West African Studies Regional Atlas on West Africa

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West African Studies

Regional Atlas on West Africa

West African Studies

Regional Atlas on West Africa Edited by Laurent Bossard

In collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States Commission With the financial support of France, Switzerland, Luxembourg and UNDP

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT The OECD is a unique forum where the governments of 30 democracies work together to address the economic, social and environmental challenges of globalisation. The OECD is also at the forefront of efforts to understand and to help governments respond to new developments and concerns, such as corporate governance, the information economy and the challenges of an ageing population. The Organisation provides a setting where governments can compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and work to co-ordinate domestic and international policies. The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Commission of the European Communities takes part in the work of the OECD. OECD Publishing disseminates widely the results of the Organisation’s statistics gathering and research on economic, social and environmental issues, as well as the conventions, guidelines and standards agreed by its members.

This work is published on the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Organisation or of the governments of its member countries.

Also available in French under the title:

Cahiers de l’Afrique de l’Ouest Atlas régional de l’Afrique de l’Ouest

Corrigenda to OECD publications may be found on line at: www.oecd.org/publishing/corrigenda.

Cover illustration: © Daniel Krüger/Grand Krü, Berlin © OECD 2009 You can copy, download or print OECD content for your own use, and you can include excerpts from OECD publications, databases and multimedia products in your own documents, presentations, blogs, websites and teaching materials, provided that suitable acknowledgment of OECD as source and copyright owner is given. All requests for public or commercial use and translation rights should be submitted to [email protected]. Requests for permission to photocopy portions of this material for public or commercial use shall be addressed directly to the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) at [email protected] or the Centre français d'exploitation du droit de copie (CFC) at [email protected].

The Club du Sahel was established in 1976 at the initiative of OECD member countries in response to the droughts that had ravaged the Sahel and the subsequent food crisis. In 2001, its Board of Directors extended its geographic coverage to encompass all of West Africa, i.e. the 15 Member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as well as Cameroon, Mauritania and Chad.

The SWAC / OECD

Now called the Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC), it is led by a Secretariat based in Paris and administratively attached to the OECD. Supported by a network of partners and experts from West Africa and OECD member countries, its speciﬁcity lies in its approach combining direct ﬁeld-level involvement with analyses of the West African context. The SWAC promotes the regional dimension of development, supports the formulation of joint or intergovernmental policies as desired by the region’s countries, and fosters dialogue with OECD countries for a coherent understanding of the changes and dynamics taking place in West Africa. For more information, please go to: www.oecd.org/swac and www.atlas-westafrica.org To contact us: Telephone: +33 1 45 24 82 81 E-mail: [email protected]

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

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Authors and Collaborators Editorial management: Laurent Bossard Technical co-ordination and revisions: Sylvie Letassey Translation: Leslie Diamond (special thanks to Patricia Hirsch) Design and layout: Marie Moncet

Authors:

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Editorial support:

Eniko Edith Akom

Communicable Diseases

Philippe Bastide

Cocoa

Laurent Bossard

Languages, Transport, Telecommunications

Daniel Duris

Coffee

Donata Gnisci

Migration

Philipp Heinrigs

Oil and Gas, Transport, Telecommunications, Vulnerability in the Sahelian Zone

Madiodio Niasse

Transboundary River Basins

Frédéric Ocrisse-Aka

Languages

Dieudonné Ouedraogo

Demographic Trends

Christophe Perret

Transport, Telecommunications, Cotton, Rural Areas, Climate Change, Africa and China, Vulnerability in the Sahelian Zone

Marie Trémolières

Migration

Scientiﬁc contributions: ACMAD

Climate Change

Yao Adzigbey

Transport, Telecommunications

Agrhymet R.C.

Vulnerability in the Sahelian Zone, Climate Change

Habiboulah Bakhoum

Languages

Jean Bonnal

Rural Areas

François Bost

Transport, Telecommunications

Geneviève Braun

Rural Areas

Erwin Ebermann

Languages

Léonidas Hitimana

Rural Areas

Stéphane Jost

Rural Areas, Climate Change

Jean-François Marquet

Transport

Nelly Robin

Migration

Georg Ziegelmeyer

Languages

Sibiri – Jean Zoundi

Rural Areas

Laurent Bossard

Migration, Cotton, Africa and China, Vulnerability in the Sahelian Zone, Transboundary River Basins, Demographic Trends, Coffee, Cocoa, Oil and Gas, Communicable Diseases

Marie-Christine Lebret

Communicable Diseases, Demographic Trends

Christophe Perret

Coffee, Cocoa

Cartography: Hélène Gay

Communicable Diseases

Philipp Heinrigs

Oil and Gas, Transport, Telecommunications, Vulnerability in the Sahelian Zone

Cheikh Mbow

Transboundary River Basins

Frédéric Ocrisse-Aka

Languages, Migration

Christophe Perret

Transport, Telecommunications, Cotton, Rural Areas, Climate Change, Africa and China, Vulnerability in the Sahelian Zone, Coffee, Cocoa

Nicolas Rageau

Migration

Nelly Robin

Migration

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

F OREWORD

West Africa is an ever-evolving region. An immense space, it is a land of contrasts where, from North to South, the desert opens on to the savannah, the savannah gives way to the forest, the forest to the ocean. The density of the human population is variable with diverse peoples and numerous spoken languages. However, these contrasts did not lead to the creation of borders. Before the arrival of the ﬁrst Europeans, political conﬁgurations in West Africa varied greatly from vast empires to micro-societies which did not go beyond the village or groups of villages. Within each political space, governments were more concerned with the management of the population than the demarcation of its territory through the setting up of borders. Concentrations of power were thus shifting.

Foreword Normand Lauzon. Director of the SWAC / OECD Mohamed Ibn Chambas. President of the ECOWAS Commission

Today the region is made up of shared intangible borders established less than ﬁfty years ago. Granted these borders are still recent, but most of the population was born after their creation. Therefore much of the population has the sentiment of belonging to a nation, but for as much, regional roots remain. The vigour of trans-national languages such as Hausa, Arabic, Yoruba, Bambara, Fulah, Wolof, Akan, Fon, Gourmantché as well as many others, are a reminder that in West Africa, there must be compatibility between the local and the regional levels, the State and the region and between borders and integration. With the recent global changes, regional integration is now at the top of the African political and economic agenda. To protect itself and capitalise on its potential, it is imperative for West Africa to better deﬁne the shared interests among the countries of which it is composed. The Atlas is both a driver and a result of strategic thinking and regional synthesis. Its conception has stimulated dialogue among experts generally working independently. This has been an opportunity for the SWAC Secretariat and the ECOWAS Commission to develop a global vision of West African regional issues; to carry out strategic thinking based on solid evidence related to subsidiarity issues. We believe that the Atlas can provide

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southern and northern technical and political leaders with useful information to feed into debate, negotiations and decision-making. It should also be a scientiﬁc and educational tool with which to promote regional action based on complementarity, synergy and economies of scale. We hope that it will enable Anglophone and Francophone West African students to go beyond the national framework on which the educational curriculum is generally based, to have a shared understanding of their region and its interdependencies. The Atlas shall be a useful means to bring them closer together by providing them with shared references.

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The ﬁfteen chapters of this ﬁrst edition do not cover all issues pertaining to the region. Work is underway on electricity, ﬁsheries, regional organisations and borders which will appear in the forthcoming issues as well as chapters focusing on the urban environment, livestock rearing and tourism. As we have done over the last years, the Atlas will focus on topical issues and feed into the West African international agenda. The chapter on migration began in early 2006 after the dramatic events in the Spanish enclaves in Morocco. It fed into the preparation of a common position on migration of ECOWAS member States. The 2005 food crisis raised the issue of structural food insecurity. Thus, the chapter on the vulnerability of the Sahelian zone (April 2006) conﬁrmed, demonstrated, and mapped out this situation. The

chapters on relations between China and Africa, climate change, as well as oil and gas, were also launched in order to respond to the needs of the international agenda. This desire to “focus on current events” and to fuel debate when it is most heated, is decisive in terms of impact. The chapters on the Sahelian zone, transmissible diseases and climate change have been used by the ECOWAS Commission to deﬁne catastrophic risk reduction mechanisms. Several chapters have been taken up by the press1 and discussed on television.2 At times the Atlas has been used in unexpected ways. The map of GSM coverage in West Africa was used and reproduced in numerous meetings and publications related to food security. It illustrates the integration of the West African agro-food market through the instantaneous circulation of information. All of this demonstrates a need for analytical, strategic and educational syntheses to which the ECOWAS Commission and the SWAC Secretariat strive to respond. The work carried out up to now owes much to the speciﬁc ﬁnancial support provided by the French Co-operation, Swiss Co-operation, Luxembourg Co-operation and UNDP. We are also grateful to other SWAC donors – Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States whose regular ﬁnancing has enabled much of the SWAC Secretariat team to contribute to the Atlas between 2005 and 2008.

Notes 1. 2.

Notably “Gas and Oil”, “Climate Change” and “Africa and China” in « Diplomatie » magazine: www.areion.fr/publishing/www_Diplomatie/ edito01.html. « Le dessous des cartes » / ARTE (Africa and China, Oil and Gas): www.arte.tv/fr/histoire-societe/le-dessous-des-cartes/392.html.

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Atlas team is grateful to Thérèse PUJOLLE and Jacqueline DAMON – respectively President and Director of the SWAC until December 2004 – who supported the creation of the project and launched its ﬁnancing plan. For their constant support, we also express our gratitude to Dr. Mohamed Ibn CHAMBAS, President of the ECOWAS Commission, to Dr. Adrienne DIOP, Director of Communications and then Commissioner for Human Development and Gender within the ECOWAS Commission, and Normand LAUZON, Director of the SWAC. The team emphasises that the chapters on rural environment and climate change could not have been produced without the expertise and knowledge of the FAO and the Agrhymet Regional Centre of the CILSS. Similarly, the Department of African Studies of the University of Vienna (Austria) provided valuable support to the chapter on languages.

Acknowledgements

Haruna WARKANI, Head of the ECOWAS Commission’s Documentation Division, played an important role as the interface with the SWAC Secretariat and greatly contributed to the dissemination of the Atlas chapters. We are grateful to Baber TANDINA, Director ad interim of the ECOWAS Commission’s Free Movement of Persons Department until December 2007, Nfaly SANOH, Director of the ECOWAS Commission’s Free Movement of Persons Department, and Yao ADZIGBEY (Principal Programme Ofﬁcer for Transport of the ECOWAS Commission) for their contributions and constant use of the Atlas in their work. Collecting raw data for an Atlas – numbers and databases, studies and academic work, technical and policy documents – is not an easy task. Many people devoted time and energy to helping us. We sincerely thank them: AMOUZOU Dovi (Economic Mission in Lagos – DREE – Nigeria), BALAMI Dahiru Hassan (University of Maiduguri, Nigeria), BERNARD Eric (University doctoral student), BOLOUVI Michel (Sud Communication, Niger), CHAM Baboucar (Banjul International Airport, the Gambia), CHEIFFOU Amadou (International Civil Aviation Organisation,

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Western and Central African Ofﬁce, Senegal), COZIER Thierry (Delegation of the European Commission, Mali), D’ANGELO Grégory (Economic Mission in Lagos – DREE – Nigeria), DIAGNE Ababakar Sadir (ASECNA, Senegal), DIOP Charles (International Civil Aviation Organisation, Western and Central African Ofﬁce, Senegal), DIOUF Ameth (ASECNA, Senegal), DEMBELE Ousmane (University of Abidjan-Cocody, Côte d’Ivoire), ESHUN John (Contact of the Sahel and West Africa Club, Ghana), GANSARE Sanni (LARES, Benin), GELOES Ronan de (BIVAC International, Chad), GIBIGAYE Moussa (LARES, Benin), GILLET Nathalie (Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens, France), HARKOUK Arezki (GRDR, Mauritania), GRASDEPOT Olivier (Delegation of the European Commission, Cameroon), LUNEAU

Naïg (ISEMAR, France), MBOW Cheik (and team of the Laboratoire d’Etudes et de Recherches Géomatiques –LERG- of the University of Dakar), NDIAYE Pape Oumar (Dakar, Senegal), NOI Eric T. (Ghana Civil Aviation Authority, Ghana), NZEKWU Sylvia (Contact of the Sahel and West Africa Club, Nigeria), YAÏ Olabiyi Babalola Joseph (Permanent UNESCO Ambassador to Benin), OUEDRAOGO Benoît (Contact of the Sahel and West Africa Club, Burkina Faso), PAYA Fabrice (Delegation of the European Commission, Guinea), POIRSON Anne-Claire (Embassy of France, Chad), PRADELLE Jean-Marc (Embassy of France, Mauritania), RIEMBAULT Paul (Delegation of the European Commission, Chad), SOULE Bio Goura (LARES, Benin), SPASIANO Valentina (FAO), TOURRET Paul (ISEMAR, France).

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Table of Contents Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Part I. POPULATION AND SETTLEMENT Chapter 1. Demographic Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1. Major global trends . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2. West African demographic behaviour patterns 1.3. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 2. Communicable Diseases . . . . . . 2.1. Some points of reference . . . . . 2.2. Geography of diseases in West Africa 2.3. Progress and hope . . . . . . . . Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 3. Languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1. West Africa in the African linguistic landscape . . . . . . 3.2. West African diversity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3. Lingua francas or common languages . . . . . . . . . . 3.4. Conclusions with respect to the regional integration process Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 4. Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1. International migration overview: A global view to the African level 4.2. West African migration dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3. Some issues for the future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4. What are the prospects?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Part II. TERRITORIES Chapter 5. Rural Areas and Agricultural Changes . . 5.1. Changes in the rural environment . . . 5.2. Rural economy and agricultural economy 5.3. Some challenges for the future . . . . . 5.4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 6. Transboundary River Basins . . . . . . 6.1. Regional water resources interdependence 6.2. Generally under-exploited resources . . 6.3. Diminishing surface water resources . . 6.4. Water, source of tension . . . . . . . . 6.5. Experiences in joint management . . . . 6.6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 7. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1. General survey of West African transport systems . 7.2. The creation of a regional road network . . . . . 7.3. On West African roads . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4. Ports: The emergence of regional competition. . .

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7.5. The transit of goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6. Rail transport: Private investments and mining prospects. 7.7. The sharp increase in air transport . . . . . . . . . . 7.8. Aerial regional integration remains to be achieved. . . . Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 8. Telecommunications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1. Telephone: The mobile telephone explosion . . . . 8.2. Internet: Cable’s new deal . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3. Towards a West African economy of new technologies Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 10. Oil and Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1. The world of oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2. The world of natural gas: LNG opening new possibilities 10.3. Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4. West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.5. Conclusion: Need for regional co-operation? . . . . . Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 11. Cotton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1. West Africa in the international market 11.2. West African cotton . . . . . . . . 11.3. Regional stakes of development . . . 11.4. A doubly regional future. . . . . . . Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 12. Coffee . . . . . . 12.1. Global overview . . 12.2. International trade . 12.3. Coffee in West Africa 12.4. Prospects . . . . . Sources and bibliography .

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Chapter 13. Cocoa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1. West Africa in the international market 13.2. West African cocoa . . . . . . . . . 13.3. Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . .

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Part III. ECONOMY Chapter 9. Africa and China . . 9.1. Partners . . . . . 9.2. Current issues . . . 9.3. Future issues . . . Sources and bibliography .

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Part IV. VULNERABILITIES Chapter 14. Climate and Climate Change . . . . . 14.1. Climate ﬂuctuations in history . . . . . 14.2. International awareness. . . . . . . . 14.3. The African continent and climate . . . 14.4. Vulnerabilities and impacts in West Africa 14.5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 15. Vulnerability in the Sahelian Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 15.1. The Sahel and its countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 15.2. Food dependency in Sahelian countries is not increasing… . . . . . . . . . . . 270

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15.3. …But cereal production remains very erratic . . . . . . . 15.4. The agropastoral area: Vulnerability and unpredictability . . 15.5. Vegetation and soil problems are not just in the Sahel . . . 15.6. Most agricultural and pastoral methods are still traditional… 15.7. Facing the regional market. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.8. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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270 271 272 277 283 283 284

Maps 0.1. 0.2. 1.1. 1.2. 1.3. 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4. 2.5. 2.6. 3.1. 3.2. 3.3. 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 4.4. 4.5. 4.6. 4.7. 4.8. 4.9. 4.10. 5.1. 5.2. 5.3. 5.4. 5.5. 5.6. 5.7. 5.8. 5.9. 5.10. 5.11. 5.12. 6.1. 6.2. 6.3. 6.4. 6.5. 6.6. 6.7. 7.1. 7.2. 7.3. 7.4. 7.5. 7.6.

Population density in West Africa (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Expansion of the areas of urban market attractiveness 1960 – 1990 – 2020 . . . . 24 Distribution and evolution of the world population in 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Evolution of the world urban population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Distribution and evolution of the West African population . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Trend forecast for life expectancy at birth between 2000-2005 and 2045-2050 . . . 41 Infant mortality in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Incidence rate of conﬁrmed measles cases per 100,000 inhabitants (November 2006) 46 Number of malaria cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 AIDS cases and prevalence in West Africa (adults) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Tuberculosis prevalence (all forms) per 100,000 inhabitants in 2004 . . . . . . . 52 The major African language families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 West African languages spoken by more than one million native speakers in 2005 . 59 Common languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Number of migrants by continent in 1960 and 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Number of migrants in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Major host countries in Europe in 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Major host countries in Europe in 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Major West African countries of immigration (1976–1980) . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Major West African countries of immigration (1988–1992) . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Movements by West African refugees in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Population decline and growth in Europe and Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 West African migration to Europe and the United States in 2000 . . . . . . . . . 81 Maghreb and West African migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Degree of rurality in West Africa, 1960 – 2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 Settlement and agro-climatic conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 A picture of rural settlement in West Africa (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 Production systems in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Principal environmental constraints in the coastal area of the Gulf of Guinea . . . 94 Forest cover in Africa (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Rainfall in West Africa (1951/75 – 1976/2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Variation in potential biomass production in West Africa (1951/1975 – 1976/2000) . 96 Cereal and cattle trade in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Fresh tomato trade between Niger, Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana . . . . . . . . 99 Palm oil trade in Sénégambie méridionale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 Irrigation intensity in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 West African bio-climatic zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 Transboundary watercourses in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 Main transboundary aquifer systems in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 Population densities in West African river basins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 Large dams in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Migration of populations with the shrinking of Lake Chad . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Bilateral agreement along the Niger River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 Transport infrastructure in West Africa (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 Main paved or partially improved roads within ECOWAS . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Practicability of some roads in West Africa (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 Port trafﬁc in West Africa (2003) (excluding oil terminals) . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Transit and re-export corridors in ECOWAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 Impact of the Ivorian crisis on cotton export corridors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

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7.7. 7.8. 7.9. 7.10. 8.1. 8.2. 8.3. 8.4. 9.1. 9.2. 9.3. 9.4. 9.5. 9.6. 10.1.

12

Railway and merchandise transport in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . Existing and planned railways in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Air trafﬁc in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Regional air trafﬁc: Interstate passengers and direct connections . . . . . Mobile and ﬁxed-line telephone subscribers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GSM coverage in West Africa (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Submarine cables in Africa in 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Internet and optical ﬁbre cable (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Foreign direct investment throughout the world. . . . . . . . . . . . . Chinese population in selected African countries . . . . . . . . . . . . Chinese oil importations in 1995 and in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Main foreign investments by Chinese oil companies 1995 to 2006 . . . . . Destination of African oil exports in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chinese cotton imports in 1994 and in 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Crude petroleum production, consumption and major inter-regional trade ﬂows in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2. Proven reserves of oil and gas at the end of 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.3. World inter-regional gas trade in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4. Evolution of oil production in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.5. Main oil and gas ﬁelds in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.6. West African oil exports in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.7. Proven oil and gas reserves in Africa at the end of 2005 . . . . . . . . . . 10.8. Inter and intra-regional ﬂows of petroleum and petroleum products in 2005 . 10.9. Oil and gas infrastructure in North and West Africa in 2005 . . . . . . . . 11.1. Production and consumption of cotton ﬁbres in the world . . . . . . . . 11.2. Main ﬂows of cotton exports in the world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3. Destination of cotton exports from West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.4. Cotton production basins in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.5. Land suitability for rainfed cotton in Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.6. Evolution of cotton-production basins between 1960 and 2000. . . . . . . 11.7. Focus on cotton-producing zones in Burkina Faso (2001/02) . . . . . . . . 11.8. Cotton zones, ginning factories and exports of West Africa . . . . . . . . 11.9. Animal traction and cotton-producing zones in West Africa . . . . . . . . 12.1. World arabica and robusta production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.2. World coffee production and consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3. World coffee exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4. Coffee production regions in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.5. Coffee production regions in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1. Distribution of production zones and main cocoa producing and consuming countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.2. Main world cocoa export ﬂows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3. Main cocoa production zones in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.4. Growth of new cocoa areas in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.1. Regional contribution to CO2 emissions (1960–2004 total) . . . . . . . . . 14.2. Africa’s climatic zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.3. A conceivable overview of climate change in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . 14.4. Monsoon cycle in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5. Changes in pluviometric indices in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.6. Flow rate of West Africa’s main rivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.7. Changes in Lake Chad’s surface area (January 1999, 2003 and 2007) . . . . 14.8. Irrigation and hydroelectricity in the Niger River basin . . . . . . . . . . 14.9. Changes in the Fulah ethnic group’s migratory corridors between Niger, Mali, Benin and Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.10. Main vulnerable urban centres and coastal regions in West Africa . . . . . 14.11. Climatic zones favourable to malaria in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . 15.1. Rainfall and climate zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.2. Locusts in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

135 136 137 139 144 145 146 148 155 157 159 160 162 164

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

169 171 173 176 178 179 180 184 185 192 193 195 197 198 200 201 203 206 212 213 217 220 221

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

228 230 234 236 248 250 252 254 256 257 258 259

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

262 263 265 269 272

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

T ABLE

15.3. Soil quality and rural population densities . . . . . . 15.4. Change in the length of the vegetation season (1990/99) 15.5. The Sahel’s vulnerable zone . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.6. Agricultural production systems in Sahel countries . . 15.7. Main crops in CILSS countries . . . . . . . . . . . 15.8. Cattle in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.9. Population of the vulnerable zone. . . . . . . . . . 15.10. West Africa’s road and urban network . . . . . . . . 15.11. Ratio of cattle to rural population . . . . . . . . . . 15.12. Main sources of income . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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. . . . . . . . . .

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OF

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273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282

Diagrams 1.1. Simpliﬁed representation of demographic transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 1.2. Demographic transition: Three groups of countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 13.1. Typical cocoa chain organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

Figures 1.1. 1.2. 1.3. 1.4. 1.5. 1.6. 1.7. 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4. 2.5. 2.6. 2.7. 3.1. 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 5.1. 5.2. 5.3. 5.4. 5.5. 5.6. 5.7. 6.1. 6.2. 6.3. 6.4. 6.5. 6.6. 7.1. 7.2. 8.1. 8.2. 9.1. 9.2.

Estimated population of West Africa in 2007 by country . . . . . . . . . . . Evolution and forecast of the West African population . . . . . . . . . . . . Changes in the birth, death and population growth rates in West Africa . . . . . Evolution of the net migration rate by country 1970-1975 / 2000-2005. . . . . . Evolution of the total fertility rate 1960-1965 and 2005-2010. . . . . . . . . . Evolution of life expectancy in the four sub-regions of Sub-Saharan Africa . . . Age pyramid, 1950, 2005 and 2050. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Main causes of mortality in the world and share in Africa in 2002 . . . . . . . Life expectancy at birth for West African men and women . . . . . . . . . . Life expectancy at birth and health-adjusted life expectancy of West African women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Main causes of death among children under 5 years of age in West Africa . . . . 2004 Immunisation coverage – TB, diphtheria/tetanus, poliomyelitis and measles Doctors and nursing personnel per 1,000 inhabitants . . . . . . . . . . . . Access to safe drinking water and sanitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Number of languages and number of speakers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The 15 major countries of immigration in 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Migration from West African countries to OECD countries in the 2000s . . . . . Proportion of migrants in West African countries (in %). . . . . . . . . . . . Proportion of the agricultural population in West African countries . . . . . . Percentage of the rural and urban populations with access to an improved water source (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Percentage of the urban and rural populations with access to improved sanitation facilities (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Breakdown of West Africa’s working population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . West African caloriﬁc balance sheet (1990 – 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Food availability trends in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . West African decentralisation and participation typology . . . . . . . . . . . Availability of renewable fresh water in West African countries in 2003 . . . . . River basins: Interdependence and dependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Trend of rainfall in the Sahel (1950-2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Flows of the Niger River in Niamey: Average variation from 1950-2000 . . . . . Fluctuation of level of Akosombo Reservoir . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Evolution of average ﬂooded areas of Lake Chad. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Airports hosting more than 100,000 passengers per year (2003) . . . . . . . . Principal domestic routes in Nigeria (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Evolution of telephone subscribers in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Average expenditure per user in US$ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Africa’s main trading partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Main Chinese imports from Africa in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

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33 34 34 35 35 36 37 41 42

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42 44 44 54 55 58 67 70 74 90

. 93 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93 97 97 100 104 109 110 114 114 116 116 138 138 143 143 153 153

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9.3. Main Chinese exports to Africa in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4. China’s oil dependency 1990 to 2030. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5. Origin of Chinese cotton imports 1989 to 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . 9.6. Destination of cotton exports from West African countries in 2004 . . . 10.1. Projected oil consumption in 2030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2. Oil import dependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.3. Africa’s share in world proven reserves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4. Geographic breakdown of oil production in Africa . . . . . . . . . . 10.5. Oil production in West Africa in 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.6. Crude oil price since 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.7. Price composition of petrol in Burkina Faso . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1. Global and West African production of cotton ﬁbre (1960/61–2008/09) . 11.2. Extra-regional export of textiles and garments in 2004 . . . . . . . . 11.3. Dynamics of world cotton exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.4. Cotton production in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.5. Trends in cotton production in West Africa (1960/61–2008/09) . . . . . 11.6. Parallel trends of cotton and grain production in West Africa . . . . . 11.7. Estimated distribution of UEMOA textile market . . . . . . . . . . 11.8. The cotton industry in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.1. World coffee production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.2. World coffee production trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3. Coffee consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4. Per capita coffee consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.5. World prices and production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.6. Global market prices and farm gate prices paid of producers . . . . . 12.7. Types of coffee exported . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.8. Coffee production in Africa (2000-04 average) . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.9. Production distribution in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.10. African and West African production trends . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.11. Production by country in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1. Production trends (1960–2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.2. Cocoa market price trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3. Production, consumption (grinding) and stock trends . . . . . . . . 13.4. Cocoa production trends in West Africa (1960 – 2005) . . . . . . . . 13.5. Cocoa production trends in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire . . . . . . . . . 13.6. Cocoa production trends in Indonesia and Malaysia . . . . . . . . . 13.7. Plantation ageing trends in Côte d’Ivoire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.1. Temperature trends over the last 20,000 years . . . . . . . . . . . 14.2. Main causes of climate change and their time scale . . . . . . . . . 14.3. Agricultural potential prospects in the world . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.4. Mean temperature trends (minimum and maximum) in the CILSS area . 14.5. Poor performance of climate models in the Sahel region . . . . . . . 14.6a.Impact of climate change on millet/sorghum cereal yields in Niger and Burkina Faso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.6b. Percentage change in rainfed rice yields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.6c. Percentage change in irrigated rice yields . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.1. Cereal production in CILSS countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.2. Food aid to CILSS countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.3. CILSS: Coastal countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.4. CILSS: Landlocked countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.5. Breakdown of agricultural production in the Sahel’s vulnerable zone . .

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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

154 158 163 163 170 171 174 175 177 181 182 191 192 194 196 199 204 204 207 211 211 214 214 215 216 218 219 219 219 222 227 231 232 233 237 237 238 245 246 253 255 255

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261 261 261 270 271 271 271 277

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22 35 45 47 64

Tables 0.1. 1.1. 2.1. 2.2. 3.1.

Surface areas and population of West African countries . . Fertility and contraception in Kenya and Ghana . . . . . Number of poliomyelitis cases in West Africa . . . . . . New trypanosomiasis cases detected in 2004 in West Africa The status of languages in ECOWAS member countries . .

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4.1. 5.1. 5.2. 5.3. 5.4. 5.5. 6.1. 7.1. 9.1. 9.2. 9.3. 9.4. 9.5. 10.1. 10.2. 10.3. 10.4. 11.1. 11.2. 12.1. 12.2. 13.1. 14.1. 14.2. 14.3. 14.4. 15.1.

Major OECD host countries (excluding Germany) in the 2000s (in thousands) Rural and urban poverty (as percentage of total population) . . . . . . . Land use in West Africa (1961 – 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Contribution of agriculture, livestock farming, forestry and ﬁshing to the agricultural sector in some West African countries . . . . . . . . Use of fertilisers and tractors around the world. . . . . . . . . . . . . Growth in agricultural crop production and yields in West Africa . . . . . Transboundary watercourse basin organisations concerning West African countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Frequency of checkpoints on some transport routes (1999-2000). . . . . . Chinese trade with African sub-regions (average 1993-2004) . . . . . . . Oil and cotton in Chinese imports from Africa (2004) . . . . . . . . . . China’s position in African foreign trade between 2000 and 2005 . . . . . China’s approved FDI outﬂows, by region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chinese foreign direct investments in selected African countries (2002) . . Top 10 oil consumers, importers and exporters in 2005 (in million barrels per day and % of world total) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Top 10 gas consumers, importers and exporters in 2005 (in billion cubic meters and % of world total) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Oil and gas exports in 2005 in million US$ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Oil intensity of selected countries in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Macroeconomic importance of cotton in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . List of industrial units involved in the cotton sector in West Africa (2006 or the most recent year) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Coffee introduction dates in West Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Share of coffee in West Africa’s agricultural exports (million of USD) . . . . Cocoa acreage trends in West Africa from 1960 to 2004 . . . . . . . . . The world’s ten biggest CO2 contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lake Chad’s surface areas (1998-2007 average) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vulnerable coastal areas and current property value threatened areas . . . Changes in mangrove swamps in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . Average annual variation in cereal availability . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OF

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. . . 71 . . . 90 . . . 91 . . . 97 . . . 99 . . . 102 . . . . . . .

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117 130 154 154 154 156 156

. . . 170 . . . .

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172 181 182 202

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207 218 222 239 249 258 264 264 272

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21 45 48 53

Boxes 0.1. 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 6.1. 6.2. 7.1. 10.1. 10.2. 10.3. 10.4. 11.1. 11.2. 11.3. 12.1. 12.2. 12.3. 12.4.

Surface area of Africa: Perception and reality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vaccination: Remarkable progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The global fund to ﬁght AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria . . . . . . . . . Tradipractitioners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Skilled migration opportunities: Ghanaian doctors at the bedside of English and American patients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Will measures to restrict immigration to developed countries have any impacts on mobility within the West African region? The case of Senegal Migrant remittances and ODA in West Africa per capita in 1995 (in dollars) . Typology of basin organisations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . International standards on the management of transboundary basins . . . “Toll” roads as expensive as in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Natural gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LNG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Intra-regional ﬂows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The West African gas pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cotton: A long journey from India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cotton sectors in the Francophone zone before liberalisation . . . . . . . The Sikasso region in Mali: From cash crop agriculture to commercial agriculture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Constraints linked to rising production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . International market: Specialty coffees and bulk coffees . . . . . . . . . A fairly new crop for Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The sector in Côte d’Ivoire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

. . . 74 . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . .

83 83 118 121 130 172 173 183 186 196 199

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

205 212 216 218 223

15

TABLE

OF

C ONTENTS

13.1. 13.2. 13.3. 13.4. 13.5. 14.1. 14.2. 14.3. 14.4. 14.5.

The history of chocolate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cocoa uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cocoa’s long journey from the Americas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The liberalisation of the cocoa sector in Côte d’Ivoire and its consequences . Exploitation of child labour on plantations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Greenhouse gases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Global warming “sceptics”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reliability of climate models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Climate change and destructive crop pests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rift valley fever . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

229 229 235 238 239 246 247 249 260 264

16

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

SUMMARY

The size of the West Africa region is imposing: 7.9 million km², which is 2.4 times the size of China and 1.8 times the 27 European Union countries combined. More populated than the United States, the size of its population is also impressive (315 million inhabitants in 2008). By portraying this region, its population, settlement, its territories, economies and vulnerabilities, the Atlas addresses the regional issues and West African countries’ interdependencies. It sets out the accomplishments and the dynamics of adapting to an evolving global environment. The Atlas stimulates strategic thinking on the future. This publication compiles the basic texts, maps and ﬁgures of the 15 thematic chapters produced between May 2005 and May 2008.

Summary

Demography must be taken into account so as to understand societies and create policies in all domains. In West Africa, the population dynamics are undoubtedly among the most powerful ever seen in human history. On the whole, the African continent – particularly sub-Saharan Africa – remains the last major world region where mortality rates – particularly infant mortality rates – continue to be very high and life expectancy low. Hence, it is useful to examine the major communicable diseases affecting the West African population. National languages (in comparison to international languages such as English, French and Portuguese) should be considered while carrying out strategic thinking and activities related to regional integration. The cultural areas that they form are playing a greater role in West African economic geography. West African migration is very speciﬁc. Contrary to North Africa or Central America, most migratory movements within this region are intra-regional. The region is a “natural expansion tank” of West African mobility. The West African rural environment was long considered to be unchanging. But it is in fact at the

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

17

SUMMARY

core of powerful transformations. The region will certainly be mostly urban by 2020. However, the rural population continues to increase. This new era brings promises as well as risks, notably that the most vulnerable rural population (those living in marginal areas) are likely to be subject to the disadvantages of the market without beneﬁting from the advantages. The topic of transboundary river basins clearly illustrates the need to address West Africa beyond the limits of regional integration organisations. The three largest river basins of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Niger, the Lake Chad and the Senegal, map out a geographical situation in which Cameroon, Chad and Mauritania stand together with institutional West Africa.

18

Much progress has been made in the region with regard to transport and telecommunications. There are many more roads today than there were thirty years ago, ports and airports are bigger and better equipped, and new information technology is rapidly developing. The ﬁrst results of the revitalisation of the railroad system are appearing. A regional infrastructure framework, inexistent four decades ago, is progressively emerging, although it still needs to be completed and improved. As the third-ranking trading partner, strategic investor, development partner and future ﬁnancial source, China is shaking up the balance of power established on the continent since independence. The impact is so great that traditional partners – Europe and the United States in particular – have been forced to review their relations with Africa. The euphoria that goes along with oil and gas production and exploration in West Africa shrouds

one of the region’s main characteristics: most of the countries depend exclusively, or almost, on the importation of reﬁned products to satisfy internal demand. However, several positive changes have taken place in the region which are likely to modify regional prospects in the short term. Cotton is an important economic and social issue. West African governments are enthusiastic about this commodity as it is a source of hard currency. Farmers who cultivate cotton have seen their livelihoods improve and have become the main staple food crop producers of the region thanks to the cotton system. However, despite an increase in global demand, the future of this West African “white gold” is uncertain. West Africa was “conceived” for the most part by colonizers seeking suppliers of agricultural raw materials. Coffee and cocoa are emblematic of this history and often considered inseparable. Both are grown in the same areas and are dependent on the London and New York stock exchanges. In order to maintain or re-gain its place on the international market, West Africa will have to resolve its agronomic, land and human (exploitation of child labour) issues. Climate variability is deeply rooted within West African society. The climate changes analysed by the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) raise new fears, but also provide new opportunities for the African continent. The Sahel’s vulnerable zone, also deﬁned as “agropastoral”, undoubtedly suffers the most from intense climate variations and food crises. Based on available data, the Atlas describes the zone, its people and how they live from a macro-regional perspective.

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

INTRODUCTION

A region of the world The West African population basin includes all ECOWAS1 countries as well as its bordering nations of Mauritania, Chad and Cameroon (see Map 0.1.). The people of these three countries are closely linked to West Africa through shared languages and traditions. Their commercial trade as well as road, maritime and air networks continues to develop and grow with the ECOWAS zone. Mauritania, a member until 1999, is once again linked to ECOWAS through the ongoing negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union. It is a member of the CILSS2 and shares a common fate with the West African Sahel region. Chad also belongs to the CILSS and the lake bearing its name is at the centre of the river basin covering Nigeria and Niger.

Introduction Laurent Bossard Deputy Director of the SWAC / OECD

Finally, Cameroon, located to the extreme east of this demographic basin, trades equally with Nigeria as it does with its central African neighbours. The Atlas includes these three nations in most of the analyses even though they do not ofﬁcially belong to “institutional West Africa.” West Africa covers more than one quarter of the African continent yet it is depicted on maps as a less signiﬁcant area (see Box 0.1.). This immense region of 7.9 million km2 is 2.4 times the size of India and 1.8 times larger than all 27 European Union countries combined. In 2008, its population of 320 million people exceeded that of the U.S. population.3 Until recently, despite its massive size and population, West Africa’s economy and strategic position was of little interest to the international community. It was mostly known for its natural disasters, internal conﬂicts and poverty. No one competed for political or economic inﬂuence in West Africa. The cold and post –cold war period had fewer geo-strategic effects on the region than in other parts of Africa, Asia or Latin America. Rarely pursued, it was trapped in a lopsided dialogue with

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

19

INTRODUCTION

its former colonial powers supplemented with aid from North America and Japan.

purchasing power will be compensated by sheer volume. The beneﬁts will be signiﬁcant.

Since the turn of the 21st century, the region’s economic potential has undergone a remarkable transformation due to emerging neo-rich nations and the soaring prices of raw materials. Countries such as Brazil, China and India are now competing for West Africa’s oil, bauxite, uranium, iron and phosphates. These countries and others are contributing aid and investing in the regional market where they realise that the lack of

Brighter economic opportunities are redeﬁning West African countries' situation, opening up new horizons and are allowing them to negotiate from a position of strength. The new partners impose fewer demands and restrictions than do the traditional relationships. Their transaction times are shorter and they are building roads and airports faster for less money. Large scale contracts have been successfully negotiated4 and new educational

Map 0.1. Population density in West Africa (2000)

N

20

Densities (inhabitants per km²) > 234 126 < 234 57 < 126 26 < 57 14 < 26 7 < 14 <7 ECOWAS

0

1,000 km

Source: Groupe Villeret Consulting (2005)

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

INTRODUCTION

Box 0.1. Surface area of Africa: Perception and reality In the 16th century, the Flemish mathematician and geographer Gerardus Mercator developed a cylindrical map projection of the globe. The Mercator projection is still widely used today in textbooks, on wall maps in schools and universities and in the press. It determines our visual perception of the world. The world is round and the maps are Áat, no available projections have been able to illustrate this accurately. The Mercator projection stretches the surfaces progressively moving further away from the equator towards the North and South poles and pulling outward towards the East and West. Shared by the equator and placed in the centre of the map, Africa is the Mercator’s main “victim.” Thus Antarctica, taking up the entire Southern quarter of the map, is in reality half as small as Africa. North and Central America seem larger than Africa whereas the latter’s surface area is 30% greater. Similarly, Africa seems almost the same size as South America where as it is almost twice as large.

Oceania

Area (% of ground surface)

Europe Antarctica South America North and Central America

21

Africa Asia 0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

Sources: Map: Free Software Foundation − Data: United Nations

opportunities are available to students.5 No one could have guessed these possibilities years ago.

] Cocoa: West Africa represents two thirds of the world’s production. ] Coffee: Even though it is losing market share to international competitors, West Africa has the unique potential to increase production to meet global demand. According to all experts, production should increase in the coming decade. ] Oil and gas: While not being a major global actor, the region will increasingly play a role but remain import-dependant. ] Communications and telecommunication networks: Expansion will come as a result of increased international trade and mining development.

The Atlas deals with this region of the world. Although some topics need not be covered from a global perspective (analysis of particular constraints within the vulnerable Sahelian zone, study of local languages or that of cross border river basins), understanding West African issues through international interests is crucial. This is clearly true concerning climate change, China’s emergence and also the following: ] Cotton: West Africa is the second largest supplier to China and if they could further unify, West African countries could play a more prominent role in the international market.

This global approach is equally useful in comparing and understanding other particular issues. The

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

INTRODUCTION

chapter on migration indicates that Africans make up 4% of the world’s migrants and that West Africans represent 1% of all migrants. It emphasises that West African migration is mostly intra-regional as opposed to that of North Africa and Central America. Strategically, the chapter also suggests that both intra-regional mobility and other migratory ﬂows around the world should be addressed simultaneously. This strategy is the cornerstone of the Common Approach on Migration recently adopted by the Heads of State of ECOWAS members.

]

]

A group of countries Regional issues and interdependencies within West Africa are highlighted in the Atlas. For example: ] In most cases, states have great difﬁculty in co-operating within the framework of river basin management organisations. On the other hand, numerous bilateral agreements are negotiated for concrete projects. Bilateral

22

]

Table 0.1. Surface areas and population of West African countries Population 2007

Surface area Estimated population (thousands of km²) (million inhabitants)

Benin

113

9

Burkina Faso

274

15

4

1

Côte d'Ivoire

322

20

The Gambia

11

2

Ghana

239

24

Guinea

246

10

36

2

Cape Verde

Guinea-Bissau Liberia

111

4

Mali

1,240

13

Niger

1,267

14

Nigeria

924

148

Senegal

196

13

72

6

Sierra Leone Togo

57

7

ECOWAS

5,113

283

Cameroon

475

19

Mauritania

1,031

3

Chad

1,284

11

West Africa

7,903

315

Source: United Nations

]

dialogue has helped prevent tension in the management of shared resources. Nigeria, economically and demographically the largest country of the region, has inadequate air transportation to West Africa. Lagos only focuses on domestic and international air travel. There is no direct air route between Abuja, headquarters for ECOWAS, and West Africa. The development corridor of Maputo in Southern Africa6 is leading the way to effectively manage integrated transport routes between ports, capitals and larger land-locked towns. With powerful international companies investing in West African ports and railroads, they should be able to ﬁnance the development of such corridors. The largest West African cotton basin is located in a cross border area. Shared by Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, it is governed by three different national policies. This is also true for other basins including Benin-Togo, Nigeria-Niger and Nigeria-Cameroon-Chad. In West Africa, there are 35 local languages each spoken by more than one million natives. Five of these languages (Hausa, Yoruba, Fulah, Mandingo and Gbe) form dense cultural and economic areas that provide a glimpse into West Africa’s future. For example, the Hausa region of 50 million people, is building its own banking and business industry as well as a viable video industry called “Kanollywood.”

Support strategies are necessary to adapt to regional realities. Bilateral and trilateral programmes with shared cross border resources are neither given much consideration nor are they well funded. Joint Commissions and twin cities and towns are insufﬁciently accounted for. The national and local levels are not very implicated in the regional integration process. This strategy, however, is the foundation for policy enforcement throughout Europe, North America and Asia. “Moreover, the integration drive could be championed by groups of countries acting as the engine of integration within and among Regional Economic Communities (RECs). In other words, it is not necessary for all countries to be ready at the same time to embark upon Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

INTRODUCTION

the integration train. Integration at variable speed should be conceivable.” 7 Although regional policies at the macro-regional levels of ECOWAS and NEPAD are difﬁcult to implement, a few major successful infrastructure initiatives have been completed. These include pipeline transport,8 electricity connection9 and road improvement. It would be helpful to examine the formulation and implementation processes of these policies. Despite efforts undertaken by the ECOWAS Commission, the national governments remain largely unconcerned at the regional level. The principles of proportionality10 and subsidiarity11 have not been ofﬁcially ratiﬁed by the member States. The difference between joint policies (abandonment of national sovereignty at the national level toward the regional level) and inter-governmental policies (national sovereignty remains) is not yet ofﬁcially established. In most cases, due to the lack of funding, there is minimum coordination between member states. Generally, several technical seminars sufﬁce in preparation for ministerial meetings at which regional strategy is then approved. Within the European Union, the processes are incomparably more complex and take longer to execute. Experts gather from member states month after month going from one seminar into another. Community policies are intensely negotiated based on national interests where upon, in many cases, national exemptions are agreed. Regional co-operation is not always successful, yet progress can be measured. “Regional integration sceptics” often compare the EU to ECOWAS. This comparison is debatable as methodologies and objectives differ between the two entities. Should the West African regional co-operation process still be considered nascent after the creation of the CEAO12 35 years ago and the creation of ECOWAS 33 years ago? After all, the European Common Agricultural Policy was implemented at the end of the 1950’s immediately after the European Economic Commission Treaty Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

was signed. Why did the same process not begin in West Africa during the 1970’s? Has the region lost valuable time or was regional integration just not possible at that point? In the 1960’s, R. Dumont described the African sub-Saharan economy in his book, L’Afrique noire est mal partie. “We are seeing a series of tremendously intense economic archipelagos. The isolated centres of great agricultural activity are separated by vast almost empty spaces (...). Although essential to agricultural modernisation, this hinders moving over to a trade economy” (Dumont, 1962). More than 40 years later, much has changed. The WALTPS13 illustrated the link between demographic growth, urbanisation and development of the market economy by the creation of an “urban market attraction” indicator. These maps show how archipelagos in 1960 were clearly separated from one another. In 1990 and 2020, the zones of attraction spread out and are linked up. Today, West Africa more resembles the map of 2020. When the CEAO and ECOWAS were created in the mid 1970’s, 80% of the 120 million inhabitants were self-sufﬁcient and lived in rural areas. With no real economy, little trade and minimal cross-border movement, there was no foundation on which to build regional co-operation or to develop regional integration. Moreover, during the cold war, some African countries had relationships with Eastern Bloc nations while some were afﬁliated with Western Bloc countries. This resulted in ideological and economic opposition to each other. It was difﬁcult to envisage any economic co-operation within this unsuitable environment. As the cold war would not end for another 20 years after the creation of the organisations, the regional integration process could only be considered unsuccessful. In 2008, the population of West Africa was 320 million people almost half of which now live

23

INTRODUCTION

in urban areas. Today, a more realistic foundation exists for the future of viable regional co-operation. Population and trade basins interconnect and the archipelagos described by Dumont are joined across borders.

Map 0.2. Expansion of the areas of urban market attractiveness 1960 – 1990 – 2020

The past and the future Given available information, the Atlas describes transformations over the longest possible periods of time. It also provides readers with long-term forecasts by the most credible international organisations. Forecasts are by deﬁnition uncertain and should be analyzed with caution. Although impossible to accurately predict, certain observable trends will continue for the coming years and decades.

24

The demographic variable is unquestionably the most predictable long-term factor. A forecast for the 1970’s and 1980’s proved to be “accurate” within an acceptable margin of error.14 The West African population should reach 500 million just after 2030. It will be a more urban population than today and this increase will be due to a rise in the urban birth-rate.15 Like today, the population will mostly consist of young people. The decline of transmittable diseases will continue through major international initiatives.16 After combating poliomyelitis, neonatal tetanus, measles, onchocerciasis and trypanosomiasis, the great challenges of tomorrow will be AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. Defeating malaria in the short-term is technically possible; however it is responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths each year and accounts for 40% of national health budgets. West Africa has signiﬁcant arable land of which almost two thirds is not yet cultivated. This includes 9 million irrigable hectares. The economic potential greatly varies from one area to another. Today, a farmer feeds 1.75 people but by 2025 he will have to feed 2.25 people. The impact of climate change is unclear. Although losses should be minimal, Latin America and Africa will lose the most desirable farmland. However, by 2080, the African continent will have the most available farmland on earth.

1960

1990

2020 Source: WALTPS, 1994

© Club du Sahel / OECD 1994

The structurally vulnerable Sahelian zone will continue to endure regular droughts and desert locust invasions. This zone will certainly suffer the worst hardships from demographic, economic and climatic changes over any other region. The region uses only 1% per year of its renewable water resources. Consumption will increase three times faster than the increase in population over the next few decades while surface water resources will dry up. Tomorrow’s challenge will be to tap into the enormous subterranean reservoirs currently under-exploited. West Africa will surely adapt to the new global economy whereby Asia and South America will become major economic partners. In 1970, trade with Europe represented 68% of exports and 62% of imports. Today, they represent 37% and 40% respectively. This downward trend will most likely continue as Brazil, China and India respond

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

INTRODUCTION

to the West African market needs of low-priced consumer staple goods, cars, computers and mobile telephones. Likely future trade partners include Indonesia, the Philippines and Iran. All of these new partners will probably continue to exert pressure on raw materials. With its vast potential of farmland, the region could position itself as producers of bio-fuels17 made from sugar cane, palm oil, sorghum and jatropha.18 The industrial sector could also develop. The rise in oil prices leads to an increase in maritime freight costs. Therefore, it becomes less proﬁtable to transport raw materials such as iron ore and bauxite. Multinational companies are contracting for the exploitation of West African minerals as well as in the primary stages of building aluminium reﬁneries and steel mills. Similarly, foreign investment for oil reﬁning will continue to grow rapidly. Growth in telecommunications will beneﬁt market integration. The mobile phone revolution19 will facilitate West Africa’s access to the global markets. While the cost of information technology and telecommunications declines, market integration will accelerate. Agro-food prices throughout Africa will be in large part be determined by external factors such as the demand in China for sorghum,20

Chicago Board of Trade commodities prices, the biofuel demand in America, Asia and Europe, etc. Therefore, regulating the West African regional market will be crucial. The United Nations predicts that international migration will increase. What role will West Africa’s migratory patterns play in the developed countries of the world? Will West Africans migrate to new regions in Europe21 or Asia? It seems likely that intra-regional migration will continue as long as the demographic transition has not been fully completed. Will the “attraction zones” of tomorrow be the same as those of today? The development of mining and the oil sector as well as that of transport infrastructure and the optimisation of subterranean water sources, etc. could lead to new areas of development. Far from claiming to provide predictions for West Africa, the Atlas produces indices as “by-product” of the description of current trends. Based on today’s information, these hypotheses may prove to be correct. However, the start of the 21st century has already shown the volatility of global dynamics. It is vital that these rapid and unexpected changes be consistently monitored so that they may become part of a comprehensive long-term strategy.

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Economic Community of West African States. Permanent Inter-state Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel. Created in 1973, the members of this regional organisation are Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal. As of 2008, the population in the United States is 304 million. For example 2.2 billion dollars between Senegal and Arcelor-Mittal (India) iron ore excavation in Falémé; 8.3 billion dollars between Nigeria and China for building 1,300 km of railroad tracks. In September 2007, there were approximately 29,000 African students in China of which 21,000 were recipients of a Chinese Government grant. Shared by Mozambique, Swaziland and South Africa. Commission of the African Union, 2004 Strategic Plan, Volume 1. Along the 600 km, it thus links up Alagbado in the outlying areas of Lagos (Nigeria) to the villages of Cotonou (Benin), Lomé (Togo), Tema, Takoradi and Effasu (Ghana). West Africa Power Pool: www.ecowapp.org/. Electricity is not addressed in this issue. It will soon be available on the site www.atlas-westAfrica.org/ before end 2008. Avoiding the imposition on member countries of rules which are too constraining or requiring too much effort compared to that which would be reasonable or effective. Only addressing at the regional level what cannot be better handled at an inferior, national or local level. The West African Economic Community would be dissolved in 1994 and replaced by UEMOA. West Africa Long-Term Perspective Study. This margin of error is on average more or less 5%.

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25

INTRODUCTION

15. A town of 100,000 inhabitants in 2006 will have 180,000 in 2025, 80% due to new births within the urban environment, and 20% coming from the rural environment. 16. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria; the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the WHO strategy to fight tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS in the African region; priority given by USAID to fight AIDS, etc. 17. This subject has not yet been addressed by the Atlas, although it will. The SWAC stresses the significant potential of bio-fuel production in West Africa, although capitalising on this potential should not impede food production. 18. Or “Jatropha curcas”: very rustic shrub from which the extracted oil can be three or four times superior to that of rapeseed or soybean oil. 19. The number of West African subscribers is growing exponentially. A Nigerian subscriber spends on average 55 USD/month. This makes them the second greatest world “consumer” behind Japan. 20. Increasing rapidly, notably to produce bio-ethanol. 21. For example, in Eastern Europe where many of the countries are suffering the cumulative effects of a decreasing birth rate and emigration. Projections forecast that Poland could lose 4% of its population by 2030, and the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia) 10%.

26

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

I.

POPULATION

AND SETTLEMENT

PART I. POPULATION AND SETTLEMENT Chapter 1. DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 27 page 29 Chapter 2. COMMUNICABLE DISEASES page 41 Chapter 3. LANGUAGES page 57 Chapter 4. MIGRATION page 67

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

I.

POPULATION

AND SETTLEMENT

Chapter 1. DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS Dieudonné Ouedraogo (University of Ouagadougou – Burkina Faso Institut Supérieur des Sciences de la Population)

1.1. Major global trends In 2007, the world population was estimated at 6.7 billion people. After Asia (60% of the world population), Africa has been the world’s second most populated continent since 2000 (14%), closely followed by Europe (11%), Latin America and the Caribbean (9%), North America (5%) and far behind, Oceania (1%) (see Map 1.1).

1.1.1. The prospect of world population stabilisation masks some major regional discrepancies The world population is currently growing by just over 200,000 people per day, or around 80 million per year. At this pace, there will be 7 billion human beings by mid-2012 and over 9 billion by 2045. That same year, Africa will have 1.9 billion inhabitants, sub-Saharan Africa 1.7 billion, and West Africa 0.6 billion.

29 Map 1.1. Distribution and evolution of the world population in 2007

Oceania 1% Europe 11% Latin America and the Caribbean 9% North America 5% ASIA EUROPE

Asia 60%

Africa 14%

NORTH AMERICA

AFRICA

Population by continent (in billion)

LATIN AMERICA

7

2050

8 ASIA

OCEANIA

2007

6 5 4

WEST AFRICA

2

1950

3

1 0

Source: United Nations (2006)

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006

12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483150648246

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

I.

POPULATION

AND SETTLEMENT

After reaching its historic peak of 2.2% in the early 1960s, the world population growth rate was only 1.7% in the early 1980s and fell to 1.2% in 2000-2005. The world population is stabilising, but the global trend masks some major regional variations: population growth is still over 3% in some 15 Middle Eastern and sub-Saharan African countries. This variation will cause future upheaval in world population geography. Whereas the population proportions living on the Asian and European continents will fall from 71% to 58%, the African population will double reaching 21% by 2050.

30

Diagram 1.1. Simplified representation of demographic transition Rate

Decrease in birth rate and continuing fall in death rate. Population growth declines.

Birth rate

Death rate

High birth rate and high death rate. Almost no population growth.

Low birth and death rates, Population stabilises.

Decrease in death rate and high birth rate. Very high population growth.

Time

0

SSA

In 2007, there were 807 million inhabitants in sub-Saharan Africa which represents 84% of the African continent’s population; Africa's population increase is thus essentially linked to that of sub-Saharan Africa. The yearly population growth rate for sub-Saharan Africa reached its peak of 2.9% in 1980-1985. It has since been falling (2.5% in 2000-2005) and should reach 1.3% in 2045-2050.

1.1.2. Demographic trans ition: Each at its own pace Demographic change (see Diagram 1.1.) is the process by which a population transitions from low population growth caused by a high birth rate and a high death rate, to population growth that is still low, but this time as the result of a low birth rate and a low death rate. This transition can be divided into four stages: ] Stage 1: birth rates and death rates are high and there is almost no population growth. ] Stage 2: the death rate (especially infant mortality) begins to fall (development of the country and improvement in health conditions). At the same time, the birth rate remains very high, resulting in very high population growth. ] Stage 3: as the country develops, the birth rate begins to decline.

Nth Africa

EUR

] Stage 4: with a low birth and death rate, the population stabilises. This very general diagram can be considered universal to a certain extent, if we allow for a broad range of patterns, with each country and region proceeding in its own way and at its own pace. Currently, European countries or countries such as Iran and Brazil are already in the post-transition period (with low birth and death rates) and most of the countries of the world are in the third stage, moving towards the replacement rate, which stands at 2.1 children per woman, or falling below this rate. Decade after decade, country after country, entire regions have followed this movement: the Caribbean in the 1950s, South East Asia in the 1950s-1960s, Latin America in the 1960s-1970s and China and India in the 1970s. The movement spares neither Catholic countries nor Muslim countries, which are generally believed to be resistant to birth control practices. Only three areas still remain within the second transition phase, staying close to the “natural” level of 6 to 8 children per woman: ] Some Asian countries, such as Laos, Cambodia and Afghanistan;

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revolution, the meeting of basic needs, as well as the elimination of illiteracy, especially for women.

] The countries of the Arabian peninsula, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman and; ] A large number of sub-Saharan African countries.

The concept of demographic somewhat controversial:

Sub-Saharan Africa is nevertheless progressing. The fertility rate is declining after being high for a long period of time. In 40 years, the fertility rate in sub-Saharan Africa has fallen by 1.3 children. More pronounced in Southern Africa (-3.4 children) than in East Africa (-1.4), this decrease was only -1.2 children in West Africa.

transition

is

It obscures the diversity of peoples and cultures by analysing one of their deepest and most complex aspects, reproduction, using a single pattern. It assumes a closed system of “natural” entries and exits linked to births and deaths, and therefore neglects international migration, which is growing globally.

All the countries of the world, even the poorest, have left the ﬁrst phase, although the HIV/AIDS epidemic has reversed the trend for several African countries that have been hard hit by the pandemic: Botswana, Swaziland and South Africa.

Finally, the balance expected at the end of the transition may prove to be an imbalance, or a demographic deﬁcit, in other words a higher level of deaths than births. This pattern is currently experienced by a growing number of European countries or countries such as Iran and Brazil, thus causing population decline preceded and accompanied by population ageing. We now speak of a population crash or demographic winter for these countries.

United Nations projections foresee the (global) end of the transition towards 2035-2040, with a fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman, as a result of the same factors throughout the world: the health revolution and its corollary, the contraceptive

Map 1.2. Evolution of the world urban population

EUROPE

NORTH AMERICA

1960

2000

ASIA

2030

AFRICA 1960

2000

1960

2030

2000

1960

LATIN AMERICA

2000

2030

2030

OCEANIA 1960

2000

2030

WEST AFRICA 1960 2000 2030

Population evolution (Proportional representation by area in relation to 1960) 2030 2000 1960

Population distribution Rural Urban

1960

Source: FAO (2006)

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2000

2030

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1.1.3. Urban dynamics: More cities in the North… and in the South

only 15% of the West African population in 1960 and should reach 60% in 2030. The situation and

Throughout the world, the proportion of urban dwellers is constantly growing (see Map 1.2.). In 1960, a third of the population lived in cities, half in 2005, and three quarters will by 2030. However, there are considerable differences between regions. For example, the American continent has almost 80% urban dwellers. sub-Saharan Africa and Asia are the least urbanised regions (around 40% in 2005). But in these two regions the urban population is currently growing the most rapidly. It could reach almost 55% in 2030, thus reducing the gap with other parts of the world. Of the four sub-regions of sub-Saharan Africa, only Southern Africa is more urbanised than West Africa, which itself only surpassed Central Africa to take its place within sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s. Urban dwellers accounted for

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evolution vary greatly according to country.

1.1.4. Global population ageing and the relocation of the younger generations Globally, the proportion of young people (the under-15s) is expected to fall from 28% to 20% between 2005 and 2050 and that of the over-60s to increase from 10% to 22%. In 2050, the proportion of young people could still be 29% in sub-Saharan Africa, 28% in West Africa and only 15% in Europe. In sub-Saharan Africa, West, Central and East Africa are experiencing a fall in the median age, which is considerably increasing the dependency ratio, unlike Southern and North Africa, where the median age is increasing.

Map 1.3. Distribution and evolution of the West African population Distribution of West African population in 2007 6%

Cameroon

6% 34%

Côte d'Ivoire

7%

Ghana Nigeria Rest of West Africa

47%

Population growth rate in 2000-2005 from 1.3 to 1.99% from 2 to 2.99%

MAURITANIA

from 3 to 4.07%

MALI NIGER SENEGAL

2050

Population by country in million 300

CHAD

NIGERIA

250

THE GAMBIA

GUINEA

GUINEA BISSAU

2007

200

BURKINA FASO

150

BENIN 100

SIERRA LEONE LIBERIA

TOGO CÔTE D’IVOIRE

GHANA

50

NIGERIA

1950

I.

0

CAPE VERDE CAMEROON

Source: United Nations (2004)

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1.2. West African demographic behaviour patterns

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Figure 1.1. Estimated population of West Africa in 2007 by country In millions

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1.2.1. One of the world’s last demographic transitions 20

West Africa is home to 39% of the sub-Saharan African population (with East Africa just behind, at 38%), or 316 million people in 2007 including Chad and Cameroon (see Map 1.3. and Figures 1.1. and 1.2.). The regional population should be more than 400 million by around 2020 and exceed 500 million between 2030 and 2035.

Other Nigeria West African 148 million countries 167 million

15

10

5

23

Forecasts for the future should be considered cautiously. While they illustrate a regional trend, they should be regarded with greater circumspection at the national level. It is indeed impossible to predict the region’s future population and settlement restructuring/composition, in particular intra-regional migratory dynamics. The West African population annual growth rate is close to the sub-Saharan average of 2.6% in 2000-2005 and an expected 1.2% in 2045-2050. However, in many countries this decline has not yet begun. Globally, West Africa is proving to be one of the last regions in the world to begin its demographic transition. Some countries such as Niger, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Liberia and Sierra Leone are still in Stage 2, with accelerating population growth (see Diagram 1.2. and Figure 1.3.).

19

19

15

14

12

12

11

9

9

7

6

4

3

2

2

1

0

Cô Gha te n d’ a I Ca voir Bu mer e rk o in on aF as o Ni ge r Se ne ga l M al Ch i ad Gu in e Be a ni n Si e r Tog ra o Le on e Li be M au ria Th rita e Gu Ga nia in mb ea ia Ca B is s pe au Ve rd e

Nigeria alone is home to 50% of the West African population; it is the greatest demographic power in Africa and the eighth in the world, with an estimated population of 148 million in 2007.

Source: United Nations (2006), World Population Prospects. The 2006 Revision

12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483152074344

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Diagram 1.2. Demographic transition: Three groups of countries Rate Birth rate

Death rate

Time

0

Furthermore, in 2005 the general population growth rate was different from the natural growth

Burkina Faso, Benin, The Gambia, Chad, Liberia, Niger, Mali, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea Bissau

Cameroon, Nigeria, Mauritania Senegal, Togo

Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana

rate in almost all West African countries. The net migration rate in West Africa is never zero: it varies over time, being negative or positive depending on

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the socio-economic conditions in the country. Benin and Mauritania had negative net migration rates in the 1970s and now have positive rates. Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, on the other hand, were positive at the beginning of the period, but have since become negative (see Figure 1.4.).

1.2.2. A clear reduction in fertility but varying between countries

Figure 1.2. Evolution and forecast of the West African population In million

700.0

West Africa Nigeria

600.0 500.0 400.0 300.0 200.0 100.0

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6 19 5 70 19 75 19 8 19 0 85 19 90 19 9 20 5 00 20 05 20 10 20 15 20 2 20 0 25 20 30 20 3 20 5 40 20 45 20 50

60

19

19

19

55

Although there has been a signiﬁcant reduction in fertility 0.0 in West Africa (-1.2 children over 40 years), this reduction remains Source: United Nations (2006) highly unequal between countries. While fairly obvious in certain West African countries”. In other words, it is highly countries (Benin, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, the unlikely that West Africa will follow in the footsteps Gambia, Ghana, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal and of North Africa. Togo), it has barely begun in others (Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Liberia) (see Figure 1.5.). In other sub-Saharan African countries where the fertility reduction process is in full swing How quickly will fertility decline in these West (Botswana, Kenya and Zimbabwe), it seems that African countries, where the fertility rate was over this reduction is more speciﬁcally based on the 6 children until 1980? Will they rapidly reach levels increased use of modern contraception for birth in line with the replacement rate? Will they follow the trend of their North African neighbours? Figure 1.3. Changes in the birth, death and population growth rates in West Africa

North Africa is far ahead in the fertility reduction process. “sub-Saharan African societies value a set of family standards and experiences that are very different, if not opposed, to those of North African societies. Entering into union, the ﬁrst sexual experiences, marital solidarity, the status of women and family ways of life are just some of the factors that mean fertility evolves differently in these two regions. The standards governing family ideals are also embodied in social and population policies. They reinforce the ‘distances’ between North and

Birth and death rates

Growth rate

2005

61

3 2,5

51

Growth

41

2

Births 31

1,5

21

1

11

1 50-55

Deaths

0,5 0

65-70

80-85

95-00

10-15

25-30

40-45

Years Source: United Nations (2006), World Population Prospects. The 2006 Revision 12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483186277750

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not solely correlated to modern contraception.

Figure 1.4. Evolution of the net migration rate by country 1970-1975 / 2000-2005

1.2.3. Factors determining West African fertility

Net migrants per thousand 20.0 15.0

Liberia Côte d'Ivoire

a) Fertility and Economic Crisis Several countries in the region 5.0 Senegal Mauritania Sierra were experiencing an economic Cameroon Chad Leone — The recession in the 1980s when Nigeria Niger Gambia Guinea Benin Bissau Ghana Mali -5.0 the fertility transition began. Togo Burkina Faso This was a time of declining -10.0 Cape Verde household income, increasing exits > entries -15.0 Guinea costs for educating children and, 2000-05 1970-75 -20.0 for certain countries, diminishing Source: United Nations (2006), World Population Prospects. The 2006 Revision public budgets especially in educational and health services. A net reduction in fertility was seen among the spacing, facilitated by the implementation of public highest socio-professional categories and in urban family planning programmes. However, in West areas. Africa, with the exception of Cape Verde, all the countries that have begun fertility reduction have Although the fertility transition began, or a relatively low prevalence of contraceptive use accelerated, during a time of economic difﬁculties, (see Table 1.1.). West African fertility is therefore it was especially encouraged by Table 1.1. Fertility and contraception in Kenya and Ghana previous changes (better education, improved health conditions, weaker Contraceptive prevalence Fertility rate modern total traditional social frameworks, social and Kenya 4.7 children 31.5% 39% economic independence for couples and Ghana 4.5 children 13.3% 22% individuals, etc.), with the crisis simply Source: Vimard and al. (2003) triggering or accelerating an increase in awareness based on former dynamics. Figure 1.5. Evolution of the total fertility rate The crisis, which resulted in increased 1960-1965 and 2005-2010 actual and opportunity costs for having children, led populations to acknowledge Guinea Bissau the lack of coherence between their Sierra Leone Liberia individual demographic behaviour and Chad the new economic and social frameworks Mali Burkina Faso in their society. This acknowledgement Niger Europe was stronger and more rapid where Nth. America Benin Oceania individuals were part of a health, social Guinea Africa Nigeria Asia and cultural context with the dissemiAL&Car Cameroon -4.00 0.00 nation of ideals and practices that -2.00 The Gambia Togo were favourable to fertility reduction, Mauritania especially in urban areas. 10.0

entries > exits

Senegal

Côte d'Ivoire Ghana Cape-Verde -4.00

-3.00

-2.00

-1.00

0.00

1.00

2.00

3.00

Number of children per woman Source: United Nations (2006), World Population Prospects. The 2006 Revision

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4.00

In any case, a reduction in fertility ﬁrst depends on a reduction in mortality. In particular, a decrease in infant mortality is a fundamental condition for

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the success of the fertility transition. This prerequisite is nevertheless seriously disrupted by the HIV/AIDS epidemic in high-prevalence countries. b) Fertility and urbanisation With the exception of Mauritania and the Gambia, fertility declines as the share of urban dwellers in the total population increases. Cities are not the best place for large families given that space is rare and costly. Furthermore, urbanisation means deruralisation and the development of new values, including the shift from a group rationale to a couple rationale, the gradual move towards an individualistic vision, as well as better opportunities for women and the development of family models in accordance with urban constraints.

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c) Fertility and education Education has a twofold impact on fertility reduction: ] First, it encourages adults to adopt behaviour that is less dependent on the values of the community to which they belong. It encourages women’s access to paid work, gives them greater independence within the family and society and thus limits their subjection to their reproductive role. Globally, the higher the literacy rate within a population, the lower the total fertility rate.

80 75 70 65

] Second, when mass education is achieved, parents invest more qualitatively in their children. Fertility declines earlier and more rapidly when this mass education is favourable to girls.

1.2.4. The West African health transition slowed down by aids In recent decades, the mortality rate in West Africa has dropped considerably. The general mortality rate fell from 21 per 1,000 in 1970-75 to 16 per 1,000 in 2000-2005; the corresponding infant mortality rate fell from 149 to 112 per 1,000, which resulted in an increase in life expectancy at birth (see Figure 1.6.). Life expectancy rose from 40 years of age in the early 1960s to 50 in 1995. This is a relative “success” in relation to the situation in the rest of the world, where in 1995 life expectancy was 64 years and 63 years in North Africa. Improved access to health care, water, economic development, social and cultural changes and, above all, relationships between all of these elements have been fruitful.

Based on this encouraging trend, until the early 1990s the United Nations predicted a continued reduction in infant and general mortality and a subsequent increase in life expectancy. These optimistic assumptions have had to be revised due to the development Figure 1.6. Evolution of life expectancy of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which in the four sub-regions of sub-Saharan Africa has disrupted the mortality map in sub-Saharan Africa for over 25 years. East Africa Central Africa South Africa West Africa World

60 55 50 45 40 35 30 50-55 60-65 70-75 80-85 90-95 00-05 10-15 20-25 30-35 40-45 Source: United Nations (2006), World Population Prospects. The 2006 Revision

Forecasts regarding life expectancy at birth remain uncertain. The demographic impact of AIDS will depend not only on the evolution of sexual behaviour among African populations and the rate at which the disease spreads, but also and above all on the time it takes to discover vaccinations, the performance of treatments and the psychological, social and economic management of people already infected with the virus.

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In the meantime and beyond this impact, the population age structure will have been profoundly and enduringly changed.

1.2.5. More young people The age structure in West Africa is largely the result of its fertility rate and to a lesser extent its mortality rate. The current age pyramid (2005) has a narrow peak and a very wide base. The number of elderly people remains relatively low: the share of over-60s in the total population varied little between 1950 and 2005 falling from 5.2 to 4.9%. The share of young people rose from 41.6% in 1950 to 43.9% in 2005 to the detriment of the working age population, which fell from 53.1% to 51.2% over the same period. The median age fell from 19.2 years in 1950 to 17.8 years in 2005. The increase in the number of young people can be seen as a demographic bonus that should be utilised in development efforts. But it will increase pressure on the environment and social services (health and education) and will intensify migration movements within the region and towards Europe, which is geographically close and has growing labour requirements. Paradoxically, global population ageing is also beginning to be seen. It can be “detected” in small changes when comparing the age pyramid proﬁles for 1950 and 2005 and is even clearer for 2050, if the projection assumptions bear out. The proportion of elderly people (over-60s) would then be 10% in Africa and 9% in West Africa but would reach 20% in North Africa and 35% in Europe.

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1.3. Conclusion At a time in the world when an increasing number of countries are facing demographic decline, West Africa will, for a long time, continue to experience strong population growth. However, recently (2000-2005) there are indications that a slow down of growth seems to be underway at various rates according to the country. West African population growth should fall below 2% between 2020 and 2025. However, nothing is certain. Currently, only a small number of countries seem to be entering into a demographic transition process following the classic model i.e. smoothly, without interruption or even a reversal of the situation. The evolution of the AIDS pandemic, all types of crises (economic, social political – certainly conﬂicts) will have an affect on the sanitary evolutions in proportions impossible to predict. Urbanisation is an unavoidable phenomenon. While cities are a necessity for economic development, they are not without numerous and severe problems. Managing urban growth, including providing infrastructure and adequate services for an increasing number of demanding citizens must be considered a public policy priority. High geographic mobility of the population is also foreseeable. This aspect should also be integrated into national and regional policies. Finally, there should be great concern with regard to the youth. Today, 60% of West Africans are less than 25 years of age and 70% are under 30.

Figure 1.7. Age pyramid, 1950, 2005 and 2050

-40

West Africa - Age pyramid – 1950

West Africa - Age pyramid – 2005

West Africa - Age pyramid - 2050

95-99 85-89 80+ 70-74 60-64 50-54 40-44 30-34 20-24 10-14 0-4 -10 0 10 Millions

95-99 85-89 80+ 70-74 60-64 50-54 40-44 30-34 20-24 10-14 0-4 -10 0 10 Millions

95-99 85-89 80+ 70-74 60-64 50-54 40-44 30-34 20-24 10-14 0-4 -10 0 10 Millions

-30

-20

20

30

40

-40

-30

-20

Source: United Nations (2006), World population prospects. The 2006 revision

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30

40

-40

-30

-20

Woman Man

20

30

40

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Glossary Contraceptive prevalence rate: the proportion of current contraceptive users among couples where the woman is of childbearing age. Demography: the study of populations, aimed at establishing their numbers, their composition by age, sex and marital status, and their future evolution. Fertility rate: the average number of children per woman of childbearing age within a population. Median age: the value dividing the surveyed population into two equal parts. Net migration rate: the difference between the number of people entering a country and the number leaving it over a year. This concept is independent of nationality.

Sources and bibliography Ahmad, O. B., A. D. Lopez and I. Mie (2001), “The Decline in Child Mortality: A Reappraisal”, in Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 78(10), pp. 1175-1191. Buhler, P. (2004), Puissance et démographie, la nouvelle donne, Annuaire Français des Relations Internationales, Editions Bruylant, Paris. Cour, J.-M. and S. Snrech (dir.) (1998), Preparing for the Future — A Vision of West Africa in the Year 2020. West Africa Long-Term Perspective Study (WALTPS). OECD Publishing, Paris, 153 p. Garenne, M., G. Enéas et A. Léry (2000), “ La transition sanitaire en Afrique subsaharienne ”, in AdSP, numéro 30, pp. 26-30. Gendreau, F. (2006), La croissance démographique, www.unites.uqam.ca/vilmonde/Franco/Problematiques/ Croissance_demographique.htm ISTED (1998), Dynamique de l’urbanisation de l’Afrique au Sud du Sahara, www.isted.com/pole-ville/ dynamique_urbaine/contents.pdf

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Locoh, T. and Y. Makdessi (2000), “ Les politiques en matière de fécondité en Afrique subsaharienne ”, in P. Vimard et B. Zanou (dir.), Politiques démographiques et transition de la fécondité en Afrique, Collection Populations, L’Harmattan, Paris, pp. 263-296. Locoh, T. (2002), Structures familiales et évolutions de la fécondité dans les pays à fécondité intermédiaire d’Afrique de l’Ouest, www.isted.com/pole-ville/dynamique_urbaine/contents.pdf, INED, document de travail n° 112, 23 p. Loungoulah, G. L. P. (1995), “ La démographie en Afrique subsaharienne, perspectives et enjeux ”, in Afrikascopie (revue du Groupe d’Etudes et de Recherches Africaines (GRETRA), Lyon, 1995, p. 6-12). Marcoux, A. (1996), Interactions dynamique démographique ressources naturelles – environnement en Afrique de l’Ouest et centrale ; Service du programme de Population, FAO. Meslé, F. et J. Vallin (1995), “ La mortalité dans le monde : tendances et perspectives ”, Les dossiers du CEPED n° 30, CEPED, Paris. Pison, G. (2002), “ Le sida va-t-il entraîner un recul de la population de l’Afrique au Sud du Sahara ? ” in Revue Population et Sociétés, numéro 385, INED, Paris. Tabutin, D. et B. Schoumaker (2004), “ La démographie de l’Afrique au Sud du Sahara dès 1950 aux années 2000 : synthèse des changements et bilan statistique ”, in Revue Population 2004, numéro 3/4 ; INED, Paris. Tabutin, D. (1997), Les transitions démographiques en Afrique subsaharienne. Spéciﬁcité, changements... et incertitudes, Communication au Congrès Général de la Population de Beijing (UIESP, octobre 1997), 24 p. UNAIDS (2006), Report on the global AIDS epidemic. UNESCO (2003), Gender and education for all: The leap to equality, Paris, UNESCO, 342 p. United Nations (2003), Population, Education and Development, New York, United Nations, 56 p. United Nations (2003), World Urbanization Prospects. The 2003 Revision. Data on line: www.un.org/esa/ population/unpop.htm United Nations (2004), World Population Prospects. The 2004 Revision. Data on line: www.un.org/esa/ population/unpop.htm

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United Nations (2006), World population prospects. The 2006 Revision. Data on line: www.un.org/esa/ population/unpop.htm Vimard, P. (1996), “ Evolutions de la fécondité et crises Africaines ”, in J. Coussy et J. Vallin (Eds.), Les Etudes du CEPED – Crise et population en Afrique, n° 13, CEPED, Paris : 293-318. Vimard, P. (1997), “ Modernisation, crise et transformation familiale en Afrique subsaharienne ”, Autrepart (2), pp. 143-159. Vimard P., R. Fassassi et É. Talnan, (2003), “ Le début de la transition de la fécondité en Afrique subsaharienne : un bilan autour des exemples du Kenya, du Ghana et de la Côte d’Ivoire ”, in Série Santé de la reproduction, fécondité et développement, documents de recherche n° 2, pp. 31. Wikipedia (2006), Demographic transition, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition

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Chapter 2. COMMUNICABLE DISEASES Eniko Edit Akom (Centre de Coopération Internationale en Santé et Développement – CCISD – Canada)

Figure 2.1. Main causes of mortality in the world and share in Africa in 2002

2.1. Some points of reference 2.1.1. Internationally In 2002, the World Health Organization (WHO) recorded 57 million deaths in the world; among them, 17 million (i.e. almost one third) were due to cardiovascular diseases. Infectious diseases were the second main cause of mortality (11 million), especially respiratory infections (4 million), AIDS (Acquired Immunodeﬁciency Syndrome, 2.9 million)

Cardiovascular Diseases Malignant Tumours Traumas Respiratory Infections Respiratory Diseases HIV/AIDS Perinatal Infections Digestive Disorders Diarrhoeal Diseases Tuberculosis Early Childhood Diseases Malaria Maternal Conditions Nutritional Deficiency Other Diseases

Rest of the World Africa

Africa 21%

Africa 77%

Rest of the World 79%

Africa 96%

0 2 4 6 8 10 In million of persons Source: The WHO Statistical Information System (WHOSIS), December 2004

12

14

16

41

12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483072607780

Map 2.1. Trend forecast for life expectancy at birth between 2000-2005 and 2045-2050

EUROPE

74

81

NORTH AMERICA

ASIA 68 78

83

77

AFRICA

52

66

LATIN AMERICA

80

2045-50

100

2000-2005

Life expectancy at birth worldwide

72

80

OCEANIA

74

WEST AFRICA

81

60 49

40

65

20 0

66

75

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2007) World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision.

