WEAPONS
OF
MASS DESTRUCTION
WEAPONS
OF
MASS DESTRUCTION
Options for India
Editor RAJA MENON
SAGE Publications ...
79 downloads
1912 Views
1MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
WEAPONS
OF
MASS DESTRUCTION
WEAPONS
OF
MASS DESTRUCTION
Options for India
Editor RAJA MENON
SAGE Publications New Delhi M Thousand Oaks M London
Copyright ©United Service Institution of India, 2004 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilised in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. First published in 2004 by Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd B-42, Panchsheel Enclave New Delhi 110 017 Sage Publications Inc 2455 Teller Road Thousand Oaks, California 91320
Sage Publications Ltd 1 Oliver’s Yard, 55 City Road London EC1Y 1SP
Published by Tejeshwar Singh for Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, typeset in 9.5/11.5 Century751BT at C&M Digitals, Chennai and printed at Chaman Enterprises, New Delhi.
Library of Congress Cataloging-iin-P Publication Data Weapons of mass destruction: options for India / editor, Raja Menon. p. cm. Includes index. 1. Weapons of mass destruction—India. 2. India—Military policy. 3. India— Defences. I. Menon, Raja. U793.W43279 358′.3′0954—dc22 2004 2004015318
ISBN:
0–7619–3301–8 (Hb) 0–7619–3302–6 (Pb)
81–7829–425–7 (India-Hb) 81–7829–426–5 (India-Pb)
Sage Production Team: Sunaina Dalaya, Sushanta Gayen, and Santosh Rawat
CONTENTS Introduction Raja Menon
7
Part I—Theory of Effectiveness 1. 2. 3.
The Nuclear Dimension Pran Krishan Pahwa The Effectiveness of Chemical Agents B.S. Malik The Effectiveness of Biological Agents Raja Menon
21 30 47
Part II—Threats to India 4.
Formal and Non-formal Nuclear Threats M.S. Mamik
63
Part III—Current International Regimes 5. 6.
The Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime Matin Zuberi The Chemical and Biological Weapons Regimes Arundhati Ghose
79 110
Part IV—India’s Negotiating Positions 7. 8.
The Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime in Crisis Matin Zuberi Trends in the CWC and BTWC: Implications and Options for India’s Security Interests Arundhati Ghose
129 198
6 M RAJA MENON
Part V—India’s Options 9. Protection against Chemical Agents B.S. Malik 10. Protection against Biological and Toxin Warfare Raja Menon About the Editor and Contributors Index
223 247 267 270
INTRODUCTION Raja Menon
T
he strategic scenario regarding possible sources of conflict underwent its most dramatic change in 1990–91 with the collapse of the former Soviet Union (FSU). The immediate aftermath of the collapse was the birth of the idea that the United States, as the sole superpower, could now intervene militarily in any part of the world with impunity. Western military forces began to prepare themselves, tactically and technologically, to fight ‘overseas’. The western coalition began to assume that conflict had, for the immediate future, ended in North America and Western Europe. Since then tactical thinking has progressed quite far down this road, with the Americans having coined the strategic expressions—From the Sea, Battlespace Dominance of the Littoral and Littoral Warfare. At the same time, a number of political movements, which during the Cold War years would have found superpower backing, began to look for strategic ballast. Without the backing of state military power these movements inevitably looked for alternate solutions, giving rise to an increasing number of terrorist initiatives. In the Cold War years many of these terrorist activities would have been given political acceptability as wars of national liberation. Yet, a third line of thinking also emerged from the ashes of the Cold War and that was the demise of ‘deterrence’ or the need to depend on deterrence as the cornerstone of strategic stability. To summarise, the three new major strands of politico-military thinking that emerged were: • The end of nuclear deterrence as the foundation of stability. • The validity and merits of the sole superpower’s strategy of Littoral Warfare. • The response of various smaller actors in resorting to terrorism as a way of being heard.
8 M RAJA MENON
It is clear that these three movements are deeply interlinked, and in many instances one of these drivers often activates the other two. For instance, the removal of strategic deterrence, coupled with terrorist threats gave rise to the concept of counter-proliferation, with nuclear weapons being ‘used’ to deter smaller powers from using Biological and Toxin Warfare (BTW) and Chemical Warfare (CW) in response to Littoral Warfare. As can be seen, the link between the continued relevance of nuclear weapons and Littoral Warfare was the possibility of the use of biological and toxin, and chemical weapons. Again, this idea has been carried forward farthest in the Pentagon who, as early as 1995, established an Office of Counter Proliferation. That this is due to the natural evolution of a relevant strategic idea is evidenced in the Indian nuclear policy document which articulates a possible first nuclear use scenario in response to a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) attack on Indian forces anywhere. What has occurred while pursuing this chain of thought is that, first, a state’s use of Biological Toxin (BT) and Chemical (C) agents is posited against another state; and second, the threat of nuclear retaliation is assumed to reduce the chances of BT and C use by that state. The development of this idea grew so strongly that this double event–response chain has been given a name in the strategic community—that of asymmetric warfare. Over the 1990s the idea of asymmetric warfare has become fairly well entrenched. It is important to understand this in India, which politically is somewhere in the middle of all this. While all the western nations have joined the Americans as ‘doers’ in Littoral Warfare, smaller nations have yet to get their act together on what to do to prevent such warfare from being ‘done’ to them. India stands in the middle, as stated earlier, because it is perceived as a ‘doer’ of Littoral Warfare by the smaller Indian Ocean states, while New Delhi itself often has to deal with the anxiety that it could also be a ‘victim’ of Littoral Warfare. In the corelation of forces that the Indian strategic planners visualise, there is a possibility that a smaller nation with which India is engaged, could use BT and C agents to offset its conventional asymmetry. It is important to understand this assumption because the contributors to the volume have argued that in the probability matrix, the need to deal with state-sponsored BT and C attacks is low. The reasons for this major assumption are spelt out ahead. Coming to the possible use of BT and C agents by non-state actors (a scenario that this volume deals with extensively) the Indian narrative and the world narrative run parallel to one another, though somewhat apart. The world narrative is marked by some important
INTRODUCTION M 9
milestones: the World Trade Center (WTC) bombing in 1993, the September 11 attack on the WTC, the IRA bombing in London, and a couple of spectacular attacks on passenger aircraft. The Indian narrative is much more intense, longer, more painful, and largely ignored in the world literature that traces the strategic narrative just described. India fought bitter terrorism in Punjab followed by J&K in 1989, the extensive Bombay blasts in the spring of 1993, and the escalating violence in Kashmir and outside India, as the Kashmir movement was hijacked by the Taliban and the international jihadi movement. These major events, largely ignored in the world narrative, makes it necessary that India does its strategic thinking independently. The world, for instance, thinks of 9/11 as a watershed, and since the world thinks so, it becomes so. In India, however, to accept that 9/11 was a defining moment in international terrorism would be entirely unacceptable. The events of 9/11 have in fact changed the nature of the Indo-US relationship, but neither has 9/11 nor the changed nature of the relationship made any difference to India’s lonely fight against state-sponsored terrorism. This fight will have to continue. It is in this context that the study on WMD assumes significance in India. Unlike the example of the main participants of the Cold War, it is true that the standard theories of deterrence still hold good in the subcontinent. Indeed, this is perhaps the only area in the world where this is so, and cold warriors are often surprised to hear the language of the early Cold War when they visit the subcontinent. But superimposed on the Cold War nuclear theology is the active engagement of the country in fighting its old enemy—terrorism. To study the implications of the possible use of biological and chemical agents, and nuclear risks to Indian society, a study group was convened at the United Service Institution of India in New Delhi. The first issue that this study group had to get out of the way was whether the country faced a greater WMD threat from states or from non-state actors. It would have been easy to opt for the worst case scenario and cater for both kinds of threats. However, it was strongly felt that BT and C have varied effectiveness when used by states in pursuit of a political crisis. Such cases are quite different from using BT and C agents for the well-known and classic objectives of terrorist behaviour, namely, to attract attention to neglected causes, to demand negotiations or to extract revenge. The arguments in the succeeding paragraphs provide an understanding of how the study group arrived at its approach to the link between BT and C agents and non-state actors.
10 M RAJA MENON
Of the three categories of WMD there is no doubt that chemical weapons lend themselves to the easiest form of state use. While the use of chemical agents can be particularly lethal against civilian populations and poorly-trained forces (like the Kurds), properly trained armies can successfully resist CW. Furthermore, a side using chemical weapons will initially have to protect its entire front with protective gear, which reduces the effectiveness of soldiers to about 30 to 60 per cent of their normal capabilities. It is therefore not surprising that the world has met great success in reaching an agreement on banning chemical weapons and ensuring that the agreement is respected. There is a vast difference between a state moving towards a full-fledged chemical weapons capability and a state merely developing a small dual-use facility to produce enough chemical agents to terrorise a small civilian population, or a few weapons for low-scale tactical use. If a country intends to acquire the former it would normally be difficult to conceal the entire process. It is true that normal dual-use plants, like those manufacturing organic phosphorous pesticides or flame retardants, could be converted to producers of CW agents of a low grade. Detecting the proliferation of chemical weapons inside a chemical weapons regime and outside it are quite different. The former assumes that the monitoring is cooperative while the latter would require unilateral intelligence gathering capabilities. Then again there is the question of the continued production of illicit gases in a known facility. Proliferant countries intending to create a genuine chemicals capability would either build a dedicated clandestine facility or convert an existing dual-use facility used for producing pesticides etc., into a chemical agent factory. It is known that of all the chemical agents ever used, only 60 have been specifically manufactured and stored with the intention of using them as weapons. The Office of Technical Assessment (OTA) has given a sequential list of steps that a proliferant country would go through on its path to militarising its chemical weapons capability. These include the manufacture of the chemical agent, the development of suitable munitions, the combining of the two, the issue of chemical ordnance to the military supply and logistic chain, and the development of tactical plans for its use. What would eventually lead a proliferant state to break the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) would be the low cost of a chemical weapons plant, estimated at $5 million to $10 million for a sophisticated chemical agent factory. On the other hand, the long sequence of converting mere manufacturing into actual military capability has to go through the processes mentioned.
INTRODUCTION M 11
In actual fact, what the country’s intelligence needs to do is to keep a track of any upcoming facility in a target country, which has dual-use capabilities in manufacturing what is called a processor chemical. Since thousands of tons of basic feedstock chemicals are used by many countries and it is virtually impossible to keep track of these ordinary chemicals as they are of little value, the movement of the precursor chemicals is controlled under the Australia Group list. Nevertheless, it is possible to substitute one of the precursor chemicals by another one, but difficult to do so without raising an alarm. For a country like India, keeping tabs on the chemical industry of a target country is not difficult provided the Indian intelligence agency at work is staffed by people who know what to look for. However, even if the basic C agent manufacturing capability exists, its weaponisation process would still require that the agent be stabilised, often ‘thickened’ or mixed with carriers. Stabilisation is the process of increasing the shelf life of agents for long periods of storage with the military. Thickening is the process of increasing the agents viscosity to increase the persistence of the chemical. Mixing is the process of adding the chemical to an aerosol or a powder for easier dispersal. From all these processes it becomes clear that there is a big difference between developing a C agent for state use, for example, by the military, and the clandestine development of a token capability to pass on to non-state actors. The former means deliberately breaching the agreement on the CWC, while the latter makes terrorist misuse of a C agent, with state support, the most likely condition that we need to study. Biological and Toxin Warfare (BTW) has often been called public health in reverse because it involves the deliberate use of diseases to kill people. Often referred to as the poor man’s atom bomb, states and non-state actors can embark on producing BW agents far more surreptitiously than producing C agents. The latter, as explained earlier, needs the production of distinctive precursor agents and specialised equipment that leave behind large telltale signs of the attempt to embark on the manufacture of chemical weapons. Furthermore, small amounts of BW agents can be produced in a clandestine manner. In terms of pure theory it is true that a small quantity of biological organisms can infect a large number of people, but their long incubation period is a major limitation on their tactical use in the battlefield. This does not automatically mean that BW agents can be used against the civilian population because the delayed effect on the people, crops or animals also takes place with delayed effect. Such use, which might be meant to damage the morale of a people or coerce them into
12 M RAJA MENON
war terminations would also occur with delayed effect during which the circumstances surrounding the event would have changed. However, it would be prudent to assume that because of their potential to cause great damage, small states might consider using BW agents in regional conflicts or when threatened by a nuclear state. The practical difficulties of delivering BTW agents in a predictable manner needs to be discussed in more detail to substantiate the stand taken in this volume that the use of BTW against the military has by and large been disregarded. Incorporating BTW agents into area delivery weapons like cluster bombs requires that complex engineering hurdles be overcome. Reliability in military use can be ensured only if the agent can be made to perform consistently. This is achieved by converting the agent into a non-volatile solid to be disseminated either as a liquid slurry or a freeze dried powder of freeze dried toxins or organisms. Once this is done aerosol spraying either from an aircraft or from the back of a truck, or in cluster bomblets as the payload of a ballistic missile is possible. But there are still many more obstacles. Protein toxins are subject to severe environmental stresses such as heat, oxidation and shear forces. The challenge is to overcome the rapid decay of BT agents when sprayed. The aerosol must have dimensions that can overcome the body’s natural filters and penetrate deep enough to cause illness. To keep the aerosol suspended in the air they must be between 1 and 5 microns. Particles smaller than 5 microns will travel over long distances. Particles larger than these collapse to the ground on collision with each other or with other objects, while particles below 1 micron are exhaled by the victim. So when actual tests are conducted, it is found that almost all BT agents do not meet the stability requirements in an aerosol. Furthermore, the use of mechanical devices to generate aerosols reduces the number of infectious cells. Once released the cloud decays rapidly over time and even more rapidly under the influence of heat and ultraviolet light. If an explosive is used to disperse the aerosol, the initial blast and heat may cause as much as 95 per cent of the BT agents to become ineffective. Heavy spores such as anthrax could settle on the ground without decay and continue to be virulent. The classic scenario of a drone or a Ultra-light Aerial Vehicle (UAV) being used to spray BT agents is technically feasible but requires a sophisticated level of agent formulation as well as UAV technology. A UAV attack on a cold clear night with a stable atmosphere would be most suitable for the creation of a large cloud. For all these reasons, with immense imponderables for subsequent tactical events, the use
INTRODUCTION M 13
of BT agents on the battlefield in the Indian scenario is virtually ruled out. This categorical assertion does not include the possibility of use of BT agents against Indian forces overseas in areas beyond the subcontinent, in which case these conditions don’t hold good. A great deal of discussion took place on the scenario for the use of Nuclear (N) weapons in the study group. It was difficult to argue that the concept of deterrence had collapsed in the subcontinent. Therefore, it was reasoned that the best preventive against the use of such weapons remained the weapon itself. The possible use and manufacture of nuclear weapons was also discussed is great detail. While unauthorised access to nuclear weapons remained a possibility in states where societal cohesion might collapse, the use of such weapons manufactured by non-state actors did not enthuse the group. Theoretically, a crude nuclear device is not beyond the manufacturing capability of non-state actors. However, in the area around the subcontinent the hurdles to be crossed by terrorist organisations attempting to manufacture a nuclear device seemed beyond the limits of legitimate credibility. The services of friendly scientists etc., was also discussed, but it would appear that friendly scientists might more readily assist in the theft of nuclear weapons than the manufacture of one, over a number of years. In India, these subjects have been rarely dealt with in detail. There is a plethora of information on the international regimes that attempt to curb N, BT and C proliferation. For a number of years the national effort seemed reduced to relying solely on international regimes to ensure the safety of the nation. Partly, this may have been because the discussions on the country’s approach to the international regimes were unclassified and academics had free access to enough materials for discussion. The debate in the country is therefore reasonably sophisticated when it comes to international regimes and quite unsubstantial when it comes to the mechanics of use and the protection of society. This volume opens with three chapters that address the issue of the dangers posed by the N, BT and C agents, in general, and towards governments and people. There is a need for a dispassionate analysis here to avoid both overstating the possibility of N, BT and C use, while not minimising their effectiveness if used. Thereafter the study looks at the threats actually posed to both the Indian government and the Indian people. The third part of the study looks at what needs to be done to protect India from these threats. In these chapters it becomes clear that while the nuclear threats are addressed mostly by creating institutions, procedures and command structures to manage
14 M RAJA MENON
India’s nuclear arsenal, the other two threats require substantially different approaches. The chemical and biological threats are seen to emanate largely from non-state actors, either with or without host nation support. In the case of the former, there is a need to move down the track of what the Americans call counter-proliferation so that the power of the Indian state is used to deter or dissuade granting of support or sanctuary to non-state actors. The more pressing problem remains the one of protecting our people, particularly from BT use. This capability is seen largely to fall into the category of dealing with large-scale medical disasters. It is interesting to note, for instance, that the Indian state is not without experience in this area since more than a million people died each year from the plague between 1900 and 1905. The last sets of chapters in this volume deal with the positions that the Indian government needs to take in international fora while addressing international initiatives to prevent N, BT and C use. It is possible that the passage of time may date some aspects of this study, but the core of the study will remain relevant for many years because it is concerned with the mammoth task of protecting people. There are portions of this volume that should attract the general reader, as also the specialist and the policy maker. This volume has not ignored aspects related to international relations and the international regime, but rather it has concentrated much more on the protection of society and the armed forces against both state and non-state actors armed with BT and C weapons. In this respect the volume breaks new ground. Perhaps the many recommendations made here could be summarised, if the policy makers want ready access to such a list of recommendations. However, a ready- to-use list of recommendations is given here: • A Joint Parliamentary Committee to be formed from all the political parties to address the problems of command, authority to take measures, and accountability and funding at the national level to combat BT and C terrorism. • The National Security Adviser (NSA) run an office to centrally coordinate the intelligence and interdepartmental work concerned with combating terrorism. • The central authority coordinating all active measures to protect the people be placed under the Home Ministry and through the Home Ministry under the Department of Home Affairs in each state.
INTRODUCTION M 15
• The Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) be tasked to write a national strategic plan to combat BT and C terrorism nationwide. • The coordinating ministry, the Home Ministry be tasked to write a national strategic plan, based on the national disaster management plan (which was passed off to the Ministry of Agriculture) to deal with bio-terrorism. The national plan could have the state plans incorporated as appendices. States however would have no idea of how to go about writing a plan without a sample plan from the centre. • The National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD) be tasked to write a National Laboratory Network Plan to be incorporated under the ICMR. Part of the cost of networking national labs be recovered from the laboratories themselves. • A national logistic plan be written by the ICMR to support the national strategic plan made by the Ministry of Home Affairs. • The role of the military be clearly defined by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the training for static and mobile units designated to support civilian authority be given. • The Central Board of Revenue be tasked to write a national plan for the customs authorities to upgrade training and surveillance to check the movement of BT and C agents across India’s borders. • The Coast Guard be designated to actively patrol using special equipment to monitor the movement of BT and C agents. • The ICMR be tasked to open a government subsidised vaccine production plant for the necessary medicines to be manufactured. • A Metropolitan Medical Response System to be written separately, somewhat like the Mumbai Disaster Relief Scheme. The effects of BTW and CW are far more catastrophic within large metropolitan areas, and since their administration runs through a slightly different, quicker channel than in the countryside, large cities like Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore, Chennai, Kolkata, Ahmedabad etc., should therefore have more specific schemes. • An intergovernmental coordination body be instituted consisting of the customs, the Coast Guard, the immigration and airport authority, Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), and the Border Security Force (BSF) to discuss the monitoring at our borders. Coordination meetings be held with national security agencies of neighbouring agencies, as has been done for narcotics control, to coordinate preventive action against N, BT and C agents.
16 M RAJA MENON
• The National Security Adviser and the National Command Post be given the authority and held accountable for running a countrywide disaster control plan in conditions where a national emergency has not been declared and the provisions of the Union War book are not quite applicable. • The Home Ministry and the MOD run schemes to bring the Home Guards, the fire services, the NCC and the reservists into the system of disaster management. Finally, it is necessary to take a quick look at the last outbreak of the plague in Surat to see the lessons that can be learnt on how to improve matters. The incredible fact to be noted about the last Surat plague outbreak, is that, to this day, there is no unanimity over whether the disease was a natural form of plague or a deliberate attempt to introduce a biowarfare agent into India. The brief facts are that the NICD started its investigation on 2 September 1994 on the report of a suspected plague case. But until 22 September, the general consensus was that the disease, which had already caused 17 deaths, was actually pneumonia. The NICD did call in the CDC from USA and the World Health Organization (WHO) immediately. Although quarantine of a plaque-infested area is permitted, panic-stricken people began to flee and took the disease with them to many other parts of India. By 11 October, when the government appointed a Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), there were totally opposite views in the country on whether the disease was a natural outbreak or a deliberately introduced strain. The TAC created even more confusion when one member of the committee refused to sign the findings that the deaths had been caused by bubonic plague. Quite possibly, the entire controversy was unnecessary, but the point to note is that unless there are strong mechanisms in place before an outbreak, this kind of controversy is bound to recur. Almost all the fears of the experts—the fleeing of people from the scene of the disaster, the lack of clarity on the source of the pathogen, the setting up of ad hoc bodies—are all occurrences that need to be avoided for the future. To summarise, the essential strategy in this volume is to create a layered defence against BT and C use against the people of this country. Here counter-proliferation, deterrence and Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) measures like the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) are the farthest layers of defence, and consequence management the last. In between these are the set of measures which include
INTRODUCTION M 17
mobilising the border management agencies like the BSF and customs, stockpiling of vaccines and medicines, mobilising the ICMR and the NICD, and making the armed forces the lead agency in fielding mobile teams. The lead agency for the management of the three tiers of defence are as follows: • The outer tier (deterrence, CTR, PSI etc.)—NSA. • The middle-tier action by ICMR, NICD, BSF, Customs National Terrorism Center (MHA). • The inner tier consequence management—state governments, sample scheme by MHA, sample mobile units by the armed forces (MOD). The Home Ministry has already organised the raising of six disaster management battalions to be fielded within 24 hours to combat natural disasters. This is a good model for doing something similar in the consequence management of B and C disasters. Similarly, a National Disaster Knowledge Network (NANADISK) exists to exchange information on natural disasters. Both this network and the Indian Disaster Resource Network (IDRN) into which a joint project of the Government of India and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) could also be pressed into service in case of a B or C disaster. The state of Maharashtra has an earthquake emergency rehabilitation programme (EERP) funded by the World Bank after the Latur disaster. This is a more grass-roots organisation with 37 V-SAT terminals in 37 districts. Thus, existing infrastructure is being used in defending the people of this country against BT and C use.
PART I THEORY OF
EFFECTIVENESS
CHAPTER
1 The Nuclear Dimension Pran Krishan Pahwa
N
uclear, chemical and biological weapons or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) pose a serious threat to the entire world today. Of these, nuclear weapons are the most potent in the short run because they have the capability of causing large-scale human and material damage in a very short period of time. Whereas the use of chemical weapons is already banned and a convention for the ban of biological weapons is being negotiated, there is no international treaty or convention which bans the use of nuclear weapons and there is little likelihood of one being agreed upon in the future. Countries not restrained by the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) can legitimately use nuclear weapons against other countries if they so decide. Some non-nuclear states could also acquire nuclear weapons clandestinely and use them to threaten other countries. There is also the disturbing possibility of some terrorist organisations managing to acquire a nuclear weapon and using it to blackmail or inflict physical damage. The chances of this have increased of late because of the relatively easier availability of nuclear related materials and the spurt in smuggling and trafficking in them after the breakup of the former Soviet Union (FSU).1
22 M PRAN KRISHAN PAHWA
India is vulnerable to both these types of threats. Two of its neighbours, China and Pakistan, are nuclear states and India has strained relations with both. Several well-organised terrorist and separatist groups, some of them enjoying foreign state patronage, are operating in the country. It is quite conceivable that any one of them could take the extreme step of acquiring nuclear weapons to achieve their aims. This is admittedly the less likely choice vis-à-vis the other WMD,2 but the possibility is real and the country has to be aware of it.
USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY ANOTHER STATE For India, such a threat can only come from China or Pakistan at present as they have nuclear weapons. To decrease the possibility of conventional war or a low intensity conflict escalating into a nuclear exchange it is necessary that the political hostility that drives the danger of nuclear war be reduced. This may be easier said than done. Meanwhile, recognising that political hostility exists, a separate set of measures needs to be taken and intimated to the other side so that the nuclear arsenals are seen to be totally under control. Following is a list of the measures that can be undertaken: • Proper accounting of all nuclear weapons and materials by national legislation. • Ensuring security and safety of nuclear weapons and materials during transportation. • Incorporating technical safety measures such as authentication codes for launching, Permissive Action Links (PALs), and Environmental Sensing Devices (ESDs) in the weapons. • A reliable command and control system with a clear-cut chain of command and procedural checks like the two-man rule for launching a weapon. • Periodic verification, including background, of all personnel involved with the production, storage, transportation, handling and security of nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan have only recently become overt nuclear weapons states and are still in the process of organising their nuclear forces.
THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION M 23
Very little information is available on whether the aforementioned measures have been put in place by them. If not, then there could be a threat of an unauthorised or accidental nuclear attack to India from Pakistan. China, on the other hand, is an old and established nuclear power. It is, however, very secretive about divulging any information on nuclear matters, but it may be presumed that it would have, by now, taken sufficient preventive measures against any unauthorised or accidental nuclear firing. Apart from safety there is also a need for some nuclear risk reduction and confidence building measures between the three countries. These include: • Keeping each other informed of the broad nature of the safety measures undertaken. • Maintaining a ‘hot-line’ between the political and military leaders of the three states. • Keeping each other informed of the various states of readiness laid down for the nuclear forces of these countries and their implications. • Forewarning the others about nuclear and missile tests. • Providing technology for nuclear safety if requested. There has been very little progress in establishing these confidence building measures (CBMs) till now. China refuses to discuss nuclear CBMs with India on the grounds that the NPT does not recognise India as a nuclear power. With Pakistan some measures were put in place before the countries carried out their nuclear tests in 1998 but the subject has since been linked with the Kashmir issue. Although there was great progress at Lahore, Kargil has brought an end to the Lahore process.
NUCLEAR TERRORISM Nuclear terrorism has two major advantages for terrorists: It can cause maximum casualties in the shortest possible time and it can bring instant and worldwide recognition and notoriety to the group that practises it. Terrorists groups are also of two types—those out to gain recognition for themselves and their cause, and those seeking revenge against the state or a section of the people.3 The former
24 M PRAN KRISHAN PAHWA
announce their identity and in all probability use the nuclear threat only to cause panic or to acquire publicity. This may be counterproductive in the long run because the terrorists and their cause are likely to lose international sympathy and no country or group would like to be seen to be associated with them.4 The latter type of terrorist group works anonymously and seeks satisfaction in causing maximum casualties and damage, thereby wreaking revenge. The threat from terrorist groups could be in one of the following forms: • Use of a nuclear weapon. • Use of a radiological weapon.5 • Attack on a nuclear plant from inside or outside, including use of a truck-bomb.6
AVAILABILITY
OF
NUCLEAR MATERIALS
One of the reasons why nuclear terrorism is the less preferred choice of terrorist groups and has not been used so far is because of the difficulties involved in procuring or fabricating nuclear weapons and obtaining fissile and radioactive materials. This problem is no longer as acute as it was after the breakup of the FSU. The situation regarding the availability of nuclear materials, consequent to the breakup of the FSU, can be summarised as follows: • Economic conditions in the FSU have deteriorated. Pay for workers in key industries and facilities are poor and military morale is low. Organised crime is on the increase and there is a considerable amount of corruption and criminality in the Russian military as well as the bureaucracy.7 • There has been an increase in the number of attempts at smuggling of nuclear materials.8 • The Russians admit to the theft of substantial quantities of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) within their own borders.9 • Former Russian National Security Adviser Alexander Lebed has alleged that 100 portable suitcase bombs of 1 kt each have been unaccounted for since the breakup of the FSU. The Russians however claim that there never were any such weapons.10 • There are approximately 950 sites of all types for HEU and plutonium in the FSU. Physical security measures at most of them are inadequate and the system of accounting is poor.11 There
THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION M 25
has been a case where a Russian naval officer, without any great difficulty, managed to steal 4 kg of HEU from a storage area of the Northern Fleet HQ.12 A large number of agencies are involved in the control of fissile materials13 and the authorities are said to unaware of the total amounts and types of materials held in the country.14 • Russia insists that its nuclear materials are safe and properly accounted for but this is contested by outside observers.15 • Russia currently has fissile material amounting to 200 t of plutonium and 800 to 1200 t of HEU. About 6 t more of plutonium and 30 t of uranium is likely to be added to it in the next 15 years on account of the dismantling of nuclear weapons under various arms agreements.16
USE
OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Terrorists could use a nuclear weapon to threaten or cause casualties. Since nuclear weapons would not be readily available to them, the option would be to either procure one or build one. The only way of procuring a nuclear weapon is to either steal one or to illegally buy one from one of the nuclear-armed states. So far these states have managed to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists.17 At least there is no reported case of any missing weapons. There was come concern about the security of Russian tactical nuclear weapons deployed in the conflict areas on its periphery but it has been confirmed that these have all been successfully withdrawn.18 Nevertheless, if a terrorist group were to think of obtaining a nuclear weapon, the obvious source would be Russia. The corruption and state of morale of the Russian military have already been commented upon. Detonating the stolen weapon could be a problem because of the inbuilt safety arrangements, but this could be overcome with the help of a nuclear scientist. It is also claimed that not all Russian nuclear weapons are fitted with the necessary safety devices.19 The other possibility is that a hostile nuclear armed state may make two nuclear weapons available to a terrorist group (the second weapon would be required to deter any possible retaliation after the use of the first one).20 Formerly, conventional wisdom maintained that individuals and terrorist groups were incapable of building a nuclear bomb.21 This is no longer true. Growing globalisation has made nuclear materials and technology more easily available.22 The breakup of the FSU has
26 M PRAN KRISHAN PAHWA
further helped the process. Carson Mark, former head of the nuclear weapons development division at Los Alamos has stated that a team of a dozen specialists comprising nuclear physicists, a mechanical engineer, a chemist, an explosives expert and a mathematician could build a nuclear weapon in one year.23 These again could come from the FSU where many nuclear scientists are now out of a job.24 Some have already reportedly accepted lucrative appointments with countries like Iraq, Iran and Libya. In 1992, 32 scientists were prevented from emigrating to North Korea by Russia.25 Nevertheless, it would appear that the support of a state is necessary to facilitate the clandestine manufacture of a nuclear weapon. A terrorist nuclear bomb would most likely be a simple fission bomb. The most important requirement for it is fissile material, either U-235 or Pu-239. The Natural Resources Defence Council of USA has noted that for a crude bomb, 15–25 kg of fissile material would be required.26 Once again the source for this is likely to be the FSU for the reasons already mentioned. Even reactor grade plutonium could be used but would be less reliable and would require a larger quantity to achieve critical mass.27 Delivering the bomb to the target would not be a very difficult proposition under Indian conditions. We have a long coastline along which smuggling is common. A few years ago an aircraft brazenly violated our airspace and dropped arms inside the country. In the north we have an open border with Nepal along which there is little security. Arms are regularly being smuggled into the country for terrorist and separatist groups from Pakistan, China, Myanmar and Bangladesh. Smuggling in a nuclear bomb that is likely to weigh around 1 t, broken up into parts if necessary, should therefore not be too difficult. It could even be brought in through the normal trade routes as part of a normal consignment with lead shielding around the fissile core to avoid detection. With so much material coming into the country everyday there is every chance that a nuclear bomb could get through.
USE
OF
RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Nuclear weapons and fissile materials are difficult to procure. A cheaper and technically more feasible option is the use of radiological weapons made up of non-fissionable radioactive materials like Cesium-137, Strontium-90 or Cobalt-60.28 These can be a potent tool in the hands of terrorists. Radioactive materials can be delivered through a conventional
THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION M 27
explosive device, through the air-handling system or introduced into the water supply.29 Depending on its nature, a radioactive substance could either cause cancer or induce acute radioactive poisoning resulting in heavy casualties. A small cylinder tied to a hand grenade would kill everyone within a 1 km radius.30 The feasibility of this form of terrorism was demonstrated by Chechen rebels in 1995 when they planted 32 kg of Cesium-137 in a Moscow park and informed a news channel about it. The substance was found to be of industrial standards used in X-ray equipment but it could have produced a poisonous fallout had it been mated with a conventional explosive.31
NUCLEAR PLANTS A nuclear plant can be turned into a nuclear weapon by terrorists according to Ted Taylor, a nuclear weapons designer.32 Nuclear plants can be attacked and captured by terrorists using handheld weapons and explosives from the outside along with a little help from the inside.33 While a thermonuclear explosion is not possible at an electricity generating nuclear plant, terrorists could cause a steam explosion that would suddenly eject large amounts of radioactive particles into the atmosphere.34 It is also possible to use a truck-bomb to ram into a nuclear plant and achieve the same results.35
CREDIBILITY
OF
NUCLEAR TERRORIST THREAT
It is not necessary for a terrorist group to establish the credibility of its threat if it is out to cause damage to seek revenge. It would simply act without any warning. This would not be essential for a group merely seeking publicity for itself and its cause either. The very fact that the group has made a nuclear threat will get it international headlines. Credibility is required by that group which seeks to achieve concessions through nuclear blackmail. It is a two-way requirement. The government needs to determine if the threat is really credible and the terrorist group needs to convince the government that it really has a nuclear or radiological weapon. The terrorists could try and prove to the government that they actually have a nuclear weapon by sending it a schematic diagram of the weapon or plant a sample of the fissile material (as in the case of the Chechens). They could even explode a device in a remote area if they have more than one. In case the weapon has been stolen they could
28 M PRAN KRISHAN PAHWA
send the serial number and other identification details of the weapon to the government.36 The government would need very little evidence to be persuaded because it would be under tremendous pressure from the public as was seen in the case of the hijacking of the Indian Airlines plane to Kandahar. It would most probably have to give in. That is what nuclear terrorists would bank on.
CONCLUSION India faces a nuclear threat from both its nuclear armed neighbours, China and Pakistan as it has strained relations with both. There could also be an accidental or unintended use of nuclear weapons by any of the three countries because of lack of nuclear CBMs among them. There also exists the possibility of use of nuclear or radiological weapons by any of the several terrorist groups operating in India though the chances are slim. Whereas fissile materials and nuclear technologies are more accessible to them today than any time in the past, the risks involved and the resources required to produce or steal a nuclear weapon are likely to be beyond reach. There is no evidence that any terrorist organisation has obtained nuclear materials or devices37 but the possibility remains and the country must be prepared to meet it if it ever materialises.
NOTES
1.
2.
3.
See Guy B. Roberts, ‘Nuclear Weapons Grade Fissile Materials: The Most Serious Threat to US National Security Today?’, INSS Occasional Paper 8, Proliferation Series, January 1995, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, US Air Force Academy, Colorado. Dr John M. Deutch, Director, Central Intelligence, in his Speech at the Conference on Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons Proliferation and Terrorism, 23 May 1996. See Dr Gordon C. Oehler’s statement for the record titled ‘The Continuing Threat From Weapons of Mass Destruction’, at http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/ product/go_testimony_032796.html. Dr Oehler is Director, Nonproliferation Center, CIA.
THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION M 29 4. Barry L. Rothberg, ‘Averting Armageddon: Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in the United States’, Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, 8(1), p. 79. 5. Ibid. 6. Testimony of Paul Levanthal on behalf of the Nuclear Control Institute on the Recommendations of the NRC Safeguard Performance Assessment Task Force. You can also access his testimony online at http://www.nci.org/t/t5599.htm. 7. Graham H. Turbiville Jr., ‘Weapons Proliferation and Organised Crime: The Russian Military Force Dimension’, INSS Occasional Paper 10, Proliferation Series, June 1996. See http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/occasion.htm. 8. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, ‘Smuggling of Special Nuclear Materials’ Commentary No. 57. For further details see ‘Chronology of Nuclear Smuggling Incidents—Appendix A’ at http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/ product/go_appendixa_032796.html. 9. See notes 4 and 7. 10. See abcnews homepage for the nine search engines with information on the Russian suitcase bombs. Also see http://www.dhushara.com/book/explod/ plnt.htm. 11. See note 8. 12. See note 7. 13. See note 8. 14. Ibid. 15. See note 7. 16. See note 4. According to this document 500t of U-235 and 300l of Pu-239 from dismantled weapons and other sources must eventually be disposed as a result of the arms control agreements. 17. For Nuclear weapons description access http://www.milnet.com/milnrt/ nukedesc.htm. 18. See note 7. 19. See note 4. 20. Ibid. 21. See note 8. 22. See note 3. 23. See note 4. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. See note 3. 29. See note 4. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. See http://www.tmia.com/sabter.html. 33. See note 6. 34. See note 32. 35. See note 6. 36. See note 4. 37. See note 2.
CHAPTER
2 The Effectiveness of Chemical Agents B.S. Malik
P
rofessor Schrefeld produced a poison gas which the Germans unleashed for the first time on 22 April 1915 at Ypres, with disastrous results. The new weapon caused high casualties but the Germans failed to exploit the situation tactically. The Allies retaliated in kind in September 1915, but they too could not take advantage of the sudden breakthrough and the German lines, though breached, remained intact. This incident showed the usefulness of gas as a surprise weapon but was not strategically decisive. However, gas continued to be used by both sides throughout the remaining part of World War I. Thus started Chemical Warfare (CW), a term which came to include the use of poison gases. CW also encompasses smoke-producing devices and incendiary materials. Though its primary focus started with poison gases, the term was soon commonly used to explain the use of various temporarily disabling or lethal gaseous substances. There has been considerable debate against including non-lethal materials into the gamut of CW, since these are used to control mobs both in civil disturbances and war situations.
THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF
CHEMICAL AGENTS M 31
Different methods were used to deliver gas in an attack. In the gas cloud, or mist, the wind became the favoured carrier of gas. The methods of delivering CW agents through mines, mortar and artillery shells were developed and perfected. The technique of spraying poison gases from low flying aircraft increased the range as also retained the surprise element so crucial to success in CW. It is notable how Rudolph Binding, graphically captured the effect of gas in, A Fatalist at War.1 The effect of the successful gas attack was horrible. I am not pleased with the idea of poisoning men. Of course the entire world will rage about it first and then imitate us. All the dead lie on their backs with clenched fists; the whole field is yellow. Perhaps not many people know that the wife of the inventor of poison gas committed suicide on hearing of the use of her husband’s invention. This general revulsion never left the psyche of mankind and CW at best remained an ungentlemanly means of conducting war. Never popular with the troops or the commanders, technical difficulties were often raised by them when the use of gas was ordered. Chemical agents were never fully integrated into land warfare, because of the undefined technical character of these weapons, and the indirect limits they place on all forms of combat activity.
A BRIEF HISTORY
OF
CHEMICAL WARFARE
The use of CW in World War I had so stunned the world that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 was adopted soon thereafter to bring an end to these horrible weapons. Whatever may have been the reservations of some countries, even the nations who started CW in World War I refrained from using it during World War II. The history of CW in many ways has been very closely linked to the views of the erstwhile USSR and USA, and hence we need to amplify them in some detail. Till much after World War II, USA did not ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol on CW, but it developed a strong Chemical Corps with considerable R&D and a massive training programme. However, it also started operation ‘Cut Hole And Sink Them (CHASE)’, to get rid of its old stockpile of CW weapons from 1946 to 1974. Thereafter, USA went through some policy convulsions on CW due to public opinion and subsequent political pressure. On the other hand, the Soviet
32 M B.S. MALIK
Union continued with CW research and the results were evident in the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning CW was resubmitted to the US Senate in 1969. The Senate ultimately approved both the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on 16 December 1974. The US President signed it on 22 January 1975. Due to the prevailing political mood, based on the controversy arising from the use of herbicides and napalm in Vietnam, no money was made available for further developments like binary weapons till 1977. On 8 April 1975, the US government renounced the first use of herbicides as a result of the post-Vietnam reforms. The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was formed in 1973 and it took up discussions about removing the ‘hollowness’ of the US army. The results of the Arab-Israeli war became the immediate cause for the reappraisal of the CW capability through studies conducted by TRADOC. In August 1976, bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the US took place in Geneva on the subject of a global chemical weapons ban.2 By this time, however, a revival of CW capability had started in the US and the proposed plans to disband the Chemical Corps were cancelled. The early 1980s saw efforts to standardise military operations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The funds for chemical and biological weapons were increased and British protection equipment was purchased in big numbers. By 1911 plans had been made for collective protection systems in all armoured vehicles. President Jimmy Carter ordered an executive review of the US army’s CW policy and posture. However, no funds were alloted till 1977 for binary production facilities because of the ongoing US-Soviet efforts to control chemical weapons3 and the domestic political controversy over the use of napalm and herbicides in Vietnam. The outbreak of anthrax in the Soviet Union in April 1979 followed by the invasion of Afghanistan made the US take note of the serious biological and chemical warfare threat. The four years of CW discussions between the Soviet Union and USA (1976–80) had proved futile. By 1981 the use of third-generation chemical agents in Afghanistan and Laos had become public. Some samples were identified as trichothe mycotoxins (T2 toxin) or yellow rain. The Soviets used CW not to support the tactical battle but in a strategic supporting role, bombing villages in terrain denial missions in Afghanistan. According to reports, the use of chemical agents by the Soviet Union declined sharply after 1982 due to public condemnation. It was also observed that the reduced usage of the chemical agents was not so
THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF
CHEMICAL AGENTS M 33
much due to moral reasons, but limited strategic gains and restrictions on their own troop movements in Afghan terrain where movement was already restricted. Other weapons like fuel air explosive (FAE), incendiaries and anti-personnel mines proved much more effective. Accordingly, in an effort to advance the cause of banning CW, the US followed a two-pronged approach. First, to launch an intensive diplomatic effort in a multinational forum to complete a chemical arms elimination treaty, and second, to revitalise the CW capability of the US armed forces.4 A four nation mission (Australia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland), sent by the UN Secretary General, confirmed in March 1984 that Iraq had obtained much of the materials for its CW programme from the international chemical industry. This reinitiated the quadripartite conference between America, Britain, Canada and Australia (ABCA) the purpose of which was to revitalise the old technical community of the Vietnam years. The UK had had problems with a public campaign against chemical weapons and the offensive CW programme had to be abandoned in the 1950s at Porton Down. President Reagan announced that a draft chemical weapons ban treaty would be presented in Geneva but simultaneously called for congressional support for the modernisation of the chemical stockpile. Since the Cold war began, tactical CB weapons have been discussed in the same terms as strategic, megaton nuclear devices—as so-called ‘weapons of mass destruction’ or WMDs. Our national policy of responding to enemy use of CB weapons has shifted over the years from one extreme to the other, from retaliation using similar CB weapons to massive conventional retaliation to (most recently) nuclear retaliation.5 The often quoted examples of CW attacks are as follows: • In 1968 during the Yemeni civil war. First use of CW after the world war. • Extensive use of Agent Orange by US forces in Vietnam against the country’s ecology • In 1975 and 1981, in Laos, 261 attacks by Vietnamese and Laos forces caused 6,504 deaths using T2 toxin, nerve agents and riot control agents using sprays, rockets and bombs from AN-2 and captured American L-19 and T-28/41 aircraft. • In 1979 and 1981, in Kampuchea, 124 attacks and 981 deaths through the T2 toxin, CW agents and riot control agents.
34 M B.S. MALIK
• In 1979 and 1981, in Afghanistan, 47 attacks by the Soviets caused 3,042 deaths using nerve agents, T2 toxin and riot control agents using aircraft and helicopters firing rockets, sprays and bombs. • In 1982, a several thousand of their 7,000 to 10,000 casualties of Iranians were caused by the mustard gas. Iraq used Mi-8 helicopter sprayers and artillery shells. • In 1984, in the Hawizeh marshes near Basra, mustard gas caused 12,000 to 20,000 casualties of Iranians. • In 1988, mustard and nerve gas used on four occasions around Basra against a civilian population at Halabjah. Reports indicate use of phosgene and hydrogen cyanide by Iranians and blood agent by the Iraqi forces on 17 April at Al-Faw Peninsula. Iraq used mustard gas and nerve agents against Kurds in June–July. From over a million military and civil casualties, 45,000 were caused by CW.
DEVELOPMENT
OF
CW AGENTS
Choking agents such as chlorine and phosgene gases were the first to be used in World War I. Subsequently, blood agents such as hydrogen cyanide gas (so called for they choke the transfer of oxygen from the blood to the vital organs) were used. Both choking and blood agents are generally non-persistent, lasting a short while (minutes to hours). A simple mask can protect one against these. Not very effective in mortar bombs and artillery shells, the usual form of dispersion of these agents was from cylinders. These were needed in large quantities for effect and were put to better use in offensive operations. During World War I, persistent agents like mustard gases and lewisite were used, and they could linger on the ground for days and weeks. These chemical agents were not lethal in small quantities and affected the moist areas of the body like the eyes, throat, underarms and groin. Contact with blister agents resulted in large blisters after a few hours. For protection, special clothing was required, in addition to the mask. These liquids were dispersed as an aerosol mist in the air using land mines, artillery shells, mortars and aircraft spray tanks. As World War II came to a close, nerve agents were developed as a pesticide. The first G-nerve agent was non-persistent. The later V-type agents developed after the war were made more persistent. The present nerve agents
THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF
CHEMICAL AGENTS M 35
are organophosphate compounds, and are odourless and colourless liquids. They cause symptomatic reactions on evoporation, leading to extreme muscle spasms and death. There has been no further development in CW except that nerve agents are now produced in binary form consisting of two components which mix on launch. The detailed characteristics of all the CW agents are explained in the succeeding paragraphs. Table 2.1 shows the physiological classification of different nerve agents. Table 2.1 Physiological Classification of Nerve Agents Types of Agents
Composition
Nerve agents Vasicants Blood agents Irritants Lung damaging agents Psychochemicals Plant damaging agents
Sarin, Soman, Tabun, VX SM, NM, Lewisites HCN, CNCI CN, CS, CR Phosgene BZ 2, 4D, 2, 4, 5-T
Following is the mechanism of the nerve agent acetycholine. It is the chemical transmitter shown on the left of the formula and so called because it transmits impulses from the nerve endings to the muscles.
Acetylcholine
AchE
Choline and Acetic Acid
H2O However, in the presence of another nerve agent AchE is inhibited and so the enzyme action is impaired. AchE or acetycholine estrate, shown on top of the arrow is an enzyme which is present at the neuromuscular junction. As indicated, in the presence of the nerve agent, acetycholine estrate’s enzyme action of breaking into choline and acetic acid is impaired. This leads to accumulation of acetycholine estrate causing neuromuscular toxicity resulting in excessive twitching, constriction of pupils, respiratory depression and muscular paralysis. Lesser production of AchE is called myasthenia.
36 M B.S. MALIK
DETAILED CHARACTERISTICS
OF
CW AGENTS6
BLISTER GASES Blister gases such as mustard gas produce a reddening of the eyes, skin and mucous membranes, followed by blisters. The bronchial tubes are irritated and pneumonia usually develops. Mustard gas often remains on the ground for several days. Mustard gas, which is lethal only in heavy concentrations, is used to incapacitate troops.
CHOKING GASES Choking gases such as chlorine, phosgene and diphosgene, attack the respiratory tract. Chlorine produces quick irritation and choking. The immediate effect of phosgene and diphosgene is less noticeable, but the lungs slowly fill with fluids and the victim suffocates within a few days.
NERVE GASES Nerve gases such as Tabun (or GA), Sarin (or GB) and Soman (or GD) are colourless, odourless and tasteless. These gases destroy the normal functioning of the nerves and muscles. They enter the body through the lungs, skin or mucous membranes killing the victim within a few minutes of the poisons entering the blood.
PSYCHO-CHEMICAL GASES Psycho-chemical gases such as BZ are incapacitating agents that attack the brain, inducing hallucination and giddiness in the victims. They are not lethal. BZ was developed by the United States after World War II. Its chemical composition is not very well known.
VOMITING GASES Gases such as DM (diphenylaminochloroarsine) rarely kill, but cause severe sneezing, coughing, headache, nausea and vomiting. DM, also
THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF
CHEMICAL AGENTS M 37
called adamsite, was developed during World War I. Vomiting gases are mainly used in riot control.
TEAR GASES Gases such as CN (chloroacetophenone) and CS (ochlorobenzalmalononitrile) produce severe eye irritation, resulting in a blinding flow of tears. Tear gases are used principally by police and troops for mob control. CN was first widely used during World War I and was developed by the British in the 1950s. The United States used CN mixed with the vomiting gas DM in the Vietnamese war.
VX AGENT The VX agent is a thick liquid with a consistency similar to that of motor oil, but colourless and odourless. The suspended particles are not gas but suspended drops of water, like an aerosol that did not evaporate quickly. This agent was designed to contaminate ground and materiel for days.
