Who Speaks for Roma?: Political Representation of a Transnational Minority Community

Who Speaks for Roma?

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Who Speaks for Roma? Political Representation of a Transnational Minority Community

Aidan McGarry

2010 The Continuum International Publishing Group Inc 80 Maiden Lane, New York, NY 10038 The Continuum International Publishing Group Ltd The Tower Building, 11 York Road, London SE1 7NX www.continuumbooks.com Copyright © 2010 by Aidan McGarry All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the written permission of the publishers. ISBN: HB: 978-0-8264-2880-6 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data McGarry, Aidan. Who speaks for Roma? : political representation of a transnational minority community / by Aidan McGarry. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-2880-6 (hardcover : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-8264-2880-0 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Romanies–Europe, Eastern–Social conditions. 2. Romanies–Europe, Eastern–Politics and government. 3. Romanies–Europe, Eastern–Ethnic identity. 4. Political participation–Europe, Eastern. 5. Europe, Eastern–Ethnic relations. 6. Europe, Eastern–Politics and government. I. Title. DX210.M34 2010 323.1191ʹ49704–dc22 2009051367

Typeset by Newgen Imaging Systems Pvt Ltd, Chennai, India Printed in the United States of America

For Rowan

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Contents List of Figures and Tables Acknowledgements List of Acronyms

x xi xii

INTRODUCTION

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CHAPTER 1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ROMA IN EUROPE 7 A Passage from India 7 Arrival in Europe 10 Roma and Travellers 12 Persecution and Romanticism 15 O Baro Porrajmos: The Holocaust 20 Roma under Communism 24 Post-communism: Romani Awakening 28 CHAPTER 2 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION OF ROMA Objectives, Assumptions and Rationale Theoretical Basis Methodological Approach Mobilization, Political Participation and Representation Minorities, the Democratic State and International Law The Roma Social Movement Determining Legitimacy

33 35 36 38 41 47 49 52

CHAPTER 3 AMBIVALENT DISCOURSE: RIGHTS-BASED THEORIES ON MINORITIES Introduction Rights-based Approaches to Minority Issues

59 59 59

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CONTENTS

Minority Rights: Analytical and Cultural Presuppositives A Rights versus Justice Conception of Minority Protection Citizenship Rights and Roma Political Rights and the Pursuit of Representation Representing People and Representing Interests Rights versus Interests Key Concepts CHAPTER 4 WHO SPEAKS FOR ROMA? ORGANIZING STRUCTURES OF REPRESENTATION IN ROMANIA Introduction Interests of Roma in Romania Élite Representation of Roma Monopolizing Roma Representation Localized Legitimacy through Civil Society Conclusion Ethnic Mobilization Political Participation Interest Articulation Legitimate Representation Hypotheses CHAPTER 5 SELF-GOVERNMENT AND INTEREST REPRESENTATION IN HUNGARY: A WRONG STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION? Introduction Shared Interests of Roma in Hungary The Minority Self-Government System: Political Participation in a Cultural Institution The Needle in the Haystack: Élite Romani Representatives The Absence of Ethnopolitics: Let Sleeping Dogs Lie Plugging the Hole: Romani Civil Society Organizations Conclusion Ethnic Mobilization Political Participation Interest Articulation Legitimate Representation Hypotheses Hungary and Romania Compared

61 63 66 70 72 75 79

83 83 84 89 93 97 101 101 102 103 104 105

109 109 110 114 118 120 122 125 125 126 127 128 129 130

Contents

CHAPTER 6 ROMA REPRESENTATION IN THE TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL CONTEXT Introduction A European Minority The Transnational Roma Social Movement Transnational Roma Interests International Romani Union (IRU) Roma National Congress (RNC) European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) Open Society Institute-Roma Participation Programme (OSI-RPP) European Roma and Traveller Forum (ERTF) Notes on Legitimacy of Transnational Organizing Structures of Representation The European Union’s Policy on Roma European Roma Information Office (ERIO) Conclusion Ethnic Mobilization Political Participation Interest Articulation Legitimate Representation

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136 136 137 140 142 143 143 145 145 146 147 148 152 157 157 158 158 159

CONCLUSION Assessing the Hypotheses H1: Political decentralization increases the legitimacy of Roma representation H2: Due to inadequate organizing structures of representation in the domestic political context, transnational Romani activity increases Contested Ethnic Group Identity and Shared Interests

163 165

Glossary References Index

176 178 195

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168 170

List of Figures and Tables Figure 2.1 Hypothesis 1: Decentralization increases the legitimacy of representation structures

40

Figure 2.2 The political participation of Roma in the domestic political context

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Table 4.1 Key features of organizing structures of representation in Romania

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Table 5.1 Key features of organizing structures of representation in Hungary

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Acknowledgements This book has benefited from critical and constructive engagement from a number of friends and colleagues. My sincere thanks go to my mentor, Antje Wiener, whose vigorous critique was matched by valuable insights and encouragement. My thanks also to David Phinnemore for providing expertise, particularly on Romania, as well as practical suggestions. The manuscript in whole or in part has profited from the input from several friends and colleagues during its gestation including Laura Cashman, Margaret Hagan, Erhan Içener, Jennifer Jackson-Preece, Thomas Pfister, Cathal McCall, Guido Schwellnus and Diana Schmidt-Pfister. I am grateful to all support staff within the School of Politics and International Studies and the library staff at Queen’s University, Belfast for all their help. My research has been financially supported by a Department of Education and Learning Grant, the British International Studies Association Founders Fund Award, the William and Betty MacQuitty Fellowship and the Romanian Embassy in the UK Language Scholarship. I am indebted to the many Roma representatives, activists, and advocates who I interviewed over the course of this research. Their insights and knowledge was generously shared and their hospitality warmly remembered. A word of thanks too to those academics working on Roma, particularly the political scientists, sociologists and anthropologists whose research has laid the foundation for this book. Special thanks also to Marie-Claire Antoine at Continuum who recognized the value of the book and provided indispensable advice throughout. Finally, my thanks go to my family for their unwavering support, in particular my parents, James and Philomena, and to my partner Rowan. Aidan McGarry Brighton, 2009

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List of Acronyms CEDIME-SE CEEC CoE DG DRI ECRI ENAR ERIO ERPC ERRC ERTF EU EUMC FCNM GT-ROMS H1 H2 HRW ICCPR IRU MG-S-ROM MSG MSzP NAR NCCD NGO

Centre for Documentation and Information on Minorities in Europe – South-Eastern Europe Central and Eastern European Country Council of Europe Directorate General Department for Inter-Ethnic Relations European Commission against Racism and Intolerance European Network Against Racism European Roma Information Office European Roma Policy Coalition European Roma Rights Centre European Roma and Traveller Forum European Union European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities Working Party on Roma Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Human Rights Watch International Convention on Civil and Political Rights International Romani Union Group of Specialists on Roma/Gypsies Minority Self-Government Hungarian Socialist Party National Agency for Roma National Council for Combating Discrimination Non-Governmental Organization

xii

List of Acronyms

OSCE OSCE-ODIHR OSI OSI-RPP PER RM RNC RPPE RSM SDP TAN UK UN UNICEF USA

xiii

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe – Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Open Society Institute Open Society Institute-Roma Participation Programme Project on Ethnic Relations Resource Mobilization Roma National Congress Roma Party Pro-Europe Roma Social Movement Social Democratic Party Transnational Advocacy Network United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Children’s Fund United States of America

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Introduction No other minority community generates such a polarized response as Roma. On the one hand, Roma signify an intriguing object of fascination with a unique history and culture, while on the other hand, Roma are excluded and persecuted wherever they live. While Roma are widely dispersed across the world, they are a European minority, found in every state on the continent, though located principally in Central and Eastern Europe. It is estimated that the population of Roma in Europe is between 10–12 million, comparable to Greece. Roma are not indigenous and are thought to have originated from India where they left approximately one thousand years ago, though their origin and migratory route are contested due to the lack of written evidence documenting their existence prior to their arrival in Europe in the thirteenth century. It must be remembered that Roma are not one homogenous block, they are extremely heterogeneous but they do share one commonality – everywhere they reside they are faced with discrimination and marginalization. I have always been fascinated by minority communities probably because of my own experience growing up as a minority – that is, in a non-dominant position – in Northern Ireland. For this reason, issues of justice and equality have informed both my research and activism and I became interested in how minority communities ‘fit’ into societies, particularly how they define their needs and articulate their interests. I first became aware of the plight of Roma in the 1990s when the international political spotlight fixed on issues of ethnicity in Eastern Europe and the more I learned about Roma, the more complex their situation revealed itself. They are experiencing explicit discrimination and racism resulting in extreme socio-economic deprivation and suppression of cultural identity. Exclusion and persecution characterize the lives of many Roma, much of which is based on stereotypes which construct them as thieves and beggars who are not to be trusted. I wanted to understand why Roma are treated so badly by various state agencies as well as by mainstream society but unfortunately to fully explain this phenomenon was beyond the scope of this book – citing their 1

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perceived ‘difference’ is too simplistic. For this reason, I focused on one aspect which at once both explained their situation and offered a means to rectify it: their political representation, and lack thereof. I am not Romani, therefore my perspectives and insights are those of an outsider’s looking in but I hope to contribute to the debate through research which is robust, honest and useful. It is my intention to shed some light on who Roma are in terms of the political space they occupy because it is through political structures that the voice of Roma is heard. There have been various attempts to explain and understand the situation of Roma but these have often failed to fully take account of the particular heterogeneous quality of this ethnic minority group. Roma are unlike other ethnic minority groups as they are a transnational minority without a kin state. Additionally, they are not united along linguistic, religious, familial, occupational and class lines and they are not territorially concentrated. As ethnicity and ethno-nationalism were embraced by minority actors across Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, Roma were increasingly ignored by the state. Most research on minorities has focused on ethnic conflict and resolution but because Roma have never ‘risen up’ or used violence, they have been neglected in academic and political discourse. Issues surrounding minority representation and participation continue to prompt questions about accommodating diversity in democratic systems. No state in Europe is ethnically homogeneous despite claims to the contrary and this book argues that acknowledging the value and contribution of the Romani community creates a rich and textured society. International organizations, states and societies have had to address those minority groups, who, due to their ethnic identity and cultural affiliations remain marginalized in public life. Such issues demand greater attention by policymakers which invariably centre on recognition, justice and access to rights. Representation of Roma has been given increasing credence by states and international organizations particularly since the collapse of communism however this attention has thus far failed to capture the subtle dynamics of this unique minority group. Crucially this raises questions about how the Romani community has attempted to seize control of their situation by creating organizing structures of representation in domestic and transnational political contexts. For this reason, I inflate the role of the Roma social movement in order to capture processes of ethnic mobilization and interest articulation. Most analyses of Roma have examined their relationship with the state, discussing various approaches and divergent expectations and usually

Introduction

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involve prescriptive analysis and attempts to solve the Roma ‘issue’. According to this problem-solving view minority groups must balance competing preferences: the desire to be integrated and enjoy equal rights with other citizens is balanced by the desire to enjoy their ethno-cultural group characteristics without fear of persecution. In seeking a more just and equitable society it is therefore necessary to allow certain provisions for minority groups to access citizenship rights and human rights. From an academic point of view, Roma fall through the cracks of conventional theories on minorities which have so far failed to account for this diverse community; therefore, I attempt to shed light on the political life of Roma and borrow insights from social movement, citizenship and social constructivist literatures. In order to gain a hold on the domestic and transnational empirical case studies I employ the key concepts of ethnic mobilization, political participation, interest articulation and legitimate representation. These concepts act as a prism through which to gain a fuller understanding of the situation of Roma in domestic and transnational political contexts. The main puzzle starts from the question: ‘Who speaks for Roma?’ Given that they are a dispersed and heterogeneous minority group, we may ask how do Roma organize themselves in public life? It is posited that any organizing structure of representation remains hollow unless it is vested with legitimacy, and this legitimacy must come from the Romani community. However, legitimacy cannot be attained or measured in a positivist sense thus this book attempts to evaluate the legitimacy claims of domestic and transnational organizing structures of representation by contextualizing socio-political interactions. This necessitates a broad understanding of representation and legitimacy because a variety of organizing structures of representation are created by the Roma social movement including élite, ethnic political parties, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), advocacy networks and other political fora. In this sense representation constitutes more than formal state structures such as parliamentary representation and means I must examine organizing structures of representation which Roma create. These structures are considered as ‘organizing’ as the term purposively captures a continuous (in the sense of never conclusively completed) process involving mutually constitutive interactions between agency and structure. Legitimacy is thus not conceptualized as an output category, or something which is earned through political status, but is conferred by the Romani community itself onto organizing structures of representation. This book inquires whether a common ethnic identity is a prerequisite for legitimate representation. The role of the state, international organizations

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WHO SPEAKS FOR ROMA?

and gaje (non-Roma) élite is acknowledged but ultimately downplayed as the empirical focus centres on how (not why) Roma organize themselves politically through stalagmite mobilization, that is, societal processes from below. Roma cannot depend on the benevolent will of majorities which frequently suppress minority interests therefore they create their own organizing structures of representation. These organizing structures of representation are created with reference to the ethnic group identity of Roma and provide a platform through which Roma can articulate their shared interests communicating to policy-makers the most pertinent socio-economic and political interests of the group. In this respect, I examine how the Romani community engages in the gaje-constructed political world. I assess the domestic as well as transnational political contexts because collectively Roma are a transnational minority yet individually they are citizens of nation states. Only by analysing both domestic and transnational contexts is it possible to fully understand the situation of Roma. The day-to-day existence of Roma is shaped by relations with the state and mainstream society and for the most part these encounters are negative thus it is the responsibility of government to implement effective legislation and policy which improves the lives of Roma. However, particularly since the 1990s there has been increasing advocacy by Romani élite in international organizations such as the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe (CoE), the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) which set standards on minority protection. The international political context has proved a vital space for Roma to gain leverage over domestic opposition, articulate their interests, and improve their socio-economic and political situation. Yet despite noticeable successes and the creation of transnational organizing structures of representation, Roma continue to be marginalized in their respective home states. Chapter 1 provides a historical overview of Roma in Europe including when they arrived and the persecution which they faced. This chapter relies on existing research conducted by historians and anthropologists and traces the migration of Roma from India approximately one thousand years ago. Necessarily this overview is highly selective but it is intended to provide the reader with a foundational understanding of key developments for the Romani community including: the Holocaust; their situation under communism; and their experience post-1989. It is argued that a rise in political consciousness and collective action emerged due to the persecution and marginalization suffered by Roma following the collapse of

Introduction

5

communism in Central and Eastern Europe. Chapter 2 introduces the rationale of the book by highlighting the importance of political participation for Roma including how Roma establish organizing structures of representation to articulate their interests. Processes of ethnic mobilization and participation are situated in a broader theoretical discussion of minorities in Europe and how the situation of Roma is unique in that they constitute ‘a nation without a territory’. Political participation is presented as crucial if Roma are to have a voice in society and ensure that their interests are taken into account by policy-makers to redress their dire socio-economic situation. Chapter 3 argues that the academic literature on minorities focuses on rights, that is, the rights and duties of minority communities. However, the discussion ends at state policy and legislation which means that the importance of an interest-based approach is often ignored. By locating the debate on interests, I examine political processes and minority community representation. Thus this book asks: what is it that Roma want, in terms of interests, and how do they express these interests? This requires an analysis of political participation and representation which the minority rights literature overlooks. Additionally, it is inquired whether there is a difference between representing people and representing interests in the case of Roma. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 comprise the empirical content with Chapter 4 exploring the situation of Roma in Romania. It examines how Romania has attempted to integrate the interests of minorities, including Roma, through constitutional provisions and legislation. Through interviews and document analysis the interests of Roma in Romania are outlined and evaluated. The chapter details three organizing structures of representation in Romania in turn: élite; political parties; and civil society organizations which claim to speak on behalf of Roma, and each organizing structure of representation is assessed in terms of its activities and legitimacy. This chapter evaluates the political participation and ethnic mobilization of Roma in Romania as well as the capacity of organizing structures of representation to articulate interests. Chapter 5 focuses on Hungary and begins by assessing the minority self-government system in Hungary which is one of the most progressive minority regimes in Europe. However, the minority self-government system favours cultural interests, such as language and education, which are not as relevant for Roma whose interests are primarily socio-economic and political. The interests of Roma are determined through an analysis of policy documents and interviews. The chapter then focuses on three organizing structures of representation: élite; political parties; and civil society organizations and the claims of these structures

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to be legitimate representatives of Roma are assessed in turn. It is asked whether a common ethnic identity is enough to determine legitimate representation and assesses the phenomenon of ‘ethnopolitics’. Common themes and issues with regard to the ethnic mobilization, political participation and interest articulation of Roma in Romania and Hungary are highlighted and assessed. Chapter 6 provides the final empirical case-study. It is argued that Roma are a transnational minority and therefore require an effective voice at the transnational level. Indeed, the transnational political context has acted as a receptive environment in which Roma can advance their claims. This chapter begins with a historical analysis of the development of Romani activism in the transnational political context and highlights the role and impact of international NGOs and transnational advocacy networks. The impact of the EU as an ally of Roma is examined by focusing on policy developments as well as Romani activism and mobilization based in Brussels; in particular, the role of the European Roma Information Office. The conclusion is presented in the final chapter. It is argued that the ethnic group identity of Roma is contested which hinders the creation and development of legitimate organizing structures of representation. The question of ‘Who speaks for Roma?’ is answered within a focused discussion on the political representation of minorities and it is argued that organizing structures of representation in the transnational political context are less legitimate than domestic representation structures however they carry more influence and normative power.

1 Historical Overview of Roma in Europe A Passage from India Roma are often described as a people without a history but the truth is that the story of Roma is a journey which has not been written down, and for that reason there exists room for speculation and myth. It is now widely acknowledged that India, specifically North India, ‘formed the cradle of the Gypsy nation’ (Kenrick and Puxon 1972, 13) though some commentators dissent from this view (Okely 1983; Mayall 2004). However, the Indian supposition is one of the least controversial facets of Romani history because competing theories have been put forward to explain who they were in India, why they left, when they left and when they arrived in Europe. Because no documented account of their migration westward exists with which we can trace and scrutinize it leaves us postulating various hypotheses based on conjecture and little more until they arrived in Europe and the settled Europeans recorded the presence of these strange and exotic people from the east. The real danger is that academics, due to the absence of primary evidence, treat fiction as fact which in turn becomes the de facto truth due to publication and citation (Matras 2009). The perspective offered here is based on a careful reading of existing theories and ideas formulated by academics – principally historians and linguists. In this respect I present a potted account of Romani history over 1,000 years, a period which is characterized by nomadism, persecution, assimilation and marginalization. Condensing a millennia’s history into one chapter is a task fraught with hazards and has resulted in a highly selective account centring on key events and developments. Indian society, then as now, was dominated by the caste system. It has been argued that Roma probably existed as a loose amalgamation of

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nomadic tribes and therefore remained outside of the rigid caste system (Kenrick and Puxon 1972, 13). Vesey-Fitzgerald (1973, 1) supports this nomadic identifier: ‘They are, and they always have been, wanderers.’ Such a view suggests that Roma were nomadic before their stay in India but no insights are proffered into where they might have migrated from and when. I steer clear of such an idea primarily due to the clear correlation between words in Romani and the ancient Indian language of Sanskrit which indicates that Roma were in India for an extensive period, and could well be indigenous. Language has proven an effective tool when attempting to uncover Romani history. Indeed it was language which made the initial link between Roma and India in the eighteenth century displacing the commonly held view, cultivated and nurtured by Roma themselves that Roma hailed from Egypt. The idea that language could be used as a tool to trace the migratory route of Roma was popularized by Sampson (1923) and continues today (Hancock 2002). Linguistic evidence suggests that Roma left India approximately 1,000 years ago and spent a relatively short time in the Middle East. It has also been suggested that Roma did not move in one solid mass from east to west; rather, they pursued different trajectories over the years and not all of these ended in Europe. Media and literature have consistently portrayed these migrations as expressing inherent nomadism rather than as being historically motivated (Lemon 2000, 9) particularly since the dramatic rise of interest in, and corresponding romanticism of, Roma in nineteenth-century literature. An image was constructed of Roma as wild and free who had descended from untouchable castes of entertainers. To support such claims historians and Gypsiologists have sometimes fallen into the trap of accepting any possible shred of evidence as the objective truth without subjecting such data to the rigour of intellectual inquiry. One such piece of evidence indicates that Roma left India long before AD 1000. The Persian poet Firdausi and the Arab writer Hamza, both writing in the tenth century, refer to the monarch Bahrâm who imported 12,000 musicians into Persia of both sexes from India about AD 420, and some historians have drawn the causal arrow from these musicians to Roma. Others have dismissed the assertion that these musicians are Roma and instead argue that they constitute the Dom community found today in the Middle East (Hancock 1987). In terms of migratory patterns it has been suggested that three migratory routes were taken: for Roma (the European Gypsy); for Lom (the Armenian Gypsy); and Dom (the Syrian and Persian Gypsy). Sampson (1923) argues that each nomenclature corresponds with the Sanskrit doma

Historical Overview of Roma in Europe

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and the modern Indian dom which refers to a man of low caste who makes his living singing and dancing. Furthermore, he argues that Roma left India as one group in the tenth century but separated after passing through Persia. According to this hypothesis, the first group (Dom) remained in the Near East, the second group (Lom) migrated towards Armenia and the third group (Rom) continued towards Europe through Anatolia (presentday Turkey). However, this theory is founded on the assumption that each group’s language derives from one common stem but Ian Hancock, a prominent Romani academic, disagrees. Hancock (2002, 6) argues that these groups did not leave India en masse as Sampson suggests but actually left at different times and under different circumstances with lexicon commonalities between Romani and Domari highlighted to corroborate this assertion. Historical evidence testifies to a series of military invasions in India in the eleventh century. Between 1000 and 1027, India endured a succession of Afghani and Turk attacks led by Mahmud of Ghazni, who was attempting to spread Islam. The same area was also conquered by the Seljuk Turks who could have taken Roma as prisoners of war and brought them back to the north coast of Turkey. It is possible that Roma joined the conquering armies though probably not as soldiers because armies were often accompanied by a large number of followers who erected tents, cleared the battlefield and cooked and entertained the soldiers. Hancock states (2002, 11) that these followers, ‘did not belong to the Kshatriya (warrior) caste, but together with the Rajputs, whether as prisoners of war or with victors routing the enemy, they left India’. Roma then moved westwards along the silk-road after these military invasions towards Persia and Armenia. As noted previously, Roma did not move in a solid block and pursued a number of trajectories, some went west while others went north to Russia, others still continued south after Persia. Linguistic evidence is instructive at this point – Roma probably did not remain in Persia too long due to the negligible impact of Persian on their language. However, some authors warn against relying on language to trace the history of Roma because it is based on speculation and teleological thinking (Lucassen et al. 1998). Despite the different paths taken by Roma groups, it is certain that most Roma found their way to Byzantium and would later cross the Bosphorus into Europe in the late thirteenth century. They likely remained in Byzantium for several centuries which can be witnessed in the perceptible incidence of Greek words found in Romani; indeed, it is estimated that 250 Romani words find their origins from Greek and there is also evidence of Greek grammar impacting on Romani. When Roma did move again into

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Europe such movement was probably due to military conquest again, this time by the Ottoman Turks. As Hancock (2002, 8) argues: Just as Islam had spread eastwards into India, initiating the move of our ancestors out of that part of the world, Muslim expansion towards the West, particularly initiated by the Seljuk Turks, was also the primary reason why they moved into Europe. From 1071 onwards, the Byzantine Empire began to be encroached by Muslim invaders and in 1453 Mohammed II defeated Emperor Constantine and the city of Byzantium (Istanbul) fell to the Ottoman Turks. There is evidence of a Romani presence in Europe from 1283 in a document from Constantine referring to taxes collected from ‘the so-called Egyptians and Tsigani’ which is the earliest official recording of Roma in Europe. It is almost certain that Roma were conscripted into the Turkish army and many entered Europe that way and by the fourteenth century there were Romani settlements in southern Greece. The idea that Roma came to Europe because of accidental wanderings seems highly implausible – Roma came to Europe because they had to.

Arrival in Europe Roma arrived in Europe from a number of directions but by the end of the fourteenth century a large proportion of Roma in Eastern Europe had settled. A significant number of Roma would have crossed the Bosphorus into the Balkans, while others came from Greece, following the pilgrims’ route across Crete and records attest to a Roma presence in Crete in 1322. Some Roma even came via North Africa and settled on the Iberian peninsula. Throughout their history Roma have demonstrated malleability, constantly adapting to their surroundings and this durability is because of occupations which allowed them to negotiate difficult terrain prior to their arrival in Europe. The key economic niche of Roma has traditionally been metal work of various forms as well as craftwork and musicianship with other occupations, such as bear-training and palmistry, playing a much less important role. Despite this, the fortune-telling Gypsy has proven a difficult image to shake and has led to mistrust and suspicion on the part of the settled European society. The Greeks referred to them as the heretical sect Astingani and from this derived other exonyms including Zigeuner (Germany), Ciganyok (Hungary), Tsigani (Bulgaria), Tigani (Romania), Zingari (Italy), Zingali and Gitanos (Spain) and Ciganos (Portugal). It should

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be noted that the English word ‘Gypsy’ stems from ‘Egyptian’, the moniker which many Roma were known as across Europe from the Middle Ages. Roma settled in south-eastern Europe from the late thirteenth century and remained for many years in the Balkans as well as in Moldavia and Wallachia (present-day Romania) and they did not begin to move across Europe until the fifteenth century. From 1417 onwards written documents and municipal accounts allow us to trace their journey. Roma began to move into Central and Eastern Europe because their provinces had been invaded or were directly threatened by the rapidly advancing Ottoman Empire. They spread across Europe in waves with the first group numbering only a few hundred which Vesey-Fitzgerald (1973, 12) suggests was a ‘reconnaissance party charged with the duty of spying out the land’. The ability of Roma to adapt to their surroundings is one of the key reasons for their demographical success and presence across the world. One aspect has been their willingness, and canniness, to practise the dominant religion wherever they found themselves. In early Medieval Europe Christianity was the dominant religion and the Church, along with monarchs, were key actors who controlled all aspects of social and economic life. When Roma arrived in Europe they soon became Christians and adopted names which affirmed this status. When they migrated across Europe in the early fifteenth century they presented themselves as pilgrims who were banished from their homeland and had been instructed to penance for their sins. Claiming Egyptian origins, the ‘pilgrims’ explained that they were lapsed Christians who reverted to Islam but had now found their way back onto the Christian path. This band of pilgrims had supporting letters of recommendation from the emperor of Sigismund, and later on the pope, which confirmed their status meaning that various dukes and counts as well as mainstream society welcomed these pilgrims and provided them with food. Their position as pilgrims ensured that they were provided a safe conduct in spite of their appearance. Europeans in the fourteenth century would not have seen anything quite like a Rom before. Their dark skin and hair, along with colourful clothes and jewellery would have stood out, but their standing as pilgrims ensured that, initially at least, they were treated as a harmless curiosity. These Roma soon traversed German lands and headed towards Italy. In 1414 they were in Basle, in 1416 in Meissen and in 1418 in Saxony. By 1422 they were in Bologna and Rome. There is a strong suggestion that Roma secured an audience with Pope Martin V (although Vatican archives have no record of it) because later in the year they were back again in Switzerland and they had with them papal, as well as imperial, safe-conducts. The prospect

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that this document, like the previous letters of recommendation, was a forgery is not beyond the realms of possibility though it would have required an extraordinary amount of skill. When they arrived in Paris in 1427 they brought with them their story of pilgrimage and penitence and explained that the Pope had instructed them to roam for seven years ‘following about the world, without sleeping in a bed in order to atone for their sins’ (cited in Clébert 1963, 35). However the warm welcome they received did not last long and a veil of suspicion soon informed their treatment by authorities and society. The first wave of Roma had travelled across Europe in relatively small numbers followed by more wandering bands which meandered across the continent in the intervening years but by 1438 thousands of Roma rapidly spread across Europe and in particular Germany, Italy and France. By 1447 they were in Spain, by 1501 in Poland, the Baltics and Russia, and by 1512, in Sweden. It is important to note that these dates signify the official date which the presence of Roma appeared in recorded documents and does not mean that Roma were not present before these dates. In what would come to typify the Romani experience in Europe, repressive legislation and persecution soon followed. Across Europe Roma were not permitted to conduct business with shopkeepers and soon turned to petty theft to feed their families. Additionally, the practice of fortune-telling meant that they were accused of sorcery and feared by those who they came into contact with. It is possible that they exploited certain professions such as fortunetelling which was consistent with their construction as a magical ethnic ‘other’ from Egypt. This negative construction substantiated other accusations levelled at Roma that they were dirty and impure: ‘forbidden to use town pumps or wells, denied water by fearful householders, uncleanliness became a part of the stereotype’ (Hancock 1991, 5) – the importance of cleansing rituals or Romaniya was not common knowledge to gaje. Roma were at this point a sizeable presence in Europe and migrated northwards to the United Kingdom where they encountered a similar nomadic community called Travellers.

Roma and Travellers There is much debate as to the relationship between Roma and Travellers – do they share the same heritage or are they distinct ethnicities? The truth is somewhere in between. The first official record of Roma was in Scotland in 1505 among the accounts of the Lord High Treasurer: ‘1505, Apr. 22. Item to the Egyptians be the Kinge’s command vii lib.’, while the first

Historical Overview of Roma in Europe

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authenticated record of their presence in England was in Lambeth in 1514 (Kenrick and Clark 1995, 24). It is likely that this group of ‘Egyptians’ were part of the pilgrimage which had traversed Europe in the previous century, and therefore are Roma in that they retain an Indic origin. Travellers are found on the islands of the United Kingdom and retain one of a selection of pronouns: English; Irish; Scottish; and Welsh. Some Travellers left the United Kingdom and are nowadays found in Canada, the USA and Australia, but many remain. The reason why comparisons are drawn between the two is quite clear. Travellers are nomadic (in spring and summer usually) and experience persecution from mainstream society. Vesey-Fitzgerald (1973, 20) accepts the inconclusive evidence pertaining to the origins of Travellers – that is, if Travellers are indigenous or if they are Roma: ‘we do not know how long before nor do we know for certain if we had gypsies in these islands before the great invasion swept across Europe.’ Arguments persist that Roma and Travellers are the same, that is, they possess the same Indian genealogy thus any cultural differences between Roma and Travellers is explained by identity corruption and assimilation, and strategies for cultural survival. Anthropologist Judith Okely (1983) argues that we should be sceptical of the construction of a common homeland in India but acknowledges the importance of such a construction, particularly in building international solidarity among Roma. The reasons for her scepticism are based on the dangers of such a linkage, that it has led to ‘divisions in Britain between the “true blooded” Romany and the rest, including the counterfeit or drop-out, “half-blood” or mere “Traveller”’ (Okely 1983, 13). One of the leading British Gypsiologists, Vesey-Fitzgerald (1973, 33) draws a distinct line between Roma, or as he calls them ‘gypsies’ and Irish Travellers, the latter he refers to as ‘tinkers’: ‘The wandering folk of Ireland are tinkers and they are quite distinct from gypsies.’ The term tinker is used to refer to the itinerant smiths and tin-men of the British Isles who live in similar conditions to those of Roma (Clébert 1963, 82). Mayall (1988, 45) notes that any differences between Travellers and Roma were marginal in the eyes of the settled society and the commonalities were more important, ‘united by a common life-style which revolved around nomadism and self-employment, and by a shared day-today existence and the experience of marginality vis-à-vis settled society’. Though when Roma arrived in the United Kingdom they would have encountered nomadic families travelling the roads, practising traditional occupations. ‘Gypsies’ has been the exonym traditionally invoked to describe all Roma and Travellers. According to the majority society there was no distinction

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to be made: they were dirty thieves who stole children, cast spells and were not to be trusted. Traveller is an endonym which is now used due to extensive advocacy and lobbying by Traveller organizations in the United Kingdom and Ireland; however, neither nomenclature captures the heterogeneity of these communities in the United Kingdom. There is a school of thought which argues that Irish and Scottish Travellers are indigenous to the United Kingdom (known as Minceir) while English and Welsh Travellers are thought to originate from India (known as Romanichals). A sceptical Okely (1983, 18) explains: The English and especially the Welsh Gypsies are given the exotic Indian or Romany origin, while it is said that the Irish and Scottish Travellers or Tinkers are ‘merely’ descendants of vagrants and victims of the Great famine or the Highland clearances. To be a Traveller refers to a nomadic identity and those Irish and Scottish Travellers tend not to adopt the exonym Gypsy as it is loaded with negative associations. Often they are described as Tinkers which springs from their traditional economic work with metal and they have their own Cant, or language, including Shelta and Gammon. Of course, we must be careful not to conflate ethnicity with language or race because no group can be reified so easily. Irish Travellers have been constructed as an indigenous minority with discussions of ‘racial’ signifiers such as colour, genes or blood, largely absent from Traveller-related discussions (Helleiner 2000, 8). There are two dominant narratives which persist to account for the presence of Travellers in Ireland. First, they are portrayed as descendants of peasants forced into itinerancy by evictions and famines which the Irish endured under British rule. The second narrative maintains that Travellers have been present for much longer (Joyce and Farmar 1985, 1) as records refer to wandering people in pre-colonial Ireland. Notably, there were close ties between Irish and Scottish Travellers as there was constant traffic across the Irish Sea. The resilience and endurance of Roma is one of the most remarkable aspects of their history. Today Roma are present all over the world including North and South America, Africa, Australia and parts of Asia. In her seminal study of Roma in the USA, Anne Sutherland argues that there are approximately one million Roma scattered across the country, the largest group being the Vlax-speaking Roma which constitute around 500,000 and who tend to reside in large cities such as Chicago and Los Angeles (Sutherland 1986, xv; see also Lockwood and Salo 1994). Additionally, there are pockets of other sub-groups including Romanichals, Irish and Scottish

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Travellers, Hungarian-Slovak, Ludar, Boyash, Lovara and Sinti. Many Roma in the southern states of the USA are descended from Travellers who left Ireland during the potato famine in the mid-nineteenth century (Helleiner 2000, 33). Given that vagabonds and itinerants were a target group for the Draconian transportation law of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenthcentury England (Lee 1997, 73), there is a good chance that Roma were aboard the first fleet of convicts which arrived in Australia in 1788. After 1945, migratory streams flowed towards Australia and New Zealand and many Roma appeared within this migration stream but they are now relatively integrated into society. Smaller groups of Roma are to be found in Africa including in Sudan and Egypt, as well as in South and East Africa while in Asia their presence is modest and scattered. Finally here, South America houses several Romani communities which are found mainly in Brazil, Peru and Chile. There is a risk that such geographic diffusion fuels the imposed ascription of Roma as wanderers who cannot help but stay on the road, that somehow this wanderlust is part of their nature, ‘in the blood’. The truth is that once they arrived in Europe, Roma were before long met with resistance and persecution. And the imperial powers of the age, in particular England, France, Spain and Portugal ensured that these undesirable elements were sent off to the far-flung outposts of the empire. Even when Roma did migrate by choice it was an attempt to escape, hoping that the next land offered a better life. Yet, once those Roma arrived they invariably faced opposition and many responded by attempting to integrate in order to escape persecution.

Persecution and Romanticism The initial arrival of Roma in Europe was characterized by tentative acceptance and curiosity on the part of settled Europeans. Soon however, the mood shifted and Roma found themselves targeted by repressive measures described as ‘sustained genocidal persecution and enslavement’ (Gheorghe and Acton 1995, 31), which began in earnest from the early sixteenth century. Deportation was one way which authorities attempted to purge the Roma ‘pest’ but there were other courses of action too. At one point or another, Roma have been banished from almost every European state: ‘Germany did so in 1497, Spain in 1499, France in 1504, England in 1531, Denmark in 1536, Moravia in 1538, Scotland in 1541, Poland in 1557, Venice in 1549, 1558 and 1588, and so on’ (Vesey-Fitzgerald 1963, 31). These measures treated Roma as a social category of vagabonds and beggars and not

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as a distinct ethnic group, though that status would change under the Nazi regime with devastating consequences. The cloak of Christianity offered temporary protection but without it Roma were exposed to persecution with banishment and refusal of safe passage becoming the norm by the end of the sixteenth century across Europe – the veneer of tolerance could not be sustained by the settled Europeans. The situation of Roma became more perilous in the sixteenth century and lasted to the flowering of romanticism and Gypsiology in the nineteenth century. In their historical analysis, Kenrick and Puxon (1972) ignore political frontiers and therefore do not follow national trends in anti-Roma thought and action, arguing instead that it is a European phenomenon. While I agree with this to an extent I think it is useful to have an overview of the historical persecution in European states. There was no systematic co-ordinated effort on the part of European rulers to repress their respective Romani populations but it is striking how many European states enacted hostile legislation and how quickly societies turned against Roma. The following overview is based on the work of Clébert whose attention to detail and official discourse provides an authoritative account of Roma across Europe. As we shall see, Roma were faced with a choice between expulsion or death. Several states enacted legislation which imposed death simply for being Roma: English law imposed death for being Romani in 1554 while in Prussia, all Romani men and women over 18 faced death. Other state responses were cruel and brutal including in eighteenthcentury Holland where the state organized nationwide hunts to expel Roma and nineteenth-century Denmark which hunted Roma like foxes (Kenrick and Puxon 1972, 46). The Balkans offered a relatively safe haven where Roma were able to move without much interference due to the fact that the native inhabitants of the region were also of Asiatic origin as a result of the Ottoman invasion. Moving north we find the situation of Roma more restrictive than in the Balkans. In Moldavia and Wallachia landowners who encountered Roma would turn them into slaves which began in the sixteenth century, evidence suggesting that it could have been an early as 1541. Some slaves belonged to the State and others to the Church though both fates were equally dire. Their duties included gold-washing and bear-training while many toiled the land. Slavery in Moldavia and Wallachia persisted well into the nineteenth century and in 1818 new edicts were incorporated into the Wallachian Penal Code which stated that ‘Gypsies are born slaves’. It was external events which finally saw the abolition of slavery in 1855, with complete legal freedom secured in 1864. The Industrial Revolution was impacting on

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agricultural practices and was matched by changing social values, thus slavery was increasingly regarded as cruel and outdated. Roma were also slaves in England, Russia, Hungary, Portugal and Spain but such measures were usually temporary and ad hoc, based on the whims of incumbent leaders. The situation of Roma in Hungary was marginally better given that slavery was not as prevalent; however, Roma were still subject to barbarous punishments for crimes – the abduction of children, rape, cannibalism – which were never proven. An aggressive assimilationist policy was pursued by Maria Theresa from 1761 as she attempted to suppress Romani culture. This included prohibiting Roma from sleeping in tents, speaking their language and engaging in traditional occupations such as horse-dealing. Forced sedentarization was a core tenet of the new state policy: ‘Reformers saw nomadism as the core reason for Gypsy backwardness and sought to restrict their movement through legislation and the police’ (Crowe 1995, 236). Empress Maria Theresa banned the word ‘Gypsy’ as she found it insulting and Roma were re-branded ‘Neo-Hungarians’. Children were made to go to school and many Romani children were taken from their families to be reared by Hungarian families who would socialize the youngsters. Such a policy is premised on the idea that civility can be learned and being Roma can be forgotten. This well-intentioned policy was continued by Maria Theresa’s son and successor, Joseph II but assimilation demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of the interests of Roma. After the death of Joseph II in 1790, Roma quickly returned to their traditional lifestyle. All in all, assimilation did not completely eradicate Romani culture, mainly because of its short tenure, but ensured it remained dormant. In Germany, the tide of good will towards the pilgrims soon subsided: ‘The halo did not stand up for long against the sensational number of thefts, acts of scrounging and deceit, and swindles of every kind which marked the passage of these pilgrims’ (Clébert 1963, 75). The local population began to fear Roma and soon the authorities, with the backing of the Church, began to pass hostile laws which severely restricted the ability of Roma to roam or make a living. The Age of the Enlightenment did not extend to the treatment of Roma who were banned from various Germanic lands and some were put to death. In sixteenth-century Poland various Diets attempted to banish Roma but this changed by the end of the eighteenth century thus Roma were able to prosper and integrate to some extent. Moreover, such was the presence of Roma in the second half of the seventeenth century that the Polish Crown appointed a ‘King of the Gypsies’. In the Baltic states from the sixteenth century onwards repressive decrees

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were repealed resulting in the flourishing of Romani communities. The harsh terrain and climate of Scandinavia did not deter Roma from migrating northwards but some Romani families attempting to enter Finland in the sixteenth century were driven back (Kenrick and Puxon 1972, 44). In contrast, Roma arrived in Russia from 1500 in small numbers and enjoyed a relatively peaceful existence and while Catherine the Great made Roma slaves of the Crown, she did not persecute them. From 1514 Roma were banned from Swiss lands, and in 1701 Austria outlawed Roma completely. Despite their early connection with the pope, by 1568 Pope Pius V drove them out of the domains of the Church and ordered that all male Roma were to be sent to the gallows. In France their arrival in Paris was greeted almost immediately with repressive targeted legislation and the first act of the Bishop in 1427 was to excommunicate them and drive them out. There are several reasons why Roma were persecuted: ‘they were blamed for thefts, exactions and dupery. They were accused of engaging in black magic, of living by their wits, but above all with being foreigners’ (Clébert 1963, 59). In France, this cocktail of charges levelled at Roma translated into widespread fear and enmity, which culminated in renewed arrest and expulsion orders against Roma issued by Henry IV in 1607. At the same time, a sizeable population of Roma are to be found in Spain and Portugal. Roma arrived on the Iberian peninsula from two directions: one group arrived from the north which was recorded in Barcelona in 1447 and certainly denotes the group which carried the papal papers. The second group (Gitanos) arrived from North Africa and signify a group which separated from the ‘European’ Roma in the Middle East many centuries prior. Interestingly, these Roma had actually come via Egypt but it is not known when they crossed the straits of Gibraltar though it is likely that they were present in Spain before 1447. Furthermore, it is unclear when and where the two groups first encountered one another. In terms of distinctions, Gitanos are Roma yet there are significant differences between the two groups (Gay y Blasco 1999); for example, the dialects are so different they are mutually unintelligible. The earliest mention of Roma in Portugal is 1571. The Iberian peninsula was not immune from the pandemic of hostile legislation which had trailed Roma in their wake. In 1528 vagabond Roma were threatened and in 1692 Charles II forbade Roma from living in towns with less than 1,000 hearths. A more liberal policy of assimilation was born in 1783 under Charles III which was fashioned à la Maria Theresa and Roma were re-branded as ‘neo-Castilians’.

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One of the most remarkable twists in the history of Roma was their apparent, and very unexpected, redemption. Though relatively short lived it recast them as heroes rather than villains although Bancroft (2005, 40) notes that romanticization of Roma co-exists with the demonization of this ‘pariah out-group’. An accidental linguistic discovery in the eighteenth century at the University of Leiden dramatically changed the fortunes of Roma. A Hungarian linguist noticed that a significant number of Romani words were identical to words from the ancient Indian language of Sanskrit but it was not until 1783 when Heinrich Grellman published his thesis that the link to India became more widely accepted. Academics argued that Romani was actually an Indo-Aryan language and that Roma were originally from India, not Egypt. As debate raged about who Roma were and where they come from, literary images were constructed which announced Roma as a bon sauvage. A rising tide of sentiment towards Roma was principally witnessed in the arts if not in state legislation and popular attitudes. Therefore, from the nineteenth century onwards ‘alongside the stereotype dirty, dishonest, child-stealing villain we have the dark, handsome violin-playing lover Gypsy’ (Kenrick and Puxon 1972, 41). Neither is accurate however and both constructions have been hard to shake off, persisting to this day. Renewed interest in Roma came in the second half of the nineteenth century as a wave of Roma from the Balkans and Hungary entered Central Europe attracted by economic opportunity (Lewy 2000, 4). Notably, the Gypsy Lore Society was founded in 1888 with the purpose of preserving the decaying language and culture including songs and ballads. It was not concerned with advocating on behalf of this persecuted and marginalized community nor did it waste too much ink on the disputed origins of Roma. Instead it was a reaction against the perceived erosion of Romani culture and thus attempted to detail Romani culture from the central idea that Roma were a specific race. Mayall (1988, 78) argues that because Roma were constructed as a separate race, defined by hereditary and cultural characteristics, they were distanced from the settled population as well as from other wandering groups. The creation of the Gypsy Lore Society was an important development because Romani culture was oral, it was not written down. Gypsiologists were preoccupied with occupation and distinctions between the various groups as well as by linguistic issues. The elevation of Roma as romanticized protagonists was confirmed with the publication of work by George Burrow, D. H. Lawrence and Charles Dickens. Such a caricature centres on extravagant dress with vivid colours that metaphorically mirror the wild untamed spirit of Roma. Despite such

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developments, widespread societal prejudice towards Roma persisted but the twentieth century would witness the single most devastating event in Romani history.