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and malaria (0.9 million). These were followed by malignant tumours – responsible for more than 7 million deaths, while traumas caused more than 5 million deaths in 2002.

2.1.2. Within A frica AIDS remains the main cause of death in Africa, with 2.3 million estimated deaths in 2002, followed by respiratory infections, cardiovascular diseases, and malaria, each of which accounts for 1 million deaths. Special attention must be paid to diarrhoeal diseases that cause almost 800,000 deaths in Africa annually.

a) Life expectancy With the notable exception of Cape Verde, life expectancy at birth in West Africa is below the world average and much lower than in developed countries, where it is now 80 years (see Map 2.1.). In addition, while many developed countries present relatively similar health-adjusted life expectancy and life expectancy at birth levels, the situation is very different in Africa and consequently in West Africa, where people’s health is much more uncertain. Countries such as Burkina Faso, Liberia, Niger and Sierra Leone suffer healthy life year losses as high as 25% of the total life expectancy (see Figure 2.2.). While health-adjusted life expectancy rose quickly between the 1950s and

ld eV er de 68 59

72 63

ra Le o Ni ne g Cô Li er te ber d' ia Iv oi Gu in M re ea a Bi li s Ni sau ge Bu C ria rk ha in d Ca a Fa m so er o Be on n Gu in in Th T ea e og Ga o m Se bia ne g M Gha al au n rit a an ia W or ld Ca pe Ve rd e

Demographers predict yet another signiﬁcant hike in global life expectancy, including in Africa, subject to continued efforts in combating not just HIV/AIDS but also other scourges such as malaria, TB and early childhood infectious diseases.

Life expectancy at birth Health-adjusted life expectancy 80 70 60 60 57 58 57 50 55 56 49 50 51 48 48 51 48 53 49 47 47 44 40 45 46 46 46 40 41 36 37 38 41 42 42 42 42 30 35 30 20 10 0

Ca p

W or

Si

er

ra Le on Ni e g Cô Li er te be d' ria Iv oi Gu r in M e ea al Bi i s Ni sau ge r Bu Ch ia rk ad in Ca a F m aso er o Be on Gu nin in e Th To a e go Ga m Se bi ne a g G a M ha l au na rit an ia

In Southern Africa, which has the highest prevalence level of HIV (Human Immunodeﬁciency Virus that eventually leads to AIDS), life expectancy has fallen from 62 years in 1990-1995 to 48 years in Figure 2.2. Life expectancy at birth for West African 2000-2005. It is expected to fall men and women further to 43 years in the coming Men Women decade before a slow recovery 80 begins. There will probably be 70 zero demographic growth in the 60 region between 2005 and 2020. 50 In fact, projections for Botswana, 40 Lesotho and Swaziland indicate 30 a decline in the population. 20 However, the introduction of 10 ARV (antiretroviral) drugs and 0 the increasingly widespread preventative measures -that are now taking root in Source: WHO, World Health Statistics 2007 Highlights and Tables populations’ behaviour are 12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483103384238 expected to contribute considFigure 2.3. Life expectancy at birth and healtherably to reducing AIDS- induced adjusted life expectancy of West African women mortality in the decades to come.

Si er

42

2.1.3. In West Africa

Source: WHO, World Health Statistics 2007 Highlights and Tables

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1970s, there was a slowdown during the last few decades of the 20th century, essentially due to AIDS and other transmissible diseases. b) Infant mortality High infant mortality largely explains the gap between life expectancy at birth in sub-Saharan Africa and in the rest of the world. sub-Saharan Africa’s infant mortality rate is about 5 to 6 times higher than Europe’s or North America’s.

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Despite the considerable efforts and progress made (infant mortality has halved since the 1970s), mortality rates among children in the under 5 age group are still very high; one out of every ten sub-Saharan African children does not live to the age of 1 year (as compared to 1 out of 25,000 in Germany, for example) and one out of ten does not live to be 5 years old. In West Africa, the rates are higher: at 150 per 1,000 live births in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Niger, while with

Map 2.2. Infant mortality in Africa

N

0

1,000 km

43

Less than 20 per 1,000 live births 20-50 per 1,000 live births 50-100 per 1,000 live births 100-150 per 1,000 live births More than 150 deaths per 1,000 live births

Source: WHO, World Health Statistics 2007 Highlights and Tables

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© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

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26 per 1,000, Cape Verde’s rate is lower than the world average (51 per 1,000) but still far from the rate of around 5 per 1,000 in developed countries. Apart from perinatal pathologies (accounting for over a quarter of deaths among children below 5 years of age), the main causes of child mortality in this age group are malaria (21%), acute respiratory infections (21%), diarrhoea (16%), measles and malnutrition – often a combination of several of these diseases (see Figure 2.4.).

Figure 2.4. Main causes of death among children under 5 years of age in West Africa

Mauritania The Gambia Côte d'Ivoire Liberia Togo Guinea Ghana African Region Nigeria Mali Benin Cameroon Guinea Bissau Chad Senegal Sierra Leone Burkina Faso Niger

Pneumonia

Measles

Accidents

HIV/AIDS

Other causes

27% 21% 21%

16%

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Figure 2.5. 2004 Immunisation coverage – TB, diphtheria/tetanus, poliomyelitis and measles

Poliomyelitis (3rd dose)

Diphteria/Tetanus

Tuberculosis

Measles

400 350 300 250 200 150

SS G A M uin au e rit a a Ca nia m er oo n M Ca a pe li Ve rd e To g Gu W o in o r ea ld Bi ss a Se u ne ga l Bu rk in aF as o Th Ben e i n Ga m bi a

ge r Li ia be ri Cô Ch a te ad Si d'Iv er oi ra re Le on e

Malaria is the primary cause of 100 morbidity and mortality in West 50 Africa. Other serious tropical diseases include meningitis, cholera, 0 r a ge an onchocerciasis, trypanosomiasis Ni Gh (100% of world cases), dracunSource: The State of the World’s Children, Statistics, UNICEF 2007 culosis, schistosomiasis, leprosy, yellow fever (90% of world cases) as well as diarrhoeal diseases other than cholera. 2.2.1. Encouraging r esults Acute respiratory diseases and malnutrition complete the landscape of the main pathologies. a) Poliomyelitis: Towards eradication Poliomyelitis, also simply called polio, is an acute Some diseases are present in a speciﬁc geographic infectious disease that is transmitted through environment. For instance, onchocerciasis and contaminated food and water, and multiplies annual epidemics of meningitis are particularly in the intestine, from where it can invade the prevalent in the Sudano-Sahelian region. Other nervous system and cause paralysis, which is often diseases remain limited to a few countries such as permanent. Sub-Saharan Africa = Lassa fever in Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea, and Buruli 62% of the world’s poliomyelitis cases ulcer disease in coastal countries between Côte (i.e. 1,230 persons in 2006) d’Ivoire and Ghana. Ni

44

Malaria

Diarrhoea

Source: WHO, World Health Statistics 2007

2.2. Geography of diseases in West Africa Africa has a warm climate and a rich and varied biosphere, especially in tropical and equatorial regions. Unfortunately, these positive aspects result in the presence of a large variety of diseases affecting many populations.

Perinatal pathologies

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Box 2.1. Vaccination: Remarkable progress West Africa has achieved tremendous progress in immunisation coverage over the last two decades, with the exception of Chad. This is particularly the case with DPT, BCG and polio vaccines, with the notable exception of Nigeria in the case of polio. Between 1990 and 2003, several countries considerably improved their vaccination programmes. Niger and Mauritania, with an annual increase of almost 3%, achieved a measles immunisation coverage of respectively 74% and 64%. However, West Africa’s coverage overall is by far the lowest in the world. In 2004, only 54% of children were vaccinated against measles. Between 1990 and 2003, vaccine coverage even decreased in Nigeria, as well as in Burkina Faso, Cape Verde and Togo. Only Ghana and the Gambia are likely to achieve a measles vaccination coverage of over 90% in 2010. While the incidence of childhood transmissible diseases has declined considerably in recent decades, the still fairly low vaccination rates do not allow to forecast their eradication in the near future.

Since the WHO adopted a resolution aimed at eradicating poliomyelitis in 1988, considerable progress has been achieved everywhere in the world, including West Africa. Several immunisation campaigns have reduced the number of countries with endemic poliomyelitis from 122 in 1988 to just 7 in 2003. Since 2003, however, the suspension of the vaccination campaign for religious reasons, notably in Nigeria, has caused a rise in the number of cases in this country as well as in Niger, along with a reappearance of cases in formerly polio-free countries. Thus, polio cases were reported in 2004 in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Togo. In 2005, following renewed immunisation efforts, the number of Table 2.1. Number of poliomyelitis cases in West Africa Countries Chad Cameroon Niger Nigeria Total Source: www.polieradication.org

2006 1

2007 20

2

0

11

11

1,122 1,136

286 317

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cases dropped considerably in Niger. Although the number of cases may have decreased substantially in Nigeria (from 1,122 cases in 2006 to 286 in 2007), intense transmission of the wild virus continues in the country. Sub-Saharan Africa = 15% of deaths due to measles worldwide (i.e. 36,000 persons in 2006)

b) Measles: On the decline Measles is an acute rash infection, due to a virus of the Paramyxovirus family that essentially affects children from the age of 5-6 months. Contamination occurs through infectious droplets. Measles can be controlled through immunisation. In 2000, 396,000 Africans died of the measles, accounting for 50% of deaths due to this disease worldwide. In 2006, the ﬁgure fell to 36,000 deaths (15% of deaths due to measles worldwide). 80% of deaths occurred in Central and West Africa. The remarkable decline in mortality caused by measles was due to the implementation of a system based on monitoring, preventative vaccination and treatment in 29 countries in 2005, including 10 West African countries. In recent years, epidemics occurred in only less than a quarter of the countries covered by this system: Cameroon (2003-2005), Togo and Benin (2004-2005), and Mali (2004). c) Neonatal tetanus: Almost eliminated Neonatal and maternal tetanus are caused by an infection with Clostridium tetani during deliveries occurring in unhealthy conditions. Neonatal and maternal tetanus remains one of the main causes of death for newborns and mothers in Africa. It can be prevented by rigorous hygiene, immunisation and the administration of antibodies in case of contamination. Twenty-eight countries account for 90% of worldwide cases. Sixteen of them are in Africa, including 12 in West Africa. Faced with a persistent number of cases reported, the WHO initiated a neonatal tetanus eradication campaign in 2000. Considerable progress was achieved up to 2005, especially with the elimination of the disease in

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Map 2.3. Incidence rate of conﬁrmed measles cases per 100,000 inhabitants (november 2006) < 0.5 cases per 100,000 0.5-0.9 per 100,000 1.0-1.9 per 100,000 Monitoring system non-operational prior to September 2006

MAURITANIA MALI NIGER CHAD

SENEGAL THE GAMBIA BURKINA FASO GUINEA

GUINEA BISSAU

SIERRA LEONE LIBERIA

46

BENIN

CÔTE D’IVOIRE

NIGERIA

TOGO GHANA

CAMEROON

CAPE VERDE

Source: WHO-AFRO

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

work and prevents farming in fertile river valleys. The ﬁght against onchocerciasis began in West Africa in the 1970s. According to the WHO, the Onchocerciasis Control Programme (OCP) helped prevent 600,000 new cases in 11 of the region’s countries between 1974 and 2002, while over 20 million hectares of arable land along the rivers were freed of this disease.

several countries, including Togo. Other Sub-Saharan Africa = countries, including Benin, Ghana, Guinea and Mali, are very likely to eradicate the 99% of onchocerciasis cases worldwide (i.e. 17 million persons) disease in the short term. d) Onchocerciasis: Considerable progress Onchocerciasis or “river blindness” is a parasitic infection transmitted through the bite of an infected black ﬂy of the Simulium species. Onchocerciasis causes serious cutaneous lesions and irreversible blindness in its last stage.

Onchocerciasis

Onchocerciasis is particularly rife in West and Central Africa, with an estimated 120 million people exposed to the disease. It has a considerable impact on the economies of affected countries as it reduces people’s capacity to

Capitalising on the OCP experience, a pan-African programme was initiated in 1995, making it possible to protect millions of people and repopulate extensive agricultural areas through preventative measures based on the use of

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the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Swaziland, where no new cases have been reported for several decades. But it is difﬁcult to assess the current situation in several e) Trypanosomiasis: Signiﬁcant decline in cases endemic countries for lack of adequate African human Trypanosomiasis Sub-Saharan Africa = surveillance and diagnostic methods. (sleeping sickness) is caused by a parasite transmitted to man 100% of trypanosomiasis cases (i.e. 70,000 persons) The disease is also difﬁcult to prevent through the bite of an infected and treat. Detection and management glossina or tsetse ﬂy. of patients requires well-trained staff and well-equipped health centres. Without Trypanosomiasis is one of treatment, the disease inevitably the most neglected diseases leads to death. In 2000, the WHO in the world. It affects Trypanosomiasis set up a surveillance system in disadvantaged populations in endemic countries along with free remote rural sub-Saharan Africa medical supplies. regions. This disease was almost eradicated towards the mid-1960s, but In 2005, surveillance was the slackening of surveillance and disconreinforced and the disease’s tinuing of antivectorial programmes led to incidence declined considerably its resurgence in several regions over the last throughout the continent: from 30 years. Almost 40,000 cases were recorded 27,240 in 2001 to 17,620 in 2004. in 1998, but it is estimated that 300,000 to

biological larvicides for the antivectorial treatment of stagnant waters.

Table 2.2. New trypanosomiasis cases detected in 2004 in West Africa Countries Burkina Faso

2

Nigeria

10

Cameroon

17

Guinea

17

Côte d’Ivoire

72

Chad

483

Total

601

Source: The Weekly Epidemiological Record, 24 February 2006, 81st year – No. 8, 2006, 81, 69-80

500,000 more cases remained undiagnosed and untreated. More than 60 million persons are at risk in 36 countries. Prevalence may vary from one country to another and from one region to another within the same country. In 2005, major outbreaks were observed in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan. Transmission seems to have stopped in countries such as Botswana, Burundi, Ethiopia,

2.2.2. Three still highly active epidemic diseases a) Meningococcal meningitis Meningococcal meningitis is a bacterial infection of the meninges caused by Neisseria meningitidis, a bacterium which is transmitted from one person to another through contaminated droplets of nasal and oral secretions, often emitted by asymptomatic carriers. In West Africa, the start of each year is marked by meningitis epidemics affecting children and adolescents in particular. Despite the existence of an effective vaccine, there is no routine immunisation. Due to limited protection lasting only for 3 to 5 years and the absence of Meningitis group immunity, vaccination campaigns are carried out more in reaction to epidemic outbreaks.

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The most affected countries are those located in the “meningitis belt” spreading from Ethiopia to Senegal, i.e. Sudano-Sahelian

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countries with a warm, dry climate. Epidemics occur annually, but also follow a 3-to 5-year cycle, with a very high number of cases in some years alternating with less intense years. 1997 and 2002 were years with high epidemic levels, with 60,000 and over 33,000 reported cases respectively and a 13% lethality rate in 2002 in Burkina Faso. Fewer cases were reported in 2005 and 2006 (less than 6,000 in 2006). On the other hand, in 2007, there were once again major epidemics with more than 38,000 cases reported, including over 26,000 in Burkina Faso. Lethality was 8% and varied extensively between less than 3% in Ethiopia and 25% in Côte d’Ivoire. Over the last few years there Box 2.2. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria

48

was set up to substantially increase resources for the Àght against these three most devastating diseases in the world and to direct these resources towards the regions that needed them most. In 2000, leaders of the G8 countries initiated the establishment of a Global Fund for raising and directing resources following the identiÀcation by several public health experts of a number of effective measures to prevent and treat AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria that could change the evolution of these diseases if they were implemented at a large scale. In 2002, the Global Fund’s Board approved the Àrst Round of grants to 36 countries.

has been an emergence of a highly aggressive Neisseria strain, the NM W135, which could be one of the factors responsible for the high lethality recorded in some of these countries. New polyvalent vaccines against several strains of Neisseria meningitidis should be effective for a longer term and could be used in routine vaccination programmes, which would make it possible to eliminate major meningitis epidemics in a relatively near future. b) Cholera Cholera is a diarrhoeic disease caused by Vibrio cholerae, a curved-rod shaped bacterium

that was discovered in 1883. The most acute form is fatal in over half the cases if left untreated (from a few hours to three days). Contamination is oral, of faecal origin, through drinking water or contaminated food items. In 2005, the WHO reported 130,000 cholera cases in the world, with 95% in Africa and 60% in West Africa alone. Linked to poverty and unhealthy sanitary conditions, the disease breaks out every year, particularly during the rainy season. Caracterised by severe diarrhoea and dehydration, cholera leads to the death of approximately 1% of those infected, particularly young children and the elderly, who are more fragile. A vaccine is available, but only offers partial, short-term immunity. Since 1970, West Africa has suffered periodic epidemic outbreaks. More serious outbreaks occurred during the ﬁrst few years of the 21st century in most of the region’s countries. In 2007, there were major outbreaks in Senegal, Sierra Leone and Guinea, among others, due to the widespread ﬂoods affecting the region. c) Yellow fever Yellow fever is a viral haemorrhagic disease caused by the amaril virus, a member of the Flaviviridae family. The qualiﬁer “yellow” is due to the icterus (“jaundice”) observed in some patients. Mosquitoes are the main vector of the disease, which is transmitted from monkeys to man and then from man to man. Every year, approximately 200,000 people across the world suffer from yellow fever, which causes about 30,000 deaths, most of which in Africa. Despite the existence of an effective vaccine, practically all West African countries are considered at risk of yellow fever epidemics. After a strong resurgence of the disease Yellow fever in the 1980s, the yellow fever vaccine’s introduction in the routine vaccination schedule as well as the intensiﬁcation of surveillance helped reduce the number of cases substantially. Nevertheless, epidemic outbreaks recur regularly: in 2005, Cameroon,

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Map 2.4. Number of malaria cases Less than 50 per 1,000 50-100 per 1,000 100-300 per 1,000 More than 300 per 1,000

Distribution in West Africa countries Liberia 5% 5% 22% Benin 5% Mali 6% Guinea 7% Senegal Burkina faso 24% 9% Nigeria 17% Ghana Other West African countries

MAURITANIA MALI NIGER SENEGAL

CHAD

THE GAMBIA BURKINA FASO GUINEA

GUINEA BISSAU

BENIN SIERRA LEONE

NIGERIA

TOGO CÔTE D’IVOIRE

LIBERIA

GHANA CAMEROON

CAPE VERDE

49 Source: UNICEF, World Malaria Report 2005

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007 12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483062285252

Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Guinea reported conﬁrmed cases of yellow fever.

2.2.3. Persistent s courges

It is also in Africa pharmacoresistance classical medicines ineffective against countries.

a) Malaria: A stubborn disease Malaria is a mosquito-borne disease caused by Plasmodium, a parasite transmitted through the bite of a female anopheles mosquito, leading to fever, pain and sweating. In 2005, malaria caused over one million deaths across the world, over 90% on the African continent, home of the most severe form of malaria, caused by plasmodium falciparum, as well as of the most formidable malaria-transmitting mosquito species.

that the highest degree of is found, as more affordable are becoming increasingly malaria in most African

Sub-Saharan Africa = 90% of the world’s malaria cases (i.e. 47 million persons)

Paludisme

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Finally, most African countries neither have the infrastructure nor the resources necessary to organise effective and sustainable anti-malaria campaigns. Malaria is one of the primary causes of infant mortality in children below the age of 5 in Africa (21%). It is also responsible for 40% of public health expenditure, for over 30% of hospital

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Map 2.5. AIDS cases and prevalence in West Africa (adults) Less than 50 per 1,000

Distribution in West Africa countries

50-100 per 1,000

12%

100-300 per 1,000

3% 3% 5% 9% 14%

More than 300 per 1,000

54%

Burkina Faso Chad Ghana Cameroon Côte d’Ivoire Nigeria Other West African countries

MAURITANIA MALI NIGER SENEGAL

CHAD

THE GAMBIA BURKINA FASO GUINEA

GUINEA BISSAU

BENIN SIERRA LEONE LIBERIA

NIGERIA

TOGO CÔTE D’IVOIRE GHANA

CAMEROON

CAPE VERDE

50 Source: 2006 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic, UNAIDS/WHO, May 2006

admissions and 50% of external consultations in high transmission areas. In addition, malaria also has negative impacts on the economy. Economic growth in high transmission countries has always been lower as compared to malaria-free countries. In fact, economists hold it responsible for an annual growth deﬁcit of up to 1.3%. Over a third of reported malaria cases occur in West Africa. Their distribution indicates a very strong concentration of cases in Nigeria and Ghana, which alone account for 40% of reported West African cases. Decades of ﬁghting malaria, including prophylactic and curative treatments, vector control measures (larvicides, insecticides, mosquito nets, etc.) and continuing education have not succeeded in reducing this disease’s toll. Recently, the parasites’ growing chemoresistance, DDT’s

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

(modern insecticide) discontinuation and the construction of artiﬁcial dams for agriculture have kept malaria among the topmost African diseases. At the same time, efforts towards the creation of a vaccine have been in vain, as the latest results only provide partial and brief protection. Over the last few years, the Global Fund’s integrated and extensive malaria control approach, including DDT’s reintroduction, as well as the advent of new, more effective medicines, have raised hopes of controlling malaria, if not eradicating it. New approaches in malaria control include mosquitoes that are genetically modiﬁed to destroy the plasmodium, biological larvicides such as BTI or Neem, etc. b) HIV/AIDS: A certain stabilisation HIV stands for Human Immunodeﬁciency Virus. The virus destroys certain lymph cells that defend the body against micro-organisms and cancer cells, thus impairing the body’s immune system.

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Opportunistic infectious diseases and certain cancers may then develop. When a person is affected by a series of such diseases, they are said to suffer from AIDS, the Acquired Immunodeﬁciency Syndrome. An HIV positive person is one who develops antibodies following an HIV infection. An HIV positive person does not necessarily have AIDS.

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to-child transmission. Finally, the signiﬁcant fall in antiretroviral prices and funding of larger-scale distribution programmes have at least led to improved if not widespread access to these drugs.

Over the last few years, the epidemic has stabilised in most of the region’s countries, along with reduced HIV prevalence in Burkina Faso and Togo’s urban areas. A similar Sub-Saharan Africa = trend has been observed in other HIV can be transmitted through sexual 67% HIV cases African countries, in particular Uganda, intercourse, blood transfusions, and (i.e. 22.5 million persons) Kenya and Zimbabwe, especially in from mother to child during birth or adults of reproductive age. Similarly, during breast-feeding. surveillance studies of West Africa’s sex workers indicate a fall in prevalence and often increasingly AIDS in Africa has had an unprecedented devassafer sexual behaviour. tating impact: life expectancy has fallen drastically, millions of children have been orphaned, health Condoms have become commonplace and professionals are being decimated by the disease countries are taking measures to protect girls – and economies are being destroyed. Despite the potential AIDS victims due to early marriages and introduction of highly active antiretroviral drugs dangerous traditional sexual practices. and the signiﬁcant reduction in their prices, it is essentially developed countries that continue c) Tuberculosis: A continuous increase to beneﬁt from these treatments to which only in the number of cases a fraction of HIV positive Africans have access. In Tuberculosis or TB is a chronic infectious disease June 2006, 6.5 million persons needed antiretrocaused by a mycobacterium, mainly Mycobacterium viral drugs, to which only 25% in low and medium tuberculosis or Koch’s bacillus (KB). The infection income countries had access. mainly affects the lungs but may also affect other organs. Contrary to developed countries, women Sub-Saharan Africa = and girls are the most affected in Africa 25% of TB cases A disease associated with and the disease is predominantly (i.e. 2.4 million persons and poverty, partially controlled by transmitted through heterosexual 0.5 million deaths per year). vaccination, TB is re-emerging intercourse. in Africa, particularly due to HIV infection and the consequent immunodeﬁciency. The number of TB West Africa is less affected than the continent’s cases has increased by 10% annually in Africa, and southern and eastern regions, but no West African in 1999, two thirds of the 2 million new TB cases country is left untouched, with Côte d’Ivoire being patients were also infected by HIV. Conversely, in the most affected: 7.1% of its adult population is sub-Saharan Africa, almost 50% of people living estimated to be HIV positive. with HIV develop TB. Moreover, HIV patients develop pharmacoresistant forms of TB more The screening and care of HIV positive persons easily. On a global scale, AIDS is the only infectious is still largely insufﬁcient. The stigmatisation of disease that kills more adults than TB. people living with HIV is a strongly de-motivating factor for screening. The cost of antiretroviral treatments is out of reach for most patients. 2.2.4. Emerging di seases Prevention campaigns are being carried out to make people aware of the importance of safer sexual behaviour and the prevention of mother-

a) Dengue Dengue, an infectious viral disease transmitted by mosquitoes, is rife in the planet’s tropical and

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Map 2.6. Tuberculosis prevalence (all forms) per 100,000 inhabitants in 2004 Less than 50 per 1,000 50-100 per 1,000 100-300 per 1,000 More than 300 per 1,000

Distribution in West Africa countries 3% 4% 4% 5% 6% 22% 8% 48%

Sierra Leone Senegal Burkina Faso Mali Ghana Côte d’Ivoire Nigeria Other West African countries

MAURITANIA MALI NIGER SENEGAL

CHAD

THE GAMBIA BURKINA FASO GUINEA BISSAU

GUINEA SIERRA LEONE LIBERIA

52

BENIN CÔTE D’IVOIRE

NIGERIA

TOGO

GHANA CAMEROON

CAPE VERDE

Source: Global Tuberculosis, Database online, WHO

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007 12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483071117117

sub-tropical regions, with a propensity for urban and peri-urban areas. Approximately 2.5 billion people, i.e. 2/5 of the world’s population, are now at risk. According to the WHO’s current estimates, there could be 50 million dengue cases in the world every year, with an approximately 5% lethality ratio. Dengue, which can take a haemorrhagic form, a potentially fatal complication, is active today in over 100 countries, including Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Nigeria and Senegal. However, so far dengue has not caused any major epidemics in Africa.

wherever the rodent species that are its carriers are found. Most infections (approximately 80%) are asymptomatic. The number of Lassa virus infection cases in West Africa is estimated at over 300,000 per year, with about 5,000 deaths per year. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, over 10% of patients admitted to hospitals suffer from Lassa fever. It has about a 15% lethality rate among hospitalised patients. In fact, mortality rates are particularly high for pregnant women, particularly in the third trimester, as well as for their foetuses, 80% of which die in utero if infected.

b) Lassa fever Lassa fever is an acute hemorrhagic fever that occurs in Western Africa. The disease was discovered in 1969 in Lassa, Nigeria. It is caused by a virus that is endemic in some West African regions (Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria), but it has the potential to spread to all of West Africa,

c) Avian ﬂu In 2006, Nigeria was the ﬁrst African country to report H5N1 strain avian ﬂu cases. The virus was isolated in several regions, including along the border with Niger, Cameroon and Benin. Niger and Cameroon soon followed, conﬁrming the presence of the H5N1 strain in regions bordering

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Nigeria, then Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire. In 2007, Ghana, Togo and Benin were added to the list of affected West African countries. While the virus was introduced through wild birds in Africa, it seems that its spread was caused by commercial activities. However, the infection seems limited to birds and the aggressive measures taken during each outbreak succeeded in limiting the epizooty’s spread. Living and housing conditions (close cohabitation with poultry) create a predisposition for H5N1 infections in humans, mainly women and children who are most often in direct contact with poultry, which makes them more vulnerable. Even if the best health care conditions are provided, these infections have a very high lethality rate (over 50%). d) Buruli ulcer disease Buruli ulcer disease is a subcutaneous tissue infection caused by the Mycobacterium ulcerans, which causes deep ulcerations and necroses. Buruli ulcer disease has an enormous socio-economic impact on affected populations and constitutes a serious public health problem in terms of morbidity, treatment and functional disabilities. Although Box 2.3. Tradipractitioners Tradipractitioners (traditional healers) are still omnipresent and people use their services. In Ghana, for instance, there is one tradipractitioner per 200 inhabitants, whereas there is just 1 doctor per 20,000 inhabitants. Traditional treatments are cheaper and culturally closer to the population. The concern for providing high quality health care has led to the marginalisation of traditional healers — even making them illegal. New movements have developed in an effort to correct this trend by promoting scientiÀc research in traditional treatment methods, as well as various natural resources, such as medicinal plants. If they could receive scientiÀc support and training, traditional healers could be excellent health workers, and could also contribute to information, education and communication. Furthermore, the use of medicinal plants and other natural resources, if found effective, can have a positive impact on the population, not only in terms of health care cost and accessibility, but also in terms of community development and the protection of traditional knowledge.

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spontaneous healing may take place, it occurs after months of progression and leaves affected patients with deep scarring, retractions and deformations. Since 1980, the disease’s detection rate has risen considerably. The disease often occurs in isolated areas and affects children in the 10-14 age group, in particular. Buruli ulcer disease has been reported in 30 tropical countries, including Australia, but West Africa remains the most affected region: 5,700 cases between 1989 and 2003 in Benin and 17,000 between 1978 and 2003 in Côte d’Ivoire, where prevalence reaches 16% in some villages. In Ghana, 5,600 cases were detected during a national survey in 1999.

2.3. Progress and hope Measures such as increased epidemiological surveillance, improved access to health care and healthy living conditions, education for disease prevention with a special focus on women and girls, children’s vaccination, priority to peri-natal and paediatric health services can help change Africa’s image in the health sector. Among the many diseases that decimate Africa’s population, many are becoming rarer or even being eradicated in several countries. Thus, the incidence of poliomyelitis is no longer signiﬁcant, except in Nigeria. Yellow fever also seems well on the way to being wiped out and recently, most of the epidemics declared have been rare and not so widespread. Leprosy, a disease that had taken a terrible toll in Africa, has almost been completely eradicated (less than 1 case/100,000 inhabitants reported per country). Onchocerciasis is also under control. With regard to HIV/AIDS, decades of global prevention and mobilisation efforts have ﬁnally succeeded in slowing down the epidemic. The progress made in combating transmissible diseases and in improving access to health services has resulted in the substantial reduction of infant mortality, which has decreased two-fold since the 1970s. Continued efforts by African countries and the international community are necessary to maintain and further these achievements, in order to enable Africans to have decent living conditions.

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However, continued vigilance is needed as the ﬁght against these major communicable diseases is far from over – the resurgence of some diseases, such as tuberculosis, proves as much. Interruptions in vaccination campaigns (poliomyelitis in Nigeria), the emergence of AIDS, and the discontinuation of vector control efforts (trypanosomiasis) are all destabilising factors that can erase the fragile victories of the past few decades.

Figure 2.6. Doctors and nursing personnel per 1,000 inhabitants Nursing

3.0

Doctors

2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5

ld

W or

Si

Ni ge L er ibe r ra ri Le a on e Be ni n Ch ad Bu rk To in go aF S e aso ne ga l Th e Mal Ga i m G bia M uin a e Cô urit a te an d' ia Iv Gu oir in e ea B Ca Gh . m an er a oo Ni n Ca ge pe ria Ve rd e

0.0 Increasing the number of health workers and strengthening their capacities are essential Source: WHO, World Health Statistics 2007 Highlights and Tables factors in controlling disease: according to estimates, West Africa has 0.12 doctor per 1,000 inhabitants on such as medicinal plants. If they could receive average, as compared to 2.3 in the United Kingdom, scientiﬁc support and training, traditional healers for example, or 5.9 in Cuba (a world record). In could be excellent health workers, and could also other words, on average, 1 doctor is available for contribute to information, education and commu8,300 inhabitants in West Africa, as compared to nication. Furthermore, the use of medicinal plants 1 for 435 in the United Kingdom. and other natural resources, if found effective, can have a positive impact on the population, not only In addition, there are wide regional disparities. 70% in terms of health care cost and accessibility, but of West Africa’s doctors are found in Nigeria alone, also in terms of community development and the which houses 45% of the region’s population. Cape protection of traditional knowledge. Verde enjoys by far the best position (1 doctor per 2,000 persons), whereas the situation in countries Access to sanitation and drinking water are also such as Niger, Liberia and Sierra Leone is critical essential factors. In Africa, only 60% of the total (less than 1 doctor per 33,300 inhabitants). Some population has access to drinking water (85% of the progress has been made in Cameroon and Senegal, urban population and 45% of the rural population), but the situation needs to be improved further. though a slight improvement has been recorded as compared to 1990, particularly in West Africa. Tradipractitioners (traditional healers) are still omnipresent and people use their ser-vices. In Diarrhoeic diseases, including cholera, cause Ghana, for instance, there is one tradipractitioner almost 800,000 deaths in Africa every year, of which per 200 inhabitants, whereas there is just 1 doctor 90% are children under the age of ﬁve. 88% of these per 20,000 inhabitants. Traditional treatments are diseases are caused by mismanaged water quality, cheaper and culturally closer to the population. inadequate sanitation and deﬁcient hygiene. The concern for providing high quality health care According to estimates, access to good quality water has led to the marginalisation of traditional healers could lead to a 30% fall in Africa’s morbidity rates. – even making them illegal. New movements have developed in an effort to correct this trend by Health: A regional and global concern promoting scientiﬁc research in traditional treatEvery country is responsible for providing minimum ment methods, as well as various natural resources, conditions for its people to develop and for creating

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governance. However, some activities need to be coordinated at the regional level, such as the eradication of diseases that can be prevented through vaccination (e.g. poliomyelitis, measles and yellow fever) or endemic disease control (onchocerciasis, trypanosomiasis) in order to ensure that the efforts deployed by one country are not cancelled out by its neighbouring country’s negligence. The production of generic drugs or other medical products also needs to be coordinated at the regional level. Finally, the ﬁght against global pandemics such as HIV/ AIDS, TB and malaria calls for international programmes, particularly for the establishment of trade agreements assuring access to reasonably priced medicines. Hence, health is both a regional and global concern.

Ch a Ni d ge Bu r rk M i n al aF i a Gu so in e M To a au g Si ri o e t Gu rra ani in Le a ea on Bi e ss Ni au ge L ria Ca ibe m ria er oo Be n S e nin ne g Ca Gh al a p n Th e V a e erd Ga e m bi a

0

Source: WHO, World Health Statistic 2007, Highlights and Tables 12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483114127562

an environment conducive to better health: infrastructure investments and good quality health staff in adequate numbers, drinking water and sanitation, a good educational system and good

Iv oi

20

d'

40

ld

60

te

80

W or

100

Cô

% of population using improved drinking water % of population with access to fundamental health facilities

re

Figure 2.7. Access to safe drinking water and sanitation

Glossary Bacillus thuringiensis var. Israelensis H-14 or Bti: a bacterium that produces a toxin fatal to insect larvae, but completely safe for humans and the environment. Health-adjusted life expectancy (HALE): the average number of years that a person can expect to live in full health. Incidence or incidence rate: the frequency of new cases. It represents the number of new disease cases per population at risk during a given time period. It is one of the indicators of morbidity. Infant mortality rate: the number of children dying under one year of age divided by the number of live births that year. Lethality: the ratio between the number of deaths due to a disease and the number of persons affected by this disease. Morbidity: the percentage of population exhibiting a certain injury or disease over a given time period (generally 1 year). Neem: a tree that has long been known for its anti-malaria properties. A decoction of its leaves or roots is used in malaria prevention and treatment. Prevalence: the percentage of persons affected by a certain disease at a given time in a given population. It is one of the indicators of morbidity.

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Sources and bibliography Awases, M., A. Gbary, J. Nyoni et R. Chatora (2004), Migration de professionnels de la santé dans six pays. Rapport de synthèse. OMS Brazzaville, 82 p. Basics II and the Ghana Health Service (2003), The Status of Referrals in Three Districts in Ghana: Analysis of Referral Pathways for Children Under Five. Published by the Basic Support for Institutionalizing Child Survival Project (Basics II) for the USAID. Arlington, Virginia, 69 p. Cornia Giovanni, A. (2001), “Globalization and health: results and options”, Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 79 (09), pp. 834-841. Fauci, A. S. (2006), Emerging and Re-emerging Infectious Diseases: The Perpetual Challenge. Milbank Memorial Fund. January. Garenne, M. and E. Gakusi (2006), Health transition in sub-Saharan Africa: Overview of mortality trends in children under 5 years old (1950-2000). Bulletin of the World Health Organisation, 84 (6), pp. 470-78. Gobbers, D. and É. Pichard (2000), “ L’organisation du système de santé en Afrique de l’Ouest : santé publique et pays pauvres ”, AdSP No 30, mars 2000, pp. 35-42. Mingat, A. (2004), L’ampleur des disparités sociales dans l’enseignement primaire en Afrique : sexe, localisation géographique et revenu familial dans le contexte de l’éducation pour tous (EPT). Banque Mondiale, Octobre 2004. Preker, A. (2004), Voluntary Health Insurance in Development. Review of Role in Africa Region and Other Selected Developing Country Experiences. World Bank, March 2004, 41 p. UNFPA (2003), Country Proﬁles for Population and Reproductive Health: Policy Developments and Indicators 2003. UNFPA, 92 p. World Health Organization (2002), Child Health Epidemiology Reference Group — Meeting Report. Child Health and Development, Department of Child and Adolescent Health and Development, La Mainaz Gex, France, March, 2002.

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Websites Centre de coopération internationale en santé et développement (CCISD)

www.ccisd.org

Conseil National de Lutte contre le Sida (CNLS)

www.cnls-senegal.org

Global Polio Eradication Initiative

www.polioeradication.org

Roll Back malaria (RBM)

www.rollbackmalaria.org

UNAIDS

www.unaids.org

UNICEF

www.unicef.org

World Health Organisation (WHO)

www.who.org

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Chapter 3. LANGUAGES Frédéric Ocrisse-Aka and Laurent Bossard (SWAC/OECD) Based on scientific contributions of Georg Ziegelmeyer, Erwin Ebermann, and Habiboulah Bakhoum (Department of African Studies, University of Vienna – Austria)

3.1. West Africa in the African linguistic landscape Linguists have identiﬁed 2,000 living languages on the African continent, grouped into four large families, excluding languages of non-African origin1 (see Map 3.1.).

The Afro-Asiatic family (353 living languages of which 299 are spoken in Africa, with a total of 340 million speakers) is not exclusively African. It also extends to the Arabic Peninsula, and covers only the northern part of West Africa. It includes Hausa which is the leading African language in terms of number of speakers.

Map 3.1. The major African language families

57

AFRO ASIATIC NILO SAHARAN KORDOFANIAN

ATLANTIC MANDE

GOUR

Origin of Bantu

KRU Historic migrations of Bantu

FAMILY NIGER CONGO BANTU Beti NILO-SAHARAN Songhai, Kanuri, Ngambay AFRO-ASIATIC Hassaniya, Arabic tchadian, Tuareg, Hausa KHOISAN

KWA

BENOUE CONGO

ADAMAWA

IGBOÏDE GROUP

LANGUAGES

ATLANTIC

Wolof, Fulah, Serer, Time

MANDE

Mandingo, Dan, Susu, Soninke

GOUR

Senoufo, Farefare, Dagbani, Dagaare, Gourmantche, Mossi

BANTU

Igbo Igala, Tiv, Ibibio, Anaang, BENOUE CONGO Yoruba, Edo, Nupe KRU Kpelle IGBOIDE

KWA

Akan, Gbe

KHOISAN

Source: SWAC/OECD

Created by: Frédéric Ocrisse-Aka

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The Nilo-Saharan family (197 living languages with 35 million speakers) covers part of the Sahara, the Upper Nile Basin and some East African highlands. It is made up of twelve language groups with only two of them located in West Africa: Songhai (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Benin) and Kanuri (Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad around Lake Chad). The Khoisan family (22 living languages with 360,000 speakers) is the smallest language family in Africa. It is concentrated in Namibia and extends to Angola, Botswana and South Africa. “In the past, Khoisan languages were spoken in most parts of Southern and Eastern Africa. They were progressively replaced in many places by Bantu and European languages”.

Out of the 2,000 living languages2 identiﬁed in Africa, 1,200 are spoken in West Africa. These languages are of very unequal importance. The 130 languages most spoken (with more than 200,000 speakers) represent more than 80% of the regional population i.e. 240 million people. And the ﬁrst ﬁve languages alone are spoken by 120 million people (see Figure 3.1.). Map 3.2. illustrates the 35 languages estimated to be spoken by more than one million people in 2005. In some cases, linguists and ethnologists recommend that several idioms, sometimes perceived as distinct languages but considered from the scientiﬁc point of view as dialects, should be grouped together under the label of one language; this is particularly the case with: ] Akan3 whose geographical area is located between Lake Volta in Ghana and River Bandama in Côte d’Ivoire. This language is divided into two groups of dialects: to the West, all of Agni – Baule, to the East all of Ashanti – Fanti4 – Abron. The total number of native speakers of the Akan language is estimated at more than 8 million people, including nearly 5 million for Ashanti – Fanti, a little more than two million for Baule, nearly one and a half million for Agni dialects, and one million for Abron. ] Gbe5 covers South-East Ghana (left bank of the Volta) and southern parts of Togo and Benin; the number of speakers is estimated at less than

Many experts believe that the birthplace of the Bantus is located south of the Benue (at the border between Cameroon and Nigeria). Four thousand years ago, the Bantus began a long migration toward Central Africa, certainly forced by climatic aridiﬁcation and development of agriculture and livestock which they rejected. This colonisation took nearly Figure 3.1. Number of languages and number of speakers three thousand years. The Bantus reached the South 1 to 5 of the continent only in the 16th and 17th centuries while 6 to 15 ﬂeeing the Masais coming from the Upper Nile Valley. Number of Languages 16 to 20 The numerous similarities Number of Speakers (in million) between the Bantu languages, 21 to 40 as well as their remarkable geographical extension make them a speciﬁc language area 41 to 130 very often distinguished from 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 the rest of the Niger-Congo Source: SWAC/OECD family. Languages ranked by number of speakers

58

The Niger-Congo family has nearly 1,500 living languages, which makes it the largest language family in the world (22% of languages on earth and 71% of African languages). It covers the largest part of West African territory, and concerns the immense majority of the population of the region. This language family is comprised of one group – the Bantu – which alone covers virtually all of Sub-equatorial Africa, excluding the Khoisan area.

3.2. West African diversity

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Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

Dan

Akan Accra

Gbe

Accra

Ashanti

m Lomé e

ng

Ad a

Abron

Abidjan

Baule Agni

Akan

Abidjan

Yamoussoukro

Kabiye

Abuja

Gbagyi

Kano

Fon Aja Ewé Porto Novo Lomé

Izon

Kanuri

Beti

Bamileke An Ibibio aa ng Douala Yaounde

Igbo

Eb Ig ira al Tiv a

Edo

Gbe

Porto Novo

Lagos

Yoruba

Nupe

Hausa

Ngambay

N‘Djamena

dian

Sources: SWAC/OECD - Vienna University - S.I.L. 2005

Created by: Frédéric Ocrisse-Aka

12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483143336405

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006

Hau Yoru Fula Igbo Man Akan Gbe Mos Kanu Song Wolo Tiv Hassa Mend Ibibi Seno Bet Tua Tim Bami Daga Ebira Izon Soni Anaa Dan Ser Igala Kpe Sus EdoArabic Nup Gour Ngam reg ne si ding nke ng leke are er lle ba h ufo i sa man bay ri u hai f niya e o tcha e o tche dian

Monrovia

Kpelle

Senoufo

Mossi

Niamey So Go ng ur ha m i Ouagadougou an tc he Farefare Dagaare

Fulah

Tuareg

POPULATION

0

5

10

Susu

Freetown Timne Mende

Conakry

Mandingo

Bamako

Soninke

Hassaniya and Tuareg

Da

15

Bissau

Hassaniya

Konyanka Malinke Maninkakan

Dyula

ni

a gb

20

25

30

Number of speakers in million 35

Banjul

Wolof Dakar Serer

Nouakchott

Maninka Mande

Maninkakan Bambara Kita Bamako Mandingo Western Maninkakan Mande

Mandingo

Banjul

Map 3.2. West African languages spoken by more than one million native speakers in 2005

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10 million people. For linguists, Gbe is a language of the Kwa group of which the main dialects are Ewe (about 3 million mainly in Togo and Ghana) followed by Fon (a little less than 2 million mainly in Benin) and Aja (1 million mainly in Benin). However, the speakers of these different dialects often perceive them as distinct languages. Here, it is difﬁcult to deﬁne the limits of a language continuum. ] Mandingo (literally: the language of Mali) is the fruit of the Mali Empire created in the 13th century by Sundjata Keita at the convergence of the Niger and the Bani rivers. Its empire and language subsequently extended to the west of Senegal, the Gambia and the North-East quarter of Guinea. The Mandingo area has 12 million speakers, with the main dialects being Bambara, Malinke, and Dyula. ] Fulah forms an ethnolinguistic arc stretching from the borders of Guinea to Cameroon. In French, the language and speakers are known as “Peul”. The distinction between Fulah and Pula(a)r is sometimes maintained to differentiate the varieties in the West from those in the East. It seems that the Fulahs originally came from an area located between East Senegal and West Mali. At the beginning of the 15th century, they reached Guinea and Massina (Inner Niger Delta) and then migrated towards the East, and particularly towards Nigeria where many of them settled. At the beginning of the 19th century, Usman dan Fodio led, in the name of Islam, the revolt of the Fulahs against the Hausa kings and established Sokoto Caliphate that brought together the Hausa cities and the Adamawa Emirates. However, “the Hausa culture remained dominant; the Fulah chiefs who became urbanites soon joined them. The Hausa language became the language of administration”. Today, out of the 25 million native speakers of Fulah, 10 million are in Nigeria, mainly in the Hausa North. The Fulahs are the majority in only one country: Guinea, where they account for 40% of the population. In addition to the groups described above, the following remarks need to be taken into account: ] The spatial extent of the original source of a language can be misleading if it is not linked

to the number of speakers. Accordingly, Hassaniya,6 which covers virtually all of Mauritania and a large part of Mali, has 3 million speakers; while Mossi has 8 million speakers concentrated on a geographical area 8 to 10 times smaller. ] The ﬁgures are in ascending order. An evaluation of the population of speakers of a language concerns the prime speakers or “native speakers” (mother tongue). Statistical data are collected at different times. Estimates of the actual number of speakers have been adjusted simply on the basis of the natural population growth of West Africa. The ﬁgure of 35 languages spoken by more than one million people is therefore relatively arbitrary since a number of languages below this level do not appear on the map. ] The ofﬁcial borders and administrative division introduce a visual bias: in a number of cases, the international borders coincide with the boundaries of the language areas, whereas such is never the case in reality. For example, the northern boundary of Soninke seems to be perfectly determined by the border between Mali and Mauritania. Obviously, there are a number of Soninke speakers in Mauritania (estimated at 30,000), but they are statistically hidden by Hassaniya speakers (2.9 million). ] Lastly, it is a picture at the macro-regional level, which cannot portray the extraordinary spatial overlapping of languages at the local level.

3.3. Lingua francas or common languages In the ethnolinguistic landscape presented in Map 3.2., most of the languages are spoken exclusively, or in the vast majority of cases, in one country. The most important include Igbo, Yoruba and Kanuri in Nigeria, Mossi in Burkina Faso, Wolof in Senegal, Hassaniya in Mauritania, Beti in Cameroon, and Songhai in Niger. This is also the case with most of the smaller languages in terms of number of speakers: Susu in Guinea, Mende and Timne in Sierra Leone, Ibibio, Tiv, Anaang, Ebira, Gbayi, Igala and Izon in Nigeria.

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Map 3.3. Common languages

Nouakchott

FULAH

Banjul

AI

GH

N SO

Dakar WOLOF

Niamey

Bamako

MANDINGO

Bissau

N‘Djamena

Ouagadougou Abuja

Conakry Freetown Yamoussoukro Monrovia

HAUSA

AKAN

YORUBA GBE

Porto Novo Lomé Abidjan Accra

Yaounde

Origin of language Extended area of language Overlaping area of language

Sources: SWAC/OECD - Vienna University - S.I.L. 2005

Created by: Frédéric Ocrisse-Aka

There are few West African languages with regional geographical scope. Fulah is spoken in 15 countries, while the Mandingo area covers ﬁve countries. Akan is the perennial link between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, just as Hausa and Kanuri link Nigeria and Niger, and Yoruba connects Nigeria and Benin. Linguists consider these six languages as lingua francas or common languages,7 in addition to Wolof and Songhai (see Map 3.3.). A number of important languages in terms of number of speakers do not appear on the list of common languages. This refers to Mossi, in particular, which is considered by the Burkinabes as a communication tool used beyond the Mossi group. Many testimonies show, for example, that it is easy to speak Mossi and be understood throughout Northern Ghana and even in Kumasi. Igbo poses the same type of problem. It is spoken as a second language by a large number of Nigerians, particularly in the Yoruba area in the western part of the country. The eight common languages selected here are described below in alphabetical order.

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006

Akan originates from Ghana (Ashanti Kingdom) where it is today the mother tongue of about 45% of the population. Kumasi It is largely used Yamoussoukro throughout the rest of Abidjan the country, especially Accra in the western part. Its geographical expansion started at the end of the 17th century when Ashanti tribes (the Agnis) immigrated to Côte d’Ivoire to ﬂee the slave hunters. At the beginning of the 18th century, it was the turn of another tribe - the Baules – to migrate to the West following a political split. The Baule Kingdom created by Queen Abla Pokou then extended Akan to Côte d’Ivoire. Fulah is a language of nomads, of which the speakers were subjects, then vectors, of the Islamisation of West Africa. It is a very particular common language. On the one hand, it has “hubs”

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the stronghold of Songhai; as well as in North Benin and, of course, in large Dakar city centres in South Nigeria. Today, it is Niamey Maradi Banjul Bamako N‘Djamena estimated that 50 to 60 million people Bissau Ouagadougou Kano know this language to various degrees. Conakry Several newspapers and many books Abuja Freetown are written in Hausa and many radio Monrovia Yaounde stations (African and international) broadcast in this language (BBC World Service, Voice of America, Deutsche Welle, China Radio International, Radio Moscow of native speakers in 15 West African countries. On and RFI). Furthermore, the Hausa video industry the other hand, the Fulahs are known for learning is ﬂourishing. It produces more than 1,000 ﬁlms the language of the populations in the areas in annually, and Hausa ﬁlm stars generate a lot which they settle. In Nigeria, Fulah cannot be of excitement from Kano to Niamey, and from considered as a “conquering” language, particularly Maiduguri to Lagos. in comparison to Hausa. The situation is reversed with the Adamawa language in Cameroon, where it is used by other ethnic groups. It is in the western part of West Africa that its vehicular nature is most Dakar evident. It is spoken in all parts of Guinea, and more Tambacounda Ségou Banjul marginally in the area bordering Guinea-Bissau, Bamako Liberia, Senegal and Sierra Leone.

Bissau

62

Gbe is a language continuum, in which the most geographically distant dialects are fairly different and can therefore make adougou understanding difﬁcult among themselves. The Kara Djougou Abuj Ewe dialect is used as a language of commuukro nication within the Porto Novo Lomé continuum, as well as Cotonou outside the area. Fon, Accra which can be understood by speakers of Ewe bordering the East, is spoken as a second language up to the town of Djougou in Benin, located more than 400 kilometres from the coast. It is therefore through a continuum that the entire Gbe is considered as a common language. Hausa is today spoken throughout Northern Nigeria, where it has Niamey Maradi more speakers than Kano gou Kanuri in Maiduguri and Fulah in Yola. Abuja Hausa is frequently spoken in Niamey, Lagos o

Kankan

Ouagadougou

Conakry Freetown Monrovia

Yamoussoukro Accra Abidjan

Mandingo is one of the largest common languages in West Africa, as it is spoken by more than 30 million people. A comparison with English fully illustrates its role as a regional reference language. The majority of the Malian population is ﬂuent in Bambara (compared here to standard English). 40% of the population of Burkina Faso is ﬂuent in Dyula, which also corresponds to standard English. More than 60% of the population of Côte d’Ivoire speaks “Ivorian Dyula” (compared to American English) as a second language. Nearly half of the population of Guinea and 15 % of Liberia and Sierra Leone speak Maninka, which could be compared to Caribbean English. About half of the Gambian population and one-ﬁfth of the population of Guinea-Bissau speak Mandinka, which could be compared to Nigerian English. One-ﬁfth of the population of Senegal is also ﬂuent in Mandingo dialects, which include varieties of Bambara (in the Tambacounda region)

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and most of the varieties of Mandingo of the West (especially Mandinka and Malinke of the West).

Songhai Empire in its glory

Dakar Banjul

Bamako

Bissau Conakry

Niamey Ouagadougou Abuja

Freetown

Porto Novo

Songhai plays an important vehicular role in West Niger, although it faces competition from Hausa, even in the capital, Niamey. Although it is a minority language in Mali, it is present on both sides of the Niger River, and more particularly in the Gao region. The Niger River is the backbone of this ethnolinguistic area, which takes its roots in the great Songhai Empire that, in its glory, covered an immense area extending up to Senegal. Zarma, the main dialect of Songhai, is mainly spoken in Niger, but it is also found as ﬁrst or second language in Nigeria and Burkina Faso. Another important dialect, Dendi, is concentrated in the northern part of Benin and south of Niger. Wolof is the de facto national language of Senegal. It is also spoken by the majority of Gambians and used on a smaller scale in Mauritania, Mali and Guinea-Bissau. Its expansion stems from its commercial dynamism and spiritual inﬂuence of Muslim Brotherhoods.8 The rapid urbanisation of regions in Cape Verde and Thiès – in the heart of Wolof country – plays an important role in the spreading of the language. An urban Wolof culture is developing, and a Wolof pidgin has Rosso been created and is widely used, Dakar Kayes especially among Banjul the youth. The increasing use Bissau of this urban Wolof in the Conakry economy, media, and

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advertising reﬂects and strengthens the emergence of a new legitimacy to the language. Yoruba is the common language of the South-East quadrant of Nigeria. Its historic centre is the City-State of Ife, which until the 12th century was the ﬂourishing capital of the Yorubas. Subsequently, the language spread, through expansion of the Kingdom of Benin, whose capital Abuja was the present day Ife Benin City. In Benin, Lagos Benin City about one and a Porto half million people Lomé Novo speak a variety of thiscra language.

3.4. Conclusions with respect to the regional integration process The ofﬁcial languages used in the ECOWAS Commission are English, French and Portuguese, which are also the ofﬁcial languages – by law or in practice – in the member countries. The only exception to this rule was Mauritania, which was an ECOWAS member until 2002 and where Arabic has been the ofﬁcial language since 1991. West Africa therefore seems to have an advantage over other regional zones which must manage the integration process with a great number of languages. For example, the European Union ofﬁcially recognises twenty-one languages which are used in high-level meetings (Ministers, Heads of Government), in all sessions of Parliament and, on the whole, all ofﬁcial texts must be translated. Even though European staff members work every day mainly in English and French, European multilingualism generates huge costs and makes procedures cumbersome. However, this comparison is not sufﬁcient. The twenty-one European languages are mother tongues for all the citizens of the Union; and any citizen or representative of the people has the right to express himself or communicate with the European institutions in his mother tongue. In West

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Table 3.1. Status of languages in ECOWAS member countries Official languages de jure

National languages

de facto

de jure

Benin

French

All the indigenous languages

Burkina Faso

French

Mossi, Dyula, Fulah

Cape Verde

Portuguese

Cape Verdean Creole

Côte d’Ivoire

French

The Gambia

English

Ghana

English

Guinea

French

Niger

French

Nigeria

Bambara All the indigenous languages

Hausa

Wolof, Serer, Dyula, Mandingo, Soninke, Fulah

Wolof

English* French

Sierra Leone Togo

Portuguese Creole

English

Mali

Senegal

Fulah, Mandingo Portuguese

Liberia

Mossi

All the indigenous languages

French

Guinea-Bissau

de facto

English French

Kabiye, Ewe

* The status of English in Nigeria is particular. In the 1999 Constitution, English was not proclaimed as the ofﬁcial language, but only as that of the National Assembly along with Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba. In practice, English is the ofﬁcial language and the laws continue to be written in English.

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Africa, English, French and Portuguese are used as mother tongues only by an elite. The regional level therefore fully reﬂects the national practices in which the colonial language is considered, de facto or de jure, as an ofﬁcial language. Nevertheless, all West African countries have adopted policies and attitudes that are favourable to national languages. Irrespective of whether they are adopted or not by the law, these languages are very frequently used, at least orally, in courts, political bodies and governments (see Table 3.1.). Taking into account West African languages in the regional integration process is not a problem at the institutional level; evidently keeping to the current three ofﬁcial languages is preferred. On the other hand, the issue needs to be considered from a more concrete and operational angle. “It is high time for our continent to make African languages the working languages in all aspects of public life. It is only by doing this that we will make our Regional Economic Communities real instruments of African integration, and the African Union a reality experienced by the people,

who will be rehabilitated and re-established in their identity and in the historical and cultural continuity of their areas. Consequently, common cross-border languages will strengthen exchange relations between the populations, beyond political borders, which should be considered, as we have always said, not as points of rupture but rather as suture points and lines of the African socio-cultural fabric, ripped and torn only 116 years ago, the suture lines of these border countries and villages of our continent in quest of unity.9” This exhortation by President Konaré of Mali, current Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, reminds us that transnational ethnolinguistic areas are tangible realities which could fearlessly support the West African regional integration process. The Senoufo area on the border of Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Burkina Faso, is also the home of the largest West African cotton basin, whose interests could be better defended through concerted management. The Hausa-Fulani area has a powerful urban network in Nigeria and considerable livestock development potential in Niger. The Soninkes, be they of Malian, Senegalese or

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Mauritanian nationality, constitute a united group, particularly through speciﬁc migration to France. The Fulah, Mandingo, Yoruba and other areas are zones of free movement, which need to be taken into account in the deﬁnition and implementation

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of regional policies. Lastly, on a smaller scale, West Africa proposes a multitude of small “crossborder areas” united by embedded social and linguistic links which could serve as basis for the development of local regional co-operation.

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

In alphabetical order: Afrikaans, Arabic, Creole, English, French, Malagasy, Pidgin and Spanish. A language is considered as living when it is spoken by at least one person. The word Akan originally refers to the inhabitants of Akwapem, Akem, Akwamu and Asante in Ghana. On the map, the Ashanti and Fanti dialects are combined. In terms of origin, the Fantis are mostly on the coast and the Ashantis farther inland. This language is also known as “Ewe,” which can be confusing being that one of the dialects also bears this name. In 1980, the 14th West African Languages Congress in Cotonou recommended the use of the word “Gbe” which means “language” in all the dialects concerned. Hassaniya is a language influenced by Arabic and highly tinged with Berber. Most African languages are learned as a first language, and consequently used as a means of communication within a group (vernacular languages). To communicate with a different ethnolinguistic group, another language must be learned (common language). More particularly that of the Mourides whose founder, Cheick Ahmadou Bamba, is considered as the spiritual son of Lawyer Majaxate Kala, translator of the Koran into Wolof. Alpha Oumar KONARE, former President of the Republic of Mali (Extract of Speech by the President of the Republic of Mali delivered on the occasion of the launching of the activities of the African Academy of Languages on 8 September 2001).

Sources and bibliography Breton, R. (2003), Atlas des langues du monde. Éditions Autrement. Paris, 80 p. Coquery-Vidrovitch, C., G. Laclavère (1988), Atlas historique de l’Afrique. Éditions du Jaguar. Cyffer, N. (2002), “The Lake Chad : a new Sprachbund boundary?” In R. Nicolaï & P. Zima (éds.), Lexical and Structural Diffusion. Interplay of Internal and External Factors of Language Development in the West African Sahel [= CORPUS, Les Cahiers 1], Nice, pp. 27-43. Ebermann, E. (2004), “Bambara, Mandenkan and the Mande Languages”. Encyclopedia of Linguistics. Ed. Philip Strazny. New York, Routledge. Gordon, R. (2005), Languages of the World, Fifteenth Edition. Ethnologue Dallas: SIL International. 1272 p. Lugan, B. (2001), Atlas historique de l’Afrique des origines à nos jours. Éditions du Rocher. Paris, 269 p. Nantet, B. (2006), Dictionnaire de l’Afrique, Histoire, Civilisation, Actualité. Larousse. 303 p. Perrot, J. (1981), Les langues dans le monde ancien et moderne ; Afrique subsaharienne. Éditions du CNRS, 691 p. Sellier, J. (2003), Atlas des peuples d’Afrique. Editions La Découverte, Paris. Smith, S. (2005), Atlas de l’Afrique. Éditions Autrement. Paris, 80 p. Ziegelmeyer, G. (2006), Thematic contribution to the Comprehensive Atlas on Regional Integration in West Africa. Department of African Studies de l’université de Vienne (Autriche). Ziegelmeyer, G., C. Baroin, G. Seidensticker-Brikay, K. Tijani, (2005), “Where languages meet — areal patterns of adverbial subordination”. In C. Baroin, G. Seidensticker, K. Tijani, (eds.), Man and the Lake. Maiduguri: Centre for Trans-Saharan Studies. Ziegelmeyer, G. (2005), Language use in Yola. Vorbereitung.

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Websites Académie Africaine des langues (ACALAN)

www.acalan.org/

Département linguistique de l’université de Laval

www.lli.ulaval.ca/

Ethnologue Languages of the World

www.ethnologue.com

Shippensburg University

www.ship.edu

Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL)

www.sil.org

The Linguist List

http://linguistlist.org/

The Rosetta Project

www.rosettaproject.org

The University of Texas at Austin

www.utexas.edu

UNESCO Culture

http://portal.unesco.org/education

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Chapter 4. MIGRATION Donata Gnisci and Marie Trémolières (SWAC/OECD) Based on a scientific contribution of Nelly Robin (IRD – Senegal)

35 million migrants currently residing there. Only three other members of the G7 are on the list of main immigrant recipient countries alongside developing countries which are nevertheless regional economic hubs (for example, Côte d’Ivoire in 14th position with 2.4 million migrants).

4.1. International migration overview: From the global level to the African level 4.1.1. Two hundred million migrants In 2005, there were 200 million migrants in the world, representing 3% of the global population. This ﬁgure is more than double that of 1970. The 1980s is marked by a sharp increase in migration (100 million migrants in 1980, 150 million in 1990). Since then, the growth rate has returned to the levels comparable to those of the 1960s and 1970s.

OECD countries, with wealthier economies and more afﬂuent lifestyles, receive a little less than half of the migrants identiﬁed in the world (97 million in 2000). 40% of these migrants come

67

Figure 4.1. The 15 major countries of immigration in 2000

The migration boom of the 1980s was due mainly to the dismemberment of the former Soviet Union and the development of mobility within the Asian continent (particularly to India). Currently, the host regions, in decreasing order, are: Asia (44 million), North America (41 million), Europe (33 million), the territories of the former Soviet Union (30 million), and Africa (16 million). More than half of the migrants are concentrated in 15 host countries. The United States tops the list as it was built on immigration, sometimes receiving several millions of people each year between the mid-19th century and the early 1920s.1 Despite the downward trend of movements, the USA remains an important host country,2 with about

% of population

Million

USA Russian Federation Germany Ukraine India France Canada Saudi Arabia Australia Pakistan United Kingdom Kazakstan Hong Kong Côte d'Ivoire Iran 0

5

10

Source: United Nations, 2003

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15

20

25

30

35

40

45

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Map 4.1. Number of migrants by continent in 1960 and 2000

EUROPE NORTH AMERICA

ASIA AFRICA

50

2000

WEST AFRICA

40 30

1960 15 12 9 6 3 0

20 10 0

Number of migrants (in million)

Percentage in 2000 Percentage in 1960

Asia

Africa

W.A.

Europe North America Percentage of migrants in total population © Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006

Sources: IOM and CMMI 2005

68 from other OECD countries. Migration is far from being oriented only from South to North.

4.1.2. African migration to developed countries African migration to developed countries is minimal. In 2004, there were 7.2 million ofﬁcially identiﬁed African migrants in OECD member countries, representing 13% of immigrants from non-member countries. They include 3.8 million North Africans and 3.4 million sub-Saharan Africans.3 Immigration is very concentrated whereas nine OECD countries are host to 90% of African expatriates.

In North America, African immigration is quantitatively high (1.2 million people), but low in comparison to other communities. For example, in 2000, there were 8 million Mexicans and 900,000 Africans in the United States; in Canada there were 300,000 Africans, 750,000 Chinese, and 150,000 Vietnamese.

In four European countries, African migration is sizeable without being the majority: ] While in The Netherlands, the three largest foreign communities (excluding developed countries) are from Surinam, Indonesia and Turkey (approximately 200,000 people from each country), the Moroccan community is considerable (150,000 people). ] In Spain there are twice as many South American communities as African communities, among whom Moroccans are the majority (310,000 people). ] In the United Kingdom, nationals from the Indian sub-continent (1 million) exceed those from the African continent (830,000). Three African communities each comprise about 100,000 people: South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria. ] Italy receives 1.3 million immigrants from developing countries. The largest immigrant community comes from the former Yugoslavia (200,000) followed by Morocco (155,000). Africans represent one-third of the immigrant community.

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Map 4.2. Number of migrants in Africa TUNISIA

MOROCCO ALGERIA

LIBYA

EGYPT

WESTERN SAHARA MAURITANIA

NIGER

MALI

CHAD

SENEGAL

ERITREA

SUDAN

THE GAMBIA BURKINA FASO BENIN TOGO SIERRA LEONE GHANA CÔTE D’IVOIRE LIBERIA

GUINEA BISSAU

GUINEA

DJIBOUTI NIGERIA ETHIOPIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REP.

SOMALIA

CAMEROON

EQUATORIAL CONGO GUINEA GABON

UGANDA KENYA

D.R. OF CONGO

RWANDA BURUNDI TANZANIA

BENIN

GUINEA

TOGO

SIERRA LEONE

ANGOLA

GHANA

MALAWI

LIBERIA

Number of migrants in million 2 and +

ZAMBIA

NAMIBIA

ZIMBABWE

MOZAMBIQUE MADAGASCAR

BOTSWANA

0.9 to 1.9 0 to 0.8 Percentage of migrants per country (%) 14.5 and +

SWAZILAND

7 to 14.5

SOUTH AFRICA

3.8 to 6.9 1.9 to 3.8 0.6 to 1.8 0 to 0.6 no avaible data Map produced in collaboration with N. Robin / IRD Dakar

Source: United Nations 2004

In three other European countries, more than 50% of immigrants from developing countries are Africans: ] In Belgium, the main immigrant community is from Morocco (100,000 people), followed by Turkey (70,000), and the Congo (DRC 40,000). ] In Portugal, immigrants originate mainly from the former colonies: Angola is predominant (175,000), followed by Mozambique (75,000), Cape Verde (45,000), and Guinea-Bissau (20,000). Apart from Africa, Brazil has the largest immigrant community with 50,000 people.

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006

] In France, Africans represent more than 75% of immigrants from developing countries. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia represent a total of 2.3 million people. sub-Saharan African communities are much less represented: Senegal (80,000), Madagascar (70,000), Côte d’Ivoire (45,000), and Mali (40,000). Turkey (180,000) and Vietnam (115,000) are the largest non-African communities. In 2000, there were ofﬁcially a few more than 100,000 Africans and more than one million Turks

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residing in Germany, an important country of immigration.

4.2. West African migratory dynamics 4.2.1. To OECD countries In the early 2000s, OECD countries ofﬁcially received 1.2 million West Africans. Despite the geographic proximity of Africa to Europe, North America is the main destination for West African nationals. This is mainly due to the immigration of Nigerians and nationals of other former English colonies. There is still a link between the former French colonies and their former colonizers; this also applies to Portugal and its former West African territories.

During the last quarter of the 20th century, new circumstances emerged that revived transSaharan trade and labour ﬂow to North Africa. The development of the petroleum sector in Libya and Algeria led to pendular migration of workers, mainly West Africans and Sudanese. After encouraging the immigration of North Africans to offset chronic labour shortage, the Libyan authorities forced many of them to leave in the mid-1980s. The country then opened up to subSaharans in the early 1990s. The economic crisis of 1995 led to another expulsion of 200,000 workers, half of whom were Sudanese. The establishment of

Though initially temporary and essentially unskilled and male, West African emigration became more sustainable as a result of family reuniﬁcation policies implemented by some Figure 4.2. Migration from West African countries European countries in the 1970s and to OECD countries in the 2000s 1980s. This was followed by new types Thousands of migrants: more women, students and 300,000 skilled people. With migration policies 250,000 in traditional host countries becoming more stringent, destinations began to 200,000 be more diversiﬁed in the early 1990s to Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain) and 150,000 North America (United States, Canada).

Togo Maur it ania Chad Burkin a Fas o Nige r

0

Mali S. Leo ne G . Bis sau Benin G uin ea The G ambia

50,000

Liber ia

a) Few West Africans are ofﬁcially in North Africa The links between West Africa and North Africa have long been based on the trans-Saharan caravan trade. The trade

100,000

ria G han a Sene gal Cape Verd e Côte d'Ivo ire Came roon

4.2.2. Labour and transit migration to North Africa

Nige

70

An analysis of the host countries of the 65,000 West African students in the university education system in OECD member countries supports this observation. While the majority of Francophones study in France (from 84% Senegalese to 52% Guineans), Anglophones prefer the United States (60% of Gambian students, 50% of other nationals of Anglophone countries).

was in gold, kola nuts, fabrics, copper, salt, ivory, European manufactured goods, and slaves. There were probably more than one million individuals involved in the trans-Saharan slave trade in the 19th century (Giri, 1994). The 20th century and colonisation witnessed the decline of trade along with population ﬂows. On one hand, human trafﬁc declined sharply at the end of the 19th century. On the other hand, the colonial powers promoted trade through the ports. As from the 1960s, the development of the agricultural frontier (Ofﬁce du Niger, Senegal’s groundnut basin, and the cocoa and coffee basin in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire) lured populations to the South.

Source: DELSA/OECD

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USA France United Kingdom Italy Portugal Canada Belgium Switzerland

351 1.1 288 12.0 176 0.2 82 0.8 68 0.0 41 0.4 14 0.4 12 0.2

Total 1,031 15 Source: DELSA/OECD Database 2004

rk in Ca a F as m o er Ca oon pe V Cô erd e te d Th 'Ivo i e Ga re m Gh bi an a a Gu in ea Gu in ea B Li be iss ria au M al i M au rit Ni a n i a ge r Ni ge ria Se ne ga l Si er ra Le Ch on ad e To go

Bu

n

ni

Be

W es

tA fr ic

a

Table 4.1. Major OECD host countries (excluding Germany) in the 2000s (in thousands)

0.7 12.4 27.1 7.6 4.7 36.0 12.4 45.2 0.1 3.2 0.3 2.8 2.5 2.3 3.3 7.2 0.0 0.1 44.9 0.1 0.4 2.4 0.3 1.9 0.4 2.4 0.4 1.4 0.2 2.5 1.2 1.1 9

61

90

67

6.0 1.0 3.9 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2

67.2 4.4 56.1 17.5 0.1 17.1 2.7 1.7

12 167

the Community of Saharan-Sahelian States in 1998 helped improve relations with sub-Saharan Africa. However, today Libya probably remains the North African country that receives most sub-Saharans (nearly 300,000 according to the 1995 census; certainly more today4). The census data obtained in the 2000s in other countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt) show a total of 20,000 West African migrants (Lahlou, 2004.). It is very difﬁcult to have a precise idea of the actual situation in view of the pendular, and often illegal, movements of the population. In recent years, it seems that sub-Saharan migration to North Africa has increased. These trends do not concern only “transit migration”. Some sub-Saharan migrants become established for long periods, while few of them go on to Europe (Bredeloup and Pliez, 2005). b) Understanding “Transit migration” Who are “transit migrants”? How many are there? The phenomenon is complex and changing. The surveys conducted and testimonies gathered indicate that it is neither the poorest nor the weakest who attempt this perilous adventure. They are mainly men, relatively young and capable of ﬁnancing a long, costly and physically painful journey. They are also relatively well-educated; many of them hold the equivalent of a GCE A level and above; few are illiterate. It is very difﬁcult to quantify these ﬂows. An annual ﬁgure of about 100,000 sub-Saharans is most often given for the 2000s. The routes through Libya, then Italy through Algeria and Morocco then

5.2 0.5 40.9 2.8 7.8 7.6 0.7 40.2 0.3 0.4 1.6 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 21.4 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.1 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2

2.2 9.6 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1

17

13

30

45

45

1.1 140.2 10.9 21.3 3.4 2.6 82.1 0.7 0.1 88.4 0.7 17.0 0.1 15.4 29.4 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.2 10.7 1.9 1.0 0.2 1.5 1.5 0.4 0.1 1.5 1.0 0.5 5

260 128

42

0.4 3.0 4.4 12.8 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 0.2 1.0 0.2 0.5 6

19

Spain, seem to represent the bulk of ﬂows to date (Lahlou, 2004). The number of those arrested in North Africa and on the European coasts is better known. In 2000, Spain arrested 3,500 West African migrants (7,000 today). The same year, Morocco5 announced the arrests of 3,000 West Africans and in Algeria 4,000 sub-Saharans were arrested. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that just over 4,000 Malians, Nigerians and Sudanese were arrested for illegal immigration in Libya in 2004. However, it seems that in 2000 arrests of sub-Saharans remained below those of emigrants from North Africa. The transit period is getting longer. More stringent control of European borders makes clandestine migration land routes longer and more treacherous. This leads to more or less temporary settlement of migrants for several years. This trend is conﬁrmed by speciﬁc observations. Accordingly, the link town of Tamanrasset in South Algeria increased from 3,000 inhabitants in 1966, including 10% sub-Saharans, to 65,000, including 50% sub-Saharans, at end of 1990 (Lahlou, 2004). Similarly, in 2005 the port town of Nouadhibou in North Mauritania has 10,000 West Africans who want to emigrate to Europe, representing 10% of its population. Morocco estimated, for the same year, that there were 20,000 sub-Saharans around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla as well as the border town of Oujda6 at the Algerian border. This migration generates a transit economy in the major link towns (hotel trade, itinerant trading, transport, but also prostitution). Human trafﬁcking is developing on former trans-Saharan salt trade routes. On these migration routes, mutual aid

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Map 4.3. Major host countries in Europe in 1993

1993 North Sea

UNITED KINGDOM THE NETHERLANDS 167,000 202,000

Atlantic Ocean

BELGIUM 179,000

GERMANY 333,000

FRANCE 1,616,000

72

PORTUGAL 52,000

Number of African migrants

ITALY 285,000

SPAIN 71,000 Mediterranean Sea

71,000

North African West African Other sub-Saharan Source: IRD Dakar 1996

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006

and religious structures, as well as associations (Bredeloup and Pliez, 2005), operate in the presence of smugglers, document forgers, as well as law enforcement. Some migrants also attempt to go by sea (canoes from Mauritania and Senegal to the Canary Islands).

increases rapidly that the need to change from one environment to another (from urban to rural areas, from poor to rich areas) is greatest. West Africa,7 like the whole of sub-Saharan Africa, is at the core of this transition and mobility phase, which other developing regions have already experienced.

