managed to provide full or partial ﬁnancial

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support for over three thousand Chinese students pursuing higher education in the United States during this period. According to the original plan, China was expected to send one hundred students to the United States each year in the ﬁrst four years beginning in 1909 and ﬁfty each year in the following years until 1940. A total of eighteen hundred Chinese students would be sent to the United States during the thirty-two-year period. Although Qinghua was unable to send one hundred students in any of the ﬁrst four years, it did dispatch more than ﬁfty students in most of the following years.27 As a result, Qinghua, by 1929, had already sent 76 percent more students to the United States than the total planned for thirty-two years. (See Appendix D.) The number of students sent by Qinghua to the United States is more impressive when it is put in comparative and historical perspectives. Between 1909 and 1929, Qinghua sent ten times more government-sponsored students to the United States than during the previous six decades. Since all Qinghua students entered colleges and universities in America, they outnumbered those who sought higher education in the United States between 1847 and 1909 by over two times. According to a survey done in 1954, American colleges and universities admitted 5,293 Chinese students between 1909 and 1929. Since all Qinghua students, including scholarship students, attended colleges and universities in the United States, they accounted for about 60 percent of that total.28 It was these Qinghua students, Wang Shuhuai convincingly argued, who not only helped keep a high percentage of government-sponsored students in the United States, but also surpassed the number of students sent to Europe and caught up with that in Japan by the end of the 1920s. As a result, the United States replaced Japan as the top choice for Chinese students seeking higher education overseas.29 With high-quality education received in China, Qinghua graduates were able to enter and graduate from 128 colleges and universities in thirty-two states in the United States, including the most prestigious ones. For example, Columbia University admitted 179 Qinghua students, Harvard University 113, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 112, University of Wisconsin 95, and University of Chicago 92.30 With strong academic abilities and superior ﬁnancial support, the vast majority of Qinghua students obtained college degrees in the United States.31 According to the available statistics of 1,289 Qinghua students, 254 of them, about 20 percent, earned doctoral degrees; 544, about 42 percent, won their master’s degrees; and 336, about 26 percent, received baccalaureate degrees. Between 1909 and 1936, about six hundred Chinese students received doctoral degrees from American colleges and universities; Qinghua graduates accounted for 42 percent.32 The vast majority of Qinghua graduates returned to China right after completing their educational programs in the United States and played important roles in almost all ﬁelds. According to statistics provided by Qinghua University in the late 1920s, about eight hundred Qinghua students had returned from the United States by 1926. Most of them, about three hundred in total, served in the ﬁeld of education. Ten of them became university presidents and

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forty served as provosts or department chairmen. About one hundred Qinghua students worked in engineering, with twenty serving as principal engineers. Among the sixty Qinghua students who engaged in business, ﬁfteen held positions as president or manager. Ten of the ﬁfty Qinghua students who were employed in the banking industry became bank directors. Fifty Qinghua students worked in government as diplomats. Given the fact that the ﬁrst Qinghua students only began to return to China in the mid-1910s, Cao Yunxiang proudly claimed that “Qinghua would not be humbled when its achievements were compared with that of any foreign universities.”33 Hu Shi is probably one of the best examples of the many Qinghua graduates who became leaders in their ﬁelds after their return to China. Having passed the examination for the indemnity scholarship with a great score in Chinese composition, Hu left for Cornell University as one of the second group of indemnity students in 1910. After losing interest in agriculture, his original major, Hu turned to the study of philosophy, earning his B.A. from Cornell and Ph.D. from Columbia University. Inﬂuenced by Harriet Monroe’s Poetry: A Magazine of Verse, Hu began to advocate and practice literary writing in vernacular language (baihua) instead of classical language (wenyanwen) while he was a student at Cornell. As soon as he returned to Beijing in 1917, Hu became one of the most prominent leaders of the New Cultural Movement (Xin Wenhua Yundong), critically reevaluating Chinese heritage, and advocating Western learning and ideas.34 The impact and inﬂuence of Qinghua students returned from the United States increased exponentially with time. When Chinese scientists elected the ﬁrst group of fellows for the Academia Sinica in 1948, ﬁfty-two of the eightyone fellows were scholars returned from the United States. Among the ﬁftytwo American-educated fellows, twenty-nine, about 56 percent of them, were Qinghua graduates.35 Eight of them served in the Section of Mathematics and Physics, nine in the Section of Biology, twelve in the Section of Humanities. If Qinghua students who graduated after 1929 and Qinghua professors were counted, the number would reach thirty-four, very close to half of the total.36 There was no other Chinese school that could match Qinghua’s achievement and contribution. The decisive actions taken by the Nationalist government helped Qinghua complete the transformation from a preparatory school into a national university and end Washington’s direct intervention in its management. However, these signiﬁcant changes did not prevent China’s educational exchanges with the United States from expanding during the Nationalist era. For the Nationalists, sending students to foreign countries, especially the United States, was not only important for maintaining good diplomatic relations, but also essential for consolidating their rule in China. Aimed at building a strong and independent nation under the leadership of their own party, the Nationalists were determined to establish an effective central administration over educational exchange and use it for their own political gain.

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The CFPEC and Educational Exchanges Although Qinghua continued to send students to the United States after it became a national university, the CFPEC began to play a more important role in promoting and sponsoring educational and cultural exchanges between the United States and China. Just like Qinghua, the CFPEC went through dramatic reorganization after the Nationalists took power. Once the Nationalist government had put its handpicked members on the board of directors, it actually allowed the CFPEC to continue and even expand educational exchanges with the United States without too much interruption. Although concerned about the Nationalist interference, Washington stayed away from direct intervention as long as the CFPEC could carry out its normal functions. As a result, educational exchanges between the two nations continued to expand under the tight control of the Nationalist Party during the ﬁrst decade of the Nationalist era. The Nationalists had problems with the organization of the CFPEC from the very beginning. Yang Xingfo, the secretary of Nationalist leader Sun Yatsen, openly expressed his distrust of the original members of the board of directors appointed by the northern warlord government in 1924. He demanded that Cai Yuanpei and Wang Jingwei, two scholars with close ties to the Nationalist Party, be placed on the board; that special committees be set up with Chinese scholars in various ﬁelds to determine the use of the returned Boxer Indemnity; and that the Bylaws of the China Foundation be revised so that one-third of the directors would be elected every year by educational and scholarly societies.37 Since Sun’s Nationalist government had little inﬂuence outside of Guangdong Province at that time, Yang’s demand was ignored. The Nationalists’ position could no longer be ignored once they established control over large parts of South China and set up their capital in Nanjing. When the Nationalist government sought immediate reorganization of the CFPEC in mid-1927, its demand was treated seriously. Fully aware of the changes in China’s political environment, Paul Monroe, the vice president of the board of directors of the CFPEC, took a special trip to China. His main object was to discuss the organization of the CFPEC with Nationalist government ofﬁcials. At the request of the government, Huang Yanpei and Ding Wenjiang resigned from the board. Cai Yuanpei and Hu Shi, two intellectuals who were trusted by the Nationalist Party, were elected to replace them in June 1927. However, such a minor change failed to satisfy the Nationalists, especially when their army pushed further north and got closer to Beijing. In July 1928, the Nationalist government announced that the CFPEC approved by a warlord government should be abolished, that its Bylaws should be revised so that all future directors would be appointed by the government rather than elected by the board, and that ﬁve more new directors would be added by the Nationalist government.38 The Nationalist decision received a strong protest from the Americans. Paul Monroe sent telegrams and letters to the new Chinese government asking for the delay of the reorganization of the CFPEC. He warned that such a drastic

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reorganization would have a negative impact on the friendly relations between the two nations.39 Paul Monroe’s warning was quickly reinforced by Washington. Having heard the Nationalist government’s plan to change the Bylaws of the CFPEC, which had been laid out by the United States government, MacMurray sent a report to Washington recommending that the indemnity remission be stopped.40 With strong support from the State Department, MacMurray sent a telegram to the Nationalist government in early October, issuing a formal warning that the return of the Boxer Indemnity would be stopped if the Bylaws of the CFPEC were unilaterally revised by the Chinese government.41 The serious warnings from Washington ﬁnally caught the attention of the Nationalist leaders. Although it insisted that it had the power to change the Bylaws and the organization of the CFPEC board of directors without consulting Washington, the Nationalist government began to look for a way out. Jiang Mengling, a former Qinghua scholarship recipient and the new Minister of Education, decided to invite all former directors to convene a board meeting of the CFPEC. Although Jiang’s decision in effect recognized the legitimacy of the CFPEC and its board of directors appointed by the previous regime, Paul Monroe believed that the abolition order issued by the Nationalist government in July could not be formally repealed by a letter from the Minister of Education. He demanded more formal action from the Nationalist government, warning that the Department of the Treasury might not be able to return the Boxer Indemnity to China any longer since the original receiving agency had been abolished by the Chinese government. In order to avoid any possible delay of the Boxer Indemnity remission, the Executive Yuan of the Nationalist government issued a formal order on December 25, 1928, to convene the old board of directors.42 The third executive meeting of the CFPEC board of directors was ﬁnally held in early January 1929. In order to keep the foundation alive, the directors had to swallow the humiliation and make necessary compromises. Although the ﬁve directors disliked by the Nationalists resigned and the ﬁve candidates appointed by the government were all elected to the board, Hu Shi resigned so as to make the election look better. Aware of the American resentment toward Wang Jingwei, Hu Shi persuaded the directors to assign to Wang the shortest term, which would last less than six months. As for the Bylaws, no serious revisions were made.43 Since the legal status of the board of directors was fully recognized and the Bylaws remained basically intact, the CFPEC was able to receive the remission of the Boxer Indemnity without interruption and continue to play an important role in educational exchange with the United States. Through the reorganization of the board of directors, the Nationalist government gained more inﬂuence and control over the CFPEC. Conﬁdent in its control, the government transferred the management of the Qinghua Endowment to the CFPEC on August 2, 1929. Taking its new responsibilities seriously, the CFPEC examined Qinghua’s books carefully. When it found out that the university had borrowed over 1.6 million Chinese yuan in the past, the CFPEC

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sent a letter to Qinghua on August 22, 1929, reminding it of the debt and informing it of the decision made by the CFPEC board that payment would be made from the indemnity remission beginning in 1932.44 Although the CFPEC was in charge of receiving all of the Boxer Indemnity remission and managing the Qinghua Endowment, only the Nationalist government had the power to decide how much could be spent on supporting Qinghua students in the United States.45 In order to put more money into building Qinghua University, the Nationalist government stopped sending Qinghua students to America beginning in 1930. As a result, Qinghua’s expenditure for supporting students in the United States declined quickly from 1,223,824 yuan in 1928 to 573,096 yuan in 1932. With the drastic savings, Qinghua’s annual budget for the University itself was increased from 743,262 yuan in 1928 to 1,654,800 yuan in 1930, and then to 1,843,737 yuan in 1931. By the early 1930s, Qinghua spent two-thirds of its funds for the maintenance and development of the university, a complete reversal from the traditional practice prior to 1929.46 Once the further expansion of Qinghua was guaranteed, the Nationalist government authorized it to send students to the United States for three years beginning in 1933. Ofﬁcially named Qinghua University Government Scholarship Students Sent to the United States (Qinghua Daxue LiuMei Gongfeisheng), the ﬁrst group had twenty-four students. The number decreased to twenty in 1934 and then jumped to thirty in 1935. Although the Ministry of Education issued an order in 1936 to extend the program for another three years, only eighteen students were sent in that year.47 By sending a much smaller number of students to the United States in the 1930s, Qinghua was able to keep the cost at a lower level. In the 1933–34 ﬁscal year, Qinghua spent only about 470,000 yuan to support students in the United States. The cost dropped to 280,000 yuan the next year and remained at 220,000 a year between 1935 and 1940, averaging about one-ﬁfth of the university’s annual expenditure.48 When Qinghua was preparing to select the ﬁfth group of students to be sent to the United States, Japan launched its attack on Chinese troops at Lugou (Marco Polo) Bridge on July 7, 1937. The Japanese troops occupied Beijing by the end of the month and moved into Qinghua in August. As the Japanese troops turned the campus into barracks and stables, Qinghua students and faculty ﬂed to the South.49 Following orders from the Nationalist government, Qinghua joined with Peking University and Nankai University to form a Temporary University (Linshi Daxue) in Changsha, Hunan Province, in August 1937.50 When the Temporary University was ready for classes on November 1, 1938, over six hundred Qinghua students had arrived from different parts of China. In February 1938, the Temporary University was ordered to move further west to Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province, as the Japanese army was approaching Changsha. Once the students and faculty members arrived in Kunming in April, the Temporary University was renamed by the Nationalist government as the Southwest Associate University (Xinan Lianhe Daxue). The new Associate University was run by an executive committee, with presidents from the three

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universities serving as its members. Mei Yiqi, the president of Qinghua, served as the chairman of the executive committee in the ﬁrst two years.51 Unable to send any students abroad in the early years of war because of extreme ﬁnancial difﬁculties, Qinghua, with help from the CFPEC, managed to continue its support for forty plus students already in the United States. When the Nationalist government decided to stop paying the Boxer Indemnity to foreign powers beginning in 1939 because of its war with Japan, Qinghua lost its most important source of revenue since Washington had no money to return to China. In order to deal with Qinghua’s budget problems, Chen Lifu, the new Minister of Education, issued a strict order on April 24, 1939, asking the CFPEC to allow Qinghua to use the interest earned by the Qinghua Endowment in the previous years for its daily operation. The gap between the interest earnings and the budget would be ﬁlled with bank loans backed by the central government.52 Although the CFPEC was not happy with Chen’s order, it broke the general rule of the Qinghua Endowment, which banned the use of the principal and interest before the remission was completed, and sent the money to Qinghua as required by the government.53 Upon receiving the funds, Qinghua decided to spend US$35,000, over half of the American dollars given by the CFPEC, to support Qinghua scholarship students in the United States.54 Once its ﬁnancial condition became stabilized with funds from the CFPEC, Qinghua University began to plan the selection of the ﬁfth group of students to be sent to the United States. Following a vague instruction from the Ministry of Education issued in August 1939, the University Affairs Commission of Qinghua adopted a resolution on November 2, 1939, announcing that the university would resume the program of sending students to the United States and that the number would be kept at twenty.55 Early the next year, the subject ﬁelds in which students would be selected were determined by the Senate and approved by the Nationalist government. President Mei Yiqi made it very clear that sending students to the United States would not only meet the nation’s needs for highly trained experts, but also continue the thirty-one-year-old mission of Qinghua.56 Following Qinghua’s tradition, the selection was handled with strict rules. A special committee was organized with the permission of the Ministry of Education. With Mei as its chairman, seven professors and one ofﬁcial from the Ministry of Education were appointed as members. The committee had the authority to make the rules for the examination, set the criteria for the selection, and appoint test givers and graders. After several months of preparation, the examinations were given in Kunming and Chongqing in August 1940. Students taking the examination at Chongqing had to switch the test site because of the Japanese air raid. Since graders were scattered throughout the Southwest, it took several months to have all the tests graded. Once all test scores came out in midFebruary 1941, the committee chose sixteen students to be sent to the United States. Because of the low scores of students who chose to take examinations in warship making, weaponry, hydraulic power stations, and airplane engines, the

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committee decided that no students should be sent to the United States in those ﬁelds that year.57 All sixteen candidates were college graduates with working experience. Nine of them graduated from Qinghua University.58 They left for the United States in summer 1941. Only fourteen managed to arrive in America that year. Two were delayed by disease and transportation difﬁculties. As soon as the selection of the ﬁfth group was completed, preparation for the examination for the sixth group of students to be sent to the United States began at Qinghua in April 1941.59 However, the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor and the freezing of foreign assets in the United States forced Qinghua University to postpone the selection to 1943. The examinations were ﬁnally held in Kunming, Chongqing, Guilin, and Chengdu in August 1943. The grading of the tests was only completed in summer 1944. Among 370 plus applicants, only twenty-two qualiﬁed with passing grades.60 Although the selected students began to apply for their passports, exit visas, foreign currency, and transportation tickets in summer 1944, they were unable to get any of these until mid-1945. They were ﬁnally able to take their trips to the United States later that year with help from Mei Yiqi.61 In addition to sending new government-sponsored students to the United States, Qinghua offered subsidies for privately sponsored students who were attending American colleges and universities during the war years. According to the regulations adopted by the university Senate on February 5, 1940, privately sponsored students with excellent grades could apply for Qinghua subsidies if they had ﬁnancial difﬁculties while attending colleges in the United States. Qualiﬁed students could receive US$40 a month for up to a year. Renewal of the subsidy was allowed only if there was a surplus of grants. The number of recipients was capped at ﬁfteen a year. The University planned to run the program for three years and the China Institute in America was authorized to accept applications from students in the United States.62 Established by the CFPEC in New York City in 1924, the China Institute was charged to enhance educational and cultural relations between the United States and China.63 It was reorganized by activists in 1930 and began to receive subsidies from the CFPEC beginning in 1930, ranging from 10,000 to 30,000 yuan annually.64 When Qinghua began to send students to the United States again in 1933, Mei Yiqi appointed Meng Chih, the chairman of the board of directors of the China Institute, as director of the Chinese Educational Mission in the United States. Therefore, it was natural for Qinghua to ask the China Institute to accept and evaluate applications for its scholarships. With the help from Meng Chih, Qinghua awarded ten scholarships to self-sponsored Chinese students in the United States in 1940. In 1941, the China Institute forwarded thirty-six applications for Qinghua scholarships to the university and six got the scholarship.65 However, the scholarship for self-sponsored students in the United States was terminated by Qinghua at the end of 1942.66 The scholarship for self-sponsored students soon attracted attention from many junior faculty members at Qinghua who wanted to use the funds to further

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their own education. Xia Xiang (Hsia Hsiang), a young teacher in the Department of Physical Education, sent a formal letter to the university Senate on April 18, 1941, asking for a university subsidy for a research trip to the United States. Aware of the tight budget for the university, Xia proposed to have a subsidy equivalent to a scholarship for a self-sponsored student.67 Xia’s application was strongly endorsed by his supervisor, Professor John Mo.68 The university soon approved applications from Xia as well as ﬁve other junior faculty members. Since the scholarship for self-sponsored students was less than half the amount offered to regular government-sponsored students, the junior faculty members sent to the United States were called semi-government-sponsored students (ban guanfeisheng).69 While appreciating the opportunity given by the university, many junior faculty members criticized the inadequate ﬁnancial support from Qinghua. Thirteen instructors sent a letter to the president, complaining that they had to work for ﬁve years with the heaviest workload and lowest pay at Qinghua before they could have the opportunity to further their education in the United States with less than half of the scholarship enjoyed by students who only needed to pass just a few examinations. They demanded that the university increase the number and amount of the scholarships for junior faculty members, provide subsidies to cover their return tickets, tuition, and clothing needed for international travel, and come up with a loan plan so that they could borrow American dollars from the university.70 Besides helping Qinghua maintain educational ties with the United States, the CFPEC itself sponsored and ran numerous programs promoting educational exchanges between the United States and China since the end of the 1920s. Among all the programs operated directly by the CFPEC, the Scientiﬁc Research Fellowships cost the most money and had the most recipients. Proposed by Fan Yuanlian in 1927, the fellowships were ﬁrst awarded in three categories in 1928.71 The Class A fellowships, amounting to 3,000–4,000 Chinese yuan annually, were awarded to established scientists capable of conducting scientiﬁc research independently. The Class B fellowships, offering 1,000–2,000Chinese yuan annually, were granted to junior researchers with at least college degrees to conduct scientiﬁc research under the guidance of senior experts. With a minimal annual subsidy of 250–500 Chinese yuan, the Class C fellowships were given to those who were interested in research but were short of funds. Between 1928 and 1941, the CFPEC awarded 594 fellowships to Chinese scholars and students. Of these, 330 recipients used their fellowships to conduct their research abroad. Over half of those who did research overseas, 173 to be exact, chose to go to the United States. The CFPEC sent many American-trained scientists to European countries in order to give them “a chance to see how scientiﬁc work was conducted in Europe.”72 As the war with Japan made international travel increasingly more difﬁcult, the CFPEC began to award Foreign Fellowships to Chinese students and scholars overseas in 1938. In 1939, the CCFPEC renewed the fellowships for twelve Chinese students and scholars studying overseas. Seven of the recipients

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were in the United States. All the new fellowships awarded in that year, ten in total, were given to Chinese students and scholars in American colleges and universities.73 The trend continued in 1940. Among thirty-nine fellowships awarded, nine were given to Chinese students and scholars in the United States and nine were given to the Chinese students and scholars planning to go to the United States. In addition to the eight hundred Chinese yuan regularly coming with the fellowship, recipients in 1940 began to receive two hundred yuan to cover their trip to or from the United States.74 It is clear that the Scientiﬁc Research Fellowships and Foreign Fellowships offered by the CFPEC during the early war years made it possible for a large number of Chinese students and scholars to conduct and complete their research in the United States and other foreign countries. In his review of the work done by the CFPEC, Ren Hongjuan, the executive secretary of the CFPEC, concluded that the success of the Scientiﬁc Research Fellowship was unmatched by any other study abroad programs during this period.75 In addition to the Scientiﬁc Research Fellowships, the CFPEC provided generous help for a large number of American-trained scientists to conduct and maintain their research in China through the Scientiﬁc Teaching Fellowships (Kexue Jiaoxi). Improving science education was one of the most important goals for the CFPEC since its inception. During his investigation of Chinese education in 1921, Paul Monroe pointed out that there were serious problems in China’s science education. The worst was seen in secondary education with too much dependence on textbooks and too little experimental experience in labs. Monroe’s observation was reiterated by George Twiss, a professor of education at Ohio State University, who visited 190 schools in China between 1922 and 1924. Twiss concluded that the best way to improve China’s science education was to enhance the quality of science teachers through various kinds of training.76 His proposal was not only applauded by Chinese educators, but also adopted by the CFPEC as a blueprint to improve China’s science education.77 In order to help as many schools as possible, the CFPEC subsidized universities to train secondary school science teachers. It began to award Scientiﬁc Teaching Fellowships to faculty members at six major universities in Beijing, Nanjing, Shenyang, Chengdu, Wuchang, and Guangzhou in 1926. It originally planned to set up thirty-ﬁve professorships every year for seven years. Although the foundation was unable to grant as many fellowships as it desired, the program lasted much longer than originally planned. According to the CFPEC rules, the fellowship was granted in one- to three-year terms. The term could be renewed and a year-long sabbatical leave would be paid by the CFPEC with travel subsidies after serving six years. Each year, the recipient would not only receive a full salary, about three thousand yuan, but also a large allowance of between ten and thirty thousand yuan from the CFPEC. The generous support from the CFPEC attracted a large number of highly qualiﬁed candidates, including many scholars returned from the United States. Among all 161 scientists who received the Scientiﬁc Teaching Fellowships from the CFPEC between

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1926 and 1935, forty-four had educational experiences in foreign countries and twenty-ﬁve of them returned from the United States.78 With the support from the CFPEC, many American-trained scientists were able to continue their research and teaching in China during a very difﬁcult period. Through Qinghua and numerous other programs, the China Foundation was able to support scores of Chinese students and scholars to receive education in the United States and conduct research in both countries. The absolute number might not be that impressive, especially in the late 1930s. However, it represented a large percentage of students and scholars sent by China to the United States during those years. Once the war with Japan started, the CFPEC soon became the only agency that still had some ﬁnancial resources to support educational exchanges between the two nations.

Establishing Central Administration over Exchanges Taking over Qinghua and reorganizing the CFPRC were only the ﬁrst steps for the Nationalist regime to establish effective central administration over China’s educational exchanges with foreign nations. While education was deemed vital by the Nationalists in establishing a new state and maintaining their party’s dominant position on China’s political stage, sending students abroad was viewed as an important venue to train high-level experts and win staunch political supporters for the Nationalist cause. As it gradually consolidated its power in education, ﬁnance, and foreign affairs, the Nationalist regime took steps to put study abroad under effective central control. It was during the Nationalist era that the central government was ﬁnally able to tell all students what criteria they had to meet in order to pursue education abroad, what they should study in foreign colleges and universities, how long they could stay overseas for educational purposes, and what they should do after the completion of their educational programs in foreign countries. The Nationalist success in establishing central control over educational exchanges was truly remarkable given its relatively weak political and military positions outside eastern and central provinces during the same period. Although the Qing Court and all the regimes during the early Republic years played an important role in China’s study abroad programs, none of them was able to establish an effective central control over education or educational exchanges with foreign nations because of their lack of political and ﬁnancial resources. In the ﬁnal years of the Qing Dynasty, the real power, as Sally Borthwick accurately pointed out, was “to a large extent delegated to regional and provincial leaders.”79 As a result, provincial and local ofﬁcials sent more students abroad than the central government. With more students going abroad, the Qing Court tried to set up rules to regulate China’s study abroad programs. Yet, the early regulations were usually brief and never seriously enforced. In 1904, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Superintendent for Education issued a set of regulations approved by the Throne. However, it did not set any academic

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or foreign language requirements for students to be sent abroad. The only thing that the Court was concerned about was the government supervision over the students. It made it clear that if provinces could not afford to send supervisors with their students, the Court would require Chinese diplomats in European countries to keep an eye on the students.80 The Ministry of Education did issue an order in March 1906, requiring that only middle school graduates with ﬂuency in the Japanese language should be allowed to go to Japan to attend high school or college.81 The new rule helped reduce the ﬂow of Chinese students to Japan. However, its scope was narrow and its implementation still largely dependent on provincial governments. Various warlord regimes also tried to put all the study abroad programs under centralized administrative control in the early years of the Republic. In October 1916, a comprehensive set of regulations on study abroad was issued by the government, giving the Ministry of Education the authority to select and send students abroad, decide what they should study and for how long, and supervise their activities in foreign countries. It also required students to send their diaries to the ministry every month for examination and return to China immediately after ﬁnishing their program abroad. All government-sponsored students had to accept appointments made by the Ministry of Education after their return.82 Besides the rules for government-sponsored students, the Ministry of Education announced regulations for self-sponsored students in 1924. It required that self-sponsored students be middle school graduates or have a minimum of two years’ work experience in schools. They should apply for a certiﬁcate of study abroad from the Ministry of Education before leaving the country. Once abroad, they should report to the Chinese agency in charge of educational affairs and have their certiﬁcates stamped by ofﬁcials. After their return to the country, they should report to the Ministry of Education with the certiﬁcates so that they could get another certiﬁcate that would allow them to enjoy the same treatment as government-sponsored students in job assignment.83 It is clear that the goal of these regulations was to put all self-sponsored students under the control of the central government. Many Chinese students with educational experience overseas actually supported the government’s effort to establish effective centralized administrative control over study abroad in the early years of the Republic. In an editorial published in the Chinese Students’ Monthly, a journal published by the Chinese Students Alliance in the United States, in 1914, the editor praised a recent order issued by President Yuan Shikai that established a special ofﬁce to recruit returned students to work for the government. He believed that it was the government’s responsibility to make every possible use of the returned students. The editor believed that the laissez-faire policy of the central government, which allowed the returned students “to shift for themselves after they have come back to China,” was responsible for the failure of the study abroad programs in the past four decades.84 Despite students’ support, the warlord regimes in Beijing were never able to implement all the regulations because of their lack

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of resources and control. As a result, China’s study abroad programs remained very much decentralized until the Nationalists came into power in 1928. Aiming at building an independent and uniﬁed China, the Nationalists were more determined to establish centralized administrative control over all study abroad programs from the very beginning. The new Ministry of Education set up a special ofﬁce in the Section of Higher Education to take charge of study abroad programs.85 Qinghua, with the largest number of students in the United States, naturally became the ﬁrst target for the new regime. In December 1928, only a couple of months after the Nationalist government took over Qinghua, the ministry issued a new set of regulations, establishing a new ofﬁce, the Student Supervision Ofﬁce of Qinghua University in the United States (Qinghua Daxue LiuMei Xuesheng Jianduchu). According to the new regulations, the superintendent would be appointed by the Minister of Education in consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather than by the president of Qinghua.86 In addition to the traditional charges, the superintendent was authorized to check, guide, and supervise the conduct of all Qinghua students, and investigate and report on their performances in American colleges and universities. In order to improve the communication and supervision, the new regulation also clearly required that all the communications between the superintendent’s ofﬁce and Qinghua University be conducted in Chinese.87 On the recommendation of Luo Jialun, Mei Yiqi, a former Qinghua graduate, was appointed superintendent by the Nationalist government in November 1928. Once in ofﬁce, Mei streamlined personnel by letting go the driver, reducing the hours for the domestic assistant, reassigning the cooking responsibility to his wife, who joined him about a year later, without pay, and asking the secretary to pick up more of the workload without increasing the salary. While doing everything he could to cut spending, Mei opened up his ofﬁce to Chinese students in Washington, DC, and all over the United States. In order to keep students away from “indecent” recreations like going to the dance halls, Mei organized a lot of interesting activities to attract more students.88 With his experience as provost and then superintendent at Qinghua, Mei was fully aware that the returned students had a hard time to get themselves employed while employers in China were unable to ﬁnd experts to ﬁll their positions. In order to help Qinghua students ﬁnd suitable jobs back in China, Mei collected detailed information on over three hundred Qinghua students in the United States and sent it back to China in 1930 as a reference for employers. Knowing that there were thousands more Chinese students in the United States, he pledged to include more of them in his data bank in the future.89 Having successfully taken over Qinghua and reorganized its superintendent’s ofﬁce in the United States, the Nationalist government began to concentrate on the development of a national policy for all of China’s study abroad programs. The Ministry of Education ﬁrst conducted a survey to gather data from students who were studying overseas as well as those who had returned to China.90 Based on the information gathered through the survey, Zhu Jiahua, the

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education minister, reported that with over ﬁfty-four hundred Chinese students overseas, the nation spent about twenty million yuan annually to support them, an amount much larger than the annual budget for all universities in China. Since there were no strict regulations on age, qualiﬁcations, or major areas, many students went abroad seeking general undergraduate education, rather than specialized graduate training. Thus, he proposed that only those with college education and work experience, as well as those with assistant professorships, should be sent abroad as government-sponsored students. Students sent by provincial governments had to pass examinations given by the Ministry of Education. As for private students, Zhu demanded that only those with college diplomas should be sent. He hoped that, with higher qualiﬁcation requirements, study abroad would focus on training specialists needed by the nation, spending less money and shorter time.91 The Ministry of Education began to tighten its control on study abroad in 1929. It promptly sent orders to all provinces requiring that all students sent abroad by provincial governments should focus on science and engineering and be strictly tested. In order to give the central government more control over these students, it also required that they apply for special Study Abroad Permits (Liuxue Zhengshu) from the ministry before they could leave the country.92 Following the new rules, the Nationalist government issued 1,657 permits to government-sponsored students and 1,577 self-supported students in 1929.93 In 1931, the Ministry of Education revised the regulations, requiring all students, including government-sponsored students (gongfeisheng), self-sponsored students (zifeisheng), and government-subsidized students (ban gongfeisheng), to apply for Study Abroad Permits. Without the permits, students would not be allowed to apply for student passports, government subsidies, or Indemnity Scholarships before they left the country, or receive government jobs or ofﬁcial diplomas after their return to China.94 Tougher policies on study abroad were adopted throughout the 1930s. As part of the effort to modernize the Chinese economy and education, the ministry planned, in 1930, to send more students abroad for higher education in the next six years. The exact number of students to be sent abroad and the subjects to be studied by them would be determined by the ministry based on the need and ﬁnancial conditions.95 The new plan required that 70 percent of government-sponsored students should study sciences, agriculture, engineering, and medicine in order to meet the needs of economic reconstruction at home and prepare faculty members for colleges and universities. The Nationalist government also encouraged self-sponsored students to do the same by offering them subsidies to study in those ﬁelds. In sharp contrast, no subsidies would be given to students majoring in humanities or social sciences until they entered graduate school. It also required that all government-sponsored students be experienced and well-established professors and professionals with strong foreign language ability. The qualiﬁcation for self-sponsored students was lower. However, they

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still needed to be at least high school graduates and to pass language tests in order to receive Study Abroad Permits.96 The most comprehensive regulations on study abroad were adopted in 1933. With forty-six articles, the Central Government’s Regulations on Sending Students Abroad (Zhongyang Zhengfu Paiqian Xuesheng Liuxue Zhangcheng) required that all government-sponsored students had to be graduates from a recognized three-year college with more than two years’ work experience, or from a four-year university. They should enroll in upper-division classes or graduate schools once abroad. As for self-supported students, they had to be graduates from three-year colleges or advanced vocational schools with two years’ work experience. Both government- and self-sponsored students had to apply for Study Abroad Permits from the Ministry of Education before they could leave the country. The government-sponsored students had to complete their educational programs in two to six years. If they refused to serve in the province that had provided for their education, they would have to repay all the expenses. All students were required to register their graduation diplomas with the Ministry of Education after their return to China.97 Provincial governments could send as many students abroad as they wished. However, they had to strictly follow the rules set up by the central government in selecting and sending their students. Each self-sponsored student was required to have, in addition to the Study Abroad Permit, a guarantee letter from either a ﬁrm or an established businessman or professional who had the ﬁnancial resources to cover all the expenses for the student. A guarantor had to pledge that he would be responsible for the ﬁnancial needs and the behavior of the student while the student was abroad.98 Once adopted, the new regulations were very rigorously enforced by the Nationalist government. When it approved Qinghua University to send students to the United States again in 1933, the Ministry of Education made sure that Qinghua opened its examinations to students from all schools in China, applied the qualiﬁcations set by the central government, chose students only in the ﬁelds approved by the ministry, and allowed them to stay in the United States for only two years, with the possibility of a one-year extension. Once chosen, the candidates were required to remain in China for at least six months to identify domestic needs. They would be allowed to leave for the United States only after they had proved that their education abroad would help meet the needs at home. During their stay in the United States, the students had to send their grade reports back to Qinghua at the end of each semester. After their return to China, they had to accept jobs assigned to them by the central government and work there for at least three years.99 Even greater effort was made to keep all provinces in compliance with the new regulations set by the central government. Each province had to submit its revised provincial regulations on study abroad to the Ministry of Education for review and approval before it could send any students abroad. The ministry went

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through all the provincial regulations very carefully and imposed changes wherever it deemed necessary. For example, Guangdong Province sent its revised rules on study abroad to the Ministry of Education on February 28, 1935. After a quick review, the Ministry of Education instructed Guangdong to make four more corrections and submit another revised version for further review.100 Fully aware of the seriousness of the matter, the Bureau of Education of Guangdong made all the changes required by the Ministry. It replaced the word “Rules” (Guicheng) with “Regulations” (Zhangcheng) so as to be consistent with the term used by the ministry. It added a clause in article three to make sure that the examination dates, number of students to be selected, countries to which students would be sent, years allowed to study abroad, and subjects to be studied, would not only be determined by the Bureau of Education, but also be approved by the Ministry of Education. In addition, it created a new article clearly stating that all students who had passed the preliminary examinations in the province had to pass tests given by the Ministry of Education before they could be sent abroad. The last correction was to add a sentence at the end stating that any items that were not covered by this document would be handled according to the Regulations issued by the ministry.101 The provincial regulations were ﬁnally approved by the ministry after the second round of revisions. The central government always kept a close eye on the implementation of the revised regulations by provinces. On April 11, 1935, Zhongyang Ribao (Central Daily), published by the Nationalist Party, reported that Guangdong Province was planning to give examinations to select the second group of government-sponsored students to be sent abroad. On the next day, the Ministry of Education sent a telegram to Guangdong seeking veriﬁcation of the plan. It emphasized that if Guangdong did have such a plan, the Bureau of Education of Guangdong should follow the previously approved regulations and send the plan to the ministry for approval.102 Upon receiving the scolding from the ministry, Guangdong sent its plan immediately to Nanjing. The ministry approved the plan after making some minor corrections.103 Learning from this experience, Guangdong Province sent the plan for the selection of the third group of students to the ministry for approval before it made the public announcement the next year.104 Following the new regulations, the Ministry of Education started in 1934 to give veriﬁcation examinations to all students who had passed provincial tests. In that year, thirty-eight students from Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, and Henan Provinces took and passed veriﬁcation examinations. All but one student chose to study sciences, engineering, medicine, or agriculture. Over half of the students, twenty-one in total, were sent to the United States. None went to Japan. Veriﬁcation examinations became another effective tool for the Ministry of Education to implement its study abroad policies.105 The central control over study abroad was reinforced by the new passport system established by the Nationalist government. Until the end of the Qing Dynasty, Chinese passports were issued by customs ofﬁcials at various open ports in handwriting without a standardized format. The lack of a centralized

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ofﬁce in charge of the issuance of passports in a uniform format had not only caused confusion among American immigration ofﬁcials and frustration among Chinese students, but also denied the Qing Court an effective way to have real control over students seeking education in foreign countries. A modern passport system began to emerge during the early Republic period. However, the central government only managed to put the issuance of passports under its tight control after the Nationalists came to power. Even Feng Yuxiang, one of the most powerful military leaders, who had the real control over the Northwest of China, had to ask for approval from the central government in order to send his two assistants to study in the United States in 1928 and 1929, since he could no longer get passports for them from any customs ofﬁcials under his jurisdiction.106 The Nationalist control over study abroad was further strengthened as a result of monetary reforms carried out in the 1930s. China had about 110 different currencies issued by various banks before the Nationalists took over. The political uniﬁcation of China under the Nationalists made it possible for thorough monetary reforms. The Nationalist government ﬁrst replaced the tael (liang) with silver dollars (yuan) in early 1933. With the rise in the price of silver on the world market, a large amount of silver ﬂew out of China beginning in 1934. In order to stabilize China’s currency, the Ministry of the Treasury, led by Kong Xiangxi, replaced silver dollars with a new Legal Paper Currency (Fabi) in November 1935. According to the new regulations adopted by the Nationalist government, only four national banks, the Central Bank (Zhongyang Yinhang), the Bank of China (Zhongguo Yinhang), the Bank of Communication (Jiaotong Yinhang), and the Farmers’ Bank (Nongmin Yinhang), were allowed to issue the new paper currency and handle foreign exchange. As a result, foreign currencies and their exchange, for the ﬁrst time in China’s modern history, were put under central control.107 With the real power in hand, the Nationalist government demanded that all provincial governments send in their study abroad budget for approval and provide ﬁnancial support for students according to the national standard. All self-sponsored students had to ﬁll out a special Foreign Currency Purchase Application Form to be reviewed and approved by the Ministry of Education.108 The Nationalist effort to establish central control over study abroad was rather effective. In order to secure their opportunities for study abroad and increase the prospectus to ﬁnd decent jobs after their return, the vast majority of students followed the new regulations established by the central government. Between 1929 and 1937, the Ministry of Education issued 7,594 Study Abroad Permits to students. Following the government requirements, more students began to focus on science and engineering. In 1929, about two-thirds of students studied humanities, law, business, and education abroad. Within two years, about half of the students majored in science, engineering, medicine, or agriculture. Beginning in 1933, the number of students majoring in the latter ﬁelds always exceeded those in the former. With the new emphases, the Nationalists were able to direct more government-sponsored students to colleges and

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universities in the United States in the 1930s. Between 1929 and 1937, Japan still attracted more self-sponsored students, mostly because of its geographic proximity, lower cost, and lower qualiﬁcation requirements. However, China sent 308 government-sponsored students to the United States while dispatching only 75 to Japan.109 Among the students sent abroad by the Central Committee of the Nationalist Party between 1930 and 1933, seventy-two entered colleges and universities in the United States. Only nine of them ended up in Japan.110 The United States attracted more government-sponsored students than any other country during this period. The Japanese invasion, while drastically reducing the territory under Nationalist rule, actually reinforced the central administrative control over study abroad. No sooner had the Japanese launched their attack at the Marco Polo Bridge in July 1937 than the Ministries of Education and the Treasury issued a joint order to sharply reduce the number of students to be sent abroad in order to save foreign currency for war purposes. Those who were allowed to go abroad had to major in military science, engineering, medicine, or other subjects related to military defense. Only graduates from universities and colleges with two years of research or work experience and graduates from threeyear junior colleges with four years of research or work experience would be qualiﬁed for education abroad. Study Abroad Permits were still required for all students. Those who were already in foreign countries would not be allowed to get any foreign currency from the government if they had not received Study Abroad Permits. However, the Ministry of Education would approve enough foreign currency for the purchase of return tickets for those students who chose to go back to China immediately.111 The study abroad policy was revised by the Nationalist government in April 1939. The new policy basically banned the dispatch of any governmentsponsored students abroad during the war against Japan except those with special approval. No self-supported students would be allowed to go abroad unless they could receive full foreign scholarships and would not purchase any foreign currency from the Chinese government. At the same time, they still had to meet the qualiﬁcation requirements listed in the earlier regulations. Students who were sent abroad to study military science had to receive approval from Jiang Jieshi, the chairman of the Central Military Committee. Those who were sent to study engineering, sciences, and medicine had to be approved by the Executive Yuan. In order to save foreign currency, those government-sponsored students who had studied abroad for three years or failed to receive decent grades had to return to China immediately. No foreign currency would be provided for those who refused to return after receiving the orders. Those who were studying military science, engineering, other sciences, or medicine abroad would continue to receive foreign currency to cover all their expenses after veriﬁcation conducted by the Ministry of Education. As for self-supported students, government would provide help for those who made excellent grades at school but had ﬁnancial difﬁculties.112

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The new study abroad policy was implemented immediately and effectively. Upon receiving the instructions from the Ministry of Education, Guangdong Province sent orders to the thirteen students who were studying abroad with provincial support. Following the new regulations, it allowed four students who were abroad less than three years to continue their study, and permitted six students who had studied abroad for three years to extend their stay for another year since they were studying engineering. The other three, who had also studied overseas for three years, were ordered to return to China immediately.113 Of those ten students who were allowed to continue their study abroad, half were attending colleges and universities in the United States. Zhao Shanhuan, one of the three students who were ordered to return to China, pleaded for an extension of another year so that he could complete his Ph.D. in entomology. Although he had strong recommendation letters from the president of Cornell University and Hu Shi, the Chinese ambassador to the United States, Zhao failed to get support from Chen Lifu, the Minister of Education.114 The implementation of the new study abroad policy led to an immediate and drastic reduction in the number of Chinese students sent abroad during the war years. The number of Study Abroad Permits issued to students going abroad by the Ministry of Education dropped from 894 in 1936 to 366 in 1937, and then to 59 in 1938. Of course, educational exchanges with Japan came to a complete stop after the war broke out. The United States also saw a sharp reduction of Chinese students arriving at its colleges and universities. However, most of the Chinese students who did go abroad during the early war years ended up in the United States.115 As a result, the United States ﬁnally replaced Japan as the chief partner in educational exchange at the beginning of World War II. The Nationalist government also took strong steps to get as many students back home as possible. The Ministry of Education issued two orders in 1938 requiring all students who had studied abroad for three years to return to China within six months. Besides appealing to students’ patriotic feelings, the ministry did not hesitate to take advantage of the ﬁnancial difﬁculties faced by students or the central control of all foreign currencies. The Ministry of Education decided to give seven hundred Chinese yuan to all students sponsored by provinces that were under the Japanese occupation. The money could be used as a three-month stipend or for the purchase of return tickets for those who had studied abroad for three years. Self-supported students from Japanese-occupied provinces could also receive two hundred Chinese yuan a month for up to three months from the Ministry of Education. However, the relief was only a one-time offer. Therefore, most of them had to use the government money to buy return tickets.116 While sharply reducing the number of students overseas, the Nationalist government succeeded in getting students to focus on academic areas closely related to China’s war effort. Among about one thousand students sent abroad in 1936, 46 percent still chose to study humanities, law, business, and education.117 Drastic changes took place after the war broke out. Among the sixteen

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government-sponsored students sent by Qinghua University to the United States in 1941, only one majored in economic history and another in business administration. The rest focused on science, engineering, medicine, and agriculture. At least half of them chose to study military-related subjects.118 The same could be found among the self-sponsored students who received Qinghua scholarships in 1940. Only two of the ten students studied political science and economics. The rest all majored in sciences and engineering, with three in aviation.119 Coupling strict rules with patriotic appeal and ﬁnancial assistance, the Nationalist government was rather effective in implementing its wartime study abroad policy and further consolidating its control over students and scholars involved in educational exchanges. About three hundred students followed the instructions and bought their return tickets with government subsidies by the end of 1939. Most of those students who chose to return to China had been studying in Japan and European countries. In sharp contrast, most applications for government support for extended stays came from students in the United States.120 At the same time, a considerable number of students managed to relocate themselves from Japan and Europe to the United States in order to continue their pursuit of higher education. However, they had to follow the rules set by the Nationalist government in order to make sure that they would receive their ﬁnancial support regularly. The beginning of the war, while reducing the number of students sent abroad by China, actually allowed the Nationalist government to further tighten its control over China’s study abroad programs and strengthen its educational ties with the United States.

