When Leaders Learn and When They Don't: Mikhail Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung at the End of the Cold War (S U N Y Series in Global Politics)

When Leaders Learn and When They Don't: Mikhail Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung at the End of the Cold War Akan Malici

State University of New York Press

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

SUNY

SERIES IN

GLOBAL POLITICS

James N. Rosenau, editor

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T Mikhail Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung at the End of the Cold War

AKAN MALICI

State University of New York Press

Cover photographs: Mikhail Gorbachev, 12/8/1987. © Reuters/Gary Hershorn/Landov Kim Il-Sung, 2/6/2007. © Reuters/Lee Jae-Won/Landov Published by

STATE UNIVERSITY

OF

NEW YORK PRESS, ALBANY

© 2008 State University of New York All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher. For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY www.sunypress.edu Production, Laurie Searl Marketing, Michael Campochiaro

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Malici, Akan, 1974– When leaders learn and when they don’t : Mikhail Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung at the end of the cold war / Akan Malici. p. cm. — (SUNY series in global politics james n. rosenau, editor) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7914-7303-0 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich, 1931– 2. Political leadership—Soviet Union—History. 3. Heads of state—Soviet Union. 4. Soviet Union—Foreign relations—1985–1991. 5. Soviet Union—Politics and government—1985–1991. 6. Kim, Il-song, 1912–1994. 7. Political leadership—Korea (North)—History. 8. Heads of state—Korea (North) 9. Korea (North)—Foreign relations. 10. Korea (North)—Politics and government. I. Title. JN6540.M35 2008 947.085'4092—dc22

2007011276 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

CONTENTS

List of Tables and Figures

vii

Acknowledgments

ix

I ONE

THE ARGUMENT

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND THE PUZZLE OF FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE AND CONTINUITY

3

Mikhail Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung The Decision-Making Approach Beliefs and Strategic Interaction Outline of the Book

TWO

A THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS

25

The Theory of Moves (TOM) Preferences Need Inferences Making Beliefs and Learning Patterns Visible The Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP) The Subjective Games of Gorbachev's Predecessors (1980–1985)

II THREE

THE CASES

GORBACHEV: UNCOMMITTED THINKER AND MOTIVATED LEARNER

47

The Early Gorbachev Era (1985–1986) The Second Year of the Gorbachev Era (February 1986– January 1987)

FOUR

GORBACHEV: COMMITTED TEACHER AND REFORMER

Gorbachev Induces U.S. Cooperation (1987–1988) Gorbachev Transforms Great Power Politics (1989–1991)

65

vi

CONTENTS

FIVE

KIM IL SUNG: REVOLUTIONARY COLD WARRIOR

85

Deadlock in the Cold War (1980–1983) The Deadlock Continues (1984–1986)

SIX

KIM IL SUNG: TOUCHED BY THE WINDS OF CHANGE?

107

The Catalytic Period (1987–1990) The Post–Cold War Period (1991–1994)

III SEVEN

THE IMPLICATIONS

LESSONS FROM THE PAST AND APPLICATIONS TO THE FUTURE

131

Main Findings Theoretical Significance The Continued Relevance of Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung

Notes

145

Bibliography

167

Index

189

SERIES LIST

191

TABLES AND FIGURES

TABLES 2.1

George’s Ten Questions about Operational Code Beliefs

33

2.2

Indices for Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs

35

2.3

Gorbachev’s Predecessors Compared to the Average Leader

39

3.1

Gorbachev’s Beliefs in 1985 Compared to the Average Leader

49

3.2

Main Events in U.S.-Soviet Relations in 1985

51

3.3

Learning Patterns of Gorbachev from 1985 to 1986

55

3.4

Main Events in U.S.-Soviet Relations from February 1986 to January 1987

59

4.1

Gorbachev in 1987–1988 Compared to the Average Leader

66

4.2

Learning Patterns of Gorbachev

67

4.3

Main Events in U.S.-Soviet Relations in 1987 and 1988

69

4.4

Gorbachev Compared to the Average Leader

75

4.5

Learning Patterns of Gorbachev

76

4.6

Main Events in U.S.-Soviet Relations from 1989 to 1991

78

5.1

Kim Il Sung in 1980–1983 Compared to the Average Leader

88

5.2

Main Events in North Korean Relations with the United States, South Korea, and Japan from 1980 to 1983

90

Kim Il Sung’s Operational Code (1980–1983) and (1984–1986) Compared

99

5.3 5.4

Main Events in North Korean Relations with the United States, South Korea, and Japan from 1984 to 1986

101

6.1

Kim Il Sung in 1987–1990 Compared to the Average Leader

109

6.2

Learning Patterns of Kim Il Sung

110

vii

viii 6.3

TABLES AND FIGURES Main Events in North Korean Relations with the United States, South Korea, and Japan

112

6.4

Kim Il Sung’s Operational Code Patterns (1987–1994)

122

6.5

Main Events in North Korean Relations with the United States, South Korea, and Japan from 1991 to 1994

123

Operational Codes of Kim Il Sung (1991–1994) and Kim Jong Il (1995–2003)

138

7.2

Kim Jong Il Compared to the Average Leader

139

7.3

Main Events in North Korean-U.S. Relations since 2002

141

7.1

FIGURES 2.1

Games at the End of the Cold War

28

2.2

Transition Game

28

2.3

No Conflict Game

29

2.4

Cold War Game

29

2.5

Steps in the Verbs in Context System (VICS)

34

2.6

A Theory of Inferences about Preferences

36

2.7

Brezhnev’s Subjective Game

40

2.8

Andropov’s Subjective Game

41

2.9

Chernenko’s Subjective Game

43

3.1

Gorbachev’s Subjective Game (1985)

49

3.2

Gorbachev’s Subjective Game (1986)

58

4.1

Gorbachev’s Subjective Game (1987–1988)

68

4.2

Gorbachev’s Subjective Game (1989–1991)

77

5.1

Kim Il Sung’s Subjective Game (1980–1983)

89

5.2

Kim Il Sung’s Subjective Game (1984–1986)

100

6.1

Kim Il Sung’s Subjective Game (1987–1990)

111

6.2

Kim Il Sung’s Subjective Game (1991–1994)

123

7.1

Kim Jong Il’s Subjective Game

140

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am greatly indebted to several teachers and colleagues for their support and encouragement. I am particularly grateful to Dr. Stephen Walker for his untiring support and guidance. It is to him that I owe my interest in the psychological study of world leaders and also to him that I owe my schooling in their study. I am proud and happy that over the years he was not only my mentor but also became my friend. I will cherish my relationship with him for a lifetime. I also want to express my gratitude to Dr. Hendrik Spruyt from Northwestern University, Dr. Sheldon Simon from Arizona State University, Dr. Mark Schafer from Louisiana State University, and Dr. Michael Young from Social Science Automation in Hillard, Ohio. Hendrik Spruyt and Sheldon Simon were invaluable in reading several earlier versions of this book and offering important insights. Mark Schafer was very helpful with the data analysis and Michael Young provided me with the necessary computer software to obtain the data. I also want to thank Dr. Michael Rinella from SUNY Press for his very conscientious work as the editor and Laurie Searl for her much appreciated help during the production process. Finally, I want to thank my wife Johnna for her help with everything relating to this book. More important, however, she travels with me on a journey full of unseen places filled with unspeakable reward. This book is dedicated to my parents Nefijat and Gulyasa.

ix

This page intentionally left blank.

PART I

THE ARGUMENT

This page intentionally left blank.

CHAPTER ONE

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND THE PUZZLE OF FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE AND CONTINUITY

Henry Kissinger once remarked: “As a professor, I tended to think of history as run by impersonal forces. But when you see it in practice, you see the difference personalities make.”1 It appears to be common sense that the conduct of international affairs cannot be explained without reference to the beliefs of individuals such as Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Vladimir Lenin, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Mahatma Gandhi, or Mao Zedong. No recent policymaker would try to explain the world today without references to the personal goals and beliefs of such leaders as Vladimir Putin, Hu Jianto, or Muammar Quaddafi. The policymaking community in Washington takes it as an article of faith that whoever the individual is who is the prime minister of Great Britain, the chancellor of Germany, or the king of Saudi Arabia has real repercussions for the United States and the rest of the world. Therefore, it is somewhat ironic that, despite the knowledge of practitioners and the intuition of citizens, leaders matter very little in the discourse of conventional international relations theory. My firm conviction, however, is that a compelling explanation of international relations cannot dispense with an examination of the leader. He or she must be an integral part of the analysis. The main premise in this book is that the most important aspect of international relations is how leaders represent themselves and their enemies. These representations are the starting point for strategic interactions and the medium by which they determine who they are, what they want, and how they should behave. My argument following from this premise is that leaders do matter as agents of change and continuity in the international system. 3

4

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

If there is a group of world leaders who deserve increased attention and investigation, then Mikhail Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung certainly belong to it. These men, for better or worse, truly have made history. From “interdependence” in strategic relations to “reasonable sufficiency” regarding unilateral arms cuts, Gorbachev’s new thinking constitutes a break with the Soviet experience of the past and a rejection of much of the theoretical thinking that prevailed for decades within the Soviet decision-making elite. His foreign policy reforms and reorientations were welcomed not only by the people of the United States and its policymakers but by people around the world. Confrontational bloc politics came to an end, and a new era began to emerge. However, after an initial global euphoria, the world came to realize that some cold war residuals of resistance would remain. One of them was North Korea under the leadership of Kim Il Sung. Kim Il Sung’s story is different from that of Gorbachev. He inaugurated much of North Korea’s political thinking—most important the juche ideology of the country’s self sufficiency—at the founding of the republic in 1948.2 It was he who persisted in the ideologies of juche, Leninism, and Marxism and who made only minor concessions, if any, to alternate ways of political thinking and acting. He also maintained and nurtured the idea of a global revolution. It was he along with a few others, such as Fidel Castro of Cuba, who kept alive the “communist threat,” albeit in a different form.

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AND KIM IL SUNG This book is about two leaders who astonished the global scholarly and policymaking community and continue to be fascinating. There are, of course, previous studies that have addressed Mikhail Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung and their respective foreign policies. So, why another book? First, substantive and important questions about these two leaders have not been satisfactorily answered. Almost a decade ago, six years after the end of the cold war, Soviet specialist Archie Brown argued that “there is still a paucity of political analyses which try to comprehend the evolution of Gorbachev’s thinking.”3 This judgment holds true today. A similar conclusion can be drawn regarding the case of North Korea. Here, too, we can find accounts of the Kim Il Sung era and a man who amazed the political spectator by his tendency to isolate North Korea internationally. However, there also is a paucity of analyses capable of grasping the content and evolution of Kim Il Sung’s thinking and his contribution to the trajectory of North Korea’s foreign policy behavior. Was Gorbachev’s foreign policy due to a learning process in which he gradually adjusted his beliefs about the political universe and the best means by which to achieve goals in this universe? This is often argued in the literature about the end of the cold war, yet never systematically demonstrated. Why did Kim Il Sung’s foreign policy show more continuity than

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

5

change despite increasing political isolation and economic deterioration? Did he fail to engage in any learning processes? Did these leaders learn from their experience or were they foreclosed against them? On a more general level, the question was formulated two decades ago in a classic study by Llyod Etheredge titled Can Governments Learn? Governments learn through the individuals within them, and when they stand at the pinnacle of their respective state hierarchies, as is the case for Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung, it becomes imperative to scrutinize their learning processes. There are many anecdotal assumptions about both leaders, but little systematic evidence. Conclusive answers to these questions are important because they could shed light on agent-centered mechanisms that are either conducive or stifling to processes of international conflict resolution. Second, Mikhail Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung offer a unique opportunity for making significant theoretical contributions to the study of foreign policy and strategic interaction in world politics. If there is to be greater progress in the discipline, scholars should take greater advantage of studying leaders such as these two. Long ago, Arnold Wolfers argued what makes intuitive sense: namely, that factors external to the actor can become determinants of foreign policy only as they affect the mind, the heart, and the will of the decision-maker.4 Nevertheless, individual leaders often remain a residual category in much of international relations theory. This book brings leaders back into the equation by contributing a sophisticated model of foreign policy decision-making. The beliefs and perceptions of leaders are at the core of this model. Third, ideational variables such as beliefs and perceptions are difficult to assess. Scholars have even argued that they are “unobservable.”5 In this book I make two methodological contributions. The first is to apply methods by which these unobservables become observables. The second is to derive preferences from beliefs and to endogenize them in rigorous game-theoretic models. These steps are promising because such models carry positive statements about what ought to happen if foreign policy behavior is indeed related to beliefs. Overall, these substantive, theoretical, and methodological contributions advance the scientific study of ideational variables, whose relevance has been demonstrated most recently since September 11, 2001. Each of these contributions is worth examining in more detail. The Case of Gorbachev When Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in March 1985 international politics in general and U.S.-Soviet relations in particular showed few signs that they were about to undergo fundamental change. Several Soviet specialists supported the expectation that there would not be much change in Soviet foreign policy and that confrontational bloc politics would continue. Archie Brown, for example, pointed out that “no far reaching changes in the Soviet

6

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

political and economic system or in Soviet foreign policy could be expected.”6 Joseph Nye argued that “Gorbachev’s overall approach to foreign policy suggests continuity rather than a radical break with the recent past.”7 Similarly, Seweryn Bialer suggested that there “is almost no expectation that the tensions in Soviet-American relations will subside in the foreseeable future.”8 Moreover, one year after Gorbachev assumed power in the Kremlin, U.S.-Soviet historian John Lewis Gaddis advanced the thesis that, for all its dangers, the bipolar cold war system had proved remarkably stable and was comparable “in longevity at least, to the great and now wistfully recalled nineteenth-century systems of Bismarck and Metternich.” Gaddis argued further that “unlike those earlier systems, after four decades of existence [the cold war system] shows no perceptible signs of disintegration.”9 Yet, contrary to these expectations, over the next few years the cold war system would disintegrate, and scholarly disagreement continues over the sources for its dissolution. The rational actor premises underlying many of the conventional theories of international relations, and in particular realism as the most prominent theory of security studies, lead us to expect cooperative foreign policy behavior, or policies of accommodation in general, only when cooperation is indeed prudent. Since there was “nothing in Gorbachev’s biography to suggest the personality of a rebel,” he is said to have displayed exactly this response as the Soviet Union found itself in an economic bottleneck.10 In the 1980s, the U.S. Congress approved the highest defense budget in its history. This action would intensify the arms race, and President Ronald Reagan was about to outspend the Soviet Union. Reagan’s military adviser Richard Perle reaffirmed this view, arguing that “the buildup of American military capabilities contributed mightily to the position of strength that eventually led the Soviet leadership to choose a less bellicose, less menacing approach to international politics.”11 Similarly, scholars have also argued that the only viable option—in fact, the only rational choice for Gorbachev— was to withdraw from the ruinous cold war competition.12 The reorientation in Soviet foreign policy, therefore, had nothing to do with any substantive changes in his beliefs as an alternative group of scholars came to argue later. At least initially, Gorbachev indeed showed no signs of a change of heart. He himself recounted later that his “new thinking” was not a “sudden revelation,” and he has rejected any claim to have entered office with a “detailed action plan.”13 On the day of his accession, Gorbachev issued his first statement regarding Soviet foreign policy and emphasized continuity as he reiterated the familiar overall framework of Soviet policy: strengthening the socialist community, supporting peoples’ liberation and progressive development in the Third World, and coexisting with the capitalist powers.14 In this early phase, Gorbachev at times even engaged in harsh antiU.S. rhetoric. In May 1985, he denounced U.S. “state terrorism” in Nicara-

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

7

gua and an “undeclared U.S. war” against Afghanistan. In October, he stated that U.S. imperialists were pursuing a policy of “social revenge” and suppressing national liberation movements. In early 1986, he argued against U.S. policies of “hegemonism” and stated that the nature of imperialism inherent in U.S. foreign policy was aggressive because of its “influential militaryindustrial complex.”15 Thus, the scholarly expectation indeed seemed plausible that if Soviet foreign policy were to change at all, it would have nothing to do with a learning process of Gorbachev and everything to do with structural adaptation.16 Moreover, it was also plausible to argue that any foreign policy would result from the apparent new realities of relative Soviet decline. This expectation was reinforced by many conservative policymakers in the United States who were convinced that the Soviet Union, if it could, would remain committed to the overthrow of capitalism.17 These views were subsequently carried into the post–cold war era in which scholars continued to reject a belief system explanation and argued that the Soviet reorientation was caused by the economic and military preponderance of the United States.18 However, the interpretation of an alternative group of scholars does ascribe the reorientation in Soviet foreign policy to Gorbachev’s changing beliefs over the course of his tenure. The basis for this argument is summarized by one Soviet specialist arguing that “the notion that the arms race in the 1980s forced the Soviet economy to its knees suffers from the problem that the Soviet economy had been in an even worse state in previous phases of the Soviet empire.”19 The argument of forced change is also rejected by the Soviet Union’s Director of the Institute for the USA and Canada and Gorbachev adviser Georgi Arbatov. At a 1991 conference sponsored by the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs in Rome, he argued: “The version about President Reagan’s ‘tough’ policy and intensified arms race being the most important source of perestroika—that it persuaded communists to ‘give up’—is sheer nonsense.”20 Asking the counterfactual question of why Gorbachev’s predecessors Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko did not act as Gorbachev did when faced with similar external circumstances leaves no other answer than to consider Gorbachev as indispensable. Archie Brown put it well: “Gorbachev was, after all, the fourth Soviet General Secretary . . . to coincide with Reagan’s period in office, but the first to interpret the intensification of the arms race not as a reason for the Soviet Union to step up its military efforts but as an additional reason for seeking a new basis for trust in East-West relations.”21 Indeed, while Gorbachev was not a rebel, he was a novelty when he arrived on the political stage. He was a generation younger than Brezhnev and most of his colleagues. He was seventeen years younger than Andropov, nineteen years younger than Chernenko, and thirteen years younger than the average age of the ten surviving and full voting members of the Politburo.

8

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

These differences in age may, of course, bring with them distinct political socialization experiences. Janice Stein writes: Most of the members of Brezhnev’s Politburo were born around 1910 and lived through the early revolutionary years. They were young adults during the forced collectivization under Stalin and fully responsible adults during World War II. Their formative experiences were the creation of the Soviet Union, the surprise attack by Hitler’s Germany, and the trauma of the “Great Patriotic War.”22 Given these experiences, the development of a competitive attitude and corresponding beliefs toward the political world seems unsurprising. The political socialization of the Gorbachev Politburo, however, occurred under different parameters: Many of the members of the Politburo under Gorbachev were born around 1930, and their formative political experience was Khruschev’s denunciation of Stalin in 1956. Those who came of political age during this period were heavily influenced by Khruschev’s attempt to liberalize the political process, to free Soviet society of the Stalinist legacy, and to reform Soviet politics. They described themselves as ‘children’ of the Twentieth Party Congress, and many emerged as colleagues or advisers to Gorbachev in the first few years of his administration. Some of Gorbachev’s advisers lived through the ‘years of stagnation’ in frustrated isolation and were receptive to reform and change.23 Different formative experiences may have thus led the “Gorbachev generation” to be open to new ways of thinking.24 Although Gorbachev did not arrive with a full-fledged agenda of new thinking, some changes could have been expected nevertheless. Scholars point out that Gorbachev had introduced a change of style and that he was a technocrat. Archie Brown illustrated Gorbachev’s new style as follows: [E]very Soviet leader relied . . . on outside specialists, but these experts were generally very conscious of what the leader wanted to hear. A three-stage filtering process meant that, in the first instance, only ‘reliable’ specialists whose views were unlikely to offer a significant challenge to the conventional wisdom . . . were apt to be consulted; second, their recommendations were mediated by the permanent officials in the Central Committee . . . third, the specialists themselves engaged in self-censorship and—with rare exceptions—did not advocate radical change. . . . [T]his consultative process changed under Gorbachev. He was prepared to listen to a

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

9

broader range of specialists with fresh ideas. . . . Especially in the earlier years of his leadership, Gorbachev was prepared to meet directly with specialists from academic institutes . . . and he made it clear that he would actively welcome fresh ideas.25 Gorbachev’s arrival on the political stage as a technocrat had farreaching implications. The Gorbachev era became the heyday of the institutchki—the scholars who worked in policy-oriented research institutes— and of political entrepreneurs and epistemic communities, all of which were “unleashed by glasnost.”26 Facing “windows of opportunities,” these actors were of relevance to Soviet security policy as they succeeded in influencing foreign policy with their “recognized expertise and competence” and their authoritative claim to “policy-relevant knowledge” in the security sphere.27 Soviet expert Jeff Checkel has convincingly shown that “institutchiks” in research institutions under the aegis of the Academy of Sciences, the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), and the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada (ISKAN) were able to convince Gorbachev through advisers such as Aleksandr Yakovlev and Yevgeniy Primakov that international politics had to be analyzed in such nonclass categories as “interdependence” and that his enemy image of American capitalism had to be changed. Together these actors contributed to the development and emergence of new ideas and Gorbachev’s new thinking in the realm of foreign policy.28 This new thinking has been described as “a deep, conceptual reassessment of what the US-Soviet relationship ‘was.’ ” It was “constitutive theorizing at the lay level” through which Gorbachev came to rely on a substantially changed image of the adversary.29 As Soviet scholar Robert Legvold has put it, what Gorbachev had done was “to set aside the holiest of Soviet foreign policy concepts, the notion that the most elemental dynamic of international politics resides in the tension between two historic social orders— socialism and capitalism.”30 Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze would later confirm in his memoirs that Gorbachev’s “thinking went beyond the boundaries of prescribed norms.”31 Through practices such as the revocation of the Brezhnev doctrine, which from the American perspective constituted the conflictual Soviet-American relationship, he invited a gradually emerging redefinition of this relationship between the superpowers and a conflict that seemed like it had become “set in stone.”32 Scholars attributing the change in Soviet foreign policy to Gorbachev’s learning process of Gorbachev also point to his statements. Contrary to those cited earlier about U.S. hegemonism, these are of a fundamentally different nature. In 1986, Gorbachev argued: Security cannot be built endlessly on the doctrines of containment and deterrence. . . . In the context of relations between the USSR

10

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T and the USA, security can only be mutual, and if we take international relations as a whole it can only be universal. . . . In the military sphere we intend to act in such a way as to give nobody grounds for fear . . . about their security.33

The highest defense spending in the history of the United States under the Reagan administration during the 1980s suggested that the doomsday clock was certainly ticking fast and that it was just a few minutes before midnight. Then suddenly, by 1991, the enduring rivalry between the superpowers had ended, the cold war was history, and people and policymakers around the world came to envision an emerging era marked by cooperation. The conclusion by these scholars is that Gorbachev ended the cold war because he wanted to and not because President Reagan outspent the Soviet Union. Gorbachev was an “uncommitted thinker and motivated learner” who changed his beliefs in the course of his tenure and along with it the course of Soviet foreign policy.34 Although this judgment is a widely held claim in the scholarly literature about the end of the cold war, no systematic evidence about its psychological basis has been collected to test it. This omission is regrettable because if mechanisms of change are situated within individual leaders, then it becomes imperative to scrutinize them further to the point where learning is demonstrated to have occurred and not just assumed. The Case of Kim Il Sung As the cold war came to an end, scholars contemplated that we might soon miss it.35 The reason for such a counterintuitive feeling is simple: with the move from bipolarity to unipolarity, security threats no longer emanated from the rivalry of two superpowers but rather from the existence of rogue states. Rogue states are said to be security threats because they are driven by hostile intentions and are difficult to deter. Rogue states are, furthermore, suspected of sponsoring or practicing international terrorism and engaging in the acquisition and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While Gorbachev opened up the Soviet Union as he sought new relations with the West, Kim Il Sung amazed the political spectator by his tendency to isolate North Korea.36 Kim Il Sung’s formative years occurred under parameters different from those of Gorbachev. It was particularly the Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula prior to World War II that would prime his personality and his lasting hostility toward Japan and subsequently also toward the United States and South Korea. In his autobiography, Kim Il Sung would remember that “The Japanese, whenever they had a chance, would slander our nation, calling it an ‘inferior nation.’ They claimed, therefore, Japan should ‘protect,’ guide and ‘control’ the Korean nation. . . . The Korean people, even if three of them get together, must unite to fight against the Japanese imperialists.”37

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

11

Contrary to Gorbachev, there is much in Kim Il Sung’s biography to suggest the personality of a rebel. North Korean specialist Adrian Buzo writes that Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary dispositions emerged from an infusing of elements drawn from [his] early experiences, the times in which he lived, and above all from his experience as an anti-Japanese guerrilla fighter in Manchuria in the 1930s, with the Stalinist model of state-building. For Kim the guerilla years were a profound and protracted experience, covering many years as a young adult under arms in an isolated and forbidding environment. They shaped his perspective of the world and especially shaped his view of the purpose of political power and state-building.38 Kim Il Sung’s background, in contrast to Gorbachev’s, appeared to preclude him to alternative modes of thinking. Because he spent his formative years as a guerilla in remote areas, his exposure to the modern world was very limited. Contrary to Gorbachev, he was not surrounded by “intellectuals at his elbow,” or any foreign advisers. According to Buzo: This isolation shaped his intellect by limiting his exposure to outside ideas and moulding the ways in which he conceptualized and dealt with practical problems. Guerilla life instilled in him the habits of self-reliance, perseverance and unremitting struggle, but we may also see in this period the roots of his later attitude of deep suspicion and mistrust towards ‘outsiders’ and more broadly the diversity and pluralism of the external world. He lived in a predatory, political subculture of force which encouraged in him an outlook that accepted callousness and criminality as a daily reality.39 Indeed, Kim Il Sung did not appear to live according to the title of his multivolume autobiography, With the Century. Buzo argues that Kim Il Sung never advanced intellectually beyond the experiences of his early days: [Kim Il Sung’s] weaknesses were . . . significant. They began with Kim’s intellect, which was formed under the influence of limited schooling, extended military struggle, and political combat with the oligarchy. As a result, he could not frame effective policies to pursue economic development and modernization, nor was he able to seek advice of those who could. Convinced of the universality of Stalinism, he was not interested in any further refinements or revisions, and his concept of modernity increasingly became frozen in the past.40 Indeed, as Buzo adds, “judging by his post-1945 actions, he . . . came to possess the deep conviction that his experience of people and politics in the

12

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

guerilla movement held true for people and politics everywhere.”41 Advice was almost anathema to Kim Il Sung. He was even resistant to advice from the Soviets, as described later by a former Soviet official in Moscow’s Pyongyang embassy: “He would agree with our leaders and give a lot of promises, but afterwards he would pursue the same line, his own line.”42 After Japan was defeated in the Second World War, the occupation ended and the Korean peninsula was partitioned into North and South. The North fell under the auspices of the Soviet Union, which soon installed Kim Il Sung as North Korea’s leader, “a selection that may have been made by Stalin himself.”43 It was also with Soviet approval and support that Kim Il Sung had embarked on an ill-fated attempt to conquer South Korea in 1950.44 Documents from the Soviet archives, which were opened to researchers in the 1990s, demonstrate vividly how Kim Il Sung repeatedly implored Stalin and his diplomats to authorize an invasion of the South, at one point telling Soviet embassy officers: “Lately I do not sleep at night, thinking about how to resolve the question of the unification of the whole country. If the matter of the liberation of the people of the southern portion of Korea and the unification of the country is drawn out, then I can lose the trust of the people of Korea.”45 Kim Il Sung’s invasion of South Korea was repulsed by the forces of the United States, South Korea, and several other states under the flag of the United Nations. After the armistice that followed the Korean War in 1953, international politics for Kim Il Sung was a continuous revolution against the hostile regimes and forces of the United States, Japan, and South Korea. “Kimist ideology,” Buzo writes, “dictated a resolute confrontation with U.S. imperialism and Japanese militarism and this basic strategy continued, affected neither by the enormous economic power which Japan had acquired nor by the increasingly stable, long-term U.S. political and military commitment to Northeast Asia.”46 Indeed, throughout the cold war, North Korea pursued hard-line policies of confrontation, particularly antagonistic toward the United States as the imperialist force of the capitalist world, but also against its allies South Korea and Japan and most other “capitalist” states. Highpoints here include: the Korean War in 1950, the attempted raid on the presidential mansion in Seoul in 1968, the seizing of the USS Pueblo in the same year, the shooting of a U.S. Navy reconnaissance plane in 1969 and the Nixon– Sato Joint Communiqué in the same year, the attempted assassination of South Korean President Park Chung Hee in 1974, the North Korean attack on American soldiers in 1976 (the Panmunjon axe murders), the North Korean bombing of Rangoon in 1983, and the downing of a South Korean airliner in 1987. For most of the cold war era, North Korea, as a “fortress of communism,” was able to rely on the Soviet Union for much-needed economic, military, and political support. However, with the breakdown of the Soviet

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

13

Union, this support system quickly dried up. The economy of North Korea declined significantly, especially vis-à-vis its security competitors the United States, South Korea, and Japan. In September 1990, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze informed Pyongyang that Moscow would suspend further largescale Soviet investments in North Korea and cut military aid sharply.47 Soon afterward, the so-called Gorbachev directive, instructed Soviet organizations to curtail military technological cooperation with North Korea.48 The Soviet economic withdrawal was accompanied by a discontinuation of political and diplomatic support for Pyongyang and culminated when Gorbachev granted diplomatic recognition to South Korea in 1990.49 The political isolation became even more severe as further former communist and socialist partners, especially in Europe, went on the path to democratization and sought alliances with the West. According to one expert on Korean affairs, the events surrounding the end of the cold war resulted in the regime’s confrontation with the most severe foreign policy challenges since the 1950s.50 These dramatic changes lead to the expectation that Kim Il Sung would engage in a learning process in which he would adjust his beliefs and initiate a redirection in North Korea’s external relations. However, given that North Korea’s immediate post–cold war era foreign policy was marked by a mixture of less change and more continuity, scholars disagree whether Kim Il Sung changed his beliefs or not. Emphasizing the changes in North Korean foreign policy toward pragmatism, some scholars argue that economic deterioration and political isolation had a significant impact on Kim Il Sung. More specifically, they argue that Kim Il Sung did engage in a learning process in response to changes in the international system, and, furthermore, that North Korea’s foreign policy behavior after the end of the cold war is due to Kim Il Sung’s altered beliefs.51 Exemplary here is that North Korea conceded and signed a twenty-fivearticle Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation (the “Basic Agreement”) with South Korea, signed the “Agreed Framework” with the United States, and, in the economic realm, created a free economic trading zone (FETZ).52 Another group of scholars highlight the continuity in North Korean foreign policy behavior. These scholars question the sincerity of any changes that did occur in the post–cold war period and argue that departures toward pragmatism are unstable at best. They also contend that while there was some change in North Korea’s foreign policy behavior, it also demonstrated continuity as it became delinquent in meeting its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) obligations, threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and engaged in the reprocessing of plutonium, leading to the dramatic nuclear crisis before Kim Il Sung’s unexpected death in 1994.53 The conclusion of these North Korea specialists is that the beliefs of Kim Il Sung have not been affected and that any post–cold war behavior represents merely a coerced adaptation to a changing environment.54

14

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

Indeed, Kim Il Sung’s hostile beliefs toward the United States appeared to remain unchanged. As late as 1993, the regime republished a volume titled The U.S. Imperialists Started the Korean War. Kim Il Sung acknowledged the changing realities at the end of the cold war, but argued that “the old forces which tried to dominate the world by means of its strength . . . still remain.” Kim Il Sung further argued that “the imperialists, with a monopoly of modern mass media, pour out torrents of reactionary ideas and culture as well as distorted information to meet their own needs and interests. They suppress the people’s voice of justice, deliberately mislead public opinion, invent lies, embellish their antipopular societies and fan aggression and war.”55 Scholars rejecting a belief system explanation for the (few) changes in North Korea’s foreign policy behavior since the end of the cold war also remind us that, despite the dramatic changes in North Korea’s position in the international system and unlike other former socialist states, North Korea remained socialist. Indeed, even after the demise of the entire socialist bloc, to the amazement of many international observers, Kim Il Sung continued to forecast the ultimate victory of the socialist revolution against the “imperialists” led by the United States. In 1993, he argued: The present revolutionary situation is grave and complex, but the future of the revolution is bright and our cause shall emerge victorious. Although the imperialists are putting on a show of power, the contradictions and corruption inherent in imperialism are becoming aggravated with the passage of time, and the downfall of imperialism and the victory of socialism are an inexorable law of history. The imperialists cannot dampen our people’s belief in socialism. . . . We have the strength to defend and bring honour to socialism and to accomplish the revolution.56 Thus, it appears indeed plausible that Kim Il Sung did not engage in any learning process. However, as in the case of Gorbachev, there is no systematic evidence for such a conclusion. Because continuity is the flipside of change, the scrutinizing of Kim Il Sung’s beliefs is just as important as in the case of Gorbachev. Did Kim Il Sung really resist engaging in learning processes in the face of global change? Because (too) much writing on Kim Il Sung is based on anectodal evidence, North Korean specialist David Kang thus argues that further “serious study must . . . be focused on what available evidence there is regarding the mindset of the North Korean leadership.”57 The Puzzles of Learning and Rationality The Soviet Union and North Korea are paradigmatic examples for change and continuity in the international system. The scholarly literature in both cases raised interesting research puzzles that recur more generally within the

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

15

literature on foreign policy decision-making and political psychology: Do individuals learn from experience? If so, what do they learn? Furthermore, is learning related to foreign policy behavior and the strategic interactions between states? One of the main goals in this book is to derive more conclusive answers to these questions based on systematic evidence. Related to questions about beliefs, learning, and its impact on a state’s foreign policy are questions about the rationality of a leader’s foreign policy strategies. Conventionally, Gorbachev’s policies at the end of the cold war are characterized as rational while Kim Il Sung’s belligerence and his continuation on the status quo path, despite North Korea’s increasing political isolation and economic deterioration, are characterized as “irrational.”58 I argue that this conventional wisdom is doubly wrong, built both on flawed observations and mistaken logic. Empirically, in much of conventional international relations discourse, states and their leaders are said to react rationally to the reward and punishment contingencies in the international environment. To what extent these contingencies shifted has been the subject of scholarly debate. Some realist scholars have pointed to the absolute decline of the Soviet economy, referencing the high cost of financing Moscow’s external empire and rising defense expenditures in relation to the Soviet state budget and its GNP.59 However, others have argued that the reward and punishment contingencies remained more or less unchanged. The Soviet economy had grown at rates above 5 percent until 1970. It then dropped to 2.6 percent at the end of the decade and reached only 2.7 percent in the first part of the 1980s. However, the recession of the Soviet economy was part of a global trend that did not spare the United States. The latter reached growth levels of 4 percent in the 1960s, dropped then to a rate of 2.7 in the 1970s, and then even further to 2.6 in the 1980s.60 The logic of change by economic pressure is also rejected by Gorbachev himself. In his memoirs he writes: The assumption that the Soviet Union is in a “hopeless position” and that it is necessary just to press harder to squeeze out everything the US wants is . . . profoundly [mistaken]. In real politics there can be no wishful thinking. If the Soviet Union, when it was much weaker than now, was in a position to meet all the challenges that it faced, then indeed only a blind person would be unable to see that our capacity to maintain strong defenses and simultaneously resolve social and other tasks has enormously increased.61 In the end, the economic burden certainly weighed heavier on the Soviet Union than on the United States. However, with equal certainty it can also be said that the reward and punishment contingencies did not change to an extent that would lead anyone to expect the monumental changes in Soviet foreign policy that Gorbachev did engage in.62 After all,

16

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

the end of the cold war did come as a surprise. Gorbachev’s enormous unilateral concessions indeed present an anomaly for the prevailing theoretical views at the time where superpowers are described as being “engaged in a never-ending struggle to improve or preserve their relative power positions.”63 From this perspective, his behavior toward the U.S. seems “irrational.”64 This strengthens the assumption that Gorbachev and his beliefs were indispensable regarding the changes in Soviet foreign policy.65 A different economic scenario applies to North Korea. Its growth rates relative to the growth rates of security competitors such as the United States, South Korea, and Japan declined significantly. In 1990, it experienced a negative growth rate of –3.7 percent. Even worse were the years 1991 and 1992 when negative growth rates of –5.2 and –7.6 percent were recorded. During the same time the United States achieved modest, yet positive growth rates averaging slightly over 1 percent between 1990 and 1993. The Japanese economy oscillated at growth rates between 3 and 5 percent between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s, while the South Korean economy flourished at a growth rate of 5.4 percent between 1985 and 1990 and 9 percent between 1990 and 1995.66 In the case of North Korea, the reward and punishment contingencies changed dramatically, but a corresponding change in its foreign policy behavior to compensate for relative losses remained more or less absent. This is surprising to conventional international relations theory. Robert Jervis, for example, has argued that since small states lack the resources of great powers, they also lack a “margin of time and error” in their responses to occurrences in the international environment. The international environment, therefore, dictates that leaders of small states be “closely attuned” to it.67 As in the Soviet case, Kim Il Sung and his beliefs appear to be indispensable in order to account this time for continuity and not change. Previous arguments about Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung are also built on mistaken logic. The way the analysis is often framed—“Are leaders rational or not?”—has contributed to the emergence of the mistaken wisdom about both leaders. The problem is compounded by making judgments deductively— not from the perspective of the actor but from that of the observer. This fallacy was articulated decades ago by one of the most prominent traditional scholars of international politics. As a classical realist, Hans Morgenthau never expected a rational theory to describe the actual course of foreign policy. Instead he expected the “contingent elements of personality, prejudice, and subjective preference, and all of the weaknesses of intellect and will which flesh is heir to . . . to deflect foreign policies from their rational course.”68 Ironically and unfortunately, the neorealist scholarship following Morgenthau departed rather significantly from his insights as considerations of such ideational variables were excluded until very recently.69 In one sense, my book might be understood as a study that goes “back to the roots” of realist international relations theory. It does so, however, equipped with a sophisticated tool-kit capable of scientifically investigating the

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

17

factors mentioned by Morgenthau. I argue that leaders act within the context of their simplified subjective representations of reality. Subjective representations necessarily lead decision-makers to deviate from the normative assumptions of rational choice models.70 This is not to say that people’s actions are irrational, just that their actions are context-dependent: “Policy makers may act rationally, but only within the context of their simplified subjective representations of reality.”71 Policymakers, in other words, are not irrational, but are guided by “bounded rationality” and it is within these empirical boundaries that we have to judge rationality.72 Determining accurately the bounded rationality of leaders is important for creating a better understanding of the dynamics of conflict management and resolution. It is, for example, “easy” to argue that Kim Il Sung is “crazy.” However, it is much more valuable to try to come to an enlightened understanding of why he does what he does.

THE DECISION-MAKING APPROACH International relations theorists often argue that a foreign policy explanation with a focus on such concepts as “beliefs” and “learning” lacks parsimony and is inherently difficult to be operationalized.73 Implicit is the prescription that researchers should refrain from such endeavors and work within analytic frameworks that contain a few clearly identifiable key concepts.74 Such prescriptions are not justified. The eagerness for parsimony is a diversion from the areas in which much of the relevant political explanatory action does occur—namely, from deliberative and purposeful actors.75 Moreover, world politics (and, by extension, foreign policy) is complex and we might, therefore, question the applicability of conventional international relations theorizing to the universe of foreign policy cases that call for an explanation. In this book, I argue that refusing to theorize about the impact of ideational variables on politics is not justified. To consider actors as amorphous entities and to rob them of any consciousness is equivalent to denying the sociopsychological character of politics.76 Such an understanding of international interactions is impoverished and can only be enriched by an effort to develop a better understanding of the agents of political action. With this book I intend to apply a psychological theory to the study of foreign policy decision-making in the context of strategic interactions. This application begins with a simple insight noted by Lake and Powell: students of international relations are typically interested in explaining the decisions and choices of actors, conceptualized as “strategic; that is each actor’s ability to further its ends depends on how other actors behave,” and, therefore, an actor must try to anticipate what the other actors will do. Lake and Powell note further that “outcomes ranging from the foreign policies of individual states to international phenomena such as war or cooperation cannot be understood apart from the strategic choices actors make and the interaction of those choices.”77

18

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

Such an understanding of international politics makes game theory an appropriate vehicle to analyze international interactions because strategic choices are at center stage here. However, game theory’s prevalent method of deriving preferences by assumptions is insufficient because it leads to an abstraction away from the reality the actors actually perceive. It is important to recognize that a proper modeling of games between players (actors) requires the researcher to enter the mind of the actors and ask how actors represent themselves and others. These representations are the result of a cognitive process that calls on the researcher to problematize and theorize actors preferences, their beliefs, and perceptions. The scholarly focus on beliefs and perceptions may be considered an outgrowth of Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin’s seminal decision-making approach to foreign policy analysis.78 Their argument was directed against undue emphases on the balance of power and external circumstances at the exclusion of individual features of the decision-maker. According to Snyder and his associates, individual cognitions influence to a large degree a decision-maker’s “definition of the situation” which, in turn, delivers “the key to the explanation of why the state behaves the way it does.”79 Similar to Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, Harold and Margaret Sprout argued that factors external to the decision-maker attain their relative relevance through a cognitive process of perception.80 These perceptions can also be “conceived as a sort of matrix . . . which limits the execution of undertakings.”81 These were understood as concrete strategies, decisions, and intentions. The Sprouts suggested that understanding foreign policy outputs (which they associated with the analysis of power capabilities within an interstate system) without reference to foreign policy undertakings was misguided. They write: “Explanations of achievement and estimations of capabilities for achievement invariably and necessarily presuppose antecedent undertakings or assumptions regarding undertakings.”82 To explain undertakings, that is, foreign policy behavior, it is necessary to look at the individuals who are at the pinnacle of the decision-making apparatus. More important, one needs to examine the “psychological climate” of these individuals, which distorts their perceptions of the surrounding environment. Some years later, influenced by Snyder and his colleagues and building on the Sprouts’ work, Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein developed an input-process-output model in which the process was marked by the decision-makers’ interpretations and perceptions of the external environment.83 Brecher and his associates labeled this stage of the model the “psychological environment” in which information is filtered through an “attitudinal prism” considered to have considerable impact on the foreign policy behavior of any given state. The shortcoming that these and similar approaches shared was that they fell short in measuring many of the concepts and variables they identified as having strong impacts on foreign policy. However, psychological research

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

19

on foreign policy decision-making continued with milestones set by Axelrod’s Structure of Decision and Jervis’s Perception and Misperception in International Politics.84 Both works illustrate how expectations and beliefs produce interpretations and distortions that, in turn, have profound effects on the actions of states. Concepts and variables were clearly linked and standards of measurement were developed. An increased confidence in psychological approaches to the study of foreign policy and a parallel occurrence of discomfort with traditional paths of inquiry led Robert Jervis to the conclusion that “it is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers’ beliefs about the world and their images of others.”85 Belief systems became increasingly important when the cognitive revolution in psychology replaced the behavioral revolution in political science by the 1980s.86 Henceforth, the individual was not considered a “passive agent who merely responds to environmental stimuli.” He or she was seen instead as a selective agent responding to and actively shaping his or her environment—a “problem solver” who aims to make sense of a complex environment and derive alternatives for decisions.87 It is, therefore, no longer adequate to black-box the policymaking process and limit its study to actionoutcome covariations. It is instead necessary to study what or how leaders think about events in their environment and how this thinking changes over time—that is, what they believe and whether they learn over the course of their strategic interactions. The theoretical contribution of this book, therefore, is to expand further the “menu for choice” for international relations theorists.88 What is needed are rigorous approaches to the study of decision-making in strategic contexts that illuminate how individual leaders represent themselves and others over time and how these changing or unchanging subjective representations lead to decisions that generate change or continuity in the international system.

BELIEFS AND STRATEGIC INTERACTION In recent years, international relations scholars have increasingly acknowledged the relevance of the individual leader and the role of ideational variables such as perceptions and beliefs.89 However, so far they have failed to incorporate them fruitfully into their research programs. A systematic demonstration of their importance remains absent and we are thus reminded of James Rosenau’s classic criticism that “to identify factors is not to trace their influence.”90 Yet, it is the latter on which we should and must concentrate our efforts if the goal is to move beyond assumptions of leaders’ beliefs and learning processes. One important reason why individuals as agents of change and continuity remain undertheorized in the discourse of international relations theory can be found in a lack of rigorous methods that would enable the scientific study of

20

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

the link between ideational variables and strategic interactions. Indeed, the task of tracing the impact of ideational variables beyond a state’s foreign policy decisions to systemic interaction processes is a daunting one involving the solution to some major methodological problems. Ideational approaches to the study of foreign policy in general and psychological approaches in particular have often been criticized for advancing underspecified models lacking rigorous conceptualization and operationalization.91 It is also this lack that has hindered previous investigations of Gorbachev’s and Kim Il Sung’s beliefs and learning patterns from moving beyond relatively anecdotal evidence. Any further worthwhile investigation of these or any other cases, one scholar writes, “requires formidable tools.”92 In this book, I use newly developed methods of textual analysis in combination with sequential game theory to examine and analyze the beliefs of Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung, their learning patterns, and, ultimately, their impact on change and continuity in the strategic interactions of the Soviet Union and North Korea in the international system. It is only through an application of rigorous scientific methods that we can assert with confidence and certainty our intuition—namely, that leaders, their beliefs, and subjective perceptions do matter in explaining the strategic interactions between states and the ensuing course of international relations at the end of the cold war. Discerning Beliefs and Learning Patterns of Leaders In the past, researchers have been handicapped in their efforts to systematically discern the beliefs of leaders. These are intangible and scholars have argued that they are “unobservable.”93 Similarly, the concept of learning is “difficult to define, isolate, measure, and apply empirically.”94 The methods employed in this book are capable of making observable these “unobservables” and systematically measuring learning processes. Thus, one methodological contribution is to advance the scientific study of ideational variables—a necessity that is increasingly acknowledged by representatives of all paradigms within the international relations discourse.95 I address this necessity by employing measurement innovations that have been developed and refined in several pilot studies.96 I use operational code analysis as a method for determining Gorbachev’s and Kim Il Sung’s beliefs and subjective perceptions.97 When applied over time, operational code analysis makes it possible to detect learning patterns of leaders as a result of their changing beliefs. By employing operational code analysis, this book follows in the tradition of other recent studies.98 Yet it is distinctive and progressive in using a quantitative method of content analysis, namely, the Verbs in Context System (VICS), applied to the public statements of leaders through an automated content analysis program called Profiler+. This system was developed in an effort to provide researchers engaged in content analysis with a systematic and replicable method of textual analysis.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

21

Previous studies have underlined the validity of the method and led to further examinations of world leaders such as Fidel Castro, Vladimir Putin, Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Lyndon Johnson, Bill Clinton, Mao Zedong, Deng Xioaping, Yithzak Rabin, and Shimon Peres.99 The development of the Profiler+ software has made it possible to subject large quantities of a leader’s public statements to automated content analysis and simultaneously ensure 100 percent coding reliability. The details of these procedures are discussed in the next chapter. Here it is important to recognize that the results of these methods are quantitative data on leaders’ beliefs and, thus, it becomes possible to systematically compare and contrast the beliefs of leaders to each other and identify changes in a single leader’s beliefs over time as a result of learning. Analyzing leaders’ beliefs and learning patterns through procedures of content analysis also involves problems, and these must be acknowledged and discussed. Problems of Content Analysis and Solutions The principal sources for the study of beliefs are the public statements of political leaders: their speeches, press conferences, and interviews—predominantly on the subject of foreign policy for the time period under consideration. These statements must of course be treated with great caution as they may contain manipulative rhetoric and factual misinformation. It is important to exclude statements that are propagandistic in nature (whether in a positive or negative sense) and to include statements that are judged to reflect a leaders’ actual foreign policy dispositions. Here I have relied upon the judgments of Soviet and North Korean area specialists who have become familiar with the context of Soviet and North Korean foreign policymaking over many years.100 With an eye to themes that are repeated in the same mode on different occasions, they become an invaluable source for the “ata-distance” determination of what a leader is thinking and believing during any given stage of his administration.101 Another issue is whether public or private material is likely to produce the most accurate assessments of leaders’ beliefs and foreign policy dispositions.102 The sample of statements in this study falls into the category of public material. There are simply fewer private statements than public ones and sampling private statements would undermine the desirable procedure of random sampling. However, the use of public material for “at-a-distance” assessment techniques has been criticized for not truly capturing internally held beliefs of leaders.103 I contend that this critique is often somewhat inflated. The operational code research program does not necessarily claim that public statements capture the private beliefs and worldviews of leaders. Instead, it aims to analyze and determine publicly articulated beliefs that the leader is convinced are important at a given moment in time and see if they influence a state’s behavior.104

22

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

Researchers engaged with one or another form of content analysis of political leaders’ public statements are also often confronted with the “ghostwriter” criticism. This criticism addresses the fact that public statements, although made by the leader, are often prepared by teams of speechwriters operating behind the scenes. This process does not mean that these speeches or other forms of public statements cannot be taken as indicators of a leader’s beliefs and policy preferences. Both Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung provided their writers with clear directives on the content of the statements that were to become official. Statements reached the public only after the leaders had reviewed and agreed to the content and rhetoric of the material.105 We can, therefore, assert with some confidence that these public statements reflect the two leaders’ beliefs. As is the case for most methods of empirical inquiry, the procedures of content analyses are certainly not flawless. However, if the assumption that individual leaders matter is taken seriously, researchers must try to enter the minds of these leaders. Leaders will not subject themselves to psychological analysis in a laboratory setting. By engaging in careful sampling procedures and showing an awareness of the difficulties noted earlier, content analysis becomes an invaluable tool for studying The World in Their Minds.106 Endogenizing Beliefs and Learning Patterns in Game-Theoretic Models Whereas making beliefs and learning patterns observable is the first methodological task in this book, the second task is to systematically trace their influence on behavioral dynamics, especially strategic interaction. I shall utilize Steven Brams’s Theory of Moves (TOM) as a method to assess the relative viability of a belief system explanation for the trajectory of Soviet and North Korean behavior.107 This game-theoretic model is especially promising for the questions at hand, because it carries positive statements about what ought to be expected over time if decisions are indeed influenced by beliefs and learning patterns. Past game-theoretic studies have been criticized on various grounds. Indeed, one can sometimes not help feeling that game theory models have become popular not because they capture adequately the most important dynamics of international politics, but because they are methodologically intriguing and lend themselves to interesting manipulations and experiments of counterfactual reasoning.108 Researchers have also cautioned against theoretical remedies, such as endogenizing ideational variables. Although there have been interesting attempts to investigate such questions within a gametheoretic approach to interaction, they argue that “game theory was not designed for this task and so its relevant conceptual repertoire is relatively underdeveloped.”109 Scholars such as Robert Jervis and Deborah Larson argue that international relations and, by extension, foreign policies, are complex human social phenomena and can therefore not be understood through an economic lens such as game theory.110

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

23

A related criticism addresses the often employed assumption of substantive rationality in game-theoretic approaches. Terry Moe argues that models built on unrealistic assumptions are by definition inappropriate models for understanding the world.111 Still another criticism is that game-theoretic approaches have ignored various factors that influence a state’s foreign policy. Among these are bureaucratic infighting, domestic politics, national character, and individual personalities.112 Individual personalities are especially important when these individuals stand at the pinnacle of the decision-making process.113 Much of the criticism against a game theory approach is the result of its adherence to deductive reasoning from a priori assumptions. Theorists working in this genre argue that it is sufficient to predict outcomes based on players acting “as if” they were substantively rational. Preferences are simply derived from assumptions.114 Jervis summarizes the case against such theorizing, stating that it is not justifiable that “actor’s values, preferences beliefs, and definition of self are exogenous to the [game-theoretic] model.” He further adds: “By taking preferences as given we beg what may be the most important question on how they were formed. . . . Economic theory treats tastes and preferences as exogenous. Analysis is therefore facilitated, but at the cost of drawing attention away from areas that may contain much of the explanatory ‘action’ in which we are interested.”115 Because both Mikhail Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung constitute ultimate decision units in their respective political systems, attention to their beliefs becomes indispensable.116 A focus on beliefs also answers the call for a social analysis since it considers human complexities. The valid criticism of game theory as “austere,” in other words, does not necessarily lead to a discarding of the entire approach. Instead it should be understood as a challenge, which calls for an incorporation of the complexities of decision-making into the models.117 Games must adequately capture the strategic situation from the vantage point of the actors. This includes preferences that are not simply assumed, but unambiguously derived from a rigorous theory.118 In this book, I derive preferences from beliefs and subsequently specify these preferences as a game-theoretic model. I thus move beyond traditional game theory analyses, which passively represent the situation between two actors. My analysis actively constructs their situation and thereby bridges the gap between psychological research on learning and microeconomic research on strategic choice.119

OUTLINE OF THE BOOK The chapters in this book are organized into three major parts. Part I consists of this chapter and the next. Chapter 1 has laid out the overview and the contributions of this book while chapter 2 presents the theoretical core. Here I devise a theory of foreign policy decision-making, in which I endogenize

24

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

preferences within a rigorous game-theoretic model. Part II presents the empirical cases of political leadership and foreign policy dynamics. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with Gorbachev and Soviet foreign policy behavior. Chapters 5 and 6 address Kim Il Sung and North Korean foreign policy behavior. The central question in these case studies is whether the foreign policies of these countries correspond with the implications set forth by a learning analysis of each leader’s beliefs. Part III presents the implications of the study. In chapter 7, I review the current crisis in U.S.-North Korean relations and engage in a discussion of the policy implications provided by the end of the cold war for managing and resolving this conflict.