4.2.3. Intra-regional migration

Over the past 45 years, the number of inhabitants in West Africa increased from 88 million to 290 million (that is, multiplied by 3.3) while the urban population increased from 13 million to 128 million (that is, an increase of 10-fold). Over the same period, it is estimated that more than

a) A territory of extreme mobility World history shows that demographic transition corresponds to a period of great population mobility. Indeed, it is when the population

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Map 4.4. Major host countries in Europe in 2000

2000 North Sea

UNITED KINGDOM 831,000 THE NETHERLANDS 275,000

Atlantic Ocean

GERMANY 85,000 BELGIUM 245,000 FRANCE 2,850,000

73 PORTUGAL 350,000

ITALY 439,000

SPAIN 406,000 Number of African migrants North African

245,000

Mediterranean Sea

West African Other sub-Saharan Data gathered for all African regions (Germany) Source: DELSA/OECD 2005

80 million West Africans migrated from rural to urban areas. Urbanisation was the ﬁrst result of mobility of the West African population, even though urbanisation is no longer one of the major reasons for mobility.8 Quantitative estimates of intra-regional migration are more random. Calculations based on population censuses indicate that countries of the region currently host about 7.5 million migrants (Migration Policy Institute, 2000) from another West African country, representing 3% of the regional population. This rate, which has been increasing since 1990, is

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006

above the African average (2%) and largely exceeds that of the European Union (0.5%). Furthermore, it should be noted that these evaluations of migrant populations do not adequately portray the reality of the ﬂows. The movements were seriously studied only for the 1976–1980 (World Bank, 1990) and 1988–19929 periods during which between 500,000 and 1 million people moved from one country to another each year. The West African Long-term Perspective Study –WALTPS– (Club du Sahel/OECD, 1998) estimates that nearly 30 million West Africans changed country of residence between 1960 and 1990, representing an average of one million people

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each year. Despite statistical uncertainties, West Africa therefore appears as an area of intense intermixing of populations.

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A spatial analysis over a long period shows that, to date, most migration is to coastal areas, as a result of the development of cash crops, port urbanisation and degradation of the natural environment in the region’s Sahelian areas. This migration responds to the need to seek economic opportunities and diversify risk and poverty reduction strategies.

consist more of seasonal male workers. At the same time, the development of transport infrastructure (particularly the railway) enables and encourages individual mobility over long distances. Many links were established between the areas of origin and the host countries. Furthermore, neither colonisation nor independence had any signiﬁcant impact on the high mobility within traditional socio-cultural areas, such as the Hausa Kanuri area, the Fulani area (from Lake Chad to Futa Djalon), the Mande area, etc.

While mobility is a lifestyle initially linked to nomadism, colonisation gave rise to new types of movements, mainly reﬂecting the agricultural ambitions of the colonizers. Forced recruitment led to the migration of entire families, particularly from Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) and Guinea, to the Ofﬁce du Niger in Mali, and from Sahelian countries to the cocoa and coffee plantations in Ghana and forestry industries in Côte d’Ivoire. The movements from Mali and Guinea to groundnut production areas in Senegal and the Gambia

Following independence, for a decade Ghana became the main regional immigration pole particularly because of its cocoa and gold. This period ended with the Alliance Compliance Order (1969) and expulsion of several hundred thousand immigrants. Over the long term, the “epidermic” reactions to migration (rejection and/or expulsion of “foreigners”) do not seem to have sustainably constrained the structural trend of regional mobility.

Box 4.1. Skilled migration opportunities: Ghanaian doctors at the bedside of English and American patients The British Medical Journal estimates that between 1993 and 2002, 410 pharmacists, 630 doctors, 87 laboratory technicians and 11,325 Ghanaian nurses went to the United Kingdom. This trend seems to be growing. Out of 3,000 doctors trained in Ghana, half of them are abroad (the United Kingdom for doctors and the United States for nurses). However, a number of the Ghanaian doctors occupy under-qualiÀed positions in British medical services. Retired doctors, who return to Ghana, open private medical practices and ignore public institutions. The results of a survey among medical students show that 65% of them want to leave the country. Dialogue recently took place between Ghana and the United Kingdom on the feasibility of a visa granting authorisation to some professionals for circular migration involving temporary return to their countries of origin for highly specialised operations or staff training. This would offset the country’s lack of medical staff. Furthermore, there are Cuban professionals in Ghanaian institutions. Source: Interview with ISSER Experts, Legon University, Accra, Ghana

Figure 4.3. Proportion of migrants in West African countries (in %) 2000

1990

Côte d'Ivoire The Gambia Burkina Faso Guinea Liberia Togo Ghana Senegal Mauritania Cape Verde Benin Guinea Bissau Sierra Leone Niger Cameroon Nigeria Chad Mali % 0

4

8

12

16

Source: Migration Policy Institute, 2000

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From the 1970s, three migratory sub-systems guided regional movements: the Ghana–Côte d’Ivoire pole mainly because of the cocoa and coffee economy, and Nigeria and its petroleum godsend, as well as Senegal because of trade and groundnuts. Within this context, movements were, however, irregular. In a short period, they could change or reverse. This illustrates the remarkable capacity of the regional population to adapt. The case of Côte d’Ivoire is a good example: ] 1975 to 1978 was a period of an economic boom. Between 1975 and 1977, coffee and cocoa prices tripled. Producer prices increased sharply. State revenue and public investment programmes exploded. Stimulated by demand, private investments increased at an average annual rate of 19%. From 1976 to 1980, the net migration of Côte d’Ivoire was +1.3 million people, including 700,000 from Burkina Faso, 300,000 from Mali and 100,000 from Guinea (World Bank, 1990). The “settlement boom” therefore followed the “economic boom”. ] 1986 to 1993 was marked by recession. From 1981 to 1993, there were successive phases of adjustment marked by the downward trend of private investment and a sharp decline in public investment. A new reversal of the terms of trade in 1986 (-20%), which continued until 1993, plunged the country into economic crisis, which affected migratory movements (reduction and reorientation of movements). ] The 1998 census showed that up to 4 million foreign nationals lived in Côte d’Ivoire out of a total population of 16 million. Since the outbreak of the crisis in 1999, it has been more difﬁcult to estimate. However, it is too early to talk of a structural change in intra-regional economic migration. Between 1970 and 1980, the Nigerian economy was inﬂuenced by the oil boom. Oil revenue was invested in trade, services, and industry, attracting skilled and unskilled labour. In 1983, the country had 2.5 million West African immigrants, 81% of whom were from Ghana, 12% from Niger and 3% from Togo and Benin. In the mid-1980s, the economic recession led to the expulsion of irregular migrants, who would subsequently return. After

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polarising West African migration for more than one decade, Nigeria itself became a country of emigration towards the outside world. In Senegal, migratory movements came from neighbouring countries (Cape Verde, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Mauritania) and from the Gulf of Benin (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Togo). The ﬁrst foreign community was from Guinea (from 300,000 to 47,000 people between 1970 and 1997). The Guineans are active in wholesale and retail trade, as well as in urban transport and laundry. Other communities are also involved in the urban economy. Furthermore, Senegalese emigration is historically linked to the movement of skilled labour in the francophone zone during the colonial period, particularly to Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Gabon. The political and economic instability of traditional host countries explains, among other things, the circular nature of this migration. At the moment, Senegalese emigrants are turning increasingly to new African destinations (Cameroon, Angola, Congo, and South Africa) or international destinations. Nowadays, the three sub-systems continue to attract West African migration. However, their role has changed. Côte d’Ivoire has become a transit country, a stepping stone for wealth accumulation before proceeding to other regional or international destinations. Economic or labour reasons guide migration to or out of Senegal, playing a double role of country of immigration or emigration. Nigeria is a transit zone, where human trafﬁcking networks are organised, in particular. The existence of employment and production areas was at ﬁrst enough to satisfy this intra-African circular mobility. This mobility henceforth opens up to other areas in search for new opportunities. b) Refugees remain primarily in the region Since independence, there have been successive tensions in West Africa, in particular: the Biafran war in Nigeria from 1967 to 1970, the elimination of the political opposition leaders of the Sékou Touré regime in Guinea, the liberation struggle in GuineaBissau from 1963 to 1973, border tensions between Senegal and Mauritania in 1989, the Chadian crisis

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from 1982 to 1990, the Tuareg conﬂict in Mali and Niger from 1990 to 1997, conﬂicts in the Mano River countries from 1989 to 2000 and, more recently, the crises in Côte d’Ivoire and Sudan. These episodes generate more or less a massive exodus within the countries concerned (internally displaced) and abroad (refugees).10

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Africa is the continent which receives the highest number of refugees in the world: 2.7 million.11 After Central Africa, West Africa was the second region of asylum on the continent in 2004 with 725,000 refugees. This ﬁgure does not take into account the numerous daily cross-border movements of people going back and forth between their work place and the refugee camps along the borders, rest areas for the night. From one year to another, statistics vary signiﬁcantly. In the 1990s, Guinea received refugees ﬂeeing from neighbouring Liberia, and then from Sierra Leone. Over the same period, Côte d’Ivoire received a large number of Liberian nationals who were then forced to go to Ghana in 2002. In 2005, Chad received 225,000 Sudanese. Since the movements of West African refugees were the result of poor people ﬂeeing emergency situations, they mainly ﬂed to neighbouring countries, in particular the nearest border countries. Few people had the means to seek asylum in developed countries. Experience shows that the desire to return is very strong (nearly 600,000 Liberians returned to their country in 2004). The longer the exile, the more refugees become involved in local economic activities, establish social relations and settle in the host area or country. These populations, some of whom lose their refugee status over time, then become migrants.

4.3. Some issues for the future 4.3.1. Emigration to counterbalance population decline in Europe? Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, is a continent with a rapidly growing population. Though half as populated as Europe12 in 1960, it now has 1.2 times the number of inhabitants. In 25 years, it will be twice as populated as the European continent. Africa’s youth population is also signiﬁcant. In 2005,

60% of the sub-Saharan population was below 25 years of age as compared to 30% in Europe. On the contrary, many developed countries are in the process of depopulating. The European Union is no exception. According to Eurostat, no EU member country (apart from Ireland) attained the fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman required for rejuvenating the population. With zero immigration, the EU would lose 3% of its population, or 15 million inhabitants, by the year 2030.13 The United Nations has proposed projections taking into account immigration rates comparable to those of today. These calculations show that while the EU population will increase by 1.5% in 2030 (an increase of 8 million inhabitants), this would not prevent Italy from losing 2.6 million inhabitants; Poland would lose 2.3 million, and Germany 1.2 million, etc. Some countries, such as Ireland, Great Britain and France, are the exceptions. However, for all countries, the ageing of the population could make it difﬁcult to maintain the working population at an acceptable level. Some scenarios are alarming. Accordingly, the EU with 25 countries could lose 48 million of its working population between 2020 and 2050.14 This median scenario indicates that the EU's potential working population would decrease after 2015. The replacement index for the working population would fall from the current 1.1 to 0.76 in 2020. In view of these prospects, the European Union met in Lisbon in 200015 and began a process by which it would capitalise, to the greatest extent, on the potential active population of member countries. The countries set the target employment rate at 70% of the working age population in 2010. The mid-term review of the Lisbon strategy shows that these targets would not be attained in many member countries. In order to offset the shortage of labour estimated at 13 million and attain the targets of 2010, the entry of 43 million migrants would be necessary (Feld, 2004). While debate by experts is not over on the exact level of European labour requirements, it is now generally accepted that Europe will have to meet the challenge of a declining population and the need for a working population coming from abroad.

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Maps 4.5. and 4.6. Major West African countries of immigration (1976–1980 and 1988–1992)

1976 - 1980

MAURITANIA MALI

NIGER

SENEGAL

CHAD

THE GAMBIA

BURKINA FASO

GUINEA BISSAU GUINEA

BENIN TOGO GHANA

SIERRA LEONE

NIGERIA

CÔTE D’IVOIRE

LIBERIA

CAMEROON CAPE VERDE

77

Source: World Bank, 1990

Migrant destination country (migratory balance >100,000) Migrant origin country (migratory balance > -18,000) Zero-balance migratory countries Country not included in this survey

67

Migratory flows > to 20,000 Migratory flows < to 20,000

24

Number of migrants (x 1,000)

1988 - 1992

MAURITANIA MALI

31

NIGER

32

SENEGAL

CHAD

THE GAMBIA 37

GUINEA BISSAU 38

BURKINA FASO

117

GUINEA

166

383

BENIN

380

SIERRA LEONE 38

LIBERIA

CÔTE D’IVOIRE

47

TOGO

NIGERIA

GHANA 67

24

CAMEROON CAPE VERDE Source: Corrected survey of REMUAO/CILSS/CERPOD 1996

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Map 4.7. Movements by West African refugees in 2005 Refugees per host country (number) more than 130,000 from 50,000 to 100,000 rom 20,000 to 50,000 less than 20,000

MOROCCO CANARY ISLANDS (Spain)

LIBYA ALGERIA

Flows of refugees from origin country (in thousands) WESTERN SAHARA

6

MAURITANIA 20

MALI

NIGER

SENEGAL 0,5

THE GAMBIA

225 SUDAN

4

GUINEA BISSAU

SIERRA LEONE

To U.S.A.

39

BENIN

25

14

7

10

GHANA CÔTE D’IVOIRE LIBERIA 0,5

TOGO

6

BURKINA FASO

GUINEA

5

NIGERIA 30

1

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

17

20

CAMEROON

78 6

CAPE VERDE Liberian refugee flows

D.R. OF CONGO

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

To Germany

GABON

Source: HCR 2006

CONGO

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006

GUINEA SIERRA LEONE

150

CÔTE D’IVOIRE GHANA

74 61

LIBERIA

To U.S.A.

42,5

20

4.3.2. A new geography of migration In light of demographic challenges, many factors will determine the geography of world and African migration in coming decades. These shall include economic growth in developed countries, emerging countries, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, increased exploitation of West African oil resources (Nigeria, Chad, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, etc.) and its economic and ﬁnancial impacts, the trend of commodity prices, world geo-strategic relations and risks of instability.

Within this context of major uncertainties, it seems that some trends will continue. The ﬁrst trend concerns the increase in international labour migration, the consequence of economic globalisation and trade development. Unless exceptional circumstances arise, the growth recorded over the past ﬁve decades should continue. The United Nations suggests that the number of international migrants to developed countries should reach 2.2 million per year over the 2005–2050 period. This ﬁgure represents only 4% increase in the population of developing countries over the same period. The second trend reinforces the ﬁrst. It indicates that migration policies of developed countries are geared towards selective migration which will nevertheless increase because of problems of demographic recession.

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The third trend is that of high mobility in Africa, and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, due to very high demographic growth. This mobility will, as in the past, lead to internal, regional and international movements. Despite these trends, the changing nature of migration throughout history makes it very difﬁcult to propose any forecasts, and also raises a few questions. How will West Africa participate in migration to developed countries? Will West Africans ﬁnd new host countries in Europe,16 America, and even Asia? What will be the relationship between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa? What is the future of mobility within the West African region? a) The relationships between West Africa, North Africa and Europe A number of factors link North Africa to Europe. In the seven European countries in which there is high African immigration (Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and United Kingdom), North African nationals are by far the highest in population, except in the United Kingdom. The Moroccan migrant communities are dominant in Italy, Belgium, Spain, and, to a lesser extent, in France and the Netherlands. Today, 5% of the population of Morocco lives in Europe. Algeria and Tunisia have historic migration links with France. The geographic proximity of Europe to North Africa is strengthened even conﬁrmed by “migratory proximity”: the three large European countries bordering the Mediterranean (Spain, France and Italy) are the major host countries. This double proximity calls for dialogue. Four considerations should be taken into account: ] North Africa has a reservoir of highly skilled labour. In Morocco, 75% of unemployed women have university degrees, and students with higher education wait for between one and three years to obtain their ﬁrst job. ] North Africa is an important economic area for Europe (particularly for its energy supply, as well as for the solvent market it represents). ] The demographic pressure in North Africa is less than that of sub-Saharan Africa.

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] A recent phenomenon, which could become signiﬁcant, is developing. Retired Europeans are expatriating to the southern Mediterranean coasts in search of more pleasant and less expensive living conditions. Several tens of thousands of French nationals have already settled in Tunisia and Morocco. Europe considers North Africa a close neighbour and partner. Indeed, Europe could encourage North Africa to provide help in exchange for compensation and protection from clandestine sub-Saharan immigration. This is in line with Community initiatives (Barcelona Declaration to establish a global European–Mediterranean partnership), bilateral initiatives (Spanish aid to Morocco and Italian aid to Libya for border surveillance) or multilateral initiatives (5+5 Forum associating North African countries and the ﬁve Mediterranean European countries).17 European–Mediterranean dialogue therefore seems to be well on track. On the other hand, there is little co-operation on migration and development between Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. For the moment, it is limited to bilateral discussions between a European country and an African country (Spain – Senegal, Spain – Mauritania, France – Mali, France – Senegal, etc.) for the implementation of more effective methods of limiting departures or incentives for the return of migrants in exchange for compensation. These bilateral approaches certainly have their limits. Clandestine emigration has become difﬁcult through one country to another: from North Africa to Mauritania, then to Senegal and Guinea. New routes could develop through Egypt and the Red Sea. Furthermore, implemented bilateral measures are not coordinated and could lead to misunderstandings between West African countries. A bloc-to-bloc dialogue between the European Union and West Africa is probably a logical option, knowing that the EU and ECOWAS, joined by Mauritania, have embarked on the implementation of an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) which envisages, in the short-term, the creation of a free trade area between the two entities. Lastly, a tripartite European–Mediterranean–West African dialogue is also needed as a logical and

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Map 4.8. Population decline and growth in Europe and Africa

FINLAND NORWAY UNITED KINGDOM

Evolution of the population Very rapidly increasing (x2 or + up to2030) Rapidly increasing (x1.5 to 2 up to 2030) Increasing (x1.3 to 1.5 up to 2030) Slowly increasing (x1.1 to 1.3 up to 2030) Stable (x1 to 1.1 up to 2030) Decreasing up to 2030

IRELAND

ESTONIA SWEDEN LATVIA LITHUANIA

THE NETHER LANDS

BELGIUM FRANCE

POLAND GERMANY CZECH SLOVAKIA REPUBLIC HUNGARY AUSTRIA

ITALY

SPAIN

GREECE

PORTUGAL

CYPRUS CRETE

MALTA CANARY ISLANDS (Spain)

TUNISIA

MOROCCO

ALGERIA

LIBYA EGYPT

WESTERN SAHARA

MAURITANIA CAPE VERDE

MALI NIGER SENEGAL CHAD THE GAMBIA BURKINA FASO SUDAN GUINEA BISSAU GUINEA BENIN GHANA SIERRA NIGERIA CÔTE LEONE CENTRAL AFRICAN D'IVOIRE REPUBLIC LIBERIA CAMEROON

DJIBOUTI SOMALIA ETHIOPIA

TOGO

80

ERITREA

UGANDA

EQUATORIALE CONGO GUINEA GABON

KENYA RWANDA BURUNDI

D.R. OF CONGO

Evolution of the population (statistics and projections)

TANZANIA

2,000

ANGOLA

1,600

Africa

ZIMBABWE

1,000

400

OZ

M

NAMIBIA

800 600

E

QU

BI

AM

BOTSWANA

Europe

AR

1,200

MALAWI ZAMBIA

DA GA SC

1,400

MA

Million of inhabitants

1,800

SWAZILAND

200

19

50 19 55 19 60 19 65 19 70 19 75 19 80 19 85 19 90 19 95 20 00 20 05 20 10 20 15 20 20 20 25 20 30 20 35 20 40 20 45 20 50

0

Source: United Nations, 2004

LESOTHO SOUTH AFRICA

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006

necessary prospect, since it would help bring together, around the same table, the emigration countries of West Africa, emigration and transit countries of the same region (Senegal, Mauritania, in particular) as well as emigration and transit countries of North Africa.

b) What does the future hold for regional mobility? West African human geography has evolved signiﬁcantly over the past few decades. Mobility has led to a network of towns that did not exist in 1960, populated empty regions, and drawn the Sahelian fringes closest to the desert to

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the South. Intra-regional migration and urbanisation, in particular, have played a key role in the reconstruction of settlements. While there has always been human mobility in West Africa, some migration has been forced during political or economic tensions: expulsions in Côte d’Ivoire (1964), Ghana (1969), Nigeria (1983 and 1985), Mauritania and Senegal (1989), Benin in 1998, or more or less massive ﬂeeing of populations that feel threatened (Côte d’Ivoire since end 1999). A number of bilateral agreements have been signed between countries of origin and host countries: Burkina Faso – Mali in 1963, Togo – Mauritania in 1965 or Burkina Faso – Côte d’Ivoire in 1990. It is difﬁcult to conclude that these events have had limiting impacts on intra-regional migration since such migration continues to develop. Despite these tensions, intra-regional migration has played a beneﬁcial regulating role for departure

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areas as well as for the host areas. There is consensus that the “Ivorian miracle” of the 1980s owes much to the inﬂow of Sahelian labour to the cocoa and coffee plantations in the south of the country. Similarly, it is very likely that the central plateau of Burkina Faso would have found it difﬁcult to sustain a fast growing population on steadily deteriorating land. If there had not been any urbanisation or migration since 1960, Burkina Faso would have had a rural population of 15 million inhabitants instead of the current 6 million. Migration strategies respond to the search for economic opportunities, and can adapt to markets by diversifying destinations or activities. While the freedom of movement reduces social and demographic pressure in the areas of departure, it “limits the propensity of migrants to settle permanently in host areas” (Ouedraogo, 2002) of the region or abroad.

Map 4.9. West African migration to Europe and the United States in 2000

MAURITANIA

MALI

NIGER

SENEGAL CAPE VERDE THE GAMBIA Migratory flows to U.S.A. to Europe Number of migrants 7,740 4,560

GUINEA BISSAU

BURKINA FASO GUINEA

BENIN NIGERIA

SIERRA LEONE

TOGO LIBERIA

CÔTE D’IVOIRE

GHANA

2,050 580 20 Source: United Nations, 2004

Map produced in collaboration with N. Robin / IRD Dakar

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Map 4.10. Maghreb and West African migration

FRANCE

Maghreb migration

ITALY

West African migration SPAIN PORTUGAL 3.35 million in Europe Atlantic Ocean

TUNISIA MOROCCO

CANARY ISLANDS (Spain)

Intra-regional migration 1.03 million

ALGERIA

WESTERN SAHARA

0.39 million in North America

MAURITANIA MALI

CAPE VERDE

82

Intra-regional migration 7.50 million

SENEGAL THE GAMBIA GUINEA BISSAU

BURKINA FASO

GUINEA SIERRA LEONE LIBERIA

NIGER CHAD

BENIN

TOGO

0.21 million in North America

0.77 million in Europe

NIGERIA

GHANA CÔTE D'IVOIRE

CAMEROON Gulf of Guinea Sources: DELSA-OECD/Migration Policy Institute, 2000

4.4. What are the prospects? In 1979, ECOWAS member States adopted the Protocol on Free Movement, the Right of Residence and Establishment.18 These provisions partially entered into force in 1980. In particular, an ECOWAS passport was introduced,19 with an identity card that is still sufﬁcient for UEMOA nationals. The ECOWAS zone, despite the persistence of petty annoyances, is institutionally becoming a zone of free movement. Migration takes place mainly by land, over more than 15,000 km of borders between ECOWAS countries and of which there is an additional to 8,500 km between these countries

EQUATORIAL GUINEA © Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006

and their neighbours, namely Mauritania, North Africa, Chad and Cameroon. These borders do not correspond to the transnational socio-cultural areas within which mobility is so natural that it is difﬁcult to imagine that it can be forced. For example, the Hausa zone has 30 million people in North Nigeria and Niger, and the Mande zone has 15 million people in Senegal, Mali, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire. Furthermore, it is expected that demographic pressure will continue in the future. Average projections by the United Nations indicate that the population of Niger could reach 50 million in 2050,

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that of Mali and Burkina Faso 40 million, and that of Côte d’Ivoire 34 million. Is the vision of a Sahel more densely populated than the coast realistic, and under what conditions? Can we imagine that this new (and last) phase of demographic transition in West Africa will not be accompanied by a spatial reconstruction of population distribution? How can we respond to the need for mobility of a population with 60% of people under 25 years of age? What will be the roles of urbanisation, intra-national mobility, as well as regional and international migration within this reconstruction? Will the future host areas necessarily be the same as those of today? In West Africa are there any areas with signiﬁcant agricultural potential, relatively low rural population densities and growing towns likely to offer opportunities and services to the rural areas? The areas eradicated from onchocercosis20 covering 850,000 km² amply meet this proﬁle. Being on the borders of Sahel countries and the Gulf of Benin, their populations are currently growing relatively rapidly. Their development requires a regional approach which alone will better optimise their hosting and development potential. Furthermore, is it possible to better promote the rapid development of the network of secondary towns in the region by making each of them a local pole of urbanisation and development? Is the varying “population” sufﬁciently present in the development programmes of the large regional river basins?

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Box 4.2. Will measures to restrict immigration to developed countries have any impact on mobility within the West African region? The case of Senegal For some time now, the authorities of Dakar airport (one of the busiest airports in the region with Áights to Europe, North America and Middle East) are required to ensure that travellers transiting to Paris have airport transit visas issued by French Consulates; this requirement is based on a bilateral agreement between France and Senegal. Furthermore, Senegal is required to comply with the texts of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and in particular with Annex 9 of the Chicago Convention which stipulates that “operators shall take precautions at the point of embarkation to ensure that passengers are in possession of the documents prescribed by the States of transit and destination for control purposes” (Eleventh Edition, July 2002, ICAO). The problem lies less in airport control itself than in the fact that movement within the ECOWAS zone is free and requires no visa. In other words, Gambian and Guinean nationals can enter freely into Senegal and be sent back from Dakar airport by the Senegalese authorities if they attempt to board a plane for Europe or North America without the documents required by the country of destination. Do decisions such as the institution of airport transit visas not run the risk of putting some West African countries in an awkward position as regards the integrated region to which they belong? Is there not the fear that the increasingly restrictive measures of the North will inÁuence mobility, which has been defended for a long time by the ECOWAS treaties? Source: IRD 2006

Box 4.3. Migrant remittances and ODA in West Africa per capita in 1995 (in dollars) Average years 90 Benin Burkina Faso Cameroon Cape Verde Côte d’Ivoire The Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Liberia Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone Chad Togo

Remittances 18 10 1 205 8 n.a. 1 0.4 2 n.a. 11 5 1 8 15 n.a. 0.2 5

Source: World Bank and OECD

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ODA 47 42 40 312 62 60 37 55 112 41 46 105 35 2 73 33 36 41

2004 Remittances 7 3 0.7 186 8 5 4 5 15 n.a. 12 0.7 2 18 45 5 n.a. 25

ODA 7 3 47 282 8.5 42 65 30 50.8 66 43 60 40 4 96 68 34 10

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The best strategy for West African countries to meet the needs of mobility of the population and progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals deﬁned by the United Nations would likely be dynamic action towards regional territorial development, development of new economic centres, and ﬁnancing of infrastructure.

Could this strategy be incorporated in the implementation framework of the EU/ECOWASMauritania Economic Partnership Agreement? In the negotiation mandate provided by the Heads of State of the region to ECOWAS in collaboration with the UEMOA, support for the regional integration process is top priority.

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

84 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

1.5 million Irish went to the United States in 1848; 1.3 million Italians in 1913. In 2002, there were 1.06 million foreigners who entered the country (OECD, 2004). Statistics obtained after processing DELSA-OECD data for the 2000s, excluding Germany. Newspaper articles indicate one million or more in 2000/2001, including 500,000 Chadians. National Indicative Programme MEDA with the European Commission in 3 stages: management of border controls, institutional support for the movement of persons, and strategies for the development of north provinces. This town is not only the main point of entry into Morocco, but also from where migrants are repatriated once arrested by the Moroccan authorities. See Wender, 2004. Defined here as the group formed by ECOWAS 15 member countries plus Mauritania, Chad and Cameroon. Today, two-thirds of the increase in the urban population is due to births in urban areas; this proportion should increase in the future. Migration Networks and Urbanization in West Africa. At the global level, refugees account for 4.6% of the migrant population (9.2 million out of 200 million). 70% live in developed countries. Even though this figure remains very high, it has been falling sharply since 2000 (-24%). In West Africa, 52.7% of the refugees were women. The data concerns the population with “refugee” status as defined by HCR, thereby excluding other populations such as those who are stateless, internally displaced, repatriated, etc. Definition of Europe by the United Nations: 47 countries including the Russian Federation, but not Turkey. For example: Spain (-1.6 million inhabitants.), Italy (-5 million), Germany (-7.5 million). No country recorded a dynamic population, even though some of them faired better than others, in particular Ireland and France. Median scenario of the Population Division of the United Nations, 2004 Extraordinary European Council of Heads of State and Government held on 23 and 24 March 2000 on “Employment, Economic Reform and Social Cohesion – Towards a Europe of Innovation and Knowledge”. For example, in Eastern Europe where most countries have the disadvantages of a decreasing birth rate and emigration. Forecasts suggest that Poland could lose 4% of its population by 2030, the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia) stand to lose 10%. Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia / Spain, France, Italy, Malta, and Portugal. Protocol A/P1/5/79 on the free movement of persons, the right of residence and establishment. Standard Model adopted by the Conference Heads of State and Government in 2000. The passport was issued in Benin and Senegal in 2003. The entire zone covers the north of Côte d’Ivoire, the centre, the south and west of Burkina Faso, the north of Guinea, the south of Mali, the east of Senegal, the north of Togo, the north of Ghana, the north of Benin and the south-west of Niger.

Glossary Asylum (territorial): Protection granted by a State to an alien on its own territory, based on the principle of non-refoulement, leading to the enjoyment of certain internationally recognised rights. Asylum seeker: Person seeking to be admitted into a country awaiting decision on his/her application for refugee status. Brain drain: Emigration of trained and talented individuals to a third country, due to causes such as conﬂict or lack of opportunities in their country of origin. Clandestine/irregular migration: Secret or concealed migration in breech of immigration requirements. It can occur when a non-national breaches the entry regulations of a country, or having entered a country legally overstays in breach of immigration regulations. Country of destination: Country that is a destination for migratory ﬂows (legal or illegal). Country of origin: Country that is a source of migratory ﬂows (legal or illegal). Country of transit: Country through which migratory ﬂows (legal or illegal) move.

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Diaspora: Any people or ethnic population that leave their traditional ethnic homelands, being dispersed throughout other parts of the world. Economic migrant: Person leaving his/her habitual place of residence to settle outside his/her country of origin in order to improve his/her quality of life. Emigration: The act of departing or exiting from one State with a view to settle in another. Expulsion: Act by an authority of the State with the intention of securing the removal of a person or persons against their will from the territory of that State. Family reuniﬁcation/reunion: Process whereby family members already separated through forced or voluntary migration regroup in a country other than the one of their origin. Forced migration: Movements of populations caused by the need to ﬂee from danger, persecutions and violence. Freedom of movement: This right is made up of three elements: freedom of movement within the territory of a country, the right to leave any country (including his own) and to return to his country. Immigration: Process by which the national of a country moves into another country for the purpose of settlement. Migrant ﬂow: Number of migrants counted as moving to or from a country to access employment or to establish themselves over a deﬁned period of time. Migrant stock: Number of migrants residing in a country at a particular point in time. Migration: Process of any movement of persons, internal or international, whatever its length and causes. Protection: All activities aimed at obtaining respect for individual rights in accordance with international law. Pull factors: Factors that attract migrants to the country of destination. Push factors: Factors that drive migrants to leave their countries of origin. Refugee: A person who, “owing to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country””. Source: www.un-ngls.org/IOM-migration-Glossary.pdf

Sources and bibliography Ammassari, S. (2004), “ Gestion des migrations et politiques de développement : optimiser les bénéﬁces de la migration internationale en Afrique de l’Ouest ”, Cahiers des Migrations Internationales, BIT, Genève. Assemblée nationale française (2006), Rapport d’information sur les perspectives démographiques de la France et de l’Europe à l’horizon 2030, Paris. Bredeloup, S. et O. Pliez (2005), Migrations entre les deux rives du Sahara, Autrepart n° 37, IRD, Bondy. 199 p. CMMI — Commission mondiale sur les migrations internationales (2005), Les migrations dans un monde interconnecté : nouvelles perspectives d’action, Genève. 97 p. Cour, J.-M. and S. Snrech (dir.) (1998), Preparing for the Future — A Vision of West Africa in the Year 2020. West Africa Long-Term Perspective Study (WALTPS). OECD Publishing, Paris, 153 p. Fall, A. S. (2002), Enjeux et déﬁs de la migration internationale de travail ouest-Africaine, Université du Québec en Outaouais, Gatineau. Fall, P. D. (2004), Etat-nation et migrations en Afrique de l’Ouest : le déﬁ de la mondialisation, UNESCO, Paris, SHS/2004/MWB/2. Fall, P. D. (2003), Migrations internationales et droits des travailleurs au Sénégal, UNESCO, Paris, SHS/2003/ MC/5. Fargues, P. (dir.) (2006), Migrations méditerranéennes : Rapport 2005, EUI/EUROMED, Bruxelles. Feld, S. (2004), Les migrations internationales de travail et les objectifs d’emploi de l’UE pour 2010. Communication préparée à l’occasion du colloque sur “ Les migrations internationales : observation, analyse et perspectives ” organisé par l’AIDELF à Budapest www-aidelf.ined.fr/colloques/Budapest/ Seance5/s5_feld.pdf Giri, J. (1994), Histoire économique du Sahel. Karthala, Paris, 259 p.

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POPULATION

AND SETTLEMENT

Haas, H. de (2005), “Morocco’s migration transition: trends, determinants and future scenarios”, Global Migration Perspectives, n° 28, GCIM, Geneva. Lahlou, M. (2004), “ Les migrations des Africains subsahariens entre Maghreb et Union européenne ” communication préparée à l’occasion du colloque sur “ Les migrations internationales : observation, analyse et perspectives ” organisé par l’AIDELF à Budapest www-aidelf.ined.fr/colloques/Budapest/ Seance2/S2_Lahlou.pdf. Manuh, T. (ed.) (2005), At home in the world: International migration and development in contemporary Ghana and West Africa. sub-Saharan Publishers, Accra. 354 p. Institut Panos (2004), Les migrations forcées en Afrique de l’Ouest, Panos, Dakar. IOM — International Organization for Migration, 2005, World Migration: costs and beneﬁts of international migration, Geneva. OECD (2005a), Trends in International Migration, OECD, Paris. 390 p. OECD (2005b), Migration, Remittances and Development, OECD, Paris. 364 p. Ouedraogo, D. (2002), “ Migrations circulaires et enjeux identitaires en Afrique de l’Ouest ”, Les Cahiers du Gres, vol. 3, n° 1, printemps. pp. 7-23. Robin, N. (1996), Atlas des migrations ouest-Africaines vers l’Europe 1985-1993, ORSTOM, Bondy. 85 p. Staub, V. (2005), La Libye et les migrations subsahariennes, mémoire de Cycle de Relations internationales approfondies, Paris. L’Harmattan SWAC (2008), West African Mobility and Migration Policies of OECD Countries. “West African Studies” Collection, OECD Publishing. 139 p. SWAC (to be published in 2009), The Regional Stakes of West African Migration. “West African Studies” Collection, OECD Publishing. United Nations Population Division (2002), International migration report, New York. United Nations Population Division, ESA/P/W (2000), Replacement migration, New York.

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Wender, A. S. et al. (2004), Gourougou, Bel Younes, Oujda : la situation alarmante des migrants subsahariens en transit au Maroc et les conséquences des politiques de l’Union européenne, CIMADE, Paris. 50 p. Wihtol de Wenden, C. (2005), Atlas des migrations dans le monde, Autrement, Paris. 80 p. World Bank (1990), International Migration in sub-Saharan Africa, Washington D.C.

Databases Migration Policy Institute Data on world migrations www.migrationinformation.org/index.cfm OECD Database on immigrants and expatriates in OECD countries www.oecd.org/document/51/0,3343,en_2649_33931_34063091_1_1_1_1,00.html UN World Migrant Stock: The 2006 Revision Population Database http://esa.un.org/migration/index.asp?panel=1

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II. TERRITORIES

PART II. TERRITORIES Chapter 5. RURAL AREAS AND AGRICULTURAL CHANGES page 89 87 Chapter 6. TRANSBOUNDARY RIVER BASINS page 109 Chapter 7. TRANSPORT page 125 Chapter 8. TELECOMMUNICATIONS page 143

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Chapter 5. RURAL AREAS AND AGRICULTURAL CHANGES Christophe Perret (SWAC/OECD) With the support of Jean Zoundi and Leonidas Hitimana (SWAC/OECD) This chapter benefited significantly from the work of the Rural Development Division within the FAO’s Sustainable Development Department (Jean Bonnal, Geneviève Braun, Stéphane Jost and Valentina Spasiano) with the support of other FAO divisions and departments (Animal Production, Water Resources, Statistics, Forests, Environment, Technical Co-operation and Fisheries).

Living in the West African countryside at the turn of the 21st century no longer necessarily implies making a living from primary activities. Nor does it mean living in isolation from the rest of society, especially towns. Urban and rural areas are closely linked, even if disparities remain in terms of living conditions.

At all latitudes and at all times, access to health and education services is more difﬁcult within rural areas than in towns. West Africa is no exception to this rule. In towns, 85% of the population now has access to drinking water and 58% to improved sanitation facilities, in rural zones these ﬁgures stand at only 45% and 28% respectively

Map 5.1. Degree of rurality in West Africa, 1960 – 2020

2020

89

1990

1960

Degree of rurality in West Africa, 1960 – 2020 Rural population / Total population

Population of towns

(By administrative entity)

(Number of inhabitants)

Over 80% Between 50 and 80% Between 15 and 50% Less than 15%

Predominantly rural area

Predominantly urban area

50 to 100,000 100 to 200,000 200 to 500,000 500 to 1 million 1 to 2 million 2 to 5 million 5 to 10 million Over 10 million

Figures not presented

Source: Figures taken from the WALTPS Study, Club du Sahel/OECD

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II. TERRITORIES

Figure 5.1. Proportion of the agricultural population in West African countries % 100 90 80

1979-81 2004

70 60 50 40 30 20 10

Conversely, sparsely populated rural areas (fewer than 15 people/km²) are situated in apparently hostile environments (arid or very humid zones) but also in the “middle belt”, which roughly corresponds to the areas of valleys affected by river blindness which was eradicated between the mid-1970s and the late 1990s. The settlement or re-settlement of these valleys is not yet over. Certain regions where a good deal of land is still available have population growth rates exceeding 3% per year (above the regional average). Surely new frontiers are developing (see Map 5.3.)?

Ca pe

Ve rd Cô Nig e te eri d’ a ivo B ire M en au in Ca rita m nie er o G on ha na Si er Tog ra o Le o Li ne be ri C a Se had Th ne e g G al am G bi ui ne M a a a Bi li ss G au ui n Bu N ea rk ig in er a Fa so

0

which is also heterogeneous, stretches from Ouagadougou to N’Djamena, and includes three historical subsets: in central Burkina Faso (the Voltaic centre), in northern Nigeria (the Hausa centre) and around northern Cameroon (the Kanuri centre).

Source: Statistical Yearbook, FAO (2004)

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90

(see Figures 5.2. and 5.3.). AIDS is no longer an urban disease. More than half of all people infected by the virus live in rural areas, where it appears to be spreading more rapidly than in towns. Rural-urban disparities are equally visible in education, but also in access to markets, information, culture and innovation; just some of the factors that, when combined, explain why poverty is higher in rural areas (see Table 5.1.).

5.1.2. Land dy namics At the regional level, cultivated areas grew from 8.4 to 11.8% of all land between 1961 and 2002. Table 5.1. Rural and urban poverty (as percentage of total population)

5.1. Changes in the rural environment

Countries

5.1.1. Areas and settlement As a rule, settlement areas are linked to the climate. Three quarters of the West African population live in the humid and sub-humid zones, 20% in the semi-arid zone (the Sahel) and 5% in the arid zone (see Map 5.2.). On this climate map, current settlement patterns still bear the marks of the old Sahelian centres and reﬂect the tremendous pull of the coastal areas. Today the region has three areas of high rural density (more than 50 people/km²), which are structured by the urban network (see Map 5.3.). The ﬁrst is along the Gulf of Guinea between Abidjan and Douala; the second is made up of a series of small areas around the coastal towns on the Atlantic coast between Dakar and Monrovia; ﬁnally, the third,

Benin Burkina Faso Cameroon Chad Côte d’Ivoire The Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea Bissau Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone Togo

Survey year(s) 1999

Rural

Urban

National

33

23

29

1998

51

16

45

2001 1995-96 1998 1998-99 -

50 67 70 61 50 52

22 63 30 48 19 51

40 64 33 58 39 52

-

65

29

54

1998 2000 1998 1992-93 1992

76 61 68 36 40

30 25 30 30 24

64 46 48 34 33

2003-04

79

56

70

1997-89

n.a

n.a

32

Sources: World Bank, 2005 Development Indicators; IFAD, COSOP

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Map 5.2. Settlement and agro-climatic conditions C ANARY ISLANDS (SPAIN)

MOROCCO Arid zone

ALGERIA

WESTERN SAHAR A

Semi-arid zone Humid and sub-humid zone

5%

Percentage of the West African population living in the zone

MAURITANIA MALI

5%

NIGER

CHAD

SENEGAL THE GAMBIA GUINEA BISSAU

BURKINA FASO

GUINEA

SUDAN

20%

TOGO GHANA BENIN

SIERRA LEONE

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

NIGERIA

75%

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

LIBERIA CAMEROON SAO TOME-AND-PRINCIPE EQ. GUINEA

Source: FAO, SWAC / OECD (2006)

There is still considerable potential cropland since only 36% of this land is actually cultivated. Average land pressure1 is moderate (1.4 people/ha in recent years compared to 1 in the 1960s) and remains lower than the average for developing countries, which stands at around 2.3 people/ha. Land for grazing remains stable, although in certain Sahel regions, transhumance corridors and staging points have disappeared or have been turned into farmland (see Table 5.2. and Map 5.4.).

0 100 200 km

GABON

CONGO

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

Farmers are obliged to use more inputs and in some cases they temporarily or permanently abandon certain plots. The way in which land resources are perceived is evolving. As a production factor in a market economy, land is acquiring greater value. Irrigated plots, rich or well-drained soil, and proximity to major consumption centres and input suppliers are some of the factors of a rapidly developing agricultural land market. Private investment by non-agricultural urban operators is a new trend that is likely to develop in the future. On the other

However, considerable land problems remain. This is the case, for example, in rural areas close to the urbanised coast of the Gulf of Guinea (see Map 5.5.). Long natural Table 5.2. Land use in West Africa (1961 – 2002) fallow periods, which were the Area Arable Land under Pastures basis of soil fertility management, of land land permanent crops (%) are shorter and cultivated plots (1,000 ha) (%) (%) 2002 1961 1980 2002 1961 1980 2002 1961 1980 2002 are increasingly exploited. This West Africa 790,000 7.6 8.1 10.3 0.8 1.1 1.5 28.8 28.8 29.2 leads to soil deterioration resulting World 13,432,000 9.5 10 10.4 0.7 0.8 1.0 23.2 24.1 25.6 in lower productive capacity, and therefore a reduction in yields. Source: FAO Statistical Yearbook (2004) Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

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Dakar Ouagadougou

Niamey

Douala

Kano Kaduna Jos Abuja Ibadan Kumasi Lomé Lagos Benin City Cotonou Accra Abidjan Port Harcourt

Bamako

Sources: Waltps data, MDP

Monrovia

Conakry Freetown

Nouakchott

<2

2 -3

Annual population growth rate (%) >3

Tillabery

Boucle du Plateau central Mouhoun Centre-Centre- Est Haut-Bassins Sud Est Alibori Sikasso Upper Atacora Upper Faranah Kankan SudCascades Savanes East Ouest West Borgou Kara Denguele Savanes Northern Donga Worodougou Vallée du Zanzan Bandama Source: MDP

Koulikoro Ségou

Rural settlements dynamics in onchocerciasis-freed zones (1990-2005)

Tambacounda

92 Map 5.3. A picture of rural settlement in West Africa (2005)

0 100 200 km

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

Yaoundé

N'Djaména Maiduguri

Onchocerciasisfreed zones

Less than 15

15 to 50

50 to 100

100 to 200

Rural density (inhab/km² - 2005) Over 200

II. TERRITORIES

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II. TERRITORIES

hand, a move towards the decapitalisation of the land of the poorest social classes is expected.

Figure 5.2. Percentage of the rural and urban populations with access to an improved water source (2002) % 100 80

Urban population Rural population

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Source: WHO (2006) 12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/482826646778

Figure 5.3. Percentage of the urban and rural populations with access to improved sanitation facilities (2002) % 80 70

Urban population Rural population

60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Ch ad Bu N rk ig e in a r Fa G so ui ne Li a b M er au ia r it an i Be a ni n Ca T pe ogo Cô Ve r G te d de ui n e 'Ivo i a Bi re ss a Si Nig u er ra eria L Ca eon e m er Se oon ne ga l Th e Ma G li am b G ia ha na

There is considerable potential for conﬂict linked to these rural changes, whether due to the agricultural colonisation of the lowlands traditionally used for grazing, transhumance through areas of cropland or the management of water resources. In many cases, these problems are regional. Once situated in the Sahelian countries, the centre of gravity for West African livestock farming is now imperceptibly shifting towards the north of the coastal countries. This slow migration of herds is accompanied by that of cattle-rearing populations. Land disputes that were once conﬁned to individual groups are now also causing inter-community disagreements.

90

Ch ad M ali Ni ge r To go Gu Ca ine Bu mer a rk oo in n a M Faso au Sie rit r an Gu ra Le ia in o ea ne Bi ss a Ni u ge r Lib ia er S e ia ne ga Be l ni G n Ca han a p Cô e Ve te rd d' e Th Ivoi e G re am bi a

In this context, the land reforms launched in the mid-1980s are pushing the limits of tradition and modern law to strike a balance between the promotion of a capitalistic form of agriculture and that of equity. Progress is slow and dialogue is difﬁcult.

The 107 million hectares of forest2 in West Africa are clearly not exempt Source: WHO (2006) from these changes in rural areas (see 12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483002026180 Map 5.6.). It is estimated that between 1990 and 2005, forest cover diminished at a rate of 5.1.3. Climate 1.2 million hectares per year, which is far higher than the average for the continent. This reduction A “wet” period from the 1950s to the early 1970s was seen in the fragmentation of cover, especially was followed by a dry period characterised by the in the humid zone: a shift from closed forest to two great droughts of 1973 and 1984. Between open forest and then to woodland. According to these two periods, the reduction in rainfall was FAO estimations, over 10% of closed forests were remarkable. It was considerable in the coastal areas transformed into open forests between 1980 and (minus 150 mm/year), but rainfall there remains 2000 and between 3 and 7% of fragmented forests high (between 2,000 and 3,000 mm/year). In the became woodland during the same period. Sahel region, the reduction in rainfall was not as severe (minus 60 to 90 mm/year), but was felt more These changes are linked to extensive agriculture acutely (see Map 5.7.). This vision of course has (cacao, coffee, etc.), forestry (wood energy and log certain limits, due to the ﬁxed comparative periods. exports3), mining activities, the development of For the Sahelian countries, for example, the dry periods lasted from the early 1970s until the early infrastructure and ﬁres. Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

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Map 5.4. Production systems in West Africa

0

94

Source: FAO, World Bank (2001)

150

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

Sparse (arid)

Irrigated

Root crop

Forest based

Pastoral

Irrigated areas in rainfed farming system Cereal-root crop mixed

Tree crop

Coastal artisanal Fishing

Agro-pastoral (millet/sorghum)

300 km

Highland temperate mixed

Map 5.5. Principal environmental constraints in the coastal area of the Gulf of Guinea

BENIN TOGO

NIGERIA

GHANA

CAMEROON Environmental constraints Very degraded lands

Average climatic production potential

Low agricultural capacity of soil

High climatic production potential

Source: FAO, World Bank (2001)

Rural density population > 50 inhab/km² © Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

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II. TERRITORIES

Map 5.6. Forest cover in Africa (2005)

1,056 4,364

217

2,277

67

1,011 267 1,266 8,673

11,921

12,572

471

1,554

6,794 6,724

67,546

2,351 5,517 11,089 386 3,154 10,405 21,245 1,632

6

2,072 2,754

7,131

13,000 22,755

3,627 480

21,775 22,471

3,522

133,610 152 35,257

95 3,402

59,104 42,452 Forest Area in 2005 (Thousand ha)

17,540

19,262

12,838

7,661 11,943 Closed forest

541

Open or fragmented forest

9,203

Other woodlands

8 0 200 400 km

Other

Source: Forestry Department, FAO (2006)

1990s. Since then, rainfall has increased, although it remains highly variable. The reduction in rainfall results in desertiﬁcation, the descent of herds towards the south and a drop in river levels4 and in biomass production5 (see Map 5.8.). The impact of climate change can also contribute to these changes.

population. During the 1982/84 period, the cattle population dropped by almost 60% in Niger, because herds were either decimated or moved southward.

Despite being difﬁcult to assess, the decrease in potential production of dry cereals or fodder for livestock is clear. The great Sahel droughts affected fodder production and consequently the animal

5.2.1. Production

5.2. Rural economy and agricultural economy

In 1960, 85% of the population lived in rural areas centred around a self-subsistence economy with

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II. TERRITORIES

Map 5.7. Rainfall in West Africa (1951/75 – 1976/2000) Average rainfall in theMAROC Sahel (1950 - 2000)

2

Rainfall differential (mm/year) (1976-2000 compared to 1951-1975)

ILES CANARIES (Espagne)

1 0 SAHARA OCCIDENTAL

-1

Rainfall (mm/year) (1976-2000 average) LIBYE

< - 150

- 60 to - 30

- 150 to - 90

- 30 to 0

Isohyet

- 90 to - 60 -2

Standardised with respect to 1989-1993 Source: Global International Waters Assessment (2004)

1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975 Years

1980

1985

1990

1995

ALGERIA

2000

20°N

MAURITANIA

100 mm

100 mm

MALI

250 mm

250 mm

NIGER SENEGAL

500 mm

1,000 mm THE

CHAD

GAMBIA

BURKINA

1,500 mm

GUINEABISSAU 2,000 mm

FASO

GUINEA

0m

m

BENIN

3,000 mm

NIGERIA

SIERRA LEONE

TOGO CÔTE D'IVOIRE

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

00

mm

CAMEROON

2,000 mm

1,5 m

2,000

0m

50

1,

400 km

SAO TOME-AND-PRINCIPE U I N É E

A

mm

EQ. G

m

0m

200

1,50

96

0

1,000 mm

GHANA

LIBERIA 2,000 mm

3,000 mm

CAPE VERDE

SUDAN

50

1,500 mm D.R. OF CONGO CONGO

GABON

Source: SDRN / FAO, SWAC / OECD (2006)

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

Map 5.8. Variation in potential biomass production in West Africa (1951/1975 – 1976/2000) Annual climatic potential for dry biomass production (g/m²/year)

MOROCCO CANARY ISLANDS (SPAIN)

ALGERIA

ALGERIE 480

WESTERN SAHARA

Variation in annual climatic potential for dry biomass production (g/m²/year) (1976-2000 compared to 1951-1975) LIBYE

1976 - 2000

- 300 to - 200

- 100 to - 50

- 200 to - 100

- 50 to 50

* This potential refers to all rainfed production

MAURITANIA MALI 480

NIGER

480

THE GAMBIA

BURKINA

1,680

2,

SUDAN

720

GUINEABISSAU

FASO

GUINEA

400

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

SIERRA LEONE

1,920

SAO TOME-AND-PRINCIPE N E A UI

2 ,4 0 0

Source: Global International Waters Assessment (2004)

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

CAMEROON

EQ. G

400 km

1

0 ,68

1,920

20

1,920

200

1,9

1,680

0

NIGERIA

1,680 LIBERIA

CAPE VERDE

1,220

TOGO GHANA BENIN

2 ,4 0 0

1,220

CHAD

SENEGAL

720

D.R. OF CONGO CONGO

GABON

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

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few connections to the urban population (see Figure 5.4.). The rural economy, which was almost exclusively agricultural, generated half of the region’s GDP. Over the last 50 years, cities have expanded and increased in number to become connected with each other and with rural areas. The rural sector’s working population, despite being more numerous, now plays a smaller part in the economy, particularly in favour of the informal urban sector, and accounts for 30% of the region’s GDP. Although the rural economy is diversifying (agricultural product processing, mining, handicrafts, trade, transport and tourism), it is still dominated by agricultural activities, whose share in the income of the rural population will long remain preponderant.6 Agriculture accounts for over half of West African countries’ “agricultural GDP”, except in Mauritania, where livestock farming predominates. The latter is the second largest contributor to “agricultural GDP” in other countries, particularly in Sahelian countries, where it represents 30 to 40% of this GDP (see Table 5.3.). Post-independence, agricultural policies focused on promoting the export sectors ensuring foreign exchange inﬂows (palm oil, coffee, cocoa, cotton, groundnuts, etc.) that had been established during colonial rule. But food crops made the most progress, growing from 71% of agricultural production volume in 1960 to 78% in 2005. This boom concerns cereal crops (rice and corn), tubers and fruit and vegetable production, as well as the livestock and dairy sectors. This trend is the result of high growth in urban demand, decreasing public investment in cash crops and international market price ﬂuctuations.

Figure 5.4. Breakdown of West Africa’s working population % Working population

100 80

Rural Sector 60 40

Informal Non-Rural Sector 20

Modern Non-Rural Sector

0 1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

Table 5.3. Contribution of agriculture, livestock farming, forestry and ﬁshing to the agricultural sector in some West African countries Agriculture Burkina Faso Cameroon Chad The Gambia Guinea Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Senegal

55% 76% 47% 68% 95% 57% 20% 56% 84% 55%

Livestock Forestry Fishing farming 35% 10% 12% 6% 6% 44% 9% 23% 3% 6% 19% 12% 4% 28% 14% 53% 27% 33% 11% 10% 2% 5% 30% 5% 11%

Years 2004 2004 2002 2004 2004 2004 2005 2003 2003 2003

Source: IMF country data

Figure 5.5. West African calorific balance sheet (1990 – 2004) Cal/pers/day 5,000

18% Total Regional Availability

4,500

Regional Food Production

4,000

Food Consumption

3,500

16% 14%

Imports/Total Availability (%) 12%

3,000 10% 2,500 8% 2,000 6%

1,500

An analysis of food production and consumption indices calculated in calories per capita per day and also in terms of imports (see Figure 5.5.) shows that agriculture has succeeded to a large extent in coping with

2020

Source: Club du Sahel/OECD (1998)

4%

1,000

2%

500 0

1990

Source: FAOSTAT (2006)

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1995

2000

2004

0%

12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483010772248

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II. TERRITORIES

Map 5.9. Cereal and cattle trade in West Africa Trade flows (2003)

MOROCCO CANARY ISLANDS (SPAIN)

Cattle flows

LIBYE

Cereals flows

ALGERIA WESTERN SAHARA

Sahelian countries Coastal countries Source: Comtrade database, UNCTAD (2006)

MAURITANIA MALI NIGER

CHAD

SENEGAL THE GAMBIA

GUINEABISSAU

BURKINA FASO

GUINEA

COTE D'IVOIRE

SIERRA LEONE

SUDAN

TOGO GHANA BENIN

NIGERIA CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

LIBERIA CAMEROON

98

D.R. OF CONGO EQ.

CAPE VERDE

G

SAO TOME-AND-PRINCIPEU I N E A

GABON

CONGO

0

150

300 km

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

the high population growth. Food production per capita/day has remained stable over the past 25 years (at around 2,000 calories), while consumption has risen considerably over the last 15 years (from 2,200 to almost 2,500 cal/capita/day), stimulated by an increase in incomes, especially in urban areas. Consequently, food imports have risen to 16% of available regional stocks.

5.2.2. Regional trade East-west complementarities (between plateau regions and mangrove areas) and north-south complementarities (between the Sahel, the savannah and forests) stimulate long-distance trade (see Map 5.9.). Sahelian cereal and meat ﬂows are mostly directed towards the coast. The tubers, fruit and vegetables of the Sudanese savannah supply not only the network of secondary towns criss-crossing this area, but also the cities of

the coastal and Sahelian countries (for example, trade in rainfed or off-season tomatoes supplies the coastal cities of Cotonou and Lagos, see Map 5.10.). Harvested produce from the forest region is directed towards the consumption centres in the north of the coastal and Sahel countries, as is the case with the palm oil trade, from Guinea-Bissau and Guinea to Senegal and Mali (see Map 5.11.). This trade, whose volumes are impossible to assess today, has almost certainly increased a great deal over the last few decades. Built upon old structured networks, sometimes well-linked to the informal foreign exchange market, they have beneﬁted from the growth in urban demand and from improvements in storage and transport infrastructure. Economic liberalisation and regional construction (ECOWAS, UEMOA) are also favourable elements, even if the application of the principle of

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Map 5.10. Fresh tomato trade between Niger, Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana Production zones (By administrative entity)

NIGER

Out-of-season tomatoes Rainfed tomatoes

Trade flows

Maradi

Out-of-season tomato flows Rainfed tomato flows

Kano

BENIN TOGO NIGERIA

GHANA

Lomé

Lagos Cotonou

Accra 0

Source: Lares (2002)

5.3.1. Meeting the demands of regional market growth In 2025, West Africa could count 140 million more people than in 2005. A farmer will have to feed 2.25 people, compared to 1.75 today and there will be less potential for extending cropland areas than in the past. Agricultural intensiﬁcation, which is already underway notably in peri-urban areas, will inevitably continue. In comparison with other parts of the world, agricultural intensiﬁcation in West Africa remains low. Although fertiliser consumption increased ﬁve-fold from 1970 to 2000, it is still 10 times lower than the world average (see Table 5.4.).

200 km

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

the free ﬂow of goods, without any customs duties or quantitative restrictions, still poses problems.

5.3. Some challenges for the future

100

Irrigation use is also expected to increase. West Africa has considerable potential in this ﬁeld – over 9 million hectares – which is, as yet, little used (8% of irrigable land) in comparison with other regions, especially North Africa (see Map 5.12.). Today, fewer than a million hectares of land are effectively irrigated in the region, to which the same amount of shallow or receding water areas must

Table 5.4. Use of fertilisers and tractors around the world Fertilisers Tractors/ (kg/person working in 1,000 people working in the agricultural sector) the agricultural sector Africa Asia Europe Latin America and the Caribbean North America West Africa World Source: FAOSTAT (2006)

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1970 6.1 8.2 281.0

2000 8.7 37.1 362.8

1970 1.3 0.5 68.6

2000 1.2 4.1 177.2

23.7

113.7

5.2

16.3

1,430.2 0.8 34.7

2,995.0 3.9 52.5

513.6 0.1 8.1

762.0 0.4 10.5

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Map 5.11. Palm oil trade in Sénégambie méridionale St Louis Louga

Linguére

Touba Thies Kayes

DAKAR Diourbel

Kaolack Tamba

Diaobe :: March éé Diaobe March Diaobe: Regional régional de l’huile de régional de l’huile palm oil market de palme palme

BANJUL

Kolda Kolda

Ziguinchor Bafata Bafata

Guinea BISSAU

Flows from production zones

100

Regular flows from Diaobe Main asphalt road

Intermittent flows

Track 50 km

0

Maritime flows

Source: ENDA – DIAPOL

be added. However, prospects seem to focus on the increase in cropping intensity7 rather than that of irrigated areas.

5.3.2. Reacting to changing consumption patterns

© ENDA – Diapol and SWAC/OECD 2004

Figure 5.6. Food availability trends in West Africa 2,600 SAHEL

COASTAL COUNTRIES

2,400 Kcal/pers./day 2,200

Others

2,000

Meat

1,800

Fruits, vegetables

1,600

West African patterns of food consumption are changing under the effect of the development of the market economy, the connection of rural and urban areas and urbanisation. City dwellers increasingly value imported rice and wheat and they are diversifying their intake

Vegetable oils

1,400

Pulses

1,200

Sweeteners

1,000 800

Tubers

600

Other cereals

400

Wheat

200

Rice 1964-66

1978-80

1999-2001

1964-66

1978-80

1999-2001

Source: FAO, Food and Nutrition Division

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Map 5.12. Irrigation intensity in Africa

Niger

Senegal

Lake Chad

Volta Irrigation potential in Africa

Rest of Africa (88%)

West Africa (22%)

101 Irrigated area in irrigation potential percentage per major river basin Over 100%* 80 - 100% 60 - 80% 40 - 60% 20 - 40% Less than 20% * The irrigation potential only includes renewable water resources. Algeria and Lybia also use non-renewable resources (fossil grounwater) which may explain the values of above 100% values.

0

Source: Moïse Sonou (2000)

(particularly more fruit, vegetables and legumes) (see Figure 5.6.).8 The advantage of imported cereals is mostly due to their regular availability on the market, in terms of both quality and quantity, due to the food security policies implemented by States and regional

200

400 km

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

institutions in order to ensure regular supplies to cities at reasonable prices. But this attraction towards imported cereals also concerns rural areas and intermediate towns in the Sahel in the lean season. On the contrary, the irregularity of local product markets, exchange rate ﬂuctuations and the vagaries of seasonal supplies depending on

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Table 5.5. Growth in agricultural crop production and yields in West Africa West Africa Fruits Corn Millet Oilseed Dry pulses Rice (Paddy) Roots and tubers Sorghum Vegetables

Crop areas 2005 (Million ha)

Production 2005 (Million tonnes)

Yields 2005 t/ha

3.3 9.0 15.5 15.7 11.2 6.0 12.8 13.4 2.5

18.5 10.8 11.9 4.7 4.1 7.9 106.0 12.6 14.1

5.6 1.2 0.8 0.3 0.4 1.3 8.3 0.9 5.6

Annual growth rate (1970/2005) Crop areas 1.6% 2.7% 1.1% 1.4% 1.7% 3.3% 2.9% 1.1% 2.2%

Production 2.2% 3.5% 2.0% 2.0% 2.9% 3.8% 3.2% 2.1% 3.0%

Yields 0.6% 0.7% 1.0% 0.6% 1.2% 0.5% 0.3% 1.0% 0.7%

Source: FAOSTAT (2006)

climatic conditions make investments in products of this type less attractive. However, food crops have undergone a relative diversiﬁcation with the development of the West African production of rice, corn, tubers, fruit and vegetables, meat and milk (see Table 5.5.). This agricultural diversiﬁcation, which is admittedly still limited, is largely based on family farming, 102 which is also now turning to trade in processed products adapted to urban constraints. Attieke and gari (manioc) have become veritable “national dishes” for urban dwellers in Côte d’Ivoire, Benin and Nigeria. In the Sudanese area yams have begun to compete with cotton crops due to the growth in urban demand. The agri-food business is developing in the highest density urban-rural areas, especially in Nigeria. This agribusiness is based on large capitalistic farms, which maintain close connections with input supply chains. In some cases, small farms work on a contractual basis with industries (Mauritania’s milk production sector or tomatoes in Senegal). Companies doing large-scale manioc processing for animal feed and other industrial by-products are being set up in Ghana and Nigeria, creating a large market for producers.

5.3.3. Protecting the regional market The West African food market is suffering from multiple trade policies of regional States. National customs policies aimed at protecting the domestic market are thwarted by the far more liberal

strategies of their neighbours. The establishment of the UEMOA Common External Tariff (CET) has opened the way, even if protection rates for rice, milk and meat are low. The extension of the CET to all ECOWAS countries – scheduled in principle from 1 January 2008 – should eliminate distortions between protectionist countries such as Nigeria and very open countries such as the Gambia. Differences in national interests explain the region’s still ambiguous position on the methods of this extension. Monetary differences also play a considerable part, especially due to the overvaluation of the CFA franc in the wake of the euro. At the same time, the European Union and ECOWAS countries, along with Mauritania, are negotiating the creation of a free trade area within the framework of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). The aim of the EPA in West Africa is to adapt progressively to the conditions of international trade marked by a liberalised global market in accordance with the WTO agreement. The problematic negotiations are based on the following elements and perspectives: ] The increased opening up to products imported from the European Union should beneﬁt consumers by reducing food costs, but to the detriment of local production, which will have to compete with imported products (some estimations show that extra-regional imports of onions, potatoes, beef or poultry meat would increase by 15 to 20%). ] The anticipated effects of protection for local production will only be seen in the mediumand long-term, which may put a strain on

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consumers’ purchasing power and increase the risks of food insecurity in the shorter term. ] The short-term beneﬁts of free access to the European market for West African products are unclear. On the one hand, thanks to the “Tout Sauf les Armes” (Everything but Arms) initiative, the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)9 already have access to European markets without having to pay customs duties for any products except those covered by a speciﬁc protocol. Only Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Cape Verde, all non-LDCs, could potentially beneﬁt from a possible opening. On the other hand, countries exporting food products to Europe have to meet quality and timeframe criteria that they have not yet fully mastered, except in the case of certain sectors, such as fresh fruit and vegetables. ] The WTO provides for “special products” and “special safeguard” mechanisms to temporarily protect the local products that are essential to food security. At the same time, the Framework Agreement on Agriculture of 1 August 2004 requires all non-LDC developing countries to continue reducing their bound customs duties. Faced with this complexity, West African countries are still moving forward haphazardly. Subject to differing interests, they are also placed into two distinct categories by the international community – DCs and LDCs – whose “rights” are not the same in terms of the protection of agriculture. Recognition of “Least Developed Regions” (a new concept), would undoubtedly remove a certain number of barriers and would allow States to follow in the footsteps of rural and agricultural actors, who are becoming organised at the regional level and are increasingly inﬂuential in the deﬁnition of policies.10

5.3.4. Deﬁning rural development policies with the actors concerned The 1980s were marked by the implementation of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) in the agricultural sector. These policies led to the withdrawal of instruments supporting the sector (realignment system, stabilisation board), making

producers more vulnerable to changes in international prices; this was even more so given that the trade policies triggered the liberalisation of trade while there was increased competition from Asia and subsidised agriculture from OECD countries. Furthermore, agricultural liberalisation encouraged the transfer of certain State activities and powers to private actors and farmers’ organisations, which now play a greater role in the sector’s organisation or in the deﬁnition of rural strategies at the national and local levels. At the same time, rural development management has evolved towards greater decentralisation, while participatory mechanisms and procedures have also developed, either as pilot projects or as more important institutional reforms. They tend to involve local actors to a greater extent and to give them the opportunity to take part in planning and implementing initiatives concerning them. However, such practices are not widespread and there may be very various degrees of participation and decentralisation/centralisation in different countries, giving rise to ﬁve groups of countries 103 according to their typology (see Figure 5.7.). While consultation processes are developing everywhere, effective participation by populations in managing their affairs often still remains at a pilot stage in many countries and the transfer of powers and responsibilities is unevenly distributed. At the regional level, strategies and policies are being drawn up or implemented, such as the UEMOA’s agricultural policy, the CILSS’ Strategic Framework for Food Security, the ECOWAS/CILSS sub-regional programme combating desertiﬁcation and the ECOWAS agricultural policy framework for West Africa (ECOWAP). Like economic operators, farmers’ organisations grouped together at the regional level play a greater role in drafting and directing these policies. Thus, the intervention of ROPPA members (West African Network of Farmers’ Organisations and Agricultural Producers) in national workshops has made it possible to inﬂuence debates on the ECOWAS Common Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP). Beyond the regional level, these organisations have gained greater weight and take part in international negotiations. Some institutions have been particularly active alongside the C4 countries

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(Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad) in trade negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO): the African Cotton Association (ACA), the African Producers’ Association (APROCA) and ROPPA.

Figure 5.7. West African decentralisation and participation typology A five-class typology From state-controlled to participatory…………

From centralised to decentralised

Centralisation Countries with low decentralisation I

Countries with low decentralisation and participation

and average participation

Guinea Bissau Chad Côte d'Ivoire

Countries with average decentralisation and participation

II Sierra Leone West Africa is facing two IV Togo Mauritania Statemajor political challenges. Participative controlled Guinea Benin Cameroon Firstly, national political Ghana Niger III Liberia Cape Verde V The Gambia solidarity needs to be reinMali forced in order to defend Burkina Faso Countries with average Senegal decentralisation and low participation the countries’ and region’s interests. The beneﬁts of Countries with strong decentralisation and participation such action could be seen Decentralisation when cotton-producing countries (Benin, Burkina Source: FAO, Rural Development Division (2006) Faso, Mali and Chad) joined forces during the WTO negotiations. However, the same needs to be done (those living in marginal zones) are subject to the now during the trade negotiations to be held market’s disadvantages without beneﬁting from its 104 within the framework of the Economic Partnership advantages. As was the case in other parts of the Agreement (EPA) with the European Union or partworld at different times, the shift from a traditional nerships with new actors, such as China, India or agrarian economy to urbanisation and the market Brazil. How can ECOWAS countries reconcile their economy involved an increased consumption of different interests? And secondly, more considerathe agricultural space and non-renewable natural tion must be given to complementarities between resources (timber). production basins and consumers’ needs, as well as to the common resources shared between different These changes may seem powerful and rapid, but regions. Strategies focused on the development of there is no doubt that they will be even more so cross-border regions or basins on the basis of their in the next 20 years. In 2020, the urban population comparative advantages need to be furthered. is likely to represent more than 50% of the total population. A city with 100,000 inhabitants in 2006 will have 160,000 in 2025 solely through its 5.4. Conclusion natural growth, and probably 180,000 with rural entrants. Land will be perceived as a capital asset Rural development policies cannot look to the past by a growing number of farms (perhaps more to prepare for the future, for over the last 45 years, environmentally-friendly practices will emerge?). West Africa’s rural landscape has witnessed To their beneﬁt, larger proportion of farms than deep-seated changes. The growing population today will be well connected to the market. Farmers and urbanisation have turned West Africa into in marginal zones will continue to suffer from a regional market. Rural and urban areas, local the vagaries of the climate and the market, and and national levels are closely interlinked and perhaps even more so from the impact of climate interdependent; they have jointly entered the change. competitive era.

This new era seems promising, though risk-laden, in particular because the weakest rural groups

Far more than in the past or even today, “agriculture” will not be the sole activity in rural

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areas, although it will remain the driving force. Furthermore, rural and urban areas are closely linked and their relations will become even more

intense. Any development policy or strategy must take this into account.

Notes 1. 2.

The ratio of agricultural population to arable land or land under permanent crops. West African forest cover is made up of closed forests, open or fragmented forests and other woodland. The dry zone is made up of steppe vegetation, bush and open savannah woodland. The more productive humid zone is characterised by savannah woodland, semi-deciduous tropical forest and tropical rainforest. 3. A total of 90% of the productive use of West African forest cover was for household energy purposes in 2005, compared to 86% in the 1980s. The production of industrial roundwood remains more modest and is increasing more slowly than the population. 4. Some estimations show that the levels of the Senegal and Gambia Rivers dropped by almost 60% in the 1970s and 1980s. The Niger River dropped by around 15%. 5. FAO estimations show that between 1951/1975 and 1976/2000, the reduction in rainfall resulted in a reduction in dry biomass production of between 100 and 200 g/m²/year in the Sahelian regions of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and northern Nigeria; this reduction reached between 200 and 300 g/m²/year in Senegambia. 6. In Cameroon, for example, the share of agricultural income in rural income could fall from 72% in 2002 to 66% in 2020. Cour, J.-M. (2006): Développement rural et urbanisation, quels enjeux ? 7. Cropping intensity is a perimeter’s annual cropping area/equipped area. In West Africa, specialists estimate that this ratio could increase from 129% in 1996 to 156% in 2030. 8. In traditional cereal-producing countries, the cereal base represents half the cost of a dish in rural areas and only a third in towns. 9. Some LDCs: Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. 10. The West African Network of Farmers’ Organisations and Agricultural Producers (ROPPA) on the ECOWAS Common Agricultural Policy; the African Cotton Association (ACA) and the African Producers’ Association (APROCA) in cotton trade negotiations.

Sources and bibliography Azzabi, A. (2006), Indicateurs et référentiels pour le suivi de la réforme agraire et du développement rural. Document technique pour la session parallèle de la CIRADR sur les mécanismes de suivi et les indicateurs du développement rural, Porto Alegre (Brésil), 10 mars 2006. Bonnal, J. (1995), Participation et risques d’exclusion — Réﬂexions à partir de quelques exemples sahéliens. FAO, Rome. 91 p. Chauveau, J.-P., P. Lebas, P. Lavigne Delville (1997), La dynamique des sociétés rurales face aux projets participatifs de développement rural : Réﬂexions et propositions d’action à partir d’expériences d’Afrique de l’Ouest. FAO, Rome. 155 p. Club du Sahel et de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (à paraître), L’avenir de l’élevage au Sahel et en Afrique de l’Ouest : Potentialités et déﬁs dans la perspective d’un renforcement du marché régional. Rapport provisoire. CSAO / OCDE, Paris. Club du Sahel et de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (2007), Les réformes foncières en Afrique de l’Ouest. CSAO / OCDE, Paris. Club du Sahel et de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (2007), Note Conceptuelle pour une réﬂexion régionale sur le devenir du Monde Rural dans les 20 prochaines années. Note interne CSAO / OCDE, Paris. CICRED (1999), Dynamique de peuplement des zones rurales libérées de l’onchocercose en Afrique de l’Ouest. Synthèse de monographies nationales, CICRED, FAO, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères — Coopération et Francophonie. CIRADR (2006), Rapports nationaux et Déclaration ﬁnale de la Conférence Internationale sur la Réforme Agraire et le Développement Rural, FAO/CIRADR, 7 — 10 mars 2006, Porto Alegre, Brésil. Cour, J.-M. and S. Snrech (dir.) (1998), Preparing for the Future — A Vision of West Africa in the Year 2020. West Africa Long-Term Perspective Study (WALTPS). OECD Publishing, Paris, 153 p. Dahou, K. (2003), “ Structure du commerce extérieur et intégration régionale ”. Dans L’Afrique de l’Ouest dans la compétition mondiale, Karthala, Paris.