Exerting Party Control Establishing effective central control over schools and study abroad was important to the Nationalists as part of their state-building effort. However, their ultimate goal was to use the schools and educational exchange programs to instill the ofﬁcial ideology of the Nationalist Party in the minds of students and turn them into staunch supporters of the Nationalist cause. Once all the schools were put under effective supervision of the central government, the Nationalist regime began to impose increasingly tight control over students’ thought through a series of administrative, curricular, and institutional changes. Such an effort, termed partiﬁcation (danghua) of education by Wen-shin Yeh, was also extended to all study abroad programs.121 By the early 1930s, the Three Principles of the People (Sanmin Zhuyi) were included as part of the test for all government-sponsored students and steps were taken by the Nationalist regime to establish thought control over Chinese students and scholars in the United States as well. As Zhang Yufa sharply observed, the biggest change made by the Nationalist government in education was its emphasis on ideology.122 The same could be said about its handling of China’s study abroad programs. Fully aware of the important role played by students and scholars in Chinese politics and society, the Nationalists began their effort to establish tight

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control over schools and students when they were still rebelling revolutionaries in Guangdong and Guangxi Provinces in the mid-1920s. While preparing for the Northern Expedition in March 1926, the Nationalists established the Council of the Educational Administration (Jiaoyu Xingzheng Weiyuanhui) to handle educational affairs. One of its ﬁrst orders was to instruct the Bureau of Education of Guangxi Province to add Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People as a course to the curriculum of all schools in that province. In July, the council adopted several important policies requiring students and teachers from all schools to join the Nationalist Party. It also called upon local party leaders in each county to serve as directors of the Bureau of Education and organize local party branches in schools.123 They intended to use schools to help them mobilize students and the masses, and win popular support for their military action against warlords.124 As the Northern Expedition Army marched victoriously to the North and put more provinces under its jurisdiction, the Nationalist Party took further steps to exert political control over schools and impose party education (danghua jiaoyu) on students. Tighter party control became needed when party puriﬁcation (qingdang) was started by Jiang Jieshi in April 1927, causing frustration and disillusion among many people, especially intellectuals.125 In August 1927, the Central Committee of the Nationalist Party approved the Rules on Party Education at Schools (Xuexiao Shixing Danghua Jiaoyu Banfa), which were enforced in the territories controlled by the Northern Expedition Army. Soon, the University Council adopted a national regulation to impose party education and political advising at all schools.126 Establishing tight party control over education and people’s thoughts became the top priority of the Nationalist Party after Jiang Jieshi rose as the top leader. According to Sun Yat-sen, the national revolution and reconstruction should go through three stages: military government, political tutelage, and constitutional government. Having defeated the warlords in the Northern Expedition, Jiang declared in 1928 that the Nationalist revolution had entered the second stage—political tutelage, which meant that the Nationalist Party should teach the people, including students and scholars, how to act and think.127 With authoritarian military training and strong belief in the Confucian ideal of social order, Jiang openly announced that the ﬁrst task for the Nationalist Party was to strive for “the unity of the Chinese public’s thought, and to ﬁrmly establish Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People as the nation’s only thought so that they will not desire a second system of thought to create disorder in China.”128 To Jiang, tighter and broader party control was needed and justiﬁed since the Nationalist Party “is the headquarters of our national reconstruction” and “China’s destiny is entrusted to the Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party).” He declared that during the period of reconstruction the Nationalists “must proceed with the same spirit and by the same methods as in our Revolution and armed resistance,” which meant tight party control.129 In July 1928, the Executive Central Committee of the Nationalist Party passed a resolution requiring all schools

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in China to add a special course on party education in order to make sure that the party’s ideology was accepted by all Chinese.130 The push for party control and party education was also extended to missionary schools. While forcing all missionary schools to register with the government and put Chinese in leading positions, the Nationalist government refused to register any elementary or middle schools that taught religion or held religious services in order to protect China’s educational sovereignty and the dominant position of the Nationalist ideology. Beginning in 1933, Western missionaries were banned from running elementary schools for Chinese children. As a result, thousands of missionaries left China and many missionary schools were either turned over to Chinese private groups or abandoned.131 Those missionary schools that were allowed to remain open had to drop mandatory Sunday services and remove religious materials from their libraries. When the Nationalist regime made party education a part of the national curriculum, missionary schools had to accept political instructors appointed by the local government, who would teach party education courses and report any political deviation from ofﬁcial policies.132 Despite an internal power struggle between Nationalist leaders at the national and local levels, the Nationalists’ effort to exert thought control reached colleges and universities throughout China. Seeing it as a good opportunity to expand their political power, many local Nationalist leaders were very enthusiastic about establishing party control over schools and students. The Nationalist Party Committee in Beijing sent a telegram to the central government in July 1928, asking for direct supervision of all universities and colleges in Beijing. Its proposal was politely turned down by the University Council of the central government. In its reply to the local leaders in Beijing, the University Council made it clear that the local Party Committee might have the authority to intervene only when there was a security emergency.133 In order to make sure that it had complete control over higher education, the Nationalist regime soon appointed new leaders of many colleges and universities, including Qinghua. General Bai Congxi, a key Nationalist leader, did not hide the real purpose of the change of leadership of colleges and universities. He openly told his audience at the inaugural ceremony that the appointment of Luo Jialun as the president would “turn Qinghua into an integral part of the Party’s mission, and make everyone of you a loyal comrade of the Party.”134 As Jiang Jieshi’s former secretary, Luo did not waste any time in introducing party education to Qinghua University. One of the ﬁrst things that he did was to make the Three Principles of the People a required course for all students and demand that the Departments of Political Science and Economics tailor their curricula to the needs of that course.135 Following the orders from Nanjing, Luo Jialun started military training at Qinghua in November 1928. Qinghua students were organized into four teams and forced to wear uniforms and salute administrators and faculty members on the campus. Following strict schedules, they had morning and evening roll calls every day and drills on school playgrounds

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as well as in the camp every week. Students were punished if they broke any rules.136 The purpose, of course, was to train the students to be obedient followers of the Nationalist Party. Luo’s effort to unify students’ thoughts with Nationalist principles received high remarks from Jiang Jieshi.137 The party education and indoctrination were also extended to students selected for educational exchange. As early as October 1928, the Mass Training Department (Minzhong Xunlianbu) of the Central Committee of the Nationalist Party worked out The Plan for the Implementation of Party Education (Dangzhi Jiaoyu Shishi Fangan). In the special section on study abroad, it required higher educational qualiﬁcations as well as a strong grasp of the party doctrines for all students to be sent abroad.138 In 1933, the Nationalist government adopted a new set of regulations requiring all candidates for governmentsponsored study abroad programs to take party doctrine (Dangyi) as part of the qualiﬁcation tests. As the top subject in the preliminary examinations, party doctrine, together with Chinese language, history, and geography, counted for 25 percent of the total grade. Students might still be able to go abroad if they had failed some tests in their own subject ﬁelds or foreign languages. However, no students would be allowed to go abroad if they could not pass the test on the party doctrine.139 All schools in China, including Qinghua University, were forced to follow the regulations on thought control adopted by the central government. When it received the approval to send students to the United States again in 1933, Qinghua revised its regulations on examination contents and selection process. The revised regulations required that all candidates who were competing for the government scholarship had to take tests in general subjects as well as in their specialties. As required by the central government, the test on party doctrine was listed as the ﬁrst that students had to take. According to the new rules, students had to score at least 60 percent to pass the party doctrine test. While lower grades could be accepted in any other subjects, failure on the test of party doctrine would cost them the candidacy for government scholarships.140 Besides the inclusion of party education as part of the examination, the Nationalist government tried to send as many Nationalist Party members abroad as possible and encouraged them to continue their party activities while abroad. Following instructions from the central government, all provinces asked applicants to clearly list whether they were Nationalist Party members when applying for study abroad. Party members would be selected as long as their test scores were close to those of nonmembers. Some party members did continue their activities while studying in foreign countries. Liu Fukang, a student sent by Guangdong Province to study shipbuilding in England, was very active in the local Nationalist branch. Having organized a “Youth League for Industrial Development in China (Zhonghua Gongye Jianshe Qingniantuan),” he sought guidance from Chen Lifu, Minister of Education. Chen was very interested in Liu’s political activities. He instructed Liu to report on the current local situation and future plans to the General Branch of the Nationalist Party in Britain so that the

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Overseas Division of the party could provide guidance for him in the future.141 Similar activities were reported in the United States, too. The Nationalists intensiﬁed their efforts to exert tighter political control over students at the beginning of the war against Japan. As the Japanese pushed further inland, more and more student demonstrations were organized to protest the Nationalist policy that had given higher priority to ﬁghting the Communists than the Japanese invaders.142 To the Nationalists, the student protest movement was fueled and organized by the Communists. Fully aware of the political power and inﬂuence that students and intellectuals had in Chinese society, the Nationalist leaders were determined to do everything within their power to keep students from the Communists and make them staunch supporters of the Nationalist Party.143 In order to strengthen political control over students, Jiang appointed Chen Lifu, head of the Bureau of Central Investigation (Zhongguo Guomindang Tongji Diaocha Ju), former party secretary, and director of the party’s Organization Department, as the Minister of Education in early 1938. As one of Jiang’s closest conﬁdants, Chen believed that the foremost task of education during the war was to win over the youth. Under Chen’s leadership, the Ministry of Education made a lot of changes in higher education to strengthen thought control during the war years. First of all, it standardized the curriculum and made the Three Principles of the People one of the required courses for all students. Secondly, it put the writing and publication of all textbooks, which used to be handled by private publishers, under its control. All schools had to use textbooks adopted and published by the central government. Although Chen Lifu argued that the measure was taken to improve higher education and save paper, most students and scholars believed that it was done to tighten thought control.144 Thirdly, it institutionalized party control by appointing party members to key administrative positions and establishing special ofﬁces at schools and universities. According to The Basic Principles for the Administration of University and Colleges (Dazhuan Yuanxiao Xingzheng Zuzhi Yaodian), adopted in 1939, all chief administrators of universities and colleges had to join the Nationalist Party, and all schools had to set up a Department of Student Supervision (Xundao Chu) as one of the three administrative departments. The sole responsibility of the new department was to carry out party education and provide political and ideological supervision on behalf of the party among the students.145 While strengthening the party’s control, Chen was instrumental in introducing the Youth League of the Three People’s Principles (Sanmin Zhuyi Qingnian Tuan) to higher and secondary educational institutions. The Youth League was based on the Blue Shirt Society (Lanyi She), composed of young military ofﬁcers, and the League of Purity (Qingbai Tuan), headed by Chen. Formally established in 1938, the Youth League served as the front organization for the Nationalist Party. Its purpose was to recruit as many students as possible and train them to become Nationalist Party members. When Chen became the Minister of Education, the Youth League was given the responsibility to help the party supervise students at all schools.146

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The leaders of the Youth League also tried to expand their political activities among Chinese students and scholars at colleges and universities in the United States. In 1938, General Zhang Zhizhong (Chang Chi-chung), one of the major leaders of the Youth League, appointed Meng Zhi (Chih Meng), director of the China Institute in America, as an advisor for the league’s branch in the United States. Zhang urged Meng to use his inﬂuence to recruit Chinese students for the league. Meng refused to take the position because he found some of the league’s regulations unacceptable. One of the rules that he did not like was that a member had to pledge absolute loyalty to the commandant and his deputies personally. He was also offended by another rule, which provided that a member would be deprived of liberty after two warnings for violation of any regulations. Although Meng explained his decision to the Youth League leaders in New York, his rejection put him on the black list of the Nationalist Party. Meng was regarded as anti-Nationalist and untrustworthy by the Nationalist government until mid-1942, when he was ﬁnally cleared by a special committee that had reviewed his records.147 The Youth League’s activities were only part of the Nationalist grand strategy to exert tighter control over students and scholars in foreign countries. Right after taking over the Ministry of Education, Chen Lifu set up a new ofﬁce within the Division of Higher Education charged with the responsibility to handle study abroad and cultural exchange programs. While reducing the number of students sent abroad, the new ofﬁce worked hard to tighten its supervision and control over Chinese students and scholars overseas. Through agents in the United States, Chen Lifu kept a close eye on all activities of Chinese students and scholars. For example, Meng Zhi commented at a Chinese student conference that “America’s two-party system and the checks and balances built into its governmental structure were more congenial to our Chinese tradition of the Mandate of the Heaven than the current one-party dictatorship of the Nationalist Party without universal suffrage.” Meng’s speech was reported back to the Nationalist regime and recorded in the secret ﬁle kept by the Ministry of Education. It became part of evidence proving that Meng was not politically trustworthy.148 The exertion of party control was made possible and relatively easy with the establishment of effective central administrative control over education and study abroad. The Nationalist government never hesitated to use its power to extend the party indoctrination to all schools in China or exert tight control over Chinese students overseas. The purpose, of course, was to maintain the dominant position of the Nationalist Party in the nation as well as in the government. Although few students, especially those who were seeking higher education overseas, openly challenged the Nationalist effort for party control, many, especially those who had received liberal education at American colleges and universities, resented it from the very beginning. It was such a strong resentment that gradually tore Chinese students and intellectuals away from the Nationalist causes and forced Jiang Jieshi, as John Israel pointed out, to “rely on a crumbling military-bureaucratic coalition incapable of sustaining him.”149

Chapter 5

Maintaining the Educational Front

W

orld War II created difﬁculties as well as opportunities for educational interactions between the United States and China. As allies, the two nations not only fought shoulder to shoulder against the common foe on the battleﬁeld, but also collaborated in education and educational exchanges, another important front in the war. Washington drastically increased its support for the Chinese effort at preserving the nation’s educational system and for sustaining educational exchanges between the two nations to deal with the crisis in diplomatic relations with China caused by its Europe First strategy. The Nationalist government cooperated with Washington, not without reluctance, in order to maintain good relations with a major ally and to protect Chinese schools, a unique front in China’s war against Japan. With strong support from both governments, most Chinese colleges and universities managed to survive the war, and educational exchange between the two nations continued and even expanded. By the end of World War II, China was ready to send thousands of students to the United States to be trained for the postwar reconstruction. While the military cooperation between the two allies was impressive, the United States and China were true chief partners only in educational exchanges.

Initiating the Cultural Relations Program The relations between China and the United States were strained by the lack of American assistance to the Chinese war effort against Japan prior to Pearl Harbor. Although Jiang Jieshi appointed Hu Shi as the ambassador to Washington to obtain more tangible assistance right after the Japanese invasion, China got only two small loans, totaling $45 million, from the United States between February 1939 and April 1940.1 When Congress extended the Lend-Lease aid to China in March 1941, Song Ziwen (T. V. Soong) was sent to Washington asking for one thousand airplanes and equipment for thirty infantry divisions. Song’s 122

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requests were largely rejected by ofﬁcials in the War Department, who did not believe that China could effectively utilize such a large amount of aid.2 The lack of trust in the Nationalist government, coupled with the effective Japanese blockade and poor road conditions in Burma, greatly impeded the allotment and ﬂow of Lend-Lease supplies to China. By the end of 1941, China had received only $26 million worth of aid from the United States, counting for 1.7 percent of the total supplies offered to all foreign countries.3 Frustrated by the lack of substantial American aid, Jiang warned Washington in late November 1941 that, without strong support from the United States, the morale of Chinese troops was certain to go down and the spirit of resistance of both the people and the army might collapse.4 However, Jiang’s complaints gained neither sympathy nor increased material aid from Washington. Washington’s aid to China remained limited even after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Although it was Japan that inﬂicted the ﬁrst heavy losses on American forces and brought the United States ofﬁcially into the war, President Franklin Roosevelt and his advisors adopted the Europe First strategy. Roosevelt made it clear to his advisors that he “would rather lose anything else than have the Russians collapse.”5 In a memorandum to the president, Admiral Harold Stark and General George Marshall articulated the view that “[t]he primary objective of the two nations [United States and Britain] is the defeat of Germany.”6 They emphasized that in any case an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan since such a war would weaken the effort to defeat Germany. They advised that no American armed forces be sent to China, that material aid to China be accelerated only if consonant with the needs of Russia, Britain, and America’s own forces, and that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.7 Following such a strategy, Washington continued to provide minimal military assistance to China. Although Jiang managed to obtain a $500 million loan to support China’s currency (yuan) and ease the Chinese economic situation right after Pearl Harbor, China received only a trickle of military supplies from the United States. In May 1942, only 80 tons of supplies were sent to China, 160 tons in June, and 73 tons in July.8 The lack of substantial American military assistance aroused the strongest protest from Jiang Jieshi. On June 25, 1942, he ordered General Joseph Stilwell, his Chief of Staff appointed by President Roosevelt, to transmit a note to Washington, listing the minimum requirements essential for the maintenance of the Chinese Theater. Jiang demanded that the United States send three American divisions to India to help establish communication lines through Burma, supply and maintain ﬁve hundred planes in China, and ﬂy at least ﬁve thousand tons of supplies to China over “the Hump” every month from August on.9 President Roosevelt, while sending Lauchlin Currie back to China to soothe Jiang, promised to provide only 265 planes to China, which were actually not delivered until almost the end of the war. Unable to get what he believed that China deserved from the United States, Jiang revealed his anger by forcing Roosevelt to recall Stilwell. On several occasions, Jiang Jieshi even threatened to make a

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separate peace with Japan if he could not get adequate aid for his country.10 It is clear that by the end of 1942, the alliance between the two nations was actually in serious trouble. Keenly aware of China’s important role in the war against Japan, the State Department was more sensitive to China’s needs and anxious to maintain friendly relations with the Asian ally. With little inﬂuence over the deployment of troops or allocation of military supplies, it had to resort to some other means to improve Washington’s relations with China. Expanding educational and cultural ties with China quickly became the top choice for the State Department. The department was much better equipped to handle educational and cultural exchanges because of the Division of Cultural Relations, a new ofﬁce established several years earlier to manage cultural exchange programs with Latin American countries, designed to counter German cultural penetration in that part of the world.11 Under the auspices of the State Department, Washington began to assist student exchange programs with sixteen Latin American countries in 1939. Despite their enormous publicity, the exchange programs were relatively small. By the end of 1943, the State Department had funded sixtythree students from Latin American countries studying in the United States and sponsored twenty-nine American students to study in those countries.12 No sooner had the Division of Cultural Relations been established than the State Department was pressed to adopt a cultural relations program with China. As early as March 1938, Roger S. Greene, who had served as consul general in China and on the board of directors of the CFPEC for over a decade, wrote to Benjamin Cherrington, chief of the newly established Division of Cultural Relations, recommending that cultural attachés be sent abroad, including to China, to provide the cultural scope for political ofﬁcers. He observed that the Japanese army paid much attention to Chinese educational movements and institutions in peacetime and that during the war it purposefully sought out and destroyed those institutions. Therefore, Greene insisted that the United States should not overlook the cultural and educational aspects of its relations with China.13 On May 2, 1941, George Cressey, a professor of Asian geography at Syracuse University, met with Stanley Hornbeck, the senior advisor of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, proposing that American professors be sent to universities in unoccupied China to give short series of lectures on matters of current interest, particularly those that would improve relations between the two countries.14 Proposals from scholars like Cressey aroused strong interest among ofﬁcials in the State Department. Hornbeck ﬁrst invited Willys Peck, a veteran of U.S.-China educational exchange and the newly appointed minister to Thailand, to join the discussion with Cressey. Impressed by Cressey’s idea, Peck got both Maxwell Hamilton, chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, and Charles A. Thomson, chief of the Division of Cultural Relations, interested in it. A man of action, Peck quickly put three projects in a written budget proposal: plan to send American educators to unoccupied China to lecture on subjects of mutual interest, provide Chinese educational institutions with motion pictures depicting

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industrial operations and social betterment in the United States, and present to Chinese educational institutions books, periodicals, and scientiﬁc equipment. The purpose of the program was to serve as a “continual reminder of the good will of the Government and people of the United States.”15 Peck even consulted Hu Shi, the Chinese ambassador in Washington, about the projects. His plan received hearty approval from Hu.16 While Cressey and Peck were advocating a China cultural relations program in Washington, many American educators and diplomats in China made similar recommendations. In June 1941, four American professors working at Nanking (Nanjing) University sent a memorandum to the State Department proposing in detail a program of technical training and assistance to be undertaken by the department.17 In July, Clyde B. Sargent, associate professor and chairman of the Foreign Languages Department at Qilu (Cheeloo) University, relocated at Chengdu, Sichuan, recommended that a bureau of Sino-American cultural relations be established in the State Department. The American embassy at Chongqing forwarded Sargent’s proposal to the department for consideration.18 The concrete plans from Peck and strong recommendations from American educators and diplomats helped the State Department make up its mind on adopting a China cultural relations program. On July 31, 1941, Stuart E. Grummon, an experienced Foreign Service ofﬁcer, was appointed to organize and head such a program.19 With limited experience in China and minimal knowledge of Chinese culture and language, Grummon had to depend on his colleagues and staff members of the Division of Cultural Relations in developing the China program. As a result, his ﬁrst comprehensive report on the proposed China cultural relations program included not only almost all the recommendations made by Peck, but also some new projects copied from the recent educational exchange programs with Latin American nations. One of the new projects called for the training of Chinese technical and administrative experts through aid to Chinese students. He insisted that this project should be “analogous to the project under which a number of young electrical engineers from the other American republics were brought to the United States under the auspices of the Rural Electriﬁcation Administration for special training in that ﬁeld.” Another project was Chineselanguage radio programs that would focus on “life in the United States.” The last was to hold a special conference on cultural relations between the United States and China. Attended by government ofﬁcials with experience in China and representatives from universities, libraries, and museums, the conference, he suggested, should be “similar to those on inter-American relations held under the auspices of the Department in the fall of 1939.”20 Grummon’s plan to build the China cultural program after the Latin American model received both support and criticism. Most members of the advisory committee to the Division of Cultural Relations approved Grummon’s plan and added some new projects, including a survey of Chinese-American cultural relations, which had been essential to cultural relations programs with Latin American countries at a meeting held in November 1941. The only open

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criticism came from James T. Shotwell, a professor at Columbia University. He argued that, since a large number of Chinese students had been trained in the United States, the cultural relations program should emphasize practical assistance instead of the presentation of American culture and the American way of life, which were already familiar to them. Despite Shotwell’s opposition, the committee recommended the enlarged program to the Division of Cultural Relations.21 The strong support from the advisory committee and key ofﬁcials in the Department of State failed to win funding for the China cultural program from the Lend-Lease Aid program, which was limited to military purposes. Thus, Grummon was forced to turn to other sources for funding. As an experienced diplomatic ofﬁcer and administrator, Grummon keenly recognized the opportunity created by the Japanese sudden attack on Pearl Harbor. Three days after the attack, he sent a memorandum to the State Department urging that since “China has become an ally of the United States, the program should receive even greater emphasis.” He stressed that “it is now not merely a question of keeping China ﬁghting against Japan but becomes an important contributory element in our own struggle [against] Japan.”22 Concerned with the possibility that China might opt for a separate peace with Japan, he pointed out that the China cultural relations program would “have an important bearing upon the continuance of China’s will to ﬁght” and “contribute to maintaining the morale of the intellectual classes in China, whose inﬂuence upon China’s continued participation in hostilities is of great importance.”23 Grummon’s plan and argument helped policy makers not only see clearly the signiﬁcance of educational and cultural exchanges in the war against Japan, but also ﬁnd a new instrument for dealing with the crisis looming large in U.S.-China diplomatic relations. Finally, the China cultural program got its ﬁrst appropriation of $150,000 for the coming ﬁscal year from the president’s Emergency Fund on January 14, 1942. With money in hand, the State Department wanted to get the China cultural program started as soon as possible. Realizing the important role that the American embassy would play in implementing the program, the department decided to send Grummon’s plan to the embassy at Chongqing before any concrete actions were taken. In order to help diplomats in China fully understand the importance of the program, the department sent Ambassador Clarence Gauss a long telegram on January 29, 1942, elaborating that during the past year the Department has given increasing attention to the desirability of supplementing the aid which this Government has been extending to China along the line of what may be conveniently termed cultural assistance, designed during the emergency, primarily to bolster Chinese morale and secondarily to assist China in many different ways in which American scientiﬁc, technical, social, educational, industrial and other experience may be of use to China in raising the standard of living, improving the condition of its rural population, assisting in

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the development of educational, social and administrative programs and thus contributing to China’s war effort.24

After explaining the grandiose purposes of the program, the department listed all the major projects proposed by Grummon and invited comments and criticism from the ambassador. As an experienced diplomat in China, Gauss saw ﬂaws in the cultural program immediately. In his reply to the department, Gauss rejected the purpose of the China program as approved by the department. He warned Washington that “having in mind Chinese sensitivity, it is desirable to avoid any suggestion now of a ‘cultural’ mission to China.” Believing that the proposed projects “would do little toward bolstering morale,” he suggested that “the least said publicly in the direction at the present time the better.” With a clear understanding of what the Chinese needed at the time, Gauss proposed to redesign the whole program so that it would be “fashioned as an effort to contribute toward maintaining China’s educational front during the war period, and should be calculated to ensure as beneﬁcial results as possible under existing difﬁcult conditions.” Gauss’s advice reﬂected his understanding of the Chinese attitude toward foreign cultural aid and China’s real wartime needs. What China most needed, Gauss pointed out, was more American military and ﬁnancial assistance. He insisted that “the primary concern is how to meet those needs so far as possible.” 25 Gauss also shared his strong criticism of many projects proposed by Grummon. He did not support the comprehensive survey of America’s current cultural relations with China because the Chinese would have no time for such a survey during the war and there were not very many cultural programs carried out by American organizations in unoccupied China anyhow. Gauss also doubted that much good would come from the exchange of technical and educational leaders. He argued that technical or expert surveys and reports, the most important responsibility for American visitors, could readily be done by fully qualiﬁed Chinese specialists and experts, or by American specialists in missionary schools in China. Gauss’s strongest opposition was directed at the propaganda-oriented projects. He believed that sending light trucks equipped with full-size projectors and sound systems was impractical because it was impossible to get this heavy equipment shipped to China and motion pictures would reach only a small audience. He suggested instead that the department send the much lighter 16mm movie projectors to Chinese educational institutions, where they could be used by the Chinese for academic purposes.26 Gauss dismissed the radio project because he doubted that there were more than two thousand radio sets in the entire country. He believed that most owners of radio sets were “members of the ofﬁcial educated class who prefer to hear American and international news rather than purely cultural programs at the present time.” Therefore, he recommended abandoning the radio project completely. 27 Gauss did approve some of Grummon’s projects, but not without serious revisions. Gauss supported exchanges in such ﬁelds as medical science, public

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health, and agriculture, areas in which China had an immediate need for American expertise. However, he insisted that once these experts and specialists were in China, they should stay there long enough, at least one year, to enter into constructive collaboration with their Chinese counterparts.28 He also endorsed the aid to Chinese students pursuing technical, administrative, and educational studies in the United States, but on a much larger scale. He suggested that ﬁnancial aid be given to all Chinese students who needed help. Since there were about one thousand Chinese students in the United States at that time and many had severe ﬁnancial difﬁculties, hundreds of grants would be needed. As for the exchange of qualiﬁed leaders in educational ﬁelds, Gauss proposed that the project be postponed until transportation between China and the outside world had improved. He supported the idea of sending American professors to lecture at Chinese universities, but emphasized that the lectures should focus on subjects that China might not have been able to keep abreast of because of its isolation during the war.29 Donating needed materials to the refugee universities in Southwest China received the strongest endorsement from Gauss. Having served in China for many years, Gauss was fully aware of the importance of these universities for China. He knew that the Japanese had made painstaking efforts to destroy higher education in China and the Chinese government had worked hard to preserve its universities and colleges. Many important universities had moved from Beijing, Shanghai, and other big cities in coastal regions to the Southwest just before the Japanese occupation. In order to train and preserve the intellectuals for postwar reconstruction, these refugee universities reopened their doors in southwestern cities and villages, keeping professors and students from ﬁghting on the battleﬁeld. The Chinese regarded their effort at maintaining universities and colleges as an important front in the war against Japan. Thus, Gauss believed that helping China support their colleges and universities should be the major focus of the China cultural program. Realizing the transportation problems in China, he recommended that Washington send microﬁlms of current scientiﬁc and engineering publications instead of textbooks and scientiﬁc equipment. He believed that it was these publications that would be most helpful to university professors, who had for so long been cut off from the outside world.30 Having shared his views with the State Department, Gauss offered his vision. Based on his own experience and observation in China, Gauss argued that the China program should focus on maintaining China’s “educational front” during the war. He believed that this was the best way to “bolster morale amongst a class of Chinese whose inﬂuence in the present and for the future is important both to China and the United States.” In order to accomplish this goal, Gauss suggested that grants-in-aid be provided to faculties in free China so as to “alleviate individual cases of distress and hardship amongst Chinese members of the teaching profession and their families” and, if funds permitted, to help particularly promising students. He stressed that the teaching profession had been most seriously affected by the war. Most highly educated specialists

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and experts, many with education in the United States, could no longer support their families and were abandoning the profession in favor of other employment. Grants-in-aid, Gauss argued, “would be a real assistance to this important and inﬂuential Chinese class” and would help keep them in their profession.31 Compared with Grummon’s proposal, Gauss’s suggestions were more focused and practical. They resembled in striking ways the ﬁrst American cultural experiments in China funded with the Boxer Indemnity remissions, which aimed at improving Sino-American relations through helping Chinese intellectuals and universities. Since a large number of faculty members in Chinese universities received their education in the United States, Gauss’s plan would not only continue and enlarge the educational exchange between the two nations, but also protect a large number of American returnees, the greatest achievement of the ﬁrst joint cultural experiments.32 Gauss’s arguments were so eloquent that the State Department accepted his evaluation and vision completely. In a telegram drafted by Grummon, the State Department told Gauss that it fully shared his view that “under present circumstances the purpose of strengthening China’s morale, which need not be mentioned in your conversations [with Chinese ofﬁcials], is best achieved by the method of assisting China in the most practical fashion during the present emergency.” Agreeing with Gauss’s suggestion on the exchange of technical experts, the department directed him to invite the Chinese government to express its needs, promised to utilize experienced American experts in China, and decided to extend the stay of Americans in China from six months to a year. While asking for more recommendations regarding motion pictures and radio from Gauss, the department agreed to send 16mm motion picture projectors to the embassy immediately. However, the department insisted that if possible it would also send sound equipment and generators to China, which would be useful for showing sound pictures. The department told Gauss that the Ofﬁce of the Coordinator of Information was working with the Library of Congress concerning the possibility of supplying microﬁlms of current learned journals, especially those in scientiﬁc ﬁelds. The department also promised Gauss that it would study his recommendation regarding grants-in-aid to faculties and universities in free China. It asked Gauss to estimate the number of persons who should receive aid and the amount of money needed for the project.33 With the approval of Gauss’s plan, the China cultural program began to enter the implementation phase.

Assisting China on the Educational Front The State Department’s acceptance of Gauss’s proposal to focus on maintaining the educational front ensured that its China cultural relations program would follow the tradition established by the two nations in the earlier decades rather than the Latin American model. Although some State Department ofﬁcials later tried to insert a few relatively small projects that were similar to those undertaken in Latin America, the China cultural relations program remained

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focused throughout the war on aiding Chinese students, faculties, and universities. Since the war made it impossible for any self-sponsored students to study abroad, educational exchanges became completely a state function. Spending part of its budget on educational exchange with China for the ﬁrst time in history, Washington helped Chinese students and scholars stranded in the United States and brought more to the United States during the war. At the same time, it offered assistance to faculties and universities in unoccupied China that were experiencing extreme hardship caused by the war. The joint effort to maintain an educational front in the war against Japan thus became an important dimension in U.S.-China diplomatic relations during World War II. One of the ﬁrst things done by the State Department was to offer ﬁnancial assistance to Chinese students in the United States. As more provinces in Northern and Eastern China fell into the hands of the Japanese, an increasingly large number of Chinese students could neither continue their education in the United States because of the lack of funding, nor return home because of the Japanese occupation. The Chinese government did extend ﬁnancial assistance to about two hundred students through the Committee on Wartime Planning with the administrative help of the China Institute by January 1944.34 Unable to provide ﬁnancial support for all Chinese students stranded in the United States, it turned to Washington for help. In his meeting with State Department ofﬁcials on their China cultural program in September 1941, Hu Shi directed their attention to the ﬁnancial problems faced by Chinese students in this country. He warned them that these ﬁnancial difﬁculties would become “the most serious handicaps in effecting a student exchange.”35 In response to Hu’s request, the State Department set aside some money to help twenty Chinese students with $1,000 each in 1942 and doubled the number in 1943.36 As the Japanese sped up their invasion of Southeast Asia after Pearl Harbor and cut China off from the outside world completely, more Chinese students in the United States fell into ﬁnancial despair. Ten days after the United States declared war on Japan, Meng Zhi went to see Hornbeck and Grummon. As the ofﬁcial caretaker appointed by the Chinese government, he formally pleaded for help for Chinese students stranded in the United States. While concerned about all the students, Meng worried most about the two hundred students in the humanities who would graduate soon but could not go back to China. Even those students who had technical skills and were working in American plants still had difﬁculties supporting themselves because the current immigration laws forbade Chinese students from working in the United States. As a result, many of them did not receive pay for their work. To alleviate the students’ plight, Meng suggested that the State Department grant needy Chinese students $75 a month to defray their living expenses.37 Meng’s suggestion received a quick and favorable response from the State Department.38 The Division of Cultural Relations set up a special committee to advise it on the assistance to Chinese students. Committee members included Meng Zhi, Stephen Drygan, the director of the Institute of International

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Education, and Roger Greene. Meng would select and present the students who needed help to the committee. The committee would then recommend them to the State Departmental for ﬁnancial aid. Of course, the department had established guidelines for the selection, which included the importance of the student’s ﬁeld to China, the student’s ability, and the student’s ﬁnancial need.39 The grant-in-aid project was formally started in April 1942 when the State Department mailed the ﬁrst checks to the selected Chinese students in the United States. In the ﬁrst year, over two hundred Chinese students received aid from the United States government. Most of them were studying at universities and colleges. Less than 10 percent of them were receiving practical training in American plants.40 By May 1, 1944, the total number of Chinese students who had received grants-in-aid from the United States government reached 376.41 This number was far bigger than Grummon had ﬁrst proposed and the State Department had originally budgeted. While obtaining monetary assistance from the United States government, Meng Zhi worked hard to help Chinese students get practical training or employment in this country so that they could not only gain precious work experience, but also support themselves ﬁnancially. His effort received assistance and sanction from universities, private companies, and the State Department. Karl Compton, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, helped Meng place a considerable number of the Chinese students in industrial plants.42 At the beginning of 1942, Professor Compton visited Purdue University and the University of Michigan. After discussing the ﬁnancial problems of Chinese students, the presidents of these two universities agreed with Compton that the assistance provided for them “should be, as far as possible, in the form of opportunities for work rather than a money grant.”43 Many American corporations were very interested in hiring the highly educated Chinese students to alleviate the shortage of skilled laborers caused by the war. An ofﬁcial of American Airlines telephoned Grummon on January 27, 1942, telling him that the Engineering and Maintenance Departments of the company were “favorably disposed to giving positions to between six and twelve Chinese engineering students.” In order to avoid any possible problems with the company’s labor unions as well as government regulations, the company wished to have clear approval from the State Department. The company promised that it would pay the Chinese students the prevailing salary rate.44 The American Airlines’ desire to hire Chinese students received strong support from Grummon. He brought the matter to the attention of other interested ofﬁcials in the State Department and argued that this type of practical training for Chinese students in the United States was a contribution to China’s war effort. It was, Grummon pointed out, “in harmony with the general program of so-called cultural assistance to China which the Department is developing at the present time.”45 In response to American Airlines’ request, he drafted a formal letter on behalf of the Secretary of State, seeking ofﬁcial approval from the Justice Department for the employment of Chinese students in

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this country.46 The letter was sent to Francis Biddle, the attorney general, on February 18, 1942, urging that some administrative solution should be found to solve the problem faced by Chinese students.47 The response from the Justice Department was positive. Lemuel B. Schuﬁeld, special assistant to the attorney general, issued an instruction to the Immigration and Naturalization Service on February 27, 1942, informing it of the decision made by the Department of Justice that “consideration may be given to permitting such students [who are unable to return home or obtain funds from abroad] to discontinue school for the duration of the war or until their circumstances change and to accept full-time employment with an organization or individual approved by this service.”48 In his reply to Secretary of State Cordell Hull on March 19, 1942, Schuﬁeld suggested that Chinese students should apply directly to the Certiﬁcations Branch at the Central Ofﬁce in Philadelphia. They should provide information regarding their ﬁnancial circumstances, their intended employers, the character of their employment, compensation to be received, and any other facts that might be deemed pertinent in particular cases.49 The positive reply from the Justice Department did away with an obstacle that for decades had prevented Chinese students from being employed in this country. Happy with Justice Department’s decision, the State Department began to do its best to help Chinese students locate positions in American industry, commerce, government, and schools. The China Section of the Division of Cultural Relations was most active. In February 1943 alone, it helped one Chinese student with practical training, three with full-time employment, eight with employment records, and obtained assurance of employment opportunities from ﬁve companies. 50 By the end of 1943, the State Department had helped over three hundred Chinese students ﬁnd positions in American industry and commerce where they could receive practical training and earn their own living. The department also assisted some Chinese students to ﬁnd positions in American government. By March 1944, it had placed thirty-three Chinese students with the Department of Agriculture, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Bureau of the Census, the Farm Credit Administration, the Library of Congress, and the Treasury Department. 51 With the cooperation of the Ofﬁce of Education, the department managed to get assignments for a few Chinese graduate students as visiting teachers of Chinese history, literature, language, culture, and daily life in public schools all over the country. The department even made arrangements for three Chinese students involved in the teaching project to have tea with Mrs. Roosevelt, who had given her blessing to the project.52 The placement of Chinese students in American businesses and government became much easier after Congress abolished all Chinese exclusion laws in the fall of 1943. Chinese students would no longer be subject to the deﬁnition specially promulgated for them by the United States government. They could seek practical training in the United States just like other students and even change their status from nonimmigrant student to immigrant staying permanently in the

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United States. However, they had to compete for the immigrant quota of a mere 105 set aside for the Chinese. The assistance from the State Department in the form of ﬁnancial aid and employment placement helped Chinese students survive the most difﬁcult years during World War II. Such massive and direct aid to foreign students in the United States was unprecedented in history. In a similar situation during World War I, the State Department, instead of offering direct aid, asked the stranded Chinese students to seek help from private institutions. A sharper contrast could be seen when the United States educational exchange with Latin American nations was compared. While providing ﬁnancial aid to hundreds of Chinese students, the State Department suspended its exchange programs with Latin American countries. The special treatment that the State Department gave to the Chinese students during World War II clearly revealed the importance of educational exchanges as part of American assistance to China’s war effort. While providing ﬁnancial support for Chinese students in the United States, Washington attempted to help universities and faculties in unoccupied China through grants-in-aid in early 1942. Accepting Ambassador Gauss’s proposal, the Division of Far Eastern Affairs made every effort to push the Chinese government to provide ﬁnancial assistance to Chinese faculties and students with the Lend-Lease aid from the United States.53 However, the State Department was soon forced to give up its original plan because of strong opposition from the Chinese government as well as teachers, who did not want to receive direct grants from the United States government. The Chinese teachers, although appreciating the American intention, believed that their well-being and maintenance should be the concern of their own government, and that they ought not to depend upon the charity of another country for their daily livelihood.54 The Chinese government welcomed foreign aid, but it insisted that all ﬁnancial help from abroad should be distributed by the Chinese Ministry of Education. The Chinese proposal was unacceptable to Americans ofﬁcials, especially diplomats, since they had little conﬁdence in the corrupt Nationalist government.55 Besides, the Chinese government vehemently opposed the American plan to direct part of the Lend-Lease funds to help Chinese universities and faculties. It wanted to use all the American aid for military and economic purposes, which it deemed more important to their immediate war effort. Unable to win support from the Nationalist government, the State Department cooperated with private organizations, such as the United China Relief, in offering aid to Chinese universities and faculties. According to Wilma Fairbank, the ﬁrst American cultural attaché at the American embassy in China, the ofﬁcials of the American embassy and the United China Relief met frequently to discuss the needs of Chinese educational institutions and ways in which they might be helped.56 With the cooperation and coordination of the Division of Cultural Relations, the United China Relief began providing ﬁnancial aid to Chinese universities, teachers, and students in 1942. In order to help Chinese students ﬂeeing the occupied areas, it established committees in eight cities,

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including Xian (Sian), Guiyang (Kweiyang), and Guilin (Kweilin), to aid those traveling to inland provinces. It allocated $1.5 million for medical education in China and spent $706,000 of that sum by the end of 1942. This money was divided among the Emergency Medical Training Schools of the Chinese Army, the medical schools and colleges under the Ministry of Education, and the National Health Administration.57 Keeping aid to Chinese universities and faculties high on its list of priorities, the United China Relief had to be innovative in order to cover all universities in China. It was easy to work with Christian universities in China, which received about $600,000 from the United China Relief between April 1, 1942, and March 31, 1943, and $900,000 the next year. Most of the money was used to supplement the salaries of faculty members. The United China Relief also allocated $200,000 for direct aid to faculty members in all other Chinese universities in early 1943. However, no national universities were allowed by the government to accept American funds for the same reason it had rejected previous offers from the United States government.58 Instead of waiting for the Chinese government to change its policy, the United China Relief donated one million Chinese yuan to the CFPEC in the fall of 1943. Having just lost the income from the Boxer Indemnity remission, the CFPEC found it difﬁcult to reject such a generous contribution. Accepting the donation, the CFPEC set up an internal committee as requested by the United China Relief to manage the funds. After a brief meeting, the committee decided that the funds should be used to subsidize important individuals in educational and research institutions in Kunming since the city had the highest cost of living in unoccupied China. In order to help identify the important individuals and determine the distribution of subsidies, the committee set up an advising council to recommend candidates and comment on the management of the funds.59 Having provided aid for Chinese national universities for about two decades, the CFPEC received no objection from the Nationalist government when it started to distribute funds donated by the United China Relief. It ﬁrst invited Jiang Mengling, Mei Yiqi, and Li Shuhua as advisers. The Advisory Council met on October 3, 1943, and worked out Rules for the Special Research Subsidies (Tebie Yanjiu Buzhujin Banfa). According to the Rules, applicants for the subsidies had to be well-established professors and researchers conducting research or writing at universities and research institutes who were experiencing extreme ﬁnancial difﬁculties and without outside income greater than one thousand yuan a month.60 In 1944, eighty scholars received twelve thousand yuan each. In 1945, the subsidy funds were expanded to seventy million yuan and offered to 936 scholars from all universities and research institutions in unoccupied China.61 The United China Relief succeeded in circumventing the Nationalist government in providing direct aid to Chinese faculties, including those at national universities. While cooperating with private agencies in providing ﬁnancial aid to Chinese scholars, the State Department implemented a number of programs that

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helped improve the work and life of Chinese professors during the war. One of them was to invite Chinese scholars to visit the United States. The American embassy at Chongqing sent the ﬁrst invitation letters to presidents of Southwest Associated University, Central University, Wuhan University, Zhejiang University, Sichuan University, and Yunnan University on November 4, 1942, asking them to select their representatives to be sent to the United States. All the universities responded swiftly and the ﬁrst group of Chinese representatives was composed entirely of faculty members, mostly in social and political sciences. They ﬁnally left China for the United States via India in June 1943 after overcoming some political obstacles. Having learned a lesson from the selection of the ﬁrst group, the State Department reluctantly got the Nationalist government involved in the process. As a result, more university administrators were sent to the United States in the following years. Between 1943 and 1946, four groups of Chinese educators and artists, totaling twenty-six, were brought to the United States.62 (See Appendix E.) Besides personnel exchanges, the State Department strongly supported the Microﬁlm Project. Although still in its infancy, microﬁlm technology allowed hundreds of pages of documents to be contained in a single role of microﬁlm and read with a microﬁlm reader. John King Fairbank, a young ofﬁcer assigned by the Coordinator of Information as a special assistant to the American ambassador, was formally instructed to help the embassy staff in carrying out the Microﬁlm Project before he left for China. Deeply interested in the project, he brought with him the ﬁrst model projector to Chongqing in August 1942. He also took with him some electric light bulbs and lenses so that more readers could be assembled in China.63 Once arrived in Chongqing, Fairbank worked closely with Yuan Tongli (T. L. Yuan), one of his old friends and currently the director of the National Library, to set up special ofﬁces under the American embassy and the Ministry of Education to provide and receive microﬁlms.64 With close collaboration from the Chinese government, a number of reading rooms equipped with microﬁlm readers were soon established at all major national universities in unoccupied China.65 The State Department began to regularly microﬁlm about sixty leading journals recommended by the National Research Council in science, engineering, social sciences, and humanities. By the end of 1943, over one million pages of microﬁlmed materials were sent to these reading rooms.66 Over 150 people, almost all faculty members, used the two projectors at the National Central University Library in the ﬁrst month. Because of the high demand, each person was allowed to use a reader for at most two hours at each sitting. They had to make reservations more than a week in advance to guarantee their access.67 In order to better meet the needs of Chinese researchers, the American embassy began to forward to Washington speciﬁc requests for microﬁlm negatives for individually identiﬁed articles in March 1943. By special arrangement with the State Department, the library of the Department of Agriculture searched for and microﬁlmed those articles to be sent to China. This kind of

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personal service became increasingly popular among Chinese researchers in 1944 and was deeply appreciated.68 Because of the success of the Microﬁlm Project, the State Department helped establish two more reading rooms, one for general reading and the other for microﬁlms, at the faculty center at Northeastern Associated University in mid-1945.69 Another step taken by the American embassy to assist Chinese universities in unoccupied China was to provide funding for research projects on various wartime issues. The American embassy solicited and approved six research proposals from faculty members at Southwestern Associate University in 1945. The projects included a survey of the remains of ancient architecture in the Southwest and a study of wartime labor, inﬂation, prices, and cost of living in unoccupied China. The budget for the proposals ranged from US$1,000 to US$3,000.70 When the university was slow to pick up the approved funds, the American consul at Kunming paid a visit to the university on June 26, 1945, urging immediate action.71 A few days later, the American consulate at Kunming sent six sets of vouchers amounting to US$13,000 to President Mei Yiqi, asking for signatures from payees. Afraid of missing the deadline, Mei, following the instructions from the American consul, sent the directors of the six projects to the American consulate immediately to sign the papers.72 The State Department found still another way to help Chinese scholars through subsidizing the translation of Chinese scholarly manuscripts into English. With help from a committee composed of eleven leading Chinese scholars, a large number of manuscripts, reﬂecting the current research of Chinese scholars in unoccupied China, were sought out for translation and publication in the United States. Each scholar, if his article was selected, would receive $100, a huge amount during the war years. Then, staff members from the Division of Cultural Relations would try to place these articles in appropriate American journals so as to bring them and their authors to the notice of the outside world. By March 1944, the division had received sixty-one manuscripts. At that time, thirteen had been published, eight were pending publication, and the rest were still under consideration.73 In this way, the division was able not only to keep scholars outside of China informed of the work done by the Chinese during the war, but also to provide desperately needed ﬁnancial assistance to Chinese scholars without hurting their pride. In addition to the well-planned and organized assistance programs, some staff members at the American embassy offered their help to Chinese faculties in many innovative ways. Having spent about a week at Lianda in Kunming on his way to Chongqing in August 1942, John King Fairbank gained some ﬁrsthand knowledge about the desperate situations of Chinese faculties at Qinghua and other colleges after meeting with dozens of his old friends and colleagues. Deeply troubled by their horrible conditions, he immediately cried for help from Washington. In one of his earliest reports to the State Department, Fairbank strongly argued that Qinghua University “represents an American interest in China because several million dollars of the returned portion of the Boxer

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Indemnity have been invested in it.” Thus, he insisted that the Qinghua faculty, as “the living agents of American educational inﬂuence” and as “the only remaining asset of an investment made by the United States Government over a period of more than thirty years” after the Japanese invasion, deserved special consideration and support. He warned that if the United States failed to help these people, it would be a shameful stain upon the American record.74 While pushing Washington for more help, Fairbank soon made it his own “private war aim” to help preserve American-educated Chinese professors. Fairbank and his wife, Wilma, tried many different ways to help the Chinese faculty members. They managed to get a large shipment of vitamin B-1, with help from Lauchlin Currie, to Qinghua in August 1943. It allowed the Qinghua medics to help counter a widespread vitamin deﬁciency. Greater effort was made to ﬁnd more income for the Chinese faculties. Fairbank persuaded Lauchlin Currie to ask the Army Special Services to set up a fund of $5,000 to pay Chinese professors to deliver lectures to American troops in Kunming. Wilma Fairbank kept up a ﬂow of drugs and other valuable hardware, such as pens and watches, to the American consulate in Kunming. She distributed them to Qinghua faculty members as salary supplements through Chen Daisun, a Qinghua professor of economics living next door to the Fairbanks. When the six exchange professors from China arrived in the United States in late 1943, Fairbank urged the Harvard-Yenching Institute to give each an additional $1,000 so that their ﬁnancial conditions could be substantially improved.75 By carrying out various cultural relations programs, Washington got itself deeply involved in helping China maintain its educational front during World War II. The Nationalist government cooperated with the United States government as long as the American involvement was limited and the Nationalist control over Chinese colleges and universities was not weakened or challenged. With Washington’s help, China was able to keep its key universities running and connected with the outside world during the war years. The maintenance of the educational front not only preserved and prepared a large group of highly trained specialists for China’s postwar reconstruction, but also made the further expansion of educational exchange between the United States and China at the end of the war possible and necessary.