O Baro Porrajmos: The Holocaust It is estimated that between 250,000 and 1.5 million Roma perished in O Baro Porrajmos, which literally translates as the ‘great devouring’. Remarkably, despite the evidence, Roma are constantly fighting to prove that Nazi policy towards them constitutes genocide and not merely ‘a crime against humanity’. Roma were exterminated because of their ethnicity, perception of racial origin and purity, not because they were different or asocial. Roma are forgotten victims of the Holocaust with Jews commanding more attention due to the sheer numbers of Jews murdered by the Nazi regime as well as a strong transnational intelligentsia to lobby and advocate on behalf of the Jewish community. The Nazi policy towards Roma was informed by ideas of racial purity and a hierarchy with Aryans at the top and Jews and Roma at the bottom. The Nazis intended to construct a new Germany that was ethnically pure; thus it was necessary to expunge any undesirable elements. Policy towards Roma was gradually formulated until the decision was made in early 1942 to exterminate all Roma in Germany and annexed territories. This section will examine the key events of O Baro Porrajmos arguing that Roma were treated as a racial group, not as a social group, and this distinction is crucial as it has implications for issues of remembrance and inclusion post-1945. The previous section highlighted issues of persecution and marginalization facing Roma in Europe the upshot being when the Nazis came to power in 1933 there already existed an extensive catalogue of anti-Roma legislation in Germany, as elsewhere. Nazi ideology was informed by affirmations of racial hierarchy with Aryan Germans at the top of the heap but they never recognized Roma as true Aryans even though Romani is an Aryan language. Most importantly, such a link did not prevent Roma being sent to concentration camps (Willems 1997). Kenrick and Puxon (1972, 60) argue that Roma were treated as a distinct, and undesirable, race in Nazi Germany evidenced in the fact that they wore brown triangles in some camps and the letter ‘Z’ (for Zigeuner) was emblazoned on their armbands. It has been suggested that Roma were treated as ‘anti-socials’ rather than as a distinct race but such a conception is inaccurate and harmful as we shall see.

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From the outset of the Nazi regime Roma, like Jews, received disproportionate attention from state institutions which was manifest in legislation and policy. In 1933 Hitler’s cabinet passed a law against the propagation of ‘lives not worthy of life’ (Lebensunwertesleben) and ordered sterilization for certain groups of people including Roma (Hancock 1991, 15). Between 1934 and the outbreak of the war in 1939, Roma were subject to an array of laws and regulations which ‘created a web of restrictions that set Gypsies apart and severely restricted their ability, individually and collectively to survive’ (Huttenbach 1991, 33). In 1935 the Nuremberg Law(s) for the Protection of Blood and Honour forbade inter-marriage or sexual relations between Aryan and non-Aryan peoples, declaring Roma and Jews ‘alien People’. In 1937 an order was released which stipulated that anyone who was prone to criminal activity (whether they had committed a crime or not) due to racial predisposition could be incarcerated. This seemingly innocuous order was targeted at Roma specifically and led to the rounding-up of Roma from 1937 who were subsequently sent to camps. At this point the fate of Roma had not been decided though certainly the walls were beginning to close in on German Roma and Sinti. In 1933, the Nazis contacted the Romani academic, Dr. Sigmund Wolf, and requested information pertaining to Roma genealogy; specifically he was asked to trace the lineage of lists of Roma to their eight great-grand-parents. It is clear that the Nazis were interested in blood lines of Roma from the beginning. A key appointment came in 1937 when Dr. Robert Ritter became head of the Racial Hygiene and Population Biology Research Unit of the Ministry of Health. The aim of Ritter was to have files on every German Roma which meant that research activities included the genealogical categorization of Roma as ‘pure’ or ‘mixed’ race. It was not until 4 December 1938 and the issuing of ‘Combating the Gypsy Menace’, that a comprehensive enquiry began. This circular is clearly couched in the language of race; for example, it refers to race-biological research on Roma as well as the racial affinity of every Roma in Germany (Kenrick and Puxon 1972, 73; Kenrick and Puxon 2009, 23–24). Lewy (2000, 36) argues that this law marks a turning point in policy towards Roma because prior to this Roma had been treated as an asocial element but now the conviction that Roma ‘constituted an alien and inferior race was added, introducing a powerful new catalyst for anti-Gypsy legislation’. Specifically the decree maintains that the issue of Roma be challenged in terms of the ‘inner characteristics of that race’. By 1942 Ritter had files of approximately 30,000 Roma, and these files were used to determine who

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was Romani and who was not. The hunting of Roma was motivated by Ritter who regarded Roma as primitive and mentally backward (Fraser 1992, 260). In fact, his definition of who was Roma was stricter that than of who was Jewish: two Romani great-great-grandparents while for Jews it was one great-great-grandparent. It seems that Ritter wanted to catch all Roma including those who had integrated – there would be no escape. A paradox emerges in terms of how Roma were classified, and by extension how they were treated. Heinrich Himmler, head of the Gestapo and the Waffen-SS suggested that distinctions need to be made between ‘pure’ Roma and those who were tainted by foreign blood in the years before they arrived in Germany. On the one hand, the Lalleri (German Roma because of their long residence in the country) and the racially pure Sinti who comprised approximately 10 per cent of all Roma in the Reich were to be declared Aryan, and thus would enjoy preferential treatment (at least this was the idea at the outset). On the other hand, Roma who had arrived more recently from the Balkans were considered to be stained with racial impurities having inter-married with non-Aryans before they arrived in Germany. On the surface at least, this policy was diametrically opposed to prevailing racial policy and ideas of purity because if Sinti were considered Aryans who had originated in India and had not inter-married, then they were considered racially pure and ought to be ranked alongside German Aryans. However such distinctions were quickly abandoned when the opportunity to purge Germany of the Roma ‘menace’ presented itself in early 1942. At the Wannsee Conference in January 1942 the official decision was taken to implement the ‘Final Solution’ of racial undesirables including Jews and in December 1942, Himmler ordered that all Roma were to be sent to camps with most being sent to Auschwitz-Birkenau. From 1939, official policy towards Roma was formulated on advice from the Office of Racial Hygiene with Johannes Behrendt declaring that ‘all Gypsies should be treated as hereditarily sick; the only solution is extermination’ (Hancock 1991, 18). The official decision to exterminate Roma is thought to have resulted from pressure from the lower ranks of the Nazi party who considered the War an ideal opportunity to rid Germany and conquered territories of Roma. At the upper echelons of Nazi power structures Hitler remained relatively silent on Roma: Mein Kampf makes no reference to Roma and in the 12 years as German ruler he mentions Roma only twice, in relation to Roma serving in the military (Lewy 2000, 38). It seems as though events had been building to such a climax. The increasingly repressive legislation, the collecting of data on blood lines and the detention of Roma and placing them in concentration camps provided

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the opportunity for the Third Reich to deal with Roma, once and for all, as it was dealing with Jews. Roma were regarded as dangerous because of their contaminated blood and assumptions of criminality, consequently there was no place for them in the Reich. Furthermore, Germany would expand across Europe meaning deportation was not an option either. The research at the Racial Hygiene and Population Biology Unit had created the conviction that Roma were inferior due to race, that is, because they were Romani. As a result, Roma could not be helped. They were biologically polluting social parasites who had to exterminated, and all subsequent government policy was informed by this conviction. While Roma were detained and deported prior to 1939, the outbreak of WWII heralded an intensification of Nazi policy on Roma. State agencies hounded Roma across German territories and deported them to various assembly points including Berlin, Prague and Munich, while those not deported were held in Mauthausen. It was this concentration camp which witnessed the largest number of Roma deaths though many Roma perished in Treblinka and Auschwitz-Birkenau as the latter housed the largest number of Roma. On the night of 31 July–1 August 1944, the bulk of Roma at Auschwitz were gassed in what has come to be known as the Zigeunernacht (the Night of the Gypsies). The exact number of Roma who were murdered in the Holocaust can only be estimated though the figure ranges from a conservative low of 250,000 (Gilbert 1985, 824) to 500,000 (Yoors 1967, 7; Huttenbach 1991, 45; Kenrick and Puxon 2009, 153) while others put the figure much higher – closer to 1.5 million (Heine cited in Hancock, 2002). In annexed territories Roma met a similar fate with thousands of Roma dying in Czech Republic, Slovakia, Serbia, Croatia, Greece, Holland, Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Belarus. The genocide of Roma by the Nazis received almost no attention following the defeat of Germany in 1945. The Nuremberg Trials were silent as regards the fate of Roma due to the lack of written evidence compared with documentation on the ‘Final Solution’ of Jews. The deaths suffered by Roma were not denied per se but were treated as a ‘crime against humanity’ by the Allied Powers and it was not until the 1962 Eichmann Trial in Jerusalem that the first charge against any Nazi was brought (Huttenbach 1991, 48). The term ‘genocide’ continues to be reserved for Jews and while there is no question that the Jews suffered genocide at the hands of Nazi Germany, the same fate was extended to Roma. Roma were targeted and identified through genealogical records compiled by Nazis, they were persecuted through legislation including prohibiting inter-marriage with pure Germans, endured forced sterilizations and medical experiments, and finally, they

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were murdered because of their perceived racial impurity. Thus the systematic extermination of Roma was intended to rid Europe of its ‘Gypsies’ and the guiding ideology of racial purity meant that Roma suffered genocide during WWII. In 1945 a shell-shocked Europe slowly came to terms with the Nazi’s policy on Jews and to a lesser extent, in terms of sheer numbers, on Roma, homosexuals and the disabled. Despite this, not one Rom was ever called to testify at the Nuremberg Trials. It must also be remembered that during WWII most European Roma had been murdered – up to 70 per cent of European Roma were killed. Villages had been wiped out and families scattered across the continent; therefore, all social and cultural organization had disappeared. Not surprisingly, Roma found themselves lacking agency with which to voice their concerns and as a result found themselves excluded from the pursuit of justice. In order for justice to be served it was necessary to make a clear link between Nazi policy on Roma and race, that is, that Roma were exterminated because they were ethnically Roma and thus an inferior race. However, reparations are resisted because it is argued that Roma were not targeted because of racial identification but rather because of their perceived criminality. Put simply, Roma would not be treated the same as Jews because they were singled out for the same fate (extermination) but for different reasons. This ignores the fact that by 1939 being Romani meant incarceration and certain deportation to a concentration camp. Moreover, ‘Nazi ideology contributed an increased emphasis on the hereditary character of crime’ (Lewy 2000, 25), which meant that criminality and racial origin were conflated in the case of Roma. Romani activists have had to fight to establish any sort of parity in terms of official recognition. Indeed, the US Holocaust Memorial Council was established in Washington in 1980 with 65 members though not one of these was Romani. Today O Baro Porrajmos is remembered in ceremonies across the world but the UN excluded Romani participants from the Holocaust Remembrance Day ceremony on 27 January 2009, exacerbating feelings of unworthiness.

Roma under Communism As one unfortunate chapter closed on Roma history, another one opened. This section concentrates on the treatment of Roma in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) under communist regimes. Following the end of WWII, the Allied Powers conspired to split the continent in two with Western Europe pursuing the ideal of liberal democracy and capitalism

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while Eastern Europe came under the influence of the Soviet Union with communism acting as the central guiding principle for social, economic and political life. After the end of the War most surviving Roma were located in Central and Eastern Europe and with restrictions placed on cross-border movement, they remained there. As with previous authorities, both well-meaning and malevolent, the newly installed communist authorities soon attempted to deal with Roma according to their own Marxist vision of equality and utility. Tong (1995, 251) accurately notes that, ‘people at all points in the political spectrum have wanted to change the Gypsies’ and communist regimes were no different, convinced as they were that social engineering could rescue Roma through assimilation. From the beginning Roma did not fit the mould of what a good socialist citizen should be because some spoke their own language, they dressed distinctively and maintained their own economic niche through selfemployment. Stewart (1997a, 87) explains that, ‘the very existence of autonomous Gypsy communities apparently quite beyond the influence of state organs was construed as a threat to political stability and ideological hegemony, a carnivalesque incitement to disorder’. Confronted with such a threat within their borders communist leaders across Central and Eastern Europe attempted to assimilate Roma. Integration was regarded as weak and not appropriate therefore assimilation became the organizing principle for the socialist state’s treatment of Roma. Roma were culturally and economically different, therefore, the agenda of socialism included the gradual suppression of cultural identity and forced-work programmes. While communist authorities did not seek to eradicate whole scale Roma populations as the Nazis succeeded in doing, they did attempt a more subtle policy which severely impacted on the cultural identity and way of life for many Roma. The idea here was that if Roma could be put to work and their children sent to school, then their inherent socio-cultural particularities would cease to exist and they would become another cog in the state machine, no different from every other citizen. As Stewart (1997b, 5) succinctly explains, ‘repression and discrimination could not have been further from the thoughts of early Communist reformers. But the desired end was surprisingly close to the fascist dream: The Gypsies were to disappear.’ While such a pursuit remained in place until the collapse of communism in 1989, many Roma resisted and continued to speak their language, practice cultural traditions and engage in ad hoc self-employment. Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe acknowledged the importance in assisting under-developed groups. However, policies and programmes were ‘shaped by administrations with little knowledge of

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the needs and no insights into the aspirations of Romani people’ (Puxon 1973, 13). The lack of recognition as a national minority impeded the protection of Romani identity because official status as a national minority would have been accompanied by certain rights. It was argued that because Roma lacked one or more of Stalin’s criteria for national status, which included common language, territory, economy and culture, they forfeited all claims to recognition other than as a social problem (Puxon 1973, 13). In 1961, the Hungarian Communist Party Congress passed a resolution stating that Roma lacked a common language, culture and beliefs, territory and economy, and therefore did not constitute a separate nationality. This implies that the lack of a specific culture meant that Roma were part of the homogeneous Hungarian nation and could be assimilated. The same assimilation policy was initiated across CEECs to varying degrees. Roma did not fit into communist ideas on cultural and social organization and their existence posed a major challenge to the communist project; therefore, forced sedentarization became the norm. Socialist authorities responded by embarking on a policy of ‘social engineering’ (Stewart 1997b, 2) which attempted to assimilate millions of Roma across CEECs. There was no transnational decision-making body guiding communist policy on Roma; rather, state activities were informed by a commitment to Marxist ideology which regarded the presence of Roma as a threat. Instead of expelling Roma communities, successive communist authorities across CEECs viewed them as an opportunity to instigate wide-ranging reform and social transformation. At this point in their journey, Roma were on the lowest rung on the ladder of social hierarchy. They had been hunted during WWII and so were rightfully distrustful of the so-called benevolent policies of communist authorities which promised to alleviate their socio-economic positioning. Many Roma did not have jobs and their children did not tend to go to school. As a general rule, opportunities for social mobility did not exist due to the lack of formal education completed by Romani children and to compound matters, Roma were discriminated against and marginalized by mainstream society, continuing a practice maintained for centuries. Communist authorities avowed to combat this discrimination by guaranteeing jobs for Roma as well as a home and education for their children. This development kept the wolves from the door and ensured a noticeable improvement in the living conditions of many Roma communities across CEECs. It was hoped that the discipline and collective spirit of the statesponsored work in the factory or on the field would galvanize Roma to participate equally in social life – as Roma shed their cultural identity and

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traditions, mainstream society would accept Roma as part of the communist ideal. Work was the bedrock of the communist ideal. Suffice to say, the type of work traditionally conducted by Roma was regarded as backward and self-serving and did not fit with the proletarian vision. Stewart (1997b, 123) argues that the fact that Roma regarded themselves as ‘sons of the market’ meant that they were seen as traders and middlemen out to turn a profit, and such entrepreneurial pursuits were soon quashed thus,‘viable life-styles, developed over many decades and based on self-sufficiency and prized skills, were destroyed’ (Brearley 1996, 11). For the most part, communist authorities created jobs for Roma (and the rest of society) in factories and farms which meant that Roma would work alongside other Hungarians/ Romanians/Poles doing mundane and repetitive tasks for a fixed wage. Ultimately however, the rewards were minimal and the hours worked were long and tough; so, naturally many sought to find self-employment such as horse-trading and metal work whenever opportunities presented themselves. Work served several complementary functions: it would fuel the state economy which was controlled completely by the communist authorities; it would instil a sense of ownership and belonging to Roma; and it would breakdown previously held negative stereotypes of Roma as workshy wanderers. In the end though, it resulted in Roma becoming more dependent on the state to provide goods and services whereas in the past Roma had been relatively self-reliant. Political representation of Roma was, as one might imagine, negligible under communist regimes. It was possible for Roma to rise through the party ranks but only if cultural identifiers such as language were hidden. In order to advance in social and political life some Roma realized the necessity of shedding their cultural baggage with this practice remaining prominent today. Despite the prevalence of assimilation national congresses were established in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the latter being one of the most hospitable socialist regimes for Roma. Across CEECs, a small number of Roma found their way onto coalitions of political parties, government agencies and voluntary bodies and seats on governmental committees dealing with Romani issues (Puxon 1973, 14). A flowering of Romani advocacy in Western Europe emerged at this time and led to the creation of the World Romani Congress (now called the International Romani Union) in London in 1971. This was the first transnational institution which used nationalism as a tool to mobilize Roma across Europe. It was created by Roma to secure a measure of control over their own destiny and provide a platform to articulate their interests. A Paris-based

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Secretariat, Comité International Rom, founded in 1967 linked Romani organizations across Europe however meetings and advocacy remained the preserve of Western Romani organizations, such as the Roma National Congress, established in Hamburg in 1982 to articulate the interests of German Sinti. These developments ensured that Roma had a voice: ‘because of their lack of political power much of the violence and inhuman oppression they encounter is left unreported’ (Yoors 1967, 7). Under communism, Roma were, officially at least, not discriminated against and did not suffer targeted violence because open antagonism toward Roma was not tolerated. Prejudice towards Roma did not disappear of course. Such embedded negative ascriptions of Romani identity and culture cannot be broken down in a generation or two, but following the collapse of communism in 1989 Roma increasingly found themselves the victims of targeted racist attacks and violence. Thus, Roma were cast in the familiar role of scapegoats as blame was laid at their door for socioeconomic ills caused by the tumultuous transition to democracy. Roma, lacking effective agency and a voice to defend themselves, were subject to ill-treatment, murder and pogroms by mainstream society as well as the authorities, in particular the police. Without doubt, the collapse of communism also offered hope and opportunity which was seized upon by the thin stratum of Romani intellectuals.

Post-communism: Romani Awakening The collapse of communism brought new opportunities to all but also witnessed the emergence of hostility and violence directed at Roma. More Roma were murdered in racist attacks and had their houses burned down in the immediate ‘free’ years after 1989 than in all the time that had passed from the end of WWII. The transition to democracy was mired with difficulties but of all the communities it was Roma who suffered most. It was Roma who found themselves increasingly isolated, no longer afforded the protection of a paternalist state which resulted in high unemployment, sub-standard accommodation and inadequate sanitation and health care. Moreover, with a low education level and lacking basic skills to compete in the emerging free market economy the situation of many Roma actually deteriorated throughout the 1990s. Because of the high levels of unemployment of Roma and their resulting dependence on state welfare in the early 1990s, mainstream society treated Roma as an unwanted and unnecessary appendage. This was made worse when Roma were forced into begging and flocked to urban areas where resentment towards them intensified

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(Liégeois and Gheorghe 1995). At the same time, across CEECs, mainstream politicians promulgated right-wing discourse espousing nationalist rhetoric which inflamed the virulence directed at Roma and led to cases of violence, pogroms and murder: ‘the collapse of totalitarianism in the east brought a resurgence of feelings which had been held in check since the war’ (Fraser 1992, 289). Instances of violence towards Roma occurred across CEECs thus many Roma responded by migrating to Western Europe but again they were met with discrimination and marginalization. The situation required a clear response and that came from within the Romani community as well as from sympathetic gaje. Roma organizations began to flourish after 1989 and some Roma stood for election in the first free elections across CEECs. The emergence of prominent élite and intellectuals who embraced their Romani identity and advocated on behalf of Romani communities marked a significant departure from the past. These Romani élite were a legacy of compulsory education in communist regimes and they filled the political space vacated by the socialist state. In order to mobilize the Romani community, élite attempted to foster a collective identity by highlighting common issues facing many communities. Such endeavours were, and continue to be, impeded by the heterogeneity of Roma and complex issues of ethnicity and belonging. The interests of the Romani community are diverse but a coordinated strategy has been elaborated across CEECs: [T]he Romani movement, consisting of numerous nongovernmental organizations in post-communist countries and in Western Europe, attempted a re-evaluation of its cultural heritage and past, a redefinition and construction of its own minority identity, and a rejection of its imposed and stigmatized name, as well as the emancipation of the Romani masses. (Mirga and Gheorghe 1997, 10) International organizations and NGOs shone a spotlight onto the dire living conditions of Roma, particularly in CEECs, and the violence which was being directed at them. Ringold et al. (2005, xvi) explain that, ‘Roma issues have gained increasing attention over the past decade because of emerging evidence of human rights violations and seriously deteriorating socio-economic conditions within many Roma communities.’ International organizations and advocacy networks began to frame their activities in terms of human rights violations which were supported by international law. Gaje-funded projects were established across CEECs and in some instances legislation was enacted which ensured protection of minorities,

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including Roma. Complementing these advancements in policy and legislation, the carrot of EU membership induced state behaviour to be more accommodating of minorities within their borders, which came against a backdrop of inter-ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia. But despite these developments in the 1990s, Roma remain a powerless minority and ‘the most vulnerable and poorest of Europe’s peoples within the new market economy’ (Brearley 1996, 13). The importance of having a political presence is clear – if Roma are able to have a voice then they are able to influence decisions and policies which affect them directly, meaning they cannot be ignored. Through mobilization and participation Roma are more likely to retain independence and control over their distinct ethno-cultural heritage, as well as to improve their socio-economic situation. It is possible to draw a causal arrow between the discrimination and violence which Roma experienced after the collapse of communism and the creation of organizations to represent Romani communities. This ‘ethnic awakening and mobilization’ (Mirga and Gheorghe 1997, 3) can be witnessed in the proliferation of NGOs and other bodies at a local, national and transnational level. Needless to say, international organizations did not take up the cause of Roma by chance. It was the first wave of Romani organizations and individuals which lobbied and advocated the international community, particularly in the OSCE, the CoE, the UN and the EU which ensure that Romani issues are embedded in the agendas and practices of these organizations and have resulted in some notable successes such as the creation of specific transnational organizing structures of representation which work on behalf of Roma with international support. These include the Strasbourg-based MG-S-ROM and the ERTF in the Council of Europe, the Warsaw-based Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues in the OSCE and the Brussels-based European Roma Information Office which lobbies the EU. These organizations work with other transnational bodies created by gaje such as the European Roma Rights Centre and the Open Society Institute, both based in Budapest. These transnational organizing structures of representation are of particular interest to my research due to their recent emergence and questions they raise about political participation, interest articulation and legitimate representation. Ultimately however, the optimism generated by the involvement of the international community is of little importance if it is not matched by concerted efforts to improve the situation of Roma across Europe. Roma are citizens of the state in which they reside and in order to be equal citizens Roma must be able to access the full catalogue of citizenship rights

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including civil, political and social rights but it is access where Roma experience the most problems. The prospects facing Romani élite are daunting. Some issues emerged as particularly prominent in the transnational political context. First, the use of Roma was widely propagated and exonyms such as ‘Gypsy’, ‘Zigeuner’ and ‘Gitanos’ were rejected. The reclamation of nomenclature is regarded as one of the first steps in building transnational solidarity and heralds an ownership over dominant narratives that did not exist before: ‘Names have the potential to hold the seeds of prejudice, even malice, which in turn bring upon the Romani people an unfolded hostility’ (Puxon 1973, 21). Additionally, it affirms that Roma are a distinct ethnic minority who require recognition and protection by the state because ‘recognition as an ethnic minority certainly culminates in more agreements pertaining to specific rights’ (Willems 1997, 307). Second, Romani organizations across Europe began to target repressive state policies and demand full recognition and equity with mainstream society. Necessarily this involved the questioning of prevailing norms and practices such as racism, poverty, injustice and discrimination which disproportionately affect Romani communities. Such practices are explicitly linked to the dire socio-economic conditions which many Roma endure including sub-standard health, accommodation and education provisions. Roma are excluded from society – literally banished to ghettos on the outskirts of major towns and cities where they lack basic sanitation and housing. Thirdly, resources such as international organizations have proven vital to the burgeoning Roma social movement thus calls for recognition and protection for this persecuted ethnic minority have resonated with goals of inclusion and equality. The persecution and marginalization of Roma are not just historical artefacts – they are real for many communities and are experienced through memory and everyday life. The politics of representation is tied to issues of visibility and survival. In order to survive as a culture, Roma must develop organizing structures of representation where they can have a voice in defining who they are and their interests (Lee 2001). Accordingly, political participation and mobilization are crucial if the voice of this heterogeneous community is to be heard. Moreover, battles are being fought on issues of recognition, specifically the importance of being recognized as a distinct ethnic group (Mayall 2004, chapter 7). Gheorghe (1997, 158) argues that a process of ‘ethnogenesis’ has taken place whereby a group occupying a despised and inferior position moves to a position of respectability and equality with other

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groups on the basis of a revised perception of their identity. The Roma social movement has been crucial in this transformation though prejudices and negative associations still persist in abundance and any ‘respectability’ of Roma is only in evidence in international organizations where the Romani community has been transformed into a political project. Organizations act as sites of discussion and debate between Romani representatives and activists, a place to contest ideas and to formulate demands. With political power and capital has come fragmentation among Romani élite because competing ideas exist on how best to remedy the situation of Roma. Inevitably, perhaps, the issue of legitimacy has arisen: Who has the legitimate right to speak on behalf of Roma? And how can we determine who is legitimate or not, and according to what criteria? Many of the Romani élite which emerged in the 1990s did not live so-called traditional Romani lives and some are not ethnically Romani. This is where my investigation really begins. It starts from quite a simplistic question – who speaks for Roma? – navigating a journey encompassing issues such as ethnic mobilization and political representation in order to capture the most recent chapter in Romani political history.

2 Political Participation and Representation of Roma Roma are the most disparate and disadvantaged minority group in Europe, and due to political, legal and social factors they continue to be marginalized. I am careful not to prescribe mechanisms to rectify this perceived injustice, but I do attempt to understand the vicious cycle of under-representation1 in which Roma find themselves, and offer both theoretical and empirical insights into this state of affairs. Theoretically, the research seeks to advance understandings of the complex relationship between ethnic mobilization, interest articulation and legitimate representation with regard to minorities, and empirically, it details the case of Romani political participation2 in Hungary and Romania, as well as the role and impact of transnational organizing structures of representation. The Roma issue has become more salient on the international and domestic political agenda since 1989, when the collapse of communism facilitated a resurgence of ethno-nationalism across CEECs. Its development from a marginal to a significant concern can be understood in the broader context of academic debates on human rights and minority rights. The interests of minority groups are invariably squeezed out by the majority and if the state does not provide adequate representation or preferential treatment then minority communities often mobilize and create their own organizing structures of representation to articulate their interests. Marginalized minority groups ought to be adequately represented in processes of policy-making and decision-making if they are to enjoy equality and justice, meaning that they should have input into the policy-making process particularly on decisions which affect them directly. While there have been numerous attempts to accommodate minorities by incorporating

33

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their interests into existing state structures or by creating new ones, the current national assemblies in CEECs are not truly representative of many minority groups because electoral democracy will always be an expression of majoritarian norms and preferences; furthermore, there are structural and practical barriers for minority groups which impede full participatory democracy. Roma are of particular significance, not least because, ‘the goal of creating effective and legitimate Roma representation is making its way to the forefront of national and international concerns’ (Klímová 2002, 104). Roma are an appropriate group for a case study because they have a legitimate claim to under-representation, they have been historically excluded from political rights, seen as unfit to rule and have experienced mistrust with non-Roma (Klímová-Alexander 2004, 600). Furthermore, their socioeconomic and political marginalization has been highlighted by a number of non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations’ reports (HRW 1993; Liégeois 1994; Van der Stoel 2000; ERRC 2001a; 2001b; 2002a; 2002b; 2003a; 2003b; 2004a; 2004b; OSCE 2003; OSCE-ODIHR 2003; EU Commission 2004; ERRC 2006; EUMC 2006; ERRC 2007a; ENAR 2008; OSCE 2009). The need to create organizing structures of representation in the domestic and transnational political contexts on the one hand affirms Roma’s lack of voice and, on the other, acts as a conduit through which Roma can articulate their interests. I argue that there are two main ways for Roma to increase their political participation: through parliamentary representation and through civil society organizations. First, in seeking parliamentary representation, there are several alternatives open to Romani political activists. These include: (a) the organization of Romani political parties; (b) an individual Rom standing as an independent candidate; and (c) Romani candidates standing on the party lists of mainstream parties. Although there are a number of Romani political parties in CEECs, their participation in representative bodies has been limited mostly to the local level, and they have been unable to secure sufficient electoral support at the national level. One alternative is that a Rom may also run independently as a candidate in a particular electoral district while another possibility is for Roma candidates to run on the party lists of mainstream parties however it is questionable whether a minority parliamentarian who is elected into a national parliament on the list of a mainstream political party can legitimately represent and articulate the interests of his or her minority community. Secondly, a lack of political experience and differing visions among Roma activists has led to a fragmentation of the recently emerged Romani

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movement in CEECs. The civil society arena which had been suppressed under communist regimes offered new, yet ambiguous, possibilities. Establishing Romani civil society organizations allowed for the pursuit of policy advocacy outside of the formal political arena, where actors competed over resources and jostled for position, and facilitated the creation of new organizing structures of representation to articulate Roma interests. The new Romani political élite had to learn the rules of the game and frequently found their voices drowned out by other competitive forces in the transition to democracy. This meant that the NGO sector offered an attractive alternative especially as Western donors such as the Soros Foundation and the EU presented the material resources needed to pursue policy advocacy and project implementation to the burgeoning civil society sector. This chapter begins by outlining the main objectives and assumptions of the research including the theoretical basis and the methodological approach. The mobilization and political participation of minorities is subsequently assessed offering insights into the representation of Roma. The relationship between minorities, the state and international law is then unpacked before an overview of the Roma social movement is provided. Finally, I developed an understanding of legitimacy and how it can be determined.

Objectives, Assumptions and Rationale This book represents an attempt to contribute to the debate on Roma from a political scientist’s perspective. I build on the research and investigations on Roma conducted by Acton, Gheorghe, Guy, Klímová-Alexander, Kovats, Liégeois and Vermeersch, among others, and add new empirical data as well as analytical insights. The guiding question which informs the research is ‘who speaks for Roma?’ I began my research asking this question yet soon realized that in order to adequately answer it, other inter-related aspects of participation and representation demanded attention thus I aim to: (a) highlight how the representation of Roma can only be understood in both the domestic and transnational political contexts. Roma are a transnational minority and require transnational as well as domestic organizing structures of representation; (b) argue that Roma constitute a social movement. Despite their heterogeneity Roma engage in traditional social movement activities such as symbolic protests, solidarity demonstrations, petitions and the creation of organizations to articulate interests, the latter being a central focus of my research; (c) focus more attention on the interests of Roma rather than the rights of Roma therefore Romani participation

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and voice rather than the role of the state becomes the critical component; (d) question the legitimacy of those who represent Roma in public life, be they élite, political parties, civil society organizations or international NGOs. Notably, a thin stratum of Romani activists and intellectuals has emerged since the collapse of communism and these are often self-appointed. Moreover most Roma are not aware of the plethora of organizing structures of representation which articulate their interests in domestic and transnational contexts which impedes claims to legitimate representation; (e) elucidate the link between identity and interests. I maintain that, in the case of Roma, identity and interests are insoluble as one informs the other and due to the heterogeneity and fragmented collective identity of Roma, it is more difficult to formulate and articulate shared interests. I argue that effective participation is not necessarily limited to public affairs, and can also pertain to cultural, social and economic life. Without denying the importance of other areas of the public domain, the analysis will focus its conceptual lens on participation in public affairs. This provides an opportunity to uncover patterns of institutional interaction and forms of political participation which successive Hungarian and Romanian governments have pursued to rectify the perceived deficiency in Roma representation. The role of the transnational political context is crucial and the impact of the EU as a site and ally of Romani mobilization is evaluated in turn. Furthermore, this framework permits an analysis of the relationship between minority identity and interest formation. Crucially I aim to discern the relationship between interest formation and interest articulation. In this respect the interests of Roma are articulated3 by several competing organizing structures of representation including: élite; ethnic political parties; and domestic and transnational civil society organizations which offer an access point for analysing ethnic mobilization from below. Since the analysis is based on the assumption that the Romani community cannot rely on the state to establish organizing structures of representation, I focus principally on the Roma social movement and how it has attempted to augment representativity and political participation.

Theoretical Basis This research aims to move beyond conceptual dichotomies in the literature on minority rights (Glazer 1983; Freeman 1995; Galenkamp 1996 and 1998; Wright 1999). To that end it seeks to provide existing academic discourse on minority rights with fresh impetus so as to advance understandings on minority political participation and representation. Most research on

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minority rights in Europe has focused on how CEECs have responded to international norm compliance (Liebich 1998; De Witte 2000; Gál 2000; Toggenburg 2000; Pentasuglia 2001; Brusis 2003; Vermeersch 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Schwellnus 2005; Toggenburg 2006; Kriszán 2009); and studies which focus prominently on the role of the state (Kymlicka 1995; Tesser 2003), thus negating other political contexts. In addition, it is observed that the academic literature on Roma has yet to produce a satisfactory explanation or understanding of the deplorable situation that Roma find themselves in. Research on Roma has involved emotive pleas to address their relative socio-economic standing in society (Revenga et al. 2002; Ringold et al. 2005; Pogány 2004) which has typically involved analysing how and why CEECs have complied with various international organizations’ attempts to put minority protection on the domestic agenda (Hughes and Sasse 2003). However, a move has been made to account for their lack of political participation in the organizing structures of the state, especially in CEECs (Vermeersch 2001; Weber 2001; Sobotka 2002; National Democratic Institute 2003; Vermeersch 2003a; Baclija and Haček 2007; McGarry 2008a), and how the state has attempted to integrate Romani communities (Cashman 2008). Additionally, the transnational political context has been attracting attention of late which highlights the importance of the international political context for Roma (Jenne 2000; Gheorghe and Acton 2001; Sobotka 2003; Vermeersch 2003b; Goodwin 2004; Klímová-Alexander 2004; Guglielmo and William Waters 2005; KlímováAlexander 2005; Simhandl 2006; McGarry 2008b; Trehan and Sigona 2009). The historical situation of Roma has been well-documented (Puxon 1973; Fraser 1992; Liégeois and Gheorghe 1995; Mirga and Gheorghe 1997; Crowe 1999; Mayall 2004; Bancroft 2005) which provides a strong empirical base with which to embark on more analytical investigations. The increase in the number of Roma organizations and individuals engaged in public political activity over the last 20 years has coincided with the dramatic decline in the living conditions and social status, that is, the interests, of most of Roma (Kovats 2003). The obvious conclusion is that Roma politics is ineffective in articulating the interests of the Romani community. Some scholars have pointed out the failure of Roma to enhance their political participation (Barany 1995; Kovats 1997) but have not offered any insights into why the growing political significance of Roma issue does not reflect the political capacity of the Romani community, nor indeed, what the interests of Roma actually are. This is the theoretical access point from which a true understanding of Roma political participation and representation can be constructed and takes into account the role of ethnic group identity and interests.

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Methodological Approach In determining who can legitimately represent and articulate the interests of Roma, this research proceeds in three steps in the domestic case studies. First, the interests of Roma are outlined. Secondly, the role and function of organizing structures of representation are examined and the view that élite/individuals can articulate the interests of Roma in the domestic political context is assessed; the role and impact of ethnic political parties is examined; and the purpose of Romani civil society organizations in the representation of Roma interests is gauged. Thirdly, the legitimacy of these organizing structures of representation in articulating the interests of Roma is considered. Then the focus shifts to the articulation and representation of Roma beyond the state. Mobilization beyond the state raises substantive issues pertaining to representation and political participation. It is determined whether transnational organizing structures of representation have a legitimate claim to Roma representation. In order to understand the political representation of Roma, I select two CEECs, Hungary and Romania, both of which have large Romani communities which are under-represented in public life.4 A comparison of the two domestic case studies is justified on several grounds. First, Hungary and Romania have developed unique and far-reaching legislative and policy provisions to improve the political participation of minorities, including Roma. Secondly, both have established governmental agencies to address the needs (and interests) of Roma. Thirdly, Hungary and Romania have signed a number of documents which set regional standards in the field of minority protection.5 Fourthly, minority status laws have been developed by Hungary and Romania with the input of Romani élite and civil society organizations, although the minority status law thus far remains un-codified in Romania. Fifthly, both states house an increasingly active and vibrant Romani civil society community. Finally, ethnic mobilization has resulted in the establishment of very different organizing structures of representation which have their respective advantages and disadvantages. Taken together these case studies provide fertile ground for comparison of ethnic mobilization, political participation, interest articulation and legitimate representation. Since the early 1990s there has been a turn towards ethnic identification as a framework for political mobilization (Vermeersch 2006). However, there is a need for a comprehensive study of the transformation of minority political inclusion including how ethnic minority political mobilization

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is manifest, and how Roma in particular have developed tactics and repertoires to ensure their voice is heard. This research highlights the extent to which political participation has evolved outside of conventional political arenas, for example, through ethnic minority mobilization and the creation of civil society organizations. In the case of Roma, this can only be fully understood by examining how ethnic identification has motivated political participation and representation in the domestic and transnational political contexts. My research is based on primary sources with interviews and fieldwork in Hungary and Romania, as well as Dublin, Strasbourg and Brussels, having been conducted between 2004 and 2009. It brings together information published in a variety of sources, arranging the information so as to pose a number of hypotheses and preliminary questions, and identifying the controversies and gaps in the research. Necessarily this involves synergizing data relating to political participation and representation in Hungary and Romania, of particular relevance are the legislative provisions such as electoral law, legislation to establish political parties and NGOs, reports of governmental agencies, government policies, civil society organizations’ reports and mandates, and statements made by élite. The following three propositions inform and guide my research. First, it is posited that representation increases with the active involvement of Romani civil society organizations in a political context. The utilitarian principles underpinning liberal democracy imply that certain groups, notably minorities, do not have access to adequate representation structures in the domestic political context. As a result, minorities are forced to develop alternative organizing structures of representation to facilitate the articulation of their interests meaning that civil society organizations are often the most legitimate and authoritative voice in Roma representation, despite lacking a democratic mandate. Secondly, the increasing proliferation of individuals, groups and organizations which claim to represent the interests of Roma has an adverse effect on Roma representation. The Romani community possesses a contested group identity which results in fragmented interest formulation and articulation. This has created a situation in which numerous actors claim to represent the interests of Roma, and has led to a degree of dilution and confusion surrounding legitimate Roma representation. Thirdly, it is assumed that élite, though individuals, can represent the interests of Roma provided they are vested with a democratic mandate or they regarded as legitimate by Roma. These political leaders often articulate the interests of the Romani community as

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a whole therefore an individual can have a legitimate claim to represent the interests of the Romani community. Two hypotheses guide this thesis: H1: Political decentralization increases the legitimacy of Roma representation. Political and policy decisions which are taken at an abstract level rarely reflect the preferences and interests of the demos. If adequate representation structures are in place in the domestic political context, then minority groups have the potential to articulate their interests. Political decentralization, which can take a variety of forms, is often the best way for minorities to make their voices heard in a democratic system. However, I argue that the role and impact of Romani transnational mobilization and activism has created a situation whereby the interests of Roma are articulated beyond the confines of the state, and this creates problems for legitimacy. Crucially I understand decentralization as more than a system of local administration over decision-making processes, rather decentralization is a system which increases political participation and representation, and helps to ensure local ownership and stakeholder involvement over policies and decisions which affect communities directly. Decentralization increases the capacity to foster social relationships and intersubjective interaction which is necessary for legitimacy. (See Figure 2.1.)

Roma Social Movement

Domestic organizing structures of representation

higher

Transnational organizing structures of representation

Legitimacy

lower

Figure 2.1 Hypothesis 1: Decentralization Increases the Legitimacy of Representation Structures

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H2: Due to inadequate organizing structures of representation in the domestic political context, transnational Romani activity increases. I examine transnational organizing structures of representation including international Romani NGOs and transnational advocacy networks. The state employs a diverse range of representation structures to ensure that the interests of Roma are taken into account and domestic Romani actors also create organizing structures of representation such as NGOs. However, many of these are inherently flawed, and result in Roma constructing other avenues to articulate their interests, including transnational civil society organizations. Transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998a; Risse et al. 1999) have proliferated in recent years and offer a new organizing structure of representation for Roma to articulate their interests. These transnational advocacy networks do not claim to represent Roma in the strictest sense as they are often gaje institutions which advocate for human rights (examples include the Open Society Institute (OSI) and the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC)). Also, Roma have created international NGOs with a specific Romani focus which uses ethnic identity as a means to mobilize support (examples include the International Romani Union (IRU), the Roma National Congress (RNC), the European Roma and Traveller Forum (ERTF)). While acknowledging the importance of each structure I focus on the role of the European Roma Information Office (ERIO) based in Brussels and assess its capacity to articulate the interests of Roma in the transnational political context.

Mobilization, Political Participation and Representation The paternalistic attitude of communist leaders ensured that Roma enjoyed a degree of security from persecution; however, after the collapse of communism, Roma began to mobilize politically as they realized they could seize the opportunity to participate in public affairs and ensure that their voice was heard. This flurry of civil society activity extended to other minority communities in Central and Eastern Europe though these communities, including the Hungarian and German minorities found vocal support from a kin state eager to lobby on behalf of their Diaspora.6 Across CEECs, democracy became the norm but it quickly became clear that Roma would have to create new organizing structures of representation which were specific to their interests because the embedded utilitarian principles of democracy necessarily marginalize minority interests.