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Du Guerny, J. (1999), AIDS and agriculture: Can agricultural policy make a difference? Food, Nutrition and Agriculture, No. 25, 1999, FAO, Rome. FAO (2006), Progress towards sustainable forest management in Africa. Discussion report for the African Forestry and Wildlife Commission, Fifteenth session, 27-31 March 2006, Maputo, Mozambique. FAO (2005), L’état de l’insécurité alimentaire dans le monde. Éradiquer la faim dans le monde pour réaliser les objectifs du millénaire pour le développement. FAO, Rome. FAO (2005), L’irrigation en Afrique en chiffres. Enquêtes Aquastat, FAO, Rome. FAO, Commission européenne, BAD (2003), Étude prospective du secteur forestier en Afrique. Rapport sous-régional Afrique de l’Ouest. Département des Forêts, 74 p. FAO; World Bank (2001), Farming Systems and Poverty. Improving Farmers’ Livelihoods in a changing World. Rome, Washington DC. Faucheux, B., B. Hermelin, J. Medina (2005), Impacts de l’Accord de partenariat économique UE — Afrique de l’Ouest. GRET, Politiques publiques et régulations internationales, décembre 2005, Paris. Hitimana, L. (2004), La transformation de l’agriculture ouest-Africaine : vers de nouveaux partenariats pour l’innovation agricole. Note de synthèse pays : Ghana. CSAO / OCDE, Paris. IIED (2006), Modes d’accès à la terre, marchés fonciers, gouvernance et politiques foncières en Afrique de l’Ouest. Résultats du projet de recherche CLAIMS, avril 2006. IIED (2006), Making decentralization work for sustainable resource management in the Sahel. Lessons from a programme of action-research, policy debate and citizen empowerment. Making decentralization work, IIED, London. Inter-Réseaux (2006), Agricultures d’Afrique de l’Ouest : un paysage qui se redessine. Grain de sel, numéro spécial 10 ans, n°34-35, mars-août 2006. IRAM (2001), Problématiques foncières et gestion des ressources communes : regards sur quelques situations et expériences en Afrique de l’Ouest. IRAM, janvier 2001.

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LARES / IRAM (2004), Programme “ suivi des échanges transfrontaliers entre le Nigeria et les pays voisins ” : Bénin, Cameroun, Niger et Tchad. Synthèse des travaux 2000 — 2003. LARES, IRAM, Cotonou. Niasse, M., A. Afouda, A. Amani (2004), Réduire la vulnérabilité de l’Afrique de l’Ouest aux impacts du climat sur les ressources en eau, les zones humides et la désertiﬁcation. Eléments de stratégie régionale, de préparation et d’adaptation. Union Mondiale pour la Nature — UICN, Bureau Régional pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest. Ouedraogo, D. (2006), Les dynamiques démographiques. Atlas de l’Intégration régionale en Afrique de l’Ouest, CSAO/OCDE, Paris. Pélissier, P. (2000), Les interactions rurales — urbaines en Afrique de l’Ouest et du Centre. Association euro-Africaine pour l’anthropologique du changement social et du développement. PWC (2004), Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) of the EU — ACP Economic Partnership Agreements. Regional SIA: West African ACP Countries. Snrech, S. (1997), “ Transformations structurelles de l’agriculture des savanes et du Sahel ouest-Africains ”. Sécheresse, volume 8, n° 3, septembre 1997. Paris, pp. 189-199. Sonou, M. (2000), Tendances et perspectives de l’irrigation en Afrique subsaharienne. FAO, Bureau régional pour l’Afrique. SOS FAIM (2003), Légitimité et représentativité des organisations paysannes. Dynamiques paysannes, n° 1, décembre 2003. Soule, B. G. (2003), “ L’agriculture ouest-Africaine ”. Dans L’Afrique de l’Ouest dans la compétition mondiale, Karthala, Paris. Toulmin, C. and B. Guèye (2003), Transformation in West African Agriculture and the Role of Family Farms. CSAO / OCDE, Paris. UNESCO (2006), Rapport mondial de suivi sur l’EPT. Aperçu régional : Afrique subsaharienne, UNESCO, Paris. Villareal, M. (2001), The impact of HIV/AIDS on food security in Africa, 22ème Conférence régionale de la FAO pour l’Afrique.

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Websites Atlas on Regional Integration in West Africa (SWAC)

www.atlas-westAfrica.org

FAO, Natural Resources Management and Environment Department

www.fao.org/nr/index_en.htm

FAOSTAT, Statistics Division

www.fao.org/es/ess/index_en.asp http://faostat.fao.org/default.aspx?lang=en

FIVIMS, An Inter-agency initiative to promote information and mapping systems on food insecurity and vulnerability

www.ﬁvims.net/index.jspx?lang=en

ICARRD, International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, March 2006, Porto Alegre

www.icarrd.org

Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development (SARD)

www.fao.org/sard

UN System Network on Rural Development and Food Security www.rdfs.net/news/news_en.htm

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Chapter 6. TRANSBOUNDARY RIVER BASINS Madiodio Niasse Doctor of Environmental Science, Senegal

6.1. Regional water resources interdependence

Basin (8 countries), and the Comoé River Basin (4 countries).

Contrary to popular belief, West African countries, including those of the Sahel, do not lack water. Only two countries (Cape Verde and Burkina Faso) are below the international standard for water scarcity (1,700 m3 of renewable fresh water per year per person); Cape Verde is below the scarcity level which is 1,000 m3 per year (see Figure 6.1.). On the other hand, there are major problems in terms of availability at the desired time and place.

With the exception of Cape Verde, each West African country shares at least one watercourse with one of its neighbours. Fourteen transboundary basins are identiﬁed in Guinea where a large number of watercourses rise. There are eight in Côte d’Ivoire, seven in Cameroon and Liberia, and ﬁve in Nigeria and Sierra Leone. In all, the transboundary basins cover 71% of the total surface area of the region.

This problem of availability is mainly regional considering most of the water resources come from the transboundary river basins1 and aquifers.

Therefore, many countries have very high dependency ratios; the dependency ratio being 109 determined by the proportion of renewable water resources produced outside the borders of a given country (see Figure 6.2.). However, there is no correlation between the dependency and the proportion of national territory covered by

The main watercourses (The Niger, The Senegal, The Gambia, and the Lake Chad network) take their source in well-watered regions before crossing the Sahel zones Figure 6.1. Availability of renewable fresh water where there has been a chronic in West African countries in 2003 shortage of rainfall since the Annual m³ per capita early 1970s. Reducing the marked 70,000 contrasts between the wetlands and arid areas (see Map 6.1.), these 60,000 transfers still show the interde50,000 pendence of West African countries for the use and management of 40,000 fresh water resources. 30,000 20,000 10,000 1,700 m³: international scarcity standard 0

Ca pe Bu Ve r rk in de aF as Ni o ge ri Gh a an a Ni ge r To g Se o n M ega au l rit an ia Be ni n Cô Ch ad te d Th 'Ivo e G ire am bi a M Ca al i Gu mer o in ea on Bi ss a G u Sie uin rra ea Le on Lib e er ia

West Africa has 28 transboundary river basins (see Map 6.2.). The most important are the Niger River Basin (shared between 11 countries taking into account the non-active part of the basin), the Senegal River Basin (4 countries), the Volta River Basin (6 countries), the Lake Chad

Source: FAO-Aquastat

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Map 6.1. West African bio-climatic zones

Rainfall per year 0 to 100 mm 100 to 200 mm 200 to 500 mm

110

500 to 1,000 mm > 1,000 mm

Source: ESRI, Global GIS

0

200

400 km

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006

Produced by: M. Niasse, C. Mbow (2006)

transboundary basins. With a dependency ratio close to 100%, only 20% of Mauritania’s territory is covered by a transboundary basin. Contrarily, Burkina Faso “produces” all of its fresh water whereas 100 per cent of its territory is covered by transboundary basins.

Figure 6.2. River basins: Interdependence and dependence Dependance Ratio

Land percentage in a transboundary basin

Mauritania Niger Chad The Gambia Benin

The conﬁguration of groundwater also portrays an important regional dimension. These resources are in the form of various types of water tables. On one hand, they are superﬁcial water tables which are reﬁlled, generally during the rainy season, and on the other hand, they are water tables from an ancient base, and lastly they are deep water tables of sedimentary basins. There are considerable reserves of fresh water stored in these deep water tables: on a scale of approximately several thousand billions of m3. In theory, they alone could meet the current and future needs of West Africa. However, they are of variable depths, sometimes reaching one thousand to two thousand metres

Guinea Bissau Ghana Mali Senegal Nigeria Togo Liberia Côte d'Ivoire Cameroon Sierra Leone Guinea Burkina Faso Cape Verde 0

20

40

60

80

100 %

Source: M. Niasse (2005), based on WRI (2001) and FAO Aquastat (2004) 12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483611182252

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Source: ESRI, Global GIS, WHY MAP

St John

Cavally

Bia Sassandra

Komoe

Volta

Produced by: M. Niasse, C. Mbow (2006)

Cestos

Senegal

Great scarcies Little scarcies Moa Mana Morro Loffa St Paul

Corubal

Geba

The Gambia

Atui

Tano

Mono

Ouémé

Niger

Akpa Yafi

Cross

Map 6.2. Transboundary watercourses in West Africa

0

200

400 km © Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006

Lake Chad

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Map 6.3. Main transboundary aquifer systems in West Africa

Tin Séririne

Taoudéni

MourzoukDjado

Aïr Nubian Senegalese – Mauritanian LiptakoGourma

Iullemeden Chad

Sedimentary Coast

Coast

0

Source: ESRI, Global GIS, WHY MAP

Produced by: M. Niasse, C. Mbow (2006)

200

400 km

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006

112 and are often non-renewable resources (fossil water). According to ongoing studies within the framework of the UNESCO-ISARM Initiative,2 there are eleven (11) sedimentary transboundary basins in West Africa (see Map 6.3.).

6.2. Generally under-exploited resources According to the Global Water Partnership, the withdrawal level of renewable water resources in West Africa (excluding Cameroon and Chad) is currently at 11 billion m3 per year for an available 1,300 billion m3, which is less than 1%. Agriculture uses 75% of these withdrawals, domestic consumption 17%, and industry 7%. Although it is by far the highest in proportion, agricultural use of water resources is low. Out of the 75.5 million hectares of arable land in West Africa, only 1.2% (917,000 ha) is developed for irrigation, and 0.8% (635,000 ha) is used effectively. The small number of dams also helps explain the lack of capitalisation of these resources. However, by storing fresh water during seasons and years of

excess for when needed, dams are effective tools in combating uncertainties and shortages. They also help produce electric power, and reduce energy dependence on petroleum. However, building many of these infrastructures poses a number of problems. The withdrawal level of fresh water resources is increasing very rapidly. It could increase six-fold between 2000 and 2025 if West Africa maintains its current level of access to drinking water and food security; it would then increase from 11 billion to more than 65 billion m3 per year. Concurrently, the West African population would probably double. Water consumption could therefore increase three times more rapidly than the population. This differential is mainly due to probable changes in the distribution map of the West African population with continued urbanisation as well as an increase in human population density in rural areas with good farming potential and proximity to large consumption centres. The population distribution in 2000 (see Map 6.4.) already shows high concentration zones in some river basin areas: mouth of the Niger river in Nigeria, southwest of Lake Chad

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Map 6.4. Population densities in West African river basins Population density No data < 25 25 to 56 57 to 122 123 to 233 234 to 391 392 to 595 596 to 1,942

0

Source: ESRI, Global GIS

Produced by: M. Niasse, C. Mbow (2006)

in Niger, mouth of the Ouemé river in Benin, mouth of the Volta river, and upstream of the Volta basin in Burkina Faso.

6.3. Diminishing surface water resources Over the past few decades, West Africa has experienced a sharp decline in rainfall and average annual ﬂow of watercourses. A break in the rainfall pattern was observed around 1968-1972. 1970 is considered as the turning point after which the decline in average rainfall worsened from minus 15% to minus 30% depending on the zone (see Figure 6.3.). This situation led to the drifting of isohyets by about 200 km to the south. An accompanying variation in annual average ﬂows was observed for most of the rivers. In a number of cases, the decline in ﬂows was even greater than that of rainfall; dropping to minus 30% for the Senegal River (Servat and al., 1997).and minus 60% for the Niger River (Paturel and al., 1997). During the extremely difﬁcult years, there were exceptionally

200

400 km

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006

low water levels, to points where ﬂows actually stopped, as was the case in 1983, 1984 and 1987 on the Bani tributary in Douna (Mali) or as in 1985 in Niamey on the Niger (see Figure 6.4.). Facing this hydroclimatic degradation, the construction of dams seems like a logical solution. Today, there are fewer than 150 large dams in West Africa (see Map 6.5.) out of a total of 1,300 on the continent,3 and 45,000 in the world.4 The region has less than two (2) large dams per 100,000 km2, as compared to 4.3 dams per 100,000 km2 in Africa as a whole. For the same surface area, China has an average of 240 large dams, India 130, Japan 670, and the United States has 75.5 Many projects are being initiated. On the Niger River alone, about twenty sites have been identiﬁed for large dams, and are at more or less advanced stages of planning. They include, in particular, Fomi and Kamarato in Guinea; Kénié, Tossaye and Labezanga in Mali; Dyodyonga and Gambou

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between Benin and Niger; Kandadji in Niger; and Lokoja, Makurdi and Onitsha in Nigeria.

Figure 6.3. Trend of rainfall in the Sahel (1950-2000) Annual index

1.50 1.25

In most cases, the projects are conceived only at the national level, whereas the “purpose” of the dam (the river) is essentially regional, and the construction of a structure has, by deﬁnition, consequences beyond the borders. It may, in particular, result in: ] An alteration of the water quality due to increased river fragmentation. ] A change in the hydrologic regime as a result of intra and inter-basin transfers. ] A disruption of ﬁsh migration along the river and between the river and the sea; the resulting alteration of ﬁshery resources. ] The destruction of natural habitats and of reproduction areas for 114 species such as water birds. ] The slowing down of ﬂows; the change in sedimentary load of the water and of its temperature; the modiﬁcation of the ecology of coastal and delta areas (Ravenga and al, 2000; WCD, 2000).

6.4. Water, source of tension

1.00 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.00 -0.25 -0.50 -0.75 -1.00 -1.25 -1.50 1950

1955

1960

Source: L'Hote and al. (2002)

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483653785311

Figure 6.4. Flows of the Niger River in Niamey: Average variation from 1950-2000 Index of average flows

2 1.5 1 0.5 0 -0.5 -1 -1.5 -2 1941 1946 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996

The increase in the number of Source: Niasse and al. (2003) large dam projects or other river developments, the high degree of the north of Senegal. This project consisted in interdependence of West African countries with deviating part of the water from the Senegal River respect to water, as well as the signiﬁcant reduction to a 3,000 km network of ancient watercourses in of surface water availability creates fertile ground the Ferlo, Saloum, Sine, Baobolon, Car Car and for misunderstandings and tensions between Sandougou (centre-north of Senegal) valleys. The countries of the region. In most cases, problems Government of Mauritania expressed fears with are solved through dialogue. Here are a few recent respect to the impact of water reductions. Following examples. these reservations, the Government of Senegal announced a freeze on the project. Senegal – Mauritania: The development of Fossil Valleys Burkina Faso – Ghana: More dams less electricity? In June 2000, the Government of Senegal developed In 1998, the level of Lake Volta fell sharply and a project for the revitalization of dry valleys in disrupted the operation of the Akosombo hydroRegional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

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Map 6.5. Large dams in West Africa Dams Main rivers Borders River basins

0

Source: ESRI, Global GIS, WHY MAP Produced by: M. Niasse, C. Mbow (2006)

electric power station in Ghana. Some observers linked it to the increase in water withdrawals by Burkina Faso on upstream sections of the White Volta and the Black Volta; these two tributaries account for 56% of the water supply to Lake Volta in an average year. This assumption is supported by the fact that between the end of the 1960s and the mid 1990s, Burkina Faso built 1,500 small dams, constructed 3 large dams, and increased irrigated areas from 2,000 ha to 25,000 ha in the Upper Volta Basin.6 However, scientiﬁc analyses show that the total water storage capacity of all the small and large dams in Burkina Faso (including three large dams under construction) is only 1.5 billion m3, which represents less than 5% of the normal water volume of Lake Volta (Andreini and al, 2000; van de Giesen, 2001). The most plausible explanation is therefore that the decline in the level of the lake was due more to climate change and variability (see Figure 6.4.). Benin – Niger: Border uncertainties Lété Island, on the Niger River, has always been a meeting place for nomad herdsmen from Niger,

200

400 km

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006

who settle there seasonally, and sedentary farmers from Benin. To which country does the island belong? As is often the case, several documents dating from the colonial period provide contradictory information. After many years of fruitless discussions, the two Governments referred the border dispute to the International Court of Justice. This desire for peaceful settlement is certainly linked to the prospects of joint development of the river. The two countries recently signed a co-operation agreement for the construction of Dyodyonga dam on the Mékrou River (tributary of the Niger River). Another dam on the Niger River will be constructed in Gambou. Niger – Nigeria: Upstream and downstream Nigeria has made enormous hydroagricultural and energy investments downstream of the Niger River (large dams in Kainji and Jebba: 1.6 million hectares of irrigated areas, developments for river transport, and water supply to towns). The country fears that the construction of dams upstream could reduce ﬂows in the Nigerian part of the watercourse. The concern stems from the Kandadji dam in Niger

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23,000 km² to 2,000 km² (see Figure 6.6.). The populations have tended to follow the “migration of the lake” (see Map 6.6.). In the mid 1990s, about thirty villages were created by Nigerian immigrants in the Cameroonian part of the lake (IRIN News). These villages had schools and health centres which were managed by the Nigerian government.

Figure 6.5. Fluctuation of level of Akosombo Reservoir Level (m)

85

80

75

70 1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

Source: Andah (2003), GLOWA Volta Project data

Figure 6.6. Evolution of average flooded areas of Lake Chad

116

Surface (1,000 km²)

30 25

Great droughts

6.5.

20 15 10 5 0

1960

After a tense period, the two countries unsuccessfully sought to ﬁnd a solution to their dispute within the framework of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). In 1994, they brought their dispute before the International Court of Justice. In October 2002, the International Court of Justice delivered its verdict in favour of Cameroon. In December 2003, Nigeria started to withdraw from the disputed territory.

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

Source: M. Niasse (2005)

and, to a lesser degree, the Tossaye dam in Mali. These two developments could, according to some estimates, reduce the annual volume of water received in Nigeria by more than 10%. Furthermore, a high variability in average ﬂows of the river has been observed in Nigeria in recent years (reductions of 20% to 50% in average ﬂows). Concerns based on climate change over the long term and on exploitation of the resource over the medium term seem to be intermingled. Cameroon – Nigeria: The migration of Lake Chad The maximum ﬂooded area of Lake Chad decreased from 37,000 km2 in the early 1950s to 15,000 km2 in the early 1990s. The ﬂooded area for four (4) consecutive months decreased from

1995

Experiences in joint management

Since the establishment of the Volta Basin Authority (VBA) in 2006, all the major transboundary watercourses in West Africa now have joint organisations (see Table 6.1).

6.5.1. Advantages of co-operation on a boundary river: Example of the OMVS The establishment of the OMVS in 1972 was accompanied by a Convention declaring the Senegal River and its tributaries “international watercourses” on the territories of member States. One of the consequences of this status is that any intervention that can signiﬁcantly alter the regime of the river and the conditions of its navigability requires the prior approval of OMVS member States. Furthermore, a Convention in 1978 declared water and electric power infrastructure (dams, electricity lines, port infrastructure, etc.) constructed under OMVS “joint and indivisible properties of member States”. The mission of the OMVS is to promote co-operation between member States, coordinate

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Map 6.6. Migration of populations with the shrinking of Lake Chad

Greater Lake Chad

Towns and Villages Borders

Lake in 2002

Niger

0

30

60 km

Liwa

Chad Baga Sola be Yo u g du em ma syst o K er Riv

Bol

Baga Kawa Tourba

Darrak

Nigeria

Djimtilo

Monguno

Cameroon

C Ri har ve i L r s og ys om te e m

117

Ngala Source: ESRI, Global GIS

Produced by: M. Niasse, C. Mbow (2006)

technical studies and activities for the development of the river, as well as regulate the ﬂow of the river to meet the needs of irrigation, electricity production, and navigation. The two major OMVS projects to date are the Diama and Manantali dams. The Diama Dam (1986), located near the mouth of the river, is intended to limit saline seeps; it creates a theoretical irrigation capacity of 120,000 hectares and improves the ﬁlling of Lake Guier in Senegal and Lake Rkiz in Mauritania. The Manantali Dam in Mali (1987) is mainly intended

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006

for electricity production (200 megawatts). It has a storage capacity of 11.5 billion m3 of water7 and creates an irrigation capacity of 225,000 hectares. More recently, member States adopted a Charter deﬁning the principles and modalities of sharing the waters of the river between the different sectors of utilization, including the environment. The dynamism of OMVS is perhaps due to the common interests of member States and the co-operation required for managing their common

Table 6.1. Transboundary watercourse basin organisations concerning West African countries River basin Niger

Basin agency NBA (Niger Basin Authority)

Lake Chad LCBC (Lake Chad Basin Commission)

Member states 9 States: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Chad 5 States: Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, CAR, Chad

Establishment date 1963 1964

The Gambia

OMVG (Gambia River Basin Development Organisation) 4 States: The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal

1967

Senegal

OMVS (Senegal River Development Organisation)

4 States: Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal

1972

VBA (Volta Basin Authority)

6 States: Burkina Faso, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Togo

2006

Volta

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border, which is the river (see Box 6.1.). Guinea's integration into the organisation could in part change the situation since, for this country, the river does not constitute a border. Furthermore, the large irrigation and navigation development projects, which are at the core of current OMVS activities, are not of direct interest to Guinea. It is certainly in the area of hydroelectric power production that co-operation between Guinea and the three States upstream could develop in the future.

6.5.2. The difﬁcult problem of managing a transboundary river: Example of the NBA Established in 1963, the Niger River Commission (NRC) became the Niger Basin Authority (NBA) 118 in 1980. While the NRC had an essentially consultative function aimed at ensuring that a national project does not have a negative inﬂuence on the territory of another member country, the NBA had higher ambitions. Its objective was mainly to coordinate national resource development policies, plan the development of the basin, and manage joint structures and projects.

Box 6.1. Typology of basin organisations In order to analyse basin organisations, it is useful to distinguish: 1. Those which are organised around a border river: The main course of the river is the border between two States. The Senegal River, for example, is the border between Mali and Senegal over part of its course, and the border between Mauritania and Senegal over another part of its course. These three countries are OMVS member States. The recent admission of Guinea modiÀes this conÀguration, and moves OMVS to the third category described below. 2. Those which are organised around a transboundary river: This category is the most frequent in West Africa. For example, the Niger River successively runs across Guinea, Mali, Niger and Nigeria. Its main tributary, the Bénoué, runs successively across Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria. These different countries, as well as Burkina Faso, Benin, and Côte d’Ivoire from where a few tributaries of the river rise, form member States of the Niger Basin Authority (NBA). The situation of the Gambia is similar (OMVG), as well as that of the Volta Basin (VBA). 3. Lastly, those managing a watercourse that is a border in some of its sections and a transboundary in others. Taking into account Guinea (upstream country and a new member of the OMVS), the Senegal river may be placed in this category of watercourses.

B

A

Border

However, it is difﬁcult to ensure joint management of a river that is more than 4,000 km long, with a basin covering 1.5 million km² which is shared between nine states. The transboundary nature of the river does not easily lend itself to joint management arrangements in which each member state (from Guinea to Cameroon) can clearly identify beneﬁts more signiﬁcant than those it can obtain by acting unilaterally or formulating collaboration arrangements at a smaller scale. This certainly explains why the achievements of the NBA to date are mainly concentrated in

A

A B

B

Transboundary

Mixed

the area of environmental protection (control of silting and water hyacinth, etc), an important area which also has the advantage of easily obtaining consensus. In the other areas, the results are still mixed. In 2005, the Heads of State of NBA member countries adopted the Paris Declaration, which deﬁnes the general principles of good governance for the Niger Basin. Through this Declaration, NBA member countries initiated a consultation process aimed at adopting a shared vision of the river and its development. This exercise should ultimately produce an ambitious long-term development programme. Achieving these goals would refute the above-mentioned geographical determinism,

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which does not predispose the Niger River to economic co-operation within the river basin.

] The agreement between Niger and Mali relating to co-operation on the use of water resources of the Niger (July 1988). ] The hydroecological management project of the Upper Niger between Guinea and Mali. This initiative to improve hydroecological knowledge is aimed at enhancing the ecology management policies of this part of the Niger Basin. ] The Nigeria-Cameroon Protocol Agreement concluded under the supervision of the NBA in January 2000 was aimed at coordinating the release of water from dams, consulting each other with respect to water structure projects, as well as the conception and eventual implementation of joint projects.

6.5.3. Bilateral c o-operation Difﬁculties of co-operation between many states on a large basin certainly account for the development of bilateral dialogue. There are ﬁve examples of bilateral dialogue along the Niger River (see Map 6.7.): ] The Agreement between Niger and Benin relating to the development of a hydroelectric power station in Dyodyonga on the Mékrou River (January 1999). ] The Agreement between Nigeria and Niger on the equitable sharing, conservation and development of their resources in common waters (1990). This agreement concerns the sub-basins of Maggia, Lamido, Gada-Goulbi, Tagwai-El Fadama, Komadugu Yobe (this last watercourse forms part of the Lake Chad Basin Network8).

These agreements came after the establishment of the basin organisations concerned (NBA and LCBC). They highlight the relevance of the subsidiarity principle more than they challenge that of basin organisations. Furthermore, it is important to emphasise that in at least one case (Nigeria-

119 Map 6.7. Bilateral agreement along the Niger River

Niger’s water use (1988)

Fare sharing, conservation and development of shared water resources (1990)

Mali Niger

Guinea

Hydroecological management in upper Niger (1993)

Nigeria Hydroelectrical development of Dyodyonga. Mékrou river (1999)

Source: M. Niasse (2005)

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Cameroon

Coordination of water release and concertation on building projects (2000)

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Cameroon Agreement), it is the basin organisation (NBA) which facilitated discussions between the two countries concerned.

6.5.4. Macro-regional c o-operation Subsidiarity is at the core of the concerns of the Permanent Forum for the Coordination and Monitoring of the Integrated Management of Water Resources in West Africa (CPCS-GIRE) created in 2001 under the auspices of ECOWAS. The objective of CPCS-GIRE is to promote and facilitate the creation of consultative frameworks for riparian countries of shared or transboundary basins, while more generally fostering the joint management of shared water resources. The CPCS-GIRE Programme is coordinated by the ECOWAS Water Resource Coordination Unit (WRCU) based in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, and operating since 2004. The West African Water Partnership (GWP-WAWP) is the West African component of the Global Water Partnership (GWP). The GWP/WAWP was 120 established in 2002. Its secretariat is located in Ouagadougou. The GWP/WAWP is a regional platform for dialogue and consultations to promote the integrated management of water within States and within river basins. The African Network of Basin Organisations (ANBO) was established in July 2002. Initially designed to group the basin organisations of West Africa (West African Basin Organisations or RAOB), it was subsequently extended to all basin organisations in Africa. West Africa continues to play a key role within ANBO: the secretariat of the network is hosted by the OMVS, and the organisation is chaired by the NBA.

6.6. Conclusion On the whole, West Africa is not threatened over the medium term by lack of renewable water. In light of the theoretical availability of thousands of billions of m3, the prospect of increasing consumption six-fold between 2000 and 2020 (from 11 billion to more than 60 billion m3) is not off-putting; even if there are and will be problems at the local level.9 The problem lies in the technical and ﬁnancial difﬁculties of

access to groundwater reserves of which very little is exploited today.10 It also lies in climate change and variability which have led to signiﬁcant decline in the volumes of rivers over the past few decades. In other words, very little groundwater is exploited, and surface water is diminishing. This broadens the spectrum of water shortage which, even though it is far from certain, has encouraged States in the region to prepare for the construction of an ever increasing number of dams, irrigation canals or inter-basin transfer systems. The risks of disagreement and tension are real, but so far dialogue and co-operation have triumphed. History shows that “wars over water” are fortunately very rare. Professor Aaron Wolf stresses that “the only recorded incident of an outright war over water was 4,500 years ago between two Mesopotamian city-states over the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers in the region we now call southern Iraq. Since then, you ﬁnd water exacerbating relations at the international scale. But you also regularly ﬁnd hostile states—such as India and Pakistan or the Israelis and Palestinians—resolving water conﬂicts even while disputes rage over other issues. (…) Strategically, water wars don’t make sense. You cannot increase your water resources by going to war with a neighbour unless you are willing to capture the entire hydrographic basin11”. However, interdependence is such that there is pressing need to improve the quality of co-operation in West Africa as regards shared water management. The prerequisite for such an undertaking is certainly to improve information for policy-makers, water users and the general public on climate change and variability and their impacts on fresh water resources. Indeed, in certain cases, some countries have been suspected of reducing the level of rivers by diverting very large quantities, whereas only the aridiﬁcation of climate was the cause. Scientiﬁcally established information on water constitutes, more than in any other area, an essential basis for sound dialogue between stakeholders. This implies that joint observation systems should be set up, including for transboundary aquifers of which the dynamics are rarely shared. Strategic thinking on subsidiarity between the different levels of regional co-operation should be initiated.

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Box 6.2. International standards on the management of transboundary basins The 1997 United Nations Convention on the non-navigational uses of International Watercourses is the result of nearly thirty years of strategic thinking and debate by experts. Although it has not entered into force which requires ratiÀcation by at least 35 States, this Convention serves as an international standard in deÀning the responsibilities of States in the management of transboundary river basins. It deÀnes major principles such as those on equitable and reasonable use of shared watercourses, the obligation not to cause signiÀcant damage to third party countries, prior notiÀcation, information sharing between States, and consultation between riparian States, etc. The 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (or Ramsar Convention). With the exception of Liberia and Cape Verde, all West African States have acceded to this Convention. Today, the region has 46 Ramsar sites covering a total area of 10 million hectares. This Convention is particularly important for the ecological protection of wetlands. The Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), ratiÀed by all the states in the region except Sierra Leone, aims for “the conservation and sustainable use of biological resources” and seeks to “mitigate or avoid adverse impacts on biological diversity” and to “prevent any threat to biological diversity”. This Convention insists particularly on the need to conduct environmental impact assessments so as to minimise damage to ecosystems, and river ecosystems in particular. The World Commission on Dams was established in 1997 to conduct an independent assessment of world experience in the planning, construction and management of large dams, draw lessons, as well as to make recommendations for the future. Regarding dams in transboundary basins, the WCD report recommends that national water policies should explicitly include negotiation mechanisms with the other States concerned on the basis of the principles of equitable and reasonable use, prevention of signiÀcant damages, and prior information. The WCD also appealed to the international community and donors to refrain from supporting dam projects on transboundary watercourses if the riparian States raise an objection considered founded by an independent group of experts.

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Bilateral Agreements offer a good basis for promoting integrated development programmes that are difﬁcult to envisage in most river basins because of divergent interests or priorities between certain member countries of basin organisations. Basin Agencies do not all have the same purpose (boundary/transboundary river, dimension of the basin, number of member countries). Consequently, they cannot be perceived in the same manner or have the same goals. Their common link could be the development of a shared vision of all the countries concerned, dialogue on codes of conduct or water charters, and lastly, support for the implementation of bilateral agreements. The macro-regional level is just beginning. It is certainly the missing link to regional co-operation pertaining to water. It could help formulate a regional water protocol which would facilitate the task of many 121 stakeholder states in several shared basins. It is also at the West African level that states could be encouraged to ratify and implement international conventions on shared waters and the environment (see Box 6.2.). The ECOWAS Permanent Forum for the Coordination and Monitoring of the Integrated Management of Water Resources in West Africa (CPCSGIRE) could play the pivotal role of this regional process along with other regional organisations (GWP-WAWP, ANBO, etc.) that are active in the promotion of better governance of water resources in the region.

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Notes 1.

A river basin or a hydrologic basin is part of inland territory where all surface water flows towards the same outlet (watercourse or lake). The line separating two river basins is known as “the water divide”. 2. Internationally Shared Aquifer Resources Management Project. 3. In southern Africa (particularly in South Africa and Zimbabwe) we find 2/3 of the large dams constructed in Africa. 4. As defined by the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) large dams are 15 metres or more in height or if the height is between 10 and 15 metres, having a reservoir capacity of more than 3 million cubic metres. Dams between 10 to 15 metres high with a crest length of more than 500 metres, or with a reservoir volume of more than 1 hm3 of water, or with a spillway of a capacity of more than 2,000 m 3/s are also considered as large dams. (www.icold-cigb.org/chartefr.html). 5. According to statistics provided by the World Commission on Dams (WCD, 2000) and the Large Dams Register of the International World Commission on Large Dams. 6. Source: www.glowa-volta.de/cd_v3.1/index.htm. 7. Which is equivalent to the annual fresh water consumption in all of West Africa. 8. Another bilateral agreement was concluded in the Lake Chad Basin. This is the Moundou Agreement between Chad and Cameroon dating from 1970 on levels of water withdrawals from the Logone for irrigation purposes. 9. For example, in Maradi region in Niger, in Dakar area in Senegal, or in the Ouagadougou area in Burkina Faso. 10. Some countries depend largely on aquifers for agriculture. 96% of irrigation water comes from groundwater in Saudi Arabia, 69% in Bangladesh; 61% in Tunisia; 60% in Syria; 53% in India; and 34% in Pakistan (source UNEP). In West Africa, the use of groundwater for agriculture is almost zero. 11. Aaron Wolf is Associate Professor at Oregon State University (USA) and Director of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database Project. This statement is taken from an article in the Courrier of UNESCO of October 2001: “Sabre-rattling among thirsty nations”; Interview by Amy Otchet.

Sources and bibliography ABN (2002), Réunion d’information sur les barrages de Taoussa (Mali) et de Kandadji (Niger). Niamey 6-7 août. Autorité du Bassin du Niger. Niamey. Adams, W. (2000), The Social Impacts of Large Dams: Equity and Distributional Issues. Working Paper. The World Commission on Dams. Cape Town. Nov. Source: www.dams.org/docs/kbase/thematic/ tr11main.pdf

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Andreini, M; N. van de Giesen, and al. (2000), Volta Basin Water Balance. Center for Development Research. University of Bonn. ZEF Discussion Papers. No. 21. March. Ashton, P. J. (2002), Avoiding Conﬂicts over Africa’s Water Resources. Ambio. Vol 31 No.3, May. pp. 236-242. Bradlow, D. (2000), Report on International and Comparative Law Applicable to Large Dam Construction. Contributing Paper to Thematic Review V4. World Commission on Dams. Cape Town (www.dams.org). Diagne, B. (2004), “ Modèles d’organisation de bassin en Afrique de l’Ouest : le cas de l’Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du ﬂeuve Sénégal (OMVS) ”. In M. Niasse, A. Iza, A. Garane, O. Varis, (eds). La gouvernance de l’eau : Aspects juridiques et institutionnels de la gestion des ressources en eau en Afrique de l’Ouest. IUCN, Gland (Suisse), et Cambridge (Royaume-Uni). Fourd, J. P. (2002), Petites retenues d’eau. Performance et coûts : Quelles leçons tirer des expériences dans la sous-région, du Burkina Faso en particulier. Communication présentée au Forum régional sur les zones humides. UICN-BRAO. Kompienga (Burkina Faso). 12-14 juin – pp. 32-47. Giesen, N. van de, M. Andreini, A. van Edig & P. Vleg (2001), Competition for Water Resources of the Volta Basin. Center for Development Research. University of Bonn. Gleditsch, N. P., O. Taylor, K. Furlong and B. Lacina (2004), Conﬂicts over Shared Rivers: Resource Scarcity or Fuzzy Boundaries? Paper presented to the Fifth Pan-European International Relations Conference, The Hague, 9–11 September. Global Water Partnership (GWP)-WATAC (2000), Water for the 21st Century. Vision to Action for West Africa. Global Water Partnership-West Africa Technical Advisory Committee (GWP-WATAC). Ouagadougou. Horowitz, M. M. (1989), Victims of Development. Development Anthropology Network. 7(2):1-8. ICJ (no date), Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria. International Court of Justice (ICJ): www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnframe.htm. IRIN News (2003a), Cameroon-Nigeria: Border Commission discusses handover of 33 villages. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN): www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=37536&SelectRegion =West_Africa). Oct. 29. Abuja. IRIN News (2003b), Cameroon-Nigeria: Handover of Lake Chad villages begins. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN): www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=38319&SelectRegion=West_ Africa) Dec. 9. Lagos

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L’Hôte, Y., G. Mahé ; B. Somé and J. Triboulet (2002), “Analysis of a Sahelian annual rainfall index from 1896 to 2000”. Hydrological Sciences No. 47 (4). August. pp. 563-572. Ly, I. (2004), “ Les aspects juridiques liés à la gestion des eaux transfrontalières : Prévention et résolution des conﬂits ”. In M. Niasse, A. Iza, A. Garane, O. Varis (eds), La gouvernance de l’eau: Aspects juridiques et institutionnels de la gestion des ressources en eau en Afrique de l’Ouest. IUCN, Gland (Suisse), et Cambridge (Royaume-Uni). Magistro, J. V. (1993), “Ethnicity and Transboundary Conﬂict in the Senegal River Valley”. Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines. No.130-XXXIII-2, pp. 201-232. Mahé, G., J.C. Olivry (1995), " Variations des précipitations et des écoulements en Afrique de l’Ouest et Centrale de 1951 à 1989 ", Sécheresse, n° 1, vol 6, pp. 109-117. McCaffrey, S. (2001), “The Contribution of the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses”. International Journal of Global Environmental Issues, Vol. 1, Nos. ¾. Niasse, M. (2004), “ Prévenir les conﬂits et promouvoir la coopération dans la gestion des ﬂeuves transfrontaliers en Afrique de l’Ouest ”. In VertigO (Revue électronique sur les sciences de l’Environnement). Vol 5 (1). Mai www.vertigo.uqam.ca/vol5no1/art5vol5no1/vertigovol5no1_niasse.pdf Niasse, M., A. Iza, A. Garane, O. Varis, (ed) (2004). La gouvernance de l’eau : Aspects juridiques et institutionnels de la gestion des ressources en eau en Afrique de l’Ouest. IUCN, Gland (Suisse), et Cambridge (Royaume-Uni). Niasse, M. (2002), “Equity Dimensions of Dams-Based Water Resources Development – Winners and Losers”. In W. Steffen, J. Jäger, D.J. Carlson, C. Bradshaw, (ed). Challenges of a Changing Earth. Springer. Paris, London. pp. 39-43. Niasse, M., A. Afouda, A. Amani (ed.) (2004), Réduire la vulnérabilité de l’Afrique de l’Ouest aux impacts du climat sur les ressources en eau, les zones humides et la désertiﬁcation. Eléments de stratégie régionale de préparation et d’adaptation. UICN, Gland (Suisse) et Cambridge (Royaume-Uni). Paturel J. E, E. Servat, B. Kouame, H. Lubes, M. Ouedraogo, J. M. Masson (1997), “Climatic variability in humid Africa along the Gulf of Guinea – Part two: An integrated regional approach”. Journal of Hydrology, 1997, 191: 16-36. Postel, S. L. and Wolf, A.T. (2001), Dehydrating Conﬂict. Foreign Policy. September 18 www.globalpolicy.org/ security/natres/water/2001/1001fpol.htm. Parker, R. “The Senegal-Mauritania Conﬂict of 1989: a Fragile Equilibrium”. Journal of Modern African Studies, 29, 1 (1991), pp. 155-171. Revenga, C., J. Brunner, N. Henninger, K. Kassem, R. Payne (2000), Pilot Analysis of Global Ecosystems. Freshwater Systems. WRI. Washington, DC. http://pdf.wri.org/page_freshwater.pdf. Seck, S. M. (1991), Les cultivateurs “ transfrontaliers ” de décrue face à la question foncière. In B. Crousse, P. Mathieu, S. M. Seck (ed). La Vallée du Fleuve Sénégal. Evaluations et perspectives d’une décennie d’aménagements. Paris. Karthala. Servat, E., J.E. Paturel, H. Lubes, B. Kouame, M. Ouedraogo, J. M. Masson (1997), "Climatic variability in humid Africa along the Gulf of Guinea – Part one: Detailed analysis of the phenomenon in Côte d’Ivoire". Journal of Hydrology, 1997, 191: 1-15. Tchoué, G. (2004), " Le modèle de l’Autorité du Bassin du Niger ". In M. Niasse, A. Iza, A. Garane, O. Varis (eds), La gouvernance de l’eau : Aspects juridiques et institutionnels de la gestion des ressources en eau en Afrique de l’Ouest. IUCN, Gland (Suisse) et Cambridge (Royaume-Uni). Turton, A. R. (2000), Water wars in Southern Africa: Challenging conventional wisdom. In Water for Peace in the Middle East and Southern Africa. Green Cross International. Genève. pp. 112-130. UNEP (2006), Challenges to International Water: Regional Assessments in a Global Perspective. WCD (2002), Dams and Development. A New Framework for Decision-Making. World Commission on Dams. Earthscan. London & Sterling. Wolf, A.T. (2001), "Water, Conﬂict and Co-operation". In R. S. Meinzen-Dick and M. W. Rosegrant (eds): Overcoming Water Scarcity and Quality Constraints. 2020 Focus 9: October. Source: www.ifpri.org/2020/focus/focus09/focus09_14.htm. Wolf, A.T., S.B. Yoffe and M. Giordano (2003), "International Waters: Identifying Basins at Risk". Water Policy No.5 pp. 29-60.

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Wouters, P. (2000), "The Legal Response to International Water Scarcity and Water Conﬂicts: The UN Watercourse Convention and Beyond". The Water Page. Source: www.Africanwater.org/pat_wouters1. htm.

Websites Autorité du Bassin du Niger

www.abn.ne

Earthprint library

www.earthprint.com

ECOWAS. Water Resources Coordination Unit (WRCU)

www.wrcu.ecowas.int/

FAO – Aquastat

www.fao.org/ag/agl/aglw/aquastat/dbase/index.stm

Global Water Partnership/Partenariat Mondial de l’eau

www.gwpforum.org

International network of basin organizations/Réseau International des organisations de bassin/

www.inbo-news.org/

IUCN – Water Resources e-Atlas

www.iucn.org/themes/wani/eatlas/

Organisation pour la mise en valeur du Fleuve Sénégal

www.omvs.org/

The African Transboundary Water Law

www.Africanwaterlaw.org/

The World Commission on dams

www.dams.org/

The World Water Week

www.worldwaterweek.org/

UNESCO / Water Programme

www.unesco.org/water/

World Resource Institute

www.wri.org/

World Water Council/Forum mondial de l’eau

www.worldwatercouncil.org/

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Chapter 7. TRANSPORT Laurent Bossard, Philipp Heinrigs and Christophe Perret (SWAC/OECD)

7.1. General survey of West African transport systems The map 7.1. provides a macro-regional view of the entire West African area. This map is useful to review the organisation of regional networks without providing analytical information on their quality. With a few exceptions, this map illustrates an apparent congruity between the main urban network and the primary road system. It indicates that there is no densely populated and urbanised area with abnormally poor road access. High population densities and economic activity correspond to high concentration of roads (southern Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea, northern Nigeria, western Senegambia). The coastal route joining up approximately 2,000 km from Abidjan to Port Harcourt carries two thirds of total intraregional trade between ECOWAS countries. The west coast of West Africa has never been well-connected to the rest of the region. This problem however seems about to be resolved since signiﬁcant work has been undertaken on the road links of Bamako – Conakry and Bamako – Nouakchott. The privatisation in railroad between Dakar and Bamako completes this positive evolution in regional transport. Only the Mano River countries (Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone), as well as neighbouring Guinea-Bissau, seem to suffer from poor road infrastructure. A long decade of instability and conﬂict has triggered a double phenomenon of accelerated urbanisation and deterioration of communication networks. Furthermore, some inter-State links still need to be built or improved.

With the exception of Nigeria, where infrastructure is mainly ﬁnanced by domestic resources, the West African road network depends largely on development aid which ﬁnances various projects per year, and has been doing so for several decades. These investment efforts have led to the current regional system, which, while imperfect, shows considerable progress. However, the quality of the network varies signiﬁcantly. A road is built then deteriorates because of inadequate utilisation and lack of maintenance, nevertheless, users pay dearly to use them. If railroads had continued to develop after 125 independence, today they would have “eased the road” from the heavy loads carried over long distances. The current rail grid is mostly inherited from the period of colonisation. Perpendicular to the coast and disconnected from each other, their main function is related to exporting very large quantities of minerals (iron, bauxite, phosphate). Contrary to roads, they do not play a role in the integration process. The private sector taking over the Abidjan-Ouagadougou and Dakar-Bamako lines opens up however this perspective. There are numerous ports in the Gulf of Guinea which are suitably linked to the Sahelian capitals of Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey. These North-South axes are facing growing competition from East-West corridors, notably from Dakar, Nouakchott, Banjul and Conakry. The regional airport coverage also seems “adequate” in the ﬁrst analysis. The airports of capital cities and in certain cases secondary towns meet, without particular difﬁculty, the steeply increasing demand for passenger and freight trafﬁc. However, intra-regional air trafﬁc is still remarkably

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300

Kankan

Ségou

Sikasso

Koulikoro Bamako

Diéma

Bobo Dioulasso

Kaya

GHANA

BURKINA FASO

Ouagadougou

Ouahigouya

Mopti

Niger

MALI

BENIN

Kandi

Niamey

ALGERIA

Kaura-Namoda

Sokoto

Kano Zaria Jos Bauchi

Nguru

NIGER

Zinder Katsina

Maradi

Agadez

Between 1 and 2 million Between 500,000 and 1 million Between 250,000 and 500,000 Other cities

Maroua

Maiduguri Kousséri

Conakry

Kindia

Odienné Korhogo

Wa

Tamale

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005

CHAD

N'Djaména

Lake Chad

Border

Railways Main roads ECOWAS

> 2 million

Main airports Main ports

Main cities (inhabitants)

Kaduna TOGO Djougou Garoua SIERRA LEONE Parakou Pepel Minna Kara Koidu NIGERIA ué Yola Ogbomosho Marampa no Freetown Blitta CÔTE D'IVOIRE Abuja IlorinNiger Be Oyo N'Zérékoré Lake Volta EdeOshogbo Bouaké Iseyin Makurdi Man Okene Ngaoundéré Pobé Mts de Ife Daloa Mano River Akure Kpalimé Abengourou Bongs Yekepa Kumasi BohiconAbeokuta Ibadan Bamenda Yamoussoukro Monrovia Benin Onitsha Enugu Berkwai Po City LIBERIA Tema rto La Gagnoa Buchanan Prestea Bafoussam No gos Warri Aba Calabar v Nkongsamba o Abidjan Accra Onne Kumba SekondiSan Pédro Yaoundé 600 km Bertoua Takoradi Port GULF OF GUINEA Douala Harcourt Mbalmayo CAMEROON Kribi

Sangarédi GUINEA Fria

GUINEA BISSAU

Source: Sahel and West Africa Club (2005)

0

Bissau

Kayes

MAURITANIA Aïoun el-Atrouss

Zouérate

Tambacounda

SENEGAL

THE GAMBIA

Touba

Linguère

Senega l

Kamsar

Thiès Kaolack Banjul

Ziguinchor

Dakar

Saint-Louis

Rosso

Nouakchott

Nouâdhibou

ATLANTIC OCEAN

Praia

CAPE VERDE

N

126 Map 7.1. Transport infrastructure in West Africa (2005)

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ou on Ct mé Lo

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low as regards its potential. Nigerian air space is organised around interior trafﬁc and not with a view towards regional integration.

7.2. The creation of a regional road network A glance into the past reveals the progress achieved by ECOWAS Member States since their independence (see Map 7.2.). In 1960, colonisation left behind a relatively poor road network in a sparsely populated area (the ECOWAS zone has around 78 million inhabitants). On the Gulf of Guinea, the lack of a coastal link between Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana illustrated the antagonism of the colonial systems. At independence, only the coastal area of Senegal, which lodged the capital of French West Africa, had a relatively dense paved road network.

In 1975, there were approximately 115 million inhabitants in the region. The “Senegalese hub” seems to rely on its assets and remains cut off by road from the rest of the region. The Bamako-Dakar railroad indeed still functions well. The coastal band of the Gulf of Guinea was set up: the road between Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana exists. The Sahelian countries remain isolated with the exception of Burkina Faso which is now connected to Accra. Nigeria structures its national network around the large North-South and East West axes. In 1990, the ECOWAS zone had 178 million inhabitants. The “Senegalese hub” had hardly changed. Bamako and Niamey were ﬁnally linked to the Gulf of Guinea. The Bamako-Dakar railroad began to collapse; the Malian capital embarked on a long period of dependence on Abidjan. Ouagadougou and Niamey had several alternatives to open up (Cotonou, Lomé, Accra,

Map 7.2. Main paved or partially improved roads within ECOWAS* 1960

1975

1990

2005

127 N

* Excluding Cape Verde

Main paved or partially improved roads Cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants

0

300

600 km

French West Africa (1959)

Source: Sahel and West Africa Club (2005) Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005

300

SENEGAL

Kayes

Koumbia GUINEA Mamou Kindia

Koundara Koutiala

Didiéni Ségou

Sabou

Koupéla

Ouagadougou

BURKINA FASO

Niger

MALI

Gaya

Niamey

ALGERIA

Maradi Sokoto Katsina Gusau

Birni Nkonni

Border

ECOWAS

1 < 2 million 500,000 < 1 million 250,000 < 500,000 Other cities

> 2 million

Main cities (inhabitants)

Kano

NIGER

Maiduguri

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005

CHAD

Kousséri

N'Djaména

Lake Chad

Road network Motorway Paved road in very good condition Paved road in fair condition Paved road in poor condition Track in good condition Track in poor condition Ferry

Bougouni Fada N'Gourma Malanville Sikasso Tumu BENIN Kandi Zaria Bobo Dioulasso Bolgatanga Djougou Kankan Kaduna NIGERIA Tegina Korhogo Garoua Parakou Wa GHANA Conakry Tamale TOGO Kissidougou Odienné SIERRA LEONE ué Sokodé Ilorin no Niger CÔTE D'IVOIRE N'Zérékoré Be Lake Volta Bo Abuja Freetown Ngaoundéré Ogbomosho Bouaké Abengourou Atakpamé LIBERIA Bohicon Man Yamoussoukro Ibadan Techiman Ganta Porto Novo Kumasi Duékoué Daloa Onitsha Enugu Monrovia Foumbam LomCoto Lagos Benin City Bafoussam Calabar é nou Aba Tema CAMEROON Accra San Pédro Abidjan SekondiBertoua 600 km Takoradi Port Harcourt GULF OF GUINEA Douala Yaoundé

Boké

Bafata

Bamako

Diéma

Nioro

Aïoun el-Atrouss

MAURITANIA

Tambacounda THE GAMBIA

Kaffrine

Sources: Sahel and West Africa Club; ECOWAS (2005)

0

ATLANTIC OCEAN

Bissau

GUINEA BISSAU

Ziguinchor

Kaolack Banjul

Thiès Mbacké

Senega l

Rosso

Nouakchott

Saint-Louis

Dakar

Praia

CAPE VERDE

N

128 Map 7.3. Practicability of some roads in West Africa (2005)

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etc.). Côte d’Ivoire was set up in the South, facilitating the export of cocoa, coffee and wood. Thanks to petrol money, Nigeria continued to successfully interlink its roads through its territory. In 2005, forty-ﬁve years after independence, ECOWAS had 260 million inhabitants. Nigeria continued to develop its road network and remained ahead of the other countries in the region. Furthermore, the general picture of West Africa as a relatively coherent and structured regional network began to emerge. Along the coast of the Gulf of Guinea, a road now links Port Harcourt (Nigeria) to San Pedro (Côte d’Ivoire) (see Map 7.3.). Extending this coastal road to Dakar via Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau is being examined by NEPAD; just as the Dakar-Bamako connection which would make the old Sahelian dream of having a link between the Senegalese capital to N’Djamena come true. But between the network of Sahelian towns and the urban coastal network, dynamic secondary towns are growing rapidly: Kankan (Guinea), Korhogo (Côte d’Ivoire), Tamale (Ghana), Kara (Togo) and Parakou (Benin). The population of these towns has doubled over the last two decades. They should stimulate the agro-food economy and set up the urban network of the West African SudanoSahelian zone. These new areas will require a road infrastructure already somewhat adequate and lead to the creation of a median trunk road between the Sahelian axis and the coastal axis. Besides the construction of the regional network's missing links, the future stake is making trafﬁc more ﬂuid on the existing network. This would mean lifting border roadblocks and other hindrances to trafﬁc, maintaining and improving roads and developing alternative modes of transport, i.e. railroads for heavy or bulky materials (coal, minerals, cotton).

7.3. On West African roads The relatively positive macro-regional description of the West African road network should not conceal the changing and contrasting realities on

the ground. In 2005, a transporter from Niamey does not travel under the same conditions when going to Lagos or to Cotonou (see Map 7.3.). – Niamey – Lagos. The road from Niamey to Birni Nkonni is perfectly passable, even if parts of the road through some of the villages prove difﬁcult because of the deep ditches dug by villagers in order to slow down trafﬁc. Furthermore, numerous controls and tolls further slow the movement of vehicles. Arriving from Birni Nkonni, the traveller has two options: to turn off towards the South and cross the border towards Sokoto, or continue to the East towards Maradi and enter Nigeria to Katsina/Kano. The ﬁrst option is more direct, but because of the numerous potholes on the road, exceeding 60 km/h is not possible. Moreover, there are numerous police checks between Illela and Sokoto. The second option is a lot more comfortable but also much longer. The condition of the road is “acceptable” up to Maradi, Katsina and Kano despite 129 some holes in the road. From Kano, there is a four lane highway to Kaduna. Once in Kaduna, getting to Lagos via Tegina and Illorin can be accomplished under very reasonable road conditions. – Niamey – Cotonou. From the capital of Niger to the border town of Gaya, the paved road is very practicable. After having crossed the Niger River on the Malanville Bridge, the journey continues on a fairly good road even if cars are slowed down because of the numerous bridges until Kandi. The next leg of the journey is relatively free of hindrances until Cotonou. These road conditions are likely to change according to the reconstruction work undertaken. A good road could become more precarious in a few years as a result of sporadic maintenance. Nevertheless, to travel on West African roads is expensive, sometimes as expensive as travelling on the big European toll motorways (see Box 7.1.). These West African “tolls” are more often simply “informal taxes”, which are not assigned to any

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Some ports are almost exclusively devoted to the exportation of raw materials. Nouâdhibou in Mauritania is a rail route terminal, shipping 9 to 12 million tonnes of iron ore per year. Also Kamsar and Conakry are shipping between 10 to 15 million tonnes of bauxite each year. In Côte d’Ivoire, San Pedro exports wood, cocoa and coffee as its main activity. It is handling more cocoa exports than Abidjan. From Sekondi-Takoradi in Ghana manganese, bauxite, coffee, wood and cocoa is exported.

Box 7.1. “Toll” roads as expensive as in Europe In 2005, a heavy-loaded tractor-trailer paid 293 € for the toll road between Brussels and Barcelona (1,369 km); which is 22 €/100 km. In 2000, a heavy-loaded tractortrailer using the Bamako-Dakar route (1,245 km) had to pay on average 17 to 20 €/100 km in “informal tolls”. At the end of the 1990s, it cost 22 €/100 km between Lagos and Maiduguri (north Nigerian town located at the Cameroon border). Hence, the toll costs driving on a 4-lane European motorway or on a 2-lane West African road, passing through towns and villages, are more or less the same.

The other trading ports in the region also export raw materials, but their main activity is the import of goods.

construction fund or to road maintenance (see Table 7.1.). These practices are likely to increase roadblocks and other check points of which there can be 1 every 14 km, such as on the road from Lagos to Abidjan (69 checkpoints in total).

130

7.4. Ports: The emergence of regional competition The presentation of West African harbours would be incomplete without including Mauritania and Cameroon. Nouakchott and Douala’s harbour activity is increasingly linked to ECOWAS (see Map 7.4.) West Africa has twenty commercial maritime harbours with trafﬁc of more than 500,000 tonnes/ year (excluding oil terminals) of which ﬁve are located in Nigeria. The number of vessels docking at West African coasts has grown from 15,000 in the early 1990s to more than 20,000 during the early 2000s. These movements generate a trade volume (excluding petroleum exports) of more than 140 million tonnes, which equals approximately 25% of total African maritime trafﬁc, and only 1.5% of the world maritime trafﬁc. In terms of size and activity the port of Lagos is the most important in West Africa. Its annual merchandise trafﬁc is in excess of 30 million tonnes, which is approximately 55% of Nigeria’s port activity (excluding hydrocarbon exporting terminals) and 25% of total ECOWAS member countries port activity.

Nouakchott, Banjul, Conakry, Freetown and Monrovia essentially serve their national markets. The construction underway or envisaged on the regional interstate roads towards Bamako could change their operations in the relatively short-term. Nigerian ports essentially serve their national hinterland and towards the outlying areas of Niger, Cameroon and Benin. This area accounts for more than half of the population as well as the West African economy. Abidjan, Tema, Lomé, Cotonou, Dakar and Douala have a more regional role. These ports can not only count on their national hinterland in order to thrive. The development of the West African road network and an increasing number of alternatives to the land-locked regions puts them in a situation

Table 7.1. Frequency of checkpoints on some transport routes (1999-2000) Route

Distance Number of Frequency (km) checkpoints (km)

Lagos - Abidjan

992

69

14

Niamey - Ouagadougou

337

20

17

Lomé - Ouagadougou

989

34

29

Cotonou - Niamey

1,036

34

30

Abidjan - Ouagadougou

1,122

37

30

972

15

65

Accra - Ouagadougou Source: ECOWAS

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Map 7.4. Port trafﬁc in West Africa (2003) (excluding oil terminals) 2%

N

98%

Nouâdhibou Nouakchott Praia

9% 91%

Million tonnes

Lagos 5% Onne Port complex

1 24 8 15 30 Port traffic

Dakar

2003 or latest data

6% 94% 27% 73%

95%

Merchandise imported

79%

Delta port complex

Merchandise exported

10% Banjul 90%

21%

Main mineral ports

Calabar 25% 29% 75% 78% 71% Port Harcourt 22%

Kamsar 50%

Conakry

50%

10% Freetown 90% 50% Monrovia 50%

0

300

600 km

Abidjan

Cotonou

12% 25% 11% 75% 88% 34% 89% Lomé

Tema

23% 40% 77% 60% 66% San Pédro

Sekondi-Takoradi

Douala 46%

Sources: Harbour authorities; Isemar; Afristat; Mission Économique de Lagos

of direct competition. Nouakchott will soon be able to join them in this competition followed further behind by Conakry and Banjul. There is signiﬁcant investment in this sector. In Nigeria the Onne Ports Complex strives to become a regional hub for the transfer of containers1 linked to the development of a growing industrial zone. Because of the status of Monrovia’s free port, cargo trading vessels in transit can dock without being taxed or paying customs duties. Lomé’s port implemented a programme, “Solidarity on the water” aiming to promote transit operations destined to land-locked countries. But a port’s competitiveness does not only depend on its infrastructure and services. It also hinges on the quality and ﬂuidity of the land transport networks which serve it (most often being the regional interstate roads). The beneﬁciaries of this emerging trade competition will be the countries that have, at the same time, efﬁcient ports; good

54%

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005

roads without roadblocks; operational rail lines and border posts with the least administrative formalities. The competition between transport corridors could be a triggering mechanism to do away with the numerous road blocks and other obstacles to the ﬂuidity of goods and people.

7.5. The transit of goods One of the biggest economic stakes of the competition between the West African transport corridors is that of the transit of goods to and from land-locked countries. Within ECOWAS (see Map 7.5.), this concerns Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Between 1999 and 2003, transport operations to and from these countries rose by nearly 70%, from 2 to 3.4 million tonnes of goods, approximately 7.5% of total trafﬁc at the ports of Dakar, Abidjan, Takoradi, Tema, Lomé and Cotonou. These transactions, consisting mainly of imports of consumer products and exports of agricultural

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131

II. TERRITORIES

Map 7.5. Transit and re-export corridors in ECOWAS* N

1999 Dakar

MALI

Merchandise flows Thousand tonnes 800 1,600 600 1,200 400 800 400 200 200 100

NIGER BURKINA FASO

NIGERIA

Ports Dakar Abidjan Takoradi Téma Cotonou Lomé

Cotonou Tema Lomé Abidjan

2002

Countries BURKINA FASO MALI NIGER NIGERIA

2003

Dakar

MALI

Dakar

BURKINA FASO NIGER

MALI

NIGER BURKINA FASO

NIGERIA

NIGERIA

Abidjan Lomé Cotonou Abidjan Tema * According to the Nigerian authorities, there is no transit from and to its national ports

132

Sources: Harbour authorities; LARES; Marchés tropicaux

Takoradi Cotonou Tema Lomé © Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005

products (mainly cotton), will grow in line with economic activity and population increase.

In 1999, more than 50% of the transit trafﬁc with these countries was through the port of Abidjan. The rest was shared between Cotonou (19%), Lomé (17%), Dakar (11%) and Tema (1%), apportioned according to their geographic location. If the port of Abidjan’s dominance was due to its geographic location as regards Mali and Burkina Faso, it was also tied to the relative quality of the road linkages and the railroad linking Ouagadougou and Abidjan. Since 1999, the instability in Côte d’Ivoire has progressively slowed down trade ﬂows towards Tema and Lomé (see Map 7.6.). Between 2002 and 2003, the trafﬁc of goods in transit between Abidjan and the land-locked countries has been reduced ﬁve-fold. Operations with Burkina Faso have declined from 390,000 to 15,000 tonnes. While in 1998, Burkina Faso exported 80% of its cotton through Abidjan, in 2003 not one export from Burkina Faso was registered with the Ivorian port.

The Ivorian crisis has demonstrated the ability of regional actors to swiftly adapt transit activity to circumstances and opportunities. In the future, the big transport ﬂows could again experience such pendulum swings; not only in order to by-pass areas of political instability, but also to make use of the most competitive ports as well as the fastest and least expensive roads. The biggest challenge for competing transport corridors will be to maintain the quality of their infrastructure over the long term. From this point of view, preserving and maintaining the major road infrastructures would play a determining role. Overloaded trucks destroying the asphalt within a few months could be increasingly unacceptable,2 notably in the coastal countries concerned with optimising access to their ports. There could be greater pressure than before to comply with ECOWAS’ standards as regards the maximum truck load. Conversely, transporters would be able to obtain assurances for greater trafﬁc ﬂuidity and the termination of informal taxes. Finally, the revival of railroads could divert part of the heaviest transport loads3 from the roads.

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

II. TERRITORIES

Map 7.6. Impact of the Ivorian crisis on cotton export corridors

1998

Dakar MALI

1,000 t

210,000 t

NIGER

BURKINA FASO CHAD

125,000 t

90,000 t

Abidjan

Lomé

Cotonou Douala

2003 Dakar MALI

NIGER

2,000 t

170,000 t

BURKINA FASO

165,000 t

CHAD 65,000 t Lomé

0

600 km

Abidjan

Cotonou

Tema Douala Cotton exports

From Sahelian countries From ports 240 160 80 Thousand tonnes 20

A West African railway network does not exist but there are a dozen lines which, with the exception of Nigeria, are not connected to each other. Two thirds of the 10,000 km of railway tracks date from the colonial period. From the end of the nineteenth century, extensive work was carried out: Dakar- Saint Louis, then Dakar-Bamako,

120,000 tonnes

Cotton production area Border ECOWAS

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005

Sources: Harbour authorities; SDV international logistics

7.6. Rail transport: Private investments and mining prospects

< 10,000 tonnes 30,000 tonnes 60,000 tonnes

Kumasi-Tarkwa-Accra, Lagos-Ibadan, etc. In the 1930s, most of the bigger lines that we know today were completed. Conceived with the main idea of establishing colonial power and transporting agricultural goods to the large European cities, they remained for a long time the only “modern” way for West Africans to travel long distances. Passenger rail transport will not withstand the poor management of rail lines and competition from road networks which were established in the 1970s.

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133

II. TERRITORIES

Currently, more than 8 million people take the train every year within the ECOWAS zone, two thirds of which take the “Petit Train Blue” which serves the outskirts of Dakar. With little more than one million passengers, long distance trafﬁc in Nigeria is not signiﬁcant anymore. It declined ﬁfteen-fold between 1983 and 2001 due to the deterioration of the rails and rolling stock. Throughout the ECOWAS zone, when a traveller has the choice to take the railway or the road, they usually opt for the road. This is the case of the Abidjan-Ouagadougou route which takes 35 hours in the best case scenario. Even where road competition is negligible, passengers are still not taking the train: between Dakar and Bamako, one train per week and minimum two days travel hardly draws 150,000 passengers/year. However, the transport of goods seems to have a future (see Map 7.7.). Signiﬁcant investment by large international businesses in regional railroad axes (Abidjan-Ouagadougou and Dakar-Bamako) demonstrate that the private sector believes that this is a proﬁtable tool with which to transport 134 cereals and food products, hydrocarbons, cotton or fertiliser and chemical products. If these experiences are conclusive, a new era of rail transport could open up after four decades of dormancy. ECOWAS has commissioned a comprehensive feasibility study on the rehabilitation of the existing network and the building of new interconnecting lines. This study could help new private investors make decisions, at least on the regional axes with the highest potential trafﬁc (see Map 7.8.). In the meantime, the railroad sector does not perform a regional role; rather the railroad system, consisting of national lines, are geared towards transporting minerals to ports and the world market. These lines carry 25 to 30 million tonnes a year of which one third is iron in Mauritania, as much bauxite in Guinea and lesser amounts of manganese in Ghana and phosphates in Togo. If a few years ago the world markets for these products were not very encouraging, the bullish trend underway driven by the Asian demand could make the building of new railroad lines an attractive investment.

7.7. The sharp increase in air transport West African air transport only represents 0.3% of world passenger and freight trafﬁc and 10% of African activity. The trafﬁc evolution has however experienced a remarkable recent development. The number of passengers has increased four-fold between 1975 and 2003 (from 3.5 to 13.5 million) and the volume of freight 2-fold (from 100,000 to 200,000 tonnes) (see Map 7.9.). As concerns passenger trafﬁc, there are some thirty international airports in the region of which 21 handle more than 100,000 travellers per year (see Figure 7.1.). Only Lagos, Abuja, and Dakar have signiﬁcant trafﬁc, placing them among the 15 largest African airports.4 The geographic distribution is consistent with population density and economic activity. The three most important economic areas of Nigeria and the major capitals of the region are among the top 10 airports. Travelling within the region (including domestic Nigerian and interstate trafﬁc) represents almost half of total passenger trafﬁc. Tourism makes up only 50% of passengers coming from or going to other parts of the world. In 2002 nearly 3 million tourists landed at West African airports equalling 6 million passages. Tourism accounts for little less than half of the airport trafﬁc in the region. This rapidly growing sector (the number of tourists has multiplied by 2.2 between 1990 and 2002), has signiﬁcant potential to increase airport activity over the medium- and long-term. At the same time, tourism is not equally distributed within the region. Six countries (excluding periods of political crisis) attract half of the tourists visiting the region (Senegal, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Mali). Nigerian airport activity, mainly geared towards business, depends largely on the petroleum sector and its signiﬁcant national trade. Air freight transport is even more contrasted between countries in the region. Only two airports have considerable trafﬁc: Lagos and Accra (50,000 tonnes each). Trade with the global market represents almost all of the air freight trafﬁc of goods. Exports are essentially perishable goods

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

300

Freetown

600 km

B

B

Kidira

F F

Mts de Bongs

F Yekepa

Monrovia Buchanan LIBERIA

Mano River

GUINEA

Kankan

Kaya

M

Lake Volta

Tamale

GHANA

BURKINA FASO

Ouagadougou

Niger

MALI

Blitta

TOGO

Sokoto

F

Itape

Nig er Abuja

Minna

Zaria

Katsina

Maradi

Kaduna

Kaura-Namoda

Ilorin Ogbomosho

Parakou

BENIN

Niamey

Jos

NIGERIA

ué no Be

Kano

Nguru

Non-functionning or temporarely closed railways

NIGER

0 to 500,000

ECOWAS

500,000 to 1 million

More than 1 million

Other products (2001)

0 to 1 million

1 to 5 million

More than 5 million

Minerals (2002)

Railway transport (tonnes)

Border

Other cities

250,000 < 500,000 *

500,000 < 1 million

ALGERIE

1 < 2 million

> 2 million

Main cities (inhabitants)

Kumasi

P

M

B

F

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005

CAMEROON

CHAD

N'Djaména Kousséri

Ngaoundéré

Garoua

Main exports

Phosphate

Manganese

Bauxite

Iron

Ore

Lake Chad

Maroua

Maiduguri

Ajaokuta Oshogbo Kpalimé PobéIlaro Ibadan Akure Taligbo Bamenda B Yamoussoukro M Benin Onitsha Enugu Kpémé Bafoussam Berkwai P Por City C Tarkwa Lagos Lomé oto to N no o M Calabar v Tema Aba u o Warri Nkongsamba Abidjan Accra Kumba SekondiTakoradi Port Harcourt Douala GULF OF GUINEA Yaoundé

Bouaké

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Bobo Dioulasso

Koulikoro

Bamako

MAURITANIA

Zouérate

F Marampa SIERRA LEONE

B

Kindia

B

Sangarédi

Pepel

Fria

GUINEA BISSAU

Conakry

Kamsar

Bissau

THE GAMBIA

Linguère Touba SENEGAL

F

Sources: Atlas de la zone franc en Afrique subsaharienne (1995); Railways in Africa; Afristat; Marchés Tropicaux; Federal Ministry of Transport (Nigeria)

0

Kaolack

Banjul

Ziguinchor

Dakar

Thiès

S e ne g a l

Nouakchott

Nouâdhibou

Saint-Louis

ATLANTIC OCEAN

Praia

CAPE VERDE

N

Map 7.7. Railway and merchandise transport in West Africa

II. TERRITORIES

135

Dakar

Saint-Louis

Praia

Nouâdhibou

Tambacounda

Kaédi Matam

Rosso

Nouakchott

Zouérate

Ansongo

Railways 1,000 m gauge 1,067 m gauge 1,435 m gauge Planned interconnections

Cities Border ECOWAS

Kayes

Sources: ECOWAS; NEPAD; Atlas de la zone franc en Afrique subsaharienne (1995); Japan Railway & Transport Review (March 2000)

Banjul

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005

Birni-NKonni Dori Niamey Maradi Koulikoro Sokoto Ouagadougou Kaya Nguru Bamako Sangarédi Dosso Kaura Bissau Bougouni N'Djaména Namoda Kano Dabola Fria Zaria Maiduguri Kamsar Sikasso Bobo Dioulasso Pama Parakou Minna Kaduna Kankan Conakry Tamale Marampa Ouangolodougou Kafanchan Abuja Blitta Freetown Lafia Itape Mts de Pobé Ngaoundéré Man Mano River Bong Ijebu Kpalimé Ajaokuta ATLANTIC OCEAN Berkwai Sanniquellie Ode Monrovia Prestea Lagos Nkonsamba Dimbokro Lomé Cotonou Onitsha Kumba Buchanan AccraTema Abidjan SekondiSan Pédro 0 300 600 km Yaoundé Port Harcourt Takoradi Douala GULF OF GUINEA Mbalmayo

N

136 Map 7.8. Existing and planned railways in West Africa

II. TERRITORIES

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

SENEGAL

GUINEA

300

GUINEA

600 km

Accra

ALGERIA

Abidjan

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Cotonou 2 Lomé Lagos Accra2

GHANA

BENIN TOGO

BURKINA FASO

Niamey Ouagadougou

MALI

Bobo Dioulasso

Bamako

LIBERIA

SIERRA LEONE

Conakry

GUINEA BISSAU

Banjul THE GAMBIA

Dakar SENEGAL

Nouakchott

MAURITANIA

Nouâdhibou

Freight 1975

Abidjan

Lagos1

Cotonou

Lomé

GHANA

BENIN TOGO

BURKINA FASO

Bobo Dioulasso

Douala

NIGERIA

NIGER

CAMEROON

Garoua

2Estimations

Yaoundé

CAMEROON

Garoua

CHAD

N'Djaména

11972

CHAD

N'Djaména

Banjul

Dakar

Sal

CAPE VERDE

Bamako

LIBERIA

SIERRA LEONE

GUINEA

Monrovia3

Freetown

Conakry

GUINEA BISSAU

THE GAMBIA

SENEGAL

Bamako

MAURITANIA

Nouakchott

Nouâdhibou

Abidjan

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Abidjan

Niamey

NIGERIA

Kano

Garoua

NIGERIA

Abuja

Kano

NIGER

Douala

Yaoundé

32002 © Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005

Yaoundé

CAMEROON

Garoua

CHAD

N'Djaména

50,000 tonnes 20,000 tonnes 5,000 tonnes < 1,000 tonnes

>3,200,000 passengers 1,600,000 passengers 400,000 passengers < 100,000 passengers

ECOWAS

Border

CHAD

N'Djaména

Port HarcourtCAMEROON

Abuja

NIGER

Port Harcourt Douala

Cotonou Lagos Accra Lomé

GHANA

BENIN TOGO

BURKINA FASO

Bobo Dioulasso

Lagos

ALGERIA

Lomé

Ouagadougou

MALI

Accra

Cotonou

BENIN TOGO

BURKINA FASO

GHANA

ALGERIA

Niamey Ouagadougou

MALI

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Freight 2003

LIBERIA

SIERRA LEONE

Monrovia

Freetown

GUINEA

GUINEA BISSAU

THE GAMBIA

SENEGAL

Nouakchott

MAURITANIA

Bobo Dioulasso

Passengers 2003 Nouâdhibou

Conakry

Bissau

Banjul

Dakar

Sal

CAPE VERDE

Map 7.9. Air trafﬁc in West Africa

Yaoundé

NIGER

NIGERIA

Douala

ALGERIA

Niamey Ouagadougou

MALI

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Bamako

Monrovia LIBERIA

SIERRA LEONE

Conakry

Bissau

GUINEA BISSAU

Banjul THE GAMBIA

Dakar

Nouakchott

MAURITANIA

Nouâdhibou

Passengers 1975

Source: ASECNA; ITA-Paris; FAAN Nigeria

0

N

II. TERRITORIES

137

II. TERRITORIES

(fruits and vegetables, ﬁsh) and imports are manufactured goods (industrial machines, computers, telecommunications, etc.). The high cost of air freight only renders air transport of goods with very high value added viable. This constraint does not open perspectives on the development of intra-regional ﬂows in the short-term.