Expanding Educational Exchanges and Party Control The collaboration on maintaining China’s educational front clearly demonstrated that the alliance between the United States and China during World War II went far beyond military and economic aid. As the end of the war was in sight in mid-1943, both the Chinese and American governments began to take steps preparing for the further expansion of educational exchanges after the war. While the new alliance made the expansion of educational exchange relatively easy, the Nationalist effort to exert tighter control over Chinese students’ thoughts and behavior caused concern in Washington and provoked strong

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criticism from American educators. Although Washington soon dropped the issue to keep exchange programs alive, the preparation and implementation of large-scale educational exchange was delayed. Large numbers of governmentsponsored Chinese students began to arrive in the United States only at or after the end of World War II. As the war took a favorable turn for China and its allies in mid-1943, Jiang Jieshi began to plan for the postwar reconstruction in China. In the ﬁrst ten years, Jiang estimated, China would need 500,000 high-ranking cadres (gaoji ganbu). It would be impossible to have all the cadres trained at universities in China within a short period of time because of the lack of faculty and equipment. Therefore, Jiang concluded that China needed to continue its study abroad programs. He issued a secret order on April 28, 1943, instructing various ministries to prepare long-term plans for selecting and sending students abroad to be trained as cadres at all levels.76 Following Jiang’s order, the Ministry of Education worked out a ﬁve-year study abroad plan in 1943, proposing to send two thousand government- and self-sponsored students to the United States and Great Britain every year for ﬁve years. Once completed, China would have an additional ten thousand foreign-trained experts for its reconstruction. For 1943, the ministry decided to send seven hundred students to the United States and three hundred to England.77 The Chinese plan aroused strong interest and quick responses from the United States. Clarence Gauss gave his full approval for the program even before the Chinese government could complete the planning process. He also sent a report back to the State Department, strongly suggesting that the United States government facilitate the training of the Chinese students in this country.78 The embassy’s enthusiasm was echoed in Washington. Eager to get the plan started, Willys Peck, the head of the China Section in the Division of Cultural Relations, drafted a letter for the Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Treasury, asking for the latter’s opinion in regard to the use of the unspent portion of the $500 million credit established for China for the training of Chinese technical students in this country.79 Having received the green light from the Treasury Department, the State Department let the embassy know that the Treasury Department had allowed the Chinese government to ﬁnance the plan to train technical students in the United States with funds from the $500 million credit already provided by the American government, and that the Division of Cultural Relations would cooperate with the Chinese government in carrying out the plan. The department instructed the embassy to informally convey to Chinese ofﬁcials that Washington would welcome an ofﬁcial notiﬁcation of the Chinese plan.80 Despite the strong hint and encouragement from Washington, the Chinese government was reluctant to notify the State Department of its plan and slow in its implementation. The lack of an enthusiastic response from the Nationalist government and the delay of the implementation of the plan had many causes. First, the Chinese government was still busy ﬁghting the war against Japan. Thus, training students for postwar reconstruction was low on its priority

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list. Second, Chinese government agencies could not reach an agreement on the training of experts overseas. While the Ministry of Education wanted to send more regular students and scholars abroad, other agencies, like the Ministries of Transportation and the Economy, all insisted on sending out more administrators and technicians for practical training. Third, the Nationalist government was not quite willing to spend a signiﬁcant portion of the $500 million credit that it had obtained from the United States on this project. The Ministry of Education’s plan alone would cost over $4 million a year and over $20 million in ﬁve years.81 The greatest impediment to the implementation of the educational exchange plan was the controversy aroused by the Nationalist Party’s effort to impose “thought control” on Chinese students studying abroad. The Nationalist Party had been trying to exert thought control on students since the very beginning. Such an effort became more open and intensiﬁed during the war years. Following Jiang’s orders, the Ministry of Education included more political requirements in its selection of students and scholars to be sent abroad and tightened supervision over them while they were in foreign countries. In its ﬁve-year plan, the Ministry of Education explicitly mandated that all privately as well as government-sponsored students receive training in the Party Affairs Training Class (Dangzheng Xunliangban) at the Central Training Corps (Zhongyang Xunliangtuan) for a month before leaving the country. Those who had gone abroad without such training had to make it up upon their return to China. All government-sponsored students should also be induced to join the Nationalist Party or the Youth League. The ministry would establish student guidance ofﬁces overseas to supervise students’ research, training, thoughts, and behavior.82 The Nationalist government was serious in implementing the political training requirement aimed at thought control. Few people, including top scholars and administrators, were able to skip it. The Chinese scholars who were invited by the State Department for a one-year visit to the United States and American diplomats in Chongqing learned that the hard way in 1943. When the American embassy was ready to send the six selected Chinese professors to the United States on May 1, 1943, it found out that ﬁve of them had not received their passports. Despite pleas from the American embassy, the Nationalist government insisted that it would not issue passports to the professors until they completed the required political training at the Central Training Corps. As a result, the professors had to cancel their ﬂight arrangements and go to the Training Corps for two weeks.83 The training was focused on the basic doctrines of the Nationalist Party, which were neither new nor interesting to most of the scholars. However, Jiang Jieshi, serving as the general director of the Central Training Corps himself, was very serious about the training and saw it as an opportunity for the Nationalist Party to win over the scholars and students. At the end of the training, he met with all the professors and reminded them that they should all join the Nationalist Party. The professors were ﬁnally allowed to start their trip to America on June 5, 1943.84

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Having learned from this experience, the State Department modiﬁed the selection process the next year. Instead of attempting to circumvent the Chinese government, the American embassy sent copies of the invitations ﬁrst to the Foreign Ministry and announced the departure date at the very beginning. Many Chinese scholars recommended and welcomed the change in order to avoid delays and difﬁculties in getting passports and foreign currency.85 Once the Chinese government was included in the process, things went much more smoothly and more university administrators, mostly appointed by the government, were selected for the program.86 Hua Luogeng, a young mathematician at Qinghua, was invited to do research at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton in the fall of 1943. Hua attended the Central Training Corps on the recommendation of President Mei Yiqi in November with little resistance. Actually, he enjoyed staying in the Training Corps not only because he was well treated there, but also because he could take a break from his work and concentrate on making arrangements for his study in the United States. From the training camp, Hua wrote letters to the president and provost of Qinghua, asking them to apply for a passport for him as a government ofﬁcial and book his airline ticket.87 He arrived in Princeton in 1946 after a visit to Soviet Union.88 While forcing all government-sponsored students and scholars to receive political training, the Nationalist government also tightened its control over self-sponsored students. The Regulations on Sending Self-Sponsored Students Abroad (Guowai Liuxue Zifeisheng Paiqian Banfa), issued by the Ministry of Education on November 8, 1943, emphasized the ministry’s authority over all self-sponsored students overseas. The new regulations limited the number of self-sponsored students to be sent abroad each year to six hundred, with 60 percent majoring in engineering, science, agriculture, or medicine. All self-sponsored students, according to the new regulations, were required not only to attend the Central Training Corps after passing all the examinations, but also to “absolutely subject all of their thoughts and behavior abroad to the guidance and control of the [Student] Supervisor and the Embassy.” Students would be recalled back to China “if they had uttered any words contrary to the Three People’s Principles or misbehaved.”89 American diplomats in China did not like the tight political or thought control imposed by the Nationalist regime on students and scholars. However, there was little that they could do to stop it. After meeting two ofﬁcials from the Ministry of Education at the American embassy in Chongqing on May 1, 1943, Philip Sprouse, a political ofﬁcer, reported that he was ofﬁcially informed of the new requirements established by Jiang Jieshi about a month earlier. Although the Chinese ofﬁcials tried to convince him that Jiang made the decision without any input from either the Ministry of Education or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sprouse blamed Chen Lifu for the new requirements. He believed that the delay of Chinese exchange scholars “may arise from Dr. Chen Li-fu’s desire to place all hindrances possible in the path of a project which doubtlessly does not have his approval in that the group, with exception of National

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Szechwan University’s appointee, consists of outstanding Chinese scholars who have already received western training and presumably entertain western liberal ideas.”90 John S. Service, the second secretary of the embassy, reported on June 8, 1943, that intellectuals who attended the training felt embarrassed and expressed strong dislike of it.91 After the publication of the regulations on self-sponsored students, Ambassador Gauss openly expressed his fear that “under such a rigorous system of selection and control, students of known liberal political beliefs or those suspected of a questioning or critical attitude toward the Kuomintang will ﬁnd it extremely difﬁcult, if not impossible, to obtain the approval of the Ministry of Education for studying abroad.”92 Despite its concern about the Nationalist effort to extend political and thought control over Chinese students in the United States, Washington responded with restraint. When the Chinese government’s new requirements were exposed in American newspapers, the State Department instructed Ambassador Gauss on March 14, 1944, that he should indicate to the Chinese government that “the Department would view with disfavor such political surveillance of Chinese students in this country.”93 About the same time, the Ofﬁce of Far Eastern Affairs received a report revealing that some departments of the Chinese government, including Dai Li’s Secret Service, had taken action to supervise and control Chinese communities, especially Chinese students in this country. This action, the report pointed out, intimidated Chinese and violated American laws. The ofﬁce agreed that “to permit the continued development of the above-described Chinese Government Organizations in the United States would result in the obstruction of the American cultural relations program in so far as it has to deal with Chinese students in the United States and to a large extent would therefore render its aims barren.” It even warned the department that “the development per se is contrary to the American principle of freedom, not only as essential in the Atlantic Charter but also practical throughout American history, with reference to both thought and activity.” However, despite the seriousness of the matter, the Ofﬁce of Far Eastern Affairs opposed any legal action against the Chinese police organization in the United States. The only advice it gave to the department was to make a “general presentation of the Chinese Embassy at Washington with the aim of checking the growth of that unhealthy political organization.”94 While Washington was reluctant to challenge thought control imposed by the Nationalist government on students in China as well as in the United States, some American professors did not hesitate to launch a vigorous attack on such a practice. Having read news reports on the newly publicized Chinese government regulations on Chinese students, professors of the American Defense–Harvard Group, an antifascist organization, adopted a resolution on March 29, 1944, demanding veriﬁcation of the reports from the United States government. If the reports were accurate, the committee urged Washington to inform the Chinese government that it would not admit any Chinese students and would send back those who accepted such a form of control.95 Once the Chinese regulations were

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conﬁrmed, Professor Ralph B. Perry, chairman of the American Defense–Harvard Group, prepared another memorandum and sent it to several universities, denouncing the regulations as “regrettable and unacceptable,” and calling them a violation of “the basic principles of freedom for which China and the United States are now ﬁghting both in Europe and Asia” and inimical to “the best tradition of American education and scholarship and to that of liberty of thought and of teaching to which American colleges and universities are devoted.” Therefore, he demanded that all the regulations should be “rescinded or revised.”96 Professor Perry’s memorandum received unanimous approval from all the universities that were involved in educational exchange with China. Dr. Carrington Goodrich, acting director of admissions at Columbia University, took steps to notify Chinese students at the university that when they arrived at Morningside Heights they were expected to be free of outside interference. He believed that “we will get nowhere if our universities permit anyone to control the thought of these students, or keep them from saying what they think they ought to say.”97 The Massachusetts Institute of Technology did not take speciﬁc action, but Dean Robert Caldwell said that the institute would give visiting Chinese students complete intellectual freedom. The American protest reached Chongqing through various channels. The story of the action taken by American professors against thought control was ﬁrst published by the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury at Chongqing on April 9, 1944, arousing considerable discussion and debate in ofﬁcial, educational, and journalistic circles. Responding to the criticism, Chen Lifu, the Minister of Education, gave an interview on April 11, 1944, declaring that he had never believed in thought control and that the Ministry of Education had never made any attempt to institute such a control. However, he also insisted that “the educational authorities have the responsibility of supervising the thought and controlling the action of the students.” Realizing the latter statement was too close to the accusation made by American professors, the Central News Agency (Zhongyang Xinwenshe), run by the Nationalist government, published a “correction” the next day. It changed Chen’s statement to read “guiding the thought and supervising the conduct of students.”98 The Central News Agency conveniently blamed the mistake on a bad English translation. Frustrated and infuriated by the American criticism of thought control, Jiang Jieshi ordered a stop to sending Chinese students to the United States in April 1944.99 The action was taken, according to the explanation from a highranking Chinese ofﬁcial, because the Chinese government felt that criticism from American educators would increase if more students were sent to United States.100 In July 1944, the Chinese embassy in Washington ofﬁcially informed the State Department that China had indeﬁnitely postponed the plan to send a large number of government-sponsored students to America for education and training. It would not, however, forbid private students to come to the United States.101 Although Chinese ofﬁcials tried to prove that China stopped sending students to America for some other reasons, Ambassador Gauss believed that

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the main reason was its resentment toward American criticism over the issue of thought control. He told Song Ziwen that to bar students from going to the United States because of the recent publicity over thought control would simply give emphasis to the subject.102 Nevertheless, Jiang’s decision to stop sending students to the United States was seen as a serious setback in educational relations between the two countries. The State Department soon felt heavy pressure from other government agencies as well as many universities that desired to have more Chinese students and resume educational exchanges with China. In his instructions to Gauss, Secretary of State Cordell Hull noted that the department did not desire to lessen whatever salutary effect might have resulted from the opposition expressed by American educators here at home to the thought control regulations. However, Hull emphasized that “it would be equally undesirable to permit this situation to continue indeﬁnitely as a stalemate.” He ordered Gauss to estimate whether there was any possibility that Chinese students and trainees would be permitted to come to the United States in the near future. He reminded the embassy that “the Department and other agencies of the American government continue to be interested in the program of educating and training Chinese in this country.”103 On Hull’s instructions, Peck and Charles Bennett met with the Chinese ambassador in Washington on August 4, 1944, discussing a plan to train a large number of Chinese technical students in the United States. They told the Chinese ambassador that the Foreign Economic Administration had received an appropriation of $4,800,000 to partially cover the expenses of training twelve hundred Chinese students in this country. They also emphasized that the war was moving so rapidly to its end that if the Chinese government still desired to train a large number of experts for the postwar reconstruction, it should start at once.104 Impressed by the American offer, the Chinese ambassador promised to telegraph Chongqing immediately, urging his government to take steps without delay. However, he did voice his concern about the American criticism of the thought control of the Chinese students. The answer from Peck was simple and clear. The department believed that the training project had no connection with the thought control measure.105 Apparently happy with the department’s stand on the issue, the Nationalist government took steps to restart educational exchanges with the United States. In late August 1944, it ﬁrst allowed selfsponsored students to go to study in the United States. In September, the ban on Chinese students going abroad was completely lifted.106 In December, Zhu Jingnong (Chu Chin-nung), the Vice Minister of Education, formally declared that the Ministries of Education, Communication, and Economic Affairs would jointly send twelve hundred students abroad for research and practical training. The examination would be given in December. But he also told the public that some of the students would go to Britain and Canada and that supervising ofﬁces would be established in all three countries.107 In order to make sure that educational exchange between the two nations would not be interrupted again, the State Department chose to ignore

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Nationalists’ illegal activities in the United States and take steps to attract more Chinese students. In February 1945, the Justice Department informed Peck that the Chinese government continued to maintain secret police in this country and that it had taken further action to control Chinese students and Chinese communities.108 However, the State Department did nothing to check or stop their activities. What the Division of Cultural Relations did do was to design a “University Application Form” for Chinese students that could be accepted by most institutions in the United States, making it easier for Chinese students to apply to American colleges and universities. The division sent two thousand copies of the form to the American embassy at Chongqing to be distributed to American consular ofﬁcers and put in university administration ofﬁces and other places where they could be given to individual students upon request. It also suggested that the information should be shared with the Chinese press and with the public through the media.109 At the same time, the State Department approved Meng Zhi’s proposal that the China Institute in America be permitted to issue admission certiﬁcates to Chinese students so that they could apply for student visas with the certiﬁcates and come to the United States as soon as possible.110 These steps helped prepare for the huge inﬂux of Chinese students immediately after World War II.

Building a Two-Way Street The deep intervention of the American and the Chinese governments helped not only maintain the educational front in China in the war years, but also turn educational exchanges between the two nations into a two-way street. As close allies, both the American and Chinese leaders became increasingly aware of the importance of better mutual understanding between the two peoples in their effort to win the war. While continuing to support a large number of Chinese students and scholars in the United States, they took steps to encourage American scholars and students to study in China and to have Chinese scholars teaching Chinese language, culture, history, and other subjects in American colleges and universities. Although the number of people involved in studying and teaching China-related subjects was still relatively small during the war years, the government effort did help make educational and cultural exchanges between the two nations an increasingly reciprocal process. Educational exchange, by nature, is always a two-way street since every participant, no matter what ofﬁcial role he or she might play, is a “student” and a “teacher” at the same time. However, the ﬂow of students or teachers is never absolutely equal in number, especially between two nations with huge gaps in economic and social development. Educational exchanges between the United States and China, the greatest industrial power and the largest developing country since the late nineteenth century, had been heavily focused on teaching the Chinese. While an increasingly large number of Chinese students attended missionary schools in China or colleges and universities in the United States as part

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of their modernization effort, few Americans chose to study Chinese literature, language, culture, and history in China. Although some American missionaries did make efforts to study China-related subjects, their main purpose was to use the knowledge and skills to spread the Gospel and teach the Chinese. By the eve of World War II, thousands of Chinese students and scholars had attended colleges and universities in the United States. However, only a handful of American students and scholars had studied or taught in China. The lack of reciprocity in educational exchanges between the United States and China during this period was seen as cultural imperialism by many Chinese and some American scholars.111 Government was usually the chief target of their criticism. During their stay in the United States, many Chinese students took initiatives to help the Americans enhance their understanding of China. In an article published by the Chinese Students’ Monthly in March 1915, Y. L. Tong stressed that a Chinese student studying in the United States was charged with a two-fold mission. One was to learn and acquire knowledge. The other was to “represent his country unofﬁcially.” Since there were no adequate Chinese news agencies or any Chinese exchange professors in this country, he believed that “it is the duty of Chinese students not only to try to remove as many misconceptions and misunderstandings as possible about our country when they are brought to our attention, but also to disseminate a correct and true knowledge of the conditions that are obtaining and the events that are transpiring in our country.”112 Tong’s view was shared by many Chinese students in the United States. While pursuing their educational goals, many students worked hard to disseminate information about China and represent the country by making public speeches, publishing pamphlets and articles, and participating in all kinds of social and political activities.113 Hu Shi gave numerous speeches on a wide range of topics on China and wrote letters to newspapers and magazines while studying at Cornell University as an indemnity student in the 1910s.114 Hu, like many other students, served as representatives of Chinese culture in the United States. The beginning of World War II made the better understanding of China an urgent task for both governments. The Nationalist government called upon Chinese students overseas to spread the news of war conditions in China so as to win more sympathy and support for its war effort. In early 1938, the Ministry of Education instructed all students studying overseas to work at least ﬁve hours a week to inform their schoolmates and professors about the war situation, and pass the information to the public outside of universities.115 When the State Department invited Chinese scholars to visit the United States, the Chinese government chose to send eighteen scholars and educators in humanities and social sciences out of a total of twenty-six visitors between 1943 and 1946.116 These scholars were expected to teach at American colleges and universities, and inform the American scholars and students of Chinese research during the war years.117 As one of the ﬁrst group of Chinese exchange visitors selected by the Yunnan University, Fei Xiaotong completed the translation of his work Lucun Nongtian (Farm Fields of Village Lu) into English within three months after

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his arrival at Columbia University. With the help of Greta Redﬁeld, an American professor at the University of Chicago, he also translated and edited Zhang Zhiyi’s Yicun Shougongye (The Handicraft Industry in Village Yi) and Yucun Nongye He Shangye (The Agriculture and Commerce of Village Yu). During his stay at Harvard University, he managed to translate a study completed by Shi Guokui, another Chinese professor. The book was published by Harvard University Press in 1944 under the title China Enters the Machine Age.118 As soon as the United States declared war on Japan, Washington felt the increasing need to know more about China and the Chinese people. The Ofﬁce of Education under the Department of the Interior immediately took steps to introduce Far Eastern studies, especially Chinese studies, to American schools. On November 2, 1942, C. O. Arndt of the Ofﬁce of Education met with Willys Peck to discuss cooperation between the two ofﬁces in promoting the study and understanding of China in the United States. Arndt suggested that Chinese culture should be taught in American schools, that various subject bibliographies relating to China be compiled for use by schoolteachers, that Chinese exhibits, including books, maps, clothing, toys, utensils, and artwork should be prepared, and that radio shows or talks about China should be arranged.119 About a month later, Arndt called upon the Division of Cultural Relations again, proposing that Chinese students be placed as “ﬂoating teachers” in public schools.120 Responding to Arndt’s request, the division selected and prepared a number of Chinese students to teach at schools. The ﬁrst group of three students was sent to schools all over the country as “cultural ambassadors.” Fook Tim Chan, one of the ﬁrst three, was sent ﬁrst to Springﬁeld, Massachusetts, then to the Lincoln School of Teachers College in New York City, and ﬁnally to the public school system of Berkeley, California. While he was in Springﬁeld and Berkeley, Chan taught Chinese language and literature, gave radio talks, and demonstrated Chinese cooking. After Chan’s stay at Berkeley, Dr. Virgil Dickson, the Berkeley Superintendent of Schools, commented that in six months “Mr. Chan brought to our people an understanding of China far beyond any other type of experience which we could have planned for a similar length of time.”121 Washington’s efforts to enhance American understanding of China received strong support and genuine cooperation from the Chinese government as well as scholars from both nations. In December 1942, John King Fairbank and his friend Yuan Tongli prepared a memorandum on cultural relations between the United States and China. In the memorandum, they suggested that “in addition to present programs aimed at winning the war, there is urgent need for a long range program in the ﬁeld of education and the exchange of ideas.” They insisted that the long-range program should be built on two principles. One was that “ideas are as important as technics [sic].” The other was that programs of “intellectual relations with China must be reciprocal.” In order to make educational and cultural exchanges reciprocal, they recommended several projects, such as the re-publication in the United States of bibliographical and other materials appearing in Chinese publications and granting fellowships

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to American students for postgraduate study in China. They sent copies of the memorandum to the State Department as well as various inﬂuential persons in the United States. 122 Some of their proposals received strong backing from both the American and Chinese governments. Madame Jiang Jieshi met with Fairbank in October 1943 to show her strong support for the translation project. She even came up with a book proposal that would collect, translate, and publish essays written by Chinese students on their impressions of the United States. She emphasized that the essays should be critical so that Americans could know how the Chinese saw them. Fairbank praised the proposal because he believed that one objective of the American cultural program was to help Americans understand Chinese attitudes toward them. Having been critical of Chinese life for generations, Fairbank thought it only fair that Americans should now learn how the Chinese viewed American life.123 While intensifying its effort to help Americans have a better understanding of China through Chinese students and scholars in the United States, the Nationalist government began, for the ﬁrst time in modern Chinese history, to offer education on Chinese culture to American students. In November 1943, an ofﬁcial from the Ministry of Education told Fairbank that the ministry was considering providing twenty to thirty scholarships for Americans studying Chinese language and civilization in the United States and perhaps some travel grants for further study in China. He also proposed sending some Chinese books to American institutions.124 While appreciating the offer made by the Nationalist government, Washington could not send any students to China because no American students were allowed to study abroad since 1942. However, in order to help an increasingly large number of Americans who sought education on Chinese language, history, and culture during the war years, the National Library of Beijing did send six parcels of Chinese books to the Library of Congress through the American embassy in November 1944.125 Although no American students were able to go to China for education during World War II, both governments made efforts to help Americans enhance their knowledge and understanding of China. It was the ﬁrst time in modern history that the American and the Chinese governments took concrete steps to promote and improve the teaching of China-related subjects in the United States. Their action not only helped stimulate greater interest in Chinese culture among the American people, but also further broadened government intervention in educational exchange. As both governments gained experience in promoting, sponsoring, and regulating educational exchanges on both ends, they completed their experiment successfully by the end of World War II. Once the war came to an end, both governments were ready to make educational exchange a permanent dimension of their relations and push the exchange of students and scholars to an unprecedented level.

Chapter 6

From Expansion to Termination

T

he end of World War II saw the beginning of an explosive expansion in educational exchanges between the United States and China. Over one thousand students and scores of scholars were sent by China to the United States every year in the second half of the 1940s, setting a new record. While extending its arms to all the Chinese students and scholars, Washington signed the ﬁrst Fulbright Agreement with China, sending dozens of scholars and students to China with government funding for the ﬁrst time in history. However, with the Communist victory in China and outbreak of war in Korea, educational exchange between the two nations, which had just reached its peak, came to a complete stop in mid-1950. The newly established People’s Republic of China stopped sending students to the United States, which was seen as a hostile nation for its support for the Nationalist regime in China’s civil war. Viewing Communist China as a strategic threat, Washington ﬁrst halted the Fulbright Program and then did everything possible to keep Chinese students in the United States from returning to China. The American and Chinese governments were largely responsible for the drastic postwar expansion of educational exchange as well as the ﬁrst complete termination of educational relations between the two nations.

Expanding Educational Exchanges Having won the war as allies, the United States and China saw the opportunity to further expand educational exchanges between the two nations. Following its reconstruction plan worked out during the war, the Nationalist regime began to send thousands of students and scholars to the United States for education and training. The outbreak of the civil war, while creating some distraction, did not prevent the implementation of various exchange programs. Washington supported the Nationalist effort by extending some of the World War II programs and offering permanent ﬁnancial support for Chinese students. 148

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As a result, educational exchange reached an unprecedented level and educational relations continued to be the strongest tie between the two nations in the second half of the 1940s. Sending more students to the United States for education was a key element in the Nationalist postwar reconstruction plan. Such a plan was made publicly known in the speech delivered by Hu Shi, the former Chinese ambassador to the United States and the newly appointed chief delegate of China to the United Nations Education Conference, to be held in London on December 28, 1945. Speaking in front of an audience of about 550 Chinese students and scholars in the United States who gathered in the Hotel Roosevelt in New York City to celebrate the victory in the war and the success of Chinese-American educational and cultural relations, Hu Shi emphasized that “the most important relations during the past forty years between the United States and China have been the education and training of about 10,000 Chinese students in American colleges and universities.” He told his audience that “Chinese students educated in the United States are occupying positions of importance in all walks of life in China.” Partly because of that, an increasingly large number of Chinese students and professors, he announced, would come to this country in the coming years. He also hoped that more Americans interested in Chinese culture would go to China for education.1 Dr. Hu’s prediction was soon turned into reality as both the American and Chinese governments continued their support for the existing exchange programs and kept starting new ones. The State Department continued to invite Chinese educators and artists to visit the United States in 1945 and 1946. The number of Chinese visitors actually increased from six to eight a year in 1946. Among the eight visitors who stayed in this country between 1946 and 1947 were three of China’s most celebrated artists. One was Shu Sheyu (Shu Shehyu), a famous novelist better known as Lao She in China. Another was Wan Jiabao (Wan Chia-pao), the most distinguished playwright in China, known by his pen name Cao Yu. The last was Ye Qianyu (Yeh Chien-yu), a noted painter and cartoonist.2 During their stay in the United States, the artists visited universities, museums, and studios, attended writers’ conferences, and gave speeches on Chinese writers during the war. They also continued their creative work in the United States. While Cao Yu worked with an American playwright to adapt his play Peking Man (Beijing Ren) for a possible Broadway show, Lao She decided to extend his stay for another year to complete another novel, Four Generations under One Roof (Sishi Tongtang).3 The Nationalist government continued to provide assistance to Chinese students in the United States and drastically increased the number of students sent to this country after the war. When the Committee on Wartime Planning for Chinese Students in the United States was established in 1942, it only planned to offer ﬁnancial assistance to Chinese students stranded in the United States during the war for two years.4 However, the grant-in-aid scholarships offered by the committee were continued well into 1947 and the number of scholarships peaked

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in December 1946, totalling about ﬁfty.5 The most ambitious single exchange program carried out after the war would bring over one thousand Chinese technical personnel to the United States for practical training and education. As part of the Lend-Lease agreement reached by the two governments during the last year of the war, the Chinese technicians, engineers, managers, and administrator would spend a year in the United States, studying transportation and industrial development and techniques. Under the arrangements made by the China Supply Commission and the Foreign Economic Administration of the United States, the Chinese industrial trainees arrived in the United States in the summer and fall of 1945 and were placed in railway organizations, industrial plants, factories, and ofﬁces in twenty or so large cities across the nation.6 Although they did not attend regular colleges or universities for degrees, their program was educational in nature and instrumental in expanding educational exchange between the two nations. Both the Chinese and American governments had high hopes for the training of Chinese technical personnel in the United States. The Nationalist government expected the trainees to “acquire specialized, ﬁrst-hand knowledge about railway, mechanical, electrical, and automotive engineering; forestry; aeronautics; oil reﬁning; and many other technological skills.”7 It wanted to see the trainees make major contributions to China’s reconstruction as soon as they returned to China. The Department of State recognized the importance of technical education. However, it “also deems of vital importance that these young men acquire a feeling of friendship for this country, based on an understanding of what is best in American life,” since they would be future leaders in industry and labor in China. In order to achieve this goal, the State Department had asked the China Institute in America to organize a series of programs that would give the trainees opportunities to meet and mingle socially with members of the communities in which they were living.8 The China Institute appointed Benjamin Grant, an American who had lived in Beijing for years, as the ﬁeld representative in charge of all hospitality programs. With help from leaders in industry, education, ﬁnance, religion, and civic organizations, Grant was able to organize Hospitality Committees in all major cities. Under the coordination of the Hospitality Committees, the trainees were invited to concerts, plays, church suppers, baseball games, Thanksgiving and Christmas parties, and special English conversation classes. The committees’ work was so successful that most Chinese trainees left the United States with not only newly acquired knowledge, but also “the memory of American friendship.”9 Following the industrial trainees, eighteen Qinghua students who were selected through the special examination in 1944 ﬁnally arrived in the United States in May 1946. Chosen during the war years, most of these students, ﬁfteen of them, majored in engineering and sciences. One of them was Yang Zhenning (Yang Chen-ning), a physicist who would win a Nobel Prize in about a decade.10 Having taken care of all the educational exchange programs planned during the war years, both the American and Chinese governments were ready to

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put more resources into expanding the exchange. Washington offered many new programs sponsored by various federal government ofﬁces. The State Department awarded thirty-ﬁve scholarships to Chinese students in China on a competitive basis in 1946. In the same year, it also awarded nine agriculturalscholarships to Chinese students. The China Institute quickly noticed the differences between these new scholarships and the old ones. In a news release published in December 1946, the China Institute pointed out that the new scholarships marked a “new departure from the type of scholarship awarded by the State Department following Pearl Harbor and up to the beginning of 1946, when scholarships were given to members of Chinese students in the United States who were stranded here and needed ﬁnancial assistance to continue their studies.”11 In other words, the State Department started a new trend in educational exchange by awarding scholarships directly to Chinese students in China. It also meant that offering ﬁnancial support for Chinese students was no longer just a wartime emergency measure. As Washington continued to provide strong support for educational exchange with China, the Nationalist government made every effort to implement its original plan to send about one thousand students abroad every year. Having sent more than one thousand technical students to the United States in 1945, the Nationalist government announced in July 1946 that another round of national examinations would be given to select government—as well as self-sponsored students to be sent abroad. Qualiﬁcation requirements for candidates seeking education abroad remained the same as those promulgated by the government for the ﬁrst national examinations given in 1944. However, the Nationalist government, for the ﬁrst time in history, did away with most restrictions on the subject ﬁelds that could be chosen by students. As a result, self-sponsored students could choose their majors from ﬁfty subject ﬁelds approved by the government while the government-supported students could choose from ﬁfty-three.12 The reasonable qualiﬁcation requirements and increased freedom to choose majors attracted 4,463 students competing for 190 government scholarships. Having taken examinations on the Three People’s Principles, Chinese history and geography, Chinese language, foreign languages, and three additional tests in their subject ﬁelds plus an oral examination in foreign languages, only 131 applicants earned passable scores. Most of these government-sponsored students went abroad by early 1948. The largest group, thirty-three of them, left for the United States.13 Because of the civil war, after 1946 the Nationalist government was no longer able to hold any national examinations for study abroad or to send a large number of students overseas each year. However, unwilling to completely give up educational exchange, especially that with the United States, the Nationalist government continued to send smaller but more select groups of young people across the Paciﬁc. The ﬁrst group that received the special treatment were the young students who served in the military forces during the war. Although the Nationalist government had tried to keep most college students in school during

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the war years, some students were so determined to ﬁght the Japanese and defend their nation that they left classrooms for the battleﬁeld. As part of the reward for their bravery and service, the Nationalist government decided to send the best student soldiers to study abroad once the war came to an end. Having taken examinations in various subjects, twenty-ﬁve students were chosen and sent to the United States. Most of them chose to study English, history, economics, law, and business administration.14 Young military interpreters who provided their services during the war also received special treatment from the Nationalist government. During World War II, many young college students were recruited by the government to work with American military personnel as interpreters. When they ﬁrst formed the Bureau of Foreign Affairs under the Military Commission headed by Jiang Jieshi in 1943, there were only four or ﬁve hundred of them. The number was drastically increased when the government conscripted 1,224 seniors from foreign language departments at various universities in March 1944. Some of them were sent to the United States during the war to train American pilots or to work for the American government.15 Their extraordinary work helped establish a close working relationship between the two allies and received high praise from Washington. In order to reward these interpreters, the Nationalist government decided to hold special study abroad examinations for them in 1947. Under the rules for this special program, military interpreters needed only to be high school graduates to qualify for the government scholarship and take two examinations in their subject ﬁelds. The examinations were given in early April and ninety-eight applicants passed the tests. Most of them continued their education in the United States.16 In addition to large numbers of students selected through formal examinations, the Nationalist government sent smaller groups abroad on special missions. One of them was organized by the Ministry of Military Affairs. Shocked by the power of the atomic bombs dropped on Japan, General Chen Cheng, Minister of Military Affairs, wanted to jump-start China’s defense technology. He called a meeting with Zeng Zhaolun, Wu Dayou, and Hua Luogeng, three leading professors from the Southwest Associated University, in November 1945. At the meeting, Professor Wu argued that China had to train more specialists before it could build its own defense technology and industry. Agreeing with Wu’s evaluation of the situation, Chen decided to send the three professors with a few students to spend two years in the United States. With the Ministry of Military Affair paying for all their expenses, the professors led ﬁve carefully selected students to the United States in July 1946.17 While Zeng, Hua, and Wu continued to rise as the leaders in their respective ﬁelds in China, all ﬁve students, including Li Zhengdao, Tang Aoqing, and Zhu Guangya, would gain their own fame and status either as a Nobel laureate in the United States or as internationally known scientists in China.18 Unable to send a large number of government-sponsored students because of the civil war, the Nationalist government tried to let more self-sponsored

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students go abroad. The examinations for self-supported students were given at the same time as those for government-sponsored students in 1946. Among 2,774 students who took the examinations, only 2,649 completed all the tests and 1,216 earned passing scores. Given the fact that more students took the tests for government scholarships and with better scores, a special order was issued to allow those who scored lower than the requirement for government-sponsored students, but higher than the minimum requirement for self-sponsored students, to join the latter to go to study in foreign countries. Therefore, the total number of those qualiﬁed as self-sponsored students reached 1,934 in 1946.19 Earning the ofﬁcial status of self-sponsored student was essential for the young Chinese who were seeking higher education and training abroad. That status would not only allow them to apply for passports and visas needed for international travel, but also give them the privilege of purchasing foreign currencies at the ofﬁcial rate.20 Ma Daren, a journalism student who came to the United States in 1947, believed that many poor students were able to do this because they were allowed to exchange US$2,000 at the ofﬁcial rate. The ofﬁcial exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the Chinese fabi (legal currency) at that time was one to twenty while the black market rate was one to two hundred. The huge discrepancy allowed self-sponsored students to ﬁnd many creative ways to take advantage of their privilege. The most popular one was to borrow money to buy American dollars at the ofﬁcial rate and then sell a small portion of the American dollars on the black market so that they could pay off the debt and use the rest of the American dollars for their education in the United States.21 Tong Te-kong, a self-sponsored student who also came to the United States in 1947, openly acknowledged that all Chinese students should be considered government-sponsored because the ofﬁcial exchange rate they enjoyed gave them a free ride.22 The United States remained the top choice for Chinese students seeking education overseas after World War II. While some government-sponsored students were sent to different countries by the Nationalist government in order to maintain educational and cultural ties with them, most self-supported students chose the United States because it had more resources and better opportunities in higher education than any other country at the time. Having suffered no damage to its educational facilities, the United States was able to offer education in almost all ﬁelds with the highest quality and efﬁciency. By October 1947, the Chinese Ministry of Education had issued 1,163 study abroad certiﬁcates to self-supported students who had passed national examinations more than a year earlier. Among them, 1,018 students, 87.5 percent of the total, chose to come to the United States.23 Difﬁcult ﬁnancial conditions forced the Nationalist government to explore new ways to expand educational exchanges. Having received ﬁnancial help from foreign foundations and medical institutions during the war years, the Ministry of Education sought and gladly accepted scholarships offered to students at medical schools by foreign institutions in 1945. Excited by the Chinese government’s

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new policy, the Rockefeller Foundation and other American institutions began to offer scholarships to Chinese students immediately. They provided twenty scholarships in 1945, twenty-two the next year, and eighty-seven the year after. Although the scholarships were offered by foreign private institutions, the selection of students was handled by the Chinese government. Since all students had to take examinations, only ﬁve students were able to make the trip to the United States in 1945. The next two groups left China in full number and on time.24 While supporting as many Chinese students for study abroad as possible, the Nationalist government became increasingly enthusiastic about sending professors to teach or conduct research in the United States. As soon as the war came to an end, the Ministry of Education sent ten well-known professors from ten different universities across the Paciﬁc.25 The Nationalist regime made it easy for professors and researchers to go abroad on foreign appointments and scholarships. When ten Chinese professors received fellowships from the United Service to China for one year of research in the United States in 1947, they were able to make the trip without any trouble.26 They were even allowed to exchange foreign currency at the ofﬁcial rate to cover unpaid travel or living expenses.27 With such strong encouragement and support from the Nationalist government, the number of Chinese scholars who left China to take positions abroad jumped from 130 in 1945 to 270 in 1946, and reached 450 in 1947. Most Chinese professors came to the United States and a large number of them studied and taught China-related subjects.28 By 1947, according to a survey conducted by the Institute of Paciﬁc Relations, at least twelve Chinese were on the faculty at different universities and colleges in the United States, counting for about 20 percent of the specialists in the ﬁeld of Chinese studies.29 (See Appendix F.) As with its handling of Chinese students, the Nationalist government set up strict rules to regulate the professors who went abroad for teaching and research. According to regulations adopted by the Ministry of Education in November 1945, only full or associate professors with at least ﬁve years’ work experience and scholarly publications and contributions could go abroad on foreign invitation. As for those who would conduct research in foreign institutions, they had to be lecturers for at least two years or instructors for at least ﬁve years with extraordinary service records. The ministry also required those who would teach at foreign institutions to focus on Chinese culture and history and those who would conduct research in foreign countries to choose subjects predetermined by the Ministry of Education. The professors were generally allowed to stay abroad for one year of teaching and research. They needed to have approval from the ministry if extension of stay was desired. Like all the students, professors were required to make frequent reports to the government on their teaching and research abroad.30 While sending more students and professors to the United States, the Nationalist government offered scholarships to American students for Chinese studies for the ﬁrst time after World War II. In early 1946, the Ministry of Education announced that ten scholarships would be offered to American servicemen who

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had served in China to pursue Chinese studies. The scholarships aroused strong interest among American veterans. The China Institute in America, which was authorized to handle application matters, received seventy-nine applications by May 31, 1946. Over twenty applications came in after the deadline. The institute had to return the late application materials to the applicants and advise them to reapply next year.31 After careful review, the institute presented the ﬁrst scholarships from the Chinese government to American servicemen at a ceremony on September 27, 1946. Dr. Wellington Koo, the Chinese ambassador to Washington, and Howard Peterson, Assistant Secretary of War, attended the ceremony. Although the scholarships were small in number, Ambassador Koo emphasized in his speech that they clearly showed “a genuine desire on the part of the Chinese Government to stimulate the interest of the Americans in the study of China and things Chinese and thereby promote the cause of mutual understanding between our two peoples.”32 One of the ﬁrst scholarship recipients was Lucian W. Pye, a second lieutenant in the Naval Reserve, who would later become a leading scholar in Chinese studies in the United States. Beneﬁting from the old as well as new exchange programs, about ten thousand Chinese students, professors, technical trainees, and researchers arrived in the United States between 1945 and 1950, almost doubling the prewar total. The inﬂux of the unprecedentedly large number of Chinese students into the United States clearly demonstrated that educational exchange between the two nations had entered a new stage. The increasingly close educational ties not only allowed the Nationalist regime to obtain a large number of highly trained experts in various ﬁelds, but also further enhanced the mutual understanding between the two peoples. The drastic expansion was again made possible with strong support from and close cooperation between the United States and Chinese governments.

Implementing the First Fulbright Program While the Nationalist government invested much of its resources in sending an unprecedentedly large number of students and scholars to the United States right after World War II, Washington took the initiative to sign the ﬁrst Fulbright Agreement with China, committing itself, for the ﬁrst time in history, to sending a substantial number of American students and scholars to China. As with all other educational exchange programs during this period, the planning and implementation of the Fulbright Program in China was directly affected by the civil war fought between the Nationalists and the Communists. While Washington’s deep involvement in China’s civil war made the inception of the Fulbright Program in China necessary and possible, the defeat of the Nationalists brought the program to an abrupt end. Although only a relatively small group of Americans went to China as Fulbright scholars and students, the United States government role as a promoter, sponsor, and regulator of educational exchanges with foreign countries was perpetuated.

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Although the Nationalists and Communists formed a united front in the war against Japan, they entered a civil war almost immediately after the Japanese surrendered. Washington began to abandon its nonintervention policy established during World War II and provide strong and unequivocal support for the Nationalist regime. American assistance to Jiang Jieshi came in three forms. First, President Truman ordered Japanese military forces to surrender only to Jiang Jieshi and American commanders in Mainland China and Taiwan. Second, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered General Wedemeyer, the commander of American military forces in China, India, and Burma, to “assist the Central Government in the rapid transportation of Central Chinese Government forces to key areas in China” once the Japanese surrendered.33 By the end of August 1945, he had moved two Nationalist armies trained and equipped by the United States to the East Coast and helped them take Shanghai, Nanjing, and other large coastal cities.34 In December, President Truman approved the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s plan to lift six more Nationalist armies, about 200,000 men, to North China and Manchuria, move 50,000 tons of supplies for those troops each month, and increase the number of ships in Chinese waters to transport the troops and supplies.35 Third, American military forces took over Shanghai, Tianjin, Qingdao (Tsintao), and Qinhuangdao (Chinhuangtao), accepting the Japanese surrender on behalf of the Nationalist government. The American occupation of these coastal cities and ports not only denied the Communists the opportunity to take them, but also made it possible to transport more government troops from the Southwest to Northern China. Washington’s policy change caused concerns and debates among American political and military leaders. General Wedemeyer noticed the contradiction in the orders given to him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and sought clariﬁcation.36 The Joint Chiefs of Staff made it clear that “[i]t is U.S. policy to assist the Chinese Government in the establishment of essential Chinese troops in liberated areas, particularly Manchuria, as rapidly as practicable.”37 However, senior ofﬁcers in the State Department, such as Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State, and John Carter Vincent, the director of Far Eastern Affairs, viewed the increased military assistance to Jiang as undesirable. They reached a consensus that uniﬁcation in China should be achieved through democratic and peaceful means by broadening the basis of the government and that American aid to Jiang should come only after he made necessary political and economic reforms in China.38 The prevailing view among senior State Department ofﬁcials was not shared by Patrick Hurley, the American ambassador at Chongqing. As a staunch supporter and admirer of Jiang, Hurley believed that the United States should support him unconditionally. He maintained this position even after Jiang broke the peace agreement that he had painstakingly arranged between the Nationalists and the Communists. Having failed to broker a peace in China, Hurley resigned in November 1945. In his resignation address, Hurley charged that the career diplomats in Chongqing and Washington were betraying the United States and responsible for the failure of China’s uniﬁcation.

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In order to control the political damage caused by Hurley, President Truman decided to send General George C. Marshall to China to “steal the headlines away” from Hurley.39 Before Marshall left Washington, Truman had approved the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s plan to increase American aid for Jiang. He also instructed Marshall that the United States should still aid Jiang even if he refused to make any concessions and broke off the negotiations.”40 Following Truman’s instructions, Marshall decided, before he went to China, that he would do his best to increase American military aid to Jiang ﬁrst and only then hold him “to action in the matters more purely political.”41 Arriving in China on December 18, 1945, Marshall requested to keep the Marines in Chinese ports, send an American Military Assistance Advisory Group to China, and transfer 271 naval craft as well as other surplus property to the Chinese government. By March 1946, the United States had transported more than 145,000 Nationalist troops into Manchuria and provided $600 million in Lend-Lease aid to Jiang, a ﬁgure that almost matched the amount of aid given to China during World War II. At the same time, Marshall worked to win more economic and ﬁnancial aid for China, including a $500 million loan from the Export-Import Bank.42 The increased American aid did not bring the expected political results. On the contrary, it helped Jiang speed up his campaign to wipe out the Communists on the battleﬁeld. As soon as the Russians withdrew from Manchuria, Jiang ﬂew in his best troops to take over the area. Fighting broke out in Manchuria between the Nationalist and Communist troops in the spring of 1946. When Marshall hurried back from Washington to stop the ﬁghting, the Communists complied, but Jiang refused to order a cease-ﬁre.43 Frustrated by the situation in China, Marshall took Acheson and Vincent’s advice and began a serious effort to use American aid as a tool to force the Nationalists into peace negotiations sponsored by him. When ﬁghting erupted once again in July 1946, Marshall placed an embargo on the shipment of arms and ammunition to the Nationalist government. President Truman sent Jiang a personal message warning him that “unless convincing proof is shortly forthcoming that genuine progress is being made toward a peaceful settlement,” he might be forced to redeﬁne America’s policy toward China.44 However, neither the embargo nor the stern message from Truman could stop Jiang. A full-scale civil war broke out in summer 1946. Having failed in his last try at bringing about a peaceful political settlement in China, Marshall decided to leave it to the Chinese themselves and returned to Washington in December 1946.45 General Marshall was appointed Secretary of State upon his return from China. His personal experience had convinced him that China’s problem “could only be solved by the formation of all minority parties into one patriotic, highly organized, liberal party under selﬂess leadership and devoted to peace, genuine democratic government and maintaining the rights of the people.” Based on that belief, he was determined to strengthen the liberal elements in China and offer only “limited and conditional” American aid to the Central government.46 With strong backing from the president, Marshall rejected Jiang’s request for combat

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planes in July 1947.47 The new China policy of limited and conditional assistance to Jiang was ofﬁcially established, allowing Washington to continue its support for Jiang while keeping it from direct participation in China’s civil War. Over three decades later, John King Fairbank still believed that the limited assistance policy advocated by Marshall “saved us from intervening in what could only have been a super-super-Vietnam.”48 The policy of limited assistance to Jiang Jieshi aroused serious criticism and challenge immediately both within and outside the administration. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to push the president for more military aid to China, Republicans in Congress kept pressure on both Marshall and Truman. On February 20, 1948, Marshall was questioned before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs about the embargo on the shipment of arms and munitions to China.49 At the same time, many in Congress insisted that additional military equipment be made available for Jiang and that China be put in the same category as Greece with respect to military aid and advisory assistance.50 When the administration refused, Congress made aid to China a precondition for support for the European Recovery Act, the so-called Marshall Plan. The Chinese Nationalists also pressed Washington for large-scale economic and military aid. On November 17, 1947, General Zhang Qun (Chang Chun), the Chinese prime minister, sent a letter to Marshall telling him of the critical military and economic situation in China and urging both emergency assistance and a long-range aid program from the United States. When Marshall replied that $300 million would be made available beginning in June 1948, the Chinese government was not happy. In a memorandum handed to Leighton Stuart, the American ambassador, on December 22, 1947, the Nationalist government demanded that “[t]he American plan for aid to China should be a long-range four year project, the purpose of which would be to assist China to achieve political and economic stability, including currency reform.” To achieve that goal, the Chinese government requested $500 million for each of the ﬁrst two years, $300 million for the third year, and $200 million for the fourth, totalling $1.5 billion. In addition to economic aid, China asked for an immediate loan of $100 million to buy military materials in 1948.51 Marshall rejected the Chinese demand for large-scale and long-range economic aid without any hesitation. He believed that such a program would represent “a commitment by the U.S. government from which it would have been extremely difﬁcult, if not impossible, to withdraw, regardless of future developments.”52 As a military man with recent experience in and personal knowledge of the country, Marshall knew that it would be disastrous for the United States to involve itself too deeply in China. At a National Security Council meeting on February 18, 1948, Marshall pointed out that “we cannot afford to withdraw entirely from our support of Chiang Kai-shek government and that neither can we afford to be drawn in an unending drain upon our resources.”53 What he really wanted was to disengage from China. But he knew that he had to do it cautiously because the anti-Communist sentiment in the United States was rising

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and the Republicans were going to make China policy a big issue in the coming presidential campaign. In order to win reelection in 1948, the Truman administration had to ﬁnd a way to show its sympathy and support for Jiang while steering clear of China’s civil war. Further expansion of educational exchanges became an attractive alternative for the Truman administration in such a challenging political environment. Marshall was aware of and involved in educational exchanges while he was mediating in China in 1946. As part of his effort to arrange a peaceful settlement between the Nationalists and the Communists, Marshall approved a plan, under the cultural relations program, to invite educators from the Communistcontrolled areas to study at American colleges and universities for a year. He believed that such a plan could show his “evenhandedness” in dealing with the two parties. The invitation was gladly accepted by General Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai), the representative of the Communist Party in the peace negotiations.54 In order to get the Communist visitors into the United States before the end of the ﬁscal year, Wilma Fairbank ﬂew to Zhangjiakou, one of a few larger cities under Communist control, to interview the four candidates selected by the Communist Party.55 Satisﬁed with the representatives, she made arrangements to ﬂy them to Nanjing so that they could apply for passports from the Nationalist government as soon as possible. However, the Nationalist government refused to issue passports to the Communist appointees despite pressure from American ofﬁcials. Jiang had no intention of allowing the Communist representatives to go to the United States, speaking on behalf of their cause. Unable to get passports, the Communist representatives were forced to abandon their trip to the United States.56 Although Marshall failed to get the Communist representatives into the United States in 1946, his experience in China made him aware of the increasing resentment among the war-weary Chinese people, especially Chinese students and scholars, of the civil war launched by Jiang and supported by the United States. The anti-American sentiment was aggravated in late December 1946, when an American soldier raped Shen Cong, a female student at Peking University, in Dongdan Square, Beijing. On the evening of December 28, the Student Union of Qinghua University decided to hold an anti-American demonstration on December 30, and passed ten declarations. In a “Letter to Our Fellow Countrymen,” Qinghua students wrote: “We really can not believe that after eight years of bloody ﬁghting, we have only replaced the Japanese imperialists with an enslaving Ally.” In a “Letter to the Fellow Students in the Whole Country,” they warned that “as long as the American troops stay in China, the uniﬁcation of China will be impossible and the Chinese Civil War will never stop.”57 Despite warnings from the government, over ten thousand students from all colleges and universities in Beijing held their demonstration as planned on December 30. The demonstrators marched to the executive headquarters of Military Mediation, where American ofﬁcers stayed. They shouted in English: “American troops go home!” “China doesn’t need you!” Inspired

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by demonstrations in Beijing, over 500,000 students in dozens of other cities boycotted their classes and protested in the streets. In February 1947, students started a national signature campaign urging the United States to change its China policy and withdraw its troops.58 The students’ protest reinforced Marshall’s determination to ﬁnd a new way to allow the United States to show its support for Jiang and to withdraw its troops from China at the same time. The Fulbright Act quickly came to Marshall’s attention. Sponsored by J. William Fulbright, a freshman Senator from Arkansas, the Fulbright Act had a very simple beginning. At the end of World War II, many millions of dollars worth of American equipment was piled up in warehouses all over the world. It was too expensive to ship all the materials back to the United States. Moreover, most of them could not be used at home. But the equipment was desperately needed in countries that had been devastated by the war. Thus, Congress passed the Surplus Property Act of 1944, authorizing the sale of surplus war materials at prices as close as possible to their fair value.59 Senator Fulbright introduced a bill to amend the existing law in late November 1945. The Fulbright Bill did not attract any attention in Washington, DC. After a short discussion in the Committee of Military Affairs, the Fulbright Bill passed the Senate by unanimous consent without a roll call vote. It sailed through the House of Representatives with a “whoop and a holler” after Representatives made sure that it would not involve supporting international education at the expense of domestic education.60 The Fulbright Bill amended the Surplus Property Act of 1944 in three signiﬁcant ways. First, it made the Department of State responsible for the disposal of the surplus property. Second, it authorized the Secretary of State to accept payment in foreign currencies, credit, or any other way deemed proper by him. Third, it authorized the secretary to enter into agreements with foreign governments to use part of their payments to ﬁnance educational and cultural exchanges between the United States and other countries.61 The purpose of the Fulbright Act was to commit the United States government to international educational and cultural exchange and make it a permanent part of American foreign policy. Fulbright’s support for educational use of the funds was based on the American success with the Boxer Indemnity remission and his personal experience as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University in Great Britain. He believed that promoting educational and cultural relations between the United States and foreign countries would be a superb investment for Americans.62 Although the Fulbright Act authorized a new source of funding for educational exchanges, the State Department showed little interest in the funds until General Marshall became Secretary of State. On April 5, 1947, less than three months after he assumed the ofﬁce, George Marshall informed Wellington Koo, the Chinese ambassador in Washington, of his desire to negotiate and sign the ﬁrst bilateral Fulbright Agreement with China.63 At the same time, he instructed American ambassador Leighton Stuart to immediately begin negotiations in Nanjing. On April 16, 1947, the department invited the embassy