BINARY AGENTS The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) provisions made some nations very worried and they, therefore, went in for binary ammunitions. Specially-developed nerve agents by the Russians fall into this category. These agents have two components and it is only after mixing on launch that the nerve gas is formed with all its lethal affects. Albert J. Mauroni has noted in his book, America’s Struggle with Chemical–Biological Warfare, that the chemical weapons were the first researched and produced unconventional weapons because of the comparative safety in their development and production. They used modified technology of conventional artillery, aircraft and other weapons for deployment. The fact that they do not affect buildings or equipment and cause modest casualties in a smaller tactical area of immediate concern makes them attractive for countries with lesser technological means. Historically, Mauroni further noted that: Putting all three weapon systems (NBC), into one common view is much like comparing an M1 rifle, a 203 mm mortar, and an
38 M B.S. MALIK
8-inch howitzer and deciding that a military force should use the same defence against all three because they all use ballistics as a principle of operation. While use of tactical nuclear weapons could be construed as mass destruction, chemical and most biological weapons do not make the same impact, despite fears to the contrary. The real evolution of the term ‘weapons of mass destruction (WMD)’ is more politically motivated than it is logical or reasonable, and is confusing since most people are talking about nuclear weapons when they speak about WMDs in the general sense.7 However, this study group disagrees with this view which possibly has been prompted by the fact that chemical and biological weapons do not neatly fit, in the classical sense, on the scale of lethality in the growth of weapons (as shown in Figure 2.1). In the Iraq-Iran war, out of about 1,000,000 military and civil casualties, 45,000 were indeed caused by the chemical agents. However, the number of casualties is a slippery factor in determining a weapon as being capable of mass death/destruction. Where do we draw the line?
Age of missile Nuclear Weapons Air Power WW II weapons Rifled artillery Age of Gunpowder
K I L L I N 100000000 G 10000000 1000000 100000 10000
12 Pdr Gun Age of Muscle Sword BC
1000
Crossbow Stand of weapons 1000
1300
AD 1600 PERIOD
100 Close in 50 weapons 20 1900
C A P A C I T Y P E R H O U R
Figure 2.1 The Growth of Lethality Source: T.N. Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions and War (London: Mcdonald & Jane’s, 1979).
THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF
CHEMICAL AGENTS M 39
The quest to acquire CW capability continues. In 1980, the US government reported 13 countries as possessing a chemical arms programme. The CW Review Commission included in its report 16 countries in 1985 (including USA and USSR) as known or probable owners of chemical weapons. The count went up to 25 in 1991, which prompted the British, French and Germans to modernise their respective chemical defensive capabilities.
WEAPONISATION
AND THE
MILITARY VIEW
Chemical weapons act very quickly but can be detected easily and affect only a limited area. Conversely, biological weapons have an inbuilt delay system due to the use of living organisms, their effect takes a long time to manifest itself. In the same context, nuclear weapons affect instantaneously, and the use of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) may lead to strategic nuclear exchange. Consequently, the pattern seen over the years suggests that ‘nations invest in chemical weapons first, biological weapons second, and nuclear weapons third. This minimises risk and maximises investment with limited resources, while increasing technological capabilities at each stage’.8 Though appearing simple, CW is a very confused area due to the fine distinction between the weaponisation and the employment of ammunition loaded with nerve gas, napalm or CS gas. This has been aggravated by sensationalistic journalists, authors and others. Napalm and CS gas are conventional munitions related to chemical munitions in design only.9 Soldiers find CW a very strange weapon which cannot be seen and thus difficult to fight and protect against. One is never sure of the efficacy of protective gear like clothing and masks. It is not possible to say with certainty when the area is clear of the harmful effect of the CW agents. During pendency of this confirmation, even the simplest tasks become difficult to perform. All military action, including the use of weapons and other equipment, becomes difficult for the soldiers in the field in a CW situation. The result of the Combined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical Environment (CANE) exercises conducted by the US army, from 1983 to 1992, gives us some idea of the effect of fighting in protective clothing, due to physical degradation and psychological isolation.
40 M B.S. MALIK
The results are as follows: • A 52 per cent drop in direct fire and 360 per cent rise in friendly fire. • A 46 per cent drop in battle intensity and 25 per cent less enemy engagement. • A 22 per cent drop in threat forces killed in offensive attacks, a 25 per cent drop in defensive actions by night and a 11.5 per cent rise in day actions. • A 47 per cent rise in radio traffic took 53 per cent longer to be understood. • A 209 per cent rise in calls for indirect fire support in the offensive and an 11 per cent drop in defence. • A 340 per cent rise in time taken to replace the chain of command. The US army’s operational concept for individual and collective measures for chemical and biological and radiological (CBR) defence released on 30 July 1982 stressed a three-tiered approach of contamination avoidance, protection and decontamination. The new trend now emphasised is to continue the mission even if contaminated with NBC agents.
EQUIPMENT DEVELOPMENT Between 1945 and 1967, protective clothing was dependent on the likely CW agent. Impermeable suits were used by the specialists involved in the decontamination tasks, while others used impregnated permeable protection clothing. The debate continued on ‘zero’ risk to the soldiers, which meant increased protection but also increased heat stress. Since most biological agents and radiological particles could not penetrate the skin physically like chemical agents could, the stress was on lighter clothing which could be discarded. The combined requirement of protection against atomic, biological and chemical (ABC) threats changed the ‘gas mask’ into a ‘protective mask’. This was achieved by including a particle filter that stopped 2–5 micron particles and a carbon filter that absorbed vapours. The technical problem of detection is time critical. The longer the time the better the analysis and fewer the false alarms. If there were
THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF
CHEMICAL AGENTS M 41
no time to put on the protection gear there would be casualties. While balancing the requirements of early warning, detection, reconnaissance, identification and monitoring post-attack presence of solid, liquid and vapour chemical and biological warfare agents, there is always a conflict between the precision required by the specialists and the cheap and easy solution required by others. The safety standards for protective clothing in the US is based on the worst case scenario of 10 g of nerve agent per m2 of ground representing a fairly typical exposure near ground zero of the chemical artillery barrage. The UK accepts a standard of 2 to 3 g of nerve agent per m2 of ground in selecting their protective clothing. Radiological particles and biological organisms could be washed off with soap and water eliminating any threat to the soldiers with a low technology approach. Non-persistent agents do not remain long enough to require decontamination. However, chemical agents such as mustard, thickened soman and VX require thorough decontamination. Decontamination equipment in the US is based on a system of x to 5x rating which has been worked out based on the accepted decontamination level. The symbol x indicates that the item is partially decontaminated and 3x indicates that the item is 99.9 per cent clean. However, for the equipment to be completely clean and released to the general public the required rating is 5x. This requires exposing the equipment to 538°C (1000°F) heat for 15 minutes. It basically means incinerating the material. The requirement of troops to take off their masks for performing certain tasks, like manning radar, and monitoring signal communications and logistical areas like field hospitals and the like gave rise to the collective protection requirement. This is not a very high technology area since it is based on shelter and provision of clean air. The focus remained on providing integrated vehicular protection. The power demand and the weight of the systems and the large filters remain the constraining factors.
ESSENTIAL CW ISSUES There are two schools of thought: One believes in doing away with all CW weapons and even refraining from the defensive programmes lest
42 M B.S. MALIK
the adversary is given an excuse to develop a stronger CW capability to overcome the proposed defensive measures. The second believes in having a big enough ‘stick’ of credible offensive and defensive capability so that retaliation in kind is possible and it can thus force the adversary to return to conventional warfare after exchanging a few CW weapons if inevitable. The main issue here is not merely having a capability, but the heavy and unrealistic costs that would accompany the near total, if not total protection, against CW. It would follow from this that the costs of operating as normally as possible on a CW battlefield would require a whole family of CW capable equipment and weapons, designed beyond their actual functional needs to serve their basic functions, just to cater for the eventuality of the chemical weapons being used. The degradation in capability and the acceptance of dual costs would be a very serious proposition even for the very rich nations. Consequently, in our context, while considering the mountain scenario, the Iraq-Iran war experience did not enthuse us very much. In the desert, the high temperatures create problems for effective CW and the mechanised columns have both greater protection and mobility against CW. However, the use of CW in the plains is a possibility. Though the area is heavily populated on both sides of our western borders and militarily it will require favourable winds and very precise targeting, the army would be better prepared than the civilians through defensive measures like protective clothing. The air force would have a problem because the high performance aircraft cannot be flown with protective gear and also the tolerence level of chemical exposure for fliers is very low. (They need very sensitive detectors to detect very low levels of nerve agents, levels which can cause myosis, blurred and dim vision because of pin-pointed pupils.) The navy is well protected against CW. Military personnel cannot merely survive a contaminated battlefield; they must be able to sustain combat operations as well. Mauroni argues that it all boils down to choice: How much of a shield (defensive capability) and how much of a sword (CB ammunitions) is required to protect the troops. What is the balance required to survive and sustain the forces on a modern battlefield? In the ultimate analysis the military commanders must appreciate that CW agents can be defined, analysed and cleaned up. They are just chemical compounds like any other chemical (acids, fertilisers, pesticides) and can be studied and handled safely.
THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF
CHEMICAL AGENTS M 43
WMD TERRORISM (CW) The observation of Brian Jenkins takes the wind out of the oft-repeated argument of WMD terrorism, because according to him ‘Terrorists want a lot of people watching but not a lot of people killed’. If this were the case then the desperation of the terrorists would have to be supported by a state. The problem then would be of providing high technical training to terrorist groups. They would have to be told all about the inbuilt technical safeguards, self-destruct mechanisms and various other controls and authorisation protocols that accompany WMD. First, this would require a high level of scientific expertise; the scientists of the concerned state would have to virtually accompany such groups. Next comes the question of the vulnerabilities of that state itself. What if the terrorist group turns against its mentors? How safe is it to trust the WMD to such non-state actors? And even then, the conditions of use, chances of accident, transit, custody and issues of storage will pose serious problems. There is only one example of Aum Shinrikyo quoted by Joseph F. Pilat, where a well-funded technologically capable group was unable to produce high purity sarin and was not, in Falkenrath’s words, ‘proficient in its delivery’.… However, most terrorists have not yet demonstrated that they can fully exploit the (technological) vulnerabilities, nor that they desire and are able to wield WMD instruments effectively. Vulnerabilities to WMD,10 terrorism must be understood in this light and addressed on the basis of sober assessment and a prioritisation of risks. After the Tokyo attack, some people see weaknesses everywhere. Of course, a wide spectrum of vulnerabilities exist in the West and in the World, not only from WMD threats but also environmental degradation, disruption of critical infrastructure and the prospect of an asteroid striking the earth. But not all of these vulnerabilities can be addressed effectively—or, in some cases at all.11 Joseph Pilat basically questions the premises of Richard Falkernath’s assumptions and lack of technical solutions. If the threat assessments are vague, lack focus and the technological abilities quoted in
44 M B.S. MALIK
an abstract manner—more in terms of possibilities—then the responses based on available capabilities can be made to look inadequate. Fear is a difficult emotion to control and it can lead to an irrational response, quite disproportionate to the threat. In the debate over WMD terrorism, all is not simple for the terrorists. Apart from the technical difficulties, they have to contend with information leaks as also their own conscience. A defector from the Ku Klux Klan, in April 1997, informed the FBI about the plan to blow up a natural gas refinery. Similarly, a member of the dreaded Aum Shinrikyo knowingly did not arm a biological weapon due to his conscience at the last minute. Any terrorist plan contemplating the use of chemical weapons will require the highest cohesion, discipline, motivation and the highest technical expertise, secure surveillance and communication means with unlimited secure finances. Above all foolproof security (intelligence and counter-intelligence) with a system of checks and balances which can ensure that former members, approvers and deserters do not spill the beans. It will be apparent from this that even governments find it difficult to meet all these conditions. Given here are some figures to assess the effectiveness of CW agents: • About 1 t of sarin gas would be required to cause 10,000 fatalities (as reported by Richards K. Betts12). Another estimate by the US Congress Office of Technology Assessment, reported by John Mueller and Karl Mueller,13 concluded that 1 t of sarin perfectly delivered in ideal conditions may cause between 3,000 to 8,000 deaths in a heavily populated area. If the sun was out or there was moderate wind, the casualties would have been reduced to 300–800 only. • About 1 t of nerve gas or 5 t of mustard gas would be required in 1 km2 of open area to cause heavy casualties. Even for the nerve gas this would require concentrated delivery into a rather small area of about 300 heavy artillery shells or 7x 500-pounds bombs, according to Matthew Meselson from Harvard University (as reported by John Mueller and Karl Mueller).14 • The bomb used in the World Trade Center attack in 1993 was laced with cyanide, which burnt up in the explosion due to lack of expertise, as per reports from Richard K. Betts15 though not independently confirmed. • Aum Shinrikyo released sarin into a Japanese subway in 1995; the attack caused 5,000 casualties but only 12 deaths. (As reported by John Mueller and Karl Mueller.)16
THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF
CHEMICAL AGENTS M 45
• Iran reported that in March 1987, of the 27,000 gased by the Iraqis only 262 died. (As reported by John Mueller and Karl Mueller.)17 • On the other hand, infant mortality rose from the pre-Gulf War rate of 3.7 per cent to 12 per cent in 1998; an increase of 40,000 deaths of children and 50,000 of older Iraqis. (As reported by John Mueller and Karl Mueller.)18 WMD terrorism is a threat which needs to be assessed realistically, and has to be met intellectually, politically and militarily. Jessica Stern, commenting on the wrongful targeting of the Al Shifa plant in Sudan on 20 August 1998 based on incomplete information, says Whether or not the plant was producing VX for Bin Laden as the US government alleged, the desire to retaliate swiftly seems to have led policy-makers to lower their standards of evidence. The US government’s inability (or refusal) to persuade the international community that it targeted the right facility in Sudan on 20 August 1998, suggests that policy-makers are not fully prepared for the threat of WMD19 terrorism—intellectually, militarily or politically. The risk of an apocalypse is essentially nil, but the threat of terrorism with chemicals is real and growing. It demands better intelligence, careful analysis and sober, steady and careful response; not hasty judgement. Accordingly, we should selectively invest in CW reconnaissance Electronic Warfare (EW), detection and protection. ‘Knowledge is “Power” in “Gas Defence”. It saves casualties, increases the confidence of men in their own capability to protect them selves and reduce fear.’20
NOTES
1. See Binding, Rudolph, A Fatalist at War, translated by F.D. Morrow (Allen and Unwin,1929). 2. See Charles H. Bay, ‘The Other Gas Crisis–Chemical Weapons’, Parameters— Journal of the US Army War College, September 1979, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 70–72.
46 M B.S. MALIK 3. See Albert J. Mauroni America’s Struggle with Chemical–Biological Warfare (West Port: Praeger Publisher, 2000), p. 11. 4. Office of the Program Manager for the Binary Munitions, Binary Chemical Munitions Fact Sheet. Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, September 1989. p. 1. As quoted by Mauroni, op. cit. (Note 3), Chapter 6, p. 76. 5. See note 3. 6. See the New Standard Encyclopedia—1987, (Chicago, Illinois: Standard Educational Corporation). Printed in the States, Volume 11, pp. 434–35. 7. See note 3. 8. Same as note 3, p. 74. 9. See note 3. 10. NBC changed to WMD here and in next paragraph by the author to make following the text easy in this context. 11. See Joseph F. Pilat, ‘Prospects for NBC Terrorism After Tokyo’, in Brad Roberts (Ed.), Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons: Calibrating Risks and Responses (Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1997), pp. 4–15. 12. Richard K. Betts, ‘The New Threat of Mass Destruction’, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 1998, Vol. 77, No. 1. Betts is Director, National Security Studies, Council of Foreign Relations, and Professor of Political Science and Director at the Institute for War and Peace Studies, Columbia University. 13. John Mueller and Karl Mueller, ‘Sanctions of Mass Destruction’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 1999, Vol. 78, No. 3. John Mueller is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester. Karl Mueller is Assistant Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the school of Advanced Airpower studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. 14. Ibid. 15. See note 12. 16. See note 13. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. See note 10. 20. Brigadier General Alden Waitt, Gas Warfare (1943), quoted in Mauroni, op. cit. (note 3), p. 255.
CHAPTER
3 The Effectiveness of Biological Agents Raja Menon
T
he discovery that micro-organisms create diseases in humans and animals led, almost instantaneously, to the development of biological weapons that were first used in World War I against the draft animals of the other side. This was followed by the Japanese programme against Chinese civilians in the 1930s. Today’s biological warfare agents are classified into bacteria, viruses, toxins and bioregulators. Toxins may also be found under both biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW) agents. The evolution of biotechnology, spurred by the Genome Project could result in dramatically more dangerous BW agents.1 During the Cold War the two superpower rivals developed massive stocks of BW agents such as anthrax and botulinum toxins (BTX). These two are still the favoured agents of new BW powers owing to the relatively low cost of their manufacture. The Soviet Union apparently concentrated on using new genetic engineering techniques to modify the antibiotic resistance to the plague2 while the US concentrated more on BTX and staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB). So, to worry that the new biotechnological capabilities
48 M RAJA MENON
could be used in combination with the Genome Project to target specific ethnic groups while leaving the other ethnic groups unaffected would not be far-fetched. In reality, chemical and bio-weapons form a combined spectrum which ranges from classical gases such as mustard gas and nerve gas to bacteria, viruses and rickettsia. In between lie the toxins and bioregulators which are chemicals of biological origin, including BTX. To understand the subsequent work on BW, it would be useful to adopt the French classification of BW agents into the following:3 • Living agents capable of self-reproduction like bacteria and fungus. • Living agents capable of reproduction only in a host cell like viruses, for example, small pox. • Non-living agents incapable of reproduction but created by living organisms, i.e., peptides and toxins, example, Ricin. • Non-living agents obtained by chemical synthesis. This classification of biological agents has been accepted worldwide with United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), along with World Health Organization (WHO), publishing a comprehensive list. It is necessary to start with a basic list so that when we eventually reach the international regimes and the possibility of verification we know what we are dealing with.4 Refer to Appendix 3.1A. Biological agents like bacteria and virus have not found as much favour as toxins because they need time to multiply in the victim even after delivery in order to incapacitate him. It is for this reason that toxins are preferred. The standard method of delivery being to release the agent close enough to the intended victim so that the agent is inhaled directly into the lungs. For this reason, the early US bio-warfare agents were composed entirely of BTX and SEB. The former causes almost certain fatality while the latter incapacitates the victim for days. Botulinum is caused by bacteria whose spores exist in the environment and is produced in contaminated food. The toxin produced by this bacteria affects the central nervous system. However, for it to be fatal, the naturally occurring toxin would have to be processed through many stages. The toxic ricin, produced from the castor oil plant has been used for criminal purposes over centuries and was almost certainly the toxin used to kill the Bulgarian dissident, Georgi Markov, in London, when he was stabbed in the thigh with the tip of an umbrella coated with ricin.
THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF
BIOLOGICAL AGENTS M 49
The 1995 UNSCOM report on Iraq’s BT weapon programme spoke of attempts to manufacture anthrax, risin, bolutinum toxins, afla toxins and myco toxins. The use of afla toxin created much confusion originally, as it could cause liver cancer in humans, but only over a period of years. This lead investigators to believe that it may have developed as a long-term weapon against a specific ethnic group.5 It is, however, against plants that the longest levels of BW have so far been used. The type of agent used is a bioregulator, which is a chemical produced by the living organism as part of the regulatory process of its natural life. When the chemical is introduced in unnatural quantities it leads to the death or mutation of the plant. Although called herbicides, they are not the kind of anti-weed chemicals that can be found in garden shops, but include agents that may cause the plant to die from dehydration or by defoliation. These two processes are normal to all herbicides but added in BW agents are regulators (that cause the plant to die), soil stimulants and catalysts that help the agent stick to the foliage.6 The most widely used BW agent, Agent Orange, is a mixture of dichlorophenoxyacetic acid and trichlorophenoxyacteic acid whose action on plants was to shrivel the leaves or kill the roots. Herbicides were first considered as weapons in World War II when scientists suggested that they could be used to kill foodgrain crops; however, the war concluded before they could be deployed. The civilian equivalent, D, commercially called ‘Weedone’ was a roaring commercial success. It was initially used in Malaya by the British during the anti-insurgency campaign for defoliating the jungle, but subsequently more for destroying crops in areas that were under communist control. The density of use in Vietnam was calculated at about 33 kg per ha which was about 50 times the concentration permitted for domestic use. While there were side effects on humans, the effect on the ecosystem was catastrophic. The agent destroyed all living organisms and the areas attacked with Agent Orange or Agent Blue could not be repopulated for upto 10 years. The ecology remained unbalanced for upto 30 years or more. However, the extreme effectiveness of the new variants of weedkillers generated huge profits in the agriculture markets, where it was claimed that farm outputs would be doubled or trebled by selective use of weedkilling chemicals. The world is witnessing great scientific breakthroughs in the Human Genome Project, of which, along with Stage II, the physical
50 M RAJA MENON
mapping has been completed. Among the goals to be achieved by 2005 are the following: • Understand the human sequence variation. • Complete Gene identification through full-length DNA. • Complete the DNA sequences of certain model organisms leading to that of a mouse. At the time of signing the first Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), it was known that B agents could create millions of casualties. What has become clear in the last few years is that a malign use of the Genome Project could create a ‘super bug’ resistant to known medicines. As is usual with developments in technology, the problem arises from dual-use capabilities. For instance, it is now known that certain toxins were useful in medical treatment, particularly the well-known BW agent botulinum, which today is licensed for production to cure certain diseases. Recently, its use in removing the effects of ageing upon the skin of the elderly has brought it fame as a cosmetic agent. As a result, toxins are being produced in kilogram-sized quantities. Specifically, it is feared that genetic to engineering along with beneficial advances could also be used produce the following: • • • •
A toxin or malign regulator by modifying a benign molecule. Micro-organisms resistant to vaccines including antibiotics. Micro-organisms with enhanced aerosol stability. Immunologically altered micro-organisms able to evade current detection methods.
These fears are well founded because the ability to do at least two of the four alterations is required by medical science, as we shall see later. For instance, altering a bioregulator may be an activity needed to enhance an existing cure, but the possibility of misuse is just as great. Ever since inhalers became popular with asthma patients the advantage of depositing minute quantities of the curing drug to the affected organ has been recognised. So, the stability of drugs and micro-organisms in an aerosol are actually part of beneficial medical activity that could simultaneously be misused. The military use of toxins requires that they be dispersed as an aerosol (as sub-cutaneous, i.e., through the skin, introduction has been ruled out). This requires that the drug be stored as an aerosol
THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF
BIOLOGICAL AGENTS M 51
and spread over a geographical area so as to give each victim the requisite concentration into his lungs. Assuming a division of troops or tanks could be spread over an area of 100 km2, it has been calculated that to achieve the required concentration of killing, 50 per cent of those exposed would require about 80 t of chemical toxins that are stable in aerosols. The danger of course is that bacterial toxins are required in concentrations of one hundredth of chemical toxins. At present, producing such large quantities of bacterial toxins from nature is still a problem. However, genetic research may make it possible to produce large quantities at cheaper rates in times to come. Hence the concern that advanced medical research could be a dual-use capability. Currently, two chemical toxins are on the CWC list—ricin and saxitoxin,7 both chemically derived although 10 toxins are on the Australia Group Export Control List (see Appendix 3.2B). The newer toxins are more or less all aimed at attacking the body’s immune system, which today remains the best defence against bacterial BW. In the early 1990s, the method of overcoming the immune system8 was noticed in the staphylococcal toxins which were already being used in BW, but whose actions had not been fully understood. The ingenuity and evil in man as seen in BW technology is truly represented in the illegal manufacture of what are called bioregulators. These are natural substances provided by each human body to regulate its natural functions such as vasodilation, muscle contraction, blood pressure, temperature, heart rate, and immune responses. A broad relationship between the way in which peptides act on body functions is given in Table 3.1.9 Table 3.1 Regulation of Body Functions Function Pain
Blood Pressure
Temperature Arousal Level and Motor Activity
Peptides The substances P and Livadikinin transmit pain; Opiodi and Cholecystokin (CCK) inherit pain. The Corticotrophic Relaxing Hormone (CRH) releases the hormone opiodi, and neuropeptide Y decreases blood pressure. Somatostatin elevates temperature, CCK lowers body temperature. CRH and Substance P increases arousal; CCK reduces it.