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At the heart of the debate surrounding political participation and representation lies mobilization. The traditional understanding of political mobilization has been the ‘deliberative activity of a group of individuals for the realization of political objectives’ (Barany 1998, 309). In addition, these goals generally encompass ‘enhanced interest representation; the cessation of political, social; economic and other types of discrimination; and the improvement of the given collective’s conditions and relative standing in society’ (Barany 1998, 309–310). Furthermore, Gurr (1993, 123) understands ethnic mobilization as being fuelled by people’s grievances about their relative deprivation and their determination to pursue political interests. What Barany and Gurr term ‘interests’ can more accurately understood as ‘preferences’, as the latter concept is loaded with rational intentions and motivations. The rational language of mobilization to attain goals does not tell the whole story as political mobilization is more than a simple means– end calculation. Ethnicity retains no conceptual or contextual autonomy meaning that ethnic groups such as Roma can mobilize around their ethnicity to articulate their interests. While some political theorists explain that culture provides a ‘conditioning element for action’ (Nettl 1967, 27), this line of thought pursues the functional attribution of politics where goal attainment is its primary purpose. However, it is more appropriate to understand ethnicity as a point of reference for minorities as they mobilize politically whereby ethnicity serves as a unifying agent or glue which holds the social movement together. The real function of ethnic mobilization lies in its ability to turn the Romani community into an effective pressure and interest group, as national-ethnic groups are by definition in the contemporary world indeed, ‘the future of the Romani community depends on its successful development into such a group, conscious of its rights, interests and power’ (Mirga and Gheorghe 1997, 33). Of course, ethnic mobilization alone does not guarantee success because successful mobilization will usually depend on a number of variables or conditions being in place including: a strong ethnic identity; the effectiveness of the group (through its organizations and leadership); and the actions of the state (Barany 1998).7 Each of these indicators is considered in turn. It is necessary to caution against assuming that a distinctive ethnic group possesses a strong and well-developed identity. Thus while Roma are the largest and most geographically dispersed minority group in Europe, they do not share a cohesive identity. This is due to differences in, among others, income, geography, occupation, language, religion and familial ties. This has resulted in a contested group identity, and often Roma themselves are unwilling to identify themselves as Roma due to the perception that this

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will result in further persecution.8 This is not to say that identity cannot be constructed as actors continually attempt to negotiate identities which are achieved through intersubjective interaction through and between groups.9 In the transnational political context this has resulted in attempts by the IRU and the RNC to foster Romani nationalism as a stateless nation. This research contends that there is a direct link between identity and interests and reconciling this conceptual cleavage involves theorizing the political participation of Romani actors within existing and emerging organizing structures of representation. The effectiveness of a group will determine the success of mobilization which is primarily centred on the role of leaders and organizations. First, as Barany (1998, 311) rightly points out, ‘the importance of the leader(s) is difficult to overestimate for those in a leadership position may determine the success or failure of the organization or movement.’ Leaders frequently set the agenda and goals of an ethnic group, and determine the strategies which the group as a whole will pursue. Whether an ethnic group concerns itself primarily with cultural issues (education); political issues (securing members in parliament); economic issues (equal opportunities in the workplace); or with social issues (access to adequate housing) is usually the prerogative of the leader. Sometimes interests are general (addressing discrimination) and sometimes they are specific (preventing the perpetuation of negative stereotypes in the media), but as a rule ethnic identification will dictate which interests are formed. Because Roma retain many interests, both proximate and ultimate, the role of organizations becomes important for it is through these that interests find expression. The institutional form through which mobilization itself is communicated is a crucial determinant of successful ethnic mobilization. Each of the new constitutions of CEECs guarantees the freedom of association, be they political parties or civil society organizations, and formal organizations have been created in the transnational political context. There has been a proliferation of organizing structures of representation which lobby and advocate on behalf of Roma in CEECs, and the fragmentation which characterizes all social movements can be found in the Roma social movement too. The state is usually, but not always, the target of ethnic mobilization therefore it plays a key role in determining the success or failure of ethnic mobilization. The state must be sure that it is dealing with the legitimate representatives of the ethnic community meaning that it must be convinced that the ethnic group’s leaders, organizations and political parties enjoy some degree of authority within the ethnic group, and articulate its interests (Gurr 1993, 68). In spite of the large number of Romani organizations

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in Hungary and Romania, their communities have benefitted from increasing state consideration in the form of concrete programmes designed to rectify past injustices. The impact of the EU’s accession criteria10 on CEECs has, of course, been instrumental in determining the direction of state policy on minority protection. However academic discourse has inflated the importance of the EU at the expense of structural adjustments occurring within the state (De Witte 2000; Toggenburg 2000). Yet there have been some moves recently to analyse these structural adjustments occurring within the state which domestic actors respond to (Vermeersch 2006). This includes a change in government which provides the opportunity for domestic Romani élite entrepreneurs to strategically engage and manipulate the socio-political situation for their own organization’s benefit. Usually the state is both the site and target for social movement activity but Chapter 6 demonstrates that transnational organizing structures of representation circumvent state structures when articulating interests to an international audience, albeit one with strong normative power. A number of initiatives to enhance political representation of minorities, including Roma, can be identified in Hungary and Romania. In Romania, the constitution guarantees every national minority representation in the Chamber of Deputies. In 1993, a Council for National Minorities was established by the government which co-ordinates the programmes of various state authorities and provides a special forum for the articulation of minority issues. The Roma Party Pro-Europe (RPPE) has a monopoly on Roma representation and receives designated government funding as the voice of Roma in formal political structures. In 2001 the government elaborated the ‘Roma Strategy’ to address Roma problems over a ten-year period. Additionally, despite efforts on the part of the Hungarian minority, the status law on minorities in Romania has not been passed through the Chamber of Deputies. In Hungary, the Minorities Law was adopted in 1993 which provides a far-reaching system of local and national self-government. In 1995, a Parliamentary Commissioner (Ombudsman) for National and Ethnic Minorities was established, and the incumbent is a Rom. However, there is no Romani representative in the Hungarian parliament who attained the position on an ethnic ticket although several have been included and elected on mainstream party lists. It is necessary to consider each of these indicators when attempting to understand the political participation of Roma, and who can legitimately claim to represent and articulate their interests. At the heart of the matter sits ethnic mobilization. The act of mobilizing suggests an attempt to unite in order to achieve a goal. However, it is argued here that ethnic mobilization

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is more complicated than a simple means–end calculation, and therefore, other factors must be considered: What is the role of identity?11 Who articulates the interests of Roma? What structures have Hungary and Romania created to alleviate the problems faced by Roma? How is ethnic mobilization secured in the transnational political context? Of particular concern for this research is to uncover the relationship between political participation and representation to determine who represents the interests of Roma, and who can claim to do so legitimately. Examining political participation and organizing structures of representation is useful because the results and impact are tangible – the rewards are specified through legislation or by the direct allocation of rights and privileges. The very nature of interest-group rivalry, where a plurality of identities overlap, means that the political context becomes the most significant in the competition for the values and interests of a minority group. But politics is more than just the arena of interests, or of social transformation through mobilization. Politics is also a highly emotive arena, where heightened political competition over interests can spill over into outright hostility. Here interests can morph into ‘causes’ which invite violent conflict and even war (Bell 1975, 162). Yet Roma are an ethnic group who have never ‘risen up’12 to realize their goals, so when we understand interests here, they refer to a non-violent intra-group competition to effect political change. Brass (1996, 86) points out that identity is used by an ethnic group ‘to create internal cohesion and differentiate themselves from other groups’ and is frequently invoked to generate support for an individual or organization, and such a conception of identity is in tune with Roma representation in both the domestic and transnational political contexts. Ethnic groups which use ethnicity to make demands in the political context for a change in their status, economic opportunities, or in their civil rights are engaged in a form of interest group politics which became prominent in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s (Piven and Cloward 1977; McAdam 1982), which attempted to improve the well-being of group members as individuals. We might presume to know why ethnic minorities mobilize but less is known about how they mobilize. There are numerous ways in which an ethnic minority can mobilize, but as with all social movements, the role of civil society is of paramount importance. In her exploration of new social movements, Cohen (1985, 682) determines that ‘civil society has become the indispensable terrain on which social actors assemble, organize and mobilize’ and details how the institutional structures of the state change through new social movements and interaction, deconstructs the

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epistemological divide in new social movement research, and highlights the reasons why actors mobilize to secure recognition through various forms of representation, the most important being civil society (1985, 663–716). Representation is only possible once actors mobilize around a common identity, however as has been noted already, Romani identity is contested which makes ethnic mobilization, interest articulation and legitimate representation all the more difficult. I acknowledge, though deliberately downplay, the role of exogenous actors such as the state, international organizations and donor agencies, and concentrate instead on mobilization by Roma themselves.13 Are organizing structures of representation the result/expression/product of mobilization or are they just part of the process, like social partners? The simplified diagram below (Figure 2.2) is broken up into two areas: the majority and the minority. Of concern here are those elements contained within the minority arena (for the moment the role and impact of transnational organizing structures of representation are sidelined). The process starts with ethnic mobilization which results in the creation of organizing structures of representation, and is sustained due to social interaction between the Romani community and the organizing structures of representation. These organizing structures of representation are not legitimate from the outset but can be legitimated only by the minority community in a variety of ways. The interests of the minority community are articulated by the organizing structures of representation, and appear both inside the minority and majority arenas because interests are articulated to the

Majority Minority

Legitimacy

Ethnic mobilization

Legitimacy

Organizing structures of representation

Legitimacy

Interest articulation

Legitimacy

Figure 2.2 The Political Participation of Roma in the Domestic Political Context

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majority as well as the minority. It is worth noting that there is no direct linkage between ethnic mobilization and legitimacy. Legitimacy can only be conferred on the organizing structures of representation by the minority and because the arrows flow into the organizing structures of representation, it shows that this is an input legitimacy. The next logical step in a scientific inquiry would be to determine whether the interests of Roma are secured and under what conditions, however due to spatial constraints I do not pursue this particular path.

Minorities, the Democratic State and International Law Minority rights protection does not always boil down to rights, because politics often plays a more critical role. Unlike the freedom from torture14 which the state must ensure, the state has no obligation to guarantee political participation for minorities.15 The issues affecting minorities involve not only a question of human and minority rights, but also raise questions about modes of governance. Certain individuals, because of their membership in a national or ethnic group are persecuted or marginalized; however, this does not legitimize positive discrimination, either in constitutional restructuring, or in other contexts.16 Such an approach is incompatible with the prevailing individualist ethos which has informed the discourse on human rights and minority rights. The democratic state is obliged to implement human rights to all its citizens, and appropriate minority rights to persons belonging to national minorities. Wheatley (1999, 203) explains the importance of this dynamic, ‘such rights provide the parameters for the political discourse within a democracy, providing the grounds upon which the political debate may legitimately be held and framing the context within which arguments may be formed’. A general right to political participation17 is contained in Article 25 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which provides that all citizens enjoy, without discrimination as to race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion or national origin: ‘(a) the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.’ While this right is clearly a treaty obligation guided by the principle of pacta sunt servanda, it has also been claimed as a general rule of customary international law (Fox 1992, 539). In Europe, the right is reflected in the regional standards produced by the CoE and the OSCE18 and may therefore be considered as a regional custom.

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Under the traditional model of democracy, no special measures are required by the state to take into account the demands of a multi-ethnic society, in which an ethnically or linguistically distinct majority and minority must co-exist, ‘nor is the state required to create the institutional framework for political debate, open paths to political participation which would otherwise be blocked’ (Steiner 1988, 109–110). Wheatley (1999, 204) points out that ‘liberal democracy [. . .] allows all groups the right to compete freely with the advancement of their particular ideas and opinions’. Still, the obvious consequence of this system is that the minority interest will always be out-bid by the majority. The preamble to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) states ‘a pluralist and genuinely democratic society should not only respect the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of each person belonging to a national minority, but also create the appropriate conditions enabling them to express, preserve and develop this identity’ which means that the interests of the minority polis need to be reflected and cultivated. Obviously, governments which are elected by the majority are likely to reflect the interests of the majority which can be witnessed both in the formulation of policy and its implementation. This is the very reason why ethnic mobilization and interest articulation are so important for minorities. They create organizing structures of representation through stalagmite mobilization and through these they can articulate their interests. The Explanatory Report to the FCNM suggests measures which the state may adopt to ensure the effective participation of national minorities inter alia: consultation by the state with members of national minorities through representation institutions when the state is contemplating administrative or legislative measures likely to have a direct effect on the national minority; involving the national minority in the preparation and implementation of regional development activity likely to affect them; allowing effective participation by persons belonging to national minority into the decision making proves at national and regional level.19 The right to political participation, to have a voice, does not prescribe one particular mechanism through which persons belonging to the national minority group may participate in the public life of the state, but it does demand that the right be effectively implemented. Therefore the government must set up adequate organizing structures of representation. Such formal mechanisms will inevitably vary from state to state, depending

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upon the constitutional history, that is, the cultural path, and institutions of the state. Hungary and Romania have pursued innovative and divergent representation structures when accommodating their minorities, including Roma however I primarily focus on the organizing structures of representation which are the result of stalagmite mobilization both within and beyond the state because it is only through these structures that we can determine the interests of Roma.

The Roma Social Movement The Roma social movement is a multifaceted phenomenon and requires a combination of theoretical perspectives in order to gain a greater purchase on it. No single ready-made theoretical model can provide all the tools necessary to explain the political participation and representation structures of Roma. I do not whimsically tip theoretical propositions into a metaphorical shopping cart but ‘parasitically’ (Evans 1996, 5) draw on analytical distinctions and insights from a variety of theoretical positions in sociology, political science and international relations. The basic puzzle is, how do Roma make their voice heard in a liberal democratic system which teleologically suppresses minority interests? Roma slip through the cracks of conventional political theories because one unified theory cannot be imported and applied to understand their situation. Therefore I draw on several literatures and theoretical insights to uncover patterns and instances of ethnic mobilization, political participation, interest articulation and legitimate representation. This middle-way has been shown to be useful for researchers who pursue theoretically informed empirical political analysis through diverse conceptual lenses (Kohli 1996, 2). My conceptual framework draws mainly on understandings in the academic discourse on representation, social movements, citizenship and minority rights. The evolving concept of representation bridges political participation and interests (Birch 1971; Hindess 2001) and I maintain that representation can only be understood as being of interests, and not of persons. The social movement literature stresses the role of identity for mobilization and creating organizing structures of representation. The citizenship literature provides an insight into the relationship between Roma and the state by focusing on access to citizenship (Marshall 1950; Turner 1990), and the struggle for citizenship rights (Tilly 1978). The minority rights literature houses numerous innovative concepts with which to apply to the case of Roma including ethnicity, justice, anti-discrimination and cultural identity. Despite this, the task inevitably falls to the interpretive skills of the researcher to make sense of Roma representation. A holistic

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and systemic approach is not analytical dilute but actually strengthens the capacity of the theory to make sense of the empirics. By analysing organizing structures of representation it is possible to understand the nature of the Roma social movement and its relationship to wider society. But what is a social movement and do Roma constitute such a phenomenon? Tarrow (1998, 4) maintains that social movements are ‘collective challenges, based on common purposes and solidarities, in sustained interaction with élite, opponents and authorities’, which means the shoe fits. The political practices of social movements construct the interests they represent (Laclau and Moffe 1985; cited in Foweraker 1995, 13) and the group identity of Roma provides a cultural space in which intersubjective processes can reproduce identity and interests. This insight is significant as a social movement is not an objective fact but must be understood as a process. The importance and relevance of a social movement lies in civic activism and community mobilization which occurs outside of formal political and legal channels which has steadily increased, particularly since the 1960s. Furthermore, as Mayer (1991, 63) explains, ‘social movements are no longer apart from mainstream political parties, lobbies, and interest groups, but rather, they share space with them as legitimate partners.’ The traditional structural perspective examines the organizations themselves including their functions and capabilities, although organizations are only one expression of a social movement. Sidestepping issues of power and tactics in formal structures allows the analysis to concentrate on identity and the socio-cultural context in which identity is both constructed and embedded. In this respect formal organizations are an expression of culture and identity (Lomnitz 1982, 569–570). The research on social movements has been dominated by two paradigms built on competing epistemological foundations: one is resource mobilization (RM) which puts emphasis on leaders and societal élite in the political opportunity structure; while the other is the macrosociological approach which focuses on identity. Since these two approaches have dominated research on social movements, their specific propositions and insights are discussed with reference to the ethnic mobilization of Roma. The foundations for the RM approach were laid by Olson’s (1965) theory of collective action which stresses the importance of rational calculating actors in social movements. The building blocks of the RM approach are resources, formal organization, tactics and political opportunities. It proved useful in analysing the relevance of organization in a social movement (Piven and Cloward 1977), studies on the relationship between social movements and political opportunity structures (Eisinger 1973; Tarrow

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1983), studies on the development of specific contemporary movements such as the women’s movement (Freeman 1975) and the civil rights movement (McAdam 1982), and attempts have been made to bolster the structural element of the RM approach (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1992; Snow and Benford 1992). Nonetheless, several criticisms have been levelled at the RM approach because: (1) it says little about the emergence and definitions of interests which it treats as given and stable; (2) it uses overly simplistic rational actor models; (3) it tends to overestimate the importance of formal organizations for collective mobilization (Kitschelt 1991, 330). In response to these shortcomings the macrosociological approach has attempted to reduce the role of agency by analysing societal structures. In this sense, ‘organization is not simply an instrumental facilitator of collective action, but also an expression of the movement practices and aspirations themselves: the medium can be the message’ (Kitschelt 1991, 336: emphasis added). I primarily examine formal organizations leaving other expressive ‘action repertoires’ (Rucht 1990, 164) such as demonstration and protest to one side. In order to compensate for the attention given to formal organizations, I bring identity and interests into the discussion. Organizations articulate interests that have been constructed according to ideological affinities and circumstances but the relationship between identity and interests is not progeny; rather, the interests and identity of Roma are insoluble. Actors are grounded in a context and culture which produces shared interests; however, to focus on actors alone, as the RM approach does, is to miss the bigger picture and the aspect most relevant to the macrosociological approach – the societal framework, which permits the interplay of agency and structure. The macrosociological approach points to socio-political context in which Romani identity and interests are constructed and reproduced through interaction. If RM approaches show how movements mobilize for their claims then macrosociological theories explain why certain movements emerge and develop (Melucci 1985), by focusing on identity. Some scholars have emphasized that identity is a strategy (Rucht 1990, 161–164) while others have suggested that identity is a choice, something which the individual can opt into (Friedman and McAdam 1992, 157), ignoring identity’s constructed and relational qualities. But identity is not understood as a ‘cause’ in the positivist sense rather it is a necessary precondition for social movements. In addition, identity always works in relationship to, and interacts with other social processes and variables (Adler and Crawford 2002, 5) which is why it is futile to analytically separate identity from interests in the Roma social movement. These ‘new social movements’ (Melucci 1980; 1985;

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1992) stress ‘participatory decision-making, a decentralized structure, and opposition to bureaucratic procedures’ (Dalton et al. 1990, 5). The role of values, identity and interests emerge prominently in the macrosociological approach and it is postulated that the (re)construction of identity becomes a key task of any social movement. A social movement is a ‘socially constructed collective reality’ (Melucci 1992, 5) and Roma construct this reality with reference to their group identity and shared interests. Political processes and the creation of institutions demonstrate the importance of avoiding ‘groupism’ in which the group becomes the fundamental unit of analysis (Brubaker 2004), showing how ethnicity ‘works’ in context. A key task of my research is to problematize and question the identity and interests of Roma in domestic and transnational socio-political contexts, demonstrating that these soft institutions are not fixed or given, and crucially that they are inextricably linked.

Determining Legitimacy Questioning the legitimacy of Roma representatives might seem an easy target. Indeed, what political authority can claim to be legitimate due to infrequent elections and declining voter turnout at the ballot box across Europe? I do not place these structures on trial rather I investigate the legitimacy of Roma representatives in the domestic and transnational political contexts because these structures, for better or worse, have the capacity to formulate and articulate the needs of Roma to the broader community as well as to the state and inter-governmental organizations. Legitimacy has become a hotly contested issue in the international relations literature (Atack 1999; Clark 2003; Collingwood 2006). I am primarily concerned with legitimate representation as opposed to legitimate behaviour or authority; therefore, institutions are the key. Furthermore, I am not convinced by Weber’s understanding of the concept whereby the subjective perception of legitimacy is the crucial determinant. An individual’s perception of legitimacy is of no use because no normative yardstick exists with which to evaluate legitimacy claims. Transnational organizing structures of representation lack many of the characteristics used by liberal theorists to justify legitimacy’s exercise, such as democratic representation or accountability to the public. Collingwood (2006, 448) holds that ‘a legitimate government in the modern liberal sense is chosen by its citizens, operates within the limits of a written constitution or detailed customary and legal rules, and is expected to fulfil (within reason) its electoral promises.’ It follows that if transnational organizing structures of representation are

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representing and articulating the interests of Roma then they should be subject to particular rules or standards such as norms of transparency or accountability. The substance of legitimacy is quite distinct in the domestic and transnational political contexts thus a flexible understanding of legitimacy is required in order to accommodate both contexts. One of the key contributions of this book is to provide a clearer conception of who or what can legitimately represent Roma. However the concept of legitimacy itself needs some explication. Representation is often not enough on its own, there must be legitimacy too or else representation is a hollow structure. Legitimacy can be determined in a number of ways, the most obvious being that a person or institution is vested with a democratic mandate. One interpretation of legitimacy is provided by Nettl (1967, 261) who states that ‘traditional forms of legitimacy are characterized in terms of an analogy with the theatre; the relationship between rulers and ruled being presented as an actor-audience relationship.’ The classic contribution to the understanding of legitimacy as a sociological phenomenon was set out by Weber who argues that legitimacy is a willingness to comply with a system of rules regardless of how this is achieved. Following Weber, legitimacy means a belief in legitimacy, in other words, a belief in the right to rule. Weber identified three types of political legitimacy based upon: history and customs (traditional authority); the power of personality (charismatic authority); and a framework of formal, legal rules (legal-rational authority). A Weberian understanding of legitimacy considers a polity to be legitimate if the governed accept the fundamental norms and principles of the legal and political system (Merquior 1980). However, legitimacy is not a rule in and of itself as it cannot be objectively determined. This research understands legitimacy as part of a process involving social recognition and interaction (Tully 1995; Wiener 2007), because legitimacy is more than constituents following rules or obeying a charismatic leader. Social interaction, such as the creation of organizing structures of representation, brings in a community who share tacit understandings about appropriate and legitimate organizing structures of representation. When a population mobilizes, for whatever reasons, its cultural and social characteristics such as ethnicity acquire a new importance through the process of articulating interests in organizing structures of representation. With the emergence of formal organizations, a new type of Romani leadership has come into existence which has raised questions of legitimacy. Should leadership devolve from the traditional power structure (i.e. through familial ties) or from the constituency of a formal organization and from

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the state authorities (Jimenez 1995)? Mirga and Gheorghe (1997, 11) maintain that, ‘there is no doubting the legitimacy of leadership drawn from within the traditional power structure’. Nevertheless, these leaders are not usually well prepared for participation in the modern bureaucratic structures such as government and public administration. A modern and democratic leadership legitimized by the constituency of a formal organization is an ideal not yet well rooted in Romani communities. These understandings of legitimacy can only take us so far as legitimacy is more complex than an ‘X’ on the ballot sheet or obeying a leader. It is useful at this point to highlight two understandings of legitimacy: output and input.20 Output legitimacy refers to an organizing structure of representation’s capability to offer so-called deliverables to a community; for example, economic prosperity. Output legitimacy relies on rational inference based on tangible and measurable outcomes in which legitimacy can be reduced to performance. As a corollary, input legitimacy emphasizes the ownership which a community has over its representative institutions, and is dependent on this community being united by a common identity. Constituents thus have a stake in the decision-making process, without being in control of it. Decentralization is important for input legitimacy as constituents can participate directly in policy and decision-making which impact upon them. At a local level, constituents can become involved and this social recognition helps to foster legitimacy. Precisely because we are dealing with a process whereby actors can confer consent on an organizing structure of representation, it becomes equally important to conceive of a reverse situation whereby actors can dissent, or express their disapproval therefore deeming an organizing structure of representation to be illegitimate. Being embedded in a political context, interpreting interests based on the substance of Romani identity brings consensus, reciprocity and participation into the fold. In this sense legitimacy means a community having a stake in or access to those institutions which claim to represent them. Tully’s understanding of legitimacy comes from an inter-institutional dialogue where the conventions of mutual recognition and consent conspire to bring about legitimacy, ‘indeed, legitimacy [. . .] depends on this continuity, for it is the condition of Aboriginal consent to recognize them’ (Tully 1995, 124).21 Legitimacy is not a rule, but a value which comes about through interaction and practice. In this respect legitimacy is akin to a custom where Tully’s conventions of recognition and consent seem most relevant. As legitimacy is constructed through interaction in socio-political contexts and these relationships are based on tacit agreements of recognition, it is important to consider social processes such as mobilization which

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allow legitimacy to be constructed. Nettl (1967, chapter 9) maintains that mobilization impacts directly on legitimacy and points to the not necessarily exclusive processes of stalactite and stalagmite mobilization. Stalactite mobilization is ‘top down’ and the key actors are charismatic leaders, the military and the civil bureaucracy. Stalagmite mobilization is ‘bottom up’ and represents cleavage-based mobilization against or towards an existing authority and is a legitimizing function of a social movement. Romani political participation and representation is primarily stalagmite mobilization witnessed in the creation of organizing structures of representation above and beyond the state. A useful understanding of how to determine legitimacy has been provided by Atack (1999, 855–863) in his discussion of development NGOs where he cites four criteria: representativeness; distinctive values; effectiveness; and empowerment. First, representativeness is procedural and is based on modes of operation. In this respect, transnational organizing structures of representation can be legitimate if they are transparent, accountable and provide channels for participation. Secondly, distinctive values maintain that solidarity is a normative principle so legitimacy is based on shared interests and needs rather than coercion. Thirdly, effectiveness highlights the importance of programme deliverability and achieving goals, which can be described as output legitimacy. Finally, empowerment emphasizes self-help and self-reliance including collective decision-making. It is assumed that each is relevant to varying degrees when assessing the legitimacy claims of transnational organizing structures of representation working on Romani issues although the role of distinctive values may prove more fruitful given that it centres on the constitutive components of the community itself. Any attempt to define or confer legitimacy on a Romani actor or institution necessarily requires a degree of latitudinal interpretation. The legitimacy of non-Roma governmental agencies can be increased due to interaction and consultations with Romani civil society organizations on Roma-related issues. An understanding of legitimacy as it relates to NGOs has been elaborated, ‘having the right to be and to do something in society, a sense that an organization is lawful, proper, admissible, and justified in doing what it does and saying what it says, and that it continues to enjoy the support of an identifiable constituency’ (Edwards, M. 1999, 258). This understanding of legitimacy is useful as it emphasizes that NGOs, as organizing structures of representation, require the support of the Romani community in order to be legitimate. That is, legitimacy is conferred on an organizing structure of representation by a constituency particularly if the purpose of a structure is to represent an identifiable constituency. For NGOs, the key is to

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establish a relationship built on trust and recognition which can only be secured through informal and formal localized interaction. The underlying question is why are some institutions, organizations and individuals perceived as legitimate by Roma, and others not? Subjective perception of legitimacy is not enough in itself as legitimacy is a social construct which is conferred on organizing structures of representation. There are some elements in a society which influence the legitimacy of representation such as: authority; order; equality; justice; access; and shared understandings. However, each of these elements depends upon social recognition based on (inter) institutional practices. So, this situation is not dichotomized into structural legitimacy or agency legitimacy, and is instead a mix of both. Ultimately though, the agents (Roma) confer legitimacy on the structure (organization structures of representation), which is realized through political participation and engaging in socio-cultural embedded practices. Essentially this book examines institutional legitimacy, which can be determined in the domestic and transnational political contexts. Collinwood (2006, 447–448) lists seven sources of legitimacy which transnational actors make reference to: notions of justice; reference to international legal norms; impartiality – financial and political independence; an extensive membership; ‘giving voice’; expertise; partnership with powerful actors. The most relevant of these sources of legitimacy to Roma representation is ‘giving voice’ particularly since the Roma social movement (RSM) has stepped up its lobbying activities and involvement with norm-setting international organizations. In this respect, many Romani transnational organizing structures of representation justify their actions not in terms of democratic processes, accountability or transparency but with reference to specific values and interests. Since legitimacy is dependent upon societal interaction for its existence, I contextualize the social and political relationships within and beyond the state. By drawing up a framework which provides a structural connection between various factors such as mobilization and decentralization, the discussion can move away from output and performance-based legitimacy. One way to overcome the inherent difficulties in determining input legitimacy is to define the normative criteria for legitimacy, for example, by providing qualitative data in a broad perspective through reference to socio-political practices, while another is to outline what an organizing structure of representation could do to become more legitimate. I seek to determine who can legitimately claim to represent the interests of Roma but do not provide a succinct, rigidly defined and operational conception of legitimacy. It is maintained that this is necessary in order to capture processes such as ethnic mobilization, political participation, interest articulation and legitimate representation

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that necessarily occur across socio-political contexts. Asking ‘who speaks for Roma?’ does not go far enough because representation alone is a hollow structure, legitimacy is necessary to invest the structure with meaning. Therefore this research attempts to assess whether those who claim to represent the interests of Roma do so legitimately, something which has been largely absent from academic discourse on Roma. It is held, following Tully and others, that social interaction is key to creating legitimacy (Tully 1995; Wiener 2007) thus I concentrate on interactions for example, the creation of organizing structures of representation, and the articulation of shared interests as it occurs across socio-political contexts. Having established the contours of the book I will now highlight how minorities have been addressed in academic discourse, arguing that rightsbased approaches have dominated theoretical understandings of minorities, including Roma. This focus on rights has meant that the role of the state in guaranteeing citizenship and human rights prevails. Investigations typically assess whether certain states are fulfilling their international and domestic obligations to protect certain minority communities within their borders. However I argue that because of the focus on rights the role of interests has been ignored. The utility of examining interests instead of rights means that stalagmite mobilization and the role of Roma themselves can be inflated which yields a more nuanced and complete picture of Roma representation across political contexts.

Notes 1. Political representation denotes the duty of representing and articulating interests. 2. The term political participation is used here in the sense of a social activity, of taking part with others in some socio-political process and it is intended as a non-restrictive term meaning that it can be applied to all facets of public life. 3. This research maintains that interests are ‘articulated’, as opposed to ‘secured’. This is because articulation suggests that interests are verbalized and given concrete expression by organizing structures of representation, whereas securing interests is the final destination for interests. I am careful not to attempt to determine whether interests are secured or not, and under what conditions which would involve conceptual mapping of structural circumstance in a given political context. It is the initial moves of interest formation and articulation which are of primary concern. 4. Due to spatial constraints I do not examine Western Europe, although research on political representation of Roma/Travellers in the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, France and Germany would be a welcome addition to the emerging academic discourse in political science. 5. Both Hungary and Romania have signed and ratified the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) (1995) as well as the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992).

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6. While Roma are territorially dispersed they are unlike other transnational Diaspora, such as the Jewish community, because they lack a homeland. Roma are a nation without a territory. 7. For a more comprehensive understanding of theoretical approaches to ethnic mobilization see: Vermeersch 2006, 28–43. 8. The census figures in many CEECs are regarded as unreliable for this reason (Ringold et al. 2005, 1). 9. I avoid an exclusive theoretical focus on the creation of group identity. Suffice to say that identity can be held by individuals and groups. 10. The Copenhagen criteria (1993) states that EU accession states must guarantee ‘respect for and protection of minorities’. See: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/ intro/criteria.htm (accessed 10 May 2009). 11. See, for example, social movement theories which highlight the role identity plays in social movements (Cohen 1985). 12. While the region was a tinderbox of ethnic tension and conflict Roma never resorted to violence. See: Crowe 2008. 13. This is termed ‘stalagmite’ mobilization (bottom up), as opposed to ‘stalactite’ mobilization (top down) (Nettl 1967, chapter 9). 14. Article 7, ICCPR (1966). 15. The importance of political participation for minorities is outlined in Article 2 (2) and (3) of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992); Article 15 of the FCNM (1995); and Paras 33 and 35 of the OSCE’s Copenhagen Document (1990). See: Packer 1996. States certainly undertake duties towards minorities in the spheres of recognition, protection, and promotion (of identity) while sidestepping the altogether more thorny issues of substantive and procedural rights. For a discussion on political representation see: Pollak et al. 2009. 16. This is not to suggest that international law does not legitimize positive discrimination in the case of national minorities. See, for example, Article 4 FCNM ‘(2) Parties undertake to adopt, where necessary, adequate measures in order to promote, in all areas of economic, social, political and cultural life, full and effective equality between persons belonging to a national minority and those belonging to the majority.’ 17. For a detailed discussion on political participation in international law see: Fox 1992. 18. The OSCE’s Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life (1999) are not legally binding but represent strong political commitments. 19. Explanatory Report on the FCNM, Council of Europe (1994) 10, Strasbourg, November 1994, Para. 80. 20. This binary has become a sine qua non in most academic discussions on legitimacy. For further see: Scharpf 1999, 2–28. Scharpf provides an understanding of input and output oriented legitimacy as they relate to democratic governance in the EU. 21. The social dimension of Tully’s understanding of recognition is highlighted by Wiener 2006, 419–420.

3 Ambivalent Discourse: Rights-based Theories on Minorities Introduction Research on minorities requires a better understanding of political participation and representation and it is argued that a clearer, though not necessarily fixed, conception of political participation and representation would allow researchers to pursue selected investigative trajectories based on more specific analytical assumptions. The minority and Roma rights literatures have treated political participation and representation differently to the extent that an accurate understanding of each has become lost among wider philosophical debates on the status and protection of ethnic minority groups. This chapter unpacks the relationship between rights and interests, maintaining that both are distinct concepts but interests are more useful in uncovering patterns of mobilization across political contexts. It begins by analysing the dominant rights-based approaches to minorities before exploring the rights and justice-based approaches to minority protection and argues that representation can only be understood as being of interests, rather than persons before discussing the similarities and differences of rights and interests. Finally, I introduce four key concepts which are applied to the three subsequent empirical chapters.

Rights-based Approaches to Minority Issues A right is an entitlement to act or be treated in a particular way and can be divided into either legal or moral rights. Minority and Roma rights are essentially moral rights, meaning a moral claim to social justice and

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equality, which have been increasingly codified in international law, and sometimes in domestic law. Rights can be further distinguished between positive and negative rights (Schwellnus 2005). Positive rights are rights that impose demands on others, and particularly the government, in terms of the provision of resources or support. Negative rights are rights which impose restrictions on the behaviour of others, including the government and society. It is worth mentioning that the substantive content of both minority and Roma rights discourse is a mixture of negative and positive rights. Certainly, political participation is a basic human right as is the right to adequate representation, that is, the right to take part in political processes, and the right to represent and to be represented. Both the minority and Roma rights literatures have inflated the importance of rights more generally, at the expense of other values, notably interests. Rights constitute a person and endow her with the capacity to execute her distinct equal status in a society, whereas interests are held by individuals and groups and can be differentiated between proximate and ultimate interests. These interests generate a spark when they are represented or articulated on behalf of an individual or group. The failure of both these literatures to address the role of interests in any meaningful sense has resulted in academic discourse being characterized by an over-emphasis on rights. Because of the contractarian emphasis on duties and responsibilities the main actor has invariably been the state, for rights are a conduit for the mutually constitutive relationship between the state and its citizens. The rights-based literatures conceive of minority ‘problems’ which need to be solved, rights therefore become a tool to fix any number of pre-defined ‘problems’. This has negative implications and has resulted in the discourse directing all attention to the reactive role of the state in rectifying minority issues (Zoon 2001). The key point is that rights are accorded (secured and given), whereas interests are intersubjectively constructed and articulated by the group themselves. How one conceptualizes the academic literature on minorities is significant, as the literature is often reflective of the actual situation. The discourse on minorities, as well as the separate discourse on Roma, is a rights-based approach which centres on the role of the state in bringing about fundamental change for these persons. This means that minority rights are not accorded for any other reason besides civic duty. These special rights are usually bestowed on minority groups because of the disadvantageous social position they find themselves in relative to the rest of society, or because of past perceived injustices thus it follows that the rights accorded to

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Roma shares the same reasoning. The state is the authoritative polity which accords rights, be they individual or collective, negative or positive, human or citizenship.

Minority Rights: Analytical and Cultural Presuppositives Minority rights theorists are primarily concerned with whether society should recognize, accommodate or protect certain minorities within the demos. The understanding in this instance is that a democratic society will always look after the interests of the majority of the people, most of the time. Minority rights theorists often begin by asking what a minority is (Packer 1993; Gál 2000; Potier 2001) – attempts to define this group have proven to be notoriously difficult (Capotorti 1977; Deschênes 1985) – before setting out to define the ethics of recognizing, accommodating or protecting diversity (Glazer 1983; Gutmann 1994; Taylor 1994). Among minority rights theorists there is a tacit understanding that minorities must be dealt with in an appropriate way. Indeed, if no recognition, accommodation or protection is accorded to minority groups, this absence of rights must be based on sufficiently reasoned arguments. The most common among such arguments holds that minorities do not require any special rights because individual members of a minority group have access to the full catalogue of human rights (Kymlicka 1995). These human rights are universal and encapsulate all individuals irrespective of race, gender, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation and so forth. The behemothic liberalcommunitarian debate which has emerged in this discipline is, however, of little use in providing analytical insights into what is essentially the right to political participation and to be represented. In attempting to rationalize an issue area as complex as minority rights, theorists have proposed different solutions. The academic discourse on minorities might focus on more searching philosophical questions including why there should be rights for minorities, arguing that minority groups can secure their rights through international human rights law (Thornberry 1991; Steiner and Alston 2000). Other issues which minority rights theorists tackle include the existence of cultural rights (Kukathas 1995), ethnic conflict resolution (McGarry and O’Leary 1996; Pentasuglia 2001; Weller and Wolff 2005) and variations of group-differentiated rights, as well as preferential treatment (Edwards, J. 1999). Minority rights theorists expend much effort debating the virtues of group-differentiated rights or special rights which minorities ought to enjoy due to past perceived injustices.

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Such a rationale maintains that it is the state’s responsibility to rectify a minority group’s disadvantageous social position, and most of this debate has centred on preferential treatment.1 The central dilemma of preferential treatment is that it appears to bestow benefits on people for arbitrary reasons arguing that anti-discrimination legislation alone is not enough to redress socio-economic and political inequalities. Preferential treatment is essentially a group-based practice aimed to compensate or to provide equal opportunity (Edwards, J. 1999, 149) which sustains the adage that equality cannot be achieved by treating everyone the same (Cohen 2005, 1). Ethnicity, in and of itself, does not automatically require rights claims of any sort and if such claims can be derived from ethnicity, it must be by virtue of discriminatory treatment that they endure because of ethnic identification. Ethnicity therefore cannot be understood as an objective category which demands rights. Such an argument reasons that Roma could demand rights because of how they are treated by the state and society, their socio-economic and political exclusion, and negative perceptions of Romani identity. Suffice to say that rights can be accorded to a minority group by virtue of being a minority (in the sense that they are numerically inferior and occupy a non-dominant position) as well as how they are treated and their specific needs. Roma are treated differently because of their ethnic identity and thus can command certain rights from the state because of this. Even a wealthy Rom can suffer discrimination and exclusion because of the perception and negative association of Romani ethnicity. One way to change perceptions and stereotypes is through a positive affirmation of ethnicity in public institutions. Perhaps not surprisingly, ethnic groups are disproportionately represented in all public institutions. For example, Fiscus (1992, 27) claims that all groups have a right to a representative in all offices, positions, jobs etc. that is ‘the same’ as their representation in the population as a whole.2 But it is impossible to determine what fair representation is and such an approach would hold that if Roma had ‘the same’ representation then this would somehow alleviate their problems which it most certainly would not. In addition, it is important to note that when dealing with Roma, the issue of fair and adequate representation is further complicated by the fact that there are no reliable statistics on the actual number of Roma in many states, or indeed a willingness of Roma to declare themselves as such. To summarize, the core problem with research on minorities lies in the fact that it treats these groups as minorities. While this may seem obvious, it is worth pointing out that according to prevailing understandings in the

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academic discourse minorities only exist in a relational sense, that is, when compared to majorities. The identity of a minority group is constructed and affirmed in relation to the different qualities and experiences that they share with the majority meaning that a ‘social group exists and is defined as a specific group only in social and interactive relation to others’ (Young 1995, 161). Of course, a minority is more than just a numerically inferior group in a non-dominant position. It possesses an identity which is constructed through intersubjective interaction both with the majority and with each other. It is through these interactive processes in which prevailing narratives and meanings of group identity are created and contested. Having been informed by the dominant liberal paradigm, rights discourse has been primarily concerned with the relationship between the individual and the state. As traditionally understood, the purpose of the human rights project is to erect barriers between the individual and the state, so as to protect human autonomy from being violated by state structures. This is one of the reasons why minority rights discourse usually places the state at the centre of all analyses. It is the state which guarantees individual and special rights, but due to this focus on the state, other competing actors are sidelined. Particularly the role of the minority group in mobilizing around its ethnic identity to secure more appropriate and adequate organizing structures of representation is neglected in rights-based approaches. It is more beneficial to approach minority issues in a locally generated, context specific milieu. Moreover, minorities themselves create organizing structures of representation which are, or at least should be, beyond the remit of state responsibility and authority.

A Rights versus Justice Conception of Minority Protection Demands for rights and justice are frequently articulated by ethnic minorities through political processes but rights and justice must be analytically separated in order to account for divergent interpretations in these ‘post-material goods’ (Inglehart 1990). The literatures on minority rights and Roma rights have always maintained that their respective subjects are united by a common identity. This a priori supposition has resulted in minority and Roma rights discourse being characterized by a focus on rights and duties with little or no attention being given to issues of interest articulation, justice and political process. I start from the view that minorities in general and Roma in particular, are not united by a common identity. Indeed, I problematize this common assumption and hold that identity and

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interests can be analytically related through reference to ethnic mobilization and political participation. It would appear, prima facie, that there is a direct link between the minority and Roma rights literatures, as both begin from the ontological assumption that the subjects are united in a common identity, and crucially they are concerned with rights, as opposed to politics or interests. However, ‘rights get defined, refined, protected and respected through various political processes which allow them to be tailored to particular contexts’ (Bellamy 2001, 57), while justice is secured through normative reasoning. Therefore the role of institutional and organizational structures is inflated to take account of these political processes which the rights-based literatures negate. In the process of transforming the demands of actors (inputs), into policy (outputs), several institutions may be involved including political parties, civil society organizations, the legislature, the executive, the courts and the bureaucracy, all of whom are components of the political system. Minority rights – as a social, political and legal concept – is found in a multitude of political contexts, from international organizations, to nation states, to sub-state governance structures. It can be found in academic discourse, political debates, international law and governmental initiatives. A minority is usually understood to mean an ethnic, religious, political or other group which are in a non-dominant position vis-à-vis other groups in society. A right is typically understood to mean what is morally good, legal or proper and is synonymous with privilege, duty and responsibility. Taken together we can deduce that minority rights are claims made by minority groups which enable them to enjoy or have access to certain privileges which they would not normally enjoy given their social, political or economic marginalization, relative to other groups within a society. While there has been rights-based research conducted in certain areas particularly in Central and Eastern Europe (Jovanovic 2002; Singh Inder 2002), most academic discourse focuses on international and regional organizations, treaties, instruments and laws.3 Thornberry (1991, 7) demonstrates the ambiguity of minority rights, ‘some minority rights look like process rights (the development of identity and culture, the education continuum); others look like civil and political rights – speech, worship, participation, names, contacts across frontiers.’ Therefore the rights accorded to minorities are manifest in a number of institutional fora, which only political processes can take account of. Ethnic mobilization results in the creation of diverse, though not necessarily competing, organizing structures of representation and governmental strategies to address minority protection. These include:

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minority self-governments; the granting of territorial or cultural autonomy to minority groups; the funding of activities and organizations of national minorities; the introduction of particular forms of affirmative action, guaranteed representation, or consultation of minorities in governmental institutions; and the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction (Vermeersch 2003b, 1–2). Each organizing structure of representation created by Roma is a microstructure which is part of the larger macro-structure of the Roma social movement. I make no attempt to pass judgement on the correct policy path which governments pursue in Hungary and Romania, rather I offer a means to understand how Roma of Hungary and Romania have mobilized around their ethnicity, to articulate their interests and the impact this has had on political participation and the organizing structures of representation in these states. As a further step the transnational political context is examined in which different organizing structures of representation have been constructed by Romani élite. Minority groups must balance competing struggles for inclusion on the one hand and differentiation on the other. Minorities want to be integrated into society without being assimilated and they also want to be recognized as different by retaining their cultural or ethnic affiliations. Both of these struggles make demands for recognition (Taylor 1994; Tully 1995; JacksonPreece 2005, 162) as well as distribution and justice. Ethnic mobilization, as a crucial component of a social movement, necessarily creates organizing structures of representation through which the interests of the minority may be articulated. The Roma social movement struggles in the sense that they mobilize for change in their socio-economic circumstances, protection of their culture, access to political structures and to re-affirm their identity. Like every social movement they attempt to effect change (although this is always non-violent), and assert their right to be different and not be persecuted because of this difference. Tilly (1978) maintains that struggle is an essential component of the political process in which to secure full citizenship. However citizenship rights such as civil, political and social rights (Marshall 1950; Turner 1990) alone are not sufficient because without full access to these rights they are meaningless to those who occupy an unequal position in society. The utility of rights can be located in an individual and as well as a collective dimension. Communitarian approaches to minority rights place an overly strong weight on the homogeneity of communities and the amount of agreement on conceptions of the ‘good life’ which these communities

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pursue (Bellamy 2001, 54). While Roma share interests, these are multiple and shifting because they are not a bounded internally homogeneous group. In this respect it is important not to underestimate politics as some rights-based theories do, as only politics can account for social processes and social change. As Bellamy (2001, 54) notes ‘though communitarians give more weight to political deliberation than rights-based models, both versions hold such deliberation assumes and promotes consensus on the good through explicating shared understandings, thereby abstracting from the very circumstances of dissent that make politics necessary.’ It follows that dissent is likely to arise because actors in a given political context do not share common experiences or a normative framework, and this is the case with Roma who are not united by a common identity. I start from the view that rights-based theories of minorities negate political processes and an understanding of soft institutions such as ethnic identity and interests. The concept of ethnic mobilization helps to demonstrate that these soft institutions are intersubjectively constructed and find expression in organizing structures of representation. Minorities constantly struggle for concessions, such as rights, from the state, however a focus on interests emphasizes the specific role of the Romani community and their understandings of justice. Minorities engaged in social movements find themselves in a paradoxical situation. On the one hand they want to be recognized, respected and treated equally, but on the other hand, they demand the right to be different which cannot be accommodated by liberal-individualist ideas on justice.