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to estimate the number of grants and the amount of each grant needed for the program, and to propose standards for the selection of Chinese and American recipients. It instructed the embassy to get the Chinese government to pay the ﬁrst $250,000 immediately and to ﬁnd an executive secretary locally for the United States Educational Foundation in China (USEFC), the agency that would handle the program in the future.64 In order to speed up the negotiation, the Ofﬁce of Far Eastern Affairs suggested that it would be wise to reach a simple form of agreement ﬁrst and leave the details to be taken care of by charter and bylaws in the future.65 Busy ﬁghting the civil war, the Nationalist regime was not excited about the new exchange program or the terms proposed by Washington. After three months of painful negotiation, the Chinese Ministry of Education ﬁnally agreed to accept the new educational exchange program. However, the Foreign Ministry demanded several changes in the agreement drafted by the State Department. First, it insisted that the name of the agency handling the program should be the Sino-U.S. Educational Foundation instead of the United States Educational Foundation in China so as to indicate that the two countries were cooperating as equals in the project. Second, the USEFC should spend at least $1 million a year so that the program could be terminated within twenty years. Third, Chinese educators and ofﬁcials should be included on the board of directors of the USEFC so that the program could be implemented in the same way as earlier programs sponsored by the Boxer Indemnity remission.66 The State Department refused to accept any of the demands from the Chinese government. It insisted that the name should remain unchanged and that only Americans could be members of the board of directors since the USEFC was supported by American money. Chinese educators and ofﬁcials, the State Department contended, could be allowed to serve on an advisory committee. The department also stood fast on its original proposal that yearly expenditures of the USEFC should be under $1 million, with any unexpended funds to be used in the future.67 In that way, the exchange program could be sustained for decades since China, as the largest buyer of American “surplus property,” had to pay tens of millions of dollars to the United States. While refusing to make any concessions, the State Department put increasing pressure on the Nationalist leaders. At a dinner hosted by the China Institute in America to honor Wang Shijie (Wang Shih-chieh), the foreign minister of China, Marshall focused on educational relations in his speech. Openly expressing his admiration for the Chinese students, Marshall pointed out that education had beyond any doubt the greatest inﬂuence on U.S.-China relations, and that it might be the greatest stabilizing force. Therefore, he challenged Wang to “do all we can to promote and stimulate the carrying forward of this work.”68 Under the pressure from Washington, the Chinese government had little choice but to accept the agreement as it stood. To Jiang, using Chinese currency to fund the Fulbright Program posed no problem. Furthermore, Jiang could not afford to be too tough on the Fulbright Agreement, fearing that he might lose the

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American aid completely. In the end, the Chinese foreign minister asked only that ofﬁcials of the foundation should not be granted tax exemptions or other immunities enjoyed by American diplomats in China.69 By the end of September, all issues had been settled. The Chinese government agreed to allow the program to go on after 1967 if there was a surplus of funds. It also promised to make the ﬁrst payment of $250,000 in Chinese currency within thirty days of the signing of the agreement so that the program could be started immediately.70 Having resolved all the differences, the United States and China signed the ﬁrst Fulbright Agreement on November 10, 1947. The State Department hurried to get the Fulbright Program into operation because the situation in China was deteriorating rapidly. With Jiang spending almost every penny he had on the civil war, Chinese higher education was on the brink of bankruptcy in 1947. Salaries for professors remained extremely low and often went unpaid. After the price of food doubled in May 1947, most professors and students were unable to feed themselves or their families. Discontent among intellectuals led to an antihunger and antiwar movement in mid-1947, in which students and scholars demanded an end to the war. Unhappy with such activities, the Nationalist government issued orders to prohibit student demonstrations. Jiang himself gave a speech on May 20, 1947, calling students “rioters” and threatening those who disobeyed the order with “severe punishments.”71 While the student movement surged in cities controlled by the Nationalists in July 1947, the Chinese Communists began a major offensive. By November, lines of communication in Manchuria had been cut and Jiang’s troops were isolated in a few large cities. Aware of the seriousness of the situation, Jiang turned to Washington for more military aid. Although Marshall lifted the embargo on the shipment of arms and ammunition in May 1947, he refused to provide the unconditional and large-scale military aid that Jiang requested. Even though he was planning military aid for Greece and Turkey and economic aid to European countries at this time, Marshall did not include China in his plan. The only plan Marshall showed any interest in with regard to China at that time was the Fulbright Program. The State Department moved to carry out the Fulbright Agreement as quickly as possible. On November 8, 1947, the State Department instructed the embassy at Nanjing to provide a list of institutions in China deemed eligible by the still nonexistent USEFC for educational exchanges with the United States and a draft of the exchange program recommended for 1948.72 Within a few weeks, the department ordered the embassy to provide administrative supplies and equipment for the USEFC and transmit its communications to the department so that the USEFC could begin its work before the ﬁrst payment from the Chinese government was received.73 On December 5, 1947, the embassy released the names of the members of the USEFC board of directors. Leighton Stuart was the chairman and its members included two ofﬁcials from the embassy and two private American citizens representing educational and

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business interests in China.74 On the next day, George Harris, the cultural attaché of the embassy and the secretary of the USEFC, sent to the department a long telegram listing Chinese and American institutions in China eligible for the Fulbright Program and recommending the exchange projects for 1948. He suggested that grants be awarded according to the following order of priority: American professors teaching educational techniques, English language, and American literature and history in Chinese institutions; American graduate students specializing in the area of Chinese studies; Chinese students studying in American colleges in China; American scholars conducting special research or ﬁeld projects in China; and travel grants for Chinese students and scholars coming to the United States.75 As the USEFC’s proposal was approved by the State Department, the Board of Foreign Scholarships was appointed by President Truman to select American scholars and students to be sent abroad to study under the Fulbright Program. At the urgent request of the State Department, the USEFC worked out a concrete exchange plan for 1948 with assistance from the United States Information Service and the embassy.76 It recommended that grants be offered to twenty American professors who would teach in Chinese universities, twenty American students who would study in China, one hundred Chinese students who would attend American colleges and universities in China, ten American researchers who would conduct research in China, and thirty Chinese students and scholars who would come to study in the United States.77 As the most ambitious educational exchange program funded by the federal government, the ﬁrst Fulbright exchange projects received approval from the State Department and the Board of Foreign Scholarships. In March 1948, Derk Bodde, a professor of Chinese intellectual history at the University of Pennsylvania, was selected as the ﬁrst Fulbright Fellow to study and teach in China.78 The Fulbright Program ofﬁcially began with Bodde’s arrival in Beijing in August 1948. By the end of that year, forty-one Americans had been awarded Fulbright grants. But only twenty-seven were able to accept them. This ﬁrst group of Fulbright grantees included four visiting professors, seven research scholars, and sixteen graduate students. Two-thirds of them chose to go to Beijing.79 By 1948, Beijing had reestablished itself as the cultural and educational capital of the nation since most universities and research institutes that had ﬂed the city during the war returned to the city. Soon after his arrival in Beijing, Bodde began his collaboration with Professor Feng Youlan at Qinghua University in translating the second volume of Feng’s History of Chinese Philosophy. The translation was later published by the University of Pennsylvania Press in 1951. Both the USEFC and the Fulbright Fellows had to make tough decisions as the military and political situations changed drastically at the end of 1948. On November 1, the Communists took Shenyang (Mukden), which marked the complete defeat of the Nationalists in Manchuria. With the fall of Manchuria and the beginning of another major Communist offensive in Shandong and Anhui Provinces, Beijing was under direct threat. In mid-November, the USEFC,

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concerned about the Fulbright Fellows in Beijing, sent a chartered plane to pick up those who desired to leave, but allowed those who did not want to leave to stay.80 Actually, it encouraged the Americans to stay by paying their grants in full in American dollars so that the Fulbright Fellows would not be cut off from their ﬁnancial resources. This was another unorthodox measure since the State Department had previously insisted that no American dollars be used in the Fulbright Program in China.81 The State Department had a number of reasons to continue the Fulbright Program during this period of revolutionary change in China. The ﬁrst was the strong desire of the USEFC to complete the Fulbright projects that it had been working on for such a long time. It did not want to force the Fulbright Fellows to leave the work they had just started. The second was the American need for a large number of Americans “professionally qualiﬁed to deal with China matters on the levels of government, business and education.”82 The USEFC believed that the only way to obtain these professionals was to continue the educational exchange with China. The third was the important role that the Fulbright Fellows might be able to play in countering Communist attacks on the United States. After the Communists took Beijing and Nanjing, American diplomats, as well as American businessmen and missionaries, were isolated from the Chinese community. The Fulbright scholars and students studying and working among the Chinese at various universities were the only Americans who were able to move freely within Chinese student and academic circles. George Harris believed that “this small group of American students and scholars, in maintaining the friendship and respect of numerous individual Chinese, stands in some part as a living refutation of the virulent propaganda attack levelled on all things American throughout the Communist area.”83 Despite its effort to keep the Fulbright Program alive in China, the USEFC soon found it impossible to continue its work there. On August 31, 1949, the USEFC suspended its operations due to the exhaustion of its funds and its inability to acquire further support from the Chinese Nationalist government, which was ﬂeeing to Taiwan. By October, all grants allocated for the year were exhausted and all American staff of the USEFC left for home. The ﬁrst Fulbright Program lasted only a year in China. The short-lived enterprise did beneﬁt a few American scholars, like Derk Bodde, who later made great contributions to Chinese studies in the United States.84 But its quick demise marked the beginning of the end of Washington’s strong support for educational exchanges with China.

Providing Emergency Aid to Chinese Students The devastating defeat suffered by the Nationalists in the civil war not only caused the premature death of the ﬁrst Fulbright Agreement, but also forced Washington to provide emergency aid for Chinese students stranded again in the United States. Starting with a temporary program with limited scope, the State Department soon had to tap various resources to provide massive and extended

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ﬁnancial relief for an unprecedented number of Chinese students. The unusually generous aid was provided for humanitarian as well as strategic purposes. With millions of dollars dispersed among thousands of Chinese students, Washington was able to help the majority of them to complete their education in the United States. Their extended stay in the United States denied the Chinese Communists the services of a large number of highly trained experts and professionals. With strong support from both the Chinese and American governments, the number of Chinese students in the United States kept increasing after the end of World War II. Even the civil war did not slow down the inﬂux of Chinese students and scholars as more Chinese intellectuals sought to escape the danger and chaos under the authoritarian Nationalist regime. In 1945, there were about one thousand Chinese students in this country. By 1948, the number soared to 3,900.85 According to statistics gathered by Congress in mid-1949, there were only eighty-three Chinese students in the United States who could still receive full ﬁnancial support from the Chinese government. Another fourteen hundred were government-certiﬁed self-sponsored students who came to the United States with US$1,800 purchased at the ofﬁcial rate. The largest group, about twenty-one hundred, were private students who had to obtain sufﬁcient ﬁnancial support on their own before they were allowed to leave the country for the United States.86 Some students, especially privately sponsored ones, began to have ﬁnancial problems in early 1948 because of the civil war. Beginning in the autumn, an increasing number of Chinese students were faced with ﬁnancial difﬁculties also because of economic reforms implemented by the Nationalist government. In order to stop the inﬂation and stabilize the economy, the Nationalist regime replaced the yuan, the unit of currency then in use, with the new “gold yuan” at a rate of one to three million in August 1948. At the same time, it ordered the people to exchange all their gold, silver, and foreign currencies for gold yuan notes at the Central Bank.87 This reform, representing sheer robbery, stripped the Chinese people, especially the middle class, of their assets. Few Chinese families were able to continue their support for their children in the United States. Unable to receive ﬁnancial support from their families, Chinese students in the United States ﬁrst turned to seek help from their colleges and universities. Sympathetic to the Chinese students, most schools did what they could to help, offering them scholarships, loans, and part-time employment on campus. It soon became clear, however, that the challenge was too big for the schools to handle. Lacking the funds to provide help for all needy Chinese students, universities and colleges had to turn to the federal government for assistance.88 The State Department, which was aware of the ﬁnancial problems suffered by Chinese students since the beginning of 1948, did become deeply concerned. However, the department had no funds or authorization to provide help. In mid-1948, the State Department managed to get a pathetic $8,000 from the appropriation for the implementation of the Smith-Mundt Act and authorized the Ofﬁce of Education to use the money to assist Chinese students. But with such a small amount, the ofﬁce was able to award each grantee only $100.

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Even that little assistance was gone by the end of the year when the fund was exhausted.89 As the situation deteriorated in China, even government-sponsored students had difﬁculties receiving their payments in full and on time. On December 31, 1948, Meng Zhi sent a memorandum entitled “Estimated Financial Needs of Chinese Students in the United States” to several ofﬁcials in the Ofﬁce of Educational Exchange of the State Department. Ten days later, Meng wrote Secretary of State George Marshall, formally requesting emergency aid for Chinese students in the United States. Meng estimated that among all the Chinese students in this country, about twenty-ﬁve hundred would need ﬁnancial assistance within six months. Basing his estimate on a calculation done by the National Association of Foreign Student Advisors, Meng pointed out that the average amount needed for each student was $500 exclusive of all other sources of income. Therefore, an emergency aid fund of $1,250,000 would be required to cover the second half of 1949.90 Meng’s letter formally placed the ﬁnancial problems faced by Chinese students before the State Department. Aware of the strong sentiment in Congress to cut government spending, especially foreign aid, the State Department managed to work out an agreement with the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) to assist Chinese students with funds originally appropriated for economic aid to China. It was relatively easy for the department to obtain approval from the Nationalist government for the arrangement. Aware of the ﬁnancial difﬁculties faced by Chinese students in the United States, the Nationalists welcomed any measures that could help alleviate the pain caused by its economic reforms at home. On February 12, 1949, Wellington Koo, the Chinese ambassador in Washington, formally requested the ECA to allocate $500,000 to the State Department to assist Chinese students.91 In order to make certain that the ECA would cooperate with the State Department, the Chinese government managed to get support for the arrangement from Roger Lapham, the chief of the ECA’s China Mission. At the request of the Chinese government, Lapham headed home on February 17, 1949, to persuade Paul Hoffman, head of the ECA, and Congress to transfer the funds.92 Having received the request from the Chinese government and a formal supporting letter from James Webb, the Under Secretary of State, the ECA allocated the money to the State Department on March 23, 1949. With a half million dollars in hand, the State Department was able to start the Program of Emergency Aid to Chinese Students ofﬁcially on April 1, 1949.93 As cosponsors, the State Department and the ECA, while sharing a common vision for the program, did have some minor disagreements. One was about the criteria for selecting Chinese grantees. As the former emphasized individual merit and the usefulness of their specialty, the latter focused on assisting technical students who came to the United States mostly with ﬁnancial support from the ECA. Despite the disagreement, both agencies believed that the fund should be used as a temporary stop-gap measure to aid only a relatively few persons.94 However, their shared original vision for the program soon proved impractical.

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As the disastrous results of the Nationalist economic reforms came into full bloom and Communist control expanded rapidly in China, almost all Chinese students and scholars were cut off from their ﬁnancial resources by mid-1949. Receiving no money from either their government or families in China, the Chinese students had to turn to the American government for help. By the end of June, the State Department had received twenty-two hundred applications for assistance from Chinese students in technical and related ﬁelds. All of them had been approved and endorsed by the universities and colleges.95 With such a large number of applicants, the entire $500,000 was earmarked for accepted grantees by August 8, 1949.96 Although the entire fund was gone, applications for ﬁnancial aid from Chinese students continued to pour in. The State Department had to seek additional funding to meet the need. Following the advice of his legal counsel, Paul Hoffman indicated that further use of the ECA appropriations without Congressional sanction was impossible.97 The State Department had no choice but to turn to Congress for the money needed by the Emergency Aid Program. Its task was made easier when it found enthusiastic collaborators on Capitol Hill. As staunch supporters of Jiang Jieshi, Representatives Walter Judd of Minnesota and Mike Mansﬁeld of Montana were also concerned about Chinese students in the United States and willing to help them. They introduced two similar bills in the Committee on Foreign Affairs on July 2, 1949, proposing the allocation of $4 million for the Program of Emergency Aid to Chinese Students from funds previously appropriated for aid to China.98 The Judd-Mansﬁeld proposal received immediate endorsement from the State Department as well as the media. On July 8, Assistant Secretary of State Ernest A. Gross sent a letter to the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs appealing for federal assistance to meet “the emergency needs of the Chinese students stranded in the United States.”99 The New York Times called the proposed assistance the best investment the United States could make, arguing that providing ﬁnancial aid to the students would help make new friends and counteract the anti-American propaganda that was the stock in trade of the Chinese Communists.100 With strong support from the State Department and the media, the House passed the combined bill prepared by the chairman and incorporated it in the Foreign Aid Appropriation Act of 1950, which passed the Senate on September 29. The act was signed into law by President Truman on October 6, 1949.101 The new legislation provided desperately needed funds for the Program of Emergency Aid to Chinese Students and helped expand its scale and scope. In the 1949–1950 ﬁscal year, the State Department awarded grants to 2,164 new applicants. Prior to this, only about three hundred Chinese students had received aid from the department.102 Unlike the program funded under the old ECA arrangement, which required the grantees to be technical students, the new legislation extended coverage to all students regardless of their ﬁeld of study.103 Despite its strong support for the Program of Emergency Aid to Chinese Students, Congress still conceived of it as a temporary measure. In its report to

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the House, the Committee on Foreign Affairs emphasized that the program was “based on the recognition that something must be done now to meet present exigencies.” It insisted that there was no intention to extend the aid to any student beyond the limit of the academic course that he or she had undertaken. Since the committee believed that the course of events in China was still unpredictable, it was not sure whether it was necessary to change the immigration laws and regulations in order to allow all Chinese students to work after completing their education here. However, it approved the State Department’s view that Chinese students should not be forced to return to China. 104 More money was needed when the $4 million appropriated by Congress ran out again on June 30, 1950. At that time, there were still a rather large number of Chinese students who had not completed their education. Moreover, favorable changes in the situation in Mainland China were viewed as increasingly unlikely. The State Department therefore went back to Congress seeking more ﬁnancial support for the Emergency Aid Program. The further extension of the program drew criticism in Congress. As part of their effort to cut the Truman administration’s foreign aid program, some members of Congress, including Representative Francis Bolton of Ohio, questioned Secretary of State Dean Acheson as to the desirability of extending the program. Acheson insisted that additional funds were deﬁnitely needed. Again, Walter Judd came to the aid of the State Department. In discussing the ECA’s appropriation bill for 1951, Judd proposed an amendment that allocated $6 million from funds previously appropriated for the China Aid Act of 1948 to assist Chinese students. His amendment was incorporated into the China Aid Act of 1950 and approved on June 5, 1950, three weeks before the outbreak of the Korean War.105 This new legislation expanded the Program of Emergency Aid to Chinese Students in almost every direction. First, an unprecedentedly huge sum was appropriated to provide ﬁnancial aid for Chinese students and scholars in the United States for an extended period. Unlike earlier legislation, which required a clear time limit for the spending, the new China Aid Act of 1950 would allow the funds for the program to “remain available until expended.”106 Second, the new legislation permitted the program to be further expanded to cover postdoctoral students, research workers, teachers, and professors. For the ﬁrst time, all four hundred or so visiting Chinese scholars and professors in this country were eligible to apply for American government grants. By 1955, 286 Chinese scholars had received grants under the program. Third, the program allowed the State Department to use the funds to bring advanced Chinese students and scholars stranded in Hong Kong or other East Asian countries to the United States. The department instructed American embassies in the Far East to help these Chinese students and allocated $200,000 for the ﬁrst year’s operation.107 Last but not least, the legislation ofﬁcially opened the door for Chinese students to stay in this country permanently by permitting Chinese students to work after completing their education here. In order to avoid making Chinese students permanent public charges, the act authorized and directed the attorney general “to

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promulgate regulations providing that such selected citizens of China who have been admitted for the purpose of study in the United States, shall be granted permission to accept employment upon application ﬁled with Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization.”108 With millions of dollars spent on emergency aid to Chinese students, Washington replaced the Nationalist regime, which was defeated and forced to ﬂee to Taiwan, as the sponsor and caretaker for thousands of Chinese students and hundreds of Chinese scholars in the United States. The unprecedented ﬁnancial assistance from the American government not only allowed a vast number of Chinese students to earn master’s or doctoral degrees after completing their undergraduate education program at American colleges and universities, but also effectively extended their stay in the United States. Yet as Washington reversed its traditional policy and worked hard to keep Chinese students and scholars in this country, it helped bring educational exchange between the two nations close to its complete termination.

Terminating Educational Exchange Although the Emergency Aid Program was originally designed to provide temporary help for Chinese students and scholars in this country, the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 set a new path for diplomatic relations between the two nations and brought fundamental changes to the emergency aid program for Chinese students. As the United States and the newly established People’s Republic of China entered the war in the Korean Peninsula on opposite sides, normal educational exchanges between the two nations became impossible. While refusing to allow any students or scholars to go across the Paciﬁc for educational purposes, both sides fought to win over the Chinese students stranded in the United States. As the Communists made patriotic calls in order to lure as many Chinese students and scholars as possible back to China, Washington did its best to keep all Chinese students in this country. With generous ﬁnancial aid, complete reversal of immigration policy, plenty of employment opportunities, and strict orders to ban some Chinese from leaving this country, Washington managed to keep an unprecedentedly large number of Chinese students and scholars staying permanently in the United States. As a result, both the American and the Chinese governments turned themselves from promoters and sponsors into blockers and terminators of educational exchanges. They worked together to sever not only diplomatic relations, but also educational ties between the two nations for the ﬁrst time in history. Despite its claim that the “immediate purpose” of the ﬁnancial assistance provided for the Chinese students in the United States was “a humanitarian one,” Congress made it very clear from the beginning that the relief effort was developed to safeguard American interests in China. Defending its decision to support the Emergency Aid Program for the Chinese students, the House Committee on Foreign Relations pointed out that since the Chinese students “had an

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opportunity to observe and experience the democratic way of life,” and occupied leadership positions in Chinese society as scholars always had, they were “in the unique position to exert a profound inﬂuence on the future course of their country.” Therefore, the committee emphasized that there was “no question that it is in the interest of the United States to assist these individuals who can play such a vital role in shaping China’s future.”109 When the bill introduced by the committee passed the House on August 1, 1949, Representative Judd, a staunch supporter of the program, told the public that the objective of the legislation was to help Chinese students “become advocates of our system as to the Communists.”110 From the very beginning, the State Department had difﬁculties in coming up with evidence to prove that any students who returned to China from the United States were in fact persecuted. Reports received by the State Department actually showed the opposite. Six weeks after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Walter McConaughy, the acting American consul general at Shanghai, told the State Department that he had “not heard of any incidents where Chinese students returning from abroad have experienced difﬁculties reentering Communist China due [to] obstacles imposed by Communist authorities or of any unreasonable pressure imposed on them after arrival.”111 A year later, the New York Times reported that Chinese students who returned from the United States received a warm welcome once they crossed the border between Hong Kong and China.112 The nice treatment that returned students received in China helped explain at least partly why many students went back to their homeland despite employment opportunities in the United States. The State Department was alarmed by the welcome given to the returned students by the Communist regime and by students’ willingness to embrace the new People’s Republic of China. According to McConaughy’s report, not only were the returned students enthusiastically received, they appeared to accept the new regime whole-heartedly. He pointed out that the emphasis of “present Communist policy seems to be on welcoming back trained personnel and on utilization [of] technical skills acquired abroad, which [is] quite natural [given the] extreme shortage [of] trained manpower in Communist China.”113 Deeply concerned about the situation, the State Department became increasingly reluctant to allow Chinese students to return to China. In order to prevent Chinese students from becoming Communist supporters, the department increased its efforts to expose Chinese students to the democratic way of life in this country and to keep them here. Upon receiving the report from McConaughy, William Johnstone, Jr., director of the Ofﬁce of Educational Exchange at the State Department, proposed to invite presidents of a dozen or so major universities to meet with department ofﬁcials in Washington. The purpose of the meeting was to solicit their views on how to deal with Chinese students so as to “strengthen and encourage democratic forces in China.”114 Johnstone wanted to discuss three major issues with the university presidents. The ﬁrst was the participation of universities and colleges in

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the effort to enhance Chinese students’ understanding of American democratic institutions and life through visits to American communities and homes, participation in American student activities, and close relations with faculty members. The second was to have newspapers and magazines published at colleges and universities, with assistance from the State Department, providing more information for Chinese students. The increased information on developments in China as well the United States, Johnstone argued, would help keep the students away from Communist propaganda and prepare them for combat against Communism. The third was to encourage civilian organizations to set up hospitality projects in which Chinese students would be “adopted” by American families.115 While giving strong support for the meeting initiated by Johnstone and other activities, the State Department believed that the best way to deny the Communists the highly trained experts from the United States and to preserve a democratic force for the future was to help Chinese students complete their education here and prevent them from returning to Communist-controlled China. Although consistent with its Cold War policy, the State Department’s plan to extend the Chinese students’ stay in this country beyond their education met resistance from other government agencies that were still unwilling to give up traditional immigration policy toward the Chinese. For instance, at the inception of the Emergency Aid Program, Chinese students had to sign a statement before receiving grants, pledging that “upon termination of the award I promise to return to China.” The ECA insisted on the pledge because the $500,000 fund used to help Chinese students came from the appropriation made for economic aid to China. It believed that the funds were properly used only if the students who had received aid would return to China and use their training in China’s economic reconstruction. The Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange shared the same view. It recommended that no federal funds be granted unless arrangement was made for the grantees’ return to China. Because of this requirement, about one thousand Chinese students returned to China between 1949 and 1950. Over six hundred of them went back home with travel grants paid by the United States government.116 The State Department vehemently opposed the forcible return of Chinese students. The Department’s Advisory Committee on Emergency Aid to Chinese Students argued that students should not be required to return to areas under Communist control and that they should be permitted to postpone their return until conditions had stabilized. Under pressure from the State Department, ECA administrator Hoffman agreed to modify the pledge so that the grantees would only return to China “as soon as practicable.”117 Although Chinese students had to sign this provisional pledge as a condition of receiving grants from the federal government, they knew that their extended stay in the United States would be safe since political stability in China was anything but near in sight. The pledge was ﬁnally rendered meaningless when the China Aid Act of 1950 passed Congress. The new law permitted all Chinese students, including those who had completed their education here, to seek employment in the United States for a

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prolonged stay.118 Realizing the contradiction between the pledge and the act, the Advisory Committee on Emergency Aid to Chinese Students recommended the abolition of the pledge in May 1950. Four months later, Assistant Secretary of State Edward W. Barrett made the same recommendation to Congress.119 It is clear that the United States government was ready by mid-1950 to abandon its traditional policy requiring Chinese students to return to China immediately after their graduation. Chinese students, for the ﬁrst time in history, were encouraged to extend their stay in the United States. The beginning of the direct military confrontation between the United States and China on the Korean Peninsula further strengthened Washington’s determination to keep Chinese students in the United States. Prior to the fall of 1950, the State Department tried to keep Chinese students from returning to Communist-controlled China mainly through offering them ﬁnancial aid for education and employment opportunities in this country. Once the war broke out in Korea, the State Department, with the strong belief that China was behind the North Korean attack, began to take more forceful steps to keep all Chinese students and scholars in the United States. As early as September 1950, the State Department banned any Chinese students and scholars with science and engineering education that might be a possible threat to American military forces from returning to China. It did not want to see American-trained students going back home and helping Chinese Communists in the war against the United States. Furthermore, it hoped to preserve these students as democratic forces and use them for the future reconstruction of a free China. As a result, at least 150 detention orders were issued to prohibit the departure of Chinese students during the ﬁrst year of the Korean War.120 The detention orders had a grave impact on many Chinese students and scholars, including Qian Xuesen (Tsien Hsueh-shen), a renowned jet-propulsion scientist and professor at the California Institute of Technology. In July 1950, Professor Qian, despite his involvement in and contribution to top secret research for the Army and Navy during the war, was accused of being a member of the Communist Party and stripped of his security clearance for defense-related projects. Irritated by the unfounded attacks leveled against him and angry at the loss of the right to continue his research, Qian decided to leave the United States, where he had studied and worked for over two decades. After he and his family had put their luggage on the ship and prepared to return to China at the end of August, the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an order to prohibit their departure. Their luggage was removed from the ship and Qian was accused of stealing secret documents. On September 6, 1950, Qian was arrested at his home in Altadena, California, as a spy.121 Having stayed in jail for a few weeks, Qian was released on a $15,000 bond. As part of the deal, Qian had to report to the Immigration Service every month and stay within the county border. Although no evidence was found to prove Qian’s connections with the Communists, the FBI kept him under tight surveillance in the next ﬁve years before he was ﬁnally allowed to leave.122

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While putting Qian in prison, the federal government arrested Zhao Zhongyao, Shen Shanjong, and Luo Shijun, three Chinese scholars and students who had worked and studied at the California Institute of Technology, on September 12, 1950, on their way back to China. American agents searched and interrogated the Chinese scholars on board the President Wilson, docked at Yokohama, Japan, and then took them away from the ship, which was heading to Hong Kong. Accused of stealing American defense secrets, the three Chinese were put in a jail for prisoners of war run by the United States Eighth Army in Japan.123 They were pressed to confess their relations with Qian and to make false accusations against the scientist. Unable to produce any evidence against the detainees after careful search of their luggage and long interrogations, the United States government had to release them to the Chinese embassy, controlled by the Nationalist government, in Japan. The Nationalist diplomats tried to persuade the three scholars either to go back to the United States or to accept the offer from Fu Sinian, the president of the National Taiwan University, to teach at that institution. Neither option was acceptable to the Chinese detainees. Following persistent requests from the detained Chinese scholars and strong protests from the new Communist government, the three scholars were ﬁnally allowed to leave Japan for China on November 15, 1950.124 In contrast to the swift and strong actions taken by the State Department, the Department of Justice, despite the direction and authorization from Congress, was slow in promulgating the necessary immigration regulations that would permit Chinese students to work after completing their education in the United States. As late as March 1951, those students who left school for lack of funds or accepted jobs after graduation were “very likely to be served with a warrant of arrest, forced to return to his campus under the custody of some ofﬁcials there, and even served with a warrant of deportation.” Ironically, the Justice Department took this action because it too was trying to be tough with Communists. It believed that some Chinese students were sympathetic to Communism since they were members of student organizations such as the Chinese Students’ Christian Organization and the Scientiﬁc Workers Association of Engineering and Chemistry. Branding the leaders of these organizations as subversive, the attorney general’s ofﬁce tried to get Communist sympathizers out of this country.125 The Justice Department’s tactics drew strong criticism from universities, the State Department, and Congress. According to the New York Times, one professor, who had seen the different approaches taken by the State and Justice Departments in dealing with Chinese students, vehemently opposed sending Chinese students back to China no matter what their political views were. The professor pointed out that “it is criminal to send back our friends and idiotic to send back our enemies—since all of them are highly trained.” He told James Reston, the well-known columnist, that “[n]o sensitive government would let any of them go near Peiping, whether they wished to go or not.”126 The State Department and many in Congress shared the same view. The State Department

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repeatedly urged the Justice Department to put the act which permitted Chinese students to work into force. Receiving no positive response from the Justice Department, the State Department took the issue to Capitol Hill in order to prevent Chinese students from being deported by the Immigration Service. On February 1, 1951, Senator Warren Magnuson of Washington introduced a bill to the Committee on the Judiciary, providing that no Chinese students should be deported for a period of three years and that they should be allowed to work during that period.127 An identical bill was introduced by Representative Arthur G. Klein from New York to the House Judiciary Committee on March 12.128 Under the heavy pressure, the Justice Department ﬁnally revised the immigration regulations on April 13, 1951, allowing Chinese students to remain indeﬁnitely and work in the United States rather than forcing them to return to Communist China. But it still required Chinese students to apply for work permits and report their whereabouts and the nature of their jobs to the Immigration Service every three months.129 In mid-April 1951, Immigration ofﬁcials began meeting with State Department ofﬁcials to discuss “the question of forbidding Chinese students to leave the United States, especially those with scientiﬁc and certain kinds of technical knowledge and skills.”130 By mid-June, ofﬁcials from the two departments had reached an agreement under which the State Department would establish a list of Chinese students and scholars who should be prohibited from leaving the country. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, under the Justice Department, would be authorized to control the departure of these Chinese.131 The cooperation from the Justice Department ﬁnally insured the full implementation of the Emergency Aid Program for Chinese Students. By 1955, 3,498 Chinese students had received 7,777 grants from the Emergency Aid Program.132 With generous government grants, almost all Chinese students were able to complete their education in the United States and many got graduate degrees. Their higher degrees, in turn, helped them obtain satisfactory employment in this country. In a survey conducted by the State Department of ex-grantees for the period between July 1951 and June 1953, 46 percent had ﬁnished their studies and were employed. Of those who were employed, over 97 percent were satisﬁed with their jobs. About 70 percent of them were employed in their own ﬁelds. Fewer than 3 percent were unsatisﬁed with their jobs since they had to work as laborers, waiters, etc.133 With decent jobs, stable lives in the United States, and considerable fear of the unstable economic and political situation in China, most Chinese students decided to change their legal status from student to immigrant and stay in this country permanently. Therefore, when Washington ﬁnally lifted all 150 detention orders in 1955, only 39 of the Chinese students and scholars affected by the orders chose to return to China.134 Although some Chinese as well as American students and scholars continued to ﬁnd ways to go back to their motherland in the early 1950s, neither China nor the United States sent any students or scholars across the Paciﬁc after 1949. All exchange programs were terminated and all American schools

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in China were closed. As a result, educational interactions between the two nations came to a complete stop for the ﬁrst time since the 1830s. The total severing of the century-long educational ties clearly demonstrated that the American and Chinese governments were capable not only of fostering the most drastic expansion of educational exchange across the Paciﬁc, but also of bringing it to an abrupt end. With government playing such a pivotal role, intercultural relations between the Americans and Chinese were no longer merely interactions between the two peoples. Instead, the expansion and even the existence of cultural interactions between the United States and China were largely shaped and determined by the intervention of the governments of the two nations since the mid-nineteenth century.

Chapter 7

A Historical Perspective

E

ducational exchanges between the United States and China experienced the most drastic expansion and abrupt termination, all within the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century. As the linchpin of China’s modernization and the strongest tie between the two peoples, educational interactions—their rise and fall—inevitably had a lasting impact on the political, social, economic, and educational development of both societies and on the relations between the two nations. If the continuing expansion of educational exchange throughout this period proved that it is possible for peoples with very different cultural and historical backgrounds to share knowledge and ideas, the sudden breakdown of the educational ties at the beginning of the 1950s revealed that government had become the dominant player, whose domestic as well as foreign policies largely determined the fate of U.S.-China educational relations. An accurate assessment of the impact of educational exchange and a thorough analysis of the causes for its expansion as well as termination will help us not only have a better understanding of a key dimension in the modern history of the United States, China, and their relations during this period, but also avoid another catastrophic breakdown of educational ties between the two nations. Although few scholars would deny the large-scale expansion of U.S.China educational interactions in the ﬁrst half of the last century, they were divided on the signiﬁcance and impact of educational exchanges. Some scholars, like Shu Xincheng and Y. C. Wang, believed that China’s study abroad program, especially educational exchange with the United States, was a complete failure because of its extremely high cost, unfair distribution of resources, and the lack of usefulness of the knowledge and skills obtained by Chinese students from American colleges and universities. Wang even argued that the lack of economic growth and the victory of the Communists in China were mainly caused by the returned students, who became too specialized in skills, too individualistic in attitudes, too aloof from the masses, and too dependent on government.1 Some other scholars, like Li Xisuo and Su Yunfeng, saw China’s educational exchanges with 176

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foreign countries, especially those programs with the United States, as a huge success. They credited returned students for the rapid development of science and technology, and the emergence of modern education and economy in China.2 The conﬂicting views reﬂected the multidimensional nature of educational exchange resulting from deep government intervention in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century. While the former overlooked the speciﬁc goals set for educational exchanges at different times and the importance of the enhancement of mutual understanding between the two peoples, the latter failed to pay enough attention to the role played by government in U.S.-China educational exchange. From a historical perspective, U.S.-China educational exchange in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century was an unprecedented success as well as an astonishing failure. Both the success and the failure depended not only on the participation of the students and scholars, but also on the role played by the American and Chinese governments. There is no doubt that with generous support from both governments educational exchange between the two nations succeeded in training a large number of experts in various ﬁelds to meet the needs of China’s modernization effort in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century. However, neither the Chinese nor the American government was successful in dealing with their political or diplomatic crises through the expansion of educational exchange. Actually, all the Chinese regimes collapsed despite their support for study abroad because they alienated the returned students and scholars by rejecting serious political and social reforms. The United States was eventually forced out of China completely when educational exchange between the two nations was at its peak because Washington kept most Chinese students and scholars angry by refusing to abandon or revise its China policies, which were perceived as hostile by the Chinese. Therefore, in order to turn educational exchange into an enduring bridge between the two peoples and two cultures, stronger support, closer collaboration, broader interaction, and better understanding of the nature and function of intercultural relations from both the American and Chinese governments are needed.

Educational Success As major sponsor, regulator, promoter, and coordinator, both the American and Chinese governments set many goals for educational exchange programs between the two nations. Although Chinese regimes and Washington might have slightly different political or diplomatic motifs, they all wanted to see more students and scholars involved in exchanges so that knowledge and ideas could be shared across the Paciﬁc and education on both sides of the ocean could be beneﬁted. Right after its establishment, the Ministry of Education of the Qing government made it clear that the goal for study abroad was to train highly specialized experts in various ﬁelds while domestic schools aimed at universal and general education.3 Such a policy was actually inherited by all succeeding regimes.4 In order to achieve that goal, China sent an increasingly large

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number of Chinese students and scholars to the United States for higher education beginning in 1905. With knowledge and ideas obtained from the United States, Chinese students became leaders in almost all ﬁelds after their return to China. Their contribution to the modernization of Chinese education, science, technology, economy, and politics during this period could never be overestimated. While learning from their American teachers and schoolmates, they also served as unofﬁcial envoys for China, disseminating information and knowledge of Chinese culture and history to an increasingly larger American audience. Together with American scholars and students, they contributed to the construction of a cultural bridge across the Paciﬁc, bringing the mutual knowledge and understanding between the two peoples to an unprecedented level. With strong support from both the American and Chinese governments, educational exchange between the two nations succeeded in training a large number of experts in all ﬁelds for China in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century. According to a survey published by the China Institute in America in 1954, only 51 Chinese students were admitted to colleges and universities in the United States between 1900 and 1904. The number increased about seven times, totaling 353 in the next ﬁve years. The sharp increase continued in the next two decades, reaching 1,661 in the 1910s, and 3,632 in the 1920s. Although the beginning of the war with Japan reduced the number of Chinese students enrolling in American colleges and universities to a trickle, the decade as a whole still saw 2,031 Chinese students entering American institutions of higher education. As soon as World War II came to an end, Chinese students began to pour into the United States for education and training. By the end of the 1940s, American colleges and universities took in an unprecedented 5,739 Chinese students. As a result, the number of Chinese students that came to the United States for education in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century increased twenty times compared with those in the previous ﬁfty years.5 With less than a hundred attending colleges and universities in the United States in the academic year 1904–05, Chinese students counted for less than 4 percent of the total of 2,673 foreign students in this country and ranked ﬁfth after Canada’s 614, Mexico’s 308, Cuba’s 236, and Japan’s 105.6 As their number shot up to 549 in the academic year 1911–12, their ranking moved up to third place.7 By the academic year 1920– 21, there were 1,443 Chinese students in American colleges and universities, making them the largest foreign student body.8 As their number increased, more Chinese students pursued undergraduate as well as graduate education in the United States. Prior to 1905, most Chinese entered preparatory schools or secondary schools for education in the United States. Among roughly 1,000 Chinese students who came to the United States between 1847 and 1904, only 105 were admitted to colleges and universities and fewer received baccalaureate degrees.9 A master’s was the highest academic degree earned by Chinese students in the United States and only three of them achieved such an honor during this period.10 Beginning with the indemnity students, almost all Chinese students who came to the United States after 1905

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sought higher education and a majority of them earned baccalaureate and graduate degrees. This trend was reinforced during the Nationalist era. Among the 3,610 Chinese students enrolled in 402 American colleges and universities in the spring of 1949, there were 2,280 graduate students and 935 undergraduates.11 Such a high percentage of graduate students was unheard of among any other groups of foreign students or the Americans. According to Yuan Tongli’s study, a total of 2,751 Chinese students earned their doctoral degrees in this country between 1905 and 1960.12 There is no doubt that more Chinese students completed undergraduate as well as graduate programs in the United States than in any other nations in the world. Chinese students also widened their choice of subject ﬁelds during this period. Prior to 1905, students were required to study only defense-related subjects like “military, ship making, mathematics, and manufacturing.”13 Although the Qing Court still wanted to focus on science, agriculture, engineering, and medicine after 1905, the indemnity students and Qinghua graduates did have more choices for their majors. A large percentage of them chose to study business, law, arts, education, history, languages, etc.14 By the end of the 1940s, Chinese students could pick almost any subject ﬁelds that were available in American colleges and universities.15 Among 3,610 Chinese students enrolled at American universities in the spring of 1949, 24 percent of them were registered in pure and applied sciences, 20 percent in engineering, 17 percent in arts and humanities, 12 percent in business and management, 10 percent in social and political sciences, and 7 percent in education.16 With advanced education and degrees received in the United States, many returned students and scholars quickly became leading ﬁgures in various ﬁelds in China. Who’s Who of China (Zhongguo Mingrenlu) included 176 American returnees in its 1925 edition. The number jumped to 392 in 1931. These numbers were quite impressive, especially when compared with students returned from Japan. Despite the fact that far more Chinese students had received education in Japan by this time, only 111 and 203 of them were included in the same publication in 1925 and 1931, respectively. Among those famous American returnees, university professors counted for 30.1 percent and 34.4 percent, government ofﬁcials 20.5 percent and 18.1 percent, and engineers 13.1 percent and 9.4 percent in respective years. In sharp contrast, most students who returned from Japan became well-known as government ofﬁcials. University professors only counted for 4.5 percent in 1925 and 9.9 percent in 1931.17 When Academia Sinica was established in 1948, forty-nine, 60.5 percent, of the eighty-one fellows had received their education in the United States, ﬁve times more than in second-ranked Britain and ten times more than in ﬁfth-ranked Japan.18 (See Appendix G.) Since a large percentage of American returnees became teachers and professors, their inﬂuence on Chinese education, especially higher education, was most profound. With advanced education and updated knowledge, the American-returned students were recruited by all major colleges and universities as administrators and professors. American-returned students served as presidents

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not only at Qinghua, which was known for the dominant role played by students educated in the United States, but also at Beijing University, formerly the Capital University (Jingshi Daxuetang), Nankai University, Jiaotong University, and Southeast University (Dongnan Daxue) beginning in the 1920s. In those universities, professors graduated from American colleges and universities were dominant either in number or in inﬂuence. In 1930, Nankai had forty-one professors. Thirty-one of them had returned from the United States.19 Southeast University, led by Guo Binwen (Pin-wen Kuo), who served as the president of the Chinese Students’ Alliance, the largest organization for Chinese students in the United States, while studying at Columbia University, was able to collect about ﬁfty American-returned students. John Leighton Stuart, a famous American educator and diplomat in China, observed that all American returnees were outstanding in their own ﬁelds and that they gave “the impetus to education based on [the] American model.”20 With such a high concentration, the American-returned students drastically changed the theory, contents, curriculum, and direction of Chinese education. Beginning in the 1920s, several major new educational movements rose in China, including vocational education, village education, and science education. The leaders of all these movements had received their education in the United States. The best-known one was the science education movement started by a group of Chinese students studying at Cornell University in 1914. Sharing the belief that the poverty and backwardness of Chinese society was caused by the lack of science, the students decided to do their part to promote science education and research in China. In January 1915, they published the ﬁrst volume of the Journal of Science (Kexue) in Shanghai. On October 25, they organized the Chinese Society of Science (Zhongguo Kexueshe) with Hu Mingfu, Zhao Yuanren, Bin Zhi, Ren Hongjuan, and Zhou Binwen, all students in the United States, as the founding members.21 While the Journal of Science was the ﬁrst and remained for a long time the only comprehensive science journal in China, the Society of Science was the ﬁrst national society for Chinese scientists. As more students joined them and returned to China, science education and education with scientiﬁc methods and contents began to change all the schools in China. When more American-returned students resumed teaching and administrative positions at universities and schools, they tried to change not only the content of teaching, but also the educational system in China. Right after his return from Columbia, Hu Shi began to push for the adoption of credit hour and elective systems to replace the old grade system at Beijing University. Impressed by Hu’s proposal, Cai Yuanpei, the president of Beijing University, sent Hu as the university’s representative to attend the meeting held at the Ministry of Education so that he could introduce his plan to all other universities. Hu’s proposal received unanimous support from university presidents attending the meeting. With the approval of the Ministry of Education, Beijing University adopted the American-style systems immediately and many other universities followed suit in the 1920s.22 In 1924, the Ministry of Education issued the Regulations on

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National Universities (Guoli Daxuexiao Zhangcheng), requiring all universities to use the elective system and to establish a Board of Directors (Dongshi Hui), Senate (Pingyi Hui), and Faculty Council (Jiaoshou Hui).23 These institutions, directly borrowed from American colleges, existed in Chinese universities until the early 1950s. Although most American-returned scholars taught at colleges and universities, they cared very much about elementary and secondary education. Unhappy with the old school system patterned after the Japanese model in the wake of the Revolution of 1911, many American-returned students wanted to change the system and curriculum of elementary and secondary schools in China.24 Hu Shi joined with many other educators, such as Cai Yuanpei, Tao Xingzhi, and Jiang Mengling, in formulating the School System Reform Bill, which was ﬁrst endorsed by delegates at the annual conference of Provincial Societies of Education and then adopted by the Ministry of Education in 1922. Following the School Reform Decree of 1922, China replaced the old Japanese-style school system with a new one. With six years for elementary school, three years for middle school, and three years for high school, the new system was clearly modeled after the public schools in the United States.25 Such a system has remained largely unchanged until today. Education in the United States had not only turned thousands of Chinese students into experts in various ﬁelds, but also made them go-betweens for both cultures. In order to prepare themselves for their education in the United States, most Chinese students studied English, American history, literature, geography, and politics before they left their motherland. Once they arrived in America, they worked very hard to learn as much as they could in and outside the classroom. Many did so well that they won prestigious awards as students. Zhao Yuanren and Hu Da were inducted to both Sigma Xi and Phi Beta Kappa at Cornell University in 1914, a rare honor even for the brightest American undergraduate students.26 Hu Shi won the Corson Browning Prize, an English composition contest, in 1914 and the American Association for International Conciliation essay contest in 1916.27 Like many of his peers, Hu Shi showed great interest in American culture, politics, and society. Deeply involved in local and national political campaigns in 1912 and 1916, Hu went to many campaign meetings in Ithaca, New York, and wore the Bull Moose pin for two months to support the Progressive Party in the election of 1912. Hu saw his participation not only as the best way to get to know American politics, but also as a necessary step to get himself interested in public affairs. He believed that if a person had no interest in public affairs in his community in the United States, it would be difﬁcult for him to become enthusiastic about public affairs after his return to China.28 Besides learning through their personal experiences, quite a number of Chinese students made the United States their research subject. After China, the United States was the second most popular subject among the Chinese students as a dissertation topic. Numerous theses and dissertations were written on American culture, education, economy, philosophy, politics, and society during this

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period.29 While some came out as books in the United States, most of the studies were published in China. These scholarly works helped lift Chinese study of the United States to a level much higher than that in the nineteenth century. In addition to their own original study of the United States, many Chinese students made great efforts to translate American books into Chinese. While studying at Cornell University, Zhao Yuanren translated Alice in Wonderland into Chinese, which instantly became a popular book among Chinese youth. Yang Enzhan, another student returned from the United States, translated many books on American politics and education. These books helped introduce American culture, history, politics, and educational system to the Chinese.30 A collective effort was made by the Business Publisher (Shangwu Yinshuguan) in the 1920s and 1930s. Since the vast majority of its editors and department heads, including Zhu Jingnong, Hu Shi, Zhu Kezhen, and Tang Yue, were American returnees, it published a whole set of textbooks from elementary to high school in 1923 for the newly reformed educational system. Many of the new textbooks were “borrowed” from the United States.31 Chinese students in the United States served not only as eyes, but also as unofﬁcial envoys for China. They worked hard to help the Americans have a better knowledge and understanding of the Chinese culture, history, and people through speeches delivered on various occasions, articles published in newspapers and journals in both Chinese and English, and completed dissertations and theses on China. Many Chinese students, like Chen Dingmo, Wu Jiagao, Zhang Zuchun, and Huang Tianfu, gave numerous speeches on Confucianism, Daoism, Chinese mathematics, railroads, and agriculture while studying in the United States.32 Hu Shi sent letters to national magazines and local newspapers to denounce the view that Japan should be allowed to direct the affairs of China.33 The most systematic introduction to Chinese culture and history was provided by the theses and dissertations on China written by Chinese students pursuing graduate degrees in the United States. Between 1905 and 1950, Chinese students completed about three hundred dissertations on Chinese history, economics, politics, education, law, literature, and language.34 Many of those dissertations were later published in the United States, providing new sources and different perspectives for American scholars and the public in their study and understanding of China. As an increasingly large number of Chinese students and scholars came to the United States for education, more Americans went to China for educational purposes in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, improving the dissemination of knowledge and exchange of personnel. Unlike the missionaries, they were engaged in educational activities in China for academic purposes. Over sixty Americans taught Western learning courses at the Qinghua Academy in the 1910s.35 At the invitation of his former students, John Dewey, a well-known professor of philosophy at Columbia University, lectured in China between 1919 and 1921, making pragmatism one of the most popular philosophical trends among the Chinese during this period.36 John King Fairbank, a graduate of Har-

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vard University and a D.Phil. candidate at Oxford University, was one of the ﬁrst American students who studied the Chinese language, history, and culture in the early 1930s.37 The largest number of American students, scholars, and experts arrived in China with sponsorships from the State Department during and after World War II. As one of the ﬁrst Fulbright scholars, Derk Bodde offered the most intimate and insightful observations on the revolutionary changes brought by the Communists in 1949 in his Peking Diary: A Year of Revolution.38 Educational exchange between the United States and China in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century was a huge success in terms of the transfer of knowledge and the enhancement of mutual understanding. The success was made possible with direct, persistent, sometimes concerted intervention by the Chinese as well as the American government. Government support and promotion of educational exchange came in many different ways. One was ﬁnancial assistance. Fully aware of the importance of educational exchange, both the Chinese and American governments injected huge ﬁnancial resources into various exchange programs. In addition to about $28 million from the Boxer Indemnity remission, tens of millions of U.S. dollars were spent by both governments on educating Chinese students in the United States during this period.39 A rather large number of Chinese and American students and scholars were beneﬁted by the generous government support. Among the twenty thousand or so Chinese students who entered American colleges and universities for education between 1905 and 1950, about one-third of them were recipients of government scholarships, subsidies, stipends, and assistance. As the most popular program, the Qinghua scholarship was awarded to about four thousand students, around 20 percent of the total. If the ofﬁcial exchange rate offered by the Chinese government to self-sponsored students is counted as a form of government assistance, then the majority of Chinese students received government support. Besides ﬁnancial support, both the United States and the Chinese governments made institutional and legal changes to pave the road for educational exchanges. The Qing Court’s abolition of the traditional examination system and replacement of traditional academies with new Western-style schools removed the greatest barrier to educational exchange with other nations and created the unprecedented need for experts with modern training and education. As the institutional barriers were removed by the Qing Court, the executive branch of the United States government made great efforts to lower and eventually remove the legal obstacles created by the Chinese exclusion laws and regulations. Such an effort, while insufﬁcient to eliminate the racial discrimination against the Chinese in this country, did make it easy to admit Chinese students to American colleges and universities during this period. The governmental support for educational exchange became most effective and productive when the two central governments were able to collaborate with each other. The cooperation ﬁrst began with educational exchange programs funded with the returned Boxer Indemnity, beginning in 1908. The two governments worked together to make sure that large groups of Chinese students could

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enter the United States with few incidents and that a school could be established and run to prepare Chinese students for higher education in the United States. Although the closeness of the cooperation was reduced as the Chinese government successfully put Qinghua and China’s study abroad programs under its complete control in the 1930s, both governments continued to give their support to educational exchange between the two nations. As war broke out in the Paciﬁc, the collaboration between the two central governments entered a new era. Despite extreme difﬁculties caused by the war, both governments made great efforts to maintain the ﬂow of students and scholars across the ocean. As soon as the war came to an end, the two governments further expanded and deepened their cooperation in educational exchange, bringing it to an unprecedentedly high level until the defeat of the Nationalist government. While fully recognizing the signiﬁcance of government support and collaboration, it is equally important to see that government intervention and cooperation could only be effective with a positive response and active participation from students and scholars involved in exchange programs. With the adoption of a modern educational system in China, Chinese students and scholars showed an increasingly strong desire to pursue education and training in the United States in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century. Actually, as the staunchest supporters and participants, they pushed both the Chinese and American governments for greater support for educational exchanges. The strong desire of Chinese students and scholars to pursue higher education and training in the United States was generated and reinforced by various political, social, and economic forces. First, they saw American education and training as the best way to prepare themselves for the construction of a powerful and prosperous China. As members of China’s educated elite, they shared the strong sense of obligation to serve their nation. Second, with the termination of traditional education and examinations, Western-style education obtained in foreign countries, especially the United States, became a new “short-cut” for successful careers. Many Chinese students and scholars competed for the rare opportunities to study in the United States for their own individual success. Third, the generous support from government and other institutions and superior study and research conditions in the United States had great appeal for Chinese students and scholars, who had suffered tremendously from frequent wars, political instability, and demeaning working and living conditions in China. To many, educational experience in the United States would not only help enhance their knowledge and research, but also allow them to get away, at least for a short period, from difﬁcult political and ﬁnancial situations in China.