CHAPTER TWO

A THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS

In this chapter I present a psychological theory of foreign policy decisionmaking, which conceptualizes international politics as the strategic interactions between actors. This theory endogenizes beliefs and learning patters within a rigorous game-theoretical model, which requires three steps. First is the introduction and discussion of an appropriate game-theoretical model for this task. Second is the specification of a method by which beliefs and learning patterns of leaders can be systematically discerned and analyzed. Third is the task of deriving preferences from beliefs and integrating them into the axioms of game theory. I conclude this chapter by briefly illustrating the application of the theory to Soviet leaders before Gorbachev.

THE THEORY OF MOVES (TOM) According to Steven Brams, any game-theoretic model should propose rules of play that reflect how players think and act in the strategic situation being modeled. Much of conventional game theory fails to do so. As Brams points out, players do not usually “choose strategies simultaneously or independently of each other, as assumed in the normal or strategic form of a game that can be represented by a payoff matrix.” 1 In contrast to conventional game theory, Brams’s Theory of Moves (TOM) understands a game to be constituted through sequential moves within a single game.2 TOM allows players to move and countermove within a payoff matrix and thus enables the researcher to capture the action–reaction sequence that describes international politics more realistically than the simultaneous moves of conventional game theory. It is important to recognize that TOM is not equal to a theory of iterative (repeated) games. It is primarily a theory of moves within a single game and not a theory about the same game played repeatedly. Depending on the “initial state” (cell) in which the game begins, TOM’s sequential 25

26

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

game theory may specify a different “final state” (cell) that is the solution to the game and the prediction for the sequence of interactions and final outcome between players in the real world. In contrast, a theory of iterated (repeated) games may simply predict the same outcome each time the game is played with the assumptions of simultaneous moves and two-sided (i.e., shared by both players) information associated with the rules of classical game theory. Because players in the real world of international politics do not exist in a vacuum, the determination of an initial state allows a more realistic modeling of a strategic situation between two players. From the initial state, players then look ahead to evaluate whether they can do better by moving or staying in this state. Their choices will vary, depending on the initial state, the rules that indicate what kinds of moves are possible, and the means that best satisfy their goals.3 The initial state is a central concept in TOM and because TOM has been criticized for the “arbitrary assignment of a starting point,” it is an important issue to address further.4 According to Brams, “the choice of the initial state, and what constitutes future states and eventually an outcome, depends on what the analyst seeks to explain.”5 As I have suggested, games do have a history and the task is to be sensitive “to issues of time, place, and the circumstances of the players to model accurately the strategic situation at hand.”6 The initial states in this book describe Soviet and North Korean leaders’ “definitions of the situation” at the beginning of the respective historical periods under investigation.7 It is not determined arbitrarily, but after a careful analysis of the writings of Soviet and North Korean foreign policy specialists. The empirical chapters in this book will show the plausibility of these determinations. Following von Neumann and Morgenstern, Brams defines a game as “the totality of rules which describe it.”8 Traditionally a game consists of two contending parties: Ego (Row) and Alter (Column). The model employed here specifies 2 x 2 games with the outcomes of settlement, domination, submission, and deadlock, formed by the intersection of cooperation (CO) and conflict (CF) choices by Ego and Alter in which both players strictly rank these outcomes from 4 = highest to 1 = lowest.9 From Ego’s perspective, domination is the outcome when Ego chooses a conflictual strategy (CF) while Alter chooses a cooperative strategy (CO). Submission is the outcome when Ego chooses a cooperative strategy (CO) while Alter chooses a conflictual strategy (CF). A settlement is reached when both players choose a cooperative strategy (CO, CO) and a deadlock is the outcome when both players choose a conflictual strategy (CF, CF). TOM specifies several rules of play for Ego and Alter to reach a final outcome. 1. Play starts at an outcome that is called the initial state and is located at the intersection of a row and column in a 2 x 2 payoff matrix.

A THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS

27

2. Ego or Alter can unilaterally switch its strategy and thereby change the initial state into a new state, in the same row or column as the initial state. 3. If Ego is the first to switch strategy, Alter can respond by also unilaterally switching its strategy and thereby moving the game to a new state and vice versa. 4. Moves and countermoves “continue until the player . . . whose turn it is to move next chooses not to switch its strategy. When this happens, the game terminates in a final state, which is the outcome of the game.” 5. Neither Ego nor Alter will move from an initial state if this move leads either to a less preferred final state or returns the game to the initial state.10 The three games depicted next describe plausible games that were “played” at the end of the cold war. The following discussion of these games will lead to a specification of theoretical concepts and expectations that I will subsequently test in the empirical section of this book. The Cold War Game is the well-known prisoner’s dilemma game attributed by outside observers to the superpowers during the mid-1980s.11 This game has no cooperative solution (3,3) under rules of simultaneous play and no cooperative solution under rules of alternating play when the initial state is deadlock (2,2). TOM does specify a (3,3) solution for prisoner’s dilemma in repeated play if the initial state is either (4,1) or (1,4) and if the player with the lowest-ranked outcome is willing to exercise “threat” power in preplay communication.12 That is, if this player communicates credibly to the player with the highest-ranked outcome that it will move to (2,2), then the latter moves to (3,3). In order for (3,3) to be a stable nonmyopic equilibrium, each player must also be willing to threaten credibly that it will move to (2,2) if the other moves from (3,3) (see Fig. 2.1). The scholarly literature shares an agreement that U.S.-Soviet relations were in a (2,2) deadlock when Gorbachev took power in early 1985. Soon after his accession, Gorbachev articulated his new thinking on foreign policy, which included the concept of common security. This concept implied that the security of the superpowers was indivisible and linked to the security of the world in an era of nuclear overkill capacity. While Ego (Gorbachev) altered his preferences and advocated superpower rapprochement and cooperation, Alter’s (Reagan) preference rankings remained unchanged leading to the Transition Game (see Fig. 2.2). This would present some very formidable problems for Gorbachev as he managed Soviet foreign policy. The main problem was that the belief systems of the two leaders now specified different subjective games as definitions of the situation.

28

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T Game 32 ALTER CO CF CO

3,3

Game 27 ALTER CO CF

1,4

CO

EGO

4,3

ALTER CO CF

1,4

EGO CF

4,1

2,2*

4,4*

1,2

CF

2,1

3,3*

EGO CF

COLD WAR GAME

CO

2,1

3,2*

TRANSITION GAME

NO CONFLICT GAME

Nash equilibrium solutions are asterisked and nonmyopic equilibrium solutions are underlined. The game number above the first two games is the game number assigned by Brams (1994: Appendix, pp. 215–219) for these two conflict games where he identifies their Nash and nonmyopic equilibria.

Figure 2.1: Games at the End of the Cold War Although Gorbachev’s Transition Game shown in Figure 2.2 has a nonmyopic equilibrium of (4,3) mutual cooperation, it is volatile. The stability of this solution requires the player with the higher-ranked outcome (Ego) to threaten the other player with a return to deadlock if it (Alter) defects from the mutual cooperation outcome. It also requires Alter (Reagan) to make the strategic choice of “move” toward (CO, CO). If the initial state of this transition game is (3,2) deadlock, it is irrational for Ego (Gorbachev) to choose “move,” because a move to (1,4) leaves Alter (Reagan) no incentive to move further from this state. Gorbachev was thus captured in an iron cage, which he wanted to escape, but could not do without Reagan. ALTER CO CO

4,3

|¨

Ø

EGO CF

2,1

ALTER CF 1,4 ≠

Æ

Ego’s Strategy: Stay

CO

“3,2”

CO

4,3

CF Æ|

≠

EGO CF

2,1

1,4 Ø

¨

“3,2”

Alter’s Strategy: Move

“Initial state” is in quotations and final state is underlined with “stay” (Æ|) or “move” (Æ) indicating alternate moves by Ego and Alter from the “initial state” following the rules of play for Brams’s (1994) Theory of Moves (TOM) listed earlier. The cycling directions of the arrows depend on the moving player. From the initial state (3,2) deadlock, the only possible move for Ego would be upwards (≠) toward (CO). The only possible move for Alter is sidewise (¨), also toward (CO).

Figure 2.2: Transition Game

29

A THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS ALTER

ALTER

CO CO

4,4

CF ¨

1,2

Ø

EGO CF

2,1

≠ Æ

CO CO

CF

Ego’s Strategy: Move

Æ|

1,2

≠

EGO

“3,3”

4,4

CF

2,1

Ø ¨

“3,3”

Alter’s Strategy: Move

“Initial state” is in quotations and final state is underlined with “stay” (Æ|) or “move” (Æ) indicating alternate moves by Ego and Alter from the “initial state” following the rules of play for Brams’s Theory of Moves (TOM) listed earlier.

Figure 2.3: No Conflict Game

Nevertheless, at the end of the cold war, the superpowers found themselves in the No Conflict Game (see Fig. 2.3). This game has the twin virtues of a (4,4) no conflict equilibrium that is both a Nash myopic equilibrium and a Brams nonmyopic equilibrium.13 It is not necessary to communicate threats to maintain cooperation because both players rank it as their highest outcome and, as the analysis of strategies demonstrates, both Ego and Alter will move toward it from an initial state of deadlock. A different and much shorter and simpler analysis applies to the case of North Korea. Contrary to Soviet-U.S relations, the relations of North Korea with its traditional security competitors, the United States, South Korea, and Japan, remained locked in the Cold War Game shown in Figure 2.4.

ALTER CO CO

3,3

|¨

Ø

EGO CF

4,1

ALTER CF 1,4 ≠

Æ

Ego’s Strategy: Stay

CO

“2,2”

CO

3,3

CF Æ|

≠

EGO CF

4,1

1,4 Ø

|¨ “2,2”

Alter’s Strategy: Stay

“Initial state” is in quotations and final state is underlined with “stay” (Æ|) or “move” (Æ) indicating alternate moves by Ego and Alter from the “initial state” following the rules of play for Brams’s Theory of Moves (TOM) listed earlier.

Figure 2.4: Cold War Game

30

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

With an initial state of deadlock (2,2), it is irrational for either Ego or Alter to choose “move” because a move by one player from deadlock (2,2) leaves the other player no incentive to move any further. Consequently, North Korea and its security competitors remained prisoners of the dilemma. Kenneth Oye puts the central question posed by these three games as follows: “If international relations can approximate both a Hobbesian state of nature and a Lockean civil society, why does cooperation emerge in some cases and not in others?”14 The response to Oye’s question in this book is that Gorbachev, in order to achieve a settlement in superpower relations, engaged in the “irrational” strategy of “altercasting”—“a technique of interactor control in which ego uses tactics of self-presentation and stage management in an attempt to frame alter’s definitions of social situations in ways that create the role which ego desires alter to play.” Thus, with the strategy of altercasting “Ego tries to induce alter to take on a new identity (and thereby enlist alter in ego’s effort to change itself by treating alter as if it already had that identity.”15 The ultimate goal is that both Ego and Alter, in the end, subscribe to a newly emerging “definition of the situation.”16 In short, Gorbachev’s goal was to demonstrate to Reagan that his image of the Soviet Union was false. The strategy is irrational insofar as Ego runs a risk of being dominated by Alter until and unless the strategy is successful. Doing it nevertheless is the “Gorbachev phenomenon.” Unlike Gorbachev, neither Kim Il Sung nor any of North Korea’s security competitors chose a strategy of altercasting with the hope of escaping the iron-cage determinism of the Cold War Game. To the contrary, the analysis of Kim Il Sung shows that, at times, he tended to misperceive the international environment as overly hostile. He tended to be resistant to conciliatory gestures by his traditional security competitors, as these signals would put his very beliefs about the political universe in doubt. His self-fulfilling prophecies would then indeed often cast his competitors into a conflictual role. Altercasting and self-fulfilling prophecies share the common feature that Ego sends cues to Alter, although this “messaging” is much less conscious with self-fulfilling prophecies. While altercasting creates the possibility of reconstituting a conflictual game into a no conflict game, self-fulfilling prophecies contain the danger of reifying and perpetuating the conflict game.

PREFERENCES NEED INFERENCES To explain why the preferences in the previous strategic interaction games change or remain unchanged requires an analysis of the players, their beliefs, and their learning patterns since they are important factors in realistically modeled strategic interactions between states.17 In turn, this task requires the analyst to depart from the assumptions of conventional game theory. Conventional game-theoretical analyses of interactions take as givens (do not

A THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS

31

explain) who the players are or why they rank or weigh their preferences for the different outcomes. The structure of the game—of the actor’s beliefs about each other and their preferences—is exogenous to interaction and, as such, does not change. Consequently, as Lake and Powell point out, “when trying to explain changes in behavior,” these approaches turn to “untheorized preference- or belief-based explanations as a last resort.” Lake and Powell further caution that “invoking unexplained changes in preferences or beliefs to account for changes in behavior is, in a way, ‘too easy.’ ”18 I go further, arguing that it is not only “too easy,” it’s simply wrong. Strategic choice theories of international relations typically try to explain the change in behavior through an alteration in the strategic environment (e.g., in the balance of power). This inevitably leads to “sins of omission,” that is, making assumptions about the impact of environmental factors without controlling for actors’ preferences.19 Indeed, as Jeffry Frieden and Kenneth Oye note: Many instances of international conflict or cooperation are ascribed to structural factors when, in fact, they might more accurately be attributed either to irreconcilable or harmonious national preferences, which makes attention to environmental constraints superfluous. One cannot assert that the strategic setting led to cooperation among states without first establishing that there might otherwise have been some reason for disagreement, and vice versa.20 When modeling the strategic situation between two actors, it is important to recognize that the assumption of exogenously given preferences abstracts away those aspects of the interaction process that create actors’ “taken-for grantedness” assumptions. It is also important to recognize that whenever preferences are taken as givens, this should be regarded as “a methodological bracketing of the process by which they are produced, and not let it become a tacit ontology.”21 It follows that insofar as conventional game-theoretic approaches to international interactions assume a position of “tacit ontology” (which they do), they “misdescribe” how change and continuity in international interactions actually occur.22 Instead, one has to recognize that leaders matter via the decisions they make and by virtue of the beliefs that motivate these decisions. In this book I argue that actors engage in a process of cognitive learning in which they change their beliefs (or degree of confidence in their beliefs) as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience.23 This process can be strong enough to lead to an alteration of preferences. But even when actors do not engage in a process of cognitive learning, it is important to realize that this “stability is endogenous to interaction, not exogenous” as beliefs are necessary conditions for the possibility of purposeful action in the first place.24

32

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

The foregoing analysis leads to a specification of three actor attributes that are important in the context of their strategic interactions: their preferences, their perceptions about the preferences of others, and their learning patterns. Actors have preferences defined as how they rank the possible outcomes of a game. Perceptions about the preferences of others introduce the strategic context, which dictates to what degree preferences (or, more exactly, preference orderings) are to be implemented. For example, Ego may prefer a settlement over a mutual deadlock. At the same time, Ego perceives Alter to prefer domination. Rules of strategic rationality prescribe Ego not to follow through on his preference with the highest value because otherwise he may be in danger of falling by the wayside.25 Instead, the prescription would consist of a strategy that comes as close as possible to the outcome the actor most prefers. In other words, the final outcome or the equilibrium solution of a game is not a function of one player’s preference orderings but the intersection of both players’ preference orderings and the strategic calculations that flow from them. However, to what degree players engage rationally in strategic calculations, and how prominent the danger of falling by the wayside figures in an actor’s decisionmaking process, are empirical questions calling for investigation. In an interaction game between two players, the payoff matrix formed by the intersection of preference rankings by Ego and Alter changes as a result of cognitive strategic learning, which can occur at the simple, diagnostic, or complex level. The emphasis is on cognitive so as to distinguish it from behavioral mechanisms of foreign policy change such as structural adaptation, which is not accompanied by changes in actor’s beliefs.26 Simple learning leads to a change in Ego’s preferences, while diagnostic learning leads to a change in Ego’s perceived preferences about Alter. Finally, complex learning leads to a change in Ego’s preferences and Ego’s perceived preferences of Alter.

MAKING BELIEFS AND LEARNING PATTERNS VISIBLE In order to discern beliefs and cognitive learning patterns, I use operational code analysis. The research program’s conceptualization of the “self in situation” with the “Self ” (Ego) having diagnostic propensities about a strategic situation featuring “Other” (Alter) and prescriptive propensities toward this situation makes it an appropriate vehicle for subsequently endogenizing preferences within the game theory described here. To determine a leader’s diagnostic and prescriptive propensities the main task is to systematically discern answers from public statements to a set of five philosophical and five instrumental questions identified by Alexander George27 shown in Table 2.1. Over time a leader might give different answers to these questions as a result of experiential learning. For experiential learning to occur, it is sufficient that actors alter any of their beliefs without necessarily redefining their pref-

A THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS

33

Table 2.1: George’s Ten Questions about Operational Code Beliefs The Philosophical Beliefs in an Operational Code P-1.

What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?

P-2.

What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other?

P-3.

Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

P-4.

How much “control” or “mastery” do (a) self and (b) other have over historical development? What is (a) self and (b) other’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction?

P-5.

What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development? The Instrumental Beliefs in an Operational Code

I-1.

What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

I-2.

How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?

I-3.

How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

I-4.

What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interests?

I-5.

What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?

erences or the perceived preferences of others or both. For cognitive strategic learning to occur, the beliefs must change sufficiently to alter the preference rankings attributed to self or other or both. In order to determine Soviet and North Korean operational codes, I employ the Verbs in Context System (VICS).28 As a method of content analysis, VICS draws inferences about a leader’s operational code beliefs from public statements, such as speeches or interviews. The focus within each public statement is on verbs because these are considered to be a speaker’s linguistic representation of perceived power relationships. VICS provides values for six attributes of each recorded verb and its surrounding context: subject, verb category, domain of politics, tense of the verb, intended target, and context (see Figure 2.5). The categories in Figure 2.5 subsequently become the basis for calculating indices of the answers to the operational code questions posed by George. An automated content analysis program called Profiler+ retrieves the verbs from each decision-maker’s public statements, codes them with the aid of an operational code dictionary, and then provides the data to index each element of the decision-maker’s operational code according to the procedures described in Table 2.2.29

34

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T 1. IDENTIFY THE SUBJECT AS SELF

OR

OTHER

2. IDENTIFY THE TENSE OF THE TRANSITIVE VERB AS PAST

PRESENT

FUTURE

AND IDENTIFY THE CATEGORY OF THE VERB AS POSITIVE (+)

NEGATIVE (–)

APPEAL, SUPPORT (+1)

OPPOSE, RESIST (–1)

OR

OR

PROMISE BENEFITS (+2)

THREATEN COSTS (–2)

REWARDS (+3)

PUNISHMENTS (–3)

WORDS

DEEDS

OR

3. IDENTIFY THE DOMAIN AS DOMESTIC

OR

FOREIGN

4. IDENTIFY TARGET AND PLACE IN CONTEXT AN EXAMPLE A quote taken from Kim Il Sung’s New Year’s speech in 1994: “Last year, the imperialists more viciously than ever maneuvered to isolate and stifle our republic.” 1. Subject. The subject is “the imperialists,” which is coded as other, that is, the speaker is not referring to his or her self or his or her state. 2. Tense and Category. The verb phrase “have isolated and stifled” is in the past tense and is a negative deed coded, therefore, as punish. 3. Domain. The action involves an actor (imperialists) external to the speaker’s state (the United States); therefore, the domain is foreign. 4. Target and Context. The action is directed toward “our republic”; therefore, the target is coded as North Korea. In addition, a context is designated: U.S.-North Korean nuclear crisis 1993–1994. Source: Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998).

Figure 2.5: Steps in the Verbs in Context System (VICS)

The result of these procedures is a set of coded verb constructions manifested in the speaker’s rhetoric, which demonstrate beliefs about self and others in the political universe in terms of cooperative and conflictual attributions. Because the procedures lead to quantified results, it is possible to statistically compare operational codes (a) between leaders of different states, (b) successive leaders in one state, and (c) the same leader over the time and thereby evaluate experiential and cognitive strategic learning patterns.

35

A THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS Table 2.2: Indices for Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs Philosophical Beliefs Elements

Index*

Interpretation

P-1. NATURE OF THE POLITICAL UNIVERSE (Image of Others)

% Positive Minus % Negative +1.0 friendly to Transitive Other Attributions –1.0 hostile

P-2. REALIZATION OF POLITICAL VALUES (Optimism/Pessimism)

Mean Intensity of Transitive Other Attributions Divided by 3

+1.0 optimistic to –1.0 pessimistic

P-3

1 Minus Index of Qualitative Variation** for Other Attributions

1.0 predictable to 0.0 uncertain

POLITICAL FUTURE (Predictability of Others Tactics)

P-4. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT (Locus of Control for Self and Other)

Self (P4a) or Other (P4b) 1.0 high to 0.0 Attributions low self control ÷ [Self plus Other Attributions]

P-5. ROLE OF CHANCE (Absence of Control)

1 Minus [Political Future x 1.0 high role Historical Development Index] to 0.0 low role

Instrumental Beliefs Elements

Index

Interpretation

I-1.

APPROACH TO GOALS (Direction of Strategy)

% Positive Minus % Negative Transitive Self Attributions

+1.0 high cooperation to –1.0 high conflict

I-2.

PURSUIT OF GOALS (Intensity of Tactics)

Mean Intensity of Transitive Self Attributions divided by 3

+1.0 high cooperation to –1.0 high conflict

I-3.

RISK ORIENTATION (Predictability of Tactics)

1 Minus Index of Qualitative Variation for Self Attributions

1.0 risk acceptant to 0.0 riskaverse

I-4.

TIMING OF ACTION (Flexibility of Tactics)

1 Minus Absolute Value [% X Minus % Y Self Attributions]

1.0 high to 0.0 low shift propensity

a. Coop v. Conf Tactics b. Word v. Deed Tactics

Where X = Coop and Y = Conf Where X = Word and Y = Deed

UTILITY OF MEANS (Exercise of Power)

Percentages for Exercise of Power Categories a through f

a. b. c. d. e. f.

a’s frequency divided by total b’s frequency divided by total c’s frequency divided by total d’s frequency divided by total e’s frequency divided by total f’s frequency divided by total

I-5.

Reward Promise Appeal/Support Oppose/Resist Threaten Punish

+1.0 very frequent to 0.0 infrequent

*All indices vary between 0 and 1.0 except for P-1, P-2, I-1, and I-2, which vary between –1.0 and +1.0. P-2 and I-2 are divided by 3 to standardize the range (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998). **“The Index of Qualitative Variation is a ratio of the number of different pairs of observations in a distribution to the maximum possible number of different pairs for a distribution with the same N [number of cases] and the same number of variable classifications” (Watson and McGaw, 1980: 88). Source: Walker, Schafer, and Young (2003).

36

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

THE THEORY OF INFERENCES ABOUT PREFERENCES (TIP) The task of endogenizing preferences is accomplished by integrating a Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP) into TOM.30 TIP infers preferences from the key beliefs of a leader’s operational code. The first key belief is a leader’s image of the political universe (P-1). What are the motivations of other actors? Another key belief is the belief in the ability to control historical development (P-4a) versus the degree of control attributed to other actors (P-4b). The final key belief concerns the strategy a leader considers effective and appropriate for achieving political goals (I-1). Changes in these philosophical and instrumental beliefs interact to define changes in the strategic preferences of self (I-1, P-4a) and the perceived preferences of other actors (P-1, P-4b) regarding the political outcomes of domination, submission, settlement, or deadlock in world politics. The intersecting preferences for Self (Ego) and Other (Alter) identify formal models of “subjective games” in a leader’s operational code belief system.31 The signs in the propositions in Figure 2.6 indicate whether a particular leader’s I-1 and P-1 indices are above (+) or below (–) the mean for a norming group of world leaders.32 The signs for the P-4 indices indicate whether they are greater than (>), less than (<), or within (=) one standard deviation of the mean for the norming group.

Prop. 1. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, <), then Settle > Deadlock > Submit > Dominate = Appeasement Prop. 2. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, =), then Settle > Deadlock > Dominate > Submit = Assurance Prop. 3. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, >), then Settle > Dominate > Deadlock > Submit = Stag Hunt Prop. 4. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (–, <), then Dominate > Settle > Submit > Deadlock = Chicken Prop. 5. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (–, =), then Dominate > Settle > Deadlock > Submit = Prisoner’s Dilemma Prop. 6. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (–, >), then Dominate > Deadlock > Settle > Submit = Bully Source: Walker and Schafer (2003a).

Figure 2.6: A Theory of Inferences about Preferences

A THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS

37

For example, if Ego’s key beliefs for Self (I-1, P-4a) meet the conditions specified in Proposition 5, the behavioral expectation is that he prefers domination (4) over settlement (3) over deadlock (2) over submission (1). If, at the same time, Ego’s master beliefs for Other (P-1; P-4b) also meet the conditions specified in Proposition 5, the preference ordering he ascribes to Alter is also domination (4) over settlement (3) over deadlock (2) over submission (1). The numbers in parentheses specify the preference ordering for Ego and his perceived preference ranking for Alter. If plotted into a 2 x 2 game matrix formed by the intersections of cooperation (CO) and conflict (CF), the result is a classic prisoner’s dilemma game. In accordance with the main assumption of this study, a state’s foreign policy in the context of strategic interactions is expected to change if the key beliefs in a leader’s operational code fit different propositions in this theory over time. In this case a leader would be engaging in cognitive strategic learning as well as experiential learning. Continuity, on the other hand, prevails if a leader’s operational code beliefs continuously match the same propositions. In this case, he might engage in experiential learning, but neither Self’s own preferences nor the inferences about Other’s preferences change. The strategy in this book for testing whether Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung engaged in any experiential learning processes is to compare and contrast the evolution of their beliefs over time statistically through ANOVA analyses. For these comparisons, I use mean values of the sampled statements for the operational code indices of Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung. The strategy for testing the theoretical expectations specified through TIP and cognitive strategic learning hypotheses is to periodically identify the ordinal preference rankings for each leader and period under consideration, to plot their intersection into 2 x 2 payoff matrices, and then investigate the empirical viability of the solutions for these games specified by Brams’s Theory of Moves (TOM). For these analyses, I use aggregate scores of the sampled statements for the leaders’ operational code indices. Constructing the leader’s subjective game from these scores is beneficial because what emerges is a model in which preferences are not assumed, but systematically derived. Moreover, the predictions of this model allow for a relatively unambiguous evaluation of the impact that an actor’s beliefs and perceptions have on actual foreign policy decisions. In the remainder of this chapter I will illustrate the application of this analytical strategy with a brief discussion of the link between Soviet foreign policy behavior and the subjective games embedded in the operational codes of Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko as Gorbachev’s predecessors. These examples also provide a baseline from which Gorbachev’s subsequent levels of learning can be assessed. These comparisons will also help in understanding the novelty and extent of the reform policies adopted by Gorbachev.

38

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

THE SUBJECTIVE GAMES OF GORBACHEV’S PREDECESSORS (1980–1985) When Leonid Brezhnev assumed the post of the Soviet Union’s general secretary in 1966, the memories of the Cuban missile crisis were still fresh and readily available. Brezhnev had no intention of following the course of his predecessor Nikita Khrushchev.33 Instead of the “turmoil” represented by Khrushchev, Brezhnev promoted a policy of normalization and “stability” that became known as the policy of détente.34 Brezhnev’s desire for stability and normalization is reflected in a comparison of his operational code for the period between January 1980 and November 1982 with the data of the norming group. The results of the ANOVA in Table 2.3 indicate a high degree of resemblance between the mean operational code scores of Brezhnev and the “average” leader. None of his operational code indices is significantly different from the average world leader. At the beginning of the 1970s, the Soviet Union had already set out to improve, or at least normalize, relations with the capitalist world. Regarding his main contender, the United States, Brezhnev’s “strategy aimed to create frameworks of agreement . . . in order to consolidate and stabilize the Soviet position in the world while avoiding general war.”35 Accordingly, in May 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the SALT I Treaty, the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty,36 and the Agreement on Basic Principles of Relations (BPA).37 Other U.S.–Soviet summits followed: (1) in June 1973 in Washington, which was followed by U.S. industrial loans, trade agreements, and Soviet support of the Paris peace agreement; (2) in June–July 1974 in Moscow; (3) another meeting in November of the same year that led to the conclusion of a new SALT agreement; and (4) in July–August 1975 in Helsinki accompanying the thirty-five-nation European conference.38 This cooperative trend slowed and shifted after 1976. Although President Carter and Brezhnev managed to sign SALT II in a June 1979 summit in Vienna, the second half of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s were marked by significantly less cooperation as the United States (more so than the Soviet Union) moved away from détente.39 When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979,40 “SALT II was withdrawn from Senate ratification, and the United States imposed a grain embargo on the Soviets and boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics.”41 In the same year Ronald Reagan was elected president and soon promised to increase American military power and more actively oppose what he perceived as Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Angola.42 Despite these setbacks in the second half of the 1970s and early 1980s, which in Brezhnev’s view originated from the behavior of the United States, his beliefs remained stable and oriented toward détente.43 The aggregated scores for Brezhnev’s key beliefs are Self (I-1 = .46, P-4a = .14) and Other (P-1 = .22, P-4b = .28).44 Brezhnev’s score for I-1 is greater than the I-1 score

Realization of Political Values (Pessimism/Optimism)

Political Future (Unpredictable/Predictable)

Historical Development (Low Control/High Control)

Role of Chance (Small Role/Large Role)

Strategic Approach to Goals (Conflict/Cooperation)

Intensity of Tactics (Conflict/Cooperation)

Risk Orientation (Averse/Acceptant)

Timing of Action a. Conflict/Cooperation b. Words/Deeds

Utility of Means a. Reward b. Promise c. Appeal/Support d. Oppose/Resist e. Threaten f. Punish

P-2.

P-3.

P-4.

P-5.

I-1.

I-2.

I-3.

I-4.

I-5. 0.190 0.075 0.427 0.123 0.056 0.129

0.542 0.608

0.195

0.180

0.384

0.989

0.133

0.087

0.072

0.198

Brezhnev*

0.110 0.066 0.464 0.205 0.507 0.094

0.713a 0.340

0.223

0.110

0.287

0.990

0.145

0.064*

0.099

0.180

Andropov*

0.230 0.022 0.441 0.167 0.031 0.109

0.616 0.602

0.256

0.200

0.384

0.990

0.142

0.072

0.142

0.256

Chernenko*

0.167 0.073 0.427 0.147 0.047 0.138

0.509 0.525

0.304

0.139

0.334

0.968

0.212

0.148

0.118

0.250

Average Leader**

Differences are statistically significant at the p < .05 level (two-tailed test). *n = 9. The sample for each leader was drawn randomly and represents approximately 50 percent of all available public statements for each leader. **n = 264 for P-1–P-5; n = 255 for I-1–I-5.

Nature of Political Universe (Conflict/Cooperation)

P-1.

Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs

Table 2.3: Gorbachev’s Predecessors Compared to the Average Leader

A THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS 39

40

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

for the norming group (.33) and his P-4a score (.14) is within one standard deviation of the mean for the norming group (.21). These two scores are used to infer the preference ordering for Self and they meet the conditions specified in Proposition 2 in TIP. At the same time, Brezhnev’s P-1 score (.22) is smaller than the P-1 score for the norming group (.25), while his P-4b score (.28) is within one standard deviation of the mean score for the norming group. These two scores are used to infer Self’s perceptions of Other’s preference ordering and they meet the conditions specified in Proposition 5 in TIP. The key beliefs in Brezhnev’s operational code for the period 1980– 1982 thus prescribe an Assurance strategy that ranks settlement over deadlock over domination over submission for the Soviet Union and attributes a prisoner’s dilemma strategy that ranks domination over settlement over deadlock over submission to the United States. Brezhnev’s subjective strategic game specified through the key beliefs in his operational code appears in Figure 2.7. Brezhnev’s subjective game with an initial state of (4,3) represents his belief in the utility of détente—a strategy of mutual settlement despite his perception of the United States being rather conflictual. The prediction from TOM is that Brezhnev will “stay” at (4,3) and continue to engage in cooperative tactics combined with de-escalatory moves. Accordingly, the Soviet Union offered to amend the SALT II Treaty and proposed to the Reagan administration a mutual moratorium on intermediate-range missile deployments in Europe in 1981. In March 1982, Brezhnev went further and announced a unilateral moratorium on further deployment of SS-20 missiles in Europe and a unilateral Soviet pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.45 Brezhnev’s belief that the United States would reciprocate was not validated. Refusing the Soviet offer to amend the SALT II Treaty, it decided instead to reject the treaty and not move to resume strategic arms

OTHER CO CF CO

“4,3” |¨ 1,4 Ø

SU CF

OTHER CO CF

≠

2,1 Æ| 3,2

Brezhnev’s strategy: Stay

OTHER CO CF

CO Settle Submit SU

CO

≠

SU CF Dominate Deadlock SOVIET UNION OUTCOMES

“4,3” Æ| 1,4

CF

Ø

2,1 ¨ 3,2

Brezhnev’s perception of the U.S. strategy: Stay

The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols “Æ” and “Æ|” indicate the respective strategic choices of “move” or “stay” by the player with the next move given the initial state and TOM’s rule of play (Brams, 1994).

Figure 2.7: Brezhnev’s Subjective Game

41

A THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS

talks.46 The United States arms buildup underlined hard-line policies of confrontation and isolation.47 Détente appeared to have come to an end.48 Brezhnev died on November 10, 1982, and his successor Yuri Andropov entered office at a time of tense relationships. From the Soviet perspective, the United States “has chosen across the board not only to give priority to competition over collaboration and negotiations, but to give priority to military power” with the final goal of containing the Soviet Union.49 Andropov’s beliefs in Table 2.3 differ from those of the “average leader” in that he thinks that the political future is less predictable (P-3) and has a significantly higher propensity to shift between cooperative and conflictual tactics (I-4a). Despite an overall similarity with the norming group regarding the other operational code indices, Andropov’s beliefs indicate a tendency toward a conflictual stance.50 The aggregated scores for Andropov’s master beliefs are Self (I-1 = .30, P-4a = .15) and Other (P-1 = .21, P-4b = .27), which specify the preference ordering in Proposition 5 for Self and Other in TIP. Andropov’s operational code scores in the period between November 1982 and February 1984 defines a prisoner’s dilemma strategy that ranks domination over settlement over deadlock over submission for the Soviet Union and applies the same preference order to the United States. His subjective strategic game is mapped out in Figure 2.8. Andropov’s subjective game differs from that of his predecessor. The initial state of (1,4) represents his belief that policies of détente had been favored by the Soviet Union and were not reciprocated by the United States. In this classic prisoner’s dilemma game, according to TOM, each player obtains its next-best payoff (3) by choosing CO if the other player also chooses cooperation, but both have an incentive to defect from this state to obtain their best payoff (4) by choosing CF when the other player chooses

OTHER CO CF CO

3,3 Æ “1,4” ≠

SU CF

OTHER CO CF

Ø

4,1 |¨ 2,2

Andropov’s strategy: Move

OTHER CO CF

CO Settle Submit SU

CO

Ø

SU CF Dominate Deadlock SOVIET UNION OUTCOMES

3,3 |¨ “1,4”

CF

≠

4,1 Æ 2,2

Andropov’s perception of the U.S. strategy: Stay

The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each player. The symbols “Æ” and “Æ|” indicate the respective strategic choices of “move” or “stay” by the player with the next move given the initial state and TOM’s rule of play (Brams, 1994).

Figure 2.8: Andropov’s Subjective Game

42

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

CO.51 Both players could escape this “trap” and move to (3,3) if the player with the lower-ranked outcome would communicate a credible or compelling threat (such as in the Cuban missiles crisis) or if (subjective) perceptions of potential concessions existed. Since neither of these conditions was met, the choice of mutual defection by the Soviet Union and the United States came to be the (2,2) Nash equilibrium.52 Indeed, Andropov’s perception was that Reagan will choose to stay at (1,4). The prediction from TOM is thus that Andropov would “move” and engage in tactics of mutual punishment. Confirming Andropov’s perception, in December 1982, Reagan approved National Security Directive (NSDD)75 that established three objectives: “(1) to contain Soviet expansion and to moderate Soviet international behavior; (2) to encourage . . . change in the Soviet system toward greater liberalism . . . and (3) to negotiate agreements that were in the interest of the United States.”53 Increased American readiness to utilize military force in order to roll back revolutionary movements that were approved by the Soviet Union was seen in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Lebanon, and Grenada. Soviet-U.S. relations worsened further with the Soviet shooting of a Korean Airliner, KAL 007, on September 1, 1983.54 The only concession the Reagan administration initiated was negotiations in the field of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe. The proposed terms were rejected by the Andropov regime. When NATO deployment of Euromissiles began in November 1983, the Soviet Union broke off the ongoing talks. Strategic arms reduction talks (START) reached a similar fate. Both the Soviet Union and the United States “tried to get maximum reductions in the forces of the other side, but without being willing to make comparable sacrifices in their own forces and capabilities.”55 In December, the Soviet Union left the talks and the “year ended with AmericanSoviet relations severely strained.”56 Then the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States began to improve again. Andropov died on February 10, 1984, and, at his funeral, Vice President George Bush agreed with Andropov’s successor, Konstantin Chernenko, on the need to improve relations.57 Such an agreement is reflective of Chernenko’s beliefs that resemble those of the “average leader.” No significant differences for any of the operational code indices can be found in Table 2.3. The aggregated scores for Chernenko’s master beliefs are Self (I-1 = .39, P-4a = .15) and Other (P-1 = .25, P-4b = .27), which specify the preference ordering in Proposition 2 for Self and Other in TIP. Chernenko’s operational code in the period between 1984 and 1985 is an Assurance strategy that ranks settlement over deadlock over domination over submission. He applies a mirrored preference ordering to the United States. Chernenko’s subjective game with an initial state of (3,3) represents his beliefs that the two parties had deadlocked each other (see Fig. 2.9). However, his preference ordering indicates a belief that détente and settle-

43

A THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS OTHER CO CF CO

4,4 ¨ 1,2 Ø

SU CF

OTHER CO CF

≠

2,1 Æ “3,3”

Chernenko’s strategy: Move

OTHER CO CF

CO Settle Submit SU

CO

≠

SU CF Dominate Deadlock SOVIET UNION OUTCOMES

4,4 Æ| 1,2

CF

Ø

2,1 ¨ “3,3”

Chernenko’s perception of the U.S. strategy: Move

The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols “Æ” and “Æ|” indicate the respective strategic choices of “move” or “stay” by the player with the next move given the initial state and TOM’s rule of play (Brams, 1994).

Figure 2.9: Chernenko’s Subjective Game

ments could be revitalized.58 Chernenko’s subjective game, like Andropov’s, is symmetrical. However, here both parties obtain their best payoff by choosing CO. The prediction from TOM is that both sides would move toward (4,4) settlement and engage in more cooperative tactics combined with deescalatory moves. For their part, the Soviets “proposed resuming the mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) negotiations on conventional arms on March 16, thus indicating that the suspension of INF and START did not represent a Soviet policy of boycotting all arms control talks.”59 At the American Conference on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges on June 27, President Reagan reciprocated, as he “mentioned no fewer than sixteen proposals for agreements on cooperation in various areas—most of them renewals of earlier agreements.” On September 11, 1984, the Soviet Union and the United States resumed negotiations at the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in Stockholm. On January 7–8 1985, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Secretary of State George Schultz met in Geneva and concluded with an agreement on a formula for the scope of planned nuclear and space arms control talks (NST). According to the agreement, “three concurrent sets of negotiations would be held, dealing with strategic offensive arms reductions (START), intermediaterange missile forces (INF), and strategic defense and space weapons.”60 Although relations between the Soviet Union and the United States were “warming,” irritants were not eliminated in their international interactions. Among these were increasing frictions over the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative first articulated in 1983, contentions over Nicaragua, diplomatic expulsions, and the Soviet boycott of the Olympic Games in Los Angeles. However, despite these disturbances, a “policy of gradual normalization” prevailed.61

44

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

This summary of the years 1980–1985 is a rather cursory glance at events and policies that occurred between the United States and the Soviet Union. It nevertheless appears safe to conclude with some statements about prevailing tendencies for the time periods under review. In toto, the preGorbachev era was a period of ups and downs that coincided with alternating Soviet leadership.62 The Reagan administration’s challenge was met by Brezhnev’s efforts to maintain détente. When Andropov entered office, détente collapsed and both sides aimed to dominate the other, engaged in tactics that intended to compel the other, and initiated escalatory moves. Relations began to improve again after Andropov’s death. The Chernenko interregnum was marked by a strategy that aimed to stabilize Soviet-U.S. relations. Toward that end, both sides engaged in cooperative rather than conflictual tactics and de-escalatory moves.63 The strategies, tactics, and moves undertaken in the pre-Gorbachev era were to a large extent reflected in the beliefs of successive Soviet leaders. In the next chapter, I turn to the Gorbachev era and I will discuss the evolution in U.S.-Soviet relations and the difference Gorbachev made.

PART II

THE CASES

This page intentionally left blank.

CHAPTER THREE

GORBACHEV: UNCOMMITTED THINKER AND MOTIVATED LEARNER

The title of this chapter echoes Janice Stein’s argument that Soviet foreign policy after 1985 cannot be explained without reference to the impact of Gorbachev’s changing representation of international relations.1 According to Stein, Gorbachev was an uncommitted thinker and motivated learner because he was open to the ideas of foreign policy experts and ready to alter his beliefs in response to experience. Stein’s argument is part of a literature that emerged in the early 1990s in response to an intellectual vacuum after the end of the cold war. A common thread that ran through this literature was that plausible claims were made (such as that Gorbachev learned and that this mattered), but not effectively demonstrated. The goal in this chapter is to reveal the cognitive learning patterns of Gorbachev and relate them to the transformation in the foreign policy behavior of the Soviet Union after 1985. I will show how Gorbachev moved forward despite the intransigence of the United States and despite his perception that the latter would remain steadfast in its antagonistic course. Gorbachev would thereby violate the postulates of strategic rationality.

THE EARLY GORBACHEV ERA (1985-1986) When Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in March 1985, international politics in general and U.S.-Soviet relations in particular showed few signs that they were about to undergo fundamental change.2 Nobody could have foreseen the dramatic changes that were to follow and even today scholars are still engaging in an “autopsy” over the reasons for Soviet behavior in world politics after 1985.3 At the beginning of his tenure, Gorbachev’s intentions were reformist, but not transformative.4 In order to promote reform, he changed the balance 47

48

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

of influence and the balance of power in the Soviet decision-making apparatus.5 Gorbachev was further able “to have a decisive impact on the development of ideas on the Soviet Union’s relationship with the outside world and on the actual conduct of Soviet foreign policy by virtue of . . . key appointments.”6 Among these were, for example, the appointment of Eduard Shevardnadze as foreign minister. In his memoirs, Shevardnadze recalls that, at first, he was reluctant to accept the appointment because of his lack of experience. Shevardnadze also remembers Gorbachev’s response: “No experience? Well perhaps that’s a good thing. Our foreign policy needs a fresh eye, courage, dynamism, innovative approaches. I have no doubt that my choice is right.”7 Of importance was also the substitution of Boris Ponomarev as head of the International Department by Anatoly Dobryin, the promotion of Alexander Yakolev to Politburo and Secretariat membership, the substitution of Konstantin Rusakov as head of Socialist Countries Department of the Central Committee by Vadim Medvedev, along with the appointment of Georgy Shakhnazarow to the post of the First Deputy Head of that department. What all these and other members of the new elite under the leadership of Gorbachev shared in common was a homogeneous criticism of the Soviet system and a conviction of the need for changes and reforms.8 The extent of changes and reforms were rather modest at the beginning, however, and Gorbachev’s beliefs in the first year of his tenure did not promise more. When we compare Gorbachev’s beliefs to those of the “average leader” in Table 3.1 we note that there is nothing extraordinary about him. None of Gorbachev’s philosophical beliefs or any of his instrumental beliefs shows significant differences to the beliefs of the average leader. Also, a comparison with his predecessors reveals more continuity than change.9 The aggregated scores for Gorbachev’s master beliefs are Self (I-1 = .45, P-4a = .17) and Other (P-1 = .24, P-4b = .25), which specify the preference ordering in Proposition 2 for Self and Proposition 5 for Other in TIP. Gorbachev’s operational code in the period between 1985 and 1986 prescribes an Assurance strategy that ranks settlement over deadlock over domination over submission for the Soviet Union and attributes a prisoner’s dilemma strategy that ranks domination over settlement over deadlock over submission to the United States. Gorbachev’s subjective strategic game specified through the master beliefs of his operational code appears in Figure 3.1. The initial state of (3,2) in Gorbachev’s game represents the deadlock situation between the superpowers that was characteristic for much of the cold war era. Gorbachev’s subjective game leads to the expectation that Reagan should move form deadlock toward (4,3) settlement. If Gorbachev and Reagan had shared the same definition of their game, then Reagan would indeed move to (4,3) settlement; however, Gorbachev’s dilemma was precisely that Reagan did not define their game the same way. An analysis of Reagan’s subjective game shows that he perceived the Soviet Union to be

49

GORBACHEV

Table 3.1: Gorbachev’s Beliefs in 1985 Compared to the Average Leader Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs P-1. Nature of Political Universe (Conflict/Cooperation) P-2. Realization of Political Values (Pessimism/Optimism) P-3. Political Future (Unpredictable/Predictable) P-4. Historical Development (Low Control/High Control) P-5. Role of Chance (Small Role/Large Role) I-1. Strategic Approach to Goals (Conflict/Cooperation) I-2. Intensity of Tactics (Conflict/Cooperation) I-3. Risk Orientation (Averse/Acceptant) I-4. Timing of Action a. Conflict/Cooperation b. Words/Deeds I-5. Utility of Means a. Reward b. Promise c. Appeal/Support d. Oppose/Resist e. Threaten f. Punish

Gorbachev 1985* 0.217

Average Leader** 0.250

0.097

0.118

0.079

0.148

0.169

0.212

0.986

0.968

0.357

0.334

0.160

0.139

0.188

0.304

0.569 0.613

0.509 0.525

0.190 0.045 0.443 0.141 0.065 0.115

0.167 0.073 0.427 0.147 0.047 0.138

*n = 9. **n = 264 for P-1–P-5; n = 255 for I-1–I-5.

OTHER CO CF CO

4,3 |¨ 1,4 Ø

SU CF

OTHER CO CF

≠

2,1 Æ “3,2”

Gorbachev’s strategy: Stay

OTHER CO CF

CO Settle Submit SU

CO

≠

SU CF Dominate Deadlock SOVIET UNION OUTCOMES

4,3 Æ| 1,4

CF

Ø

2,1 ¨ “3,2”

Gorbachev’s perception of the U.S. strategy: Move

The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each player. The symbols “Æ” and “Æ|” indicate the respective strategic choices of “move” or “stay” by the player with the next move given the initial state and TOM’s rule of play (Brams, 1994).

Figure 3.1: Gorbachev’s Subjective Game (1985)

50

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

driven by hostile intentions. Reagan’s beliefs would not allow for mutual rapprochement. The aggregated scores for his master beliefs specify a prisoner’s dilemma strategy for both Self (I-1 = .30, P-4a = .26) and Other (P-1 = .20, P-4b = .16).10 Therefore, Reagan chose to stay at deadlock. For Gorbachev himself it would be irrational to “move” because a move to (1,4) from deadlock would leave Reagan no incentive to move any further. Calculations of strategic rationality would, therefore, predict that Gorbachev would “stay” at (3,2) and thereby reify the deadlock between the superpowers. This prediction proved false as Gorbachev declined to take a conflictual posture and instead shifted to a strategy of cooperation. It is here where we encounter the much-cited “Gorbachev phenomenon” as it relates to the international relations of the Soviet Union.11 In recognition of the forces that constitute security dilemmas, such as the one in which the Soviet Union and the United States had perceived themselves to be locked in, “are themselves ongoing effects of, not exogenous to the interaction,” Gorbachev aimed to change them.12 Gorbachev set out to demonstrate to the United States that its past perception of threat emanating from the Soviet Union was a social construction not warranted any longer. It became Gorbachev’s goal in the following years to deconstruct this construction. His foreign policy process vis-à-vis the United States took the form of a social process—“one of constructing and reconstructing self and social relationships.”13 Violating the rules of strategic rationality, Gorbachev chose to “move,” engaging in cooperative tactics combined with de-escalatory moves as he adopted a strategy of altercasting. The goal of the strategy was to reframe Reagan’s definition of the situation through enduring unilateral concessions. In other words, Gorbachev’s goal was to demonstrate to Reagan that his image of the Soviet Union was false. In his memoirs, Gorbachev recounted that in 1985, “the détente of the 1970s was . . . curtailed” and that what was needed to improve superpower relations was to “get rid of the force of habit in our thinking” and “to look at things with a fresh eye.”14 This was Gorbachev’s objective for both the United States and the Soviet Union. Table 3.2 highlights the main events in U.S.-Soviet relations during Gorbachev’s first year as secretary general, which are then discussed in detail. The first meeting of the Politburo after Gorbachev’s accession concluded that the Soviet Union would be ready and willing to concentrate efforts toward détente with the United States and other Western countries. Gorbachev remembered that this meeting was “a turning towards a new way of political thinking.”15 Working towards this goal and continuously violating the rules of strategic rationality, Gorbachev announced on April 7 a sixmonth unilateral moratorium on deployment of intermediate-range missiles (SS-20) in Europe and a moratorium on further deployment of SS-20s. On April 17, Gorbachev went further and proposed a moratorium on all nuclear weapon testing.16 However, none of these initiatives was reciprocated by the

51

GORBACHEV Table 3.2: Main Events in U.S.-Soviet Relations in 1985 Month

Soviet Union

March

Gorbachev announces that Soviet Union (SU) would work toward détente.

United States

April

Gorbachev announces unilateral moratorium on SS-20. Gorbachev proposes moratorium on all nuclear weapon testing.

June

July

Reagan assaults communism as a political system. Gorbachev announces that SU would stop nuclear testing until January 1, 1986.

August

U.S. conducts nuclear tests. Reagan stresses U.S. determination to develop SDI further. U.S. test-launches MX missile.

September

November

Gorbachev proposes 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms.

U.S. conducts nuclear tests and commissions battleship USS Iowa into the Baltic Sea.

Geneva Summit

United States. It rejected them in toto, and instead pushed ahead vigorously with the development of SDI. A general disharmony in Soviet-U.S. relations at the time was then interrupted by a few signs of improvement. Soon after a meeting of secretaries of state George Shultz and Anatoly Gromyko, Gorbachev met with U.S. Secretary of Commerce Baldrige and reportedly said that it was “high time to defrost the potential of Soviet-American cooperation.” Baldridge described the purpose of this meeting as not only to restore high-level trade contacts but also as “part of President Reagan’s effort to seek a more constructive working relationship with the Soviet Union.”17 In subsequent weeks, meetings on regional issues were held at the deputy minister–assistant secretary level, and although no breakthroughs were reached, “the continuing quiet political dialogue . . . was recognized as useful by both sides.”18 Talks at the leader level were announced to follow at a summit in Geneva on November 19–20. However, these positive signs soon experienced reversal. Until the Geneva summit, the general tendency was one of Soviet initiatives coupled with American contentions.