52 M RAJA MENON
A list of new toxins and bioregulators along with a list of bioregulators that have been synthesised artificially are given in Appendix 3.2B. The isolation of these peptides (as they are called) and their synthesisers has made it possible to introduce these substances in an aerosol form to produce unwanted effects on the body that cannot be ascribed to an outside attack, if and when diagnosed. Another side issue is the combination of the benefits of the Genome research with computer-aided molecular design and computer-aided drug design. This has been possible by understanding how the body’s organisms have the ability to sense the important chemicals in their environment. The signalling of messages across cells is done by a signalling chemical called ligand which has an effect on the victim cell by acting through a cell receptor. For the ligand to reset effectively with a cell receptor, it must remain in contact with the receptor for some time. This is effected by a chain of amino acids; there are 20 of these in our body. The nature of the amino acid decides the change in the structure of the receptor and hence that of the cell. Medical cures are effected in the body by the actual process of interfacing with the cell in a benign way. It would be just as easy to interfere with cells in a malign way and hence the worry in medical circles of the vast potential for misuse of the short cuts now offered by Genome research. Delivery of BW agents needs careful study. The lethality of a BW agent is expressed in the formula LD50 or the dosage at which 50 per cent of those exposed to the toxin would die. A comparative table of toxins in also contained in the Australia List given in Appendix 3.2B. In 1992, a paper produced to study the verification measures for the BTW Convention did a comparative analysis of the amount of toxin required to create scenario lethalities. The targets studied were a military base (10 km2) a city (1,000 km2) and a battlefield 3,000 km2.10 Assumption of LD50
Mly Base
City
Bttlfd
10 ng 100 ng
1g 10 g
1 kg 10 kg
3 kg 30 kg
At the time, the lethality figures for chemical agents were better understood. In which case, for comparison, it was found that botulinum toxin, if distributed over the same area, say 60 km2 would cause as many deaths as 15 t of nerve gas. But this would depend a lot on the efficiency of distribution because the calculation is based
THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF
BIOLOGICAL AGENTS M 53
purely on lethality and concentration. Over the years we have developed a clear understanding of the way aerosols behave in human lungs and this research has further developed the method of delivering aerosol medicines for curing cystic fibrosis, for instance. Medical advancement requires that many peptides and proteins be delivered by aerosols and action taken to prevent them from being broken up easily by the enzymes in the body. One method that has been developed is to encapsulate the drug particle in a degradable polymer coating. The possibilities for misuse are obvious. Similarly, the possibility of attacking the central nervous system by delivering drugs directly to the brain is part of ordinary medical research which requires that the blood-brain barrier be breached. Agents that can attack the brain have already been developed—Agent BZ. That biotechnology would be used for warlike purposes was clear once the research on the AIDS virus, which targets the human immune system, began. At the time, considerable beneficial work was being done on suppressing the functioning of the immune system which is necessary to effect successful organ transplants. The possibility of misusing advanced medical research increases in direct proportion to the level of advance, but it is unclear whether the worst development could be used in the near future for causing immense casualties. The use of chemical agents for criminal activities is evident even for political assassinations without detection. Just as worrying is the enormous possibility of agricultural warfare which again could be a by-product of the measures undertaken to destroy large areas of poppy cultivation. Similarly, as the world moves towards ethnic strife, could the misuse of BW be seen as a weapon for ethnic cleansing?
54 M RAJA MENON
APPENDIX 3.1A Potential Agents for Biological Weapons Disease
Mortality
Viral Chikungunya fever Dengue fever Eastern equine encephalitis Tick-borne encephalitis Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE) Influenza Yellow fever Smallpox
Very low Very low High (>60%) Variable (upto 30%) Low Usually low High (upto 40%) Variable (but usually upto 30%)
Rickettsial Q-fever Psittacosis Rocky Mountain spotted fever Epidemic typhus
Low Moderately high Usually high (upto 80%) Variable (but usually upto 30%)
Bacterial Anthrax (pulmonary) Brucellosis Cholera Glanders Melioidosis Plague (pneumonic) Tularemia Typhoid fever Dysentery
Almost invariably fatal Low Usually high (upto 80%) Almost invariably fatal Almost 100% fatal Almost 100% fatal Usually low (can be upto 60%) Moderately high Low to moderately high
Fungal Coccidioidomycosis
Low
APPENDIX 3.2B Australia Group Export Control List: A Summary 1. New entries in the Export of Goods (control) Order, 1992, covering biological materials as follows: IC 351 Human pathogens, Zoonosis and toxins IC 352 Animal pathogens IC 353 Genetically-modified micro-organisms
THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF
BIOLOGICAL AGENTS M 55
2. New entry in the EG© O 1992 covering biological equipment as follows: 2B 352 equipment capable of use in biological manufacturing 3. Warning guidelines IC 351 Human pathogens, zoonosis and toxins a. Viruses, whether natural enhanced or modified, either in the form of isolated live cultures or as material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with such cultures, as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.
Chikungunya virus Congo-Crimean haemorrhagic fever virus Dengue fever virus Eastern equine encephalitis virus Ebola virus Hantan virus Junin virus Lassa fever virus Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus Machupo virus Marburg virus Monkey pox virus Rift Valley fever virus Russian Spring-Summer encephalitis virus Variola virus Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus Western equine encephalitis virus White pox Yellow fever virus Japanese encephalitis virus
b. Rickettsia, whether natural, enhanced or modified, either in the form of isolated live cultures or as material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with such cultures, as follows: 1. Coxiella burnetii 2. Rickettsia Quintana
3. Rickettsia prowasecki 4. Rickettsia rickettsii
c. Bacteria, whether natural, enhanced or modified, either in the form of isolated live cultures or as material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with such cultures, as follows: 1. Bacillus anthracis 2. Brucella abortus 3. Brucella melitensis
8. Pseudomonas mallei 9. Pseudomonas pseudomallei 10. Salmonella typhi
56 M RAJA MENON 4. 5. 6. 7.
Brucella suis Chlamydia psittaci Clostridium botulinum Francisella tularensis
11. Shigella dysenteriae 12. Vibrio cholera 13. Pasteurella pseudotuberculosis var pestis (Yersinia pestis)
d. Toxins, as follows: 1. Botulinum toxins 2. Clostridium perfringens toxins 3. Conotoxin 4. Ricin 5. Saxitoxin
6. Shigatoxin 7. Staphylococcus aureus toxins 8. Tetrodotoxin 9. Verotoxin 10. Microcystins (Cyanginosins)
IC 352 Animal pathogens as follows: a. Viruses, whether natural, enhanced or modified, either in the form of isolated live cultures or as material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with such cultures as follows: 1. African swine fever virus 2. Avian influenza virus which are: i. Uncharacterised; or, ii. those defined in EC Directive 92/40/EC, as having high pathogenicity, as follows: • Type A viruses with an IVPI (intravenous pathogenicity index) in 6 week old chickens of greater than 1.2; or • Type A viruses H5 or H7 subtype for which nucleotide sequencing has demonstrated multiple basic amino acids at the cleavage site of haemagglutinin. 3. Bluetongue virus 4. Foot and mouth disease virus 5. Goat pox virus 6. Porcine herpes virus (Aujeszky’s disease) 7. Swine fever virus (Hog cholera virus) 8. Lyssa virus 9. Newcastle disease virus 10. Peste des petits ruminants virus 11. Swine vesicular disease (Porcine enterovirus type 9) 12. Rinderpest virus 13. Sheep pox virus 14. Teschen disease virus 15. Vesicular stomatitis virus
THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF
BIOLOGICAL AGENTS M 57
c. Bacteria, whether natural, enhanced or modified, either in the form of isolated live cultures or as material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with such cultures, as follows: 1. Mycoplasma mycoides IC 353 Genetically-modified micro-organisms, as follows: a. Genetically modified micro-organisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with pathogenicity and are derived from organisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences coding for many of the toxins specified in head d. of entry IC 351. 2B 352 Equipment capable of use in biological manufacturing, as follows: a. Containment facilities at Containment Level (ACDP) 3 or 4, and related equipment, as follows: 1. Facilities that meet the criteria for Containment Level 3 or 4 as specified in guidance from the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens approved by the Health and Safety Commission (published by HMSO, Second Edition 1990). Note: The criteria for Containment Level 3 or 4 in head a. of this entry are equivalent to the criteria for p3 or p4, BL3, L3 or L4 containment as specified in the WHO Laboratory Biosafety manual (Geneva, 1983). 2. Independently ventilated protective full or half suits. 3. Biological safety cabinets or isolators, which allow manual operations to be performed within whilst providing an environment equivalent to Class III biological protection. Note: In this entry, isolators include flexible isolators, dry boxes, anaerobic chambers and glove boxes. b. Fermenters, bioreactors, chemostats and continuous-flow systems capable of operation without the propagation of aerosols, having all the following characteristics: 1. Capacity of 300 l or more. 2. Double or multiple sealing joints within the steam containment area. 3. Capable of in-situ sterilisation in a closed state. c. Centrifugal separators or decanters, capable of continuous separation without the propagation of aerosols, having all the following characteristics: 1. Flow rate exceeding 100 l per hour. 2. Components of polished stainless steel or titanium.
58 M RAJA MENON 3. Double or multiple sealing joints within the steam containment area, and 4. Capable of in-situ sterilisation in a closed state. d. Cross-flow filtration equipment, designed for continuous separation without the propagation of aerosols, having both of the following characteristics: 1. Equal to or greater than 5 m2. 2. Capable of in-situ sterilisation. e. Steam sterilisable freeze drying equipment with a condenser capacity exceeding 50 kg of ice in 24 hours and less than 1,000 kg of ice in 24 hours. f. Chambers designed for aerosol challenge testing with pathogenic micro-organisms or toxins and having a capacity of 1 m3 or greater.
WARNING GUIDELINES Although items in the categories listed ahead have not been brought under export control, it is possible that these could be used in BW proliferation programmes and thus enquiries or orders relating to such items should be carefully assessed. a. ACDP (Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens) Hazard group 4 and group 3 micro-organisms not controlled and some Hazard group 2 micro-organisms, such as the following: Clostridium perfringers Clostridium tetani Enterohaemorrhagic Escherichia coli serotype 0157 and other verotoxin producing serotypes Legionella pneumophila Yersinia pseudotuberculosis Absettarov virus Hanzalova virus Hypr virus Kyesanur forest virus Louping ill virus Mopeia virus Murray Valley encephalitis virus Omsk haemorrhagic fever virus Oropouche virus Rocio virus St. Louis encephalitis virus
THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF
BIOLOGICAL AGENTS M 59
b. Toxogenic micro-organisms not controlled, such as species of clostridia and corynebacteria. c. Pathogens harmful to plants, fish or bees, and capable of causing serious economic or environmental damage. d. Genetically modified micro-organisms (GMOs) other than those controlled, which cause disease in man, animals, or plants, or harm to the environment, or which contain genes associated with pathogenicity; but excluding pesticides and herbicides active against weed plants. e. GMOs having enhanced expression of innate toxins or of other toxic organic chemical is considered to be one containing at least one carbon–carbon bond. f. Some types of genetic material, such as genomic libraries from toxogenic or pathogenic micro-organisms, potential host organisms for genetic modification, and nucleic acid factors relevant to expression. g. Toxins not controlled, including the following: Abrin Cholera toxin Tetanus toxin Trichothecene mycotoxin h. Media for cultivating agents, especially when ordered in unusually large quantities. i. Tissue culture cell lines suitable for large-scale growth of viruses, rickettsia, or chlamydia. j. Equipment other than controlled, on pilot scale or larger, suitable for use in the production, harvesting, drying or micro-encapsulation of pathogenic micro-organisms, or for the purification of toxins or of other organic chemicals of biological origin. k. Equipment suitable for the dissemination of biological agents, such as aerosol generators. Source: http://www.state.gov/t/np/2001/3525.htm.
NOTES
1. 2.
Malcolm Dando, The New Biological Weapons (Boulder: Lynne Riener, 2001), p. 33. R. Preston, Annals of Warfare: The Biopioneers in New Yorker, March, pp. 52–65; US Army, US Army Activities in the US Biological Warfare Programmes, vol. 122 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1977).
60 M RAJA MENON 3.
4.
5.
6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
The French classification is simple and useful. After 1991 an ad-hoc committee was established to examine verification measures for the implementation of the biowarfare in the light of rapidly changing technology. Four such meetings were held known as VEREX meetings in March 1992, November 1992 and September 1993. For more information see BWC/ CONF III/VEREX/WP 13, Geneva, 1 April 1992. The master list for agents against man is produced by the UN in Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons and the Effects of their possible use, Annex IV (New York: UN E 69.1.24, 1969). A modified list is given in Appendix 3.1A, as produced by Dando, Biological Warfare in the 21st Century (London: Brassey, 1994), p. 31. UN Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General on the Status of the Implementation of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) Plan for the Monitoring and Verification of Iraq’s Compliance with Section C of Security Council Resolutions 687,1991.s/1995/864 (1995). US Army, Field Manual Military Chemistry and Chemical Components, FM3-9 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1975). See Appendix 3.2B, the Australia List. Same as note 1, p. 44. Same as note 1, p. 79. Biological Weapon Convention, BWC/CONF.111/VEREX/WP 88, Geneva, 4 December 1992.
PART II THREATS TO
INDIA
CHAPTER
4 Formal and Non-formal Nuclear Threats M.S. Mamik
T
hreats are those conditions that inhibit one’s freedom to think and act naturally. They can result from different causes. This chapter deals with the fear that emanates from the threat of nuclear weapons being used in two situations: between states; and between non-state and/or state, society or group or place, city, facility, etc. In India, this threat is heightened by the time factor—the few minutes of missile flight time between our western neighbour, Pakistan, or even China, and the US, so that even the most well-designed and executed evacuation or defence measures will not save many lives in the subcontinent in the event of an attack. This chapter deals with the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in terms of the following: • • • •
What is the threat (background and calibration)? Who is threatening whom (state and non-state actors)? Where the threat emanates from. Does the source of the threat change—from state to non-state actors, and vice versa. • What needs to be done?
64 M M.S. MAMIK
BACKGROUND Currently, WMD threats emanate from its evolutionary dynamics, namely: • The use of WMD in World War II as war terminator and in the Cold War as dissuader. • The use of WMD for deterrence, compellance and blackmail today. (Latest use by Pakistan in 2001.) • Nuclear weapon states now use their arsenals for deterrence, compellance and blackmail. • WMD have been politically attractive, viable and effective instruments in conflict and crisis resolution/management/transformation, as well as arms control and technology transfer or denial.1 • Radiological devices are now a tool of terrorism too.
CALIBRATION STATE
TO
OF
THREATS
STATE THREATS
These threats emanate from various dimensions based on a complex strategic calculus of a number of environmental factors2 and political, historical, economic and socio-religious, and cultural3 factors. Some of these are tangible and some are perceived or merely feared. Conventional assessments of military capabilities can be made somewhat realistically by discounting a host of factors from weapon counts4 and organisation inputs listed in Jane’s Yearbooks to assess the residual capability. Making a calculus for nuclear weapons is different. Currently we see that the state to state threat is generally declining among erstwhile adversaries due to reduction in nuclear arsenals, deployment, de-targeting, lowering of alert states or readiness and other risk-reduction measures. Another development, though yet militarily unproven, is anti-missile defence.5 The significant reason for this is the end of the Cold War. Another reason is that accurate alternatives are available to a few, and also because the economics of disarmament are beginning to make an impact. But the same cannot be said for Asia. On the other hand, the probability/likelihood of the use of WMD by non-state actors (including those with covert or overt state support) is increasing due to
FORMAL
AND
NON-FORMAL NUCLEAR THREATS M 65
easier access to material and technology and increased boldness on the part of these groups (9/11 is the best example of this).
FACTORS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR THREATS—CALIBRATION NON-RELEVANCE
OF
PARITY
Small arsenals do deter larger ones and nukes (nuclear weapons) are often quoted as conventional disparity equalisers. The first important difference is the non-essentiality of arsenals to have parity as this concept rests on the ability to deliver disproportionate punishment or destruction through deterrence and compellance; many doctrines6 have evolved over the years with the most famous being Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Non-relevance of parity depends on the condition that each side has something to lose if the other side uses nuclear weapons, as also in the case of retaliation.
STRATEGIC STABILITY In the Cold War period, strategic stability was achieved through a combination of crisis stability and arms race stability.7 What is the present situation?8 History shows an undeclared arms race of two nascent nuclear states in the subcontinent having passed through three crises including one localised war. However, China’s status was a component of India’s9 strategic asymmetry since 1964. As China grew in capability and diversity along with an undeclared but more credible Pakistani capability, India was really hemmed into a nuclear corner10 with border disputes as well as socio-religious conflict continuing with the two adversaries at varying levels. Strategic stability is relevant only in state to state calculations but is null and void in an asymmetric situation when any non-state actor is involved.
POLITICAL WEAPON—USE NOT GUARANTEED Mere possession of a nuclear weapon does not guarantee its use in a time of crisis as it is not a military but a political weapon. In conventional
66 M M.S. MAMIK
usage, where war is an extension of politics by military means, the decision to go to war is made by the leadership based on a perceived gain or better strategic balance, when the leadership has a fair chance to both perceive and weigh its chances. India’s nuclear dilemma begins on this reality that in Pakistan,11 the weapon is owned and controlled by the military and that, overwhelmingly, the application of a nuclear weapon could be in pursuit of a military strategy, not a political one.12
MISPERCEPTION
AND
MISCALCULATION
The military control and command structure in Pakistan is destabilising. This is unprecedented in nuclear history and is the most dangerous element.13 India’s arms control efforts and those of others— namely the US—have not addressed the transfer of nuclear weapons to civilian control, which is virtually impossible under a military regime.
ALL AZIMUTH DIRECTION
AND
DUALITY
OF
THREAT AXIS
India’s problem14 is accentuated due to the presence, simultaneously, of two adversaries who are close political and military allies and who are also using this alliance as a strategic pincer to pressurise India on many fronts. The other factors which differ from the erstwhile US-USSR relationship is the fact that both these powers once fought as allies and had found a way of doing business throughout the Cold War. The Cold War was more ideological and as soon as the Communist face of the former Soviet Union changed, the nuclear tensions drastically reduced even though the weapons still existed. But here, in the subcontinent, there exists a history of religious animosity superimposed on misplaced perceptions of the strength of regional sub-nationalism and increasing fundamentalism. On the Chinese front is the realism of both countries being ancient civilisations which have survived history and the test of time.
GEOMETRY The short missile flight time makes it impossible to issue warnings to the civilian population. Yet, they may be primary targets because
FORMAL
AND
NON-FORMAL NUCLEAR THREATS M 67
of the poor accuracy of South Asian missiles which can only hit cities. While Pakistan suffers from the same vulnerability as India with most of its countervalue and counterforce targets located close to its borders (though India does enjoy some degree of depth), the situation with regard to China is radically different and asymmetric. Most of China’s economic capacity and important population centres are near the coast and significantly far from India’s reach with at least a 10–15 minutes missile flight time between the two countries. Thus, the geometry of the threat from the two different axes, if simultaneous, can be very dangerous. It is necessary therefore to always ensure non-simultaneity of threat as one of India’s policy objectives. One can conclude that asymmetry of target vulnerability and geometry as well as simultaneity are features different from the Cold War strategies so far enunciated under the one-to-one deterrence formulae.
METEOROLOGY The prevailing westerlies favour our western adversary.15 This can be illustrated using data and target analysis from the Indian Meterological Department to see the impact of nuclear weapons.
GEOGRAPHY Factors such as terrain, built-up area and their relative position affects the overall destructive impact of a nuclear weapon based on the enemy’s capability. The same weapon can have a different destructive impact in a different country due to developmental differentials. Is economic vulnerability a consequence of better development?
DOCTRINE India’s and China’s ‘No First Use’ doctrines16 do not seem to provide any further reassurance or confidence building than the paper on which they are written. This is due to historical factors and the proven record of both countries of acting in their national interest when confronted with international obligations or even selfpronounced unilateral measures. Thus, our ‘no first use’ fails to
68 M M.S. MAMIK
reassure Pakistan as does China’s failure to make any allowance for India’s calculations.17
CONTROL Another destabilising factor—aspects of control—is also loaded against India. Whilst Pakistan has established and exercised its National Security Council (predominantly military) as the supreme decision-making body, in India the National Security Council (NSC) with its plethora of components and ambiguous weaponisation neither enhances nor reflects credibility of use of nuclear weapons even under retaliatory circumstances. On the other hand, the Chinese decision making with their Central Military Commission as well as established diversified and mobile arsenal have a time tested, decisionmaking apparatus with party–military interactions smoothened out.
DISARMAMENT Countries use the instrument of disarmament18 and arms control to advance national security interests through reduction or constraints on their adversaries. But in India we see that the arms control and disarmament measures yield little in terms of advancing the country’s own national security interests. The clandestine weaponisation of Pakistan, the de facto passage of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the General Assembly and resolutions passed after Pokhran show very little convertible power and influence in shaping India’s security environment.
CREDIBILITY
OF
THREATS
The simple question is who is making the threat and what is his capability and credibility. The factors that need to be considered while evaluating the threats of WMD of the nuclear type are as follows: • Capability—Warheads and Delivery Means and Protection: These essentially look at types, numbers, levels of sophistication, reliability, purity of fissile material availability, reliability, storage
FORMAL
•
• • •
•
•
•
AND
NON-FORMAL NUCLEAR THREATS M 69
and safety. The delivery systems include type diversity, response, mobility, storage, penetrability, range survivability, MIRV/multiple target, multiple warheads, etc. Vulnerability: This includes availability of targets within range and targeting (force/value targets, leadership), strategic vulnerability of installations of economic and public utility, relative asymmetry/symmetry of capability vs vulnerability between adversaries. Credibility: Includes perceived vs actual threats and the inherent gaps between the two. It is determined by the type of government/ decision-making apparatus, and ethnic homogeneity. Cultural Factors: These include tolerance vs totalitarianism or a theocratic–military/failing state based on hatred of others.19 Disaster Management and Recovery: A demonstrated good and effective disaster management and recovery system (compared to a poor, ineffective one) gives the adversary lesser chance of creating panic and leadership decision uncertainities. Anti-Missile Defences (AMD): The deployment of anti-missile defences by the US and its Allies especially in Asia’s Far East will have a downstream effect as China responds with enhancements in the quality of its Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV’s), decoys, defences, as well as quantity in terms of numbers, range, yield etc. This will cause the strategic balance of India’s simultaneous dual deterrence against its two nuclear capable neighbours to shift towards a position of disadvantage. Accidental20 and Unauthorised Use by both Own and Adversary due to Proximity: The possibility of accidental21 and unauthorised use or self-made threat stems from lacunae in custodial care, movement, access or control and release deficiencies, as also terrorism resulting from such lapses. Such an event can also be due to shortfalls in technology or reliability or component failures for which a stockpile stewardship and testing programme is vital. The danger of malfunction or inadvertent activation of both warhead or delivery systems can be real if security, handling and transportation are not handled with adequate care. Anti-proliferation/Counter-proliferation Initiatives of Other States: It may be possible that actions taken by other states under counter-proliferation/anti-proliferation initiatives may at times lead to surprisingly unintended disasters or occurrences which can pose a threat to the targeted state.
70 M M.S. MAMIK
NUCLEAR TERRORISM ‘The greatest threat to the world’s security probably stems from the proliferation and the increasing technical sophistication of weapons accessible to terrorist organizations’22 The serious issue is that WMDs are increasingly becoming accessible to rogue states, organisations, and groups who are also becoming bolder probably because of the asymmetric rules of the game in the civilised societies which they subvert. They act in a catalytic manner, directing societal terror to target the state—a dangerous situation for a threatened party as it is a totally disproportionate and asymmetric situation. It would involve in Churchill’s world ‘never in the field of human history were so many threatened by so few’, as also another corollary ‘never in human history were so many searching for so few’.
FACTORS
FOR
GROWTH
Following are the factors fostering the growth of nuclear terrorism: • A perception of a long unsolved grievance, and prosperity for violence supported by misguided religions faith. • Better capability, access to material and technology. • A perceived lack of state readiness or competence or will to respond to a nuclear attack. • Exploiting existing societal/demographic factors in the current political, military or socio-cultural state of the entity threatened. • Weakness or irresoluteness of target. • External response and support or lack of coordination in the response.
RESPONSE The response to a state nuclear threat by a state is well analysed by existing bureaucracies. There are adequate case histories like the cuban crises and the form Kipper war, when the US went to DEFCON3. A state response to nuclear terrorism is still a grey area and not well researched. A few points that affect response are as follows:
FORMAL
AND
NON-FORMAL NUCLEAR THREATS M 71
• Effort: A disproportionate effort would be involved in mobilising resources to track and neutralise the threat in a highly timecompressed situation. • Retaliation: One of the main questions would be whom to retaliate against. It would be difficult to surmise who could have attacked, and to track and respond to the attack successfully. • Force against Non-sstate Actors: The perpetrators of nuclear terrorist threats are mostly non-state actors—individuals, groups, organisations23 with apocalyptic goals, who are difficult to identify and even more difficult to retaliate against. With the increased relevance of suicide bombers as carriers, desperate acts even with radiological material cannot be ruled out. Limits to Response: The response is also • Collateral Damage—L compounded by considerations of collateral damage and risk to population. New technology, difficulty in checking and restraining mentally-challenged individuals or those with extreme religious beliefs in democratic societies with respect for human rights, are additional factors which come into play while dealing with those seeking to abet such acts. • Own Nuclear Arsenal: In such cases one’s own nuclear retaliatory capability is of little or no use, and could instead, be at risk. • Asymmetry of Threat: The net implication is that whilst a nuclear state threat is directed against a state, a nuclear terrorist threat can target a range of entities, from groups of individuals, to facilities, cities, economic centres, communication choke points, vital installations and nuclear facilities. This can be done using conventional destructive devices or by merely placing radiological material at important points to cause maximum dislocation and fear. The net fear effect is easy to assess by the fictionary multiplication of the effects of the word ‘nuclear’ and ‘terrorism’ in the human mind. In a strife-torn society where religious–ethnic conflict is superimposed upon the territorial designs of a neighbour, the chances of nuclear terrorism can only be discounted at the nation’s peril. The scale and variation of this theme encompasses a wide spectrum of possibilities depending on the resources that the elements can bring to bear. The chances of active outside state support to such adventures cannot be ruled out especially by a military regime which seeks to leverage state aid to terrorism to its advantage and also use terrorism coupled with nuclear blackmail as an instrument of state policy. The important factor in dealing with such threats is the belated
72 M M.S. MAMIK
realisation that when it occurs not enough has been done in peace time to respond to it in terms of infrastructure, technology or operational and individual protection measures. The various contingencies that could be likely under such a scenario are: • A crude or improvised device or radiological material at a sensitive or populated location. • A stolen suitcase device that ex-KGB/erstwhile USSR obtained clandestinely from other groups being reported to be on the move or sighted. • A device being smuggled into an Indian town/city industrial centre. • Small quantities of fissile materials stolen from own facilities and reported to be in wrong hands. • Using the ruse of a terrorist group threatening to use any crude device/radioactive material in a religious place to blow it up. • Crude conventional suicide attacks on any nuclear installation/economic centre to obtain radioactive materials or nuclear devices to embarrass the government. • Takeover of a nuclear power plant with a threat to remove coolants and cause an explosion similar to Chernobyl, or to blow it up using conventional explosives to release radiation— a remote possibility considering double containment. • Gaining unlawful access to nuclear power plants, threatening employees, making demands and holding the people inside hostage. • Lacing conventional explosives with radiological materials.