Citizenship Rights and Roma Roma are, ultimately, citizens of the states in which they reside and this includes every state in Europe. When they vote at the national and local elections, it is assumed that Roma are represented too, as they constitute part of the vote-wielding public. However without actual access to citizenship rights, Roma are not full citizens. Indeed, gaje often perceive the interests of Roma as diametrically opposed to their own, and vice versa. Marshall described citizenship as three sets of rights: civil rights to liberty and equality before the law, the political rights to vote and to participate in the political processes, and the social rights to participate fully in the way of life that is shared by the citizens as a whole (Marshall 1950; cited in Sobotka 2002). However, more recently the concept of citizenship and thus political participation has remained insensitive to groups from diverse

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backgrounds such as women and ethnic minorities (Sobotka 2002, 4). It follows that states must provide opportunities for minority groups to access formal political structures and provide the space and capacity for minorities to create alternative informal political structures. Since the 1990s human rights groups and advocacy organizations defending the rights of Roma have framed their arguments with reference to the discrimination of Roma in all spheres of life. The ability of Roma to access citizenship rights is impeded by societal marginalization, discrimination and persecution which Romani communities continue to endure. Sobotka (2002) correctly argues that even if Marshall’s core elements of citizenship, consisting of civil, political and social rights were implemented, members of minority groups can still find themselves excluded from the full enjoyment of citizenship, that is, political participation. But political participation is more than when Roma simply have a ‘voice’ in the policies and decisions which affect them. A crucial aspect of this participation is representation and articulation of interests. In this view, the state would no longer be the central focus but one of many actors ensuring more adequate representation for citizens, including members of minority groups (Hindess 2001, 103). I argue that other actors would include élite, political parties, civil society organizations, transnational advocacy networks and international Romani NGOs. The political mobilization of Roma is the most obvious response to the current situation of exclusion from the political processes (Barany 1998). Ethnic mobilization has taken place in the past and has resulted in the establishment of organizing structures of representation through which Roma can articulate their interests. However, ‘mobilization alone does not suffice to overcome the numerous barriers facing Roma in the political sphere’ (Russinova 2003, 5). In order to tackle the accumulated problems faced by Roma throughout history, a situation which is complicated by the lack of a critical mass of Roma in politics and a dearth of instruments to compensate for this structural weakness, more than grass-roots action is required (Russinova 2003, 5). From the early 1990s, Roma have been one of the most active social movements in Central and Eastern Europe as regards political participation. Collective action repertoires range from local or national elections, campaigning, membership of political parties, creation of community-based organizations, advisory bodies to government, demonstrations, symbolic acts, letter writing and monitoring the implementation of governmental policies. Sobotka (2002) contends that throughout the 1990s, most Romani leaders were attracted by this form of political participation,

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mainly civil and transnational society-based participation. As a result, the formal political processes in the guise of periodic elections and political party representation, suffered. Romani élite found themselves buffered by the winds of countervailing forces, such as negative stereotypes, racism and hostile political actors, which conspired to exclude Roma from the national assembly and other formal political structures. The only path open to Roma was civil society which was at once inward looking (focusing on the needs and interests of Roma) and outward-looking (towards the sympathetic third parties such as the international political community and private donors). The impact of this approach was that the state was often by-passed but it is the state which guarantees citizenship rights. There are two important and relatively distinct ways of approaching Roma issues from a theoretical point of view which have informed governmental and international policy towards Roma issues. These are the ‘social integration’ school and the ‘racial discrimination’ path of thought.4 First, the social integration school maintains that Roma are just un-integrated into the mainstream society and they need to be forced to pursue education and to work, becoming full citizens in the process. The crucial issue here is that Roma should be assimilated into wider society and the results will no doubt be beneficial for the majority of the population. The social integration school has its roots in the Enlightenment movement of the eighteenth century, but it was continued by different social currents including half a century of communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe during the twentieth century. This school of thought resulted in Roma being framed as ‘natives’. These ‘natives’ are considered to be primitives therefore civilized people have the moral duty to take these ‘primitives’ to the level of Western well-being. Communist leaders maintained that it was possible to transform Roma into new and improved members of society, through forced sedentarization, education and employment (Stewart 1997b). Nowadays, politically correct attitudes prohibit such an overt pursuit of the social integration school of thought, and have been replaced by the more transparent euphemism of ‘social inclusion’, continuing the Enlightenment tradition nonetheless. The paradigm of liberal individualism promotes an assimilationalist ideal because it condemns group-based exclusions and discriminations. This school of thought argues that people should be considered as individuals only, and not as members of a group therefore there exists no categorical group-based differences among persons. So, following this line of reasoning, law and formal institutions make no distinction among persons, and ensure moral and political equality. Certainly the socio-economic exclusion of Roma is pervasive across CEECs; the danger

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is that the preservation of cultural identity is negated or side-stepped in favour of policies which target health, education, employment while language and cultural interests are left out in the cold. It is an unintended irony that the current efforts of the World Bank, Open Society Institute and several governments of Central and Eastern Europe are the offspring of the same ideology, an ideology where there is no place for ‘Roma interests’, only ‘Roma problems’ (requiring obviously, ‘solutions’). The World Bank’s Decade of Roma Inclusion (2005–2015) focuses on housing, employment, education and health care; therefore the main problems of Roma are related to poverty (e.g. illiteracy, lack of skills, poor housing), and these problems may be solved by financial assistance from the World Bank and good will from enlightened political leaders of CEECs, usually under the watchful eye of the EU. Attempts have thus been made to integrate Roma into the fabric of society and the institutions of the state; however, their ability to access citizenship rights has not yet materialized. Notably most current efforts to integrate Roma across CEECs are generated by external pressure rather than domestic political will. The second school of thought concerning theoretical approaches to the situation of Roma in Europe is the so-called racial discrimination one, which is largely embraced by the most radical Romani activists, and it has its roots in the soil of Romanticism. Contrary to the Enlightenment, the Romantic attitude toward Roma places emphasis on the liberty of their culture and lifestyle. The origins of such a thesis stems from Rousseau and the Romantic idea of the bon sauvage. In this perspective, Roma are considered to be uncorrupted by mainstream society, and they represent the salt of the earth meaning that the ‘Roma problem’ is not the fault of Roma themselves rather it is the gaje-constructed world which conspires against them. It posits that Roma live in a society which is inherently racist and intolerant of alternative cultures and so discriminates against them which means Roma are unable to attend school or secure adequate employment. The ‘racial discrimination’ school of thought maintains that Roma are under-represented in central and local institutions because of negative perceptions of their group identity. As regards their political representation, they emerge as objects of manipulation and victims, and not active players, though this does appear to be changing. This institutionalized racism has many consequences including an increase in social stigma experienced by Roma resulting in less Roma identifying themselves as Romani in the national census, and the fact that many Romani high-achievers prefer not to present themselves as Romani as they fear their ethnic identity will hinder them as individuals, in accessing employment for example. A Rom

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who is well educated and/or wealthy will still face discrimination due to perceptions of her ethnicity and could be refused access to goods, facilities and services. A word of caution is required here. Despite compelling evidence of its existence, pointing to racism is fraught with unintended consequences. Activists and advocates might explain the situation of Roma as a product of racism, embedded in institutions and public attitudes, and apportion blame accordingly. But this allows governments to deflect blame away from social processes which create racism, which cannot be understood as an objective category or something which exists. Racism thus becomes a tangible ‘thing’ which permeates society but even the concept of anti-racism can become a hindrance to political progress in this field because it fetishizes the concept of ‘race’ (Gilroy 1987). The situation of Roma is much more serious than that of other minorities in Hungary and Romania. The issues that they are facing (organizational, social, educational, sanitary-medical, occupational, housing, discrimination etc.) are so multiple and multi-faceted that there cannot be quick-fixes. These issues are the same ones faced by the majority of the population in Hungary and Romania too, but what makes the situation of Roma more pronounced is they must deal also with racial discrimination due to their ethnic identity in their day-to-day lives. One thing is certain though, determined measures are required to significantly improve the situation of Roma in Hungary and Romania. Far from being only a matter of ‘social integration’ or ‘racial discrimination’ the Roma issue is extremely complex. In the transnational political context, no model exists to accommodate Roma interests. Roma are treading on unchartered territory, taking opportunities if and when they arise, learning as they go, and creating organizing structures of representation is an obvious way for Roma to improve their lot. It follows that Roma pursue various avenues and access different organizing structures of representation to articulate their interests.

Political Rights and the Pursuit of Representation A conflict arises in the academic discourse as to how representation should be defined. First, political representation can be understood in narrow terms, as in the mandate in the legislature and/or the executive at central and/or local level. Secondly, participation in public affairs understood in broader terms includes: participation in local or national elections; campaigning; membership in political parties; advisory bodies to government; human rights activism; or community organization. Mirga and Gheorghe (1997) point out that the term ‘Romani representative’ is implicitly given a

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broader meaning than merely elected officials, due to the lack of elected Romani leaders. I would argue that under the rubric of ‘Roma representative’ fall civil society activists and advocates, traditional familial/clan leaders and governmental advisors, all of whom lack a democratic mandate yet such structures impact on the capacity of Roma to have a voice in the public sphere. States that have well-designed democratic political institutions are more successful at managing conflict and resolving political grievances, especially those that relate to national minorities. Accordingly, the design of the political institutions and the electoral system in particular has an important role in ensuring effective participation in public life. Electoral systems can be specifically constructed to address the needs of particular groups in society. By way of illustration, reserved seats for a particular minority may ensure representation for this community but unless the underlying processes and mechanisms such as funding, training and education are provided, that representation may have little impact. In most parts of Central and Eastern Europe in the post-communist period there has been at least, and often at most, one Romani representative elected to the national assembly on the party list of a mainstream political party. In some instances, such as in Romania for example, Roma have a single reserved seat guaranteed by a constitutional provision. However, the practice of placing one or two Roma representatives on national elected bodies has legitimized tokenism in Roma representation. While Romani representatives, whose placement on mainstream party lists is often advertised as an expression of the goodwill of the party to tackle problems facing Roma, have increased the chances of a given mainstream party winning Romani votes, their recruitment to the respective party has almost never resulted in any meaningful role in shaping the party’s policy agenda with regard to Roma. Conversely, these representatives often complain that they are only expected to voice their opinions on Romani issues alone. Nor has the presence of Roma in mainstream political parties guaranteed any commitment by the respective party to Roma policy. The inclusion of Roma in mainstream party lists is perceived by outsiders to be motivated by political calculations rather than a true commitment to formulating appropriate policy, tailored to the interests of Roma. Political rights and legitimate representation cannot be measured by the existence of laws guaranteeing democratic principles rather account needs to be taken primarily of the citizen’s capability to exercise these rights (Russinova 2003, 5). Of course, a rule lies in its (social) practice in that ‘practice is, as it were, a continual “interpretation” and reinterpretation

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of what the rule really means’ (Taylor 1993, 57) thus the state should fulfil its primary obligation to guarantee equal rights for all citizens. In the case of Roma, this duty often translates into preferential treatment policies to tackle racial discrimination in all spheres of social life, as well as policies targeted at increasing the participation of Roma in public life, through actions such as political education programmes to change embedded attitudes among party leaders and members, promotion of Roma minority candidates for public office, and voter education. With this in mind it becomes clear that Roma need to be the instigators of their own destiny. If it is left to the state then they could only expect the lowest common denominator. It is not in the state’s interests to provide adequate representation structures for Roma which are actually reflective of their demographic weight. It is important to remember that it is not always about what the state accords Roma, crucially Roma must create organizing structures of representation themselves, through mobilization. Romani NGOs are one of the fundamental expressions of this (stalagmite) mobilization but are not as apolitical as one might expect. Romani political parties should not be viewed simply as ancillary institutions but they have thus far failed to construct a coherent platform due to their fragmented group identity which impacts negatively on their capacity to mobilize broad support across the Romani electorate, and a political élite characterized by competition and factionalism. Additionally, a contested nationalism based on territorial and cultural claims, which motivates other ethnic communities is absent from Roma political party rhetoric (McGarry 2009a). As a political principle, representation is a relationship through which an individual or group stands for or acts on behalf of, a larger body of people. But representation is more than simply representing a constituency rather it is more appropriate to conceive of representation as being of interests. Interests are constructed and shared by a group who share an identity. In the case of Roma this is problematic, because the group identity of Roma is contested which impedes the formulation and articulation of shared interests. It has often been assumed that representative democracy constitutes a limited and indirect form of democratic rule, provided that representation links government and the governed in such a way that the citizen’s interests are effectively articulated or their preferences secured.

Representing People and Representing Interests Legitimizing representation is a problem which the modern polity faces and this research attempts to deal with the issue of representation through

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a normative enquiry. The fundamental questions are: ‘Are Roma legitimately represented by X?’ and ‘Does X articulate the interests of Roma?’ These are questions of what should be, or is, actually represented. Pitkin (1968, 39) argues that there is a difference within the category of practical representation between what we might call the form and substance of representing, between the question of whose official, authorized representative a man is, on the one hand, and the question of who he really acts for, consults, looks after, is responsive to in practice, on the other. Does a representative represent individuals, or do they represent personal interests, sectional interests or class interests? Moreover, is it possible to represent an individual or indeed aggregated individuals in a polity? A representative might look after another person’s interests, if these were clearly known, but they could hardly formulate another person’s will. Society is composed of sections and groups with overlapping memberships, therefore a person is an individual but also a member of a ‘bundle of interests and affiliations’ (Birch 1971, 78). In this view, political activity reveals neither a fundamental harmony of interests nor a fundamental conflict, but an oscillating series of clashes and compromises. It is widely assumed among political theorists that a conflict of interests in society is inevitable and will lead to the development of factional disputes on political issues. Since the dominance of one faction, however large or small, over others is considered undesirable steps must be taken to avoid this, most notably, through the establishment of organizing structures of representation. Due to the existence of sectional interests, compromise and negotiation is always necessary. Political scientists who have tried to explain political behaviour simply in terms of group pressure have been found wanting because agency alone cannot capture the subtle nuances of political activity. As Birch (1971, 87) explains, ‘equilibrium is never achieved in the political system, as it has to give account not only to actual pressures for sectional interests but also for potential pressures for general interests.’ This continuous disequilibrium between representation and the Roma social movement suggests that representation is constantly negotiated through social interaction and is not something which is ever conclusively attained. Liberal theorists consider representation as being ‘of individuals rather than corporate bodies, interests or classes’ (Pitkin 1972, 190) but this ignores the social dimension to the political identity of an individual, a view

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advanced by Aristotle. The representation of people does not necessarily mean the representation of all people; accordingly, I argue that it is more appropriate to conceive of representation as being of interests, rather than persons. It is held that one person or group cannot represent a society but one person or group can, in principle, represent the shared interests of a society. Interests are intersubjective, multiple and shifting alignments and are something which groups have in common. The key distinction I make is that the represented are not unique individuals, but repositories of interests. Needless to say, ethnic minority groups will often share some but not all of the same interests. Individuals cannot represent the will of others but can represent the common purposes or goals of an association, and therefore can act for a group. Interests are more than aggregated units which reach a tipping point and must be addressed. All societies have a universal interest which is simply the sum of all the interests of the various members who compose the society. Each person has proximate (self-regarding and private) and ultimate (social and universal) interests, but which ought they pursue?5 For example, a Rom will have proximate interests (such as securing education for her daughter), and ultimate interests (such as the alleviation of poverty). These are specific to her ethnicity in that they are informed by and constructed through reference to her ethnic identification. Rationalists maintain that only self-seeking proximate interests matter, whereas communitarians hold that, we are social animals therefore ultimate interests are more important. Organizing structures of representation can only articulate shared interests which are intersubjectively constructed by the Romani community, therefore these structures cannot articulate subjectively held proximate interests. The implication being that a Romani political party or civil society organization, can only articulate interests which are held by many Roma. A communitarian understanding of politics and society helps to understand the Romani community’s relationship to the majority. Sometimes a section of society is systematically discriminated against on the basis of their ethnicity and/or ‘race’ and come to understand themselves as a targeted population or community. For instance, Simhandl (2006, 106) points out that the EU explicitly links the discrimination that Roma face to their ‘way of life’, that is, their ethnicity. The result of these processes of oppression can be that more attention is placed on community needs rather than on the needs of individuals or sub-groups. In practice, this often means that the ‘representation of minority ethnic communities in the public sphere functions in accordance with “racial” and ethnic stereotypes’ (Burlet

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and Reid 1998, 273). This can provoke reactions such as passive resignation whereby the group simply accepts this practice and acquiesces or they can use ethnic identity to create a positive self-image which they can project onto the majority in order to change their attitudes. The problem of representation can be summarized thus: if ‘to represent’ as an activity is to have substantive meaning, it must be ‘to act in the interest of ’ or ‘to act according to the wishes of ’ but by definition no one can really act for or represent another in public affairs.

Rights versus Interests The academic discourse on Roma, and on ethnic minorities more generally, focuses on the rights which those groups in a disadvantageous position should enjoy and how nation states are failing in their obligation to guarantee special rights. These literatures share a similar departure point in that they start from the supposition that minorities, including Roma, are often marginalized and it is the state’s responsibility to rectify past perceived injustices. The minority and Roma rights literatures consider that the responsibilities that fall to the state are required by various international and regional standards, which the state signs. Invariably these are rights which ethnic minority groups should enjoy. However, due to a focus on rights, the literature has worked through a catalogue of duties on the state and therefore has failed to give credence to the role of interests. By working through a directory of rights researchers have consistently shown that some states fail to fulfil their international obligations with regards to minority protection, and proceed to document the reasons why this phenomenon persists, and the aggregated effect on minority groups (Gál 2000). This is hardly surprising because actors in government who represent the majority of the population tend to suppress interests that they deem less important. So both the minority and Roma rights literatures, while skirting around issues such as equality and justice, concentrate on the state’s shortcomings in attempting to secure rights for minorities. These literatures have also failed to take account of the interests of the minorities themselves. When interests are brought into the equation, they are centred on the state’s interests to enact certain pieces of legislation or policies, and how this maps with the rights of Roma. If rights and interests are the same, which many in the field assume they are, then we will always be left in a situation where the state is the key actor, that is, its role is to secure those rights and interests. However, if rights can be pushed to one side then a focus on a minority’s interests can demonstrate how

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minority actors mobilize around identity to articulate interests with a view to securing rights. This research argues that a stronger focus on the interests of Roma can help uncover interactive processes and understandings which the rights-based literature ignores. Both rights and interests share some qualities: they are both held by minorities; they are treated as a means and an end interchangeably in the literature; and both carry a degree of oughtness in a moral sense. The differences are more prevalent and telling: rights are seen as the end-point as far as policy-makers, élite, advocacy networks and researchers are concerned, whereas interests are assumed from the outset. Rights are ‘collectively conferred and designed to promote collective interests’ (Sunstein 1995, 336) so they are protected by social institutions for social reasons. It is worth asking whether interests serve as a catalyst for rights, or if the reverse is true? Both require social interaction to be realized but actors mobilize around their identity to articulate their interests, whereas they struggle to secure their rights. Rights are conferred on communities whereas interests are intersubjectively constructed by the community in question: Roma are not allocated their interests, they must define them. The idea of shared interests is obviously capacious, therefore a movement will split into numerous trajectories, but each trajectory has the same goal – an enhanced representation structure to articulate their interests. Interests, like rights, are often not served on a plate by benevolent majorities eager to do the ‘right thing’, and we should not expect such altruistic activity. It requires ethnic mobilization voiced through organizing structures of representation to make others, such as state structures and international organizations, take notice. A common thread emerges – representation and participation of minorities are vital to articulating interests. Due to the focus on rights which ought to be secured, the literatures on minority and Roma rights fail to accommodate the interplay and relationship between a minority, mobilization and representation. Of key concern for this research is how the minority representation is actualized, which means examining the political participation of Roma. Any attempt to assess the political participation of Roma has fallen short of the mark because either political participation is treated as a monolithic structure/institution to secure certain rights, or the academic discourse points out that the political participation of Roma is inadequate, and sets out to uncover the reason why this situation has arisen. The focus of this research is to examine the ways in which political participation has been used by Roma to articulate their shared interests.

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I draw a distinction between proximate and ultimate interests. Proximate interests are held by individuals and relate to those interests which are of primary concern to an individual while ultimate interests are held by a group. Normally these interests are pursued for the benefit of the group as a whole and are more far-reaching and wider in scope than proximate interests. For example, one of the ultimate interests of Roma is the effective enforcement and monitoring of anti-discrimination. It is worth remembering that proximate and ultimate interests are not mutually exclusive and are often complimentary and there can be many interests held within a supposedly homogeneous group. This book is more concerned with ultimate interests which will be termed shared interests6 to highlight their intersubjective quality because certain fundamental shared interests ‘cannot be reduced to distinctly individual concerns’ (Heinze 1999, 29). Suffice to say, an organizing structure of representation cannot articulate proximate interests as these institutions are created to articulate the shared interests of the Romani community. Due to the concentration on the interests of Roma, some analytical explanation is required. I do not treat interests as means to an end, that is, Roma do not mobilize around specified interests to achieve political and legislative objectives, rather, interests serve a dual function. First, contextualizing interests helps us to understand how Roma organize politically, and secondly they determine their preferences and needs, that is, what they want. In order to subjugate the concepts of identity and interests, it is necessary to place them in a broader discussion of ethnic mobilization and representation structures. Identity, by its very nature, suggests a cohesive quality to unite a group. In the case of the Roma however, identity is fragmented in the sub-national, national and transnational contexts. Identity becomes important when we bring interests into the fold, and try to understand how an ethnic minority mobilizes around identity, however fragmented, and articulates its interests. I endeavour to show that, in the case of Roma, identity and interests are mutually constitutive. The first crucial task of the empirical research is to determine what the interests of Roma actually are in each context. Interests are intersubjectively constructed by actors because they do not exist ‘out there’ in the world and as such must be created and negotiated. However, it is not always Romani actors who define and articulate the interests of this community because very often non-Roma (PER 2001; PER 2006) or un-elected actors claim to represent the interests of Roma, which raises questions of legitimacy. On the surface the interests of Roma, like many minority communities,

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would appear to be linked to socio-economic issues such as anti-discrimination and anti-racism policies, and access to adequate housing provisions and education. Indeed, successive Hungarian and Romanian governments (as well as international organizations) have often framed Roma policies as being guided by these interests. Interests and representation structures often reinforce each other since the routines of policy-making are usually designed to reflect a particular set of ideas about what can and should be done in a sphere of policy; therefore, I examine the relationship between interests and representation structures. Because these representation structures are organizing it suggests a process whereby this mutual constitution is constantly shaped and renegotiated. Therefore organizing structures of representation are malleable and adaptive in order to articulate multiple shared interests at any one time capturing the heterogeneity of the Roma social movement. We can, therefore, ask how political participation is analytically linked with shared interests? As this chapter has demonstrated, Roma need to participate in political life to enable the articulation of their shared interests. Political participation is a right which Roma enjoy, and through political participation, Roma secure representation to articulate their shared interests. In the following empirical chapters, it is necessary to determine what the shared interests of Roma are in Hungary, Romania and the transnational political context, and how they pursue representation through ethnic mobilization and political participation. The sparse attention which is given to interests in the Roma rights discourse usually treats interests as an a priori assumption. Normally, the research follows a similar path, Roma have interests (often confused with rights) such as health, educational and economic opportunities, yet states fail to realize these in adequate ways. Invariably, the discourse then examines the whys and wherefores of this regrettable situation however interest formation and articulation are sidelined. Contemporary academic discourse does not demonstrate how Roma mobilize around their interests. Since it has been established why Roma mobilize around their interests, the question really becomes how do Roma articulate their shared interests? This requires an analysis of organizing structures of representation and processes of political participation located in domestic and transnational political contexts. Before embarking on the empirical investigation it is useful to revisit the four key concepts which will be applied to each case study: ethnic mobilization; political participation; interest articulation; and legitimate representation. These concepts focus the research and provide a reference through which to make sense of the domestic and transnational political contexts.

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Key Concepts I employ four concepts which are used both analytically and functionally to help uncover understandings on the relationship between identity, interests and representation as it relates to the Roma social movement in the domestic as well as transnational political contexts. These are: ethnic mobilization; political participation; interest articulation; and legitimate representation. Furthermore, as pragmatic tools these concepts help ensure the research remains disciplined and focused as the empirics are consistently referred back to these concepts to unearth relevant information. The chapters on Romania, Hungary and the transnational political context each concludes with an analysis of these key concepts, specifically by discussing how the empirical data enhances understandings on each of the concepts, and vice versa. Ethnic mobilization results in the creation of diverse though not necessarily competing organizing structures of representation. Roma in Hungary and Romania mobilize around their ethnic identity, to articulate their shared interests, which are informed by their ethnic affiliation. For example, the shared interest of addressing discrimination is directly linked to the persecution Roma face as a result of their ethnic group identity, which in turn affects the ability to gain employment. Ethnic mobilization is a key component of the Roma social movement which emphasizes grass-roots or stalagmite mobilization, and so relegates the importance of material resources and structural conditions which makes mobilization more or less likely. Here Roma use their ethnic identity as the stimulus to create organizing structures of representation and this ethnic identity acts as the glue for the macro structure of the Roma social movement. Political participation is used here in the sense of a social activity, of taking part with others in some socio-political process. Political participation is the most obvious way for Roma to articulate their interests and address pertinent legislative, cultural and socio-economic issues. The quantitative increase in the number of organizations and individuals engaged in public political activity over the last 15 years has coincided with the dramatic decline in the living conditions and social status, that is, the interests of most of Roma (Kovats 2003). The obvious conclusion is that Roma politics is ineffective in articulating the interests of the Romani community. Considering their demographic weight, Roma are disproportionately represented in domestic and transnational political structures. There are different modes of political participation including élite, political parties and civil society organizations because establishing Roma representation is

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problematic therefore a variety of organizing structures of representation are considered. I focus on interest articulation rather than ‘securing’ interests as the latter would necessarily involve analysing structural conditions which would make securing interests more or less likely in a given context. Furthermore, articulation suggests that interests are verbalized and given concrete expression by organizing structures of representation whereas securing interests is often the final destination. It is the initial moves of interest formation and interest articulation which are of primary concern. Society is composed of sections and groups with overlapping memberships, therefore a person is an individual but also a member of bundles of interests and affiliations. In this view, political activity reveals neither a fundamental harmony of interests nor a fundamental conflict but rather an oscillating series of clashes and compromises. Interest articulation denotes a process which involves many voices being heard. It is posited that ethnic identity, mobilization, representation, interests and legitimacy are related, and the goal of this research is to understand that relationship, and the actors and institutions involved. Interests have remained a matter for conjecture in political science and international organizations’ discourse, and this has resulted in inadequate organizing structures and policies in the domestic and transnational political contexts.7 The interests of Roma are often assumed by policy-makers and decision-makers therefore they have been increasingly been defined in cultural terms, as a matter of discrimination, rather than by identifying the causes of and effectively addressing the considerable objective problems faced by many Roma including poverty, health and unemployment. Crucially, the interests of Roma are intersubjectively constructed by the Romani community themselves, which means that only Roma can define these interests. Governmental policies and agencies must consult with the Romani community (through their organizing structures of representation) in order to be attuned to the needs and interests, tailoring policy accordingly. One of the chief tasks of my research is to find a way of establishing the actual interests of Roma, before determining who or what articulates these interests, then ascertaining whether they can claim to do this legitimately. The interests of Roma can be established through reference to constructed discourses namely: the mandates of Romani civil society organizations, legislative interventions; interviews with prominent Romani actors who work in governmental and non-governmental institutions; and the state’s interpretation of Roma’s interests can be uncovered by analysing Hungary and Romania’s policies towards Roma since 1989. Of course,

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different sources present competing conceptions of the interests of Roma but it is presumed that dominant themes and issues can be identified. By examining ethnic mobilization, political participation and interest articulation it is expected that patterns of social interaction and legitimate representation can be uncovered. A broad understanding of both legitimacy and representation must be employed in order to accommodate the diverse political contexts and organizing structures of representation employed in the research. The tension between establishing a rigid definition of legitimate representation and a broad definition to accommodate these diverse structures is noted. To overcome this issue, both legitimacy and representation must be understood as ‘giving voice’ to the Romani community. Legitimacy cannot be measured, rather the Romani community decide whether organizing structures of representation are legitimate or not. Therefore, since legitimacy is dependent upon societal interaction for its existence, I must contextualize the social and political relationships within and beyond the state. Without legitimacy, institutions are hollow structures indeed the issue of legitimacy for Roma representation has gained in importance, ‘the legitimacy issue remains key, since it is a prerequisite for full recognition of a Romani partner for dialogue, consultation, and decision-making’ (PER 2002, 30). Having laid the conceptual framework attention now turns to the case studies. I selected the case studies of Romania and Hungary although other states in Central and Eastern Europe would have yielded interesting results. With the carrot of EU accession, all states in Central and Eastern Europe have elaborated national policies to help integrate minorities, and several have established policies targeting Roma, though with varying degrees of success. As outlined previously Romania and Hungary have attempted to integrate their minorities in innovative ways yet Roma continue to lack a clear voice in public life which is at least contiguous with their demographic weight.

Notes 1. Preferential treatment is distinct from affirmative action. While affirmative action is usually a legally sanctioned practice which respects the criteria of merit, and sets only targets, preferential treatment is much more widely proscribed, and deals with quotas. Preferential treatment is the most well-defined and extensively used group practice aimed at one or more minority group (Edwards J 1999, 155). 2. Affirmative action measures have been quite controversial in the United States and have created unintended consequences in that the ‘innocent victim’ invokes sympathies

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from the majority. See Fottrell’s (1999, chapter 8) discussion on the 1978 case of Regents of the University of California v Bakke. 3. There has been an accumulation of academic writing and research examining the role of international and regional institutions as they attempt to manage minority rights and much of this research has focused on the EU. The legal dimension of the EU’s minority rights policy has been detailed by legal scholars, who, by and large, find the EU’s system lacking when it comes to minority protection. Invariably, this research has followed a descriptive and historical format, and involves normative reasoning. See: Amato and Batt 1998; De Witte 2000; Toggenburg 2000; Pentasuglia 2001; Johns 2003. More recent analyses have focused on legal implications; see: Vizi 2005; Toggenburg 2006 and shifting EU minority policy; and see: Schwellnus 2004; Guglielmo and William Waters 2005. Other research has highlighted the EU’s inability to foster a succinct minority rights policy, and one which falls short of the mark: Schwellnus 2001. 4. My thanks to Dan Oprescu for pointing this out. Personal interview with Dan Oprescu, senior advisor in Romanian National Agency for Roma, Bucharest, Romania, 27 September 2005. Dr Oprescu’s comments are his own and do not reflect the views of the National Agency for Roma. 5. People often believe it more important to consider the well-being of others before the advancement of personal or proximate interests. Most prefer their proximate interests but ‘it is the job of the legislator to punish people’s self-regarding actions, and reward their social actions so the latter becomes more desirable’ (Pitkin 1972, 199). It does not mean that proximate and ultimate interests are mutually exclusive. Indeed, there is an argument that anyone’s true interest is their share of the public or ultimate interest and when they pursue their proximate interest they are misguided. 6. This is due to semantic preference. I make no distinction between shared, collective, group and mutual interests. 7. Kovats (2001a) points out the negative impact of the CoE’s and OSCE”s presumptions of anti-racism as the prevailing Roma interest.

4 Who Speaks for Roma? Organizing Structures of Representation in Romania1 Introduction Romania houses an active and vibrant Romani community which has seized the opportunity to develop organizing structures of representation since the collapse of communism.2 The state too has responded to the needs and interests of Roma who make up at least 3 per cent of the Romanian population,3 and are geographically dispersed. The case study of Romania presents some interesting legislative innovations which are unique to this state and impact directly on how Roma mobilize politically, and articulate their interests through organizing structures of representation. Despite mobilization efforts, Roma remain woefully under-represented in public life (Roma occupy two seats out of 334 in the Chamber of Deputies, despite a population between 3 and 10 per cent). Furthermore, the contentious ‘Law on National Minorities’ which contains provisions for cultural autonomy continues to struggle through parliament and remains un-codified. I hypothesize that political decentralization increases the legitimacy of Romani representation (H1) and that due to inadequate organizing structures of representation in the domestic political context, transnational Romani activity increases (H2). It will not be possible to address these hypotheses comprehensively in this chapter alone as the transnational organizing structures of representation must be examined in Chapter 6 before H1 and H2 can be sufficiently evaluated. This chapter applies the political concepts of ethnic mobilization, political participation, interest articulation and legitimate representation to better understand the situation of Roma representation in Romania. I begin by outlining the interests of Roma in Romania

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before examining the role of élite in representing Roma and articulating their interests. In Romania, a representation system exists whereby all officially recognized national minorities are guaranteed one seat in parliament for an élite to occupy by virtue of the fact they are an ethnic minority.4 Additionally, NGO leaders and Romani activists have been appointed to advisory and consultative positions within state institutions. An analysis of ethnicity-based political parties is then detailed before the role of civil society organizations as a means to articulate the interests of Roma is uncovered. Finally, a conclusion elaborates on the key concepts of ethnic mobilization, political participation, interest articulation and legitimate representation.

Interests of Roma in Romania It is necessary to identify the interests of Roma in Romania before the legitimacy of organizing structures of representation can be assessed. It is important that the interests discussed here are not exhaustive, but several key shared interests appear to have more prominence than others when a variety of sources (including policy documents, legislation, activities of NGOs and interviews) are analysed, that is, certain shared interests and general themes can be identified. It has been argued that the ‘living conditions of Roma has deteriorated in the post-communist period; violence against members of the community; as well as widespread prejudice had become more and more frequent’ (Caluser 2008, 43) which has made the specification of Roma interests and the creation of representation structures to articulate these interests all the more acute. There have been a number of internationally sponsored programmes in Romania which have identified the key interests of Roma. However, demographic and social statistics, including statistics in income and living conditions, need to be further developed in order to be of use to both policy-makers and civil society.5 Understanding the cultural, political, ethnic and linguistic needs particular to Romani communities are crucial in order to protect their specific identity and their contribution to the multicultural Romanian heritage, as well as to anchor this ethnic minority within contemporary society. The main interests of Roma must be distinguished from ‘problems’ facing Roma requiring, of course, ‘solutions’. This rationale has informed much of the domestic political debate on how to deal with Roma, and is often framed in negative terminology. By design politics must be more than checklist problem-solving because it needs to provide a discourse for struggle and debate. Interests serve a dual function: they help to determine the conception of the ‘good life’ which Roma have

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for themselves; and they demonstrate how Roma organize themselves politically. There are three broad approaches to conducting research on Roma in Romania by public bodies as well as by academics6: (1) the socioeconomic approach which starts from the idea that the Romani community is confronted with problems related to poverty and difficulties in securing adequate living conditions; (2) the relationship with authorities approach which deals with aspects related to a presumed institutionalized discrimination against Roma in their relations with public authorities; (3) the identity approach which considers the traditions and culture of Roma which constitute this group and their identity. While I touch upon aspects of all three approaches, the identity approach is considered particularly relevant because the negative association of Romani identity actually informs their relative socio-economic position and the embedded discrimination which they face. So, if we understand Roma as possessing shared interests, which are inextricably linked to their ethnic group identity, then the debate moves beyond simplistic checklist-solving and into more pragmatic ways of macro-management for the domestic political élite as well as for the Romani community themselves. The main shared interests of Roma are education, health, employment and social affairs including housing, and political participation. While these are overtly socio-economic and political this does not diminish the importance of cultural interests and identity for Roma. The interests of Roma have been determined by examining the mandates, publications and activities of Roma NGOs, interviews with prominent Roma élite and activists, document analysis of research institutes, programmes of international organizations and international donors, and through domestic discourse analysis for example, the National Strategy for the Improvement in the Situation of Roma (hereafter the ‘National Strategy’). The ‘National Strategy’ was adopted in 2001 and is a detailed programme that addresses the multi-faceted experiences of Roma, incorporating measures at the central, municipal and local government levels. The ‘National Strategy’ was elaborated with the help of the Working Group of Roma Associations whose consultations with the government began in 1998. Each shared interest is considered in turn. First, the level of formal education and professional qualification of the Romani population is generally low. According to the Education Law,7 Romani students can learn Romani language and Romani history and culture courses upon request which helps to sustain and perpetuate their cultural heritage. It is worth noting that without a minimum of Grade VIII education, Romanians cannot legally be hired by any employer and procure a work card (Carte de Muncă) which ‘theoretically entitles the holder

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to a pension, unemployment and health insurance as well as a median wage established by the government for that particular type of employment’ (CEDIME-SE 2001, 43). By promoting equality in education and giving equal opportunities to Romani students at all levels of education, graduates should be able to secure employment on completion of education.8 So these interests are often intertwined and therefore should not be dealt with in isolation, meaning that efforts should be geared towards addressing all shared interests.9 While the benefits of an education are primarily felt by an individual, there is also a diffused benefit to Roma education as it helps to create an intelligentsia, one which is notably absent at present and impedes development in other socio-economic and political areas. The mere existence of rights, including rights to education, is not sufficient because without access to these rights, they are meaningless. A disconnection between the substance and purpose of these rights on the one hand and the practical capacity to access these rights on the other is symptomatic of the more general situation of Roma in Romania. Secondly, improvement in their access to health services such as community health vaccinations, advice on family planning, providing of health-related information, supporting pregnant Romani women and new born children, and solving identification problems10 are a key shared interest of the Romani community. The ‘National Strategy’ focuses on the need to improve access to public services for Roma (Zoon 2001). Some Roma are excluded from public health care ‘by virtue of the fact that they lack birth certificates, identification cards, or other proofs of residence’ (CEDIME-SE 2001, 27), so the shared interests of access to adequate health care and identification documentation are closely linked because one cannot be effectively addressed without the other. Health mediators who work in local Romani communities are vital to address the issue of identification as they can determine who has and who has not got the necessary documentation, and help them acquire these documents with the help of Romani NGOs, such as Romani CRISS. Thirdly, social inclusion, assistance and equal opportunities between the majority and minority are of paramount importance to Roma. Social inclusion programmes should as a matter of principle, include all vulnerable persons if structural inadequacies are to be addressed and full social rights are to be enjoyed. By fighting discrimination in hiring Romani candidates11 and giving financial support for small and medium enterprises owned by Roma, inequalities are addressed through economic development. A significant element of social inclusion and assistance relates to housing and studies have shown that higher levels of education are associated with

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better housing conditions (OSI 2006, 65). Access to adequate housing has become a contentious issue for Roma (Berescu and Celac 2006) and arguments have been levelled at the government by Romani NGOs that there have been attempts to ghettoize Roma. Romani ghettos are located on the outskirts of urban areas and lack adequate sewerage and sanitation, which in turn creates health problems. Furthermore, ‘exclusion or excessive distance from other settlements, public services such as quality schooling, postal services, healthcare and other urban facilities are crucial for quality-of-living standards’ (European Commission 2004, 25). Of course, segregation is a breeding ground for contempt as it reinforces previously held pejorative stereotypes, and exacerbates socio-economic divergence. Finally, the equal and active participation of the Romani population and civil society is required for legitimate representation and the articulation of interests. While some believe that Roma should be proportionally represented in parliament in line with their demographic weight, this idealistic view sidesteps more pertinent issues such as establishing the appropriate proportion. Roma representation is controversial since there seems to be no unity or consensus among the different Romani groups on how it should be realized. Political participation is low at local and national level and can be partly explained by low levels of education and high levels of poverty. One of the most important aspects of the ‘National Strategy’ is its focus on the political participation of Roma. In particular, these measures call for the establishment of local structures with Roma representatives to implement the ‘National Strategy’ and ensure it meets the needs of individual Romani communities. These measures have the potential to institutionalize Roma representation in local governance to create a powerful network of Romani civil servants and to capitalize on the increasing number of Romani civil servants and Romani university graduates. However, many of these offices have not yet been able to exert a significant influence on decision-making processes as their activities and responsibilities in relation to other governmental bodies remain ambiguous. As a community, Roma are slowly realizing they must mobilize and organize politically in order to articulate their shared interests. This is impeded by the absence of an intelligentsia who know how to articulate their interests and can vote, train others and create new representation structures. As one activist points out, ‘We need diplomats, we need lobbyists, we need advocacy, we need think tanks.’12 The example of the Hungarian community in Romania is often used to illustrate how a minority can be effective if it has an intelligentsia ready and able to engage in the structures of politics on its behalf. This is impeded by the fact that many Roma who are educated

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choose to assimilate and not to self-identify as Roma due to the discrimination and racism which they could face. These shared interests have one common dimension: access.13 It is access to education, housing, healthcare and the labour market which is of concern to Roma. One way to address the issue of access has been to provide affirmative action and preferential treatment, for instance, guaranteeing university places for Romani students. However, access to public goods is hindered because of the poverty and racial discrimination which most Roma are disproportionately affected by. While reducing poverty levels in Romania is an interest of all Romanians more generally, it is a specific shared interest of the Romani community. Social justice, marginalization and stigmatization of Roma are key interests which need to be addressed as they can help break the vicious cycle of poverty-exclusion-discrimination and elevate the Romani community’s self-image. Roma have a negative image in mainstream society which means discrimination has become a major problem. Measures to prevent discrimination were enhanced by the adoption of Law 48/2002 (previously 137/2000) on the elimination of all forms of discrimination. This legislative intervention includes a broad definition of discrimination on grounds of ethnicity, race and gender, and stipulates equality in economic activity, employment, access to legal, administrative and public health services, access to education and the right to personal dignity.14 The National Council for Combating Discrimination (NCCD) was established in 2002 as part of the ‘National Strategy’ and is dedicated to eradicating all forms of discrimination and injustice. While this institution is for all citizens of Romania, including other national minorities, the bulk of cases brought before it concern Roma.15 National minorities in Romania have their own interests usually related to the preservation of culture and language, and do not face widespread discrimination as Roma do. Of the other 19 national minorities in Romania, 18 are demographically small and only the Hungarian community has a comparable population size however, it has been able to mobilize politically, possesses an intelligentsia, as well as a kin state to lobby and advocate on its behalf. In what way can we understand interests as they relate to representation especially since participating in public life and securing representation is a specific interest of ethnic minorities? One shared interest of Roma is to gain access to the organizing structures of representation to actually articulate their shared interests. It is worth pointing out that a hierarchy of interests does not exist indeed the interests of Roma are constructed and constituted by their ethnic identity. Moreover, formulating interests in this way leads us down a cul-de-sac, wherein the rationalist understanding of

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interests prevails. If there is a hierarchy of interests, then some are deemed more important than others in a given space and time, therefore the interests concerned can be used strategically by motivated actors. I maintain that shared interests are intersubjectively constructed by actors who share a common ethnic identity. In this respect the Roma social movement mobilizes around its ethnicity to articulate its multiple and shifting shared interests. Very often actors will engage in a social movement where they receive no direct and tangible material benefits through this community activism or advocacy. If they were self-seeking rational individuals motivated by proximate interests they would not get involved in community activism (Gutmann 2003, 124), and would pursue individual material interests. Those involved in the Roma social movement tend to be educated compared to other Roma and signify only a small proportion of the Romani community. Clearly, there exists numerous shared interests and this section only details some of the most pertinent. These interests are often intertwined and are articulated by several organizing structures of representation including Romani élite, political parties and civil society organizations.