52

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

This contentious position was, for example, articulated in mid-June when President Reagan declared that the United States would “demonstrate that communism is not the wave of the future,” that the United States would “prevent the further expansion of totalitarianism throughout the world,” and that the United States would “show the captive nations that resisting totalitarianism is possible.”19 This antagonistic tone was joined by other administration leaders such as CIA Director William Casey, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinebrger, and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Michael Armacost. The month ended with U.S. plans to expel Soviet diplomats and to reduce the number of Soviet citizens employed by the American embassy in Moscow.20 Despite this conflictual rhetoric, Gorbachev intended to “pave the way by creating a more favorable climate” in Soviet-U.S. relations and announced in a statement on July 30 that the Soviet Union would unilaterally stop nuclear testing until January 1.21 He also invited reciprocation, as he promised that “the moratorium would remain in effect beyond that date if the United States also refrained from testing. The Soviets then halted all nuclear tests.”22 Gorbachev’s hope was and remained that the United States would ultimately reciprocate. Since April, when the United States first rejected Soviet proposals, the Reagan administration did not change its attitude. Instead of reciprocating, the United States “decided to counter the burgeoning Gorbachev peace offensive by a rebuttal, rather than competition or engagement.”23 Almost provocatively, on August 17 the United States conducted nuclear tests. The following week experienced further escalations of hostile U.S activities. After the announcement of a Shevardnadze–Reagan meeting for September, national security adviser McFarlane expressed pessimism that “even incremental improvements” could be reached in U.S.-Soviet relations.24 On the following day, Reagan “notified Congress that the United States would soon carry out the first live tests of an antisatellite missile . . . [and] stressed U.S. determination to continue SDI.” Still one day later, the United States accused the Soviets of using chemical dust (“spy dust”) to track U.S. diplomats in Moscow—a charge that was vehemently denied. On August 25, deeds followed words as the United States for the first time test-launched its MX missile from an underground silo. Despite vehement Soviet protests, missile and laser tests continued in September, and culminated in a U.S. announcement regarding the creation of a U.S. space command to coordinate all military systems in space.25 Gorbachev’s “peace initiative” continued. In a Time magazine interview at the end of August, he acknowledged the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations and, despite this, argued in favor of the Soviet moratorium. The negative U.S. responses he attributed to “confusion and uncertainty . . . [and] anxiety” in the American government. Gorbachev went even further in September when he submitted a letter to Reagan through Shevardnadze in

GORBACHEV

53

which he proposed reductions of 50 percent in strategic offensive arms to a number of 6000 nuclear warheads, accompanied by an agreement not to develop, test, or deploy “space-strike weapons.”26 Any concession on SDI, however, was not only elusive but out of the question for Reagan. On the same day that Shevardnadze met with Reagan, the United States conducted another nuclear test and soon afterward, in an unprecedented move, sent the battleship USS Iowa (armed with long-range cruise missiles) into the Baltic Sea. Further U.S. moves of escalation followed in November through a unilateral reinterpretation of a key provision of the ABM Treaty. National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane disclosed that the administration considers the ABM Treaty to permit the development and testing of space-based ABM systems and components—“heretofore believed banned by the treaty.”27 This reinterpretation was controversial to the degree that even U.S. allies such as West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher would contest it.28 The protest motivated Reagan to defer, but not diffuse the issue. By the time of the Geneva summit, the Soviets looked back on, from their point of view, a disappointing record of Soviet initiatives and U.S. contentions. Gorbachev’s hope was to “move” Reagan from a rather uncompromising stance (especially regarding SDI) through personal discussions.29 In his memoirs, Gorbachev remembers, “We viewed the Geneva meeting realistically, without grand expectations, yet we hoped to lay the foundations for a serious dialogue in the future.”30 While Gorbachev failed to move Reagan much in Geneva, as history would show, he would indeed succeed in laying the foundations for more farreaching discussions in the future. At the summit, the two leaders agreed on reducing strategic arms by 50 percent (“in principle”) and on negotiations that were to follow regarding a prospective INF agreement. Also, both sides stated that a nuclear war is a non-option. A joint statement contained the following text: The sides having discussed key security issues, and conscious of the special responsibility of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. for maintaining peace, have agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Recognizing that any conflict between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. could have catastrophic consequences, they emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority.31 After the meeting, President Reagan spoke of a “fresh start” in U.S.Soviet relations and of “heading in the right direction.”32 Despite a failure regarding the SDI issue, Gorbachev concluded that “the meeting was necessary

54

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

and useful.”33 Relations after the summit did improve somewhat. For example, on November 23, the United States and Soviet Union agreed to resume direct airline flights connecting New York and Washington with Moscow and Leningrad.34 And, on December 23, Reagan stated that the United States would continue to adhere to the SALT II provisions after the expiration of the unratified treaty at the end of the year.35 At the same time, however, U.S. nuclear testing and SDI research continued, and in a report to Congress, Reagan accused the Soviet Union of various violations of arms control agreements. The Geneva summit, in short, while carrying some promising signs, did not usher in a new détente as Gorbachev had anticipated.36 Later Gorbachev recounted that “we always knew that nothing would change by itself and that it required a good deal of initiative to continue what had been achieved.”37 Reagan, in the mind of Gorbachev, “was a man you could do business with.”38 The turning point in Soviet-U.S. relations would then indeed be reached later—after October 1986 in a second summit meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan in Reykjavik, Iceland. Nicholas Oberdofer summarizes the year 1986, arguing that: it would be pivotal for Mikhail Gorbachev’s foreign policy. Early, in the new year, the General Secretary would begin actively transforming it, first with a set of lofty goals for elimination of nuclear weapons and then with a revision of national policy and ideological doctrine presented to the Twenty-seventh Communist Party Congress. . . . For decades Moscow’s positions had seemed utterly inflexible, set in concrete. Gorbachev would set out to change all that. In 1986 he would be a man in motion, managing to a remarkable degree to take initiative in world affairs as no world leader had done before him.39 This assessment is reflected in a comparison of Gorbachev’s beliefs with the average world leader in the left half of Table 3.3. In 1986 (period 2), Gorbachev’s strategic approach to goals and intensity of tactics are significantly more cooperative (I-1, I-2) when compared to the average leader. He had a significantly lower propensity to shift between cooperative and conflictual tactics (I-4a), while at the same time he ascribed a significantly higher utility to promise tactics (I-5b). Gorbachev was thus in a process of distinguishing himself from normalcy and, over time, would, in fact, become an extraordinary leader. Along with his differentiation from the average leader came a differentiation from himself as shown in the right columns of the table. In 1986, Gorbachev’s beliefs differentiated themselves in the same direction with respect to these same indices as in the above comparisons. Additionally, in 1986, he ascribed significantly less utility to punish tactics (I-5f) than in 1985. Gorbachev thus engaged in experiential learning and this should lead to an

0.226

Nature of Political Universe (Conflict/Cooperation)

Realization of Political Values (Pessimism/Optimism)

Political Future (Unpredictable/Predictable)

Historical Development (Low Control/High Control)

Role of Chance (Small Role/Large Role)

Strategic Approach to Goals (Conflict/Cooperation)

Intensity of Tactics (Conflict/Cooperation)

Risk Orientation (Averse/Acceptant)

Timing of Action a. Conflict/Cooperation b. Words/Deeds

Utility of Means a. Reward b. Promise c. Appeal/Support d. Oppose/Resist e. Threaten f. Punish

P-1.

P-2.

P-3.

P-4.

P-5.

I-1.

I-2.

I-3.

I-4.

I-5.

0.139

0.350c

0.167 0.073 0.427 0.147 0.047 0.138

0.509 0.525

0.190 0.045 0.443 0.141 0.065 0.115

0.569 0.613

0.188

0.160

0.357

0.986

0.169

0.079

0.097

0.217

Period 1*

Significant differences between indices at the following levels: ap ≤ .01, bp ≤ .04, cp ≤ .05, dp ≤ .07, ep ≤ .10 (two-tailed test). *n = 9. **n = 264 for P-1–P-5, 255 for I-1–I-5.

0.180 0.142d 0.508 0.092 0.018 0.058

0.336e 0.481

0.304

0.334

0.664b

0.253

0.968

0.212

0.148

0.118

0.250

Avg. Leader**

0.984

0.167

0.091

0.117

Period 2*

Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs

Table 3.3: Learning Patterns of Gorbachev from 1985 to 1986

0.180 0.142a 0.508 0.092 0.018 0.058e

0.336c 0.481

0.253

0.350c

0.664b

0.984

0.167

0.091

0.117

0.226

Period 2*

GORBACHEV 55

56

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

engagement in increasingly cooperative tactics. This prediction would be validated over the course of the next months. Upon his return from Geneva to Moscow, Gorbachev charged the foreign and defense ministries and a group of scientists and security experts with using the results of the Geneva summit to develop an arms control initiative before the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress that was scheduled for the end of February.40 The congress would mark the first “grand articulation” of the new thinking and a fundamental break with the past. In the days and weeks prior to the congress, Shevardnadze remembers in his memoirs that he “detected [Gorbachev’s] thoughts moving in completely uncharted and, frankly, dangerous direction. It was dangerous from the viewpoint of the exponents and defenders of those dogmas that had prevailed for decades.”41 However, when the congress opened on February 25, Gorbachev’s leadership position was sufficiently consolidated and it remained unchallenged. Garthoff explains that “even before the party congress, as well as in changes attendant on the formal election of new leading party officials by the congress, Gorbachev and his allies effectively ‘packed’ the key party Secretariat and removed most of his opponents . . . from the Politburo.”42 The congress then represented probably the first (public) instance in which Gorbachev “identified himself with a new concept of security alien to traditional Soviet thinking.”43 In his Report to the Twenty-seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev said: Security cannot be built endlessly on fear of retaliation, in other words, on the doctrines of “containment” or “deterrence.” . . . In the context of the relations between the USSR and the USA, security can only be mutual, and if we take international relations as a whole it can only be universal. The highest wisdom is not caring exclusively for oneself, especially to the detriment of the other side. It is vital that all should feel equally secure. . . . In the military sphere we intend to act in such a way as to give nobody grounds for fear, even imagined ones, about their security.44 Gorbachev’s report may be considered the rhetorical turning point in Soviet-U.S. relations that was to be followed by a behavioral turn.45 It is worthwhile to take a closer look at its “character.” Filtering out the novelty, Raymond Garthoff writes: The new element that dominated the report, in its discussion of the contemporary world and of Soviet policy, was global interdependence and the need for stable and mutual international security. The structure of the discussion, as well as the content, reflected this change in thinking. Instead of reflecting the image of Stalin’s clash of two worlds, or even discussing separate socialist, develop-

GORBACHEV

57

ing countries and Western capitalist worlds, the discussion was about one world.46 Most important, Gorbachev argued that “one cannot resolve . . . global problems . . . by the efforts of any one state. . . . For this cooperation on a global scale is required.” He also emphasized that security between the Soviet Union and the United States can only be mutual, and “if one takes international relations as a whole, can only be universal.” He continued to say that the two superpowers “have not a few common interests, and there is the objective imperative to live in the world at peace with one another, and to compete on an equal and mutually advantageous basis—but only equal and mutually advantageous.” Gorbachev’s foreign minister Shevardnadze shared Gorbachev’s mindset. He later remembered: Our guidelines were precise: to stop the preparation for nuclear war; to move Soviet-American relations onto a track of normal, civilized dialog; to reject the dead, brutally rigid positions in favor of intelligent, mutually acceptable compromises; to move our affairs toward a balance of interests; to strive for the confinement of military capabilities to the level of reasonable sufficiency; to confirm the principle of comprehensive control and verification; to seek ways to end nuclear tests and dismantle the American and Soviet intermediate range missiles in Europe; to bring Soviet troops out of Afghanistan; to create a security system in Europe on the basis of the Helsinki process, radically cutting nuclear and conventional arms; to defuse regional conflicts, to normalize relations with China; to build relations with our neighbors on a basis of respect of their interests and the principles of noninterference in their internal affairs; to concern ourselves with global problems. All this had to be embodied in a practical policy.47 The Soviet leadership’s talk about the “universality of international relations,” “common interests,” “mutual advantages,” “balance of interest,” and “reasonable sufficiency” indicates a desire for a departure from what international relation scholars would denote as realist power politics.48 The rhetorical departure by necessity preceded the behavioral departure. William Connolly writes that all politics is a linguistically constituted activity and argues that “the language of politics is not a neutral medium that conveys ideas independently formed; it is an institutional structure of meanings that channels political thought and action in certain directions.”49 From such a perspective, “Speaking a language involves taking on a world, and altering the concepts constitutive of the language involves nothing less than remaking the world.”50 This is what Gorbachev set out to do—to remake not only the Soviet Union, but the world surrounding it—to change the culture of anarchy. He

58

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

was convinced that anarchy would not necessarily lead to conflictual international relations as much of conventional relations theory would have it. Gorbachev was to prove this in subsequent years. He himself recounted later that “adversaries must become partners and start looking jointly for a way to achieve universal security.”51 Because the United States remained recalcitrant, the best way to initiate this process, in the mind of Gorbachev, was not through the reciprocation of hostilities but through continuous, unilateral gestures.

THE SECOND YEAR OF THE GORBACHEV ERA (FEBRUARY 1986–JANUARY 1987) In the period between February 1986 and January 1987 the aggregated scores for Gorbachev’s master beliefs are Self (I-1 = .60, P-4a = .19) and Other (P1 = .24, P-4b = .23). These scores specify the preference ordering in Proposition 2 for Self and Proposition 5 for Other in TIP. Gorbachev’s operational code continued to prescribe an Assurance strategy that ranks settlement over deadlock over domination over submission and attribute a prisoner’s dilemma strategy that ranks domination over settlement over deadlock over submission to the United States. Gorbachev’s subjective strategic game appears in Figure 3.2. Gorbachev’s subjective game with an initial state of (1,4) represents his disappointment with the Geneva summit, which did not lead to the emergence of a new détente despite repeated Soviet efforts. When in danger of being dominated, calculations of strategic rationality would predict that Gorbachev would reciprocate, assume a conflictual posture by moving to (3,2), and seek a settlement (4,3) from there. This prediction proved false. Gorbachev continued declining to take a conflictual posture—even as a transition tactic toward the settlement outcome. OTHER CO CF CO

4,3 Æ “1,4” ≠

SU CF

OTHER CO CF

Ø

2,1 |¨ 3,2

Gorbachev’s strategy: Move

OTHER CO CF

CO Settle Submit SU

CO

Ø

SU CF Dominate Deadlock SOVIET UNION OUTCOMES

4,3 |¨ “1,4”

CF

≠

2,1 Æ 3,2

Gorbachev’s perception of the U.S. strategy: Stay

The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each player. The symbols “Æ” and “Æ|” indicate the respective strategic choices of “move” or “stay” by the player with the next move given the initial state and TOM’s rule of play (Brams, 1994).

Figure 3.2: Gorbachev’s Subjective Game (1986)

59

GORBACHEV

Again, contrary to strategically rational prescriptions that would follow from TOM—namely, to exercise “threat power”—Gorbachev chose an “irrational” cooperative strategy. According to TOM, Gorbachev in a prior communication should threaten to move to (3,2) deadlock, in an effort to induce Reagan to move from (1,4) domination to (4,3) settlement in order to avoid the Pareto-inferior outcome of (3,2) deadlock.52 However, the historical record indicates that Gorbachev chose to “stay” at (1,4) and used promises and proposals rather than threats to induce Reagan to move to settlement (4,3). Gorbachev thereby maintained his strategy of altercasting. He continued in his attempt to communicate to Reagan that his view of the Soviet Union was fallacious. Gorbachev was convinced that “all of us face the need to learn to live at peace in this world, to work out a new mode of thinking, for conditions today are quite different from what they were.”53 He continued to engage in cooperative efforts despite his anticipation that the United States may still not follow suit. In fact, in his memoirs, Gorbachev recounts a “setback after Geneva.” In his perception, “the general public throughout the world showed genuine interest in the ‘new thinking’ presented at the XXVIIth Party Congress.” However, “Top officials in Washington, who set the tone for the West, openly denounced our declaration. In addition to allegedly ‘lacking seriousness,’ this move of ours was seen as a dangerous attempt to improve Moscow’s prestige at the expense of Washington.”54 Table 3.4 summarizes the main events in Soviet-U.S. relations in 1986 and 1987. At times, it appeared that Gorbachev’s pessimistic anticipation about the United States was exaggerated. The superpowers engaged in some mutually

Table 3.4: Main Events in U.S.-Soviet Relations from February 1986 to January 1987 Month

Soviet Union

United States

March

Gorbachev renews nuclear testing moratorium.

Reagan criticizes Moscow’s policies toward the developing world and authorizes funds for covert military assistance.

April

Gorbachev offers substantial reductions of conventional forces in Europe.

U.S. conducts nuclear tests.

June

Gorbachev concedes toleration for laboratory research on SDI.

Reagan advocates materialization of SDI.

October

At the Reykjavik summit, Gorbachev proposes a significant cut in strategic weapons. Both sides reach some not very far-reaching agreements.

60

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

cooperative moves, according to the agreements of the Geneva summit. Soviet and U.S. regional experts met from March through September to discuss issues of contention regarding southern Africa, East and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. At the same time, scientific experts from both sides met to discuss the banning of chemical weapons and hold talks on prospective nuclear risk reduction centers. Further cooperation was achieved on cultural and educational matters. For the most part, however, Gorbachev’s anticipation was not exaggerated, but realistic. The altercasting prediction that follows from Gorbachev’s preferences is that he would continuously engage in increasingly cooperative tactics while Reagan would “stay” at the initial state of domination. In March, the U.S. battleships USS Yorktown and USS Caron entered Soviet territorial waters in the Crimean Sea.55 Progress regarding cooperation was further disturbed by Reagan’s rhetoric accompanying the U.S. bombing of Libya that “seemed to fit an ominous pattern of new muscle flexing by the American military.”56 Ignoring ongoing talks on regional matters, on March 21, Reagan accused Moscow of a “continuing horror of the Soviet attempt to subjugate Afghanistan,” and authorized “another $300-plus million in ‘covert’ military assistance.”57 A few days later, Attorney General Edwin Meese joined Reagan’s conflictual rhetoric, as he accused the Soviet Union of “torture, rape and toxic gas, of famine, of scorched earth and genocide” while attempting “to dominate the entire world.”58 The United States indeed appeared to be foreclosed to a rapprochement of the superpowers, while Gorbachev remained faithful that it could be reached. He had recognized early on and was aware that Soviet presence and actions in Afghanistan could not be justified. In February, he had described Afghanistan as a “bleeding wound” and initiated plans for the Soviet withdrawal. He was disappointed that his admission of Soviet failures and plans for change were not acknowledged by the leadership in the United States. In his memoirs, Gorbachev recounts his commitment that the Soviet Union should not “obstinately try to counter” American provocations, “which would only serve the purpose of . . . hawks [in the United States].” Instead Gorbachev believed that “we must steadfastly continue our dialogue, pressing the West to reciprocate our moves.”59 Gorbachev recollects further: We could not accept the American ‘no’ to our consistent efforts to achieve a rapprochement of positions and hammer out a reasonable compromise. We knew what we needed was a breakthrough. . . . Then came the idea of holding an interim Soviet-American summit in order to give a really powerful impetus to the cause of nuclear disarmament, to overcome the dangerous tendencies and to swing events in the right direction. The US President accepted our initiative, which seemed quite inspiring. That was how the way was paved for the Reykjavik summit in October 1986.60

GORBACHEV

61

Until the summit in Reykjavik, Gorbachev persisted with cooperative initiatives. At the end of March, he renewed the nuclear testing moratorium under the provision that the United States would follow suit. His offer, Gorbachev remembered later, was “the result of a serious study of numerous appeals to the Soviet leadership from various intellectuals from other countries.”61 Gorbachev’s move remained unreciprocated, however, as the United States engaged in a new nuclear weapons test on April 4. The Soviets had to conclude that the United States was not only not interested in any concessions regarding SDI, but also remained uncompromising on nuclear testing issues. “The picture looked bleak,” Garthoff concludes, “but the Soviet leadership was not giving up on prospects for developing relations.”62 Later that month Gorbachev engaged in “a serious offer of negotiations” regarding a “substantial reduction” of conventional forces in Europe to be verified through on-site inspections.63 He also anchored the Warsaw Pact in this proposal, as he suggested the establishment of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) as a new security forum. Furthermore, he initiated a development in Soviet military doctrine toward “defensive principles” and a “balance of military forces at the lowest possible levels,” combined with the “reduction of military potentials to the limits necessary for defense.”64 More specifically, the proposal called for mutual force reductions of 100,000 to 150,000 troops within a period of two years, to be then followed by additional reductions of 350,000 to 400,000 troops. In addition to these cuts, Gorbachev proposed a “reduction of “operational-tactical nuclear arms with a range of up to 1,000 km,” which posed a major concern to West European NATO allies such as Great Britain and France. These moves of Gorbachev came despite Reagan’s May confirmation of Secretary Weinberger’s earlier announcement that SALT II is “dead.”65 Gorbachev still kept pushing. At his report to the Central Committee on June 16, he conceded a toleration for “laboratory research” regarding SDI—an unprecedented move on this issue. Another move of this kind followed when he suggested setting INF systems, apart from ICBMs and SLBMs, at a zero level in Europe pertaining to the Soviet Union and the United States and not to other NATO states such as Britain and France.66 Reagan’s reaction was positive in general, attributing “a serious effort to the Soviets,” but nevertheless advocating the realization of SDI without any signs of compromise. Instead, he advanced a proposal containing the suggestion to eliminate all ballistic missiles, which, because of heavy Soviet reliance on missiles, was not acceptable to Gorbachev.67 In sum, the signs before the Reykjavik summit were not much different from the signs before the Geneva summit. While Soviet-U.S. relations had improved somewhat, the relationship was still marked by Soviet initiatives and U.S. contention.68 Garthoff writes that as the Reykjavik summit approached,“it became clear that although Reagan was prepared to negotiate on his own terms, he was not disposed to seek a real compromise. . . . He was

62

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

prepared for a summit with or without an arms agreement, and he would gain . . . either by showing that the Soviets had accepted his position or that they had not and that he would stand firm until they did.”69 For Gorbachev, however, arms control agreements were one of the cornerstones in his larger agenda. In his memoirs, he writes: “Pondering the question of what stands in the way of good Soviet-American relations, one arrives at the conclusion that, for the most part, it is the arms race.”70 Taking the initiative at the first meeting in Reykjavik, Gorbachev laid it out in the form of a comprehensive set of proposals regarding strategic arms, intermediate range missiles, and space weapons. He kept urging a mutual moratorium on nuclear testing, although he did not insist on an immediate implementation, as he did previously. His agenda carried unprecedented concessions as he accepted, for example, an equal 50 percent cut in ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.71 He went further and also agreed to include a cut in the Soviet heavy (SS-18) missiles in his proposal. Furthermore, he agreed “to exclude all American forward-based shorter-range systems capable of striking the Soviet Union from the ‘strategic forces’ to be counted and limited.”72 With regard to space weapons and defensive systems, the Soviet side moderated their initial demand from a fifteen-year nonwithdrawal commitment from the ABM Treaty to ten years. Gorbachev reiterated his concession about SDI laboratory research. On INF, he reiterated his zero-level suggestion, but also went further as he dropped his earlier demand that French and British weapons should be frozen at existing levels. Reagan’s position was much more shallow. Reagan was able to accept the zero Soviet and U.S. INF missiles in Europe, which was not a real concession because NATO allies were in a position to maintain their missiles. On SDI and space weapon testing, he remained stubborn and uncompromising. He was prepared to consider a ten-year period regarding a nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty, as suggested by Gorbachev. He conditioned it, however, by the call for an agreement with the provision that at the end of the period each side would legitimately be able to deploy ABM defenses. Gorbachev and his team were frustrated. In their mind, the ABM Treaty was supposed to last for an unlimited time in the first place. “They envisaged the purpose of a ten-year commitment as a reinforcement, not as a grace period before withdrawal.”73 In Reykjavik, the two superpowers reached near-agreements on the elimination of nuclear weapons, an elimination of Soviet and U.S. INF missiles in Europe, and the prospect of elimination of all ballistic missiles. These agreements did not include British and French cuts, and an elimination of ballistic missiles would disadvantage the Soviet Union to a considerably larger extent than the United States. Given that the latter would make no concession regarding SDI, which was a major concern of the Soviet side (and to which Gorbachev had bound his INF concessions), the Soviet hope for a quid pro

GORBACHEV

63

quo was disappointed. While the Soviet Union had moved, the United States for the most part balked.74 The conclusion of the hundreds of journalists, just before Gorbachev’s final press conference after the negotiations, was that the superpower summit had failed. Shevardnadze expected Gorbachev to say “one can’t deal with the U.S. administration.”75 Gorbachev, however, “managed to find much that was positive” and chose to describe the Soviet position and the U.S. responses as “constructive.”76 Nevertheless, in the summit’s immediate aftermath, Soviet-U.S. relations and prospects for accord did not improve much. A follow-up meeting between Shultz and Shevardnadze on November 5–6 in Vienna, which had the purpose of concluding near-agreements from Reykjavik, was “completely unsuccessful.”77 At the end of the year, Soviet-U.S. relations were in a “slump.”78 When the United States nevertheless suggested an exchange of televised greetings between the two leaders, the Soviets considered it propagandistic. Foreign ministry spokesman Gennady Gerasimiov asked: “Why should we create any illusions about our relations?”79 Gorbachev was disappointed as well. In his recollections, he writes that all the “obvious and encouraging manifestations of the new thinking are being countered by militarism and the political attitudes linked with it, which have so dangerously lagged behind the sweeping changes taking place internationally.”80 Although Gorbachev’s initiatives were not reciprocated by Reagan, his new thinking “made inroads in American public opinion and among the domestic opponents of Reagan’s hard-line foreign policy.”81 It was the mounting pressure from this arena that would soon serve as a stimulus for Reagan to reevaluate his stance toward the Soviet Union.82 This was a purposive strategy of Gorbachev and he remembers in his memoirs, “I started thinking how I could meet American people outside the official events. We eventually managed to organize meetings with influential American citizens—leading publishers, editors and businessman.”83 Other stimuli would emanate from the replacement of Defense Secretary Weinberger and Assistant Defense Secretary Pearle—both hawkish toward the Soviet Union—with less doctrinaire figures and from further interaction with the Soviet Union in which the latter would push increasingly toward cooperation.84

This page intentionally left blank.

CHAPTER FOUR

GORBACHEV: COMMITTED TEACHER AND REFORMER

In the new year, Gorbachev remained “committed to change,” although he was frustrated by the “slow U.S. response.” Despite his frustration, he insisted that Reykjavik “was a breakthrough,” commenting that “we have never come so close to accord before” and that it “allowed us for the first time to look over the horizon.”1 Gorbachev experienced failures of his preceding efforts and set out for new trials. In response to his failures, he would “expand his schema and his scripts for action” even further.2 He was and remained motivated to learn not only how to achieve goals but also about his general worldview.3 In his memoirs, Gorbachev wrote, “We realized that it was vitally important to correct the distorted ideas we had about other nations.” In this period, Gorbachev also remembered later, “We were gradually freeing ourselves of stereotyped thinking and the habit of blaming everything on the ‘imperialist Western states.’ ”4 In this chapter, I will argue that Gorbachev performed not only as a motivated learner, but also as a committed teacher. Gorbachev appears to have succeeded in reconstructing the image the United States held of the Soviet Union and thereby the mutual relationship between the two superpowers. I will demonstrate how Gorbachev’s strategy of altercasting succeeded, as he gradually induced cooperative U.S. moves.

GORBACHEV INDUCES U.S. COOPERATION (1987–1988) The conclusions made about Gorbachev’s learning patterns so far are confirmed by Gorbachev himself in his memoirs when he wrote, “In the two and a half years which have passed since April 1985, we have gone a long way in comprehending the world situation and ways to change it for the better.”5 In 1987, Gorbachev distinguished himself increasingly from the average leader. 65

66

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

The comparison between Gorbachev in the time period 1987–1988 (period 3) and the average leader in Table 4.1 shows significant differences with respect to various philosophical and instrumental beliefs. Compared to the average leader, Gorbachev views the political universe in significantly more cooperative terms (P-1). Moreover, Gorbachev is significantly more optimistic about the realization of his political values (P2), and he considers the political future to be less predictable (P-3). In the realm of instrumental beliefs, Gorbachev’s strategic approach to goals and intensity of tactics are significantly more cooperative (I-1, I-2). He had a significantly lower propensity to shift between cooperative and conflictual tactics (I-4a), and he ascribed a higher utility to Appeal and Support tactics (I-5c) while he discarded the utility of Punish tactics (I-5f).6 The analysis in Table 4.2 reveals that Gorbachev also engaged in experiential learning. A look at the left part of the table reveals that in this

Table 4.1: Gorbachev in 1987–1988 Compared to the Average Leader Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs

Time Period 3*

Average Leader**

P-1.

Nature of Political Universe (Conflict/Cooperation)

0.452b

0.250

P-2.

Realization of Political Values (Pessimism/Optimism)

0.247c

0.118

P-3.

Political Future (Unpredictable/Predictable)

0.143d

0.148

P-4.

Historical Development (Low Control/High Control)

0.197

0.212

P-5.

Role of Chance (Small Role/Large Role)

0.971

0.968

I-1.

Strategic Approach to Goals (Conflict/Cooperation)

0.686a

0.334

I-2.

Intensity of Tactics (Conflict/Cooperation)

0.330b

0.139

I-3.

Risk Orientation (Averse/Acceptant)

0.323

0.304

I-4.

Timing of Action a. Conflict/Cooperation b. Words/Deeds

0.315b 0.417

0.509 0.525

Utility of Means a. Reward b. Promise c. Appeal/Support d. Oppose/Resist e. Threaten f. Punish

0.160 0.085 0.596a 0.098 0.013 0.045c

0.167 0.073 0.427 0.147 0.047 0.138

I-5.

Significant differences between indices at the following levels: ap ≤ .01, bp ≤ .02, ≤ .10, (two-tailed test). *n = 15. **n = 264 for P-1–P-5, 255 for I-1–I-5.

c

p ≤ .05, dp

0.226

Nature of Political Universe (Conflict/Cooperation)

Realization of Political Values (Pessimism/Optimism)

Political Future (Unpredictable/Predictable)

Historical Development (Low Control/High Control)

Role of Chance (Small Role/Large Role)

Strategic Approach to Goals (Conflict/Cooperation)

Intensity of Tactics (Conflict/Cooperation)

Risk Orientation (Averse/Acceptant)

Timing of Action a. Conflict/Cooperation b. Words/Deeds

Utility of Means a. Reward b. Promise c. Appeal/Support d. Oppose/Resist e. Threaten f. Punish

P-1.

P-2.

P-3.

P-4.

P-5.

I-1.

I-2.

I-3.

I-4.

I-5.

0.160 0.085 0.596h 0.098 0.013 0.045

0.315 0.417

0.323

0.330

0.686

0.190 0.045 0.443 0.141 0.065 0.115

0.569 0.613

0.188

0.160

0.357

0.986

0.079

0.143e

0.971i

0.097

0.247c

0.169

0.217

0.452c

0.197

Period 1*

Period 3**

0.160 0.085i 0.596d 0.098 0.013i 0.045d

0.315b 0.417g

0.323i

0.330d

0.686b

0.971f

0.197

0.143c

0.247b

0.452a

Period 3**

Significant differences between indices at the following levels: ap ≤ .002, bp ≤ .004, cp ≤ .005, dp ≤ .02, ep ≤ .03, fp ≤ .05, gp ≤ .06, hp ≤ .08, ip ≤ .10 (twotailed test). *n = 9. **n = 15.

0.180 0.142 0.508 0.092 0.018 0.058

0.336 0.481

0.253

0.350

0.664

0.984

0.167

0.091

0.117

Period 2*

Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs

Table 4.2: Learning Patterns of Gorbachev

GORBACHEV: COMMITTED TEACHER AND REFORMER 67

68

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

period he views the political universe in much more cooperative terms (P-1) than in 1986 (period 2). Compared to the previous year, in this period he is also significantly more optimistic about the realization of his political values (P-2) and considers the political future to be much more predictable (P-3). Finally, he ascribes a significantly smaller role to Chance (P-5). With respect to instrumental beliefs, in the period 1987–1988, he ascribes significantly more utility to Appeal tactics than in the previous period (I-5c). The right part of Table 4.2 uses Gorbachev’s beliefs of the year 1985 (period 1) as a baseline for a comparison with his beliefs in the period 1987– 1988. As expected, this comparison demonstrates a comprehensive experiential learning pattern for Gorbachev; that is, his beliefs experienced change with respect to four of five philosophical beliefs and nine of eleven instrumental beliefs. Beyond his experiential learning process, Gorbachev also engaged in cognitive strategic learning at the diagnostic level as the change in one of his master beliefs (P-1) was sufficient to alter his perception of the U.S. game in the period 1987–1988 (period 3). His beliefs now indicated a mutually cooperative stance between the superpowers in the period between 1987 and 1988. The scores for Gorbachev’s master beliefs are Self (I-1 = .66, P-4a = .20) and Other (P-1 = .48, P-4b = .21), which specify the preference ordering in Proposition 2 for Self and Other in TIP. Gorbachev’s operational code for this period prescribes an Assurance strategy that ranks settlement over deadlock over domination over submission. He applies a mirrored preference ordering to the United States. His subjective game for this period is mapped out in Figure 4.1.

OTHER CO CF CO

4,4 Æ| “1,2” ≠

SU CF

OTHER CO CF

Ø

2,1 ¨ 3,3

Gorbachev’s strategy: Move

OTHER CO CF

CO Settle Submit SU

CO

Ø

SU CF Dominate Deadlock SOVIET UNION OUTCOMES

4,4 ¨ “1,2”

CF

≠

2,1 Æ 3,3

Gorbachev’s perception of the U.S. strategy: Move

The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols “Æ” and “Æ|” indicate the respective strategic choices of “move” or “stay” by the player with the next move given the initial state and TOM’s rule of play (Brams, 1994).

Figure 4.1: Gorbachev’s Subjective Game (1987–1988)

GORBACHEV: COMMITTED TEACHER AND REFORMER

69

Gorbachev’s subjective game with an initial state of (1,2) represents his beliefs that the United States had not sufficiently reciprocated the cooperative initiatives of the Soviet Union in the preceding months and years. However, his subjective game reflects an expectation that mutual settlements and cooperation can be reached in the near future. In other words, Gorbachev believes that his strategy of altercasting has been effective and that the United States has adapted a new definition of the situation. Indeed, Reagan confirmed Gorbachev’s belief in 1988 when he responded with a “No” to the question of a journalist whether he still considered the Soviet Union the “evil empire.” Reagan added, “I was talking about another time, another era.” 7 The prediction from the game is that the United States will move toward (4,4) settlement and engage in more cooperative tactics with de-escalatory moves without the Soviet Union having to escalate with conflict moves. Table 4.3 again highlights the main events in Soviet-U.S. relations in 1987 and 1988. Table 4.3: Main Events in U.S.-Soviet Relations in 1987 and 1988 Month 1987 February

Soviet Union

United States

Gorbachev decouples SDI prospective INF agreements.

March

U.S. initiates various forms of diplomatic exchanges continuing through September.

June

Reagan requests SRINF to be included in prospective INF agreements.

July

Gorbachev proposes the elimination of all INF and SRINF.

August

Reagan says U.S. objective is to break out of cold war stalemate. Reagan orders dismantling of 72 nuclear Pershing missiles.

September

U.S. and SU commit to establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers in Washington and Moscow.

December

Washington Summit—signing of INF Treaty.

1988 February March December

U.S. signals reductions of trade restrictions. U.S. and SU establish nuclear risk reduction centers in Washington and Moscow. Gorbachev announces significant unilateral cuts.

70

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

A general willingness to cooperate was shown in Soviet-U.S. bilateral diplomatic consultations throughout 1987. In March, U.S. Undersecretary of State Michael Armacost met with the Soviet First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yuly Vorontsov in Moscow to discuss regional conflicts. In June, U.S. Information Agency Director Charles Wick traveled to Moscow to discuss communication exchanges. In July, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Vernon Walters and Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky discussed matters on the United Nations and the Gulf conflict. In the same month, Assistant Secretary Richard Murphy and Ambassador Vladimir Polyakov met to consult on Middle East affairs. In August, Assistant Secretary Richard Schifter discussed human rights issues in Moscow. In September, Soviet and U.S. officials met in Moscow and Geneva to consider the Far East, Southeast Asia, and Afghanistan. A second meeting on human rights took place in November between Secretary of State John Whitehead and Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Adamishin. A follow-up meeting on regional conflicts between Armacost and Vorontsov also occured that month. After Reykjavik, Gorbachev believed that “one more attempt might be necessary to step over what divides us.”8 In an unprecedented move, Gorbachev decided to give in to Reagan’s uncompromising stance on SDI. On February 28, he took the initiative as he decoupled SDI from any INF missiles agreements. Later Gorbachev attributed his change of mind on INF agreements to his experiences at the Moscow international forum “For a Nuclear Weapon-Free World and the Survival of Humanity”—a meeting between international experts on nuclear weapons.9 Gorbachev recounted: “I had the opportunity to feel the moods and hear the thoughts and ideas of an international intellectual elite. My discussions with them made a great impression on me. I discussed the results of the congress with my colleagues in the Politburo and we decided to make a new major concession.”10 Gorbachev’s concession put the INF element of the nuclear arms talks, which were deadlocked after the Reykjavik summit, back on track. Although the concession carried disadvantageous aspects for the Soviets, Gorbachev considered it as an important, and therefore worthwhile, step to reestablish arms control, “giving it new momentum.”11 Gorbachev also kept stressing his agenda of “reasonable sufficiency” in military affairs.12 On March 1, “he identified himself publicly as head of the Defense Council” to “underscore his supremacy in military matters” and initiated a formal revision of the military doctrine issued by the Warsaw Pact on May 30, 1987.13 These initiatives, while welcomed by the United States, still did not break the impasse. Now Reagan challenged the Soviet Union to include shorter range INF [SRINF] in any agreement to protect allied security interests. On the same day Gorbachev proposed first to freeze and then cut these systems. About one month later, on July 23, Gorbachev proposed a global double zero, eliminating all INF and SRINF in Asia and in Europe and

GORBACHEV: COMMITTED TEACHER AND REFORMER

71

thereby motivating Reagan toward an agreement.14 Gorbachev’s foreign policy decision-making authority was underlined. A concession of this nature “on the part of a general secretary without the participation of the military was unprecedented.”15 Now Reagan signaled cooperation, as he gave in to a Soviet demand to dismantle seventy-two U.S.-controlled nuclear warheads on West German Pershing Ia missiles.16 Negotiations on the INF issue continued throughout the summer and culminated in a summit between Gorbachev and Reagan in December in Washington. In July, Reagan shifted his long-standing conflictual rhetoric toward a more cooperative tone.17 His general objective was, he argued, to “break out of the stalemate of the Cold War . . . to dispel rather than to live with the two great darkening clouds of the postwar era.” He asked the Soviets to reduce military secrecy. Gorbachev did his share as he continued to make cooperative moves. Already prior to Reagan’s statement he “expressed readiness for joint calibration tests for nuclear tests that could verify a ban on virtually all tests.”18 And on September 8, a U.S. delegation was permitted access to the radar station at Krasnoyarsk. One month later, Western experts were allowed to inspect the chemical weapons factory at Shikany.19 The Soviet Union engaged in still more unilateral efforts. “In the fall,” for example, “Soviet ballistic missile submarine patrols off the U.S. coast were discontinued. And for the first time in a decade, there was no Soviet naval visit to the Caribbean (which set a new pattern).”20 In September, Shevardnadze departed for a visit with Reagan in Washington. The achievement of this meeting was an “agreement in principle to conclude a treaty” on an elimination of INF and SRINF,21 an increase in the prospects of a further meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan later that year, and an agreement on the implementation of “full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations” on nuclear testing, which then began in early November.22 Furthermore, Shevardnadze and his American counterpart signed an agreement committing both sides to establish “Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in Washington and Moscow to exchange information and notifications required by various arms agreements in order to reduce the risk of miscalculation or misunderstanding.”23 Finally, the Soviet foreign minister “surprised Schultz . . . with a secret initiative. . . . All Soviet troops were to be withdrawn from Afghanistan, hopefully by the end of the Reagan administration, with U.S. help.”24 A meeting on the leader level—the Washington summit—was announced for December 7–10. On December 8, 1987, the INF Treaty was signed at the White House.25 According to Reagan and Gorbachev, the treaty was “historic” because for the first time it would entail the “complete elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms.”26 The main provisions of the treaty were twofold: first, both the Soviet Union and the United States would, within a period of three years, destroy all of their intermediate and shorter-range land-based missiles and their launchers.27 Second, the treaty set in place

72

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

mutual monitoring arrangements of nuclear facilities and deemed it legitimate for both sides to engage in extensive and intrusive verification inspections.28 Although the major and most important concessions came from the Soviet side, Gorbachev was happy to see that persistence and repeated articulation of “new thinking” can, and did, lead to agreements.29 He expressed the hope that the INF Treaty “would lend momentum not only to arms control in the future but transforming the political relationship between the two nations.”30 With regard to the stalemated START, both sides agreed that they would “find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long range nuclear armed SLCM’s.” Summarizing further, Garthoff writes that “several procedures for verification were agreed on, building on the INF breakthrough. Agreement was reached on an overall ceiling of 4,900 ballistic missiles within the agreed-on ceiling of 6,000 delivery vehicles.”31 Where the two sides found no agreement, however, was on SDI and the ABM Treaty. A new summit was scheduled to be held in Moscow between May 29 and June 2. Nevertheless, on his return to Moscow, Gorbachev gave a positive report to the Politburo. He now felt that his moves were reciprocated— perhaps not to an extent that would equal his concessions, but reciprocated nevertheless. He took further satisfaction in his increasing popularity in the United States and his expectation that this would also have an effect on the American leadership—as it did.32 In contrast to the preceding year, the new year started with an exchange of televised New Year’s greetings. On February 21, Schultz went to Moscow to meet with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev to initiate preparations for the planned summer summit in Moscow. At this occasion, progress was made (for the first time) in the economic realm. Schultz conveyed the U.S. commitment to work toward a reduction of the Western Coordinating Committee (COCOM) restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union and also to ease its own restraints. Diplomatic consultations continued. Assistant Secretary Richard Murphy met Shevardnadze in March to discuss Middle East issues and in April Deputy Minister Igor Rogachev and Assistant Secretary Richard Schiffer discussed politics in East Asia and the Pacific. Again one month later, Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker met with Deputy Minister Anatoly Adamishin to discuss the African region, especially Angola and Namiba. Probably the most important meeting (and the first of its kind since 1979) was between Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci and Minister of Defense Dmitry Yazov. The subjects of discussion were military doctrine and policy and conventional force reductions. Both sides “expressed satisfaction with the meeting and committed themselves to continue contacts at various levels.” Congressional visits increased and so did “unofficial cooperation, including trials of nuclear testing detection equipment in January at both the Nevada and Semipalatsink nuclear test ranges.”33

GORBACHEV: COMMITTED TEACHER AND REFORMER

73

On March 23, Schultz and Shevardnadze implemented their agreement from September of the previous year: nuclear risk reduction centers were opened in Moscow and Washington. One month later, both met in Geneva to sign bilateral “Agreements on Afghanistan.”34 In a final presummit meeting in Geneva, May 11–12, Schultz and Shevardnadze signed “an agreement specifying that the INF Treaty covered similar categories of intermediaterange weapons based on other physical principles, plugging a gap in INF Treaty Coverage.”35 Reflecting in retrospect about the goal of the summit, Gorbachev writes, “We wanted [Reagan’s] visit to become another milestone marking the end of the cold war.”36 Indeed, at the summit Gorbachev and Reagan did make some progress with regard to the long stalemated START negotiations, particularly with respect to mobile intercontinental missiles and air-launched missiles, and the two foreign ministers signed agreements on commitments to advance notifications of ICBM test launchings and on joint efforts regarding the monitoring of underground nuclear test limitations. The two sides also extended a 1973 agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Further cooperative arrangements were concluded on fishing rights, sea search and rescue, long-range radio navigation in the northern Pacific region, transportation technology, expanded civil space cooperation, and cultural exchange. Although these arrangements were not (or only indirectly) related to security, they were considered useful as well as instrumental to a growing pattern of cooperation. The traditional dynamic at previous meetings was that Gorbachev was willing to concede more than Reagan, that the former was ready to move further from his initial position than the latter. So it happened this time. Gorbachev concluded that “more could have been achieved.”37 However, he also concluded that some substantial new Soviet initiatives were necessary to move Soviet-U.S. relations further forward. Soon after the summit, in accordance with his practice after the Reykjavik summit, Gorbachev requested academic institutes to explore venues for a further reformulation of the new defensive defence doctrine, and at the end of July he addressed a “scientific-practical conference on foreign and security policy” hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.38 The conference included many academic officials and Gorbachev concluded with a proposal for an even stronger effort to reconstitute Soviet-U.S. relations in particular and international relations in general by cooperative political means. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze “elaborated on the new conception of security and reliance primarily on political means of ensuring security; on freedom of choice (self-determination) of peoples.”39 He argued that “it is in everyone’s interest (including ours) to seek to have the military activity of all countries confined to their national boundaries” and that it was in the Soviet Union’s interest “to dismantle military bases on the territory of other countries and also to dissolve opposing military-political alliances.”40 The days of power

74

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

politics and coercion (particularly in Eastern Europe) appeared to be numbered and would be buried by the end of the year.41 Between the Moscow summit and the next major event in Soviet-U.S. relations, which would follow with Gorbachev’s appearance at the United Nations, negotiations on strategic arms reductions continued. So did negotiations toward a ban on chemical weapons as well as diplomatic consultations on bilateral and regional issues.42 Soviet domestic opposition to what was perceived as asymmetrical cooperation (which de facto it was) did exist, but was repeatedly muted through Gorbachev’s strategic maneuvering and personnel politics.43 After he had purged the Central Committee, he decided that he would lay out the new Soviet initiatives at the United Nations General Assembly.44 At his UN speech on December 7, Gorbachev expressed “keen interest in an invigorated role of the United Nations with active Soviet cooperation, publicly signaling an end to the traditional Soviet position of regarding the United Nations as a forum for continuing Cold War competition.”45 For Gorbachev, the practice of international politics had departed from realist zero-sum assumptions toward positive-sum assumptions. He announced a unilateral reduction of the Soviet armed forces by 500,000 troops, with a particular emphasis of withdrawals and reductions from Eastern Europe. He included a withdrawal and disbanding of offensive weaponry—six tank divisions from central Europe, including 5000 tanks and 50,000 men. Additionally, “Gorbachev noted that in all the Soviet forces in Europe would be cut by 10,000 tanks, 8500 artillery pieces, and 800 combat aircraft.”46 He concluded by emphasizing a “deideologization of foreign policy” and an endorsement of “freedom for choice” for all peoples. By the end of 1988, international politics had been transformed. And the most prominent theory within the realm of security studies—structural realism—was in trouble. One of the two superpowers had stopped playing power politics, although states in a realist account are described as being engaged in a perpetual power struggle to improve or at least preserve their relative power positions in the international system.47 The unexpected would continue in 1989 and beyond.

GORBACHEV TRANSFORMS GREAT POWER POLITICS (1989–1991) By 1989, Gorbachev had become an extraordinary leader. A comparison between Gorbachev in the time period 1989–1991 (period 4) and the average leader in Table 4.4 shows significant differences with respect to the same indices as in the previous period, albeit on higher levels of significance. Additionally, in the more recent period, Gorbachev is less likely to oppose and resist tactics (I-5d) when compared to the average leader. While Gorbachev had thoroughly distinguished himself from the average leader, he also engaged in further experiential learning processes in which

GORBACHEV: COMMITTED TEACHER AND REFORMER

75

Table 4.4: Gorbachev Compared to the Average Leader Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs P-1. Nature of Political Universe (Conflict/Cooperation) P-2. Realization of Political Values (Pessimism/Optimism) P-3. Political Future (Unpredictable/Predictable) P-4. Historical Development (Low Control/High Control) P-5. Role of Chance (Small Role/Large Role) I-1. Strategic Approach to Goals (Conflict/Cooperation) I-2. Intensity of Tactics (Conflict/Cooperation) I-3. Risk Orientation (Averse/Acceptant) I-4. Timing of Action a. Conflict/Cooperation b. Words/Deeds I-5. Utility of Means a. Reward b. Promise c. Appeal/Support d. Oppose/Resist e. Threaten f. Punish

Period 4* 0.512a

Average Leader** 0.250

0.272b

0.118

0.157

0.148

0.247

0.212

0.961

0.968

0.774a

0.334

0.380a

0.139

0.325

0.304

0.227a 0.473

0.509 0.525

0.190 0.111 0.591b 0.048b 0.160 0.510c

0.167 0.073 0.427 0.147 0.047 0.138

Significant differences between indices at the following levels: ap < .001. bp ≤ .01, cp ≤ .02 (two-tailed test). *n = 20. **n = 264 for P-1–P-5, 255 for I-1–I-5.

both his philosophical and instrumental beliefs would change. The comparison to the previous period in the left two columns of Table 4.5 indicates that in 1989–1990 (period 4) Gorbachev perceives himself to have more control over the historical development of international relations (P-4) when compared to the years 1987–1988 (period 3). Additionally, he significantly decreased his beliefs in the utility of oppose and resist tactics for the attainment of political goals. The right two columns of the table show a comparison of Gorbachev’s beliefs at the beginning and the end of his tenure and they demonstrate comprehensive experiential learning. Extraordinary international relations were to be expected in the time to come. At the beginning of the year, however, there was a “lull” in SovietU.S. relations.48 Newly elected president George Bush entered the White House with some hesitation toward the Soviet Union.49 The first notable interactions between the two sides did not occur until Secretary of State

Period 3**

0.097 0.079 0.169 0.986 0.357 0.160 0.188 0.569 0.613 0.190 0.045 0.443 0.141 0.065 0.115

0.272 0.157 0.247i 0.961 0.774 0.380 0.325 0.227 0.473 0.190 0.111 0.591 0.048g 0.160 0.051

0.190 0.111 0.591b 0.048c 0.016h 0.051e

0.227a 0.473

0.325b

0.380b

0.774a

0.961d

0.247f

0.157b

0.272b

0.512a

Period 4***

≤ .005, dp ≤ .007, ep ≤ .01, fp ≤ .04, gp ≤ .05, hp ≤ .08, ip ≤ .10 (two-

0.217

Period 1*

0.512

Period 4***

Nature of Political Universe 0.452 (Conflict/Cooperation) P-2. Realization of Political Values 0.247 (Pessimism/Optimism) P-3. Political Future 0.143 (Unpredictable/Predictable) P-4. Historical Development 0.197 (Low Control/High Control) P-5. Role of Chance 0.971 (Small Role/Large Role) I-1. Strategic Approach to Goals 0.686 (Conflict/Cooperation) I-2. Intensity of Tactics 0.330 (Conflict/Cooperation) I-3. Risk Orientation 0.323 (Averse/Acceptant) I-4. Timing of Action a. Conflict/Cooperation 0.315 b. Words/Deeds 0.417 I-5. Utility of Means a. Reward 0.160 b. Promise 0.085 c. Appeal/Support 0.596 d. Oppose/Resist 0.098 e. Threaten 0.033 f. Punish 0.045 Significant differences between indices at the following levels: ap ≤ .000, bp ≤ .001, cp tailed test). *n = 9. **n = 15. ***n = 20.

P-1.

Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs

Table 4.5: Learning Patterns of Gorbachev

76

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

77

GORBACHEV: COMMITTED TEACHER AND REFORMER

James Baker visited Moscow on May 10–11. In his discussions with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev, it was agreed that transnational problems, “such as global environmental concerns and narcotics trade and other international law enforcement issues,” should be added to the traditional agenda of Soviet-U.S. high level talks of arms control, regional problems, and bilateral relations.50 A series of meetings between Shevardnadze and Baker followed in which the two foreign ministers negotiated conditions for a future summit meeting. While Bush hesitated initially, he no less than Gorbachev aimed for a further redefinition of U.S.-Soviet relations. Gorbachev’s beliefs reflected this expectation. His beliefs and perceptions indicate a mutually cooperative stance in the period between 1989 and 1991. The scores for Gorbachev’s master beliefs are Self (I-1 = .75, P-4a = .26) and Other (P-1 = .52, P-4b = .16), which specify the preference ordering in Proposition 2 for Self and Other in TIP. Gorbachev’s operational code in this period continues to specify an Assurance strategy that ranks settlement over deadlock over domination over submission. As in the previous period, he applies a mirrored preference ordering to the other. Gorbachev’s subjective game with an initial state of (4,4) represents his beliefs that the conflictual nature of Soviet-U.S. relations had been transformed to a cooperative nature (see Fig. 4.2). Because (4,4) is both a Nash myopic equilibrium and a nonmyopic equilibrium as specified by TOM, the prediction is both sides would continue to engage in cooperative tactics and moves. The main events in Soviet-U.S. relations are summarized in Table 4.6. On May 12 in a speech at Texas A&M University, Bush declared that “as the Soviet Union . . . moves toward greater openness and democratization, as they meet the challenge of responsible international behavior, we will match

OTHER CO CF CO

“4,4” ¨ 1,2 Ø

SU CF

OTHER CO CF

≠

2,1 Æ 3,3

Gorbachev’s strategy: Stay

OTHER CO CF

CO Settle Submit SU

CO

≠

SU CF Dominate Deadlock SOVIET UNION OUTCOMES

“4,4”Æ| 1,2

CF

Ø

2,1 ¨ 3,3

Gorbachev’s perception of the U.S. strategy: Stay

The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each player. The symbols “Æ” and “Æ|” indicate the respective strategic choices of “move” or “stay” by the player with the next move given the initial state and TOM’s rule of play (Brams, 1994).