RECOMMENDATIONS It is necessary to be brief while recommending the measures necessary to deal with such a vast canvas as nuclear terrorism. Primarily, these recommendations rest on the pillar of eternal and all encompassing vigilance by the entire society and not exclusively by the government or security agencies. Anything nuclear or would-be-radiological should be kept apart from a prospective terrorist or anti-social element. All would agree that finding a prospective terrorist before his strike is certainly a difficult but not impossible task. In illustrating this point lessons can be learnt from recent Hollywood movies like Peacemaker, Broken Arrow, Crimson Tide etc.
FORMAL
AND
NON-FORMAL NUCLEAR THREATS M 73
• Denial of Capability: Denial of state support to fabricate complex devices even though general information may be available in open literature. • Check Unauthorised Activity: There should be procedures and deterring conduct clauses in place for those handling radioactive materials. • Information Security: This is a new area and is tantamount to a certain amount of policing of the web. • Human Security: This subject is referred to in the US as Personnel Responsibility Programmes, where a certain amount of intrusive verification is necessary for personal working in sensitive posts. • Proactive Intelligence. • Training and simulation exercises, of situations, decision making and communicating while safeguarding public morale. • Crisis management centres, national rapid response teams and negotiators with language training. • Specialised equipment to locate, defuse and reduce collateral damage. • Legislative measures to check implementation by the severest punishment.
MEASURES
TO
RESPOND
TO SUCH INCIDENTS/ACTIVITIES
• There should be a situation asessessment using a crisis centre, action plan and activation of communications and authorities as required at the centre/state/district/facility/area level. • Communication links should be established with those claiming responsibility if known. A check should be made for any state backing. • There should be information management with a proactive information strategy right from the outset to delink cause and focus on danger to humanity—removing media advantage from the terrorist while maintaining public morale. • Locating, isolating and cordoning the affected area with medical prophylactic measures superimposed. • Using systemised evacuation as required. • Using National Rapid Response Teams24 with specialised equipment. • Surveillance effort including air and electronic human and other surveillance.
74 M M.S. MAMIK
• Maintaining a dossier on groups responsible for such incidents with the aim of ascertaining their characteristics, composition and ideology. • A coordination of the global response. • Prevention of fear psychosis and paralysis of administration. • Medical and administrative response and readiness. • Use of non-governmental organisations to infiltrate terrorist networks.
NOTES
1. See the conclusion of Hypothesis I in unpublished Ph.D Thesis, M.S. Mamik, ‘Effectiveness of Sea Based Nuclear Weapons in International Relations’, University of Madras, p. 365, 1995. 2. See C.J.M. Mathew, ‘India’s Nuclear Dilemma’, Monograph Sabina Printing Press, 1981. 3. Asia nanda and Hakemulder, Nuclear Subcontinent’ (New Delhi: Minerva Press, 2000). 4. For the size of current arsenals, access the Center for Defence Information document ‘Current World Nuclear Arsenals’ at www.cdi.org/issues/nukef&f/ database/nukestab/html. Also see different editions of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists under the heading NRDC Nuclear Notebook as follows: • • • • • • • •
Nov/Dec 2000, p. 78–79: ‘Chinese Nuclear Forces’. May/June 2001, p. 65: German Plutonium, Where it is (Table). September/October 2000, p. 69–71: ‘French and British Nuclear Forces’. May/June 2000, p. 69–71: ‘US Nuclear Forces 2000’. March/April 2001, p. 77–79: ‘US Nuclear Forces 2001’. May/June 2001, p. 78–79: ‘Russian Nuclear Forces 2001’. July/August 2000, p. 70–71: ‘Russian Nuclear Forces 2000’. July/August 2000, Strategic Rocket Forces (Table).
5. For AMD rationale, see John Isaacs, ‘A Political Decision’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2000, Vol. 56, No. 2, pp. 23–25. 6. See William Arkin, ‘The SIOP—Forever Immoral, The Last Word’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 57, No. 2, p. 4. 7. See Gaurav Kampani, ‘The Military Coup in Pakistan: Implication for Nuclear Stability in South Asia’, Center for Non-Proliferation Studies (CNS), October 1999. 8. See Gaurav Kampani and Haider K. Nizamani, ‘Pakistan: Shift Away from Indo-Centrism’, CNS Outside Publication, (reproduced in Dawn, 2001).
FORMAL
AND
NON-FORMAL NUCLEAR THREATS M 75
9. For India’s quest rationale and logic behind its decision to go nuclear see George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb—The Impact on Global Proliferation (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000). 10. See Raj Chennappa, Weapons of Peace (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers, 2000). 11. See Mohammed Ahmedullah, ‘Let ‘em Eat Nukes’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2000, Vol. 56, No. 5, pp. 52–57. 12. See, Mario E. Carranz, ‘An Impossible Game: Stable Nuclear Deterrence after the Indian and Pakistani Tests’, Nonproliferation Review, Spring/ Summer 1999, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 11–24. 13. See Clayton P. Bowen and Daniel Wolven, ‘Command and Control Challenges in South Asia’, Nonproliferation Review, Spring/Summer 1999, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 25–35. 14. See Gopal Raj, Reach for the Stars, (New Delhi: Viking Publisher, 2000). 15. See Brig. Vijay K. Nair, Nuclear India (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1992). 16. Ashley Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001). 17. For details on India’s nuclear theology see K.R. Menon, A Nuclear Strategy for India (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000). 18. The total number of nuclear weapons built between 1945 and 2000 is estimated at 128,060. The total holding today among the nuclear weapon states (NWS) is 3,535 (2000) from a peak of 69,478 in 1986 (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists). 19. See Jessica Stern, ‘Meeting with the Muj’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2000, Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 42–51. 20. See Cristina Chuen and Michael Jasinski, ‘Russia’s Blue Water Blues’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2001, Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 65–69. 21. Details of nuclear-related mishaps at sea and on board ships are given in Neptune Papers No. 3, Naval Accidents 1945–88, and also in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, various editions. 22. In Carpentier De Gourdon, ‘The War Machine and New Security Hazards: The System is Poised to Devour its Own Children’, World Affairs, April–June 2001, Vol. 5, No. 2. 23. See chapter titled ‘Taliban at the Helm—What does it Portend’, in J.N. Dixit, An Afghan Diary: Zahir Shah to Taliban (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2000). 24. See US Congress Senate Hearings for nuclear material thefts in erstwhile USSR, the formation of Emergency Response Teams and its functions.
PART III CURRENT INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
CHAPTER
5 The Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime Matin Zuberi
I
nternational regimes consist of rules and regulations, and rights and obligations accepted by a group of states. The nuclear nonproliferation regime is an interlocking network of international treaties, domestic legislation, bilateral, regional and multilateral verification systems called ‘nuclear safeguards’, positive and negative security assurances, economic sanctions, technology controls, and nuclear-weapon-free zones.1 The crown jewel of this regime is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that came into force in 1970. The nodal agency for the regime is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. Unlike the verification regime of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as well as the proposed Protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the nuclear non-proliferation regime sharply demarcates nuclear-weapon powers from other members of the international system of states. The NPT initially rested on the geopolitical authority of the two superpowers that were not only leaders of the rival alliance systems, but were also the most advanced in military as well as civilian uses of nuclear technology. The treaty was negotiated in the period of
80 M MATIN ZUBERI
transition from pre-industrial to industrial atomic ages.2 This was a period of nuclear euphoria when countries could have legitimate peaceful nuclear aspirations without being suspected of harbouring secret military ambitions. An American scholar who had the privilege of moulding the non-proliferation regime, however, later articulated the logic of inequality embedded in it. ‘Paradoxically’, he pointed out, ‘under many circumstances the introduction of a single bomb in some non-nuclear state may be more likely to lead to nuclear use than the addition of a thousand more warheads to the US, and Soviet stockpiles.’3 The states that assumed the role of nuclear Galahad would, of course, require thicker armour to look after the lesser breed. The initial targets of the NPT were West Germany and Japan. In West Germany it was called a ‘Nuclear Versailles’ and a ‘Second Yalta.’ About 90 deputies in the Bundestaag voted against its ratification. Manfred Woerner, who later became Secretary General of NATO, was one of them.4 While the two superpowers had proposed a treaty of unlimited duration, West Germany and Italy favoured 25 years to be followed by a conference to decide its future. It was suggested that an American commitment on uninterrupted supply of enriched nuclear fuel for German reactors should be made a precondition for German accession to the treaty. Washington accepted the West German condition that the dissolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would lead to German withdrawal from the treaty. The provision allowing non-explosive military research was inserted due to the Italians lobbying for it.5 Japan was one of the last countries to accede to the treaty. It secretly made a cost-benefit analysis of going nuclear before acceding to it in February 1970.6 The treaty became operational on 5 March 1970. The Japanese government issued a long list of reservations at the time of accession. These were about the long duration of the treaty as well as the possible adverse impact of IAEA safeguards on Japan’s energy economy. It, however, pointedly took note of the withdrawal clause in the treaty. A safeguards agreement with the IAEA was concluded six years after accession to the treaty.7 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had spelled out the basic framework of India’s nuclear policy and strategy. He declared in 1954 that India was prepared “even to limit, in common with other countries, our independence of action…provided it is for the common good and not exercised in a partial way, and not dominated over by certain other countries, however good their motives.”8 As the NPT is basically a discriminatory treaty, India decided not to join it.
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME M 81
ARTICLES I
AND
II
OF THE
NPT
Article I of the NPT prohibits nuclear weapon states from transferring their nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over them, directly or indirectly, to non-nuclear weapon states. Article II contains a parallel commitment by the non-nuclear weapon states not to receive them. The normal procedure is to register reservations regarding any treaty commitment at the time of accession to it. The United States, instead, evolved its unilateral interpretation of these commitments in consultation with allies and showed it only to the Soviet Union and some other delegates. It was later made public during the US Senate hearings. Attached to Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s Letter of Transmittal of the draft treaty to the President, dated 2 July 1968, were undated questions on it asked by US Allies together with answers given by the US government. The following answers included a broad interpretation of the NPT: The treaty deals only with what is prohibited, not with what is permitted. It does not deal with, and therefore does not prohibit, transfer of nuclear delivery vehicles or delivery systems, or control over them to any recipient, so long as such transfer does not involve bombs or warheads. It does not deal with arrangements for deployment of nuclearweapons within allied territory as these do not involve any transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which time the treaty would no longer be controlling. It does not deal with the problem of European unity, and would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components.9 The initial signatories to the NPT thus came to know about these interpretations from the Hearings. American nuclear weapons are at present located on the territories of six non-nuclear NATO countries, their fighter-bombers use dual-capable aircraft, and their pilots are trained to use nuclear weapons. A classified memorandum of 1964, recently partially de-classified, stated that ‘the non-nuclear NATO partners in effect become nuclear powers in time of war.’ NATO’s North Atlantic Council
82 M MATIN ZUBERI
approved, in May 2000, a document called MC-400/2 retaining the use of nuclear weapons in deterring countries possessing chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems. Would nuclear sharing in such contingencies be valid under the NPT?10 Dean Rusk also stated that ‘if NATO were to dissolve’ some member countries might withdraw from the treaty.11 NATO is thus a non-proliferation tool! Non-nuclear weapon states are now complaining about the contravention of Articles I and II of the NPT. In 1995, Mexico questioned the provision for control over American nuclear weapons in Europe under NATO command to be transferred to a non-nuclear weapon state in case of hostilities. South Africa raised concerns in 1997 about the ‘non-proliferation implications’ of NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe. The joint statement of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1998 opposed ‘nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements.’12 The movement’s working paper for the 1999 Preparatory Committee for the NPT review conference of 2000 called for ban on ‘nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements.’13 Germany’s non-nuclear weapon status was reaffirmed in the TwoPlus-Four Agreement that facilitated German unification in 1990. ‘When Europe becomes a federal state’, however, said a senior European official, ‘logic would dictate that Germany and the rest must co-inherit whatever is the nuclear weapons legacy of France and Britain.’ While German officials describe their country as ‘nonnuclear, forever’, the issue of an eventual German co-possession of nuclear weapon has been articulated by non-officials in the context of the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 that mandates common defence for a future United Europe.14 Article II of the NPT contains an undertaking by non-nuclear weapon states ‘not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.’ The treaty, however, does not define ‘manufactures’ or ‘other nuclear explosive devices.’ While the first American draft prohibited the ‘manufacture’ of ‘nuclear weapons’, a subsequent Soviet draft added ‘prepare for the manufacture’ to the prohibition. This prompted Ambassador Alva Myrdal of Sweden to probe the various stages of the manufacturing process. She maintained that prohibiting just the final act of ‘manufacture’ might be too late in these long chains of decisions. However, to probe the preliminary thinking of politicians and the laboratory research of scientists was, obviously, difficult and would be considered undesirable intervention. ‘Could a middle link be found on which the prohibitory regulation should most definitely be focused?’15 Sweden had kept the
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME M 83
nuclear option and the Swedish military authorities supported the development of tactical nuclear weapons.16 As the proposed definitions were either too narrow or too broad, the negotiators gave up in despair. Hence, the extraordinary fact that the NPT does not contain precise definitions of what it prohibits. American chief negotiator William C. Foster, however, listed activities that were not prohibited: ‘Neither uranium enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable material’ for peaceful purposes under safeguards would violate Article II. ‘Also clearly permitted would be the development, under safeguards, of plutonium-fueled power reactors, including research on the properties of metallic plutonium, nor would Article II interfere with the development or use of fast breeder reactors under safeguards.’17 While ratifying the treaty, the West German government made public its reservations. It contended that no nuclear activities in the fields of research, development, manufacture or use for peaceful purposes are prohibited nor can transfer of information, materials and equipment be denied to non-nuclear weapon States merely on the basis of allegations that such activities or transfers could be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Japan made a similar reservation. Australia went a step further and maintained that ‘no nuclear development should be prohibited except when such activities would have no other purpose than the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices.’ In a working paper submitted to the Geneva disarmament conference on 7 July 1975, the Japanese government asserted that the ‘NPT does not explicitly prohibit weapons-oriented R&D short of production of nuclear explosive devices.’18 These deliberate ambiguities ensured that the industrialised states’ capability to manufacture nuclear weapons would not be impeded by treaty stipulations.
MULTIPOLAR CIVILIAN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGICAL ORDER The industrial foundations of the NPT regime were shaken soon after accession of the target countries. The 1970s witnessed dramatic
84 M MATIN ZUBERI
efforts by west European countries to enrich themselves through nuclear commerce. Having imported the American light water, enriched uranium reactor systems, they were sensitive to their dependence on the United States for fuel. The United States manipulated its enrichment monopoly—a lucrative by-product of its massive nuclear weapons programme—for commercial gain and as an instrument of the non-proliferation policy. Thus, when the Dutch and West German groups started to investigate the gas centrifuge technology of enrichment, Washington managed to get their work classified. Research, however, proceeded in secret until an official announcement made by the Dutch Stating that research on ‘enriching uranium under the ultracentrifuge method has progressed far enough for the construction of a pilot plant in 1969 to be considered.’19 Two factors made centrifuge technology attractive: One, that power consumption was less than a quarter of that of diffusion plants; and, two, greater flexibility in construction and operation due to the smaller unit size of centrifuge plants that could be scaled up as work proceeded. Moreover, unlike the gigantic gaseous diffusion plants, centrifuge enrichment work could be concealed in a modest-sized laboratory. An Anglo-Dutch-West German agreement to corner a large slice of the enrichment market was, accordingly, signed on 4 March 1970. Not to be left out, France announced on 26 February 1971 its decision to build a gaseous diffusion plant.20 The French plant was partly financed by Belgium, Italy, Spain, and Iran. American monopoly on supplies of enriched uranium was broken.
COMMERCIAL COMPETITION
AND
SAFEGUARDS
It is through nuclear exports that the tentacles of the regime have spread far and wide. And commercial competition has resulted in periodic rediscovery of non-proliferation concerns and tightening of safeguards and economic and technology controls. Prospects of commercial competition in the peaceful uses of atomic energy in the post-Second World War soured Anglo-American relations even during the Manhattan Project. The Americans suspected that British interest in the project was commercial. The British were simply bewildered by this charge. To remove this contentious issue, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed that
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME M 85
any post-war advantages of an industrial or commercial character shall be dealt with as between the United States and Great Britain under terms to be specified by the President of the United States to the Prime Minister of Great Britain.21 Some early transactions like the Indo-Canadian agreement for the supply of the CIRUS research reactor contained only an Indian pledge that it would be used for peaceful purposes. The verification regime had not yet been established. Later bilateral agreements for cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy between the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and recipient countries provided for broad inspection rights; but were confined to the supplied nuclear material or facility.22 The need to respond to commercial competition from Britain and the former Soviet Union led to a partial lifting of nuclear secrecy and the inauguration, in December 1983, of the ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme of the United States.23 Contrary to common assumptions, the first international nuclear power reactor sales were of natural uranium units from Britain, Canada, and France (see Appendix 5.1A at the end of the chapter). As more countries started to develop their nuclear industries, it was feared that nations might shop around and buy nuclear equipment and material from states that imposed the least controls or even no controls.24 As US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles put it: No one nation can, alone, indefinitely police the spread of nuclear power plants… . Sovereign nations would accept an international system of broad acceptability. But they will not long be content to have their electric-power systems under continuous supervision by technicians merely serving another nation.25 Obviously, long-term and safe foreign markets for American nuclear equipment and materials required an international system of safeguards. These anxieties resulted in the establishment of the IAEA. ‘This is’, assured Dulles, ‘essentially a made-in-America project.’ Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Lewis Strauss asserted that the Agency would ‘create a practical working model of an inspection system’ for a distantly envisioned nuclear disarmament.26 When the agency’s first safeguards document was proposed, there were acrimonious debates and ‘the air in the boardroom was reminiscent of Agincourt’.27 As the industrialised countries required no assistance from the agency, it was feared that its controls would be imposed on nuclear industries in the developing countries. That would lead to an extraordinary situation in which the industrialised
86 M MATIN ZUBERI
world that had the capability to embark on weapons programmes would escape all controls. India and several other non-aligned countries were worried about the uneven impact of the controls. Homi Bhabha pointed out that industrialised countries had the technical and material resources to push forward their own atomic programmes without any assistance from the agency ‘and to make atomic weapons, if they so wished.’ He correctly predicted that the maximum verification effort would be directed against developing countries that were ‘ipso facto least in a position to make atomic weapons.’ He also foresaw the possibility of what happened in Iraq: Nuclear weapons efforts in parallel with peaceful programmes under safeguards.28 Three nuclear verification systems are now in operation:
EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY (EURATOM) SAFEGUARDS France, West Germany, Italy and some other West European countries established their own organisation that contained provisions for mutual inspections. Here, friends inspect each other.29 As a result of the sophistication of their fuel cycles and the largest amounts of fissile material, 70 per cent of IAEA inspections were conducted in Germany, Japan and Canada. EURATOM and IAEA have recently concluded a new ‘partnership agreement’ reducing IAEA inspections by two-thirds.30 The locus of safeguards has shifted to certain ‘sensitive’ developing countries. This fundamental change in the verification regime has occurred in violation of the basic premises of the non-proliferation regime.
PRE-NPT SAFEGUARDS Their objective is ‘to ensure, so far as it is possible, that assistance provided … is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.’31 Indigenously produced facilities are not subjected to inspection and control. There are five basic elements of this safeguards system: A subsidiary agreement between the agency and the recipient country regarding control provisions; a design review of the nuclear facilities under control; provision of records (ledgers, details of chemical composition of nuclear materials, etc.); reports to the agency based upon the records; and, on-site inspection by the agency.32 This facility-specific system is applicable to three categories of agreements: Project agreements in which IAEA provided assistance; unilateral submissions by member-states (the NPT nuclear-weapon
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME M 87
states have voluntarily submitted some of their nuclear facilities, not directly related to their military programmes, to such safeguards); and, safeguards transfer agreements when a member-state transfers its safeguards rights contained in a bilateral agreement to the IAEA. For instance, Canada and the United States transferred their safeguards on the Rajasthan and Tarapur Power Stations to the IAEA. The rest of the Indian fuel cycle is free from any foreign intrusions. Canada also transferred its safeguards on the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant to the IAEA. There were controversies regarding their implementation in the mid-1970s and during 1981–82. In the first instance, the agency’s surveillance cameras could not track the inventory of fissile material in the plant.33 On the second occasion, IAEA Director Sivgard Eklund advised the agency’s Board of Governors that since Pakistan had acquired an un-safeguarded nuclear fuel-reprocessing plant, it was no longer possible to certify that nuclear material had not been diverted for military purposes. A substantial upgrading of surveillance technology was, therefore, necessary.34 It was only in 1983 that the IAEA was once again in a position to safeguard the Karachi Power Plant. By the mid-1970s, however, the growth of a nuclear grey market provided opportunities to circumvent the non-proliferation regime through clandestine purchases of components and materials for Pakistan’s weapons programme.35
NPT SAFEGUARDS In view of the stringent safeguards imposed by the NPT, it is interesting to recall the first American and Soviet drafts of Article III of the treaty. The American draft contained a single sentence: ‘Each of the States Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities.’ This draft was not discriminatory as it applied to all states, whether they were nuclear weapon powers or not. The Soviet draft was even more permissive than the American one: ‘The Parties to this Treaty shall refrain from offering any support, encouragement, or inducement to States seeking to own, manufacture, or exercise control over nuclear weapons.’ They were obliged not to encourage other states in the manufacture of, and control over, nuclear weapons. Subsequent drafts drew a sharp distinction between non-nuclear weapon countries whose civilian nuclear enterprises were to be subjected to surveillance and control, and the privileged few nuclear-weapon powers that escaped them.36
88 M MATIN ZUBERI
The objective of these safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear facilities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The terms ‘manufacture’, ‘nuclear weapons’, or ‘other nuclear explosives’, however, are not defined. ‘Significant Quantities of Nuclear Material’, however, are defined as 8 kg of plutonium and 25 kg of enriched uranium. In order to protect the commercial interests of the industrialised non-nuclear weapon countries, the human element of inspection is reduced to the barest minimum. Safeguards apply to the nuclear material and the facilities through which it passes; these are listed in a subsidiary agreement between the agency and the state concerned. This is a countrywide nuclear material-accounting system; the flow of nuclear material is checked not throughout the fuel cycle but at Material Balance Areas (MBAs). The frequency of agency inspection is set according to the volume of nuclear material passing through the MBAs. The more extensive the fuel cycle of the inspected state, the greater the flow of nuclear material.37 Tamper-proof seals, surveillance and checking of records are supposed to ensure that there has been no diversion of materials for military purposes. An important way of checking the flow of nuclear materials is to take into account what is called ‘limits of error in material unaccounted for’ (LOEMUF). There is also a provision for the ‘material unaccounted for’ (MUF), resulting from discrepancies between book inventory and physical inventory of nuclear material. If the discrepancy cannot be attributed to the normal loss in an extensive fuel cycle, it has to be reported to the IAEA. According to one Japanese expert, in a country with an extensive fuel cycle, the amount of material unaccounted for could total 10 to 50 bombs every six months.