7.8. Aerial regional integration remains to be achieved

Figure 7.1. Airports hosting more than 100,000 passengers per year (2003) Lagos Abuja Dakar Port Harcourt Sal (Cape Verde) Abidjan Accra Douala Bamako Banjul Cotonou Conakry Kano Yaoundé Lomé Ouagadougou Nouakchott Freetown Enugu (2002) N'Djamena Niamey

Nigeria ECOWAS member countries

Others

ECOWAS non-member countries Thousand passengers per year

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

With 800,000 passengers in 2003, air travellers between the regional Source: ASECNA; ITA-Paris; FAAN Nigeria States represent only 6% of West African airport trafﬁc (see Map 7.10). Only two airports have signiﬁcant activity in to Europe but are not linked directly with any this regard and can be considered as a connecting capital in the region. hub to other West African capitals: ] Abidjan: 350,000 passengers, 12 direct regional The creation of the airline Air Afrique uniting old 138 links. French colonies soon after independence5 has ] Dakar: 200,000 passengers, 15 direct regional probably been one of the factors limiting the linking links. of Nigerian air space to the rest of the region. The closing down of Air Afrique in January 2002 and the With less than 90,000 passengers, coming from or going to an airport located in another West Figure 7.2. Principal domestic routes African country, Lagos is more of a “bridge” than a in Nigeria (2002) hub. Its only signiﬁcant regional link is with Accra Maiduguri (50,000 passengers), followed far behind by Abidjan Kano N (20,000), Douala (9,000), Dakar (6,000) and Bamako (1,000). Kaduna Lagos is ﬁrst and foremost an airport geared towards the rest of the world and towards its internal market. In 2001, it alone handled 1.9 million domestic passengers. The other Nigerian airports have hardly any direct regional links, the majority of passengers being domestic: Abuja 1.3 million passengers, Port Harcourt 700,000 and Kano 200,000. In total, domestic Nigerian trafﬁc is six times greater than West African inter-State trafﬁc (see Figure 7.2.). It is a world away from the rest of the region to which it is not very well connected. The second and fourth biggest West African airports, Abuja (the “capital” of ECOWAS) and Port Harcourt, respectively, have regular ﬂights

Abuja

Enugu

Lagos

Calabar Port Harcourt

0

Number of passengers per year Between airports > 500,000 passengers

300 km

Per airport 1.8 million passengers

100,000 < 500,000 passengers

600,000 passengers

50,000 > 100,000 passengers

< 100,000 passengers

Source: FAAN Nigeria

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

300

600 km

Freetown

Monrovia LIBERIA

GUINEA

MAURITANIA

SIERRA LEONE

Conakry

GUINEA BISSAU

THE GAMBIA

SENEGAL

Nouakchott

Sources: ITA-Paris; amadeus.net

0

Bissau

Banjul

Dakar

ATLANTIC OCEAN

Sal

CAPE VERDE

N

Bamako

Abidjan

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Bobo Dioulasso

BURKINA FASO

Accra

GHANA

BENIN

Cotonou

Douala

NIGERIA

NIGER

* or latest data

Port Harcourt

GULF OF GUINEA

Lagos

Niamey

Lomé

TOGO

Ouagadougou

MALI

CAMEROON

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005

Yaoundé

CHAD

N'Djaména

< 45,000 passengers

50,000 passengers

100,000 passengers

Border ECOWAS

200,000 passengers

< 10,000 passengers

400,000 passengers

10,000 < 25,000 passengers

25,000 < 45,000 passengers

> 45,000 passengers

Number of passengers in 2003* Per airport Between airports (direct connections)

Map 7.10. Regional air trafﬁc: Interstate passengers and direct connections

II. TERRITORIES

139

II. TERRITORIES

liberalisation of the African air space a year later, has spurred the creation, or revival, of ﬁfteen or so airlines, adding to the numerous Nigerian airlines. This process reﬂects very different realities from microairlines to companies owning several large carriers. In West Africa as elsewhere, the future will belong to companies that are able to structure themselves within the framework of South-South and North-South alliances.

Even if it is not yet apparent, this process is underway and should logically trigger a decompartmentalisation of West African air space and the emergence of a small number of regional companies and/or signiﬁcant African companies.

Notes 140

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Very large vessels deliver containers to a distribution port (sort of hub). The containers are then loaded onto smaller vessels or on wagons or trucks that transport the containers to their final destination. Building one km of asphalted road costs around 200,000 €. 700 €/km should be spent each year to assure standard maintenance. 11.5 tonnes per axle. Johannesburg is the largest African airport (12 million passengers), Atlanta is the world’s biggest in terms of passenger traffic (79 million). As from October 1960, the Conference of French-speaking African States asked President Houphouêt Boigny to examine the idea of creating an airline bringing Benin, Burkina Faso, Central-Africa, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo together. Air Africa was officially created on 28 March 1961.

Sources and bibliography airbus (2004), Global Market Forecast 2004 — 2023. Airbus SAS, France. BAD (1999), African Development Report. Infrastructure Development in Africa. Oxford University Press, New York. Banque Mondiale (1999), Système de desserte à escales multiples ou système de transbordement. Transport maritime de conteneurs entre l’Afrique de l’Ouest et l’Europe. Banque Mondiale, document de travail SSATP No. 31F, Washington, DC. Becq, B. (1993), The sub-Saharan Africa transport policy program, road rehabilitation and maintenance: the role of RMI in World Bank ﬁnanced highway and transport sector projects. World Bank, Washington, DC. Bennaﬂa, K. (2002), Le commerce frontalier en Afrique centrale : Acteurs, espaces, pratiques. Karthala, Paris. BIVAC International (2005), Faisabilité du suivi du transit Cameroun-Tchad. Bivac International, N’Djamena. Bost, F. (2004), “ L’Afrique de l’Ouest dans les stratégies des entreprises ”, dans L’Afrique de l’Ouest dans la compétition mondiale. Quels atouts possibles ? Karthala, Paris. Buah, F.K. (1986), A history of West Africa from AD 1000. Macmillan Publishers Ltd, London. Cheneau Loquai, A. (2004), Mondialisation et technologies de la communication en Afrique. Karthala, Paris. Debrie, J. (2001), De la continentalité à l’État enclavé, circulation et ouverture littorales des territoires intérieurs de l’Ouest-Africain. Thèse de Doctorat, Université du Havre. Empresa Nacional de Administraçao dos portos (2004), Estatisticas Consolidado. São Vincente, Republica de Cabo Verde.

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

II. TERRITORIES

Gambia Ports Authority (1999), Annual Report and Financial Statements for the year ended 31 December 1999. Banjul, Gambie. ISEMAR (2002), L’industrie maritime mondiale 1970-2000. Panorama des mutations. Note de synthèse n° 48, octobre 2002, Saint Nazaire. ISEMAR (2003), La desserte des pays enclavés : l’exemple du corridor béninois en Afrique de l’Ouest. Note de synthèse n°57, septembre 2003, Saint-Nazaire. Karanga, A. (2001), Transit par voie ferroviaire en Afrique de l’Ouest et du Centre. Symposium sur le transport en transit en Afrique de l’Ouest et du Centre, 27 février au 1er mars 2001, Abidjan. Laan, H. L. van der (1981), "Modern Inland Transport and the European trading ﬁrms in colonial West Africa". Cahiers d’Études Africains n° 84, Paris. LARES, IRAM (2004), “ Synthèse des travaux ”. Économie régionale, série échanges régionaux, avril 2004. Mabogunje, A.L. (dir.) (2002), Atlas du Nigeria. Éditions du Jaguar, Paris. Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens (2004), “ Dossier Fret aérien et maritime ”. n° 3072, 1er octobre 2004, Paris. Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens (2003), “ Dossier ports ”. N°2997, 18 avril 2003, Paris. Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens (2003), “ Dossier Transport aérien ”. N°2991, 7 mars 2003, Paris. Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens (2001), “ Mines d’Afrique ”. N°2915, septembre 2001, Paris. Marquet, J.-F. (2004), Les routes en Afrique de l’Ouest. Mémoire de DEA, Université de Paris X Nanterre. Martin, B., M. Micoud (1997), World Bank policy and government practice in Ivory Coast and Ghana. Structural adjustment and railways privatisation, World Bank, Washington DC. Ministère des travaux publics et des transports, République de Guinée (2004), Prestations complémentaires du PNT, programme sectoriel routier. Conakry, République de Guinée. Mission Économique du Bénin (2004), Le Port Autonome de Cotonou. 29 septembre 2004, Cotonou. Mission Économique de Côte d’Ivoire (2004), Côte d’Ivoire : le secteur portuaire. 20 octobre 2004, Abidjan. Mission Économique de Côte d’Ivoire (2004), Infrastructures et matériel de transport en Côte d’Ivoire. 4 octobre 2004, Abidjan. Mission Économique de Côte d’Ivoire (2003), Afrique de l’Ouest : le secteur ferroviaire. 1er juin 2003, Abidjan. Mission Économique du Ghana (2004), Les transports maritime, ﬂuvial et ferroviaire au Ghana. 9 janvier 2004, Accra. Mission Économique de Lagos (2004), Les ports au Nigeria. 15 octobre 2004, Lagos. N’Guessan, N. (2003), La problématique de la gestion intégrée des corridors en Afrique subsaharienne. Programme de politiques de transport en Afrique subsaharienne, Banque mondiale et Commission économique pour l’Afrique, document de travail SSATP n° 3F, Washington, DC. Odeleye J. A. (2000), Public–Private Participation to Rescue Railway Development in Nigeria. Japan Railway & Transport Review No 23 (pp.42–49), March 2000, Tokyo. ONUDI (2002), Investir en Guinée. Guinée : pays aux ressources multiples, pays d’avenir. ONUDI, Vienne. Organisation de l’Aviation Civile Internationale (OACI) (2004), Airports: Vital catalyst for economic growth. Working Paper 199, Montréal, Quebec. Organisation de l’Unité Africaine (1968), Atlas International de l’Ouest Africain, Organisation de l’Unité Africaine / IFAN, Paris. Pedersen, P.O. (2001), The freight transport and logistical system of Ghana. Centre for Development Research, Working Paper 01.2., Copenhagen. Port Autonome de Dakar (2003), Rapport statistiques 2003. Port autonome de Dakar, Sénégal. Port Autonome de Douala (2002), Rapport sur l’état du secteur pétrolier national. Port Autonome de Douala, Janvier 2002, Cameroun. Pourtier, R. (dir.) (1995), Atlas de la Zone Franc en Afrique subsaharienne, La Documentation française, Paris. Soule, B. G. (2002), Impact de la crise ivoirienne sur la dynamique régionale : cas des pays du Golfe du Bénin. Réunion consultative, “ Dynamique régionale et crises en Afrique de l’Ouest ”, Cotonou, 16-17 décembre 2002.

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Soule, B. G., C. Obi, (2001), Les perspectives commerciales entre le Nigeria et ses voisins. Club du Sahel/OCDE, Paris. Sournia, G. (dir.) (2000), Atlas de l’Afrique, Editions du Jaguar, Paris. UNCTAD (2003), Review of maritime transport 2003. UNCTAD Secretariat, United Nations, New York and Geneva. UNCTAD (2004), Review of maritime transport 2004. UNCTAD Secretariat, United Nations, New York and Geneva. Villiers, L. de (2005), Africa 2005, Business Books International, New Canaan. Carte Michelin de l’Afrique Nord et Ouest (2001). Éditions du voyage, Paris, France.

142

Websites African Diamonds Plc

www.afdiamonds.com

African railways

www.fahrplancenter.com

Afristat

www.afristat.org

Airports Council International

www.airports.org

A-Z Worldairports

www.azworldairports.com

ECOWAS/CEDEAO

www.ecowas.int

European Commission (country sites)

http://europa.eu.int/comm/world

FAO / SMIAR

www.fao.org/giews/english/index.htm

International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH)

www.iaphworldports.org

Institut Supérieur d’Économie Maritime (ISEMAR)

www.isemar.asso.fr

Institut de la Zone Franc (IZF)

www.izf.net

Marineafric

www.marineafric.com

Missions Économiques (Afrique subsaharienne et océan indien)

www.dree.org

NEPAD

www.nepad.org

Nigerian Port Authority (NPA)

www.aboutnpa.co.uk

Organisation Maritime Pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest et du Centre (OMAOC)

www.marineafric.com/mowca/omaoc/pres3-f.htm

OT Africa Line (OTAL)

www.otal.com

Ouest Afrique Economie

www.ouestafriqueeconomie.com

Port Autonome d’Abidjan

www.paa-ci.org

Ports Autonomes du Cameroun

www.camnet.cm/investir/transpor/onpc

Ports Autonomes du Cap-Vert

www.enapor.cv

Port Autonome de Cotonou

www.portdecotonou.com

Port Autonome de Dakar

www.portdakar.sn

Port Autonome de Banjul

www.gamport.gm

Ports Autonomes du Ghana

www.ghanaports.gov.gh

Port Autonome de Lomé

www.togoport.tg

Port Autonome de San Pedro

www.sanpedro-portci.com

WAEMU/UEMOA

www.uemoa.int

World Bank

www.worldbank.org

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II. TERRITORIES

Chapter 8. TELECOMMUNICATIONS Laurent Bossard, Philipp Heinrigs and Christophe Perret (SWAC/OECD)

ness tool (working in network, market information). Although still marginal, a certain proportion of artisans also have access to this technology since the West African crafts industry also works, for the most part, in networks. Finally, even though until present

8.1. Telephone: The mobile telephone explosion

The use of mobile telephones has grown exponentially since the end of the last century (see Figures 8.1. and 8.2. and Map 8.1.). Whereas in the Figure 8.1. Evolution of telephone subscribers in West Africa developed countries the Million number of subscribers has almost reached its maximum, 8 Mobile telephone it remains rather low within the West African region with 6 8 million subscribers in 2003, or 3 telephones for every 4 100 inhabitants compared to 55 telephones per 100 in2 habitants in Europe. Fixed-line Even if the growth in the mobile telephone sector underway over the last years is greater in West Africa than other parts of the world, the future trends are difﬁcult to predict. On one hand, a very important part of the regional population does not have sufﬁcient income to access this technology. But on the other hand, the purchase of a mobile telephone is, for a growing number of West Africans, an essential investment which they will undertake even if it is a large part of their income. Commerce, at a certain level, is an activity where the possession of a mobile telephone is an essential competitive-

143

0 1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Source: International Telecommunication Union (ITU, 2005)

Figure 8.2. Average expenditure per user in US$ Japan Nigeria United Kingdom Africa Egypt Brazil India

US$ per month

0

10

20

Source: African Telecommunication Indicators (ITU, 2004)

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

30

40

50

60

70

II. TERRITORIES

Map 8.1. Mobile and ﬁxed-line telephone subscribers N

1998 96

6 2

3

Mauritania

Cape Verde 21

1

Chad

Sénégal 7

The Gambia

Niger

16

3 4

2

Mali

4

Guinea Bissau 3 2 Guinea

Burkina Faso

6

1

Benin

4

2

Sierra Leone 2

6

12

2

4

7

Nigeria

7 Togo

Ghana

Côte d'Ivoire

7

Liberia

Cameroon

Number of users per 1,000 inhabitants

2003

156 116

144

ECOWAS

Fixed-line telephone

Border

109

56

12 * 22 *

75

23 2

5*

Mauritania

Cape Verde

2*

Niger

Mali

8

Senegal 29 *

1

8

The Gambia

14

3

74

1

14 20

2 **

Liberia

26 10

36

5

Sierra Leone

5

Burkina Faso 34

Guinea

2*

Chad

19

Guinea Bissau

14

0

Mobile telephone

44 Benin

7

Nigeria

66

Ghana 12

Côte d'Ivoire

7*

500 km

Togo Cameroon

Sources: International Telecommunication Union (ITU, 2004); World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2004)

*

Data 2002

**

Data 1998

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005

the West African mobile telephone market was mainly in the hands of European ﬁrms, much less expensive Asian products could change this situation. According to specialists, it is possible that this sector will continue to grow strongly, even though the limits of this expansion are uncertain. Be that as it may, mobile telephone operators consider the West African market as proﬁtable

because all the densely populated areas are already covered by a network (see Map 8.2.). As regards ﬁxed line telephones, “it assumes a ﬁxed monthly payment, whatever the amount of usage. The prepaid mobile telephone, once acquired, can handle high variances in consumption. Within this context, small African consumers, where income is neither guaranteed nor stable, the possibility

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

Ilha de Orango

Ilha Formoza

Et Tidra

Million

2002

Source: GSM World (2007)

2003

2004

2006

2011**

Source: Informa Telecoms & Media

2005

Fixed telephone line subscriptions

* *Except Cameroon ** Estimation

0

20

40

60

80

100

Mobile telephone subscriptions in West Africa*

Map 8.2. GSM coverage in West Africa (2006)

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

II. TERRITORIES

145

Sources: Eric Bernard (2004), "Le déploiement des infrastructures Internet en Afrique de l'Ouest"; Alcatel

SAT-3/WASC cable SAT-3/SAFE cable

LIBYA

TUNISIA LFON (1999)

Cape Town

SOUTH AFRICA

ANGOLA

Luanda

Libreville GABON

EGYPT

Cairo

Alexandria

SAT-

Cyprus

UAE, India Yemen

India, Malaysia

India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Singapore

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005

002)

N

Singapore, Australia, Hong-Kong, Japan

MAURITIUS REUNION

Djibouti DJIBOUTI

FE (2 3 / SA

Suez

Turkey

F

Co-owners of the SAT-3 cable Countries connected to the cable Countries not connected to the cable

Africa 46%

Asia 17%

SAT-3 / WASC (2002)

98)

SEA-ME-WE 3 (19

Italy

SEA-ME-WE 2 (Segment Bizerte 2) (1994)

Italy

BENIN NIGERIA CÔTE GHANA D'IVOIRE Cotonou Lagos Abidjan Accra CAMEROON Douala

)

Europe 23%

Dakar SENEGAL

Algiers

ALGERIA ALGERIE

Tétouan Casablanca MOROCCO

France

)

USA 14%

Brazil

CAPE VERDE

SAT-2 (1993)

Spain

97

(19

Owners share of the SAT-3/WASC/SAFE cables

Border

ECOWAS

Landing point

Submarine cable (start of service date)

Countries connected to at least one cable

ATLANTIS

2 (1999)

Portugal

o ib Dj nAd e

992

)

A (1

94

FRIC

19

A EUR

G LA

ut i(

146 Map 8.3. Submarine cables in Africa in 2003

II. TERRITORIES

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II. TERRITORIES

of reducing ﬁxed costs is a substantial advantage, even if one must pay slightly more for the communication.” The ﬁxed line telephone’s future for the general public seems to be compromised in the medium-term, at least as it concerns high individual usage challenged by the “tele-centres”. It remains however an important prerequisite for Internet access.

8.2. Internet: Cable’s new deal1 At the same time intangible and very concrete, cyberspace is added and superimposed on to real space and depends upon the existence of satellites, cables, relays, electronic systems, etc. The West African Internet network developed particularly rapidly. Totally non-existent in 1994, the World Wide Web reached all ECOWAS countries by 1998, either by means of satellite or by submarine cable (see Map 8.3.). Between these two vectors, the African governments must make choices, taking into account the rapid technological changes, the insufﬁciency of their budgets and globalisation. These choices cannot operate at a purely national level. They depend on consultation at the regional level even at the continental level. Virtually, Intelsat, Panamsat and New Skies satellite systems are accessible from anywhere in West Africa. In practice, to have access zones depends upon the decision or capacity of an operator (access provider) to use and pay for satellite access. The proﬁtability objective, which correlates to the privatisation of international services and growing competition, is not conducive to covering the entire African continent. Although the prices for satellite access have a tendency to drop rapidly, proﬁtability areas will remain limited and concentrated in urban areas. The dependence of African countries upon a few companies has led to the development of the RASCOM2 project which should lead to a better appropriation of the system. But this project will enter into competition with ever more numerous satellite systems. On the global level, submarine ﬁbre optic cables carry 80% of all voice communications, fax and

Internet. Less ﬂexible than satellite, they have a higher transmission capacity. In 1999, the Atlantis 2 cable linked Senegal and Cape Verde to South America and Europe. This 12,000 km long link is connected to the already existing cables Unisur (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay) and Columbus-2 (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Mexico, United States). Introduced in 2002, the SAT-3/WASC3 cable links Portugal to South Africa, to which some coastal West African countries are linked and also are co-owners: Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Benin and Nigeria. Thanks to the SAT-3/WASC cable, the global ﬂow towards the region increased signiﬁcantly. It allows West Africa to access the world’s submarine cable system and to thus be linked with other continents, a possibility from which only Senegal and Cape Verde beneﬁted until recently. The actual utilisation to be developed from these capacities will depend greatly upon the strategy set up by the cable operators. Will the ability to connect to the internet truly increase or will other services 147 be favoured (telephone, television), etc.? According to some analyses, nearly 80% of revenues generated by African telecommunications are currently diverted from the continent, because the trafﬁc between two African countries goes through, almost by force of circumstance, international hubs managed abroad. In establishing direct routes between African countries, the SAT-3/WASC cable avoids diversion of the continent. From the perspective of the end user, it is likely that prices for services will decrease (Internet or telephone connection) and the diversity of services will increase.

8.3. Towards a West African economy of new technologies It is estimated that there are approximately 2 million personal computers within ECOWAS Member states. This represents one computer per 125 inhabitants compared to 1 computer for 5 inhabitants in Spain. The number of Internet users is almost equal to the number of personal computers. A large number of computer owners are not connected to the Internet whereas

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

0.25

1

EUROPE

ECOWAS Border

SAT-3 Submarine cable ATLANTIS 2 Submarine cable Existing optical fibre cable Under construction Planned cable

Optical fibre cable

600 km

> 25

10 < 25

5 < 10

2.5 < 5

Internet users (for 1,000 inhabitants) < 2.5

LIBERIA

SIERRA LEONE*

GUINEA*

GUINEA BISSAU

THE GAMBIA*

SENEGAL

MAURITANIA*

TOGO

GULF OF GUINEA

SAT 3 / West African Submarine Cable (WASC)

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

GHANA*

BURKINA FASO

MALI*

BENIN

NIGER*

Source: telegeography.com

CAMEROON

CHAD*

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005

NIGERIA

Capacity of submarine cables

AF RIC

Source: International Telecommunication Union (IUT, 2004)

5

Downloaded bits (per inhabitant)

300

ATLANTIC OCEAN

S

A

AT L

A

RIC

ME

HA

OU T

Map 8.4. Internet and optical ﬁbre cable (2003)

SO H UT

* Data in 2002

0

CAPE VERDE

LE

AB

2C

NT IS

EUROPE

148

N

II. TERRITORIES

A

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II. TERRITORIES

many Africans access the World Wide Web at the rapidly growing number of Cybercafés. The development of internet access depends upon both a ﬁnancial investment (acquiring a computer often corresponds to several years of income) and the quality and cost of the connection.

costs will decrease over the medium-term if, as in other economic sectors, liberalisation continues. The prospects for Internet development in West Africa are positive, even if they will continue to affect only a small part of the population for quite some time.

As regards the cost, the future solution would be undoubtedly to build computers in the region in sufﬁcient quantity in order to achieve economies of scale. Assembly factories already exist in Nigeria and one is being set up in Senegal. In any case, only the regional market can be viable. Short of that, the region could, as is done for automobiles, resort to ever-increasing imports of second hand material. In the short term, the explosion of South Asian-made bottom-of-the-line computers on the regional market is also a plausible hypothesis. However that may be, and as everywhere in the world, the average cost of a computer in West Africa will certainly continue to fall even if this technology remains out of the mainstream.

Over the last few years, call-centre companies have developed. These enterprises work for European and American clients. Their competitive edge is in both easy access to a dual telephone-internet system and the low cost of local staff. A certain number of call-centre companies already exist in Senegal and Cape Verde. Their expertise lies in treating customer/data ﬁles, assuring the layout of revues and publications, offering off-site customer service to foreign clients (hot line), translating, etc. The potentials are large and should generate a new West African economy in the future based on using new technologies.

The quality of connection is constantly improving. With the exception of Guinea-Bissau, all ECOWAS countries’ bandwidth4 has signiﬁcantly increased over the last few years. The submarine cable SAT-3 WASC and the land cables that are already installed or underway should speed up the process (see Map 8.4.). The scenario for all large and medium size towns in the region to have easy internet access in the years to come is feasible. The question of access costs remains. The hope is that

However, the dream of Internet everywhere and 149 for everyone cannot yet come true due to the low average income in West Africa as well as for reasons which go largely beyond the strict framework of new technology. The territorial deployment of the Internet is still largely incomplete and will remain so over the medium-term. The Internet itself is not enough. It requires at least electricity and a ﬁxed-line telephone, two services which are still far from being accessible to the entire region.

Notes 1. 2.

3. 4.

The text on this page is largely taken from Mr. Eric Bernard’s doctorate thesis, “The deployment of Internet infrastructures in West Africa” submitted to the University of Montpellier III – Paul Valery, in 2004. The Regional African Satellite Communications Organisation (RASCOM) was created in 1992 in order to establish telecommunications services, notably by satellite, to cover the rural zones as well as the urban zones. Its aim is also to assure the development of inter-urban communications within each country as well as international communications between African countries. The organisation constitutes 44 member countries including all of the countries of West Africa. South Atlantic Telecommunications/West Africa Submarine Cable. Defined as the flow supported by a communication line. But the same bandwidth does not have the same meaning according to population size. Nigeria would need a bandwidth 344 times greater than that of Senegal in order to have the same bits/inhabitant ratio (which represents a theoretical fraction of the international bandwidth available for each inhabitant).

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II. TERRITORIES

Sources and bibliography Bernard, É. (2003), Le déploiement des infrastructures Internet en Afrique de l’Ouest. Thèse de doctorat, Université de Montpellier. Bost, F. (2004), “ L’Afrique de l’Ouest dans les stratégies des entreprises ", dans L’Afrique de l’Ouest dans la compétition mondiale. Quels atouts possibles ? Karthala, Paris. Cheneau Loquai, A. (2004), Mondialisation et technologies de la communication en Afrique. Karthala, Paris. Economist (The) (2005), “The real digital divide”. 12-18 March 2005, London. Ernst & Young (2004), Cartographie du secteur des Télécommunications. Ernst & Young, Abidjan. Gologo, C. O. (2004), ECOWAS regional Information and Communication Infrastructure (INTELCOM II). ECOWAS, Abuja. Mabogunje, A.L. (dir.) (2002), Atlas du Nigeria. Éditions du Jaguar, Paris. Minges, M. (2005), African Telecommunication Indicators 2004 (ppt presentation). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Ntambue, T. R. (2001), L’Internet, son Web et son Email en Afrique : approche critique. L’Harmattan, Paris. Organisation de l’Unité Africaine (1968), Atlas International de l’Ouest Africain, Organisation de l’Unité Africaine / IFAN, Paris. Pourtier, R. (dir.) (1995), Atlas de la Zone Franc en Afrique subsaharienne, La Documentation française, Paris. Sournia, G. (dir.) (2000), Atlas de l’Afrique, Éditions du Jaguar, Paris. ONUDI (2002), Investir en Guinée. Guinée : pays aux ressources multiples, pays d’avenir. ONUDI, Vienne. Union européenne (2000), Télécommunication, quels schémas réglementaires pour les pays Africains à bas revenu. BIPE, ESMT, Boulogne. Villiers, L. de (2005), Africa 2005, Business Books International, New Canaan.

150

Websites Afristat

www.afristat.org

Band Width Market

www.bandwidthmarket.com

ECOWAS/CEDEAO

www.ecowas.int

European Commission (country sites)

http://europa.eu.int/comm/world

FAO / SMIAR

www.fao.org/giews/english/index.htm

GSM World

www.gsmworld.com

Institut de la Zone Franc (IZF)

www.izf.net

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

www.itu.int

Missions Économiques (Afrique subsaharienne et océan indien)

www.dree.org

Mobile Africa

www.mobileAfrica.net

NEPAD

www.nepad.org

Ouest Afrique Économie

www.ouestafriqueeconomie.com

Telegeography Research

www.telegeography.com

WAEMU/UEMOA

www.uemoa.int

World Bank

www.worldbank.org

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III. E CONOMY

PART III. ECONOMY Chapter 9. AFRICA AND CHINA page 153 Chapter 10. OIL AND GAS page 169 Chapter 11. COTTON page 191 Chapter 12. COFFEE page 211 Chapter 13. COCOA page 227

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151

III. E CONOMY

Chapter 9. AFRICA AND CHINA Christophe Perret (SWAC/OECD)

9.1. Partners 9.1.1. Trade

Figure 9.1. Africa’s main trading partners Million of US dollars

80,000

United States France Italy United Kingdom

70,000 60,000

China India

50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000

153

10,000

4 20 0

0

20 02

20 0

6

4

19 98

19 9

19 9

0

19 92

19 9

19 88

19 86

19 84

19 82

0 19 80

In 1978, the economic and social reforms led by Deng Xiaoping put China on track towards globalisation. Today, the country’s growth (on average 10% per year for over 20 years) is driven by exports in low-cost goods. The competitiveness of its export products and its raw material requirements are changing the parameters of the global economy. Even if it does not represent a key issue for the Chinese economy, Africa is directly affected by these upheavals.

Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF (2006)

Trade with Africa has increased considerably: it increased 50-fold between Figure 9.2. Main Chinese imports from Africa in 2005 1980 and 2005 reaching $40 billion. However, this trade barely represents Metalliferous Ore 13% 2.5% of Chinese foreign trade. From an accounting point of view, Africa remains a marginal trading partner for Beijing. Cotton From the African perspective, the 3% dynamic is quite different: practically nil 25 years ago, by 2004, China had Wood Oil become Africa’s third-ranking trade 2% 71% partner, after the United States and France. In the span of one decade (1993 Pearls and Precious Stones to 2004), it has successively surpassed 3% Portugal, Japan, India, Italy, the UK and Germany (see Figure 9.1). Generally, Others 8% since 1993, Africa imports more from Source: Comtrade database, UNCTAD (2006) China – mainly everyday consumer clearly an importer with respect to Central Africa goods – than it exports to it – mainly oil and raw and southern Africa which have major mining materials (see Figures 9.2. and 9.3.). However, resources, especially oil (see Table 9.1.). the situation varies in each region; China is Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

III. ECONOMY

With regard to West Africa, practically all exports to China consist of oil and cotton. Yet these two commodities do not have the same status: cotton is a strategic supply source for the Chinese textile industry whereas West African oil is a marginal supply source for China (see Table 9.2.).

Figure 9.3. Main Chinese exports to Africa in 2005 Electrical Appliance 7% Telecommunication Equipment 8%

Industrial Equipment 5%

Transport Vehicules 8% Others 42%

Clothing and Footwear 14%

Textile 16%

Within a few years, China has thus become the leading trading partner for the exports of major cotton producers (Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad). Conversely, West African imports coming from China continue to increase (see Table 9.3.). With its sizeable population (300 million in 2006, i.e. a third of the continent’s population), West Africa is an attractive consumer market for Chinese products. Nigeria alone represents 45% of the regional population and imports 42% of Chinese exports to West Africa. Besides Nigeria, the main destinations for China’s exports, in decreasing order, are Benin (15%), Ghana (9%), Togo (8%), Côte d’Ivoire (7%) and the Gambia (3%). The share of goods imported from China by Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana seem proportional to their population. However, the respective intensity of trade with Benin, Togo and the Gambia is greater in terms of the market size. This situation is due to their transiting of trade to neighbouring countries.

9.1.2. Investments

Source: Comtrade Database, UNCTAD (2005)

154

The participation of the African continent in the International Division of Labour (IDL)1 has been limited. Financial investments, mainly in the form

Table 9.1. Chinese trade with African sub-regions (average 1993-2004) Millions US dollars

Imports

North Africa

816

1,564

West Africa

257

1,568

Central Africa

841

71

51

401

East Africa

Table 9.3. China’s position in African foreign trade between 2000 and 2005

Exports

Southern Africa

2,239

1,311

Africa

4,205

4,916

Exports

* Sub-regions as deﬁned by the African Union. Source: Compiled Data from the Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF (2006)

Table 9.2. Oil and cotton in Chinese imports from Africa (2004) Chinese Imports Oil Cotton

Africa Billion US dollars 10.1

% 64.2

West Africa Billion US % dollars 0.65 44.8

0.7

4.2

0.60

37.8

Others

4.9

31.6

0.25

17.4

Total

15.7

100

1.50

100

Source: Comtrade Database, UNCTAD (2006)

Benin Burkina Faso Cameroon Cape Verde Chad Côte d’Ivoire The Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Liberia Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone Togo

Exports

2000

2005

2000

2005

33 50 5 47 58 19 35 14 7 37 19 19 11 43

1 1 12 2 21 21 8 17 11 1 24 16 15 10

4 18 8 14 22 1 9 6 5 8 6 6 5 8 10 7 10

4 12 4 15 8 4 1 2 1 8 5 4 4 9 1 7 5 2

Source: Comtrade Database, UNCTAD (2006)

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Source: World Investment Report, UNCTAD (2006)

PACIFIC OCEAN

LATIN AMERICA

United States

NORTH AMERICA

5

55

125

Billion of US dollars

1970

1990

2004

FDI inflows

MIDDLE EAST

45

95

220

INDIAN OCEAN

SOUTH ASIA

CENTRAL EUROPE AND ASIA

FDI outflows (The top five investors in 2004)

SUBSAHARAN AFRICA

NORTH AFRICA

Spain

ATL ANTIC OCEAN

EUROPE

France

United Kingdom

Map 9.1. Foreign direct investment throughout the world

OCEANIA

EAST ASIA

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006

China

III. E CONOMY

155

III. ECONOMY

of foreign direct investments (FDIs), remain low (3% of global FDI in 2004) and vary considerably from year to year (see Map 9.1.). Although the United Kingdom, the United States and France remain the leading investors in sub-Saharan Africa, new countries in East Asia, South America and even South Africa are interested in the emerging opportunities on the continent. Among these countries, China contributed 0.7% of FDI in Africa between 1979 and 2002. Between 1979 and 2002, almost 10% of Chinese foreign direct investment was in Africa (see Table 9.4.). Over that period, six African countries were among China’s top 30 partners, including two West African countries (Nigeria and Mali).2 Until 1995, the focus was strongly on southern Africa. Since then, however, the scope of Chinese investments in Africa has broadened. Recently, the trend has intensiﬁed and China could become a major player in the future. In 2004, Chinese FDIs were more than $ 900 million of the 156 total $ 15 billion in FDI received by Africa. These investments should continue over the coming years for two concomitant reasons. Firstly, the gradual lifting of restrictions on the Chinese government, in order to prevent the increase in currency reserves from putting pressure on interest rates, should favour growth of investments outside the country. Secondly, China has made ﬁrm commitments to facilitate trade and investment in the African continent.

Table 9.4. China’s approved FDI outﬂows, by region Rank

Region

Number of projects

According to the results of a survey carried out in 2000 on 100 Chinese multinationals, Africa is a priority market for a third of them. Between 650 and 750 Chinese companies are now established in sub-Saharan Africa. The main investment sector is oil. But, many other sectors, viewed as high potential or proﬁtable, attract strong capital ﬂows from Beijing, Shanghai and elsewhere: mining, ﬁshing and exotic wood, manufacturing industries as well as infrastructures (roads, railway, ports, airports, telecommunications, etc.). Of the thousands of projects executed in Africa, 500 are exclusively conducted by the China Road and Bridge Corporation, a construction company. The ZTE Corporation (Chinese group specialising in telecommunications, established in 1985) is launching into several African countries.

9.1.3. Migration Historically, Chinese migration to Africa goes back to the nineteenth century during the “Coolie trade” when Chinese migrants worked in the South African mines or sugar plantations on islands in the Indian Ocean. They sometimes replaced slaves that had been freed with the abolition of the slave trade. It is in fact in these areas that the strongest diasporas are found in Africa (see Map 9.2.). Over the past four decades, China has sent on temporary missions between 15,000 and 20,000 technical assistants in the medical sector and 10,000 agricultural specialists, among others.

Table 9.5. Chinese foreign direct investments in selected African countries (2002) Inward FDI stocks ($ million)

Accumulated value (1979-2002) $ million

Chinese FDI stocks ($ million)

Proportion (%)

3,672

5,482

Cameroon

1,505

16

1.1

North America

847

1,270

Ghana

1,610

19

1.2

3

Africa

585

818

Mali

523

58

11.0

4

Latin America

362

658

Nigeria

22,570

44

0.2

5

Europe

1,194

561

South Africa

29,611

125

0.4

6

Oceania

300

550

Tanzania

2,335

41

1.8

6,960

9,340

Zambia

2,241

134

6.0

1

Asia

2

TOTAL

Source: Ministry of Commerce of China, in “China: an emerging FDI outward investor” (2003)

Source: Jenkins, R. (2006) The economic impacts of China and India on sub-Saharan Africa: trends and prospects

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Map 9.2. Chinese population in selected African countries

LIBYA

EGYPT

ALGERIA

SUDAN NIGERIA CÔTE LIBERIA A

ETHIOPIA AN NA N A GHANA

D'IVOIRE D'IIVO I

CA CA O CAMEROON G A UGANDA

SAO TOMEAND-PRINCIPE E

157

KENYA

D.R. OF CONGO

GABON ON ON GABON SEYCHELLES LL S TANZANIA

Chinese Population in Africa ANGOLA Population 2001, Ohio University database

ZAM ZAMBIA

Estimates 2002 to 2006 Sautmann Barry V.

OZ O ZAMB Z AMB BI U BIQ MOZAMBIQUE

ZI WE ZIMBABWE

MADAGASCAR

A AN SWAZILAND

30,000 5,000 to 10,000 2,000 to 3,000

OUTH U H SOUTH IC AFRICA

ESOT ESO LESOTHO

MAURITIUS

1,000 Less than 300 © Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006

In recent years, two new phenomena have occurred. Firstly, labour migration follows the penetration rate of companies; companies arrive with their own site and workforce. Part of this workforce, undoubtedly a tiny minority, never returns home once the work is completed and becomes part

of the illegal immigrant environment. Secondly, individual migrations of small entrepreneurs, often traders, restaurant owners, etc. are developing. This migration originates in China as well as European countries, France in particular. This trend is quite recent. Established in African towns,

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Chinese immigrants set up small businesses and import everyday consumer goods such as electronic appliances, textiles and clothing and compete with local traders. Social tensions could ﬂare up between African and Asian retailers. How many Chinese people now live in Africa? There are no reliable ﬁgures: the Chinese authorities ofﬁcially identify 78,000 workers on the continent. Other sources estimate that the Chinese diaspora in Africa – including descendents – could reach approximately 500,000,3 including 150,000 holding a Chinese passport. Most come from the People’s Republic of China but there are also Taiwanese and immigrants from Hong Kong who arrived before the reintegration of the former British enclave.

9.2. Current issues 9.2.1. Oil

(of which 80% would be imported). These signiﬁcant volumes force China to be more active diplomatically and economically in the petrol sector with respect to other consumer countries. The Middle East is the major supplier to the Chinese economy. Considering the geopolitical tensions in the region, especially since 11 September 2001 and the American offensive in Iraq, Beijing has tried to diversify (see Map 9.3.) and secure its oil imports. This has had a signiﬁcant impact on the regional (Central Asia, Southern Asia and Russia) and international (South America and Africa) geopolitical situation. Oil companies increase production contracts as well as prospecting efforts, in a context in which current oil prices enable the development of deep offshore sources or the operation of wells that had been considered unproﬁtable until now. Africa is considered to be an oil El Dorado. With the Middle East and South America, it is one of the regions with the largest number of new sources. Furthermore, oil found in Africa is of high quality. Even if states like Cameroon have no real growth prospects, sub-Saharan production, particularly by heavyweights such as Angola and Nigeria, will increase over the next few years. In addition, a certain number of countries have recently entered into oil production: Chad in 2003, Mauritania in 2006. Others will most probably do so in the future, such as Mali in 2008 or Sao Tome by 2010.

Economic recovery and the demographic weight of China demand higher energy consumption than in the past. The structure of this demand histori158 cally depends on coal consumption, for which China is the world’s leading producer. By the next generation, coal consumption will still dominate the Chinese energy proﬁle. However, that does not prevent the country from developing other options whether through hydroelectricity (the construction of the Three Gorges dam4 is an illustration of this), nuclear energy, gas and ... oil. Oil, which is used in transportation and industry, is the country’s second source Figure 9.4. China’s oil dependency 1990 to 2030 of energy. Its demand has mb/d increased since the 1970s, to 15 such a point that China has become a net importer since 12 1993. In 2005, China is the second largest consumer of oil in the world with more than 6 million barrels/day behind the US (20 million barrels/ day) and ahead of Japan (5 million barrels/day). By 2030, experts forecast that Chinese demand could exceed 13 million barrels/day

60% 40%

9 Oil Dependency

6

20% 0%

3 0 1990

80%

2000 Production

2010 Demand

-20% 2020 2030 Imports in % of demand

Source: International Energy Agency / OECD (2004)

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Between 1998 and 2005, Chinese imports of African oil increased nine-fold, rising from 100,000 to more than 900,000 barrels/day. This growth is particularly

strong when compared to its total imports of crude oil which only increased by 3.5 over the same period. 90% of these ﬂows come from sub-Saharan

Map 9.3. Chinese oil importations in 1995 and in 2005

1995

Source of Petroleum Imports by China (%) Others 5% East Asia 41%

United Kingdom

Middle East 45%

West Africa 9%

Russian Federation

Algeria Lybia

Iran Saudi Arabia Yemen

Nigeria

Oman Vietnam

Gabon Congo

Malaysia

Angola PACIFIC OCEAN

Indonesia

ATL ANTIC OCEAN

INDIAN OCEAN

Australia

159

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006

Source: Comtrade Database, UNCTAD (2006)

Source of Petroleum Imports by China (%)

2005

Others 5% Latin America 3%

Norway

Middle East 47%

Russia 10%

Russian Federation

West Africa 28%

East Asia 7%

Algeria

Venezuela

Ecuador

Brazil

Lybia Egypt

Iran

Saudi Arabia

Chad Oman Yemen Nigeria Sudan Equatorial Guinea Congo Gabon Angola

ATL ANTIC OCEAN

PACIFIC OCEAN

Irak

Vietnam Thaïlande Brunei Malaysia Indonesia

INDIAN OCEAN

Australia

Argentina

Source: Comtrade Database, UNCTAD (2006)

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006

Chili

Source: Petroleum companies, LEPII (2006)

PACIFIC OCEAN

Peru

Ecuador

Brazil

Venezuela

160 Nigeria

Niger

Angola

Gabon

Equatorial Guinea

OCEAN Mauritania ATL ANTIQUEMali

Algeria

Congo

Chad

Tunisia

Syria

Kazakhstan

Sudan

Oman

Turkmenistan Iran

Saudi Arabia

Irak

Azerbaïdjan

INDIAN OCEAN

Russian Federation

Map 9.4. Main foreign investments by Chinese oil companies 1995 to 2006

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006

CNOOC

CNPC / PetroChina

Sinopec

Australia

Indonesia

III. ECONOMY

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African countries, mainly Angola, China’s leading African supplier (45% of its imports), followed by Sudan (18%), the Republic of the Congo (14%) and Equatorial Guinea (9%). The intensiﬁcation of trade relations between China and sub-Saharan oil-producing countries results from growing investments by Chinese oil companies. They are now active, to varying degrees, in Sudan, Angola, Nigeria, Algeria, Gabon, Mauritania, Niger and Mali (see Map 9.4.) and could soon be active in Chad, Libya or the Central African Republic. The CNPC (China National Petroleum Company) is the company that has invested most on the continent. It is present in 8 countries with a strategic positioning in Sudan where it has a majority stake in the country’s main oilﬁelds (Muglad and Melut). The SINOPEC group (China Petroleum Corporation) has signed exploration and production agreements in 6 African countries (Algeria, Angola, Congo, Gabon, Mali and Sudan). Finally, the CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation), reﬂecting China’s ambition for offshore operations, is above all visible in the Gulf of Guinea. This company targets deep-sea extraction which could be proﬁtable over 20 years or more. It has entered the recently discovered Akpo Field in Nigeria. This company has invested $ 2.3 billion to acquire 45% of the capital. In February 2006, it also signed an exploration contract with Equatorial Guinea for the offshore S block (see Map 9.4.). West Africa is therefore not the current major issue for China: West African oil exports only amount to 5% of African exports to China. However, in the long term, West Africa is attractive because of reserves in Nigeria, recent operations opened in Mauritania and Chad with potential operations in the Sahelian strip conﬁned between Chad and Mauritania.

9.2.2. Cotton Since the late 1980s, China has been heavily dependent on American cotton: it imports between 40% and 60% of its annual requirements from the United States and more than 75% from the United States, Central Asia, West Africa and Australia combined. The rest of its imports come

from various sources: southern Asia (Pakistan in particular), South America (Brazil), Africa, the Middle East. West Africa had a minor role, as in 1994, only 2.2% of Chinese cotton imports came from the West African region. However, since 2002, between 15 and 20% of Chinese cotton imports have come from West African countries (see Map 9.6.). Cotton exports from West Africa naturally target the most dynamic industrial zones. As for West Africa, it is estimated that in 2004 almost half of the region’s cotton was exported to China (see Figure 9.5.). In 2004, more than 50% of cotton from Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Togo was exported to China. Moreover, almost one third of cotton from Cameroon, Mali and Chad was bought by China and only 10% of Senegalese and Nigerian cotton. More broadly, 80% of this cotton was exported to the rest of Asia, namely Thailand, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia and India. Chinese and Asian demand has therefore contributed to restructuring cotton trade ﬂows.5 Over and above the restructuring of 161 international ﬂows, Chinese demand has increased West African cotton exports. At the regional level, it is estimated that between 2002 and 2004, Chinese imports contributed to 41% of the growth rate in farming exports for all cotton producing countries put together. More broadly, Chinese imports contributed to 2.5% of the growth rate of total exports and to 1.1% of the economic growth rate of cotton-producing countries. Among the countries, the most visible macroeconomic impacts are in Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Togo. Chinese cotton imports contributed to 7% of the economic growth rate in these four countries. According to current outlooks, Chinese demand for cotton and Chinese cotton imports should remain high until 2010. Given its key position on the international market, China plays a fundamental role in determining the level of international prices. Growth in Chinese imports seems to have increased prices in the short term over the past two to three years. Is this situation sustainable? Will West Africa beneﬁt from this new conﬁguration? Very recently, Michel Fok highlighted that

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Source: Comtrade database, UNCTAD (2006)

* Data calculated in proportion to flows (see table)

Principal regions consuming African petroleum

Origin of exports (2005)*

Petroleum flows*

PACIFIC OCEAN

United States

13%

28%

0%

2%

1%

0%

Japan

European Union

1%

2%

9%

34%

1%

8%

ATL ANTIC OCEAN

Countries in the Gulf of Guinea

North Africa Chad Sudan

European Union 25

INDIAN OCEAN

Map 9.5. Destination of African oil exports in 2005 Chad / Sudan

United States

Gulf of Guinea

China

North Africa

162

2005

China

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006

Japan

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Figure 9.5. Origin of Chinese cotton imports 1989 to 2004 Million of US dollars

3,500

Others

3,000

West Africa

forcing 12,000 employees out of work. There were another 13,000 job losses in Lesotho. Low-cost Chinese textile and other consumer imports also devastated consumer product industries in several Nigerian cities.

2,500

United States 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

Source: Comtrade Database, UNCTAD (2006)

Figure 9.6. Destination of cotton exports from West African countries in 2004 Million of US dollars

300 250

China Rest of the World

200 150 100 50 0 Benin

Burkina Cameroon Côte Faso d'Ivoire

Ghana

Mali

In any case, negotiations between China and African countries will be important for the future of the West African cottonproducing and textile sectors. The forum on China/ Africa co-operation could be the venue for such negotiations. Recently, China pledged to support the West African cotton-textile industry through technology transfers to “help these countries increase the volume of their cotton production and develop their cotton industry.” Within this context, China “will open clothing production plants and textile processing centres in several West African countries.”6 Could this episode be the ﬁrst sign of a change in Chinese strategy in Africa?

Nigeria Senegal

Source: Comtrade Database, UNCTAD (2006)

“The cotton world is now very attentive to the impact China has on the development of rules governing transaction contracts. This country is currently setting out its own rules without completely following the Liverpool rules. Considering that it is a major destination for West African cotton, countries in that region should be extremely attentive to this development”. The other issue is linked to the impact of competition from Chinese textile exports on the West African textile sector: Chinese textile exports have harmed industries in Lesotho, Swaziland, Ghana, Uganda, Kenya, South Africa, and Morocco. Since the surge in Chinese textile imports began in 2003, South Africa lost 55,000 jobs in the industry by the end of 2005. More than ten clothing factories closed in Swaziland,

But it seems important to put this impact into perspective. In West Africa, textile imports come from other regions of the world, not counting the market in secondhand clothes coming from the European Union. And, as paradoxical as it may seem, a certain number of Chinese economic operators have invested in the African textile industry. For example, in West Africa, in the four textile industries operating in Ghana, two belong to Chinese groups. Likewise, in Benin, of the three industries currently operating, 163 two are funded by Chinese companies. Could this be indicative of a trend that will be conﬁrmed in the future?

Chad

Togo

9.3. Future issues Oil and cotton will remain key issues at the core of Sino-African relations in the coming decades.

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Central Asia 10.1%

Australia 8,5%

United States 63.2%

Others 8.8%

Source: Comtrade Database, UNCTAD (2006)

West Africa 2.2%

Africa (others) 7.2%

China's Cotton Imports in 1994 0.9 billion of US dollars

WEST AFRICA

CENTRAL ASIA

UNITED STATES

1994

164

AFRICA

CHINA

AUSTRALIA

Central Asia 11.4%

Australia 5.6%

West Africa 18.1%

Africa (others) 2.6%

China's Cotton Imports in 2004 3.1 billion of US dollars

WEST AFRICA

2004

AFRICA

CHINA

AUSTRALIA

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006

United States 56.7%

CENTRAL ASIA

Others 5.6%

UNITED STATES

Map 9.6. Chinese cotton imports in 1994 and in 2004

III. ECONOMY

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However, they will not be the only issues at play. It is already possible to discern tension on the world steel and aluminium (bauxite) market. More generally, the African continent will undoubtedly remain an attractive market showing constant growth (if only in demographic terms) for Chinese manufactured products. The risk of a growing “invasion” of competing imports or imports preventing the development of local industry should therefore be taken into account. To balance this, two factors could encourage Chinese investors to ﬁnance West African industry. Firstly, the increase in sea transportation costs should progressively favour the creation of primary processing units in particular (iron, bauxite). Secondly, the prospect of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between African regions and the European Union should encourage Chinese industrialists (but also Indian, Brazilian, etc.) to produce within these regions in order to gain access to the

European market. The ECOWAS zone is, from this perspective, particularly well-positioned as it offers three advantages: geographic proximity to Europe, availability of raw materials (cotton, iron, bauxite, etc.) and a more available, abundant and low-cost workforce than in North Africa, for example. If this hypothesis is proven, it is probable that countries with non-convertible currency (Ghana, Nigeria, etc.) will be more attractive than countries in the franc/euro zone where production costs are higher. Political and geo-strategic considerations will undoubtedly continue to have an impact and will probably partly compensate for this bias. Whatever happens, many African leaders see the Chinese irruption on their continent as an economic opportunity – “what if development came from the East?”-, doubled by a political opportunity – “What if Africa became a strategic issue, it could leave the era of submission to go forward into the era of negotiation.”

165

Notes 1. 2.

3. 4. 5. 6.

The International Division of Labour is the breakdown of production activities between the world’s nations. However, the Ministry of Commerce of China does not include all of China’s direct investment. To get a general picture, mainland China's outward FDI should reach around $40 billion (data provided by UNCTAD) whereas those recognised by the Chinese Ministry (officially approved outflows) only represent a quarter of this amount. By including Hong Kong, the financial hub for mainland China, FDI stock will reach 450 billion US dollars. Moreover, a share of foreign direct investment would be financed by former Asian residents in African countries and are thus included in private transfers in terms of balance of payments. According to the studies conducted on Tanzania or Uganda, 20% or 30% of direct investments made by China in these countries are accounted as private transfers. See Bhinda Nils, and al. (1999) Private capital flows to Africa: perception and reality. As a comparison, there are 35 million Chinese immigrants throughout the world. The Three Gorges dam is located in the middle of mainland China on the Yangzi-Jiang River. For more information on this subject, see Chapter 11. AllAfrica.com: Afrique de l’Ouest : Coton, la Chine promet son appui à l’Afrique de l’Ouest, 8 novembre 2006.

Sources and bibliography Adie, W.A.C (1964), Chinese Policy towards Africa. The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Stockholm, pp. 43-63. Aicardi de Saint Paul, M. (2004), La Chine et l’Afrique. Entre engagement et intérêt. Géopolitique Africaine. Airault, P. (2006), Ils ont choisi l’Afrique. Jeune Afrique, 12 novembre 2006. www.jeuneafrique.com Ansprenger, F. (1964), Communism in tropical Africa. The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Stockholm, pp. 75-100. Balencie, J.-M. (2005), La présence chinoise en Afrique. Dans les entreprises françaises et l’Afrique, 17ème rapport, 2006, Conseil français des investisseurs en Afrique. Le MOCI, Paris, France. Bhinda, N. and al. (1999), Private capital ﬂows to Africa: perception and reality. FONDAD, December 1999, The Hague. Part I (30 p.), part II (60 p.). www.fondad.org/publications/ﬂ owstoAfrica.htm Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

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Braud, P.-A. (2005), La Chine en Afrique : anatomie d’une nouvelle stratégie chinoise. Analysis, 7 p. www.iss-eu.org/new/analysis/analy124.pdf Cerems (2006), La Chine à la conquête du continent noir. Cerems, Institut des hautes Études de Défense Nationale, 9 p. www.ihedn.fr/portail/cerems/cerems_articles_0601_Chine.pdf Chung-Lian, J. (2003), Pékin et Taipeh : les enjeux Africains. Géopolitique Africaine. www.African-geopolitics.org Chung-Lian, J. (2004), Le pétrole, nouvelle dimension des relations sino-Africaines. Géopolitique Africaine. www.African-geopolitics.org Fang, C., A. B. Babcock (2003), China’s cotton policy and the impact of China’s WTO accession and Bt cotton adoption on the Chinese and U.S. cotton sectors. Working paper 03-WP-322, January 2003, Center for agricultural and rural development, Iowa State University, Iowa. Favennec, J.-P., P. Copinschi, (2003), Les nouveaux enjeux pétroliers en Afrique. Dans Politique Africaine n° 89, mars 2003, Paris, pp. 127-148. Fok, M. (2005), Coton Africain et marché mondial : une distorsion peut en cacher une autre plus importante. Colloque Agence universitaire de la francophonie. Filières d’exportation de produits agricoles du Sud : réformes institutionnelles, négociations internationales et impacts socio-démographiques, 6 et 7 avril 2005, Bamako. Gravereau, J. (2005), Les nouveaux visages de la Chine. Dans Enjeux diplomatiques et stratégiques, Centre d’Études Diplomatiques et Stratégiques. Economica, Paris, France. Igue, J. (to be published), Impact de la Chine et de l’Inde sur les économies Africaines : Cas du Bénin, du Burkina Faso et du Ghana. Centre de Développement, OCDE, Paris. Jenkins, R., C. Edwards (2006), The economic impacts of China and India on sub-Saharan Africa: trends and prospects. Journal of Asian Economics 17, 2006, pp. 207-225. Lafargue, F. (2005), La Chine, une puissance Africaine. Perspectives chinoises n° 90, juillet-août 2005, pp. 19-30.

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Lafargue, F. (2006), États-Unis, Inde, Chine : la compétition pour le pétrole Africain. Monde Chinois n° 6, hiver 2005/06, pp. 19-31. Locatelli, C., J.-M. Martin-Amouroux (2005), L’intégration internationale des industries chinoises de l’énergie et ses conséquences géopolitiques. Communication présentée au 5ème colloque international sur l’économie chinoise, Clermond-Ferrand, 20-21 octobre 2005, 21 p. www.cerdi.org/Colloque/ CHINE2005/papier/Martin-Amouroux_6.pdf Lowenthal, R. (1964), The Sino-Soviet Split Repercussions in Africa. The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Stockholm, pp. 131-145. Ma Mung, E. (2006), Deux migrations : l’une ouvrière, l’autre commerçante. Dossier emploi, dans Libération, 15 mai 2006. Müller, K. (1964), Soviet and Chinese Programmes of Technical Aid to African Countries. The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Stockholm, pp. 101-130. OECD (2004), World Energy Outlook 2004. International Energy Agency, OECD, Paris, 578 p. Order, C. (1965), Red China in Africa. The American-African Affairs Association, New-York, 16 p. Sautman, B. V. (2006), Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Africa. Centre on China’s Transnational Relation, Working Paper No. 12, The Hong-Kong University of Science and Technology, 40 p. Servant, J.-C. (2003), Offensive sur l’or noir Africain. Le monde diplomatique, janvier 2003. Shinn, D. H. (2006), Africa and China’s Global Activism. Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, Paper presented at the National Defense University Paciﬁc Symposium China’s Global Activism: Implications for U.S. Security Interests, National Defense University, June 20, 2006, 8 p. Snow, P. (1988), The star raft: China’s encounter with Africa. 1st American Ed., 250 p. UNCTAD (2003), China: an emerging FDI outward investor. E-Brief, 4 December 2003, 10 p. www.unctad.org/sections/dite_fdistat/docs/china_ebrief_en.pdf Zhang, H. (2000), La politique Africaine de la Chine. Institut d’Études sur l’Asie occidentale et l’Afrique, Académie des Sciences Sociales de Chine. Zweig, D., J. Bi (2005), China’s Global Hunt for Energy. In Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005.

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Websites Africa Energy, Cross border information

www.Africa-energy.com

Beijing Review

www.bjreview.com.cn/

Centre d’études français sur la Chine contemporaine

www.cefc.com.hk

Chinafrique

www.chinafrique.com

China Internet Information Center

www.china.org.cn

China National Petroleum Company (CNPC)

www.cnpc.com.cn

Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Africa Department

www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq/2913/

CNOOC limited

www.CNOOCltd.com

Development Centre (OECD)

www.oecd.org/dev

Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

www.focac.org/eng/

Géopolitique Africaine

www.African-geopolitics.org

International Energy Agency (OECD)

www.iea.org

LEPII, Département énergie et politiques de l’environnement http://web.upmf-grenoble.fr/iepe The Jamestown Foundation

www.jamestown.org

UN News Centre

www.un.org/apps/news/

UN ofﬁce for the coordination of humanitarian affairs, Irin News

www.irinnews.org

167

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III. E CONOMY

Chapter 10. OIL AND GAS Philipp Heinrigs (SWAC/OECD)

demand) and second, soaring oil demand, notably in China and India.

10.1. The world of oil 10.1.1. Still thirsty

The USA accounts for respectively 25% and 28% of total world consumption and imports. In 2005, China was the world’s second largest oil consumer and India was sixth. China’s 7.2% average annual increase in oil consumption during the last ten years made it the third largest importer of oil, only ten years after having been a net-exporter. China’s imports grew at an annual rate of 23% during the same period.

In a simpliﬁed way, the world of oil can be divided into two “blocks”: ] One, high consumption net-importing block composed of North America, Europe and Asia Paciﬁc; and ] Another one, net-exporting low-consumption composed of the Middle East, former Soviet Union, Africa and Latin America. (see Map 10.1.).

169

The last decade witnessed only two major changes to this conﬁguration. First, the emergence of Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union as major crude petroleum exporters (due to large exploration investments and a decline in domestic

Oil consumption in Europe remained relatively stable since 1980, reﬂecting on the one hand energy diversiﬁcation and energy efﬁciency efforts and on the other hand slower population growth. Overall

Map 10.1. Crude petroleum production, consumption and major inter-regional trade ﬂows in 2005 11.8 16.4

22.9

5.8

1.3

0.5

3.9

FORMER SOVIET UNION

9.9

6.2

USA & CANADA

EUROPE

0.4

0.3 3.1

3.5

1.4

25.1

2.7

5.7

4.4

0.3

11.9

LATIN AMERICA

Production

6.2

Inter-area flows in million barrels per day*

16.7

ASIA-PACIFIC

2.8 9.8

9.8

7.3

0.8

MIDDLE EAST

AFRICA

4.5

0.2 0.7

2.4

Consumption

0.2

China

0.2

16.4

0.5 to USA & CANADA

0.8

6.8 10.7

2.5 1.1

* only flows above 0.1 mbd are represented

Source: BP 2006

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

III. ECONOMY

Table 10.1. Top 10 oil consumers, importers and exporters in 2005 (in million barrels per day and % of world total) Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Consumption USA 20.7 (24.6%) China 7.3 (8.9%) Japan 5.4 (6.4%) Russia 2.8 (3.4%) Germany 2.6 (3.2%) India 2.5 (3.0%) South Korea 2.3 (2.7%) Canada 2.2 (2.6%) France 2 (2.4%) Mexico 2 (2.3%)

Imports USA 13.8 (27.7%) Japan 5.4 (10.7%) China 3.7 (7.4%) Germany 2.6 (5.2%) South Korea 2.3 (4.6%) France 2 (3.1%) India 1.7 (3.4%) Italy 1.7 (3.4%) Spain 1.6 (3.2%) Netherlands 1 (2.1%)

Exports Saudi Arabia 9.1 (18.3%) Russia 6.8 (13.6%) Norway 2.7 (5.4%) Venezuela 2.5 (5.3%) Iran 2.4 (4.8%) United Arab Emirates 2.4 (4.8%) Kuwait 2.4 (4.7%) Nigeria 2.3 (4.6%) Mexico 1.8 (3.6%) Algeria 1.8 (3.5%)

Source: BP 2006

for OECD countries a decrease in oil intensity1 has been observed during the last decades. Accounting for almost one third of production and half of inter-regional exports, the Middle East is the world’s petrol station. Although, Africa accounts for 12% of global production at best, it is the second largest exporting region with 16% of total exports. Today, Africa accounts for a quarter of European imports and 20% of USA and China’s imports. The 170 countries of the former Soviet Union,2 together account for 15% of world production and 14% of exports.

energy demand in 2030). World oil consumption is predicted to increase to 121 million barrels per day (mbpd) in 2030, up from 82 mbpd today. The transport sector will continue to dominate oil demand and increase its share in total to 54% by 2030. In addition, the transport sector will account for two thirds of the total increase in oil consumption. Oil demand will grow fastest in developing countries, increasing its share in world oil demand from just under 30% in 2002 to 40% in 2030. The IEA estimates that Africa will see the fastest increase in oil consumption, with 3.4% annually between now and 2030. Nevertheless, it will still account for only 5% of total world oil consumption at the end of that period. China’s oil consumption will increase at 3.4% annually and reach 13.3 mbpd, or 11% of world total. OECD countries will remain

World reﬁning capacity is still heavily concentrated in importing regions, with USA & Canada, Europe and Asia Paciﬁc, each accounting for around 20% of global capacity. The former Soviet Union, Latin America and the Middle East have an installed reﬁning capacity of 10% each. Africa accounts for 4% of total reﬁning capacity, of which only Figure 10.1. Projected oil consumption in 2030 13% is in West Africa. mb/d

%

10.1.2. Global trends: More will be ﬂowing

30 25

5

Estimates from the IEA3 predict a 60% increase in world energy demand over the period 2002 – 2030, with fossil fuels continuing to dominate the energy mix (oil will account for 35% and gas for 25% of total

20

4

15

3

10

2

5

1

0

0

6

ss ia Ru

In di a

a Af ri c

e dl id M

he

Source: World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2004, IEA/OECD

Average growth rate

Ea st

sia

2030

rA

fic ot

Pa ci D EC

O

Ch in a cl .M ex ic o in LA

op e D

EC O

US

A

&

Ca

Eu r

na

da

2004

12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/482778402562

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

III. E CONOMY

Map 10.2. Proven reserves of oil and gas at the end of 2005

USA & CANADA

16.8 FORMER SOVIET UNION 52.5

EUROPE 2.2 2.3

2.2 2.1 China

5.9 6.3 AFRICA 15.2 LATIN AMERICA

MIDDLE EAST 64.9 101.2

13

ASIA-PACIFIC 3.2 11.2

WEST AFRICA

6.7 16.7

Source: BP 2006

In thousand million tonnes Oil Gas (in oil equivalent)

the largest oil consumers, accounting for 47% of total consumption in 2030, down from 59% in 2002.

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

But inter-regional exports from Latin America will decrease with internal consumption off-setting 171 production increases.

However, it is changes in production that will have The decline in production in main consumption the strongest impacts on the world oil market. regions will lead to higher oil-import dependence The naturally very uneven distribution of proven (see Figure 10.2.) and consequently increase the reserves of oil and gas will lead to further concenvolume of inter-regional trade ﬂows signiﬁcantly. tration of production and exporting regions (see Oil ﬂows from one region to another will more than Map 10.2). Especially OECD countries will see their double between now and 2030, reaching 65 mbpd. production drop. Europe’s production will decline to a third of today’s level and the USA & Canada will experience a Figure 10.2. Oil import dependence 30% decline in production. The increase in demand will primarily be met with production increases in the Middle East where half of combined world proven oil and gas reserves are located. The Middle East will contribute 70% to the total increase in production and account for 43% of total world production in 2030. The remaining 30% will come from the other main production areas, former Soviet Union, Africa and Latin America.

% 100 2002

2030

80

60

40

20

0

OECD Pacific

Source: IEA/OECD

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

India

OECD Europe

OECD North America

China

12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/482756705235

III. ECONOMY

import origin to reduce dependence on individual oil exporting countries.

Box 10.1. Natural gas is a fossil fuel like oil and coal. Most gas has been found during oil exploration due to geological conditions that enable gas to be trapped below ground. Today, gas provides 21% of the world primary energy supply. 37% of gas consumed is used for heat and power generation, 26% by residential and commercial users and 24% by industry. “Despite rising prices, after 2010, natural gas

10.2. The world of natural gas: LNG5 opening new possibilities

will remain the most competitive fuel in new power stations in most parts of the world, as it is the preferred fuel for high-efÀciency combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGT’s). Natural gas has inherent environmental advantages over other fossil fuels, including lower carbon content and fewer emissions of noxious gases.” (World Energy Outlook – WEO 2004).

This will not only add to the price of oil (transport costs) but also to the risk of supply disruptions at the major chokepoints in the maritime oil trade.4 Today’s energy security strategies of the major importing countries already put a premium on oil 172 from exporting regions that are easily accessible, hence reducing the transport time and cost as well as improving supply security. This is the case for off-shore and coastal oil from the West African and Latin American coasts. It takes two weeks for Nigerian oil to reach the American market compared to six weeks for oil from the Middle East. In addition, importing regions also seek to diversify

Today, natural gas is the world’s third largest energy source, after oil and coal, accounting for 21% of total primary energy use. With strong demand growth projected over the next decades, primarily from the power sector in developing countries, gas consumption will almost double between now and 2030 and reach 4,900 billion cubic meters (bcm), replacing coal as the world’s 2nd most important energy source. Due to the high costs of transporting gas, and therefore the need for production sites to be close to consumption areas, gas exports and imports are heavily concentrated in a few countries (see Table 10.2.). Today, only 26% of gas consumption is traded (compared to 62% of oil), with pipelines accounting for 74% of total gas movements and Liqueﬁed Natural Gas (LNG) for the remainder Proven reserves of gas have increased steadily over the last decades and outpaced production by a wide margin. Although, Russia, Iran and Qatar hold 57% of global gas reserves, gas is more widely distributed than oil. Nonetheless, gas import dependence of OECD countries will also increase, particularly in Europe. Europe will import 80% of its

Table 10.2. Top 10 gas consumers, importers and exporters in 2005 (in billion cubic meters and % of world total) Rank

Consumption

Imports

Exports

(23%)

USA

122 (16.9%)

Russia

151 (20.9%)

405 (14.7%)

Germany

91 (12.6%)

Canada

104 (14.1%)

United Kingdom

95 (3.4%)

Japan

76 (10.5%)*

Norway

79 (10.9%)

4

Canada

91 (3.3%)

Italy

5

Iran

89 (3.2%)

Ukraine

1

USA

2

Russia

3

634

73 (10.1%) 59

Algeria

65

(9%)

(8.2%)

Netherlands

47

(6.5%)

6

Germany

86 (3.1%)

France

49

(6.8%)

Indonesia

36

(5%)

7

Japan

81 (2.9%)

Spain

33

(4.6%)

Malaysia

29

(4%)*

8

Italy

79 (2.9%)

South Korea

30 (4.2%)*

Qatar

27 (3.7%)*

9

Ukraine

73 (2.6%)

Turkey

27

(3.7%)

Germany

15

(2.1%)

10

Saudi Arabia

70 (2.5%)

Belgium

22

(3%)

Australia

15

(2%)*

Source: BP 2006 * 100% in the form of LNG.

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

III. E CONOMY

Map 10.3. World inter-regional gas trade in 2005

FORMER SOVIET UNION EUROPE 13.1

3.9

13.3

13.4

2.3

8.4

USA & CANADA

10.7

0.1 0.5

China

0.1

0.6

0.2

0.7 0.7 5.1

0.1

0.2

2.6

1.2

5.1

4.4

5.9

ASIA-PACIFIC

MIDDLE EAST

AFRICA 3

0.6

3

LATIN AMERICA

6.2 Consumption

0.1

3.3 Production

Pipeline flows LNG flows

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

Source: BP 2006; IEA/OECD

total consumption by 2030 (an increase from 49% today). Consequently, interregional trade of gas is projected to triple.

In million barrels per day of oil equivalent

Already today Nigeria, holding Africa’s largest gas 173 reserves, is the world’s 7th LNG exporter.

10.3. Africa LNG trade (see Box 10.2.) will expand rapidly and account for 50% of total gas trade by 2030. The development of LNG will globalise the gas market by creating links between continents, which until today were too distant as to allow for gas trade.6 This will especially beneﬁt production in Africa.

10.3.1. The new surge for African oil and gas At the beginning of this century, Africa is (again) receiving plenty of attention with respect to its natural resources. Although, it can not match resources in the Middle East and Russia, Africa will

Box 10.2. LNG is a liquid that forms when natural gas has been cooled to -162C (liquefaction). Prior to the liquefaction process, oxygen, carbon dioxide, sulphur compounds, water and other impurities are removed from the gas. LNG has a volume that is 600 times smaller than that of gas and is the only viable form to transport gas other than pipelines. Arrived at its destination, LNG is warmed into a gas again (regasiÀcation) and introduced into pipelines to reach consumers. Although, Àrst liquefaction dates back to 1873 it was only in 1961 that the Àrst liquefaction plant was commissioned in Arzew, Algeria. Technical improvements leading to signiÀcant reduction in LNG unit costs, increases in ship capacity and strong demand for gas have led to a boom in LNG over the last years. Today, there are 15 production sites in 13 countries exporting to 14 countries for a combined volume of 130 million tonnes a year using 179 operational ships. Japan is the biggest importer, accounting for 40% of all LNG traded. Malaysia and Qatar are the two biggest exporters accounting for 15% each. The IEA predicts a near doubling of LNG production over the next Àve years to reach a capacity of 255 million tonnes by 2010. Nigeria will become one of the biggest exporters, satisfying the rapidly growing markets in Europe and the USA. In addition, LNG development has led and will continue to lead to signiÀcant reductions of gas Áaring and venting, especially in Nigeria, and thereby reduce environmental degradation.

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III. ECONOMY

play an important role in diversiﬁcation strategies and become a central part of energy security policies in all major importing regions.

production and transport (see Box 10.2) and to improvements in reserve recovery. ] High world market prices encourage investments in exploration, also in previously unproﬁtable (or risky) locations. ] Limited access to other major oil reserves, notably in the Middle East.9 ] Growing world demand, driven by China and India (that are also investing in countries where perceived risks are very high e.g. Sudan).

In 2004, Africa supplied 25% of Europe’s, 20% of USA & Canada’s and China’s crude oil imports (see Maps 10.1. and 10.6.). Gas exports are following an equally positive trend (see Figure 10.3.).

174

There are several external and internal factors that have contributed to the recent developments vis-à-vis African oil and gas. The internal factors that contribute to the boom in production are: ] End of civil wars (Angola). ] Proximity to North American and European markets. ] Signiﬁcant growth in domestic (or regional) demand. Particularly for gas production, domestic/regional demand is a major factor given the signiﬁcant transport and storage costs for gas. Gas demand in Africa is projected to increase four-fold between now and 2030, the second fastest growth rate after China. The global factors are: ] Intensiﬁed efforts by importing countries to lower dependence on too few exporting countries.7 ] Improvements in technology have led to signiﬁcant cost reductions in off-shore oil exploration and production (where most of sub-Saharan African oil is found8), in LNG

10.3.2. Production is keeping up with expectations In 2006, Africa had 17 crude oil producing countries. Africa’s biggest oil producer is Nigeria with 2.6 million barrels per day or 25% of total African production. North Africa accounts for the largest share in production, 45%, but its share has been decreasing constantly. Between 1980 and 2005, Africa witnessed the emergence of several new producing countries (Chad, Sudan, Mauritania, Equatorial Guinea) as well as the increase in production in some others (Angola, Nigeria, Libya, Congo) (see Map 10.4.). In addition, in several other countries, particularly in West Africa, exploration activities are underway (see 10.4.2.).

All “oil-majors”10 are active in Africa and are expanding their activities. In 2005, Africa accounted for half of Total’s and ENI’s production; one third of Exxon’s revenues, 60% of BP’s and 33% of Exxon’s oil reserve additions11 and 47% and 43% of undeveloped acreage of Figure 10.3. Africa’s share in world proven reserves Total and Exxon respectively.

% 10 Oil 9 Gas 8

7

6

5 1980

1985

Source: BP Statistical Yearbook 2006

1990

1995

2000

2005

12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/482748667378

Concerning natural gas, large scale production is concentrated in North Africa, accounting for 82% of total production of which Algeria represents two-thirds. North Africa beneﬁted from both its proximity to European markets allowing for the construction of a well developed pipeline system linking production sites to Spain and Italy and signiﬁcant domestic demand. In 2005, Nigeria accounted for 15% of

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III. E CONOMY

African gas production up from 4% ten years earlier. But with the rapid growth of LNG and domestic demand, subSaharan African countries will, over the short to medium term, increase its share. The construction of the West African gas pipeline (due to come on stream in 2007) and the construction and planning of several LNG liquefaction plants should more than double Nigeria’s production over the coming years. Other LNG liquefaction plants are being built in Angola and Equatorial Guinea.

Figure 10.4. Geographic breakdown of oil production in Africa 000 bpd 10,000

8,000

Other 6,000

West Africa 4,000

North Africa 2,000

0 1965

1970

1975

1980

Source: IEA/OECD; BP Statistical Yearbook 2005

As regards reserves, North Africa accounts for the largest oil and gas reserves, followed by West Africa. At the individual country level, Nigeria accounts for the largest combined oil and gas reserves, followed by Libya and Algeria (see Map 10.7.).

10.4. West Africa 10.4.1. Nigeria and the newcomers After initial unsuccessful exploration attempts in the early 20th century it was in 1956 that commercial quantities of oil were struck in Nigeria. 20 years later Nigeria had become Africa’s largest oil producer with 2.2 mbpd. With the fall in world oil prices in the ﬁrst half of the 1980s Nigerian production fell signiﬁcantly.12 Production began increasing again from 1987 making Nigeria the only major oil and gas producer of the region. Today, Nigeria accounts for 86% of total West African oil production and almost all gas production. The majority of its reserves are found in the Niger Delta Basin, an area of 75,000 km2 which stretches into Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea (see Map 10.5). In January 2006, Nigeria’s proven oil reserves stood at 35.9 billion barrels, equal to 32% of total African and 3% of world proven reserves. In addition, it has proven gas reserves of 5.2 trillion m3, 36% of total

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/482738084311

African and 2.9% of world proven reserves. Over the last ten years Nigeria’s oil production increased by an annual average of 3% reaching 2.6 mbpd and gas production by 18% to 20 billion m3 per year. Oil and gas production will signiﬁcantly increase over the coming years with recent discoveries coming on stream and additional LNG plants becoming 175 operational. Cameroon started producing oil in 1977 and reached a production peak as early as 1985 at 181 kbpd. Its current production is evaluated at 54 kbpd. Nevertheless, some major oil companies are still present in Cameroon and investing in exploration activities. Cameroon’s oil reserves are estimated at 700 million barrels. However, one major development over the last few years was the emergence of three new production countries: Chad, Côte d’Ivoire and Mauritania. Chad, which started producing oil only in 2003, after several promising discoveries in the 1970s, is already the regions second largest producer with 210 kbpd in 2006. Chad’s oil production comes from two ﬁelds in the Doba Basin, Komé and Miandoun and is exported through the Doba – Kribi pipeline. The Bolobo ﬁeld is close to coming on-stream and will add to current production levels. With continued exploration activity by major oil companies in several new ﬁelds, notably in the Doseo and Lake Chad Basins, Chad’s proven reserves are now estimated at 900 million barrels.