Figure 4.2: Gorbachev’s Subjective Game (1989–1991)

78

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

Table 4.6: Main Events in U.S.-Soviet Relations from February 1989 to 1991 Month

Soviet Union

United States

1989 May

Bush declares the U.S. to be ready for further cooperation. Bush announces U.S. cuts in troops and armory.

August September

U.S. and SU acknowledge authority of International Court of Justice. Wyoming talks: SU decouples START from SDI. Bush proposes bilateral accord to reduce chemical weapons stockpiles.

December

Bush offers further normalization of trade relations.

1990 February

Bush proposes mutual troop reductions in Europe.

June

Washington summit: U.S. and SU conclude agreements on nuclear weapons.

July

Moscow summit: Conclusion of START I.

September

Conclusion of “2+4” talks. Bush announces unilateral redeployment and reduction of U.S. nuclear weapons.

October

Gorbachev reciprocates.

their steps with steps of our own.”51 And in a speech at the Coast Guard Academy, the president said that, “through negotiations,” the United States and the Soviet Union “can now transform the military landscape of Europe.”52 The United States, probably more than ever, intended to deliver its part to this transformation. At a NATO conference in Brussels on May 29, Bush announced that the United States would cut 30,000 troops in Europe and further “cutbacks in warplanes and helicopters to match the Soviet proposals.” New also was “the timing of the cuts, to take place starting in 1992 rather than five years later as proposed by Gorbachev.”53 After these positive signs, on June 13, the two sides also signed an agreement for averting military activity in specified conflict-prone areas. A joint military commission was established to monitor the implementation of the agreement. Unprecedented was a Soviet move on July 21. In an appearance before the House Armed Services Committee, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev said that

GORBACHEV: COMMITTED TEACHER AND REFORMER

79

the Soviet Union was determined to put into place a defensive military doctrine with troop strength levels as low as possible.54 Never before did a Soviet military officer testify before a congressional committee. What followed in September were the so-called Wyoming talks between foreign ministers Shevardnadze and Baker.55 Just as happened with respect to the INF Treaty, the Soviet Union now decoupled START negotiations from SDI. Bush did not move toward talks on START yet, but instead declared the United States ready to agree with the Soviet Union on a bilateral accord to reduce chemical weapons stockpiles by 98 percent. Gorbachev promptly signaled his agreement to the proposal, which would be formalized at a summit in May 1990. A speech given by James Baker on October 4 reminded the international audience of Gorbachev’s speech to the Twenty-Seventh Congress of the Communist Party about three and a half years ago. He said: “our own national interest . . . does not exist in isolation from the events taking place in the Soviet Union” and advocated a “search for points of mutual advantage.”56 Shevardnadze reciprocated, saying that “the Soviet-American dialogue has scaled new heights in terms of openness, businesslike intensity, the range of questions raised, and the degree of mutual understanding and amicability.” Surprising to everyone was that Shevardnadze acknowledged that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan a decade ago had “violated norms of behavior, and gone against common human interest.”57 “Common interest” became a reference not only in words, but also in deeds. In August, in a reversal of the trend in U.S. policy during the Reagan administration, both sides agreed to accept “binding arbitration of the International Court of Justice in disputes over interpretation of a number of treaties concerning terrorism, hijacking, drug smuggling, and the like.” Unprecedented was also the Soviet-U.S. “cosponsorship of a UN General Assembly Resolution calling on all nations to strengthen the United Nations in defending peace and human rights.”58 What started with Gorbachev’s initiative at the United Nations in December of the preceding year continued with events like these. The United Nations had effectively ceased to be a mere mirror of power politics among the superpowers and was acknowledged increasingly by both sides as a forum. The events in Eastern Europe in the second half of 1989, and Gorbachev’s passive attitude toward them, did their part in further redefining the West’s understanding of the Soviet Union.59 When Gorbachev talked about the “right to self-determination” at the United Nations, he meant it. Communist regimes in Poland, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania fell like dominoes and along with it, of course, the Soviet orbit diminished.60 The events motivated Secretary of State Baker to convince President Bush to negotiate a pre-summit “interim” summit. Gorbachev and Bush then met indeed on warships of the two countries off the coast of Malta in the Mediterranean. Although no agreements were

80

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

concluded, “the meeting provided not only for a useful exchange of views but also for a joint resolve to press ahead in the strategic arms reduction talks (START)” toward a more concrete agreement on the reduction of nuclear weapons, and toward detailing the reductions of conventional forces in Europe. The meeting opened yet another phase in Soviet-U.S. relations. According to Garthoff, the Malta summit “may be accorded the honor of symbolically representing the end of the postwar and Cold War world.”61 Shevardnadze later recollected that Gorbachev used this occasion to confirm that the United States was no longer the Soviet “enemy image.” Gorbachev stated, “We in the Soviet Union are prepared not to view the United States as our military opponent.”62 Cooperation between the superpowers would indeed reach a new quality. Bush went beyond political-military issues. He offered to normalize trade relations on a bilateral level through the prospective granting of mostfavored-nation (MFN) status. He also “promised to support Soviet observer status in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,” thus helping to bring the Soviet Union into the world economic structure.63 Bush had moved the United States further than it ever had in Soviet-U.S. relations. At the conclusion of the Malta conference, Gorbachev said: “The world is leaving one epoch, the ‘Cold War,’ and entering a new one.”64 The objective of the United States in the new year had become to move “beyond the Cold War.”65 In his State of the Union address, President Bush proposed mutual substantive reductions of conventional arms, which were to complement the ongoing multilateral talks on conventional forces in Europe (CFE). Bush suggested a troop reduction in central Europe to 195,000 on both sides.66 However, he also requested that the United States be allowed to keep 30,000 additional troops in other parts of Europe.67 The Soviet Union accepted the proposal on February 13. At the same time the foreign ministers started to prepare the so called “2+4” talks between the Soviet Union and East Germany on the one side and the United States, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and France on the other. The symbolic Berlin Wall had already fallen a few months earlier, and later that year these talks would seal the end of the cold war. In the spring months of 1990, Gorbachev was kept busy with domestic affairs as he consolidated his power further. Already in 1989, Gorbachev had started to prepare the abolishment of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution “that established the leading role of the Communist party and to create an elected presidency from which to rule.” He also forced through his interpretation “that the end of the leading role of the party meant the end of the party organs and the party first secretaries at each level.” De facto, Gorbachev had been the ultimate decision unit beforehand—a position that he reached through his strategic maneuvering. De forma, he was becoming it now. On March 13, the Congress of People’s Deputies agreed to abandon Article 6 and approved the proposed strengthening of the presidency. For Gorbachev, this meant “the

GORBACHEV: COMMITTED TEACHER AND REFORMER

81

end of power of the Central Committee and Politburo to make policy decisions that had authority over him in his new presidential office.”68 Back on the international stage, the Washington summit from May 31 to June 3 led to a further stabilization of the normalization process between the Soviet Union and the United States. Gorbachev describes his perception in his memoirs, stating, “The main achievement of the . . . summit [was], I would say, that we significantly increased the pace of the clean-up of the gigantic powder magazine left over from the Cold War.”69 Indeed, the summit concluded with fifteen agreements, including the destruction of nuclear weapons, protocols to the 1974 and 1976 nuclear testing treaties, and cooperation in exploring peaceful uses of atomic energy.70 Most important for the Soviet Union, Bush agreed to sign a trade treaty of vital interest to Gorbachev.71 Gorbachev confirmed the validity of the CSCE (Helsinki Act) guidelines, that states had the right to choose their own external alliances. He thereby signaled a green light—united Germany’s membership in NATO. In his memoirs, Shevardnadze remembers that President Bush also used the occasion to respond to Gorbachev’s Malta statement in which he declared that the United States would not constitute an enemy image to the Soviets. Bush now stated, “You can count on the United States of America never to threaten the Security of the Soviet nation.”72 START was at this time excluded from any progress.73 However, “in all . . . the 1990 Washington summit showed that U.S.-Soviet relations were essentially normalized and developing new areas of cooperation as well as serving to regulate or settle areas of difference.”74 The NATO members themselves held a summit in London at the beginning of July. The outcome was a declaration that, because of Baker’s influence, “conceded many points that the Soviets . . . had been demanding of the alliance.” It called for strengthening the political component of NATO; it committed NATO never to be “the first to use force” and as “it no longer perceived the Warsaw Pact as an adversary; it vowed to change the force structure and strategy ‘fundamentally,’ by ‘moving away’ from the strategy of forward defense, and ‘modifying flexible response’ to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons.”75 The multilateral discussions in the “2+4” talks regarding German unification, which were of course dominated by the two superpowers, came to a settlement as well. By September, Gorbachev had confirmed Soviet acceptance of the “nine assurances.” Germany could unify under the umbrella of NATO on October 3. Mulilateralism culminated at the CSCE summit in Paris in November. The most relevant outcome here was the signing of the CFE treaty regarding cuts in conventional arms of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in Europe “from the Atlantic to the Urals.” Soviet-U.S. relations achieved an all-time high and Garthoff adds that “as multilateral diplomacy was rapidly winding down the Cold War confrontation in Europe, U.S.-Soviet relations were expanding in bilateral interests in

82

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

a new ‘partnership’ toward resolving conflicts around the world.”76 Among these conflicts was the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, which the two superpowers first addressed in a one-day summit in Helsinki on September 9. The Soviet Union’s position on this issue alongside the United States was important because in the past it had entertained close ties to Iraq. The Gulf crisis remained on the agenda of several meetings between Shevardnadze and Baker in the fall months. So did the strategic arms talks. Other contacts, for example, among the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued as well. “The crowning achievement of 1990,” Garthoff concludes, “was the decisive replacement of military confrontation between East and West in Europe and the reunification of both Germany and Europe.”77 The following year would be the last year of Soviet-U.S. relations. Not anticipating that the dissolution of the Soviet Union would follow so soon, in his State of the Union address, President Bush said that he wanted to “continue to build a lasting basis for U.S.-Soviet cooperation.”78 Soon afterward, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Baker emphasized the importance of progress on a START Treaty for the American national interest.79 In mid-March, he visited Moscow to discuss START and, along with it, the Gulf War and the Middle East, and regional conflicts in general.80 Gorbachev, his new Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnyky, and Baker agreed on convening a peace conference dealing with the Middle East later that year.81 While START was discussed in general, the particularities were deferred to the summer. In the summer, more specifically on July 14, Foreign Ministers Baker and Bessmertnykh met in Washington and announced that they were near the completion of the START Treaty, except for one issue. Temporarily, “the two leaders were unable to agree on how to define throw-weight for the purpose of determining whether a missile is a new type of missile that could carry a different number of warheads.”82 However, the issue was resolved in a side meeting between Gorbachev and Bush at the Group of Seven economic summit in London just a week later. The leaders also used this occasion to announce that they would hold a full summit meeting in Moscow on July 30–31. At the summit, START I was finally signed by Gorbachev and Bush. It called for “reductions of about 25 percent for the United States and 35 percent for the Soviet Union (owing to differential and nominal counting rules for some types of weapons).” However, the “reductions in quick-reaction ballistic missiles within the overall totals . . . were much greater.” And most important, the “agreed and reduced ceilings provided greater assurance and predictability and permitted large reductions through unilateral budgetary programming decisions.” The two sides agreed “to resume consultations in October in Moscow on further negotiations on strategic nuclear and space arms control measures to enhance strategic stability.”83 In August, Gorbachev became the subject of an abortive coup.84 On September 27, Bush launched

GORBACHEV: COMMITTED TEACHER AND REFORMER

83

a unilateral initiative for the redeployment and reduction of American nuclear weapons. He furthermore announced the halting of the twenty-four-hour alert for American bombers and invited the Soviet Union to reciprocate.85 He did not, however, make his plans contingent on the Soviet response. Gorbachev did follow suit and went even further. On October 5, he suggested the destruction of all tactical nuclear weapons. He announced the “removal of all strategic bombers from alert,” the termination of “new mobile missile projects,” and that “there would be no increase in the existing SS-24 rail-mobile system.” He also announced the removal of “503 ICBMs from alert, including 134 MIRV missiles, and he said that 92 submarine-launched missiles were being removed from the active force, matching the U.S. action” and that the “Soviet Union would unilaterally further reduce its START limited warheads.”86 On the multilateral level, the NATO member states met in Rome at the beginning of November. The member states added “cooperation” as a new strategic concept to the twin pillars of defense and détente, which had existed since 1967. The danger of war, conventional or nuclear, had receded. The new center of gravity became the economic and political situation of the Soviet Union, which ultimately led to the resignation of Gorbachev on December 25. What did he leave behind? “In just less than seven years,” Robert Kaiser writes, “Mikhail Gorbachev transformed the world. He turned his own country upside down. . . . He tossed away the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe with no more than a fare-thee-well. He ended the cold war that dominated world politics.”87 World politics now entered a different phase. It had departed from the conventional knowledge of theoreticians and policymakers alike. Gorbachev demonstrated that anarchy has no determinate logic in itself and that it is what states make of it. Although most of world politics was transformed, some islands of resistance would persist. One of them was North Korea.

This page intentionally left blank.

CHAPTER FIVE

KIM IL SUNG: REVOLUTIONARY COLD WARRIOR

For the most part since the inception of North Korea in 1948, Kim Il Sung has been considered a revolutionary leader. Throughout the decades, he persisted in the ideologies of juche (self-sufficiency), Marxism-Leninism, and made virtually no concessions to alternative ways of political thinking and acting. Throughout the decades, Kim Il Sung also maintained and nurtured the idea of a global revolution. For much of the cold war, the foreign policy of North Korea was one of antagonism and hostility toward the United States, South Korea, and Japan in particular and the Western and capitalist world in general. It was only toward the end of the 1980s that some observers of North Korea began to argue that Kim Il Sung dampened his revolutionary motives and intentions as he came to recognize a fundamentally changing international order in which his initial goals seemed increasingly unrealistic. The focus of this chapter is the foreign policy behavior of North Korea between 1980 and 1987—a time period in which North Korea was still firmly embedded in the bloc structure of the cold war. This reality changed in the late 1980s as Gorbachev initiated a rapprochement with the West and loosened the ties to North Korea. However, an analysis of Kim Il Sung’s beliefs reveals that they look very different from those of Gorbachev and they rendered the prospects of reform in North Korea elusive. In the following pages, I will also demonstrate how Kim Il Sung’s contentious beliefs were translated into North Korean foreign policy behavior.

DEADLOCK IN THE COLD WAR (1980–1983) Ever since its inception, the Soviet Union played a prominent role in North Korea. To a large extent the Soviet Union can be considered responsible for the establishment of the regime during its occupation of the northern half 85

86

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

of the Korean peninsula after the division of the country at the and of the Second World War.1 It was also with Soviet backing that Kim Il Sung had tried to invade and conquer South Korea in 1950. After the armistice that followed from the Korean War (1950–1953), the relations between North Korea and the United States were frozen in cold war enmity and mutual distrust.2 The modest communication that existed between the two countries until 1980 occurred primarily through the Military Armistice Commission or in the form of hostile confrontation such as the 1968 seizing of the USS Pueblo and the 1976 “axe murders” in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Throughout the decades, Kim Il Sung denounced the United States as “imperialists,” Japan as “militarist,” and South Korea as an “extension of the United States.”3 In the late 1970s, however, U.S. President Jimmy Carter decided that this extension was to be cut. The analogy of the Vietnam War rested with President Carter at this time and “adventures” in Asia had to be curtailed.4 It was as early as 1975, in the first days of his candidacy for president, when “Carter advocated the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea which, after the pullout from Vietnam, were the only remaining U.S. military deployment on the mainland of Asia and a tripwire that guaranteed immediate U.S. involvement in case of a North Korean attack.” In March 1977, President Carter submitted a letter to National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance that bearded a content that was essentially addressed to South Korean President Park Chung Hee. It stated that American forces would be withdrawn while air cover will be continued.5 In the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, President Kim Il Sung had long awaited the departure of the “imperialists.” The North Korean Dictionary of Political Terminologies, which, as most other publications, is statesanctioned, defines “U.S imperialism” as the work of the “most barbarously piratical invader and head of all other imperialistic countries.”6 In Kim Il Sung’s perception, the United States was the “main stumbling block to Korean reunification” and as his “guerilla personality” manifested itself in ever stronger terms toward the end of the 1970s, the United States would reverse its intentions to withdraw from the Korean peninsula.7 One condition for the Carter withdrawal plan to be implemented had been that “the military balance on the peninsula would continue to be favorable to the South.”8 In the latter half of the 1970s, Kim Il Sung’s military policies did not meet this condition. Between 1975 and 1980, he increased North Korean military expenditures by more that $400 million from $878 million to $1.3 billion. The total size of the army grew by almost 200,000, from 410,000 to 600,000. The number of tanks doubled to 2650. Other weaponry, such as field artillery, submarines, torpedo boats, and aircraft fighters, experienced a dramatic numerical increase as well.9 In 1980, the military capabilities of North Korea had surpassed those of South Korea.10 The location of new tank divisions in a valley only about fifty miles

KIM IL SUNG: REVOLUTIONARY COLD WARRIOR

87

north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), together with infiltration tunnels leading from the North to the South, would reinforce the suspicion of potential North Korean aggression in the near future. Faced with such a possibility, U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski announced on July 20 that “a withdrawal of U.S. combat elements was suspended until 1981.”11 When, in late 1979, President Park of South Korea was assassinated, the situation was even more precarious as the potential for a North Korean invasion increased. In response to such a danger, the U.S. State Department announced that it would “react strongly in accordance with its treaty obligations to the Republic of Korea to any external attempt to exploit the situation in the Republic of Korea.”12 Perhaps it was because of this warning that North Korea did not set out immediately to take advantage of the upheavals in the South. Instead, it put forth a proposal for the resumption of dialogue. The proposal came in the form of several letters to twelve prominent South Korean leaders, including the heads of the political parties. The principal message of the letters was that North Korea would be ready to hold “talks between the authorities of the North and the South,” in conjunction with a “comprehensive political consultative conference,” and to “bring to maturity talks between the highlevel authorities.”13 On January 12, South Korea’s interim president Ch’oe Kyu-ha characterized the North Korean proposals as a “first affirmative reaction to our proposal for dialogue between the responsible authorities of the South and the North.”14 He suggested further that working-level delegates from both sides would meet in Panmujon on February 6 to work out procedural details of prospective high-level meetings. A few days later, North Korea formally accepted the proposal for preliminary talks. Then, however, Kim Il Sung’s contentious and uncompromising attitudes entered as an obstacle. This is reflected in a comparison of Kim Il Sung’s beliefs with the average world leader in Table 5.1.15 Compared to the average leader, Kim Il Sung perceives himself not to have much control over the political universe (P-4) and he ascribes a high role to the influence of chance (P-5). On the level of instrumental beliefs, Kim Il Sung’s strategic approach to goals and intensity of tactics is significantly more conflictual (I-1, I-2), he is significantly less likely to ascribe utility to Appeal tactics (I-5c), and he is significantly more likely to ascribe utility to Punish tactics (I-5f) as a means of achieving political goals. In sum, when compared to the “average world leader,” Kim Il Sung’s beliefs about the nature of the political universe and the best means of achieving his goals in that universe are significantly more hostile and conflictual. In the period between 1980 and 1983, the aggregate scores for Kim Il Sung’s key beliefs are Self (I-1 = .14, P-4a = .13) and Other (P-1 = .14, P-4b = .29), which specify the preference ordering in Proposition 5 for Self and Other in TIP. Kim Il Sung’s operational code prescribes a prisoner’s dilemma strategy that ranks domination over settlement over deadlock over

88

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

Table 5.1: Kim Il Sung in 1980–1983 Compared to the Average Leader Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs

1980–1983*

Average Leader**

P-1.

Nature of Political Universe (Conflict/Cooperation)

0.165

0.250

P-2.

Realization of Political Values (Pessimism/Optimism)

0.114

0.118

P-3.

Political Future (Unpredictable/Predictable)

0.103

0.148

P-4.

Historical Development (Low Control/High Control)

0.124b

0.212

P-5.

Role of Chance (Small Role/Large Role)

0.987c

0.968

I-1.

Strategic Approach to Goals (Conflict/Cooperation)

–0.010b

0.334

I-2.

Intensity of Tactics (Conflict/Cooperation)

–0.058c

0.139

I-3.

Risk Orientation (Averse/Acceptant)

0.103

0.304

I-4.

Timing of Action a. Conflict/Cooperation b. Words/Deeds

0.476 0.466

0.509 0.525

Utility of Means a. Reward b. Promise c. Appeal/Support d. Oppose/Resist e. Threaten f. Punish

0.179 0.081 0.235a 0.170 0.064 0.271a

0.167 0.073 0.427 0.147 0.047 0.138

I-5.

Significant differences between indices at the following levels: ap ≤ 0.02, bp ≤ 0.05, cp ≤ 0.10, (two-tailed test). *n = 10. **n = 264 for P-1–P-5, 255 for I-1–I-5.

submission. He applies the same preference order to his opponents—mainly the United States, South Korea, and Japan.16 Kim Il Sung’s subjective strategic game is mapped out in Figure 5.1. The initial state of (2,2) represents Kim Il Sung’s belief that he and his opponents are in a mutual deadlock. Kim Il Sung’s operational code, like that of Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, represents a classic prisoner’s dilemma game as the definition of the situation. The prediction following from TOM is that Kim Il Sung will “stay” and engage in tactics of punishment in re-

89

KIM IL SUNG: REVOLUTIONARY COLD WARRIOR US, SK, JAPAN CO CF CO

3,3 |¨ 1,4 Ø

NK CF

US, SK, JAPAN CO CF

≠

4,1 Æ “2,2”

Kim Il Sung’s strategy: Stay

US, SK, JAPAN CO CF

CO Settle Submit NK

CO

≠

NK CF Dominate Deadlock NORTH KOREA OUTCOMES

3,3 Æ| 1,4

CF

Ø

4,1 |¨ “2,2”

Kim Il Sung’s perception of opponents’ strategy: Stay

The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each player. The symbols “Æ” and “Æ|” indicate the respective strategic choices of “move” or “stay” by the player with the next move given the initial state (Brams, 1994).

Figure 5.1: Kim Il Sung’s Subjective Game (1980–1983)

sponse to his perception that his opponents will do the same. Table 5.2 summarizes the main events in North Korea’s relations with the United States, South Korea, and Japan in the years between 1980 and 1983. In a collection of Kim Il Sung’s thoughts, titled For an Independent World, many sections confirm this analysis of Kim Il Sung’s hostile beliefs. In one of these sections dating from the 1980s, he describes his perceptions of international politics: On the international scene . . . an acute struggle is taking place between the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces and between the anti-imperialist forces and the dominating forces. The people’s revolutionary struggle against imperialism and for independence is mounting as the days go by, while the great powers are intensifying their aggressive acts and scramble to maintain their supremacy.17 A glance at Table 5.2 indicates that Kim Il Sung’s perception of the international environment as being predominately hostile and the intentions of his antagonists, the United States, South Korea, and Japan, to be overly conflictual is a misperception. Indeed these states, at times, set out with conciliatory moves. However, these were ignored by Kim Il Sung, as he proved himself to be closed to information that would put his very beliefs and ideas about the political universe in doubt. This misperception would be reified over the years to come and, even more tragically, Kim Il Sung’s selffulfilling prophecies would indeed often cast his competitors in a conflictual

90

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

Table 5.2: Main Events in North Korean Relations with the United States, South Korea, and Japan from 1980 to 1983 Month

North Korea

United States/South Korea/Japan

1980 February

Beginning of eleven rounds of talks between North Korea and South Korea that conclude in a deadlock in August.

April

North Korea accuses Japan, U.S., and South Korea of aggressive intentions in Asia.

September

North Korea suspends talks with South Korea.

October– December

North Korea initiates development of nuclear weapons.

Japan and U.S. normalize relations with China.

1981 January

North Korea denounces South Korean president and accuses U.S., South Korea, and Japan of aggressive intentions.

June

August

President Reagan announces increase of U.S. troops in South Korea and the provision of modern weaponry. South Korea proposes talks with North Korea.

North Korea fires antiaircraft missile at American reconnaissance plane.

1982 January

North Korea denounces “Team Spirit” exercise.

South Korea proposes diplomatic relations with North Korea.

1983 January

North Korea denounces “Team Spirit” exercise.

August

October

U.S. relaxes restrictions on contacts with North Korea. North Korean commando attempts to assassinate South Korean President Chun in Rangoon.

KIM IL SUNG: REVOLUTIONARY COLD WARRIOR

91

role. In other words, his prophecies (or predictions) would become an integral part of the situation and thus affect subsequent developments of North Korean international relations. Robert Merton explains that “The self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning, a false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the originally false conception come true. The specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a reign of error. For the prophet will cite the actual course of events as proof that he was right from the beginning”18 The self-fulfilling prophecy thus carries the reversed logic of altercasting. Whereas altercasting is a cooperative strategy Ego uses in an effort to induce a redefinition of the situation by Alter, the logic of the self-fulfilling prophecy, in effect, induces a reenforcement of Ego’s already existing definition by Alter. While a strategy of altercasting bears the possibility that an enduring rivalry between two states would shift from a Hobbesian conflict into a Lockean world of interstate civility, the presence of a self-fulfilling prophecy almost dooms the relationship between states to remain locked in a Hobbesian world of enemies. Kim Il Sung engaged in conflictual tactics to reduce the dissonance arising from his faulty definition of his competitors’ intentions and their initially disconfirming actual behavior. In effect, promising prospects were often reversed, providing Kim Il Sung with the opportunity to cite the subsequent course of events as a proof that he had been right. His belief was, and would remain, that the aggressive nature of the United States, South Korea, and Japan “will never change.”19 While the international relations of the Soviet Union steadily improved due to Gorbachev’s altercasting strategy, those of North Korea maintained a complex and tragic pattern of new chances and missed opportunities. Ironically, Kim Il Sung’s tactics reversed the logic of altercasting by preventing a change in the definition of its security competitors. In accordance with the predictions from Kim Il Sung’s subjective game, North Korea should not come to the previously envisioned high-level meetings. In the meantime, Ch’oe Kyu-ha fell victim to a coup and was replaced by General Chun Doo-hwan who established military control over the South Korean government.20 The main outcome of the eleven preliminary meetings lasting from February until August was a decision on the location for the summit meeting between the two leaders. While these talks represent mutual de-escalatory moves by North Korea and South Korea alike, further agreements were elusive. Koh writes that “that they could not even agree on the agenda of the proposed talks, nor even its name, showed how deep-seated mutual distrust was.”21 At the same time, this was a demonstration that sincere interest was lacking. Soon North Korea would depart from any cooperative gesture and would bring forward another posture. In September 1980, just shortly before the eleventh session of meetings between delegates from both sides, North Korea unilaterally suspended the talks with the following statement:

92

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T The prevailing situation clearly shows that we cannot have a dialogue with the military fascist group of South Korea. . . . The criminals denounced by the whole nation and the world must be treated as criminals. We have no idea of taking the blood-stained hands of the butchers who pursue the permanent division of the nation and murdered compatriots at the sacred conference table nor intention to regard them as the party to our dialogue. . . . Considering that it is meaningless to continue the contact . . . we will not go to the place of dialogue for the time being till everything has returned to normal in South Korea.22

Such and similar rhetoric coming from Pyongyang in the fall of 1980 seemed to confirm earlier assessments of South Korean observers, namely, that North Korea had again engaged in a “war strategy disguised by peace gestures.”23 Young Kim writes: The motivations for North Korea’s initial proposal to resume NorthSouth contact are not difficult to discern. Since the situation in the South was highly volatile following the assassination of President Park . . . and the military coup of December 12, it is reasonable to assume that the North wanted to exploit the situation to its own advantage. North Korea probably wanted to expedite the process of ‘democratization’. . . . The call for dialogue with the South would also deprive the South Korean armed forces, using the threat of a North Korean invasion, of an excuse for establishing military rule.24 Similarly, North Korea’s calls for friendlier relations with Japan are to be regarded with suspicion. Kim Il Sung lobbied for economic and political relations with Japan. Being asked whether an improvement of North Korean-Japanese relations would be possible in light of Japan’s good relations with South Korea, Kim Il Sung responded that “Japan-South Korea relations are between those two countries; they do not concern us.”25 Despite some exchanges, mainly on the cultural and educational level, and despite Kim Il Sung’s claim to the contrary, on April 12, a different North Korean attitude became visible also toward Japan. The North Korean Worker’s Party organ Nodong Sinmun was authorized to label the Japanese administration under the leadership of Prime Minister Ohira as “reactionaries” and write that they are “accelerating the political, economic and military infiltration of South Korea as the first step in realizing their wild dream of expansion in Asia.”26 Kim Il Sung also ascribed expansionist and aggressive motivations to the United States. In the perception of Kim Il Sung, the United States used the South Korean government as an extended arm for a foreign policy of imperialism. In his speech at the Sixth KWP Congress, which convened in Pyongyang during October 10–14, he said:

KIM IL SUNG: REVOLUTIONARY COLD WARRIOR

93

We must do away with the colonial fascist rule of the U.S. imperialists and their stooges in South Korea and reunify the country, and thus end the distress and tragedy of our fellow countrymen and carve out a bright future for our nation. If reunification does not come quickly and division continues, our nation will remain bisected forever, and the South Korean people will be unable to cast off the yoke of colonial slavery.27 Kim Il Sung furthermore attributed the responsibility for the military coup in South Korea to the United States. In the same speech he argued that all the barbaric acts of the South Korean military fascist elements that stir up the towering indignation of the world public now are committed under the manipulation and aegis of the United States. It is the United States that masterminded the beastly pogrom against the patriotic people who rose in revolt in Kwangju. It is the United States that instigated the cruel suppression of the South Korean democrats and it is also none other than the United States, the wirepuller, that has rigged up the military fascist dictatorial “government” in South Korea and put a hangman at its head.28 Despite this harsh anti-U.S. rhetoric, Janus-faced Kim Il Sung persisted in his call for negotiations with the United States on the development of NorthSouth relations. In fact, just minutes after his speech, he reportedly renewed such a call. There is good reason to assume that the United States (and, for that matter, also Japan and South Korea), because of its past experience with North Korean diplomatic behavior, perceived occasional cooperative moves of Kim Il Sung as a “deception strategy.” A deception strategy is a “false announcement” of the deceiver’s “preferences to induce the other player to choose a strategy favorable to itself.” For such a strategy to be effective, the player that is to be deceived may have “no information about the deceiver”—that is, there may be no history of interactions between the two players.29 Such was, of course, not the case for the United States and North Korea. The United States thus rejected North Korean calls for negotiation and the international environment would become increasingly unfavorable for North Korea, thereby vindicating Kim Il Sung’s pessimistic perceptions. China, a close ally of North Korea throughout the 1970s, had just signed the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, and established the full normalization of U.S.-Chinese relations.30 North Korean specialist Adrian Buzo writes that “the new reality for [North Korea] in the 1980s was an . . . emerging China-Japan-US triangle of common policy interests in the region generally and on the Korean Peninsula in particular.”31 Faced with such a reality and with economic difficulties caused among other things by large military expenditures, as well as the lack of effective

94

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

bargaining chips vis-à-vis the United States, South Korea, and Japan, North Korea initiated the development of nuclear weapons as it began the construction of a 5 MW reactor fueled with natural uranium and moderated with graphite. Kim Il Sung viewed it as “an instrument of both deterrence and coercion (as well as a status symbol) to serve his strategic goal of reunification by force.”32 Plutonium produced from this reactor would stand at the heart of U.S.-North Korean disputes in years to come and most prominently in 1994.33 In the meantime, North Korea sought reinforcement for its position in the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), which consisted primarily of Third World countries and shared an antagonism against “Western capitalism.” Throughout 1980, North Korea vigorously pursued both invitational and visitational diplomacy with such countries as Zimbabwe, Angola, Algeria, Mali, or Mozambique. From Kim Il Sung’s perspective, “strengthening the international revolutionary forces and cementing solidarity with them would lead to the creation of a favorable international situation for an all-Korean revolution, thus hastening the victory of world revolution.”34 At the same time, Kim Il Sung considered this revolution to be endangered. In 1981, Kim Il Sung along with other North Korean officials indicated worries that not only the United States and South Korea but also Japan and South Korea would collaborate in questions of regional and international security.35 Again, in his collected thoughts, For an Independent World, Kim Il Sung describes his belief that “we should wage the struggle against American imperialism.” The way to do so is “to destroy it by a revolutionary method. Revolutionary countries should all endeavor to tear American imperialism apart. . . . The revolutionary struggle against American imperialism should be waged vigorously wherever its tentacles of aggression are extended.”36 Unofficial meetings between Japanese and South Korean defense officials did not go unnoticed in Pyongyang and prompted the Nodong Sinmun to write about the “wicked aggressive design . . . [of] the Japanese reactionaries . . . [for] secretly delivering large quantities of howitzer and mortar barrels and other gun accessories . . . [and] handling over technical blueprints for the manufacture of heavy weapons.”37 Also at the beginning of the year, on January 19, North Korea denounced South Korean President Chun as an “illegal” chief of state and the “ring-leader of murderers and the butcher of the nation.” This came after Chun’s cooperative move of proposing “a historic exchange of visits between the highest authorities of both halves of Korea.”38 As opposed to Japanese-South Korean exchanges, U.S.-South Korean exchanges were official. Three days after President Reagan’s inauguration, on January 21, the White House announced President Chun’s impending visit. Chun arrived in Washington on February 2 and was assured by Reagan that the new administration had no plans to withdraw American troops from the Korean peninsula. In fact, Reagan soon increased U.S. troops to the largest number on duty in Korea since 1972. Reagan also told Chun that the United

KIM IL SUNG: REVOLUTIONARY COLD WARRIOR

95

States was “prepared to sell Korea F-16 warplanes, the most modern in the U.S. inventory.”39 These U.S. actions had as a consequence a reification of the already existing security dilemma and, therefore, it may be of little surprise that in 1981 North Korea perceived the United States to be (even) “more bellicose” than in previous years. It appears again as somewhat Janusfaced that North Korea’s “militancy” was, at times, accompanied “by signals indicating interest in opening a dialogue with Washington on the question of the Korean armistice agreement and an interest in promoting scholarly contacts with the U.S. on a ‘reciprocal invitation’ basis.”40 The sincerity of such signals was very much doubted by U.S. government officials and, subsequently, U.S.-North Korean relations did not improve but instead deteriorated. On August 26, the United States charged Pyongyang with the firing of an antiaircraft missile at an American SR-71 reconnaissance plane flying “in South Korean and international airspace.” The U.S. government expressed a “serious concern at this act of lawlessness” and a firm intention to “take whatever steps” necessary to ensure the future safety of such flights. North Korea was provoked and labeled the allegations a “groundless fabrication” aimed to provoke a new war in Korea.41 Kim Il Sung’s belief was: Under the pretext of a ‘threat of southward invasion,’ the South Korean military facists are introducing a large amount of up-todate lethal weapons and modern military equipment from the United states and are staging clangorous war exercises with the American troops almost every day. It is due to these maneuvers for a new war, conducted by the US imperialists and the South Korean military fascists, that the situation in our country is now strained to the extreme, and that there is the danger of war breaking out any minute.42 Along with the prevailing perception in North Korea that the United States would be more bellicose, and along with the hostile rhetoric exchange between North Korea and the United States, the rift between the two Koreas widened further in 1981. Rhetorical “sparring” between North and South Korea continued, punctuated by intermittent charges and countercharges of provocations along the demilitarized zone. Despite this unpromising atmosphere, on June 5, Chun proposed to “discuss frankly all questions raised by both sides” at a time and place of Kim Il Sung’s choice. North Korea rejected Chun’s invitation and started to politicize sports issues. On September 30, the International Olympics Committee (IOC) selected Seoul as the host-city for the 1988 Summer Olympics. North Korea denounced this decision “as contrary to the Olympic spirit of separating sports from politics,” and argued that “Chun was seeking to exploit the coming event as a vehicle to further his ‘two Koreas’ policy.”43

96

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

Whether South Korea indeed harbored such intentions remains doubtful.44 In January 1982, Chun set forth several proposals for the solution of the reunification problem. Among other items, his proposal suggested the establishment of a “Consultative Conference for National Reunification” that would consist of “representatives of North and South Korea with the aim of drafting a constitution for a unified Korea.” He also proposed “the conclusion of a provisional agreement on basic relations between the two Korean states, and the establishment of ‘resident liaison missions’ headed by cabinet-rank plenipotentiaries in each other’s capitals.” A few days later, North Korea rejected these proposals in toto, and set forth its own list of comparatively low-profile suggestions, demonstrating that it was not willing to compromise on other’s terms or other’s suggestions.45 The Non-aligned Movement remained an important, and probably the only, forum for Kim Il Sung to compete with South Korea and mobilize opinion against U.S. imperialism.46 In May 1982, Pyongyang hosted a conference of the “News Agencies Pool of Nonaligned Countries.” The agenda was marked by an assault on the “imbalance and inequality in the international order of information and communications.”47 At a subsequent conference in Havana, North Korea again took the occasion to antagonize both the United States and South Korea vis-à-vis the members of the Nonaligned Movement. North Korea’s efforts were successful. In November, it concluded a treaty with Libya under the leadership of Colonel Muammar Quaddafi who, at that time, was believed to be “an agent of [an] international terrorist conspiracy.”48 Both sides pledged themselves to “exchange military data and specialists” and to provide “the other party with weapons not possessed by it.” The war between Iraq (backed by the United States) and Iran started in 1980, and although Pyongyang announced a stance of neutrality at the eve of the conflict in October 1979, it reportedly supplied “about 40 percent of the approximately $2 billion worth of weapons, ammunition, and equipment Iran acquired abroad” in 1982.49 Material aid was complemented with personnel contributions as North Korea also provided Iran with about 300 military instructors.50 While North Korea thus engaged indirectly in military encounters with the United States or its allies, in its direct interactions it relied on hostile rhetoric for the most part. Both the United States and Japan “were accused of colluding against [North Korea] for a new war and of having reduced South Korea to a ‘double colony.’ ”51 Kim Il Sung’s belief was and would remain that “the US troops occupation of South Korea and the US imperialists’ ‘two Koreas’ plot are the main obstacle to the reunification of our country.”52 Similar was the North Korean reaction to the “Team Spirit” military exercise of the United States and South Korea in February, which exacerbated the perception of hostility in Pyongyang. The North Korean foreign ministry issued a statement denouncing the United States and South Korea

KIM IL SUNG: REVOLUTIONARY COLD WARRIOR

97

for conducting a “test war” and a “preliminary war.”53 Hostilities toward South Korea also occurred in deeds. In September, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations had announced its intention to sponsor a regional conference in Pyongyang. Pyongyang, however, refused entry to a South Korean delegation. The FAO’s reaction was a withdrawal of any support. Considering South Korean leader Chun as an impediment for North Korean goals, in the final months of the year, North Korea went beyond conventional means of conducting international politics as it engaged in secretive plans to assassinate Chun on a state visit in Gabon. According to Koh Yong Hwan, a North Korean diplomat who participated in the preparations for the assassination but later defected to the South, “the operation had been called off at the last minute.” This happened “because the assassination of the South Korean president in an African country could have devastated North Korea’s important African support in the UN General Assembly.”54 Acts that resemble the doings of terrorists, however, would follow in the coming year. In January of the next year, Japanese Prime Minister Yashuhiro Nakasone departed for Seoul for a state visit. The North Korean partycontrolled Korean Central News Agency criticized this visit as “a criminal junket to further coil up the tensions in and around the Korean peninsula and increase the danger of war.” At the same time, it renewed its denunciation of what it called “the fabrication of the triangular military alliance” between the United States, Japan, and South Korea. In February and March, the “Team Spirit” joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises continued and were denounced by Kim Il Sung as “a very dangerous military provocation pushing the situation on the Korean peninsula to the brink of war.” In response to these exercises that Pyongyang continued to perceive as provocative, North Korea placed the “county under a quasi-war state.” At the end of July, this move was followed by North Korea’s annual “Month for the Joint Anti-U.S. Struggle.”55 Again as in previous years, North Korea, in a move that is difficult to comprehend, aimed to establish closer ties with the United States just shortly after it had initiated a harsh verbal attack. And surprisingly, the United States was open to some communication. Secretary of State George Shultz “ordered the relaxation” of some restrictions on contacts with North Korea.56 At the same time, the Japanese government sent a parliamentary delegation to North Korea to discuss fishery and potential trade agreements. Soon afterward, Japanese foreign minister Abe Shintari received a North Korean delegation attending an international conference of legal experts in Tokyo. These positive developments were soon reversed. North Korea was committed to prevent Chun from becoming further established as the South Korean authority figure because this would stand in the way of Korean reunification under Kim Il Sung’s leadership. Intending to assassinate Chun,

98

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

on October 9, a North Korean commando detonated a bomb at an official event of the South Korean government in Rangoon.57 The detonation killed seventeen senior South Korean officials, including four Cabinet ministers. Chun escaped because the bomb was detonated prematurely. Following an official investigation, on November 4, Burmese authorities announced that North Korea was responsible for the bombing—a judgment that was shared by the international community.58 The consequence was a renewed deterioration of temporarily improved North Korean relations with the United States and Japan. After Burma’s announcement, Tokyo condemned North Korea’s role in the terrorist acts and imposed a package of sanctions on November 7. These included restrictions on trade with North Korea, and restrictions on the entry of North Korean officials to Japan, and restrictions on travel of Japanese officials to North Korea and official contacts with North Koreans in third countries. In a self-defeating move, “North Korea responded by imposing its own restrictions on Japan, including a suspension of the fishery agreement talks.” When a North Korean soldier defected to Japan, it reacted “by taking hostage a Japanese freighter and four crewmen while they were in Nampo port, pressing Tokyo to return the soldier.”59 Talks with the United States that North Korea had proposed previously were (of course) suspended. North Korean diplomatic relations that remained in 1983 were (again) mainly with members of the Non-aligned Movement. From these countries, North Korea continued to receive state visits by government leaders in 1983 and also dispatched its own officials to those countries.60 In this year, Pyongyang also “expanded its role as a supplier of arms and military expertise to countries in Africa and Latin America” as it reportedly provided countries such as Grenada, Iran, and Zimbabwe with military supplies at a value of several hundred millions.61 At the same time, North Korean military instructors were sent to such countries as Brunei, Libya, Somalia, and Uganda. Kim Il Sung continued to consider the Non-aligned Movement a main vehicle for a global revolution when he gives the following assessment: The present situation urgently demands that the non-aligned countries wage the struggle to establish a new international economic order . . . by achieving economic independence and realizing southsouth cooperation, along with the struggle to check and frustrate the aggressive and belligerent policy of imperialists and preserve peace and security in the world.62 Kim Il Sung also hosted the World Conference of Journalists Against Imperialism and For Friendship and Peace in Pyongyang at the beginning of July. At the conference he delivered a speech entitled “Let Us Shatter Imperialist Moves Toward Aggression and War and Safeguard Peace and Independence.”63 In sum, the North Korean foreign policy of contention and

KIM IL SUNG: REVOLUTIONARY COLD WARRIOR

99

hostility continued in 1983. Would Kim Il Sung draw any lessons from the feedback following these? The answer is, in short, “No,” and I will next illustrate how North Korea together with its opponents continued to play power politics and reify a mostly gloomy picture of their international relations.

THE DEADLOCK CONTINUES (1984–1986) The Rangoon bombing was a major setback in inter-Korean relations and carried over into 1984.64 The deadlock that at times had been interrupted in the preceding years, albeit without lasting success, continued. Nothing else was to be expected as neither Kim Il Sung’s diagnosis of the international environment nor his prescriptive beliefs toward this environment changed. Kim Il Sung, in other words, did not engage in any experiential learning (see Table 5.3).

Table 5.3: Kim Il Sung’s Operational Code (1980–1983) and (1984–1986) Compared Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs P-1. Nature of Political Universe (Conflict/Cooperation) P-2. Realization of Political Values (Pessimism/Optimism) P-3. Political Future (Unpredictable/Predictable) P-4. Historical Development (Low Control/High Control) P-5. Role of Chance (Small Role/Large Role) I-1. Strategic Approach to Goals (Conflict/Cooperation) I-2. Intensity of Tactics (Conflict/Cooperation) I-3. Risk Orientation (Averse/Acceptant) I-4. Timing of Action a. Conflict/Cooperation b. Words/Deeds I-5. Utility of Means a. Reward b. Promise c. Appeal/Support d. Oppose/Resist e. Threaten f. Punish No significant differences between indices. *n = 10. **n = 8.

1980–1983* 0.165

1984–1986** 0.218

0.114

0.152

0.103

0.086

0.124

0.143

0.987

0.987

–0.010

0.099

–0.058

–0.045

0.103

0.301

0.476 0.466

0.568 0.501

0.179 0.081 0.235 0.170 0.064 0.271

0.134 0.080 0.336 0.132 0.057 0.263

100

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

In the period between 1984 and 1986 the aggregated scores for Kim Il Sung’s master beliefs are Self (I-1 = .28, P-4a = .16) and Other (P-1 = .21, P-4b = .26), which specify the preference ordering in Proposition 5 for Self and Other in TIP. As in the preceding years, Kim Il Sung’s operational code again prescribes a prisoner’s dilemma strategy that ranks domination over settlement over deadlock over submission. He applies the same preference order to his opponents. Kim Il Sung’s subjective game remained unchanged, and is mapped out in Figure 5.2. Neither North Korea nor any of the other parties involved moved from the initial state (2,2) of the preceding period. The prediction of TOM is the same as it was in the previous period, namely, that Kim Il Sung will continue to “stay” at the (2,2) equilibrium and engage in belligerent tactics in response to his perception that his opponents will do the same. Table 5.4 summarizes the main events in North Korea’s relations with the United States, South Korea, and Japan until the year 1986. The prediction of relations between North Korea on the one side and the United States, South Korea, and Japan on the other would come true after a typically short intermezzo. On January 10, Pyongyang initiated a proposal for “tripartite talks” among the United States, North Korea, and South Korea, reasoning that the parties concerned with the pending question are us, the United States and South Korea. The United States is the provoker of the Korean War, a belligerent party in a war with us and a signatory to the armistice agreement. The South Korean authorities are another party, which is aggravating the tensions in our country and bringing the clouds of war. Therefore, a complete peace and a durable peace

US, SK, JAPAN CO CF CO

3,3 |¨ 1,4 Ø

NK CF

US, SK, JAPAN CO CF

≠

4,1 Æ “2,2”

Kim Il Sung’s strategy: Stay

US, SK, JAPAN CO CF

CO Settle Submit NK

CO

≠

NK CF Dominate Deadlock NORTH KOREA OUTCOMES

3,3 Æ| 1,4

CF

Ø

4,1 |¨ “2,2”

Kim Il Sung’s perception of opponents’ strategy: Stay

The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each player. The symbols “Æ” and “Æ|” indicate the respective strategic choices of “move” or “stay” by the player with the next move given the initial state (Brams, 1994).

Figure 5.2: Kim Il Sung’s Subjective Game (1984–1986)

KIM IL SUNG: REVOLUTIONARY COLD WARRIOR

101

Table 5.4: Main Events in North Korean Relations with the United States, South Korea, and Japan from 1984 to 1986 Month

North Korea

United States/South Korea/Japan

North Korea initiates proposal for “tripartite talks” with U.S. and South Korea.

U.S. and South Korea reject talks.

1984 January

North Korea accuses U.S. of boundless aggressive ambition and imperialism. July

North Korea seizes Japanese fishing vessels.

September

North Korea offers humanitarian aid to South Korea.

1985 February

October November

U.S. denounces North Korea as sponsor of terrorism. North Korea accuses U.S. of international terrorism.

Japan lifts restrictions that were imposed after Rangoon bombing.

North and South Korean troops exchange fire at the DMZ.

1986 January

Extensive military exercises of U.S. and South Korea.

cannot be guaranteed, even if the question were solved between us and the United States, and accordingly, South Korea must also come out to the negotiation for peace. The peace negotiation should take the form of tripartite talks, secondly, because the question cannot be satisfactorily solved if the United States and the South Korean rulers are separated from each other, as they are closely tied up with each other in the war policy against us.65 The proposal stated that “the Seoul authorities . . . may participate on an equal footing in the talks between us and the United States.” The talks, according to a North Korean request, were to be conducted on two stages. In the first stage, North Korea and the United States “would negotiate a peace treaty to replace the 1953 armistice agreement and provide for the

102

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea.” In the second stage, North Korea and South Korea “would negotiate . . . a declaration of nonagression [and] a mutual reduction of forces.”66 Given the events of the recent past, such a meeting proved to be elusive. The government in Seoul rejected these proposals while the United States demanded that its talks with North Korea should be preceded by talks between Pyongyang and Seoul.67 Subsequently, the North Korean party organ Nodong Simun accused the United States of “boundless aggressive ambition” and “imperialism.”68 A few weeks later, it wrote that “the US imperialists are accelerating the fabrication of the US-Japanese-South Korean triangular military alliance and intensifying maneuvers for military aggression against our country.”69 Japanese “militarism” was reemphasized by Kim Il Sung at a banquet speech in Moscow at the end of May.70 Hostile deeds followed the hostile rhetoric. In July, North Korea seized Japanese fishing vessels, which ultimately resulted in the shooting of a ship’s captain.71 An unexpected development in inter-Korean relations occurred in September when “torrential rains and landslides in the region near Seoul . . . killed 190 people and left 200,000 homeless.”72 To everyone’s surprise, the “South Korean Red Cross Society announced that it would accept the North Korean Red Cross Society’s offer to send relief goods to . . . victims in the South.”73 Among these goods were rice, cement, textiles, and medical supplies. Whether North Korea’s offer was a sincere effort to move toward better relations or instead as a gesture with an intent to imply superiority to the South Korean people and demonstrate responsibility to the world audience remains highly questionable.74 One observer wrote that “Pyongyang’s offer appeared to be routine propaganda.”75 South Korean officials, however, did forgo any criticism and, in the following months, tensions between Pyongyang and Seoul eased somewhat. North and South Korea “held thirteen public discussions, including five economic meetings, three Red Cross meetings, three working-level Red Cross contacts, and two preliminary contacts for a North-South parliamentary exchange proposed by Pyongyang.”76 And in his 1985 New Year’s message, Kim Il Sung said that the success in these lower-level talks could lead gradually to higher-level talks and “culminate in high-level political negotiations between North and South.”77 At the same time, after some low-level North Korean efforts, North Korean-Japanese relations improved somewhat as well. On October 31, the Japanese government announced that it would lift the restrictions it imposed on North Korea after the Rangoon bombing.78 Relations that did not improve were those between North Korea and the United States. On October 7, Nodong Sinmun defined U.S. foreign policy as a “policy of international terrorism,” stating, “The United States has adopted terrorism and burglary as a national policy and is further stepping them up.”79 Overall, the American-led, Western world remained North Korea’s principal target—economically as well as politically. Kim Il Sung’s conflictual

KIM IL SUNG: REVOLUTIONARY COLD WARRIOR

103

attitude toward this target is well illustrated in an interview he gave in February 1985: As for the world’s economic situation today, we can say that the economic sphere, too, as is the case with the political sphere, is characterized mainly by the antagonism and struggle between the developed countries of the Western world and the newly-emerging nations, and between billionaires and the working masses. In an attempt to get out of the economic crisis, the imperialists are now obstinately maneuvering to maintain the old international economic order while internally intensifying the exploitation of the toiling masses and externally increasing economic pressure upon the socialist countries and stepping up their neo-colonial plunder of the third world countries.80 Around the same time, the Reagan administration established international terrorism as a foreign policy priority and issued an array of statements condemning it. The recurring message of these statements implicated not only Cuba, Iran, Libya, Nicaragua, and Syria, but also North Korea as supporters of international terrorism. In a speech in July, President Reagan explained the addition of the latter: “The extent and crudity of North Korean violence against the United states and our ally, South Korea, are a matter of record. . . . What is not readily known or understood is North Korea’s wider links to the international terrorist network.”81 More disturbing than the usual dismissive North Korean rhetoric that would follow was the movement of ten North Korean divisions from rear areas of the country to within a few miles of the DMZ.82 An incident occurring on November 23 in Panmunjom at the DMZ led to a new setback in relations between Pyongyang and Seoul. North Korean troops and soldiers of the United Nations Command opened fire on each other in a clash that erupted with the defection of a Soviet citizen crossing the demarcation line to seek political asylum.83 The incident led to several fatalities on both sides. The South Korean Minister of Culture and Information labeled it a “grave violation of the military armistice” and demanded an official apology from Pyongyang. Pyongyang, in turn, accused both South Korea and the United States of a “brazen criminal act.”84 The immediate consequence of this episode was the cancellation of previously scheduled economic cooperation talks between North and South Korea. The summit diplomacy between the two capitals continued nevertheless. On September 4–6, 1985, “a five-member North Korean delegation headed by former foreign minister Ho Dam and special envoy Han Se Hae visited the South” to discuss the prospectus for a summit meeting between Kim Il Sung and Chun. In the following month, Chang Se Dong, chief of the Agency for National Security Planning together with senior emissary

104

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

Park Chul Un visited Kim Il Sung and delivered a letter from Chun calling for an early summit meeting “as a shortcut to peace where both of us meet face to face and open hearts to exchange conversation, build up trust and prevent a war.” Then, in a move that diminished the prospects for a summit and that was not expected by the South, Kim Il Sung’s aides “presented their draft of a North-South nonaggression pact, which the southerners considered full of unacceptable rhetoric.”85 South Korea rejected this proposal. Despite dismissive rhetoric, low-level talks between the two sides went on and were consumed mainly with the task of attempting to harmonize differing draft proposals for the operation of a high-level cooperation committee. These talks were then halted in late 1985, as it became clear that the North’s preference for “immediate, wide-ranging negotiations on economic cooperation was incompatible with the South’s preference to work first through relatively minor issues in order to establish whether a basis for high-level negotiations existed.”86 Kim Il Sung was quick to attribute the blame to the United States and South Korea: Owing to the machinations of separatists in [South Korea] and abroad . . . our proposals for peaceful reunification have not brought about a desired result. At present the US is persisting in the ‘two Korea’ policy to perpetuate the division of our country. Following this policy the South Korean authorities are in fact embarking upon the road of aggravating the tension while advocating North-South confrontation, although they are talking about dialogue.87 The event that then ultimately erased any hopes for a summit meeting was the U.S.-South Korean “Team Spirit” exercise that “under Chun had been build up to a powerful array of about 200,000 United States and [South Korean] troops in increasingly realistic—and threatening—military maneuvers south of the DMZ, involving ground, sea, and air forces.”88 In response, on January 20 1986, Pyongyang issued a statement on behalf of all its public negotiating teams—economic, Red Cross, and parliamentary exchange— denouncing this “nuclear war maneuver intended against North Korea.” All further discussions were called off for an unspecified duration. During 1986, “no dialogue of any importance in economic cooperation, humanitarian contacts, or political talks . . . were held.”89 In sum, no progress was made in the years 1984-1986 and, moreover, the balance of inter-Korean negotiations in particular “was meager.” Those negotiations that did occur were insignificant. Buzo writes that “the only tangible achievements were in the humanitarian fields” and that “although Seoul attached particular importance to confidence-building measures [North Korea] did not, and so these humanitarian gestures did not signal wider forms of agreement.” According to the narrative of North Korean foreign policy told so far, Buzo concludes that “there was no sign of any strategic change

KIM IL SUNG: REVOLUTIONARY COLD WARRIOR

105

in the wider picture of [North Korean] . . . policy. He points to the pivotal instance of Kim Il Sung as he writes that “it is intrinsically improbable that an aging, doctrinaire revolutionary leadership would undertake a significant rethink of reunification strategy.”90 The coming years would, however, pose serious challenges to North Korea and Kim Il Sung.