INTENSIFIED COMMERCIAL COMPETITION Hoping to reap rich dividends from nuclear commerce, Britain and France invested in plutonium reprocessing technology. In March
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME M 89
1970, Britain, the Netherlands and West Germany entered into an agreement for building a gas centrifuge enrichment plant; France chose gaseous diffusion technology for enrichment services. A boost to the West European efforts to achieve nuclear self-reliance was provided in 1974 when the US Atomic Energy Commission unexpectedly raised the price of enrichment services to its customers and imposed stringent conditions for new contracts. The Soviet Union then started supplying enriched uranium to West European countries at a rate that was 5 per cent lower than the American price. ‘By mid-1974, the United States no longer ruled the nuclear roost.’ American ‘high-handed attitude towards enrichment services’ had left ‘a legacy of distrust and a general aspiration for self-sufficiency.’38 The emergence of France and West Germany as aggressive competitors, coupled with the loss of the US monopoly on enriched uranium services, completely transformed the global nuclear commercial landscape. American corporations like Westinghouse and General Electric had to compete with their former licensees, West German Kraftwerk Union and Fromatome of France. America’s success in making light water reactors the dominant system in the world thus undermined its control over global nuclear commerce. The United States and its military allies were now locked in intense commercial competition. Not having the American advantage of a large domestic market, these former licensees were especially dependent on exports. France was negotiating the sale of a reprocessing plant to Pakistan. The West German-Brazilian deal of June 1975 for the supply of eight nuclear power plants as well as enrichment and reprocessing facilities was estimated to be worth more than $4.5 billion. Described as the ‘deal of the century’, it triggered an upheaval in nuclear commerce. It was later revealed that Westinghouse had unsuccessfully offered a similar package to Brazil. West Germany dismissed misgivings about proliferation implications due to the deal as a case of sour grapes. It was pointed out that safeguards had been imposed not only on the facilities sold but also on any replicated technology that could be developed by Brazil. This further extension of the scope of the NPT safeguards was imposed by a country that had itself replicated American nuclear technology. Worried about the sudden escalation of nuclear competition, especially from France and West Germany, Senator Ribicoff proposed that the US should share the global nuclear market on an equitable basis.39
90 M MATIN ZUBERI
THE LONDON CLUB The competition was further intensified because of the energy crisis of 1973–74 and the inflated projections of demand for nuclear power plants from developing countries.40 At the behest of the United States, a secret conclave of representatives from the US, UK, USSR, France, West Germany, Canada and Japan took place in London in 1975. As a consequence of the threats of withdrawal from France and the USSR, the proceedings were kept secret. The main objective of this effort was to rein in West Germany and France, and to bring the USSR into a broader coalition. The inclusion of France was especially needed because it was not yet a party to the NPT. Soviet nuclear exports until then were confined to members of the Warsaw Pact. The recipient countries were supplied enriched fuel for Sovietbuilt reactors and were obliged to return all spent fuel rods for reprocessing.41 Soviet leaders had learnt a bitter lesson from their nuclear assistance to China;42 they did not allow reprocessing and enrichment activities within East European countries. After more than two years of intense commercial and political pressures, the club produced the so-called London Guidelines for nuclear commerce. West Germany and France agreed not to sell reprocessing technology until further notice.43 Suppliers of nuclear material and equipment had earlier been brought together in 1971 under a committee called the Zangger Committee after its first chairman, Claude Zangger of Switzerland. It prepared what is called the ‘Trigger List’ of export items that would trigger IAEA safeguards.44 The London Guidelines went far beyond this Trigger List that itself had gone beyond the basic undertakings of the NPT. As a result, France, under American pressure, cancelled its reprocessing deal with Pakistan in 1978.45 On 28 October 1976, President Ford admitted in a statement on nuclear policy that the US could no longer ‘control world-wide nuclear development’ and asserted that ‘avoidance of proliferation must take precedence over economic interests.’ Unilaterally reversing the direction the US had set for decades for global nuclear technological development, he declared: ‘I have decided that the United States should no longer regard reprocessing of used nuclear fuel to produce plutonium as a necessary and inevitable step in the nuclear fuel cycle.’ He also asked all concerned governments to affirm that they would regard ‘nuclear wrongdoing as an intolerable violation of acceptable norms of acceptable behaviour, which would set in motion
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME M 91
strong and immediate countermeasures.’46 It was because of this that for the first time, each shipment of low enriched uranium fuel for the Tarapur Station was subjected to public hearings.47
THE US NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT OF 1978 The Carter administration embarked on a wholesale change in the future direction of civilian nuclear technology. According to the new policy, plutonium reprocessing and breeder reactors were no longer inevitable parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Britain and France had made considerable investments in the hope of capturing the global market with reprocessing services. In the name of a non-proliferation crusade, ‘the entire thrust of a 30-year technical assumption that breeders were the ultimate reactor types was suddenly to be halted.’ As Britain, France, Germany, and Japan were proceeding down the breeder path, they resented President Carter challenging the foundations of their domestic nuclear policies. Expressing his frustration with the sudden change in nuclear policy, a Japanese diplomat told his American counterpart, ‘For 20 years we have followed US guidance on nuclear policy. Now you are saying you made a complete mistake. But it is too late.’48 The Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978 provided for renegotiation of all nuclear contracts with foreign countries and mandated full-scope safeguards as a condition for nuclear transactions. It also unilaterally extended US jurisdiction to cover any nuclear fuel, regardless of origin, utilised in a reactor or facility, partially or fully, supplied by the United States. If, for example, Namibian uranium was used in an American-supplied Japanese reactor, US jurisdiction would extend over it. This American nuclear revisionism, entailing unilateral changes in multilateral accords, did not go down well with the West Europeans and the Japanese. ‘The proposal to renegotiate existing cooperative agreements,’ wrote two experts, ‘while commitments under these agreements were not being fulfilled was viewed as contrary to the assurances of reliability of supply and further contributed to the erosion of confidence.’49 The Japanese resented the American posture of a ‘God-granted guardian’ of nuclear technology and the tendency ‘to ignore history’.50
92 M MATIN ZUBERI
By the late 1970s, the definition of proliferation changed from the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons to developing ‘nuclear explosive capability’ (through a complete nuclear fuel cycle). The objective of safeguards consequently changed from the detection of diversion to the prevention of nuclear explosive capability. This change in the objective of safeguards was contrary to their original purpose. An American architect of the NPT safeguards had earlier asserted: The safeguards system is not, was never intended to be … a system for the prevention of diversion…. If an IAEA inspector saw someone walking out of a plant with nuclear material, I do not think he would have the slightest authority to stop him. The occurrence can only be reported to the IAEA.51
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION Even the American nuclear industry was up in arms against the new policy. Some 5,000 delegates at the 11th World Energy Conference ‘roundly criticised it’.52 America’s military allies/ commercial competitors simply refused to accept the new definition of proliferation. They were furious about efforts to coerce them on reprocessing where they viewed that they had an advantage over the US, and resented attempts to eliminate European competition by changing the rules of nuclear commerce. Faced with this opposition, the US convened an International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Meeting. Between November 1978 and February 1980, 590 nuclear experts from 46 countries, including India, held 61 sessions for this purpose. Conceived as a technical exercise and not a diplomatic negotiation, it brought together industrialised and developing countries to explore proliferation-resistant technologies. The fact that the US felt compelled to convene such an exploration stood testimony to her inability to impose unilaterally conceived restrictions on the flow of nuclear technology. The gathering produced 20,000 pages of documents but it was a technically disappointing exercise. There were no technical fixes and the industrialised countries were determined to pursue their own trajectory of civilian nuclear development.53
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME M 93
After three years of bitter controversy, a nuclear truce was declared. The industrialised countries were allowed to have complete nuclear fuel cycles necessary for their energy autonomy. A political consensus eventually emerged: Drawing a line, not between ‘sensitive’ and dangerous technologies, but between ‘sensitive’ countries that could not be allowed to have enrichment, reprocessing and breeder technologies, and the industrialised non-nuclear weapon countries. The NPT had only made a distinction between nuclear-weapon powers and non-nuclear weapon countries. Another layer of discrimination was now added—non-nuclear weapon countries that were free to develop enrichment, reprocessing and breeder technologies, and others who were allowed only a fragmented nuclear fuel cycle.54 The industrialised countries thus formed a joint front under US leadership. Commercial competition took an unexpected turn when technological problems and anti-nuclear power movements gathered momentum in the US and in Western Europe. The last nuclear power plant that was not subsequently cancelled in the United States was ordered in 1974 (see Appendices 5.2B, 5.3C, 5.4D at the end of this chapter). The collapse of the American civilian nuclear industry, in which successive US administrations had invested billions of dollars, is a disaster on a monumental scale.55 With the exception of France, several West European countries have reduced their dependence on nuclear power. Environmental concerns, however, are now expected to revive civilian nuclear industry.56
NPT SAFEGUARDS SINCE THE GULF WAR
OF
1991
A resurgence of restrictive approaches following the Gulf War of 1991 led to further tightening of the non-proliferation regime. Until the early 1990s, safeguards covered only the declared facilities and materials. They were not designed to detect clandestine nuclear facilities and material. The IAEA was not ‘an international espionage organisation’ with the right ‘to roam over a country to locate clandestine nuclear plants.’57 Revelations about the Iraqi nuclear-weapons programme (see ‘Coercive Disarmament of Iraq’ in the Chapter 7) led to criticism of the IAEA safeguards. Iraq had, however, embarked upon an ambitious nuclear-weapons programme
94 M MATIN ZUBERI
by developing a covert nuclear fuel cycle that did not intersect with its declared facilities that were regularly inspected. IAEA inspectors, therefore, could not detect any diversion of nuclear material for military purposes. Despite considerable effort, Iraqi scientists had produced only 3 g of plutonium and 465 g of enriched uranium, much less than the ‘significant quantities’ of the verification system. Thus, even if the IAEA inspectors had detected this amount of diversion from its declared facilities, it would not have been in violation of its obligations. IAEA Director-General Hans Blix conceded that ‘Iraq did not divert any material for its weapons programme.’58 The industrialised countries that had in the past opposed an intrusive verification system now favoured it. Ironically, these were the countries that had profited from nuclear exports to Iraq. Now they wanted verification efforts shifted away from countries with large civilian fuel cycles to what they called ‘suspect’ countries. The IAEA Board of Governors accordingly decided in 1992 to assert the right of ‘special inspections’ of any nuclear facility in a country under agency safeguards. The objective of safeguards was again changed in 1992 to: Prevention of the transfer of capabilities ‘for use in a non-nuclear weapon state in a nuclear explosive activity or an un-safeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity.’ In a major departure from the original NPT safeguards, the IAEA can now use the National Technical Means of member states to locate undeclared nuclear material and facilities in an inspected state. New sensitive techniques for sampling rivers and the atmosphere to trace isotopes indicating clandestine operations are to be used by IAEA inspectors. ‘Country profiles’ of what are called ‘sensitive’ countries are being prepared.59 The Model Protocol Additional to Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, approved by the Board of Governors in May 1997, prescribes a more intrusive verification system. States accepting the Protocol would be obliged to provide information about their current and planned nuclear power plans. Inspectors would have access not only to nuclear sites but also to other locations that could contribute to a nuclear programme, such as research in manufacturing facilities. They would use state-of-the-art technologies to trace nuclear activity by taking samples from the environment as well as use surveillance and monitoring systems placed at key locations in the concerned state.60 Each signatory to the NPT has to negotiate with the IAEA a revised safeguards
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME M 95
agreement. By mid-2003, only 81 out of 187 signatories had negotiated such agreements; and only 37 had ratified them.61
SOUTH AFRICA DISMANTLES NUCLEAR WEAPONS South Africa’s Safari I reactors, the Koeberg nuclear power reactors, a hot cell facility, and nuclear fuel imported from France were under pre-NPT safeguards. Several facilities, including the Valindaba pilot and semi-commercial enrichment plants, a uranium conversion plant at Valindaba and a fuel fabrication plant at Pelindaba, however, remained outside the verification regime. Soon after the General Conference of IAEA adopted a resolution in September 1987 proposing suspension of the apartheid regime, South Africa announced its intention to subscribe to the NPT.62 On 10 July 1991, South Africa joined the NPT and a safeguards agreement was signed on 11 September 1991. The IAEA inspected 77 locations in November 1991. Reporting the complexities of inspecting installations of a de facto nuclear-weapon state, the IAEA Director-General declared that the inspection team had found no evidence of undeclared facilities. The team mentioned ‘the inherent difficulties associated with the evaluation of historical data extending over a period of fifteen years and the quality of the nuclear material accountancy system in use during that time.’63 The inspectors suspected existence of a weapons programme from the large inventory of weapon-grade uranium, but they kept these suspicions to themselves because of the rule of complete confidentiality of the verification procedures.64 Then on 24 March 1993, President Frederik de Klerk disclosed that a South African weapons programme had been started in 1974 and that six nuclear devices had been produced, and a seventh was being built. He added that the devices were dismantled between July 1990 and September 1991. This crucial information was withheld from the IAEA for fear of comprehensive inspections like those being conducted in Iraq. Moreover, the weapons were dismantled secretly without any international verification. Pretoria rejected the US offer to buy the highly enriched uranium on condition of a comprehensive verification.65 The non-proliferation regime does not (and cannot) explicitly prohibit a member state that has dismantled its nuclear weapons from retaining its knowledge and experience in
96 M MATIN ZUBERI
building and dismantling nuclear weapons. Can this knowledge be erased and verified like some physical object? The fact remains that when South Africa acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state, it had six nuclear weapons in its possession and all the facilities necessary for a full-fledged weapons programme. Nuclear weapons were dismantled without international supervision. By September 1991, nuclear material was removed from the weapons, melted down and stored. Major non-nuclear components of the weapons, design drawings and photographs still remained. Their destruction began in 1992. By the time of de Klerk’s announcement sensitive weapons components were destroyed or damaged and most of the classified documents shredded. It is reported that about 400 kg of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) were removed from the dismantled weapons. As less than 25 kg can be consumed in the Safari research reactor annually, South Africa will continue to have a sizeable amount of bomb-grade material for more than a decade. It also had several hundred kilograms of HEU enriched between 20 and 80 per cent that was not in the weapons. Despite repeated requests, it has refused to publish even a summary of the inventory of its HEU. The scientists and engineers who produced and dismantled the weapons remain in South Africa. There was a bizarre episode when 16 former members of the weapons programme threatened to reveal secret information to the highest bidder unless they were given more than a million dollars in unemployment benefits. The South African government had to obtain a court injunction prohibiting them from disclosing such sensitive information.66 As a Japanese expert has observed, there are questions as to the actual number of nuclear weapons, and whether all of them and their components have been completely destroyed, together with the capability to manufacture highly enriched uranium.67 Can a country, which had produced nuclear weapons, be put on par with other parties to the NPT, which are innocent in these matters? South Africa joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group as well as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN
AND
UKRAINE
One of the successes of the non-proliferation regime has been the transfer of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan and
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME M 97
Ukraine to the Russian Federation after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Approximately 3,000 strategic nuclear weapons were deployed in the three republics. Ukraine had 34 nuclear-armed strategic bombers, 176 land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and more than 1,200 nuclear warheads; it could qualify as the second most powerful nuclear weapon state in Europe.68 The removal of ICBMs along with their warheads, and their safe transportation to locations in the Russian Federation was a complex diplomatic and technical operation. Through diplomatic pressure and economic incentives Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine were persuaded to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states; their nuclear installations, until 1991 an integral part of the Soviet nuclear weapons complex, then came under the IAEA verification regime. Nuclear safeguards are generally applied from the beginning of a reactor’s operational life; this enables the agency to have a complete inventory from the start-up of nuclear facilities. The IAEA, therefore, faced the unprecedented task of preparing an authentic and complete inventory of fissile material in the nuclear installations of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The expansion of the verification system to more states has caused a drain on the meagre budgetary resources of the IAEA. The verification effort in South Africa, Argentina and Brazil under the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials in 1993, for instance, entailed the expenditure of $2,100,000.69
EXPANDING WEB OF TECHNOLOGY CONTROLS Article IV of the NPT provided for ‘the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of atomic energy.’ The basic bargain of the NPT was assistance by nuclear-weapon powers for peaceful use of atomic energy in exchange for verified undertakings by the non-nuclear weapon countries. It was generally assumed that whatever was not prohibited by the treaty was permitted and even had to be encouraged. The non-nuclear weapon states that were party to the NPT were assured:
98 M MATIN ZUBERI
The whole world of nuclear science associated with electric power production is available now. This includes not only the present generation of nuclear power reactors, but also the advanced technology, which is still developing, of fast breeder reactors.70 Even non-nuclear weapon states not party to the NPT (like India until May 1998) were told that there was ‘no requirement under the Treaty that (IAEA) safeguards must be extended to the entire peaceful nuclear programmes of a non-party as a condition of exports from a party.’71 Non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT, with the exception of industrialised countries like Germany and Japan, are no longer allowed to have enrichment and reprocessing technologies even under IAEA safeguards. And, fullscope safeguards are now the standard condition for all nuclear transactions. The nuclear suppliers revived the London Group as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). It’s meeting at Warsaw in April 1992 adopted 40 documents. Its new guidelines say that the objective of non-proliferation is the prevention of transfer of goods that could further ‘nuclear explosive activities’ or ‘nuclear fuel cycle activities’, which are not subject to safeguards. Moreover, international cooperation in the civilian nuclear enterprise is made dependent on promotion of this newly defined non-proliferation policy. While the Zangger Committee’s and London Group’s controls apply only to ‘nuclear unique’ equipment and material, the NSG published a list of 65 dual-use items of technology for which tight licensing procedures are required (see Appendix 5.5E at the end of the chapter). This ‘dual-use regime’ almost abrogates Article IV of the NPT. China joined the Zangger Committee in 1997; it now has 35 members and 38 supplier states comprise the NSG. There is a considerable overlap in the membership of the two groups. In contrast to the Zangger Committee, the NSG members are not required to subscribe to the NPT. While the Zangger Committee controls apply to transfers to non-nuclear weapon states not party to the NPT, the guidelines of NSG are for transfers to all non-nuclear weapon states.72 With French and Chinese accession to the NPT in 1992 and its unlimited extension in May 1995, the nuclear non-proliferation regime now consists of five categories of states:
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME M 99
• NPT nuclear-weapon powers (Britain, China, France, Russia and the US); • non-NPT nuclear-weapon powers (Israel, India and Pakistan); • NPT non-nuclear weapon countries; • NPT ‘virtual’ nuclear countries (industrialised countries with developed nuclear fuel cycles, especially Germany and Japan). Among non-nuclear weapon states signatory to the NPT, Japan now has the largest inventory of separated plutonium; and, • South Africa, which became an NPT non-nuclear weapon country after it dismantled its nuclear weapons. It retains the HEU from the dismantled weapons as well as the knowledge to build and dismantle them. Since some of their nuclear installations are under pre-NPT safeguards, Israel, India and Pakistan continue to be part of the nonproliferation regime. Israel is generally credited to have a sophisticated nuclear arsenal. The lifting of sanctions imposed by Canada, Japan and the US after the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998 indicates that the international community has now acquiesced in the new their status. Since Germany and Japan operate complete extensive nuclear fuel cycles and have accumulated large stockpiles of separated plutonium under IAEA safeguards, they belong to the new category of ‘virtual’ nuclear powers in the sense that they have the capacity to build a nuclear weapons arsenal ‘in a matter of months.’73 The nuclear non-proliferation regime has been universalised. In the words of a former chairman of the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission, however, ‘the obligations of non-nuclear weapon states have been unilaterally increased while the undertakings of the weapon states have been diluted.’74 As global diffusion of technology has gathered momentum, there have been successive revisions of the definition of nuclear proliferation and the objectives of nuclear safeguards. The elaborate regime now touches every aspect of nuclear technology throughout the world and the future prospect is one of an ever-expanding web of export controls as well as a more intrusive verification regime. Adherence to the NPT verification regime, however, is no longer considered a sufficient guarantee against proliferation. Counter-proliferation and ballistic missile defences are new additions to the regime.75
100 M MATIN ZUBERI
APPENDIX 5.1A Early Exports of Nuclear Power Plants Date of Sale
Seller
Buyer
1957 1958 1959 1959 1959 1959 1960 1961 1962 1962 1963 1965 1965 1965 1965 1965
USA USA UK USA UK USA USA USA USA Canada USA USA Canada Canada France France
Belgium West Germany Japan Italy Italy Italy Japan France West Germany India India Spain Pakistan India Spain West Germany
Source: Adapted from Lee C. Nehrt, International Marketing of Nuclear Power Plants (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), p. 350.
APPENDIX 5.2B Profile of US Market Growth and Decline Date
Annual Orders
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
20 39 16 7 14 22 38 41 26
Cancellations – – – – – – 6 0 8
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME M 101 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
4 3 4 0 0 0 0 0
11 2 9 13 8 16 6 16
Source: Adapted from Mark Hertsgaard, Nuclear INC.: The Men and Money Behind Nuclear Energy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), p. 288.
APPENDIX 5.3C US Domestic Orders and Cancellations Time Period 1965–69 1970–74 1975–78 1979 1980–84 1985–87
Orders
Cancellations
81 140 13 0 0 0
0 14 35 8 54 3
Source: Adapted from Steve Cohen, ‘The Political economy of Nuclear Power (1945–1990): The Rise and Fall of an Official Technology’, Journal of Economic Issues, September 1990, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, p. 800; Christopher Flawin, ‘Nuclear Power’s Burdened future,’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1987, pp. 26–31.
APPENDIX 5.4D Profile of US Reactor Exports Date
US World Market
Share, Annual 1968 1969
18% 26%
102 M MATIN ZUBERI 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
30% 43% 61% 8% 20% 22% 14% 7% 13% 33% 0% 0% 0%
Source: Mark Hertsgaard, Nuclear INC.: The Men and Money Behind Nuclear Energy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), p. 290.
APPENDIX 5.5E The Nuclear Suppliers Group List of Nuclear-rrelated Dual-u use Equipment and Materials and Related Technology
1. INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
Spin-forming and flow-forming machines ‘Numerical control’ units, machine tools, etc. Dimensional inspection systems Vacuum induction furnaces Isostatic presses Robots and effectors Vibration test equipment Furnaces—remelt, electron beam, and plasma
2. MATERIALS 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
Aluminium, high-strength Beryllium Bismuth (high purity) Boron (isotopically enriched in boron-10)
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME M 103 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11 2.12 2.13 2.14 2.15 2.16
Calcium (high purity) Chlorine trifluoride Crucibles made of materials resistant to liquid actinide metals Fibrous and filamentary materials Hafnium Lithium (isotopically enriched in Lithium-6) Magnesium (high purity) Maraging steel, high-strength Radium Titanium alloys Tungsten Zirconium
3. URANIUM ISOTOPE SEPARATION EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14
Electrolytic cells for fluorine production Rotor and bellows equipment Centrifugal multiplane balancing machines Filament winding machines Frequency changers Lasers, laser amplifiers, and oscillators Mass spectrometers and mass spectrometer ion sources Pressure measuring instruments, corrosion-resistant Valves, corrosion-resistant Superconducting solenoidal electromagnets Vacuum pumps Direct current high-power supplies (100 V or greater) High-voltage direct current power supplies (20,000 V or greater) Electromagnetic isotope separators
4. HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION PLANT RELATED EQUIPMENT (OTHER THAN TRIGGER LIST ITEMS) 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5
Specialised packings for water separation Pumps for potassium amide/liquid ammonia Water-hydrogen sulfide exchanged tray columns Hydrogen-cryogenic distillation columns Ammonia converters or synthesis reactors
104 M MATIN ZUBERI
5. IMPLOSION SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT EQUIPMENT 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5
Flash x-ray equipment Multistage light gas guns/high-velocity guns Mechanical rotating mirror cameras Electronic streak and framing cameras and tubes Specialised instrumentation for hydrodynamic experiments
6. EXPLOSIVES 6.1 6.2
6.3 6.4
AND
RELATED EQUIPMENT
Detonators and multipoint initiation systems Electronic components for firing sets 6.2.1 Switching devices 6.2.2 Capacitors Firing sets and equivalent high-current pulsers (for controlled detonators) High explosives relevant to nuclear weapons
7. NUCLEAR TESTING EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS 7.1 7.2 7.3
Oscilloscopes Photomultiplier tubes Pulse generators (high speed)
8. OTHER 8.1 8.2
8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7
Neutron generator systems General nuclear related equipment 8.2.1 Remote manipulators 8.2.2 Radiation shielding windows 8.2.3 Radiation-hardened TV cameras Tritium, tritium compounds, and mixtures Tritium facilities or plants and components Platinised carbon catalysts Helium-3 Alpha-emitting radionuclides
Source: IAEA document INFCICR/254/Rev. 1/Part2, July 1992, reproduced in SIPRI Yearbook 1993 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 242–43.