Élite Representation of Roma There are a number of individuals and élite who claim to be political representatives of Roma in Romania. Those élite are considered in turn due to their respective prominence in political life. The term ‘representative’ denotes an agent or spokesperson who acts on behalf of his or her principal, much like a lawyer or ambassador. However, following Birch (1971, 18), ‘a political representative is a person who, by custom or law, has the status or role of a representative within a political system,’ whose job it is to ensure the authoritative allocation of values in a society. In the case of ethnic minorities, this person often symbolizes the identity or qualities of a group of people meaning that they share a common ethnicity. A political representative does not act on behalf of a principal rather they represent and articulate interests that a group of individuals share. It is assumed that because ethnic minorities are united by a common ethnicity, they hold many of the same shared interests. It is perhaps more accurate to conceive of political representatives as representing bundles of interests and affiliations rather than as spokespersons in the strictest sense. The description of elected members of a political assembly as ‘representatives’ is ‘best understood as a specialized usage of the term, not exactly equivalent to any non-political usage’ (Birch 1971, 19). The essential

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characteristic of such persons is the manner of their selection, not their behaviour or characteristics or symbolic value. This raises questions about how one understands elections. Is an election a formal procedure or an expression of freedom of choice? Indeed should the elected assembly be a social microcosm of the nation reflecting a spectrum of communities and groups, each sharing specific interests? Advocates of this view have suggested that an assembly cannot be properly representative of the nation if its social composition is conspicuously different from the electorate. A public authority, such as a local or national assembly, derives its legitimacy from the process of election which its members have gone through. Nowadays election by popular vote is the source of legitimacy that appears to command the most respect, as those elected receive a ‘mandate to govern’. The legitimizing function of elections can also be found when representatives are appointed rather than elected thus in political systems where nepotism is rife, leadership legitimacy is generally regarded as low. As a corollary where meritocracy is the norm, legitimacy is generally seen to be high. Elections vest the representative in parliament with the legitimacy to articulate the interests of their constituents and to ensure that policies and legislation have the necessary input of a sectional interest so that they reflect society as a whole. Significantly, there is no nation state in which free elections based on suffrage have produced an assembly which could be fairly described as a social microcosm of the nation. Following Pitkin’s (1972, 209) useful definition, ‘representing here means acting in the interests of the represented, in a manner responsive to them,’ it follows that in an elected parliament the interests of the minority will always be sidelined by the interests of the majority. A universalistic approach to representation and citizenship cannot accommodate difference and has led to calls for special political representation for minorities (Young 1990; Kymlicka 1995). It is assumed that elected representatives are capable of rising above the promotion of their own proximate interests in order to articulate the shared interests of their constituents. If politics is more than balancing group pressures, the elected representative, insofar as (s)he is a policy-maker, must act as rather more than a delegate. If an elected representative of Roma successfully articulates the interests of Roma then (s)he will be re-elected back into public office. Previous Deputies include: Gheorghe Răducanu 1992–1996; Mădălin Voicu 1996–2000; Nicolae Păun 2000–2004; 2004–2008 and 2008–present, each of whom relied on the constitutional provision to attain their seat, having failed to attain the 5 per cent threshold. It is worth noting that each of these parliamentarians has come from the Roma Party

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(Partida Romilor) which changed its name to the Social Democrat Roma Party (prior to the 2004 elections), before settling on Roma Party ProEurope (from 2006). To reduce confusion, this political association will be referred to as the Roma Party Pro-Europe (RPPE). In the 2008 parliamentary elections two Roma were elected for the first time: Nicolae Păun secured his third term of office while Mădălin Voicu was elected on the Social Democrat Party (SDP) party list. Sometimes gaining access to representation means that a Rom must stand on the party lists of mainstream political parties. In Romania, as elsewhere, adding a Rom on the party list is not going to win many votes from the majority of citizens but can help secure the Roma vote in an area with a dense Roma demography.16 This also means that Roma are often not re-elected as these individual Roma are swallowed up in the agendas of their political parties. These individual Romani parliamentarians find it extremely difficult and frustrating to make any sort of impact on the policy-making process and also to articulate the interests of Roma as they are not sufficiently empowered. As Petrova explains ‘the typical phenomena is that if a Roma is elected they only serve one mandate because they failed to meet the very high expectations of their own supporters. That is why they cannot get a second mandate.’17 It is this failure to articulate the interests of Roma which will impact directly on their time spent in public office. The ability of Roma to articulate their shared interests is crucial because representation concerns interests and not advocacy. If Roma are unable to articulate their interests through an institutional structure, then they cannot be considered full citizens as they are not being represented. A representative of the people does not necessarily mean a representative of all the people. An elected representative who secures a seat in parliament on an ethnic ticket represents the interests of that ethnic group, and also society at large, with the idea that accommodating diversity is a goal of most societies. Such a representative does not just represent the shared interests of that ethnic group, so representation of an ethnic minority is not necessarily dependent upon a common ethnicity. There are many individual representatives who could claim to articulate the interests of Roma but they are usually primarily affiliated to an organization or institution at a local level. There is no doubt that these individuals fulfil an important role in society however their reach is localized and specific so it is difficult to argue that they can articulate the interests of the Romani community. The lack of legitimated political leaders is one of the greatest challenges facing the Romani community at a local level (Bleahu and Frunzaru 2005).

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The relative power and authority which traditional leaders exert over local Romani communities must be considered if we are to fully appreciate diverse organizing structures of representation that claim to represent Roma. While the bulibaşa is the informal leader of traditional Romani communities such as the căldărari, argintari, spoitori, cortorari, their status is usually dependent on charisma or wealth and is hereditary, an example of Weberian legitimacy. At first sight, these potestal institutions appear to fall beyond the scope of reasoned political analysis; however, they become relevant because they can influence who the Romani electorate votes for in local and national elections.18 While the bulibaşa is a localized phenomenon, there have been instances when certain individuals have proclaimed themselves to be ‘International King of the Roma’ or ‘The Emperor of all Roma Everywhere’. However even these leaders acknowledge that the authority of the bulibaşa is waning and some have even attempted to legitimate themselves by accessing national political structures. For example, Florin Cioaba, the ‘Roma King’ formed the Christian Centre of Roma in Romania, and ran in the 2000 national elections for the Chamber of Deputies securing 12,171 votes (Ionescu and Cace 2006, 35). Furthermore, Florin Cioaba is one of the four Romanian delegates to the ERTF, a transnational organizing structure of representation affiliated with the Council of Europe. All ethnic minorities in Romania (who are registered and members of the Council of National Minorities)19 have the right to one representative in the Chamber of Deputies, although the Hungarian minority regularly surpasses the 5 per cent threshold. Nicolae Păun, who is the President of the RPPE, is one of two Romani representatives in the Chamber of Deputies having attained 43,884 votes (down from 56,076 in the 2004 elections), while Mădălin Voicu secured 6,385 votes, coming first in his precinct.20 Mr. Păun is the President of the Romani political association which gained the most votes; however, he attained his seat through the aforementioned constitutional provision. It is difficult to predict how and whether a minority parliamentarian can articulate the interests of Roma, even if (s)he can lay claim to some source of legitimacy by virtue of election. Perhaps most significantly, his interventions in parliament are primarily related to Roma such as the commemoration of those Roma who perished in the Holocaust21 and the celebration of International Roma Day.22 The character, background and behaviour of Mr. Păun are not of primary concern to my research because this is a normative enquiry asking whether an élite (as an individual) can legitimately articulate the interests of Roma.23 It is assumed that should there be a change of Romani representation in the

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Chamber of Deputies at the next elections, that this enquiry would be no less relevant. At the governmental level, the National Agency for Roma (NAR) is charged with policy-making and its role is to consult with government on a range of issues related to Roma. Gruia Bumbu is the President of the NAR and is a State Secretary, therefore a Deputy Minister, but acknowledges that Roma are not sufficiently represented in public life.24 While some commentators are sceptical as to its power and purpose, it is the one institution which could claim to articulate the interests of Roma at the governmental level. It consults with the government on policies and decisions which affect the Romani community directly; however, the NAR simply does not enjoy the resources or authority required to fulfil its function adequately (ECRI 2006, 30). If it is to be more than a token institution for Roma representation or a shop window for external observers then it must be given competences which reflect its elevated positioning. Furthermore, it is the institution itself which is of primary concern when dealing with representation, as the NAR is more than the sum of its parts, therefore Bumbu’s successor will have no more or less legitimate claim to representation than he does, providing that the structure and capabilities of the NAR remain the same. Another question which arises is whether non-Roma (gaje) can represent Roma or not? And if so, do they do so legitimately? This is a pertinent, but prickly, question as it essentially asks if whether legitimacy is dependent on sharing an ethnic identity. Very often there are struggles of power in local communities and this is usually for traditional institutions of representation, who are Romani. At a national level, individuals can claim to represent Roma and articulate their interests yet have no Romani cultural characteristics or even speak Romani. Significantly, there is no non-Romani individual who occupies a prominent position in public life who could legitimately claim to articulate the shared interests of Roma.

Monopolizing Roma Representation First of all, there are no ethnic minority political parties in Romania though political NGOs and organizations do exist. Horowitz (1985, 291) maintains that an ethnic political party is a political formation which oscillates between a classic political party and an interest group, gaining support from a specific ethnic group(s) to serves their interests. The situation in Romania concerning the legal status and formulation of national minority organizations is complex. While the organizations are technically NGOs,

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they are also permitted to run in parliamentary elections to receive one of the seats set aside for the national minorities who fail to attain the 5 per cent threshold. Under Romanian NGO law, only three persons are required to form an NGO25 and there is no special certification procedure to ensure that a national minority organization is actually constituted of that minority. This occurs not only because of the allocated parliamentary seats for minorities but also because under Romanian political party finance law the state distributes funds for any party/organization that runs in the election (Decker and McGarry 2005, 19). So, how is it possible for NGOs to have a political character? Minorities have an ‘extra right in order to rectify problems of representation’,26 therefore national minorities are accorded a seat in parliament which does not apply to other political parties. This does not mean that non-minority parties have fewer rights. Rather the democratic system dictates that the majority is always favoured; therefore, positive discrimination gives minorities a voice which would otherwise be drowned out. Minorities have different views (preferences and interests) that are stronger than any political affiliation. The rationale being that minorities require a special status where their representatives are somewhere between a political party and an NGO, which does not impact on freedom of association. The fact that an NGO can be elected to the Chamber of Deputies is not considered to be an issue or even worthy of debate for minority politicians, academics and activists. The strength and utility of civil society comes from its independence as a public space which often assumes the form of an articulated system of decision-making, negotiation and representation (Melucci 1992, 10). In Romania, there is no separation of the civil and political spheres of society when it comes to minority participation and representation. While Romani NGOs are clearly ‘political’ in the sense that they are committed to action to combat discrimination and promote moral and political norms which are embedded in society, they should not be political associations that compete for state power (Steiner 1991, 70). Indeed an NGO’s inability to remain detached from political life will impact on its claims to legitimacy, particularly since in Romania the RPPE receives state funding as a group represented in parliament. This lack of autonomy and independence vis-à-vis the state impacts negatively on the credibility and legitimacy of the RPPE. After 1989 many political organizations were set up including: the Democratic Roma Union; the Ethical Federation of the Roma; the Roma Party; the Roma Union. Romani élite split for a number of reasons including ‘mutual distain, suspicion, in fighting and a marked inability to reach

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compromises’ (Barany 2001, 3). Fragmentation characterizes most movements meaning that there may be agreement in terms of goals but disagreement on how to achieve those goals. The Romanian government’s partnership with a single political organization, the RPPE has raised concerns about marginalization and exclusion of other organizations (OSI 2002, 480). The ‘National Strategy’ created the position of local experts in Roma affairs who work within the Mayor’s office,27 but these experts have mainly been appointed on the proposals made by the RPPE, without regard to standard hiring procedures or taking into consideration proposals from other representatives of Romani civil society organizations (Weber 2001). Another perceived problem is that many of these so-called Roma experts are not ethnically Romani. While it is debatable whether a non-Roma can represent Roma, the issue here is that there exists an increasing pool of Romani graduates and activists ready and able to fill these positions yet if they are not affiliated with the RPPE, they may not be hired. The RPPE has come to be accepted as the sole (and authoritative) representative body for the highly diverse Romani population, failing to take into account the expertise and experience developed in Romani civil society. Any objections that the government is overly reliant on the RPPE have been routinely dismissed because there is no other political association which can claim its electoral legitimacy or demographic reach. This issue is compounded by the fact that those organizations which are represented in the Council of National Minorities (and therefore in the Chamber of Deputies) receive an annual stipend, as well as other facilities and resources. These funds help to secure future electoral success and thus perpetuate the cycle of national (and, therefore, local) representation, ensuring that the RPPE have the resources to launch effective political campaigns. The government legitimizes its Roma policy (i.e. its initiatives, decisions and strategies) by consulting with the RPPE but no other Romani political association is given credence which means that the government only hears one Romani voice. The lack of pluralism is a worrying aspect of ethnic politics, ‘pluralism should not be construed to produce a “Sorcerer’s Apprentice” phenomenon of plethora organizations, voter’s choice is at the heart of democracy’ (Venice Commission 2004, 10). As one might expect, there have been several attempts to challenge the supremacy of the RPPE over the years but all challenges have failed for a number of reasons, mainly due to the ability of RPPE to secure votes through their superior organizational capabilities. Their representatives are visible at all political levels so most Romani voters see the RPPE as the only option. The RPPE are regarded by government as

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being the sole legitimate voice of the Romani community; therefore, the shared interests articulated by RPPE are given the most credibility at the national level. While the RPPE does not have a carte blanche to articulate whatever interests it sees fit, the interests it does articulate are highly dependent on the opinions of senior officials within this political association. Factionalism and fragmentation are issues which all social movements must contend with at some stage or another (Mason 1989, 41–58). While diversity of opinion is at the heart of all civic democracies, this issue is magnified with minorities due to their oft substandard positioning in society. It is frequently assumed that ethnic minorities are bounded internally homogeneous communities with stable group identities meaning their interests are assumed to be uniform because they share the same ethnic identity. When new associations begin to form, they are not created for the sake of it, rather they fulfil a specific function, and they articulate a shared interest of the community which they claim to represent; otherwise, any fledgling group will not survive. Tellingly most of the Romani political associations were created at democracy’s first breath between 1990 and 1992 and since then the propensity to establish Romani political associations has dissipated (Ionescu and Cace 2006, 35–36). The absence of mainstream political will coupled with the factionalism of the political élite in the Roma social movement conspire to hamper attempts to improve the representation of Roma. Moreover, the government’s reliance on a single political organization has given rise to concerns that other organizations have been effectively excluded therefore I shed light on alternative forms of representation outside of the conventional political channels which Roma create to articulate their interests, providing a better understanding of how Roma are disproportionately represented. Related to this, arguments have been raised that government’s dependence on one political organization to represent all Roma political and civic associations has led to a fragmentation of the Romani community’s NGOs (OSI 2002). Through each election, all political organizations representing the Romani community cumulate in less than 1.4 per cent (this peak was in the 1996 elections) of the total national votes.28 Support for Roma candidates in the 2008 elections dwindled meaning that in a political context where Roma compose at least 3 per cent (and up to 10 per cent) of the population, we can deduce that some Roma were either not voting or were transferring their vote to another party. The Romani electorate have always held an affinity with the SDP, which deploys political rhetoric such as ‘social assistance’ and ‘social inclusion’ which resonates with Romani voters. The SDP

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has openly courted the Roma vote and in 1999 and 2004 the SDP signed protocols with the RPPE in which it pledged to solve Roma’s social problems. The SDP also put Romani candidates on their party lists and in return in Presidential elections, Roma will often endorse the SDP candidate. The election of Voicu is significant though because it is the first time a mainstream political party has placed a Romani candidate in a winnable seat resulting in a Deputy in the national assembly. Despite this, two seats out of 334 is still not contiguous to their demographic weight – an examination of the Hungarian party’s (UDMR) electoral success highlights how far Roma have to go to improve their descriptive representation.29

Localized Legitimacy through Civil Society There are hundreds of NGOs in Romania which promote Roma rights and articulate shared Romani interests but most lack elemental resources and self-sustainability. These NGOs are active in a number of areas in numerous projects which aim to improve Roma’s enjoyment of civil, social, political, economic and cultural rights. A fundamental law on registration exists30 and it is the registration process which separates NGOs and political parties; however, in Romania an anomaly exists whereby an NGO can have a political character. This only applies to minority NGOs. In other countries the crucial point comes when a minority organization must register its status, that is, as a political party or other, and determines its precise form and function. The registration process is justified by the need for formal recognition of an association as a political party. So, outside of legal channels, is it possible to make a distinction between a political party and an NGO, if the latter can be elected to parliament? Or is it just a case of the boundary between the two being blurred in Romania? And, what does this mean for the role and purpose of national minority NGOs and political parties? As an organizing structure of representation, a civil society organization fulfils a very different function from that of a political party. The distinction between political party and NGO cannot be found by examining whether it works for its own members (not constituents), or for those outside the political system. An organizing structure of representation cannot represent an opinion (as that is subjective) but it can represent and articulate interests as these are aggregated bundles of opinions and affiliations which are intersubjectively constructed by communities. There are two main functions of a civil society organization: (a) to act as a check on state institutions; and (b) to articulate shared interests. By fulfilling its two primary functions an NGO articulates interests on behalf of a

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community through project implementation,31 publications and consultations with international and national bodies. Notably, minority NGOs often paint a more accurate (and less flattering) portrait of the actual issues and situation than state institutions. During communism the persistence of state paternalism meant that civil society was weak. After 1989, an old law, No. 21/1924, which had never been abolished, was reinforced and has become the legal frame for the newly emerging civil society and a few thousand NGOs have been created since.32 The creation of NGOs after 1990 ‘aimed at offering educational support, expressing Roma culture and traditions, community and economic development, research and social interaction, combating the prejudices and stereotypes’ (CEDIME-SE 2001, 14). Romani civil society organizations grew in importance because Roma needed to reduce their dependence on a state which could not support them adequately. After 1990, various Romani NGOs were set up but their number, aptitude and longevity were dependent on their capacity to secure funding and on the ability of leaders to guide their respective organizations. Research has shown how ‘the geographical spread and intra-ethnic heterogeneity supported the simultaneous establishment of the organizations in more regions of the country’ (Bleahu and Frunzaru 2005, 8). During this time, many NGOs were established to be antithetic to the chaotic political arena where Roma found themselves increasingly marginalized. Many professional and competitive Romani NGOs operate at national33 level, but at local level the Romani civil society appears to be fragile or not effectively organized. The creation of Romani initiative groups at community level was stimulated by the possibility of accessing internal funds from government, and external funds from international donors such as the EU and the Soros Foundation. However despite their proliferation and geographical spread their effectiveness is questionable. The interests articulated by Romani NGOs are multifarious and often depend on the geographical and cultural context of their activity because some choose to focus on human rights abuse, others on access to health, and others still on education of Romani children, among others. Agendas are often decided by the leader or director of an NGO, or an NGO is created to articulate a shared interest to increase awareness of an issue (e.g. Letiţia Mark established the Roma Women’s Association in Timişoara). The major national Romani NGOs in Romania are ‘Impreuna’, Aven Amentza and Romani CRISS due to their respective demographic and territorial reach. These NGOs can and do articulate several interests at once; however, these shared interests are not necessarily in competition with one another. This can be determined

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by examining the organizational structure of Romani CRISS: there is a health department, an education department, a human rights department and a social department dealing with ID cards.34 There have been attempts to unify the Romani movement, but these have usually been on an ad hoc temporary basis to serve a specific purpose, for example in 1999, representatives from 80 Roma NGOs convened a ‘Working Group of Roma Associations’ to consult with the National Office for Roma (which was the previous incarnation of the National Agency for Roma), to elaborate the ‘National Strategy’ ensuring that legitimate representatives were articulating the interests of Roma. While examples of unity are few and fleeting in their existence, it shows that Romani NGOs can work together at a national level to articulate their shared interests. The fact that the Roma movement, like all social movements, is characterized by fragmentation is not necessarily an impediment to the goals and purpose of the movement itself. Rather, this fragmentation is indicative of the diverse views and interests which are part and parcel of the heterogeneous Romani community. Complaints have been raised relating to the appointment of Romani experts with local governments. Some representatives from Romani NGOs have stated that the government has a different vision regarding the implementation of the ‘National Strategy’ than their own, and have called for more effective collaboration with civil society in its implementation. Notably, ‘where public institutions fail, NGOs may have greater success’ (OSI 2002, 491). NGOs may not have the power of decision but they are able to implement projects on a local level, and it is here where the real importance of the NGO lies and its ability to represent and articulate interests is cultivated. Grassroots development helps to establish a social network of actors committed to establishing cultural change for Roma so the cultural content of a social movement must be empirically grounded (McClurg Mueller 1992, 9–17). Mushrooming Romani civil society organizations orientate their efforts towards articulating certain shared interests and building the capacity of Romani communities as they implement projects dealing with common issues such as building confidence, fighting prejudice and discrimination, and expanding employment, education, housing and healthcare. While their respective contributions have been invaluable, the results are insufficient at present. The lack of political participation is an ongoing concern but efforts are being made to rectify this problem most notably through Romani NGOs. One Romani NGO, ‘Impreuna’ has become involved in a project to train 25 young Roma to become the next generation of political leaders, building

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capacity for the future. However this needs to be complimented by more concerted efforts at the grass roots level to engage and educate ordinary Roma about the importance of political participation. On a more practical level, as many Roma lack identity cards,35 they are unable to vote, which means that they are not full citizens. The major Romani NGOs are constantly juggling their activities and do not concentrate solely on one shared interest as this would be futile. Romani NGOs have quickly come to realize that shared interests are inter-related and therefore their activities should pursue a multi-pronged approach. The most important role of a Romani NGO is to implement projects on the ground, which can impact directly on the community. But an NGO, by its very nature, is not elected. Yet it certainly can be viewed as representing and articulating the interests of the Romani community legitimately. In the strictest sense, this is not political representation, but it is the local community which empowers and legitimizes an NGO by gaining their trust.36 This signifies more than an output or performance-based legitimacy when NGOs implement projects which have an impact in local communities. Their legitimacy derives from the process of organizing the local community Table 4.1 Key Features of Organizing Structures of Representation in Romania Organizing Élite structure of representation

Political party

Key features

z

RPPE have monopoly over Roma representation.

z

Support for RPPE is not contiguous with Roma population.

z

Two Romani representatives in parliament.

z

Ethnicity is important but not a prerequisite for Roma representation.

z

Authority of bulibaşa waning.

z

Accusations of tokenism in governmental agencies.

z

z

RPPE is technically (legally registered as) an NGO, though stands in elections. Mainstream political parties such as SDP enjoy support from Roma.

Civil society organization z

National and local NGOs work on a variety of interest areas.

z

Romani CRISS and ‘Impreuna’ are two of the most prominent.

z

NGOs pursue a multipronged approach to articulating interests.

z

Capacity to foster social relationships on local level.

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and articulating its shared interests, and is not dependent on electoral results. Significantly, some activists point out that it is easier to gain the trust of Romani communities if the organization shares the same ethnicity (similar to both political parties and élite). But a note of caution must be exercised and the maxim ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune’ is instructive here: NGOs survive through external funding meaning that projects which are given the green light may not necessarily signify a shared interest of Roma, but may reflect the interests of the funding body in question.37 Table 4.1 provides an overview of the key features of organizing structures of representation in Romania.

Conclusion Ethnic Mobilization Ethnic mobilization results in the creation of organizing structures of representation such as élite, political parties and civil society organizations, and goes some way in explaining how Roma make their voices heard in a liberal democratic system which suppresses minority interests. The disunity of the Romani community in Romania is primarily explained by the large number of unique sub-groups present within it, as Mirga and Gheorghe (1997, 4) explain, ‘because of this division, Romani organizations with competing claims to legitimacy have proliferated in recent years’. There is a lack of cohesive identity so they remain profoundly divided and consequently politically ineffective. Even though they have a fragmented identity, it is this ethnic identity which acts as a glue for the Roma social movement as identity is the cornerstone of any social movement (Cohen 1985). This has resulted in the formation of a multitude of organizations (both political and non-political) which claim to represent and articulate the multiple and shifting shared interests of the Romani community. Institutions, primarily NGOs and to a considerably lesser extent political associations/ parties constitute the backbone of ethnic Romani mobilization. And there has been some success with an increasing number of Roma occupying positions of decision-making at the local level, and thousands have become involved in public life, whether as volunteers working for NGOs or as representative of their communities. Major Romani NGOs such as Romani CRISS and ‘Impreuna’ would not become politicized as they believe they can achieve more as an NGO. As a social movement Roma have enjoyed most success outside of conventional political channels for participation and representation.

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Social movements frequently present a united front in order for their interests to be taken seriously by government though Roma are keen to stress their heterogeneous composition. At present, the state accepts and endorses the system of ‘community leaders’ negotiating and representing the community as a whole on ‘community matters’ such as resource provisions. Ethnic mobilization as part of a broader social movement must come from below, that is, through stalagmite mobilization; however, there comes a point when the state needs to reach out or initiate policies which impact positively on the community. If the state sends out a positive signal, the social movement deduces that its interests are being articulated in a hospitable atmosphere. Paradoxically it is only through ethnic mobilization when Roma can articulate their shared interests through organizing structures of representation that the heterogeneity of the Romani community becomes apparent. The diversity contained within the Romani community is demonstrated by the rich array of Romani organizing structures of representation and the shared interests which they articulate.

Political Participation Political participation can take a variety of forms and must be understood as a crucial component of the Roma social movement. By gaining access to formal and informal political structures, Roma are able to articulate shared interests. Importantly, in Romania, this political participation can be delineated from above such as through guaranteed parliamentary representation for all minorities, or from below through struggle and mobilization, such as through civil society organizations. Roma are represented in the Chamber of Deputies by Nicolae Păun of the RPPE and by Mădălin Voicu of the SDP but the fact that Roma have only two representatives in the parliament means that localized representation and civil society mobilization has become more important. State institutions increasingly seek Roma endorsement for various policies and initiatives, particularly those concerning minorities. Roma are often dropped into committees, council, ministries, and ‘in some cases, it seems the participation of the Roma is still only a matter of tokenism’ (PER 1999a, 18). This tokenism is epitomized by allocating national minorities a seat in the parliament without bestowing that position with any significant influence on decisions which impact on that minority directly. Indeed this ‘undermines the legitimacy of the State’s measures to accommodate the minority, allowing ethnic entrepreneurs to attack and thereby undermine the accommodation accorded to the minority by the state’ (OSCE-ODIHR 2001, 21).

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Roma have retained a long-standing indifference towards public and political life and a reluctance to participate in it and Gruia Bumbu argues that Roma ‘do not realize the importance of their vote’.38 The absence of formal structures in Romani communities has been an obstacle to participation in the modern bureaucratic structures that increasingly characterize government and public administration ‘thus the community faces the challenge of building formal structures of representation and participation’ (Mirga and Gheorghe 1997, 4). This runs in tandem with the necessity of constructing non-political organizing structures of representation such as NGOs. What follows is a ‘search for appropriate organizational structures for political representation and action’ (Mirga and Gheorghe 1997, 5), which Roma use to articulate shared interests. By and large, Roma are relatively uninterested in formal political processes but whether this is the cause or the consequence of their disproportionate representation is not clear. On the one hand, many Roma do not believe that they can play a vital role in the decision-making process while on the other hand there are those Roma who are engaged with policy-making but outside of conventional political channels such as civil society organizations. Added to this are structural issues which impact negatively on Romani political participation including societal marginalization and a lack of education.

Interest Articulation In Romania the shared interests of Roma are directly connected to their ethnic identity, which means that they are insoluble as one informs the other. The main shared interests of Roma are education, health, employment and social affairs including housing, and political participation. While reducing poverty levels in Romania is an interest of all Romanians more generally, it is a specific shared interest of the Romani community. Roma are trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty-exclusion-discrimination which harms their self-perception, and exacerbates their capacity to address these shared interests so the main function of organizing structures of representation is to articulate these shared interests. Notably, Roma have quickly learned that they must pursue a multi-pronged approach in articulating these shared interests in order to address them in any meaningful sense. For example, Romani CRISS addresses the shared interests of health and lack of official identification in tandem through local projects registering Roma with health mediators.39 The guiding principles of the ‘National Strategy’ are: (a) social utility, which means responding to the shared interests of the Romani community

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(specifically access to particular civic, socio-economic and cultural interests); and (b) decentralization, which refers to specific responsibilities assigned to public institutions at local level.40 I argue that a hierarchy of interests does not exist however I am careful to focus on shared interests (which are intersubjectively constructed) rather than proximate interests (which are held by an individual). Additionally, it is the articulation of shared interests which is relevant not whether these interests are successfully secured or not. Finally, shared interests help show how Roma organize politically and determine the competing vision of the ‘good life’ which Roma have for themselves.

Legitimate Representation The Romani community’s weak ethnic identity, infighting, poor leadership, the propagation of organizations, lack of substantial resources and low voter turnout and participation have ‘thwarted their collective action and impeded their ability to affect state policies’ (Barany 2001, 10). Representation and political participation is often not enough in itself, it needs to be supplemented by other measures (resources or specially allocated seats), but most importantly representation needs to be acknowledged as legitimate for constituents or else the representation itself is a hollow structure. Legitimacy is a social construct, like interests or group identity, and is something which must be tacitly agreed upon in order to have meaning. It is not necessary to have a direct impact on policy and decisions, but rather the articulation of interests itself is a purposeful and requisite value in any democratic society. The crucial distinction is between those who mobilize politically and create organizing structures of representation, and those who hope that their elected representatives will do it on their behalf. As one Romani political élite explains, ‘The Gypsy must mobilize too, not only to be at the will of the politicians.’41 If the state creates an organizing structure of representation, such as the NAR, then this will have less legitimacy in the eyes of the Romani community than it would if Roma had created an organizing structure of representation themselves through a process of ethnic mobilization, for example, NGOs. These NGOs have the potential to be legitimate representatives of Roma even though they have not gone through a formal election process; therefore, legitimacy must be more than an ‘X’ on a ballot sheet. Conversely, even élite who attain the highest number of votes in an election are not necessarily deemed to be legitimate representatives of the Romani community. My research conceives of both legitimacy and representation in broad understandings. Rather than measuring legitimacy it is assumed that

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legitimacy can be determined by contextualizing social and political relationships since legitimacy is dependent on societal interaction and recognition. By providing an analysis of the role of élite, political parties and civil society organizations it is possible to determine that some organizing structures of representation are more legitimate than others. However, there exist no objective criteria or normative yardstick to measure this legitimacy thus by assessing the actions of these organizing structures of representation, relative legitimacy can be deduced. The one certainty is that Roma confer legitimacy on organizing structures of representation; therefore, social interaction is crucial. In many respects legitimacy comes from a practice where Roma create the discourse of legitimacy and reconstitute this structure through formal and informal political practices. The process of Romani mobilization and the capacity of organizing structures of representation to ‘give voice’ to the Romani community determine if an organizing structure of representation is legitimate or not. Élite such as Nicolae Păun and political parties such as the RPPE rely on electoral legitimacy, whereas NGOs fall back on their proximity to the Romani communities to become legitimate. However all three organizing structures of representation are embedded in a socio-political discourse that the Romani community reconstitutes which means that legitimacy can be established through social interaction. Many of those claiming to represent Roma are also of Romani ethnic origin therefore they share a common identity. While the virtues of this ethnopolitical representation are questionable, there is no doubt that a common ethnic identity remains important for legitimate representation in the eyes of the Romani community. However, one could argue that legitimacy never really exists as there is no ‘tipping point’ to attain, so legitimacy is continually contested by Roma. At the same time one cannot ignore the importance of these social interactions where Roma recognize an organizing structure of representation as legitimate or not.

Hypotheses At this stage only the first hypothesis political decentralization increases the legitimacy of Roma representation can be addressed in any meaningful sense. On the one hand, there exists localized structures for representation including NGOs who deliver projects, and establish social networks and also political party offices. On the other hand, one of the key organizing structures of representation is the constitutional provision which guarantees a seat for all minorities in Romania. This provision was bestowed on Roma as they did not create this structure for themselves through processes

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of ethnic mobilization; furthermore, it is debateable whether it is a legitimate organizing structure of representation. To fully address H1 it will be necessary to analyse transnational organizing structures of representation and ask whether legitimacy decreases as the structures become detached from localized Romani communities in the domestic political context.

Notes 1. An earlier version of this chapter appears in the Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (McGarry 2008a). 2. The transition process has its social dimension, part of which is to ensure that the politically determined social structure is based on ‘non-discrimination and equal opportunity’ (Phinnemore and Light 2001, 2), which includes access to political structures guaranteed by law for all citizens. 3. According to the last census figures in 2002, there are 555,250 Roma present in Romania which signifies 3 per cent approximately. Unofficial estimates from international organizations and NGOs estimate the figure to be between one and two million Roma in Romania (meaning 5–10 per cent of the population of Romania approximately). 4. Constitution of Romania (revised) (2003): Article 62 (2) maintains, ‘Organizations of citizens belonging to national minorities, which fail to obtain the number of votes for representation in parliament, have the right to one Deputy seat each, under the terms of the electoral law. Citizens of a national minority are entitled to be represented by one organization only.’ Full text in English available at: http://www.legislationline.org/upload/ legislations/72/cf/e3b89dda11209ec032c71c1a36a7.htm (accessed 17 June 2009). There are 20 officially recognized minorities in Romania: Albanian; Armenian; Bulgarian; Czech; Croat; Jewish; German; Greek; Italian; Macedonian; Hungarian; Pole; Roma; Lipovan; Ruthenian; Serb; Slovak; Tatar; Turk; and Ukrainian. 5. There has not yet been any significant or organized scientific attempt to map the general and Roma specific interests at the national level, although there seems to be new efforts in this direction. Various institutions, school inspectorates, Public Health Directorates, Local Employment Agencies, and sometimes local and national NGOs have collected data on a variety of socio-economic indicators. 6. These are detailed in the Ministry of Public Information Report ‘Research on the Roma’ conducted by The Institute for Quality of Life (2001, 5–20), Bucharest. 7. Education Law 84/1995. Chapter XII makes provisions for minority education. See Articles 118–121. Full text available in English at: http://www.legislationline.org/ legislation.php?tid=168&lid=678 (accessed 13 June 2009). 8. This point was made by Letiţia Mark, President of the Roma Women’s Association of Timişoara ‘For Our Children’. Personal Interview. Timişoara, Romania, 16 August 2004. 9. The necessity of this approach was highlighted by Ilie Dinca, Vice-President of the RPPE. Personal Interview. Bucharest, Romania, 27 September 2005.

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10. The ‘National Strategy’ provides for urgent measures to draft an action plan for issuing identity cards (National Strategy for the Improvement in the Situation of the Roma, chapter XI, point 30). 11. Explicitly discriminatory job vacancy notices in mainstream newspapers have long been identified as a problem. See: Advisory Committee on the FCNM 2001, Opinion on Romania, page 406. 12. Personal interview with Gelu Duminica, Executive Director of Romani NGO, ‘Impreuna’. Bucharest, Romania, 16 May 2006. 13. The seminal, and widely cited, account of citizenship developed by T. H. Marshall details citizenship as political, social, and political rights (Marshall 1950). For a critique see: Turner 1990. Access, along with rights and belonging form the triadic components of citizenship (Wiener 1997). 14. See Government Ordinance 137/2000, chapters I, II, III, IV, V. English text available at: http://www.minelres.lv/National/Legislation/Romania/Romania_antidiscrim_English.htm (accessed 13 June 2009). 15. Personal interview with Csaba Ferenc Asztalos, President, National Council for Combating Discrimination, Bucharest, Romania, 28 September 2005. 16. Putting a Rom on a mainstream party’s list has been widely recognized as a liability given widespread societal biases against Roma indeed as Barany points out ‘for mainstream parties one Romani vote means the loss of two others’ (Barany 2001, 4). 17. Personal interview with Dimitrina Petrova, Director of the ERRC, Budapest, Hungary, 23 September 2005. 18. For insights into Romani voting patterns and specificities see: Barany 2001; Fox 2002. 19. The Council of National Minorities was established by Government Decision No. 365 in July 2001. The Council includes representatives from all 20 ethnic minorities living in Romania. 20. European Roma Information Office (ERIO) (2008). E-News. 11 December 2008, page 5. 21. Chamber of Deputies, 8 October 2008. ‘Alocuţiuni Consacrate Comemorării Holocaustului’. For full text see: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=6535 &idm=45&idl=1 (accessed 17 July 2009). 22. Chamber of Deputies, 7 April 2009. Declaraţie Politică cu Ocazia Sărbătoririi ‘Zilei Internaţionale a Romilor’. For full text see: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma ?ids=6611&idm=1,19&idl=1 (accessed 17 July 2009). 23. In 2007, while claiming to represent the Romani ethnic minority in the Romanian parliament (‘In calitate de deputat, reprezentant al etniei rromilor in Parlamentul Romaniei’), Păun failed to condemn the racist comments of President Basescu when he referred to a journalist a ‘filthy gypsy’ in a private conversation with his wife which had been accidently recorded, România Liberaˇ, 23 May 2007; see: http://www.romanialibera.ro/ (accessed 15 June 2009). 24. Personal interview with Griua Bumbu, Bucharest, Romania, 26 September 2005. 25. Ordinance on Associations and Foundations (2000), Article 4. #26/2000, O.G. #39. Full text available at: http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?tid=2&lid=694 (accessed 17 June 2009).

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26. Attila Markó, State Secretary and Head of the Department for Inter-Ethnic Relations (DRI). Statement made at a European Centre for Minority Issues conference ‘Enhancing Minority Governance In Romania’ in Sinai, Romania, March 2005. 27. ‘National Strategy’, chapter VIII, point 4. 28. Calculations based on the official data of the Central Electoral Office. See: http://www.bec2004.ro/documente/Tvot_CD.pdf and the National Institute for Statistics. See: http://www.insse.ro/Statistici/statistica%20electorala.htm (accessed 12 June 2009). 29. Elsewhere I argue that it is the lack of a clearly defined Roma nationalism which impacts negatively on the capacity of Romani political parties to secure votes from the Romani community. See: McGarry 2009a. 30. Law on Legal Persons (Associations and Foundations) (1924). Law No. 21/1924, O.G. Part I, No. 27. 31. The value of NGOs in a society cannot be underestimated particularly for marginalized groups, not least because it is harder for an individual to effect change. Moreover, in practical terms it is easier to apply for a grant for a project as an NGO. 32. Constitution of Romania (1991): Article 37 states that ‘citizens may freely associate into political parties, trade unions and other forms of association’. But, the framers of the Constitution had no intention of enhancing the NGO sector and no explicit privileges were granted to associations, foundations etc. 33. Transnational organizing structures of representation, including international Romani NGOs, are discussed in Chapter 6. 34. My thanks to Cezara David of Romani CRISS for explaining the organizational infrastructure. Personal interview, Bucharest, Romania, 16 May 2006. 35. There are numerous reasons why Roma lack identification documents including a lack of trust in state structures or they do not see the value of documentation until the need arises. 36. ‘Confidence’ and ‘trust’ were mentioned by both Gelu Duminica, Executive Director of ‘Impreuna’ and Cezara David of Romani CRISS. Personal Interviews. Bucharest, Romania, 16 May 2006 (both interviews). Thus it is possible for legitimacy to be conferred on organizing structures of representation if they are respected for the work that they do in the community, for the community. 37. For a discussion on the impact of external funders see: Trehan 2001. 38. Personal interview with Gruia Bumbu, Bucharest, Romania, 26 September 2005. 39. This was highlighted by Cezara David of Romani CRISS. Personal interview. Bucharest, Romania, 16 May 2006. 40. Decentralization and the involvement of local level institutions are singled out by the European Commission as important features of the Strategy (EU Regular Report on Romania 2001, 29). 41. Mădălin Voicu, Divers, no. 132, September 2003.

5 Self-Government and Interest Representation in Hungary: A Wrong Step in the Right Direction? Introduction Hungary is the first state to construct a nationwide network of legally recognized, publicly financed and democratically elected institutions for the representation and articulation of ethnic minorities’ interests. Article 68 of the Constitution provides the basis for the ‘Minorities Act’ and guarantees minorities the right to collective participation in public life.1 Though the structural problems of the Romani population as a political interest group may account for the decline in living standards of most Roma in Hungary, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of organizations and institutions set up to formally articulate the shared interests of the Romani community. Hungary’s seemingly progressive minority protection policy is influenced by its desire to serve as a good example to neighbouring countries which house Hungary’s Diaspora (Bessenyey-Williams 2002, 234; Deets 2008, 202–203). The proliferation of bilateral agreements which Hungary has negotiated with neighbouring countries is further testament to its commitment to Hungarian minorities abroad (Pataki 2002). Roma are one of 13 ‘national and ethnic minorities’2 recognized in Hungary and constitute somewhere between 400,000 and 600,000 of the population.3 Often, the view from the outside perceives the situation of Roma in Hungary to be less dire than in other CEECs but this chapter seeks to counter this misplaced confidence in the Hungarian minority protection system as it applies to Roma representation.

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I begin by outlining the shared interests of Roma in Hungary that occupy the time and effort of Romani activists and advocates. I then present an overview of the minority self-government system as it relates to Roma and discuss some of the advantages and disadvantages of this innovative structure, in particular its role as an organizing structure of representation which can only accommodate cultural interests. Following the same format as the previous chapter I detail the élite who claim to legitimately represent and articulate the interests of Roma and focus on two individuals: one is the President of the National Roma Self-Government and the other is a prominent civil rights leader. I ask whether the phenomenon of ethnopolitics is necessary or desirable in the case of Hungarian Roma. Subsequently, the role and activities of civil society organizations working on Romani interests are elucidated. Crucially, each organizing structure of representation is anchored in the current political context and its legitimacy is assessed. A conclusion is offered which summarizes the main findings, particularly those relating to legitimate representation before a comparison between Hungary and Romania is elaborated upon which offers insights into similarities and differences between the two with regard to Roma representation and participation.