This page intentionally left blank.

CHAPTER SIX

KIM IL SUNG: TOUCHED BY THE WINDS OF CHANGE?

The years 1987–1990 marked a catalytic period in which Kim Il Sung had to face increasing economic deterioration and political isolation emanating from the international environment. By 1991, the cold war had also come to an end. Did the events connected with its end have an effect on Kim Il Sung’s beliefs in the aftermath of the cold war? In this chapter, I will demonstrate that Kim Il Sung did not engage in sufficient learning that would lead to substantive change in North Korean foreign policy behavior—this despite the expectation found in the conventional international relations literature that “external shocks” should lead to changes especially in the foreign policy behavior of small states such as North Korea.1

THE CATALYTIC PERIOD (1987–1990) For most of the cold war, North Korea, as a “fortress of communism,”2 was able to rely on the Soviet Union for economic and military support in the form of aid and subsidized trade.3 Early in his tenure, Gorbachev responded favorably to the North Korean request to sell it modern weaponry that it could not have produced by itself. North Korea considered this weaponry vital for its national interest. The leaders in Pyongyang thought these supplies were necessary not only to increase their level of capabilities and deterrence regarding South Korea and the United States, but also to pursue the development of socialism both nationally and internationally. This beneficial relationship for North Korea extended into the Gorbachev era, peaked there, but was then terminated by Gorbachev and other reform-minded allies as they recognized and acknowledged the “errors” of their past policies.4 Subscribing to the “new thinking,” the “motives, convictions, and assessments,” of the Soviet ruling coalition led by Gorbachev 107

108

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

“led them to conclude that a new, radically different path was needed”—a path that departed from a communist doctrine, associated with confrontational bloc politics.5 As Coit Blacker points out, For Gorbachev and those closest to him, the game in world politics had changed profoundly in the four years that separated his elections as CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] general secretary and the collapse of Soviet power in Europe; if prior to 1985 the overarching object of Soviet foreign policy had been to strengthen the “position of socialism” at the expense of the West, by 1989 a new goal—to secure Soviet admission to the elaborate collection of institutions that constituted the Western economic and political system—had arisen to take its place.6 As a consequence of this new thinking, North Korea lost its once prominent status on the agenda of Soviet policymaking and gradually declined into the realm of almost total isolation. Already by 1987, as Buzo writes, “the processes of perestroika and glasnost had begun to undermine the Soviet Union’s strategic premises in its restored relationship with [North Korea].”7 The subsequent improvement of Sino-Soviet relations, JapaneseSoviet relations, and the détente between the United States and the Soviet Union consequently diminished North Korea’s strategic value as a buffer state.8 Gorbachev’s Krasnoyarsk speech in September 1988 made it clear that North Korean and Soviet interests would continue to diverge sharply, as Moscow sought an intensification of political and economic relations with South Korea, the government that was (and is) considered illegitimate by Pyongyang.9 Moscow’s departure from the once prevalent “one Korea policy” reached its climax when the Soviet Union granted diplomatic recognition to the Republic of Korea in 1990.10 This move prompted Nondong Sinmun to write, “The Soviet Union sold off the dignity and honor of a socialist power and the interests and faith of an ally for 2.3 billion dollars,” referring to Seoul’s promise to provide Moscow with loans and trade credits.11 Kim Il Sung felt betrayed by his former ally.12 At the same time, the relations between China, another traditional ally, and South Korea were improving.13 On October 20, Beijing and Seoul agreed to exchange trade offices, which would also handle consular affairs. Referring to Moscow’s and Beijing’s withdrawal from North Korea, Oh writes that “at the beginning of the 1990s . . . North Korea’s position worsened dramatically.”14 Yet another major blow was to come from the Soviet Union. In September 1990, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze officially informed North Korea that Moscow would suspend further large-scale Soviet investments in North Korea, cut military aid sharply, and insist that future bilateral trade be conducted in hard currency.15 The so-called Gorbachev directive of April 2,

KIM IL SUNG: TOUCHED BY THE WINDS OF CHANGE?

109

1991, instructed Soviet organizations to curtail military technological cooperation with North Korea.16 This was followed by total discontinuation of political and diplomatic support and economic and military assistance.17 According to one expert on Korean affairs, “The collapse of communist rule in the Soviet Union resulted in Pyongyang’s confronting the most serious challenge to its establishment since 1948. . . . It brought complete confusion and chaos to the North Korean foreign policy apparatus.”18 Did Kim Il Sung draw any lessons during this period? Given the scale of transformations in the 1987–1990 catalytic period, the results in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 may come as no surprise. Compared to the average leader, in this period Kim Il Sung continues to perceive the political

Table 6.1: Kim Il Sung in 1987–1990 Compared to the Average Leader Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs P-1. Nature of Political Universe (Conflict/Cooperation) P-2. Realization of Political Values (Pessimism/Optimism) P-3. Political Future (Unpredictable/Predictable) P-4. Historical Development (Low Control/High Control) P-5. Role of Chance (Small Role/Large Role) I-1. Strategic Approach to Goals (Conflict/Cooperation) I-2. Intensity of Tactics (Conflict/Cooperation) I-3. Risk Orientation (Averse/Acceptant) I-4. Timing of Action a. Conflict/Cooperation b. Words/Deeds I-5. Utility of Means a. Reward b. Promise c. Appeal/Support d. Oppose/Resist e. Threaten f. Punish

1987–1990* 0.170

Average Leader** 0.250

0.081

0.118

0.082c

0.148

0.079a

0.212

0.995c

0.968

0.128

0.334

0.095

0.139

0.350

0.304

0.491 0.479

0.509 0.525

0.227 0.081 0.255b 0.165 0.169a 0.103

0.167 0.073 0.427 0.147 0.047 0.138

Significant differences between indices at the following levels: ap ≤ 0.001, bp ≤ 0.01, cp ≤ 0.05, (two-tailed test). *n = 15. **n = 264 for P-1–P-5, 255 for I-1–I-5.

110

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

Table 6.2: Learning Patterns of Kim Il Sung Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs

1980–1986*

1987–1990**

P-1.

Nature of Political Universe (Conflict/Cooperation)

0.189

0.170

P-2.

Realization of Political Values (Pessimism/Optimism)

0.131

0.081

P-3.

Political Future (Unpredictable/Predictable)

0.095

0.082

P-4.

Historical Development (Low Control/High Control)

0.132

0.079b

P-5.

Role of Chance (Small Role/Large Role)

0.987

0.995a

I-1.

Strategic Approach to Goals (Conflict/Cooperation)

0.038

0.128

I-2.

Intensity of Tactics (Conflict/Cooperation)

–0.053

0.095

I-3.

Risk Orientation (Averse/Acceptant)

0.304

0.350

I-4.

Timing of Action a. Conflict/Cooperation b. Words/Deeds

0.517 0.482

0.491 0.479

Utility of Means a. Reward b. Promise c. Appeal/Support d. Oppose/Resist e. Threaten f. Punish

0.159 0.080 0.280 0.153 0.060 0.267

0.227 0.081 0.255 0.165 0.169 0.103c

I-5.

Significant differences between indices at the following levels: ap ≤ 0.005, bp ≤ 0.02, c p ≤ 0.07, (two-tailed test). *n = 18. **n = 15.

future as being rather unpredictable (P-3). Moreover, he now perceives himself to have even less control over it (P-4) as he ascribes a high role to the influence of chance (P-5). Unlike the case of Gorbachev, however, this did not transform Kim Il Sung’s confrontational international politics into lasting cooperative international politics. Compared to the average leader, Kim Il Sung is still less likely to ascribe to Appeal tactics (I-5c). Instead, he appears to favor Threaten tactics (I-5e) as a means to attain political goals. Kim Il Sung engaged in some experiential learning that manifested itself as a decreased confidence in the utility of Punish tactics (I-5f). He also engaged in cognitive strategic learning at the complex level as his loss of

111

KIM IL SUNG: TOUCHED BY THE WINDS OF CHANGE?

confidence in controlling international events (P-4) led him to redefine his strategy. Overall, however, he remains a conflictual leader. The aggregated scores for Kim Il Sung’s key beliefs are Self (I-1 = 0.16, P-4a = .10) and Other (P-1 = .18, P-4b = 0.32), which specify the preference orderings in Proposition 4 for Self and Proposition 6 for Other in TIP. Kim Il Sung’s operational code in the period between 1987 and 1990 prescribes a Chicken strategy that ranks domination over settlement over submission over deadlock for self and attributes a Bully strategy that ranks domination over deadlock over settlement over submission to his opponents, the United States, South Korea, and Japan. His subjective strategic game is mapped out in Figure 6.1. The initial state (1,3) represents Kim Il Sung’s belief that international politics was and remains a confrontational affair. The prediction from TOM is that North Korea, “forced onto its knees,” would move toward (2,4) and engage in gestures seeking conciliation while the United States and its allies would bully Pyongyang and stay at (1,3).19 As I will describe in more detail, the historical record of this period indicates that Kim Il Sung indeed adopted a more conciliatory posture at times. In the end, however, he resumed a conflictual stance. The record also indicates that Kim Il Sung continued to be a leader with a high need for cognitive consistency.20 Kim Il Sung consistently subscribed to an inherent bad faith model when thinking of international relations and his traditional enemies, the United States, South Korea, and Japan.21 The consequence was that at times he continued to misperceive the international environment and the occasional positive signals originating from it. It was probably these misperceptions that contributed to Kim Il Sung’s retreat from continuous policies of de-escalation and the ultimate reinforcement of his self-fulfilling prophecies. Table 6.3 highlights the main events in the international relations of North Korea in the period lasting from 1987 to 1990. US, SK, JAPAN CO CF CO

3,2 |¨ 2,4 Ø

NK CF

US, SK, JAPAN CO CF

≠

4,1 Æ “1,3”

Kim Il Sung’s strategy: Move

US, SK, JAPAN CO CF

CO Settle Submit NK

CO

≠

NK CF Dominate Deadlock NORTH KOREA OUTCOMES

3,2 Æ 2,4

CF

Ø

4,1 |¨ “1,3”

Kim Il Sung’s perception of opponents’ strategy: Stay

The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each player. The symbols “Æ” and “Æ|” indicate the respective strategic choices of “move” or “stay” by the player with the next move given the initial state (Brams, 1994).

Figure 6.1: Kim Il Sung’s Subjective Game (1987–1990)

112

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

Table 6.3: Main Events in North Korean Relations with the United States, South Korea, and Japan Month

North Korea

United States/South Korea/Japan

Kim Il Sung puts forth multipoint proposal relating to North-South issues.

Joint U.S.-Japanese military exercise.

1987 January February

Seoul rejects North Korean proposals.

July

Kim Il Sung proposes troop reductions.

November

North Korean commando bombs KAL flight 858.

U.S. and South Korean reject troop reduction proposals.

1988 January

Kim Il Sung proposes North-South conference.

July

South Korea initiates “Nordpolitik.”

1989 January

March

Kim Il Sung issues invitations to South Korean officials. North Korean—Japanese talks.

September

October

U.S. deploys nuclear weapons in Japan. North Korea and South Korea engage in prime ministerial talks.

1990 January

July November

Kim Il Sung acknowledges that more intense change is necessary. North Korea and South Korea engage in prime ministerial talks. Halt of prime ministerial talks; North Korea rejects IAEA inspections.

Kim Il Sung recognized and acknowledged the dramatic international changes, including the difficulties facing socialism and communism. His son and adviser Kim Jong Il interpreted the events as follows:

KIM IL SUNG: TOUCHED BY THE WINDS OF CHANGE?

113

Of course, we cannot say that so far socialist countries have brought the superiority of the socialist system fully into play. Frankly speaking, they have deviated sometimes to the ‘Right’ and sometimes to the ‘Left’ in managing the new social system. Deviations occurred in the process of establishing the socialist system, but in particular, grave mistakes were made in finding answers to new problems as to how the revolution and construction should be promoted after the establishment of the socialist system. . . . This has tarnished the image of socialism. Kim Jong Il further describes the beliefs of his father, who remained convinced of the superiority of socialism over capitalism: There is a great gulf between life under socialism, where masses of the people equally enjoy independent and creative activities to the full as masters of the state and society, and that under capitalism, where people become the slaves of money and seek only their own pleasure. A man whose mind has been paralyzed by capitalism cannot see the difference. Kim Il Sung’s learning experience was limited because the meaning he attached to these changes was limited. He continued to believe in the ultimate defeat of capitalism and the victory of socialism: The struggle between socialism and capitalism is the struggle between the new and the old. That the new emerges victorious and the old perishes is an immutable law of historical development. This law will never change, though the victory of the new may be attained only after experiencing twists and turns. . . . Our era by no means suits imperialism; it is an era of historical change in which imperialism is on the brink of ruin and the people of the world are marching forward boldly along the road to socialism, the road of independence.22 In Kim Il Sung’s mind, the future belonged to socialism, yet getting there would be a struggle. His perception of the political universe as being hostile was certainly reinforced by the loosening ties to the Soviet Union as North Korea’s traditional ally. Another factor was probably the joint U.S.Japanese military exercises at the beginning of 1987. In response, Nondong Sinmun wrote: “The US imperialists and the Japanese reactionaries, who are zealous about making preparations for an aggressive war. . . . The joint military exercise is an overture for putting in motion the aggressive system of a tripartite military alliance among the USA, Japan and South Korea.”23 In response to the loosening ties of North Korea to the Soviet Union, and to a lesser degree China, and in response to his perception of an

114

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

unfavorable international environment, Kim Il Sung attempted to increase the momentum of the Non-aligned Movement. In 1987, he initiated the signing of the Pyongyang Declaration for increased cooperation among member states. But then and afterward, in the judgment of Oh and Hassig, the Non-aligned Movement did not have the “cohesive, political, economic, or military power that could provide North Korea with a substitute for its reduced relations with the Soviet Union.”24 Kim Il Sung’s attempt to foster the bonds among the members of the Non-aligned Movement and thereby achieve a strengthened role in international relations failed. Consequently, and in accordance with the prediction from his subjective game, he aimed to reengage South Korea and the United States in new negotiations on political and military issues. On January 11, Kim Il Sung sent a letter to the South proposing to discuss such issues as (1) ceasing mutual vilification, (2) promoting multifarious collaboration and exchanges, (3) reducing arms, (4) turning the DMZ into a peace zone, (5) ceasing all large-scale military exercises, and (6) installing a neutral supervisory force consisting of troops from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Switzerland, and Sweden to preserve the peace in the DMZ. A few weeks later, Pyongyang sent a new letter calling on South Korean authorities to respond positively to the proposal. On February 14, Seoul rejected the North Korean proposals in a reply letter.25 Despite this rejection, on July 23, Kim Il Sung put forth a troop reduction proposal under which both North and South Korea would reduce troop strengths to 100,000 by 1992. A cut of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) was, however, “unlikely to alter KPA strength because large numbers of [North Korean] troops were already surplus to requirements and involved in non-military construction work.”26 Pyongyang also reiterated its earlier proposal for the installation of a neutral supervisory consortium in the DMZ. Both Seoul and Washington rejected Pyongyang’s proposals. Failing in negotiations, North Korea reverted to extreme means of political conduct that involved engaging in state-sponsored terrorism. South Korea’s rise in international reputation as the host of the 1988 Olympics was a thorn in the side of Kim Il Sung. The aim was, therefore, to sabotage the games. On November 29, 1987, Korean Airlines flight 858 exploded in midair over the Andaman Sea, killing all 115 persons abroad.27 The explosion was caused by a bomb planted by two operatives of the North Korean Department for Research and External Intelligence (RDEI). The directive was given by RDEI director Yi Yong-hyok and carried the following message: The party has decided to bomb a Korean Air plane with the aim of blocking South Korea’s attempts to perpetuate the two Koreas and also to host the 1988 Olympics on their own. This project, to be carried out at a critical juncture in time, will pour cold water on the desire of all nations of the world to participate in the

KIM IL SUNG: TOUCHED BY THE WINDS OF CHANGE?

115

Olympics and will deal the South Korean puppet regime a fatal blow. This project must be accomplished without fail and must be kept in absolute secrecy.28 North Korea denied involvement in the bombing, instead “maintaining as it had in the case of the Rangoon bombing that [South Korea] itself had planted the bomb to embarrass [North Korea].” However, the evidence was mounting and as a consequence “a wide spectrum of governments and political parties around the world found the evidence detailed and convincing and, amid another chorus of international condemnation, once again applied diplomatic sanctions to [North Korea].”29 North Korea’s international standing deteriorated further when the United States added it to its list of “terrorist states” and furthermore “rescinded an earlier decision to allow limited contacts between its diplomats and North Korean officials.”30 It was already June 1987 when Roh Tae-woo had been nominated by the Democratic Justice Party (DJP) of South Korea as its candidate to succeed President Chun.31 After he won the December elections, he was inaugurated as the new president of South Korea in February 1988.32 Just before this inauguration, in January, Kim Il Sung proposed that Pyongyang and Seoul hold a “north-south joint conference attended by persons in authority of both sides and the representatives of all the political parties and social organizations and people of all social standings.”33 Officially, Seoul rejected these proposals “as another attempt to highlight what Pyongyang viewed as the unrepresentative nature of the [South Korean] government by appealing to non-governmental groups in the South.”34 At the same time, however, President Roh was “keen to maintain contact with the North” in order to avoid further disturbances of the upcoming Olympics. Secret meetings took place in April and were carried by an agenda that “had focuses on economic assistance from Seoul in return for a pledge from the North not to disrupt the Olympics.” North Korea rejected any South Korean proposals. For example, it was “not satisfied with Seoul’s offer of $900 million against its demand for $4 billion and seized on the 1 May defection of a [North Korean] trade official to break these talks off.”35 On July 7, President Roh initiated his “Nordpolitik” (in imitation of West Germany’s “Ostpolitik” under Willy Brandt). In a declaration, which was “more conciliatory than anything his predecessors had ever offered,” he defined North Korea not as an adversary any longer but as part of “a single nation community.” He promoted a program that would include mutual visits, concerted action to resolve humanitarian issues benefiting separated families, and the opening of new trade relations. Roh also dropped previously held “objections to other nations trading with the North in non-military goods.” He furthermore suggested ending diplomatic rivalry, and sought to cooperate with North Korea internationally and assist it in improving its relations with South Korean allies such as Japan and the United States.36

116

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

Kim Il Sung’s “image of the enemy” remained firm. His initial reaction was to dismiss “the Roh declaration as a rehash of old ideas that had been put forth by his predecessor under instructions from Washington, arguing that it failed to deal with . . . fundamental issues.”37 Of course, Kim Il Sung’s perception of Roh’s declaration was an ignorant one, as it, in fact, did address such fundamental issues as Korean reunification. In Kim Il Sung’s perception, however, Roh’s declaration “was intended to permanently split the country.” Seemingly oblivious to the content of Roh’s proposal, he concluded that “peaceful negotiations cannot be reconciled with the fact that they are aiming cannons at us and sharpening their swords.”38 South Korean diplomats kept pushing toward a solution. After some half-hearted North Korean engagement with Roh’s proposal, it was rejected and, by November, “the only thing the two sides had agreed on was the format of . . . talks.” Agreeing on an agenda for those talks remained elusive and was postponed to mid-December.39 Motivated by the South Korean example, the United States offered some conciliatory gestures as well.40 These were contained within a fourpoint plan and included “a new policy of encouraging unofficial, nongovernmental visits by North Koreans to the United states,” an “easing of stringent financial regulations that impeded travel to North Korea by American citizens,” a “permission for limited commercial export of humanitarian goods,” and “renewed permission for substantive discussions with North Koreans in neutral settings.” On October 28, the U.S. Department of State issued a statement carrying the message that “the door is open for [North Korea] to pursue an improvement of relations with the United States, if North Korea abandons belligerence, confrontation and terrorism in favor of dialogue.” A bilateral meeting between North Korean and U.S. officials followed on December 5. In reviewing this episode, Oberdorfer concludes that this meeting was the first “in a series of thirty-four such sessions, in which messages were passed but little progress was made.”41 The first bilateral talks were preceded by another surprising move of South Korean President Roh on October 4 at a United Nations General Assembly speech when he “indicated a willingness to go to Pyongyang to discuss with . . . Kim Il Sung any issue relating to reunification.” Two weeks later, on October 18, Roh suggested a six-nation conference on Korea, which would include the two Koreas, the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan. The goal of the conference would be to seek ways of creating “an international environment more conducive to peace in Korea and reunification of the peninsula” under mutually agreed on principles. On October 19, North Korean First Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju rebuffed Roh’s proposal, instead reiterating the proposal for the establishment of the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo first unveiled by Kim Il Sung in 1980.42 Any further initiatives “petered out” on February 8, 1989, with North Korea suspending all talks for the duration of the annual U.S.-South Korean Team Spirit joint military exercises. After a review of the political developments

KIM IL SUNG: TOUCHED BY THE WINDS OF CHANGE?

117

of the year, Adrian Buzo concludes that the “overall balance sheet for interKorea talks in 1988 showed [only] limited achievements.”43 In 1989, the effects of the gradual Soviet withdrawal materialized and North Korea’s conduct of international relations could not compensate for it. Its GNP growth rate reflected a decline from above 3 percent in previous years to 2.4 percent in 1989. A dramatic downfall came in 1990, when the Soviet Union undertook concrete measures that hurt the North Korean economy, which bottomed out in 1992 with a negative growth rate of –7.6 percent. Though recovering somewhat in the following years, the North Korean economy was unable to reach positive growth rates.44 The magnitude of North Korea’s economic recession is further illustrated when considering the evolution of its foreign debt. Whereas in 1985, North Korea’s foreign debt made for “only” 19.2 percent of its GNP, by 1991, the country’s foreign debt was 40.5 percent of GNP and even reached 50.3 percent in 1994.45 Parallel to these developments, Kim Il Sung had to witness how former communist allies in Eastern Europe established ties with South Korea or how they were—sometimes violently—pushed out of their offices. Among these are Hungary, Poland, East Germany, Yugoslavia, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. Referring to these events in Eastern Europe, a Nodong Sinmun article quoted Kim Il Sung, saying on October 23, “Today the imperialists are resorting to a craftier peace stratagem in the face of the trend of the times and the situations which are turning to their disadvantage. Particularly malicious in it is their tactic of political, ideological, and cultural disorganization of the socialist countries from within.”46 As communism fell in Eastern Europe, “there was intense speculation that Kim Il Sung and his regime would be the next to go.”47 They were not. Not only has “the refusal of the Kim regime, under both father and son, to discard an unworkable ideology and adapt to a changed international environment . . . destroyed the North Korean economy,” it also led to an unprecedented degree of political isolation.48 Kim Il Sung continued to walk on his path, which was marked by some gestures of conciliation coupled with sudden retreats. The year 1989 began with Kim Il Sung issuing invitations to seven prominent South Korean individuals, including the heads of the four major political parties, to a “North-South political consultative meeting” in Pyongyang. The underlying motivation of Kim Il Sung, according to Buzo, was his “assertions about the unrepresentative nature of the [South Korean] Government.” Aware of this, the latter “instructed the seven to decline the invitation.” The result was that only one of the seven accepted the invitation and made an unauthorized trip to Pyongyang in late April. Upon his return to Seoul he was arrested, which led Pyongyang to “suspend unilaterally all talk activity.”49 Talks with Japan were also brought to the forefront. Noteworthy Japanese-North Korean interactions had been absent for a while. At the end of

118

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

March, Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita signaled his desire to improve relations by tacitly acknowledging past mistakes in its treatment of Korea. Takeshita also lifted sanctions toward North Korea that had been in effect since the KAL bombing in 1987. Exchanges between the two countries followed and included those of “Takako Doi, chairperson of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), to North Korea and of a Korean Worker’s Party delegation to Tokyo to attend the national convention of the JSP.”50 This promising path was interrupted anew in April when a leading North Korean official told JSP Secretary General Makoto Tanabe that “Japan’s latest overtures did not contain specific measures for promoting better bilateral relations,” and that “Japan’s apology regarding atrocities during the 36-year Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula was too vague.”51 While both sides were willing nevertheless to proceed, North Korean-Japanese relations worsened when an apparent deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan occurred in September. The North Korean Central News Agency demanded that “the Japanese ruling quarters must give up their stupid act of dancing to the nuclear drum beating of the United States.” Accusing Japan of offensive motives, it further argued that the “US nuclear weapons deployed in Japan are not a ‘nuclear umbrella’ for defending Japan.” Instead “they are aimed at attacking the Korean peninsula and other socialist countries.”52 In the meantime, Pyongyang and Seoul reentered negotiations suspended earlier in the year. At prime ministerial talks, during October 22–25, they made unexpected progress regarding an Agreement Concerning Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North. The agreement laid dormant, however, and was only signed more than two years later—during another session of talks between the two regimes in Seoul during December 10–13. Other negotiations concentrated on home visit exchanges under Red Cross sponsorship. These failed after Seoul rejected a series of North Korean preconditions, among which was “permission to stage a Seoul performance of the revolutionary opera Flower Girl, with its savage and anachronistic parody of life in the South.”53 In an effort to compensate for the loss of such close allies as East Germany and Romania, Pyongyang tried anew to increase the momentum of the Non-aligned Movement. On August 23, KCNA published a government-sanctioned paper that stated, “any attempt and pressure to distort the fundamental principle of this movement or alter its anti-imperialist independent character should be strictly rejected.” Also, it emphasized that “it is imperative to enhance and strengthen the position and role” of the movement.54 This is necessary because, as Nodong Sinmun wrote about a week later, “the imperialists, while persistently clinging to wicked anti-communist and anti-socialist maneuvers, are running riot more than ever to spread their rotten, reactionary, poisonous ideological elements.”55 Then, in 1990, when the change of global power distribution, the Soviet and Chinese reorientatios, and North Korea’s suffocating economy

KIM IL SUNG: TOUCHED BY THE WINDS OF CHANGE?

119

became undeniable, Kim Il Sung seemed to concede somewhat to the necessity of a readjustment in North Korean foreign policy.56 In his New Year’s address, he stated, “The way of building socialism should also be steadily improved and perfected in keeping with changes in the situation.”57 However, any changes that followed were without much, if any, new substance as well as short-lived, thus fitting the pattern of earlier gestures. In February 1990, North Korea again broke off all the talks as the United States and South Korea started their annual joint military exercise. This hiatus lasted until July 3, when the two sides agreed to hold prime ministerial-level talks in Seoul in early September. At these talks, “each side concentrated on presenting its own agenda for dialogue, and these agendas contained little if any overlap.”58 As in previous rounds of negotiations, North Korea pressed for a “singlestroke solution” to all problems, which would mainly involve Seoul’s advocacy of the removal of U.S. troops from the peninsula. Seoul favored a step-by-step procedure as a means of confidence-building between the two governments.59 Oh writes that the “most obvious rationale for the North’s all-or-none approach,” now and in the past, “is that it guarantees no solution, at least until conditions change so that the solution will clearly favor the North.”60 After a deadlock at these talks, “a subsequent session on 18 September [still] failed to identify any common ground on the UN issue.” Two further unproductive sessions of prime ministerial talks followed on October 17 in Pyongyang and December 11–14 in Seoul. Both sides rejected the other’s suggestions and proposals before the talks entered a “freeze.”61 While relations with South Korea were still difficult, they improved somewhat with Japan. After some conciliatory North Korean gestures, an “unprecedented joint parliamentary mission” took place when a delegation “led by senior Liberal Democratic Party Figure Kanemaru Shin and Japan Socialist Party Vice Chairman Tanabe Makoto visited Pyongyang for talks with the KWP.” The result of this visit was the “signing of an eight-point declaration by the three political parties on 28 September 1990, which covered compensation not just for the colonial period but also for what were termed ‘abnormal relations’ in the post-1945 period.”62 Pyongyang’s efforts vis-à-vis the United States were more limited. In 1990, North Korea held eight councilor-level meetings with U.S. officials. Furthermore, in an effort to better “the atmosphere for successful negotiations, Pyongyang as a friendly gesture returned the remains of five American soldiers who had died during the Korean war.”63 At the same time, the Bush administration was engaging in thoughts about removing nuclear weapons from South Korea, reasoning that “the actual presence of any nuclear weapons in South Korea is not necessary to maintain a nuclear umbrella.”64 It was hoped that this would facilitate a North Korean signing of a safeguards agreement and permission regarding IAEA inspections of facilities that increasingly were the focus of international concern. Suspicion had started to

120

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

arise that North Korea was engaged in an expansion of its nuclear efforts.65 Subsequently, the U.S. administration reverted from its previous plans to remove its nuclear arsenal from the Korean peninsula. And, as a result, the IAEA was not allowed into North Korea. Adrian Buzo summarizes the period from 1989 to 1990 correctly as one of “further barren maneuvering” with no deep-reaching efforts to bring about substantive change.66 The North Korean leadership was walking alone against an adverse trend of regional and global transformation of international politics and emerging worldwide détente.67 While, in accordance with his subjective game, Kim Il Sung indeed at times moved toward de-escalation of the enduring crisis, in the end, he confirmed it perhaps because he did not believe North Korean concessions would avoid submission and lead to settlement.

THE POST–COLD WAR PERIOD (1991–1994) Kim Il Sung recognized and acknowledged the end of the cold war and the dramatic changes that came with it. However, as he had done previously, he attributed insufficient meaning to it. Kim Jong Il described his father’s belief that Western prevalence was a passing phase: Many changes are now taking place in the world. . . . Generally speaking, this can be called a passing historical vortex which has appeared in the course of mankind’s advance towards a new world of independence. In order to form a correct view of the present age it is necessary to see the process of historical development in its full context and to identify its essence, not phenomena alone. To my regret, some people are interpreting the end of the cold war between East and West and the frustration of socialism in some countries as the victory of the old over the new and as a change in the direction of the historical tide. They are mistaken. There may be setbacks in the course of historical progress, but its direction cannot change.68 Similarly, in his annual New Year’s message on January 1, 1991, Kim Il Sung, as usual, emphasized the “invincibility” of juche socialism, stating that “despite the boisterous allegation of the imperialists that socialism is now faced with danger, socialism in our country remains completely unchanged to the wonder and admiration of the entire world. . . . The secret of success of socialism in our country lies in the fact that we strengthened [juche] in the process of constructing socialism.”69 However, despite such rhetoric that promised continuation, some policy adjustments toward pragmatism can be observed in the years 1991–1994, the year when Kim Il Sung died and was replaced by his son Kim Jong Il.70 Scholars still advise caution, arguing that the regime has only changed its style while the substance and fundamental goals of its policy remain the

KIM IL SUNG: TOUCHED BY THE WINDS OF CHANGE?

121

same.71 Victor Cha, for example, speaks of the “continuity behind the change.”72 A variety of North Korean specialists also argue that the beliefs of Kim Il Sung have not been affected and, therefore, remain autonomous from external events such as the end of the cold war and the Soviet withdrawal. In other words, they argue that any adjustment in North Korean post–cold war behavior is due to external factors.73 A cautionary note goes along with this argument. Because any change in the post–cold war era is insincere and temporary, North Korea might suddenly revert to the rash and often violent behaviors of its past. An operational code analysis of Kim Il Sung’s beliefs vindicates the arguments of critical North Korean specialists. As the comparisons on the left of Table 6.4 show, in the post–cold war, Kim Il Sung engaged in some experiential learning as he perceived himself capable of exercising more control in the political universe (P-4) and that the role of chance decreased somewhat (P-5). However, neither his perceptions of the political universe, nor his beliefs about the best means to achieve goals underwent a significant change. Overall his beliefs would still indicate a tendency toward a conflictual stance as illustrated in the comparisons on the right of the table. The aggregated scores for Kim Il Sung’s key beliefs are Self (I-1 = .28, P-4a = .14) and Other (P-1 = .16, P-4b = .28), which specify the preference ordering in Proposition 5 for Self and Other in TIP. His operational code in the period between 1991 and 1994 prescribes a prisoner’s dilemma strategy that ranks domination over settlement over deadlock over submission. He attributes the same preference ordering to his opponents. This subjective strategic game is mapped out in Figure 6.2. Kim Il Sung apparently recognized that his policies of the preceding years had failed. His insincere and half-hearted attempts toward a betterment of relations did not lead to any enduring patterns of cooperation. As a consequence, he saw himself and his opponents locked in a classic prisoner’s dilemma situation (2,2). This deadlock situation is again both a Nash equilibrium and a TOM nonmyopic equilibrium from which neither side has an incentive to move any further. Table 6.5 highlights the main events in North Korean international relations in this last period before Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994. The prediction of mutual deadlock, at least initially, would not hold true. Contrary to Kim Il Sung’s expectations, President Bush overcame hesitations he initially had and decided in the spring of 1991 to remove American nuclear deployments on the peninsula. He went even further and decided “in principle to permit North Koreans to inspect the U.S. base at Kunsan where the nuclear weapons had been stored.” By the end of the year, President Roh announced that “there do not exist any nuclear weapons whatsoever, anywhere in the Republic of Korea.”74 In a reciprocal move on December 31, 1991, North Korea signed a Joint Declaration for the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula with South Korea and followed this with the signing

Realization of Political Values (Pessimism/Optimism)

Political Future (Unpredictable/Predictable)

Historical Development (Low Control/High Control)

Role of Chance (Small Role/Large Role)

Strategic Approach to Goals (Conflict/Cooperation)

Intensity of Tactics (Conflict/Cooperation)

Risk Orientation (Averse/Acceptant)

Timing of Action a. Conflict/Cooperation b. Words/Deeds

Utility of Means a. Reward b. Promise c. Appeal/Support d. Oppose/Resist e. Threaten f. Punish

P-2.

P-3.

P-4.

P-5.

I-1.

I-2.

I-3.

I-4.

I-5. 0.227 0.081 0.255 0.165 0.169 0.103

0.491 0.479

0.350

0.095

0.128

0.995

0.079

0.082

0.081

0.170

1987–1990*

0.985

0.985b

0.160 0.087 0.378 0.165 0.098 0.109

0.595 0.541

0.251

0.114

0.160 0.087 0.378 0.165 0.098 0.109

0.595 0.541

0.251

0.114

0.250

0.147c

0.147a

0.251

0.098

0.092

0.190

1991–1994**

0.098

0.092

0.190

1991–1994**

Significant differences between indices at the following levels: ap ≤ 0.007, bp ≤ 0.02, cp ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed test). *n = 15. **n = 13. ***n = 264 for P-1–P-5, 255 for I-1–I-5.

Nature of Political Universe (Conflict/Cooperation)

P-1.

Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs

Table 6.4: Kim Il Sung’s Operational Code Patterns (1987–1994)

0.167 0.073 0.427 0.147 0.047 0.138

0.509 0.525

0.304

0.139

0.334

0.969

0.212

0.148

0.118

0.250

Average Leader***

122

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

123

KIM IL SUNG: TOUCHED BY THE WINDS OF CHANGE? US, SK, JAPAN CO CF CO

3,3 |¨ 1,4 Ø

NK CF

US, SK, JAPAN CO CF

≠

US, SK, JAPAN CO CF

CO Settle Submit NK

4,1 Æ “2,2”

Kim Il Sung’s strategy: Stay

CO

≠

NK CF Dominate Deadlock NORTH KOREA OUTCOMES

3,3 Æ| 1,4

CF

Ø

4,1 |¨ “2,2”

Kim Il Sung’s perception of opponents’ strategy: Stay

The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each player. The symbols “Æ” and “Æ|” indicate the respective strategic choices of “move” or “stay” by the player with the next move given the initial state (Brams, 1994).

Figure 6.2: Kim Il Sung’s Subjective Game (1991–1994)

Table 6.5: Main Events in North Korean Relations with the United States, South Korea, and Japan from 1991 to 1994 Month

North Korea

United States/South Korea/Japan

1991 March

October December

Bush announces the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Korea. North Korea and South Korea sign “Basic Agreement.” North Korea signs Joint Declaration for the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

1992 January

North Korea walks out of intergovernmental talks with Japan.

September

North Korea violates IAEA obligations; engages in reprocessing of plutonium.

October

North Korean cancels all NorthSouth contacts.

December

North Korea denies IAEA inspections and threatens to resign from the NPT.

U.S. and South Korea announce reinstallment of joint military exercises.

124

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

of a safeguards agreement with the IAEA on January 30 1992.75 Improvements also took place with respect to questions of Korean UN membership. In the past, Kim Il Sung had strictly refused dual UN membership for the two Koreas; he demanded one membership for both, arguing that “Korea is one.”76 In May, he declared his willingness to seek independent membership and, on September 17, both North and South Korea were admitted to the United Nations.77 Relations between North and South continued to improve. At the conclusion of a prime ministerial meeting in Pyongyang in October, both sides agreed in principle to work toward a single document that would set the terms for broad-ranging accords. Pyongyang conceded and signed a 25-article Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation (the “Basic Agreement”) with South Korea.78 North and South Korea declared that “both parties shall not use armed force against each other” and that “differences of opinion and disputes arising between the two parties shall be peacefully resolved through dialogue and negotiations.”79 Shifts can also be observed in the economic realm. In 1991, Pyongyang announced the creation of a free economic trading zone (FETZ), which opened later that year at Rajin-Sonbong. In summarizing the novelty and departure from previous practices of economic “closeness” on the part of North Korea, Cotton points out, “In addition to joint ventures, foreign owned enterprises would be permitted to operate within the FETZ. Rajin and Sonbong (and neighboring Chongjin) were declared free ports, and various taxation benefits were offered to investors in the zone.”80 Several other modest measures have been taken to attract foreign investment and trading partners for North Korean enterprises. Yet, these policy changes have not been very successful. North Korean specialists identify insufficiency of policy change as the key reason for Pyonyang’s failed economic policies.81 Because of Kim Il Sung’s questioned sincerity, specialists provide a critical interpretation of any political and economic changes. What was not progressing much were relations with Japan. At the end of January, intergovernmental talks on the normalization of North KoreanJapanese relations were held in Pyongyang. Disagreement came to the forefront when Japan rejected the principle of postwar compensation.82 Seven further rounds of discussions followed until November 1992 when the North Korean delegation walked out of the eight session without any agreement.83 Kim Il Sung failed to make constructive use of the dialogue with Japan. Commenting on his misperception of de facto international relations, Buzo writes, “It should have been immediately clear . . . that the Japanese Government would not accept the principle of postwar compensation under which Kanemaru had negotiated, but [North Korea] opted to stand its grounds, rather than return to negotiation.”84 Relations with Japan remained frozen until 1997, and were then disturbed anew by North Korea’s launching of a test-missile over Japan.

KIM IL SUNG: TOUCHED BY THE WINDS OF CHANGE?

125

In 1992, Bill Clinton replaced George Bush as the U.S. president. Relations with North Korea started with an “unprecedented high-level meeting” in New York between KWP Secretary of International Affairs Kim Young Sun and U.S Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Arnold Kanter.85 Although no concrete measures followed this meeting, both “sides expressed satisfaction with the meeting and termed the exchange of views frank and useful.”86 Of symbolic significance was that the United States and South Korea canceled their traditional joint military exercise in 1992.87 North Korea aslo hosted a U.S. “Freedom Coalition” delegation and did not hold its traditional anti-American rally on June 25, marking the anniversary of the Korean War.88 Just as relations between North Korea and the United States and South Korea reached a new momentum, they experienced a far-reaching setback. Henceforth, the foreign policies of the contending parties would meet the predictions derived from Kim Il Sung’s subjective game described earlier, and he would see himself confirmed in the belief that “the cold war structure remained unchanged.”89 While Pyongyang had signed an IAEA agreement, its implementation proved to be a different, much more contentious, matter as it went “through the familiar stages of reinterpretation and disavowal.”90 In the second half of the year, suspicion, antagonism, and eventually crisis reentered the relations between North Korea and its competitors. After violating earlier, nonnuclear pledges with South Korea, now “Pyongyang became seriously delinquent in meeting its IAEA obligations.”91 To make matters worse, evidence began to surface that North Korea “was reprocessing plutonium . . . at the burgeoning Yongbyon complex where still larger reactors and a reprocessing plant the length of a football field were under construction.”92 The setback was worsened by a developing political climate between Pyongyang and Seoul, which was “brought about in part by preparations for [South Korean] elections in December 1992.”93 North Korea considered the election of prospective President Kim Young Sam to be a further stumbling block in its international standing. Relations slowed down significantly, and North Korea developed a “Talk to me; I may go nuclear” attitude.94 In October 1992, the United States and South Korea responded by announcing in Washington that they were resuming preparations for a reinstallment of the joint military exercise. The reasoning was the “absence of meaningful improvement in South-North relations, especially on bilateral nuclear inspections.” North Korea, in turn, described this move as “a criminal act” designed to “put the breaks on NorthSouth relations and drive the North-South dialogue to a crisis.”95 The outcome was that North Korea canceled all North-South contacts. In the following months, the situation worsened further. As international concern over potential nuclear sites in North Korea increased, in December the IAEA requested “visits” to identify the nature of the suspected sites. The response from Pyongyang was that a “visit by [IAEA] officials

126

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

could not be turned into an inspection” and added that any inspections “might jeopardize the supreme interests” of North Korea. The reference to the escape clause in the NPT was clear. It permits withdrawal to avoid compromising “supreme national interest.”96 Escalation proceeded further with the start of the U.S.-South Korean joint military exercise on March 9, 1993.97 One year later, Kim Il Sung described his perception of the escalation that would continue throughout 1993: “Last year, the imperialists and reactionaries more viciously than ever maneuvered to isolate and stifle our republic and obliterate our socialist cause. As a result, the situation in our country has become very tense.”98 In response to what Kim Il Sung perceived as aggressive U.S.-South Korean moves, North Korea ordered the entire nation and armed forces to “switch to a state of readiness for war” in view of the joint exercise as a “nuclear war test aimed at a surprise, preemptive strike at the northern half of the country.” 99 On March 12, Pyongyang announced it was withdrawing from the NPT. Seoul pleaded for a final meeting between North and South, which occurred on March 19 at Pammunjom. The situation that was already marked by hostility grew worse when North Korean negotiator Park Yong Su threatened his southern counterpart Song Young Dae with the following words: “Seoul is not far from here. If a war breaks out, it will be a sea of fire. Mr. Song, it will probably be difficult for you to survive.”100 South Korean President Kim Young Sam called for an emergency meeting of the national security cabinet to request the deployment of U.S. Patriot missiles. In 1994, the final year of Kim Il Sung’s rule, the crisis indeed reached the brink of war.101 The United States, along with South Korea and Japan, pushed for UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea. The latter declared that “sanctions are a declaration of war.” Washington, in turn, engaged in preparations for a “powerful buildup of men and materiel, with great potential for precipitating a military clash on the divided peninsula.”102 North Korea, too, engaged in a military buildup. Approximately 65 percent of Korean forces, compared to a percentage of 45 a decade earlier, were stationed within sixty miles of the DMZ.103 In the end, a military confrontation on the Korean peninsula was avoided. It was only after a phase of multilateral argumentation and a series of bilateral diplomatic efforts, which included the engagement of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, that a settlement between the United States and North Korea was reached in 1994. This led to the signing of the North Korea-U.S. Agreed Framework. Within this framework, Pyongyang agreed to freeze its nuclear weapons programs, to remain part of the NPT, and to resume talks with South Korea in order to repair relations that had been disturbed in the meantime.104 The United States agreed to a provision of fuel oil and the construction of two light-water nuclear reactors as a substitute for nuclear reactors. The underlying conflict remained, however, and intensified in the course of the late 1990s and early 2000s under the new leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Il.

KIM IL SUNG: TOUCHED BY THE WINDS OF CHANGE?

127

Taking the relations between North Korea and the United States and its allies since 1980 together, we find they were and remain confrontational. At times, North Korea set out with isolated conciliatory gestures. These were, however, often half-hearted and did not lead to a substantive change. Also, at times, the United States or one of its allies initiated cooperative moves. These were quickly rejected by Kim Il Sung, as he proved himself closed to information that would put his beliefs about the fundamental nature of the political universe in doubt. In the next chapter, I will argue that it is this barrier of beliefs that U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea has to overcome.

This page intentionally left blank.

PART III

THE IMPLICATIONS

This page intentionally left blank.

CHAPTER SEVEN

LESSONS FROM THE PAST AND APPLICATIONS TO THE FUTURE

How and why do leaders matter as agents of change and continuity in the international system? The answers to these questions provided by Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung at the end of the cold war contain lessons with theory and policy implications. Therefore, I conclude this book with a summary of the main findings, a discussion of their theoretical significance, and a brief analysis of the contemporary nuclear crisis between the United States and North Korea.

MAIN FINDINGS When Gorbachev assumed power in the Kremlin in March 1985, there was nothing extraordinary about him. In fact, he seemed to be just another Soviet leader whose beliefs resembled those of his predecessors. However, a systematic content analysis of his beliefs over time supports the assertion found in the literature on the Soviet Union, namely, that he became a motivated learner.1 Gorbachev engaged in experiential learning after 1986, and the change in his instrumental beliefs led to a corresponding change in Soviet foreign policy behavior toward the United States in particular and the Western world in general. Beginning in 1987, Gorbachev engaged in cognitive strategic learning as well, resulting in a change in Gorbachev’s subjective game, as his enemy image of the United States gave way to an evolving image with much friendlier characteristics. Henceforth, Gorbachev also appeared as a committed teacher as he successfully induced cooperative U.S. moves. It was because of Gorbachev’s initiatives that confrontational superpower politics came to an end and the international community was able to bury its fears of a global nuclear disaster. 131

132

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

The ensuing hope for enduring global stability turned out to be premature, however, as the Gorbachev revolution did not spread to communist leaders outside Eastern Europe. While Gorbachev’s beliefs about the nature of the political universe became increasingly friendlier and as his beliefs about the best means to attain goals in that universe became increasingly cooperative, those of North Korea’s Kim Il Sung remained more or less static. Although the results indicate that Kim Il Sung engaged in some experiential learning after 1986, and again after 1991, his beliefs remained conflictual. Unlike Gorbachev, Kim Il Sung did not engage in any cognitive strategic learning, except for a brief interlude between 1987 and 1991. Along with the relatively static pattern of his beliefs, not much change occurred in the evolution of North Korean foreign policy behavior toward its traditional enemies, the United States, South Korea, and Japan. Kim Il Sung proved to be a continuing “cold warrior” as the winds of change in the late 1980s and early 1990s left him more or less untouched. Kim Il Sung was not perceptive of the new realities that emerged in this time, and in general tended to misperceive other states in the international environment as overly hostile. Tragically, his self-fulfilling prophecies continued to cast his competitors into a conflictual role and North Korea’s relations with the outside world remained locked in enmity.

THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE This study of two political leaders is also about two sides of the same coin— change on the one side and continuity on the other. The preeminent goal in analyzing Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung has been to illuminate and explain both sides. Examining the cases of the Soviet Union and North Korea, which may be considered as “paradigms” for the two extremes, I asked whether Mikhail Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung engaged in learning processes and if these processes mattered in the conduct of their strategic interactions with other states. I advanced the claim that important mechanisms for continuity and change are situated in the belief systems of the leaders of these states. While this assertion makes intuitive sense to policymakers and citizens alike, academics tend to relegate the study of individual leaders to a residual category. I have argued, however, that it is ultimately leaders who make decisions and implement them and that, therefore, we cannot dispense with a systematic study of them. Their subjective representations of themselves and their enemies, how these representations change or are reified, and the strategies they consider to be appropriate over time are crucial considerations for a satisfactory account of international interactions. Mainstream theories of international relations generally lack firm and secure microfoundations to account for either change or continuity in world politics.2 For example, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism as the most prominent international relations theories are mostly about “circumstances”

LESSONS FROM THE PAST

133

that actors “find” in the objective world around them, and it is these circumstances that carry all the explanatory weight.3 With a focus on environmental constraints and incentives, neither approach requires elaborate inferences about the subjective representations of a particular leader at a particular time.4 This shortcoming is unfortunate because it leads to a faulty understanding of international politics, which is an inherently social and psychological process. Denying agency as an important component of decision-making processes leads to an impoverished understanding of political action.5 As an actor’s preferences and causal beliefs are treated as unproblematic “givens,” and insofar as these are left unexplained by these theories, they cannot account for “how individuals under given conditions produce new conditions.”6 The events surrounding the end of the cold war cast serious doubt on the universal applicability of these theories. They were “caught flat-footed” by events that they did not predict and could not explain.7 Telling here is an observation made by John Gaddis, namely, “The second most ‘powerful’ state on the face of the earth did voluntarily give up power, despite the insistence of international relations theory that this could never happen.”8 The reason for this failure, as Gaddis points out further, is that theorists traditionally ignore how international relations are conducted by “conscious entities capable of reacting to, and often modifying, the variables and conditions they encounter.” Observing the evolution of international relations theorizing, John Gaddis also writes: “Students coming of age in the post-cold war era seem to grasp intuitively that the study of international relations . . . is ultimately about human beings, and that the way in which human beings engage in such relations” is difficult to comprehend through the lenses of theories that dominated throughout the cold war era.9 However, even before the end of the cold war—an era that was dominated by structural international relations theory—one observer noted that, precisely because very few real-world problems are adequately dealt with at the abstract level, “it is not surprising that many realists have abandoned the high ground of the macro-level and have come down to the trenches of real political analysis.”10 For these neoclassical realists, the individual agent stands as an intermediary between the constraints and incentives that result from the external environment and actual foreign policy decisions.11 Neoclassical realist theories of foreign policy “posit an explicit role for leaders’ preexisting belief systems, images of adversaries, and cognitive biases in the process of . . . military planning and foreign policy decisionmaking.” They assume that much of world politics would be “inexplicable without reference to the perceptions of central decisionmakers.”12 Their work thus confirms the claim that important mechanisms for the foreign policy behavior of states are situated in the belief systems of the leaders of those states.13 Similarly, neoliberal institutionalists have come to acknowledge the relevance of ideational phenomena as they speak of “complex learning” or “sociological” conceptions of interest.14 Thus, Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin

134

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

argue that institutional theory has to move beyond a focus on institutions to explain variations in state preferences. Institutional theory, they say, ought to place “more emphasis on agency, less on structure.” They further suggest that “one way of doing so would be to develop theories with microfoundations: that is, theories that begin with individuals . . . and show how, on the basis of a coherent set of theoretical assumptions, varying preferences emerge.” 15 Indeed, the theoretical toolbox that international relations scholars have used for so long appears to be in need of a reshuffling. Perhaps after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, more than ever scholars ought to realize that an understanding of international politics is impoverished if we do not sufficiently consider the impact of ideational variables, such as political or ideological beliefs of single leaders or the shared beliefs of national decisionmaking elites. I have made this claim even though approaches focusing on ideational concepts, such as beliefs and subjective perceptions, have often been viewed with considerable skepticism. Indeed, while such approaches often forcefully address problems in the traditional international relations literature, they also come with their own set of problems that are primarily methodological in character. Scholars have demonstrated little success in applying a scientific and objective method to the study of ideational variables. It is, however, crucial to employ objective and replicable methods to escape the recurring and valid criticism of subjectivism. If carried out properly, ideational scholarship can contribute to our understanding of political behavior by encouraging the problematization of actors’ preferences and investigating the ways in which they shape actors’ behavior. My hope is that theorists of international relations will see from this book that a systematic analysis of ideational variables is perfectly possible and that they will be motivated to incorporate methods such as those presented here into their respective research programs. A seminal symposium on game theory and cooperation published in World Politics about two decades ago started from an “austere” structural level of analysis and was then compelled to rely increasingly on the decisionmaking level of analysis.16 In their conclusion, Axelrod and Keohane were “struck by the importance of such variables in influencing prospects for cooperation.”17 They acknowledged that the contributors to the symposium “did not specifically set out to explore the role of perception in decisionmaking, but the importance of perception kept asserting itself.” Axelrod and Keohane concluded that throughout the symposium, “We also discovered something else: over and over again we observed that the real world actors were not satisfied with simply selecting strategies based upon the situation in which they found themselves. In many cases we saw deliberate efforts to change the very structure of that situation by changing the context in which each of them would be acting.”18 In other words, the findings of the symposium support the arguments of the cognitive revolution in psychology. The decision-maker is a “problem-

LESSONS FROM THE PAST

135

solver,” or an active agent who is not tightly constrained by situational factors of a game with fixed payoff structures. The individual is not simply to be considered a passive agent who merely responds to environmental stimuli, but rather as someone who selectively responds to and actively shapes his or her environment.19 Diminishing the exclusive relevance of the payoff structure in game theory, one of the central messages of the symposium was that “mutuality of interests is not based simply upon objective factors, but is grounded upon the actor’s perceptions of their own interests. Perceptions define interests. Therefore, to understand the degree of mutuality of interests (or to enhance this mutuality) we must understand the process by which interests are perceived and preferences determined.”20 One of the goals of this book is to employ methods that would allow the accurate modeling of preferences, strategies, and payoffs. When used properly, game theory becomes a powerful tool for empirically testing theoretical predictions because of its unambiguous positive statements of what ought to be expected in any given situation. The often-cited security dilemma is a dilemma because actors are conceived of being locked into it. The payoff matrix in any game theoretic model dictates certain behaviors and prohibits others. To address questions of Soviet and North Korean foreign policy behavior, I have employed sequential game theory as a method to assess the relative viability of a belief system explanation. The analysis of Gorbachev’s beliefs and behavior illustrates the case of a “rebel” who discarded dictates and violated prohibitions. Through his strategy of altercasting—an effort to socialize the United States into a different role vis-à-vis the Soviet Union—he managed to alter the constitutive rules of the game and overcome the “enduring rivalry” between the Soviet Union and the United States.21 Altercasting becomes a method of “problem solving”—albeit perhaps a risky one, and certainly an “irrational” one, as Gorbachev’s perception of the U.S. potential for moves toward domination underline. However, this transformational leadership strategy is the ultimate “Gorbachev phenomenon.”22 Kim Il Sung’s story is different and much simpler than Gorbachev’s. As opposed to Gorbachev, he did perceive himself constrained by the payoff matrix defined by his beliefs about North Korea’s opponents. Given North Korea’s continuous confrontational foreign policy, this leads to a counterintuitive conclusion. Contrary to the popular view of many external observers, North Korea’s approach to foreign policy is not characterized by “irrationality” but rather—to a large degree—by an adherence to the “rules of the game.”23 These rules, for the most part, prescribed continuation of the status quo, that is, conflictual policies rather than change. As a result, North Korea remained locked in a security dilemma. Despite forceful arguments made in conventional international relations theory that “external shocks” should lead to changes in foreign policy behavior—especially for small states— North Korea continued on its status quo path.24 External shocks appear to

136

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

matter little if they are rendered inconsequential because of a leader’s unchanging beliefs. In general, Kim Il Sung proved himself likely to misperceive the international environment at times and to be closed to new information as he discarded conciliatory gestures such as, for example, South Korean President Roh’s Nordpolitik in 1987 almost immediately. We are reminded of Joseph Jastrow’s famous statement, namely, that the mind is a belief-seeking rather than a fact-seeking apparatus.25 Kim Il Sung appeared wedded to an inherent bad faith model about international politics, and in a way it seems as if he became the victim of his own self-fulfilling prophecies. In the brief period that surrounded this South Korean initiative, we would have expected Kim Il Sung’s foreign policies to be more accommodative. And while we have observed some attempts in that direction, overall the suspicion arises that they were lacking substance and sincerity. Therefore, it came as no surprise that North Korea returned to a classical prisoner’s dilemma game as the definition of their situation in the post–cold war period. I conclude that changes in North Korea’s foreign policy have been and will continue to be missing, because of the absence of substantive and lasting change in the beliefs of North Korean leaders.

THE CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF GORBACHEV AND KIM IL SUNG Historical assessments of fascinating events and leaders are enhanced in value if they are theoretically guided because, ideally, it ought to be the scientific community to which the policymaking community turns for policy advice. The urge to apply, build, and refine theories is, therefore, not born of idle curiosity alone. A scientific investigation bears the prospects of identifying the causes that “really did the work” and, as such, opens the possibility of addressing and controlling them in future cases. By focusing on actor-specific details, I have engaged in “concrete theorizing” as opposed to the “abstract theorizing” of actor-general theory. Such concrete, actor-specific theorizing serves as the interface between abstract, actor-general theory and the complexity of the real world.26 The necessity of such an approach is argued by Alexander George as follows: Practitioners find it difficult to make use of academic approaches such as structural realist theory and game theory, which assume that all state actors are alike and can be expected to behave in the same way in given situations, and which rest on the simple, uncomplicated assumption that states can be regarded as rational unitary actors. On the contrary, practitioners believe they need to work with actor-specific models that grasp the different internal structures and behavioral patterns of each state and leader with which they must deal.27

LESSONS FROM THE PAST

137

In conclusion, I want to draw some policy implications about the ongoing nuclear crisis with North Korea from the case studies of Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung. Gorbachev managed to bring about peaceful change between the superpowers through his repeated, unilateral gestures of conciliation. He continued to engage in cooperative moves despite Reagan’s rejections and his continuation of hard-line policies toward the Soviet Union. In the end, Gorbachev managed to change Reagan’s beliefs about the Soviet Union and ended the rivalry between the two states. As the historical analysis in this book shows, the United States or its allies have at times made conciliatory gestures toward North Korea in the past. However, the Gorbachev case suggests that these must be consistently repeated, even in the face of negative feedback. This lesson from the end of the cold war may also apply to the contemporary, increasingly severe crisis with North Korea and to similar situations in the future. North Korea is a likely prototype for the emergence of new security threats following the end of the cold war. It is a small state, relatively isolated from the international community. At the same time, it is engaged in the acquisition of nuclear weapons and might be tempted to proliferate them, if only to gain some economic benefit. Indeed, in the post–cold war era North Korea has come to be considered the rogue state “par excellence.”28 North Korea is, as Roland Bleiker states, “the totalitarian state that . . . aspires to possess WMD; the one that lies outside the sphere of good and is to be watched, contained and controlled.”29 The nature of this threat is articulated, quite explicitly, by Richard Betts: Since the direct attack in 1950, Pyongyang has frequently demonstrated its risk propensity in more consistently reckless provocations than any other government in the world. . . . Today pessimists worry about a North Korean nuclear weapons program. Would any government be more willing to do wild and crazy things with such weapons than the one that so regularly perpetrates acts like those mentioned above?30 One aspect that reinforces this concern about North Korea and its new leader Kim Jong Il is that there is “nothing new under the son.”31 Indeed, the results in Table 7.1 indicate more continuity than change between the belief systems of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. The difference that does exist is that Kim Jong Il values the intensity of conflictual tactics (I-2) and here particularly Punish tactics (I-5f) even more than his father. However, the comparisons of Kim Jong Il’s beliefs to the average world leader in Table 7.2 warrant some further interpretation. Schafer, Robison, and Aldrich argue that high or rising levels of frustration, indicated by hostile images of the political environment (P-1), pessimism about the realization of

138

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

Table 7.1: Operational Codes of Kim Il Sung (1991–1994) and Kim Jong Il (1995–2003) Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs

Kim Il Sung*

Kim Jong Il**

P-1.

Nature of Political Universe (Conflict/Cooperation)

0.190

0.074

P-2.

Realization of Political Values (Pessimism/Optimism)

0.092

0.002

P-3.

Political Future (Unpredictable/Predictable)

0.098

0.124

P-4.

Historical Development (Low Control/High Control)

0.147

0.126

P-5.

Role of Chance (Small Role/Large Role)

0.985

0.988

I-1.

Strategic Approach to Goals (Conflict/Cooperation)

0.251

–0.054

I-2.

Intensity of Tactics (Conflict/Cooperation)

0.114

–0.130b

I-3.

Risk Orientation (Averse/Acceptant)

0.251

0.241

I-4.

Timing of Action a. Conflict/Cooperation b. Words/Deeds

0.595 0.541

0.550 0.634

Utility of Means a. Reward b. Promise c. Appeal/Support d. Oppose/Resist e. Threaten f. Punish

0.160 0.087 0.378 0.165 0.098 0.109

0.119 0.061 0.292 0.178 0.074 0.277a

I-5.

Significant differences between indices at the following levels: ap ≤ 0.04, bp ≤ 0.08 (twotailed test). *n = 13. **n = 14.

political goals (P-2), and the perception that the fate of these goals is in the hands of others (P-4) are key manifestations of the frustration-aggression syndrome.32 Early on, psychologists argued that “the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression”—a proposition that came to be known as the frustration-aggression hypothesis.33 Subsequently, the linearity of this assertion was revisited and scholars concluded that other behaviors than aggression are possible as well.34 However, if frustration is paired with an inclination toward hostile behavior (I-1, I-2), as it is in the case of Kim Jong Il, the potential for aggression is imminent.35

139

LESSONS FROM THE PAST Table 7.2: Kim Jong Il Compared to the Average Leader Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs

Kim Jong Il*

Average Leader**

P-1.

Nature of Political Universe (Conflict/Cooperation)

0.074b

0.250

P-2.

Realization of Political Values (Pessimism/Optimism)

0.002c

0.118

P-3.

Political Future (Unpredictable/Predictable)

0.124

0.148

P-4.

Historical Development (Low Control/High Control)

0.126b

0.212

P-5.

Role of Chance (Small Role/Large Role)

0.988

0.968

I-1.

Strategic Approach to Goals (Conflict/Cooperation)

–0.054a

0.334

I-2.

Intensity of Tactics (Conflict/Cooperation)

–0.130a

0.139

I-3.

Risk Orientation (Averse/Acceptant)

0.241

0.304

I-4.

Timing of Action a. Conflict/Cooperation b. Words/Deeds

0.550 0.634

0.509 0.525

Utility of Means a. Reward b. Promise c. Appeal/Support d. Oppose/Resist e. Threaten f. Punish

0.119 0.061 0.292b 0.178 0.074 0.277a

0.167 0.073 0.427 0.147 0.047 0.138

I-5.

Significant differences between indices at the following levels: ap ≤ 0.01, bp ≤ 0.05, cp ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed test). *n = 14. **n = 264 for P-1–P5, 255 for I-1–I-15.

The frustration-aggression hypothesis is similar to the “desperation thesis” discussed by North Korean expert David Kang in the context of North Korean politics. Advocates of the desperation thesis argue that a “ ‘cornered tiger’ can be increasingly dangerous and risk-acceptant in the hopes of some miraculous event changing the situation.” Kang discards the thesis because it is “merely asserted, without evidence that explains the psychological or perceptual base of the North Korean leadership.”36 However, the evidence in Table 7.2 does explain the psychology of the current North Korean leadership. It shows that Kim Jong Il’s key beliefs are all significantly more negative than those of the average world leader, supporting the antecedent

140

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

conditions that define both frustration (P-1, P-2, P-4) and aggression (I-1, I-2). Of further concern is that this combination did not occur during any period of Kim Il Sung’s rule. In the historical periods investigated earlier, Kim Il Sung’s beliefs met single elements for frustration and aggression (P4, I-1, and I-2 in the years 1980–1983; P-4 in the years 1987–1990 and also in the years 1991–1994), but never all five elements together. Thus, insofar as both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are hostile leaders, there is indeed not too much new under the son. However, this analysis reveals that Kim Jong Il is not only hostile as his father was, but desperate. Moreover, given that Kim Jong Il, unlike his father, possesses nuclear weapons, the current crisis is marked by a particularly explosive quality. The comparisons in Table 7.2 are based on mean scores. Kim Jong Il’s aggregated scores for the three key beliefs that define his subjective game are Self (I-1 = .10, P-4a = .12) and Other (P-1 = –.01, P-4b = .30). They specify the preference ordering in Proposition 5 for Self and Other in TIP. Kim Jong Il’s operational code scores in the period between, therefore, defines a prisoner’s dilemma strategy that ranks domination over settlement over deadlock over submission for North Korea and he applies the same preference order to the United States. His subjective strategic game is shown in Figure 7.1. The Agreed Framework from 1994, motivated by the goal to improve North Korean-U.S. relations, ultimately failed; both states continued to be locked into the prisoner’s dilemma game with an initial state of (2,2) deadlock. The prediction following from TOM is that Kim Jong Il will “stay” and engage in a confrontational strategy in response to his perception that the United States will do the same. Kim Jong Il’s high level of frustration/aggression accompanying this situation suggests that this deadlock may escalate

United States CO CF CO

3,3 |¨ 1,4 Ø

NK CF

United States CO CF

≠

4,1 Æ “2,2”

Kim Jong Il’s strategy: Stay

United States CO CF

CO Settle Submit NK

CO

≠

NK CF Dominate Deadlock NORTH KOREA OUTCOMES

3,3 Æ| 1,4

CF

Ø

4,1 |¨ “2,2”

Kim Jong Il’s perception of the U.S. strategy: Stay

The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each player. The symbols “Æ” and “Æ|” indicate the respective strategic choices of “move” or “stay” by the player with the next move given the initial state and TOM’s rule of play (Brams, 1994).

Figure 7.1: Kim Jong Il’s Subjective Game

141

LESSONS FROM THE PAST

rapidly in the event of prolonged disagreement between North Korea and its adversaries. Table 7.3 summarizes the main events from the year 2002 to the present. This period represents a time of increasing escalation to which both North Korea and the United States have actively contributed. Table 7.3: Main Events in North Korean-U.S. Relations since 2002 Month

North Korea

United States

2002 Jan.

President Bush declares NK to be part of “axis of evil.”

Aug. Dec.

U.S. engages in joint military exercise with South Korea. NK disables UN cameras at Yongbyon nuclear facility. NK dispels nuclear inspectors, restarts nuclear fuel processing laboratory.

2003 Jan.

NK withdraws from Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty.

Feb.–Mar.

NK tests surface-to-surface missiles and intercepts U.S. reconnaissance airplane in international airspace.

U.S. moves 24 heavy bombers to Guam (within range of NK).

NK restarts Yongbyon reactor and calls for bilateral talks with U.S.

U.S. extends training time fighters jets for joint military exercise with South Korea. U.S. rejects bilateral talks.

May–June

U.S. announces plans to take coercive steps against NK. Multilateral talks initiated by China.

July–Sept.

Dec.

NK rejects continuation of multilateral talks.

Washington announces plan to terminate construction of 2 lightwater reactors in NK.

NK announces reprocessing of 8000 nuclear fuel rods, calls for bilateral talks with U.S.

U.S. argues legitimacy of preemptive strikes and rejects bilateral talks.

NK rejects proposal.

U.S., South Korea, and Japan propose solution to nuclear crisis.

NK offers not to test or produce nuclear weapons and to freeze nuclear facilities.

U.S. demands irreversible dismantlement of NK’s nuclear program.

NK cancels ongoing talks with U.S. and South Korea.

U.S./South Korea joint military exercise.

2004 Jan.–Mar.

continued on next page

142

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

Table 7.3 (continued) Month

North Korea

June

NK calls for U.S. to pull troops from South Korea.

United States

China succeeds in initiating six-party talks in Beijing. Sept.

Six-party talks end. NK refuses to resume talks.

2005 Jan.

NK announces it has nuclear weapons and demands bilateral talks with U.S. as a precondition for restarting six-party talks.

U.S. rejects NK demands and declares that it will not wait “forever” for NK to rejoin the six-party talks.

April

President Bush calls NK leader Kim Jong Il a “tyrant” and a “dangerous person.”

Aug.

U.S./South Korea joint military exercise.

Nov. Dec.

China succeeds again in initiating six-party talks in Beijing. Pyongyang suspends six-party talks indefinitely.

In the context of the ensuing nuclear crisis, one observer reminds us that “very few policy-makers [and] security analysts ever make the effort to imagine how threats are perceived from the North Korean perspective, or consider how these perceptions are part of an interactive security dilemma in which the West, and U.S. foreign policy in particular, are implicated as deeply as the vilified regime in Pyongyang.”37 Examples of U.S. threats are the yearly joint military maneuvers between the United States and South Korea, President Bush’s inclusion of the regime in Pyongyang in “the axis of evil” in January 2002, or the new U.S. National Security Strategy, which outlined in detail the legitimacy of preemptive strikes.38 North Korea has, of course, contributed its part to the escalation of the crisis. Observers have characterized North Korean foreign policy behavior as a “coercive game-plan,” ratcheting up diplomatic and military pressure on its perceived adversaries. It was a “crude form of deterrence . . . designed both to signal Washington that it was prepared for military conflict and to push the Bush administration toward resuming a direct bilateral dialogue.”39 In consequence, the United States and North Korea find themselves in a security dilemma with potentially devastating consequences.

LESSONS FROM THE PAST

143

One strategy to address and decrease this threat is an attempt to reconstitute the relations between the United States and North Korea. The strategy suggested by the Gorbachev phenomenon is engagement—more specifically, repeated and enduring engagement. While the United States and its allies have indeed often offered conciliatory gestures, they were not sufficient to break the impasse of North Korean resistance. Sustained engagement runs counter to the recent foreign policy conduct of the Bush administration toward North Korea. High-level officials in the administration (such as former Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice), in opposition to some “soft-liners” in the government (such as former Secretary of State Colin Powell or Jim Kelly), have repeatedly articulated the apparent failure of engagement and the promise of isolationism.40 Engagement might nevertheless remain promising. Before 2002, when South Korea (backed by the United States) initiated the conciliatory “Sunshine Policy” toward Pyongyang, the situation surrounding North Korea was rather calm. Several commentators have pointed out, for example, that North Korea abstained from provoking major border incidents with South Korea. Also in 1999, the North Korean leadership declared that all test-flight launches of ballistic missiles would be suspended.41 Moreover, observers have pointed out that North Korea had by and large adhered to the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea. This assessment was even confirmed by former CIA director George Tenet, who gave a retrospective testimony to Congress on March 19, 2002.42 However, the United States has recently adopted what observers have characterized as a “hardline rejectionsist, crime and punishment” approach.43 Highly critical of the policy shift that occurred during the transition from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration, Roland Bleiker writes that the “sudden turnaround in American foreign policy . . . sharply reversed the more conciliatory approach during the Clinton administration [and] can be seen as the origin of the present nuclear crisis just as well as any actions or announcements by Pyongyang.”44 Moreover, Bleiker rightly points out that, “faced with a sudden intensification of American . . . threats, it is hardly surprising that Pyongyang reacted angrily . . . Nor is it surprising that Pyongyang is reluctant to give up its nuclear option, for it could serve as a credible deterrent against a US attack.”45 The point here is not to justify North Korean actions toward the external world, but to comprehend them better. While Pyongyang has resumed a foreign policy justifiably judged as hostile in the West, there may also be reasons for the North Korean perceptions of the international environment. If the goal of U.S. policymakers is to avoid further confirmation of the frustration-aggression hypothesis, a strategy to alter the “perceptual lens” of the Kim Jong Il regime is appropriate.46 In its absence, the preference for more extreme tactics may be the only way for Kim Jong Il to gain the world’s attention—especially when their signals are discarded as mere bluff in order

144

WHEN LEADERS LEARN AND WHEN THEY DON’T

to attain valued resources.47 “America and the world will not be blackmailed,” President Bush stressed in his 2003 State of the Union Address and the result was predictable: Pyongyang became even more recalcitrant. This escalation is very dangerous and tragic. Presumably in an effort to underline its international status, one of North Korea’s main goals appears to be bilateral talks with the United States (see the entries in the event chronology for March 2003; September 2003; January 2005). However, such a dialogue is not on the current policy menu of the U.S. administration. American officials have argued that “even entering into bilateral talks would be a form of appeasement—a sign of weakness in the face of North Korean threats.”48 Even if North Korean tactics and moves do represent a form of brinkmanship, the dangers are evident. Misperceptions, miscalculations, or a sudden escalation of tension could precipitate a disaster at any moment, fueled by the logic of a self-fulfilling prophecy in Washington and a frustrationaggression syndrome in Pyongyang.49 It is also important to recognize that the consequences of an escalation in Korea would be hard, if not impossible, to contain. As Roland Bleiker writes: “One of the world’s biggest cities, Seoul, is only 50 kilometers away from the DMZ . . . Even if pre-emptive strikes were to neutralize North Korea’s possible nuclear arsenal, they would not be able to destroy all its conventional weapons.”50 This could easily trigger a second Korean War, with disastrous regional and global consequences that, of course, would not leave the United States unaffected.51 The analysis of Kim Jong Il’s beliefs and the implications of the frustration-aggression hypothesis suggest that a strategy of direct and immediate engagement with North Korea may increase its perceived role in world politics, decrease its sense of frustration, and mitigate its inclination toward hostile behavior. The Gorbachev phenomenon, in turn, suggests that this engagement should be of enduring quality. If the United States would “play Gorbachev” more actively, if it would initiate engagement and persist with this strategy, then there might be a chance that the perceptual lens of the North Korean leadership would be altered and the relationship between North Korea and the United States might gradually be reconstituted over time. An appropriate venue for this strategy may well include direct bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea. That such is possible was demonstrated by Gorbachev.52

NOTES

CHAPTER 1 1. Henry Kissinger is quoted in Isaacson (1992, p. 13). 2. For a description of the juche ideology see An (1983) and Park (1998). 3. Brown (1996, p. 12). 4. Wolfers (1962, p. 42). 5. Wendt (1999, p. 85); see also Kratochwil (1993). 6. Brown (1996, pp. 4–5). 7. Nye (1988a, p. 388). 8. Bialer (1986, p. 343). On another occasion Bialer and Afferica (1985, p. 620) wrote that Gorbachev’s reformism “has nothing in common with liberalism . . . [It] stresses authoritarian rule, discipline, and predictable conformist behavior. Cultural experimentation, not to speak of expanded political rights, has no place in his world.” 9. Gaddis (1986, p. 100). 10. Breslauer (2002, p. 22). 11. Perle (1991, p. 35) and (1992). 12. See, for example, Deudney and Ikenberry (1991/92), Eberstadt and Ellings (2001), Oye (1995), Schweller and Wohlforth (2000), and Smith (1996). 13. Gorbachev (1995, p. 116). 14. Pravda (March 12, 1985). 15. Gorbachev (1985a, 1985b, 1986); see also Breslauer (2002, p. 57). 16. Theorists subscribing to the concept of structural adaptation “emphasize the rational and efficient adjustment to changing structural incentives, whereas learning theorists emphasize significant variations in individual responses to structural changes deriving from variations in cognitive structures, beliefs, and processes” (Levy, 1994, p. 298). 17. Nye (1988a, p. 390). 18. See, for example, Deudney and Ikenberry (1991/92) and Schweller and Wohlforth (2000). 19. Gleditsch (1993, p. 357); see also Kennedy (1993, pp. 231, 295). 20. Quoted in Kegley (1994, p. 14). 21. Brown (1996, p. 230). 22. Stein (1994, p. 162). 23. Stein (1994, p. 162); see also Hough (1988) and Sakwa (1990, p. 7). 24. For a discussion of the socialization of the “Gorbachev generation” see Hough (1980). 145

146

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

25. Brown (1996, p. 98). 26. Breslauer (1991, p. 883), Brown (1996, p. 112). On Gorbachev as a technocrat see Checkel (1993, 1997); see also Risse-Kappen (1994). 27. Haas (1992, p. 3); see also Adler (1992), Evangelista (1995), and Haas (1987). 28. Arbatov (1992, pp. 288–289). IMEMO and ISKAN prepared formal reports for Gorbachev and their researchers also contributed to the writing of foreign policy sections of Gorbachev’s speeches (Checkel, 1997, p. 99). 29. Koslowski and Kratochwil (1994, p. 223) and Wendt (1999, p. 375); Allen Lynch (1989) provides a good overview of the intellectual origins of the new thinking. For further elaborations of “new thinking” see Gorbachev’s own accounts (1987a, 1995) and Legvold (1988), Lefever and Lugt (1989), Thom (1988), and Valenta and Cibulka (1990). 30. Legvold (1991, p. 710). 31. Shevardnadze (1991, p. 23). 32. Wendt (1999, p. 375). 33. Gorbachev (1986). 34. Stein (1994). 35. Mearsheimer (1990). 36. For good overviews see Oberdorfer (1997), Scalapino and Lee (1972), Yang (1981), and Suh (1983, 1988). 37. Quoted in Snyder (1999, p. 29). 38. Buzo (1991, p. 1). 39. Buzo (1999, p. 10). 40. Buzo (1999, p. 241). 41. Buzo (1999, p. 10). 42. Quoted in Snyder (1999, p. 36); see also Oberdorfer (1997, p. 19). 43. Oberdorfer (1997, p. 153). 44. For an overview of the Soviet Union’s impact on North Korea’s formation see Lankov (2002). 45. Quoted in Oberdorfer (1997, p. 9). 46. Buzo (1999, p. 107). 47. Boulychev (1994, pp. 103–105); see also Kim, S. (1998, p. 81). 48. Toloraya (2002, p. 148). 49. See Downs (2001, p. 100) and Zhebin (1995). 50. Zaeck (1998, p. 76). 51. Kim (1994), Oh (1990), and Sang-Woo (1991, 1992). 52. Lee (2001, p. 60) and Cotton (1998). 53. Manning (1998, p. 145) and Snyder (1997). 54. Ho-yol (1992), Moon-young (1994), and Youn (1999). 55. Kim Il Sung (1993a). 56. Kim Il Sung (1993b). 57. Kang (2003, p. 313; emphasis mine). 58. See, for example, Deudney and Ikenberry (1991/92) and Schweller and Wohlforth (2000). Kim Il Sung (and later Kim Jong Il) have been characterized as “impulsive and eccentric” (Thornhill and Ward, 2002). Similarly, observers have described North Korea as a nation of “paranoid survivalists” (Olsen, 1986, p. 851)

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

147

and a “renegade state” (Spector and Smith, 1991, p. 8); see also Kang (2003), Hayes (1991), and Kim (1994). 59. See Schweller and Wohlforth (2000, p. 87). 60. Stein (1994) draws on this data. See also Kennedy (1993, pp. 231, 295). 61. Gorbachev (1987a, p. 206). 62. Chernoff (1991) employs very systematic methods to examine the claim that “the US military buildup stimulated increases in the Soviet military budget which ultimately bankrupted the Soviet Union and won the Cold War for the West.” He concludes that “there is no demonstrable relationship between the US increases and the Soviet foreign policy reversal.” See also Deudney and Ikenberry (1991/92, p. 100) for a supporting argument. 63. Gilpin (1975, p. 35). 64. See, for example, Lebow (1994) for a similar argument. 65. See also Bunce (1993, p. 116). 66. Kil and Moon (2001, p. 206), Porter, Takeuchi, and Sakakibara (2000, p. 10). 67. Jervis (1978, pp. 172–173); see also Rosenau (1966, pp. 47–48), Waltz (1979, p. 195), and Snyder (1992, pp. 317–318). 68. Morgenthau (1948, pp. 7–8). 69. Keohane (1986), Waltz (1979); see Rose (1998) and Schweller (2003) for neoclassical realism’s rediscovery of agents and ideational variables. 70. See Breslauer and Tetlock (1991), Levy (1997), Monroe (1995), Simon (1985), Stein and Welch (1997), Tetlock (1986), Tetlock (1998), Wendt (1999), and Wendt (1992). 71. Tetlock (1998, p. 876). 72. See Tetlock (1998, p. 876) and Simon (1985). See also Maoz’s (1990) elaboration of the “context-dependency” concept. 73. This often implicit criticism in conventional international relations theory has been recognized explicitly by a variety of scholars. Among them are Bennett (1999, p. 39), Evangelista (1989), Stein (1994), Walker (2004b), and Wendt (1999). 74. A similar insight is made by Jervis (2003) and Walker (2003b). 75. Jervis (1988, pp. 324–325). 76. Wendt (1987, p. 342) calls this denial “ontological reductionism.” 77. Lake and Powell (1999, pp. 3–4). 78. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1954). 79. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1954, p. 650); see also Pruitt (1965). 80. Sprout and Sprout (1965, p. 11). 81. See also the discussion of these and other Sproutian contributions— synthesized in the concept of the “ecological triad” in Most and Starr (1989, pp. 29–35). 82. Sprout and Sprout (1965, p. 225). 83. Brecher et al. (1969). 84. Jervis (1976) and Axelrod (1976). 85. Jervis (1976, p. 28). 86. See Herrmann (1988), Kelman (1965), and Kelman and Bloom (1973). 87. For an exemplification of this argument see George (1980, p. 56) and Lau and Sears (1986). 88. Russett and Starr (1981).

148

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

89. See, for example, Keohane and Martin (2003), Rose (1998), Ruggie (1999), and Walt (2003a). 90. Rosenau (1966, p. 31). 91. For examples of such criticism see Achen and Snidal (1989) and Morrow (1997). 92. Legvold (1991, p. 726). 93. Lake and Powell (1999, p. 18). 94. Levy (1994, p. 280). 95. See, for example, Brooks (1997), Christensen (1996), Christensen (1997), Christensen and Snyder (1990), Keohane and Martin (2003), Walt (1987), and Wohlforth (1993). 96. Examples include Feng (2005), Malici (2005, 2006a, 2006b) and Malici and Malici (2005a, 2005b), Schafer (2000), Walker, Schafer, and Marfleet (2001), and Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998, 1999). 97. For seminal studies using and refining the operational code construct see George (1969), George (1979), Holsti (1977), Schafer and Walker (2006), and Walker (1977, 1983, 1990, 2004a). 98. Well-known studies are Bennett (1999) and Khong (1992). 99. Crichlow (1998), Feng (2003), Malici (2005), Schafer and Walker (2001), Walker and Schafer (2000, 2003). 100. See the references cited in the chapters profiling each leader. 101. For more on “at-a-distance” methods see Schafer (2000) and Winter (1980). For a good overview of the difficulties that are related to such a method see Larson (1988a), Rasler, Thompson, and Chester (1980), and Hermann (1980). 102. Schafer (2000) and Tetlock and Manstead (1985). 103. See Schafer (2000) for a wider discussion. 104. Vertzberger (1990, p. 114); see also Walker (2000) and Winter, Hermann, Weintraub, and Walker (1991). 105. For supporting arguments see Breslauer (2002, p. xi) and Buzo (1999). 106. Vertzberger (1990). 107. For a critical exchange regarding this theory see Brams (2001) and Stone (2001). 108. Snidal (1985). 109. Wendt (1999, p. 327). 110. Jervis (1988) and Larson (1988b). 111. Moe (1979). 112. Even the founders of classical game theory characterized it as “thoroughly static” (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953, p. 44); see also Gowa (1986). 113. Standing at the “pinnacle” of the decision-making process is one of the criteria set forth by Holsti (1976, p. 30) that warrants a focus on individual leaders. Other criteria include nonroutine situations, highly ambiguous situations, circumstances of information overload, and unanticipated events. 114. See Frieden (1999) on different methods for deriving actor’s preferences. 115. Jervis (1988, pp. 319, 324–325). 116. On actor dispensability and indispensability see Goldhamer (1950), Greenstein (1967), Lane (1959), Levinson (1958), Shils (1954), and Verba (1961). 117. Goldstein and Freeman (1990, p. 183) complain that “even the . . . exciting game-theoretic work of Robert Powell (1985, 1987, 1988, 1989a, 1989b) lacks any

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

149

systematic ‘empirical’ component.” Measuring beliefs systematically and incorporating these into models of game theory is one way of enriching the latter with empiricism. 118. For a similar argument see Frieden (1999). 119. For a discussion on how perceptions can impact the payoff structures of games see Beer (1986), Gowa (1986), Keohane (1989), Larson (1986), Plous (1985), and Wagner (1983). Regarding the value of such an approach, Frieden (1999) argues that when preferences or beliefs rest on some observable trait and can be measured independently, it is perfectly appropriate to draw a link between changes in the sources of preferences or beliefs and changes in behavior.

CHAPTER 2 1. Brams (2000, p. 222). 2. Brams (1994). 3. Brams (2000, p. 222). 4. Stone (2001, p. 224). 5. Brams (1994, p. 26). 6. Brams (2001, p. 247). 7. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1954, p. 65). 8. von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953, p. 49). 9. Mathematically speaking, 2 x 2 ordinal games can specify their respective choices and outcomes as any set of options and outcomes so long as they are distinct options and ranked outcomes. The CO and CF options and the outcomes of settlement, domination, submission, and deadlock reflect the application of these mathematical models to the substantive domain of politics. See also Snyder and Diesing (1977). 10. Brams (1994, pp. 24, 27, italics in original). 11. See, for example, the contributions in Axelrod and Keohane (1985), Brams and Kilgour (1986) Downs (1989) Downs, Rocke, and Siverson (1985), Jervis (1989), and Lebow and Stein (1989). 12. Brams (1994, pp. 68–69). 13. A Nash equilibrium “is a state—or, more properly, the strategies associated with a state—from which no player would have an incentive to depart unilaterally because its departure would immediately lead to a worse, or at least not a better, state.” Under the more complex rules of play specified by Brams’s (1994) sequential game theory, the players will make alternating choices leading to a nonmyopic equilibrium (NME). “In a two-person game, a nonmyopic equlibrium is a state from which neither player, anticipating all possible rational moves and countermoves from the initial state, would have an incentive to depart unilaterally because the departure would eventually lead to a worse, or at least not a better, outcome” (Brams 1994, p. 224). 14. Oye (1985, p. 1). 15. Wendt (1992, p. 421). For some elaborations of “altercasting” see Earle (1986), Goffman (1959), and Weinstein and Deutschberger (1963). 16. Mead (1934), Perinbanayagam (1974), and Stebbins (1967). 17. Lake and Powell (1999, p. 18). 18. Lake and Powell (1999, p. 18, italics in original). 19. Frieden (1999, p. 52). 20. Frieden (1999, p. 53) and Oye (1985). 21. Wendt (1999, p. 316).

150

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

22. Wendt (1999, p. 316). 23. Levy (1994, p. 283). 24. Wendt (1999, p. 316). 25. Waltz (1979). 26. Levy (1994). 27. George (1969, p. 200). 28. Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998, 2003) and Schafer and Walker (2006). 29. For a further elaboration of the methodological advantages of the Profiler+ software see Schafer and Walker (2001) and Young (2001). 30. For previous interesting attempts to endogenize preferences within a general rationalist or game-theoretic framework see Becker (1996), Clark (1998), Cohen and Axelrod (1984), Elster (1982), and Raub (1990). For the development of TIP see Walker and Schafer (2004) and Marfleet and Walker (2006). 31. Leng and Walker (1982), Maoz (1990), Walker (1977, 2004a); see also Snyder and Diesing (1977) and Walker and Schafer (2003a). 32. The mean values for the norming group are (P-1 = +.25, SD = .32; I-1 = +.33, SD = .47; P-4 = .21, SD = .12). Comparisons to a norming group are instructive because it permits the development of a better sense of how the leaders in the present study who came to be seen as reformers and revolutionaries—those who came to be seen as bringing about peace or posing threats—compare to the “average leader.” The data for the norming group were obtained from Professor Mark Schafer, Department of Political Science, 240 Stubbs Hall, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803-5433. 33. Nelson (1995). 34. Sternthal (1997, p. 8). For a discussion of the origins of détente in the 1960s see Crockatt (1995); for a description of the United States’s way to détente see Larson (1991) and Nelson (1995). 35. Goldstein and Freeman (1990, p. 47); see also Garthoff (1994, pp. 54). 36. The provisions of the SALT I and the ABM Treaty are discussed in Farley (1988). 37. The agreement committed the parties to the goal of creating “conditions which promote the reduction of tensions in the world and the strengthening of universal security and international cooperation” (Crockatt, 1995, p. 226). 38. Maresca (1988) and Crockatt (1995). 39. See Garthoff (1985, p. 1009) and Hopf (1991, p. 598). Crockatt (1995, p. 303) writes “Reagan’s foreign policy was a conscious attempt to resurrect a pre-détente conception of the Soviet Union and of world politics.” 40. For the Soviet Union, détente was a dyadic affair involving only the United States and itself and it “did not mean that liberation struggles in the third world should be halted” (Goldstein and Freeman, 1990, p. 49; Garthoff, 1985, pp. 47–48). 41. Goldstein and Freeman (1990, p. 49). Brezhnev seemed to be convinced that the Soviet Union’s intervention in Afghanistan was not the real reason for the U.S. withdrawal from policies of détente. He concluded that “if there were no Afghanistan certain circles in the United States, in NATO, would have surely found another pretext to aggravate the world situation” (interview with Pravda, January 14, 1980). The motivation for the Unites States’s SALT II withdrawal became an issue

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

151

in a meeting between Gorbachev and then Secretary of State George Schultz. Gorbachev argued that SALT II was “dead and buried” before the invasion of Afghanistan. In later reflections, Schultz came to believe that Gorbachev (and Brezhnev) was right (Oberdorfer, 1998, p. 131). 42. Goldstein and Freeman (1990, p. 49). 43. Hopf (1991). 44. These scores are not mean scores and do, therefore, not correspond to the scores in Table 2.3. 45. Evangelista (1989, p. 306). 46. Garthoff (1994, p. 67). For a detailed discussion of Soviet-U.S. arms control politics see Carnesale and Haas (1987) and Talbott (1984). 47. Einhorn (1985), Gaddis (1989), and Garthoff (1985), Garthoff (1994). A trend toward higher military expenditure had begun under Carter—real growth for the years 1979–1981 was 4.0 percent, 3.1 percent, and 4.8 percent, respectively. However, under Reagan real annual growth for the four budgets reached 7.8 percent, 7.3 percent, 4.2 percent, and 9.5 percent (Crockatt, 1995, p. 306). A similar tendency can be inferred from the figures for defense as a percentage of gross national product (Smith, 1990, pp. 63–64). 48. For an interpretation of why détente failed see Breslauer (1983). One of the reasons why Brezhnev persisted in his faith in détente may be his need for high levels of cognitive consistency (Festinger, 1957, 1964; Hopf, 1991). We can only speculate whether he would have adjusted his beliefs in the face of a mounting dissonance between his beliefs and actual world politics. 49. Garthoff (1985, p. 1020). 50. Andropov’s thinking was often marked by zero-sum assumptions. At the June 1983 Central Committee Plenum Meeting, for example, he emphasized that U.S. and Soviet interests were fundamentally incompatible (Andropov, 1983). 51. Brams (1994, p. 127). 52. Brams (1994, pp. 127–148), Cross and Guyer (1980), and Schelling (1966). 53. Garthoff (1985, p. 1012). Garthoff (1985, p. 1012) also concludes that “NSDD-75 confirmed containment, and circumscribed (although it did not eliminate) a confrontational approach.” 54. Goldstein and Freeman (1990, p. 50). The KAL crisis is described in detail in Oberdorfer (1998). 55. Garthoff (1985, p. 1026). 56. Garthoff (1994, p.141). 57. Goldstein and Freeman (1990, p. 50). 58. Garthoff (1994, p. 168) writes that Chernenko “had been a faithful supporter of détente under Brezhnev. . . . He was less committed than Andropov . . . to a hard line against the United States and more prepared to test the possibilities for resuming a dialogue.” See also Oberdorfer (1998, p. 51). 59. Garthoff (1994, p. 146); see also Blacker (1988). 60. Garthoff (1994, pp. 156, 197). 61. Garthoff (1994, pp. 166, 202). 62. Crockatt (1995). 63. Oberdorfer (1998) describes the Chernenko period between February 1984 and March 1985 as a “turn” in Soviet-U.S. relations.

152

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

CHAPTER 3 1. Stein (1994). 2. Crockatt (1995, p. 338). 3. Kegley (1994). 4. Brown (1996, p. 229). 5. Zemtsov and Farrar (1989, p. 32). For a further discussion see Gustafson and Mann (1986), Hough (1987, 1988), and Zemtsov and Farrar (1989, pp. 31–48). 6. Brown (1996, pp. 212–213). Sakwa (1990, p. 13) summarizes that “within a year of coming to power Gorbachev had replaced two-thirds of the top leaders including eight out of the eleven members of the Secretariat, one-third of ministers and one-third of republican and regional leaders.” Colton (1988, pp. 160–161) elaborates further, stating that “by the time the Twenty-seventh Congress opened . . . 41 percent of the members of the Central Committee were newly elected. By Gorbachev’s second anniversary in power . . . he had removed 38 percent of the full and candidate members of the Politburo who had been in place when he began. Turnover over two years was 76 percent among the Central committee secretaries and department heads, 64 percent in the Council of Ministers (73 percent in its Presidium), and 39 percent among regional first secretaries of the party.” See also Gill (1987). 7. Shevardnadze (1991, p. 39). 8. Bennett (1999, pp. 117, 251), Blacker (1991, p. 454), Hasegawa (1988, p. 122), and Bialer (1988). For a discussion of these officials and how they distinguished themselves from previous elites see Hough (1997, pp. 177–189). 9. White (1990, p. 8). Because there is no significant difference between the operational code indices of Gorbachev and his predecessors in chapter 2, the results for each individual leader are not repeated in a separate table. 10. For a comprehensive analysis of Reagan’s subjective games at the end of the cold war see Malici (2006a). 11. Crozier (1990) and Lewin (1991). 12. Wendt (1992, p. 407). 13. Stryker (1987, p. 93). 14. Gorbachev (1987a, p. 121). 15. Gorbachev (1987a, p. 131). 16. Stein (1994, p. 179). 17. Quoted in Garthoff (1994, p. 218); see also Bohlen (1985) and Schmemann (1985). 18. Garthoff (1994, p. 218). 19. Quoted in Goshko (1985, p. 220). 20. Brinkley (1985) and Marcus (1985). 21. Gorbachev (1987a, p. 225). 22. Goldstein and Freeman (1990, p. 114). 23. Garthoff (1994, p. 222). 24. Quoted in Goldstein and Freeman (1990, p. 117). 25. Goldstein and Freeman (1990, pp. 117–118). 26. Garthoff (1994, p. 228). 27. Garthoff (1994, p. 230); see also Oberdorfer (1998, pp. 123–127). This reinterpretation was not unanimously agreed on within the administration. One of the opponents was Secretary of State Schultz (Schultz, 1993).

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

153

28. Garthoff (1987). 29. One of Gorbachev’s “principal arguments against the SDI were that it reflected or could give rise to a first-strike strategy” (Garthoff, 1994, p. 243). Oberdorfer (1998) gives an excellent account of the personal meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan. 30. Gorbachev (1995, p. 403). 31. Department of State Bulletin, January 1986: 8. 32. Mandelbaum and Talbott (1987, pp. 4–6). 33. Gorbachev (1987a, p. 227). 34. Goldstein and Freeman (1990, p. 120). 35. Goldblatt and Fern (1986, p. 593). 36. In fact, after the summit, Gorbachev (1987a, p. 232) complained about a dangerous and “strident” campaign by the United States, “aimed at instigating antiSoviet passions.” 37. Gorbachev (1987a, p. 214). 38. Gorbachev (1995, p. 405). 39. Oberdorfer (1998, p. 155). 40. Sternthal (1997, p. 50). 41. Shevardnadze (1991, p. 49). 42. Garthoff (1994, p. 254). 43. Risse-Kappen (1994, p. 201); see also Crockatt (1995, p. 360). 44. Gorbachev (1986). 45. Garthoff (1994, p. 255) writes that “the structure of thought and organization, as well as the content, of Gorbachev’s report . . . marked a radical change from the previous pattern. The 1981 report had presented a major section, ‘On the International Policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,’ comprising a progression of subordinate sections on relations with the world socialist system, the newly liberated countries, the world communist movement, and then the capitalist states. In startling contrast, the 1886 report started with a major section, ‘The Contemporary World: Basic Trends and Contradictions.’ ” 46. Garthoff (1994, p. 257). 47. Shevardnadze (1991, p. 51). 48. Blacker (1991, p. 435) and Haslam (1991, p. 491). 49. Connolly (1983, p. 1). 50. Ball, Farr, and Hanson (1989, pp. iv–x). 51. Gorbachev (1987a, p. 128). 52. Brams (1994, pp. 138–148; see also Game 27 on p. 217 in Brams, 1994). 53. Gorbachev (1987a, p. 124). 54. Gorbachev (1995, p. 412). 55. The USS Caron was a specially equipped intelligence-collection destroyer, and the act thereby violated not only Soviet sovereignty but also international law. The Law of the Sea Treaty, which was approved by the U.S. administration in 1983, stated that “any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal State” is not to be considered as permissive passage (Carroll, 1988, pp. 14–17). 56. Garthoff (1994, p. 270). In consequence, the Soviet Union canceled a planned Shultz–Shevardnadze meeting to demonstrate its frustration with U.S. moves. 57. Garthoff (1994, p. 272). 58. Quoted in the New York Times, March 27, 1986, p. A5.

154

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

59. Gorbachev (1995, p. 413). 60. Gorbachev (1987a, p. 223). 61. Gorbachev (1987a, p. 139). 62. Garhoff (1994, p. 275). 63. The novelty of this move is pointed out by Sternthal (1997, p. 73). She writes that the “agreement on mandatory, on-site inspections was a point that the Soviet military had consistently resisted, but it was pressured under Gorbachev to concede.” 64. Pravda, June 12, 1986. 65. Oberdorfer (1986, p. A1). In August, the American Congress voted for a resolution mandating the United States to hold its military forces according to SALT II limitations as long as the Soviet Union did so. The initial repudiation of the treaty was justified by the U.S. administration’s claims of alleged Soviet noncompliance with the treaty. Lee Hamilton, chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, argued that these accusations are “highly ambiguous and have not been represented fully and accurately by the administration” (Hamilton, 1986, pp. 3–5). 66. Gorbachev’s report is reprinted in Pravda (June 17, 1986). 67. Oberdorfer (1991, pp. 169–174). 68. Goldstein and Freeman (1990, p. 121) and von Beyme (1991). In reviewing U.S. behavior before and after the Reykjavik summit, Mendelsohn (1988, p. 141) writes that “a review of the arms control dialogue during the Reagan administration reveals . . . a remarkable series of retrograde U.S. decisions.” 69. Garthoff (1994, p. 286). 70. Gorbachev (1987a, p. 204). 71. Zemtsov and Farrar (1989, p. 168). 72. Garthoff (1994, p. 287); see also Haslam (1989, p. 166). 73. Garthoff (1994, p. 288). 74. Gates (1996, p. 409). 75. Shevardnadze (1991, p. 89). 76. Brown (1996, p. 233). 77. Garthoff (1994, p. 292). 78. Zemtsov and Farrar (1989, p. 122) and Garthoff (1994, p. 298). 79. Lee (1986, p. A1). Reagan nevertheless broadcasted a message to the Soviet people in which he referred to “enormous differences between our two systems” (Reagan, 1986). 80. Gorbachev (1987a, p. 215). 81. Goldstein and Freeman (1990, p. 122). 82. Gorbachev infiltrated American public opinion, for example, by receiving a (unofficial) U.S delegation from the Council on Foreign Relations. Back in the United States, the Council concluded that Gorbachev’s efforts to being about change in Soviet-U.S. relations were sincere and impressive. 83. Gorbachev (1995, p. 446). 84. Oberdorfer (1991, pp. 265–266).

CHAPTER 4 1. Pravda, February 16 (1987), Gorbachev (1987a, p. 227 and 1995, p. 419). 2. Stein (1994, p. 179). 3. Breslauer (2002, p. 29).

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

155

4. Gorbachev (1995, pp. 402, 442). 5. Gorbachev (1987a, p. 125). 6. With respect to I-1, I-2, and I-4a, there were also differences in the comparison of the previous period. However, the differences now occur at higher levels of significance. 7. Quoted in Gorbachev (1995, p. 457). 8. Gorbachev (1987a, p. 228). 9. Crockatt (1995, p. 361), and Gates (1996, p. 421). Brown (1996, p. 235) writes that Gorbachev “had been exposed to the arguments of Sagdeev and other scientific specialists that the Soviet side had been making more of a fuss of SDI than it deserved.” 10. Gorbachev (1987a, p. 139). 11. Garthoff (1994, p. 306). 12. For an analysis of the military’s criticism on “reasonable sufficiency,” see Sands and Phillips (1988). 13. Sternthal (1997, p. 83). Gorbachev argued for example that while the Soviet Union shall do “everything necessary to reliably guarantee . . . security . . . [it] shall not make a single step in excess of the demands and requirements of reasonable, sufficient defense” (Gorbachev, 1987b). 14. This offer was very generous as the Soviet Union has about 160 SRINF missile launchers operationally deployed while the United States has none (Garthoff, 1994, p. 312; see also Gormley, 1988). 15. Sternthal (1997, p. 85). In order to circumvent the military, Gorbachev removed Defense Minister Sokolov and appointed Dimitri Yazov in his place. The latter “had been in charge of the Defense Ministry’s Main Personnel Directorate since 1986, working closely with the Party’s Central Committee. He was a supporter of Gorbachev’s reforms . . . . In his new post, Gorbachev noted that Yazov had retired 1,200 generals. ‘In a word, his appearance in the role of Defense Minister was not accidental,’ he explained” (Sternthal, 1997, pp. 87–88). 16. Sternthal (1997, p. 86). 17. In earlier months of the year, Reagan steadily attacked the Soviets on their foreign policy in general, Soviet policy toward Afghanistan and Nicaragua in particular, and apparent Soviet noncompliance with previous arms control agreements (Presidential Documents, Vol. 23, March 10 and 16, 1987). 18. Garthoff (1994, p. 317). 19. Sternthal (1997, p. 90). 20. Garthoff (1994, p. 318). 21. In contrast to earlier negotiations in which Reagan did not include European missiles, he now agreed to withdraw the nuclear warheads for seventy-two German missiles. 22. Department of State Bulletin (1987a, 1987b). 23. Garthoff (1994, p. 320). 24. Brown (1996, p. 234) and Sternthal (1997, p. 93). This pullout was not supported by soon-to-be-replaced Defence Minister Yazov and KGB chairman Kryuchov. Gorbachev’s authority in foreign policy and security matters was once again confirmed when Yakovlev was asked who has the final say. He replied: “Mikhail Sergeyevich [Gorbachev]—of course he had the final say. Enough hesitation, he said, the troops must be withdrawn—that’s all there is to it. They must be withdrawn” (qtd. in Brown, 1996, pp. 235; see also Sakwa, 1990, pp. 332–333).