Political Failure Expectations for educational exchange from both the American and Chinese governments went far beyond knowledge transfer and personnel exchange. While Washington expected that the education of China’s future leaders in the

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United States would help alleviate and eliminate various kinds of crises and problems in its relations with China, the Chinese government, from the Qing Court to the Nationalist regime, tried to turn students and scholars into its staunch supporters through generous ﬁnancial assistance and tight political control. Although government support for educational exchange was appreciated by most Chinese students seeking education abroad, the political and thought control imposed by the government kept alienating them. The Chinese government’s persistent efforts to use only the technical expertise of the returnees and reject their demands for serious political, social, and economic reforms greatly limited the success of educational exchange and irreversibly turned many students and scholars into the strongest critics of the regime that had generously paid for their education and training overseas. As a result, the Chinese government, while enjoying the great educational success brought by the exchanges with foreign countries like the United States, failed to achieve any of its political goals. Since the Nationalists sent more students and scholars abroad, and sought tighter control over students and scholars than any other regime in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, their political failure was thus most striking. Compared with the Qing Court and the warlord regimes in the early Republic years, the Nationalist government had much more effective control over education in general and study abroad in particular. Through the establishment of national qualiﬁcation standards, the requirement for numerous examinations, control over passports and foreign currencies, and issuance of Study Abroad Permits for all students leaving the country, the Nationalist government succeeded in putting all study abroad programs under its control. Its success depended not only on the new administrative mechanisms, but also on the support of students and scholars, who favored a strong central administration over study abroad programs, at least in the earlier years. They believed that a strong central administration would help get rid of foreign interference in Chinese education and study abroad programs, and provide greater ﬁnancial support for educational exchanges. It was based on such a belief that students and scholars at Qinghua warmly welcomed the new president appointed by the Nationalist government and supported the effort to remove the Americans from the direct management of Qinghua. They even accepted the new regulations adopted by the Nationalist government to raise the qualiﬁcations for study abroad, shorten the time allowed for overseas education, require permits for all students studying abroad, and limit the amount of foreign currency allowed for each student. Students and scholars quickly turned against the regime once the Nationalists tried to impose stringent party education and tight thought control. While supporting Luo Jialun’s ﬁght for central administrative control over Qinghua and its study abroad program, Qinghua students vehemently opposed his effort to establish party control at the university. Many refused to attend morning and evening roll calls, which were part of the military training required by Luo, at the risk of being penalized or even expelled. More rejected the party

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education courses offered by the university. Faculty members showed their strong resentment toward party control by refusing to have meals with the party education teachers at the same table. Due to students’ protests, Luo was forced to cancel the military training for junior and senior students in February 1929. From then on, only freshmen and sophomores had to go through the much relaxed training.40 Still unhappy with Luo’s leadership, Qinghua students passed a resolution on May 20, 1930, urging Luo to resign. At the top of the complaint list was his effort to restrict student activities and deprive them of freedom of speech. Two days later, Luo handed his resignation to the Ministry of Education and left ofﬁce.41 More frequently, students responded to the Nationalist control with quiet resistance. Qian Xuesen was greatly disappointed by the Nationalist rule when he was a student at the Jiaotong University in Shanghai in the early 1930s. In order to escape the boring speeches made by Li Zhaohuan, the president of the university, at Monday morning meetings, Qian quickly joined the brass band so that he and other members could withdraw from the gathering immediately after their performance at the beginning of each meeting.42 When students and scholars could not ﬁnd a way to escape the party education, they would go through the training with their minds closed. They memorized the Nationalist doctrines and attended the political training camps run by the government simply for the purpose of making their trips to the United States. The obvious lack of effectiveness of the Nationalist effort was easily observed by Relman Morin, an American student attending college at Guangzhou and Beijing around 1930. He noticed that the Nationalists had made Sun Yat-sen’s writings required reading and ordered schools to observe a moment of silence in his memory every morning. However, he also sharply pointed out that “something more than his image was needed to win the full loyalty and support of the student class.”43 Many students openly challenged government control once they were abroad. Despite strong government opposition, a large number of students, like Hu Shi, changed their majors after entering colleges and universities in the United States.44 As a result, over one-third of Chinese students chose to study humanities, social sciences, law, and education between 1905 and 1953, much higher than the 20 percent limit set by the Chinese central government.45 Many Chinese students and scholars even took advantage of the newly found freedom to organize various civil societies and criticize the Nationalist government and its policies. One of the best examples was the students’ protest against the Nationalist nonresistance policy toward the Japanese invasion. In August 1935, delegates from all Chinese Student Associations, representing two thousand Chinese students in the United States and Canada, held a conference in Chicago, urging the Nationalist government to resist the Japanese invasion immediately. The Chinese Students Association of North America issued “China Must Fight Japan: A Proclamation” at the conference on October 10, 1935, the National Day of the Republic of China. It was published in all Chinese newspapers in China, South Asia, and North America, and sent to the Chinese government.

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Drawing on world and Chinese history, the manifesto tried to prove that China should and could ﬁght Japan. They demanded that the Nationalist leaders form a united front against Japan and warned them that “[w]hen statesmen concentrate on internal problems and fail to oppose inimical outside forces, the people tend to lose their conﬁdence in the central government.”46 Besides denouncing the nonresistance policy, Chinese students studying in the United States challenged Nationalists’ attempt at thought control. They warned that “to try to suppress public opinion is like seeking to dam [the] Niagara; to attempt to stiﬂe the public sentiment is like trying to extinguish a forest ﬁre by fanning the ﬂames. He who tries it succeeds only in burning himself.”47 Enjoying the freedom of speech in the United States, Chinese students published a monthly journal in both English and Chinese in December 1935. The editors declared in the opening issue that the monthly would represent Chinese students and nationals in the United States and Canada, the only group who could express the general will of the Chinese people since “the voice and patriotic activities of the Chinese people [have] been suppressed” in China. The purpose of the publication, the editors made it very clear, was to present not only student activities, but “a nationalistic movement which is chieﬂy directed against the Japanese militaristic and imperialistic invasions in China.”48 Many Chinese students did use the Monthly as a rare forum to express their views on major issues in China. In the April 1936 issue, Ba Yin openly urged the Nationalist government to stop the war against the Communists and include them in the united front against Japan. A former Nationalist Party member and petty ofﬁcial from a landlord family, Ba knew that the Communists would compete with the Nationalists for power after the war. However, he argued that the Nationalists should not worry so much about it if they really believed that the Three Principles of the People were better than Communism.49 Having exposed themselves to American culture and society beyond classrooms, Chinese students and scholars returned from the United States determined not only to apply their knowledge and skills in economic reconstruction of their nation, but also to carry out fundamental reforms of the Chinese political system. For most returnees from America, government, as Jerome Grieder pointed out, should be “an agency through which individuals of talent are recruited and given the opportunity to exercise their expertise in the interest of society at large.”50 However, the Chinese government was always reluctant to carry out any of the major political reforms prescribed by the returned students, even though it might be willing to put their expertise to use. As a result, many American returnees, while holding respectable positions in various public and private institutions, became strong critics of the government. John Dewey observed as soon as he arrived in China that the “uniform attitude of the educated class toward their government . . . is critical.”51 The discontent among the returned students over the lack of political reforms remained constant throughout the period. Hu Shi became a leader in the Literary Revolution right after his return to China in 1917. As a contributor and

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editor of liberal journals like New Youth (Xin Qingnian), the Endeavor (Nuli Zhoubao), and the Independent Critic (Duli Pinglun) between the 1910s and 1930s, Hu constantly warned of the dangers of authoritarianism and demanded freedom of thought and expression.52 The criticism from Luo Longji, another student of John Dewey and Qinghua graduate, was even more pointed. Immediately upon his return, Luo complained that he had been more free as a foreigner abroad to criticize the governments of the United States or Great Britain than he was as a citizen of the Republic of China. Undeterred by the Nationalist high-handedness, Luo joined with other Anglo-American-educated academics in publishing the Crescent Moon (Xinyue) and played an important role in turning the magazine into a political review. In his articles, Luo openly criticized the Nationalists for their violation of civil liberties, practice of rule by men, and insistence on “tutelage government.” He advocated a political system based on the principles of “entrusted power” (renmin weituo de zhiquan) and “expert service” (zhuanjia zhishi de xingzheng). Irritated by his sharp criticism, the Nationalist government arrested Luo in Shanghai and raided the journal’s ofﬁce in Beijing, conﬁscating hundreds of copies of the magazine, which carried another article by Luo chastising the theory and practice of party tutelage. As a result, publication of the Crescent was stopped completely.53 In addition to public criticism, American returnees challenged authoritarian rule in China in many different ways. Yan Yangchu (James Yen), with a B.A. from Yale and M.A. from Princeton, devoted himself to the Mass Educational Movement (Pingmin Jiaoyu Yundong) after he returned to China in 1920. His experiment in rural education in Ding County (Ding Xian), Hebei Province, focused not only on establishment of schools and dissemination of new farming technology, but also on self-government. When he was asked to lead a government-sponsored program of local self-government and mass education by Song Ziwen, the acting president of the Executive Yuan (Xingzheng Yuan), in early 1945, Yan rejected the offer because of his lack of trust in the Nationalist regime.54 His distrust proved well founded when his plea for support for a publishing house and a national training network for rural reconstruction, including self-government, was rejected by Jiang Jieshi in 1946. Yan warned Jiang that the Communists were ﬁghting on both the military front and the people’s front, and that China would be lost if he could “see only the power of the army, and not the power of the aroused peasants.”55 Unable to win support from Jiang, Yan had to turn to his colleagues as well as Washington for help. If Jiang’s lack of interest in rural reconstruction and reform alienated Yan, who would not want to see the Nationalist leader again, the heavy-handed measures taken by the Nationalist regime dashed the hopes of many intellectuals, who demanded participation in public life on their own enlightened terms. Many returned students and scholars lost conﬁdence in the regime and some of them even became staunch opponents. Wen Yiduo was one of the best examples. Coming from a rich family, Wen graduated from Qinghua and studied in the United States in the 1920s. While he was in the United States, he became a

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Nationalist and vowed to ﬁght the Communists in China. After his return, Wen was devoted to the writing of new-style poems and cared little about politics in the 1930s. However, he was increasingly alienated by the Nationalist corruption, nonresistance policy, mistreatment of the people, and the run-away inﬂation. He had to work as a stamp maker to subsidize his mere professor’s salary during the war years. As a result, he became a strong anti-Nationalist leader in 1943 and joined the Democratic League of China with many other American returnees. He opposed the authoritarian rule of the Nationalist Party and vowed to build a democratic China after World War II.56 Many American-educated scholars became completely alienated when the Nationalist government responded with force. Having received his education in the United States, Li Gongpu returned to serve as a college administrator and faculty member. He became nationally known in 1935 when he was arrested for demanding immediate resistance to the Japanese invasion and freedom of speech. In the following years, Li became a leader of the Democratic League, ﬁghting for democratic reforms in China. Perceived as a threat by the Nationalist Party and Jiang Jieshi, he was assassinated in Chongqing in July 1946. Deeply angered by the murder of his friend and colleague, Wen Yiduo publicly denounced the Nationalist regime at Li’s funeral and challenged the secret agents who were widely believed to be responsible for his death. His challenge was met quickly. Within hours Wen was assassinated not far from his home.57 The killings of Li and Wen shocked students and scholars throughout the whole nation. Even Mei Yiqi, president of the Southwest United University, was angered by the assassinations and feared for his own future.58 The heavy-handedness of the Nationalist regime aggravated the alienation and drove more students and intellectuals into the opposing camp. Neither the Nationalist effort at party control nor the Chinese intellectuals’ resistance escaped the eyes of sharp American observers. Immediately after his arrival in China in 1942, Fairbank noticed that Chen Lifu had made persistent efforts to gain control over the policies of Qinghua as well as other universities in order to control intellectual life in China. He reported that the Nationalists had urged younger faculty members to join the party and that those who had shown interest were entertained and “given special favor and attention.” Therefore, he believed that Chen’s operation represented “China’s transition from government by a dynastic family to government by a party dictatorship.” When the rigid political regimentation combined with severe ﬁnancial hardship, a lot of intellectuals, Fairbank predicted, “will therefore get lost, some will die, and others will become revolutionaries.”59 The strong resentment of Nationalist rule forced an increasingly large number of Chinese students to seek extended stays overseas. When the Nationalist government ordered students who had studied abroad for over three years to return home in 1938, many, including both government- and self-sponsored students, applied to continue their study abroad rather than go back to China.60 More students prolonged their stay in the United States than in any other country

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during and after World War II. In 1942, the Natural Resources Commission of China sent thirty-ﬁve senior technical trainees to the United States to study the electricity industry. Only eleven returned to China as planned within two years. The rest applied for and obtained extensions from the Chinese government. By March 1946, about four years later, there were still twelve trainees working in the United States.61 Many Chinese students and scholars were forced to give up their return plans because of lack of trust in the government. Having lived in the United States for twelve years, Qian Xuesen took his ﬁrst trip back to China in the summer of 1947, looking for opportunities in his motherland. He was received by Fan Xuji, an old friend and former president of Jiaotong University in Shanghai. Jiaotong University wanted to appoint Qian as its new president. Although he was received as a celebrity and invited to deliver several lectures at Qinghua, Jiaotong, and Zhejiang Universities, Qian did not get the appointment. The ofﬁcial explanation was that Qian was too young for the position. The real reason was that the Nationalist ofﬁcials, especially Chen Lifu, had little trust in Qian’s loyalty to the Nationalist Party. Disappointed with the result and disheartened by the economic and political disasters caused by the Nationalist civil war effort, Qian decided to return to the United States and continue his teaching at MIT. He also urged his friends not to return to China, making extended stay abroad a protest against the Nationalist regime.62 For those who had returned to China, it became increasingly popular to leave the country again to escape the political persecution and corruption of the Nationalist regime. Zhou Peiyuan, a graduate of Qinghua, came to the United States in 1924. After receiving his Ph.D. from the California Institute of Technology in 1928, Zhou returned to his alma mater at the request of President Luo Jialun to teach physics in 1929. He only took a one-year sabbatical in 1936 and returned to Qinghua on the eve of the Japanese attack at the Marco Polo Bridge in July 1937. During the war years, Zhou lost his conﬁdence in the Nationalist government and resented the control of the Nationalist Party. When he had the opportunity to take a second sabbatical in 1943, he rejected the offer from the Nationalists to go to the United States as a government ofﬁcial and enjoy numerous privileges. He insisted that he would leave China as a private citizen so as to avoid the political training required by the Nationalist government for ofﬁcials. Once he reached the United States, he extended his stay for over four years. He returned to China in 1947 because of his conﬁdence in the Communists, not the Nationalists. Therefore, when the Nationalist regime ﬂed the mainland in 1949, Zhou, like most of the faculty members at Qinghua, refused to follow it. He even tried to persuade Mei Yiqi, the president of Qinghua, to stay.63 Tired of its oppression and corruption, the vast majority of American returnees refused to follow the Nationalist regime to Taiwan. Among the eightyone Academia Sinica fellows, sixty decided to stay on the mainland to work with the new Communist government and about a dozen left for the United States. Only a handful chose to go to Taiwan.64 Even Hu Shi refused to accept Jiang’s

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appointments for ofﬁces in Taiwan and chose to live in New York City beginning in mid-1949. He ﬁnally moved to Taiwan in 1958, mainly because of his poor health.65 Although there were over four thousand Chinese students in the United States by the end of 1949 and most suffered from ﬁnancial difﬁculties, very few considered the option of going to Taiwan.66 They either turned to the American government for help in order to continue their education in the United States, or returned to China despite the Communist control. Over three hundred students successfully returned to China during the Korean War. When the detention policy was rescinded in 1955 as part of the effort to gain the release of American POWs from the People’s Republic of China, more students followed.67 By the end of the 1950s, over one thousand Chinese students returned to China from the United States, providing China with highly trained scientists, engineers, and professionals in all ﬁelds.68 It is clear that by the end of the 1940s, the Nationalist government effort to win political support from students and scholars through offering them educational experiences in the United States failed, as most American returnees abandoned it. The failure was especially devastating because the Nationalists had greater success in establishing strong central administrative control and spent more money on supporting over ten thousand students and scholars for higher education and training in the United States. Reexamining his defeat on the mainland, Jiang Jieshi admitted that the greatest setback for the Nationalists was their loss of the political support of students and scholars. The defeat in education, Jiang concluded, was fatal to the Nationalist Party and the government.69 While recognizing the devastating effect of the lack of political support from students and scholars, many Nationalist leaders, like Chen Lifu, blamed the United States for their failure. Chen believed that John King Fairbank was a Communist conspirator who refused to support the Nationalists’ thought control over students as well as the Chinese people. Therefore, the United States government, Chen claimed, should share a large part of the responsibility for the defeat of the Nationalist regime.70 The Nationalists’ loss of political support from Chinese intellectuals, including American returnees, and eventually their control of the mainland, was not caused by American conspirators, but by their misunderstanding of educational exchange, lack of willingness to make political reforms, and persistent efforts to exert thought control on students and scholars. They never understood that educational exchange is a wholesome cultural experience for students and scholars, who learned not only new knowledge and skills, but also different ideas and values while abroad. They could and did support the establishment of a strong central administration over China’s educational system and its study abroad programs. However, they were never willing to give up their political freedom, or their right to participate in campus as well as national politics. The liberal education that they had received in the United States and their strong sense of responsibility to modernize Chinese education, politics, and economy made it more difﬁcult for them to accept any kind of thought control. The Nationalist government’s

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attempt to turn study abroad programs into “an ideological weapon in the hands of the party” and to restrict the political freedom of the people naturally caused the strongest opposition from the American returnees.71 Unwilling to carry out democratic reforms or give up its efforts to exert thought control, the Nationalist regime itself was responsible for losing political support from students, scholars, and the masses.

Diplomatic Setbacks While the Chinese government was unsuccessful in winning political support through sending a large number of students to the United States, Washington failed to resolve problems and crises in its diplomatic relations with China by expanding educational interactions between the two nations. It became a pattern in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century that whenever U.S.China relations were faced with a serious problem or new crisis, Washington would take the initiative to expand America’s educational exchange with China rather than make adjustments in its policy or strategy perceived as hostile by the Chinese. Although an increasingly large number of Chinese students and scholars came to the United States with Washington’s support, the expansion of educational exchanges between the two nations did not remove the root causes of any of the problems or crises in U.S.-China relations. As a result, the educational experiences in the United States, which did generate deep love among Chinese students for the American people and culture, were never able to win good feelings from Chinese students for American policy toward China. Eventually, the United States and the newly established People’s Republic of China entered the military conﬂict in Korea and the ideological confrontation of the Cold War. Washington got deeply involved in educational interactions with China way before the establishment of the Division of Educational and Cultural Affairs in the State Department in 1936, which has been regarded by many scholars as the beginning of government intervention in educational exchange.72 Its deep and direct intervention in educational exchanges with China was mainly caused by the new challenges in U.S.-China relations and new resources available to it at the beginning of the 1900s. The beginning of the national boycott against American products led by students and merchants in China in 1905 forced Washington to ﬁnd new ways to deal with the crisis caused by the Chinese exclusion laws in the United States. Unable and unwilling to repeal or revise its anti-Chinese immigration laws and regulations, Washington decided to turn to educational exchanges to regain good feelings from the Chinese students and ofﬁcials so as to keep the huge China market open to American commerce. While the huge surplus of the Boxer Indemnity paid by China gave Washington the needed ﬁnancial resources at its discretion, the leading role played by Chinese students in the boycott helped Washington make up its mind to use the money for educational purposes. Washington believed that by educating a large

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number of China’s future leaders in the United States it would never see another boycott or any other anti-American movements in China. Washington’s decision to return the excessive part of the Boxer Indemnity and ban mistreatment of Chinese students did bring an increasingly large number of Chinese students to the United States beginning in 1909 and won some gratitude from the Chinese government and students. Hu Shi still felt strongly about his educational experience in the United States decades later. In a speech to a group of Chinese students in New York City, Hu told his audience that if “I were a student who had perfect freedom to plan my study abroad once more, I would go to America again for this very important reason: America is young, while China is Old.” He insisted that it was desirable for Chinese students to “assimilate some of the qualities which are found in youth and which are lacking in our old age, such as curiosity, optimism, and energy.”73 Hu’s positive view was shared by many American ofﬁcials. In a telegram sent to the attendees at a formal banquet held in New York City to honor American industrialists for their assistance in training Chinese students during the war on January 27, 1947, William Benton, Assistant Secretary of State, clearly stated that he had “long believed that the exchange of students is the shortest way over decades to promote understanding among peoples and is the best hope for peace.” Having examined the implementation of the ﬁrst ofﬁcial exchange programs since the beginning of the century, Benton concluded that the student exchange with China was “an example of what can be achieved, and an augury of what can be done on an expanded scale.”74 Although educational exchanges continued to expand during and after World War I, another diplomatic crisis emerged when Woodrow Wilson gave his support for Japan’s occupation of Shandong Province at the Peace Conference at Versailles in 1919. Faced with the rise of a new anti-American movement led by Chinese students, Washington, unwilling to change its policy toward Japan, decided to cope with the new crisis with the return of the rest of the surplus of the Boxer Indemnity to China in 1924.75 The second remission not only increased the amount of money that could be used for exchange programs, but also perpetuated educational exchange through the establishment of the CFPEC. The second remission elicited little applause from the public or good feelings from Chinese students. Inspired by rising nationalism, Chinese students and scholars, especially those at Qinghua, began their effort to gain complete control of Qinghua in the mid-1920s through transforming it from a preparatory school into a comprehensive university and limiting the number of students sent to America. By the end of the decade, the transformation of Qinghua was completed and Washington was forced to give up its direct involvement in the management of the school. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor turned the United States and China into formal allies. However, the new alliance had serous troubles from the very beginning. One of the major dividing issues was the lack of American military and economic aid for China’s war effort. Despite its appreciation of China’s

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contribution to the war against Japan, Washington did not provide the kind of military aid to China that Jiang Jieshi had expected. Angry at the minimal American aid and sharp criticism from General Stilwell, his chief American advisor, Jiang forced President Roosevelt to recall Stilwell and threatened to make a separate peace with Japan if he could not get adequate aid for his country.76 Unwilling to change its Europe First strategy or send substantially more military aid to China, Washington decided to intensify educational and cultural exchange with the Chinese during the war. Under the China cultural relations program, American technical experts were sent to China and Chinese professors, artists, and educators were brought to the United States during the most difﬁcult times of the war. The implementation of the educational exchange programs allowed Washington to demonstrate its close and special relations with China without committing substantially more resources. China did receive some assistance in maintaining its educational front. However, it never got all the support it needed to ﬁght the war. The relations between the two allies remained strained throughout the war years. The drastic expansion of educational exchange after World War II did not prevent the emergence of a new crisis between Washington and the Nationalist regime. Having failed to broker the peace in China and seeing the danger of deep intervention in China’s civil war, the Truman administration decided to adopt a policy of limited and conditional support for the Jiang Jieshi regime. The new policy drew severe criticism from Jiang and his supporters in the United States. Unwilling to change its policy, the Truman administration again responded with the expansion of educational exchange. The signing of the ﬁrst Fulbright Agreement with China and the sending of what was so far the largest group of American scholars and students to China in 1948 showed Washington’s support for the collapsing Nationalist regime without getting it further entangled in China. While giving generous support and publicity to the Fulbright Program, Washington continued to reject the Nationalists’ demand for massive and prolonged military and economic aid. Although the military and economic aid provided by Washington was not enough to make the Nationalist regime happy, it was deﬁnitely enough to antagonize thousands of Chinese students and scholars, who wanted the civil war to end as soon s possible. As early as November 1945, thirty thousand students in Kunming, Yunnan Province, sent a letter to the American government, demanding that the United States fulﬁll its promise of noninterference in China’s domestic affairs, withdraw its troops from China, stop providing weapons to the Nationalist armies, and recall Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer. In another letter, students from thirty-one universities and high schools, including Qinghua University, called upon the American people directly to stop Washington’s involvement in China’s civil war.77 Chinese students in the United States shared similar sentiments. The Chinese Students’ Christian Association, a popular Chinese student organization in North America, called for a coalition government with agrarian reform in China and for the termination of American

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military aid to the Nationalist government. Having suffered from numerous wars over decades, Chinese students just wanted to see the war to come to an end so that they could concentrate on rebuilding the Chinese economy and society. Worried so much about the current sufferings of the Chinese people and the future of China, many of them did not care if Jiang Jieshi and his regime were defeated and replaced by a Communist government.78 As the defeat of the Nationalist regime became increasingly certain, Washington shifted its focus from promoting exchange to preventing Chinese students in the United States from returning to China. Millions of dollars were spent and immigration policies were revised to make it easier for the Chinese students to extend their stay in the United States so that these American-trained talents could be kept away from the Communist regime and saved for the building of a democratic China in the future. Such an effort was intensiﬁed when both the United States and China were dragged into the war in Korea in 1950. Some Chinese students were detained by the United States to prevent them from leaving the country. Most Chinese students, while taking the opportunity to complete their education in the United States, were antagonized by the American policy toward China and accusations against themselves. Qian Xuesen, who was accused of being a Communist and forbidden to continue his research in his lab, was arrested in September 1950 right before his journey back to China. Extremely humiliated, Qian ﬁnally got back to China with the help of the Chinese government in 1955. Within four months, he presented a proposal for the establishment of China’s “space industry” to Zhou Enlai, the Chinese prime minister. Under Qian’s leadership, China launched its ﬁrst missile in 1960, ﬁrst missile with a nuclear warhead in 1966, ﬁrst satellite in 1970, and ﬁrst intercontinental ballistic missile in 1980.79 Although educational exchange between the United States and China kept expanding in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century with Washington’s deep intervention and strong support, the United States government was unable to win the good feelings of the Chinese students or maintain friendly relations with the Chinese government. The complete breakdown of diplomatic relations between the United States and the new People’s Republic of China, and the hostile confrontations between the two nations throughout the Cold War years marked a serious setback in Washington’s efforts to manage the crises and problems in U.S.-China relations through the expansion of educational exchange. Such a failure proved that educational exchange was not an effective instrument for dealing with diplomatic crises, that educational experiences in the United States alone were not enough to win good feelings from Chinese students or scholars, or maintain friendly relations with China, and that government could become a most destructive force once it turned itself from a promoter and sponsor into a blocker and terminator of educational exchanges. Educational exchange, by its very nature, could never be an ideal instrument for the management of diplomatic crises. There is no doubt that educational exchange between the United States and China was able to generate some good

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feelings among the participants, especially when their experience was pleasant and rewarding. However, the development of such good feelings depended on many factors, such as the age of the participants, their individual experiences in the host country, and the host nation’s policy toward their motherland. It usually takes a long time to build good feelings and even longer for those good feelings to become a shaping force in the relations between two nations. Therefore, educational exchange might play a positive role in the long run through the enhancement of mutual knowledge and understanding. It was not suitable, however, to serve as an instrument for dealing with day-to-day diplomatic crises. Its failure could come fast and complete, especially when nothing was done to tackle any of the root causes of the crises. Winning good feelings from Chinese students was not as easy as Washington perceived since most Chinese students who went abroad during this period were much older than those the ﬁrst Chinese Educational Mission sent to the United States in the 1870s. According to a study of Western inﬂuence on Chinese students completed by Zhao Xinshu and Xie Yu, the older the Chinese students were, the less likely they were to change their world outlook, including their attitude toward the United States. Even though their study was done on Chinese students in the United States in the 1990s, their ﬁndings were actually very accurate when applied to earlier students.80 Having learned a lesson from sending child students to the United States in the earlier decades, the Chinese government set up rules to send older and more mature students overseas from the beginning of the twentieth century in an effort to prevent them from being “denationalized.” When the Chinese government turned Qinghua from a preparatory school into a university in the 1920s, its main purpose was to make sure that no high school graduates would be sent to the United States. In the 1930s, the Nationalist government allowed only those who had a college education and two years of work experience to go abroad for higher education.81 As a result, the average age of Chinese students would be in the mid-twenties, double that of the child students sent to the United States in the 1870s. The greater maturity of the Chinese students made it difﬁcult to convince them of the good intentions of American policy and easy for them to sense any mistreatment. At a time when racial prejudice was the norm and discrimination against Chinese widely practiced, it was not difﬁcult for Chinese students to have at least some bad memories from their stay in the United States. Liang Shiqiu, a Qinghua student who attended Colorado College in Colorado Springs, remembered that barbers refused to serve Chinese students simply because they were Chinese. When a student sued a barber shop and won, the student was still told by the barber not to come to his shop since it would hurt his business. Liang and ﬁve other male Chinese students had to line up with themselves at their commencement since no white female students at Colorado College were willing to line up with them. Affected by these kinds of experiences, Liang observed that most young Chinese students began to have stronger patriotic feelings toward their own motherland after they came to the United States.82

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Once mistreated, Chinese students were more likely to articulate their resentment through actions or publications. Wen Yiduo disliked his experience in the United States almost from the very beginning. Unable to ﬁnd a peaceful and friendly environment in either Chicago or Colorado Springs, Wen decided that he should return to China without completing any educational program in the United States. He told his family that the United States was not a place for him to stay for an extended period. He claimed that it was impossible to describe in written words the experience and feelings of a Chinese youth with intellect in the United States. He promised that he would pour out his accumulated resentment and anger when he returned to China the next year.83 Wen did end his stay the next year without getting a formal degree. Fei Qihe could not forget the mistreatment that he had received at his entrance into this country after spending six years to earn his baccalaureate degree from Oberlin College and master’s degree from Yale University. Before he left the United States in 1907, he published an article in the Outlook, telling his readers that “America is not so good a friend to China as I had mistakenly thought, because in no part of the earth are the Chinese so ill treated and humiliated as in America.”84 While sensitive about their own mistreatment in the United States, Chinese students and scholars were even less willing to tolerate any hostile policies aimed at their motherland. Since the United States had never treated the Chinese people or China as an equal in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, there were always elements in Washington’s China policy that kept antagonizing Chinese students and scholars. However, Washington usually overlooked the destructiveness of its policy toward China and at the same time overestimated the favorable political impact that American returnees had on Chinese policy and society. Although over twenty thousand Chinese students had received education in the United States in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, their political inﬂuence in China was relatively small for various reasons. First, with higher degrees earned from American colleges and universities, most American-trained scholars became professional and technical experts rather than political leaders after their return to China. According to a study of the Nationalist government ofﬁcials in the early 1930s, about 70 percent of the forty-ﬁve highest-ranking ofﬁcials received education overseas. Among those who were trained abroad, about 58 percent received education in Japan, only 13 percent in the United States.85 As a result, the political inﬂuence of Western-educated men, Y. C. Wang argued, declined while their number and prominence increased.86 Second, the sharp differences in political, economic, and social conditions in the two nations meant that American returnees had to take a longer time to make the necessary adjustments and win political trust from the government. That was probably why the Nationalist government rejected the strong recommendation from Jiaotong University in Shanghai for the appointment of Qian Xuesen, a rising star in the ﬁeld of rocket science in the United States, as its new president in 1947.87 Even today, some scholars still suggest that people should not expect students educated in the United States to make

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huge contributions to China right after their return because of the great differences between the two nations.88 Third, the political inﬂuence of American returnees was further limited because of their small number. Although over twenty thousand Chinese students attended colleges and universities in the United States in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, China only received a few hundred returnees in an average year. The number was small for a country with a population of four hundred million. The return of Chinese students was ﬁrst reduced and then stopped by Washington in the late 1940s and the early 1950s. By keeping thousands of Chinese students and scholars in the United States for decades, the largest nonreturned group in Chinese history by that time, Washington actually helped minimize the political inﬂuence of American-trained Chinese students in China. While devoting substantial resources to educational exchange with China, Washington did little to take advantage of American scholars and ofﬁcials who had gained more knowledge and a better understanding of China through their educational experience there. This further reduced the possible positive impact of educational exchange between the two nations and led Washington down the road of total diplomatic failure in China. The experiences of John S. Service, the political ofﬁcer in the American embassy at Chongqing during World War II, and Derk Bodde, one of the ﬁrst Fulbright Scholars sent to China in 1948, were good examples. Born to a missionary family in Chengdu, China, in 1909, John S. Service learned to speak Sichuan dialect before he started formal education with his mother. Having received his high school and college education back in the United States, he returned to China right after his graduation in 1933. By the time the United States formally entered World War II, Service had become an experienced diplomat in China with wide contacts and keen eyes. Based on his observations, Service sent back to Washington numerous insightful reports and sharp analyses of China’s situation during the war. Sharing basic views with other experienced Foreign Service ofﬁcers in Chongqing, such as John Carter Vincent and John Paton Davies, Jr., Service believed that China was rushing toward a civil war and the Communist Party would be the certain winner. Therefore, he suggested that the United States support both the Nationalists and Communists in the war as long as they kept ﬁghting the Japanese, and maintain friendly relations with the latter. However, Service’s recommendation was vehemently opposed by Patrick Hurley, the new American ambassador to China, who had no knowledge of the Chinese language or culture, and rejected by President Roosevelt. Service and his friends were recalled from China and supporting Jiang Jieshi remained the core of Washington’s China policy.89 Accused of being Communist sympathizers, Service and other “China Hands” in the State Department who had prophetically predicted the defeat of Jiang were all purged in the 1950s. While the “alternative policy” proposed by Service and his diplomatic colleagues was rejected, the close observations of the new Communist China

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made by Derk Bodde were ignored by Washington. Arriving in Beijing in the summer of 1948, Bodde began to translate Feng Youlan’s History of Chinese Philosophy from Chinese into English. Fully aware of the epoch-making importance of events taking place in China during his stay, Bodde kept a detailed diary, recording his experiences and observations. Taking advantage of his “ability to hear and read what the Chinese were saying in their own language, without depending on translation,” Dr. Bodde was able to observe the Chinese revolution at its center and include a lot of information and insight in his diary. Disturbed by the misconceptions about China that prevailed in the United States, Bodde decided to have his diaries published in mid-1950 to help his fellow Americans have a better understanding of what was going on in China.90 Equipped with his research skills as a philosopher and ﬁrst-hand information on China, Dr. Bodde offered a quite different picture of China in his diary. Aiming at correcting Americans’ misperceptions of the Chinese revolution, Dr. Bodde openly argued against the common belief that “Moscow was behind everything that has recently happened in China.” He told his readers that “when I saw revolution ﬁrst come to Peking, what I learned very clearly was the folly and immorality of attempts by any outside power to support an indigenous regime after that regime has lost the support of its own people.”91 He attempted to prove that the Chinese revolution was a result of its own political, social, and economic development, that Jiang Jieshi’s regime could not be saved with more American aid, that the Chinese Communists rose because of their constructive contribution to China, and that the Chinese had good reason to distrust the United States after its staunch support for the Nationalist regime.92 However, Dr. Bodde’s book was dead after a few thousand copies were sold in 1950 as a victim of the notorious attacks by Senator Joseph McCarthy. As scholars and diplomats with knowledge and insight into China were expelled from the State Department and silenced by McCarthy and his followers, the American perception of China was based mostly on misinformation, bias, and fear, and Washington’s China policy was formulated and implemented by those who had little experience in or knowledge about China. Washington’s lack of interest in having greater knowledge and understanding of China did not prevent it from feeling the need for increasing educational exchange with that country. Through its long experience in China, Washington came to realize that Chinese students and scholars, because of the traditional position of scholarly leadership in Chinese society, “are in the unique position to exert a profound inﬂuence on the future course of their country.” It was based on that observation that the House Committee on Foreign Relations proposed in July 1949 to provide massive ﬁnancial aid to Chinese students stranded in the United States. They openly insisted that “it is in the interest of the United States to assist these individuals who can play such a vital role in shaping China’s future.”93 Expanding educational exchange was also compatible with Washington’s general strategy and policy toward China. Although it occupied an important

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position in America’s global strategy, ﬁrst as a market for American products and then as an ally in the war against Japan, China was never important enough for the United States to stage a military showdown there. Unable and unwilling to make a military commitment in China, Washington had to depend on other means to maintain its presence in that country. Educational exchange programs met Washington’s needs perfectly. They helped show American support for and interest in China without having Americans ﬁghting on the battleﬁeld in that country. Of course, through providing education for a large number of Chinese students, Washington was expecting to increase its inﬂuence over China and reshape it in the image of the United States. The relatively low cost of starting and maintaining educational exchange programs helped make it a favorite instrument for Washington. Despite its political importance, the actual cost for educational exchange was low both in relative and absolute terms. The largest and longest educational exchange program in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century was funded by the Boxer Indemnity remission. It actually did not cost the United States a single penny. Washington was able to initiate and participate in managing the program that sent thousands of Chinese students to the United States simply because it claimed that it was entitled to the indemnity overpaid by China. When Washington did spend some of its own money to support educational and cultural programs during and after World War II, the cost was relatively small. With limited scale and time, all the educational and cultural programs implemented by Washington cost it only about $800,000, less than 0.05 percent of the total American aid to China during World War II. The relative weight of the outlay is even less if it is measured against the total wartime expenditures of the United States.94 The most expensive was the Program of Emergency Aid to Chinese Students, which cost the United States government about $10 million from 1948 to 1955.95 As large as it was, this amounted to only one-sixth of the China aid appropriation for 1948 and 0.4 percent of all American aid to China from V-J Day to 1949.96 The State Department was actually very happy to spend the money appropriated by Congress for China aid in this way. It believed that the more money that was spent in helping Chinese students, the less would be wasted by Jiang’s corrupt regime. The low cost of educational exchange made it an attractive tool for Washington to cope with crises in its relations with China. Despite its great success in diffusing knowledge and ideas across the civilizational divide, the drastic expansion of educational exchange between the United States and China failed to win good feelings from Chinese students and scholars for Washington, or prevent any of the Chinese regimes from collapsing in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century. The success of educational exchange depended not only on the initiative and dedication of students and scholars, but also on the strong support of both the Chinese and American governments. However, neither the complete breakdown of U.S.-China relations during the Cold War, nor the downfall of Chinese regimes was caused by the expansion of educational interactions. Instead, they were the result of

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Washington’s unwillingness to revise or abandon its China policies perceived as unfair or hostile by the Chinese people as well as the Chinese government’s refusal to implement necessary political and economic reforms. In another words, the governments’ misperception of educational exchange as mere tool rather than the goal in itself sowed the seeds for political failure and diplomatic setbacks in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century.

Epilogue Restoring Educational Relations with the Visible Hand

O

n June 23, 1978, Deng Xiaoping, the paramount Chinese leader, had a meeting with a few administrators from Qinghua University, trying to ﬁnd ways to revive China’s higher education and reduce the gap between China and developed nations in science and technology. Fully aware of the shortage of experts with advanced and updated education and training at all universities and research institutes in China, Deng decided at the meeting that China should “increase the number of students sent abroad” and insisted that “students should be sent abroad not in dozens, but in thousands and tens of thousands.”1 Beijing’s decision to send more students to foreign countries was warmly received in Washington. The two governments signed the ﬁrst agreement on the exchange of students and scholars in October 1978, weeks before diplomatic relations were ofﬁcially restored. With strong support from both Beijing and Washington, hundreds and thousands of Chinese as well as American students and scholars have crisscrossed the Paciﬁc since the end of 1978. In 1989, students and scholars from Mainland China surpassed those from Taiwan to become the largest foreign student body in the United States. Educational exchange reemerged as the strongest tie between the two nations. The drastic expansion of educational exchange between the two nations since the late 1970s, as David Lampton accurately pointed out, was “more a renewal than a beginning.”2 With all foreign missionaries expelled from China and all private schools incorporated into the state-run educational system, the restoration and expansion of educational relations depended on active intervention and generous support from both governments. Although Chinese as well as American scholars began to exchange visits right after President Nixon’s historic trip to China in 1972, these early visits, as Leo A. Orleans observed, were “primarily short-term get-acquainted tours.”3 Serious and long-term exchange of scholars and students did not begin until the end of the 1970s, when formal exchange agreements were signed by Beijing and Washington. The Understanding of Educational Exchange was the ﬁrst of such agreements, signed by the 202

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United States Information Agency, Department of Education, National Science Foundation, National Academy of Science, and National Endowment for the Humanities with the Chinese Ministry of Education, National Academy of Social Sciences, and State Science and Technology Commission in October 1978, providing opportunities for undergraduate and graduate students and visiting scholars from one country to study and do research in the other. Once diplomatic relations were normalized, about two dozen exchange agreements were signed by numerous government agencies supporting various programs in almost all academic ﬁelds within six years.4 These agreements offered legal protection and ﬁnancial support for the restoration and expansion of educational exchange between the two nations. Pressed by the urgent need for highly trained experts, China took the initiative to send the ﬁrst group of students and scholars to the United States. Unable to ﬁnd qualiﬁed students from colleges and universities since they had just enrolled their regular students earlier in the year for the ﬁrst time in ten years, the ﬁrst group of ﬁfty students and scholars was selected from the Chinese Academy of Science. Once the gate opened, Chinese students and scholars began to pound American shores in tidal waves. According to State Department statistics, 1,330 visas were issued to Chinese students and scholars in 1979. The number soared to 4,324 in 1980, reached 5,407 in 1981, and shot up to 12,711 in 1986.5 By 1987, about 56,000 Chinese students and scholars had come to the United States, doubling the total between 1847 and 1949. The number of Chinese students in the United States reached around 44,000 in 1993/94, climbed to 54,466 in 1999/2000, and passed 60,000 in 2001/02, making them the largest foreign student body in most of the years since 1989.6 The growth of Chinese students and scholars in the United States was impressive not only in terms of absolute numbers, but also in terms of their relative weight among all students sent by China to foreign countries since the late 1970s. Between 1979 and 1983, China sent about 26,000 government-sponsored students and scholars and 7,000 self-supported students abroad. Of this total of 33,000 students and scholars, 19,872, 60 percent, came to the United States, in sharp contrast to the number of students and scholars sent by China to Japan, the country that had attracted most Chinese students at beginning of the twentieth century. During the same period, only 1,439, about 4 percent of Chinese students and scholars, went to Japan for training and education despite the fact that Japan had closer economic, diplomatic, and cultural ties to China at the time.7 As in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, the Chinese as well as the American government provided not only legal protection, but also generous ﬁnancial support for students and scholars involved in educational exchange. Government sponsorship was absolutely essential for Chinese students, especially in the early years. Unlike other foreign students and scholars in the United States, who were mostly, about 84 percent, F-1 visa holders receiving no ﬁnancial support from their own government, about 63 percent of Chinese students

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and scholars who came to this country between 1979 and 1983 were J-1 visa holders, depending mostly on government, at least in theory, for funding. The Chinese government kept increasing its ﬁnancial contribution to educational exchange with the United States every year during this period from about $4 million in 1979 to $21.2 million in 1983. With a total of $65 million, the Chinese government covered educational costs for 54 percent of J-1 students in 1979 and 32 percent in 1983. The United States government also offered ﬁnancial support. Between 1979 and 1983, Washington spent about $11.3 million to support about 6 percent of J-1 students and scholars from China. Although more continuing J-1 students began to receive support from American colleges and universities beginning in 1981 because of their outstanding performance, the government continued to provide most support for new J-1 students until 1983.8 As the major sponsor, the government, as it did prior to 1949, had much power to determine who could be sent to the United States, what they should study at American universities, and how long they could stay abroad, especially in the early years. In the ﬁrst three years between 1979 and 1981, the government wanted to focus on the training of middle-aged university instructors and researchers in the United States. Therefore, visiting scholars counted for about 68 percent of all J-1 visa holders, while students comprised only 20 percent. The percentage of students with J-1 visas rose sharply in 1983 as the Chinese government began to focus on having more students receive graduate- and especially doctoral-level education in the United States.9 Such a shift of focus was made possible by the graduation of the ﬁrst class of college students, who were admitted in 1978. With more students depending on government for ﬁnancial support, the Chinese government was able to have an even higher percentage of Chinese students and scholars focusing on science, technology, and other practical subjects than in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century. Among all Chinese students who had received education in the United States prior to 1954, only 25 percent chose to major in humanities and social sciences.10 This trend intensiﬁed beginning in the late 1970s, especially among J-1 students. Between 1979 and 1983, while about 19 percent of F-1 students chose to study humanities and social sciences, only 6 percent of all J-1 students and scholars selected majors in those ﬁelds.11 Little changed in the 1990s. According to statistics offered by the Institute of International Education, among 18,418 Chinese graduate students in the United States in the 1993/94 academic year, about 31.5 percent studied physical and life sciences, about 24 percent majored in engineering, and about 12 percent focused on mathematics and computer science. Only 10.9 percent of Chinese graduate students chose to study humanities and social sciences. Among 3,584 Chinese undergraduate students, only 4.6 percent majored in humanities and social sciences.12 Government also set clear time limits for Chinese students and scholars in the United States. Normally, a J-1 visiting scholar was allowed to stay in the United States for one to two years and a J-1 student for three to ﬁve years.