Shared Interests of Roma in Hungary The interests of Roma can be considered as those activities, policies and initiatives of institutions such as NGOs, governmental agencies and international organizations which explicitly target Roma; however, Etzioni (1985, 179) highlights the danger of this approach, ‘if a social group has a common or shared interest in the eyes of some social scientist, ipso facto it constitutes a politically active group, which often it is not.’ Defining public or general societal interest is precarious even if the search is focused in a specific spatial and temporal context, whereas the shared interests of Roma are somewhat more straightforward to determine, linked as they are to ethnic minority identity. Similar to Romania, these interests concern equity of access, not equity of outcome. While poverty, discrimination and marginalization are pervasive and re-occurring shared interests for most Roma, I argue social, economic, cultural and political interests to be of more relevance in the case of Hungary. Additionally, I consider the recent spike in racism targeted at Roma and the implications of this for Roma inclusion. After input from civil society organizations and the civil service, a governmental package was adopted in 2004 on Medium-Term Measures intended to improve the living standards and social position of the Romani population (Governmental Decree No. 1021/2004) which can be interpreted

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as the interests of Roma according to the Hungarian state administration. The main areas of the package include the enforcement of equal rights, the extenuation of prejudices, the elimination of segregation in education, the improvement of the quality of education, the development of employment opportunities, the improvement of life quality, health and housing conditions as well as the preservation of Romani culture, identity and languages. Within the Ministries of Education and Employment and Labour, Ministerial Commissioners in charge of Roma affairs have been appointed. There is an overlap between the interests according to government and the interests according to the Romani communities themselves but this can be explained by the input government received from Romani civil society organizations. In 2007, Hungary adopted the Roma Integration Decade Programme Strategy Plan for the period 2007–2015 which sets out tasks in two-year action plans (Kaponyi 2007). As before, these include concrete measures and monitoring tasks primarily in the field of employment, housing, education and health, although the government also recognizes that legal measures and incentives are not enough; it is essential to change attitudes and values system too which can only be achieved in the long term. The first two-year action plan (2008–2009) adopted by Governmental Decree 1105/2007 contains projects with deadlines and allocated resources (of 10 billion Hungarian Florint) in the priority areas of: education; employment and development of enterprises; housing; health; anti-discrimination; culture, media and sport; and gender equality as a horizontal issue (Ürmös 2008, 3). Social interests such as access to adequate housing, sanitation and health continue to be the most pressing for many Romani NGOs. Housing conditions are substandard for a large proportion of Roma and often do not meet the most basic health and safety requirements. Continuing a trend found across CEECs, Romani communities are frequently ghettoized on the outskirts of major towns and cities which reinforces marginalization, beyond physical detachment. The infrastructure in these ghettoes such as roads, sanitation and communications is invariably poor and in desperate need of regeneration.4 The lack of access to adequate housing has an adverse impact in other social areas such as life expectancy which is, on average, ten years less than for non-Roma (NEKH 2004, 12). Romani women are frequently discriminated against when they try to receive medical care; indeed, they have been subjected to forced sterilizations though this number is decreasing and is not official state policy.5 The most prominent cultural interest is education.6 Unlike many national minorities who demand mother-tongue education, Roma in Hungary make no explicit claims in this respect because 70 per cent of Roma speak

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Hungarian, and have been relatively assimilated as far as language is concerned (most of the younger generation of Roma have embraced Hungarian as their primary language). Romani advocacy and activism systematically addresses all levels of education, from nursery to tertiary. While it is claimed that more funding is required for books and other resources, this claim is not specific to Roma; however, Romani children are frequently treated differently by educational authorities which impacts directly and negatively on the lives of many Romani children. As Majtényi (2004, 84) explains, ‘the practice of systematically routing Roma children to “special schools” is one of the most of the most widespread forms of segregation and discrimination in Hungary.’ One the most pressing interests related to education is segregation7 which studies have shown reinforces previously held negative associations8 which the majority have for Roma and which is detrimental for Romani self-confidence.9 At the governmental level, state scholarships are available for Romani students which in time will create an intelligentsia, something which is currently missing. When dealing with minorities and access to education ‘efforts must be made to devise solutions that will enhance inclusive education while respecting diversity and inter-cultural sensitivity’ (Villalobos 2004, 19). Segregation is a form of racial discrimination which impacts negatively on the equity of access to adequate education for Roma. Various organizing structures of representation have linked the issue of education with another shared interest: access to the labour market. Without an adequate education an individual Rom will not have an equitable chance when attempting to secure employment. They are disproportionately affected by unemployment compared to the majority, and other minorities: unemployment of the Romani men stands at 74 per cent while for women this figure is 83 per cent.10 In Romani ghettoes this can rise to 90–100 per cent (NEKH 2004, 12) and the global economic downturn is likely to have exacerbated matters though authoritative recent statistics have not emerged. Roma are thus reliant on state welfare or they face absolute poverty. In turn, this reinforces the image of Roma being dependent on the state and/or resorting to begging, which fortifies widespread negative associations of Roma in society. Without an adequate education, Romani individuals do not have equitable access to the labour market and thus face a subset of related problems such as paying rent, or being forced to live in ghettoes. Taken together, Roma are victims of a vicious circle of disadvantage stimulating discrimination and prejudice, which reinforces disadvantage.

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Access to political structures is an important interest and remains an effective way to articulate other shared interests. The minority selfgovernment system, although designed for promoting cultural autonomy ‘also contains scope for minority interest representation’ (Kovats 2001a, 8). The pluralism of Romani politics represents another significant challenge for the self-government system. The main political interests include access to the political structures, both mainstream and minority-oriented, and enhanced capacity to articulate shared interests in a public forum. However, there is a lack of political mobilization and in a strict legal definition no Romani political party exists in Hungary. In exercising their right to participation, Roma are further enhancing their ability to exercise other rights. The self-government system is an organizing structure of representation through which minorities can articulate their educational, cultural and linguistic interests although there exist other organizing structures of representation which Roma have created. Discrimination hangs like a spectre over all the shared interests of Roma and has the effect of magnifying and intensifying the problems associated with securing these interests. The discrimination which Roma face is overt and flagrant. It reveals itself in an open and deliberate manner in normative acts, media reports and one-on-one interactions to such an extent that the ‘Minority Ombudsman’ has described this as ‘institutionalized’.11 Roma face discrimination on a number of grounds, in particular in the fields of education, employment and provision of goods, facilities and services. They also face discrimination in relation to their treatment by police authorities and are over-represented in the prison population. Crucially, the ‘Minority Ombudsman’ has found that the issues and interests of Roma are different from other minorities due to the discrimination which they face; thus, the shared interests of Roma are directly linked to their ethnic identity (and its negative associations from the majority). There has been a recent upsurge in racist discourse and attacks on Roma resulting in destruction of property and death.12 The chief instigator of this worrying trend has been the creation in 2007 of the Magyar Garda, an extreme right wing political organization which has held several public rallies in areas with a large Romani population, with intimidation its sole purpose. Among the group’s chief messages is the defence of ethnic Hungarians against so-called Gypsy crime (ECRI 2009, 24). The rise of extremism in Hungary, as elsewhere across Europe, has been exacerbated by economic hardships endured by Hungarian citizens who have used Roma as a scapegoat with frustrating predictability.13 In response, civil

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society has been critical of the Hungarian authorities for failing to adequately address the rising number of hate crimes against Roma (ERRC et al. 2009), calling attention to the growing number of Roma being murdered (ERTF 2009), and solidarity demonstrations have been held with Roma and ethnic Hungarians in opposition to this wave of extremism. Many shared interests are inextricably linked and must be understood as systemic meaning they cannot be articulated in isolation if they are to have any resonance with decision-makers and policy-makers. These shared interests cannot be given an ‘archimedean ordering or arranged on a onedimensional scale’ (Lucas 1976, 93), as a rationalist understanding would maintain. The shared interests of Roma are not a public interest which can be appealed to when justifying decisions; rather, it is specific to Roma due to ethnic group identity. In this sense the shared interests of Roma are never invoked by ethnic entrepreneurs as a strategy to change the institutional architecture; rather, the shared interests of Roma are directly connected to Romani identity. In the case of Roma, both identity and interests are insoluble because each informs the other, indeed the shared interests of Roma (e.g. poverty, racism and unequal access to social provisions) are directly impacted by negative ascriptions on their ethnic identity.

The Minority Self-Government System: Political Participation in a Cultural Institution Act LXXVII of 1993 ‘On the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities’ (hereafter ‘Minorities Act’) recognizes 13 national and ethnic minorities. The nuance ‘ethnic’ refers to Roma while the remaining 12 recognized groups are defined as ‘national’ minorities. The minority self-government system responded to the perceived interests of all minorities in Hungary which meant combating the assimilation process through delegating control over cultural matters and ensuring some form of formalized representation. Roma, who have no kin state, are the largest minority in Hungary and are geographically dispersed. They can be divided into the Hungarian-speaking Romungro (70 per cent), the Romani-speaking Olah (22 per cent) and the Romanian-speaking Béas (8 per cent) (Kaltenbach 1998, 62).14 For most Roma the cultural factor, particularly language, is not so relevant yet that is what the Minority Self-Government (MSG) system was created to safeguard. Certainly the linguistic aspect is of more relevance to the 12 ‘national’ minorities who have kin states and in many cases rely on the linguistic component of their identity to mark their specificity as a national minority.

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The Hungarian minority protection system is based on the concept of cultural autonomy (Eiler and Kovács 2002, 176) which means a community living anywhere in the country can be joined together in an autonomous organization on the basis of their common ethnic belonging and is recognized as a constitutional entity, namely nations with cultural sovereignty. The cultural autonomy system in Hungary provides the platform for the articulation of cultural interests related to language, preservation of tradition and heritage and education. Each national and ethnic minority has the potential to create local, regional and national self-governments, or a ‘cultural parliament’ (Krizsán 2000, 251) which has exclusive legislative authority in cultural matters, and also has a separate cultural ministry and a national Secretary of State. The ‘Minorities Act’ declares the right of national and ethnic minorities to establish self-government as a special community (i.e. collective) right at local and national level. These local and national self-governments are intended to be partners to regional governments at the local level, and to co-operate with the executive and the legislature at the national level. The relationship between the local minority self-governments and the municipal governments is imprecise. These institutions should be on an equal footing but the dynamic between them is more akin to master-servant.15 The national self-government is a ‘body of representatives supposedly representing the interests of the whole community throughout the country’ (Krizsán 2000, 253) and is elected by delegates of the local minority selfgovernments. Local and national minority self-governments can participate in legislative and administrative activities from the lowest to the highest levels of governance, express their views on draft legal regulations and request information from public administrative bodies and local government on issues affecting the minority they represent, and propose measures to address. They have a right of veto on matters relating to education, culture, local media, efforts to sustain traditions and the use of minorities’ languages; however, in other areas their function is consultative. Despite the obvious benefits of the minority self-government system there are numerous disadvantages, besides competencies being restricted to cultural interests.16 The first disadvantage relates to the election and selection of the respective local and national minority self-governments. Initially the lack of registration for voters led to the ludicrous situation in which representatives of minorities were not elected by the groups themselves and worse still some deliberately abused the electoral system so non-Roma actually sit on the local self-governments17 meaning that a great number of non-minority voters were voting in the minority self-government

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elections (Majtényi 2004, 81). In light of these serious deficiencies in June 2005, the Hungarian Parliament adopted a law (Bill T/9126) that brought about important changes in the Hungarian legal framework affecting the life of national and ethnic minorities. The first period of the new minority election process ended in July 2006 when those Hungarian citizens who were willing to declare their national or ethnic minority affiliation could register at the local electoral office. Mr Heizer, the President of the Office for National and Ethnic Minorities declared that almost 200,000 voters asked for their inclusion in the minority voters’ register which suggests that forecasts on ethnic registration were pessimistic, though still deficient. Only those Hungarian citizens who have declared their affiliation to a minority community are entitled to vote through a registration process at the local election office. In the registration form potential voters must explicitly state that they are members of that minority community. Similarly, candidates fielded are obliged to state that they are willing to undertake the representation of the minority community and must have the support of a Romani civil society organization which has been operating for three years which should ‘increase the involvement of Roma NGOs in politics’ (Burton 2007, 78), yet Burton also acknowledges that this could lead to the entrenchment of Roma NGOs in so-called ethno-business. Data protection norms18 govern this process meaning only the number of citizens registered in the minority lists will be made public and the list itself will be destroyed immediately after the electoral results are fixed. While the controversial issue of registration is acknowledged, it appears the only way to fairly elect local minority self-governments. Particularly for the Romani community, registration has the potential to increase the legitimacy of representation as those who are elected must declare their ethnic affiliation. This legislative intervention will also increase confidence in the system and substantially reduce the potential for fraudulent representation. Furthermore, while local minority self-governments are directly elected, the same is not true of national minority self-governments who are elected by an electoral college made up largely of local minority self-government representatives therefore Roma do not have a direct say in the composition of the national minority self-government and therefore have no means to call its members to account (Kovats 2001a, 18). The second disadvantage relates to the lack of representation in the national parliament for ethnic and national minorities. Paragraph 68 of the Constitution states that ‘the national and ethnic minorities living in the Republic of Hungary share the power of the people and they are constituent

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factors in the State’ while on the other hand, ‘laws of the Republic of Hungary ensure representation for the national and ethnic minorities living within the territory of the country’. So in the Constitution there is no explicit statement relating to a level of representation for national and ethnic minorities therefore ‘a literal reading of the Constitution suggests that even minority self-governments could be an acceptable means of representation’ (Krizsán 2000, 258). Indeed the emphasis on cultural interests has had the unintended consequence of highlighting its political shortcomings. Namely, how is it possible to manage and articulate shared socio-economic and political interests through an institution primarily designed for establishing the cultural autonomy of minority populations? By providing representation through the minority self-government system it suffocates calls for representation in parliament; however, the nature of representation in the various organizing structures of representation is very different, for some it is cultural and for others it is political. The third disadvantage is the danger that the National Roma SelfGovernment could be used as a tool for the promotion of one faction in Romani politics rather than acting as the representative body of the Roma as a whole (Kovats 2001a, 8). Unlike parliamentary systems of representative democracy, it provides no role for an ‘opposition’ and seriously undermines the status of unsuccessful candidates (Kovats 2001a, 9). The election rules have made it possible for one organization to form a politically homogeneous national self-government, while excluding smaller yet influential organizations. Roma are a heterogeneous ethnic group and thus their organizing structures of representation need to account for this diversity in order to be legitimate. While the ‘Minorities Act’ includes a ‘certain level of guaranteed participation and can therefore be seen as going some way to answering the procedural question of how best to integrate minority concerns and interests, into overall policy and law’ (Walsh 2000, 8), it is necessary to ask if the Hungarian minority self-government system is flexible enough to accommodate various claims that emanate from different segments of Romani groups? Any answer would need to consider: (a) the structural political weakness of Roma; (b) what the precise role of Roma interest representation is with regards to political responsibility and; (c) the fact that the ‘Minorities Act’ relates almost exclusively to cultural interests. Yet despite the inherent weaknesses of the ‘Minorities Act’, its shortcomings serve to highlight the evolution of Roma from a disengaged oppressed minority into a politically aware social movement. Roma are not mobilized by factors related to relative deprivation rather it is their ethnic identity which is

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key when attempting to understand why Roma mobilize, creating organizing structures of representation to articulate their shared interests. The main function of any organizing structure of representation is to render ‘visible and collective the questions raised by the movement’ (Melucci 1992, 11). The questions raised by the movement refer to their shared interests which can only be determined in relation to the ethnic identity of Roma, to which they are inextricably linked. In this sense Roma are not just concerned with non-material goods distribution but with the promotion and affirmation of a collective group identity.

The Needle in the Haystack: Élite Romani Representatives Without adequate organizing structures of representation there is a likelihood that successive governments may make assumptions about the interests of Roma which are at best inaccurate and at worst dangerous; therefore, Roma need to be able to feed into political channels at all levels. While parliamentarians belonging to the various minorities sit on the benches of the parliamentary parties (including three Romani MPs on the side of the opposition, Fidesz19-Hungarian Civic Union), the question of guaranteed representation for the minorities in Parliament has remained unresolved for some time yet it is a matter which regularly appears on the agendas of successive governments. It is worth asking if it is possible for Romani parliamentarians to divorce themselves from their group affiliations and commitments that constitute their identities if we assume that other parliamentarians can? In the case of Roma, can we really distinguish between civic activity, on the one hand, and a private realm of an individual’s particular identities, affiliations and interests on the other? This line of thought is precarious as it implies that shared ethnic identity is necessary for legitimate representation. Parliamentarians naturally see themselves as guardians of the public interest, and come to regard those who oppose them as motivated by sectional or private interests inimical to the public interest. Interests enter public discourse through discursive interventions and through organizing structures of representation, that is, activities, reports and consultations which are all actions but taken together become a process. Social movements consider issue identification and interest articulation as essential components of the process (Foweraker 1995, 46). But what about the value of the vote? Is it diminished at all? After all, parliament is supposed to represent the views of the governed to the government (Lucas 1976, 174) and Roma are constitutive of the governed. If the democratic system suffocates

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minority interests then special procedures need to be brought in (Young 1990) whether this should mean guaranteed parliamentary representation though is questionable. Due to the absence of a substantial Romani voice in parliament, the role of other prominent public élite is inflated. In order to avoid exhaustive lists, this chapter considers only two individuals who could legitimately claim to represent and articulate the interests of Roma.20 Orbán Kolompár is the President of the National Roma SelfGovernment based in Budapest and was selected by a college of electors from the Local Roma Self-Governments; therefore, he was not directly elected by the Romani people of Hungary. Kolompár is the most senior official in Hungary for Roma representation but how representative is he?21 The National Roma Self-Government has no powers of decision but it can consult and opine with government in certain policy areas, therefore it is able to articulate the interests of Roma. The legitimacy of this organizing structure of representation is dubious for a number of reasons including: (a) it is indirectly elected; (b) it is detached from the Romani communities that it claims to represent and; (c) it is first and foremost a cultural institution. The Local (and Medium-level) Roma Self-Governments work explicitly with Romani communities and articulate their interests to local and municipal authorities, whereas the National Roma Self-Government acts as a consultative ‘rubber stamp’ on governmental policy. Through infrequent meetings the Local Roma Self-Governments may articulate the interests of Roma to the National Roma Self-Government which means that the National Roma Self-Government is dependent on the legitimacy of the Local Roma Self-Government for its own legitimacy. There are occasions when an individual emerges who can legitimately claim to represent the interests of Roma which goes beyond conventional electoral legitimacy. This is a necessary dimension of the social movement theory in that minorities will create their own organizing structures of representation when their interests are sidelined by formal political authorities. For his part, Aladár Horváth is widely regarded as one of the most respected voices in Roma politics in Hungary. In the first free elections in 1990 he was elected as the first Romani parliamentarian in the faction of the Alliance of Free Democrats.22 While he sat on parliamentary committees such as minority rights and human rights, a conflict emerged as he began to articulate the interests of the Romani community which at the time were social and cultural interests, ‘my voice was a civil rights voice not a political party [. . .] it was not in the interests of the political parties’.23 In 1995 he established the influential Roma Civil Rights Foundation which endeavours to secure rights for Roma (and others) based on the principle of civil

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rights which considers that the problems encountered by Roma are also the problems faced by other citizens of Hungary. His ideas have been heavily influenced by the black civil rights social movement in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, and have been reiterated by influential Romani advocates in international politics.24 That movement began to connect a diversity of issues to a system of institutionalized racism: from education, to housing, to jobs, to police treatment (Young 1990, 89). Civil rights can accommodate Romani identity and culture as well as socioeconomic and political interests – the understanding being that through the oppression and discrimination which the majority ascribes to the associations with ethnic minority identity, new forms of minority identity expression and interest articulation are stunted. But the history of social movements has shown that as much as oppression and discrimination can suffocate a minority group, it often has had the unintended consequence of fostering coalition, and a sense of strength in adversity.

The Absence of Ethnopolitics: Let Sleeping Dogs Lie A political party based solely on shared ethnic identification will always attain a degree of support though its supporters are marking themselves out as distinct from the majority of society, creating organizing structures of representation because the mainstream political parties cannot, or will not, articulate their interests. As the liberal democratic system cannot accommodate the voices of all groups in society, sometimes minority groups such as women and ethnic minorities create political parties to articulate their shared interests with a view to securing representation which is either non-existent or inadequate. This is not to say that all ethnic minorities should create political parties to get their voice heard. Notably, Roma have been slow to engage in party politics and are apathetic to democratic processes. Similar to Romania, those Roma who vote do not tend to particularly favour parties on the left or right of the political spectrum. Roma are divided among class, occupation, geography, language, as well as along mainstream political party lines (between Fidesz and MSzP). Both major mainstream political parties have courted the votes of the Romani community who, according to some estimates, make up around 6 per cent of the country’s population and which could prove decisive in the delicately balanced unicameral Parliament. Unlike in Romania, both the main political parties publicly court the Romani vote but there is a discrepancy in the voting behaviour among Roma for mainstream political parties. As in most post-communist societies, Roma share fond memories of the

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paternalistic protection of the state pre-1989 when they enjoyed equal employment opportunities, were relatively integrated and experienced comparatively less direct persecution and discrimination. This has resulted in many Roma voting for more left-wing or left-of-centre parties such as MSzP; yet, it was Fidesz which returned three Romani parliamentarians in the last elections owing its success to resonating with the conservative sensibilities of the Romani community in Hungary. It is not that Roma refuse to create a political party based on ethnicity rather there are structural obstacles which impede their ability to be elected to the Parliament (Vermeersch 2006, 115–129), which begs the question: what use is a political party if it cannot secure representation in the Parliament? Roma are a heterogeneous group as divided and united as any other section of society but the main difficulties stem from differences in sub-group identity. As noted previously Roma can be divided into three sub-groups in Hungary: Romungro; Olah; and Béas and the relationships between these sub-groups are often contentious due to differences in income, language and specific cultural history,25 all of which conspire to impede their ability to organize a coherent political platform. Interests are useful in politics because they help to convey what groups want. One-on-one testimonies by individuals are not logistically possible in many societies; therefore, shared interests becomes important for governments to digest the sectional concerns of its citizens. In order to become ‘like-minded’ or find ‘common cause’ it is necessary to share some of the same interests thus the creation of an organizing structure of representation such as an ethnic political party becomes an expression of shared interests as much as it is an expression of identity. This representation is not of Roma per se but of their shared interests. Ethnopolitics is often regarded as representing a group of people who share a common ethnic identification which is true in a sense but ethnopolitics is first and foremost representation of shared interests which have been constructed due to ethnic identification. Developing a legislative framework for an electoral system that ensures effective participation by national minorities in public life has been a goal of successive Hungarian governments. It is guided by the premise that ‘an inclusive process helps to contribute to the legitimacy of the outcome’ (OSCE-ODIHR 2001, 4). But is this really true? After all, the MSG system is an institution for cultural representation which cannot articulate socioeconomic and political interests so the provisions of the ‘Minorities Act’ do not fully address the shared interests of the Romani community in Hungary. Perhaps the minority self-government system has actually hindered the development of a Romani political party in Hungary. By creating the minority

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self-government system Hungary has more than satisfied international demands and created a template for other states to follow if they choose to pursue a progressive minority protection policy. The downside is that the existence of such a system means that Romani communities direct their efforts to the local minority self-governments, at the expense of creating other more appropriate organizing structures of representation.

Plugging the Hole: Romani Civil Society Organizations Minorities have the right to establish civil society organizations,26 the main purpose of which is to call government to account through monitoring and evaluating governmental policies, and to conduct projects both locally and nationally. The numerous Romani civil society organizations and associations testify to the culture of civic advocacy and activism in Hungary. This is partly explained by the politico-civic atmosphere in Hungary after 1989 which was conducive to a high proliferation of NGOs when groups such as Roma who were basically inactive politically, became politically aware. Grass-roots activism is important as it empowers the Romani community and reduces dependence on external institutions such as the state. Civil society organizations privatize the citizens’ relationship to the state but this does not result in a depoliticized ethnicity; rather, it ensures that citizens including minorities organize themselves and take part in the monitoring and implementing of policy measures beyond the control of the state. These organizing structures of representation are part of a social movement on the fringes of bureaucratic and administrative institutions which have carved out a new social space. They articulate shared interests which have been sidelined by state-controlled structures so their real quality lies not just in their ability to effect social change or successfully impact on the distribution of state funding, but in their capacity to articulate interests of groups who are lacking a political voice. There have been moves in this direction in Hungary though as can be witnessed in legislative interventions and governmental policies which are actions which express the general will, that is, the interests of the whole of society. Young (1990, 153) holds that social movements are involved in ‘consciousness raising’ meaning that it is an outward-looking process whereby experience, frustration and anxiety can be shared with the whole of society. Exclusively articulating interests back into the Romani community is myopic so Roma must make their voice heard to gaje who control formal decision-making processes. Necessarily, successful mobilization is not solely concerned with attaining representation in parliament as other organizing

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structures of representation such as NGOs are important too. NGOs provide a mechanism for political representation which supplements the electoral process because elections are infrequent and the one person/one vote principle is too utilitarian to benefit minorities. Civil society allows minorities to articulate their interests frequently and in a space where they find common cause with others. One of the main functions of this type of organizing structure of representation is that it ‘keeps its members informed, politically aware, and active’ (Etzioni 1985, 183), all of which are key to the ability of social movements to continue their work. Political NGOs have a tenuous claim to legitimate representation of the Romani community but do articulate the shared interests of Roma in Hungary. On the one hand, they have a democratic mandate, but on the other, the proportion of Romani votes is so small as to render its representation almost void of legitimacy. The two largest political organizations are Lungo Drom and MCF Roma Union, the former being the largest political Romani civil society organization in Hungary. It is political NGOs such as Lungo Drom and MCF Roma Union which name candidates for local selfgovernment elections. In the April 2006 parliamentary elections, Lungo Drom, in coalition with the right-of-centre Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union grouping, secured three members of parliament (equalling the previous elections) although they are in the opposition. Lungo Drom Chair Florian Farkas and Jozsef Varga remain in parliament, while Mihaly Lukacs’ place was taken over by Istvan Racz. The MCF Roma Union (‘MCF Roma összefogás’), led by Orbán Kolompár attained only 0.08 per cent of total votes at the 2006 parliamentary elections. MCF Roma Union was allied with the socialist faction MSzP which won the most seats in Parliament; however, no Roma were successfully elected on its lists. NGOs also articulate the socio-economic interests of Roma engaging in what Stroschein (2002, 12) describes as ‘status raising strategies’. The state budget provides for statuary funding to help reintegrate Roma into the labour market and the key partners in this endeavour are locally based NGOs who, as representatives of the Romani minority, gather information about who is employed and what qualifications they have (Babusik 2004, 15). Locally based Romani NGOs are viewed as trusted partners by both the state and the Romani community so are privy to data on those individuals who are registered with them in order to find a job. One example is the Autonόmia Foundation which was established in 1990 with the aim of helping the emerging civil society through implementing programmes and developing projects including ‘Employment Without Prejudice’ in Tolna County in 2004/2005 which contributed to the fight against labour market

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discrimination in a localized context.27 Furthermore, Autonόmia mobilizes the support of local communities by training leaders and assisting employment initiatives.28 As one would expect in such an important policy area, there exist a plethora of NGOs working on Roma education, at all levels. One NGO, Romaversitas, was set up in 1996 and helps Romani students complete their academic studies whether at high school or university. As well as having a foundation of knowledge which will benefit students in the labour market, its goal is to contribute to the establishment of a Romani intelligentsia and ensure that those individuals embrace their ethno-cultural heritage and feel responsible for the well-being of all Roma. Another means by which Romaversitas participants engender a sense of responsibility for the Romani community and a sense of leadership is through meeting prominent Romani leaders and intellectuals and forming a close relationship with them. Additionally, according to one former student Romaversitas helps mobilization efforts for Hungarian Roma.29 Such activities fit with broader status raising strategies as NGOs ‘focus their activity on integrating

Table 5.1 Key Features of Organizing Structures of Representation in Hungary Organizing structure of representation

Élite

Key features

z

z

z

Importance of parliamentary representation is minimal. Orbán Kolompár and Aladár Horváth regarded as most legitimate. Common ethnicity regarded as crucial.

Political party

z

z

z

Sensu stricto, no Romani political party exists in Hungary. Minority SelfGovernment system has stifled development of ethnopolitics as minorities have representation in this cultural institution. Romani vote is principally spilt between Fidesz and MSzP.

Civil society organization z

z

z

Political associations of MCF Roma Union and Lungo Drom are quasi political parties but lack electoral support. National NGOs such as Autonómia and Romaversitas implement projects and interact with Romani communities. NGOs acquire a de facto legitimacy due to proximity.

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the Roma and the development of minority government institutions’ (Stroschein 2002, 15). Through education efforts and building up human rights advocacy Romani communities become empowered and equipped to foster community mobilization. The legitimacy of NGOs is not to be found in its democratic selection so legitimacy must be understood as relating to non-quantifiable goods such as trust, openness and accountability. Dissemination of information on decisions, policies and activities help legitimate NGOs in the eyes of the Romani communities on whose behalf they advocate. But legitimacy is more than procedural norms and organizational idiosyncrasies. An appreciation of input legitimacy must account for the activities of NGOs which moves beyond the basic understanding of deliverables for Romani communities. Locally based NGOs obtain de facto legitimacy due to proximity: merely existing as an NGO is not enough to receive legitimacy and this is where visibility and proximity become particularly relevant. Table 5.1 provides an overview of the key features of organizing structures of representation in Hungary.

Conclusion Ethnic Mobilization Roma use ethnic identity as the impetus to create diverse organizing structures of representation to articulate their interests. Structures such as Romani political élite and NGOs are the result of grass-roots stalagmite mobilization; however, the most robust and legally entrenched structure is the minority self-government system which was the result of a top-down government initiative although Roma were involved in the consultations and dialogues which established this system. Moreover, it can be argued that the ethnic mobilization process has suffered as a result of the minority self-government system as grass-roots activity and resources are concentrated on this organizing structure of representation. This presents additional problems as the minority self-government system focuses on cultural interests which are of less concern to Roma as socio-economic and political interests are deemed to be more pressing. Similar to the case of Romania, NGOs represent the most important organizing structure of representation in the Roma social movement because they cover a wide range of interests from education (Romaversitas) to political representation (Autonómia). Such NGOs are usually established by Romani élite who make up the intelligentsia and the agendas of these organizing structures of representation are set by these élite. Ethnic mobilization has so far failed

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to produce a successful Romani political party although political associations such as Lungo Drom and MCF Roma Union do exist, splitting the Roma vote. This is primarily due to the lack of political will as well as a clearly defined constituency and ideological vision. It would appear that ethnicity alone is insufficient to establish a political party for Roma which enjoys widespread support.

Political Participation Politics should not be an either/or choice between grass-roots interactions at the local level, and the politics of the state. Since the 1990s the Romani political élite in Hungary have been gradually moving away from traditional modes of participation into conventional structures. The communitarian understanding is instructive here, namely that national political institutions appear too distant from ordinary concerns, a feeling that we are at the mercy of the political forces which govern our lives. The spirit of communitarianism is directly linked to decentralization as it ‘involves an attempt to recapture political control in local communities’ (Taves 1988, 2). Moreover the process of decentralization strengthens local governance and can lead to forms of self-government; so by bringing the political processes closer to the citizen, participation of the citizen is automatically increased. Subsidiarity means bringing the decision-making process as close as possible to those affected by its outcome and in a similar vein, decentralization and self-government (some autonomy from governmental control in certain policy spheres) help ensure more direct forms of participation for citizens as they can feed into localized political channels. This means those most affected by a governmental policy or legislative initiatives should have some sort of input at the very least which makes for more effective governance in the long run. In Hungary, the MSG system allows Roma to articulate their interests freely while still being part of the Hungarian population, thus facilitating social cohesion. This system, however flawed, brings politics closer to the minorities by giving them a say, ‘with regard to representation in legislative, administrative and advisory bodies, Hungary has provided, at the local level, guaranteed representation, veto and consultative rights and reduced voting thresholds’ (Walsh 2000, 32). Furthermore, Burton (2007, 73) argues that ‘Roma now have access to representational rights that promote their unique ethnic identity. In theory, Roma MSGs are elected and run by ethnic Roma who have personal knowledge of the needs and concerns of the Roma community.’ Such a view suggests that Roma can only be represented by other Roma because only they can know their needs and

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concerns (i.e. the interests) but this reifies the argument for ethnopolitics. The interests of Roma can potentially be known by anyone but the key distinction is that Roma actually formulate these interests while interests can be articulated by gaje too. At the national level, there are no guaranteed seats in the parliamentary assembly which means that the ability of minorities to influence and shape policy and legislation is hindered. The guaranteed seat in parliament is a contentious issue. If we are to assume that Roma constitute approximately 6 per cent of the Hungarian population then one seat is hardly adequate and perhaps attention should be concentrated on increasing Romani parliamentary representation to something resembling its demographic weight.

Interest Articulation Social interests such as access to adequate housing, education, sanitation and health continue to be among the most pressing for Romani organizing structures of representation. While poverty and persecution are present in Hungary they are not as pronounced as in Romania, although racism has become an unwelcome presence in Hungary of late. Combating discrimination is a shared interest as discrimination intensifies the problems associated with other shared interests. Roma are discriminated due to their ethnic identity which directly impacts on their shared interests; therefore, identity and interests are interlinked. In other words, in the case of Roma, both identity and interests are insoluble because each informs the other, and the shared interests of Roma (e.g. poverty and unequal access to social provisions) are directly impacted by negative ascriptions on their ethnic identity. The main political interests include access to political structures, both mainstream and minority-oriented, and enhanced capacity to make their voices heard in a public forum. Cultural interests are important to minorities because they are often what mark this group out as different. It is the group representation character of the MSG system in Hungary which is widely regarded as so progressive. However, this organizing structure of representation has been tailored to articulate the cultural interests of Roma while at the same time inadvertently highlighting the dearth of political participation and representation. The importance of articulating shared interests is obvious, ‘a common structure or political action, articulated by autonomy and its related cluster of rights and obligations specifies the framework of possible participation in and through which people may enter and take a position in the fray of public debate’ (Horn 1996, 155; cited in Walsh 2000). Young (1990, 119)

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goes further, ‘in a society differentiated by social groups, occupations, political positions, differences of privilege and oppression, regions and so on, the perception of anything like a common good can only be an outcome of public interaction that expresses rather than submerges particularities.’ These organizing structures of representation enable Roma to articulate their shared interests and give them the capability to ensure their voice is heard.

Legitimate Representation Representation can only be meaningful if it is deemed to be legitimate, and this legitimacy must come from the Romani community. Therefore sociopolitical interactions are contextualized to understand the substance of representation. Essentially Romani organizing structures of representation rely on common cause and ‘giving voice’ to be legitimate. These structures signify concrete processes of interaction through which the shared interests of the Romani community are articulated. Since legitimacy is not measured it must be ‘gauged’ as only Roma can determine whether an organizing structure of representation is legitimate or not. Localized representation increases legitimacy as it establishes societal relationships and the legitimacy of NGOs demonstrates that Roma consider proximity to be important for legitimate representation therefore legitimacy is established through practice. Any discussion on electoral legitimacy with reference to proportionality and percentages is futile as there is no quota or benchmark for optimum legitimacy. A conception of input legitimacy is beneficial as it helps us to focus on interactions and processes. Mobilization is first necessary for the creation of an organizing structure of representation and secondly for the legitimacy itself. That is, input legitimacy comes with stalagmite mobilization and in other cases practice and interaction delineate legitimacy. Moves towards representation based on ethnic affiliation are not surprising and can be seen in each of the organizing structures of representation although the emergence of a Romani political party with meaningful support has failed to materialize as yet. For many Romani communities, their representatives (be they élite, political parties or civil society organizations) must also be Romani. In some instances the legitimacy of Romani élite, for example, Aladár Horváth, is established through trust and respect which Roma confer on this individual and can only be generated through social interaction.

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Inadequate representation structures are a leitmotif of the Roma social movement in Hungary. On the one hand, Roma have secured representation in Parliament and prominent individuals have emerged who claim to represent their interests, on the other hand, this is insufficient at present. Romani NGOs have been created to articulate political and socio-economic shared interests among others and work locally and nationally at implementing projects, raising awareness and monitoring governmental policy. In Hungary, there has been no successful move towards ethnopolitics probably due to the inability of Roma to mobilize a coherent electoral mandate which resonates with the heterogeneous Romani community.

Hypotheses Having examined political participation and representation in Romania and Hungary, it is clear that the two hypotheses cannot be sufficient addressed at present. First, H1 maintains that political decentralization increases the legitimacy of Roma representation. In the case of Hungary it depends which organizing structure of representation is being assessed. On the one hand, there exists decentralized representation through local minority self-government however this organizing structure of representation is primarily concerned with cultural matters so it is questionable whether it could be described as political decentralization in any meaningful sense. On the other hand, local NGOs work directly with the community establishing networks and delivering projects. These organizing structures of representation lack an electoral mandate but are often regarded as legitimate by the communities they represent. Secondly, H2 which states that: Due to inadequate organizing structures of representation in the domestic political context, transnational Romani activity increases which can only be addressed by focusing on transnational Romani political participation and organizing structures of representation beyond the state. By analysing the transnational political context it is possible to ascertain whether this context fills the gap left by the domestic political context, that is, to what extent does Roma’s inability to articulate their interests or to secure legitimate representation in the domestic political context, impact on the creation of transnational organizing structures of representation? As with the domestic political context this analysis will not attempt to ‘measure’ legitimacy employing a positivist epistemology rather the concept of legitimacy is understood to be bound to the context of representation, institutional interaction and societal relationships particularly between the Romani

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community and the organizing structures of representation which it confers legitimacy upon. Following H1 it is presumed that due to the figurative and metaphorical distance between transnational organizing structures of representation and the Romani communities that they claim to represent, they will have tenuous claim to legitimate representation even if they are able to articulate the shared interests of Roma.

Hungary and Romania Compared I have been careful to avoid analysing how the state has dealt with Romani communities within its borders and purposively concentrated on organizing structures of representation which Roma have created to articulate their shared interests. However before comparing the Romanian and Hungarian cases of Roma representation and political participation it is necessary to establish an understanding of the domestic political context which necessarily involves focusing on political processes, cultural paths and constitutional provisions, as well as the impact of exogenous factors. Broadly speaking there are two dominant approaches which states take towards minorities (Schwellnus 2007, 6). First, whether a negative or positive attitude towards minority protection is employed through preferential treatment or special rights depends largely on the state’s stance on multiculturalism. Secondly, the approach which rests on individualist or collective assumptions about the nature of nation, minorities and their respective rights can be understood in the context of the wider debate between liberal and communitarian conceptions of minority and group rights. Both Hungary and Romania employ ‘positive’ approaches to minority protection more generally in that they do not deny the existence of national or ethnic minorities, and make special provisions for those ethnic groups within their borders. Hungary utilizes a communitarian understanding of minority rights with special representation rights and cultural autonomy for minorities in the area of media, language and education. Romania is a unitary state (similar to France) which holds that all citizens are equal with no differentials however a constitutional provision has provided guaranteed representation in parliament for all national minorities. Exogenous factors such as EU conditionality have impacted on how Hungary and Romania have dealt with minority groups within their borders. The EU has no coherent approach towards minorities more generally and presently no EU standards exist on Roma rights. EU conditionality ensures compliance (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005); however, the

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unspecified language of the Copenhagen criteria (1993) states that accession states must have ‘respect for and protection of minorities’ and resulted in divergent policy and legal interpretations across CEECs including Hungary and Romania. The EU found itself open to criticism from Hungary which argued that the MSG system established by the ‘Minorities Act’ was more progressive than any other in Europe, including those states already members of the EU. Hungary has been influenced by its desire to ensure protection for the Magyar Diaspora and has attempted to serve as an example on this front which has led to a far-reaching and legally entrenched minority protection system. The EU has been most vocal in its European Commission Regular Reports which repeatedly mention Roma discrimination and encourage EU accession states to develop policies and anti-discrimination legislation. Romania created the ‘National Strategy’ in 2001 to improve the situation of Roma and also established the National Council for Combating Discrimination in the same year. Other exogenous factors include standards elaborated by international organizations such as the CoE and OSCE. The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities contains provisions on state’s obligation to provide for participation of national minorities; however, the implementation of this standard remains in the hands of the signatory state. The OSCE Lund Recommendations reiterate the importance of ensuring ‘effective representation’30 for national minorities; however, this is a political commitment and is not legally binding. The shared interests of Roma do not map perfectly in Hungary and Romania which suggests that Roma interests cannot be explained by objective factors such as their mere existence and size.31 This divergence can be explained by the presence of a multitude of variables including the attitudes of the majority, a range of actors, the capacity to mobilize, a strong/ weak ethnic group identity and domestic norms. The historical experience and cultural path of Romani communities in Hungary and Romania have witnessed more general trends such as the abandonment of nomadism and increasing attempts at societal integration particularly since the collapse of communism. Despite this, attempts at integration have been frustrated by attitudes of the majority towards Roma which ascribe negative associations on the Romani group identity and have established a discourse of otherness epitomized by widespread racial discrimination and socio-economic marginalization. In Hungary this has meant that Roma are frequently ghettoized on the outskirts of large towns and segregation continues between Romani and gaje children in schools. Such practices buttress previously held negative stereotypes and reinforce the majority’s perceptions of Roma

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as second-class citizens. Additionally, the recent rise in racist discourse and the emergence of the Magyar Garda is a cause for concern for Roma who once again find themselves as a target for society’s ills. Low levels of education and poverty levels relative to the majority of society means that political mobilization efforts are impeded in Romania. Romani communities in Hungary and Romania continue to be hugely under-represented in public life which would suggest this is a systemic weakness afflicting all Romani communities. Élite representation in Hungary and Romania is relatively distinctive. Romanian Roma look towards parliamentary representation and public prominence, specifically the RPPE parliamentarian, Nicolae Păun. Hungarian Roma value what role élite play in politics with the civil rights leader Aladár Horváth and the President of the National Roma Self-Government Orbán Kolompár regarded as the most legitimate élite representatives. Their ability to articulate the shared interests comes from their interaction with Romani citizens, becoming attuned to the interests of this minority group in a way that governmental agencies with appointed Roma experts cannot. When organizing structures of representation are created by the government, then these institutions invariably lack legitimacy. Since only Romani communities can confer legitimacy on an organizing structure of representation, these structures must be adequately embedded in interactive processes with Romani communities, for example, the National Agency for Roma in Romania. Voting behaviour has been characterized by the propensity to vote for non-Roma in both Hungary and Romania which implies that common ethnic affiliation is not contingent for Roma representation. This can be seen in the diminishing authority of traditional local representatives such as the bulibaşa in Romania, and the increasing number of Roma voting for mainstream political parties such as the SDP in Romania. The capacity of Roma to mobilize politically and vote is hampered by the lack of identification cards for Roma particularly in Romania. In the strictest sense neither Hungary nor Romania have Romani ethnic political parties though both have political associations that behave like political parties and are treated as such. The political NGOs of Lungo Drom and MCF Union split the Roma vote in Hungary whereas in Romania the RPPE monopolize Roma representation. None of these organizing structures of representation attain substantial support from Roma and any claims to electoral legitimacy are tenuous, at best. Civil society began to thrive in Hungary and Romania (as in other CEECs) after 1989 and has proven a valuable space with which the fledgling Roma social movement could begin to mobilize around their ethnic

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identity, create NGOs and articulate their shared interests. Romani NGOs have received funding from external private donors such as the Soros Foundation, PHARE funding from the EU and the state. A diverse range of Romani NGOs work on broad as well as focused issue areas from the local to the national level. They implement projects on the ground (such as Autonómia in Hungary and ‘Impreuna’ in Romania) and help create an intelligentsia through education (such as Romaversitas in Hungary). No single NGO is assumed to be more important than another for Romani communities but taken together they symbolize a capacity to address the most pressing socio-economic and political interests of Roma. The representation of Romani communities in Hungary and Romania must be assessed on its own merits. It is difficult to determine conclusively whether the Hungarian MSG system is more conducive to adequate political participation and legitimate representation than the Romanian system of guaranteed parliamentary representation. Both Romani communities are characterized by inadequate mobilization and remain in many respects detached from political life. Roma require the state to provide a hospitable environment through legislation and practice which will allow the voice of Roma to be heard, and both Hungary and Romania have initiated policy which addresses the needs and interests of their respective Romani communities. Ultimately the domestic context which allows the Roma social movement to flourish and access formal and informal structures of politics will provide the most effective and legitimate representation.