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME M 105
NOTES
1. See Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Inventory of International Organisations and Regimes (Monterey, CA, August 2000). 2. Bertrand Goldschmidt, ‘From Nuclear Middle Ages to Nuclear Renaissance’, in Joseph F. Pilat, Robert F. Pindley and Charles K. Ebinger (Eds), Atoms for Peace: An Analysis After Thirty Years (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), p. 112. 3. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ‘NPT: The Logic of Inequality’, Foreign Policy, Summer 1985, No. 59, p. 128. Emphasis added. 4. Theo Sommer, ‘Germany’s Reservations’, Survival, 1967, Vol. IX, No. 5, p. 144; Carl F. von Weizsacker, ‘Nuclear Inspection’, Survival, 1967, Vol. IX, No. 5, p. 148. 5. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The NearNuclear Countries and the NPT (New York: Humanities Press, 1972), pp. 51–67. 6. See Yuri Kase, ‘The Costs and Benefits of Japan’s Nuclearisation: An Insight into the 1968/70 Report’, The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2001, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 55–68. 7. SIPRI, op. cit. (note 5) pp. 35–42; Ryukichi Imai, ‘The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Japan’, Survival, September 1969, Vol. XI, No. 9, pp. 280–86. 8. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1961), p. 193. Emphasis added. 9. See Nonproliferation Treaty: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Executive H, 90th Congress, Second Session, July 10, 11, 12, and 17, 1968 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1968), pp. 262–63. 10. See Otfried Nassauer, ‘Nuclear Sharing in NATO: Is it Legal?’, Science for Democratic Action, May 2001, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 1, 13–14. 11. See Nonproliferation Treaty, op., cit. (note 9) p. 43. 12. Rebecca Johnson, ‘Troubled Treaties: Is the NPT Tottering?’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1999, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 16–18. 13. Emily Y. Bailey and John Simpson, ‘Issues and Options for the 2000 NPT Review Conference’, Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN) Issue Review, April 2000, No. 17, p. 5. 14. Mark Hibbs, ‘Tomorrow, a Eurobomb?’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 1996, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 16–23. 15. George Bunn and Roland M. Timerbaev, Nuclear Verification under NPT: What Should It Cover—How Far It May Go?, PPNN Study Five, April 1994, p. 3. 16. Karl E. Birnbaum, ‘Sweden’s Nuclear Policy’, Survival, December 1965, Vol. VII, No. 9, pp. 314–18, 333; Steve Coll, ‘Sweden’s Quiet Quest: Nuclear Arms Option’, International Herald Tribune, November 26–27, 1994. 17. Nonproliferation Treaty, op. cit. (note 9), p. 39.
106 M MATIN ZUBERI 18. George Bunn and Roland M. Timerbaev, op. cit. (note 15), p. 3 and endnote 2 on p. 20. Emphasis added. 19. ‘New Move on the Dutch Uranium Plant’, New Scientist, October 3, 1968, pp. 6–7. 20. Nicholas Vallery, ‘The Billion Dollar Enrichment Business’, New Scientist and Science Journal, September 16, 1971, pp. 617–19; Hans Mohrhauer, ‘Enriching Europe with Gas Centrifuge’, New Scientist, October 5, 1972, pp. 12–14. 21. Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy 1939–1945, (London: Macmillan, 1965), p. 439. 22. See Michael A. Bauser, ‘United States Nuclear Export Policy: Developing the Peaceful Atom as a Commodity in International Trade’, Harvard Journal of International Law, Spring 1977, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 227–71. 23. Harold L. Nieburg, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1964), pp. 78–83. 24. For ‘reactor wars’ leading to the emergence of the American light water reactor as the dominant reactor system in the world, see M. Zuberi, ‘Nuclear Commerce and Nuclear Technology’, Man & Development, 1983, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 150–61. 25. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Senate members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 55th Congress, Ist session, May 10, 14, 15, and 20, 1957, (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1957), p. 5. 26. Ibid., p. 14 and p. 88. 27. Allan McKnight, Atomic Safeguards: A Study in International Verification (New York: UNITAR, 1971), p. 48. 28. Conference on the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oral Record, Chairman, Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Homi Bhabha, IAEA/CS/OR. 7 (September 27, 1956). 29. Lawrence Scheinman, ‘EURATOM and the IAEA’, in Bennett Boksey and Mason Willrich (Eds), Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects for Control (New York: Dunellen, 1970), pp. 63–79. 30. David A. Fischer, The Future of the IAEA, PPNN Issue Review No. 2, December 1993, p. 5. 31. International Atomic Energy Agency Vienna, IAEA. Information Circular INFCIR/66. 32. For the evolution of safeguards in the context of nuclear technology and commercial competition, see M. Zuberi, ‘Nuclear Safeguards: The Servitudes of Civilian Nuclear Technology’, in K. Subramanyam (Ed.), Nuclear Myths and Realities (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1981), pp. 1–20. 33. Ashok Kapur, Pakistan’s Nuclear Development (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 6. 34. Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today (New York: Carneigie Endowment/Vintage Books, 1984), pp. 93–94. 35. See Lewis A. Dunn, ‘Nuclear “Gray-Marketeering,”’ International Security, Winter 1976–77, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 107–18. 36. Frank Barnaby, ‘Safeguards—With or Without Strings?’, New Scientist and Science Journal, February 1971, pp. 430–32.
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME M 107 37. See W. Hafele, ‘NPT Safeguards’, in SIPRI, Nuclear Proliferation Problems (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1974), pp. 142–57; Laurance Scheinman, The International Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order (Washington D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1987), pp. 147–71. 38. Michael J. Brenner, Nuclear Power and Nuclear Proliferation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 67. 39. Abraham A. Ribicoff, ‘A Market-Sharing Approach to the Nuclear Sales Problem’, Foreign Affairs, July 1976, Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 763–87. 40. See Richard J. Barber Associates, Inc., LDC Nuclear Power Prospects, 1975–1990: Commercial, Economic and Security Implications, ERDA-52 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1975). 41. Gloria Duffy, ‘Soviet Nuclear Exports’, International Security, Summer 1978, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 87. 42. See M. Zuberi, ‘Soviet and American Technological Assistance and the Pace of Chinese Nuclear Tests’, Strategic Analysis, October 2000, Vol. XXIV, No. 7, pp. 1248–55 and 1263–65. 43. Frank Barnaby, ‘A Gentleman’s Nuclear Agreement’, New Scientist, February 24, 1977, p. 469. 44. The committee meets regularly since then and updates the Trigger List. It has made eight ‘clarifications’, the last in June 1999. See Fritz Schmidt, ‘NPT Exports and the Zangger Committee’, The Non-proliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2000, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 136–45; see also Mark Hibbs, ‘China to Join Zangger Committee, But Not With Full-Scope Safeguards’, Nucleonics Week, October 2, 1997, p. 1. This reservation should be read in the context of China’s continuing nuclear and missile exports to Pakistan even after China acceded to the NPT in 1992. 45. ‘France Falls out with Pakistan over Reprocessing’, Nature, 2 February 1978, pp. 397–98. 46. Atomic Energy Law Journal, Fall 1976, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 230–52. Emphasis added. 47. Professor Joseph Nye, Deputy to the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, supported the export licence application for four months’ supply of fuel because Prime Minister Morarji Desai had given assurances that India had ‘no need whatsoever for an atomic bomb’, and that India would ‘unilaterally desist from making nuclear tests.’ See ‘Nuclear Policy: Nuclear Fuel Exports to India’, Department of State Bulletin, July 1978, p. 46. 48. Peter Pringle and James Spigelman, Nuclear Barons (London: Michael Joseph, 1982), pp. 382–83. 49. Bertrand Goldschmidt and Myron B. Kratzer, Peaceful Nuclear Relations: The Creation and the Erosion of Confidence (London, New York: The Rockefeller Foundation/The Royal Institute of International Affairs, November 1978), p. 47. Goldschmidt had been a member of the French Atomic Energy Commission and, later, French representative on the IAEA Board of Governors. Kratzer was senior American delegate for the Committee of the IAEA Board of Governors that devised the NPT safeguards. 50. Ryukichi Imai and Henry S. Rowen, Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Proliferation (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 3–14.
108 M MATIN ZUBERI 51. Myron Kratzer in Mason Willrich (Ed.), Civil Nuclear Power and International Security (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 72. 52. ‘Atom Advocates: US. Policy Draws Heavy Fire’, Time, September 22, 1980, p. 72. French, German, Japanese and Spanish experts had condemned Carter’s nuclear policy at the International Conference on Nuclear Exports held at New York in March 1978. The conference was organised by the US Atomic Industrial Forum. See Nuclear News, May 1977, pp. 38–40. 53. Pierre Lellouche, ‘International Nuclear Politics’, Foreign Affairs, Winter 1979–80, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 336–50. 54. See George Quester, ‘INFCE and the Less Developed Countries’, in Rodney W. Jones, (Ed.), Next Steps After INFCE: US Nuclear and Non-proliferation Policy (Washington, D.C.: March 1980), pp. 201–50. 55. See John L. Campbell, Collapse of an Industry: Nuclear Power and the Contradictions of US Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). 56. See Richard Rhodes and Dennis Beller, ‘The Need for Nuclear Power’, IAEA Bulletin, 2000, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 43–50; Bill McKibbon, ‘Some Like It Hot’, New York Review of Books, July 5, 2001, Vol. 48, No. 11, pp. 35–38. 57. Herbert Scoville, Jr., ‘Technical Capabilities of Safeguards,’ in Bennett Boksey and Mason Willrich (Eds), Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects for Control, op. cit. (note 29), p. 54. 58. Hans Blix, ‘The Non-proliferation Outlook’, United Nations, Disarmament, Vol. XVI, No. 2, p. 9. The elimination of Iraq’s capability to produce weapons of mass destruction was in accordance with a mandate from the UN Security Council. For the findings of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq, see ‘Iraq: The UNSCOM Experience,’ SIPRI Fact Sheet, October 1998. 59. David Fischer, Ben Sanders, Lawrence Schienman and George Bunn, A New Nuclear Triad, PPNN Study Three, September 1992. 60. International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), September 1997; see The UN Disarmament Yearbook, 1999, pp. 29–30. 61. George Bunn, ‘The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems’, Arms Control Today, December 2003, Vol. 33, No. 10, p. 8. 62. Warren H. Donnelly, South Africa, Nuclear Weapons, and the IAEA (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Update June 9, 1989). 63. PPNN Newsbrief, No. 19, Autumn 1992, p. 6. 64. Institute for Science and International Security, ‘South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons,’ ISIS Report, March 1994, pp. 2–3. 65. John B. Wolfsthal, ‘IAEA Inspects South African Nuclear Programme’, Arms Control Today, October 1992, p. 36; David Albright, ‘South Africa and the Affordable Bomb’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1994, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 37–47; PPNN Newsbrief, No. 25, First Quarter 1994, p. 13. 66. Institute for Science and International Security, ‘South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons’, op. cit. (note 64), p. 19; David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1992 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 384, 403. This book was published by Oxford for SIPRI. 67. Ruyukichi Imai, ‘Post-Cold War Non-Proliferation and Japan’, Japan Review of International Affairs, Fall 1994, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 317, 327.
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME M 109 68. M. Zuberi, ‘Cooperative Denuclearization: NPT Safeguards and India’s Nuclear Strategy’, International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, p. 153; see also ‘Nuclear Backsliding in Ukraine’, New York Times (editorial), May 4, 1993; ‘Kazakhstan, the Nuclear Holdout,’ New York Times (editorial), May 18, 1993; PPNN Newsbrief, No. 26, Second Quarter 1994, p. 8. 69. David Fischer, ‘Innovations in IAEA Safeguards to Meet the Challenges of the 1990s’, in David Fischer, Ben Sanders, Lawrence Scheinman and George Bunn (Eds), A New Nuclear Triad, op. cit. (note 59), p. 29. 70. Cited in Karl Kaiser, ‘The Great Nuclear Debate: German-American Disagreements’, Foreign Policy, Spring, No. 30, 1978, p. 84. 71. See comments of Myron Kratzer in Mason Willrich (Ed.), Civil Nuclear Power and International Security, op. cit. (see note 51), p. 68. 72. Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Inventory of International Non-proliferation Organisations and Regimes, op. cit. (see note 1), pp. 31–39. 73. See Marc Dean Milot, ‘Facing the Emerging Reality of Regional Nuclear Adversaries’, Washington Quarterly, Summer 1994, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 41–71; Patrick J. Garrity, ‘The Depreciation of Nuclear Weapons in International Politics: Possibilities, Limits, Uncertainties’, Journal of Strategic Studies, December 1991, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 475–79. 74. Munir Ahmad Khan, Nuclear Energy and International Cooperation: A Third World Perspective on the Erosion of Confidence, (London, New York: The Rockefeller Foundation/The Royal Institute of International Affairs, September 1979), p. 32. 75. Joseph F. Pilat and Walter L. Kirchner, ‘The Technological Promise of Counter-proliferation’, Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 153–66; James Clay Moltz, ‘The Impact of National Missile Defence on Non-proliferation Regimes’, The Non-proliferation Review, Fall/Winter 2000, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 61–74.
CHAPTER
6 The Chemical and Biological Weapons Regimes Arundhati Ghose
ORIGINS If the word ‘regime’ is taken to mean a set or sets of legal obligations accepted by states which share certain norms of behaviour, the norms themselves usually emanate from civil society at large (where civil societies have the awareness, access to information and the ability to articulate their concerns), reacting to certain events or practises. These reactions, at least as far as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are concerned, usually have their origins in humanitarian rather than strategic concerns, and have sometimes been codified into non-binding, though norm-setting International Humanitarian Law (IHL).1 The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) emanate directly from the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (even though there were earlier ‘declarations’—Brussels, 1874 and The Hague, 1899) which, in the public
THE CHEMICAL
AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS REGIMES M 111
revulsion to the effects of the use of chemical weapons during the First World War, prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare.2 The protocol prohibits the use of Chemical Weapons (CW) and Biological Weapons (BW) in war, but does not include any reference to the development, production, stockpiling or deployment of BW or CW, nor the procedures to deal with violations. Of the 133 states that signed the protocol about 40, including the then Government of India, entered their reservations with respect to the protocol to the effect that they would, first, be bound by the protocol only as regards those states parties that had signed and ratified it, and second, that they would not be bound as regards any country whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose allies, violated the provisions of the protocol.3 Many of these states, including the Government of UK, eventually withdrew their reservations; some after the conclusion of the BTWC in 1972 and others after the entry into force of the CWC in 1997. The Government of India has not, to date, withdrawn the reservation made on India’s behalf. The Geneva Protocol can be seen as the norm setter as far as BW and CW are concerned. In fact, in the preambles of both conventions, the states parties reaffirm their adherence to the principles, objectives and obligations of the Geneva Protocol. In 1948, the UN Commission for Conventional Armaments identified CW and BW as ‘weapons of mass destruction’. The use of chemicals and defoliants by the US during the Vietnam War, and the accidental release of nerve gas from a US army proving ground in Utah, led to the issue being taken up, in 1968, as a distinct issue, in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (the predecessor of the Conference on Disarmament). The UN Secretary General produced a report in 1969 on ‘Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use’, after the UN General Assembly (UNGA) commissioned an international group to study the issue. On 25 November 1969 the new Nixon administration announced its support for the Geneva Protocol, excluding the use of tear gas and chemical defoliants from its purview; it also unilaterally renounced BW, even in retaliation, as well as lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons. All stocks of BW were to be destroyed and research on them stopped. Britain tabled a draft treaty banning only BW, at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). The Soviet Union also submitted a draft, but covered both CW and BW. The Anglo-Saxon powers, however, maintained that CW had already been used in warfare and
112 M ARUNDHATI GHOSE
the verification of a ban against them was thus extremely difficult. Although BW stockpiles could be concealed, these weapons had not been tested under ‘realistic conditions’. These powers were, therefore, willing to subscribe to a ban on BW with minimum inspection provisions. The Soviet argument was that a ban on BW alone would tend to legitimise CW and would also be a blow to the Geneva Protocol. The deadlock was broken when, on 30 March 1971, the Soviet delegation tabled a draft on CW, and separate negotiations on a BTWC commenced. The CCD forwarded an agreed draft convention to the UNGA on 30 September 1971. The BTWC entered into force in 1975. The text of the BTWC contains an explicit call for ‘consideration of progress on the abolition of CW at its Review Conference’ (Article XII). As will be seen ahead, just as developments in the biotech industry was one of the factors leading to the establishment of VEREX, an intergovernmental group of experts working on verification mechanisms for BTWC, the modernisation of the chemical industry in many countries, coupled with reports of CW possessors and use of CW in the Iran-Iraq conflict spurred the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to commence work on a convention on chemical weapons. It was, however, the 1991 Gulf War, and the perceived threat by the Western allies of the use of CW by Iraq, that gave the definitive impetus to the flagging negotiations on CW (and possibly resulted in the highly intrusive verification system finally agreed upon). The CD concluded its negotiations within a year and the CWC was opened for signature in 1992, and entered into force in 1997. Work on a protocol to strengthen the BTWC, focusing on verification and compliance measures commenced in 1991, again spurred by the fallout of the Gulf War, with its work significantly influenced by the CWC. The Ad Hoc Group of states parties to the BTWC produced a compromise ‘Chairman’s composite text’ which, in July 2001, was rejected by the US. Work on the protocol has remained moribund since. Notwithstanding the fact that both CW and BW have been treated as categories of WMD, distinct from nuclear weapons, there is no doubt that the three regimes are, in a sense, intertwined. Apart from the substantive aspect, there has also been a direct interrelationship between the verification regimes negotiated. As noted by Alan Dowty4 the United States, in particular, has increasingly invoked its nuclear arsenal, implicitly or explicitly, as a deterrent to chemical or biological attack…. Egypt and Syria see their chemical
THE CHEMICAL
AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS REGIMES M 113
arsenals as a needed counter to Israel’s nuclear capability; they and other Arab States have refused to sign or ratify the CWC until Israel joins the NPT. He also notes that Taiwan and southern Asian nations bordering India and Pakistan have either not signed or ratified the CWC. In his view, it is increasingly impossible to separate nuclear arms control from efforts to eliminate chemical or biological weapons…. Nuclear arsenals are justified as a hedge against chemical and biological attack, while CBW is pursued as ‘the poor man’s nuclear weapon.’ The latest exposition of this view is found in the US National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction in which it is stated We know from experience that we cannot always be successful in preventing and containing the proliferation of WMD to hostile states and terrorists. Therefore, the US military and appropriate civilian agencies must possess the full range of operational capabilities to counter the threat.…5 On the verification side, the intertwining of nuclear weapons (NW) with chemical and biological weapons (CBW) regimes is more than speculative. The first comprehensive and extremely intrusive verification regime was adopted in the CWC, concluded in 1993. While this regime will be examined later, it would suffice to say that the IAEA Protocol on Additional Safeguards Agreements approved in May 1997 (Programme 93+2) drew heavily on the CWC intrusive verification techniques (even while retaining the special status of the five NPT Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and that of India, Pakistan and Israel).6 The same verification techniques, (except for the International Monitoring System) was adopted in the CTBT and further ‘refined’ in the Chairman’s composite text on the BTWC Protocol, which was eventually rejected by the US. Here, it is worth underlining the point that unlike the nuclear regime, the BW and CW regimes are universal in their application to all states parties, and they can abolish an entire category of weapons, thereby making their possession illegal. The NPT does not delegitimise nuclear weapons. This has created major difficulties for the WMD powers—exemplified in the US conditions attached to the NPT’s ratification of CW and culminating in the country’s withdrawal
114 M ARUNDHATI GHOSE
from the BTWC Protocol negotiations. Other major players, particularly Russia and China, have sheltered behind the objections of others to protect their interests. As in the case of Article XIV of the CTBT, which was adopted, as drafted, on the insistence of these two countries, the US withdrawal from the BTWC Protocol negotiations too saw no tears from the delegations of these two countries. On the other hand, while the CWC and BTWC take cognisance of the importance of the civilian use of the relevant technologies, the nuclear regime is almost purely weapons oriented, and, in fact, can be said to be biased against even the civilian uses of nuclear energy. Finally, while the nuclear regime can be said to have evolved along a given path, the BW and CW regimes developed, not only asymmetrically, but almost abruptly. The development or establishment of these regimes was uneven, perhaps because public or civil society’s reaction in the West (which had led in the establishment of all WMD and WMD regimes) has been more limited against the use of BW and CW when compared to the anti-nuclear movement. In spite of the fact that chemical weapons were used in World War I and were deployed, though not used during World War II, and BW were used against China by Japan during the same period, and more recently, allegedly by Iraq against Iran, BW and CW were not. BW and CW are still not considered effective as weapons of war by many military strategists. It is only recently, with the Gulf War and the US fear of Iraqi use of biological and chemical weapons; the collapse of the Soviet Union and the controls on biological and chemical weapons facilities and the agents produced/stockpiled by them; and, the emergence of non-state actors on the international stage, as combatants, with easy access to technology and funds to purchase these weapons, that international interest in controls on biological and chemical weapons have sharpened.
CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION (CWC) The CWC, like the BTWC, is of unlimited duration and, as of 2003, 151 states had ratified/acceded to it—the major hold-outs being the Arab states. Like the BTWC, the CWC abolished an entire category of
THE CHEMICAL
AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS REGIMES M 115
weapons. Unlike the BTWC, however, the CWC was negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament and became the first, and so far the only multilaterally negotiated disarmament treaty under full international verification procedures. Article I of the CWC prohibits the use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention and transfer, direct or indirect, of CW. It also stipulates the destruction of CW, owned or possessed or abandoned on its territory and of CW production facilities. Article II (read with the Schedules in the Annex), contains detailed provisions spelling out definitions and criteria of terms used in the convention, and the chemicals considered to be toxic chemicals or their precursors, both in terms of their potential for CW application and extent of industrial applications. Articles III–V and IX with the Verification Annex form the core of the CWC. A deadline of 10 years is stipulated for the destruction of CW and CW facilities under strict international supervision. The institutions established by the CWC, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Conference of States Parties, the Executive Council, the Technical Secretariat etc., find a reflection not only in the BTWC Chairman’s composite text but also in the institutional set up of the CTBT. The definition and categorisation of chemical weapons and their potential brings both military and industrial facilities in countries under the purview of the verification regime. To ensure compliance with the CWC, a two-prong verification regime comprising of national declarations and on-site inspections has been established. By their national declarations, 11 countries have declared possession of existing or former CWproduction facilities, including China, France, India, Iran, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States. Four countries have declared CW stocks: India, Republic of Korea, Russia and the USA. Other countries have declared old or abandoned CW on their territory. On the basis of these national declarations, the OPCW is expected to assemble a reasonably comprehensive picture of CW capabilities and of the facilities handling dual-use chemicals in member states. Information on military and industrial facilities heretofore sequestered from the eyes of all but those operating these plants must now be deposited with the Technical Secretariat on an annual basis. On-site inspections in turn grow out of the data in the declarations.7
116 M ARUNDHATI GHOSE
The verification procedures provide for the following: • ‘Routine’ on-site inspection of declared sites. • A procedure for consultations, cooperation and fact finding. • Challenge inspections, according to which each state party has the right to request an on-site inspection of any facility or locations in any other state party to deal with questions of possible non-compliance. Even for so-called ‘routine’ inspections, the treaty states that inspectors are to be granted ‘unimpeded access’ to the site. They have the right to examine records and interview personnel. They may also visit relevant parts of the facility, including chemical production, storage and waste treatment areas. If necessary, inspectors can ask to take photographs or samples. In addition, they can place seals and tags on munitions.8 In fact, these routine inspections would give a clear picture of a state’s military and industrial chemical activities. Challenge inspections, on the other hand, are supposed to proceed on the basis of ‘managed access’ wherein the challenged state can restrict the access of the inspectors to only information considered absolutely necessary. On conclusion of such a visit the inspectors would not only file a fact-based report but would also comment on the degree of cooperation accorded them by the host states. To date, no challenge inspection has taken place. The CWC also contains articles relating to restrictions of transfers of certain chemicals and requires the enactment of a national implementing legislation to, inter-alia, prohibit individuals under its jurisdiction or control from engaging in activities prohibited by the convention. Each state party is obligated to designate or establish a national authority to serve as the focal point for liaison with the OPCW and with other state authorities. India ratified the CWC in 1996. She has established a national authority under the Cabinet Secretariat. It is headed by a civilian, who is not necessarily a part of the national security establishment. Several inspections have taken place in India, particularly following India’s declaration of possession of CW, after her ratification of the CWC. During the negotiations of the CWC, an agreement was signed between India and Pakistan on chemical weapons in 1992. The agreement provided for the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and
THE CHEMICAL
AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS REGIMES M 117
included a commitment towards not developing, possessing or using chemical weapons.
THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION (BTWC) The BTWC, even though it did not contain any specific verification provisions nor prohibit its use, does consolidate the norm against BW. The convention is of unlimited duration. The major elements of the BTWC are contained in Articles I, II, III and XII: Article I prohibits, ‘in any circumstance’, the production, development, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of BW, while Article II sets a deadline of nine months after the entry into force of the convention, for the destruction of all BW specified in Article I and their means of delivery. Article III bans transfers while Article XII calls for five annual Review Conferences ‘with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention … are being realized’ (in the event, a concept of continuing review was introduced at the First Review Conference). Action against non-compliance, including carrying out investigations was left to the UN Security Council (Article VI). The BTWC regime evolved through its Review Conferences: The First Review Conference called for declarations of BW possession to be made, which later became a confidence-building measure (CBM), and the initiation of the sharing of legislative experience at the national level. The voluntary submission of declarations was made politically binding in 1986, by the Second Review Conference, and in 1991, the Third Review Conference set up an Ad-hoc Group of Governmental Experts (VEREX) to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. This move towards a verification regime was in part prompted by allegations in 1979 of a suspicious outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk, eventually traced to an accidental release from a Soviet BW facility (the US and USSR had been formally permitted by WHO to retain, until 1995, small quantities of the smallpox virus) the advance in biotechnology and reports that other countries had BW programmes.