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The vast majority of J-1 students and scholars had to return to China right after ﬁnishing their program in the United States because the Chinese government had complete control over their jobs, salary, and housing. The so-called twoyear rule imposed on J-1 visa holders, with very few exceptions, by the American government required them to leave the United States for at least two years before they could change to immigrant status. As a result, only 265 J-1 visa holders, less than 2 percent of the total, managed to change their status between 1982 and 1987. In sharp contrast, 5,973 F-1 students, about 27 percent of the total, adjusted their status during the same period.13 Like the Chinese government, Washington showed extreme enthusiasm for the restoration and expansion of educational exchange in the 1970s. On January 31, 1979, only weeks after the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries, President Jimmy Carter signed the Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology with Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, providing the legal foundation for government participation and cooperation in scientiﬁc, technological, and educational exchanges. It was under this historic agreement that about two dozen American governmental agencies signed accords and agreements to institutionalize educational exchange with China. Washington’s deep intervention and active participation in educational exchange with China easily dwarfed its pre-1949 record. While agreeing to give an unlimited number of academic visas to Chinese students and scholars who were accepted to academic programs in American institutions of higher education, the United States International Communications Agency, known as the United States Information Agency before April 1978 and after August 1982, designated the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People’s Republic of China (CSCPRC) to administer the National Program for Advanced Research and Study in China in September 1978. The CSCPRC managed to send about a dozen students and scholars to China in early 1979 and about 50 more by the end of the year. By the academic year 1984/85, 258 American students and scholars were sent under the National Program for year-long academic activities in China. In 1980, the Fulbright Program began to send American scholars to China. In 1984, 73 Fulbright lecturers went to teach at twelve universities and colleges in eight Chinese cities.14 During this period, at least 3,000 American students and scholars went to China for education and research. Although the absolute number of American students in China was much smaller than that of Chinese students in this country, the sharp growth was extremely impressive when compared with the minimal pre-1949 total. The restoration of educational relations and the reemergence of educational exchange as the strongest tie between the two nations were based on the strategic needs of both nations and lessons learned from the past. The United States and Chinese governments were able to take advantage of the complete termination of all relations, including educational exchanges, between the two nations during the Cold War years. The absence of direct interactions between the two peoples allowed American policy makers to turn the Chinese from

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valuable allies in World War II into the “Red Menace” and “Yellow Peril” in the minds of many Americans. It also made it possible for the Chinese Communist leaders to convince their people that the majority of Americans lived in absolute poverty, waiting for relief from China. The lack of mutual knowledge and understanding between the two peoples did make it easier for both governments to carry out their Cold War strategies. However, it also contributed to military and ideological confrontations that proved extremely costly and dangerous for both nations. By the early 1970s, the United States was bogged down in Indo-China by the Vietnamese Communists, backed by China, while the Chinese themselves faced political chaos, economic disasters, and educational breakdown caused by the Cultural Revolution. As the threat from the Soviet Union loomed large for both the United States and China since the late 1960s, Washington and Beijing began to reexamine their policy toward each other and seek ways to form a new alliance against their common potential foe. With changes in strategic thinking, both the American and Chinese governments began to take action to rebuild cultural and educational relations between the two nations. The restoration of educational relations proved most popular among Chinese ofﬁcials and scholars since China was beginning to refocus on the Four Modernizations—of its agriculture, defense, and science and technology industries—in the 1970s. In order to achieve that goal, China needed a huge number of scientists, engineers, and scholars with advanced education and training. Many Chinese leaders and scholars came to agree with the conclusion reached by Mao Zedong in the 1940s—that the United States was “not only the most suitable country to assist this economic development of China, she is also the only country fully able to participate.”15 Their belief was strongly supported by the fact that American-trained scholars played a most important role in developing China’s science, technology, economy, and defense despite the harsh political environment. Among twenty-three scientists who received national medals for their contributions to the development of China’s nuclear bombs, missiles, and satellites, ten of them, including Qian Xuesen, Deng Jiaxian, Zhu Guangya, Wang Xiji, Zhou Guangzhao, and Qian Sanqiang, received education in the United States.16 Therefore, reestablishment of educational relations with the United States was among the top priorities for the Chinese government. Once exchange programs were set up, Chinese leaders like Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin were among the ﬁrst to send their own children to the United States for education. Deng Jiaxian, the chief designer of China’ ﬁrst atomic and hydrogen bombs, also sent his daughter to study medicine in the United States in the mid-1980s.17 As the Chinese began to show more appreciation for educational relations with the United States, many American ofﬁcials and scholars became increasingly interested in rebuilding educational ties with China, even though with different goals and purposes.18 While strategic considerations remained prominent in the reconstruction of educational relations, special effort was made to draw lessons from past experience. Having studied Washington’s failure to utilize

Epilogue

207

educational exchange as a crisis management instrument, the United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange concluded in a report to Congress in 1955 that cultural exchange programs could only be effective when “unrelated to the necessary immediate, and frequently shifting, information and propaganda objectives.” Therefore, they suggested that “educational exchange and cultural relations activities should have to do primarily, not with typical day-to-day development and passing currents of public opinion, but rather with the more long-term activities in the ﬁelds of science, art, and education which distinguishes the culture of one nation from that of another and which conditions the long-range attitudes of every country in its foreign as well as domestic policies.”19 Having clear long-term goals became a common theme in many other reports from various scholars and organizations in the 1970s and 1980s.20 Therefore, once educational relations were reestablished, Washington intended to make them last. The deep personal involvement of Chinese leaders and ﬁrm commitment of American policy makers and scholars helped the reestablished educational relations survive many political and diplomatic challenges. Having shifted its focus from political movement to economic development, the Chinese government gradually relaxed its political control and adjusted study abroad policy in order to attract more students and scholars back to China. It still held political training classes for J-1 students and scholars in the 1980s. However, the training served more as cultural orientation and preparation than ideological indoctrination. Realizing the deep concerns of Chinese students who had violated rules or criticized the government while in the United States, Deng Xiaoping made it clear in 1992 that he “hopes that all those who have gone abroad for education return to China,” and emphasized that “no matter what political attitude they have had in the past, all Chinese students and scholars are welcome to come back.”21 Following Deng’s instructions, the Chinese government adopted a new policy in the same year that would “support the Chinese to study abroad, encourage them to return to China after graduation, give them the freedom to come and go, and attract them to serve China (zhichi liuxue, guli huiguo, laiqu ziyou, weiguo fuwu).”22 While showing more ﬂexibility in adapting its policy toward Chinese students and scholars studying abroad, Beijing worked with Washington to make sure that educational exchange between the two nations would not be seriously affected by diplomatic crises and problems. Despite substantial improvement, U.S.-China relations in the last two decades were interlaced with frequent crises and downturns. In response to the Tiananmen incident in 1989, the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the collision of military planes in 2001, high-level ofﬁcial visits were canceled or postponed, military cooperation was reduced or stopped, economic sanctions were imposed, and massive student demonstrations were held on university campuses and in city streets. However, educational exchanges between the two nations went on without any serious interruption. The most severe action taken by the Chinese government

208

U.S.-China Educational Exchange

was to withhold the exchange students and scholars who had been selected for the 1989/90 Fulbright exchange program in July 1989 as a protest against the American sanctions. The number of exchange students and scholars affected was very small and most of those who were withheld were able to come to the United States the next year. The ﬁrst downturn of educational exchange between the United States and China took place in 2002 when a stricter process was imposed on the admission of Chinese students to the United States. Under strong protest from Chinese students and American educators, Washington began to take steps to streamline the security check process in 2003 and there was a 1 percent increase in Chinese students enrolling in American colleges and universities in 2005.23 The joint effort made by both Washington and Beijing has resurrected educational exchange as the strongest tie in U.S.-China diplomatic relations. The unprecedented number of students and scholars receiving education and conducting research across the Paciﬁc has contributed enormously to the transfer of knowledge and enhancement of mutual understanding. However, such a huge success has been stained by the fact that most Chinese students who came to the United States for education in the 1980s and 1990s are still in this country, becoming major contributors to China’s brain drain, and that the feelings and attitudes of Chinese students and scholars toward the United States have become increasingly negative because of numerous clashes between the two nations in the past two decades. In order to make educational exchange even more beneﬁcial to both nations, the Chinese government may need to make more political and economic reforms in order to create more agreeable conditions for the returning students as well as all the Chinese people. The United States government, for the same purpose, should always be careful with its China policy so that it would not humiliate the Chinese people and their nation. History has clearly shown that educational exchange is most effective and fruitful when it serves as a core component of intercultural relations rather than a crisis management instrument for a particular foreign policy.

Appendix A

Schedule of Annual Remission of the Boxer Indemnity from the United States to China 1 Year

Annual Remission

Year

Annual Remission

1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919

$483,094.90 483,094.90 541,198.78 541,198.78 541,198.78 541,198.78 724,993.42 790,196.00 790,196.00 790,196.00 790,196.00

1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930

$790,196.00 790,195.99 790,195.99 790,195.99 790,196.00 790,195.99 790,196.00 790,195.99 790,196.00 790,195.99 790,196.00

209

Year

Annual Remission

1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940

$790,195.99 1,380,378.35 1,380,378.34 1,380,378.34 1,380,378.35 1,380,378.43 1,380,378.43 1,380,378.35 1,380,378.34 1,380,378.36

Appendix B

Presidents of Qinghua, 1909–1929 2 Names

Position

Tenure

Zhou Ziqi

Qinghua Academy Superintendent

2/1911–1/1912

Studied in U.S.

Supervisor for students in U.S.

Yan Huiqing

Interim Superintendent

1/1912–4/1912

U. Virginia

Councillor, Chinese Embassy in U.S.

Tang Guoan

Qinghua School President

5/1912–8/1913

Child student in U.S., 1872

Senior ofﬁcial, Foreign Ministry

Zhao Guocai

Interim President

8/1913–10/1913

M.A., U. Wisconsin

Vice President, Qinghua

Zhou Yichun

President

10/1913–1/1918

M.A., U. Wisconsin

Secretary, Foreign Ministry

Zhang Yuquan

President

2/1918–2/1920

M.L., Yale

Secretary, Foreign Ministry

Yan Heling

Interim President

2/1920–9/1920

Ph.D., Columbia

Secretary, Foreign Ministry

Jin Bangzheng

President

9/1920–10/1921

M.S., Cornell

Councillor, Foreign Ministry

Wang Wenxian

Ofﬁcerin-Charge

10/1921–4/1922

B.A., U. London

Provost, Qinghua

Cao Yunxiang

President

4/1922–1/1928

M.B.A., U. Virginia

Secretary, Foreign Ministry

Yan Heling

Interim President

1/1928–4/1928

Ph.D., Columbia

Secretary, Foreign Ministry

Wen Yingxing

President

4/1928–6/1928

West Point

Director, Baoding Military Police

210

Education

Previous Positions

Appendix C

Annual Expenditures for Qinghua University and Qinghua Students in U.S., 1912–1928 3 Year

University Expenditure

Expenditure for Students in U.S.

Total Expenditure

Percentage for Students in U.S.

1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928

234,048 333,059 382,179 511,754 750,070 870,910 654,882 515,464 531,356 711,242 565,603 561,966 610,771 716,087 766,011 831,637 725,682

392,827 609,113 626,500 654,956 648,139 666,354 708,805 776,473 852,417 963,350 1,092,861 1,127,781 1,151,199 1,185,496 1,178,090 1,201,744 895,175

626,875 942,172 1,008,679 1,166,710 1,398,209 1,537,264 1,363,687 1,291,937 1,383,773 1,674,592 1,658,464 1,689,747 1,761,970 1,901,583 1,944,101 2,033,381 1,620,857

62.6 64.6 62.1 56.1 46.4 43.3 53.0 60.1 61.6 57.5 65.9 66.7 65.3 62.3 60.6 59.1 55.2

211

Appendix D

Students Sent to the United States by Qinghua, 1909–1929 4 Year

Indemnity

1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929

47 70 63

Total

180

Preparatory

Women

12 16 43 34 42 31 44 58 63 81 45 94 81 67 69 61 62 48 38

Specialist

10

47 70 75 16 43 44 42 51 51 73 71 81 65 94 91 67 79 61 72 48 48

67

1289

10 10 8

989

212

10 7 7 8

10

10

5

5

5

5

5

5

53

Annual Total

Appendix E

Major State Department Exchange Programs During and After World War II 5 Programs

Participants

American Specialists Sent to China (1942–1946)

30

Chinese Educators and Artists Invited to the United States (1943–1947)

26

Two-Year Fellowships Awarded to Advanced Chinese Students (1943–1946)

22

Chinese Travel Grants to the United States (1945–1947)

18

Total

96

213

Appendix F

Chinese Scholars on American Faculties in China-Related Fields, 1947 6 Fields

Faculty

No. of Chinese

Percentage

History

19

4

20.1

Geography

10

2

20

Economics

4

1

25

Government/Politics Ant/Arc/Art/Sociology

6

1

16.7

11

2

18.2

Language/Literature

6

1

16.7

Religion/Philosophy

5

1

20

61

12

Total

214

19.7

Appendix G

U.S. Returnees Elected as Fellows in Academia Sinica, 1948–20017 Year

Fellows Selected

Number of Returnees

Percentage of Returnees

AmericanTrained

Percentage of Fellows

Percentage of Returnees

1948 1953 1957 1980 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001

81 172 18 283 210 59 59 58 55 56

77 158 16 199 55 17 16 11 16 19

95 92 89 70 26 29 27 19 27 34

49 87 9 128 19 5 3 2 7 9

61 51 50 45 9 8 5 3 7 9

64 55 56 64 35 29 19 18 44 47

Total

1051

584

56

318

30

54

215

Notes

Introduction 1. Chen Jian, “Sino-American Relations Studies in China,” in Paciﬁc Passage: The Study of American–East Asian Relations on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century, ed. Warren I. Cohen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 28. 2. Akira Iriye, “Americanization of East Asia: Writings on Cultural Affairs since 1900,” in New Frontiers in American–East Asian Relations: Essays Presented to Dorothy Borg, ed. Warren I. Cohen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 45; William C. Kirby, “Sino-American Relations in Comparative Perspective, 1900–1949,” in Cohen, Paciﬁc Passage, 173. 3. William Purvience Fenn, Christian Higher Education in Changing China, 1880–1950 (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1976); Jessie Gregory Lutz, China and the Christian Colleges: 1850–1950 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971); Warren I. Cohen, The Chinese Connection: Roger S. Green, Thomas W. Lamont, George E. Sokolsky and American–East Asian Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978); Mary Brown Bullock, An American Transplant: The Rockefeller Foundation and Peking Union Medical College (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Peter Buck, American Science and Modern China, 1876–1936 (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Weili Ye, Seeking Modernity in China’s Name: Chinese Students in the United States, 1900–1927 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001); Glen Peterson, Ruth Hayhoe, and Yongling Lu, Education, Culture, and Identity in Twentieth-Century China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001). 4. Wilma Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments in China, 1942–1949 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1976). 5. Akira Iriye, China and Japan in the Global Setting (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 4. 6. William J. Reese, American Public Schools: From the Common School to “No Child Left Behind” (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 11–47. 7. Peng Deng, Private Education in Modern China (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 1–18. 217

218

Notes to Pages 4–12

8. For detailed discussion of the deﬁnition and function of “hard power” and “soft power,” please see Joseph Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 1–11. 9. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957: A Statistical Abstract Supplement (Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1960), 210–211.

Chapter 1

Emerging as Facilitator

1. Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 6th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 142. 2. Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia: A Critical Study of United States’ Policy in the Far East in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1963), 49. 3. Foster R. Dulles, The Old China Trade (Boston: Houghton Mifﬂin, 1930), 20–21. 4. Li Dingyi, A History of Early U.S.-China Diplomacy (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 1997), 53–58; Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, 87–88. 5. Li, A History, 31. 6. Samuel Shaw, The Journal of Major Samuel Shaw (Boston: William Crisby and H. P. Nichols, 1971), 1–10. 7. Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, 63. 8. Ibid., 75–77. 9. Murray A. Rubinstein, The Origins of the Anglo-American Missionary Enterprise in China, 1807–1840 (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1996), 196–206. 10. Ibid., 65–69; E. A. Morrison, Memoirs of the Life and Labors of Robert Morrison (London, 1849), 1:106. 11. Clifton Jackson Phillips, Protestant America and the Pagan World: The First Half Century of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1810–1860 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), 20–32. 12. Rubinstein, The Origins, 220–221. 13. Ibid., 221; Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, 110. 14. Rubinstein, The Origins, 285–287; George H. Danton, The Culture Contacts of the United States and China: The Earliest Sino-American Culture Contacts, 1784–1844 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1931), 34–37; Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Christian Missions in China (New York: Macmillan, 1929), 217–218. 15. Eliza Gillet Bridgman, The Pioneer of American Missions in China: The Life and Labors of Elijah Coleman Bridgman (New York: Anson D. F. Randolph, 1864), 22–23. 16. Rubinstein, The Origins, 288–291. 17. David Abeel, Journal of a Residence in China and the Neighboring Countries, from 1829–1833 (New York: Leavitt, Lord & Co., 1834), 141–142. 18. Rubinstein, The Origins, 301–305. 19. Bridgman to Anderson, July 14, 1834, quoted in Rubinstein, The Origins, 309. 20. Frederick Wells Williams, Life and Letters of Dr. S. Wells Williams (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1889), 328. 21. Xiong Yuezhi, The Dissemination of Western Learning and the Late Qing Society (Shanghai: Remin Chubanshe, 1994), 131–133; Danton, The Culture Contacts, 42–44; The Chinese Repository, 2:217. 22. The Chinese Repository, December 1834, 3:382.

Notes to Pages 12–18

219

23. Suzanne Wilson Barnett and John King Fairbank, eds., Christianity in China: Early Protestant Missionary Writings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 95–106; Xiong, The Dissemination, 117–118. 24. The Chinese Repository, 5:377. 25. William Elliot Grifﬁs, A Maker of the New Orient: Samuel Robinson Brown, Pioneer Educator in China, America, and Japan, The Story of His Life and Work (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1902), 70–77. 26. The Chinese Repository, 10:569–570. 27. Yung Wing, My Life in China and America (New York: Henry Holt, 1909), 13. 28. Ibid., 581–584; Grifﬁs, A Maker, 70–77. 29. The Chinese Repository, 10:584. 30. Xiong, The Dissemination, 126–129; Yung, My Life, 13–16. 31. Samuel Wells Williams, The Middle Kingdom (New York, 1948), 2:375–376. 32. Instructions of the Prudential Committee to Peter Parker, May 1834, quoted in Phillips, Protestant America, 182–183. 33. Claude M. Fuess, The Life of Caleb Cushing (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1923), 402. 34. G. R. Williamson, ed., Memoir of the Rev. David Abeel, D.D. (New York: Robert Carter, 1848), 215. 35. Parker to Daniel Webster, January 30, 1841, cited in Edward V. Gulick, Peter Parker and the Opening of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), 51–61. 36. Fuess, The Life, 402–404; Richard E. Welch, Jr., “Caleb Cushing’s Chinese Mission and the Treaty of Wanghsia: A Review,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 58, no. 2 (December 1957): 329. 37. Li, A History, 87–91. 38. Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, 181. 39. Fuess, The Life, 407–409; Welch, Jr., “Caleb Cushing’s Chinese Mission,” 332. 40. Li, A History, 101–102. 41. The Maritime Customs, Treaties, Conventions, etc., between China and Foreign States (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1917), 1:393. 42. Edward King to the Secretary of State, September 20, 1843, Department of State, Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Canton, 1790–1906, National Archives, Washington, DC, RG 59, M101, Reel 3. 43. Niles’ National Register 67, no. 1721 (September 21, 1844): 36. 44. The Maritime Customs, Treaties, 1:351–399. 45. Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, 150. 46. The Maritime Customs, Treaties, 1:677–690. 47. Gulick, Peter Parker, 114. 48. Ibid., 119–121; Li, A History, 125. 49. Fuess, The Life, 414–415. 50. Beiping Gugong Bowuyuan, The Chronicle of Managing Foreign Affairs: Foreign Affairs in Daoguang’s Reign (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1979), 72:16–18. 51. Ibid., 22–23. 52. Te-kong Tong, United States Diplomacy in China, 1844–60 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), 210–254. 53. The Maritime Customs, Treaties, 1:713–727. 54. Ralph Covell, W.A.P. Martin: Pioneer of Progress in China (Washington, DC: Christian College Press, 1978), 90–93.

220

Notes to Pages 18–22

55. Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward, December 17, 1867, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1868 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce), 1:494–495 (hereafter cited as FRUS); Li, A History, 341–344. 56. The Maritime Customs, Treaties, 1:729–732. 57. Lord to Low, September 27, 1872, FRUS, 1872, 120–122. 58. Low to Fish, October 23, 1872; Fish to Low, December 31, 1872; ibid., 118–119, 137–138. 59. Denby to Gresham, January 2, 1895, Department of State, Despatches from the United States Legation at Peking, National Archives, Washington, DC, Record Group 59, M92, Reel 98 (hereafter cited as Legation Despatches). 60. Denby to Gresham, March 22, 1895, FRUS, 1895, 197–198. 61. Adee to Denby, July 19, 1895, Department of State, Diplomatic Instructions from the State Department to United States Diplomatic Representatives in China, National Archives, Washington, DC, Record Group 59, M98, Reel 42 (hereafter cited as China Instructions). 62. The Maritime Customs, Treaties, 1:303–341. 63. Ibid., 745–763. 64. Peter Schran, “The Minor Signiﬁcance of Commercial Relations between the United States and China, 1850–1931,” in America’s China Trade in Historical Perspective: The Chinese and American Performance, ed. Ernest R. May and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 245. 65. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1960), 550–553. 66. Duan Xiaohong, “A Study on U.S.-China Trade at the Turn of the Century, 1895– 1905,” in The United States and the Modern China, ed. Tao Wenzhao and Liang Biying (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1996), 225. 67. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics, 139, 542, 550–553, 565. 68. Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations, 4th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 56. 69. James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–1897 (Washington, DC, 1900), 5:122. 70. Xiong, The Dissemination, 164–166. 71. Ibid., 167–168; Peter Duus, “Science and Salvation in China: The Life and Work of W.A.P. Martin (1827–1916),” in American Missionaries in China: Papers from Harvard Seminars, ed. Kwang-Ching Liu (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), 15. 72. Covell, W.A.P. Martin, 60. 73. Duus, “Science and Salvation,” 18. 74. Ellsworth C. Carlson, The Foochow Missionaries, 1847–1880 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 50. 75. Xiong, The Dissemination, 288–289. 76. Carlson, The Foochow Missionaries, 52–72, 168. 77. Zhu Guanqing, A Survey of Benevolent Schools in Shanghai (Taipei: Huawen Shuju, 1968), 546–547. 78. Hu Weiqing, “A Study on the Educational Enterprises of American Methodist Church in China, 1848–1911,” Jindaishi Yanjiu (Journal of Modern History Studies), no. 2 (1999): 226.

Notes to Pages 22–25

221

79. Irwin T. Hyatt, Jr., Our Ordered Lives Confess: Three Nineteenth-Century American Missionaries in East Shantung (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 10. 80. Records of the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China, 1877 (Shanghai: Presbyterian Mission Press, 1878), 480–486. 81. Records of the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China, 1890 (Shanghai: Presbyterian Mission Press, 1890), 733. 82. Harlan P. Beach, Dawn on the Hills of T’ang; or, Mission in China (New York: Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, 1905), 203. 83. Lutz, Christian Colleges, 28–29. 84. Fenn, Christian Higher Education, 24–36. 85. Yung, My Life, 13–41. 86. Ye, Seeking Modernity, 116–129. 87. Guo Jingyi, ed., New Archives of Four Countries: Britain (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1966), 2:854. 88. Beiping Gugong Bowuyuan, The Chronicle of Managing Foreign Affairs: The Xianfeng Reign, 38:36. 89. The Maritime Customs, Treaties, 1:418, 816. 90. Beiping Gugong Bowuyuan, The Chronicle, 71:26–79. 91. Su Jing, Tongwenguan in the Qing Dynasty (Taipei, 1978), 16–17. 92. W.A.P. Martin, A Cycle of Cathay: China, South and North with Personal Experiences (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1896), 296–297. 93. Ibid., 297–298. 94. Su, Tongwenguan, 34–35. 95. Mr. Martin to Mr. Seward, enclosed in Mr. Seward to Mr. Fish, February 5, 1877, Department of State, FRUS, 1877, 91–93. 96. Su, Tongwenguan, 34–35; Xiong, The Dissemination, 304. 97. Su, Tongwenguan, 190–206. 98. Between 1868 and 1899, Guangdong Tongwenguan transferred forty-six students to Beijing and Shanghai Guangfangyanguan sent twenty-eight. Xiong, The Dissemination, 313–315. 99. Beiping Gugong Bowuyuan, The Chronicle: Tongzhi, 15:32; Yung, My Life, 170– 179. 100. Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang, “Selecting and Sending Young Students Abroad,” in Studying Abroad: Historical Records of Sending Students Abroad, ed. Liu Zhen (Taipei: National Institute of Translation, 1977), 1:18. 101. Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang, “Memo on Selecting and Sending Young Students Abroad and the Proposed Regulations,” ibid., 1:21; Gao Zhonglu, ed., A Collection of Letters from and to the Chinese Child Students Educated in the United States (Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Chubanshe, 1986), 2–4. 102. Yung, My Life, 185–186; Gao Zonglu, “Yung Wing (1828–1912) and the Chinese Young Students in the United States (1872–1881),” in The History of Chinese Studying in the United States: Education and Achievements in 150 Years, ed. Li Youning (Bronxville, NY: Outer Sky Press, 1999), 57–59; Shi Ni, Ideals and Tragedy: An Analysis on the Fates of Chinese Child Students Sent to the United States in the Late Qing Dynasty (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1999), 81–94. 103. Yung, My Life, 189–190.

222

Notes to Pages 26–31

104. Ibid., 209–220. 105. Gao, “Yung Wing,” 69–73. 106. Zeng and Li, “Selecting and Sending Young Students,” in Liu, Studying Abroad, 1:16. 107. Yung, My Life, 207–209. 108. Wen Binzhong, “Reminiscence of a Child Student Educated in the United States,” in Gao, A Collection of Letters, 80–81; Gao, “Yung Wing,” 75. 109. Gao, “Yung Wing,” 76–80. 110. Yung, My Life, 191–196. 111. Foreign Affairs Ofﬁce, Historical Records of Qing Dynasty (Taipei: Wenhai Chubanshe, n.d.), 4:17–19; Huang Gang, The History of U.S.-China Diplomatic and Consular Relations, 1786–1994 (Taipei: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1995), 63–64; Yung, My Life, 197–210. 112. Gao, “Yung Wing,” 66–67. 113. W.A.P. Martin, Report on the System of Public Instruction in China (Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1877), 26–27. 114. Xiong, The Dissemination, 304–305, 332–333. 115. Gao, A Collection of Letters, 8–84; Liu, Studying Abroad, 1:70–74. 116. Marianne Bastid, “Servitude or Liberation? The Introduction of Foreign Education Practice and Systems to China from 1840 to the Present,” in China’s Education and the Industrial World: Studies in Cultural Transfer, ed. Ruth Hayhoe and Marianne Bastid (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1987), 8. 117. Yung, My Life, 182–186. 118. The Maritime Customs, Treaties, 731. 119. United States Congress, A Compilation of the Laws, Treaties and Regulations and Rulings of the Treasury Department Relating to the Exclusion of Chinese, 57th Congress, 1st sess., Senate Document No. 291, 8–12. 120. For a clear and detailed chronology of Chinese exclusion, please see William L. Tung, The Chinese in America, 1820–1973 (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1974), 7–32. 121. Mary R. Coolidge, Chinese Immigration (New York: Arno Press, 1969), 328. 122. Vice Consul in Charge to Assistant Secretary of State, November 2, 1899, Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Canton, China, 1790–1906, National Archives, Washington, DC, RG 59, M101, Reel 13. 123. United States Congress, A Compilation of the Laws, 8–12. 124. Calculation was based on the numbers provided in reports sent to the State Department by the American consulate general at Guangzhou in 1900, Despatches from Canton, Reel 13. 125. Wu to Hay, November 28, 1901, FRUS, 1902, 68–70. 126. Fu Chi Ho (Fei Qihe), “My Reception in America,” Outlook 86 (August 10, 1907): 771–772. 127. Wu to Hay, December 9, 1901, FRUS, 1901, 73; Fu, “My Reception,” 770–773. 128. Wu to Hay, November 28, December 10, 1901, FRUS, 1902, 69, 81. 129. Wu to Hay, December 10, 1901, ibid., 81. 130. Pippy to Wu, November 14 and 30, 1900, ibid., 60–63. 131. George Campbell to Hay, March 14, 1900, SCR, FB14, quoted from Delber L. McKee, Chinese Exclusion versus the Open Door Policy, 1900–1906: Clashes over Chinese Policy in Roosevelt Era (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1977), 43.

Notes to Pages 31–37

223

132. United States Congress, Chinese Exclusion: Testimony Taken before the Committee on Immigration of Senate, 57th Congress, 1st sess., Senate Report 776, 17–18. 133. McKee, Chinese Exclusion, 78. 134. United States Congress, Chinese Exclusion, 13–15. 135. Wei Daozhi, A History of Chinese-Foreign Educational Exchange (Changsha: Hunan Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1998), 139–140. 136. John Cleverley, The Schooling of China: Tradition and Modernity in Chinese Education, 2nd ed. (North Sydney, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1991), 37–39. 137. Shu Xincheng, The History of Chinese Overseas Students in Modern China (Shanghai: Zhonghua Shuju, 1926), 31. 138. Wang Shuhuai, The Boxer Indemnity (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1985), 1–2. 139. Duan Fang, “A Memo on Sending Students to the United States, Germany, and Russia, 1903,” in Liu, Studying Abroad, 2:602–603. 140. Chen Qiongying, An Exploration of the Studying Abroad Policy of the Qing Dynasty (Taipei: Wen Shi Zhe Chubanshe, 1989), 110–115. 141. Huang Fu-ch’ing, Chinese Students in Japan in the Late Qing Period (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1983), 4–6.

Chapter 2

Tearing Down the Barriers

1. Wang Fengkai, A Brief History of Chinese Education (Taipei: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1990), 313–315; Sang Bing, Modern School Students and Social Transformation in the Late Qing (Taibei: Daohe Chubanshe, 1991), 37. 2. Ding Zhiping, ed., The Educational Records of China in the Last Seventy Years (Taipei: Guoli Bianyiguan, 1961), 6. 3. Wang, A Brief History, 316; Sang, Modern School, 39. 4. Wang, A Brief History, 314–316; Ding, Educational Records, 7. 5. Qu Lihe, Studying Abroad in the Late Qing Dynasty (Taipei: Sanmin Shuju, 1973), 19. 6. “Report on the Preparation for the Establishment of the Capital University,” July 3, 1898, in Chen Xuexun, Historical Records for the Teaching of Modern Chinese History of Education (Beijing: Renmin Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1986), 434–445. 7. Sun Jianai, “A Brief Report on the Establishment of the Capital University,” August 9, 1898, ibid., 447–448. 8. Ding, Educational Records, 7; Sang, Modern School, 39. 9. Li Duanfen, “A Memorandum Pleading for the Promotion of Modern Schools,” June 12, 1898, in Chen, Historical Records, 425–429. 10. Xu Xueyun et al., eds., A Brief History of Social and Economic Development in Shanghai, 1882–1931 (Shanghai: Shanghai Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1985), 94. 11. Ding, Educational Records, 9. 12. Zhang Baixi, “Memorandum on Schools,” in Chen, Historical Records, 527–528. 13. Ding, Educational Records, 10–13. 14. Yuan Shikai and Zhang Zhidong, “Memo on Gradual Elimination of Imperial Examination, March 13, 1903,” in Chen, Historical Records, 570–573. 15. Zhang Baixi, Rong Qing, and Zhang Zhidong, “Memo on Gradual Elimination of Imperial Examination and Promotion of New Schools, January 13, 1904,” ibid., 573–576.

224

Notes to Pages 37–42

16. Yuan and Zhang, “Memo on Gradual Elimination,” ibid., 570–573; Zhang, Rong, and Zhang, “Memo on Gradual Elimination,” ibid., 573–576. 17. Yuan Shikai et al., “Joint Memo on Immediate Abolition of the Imperial Examination System and on Promotion of New Schools, September 2, 1905,” ibid., 576– 578; Ding, Educational Records, 13–15. 18. Ministry of Education, The First Chart of Education by the Ministry of Education, 1907, pamphlet. 19. Zhang Baixi, Rong Qing, and Zhang Zhidong, “Outlines for Educational Affairs, January 13, 1904,” in Chen, Historical Records, 533–534. 20. Chen, An Exploration, 104. 21. Zhang, Rong, and Zhang, “Outlines,” 550–551. 22. Ministry of Education, “Report on the Organization of the Ministry of Education,” in Chen, Historical Records, 585–590. 23. Liu, Studying Abroad, 2:651. 24. Ibid., 2:698; Chen, An Exploration, 161–162. 25. Yan Huiqin, The Autobiography of Yan Huiqin, quoted in Liu, Studying Abroad, 2:699–700. 26. Chen, An Exploration, 158–159. 27. Huang, Chinese Students, 84. 28. According to Yang Shu, among all Chinese students in Japan, about 60 percent of them entered condensed (sucheng) educational programs, 30 percent studied general subjects in elementary and middle schools, 6–7 percent were always in transition, accomplishing nothing, 3–4 percent attended high schools or junior colleges, and only one percent enrolled in universities. Yang believed that the lack of graduates from Japanese colleges and universities had a grave impact on Chinese education. Yang Shu, “Riben Youxue Jihuashu (Plan for Sending Students to Japan),” in Chen, Historical Records, 710–711. 29. Ministry of Education, Brief Collection of Memorials of the Ministry of Education, 1:3–4. 30. Huang, Chinese Students, 86–88. 31. Liu, Studying Abroad, 2:609–611, 702–704; Chen, An Exploration, 183–189. 32. Qu, Studying Abroad, 89. 33. Chen, An Exploration, 182–189. 34. Qu, Studying Abroad, 89. 35. Wu to Hay, May 19, 1902, FRUS, 1902, 215–217. 36. Hill to Wu, July 22, 1902, ibid., 218–220. 37. Qu, Studying Abroad, 71. 38. Zhang Cunwu, The Battle over the Sino-American Immigration Treaty, 1905 (Taibei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1965), 12–13. 39. Prince Ch’ing to Conger, January 24, 1904, FRUS, 1904, 117. 40. Conger to Hay, February 6, 1904, Despatches from Legation, China, Reel 125. 41. Hay to Conger, February 19, 1904, Diplomatic Instructions from the State Department to United States Diplomatic Representatives in China, Department of State, National Archives, Washington, DC, Record Group 59, M98, Reel 45. 42. Conger to Hay, April 20, 1904, Despatches from Legation, China, Reel 128. 43. Liang Cheng to Hay, August 12, 1904, Notes from Foreign Legations, China, Reel 6.

Notes to Pages 42–46

225

44. Notes from Liang Cheng, received on September 12, 1905, Archives of the Foreign Ministry, Taipei. 45. Liang Cheng to Hay, January 7, 1905, Notes from Chinese Legation, Reel 6. 46. Xinwen Bao, August 27, 1905. 47. Zhang, The Battle, 26–27. 48. Wu to Hay, March 6, 1902, Despatches from Legation, China, Reel 5. 49. Ibid., Wu to Hay, July 6, 1901, FRUS, 1901, 100–103. 50. Aying, The Literature of Anti-American Exclusion of Chinese Laborers (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1962), 588–597. 51. Zhang, The Battle, 25–28. 52. Note from Liang Cheng received on February 11, 1905, File of Immigration Treaty, Archives of the Foreign Ministry, quoted ibid., 30. 53. Ibid., 63–64. 54. Sang, Modern School, 254. 55. Xinwen Bao, May 24, 1905. 56. Ibid., May 24, June 7, 1905. 57. Gracey to Pierce, June 7, 1905, Despatches from United States Consuls in Foochow, Department of State, Record Group 59, M105, Reel 10, National Archives, Washington, DC; Xinwen Bao, June 30, 1905. 58. Xinwen Bao, June 3, 9, 1905; Shi-shan Henry Tsai, China and the Overseas Chinese in the United States, 1868–1911 (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1983), 111–112. 59. Lay to Loomis, May 31, 1905, Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Canton, M101, Reel 19. 60. Dagong Bao, June 10, 15, 26, 1905. 61. Zhang, The Battle, 63–85. 62. Xinwen Bao, July 20, 1905. 63. Zhang, The Battle, 87–89. 64. Shi Bao, September 10, 1905. 65. Ziling Xi Bao, July 29, 1905. 66. “A Telegram to the Public from Student Associations in Beijing,” Lingnan Ribao, September 18, 1905. 67. Julius Lay to Rockhill, June 19, 1905, The William Rockhill Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University. 68. Lay to Loomis, July 24, 1905, Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Canton, Reel 19. 69. James L. Rodgers to the Secretary of State, July 27, 1905, State Department, Despatches from United States Consuls in Shanghai, China, 1847–1906, National Archives, Washington, DC, Record Group 59, M112, Reel 52. 70. Rodgers to the Secretary of State, telegram, August 5, 1905, ibid. 71. Rodgers to the Secretary of State, telegram, August 10, 1905, ibid. 72. Goodnow to Loomis, November 17, 1904, Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Shanghai, Reel 51. 73. Rockhill to Hay, June 21, 1905, Despatches from Legation, Reel 128; McKee, Chinese Exclusion, 113–114. 74. Julius Lay to Rockhill, June 19, 1905, The Rockhill Papers. 75. Rockhill to the Secretary of State, June 15, 1905, Despatches from Legation, Reel 128.

226

Notes to Pages 47–51

76. New York Times, June 13, 1905. 77. Ibid., June 8, 1905. 78. Henry Cabot Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, June 3 and 18, 1905, Selections from Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884–1918 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1925), 2:127, 157. 79. New York Times, June 16, 1905. 80. The Diary of John Hay, June 19, 1905, Container 1, John Milton Hay Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 81. Theodore Roosevelt, Presidential Papers and State Papers of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: P. F. Collier and Son), 15:159–160. 82. Theodore Roosevelt to MetCalf, June 16, 1905, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, ed. Elting E. Morrison (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952), 235–236. 83. Ibid., 240. 84. Zhang, The Battle, 202–203. 85. Roosevelt to William H. Taft, Roosevelt, The Letters, 5:131–132. 86. Roosevelt to Rockhill, August 22, 1905, The Rockhill Papers. 87. Roosevelt, Presidential Papers, 16:498–500; John Foster, “The Chinese Boycott,” Atlantic Monthly 97 (January 1906): 126–127. 88. Roosevelt, Presidential Papers, 16:631–632. 89. Tsai, The Chinese Experience, 79. 90. Zhang, The Battle, 203–233. 91. Foster, “The Chinese Boycott,” 126. 92. Adam McKeown, “Ritualization of Regulation: The Enforcement of Chinese Exclusion in the United States and China,” American Historical Review 108 (April 2003): 386–403. 93. Ding, The Educational Records, 21. 94. Chen, An Exploration, 187–196. 95. C. S. Walker, “The Army of Chinese Students Abroad,” World’s Work 13 (January 1907): 8471. 96. Liu, Studying Abroad, 2:731–733. 97. Hay to Conger, January 29, 1901, FRUS, 1901, Appendix, 356. 98. Conger to Hay, February 11, 1901, Despatches from Legation, Reel 112. 99. Wang, The Boxer Indemnity, 10–19. 100. Besides the United States, many other powers, including Russia, Britain, France, and Belgium, had demanded more from China than their actual losses and costs caused by the Boxer Indemnity. However, the American surplus was the largest in absolute amount. Ibid., 41. 101. “Memorandum from Minister to the United States Liang Cheng Received on January 19, 1905,” Qinghua Daxue Xiaoshi Yanjiushi, Selected Historical Records of Qinghua University (Beijing: Qinghua University Press, 1991), 1:73–74; Shoujun Li, “The First American Remission of the Boxer Indemnity,” in Essays on the History of the Sino-American Relations, ed. Fudan Daxue Lishixi (Chongqing: Chongqing Press, 1988), 163. 102. The Diary of John Hay, November 28, 1904. 103. Ibid., November 29, 1904. 104. Ibid., December 2, 1904. 105. Rockhill to Hay, July 12, 1905, The Rockhill Papers.

Notes to Pages 51–57

227

106. The Diary of John Hay, December 5, 1904. 107. Ibid., December 19, 1904. 108. “Memorandum from Minister to the United States Liang Cheng Received on May 13, 1905,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:76–77. 109. Ibid., 77. 110. “Memo from Commissioner of Northern Ports Yuan Shikai to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Received on May 23, 1905,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:78; Michael Hunt, “The American Remission of the Boxer Indemnity: A Reappraisal,” Journal of Asian Studies 31 (1972): 548–549. 111. “Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Minister Liang Cheng Sent on June 1, 1905,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:79. 112. Liang Cheng to Hay, December 22, 1904, FRUS, 1905, 124. 113. Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (New York: Collier Books, 1956), 182–190. 114. Rockhill to Hay, July 12, 1905, The Rockhill Papers. 115. Roosevelt to Rockhill, August 22, 1905, Roosevelt, The Letters, 4:1310. 116. Roosevelt to Rockhill, August 29, 1905, The Rockhill Papers. 117. Zhang, The Battle, 205. 118. W.A.P. Martin, The Wakening of China (New York, 1908), 251. 119. Roosevelt to Smith, April 3, 1906, Roosevelt, Presidential Papers, 5:206. 120. Rockhill to Roosevelt, July 12, 1905, The Rockhill Papers. 121. Arthur H. Smith, China and America To-day: A Study of Conditions and Relations (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1907), 219–221. 122. Editors, “American Education for Chinese,” Outlook, February 24, 1906, 387–388. 123. Smith, China, 213–217. 124. Rockhill to Roosevelt, July 12, 1905, The Rockhill Papers. 125. Carr to Straight, February 10, 1908, Department of State, Numerical and Minor Files of the State Department, 2413/92–94, National Archives, Washington, DC, Record Group 59 (hereafter cited as Numerical Files). 126. United States Congress, Congressional Record 40:6607, 7277. 127. Rockhill to Root, April 28, 1908, Numerical Files, 2112/27. 128. “Memorandum from the Minister to the United States Liang to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Received on November 1, 1905,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:80–81. 129. See memos sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Liang Cheng and Wu Tingfang during this period. Ibid., 81–87. 130. Rockhill to Roosevelt, July 12, 1905, The Rockhill Papers. 131. Root to Thompson, March 2, 1907, Numerical Files, 2413/21. 132. Huntington Wilson, memo, November 22, 1907, ibid., 2413/79. 133. Theodore Roosevelt, Presidential Message to Congress, December 3, 1907, House Document No. 1275, 60th Congress, 2nd sess., 6; FRUS, 1907, ixvii–ixviii. 134. Rockhill to Root, April 28, 1908, Numerical Files, 2112/27. 135. Rockhill to Foreign Ministry, July 11, 1908, State Department, Record of United States Legation in China: Copies of Communications from Chinese Government, Record Group 59, T-898, Reel 10, p. 63, National Archives, Washington, DC. 136. “A Memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Minister Rockhill,” July 14, 1908, in Qinghua, Selected, 1:88. 137. Supplementary Letter from Chinese Foreign Ministry to Rockhill, July 14, 1908, Rockhill to Root, July 16, 1908, Enclosure 3, Numerical Files, 2413/966.

228

138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147.

Notes to Pages 58–65

Bacon to Rockhill, July 17, 1908, FRUS, 1908, 69. Root to Rockhill, August 3, 1908, ibid., 69–70. Rockhill to Phillips, August 1, 1908, Numerical Files, 2413/148. Archives of the Foreign Ministry, File 3476, cited in Li, “The First,” 163. “Proposed Regulations for the Students to Be Sent to America,” enclosure in Rockhill to Root, October 31, 1908, FRUS, 1908, 71–73. Rockhill to Root, October 31, 1908, ibid., 71. United States Congress, Proposed Regulations for the Students to Be Sent to America, House Document, No.1275, 6th Congress, 2nd sess., 11. Rockhill to Root, October 31, 1908, FRUS, 1908, 70. Root to Rockhill, December 31, 1908, ibid., 72–73. Root to Liang Cheng, December 31, 1908, ibid., 74–75.

Chapter 3

Qinghua: The First Joint Experiment

1. W. W. Yen, East-West Kaleidoscope, 1877–1944: An Autobiography (New York: St. John’s University Press, 1974), 56. 2. Li Shoujun, “The Selection of the First Group of Chinese Students to Be Sent to the United States with the Returned Boxer Indemnity,” Historical Studies 4 (1989): 100. 3. Ibid., 101. 4. “A Joint Memorial on the Methods of Receiving American Remission and Sending Students to the United States,” July 10, 1909, in Qinghua, Selected, 1:115–116. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid., 120–121. 7. “Report from Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Education on the Beginning Operation,” ibid., 117; Li, “The Selection,” 101–102. 8. “Memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Education, August 25, 1909,” “Memorandum from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 24, 1909,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:1. 9. “Joint Memorandum from the General Education Associations from Jiangsu and Zhejiang to the Ministry of Education on the Adoption of Regulations on the Selection of Students to Be Sent to the United States,” ibid., 122. 10. “Memorandum from the Ministry of Education to All Provincial Superintendents of Education on the Rules of Selecting and Sending Students to the United States,” ibid., 124–128. 11. “The First Group of Indemnity Students Sent to the United States,” in Liu, Studying Abroad, 1:173–179. 12. “Report from the Foreign Ministry on Sending the First Group of Students to American Schools, no date, 1909,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:131–132. 13. Li Mingsu, “Remembering Schoolmates Who Were Selected and Sent to the United States in 1909,” in Liu, Studying Abroad, 1:179–186. 14. “The First Group,” ibid., 179. 15. U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Statistics, 90. 16. Knox to Consul General at Shanghai, July 22, 1911, Decimal Files, 811.42793/14. 17. “Report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Construction of a Preparatory School for Students to Be Sent to the United States, September 28, 1909,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:3–4.

Notes to Pages 65–71

18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25.

26. 27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

45. 46. 47.

229

“The Qinghua Garden and the Qinghua School,” ibid., 19–22. Liu, Studying Abroad, 1:186–193. Qinghua, Selected, 1:134–135. “Foreign Ministry’s Requests on Renaming the Preparatory School for Students to Be Sent to the United States as Qinghua Academy and the Opening of the Academy, April 11, 1911,” ibid., 143–145. Shanghai Mercury, February 13, 1911. “Qinghua Garden,” “The Foreign Ministry’s Requests,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:24, 144. Qinghua Daxue Xiaoshi Bianxiezu, Qinghua Daxue Xiaoshigao (A Preliminary History of the Qinghua University), (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1981), 10–11. “Regulations for the Qinghua Academy,” “Memo from the China Educational Mission to the United States on the Reasons for the Revision of the Regulations for the Qinghua Academy,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:24, 146–155. “The Qinghua Garden,” ibid., 24. “Memorandum to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Education on the Termination of the Educational Mission and Merge Its Responsibilities with the Academy and on the Destroy of Ofﬁcial Seal of the Ofﬁce, May 23, 1912,” ibid., 155–156. “Memo to Representative Zhang and Superintendent Huang in the United States, May 23, 1912,” ibid., 156–157. Hu Guanglu, “A Historical Account of the ‘Children Students,’” in Liu, Studying Abroad, 1:197–199. “School History,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:48. Qinghua, Preliminary History, 12–13. “Survey of Qinghua,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:28–29. Ibid., 27. Reinsch to the Secretary of State, January 6, 1915, Decimal Files, 893.42/64. Ibid. “Orders from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 27, 1917,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:239. “A Report from the Preparatory Committee on the Qinghua School Endowment,” ibid., 240–243. “Orders from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 14, 1917,” ibid., 245. Reinsch to the Secretary of State, January 16, 1918, Decimal Files, 893.42/95. Memorandum, April 10, 1918, ibid. “The Bylaws of the Board of Directors of Qinghua School, February 5, 1920,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:247–248; Qinghua, Preliminary History, 14–15. “Orders from the Foreign Ministry,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:253–254. Su Yunfeng, From Qinghua Academy to Qinghua University, 1911–1929 (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1996), 36–37. “The Organizational Chat for Qinghua School, 1912–1913,” “The Organizational Outline and Staff Assignments of Qinghua School, 1922,” “The Teaching and Administrative Organizational Chart for Qinghua School, 1925–1926,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:255–258. Reinsch to the Secretary of State, January 9, 1918, telegram, Decimal Files, 893.42/76. Secretary of State to Reinsch, January 11. 1918, ibid. Reinsch to the Secretary of State, January 17, 1918, ibid., 893.42/77.

230

48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85.