Notes 1. See: http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?tid=168&lid=1748&less=false (accessed 29 June 2009). 2. The others are: Armenian; Bulgarian; Croatian; German; Greek; Polish; Ruthenia; Romanian; Serb; Slovak; Slovene; and Ukrainian. 3. In the 2001 census, 190,000 individuals declared Romani ethnicity. Reports from domestic NGOs and international organizations estimate this figure to be between 400,000 and 600,000 (Riba 1999, 1). The European Commission puts this figure at 550,000–600,000 (EU Commission Regular Report on Hungary 2002, 31). The difference between the estimated and declared figures can be explained by historical, social and psychological reasons related to the history of Roma in Central and Eastern Europe. 4. Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights (NEKH) Report (hereafter, ‘Minority Ombudsman’) 2005, chapter 4 on Ózd Hétes ghetto. See: http:// www.obh.hu/nekh/en/reports/reports.htm (accessed 23 June 2009). 5. White, J. 2006. The Budapest Times, vol. 4 no. 37, 11 September. See: http://www.budapesttimes.hu/index.php?art=2042 (accessed 29 June 2009). ).One case from 2000 relates to a woman who was sterilized without her consent, the hospital maintaining this was for

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medical reasons. For details see: United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 2006 CEDAW/C/36/D/4/2004: http://www.un.org/ womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/decisions-views/Decision%204-2004%20-%20 English.pdf (accessed 24 July 2009). 6. Article 45(2) of the ‘Minorities Act’ states: ‘to relieve the disadvantage of the Gypsy minority in the field of education, specific educational conditions may be introduced’. For full text see: http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?tid=168&lid=1703&less=false (accessed 23 June 2009). 7. Logan, M. 2006. The Budapest Times, vol. 4 no. 19, 8 May, http://www.budapesttimes. hu/index.php?art=1713 (accessed 29 June 2009). 8. See: Murray 1985. In this seminal study Murray conducted ethnographic research in a controlled and maintained school in Northern Ireland and concluded that segregated schooling may fuel mistrust and suspicion between students and within wider society. 9. For a discussion on how segregation impacts on Roma more generally see: Petrova 2002, 5–8. 10. Younge, G. 2003. The Guardian. 8 January. For full article see: http://www.guardian. co.uk/g2/story/0,3604,870411,00.html (accessed 7 June 2009). 11. See note 1 above, chapter 5 (3.1) (accessed 29 June 2009). 12. A Romani man and his four-year-old son were shot dead in Tatárszentgyörgy on 23 February 2009 as they were trying to escape from their house that had been fire-bombed moments before (European Roma Rights Centre, Hungarian Civil Liberties Union and Legal Defence Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities) 2009. 13. Roma have also been victim of racist attacks recently in Italy and Northern Ireland. 14. For a historical perspective on Romani sub-groups in Hungary see: Marushiakova and Popov 2001, 38–39. This highlights the view that Romani identity refers to a cluster of inter-related identities rather than one homogeneous ethnic identity. 15. Insights gained from personal interview with István Kosztics. President of the Local Roma Self-Government of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary, 8 May 2006. 16. See: McGarry 2009b. 17. Self-identification of ethnic affiliation is an important (individual) right; however, in practical terms this means that no minority group can exert a decisive influence on the outcome of a minority self-government election. See: Danka and Pallai 2003, 37–45. 18. In particular: LXII Act of 1992 on Protection of Personal Data and Publication of Public Interest Information. 19. Lívia Járóka, of Fidesz, is the sole Romani representative in the European Parliament having successfully defended her seat in June 2009. 20. When asked: ‘Which individual can legitimately claim to represent the interests of Roma in Hungary?’ almost every interviewee cited Orbán Kolompár and/or Aladár Horváth. 21. It is not Orbán Kolompár per se but the President of the National Roma SelfGovernment which is being evaluated. According to Orbán Kolompár, the National Roma Self-Government and MCF Roma Union are the most legitimate representative structures for Roma in Hungary. Personal interview, Budapest, Hungary, 11 May 2006.

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22. In the 1990 Hungarian parliamentary elections three Romani MPs were elected; in 1994, this fell to one. In the 1998 elections no Roma were elected to Parliament, while in 2002 this figure rose to four (Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly Report 2002, 11). The 2006 elections saw three Romani MPs elected to Parliament. 23. Personal interview with Aladár Horváth, Budapest, Hungary, 4 May 2006. Furthermore, Mr. Horváth believes that nobody in Hungary could legitimately claim to represent the interests of Roma (including himself) and claims that he only represents those that vote for the Roma Civil Rights Foundation. Tellingly, he is highly critical of the National Roma Self-Government which he was once President of. 24. Speech made by Nicolae Gheorghe, 2006. For full text see: http://usinfo.state.gov/ xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=June&x=200606191319031CJsam ohT0.3977625 (accessed 13 June 2009). 25. See: Olson 2000, 18–30. This report discusses the problematic relationship between the Romungro and Olah in the town of Tiszavasvari in Northeast Hungary. 26. Article 17 of the ‘Minorities Act’ 1993. and, as a general right for all citizens, Act on the Right to Association. 1989. 27. Autonόmia Foundation Annual Report, 2004, page 21. 28. Personal Interview with Anna Csongor, President of Autonómia Foundation, Budapest, Hungary, 3 May 2006. 29. Personal Interview with Peter Bogdan, Budapest, Hungary, 4 May 2006. 30. OSCE 1999, Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life, September, Hague. 31. It follows that the interests of Roma are different still in the transnational political context.

6 Roma Representation in the Transnational Political Context Introduction This chapter takes a holistic approach to analysing transnational1 Roma representation, in that it assesses various transnational organizing structures of representation, isolating one for closer scrutiny, the European Roma Information Office (ERIO) in Brussels. Romani political parties and élite do not figure prominently in the transnational political context, but civil society organizations such as the International Romani Union (IRU) and the Roma National Congress (RNC), as well as transnational advocacy networks such as the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) and the Open Society Institute (OSI) ensure that Roma have a voice transnationally. These established transnational organizing structures of representation have been joined more recently by the ERIO and the European Roma and Traveller Forum (ERTF). Digesting this alphabet soup is imperative if we are to understand the interests of the European Romani community and who speaks for Roma in the transnational political context. One could argue that these transnational organizing structures of representation lack legitimacy on several grounds including a lack of procedural checks and balances, a lack of effectiveness, and because they tend to justify behaviour in terms of values (Collingwood 2006, 454). Thus transnational organizing structures of representation do not justify their representation or advocacy in terms of democratic processes, or public accountability; they instead emphasize specific values, group identity and shared interests. Transnational organizing structures of representation help to foster interaction and dialogue with external actors as well as across the broader 136

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social movement. Through the language of equality, justice and human rights they attempt to address issues affecting Roma and articulate their shared interests. However, as noted by two prominent Roma activists in 1997 ‘despite its distinctly visible ethnicity, it has no political entity of its own’ (Mirga and Gheorghe 1997, 5). This chapter analyses the contemporary Roma social movement and asks whether the situation has changed by focusing on transnational organizing structures of representation. In many ways these transnational structures ‘operate as interest groups, their clients being the oppressed and abused’ (Steiner 1991, 72), yet their strategies, principles, action repertoires and objectives differ. I begin by providing a foundational understanding of transnational social movements before highlighting several transnational organizing structures of representation which define and articulate the interests of Roma. The empirical focus of this chapter centres on the impact of the EU for Roma representation; thus, I provide an overview of EU policy on Roma before examining the specific role of the ERIO and evaluate its legitimacy. A conclusion assesses ethnic mobilization, political participation, interest articulation and legitimate representation in the transnational political context.

A European Minority Roma are a transnational minority2 which has no kin state thus their situation is not comparable with any other minority group in Europe. Furthermore, some claim that ‘Roma are Europe’s largest and most vulnerable minority’ (Ringold et al. 2005, 3), meaning that when analysing Roma representation, the transnational political context cannot be ignored. The relevance of transnational organizing structures of representation has become more pronounced since the 1990s when the international political community focused their spotlight on Roma in Central and Eastern Europe and the knowledge of their discrimination and poverty became more widespread. Roma rights have become a salient topic for international organizations particularly the EU, the CoE, the UN and the OSCE. These international organizations do not claim to represent Roma although they intermittently encourage composite member states to integrate their respective Romani populations. International organizations are comprised of states and exclude minority communities from debates on minority protection (Jackson-Preece 1998, 22), meaning they often reflect state preferences on minority protection. Recently there have been concerted attempts to integrate governmental policy on Roma, most notably through the Decade on Roma Inclusion.3

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The key issue regarding international organizations and Romani communities relates to the lack of social interaction between them begging the question, how can international organizations ‘know’ the shared interests of the Romani community if processes of dialogue and consultation are minimal? Grass (2005, 6) notes that ‘it is as if they were without a voice. By which I mean that where the socio-political decisions get taken there is no perception of them’. There have been efforts to channel the Roma voice into international organizations through the establishment of MG-S-ROM and the creation of the ERTF, which are both affiliated with the CoE. The Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues which is linked to the OSCE was set up in 2003 and the IRU has consultative status with the UN.4 The Roma voice had been subdued in Brussels until 2003 when the ERIO was constituted although intra-institutional structures exist such as the inter-departmental commission and steering group on Roma. Furthermore, the European Roma Policy Coalition (ERPC) is a network of transnational organizing structures of representation and includes the ERIO as a member. The lack of interaction has required international organizations to assume the interests of Roma. Such an approach could be found in the EU’s 2004 report ‘Roma Situation in an Enlarged Europe’ drawn up at the request of the European Commission by DG Employment and Social Affairs, which states that Roma face more serious difficulties than the rest of the population in the fields of education, employment, housing and health (European Commission 2004). In terms of Roma’s civic and political action, the report states there is an urgent need for capacity building of Romani organizations and representatives in order to increase their involvement in initiating and sustaining projects and policies. In this report the EU clearly assumes that Roma are a social problem which must be addressed through social provisions, rather than dealing with the extreme racial prejudice and discrimination which the Romani community endure.5 Ultimately the relative absence of Romani grass-roots and stalagmite mobilization in the transnational political context means that a legitimate Romani voice in international organizations is difficult to detect consequently legislative interventions and policy provisions cannot be tailored to address their shared interests. As the book’s title suggests, ‘who speaks for Roma?’ is used as a starting point for the investigation as it helps to capture the lack of adequate representation. But the ‘who’ refers to individuals and institutions subsumed under the conceptual categorization of ‘organizing structures of representation’. It is assumed that transnational organizing structures of representation are key in fostering interaction between Romani activists

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and advocates, and the communities that they represent. It has been noted that the success of the Roma social movement will be dependent on its ability to bridge the gap between the narrow and often self-appointed Romani élite and the inactive Romani masses (Mirga and Gheorghe 1997, 34). In this respect, stalagmite mobilization is not an a priori assumption. Focusing on élite and the political opportunity structure, as Vermeersch (2006) does, can account for processes of ethnic mobilization, political participation and interest articulation; however, it cannot capture legitimate representation. Legitimacy is grounded in mobilization and interaction outside of the political opportunity structure and must come from Roma themselves. Structures are enabling and constraining (Giddens 1979; 1984) and due to their social construction they have the capacity to change. The political opportunity structure (Eisinger 1973; Keck and Sikkink 1998a) has changed over time and Romani political élite have adapted to these changes. Under communist regimes, Roma were relatively comfortable as the command economy ensured they were employed, had adequate accommodation, and attended schools, but this came at a cost, ‘the general aim of the Communist policy was to make Gypsies equal citizens of their countries but successful equalization was understood to mean complete assimilation of Gypsies’ (Marushiakova and Popov 2001, 47). In the early 1990s an increase in civic awareness of Roma resulted in attempts to define their interests and secure access to political structures, as well as create new ones through ethnic mobilization (Guy 2001, 13–15). Political opportunity structures such as international organizations are stable yet flexible which the Roma social movement utilizes to articulate their interests. Significantly, while international organizations are the site of advocacy and mobilization it is often member state governments which are the primary target of transnational activism because Roma are, ultimately, citizens of the states in which they reside, meaning that tangible improvements in their situation cannot be addressed solely in the transnational political context. Perhaps necessarily, organizing structures of representation are constitutionally ambivalent in that procedural norms as well as underlying principles are contested thus they can facilitate both representation and participation, often concurrently. As Melucci explains, representation means the possibility of presenting interests and demands; but it also means remaining different and never being heard entirely. Participation also has a double meaning. It means both taking part, that is, acting so as to promote the interests and the needs of

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an actor as well as belonging to a system, identifying with the general interests of the community. (Melucci 1992, 10–11) The true value of organizing structures of representation lies in their ambiguous and flexible orientations. Transnational organizing structures of representation can make reference to a number of sources of legitimacy such as: notions of justice; reference to international legal norms; impartiality by virtue of financial and political independence; extensive membership; giving voice; expertise; and partnership with powerful actors (Collingwood 2006). The most relevant of these for the Roma social movement is legitimization through ‘giving voice’, particularly apropos for minority groups whose interests are frequently suppressed in a liberal democratic system. A word of caution is necessary here because by ‘giving voice’ it means having a presence6 ensuring that the interests of Roma are taken into account when designing policy although having a voice alone does not mean that policy and legislation will automatically reflect the interests of Roma. Roma require a broad understanding of representation therefore ‘giving voice’ helps capture an aspect of this phenomenon, and is particularly relevant in the transnational political context as we shall see. Suffice to say, by creating transnational organizing structures of representation, Roma demonstrate that they have the potential to articulate their shared interests beyond the domestic political context.

The Transnational Roma Social Movement A transnational social movement denotes ‘sustained contentious interactions with opponents – national or nonnational – by connected networks of challengers organized across national boundaries’ (Tarrow 1998, 184). Supranational institutions such as the EU have emerged as an important resource for transnational social movements. European integration has certainly contributed to the remobilization of ethnic minorities in western European states, ‘providing them with a new interlocutor and new goals’ (della Porta and Diani 2006, 44). This means that new opportunities for mobilization and participation in the transnational political context become more readily available for social movement actors (Tarrow 1995; Marks and McAdam 1999: della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Zippel 2006; Jutta and Locher 2009). Transnational social movement organizations are ‘engaged in explicit attempts to [change] some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution in society’ (Smith 1999, 591); thus through collective action the Roma social movement struggles for the appropriation

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of shared values and interests. The actors involved in the movement can be described as united by a specific solidarity despite being derived from a heterogeneous composition (Melucci 1980, 202). However, unlike social movements of the past which have emphasized collective action being dependent on leadership, organization, opportunities and material resources (Freeman 1975; Piven and Cloward 1977; McCarthy and Zald 1977) I argue that the Roma social movement is dependent on identity. Though identity is an important component of all social movements, in the case of Roma it is considered to be the most important factor for ethnic mobilization and interest articulation. As previously noted it is presumed that identity and interests are insoluble both analytically and as social facts. Identity and interests cannot be analytically separated in the case of Roma because the interests of the Romani community are directly affected by perceptions of their ethnic identity. Additionally, their experience of systemic exclusion informs other shared interests such as access to the labour force or adequate health care provisions. Ethnic identity acts as glue for this heterogeneous group and while Roma are geographically dispersed and divided across religious, cultural, occupational and linguistic lines, they are united by their ethnic identity nonetheless. Consequently, ethnicity is not an objective ‘given’ but must be understood as a consequence of a social process (Barth 1969) furthermore this ethnic identity is not static but is something which is ‘constantly shaped and reconstructed’ (Guy 2001, 5) in and across socio-political contexts. The creation of organizing structures of representation based on shared ethnicity ‘enhances ethnic collective action on a large scale insofar as they provide organizational infrastructures, leaders, and network links’ (Olzak 2004, 671). In the past there were attempts to construct Roma nationalism in the transnational political context. Even in its earliest incarnation in the nineteenth-century Roma nationalism drew on the example of Zionism (Acton 1974, 233–234) recognizing the importance of gaining the support of national governments as well as the international community to achieve their goals (Jenne 2000, 197). It is important to remember that the Roma social movement has never demanded their own territory and state. Instead ‘nation’ remains a point of reference for many Romani political activists (Vermeersch 2003b, 886–889) but the idea of a territorial Romani nation, a so-called Romanistan, is a utopian one and Roma, as a non-territorial minority, have never made irredentist claims or demanded autonomy, ‘separation is not in their ideology’ (Acton and Klímová 2001, 216–217; Goodwin 2004, 1).7 Despite the benefits of such an approach, Rövid (2009, 13–14) warns of the pitfalls of constructing Roma as a transnational minority

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principally because most Roma do not identify with such a construction while Kovats (2003, 5) argues that Roma nationalism is not a product of, but actually predates, the emergence of grassroots Roma politics, meaning that the construction of Roma nationalism is driven by a few dozen international activists (both Roma and gaje), raising issues of who can legitimacy claim to represent Roma. Gheorghe (1997, 155) points out that because nation states are the building blocks of the intergovernmental political system, this ‘adversely affects minorities such as the Roma who have no such resource, no “fatherland” to back them up’. Of course, such a conception of nationalism does not fit the case of Roma which yields succour to suggestions that Roma constitute a special case (Kymlicka 2001, 54), in the politico-legal world of minority protection. One component of nationalism construction has been linking it to ethnicity which Brubaker et al. (2006, 14) refer to as ‘politicized ethnicity’, and Romani political élite have engaged in such processes. Significantly, Gheorghe (1997, 161) suggests that the uniqueness of Roma can be used to evolve in a different way from nation states and national minorities, by interacting with non-national and supranational institutions.

Transnational Roma Interests Determining the interests of Roma is no easy feat, particularly when a wealth of information exists relating to the multiple issues which Roma face. Moreover, years of marginalization and exclusion has resulted in a myriad of interests, some of which are more pressing at a given time and in a given space. I take a more pragmatic approach in determining the shared interests of Roma by focusing on formal organizations which lobby or speak on their behalf because the medium can be the message (Kitschelt 1991). Through the activities, publications and public pronouncements of transnational organizing structures of representation it is possible to build-up a picture of those interests most relevant for Roma transnationally. These do not necessarily map with domestic interests of Roma because some are more transnational in orientation such as the standardization of language or migration issues. Kovats (2003: 3) maintains that ‘their linguistic/communal diversity and a lack of common interests, makes it unlikely that Roma could ever be politically united in any given state’, the same logic suggesting that such an enterprise would prove impossible at the transnational level. Roma may not be politically united at the transnational level due to their heterogeneity but this does not preclude the formation of shared interests.

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International Romani Union (IRU) The Prague-based IRU is the executive body of the International Romani Congress which first convened in London in 1971, although the IRU was formally established in 1977. It is charged with lobbying and negotiating with and within the international community on Romani issues and through it, traditional sources of nation-building including a flag and anthem have materialized. Serious attempts were also made to develop a standardized Romani language with support from the CoE. It propagates the construction of Roma as ‘a nation without a territory’,8 the argument being that as Roma are a non-territorial nation, they should possess the same rights as other nations, including representation in intergovernmental organizations (Klímová-Alexander 2007a: 401).9 At the first World Romani Congress in 1971, the key demands related to war crimes, language standardization and culture, and social affairs (Fosztó 2003, 112). Since the early 1990s the IRU has become a more prominent pressure group representing the Romani community at seminars and conferences with international organizations including the OSCE, CoE and the EU (Liégeois and Gheorghe 1995, 26). The Fifth10 World Romani Congress in Prague in 2000 provided participants the opportunity to come together and articulate their shared interests. The most reliable indication of these shared interests can be found in the organizing of specialized working groups which met separately from the plenary meeting. These working groups included: Education and Culture; Standardization of the Romani Language; Migration; Holocaust Restitution Issues; Kosovo; the Media; International Politics and Relations; Economic and Social issues; and the proposed new IRU Statutes and Charter (Acton and Klímová 2001, 173–187). The resulting Declaration of the Roma Nation has been presented to Heads of State and the UN Commission on Human Rights.11 While the Charter expresses the grand ambition to be the political representative of all Roma in the World including Sinti, Lovari, Chorichani, Rumungre, Vlach, Manush etc. (Acton and Klímová, 2001, 201) its appeal to representation is not grounded in the language of democratic accountability and these shortcomings have not been addressed in subsequent World Congresses in Lanciano (2004) or Zagreb (2008).

Roma National Congress (RNC) In many ways the Hamburg-based RNC echoes the work of the IRU in that it calls for the Roma to be recognized as a ‘nation’. A key tenet of its work

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has been pushing for the establishment of a European Romani Rights Charter which was first proposed in 1994 and would include a catalogue of legally binding cultural and political rights. The Charter would define the ‘legal position of the Roma in Europe and is intended to prevent the legal gaps which in the past have led to the displacement of Romani persons across Europe’.12 The RNC maintains that this robust legislative intervention would help combat anti-Gypsism, help protect Romani communities in signatory states, and serve as an instrument in securing long-term emancipation and integration. The cornerstone of the RNC ideology is that Roma should not be treated as a ‘social problem’ by states and international organizations which can be remedied through education, rather it maintains that addressing anti-Gypsism is the most important factor in improving the situation of Roma. This anti-Gypsism is embedded in the social practices of the majority of society which constructs negative associations of Romani identity. Therefore, it is only by addressing anti-Gypsism through pragmatic measures that the exogenously imposed negative interpretation of Romani identity can be challenged. The RNC was set up in 1982 as an umbrella organization as it was felt that the interests of the German Sinti clashed with the interests of the immigrant Roma in Germany (Acton and Klímová 2001, 161). They maintain that the Sinti had a distinct identity, as a Volksgruppe (Sobotka 2003, 6) and therefore had their own shared interests. This schism highlights the tension in the Roma social movement because Roma are often treated as a cohesive unit with a common group identity without due accord to the differences within this heterogeneous minority group. By arguing that Roma occupy a unique position both historically and politically as one of Europe’s legitimate nations, the RNC holds this group as a vulnerable and culturally oppressed group.13 Accordingly, ‘their emancipation process needs to draw on common roots and common perspectives beyond citizenship, group affiliation, or country of origin’.14 Thus, being a stateless and non-territorial nation in Europe, confronted with racism and persecution throughout their history, the Romani minority requires special protection. The RNC also holds that, ‘traditional policies directed at the Roma have failed, and while the process of European unification is advancing, human rights standards for the Roma have deteriorated. This paradoxical development can only be resolved by regulating a firm legal status for the Roma in Europe’.15 International NGOs such as IRU and the RNC are complimented by transnational advocacy networks, such as the ERRC and the OSI. Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) are ‘those relevant actors working

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internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services’ (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 18). These TANs represent more than a ‘moral crusade’ (Eder 1985) and although they often include activists who are part of social movements, they ‘represent ideas, not constituencies’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998a, 236). As a network it facilitates the exchange of information between the local and transnational political context and engages in lobbying, targeting key political élite, and the media. TANs are a crucial element in the Roma social movement as they can offer knowledge and expertise on a given issue or community.

European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) The Budapest-based ERRC was established in 1996 and works to combat prejudice and discrimination against Roma, and to promote genuine equality of treatment and respect. The ERRC is a public interest organization which argues before domestic and transnational courts to criticize domestic law or conduct as violating international norms, particularly in the area of discrimination. As Vermeersch (2006, 202) explains, ‘besides documenting and publicizing the systematic lack of human rights protection and sending protest letters to “shame” governments, the ERRC also started to provide targeted legal help, including litigation, to Romani victims of human rights violations.’ One recent notable success of the ERRC was the case of D. H. and Others v. The Czech Republic. In 2007, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg ruled that segregated schooling between Roma and non-Roma was discriminatory.16 The ERRC are particularly adept at information gathering and dissemination by employing a variety of media to communicate their message and activity which draws attention to transnational issues affecting Roma such as poverty (2002a) or unemployment (2007b).

Open Society Institute-Roma Participation Programme (OSI-RPP) This TAN provides institutional support grants for Romani NGOs, provides training and internship opportunities for young Romani activists and helps promotes civic advocacy. The projects which the OSI-RPP supports are defined by Romani leaders and it only funds Romani NGOs. By agitating for stalagmite mobilization it ensures that the OSI does not force the agenda,17 and its credibility as an effective organizing structure of representation is dependent on its avoidance of a paternalistic relationship with

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Roma communities. It has a long-term vision of creating a better future for the Roma by training tomorrow’s leaders and activists.18 The Roma voice in the transnational political context has been amplified by the presence of TANs and has been strengthened by the creation of ambitious structures such as the ERTF.

European Roma and Traveller Forum (ERTF) In December 2004, Terry Davis, Secretary General of the Council of Europe stated, ‘with the creation of this forum, Roma and Travellers will now have a voice at the pan-European level. For the first time in their history, they will be able to influence the decision-making which affects them’.19 The aims of this organizing structure of representation are outlined in its founding statutes and include facilitating the ‘integration of these populations into European societies and their participation in public life and in the decision-making process’.20 The ERTF is purposively different from other transnational Roma organizing structures of representation not least because of its size and geographic distribution. Ambitiously, it brings together more than 20 ethnic Romani groups including, among others: Sinti; Beas; Kalderas; Traveller/Pavee; Kale; Lovara; Jenish; and Resande. The interests of the Romani community are not the same as the interests of the Traveller community however both communities do share a common history as being a despised and marginalized minority group.21 One of the key general principles of the ERTF is to promote the interests of Roma22 and endeavours to ‘promote the struggle against racism and discrimination and facilitate the integration of these populations into the European societies and their participation in public life and in the decision-making process’.23 At the second plenary session of the ERTF in November 2006 each delegate gave a testimonial on the situation of Roma and Travellers.24 Some delegates used this opportunity to specify individual cases of discrimination or anti-Gypsism which they felt were indicative of the entire Romani community, while others pointed to more systemic problems. Recurrent interests which were articulated included: discrimination; unemployment; police brutality; historical persecution; sedentarization; social exclusion; housing; eviction; poverty; racism; marginalization; the position of women and children; and education. However when taken together a pattern often emerges concerning several shared interests which impact on Roma. Three working groups were established which can be taken together to reflect the shared interest of Roma at the European level. One dealt with human rights

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and covered anti-Gypsism, migration, refugees and Kosovo while another focused on social issues and covered cohesion, traditions, the regions and Travellers. The final working group examined civil society which included discussions on education, culture, the Holocaust, financing and enlargement. A ‘Concept Paper’ was produced which contains interests which should be included in a European Charter on the Fundamental Rights of Roma. This list-like document is unavoidably exhaustive and includes points on: the importance of robust anti-discrimination legislation; the prevalence of deteriorated living conditions; the failure of many states to adhere to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities; the lack of monitoring after EU enlargement; the practice of asylum-seeking claims being treated as bogus; the dearth of political participation in the domestic and international political context; the lack of protection for Kosovar Roma; the limited teaching of Romani language; entrenched inequality affecting Roma; equal access to the labour market; affirmative action measures to be adopted; the recognition of Romani as a European language; and the lack of research on the Holocaust.

Notes on Legitimacy of Transnational Organizing Structures of Representation No transnational organizing structure of representation is directly elected by Roma. Some commentators point out that civil society organizations, such as the IRU and the RNC, cannot represent interests as they are not a community of values, like states (Held 1995; cited in Collingwood 2006, 450). The obvious criticism of this position is how it condemns NGOs by holding it up to the normative yardstick of the democratic state. This common, yet misguided, academic practice misses the point. The real ‘value’ of international NGOs comes from their autonomy and independence not from their state-like characteristics or form. Offe (1985, 819) points out that the politics of social movements ‘seeks to politicize the institutions of civil society in ways that are not constrained by the channels of representative-bureaucratic political institutions’, and ‘non-political spheres of action exonerate political authority and provide it with sources of legitimacy’. One criticism levelled at these structures is that their centralized hierarchical leadership is detached from Romani communities and thus any legitimacy is based on ‘giving voice’ in the transnational political context. Legitimacy must be conferred on organizing structures of representation by Roma themselves but this is problematic in the case of Romani international NGOs as there is no interaction and process to link the two together. In this

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regard, Sobotka (2003, 8) explains, ‘while Roma, involved in policy formation processes have to some extent feedback to real Romani constituencies, Roma active at the transnational level, by the rules of the game [. . .] have no such feedback from Romani grassroots.’ There have been accusations that TANs are ‘élite institutions, managed bureaucratically by bourgeois intellectuals and activists, socially and culturally isolated from the constituencies [. . .] that they assist’ (Steiner 1991, 74). One of the distinctive features of TANs is that they do not claim to represent Roma in that they are advocacy organizations. Their purpose is to advocate policy changes which cannot be easily linked to rationalist understanding of their own interests as advocates plead the cause of others (Keck and Sikkink 1998b, 8–9). Trehan (2001) has criticized transnational Roma organizing structures of representation because they have tended to act only according to their normative agenda. Moreover, very often their activists and employees are drawn from those engaged in broader social movements such as anti-racism, and human and minority rights advocacy, and are not Romani in ethnic origin. The lack of a common ethnic identification creates hurdles to ethnic mobilization because TANs cannot ‘know’ the shared interests of the Romani community for certain because they do not share a common ethnic identity. It is worth reiterating that interests are constructed by the Romani community themselves through reference to their ethnic group identity. However, TANs are quick to acknowledge that they do not represent Roma but they do speak on their behalf.25 As with other transnational organizing structures of representation, the legitimacy of the ERTF is questionable for several reasons. On the one hand, the ERTF certainly ‘gives voice’ to the dispersed Roma community but it can be accused of being too far removed from the communities which it claims to represent. This lack of proximity means there is no process which links the political contexts (local, domestic and transnational) together. The ERTF unashamedly makes its intentions and purposes clear: it is there to represent Roma in the transnational political context and claims that its delegates derive legitimacy from national delegates who themselves are appointed rather than elected by the Roma community. Sharing a common ethnic identity is not sufficient in and of itself for legitimate representation because social interaction is crucial in establishing legitimacy.

The European Union’s Policy on Roma A number of questions had been asked in the European Parliament during the 1970s and led to research on the educational provision for Roma in

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European Community member states in the 1980s. Early European Union (EU) discourse on Roma focused on the perceived nomadic aspect of their ethnic identity when reference was made to persons of no fixed abode (European Parliament 1984), and applied the exonym ‘Gypsy’ to these persons. The pan-European policy paradigm did not emerge until the early 1990s and now there is ‘certainly a transnational dimension to Roma issues’ (Kovats 2001b, 106). With the accession of eight CEECs (A8) to the EU in 2004 and a further two (A2) in 2007, there were serious concerns that the situation of Roma would be forgotten. The Copenhagen criteria (1993) for accession demands that states must have ‘respect for and protection of minorities’. In its annual reports which monitored the progress of potential EU states, Roma were regularly singled out as deserving particular attention in the sections on minorities.26 The 1999 accession partnerships specified integration of Roma as a priority for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, and the Commission devoted considerable attention to its regular reports’ ‘minority rights’ section to Roma, ‘detailing infringements of their civil, political, economic and social rights, but making no reference to migration’ (Guglielmo and Waters 2005, 771). Thus the EU sought to improve the socio-economic and political situation of Roma prior to accession. However, with accession secured the message that was sent to the new EU member states was that enough had been done for Roma, and as members of the club, there was no longer the carrot or stick of EU membership to force governments to improve the situation of Roma within their borders. Somewhat unexpectedly, the EU has actually given more attention to Roma since 2004 than anytime previously. In 2004, the European Commission’s DG Employment and Social Affairs published The Situation of Roma in an Enlarged European Union (European Commission 2004) outlining the EU’s policy framework on Roma which focused on anti-discrimination, human rights, structural funds, employment and the impact of eastern enlargement. A key feature of EU Roma policy has been the categorization of Roma in social rather than ethnic or cultural terms resulting in policy which focuses on the consequences of a given situation (such as health problems, poverty, illiteracy etc.) rather than on their root causes (rejection, inappropriate provision) (Liégeois and Gheorghe 1995, 13). In 2005, the European Parliament (EP) delivered a Resolution on the Situation of the Roma in the European Union (EP 2005) which acknowledges the racial discrimination which Roma face in relation to accessing health care, segregated schooling and unemployment as well as recognizes the need to ensure effective participation of Roma in political life. The EP, in particular, has been a vocal and consistent supporter of Roma by elaborating Resolutions

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on the situation of Roma women who face multiple discrimination (EP 2006) and the need for a coherent EU Strategy on Roma (EP 2008a), the latter of which: urges the Commission to develop a European Framework Strategy on Roma Inclusion aimed at providing policy coherence at EU level as regards the social inclusion of Roma and urges the Commission at the same time to shape a comprehensive Community Action Plan on Roma Inclusion with the task of providing financial support for realising the objective of the European Framework Strategy on Roma Inclusion. (EP 2008a) The EP responded to growing antagonism towards Roma in Italy by conducting a debate on the Italian Roma crisis and a Resolution on the ethnic profiling of Roma in Italy (European Parliament 2008b). Certainly, Roma are one of the most vilified and excluded minority groups in Europe, and a Eurobarometer (69. 1) poll (European Commission 2008a) confirmed this pariah status with 24 per cent EU-wide stating that they would not feel comfortable with a Rom as a neighbour. Other institutions have contributed to Roma discourse at the EU level including a High Level Advisory Group of Experts on the Social Integration of Ethnic Minorities and their Full Participation in the Labour Market, which acknowledges that ‘the integration of Roma is a process which must address the diversity of Roma people’ (HLG 2007). In July 2008, the European Commission produced a Staff Working Paper on Roma which details the interests of Roma across Europe. This document begins by detailing the challenge facing the EU in integrating Roma, conceding that ‘core issues of Roma inclusion – education, employment, public health, housing and infrastructure and the fight against poverty – fall mainly under the responsibility of member states’ (European Commission 2008b, 4). Furthermore, it maintains that it must avoid an exclusive focus on social problems which would risk losing sight of the specific challenges that Roma face while at the same time avoiding ‘a purely ethnically-defined approach which forgoes the advantages of mainstreaming Roma issues in the main policy strands’ (European Commission 2008b, 4). It is the incoherence of EU policy on Roma which contributes to continued marginalization across member states. The EU might regard its role as co-ordinating a supranational policy on Roma but in the absence of a targeted strategy with the accompanying resources, Roma will continue to be excluded and discriminated. Put simply, political will at the EU level is not sufficient and current policy

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is not appropriate to the task of improving the situation of Roma across Europe. The EU has been reluctant to treat Roma as a specific ethnic group with particular interests and instead relies on mainstreaming the interests of Roma into existing community policy. The success of such an approach depends on the ability of the EU to co-ordinate diverse departments and funds.27 Such an approach is wary of ghettoizing Roma further by creating specific instruments to address the interests of Roma such as a specific Roma Unit, a Directive or a Strategy. Moreover, the benefits of creating targeted measures are not clear because it is argued that the outcome would be no different: ‘what should be included in a Directive or Strategy that goes beyond what we have already?’28 Another example is the European Social Fund which cannot be targeted exclusively towards Roma but can focus on issues which affect Roma such as social exclusion and antidiscrimination, thus ‘people are not defined by their ethnicity or gender but defined because they have common problems’.29 Such an approach misses the point though. The interests of Roma are informed by negative perceptions of their ethnic group identity, therefore policy cannot detach the interests of Roma from their ethnicity because it is their ethnicity which generates hostility from authorities and society across Europe. In September 2008, the EU held its first Roma Summit in Brussels bringing together over 400 delegates, the purpose of which was to examine measures to combat the persistent discrimination of Roma and to promote a firm commitment to tackling concrete problems faced by Roma. While the event itself was symbolically significant, it was also hoped that it would yield tangible benefits, namely, the creation of an EU Strategy for Roma.30 Such a development was not forthcoming, the EU instead announcing the creation of a EU Platform for Roma which left Roma activists and advocates hugely disappointed. What exactly is a ‘Platform’ and what is its purpose? In April 2009, the European Platform for Roma Inclusion, bringing together Roma advocates and representatives and EU institutions, met in Prague to decide common basic principles.31 Acknowledging the core values of the EU including human rights, non-discrimination, equality of opportunity and economic development, it declared that Roma inclusion policies should be integrated with mainstream policies in the fields of education, employment, social affairs, housing, health and security (Principle 1). Thus Roma-focused interventions would not be separated from broader policy initiatives (Principle 2) and would be mainstreamed (Principle 4). The practical delivery of policies concerning Roma inclusion will rest with EU member states, in particular with regions and municipalities,

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with close co-operation with Roma civil society (Principle 9). Finally, it states that ‘Roma involvement must take place at both national and European levels through the input of expertise from Roma experts and civil servants, as well as by consultation with a range of Roma stakeholders in the design, implementation and evaluation of policy initiatives’ recognizing that ‘support for the full participation of Roma people in public life . . . is also essential’ (Principle 10). It is too soon to tell whether increased attention at the EU level will yield notable improvements in the situation of European Roma. Roma have a presence in Brussels but EU institutions continue to pursue an ethnicityblind approach relying on anti-discrimination legislation as a tool to address the social problems. It is not clear if this approach is fit for purpose because it ignores underlying structural problems facing Roma meaning that a tailored policy with funding, objectives, deadlines, and monitoring and evaluation instruments could be the only way to meet the substantial challenges.

European Roma Information Office (ERIO) The ERIO is an international advocacy organization which promotes political and public discussion on Roma issues by providing factual and in-depth information on a range of policy issues to EU institutions, Roma civil society organizations, government authorities and inter-governmental bodies.32 It was set up in 2003 to provide the Romani community in Europe with a voice by co-operating with a large network of organizations and acts to combat racial discrimination and social exclusion through raising awareness of the issues affecting Roma, lobbying and policy development. Crucially, it does not claim to represent the Romani community but advocates on its behalf. It promotes the participation of Roma communities in decision-making processes at the European, national and local levels. By advocating for the rights of Roma it ensures that the interests of Roma are included on the policy-making and decision-making agendas of EU institutions, and by extension, of EU member states. Additionally, it asserts that its main focus is anti-discrimination policies in the field of education, employment, health care and housing.33 The ERIO maintains that it acts as an interlocutor between Roma and EU institutions ‘as an informational platform, ERIO ensures that the voices of all European Roma are heard by the EU and governmental officials’.34 Nevertheless, its role has changed somewhat since its inception, and while disseminating information ostensibly from Roma vertically to EU institutions remains a key activity, it

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finds itself lobbying more and more, responding to crises when they inevitably arise. Gamson (1990, 64–66) has shown that the presence of influential allies is crucial to a movement’s success; therefore, the ERIO targets EU institutions because it has proven an effective ally of Roma and a receptive environment to advance claims and articulate interests. The sole Romani Member of European Parliament (MEP), Lívia Járóka, argues: It is indispensable to have a strong and united voice in Europe, so that we can articulate our demands towards the authorities and decisionmakers. It is necessary to disseminate direct information among the institutions and to make them realise that Roma communities share more or less the same woes throughout Europe. Given the persistently growing responsibility of the European Union in the field of social inclusion and combating poverty it is vital to develop a strong Roma advocacy on the international level, in order to be true partners with the governing institutions in all relevant phases of policy-making, in design, implementation and monitoring.35 Furthermore, the European Parliament in particular has held formal exchanges of information with various types of associations (Marks and McAdam 1999; Lahusen 2004; della Salla and Ruzza 2007) and the ERIO has attempted to capitalize on this open door to civic advocacy. The most consistently articulated interest has been the need for a coherent EU policy on Roma which focuses on the twin goals of equality and meaningful integration. Roma are the most discriminated and marginalized minority community in the EU and clearly past efforts to improve the situation across the EU have failed for a number of reasons including lack of political will and ill-considered policy approaches. The EU has taken a minimal approach to integrating Roma focusing principally on the construction of anti-discrimination legislation. While such legislative interventions are welcomed by the ERIO, it lobbies EU institutions arguing that Roma require special measures due to their historical exclusion. One of the key reasons for past failures in improving the situation of Roma has been the lack of input into EU policies by Roma themselves: ‘patronizing policies which assume the Roma to be passive recipients of policy benefits have to be stopped’ (ERIO 2008b, 1), though evidence suggests that this practice continues. On the occasion of the International Roma Day on 8 April 2008, at an event in the EP, the Director of ERIO, Ivan Ivanov, declared that ‘it is

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increasingly acknowledged that the situation of the Roma is among the primary human rights issues in Europe’ (ERIO 2008b, 1). Couching the interests of Roma in the language of human rights is useful because rights have become a ‘master frame’ (Snow and Benford 1992) among social movements and certainly resonate with the international political community. But human rights are universally applied and ought to be cultureblind meaning that a human-rights approach must ignore ethnicity and special treatment. Thus the tool of human rights will be useful in securing basic protection of Roma through international law but cannot be wielded to comprehensively address the complex situation facing Roma across Europe. In order for Roma to enjoy equality and integration in the EU, the following interests must be addressed: effective protection of the fundamental civil rights of Roma including the right to non-discrimination; equal access to quality education; equal access to employment and self-employment opportunities; equal access to goods, facilities and services, particularly health care and housing; and full participation on an equal basis with nonRoma in economic, social, political and cultural life (ERIO 2008b, 8). These are the shared interests of Roma and have been presented ad hoc to EU institutions in various guises over the years. However, with the demand for the creation of an EU Strategy on Roma, these interests will be subsumed into a co-ordinated weapon which Roma activists and advocates could deploy against member states and EU institutions. The creation of an EU Strategy would be the clearest indicator yet of the desire of the EU to effectively address the deplorable living conditions of many Roma. It was in the shadow on the unfolding Italian Roma crisis (Amnesty International 2008) that the EU held its first EU Roma Summit in Brussels on 16 September 2008. This event was co-organized by the ERIO and signified an opportunity for Roma to amplify their concerns on current EU policy ‘we hope the Summit will not be just a “fig leaf ” placed over the lack of concrete action which is needed to promote inclusion of the most deprived and largest minority in Europe. The Summit must instead be the first brick in the foundation for a solid and consistent European Strategy for Roma’ (ERIO 2008c). The ERIO regularly seizes the opportunity to raise awareness of Roma issues ensuring that the voice of Roma is heard through diverse media. This includes: reacting to developments in the EU; organizing events in collaboration with EU institutions; attending events related to Roma issues; disseminating news bulletins and updates to Roma activists and advocates; and lobbying EU institutions. Each activity is considered in turn. The ERIO regularly reacts to developments in the EU. In July 2008, the European

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Commission announced the launch of the new Social Agenda and the ERIO argued that this document could be seen as a first step in the direction of a substantial and consistent European Strategy for Roma to ‘improve the level of protection and integration of Roma in their societies’ (ERIO 2008d). Furthermore, the ERIO publishes recommendations to the sixmonthly rotating Council Presidency which are useful to monitor the key interests of Roma and how the voice of Roma changes over time. The recommendations to the Czech Presidency in January 2009 called for the elaboration of an EU Strategy on Roma, as well as the capacity of Roma to move freely across the EU (ERIO 2009a) while those to the Swedish Presidency in July 2009 re-iterated calls for an EU Strategy and warned of the resurgence of the far-right and anti-Gypsism across Europe (ERIO 2009b). In April 2009, ERIO organized the conference ‘Roma Access to Political Participation’ at the European Parliament which focused on the participation of Roma in politics. The purpose of this event was to debunk certain myths surrounding and impeding the political participation of Roma and to draw attention to the fact that Roma are under-represented in public life in every EU member state and in some states, they are not represented at all. The Chair of ERIO’s board, Pedro Aguilera, reminded delegates that political participation is crucial because through political participation and voting the population can influence the shaping of policies (ERIO 2009c, 1). Other participants argued that proportionally the EP should have 24 Roma representatives, yet just two Roma secured seats in the 2004– 2009 assembly (Lívia Járóka and Viktória Mohácsi, both from Hungary), with only the former getting re-elected in the 2009 EP elections. Various participants linked the lack of political participation to social inclusion such as Enrika Chiozza of DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, and to poor living conditions and unemployment, such as MEP Jean Lambert. As well as organizing events, the ERIO is represented in events organized by other institutions which work on issues such as equality and rights including with the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (July 2008) and the launch of the European Platform for Roma Inclusion (April 2009). One of the key roles of the ERIO is to ensure that events and developments in the EU which relate to Roma are regularly disseminated to the Roma social movement network including Roma NGOs and national agencies across Europe.36 Often the ERIO will draw attention to incidents affecting Romani communities across Europe relating to discrimination or racism. Some events are monitored over a period of time such as the rise of the Magyar Garda in Hungary or the unfolding Roma crisis in Italy.