118 M ARUNDHATI GHOSE
With the easing of the Cold War in 1992, President Yeltsin conceded that the Soviet Union had violated the BTWC and issued a decree outlawing the continuation of the BW programme. In 1992, an agreement was reached between the three co-depository states—Russia, US and UK—giving each other access to their biological research facilities. Also, after the Gulf War of 1991, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) uncovered evidence that Iraq had an ongoing BW programme, and a report on the risk of use of BW by non-state groups, was published. The report of VEREX was presented to a Special Conference of States Parties in 1994, and it was decided to set up an Ad-hoc Group ‘to consider appropriate measures including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the BTWC, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument.’9 The Ad-hoc Group after more than six years of negotiation, ultimately came up with a ‘Chairman’s composite text’ in July 2001, a text which commanded a wide degree of consensus, but from which the US withdrew, even though it sees itself as a prime target of BW attack. According to its intelligence sources, 12 other countries have BW programmes including India and Pakistan, and seven have an offensive BW capability: China, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Russia and Syria. The elements of the ‘Ad Hoc Committee’s Chairman’s composite text’ are as follows: • Establishment of an OPBW, with an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat. • Under ‘Compliance Measures’, three types of measures are contemplated: i. Declarations: Possession of BW and facilities from 1946; use of BW; national biological defence programmes or activities; annual reports of ‘maximum biological containment’ facilities producing vaccines; annual reports on national biological defence programmes or activities which are permitted. Facilities to also report on ‘biological materials’ produced and held. Failure to comply with declarations would be penalised. ii. Visits and Clarification Procedures: There are three types of visits and one investigation as follows: • • •
Voluntary assistance visits. ‘Randomly selected transparency visits’. ‘Clarification’ visits, i.e., challenge inspection visits.
THE CHEMICAL
AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS REGIMES M 119
iii. Investigations: Field and facilities investigations with elaborate control procedures. • A number of measures to protect an investigated state, including ‘managed access’. The composite text requires states parties to review and report on their national export controls and annual declarations of data of export of certain equipment which may have dual-use purposes. It is evident how the CW model has influenced even a compromise BW protocol text, even though there is a great difference in the type of weapons and therefore, in the type of verification mechanisms.10 During the negotiations, the UK took a lead role in pushing for a highly intrusive verification regime. It was supported by most NATO countries, though the US had, even before its walkout, been ambivalent throughout, especially after their experience of CW. China and Russia opposed the degree of intrusiveness, while Iran and Pakistan, albiet supporting them also pushed for the abolition of the ad-hoc export control groups and the promotion of international cooperation in the field of biotechnology. India’s position was more muted—she supported intrusive verification with some limits. Issues relating to India’s position will be handled in Chapter 8. After the US walkout on the grounds that the text was flawed, and would not prevent cheating, but would, on the other hand, expose their facilities to international inspection, the status of the text is indeterminate.
EXPORT CONTROL GROUPS The two export control groups which have an impact on the BW and CW regimes are the Australia Group and then Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls for conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. The Australia Group was established in 1985 and is an informal association of mainly NATO countries set up to limit the spread of CBW through the control of chemical precursors, CBW equipment, and BW agents and organisms. During the CWC negotiations an informal understanding had been reached with the Australia Group that it would be disbanded once the CWC came into force. However, one of the conditions of the US ratification of the
120 M ARUNDHATI GHOSE
CWC was the strengthening of the Australia Group. According to latest information, the group which now has a common export control list, continues to operate. It has admitted the Republic of Korea and the Czech Republic to its membership.11 The Wassenaar Arrangement is basically composed of the same country’s as the Australia Group but includes Russia. One of the purposes of the arrangement, which is a successor to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCOM) is to complement and reinforce the existing export control regimes for WMD and their delivery system by focusing on threats which may arise from transfers of sensitive dual-use goods and technologies. The arrangement basically deals with conventional weapons and not CBW. However, the information sharing among group members and end-use certification requirements for each category of dual-use technology would have an impact on the transfers of equipments to non-members of the arrangement.
THE CHEMICAL
AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS REGIMES M 121
APPENDIX 6.1A PROTOCOL FOR THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE IN WAR OF ASPHYXIATING, POISONOUS OR OTHER GASES, AND OF BACTERIOLOGICAL METHODS OF WARFARE (GENEVA PROTOCOL) Signed at Geneva: 17 June 1925 Entered into force: for each signatory as from the date of deposit of its ratification; accessions take effect on the date of notification by the depositary Government. Depositary Government: France. The Undersigned Plenipotentiaries, in the name of their respective Governments: Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world; and Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which the majority of Powers of the world are Parties; and To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations; Declare: That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration. The High Contracting Parties will exert every effort to induce other States to accede to the present Protocol. Such accession will be notified to the Government of the French Republic, and will take effect on the date of the notification by the Government of the French Republic. The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are both authentic, shall be ratified as soon as possible. It shall bear today’s date. The ratifications of the present Protocol shall be addressed to the Government of the French Republic, which will at once notify the deposit of such ratification to each of the signatory and acceding powers. The instruments of ratification of and accession to the present Protocol will remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic.
122 M ARUNDHATI GHOSE The present Protocol will come into force for each signatory Power as from the date of deposit of its ratification, and, from that moment, each Power will be bound as regards other Powers which have already deposited their ratifications. In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol. Done at Geneva in a single copy, the seventeenth day of June, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Five.
APPENDIX 6.2B India had deposited its Instrument of Ratification of ‘Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Teriological Methods of Warfare’, signed at Geneva on 17 June, 1925, known as the 1925 Geneva Protocol (Annexure II), on 9 April, 1930, with the following reservation: (i) The said Protocol is only binding on His Britannic Majesty as regards those States which have both signed and ratified it, or have finally accepted thereto. (ii) The said Protocol shall cease to be binding on His Britannic Majesty towards any Power at enmity with Him whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose allies, fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.
APPENDIX 6.3C AUSTRALIA GROUP (AG) Established: 1985 Membership: 30 states—Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US. The EU Commission participates in AG meetings. AG is an informal association, which works on the basis of consensus. Regime goal: to limit the spread of CBW through the control of chemical precursors, CBW equipment, and BW agents and organisms. Regime procedures: national control laws and procedures; common control list (precursors, equipment, agents, and organisms); guidelines for the industry to assist in identifying potential chemical weapon equipment transactions; and, information-sharing among members when suspicious inquiries are received,
THE CHEMICAL
AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS REGIMES M 123
cases are denied, or information suggests possible international procurement for untoward purposes. In 1989, 50 dual-use chemicals appeared on the AG ‘warning list’ with a suggestion that AG members place controls on them. In 1991, AG agreed on additional control lists of: (i) equipment related to the manufacture of chemical weapons precursors; and (ii) biological organisms and equipment. AG members have agreed to control all 50 (currently 54) precursor chemicals on a worldwide basis. AG is considering imposing controls on BW-related dual-use equipment and micro-organisms having BW applications. At the May 1991 meeting, Group members developed a dual-use CBW equipment list, which was adopted during the December 1991 meeting. Since the conclusion of the CWC in 1992, meetings of the Group have focused closely on the interaction between Group controls and the nonproliferation and trade encouragement measures, which came into operation when the CWC entered into force. At their 4–8 October 1999 meeting, the AG members reaffirmed that their national chemical and biological export licensing measures were directed at CBW non-proliferation, and were designed not to hamper legitimate trade. They also endorsed individual members’ actions in hosting regional seminars aimed at encouraging countries not participating in the Group to consider implementing similar measures to prevent CBW proliferation. In 1998, the AG met from 9–15 October. The members reaffirmed the importance of the implementation of national measures as a way to meet their obligations under the CWC and BTWC, and agreed to keep national legislation under review. They also emphasised the important role of seminars for countries not participating in the Group. The AG’s 1997 meeting was held from 6–9 October. Participants continued to review national exporting licensing policies, reaffirmed their commitments to the CWC, and welcomed the progress of efforts to strengthen the BTWC in the negotiations taking place in the Ad Hoc Group of BTWC States Parties in Geneva. Participants also agreed to continue contacts with countries not participating, and in this context, endorsed the importance of regional seminars as valuable means of widening on export controls held in Tokyo in January 1997 and the regional CBW export control seminar for countries of central and eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States held in October 1996. In 1996, the AG met on October 14–17 to discuss the continuing problem of CBW proliferation. The participants reiterated their strong belief that full adherence to the CWC and to the BTWC was the best way to eliminate these types of weapons. In this context, the maintenance of effective export controls will remain an essential practical means of fulfilling obligations under the CWC and the BTWC. South Korea took part for the first time in the AG consultations. Experts from participating countries discussed national export licensing systems aimed at preventing inadvertent assistance to the production of CBW. They agreed to continue working to focus these national measures efficiently and solely on preventing any contribution to CBW programmes, and also
124 M ARUNDHATI GHOSE agreed to continue a wide range of contacts as well as briefings for countries not participating in the Paris consultations of the AG. The statement noted that 24 of the 30 countries participating in the AG had already ratified the CWC, and reaffirmed participants’ prior declarations of intent to become original parties. At the 16–19 October 1995 meeting AG agreed to several amendments to the lists of biological weapons relevant materials and equipment, taking into account developments since these lists were last reviewed including revelations concerning the Iraqi BW programme. The participants also exchanged views on their national approaches to ensure that all relevant regulations promoted the object and purpose of the CWC and to ensure they would be fully consistent with it upon its entry into force. They expressed the view that the lessons derived from practical experience in export licensing would assist individual countries in their preparations for national implementation of their principle obligations under the CWC while ensuring that they would not restrict or impede trade and other exchanges not prohibited by the convention. Participants also considered how best to contribute to international dialogue on the need for and role of national measures focused on preventing assistance to CBW production in line with the international bans on these weapons. They agreed to continue with a wide range of contacts, including a further active programme of briefings for countries not participating in the talks, and to promote regional consultations to further awareness and understanding of national policies in this area. The meeting also discussed the terrorist use of CBW noting that recent developments had heightened concerns about such risks. At the May 1994 meeting, the Group’s discussions centred on their increased focus on activities in support of the entry into force of the CWC. A group of technical experts considered the interaction between the AG’s list of chemicals, the export of which should be monitored, and the CWC chemical schedules. All AG members agreed to review their export licensing procedures to ensure consistency with the CWC. The AG finalised a common approach to licensing of chemical mixtures and agreed on the need for a more active dialogue with non-members on the role of export licensing measures in preventing the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. At this session, the Czech Republic was admitted to the group. At the meeting of the Group in Paris from 29 November to 1 December 1993, participating countries discussed national export licensing systems aimed at preventing any inadvertent assistance to the production of CBW. They agreed to continue working to focus national measures efficiently and exclusively on preventing association with CBW programmes and agreed to continue with a wide range of contacts, including a further active programme of detailed bilateral briefings for non-participating countries. The June 1993 meeting, held at the Australian Embassy in Paris, focused primarily on technical aspects of the AG’s work, as well as considered how to make this work better known and understood among countries not participating in the Group. Consolidation of the Group’s common export control
THE CHEMICAL
AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS REGIMES M 125
lists was achieved as a result of three subsidiary experts’ meetings, which covered BW issues, CW dual-use equipment, and CW precursor chemicals. The consolidation of the Group’s export control lists resulted in agreement on a comprehensive range of key materials (54 chemicals, agents and toxins, dual-use equipment), which could be used in CBW programmes. The AG meets once a year in Paris with Australia as a chair. (Until 1994, AG averaged two meeting each year.) Seat of the AG Meetings: Embassy of Australia, 4 Rue Jean Rey.
NOTES
1. While there are several international conventions on human rights relating to IHL, the foundations of IHL rest on the four Geneva conventions of 1949 and the two additional protocols of 1977: Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field; convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of the armed forces at sea; Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war. The two additional protocols of 1977 are: Protocol I relating to protection of victims of international armed conflicts and Protocol II relating to protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts. (India is not party to Protocol II.) These conventions were, inter-alia, used by the International Court of Justice in 1996 in giving its opinion on the question of the legality of the use of nuclear weapons. 2. Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare (Geneva Protocol) 1925. (See Appendix 6.1A for full text.) 3. Text of the Reservation given in Appendix 6.1A. 4. Alan Dowty, ‘Making “No First Use” Work: Bring all WMD Inside the Tent’, The Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2001, Vol. 8, No. 1. 5. See National Security Presidential Directive 17, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, Office of the President of the United States, Washington, D.C., December, 2002. 6. See Richard Hooper, ‘The IAEA’s Additional Protocol’, Disarmament Forum, 1999, on on-site inspections: Common Problems, Different Solutions. In fact, at the conclusion of the CWC negotiations, the Pakistan ambassador warned of the verification regime setting a precedent. The former Director General of the IAEA, Hans Blix, has also been quoted as saying:‘(The CWC) marks a considerable achievement in arms control and disarmament. Successful implementation of the CWC will have an impact beyond the scope of the Treaty’, May 1997; quoted by Leslie-Anne Levy in ‘The CWC: A Unique OSI Framework’, Disarmament Forum, 1999, Vol. 3. 7. Leslie-Anne Levy, op. cit. (note 6).
126 M ARUNDHATI GHOSE 8. 9. 10.
11.
Ibid. From the Final Declaration of the 4th conference held in 1996. See Jonathan B. Tucker, ‘Verification Provisions of the CWC and their relevance to the BWC’, Biological Weapons Proliferation, The Stimson Center, Report No. 24 (January 1998). For a brief background of the Australia Group and its discussions upto October 1999 please see Appendix 6.3C.
PART IV INDIA’S NEGOTIATING POSITIONS
CHAPTER
7 The Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime in Crisis Matin Zuberi
W
hen the nuclear non-proliferation regime was established, nuclear technology was like ‘a huge spokes wheel with the United States as its centre’. The Soviet Union had a superpower status in nuclear weaponry, but it did not have a role in global civilian nuclear transactions. The United States stood alone at the hub.1 The diffusion of nuclear technology led to the emergence of a multipolar civilian nuclear technological order that challenged the supremacy of the United States. Groupings of West European countries and Japan in the crucial sectors of uranium enrichment and reprocessing soon transformed the character of the regime. Having failed in attempts to coerce its military allies/economic competitors, the United States reinterpreted, actually overturned, various provisions of the NPT to cater to their demands. In this endeavour the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provided invaluable assistance. The competitors, in turn, were willing to be led by their alliance leader as long as they were not hampered in their pursuit of technological development. In the process, they became ‘virtual’ nuclear-weapon
130 M MATIN ZUBERI
powers—literally a ‘screw driver away’ from the cherished goal, to use the phrase inappropriately applied by non-proliferation pundits to the developing countries. A new structure of supply and demand has now emerged, the nuclear market is diversified, and all essential fuel technologies are in the commercial domain. The United States still has the largest number of nuclear power stations (104) in operation. No new nuclear reactor, however, has been ordered since 1978; and every reactor ordered between 1974 and 1978 has been cancelled. France, Japan and Russia have 59, 53, and 29 power plants respectively in operation. The French share of nuclear power in electricity consumption, at 76.4 per cent, is now the highest; the South Korean, Japanese, German and American shares are 40.7 per cent, 33.8 per cent, 30.6 per cent and 19.8 per cent respectively.2 One recent example demonstrates the transformation in the technological capabilities of major powers. The United States once had the dominant share in the global sales of nuclear power plants while British presence in the civilian nuclear marketplace was negligible. In 1999, British Nuclear Fuels, once an enterprise catering only to British domestic needs, bought the American giant Westinghouse Electric Co., that designed 69 per cent of the nuclear power plants in the United States and a half of those in the rest of the world. This British company now boasts a 12 per cent share of the global nuclear commerce and hopes to build new power plants in the United States.3
COLLAPSE
OF A
PILLAR
OF THE
REGIME
The regime did not envisage the disintegration of one of its major upholders, and the weakening of its central control over thousands of nuclear weapons and a mountain of fissile material. Even before this tectonic shift that fractured the brutal certainties of the regime, the International Chetek Corporation of Moscow promoted the novel idea of using nuclear explosions to vaporise all kinds of dangerous waste. Vladimir B. Dimitriev told an international conference in Moscow that his company was willing to export its peaceful nuclear explosive services to dispose of toxic waste, decommissioned reactors and retired nuclear weapons. Startling a conference in Ottawa by suggesting a trial waste-elimination explosion in Russia under
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
IN
CRISIS M 131
international supervision, he maintained that ‘it’s the cheapest way to get rid of really dangerous waste’. A Canadian expert present recalled ‘everybody in the room thought they were nuts’. Ray Kidder, weapons expert at the Livermore laboratory, however, said that the notion of nuclear explosions to incinerate hazardous waste and even nuclear warheads had technical merit. Alexander K. Cherneyshev of the Arzamas-16 weapons laboratory proposed decommissioning nuclear reactors and retired nuclear warheads without any preliminary dismantling. Soviet deputy minister of atomic energy and industry wrote to the United Nations offering to destroy Iraqi chemical weapons.4 There were no takers for this bizarre project. The implosion of the Soviet Union led to fears about nuclear scientists and technicians offering their services to dictatorial ‘rogue’ regimes. Secretary of State James Baker plunged deep into the Urals to visit Chelyabinsk-70, one of the 10 closed nuclear cities spread around Russia that had 16,000 employees, about 9,000 of whom were technicians and 1,000 production engineers and scientists. As his motorcade arrived at the Institute of Technical Physics, every window in the nine-storey building was packed with scientists, technicians, and their staff, ‘creating a remarkable multi-story tableau of smiling faces and waving hands.’ As he sat down in front of a blackboard in a classroom filled with the senior bomb designers, Baker observed: ‘This is every bit as remarkable for us as it is for you.’ The Russian scientists talked about the hard times that had descended on their secretive and privileged world. Vladimir I. Nitikin, deputy director of the institute, said the maximum salary of a top nuclear scientist in Russia was less than $15 at the current exchange rate. ‘It is important’, Chief Scientist Yevgeni Avrorin told Baker, ‘not just to have money for living but also interesting work.’ He stressed, however, that he and his colleagues were not begging. Scientists at the institute had been developing synthetic microscopic diamonds that would put an edge on knives that would never have to be sharpened. They had also done sophisticated work on fibre optics and various applications of nuclear medicines and nuclear magnetic resonance. Avrorin suggested joint mathematical research between Chelyabinsk-70 and Los Alamos laboratory. Responding to these suggestions, Baker said that he realised that scientists wanted to do interesting and intellectually rewarding work and to earn a decent living. Donning a white robe and protective gear, he toured the laboratory where he received a warm welcome. The scientists appeared almost desperate in their desire to obtain civilian contracts from the West. This was a truly remarkable encounter.5
132 M MATIN ZUBERI
One country’s disaster can be another’s opportunity. Vitaly Ginsburg, one of the most famous theoretical physicists, simply said, ‘We are dying’.6 A number of Western organisations and companies stepped into the Russian turmoil and ‘signed up Russian scientists and even entire laboratories for a song’. General Atomic planned to pay $90,000 to 116 scientists at the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy in exchange for one year’s worth of Tokamak experiments to aid the American fusion programme. Robert Galluci of the US State Department testified before Congress in early March 1992 that he had already received more than a hundred proposals from federal agencies and the private sector for collaborative projects with Russian scientists. Siegfried Hecker and John Nichols, directors of Los Alamos and Livermore laboratories respectively, returned from a tour of the two Russian weapons laboratories, Chelyabinsk-70 and Arzamas-16, with several proposals for joint projects.7 The Sun Microsystems Inc., hired Boris A. Babayan, whose role in the former Soviet Union paralleled that of Seymour R. Cray and who designed the Elbrus III supercomputer, along with his team of about 50 software and hardware designers.8 The US government signed a contract for one year that provided the services of 116 scientists for $90,000 (only $65 a month for a scientist) to help harness the vast energy of nuclear fusion.9 An International Science and Technology Centre was established in Moscow, with financial contributions from the United States, Japan, Canada, and the European Community, to provide professionally rewarding jobs for the weapon scientists by redirecting their talents to non-military endeavours.10 Aspersions about the easy availability of Russian weapon scientists to those with ready cash rightly angered Sergei Kapitza, president of the Russian Physics Society and son of the legendary Peter Kapitza. ‘Are the services of a nuclear bomb-maker for sale’, he asked, ‘placing him in the same category as a paid assassin, with only price and risk at issue?’ To single him out, despite his travails, ‘is an expression of distrust, if not a direct insult’ to the scientific community.11 A working scientist, if he has no other option, would migrate to a country where he can continue with his research work. Contrary to western apprehensions, therefore, no Russian nuclear scientist was reported to have gone to a developing country to sell his nuclear knowledge. By early 1998, 15,200 Russian scientists had acquired foreign citizenship, at least 500 were working abroad on a long-term basis, and about 17,000 scientists in Russia were working for American corporations.12 The greatest beneficiary,
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
IN
CRISIS M 133
in terms of scientific and technical expertise, from the Soviet collapse was thus the United States. This, indeed, was a windfall in the pursuit of non-proliferation! Washington started a variety of cooperative ventures to cope with the disintegrating nuclear weapons complex. For the safe transport of Russian nuclear warheads to storage sites, 25 specially fitted rail cars were offered. Their safety features included slanted couplings that could drive them up and over, rather than into, each other in case of an accident.13 Britain offered 250 transport containers and 20 special armoured vehicles.14 Japan sanctioned $100 million for nuclear warhead blankets and decommissioning of abandoned Russian nuclear submarines.15 The US Co-operative Threat Reduction Programme provides American equipment and financial support for the safe transportation of nuclear warheads, safe destruction of strategic delivery systems, physical protection of nuclear weapons storage sites, and safe destruction of chemical and biological weapons. A large storage facility where 50,000 containers of fissile material are to be located is to be constructed with American financial assistance. The programme is supporting 2,400 Russian nuclear weapons designers in their civilian research projects.16 A Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting Programme is designed to provide advanced security systems at Russian nuclear facilities. The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention programme promotes joint ventures between American companies and Russian technical institutes. Global Partners Venture is investing in Russian defence conversion. American industrial firms, however, are the main beneficiaries because of insistence that construction contracts should be given to them or American equipment should be bought and transported to Russia. The Nuclear Cities Initiative is designed to improve living conditions of Russian scientists.17 By far the biggest source of income for the Russian complex is the agreement to purchase 500 mt (metric tons) of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from the dismantled Russian warheads over the next 20 years to be blended down to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) before shipment to the United States. Its estimated purchase price of $12 billion is to be recovered by selling the LEU on the commercial market for civilian nuclear power stations. The Energy Department, because of its obsolete enrichment technology, had lost about half its market share of enrichment services to the Russians and the Europeans. The deal could have made Russia and the United States partners, instead of rivals, in the global enrichment market.18 It has
134 M MATIN ZUBERI
been calculated that 500 mt of HEU, enough to build more than 20,000 nuclear weapons, when converted into nuclear fuel, would save more than $50 billion worth of oil. This most innovative and mutually beneficial ‘megatons to megawatts’ deal, first proposed by Thomas Neff of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), was signed on 18 February 1993. In an ironic twist, the fissile material of the weapons that could have incinerated American cities was to provide electricity to those very urban centres. Russia has sent about 10 per cent—the equivalent of about 2,000 nuclear weapons— of the total amount of HEU to the United States. The deal, however, got entangled in the privatisation of the US Enrichment Corporation that is running at a loss and needs profits from the Russian deal to subsidise its domestic operations. ‘USEC’, asserted Thomas Neff, ‘cannot cover its high fixed costs without a Russian subsidy.’19
PAKISTAN CIRCUMVENTS
THE
REGIME
By 1975, nuclear recession and the consequent unemployment among nuclear engineers and technicians produced a global grey market of ‘nuclear mercenaries’.20 Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani metallurgist, worked between 1972 and 1975 with a Dutch engineering firm at Almelo that was part of the Anglo-Dutch-West German centrifuge enrichment consortium created in 1971. Lax security at the facility provided him access to its complete design plans, and inside knowledge of the firms supplying components for the ultracentrifuges. One task assigned to him was the translation of technical documents, including a top-secret report about a breakthrough in centrifuge technology. Khan returned to Pakistan, determined to evade all international verification mechanisms and technology controls through clandestine transactions. Pakistan established a covert purchasing network to obtain equipment and components ranging from electrical frequency inverters to maraging steel. The Pakistani technique included: floating numerous dummy corporations and trading companies in Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, the United States and West Germany that sometimes dissolved after a single covert purchasing operation; acquisition of components with various non-nuclear applications to circumvent nuclear export controls; purchases of dual-use items in a foreign country and then transferring them to Pakistan; quietly
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
IN
CRISIS M 135