Notes to Pages 71–78

Reinsch to the Secretary of State, May 14, 1918, ibid., 893.42/93. “The List of All Presidents, 1909–1929,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:16–18. “School History,” 46. Qinghua, Preliminary History, 18. Ibid., 17. Liu, Studying Abroad, 3:1092–1099. Reinsch, memorandum, February, 1918; Reinsch to the Secretary of State, June 27, 1918, Decimal Files, 893.42/95. Qinghua, Preliminary History, 17. Ibid., 27, 59. Su, From Qinghua Academy, 31–32. Elmer Ellsworth Brown, “Letter of Transmittal,” in John Fryer, Admission of Chinese Students to American Colleges, United States Bureau of Education Bulletin No. 2, 1909 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1909), ix. Brown, “Letter of Transmittal,” ix–x. Fryer, Admission, xi–xii. Ibid., xii. T. Y. Chang, “Chinese Students in American Universities,” ibid., 180–181. Mrs. St. John to Taft, April 11, 1911, Decimal Files, 811.42793/11. Knox to Calhoun, May 23, 1911, ibid., 811.42793/12. Calhoun to Knox, July 6, 1911, ibid., 811.42793/16. “Experimental Regulations on Female Students to Be Educated in the United States,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:226–228. Ye, Seeking Modernity, 146. “Appendix II: Lists for All Kinds of Students from the Qinghua Academy in 1911 to the Preparatory Section in 1929,” in Qinghua, Selected, 4:637–647. Reinsch to the Secretary of State, March 20, 1916, Decimal Files, 811.42793/76. Liu, Studying Abroad, 1:146–147. “Experimental Regulations on Professional Students to Be Educated in the United States,” in Qinghua, Selected, 4:224–226. Appendix II, ibid., 637–647; Shu, The History, 251–252. Reinsch to the Secretary of State, January 6, 1915, Decimal Files, 893.42/64. Secretary of State to Crane, June 28, 1920, ibid., 893.42/105. Crane to the Secretary of State, September 24, 1920, ibid., 893.42/110. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to MacMurray, December 13, 1920, ibid., 811.42793/115. Pope to MacMurray, August 12, 1923, ibid., 811.42793/181. Dorsey to the Secretary of State, August 25, 1919, telegram, ibid., 811.42793/133. Post to the Secretary of State, August 29, 1919, ibid. Post to the Secretary of State, Mar 30, 1920, ibid., 811.42793/107. Cunningham to the Secretary of State, June 9, 1920, ibid., 811.42793/113. Huston to the Secretary of State, February 11, 1921, ibid., 811.42793/119. The Secretary of State to Schurman, April 7, 1922, ibid., 811.42793/151. Chen Lifu, Lessons from Success and Failure: Memoir of Chen Lifu (Taipei: Zhengzhong Shuju, 1994), 31–43. See Heng Teow, Japan’s Cultural Policy toward China, 1918–1931: A Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 32–62; Wang, The Boxer Indemnity, 426–558.

Notes to Pages 79–83

231

86. “Japanese Ultimatum to Germany, August 15, 1914,” in Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, ed. John V. A. MacMurray (New York: Oxford University Press, 1921), 2:1167. 87. Cai Yuanpei, “Divinity of Labor,” Chen Duxiu, “The Von Ketteler Monument,” New Youth 5 (November 1918): 438, 449; Tse-Tsung Chow, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 20–91. 88. Wunsz King, China at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 (New York: St. John’s University Press, 1961), 6–24. 89. Paul S. Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1922), 361–362. 90. Kiang Wen-han, The Chinese Student Movement (New York: King’s Crown Press, 1948), 36. 91. Tsi C. Wang, The Youth Movement in China (New York, 1927), 161–162. 92. Qinghua, Preliminary History, 72–73. 93. “Patriotic Movement: The May Fourth,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:476. 94. Qinghua, Preliminary History, 73–75. 95. Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiation: A Personal Narrative (Boston: Houghton Mifﬂin, 1921), 257–261. 96. Reinsch, An American Diplomat, 362. 97. Lodge to the Secretary of State, May 25, 1921, FRUS, 1921, 398–399. 98. Root to Rockhill, May 27, 1908, FRUS, 1908, 65. 99. Lodge to the Secretary of State, May 25, 1921, FRUS, 1921, 398–399. 100. Hughes to Lodge, July 17, 1921, ibid., 402–403. 101. United States Congress, Congressional Record, August 11, 1921, vol. 61, part 5, 4883. 102. Terence Brockhenser, “The Boxer Indemnity: Five Decades of Sino-American Dissension,” Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Christian University, 1984, 208; Thomas G. Patterson et al., American Foreign Policy: A History since 1900 (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1983), 313–314. 103. Colby to Crane, September 21, 1920, FRUS, 1920, 763. 104. Hughes to Porter, April 7, 1922, Decimal Files, 493.11/820A. 105. Porter to Hughes, April 26, 1922, ibid., 493.11/823. 106. MacMurray to the Secretary of State, June 16, 1921, ibid., 493.11/767. 107. Schurman to the Secretary of State, September 30, 1921, ibid., 493.11/787. 108. Danton to Peck, July 27, 1920, Department of State, China Legation General Correspondence, 1920, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington, DC. 109. Huston to the Secretary of State, February 11, 1921, Decimal Files, 811.42793/119. 110. Brockhauser, “The Boxer Indemnity,” 222–223. 111. MacMurray to the Secretary of State, August 15, 1921, Decimal Files, 493.11/776. 112. Peck to Schurman, September 12, 1921, File 400B, China Legation General Correspondence, 1921. 113. Schurman to the Secretary of State, September 30, 1921, Decimal Files, 493.11/787. 114. United States Congress, Congressional Record, December 6, 1923, vol. 65, part 1, 89. 115. United States Congress, Chinese Indemnity, House Hearing, 68th Congress, 1st sess., Serial No. 8228, Washington: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1924. 116. United States Congress, Congressional Record, May 12, 1924, vol. 65, part 8, 8323.

232

Notes to Pages 83–89

117. Monroe to MacMurray, January 15, 1924, Decimal Files, 493.11/971. 118. Schurman and Peck conversation with Koo, May 28, 1924, File 400B, China Legation General Correspondence, 1924. 119. Grew to Schurman, June 19, 1924, telegram, ibid. 120. Monroe to MacMurray, November 12, 1924, Decimal Files, 493.11/1096. 121. MacMurray to the Secretary of State, June 5, 1925, ibid., 493.11/1180. 122. Calvin Coolidge, Executive Order No. 4268, July 16, 1925, FRUS, 1925, 936–937. 123. Green to MacMurray, July 3, 1925, Decimal Files, 493.11/1191. 124. Lockhart conversation with Sze, June 11, 1925, ibid., 493.11/1179. 125. MacMurray to the Secretary of State, July 10, 1925, Despatches from China Legation, 1925. 126. Brockhauser, “The Boxer Indemnity,” 236. 127. Kellogg to MacMurray, July 30, 1925, telegram, File 400B, China Legation, 1925. 128. Executive Order 4268, July 16, 1925, Decimal Files, 493.11/1168. 129. Kellogg to MacMurray, October 8, 1927, Telegram, China Legation, 1927. 130. MacMurray to the Secretary of State, August 27, 1925, Decimal Files, 493.11/1191. 131. Bell to the Secretary of State, October 4, 1924, ibid., 493.11/1095. 132. Minbao, July 23, 1925. 133. Zhou Yichun, “A Memorandum to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Gradual Elevation of Offering and Preparation for the Establishment of the University,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:276–277. 134. Memorandum, January 5, 1915, in Reinsch to the Secretary of State, January 6, 1915, Decimal Files, 893.42/64. 135. “The Table of Major Buildings for Qinghua College,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:446; Su, From Qinghua Academy, 24–25; Qinghua, Preliminary History, 45. 136. The library, gymnasium, and science buildings were completed in 1919, while the auditorium was opened in 1921. “Four Major Buildings of Qinghua School,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:447. 137. Zhang Yuquan, “Report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on University Planning,” ibid., 278–280. 138. Cao Yunxiang, “Methods to Upgrade Qinghua School,” Supplement Issue of the Tenth Anniversary of Qinghua Weekly, March 1, 1924, 69. 139. “Invitation to Serve as Adviser for the Founding of Qinghua University,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:287; Qinghua, Preliminary History, 48. 140. “The Organization and Curriculum of the University Section,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:293; Qinghua, Preliminary History, 48–49. 141. Qi Jiaying, The Chronology of Qinghua Humanity Studies (Beijing: Qinghua Daxue Chubanshe, 1999), 14–15; Qinghua, Preliminary History, 48–51. 142. “The Organization,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:293–294. 143. “New Regulations for the Beijing Qinghua School,” “The Organization,” ibid., 1:159–164, 294–295. 144. Qian Duanshen, “Qinghua School,” Qinghua Weekly 362 (December 4, 1925): 791–798; Su, From Qinghua Academy, 48–53. 145. “The Bylaws of the Qinghua School,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:298–299. 146. Su, From Qinghua Academy, 49. 147. Cao Yunxiang, “The Reform Plan for Qinghua School,” The Supplementary Issue, March 1, 1924, 69.

Notes to Pages 89–97

233

148. Qinghua, Preliminary History, 56. 149. Shu, The History, 248–251. 150. Heintzleman to the Secretary of State, December 15, 1924, Decimal Files, 893.42/206. 151. Deng, Private Education, 73–79. 152. Heintzleman to the Secretary of State, December 15, 1924, Decimal Files, 893.42/206. 153. “School History,” 46. 154. Consul at Tianjin to the Secretary of State, December 13, 1923, Decimal Files, 893.42/192. 155. The 11th Supplement Issue of Qinghua Weekly, June 18, 1925, 89–92. 156. Qinghua, Preliminary History, 46–47.

Chapter 4

From Central Administration to Party Control

1. Hsü, The Rise, 530–531. 2. “Report from Representatives Sent to the South (Capital),” in Qinghua, Selected, vol. 2, part 1, 50–51. 3. Memorandum, July 31, 1928, MacMurray to the Secretary of State, August 2, 1928, Decimal Files, 893.42/235. 4. Ibid. 5. MacMurray to Tong, August 1, 1928, ibid. 6. MacMurray to the Secretary of State, August 14, 1928, ibid., 893.42/232. 7. Luo Jialun, “The Plan and Process of the Rectiﬁcation of the University Affairs,” in Qinghua, Selected, vol. 2, part 1, 4. 8. “The Bylaws of the National Qinghua University,” ibid., 138–139; Qinghua, Preliminary History, 93–94. 9. Luo Jialun, “Academic Freedom and the New Qinghua,” in Qinghua, Selected, vol. 2, part 1, 199–201. 10. Su, From Qinghua Academy, 146–155; Luo, “The Plan,” 8–13. 11. Su, From Qinghua Academy, 145. 12. Luo, “The Plan,” 16–19. 13. Luo Jialun, “President Luo’s Speech at the Anniversary Week, December 17, 1928,” ibid., 154–158. 14. Luo Jialun, “The Past and the Present of Qinghua University,” ibid., 206–207. 15. Qinghua, Preliminary History, 79. 16. “Report from Representatives Sent to the South,” in Qinghua, Selected, vol. 2, part 1, 49–58. 17. “Minutes for the Seventh Meeting of the Senate, April 9, 1929,” ibid., 61–62. 18. “The Original Resignation Letter from President Luo,” ibid., 62–67. 19. “Instruction from the Ministry of Education of the National Government, No. 572,” ibid., 76. 20. “A Talk Given by Luo Jialun at a Guiyang Qinghua Alumni Meeting, October 24, 1940,” ibid., 81. 21. MacMurray to the Secretary of State, November 2, 1928, Decimal Files, 893.42/246. 22. The Secretary of State to MacMurray, August 21, 1928, ibid., 893.42/232. 23. Division of Far Eastern Affairs, memorandum, May 6, 1929, ibid., 893.42/260.

234

Notes to Pages 97–102

24. Ibid. 25. Qinghua, Selected, 4:636–647. 26. “Regulations of Qinghua School on Subsidizing Self-Support Students in the United States,” ibid., 1:229–231; Su, From Qinghua Academy, 397; Wang, The Boxer Indemnity, 316. 27. “The List of Various Students from Qinghua Academy to the Preparatory School between 1911 and 1929,” in Qinghua, Selected, 4:637–647. 28. China Institute in America, A Survey of Chinese Students in American Universities and Colleges in the Past One Hundred Years (New York: China Institute in America, 1954), 26–27. 29. Wang, The Boxer Indemnity, 316–317; Huang, Chinese Students, 83–105. 30. Shen Xizhen, “A Study on Qinghua Students Sent to the United States: A Case Study of Preparatory Students,” master’s thesis (Taiwan: Guoli Zhongxing Daxue Lishi Yanjiusuo, 1994), 95–98, cited in Su, From Qinghua Academy, 382–383. 31. Cao, “The Past, Present, and Future of Qinghua School,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:40. 32. Wang, The Boxer Indemnity, 317–318; Liang Shiqiu, About Wen Yiduo (Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxueshe, 1967), 26–51. 33. Cao, “The Past,” 40–41. 34. Hsü, The Rise, 497. 35. Wang, The Boxer Indemnity, 320. 36. The Academia Sinica, The List of the First Group of Fellows of the Academia Sinica (Najing: Academia Sinica, 1948), 21–24. 37. Shanghai Daily, September 19, 1924. 38. New Daily of Current Affairs, July 28, 1928. 39. Paul Monroe to C. T. Wang, August 17, 1928, Monroe to Cai Yuan Pei, August 31, 1928, Papers of China Foundation, cited in Yang Tsuihua, Patronage of Sciences: The China Foundation for Promotion of Education and Culture (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1991), 24. 40. MacMurray to the Secretary of State, August 5, 1928, Decimal Files, 493.11/1349. 41. New Daily of Current Affairs, October 4, 1928. 42. Yang, Patronage, 26–28. 43. Ibid., 28–30. 44. “Letter from the Board of Directors of the CFPEC to Qinghua University, August 22, 1929,” in Qinghua, Selected, 2:686–687. 45. “Letter from the Board of Directors of the CFPEC to Ministry of Education, September 9, 1929,” ibid., 694–695. 46. “Expenditures for the University and Students Sent Abroad, 1912–1928,” ibid., 432–433; Yang, Patronage, 64. 47. “The List of the First Group of Government Sponsored Students to Be Sent to the United States, 1933,” “The List of the Second Group of Government Sponsored Students to Be Sent to the United States, 1934,” “The List of the Third Group of Government Sponsored Students to Be Sent to the United States, 1935” “The List of the Fourth Group of Government Sponsored Students to Be Sent to the United States, 1936,” in Qinghua, Selected, 2:679–680. 48. “Schedule of Accumulations, Qinghua University Endowment Fund,” ibid., 716– 717. 49. Mei Yiqi, “Qinghua during the War against Japan,” ibid., 3:17–21.

Notes to Pages 102–105

235

50. “A Secret Order from the Ministry of Education Appointing the Leaders for the Changsha Temporary University, August 28, 1937,” in Historical Records of the National Southwest Associated University, ed. Beijing Daxue et al. (Kunming: Yunnan Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1998), vol. 4, 3. 51. “The Resolution of the Executive Committee of the Southwest Associated University on the Appointment of Mei Yiqi as the Chairman of the Executive Committee, December 21, 1938,” “The Resolution of the Executive Committee of the Southwest Associated University on the Reappointment of Mei Yiqi as the Chairman of the Executive Committee,” ibid., 4. 52. “Order from the Ministry of Education, No. 9254, April 24, 1939,” in Qinghua, Selected, 3:338–339. 53. “Memo from the China Foundation to the Ministry of Education on Transferring Funds to Qinghua University, July 12, 1939,” ibid., 339–340. 54. “Minutes for the Twenty-Fifth University Affairs Committee Meeting, August 17, 1939,” ibid., 341–342. 55. “Resolutions Made by the Twenty-Sixth University Affairs Meeting on the Selecting and Sending the Fifth Group of Students to the United States, November 2, 1939,” ibid., 223–224. 56. Mei Yiqi, “Qinghua during the War against Japan (The Sequel),” ibid., 24. 57. Mei Yiqi, “Qinghua during the War against Japan (The Third Year),” ibid., 7–28. 58. “The Brief Table of Biographic Information of the Fifth Group of Students Selected to Be Sent to the United States,” ibid., 229–232. 59. “Resolutions Made by the Thirteenth Senate on the Examination for the Sixth Group of Government Scholarship Students to Be Sent to the United States,” ibid., 238. 60. Mei Yiqi, “Qinghua during the War against Japan (The Fifth Year),” “Qinghua during the War against Japan (The Sixth Year),” ibid., 8, 46. 61. “A Letter from Zhang Jianhou et al. to President Mei on Issues of Going Abroad,” ibid., 261–263. 62. “Methods for Qinghua Scholarship for Privately Sponsored Students in the United States, Adopted by the Senate on February 5, 1940,” ibid., 264. 63. CFPEC, A Summary of the Activities of the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture, From 1925 to 1945, December 1946, 14–15. 64. Yang, Patronage, 98–100. 65. “The List of Students Chosen by the Fifteenth Senate to Receive the Scholarship for Self-Sponsored Students in the United States, June 23, 1941,” in Beijing, The Historical Records, 3:517. 66. “Resolution on the Termination of the Scholarship for Self-Sponsored Students in the United States Adopted by the Nineteenth Senate, December 16, 194,” in Qinghua, Selected, 3:270. 67. “An Application Letter from Xia Xiang to the Senate for Research Overseas,” ibid., 267–268. 68. “Recommendation Letter to President Mei from John Mo for Xia Xiang’s Studying Abroad, April 19, 1941,” ibid., 266. 69. “A Brief Biographical Table for Lecturers, Teachers, and Assistant Instructors Sent to the United States by Qinghua in 1941 with Semi-Government Scholarships, May 8, 1941,” ibid., 265–266.

236

Notes to Pages 105–110

70. “A Letter to the President from Thirteen Teachers and Assistant Instructors Headed by Zhu Hongfu for the Improvement of Treatments for Self-Sponsored Students Studying Abroad, May 5, 1941,” ibid., 268–270. 71. CFPEC, The Third Report, 1928, 30–35. 72. CFPEC, A Summary, 11–12. 73. CFPEC, The Fourteenth Report, 1939, 11–18. 74. CFPEC, The Fifteenth Report, 1940, 10–15. 75. Ren Hongjuan, “A Business Review of the China Foundation,” Oriental Magazine 32, no. 7 (April 16, 1935): 19. 76. George R. Twiss, Science and Education in China: A Survey of the Present Status and a Program for Progressive Improvement (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1926), 17–24. 77. Yang, Patronage, 116. 78. Ibid., 117–121. 79. Sally Borthwick, Education and Social Change in China: The Beginnings of the Modern Era (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, Stanford University, 1983), 69–70. 80. “Brief Regulations on Sending Students to the West Approved by the Throne, September 15, 1904,” in Chen, Historical Records, 720. 81. Huang, Chinese Students, 86; “Memo on the Management of Chinese Students Studying in Japan,” in Liu, Studying Abroad, 2:270–276. 82. Ministry of Education, “Regulations for Selecting Students to Be Sent Abroad,” ibid., 3:1002–1008. 83. Ibid., 1010–1014. 84. Editorial, “Government Services for the Returned Students,” Chinese Students’ Monthly, October 1914, 126–128. 85. “The Organizational Chart for the Ministry of Education, January 4, 1929,” “The Revised Organization of Ofﬁces in All Sections in the Ministry of Education, July 22, 1932,” in The Collection of Historical Records of the Republic of China, ed. Zhongguo Dier Lishi Danganguan (Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji Chubanshe, 1994), section 5, vol. 1, 58–60. 86. “The Operation Regulations for the Qinghua School Ofﬁce for the Superintendent for Students in the United States,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:215–218. 87. “Detailed Regulations of Operation of the Ofﬁce of Student Superintendent of Qinghua University in the United States,” in Liu, Studying Abroad, 3:1049–1052. 88. Huang Yanfu and Ma Xiangwu, Mei Yiqi and Qinghua University (Taiyuan: Shanxi Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1999), 17–18. 89. Mei Yiqi, “A Letter to the Central University on Enabling Overseas Students to Return and Serve in China after Finishing Education Abroad, May 15, 1930,” in Zhongguo, The Collection, 1:393. 90. Huang Jilu, The Education and Research Prior to the Anti-Japanese War (Taipei: Zhongyang Wenwu Gongyingshe, 1970), 152–153. 91. Zhu Jiahua, “A Statement on the Reform of the National Education,” in Liu, Studying Abroad, 4:1663. 92. Du Yuanzai, ed., Revolutionary Documents: Higher Education Prior to the War against Japan (Taipei: Zhongyang Wenwu Gongyingshe, 1971), 180–181; Liu, Studying Abroad, 4:1661.

Notes to Pages 110–115

237

93. “The Statistics of Students Sent Abroad between 1929 and 1937,” in Zhongguo, The Collection, 1:394. 94. “Revised Regulations on Issuance of Studying Abroad Permits,” in Liu, Studying Abroad, 4:1677–1679. 95. Ministry of Education, “The Improvement Plan for National Education,” in Liu, Studying Abroad, 4:1661–1663. 96. Ibid., 161–163; Huang Jilu, Educational Policy and Reforms before the Anti-Japanese War (Taipei: Zhongyang Wenwu Gongyingshe, 1971), 169–170. 97. “Regulations on Studying Abroad,” in Zhongguo, The Collection, 1:381–385. 98. Ibid., 383–388. 99. “Regulations of National Qinghua University on the Selection of Students to Be Sent to the United States,” in Qinghua, Selected, vol. 2, part 2, 667–671. 100. “The Revised Temporary Rules Regarding the Examination and Selection of Government Sponsored Students to Be Sent Abroad Submitted by the Bureau of Education to the Ministry of Education, February 28, 1935,” “Order from the Ministry of Education on the Revisions to Be Made in the Revised Temporary Rules Regarding the Examination and Selection of Government Sponsored Students to Be Sent Abroad Submitted by the Bureau of Education, March 14, 1935,” in Lin Ching-fen, Students Selected by Provinces for Studying Abroad: Historical Records on Chinese Students Studying Abroad during the Sino-Japanese War (Taipei: Guoshiguan, 1994), 1:1–7. 101. “The Memo from the Bureau of Education of Guangdong Province on Following the Order from the Ministry of Education in Further Revising the Regulations Regarding the Examination and Selection of Government Sponsored Students to Be Sent Abroad, March 28, 1935,” ibid., 7–12. 102. “A Telegram from the Ministry of Education to the Bureau of Education of Guangdong, April 12, 1935,” ibid., 18–19. 103. “The Ministry of Education Order, No. 4750, April 16, 1935,” ibid., 19. 104. “The Brief Plan for the Examination and Selection of the Third Group of Government Sponsored Students to Be Sent Abroad Submitted to the Ministry of Education by the Bureau of Education of Guangdong, April 4, 1936,” ibid., 22–23. 105. Liu, Studying Abroad, 4:1826–1828. 106. “Documents on Feng Yuxiang’s Recommendation for Sending Huang Shaogu, Guo Chuntao Abroad for Education,” in Zhongguo, The Collection, 1:390–392. 107. Yan Su and Dong Junfeng, Kong Xiangxi and Song Qingling (Beijing: Zhongguo Dangan Chubanshe, 1994), 164–171; Hsü, The Rise, 566. 108. “A Letter from the Ministry of Education to the Consulate in Liverpool on Student Lu Senjian’s Application for the Purchase of Foreign Currency, February 27, 1929,” in Lin, Students, 1:160–161. 109. “The Statistics of Students Sent Abroad between 1929 and 1937,” in Zhongguo, The Collection, 1:394–397. 110. “Students Sent Overseas or Subsidized by the Central Committee of the Nationalist Party, 1930–1933,” ibid., 380. 111. Liu, Studying Abroad, 4:1991–1992. 112. “Revised Temporary Methods to Restrict Studying Abroad,” ibid., 1992–1993. 113. “The Memo to the Ministry of Education from the Bureau of Education of Guangdong Province on the Recall or Extension of Government-Sponsored Students in Europe and the United States, December 31, 1938,” in Lin, Students, 1:35–36.

238

Notes to Pages 115–120

114. “Letter from the Chinese Embassy to the Ministry of Education, November 30, 1938,” “Letter from the Ministry of Education, No. 11565,” ibid., 101–105, 109–111. 115. “The Statistics of Students Who Have Received Studying Abroad Permits in the Past Decade,” in Du, Revolutionary Documents, 181–182. 116. Liu, Studying Abroad, 4:2003–2006. 117. Ibid., 2034. 118. “The Brief Table,” 229–234. 119. “Scholarships for Self-Sponsored Students to Be Sent to America, 1940,” in Qinghua, Selected, 3:265. 120. Liu, Studying Abroad, 1666–1667, 2004–2006. 121. Wen Hsin Yeh, The Alienated Academy: Culture and Politics in Republican China, 1919–1937 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 167–182. 122. Zhang Yufa, A History of the Republic of China (Taipei: Lianjing Chuban Shiye Gongsi, 1998), 195. 123. Ding, The Educational Records, 130–133. 124. John Israel, Student Nationalism in China, 1927–1937 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1966), 12. 125. Ibid., 14–15. 126. Ding, The Educational Records, 148–149. 127. Lloyd E. Eastman, “Nationalist China during the Nanking Decade, 1927–1937,” in The Nationalist Era in China, 1927–1949, ed. Lloyd E. Eastman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 9–10; Chiang Kai-shek, China’s Destiny (New York: MacMillan, 1947), 151. 128. Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927– 1937 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 308–309; Israel, Student Nationalism, 189. 129. Chiang, China’s Destiny, 151, 220. 130. “The Temporary Regulations Issued by the Nationalist Government in Nanjing on the Addition of a Party Education Course, July 30, 1928,” in Zhongguo, The Collection, 1:1030. 131. Deng, Private Education, 78–81. 132. Bulletin of the Ministry of Education 2, no. 7. 133. “A Telegram Sent to the Nationalist Government by the Political Committee of the Nationalist Party in Beiping on Bai Congxi’s Proposal for the Implementation of the Education of the Three Principles of the People, July 28, 1928,” in Zhongguo, The Collection, 1:1010. 134. Qinghua, Preliminary History, 95. 135. Qinghua, Selected, 10–12. 136. “The Plan for the Implementation of Party Education,” in Zhongguo, The Collection, 1:1011–1015; Qinghua, Selected, 12–13. 137. Central Daily, March 20, 1931. 138. “The Plan for the Implementation of Party Education,” in Zhongguo, The Collection, 1:1020. 139. “Regulations on Studying Abroad,” ibid., 382–383. 140. “Rules for the Selection of Government Sponsored Students to Be Sent to America,” in Qinghua, Selected, 2:671–679. 141. “Informal Letter from the Ministry of Education, No. 6751, March 7, 1940,” in Lin, Students, 1:124–125.

Notes to Pages 120–125

239

142. Israel, Student Nationalism; Lincoln Li, Student Nationalism in China, 1924–1949 (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994); Jeffrey Wasserstrom, Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China: The View from Shanghai (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991); Azhe, The Brief History of Student Movement in Modern China (Hong Kong: Dasheng Chubanshe, 1983). 143. Wasserstrom, Student Protests, 156–159. 144. Chen, Lessons, 260–286. 145. The other two departments were the Department of Teaching (Jiaowu Chu) and the Department of Services (Zongwu Chu). Fan Xiaofang, The Reign of the Jiang’s and the Gang of Chen’s: The Art of Strategy of Jiang Jieshi, Chen Guofu, and Chen Lifu (Taipei: Zhouzhi Wenhua, 1994), 192, 257; Chen, Lessons, 257–258. 146. Chen, Lessons, 224–226. 147. Chih Meng, Chinese American Understanding: A Sixty-Year Search (New York: China Institute in America, 1981), 187–188. 148. Ibid., 187. 149. Israel, Student Nationalism, 192.

Chapter 5

Maintaining the Educational Front

1. Jung-chao Kuo, From Pearl Harbor to Yalta: The Tragedy of Sino-American Cooperation During World War II (Taipei: Zhongguo Yanjiu Zhongxin Chubanshe, 1979), 10–16. 2. Charles E. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China (Washington DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1952), part 1, 14–15. 3. Hsü, The Rise, 600. 4. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission, part 2, 774. 5. Quoted in James M. Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom 1941–1945 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 248. 6. United States Congress, Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 1st Session, 79th Congress (Washington DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1946), part 14, 1061. 7. Ibid., 1061–1062. 8. Herbert Feis, The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (New York: Atheneum, 1965), 42–43. 9. Ibid., 44. 10. Yin Zhou, “General Marshall’s Mission to China,” Historical Archives, February 1991, 129. 11. J. Manuel Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings of U.S. Cultural Diplomacy, 1936– 1948, Department of State Publication 8854 (Washington DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1976), 89–105. 12. The State Department’s sponsorship of American students was suspended in December 1942 for the duration of the war. Department of State, The Cultural Cooperation Programs, 1938–1943, Publication 2137 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1944), 9–10. 13. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 9. 14. The Division of Far Eastern Affairs, memorandum of conversation, May 6, 1941, Decimal Files, 811.42793/458. 15. Peck, memorandum, May 6, 1941, ibid., 811.42793/458.

240

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

55. 56.

Notes to Pages 125–133

Peck, memorandum, May 26, 1941, ibid., 811.42793/467. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 10. Gauss to the Secretary of State, July 24, 1941, Decimal Files, 811.42793/473. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 11. Thomson, memorandum, October 17, 1941, Decimal Files, 811.42793/497. Ibid. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 13–14. Grummon, memorandum, December 10, 1941, National Archives, RG 59, WHB, Box 53, Folder: RC-China #1, quoted in ibid., 15. State Department to American Embassy at Chongqing, January 29, 1942, Decimal Files, 811.42793/527A. Gauss to the Secretary of State, February 12, 1942, ibid., 811.42793/535. Ibid. Gauss to the Secretary of State, March 27, 1942, ibid., 811.42793/572. Gauss to the Secretary of State, February 12, 1942, ibid., 811.42793/535. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Gauss to the Secretary of State, July 26, 1943, ibid., 811.42793/1302. Secretary of State to Gauss, February 24, 1942, ibid., 811.42793/535. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 115. Pattee, memorandum, September 22, 1941, Decimal Files, 811.42793/484. Thomson, memorandum, October 17, 1941, ibid., 811.42793/483. Grummon, memorandum, December 19, 1941, ibid., 811.42793/509. Ibid. State Department, The Cultural Cooperation Programs, 12. China Section of the Division of Cultural Relations, “Monthly Report, March 5, 1943,” Decimal Files, 811.42793/1067A. State Department, The Cultural Cooperation Programs, 12–13. Grummon, memorandum, December 19, 1941, ibid., 811.42793/509. Grummon, memorandum of conversation, January 22, 1942, ibid., 811.42793/546. Grummon, memorandum, January 27, 1942, ibid., 811.42793/548. Ibid. Grummon, memorandum, January 22, 1942, ibid., 811.42793/546. Long to Biddle, February 18, 1942, ibid., 811.42793/549A. Department of Justice, Instruction No. 47, February 27, 1942, ibid. Schuﬁeld to Hull, March 19, 1942, ibid. China Section, “Monthly Report, March 5, 1943,” ibid., 811.42793/1067A. State Department, The Cultural Cooperation Programs, 14–17. Division of Cultural Relations, memorandum, December 1, 1942, Decimal Files, 811.42793/941; W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 116–117. Division of Cultural Relations, memorandum, March 17, 1942, Decimal Files, 811.42793/581. Gauss to the Secretary of State, December 1, 1942, Decimal Files, 811.42793/924; John Israel, Lianda: A Chinese University in War and Revolution (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 307. Cohen, America’s Response, 130–131. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 37–38.

Notes to Pages 134–140

241

57. Field Director of United China Relief to Chen Lifu, December 9, 1942, enclosed in Gauss to the Secretary of State, December 16, 1942, Decimal Files, 811.42793/929. 58. Gauss to the Secretary of States, February 23, 1943, ibid., 811.42793/1039. 59. “A Letter from the China Foundation to Mei Yiqi, September 21, 1943,” in Beijing, The Historical Records, 3:743. 60. “Letter from Jiang Menglin, Li Shuhua, Mei Yiqi to the Southwest Allied University on the Distribution of ‘Subsidies from the United China Relief,’” ibid., 744–745. 61. Yang, Patronage, 110. 62. For details on the exchange program and the complete list of Chinese educators and artists invited to the United States between 1943 and 1946, please see W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 83–113. 217–218. 63. John K. Fairbank, Chinabound: A Fifty-Year Memoir (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), 204–205; W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 46. 64. Gauss to the Secretary of State, December 1, 1942, Decimal Files, 811.42793/883. 65. Gauss to the Secretary of State, January 1, 25, 1942, ibid., 811.42793/960, 811.42793/980. 66. Fairbank, Chinabound, 209–210; W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 46–48. 67. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 47. 68. Ibid., 48. 69. “A Letter from Chen Daisun to President Mei Reporting on the Preparation of Research Proposals,” in Beijing, The Historical Records, 3:751. 70. “A Letter from Chen Daisun to President Mei Reporting on the Preparation of Research Proposals,” ibid., 746–751. 71. “A Letter from Chen Daisun to President Mei, June 27, 1945,” ibid., 746. 72. “A Letter from Hewang to Mei Yiqi, June 29, 1945,” “A Letter from Mei Yiqi to Langdon, June 29, 1945,” ibid., 751–752. 73. Secretary of State to Gauss, April 4, 1944, cited in W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 208–209. 74. Fairbank to Hiss, September 23, 1942, in Fairbank, Chinabound, 197–199. 75. Ibid., 231. 76. Liu, Studying Abroad, 3:2082. 77. Ministry of Education, “The Plan for Sending Government Sponsored Students to England and the United States in 1943 by the Ministry of Education,” ibid., 2083– 2094. 78. Peck, memorandum, September 4, 1943, Decimal Files, 811.42893/1286. 79. Ibid., 811.42793/1286A. 80. Secretary of State to the American Embassy at Chongqing, October 2, 1943, ibid., 811.42793/1286. 81. “Ministry of Economy Regulations on Selecting and Sending Trainees in Industries and Mining,” “Drafted Regulations by the Ministry of Transportation on Sending Trainees Abroad,” in Liu, Studying Abroad, 3:2099–2114. 82. Ministry of Education, “The Plan,” ibid., 2083–2099. 83. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 85–95. 84. Zhang Guansheng, The Biography of Fei Xiaotong (Beijing: Qunyan Chubanshe, 2000), 218–219. 85. Langdon to Gauss, May 24, 1944, Decimal Files, 811.42793/1828.

242

Notes to Pages 140–145

86. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 218–219. 87. “A Letter from Hua Luogeng to President Mei, November 16, 1943,” “Letters from Hua Luogeng to Provost Pan, November 16, 19, 1943,” “A Memo from Mei Yiqi to the Ministry of Education on Hua Luogeng’s Application for Passport, November, 1943,” Qinghua, Selected, 3:315–317. 88. Zhen Renjia, “The Life of China’s Gifted Mathematician Hua Luogeng,” Biographical Literature 74 (1985, no. 2): 51; Chen Ningning, “Hua Luogeng: A Magniﬁcent Life,” in Zhu Jiping, Rooted in China: Reports on Famous Returned Scientists (Hefei: Anhui Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1997), 155–156. 89. Jiaoyubu, “Regulations on Self-Sponsored Students Studying Abroad, November 8, 1943,” in Liu, Studying Abroad, 3:2115–2118. 90. American Embassy to Secretary of State, May 5, 1943, quoted in W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 93–94. 91. American Embassy to Secretary of State, June 8, 1943, ibid., 123. 92. Gauss to the Secretary of State, November 16, 1943, Decimal Files, 811.42793/1441. 93. Secretary of State to Gauss, March 14, 1944, ibid., 811.42793/1403. 94. Ofﬁce of Far Eastern Affairs, memorandum, March 21, 1944, ibid., 811.42793/1699. 95. “Report of the Chairman,” American Defense–Harvard Group, from May 15, 1943, to June 15, 1944, Harvard University Archives, HUD3139.244. 96. Benjamin Fine, “Colleges May Bar Chinese Students,” New York Times, May 11, 1944, 21. 97. Ibid., 21. 98. American Embassy at Chongqing to the Secretary of State, April 18, 1944, Decimal Files, 822.42793/1713. 99. Gauss to the Secretary of State, May 3, 1944, ibid., 811.42793/1766. 100. Gauss to the Secretary of State, April 25, 1944, ibid., 811.42793/1696. 101. Secretary of State to the American Embassy at Chongqing, July 5, 1944, ibid., 811.42793/1816. 102. Gauss to the Secretary of State, May 3, 1944, ibid., 811.42793/1766. 103. Hull to the American Embassy at Chongqing, July 5, 1944, ibid., 811.42793/1816. 104. MacMurray, memorandum, August 21, 1944, ibid., 811.42793/8–2144. 105. Ibid. 106. American Embassy to the Secretary of State, September 24, 1944, National Archives, RG 84, 842-Education. 107. Chu Chin-nung, “Survey of Chinese Students Studying Abroad,” China at War 13 (December 1944, no. 6): 18–19. 108. MacKnight to Peck, February 13, 1945, Decimal Files, 811.42793/1345. 109. Shaw to Gauss, May 12, 1944, ibid., 811.42793/1770C. 110. Peck, memorandum, May 26, 1945, ibid., 811.42793/3–2645. 111. “An Educational ‘Chop-Suey’ for China,” China Weekly Review 29 (July 12, 1924, no. 6): 177; Teow, Japan’s Cultural Policy, 124–162. 112. Y. L. Tong, “The Chinese Students and the American Public,” Chinese Students’ Monthly 10 (March 1915, no. 6): 348–351. 113. About Chinese students’ efforts to unofﬁcially represent China in the United States, please see Hongshan Li, “The Unofﬁcial Envoys: Chinese Students in the United States, 1906–1938,” in Image, Perception, and the Mating of U.S.-China Relations,

Notes to Pages 145–152

114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125.

243

ed. Hongshan Li and Zhaohui Hong (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1998), 153–159. Hu Shi, Hu Shi Diary: The Years of Studying Abroad (Changsha: Yuelu Shushe, 2000), 128–236, 401–408. Liu, Studying Abroad, 3:2046–2052. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 217–218. Zhang, Fei, 219. The ﬁrst three books were later included as the ﬁrst volumes of Earthbound China, a book series published by the University of Chicago Press in 1945. Ibid., 224–225. Peck, memorandum, December 2, 1942, Decimal Files, 811.42793/966. Dennis, memorandum, December 1, 1942, ibid., 811.42793/941. Quoted in W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 118. Gauss to the Secretary of State, January 30, 1943, Decimal Files, 811.42793/1006. Gauss to the Secretary of State, October 7, 1943, ibid., 811.42793/1406. Gauss to the Secretary of State, November 30, 1943, ibid., 811.42793/1449. American Embassy at Beijing to the Secretary of State, November 20, 1944, ibid., 811.42793/11–2044.

Chapter 6

From Expansion to Termination

1. “Chinese Victory Banquet in Honor of University Students and Faculty of China and Chinese American Educational and Cultural Relations,” China Institute in America, China Institute Bulletin 30 (January 1946): 1. 2. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 217–218. 3. “Chinese Author and Playwright Return Home,” China Institute Bulletin 41:2; “Lao Sheh,” ibid., 43:9. 4. “Chinese Government Organizes Committee on Wartime Planning for Chinese Students in the United States,” ibid., 8:5. 5. “Grant-in-Aid Scholarships,” ibid., 38 (December 1946): 4. 6. “The United States Extends Warm Welcome to Chinese Industrial Trainees,” ibid., 27:1. 7. “The Chinese Industrial Trainees,” ibid., 35 (June 1946): 1. 8. “The United States Extends Warm Welcome to Chinese Industrial Trainees,” ibid., 27:1. 9. “The Chinese Industrial Trainees,” ibid., 35:2. 10. “Tsin Hua Scholarship Students,” ibid., 34:8. 11. “Agricultural Scholarships,” “Scholarships and Fellowships for Chinese Students,” ibid., 38:4, 9. 12. Liu, Studying Abroad, 3:2138, 2169–2170. 13. “The Regulations on Studying Abroad Examinations for Self-Supported Students by the Ministry of Education in 1946,” ibid., 2162–2168, 2170. 14. Ibid., 4:2176–2177. 15. Ministry of Education, The Second Educational Annual, 1948, 567; Y. C. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West, 1872–1949 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), 133. 16. “The Regulations on Examinations to Select Interpreters for Studying Abroad by the Ministry of Education,” in Liu, Studying Abroad, 4:2178–2181.

244

Notes to Pages 152–157

17. Wu Dayou, “Hua Luogeng Was Sent by the Ministry of Military Affairs to the United States for Research,” Biographical Literature 74 (1985, no. 3): 20. 18. All graduates were from Qinghua University. Li Zhengdao won the Nobel Prize in physics with his schoolmate Yang Zhenning in 1958. Tang Aoqing and Zhu Guangya became China’s top scientists in chemistry and nuclear physics, respectively. 19. Liu, Studying Abroad, 4:2138–2139. 20. “Regulations on the Purchase of Foreign Currency by Government and Self-sponsored Students Going Abroad,” ibid., 2189–2191. 21. Ma Daren, “From Studying Abroad to Staying Abroad: An Autobiography of a Chinese Student in the United States,” in Studying in the United States for Eighty Years, ed. Li Youning (New York: Outer Sky Press, 1999), vol. 2, 94. 22. Tong Te-kong, “An Account of a Student Worker,” ibid., 1:170. 23. Liu, Studying Abroad, 4:2139. 24. Ibid., 2192–2195. 25. “Arrival of Visiting Professors from China,” China Institute Bulletin 27:5–6. 26. “Chinese Professors and Research Workers Awarded U.S.C. Fellowships,” ibid., 45:2. 27. Liu, Studying Abroad, 4:2190–2191. 28. Y. C. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West, 1872–1949 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), 135–136. 29. American Institute of Paciﬁc Relations, “Current State of American Research on the Far East and the West Paciﬁc,” Far Eastern Quarterly 7 (May 1948, no. 3): 272–281. 30. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals, 136; Liu, Studying Abroad, 4:2186–2187. 31. “Sino-American Cultural Service Scholarship,” China Institute Bulletin 35:9. 32. “Chinese Government Awards Scholarships to American G.I.’s,” ibid., 1. 33. Joint Chiefs of Staff to Wedemeyer, August 10, 1945, FRUS, 1945, 528. 34. Hurley to the Secretary of State, August 31, 1945, ibid., 544. 35. Harry S. Truman, memorandum, December 12, 1945, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 173, Truman Library, Independence, MO. 36. Wedemeyer to Marshall, August 19, 1945, FRUS, 1945, 7:532. 37. Joint Chiefs of Staff to Wedemeyer, September 18, 1945, ibid., 565. 38. Vincent to Acheson, September 20, 1945, ibid., 567; Gary May, China Scapegoat: The Diplomatic Ordeal of John Carter Vincent (Washington, DC: New Republic Books, 1979), 135–137. 39. Clinton Anderson, Outsider in the Senate: Senator Clinton Anderson’s Memoirs (New York: World Publishing Co., 1970), 78. 40. FRUS, 1945, 7:767–770. 41. Marshall to Lehey, ibid., 748. 42. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), 147–148. 43. Marshall to Truman, May 22, 1946, FRUS, 1946, 9:882; notes by Marshall, May 22, 1946, ibid., 9:880–881. 44. United States Congress, Committee on the Judiciary, Institute of Paciﬁc Relations, Hearing, 82nd Congress, 1st and 2nd sess., 15 parts (Washington DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1951–1952), 2253–2254. 45. Marshall to Truman, December 25, 1946, FRUS, 1946, 10:665.

Notes to Pages 157–163

245

46. Minutes of meeting between General Marshall and Professor Chou Tsien-chung at Nanking, December 21, 1946, ibid., 648–649. 47. Marshall, memorandum of conversation, June 27, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 852. 48. May, China Scapegoat, 16. 49. State Department, U.S. Relations, 355. 50. Ibid., 351–353. 51. Ibid., 372–377. 52. Ibid., 387. 53. James Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, ed. Walter Millis (New York: Viking Press, 1951), 372. 54. American embassy at Nanking to the Secretary of State, May 31, 1946, State Department, Foreign Affairs Document and Reference Center, microﬁlm, cited in W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 107. 55. The group was led by Zhou Yang, vice president of the North China Associate University. The other three members included a dramatist, a mechanical engineer, and a chemist. Ibid., 108. 56. Ibid., 109. 57. Qinghua, Preliminary History, 464–465. 58. Ibid., 466. 59. Department of State, Regulations and Orders Pertaining to Foreign Surplus Disposal, State Department Publication 2704 (Washington DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1946), 2–3. 60. Walter Johnson and Francis Colligan, The Fulbright Program: A History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 20–21. 61. “Foreign Educational Beneﬁts and Surplus Property,” Senate Report No. 1039, 79th Congress, 2nd sess., March 12, 1946, 1. 62. Roger Swanson, “The Fulbright Program Is the Best Investment,” Kansas City Star, May 17, 1952. 63. Marshall to Koo, April 5, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 7:1263. 64. Secretary of State to American Embassy at Nanking, April 16, 1947, ibid., 1264. 65. Bennett, memorandum, May 9, 1947, Records of the Ofﬁce of Chinese Affairs, box 4. 66. American Embassy at Nanking to the Secretary of State, July 8, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 7:1279–1280. 67. Secretary of State to the American Embassy at Nanjing, July 30, 1947, ibid., 1280– 1281. 68. “China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Secretary of State Marshall Praise Work of China Institute,” China Institute Bulletin 45 (October 1947): 2. 69. American Embassy to the Secretary of State, August 19, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 7:1282–1283. 70. Secretary of State to the American Embassy at Nanking, ibid., 1289–1290. 71. Qinghua, Preliminary History, 467–469. 72. Secretary of State to the American Embassy at Nanking, November 8, 1947, Decimal Files, 811.42793 SE/11–847. 73. Secretary of State to the American Embassy at Nanjing, December 1, 1947, ibid., 811.42793/12–147. 74. American Embassy at Nanking to the Secretary of State, December 4, 1947, ibid., 811.42793/12–447.

246

Notes to Pages 163–168

75. American Embassy to the Secretary of State, December 5, 1947, cited in W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 167. 76. Secretary of State to the American Embassy at Nanking, December 18, 1947, Decimal Files, 811.42793/12–1847. 77. Secretary of State to the American Embassy at Nanking, January 19, 1948, ibid., 811.42793/1–1948. 78. Derk Bodde, Peking Diary: A Year of Revolution (New York: Henry Schuman, 1950), 1. 79. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 179. 80. American Embassy at Nanking to the Secretary of State, November 9, 1947, Decimal Files, 811.42793 SE/11–948. 81. W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 194–196. 82. American Embassy to the Secretary of State, July 16, 1949, Decimal Files, 811.42793 SE/769. 83. Ibid. 84. About the experiences and achievements of the ﬁrst group of Fulbright fellows, see W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 193–200. 85. China Institute in America, A Survey of Chinese Students in American Universities and Colleges in the Past One Hundred Years (New York: China Institute in America, 1954), 18. 86. United States Congress, Relief of Chinese Students, July 13, 1949, House Report 1039, 81st Congress, 1st sess., 2. 87. Stuart to the Secretary of State, August 23, 1948, U.S. Relations, 877–878. 88. Chih Meng to the Secretary of State, January 10, 1949, Decimal Files, 811.42793 SE/1–1049; New York Times, January 27, 1949, 1. 89. State Department, The Program of Emergency Aid to Chinese Students, 1949–1955 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1956), 3–4. 90. Chih Meng to the Secretary of State, January 10, 1949, Decimal Files, 811.42793 SE/1–1049. 91. State Department, The Program of Emergency Aid, 5. 92. New York Times, February 17, 1949, 11. 93. Webb to Hoffman, March 9, 1949, Decimal Files, 811.42793 SE/3–849; Hoffman to Webb, March 23, 1949, ibid., 811.42793 SE/3–2349. 94. Ibid., 811.42793 SE/3–849, 811.42793 SE/3–2349. 95. United States Congress, Relief, 4. 96. State Department, The Program of Emergency Aid, 6. 97. Hoffman to Cleveland, March 18, 1949, enclosure in Hoffman to Webb, March 23, 1949, Decimal Files, 811.42793 SE/3–2349. 98. Digest of Public General Bills, 81st Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1949), 410. 99. United States Congress, Relief, 2. 100. New York Times, July 4, 1949, 12. 101. United States Congress, Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st sess., vol. 95, part 10, 13541–13543. 102. State Department, The Program of Emergency Aid, 24. 103. United States Statutes at Large, vol. 63, pt. 1 (Washington DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1951), 711. 104. United States Congress, Relief, 8.

Notes to Pages 168–178

105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121.

122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132.

133. 134.

247

Ibid. United States Statutes, vol. 64, pt. 1, 202. State Department, The Program of Emergency Aid, 27. United States Statutes, vol. 64, 202. United States Congress, Relief, 2. New York Times, August 2, 1949, 12. McConaughy to the Secretary of State, November 16, 1949, Decimal Files, 811.42793 SE/11–1649. New York Times, September 21, 1950, 10. McConaughy to the Secretary of State, November 16, 1949, Decimal Files, 811.42793 SE/11–1649. Johnstone, memorandum, November 30, 1949, ibid., 811.42793 SE/12–549. Ibid. State Department, The Program of Emergency Aid, 8–15. Ibid., 16. United States Statutes, vol. 64, 202. State Department, The Program of Emergency Aid, 16–17. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals, 140. Wang Wenhua, A Chronology of Qian Xuesen (Chengdu: Sichuan Wenyi Chubanshe, 2001), 72–79; Wang Shouyun, “A Brief Biography of Qian Xueseng,” People’s Daily: Overseas Edition, November 1, 1991, 2. Wang, Qian Xuesen, 79–80. New York Times, September 21, 1950, 10; Zhu, Rooted, 335–336. Zhu, Rooted, 336. New York Times, March 9, 1951, 3. Ibid. Senate Bill 748, 82nd Congress, 1st sess., February 1, 1951. H.R. 3171, 82nd Congress, 1st sess., March 12, 1951. New York Times, April 15, 1951, 9. Holland, memorandum, undated, Records of the Ofﬁce of Chinese Affairs, box 27. Ibid. United States Congress, Relief, 2; Committee on Educational Interchange Policy, Chinese Students in the U.S., 1948–1955: A Study in Government Policy (New York, 1956), 5. State Department, The Program of Emergency Aid, 22–23. Committee on Educational Interchange Policy, Chinese Students, 10–11.