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

Source: BP 2006; IEA/OECD

0.6 mb/d less than 0.1 mb/d

1. 7 mb/d

2.6 mb/d

Non oil producing countries

Angola

Gabon Congo

Cameroon

Libya

Tunisia

Nigeria

Algeria

Oil producing countries

1980

176

Egypt

0

5

10

15

20

Production

1980 2005

Exports

In % of World total

Proved reserves © Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

South Africa

Angola

Egypt

Sudan

Equatorial Guinea Gabon Congo DR Congo

Cameroon

Chad

Libya

Tunisia

Nigeria

Algeria

Côte Ghana d'Ivoire

(2006)

Mauritania

2005

Map 10.4. Evolution of oil production in Africa

III. ECONOMY

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III. E CONOMY

new signiﬁcant discoveries are highest in the already producing countries like Nigeria, Chad and Mauritania. Cameroon Côte d'Ivoire Mauritania For example, Nigeria has set a target 52 Kb/d 98 52 of increasing proven oil reserves to Chad 210 40 billion barrels and production capacity to 4 mbpd in 2010. It also plans to triple Nigeria gas production by 2009. This will further 2,600 bolster its dominant position potential to increase their oil and/or gas production or develop new production. These countries are Chad, Mauritania, Côte 12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/482736841217 Source: IEA/OECD d’Ivoire and Cameroon and prospects for new discoveries are promising in Mali and Niger and some coastal countries. This Côte d’Ivoire, the regions third largest oil producer is underlined by the presence of some “oil majors” with a daily production of 98,000 barrels, has like Total in Mauritania, Exxon in Chad, Cameroon estimated proven oil reserves of 100 million barrels. and Niger and also of Chinese oil companies. The The majority of its oil wells, 86%, are located in China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has shallow marine areas off the coast. Production is exploration agreements in Chad, Mauritania and concentrated in the Espoir and Baobab ﬁelds that Niger, SINOPEC in Mali and Côte d’Ivoire13 and came on stream in 2002 and 2005 respectively. Gas was ﬁrst discovered in the 1980s but only recently China National Off-shore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) has its development begun. Gas production in is active in Nigeria. 177 2003 was 1.46 billion m3 with estimated reserves of In other coastal countries, Senegal, the Gambia, 31 billion m3. Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Togo, hopes of ﬁnding oil ﬁelds In February 2006, Mauritania joined the club containing economically viable quantities of oil of oil producers. Production at the Chinguetti and gas also exist. Many independent internaoilﬁeld averaged 52,000 bpd. Mauritania’s oil tional oil companies are active in these countries and gas production will soon increase with the and have, over the last decade, found several oil developments of the Banda (gas ﬁeld), Tiof and and gas ﬁelds, but production has not yet begun. Tevet coming on stream. Mauritania has proven Exploration licenses are being bought or renewed oil reserves of 1 billion barrels placing it second in by these companies, several of which have a large West Africa. part of their exploration activity focused on the region underlining their continued interest and Ghana is West Africa’s smallest producing country expectations. All these factors seem to conﬁrm with a daily production of 6,000 bpd. Exploration that West African oil production will continue to activities are currently underway with renewed increase in coming years without signiﬁcantly interest in exploration and production licenses changing the regional composition of production. from several independent oil companies. Figure 10.5. Oil production in West Africa in 2006

10.4.2. Prospects: The big rush Expectations by countries and oil companies for discovering sizeable new oil and gas reserves in the region are currently very high. Exploration and seismic research activities are underway in all West African countries, except Burkina Faso and Cape Verde. But undoubtedly, prospects for

In terms of gas exploration and production the situation is different. Although, gas reserves were discovered at the same time as oil, commercial production only started recently. For the most time associated gas14 has been ﬂared or simply vented by oil producers. In 2003, Nigeria, where 95% of gas reserves are associated, ﬂared and vented close to 20 bcm of gas,15 the largest volume in the world.

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

Accra Lome Tano

Foxtrot Baobab Espoir Niger Delta Basin

Panthere

Abidjan

Niamey

Cotonou Lagos

Ouagadougou

Taoudeni Basin

Bamako

Monrovia

Source: IEA/OECD; Company information

OCEAN

ATLANTIC

Bissau

Banjul

Dakar

Conakry Freetown

Nouakchott

Banda

Chinguetti

Tiof

178 *some fields contain oil and gas

0

150 300 km

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

Yaounde

Rio del Ray

Komé

Bongor Basin Doba Basin Doseo Basin

N'Djamena

Miandoun Bolobo

Lokélé

Port Harcourt

Abuja

Kano

Oil / Gas basin Gas field

Bolobo Oil field*

Doba Banda

Countries with oil exploration

Countries with oil production

Lake Chad Basin

Termit Basin

Map 10.5. Main oil and gas ﬁelds in West Africa

III. ECONOMY

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

22

22

12

8

61

LATIN AMERICA

Source: UN COMTRADE (2006)

12

USA & CANADA

SOUTH AFRICA

1 9

2

Share in importing region total extra-regional imports

calculated from US$ trade data

Direction of West African petroleum exports Share of total West African petroleum exports,

8

5

EUROPE

Map 10.6. West African oil exports in 2005

6

ASIA PACIFIC

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

1

China

III. E CONOMY

179

III. ECONOMY

Map 10.7. Proven oil and gas reserves in Africa at the end of 2005

Tunisia 0.7 Libya

Algeria 28.8

39.1

12.2

9.4

Egypt 3.7

11.9

Mauritania 1

Chad 0.9

Nigeria 32.8

Sudan 6.4

35.9

Cameroon 0.7

Equatorial1.8 Guinea 2.2 Gabon 1.5 DR Congo Congo 1.8

180

0.5

Angola Oil producing countries

9

Non-oil producing countries Proved oil reserves end 2005 Proved gas reserves end 2005 in oil equivalent 12.2

In thousand million barrels

Source: BP 2006; IEA / OECD; CIA 2006

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

Calculated as quantity of gas ﬂared per barrel of oil produced, Cameroon was the world leader with 65 cm per barrel. The three main barriers identiﬁed to gas utilisation: i) lack of efﬁcient regulation; ii) poor access to local, regional and international gas markets; and iii) ﬁnancing constraints for projects that reduce gas ﬂaring (GCFR 2002)] have in recent years signiﬁcantly been reduced in Nigeria.

Nigeria’s 2004 Strategy Gas Plan set out an end to gas ﬂaring by 2008 and encouraged gas production through various incentive measures like ﬁscal and tax beneﬁts and credit at subsidised rates of interest. In addition, demand for gas, one crucial factor in promoting gas production, is increasing rapidly in the region, as well as in other markets, and will spur regional gas production.

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III. E CONOMY

10.6. Crude oil price since 1960

Real US$

Nominal US$

Ja

nJa 60 nJa 62 nJa 64 nJa 66 nJa 68 nJa 70 nJa 72 nJa 74 nJa 76 n Ja -78 n8 Ja 0 nJa 82 nJa 84 nJa 86 nJa 88 n Ja -90 nJa 92 nJa 94 nJa 96 nJa 98 nJa 00 nJa 02 nJa 04 n06

Figure Nigerian LNG production capacity, currently at US$ / barrel 22 bcm per year, is projec80 ted to increase to 73.7 bcm 70 per year by 2010,16 placing 60 Nigeria second in world 50 LNG production capacity behind Qatar. Domestic 40 demand is projected to 30 triple between now and 20 2010 with the largest 10 share coming from the 0 power generation sector. Demand for Nigerian gas elsewhere in the region Source: UNCTAD; IMF will also increase signiﬁcantly. However, signiﬁcant investment, private as well as public, is needed to achieve these targets. The West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) from Ecravos (Nigeria) to Cotonou (Benin), Lome (Togo) and Tema and Takoradi (Ghana), privately ﬁnanced, under a World Bank (see Box 10.4) guarantee scheme highlights the positive impact of regional co-operation, strong demand, effective regulation and ﬁnancing on the gas sector and hence electricity generation.

To date the only other country that could become an LNG exporter is Mauritania where initial proposals are being discussed. One decisive factor will be the discovery of sufﬁciently large gas reserves. Countries like Cameroon, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and to a lesser extent Senegal, will increase production to meet internal demand, principally from the power generation sector. Cameroon has already launched projects to monetise its natural gas reserves that are estimated at 300 bcm with proven reserves of 160 bcm in the Rio del Ray ﬁeld. Gas production is projected to come on-stream in early 2007. Table 10.3. Oil and gas exports in 2005 in million US$

Cameroon Chad Nigeria

Exports

% of total exports

% of GDP

1,660 2,017 41,039

50 96 95

10 37 41

Source: Comtrade Database, World Development Indicators (WDI)

12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/482728682762

10.4.3. Politics and economics Fossil fuels play a very important role in the economics and politics of every country. Exports and imports of oil and gas account for the largest share of trade in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and 181 Mauritania17 (see Table 10.3.). With real oil prices at its highest level since the early 1980s and no imminent reasons to believe in a substantive reversal, the oil sector will continue to dominate these countries’ economies. Indeed, due to the price increases over the last two to three years Nigeria’s oil revenues have almost doubled from 22 billion US$ 2003 to 40 billion US$ in 2005. The positive impact for exporting countries is naturally mirrored by an increased import bill in net importing countries.18 In Senegal for instance, petroleum imports more than doubled between 2002 and 2005 from 300 million US$ to more than 700 million US$,19 a trend observed in all countries in the region. Also the share of oil imports in total imports has increased to around 20% in most countries and exceeding 1/3 in others. Thus, oil price ﬂuctuations impact signiﬁcantly and have worsened the external balance in net-importing countries. A problem that is further aggravated by countries’ export concentration in a few raw materials that are also subject to important price ﬂuctuations.

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III. ECONOMY

consumption per GDP across countries. Table 10.4 shows that West African countries GDP in billion Oil consumption Thousands of US$ of GDP per barrel US$ in kbpd of daily oil consumption consume on average 30% Benin 4.3 14 306 more oil per unit of GDP Burkina Faso 5.2 8 646 produced than the average Cameroon 17.0 23 738 EU country. Four out of the Côte d’Ivoire 16.1 22 730 eight West African countries Ghana 10.7 45 238 cited in the Table consume Mali 5.1 8 638 more oil per unit of GDP than Nigeria 99.0 321 308 the USA. Even considering Senegal 8.3 34 245 under-accounting of GDP France 2,110 1,961 1,076 (due to a large informal United States 12,455 20,655 603 economy) or overestimating Source: BP Stat; Energy Information Administration (EIA); WDI petrol consumption, the overall picture is clear. The reasons explaining the relative importance of oil But these price increases also have a direct impact consumption are several: large share of trade in GDP on consumers via petrol prices. In most countries necessitating exporting of primary raw materials petrol prices have increased between 40-50%. and importing consumption goods; geography Given the already important share of transport (large size of countries, access to sea); the quasi cost in total factor cost, especially in land-locked total absence of alternatives to road transport and a countries, this increase had repercussions on most relatively high share of oil in electricity generation consumption products. 182 either in thermal power generation plants or in private diesel generator units.20 With 50% of oil The importance of oil consumption in these economies can be illustrated by comparing oil consumption in the transport sector and a high share of traded products, oil price increases impact most economic sectors.21 Table 10.4. Oil intensity of selected countries in 2005

Figure 10.7. Price composition of petrol in Burkina Faso 100% Total margins 15%

75% Taxes 38%

50% Transport 8%

25%

Price at coastal storage 39%

0% Source: Mission Économique (2006a)

This not only impacts the economies vulnerability to oil price increases, but also on policy options to mitigate its effects. Whereas in industrialised countries increases in oil prices will lead, even in the short-term, to reduction in consumption by using alternatives or by simply reducing consumption. In West Africa the absence of alternatives and the share of oil consumption in productive sectors reduce the possibilities of short-term adjustments through changes in consumption patterns. Policies should therefore focus on medium- to long-term consumption and cost reductions by providing alternatives to road transport i.e. rail or water ways; cheaper import costs (infrastructure); diversiﬁcation of primary energy sources especially in electricity generation. The analysis of the price structure of one litre of petrol (Super 91) in Burkina Faso in April 2006 shows the percentage of taxes in the pump price. Half of Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

III. E CONOMY

the taxes are accounted for by a tax on petroleum products (TPP) and the other half is made up of VAT (34%) and customs (16%). Government budgets depend, to varying degrees, on the taxation of petroleum products: 18% in Ghana, 7% in Burkina Faso (TPP only), 12% in Guinea and 15% in Senegal. With some of these taxes levied as a percentage of value (i.e. customs and VAT) government revenues have increased thanks to an increase in world oil prices. Although, there is no need to discuss the importance of government revenue, however questions concerning the economic impact of these taxes must be addressed.

10.5. Conclusion: Need for regional co-operation?

that is also favoured by states actively seeking to reduce dependence on imports and that beneﬁt from strengthened bargaining positions vis-à-vis oil companies trying to acquire exploration and production licenses.26 But other political developments like de-regulation of petrol pricing and privatisation27 are also signiﬁcantly improving the region’s attrativeness. Demand projections by reﬁnery operators are already made based on assumptions at the regional level. The regional market is thus the logical operating environment and internalised by private operators. Regional integration organisations like ECOWAS and UEMOA can assist in this process of “private sector regional integration” by further promoting the free ﬂow of products, harmoni-

The current euphoria of oil production and exploration in West African countries is overshadowing one important aspect of the region: most countries still depend exclusively, or almost exclusively, on imports to satisfy their domestic demand. Although, the region is among the world’s largest exporter of crude oil, it imports the majority of its petroleum products (reﬁned crude petroleum) from outside the region. Extra-regional imports of petroleum products22 are 4.5 times greater than intra-regional ﬂows.23 Although, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Ghana and Senegal have operating reﬁneries, its actual operating capacities are insufﬁcient to assure the supply of the regional market. West Africa has experienced decades of underinvestment24 in its reﬁneries that have resulted in low capacity utilisation and inefﬁcient distillation processes. Today, the actual petroleum product production in West Africa is estimated at 385,000 barrels per day (installed capacity 620,000 bpd) which contrasts with at least 400,000 barrels per day demand in Nigeria alone and around 600,000 barrels per day in the region. Nevertheless, the region is witnessing several positive developments that could signiﬁcantly change the regional outlook in the near future. Strong and rapidly growing regional demand and high oil prices generate renewed interest from private investors in reﬁneries.25 This is a trend Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

Box 10.3. Intra-regional Áows of petroleum and petroleum products represent only a small fraction of total Áows and are structured around the Àve countries producing petroleum products in their reÀneries. Nigeria exports around 2.4 bn US$, or 5% of its total production, of crude oil to Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Senegal. These countries produce some estimated 180,000 bpd of petroleum products, half of which are used to satisfy domestic demand. The other half is exported within the region. Côte d’Ivoire accounts for 50% of total regional product Áows, or around 45,000 bpd. Cameroon and Senegal make up, at roughly equal shares, the other half of intra-regional Áows. These Áows are relatively evenly distributed according to demand size, with a large share of Ivorian exports directed towards Nigeria. Total intra-regional Áows of petroleum products account for some 25% of total imports. However, besides these “traditional” exporters, Togo emerged as a new regional distribution hub. With the Ivorian crisis Togo has become the region’s land-locked countries main transit market, as illustrated by its signiÀcant imports from outside the region. According to Àgures from Mali’s OfÀce National des Produits pétroliers (ONAP), 42% of the country’s imports came from Togo in 2003. Another phenomenon of intra-regional trade is a signiÀcant volume of unrecorded, i.e. smuggled, petroleum Áows between Nigeria and its neighbours.

183

10

5

4

37

360

4

5

121

MAURITANIA

9

19

CÔTE LIBERIA D'IVOIRE

SIERRA LEONE

3

GUINEA

32

9

32

Source: UN COMTRADE, 2006

CAPE VERDE

2

GUINEA BISSAU

2

THE GAMBIA

9

SENEGAL

184

10

93

870 57

TOGO

8

23

BENIN20

25

46

28

610

GHANA

4

BURKINA FASO

MALI 9

34

Mexico

India 23

0

603 13

NIGERIA

NIGER

57

0

150

Million US$ 300 km

Petroleum products

Crude petroleum

300 km 0 Club 150/ OECD © Sahel and West Africa 2007

CAMEROON

5

2005 (or latest available)

13

CHAD

300 km

Source: UN COMTRADE, 2006

150

Petroleum and petroleum product imports in US$ million in 2005 (only flows above 10 million US$)

Senegal 1,237 Guinea 46 113 Bissau 276 14 Guinea Benin 40 South Africa 32 80 Sierra 14 Togo Nigeria Côte Leone 20 Ghana 16 d'Ivoire 27 204 32 Liberia 304 46 20 Cameroon 17 Cape Brazil India China Verde Brazil

276

USA 14 Mauritania

EU 25

Map 10.8. Inter and intra-regional ﬂows of petroleum and petroleum products in 2005

III. ECONOMY

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Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

Ouagadougou

TUNISIA

Kano

NIGER

Maiduguri

In Amenas

Bouri

Ashtart

Ras Lanuf

Source: IEA/OECD 2005; Comité Professionel du Pétrole 2005

Fo in Ri nn ss Pe Bra

B

on

Kribi

Gas pipeline under construction Tanker terminal or loading platform

LNG plant Exploration area

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

Petroleum product pipeline Refinery

City

Gas pipeline Oil field

Unity

Khartoum

El Gily

Port Soudan

Zeit Bay

Crude oil pipeline

Heglig

SUDAN

EGYPT

Assiout

Gas/condensate field

CHAD

Sarir

Tobrouk Damietta Sidi Abdel Alexandrie Benghazi Port Saïd Rahman Zueitina Idku Suez Marsa El Brega Le Caire Wadi Feiran Ras Sukheir

LIBYA

Sidra

N‘Djamena

Zawia Tripoli

La Skhirra

Tunis

Bizerte

HassiMessaoud

Kaduna

Niamey

BENIN

BURKINA FASO

MALI

ALGERIA

In Salah

Hassi R’Mel

Alger

Bejaïa

NIGERIA Doba Abuja TOGO Freetown CÔTE D’IVOIRE Cotonou GHANALome Lagos Warri SIERRA LEONE Monrovia CAMEROON Accra Port Harcourt e gl s LIBERIA Abidjan Limbe a E o a av s Douala Se scr ado n E rc to er CAPE VERDE ny g v

Bamako Banjul THE GAMBIA GUINEA BISSAU Bissau Conakry GUINEA

Dakar SENEGAL

Nouakchott

MAURITANIA

Nouadhibou

MOROCCO

Rabbat

Mohammedia

Sidi-Kacem

Oran

Arzew

Skikda

Map 10.9. Oil and gas infrastructure in North and West Africa in 2005

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Box 10.4. The West African gas pipeline will carry over a distance of 678 km natural gas from Nigeria’s Niger Delta to customers in Benin, Togo and Ghana29. This 600 million US$ project was Àrst conceived in 1995 by the governments of Benin, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo, under the auspices of ECOWAS, and is expected to be completed in the Àrst half of 2007. The shareholders of the West African Gas Pipeline Company (WAPCo) are Chevron (36.7%), the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (25%), Shell (18%), Ghana’s Takoradi Power Company (16.3%), Société Togolaise de Gaz (2%) and Société Béninoise de Gaz (2%). The World Bank through its Multilateral Investment Guarantee Scheme has provided risk insurance of 125 million US$ for this project. The pipeline, majority of which is located off-shore, has metering stations in Cotonou, Lomé, Tema and Takoradi and is expected to have a maximum capacity of 13 million cubic meters. The gas will help generate an additional 2,500 GWh (gigawatt hours) of electricity a year. It is an important component of the development of the West African Power Pool that will link power generation across a regional transmission grid to countries across the region. In addition to the economic beneÀts, the pipeline is also having important positive effects on the environment by reducing gas Áaring in Nigeria.

sation of ﬁscal policies and quality standards and by incorporating these aspects in the planning of infrastructures like storage, ports and land transport. Regional gas market integration is at a more advanced level. Gas markets are, in general, still 186 predominantly “regional” markets given their characteristics in terms of transport and storage.28 The West African Gas Pipeline (see Box 10.4.) might be the best example for regional energy (in particular electricity) market integration. It demonstrates, on the one hand, achievements of governments and regional institutions and on the

other, the willingness of international companies to invest in the regional market. Although, regional oil and gas markets are still in its infancy, the signs for the medium-term are encouraging. The regional oil market will, notably in the case of successful oil explorations in the region’s landlocked areas (Mali, Niger), need to ﬁnd ways to maximise beneﬁts for exporting countries but also the region. Nevertheless, oil will remain less important than gas at the regional level. A regional gas market is a crucial step towards regionally integrated electricity markets.

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Notes 1. 2. 3.

4.

5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 10.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22.

23.

24. 25.

26. 27. 28. 29.

Oil intensity here is defined as the amount of oil consumed per unit of GDP. Russia is by far the largest producer in this group accounting for 80% of production and 90% of exports. If not specified otherwise, all estimates are from the 2004 World Energy Outlook Reference Scenarios. The reference scenario is calculated on the assumption that no major energy policy changes will take effect between now and 2030. The alternative policy scenario from the WEO 2004, that includes changes in policies, estimates world oil demand 10% lower than in the reference scenario. The lower demand is principally attributed to increased energy efficiency in transport. These chokepoints are the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, the Suez Canal and the Bosphorus. Today, 35 million barrels pass through these narrow passages every day. Accidents or attacks that could lead to temporary closure of these maritime routes would heavily disrupt world oil supply. Liquefied Natural Gas. A widely accepted threshold level for LNG becoming economically viable over pipeline is 4,000km for onshore pipelines. Given the distribution of world reserves Middle Eastern countries will see their share in world exports considerably increase over the next years; the “Russian gas crisis” of January 2006 has also reminded European countries of the risks of strong import concentration. Off-shore oil and gas exploration also allows for direct shipping from production sites to markets and thereby reducing significantly the possibilities of production disruptions caused by attacks. This is reducing risks for oil companies that are producing in “unstable” regions. The world’s largest proven oil reserves in the Middle East (and to a lesser extent in Russia) are predominantly controlled by large state companies, e.g. Saudi Arabia- ARAMCO the largest oil company in the world with a production of 9.1 mbpd in 2005. “Oil majors” are the biggest publicly traded oil companies in the world, Exxon Mobil and Chevron of the US, Total of France, BP of UK and Royal Dutch/Shell (UK/Holland), each producing between 1.6 to 2.6 million barrels of crude oil per day. In general, these companies are only active in areas that promise significant discoveries. Reserves found and proven in 2005. The oil price shocks (1st 1973, 2nd 1979) were the results of reductions in OPEC production quotas to provoke an increase in world oil market prices. Nigeria became a full member of OPEC in 1971. In co-operation with India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and Oil India. Associated gas is natural gas which is found in association with crude oil, either dissolved in the oil are or separate as free gas above the oil. This quantity could produce more than 100 terawatt-hours of electricity, equivalent to total power consumption of sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa or if exported to US and European markets earn US$10 billion (World Bank, 2004). 5.4 bcm capacity is under construction – completion 2007; 24.5 bcm are in engineering phase – completion 2009-10 and 27.2 bcm are planned – completion 2010 (IEA 2006). Data on Mauritania is not yet available. Also affecting crude oil exporting countries like Nigeria, where imports of petroleum products increased from 0.6 bn US$ in 2002 to 1.8 bn US$ in 2005. Petroleum product prices are in addition to crude prices influenced by other factors like variations in seasonal demand and refining capacities and can therefore exhibit distinctive movements. This is not due to increased (re-) exports to Mali. According to data from the IEA, the share of oil in electricity generation in Africa was 13% in 2002 as compared to 6% in OECD countries. Chad’s only major power station is fuelled by oil. Due to the high price of oil, Chad’s electricity costs are among the highest in the world (EIA). The flows in Map 10.8. are petroleum and petroleum products (SITC code S3-33) and could in theory include crude petroleum. If some flows include crude petroleum, its share will be negligible given the limited refining capacity and the large imports of crude petroleum from other countries. In 2005, West Africa imported from outside the region 2.8 billion US$ worth of petroleum products, compared to official intra-regional flows of 0.6 billion US$. Nigeria accounts for close to 60% of total extra-regional imports. The major exporter to the region is the European Union, accounting for 75% followed by Brazil and India representing 12% and 7% respectively. With the recent price hikes in petroleum and petroleum products, these imports account for a rapidly growing share in total imports. With low crude oil prices during the period 1980-2000 refining margins were very low which resulted in underinvestment in refining capacities in many areas of the world. Tema Oil Refinery was upgraded to a capacity of 45,000 barrels per day in 1999, Cameroon’s national oil refinery SONARA has just announced an US$ 383 million upgrade of its Limbé refinery, China’s CNPC has shown interest in Nigeria’s Kaduna refinery with an obligation of re-establishing its 110,000 barrel per day capacity. As might be the case with the Kaduna refinery. E.g.: Negotiations are currently underway to privatise Tema Oil Refinery and expand capacity to 110,000 bpd. Although, LNG developments are changing rapidly, pipelines are the most efficient way of trading. A possible extension, notably to Abidjan, has already been envisaged.

Glossary Barrel: A unit of volume equal to 159 litres or 42 U.S. gallons. Basin/sedimentary basin: Refers to any geographical feature exhibiting subsidence and consequent inﬁlling by sedimentation. As the sediments are buried, they are subjected to increasing pressure and begin the process of lithiﬁcation. Sedimentary basins are the location for almost all of the worlds hydrocarbon reserves. Crude Oil: Crude oil is a mineral oil of natural origin comprising a mixture of hydrocarbons and associated impurities, such as sulphur. It exists in the liquid phase under normal surface temperature and pressure and its physical characteristics (density, viscosity, etc.) are highly variable. Energy source: Any substance or natural phenomenon that can be consumed or transformed to supply heat or power. Examples include petroleum, coal, natural gas, nuclear, biomass, electricity, wind, sunlight, geothermal, water movement, and hydrogen in fuel cells.

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III. ECONOMY

Field: An area consisting of a single reservoir or multiple reservoirs all grouped on, or related to, the same individual geological structural feature and/or stratigraphic condition. Flared: Gas disposed of by burning in ﬂares usually at the production sites or at gas processing plants. Fossil Fuels: An energy source formed in the earths crust from decayed organic material. The common fossil fuels are petroleum, coal, and natural gas. Natural Gas: Natural gas comprises gases, occurring naturally in underground deposits, whether liquid or gaseous, consisting mainly of methane. Petroleum Products: Petroleum products are any oil-based products which can be obtained from primary distillation and are normally used outside the reﬁnery industry. Primary energy: All energy consumed by end users, excluding electricity but including the energy consumed at electric utilities to generate electricity. Proved reserves: Estimated quantities of energy sources that analysis of geologic and engineering data demonstrates with reasonable certainty are recoverable under existing economic and operating conditions. The location, quantity, and grade of the energy source are usually considered to be well established in such reserves. Reﬁned petroleum products: Reﬁned petroleum products include but are not limited to gasolines, kerosene, distillates (including No. 2 fuel oil), liqueﬁed petroleum gas, asphalt, lubricating oils, diesel fuels, and residual fuels. Reﬁnery: An installation that manufactures ﬁnished petroleum products from crude oil, unﬁnished oils, natural gas liquids, other hydrocarbons, and oxygenates.

Sources and bibliography african Development Bank (2006), High Oil Prices and the African Economy. British Petroleum (2006), BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2006; www.bp.com/statisticalreview. British Petroleum (2005), BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2005; www.bp.com/statisticalreview.

188

Cornot-Gandolphe, S. and al. (2003), The Challenges of Further Cost Reductions for new Supply Options (Pipeline, LNG, GTL). Economist (The) (2006), January 5; Nervous Energy; The Economist, London. ESMAP (2006), Coping with Higher Oil Prices; Report 323/06 2006; World Bank, Washington. ESMAP (2004), Gas Flaring and Venting; Viewpoint, Note Number 279; World Bank, Washington. Hallouche, H. (2006), The Gas Exporting Countries Forum: Is it really a Gas OPEC in the Making? Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. International Energy Agency IEA (2005), World Energy Outlook 2005: Middle East and North Africa Insights; OECD/IEA, Paris. IEA (2006), Natural Gas Market Review: Towards a global gas market; OECD/IEA, Paris. IEA (2005), Resources to Reserves; OECD/IEA, Paris. IEA (2004), World Energy Outlook 2004; OECD/IEA, Paris. Energy Information Administration (2005), Country Analysis Briefs: Economic Community of West African States; US Department of Energy, Washington. Energy Information Administration (2006), Country Analysis Briefs various; US Department of Energy, Washington. Financial Times (2006) November 20; West Africa Gas Pipeline: Promise becomes a reality; Financial Times Limited. Jensen, J. T. (2002), LNG and Pipeline Economics; 2002. Le Monde (2006), February 14; Pétrole, gaz, une année à risques; Paris. Mission Économique (2006c), Le secteur pétrolier au Nigeria; MINEFI –DGTPE, Nigeria. Mission Économique (2006b), Le secteur gazier au Nigeria; MINEFI –DGTPE, Nigeria. Mission Économique (2006a), Les hydrocarbures en Mauritanie; MINEFI –DGTPE, Nigeria. Mission Économique (2006), Le marché des hydrocarbures au Burkina Faso; MINEFI –DGTPE, Burkina Faso. Mission Économique (2006), Cameroun : le secteur pétrolier; MINEFI –DGTPE, Cameroun. Mission Économique (2005), Le marché malien des produits pétroliers; MINEFI –DGTPE, Mali.

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III. E CONOMY

Mission Économique (2005d), Rafﬁnage, pétrochimie et distribution de produits pétroliers au Nigeria; MINEFI –DGTPE, Nigeria. Mohamedi, F. (2006), China’s External Energy Relations: Strategic and Corporate Dynamics; PFC Energy, Washington. OECD (2006), African Economic Outlook 2005/2006; OECD, African Development Bank, Paris. Pan, E. (2006), China, Africa, and Oil; Council on Foreign Relations. Petroleum Economist (2005b), West Africa: Nigeria prepares to join Qatar as world GTL leader; Petroleum Economist PLC. Petroleum Economist (2005a), Africa; Land of emerging producers; Petroleum Economist PLC Petroleum Economist (2004) West Africa: Gulf of Guinea’s golden triangle; Petroleum Economist PLC. Ruppert, M. C. (2003), Saudi Arabia, West Africa – Next Stops in the Inﬁnite War for Oil; From The Wilderness Publications. Time Asia Magazine (2004), October 18; China’s Quest for Oil; Time Inc. Websites BP

www.bp.com

Chevron

www.chevron.com

China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)

www.cnpc.com

Devon Energy

www.devonenergy.com

Eni

www.eni.it

ExxonMobil

www.exxonmobil.com

Hess Corporation

www.hess.com

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

www.opec.org

Repsol YPF

www.repsolypf.com

Shell

www.shell.com

Société Ivoirienne de Rafﬁnage

www.sir.ci

Tema Oil Reﬁnery Ghana

www.torghana.com

Total

www.total.com

Tullow Oil

www.tullowoil.com

Databases British Petroleum Statistical Yearbook IMF Statistical Yearbook International Energy Agency United Nations COMTRADE

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Chapter 11. COTTON Christophe Perret (SWAC/OECD)

11.1. West Africa in the international market 11.1.1. Global overview of supply and demand Since 1960, world production of cotton ﬁbre has doubled from 10.2 to 20.3 million tonnes, representing a moderate average annual growth of 1.7%. Although there are numerous cottonproducing countries, global production is largely dominated by China (28%), followed by the United States (17%) and India (12%). These three countries alone accounted for nearly 60% of total global production of cotton ﬁbre in 2004/05, compared to 47% 30 years ago. In this international environment, West Africa1 occupies a modest place: the region ranks ﬁfth in the world and contributes only 5% of global production. It has, however, made remarkable progress by increasing its production ten-fold since 1960 to reach a total of more than one million tonnes of ﬁbre produced per year for the past four years (see Figure 11.1.).

Between 1960 and 2000, global demand for cotton ﬁbre increased at the same pace as population growth, i.e. 1.8% annually. By contrast, during this period, global consumption of artiﬁcial ﬁbres increased by 4.7% per year, marking the relative decline of cotton compared to synthetic ﬁbre. Cotton represented 68% of total ﬁbre use in 1960; this percentage followed a downward trend to reach 38% in 2000.2 Within the clothing sector, the demand for natural ﬁbres continues to increase and cotton remains the primary natural ﬁbre3 used. For non-clothing use, however, demand for artiﬁcial ﬁbres is increasing. 191 In the medium-term, given the economic and demographic projections, global consumption of all textile ﬁbre should increase by roughly 2.3% per year until 2010 to reach 62 million tonnes. Cotton consumption should increase at a more moderate pace (1.8% per annum), and world demand should rise to 23.6 million tonnes by 2010.

11.1.2. International trade Figure 11.1. Global and West African production of cotton fibre (1960/61–2008/09) Million tonnes 1.5

Million tonnes 25

1.2

1 Mt

World production 0.9

10.2 Mt 0.6

West African production 0.3

0.1 Mt 0

1960/61

Forecast (2004/05 to 2008/09)

20.3 Mt 20

15

10

5

0

1970/71

1980/81

1990/91

2000/01

Source: SWAC/OECD (2005), data from ICAC 12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483304824205

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The difference between supply (depending on factors like the environment, agricultural policies, etc.) and demand for cotton (resulting mainly from textile industrial activities) largely explains the international cotton ﬁbre trade. Although China and South-East Asian countries produce 50% of world cotton, they are today net importers of ﬁbres due to their high industrial capacity and competitiveness in the textile/ clothing sector (currently, nearly

III. ECONOMY

Map 11.1. Production and consumption of cotton ﬁbres in the world 3,730

5,195 4,510

1,835

North America

530 65 Central America

1,105 1,235

5,870 4,935 645 30 Russian Federation 1,480 China 955 385 475 Central Asia Europe 1,645 1,395 South Asia 350250 North Africa 975 Middle East 100 West Africa

South America

1,700 55 East Asia

655 30 Australia

Cotton-producing countries

350 200

Regional limit

Sub-Saharan Africa (Other Countries)

Production of cotton fibre Consumption of cotton fibre Average 2000/01 - 2004/05 (thousand tonnes)

192

© Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2006

Source: ICAC (2005)

South-East Asia imported two-thirds of their cotton from the US, Central Asia, West Africa and Australia (see Map 11.2.). In the future, upon the termination of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC)4 exports Figure 11.2. Extra-regional export of textiles and garments in 2004 of cotton ﬁbres should be geared more towards the Million dollar US most competitive textile and Textile exports Clothing exports 80,000 garment producers, namely 70,000 China and India.

45% of textiles and clothing are exported from this region – including intra-regional European trade). Between 2002 and 2004, China and countries in

60,000

50,000

40,000

30,000

20,000

10,000

0

China

East Asia Europe

South Asia

Source: SWAC/OECD (2006), data from WTO

North America

Middle Central East America

North South Russian SSA Africa America Federation

Oceania

The USA, which consumes 8% of the world’s cotton ﬁbres and produces 17%, ranks as the leading cotton exporter on the international market. Given the weak industrial capacities of Africa, Central Asia and Australia, these areas also play an important role in the natural ﬁbre export.

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

South America

Source: Comtrade database, UN (2006)

Central America

UNITED STATES

Middle East

CENTRAL ASIA

China

South Asia

Russian Federation

Sub-Saharan Africa (Other countries)

WEST AFRICA

North Africa

Europe

Cotton-producing zone

America

North

Map 11.2. Main ﬂows of cotton exports in the world

Main cotton export flows (2002-2004)*

Major textile industrial zones

AUSTRALIA

© Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2006

* These flows represented over 90% of exports from the USA, Central Asia, West Africa and Australia

East Asia

III. E CONOMY

193

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11.1.3. West Africa: A major player on the international market

11.2. West African cotton 11.2.1. Continental overview

None of the West African countries is today playing a major role in the international cotton trade. However, considered as a regional entity, West Africa is the world’s third largest exporter (averaging nearly one million tonnes over the 2000/01–2004/05 period, or 13% of global production), behind the USA (2.5 million tonnes, or 37%) and Central Asia (1.2 million tonnes or 17%). Cotton exports from West African countries developed quickly. The annual growth rate of West African cotton exports, which developed much more rapidly than in other regions of the world, was close to 6% in 1960. Only Australia registered a higher trend in cotton exports, with an annual average rate of nearly 11% during the same period.

Africa produces about 100 species of cotton grains, whose presence dates back to the 10th and 13th centuries. In countries with low rainfall, cotton must be irrigated. This is the case for most of the areas cultivated in Egypt and all those areas cultivated in Morocco. In sub-Saharan Africa, cotton production, mainly rainfed, is concentrated in the tropical zone where dry seasons and humid seasons alternate. There are ﬁve cotton basins on the continent, the largest being the West African basin, which stretches from Senegambia to South-Eastern Chad and even to the heart of the Central African Republic. It accounts for nearly two-thirds of Africa’s total cotton production. Out of the 12 leading African cotton-producing countries, eight are in West Africa. The rest of Africa’s cotton is distributed among four zones along a North–South strip stretching from the Nile Valley to South Africa. The most important zone is that of the Nile Valley as Egypt has been the leading African producer on average for the past ﬁve years.

Nevertheless, a short-term analysis of the international market trend presents a somewhat different picture. Over the past ﬁve years, South America, 194 the USA and Africa are the most active regions on the international market (see Figure 11.3.) and Brazil quite recently appeared as a dynamic actor. Indeed, this country could catch up with the level of Australian exports in 2006, with a volume of around 450,000 tonnes. Exports from the USA The contemporary geography of African cotton increased from 1.5 to 2.5 million tonnes, conﬁrming is quite different from the reality that prevailed in the country’s dominant position. Exports from the 1960s. Following independence, West Africa Central Asia are somewhat on the decline. In the Figure 11.3. Dynamics of world cotton exports short- and medium-term, the USA, Central Asia Average 2000/01 - 2004/05 Thousand tonnes and West Africa should 2,500 Over 10% maintain their position Annual average growth rate of cotton exports 0 to 10% as leaders on the interna(2000/01 to 2004/05) 2,000 tional market. West Africa -2 to 0% could replace Central 1,500 Less than -2% Asia in second position, which will surely have an 1,000 impact on cotton supply from China and globally from Asia (see Map 11.3.). 500 For some years now, there has indeed been a reori0 United South West Africa Russian Europe Central China Australia East Asia South Middle entation of West African States America Africa (Other) Federation Asia Asia East Source: SWAC/OECD (2006), from ICAC data exports to this region. Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

Source: Comtrade database, UN (2006)

South America 1%

South Asia 17%

East Asia 17%

North Africa 3%

China 46%

Others 0.6%

Sub-Saharan Africa 1% European Union 14%

Destination of cotton expor ts from West Africa (2004)

South America

(Excluding West Africa)

Sub-Saharan Africa

West Africa

North Africa

Europe

China

South Asia

Map 11.3. Destination of cotton exports from West Africa

© Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2006

East Asia

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195

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accounted for an average of only 15% of African production compared to nearly 40% for Egypt and 20% for East Africa. Cotton policies implemented from the 1970s within the francophone zone largely explain the development of cotton in this area.

11.2.2. Origin and development of West African cotton

Figure 11.4. Cotton production in Africa Average 2000/01 – 2004/05 Egypt Mali Burkina Faso Benin Côte d'Ivoire Zimbabwe Cameroon Nigeria Sudan Togo Tanzania Chad Zambia South Africa Mozambique Uganda Ethiopia Senegal Madagascar Ghana CAR Kenya

West African Countries

Other African Countries

Thousand tonnes

The second half of the 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 Source: SWAC/OECD (2006), from ICAC data 19th century was a key period in the history of cotton. The 1850s were initially marked by a Box 11.1. Cotton: A long journey from India doubling of the world It was from India that the art of cotton fabric was exported to the Old World. As early as cotton price under the 445 BC, the Greek Herodotus wrote of India: “there are trees growing in the wild, whose 196 combined effects of the fruit produces better wool, more beautiful than sheep”. As early as the 7th Century, rapid development of the Arab conquerors brought the use of cotton to North Africa and Europe. Trade between textile industry in Europe Europe and India took a new turn, thanks notably to the opening of the routes to India and major strikes in India by Vasco da Gama in 1497. With the invention of the weaving trade by Jacquard, cotton (revolt by Indian soldiers was part of the European Industrial Revolution. The ginning and spinning techniques serving in companies in were later improved. In the industrialised countries, cotton clothing, even of the Ànest the East Indies). Later, cotton became accessible to all. The invention of the saw-gin was at the origin of the the Civil War in the cotton production boom in the United States. At the beginning of the 20th Century, United States (1861–1865) 90% of global cotton trade was in the hands of Europeans and raw cotton was mostly supplied by the United States, India and Egypt. Today, cotton is cultivated on all Àve deprived the market of a continents, in some 100 countries. major source of supply. The end of the hostilities Text from cotton ﬁle produced by Cirad www.cirad.fr/fr/regard_sur/coton.php certainly forced prices down but ushered in Valley, where the Soninkes have a long-standing a new era due to the disappearance of the unpaid cotton tradition, then the Casamance; without labour of slaves. European powers then turned to success. In the 1930s, the construction of the Ofﬁce their African colonies under the pressure of their du Niger au Mali was initially designed for cotton industrial lobbies. In the early 1860s, an association production. There again, hopes were shattered. for the development of cotton production was Finally, it was the savannahs of French Equatorial created in Manchester at the initiative of a group Africa (AEF), lying between Cameroon, Chad, and of industrialists concerned about the supply CAR, that constituted the ﬁrst major cotton basin difﬁculties. Very quickly, trials were launched in (see Map 11.6). Since the 1970s, the latter is still the The Gambia and Sierra Leone, and later in Nigeria. most important basin in the region (42% of West In 1903, the British established in Nigeria the British African production) ahead of the Nigerian basin Cotton Growers Association (BCGA). For its part, (38%). the French government ﬁrst turned to the Senegal Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

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Map 11.4. Cotton production basins in Africa

ATLANTIC OCEAN

yp Eg

West African B

tian Basin

Ea s

asin

Gre

t African Basin

at Lakes Basin

Production from Cotton Basin in Africa*

East African Basin 6%

u

Southern African Basin 13%

e th

r

frica nA

n Basin

197

So

Great Lakes Basin 6%

INDIAN OCEAN

West African Basin 60%

Egyptian Basin 15%

0

Climatic zones

*Average 2000/01-2004/05 Source: ICAC (2005)

It was only after independence that cotton developed more in the West of Africa (see Map 11.6.) under the effect of voluntary policies greatly inspired by the former colonial powers whose own textile industries continued to ﬂourish until the beginning of the 1980s. These policies rely on parastatal enterprises that provided support to and ensured close supervision of producers in extension services, research, marketing support, etc. (see Box 11.2).

300

600 km

Cotton-production zones

Tropical climate

West Africa

Equatorial climate

Main rivers © Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2006

Over the past 45 years, the areas devoted to cotton production have practically quadrupled, from 800,000 to 3 million hectares. In other words, cottongrowing areas increased from 1.5% to 3.5% of arable land in West Africa. Comparatively, grain crops such as maize, millet and sorghum are cultivated on 9, 16 and 14 million hectares respectively. The extension of cotton-growing areas was accompanied by an underlying increase in output from 400 kg/ha at the beginning of the 1960s to 1 ton/ha today.

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Map 11.5. Land suitability for rainfed cotton in Africa

500 mm 1,000 mm

1,000 mm

ATLANTIC OCEAN

500 mm 1,000 mm

Land Suitability for Rainfed Cotton

INDIAN OCEAN

1,000 mm Very suitable

198

Suitable

500 mm

Moderately suitable 1,000 mm

Marginally suitable Not suitable

1,000 mm

Average annual rainfall 500 mm

1,000 mm

Isohyets 500 - 1,000 mm 0

More than 1,000 mm

300

600 km

500 mm

Source: FAO (2006)

© Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2006

11.2.3. An era of reforms and liberalisation Despite this performance, the cotton sector faced periods of major economic and ﬁnancial crises. It was after these difﬁculties that structural adjustment policies, heralding the ﬁrst liberalisation reforms, were initiated. Liberalisation of the cotton sector, observed in most of the countries, was the result of a number of homogeneous trends. On one hand, State corporations have been gradually transferring a number of functions (research and

development activities, inputs supply, production and primary collection of cotton and ginning activities) to the farmers’ unions or other private actors. In the case of Anglophone countries, this process has even been completed.5 Producers’ or farmers’ groups are increasingly involved in the overall management of the sectors. On the other hand, these changes do not fundamentally call into question some of the responsibilities of the State, which entail making or inﬂuencing decisions taken on price ﬁxing, in particular. These general trends,

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Thousand tonnes

1,400 1,200

Mali-Burkina Faso-Côte d'Ivoire Chad-Cameroon Others Cotton prices fell to 35 cents/pound in October 2001

1,000 800

Forecast ICAC

600 400 200 0 1960/61

producers such as Sodeﬁtex in Senegal). In other cases, the public enterprises have been Benin-Togo Nigeria-Niger completely dismantled and replaced by new structures: the Nouvelle compagnie cotonnière de Guinée (CGC – whose capital is provided by private stakeholders and producers), was created at the end of the public cotton development project, and, in 2000, signed a 15-year agreement with the State. Irrespective of their nature, however, cotton companies in Francophone countries still 2000/01 have a number of prerogatives in the sector’s organisation, despite their dwindling numbers. In Ghana, activities relating to the production and marketing of cotton have been totally privatised and the State-owned cotton company no longer exists. 199 The State is limited to the role of the certiﬁcation of seedlings and maintenance of rural roads. The same applies to Nigeria, where public authority intervenes in research (the Agricultural Research Institute in Zaria), in the certiﬁcation and supply of seedlings through the Ministry of Agriculture, and in subsidies for fertilizers. 5 to 2008/09)

Figure 11.5. Trends in cotton production in West Africa (1960/61–2008/09)

1970/71

1980/81

1990/91

Source: SWAC/OECD (2006), from ICAC data

however, cannot conceal the diverse modes of liberalisation: ] The nature of cotton companies. In some cases, these companies are still in place but have opened their capital to producers or other national and international private stakeholders (e.g. Union Nationale des Producteurs de Coton au Burkina Faso – Unpc-B – in the capital of Soﬁtex in Burkina Faso; private companies (Aiglon, Dagris) within the Société Nationale du Coton au Niger; private companies and

Box 11.2. Cotton sectors in the Francophone zone before liberalisation The development of cotton in West Africa, notably in the Francophone area, is the result of the establishment and involvement of the CFDT (Compagnie Française pour le développement des Fibres Textiles, a French parastatal company founded in 1949) in the national cotton sectors, with the support of research, particularly by the IRCT (Institut de Recherche du Coton et des Textiles Exotiques founded in 1946). The nationalisation of cotton structures in the 1970s did not challenge the role of the CFDT, which owns shares in national companies: Cotontchad (1971, Chad), Sodecoton (1974, Cameroon), SodeÀtex (1974, Senegal), CIDT (1974, Côte d’Ivoire), Sotoco (1974, Togo), SoÀtex (1979, Burkina Faso), CMDT (1975, Mali). The sectoral approach adopted in each of the countries was based on joint modalities for a number of functions: price equalisation, the purchase of cotton seed, the Àxing of selling prices of inputs throughout the entire cotton zone, the Àxing of a purchase price valid for the entire collection season, and the payment on collection of inputs supplied to farmers by the cotton company without trade margin, obligation and exclusive purchase of the entire harvest by the cotton company. Source: Le coton en Afrique de l’Ouest et du Centre. Situation et perspectives. Ministère français de la coopération et du développement (1991).

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

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Map 11.6. Evolution of cotton-production basins between 1960 and 2000

1960s

ATLANTIC OCEAN

MAURITANIA MALI

400

SENEGAL

NIGER

CHAD

800

THE GAMBIA 1% GUINEA BISSAU

BURKINA FASO

GUINEA SIERRA LEONE

BENIN

15% CÔTE D'IVOIRE

4%

GHANA

38% 42%

NIGERIA

TOGO

LIBERIA CAMEROON 200

0 150 300 km

© Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2006

2000s

ATLANTIC OCEAN

MAURITANIA MALI SENEGAL

400

THE GAMBIA

800

GUINEA BISSAU

NIGER BURKINA FASO

3% GUINEA

51%

7% BENIN

22% CÔTE GHANA TOGO D'IVOIRE

SIERRA LEONE

CHAD

17%

NIGERIA

LIBERIA CAMEROON 0 150 300 km

© Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2006 Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

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] The functions of State-owned cotton companies. In some countries, these functions are limited to ginning, while other activities are carried out by private actors or farmers’ groups: in Benin, the Sonapra manages 12 ginning factories out of the 20 in operation; in Togo, liberalisation opened the market to three new operators, apart from Sotoco, for ginning and spinning activities. In The Gambia, Gamcot, a private company, manages the collection and ginning of cotton, agricultural supervision, with Sodeﬁtex (Senegal) ensuring the technical and ﬁnancial aspects. In other countries, including Burkina Faso, liberalisation adhered to the integrated sector principle, where each cotton company is responsible for organising the production, processing and marketing of cotton ﬁbre. ] The restructuring of the sector and creation of new cotton companies were sometimes accompanied by a geographical redeﬁnition of their activities. This is the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, where three companies share the territory: CIDT Nouvelle in the South,

Ivoire Coton in the North-West and LCCI in the North-East. In Burkina Faso, if Soﬁtex has conserved its role in the West, Faso Coton has taken over the Central zone and Socoma the East zone. This conﬁguration could be adopted in Mali from 2008, or for the impending privatisation of Sodecoton (Cameroon) or Cotontchad (Chad). Subject to different and sometimes divergent national policies, cotton producers do not share the same access to extension, training, input supply and marketing services, as this will vary depending on which side of the border they are situated. Yet, the cotton-producing basins are situated along the borders (see Maps 11.7. and 11.8.). Will the process of liberalising national sectors gradually eliminate these policy disparities? The fact is that these processes today are conducted without consultation between the countries, which adopt different approaches to liberalisation. The implementation of cross-border co-operation strategies and the harmonisation of national

Map 11.7. Focus on cotton-producing zones in Burkina Faso (2001/02) Bord e Mali/ rs of the Côte Burk d ina F ’Ivoire/ aso C otton

basin

ali/ a e M urkin h t of ire/B sin o art He e d’Iv ton ba t t Cô o Co Fas

B Be ord T n ers Co ogo in/B of tto /Ni urk the n ge in ba r a Fa sin s

o/

Production 2001/02

In tonnes More than 50,000 30,000 – 40,000 20,000 – 30,000 10,000 – 20,000 5,000 – 10,000 Less than 5,000

Source: Economic and Social Importance of Cotton in West Africa: Role of Cotton in Development, Trade and Livelihoods. SWAC/OECD, November 2005

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

© Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2006

201

III. ECONOMY

policies have become necessary today. It is in this spirit that ECOWAS intends to promote the “development of cross-border co-operation ties among the different national cotton companies in order to harmonise their strategies and methods of intervention, reduce costs of inputs, develop synergies and reduce costs of collection, ginning and transportation to the ports”.

11.3. Regional stakes of development

Cotton is cultivated in all the sub-humid and semi-arid zones with an annual rainfall of between 500–700 mm and 1,200–1,500 mm. Hence the crop is found in both the Northern zones of the coastal countries (Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Togo) and the Southern zones of the landlocked countries (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad). Cotton is also cultivated in the centre and even the south of Benin and Togo, as it has adapted to the rainfall characteristics of this region (see Map 11.8.).

These transnational basins are scattered with ginning factories (there are nearly 100 in West Africa, compared to 1,000 in the USA, whose cotton grain production is four times higher). It is from these factories that cotton is transported by road or rail to the ports of the coastal countries. Until 1999, most of the Sahelian cotton was exported through the port of Abidjan. The Ivorian crisis has compelled the economic operators to use other transit corridors as in the case of cotton from Burkina Faso, which is directed to the port of Lomé and to a lesser extent, that of Tema.

These environmental determinants make the West African cotton zones basically cross border areas. The most important of them is situated along the border areas of Mali, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire. Benin and Togo share most of the second basin.

These exports earn signiﬁcant external (and budgetary) resources for national economies and have varied impacts, depending on their economic structure (see Table 11.1.).

11.3.1. Regional basins for national wealth

202

The third is centred on Northern Cameroon and Southern Chad. The fourth is basically Nigerian. A ﬁfth basin, though marginal at the regional level, lies between Senegal, Eastern Gambia, part of Northern Guinea and the North-East of GuineaBissau. Some of these areas are bound by highly powerful socio-cultural links: the Hausa zone between Nigeria and Niger or the Senoufo zone between Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Burkina Faso.

Table 11.1. Macroeconomic importance of cotton in West Africa Average 2000-2004 Benin Burkina Faso Cameroon Cape Verde Chad Côte d’Ivoire Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Liberia Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone The Gambia Togo

Cotton fibre exports (million US$) 142.5 154 102.8 59.7 147.7 5.3 0.2 0.1 188.1 0.2 31.8 17.5 0.2 39.6

Share in West African cotton exports 16% 17% 11% 7% 17% 1% 21% 4% 2% 4%

Share in the country’s agricultural exports 70% 75% 20% 52% 6% 1% 63% 7% 11% 38%

Share in the country’s total exports 30% 56% 7% 30% 4% 1% 30% 9% 8%

Source: FAOSTAT (2006)

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© Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2006

50 Road Ginning factory

Sahelian cotton

260 200

Cotton exports through the ports (2003)

National cotton Rail Heart of the cotton basin

Abidjan OCEAN

Means of cotton exports

Douala Cotonou Lomé

agos Lagos

Tem Te TTema e ATLANTIC TLANTIC

Conakry ryy

Bissau iss ssau

Banjul jul u ul 1,200 m m 1,500 mm

Dakar

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

Thousand tonnes

300 km 15 150 0

mm

50 0 Source: FAOSTAT (2006)

500,000

200,000 950,000 OCEAN

Production from cotton basins

(tonnes of cotton seeds)

20,000 ATLANTIC

Map 11.8. Cotton zones, ginning factories and exports of West Africa

1

350,000

1,200 mm m 0m ,50

It is estimated that two to three million West African households cultivate cotton on part of their farms; the average cotton farm is one to two hectares. In

the vast majority of cases, cotton is produced with relatively few resources and family labour, which is not highly paid compared to deve-loped countries. This general observation, however, conceals the heterogeneous nature of the types of farms. While smallholder family farms, that may be under-

Limit mit of cotton-producing basin

11.3.2. From cotton production to development of grains and livestock breeding

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Figure 11.6. Parallel trends of cotton and grain production in West Africa Thousand tonnes

Thousand tonnes

50,000

3,500 Cereal production

45,000 40,000

3,000

Cotton seed production

35,000

2,500

30,000

2,000

25,000 20,000

1,500

15,000

1,000

10,000 500

5,000 0

0 1961

1966

1971

1976

1981

1986

1991

1996

2001

Source: SWAC/OECD (2006), data from FAOSTAT

Figure 11.7. Estimated distribution of UEMOA textile market Local production

204

Fraudulant Imports

Second-hand Clothing

In the sparsely populated sub-humid savannahs, the appearance of cash crops has facilitated the development of animal draught cultivation, as these activities make it possible to earn the necessary income to purchase the materials and animals. In the case of cotton pioneers, animal draught cultivation was used to limit weed invasion through tilling before sowing and through mechanical weeding. However, all cotton-growing zones in the region are not uniformly affected by this phenomenon; as the rates of recorded use of animal draught differs at the centre of the main West African cotton basin: nearly 60% of the cotton farms in Burkina Faso, 85% in Mali6 (see Map 11.9.).

11.3.3. The textile industry

Source: UEMOA (2003)

West Africa’s cotton production is generally underexploited;7 most of the ﬁbre produced is exported to the international market. However, the situation is quite different in Francophone countries than in Anglophone countries. In Francophone countries more than 90% of the cotton produced is exported in the form of ﬁbres whereas in Anglophone countries 90% and 65% of Nigerian and Ghanaian cotton respectively were consumed locally by the textile industry from 1993/94 to 2003/04, for example.

Imports

equipped or not equipped at all, form the vast majority of farms, slightly larger plantations (two to ﬁve hectares) have developed as a result of animal traction. There is also a small number of farms (20–30 ha) that mainly use family workers, but with considerable agricultural equipment for animal traction or motorised cultivation. Cotton production is never, or almost never, the sole activity practised on a farm, even if it is often the main activity. It has given rise to the development of the practice of mixed cultivation in association with millet, sorghum and, more recently, maize. The succession of cotton and grains on the same plot enables the second crop to beneﬁt from the aftereffect of fertilizers carried by the ﬁrst. This explains to some extent why cotton and grain production levels have followed the same trend since the 1980s (see Figure 11.6.).

While the ﬁrst industrial plants were set up from the 1950s, it was only during the 1965–1985 period that West Africa witnessed the birth and development of the textile industry under the effect of voluntary policies implemented by the State. This “boom” period was followed by difﬁcult years marked by the crisis in public enterprises, structural adjustments, devaluation of the CFA franc as well as competition from secondhand

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clothing imported from developed countries and Asian textiles (see Figure 11.7.). This situation triggered a de-industrialisation process within the UEMOA zone. There were 41 industrial plants in 1980 as compared to about twenty operating today. In Nigeria, the sector professionals were equally concerned about the situation. While in 1999, there were about 100 factories based mainly in Lagos and Kaduna, today only about 20 or 40 are still operating, according to sources. There are two contradictory trends for the future: ﬁrstly, the AGOA8 agreements and the implementation of a regional policy capitalising on the textile chain within the UEMOA would improve industrial activities in the region.9 Secondly, however, the end of the ATC Agreements should intensify competition from countries like India and China, unless a regional trade policy coherent with the industrial strategy is promoted. Beyond the industrial level, the artisanal textile and traditional clothing sector (weaving, dyeing, manufacturing and selling of materials, etc.) is the second largest employer in West Africa, after agriculture. Between 65 and 70% of Malian artisans, 50% of Burkinabe artisans and 30 to 40% of Ghanaian artisans are operating in the traditional textile sector.

11.4. A doubly regional future The position of West Africa on the international market and the development prospects of the cotton sector at the regional and international levels depend on a number of internal and external factors (emergence of new producing countries, development of biotechnological cotton, competition from synthetic ﬁbres, euro/dollar exchange rates, oil prices, etc.). Among these factors, the ﬁght against agricultural subsidies constituted a major and highly-publicised challenge for West African cotton. The results obtained from the Doha Round Negotiations on cotton are relatively encouraging. West African countries, in collaboration with representatives of NGOs and professional organisations, have proven their ability to inﬂuence decisions made by international bodies. According to an ofﬁcial WTO communiqué issued during the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in December 2005: Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

Box 11.3. The Sikasso region in Mali: From cash crop agriculture to commercial agriculture Cotton cultivation is a very old activity in Mali. It was imposed as an export crop by the colonial administration. One agency (CMDT) took over the cultivation, collection and ginning activities. CMDT compels farmers to increase their output (from 200 kg to 1,600 kg), by limiting the areas cultivated and fertilizer use. The farmers quickly understood that the fertilizer Ànanced by cotton can also be used for food cultivation (they sometimes “divert” part of the fertilizer to this end). Cotton revenues are Àrst invested in the increase of the herd as a form of savings; then the revenues are used to purchase draught animals and ploughs. When the pressure from CMDT eases, farmers use animaldrawn ploughs to increase the cultivated area. At the same time, given the growth in urban, local and regional demand for food, grains, particularly maize, have become traded crops. Between 1984 and 1997 in the Sikasso region, the average area cultivated by each farmer increased from one to three or four hectares. From 1977–1997, maize production increased from 10,000 to 70,000 tonnes. At the same time, cotton farming areas increased from 15,000 to 78,000 hectares with a decline in output. On a farm of 85 hectares, the distribution between cotton and grains is set at around 30 hectares for cotton/55 hectares for grain. An initial system of land repartition for crop rotation and the use of livestock for agricultural practices has taken the place of traditional shifting cultivation. The next challenge to be addressed is the disappearance of fallow lands and the need for soil regeneration. Source: ECOLOC Study, Sikasso (Mali), Club du Sahel / OECD, July 1998

Sikasso Zone cotton and maize production Cotton

1,500 t/ha

1,000 Maize 500 62

76

84

92 97

205

SIERRA LEONE

LIBERIA

GUINEA

MAURITANIA

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Source: CIRAD, Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD (2006)

ATLANTIC OCEAN

GUINEA BISSAU

THE GAMBIA

SENEGAL

ATLANTIC OCEAN

206

GHANA

BURKINA FASO

MALI

TOGO

BENIN

150

300 km

© Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2006

0

Use of cattle for tilling by animal traction

< 30%

CAMEROON

Use of mules and horses for sowing, weeding, collection and transportation

> 90%

CHAD

Use of cattle for animal traction mules and horses for transportation

20 to 40%

NIGER

Use of cattle for animal traction mules and horses for transportation

Use of animals for carrying, transporting and watering

Cotton zone

40 to 75%

NIGERIA

Percentage of equipped farms

Map 11.9. Animal traction and cotton-producing zones in West Africa

III. ECONOMY

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] “All forms of export subsidies for cotton will be eliminated by developed countries in 2006. ] On market access, developed countries will give duty and quota free access for cotton exports from the least developed countries (LDCs) from the commencement of the implementation period. ] Members agree that the objective is that, as an outcome of the negotiations, trade distorting domestic subsidies for cotton production be reduced more ambitiously than under whatever general formula is agreed and that it should be implemented over a shorter period of time than generally applicable. We commit ourselves to give priority in the negotiations to reach such an outcome”.

Figure 11.8. The cotton industry in West Africa Cotton production

Extra-regional exports

50%

40%

90% Intra-regional exports

Cotton fibre 10%

Loss 10%

Cotton seeds

Spining Oil and soap Oilcakes mill

Seeds Weaving

Market (regional or export)

Dyeing and printing Use of imported products

Industrial clothes (Wax, Fancy, etc.) Craft cloths (Kente, Mandjack, etc.)

Clothing industry

Source: SWAC/OECD 2006

Table 11.2. List of industrial units involved in the cotton sector in West Africa (2006 or the most recent year) Ginning factories Number of factories Benin Burkina Faso Cameroon Chad Côte d’Ivoire The Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Mali Niger

20 15 9 10 12 1 n.a. 1 1 17 2

Oil factories

Ginning Cotton grain capacity production (tonnes) (2000-05) 650,000 535,000 300,000 230,000 420,000 10,000 n.a. n.a. n.a. 600,000 60,000

415,000 432,000 219 000 198,000 346 000 5,000 20,000 49,000 4,000 515,000 10,000

Textiles

Industrial units 2 1 1 1 1 n.a. 3 -

4 (incl. 1 inoperative) 2 5 1 (closed)) 2 (incl. 8 inoperative) 5 1 2 2 (incl. 1 inoperative) About 100 (incl. 60-80 inoperative) 12 (incl. 4 inoperative) 4 (incl. 2 inoperative )

Although the trade negotiations carried out within the framework of the Doha Development Round are currently suspended, the main lesson from the process carried out within the WTO is that it is absolutely necessary to reach a regional Nigeria 2 n.a. 378,000 n.a. understanding. This co-operation, Senegal 5 65,000 41,000 n.a. which directly involved four West Togo 6 200,000 162,000 1 African cotton-producing coun- Source: Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD (2006) tries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali), should be extended to other West African producing countries. Speaking as of the its systems and the capacity of West African one, these countries would be in a position to defend cotton sectors to organise themselves to meet the interests of this third world exporter, namely West growing demand. An approach to these challenges Africa. The future, therefore, belongs to a Common at the level of the cotton zone, i.e. cross-border Cotton Policy facing the challenges of the internabasin, deserves particular attention, in that regard. tional market, particularly China;10 and also in the The future of West African cotton may, therefore, be perceived as “doubly regional”; that is, as face of the challenge of the “rebirth” of the textile regional at the “macro” level so that West Africa can industry in the region. capitalise on its position internationally, as well as regional at the more “micro” level of the crossThe future of West African cotton will also depend border production basins. on the its cost/ quality ratio, on the sustainability Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

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Notes 1. 2. 3.

West Africa is defined here as the region composed of ECOWAS member countries, Cameroon, Mauritania and Chad. Source: UNCTAD, see www.unctad.org/infocomm/anglais/cotton/uses.htm The three main markets for cotton fibre are: clothing (60%), furnishings (about 33%) and professional clothing (5%). Cotton is also used for manufacturing specific textiles and for medical purposes. 4. Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC): WTO Agreement on Textiles and Garments aims at integrating trade in this sector into the GATT regulations framework; expiry date: 1 January 2005. See WTO Glossary: www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/glossary_e.htm. 5. Ghana was the first country to implement liberalization reforms in 1985, with the privatisation of the Cotton Development Board (CDB), now the Ghana Cotton Company Ltd, GCCL). The State holds 30% of its capital, apart from other shareholders: textile companies, input suppliers and the Agricultural Development Bank 6. DAGRIS (2002): Les filières partenaires. 7. If the textile industry alone is discussed here, it should be noted that cotton grain is largely processed in West Africa, particularly to extract the oil for human consumption and the cotton seed cake for cattle feed; these activities will be discussed in another chapter of the Atlas. With an output of 3.9 million tonnes, cotton oil is ranked fifth in terms of global cooking oil consumption. Oil cake ranks sec ond in animal feed consumption, behind soya. 8. AGOA: African Growth Opportunity Act. Promulgated on 18 May 2000 by President Bill Clinton, this law enables sub-Saharan African countries to export to the United States, duty and quota free, products that meet defined eligibility rules of which 14 West African countries are today eligible. 9. The UEMOA’s textile development strategy provides for “a dynamic regional textile industry, for processing 25% of local cotton production, creating 50,000 industrial jobs”. See the study on the identification and promotion of regional industrial units in the UEMOA cotton sector (March 2003). 10. According to current projections, Chinese cotton demand and imports should remain high until 2010. West Africa seems to have accounted for this change: 46% of its cotton was exported to China in 2004, contributing to nearly 20% of the total cotton imports of China. Can this situation be sustained? Will West Africa benefit from this new situation?

Sources and bibliography AFD (2006), La ﬁn des quotas textiles. La lettre des économistes de l’AFD, n° 11, janvier 2006, Paris. Baffes, J. (2004), Cotton. Market setting, trade policies, and issues. World Bank Policy Research, Working paper 3218, February 2004, Washington DC. CEDEAO (2004), Cadre de politique agricole pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest. ECOWAP. Document de référence pour la première phase de consultations nationales. Juillet 2004.

208

Cheng, F., B. A. Babcock (2003), China’s cotton policy and the impact of China’s WTO accession and Bt cotton adoption on the Chinese and U.S. cotton sectors. Working paper 03-WP-322, Center for agricultural and rural development, Iowa State University, January 2003, Iowa. Club du Sahel (1998), L’économie locale de Sikasso, Mali. Etude de cas du programme “ Relance des activités locales en Afrique de l’Ouest ". Club du Sahel/OCDE, juillet 1998, Paris. CIRAD (2006), Dossier Coton. See: www.cirad.fr/fr/regard_sur/coton.php. CIRDES (2003), Traction animale et stratégies d’acteurs : quelle recherche, quels services face au désengagement des États ? Atelier international d’échange, 17-21 novembre 2003, Bobo Dioulasso. Dahou, K., T. Dahou et C. Gueye (2002), Espaces frontaliers et intégration régionale. Le cas de SKBo. Enda Tiers Monde, Dakar. Dagris (2005), Production cotonnière Africaine – Campagne 2004/05. Note de conjoncture n° 8, novembre 2005, Paris. FAO (2003), Medium-term Prospects for Agricultural Commodities, Committee on Commodity Problems, 64th Session, 18-21 March 2003, Rome. Estur, G. (2005) Situation et perspectives du marché mondial du coton. ICAC, 8 avril 2005, Washington. Estur, G. (2005) The competitiveness of African Cotton on the World Market. ICAC, January 2005, Washington. Fok, M. (2005), Coton Africain et marché mondial : une distorsion peut en cacher une autre plus importante. Colloque Agence universitaire de la francophonie. Filières d’exportation de produits agricoles du Sud : réformes institutionnelles, négociations internationales et impacts socio-démographiques, 6 et 7 avril 2005, Bamako. Goreux, L., J. Macrae (2003), Réformes des ﬁlières cotonnières en Afrique subsaharienne. Juillet 2003, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, juillet 2003, Paris. Harsmar, M. (2004), Indigenous institutions – Constraint or refuge? The case of agricultural dynamism at the Mossi Plateau in Burkina Faso. Unpublished report. Sweden. Igue, J. (2003), Le secteur informel en Afrique de l’Ouest : Le cas du tissu traditionnel. Dans L’Afrique de l’Ouest dans la compétition mondiale. Quels atouts possibles ? J. Damon et J.O. Igue (eds) Karthala/SWAC-OECD. Lagandre, D. (2005), Le secteur cotonnier en zone franc, entre succès et dépendance. AFD, Rapport thématique Jumbo, septembre 2005, Paris.

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III. E CONOMY

MacDonald, S., T. Vollrath (2005), The forces shaping World cotton consumption after the Multiﬁber Arragement. USDA, Electronic outlook report from the economic research service, April 2005. Ministère de la Coopération et du Développement (1991), Le coton en Afrique de l’Ouest et du Centre. Situation et perspectives. Groupe de travail de la Coopération française, Paris. Nubukpo, K. (2004), L’avenir des ﬁlières cotonnières ouest-Africaines : quelles perspectives après Cancun ? Communication à la Commission Économique de la Francophonie, 7 avril 2004, Paris. OECD (2004), A New World Map in Textiles and Clothing: Adjusting to Change. Organisation for Economic and Development Co-operation (OECD), Paris. Orsena, Erik (2006), Voyage aux pays du coton. Petit précis de mondialisation. Fayard édition, Paris. Perrin, S., D. Lagandre (2005), Le coton Africain face à la concurrence du marché mondial. AFD, Rapport thématique Jumbo n° 6, septembre 2005, Paris. See: www.unctad.org/sections/dite_fdistat/docs/ china_ebrief_en.pdf. Sahel and West Africa Club (2005), Economic and social importance of cotton in West Africa: role of cotton in development, trade and livelihoods. SWAC/OECD, November 2005, Paris. Sow, H. (1999), L’industrie textile dans les pays de l’UEMOA. Centre pour le développement de l’entreprise (CDE). Partenariat n° 41, mars-avril 1999. See: www.cde.int/ﬁles/pubs/13/Partenariat41.pdf. UEMOA (2003), Étude d’identiﬁcation et de promotion d’unités industrielles régionales dans la ﬁlière coton de l’UEMOA, UEMOA mars 2003. UNCTAD (2005), Infocomm, market information in the commodities areas. Cotton production. See: http://r0.unctad.org/infocomm/anglais/cotton/market.htm. UNCTAD (2005), Infocomm, market information in the commodities areas. Uses. See: http://r0.unctad.org/ infocomm/anglais/cotton/Uses.htm. Valderrama Becerra, C. A. (2004), The world cotton market: a long-term outlook. ICAC, WTO African Regional Workshop on Cotton, March 23-24, 2004, Cotonou. Zoundi, J.S., K. Hussein, L. Hitimana (2006), Libéralisation de la ﬁlière coton et innovation agricole en Afrique de l’Ouest. In Cahiers Agriculture, vol. 15, n° 1, janvier-février 2006. Websites CIRAD. Dossier coton

www.cirad.fr/fr/regard_sur/coton.php

Dagris. Informations sur le coton

www.dagris.fr/infocoton.html

FAO. Land and Water Development division

www.fao.org/ag/agl/default.stm

FAO. Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS)

www.fao.org/giews/english/spot4/waf/index.htm

International Cotton Advisory Committee

www.icac.org

IZF

www.izf.net

UNCTAD. Market Information in the Commodities Area – Cotton

http://r0.unctad.org/infocomm/anglais/indexen.htm

UNSTATS. Database Comtrade

http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/default.aspx

USDA. Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) www.fas.usda.gov WTO. The Cotton Sub-Committee

www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/cotton_subcommittee_e.htm

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Chapter 12. COFFEE Daniel Duris (CIRAD – France)

12.1. Global overview 12.1.1. More robusta

Figure 12.1. World coffee production 140

In million of 60-kg bags

90% Total

12.1.2. The rise of Brazil and Vietnam

% Arabica / Total 100 Arabica 80 75% 60 40 Robusta

20

211 60%

2005

2000

1995

1990

1985

1980

1975

1970

0

1965

Since 1964, world coffee production has grown at a rate of 1.4% per year, increasing from 3.1 to 6.3 million tonnes. With a lower growth rate than Robusta (0.9% as compared to 2.7%), Arabica’s share has fallen from 4/5 to 2/3 of total coffee production over the last 40 years (see Figure 12.1. and Map 12.1.). Arabica is far more sensitive to climatic conditions and therefore subject to greater ﬂuctuations in its production from year to year.

120

1960

There are two kinds of coffee: Arabica (Coffea arabica), cultivated at higher altitudes, and Robusta (Coffea canephora), better adapted to hot, humid regions. Arabica, which has a lower caffeine content than Robusta (1.4% and 2.5% respectively), is considered more aromatic. It is more popular with consumers, whereas Robusta has a more intense body.1

Source: USDA

Figure 12.2. World coffee production trends 100% South America

Africa 75%

Central America

Asia

50% South America 25% Africa

Africa’s predominance in the early 0% 1960-64 1999-04 1960-64 1999-04 1960s is giving way to the rise of Asia and Latin America. With the increased Arabica Robusta growth in coffee production in Asia and South America (see Figure 12.2.) crises2 and the development of alternative crops there is also relative stagnation and perhaps even a decline in production in other regions of the world. (palm oil, rubber and cocoa) that are more proﬁtable This is due to high production costs, a series of and, more importantly, less labour-intensive. Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

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Map 12.1. World arabica and robusta production Arabica was the first coffee ever grown. It prefers cool climates without frost and grows best in mountainous tropical regions. It can be found in East Africa's high plateaus, Central America's volcanic slopes and South America's Andean hillsides. However, there are some production areas that are not located at high altitudes, particularly in Brazil. Robusta is produced by Coffea canephora. It prefers hot and humid equatorial climates, where cocoa and bananas also grow. It does not grow well at high altitudes. The West African plains, Vietnam and Indonesia are major production zones. Source: CIRAD (2003)

2000-04 1960-64 Arabica and Robusta Production

Coffee producing countries

65,000

117,000

(in thousand 60-kg bag)

212 Source: ICO (2007)

Arabica

Predominantly Arabica

Robusta

Predominantly Robusta

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

Box 12.1. Constraints linked to rising production Up to 80% of coffee cultivation is carried out on small family farms whose revenue depends greatly on their production. Average yields for Robusta and Arabica are 485 kg/ha and 600 kg/ha respectively, while plant material production potential is assessed at 1,000-1,200 kg/ha indicating a relatively low level of intensiÀcation. Improving average yields is one solution for increasing overall production. However, the biggest producers (Brazil and Colombia in the case of Arabica, and Vietnam in that of Robusta) achieve yields that are higher than or equal to global averages. A second way of increasing production is to increase cultivated areas. Coffee cultivation is highly labour-intensive. On average, 250-300 work days are required to produce 1 tonne of coffee of which around 80% are devoted to harvesting (daily wage labour). Hence, labour costs are a large part of production costs. Not much of the labour involved can be mechanised, particularly in the case of Arabica, which is essentially grown in mountainous regions with high population densities. Brazil is an exception, with conditions enabling almost total mechanisation of cultivation. There are various constraints to increasing Arabica coffee production. Most Latin American countries incur high labour costs and there is signiÀcant pressure on land resources, whereas for Robusta, it is not so much pressure on land, but labour availability that often proves a major problem. Finally, increased growth would require easy and low-cost access to Ànancial resources.

As of 1975, there was a spurt in Brazil’s Robusta production, which stabilised in the early 1990s. This was followed by Vietnam’s entry into the global market, which led to a signiﬁcant fall in Arabica’s share in global supply.

12.1.3. Demand is concentrated in the North Since man “domesticated” its production (probably around the 15th century in Arabia), coffee has been used solely as a beverage, after roasting and

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1,040

* United States and Mexico Source: ICO (2007)

South America

3,100

Central America and Carribean

820

NAFTA*

290

1,410

285

220

Sub-saharan Africa

930

North Africa & Middle East

Europe

2,740

820

Exporting countries Coffee consumption

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

Importing countries Coffee production

2000-04 Averge (In thousand tonnes)

Asia

1,580

Map 12.2. World coffee production and consumption

III. E CONOMY

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III. ECONOMY

12.1.4. The emergence of new markets

In thousands of 60-kg bags 140,000

Arabica

120,000

OC

Robusta

100,000

WC

80,000

IM

60,000 40,000

EX

20,000

NM 2005

2000

1995

1990

1985

1975

1970

1980

0

1965

Though produced in the South, coffee is mainly consumed in the North. World consumption,3 around 5.1 million tonnes of green coffee, is essentially concentrated in Western Europe, North America and Japan (79%), the main importing member countries of the International Coffee Organisation.4 In the context of 214 global consumption (see Map 12.2.), member countries import approximately 59.6% whereas non-member countries import 15.8%, while the remainder (24.6%) represents domestic consumption in exporting countries, the highest being in Brazil and Ethiopia.