156

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

25. The text of the INF Treaty is reproduced in Survival 30 (March/April 1988): 162–180. 26. Presidential Documents (December 14), Vol. 23: 1494. 27. Haslam (1989, ch. 7). 28. Garthoff (1994. p. 327). 29. Brown (1996, p. 236) and Gates (1996, p. 423). 30. Garthoff (1994, p. 328). 31. Garthoff (1994, p. 328). 32. At the end of December, Time magazine chose Gorbachev as “Man of the Year” in recognition of his efforts to reduce tensions and the danger of war. 33. Garthoff (1994, pp. 342–343). 34. State Bulletin, “Agreements on Afghanistan,” Vol. 88 (June 1988): 56–60. 35. Garthoff (1994, p. 347). 36. Gorbachev (1995, p. 451). 37. Quoted in Garthoff (1994, p. 359). 38. Gorbachev’s foreign policy ideas articulated at the conference were in part stimulated by Vyacheslav Dashichev—a foreign policy analyst at the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist system. In articles and interviews, he argued that “superpower ambitions in foreign policy” in the past had resulted in a series of foreign policy mistakes. He criticized past Soviet foreign policy behavior for not corresponding “to internal tasks” and for creating “distortions” and “stereotypes” of the supposed enemy, which had as a consequence a “psychosis” of the nation and an unwarranted fear of imminent attack. He furthermore argued that politics should prevail over military means and that foreign policy should not “be costly in character, but should focus on “interaction and cooperation in the most diverse of spheres” (Sternthal, 1997, p. 115). 39. Garthoff (1994, p. 362). 40. Quoted in Sternthal (1997, p. 117). 41. Shevardnadze’s statements, which were later followed by Gorbachev’s speech at the United Nations on December 7, accelerated reforms in Europe. An increasing financial burden might have been a necessary condition for letting eastern Europe loose, but not a sufficient one. Sternthal (1997, p. 138) writes that the “erosion of bloc unity was, in large part, the result of shifts in ideological dogma. The promulgated new worldview and the subsequent change in the image of the enemy, which was no longer defined as the ‘imperialist West,” accelerated the process of deStalinization in the region.” 42. Most outstanding, because unprecedented, were probably the meetings of top military leaders from both sides. Marshal Akhromeyev visited, for example, Admiral William Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the beginning of July. One month later, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci visited General Yazov in Moscow. Also in July, Ambassador Jack Matlock and Shevardnadze discussed the Iran-Iraq War and the conflict in Kampuchea. These talks were extended in September to meetings of high-level experts on a range or regional conflicts. In October, Assistant Secretary Elliot Abrams met with Yury Pavlov to discuss Latin American affairs. One month later, both sides engaged in consultations regarding the opening of four-power talks on Angola and Southwest Africa. Shortly afterward, Assistant Secretary Gaston Singur and Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev met to discuss East Asian affairs. 43. A major reshuffling of officials took place in the summer and fall of 1988. The basic outcome of Gorbachev’s “Machiavellian” (Hough, 1997, p. 250) personnel politics

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

157

was an eradication of “critics” and a promotion of officials Gorbachev sympathized with. Yakolev, for example, became chairman of the International Relations Commission, and the International Department and Socialist Countries Department were merged and headed by Andrei Gromyko. Conservatively oriented Dobrynin lost his job and Viktor Chebrikov was removed as chairman of the KGB. For more see Hough (1997). For a general outline of Gorbachev’s personnel policy see Iivonen (1989). 44. Risse-Kappen (1994, pp. 202–203) illustrates how Gorbachev’s position at the United Nations was influenced by the above mentioned institutchiks. He writes: “The institutchiks argued that reasonable sufficiency should lead to a restructuring of Soviet military forces in such a way as to preclude the ability to conduct . . . offensive operations. ISKAN analysts such as Vitali Zhurkin, Sergei Karaganov, and Andrei Kortunov as its deputy head, became leading advocates of the concept. The latter embraced Western ideas of nonoffensive defense and translated them into the Soviet context . . . Kokoshkin was involved in transnational exchanges . . . and had frequent contacts with European peace researchers . . . who were also in touch with the junior Arbatov, Karganov, and the bureaucracy of the Soviet foreign ministry.” (See also Frank and Gillette, 1992). 45. Sternthal (1997, pp. 127–128). 46. Blacker (1991, p. 437), Crockatt (1995, p. 363), Garthoff (1994, p. 366), Powaski (1998, p. 257), Sakwa (1990, p. 334), and White (1990, pp. 151–161). 47. Gilpin (1975, p. 35) and Waltz (1979). 48. Brown (1996, p. 239). 49. Oberdorfer (1991, pp. 334–345) and Beschloss and Talbott (1993, pp. 56–68). 50. Garthoff (1994, p. 379). 51. Presidential Documents (May 22, 1989). 52. Quoted in Oberdorfer (1998, p. 349). 53. Oberdorfer (1998, p. 350). Bush’s move had a bolder shape initially. Oberdorfer (1998, p. 350) writes that “at one stage the discussions envisioned cutting U.S. forces in Europe by 75 000 troops.” 54. Hill (1993, p. 314). 55. Beschloss and Talbott (1993, pp. 117–121). 56. Baker (1989, pp. 20, 24). 57. Pravda, October 24, 1989. 58. Garthoff (1994, p. 389). 59. Oberdorfer (1998, p. 353). 60. Scholars have interpreted Gorbachev’s concessions to Eastern European states as a “calculated strategy.” As Deputy of the Supreme Soviet Fyodor Burlatsky put it, Gorbachev’s hope was to have “mini-Gorbachevs” come to power in these countries. Koslowski and Kratochwil (1994, p. 234) argue that Gorbachev wanted “to encourage reform of all Communist Parties in order to avert popular revolts in Eastern Europe which would have repercussions on the Soviet Union itself.” He hoped to “retain control through reform,” which at the same time would also allow a strengthening of the Soviet Union itself. 61. Garthoff (1994, p. 406). 62. Quoted in Shevardnadze (1991, p. 98). 63. Garthoff (1994, p. 407); see also Oberdorfer (1998, p. 378). 64. BBC (December, 3, 1989). 65. Garthoff (1994, p. 409).

158

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

66. Hill (1993, p. 320). This meant that the United States would cut about 60,000 troops, while the Soviet Union would cut about 370,000. 67. Presidential Documents, February 5, 1990. 68. Hough (1997, pp. 261, 271). Hough adds that “even as the decision was being made, Gorbachev was bypassing the Politburo on the crucial matters of the future of Eastern Europe and German unification,” thus pointing to Gorbachev’s authority before these changes in the political system of the Soviet Union (see also Adomeit, 1994). 69. Gorbachev (1995, p. 539). 70. Oberdorfer (1998, p. 422). 71. Sternthal (1997, p. 186). 72. Quoted in Shevardnadze (1991, p. 98). 73. Bush attempted to move Gorbachev on this point through “nine assurances.” These “ranged from commitments to leave Soviet forces in East Germany and not to extend NATO forces to that area during a transition period, to firm German commitments not to expand Germany’s borders, and West German economic support for perestroika, an item of great importance to Moscow” (Oberdorfer, 1998, p. 416, emphasis in original). 74. Garthoff (1994, p. 426). 75. Sternthal (1997, pp. 196–197); see also Beschloss and Talbott (1993, p. 237). The text of the declaration is reprinted in the New York Times (July 7, 1990): 5. 76. Garthoff (1994, p. 434). 77. Garthoff (1994, p. 444). 78. Presidential Documents (February 4, 1991): 90–91. 79. Baker (1991). 80. Beschloss and Talbott (1993, pp. 342–354). 81. Shevardnadze had resigned on December 20, 1990; see Oberdorfer (1998, pp. 442–445). 82. Hill (1993, p. 331). 83. Garthoff (1994, p. 466). 84. On the coup see, for example, Hough (1997). 85. Hill (1993, p. 334). This included the “elimination of all remaining U.S. ground force tactical nuclear weapons; the removal from all U.S. naval ships and submarines, including aircraft carriers . . . , of all nuclear weapons, . . . consolidation of operational command of all U.S. strategic nuclear forces, bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and missile submarines in one U.S. Strategic Command; and cancellation of programs for mobile ICBMs and new short-range bomber attack missiles (SRAMs)” (Garthoff, 1994, p. 491). 86. Garthoff (1994, p. 492). 87. Kaiser (1992, pp. 11, 13).

CHAPTER 5 1. Snyder (1999, p. 25) writes that “without experience in governing and dependent on Soviet support . . . the young Kim Il Sung appears to have been in no position to ignore his Soviet advisers regarding structure and functions of the government.” 2. On the Korean War see, for example, Cumings (1981), Hastings (1987), and Sandler (1999).

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

159

3. Buzo (1999, p. 107) and Manning (1998, p. 141). 4. For a good overview of President Carter’s position toward the Korean peninsula see Gleysteen (1999). 5. Oberdorfer (1997, pp. 84, 88). For a history of U.S.-South Korean relations see MacDonald (1992). 6. Oberdorfer (1997, p. 94). 7. Koh (1984, p. 89). 8. Oberdorfer (1997, p. 101). 9. Han (1983, p. 158). 10. Eberstadt (1996, pp. 10–12; 1998, p. 243) and Cha (2001, p. 179). 11. Oberdorfer (1997, pp. 107–108). 12. Oberdorfer (1997, p. 111). 13. Koh (1983, p. 295), Koh (1984, pp. 141, 186), see also Kim (1981, p. 114). 14. Koh (1983, p. 296). 15. Unlike with Soviet leaders, random sampling of Kim Il Sung’s statements was not possible due to a limited availability of statements. The sample of Kim Il Sung’s rhetoric is thus a purposive sample predominantly concerned with international affairs and North Korea’s relations with the United States, South Korea, and Japan. 16. Whereas the Soviet leader’s subjective games were mainly determined by a dyadic relationship with the United States, North Korea’s game is a “four-way street” as it also considers itself to be in a competition with South Korea and Japan. 17. Kim Il Sung (1986, p. 41). 18. Merton (1957, p. 423). 19. Kim Il Sung (1986, p. 44). 20. Buzo (1999, p. 123). The political upheavals in South Korea are described, for example, in Gleysteen (1999) and Clark (1988). 21. Koh (1983, p. 196). 22. Quoted in Kim, Y. (1981, p. 114); see also Buzo (1999, p. 106). 23. Han (1983, p. 158). 24. Kim (1981, p. 114). 25. Kim (1981, p. 118). 26. Kim (1981, p. 119). 27. Quoted in Koh (1983, p. 265). 28. Quoted in Kim (1981, p. 121). 29. Brams (1994, p. 170); see also Brams (1977), Brams and Zagare (1977, 1981), Daniel and Herbig (1982), Mor (1993), Muzzio, (1982), and Zagare (1979). 30. Solomon (1981). 31. Buzo (1999, p. 107). 32. Manning (1998, p. 142). 33. Buzo (1999, p. 106). The history and evolution of the North Korean nuclear program are told in detail by Mazarr (1995a and b); see also Hayes (1991). 34. Kim (1981, p. 124). 35. Scalapino (1983, p. 331). 36. Kim Il Sung (1986, p. 83). 37. Quoted in Foreign Broadcast and Information Service Asia and Pacific (Jan 9, 1981): D1 (henceforth FBIS). 38. Shinn (1982, p. 102). 39. Oberdorfer (1997, p. 137).

160

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

40. Shinn (1982, pp. 104–105). 41. Shinn (1982, p. 105). 42. Kim Il Sung (1986, p. 104). 43. Shinn (1982, p. 103). North Korea also rejected cooperative South Korean proposals regarding low politics, such as cultural or educational exchanges. 44. Henry Scott Stokes (1982, p. A4) wrote in the New York Times that “for years, Kim Il Sung carried the torch of reunification; Mr. Park [Chung He] by contrast, seemed to lack confidence in dealing directly with the Communists. The torch may now have passed to Mr. Chun.” 45. Koh (1984, pp. 182, 192–193). For details about North Korea’s rejection see Koh (1984, p. 191). For details on North Korea’s proposals see Koh (1984, p. 164). 46. In the past Kim Il Sung had characterized the Non-aligned Movement as “a mighty anti-imperialist revolutionary force reflecting the main trend of the present era” and that its “emergence . . . has decisively strengthened the revolutionary forces of the world and greatly weakened the reactionary forces of imperialism” (quoted in Koh, 1984, p. 220). 47. Shinn (1983, p. 104). 48. Hoagland (1981, p. A1). In June 1981, a CIA report on international terrorism identified the Libyan government as “the most prominent state sponsor of and participant of international terrorism” (CIA, 1981, p. 9). For a discussion of the conflict between the United States and Libya see Wright (1981/82). 49. Halloran (1982, pp. 1–2). 50. Shinn (1983, p. 104). 51. Shinn (1983, p. 104). 52. BBC (September 18, 1982). 53. Koh (1984, p. 90). 54. Oberdorfer (1997, p. 142). 55. Kihl (1984a, p. 105–106). 56. Kihl (1984a, p. 106). 57. Hinting at Kim Il Sung’s personal involvement, Buzo (1999, p. 125) writes that “there can be little doubt that the Rangoon operation was carefully planned at the highest level in Pyongyang with the intention of creating an atmosphere of fear, confusion and demoralization in Seoul.” On the planning of the bombing see Bermudez (1998, pp. 133–136). 58. Buzo (1999, p. 125). 59. Kihl (1984a, p. 107; 1985, p. 66). 60. These included, for example, the People’s Republic of Congo President Denis Sassou-Nguesso, Upper Volta Prime Minister Thomas Sankara, Nicaraguan leader Daniel Ortega Saavedra; Egyptian President Mohamed Mubarak; Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, Seychelles President France Albert Rene, Lesotho Prime Minister Lebua Jonathan, Rwandan President Habyarimana Juvenal, Guinean Prime Minister Lansana Beavogui, and Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hussein. 61. Taubman (1983, pp. 1–2). 62. Quoted in Kihl (1984a, p. 108). 63. FBIS (Asia/Pacific) July 5, 1983, p. D.12. 64. Kihl (1984b, pp. 198–199). 65. BBC (July 17, 1984). 66. Kihl (1985, p. 67).

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

161

67. Haberman (1984a, pp. A3, 1). For a detailed reasoning of why South Korea and the United States refused to engage with North Korea’s proposal see Buzo (1999, pp. 147–149). 68. BBC (Jan 31, 1984). 69. BBC (May 3, 1984). 70. Burns (1984, p. 1). 71. Kihl (1985, p. 74). 72. Oberdorfer (1997, p. 148). 73. Kihl (1985, p. 76). 74. Oberdorfer (1997, p. 148). Questioning the sincerity of North Korea’s offer, Buzo (1999, p. 271) writes: “Significant as the breakthrough was, the act of giving was far from a gracious one, with the DPRK imposing a number of conditions on delivery that were contrary to the International Red Cross rule of respecting the wishes of the recipient country, and at one stage walked out of the delivery negotiations.” 75. Rhee (1987, p. 886); see also Cotton (1991, p. 179). 76. Oberdorfer (1997, p. 148). 77. Quoted in Oberdorfer (1997, p. 149). This call was also emphasized in an editorial of Nodong Sinmun that stated that “although the Red Cross talks and the meetings for economic cooperation contribute significantly to the easing of tensions, these talks cannot deal with political problems, and higher level political talks should be organized to discuss political issues dividing the two sides” (quoted in Suh, 1986, p. 79). 78. Japan Economic Newswire (1984, October 31): Japan Announces Lifting of Restrictions against North Korea. 79. BBC (October 10, 1984). 80. Quoted in Buzo (1999, p. 144). 81. Quoted in Bermudez (1998, p. 137). 82. Clough (1987, p. 217). 83. Haberman (1984b, p. 1) and Kihl (1985, p. 78). 84. Haberman (1984b, p. 1). 85. Oberdorfer (1997, p. 152). 86. Buzo (1999, p. 152). 87. BBC (October 16, 1985). 88. Oberdorfer (1997, p. 152). 89. Suh (1987, p. 61). 90. Buzo (1999, pp. 153–160).

CHAPTER 6 1. This claim by structuralists is argued in more detail in Hermann (1990); For examples see Waltz (1979) and Wolfers (1962). 2. An official of the Soviet Central Committee described the Soviet Union’s relationship to North Korea in 1984: “North Korea, for all the peculiarities of Kim Il Sung, is the most important bastion in the Far East in our struggle against American and Japanese imperialism and Chinese revisionism” (quoted in Oberdorfer, 1997, p. 154). 3. For the extent of the military and economic aid see Malici and Shackelford (2003) and Oh and Hassig (2000). 4. Erisman (2000, pp. 110–111). For an overview of Russian-North Korean relations see Wishnick (2002).

162

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

5. Kegley (1994, p. 33); see also Bundy (1990) and Kaiser (1992). 6. Blacker (1993, p. 188). 7. Buzo (1999, p. 157). 8. Ahn (1992). 9. Buzo (1999, p. 187) and Zhebin (1995, p. 735). 10. Downs (2001, p. 100). China, like the Soviet Union, departed from the “one Korea policy” as it intensified economic and political relationships with the Republic of Korea. Although China came to replace the Soviet Union as the [North Korea’s] main trading partner “by default,” trade with China never reached the same level that it had with the Soviet Union (Oh and Hassig, 2000, p. 157). 11. Oh and Hassig (2000, p. 154). 12. Ellison (2001, p. 166). 13. For an overview of Chinese-Korean history see Lee (1996) and Kim and Lee (2002). 14. Oh (1992, p. 8). The Soviet Union’s announcement of the establishment of full diplomatic relations with South Korea also meant that the 1961 North KoreanSoviet Mutual Defense Treaty became ineffective. 15. Boulychev (1994, pp. 103–105); see also Kim. S. (1998, p. 81). 16. Toloraya (2002, p. 148). 17. Zhebin (1995). 18. Zaeck (1998, p. 76). 19. See Brams (1994, p. 217, game 18). 20. On cognitive consistency that discusses an individual’s relative openness or closeness to new information see Abelson et al. (1968), Abelson and Rosenberg (1958), Glass (1968), Heider (1958), Osgood (1960), and Zajonc (1960). For applications to foreign policy analysis see Adelman (1973), Hermann (1984), Holsti (1967), and Jervis (1976). 21. On the bad-faith model see Holsti (1967). 22. Quoted in Buzo (1999, p. 198). 23. BBC (January 24, 1987). For arguments supporting the North Korean perception of the joint military exercises see Kang (1995) and Tow (1991). 24. Oh and Hassig (2000, p. 159). 25. Koh (1988, p. 67). 26. Buzo (1999, p. 176). 27. On the planning of the bombing see Bermudez (1998, pp. 136–139). 28. Bermudez (1998, p. 138). 29. Buzo (1999, p. 177). 30. Koh (1989, p. 43). 31. For details of this transition that were to be followed by the implementation of increasingly democratic structures in South Korea and that were watched with apathy in the North see Steinberg (1988), Cotton (1989), and Johnson (1989). 32. Roh, like Chun, had a military background and was subject to the same quality of criticism, namely, being a “puppet leader” of the United States and suppressing momenta (often referred to as “democratic forces”) in the South that are favorable toward a Koran reunification under northern premises. On November 27, the North Korean Voice of National Salvation broadcast a report arguing that it would be the “trick of the puppets to openly suppress the South Korean people and demo-

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

163

cratic forces, and disrupt democratic forces and dissident groups by driving a wedge between them in order to extend the dictatorship” (BBC, November 27 1987). 33. Koh (1989, p. 42) and Buzo (1999, p. 177). 34. Buzo (1999, p. 177). 35. Koh (1989, p. 43) and Buzo (1999, p. 177). 36. Buzo (1999, p. 178), Oberdorfer (1999, p. 188), Koh (1989, p. 43), and Roh (1989). 37. Koh (1989, p. 44). 38. Quoted in Oberdofer (1997, p. 189). 39. Koh (1989, p. 44). 40. Manning (2002, p. 66). 41. Oberdorfer (1997, pp. 194–196). 42. Koh (1989, p. 44). 43. Buzo (1999, p. 180). 44. Oh and Hassig (2000) and Malici and Malici (2005a). 45. Oh and Hassig (2000, pp. 42–46). 46. Quoted in Oh (1990, p. 80). 47. Oberdorfer (1997, p. 218). 48. Oh and Hassig (2000, p. 41). 49. Buzo (1999, p. 181). 50. Oh (1990, p. 80). 51. Kyodo News Service (1989). 52. BBC (September 23, 1989). 53. Buzo (1999, pp. 181, 183) and Cotton (1991, p. 179). 54. BBC (August 23, 1989). 55. BBC (September 2, 1989). 56. For a detailed assessment of the North Korean economy see Nolan (1996). 57. Sang-Woo (1992, p. 74). 58. Buzo (1999, p. 182). 59. Cotton (1991, p. 180). 60. Oh (1992, p. 17). 61. Buzo (1999, p. 183). 62. Buzo (1999, p. 192). 63. Sang-woo (1991, pp. 71–78). 64. Oberdorfer (1997, p. 258). 65. According to a report released by the South Korean foreign ministry in the early 1990s, North Korea was engaged in the development of four reactors from which it could produce weapon-grade plutonium. The report also judged that by 1994 North Korea would be able to deploy several bombs; see Sang-Woo (1992, p. 62). 66. Buzo (1999, p. 180). 67. Sang-Woo (1991, p. 72). 68. Quoted in Buzo (1999, p. 199). 69. Quoted in Sang-Woo (1992, p. 56). 70. Oh (1998, p. 131). 71. Sang-Woo (1991, p. 78). 72. Cha (2000).

164

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

73. Ho-yol (1992), Mazarr (1991), Moon-young (1994), and Youn (1999). 74. Oberdorfer (1997, p. 260). 75. Manning (2002, p. 71). In the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, North and South agreed not to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons [and to] use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes.” Both sides furthermore agreed that they would “not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities” and to verify the agreement through mutual inspections (Downs, 2001, p. 101; see also Manning, 2002, p. 71). 76. Sang-Woo (1992, p. 61). 77. Kim Il Sung’s decision to approve separate entry of the two Koreas to the United Nations appeared to have been motivated after he had engaged in discussions with Gorbachev and Jiang Zemin; see Lee (2001, p. 60). 78. Lee (2001, p. 60). 79. Quoted in Lee (2001, p. 60). 80. Cotton (1998, p. 213). 81. Noland (2002). 82. Postwar compensation had been negotiated by the LDP official Kanemaru Shin without legitimate authorization. Buzo (1999, p. 193) writes: “When a significant number of his LDP colleagues, as well as sections of the bureaucracy including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs examined the text of the Joint Declaration, they concluded that Kanemaru had exceeded his brief in signing a declaration unduly favorable to the interests of [North Korea], especially in the open-ended acknowledgement of Japanese responsibility for post-1945 events.” 83. Merrill (1993, p. 52) and Lee (1994). 84. Buzo (1999, p. 201). 85. Quinones (1998, p. 110). For a more elaborate review of the Clinton administration’s policies toward North Korea see Berry (1995). 86. Merrill (1993, p. 51). 87. Mazarr (1995b, p. 95). 88. Merrill (1993, p. 51). 89. Kim Il Sung (1994). 90. Downs (2001, p. 101); see also Snyder (1999, p. 44). 91. Manning (1998, p. 145). 92. Manning (1998, p. 145). 93. Oberdorfer (1997, p. 271). 94. Manning (2002, p. 75) and Snyder (1997). 95. Oberdorfer (1997, pp. 272–273). 96. Kim (1994, p. 269), Koh (1998, p. 88), and Oberdorfer (1997, p. 276). 97. Mazarr (1995b, p. 95). 98. BBC (January 3, 1994). 99. Mazarr (1995b, p. 95) and Oberdorfer (1997, p. 279). 100. Quoted in Oberdorfer (1997, p. 304). 101. Mazarr (1995b, p. 113) and Perry (2000, p. 121). 102. Oberdorfer (1997, p. 306). 103. Oberdorfer (1997, p. 313). 104. Lee (2001, p. 61), Scalapino (2002, p. 14), and Henriksen (1997).

NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

165

CHAPTER 7 1. Lebow (1994), Stein (1994), and Wendt (1999). 2. Lake and Powell (1999, p. 21). 3. Goldstein and Keohane (1993, p. 4). 4. Jervis (2003). 5. For similar arguments see Dessler (1989), Doty (1997), Wendt (1987). 6. Przeworski (1985, p. 401); See also Carlsnaes (1992, p. 251) and Elster (1986). For a critique from a cognitivist perspective see the essays in Geva and Mintz (1997). 7. Wohlforth (1998, pp. 653–655); see also Lebow (1994), Lebow and RisseKappen (1995), and Koslowski and Kratochwil (1994). 8. Gaddis (1992, p. A44); see also Lebow (1994). 9. Gaddis (1992/93, p. 55). 10. Herrmann (1988, p. 177); see also Jervis (1988, pp. 324–325). 11. Rose (1998, pp. 147, 157–158). 12. Taliaferro (2000/01, p. 141); see also Posen (1984, pp. 67–69) and Christensen (1997, pp. 68–70). 13. For a similar argument see Dessler (2003, p. 401); for works underlining this claim see Brooks (1997), Christensen (1996), Christensen (1997), Christensen and Snyder (1990), Walt (1987), and Wohlforth (1993). Despite this acknowledgment, the “new realists” have not undertaken a systematic measuring of variables they hold accountable for foreign policy choices—a fact that renders their work inherently unsatisfactory. 14. Keohane (1990, p. 183) and Nye (1987). 15. Keohane and Martin (2003, pp. 96, 103). 16. The symposium was entitled “Cooperation Under Anarchy” and is reprinted in Oye (1986). 17. Quoted in George et al. (1988, p. 10). 18. Axelrod and Keohane (1985, pp. 247–248). 19. Herrmann (1988). 20. Axelrod and Keohane (1985, p. 229). 21. Koslowski and Kratochwil (1994, p. 223), Gartzke and Simon (1999), and Goertz and Diehl (1995). 22. Crozier (1990) and Lewin (1991). 23. Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il have been characterized as “impulsive and eccentric” (Thornhill and Ward, 2002). Observers have described North Korea as a nation of “paranoid survivalists” (Olsen, 1986, p. 851) and a “renegade state” (Spector and Smith, 1991, p. 8); see also Kang (2003). 24. Hermann (1990), Waltz (1979), and Wolfers (1962). 25. Joseph Jastrow is quoted in Holsti (1976, p. 20); see also Axelrod (1976), George (1980), Jervis (1976), Lebow (1981), and Tetlock and McGuire (1986). 26. Hudson and Vore (1995, p. 211) and Lane (1990, p. 927). 27. George (1993, p. 9). 28. Bleiker (2003, p. 731). See also the declaration of the U.S. State Department that in 2000 had reaffirmed its designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism.

166

NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

29. Bleiker (2003, p. 731). 30. Betts (1993/94, p. 66). 31. Oh and Hassig (2000, p. 102). 32. Schafer, Robison, and Aldrich (2006). 33. Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears (1939, p. 338). 34. Miller et al. (1941). 35. Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears (1939, p. 338), Berkowitz (1989), Miller et al. (1941). 36. Kang (2003, p. 313). The logic of the desperation thesis is similar to the risk-taking explanation offered by prospect theory. See Kahneman and Tversky (1982). 37. Bleiker (2003: 721). Donald Gregg is one of the few examples who admit that “the US scares North Korea” (quoted in Bleiker, 2003, p. 727). It is also little known “that a number of times U.S. forces have strayed into the northern side of the DMZ” (Kang, 2003, p. 312). 38. For an argument suggesting that North Korea does indeed not belong in any way in the “axis of evil,” see Cha and Kang (2003). 39. Gross (2003). 40. For an argument elaborating on the view that the Clinton administration’s policies toward North Korea did not fail see Cha and Kang (2003). Bruce Cumings (1999, p. xiv) goes so far as to argue: “Bill Clinton and the two Korean leaders [Kim Jong Il and Kim Dae-jung] did more to lessen tensions in Korea than all the heads of state going back to the country’s division in 1945.” 41. Eberstadt (2003, p. 148). 42. Bleiker (2003, p. 728). 43. Shenon (2002), Sanger 2002, and Sigal (1998). 44. Bleiker (2003, p. 727). Stephen Walt (2003b) likewise writes that this was “the most rapid and dramatic change in the history of US foreign policy.” 45. Bleiker (2003, p. 727). 46. In November 2002, North Korean ambassador to the United States Han Song Ryol had stated “our government will resolve all U.S. security concerns through . . . talks if your government has a will to end its hostile policy” (quoted in Cha, 2003, p. 314). 47. In an interview with NBC television, President Bush said North Korea was “back to the old blackmail game,” and described the latest threats as “an opportunity to say to the North Koreans and the world we’re not going to be threatened” (The Daily Telegraph, April 26, 2003). 48. Gross (2003). 49. Bleiker (2003, p. 719). 50. Bleiker (2003, p. 720). 51. Bleiker (2003, p. 721) writes: “The rhetoric of rogue states is indicative of how US foreign policy continues to be driven by dualistic and militaristic Cold War thinking patterns. The ‘Evil Empire’ may be gone; not so the underlying need to define safety and security with reference to an external threat that must be warded off at any cost.” 52. Some critics might point out that the engagement with Gorbachev was accompanied by perestroika and glasnost—that is, economic and political reforms. However, the United States has successfully pursued a strategy of restructuring relations with other authoritarian governments (e.g., China) without requiring prior reforms in the structure of the regime or the economy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abelson, R.P., Aronson, E., McGuire, W. J., Newcomb, T. M., Rosenberg, M. J., & Tannenbaum, P. H. (Eds.). (1968). Theories of cognitive consistency: A sourcebook. Chicago: Rand McNally. Abelson, R. P., & Rosenberg, M. J. (1958). Symbolic psycho-logic: A model of attitudinal cognition. Behavioral Science, 3, 1–13. Achen, C., & Snidal, D. (1989). Rational deterrence theory and comparative case studies. World Politics, 41, 143–169. Adelman, M. L. (1973). Crisis decision-making and cognitive balance. In Sage Professional Papers in International Studies (Vol. 1, pp. 61–94). Beverly Hills: Sage. Adler, E. (1992). The emergence of cooperation: National epistemic communities and the international evolution of the idea of nuclear arms control. International Organization, 46, 101–145. Adomeit, H. (1994). Gorbachev, German unification, and the collapse of empire. Post-Soviet Affairs, 10, 217–219. Ahn, B. (1992). The possibility of change in North Korea. Korea and World Affairs, 16, 421–435. An, T. S. (1983). North Korea in transition. From dictatorship to dynasty. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Andropov, Y. (1983). Speech at the June 1983 Central Committee Plenum. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), p. R11. Arbatov, G. (1992). The system: An insider’s life in soviet politics. New York: Times Books. Axelrod, R. (1976). Structure of decision. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books. Axelrod, R., & Keohane, R. (1985). Achieving cooperation under anarchy: Strategies and institutions. World Politics, 38, 226–254. Baker, J. (1989). U.S.-Soviet relations: A discussion of perestroika and economic reform. Department of State Bulletin, 89 (December), 20–26. Baker, J. (1991). Foreign policy overview and budget requests for fiscal year 1992: Hearing before the Senate Committee on foreign relations, 102 nd Cong., 1st Sess. (testimony). Ball, T., Farr, J., & Hanson, R. (Eds.). (1989). Political innovations and conceptual change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. BBC News. (1989, December 3). Malta summit ends cold war. Retrieved February 15, 2004, from http://news.bbc.co.uk BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. (1982, September 18). Banquet speech by Kim Il-sung, pp. FE/7134/A3/5. 167

168

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. (1984, January 31). N Korea accuses Reagan of “boundless aggressive ambition” (Part 3), pp. FE/7554/A1/1. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. (1984, May 3). ‘Nodong Simmun’ on need to strengthen unity against imperialism (Part 3), pp. FE/7633/A1/1. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. (1984, July 17). N Korea official explains reasons for tripartite talks proposal (Part 3), pp. FE/7697/A3/1. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. (1984, October 10). North Korea says USA has “policy of international terrorism” (Part 3), pp. FE/7770/A1/1. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. (1985, October 16). Speech by Kim Il-sung at mass rally for Nicolae Ceaucescu, pp. FE/8083/A2/1. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. (1987, January 24). North Korea denounces USJapanese military exercise (Part 3), pp. FE/8474/A3/1. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. (1987, November 27). North Korea condemns Tae-u’s elections “hooliganism” (Part 3), pp. FE/0011/A3/1. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. (1989, August 23). North Korea urges “antiimperialist independent character” of non-aligned movement (Part 3), pp. FE/ 0542/A1/1. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. (1989, September 2). North Korea warns against imperialist “ideological and cultural infiltration” in socialist countries (Part 3), pp. FE/0551/A1/1. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. (1989, September 23). North Korea denounces Japan’s “dancing to the nuclear drum” (Part 3), pp. FE/0569/A3/1. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. (1994, January 3). Kim Il-sung gives new year speech (Part 3), pp. FE1885/D. Becker, G. (1996). Accounting for tastes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Beer, F. (1986). Games and metaphors. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 30, 171–191. Bennett, A. (1999). Condemned to repetition? The rise, fall, and reprise of Soviet-Russian military interventionsim, 1973–1996. Cambridge: MIT Press Berkowitz, L. (1989). Frustration-aggression hypothesis: Examination and reformulation. Psychological Bulletin, 106, 59–73. Bermudez, J. (1998). North Korean special forces. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. Berry, W. (1995). North Korea’s nuclear program: The Clinton administration’s response. Colorado Springs: Institute for National Security Studies. Beschloss, M., & Talbott, S. (1993). At the highest levels: The inside story of the end of the cold war. Boston: Little Brown. Betts, R. (1993/94). Wealth, power, and instability: East Asia and the United States after the cold war. International Security, 18, 34–77 Bhaskar, R. (1979). The possibility of naturalism. Brighton, UK: Harvester Press. Bialer, S. (1986). The Soviet paradox: External expansion, internal decline. London: Taurus. Bialer, S. (1988). Gorbachev’s program of change: Sources, significance, prospects. In S. Bialer & M. Mandelbaum (Eds.), Gorbachev’s Russia and American foreign policy (pp. 231–303). Boulder: Westview Press. Bialer, S., & Afferica, J. (1985). The genesis of Gorbachev’s world. Foreign Affairs, 64, 605–644. Blacker, C. (1988). The MBFR experience. In A. George, P. Farley, & A. Dallin (Eds.), U.S.-Soviet security cooperation. achievements, failures, lessons (pp. 123– 143). New York: Oxford University Press.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

169

Blacker, C. (1991). Learning in the nuclear age: Soviet strategic arms control policy, 1969–1989. In G. Breslauer & P. Tetlock (Eds.), Learning in U.S. and Soviet foreign policy (pp. 429–468). Boulder: Westview Press. Blacker, C. (1993). Hostage to revolution: Gorbachev and Soviet security policy, 1985– 1991. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. Bleiker, R. (2003). A rogue is a rogue is a rogue. US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis. International Affairs, 79, 719–737. Bohlen, C. (1985, May, 21). Defrost relations Gorbachev asks, as trade talks open. Washington Post, pp. A1, A22. Boulychev, G. (1994). Moscow and North Korea: The 1961 treaty and after. In I.-Y. Chung & E. Chung (Eds.), Russia in the far east and pacific region (pp. 81– 118). Seoul: Sejong Institute. Brams, S. (1977). Deception in 2 x 2 games. Journal of Peace Science, 2, 171–203. Brams, S. (1994). Theory of moves. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Brams, S. (2000). Game theory: Pitfalls and opportunities in applying it to international relations. International Studies Perspectives, 1, 221–232. Brams, S. (2001). Response to Randall Stone. Heresy or scientific srogress? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45, 245–254. Brams, S., & Kilgour, M. (1986). Is nuclear deterrence rational? Political Science, 19, 645–651. Brams, S., & Zagare, F. (1977). Deception in simple voting games. Social Science Research, 6, 257–272. Brams, S., & Zagare, F. (1981). Double deception: Two against one in three-person Games. Theory and Decision, 13, 81–90. Brecher, M., Steinberg, B. S., & Stein, J. G. (1969). A framework for research on foreign policy behavior. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 13, 75–101. Breslauer, G. (1983). Why détente failed: An interpretation. In A. George (Ed.), Managing US-Soviet rivalry: Problems of crisis prevention (pp. 319–340). Boulder: Westview Press. Breslauer, G. (1991). Learning in Soviet policy toward that Arab-Israeli conflict. In G. Breslauer & P. Tetlock (Eds.), Learning in U.S. and Soviet foreign policy (pp. 551–585). Boulder: Westview Press. Breslauer, G. (2002). Gorbachev and Yeltsin as leaders. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Breslauer, G., & Tetlock, P. (Eds.). (1991). Learning in U.S. and Soviet foreign policy. Boulder: Westview Press. Brinkley, J. (1985, June 25). U.S. embassy to reduce Soviet staff. New York Times, p. A3. Brooks, S. (1997). Dueling realism. International Organization, 51, 445–477. Brown, A. (1996). The Gorbachev factor. New York: Oxford University Press. Bunce, V. (1993). Domestic reform and international change: The Gorvachev reform in historical perspective. International Organization, 47, 101–138. Bundy, M. (1990). From cold war to trusting peace. Foreign Affairs, 69, 197–212. Burns, J. (1984, May 26). Moscow talks end for North Korea. New York Times, p. 1. Bush, G. H. W. Remarks at the Texas A&M University commencement ceremony, May 22, 1989. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 699–702. Bush, G. H. W. Address before a joint session of the congress on the state of the union, February 5, 1990. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 150.

170

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bush, G. H. W. Address before a joint session of the congress on the state of the union, February 4, 1991. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 90–91. Buzo, A. (1999). The guerrilla dynasty: Politics and leadership in North Korea. Boulder: Westview Press. Carlsnaes, W. (1992). The agency-structure problem in foreign policy analysis. International Studies Quarterly, 36, 245–270. Carnesale, A., & Haas, R. N. (Eds.). (1987). Superpower arms control: Setting the record straight. Cambridge: Ballilnger. Carroll, E. (1988). Black day on the Black Sea. Arms Control Today, 18, 14–17. Cha, V. (2000). The continuity behind the change in Korea. Orbis, 4, 585–597. Cha, V. (2001). Making sense of the black box: Hypotheses on strategic doctrine and the DPRK threat. In S. Kim (Ed.), The North Korean system in the post-cold war era (pp. 177–194). New York: Palgrave. Cha, V., & Kang, D. (2003, May/June). The Korea crisis. Foreign Policy, 20–28. Checkel, J. (1993). Ideas, institutions, and the Gorbachev foreign policy revolution. World Politics, 45, 271–300. Checkel, J. (1997). Ideas and international political change. New Haven: Yale University Press. Chernoff, F. (1991). Ending the cold war: The Soviet retreat and the US military buildup. International Affairs, 67, 111–126. Christensen, T. (1997). Perceptions and alliances in Europe, 1860–1940, International Organization, 44, 137–168. Christensen, T. (1996). Useful adversaries: Grand strategy, domestic mobilization, and Sino-American conflict, 1947–1958. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Christensen, T., & J. Snyder, J. (1990). Chain gangs and passed bucks: Predicting alliance patterns in multipolarity. International Organization, 44, 137–168. Christensen, T. (1997). Perceptions and alliances in Europe, 1865–1940. International Organization, 51, 65–98. CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). (1981). Patterns of international terrorism 1980. Washington, DC: National Foreign Assessment Center. Clark, D. (Ed.). (1988). The Kwangju uprising. Shadows over the regime in South Korea. Boulder: Westview Press. Clark, W. (1998). Agents and structures: Two views of preferences, two views of institutions. International Studies Quarterly, 42, 245–270. Clough, E. (1987). North Korea and the United States. In J. K. Park, C. K. Byung, & T. Kwak (Eds.), The foreign relations of North Korea (pp. 255–273). Boulder: Westview Press. Cohen, M., & Axelrod, R. (1984). Coping with complexity: The adaptive value of changing utility. American Economic Review, 74, 30–42. Colton, T. (1988). Gorbachev and the politics of the system. In S. Bialer & M. Mandelbaum (Eds.), Gorbachev’s Russia and American foreign policy (pp. 151– 186). Boulder: Westview Press. Connolly, W. (1983). The terms of political discourse (2nd ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cotton, J. (1989). From authoritarianism to democracy in South Korea. Political Studies, 37, 244–259. Cotton, J. (1991). Conflict and accommodation in the two Koreas. In S. Harris & J. Cotton (Eds.), The end of the cold war (pp. 164–182). Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

171

Cotton, J. (1998). The Raijin-sonbong free trade zone experiment: North Korea in pursuit of new international linkages. In S. Kim (Ed.), North Korean foreign relations in the post-cold war era (pp. 212–234). New York: Oxford University Press. Crichlow, S. (1998). Idealism or pragmatism: An operational code analysis of Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres. Political Psychology, 19, 683–796. Crockatt, R. (1995). The fifty years war. New York Routledge. Cross, J., & Guyer, M. (1980). Social traps. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Crozier, B. (1990). The Gorbachev phenomenon: “Peace” and the secret war. Lexington, GA: Claridge Press. Cumings, B. (1981). The origins of the Korean war. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cumings, B. (1999). Parallax visions: Making sense of American-East Asian relations at the end of the century. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Daniel, D., & Herbig, K. (Eds.). (1982). Strategic military deception. New York: Pergamon. Department of State Bulletin. (1987a). Joint statement on nuclear testing negotiations, September 17, 1987. Vol. 87 (November): 40. Department of State Bulletin. (1987b). Joint statement on diplomatic talks, September 18, 1987. Vol. 87 (November): 40. Dessler, D. (1989). What’s at stake in the agent-structure debate? International Organization, 43, 441–473. Dessler, D. (2003). Explanation and scientific progress. In C. Elman & M. Elman (Eds.), Progress in international relations theory: Appraising the field (pp. 381– 404). Cambridge: MIT Press. Deudney, D., & Ikenberry, J. (1991/92). The international sources of Soviet change. International Security, 16, 74–118. Dollard, J., Doob, L. W., Miller, N. E., Mowrer, O. H., & Sears, R. R. (1939). Frustration and aggression. New Haven: Yale University Press. Doty, R. (1997). Aporia: A critical exploration of the agent-structure problematique in international relations theory. European Journal of International Relations, 3, 365–392. Downs, C. (2001). Discerning North Korea’s intentions. In N. Eberstadt & R. Ellings (Eds.), Korea’s future and the great powers (pp. 88–106). Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research in association with the University of Washington Press. Downs, G. (1989). The rational deterrence debate. World Politics, 41, 225–237. Downs, G., Rocke, D., & Siverson, R. (1985). Arms races and cooperation. World Politics, 38, 118–146. Earle, W. (1986). International relations and the psychology of control: Alternative control strategies and their consequences. Political Psychology, 7, 369–375. Eberstadt, N. (1996). National strategy in North and South Korea. NBR Analysis, 7, 5–24. Eberstadt, N. (1998). North Korea’s unification policy: 1948–1996. In S. Kim (Ed.), North Korean foreign relations in the post-cold War Era (pp. 235–257). New York: Oxford University Press. Eberstadt, N. (2003). Korea. In R. Ellings, & A. Friedberg (Eds.), Strategic Asia 2002– 2003 (pp. 131–182). Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research. Eberstadt, N., & Ellings, R. (2001). Assessing interests and objectives of major actors in the Korean drama. In N. Eberstadt & R. Ellings (Eds.), Korea’s future and the great powers (pp. 315–342). Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research.

172

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Einhorn, R. (1985). Negotiating from strength: Leverage in U.S.-Soviet arms control. New York: Praeger. Ellison, H. (2001). Russia, Korea, and Northeast Asia. In N. Eberstadt & R. Ellings (Eds.), Korea’s future and the great powers (pp. 164–187). Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research. Elster, J. (1982). Sour grapes—utilitarianism and the genesis of wants. In A. Sen & B. Williams (Eds.), Utilitarianism and beyond (pp. 219–238). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Elster, J. (Ed.). (1986). Rational choice. New York: New York University Press. Erisman, H. M. (2000). Cuba’s foreign relations in a post-Soviet world. Gainsville: University Press of Florida. Etheredge, L. (1985). Can governments learn? American foreign policy and Central American revolutions. New York: Pergamon. Evangelista, M. (1989). Sources of moderation in Soviet security policy. In P. Tetlock et al. (Eds.), Behavior, society, and nuclear war (Volume 2, pp. 254–354). New York: Oxford University Press. Evangelista, M. (1995). The paradox of state strength: Transnational relations, domestic structures, and security policy in Russia and the Soviet Union. International Organization, 49, 1–38. Farley, P. (1988). Strategic arms control, 1967–87. In A. George, P. Farley, & A. Dallin (Eds.), U.S.-Soviet security cooperation. Achievements, failures, lessons (pp. 215–253). New York: Oxford University Press. FBIS Asia/Pacific. (1981, January 9), p. DI. FBIS Asia/Pacific. (1983, July 5), p. D12. Feng, Huiyun. (2005). The operational code of Mao Zedong: Defensive or offensive realists? Security Studies, 14, 637–662. Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Festinger, L. (1964). Conflict, decision, and dissonance. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Frank, W., & Gillette, P. (Eds.). (1992). Soviet military doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, 1915–1991. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Frieden, J. (1999). Actors and preferences in international relations. In D. Lake & R. Powell (Eds.), Strategic choice and international relations (pp, 39–76). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gaddis, J. L. (1986). The long peace: Elements of stability in the postwar international system. International Security, 10, 99–142. Gaddis, J. L. (1989). Hanging tough paid off. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 45, 11–14. Gaddis, J. L. (1992). The cold war’s end dramatizes the failure of political theory. The Chronicle of Higher Education, 23, A44. Gaddis, J. L. (1992/93). International relations theory and the end of the cold war. International Security, 17, 5–58. Garthoff, R. (1984). Postmortem on INF talks. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, 40, 7–10 Garthoff, R. (1985). Détente and confrontation. American-Soviet relations from Nixon to Reagan. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Garthoff, R. (1987). Policy versus the law: The reinterpretation of the ABM treaty. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Garthoff, R. (1994). The great transition. American-Soviet relations and the end of the cold war. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

173

Gartzke, E., & Simon, M. (1999). “Hot hand”: A critical analysis of enduring rivalries. The Journal of Politics, 61, 777–798. Gates, R. (1996). From the shadows. The ultimate insider’s story of five presidents and how they won the cold war. New York: Simon & Schuster. George, A. (1969). The operational code: A neglected approach to the study of political leaders and decision-making. International Studies Quarterly, 13, 190–222. George, A. (1979). The causal nexus between cognitive beliefs and decision-making behavior. In L. Falkowski (Ed.), Psychological models in international politics (pp. 95–124). Boulder: Westview Press. George, A. (1980). Presidential decisonmaking in foreign policy: The effective use of information and advice. Boulder: Westview Press. George, A. (1993). Bridging the gap between theory and practice. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute for Peace. George, A., Farley, P., & Dallin, A. (Eds.). (1988). U.S.-Soviet security cooperation, achievements, failures, lessons. New York: Oxford University Press. Geva, N., & Mintz, A. (Eds.). (1997). Decisionmaking on war and peace. The cognitive-rational debate. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Gill, G. (1987). Power, authority and Gorbachev’s policy agenda. In R. Thakur & C. Thayer (Eds.), The Soviet Union as an Asian-pacific power: Implications of Gorbachev’s 1986 Vladivostok initiative (pp. 19–38). Boulder: Westview Press. Gilpin, R. (1975). U.S. power and the multinational corporation. New York: Basic Books. Glass, D. C. (1968). Theories of consistency and the study of personality. In E. F. Borgatta & W. W. Lambert (Eds.), Handbook of personality theory and research (pp. 788–854). Chicago: Rand McNally. Gleditsch, N. (1993). The end of the cold war: Evaluating theories of international relations. Journal of Peace Research, 30, 357. Gleysteen, W. (1999). Massive entanglement, marginal influence: Carter and Korea in crisis. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Goertz, G., & Diehl, P. (1995). The initiation and termination of enduring rivalries: The impact of political shocks. American Journal of Political Science, 39, 30–52. Goffman, E. (1959). The presentations of self in everyday life. New York: Doubleday. Goldblatt, J., & Fern, R. (1986). Chronology. In Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Ed.), World armaments and disarmament (pp. 589–94). New York: Oxford University Press. Goldhamer, H. (1950). Public opinion and personality. American Journal of Sociology, 55, 346–354. Goldstein, J., & Freeman, J. (1990). Three-way street. Strategic reciprocity in world politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Goldstein, J., & Keohane, R. (Eds.) (1993). Ideas and foreign policy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Gorbachev, M. (1985a, May 9). Kremlin speech. FBIS, p. R15. Gorbachev, M. (1985b, October 16). Central committee plenum report. FBIS, p. R6. Gorbachev, M. (1986, February 26). Report to the 27th communist party of the Soviet Union. FBIS, pp. O1, O4.

174

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gorbachev, M. (1987a). Perestroika: New thinking for our country and the world. New York: Harper and Row. Gorbachev, M. (1987b). Restructuring—A vital cause of the people. (Speech by M.S. Gorbachev to the eighteenth congress of trade unions of the USSR, February 26). Moscow: Novosti Press Agency. Gorbachev, M. (1995). Memoirs. New York: Doubleday. Gormley, D. (1988). Double zero and Soviet military strategy: Implications for western security. Coulsdon, UK: Jane’s Information Group. Goshko, J. (1985, June 15). Reagan lashes communism: Conciliatory tone dropped in broadcast to Soviets, East Europeans. Washington Post, p. A17. Gowa, J. (1986). Anarchy, egoism and third images: The evolution of cooperation and international relations. International Organization, 40, 167–186. Greenstein, F. (1967). The impact of personality on politics: An attempt to clear away underbrush. American Political Science Review, 61, 629–641. Gross, D. (2003). Tensions escalate in Korea as the U.S. targets Iraq. Comparative Connections, 5 (1), 38–47. Retrieved March 3, 2004, from http://www.csis.org/ media/csis/pubs/0301q.pdf. Gustafson, T., & Mann, D. (1986). Gorbachev’s first year: Building power and authority. Problems of Communism, 35, 1–19. Haas, P. (1987). The power of ideology: The quest for technological autonomy in Aargentina and Brazil. Berkeley: University of California Press. Haas, P. (1992). Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy coordination. International Organization, 46, 1–35. Haberman, C. (1984a, January 12). Seoul rejects north’s offer of Korean unity talks. New York Times, pp. A1, 4. Haberman, C. (1984b, November 24). 3 Koreans killed as soldiers trade shots in the DMZ. New York Times, pp. 1–2. Haggard, S. (1991). Structuralism and its critics: Recent progress in international relations, In E. Adler (Ed.), Progress in postwar international relations (pp. 403– 437). New York: Columbia University Press. Halloran, R. (1982, December 19). Iran is said to get North Korean arms. New York Times, pp. 1–2. Hamilton, L. (1986). Soviet compliance and the future of SALT. Arms Control Today, 16, 3–5. Han, S.-J. (1983). North Korea’s security policy and military strategy. In R. Scalapino & J.-Y. Kim (Eds.), North Korea today. Strategic and domestic issues (pp. 144– 163). Berkeley: Center for Korean Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California. Hasegawa, T. (1988). Gorbachev, the new thinking of Soviet foreign-security policy and the military: Recent trends and implications. In P. Juviler & H. Kimura (Eds.), Gorbachev’s reforms (pp. 115–147). New York: Aldine De Gruyter. Haslam, J. (1989). The Soviet Union and the politics of nuclear weapons in Europe, 1969–1987. The problem of the SS-20. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan. Haslam, J. (1991). Soviet policy toward Western Europe since world war II. In G. Breslauer & P. Tetlock (Eds.), Learning in U.S. and Soviet foreign policy (pp. 469–503). Boulder: Westview Press. Hastings, M. (1987). The Korean war. London: M. Joseph.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

175

Hayes, P. (1991). Pacific powderkegs: American nuclear dilemmas in Korea. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley. Henriksen, T. H. (1997). North Korea’s two Kims and American foreign folicy. In T. Henriksen & J. Mo (Eds.), North Korea after Kim Il Sung (pp. 151–172). Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. Hermann, C. F. (1990). Changing course: When governments choose to redirect foreign policy. International Studies Quarterly, 34, 3–21. Hermann, M. (1980). Comments. International Studies Quarterly, 24, 67–74. Hermann, M. (1984). Personality and foreign policy decision making. In D. Sylvan & S. Chan (Eds.), Foreign policy decision making: Perception, cognition, and artificial intelligence (pp. 53–80). New York: Praeger. Herrmann, R. (1988). The empirical challenge of the cognitive revolution: A strategy for drawing inferences about perceptions. International Studies Quarterly, 32, 175–203. Hill, K. (1993). Cold war chronology. Soviet-American relations, 1945–1991. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc. Ho-yol, Y. (1992). North Korea’s economic policy and the role of political leadership. Vantage Point, 15, 8–9, 1–10 and 1–10. Hoagland, J. (1981, March 22). White House revamps top policy roles. Washington Post, p. A1. Holsti, O. (1967). Cognitive dynamics and images of the enemy: Dulles and Russia. In D. J. Finlay, O. Holsti, & R. R. Fagen (Eds.), Enemies in politics (pp. 25– 96). Chicago: Rand McNally. Holsti, O. (1976). Foreign policy viewed cognitively. In R. Axelrod (Ed.), Structure of decision (pp. 18–54). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Holsti, O. (1977). The operational code as an approach to the analysis of belief systems. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Hopf, T. (1998). The promise of constructivism in international relations theory. International Security, 23, 171–200. Hopf, T. (1991). Peripheral visions: Brezhnev and Gorbachev meet the Reagan doctrine. In G. Breslauer and P. Tetlock (Eds.), Learning in U.S. and Soviet foreign policy (pp. 586–629). Boulder: Westview Press. Hough, J. (1980). Soviet leadership in transition. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Hough, J. (1987). Gorbachev consolidating power. Problems of Communism, 36, 21–43. Hough, J. (1988). Russia and the west: Gorbachev and the politics of reform. New York: Simon and Schuster. Hough, J. (1997). Democratization and revolution in the USSR, 1985–1991. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Hudson, V., & Vore, C. (1995). Foreign policy analysis yesterday, today, and tomorrow. Mershon International Studies Review, 39, 209–238. Iivonen, J. (1989). Gorbachev’s personnel policy. In R. Hill & J.A. Dellenbrandt (Eds.), Gorbachev and perestroika. Towards a new socialism? (pp. 137–170). Worcester, UK: Billing & Sons. Isaacson, W. (1992). Kissinger. New York: Simon and Schuster.