Chapter 7

A Historical Perspective

1. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals, xii–xiv, 502–503; Shu, The History, 211. 2. Li Xisuo, Modern Foreign-Educated Students and Cultural Exchange between China and Foreign Countries (Tianjin: Renmin Chubanshe, 1991), 4; Su, From Qinghua Academy, 377–398. 3. “Memo on the Management of Chinese Students Studying in Japan,” in Liu, Studying Abroad, 1:270–276. 4. Tian Zhengping, Returned Students and the Modernization of Chinese Education (Guangzhou: Guandong Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1996), 406–411. 5. China Institute in America, A Survey, 28.

248

Notes to Pages 178–183

6. William R. Wheeler et al., The Foreign Students in America (New York: Association Press, 1925), 11. 7. Samuel Paul Capen, “Opportunities for Foreign Students at Colleges and Universities in the United States,” United States Bureau of Education, Bulletin 27 (1915): 2–7. 8. Wheeler et al., The Foreign Students, 307. 9. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals, 43–45; China Institute in America, A Survey, 26. 10. China Institute in America, Theses and Dissertations by Chinese Students in America, n.d., 1. 11. China Institute in America, A Survey, 28–29; idem, China and America: A Chronicle of Cultural Relations, April–May, 1949, 10. 12. T’ung-li Yuan, A Guide to Doctoral Dissertations by Chinese Students in America, 1905–1960 (Washington, DC: Sino-American Cultural Society, 1961). 13. Zeng and Li, “Memo on Selecting,” 112–115. 14. “A Joined Memorial,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:116. 15. China Institute in America, A Survey, 34–35. 16. Ibid., 10. 17. Tian, Returned Students, 107–108. 18. Bai Yuntao, “Foreign-Educated Students and the Quantitative Analysis on Chinese Fellows,” Chinese Scholars Abroad, Februrary 25, 2005, http://www.chisa.edu.cn/ chisa/article/20050225/20050225002310_1.xml. 19. Nankai Daxue, The History of the Nankai University (Tianjin: Nankai Daxue Chubanshe, 1989), 119. 20. Leighton Stuart, Fifty Years in China: The Memoirs of John Leighton Stuart, Missionary and Ambassador (New York: Random House, 1954), 101. 21. Ren Hongjuan, “A Brief History of the Chinese Society of Science,” in Selected Records of Literature and History (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1961), 3. 22. Cai Yuanpei, “Autobiography,” in The Complete Collection of Cai Yuanpei’s Writings (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1984), 332. 23. Tian, Returned Students, 441–442. 24. Ibid., 354–357. 25. Ibid., 388–389; Hubert O. Brown, “American Progressivism in Chinese Education: The Case of Tao Xingzhi,” in Hayhoe and Bastid, China’s Education, 132. 26. Tian, Returned Students, 129. 27. Ibid., 128, 667–669; Xiao Tian and Ji Jin. A Biography of Hu Shi (Beijing: Tuanjie Chubanshe, 1999), 121–125, 28. Hu, Hu Shi, 731–732. 29. Yuan, A Guide. 30. Li, Modern Foreign-Educated Students, 332–334. 31. Zhuang Yu, “A Discussion on the Changes in the Textbook Editing in China,” in The Ninety Years of the Business Publisher (Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1987), 65. 32. Li, Modern Foreign-Educated Students, 337. 33. Hu, Hu Shi, 401–408. 34. Yuan, A Guide, 1–70. 35. Su, From Qinghua Academy, 313–331. 36. Xiao and Ji, Hu Shi, 129–136. 37. Fairbank, Chinabound, 38–40. 38. Bodde, Peking Diary.

Notes to Pages 183–191

249

39. Root to Rockhill, December 31, 1908, FRUS, 1908, 72–75. 40. Luo, “The Plan,” 12–13. 41. Luo Jialun, “President Luo’s Resignation and the University Administration Transition,” in Qinghua, Selected, 2:77. 42. Wang, Qian Xuesen, 21–27; Iris Chang, Thread of the Silkworm (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 27–34. 43. Relman Morin, East Wind Rising: A Long View of the Paciﬁc Crisis (New York, 1960), 134–135. 44. Xiao and Ji, Hu Shi, 31–34. 45. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals, 510–511. 46. “China Must Fight Japan—A Proclamation,” Chinese Student 1 (1935, no. 1): 4. 47. Ibid., 5. 48. Editorial, ibid., 3. 49. Ba Yin, “Resisting Japan and Uniting with the Communists,” ibid. 1 (April 1936, no. 7–8): 24–28. 50. Jerome B. Grieder, Intellectuals and the State in Modern China: A Narrative History (New York: Free Press, 1981), 340. 51. John Dewey, “Public Opinion in Japan,” New Republic, November 11, 1921. 52. Jerome B. Grieder, Hu Shi and the Chinese Renaissance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 247; Intellectuals, 340. 53. Grieder, Intellectuals, 341–344. 54. Stacey Bieler, “Patriots” or “Traitors”? A History of American-Educated Chinese Students (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), 259–260. 55. Charles W. Hayford, To the People: James Yen and Village China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 207. 56. Wu Han, “Wen Yiduo Who Smites the Table and Rises to His Feet with Anger,” in Qinghua Daxue Xiaoshi Yanjiushi, Biographies of Qinghua Alumni (Beijing: Qinghua Daxue Chubanshe, 1983), 1:86–89. 57. Sun Dunhuan, “Wen Yiduo,” in Qinghua Daxue Xiaoshi Yanjiushi, Heroes and Martyrs of Qinghua (Beijing: Qinghua Daxue Chubanshe, 1994), 174–188. 58. Huang Yanfu, “Mei Yiqi, 1882–1962,” in Qinghua Daxue Xiaoshi Yanjiushi, Biographies of Qinghua Alumni (Beijing: Qinghua Daxue Chubanshe, 1995), 3:18. 59. Fairbank, Chinabound, 198–199, 249–253. 60. Liu, Studying Abroad, 3:1665–1666, 4:2003–2006. 61. Chen Yufeng and Chen Yuhuang, eds., Historical Records of the Technical Personnel Sent by the Natural Resources Commission to the United States, 1942 (Taipei: National Archives, 1988), 1:468–504. 62. Wang, Qian Xuesen, 62–64; Chang, Thread, 130–139. 63. Qinghua, Biographies, 3:152–162. 64. Zhong Feng, “The Corrupt Fellow System in the Mainland,” Xinyusi, http://www. xys.org/xys/ebooks/others/science/dajia3/yuanshizhidu.txt. 65. Grieder, Hu Shi, 295–297, 311; Xiao and Ji, Hu Shi, 299–320. 66. Zhu, Rooted, 336. 67. Chang, Thread, 184–190. 68. Oumei Tongxuehui, Strive to Rejuvenate China: The Sequel (Beijing: Jingji Kexue Chubanshe, 1993), 22–36. 69. Li Songlin, Jiang Jieshi and His Son in Taiwan (Beijing: Zhongguo Youyi Chuban Gongsi, 1993), 29–30.

250

Notes to Pages 191–200

70. Chen, Lessons, 310. 71. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals, 123; Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, 160. 72. J. Manuel Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings of U.S. Cultural Diplomacy, 1936– 1948; W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments; William Kirby, “Intercultural Connections and Chinese Development: External and Internal Spheres of Modern China’s Foreign Relations,” in China’s Quest for Modernization: A Historical Perspective, ed. Frederick Wakeman Jr. and Wang Xi (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California–Berkeley, 1997), 208–223. 73. Meng Chih, “American Educational Inﬂuence on China: The American Returned Students of China,” in Chinese American Cultural Relations, ed. Chi-pao Cheng (New York: China Institute in America, 1965), 160. 74. “American Honored by Chiang Kai Shek for War Aid to China,” China Institute Bulletin 40 (February 1947): 2. 75. Lodge to Secretary of State, May 21, 1921, FRUS, 1921, 98–99. 76. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission, 2:774; Zhou Yin, “General Marshall’s Mission to China,” in Lishi Dangan (Historical Archives), February 1991, 29. 77. Qinghua, Selected, 3:520–523. 78. New York Times, March 9, 1951, 3. 79. Wei Gengfa and Qi Suying, Qian Xuesen: An Award-Winning Scientist for the Making of the Missile, Atomic Bomb, and Satellite (Shijiazhuang, Hebei: Hebei Shaonian Ertong Chubanshe, 2001), 202–239; Wang, “Qian Xuesen,” 2. 80. Zhao Xinshu and Xie Yu, “Western Inﬂuence on (People’s Republic of China) Chinese Students in the United States,” Comparative Education Review 36 (November 1992): 509–529. 81. Liu, Studying Abroad, 4:663–664. 82. Liang, About Wen Yiduo, 26–27. 83. Ibid., 47–51. 84. Fu, “My Reception,” 770–773. 85. Pan Chaoxuan, “A Review and Analysis of China’s Studying Abroad History,” in Selected Essays on Studying Abroad, ed. Fang Xiao (Xiamen: Xiamen Daxue Chubanshe, 1993), 116. 86. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals, 502–503. 87. Wang, Qian Xuesen, 62–63; Chang, Thread, 130–139. 88. Lin Cantian, “The Status and Analysis of Chinese Students in the United States,” in Fang, Selected Essays, 108. 89. Joseph W. Esherick, ed., Lost Chance in China (New York: Random House, 1974), xiv–xix. 90. Bodde, Peking Diary. 91. Ibid., xiv. 92. Ibid., 267–271. 93. United States Congress, Relief, 2. 94. Between 1942 and 1945, the American government spent $800,000 on its cultural relations program. At the same time, its total aid to China amounted to $1.5 billion. Chih Meng to the Secretary of State, January 10, 1949, Decimal Files, 811.42793 SE/1–1049. 95. State Department, The Program of Emergency Aid, 28. 96. The total amount of American aid to China from V-J Day to 1949 was over $2 billion, which included a large amount of weapons and equipment sold to China as

Notes to Pages 200–210

251

“surplus” materials for only a fraction of the original cost. The Ofﬁce of Far Eastern Affairs, memorandum, January 16, 1950, Records of the Ofﬁce of Chinese Affairs, box 26.

Epilogue 1. Xie Qigang, “For the Sake of Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s Request,” Chinese Scholars Abroad, June 20, 2003, http://www.chisa.edu.cn/newchisa/web/0/2003–06–20/ news_2772.asp. 2. David M. Lampton, A Relationship Restored: Trends in U.S.-China Educational Exchange, 1978–1984 (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1986), 20. 3. Leo A. Orleans, Chinese Students in America: Policies, Issues, and Numbers (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1988), 23. 4. Lampton, A Relationship Restored, 233–238. 5. Orleans, Chinese Students, 88. 6. Institute of International Education, Open Door, 1993/94–2002/03. 7. Orleans, Chinese Students, 186. 8. Ibid., 44–49. 9. Ibid., 33–34. 10. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals, 510–511. 11. Lampton, A Relationship Restored, 38–39. 12. Institute of International Education, Open Door, 1993/94. 13. Orleans, Chinese Students, 38–39, 94–95. 14. Lampton, A Relationship Restored, 66–71. 15. John S. Service, “The Views of Mao Tse-tung: America and China,” in Esherick, Lost Chance, 373. 16. Song Jian, ed., Biographies of the Heroes Who Built Missiles, Nuclear Bombs, and Satellites (Beijing: Qinghua Daxue Chubanshe, 2001). 17. Wei and Qi, Qian Xuesen, 344–345. 18. Jonathan Spence, To Change China: Western Advisers in China, 1620–1960 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969). 19. U.S. Congress, Fourteenth Semiannual Report on Educational Exchange Activities, 84th Congress, 1st sess., House Document No. 219 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1955), 7. 20. Lampton, A Relationship Restored, 11–12. 21. Li Ze, “Looking Back at the 25 Years of Studying Abroad at Academia Sinica,” China Scholars Abroad, http://www.chisa.edu.cb/newschisa/wen/0/2003–06–20/ news_833.asp. 22. “Sources: The Four Phases for Chinese Students Seeking Education Abroad since the Beginning of Opening and Reform,” ibid., http://www.chisa.edu.cn/newschisa/ wen/0/2003–06–20/news_2765.asp. 23. Institute of International Education, Open Door, 2005, http://opendoors.iienetwork. org/?p=69736.

Appendix 1. Root to William Rockhill, December 31, 1908, FRUS, 1908, 74. 2. Data drawn from “A Complete List of all Presidents,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:16–18.

252

Notes to Pages 211–215

3. Based on “A Comparative Table for Annual Expenditures for the University and Students in the United States, 1912–1928,” in Qinghua, Selected, 1:432–434. 4. This table is based on Special Issue on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Qinghua National University, 1931, and on the student lists included in Appendix I–II, Qinghua, Selected, vol. 2, part 1, 636–647. 5. Data drawn from Appendix IV–VII, W. Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiments, 214–221. 6. Based on data from “Current State of American Research on the Far East and the Western Paciﬁc,” American Institute of Paciﬁc Relations, Far Eastern Quarterly 7 (May 1948): 272–281. 7. Bai Yuntao, “Returnees and Fellows of Chinese Science Academy,” Chinese Scholars Abroad, http://www.chisa.edu.cn/chisa/article/20050225/20050225002310_1.xml.

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index

Abeel, David, 10, 20 Academia Sinica, 99, 179, 190, 215 Acheson, Dean, 156–157, 168 Additional Articles to the Treaty of Tientsin, 18. See also Burlingame Treaty Administrative Committee on College Affairs (Xiaowu Guanli Weiyuanhui), 88 Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, 171 American Airlines, 131 American Association of International Conciliation, 181 American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 9–11, 14, 21 American China Development Company, 52–53 American Defense-Harvard Group, 141 American-educated students, 5 American factory, 8–9, 11 American Land (Meiguo Di), 72 American merchants, 7–10 American Military Assistance Advisory Group, 157 American Revolution, 32 Anglo-Chinese Educational Committee, 77 anti-American boycott of 1905, 40, 43–44, 47, 52, 54 anti-Chinese boycotts, 43, 53 anti-Chinese immigration laws, 40–41 Arndt, C. O., 146 Arthur, Chester A., 32

Atlantic Charter, 141 Ba, Yin, 187 Bacon, Robert, 57 Bai, Congxi, 118 Baker, J. E., 84 Baldwin, C.C., 21 Bank of China (Zhongguo Yinhang), 113 Bank of Communication (Jiaotong Yinhang), 113 Barrett, Edward B., 172 Bastid, Marianne, 29 Beijing University, 24, 80, 89 180. See also Capital University; Jingshi Daxuetang Beiyang Xuetang, 39 benevolent school (yixue), 22 Bennett, Charles R., 84, 143 Benton, William, 193 Biddle, Francis, 132 Bin, Zhi, 180 Bliss, Tusker H., 80 Blue Shirt Society (Lanyi She), 120 Board of Directors (Dongshihui), 181 Board of Foreign Scholarships, 163 Board of Qinghua College Endowment, 70 Bodde, Derk, 163–164, 183, 198–199 Bolton, Francis, 168 Boone, William, 20 Boone University, 82 Borthwick, Sally, 107

273

274

Boston Chamber of Commerce, 32 Boston Merchants Association, 32 Boxer Indemnity: control of, 89–90, 192–193; ﬁrst return of, 34, 49–63, 67, 69; receiving of, 101–103, 134; second return of, 78–87; success of, 160–161, 200, 223n138; use of, 73–76, 97, 129, 136, 183, 209 Boxer Rebellion, 19, 30, 33, 50, 59, 80 Bridgman, Elijah C., 10–12, 16 Brown, Elmer E., 73 Brown, Samuel R., 12–13, 23 Buck, Peter, 217n3 Bullock, Mary Brown, 217n3 Burdon, J.S., 23 Bureau of Census, 132, 218n9 Bureau of Foreign Affairs, 152 Burlingame, Anson, 18, 24 Burlingame Treaty, 18, 26, 29, 41. See also Additional Articles to the Treaty of Tientsin Business Publisher (Shangwu Yinshuguan), 182 Cai, Yuanpei, 93, 100, 180–181 Caldwell, Robert, 142 Calhoun, W. J., 74 California Institute of Technology, 172–173, 190 Cao, Yunxiang, 87–89, 210 Cao Yu, 149 Capital University, 32, 36, 38, 45, 49, 223n7. See also Beijing University; Jingshi Daxuetang Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 77 Carter, Jimmy, 205 Central Bank (Zhongyang Yinhang), 113, 165 Central Kingdom, 16 Central Military Committee, 114 Central News Agency (Zhongyang Xinwenshe), 142 Central Party School (Zhongyang Dangwu Xuexiao), 94 Central Training Corp (Zhongyang Xunliantuan), 139–140 Central University, 135

Index

Chan, Fook Tim, 146 Chen, Cheng, 152 Chen, Cunxuan, 49 Chen, Daisun, 137 Chen, Dingmo, 182 Chen, Hengzhe, 75 Chen, Jian, 217n1 Chen, Jucai, 15 Chen, Lanbin, 25, 27 Chen, Lifu, 78, 96, 103, 114, 120–121, 140, 142, 189–191 Chen, Yikan, 43 Chen, Yinke, 87 Cherrington, Benjamin, 124 Cheshire, Fleming D., 55 Chiang Kai-shek, 158. See also Jiang, Jieshi China, People’s Republic of, 148, 170, 191–192, 195 China Aid Act of 1948, 168 China Aid Act of 1950, 168, 171 China cultural relations program, 125, 127, 129, 194 China Enters the Machine Age, 146 China Institute in America, 104, 121, 130, 144, 150–151, 155, 161, 178 “China Jail,” 30–31 China Lobby, 198 China National Association for the Advancement of Education, 82 China Supply Commission, 150 Chinese Educational Association, 89 Chinese Educational Mission to the United States, 24–27, 32, 54, 196 Chinese Exclusion Act, 29 Chinese exclusion laws, 31, 43–45, 47–49, 192 Chinese exclusion policy, 47–48, 54–55 Chinese Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture (CFPEC): cooperation with, 134; expansion of, 96; founding of, 83–84, 193; history of, 234n39; reorganization of, 90, 100–107, 124 Chinese Relief Expedition, 50 Chinese Society of Science (Zhongguo Kexueshe), 180 Chinese Students Alliance, 108, 180

Index

Chinese Students Association of North America, 186 Chinese Students’ Christian Organization, 173, 194 Chinese Students’ Monthly, 108 civil service examination system, 5, 28–29, 34–38, 49, 183 Cohen, Warren I., 20, 217n1 Cold War, 5–6, 171, 192, 195, 205, 206 Collins, Judson, 21 Colorado College, 196 Columbia University, 64, 83, 98–99, 142, 146, 180, 182 Commercial Treaty of 1903, 19 Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People’s Republic of China (CSCPRC), 205 Committee on the Preservation of the Endowment for Qinghua School and Educational Mission in the United States, 70 Committee on Wartime Planning, 130, 149 common schools, 3 Communist China, 6, 170, 174, 198 Communist Party: American, 172; Chinese, 159, 198 Communist regime, 6, 170 Compton, Karl, 131 Confucianism, 4, 182 Confucian classics, 4, 34 Conger, Edwin H., 41, 50 Coolidge, Calvin, 83–84 Coolidge, Mary, 30 Coordinator of Information, 135 Cornell University, 55, 64, 99, 115, 180–182 Corson Browning Prize, 181 Council of the Educational Administration (Jiaoyu Xingzheng Weiyuanhui), 117 Council of Three, 79 credit-hour system, 66, 180 Crescent Moon (Xinyue), 188 Cressey, George, 124–125 Cullom, Shelby M., 55 cultural imperialism, 145 cultural interaction, 7 cultural relations, 104, 125, 127, 146, 149, 160, 206

275

Cultural Revolution, 206 Cunningham, Edwin S., 77, 82 Currie, Lauchlin, 123, 137 Cushing, Caleb, 15–16 Dai, Jitao, 96 Dai, Li, 141 Danton, George, 82 Daoism, 182 Daugherty, Harry M., 78 Davis, John Paton, 198 Democratic League of China, 189 Deng, Jiaxian, 206 Denby, Charles, 19 Deng, Peng, 217n7 Deng, Xiaoping, 202, 205–207 Dengzhou College, 22 Dengzhou (Tengchou) School, 22 Dennett, Tyler, 8–9, 218n2 Department of Agriculture, 132, 135 Department of Education, 203 Department of Homeland Security, 6 Department of Interior, 146 Department of Justice, 78, 131, 144, 173–174 Department of Labor, 77 Department of State: aid to Chinese students in the United States during and after World War II, 170–174, 192; China cultural relations program, 124–126, 128–136, 138 140–144, 149– 151, 213; establishment of diplomatic relations with China, 15–16; Fulbright program, 155, 160–168; impact of McCarthyism, 199; involvement in the education of Chinese students in the United States, 26, 30, 192, 203; management of Qinghua, 69–71, 76–78; negotiation of immigration treaty with China, 41–42, 44–46; protection for American missionaries in China, 19; return of the Boxer Indemnity, 55, 58–59, 64, 81–84; visa policy toward Chinese students, 6 Department of Treasury, 30–31, 40–41, 84, 132, 138 Dewey, John, 182, 187–188 Dickson, Virgil, 146

276

Ding, Wenjiang, 87, 100 Division of Cultural Relations, 124–126, 130, 132–133, 136, 138, 144, 146 Division of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 192 Division of Far Eastern Affairs, 124, 133, 156. See also Ofﬁce of Far Eastern Affairs Drygan, Stephen, 130 Duan, Fang, 33, 40, 50 East India Company, 9 East India Squadron, 14 Eastern Zhou Dynasty (771–221 BCE), 4 Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), 166–168, 171 educational exchange: as closet tie in U.S.-China relations, 1–6, 176–177; as a front in World War II, 122–124, 129, 133; as government experiment, 62, 66–67, 69, 73–75, 85; as a two-way street, 145–151, 155, 158, 160, 163; as provided by treaties, 17; beginning of, 32, 38; central administration of, 92, 99–100, 105, 107, 114; Chinese civil war and, 169, 175; government support for, 50, 59, 97, 183–185; historical impact of, 191–195, 198–200, 202, 204–208; under the Nationalist Party control, 119, 137, 139, 142–144. See also educational interactions educational front, 129, 144 educational interactions, 1–3, 6, 32, 59, 92, 122, 175, 192. See also educational exchange educational relations, 2–3; 5–6, 9, 104, 161, 176, 205–206 educational sovereignty, 118 educational ties, 1. See also educational relations eight-leg essay (bagu), 35–36 Eight-Power Alliances, 33 elective system, 180–181 Emergency Aid Program, 167–169, 171, 174. See also Program of Emergency Aid to Chinese Students emergency aid to Chinese students, 164, 166

Index

Emergency Medical Training School, Chinese Army, 134 Emperor Daoguang, 17 Empress Cixi, 36–37 Empress of China, 7–8 Endeavor (Nuli Zhoubao), 188 Europe First Strategy, 122–123, 194 European Recovery Act (Marshall Plan), 158 Everett, Edward, 15 Executive Central Committee, Nationalist Party, 117 Executive Yuan (Xingzheng Yuan), 101, 114, 188 Export-Import Bank, 157 Faculty Council (Jiaoshouhui), 88, 96, 181 Fairbank, John King, 135–137, 146–147, 158, 182, 189, 191 Fairbank, Wilma, 133, 137, 217n4, Fan, Xuji, 190 Fan, Yuanlian, 62, 65, 67, 70–71, 87, 105 Farm Credit Administration, 132 Farmers’ Bank (Nongmin Yinhang), 113 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 172 Fei, Qihe (Fu, Chi Ho), 30, 197 Fei, Xiaotong, 145 Feng, Youlan, 163, 199 Feng, Yuxiang, 92, 113 Fenn, William Purvience, 217n3 Fish, Hamilton, 18 Fong-wang-tu Academy (Fanwangdu Shuyuan), 44 Foreign Aid Appropriation Act of 1950, 167 Foreign Currency Purchase Application Form, 113 Foreign Economic Administration, 143, 150 foreign exchange, 113 Foreign Fellowship, 105–106 Foreign Ministry: involvement in educational exchange, 57–58, 61–62, 65, 67, 69, 140, 161; protest of the Chinese exclusion policy, 43; taking over of Qinghua, 71, 93, 95–96. See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs Foster, David J., 48

Index

Four Books, 10 Four Generations under One Roof (Sishi Tongtang), 149 Four Modernizations, 206 Fourteen Points, 78–79 freedom of speech, 186–187, 189 Fryer, John, 23, 40, 73–74 Fu, Sinian, 173 Fujian Shipyard, 33 Fulbright Act, 160 Fulbright Agreement, 148, 155, 160–162, 164, 194 Fulbright Bill, 160 Fulbright Fellow, 163–164 Fulbright, J. William, 160 Fulbright Program, 148, 155, 161–163, 194, 205 Fulbright Scholars, 155, 164, 183, 198 Gauss, Clarence, 126–129, 133, 138, 141–143 gongsheng, 36 Goodnow, John, 46 Goodrich, Carrington, 142 Government Council (Zhengfuyuan), 93 government-sponsored student (gongfeisheng), 110–116, 138–140, 142, 153, 189 government-subsidized student (ban gongfeisheng), 110 Grand Canal, 82 Grant, Benjamin, 150 Greeks, 2 Greene, Roger, 84, 124, 131 Gresham-Yang Treaty, 41, 44, 48 Grieder, Gerome, 187 Gross, Earnest A., 167 Grummon, Stuart E., 125–127, 129–131 Guangxu Emperor, 36 Guangzhou (Canton), 3, 7–12, 14–15, 23–24, 30 Guangzhou trade system, 8 Guo, Binwen (Kuo, Pin-wen), 180 Guo, Songtao, 23 Hamilton, Maxwell, 124 Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), 4 hang (hong), 8

277

Hangzhou Presbyterian College, 22 Hankou-Guangzhou (HankowKuangchou) railroad incident, 52 Hankow (Hankou) railroad concession, 48, 53 Hanlin Yuan, 25 hard power, 4, 217n8 Harris, George, 163–164 Harrison, William Henry, 14 Harvard University, 54, 64, 98, 146, 182 Harvard-Yenching Institute, 137 Hay, John, 31, 40–42, 47, 50–52, 226n80 Hayhoe, Ruth, 217n3 high culture, 2 Hill, David J., 41 History of Chinese Philosophy, 163 Hoffman, Paul, 166–167, 171 Hornbeck, Stanley, 124, 130 Hospital of Universal Love, 11–12 Hospitality Committees, 150 Hsü, C. Y., 7 Hu, Da, 181 Hu, Dunfu, 72 Hu, Mingfu, 180 Hu, Shi: as an advisor to Qinghua University, 87; as Chinese ambassador to the United States, 115, 122, 125, 130, 145, 149; as a professor at Beijing University, 180–182; educational experience in the United States, 99–101, 186–188, 193; relations with Jiang Jieshi, 190 Hua Luogeng, 140, 152 Huai River, 82 Huang, Tianfu, 182 Huang, Yanpei, 100 Huangpu (Whampoa), 7–8 Hughes, Charles Evans, 80–82, 84 Hull, Cordell, 132, 143 Hundred-Day Reform (Bairi Weixin), 36 Hurley, Patrick, 156–157, 194, 198 Huston, James, 78, 82 Immigration and Naturalization Service, 132, 172, 174 Imperial Qinghua Academy (Diguo Qinghua Xuetang), 65. See also Qinghua Xuetang

278

Indemnity Scholarships, 110 Indemnity students, 60, 64–67, 178–179 Independent Critic (Duli Pinglun), 188 Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton University, 140 Institute of International Education, 130, 204 intercultural relations, 3, 9, 175 International Missionary Union, 31 International Protocol of 1901, 59. See also Treaty of 1901 (Xinchou Heyue) international relations, 2, 6 Israel, John, 121 Iriye, Akira, 2, 217n2 James, Edward J., 55 Japanese, 2, 32 Jenks, Jeremiah, 55 Jiang, Jieshi (Chiang, Kai-shek): control of educational exchange, 114, 117–119, 121, 138–140, 142–143; establishment of the Nationalist regime, 92; intellectuals antagonized by, 188–191, 198–200; relations with the United States,122–123, 152, 156–159, 161–162, 167; taking over of Qinghua University, 94, 96 Jiang, Jieshi, Madame, 147 Jiang, Mengling, 96, 101, 134, 181 Jiang, Zemin, 206 Jiangnan Zhizaoju, 35 Jiaotong University, 180, 186, 190, 197 Jin, Bangzheng, 90, 210 Jinchun Garden, 68 Jingshi Daxuetang (Capital University), 24 jinshi (advanced scholar), 4, 36 Johnson, Stephen, 21 Johnston, William, 170–171 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 156–158 Journal of Science (Kexue), 180 Judd, Walter, 167–168, 170 juren (elevated man), 4, 36 Kearny, Lawrence, 14–15 Kellogg, Frank B., 84 King, Edward, 15 Kirby, William, 2, 217n2 Klein, Arthur G., 174 Knights of Labor, 30

Index

Knox, Philander, 74 Kong, Xiangxi (Kung, Hsiang His), 30, 113 Koo, Wellington, 83, 155, 160, 166 Korean War, 1, 6, 168–169, 172, 191, 194 Kuomintang, 117, 141. See also Nationalist Party Lampton, David, 202 Lansing, Robert 80 Lao She (Shu, Sheyu), 149 Lapham, Roger, 166 Lay, Julius, 45–46 League of Nations, 79 League of Purity (Qingbai Tuan), 120 Legal Paper Currency (Fabi), 113, 153 Lend-Lease aid, 122–123, 126, 133, 150, 157 Liang, Cheng, 41–43, 51–52, 56 Liang, Dunyan, 60–61 Liang, Fa, 11 Liang, Qichao, 87 Liang, Shiqiu, 196 Lianzhou (Lienchou) incident, 53 Li, Dingyi, 8 Li, Duanfen, 36 Li, Gongpu, 189 Li, Hongzhang, 23–24, 26, 28–30 Li, Shuhua, 134 Li, Xisuo, 176 Li, Zhaohuan, 186 Li, Zhengdao, 152 Library of Congress, 76, 129, 132, 147 Lin, Zexu, 11 Linthicum, J. Charles, 82–83 Literary Revolution, 187 Liu, Fukang, 119 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 47, 80–81, 83 London Missionary Society, 9 Lord Napier, 11 Low, Frederick, 18 Lucun Nongtian (Farm Fields of Village Lu), 145 Lu, Yongling, 217n3 Lugou (Marco Polo) Bridge, 102. See also Marco Polo Bridge Luo, Jialun, 94–96, 109, 118–119, 185–186, 190 Luo, Longji, 189

Index

Luo, Shijun, 173 Lutz, Jessie Gregory, 217n3 Ma, Daren, 153 Maclay, Robert, 21 MacMurray, John Van, 81–85, 93–94, 96–97, 101 Madison, James, 9 Magnuson, Warren, 173 Mansﬁeld, Mike, 167 Manson Academy, 23 Mao, Zedong, 206 Marco Polo Bridge, 113, 190. See also Lugou Bridge Marshall, George C., 123, 157–162, 166 Marshall Plan (European Recovery Act), 158 mass education, 188 Mass Educational Movement (Pingmin Jiaoyu Yundong), 188 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 64, 98, 131, 142, 190 Mateer, Calvin, 22 Martin, W.A.P., 18, 21, 24, 36, 53, 219n54, 220n71 May Fourth Movement, 90 McCartee, D.B., 21 McCarthy, Joseph, 199 McConaughy, 170 McKeown, Adam, 49 McLean, A.S., 25 Mei, Yiqi, 103–104, 109, 134, 136, 140, 189–190 Meng, Chih (Meng Zhi), 104, 121, 130–131, 144, 166 Metcalf, Victor, 42, 47–48, 51 Miami University, 47 Microﬁlm Project, 135–136 Military Academy, West Point, 26, 209 Military Commission, 152 Ministry of Economy, 139, 143 Ministry of Education: dealing with foreign aid, 133–135; establishment of, 38–39, 50; handling of educational exchange, 77, 108–115, 120, 138–140, 142–147, 153–154, 161, 177; management of Qinghua, 60–61, 71, 96, 102–103; reform of Chinese schools, 67, 180–181, 203

279

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 42, 52, 57, 94–95, 107, 109, 140, 161. See also Foreign Ministry Military of Military Affairs, 152 Ministry of Transportation, 139 missionaries, American: arrival in China, 3, 7; involvement in treaty making, 16–18; saved by Chinese, 30; sending Chinese students to the United States, 23, 27; as students of Chinese language, 10–11, 28; work in India, 9; working among the Americans, 13–16. See also missionary schools, American missionary enterprise, American, 1, 218n9 missionary schools, American, 2, 13, 21–22, 27–29, 33, 40, 63, 118 Mo, John, 105 modern schools, in China, 5, 24, 34–37, 63 Monroe, Harriet, 99 Monroe, Paul, 83–84, 100–101, 106 Morgan, J.P., 53 Morin, Relman, 186 Morrison Education Society, 12–13 Morrison Memorial School, 12–13 Morrison, Robert, 9–13 Mr. “D” (Democracy), 5 Mr. “S” (Science), 5 Mu, Zhanga, 17 Nankai University, 102, 180 Nanking (Nanjing) University, 125 Nanyang Gongxue, 36. See also Public College of South Sea National Academy of Science, 203 National Academy of Social Sciences, 203 National Affairs Council, 96 National Association of Foreign Student Advisors, 166 National Endowment of the Humanities, 203 National Health Administration, 134 National Library of Beijing, 147 National Program for Advanced Research and Study in China, 205 National Qinghua University, 94 National Research Council, 135 National Science Foundation, 203 National Security Council, 158

280

National Taiwan University, 173 Nationalist Party (Guomindang): control of scholars, 92, 94; indoctrination by, 116–117, 119–121, 139; intellectuals antagonized by, 187, 189–191; management of educational exchange, 100; newspaper published by, 112 Nationalist regime: administration of educational exchange, 4, 93–94, 107, 116, 121, 148, 154–156, 169; intellectual antagonized by, 165, 199; reform of missionary schools, 118; relations with the United States, 194; thought control imposed by, 140, 185, 188–192 Natural Resources Commission, 190 Naval Academy, Annapolis, 26 Naval Academy of the North Sea (Beiyang Shuishi Xuetang), 35 Nevius, John Livingston, 21 New Cultural Movement (Xinwenhua Yundong), 99 new deals (xinzheng), 52 New England, 3, 9, 25 New Youth (Xin Qingnian), 188 Nixon, Richard, 202 Nobel Prize, 150 North China University, 22 Northeaster Associate University, 136 Northern Expedition, 92, 117 Northrop, B.G., 25 Nye, Joseph, Jr., 218n8 Oberlin College, 30, 197 Ofﬁce of China Educational Mission to America (OCEMA), 62–63, 65–67, 70. See also Youmei Xuewuchu Ofﬁce of Coordinator of Information, 129 Ofﬁce of Education, U.S. Department of Interior, 132, 146, 165 Ofﬁce of Educational Exchange, U.S. Department of State, 166, 170 Ofﬁce of Far Eastern Affairs: U.S. Department of State, 141, 161. See also Division of Far Eastern Affairs ofﬁcial degrees, 4, 28–29. See also xiucai; juren; jinshi Ohio State University, 106 Olyphant, D.W.C., 10

Index

Open Door, 47, 222n131 Opium War, 15, 19, 23 Orleans, Leo, A., 202 Oxford University, 183 Paris Peace Conference, 78–80, 85–87, 193 Paris Peace Treaty, 80 Parker, Peter, 11–12, 14, 16 partiﬁcation (danghua), Nationalist, 116 Party Affairs Training Class (Dangwu Xunlianban), 139 party doctrine (dangyi), 119 party education (danghua jiaoyu), 117–120, 185–186 Peck, Willys, 82–83, 124–125, 138, 143–144, 146 Peking Men (Beijing Ren), 149 Peking Union Medical College, 217n3 Peking University, 22, 102, 159 Perry, Ralph B., 142 Peterson, Howard, 155 Phi Beta Kappa, 181 political tutelage, 117 Porter, Stephen D., 81–83 Peterson, Glen, 217n3 Powderly, Terence, 30 Preparatory Committee on Qinghua School Endowment, 69 Prince Gong, 23 Prince Qing (Ch’ing), 41 Princeton University, 64, 140, 188 private schools, 4 Program of Emergency Aid to Chinese Students, 166–168, 200. See also Emergency Aid Program Progressive Party, 181 Provincial Societies of Education, 181 Public College of South Sea, 35. See also Nanyang Gongxue Purdue University, 131 Pye, Lucian, 155 Qi, Ying, 17 Qian, Sanqiang, 206 Qian, Xuesen (Tsien, Hsueh-shen), 172–173, 186, 190, 195, 196, 206 Qilu (Cheeloo) University, 22, 125. See also Shandong Christian University

Index

Qing Dynasty (1644–1911), 4, 221n91, 107, 112 Qinghua, 60, 85–91, 94, 196 Qinghua College, 67–71, 76, 84, 93 Qinghua College Committee, 68–70 Qinghua endowment, 69–70, 94–97, 101–103 Qinghua examination for professional students, 78 Qinghua Garden, 64–65 Qinghua Scholarships, 87, 116, 183 Qinghua School Reorganization Committee (Qinghua Xuexiao Gaizu Weiyuanhui), 88 Qinghua Students: achievements of, 97–99, 234n30; in May Fourth Movement, 80; involvement in Qinghua reorganization, 88–89, 96; in the United States, 109, 150, 179, 211; in World War II, 102; under the Nationalist rule, 118, 185–186, 188 Qinghua University (Qinghua Daxue): anti-American movement in, 159; establishment of, 87; impact of World War II, 136–137; inﬂuence of, 180, 184; involvement in Fulbright Program, 163; management of, 210–211, 226n101; Nationalist reform of, 93–105, 193–194; sending students to the United States, 107, 109, 111, 116, 202; under the Nationalist rule, 118–119, 140, 185, 189–190 Qinghua Xuetang (Qinghua Academy), 65–67, 182 Qinghua Xuexiao (Qinghua School), 64, 67–76, 82, 94, 188, 232n144 Qu, Lihe, 40 Red Menace, 206 Redﬁeld, Greta, 146 Reed, William Bradford, 17 Reese, William J., 217n6 Regulations on National Universities (Guoli Daxue Zhangcheng), 181 Regulations on Sending Self-Sponsored Students Abroad (Guowai Liuxue Zifeisheng Paiqian Banfa), 140

281

Reinsch, Paul, 68–71, 75–77, 86 Ren, Hongjuan, 106, 180 Revolution of 1911, 66–67, 181 Rockefeller Foundation, 154, 217n3 Rockhill, William, 42, 44, 46, 51–59, 61 Rodgers, James L., 45–46 Romans, 2 Rong, Kui, 63 Rong, Qing, 37–38 Roosevelt, Eleanor, 132 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 123, 198 Roosevelt, Theodore, 31, 40–41, 44–49, 52–57, 59, 222n131 Root, Elihu, 54–56, 58, 77 Rubinstein, Murray, 9, 218n9 Russell, Bertrand, 68 Russian Revolution, 85 Sargent, 46 Sargent, Clide B., 125 Schereschewsky, Samuel, 22 School Reform Decree of 1922, 181 School System Reform Bill, 181 Schuﬁeld, Lamuel B., 132 Schurman, Jacob Gould, 82–83 science education, 106, 180 Scientiﬁc Research Fellow, 105–106 Scientiﬁc Teaching Fellowship, 106 Scientiﬁc Workers Association of Engineering and Chemistry, 173 Seamen’s Friend Society, 10 Second Great Awakening, 9 Second Opium War, 17, 23 self-sponsored student (zifeisheng), 110–111, 113–116, 138, 140, 153, 183, 189 self-strengthening movement, 23 Senate (Pingyihui), 88, 96, 181 Service, John S., 141, 198 Seward, William, 18 Shandong Chamber of Commerce, 79 Shandong Christian University, 22. See also Qilu (Cheeloo) University Shandong Educational Association, 79 Shang Dynasty (1775–1122 BCE), 4 Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, 42, 44–46 Shanghai Evening News and Mercury, 142

282

Shanghai Student Association (Hu Xue Hui), 44 Shanghai Student Union, 79 Shaw, Samuel, 9, 218n6 Shen, Cong, 159 Shen, Shanjong, 173 Sheng, Xuanhuai, 35, 39 Shi, Guokui, 146 Shotwell, James T., 126 Shu, Sheyu (Shu, Shehyu or Lao She), 149 Shu, Xincheng, 176 Sichuan (Szechwan) University, 135, 141 Sigma Xi, 181 Sino-Japanese War, 35 Smith, Arthur, 54 Smith, E. K., 72 Smith-Mundt Act, 165 Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, 11 soft power, 4, 218n8 Song Dynasty, 80 Song, Ziwen (Song, T. V.), 122, 143, 188 Southeastern University (Dongnan Daxue), 89, 180 Southwestern Associate University (Xinan Lianhe Daxue), 102, 135–136, 152, 189 space industry, 195 Sprouse, Philip, 140 St. John, Burton, 74 St. John’s University, 22 Stark, Harold, 123 State Science and Technology Commission, 203 Stevens, Edwin, 11 Stilwell, Jesoph, 123, 194 Straight, Willard, 55 Stuart, John Leighton, 158, 160, 162, 180 Student Association, Qinghua, 90 Student Supervision Ofﬁce of Qinghua University, 109 Study Abroad Permit, 110–111, 113–115, 138, 185 Sui Dynasty (581–618), 4, 34 Sun, Jianai, 36 Sun, Yat-sen, 85, 100, 117, 186 Su, Yunfeng, 73, 88, 176 Surplus Property Act of 1944, 160

Index

Syracuse University, 124 Taft, William Howard, 47, 55, 74 Tang, Aoqing, 152 Tang, Guoan, 62–65, 67–68, 70, 210 Tang, Shaoyi (T’ang Shao-i), 56, 58 Tang, Yue, 182 Tang, Yueliang, 93 Tang Dynasty (619–896), 4, 34 Tao, Xingzhi, 181 Taylor, H.A., 31 Temporary Committee on University Affairs, 87 Temporary University (Linshi Daxue), 102 Tennessee Valley Administration, 132 Thompson, Charles A., 124 thought control, 118, 120, 139–143, 185, 187, 192 Three Principles of the People (Sanmin Zhuyi), 116–118, 140, 151, 187 Tiananmen incident, 6, 207 Tianjin Intermediate School, 74 Tianjin Military Academy (Tianjin Wubei Xuetang), 35 Tong, Te-kong, 153 Tong, Y.C., 65 Tong, Y. L., 145 Tongwenguan, , 23–24, 28, 35–36, 221n91 Tracy, Ira, 11 Treaty of Bogue, 15–16 Treaty of 1894, 31 Treaty of 1901 (Xinchou Heyue), 36. See also International Protocol of 1901 Treaty of Nanking, 15 Treaty of Tientsin, 17, 20, 23 Treaty of Wanghsia, 16–17, 21 Truman administration, 194 Truman, Harry S., 156–159, 163, 167 Tseng, Tong, 30 tutelage government, 188 Twiss, George, 106 Tyler, John, 15 Union Mission University, 76 United China Relief, 133–134 United Nations Education Conference, 149 United States-China relations, 1–2, 7, 17, 20, 33

Index

United States Educational Foundation in China (USEFC), 160, 162–164 United States Information Agency, 202, 205 United States Information Service, 163 United States International Communications Agency, 205. See also United States Information Agency University Affairs Committee, Qinghua University, 103 University Council (Daxueyuan), 93, 96. 117–118 University of California, Berkeley, 40, 71, 73 University of Chicago, 75, 98, 146 University of Edinburgh, 23 University of Illinois, 55, 64 University of London, 71 University of Michigan, 131 University of Pennsylvania, 163 University of Wisconsin, 64, 67, 77, 98 University Planning Committee (Daxue Choubei Weiyuanhui), 86 Van Buren, Martin, 14 Van Name, A., 27 Vassar College, 75 Village Education, 180 Vincent, John Carter, 156–157, 198 visa review process, 6 visible hand, 33 Vocabulary of the Cantonese Dialect, 10 vocational education, 180 Wah, Yip, 30–31 Wang, Daxie, 69 Wang, Guowei, 87 Wang, Jingwei, 100–101 Wang, Shijie (Wang, Shih-chieh), 161 Wang, Wenxian, 71, 210 Wang, Xiji, 206 Wang, Y. C., 176, 197 Wang, Zhengting (Wang, C. T.), 93 Wangxia (Wanghsia), 15 warlord period, 73 Webb, James, 166 Webster, Daniel, 14 Webster, Fletcher, 16

283

Webster, Harriet, 14 Wedemeyer, Albert Coady, 156, 194 Wellesley College, 54 Wen, Yiduo, 80, 188–189, 197 Wen, Yingxing, 210 Western-style education, 3, 27 Western Zhou Dynasty (1122–771 BCE), 3 White, Henry, 80 White, Moss, 21 Williams, Samuel Wells, 11, 18, 27 Wilson, Huntington, 56 Wilson, Woodrow, 78–80, 193 Wold, P. I., 72 Wong, Fong, 23 Wong, Shing, 23 Wood, Mary Elizabeth, 82 World War I, 76, 78–79, 133 World War II: abolition of anti-Chinese immigration laws and, 48, 78; Chinese conditions in, 5, 133; educational front in, 137–138, 144; expansion of U.S.China educational relations after, 178, 183, 189–190, 194, 213; expansion of U.S.-China educational relations during, 115, 122, 130, 152, 165, 200; Fulbright Program and, 145, 147–148, 154–157, 160, 198; United States and China as allies in, 206 Wu, Dayu, 152 Wu, Jiagao, 182 Wu, Mi, 87 Wu, Tingfang, 31, 40–41, 43, 56 Wu, Zideng (Woo, Tsze Tung), 26 Wuben School (Wuben Xuetang), 45 Wuhan University, 135 Xia, Xiang, 105 Xie, Yu, 196 Xiong, Yuezhi, 21 xiucai (Budding talent), 4 Xu, Jiyu, 20 Xu, Shichang (Hsu Shi-ch’ang), 56 xue zai guanfu, schools run by government, 4 Yale College, 23–24, 27 Yale University, 54, 71, 188, 197 Yan, Heling, 210

284

Yan, Huiqin, 39, 210 Yan, Xishan, 92 Yan, Yangchu (Yen, James), 188 Yang, Enzhan, 182 Yang, Shiqi, 43 Yang, Shu, 39 Yang, Xingfo, 100 Yang, Zhenning, 150 Ye, Qianyu (Yeh Chien-yu), 149 Ye, Weili, 217n3 Yeh, Wen-shin, 116 Yellow Peril, 206 Yicun Shougongye (The Handicraft Industry in Village Yi), 146 Yinghuan Zhilue (A Brief History of the World), 20 Yiyeguan, 62, 64 Youmei Xuewuchu (Ofﬁce of China Educational Mission to America), 61 Youmei Yiyeguan (Preparatory School for Students to Be Sent to the United States), 65 Young Men’s Christian Association, 65 Youth League of the Three People’s Principle (Sanmin Zhuyi Qingnian Tuan), 120–121, 139 Yuan, Shikai, 37, 44, 50, 52, 54, 56, 108, 227n110 Yuan, Tongli (Yuan, T. L.), 135, 146, 179 Yucun Nongye He Shangye (The Agriculture and Commerce of Village Yu), 146 Yue, Fei, 80 Yunan University, 135, 145

Index

Yung, Wing, 13, 23–27, 29, 32, 221n102 Zeng, Guofan, 23, 26 Zeng, Zhaolun, 152 Zeng, Zhu, 45, 48 Zhang, Baixi, 32, 37 Zhang, Boling, 87 Zhang, Cunwu, 43 Zhang, Qun (Chang, Chun), 158 Zhang, Yufa, 116 Zhang, Yuquan, 71, 86, 90, 210 Zhang, Zhidong, 33, 35–38 Zhang, Zhiyi, 146 Zhang, Zhizhong, 121 Zhang, Zuchun, 182 Zhang, Zuolin, 92 Zhao, Guocai, 210 Zhao, Shanhuan, 115 Zhao, Xinshu, 196 Zhao, Yuanren, 87, 180–182 Zhao, Zhongyao, 173 Zhejiang University, 135, 190 Zhou, Binwen, 180 Zhou, Enlai (Chou, En-lai), 159, 195 Zhou, Guangzhao, 206 Zhou, Peiyuan, 190 Zhou, Yichun, 67–68, 70–71, 84–86, 210 Zhou, Ziqi, 62, 65, 67, 70, 210 Zhu, Guangya, 152, 206 Zhu, Jiahua, 109–110 Zhu, Jingnong, 143, 182 Zhu, Kezhen, 182 Zongli Yamen (Ofﬁce of Foreign Affairs), 23–24 Zuo, Zongtang, 23–24

About the Author

Hongshan Li is an associate professor of history at Kent State University Tuscarawas. He has published a number of articles, book chapters, and edited volumes on U.S.-China relations and modern Chinese history. He was the president of the Chinese Historians in the United States between 1997 and 1999.