Figure 12.3. Coffee consumption

1960

grinding. It has been prepared and consumed in many different ways over time (decoction, infusion, ﬁltration, percolation, etc.) but there has not been any real innovation, except for soluble (instant) coffee. Global demand is relatively insensitive to price variations, although price hikes, such as those in 1977 or 1997-98, do lead to a fall in consumption. In fact, coffee consumption is strongly linked to revenues.

Overall consumption (OC), World consumption (WC), non-members (NM), importers (IM), exporters (EX) Sources: ICO & USDA

12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483316806455

Figure 12.4. Per capita coffee consumption kg green coffee per capita

6

Western Europe 5.5 5 4.5

USA 4

Other importing member countries

3.5 3

1993

1994

1995 1996

1997 1998

1999

2000 2001

2002

Source: F.O. Licht

The annual growth in world consumption between 1965 and 2004 is estimated at 1.7%, i.e. higher than the growth in production (1.4%). It was particularly high in non-ICO member countries (+ 3.5%), especially the new European Union member countries and the former Soviet bloc countries (see Figure 12.3.). Non-member countries are not bound to comply with the ICO’s recommendations and generally purchase lower quality coffees, therefore at lower prices (or those not included in quotas up to 2000). This partially explains the relatively higher rise in consumption in these countries as compared to member countries. Along with the increase in purchasing

power, consumption in these countries is likely to intensify further over the next 25-30 years. In Western Europe and the USA consumption increased only by 1.2% and per capita consumption is decreasing due to competition from sweetened and ﬂavoured drinks, especially among the youth, or due to its purportedly harmful effects on health5 (see Figure 12.4.).

12.1.5. Future prospects World consumption could reach 7.6 million tonnes and global consumption almost 10 million tonnes

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III. E CONOMY

by 2025, with production at 9.4 to 9.8 million tonnes. If domestic consumption growth in producing countries continues at the present pace (+1.5%), there could be a shortfall in supply. At a constant growth rate, Robusta production should increase by 1.75 million tonnes and that of Arabica by almost 1 million tonnes. Robusta’s share would then increase to 46% of the world market, which would lead to Robusta partially replacing Arabica.6 This is an acceptable assumption given the progress in research on aromas and decaffeination techniques to exclude organic solvents despite consumer preference for Arabica.

Rising prices led to an increase in supply after a 3 to 5 year gap, which resulted from the time taken to set up new cultivation areas or revive plantations that had been neglected during the crisis. On the other hand, falling prices led to a relatively rapid drop in production (and quality). Planters only harvested the most productive ﬁelds, neglected maintenance and even gave up all or part of their coffee plantations. Until the mid-1980s, the price differential between Robusta and Arabica was relatively small as the Robusta demand by the instant coffee industry remained high. Robusta’s attractive price as compared to natural Arabica10 led countries like Brazil and Vietnam to produce this type of coffee. This resulted in an increase in the price differential. Above all, the crises had greater impact on Robusta producing countries. Therefore, the price differential penalised Robusta growers despite lower production costs. On the whole, Brazilian and Vietnamese producers were better paid for their Robusta than West African growers (see Figure 12.6.), undoubtedly contributing to the decline of coffee plantation in West Africa and the 215 growth of Robusta in Vietnam and Brazil.

If this assumption proves true, it would be favourable to African countries. It all depends on the responsiveness of national authorities and networks (access to demand-related information and technological progress in the industry) and the incentives offered by producing countries, if any. This scenario is predicated on the improvement of cropping practices on existing, relatively young plantations7 where production can be doubled rapidly (5-10 years). It also depends on the replacement of aging plantations8 with improved planting material. Over 75% of low-production 12.2.2. Trade plantations (< 250 kg/ha) would then have to be replanted in Angola, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire and South America exports 42% of the coffee produced the DRC. Finally, this would also call for increasing in the world, followed by Asia (24%) and Africa the cropped area by improving formerly fallow and/or virgin land. Figure 12.5. World prices and production Hundreds of thousands of hectares in sub-Saharan Africa could prove In hundred US Cents/lb In million bag 130 250 highly promising, though there are Important Differential labour-related constraints (it takes 120 1 man/year to produce 1 tonne of 200 coffee) along with those stemming 110 from the isolation of some 150 100 landlocked countries (the Central African Republic, for example). 90 100

12.2. International trade

80

Arabica prices 50

12.2.1. Market and prices

Production: average mobile over 5 years

70 Robusta prices

Sources: Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens and ICO

12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483325238630

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2005

2002

1999

1996

1993

1990

1987

1984

1981

1978

1975

1972

1969

1966

1963

60

1960

0

Relatively stable between 1960 and 1975, world market prices9 were very volatile between 1975 and 2005.

III. ECONOMY

Figure 12.6. Global market prices and farm gate prices paid of producers US Cents/lb 55.00

Global prices

50.00

Brazil

45.00 40.00

Vietnam 35.00

Togo

30.00 25.00

Côte d'Ivoire

20.00 15.00 10.00

2000 Source: ICO

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483336887575

Box 12.2. International market: Specialty coffees and bulk coffees

216

Specialty coffees (10% of the market) are generally negotiated directly between producers and buyers or are paid for on the basis of their stock exchange prices (New York), often with a bonus. Bulk coffees (90% of the market) are the inputs for large- and medium-scale roasting units. Their prices are determined by the New York (Arabica) and London (Robusta) stock exchanges on a supply-demand basis. The bulk coffee market is highly speculative. The advent of Vietnam on the international market led to a considerable drop in world prices in the mid-1990s and a substantial fall in Robusta prices that continued until 2005-2006. The market is also sensitive to climatic conditions in Brazil – news about frost in June-July leads to an increase in prices, favouring both Arabica and Robusta. Coffee trading is dominated by a handful of multinationals from whom the large coffee roasting corporations purchase their supplies. These multinationals are set up in the producing countries as exporters and in consuming countries as importers.

(16%). Excluding West African countries, Africa has a 10.5% share of the global market and its coffee is exported mainly to Europe and non-ICO countries (see Map 12.3.). West Africa’s share of the market is less than 6%, apportioned between Europe and ICO non-members. The region’s countries have lost part of their market share since the 1960s. In the early 1960s, North America imported 55,000 to 60,000 tonnes of coffee from Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon, whereas in the 2000s, trade statistics indicate no imports from West Africa.

Over 95% of coffee exported by producing countries is exported as green coffee (see Map 12.3.). Producing countries export barely 4% of their coffee in the form of soluble coffee and have a very low share of roasted coffee.11 Only a few producing countries have developed their own soluble coffee industry: Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Thailand and the Philippines being the most important. West Africa has only one soluble coffee manufacturing plant in Côte d’Ivoire with a capacity of 15,000 tonnes of green coffee per year. Several coffee producing countries have attempted to sell roasted coffee for export. Apart from roasting for domestic consumption, the process remains largely marginal for exports and is limited to special coffees. This process is technically difﬁcult as costly promotional tools have to be set up while there is ﬁerce competition from large multinationals that are offering mixtures rather than pure original coffees. Multinationals offer consumers a coffee with the desired sensory characteristics that remain as constant as possible over time in order to maintain their market share which is achieved by optimising mixtures of different origins.

Europe imports 53% of the coffee produced, followed by North America (26%). The rest is shared between Asia and non-ICO members. Unlike producing countries, importing countries process green coffee into roasted and ground coffee or soluble coffee. Europe consumes 92.4% of its imports and re-exports 7.6% in the form of green coffee (55%), roasted coffee (13%) and soluble coffee (32%). Green coffee is generally unloaded in Hamburg and Rotterdam’s ports (less in The Hague and Trieste). It is then re-exported to non-member

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Source: F.O. Licht

Non Member Countries

13.9%

42.1%

4.2%

North America

5.6%

Europe

13.9%

23.7%

Asia

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

Soluble industry in producing countries

Main coffee export flows

Volume (%) of exports per production zone

12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483358057218

10.5%

Map 12.3. World coffee exports

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217

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European countries, such as Russia or the former Soviet bloc countries, or else to member countries. North America re-exports 1.8% of its imports while Asia re-exports 6.9% (see Figure 12.7.).

and Nigeria (see Map 12.5.). Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon and Guinea alone produce 94% of Africa’s coffee, i.e. about 240,000 tonnes (see Figure 12.9.). Benin

12.3. Coffee in West Africa

Figure 12.7. Types of coffee exported Asia

12.3.1. African overview 100%

North America Europe

Asia

South AmerIca

60%

NAFTA

80%

Africa

Robusta is cultivated at low altitudes, humid equatorial and tropical areas. Arabica prefers higher altitudes with signiﬁcant differences in day-night temperatures. For both, the biggest constraint is rainfall – as much its quantity as its distribution. The Northern plantation limits are generally deﬁned by the 1,500 mm isohyet, subject to the dry season not exceeding four months. Apart from unclean ﬂoodable soil, no special soil types are particularly favourable.

40%

20%

Green Soluble Roasted Coffee

0%

Exporting Countries

Importing Countries

Source: F.O. Licht

Box 12.3. A fairly new crop for Africa

African production declined between 1960 and 2004. From 900,000 tonnes in the early 218 1960s, it peaked at 1.2 million tonnes (1980-84 average) before dropping to 865,000 tonnes at the beginning of 2000. It currently accounts for 12.3% of global production as compared to 23% in the 1960s (see Figure 12.8.). There are 26 producing countries and 3 major production regions (see Map 12.4.). West Africa (30% of Africa’s production) grows Robusta almost exclusively. East Africa (69%), with the exception of Uganda, essentially produces Arabica. Production in Central Africa12 (1%) has been declining for several decades now. There was a sharp decrease in Angola’s coffee production as from 1975 and in Congo as from 1992, essentially due to political instability.

12.3.2. West Africa a) Production areas Climatic conditions favour coffee growing in nine countries. Apart from Cape Verde, these countries are spread out across two major coffee-producing areas – one area around Côte d’Ivoire (Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Togo) and the other around Cameroon

Arabica, originating from Ethiopia’s high plateaus, was Àrst planted in Yemen in the early 15th century. Imported by Istanbul in the mid-16th century, coffee consumption slowly spread to all of Europe in the 17th century. Arabica was introduced to Java around 1690 and developed in the New World in 1720 – Àrst in the Caribbean, then Brazil, followed by Central America. In the 19th century, Europe started receiving supplies from Latin America. Europe’s mighty nations were building their colonial empires during the same period, particularly in Africa, and began introducing Arabica. Unfortunately, it did not adapt to West and Central Africa’s hot and humid areas. At the same time, new species of coffee plants were discovered in West Africa and the Congo basin (Coffea liberica and Coffea canephora) and these gradually started being planted in order to lower dependence on Latin American imports. Hence, coffee plants of African origin did not begin spreading across the continent until much later.

Table 12.1. Coffee introduction dates in West Africa Countries Côte d’Ivoire

Plantation start dates End 19th, early 20th: C.liberica 1930: Robusta

Cameroon

1913: Arabica – 1930: Robusta

Guinea

1895: Arabica – 1910: Robusta

Togo

1923: Robusta

Benin

1930: Robusta

Liberia

1875: Arabica – 1945: Robusta

Cape Verde

1790: Arabica

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Except for coffee roasting for local markets, there is no industry in West Africa. The

229.1 175.7 169.8 51.1 50.7 43.6

Total: 862,000 tonnes

22.7 22.5 21.4 19.2 18.6

African production trends Million tonnes

1.4

8.3 6.3 6.2 4.7 2.8 2.7 2.2 2.0 1.8 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0

1.1

0

50

100

West Africa

150

2005

2000

1995

1990

1985

1980

1975

1970

1965

1960

0.7

200

250 In thousand tonnes

Other African countries

12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483343163360

Source: USDA

Figure 12.9. Production distribution in West Africa Liberia 0.2% Ghana 1% Sierra Leone 1% Côte d'Ivoire 67%

219

Nigeria 1% Others 6% Guinea 7%

Togo 3%

Cameroon 20%

12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483354015625

Source: USDA

Figure 12.10. African and West African production trends 40%

1960-64

1980-84

2000-04

30%

20%

Africa / World (%)

World

Africa West Africa (%)

Source: USDA

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29.5%

34.1%

3.6%

30,0% 30.0%

7.5%

0%

6.9%

10%

12.3%

During the colonial period, while the UK promoted cocoa, France encouraged coffee growing (see Figure 12.11.) during the 1925-30 period, especially in Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire. Most plantations belonged to small native family farms involved in mixed farming. European plantations13 represented less than 2% of the area (see Box 12.4.). On the eve of their independence, Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon respectively owned plantations covering 600,000 and 80,000 ha. In Guinea, a support fund was set up in 1951 and by 1960 production reached almost 15,000 tonnes before falling drastically. The same year, Togo cultivated 20,000 ha and produced 12,000 tonnes.

Ethiopia Uganda Côte d’Ivoire Kenya Cameroon Tanzania Congo (ex Zaire) Burundi Madagascar Rwanda Guinea Togo Zambia Zimbabwe CAR Malawi Nigeria Angola Sierra Leone Ghana Liberia Congo Gabon Equat Guinea Benin

22.0%

b) The end of the “Golden Age” Average production today (255,000 tonnes) is less than it was in the 1960s, after peaking at almost 400,000 tonnes (see Figures 12.10. and 12.11.). In forty years, coffee’s share in agricultural product exports was down from 17.1% to 6.4% (see Table 12.2.), while agricultural exports rose by more than 80%. In fact, the trend was visible in both Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon long before the 1990 crisis. The bankruptcy of the stabilisation funds set up in French-speaking countries was one of the probable causes of this decline, but other factors also played a role. The 1983 drought highlighted the plantations’ sensitivity to climatic instability, the preference for “cocoa” in Côte d’Ivoire, the aging of plantations and their inadequate maintenance.

Figure 12.8. Coffee production in Africa (2000-04 average)

23.1%

stopped exporting coffee about ten years ago and its production no longer manages to meet even domestic consumption, as climatic conditions are not sufﬁciently favourable. The Cape Verde islands produce a few tonnes of Arabica, used only as niche coffees.

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Map 12.4. Coffee production regions in Africa

West W We e A Africa r

ntra n a Africa Central East A Africa

Production shares of Africa’s three producing regions

220

Central Africa 1%

West Africa 30% East Africa 69%

Robusta Arabica

Source: F.O. Licht, ICO, USDA

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

only exception is the Nestlé soluble factory in Côte d’Ivoire. It was set up shortly after independence with the target of producing 10-15,000 tonnes of soluble coffee.14 The coffee is exported to neighbouring countries, the Middle East and East Africa.

12.3.3. The failure of the coffee sector in French-speaking countries A) Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon before Liberalisation Stabilisation funds were set up in 1955. Their role – initially limited to stabilising prices for

producers – was rapidly extended to the entire sector: extension,15 input supplies, infrastructure, etc. The stabilisation mechanism was based on guaranteeing a price to producers, a scale of marketing charges for reimbursing and paying operators and a guaranteed CIF (Cost Insurance Freight) price. The funds concerned – the CSSPPA16 in Côte d’Ivoire and the ONCPB17 in Cameroon – covered the difference between the CIF price and the sale price (either through levies or by providing support, depending on the prevailing rates). Although marketing was ofﬁcially private, it was under tight State control. Operators had purchase

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LIBERIA

GUINEA

Source: CIRAD (2007)

SIERRA LEONE

CAPE VERDE

GUINEA BISSAU

1500 mm

THE GAMBIA

SENEGAL

MAURITANIA

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

GHANA

BURKINA FASO

MALI

TOGO

BENIN

NIGERIA

NIGER

CAMEROON

1,500 mm

Isohyet (1961-89)

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

CHAD

1,500

Robusta

500 - 1,000 Less than 500

Arabica

Coffee production zones

Over 1,000

Relief (meters)

Map 12.5. Coffee production regions in West Africa

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221

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the Special Investment Budget in Côte d’Ivoire and production subsidies in Cameroon. But due to lack of rational 1990-94 Average 2000-04 Average management, they were unable to Farm % Farm % support producers’ prices when global Countries Coffee Coffee products coffee products coffee coffee prices fell drastically at the end of Benin 0.1 17.5 0.3% 0.00 53.5 0.0% the 1980s. A benchmark study (Ministry Cameroon 110.7 2,235.0 5.0% 73.9 2,356.6 3.1% of Co-operation, France, 1993) has shown Côte d’Ivoire 240.8 3,320.8 7.3% 167.1 4,314.4 3.9% that stabilisation surpluses should have Ghana 1.1 343.6 0.3% 2.0 770.4 0.3% made it possible to support prices for 13 Guinea 6.1 11.9 51.5% 6.2 11.9 51.7% additional crop years in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia 0.3 3.2 10.7% 0.3 4.0 6.7% 11 additional crop years in Cameroon. Nigeria 0.7 178.8 0.4% 0.3 381.7 0.1% In fact, the stabilisation funds became Sierra Leone 4.7 14.8 32.0% 1.5 8.4 17.2% so indebted that planters received Togo 12.9 45.0 28.7% 4.9 45.5 10.7% only half the guaranteed price as of the Total 377.4 2,201.6 17.1% 256.1 3,992.4 6.4% 1989-90 crop year. The consequences Source: FAOSTAT were immediately visible – plantations were no longer well maintained, those quotas in speciﬁc areas for domestic marketing that produced limited quantities of coffee were soon and needed to obtain the funds’ authorisation to abandoned and production declined on the whole be able to export, but only if the Funds themselves (see Figure 12.11.). were not marketing coffee. The General Budget in each of these countries came from a Single Exit Tax. Confronted with this crisis, neither the ICO’s Coffee grinding too was controlled and subject to 222 the approval of the Fund in Cameroon, while being International Coffee Agreement,18 nor the STABEX19 a State monopoly in Côte d’Ivoire. were able to play any compensatory role. The ICO abandoned the quota system in 1989. Its initial From 1960 to the mid-1980s, these stabilisation objective was to keep prices within a speciﬁc range, funds accumulated surpluses that were used for thereby ensuring at least the minimum receipts Table 12.2. Share of coffee in West Africa’s agricultural exports (million of USD)

Figure 12.11. Production by country in West Africa Cameroon

300

RCI

Guinea

25

250

Togo

Benin

20

200

15

Dryness

150

10

100 50

5

0

Ghana Nigeria

12

Liberia Sierra Leone

2005

2001

1997

1993

1989

1985

1981

1977

1973

1969

1965

1961

1957

1953

1949

1945

1941

1937

1933

1929

19 29 19 34 19 39 19 44 19 49 19 54 19 59 19 64 19 69 19 74 19 79 19 84 19 89 19 94 19 99 20 04

0

Benin: Production began with the country's independence but remained marginal.

10

Guinea: Increased production up to 1962 then significant and continuous fall until the country started re-opening in 1985. Two coffee plantation support projects in 1985 to 1995.

8 6

Incomplete Data

Togo: plantation support projects from 1972 to 1982, which led to increased production.

4 2

2005

2001

1997

1993

1989

1985

1981

1977

1973

1969

1965

1961

1957

1953

1949

1945

1941

1937

1933

1929

0

Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone: The political situation in these countries - except for Ghana, a cocoa producer - thwarted all coffee production support efforts within the framework of World Bank funded projects.

Sources: FAO (1929-1959), USDA (1960-2006), Les caféiers et les cafés dans le monde (René Coste)

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to coffee-growing States. The surpluses produced in each ICO member country could be exported to non-member countries at prices that were often lower than those of the quota system. Countries gradually started bypassing the agreement – for instance, by selling a part of their production under another country’s quota. In addition, the funds made available within the STABEX framework proved to be inadequate and were not always used for stabilisation purposes.

Box 12.4. The sector in Côte d’Ivoire About 300,000 coffee growers – the majority also producing cocoa – have plantations of 1 to 5 ha (average: 1.5 to 2 ha). The average yield is low (less than 300 kg/ ha) since the plantations are old (over 25 years), poorly maintained and extensively cultivated without inputs. As most of these farmholdings are family-owned, they use paid labour only for harvesting and some heavy maintenance work. Coffee and cocoa generate a major but insufÀcient portion of revenue, which is why food crops occupy at least 50% of the land on farms and monopolise a large section of the labour force.

b) Reforms in Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon In the early 1990s, the World Bank insisted on the liquidation of the ONCPB in Cameroon and the CSSPPA in Côte d’Ivoire and for liberalising the sector. But the two countries implemented less drastic measures. Cameroon set up the “Ofﬁce national du café et du cacao” (ONCC or National Coffee and Cocoa Ofﬁce) with modiﬁed prerogatives. An Inter-professional Committee (the CICC) was set up to help deﬁne the sector’s strategies. The pricing system was based on the calculation of a reference price ﬁxed according to the daily market prices posted in London, the calculation of a farm price negotiated with traders and the determination of a minimum guaranteed price for producers (farm price less industry costs). The stabilisation system, based on the difference between the farm price and the contract reference price, was maintained. However, the producers’ remuneration depended on world prices. Special purchasing zones and purchase controls were abolished while the co-operative movement was strengthened. The reform led to the disappearance of small local exporters in favour of international companies and large-scale exporters, capable of securing client loyalty by implementing a quality policy. In Côte d’Ivoire, the 1995 Agricultural Structural Adjustment Programme (ASAP) paved the way for a series of reforms, culminating in the complete liberalisation of the coffee-cocoa sector. The CSSPPA continued to play a role until 1998 but no longer monopolised export sales. Domestic marketing was fully liberalised. Although quotas were abolished, operators had to obtain an export

Most producers are members of a co-operative. After the harvest, coffee is dried and husked in cottage-type units or by co-operatives. Following cursory sorting, the beans are delivered to the co-operative or sold to a middleman who resells them to a bigger buyer or an exporter. To ensure better quality control, some exporters have set up buying centres where producers and co-operatives sell their produce, provided it meets the requisite quality criteria; producers receive a quality and production bulking bonus. The soluble coffee factory in Côte d’Ivoire sources its beans from such buying centres, distributed across the entire production area.

223

permit from the CSSPPA. However, the stabilisation system, based on an FOB reference price and a sales price, remained in force. With the 1998/99 crop year came the end of the CSSPPA, coming into effect in 2000. Two new players then came on the scene: ] The ARCC (“Autorité de Régulation du café/ cacao” or Coffee/Cocoa Regulatory Authority): A

public

body,

responsible

for

advising

the Interministerial Committee, regulating the sector and ensuring proper control. ] The BCC (“Bourse du café/cacao” or coffee/cocoa stock exchange): A private body, managed by the sector’s professionals and aimed at fulﬁlling operational (commercial) functions.

These organisations were supported by other organisations

and

committees,

creating

full-ﬂedged inter-professional network:

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a

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224

] The “Comité Interministériel des Matières Premières” (CIMP or Interministerial commodity committee): Chaired by the Prime Minister, it deﬁned the sector’s policy and saw to the respect of the objectives ﬁxed by the government. ] The “Fonds de Régulation et de Contrôle” (FRC or Regulatory and Control Fund): A legal entity under private law, it was responsible for constant control over exporters’ ﬁnancial commitments, collecting charges levied on the ARRC’s and BCC’s accounts and establishing the price scale. ] The “Fonds de Garantie des Coopératives Café-Cacao” (FGCCC or Coffee-Cocoa Co-operative Guarantee Fund): Its mission consisted of helping Professional Agricultural Organisations (OPA) access bank credits. ] The “Fonds de Développement et de Promotion des producteurs de Café et Cacao” (FDPCC or Coffee and cocoa producers’ development and promotion Fund): Set up at the producers’ initiative, it helped producers enter the coffee/ cocoa sector.

12.4. Prospects While losing ground on the world market, Africa and West Africa’s future is uncertain especially faced with the rise of Latin America (Brazil) and Asia (Vietnam). In 2025, global Robusta demand is likely to be between 3.4 and 4.3 million tonnes (2.5 million tonnes in 2004). To maintain its current market share, West Africa would need to produce at least 575,000 tonnes, i.e. more than twice its current production. But is this minimum target, which does not include regaining the market share lost over the last 25 years, realistic? With the same surface area, doubling the average yield should make it possible. The situation varies depending on the country, although intensiﬁcation20 is essential for all of them: ] Côte d’Ivoire’s plantations, of which at least 60% are old, are decreasingly productive and need to be renewed.21 The remaining 40% need to be regenerated.22 However, the country suffers from a shortage of manpower.

] Several systems co-exist in Cameroon: intensive Robusta in the Mongo, extensive Robusta, and Arabica compete with food crops. Intensiﬁcation is relatively recent. The resumption of maintenance processes should provide quick results. ] Guinea was not confronted with successive coffee crises to the same extent. Its relatively young plantations are being expanded basically by using rainfed rice producing land that is already depleted. Intensiﬁcation is the sole option. ] Togo has very limited possibilities for expanding its plantations. Plantations were revived between 1975 and 1985. It is imperative to at least hold on to the existing potential. ] Cocoa is the priority in Ghana and Nigeria, so a spectacular growth of coffee production is unlikely. ] Liberia has considerable land reserves. The country is not densely populated and opportunities for highly-paid work are limited. Although more densely populated, Sierra Leone faces a similar situation. Admittedly, West Africa’s current share of Robusta’s global market is not very signiﬁcant (8-9%). Nevertheless, it could become so in the coming 20-25 years. Firstly, because coffee is a proﬁtable crop, especially in areas where cocoa cannot be grown (Western Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Togo, etc.). Furthermore, increased freight costs have given West Africa a comparative advantage over its competitors in the European and US markets. Finally, there are limited possibilities for additional production in other regions of the world.23 A minimum production target could be achieved with better plantation productivity by 2025-2030. This will be possible if regional-level consultation takes place, especially in the ﬁeld of agricultural research (improving varieties). In fact, with the complete liberalisation of the coffee sector, the States could play a signiﬁcant role by working on a common agricultural policy. Coffee remains and will remain an enterprise that can improve the West African farmers’ living conditions.

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III. E CONOMY

Notes 1. 2. 3.

4.

5. 6.

7. 8. 9.

10.

11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20.

21.

22. 23.

Robusta is used mainly for producing soluble coffee. Its second use is in the preparation of Arabica/Robusta mixtures for inexpensive coffees. Years during which coffee prices in New York (Arabica) and London (Robusta) remained very low. For Robusta, the years were: 1981-1983, 1986, 1990-1995 and 2000-2005. For Arabica, the years were: 1981-1982, 1987-1988, 1990-1995 and 2001-2006. According to the International Coffee Organisation (ICO), world consumption is defined by the actual consumption of importing member countries added to the net imports of non-member countries. Global consumption is the combination of world consumption and domestic consumption in exporting member countries. Member countries are signatories of the International Coffee Agreement. They are divided into consuming countries or importing countries (32) and producing countries or exporting countries (45). See http://www.ico.org/listmembers.asp. Together (producers and consumers), they define the ICO’s strategies to tackle the challenges facing the world coffee sector through international co-operation. Caffeine is considered a stimulant – even a potentially addictive drug. Coffee is sometimes held responsible for cardio-vascular incidents. A second hypothesis is based on the continuance of the current ratio, i.e. 1/3 Robusta and 2/3 Arabica, with an average 1.4% increase in production. In that case, Arabica production would have to increase by 1.5 million tonnes and Robusta’s by 0.8 million tonnes to meet demand. Less than 20-25 years. More than 25-30 years. Coffee is a commodity that is listed on the New York (Arabica) and London (Robusta) stock exchanges. According to the ICO’s classification, there are 4 categories of coffee (Arabica extra-mild, Arabica mild, Arabica natural and Robusta), each listed separately on the international market. Arabica’s production costs are higher than Robusta’s (by 50-80%, depending on levels of intensification and plant health problems). On the other hand, Robusta’s prices are on average 20% lower than those of natural Arabicas (Brazilian type). Whenever Robusta prices go above 50 cents/lb, Robusta becomes very profitable for producers. Drying and dehusking is generally undertaken on the plantation. The main industrial processes conducted in producing countries consist of ensuring that all the coffee delivered by growers, of whatever grade, is in compliance with international trading standards, which includes cleaning to eliminate dust and other undesirable material, sorting to eliminate defective beans likely to affect taste quality and grading according to bean size. Angola, Gabon, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo and Democratic Republic of the Congo. European plantations were monoculture plantations and used salaried labour and inputs. It takes 3 kg of green coffee to produce 1 kg of soluble. Sector-wise specialised State companies (SATMACI in Côte d’Ivoire, SRCC in Togo, SODECAO in Cameroon) supported producers and undertook distribution activities. CSSPPA: “Caisse de stabilisation et de soutien des prix des productions agricoles en Côte d’Ivoire” (Côte d’Ivoire Fund for stabilisation and price support for agricultural production). ONCPB: “Office National de Commercialisation des Produits de Base” (National Commodities Marketing Office). Signed in 1962, this agreement was renewed 4 times until 1983 on the basis of the quota system. The 1983 agreement was extended to 1994, at which time a fifth agreement ratifying market liberalisation was concluded. This agreement, valid until 1999, was extended to 2001, the date of the last agreement on coffee currently in force. Established in 1975, STABEX (Exports stabilisation) concerned 48 agricultural commodities and compensated for the loss of export receipts suffered by all the ACP (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific) States exporting to the EEC. The first intensification level involves putting land and labour resources to the best use and is not necessarily synonymous with using inputs. Agro-forestry systems for perennial crops constitute one such constructive and sustainable solution. The second level involves intensifying foods crops in farms, thereby freeing land resources and labour for coffee. Admittedly, about a dozen years of extensive cultivation have partially depleted the land but coffee plants are relatively less demanding. Replanting is possible in leguminous plant-based agro-forestry systems. In addition, an intensification policy (fighting weeds and pruning) would help cut down the surface area used and thereby select less exhausted land. Coffee regeneration consists of pruning coffee plants in order to restore the tree’s ‘architecture’ and thereby raise productivity. Forced Robusta cropping intensification in Vietnam compromised production sustainability in the long term. Production costs in Brazil increased and mechanising Robusta cultivation proved difficult. Indonesia had no option other than to expand the surface area at the expense of classified forest reserves, with oil palms taking over any area left free. Angola had to first clear coffee plantations of mines. Uganda, another large Robusta producer, is landlocked and has high production costs (Kampala/Mombasa transportation).

Sources and bibliography CIRAD (2003), Le café, des terroirs et des hommes ; 16 p. CIRAD Internal Reports: Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Guinea. Coste, R. (1961), Les caféiers et les cafés dans le monde (Part II, 2nd volume). Daviron, B. & al (2002), Commerce agricole : l’idée de libre-échange a-t-elle vécue ? In : Déméter 2002 : économie et stratégies agricoles. Nouveaux enjeux pour l’agriculture. — Paris : Colin, 2001, pp. 9-52. Daviron, B., S. Ponte (2005), The coffee paradox: Global markets, commodity trade and the elusive promise of development. London, Zed Brooks, 288 p. International Coffee Organisation: International Coffee Agreement (1983, 1994, 2001). Laporte, B. (1992), Les réformes des systèmes de commercialisation et de stabilisation des ﬁlières café et cacao au Cameroun et en Côte d’Ivoire — Paris : Ministère de la Coopération et du Développement — 174 p. Ministry of Co-operation (1993), La compétitivité des cafés Africains, Paris : Collection Rapport d’étude — 252 p.

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Ruf, F. (1987), Éléments pour une théorie sur l’agriculture des régions tropicales humides : de la forêt, rente différentielle, au cacaoyer capital travail. In: L’agronomie tropicale, Vol.42/n° 3, pp. 218-232

Statistical Data Sources FAO

Statistical Database FAOSTAT

F.O. Licht

Coffee years books (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004)

ICO

Consumption, imports and exports in member and non member countries from 1980 to 2005

Pan American Bureau of Coffee Statistical series from 1958 to 1965 USDA

Database (1960-2005)

226

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Chapter 13. COCOA Philippe Bastide (CIRAD – France)

13.1. West Africa in the international market 13.1.1. Overview of supply and demand Since 1960, world cocoa production has increased threefold, from 1.2 to 3.6 million tonnes. This growth was punctuated by several jolts caused by structural adjustment policies, crop infestations, diseases and market speculation, all of which have affected production. Approximately ﬁfty countries in the inter-tropical zone grow cocoa beans, three of which dominate world production: Côte d’Ivoire (39%), Ghana (21%) and Indonesia (13%).

region’s dominance at all – in fact, it has only been strengthened further. The region has been able to increase its production in the face of rising world demand, whilst the American and Asian regions were experiencing relative stagnation (see Figure 13.1.).

From 1960 to 2006, world demand rose in step with production reaching 3.5 million tonnes. The 70 “user countries”1 include exporting countries, which have low consumption levels but process cocoa to produce by-products for the industry, as well as importing countries, which process and consume a 227 major share of the production.

The oldest of the three major production basins (see At present, while demand is stagnating in American Map 13.1.) covers Central America and stretches countries (25% of international demand) and in across South America from the western Paciﬁc Europe (50% of the world's primary consumption), coast to the Brazilian coastline. The second can be it is increasing slightly in Asian and Oceanian found in West Africa, from Guinea to Cameroon countries (13%). West African consumption is where, apart from Benin, all the countries grow cocoa trees. Other more modest African producing marginal. countries (<7,000 tonnes/ year) are spread across Figure 13.1. Production trends (1960–2005) the rest of the continent. In thousand tonnes Indonesia is at the heart 4,000 of the third basin, along Rest of World 3,500 Indonesia & Malaysia with Malaysia (although Brazil & Ecuador its production has fallen 3,000 West Africa drastically since the 1990s), 2,500 and Papua New Guinea 2,000 where production has been increasing. 1,500 1,000 500 0

19 60 19 62 19 64 19 66 19 68 19 70 19 72 19 74 19 76 19 78 19 80 19 82 19 84 19 86 19 88 19 90 19 92 19 94 19 96 19 98 20 00 20 02 20 04

Two-thirds of world cocoa production originates from West Africa alone. The political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire has not compromised the

Sources: G&D; EdF Man; ICCO (2007)

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III. ECONOMY

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

Main Cocoa Producers

Apparent Cocoa Consumption

Cocoa Production and Consumption (In thousand tonnes)

180

Source: ICCO (2007)

740

Nigeria

1,410

Ghana

Côte d'Ivoire

West Africa

170

Cameroon

25

Africa (Others) West Africa 170

Brazil

275

Latin America 80

Ecuador

2,600

Indonesia

435 35

Malaysia

280

Asia (Others) 1,635

Europe 845

Japan

150

USA and Canada

228

Map 13.1. Distribution of production zones and main cocoa producing and consuming countries

While cocoa may be produced essentially in developing countries, its by-products are consumed mainly in industrialised countries, with the main

purchasers being the chocolate processing and confectionary industry. Some producing countries also process part of their cocoa bean production themselves. The by-products obtained (cocoa mass, powder and butter – see Box 13.2.) are exported or

Cocoa Production

13.1.2 Trade and the international market

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Box 13.1. The history of chocolate Cocoa trees originated in Central America’s rainforests. The Mayas and Aztecs used their beans to prepare a brew called “chocolate” (bitter water) that was believed to have nourishing, strengthening and aphrodisiac effects. It was also used as currency for paying taxes and purchasing slaves. Christopher Columbus discovered cocoa in July 1502 on the tiny island of Guanaja (currently Honduras). In 1524, Hernán Cortès sent a cargo of cocoa beans to the court of Charles V, who adopted the drink to which honey is added. Cocoa turned into a proÀtable business, with the Spanish having a monopoly. It was introduced to France in 1615 with the marriage of Anne of Austria, daughter of Spain’s King Philip III, with Louis XIII. In 1657, it entered England and in 1660, the English began growing cocoa in Jamaica, one of their colonies. In the 17th century, the Dutch took over a major share of the cocoa trade between America and Europe. For a very long time, the preparation technique was very basic: hand-grinding of the cocoa beans with a cylinder on a heated, slanting stone; but it changed considerably throughout the 19th century: 1811: POINCELET, a Frenchman, developed a cocoa-bean mixer. 1815: VAN HOUTEN, a Dutchman, set up the Àrst chocolate factory, soon followed by the Swiss – CAILLER (1819), SUCHARD (1824), then in Lausanne by KOHLER, and then LINDT and TOBLER. 1819: Cailler, a Swiss, produced the Àrst chocolate bar. 1821: CADBURY, a Briton, made his own chocolate. He invented crunchy black chocolate, chocolate biscuits for tea, as well as chocolate with fruit and nuts. 1824: Antoine MENIER set up the Àrst industrial chocolate factory in the world at Noisiel sur Marne (France). 1828: Conrad J. Van Houten registered his patent for chocolate powder. 1830: Kohler developed hazelnut chocolate. 1842: Charles BARRY developed trading in London and a cocoa processing factory was established in Meulan in the early 20th century. 1847: Sale of chocolate in bars. 1848: Auguste POULAIN established a confectionary and chocolate unit in the periphery of Blois (France). 1862: Establishment of the ROWNTREE chocolate factory in England.

used domestically to supply the chocolate industry. Producing countries’ share of processing is growing steadily. In Brazil and Malaysia, the local processing industry absorbs most of their production. In West Africa, the grinding entities – most of which are located in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana – account for 14% of world volume. Cocoa is mainly traded on London and New York’s stock markets. Highly sensitive to rumours or

anticipation of stock depletions, bad harvests and weather-related or political events, the market is extremely unstable and speculative. Price variations can be considerable (see Figure 13.2.). However, market prices have shown a downward trend since the early 1980s, due to the dual impact of supply surplus and the substantial reserves held by consuming countries. In the 1980s, consuming countries took advantage of falling prices to build up considerable reserves, which they use to regulate

Box 13.2. Cocoa uses The by-products of cocoa beans (liqueur, paste, butter, cake and powder) are the chocolate industry’s raw materials, and its best-known end product is chocolate. Other products are also prepared with the main intermediary by-products mentioned, notably butter and powder. Powder is used to Áavour biscuits, ice creams, milk products, dairy drinks, etc. Cocoa butter is also used in tobacco, soap and cosmetic manufacturing. In traditional medicine, it is used to treat burns, chills, dry lips, fevers, malaria, rheumatism, snake bites and other wounds (source: UNCTAD). Since 2000, a European directive authorises the use of up to a maximum of 5% of six fats from different plants to replace cocoa butter in chocolate production. These are: illipe, palm oil, sal, shea, kokum gurgi and mango kernels. While manufacturers have beneÀted from this situation due to the cost of these products and ease of manufacture, producers highlight the impact in terms of the reduction of world cocoa demand.

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229

Source: UNCTAD (2006)

Ecuador

Brazil

Dominican Republic

USA

230

West Africa

Europe

Map 13.2. Main world cocoa export ﬂows

Malaysia

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

Côte d'Ivoire Ghana Nigeria Cameroon Main cocoa export flows

Indonesia

Japan

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Figure 13.2. Cocoa market price trends Cocoa prices (USD/t)

Cocoa prices (USD/t)

4,000

4,000

3,500

3,500

3,000

3,000

2,500

2,500

2,000

2,000

1,500

1,500

1,000

1,000

500

500

0 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

0 2000

Sources: ICCO and Nybot 12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483427186551

the market to their advantage. Producing countries are not in a position to build reserves2 in their own interest,3 which is why they remain subject to the world market.

13.1.3. The sector and its actors Cocoa is produced by small farmers, more-or-less structured co-operative-type organisations or major groups (large plantations). Merchantable cocoa,4 produced by local producers or artisans, enters the market via channels in which the number of actors has increased substantially since the sector’s liberalisation. The largest number of actors, patent-holders, accredited by local monitoring organisations, act as intermediaries for supplying exporters. Today, large exporters are investing in purchase systems that are closer to the producers, much to the detriment of smaller actors. The new system also affects local patented exporters – initially very large in number – the weakest of whom are seeing their market shares shrink or disappear. Thus, the major exporters are playing an increasing role in producing countries, in processing merchantable cocoa into manufactured products. They supply the industry in consuming countries with raw material, liquor, butter and powder, and put chocolate-based products on local or regional markets. Three big multinational groups dominate the market: ADM Cocoa, Cargill and Barry Callebaut. They are present in West

London exchange New York exchange

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483361271128

Africa’s producing countries along with other players whose size varies according to the country concerned. Most of the cocoa produced is sent to the main consuming countries5 in the form of merchantable cocoa or semi-manufactured products. After 231 being unloaded in the ports, the cocoa – which can be stored as cocoa beans for 3 years or more – is redirected towards industrialists and manufacturers. They make the end products or intermediary products for chocolate and biscuit industries, as do artisans that have not invested in the direct processing of cocoa beans.

13.2. West African cocoa 13.2.1. Regional overview West Africa, the world leader, produces over 99% of African cocoa. The continent’s other producing countries – Uganda, Tanzania, Madagascar, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome & Principe – are highly renowned in the industry and among chocolate manufacturers for their cocoa’s aromatic properties. But their national production stands at less than 7,000 tonnes/year. West African production (see Figure 13.4.) is dominated by Côte d’Ivoire (1.3 million tonnes in 2005) and Ghana (600,000 tonnes), which produce almost 60% of the world’s cocoa. Nigeria

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(175,000 tonnes6) and Cameroon (166,000 tonnes) share a production basin. These four countries are

4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000

among the world’s ﬁve primary producers. Togo, Sierra Leone and Liberia’s production is much lower.7 The prospects of an increase in cocoa cultivation in these Figure 13.3. Production, consumption (grinding) countries are slim (availability and stock trends of land and labour, competition from other economic agricultural 1,000 tonnes activities). Apart from a few new Stocks accumulated Grinding Production pioneer farming areas that could be brought under cocoa cultivation in Nigeria and Cameroon – and maybe Liberia and Sierra Leone – all the favourable cocoa cultivation areas are already being exploited in West Africa.

500

13.2.2. Comparison of paths taken by Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire

19 60

/6 19 1 63 /6 19 4 66 /6 19 7 69 /7 19 0 72 /7 19 3 75 /7 19 6 78 /7 19 9 81 /8 19 2 84 /8 19 5 87 /8 19 8 90 /9 19 1 93 /9 19 4 96 /9 19 7 99 /0 20 0 02 /0 20 3 05 /0 6

0

12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483466318705

Source: ICCO (2006)

Diagram 13.1. Typical cocoa chain organisation

232 Producers’ groups Cooperatives

Small family plantations Middlemen

Big plantations Local post-harvest processors Local grinders Patented buyers

Inspection Checking

Local chocolate manufacturers Local consumers

Exporters

Producers Consumers

Sea carriers

Stock-keepers Storage

Traders

Other inputs milk, sugar, packaging

Chocolate Manufacturers

Liquor, butter & powder

Grindings (Europe, USA, etc.) Powder

Distributors, Wholesalers Retail trade Hyper/supermarket, artisans Consumers

Biscuit, ice cream & confectionery manufacturers

a) Development of new pioneer farming areas (late 19th century to 1940) Cocoa cultivation emerged in the Gold Coast (currently Ghana) in 1871. Exports to Great Britain started in 1881. At that time, the production centre was located in Accra’s highly populated hinterland, now the country’s Eastern Region. The planted area spread rapidly. Cocoa plantation was encouraged by the missionaries and promoted by their botanical gardens, quite naturally following in the wake of the road and rail infrastructure gradually being developed. In around 1890, cocoa could be seen in Western Côte d’Ivoire, bordering Liberia, where it was grown alongside coffee. However, the colonial authorities paid it little attention from an economic point of view. The ﬁrst real plantations, combined with coffee trees, were developed by European planters in 1895. A few years later, cocoa cultivation developed around Tiassale, but these plantations,

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badly maintained and in areas with poor soil or tidal ﬂats, soon died out. In 1904, Côte d’Ivoire produced approximately 2 tonnes.

Figure 13.4. Cocoa production trends in West Africa (1960 – 2005) 1,000 tonnes

2,500 Cameroon

Nigeria

Ghana

Côte d'Ivoire

In 1936, despite an excellent harvest (305,000 t), the swollen shoot disease struck Ghana’s main production centre. The Administration established the Tafo cocoa station (1938), the second in the history of cocoa plantations following the one in Trinidad, in order to improve cultural control

05

02

20

99

20

96

19

93

19

90

19

87

19

84

19

81

19

78

19

72

75

19

19

69

19

66

63

In Ghana, favourable prices and a continuous improvement in transport infrastructure led to the clearing of vast areas in the Brong-Ahafo region, even further towards the west. The forest area was extensively affected. By 1932, production had risen to 260,000 tonnes. Producers had started organising themselves into co-operatives and pressuring the buyers. The Côte d’Ivoire’s 32,000 tonnes came almost exclusively from the East. In order to deal with the labour shortage, France attached six Upper Volta provinces to Côte d’Ivoire assisting in the emergence of a category of well-off native planters, but trading remained in the colonisers’ hands or those of the Lebanese-Syrians.

19

19

19

19

60

At around the same time, in Ghana, 2,000 cocoa had spread to Kumasi. In 1908, production stood at 1,500 20,000 tonnes.Three years later, the country became the biggest world 1,000 producer. Given the enterprise’s success, in 1912, the French 500 imposed intensiﬁed cropping in the Indenie area in the country’s eastern region. Whereas the British 0 promoted indigenous plantations, the French promoted colonisers. 12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483551827412 Source: G&D, EdF Man, ICCO (2007) Individual plantations, seeking to avoid forced crop cultivation and the variety selection. This station became the systems, emerged only a few years later with the WACRI8 in 1944, with a branch in Nigeria, only to advent of migrants from the West and the country's central region. In 1919, Côte d’Ivoire’s eastern give way to two national structures following the region produced 10,000 tonnes as compared to two countries’ independence: the Cocoa Research Ghana’s 147,000 tonnes (1/3 of world production). Institute of Ghana (CRIG) and the Cocoa Research 233 Over the following decade, the plantations spread Institute of Nigeria (CRIN). French research emerged to the West, towards what would later be called much later in Côte d’Ivoire, in the form of the the cocoa belt, as well as to the South. “Centre de recherche agronomique de Bingerville”. On the eve of the Second World War, cocoa production amounted to 300,000 tonnes in Ghana and 55,000 tonnes in Côte d’Ivoire. During the war, a discriminatory cocoa purchase pricing policy discouraged planters in Côte d’Ivoire. Consequently, an increasing number of plantations were abandoned. b) Structuring of the sector and establishment of stabilisation funds and control and monitoring organisations (1950–1970) In Ghana, the colonial state guaranteed the purchase of total production. In 1947, the “Cocoa Marketing Board”, more commonly known as “Cocobod”, was established. It strictly supervised the entire chain: from the supply of seedlings and seeds, sanitary control, access to phytosanitary products, purchase and disposal of the produce, to quality control for exports. In fact, the Cocobod turned into a state within a state. However, swollen shoot disease continued to wreak havoc in old areas while

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

SENEGAL

SIERRA LEONE

Freetown

Conakry

Bissau

CAPE VERDE

GUINEA BISSAU

THE GAMBIA

Banjul

Dakar

Nouakchott

Abidjan

Kumasi

Niamey

Lomé

Lagos

Cotonou

BENIN TOGO Ibadan

Accra

GHANA

FASO

60% of World Cocoa

Daloa

Bouaké

BURKINA

MALI

Ouagadougou

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Bamako

Source: CIRAD (2007)

Monrovia LIBERIA

GUINEA

MAURITANIA

234 Maiduguri

Yaoundé

Bafoussam

Bamenda CAMEROON

Port Douala Harcourt

Warri

Benin Citu

Jos

NIGERIA

Abuja

Kaduna

Kano

NIGER

Map 13.3. Main cocoa production zones in West Africa

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

N'Djaména

CHAD

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Box 13.3. Cocoa’s long journey from the Americas The cocoa tree, Theobroma cacao, originally grew spontaneously in Central or South American forests, from where this species originates. In about 4,000 B.C. the Àrst cocoa “crops” appeared simultaneously in Central America and the tropical forests of the Yucatan and Guatemala. The Criollo (cocoa variety with aromatic beans containing 50% fat) cultivated today is a result of this Àrst wave of domestication. Their big white beans, containing few polyphenols (basic colorant molecules), can be used for human consumption with barely any processing required other than drying. No vestiges of plantation have been found among South America’s Andean population before the Spanish conquest. The climate’s greater humidity, which makes drying extremely difÀcult, could be the reason why these beans were not used in this region. The limitation of cocoa cultivation area in the north of the Andes during the initial cocoa cultivation phase is perfectly in line with the almost total absence of the Criollo variety in the Amazon basin. The only Criollo harvested this side of the Andean mountains were in Venezuela, which seem to have been introduced later by Capuchin monks. Two other major waves of domestication then took place, with the cocoa plants coming directly from the Amazon basin. First came the development of Nacional cocoa in Ecuador, with its geographic spread being limited to that country. Then, much more recently, probably toward the end of the 18th century, the Amelonado varieties were created in Brazil and then dispersed almost all over the world, and will quickly become the main source for cocoa production. The main stages in cocoa’s world conquest were: 1560

Introduction of the cocoa tree by the Dutch in Celebes and Java

1614

Introduction to the Philippines by the Spaniards

1822

Introduction of cocoa trees in the Sao Tome, Principe and Fernando Po islands by the Portuguese

1834–1880 Introduction to Ceylon, India and then Madagascar and the Fiji islands by the British 1871

Introduction of the Àrst cocoa trees on the African continent in Ghana (Eastern Region)

1890

Introduction of the Àrst cocoa trees West of Côte d’Ivoire

1920

Introduction of cocoa trees in Cameroon by the Germans.

In Côte d’Ivoire, the colonial authorities had to deal with the “Syndicat agricole Africain” (SAA, the African agricultural union), established in 1944 and led by the future President of the Republic, Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Forced labour, price discrimination and mandatory deliveries were abolished. Stimulated by high world prices, the economy of native plantations rapidly expanded. The cocoa producing area stretched towards the West. In 1955, France set up a Stabilisation Fund.

said, “la terre appartient à celui qui la cultive” (the land belongs to those that cultivate it). The land-rush that ensued was triggered as much by farmers as by agro-processing industrialists (palm, rubber, fruit cultivation, etc.) The “Société d’État d’assistance technique pour la modernisation de l’agriculture en Côte d’Ivoire” (SATMACI) was then set up to provide training to extension workers and to promote producers’ groups in order to facilitate access to equipment and inputs. In 1961, the two countries accounted for 43% of world production with respectively 81,000 and 417,000 tonnes. Indeed, the State maintained strong control over production through the Cocobod in Ghana and the CAISTAB in Côte d’Ivoire.9

Until the early 1960s, high world prices stimulated the increase of the area under cocoa in both countries. When Ghana gained its independence in 1957, private cocoa buyers disappeared in favour of State-controlled co-operatives. In 1960, in Côte d’Ivoire, the President-Planter Houphouët-Boigny

The drop in world prices in the 1960s provoked a real crisis in both countries. In Ghana, despite a peak in production with 500,000 tonnes in 1964, the crisis led to a general decline and prompted the Cocobod to re-introduce a dose of liberalism with the return of private buyers.

westward expansion accelerated. In 1946, when production fell to 192,000 tonnes, a major uprooting campaign was initiated. Stopped in 1962, it was resumed in the 1980s and 1990s.

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235

Côte d'Ivoire

Source: CIRAD (2007)

1960s

1890

1900 - 1930

Côte d'Ivoire

End 19th – 1930

236

1880'

Ghana

1900'

1930'

Ghana

Today Ghana

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

* 1960 and today

0 - 30,000 tonnes

30 - 60,000 tonnes

60 - 100,000 tonnes

Over 100,000 tonnes

(by administrative unit*)

Cocoa production

Côte d'Ivoire

Map 13.4. Growth of new cocoa areas in West Africa

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Figure 13.5. Cocoa production trends in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire 1,000 tonnes

1,400 Ghana

Côte d'Ivoire 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200

20 05

19 99 20 02

19 96

19 93

19 90

19 87

19 84

19 81

19 78

19 75

19 72

19 69

19 66

19 63

0

19 60

c) The era of reforms and liberalisation (1970 to date) In 1969, the mass expulsion of foreigners (Aliens Compliance Act10) reduced the availability of manpower and management skills in Ghana. In the 1970s, the deterioration of plantations and the road network, along with fraudulent exports, led to a further drop in production despite a signiﬁcant hike in world prices. The State tried to deal with the situation, in vain, by funding the inputs and labour necessary to set up plantations. On the other hand, Côte d’Ivoire took in many of the workers expelled from Ghana and continued its unstoppable growth, drafting an aggressive cocoa policy (free supply of improved seedlings, loans and subsidies). From 1977 onwards, it became the world’s biggest producer (see Figure 13.5.).

Sources: G&D, EdF Man, ICCO

Figure 13.6. Cocoa production trends in Indonesia and Malaysia 1,000 tonnes

500

Indonesia

Malaysia

450 400 350 300

237

250 200 150 100 50 0

19 60 19 63 19 66 19 69 19 72 19 75 19 78 19 81 19 84 19 87 19 90 19 93 19 96 19 99 20 02 20 05

The 1980s saw the emergence of two new signiﬁcant producers at world level – Indonesia and Malaysia (see Figure 13.6.) – while world prices continued their downward trend until the mid-1990s. Regulatory and support mechanisms for producers rapidly ran out of steam: budget restrictions, layoffs in production, outreach and research support structures, followed by competition between the Cocobod and private enterprises (1993) and the CAISTAB’s bankruptcy in 1999 (see Box 13.4.).

Sources: G&D, EdF Man, ICCO

Thereafter, multinationals began to dictate conditions to the entire sector, leaving planters with no choice but to accept the price offered.11 Eager to better control the quantity and quality of their supplies from planters, they found ways to get closer to them (credit, pre-ﬁnancing of harvests). They also set up processing and semi-manufactured product units. With limited means, local competitors found themselves unable to ﬁght them, thereby leading to a decrease in the number of actors in the sector. Finally, despite a theoretical purchase price ﬁxed at the start of the agricultural season, small producers experienced a drop in income, especially in Côte d’Ivoire.

12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483564003530

13.3. Prospects The sensory12 and physical properties of West African cocoa make it a much sought-after product,13 although overall production quality seems to be declining. Combined with production and quality control strategies, they make it possible to obtain higher prices, as is the case with Ghana’s cocoa, considered the regional benchmark. However, a number of problems weigh heavily on the sector’s future. First and foremost is the issue of pests and diseases. Mirids, which are small insects, attack the fruit and branches. Once planted, relocating or replanting plantations becomes very difﬁcult. Black

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Box 13.4. The liberalisation of the cocoa sector in Côte d’Ivoire and its consequences Until the late 1970s, cocoa was at the heart of the “Ivorian miracle”. High world market prices enabled the State to garner considerable proÀts. The Stabilisation Fund (CAISTAB) set the purchase prices for planters, collected taxes and compensated for any decreases in the prices paid to exporters while continuing to pay a guaranteed price to planters. The income from cocoa was redistributed according to tacit rules of a political, category-wise, regional and ethnic balance and funded the infrastructure. In the 1980s, the country was hit hard by the deregulation of international commodity markets, the establishment of global private groups and the advent of new Asian competitors (Indonesia and Malaysia). Prices fell drastically in 1985. In 1989, after having vainly attempted to raise prices by stock-piling, the country was forced to initiate a liberalisation process within which the high point was the dissolution of the CAISTAB in 1999. Thereafter, major international groups (Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland and Barry Callebaut) began to dictate terms to the entire sector. In the end, the plantation price was halved and planters found it increasingly difÀcult to access credit. Local exporters gradually disappeared from the scene.

238

A new control mechanism that could meet the donors’ requirements was set up. It included a series of bodies: the “Autorité de régulation du café et du cacao” (ARCC – Coffee and cocoa regulatory authority), the “Bourse du café et du cacao” (BCC – Coffee and cocoa stock exchange), the “Fonds de régulation et de contrôle” (FRC – Regulatory and control fund), the “Fonds de développement et de promotion des producteurs de café et cacao” (FDPCC – “Coffee and cocoa producers’ development and promotion fund), the “Fonds de garantie des coopératives café-cacao” (FGCCC – Coffee-cocoa co-operative guarantee fund) and the “Association nationale des producteurs de café-cacao de Côte d’Ivoire” (ANAPROCI – National Côte d’Ivoire coffeecocoa producers’ association). Today, farmers, who are trying to organise themselves in order to protect their income, criticise the complexity and operating costs of this mechanism. Recent cases of clandestine Áows of Côte d’Ivoire cocoa to neighbouring countries illustrate this problem very well.

Figure 13.7. Plantation ageing trends in Côte d’Ivoire % area under plantation

40

1993

30 25 20 15 10 5 1-5

6 - 10

11 - 20

21 - 30

31 - 40

41 +

Age in years Source: CIRAD (2004)

Ageing plantations are another problem (see Figure 13.7.), combined with decreasing soil fertility.15 Moreover, this problem goes hand-in-hand with the ageing of the producers’ population: land pressure makes land inheritance and know-how difﬁcult while other (food and cash) crops are more ﬁnancially proﬁtable. Finally, limited resources for producers’ training curtail the dissemination of best practices and superior quality cocoa production. In the years to come, West African production could decline. Other regions, particularly Asia, may be able to beneﬁt from the favourable growth prospects of world demand. However, there is still some room for manoeuvre.

13.3.1. Intensiﬁcation – But to what extent?

2001

35

0

pod14 is also widespread. In these two cases, chemical pest control methods are available, but their use is dependent on purchase prices and the producers’ technical skills. Further, Swollen Shot entered eastern Côte d’Ivoire after wreaking havoc in Ghana and the only known means of control is uprooting and burning infested trees.

12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483564572332

West African cocoa’s erstwhile growth was essentially due to the occupation of accessible forest areas favourable to its cultivation (see Table 13.1.). Without speaking of sedentation as such, farmers’ migration to regions where forest resources are still available are now quite limited. In the future, improving production merely by increasing the cultivation area will be harder to accomplish.

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In traditional cocoa growing regions, the consumption of forest rent16 coupled with using land for cultivation over many years (sometimes for over 40 years) has led to a gradual decline in soil fertility. There are still a few potential areas where forest land could be cleared and cultivated, especially in Nigeria and Cameroon. However, any strategy aimed at opening up new pioneer farming areas will come up against environmental conservation and biodiversity issues to which decision-makers are increasingly sensitive, keeping in mind the social and economic aspects associated with handing down land.

Box 13.5. Exploitation of child labour on plantations For several years there has been increasing pressure on cocoa producing countries (in particular Côte d’Ivoire) to eradicate the worst forms of child labour on cocoa plantations (an estimated 200 000 children are involved). In 2001, two US Congressmen developed an initiative aiming to eliminate the “worst forms of child labour” on West African plantations. The Harkin-Engel Protocol sets out a 6 point strategy, including speciÀc deadlines, to abolish the abusive and slavery-type practices carried out, of which children are the victims, in cocoa bean and cocoa-bean by-product production in this African region. It advocates developing standards applicable to the entire economic sector as well as establishing an independent monitoring, reporting and certiÀcation system. The industry has agreed to certify that cocoa cultivated and processed in West Africa and used in the production of chocolate and its by-products has been produced without using abusive forms of child labour.

If West Africa wishes to retain its position as the world’s biggest cocoa producing region, intensiﬁcation is the only way. It would call for considerable efforts at conserving, as well as improving soil fertility and applying highperformance farming processes. Such modiﬁcations will require the acquisition of new agro-forest management skills fundamental for cocoa cultivation and knowledge about the measured use of pesticides and fertilizers. The socio-economic and environmental contexts should, however, dictate how these measures are applied. Another both agronomic and technical alternative is also possible. A wide range of insect- and fungus-resistant, as well as productive, varieties are now available. With these more resistant varieties, signiﬁcant productivity gains are possible provided that the soil fertility issue is adequately addressed.

13.3.2. Quality or quantity? The sector’s liberalisation and strong demand have stimulated production. Everything which is produced is purchased and it is by increasing purchased volumes that buyers are able to augment most of their proﬁt margins. However, this has caused a decline in the West African cocoa quality that no incentive- and remuneration-based policy has attempted to counter. The main quality criteria are based on physical parameters – granulometry17 and percentage of defects – such as mouldy, non-fermented or broken

Initially set for 1 July 2005, the date prohibiting the USA from importing West African cocoa was pushed back to 1 July 2008. The deadline was postponed because, even though the expected results were not achieved, signiÀcant progress was made (pilot projects, strategic thinking undertaken on the cocoa certiÀcation system, awareness-raising among producers of the problems linked to cocoa and its appropriation).

beans. In fact, cocoa beans which are not very well fermented and dried do not keep as well. To reduce risks and losses or, to put it more simply, avoid having to transport poor quality cocoa or by-products not used in the chocolate industry Table 13.1. Cocoa acreage trends in West Africa from 1960 to 2004 Countries

Hectares in 1961

Hectares in 2004

Cameroon

300,000

460,000

Côte d’Ivoire

250,000

4,000,000

Ghana

1,668,000

1,800,000

Liberia

2,500

9,000

Nigeria

700,000

800,000

Sierra Leone

10,000

32,000

Togo

30,000

60,000

2,960,500

7,161,000

TOTAL

Sources: FAOSTAT, ICCO and survey-based CIRAD estimations (2003-2005)

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(pods, defective beans, etc.), the major international groups have set up procurement systems closer to the planters and invested in cocoa bean processing within the producing countries. At the same time, specialised high value-added markets have been developing. In most cases, access to niche markets is based on more direct contracts between buyers and producers on the basis of speciﬁcations, introducing the notion of negotiations in transactions. This does not necessarily translate into quality improvement18 but does nonetheless make it possible to highlight differences between products. The recent emergence of geographical indications and designations of origin in this regard is encouraging. Some initiatives have been set up in Ghana, Cameroon, and Togo and are also emerging in Côte d’Ivoire, essentially related to fair trade

and organic cocoa19 for which demand is growing signiﬁcantly. The resulting increase in value owing to these quality attributes can be quite lucrative for producers. However, the distribution and utilisation rules for such value added differ, from a total repayment of the bonus to producers to the constitution of a fund solely for shared use.

In this context of market diversiﬁcation, ﬂexibility in cocoa management coupled with adaptable and accessible technical requirements contribute to West Africa’s competitive edge over other regions with a higher break-even point and greater constraints. But to preserve its dominant position, the region must adopt policies to make the cultivated area more proﬁtable, encourage the conservation of resources and improve labour productivity.

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Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

17.

18. 19.

“Cocoa use” means the grinding and processing of the raw material – cocoa beans – into various by-products, mostly destined for the chocolate industry (see Box 13.2.). In tropical countries, storage is difficult due to the hot and humid climate which promotes insect and mould development, making storage highly costly. In 1998, Côte d’Ivoire’s President Houphouët-Boigny launched “the cocoa wars” in an attempt to drain European markets by building reserves, but failed in the effort. After harvesting the cocoa pods, they are broken open manually to extract the beans. These are left to ferment for 5-6 days, after which they are dried. This product can then be stored and is called “merchantable cocoa”. Six multinationals control 80% of chocolate mass distribution: Cadbury-Schweppes, Ferrero, Hershey Mars, Nestlé and Phillip Morris. The production statistics have been taken from the ICCO and may differ from those of the FAO’s, especially in the case of Nigeria (412,000 tonnes according to the FAO as against 175,000 tonnes for the ICCO). In 2004, the FAO’s production estimates were 22,000 tonnes in Togo, 11,000 tonnes in Sierra Leone and 2,500 tonnes in Liberia. West African Cocoa Research Institute. However, the Caistab plays a role that is essentially limited to establishing price lists. It is estimated that 50% of foreigners left the country. See the chapter on “Migration” in the Atlas on Regional Integration in West Africa. Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire established a new regulatory and control system to defend their producers, but it aroused the Bretton Woods institutions’ suspicions. Characteristics of a product perceived by the sensory organs: taste, smell, appearance and consistency. Cocoa from Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire is known for its strong aroma, Cameroon’s cocoa is reputed for the natural red component it contributes to the preparation of blends. Because of causal fungus, whose aggressiveness may vary from one region to another, it could lead to production losses that may even exceed 90% in extreme cases. Because elements inherited from forests that no longer exist have been consumed and crop rotation is not practiced. When land and tropical forest are accessible at low cost, investment costs in perennial crops are reduced because forests often provide rapid growth guarantees for such low-cost crops (low initial parasite pressure, organic matter availability, protection against wind and vagaries of the weather, etc.). Yields are often high during initial cycles and so are incomes. That is what is known as “forest rent” (la rente forêt) (F. Ruf). Defined by the number of grains per 100 g, the granulometry of cocoa beans is considered acceptable if it stands at a minimum of 100 grains/100 g. At lower values, it is favoured by industrialists who prefer bigger beans as the wastage (shell) ratio is lower. At values higher than 120 beans/100 g, cocoa is considered to be below standard or off-grade. In particular, products labelled “fair trade certified” still suffer from quality variations. http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/fr/lvb/l66044.htm Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

III. E CONOMY

Sources and bibliography Aguilar, P., D. Paulin, Y. Keho, G. N’Kamleu, A. Raillard, O. Deheuvels, P. Petithuguenin, J. Gockowski (2003) L’évolution des vergers de cacaoyers en Côte d’Ivoire entre 1995 et 2002, 14th International Cocoa Research Conference, Accra (Ghana), 13-18 October 2003. 1167-1175 pp. Alary, V. (2000), Les cacaoculteurs camerounais face aux risques : essai de modélisation. Collection Bibliothèque du Développement, L’Harmattan Eds., 236 p. CIRAD Eds, GRET and Ministry of Foreign Affairs joint Editions (2002), Mémento de l’agronome, 1692 p. Dorin, B. (2003), De la fève ivoirienne de cacao à la plaquette française de chocolat noir. CIRAD Report no. AMIS-36 CP-1602. 62 p. Gilbert, C.L. (1997), Cocoa market liberalization. Cocoa Association of London Eds, London. 71 p. Hanak-Freud, E., P. Petithuguenin, J. Richard (2000), Les champs du cacao : un déﬁ de compétitivité Afrique – Asie. Economy and development collection. Karthala and CIRAD Eds. 210 p. Ministry of Co-operation and Development (1990), Compétitivité du cacao Africain. Fact-ﬁnding report by the Ministry of Co-operation and Development, Paris, France Eds. 279 p. Mission économique, MINEFI-DGTPE (2005), Côte d’Ivoire: The rubber sector. “ Fiche de synthèse ”, Embassy of France in Côte d’Ivoire. Ruf, F. (1995), Booms et crises du cacao : les vertiges de l’or brun. Collection économie et développement. Ministry of Co-operation, Karthala and CIRAD Eds. 459 p. Ruf, F. (2000), Socio-economic factors modulating plantation replanting, Oléagineux, Corps Gras, Lipides. 7 (2), 189-196 (Africa, plantation and development dossier). Websites Cocoa Producer’s Alliance (COPAL)

www.copal-cpa.org/

ED&F Man

www.edfman.com/Cocoa.php

FAO

http://faostat.fao.org/site/526/default.aspx

Federation of Cocoa Commerce (FCC)

www.cocoafederation.com/about/index.jsp

International Cocoa Organization (ICCO) www.icco.org/ UNCTAD

http://r0.unctad.org/infocomm/anglais/cocoa/market.htm#cot

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PART IV. VULNERABILITIES Chapter 14. CLIMATE AND CLIMATE CHANGE 243 page 245 Chapter 15. VULNERABILITY IN THE SAHELIAN ZONE page 269

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Chapter 14. CLIMATE AND CLIMATE CHANGE Christophe Perret (SWAC/OECD) This chapter received support and technical contributions from Stéphane Jost, Paul Brunel and Anna Ricoy (FAO); Ali Abdou, Job Andigué, Mathieu Badolo, Amadou Bocar Bal, Issa Garba, Issaka Lona, Ouaga Hubert N’Djafa, Benoît Sarr, Brahima Sidibe, Bonaventure Somé, Seydou Traore and Hervé Trébossen (CILSS Agrhymet Regional Centre); and André Kamga (ACMAD).

14.1. Climate ﬂuctuations in history 14.1.1. At the heart of a new interglacial period The climate goes through different cycles of variable duration, alternating between cold and hot periods. The Wilson cycle is the longest of these cycles. It occurs every 300 million years, when the gap between continents narrows due to the interplay of their tectonic plates and the consequent changes in ocean circulation and in erosion (uplift of mountain ranges), triggering an overall cooling of the planet.

temperature, followed by a warm period of around 10,000-20,000 years, called the interglacial period. This is then followed by a gradual cooling of the planet and the initiation of a glacial era. The end of the glacial stage is followed by a sudden reheating, leading to a new cycle. The last glacial period reached its climax 18,000 years ago. The planet has been going through an interglacial period for over 10,000 years. Indeed, the warm period undoubtedly had some bearing on the development of agriculture and sedentary cattle breeding (Neolithic period).

14.1.2. From “Groenland” to famine

Within these long cycles, more intense and less Other, shorter cycles linked to star movements frequent variations can be measured. The 10th and punctuate climate alternations. The Earth has gone 11th centuries were marked by a warm and less through several phases of warming and cooling humid period. It was the era when Viking sailors over the last 700,000 years, at an average frequency discovered and baptised “Greenland” (the “Green of 100,000 years. A cycle consists of a sudden rise in Land”) and established colonies at the southern tip of the island. The reigning temperatures allowed for cereal cultivation. This phase, called the Figure 14.1. Temperature trends over the last 20,000 years medieval optimum, was no warmer Temperature variation (°C) than the early 21st century (see 5 Average temperature over the last 10,000 years: 15°C Figure 14.1.). 4 3 2 1 0

Middle Ages

Start of Agriculture

1940

-1

Little Ice Age

-2 -3

End of Ice Age

-4 -5 20,000

10,000

2,000

1,000

300

100

Today

Number of years (logarithmic scale)

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+100

At the end of the Middle Ages, the Northern Hemisphere cooled down considerably, a process that continued until the beginning of the 19th century. A thermal low was reached in the 17th century. This small glaciation or Little Ice Age seemed to correspond to low solar activity. It was marked by a succession of particularly harsh winters, accompanied by food shortages and famines.

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14.1.3. Global warming in the 20th century Ground temperature measurements taken between 1906 and 2005 show a general rise of 0.74°C. This warming cycle seems to have intensiﬁed over the last ﬁfty years, with a 0.13°C increase in temperature per decade. 1998 and 2005 recorded the highest surface temperatures since 1850. The trend seems to be correlated with an increase in greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere (see Box 14.1.), such as carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O). These gases are considered to be primary causes of global waming.

Box 14.1. Greenhouse gases When solar radiation reaches the Earth’s atmosphere, a part of it (28%) is directly reÁected back (back to space) by the Earth’s air, white clouds and uncovered surface areas (particularly white, ice-covered areas like the Arctic and Antarctic). This is called the albedo. Incidental sun rays that are not reÁected back into space are absorbed by the atmosphere (21%) and the Earth’s surface (51%). This part of the radiation absorbed by the Earth creates heat (energy), which is then returned towards the atmosphere, especially at night and in winter, in the form of infrared rays. This is known as black body radiation. This radiation is partly absorbed by greenhouse gases and then re-emitted towards the Earth in the form of heat, hence its name, greenhouse effect. Without this phenomenon, the Earth’s average temperature would fall to -18°C, after which ice would spread its blanket across the planet, the Earth’s albedo would rise and its temperature would likely stabilise at -100°C.

Figure 14.2. Main causes of climate change and their time scale Characteristic time period (years)

14.2. International awareness

8

10

7

6

10

10

In understanding a system as complex as climate, uncertainty will probably always reign. The quantity of greenhouse gases and atmospheric dust, solar energy and its distribution across the Earth’s surface, ocean movement and the position of the continents are just some of the factors inﬂuencing the climate at different stages in time (see Figure 14.2.).

4

10

-1

1000

100

10

1

10

Solar variations

246 14.2.1. Certainties

and uncertainties

5

10

Variations in the Earth’s orbit Continental drift Formation of mountains, sea level

Volcanic dust Atmosphere - ocean – cryosphere Atmosphere – ocean Atmosphere Human activity (pollution, carbon combustion, soil use)

Sources: Atlas du réchauffement climatique ; IPCC (2007)

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) deﬁnes climate change in Article 1 as “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods”. The scientiﬁc community does not make this distinction, deﬁning climate change as resulting from the combined effect of human activity and natural climate variability.

In this regard, the latest IPCC1 report conﬁrmed with a “very high degree of conﬁdence” the primacy of human responsibility over natural factors in global warming, through the combined effect of greenhouse gases, aerosols and the albedo (scientists do not unanimously agree with the IPCC conclusions – see Box 14.2.). The ﬁrst, which lead to warming, are mainly the result of the combustion of fossil energies (carbon dioxide) and the development of agriculture (methane and

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IV. VULNERABILITIES

Box 14.2. Global warming “sceptics” There are a number of important high-level scientists who are not proponents of the work carried out by the IPCC. They are critical of this work, the results and the way in which it functions. While many of them do not refute the reality of recent global warming, they sometimes dispute the anthropogenic origin as set out in the letter signed by 61 scientists sent to the Canadian Prime Minister in October 2006: “The evidence drawn from observations does not support computer-generated current climate models (...). The expression “climate change is a reality” is meaningless and is used by militants to convince the general public that climatic catastrophe is imminent (…). This fear is unjustiÀed. The planet’s climate changes continually due to natural causes. Human impact is impossible to distinguish from natural occurrences.” A petition signed by 19,000 American scientists already set out: “There is no convincing scientiÀc evidence that human release of carbon monoxide, methane, or other greenhouse gases is causing or will, in the foreseeable future, cause catastrophic heating of the Earth’s atmosphere and disruption of the Earth’s climate. Moreover, there is substantial scientiÀc evidence that increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide produce many beneÀcial effects upon the natural plant and animal environments of the Earth” (www.oism.org/pproject/). In his book, “Global Warming: Myth or Reality?” The Erring ways of Climatology”, Marcel Leroux, Professor Emeritus of Climatology at the University Jean-Moulin (Lyon, France) writes: “The Greenhouse effect is not the cause of climate change. The probable causes are thus: well-established palaeoclimatic orbital parameters (…); solar activity (…); volcanic activity and associated aerosols (more particularly sulphates), of which the (short-term effects) are undeniable; and further on, the greenhouse effect and in particular that caused by water vapour, of which the impact is not known. These factors are constantly combined and it seems difÀcult to establish the relative importance of these various factors on the climate’s evolution. At the same time, there is a tendency to highlight the anthropogenic factor which is, clearly the least credible among all of the factors cited above.” Source: Diplomatie magazine special series No. 4 (2007), /www.penseeunique.fr/paroles.html

nitrous oxide). The second and third, however, lead to global cooling. As for natural factors, the effect of solar radiation is to a limited extent an added factor to other global warming dynamics. The future rise in greenhouse gases will intensify global warming and impact the world’s climate system in several ways. According to the scenarios developed,2 the Earth’s average temperature will rise by 1.8°C to 4°C (1.1 to 2.9°C according to the minimum scenario; 2.4 to 6.4°C according to the highest scenario) and sea levels will rise by 18-38 cm to 26-59 cm by the end of the century, with widespread heat waves and heavy periods of rainfall.3

14.2.2. International commitments The energy sector, largely dominated by the use of fossil fuels, contributes to over 80% of greenhouse gas emissions, including 95% in the form of CO2 (see Map 14.1.). The reduction in these emissions largely depends on a change in energy models, which could accelerate due to the possible ending of the oil era by the end of this century. Alternatives 247 do exist (hydraulic, nuclear, solar, wind, bio-fuel energy, etc.), but they come with their own economic, technical and environmental constraints and, therefore, time constraints as well. For the coming generation, fuels will remain at the heart of energy consumption. Faced with this perspective, the UNFCCC is seeking to stabilise atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that would prevent any “dangerous anthropogenic perturbation to the climate system”. Meeting in 1997 in Kyoto, the 3rd session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC ﬁnally adopted a Protocol ﬁxing the greenhouse gas emission reduction target for the 2008-2012 period at 5% as compared to 1990, deﬁning speciﬁc targets for each of the countries in Annex I of the Convention:4 for instance, -8% for the European Union, -7% for the USA but, on the contrary, +8% for Norway and +10% for Iceland. Many of the protocol signatory countries would have difﬁculty in complying with these ratios. Three so-called “ﬂexibility” mechanisms were developed to facilitate actions to be undertaken with regard to the reduction of emissions:

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Source: International Energy Agency (2007)

CO2 Emissions from fossil fuel combustion

4.5%

Latin America

North America

33%

248

Africa

2.5%

25%

Europe Middle East

3.5%

5.5%

Russia and Central Asia

Industry 5.5%

Agriculture 8%

Waste 2.5%

19%

East Asia

84%

5.5%

Oceania

1.5%

South Asia

0

20

40

60

CO2 95%

CH4 5%

N2O 1%

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

Energy

80

Distribution of anthropogenic greenhouse gases 100

Map 14.1. Regional contribution to CO2 emissions (1960–2004 total)

IV. VULNERABILITIES

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] The trading of emission quotas (Emissions Trading), enabling Annex I countries to sell or purchase emission rights between them;

Box 14.3. Reliability of climate models Climate projections are based on models that are able to achieve good large-scale simulations with increasingly better performances. Some of these climate models are, for instance: Hadcm3, ECHAM4, NCAR, CCSR, CSIRO, CGCM2, etc. However, their ability to reproduce the climate varies according to different world regions. They therefore have several limitations with regard to taking certain climate factors, such as clouds, into account.