176

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Japan Economic Newswire (1984, October 31). Japan announces lifting of restrictions against North Korea. Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics, 30, 167–214. Jervis, R. (1983). Security regimes. In S. Krasner (Ed.), International regimes (pp. 173– 194). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Jervis, R. (1988). Realism, game theory, and cooperation. World Politics, 40, 324–325. Jervis, R. (1989). Rational deterrence: theory and evidence. World Politics, 41, 183–207. Jervis, R. (2003). Realism, neoliberalism, and cooperation. Understanding the debate. In C. Elman & M. Elman (Eds.), Progress in international relations theory: Appraising the field (pp. 277–309). Cambridge: MIT Press. Johnson, C. (1989). South Korean democratization: The role of economic development. The Pacific Review, 2, 1–10. Kahneman, D., & Tversky A. (1982). Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (pp. 163–178). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kaiser, R. (1992). Why Gorbachev happened: His triumphs, his failure, and his fall. New York: Simon and Schuster. Kang, D. (1995). Rethinking North Korea. Asian Survey, 35, 253–267. Kang, D. (2003). International relations theory and the second Korean war. International Studies Quarterly, 47, 301–342. Kegley, C. (1994). How did the cold war die? Principles for an autopsy. Mershon International Studies Review, 38, 11–41. Kelman, H. (1965). Social-psychological approaches to the study of international relations: Definition of scope. In H. Kelman (Ed.), International behavior: A social psychological analysis (pp. 3–35). New York: Holt, Rinehart. Kelman, H., & Bloom, A. H. (1973). Assumptive frameworks in international politics. In J. Knutson (Ed.), Handbook of political psychology (pp. 261–295). New York: Holt, Rinehart. Kennedy, P. (1993). Preparing for the twenty-first century. London: HarperCollins. Keohane, R. (Ed.) (1986). Neorealism and its critics. New York: Columbia University Press. Keohane, R. (1998). International institutions: Two approaches. International Studies Quarterly, 32, 379–396. Keohane, R. (1990). International liberalism reconsidered. In J. Dunn (Ed.), The economic limits to modern politics (pp. 165–194). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Keohane, R., & Martin, L. (2003). Institutional theory as a research program. In C. Elman & M. Elman (Eds.), Progress in international relations theory. Appraising the field (pp. 71–107). Cambridge: MIT Press. Khong, Y. F. (1992). Analogies at war. Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam decisions of 1965. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kihl, Y. W. (1984a). North Korea in 1983: Transforming “the hermit kingdom”? Asian Survey, 24, 100–111.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

177

Kihl, Y. W. (1984b). Politics and policies in divided Korea: Regimes in contest. Boulder: Westview Press. Kihl, Y. W. (1985). North Korea in 1984: “The hermit kingdom” turns outward! Asian Survey, 25, 65–79. Kil, S. H., & Moon, C. I. (2001). Understanding Korean politics. Albany: State University of New York Press. Kim, H. (1998). The nature of the North Korean state. In I. J. Kim (Ed.), Two Koreas in transition (pp. 17–32), Rockeville, MD: InDepth Books. Kim Il Sung (1986). For an independent world. Pyongyang, North Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House. Kim Il Sung (1993a). Non-Aligned information services must contribute to the people’s cause of independence. Pyongyang, North Korea: Foreign Language Publishing House. Kim Il Sung (1993b). Young people must accomplish the revolutionary cause of Juche, upholding the leadership of the party. Pyongyang, North Korea: Foreign Language Publishing House. Kim Il Sung (1994). Answers to questions raised by a Japanese journalist delegation from NHK. Pyongyang, North Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House. Kim Il Sung (1991–95). With the century (Vols. 1–6). Pyongyang, North Korea: Pyongyang Publishing House. Kim, P. S. (1994). Will North Korea blink? Matters of grave danger. Asian Survey, 34, 258–272. Kim, S. (1998). North Korean foreign relations in the post-cold war era. New York: Oxford University Press. Kim, S., & Lee, T. H. (2002). Chinese-North Korean relations: Managing asymmetrical interdependence. In S. Kim & T. H. Lee (Eds.), North Korea and Northeast Asia (pp. 109–137). New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Kim, Y. (1981). North Korea in 1980: The son also rises. Asian Survey, 21, 112–124. Koh, B. C. (1983). Unification policy and North-South relations. In R. Scalapino, & J.-Y. Kim (Eds.), North Korea Today. Strategic and Domestic Issues (pp. 264– 308). Berkeley: Center for Korean Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California. Koh, B. C. (1984). The foreign policy systems of North and South Korea. Berkeley: University of California Press. Koh, B. C. (1988). North Korea in 1987: Launching a new seven-year plan. Asian Survey, 28, 62–70. Koh, B. C. (1989). North Korea in 1988: The fortieth anniversary. Asian Survey, 29, 39–45. Koh, B. C. (1998). North Korean policy toward the United States. In D.-S. Suh & C.-J. Lee (Eds.), North Korea after Kim Il Sung (pp. 85–101). Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Koslowski, R., & Kratochwil, F. (1994). Understanding change in international politics: The Soviet empire’s demise and the international system. International Organization, 48, 215–247. Kowert, P. (1998/99) National identity: Inside and out. Security Studies, 8, 1–34. Krasner, S. (1993). Power, polarity, and the challenge of disintegration. In H. Haftendorn & C. Tuschoff (Eds.), America and Europe in an era of change (pp. 21–42). Boulder: Westview Press.

178

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kratochwil, F (1993). Norms versus numbers: Multilateralism and the rationalist and reflexivist approaches to institutions—a unilateral plea for communicative Rationality. In J. Ruggie (Ed.), Multilateralism matters: The theory and praxis of an institutional form (pp. 443–472). New York: Columbia University Press. Kyodo News Service (1989, April 3). North Korea unsatisfied with Japan’s apology. Japan Economic Newswire. Lake, D., & Powell, R. (1999). International relations: A strategic-choice approach. In D. Lake & R. Powell (Eds.), Strategic choice and international relations (pp. 3–38). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lane, R. (1959). Political life. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. Lane, R. (1990). Concrete theory: An emerging political method. American Political Science Review, 84, 927–940. Lankov, A. (2002). From Stalin to Kim Il Sung. The formation of North Korea 1945– 1960. London: Hurst & Company. Larson, D. (1986). Game theory and the psychology of reciprocity. Unpublished paper, Columbia University. Larson, D. (1988a). Problems of content analysis in foreign policy research. International Studies Quarterly, 32, 241–255. Larson, D. (1988b). The psychology of reciprocity in international relations. Negotiation Journal, 4, 281–301. Larson, D. (1991). Learning in U.S.-Soviet relations: The Nixon-Kissinger structure of peace. In G. Breslauer & P. Tetlock (Eds.), Learning in U.S. and Soviet foreign policy (pp. 350–399). Boulder: Westview Press. Lau, R., & Sears, D. (1986). Social cognition and political cognition: The past, the present, and the future. In R. Lau & D. Sears (Eds.), Political cognition (pp. 347–366). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Lebow, R. (1981). Between peace and war. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Lebow, R. (1994). The long peace, the end of the cold war, and the failure of realism. International Organization, 48, 249–277. Lebow, R., & Risse-Kappen, T. (Eds.). (1995). International relations theory and the end of the cold war. New York: Columbia University Press. Lebow, R., & Stein, J. (1989). Rational deterrence theory: I think, therefore I deter. World Politics, 41, 208–224. Lee, C. J. (1996). China and Korea: Dynamic relations. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. Lee, C. J. (2001). Conflict and cooperation: The pacific powers and Korea. In N. Eberstadt, & R. Ellings (Eds.), Korea’s future and the great powers (pp. 51–87). Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research. Lee, G. (1986, December 31). Soviets reject new year’s TV exchange. Washington Post, p. A1. Lee, H. S. (1994). Economic factors in Korean reunification. In Y.-W. Kihl (Ed.), Korea and the world: Beyond the cold war (pp. 167–188). Boulder: Westview Press. Lefever, E., and Lugt, R. (1989). Perestroika: How new is Gorbachev’s new thinking? Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Legvold, R. (1988). Gorbachev’s foreign policy: How should the United States respond? New York: Foreign Policy Association.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

179

Legvold, R. (1991). Soviet learning in the 1980s. In G. Breslauer & P. Tetlock (Eds.), Learning in U.S. and Soviet foreign policy (pp. 684–732). Boulder: Westview Press. Leites, N. (1951). The operational code of the politburo. New York: McGraw-Hill. Leites, N. (1953). A study of bolshevism. New York: Free Press. Leng, R., & Walker, S. (1982). Comparing two studies of crisis bargaining. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 26, 571–591. Levinson, D. (1958). The relevance of personality for political participation. Public Opinion Quarterly, 22, 3–10. Levy, J. (1994). Learning and foreign policy: Sweeping a conceptual minefield. International Organization, 48, 279–312. Levy, J. (1997). Prospect theory and the cognitive-rational debate. In N. Geva & A. Mintz (Eds.), Decision-making on war and peace. The cognitive-rational debate (pp. 33–50). Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Lewin, M. (1991). The Gorbachev phenomenon: A historical interpretation. Berkeley: University of California Press. Lynch, A. (1989). Gorbachev’s international outlook: Intellectual origins and political consequences. New York: Institute for East West Security Studies. MacDonald, D. (1992). U.S.-Korean relations from liberation to self-reliance. Boulder: Westview Press Malici, A. (2005). Discord and collaboration between allies: Managing external threats and internal cohesion in Franco-British relations during the 9/11 era. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49, 90–119. Malici, A. (2006a). Committed teacher meets motivated learner: Altercasting at the end of the cold war. In M. Schafer & S. Walker (Eds.), Beliefs and leadership in world politics: Methods and applications of operational code analysis. New York: Palgrave. Malici, A. (2006b). Germans as venutians: The culture of German foreign policy behavior. Foreign Policy Analysis, 2, 37–62. Malici, A., & Malici, J. (2005a). The operational codes of Fidel Castro and Kim-Il Sung: The last cold warriors? Political Psychology, 26, 387–412. Malici, A., & Malici, J. (2005b). When will they ever learn? An examination of Fidel Castro and Kim Jong-Il’s operational code beliefs. Psicología Política, 31 (November), 7–22. Malici, A., & Shackelford, J. (2003, February/March). The operational codes of Fidel Castro and Kim-Il Sung: The last cold warriors? Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Portland, Oregon. Mandelbaum, M., & Talbott, S. (1987). Reagan and Gorbachev. New York: Vintage Books. Manning, R. (1998). The United States in North Korean foreign policy. In S. Kim (Ed.), North Korean foreign relations in the post-cold war era (pp. 140–162). New York: Oxford University Press. Manning, R. (2002). United States-North Korean relations: From welfare to workfare? In S. Kim & T. H. Lee (Eds.), North Korea and Northeast Asia (pp. 61–88). New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Maoz, Z. (1990). National choice and international processes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

180

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Marcus, R. (1985, July 26). Soviet diplomat cut considered. Washington Post, p. A22. Maresca, J. (1988). Helsinki accord, 1975. In A. George, P. Farley, & A. Dallin (Eds.), U.S.-Soviet security cooperation. achievements, failures, lessons (pp. 106– 122). New York: Oxford University Press. Marfleet, G., & Walker, S. (2006). A world of beliefs: Simulating interactions among agents with different operational codes. In M. Schafer & S. Walker (Eds.), Beliefs and leadership in world politics: Methods and applications of operational code analysis. New York: Palgrave. Mazarr, M. (1991). Orphans of glasnost: Cuba, North Korea, and the US. Korea and World Affairs, 15, 58–84. Mazarr, M. (1995a). North Korea and the bomb: A case study in nonproliferation. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Mazarr, M. (1995b). Going just a little nuclear: Nonproliferation lessons from North Korea. International Security, 20, 92–122. Mead, G. (1934). Mind, self, and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mearsheimer, J. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. New York: W.W. Norton. Mendelsohn, J. (1988). The Soviet-American arms control dialogue before and after Reykjavik. In D. Nelson & R. Anderson (Eds.), Soviet-American relations (pp. 141–152). Wilmington: SR Books. Merrill, J. (1993). North Korea in 1992: Steering away from the shoals. Asian Survey, 33, 43–53. Merton, R. (1957). Social theory and social structure. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. Miller, N. R., Sears, R., Mowrer, O. H, Doob, L. W., & Dollard, J. (1941) The frustration-aggression hypothesis. Psychological Review, 48, 337–342. Moe, T. (1979). On the scientific status of rational choice models. American Journal of Political Science, 23, 215–243. Monroe, K. (1995). Psychology and rational actor theory. Political Psychology, 16, 1–22. Moon-Young, H. (1994). North Korea’s foreign policy in transition. Vantage Point, 17 (7–8), 21–29 and 19–27. Mor, B. (1993). Decision and interaction in crisis: A model of international crisis behavior. Westport, CT: Greenwood. Morgenthau, H. (1948). Politics among nations. The struggle for power and peace. New York: McGraw-Hill. Morrow, J. (1997). A rational choice approach to international conflict. In N. Geva & A. Mintz (Eds.), Decisionmaking on war and peace: The cognitive-rational debate (pp. 11–31). Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Most, B., & Starr, H. (1989). Inquiry, logic and international politics. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. Muzzio, D. (1982). Watergate games: Strategies, choices, outcomes. New York: New York University Press. Nelson, K. (1995). The making of détente. Soviet-American relations in the shadow of Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. New York Times. (1986, March 27). Meese accuses Soviet Union of afghan war crimes, p. A5. New York Times. (1990, July 7). Text of declaration after the NATO talks, p. 5. Nolan, M. (1996). The North Korean economy. Joint U.S. Korea Academic Studies, 6, 127–178.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

181

Noland, M. (2002). North Korea’s external economic relations: Globalization in ‘our own style.’ In S. Kim & T. H. Lee (Eds.), North Korea and Northeast Asia (pp. 165–193). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Nye, J. (1987). Nuclear learning and U.S.-Soviet security regimes. International Organization, 41, 371–402. Nye, J. (1988a). Gorbachev’s Russia and U.S. options. In S. Bialer & M. Mandelbaum (Eds.), Gorbachev’s Russia and American foreign policy (pp. 385–408). Boulder: Westview Press. Nye, J. (1988b). Neorealism and neoliberalism. World Politics, 40, 235–251. Oberdorfer, D. (1986, May 28). U.S. is ‘no longer bound’ by SALT II, Weinberger says. Washington Post, p. A1. Oberdorfer, D. (1991). From the cold war to a new era. The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983–1991. New York: Poseidon Press. Oberdorfer, D. (1997). The two Koreas. A contemporary history. Reading: AddisonWesley. Oberdorfer, D. (1998). From the cold war to a new era. The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983–1991 (updated ed.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Oh, K. D. (1990). North Korea in 1989: Touched by winds of change? Asian Survey, 30, 74–80. Oh, K. D. (1992). North Korea in the 1990s: Implications for the future of U.S.-South Korean security alliance. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. Oh, K. D. (1998). North Korea’s foreign relations in transition. In I. J. Kim (Ed.), Two Koreas in transition. Implications for U.S. policy (pp. 130–148). St. Paul: Paragon House. Oh, K. D., & Hassig, R. C. (2000). North Korea through the looking glass. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Olsen, E. A. (1986). The arms race on the Korean peninsula. Asian Survey, 32, 105–118. Onuf, N. (1989). World of our making: Rules and rule in social theory and international relations. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. Osgood, C. (1960). Cognitive dynamics in the conduct of human affairs. Public Opinion Quarterly, 24, 341–365. Oye, K. (1985). Explaining cooperation under anarchy: Hypotheses and strategies. World Politics, 38, 1–24. Oye, K. (Ed.). (1986). Cooperation under anarchy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Oye, K. (1995). Explaining the end of the cold war: Morphological and behavioral adaptations to the nuclear peace? In R. Lebow & T. Risse-Kappen (Eds.), International relations theory and the end of the cold war (pp. 57–84). New York: Columbia University Press. Park, H. S. (1998). The nature and evolution of juche. In I. J. Kim (Ed.), Two Koreas in transition (pp. 33–43), Rockeville, MD: InDepth Books. Perinbanayagam, R. (1974). The definition of the situation: An analysis of the ethnomethodological and dramaturgical view. Sociological Quarterly, 15, 521–541. Perle, R. (1991). Military power and the passing cold war. In C. Kegley & K. Schwab (Eds.), After the cold war: Questioning the morality of nuclear deterrence (pp. 33– 38). Boulder: Westview Press.

182

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Perle, R. (1992). Hard line. New York: Random House. Perry, W. (2000). The United States and the future of East Asian security. In K. Woo (Ed.), Building common peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. Seoul, South Korea: Yonsei University Press. Plous, S. (1985). Perceptual illusions and military realities: The nuclear arms race. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29, 363–389. Porter, M., Takeuchi, H., & Sakakibara, M. (2000) Can Japan compete? Cambridge: Perseus. Posen, B. (1984). The sources of military doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the world wars. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Powaski, R. (1998). The cold war. The United States and the Soviet Union 1917–1991. New York: Oxford University Press. Powell, R. (1985). The theoretical foundations of strategic nuclear deterrence. Political Science Quarterly, 100, 75–96. Powell, R. (1987). Crisis bargaining, escalation and MAD. American Political Science Review, 81, 717–735. Powell, R. (1988). Nuclear brinkmanship and two-sided incomplete information. American Political Science Review, 82, 155–178. Powell, R. (1989a). Crisis stability in the nuclear age. American Political Science Review, 83, 61–76. Powell, R. (1989b). Nuclear deterrence and the strategy of limited retaliation. American Political Science Review, 83, 503–520. Powell, R. (1994). Anarchy in international relations theory: The neorealist-neoliberal debate. International Organization, 48, 313–344. Pravda. (1980, January 14). Interview with Brezhnev, FBIS, pp. A1–A6. Pravda. (1985, March 12). Speech of comrade M. S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the central committee of the CPSU at the plenary meeting of the central committee of the CPSU on March 11, 1985. Pravda. (1986, June 12). Warsaw Pact appeals to the NATO states and all European countries a program for reductions of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe. Pravda. (1986, June 17). Report by M. S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CC of the CPSU, at the June 16 CC plenum. Pravda. (1987, February 17). Speech by M. S. Gorbachev. Pravda. (1989, October 24). Foreign policy and perestroika, foreign minister E. A. Shevardnadze’s report to the USSR supreme Soviet, October 23, 1989. Pruitt, D. G. (1965). Definition of the situation as a determinant of interactional action. In H. Kelman (Ed.), International behavior: A social-psychological analysis (pp. 393–432). New York: Holt, Rinehart. Przeworski, A. (1985). Marxism and rational choice. Politics and Society, 14, 379–409. Quinones, C. K. (1998). North Korea: From containment to engagement. In D.-S. Suh & C.-J. Lee (Eds.), North Korea After Kim Il Sung (pp. 101–119). Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Rasler, K., Thompson, W., & Chester, K. (1980). Foreign policy makers, personality attributes, and interviews: A note on reliability problems. International Studies Quarterly, 24, 47–66. Raub, W. (1990). A general game-theoretic model of preference adaptations in problematic social situations. Rationality and Society, 2, 67–93.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

183

Reagan, R. Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, March 10, 1987. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 239–284. Reagan, R. Regional conflicts, radio address to the nation, March 16, 1987. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 235–236. Reagan, R. Soviet Union-United States summit in Washington, DC, joint statement, December 14, 1987. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 1494. Reagan, R. New Year’s message, January 5, 1986. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 1681–1683. Rhee, K. S. (1987). North Korea’s pragmatism: A turning point? Asian Survey, 27, 885–902. Rice, C. (1988). SALT and the search for a security regime. In A. George, P. Farley, & A. Dallin (Eds.), U.S.-Soviet security cooperation. Achievements, failures, lessons (pp. 293–306). New York: Oxford University Press. Risse-Kappen, T. (1994). Ideas do not float freely: Transnational coalitions, domestic structures, and the end of the cold war. International Organization, 48, 185–214. Roh, T. W. (1989, Fall). Three points principles of unification, August 15, 1989. Korea and World Affairs, 576–579. Rose, G. (1998). Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy. World Politics, 51, 144–172. Rosenau, J. (1966). Pre-theories and theories of foreign policy. In B. Farrell (Ed.), Approaches to comparative and international politics (pp. 27–92). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Ruggie, J. (1999). What makes the world hang together? Neo-utilitarianism and the social constructivist challenge. In P. Katzenstein, R. Keohane, & S. Krasner (Eds.), Exploration and contestation in world politics (pp. 215–246). Cambridge: MIT Press. Russett, B., & Starr, H. (1981). World politics: The menu for choice. New York: W. H. Freeman. Sakwa, R. (1990). Gorbachev and his reforms 1985–1990. New York: Philip Allan. Sandler, S. (1999). The Korean war: No victors, no vanquished. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. Sands, J., & Philips, H. (1988). Reasonable sufficiency and Soviet conventional defense. International Security, 13, 164–178. Sang-Woo, R. (1991). North Korea in 1990: Lonesome struggle to keep chuch’e. Asian Survey, 31, 71–78. Sang-Woo, R. (1992). North Korea in 1991: Struggle to save chuch’e amid signs of change. Asian Survey, 32, 56–63. Sanger, D. (2002, October 21). U.S. plans to junk North Korea pact. International Herald Tribune. Satterwhite, D. (1998). North Korea in 1997: New opportunities in a time of crisis. Asian Survey, 38, 11–32. Scalapino, R. (1983). North Korean relations with Japan and the United States. In R. Scalapino & J.-Y. Kim (Eds.), North Korea today. Strategic and domestic issues. Berkeley: Center for Korean Studies, University of California. Scalapino, R. A. (2002). Korea: The options and perimeters. In T. Akaha (Ed.), The future of North Korea (pp. 9–25). New York: Routledge Scalapino, R., & Lee, C. (1972). Communism in Korea. Berkeley: University of California Press.

184

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Schafer, M. (2000). Issues in assessing psychological characteristics at a distance. Political Psychology, 21, 511–528. Schafer, M, Robison, S., & Aldrich, B. (2006). Operational codes and the 1916 Easter rising in Ireland: A test of the frustration-aggression hypothesis. Foreign Policy Analysis, 2, 63–82. Schafer, M., & Walker, S. (2001). Political leadership and the democratic peace: The operational code of prime minister Tony Blair. In O. Feldman & L. Valenty (Eds.), Profiling political leaders: Cross cultural studies of personality and behavior (pp. 21–37). Westport, CT: Praeger. Schafer, M., & Walker, S. (Eds.). (2006). Beliefs and leadership in world politics: Methods and application of operational code analysis. New York: Palgrave. Schelling, T. (1966). Arms and influence. New Haven: Yale University Press. Schmemann, S. (1985, May 22). Trade gain in Soviet talks seen. New York Times, p. D1. Schultz, G. (1993). Turmoil and triumph: My years as secretary of state. New York: Scribner’s. Schweller. R. (2003). The progressiveness of neoclassical realism. In C. Elman & M. Elman (Eds.), Progress in international relations theory (pp. 311–347). Cambridge: MIT Press. Schweller, R., & Wohlforth, W. (2000). Power test: Updating realism in response to the end of the cold war. Security Studies, 9, 60–108. Shenon, P. (2002, November 5). U.S. rejects North Korean call for talks on nuclear program. International Herald Tribune. Shevardnadze, E. (1991). The future belongs to freedom. New York: Free Press. Shils, E. (1954). Authoritarianism: ‘right’ and ‘left.’ In R. Christie & M. Jahoda (Eds.), Studies in the scope and method of “the authoritarian personality” (pp. 24– 49). Glencoe, IL: Free Press. Shinn, R.-S. (1982). North Korea in 1981: First year for de facto successor Kim Jong Il. Asian Survey, 22, 99–106. Shinn, R.-S. (1983). North Korea in 1982: Continuing revolution under Kim Jong Il. Asian Survey, 23, 102–109. Sigal, L. (1998). Disarming strangers: Nuclear diplomacy with North Korea. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Simon, H. (1985). Human nature in politics: The dialogue of psychology with political science. American Political Science Review, 79, 293–304. Smith, H. (1996). North Korean foreign policy in the 1990s: The realist approach. In H. Smith, C. Rhodes, D. Pritchard, & K. Magill (Eds.), North Korea in the New World Order (pp. 93–113). New York: St. Martin’s Press. Smith, S. (1990). The Reagan legacy and the Bush predicament. In M. Pugh & P. Williams (Eds.), Superpower politics: Change in the United States and the Soviet Union (pp. 60–81). Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Snidal, D. (1985). The game theory of international politics. World Politics, 38, 25–57. Snyder, G., & Diesing, P. (1977) Conflict among nations. Princeton: Princeton University. Snyder, J. (1992). Myths of empire: Domestic politics and international ambitions. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Snyder, R., Bruck, H. W., & Sapin, B. (Eds.). (1954). Foreign policy decision-making as an approach to the study of international politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

185

Snyder, S. (1999). Negotiating on the edge. North Korean bargaining behavior. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Snyder, S. (1997, March). North Korean crises and American choices: Managing U. S. policy toward the Korean peninsula. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada. Spector, L.S., & Smith, J. R. (1991). North Korea: The next nuclear nightmare? Arms Control Today, 21, 8–13. Sprout, H., & Sprout, M. (1965). The ecological perspective in human affairs. Princeton: Princeton University Press Sprout, H., & Sprout, H. (1969). Environmental factors in the study of international politics. In J. Rosenau (Ed.), International politics and foreign policy (pp. 41–56). New York: Free Press. State Bulletin. (1988). Agreements on Afghanistan. 88 (June), 56–60. Stebbins, R. (1967). A theory of the definition of the situation. Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 4, 148–164. Stein, A. (1989). Governments, economic interdependence, and international cooperation. In P. Tetlock et al. (Eds.), Behavior, society, and international conflict (pp. 241–324). New York: Oxford University Press. Stein, J. (1994). Political learning by doing: Gorbachev as an uncommitted thinker and motivated learner. International Organization, 48, 155–183. Stein, J., & Welch, D. (1997). Rational and psychological approaches to the study of international conflict: Comparative strengths and weaknesses. In N. Geva & A. Mintz (Eds.), Decision-making on war and peace. The cognitive-rational debate (pp. 51–77). Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Steinberg, D. (1988). Sociopolitical factors and Korea’s future economic policies. World Development, 16, 19–34. Sternthal, S. (1997). Gorbachev’s reforms. De-stalinization through demilitarization. Westport, CT.: Praeger. Stokes, H. S. (1982, March 4). South Korea under Chun: New vigor but little shift toward democracy. New York Times, p. A4. Stone, R. (2001). The use and abuse of game theory in international relations. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45, 216–244. Stryker, S. (1987). The vitalization of symbolic interactionism. Social Psychology Quarterly, 50, 83–94. Suh, D.-S. (1983). Kim Il-song: His personality and politics. In R. Scalapino & J.-Y. Kim (Eds.), North Korea today: Strategic and domestic Issues (pp. 43–64). Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California. Suh, D.-S. (1986). North Korea in 1985: A new era after forty years. Asian Survey, 26, 78–85. Suh, D.-S. (1987). North Korea in 1986: Strengthening the Soviet connection. Asian Survey, 27, 56–63. Suh, D.-S. (1988). Kim Il Sung: The North Korean leader. New York: Columbia University Press. Talbott, S. (1984). Deadly gambits: The Reagan administration and the stalemate in nuclear arms control. New York: Knopf. Taliaferro, J. (2000/01). Security seeking under anarchy. Defensive realism revisited. International Security, 25, 128–161. Taubman, P. (1983, November 5). U.S. makes public arms pacts it says grenadians made. New York Times, pp. 1–2.

186

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Tetlock, P. (1986). Psychological advice on foreign policy. What do we have to contribute? American Psychologist, 41, 557–567. Tetlock, P. (1991). Learning in U.S. and Soviet foreign policy. In search of an elusive concept. In G. Breslauer & P. Tetlock (Eds.), Learning in U.S. and Soviet foreign policy (pp. 20–61). Boulder: Westview Press. Tetlock, P. (1998). Social psychology and world politics. In D. Gilbert, S. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (4th ed., Volume II, pp. 868–982). New York: McGraw-Hill. Tetlock, P., & Manstead, A. S. R. (1985). Impression management versus intrapsychic explanations in social psychology: A useful dichotomy? Psychological Review, 92, 59–77. Tetlock, P., & McGuire, C. (1986). Cognitive perspectives on foreign policy. In S. Long (Ed.), Political behavior annual, Vol. 1 (pp. 255–273). Boulder: Westview Press. Thom, F. (1988). Glasnost, Gorbachev & Lenin: Behind the new thinking. London: Policy Research. Thornhill, J., & Ward, A. (2002, December 15). The puzzle of how to deal with North Korea’s strange autocrat. Financial Times, p. 7. Toloraya, G. (2002). Russia and North Korea. In T. Akaha (Ed.), The future of North Korea (pp. 147–156). New York: Routledge. Tow, W. (1991). Reassessing deterrence on the North Korean peninsula. Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 3, 179–218. Valenta, J., & Cibulka, F. (1990). Gorbachev’s new thinking and third world conflicts. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Verba, S. (1961). Assumptions of rationality and non-rationality in models of the international system. World Politics, 14, 93–117. Vertzberger, Y. (1990). The world in their minds. Information processing, cognition, and perception in foreign policy decisionmaking. Stanford: Stanford University Press. von Beyme, K. (1991). UdSSR und USA: Von der konfrontation zur kooperation. In R. Hamann, & V. Matthies (Eds.), Sowjetische aussenpolitik im wandel. Eine zwischenbilanz der jahre 1985–1990 (pp. 131–146). Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1953). Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wagner, H. (1983). The theory of games and the problem of international cooperation. American Political Science Review, 77, 330–346. Walker, S. (1977). The interface between beliefs and behavior: Henry A. Kissinger’s operational code and the Vietnam War. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 21, 129–168. Walker, S. (1983). The motivational foundations of political belief systems: A reanalysis of the operational code construct. International Studies Quarterly, 27, 179–201. Walker, S. (1990). The evolution of operational code analysis. Political Psychology, 11, 403–418. Walker, S. (2000). Assessing psychological characteristics at a distance: Symposium lessons and future research directions. Political Psychology, 21, 597–602. Walker, S. (2003b). Operational code analysis as a scientific research program: A cautionary tale. In C. Elman & M. Elman (Eds.), Progress in international relations theory: Appraising the field (pp. 245–276). Cambridge: MIT Press.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

187

Walker, S. (2004a). The Management and resolution of international conflict in a “single” case: American and North Vietnamese exchanges during the Vietnam war. In Z. Maoz, R. Stoll, C. Morgan, A. Mintz, & G. Palmer (Eds.), Multiple paths to knowledge in international relations. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Walker, S. (2004b). Role identities and the operational codes of political leaders. In M. Hermann (Ed.), Political psychology as a perspective on politics. Advances in political psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 71–106). London: Elsevier. Walker, S., & Schafer, M. (2000). The political universe of Lyndon B. Johnson and his advisors. Political Psychology, 21, 529–544. Walker, S., & Schafer, M. (2003a, October). The contributions of operational code analysis to foreign policy theory: Beliefs as causal mechanism. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association-West, Las Vegas. Walker, S. & Schafer, M. (2003b). Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson: Realist and idealist archetypes? Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Boston Park Plaza Hotel, Boston, July 5–9. Walker, S., & Schafer, M. (2004). Dueling with dictators: Explaining strategic interactions between the United States and rogue leaders. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 2–4. Walker, S., Schafer, M., & Marfleet, G. (2001, August/September). The British strategy of appeasement: Why did Britain persist in the face of negative feedback? Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco. Walker, S., Schafer, M., & Young, M. (1998). Systematic procedures for operational code analysis: Measuring and modeling Jimmy Carter’s operational code. International Studies Quarterly, 42, 175–190. Walker, S., Schafer, M., & Young, M. (1999). Presidential operational codes and the management of foreign policy conflicts in the post-cold war world. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 43, 610–625. Walker, S., Schafer, M., & Young, M. (2003). Profiling the operational codes of political leaders. In J. Post (Ed.), The psychological assessment of political leaders (pp. 215–245). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Walt, S. (1998, Spring). International relations: One world, many theories. Foreign Affairs, 29–46. Walt, S. (2003a). The enduring relevance of the realist tradition. In I. Katznelson & H. Milner (Eds.), Political science: The state of the discipline (pp. 197–230). New York: W.W. Norton. Walt, S. (2003b). Beyond Bin Laden: Reshaping US foreign policy. International Security, 26, 56–78. Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of international politics. New York: McGraw-Hill. Watson, G., & McGaw, D. (1980). Statistical inquiry. New York: John Wiley. Weinstein, E., & Deutschberger, P. (1963). Some dimensions of altercasting. Sociometry, 26, 454–466. Wendt, A. (1987). The agent-structure problem in international relations theory. International Organization, 41, 335–370. Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics. International Organization, 46, 391–425.

188

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Wendt, A. (1999). Social theory of international politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. White, S. (1990). Gorbachev in power. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Wishnick, E. (2002). Russian-North Korean relations: A new era? In S. Kim & T. H. Lee (Eds.), North Korea and Northeast Asia (pp. 139–162). New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Winter, D. (1980). An exploratory study of the motives of Southern African political leaders: Measured at a distance. Political Psychology, 2, 75–85. Winter, D., Hermann, M., Weintraub, W., & Walker, S. (1991). Theory and predictions in political psychology. Political Psychology, 12, 215–246. Wohlforth, W. (1993). The elusive balance: Power and perceptions during the cold war. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Wohlforth, W. (1994/95). Realism and the end of the cold war. International Security, 19, 91–129. Wohlforth, W. (1998). Reality check: Revising theories of international politics in response to the end of the cold war. World Politics, 50, 650–680. Wolfers, A. (1962). Discord and collaboration. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Wright, C. (1981/82). Libya and the west: Headlong into confrontation? International Affairs, 58, 13–41. Yang, S.-C. (1981). Korea and the two regimes: Kim Il Sung and Park Chung Hee. Cambridge: Schenckman. Youn, H. S. (1999). Changes in DPRK-Russia relations 1989–1999: Before and after Kim Jong-Il. Journal of East Asian Affairs, 13, 434–463. Young, M (2001). Building worldviews with Profiler+. In G. Barnett (Ed.), Progress in communications sciences (pp. 17–32). Westport, CT: Ablex. Zaeck, J. S. (1998). Russia in North Korean foreign policy. In S. Kim (Ed.), North Korean foreign relations in the post cold war era (pp. 75–93). New York: Oxford University Press. Zagare, F. (1979). The Geneva conference of 1954: A case of tacit deception. International Studies Quarterly, 23, 390–411. Zajonc, R. B. (1960). The concept of balance, congruity, and dissonance. Public Opinion Quarterly, 24, 280–296. Zemtsov, I., & Farrar, J. (1989). Gorbachev. The man and the system. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Zhebin, A. (1995). Russia and North Korea: An emerging, uneasy partnership. Asian Survey, 35, 726–739.

INDEX

Agreed Framework, 13, 126, 140, 143 altercasting: defined, 30, 91, 149n15. See also Gorbachev Andropov, Yuri, 7, 37–44 passim, 88, 151n50, 151n58 ABM (Antiballistic Missiles) treaty, 38, 53, 62, 72, 150n36 attitudinal prism, 18. See also perceptions Arbatov, Georgi, 7, 146n28, 157n44 Axelrod, Robert, 134 Basic Agreement, 13, 123, 124 beliefs: instrumental, 33; operational code, 33, 37; philosophical, 33 Brams, Steven, 25–29 passim Brecher, Steinberg and Stein, 18 Brezhnev, Leonid, 7, 9, 37–41, 150n41, 150n48, 151n58 Brown, Archie, 4–8 passim Buzo, Adrian, 11–12, 93, 104–124 passim Checkel, Jeff, 9 Chernenko, Konstantin, 7, 37–44 passim, 151n58, 151n63 content analysis, 20–22, 33 decision-making: and external circumstances, 5, 15–19, 31, 132–136; and subjective representations, 17, 19, 132–133. See also perceptions détente between U.S. and Soviet Union, 38–44 passim, 50–67 passim, 83, 108, 150n34, 150n39–41, 150n48 DMZ (Demilitarized Zone), 86–87, 95 economic conditions: in North Korea, 13, 16, 117–118; in Soviet Union, 6–7, 15–16

Etheredge, Lloyd, 5 frustration-aggression hypothesis/ syndrome, 137–139. See also Kim Jong Il Gaddis, John Lewis, 6, 133 game theory: advantages of, 5, 18, 20; conventional and sequential contrasted, 25–26, 30, 32, 149n13; criticism of, 22– 23, 134–135. See also TOM; preferences Garthoff, Raymond, 56, 61, 72, 80–82 Geneva Summit, 51–61 passim George, Alexander, 33, 136 Gorbachev, Mikhail: and altercasting, 50, 59, 60, 65, 69, 91, 135; and Gorbachev generation, 8, 145n24; and institutchki, 9; learning patterns of, 54–55, 65–68, 74–76, 131–132; and new thinking, 4– 9 passim, 27, 56, 59, 63, 72, 107–108, 146n29; phenomenon, 30, 50, 135, 143–144; and politburo, 8, 48–50 passim, 56, 70–72 passim, 81, 152n6, 152n68; and political socialization, 8; and reasonable sufficiency, 14, 57, 70, 157n44 IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency): in North Korean external relations, 13, 112–125 passim ideational variables: criticism of, 5, 20, 22, 134; and conventional international relations theory, 16, 20, 133–134; impact of, 16–20 passim, 134–135; scientific study of, 5, 19–20, 134 international relations theory: conventional, 6, 15; criticism of, 3, 16–17, 58, 107, 132–136 passim

189

190

INDEX

Jervis, Robert, 16, 19, 22–23 Kim Il Sung: and juche ideology, 4, 85, 120, 145n2; learning patterns of, 99, 110, 113, 121, 132; and self-fulfilling prophecies, 20, 111, 132, 136; as a revolutionary, 11–12 Kimist ideology, 12 Kim Jong Il, 112–113, 120, 126; and selffulfilling prophecy, 137–140, 142–144 Korean War, 12, 14, 86, 100, 119, 125, 158n2 Learning: analyzing of, 17–25 passim, 30–37 passim; cognitive strategic, 32–34, 37; complex, 32, 133; diagnostic, 32; experiential, 32, 34, 37; simple, 32 Malta summit, 80 Morgenthau, Hans, 16–17 Nash equilibrium: defined, 149n13 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 42, 62–62, 78–83 passim, 158n73 Non-aligned Movement (NAM), 94, 96, 98, 114, 118, 160n46 nonmyopic equilibrium: defined, 149n13 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) 18, 123, 126 Oye, Kenneth, 30–31 perceptions: important in decisionmaking, 5, 18–20, 32, 37, 40–42 passim, 133–135 passim, 149n119. See also decision-making preferences: assumed/exogenous in game theory, 18, 23, 30–31; endogenous in game theory, 5, 23– 24, 31; general 30–32, 36–37 Profiler+: as automated method of content analysis, 20–21, 33, 150n29 psychological climate and environment, 18. See also decision-making Rangoon: bombing of, 12, 90, 98–102 passim, 115, 160n57

rational choice models: discussed, 6–7, 15–17, 23, 135–136 rationality: and game theory, 23; bounded, 17; strategic, 32. See also decision-making realism, 6, 74; neorealism, 132; neoclassical realism, 133 Reykjavik summit, 54, 59–65 passim, 70, 73 rogue states: defined, 10, 137 Rosenau, James, 19 SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), 38, 40, 54, 61, 150n36, 150n41, 154n65 SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative), 43 self-fulfilling prophecy, 30, 91; in contemporary U.S.-North Korean relations, 144. See also Kim Il Sung Shevardnadze, Eduard, 9, 13, 48–63 passim, 71–82 passim, 108 Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, 18 Sprout, Harold and Margaret, 18 START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks), 42–43, 72–72, 78–83 passim Stein, Janice, 8, 18, 47 strategic choice: defined, 17 strategic interactions, 3, 15–20 passim, 25, 30–37 passim, 132 subjective representations: in decisionmaking, 17, 19, 132–133 Team-spirit exercise, 90, 96–97, 104, 116 TIP (Theory of Inferences about Preferences), 36–37, 40, 150n30 TOM (Theory of Moves), 22, 25–38 passim, 37. See also game theory Twenty-Seventh Party Congress, 54, 56, 79, 152n6 United Nations: in North Korean external relations, 12, 97, 103, 116, 124, 164n77; in Soviet external relations, 70, 74, 79, 156n41, 157n44 VICS (Verbs in Context System), 20–21, 33–34 von Neumann and Morgenstern, 26 Warsaw Pact, 61, 70, 81 Wolfers, Arnold, 5

SUNY SERIES IN GLOBAL POLITICS James N. Rosenau, Editor

LIST OF TITLES American Patriotism in a Global Society—Betty Jean Craige The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations—Brian C. Schmidt Power and Ideas: North-South Politics of Intellectual Property and Antitrust— Susan K. Sell From Pirates to Drug Lords: The Post–Cold War Caribbean Security Environment—Michael C. Desch, Jorge I. Dominguez, and Andres Serbin (eds.) Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics—Joseph Lepgold and Thomas G. Weiss (eds.) Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative Perspective—Arie M. Kacowicz Private Authority and International Affairs—A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter (eds.) Harmonizing Europe: Nation-States within the Common Market—Francesco G. Duina Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations—Paul J. D’Anieri Leapfrogging Development? The Political Economy of Telecommunications Restructuring—J. P. Singh States, Firms, and Power: Successful Sanctions in United States Foreign Policy—George E. Shambaugh Approaches to Global Governance Theory—Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair (eds.) After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the Twenty-First Century—Ronnie D. Lipschutz Pondering Postinternationalism: A Paradigm for the Twenty-First Century?— Heidi H. Hobbs (ed.) 191

192

SUNY SERIES IN GLOBAL POLITICS

Beyond Boundaries? Disciplines, Paradigms, and Theoretical Integration in International Studies—Rudra Sil and Eileen M. Doherty (eds.) International Relations—Still an American Social Science? Toward Diversity in International Thought—Robert M. A. Crawford and Darryl S. L. Jarvis (eds.) Which Lessons Matter? American Foreign Policy Decision Making in the Middle East, 1979—1987—Christopher Hemmer (ed.) Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy: Transaction Costs and Institutional Choice—Katja Weber Counter-Hegemony and Foreign Policy: The Dialectics of Marginalized and Global Forces in Jamaica—Randolph B. Persaud Global Limits: Immanuel Kant, International Relations, and Critique of World Politics—Mark F. N. Franke Money and Power in Europe: The Political Economy of European Monetary Cooperation—Matthias Kaelberer Why Movements Matter: The West German Peace Movement and U. S. Arms Control Policy—Steve Breyman Agency and Ethics: The Politics of Military Intervention—Anthony F. Lang, Jr. Life After the Soviet Union: The Newly Independent Republics of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia—Nozar Alaolmolki Information Technologies and Global Politics: The Changing Scope of Power and Governance—James N. Rosenau and J. P. Singh (eds.) Theories of International Cooperation and the Primacy of Anarchy: Explaining U. S. International Monetary Policy-Making After Bretton Woods—Jennifer Sterling-Folker Technology, Democracy, and Development: International Conflict and Cooperation in the Information Age—Juliann Emmons Allison (ed.) Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia— Nazih Richani The Arab-Israeli Conflict Transformed: Fifty Years of Interstate and Ethnic Crises—Hemda Ben-Yehuda and Shmuel Sandler

SUNY SERIES IN GLOBAL POLITICS

193

Debating the Global Financial Architecture—Leslie Elliot Armijo Political Space: Frontiers of Change and Governance in a Globalizing World— Yale Ferguson and R. J. Barry Jones (eds.) Crisis Theory and World Order: Heideggerian Reflections—Norman K. Swazo Political Identity and Social Change: The Remaking of the South African Social Order—Jamie Frueh Social Construction and the Logic of Money: Financial Predominance and International Economic Leadership—J. Samuel Barkin What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and Its Judgment of Human Nature — Annette Freyberg-Inan Democratizing Global Politics: Discourse Norms, International Regimes, and Political Community—Rodger A. Payne and Nayef H. Samhat Landmines and Human Security: International Politics and War’s Hidden Legacy— Richard A. Matthew, Bryan McDonald, and Kenneth R. Rutherford (eds.) Collective Preventative Diplomacy: A Study of International Management—Barry H. Steiner International Relations Under Risk: Framing State Choice—Jeffrey D. Berejikian Globalization and the Environment: Greening Global Political Economy— Gabriela Kütting Sovereignty, Democracy, and Global Civil Society—Elisabeth Jay Friedman, Kathryn Hochstetler, and Ann Marie Clark United We Stand? Divide and Conquer Politics and the Logic of International Hostility—Aaron Belkin Imperialism and Nationalism in the Discipline of International Relations— David Long and Brian C. Schmidt (eds.) Globalization, Security, and the Nation State: Paradigms in Transition—Ersel Aydinli and James N. Rosenau (eds.) Identity and Institutions: Conflict Reduction in Divided Societies—Neal G. Jesse and Kristen P. Williams

194

SUNY SERIES IN GLOBAL POLITICS

Globalizing Interests: Pressure Groups and Denationalization—Michael Zürn (ed., with assistance from Gregor Walter) International Regimes for the Final Frontier—M. J. Peterson Ozone Depletion and Climate Change: Constructing A Global Response— Matthew J. Hoffmann States of Liberalization: Redefining the Public Sector in Integrated Europe— Mitchell P. Smith Mediating Globalization: Domestic Institutions and Industrial Policies in the United States and Britain—Andrew P. Cortell The Multi-Governance of Water: Four Case Studies—Matthias Finger, Ludivine Tamiotti, and Jeremy Allouche, eds. Building Trust: Overcoming Suspicion in International Conflict—Aaron M. Hoffman Global Capitalism, Democracy, and Civil-Military Relations in Colombia— Williams Avilés Complexity in World Politics: Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm— Neil E. Harrison Technology and International Transformation: The Railroad, the Atom Bomb, and the Politics of Technological Transformation—Geoffrey L. Herrera The Perils and Promise of Global Transparency: Why the Information Revolution May Not Lead to Security, Democracy, or Peace—Kristin M. Lord Global Liberalism and Political Order: Towards a New Grand Compromise?— Steven Bernstein and Louis W. Pauly, eds. Well-Oiled Diplomacy: Strategic Manipulation and Russia’s Energy Statecraft in Eursia—Adam N. Stulberg [April 2007] Cooperating Rivals: The Riparian Politics of the Jordan River Basin—Jeffrey K. Sosland [August 2007]

POLITICAL SCIENCE

8)&/
-&"%&34
-&"3/


BOE
8IFO
5IFZ
%POµU

.JLIBJM
(PSCBDIFW
BOE
,JN
*M
4VOH
"5
5)&
&/%
0'
5)&
$0-%
8"3

"LBO
.BMJDJ
8IFO
-FBEFST
-FBSO
BOE
8IFO
5IFZ
%POµU
JOWFTUJHBUFT
UXP
FYUSBPSEJOBSZ
MFBEFST±
.JLIBJM
(PSCBDIFW
BOE
,JN
*M
4VOH±CZ
FNQMPZJOH
TPQIJTUJDBUFE
NFUIPEPMPHJFT
BOE
BEWBODJOH
B
OFX
UIFPSZ
PG
GPSFJHO
QPMJDZ
EFDJTJPO
NBLJOH
#PUI
MFBEFST
SFEFGJOFE
UIF
UIFPSZ
BOE
QSBDUJDF
PG
JOUFSOBUJPOBM
SFMBUJPOT
BOE
MFGU
B
IFSJUBHF
UIBU
XF
GBDF
UPEBZ±B
VOJQPMBS
XPSME
JO
XIJDI
TFDVSJUZ
UISFBUT
OP
MPOHFS
FNBOBUF
GSPN
UIF
SJWBMSZ
PG
UXP
TVQFSQPXFST
CVU
SBUIFS
GSPN
UIF
FYJTUFODF
PG
SPHVF
TUBUFT
TVDI
BT
/PSUI
,PSFB
"LBO
.BMJDJ
EFNPOTUSBUFT
IPX
(PSCBDIFW
NPWFE
UIF
BOUBHPOJTUJD
TVQFSQPXFS
SFMBUJPOTIJQ
UPXBSE
B
,BOUJBO
XPSME
PG
GSJFOET
XIJMF
,JN
SFJGJFE
B
)PCCFTJBO
XPSME
PG
FOFNJFT
BU
UIF
FOE
PG
UIF
$PME
8BS
5IF
CPPL
DBSSJFT
JNQMJDBUJPOT
BCPVU
EFDMJOJOH
BOE
OFXMZ
FNFSHJOH
UISFBUT
BT
UIF
DPOGJHVSBUJPO
PG
UIF
JOUFSOBUJPOBM
TZTUFN
DIBOHFT ²5IJT
CPPL
NBLFT
BO
JNQPSUBOU
DPOUSJCVUJPO
JO
IJHIMJHIUJOH
UIF
JNQPSUBODF
PG
QPMJUJDBM

MFBEFSTIJQ
*U
TUBOET
JO
PQQPTJUJPO
UP
NPSF
EFUFSNJOJTUJD
USFBUNFOUT
UIBU
XPVME
TBZ
UIJOHT
´IBE
UP
IBQQFOµ
JO
B
DFSUBJO
NBOOFS
5IF
DPNQBSJTPO
PG
(PSCBDIFW
BOE
,JN
*M
4VOH
CSJOHT
PVU
UIF
HSFBU
QPUFOUJBM
GPS
WBSJBUJPO
JO
XIBU
B
SFHJNF
EPFT
EFQFOEJOH
VQPO
UIF
QSFTFODF
PS
BCTFODF
PG
MFBSOJOH
BNPOH
UPQ
MFBEFSTIJQ
"T
BO
FGGPSU
UP
CSJOH
UPHFUIFS
UIF
DPHOJUJWF
BOE
SBUJPOBM
DIPJDF
BQQSPBDIFT
UIJT
CPPL
JT
BNPOH
UIF
CFTU
*
IBWF
TFFO³
±
1BUSJDL
+BNFT
BVUIPS
PG
*OUFSOBUJPOBM
3FMBUJPOT
BOE
4DJFOUJGJD
1SPHSFTT
4USVDUVSBM
3FBMJTN
3FDPOTJEFSFE ","/
."-*$*
JT
"TTJTUBOU
1SPGFTTPS
PG
1PMJUJDBM
4DJFODF
BU
'VSNBO
6OJWFSTJUZ "
WPMVNF
JO
UIF
46/:
TFSJFT
JO
(MPCBM
1PMJUJDT +BNFT
/
3PTFOBV
FEJUPS 45"5&
6/*7&34*5:
0'
/&8
:03,
13&44 XXXTVOZQSFTTFEV