] Joint Implementation (JI), which would enable the stakeholders to make investments aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions outside their national territory and thereby beneﬁt from the emission credits generated by the reductions achieved; ] The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), similar to the previous mechanism, but favouring investments by Annex I countries in Annex II countries.

At best, models can only forecast, with an accuracy of up to three degrees, the increase in balance point caused by the doubling of the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. The lack of comprehensive knowledge about former climate cycles does not help in forecasting the future with any accuracy. Current greenhouse gas concentrations already surpass the maxima reached in the “recent” past (740,000 years), and it is impossible to “read” any climate corresponding to possible future carbon dioxide or methane rates in ice cores or sediments. On the basis of the changes in population growth, greenhouse gases and energy consumption, various climatological models enable us to envisage about forty scenarios of future climate changes. None of these take any global conÁicts or disasters into consideration, nor any (unforeseeable) changes in natural factors (volcanoes, natural cycles). Sources: Atlas du réchauffement climatique; IPCC (2007)

Table 14.1. The world’s ten biggest CO2 contributors Countries (or region)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

USA European Union China Russian Federation Japan India Canada South Korea Mexico Australia

Source: International Energy Agency (2007)

CO 2 emissions (2000-04 average) Total (Mt)

Per capita

5,700 3,870 3,670 1,520 1,200 1,020 540 445 360 350

19 8 3 11 9 1 16 9 3 16

The USA, which did not ratify the Protocol, are not committed to complying with these ratios.5 Moreover, neither India nor China is committed to complying. However, these countries contribute substantially to greenhouse gas emissions: the USA is the prime contributor, with China and India in 3rd and 6th position respectively (see Map 14.1. and Table 14.1.). The impact of East Asia’s industri- 249 alisation and rapid growth on greenhouse gas emissions is of great concern to the international community. The governments of these States are no less concerned, as illustrated by the development of renewable energies in India (the country is now the fourth biggest producer of wind energy in the world) or the construction of the world’s ﬁrst ecocity (Dongtan) by the Shanghai Municipal Corporation in China. However, the magnitude of the responses required goes well beyond these measures. The quest for more sensible energy consumption is a path that needs to be explored by the entire international community. The revision of the Kyoto Protocol adopted in Nairobi (Kenya) in November 2006 placed greater emphasis on the so-called “emerging” and “developing” countries: the expansion of the agreement to countries such as China or India, the implementation of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the functioning modalities of the Adaptation Fund to be used to guard against the impacts of global warming in poor countries and the establishment of a fund to develop “clean energies” for Africa, were at the centre of the debate.

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Following the Bali Conference in December 2007, all of the countries present decided to launch a series of negotiations leading to a new agreement that would replace the Kyoto Protocol as from 2013.

14.3. The African continent and climate

Africa, which contributes the least to greenhouse gas emissions and is considered to be the most vulnerable to the effects of climate change, will have to ﬁnd its own place in these negotiations.

Africa has gone through different climate periods in the past. Before the end of the ice age (-18,000) the continent was almost a desert. Then a rainy period began between -12,000 and -5,000. It led to

14.3.1. Climate variability and characteristics

Map 14.2. Africa’s climatic zones 30°N

20°N

250 10°N

Equator

Climatic zones

Equator

10°S

Humid Sub-humid Humid 20°S

Sub-humid Dry Semi-arid Arid

30°S

Hyper-arid Source: WMO (2001)

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007 Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

IV. VULNERABILITIES

the eradication of most arid areas and enabled the development of agriculture and cattle breeding in what is known today as Western Sahara. The existence of a gigantic Lake Chad during the Middle Holocene period (over 6,000 years ago) attests to these historical ﬂuctuations.6 The climate in Africa today is almost the same as 2,000 years ago, with more arid or more humid phases. The era of the ﬁrst great Sahelian empires (10th to 15th centuries) was a rainy period during which living conditions were far more favourable than they are today. However, in the early 19th century, the continent was struck by an arid period that lasted a few decades. The stream ﬂow of the Nile fell considerably and Lake Chad dried up. These ﬂuctuations continued during the next century. After a short dry period, a humid phase began, lasting until the 1960s. The 1970-1980 decade was once again marked by an aridiﬁcation of the climate, which was a heavy burden on the population. Today, most of the African continent is tropical, except for the Mediterranean region and South Africa. Rainfall varies according to an enormous gradient of +1 mm/year in some Saharan regions to +5,000 mm/year at the equator. There is very little variation in temperatures, generally high, throughout the year. However, day-night temperature variations are greater – as much as 10-15°C (even more in the deserts), whereas interannual variations South of the Sahara remain between 6 and 10°C.

14.3.2. Contrasting picture of climate change Climate models are relatively useful when it comes to forecasting temperature changes in Africa. In its latest report, the IPCC conﬁrmed that in the 21st century, global warming would be more intense in Africa than in the rest of the world. The average rise in temperature between 1980/99 and 2080/99 would be between 3 and 4°C for the continent as a whole, 1.5 times greater than at the global level. The increase would be less marked in coastal and equatorial areas (+3°C) and the highest increase would take place in the Western Sahara region (+4°C).

However, the results of rainfall projections remain uncertain. North Africa, southern Africa and East Africa are some of the regions where there is less uncertainty. Africa’s Mediterranean coast, like the Mediterranean coastline in general, is likely to experience a decrease in precipitation (-15 to -20%) over this century. The drying-out process will affect the northern bank of the Sahara and the West African coast up to its 15° latitude North (Dakar’s latitude). At the other end of the continent, less rainfall is expected during the winter and especially in spring in southern Africa. Along the tropical belt, the results achieved by the models show an increase in rainfall in the Horn of Africa. However, no conclusions can be drawn regarding rainfall in West Africa (see Map 14.3.).

14.3.3. New opportunities for the continent Apart from climatic uncertainties and its vulnerability, sub-Saharan Africa could beneﬁt from this situation in terms of energy diversiﬁcation/ transition and agricultural trade. Due to its low energy consumption, it is the lowest greenhouse gas producing region today. But biomass use (80% of energy demand) is the primary cause of deforestation in sub-Saharan Africa. Electricity production consumes an increasing amount of thermal energy (oil and gas): 80% today, as compared to 2/3 some 25 years ago. In the future, its energy supply choices will be increasingly dictated by environmental issues and the climate challenge in particular. Africa has considerable hydroelectric, solar and wind energy potential that could be developed within the framework of the CDM7 or with investment in clean energy and development. A regional approach may be better suited for attracting this kind of investment, all the more so since several countries share these resources (e.g. cross-border river basins). Vegetation, in particular Central Africa’s forest resources, makes this region an important “climate protector” for the world due to the role of carbon sinks. If the forest were recognised as a world public good,8 an energy transition mechanism could be

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IV. VULNERABILITIES

Map 14.3. A conceivable overview of climate change in Africa

C

Casablanca

Dakar

+4°C

° 2.0

20°

Algiers Tunis

Rabat

30°

Alexandria

Tripoli

+4°C

+

10°

+3

°C

+3.5°C

C

.5°

+3.5

Conakry Freetown

Monrovia

Cotonou Lomé Lagos

Abidjan Accra 0°

+3°C

Douala Port Harcourt

Mogadishu

+3

°C

Luanda

+2.5°C

Dar Es Salaam

10° 252

20°

+3.5°C

Maputo

+2.0°C

Durban

30°

+2.0°C Cape Town

Port Elisabeth

Projections (2080/99 compared to 1980/99) Rainfall variations (%) - 5 to 0

> 15 5 to 15

-20 to -5

0 to 5

< -20

Threatened mangroves, fragile ecosystems and deltas Coastal urban center of over 1 million inhabitants

Temperature variations + 3.5°C

Source: IPCC, Atlas de l’environnement (2007)

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

envisaged in order to limit the consumption of this environmental resource. Climate change will certainly have an impact on agricultural surface areas at the global level and on the food security of its population. It seems that

along with Latin America, the African continent will suffer the largest agricultural land losses. But these losses would be marginal as compared to potentially cultivable land. In 2080, the African continent will still have the largest potential agricultural land area (see Figure 14.3.).

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IV. VULNERABILITIES

North America, Europe and, to a lesser extent, Asia will see a rise in their agricultural potential. New land will be cultivated and crop intensity will increase. However, the realisation of a greater part of Africa’s agricultural potential can also be envisaged, in order to meet the rising need for food products in Asian countries and the development of bio-fuels (bio-diesel from palm oil) in Europe and America (ethanol from cereals), although greater caution is called for in the case of this hypothesis. Africa will have to ﬁnd the right balance between land resources, food security and the development of new partnerships and external markets.

Figure 14.3. Agricultural potential prospects in the World Million ha

ASIA

Potential, 2080 Reference, potential Current cultivated, 1994-96

AFRICA

Potential, 2080 Reference, potential Current cultivated, 1994-96

LATIN AMERICA

Potential, 2080 Reference, potential Current cultivated, 1994-96

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

Million ha

OCEANIA

Potential, 2080 Reference, potential Current cultivated, 1994-96

EUROPE AND Potential, 2080 Reference, potential RUSSIA FEDERATION Current cultivated, 1994-96 NORTH AMERICA

Potential, 2080 Reference, potential Current cultivated, 1994-96

0 Soil suitability for agriculture

100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800

Cultivation modes

Suitable to very suitable

Rainfed crops

Moderatly suitable

Irrigated crops

Potentially suitable (Forest and protected areas) Source: Fischer and al. (2002) Climate change and agricultural variability

Indeed, inﬂationist effects on cereal markets, partly supported by the demand for bio-fuels and rise in transportation costs, can already be felt. The increase in imported cereal prices is also being witnessed in West African markets. This points to a risk of short-term food insecurity but is also seen as an opportunity to make better use of local production and processing in the longer term.

14.4. Vulnerabilities and impacts in West Africa 14.4.1. West Africa’s climate between global phenomena and regional dynamics Rainfall patterns in West Africa are linked to the seasonal movement of the inter-tropical convergence zone, where the hot and dry tropical easterly winds blowing in from the northeast meet with the humid air masses coming in from the southern Atlantic Ocean, linked to the onset of the monsoon9 (see Map 14.4.). The semi-arid zone, essentially including the Sahel and Sahel-Saharan belt, is marked by a single rainy season. The Sahel receives most of its rainfall between July and September. Further south, the climate in the Gulf

253 of Guinea countries is marked by the alternation of two rainy seasons and two dry seasons. There has been a substantial reduction in rainfall in West Africa over the last ﬁfty years, with a clear break between 1968 and 1972. The reduction is extremely clear in the Sahel, with highly deﬁcit periods in 1972-73, 1982-84 and 1997. This trend has taken the form of a 200-kilometer downward slide in isohyets towards the South and a historic aridiﬁcation process in the area’s climate. The decrease in rainfall has not spared the Sudanese and Guinean areas either. The change in rainfall pattern that has taken place in the previous decades may not necessarily settle. Since the mid-1990s, a return to better rainfall conditions has been noted, in particular in continental Sahel (see Map 14.5.). Temperature changes in northern and southern Atlantic Ocean and Indian Ocean water surfaces10 as well as surface temperature anomalies in the Paciﬁc, linked to the El Niño11 phenomenon, are an important driving force for West Africa’s monsoon activity. Temperature variations in the oceans,

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IV. VULNERABILITIES

Map 14.4. Monsoon cycle in West Africa

January

Inter-tropical front Secondary front Wind direction

)

ttan

erly ast

(

ma Har

50

Rainfall (mm / month)

le

nta

tine Con

20

Marine e

asterlies

10

254

Source: IRI (2007)

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

Ma

rin

ee ast erl ies

July

50

100

200

150

ons oon

250

Source: IRI (2007)

nea

100

150

Gui

50

nm

200

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

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IV. VULNERABILITIES

Figure 14.4. Mean temperature trends (minimum and maximum) in the CILSS area

Minimums

2 1,5

Variance (°C)

1 0,5 0 -0,5

1

0

01

20

96

91

19

19

81

19

86

76

19

71

19

66

19

61

19

19

1,5

0

01

20

96

91

19

19

86

19

81

19

19

76

71

19

61

19

19

Sudanese Zone

Average = 21.1 °C

2

51

01

20

96

91

19

19

86

19

19

76

19

19

19

19

56

19

19

81

-2

71

-2

66

-1 -1,5

61

-1 -1,5

66

-0,5

19

0 -0,5

1 0,5

19

0,5

56

Variance (°C)

1

51

Average = 35.0 °C

255

2

1,5

1,5

1

1

01 20

96

91

19

19

86

19

81

19

76

19

71

19

51 19

01

20

96

91

19

19

86

19

81

19

76

19

71

19

66

19

19

61

-2

56

-2

51

-1,5

66

-1

-1,5

19

-1

0 -0,5

61

0 -0,5

0,5

19

Variance (°C)

0,5

56

Variance (°C)

Average = 36.4 °C

2

1,5

Variance (°C)

19

19

Sahel Zone

Average = 21.9°C

2

51

01

20

96

91

19

19

81

86

19

76

19

71

19

19

19

19

19

66

-2

61

-2

56

-1 -1,5

51

-1 -1,5

56

-0,5

19

Another climate variable is the fact that changes in West Africa and particularly the Sahel’s temperatures have been faster than global warming. The increase has varied between 0.2 and 0.8°C since the end of the 1970s. This trend is stronger in terms of minimum rather than maximum temperatures (see Figure 14.4.).

Average = 35.8 °C

0,5

19

Variance (°C)

2 1,5

19

Between global factors and regional and continental dynamics, West Africa’s climate is subject to considerable variations.This is particularly true in the Sahel, where rainfall, lower than in the coastal area, varies by more than 1,000 mm over a distance (North-South) of 750 km. Hence, this region is extremely sensitive to vagaries of the intertropical convergence zone. From one year to the next, there may be more than a 30% variation in the length of the rainy season.

Maximums

Sahel-Saharan Zone

Average = 20.4 °C

19

sensitive to global climate changes, will undoubtedly have repercussions on the West African monsoon. In addition to these global phenomena is the effect of continental surface processes (vegetation, soil moisture, water cycle or albedo) on monsoon dynamics. However, the interactions/retroactions between continental dynamics and the climate are as yet not well understood.

Source: Agrhymet Regional Centre (2007)

Figure 14.5. Poor performance of climate models in the Sahel region Annual rainfall signal (mm) 200 180 160

14.4.2. West Africa’s climate change scenarios: Still highly uncertain

140 120 100 80 60 40 20

Observations CCSR

Se

Au gu st pt em be r Oc to be r No ve m be r De ce m be r

ly Ju

ne Ju

ay M

Ap ril

ru ar y M ar ch

Fe b

ua r

y

0

Ja n

There is still a fair amount of uncertainty in rainfall-related climate projections for West Africa. If a simple average of all the scenarios is taken, slight humidiﬁcation in the Sahelian region,

HadCM3 CSIRO

ECHAM4 CGCM2

NCAR

Source: Capacity building project for adaptation to climate change in the Sahel, CRA / CILSS (to be published)

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

J

A

S

O

O

N

D

D J

F

M

Niamey

0 A

J

A

Source: Nicholson Sharon E. (2001), Agrhymet Regional Centre (2007)

0

J

0

M

50

100

150

50

100

150

200

F 200

S

N

250

A

J

Ouahigouya

M

Bamako

A

250

M

M

300

F

F

50

100

150

300

J

Dakar, Sénégal

200

250

350

J

0

50

100

150

200

250

256

J

M

M

F

J

A

M

J

A

M

A

M

J

S

N

D

J

J

J

A

A

S

S

O

O

N’Djaména

O

N

N

D

D

1951 - 1960 1981 - 1990 1991 - 2000

Mean total monthly rainfall in some stations in the Sahel (mm / month)

Map 14.5. Changes in pluviometric indices in West Africa

Guinean Coast

Sudano-Guinean Zone

Sudan

N'Djamena, T chad

Sahel

Sahelo-saharan Zone

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

1 0 -1 -2 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991

1 0 -1 -2

1 0 -1 -2

1 0 -1 -2

1 0 -1 -2

Standardised rainfall indices in West Africa per agro-climatic zone 1921 - 1998

IV. VULNERABILITIES

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IV. VULNERABILITIES

whereas no real changes along the Guinean coast can be inferred. Recent tests have shown the limited capacity of models to forecast West Africa’s climate. For instance, in the models, the start of the rainy season appears 1-2 months prior to the dates actually observed. A comparison of the Sahelian climate observed (1961-1990) with climates simulated by six general circulation models recommended by the IPCC (see Figure 14.5.) illustrates these shortcomings. Contrary to the real situation, the models show a marked rainy season almost throughout the year, along with a considerable bias (140-215 mm/year) in annual aggregate rainfall estimates as compared to the data observed. These results favour a better understanding of West Africa’s climate, to be used as a basis to develop regional climate models, provided that statistical series are sufﬁciently long and reliable.12 However, the current rainfall network is far from being able

to guarantee an error margin lower than 10% in agro-meteorological analyses. In the CILSS countries, only 1.5% of the region has an adequate number of rainfall stations to enable a better picture of rainfall patterns, however with the desert and agro-pastoral areas having even fewer.

The IPCC also acknowledges the limitations of research on extreme climate events. Climate changes are likely to increase the frequency and seriousness of ﬂoods and droughts in regions with high rainfall variability. Among the current climate forecasting activities, the ACMAD, the Agrhymet Regional Centre and their partners have established seasonal forecasting facilities for the rainy season at the regional level.13 Short-time forecasts of this kind help anticipate and manage climate risks better during the cropping season, ﬂoods or stream ﬂows. A local-level analysis would undoubtedly make it possible to draw up forecast charts that are better adapted to local actors.

257 Map 14.6. Flow rate of West Africa’s main rivers

River flows (m3/s) 2,470 2,223 1,976 1,729 1,482 1,235 988 741 494 247 0

2002-03 1984-85

River flows (m3/s)

05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 01 02 03 04

Month

2,390 2,151 1,912 1,673 1,434 1,195 956 717 478 239 0

2002-03 1984-85 1967-68

River flows (m3/s)

05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 01 02 03 04

Month

5,270 4,743 4,216 3,689 3,162 2,635 2,108 1,581 1,054 527 0

2002-03 1984-85 1961-62

05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 01 02 03 04

Month

Kayes Boromo

Niamey N‘Djaména River flows (m3/s)

River flows (m3/s) 110 99 88 77 66 55 44 33 22 11 0

Lokoja

2001-02 1984-85 1967-68

05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 01 02 03 04

Month

Source: IRD (2007)

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22,240 20,093 17,946 15,799 13,652 11,505 9,358 7,211 5,064 2,917 770

2002-03 1984-85 1967-68

04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 01 02 03

Month

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

IV. VULNERABILITIES

Map 14.7. Changes in Lake Chad’s surface area (January 1999, 2003 and 2007)

1999

Bare soil Wetlands Wetlands favourable to flood recession cultivation Aquatic vegetation Swamp areas Partially covered water Perennial bulk water

2003

2007

258

Source: Agrhymet Regional Centre (2007)

14.4.3. Impact on water resources

Table 14.2. Lake Chad’s surface areas (1998-2007 average)

The region’s countries share their surface water resources, which are concentrated in a few watershed areas, the main ones being found in Niger, Lake Chad, Senegal, the Gambia and the Volta. Following the decrease in rainfall since the 1970s, the main rivers have witnessed a drop in their stream ﬂows (See Map 14.6.). The Niger River’s (Onitsha) stream ﬂow fell by 30% between 1971 and 1989; those of the Senegal and Gambia Rivers fell by almost 60%. The reduction was relatively greater than the drop in rainfall levels. Along with climatic factors, the increase in water demand is a major factor of this resource’s depletion. Rapid ﬂuctuations in Lake Chad’s surface levels provide a good illustration. Before the 1980’s,

Average surface areas (sq. km) Bulk water

1,940

Partially covered water

4,633

Aquatic vegetation in archipelagos

4,585

Swamps

5,588

Source: Agrhymet Regional Centre (2007)

the drop in rainfall levels (rainfall over the Lake represents 13-14% of the annual water input) and the consecutive decrease in the Chari River’s ﬂow rate (83% of the lake’s yield) and that of its tributary, the Logone, explain largely the reduction

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IV. VULNERABILITIES

Map 14.8. Irrigation and hydroelectricity in the Niger River basin

Irrigable surface area Irrigated area, data not available

1

Hydroelectric production (GWh/year)

0

Irrigated area

-1

Variation from the mean

2

Dams

-2

70,000 1955 32,000

1965

1975 1985 Years

1995

2005

Inter-annual changes in Niger river flow in Niamey Source: Agrhymet (2007)

40

3,000

Goronyo

Markala 2,000

Sotuba 6 Dabola

23,000

44,000 Zobe 37,000

200 1,500 Sélingué

Bakolori Kandji

Dadin Kowa

320

2,000 Lagdo

1,650

12,000

Kiri Jebba

Source: Global International Assessment Water (2004), Awaïs Aboubakar (2003)

in the lake’s surface area, apart from evaporation and seepage. After the 1980s, irrigation for farming and arboriculture in the Chari and Logone basins is one of the main causes of the reduction of water in Lake Chad. “Partially covered waters” are subject to these ﬂuctuations (see Map 14.7.), and assessing the impact on perennial bulk water is still difﬁcult. Between 2003 and 2007, there was a notable increase in “partially covered water” surface areas, deﬁnitely associated with increasing rainfall. Climate variability and the construction of dams in response to increasing population consumption or the growing number of irrigation and hydroelectric projects have led to rising tension and potential conﬂicts between countries over shared river basins. About 15 dams have been built in the Niger River basin (see Map 14.8.). There are numerous projects (Fomi and Kamarato in Guinea; Kénié, Tossaye and Labezanga in Mali; Dyodyonga and Gambou between Benin and Niger; Kandadji in Niger; Lokoja, Makurdi and Onitsha in Nigeria) and

Shiroro

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

the balance between different water uses and the climate risks involved will have to be considered. In the future, climate change could have a lasting effect on the quantity of water in circulation in basins or even in ground water levels that are recharged during the rainy season.14 But on the whole, West Africa does not face a mid-term renewable water shortage threat, although some challenges may emerge locally. Better use and integrated regional management of available renewable water supplies are essential.

14.4.4. Possible impacts on cereal farming West African farming is directly correlated to weather hazards. By 2100, estimated farm sector losses will vary between 2-4% of the regional GDP. Pastoral and agro-pastoral areas will undoubtedly be the most affected by climatic variations. Food crops, mainly focused on cereal production in Sahelian countries, essentially depend on the rainy

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259

IV. VULNERABILITIES

season’s characteristics, along with other climatic and environmental factors. Case studies undertaken in Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have come up with divergent results.15 The average yield of millet and sorghum – the staple diet of the Sahelian population – is likely to fall by 15 to 25% in Burkina Faso and Niger by 2080 (see Figure 14.6a). These crops should be less vulnerable to temperature variations lower than 2°C and to slight rainfall variations (± 10%). Conversely, average rice yields should increase, whether it is produced under rainfed or irrigation conditions (see Figures 14.6b and 14.6c). A rise in the atmospheric concentration of CO2 (fertilizer effect), a moderate increase in temperature and adequate water 260 resources would lead to a 10-25% increase in cereal yields in the CILSS countries’ irrigated areas and a 2-10% increase in rainfed rice. However, these impacts do not take changes in the cropping season into account (changes in the sowing date or extreme rainfall conditions), nor changes in the breeding and migration areas of destructive crop pests (see Box 14.4.). Moreover, climate change could lead to a change in the location of optimal cropping areas (the lowering of isohyets since the 1970s was followed by a change in West Africa’s cotton growing areas).

14.4.5. Uncertain future of migrant livestock farming Along with cereal production, livestock farming plays an important role in all Sahelian countries. It contributes up to 10-15% of the GDP in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Chad (even more

Box 14.4. Climate change and destructive crop pests The climate, the distribution areas of certain insect groups and the emergence of new insect pest distribution areas are closely correlated. Case of desert locusts Desert locusts (Schistocerca gregaria) are spectacularly responsive and are able to take advantage of favourable conditions for their multiplication and expansion, such as unexpected rains. During its life cycle, a female can lay around a hundred eggs two or three times. Migratory by nature, desert locusts can also move quickly into areas that favour their growth. In addition, this species is not subject to any diapause or period of suspended growth during its lifetime. The dessication that would take place after a rise in temperature and/ or decrease in rainfall will affect the desert locust’s survival and growth conditions, without however eradicating them altogether. On the other hand, any improvement in ecological conditions (soil moisture and vegetation) can promote their growth. An increase in the number of unexpected rainfall episodes apart the usual rainy season would favour reproduction, followed by gregarisation, and would increase the already strong hazard they represent for crops. Behavioural changes in this species’ reproduction areas have already emerged. Thus, while activity has decreased in some areas, new areas seem to be emerging, as indicated by the frequency with which this species has been reported during the exploration carried out in the frontline Sahelian countries. Case of Senegalese locusts The Senegalese locusts’ habitat extends between the 10th and 18th north parallels in the Sahelian belt. The outbreaks observed between 1974 and 1980 as well as those reported between 1985 and 1989 seem to have been due to the extraordinary resistance of their eggs to drought conditions and to the disappearance of a number of their enemies. Irregular rainfall led to hatching where adequate rainfall was received and the entry or continued diapause of the eggs where not enough was received. The number of eggs in diapause rose from one year to the next, thereby increasing the overall locust population, which grew further with the return of rains. The insect population’s movement was also closely linked to the Inter-tropical Front. If the slide in isohyets observed in the Sahel after 1968 was to recur, it could affect the northern and southern boundaries of the insect’s reproductive areas. Case of cotton stainer The cotton stainer (Dysdercus voelkeri) moves between the coastal belt and the Sahel during the course of the year. These movements take place in a South-North direction when humidity increases in the South, and in the North-South direction with the advent of dry and hot winds in the North. They follow the Inter-tropical Front’s movement and the northern boundary of their movement is limited to the 500 mm isohyet. The change in isohyets could affect the boundaries of this pest’s activity zone. Source: Brahima Sidibe, Amadou Bocar Bal – CRA/CILSS, Annie Monard – FAO (2007)

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IV. VULNERABILITIES

Figure 14.6a. Impact of climate change on millet/sorghum cereal yields in Niger and Burkina Faso Variation in cereal yields (%)

Climate scenario

0 -5 -10 -15 -20 -25 -30

Niger

Burkina Faso

Source: Agrhymet Regional Centre (2007)

Figure 14.6b. Percentage change in rainfed rice yields Variation in cereal yields (%)

Climate scenario

15

10

5

0

-5 Burkina Faso

Mali

Senegal

Source: Agrhymet Regional Centre (2007)

Figure 14.6c. Percentage change in irrigated rice yields Variation in cereal yields (%)

Climate scenario

30 25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 -10 Niger

Burkina Faso

Mali

Senegal

Source: Agrhymet Regional Centre (2007)

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in Mauritania). Migratory pastoralism16 (70-90% of cattle breeding is migratory) remains a production mode adapted to some Sahel-Saharan ecosystems. It has undergone signiﬁcant transformations due to population growth, the political options selected or environmental changes such as climatic variations. One of the signiﬁcant innovations occurring in the Sahel over the last decades has been the birth and popularisation of agropastoralism, i.e. the combination of farming and livestock breeding within the same farm. This new resource development system stems from a strategy adopted by farmers and shepherds to limit the risks associated with the uncertain climate. Farming helps shepherds limit the purchase of cereals during the lean period and farmers seek to diversify their activities and capitalise on their 261 income sources by investing in cattle. The changes in these practices are coupled with the spatial transformation of activities, following the changes in the Sahel’s climate conditions. In search of better pastures, nomadic shepherds go farther and farther away during the wet season, generally towards the North. Once the season ends, they gradually return to their villages where pastures and water supplies remain to be found. The 1973/74 and 1984/85 droughts especially changed the spatial dynamics of migratory herding and pasture lands in the Sahel. The case of Fulah breeders in the Dallol Bosso area (Niger) is particularly striking in this regard. Many of these breeders found refuge farther south in Benin and Nigeria where they sometimes settled. These changes proved to be long-lasting and today, the 1973 and 1984 “pastoral runs” have turned into migratory pastures during the dry season (see Map 14.9.).

IV. VULNERABILITIES

Map 14.9. Changes in the Fulah ethnic group’s migratory corridors between Niger, Mali, Benin and Nigeria

Before 1973

1973 MALI

MALI

Abala

Abala

NIGER

NIGER

Filingué

Filingué Niamey

Niamey Birni N’Gaouré

Say

Birni N’Gaouré

Say

Dosso

Dosso

NIGERIA

NIGERIA 262

BENIN

BENIN

1984

2002-2003 14.4.6. Coastal areas and vulnerable ecosystems

Corridors used during the rainy season (before 1973, 2002-2003) or migratory roads (1973, 1984) Corridors used during the dry season Settlement or residence location

MALI

Settlement location

Abala

Abala

NIGER

NIGER Filingué Niamey Say

Filingué

During the 20th century, sea levels rose by an average 1.7 mm per year, i.e. 17 cm in 100 years. This trend is likely to accelerate in the future. Current worldwide projections forecast a 30-50 cm rise in sea levels in the 1990-2100 period.

Niamey Birni N’Gaouré

Say

Birni N’Gaouré

Dosso

Dosso

NIGERIA

NIGERIA BENIN

The environment is an integral part of the life of nomadic cattle breeders in the Sahel. Migratory herding characterises their need to adapt to the changes in the natural environment. Climate changes – favourable or not – will alter the quantity and quality of natural pastures and will undoubtedly lead to new forms of transhumance corridors in the region. But the breeders will have to deal with growing agricultural pressures, greater environmental constraints in the years to come and occasional political risks.17 Some of them may even turn increasingly towards agro-pastoralism or a sedentary or semi-migratory livestock breeding system. For others, mobility will remain at the heart of their strategy, provided that it ﬁnds support both at national and regional levels.

BENIN

Source: IRD, Laboratoire de cartographie appliquée, Boutrais Jean (2005)

Over one-fourth of Africa’s population lives along a 100 km-long coastal strip. Three regions are especially vulnerable, both from the population settlement areas and ecosystem perspectives – the East African coastline between Kenya and South Mozambique, the Red Sea coastal area and the West African coast.

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Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

100

200 km

Freetown

Conakry

Monrovia

250,000 - 500,000

500,000 - 1 million

1 - 2 million

2 - 10 million

> 10 million

Sources: NASA / DLR, Sahel and West Africa Club (2007)

0

Dakar

Nouakchott

Accra

Less than 15

15 to 50

50 to 100

100 to 200

Lomé

1.5

Warri

0.5

River Gambia

1

Mangroves and wetlands

Banjul suburbs

Banjul City

2 0.5

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

Source: UNEP (2002)

1 1.5 2

Atlantic Ocean

Rise in sea level (meter)

Calabar Douala Port Harcourt

Lagos

Cotonou

More than 200

Rural density (inhab/km² - 2005)

Abidjan

Main coastal urban centres (Over 250,000 inhabitants)

Elevation below 10 meters

Impact of rise in sea level on Banjul (The Gambia)

Map 14.10. Main vulnerable urban centres and coastal regions in West Africa

IV. VULNERABILITIES

263

IV. VULNERABILITIES

Table 14.3. Vulnerable coastal areas and current property value threatened areas*

Senegal The Gambia Côte d’Ivoire Benin Nigeria

Submerged Surface area lost surface area through erosion (sq. km) (sq. km) 1,650 28 — 44 46 471 17.5 22,5 8,864 78 — 145

Value of property affected (million of USD) 345 — 464 4,710 9,003

Source: IUCN (2004): Reducing West Africa's Vulnerability to Climate Impacts on Water Resources, Wetlands and Desertiﬁcation * Resulting from an increase in sea levels (0.5 m by 2,100)

Box 14.5. Rift Valley fever

264

An infectious viral disease, Rift Valley fever affects domestic ruminants (cattle, sheep, goats, buffaloes, antelopes, etc.), camelidae and human beings. Originating in the valley from which it takes its name, it is found in Senegal, Mauritania, Nigeria and Cameroon in West Africa. The virus is usually transmitted through the infectious bite of mosquitoes belonging to different genuses (mostly Aedes and Culex, Anopheles, etc.) or ticks. If the emergence of the disease in the form of an epidemic coincides with high rainfall periods succeeding years of drought, the epidemics shift to the dry season in West Africa.

Table 14.4. Changes in mangrove swamps in West Africa Ha Benin Cameroon Côte d’Ivoire The Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Liberia Mauritania Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone Togo

1980 4,400 267,000 89,000 64,300 12,000 285,000 245,000 19,000 140 999,000 175,000 165,600 1,500

1990 1,400 248,000 40,000 61,700 11,000 292,500 245,000 19,000 112 998,000 175,800 150,500 1,300

2000 1,080 229,000 12,700 59,100 9,000 290,000 245,000 19,000 84 997,000 176,700 135,300 960

Source: FAO (2003) Situation des forêts du monde

In West Africa, the areas most vulnerable to a rise in sea levels or extreme incidents arising from the ocean (extremely high tides) have the highest population concentrations and are sometimes the most urbanised (except for the Mauritanian coast). From Douala to Dakar, there are 12 townships of over a million inhabitants along the coastline (see Map 14.10.). Furthermore, productive eco-systems

(mangrove swamps, deltas and estuaries) are used for important economic activities in the ﬁshing, farming and tourism sectors. The rise in sea levels has had a direct impact on these areas: submergence and coastal erosion, an increase in ﬂood-prone areas and in salinity in estuaries and coastal water tables (see Map 14.10., example of Banjul). Without policies on adapting to these changes, a 0.5 metre rise in sea levels by 2100 will lead to direct loss of land through submergence and erosion (see Table 14.3.). Translated into economic terms, infrastructural damage is currently estimated at several hundreds of millions of dollars in Senegal, almost 4.7 billion in Côte d’Ivoire (onefourth of its current GDP) and even 9 billion in Nigeria (10% of its current GDP). Human behaviour is the main cause of the ecosystems’ degradation or disappearance. However, rising sea levels threaten the coastal regions’ biotopes (beaches, lagoons, swamps, etc.), whose disappearance, degradation or salinisation constitute high risks for resident species. Mangrove swamps, which occupy large surface areas in Nigeria, Guinea, GuineaBissau, Cameroon and Senegal, are particularly sensitive (see Table 14.4.). The submergence of these mangrove swamps or coastal lagoons could lead to a loss in biodiversity. The IUCN’s Red List currently estimates 723 endangered species18 in Africa.

14.4.7. Spatial shifts in diseases Several vector-borne diseases prevail in West Africa, including malaria, Rift Valley fever (see Box 14.5.), African trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), the almost eradicated onchocerciasis and even yellow fever. Rainfall, temperature and hygrometry play an important role in the occurrence of these vectors (see Map 14.11. on climate zones favourable to malaria transmission in West Africa). Mosquitoes, the tsetse ﬂy and the large majority of insects (including locusts) need wet and “green” areas to spread. Thus, decreasing rainfall and

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IV. VULNERABILITIES

Map 14.11. Climatic zones favourable to malaria in West Africa

Marginal malaria

Endemic malaria

Malaria prevalence rate (%)

Climatic zones and transmission of malaria

265

0 - 20 20 - 35

Favourable climate, stable transmission

35 - 50 50 - 65 More than 65

Instable transmission Unfavourable climate

Source: Atlas du risque de la malaria en Afrique, Le Bras Jacques (2001)

desertiﬁcation can limit the development of these species. In Senegal, for instance, such phenomena have resulted in the near-disappearance of A. funestus mosquitoes, which has led to a more than 60% drop in the prevalence of malaria over the last thirty years. But a drier climate does not automatically lead to a decrease in these insects’ growth areas. For instance, mosquitoes can compensate for the areas lost through the drying up of marshland by moving to other ‘habitats’, such as the swamps that form in river beds that are drying up or temporary rainwater ponds. Moreover, the increase in the number of extreme climatic events (irregular rains

© Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2007

in particular) could increase these insects’ growth opportunities. Apart from altering the insects’ dispersion area, climate changes can lead to human and cattle migration towards areas where fodder is available. The risk of contact with other disease-carrying insects rises and new diseases may develop. Shepherds and farmer-shepherds who ﬂed to the South following the 1970s drought lost a majority of their livestock through African trypanosomiasis – a disease which had not yet been encountered. The most striking effect of climate change on the transmission of vector-borne diseases will probably

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IV. VULNERABILITIES

be witnessed at the extremes of the temperature range favourable to transmission. Impacts will not be uniform: some regions will experience a rise in transmission risks, while certain diseases will disappear in others. Thus, it is probable that in a large part of Western Sahel and South-Central Africa, the climate would become unfavourable to the transmission of malaria by 2050 to 2080 – the primary cause of mortality in tropical Africa.

14.5. Conclusion The IPCC’s work shows global warming trends with near certainty and the signiﬁcant role played by human activities, although it may be based on imperfect assumptions and models. Their main advantage lies in the collective awareness of what is in the general interest. It is not in the general interest to accurately forecast or know the exact “share of human beings” in climate change. What is in the general interest is knowing that Man can do a great deal to mitigate its causes and impacts.

266 Like all other world regions, Africa and West Africa must take up this challenge – essentially that of vulnerability and uncertainty. Were the widespread 1973 and 1984 droughts a manifestation of climate change? What about the 2007 ﬂoods? As in the past, adaptation to climate variability remains a priority.

Perhaps more than elsewhere, analyses of this region have remained inadequate and the conclusions arrived at by climate projections and their consequences are too uncertain to effectively anticipate risks and opportunities linked to climate change. At a time when the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) and the “regional plan of action for reducing vulnerability in the face of climate change in West Africa” are being formulated, the development of more reliable information systems adapted to local and regional contexts should be at the heart of the strategies adopted. Greater awareness and participation by local actors will also be necessary to formulate and implement these adaptation strategies.

At the international level, the post-Bali meetings as from 2008 and the Conference on food security, climate change and bio-energy in Rome in June 2008 are important events. A common stand on the issue of climate change and the ratiﬁcation of the Kyoto or Post-Kyoto Protocol (“Bali Protocol”) in the African Union (AU) or Regional Economic Communities such as ECOWAS would give greater weight to African countries in negotiations. Funding opportunities associated for the most part with these negotiations would allow them to better prepare for the future.

Notes 1.

2. 3.

4. 5. 6.

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC in English, GIEC in French) was set up jointly by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1988. The latest report (Climate Change 2007) is the fourth in a series that began in 1990; it draws up an assessment of six years of work undertaken by a network of 2,500 scientists, based on actual observations and increasingly effective climate models. Some scenarios are based on the assumption that no policy on limiting human factors in global warming is implemented. Others include such policies (mitigated projections). A downward correction has been made in temperature or sea level increases as compared to the Third assessment report (TAR, 2001). Within the framework of the TAR, forecasts highlighted a 1.4 to 5.8°C rise in mean temperature and a 0.09 to 0.88 m rise in average sea levels the world over between 1990 and 2100. Annex I countries are the industrialised States that were OECD members in 1992, in addition to transition economies, including the Russian Federation, the Baltic countries and some Eastern and Central European countries (a total of 41 countries). Although the USA did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, several American cities and states actually apply it. Lying in what is now the world’s biggest inland basin (i.e., one in which running water does not reach the sea and is lost in the soil), the Lake covered a 340,000 km² surface area (the size of Côte d’Ivoire today) and reached a maximum depth of 160 metres (currently less than 10 m), forming the fourth largest lacustral reservoir in the world after the Caspian Sea and the Baikal and Tanganyika Lakes. Today, this mechanism essentially benefits the major emerging countries (China and India). Africa Partnership Forum (2007) Climate change and Africa. 8th Africa Partnership Forum meeting, Berlin - Germany, 22-23 May 2007. The origin of the term monsoon comes from the Arabic word mawsim. For Arab sailors, it meant the season of favourable winds for sailing to India. For instance, when ocean surface temperatures are warmer in the southern Atlantic Ocean than the North, a monsoon cycle emerges in the South, which can deprive the region of its customary rainfall. El Niño (which means the Child Jesus in Spanish) takes its name from the fact that it takes shape around Christmas. It characterises a sudden change in the Equatorial Pacific’s oceanic and atmospheric circulation, which manifests in a rise in ocean surface temperatures. Some of the historical information is still available only on paper. The PRESAO, which drafts forecast charts on the probability of lower, equal or higher than normal rainfall, is an example of the tools developed. With a return to better rainfall conditions, ground water levels have sometimes recharged since the 1990s in the Sahel. [Koulm et al (2005) La sécheresse au Sahel, un exemple de changement climatique. ENPC Climate Change Workshop – VET Department].

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IV. VULNERABILITIES

15. For more details about the hypotheses used, see: Sarr Benoît, Traore Seydou, Salack Seyni (2007) Évaluation de l’incidence des changements climatiques sur les rendements des cultures céréalières en Afrique soudano sahélienne. Agrhymet Regional Centre, CILSS, Niamey. 16. Migratory pastoralism can be defined as a livestock production system with seasonal movements of a cyclical nature and of variable scope. These movements take place between complementary ecological zones, under the supervision of a few individuals, with a large section of the group remaining sedentary. Sahel and West Africa Club (2007) Livestock in the Sahel and West Africa. Note to decisionmakers, Issue 3. 17. Tensions between northern Niger and Mali limit the availability of pastures for livestock farmers in these regions. 18. Species classified under “critical”, “threatened” and “vulnerable” categories.

Sources and bibliography AFSSA (2005), Fièvre de la vallée du Rift, www.afssa.fr/ftp/afssa/basedoc/1-ﬁ evre_du_Rift.pdf AMMA (2002), La mousson ouest-Africaine et ses composantes. Février 2002. Andigué, J. (2007), Impacts des changements climatiques sur le lac Tchad. Centre Régional Agrhymet, CILSS. Awaïss, A. (2004), L’Initiative Bassin du Niger (IBN), développement durable et gestion intégrée d’un grand ﬂeuve. Afrique contemporaine, été 2003. Badolo, M., E. Y. Ouedraogo (2007), Contribution à la déﬁnition d’une politique climatique sous-régionale en Afrique de l’Ouest. Revue internationale des changements climatiques en Afrique. Boutrais, J. (2007), Crises écologiques et mobilités pastorales au Sahel : les Peuls du Dallol Bosso. Climate Research 17, 123-144. CRA / CILSS (à paraître), Projet d’appui aux capacités d’adaptation aux changements climatiques au Sahel. Centre Régional Agrhymet, CRA/CILSS, Niamey. Club du Sahel et de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (2007), Élevage au Sahel et en Afrique de l’Ouest. Note aux décideurs numéro 3. Denhez, F. (2007), Atlas du réchauffement climatique. Revue Autrement. Diplomatie (2008), Menaces contre la planète. Diplomatie, hors série n° 4, décembre 2007-janvier 2008, Areion. ECA (2007), Climate change and development: Risk and Opportunities for Africa. ECA/SRO-WA. Niamey June 14, 2007. FAO (2007), Adaptation to Climate Change in Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. Perspective framework and priorities. ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/009/j9271e/j9271e.pdf FAO (2007), Climate Change and Food Security: a Framework for Action, Rome, 2007. (Document to be published at the Bali Conference). FAO (2004), La biodiversité agricole en Afrique de l’Ouest : situation actuelle, expériences et perspectives. www. fao.org/docrep/008/y5667f/y5667f00.htm FAO (2003), Situation des forêts du monde. www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/Y7581F/Y7581F00.HTM Fischer, G., M. Shah, H. V. Velthuizen (2002), Climate Change and Agricultural Vulnerability. International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis under United Nations Institutional Contract Agreement No. 1113 on “Climate Change and Agricultural Vulnerability” as a contribution to the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg 2002. Forum pour le Partenariat avec l’Afrique (2007), Les changements climatiques et l’Afrique. 8ème réunion du Forum pour le Partenariat avec l’Afrique / OCDE, Berlin — Allemagne, 22-23 mai. GIEC (2001), Bilan des Changements Climatiques : les Éléments Scientiﬁques. Groupe de travail I. Gigli, S., S. Agrawal (2007), Stocktaking of Progress on Integrating Adaptation to Climate Change into Development Co-operation Activities. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development / OECD. GIWA (2004), Guinea Current. Régional Assessment 42, Global International Waters Assessment. IPCC (2007), Climate Change 2007. Fourth Assessment Report (AR4). International Energy Agency (2006), CO2 Emission de CO2 dues à la combustion d’énergie (Emission from Fuel Combustion, 1971 — 2004. International Energy Agency, IEA/OECD. IUCN (2004), Reducing West Africa’s vulnerability to climate impacts on water resources, wetlands and desertiﬁcation. Kamga, F. A., E. Buscarlet (2006), Simulation du climat de l’Afrique de l’Ouest à l’aide d’un modèle climatique régional. Journal La météorologie no. 52. Février 2006, Société Météorologique de France.

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Koulm et al (2005), La sécheresse au Sahel, un exemple de changement climatique. Année universitaire 2004-2005, Atelier Changement Climatique ENPC — Département VET. N’Djafa, O. H. (2007), L’adaptation aux changements climatiques au Sahel. Quelles réponses régionales ? Centre Régional Agrhymet, CILSS, Niamey. Nicholls, R. J. (2007), Adaptation options for coastal areas and infrastructure: An analysis for 2030. Nicholson, S. E. (2001), Climatic and environmental change in Africa during the last two centuries. OMS (2001), Bulletin de l’Organisation mondiale de la santé, “ Changements climatiques et maladies à transmission vectorielles, une analyse régionale ”. Recueil d’articles n.4, 2001, http://whqlibdoc.who.int/ recueil_articles/2001/RA_2001_4_62-72_fre.pdf Sarr, B., S. Traore, S. Salack (2007), Évaluation de l’incidence des changements climatiques sur les rendements des cultures céréalières en Afrique soudano-sahélienne. Centre Régional Agrhymet, CILSS, Niamey. Sarr, B. (2007), Le climat ouest-Africain et son évolution depuis les années 1950. Centre Régional Agrhymet, CRA / CILSS, Niamey. Sidibe, B., A. B. Bal (2007), Changements climatiques et insectes ravageurs des cultures. Centre Régional Agrhymet, CRA / CILSS, Niamey. Websites African Centre of Meteorological Application for Development (ACMAD) www.acmad.ne/ African Monsoon Multidisciplinary Analyses (AMMA) www.amma-international.org Agrhymet Regional Centre (ARC) www.agrhymet.ne/

268

Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD-DAC / OECD) www.oecd.org/document/34/0,3343,fr_2649_34421_39313186_1_1_1_1,00.html Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) www.uneca.org/ Environment Directorate (ENV / OECD) www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en_2649_33713_1_1_1_1_1,00.html FAO (website on climate change) www.fao.org/clim/ FAO (Climpag website on Climate Impact on Agriculture) www.fao.org/nr/climpag Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) www.ipcc.ch/ International Energy Agency (IEA / OECD) www.iea.org International Research Institute for Climate and Society (IRI) http://portal.iri.columbia.edu/portal/server.pt Mapping malaria Risk in Africa (MARA) www.mara.org.za Pensée Unique (Paroles de grands chercheurs sur le réchauffement climatique) www.pensee-unique.fr/paroles.html Système d’Observation du Cycle Hydrologique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest et Centrale (HYCOS-AOC) http://aochycos.ird.ne/HTMLF United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) http://unfccc.int

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IV. VULNERABILITIES

Chapter 15. VULNERABILITY IN THE SAHELIAN ZONE Philipp Heinrigs and Christophe Perret (SWAC/OECD)

crops and makes more intensive farming practices risky.1

15.1. The Sahel and its countries Climatically the Sahel is deﬁned as the area between the 200 and 600 mm isohyets (sometimes 150-500 mm) stretching through six continental West African countries (Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad) and brushing northern Nigeria and northern Cameroon.

Halfway between the 200 and 600 mm isohyets is the limit of the rainfed agricultural area, a theoretical border which has many exceptions depending on soil quality and the existence of fossil valleys. North of this line is the “nomadic area” where each year the extent of new vegetation indicates the quality of the rainy season and determines pastoral activity. South of the line are the villages of sedentary farmers, engaged in diverse activities where cattle herds move north during the annual growing season. Both nomadic 269

The vegetation is savannah – tree-dotted steppes in the south and bushes the further north you go. The wet season lasts only three months and rainfall varies from one year to another. Much of the soil is barren and vulnerable. This rules out most export

Map 15.1. Rainfall and climate zones N

Evolution of the rainfall index in the CILSS countries from 1895 to 2000

MOROCCO 1.5

LIBYE

ALGERIA

ATLANTIC

1.0

WESTERN SAHARA

OCEAN

0.0

2000

1985

1970

1955

1935

1925

MAURITANIA

1915

1.5

1900

1.0

MALI

200

NIGER

CHAD

200 600

SENEGAL

600

THE GAMBIA BURKINA FASO

GUINEA BISSAU

GUINEA BENIN NIGERIA

SIERRA LEONE

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

GHANA

TOGO

Source: Agrhymet Regional Centre (ARC), SWAC / OECD (2005)

0

500 km

CAR

CAMEROON

LIBERIA

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

Isohyet (mm/year)

Current climate zones

200

Average isohyet 1940-1967

Saharan

Sahelo-sudanian

200

Average isohyet 1968-2000

Sahelian

Sudano-sahelian

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Border

IV. VULNERABILITIES

and sedentary inhabitants have long devised ways to cope with climate variations as best they can — by nomadism, by ancient traditions of human and livestock migration in the dry season and by having extensive and scattered growing areas to reduce economic and climatic risk.

Figure 15.1. Cereal production in CILSS countries (1987/88 = 100) 300

250

200

150

Vulnerability is ever-present and 100 takes many forms in the Sahel 50 and West Africa, in both rural and * /88 8/89 9/90 0/91 1/92 2/93 3/94 4/95 5/96 6/97 7/98 8/99 9/00 0/01 1/02 2/03 3/04 4/05 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 87 urban areas as well as in poorer 0 Net Imports Population and more afﬂuent zones. However, Gross production Available cereals crops per capita Gross production trend Trend of available cereal crops per capita the inhabitants of the agropastoral * Forecast Source: CILSS 2005 area (Sahel) suffer most from 12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/482627554753 uncertainty and risk. This is where the four major droughts of the last century (1909-13, 1940-44, 1969-73 and 1983-85) aid fell sharply (see Figure 15.2.) while commercial caused the most devastation and killed the most imports increased faster than production. people. The landlocked countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, 270 It seems that due to global warming the Sahel Mali and Niger), which produce 90% of the cereals, is becoming drier. There have been two distinct constitute 75% of the population and import little, climate periods during the last century — a wet are distinct from the Atlantic coastal countries period which preceded a dry period as from the (Mauritania and Senegal), which produce few early 1970s. The southward drift of the isohyets is cereals and import much more. proof of this, which threatens the delicate balance between people and their environment. Figures 15.3. and 15.4. clearly illustrate the differences. Production in the two coastal states has stagnated and their imports have risen sharply. The 15.2. Food dependency in Sahelian agricultural sector is very small in Mauritania and countries is not increasing… average-sized, but greatly degenerated, in Senegal. They are more urbanised than most other countries The Sahel’s image is one of drought, famine and and rice, of which they do not produce enough, food shortages. But the record of individual CILSS heavily dominates their food consumption. member countries paints a different picture. Their cereal production over the past 17 years has risen In the landlocked countries, which have more faster than their population – by 73% compared to agricultural potential, cereal production is 54%. Per capita cereal availability2 also increased increasing while the share of imports remains slightly (see Figure 15.1.). almost the same. A thorough analysis of all food products shows that output of fruit, vegetables and meat rose substan15.3. …But cereal production tially over the same period throughout the Sahel remains very erratic and West Africa (a series of the Atlas will deal with agriculture and livestock). The overall share of food It seems that over the long-term Sahel countries imports remained fairly steady, rising from 19% to will probably not rely more on food imports, 21% of gross regional production. The volume of food but will be subject to sharp annual variations in Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

IV. VULNERABILITIES

Figure 15.2. Food aid to CILSS countries

400 Thousand of tonnes

cereal production which reﬂect the prevailing rainfed cultivation methods. Crisis management of recurrent production shortages involves extra-regional food imports in the forms of commercial imports and food aid, and using existing cereal stocks. Together they play the role of an adjustment variable between supply and demand.

300

200

100

87 /8 8 88 /8 9 89 /9 0 90 /9 1 91 /9 2 92 /9 3 93 /9 4 94 /9 5 95 /9 6 96 /9 7 97 /9 8 98 /9 9 99 /0 0 00 /0 1 01 /0 2 02 /0 3 03 /0 4 04 /0 5*

0

* Forecast So urce: CILSS 2005

Figure 15.3. CILSS: Coastal countries Net imports

Gross production

14,000

12,000

Thousand of tonnes

Since the late 1980s, cereal production has varied by an average 20% from year to year in both coastal and landlocked countries. But the two groups have different ways of stabilising cereal availability. In the coastal states commercial imports signiﬁcantly stabilise cereal availability, with cereal stocks and food aid having almost no inﬂuence. In landlocked countries cereal stock management has the greatest impact on stabilising cereal availability followed by commercial imports and food aid.

10,000

8,000

271

6,000

4,000

0

87 /8 8 88 /8 9 89 /9 0 90 /9 1 91 /9 2 92 /9 3 93 /9 4 94 /9 5 95 /9 6 96 /9 7 97 /9 8 98 /9 9 99 /0 0 00 /0 1 01 /0 2 02 /0 3 03 /0 4 04 /0 5*

2,000

* Forecast

12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/482631657824

So urce: CILSS 2005

Net imports

Gross production

14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

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*

4

/0 5 04

3

/0 03

2

/0 02

1

/0 01

0

/0 00

9

/0 99

8

/9 98

7

/9 97

6

/9 96

5

/9 95

4

/9 94

3

/9

2

/9 92

1

/9 91

/9

0

* Forecast Source: CILSS 2005

90

9 /8

/8

/9 89

88

8

0 87

The Sahel’s vulnerable zone is also the “front line” against locust invasions that regularly sweep West Africa,4 most recently in 1986-89 and

Figure 15.4. CILSS: Landlocked countries

Thousand of tonnes

In the rainfall-deﬁned Sahel, an agropastoral area (see Map 15.1), there are between 50 and 110 days of rain a year.3 North of the blue line, the length of the rainy season varies by approximately 30% from year to year. The area suffers from both persistently low and very unpredictable rainfall. This is the area we initially deﬁned as “Sahel’s fragile high-risk zone”. It is within this area that pockets of food shortages were observed in 2005, especially in Niger.

93

15.4. The agropastoral area: Vulnerability and unpredictability

12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/482716164744

IV. VULNERABILITIES

2004, causing severe damage to crops and vegetation. The insects breed in the desert in April and May. They move south and attack the pastoral area between May and July. A second wave appears in the Sahel, summer breeding ground, and the insects lay waste to crops between August and October before often moving north to winter and spring breeding grounds.

15.5. Vegetation and soil problems are not just in the Sahel

272

Table 15.1. Average annual variation in cereal availability

1 = PRODUCTION

20%

18%

2 = 1 + IMPORTATIONS

16.6%

5.5%

3 = 2 + STOCK VAR.

12.4%

5.8%

44 ==33 + +FOOD FOODAID AID +FOOD

12.1% 12.1%

5.6% 5.6%

In the landlocked countries, large producers, food stocks play a more important role in off-setting production variation; but there are extreme fluctuations in cereal availability. In the coastal atlantic countries, imports for the most part offset production variations. In both cases, food aid plays a marginal role. Source: CILSS 2005

Vegetation and soil quality are key determinants to West Africa’s food security given the large part of the population that remain directly dependent on the exploitation of these resources for their subsistence. Rainfall and rural demographic pressure are closely linked to the Sahel’s vegetation, which seems set in long-term decline as isohyets fall.

But paradoxically, the vegetation season increased in the 1990s in the Sahel, especially after 1995 when vegetation signiﬁcantly spread northward. Soil suitability for agriculture varies greatly from region to region and determines signiﬁcantly rural population settlement. Hence no area combines major climatic uncertainty with the exploitation of poor soil. Densely-populated areas with unsuitable soil are situated south of the climatically deﬁned

Map 15.2. Locusts in West Africa N

Locust breeding grounds from July to September Movement of swarms from August to October

MAURITANIA MALI

NIGER CHAD

SENEGAL THE GAMBIA

Limit of the Sahel's vulnerable zone

BURKINA FASO GUINEA BISSAU

0 Source: CILSS SWAC / OECD (2005)

500 km

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

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Senegal

Source: CILSS SWAC / OECD (2005)

N

Rural population density (inhab/km²) > 150 inhab/km²

MARADI

ZINDER

Lake Chad

High population density on suitable soil

*Calculated upon administrative units

High population density on unsuitable soil

Niger

Low population density on suitable soil

100 to 150 inhab/km²

50 to 100 inhab/km²

30 to 50 inhab/km²

10 to 30 inhab/km²

Suitable soil

500 km

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

0

Limit of the Sahel's vulnerable zone

Average suitable soil

Soil suitability for agriculture Unsuitable soil < 10 inhab/km²

Map 15.3. Soil quality and rural population densities

IV. VULNERABILITIES

273

SENEGAL

MOROCCO

LIBERIA

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

SIERRA LEONE in the vegetation season

Trend of a shortening

MAURITANIA

WESTERN SAHARA

GUINEA

Source: CILSS SWAC / OECD (2005)

GUINEA BISSAU

THE GAMBIA

N

274

GHANA

MALI

TOGO

BENIN

ALGERIA

NIGERIA

NIGER

CHAD

LIBYE

CAMEROON

500 km

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

0

CAR

More than 100 days

From 60 to 100 days

From 20 to 60 days

Less than 20 days

Trend of a prolongation in the vegetation season

Length of the vegetation season (between 1990 and 1999)

Map 15.4. Change in the length of the vegetation season (1990/99)

IV. VULNERABILITIES

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Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

GUINEA BISSAU

110 days

Banjul

Dakar

50 days

OCEAN

ATLANTIC

500 km

Bissau

LIBERIA

Bamako

MAURITANIA

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

High risk Sahel's vulnerable zone

Desert region (nomadic breeding)

SIERRA LEONE

GUINEA

THE GAMBIA

SENEGAL

Nouakchott

WESTERN SAHARA

MOROCCO

Source: Agrhymet Regional Centre (ARC), SWAC / OECD (2005)

0

N

GHANA

Ouagadougou BENIN

Niamey

Average risk Sahel's vulnerable zone

TOGO

BURKINA FASO

MALI

ALGERIA

50 days

NIGERIA

Map 15.5. The Sahel’s vulnerable zone

Limit of the Sahel's vulnerable zone

CHAD

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

Border

Capitals

Inter-annual variation of the length of the rainy season below 30%

CAR

Inter-annual variation of the length of the rainy season exceeding 30%

N'Djaména

CAMEROON

Length of rainy season

NIGER

LIBYA

IV. VULNERABILITIES

275

LIBERIA

SIERRA LEONE

GUINEA

MAURITANIA

Source: CILSS (AP3A) SWAC / OECD (2005)

GUINEA BISSAU

THE GAMBIA

SENEGAL

LOUGA

WESTERN SAHARA

MOROCCO

CÔTE D'IVOIRE GHANA

TOGO

BURKINA FASO

MALI

Rice

BENIN

ALGERIA

Transhumant herding zone

D ZINDE

NIGERIA

MA R A

R

CAMEROON

Mix non-pastoral

Food crops / non pastoral

NIGER

Mix-pastoral

Food crops / pastoral

Agricultural production system

I

N

276 Map 15.6. Agricultural production systems in Sahel countries

500 km

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

0

CAR

Limit of the Sahel's vulnerable zone

CHAD

LIBYA

Cash crop / non-pastoral

Cash-crop / pastoral

IV. VULNERABILITIES

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

IV. VULNERABILITIES

Figure 15.5. Breakdown of agricultural production in the Sahel’s vulnerable zone Rice

Maize

Cotton

vulnerable zone. This conﬁrms that vulnerability and thus food insecurity are not only characteristics of the Sahel. Therefore, most of the Sahelian population is naturally concentrated mainly in Niger, where the best soils lie.

Cowpeas

15.6. Most agricultural and pastoral methods are still traditional…

Peanut

Sorghum Source: CILSS (AP3A) SWAC / OECD (2005)

Millet Calculated on the basis of agricultural production in tonnes (2000)

The lifestyle of most inhabitants in the vulnerable zone is probably one of West Africa’s least-changed in recent decades. The main production system, apart from traditional nomadic cattle-raising, is food

Map 15.7. Main crops in CILSS countries N

Isohyet 200

Millet / Sorghum

Limit of the Sahel's vulnerable zone

Millet production zones (> 100 kg/rural inhab/year) Sorghum production zones (> 100 kg/rural inhab/year)

0

500 km

0

500 km

0

500 km

Maize / Rice

N

Maize production zones (> 50 kg/rural inhab/year) Rice production zones (> 50 kg/rural inhab/year)

Peanut / Cowpeas / Cotton

N

Peanut production zones (> 50 kg/rural inhab/year) Cowpeas production zones (> 30 kg/rural inhab/year) Cotton production zones (> 30 kg/rural inhab/year)

Source: CILSS (AP3A) SWAC / OECD (2005)

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

277

IV. VULNERABILITIES

Map 15.8. Cattle in West Africa

10 to 20 heads/km² 20 to 100 heads/km²

278

0

1,000 km

More than 100 heads/km2 Source: FAO

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

crops/pastoral. This system is centred around growing millet in northern regions, and sorghum in southern regions and is accompanied by transhumant livestock farming so as to minimise risk. This farming system is essentially deﬁned by auto-subsistence, with little or no inputs, and monetary income from crops or livestock is small or non-existent. Between Maradi and Zinder in Niger, cowpeas, considered a cash crop although not comparable with groundnuts or much less cotton, are grown with millet and sorghum. Cowpeas are a food crop and are grown in the same way as traditional cereals (with few inputs) and largely depend on good rainfall. In the Louga area, groundnuts and cowpeas are associated with livestock in a system which also heavily relies on rainfall. Only irrigated rice paddies in the Senegal and Niger River valleys provide protection against vulnerability except during severe drought.

By simplifying, one could describe the cerealproducing areas in more or less horizontal strips: one of millet in the North; one of sorghum mostly south of the 400 mm isohyet; and an area of maize in the southern Sahel. This observation, based on agro-ecological criteria, is conﬁrmed by production ﬁgures. Agricultural surveys suggest that about a third of the Sahel countries’ total millet production was grown in the vulnerable zone in 2000, along with 15% of all sorghum and just under 10% of maize. In this zone, millet is the main cereal crop in Chad, Mali, Niger and Senegal whereas ﬂoodrecession grown sorghum is the main cereal crop in Mauritania. Livestock plays an important role in all Sahelian countries. It accounts for up to 10-15% of the GDP in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger and Senegal. In the largely nomadic northern area, mainly camels and goats are reared. In the Sahelian zone, transhumant

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

Nouakchott

San

Mopti

Gao

From 100 to 150 inhab/km²

From 50 to 100 inhab/km² From 30 to 50 inhab/km²

Tahoua

Sokoto

Maradi

Birni N'Konni Daura

Zinder

Agadez

Arlit

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

Burkina Faso

Million of inhabitants

Less than 10 inhab/km²

From 10 to 30 inhab/km²

More than 500,000 From 250,000 to 500,000 From 100,000 to 250,000 From 50,000 to 100,000 From 20,000 to 50,000

Towns (inhabitants)

Abéché

Mauritania

Main asphalted roads

Road network

500 km

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

0

Sarh

Chad

Limit of the Sahel's vulnerable zone

Senegal

Except Nigeria

Moundou

Kélo

N'Djaména

Mali

Niger

Rural population in high risk fragile zone

Kukawa Nguru Argungu Dosso Kaura Katsina Gashua Birnin-Kebbi Jega Namoda Dutsin-Ma Gumel Hadejia Maiduguri Gusau Azare Gummi Kousseri Kano Dutse Potiskum Damaturu Funtua Bama Yelwa Maroua Bauchi Biu Gombe

Niamey

Rural population density (2000)

Koudougou

Ouagadougou

Ouahigouya

Sikasso Banfora BoboDioulasso

Koutiala

Ségou

Administrative units (levels 1 and 2)

Bamako

Kati

More than 150 inhab/km²

Kayes

Border

Richard-Toll Louga Dakar Thiès Touba M'Backé Diourbel M'bour Tambacounda Kaolack Banjul Kolda Ziguinchor Bissau

SaintLouis

Nouâdhibou

Source: Agrhymet Regional Centre, SWAC / OECD (2005)

N

Map 15.9. Population of the vulnerable zone

IV. VULNERABILITIES

279

IV. VULNERABILITIES

Map 15.10. West Africa’s road and urban network

N

1975

280

2005

Town of more than 100,000 inhabitants Main paved or partially improved roads Sahelian zone (between 200 and 600 mm) 0

Source: Agrhymet Regional Centre (ARC), SWAC / OECD (2005)

600 km

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

cattle with great seasonal North-South movements are raised throughout the Sahel, along with agro-pastoral livestock rearing that migrate less and even sedentary livestock farming in the southern most parts.

plays a signiﬁcant role for the rest of West Africa. The permanent migration of herds southward after the major droughts of 1973 and 19845 as well as the rapid growth of sedentary livestock farming in cotton-growing areas partly explains this evolution.

FAO estimates show, that cattle farming in the Sahel’s vulnerable (agro-pastoral) zone accounts for a relatively small number of livestock and no longer

But livestock is still a major activity in the vulnerable zone — which has a very high ratio of

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

SENEGAL

MAURITANIA

Source: CILSS, SWAC / OECD (2005)

GUINEA BISSAU

THE GAMBIA

N

BURKINA FASO

MALI

500 km

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

0

CHAD

Less than 0.5 bovines / rural inhab

Between 1 and 2 bovines / rural inhab

NIGER

Between 0.5 and 1 bovines / rural inhab

Bovine population density (2000) More than 2 bovines / rural inhab

Map 15.11. Ratio of cattle to rural population

IV. VULNERABILITIES

281

Nouakchott

Nouâdhibou

Source: Fews-Net SWAC / OECD (2005)

GUINEA BISSAU

Bissau

Saint- Richard-Toll Louis Louga Dakar ThièsTouba M'Backé M'bour Diourbel Kaolack SENEGAL THE Banjul Tambacounda GAMBIA Ziguinchor Kolda

N

Kayes

MAURITANIA

Bamako

Kati

San

Gao

Ouagadougou Koudougou BURKINA FASO

Ouahigouya

SikassoBanfora BoboDioulasso

Koutiala

Ségou

MALI

Mopti

282 Niamey Dosso

Tahoua Birni N'Konni Maradi

NIGER

Zinder

Agadez

Arlit

Moundou

Kélo

N'Djaména

0

Sarh

CHAD

Abéché Limit o off the Sa SSahel's vulnerable v ln n ble zone zo

500 km

From 50,000 to 100,000

From 250,000 to 500,000 From 100,000 to 250,000

More than 500,000

Towns (inhabitants)

© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007

* The two most important sources of income of rural households are represented (excl. Senegal)

Fisheries

Regional migration Other activities (tourism, mining)

Agricultural crops Livestock breeding and milk products

Main sources of income*

Map 15.12. Main sources of income

IV. VULNERABILITIES

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IV. VULNERABILITIES

cattle per rural inhabitant — and is very often the main source of income for rural families.

15.7. Facing the regional market Although production methods and lifestyles in the Sahel’s vulnerable zone remain mostly very traditional, the overall environment has greatly changed over the past 30 years. The climate has become drier and the average isohyets have moved 100-150 km further south. Also, West Africa’s population has grown very rapidly, from less than 130 million to nearly 300 million between 1975 and 2005. The number of cities of over 100,000 people has risen from 30 to 135 and the network of main roads has expanded more than ﬁve-fold. The Sahel’s vulnerable zone is now home to 8 million people — about 3% of West Africa’s population — and has very few signiﬁcant urban centres. Its increasing links with big urban settlement areas mean that the old Sahel lifestyles are now up against markets whose ﬂuctuations can magnify the effect of nature’s uncertainties such as locusts and lack of rainfall. This is what happened during the 2005 dry season, especially in southern Niger, whose inhabitants are heavily inﬂuenced by northern Nigeria. But this proximity to large urban centres also provides part of the rural population with opportunities and income, especially through seasonal migration to towns and to commercial agriculture areas. The connection of the Sahel with West African markets is now a reality that neither prevention

nor management strategies of food shortages nor long-term development policies can ignore.

15.8. Conclusion The past and recent history of the Sahel’s vulnerable zone shows that this part of West Africa deserves special attention and probably special treatment in medium- and long-term development policies. Some past and present trends are not very encouraging. It is an area of structural emigration and represents only a small percentage of the region’s population. It is no longer a signiﬁcant livestock breeding area and it is plagued by unpredictable weather and crop pests and now also by market uncertainties. Its demographic, economic and climatic transition is probably the most difﬁcult and least-promising in West Africa. However, the situation and the prospects are not homogenous. The major valleys, of the Senegal and Niger rivers, have a future as irrigated farmland that 283 is still very under-used. But further east, especially in central Niger, the quest for positive connections to the Nigerian market is a more complicated issue. The economic potential of these areas is often limited and they are naturally areas of temporary or permanent emigration. The lure of more attractive urban and rural areas will probably continue. It is not about encouraging or opposing migration but rather to support those who cannot or do not want to leave the region and help them acquire the means to live in that region with dignity.

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Most authors agree that the critical level is between 400 and 800 mm of rainfall, usually about 600 mm. Agricultural intensification is defined here as increasing the amount of labour and/or capital applied to each unit of cultivated land. Cereal availability = gross production – seeds and losses + net imports + variation in stocks. Source: The CILSS Agrhymet Regional Centre; 2005. The main invasions occurred in 1926-34, 1940-48, 1949-63, 1967-69, 1986-89 and 2004. In Niger, for example, the number of cattle has halved over 30 years due to a steady decline in available fodder.

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IV. VULNERABILITIES

Sources and bibliography Bernus, E. et S.A. Hamidou (1981), Atlas du Niger; Ed. Jeune Afrique; Paris. CILSS — Centre Régional Agrhymet / Programme Majeur Information (2001), Projet Alerte Précoce et Prévision des Productions Agricoles ; Le contexte de la vulnérabilité structurelle par système de production dans les pays du CILSS ; Niamey. CILSS (2004), Vingt ans de prévention des crises alimentaires au Sahel, bilan et perspectives ; Ouagadougou. CILSS — CERPOD (2000), Atlas migration et environnement au Sahel ; Bamako. CILSS — Centre Régional Agrhymet (2004), Atlas décennal de la sécurité alimentaire et de la gestion des ressources naturelles au Sahel (1991-2000). CILSS (2005), Gestion de la situation alimentaire 2004-2005 au Sahel. Forum on the medium- and long-term challenges for food security in the Sahel and West Africa, SWAC (OECD, Paris), 18 October 2005. CIRAD (2003), Atlas : Agriculture et développement rural des savanes d’Afrique centrale (Cameroun, République centrAfricaine, Tchad). Pôle régional de recherche appliquée des savanes d’Afrique centrale (PRASAC), CIRAD. N’Djamena, Tchad ; Montpellier, France. Club du Sahel (1996), Current Thinking on Agricultural Changes in the Sahel; Paris. ENDA-Diapol/SWAC (2004), Maradi-Katsina-Kano : couloir de développement, Paris-Dakar. FAO Agro maps: www.fao.org/landandwater/agll/agromaps/ FAOSTAT : http://faostat.fao.org/faostat/ FEWS Net (2005), Burkina Faso Livelihood Proﬁles. USAID, Fews Net Project. FEWS Net (2005), Chad Livelihood Proﬁles. USAID, Fews Net Project. FEWS Net (2005), Niger Livelihood Proﬁles. USAID, Fews Net Project. FEWS Net (2005), Mali Livelihood Proﬁles. USAID, Fews Net Project. FEWS Net (2005), Mauritania Livelihood Proﬁles. USAID, Fews Net Project.

284

FEWS Net, CILSS (2005), Suivi de la situation alimentaire au Sahel et en Afrique de l’Ouest. Évolution des marchés et situation alimentaire en 2004 et 2005. Forum on the medium- and long-term challenges for food security in the Sahel and West Africa, SWAC (OECD, Paris), 18 October 2005. Lerebours-Pigeonnière A. et J.C. Arnaud (2001), Atlas du Mali; Ed. Jeune Afrique; Paris. Lerebours-Pigeonnière A. et T. Ménager. (2001), Atlas du Burkina Faso; Ed. Jeune Afrique; Paris. Pélissier P. and G. Laclavère (1980), Atlas du Sénégal; Ed. Jeune Afrique; Paris. SWAC (2004), Analyse régionale de quelques indicateurs socio-économiques ouest-africains ; Paris. SWAC (2003), Transformation in West African Agriculture and the Role of Family Farms; Paris. SWAC/ECOWAS (2005), Regional Atlas of Transports and Telecommunications in the ECOWAS Zone; Paris-Abuja. WFP (2005), Interim Report: Niger — Analysis of Cereal Markets in 2004-2005. WFP (2005), WFP Emergency Assessment Brief: Niger.

Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009

OECD PUBLISHING, 2, rue André-Pascal, 75775 PARIS CEDEX 16 PRINTED IN FRANCE (44 2009 01 1 P) ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 – No. 56533 2009

West African Studies

Regional Atlas on West Africa Recent global changes have placed regional integration at the centre of Africa’s political and economic agenda. West African countries should deﬁne areas of common interest in order to better optimise their potential. This Atlas is both a driver and the result of strategic thinking on regional integration in West Africa. Containing maps, statistics and analyses, it describes the West African region, its population, settlement, territories, its economy and its vulnerabilities. It analyses the developments and the ways in which West Africa is conforming to a constantly changing global environment. The Atlas also identiﬁes the medium- and long-term trends and provides elements for strategic thinking on the future. Political and technical leaders of the North and South will ﬁnd the information contained in the Atlas useful in debates, negotiations and decision-making. This Atlas will also interest all development actors as well as students and journalists. Educational tools (such as maps, tables and ﬁgures) will enable a broad audience to discover a region of the world which is, at the same time, promising and vulnerable. A dynamic link (StatLink) is provided for some of the maps and ﬁgures. It directs the user to a web page where the corresponding data are available in Excel® format.

The full text of this book is available on line via these links: www.sourceoecd.org/development/9789264055926 www.sourceoecd.org/emergingeconomies/9789264055926 Those with access to all OECD books on line should use this link: www.sourceoecd.org/9789264055926 SourceOECD is the OECD online library of books, periodicals and statistical databases. For more information about this award-winning service and free trials ask your librarian, or write to us at [email protected].

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