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Information gathering and dissemination is a key feature of the work of the ERIO and remains a crucial component however more recently ERIO has found itself lobbying and advocating directly with EU institutions. The ERIO lobbies with the EP which has proven a powerful ally for European Roma, so much so that the ERIO presented an award to the President of the EP on International Roma Day 2009 to acknowledge its valued support. The European Commission is another focal point of ERIO advocacy in particular DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities where the main expertise on Roma at the EU level is located. Other Directorates General are important though including DG Enlargement, DG Regional Development, DG Education and Culture, and DG Justice, Freedom and Security. One indicator of the success of a social movement is its ability to form alliances thus Roma activists have established links with Members of the European Parliament, Commission officials, and political élite in member states meaning that ‘the EU provides an environment where Roma can express themselves’.37 Social movements create and sustain networks (Diani and McAdam 2003) which facilitate co-operation across institutions and political contexts. To be successful the ERIO must be able to take advantage of opportunities when they arise and to do this they frame demands in ways that chime with political authorities in the EU, their core supporters and the media, and deploy action repertoires which resonate with political authorities and increase their visibility. The ERIO certainly made its presence felt during the unfolding Italian Roma crisis from 2007 onwards though initially this was to inform the Roma social movement network about events in Italy and to warn national governments and EU institutions what was happening. During 2007 and 2008 the Italian authorities embarked on a systematic programme targeting Roma through policy and discursive interventions, including hate speech. Following the decree adopted in Italy in November 2007 which allows for the expulsion of EU citizens who are criminals, the ERIO issued a statement accusing the Italian authorities of pursuing an ‘aggressive racist campaign against Roma in Italy’ (ERIO 2007). Forced evictions of Romani communities, anti-Roma statements by political authorities and the media, finger-printing of Roma (including children), and authoritarian ‘security’ measures cultivated an atmosphere of antagonism and hostility towards Romani communities in Italy in which anti-Romani violence is tolerated and is on the rise. While it was the ethnic profiling of Romani communities in camps which caused outrage among Romani activists as well as EU officials, it was actually the legality of expulsions to other EU states, particularly Romania, which allowed the EU to

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finally intervene. Significantly, MEPs such as Viktória Mohácsi, Magor Csibi and Claude Moraes joined the ERIO in condemning the Italian authorities although Commission officials were reluctant to publicly denounce a member state. The ERIO also used the Italian Roma crisis to ask the European Commission to ‘ensure that the principle of equal treatment is strictly followed by each member state, to adopt a horizontal approach concerning Roma’s situation in Europe and to propose as soon as possible a specific European Roma policy’ (ERIO 2008e). The ERIO has evolved, as most representation structures do, responding the developments in the EU. Ivan Ivanov notes that: the purpose of ERIO was to provide information about Roma across the whole of the European Union to show that the Roma situation is not just an issue in Eastern Europe but is an issue in Western Europe also. But, you know, they [the EU] realized that providing them with information is not enough. They needed someone to make recommendations, proposals and so on, so this is how the ERIO moved from being a purely information office, and this is our main aim in fact.38 The ERIO is careful to argue that it does not represent Roma: ‘we don’t represent because we have not been elected by Roma, but we advocate on their behalf before European institutions and national governments.’39 Legitimate representation is thus equated with a democratic mandate applying domestic conventions of legitimacy to the transnational political context. However, Ruiz highlights the importance of having a voice in the EU: ‘I have seen how ERIO’s presence has contributed to keep the Roma issue at the top of the agenda for European institutions and for civil society and that was why it was created in 2003.’ Having a presence in Brussels has clearly improved the capacity to ensure that the voice of Roma is heard and is difficult to imagine that the recent flurry of policy and activity on Roma issues emanating from the EP and the European Commission has not been the result of advocacy by the ERIO.

Conclusion Ethnic Mobilization Transnational organizing structures of representation reflect the various strategies and capabilities of the Roma social movement. Each shares a common ethnic group identity (this is less applicable to TANs) which is

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the glue that holds the structure as well as the macro-structure of the social movement together. Creating organizing structures of representation is a key element of all social movements as it provides a platform through which the movement can make its voice heard. Roma are a transnational minority who have been persecuted and marginalized because of negative ascriptions of their ethnic identity. Crucially, their identity and interests are insoluble as the interests of Roma are determined by their group identity, and their experiences as an oppressed group. The construction of ethnic group identity is particularly relevant as this must take place in a political context. Since the 1990s Romani activists and advocates have increased their efforts towards the transnational political context in order to influence policy affecting Roma and ensure that the interests of Roma are taken into account.

Political Participation Participating in public and civic structures allows the interests of Roma to be heard which otherwise could be either forgotten or defined by gaje institutions. This participation takes a variety of forms including shaming, lobbying, networking, information dissemination, consulting, training and researching and each is considered relevant for the Roma social movement. Transnational organizing structures of representation are not duplicitous or in direct competition with one another, rather they should be understood as fulfilling specifics requirements in the broader Roma social movement. Formal representation at the transnational level is negligible which means that the principal role of transnational organizing structures of representation is to ensure the voice of Roma is heard.

Interest Articulation There exists a multitude of shared interests which are articulated by these organizing structures of representation although some can be highlighted as being particularly important to the Roma social movement. First, Roma demand to be recognized as a nation in their own right. Roma have no kin state and make no territorial claims, yet being recognized as a nation would acknowledge the validity of this group and could lead to positive concessions in the future. Secondly, discrimination against Roma is widespread and even when favourable legislation exists, in practice violations are a persistent occurrence. Thirdly, poverty disproportionately affects Roma and intensifies social marginalization as many Roma are unemployed, live

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in substandard housing, and do not have access to adequate medical care. Due to a general absence of access to education they are unable to change their current circumstances for themselves. Finally, calls for an EU Strategy on Roma, which would address other shared interests, have been invoked more regularly particularly since EU enlargement in 2004. Shared interests have been articulated by the transnational organizing structures of representation, often by several concurrently. It is widely accepted that one way to improve the situation of Roma is to increase their political participation in the transnational political context, even if this is not direct power and influence, and is only weaker forms of advocacy such as consulting, lobbying, networking and advising.

Legitimate Representation The legitimacy of these structures is questionable because their activities are often abstracted from Roma, which means that ethnic mobilization is driven mainly by élite from within the movement who are able to set the agenda. A leading Romani intellectual, Nicolae Gheorghe, (1997, 157) acknowledges the ‘crisis of legitimacy’ with regard to the construction of Romani identity in the transnational political context arguing that Roma are in a process of ‘ethnogenesis’ (158), moving from a position of inferiority to one where they enjoy more equal treatment with other communities. But who is pulling the strings at this critical juncture of Roma history? The only visible manifestation of Roma representation in the transnational political context is organizing structures of representation led by a thin stratum of Romani intellectuals. In this respect it is unlikely that the drive to be recognized as a nation came from a groundswell of Roma support, so the elaboration of Roma as a stateless nation is an élite construct. Another concern is that democratic accountability or critical engagement from the wider Romani community is nominal, meaning that interests articulated by transnational structures are presented, however well-intentioned, to international organizations and the European Romani community as a fait accompli. The centralized hierarchical leadership of the IRU and RNC is detached from Romani communities, so their claims to legitimacy are based on shared values and ‘giving voice’ to Roma in the transnational political context. Legitimacy is conferred on organizing structures of representation by the Romani community so social interaction establishes a legitimacy discourse, and Roma input into this discourse. However there is a disconnection between transnational organizing structures of representation and

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the Romani community which makes legitimacy difficult to establish. TANs are a crucial element in the social movement as they offer specialist skills and knowledge such as familiarity and expertise on a given issue or community. The utility of TANs lies in their capacity to empower local Romani communities through training and funding (OSI-RPP) and their ability to induce domestic political actors to uphold international norms including anti-discrimination and anti-racism (ERRC). The creation of the ERTF should be understood as fitting into the broader European-wide Roma social movement which has been gathering momentum since the early 1990s. There is no question that it ‘gives voice’ to Roma in a transnational political context which is both receptive and attentive and the same applies to ERIO, which it is not an umbrella organization like the IRU, RNC or ERTF. In addition, ERIO does not claim to represent or unite all Roma but exists to lobby the EU and raise the profile of issues affecting European Roma.40 A shared solidarity means that organizing structures of representation can ‘give voice’ to Roma as a political platform which necessarily involves different goals, repertoires, strategies of action as well as networks of alliance and organizing structures of representation.

Notes 1. Transnational is used to characterize regular activity crossing national borders that involves one non-state actor, while international would only suggest increasing interactions among states (Risse-Kappen 1995, 3; cited in Clark et al. 1998, 3). 2. There are currently 12 million Roma in Europe, mostly (though not exclusively) located in Central and Eastern Europe (Kawczynski 2000). The Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights 2005 Report on the ‘Human Rights Situation of the Roma, Sinti, and Travellers in Europe’ maintains there are ten million Roma, and that they are a truly ‘pan-European’ minority. For full text see: http://www.human-rights.hr/dokumenti/ CoE%20CHR%20Roma%202005%5B2%5D.htm (accessed 8 August 2009). Additionally, the Council of Europe issued a Recommendation (1203) in January 1993 stating: ‘Gypsies are a true European minority.’ 3. The Decade of Roma Inclusion (2005–2015) brings together 12 states: Albania; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; the Czech Republic; Hungary; Macedonia; Montenegro; Romania; Serbia; Slovakia; and Spain. It focuses on education, employment, health and housing, and commits governments to take into account the other core issues of poverty, discrimination and gender mainstreaming affecting Roma communities. For more information see: http://www.romadecade.org/ 4. In 1979 the IRU was given consultative status at the United Nations Economic and Social Council. In 1993, it was promoted to Category II Special Consultative Status at the UN, which in effect recognizes its authority in amplifying the voice of Roma at an international level. For further see: Klímová-Alexander 2005, chapter 3.

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5. For an understanding of why Roma are treated as a social problem see: Thelen 2005, 29–35. 6. On the politics of presence see: Phillips 1998. 7. Recognition of Roma as a transnational nation with a specific group identity is the first step for the Roma social movement to be empowered to articulate these interests. The importance of recognition of minorities is expressed by Taylor 1994. 8. This was explicitly articulated in the ‘Declaration of Nation’ at the fifth Romani World Congress in 2000. Full text reproduced by Acton and Klímová 2001. 9. The historical development of transnational mobilization in the second half of the twentieth century are detailed by Puxon 1973; Jenne 2000; Klímová-Alexander 2007a; Klímová-Alexander 2007b. 10. The previous congresses were held in 1971, 1978, 1981 and 1990 respectively. 11. Oral statement by the IRU, an NGO in Special Consultative Status, delivered by Paolo Pietrosanti. Fifty-seventh session, March-April 2001. For full text see: http://www. radicalparty.org/humanrights/gy_comm_57_pietrosanti.htm (accessed 12 June 2009). 12. Kawczynski 2000. Report on the Condition of the Roma in Europe. Report commissioned by the OSCE. 13. The Roma National Congress. General Principles. See: http://romanationalcongress. webs.com/whoweare.htm (accessed 14 August 2009). 14. See note 12 above. 15. Roma National Congress. 1994; cited in Mirga and Gheorghe 1997, 20. 16. For details of the case and its impact see: http://www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk=2945 (accessed 14 August 2009). 17. Personal interview, Bernard Rorke, Director of the OSI-RPP, Budapest, Hungary, 3 May 2006. 18. Personal interview, Gyula Vamosi, Romani activist, Péc, Hungary, 8 May 2006. 19. For full text of speech see: http://www.ertf.org/01/media/downloads/english/ Terry%20Davies,%20Opening.doc (accessed 19 July 2009). 20. Article 2.1. For statutes in full see: http://ertf.org/01/en/dyn/about_us/general/ statutes_of_the_ertf.html (accessed 28 August 2009). 21. This commonality between Roma and Travellers was expressed separately by Catherine Joyce of the Blanchardstown Development Project and Martin Collins, the Irish delegate to the ERTF. Personal interviews, Dublin, Ireland. 10 October 2006. 22. See note 20 above, Article 3.1. 23. See note 20 above, Article 2.1. 24. The author attended the second plenary session of the ERTF. 25. Personal interviews with Dimitrina Petrova, Director of the ERRC, Budapest, 23 September 2005; Claude Cahn, Programmes Director of the ERRC, Budapest, 11 May 2006; and Bernard Rorke, Director of the OSI-RPP, Budapest, 3 May 2006. 26. For more on EU policy and Roma see: Simhandl 2006. 27. Personal Interview with Belinda Pyke, Director, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities on Anti-Discrimination, Brussels, 4 November 2008. 28. Personal Interview with Joachim Ott, Co-ordinator of the Roma Action Group, Brussels, 4 November 2008.

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29. Personal Interview with Peter Stub-Joergensen, Director of the European Social Fund, Brussels, 6 November 2008. 30. The necessity of creating an EU Strategy is detailed by the European Roma Policy Coalition 2008. 31. For the full text of the Common Basic Principles see: Council of the European Union 2009, Annex: 5–8. 32. ERIO profile. www.erionet.org (accessed 9 August 2009). 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Electronic communication with Lívia Járóka, Member of the European Parliament, 24 July 2009. 36. These can be accessed from www.erio.org.net. 37. Personal Interview with Joachim Ott, Co-ordinator, Roma Policy Coalition, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Brussels, 4 November 2008. 38. Personal Interview with Ivan Ivanov, Director of ERIO, Brussels, 5 November 2009. 39. Personal interview with Guillermo Ruiz, Policy Officer of ERIO, Brussels, 5 November 2009. 40. Interestingly, EU institutions actually derive legitimacy for their policy on Roma by consulting with the ERIO, the Roma voice in Brussels.

Conclusion Roma have lived in Europe for over 700 years yet they continue to be treated as outsiders, as though they do not belong. Systematic persecution from authorities and wider society has met them throughout their history yet they have survived, flourished and their cultural identity remains strong. Roma are present in every state in Europe, most residing in Central and Eastern Europe; however, in every state Roma are the most marginalized and excluded community, consistently harassed and vilified even today with justice and equality out of reach. What makes Roma such a fascinating case among the European mosaic of minority communities is that they are unique. They do not speak the same language,1 or practice the same religion and possess divergent levels of wealth and education, although broadly speaking discrimination and racism is a common experience. They are a transnational minority without a kin state, and despite enduring persecution they have never used violence to change their circumstances. This does not signify passive acquiescence in the face of constant exclusion because more recently Roma have begun to make their voice heard in the domestic and transnational political contexts. Now more than ever Roma appear to have the potential to make their interests known and a chance to improve their situation across Europe. The purpose of representation is to make present what is absent (Birch 1971; Pitkin 1972). In the case of Roma it is their interests which have been missing for various reasons meaning that state policies have ignored them, exacerbating existing problems. In liberal democratic systems we select and authorize representatives on grounds of identity, common interests or expertise (O’Neill 2001). I have argued that Roma share interests which are informed by their experience as being a marginalized minority community, meaning that identity and interests are insoluble. Their interests are overwhelmingly socio-economic and political such as access to adequate health, education, employment, housing, as well as combating discrimination. This does not mean that the cultural interests are unimportant; rather, the

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situation of Roma across Europe is so precarious that socio-economic interests are more pressing. If European governments commit to improve the situation of Roma then we would surely witness a significant increase in demands for preservation of culture. Moreover, the lack of a political voice is an interest for it is through political participation that Roma can ensure their interests are accounted for when formulating policy. Clearly, the lack of ethnic mobilization in the past has hindered attempted to give Roma a voice in the domestic and transnational political contexts. The implications of this approach are obvious: policies which are worked out for rather than with Roma are unlikely to reflect their real needs and interests. Roma must therefore be able to input and decide on policy which affects them directly as well as the capacity to monitor and evaluate its implementation. As the case studies of the domestic and transnational political contexts have shown, Roma are increasingly finding a political voice and are not relying solely on liberal democratic processes. Parliamentary representation of Roma does not reflect their demographic weight thus the burgeoning Roma social movement has created civil society organizations at the local, national and transnational level to articulate their interests. Despite encouraging evidence of stalagmite mobilization, tangible improvements in the living conditions of Roma remain out of reach, which indicates that state policies are ineffective or that the historical exclusion of Roma is so embedded that more must be done. As Roma are a transnational minority, the transnational political context offers an opportunity to advance claims beyond state borders where traditionally governments have been unwilling to alleviate the problems faced by Romani communities. My research was motivated by the desire to shed light on how a disenfranchised minority group can change their circumstances through representation. It analysed the case of Roma representation in Hungary and Romania and hypothesized that localized representation increased legitimacy (H1), and that transnational Romani activity increased due to inadequate organizing structures of representation in the domestic political context (H2). I argued that to fully understand who speaks for Roma it is necessary to account for both the domestic and transnational political contexts. The case studies found that Roma are under-represented in political life and therefore create organizing structures of representation to articulate their shared interests which are constructed in a variety of political contexts.

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Assessing the Hypotheses H1: Political decentralization increases the legitimacy of Roma representation Political decentralization is a non-restrictive term and refers to localized civic activity including formal and informal modes of participation and representation including élite, NGOs and political parties. Proximity between the Romani community and organizing structures of representation is vital because legitimacy can only be conferred by the Romani community and this is problematic at the transnational level. Lívia Járóka, Member of the European Parliament, argues that: local implementation is the crucial factor of all initiatives, so any transnational Roma representation claiming legitimacy must operate in a bottom-up approach, gathering grass-roots information and concluding it in clear and specific policy recommendations for the authorities. Roma communities can therefore be involved in policies affecting them from the grassroots level up to the international consultation NGOs, in all aspects of planning, implementation and supervision. It is also vital to be ‘strapped’ with the necessary financial, academic and human resources and also, of course, advocacy must be independent in order to play their role as ‘watchdogs’ of the Roma communities.2 In the case of Roma this appears particularly relevant because often Roma representation is not based on electoral legitimacy. Historically Roma have relied on local representation alone such as the charismatic traditional leadership of the bulibaşa in Romania but since the collapse of communism the growth in civil society and political pluralism meant new opportunities presented themselves for Roma, as well as for the wider society. The proliferation of Romani organizing structures of representation in the 1990s has been characterized by the fragmentation and factionalism of Romani political élite as they compete over material and non-material goods. In the domestic political context, ethnic political parties continue to be regarded as the most legitimate organizing structure of representation, as it attains direct and quantifiable electoral legitimacy. However, even here the Roma vote is split with many opting for mainstream political parties, who deploy socio-economic rhetoric which resonates with Roma at the ballot box.

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The RPPE has established a monopoly over Roma representation in Romania which it is able to perpetuate through governmental funding. The RPPE has a presence in every county in every region in Romania which effectively means it has become so entrenched it could be described as monopolizing Roma representation. In both Hungary and Romania, Roma political parties/political associations do not secure electoral support contiguous to their demographic weight for a number of reasons including inadequate education among Romani communities, poverty, lack of identification documents, distrust of electoral democracy and political élite, and the fact that many Roma do not see the value of the vote. For these reasons, the role and impact of the NGO sector is imperative for Roma in the domestic political context because NGOs potentially provide a trusted medium through which Roma articulate their interests and external private donors filter funding, help implement projects and deliver services. The real value of the NGO sector derives from its capacity to represent without a mandate. NGOs are not elected but in the case of Roma they act legitimately in articulating their shared interests; therefore, legitimacy must be more than an ‘X’ on a ballot sheet. More than any other organizing structure of representation, NGOs work closely with the Romani community, day-in and day-out, which enables them to build up relationships of trust. Crucially it is not the deliverables of the projects which are of primary concern but the relationships and interactive processes which can only be constructed on a local level. Legitimacy is conferred on NGOs by the Romani community because they are able to give voice to this minority. Transnational organizing structures of representation are created beyond the state for a purpose. Their role and substance is necessarily distinct from those found in the domestic political context however they remain subject to the same evaluations as any structure. So are some transnational organizing structures of representation more legitimate than others? Or are these structures so hollow in legitimacy as to render them obsolete? As with the cases of Hungary and Romania, I examine legitimacy of representation, rather than legitimacy of influence or legitimacy of behaviour and make no attempt to rank these organizing structures of representation in terms of their respective legitimacy rather I draw attention to the social construction of legitimacy. The IRU and RNC are two of the most far-reaching attempts to secure Roma representation in the transnational political context, both being created by Roma, for Roma. The Romani political élite who drive this process intend to establish a platform through which Roma can make their concerns known, to the dispersed Romani communities around the world as

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well as to third-parties such as international organizations and the state. Up until the 1970s, Roma mobilization was absent and it was through these structures that nation-building efforts began in earnest. The IRU and RNC helped to create an understanding of Roma as a stateless nation, and for the first time articulated their shared interests. However, accusations have been levelled at these structures for being élitist which are too far removed from the constituencies they claim to represent. There is no interaction or relationship between the governing Romani political élite and the Romani community thus the actual role of Romani communities is minimal in both the IRU and RNC. The interests which are articulated are specified by the political élite, not by Roma, even though élite often share a common ethnicity. Neither the ERRC nor the OSI-RPP attempt to represent Roma as a constituency or their shared interests. In many respects they fulfil a vital function by shaming norm-violating states through judicial proceedings (ERRC) or by stimulating ethnic mobilization through training and project creation (OSI-RPP). These transnational organizing structures of representation are gaje institutions and as such suffer from a lack of conferred legitimacy despite the laudable activism, advocacy and research which they conduct. The key function of the ERTF is to provide a voice for Roma in Europe where it can articulate its shared interests to a receptive audience including international organizations, and the same is true of the ERIO. Unlike the ERTF, the ERIO claims it does not represent Roma, but lobbies and advocates on its behalf, fulfilling a crucial role by influencing policy and legislation at the transnational level. By providing a voice in the transnational political context, transnational organizing structures of representation ensure that Roma cannot be completely ignored, although current EU policy on Roma is not reflective of their needs. The EU has thus far ignored calls for an EU Strategy and pursues an ethnicity-blind approach to Roma by mainstreaming the interests of Roma such as education and unemployment into existing policy instruments. At present and perhaps for the first time in a long history on the continent, Roma have access to the corridors of power but they do not hold decision-making capacity and therefore their destinies remain in the hands of others. Outreach programmes and community involvement are necessary so that there are channels of consultation open in order that Roma’s shared interests are ‘fed in’. At the moment no transnational organizing structure of representation can be cited as doing enough in this respect. Concerted efforts must be made to improve and revolutionize the flow of information and to institutionalize the socio-political interactions with local Romani communities. Of course, stalagmite mobilization comes from

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below to create these organizations but a new culture of representation and participation must be promoted if the transnational organizing structures of representation are to have meaningful legitimacy and impact.

H2: Due to inadequate organizing structures of representation in the domestic political context, transnational Romani activity increases The poor socio-political and economic situation of Roma has been historically ingrained. It is doubtful whether years of poverty, discrimination and marginalization which Roma have endured could be erased by policies espousing citizenship, equality and human rights. This experience has created a unique identity for Roma and a common reference point in their shared heritage. Particularly since the 1990s concerted attempts have been made to improve the situation of Roma through the creation of organizing structures of representation. Many Roma in Hungary and Romania live in substandard housing, cannot access adequate healthcare, are overrepresented in unemployment figures and lack foundational education. They are discriminated, socially marginalized and live in relative poverty, thus it is not surprising that recent efforts to address the situation have been found wanting. Initiatives such as self-government and control over cultural interests as in Hungary, or a guaranteed seat in Parliament as found in Romania, are not appropriate to the task at hand. Even targeted policies on Roma such as the ‘National Strategy’ in Romania have not been adequately resourced or allocated appropriate decision-making authority. It is difficult to imagine how this situation can be rectified in the domestic political context without mobilization including a substantial increase in parliamentary representation, at least contiguous to Roma’s demographic weight. Throughout the 1990s Roma found its most vocal support emanating from the international political community: international organizations; international NGOs; private donors; and sympathetic Western states. Not surprisingly, attention shifted to the transnational political context as a means to increase their political participation and articulate their shared interests. Recently there has been a noticeable increase in the number of Romani transnational organizing structures of representation which do not directly address the problems experienced by Roma in their respective home states or act as a substitute to domestic representation structures. The creation of both the IRU and RNC was focused on the perceived necessity of giving a voice for Roma (and Sinti) in the transnational political context.

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Both the IRU and RNC were created and driven by Romani political élite who used their group identity, attracted attention to their cause and secured resources. Their creation signifies the beginning of the Roma social movement which did not gather pace until after 1989 when civil society more generally began to flourish in Central and Eastern Europe. Although, there is no evidence to suggest that the IRU and the RNC were created due to inadequate structures of representation in the domestic political context. The ERRC and the OSI-RPP are more concerned with the domestic situation of Roma as they concentrate their efforts within state borders. Although the international political community is an important audience for these TANs, the domestic political context is where Roma live therefore this is where they focus their attention. The ERRC is adept at ensuring that practice follows the rule regarding domestic legislation, particularly those laws concerning anti-discrimination. There are frequent violations of antidiscrimination (and other) laws against Roma so the ERRC was created as a public interest organization to ensure more uniform adherence with the law particularly as it relates to public bodies. The OSI-RPP, for its part, helps to equip the Romani community with the necessary tools (leadership, training, skills and knowledge) today so that they may positively affect the future tomorrow. The ERTF can be seen as the next logical step in the evolution of transnational Romani representation as it is more politicized and legally entrenched than the IRU or RNC. Delegates understand their role as more than simply symbolic as it offers the possibility of articulating the shared interests of the Romani community. These shared interests are aggregates of the composite issues and problems which Roma face across Europe but are unable to adequately address in the domestic political context due to unfavourable structural conditions. A shared history of oppression, disadvantage and persecution has meant that a Rom from Albania can identify with a Traveller from Ireland. Sometimes their interests are the same, sometimes they are different but identity provides the ultimate reference point for the Roma social movement. It could be seen as part of a general trend in the Roma social movement to transnationalize their shared interests as the international political community have heretofore provided a receptive audience to the situation of Roma across Europe. The ERIO began as an information-gathering and dissemination nexus but increasingly found itself lobbying and providing consultancy to EU institutions, notably the EP and Commission, conscious of the power of the EU to adopt legislation which has direct effect in member states. There are no explicit causal arrows which flow from the domestic to the transnational political

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context so it is difficult to determine whether increased Roma advocacy and activism is the result of inadequate organizing structures of representation in the domestic political context. There is no question that transnational Romani activity has increased recently but there are two further possible explanations. First, Melucci (1992, 9) claims that social movements have a tendency to ‘acquire a transnational dimension’ which implies that this activity is simply part of a broader macro-structure of activity and certainly this explanation is difficult to refute. Secondly, Roma are a transnational minority; consequently, the transnational political context provides a natural forum and receptive environment for this group without a kin state to fight on their behalf. Extreme poverty, discrimination and marginalization have galvanized Roma to create transnational organizing structures of representation to articulate their interests. This final explanation is the most convincing as it emphasizes how Roma themselves create transnational organizing structures of representation which are most appropriate to their socio-political situation as a heterogeneous transnational ethnic minority group. Despite decades of transnational activism, perceptible improvements in the situation of Roma across Europe cannot be detected and recent events in Italy, Hungary and Northern Ireland demonstrate that Roma continue to be targeted by hostile legislation and societal discrimination.

Contested Ethnic Group Identity and Shared Interests Although widely assumed to possess a stable group identity, Roma are a heterogeneous minority community with multiple subgroups which impedes efforts to secure representation and articulate interests in the domestic and transnational political contexts. It can be argued that some degree of commonality exists due to a collective history and experience as outsiders (as they have been variously termed as Zigeuner, Tigani, Cigany, Gypsy and Traveller in different political contexts), as well as shared values. While Roma can be described as possessing multiple identities, ethnic identity does appear to be a key factor in the mobilization process. Organizing structures of representation are an expression of Romani group identity reflecting the heterogeneity and diversity within this ethnic community. It can determine who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ and establishes parameters of shared experience, tacit understandings and common values. It is a mistake, however, to assume that a distinctive ethnic group possesses a strong and well-developed identity. After all, Roma are the largest and most geographically dispersed ethnic minority group in Europe which has resulted

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in a fragmented identity. Additionally, all minority groups experience a tension between private self-identification and public ethnic identity affirmation. On the one hand, minorities aspire to be recognized as different and on the other hand they maintain a desire to be treated equally and socially integrated, without being assimilated. This creates a challenge for state structures and society, but also a problem for minority groups such as how to establish organizing structures of representation which can accommodate these divergent aspirations. Ethnic identity does not exist a priori and then Roma parasitically attach themselves onto it, rather it is necessary to capture an identity’s constructed and relational quality. People participate in ethnicity, rather than simply constitute members of a particular group therefore it is a ‘relational phenomenon, not simply as substance’ (Calhoun 2003, 560). The ethnic identity of Roma is directly linked to their shared interests which are publicly articulated in both the domestic and transnational political contexts. Roma constantly renegotiate their ethnic group identity and representation structures which provides for the possibility of change and adaptation in the future. Representation is not something which is ever attained as it is not a monolithic institution, rather it can more accurately be described as something which is pursued. Roma are a social movement which means that through collective action they struggle for the appropriation of shared values and interests. The actors involved in the movement can be described as united by a specific solidarity despite being derived from a heterogeneous composition (Melucci 1980, 202). This solidarity denotes the improvement in the living conditions of all Roma. Though identity is an important component of all social movements, in the case of Roma it is considered to be the most important factor for securing representation and articulating interests. The interests articulated by the Roma social movement in the domestic and transnational political context are informed by their ethnic group identity and processes of mobilization which include participation and representation. Creating organizing structures of representation is a key element of social movements as it provides a platform through which the movement can make its voice heard. Ethnic mobilization and stalagmite social processes are imperative for these structures to be able to legitimately represent the interests of Roma. Only the Romani community can ‘know’ what their interests actually are as they are intersubjectively constructed with reference to their ethnic group identity. Subjectively held proximate interests have no place in organizing structures of representation because these structures are created to articulate intersubjectively constructed shared interests.

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Rights-based theories have dominated academic discourse on minorities; therefore, I have emphasized the role of interests as a counterweight. Both rights and interests are socially constructed and as such are constantly being reshaped and renegotiated. Like interests, rights get defined and refined through social interaction but interests carry with them an expression of ‘groupness’ as a substance created by stalagmite collective action. The historical situation of Roma is illuminating for socio-political researchers, not least because it shows how rapidly the Roma social movement has advanced. During the communist era many minorities, including Roma, were tolerated and to some extent assimilated. Indeed, the paternalistic attitude of the communist leaders and the structure of the command economy ensured that Roma were employed and enjoyed a degree of security from persecution. In the early 1990s, after the collapse of communism, Roma were increasingly used as scapegoats for the socio-economic problems experienced in the transition process in Central and Eastern Europe (Barany 1998), and as a result suffered targeted persecution and violence. This galvanized Roma to mobilize politically as they realized they could seize the opportunity to participate in the organizing structures of the state, as well as in the emerging civil society, and since then there has been a turn towards ethnic identification as a framework for political mobilization (Vermeersch 2006). The key goals of Roma mobilization generally encompass ‘enhanced interest representation; the cessation of political, social, economic and other types of discrimination; and the improvement of the given collective’s conditions and relative standing in society’ (Barany 1998, 309–310). The diversity within the Romani community is demonstrated by the rich array of domestic and transnational organizing structures of representation and the interests which they articulate. The Roma social movement has instigated the proliferation of organizing structures of representation in the domestic and transnational political contexts. I examined the role of élite, political parties and civil society organizations in Hungary and Romania which the Romani community use to articulate their shared interests and necessarily employed a broad understanding of representation to accommodate the diversity contained within the Roma social movement and the organizing structures of representation which it has created. While focusing on one single mode of representation such as parliamentary representation would have yielded valuable results, I am concerned with understanding ‘who speaks for Roma?’ and therefore must consider a diverse range of representation structures. Similar to the domestic organizing structures, transnational organizing structures of representation use ethnic

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identity as the impetus for mobilization. These structures should not be conceived of as competing against each other rather in many ways they complement one another through their respective focus, membership, territorial reach, funding resources, mandates and ideologies. They often operate on parallel tracks, reinforcing and validating the effort of other structures without falling victim to duplicity. The array of constructed organizing structures of representation is reflective of the multiple and shifting shared interests of the Romani communities. Interests can be held by individuals (proximate interests) and held by groups (shared interests) at the same time. Unlike subjectively held proximate interests, shared interests are intersubjectively constructed and relate to the well-being of all group members. Only shared interests can be articulated by an organizing structure of representation as proximate interests involve rationalist means-end calculations by individuals. While interests help locate the needs and preferences of Roma, as a conceptual tool they illustrate how Roma are represented because Roma articulate divergent interests in each political context. It is the interests of Roma which are represented not the community itself. The shared interests of Roma are multiple and shifting due to their contextual construction with the result that they have the capacity to be articulated by a number of organizing structures of representation (such as TANs, political parties and NGOs) and in distinct socio-political contexts (both domestic and transnational). Interests in the domestic context do not map perfectly with those of the transnational political context although some interests are articulated primarily in the transnational political context such as migration, standardization of language and anti-Gypsism. The interests articulated in the domestic political context relate primarily to access to social goods such as education, health and employment as well as combating discrimination though this is not to say that discrimination and societal marginalization are not important or should not be dealt with in the transnational political context. Access to political structures is a shared interest in its own right but political participation is nominal in the domestic and transnational political contexts and can be partly explained by low standards of education, poverty, as well as fragmentation and factionalism. Analysing the domestic political context alone is not adequate in order to determine ‘who speaks for Roma?’ There is no simple straightforward answer to this question which is reflective of a number of factors including: the relative substandard socio-economic position vis-à-vis the majority of society; their shared experience of persecution, marginalization and discrimination; the absence of a bounded, internally homogeneous ethnic

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group identity; and a dispersed population. Taken together, these factors stifle the voice of Roma and restrict their capacity to articulate their shared interests. Significantly, the articulation of interests through these organizing structures of representation in the domestic and transnational political contexts contest dominant narratives and norms constructed by gaje. The expression of interests through ‘giving voice’ becomes part of the political discourse and is informed by political processes and interactions involving a multitude of actors and institutions. Furthermore these organizing structures of representation do not represent the Roma constituency per se but represent the interests of this community which are shifting and multiple. However to ‘speak for’ or to ‘give voice’ to Roma does not tell us enough about the various organizing structures of representation, because legitimacy is essential in order for a structure to be seen as authoritative and valid. The transnational political context has provided Roma with a receptive environment in which to articulate their interests. The Roma social movement has increased its activity in the transnational political context since the early 1990s by creating transnational organizing structures of representation, lobbying and networking in international organizations, and targeting domestic governments which fail to uphold democratic values and international standards on minority protection. Transnational organizing structures of representation demonstrate that ethnicity is not as crucial for legitimacy as it is in the domestic political context, as these structures rely on sharing values and ‘giving voice’. These transnational organizing structures of representation do not justify their representativity in terms of democratic processes, or public accountability; they instead emphasize specific values, group identity and shared interests. Accumulatively they ‘give voice’ to the Romani community by establishing a political platform which governments and international organizations increasingly take seriously. Civil society tends to function more effectively in localized settings so when transnational organizing structures of representation are created there is a disconnect between these institutions and the constituencies which they claim to represent, that is, there is modest societal interaction therefore the construction of legitimacy is hindered. In many respects it is not possible to determine who speaks for Roma because representation is necessarily complex and intangible. In modern democratic polities we increasingly find the participation of actors who are un-elected, and this is particularly true of communities such as Roma who lack the opportunity, resources and capacity to be democratically elected. Institutions are the

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preserve of gaje thus Roma are learning the gaje world of political representation, from elaborating Roma nationalism and a sense of solidarity to create formal organizations. In the process, Roma social movement actors must learn the rules of the game to challenge dominant narratives and reaffirm their identity in European society.

Notes 1. Romani was recognized by the Council of Europe’s (1992) Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Numerous dialects are found across the continent and many Roma were assimilated under communism, speaking the tongue of the host state. 2. Electronic communication with Lívia Járóka, 24 July 2009.

Glossary Gaje Gaje is a noun which refers collectively to all those who are non-Roma. A gajo is an individual who is not Romani.

Gypsy Gypsy is an exonym ascribed onto Roma and normally carries with it negative associations. This politically incorrect term is no longer in common usage, certainly in academic discourse and in the language of elites in the international political community, although its usage still persists across Central and Eastern Europe and in the UK. Its etymology derives from when Roma first arrived in Europe and proclaimed themselves to be from Egypt.

Roma Roma is a noun and refers to the plurality of the members of this minority, that is, the group as a whole. Romani refers to the language spoken by this group and is also used as an adjective to describe an ethnic identification. A Rom is an individual member of the Romani community (Mirga and Gheorghe 1997, 3). Roma is an endonym which has been constructed by Romani activists eager to foster a positive affirmation of Romani ethnicity. All Roma share a history of assimilation, persecution, integration and oppression at various points in time. While many sub-groups fall under the aegis of Roma, it signifies a political category which is heterogeneous.

Traveller Travellers are found predominantly in the UK and Ireland, though they are also present in sizeable numbers in North America. They can be further

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subdivided into Irish and Scottish Travellers (known as Minceir) as well as English and Welsh Travellers (known as Romanichals). Travellers tend to be more nomadic and their advocacy usually centres on access to halting sites and demands for equality. In their own languages the Welsh, English, Scottish and Irish Travellers are known respectively as, Kale, Romanichals, Nawkens and Minceirs.

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Index access to public goods 163–4, 168 Hungary 111–12 Romania 88 affirmative action 81n. 1–2, 88 Aguilera, Peter 155 Alliance of Free Democrats (Hungary) 119 Armenian gypsy see Lom community assimilationist policy 18th century Hungary 17 CEEC communist regimes 25–8, 139, 172 see also social integration Australia Roma migration to 15 Autonómia Foundation (Hungary) 123, 133 Aven Amentza (Romanian NGO) 98

Roma under paternalistic state protection of 24–9, 120–1, 139, 172 Christian Centre of Roma (Romania) 92 Cioaba, Florin 92 citizenship rights 66–70 civil society organizations 34–5, 45–6, 132–3, 164, 174 functions 97 Hungary 122–4 Romania 97–101 CoE see Council of Europe collective action 67, 171 Olson’s theory 50 Comité International Rom 27–8 communist regimes Roma and 24–9, 120–1, 139, 172 community leaders 102 Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues 30, 138 Council for National Minorities (Romania) 44 Council of Europe (CoE) 30, 138 FCNM 48, 57n. 5, 58n. 15–16, 131, 147 Csibi, Magor 157 cultural autonomy 115, 130

Bahrâm V, King of Persia 8 Bumbu, Gruia 93, 103 Byzantium Roma migration to 9–10 Catherine the Great, Tsarina of Russia 18 CEEC see Central and Eastern European Countries Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) impact of EU accession criteria on 44, 130–1, 149 Roma organizations’ proliferation 29, 30 Roma position post-communism in 29–32

Decade of Roma Inclusion (2005-2015) 69, 137, 160n. 3 Declaration of the Roma Nation 143 democracy minority protection and 48, 61–2 Dom community 8, 9 education Hungary 111–12, 124 Romania 85–6

195

196

INDEX

Egypt claims of Roma origin from 8, 11, 19, 176 Roma migration via 12–13, 18 Roma presence in 15 elections and electoral systems legitimacy 90, 165–6 political representation and 71 voting behaviour and patterns in Hungary 115–16, 121, 132, 134n. 22 voting behaviour and patterns in Romania 96–7, 132 élite 39–40 CEECs 29, 36 challenging issues facing 31–2 Hungary 118–20, 128, 129, 132 ‘politicized ethnicity’ 142 Romania 89–93, 100, 105, 132 transnational context 159, 166–7 see also gaje employment communist regimes 27 Hungarian NGO’s ‘Employment Without Prejudice’ programme 123–4 Hungary 112 English Travellers 14 ERIO see European Roma Information Office ERPC see European Roma Policy Coalition ERRC see European Roma Rights Centre ERTF see European Roma and Traveller Forum ethnic identity 3–4, 45, 46, 141, 170–1 discrimination and 69–70, 74, 11–12 minority rights and 62 political participation and 38–9 shared interests and 171–5 ethnic mobilization 44–5, 79 domestic context 101–2, 124–6 minority protection and 64–5 modes of 45–6 notion 42 social movement and 65, 101–2 state and 43–4 transnational context 157–8

ethnogenesis 31–2 ethnopolitics 6, 132, 165–6 Hungary 120–2, 126 Romania 93–4, 166 EU see European Union Europe persecution of Roma 15–20 Roma arrival in 10–12 Roma population 160n. 2 European Commission 156, 169 Staff Working Paper on Roma 150 European gypsy see Roma European Parliament 149–50, 153, 169 ‘Roma Access to Political Participation’ conference 155 Roma representation in 155 European Platform for Roma Inclusion 151 European Roma and Traveller Forum (ERTF) 30, 41, 138, 146–7, 169 legitimacy 148, 160, 167 European Roma Information Office (ERIO) 6, 30, 41, 138, 160 event organization in collaboration with EU institutions 155 information dissemination 155–6 Italian Roma crisis and 156–7 lobbying role 156 reacting to developments in EU 154–5, 156–7 role 152–4, 167, 168 European Romani Rights Charter 144 European Roma Policy Coalition (ERPC) 138 European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) 30, 144, 145, 167, 169 European Social Fund 151 European Union (EU) 6, 30, 36 EU Strategy for Roma 154, 155 first Roma Summit (2008) 151, 154 impact of Copenhagen criteria on minority protection 44, 130–1, 149 need for coherent Roma policy 153, 167 role in Roma development and anti-discrimination policies 131 Roma policy 137, 148–52

Index The Situation of Roma in an Enlarged European Union report 138, 149 Farkas, Florian 123 FCNM see Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Union 118, 120, 121, 123, 134n. 19 Firdausi 8 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) 48, 57n. 5, 58n. 15–16, 131, 147 France persecution of Roma 18 gaje 29 Roma representation and 93 gaje institutions 30, 41, 158 legitimacy 167 see also individual organizations, e.g., European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) Germany extermination of Roma during Nazi regime 20–4 persecution of Roma 17 ghettos 87, 111 Gitanos 18 Grellman, Heinrich 19 gypsy see Roma Gypsy Lore Society 19 Hamza 8 Himmler, Heinrich 22 history of Roma 4–5 arrival in Europe 10–12 geographic diffusion 14–15 Indic origin 7–8, 13, 19 migration from India 8–10 Hitler, Adolf 22 the Holocaust see O Baro Porrajmos Horváth, Aladár 119–20, 127, 132, 133n. 20 housing conditions and facilities Hungary 111 Romania 86–7

197

human rights 47, 61, 154 Hungary 5–6, 38 access to public goods 111–13 assimilationist policy of Maria Theresa 17 constitutional provision for minority protection and representation 44, 109, 116–17, 122 discrimination 111–12, 131–2 ethnic mobilization 124–6 interest articulation 123–4, 127–8 legitimate representation 128–9, 132 Medium-Term Measures (2004) 110–11 minority protection 115, 130 political affiliation 120–1 political participation in a cultural institution 114–18, 126–7, 130 racist attacks 113–14, 132, 134n. 12 Roma Integration Decade Programme Strategy Plan (2007–2015) 111 Roma population 109, 133n. 3 status raising strategies of NGOs 123–4 voter registration 115–16 ICCPR see International Convention on Civil and Political Rights identity interests and 36, 42–3, 77, 127 linguistic component of 114 of minority groups 63 minority rights and 63–4 social movement and 51–2, 141 socio-economic position and 85 see also ethnic identity ‘Impreuna’ (Romanian NGO) 98, 101, 133 political leadership training 99–100 India Roma’s migration from 8–10 Roma’s origin 7–8, 13, 19 input legitimacy 54, 56, 128 intelligentsia 86, 87–8, 112, 124, 133 see also elite interest(s) 5, 35–6, 37, 59, 77–8, 80, 163–42 Hungarian legal recognition 109 identity and 36, 42–3, 77, 127

198

INDEX

interest(s) (Cont’d) international organizations and 137–8 representation of 72–5 rights vs. 75–8 significance of 60 transnational 142 see also shared interests interest articulation 36, 57n. 3, 80–1 domestic context 91, 103–4, 123–4, 127–8, 173–4 political participation and 76, 78 transnational context 158–9, 174–5 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Article 25 47 international law on political participation 47, 58n. 15 international organizations 168 Roma rights and 137–8 Roma voice 138 see also transnational organizing structures of representation International Romani Union (IRU) 41, 138, 143, 147, 168–9 consultative status to ECOSOC 160n. 4 legitimacy 159, 166, 167 Irish Travellers 13, 14 in southern states of US 15 IRU see International Romani Union Italy Roma crisis 150, 156–7 Járóka, Lívia 155 Kolompár, Orbán 119, 123, 132, 133n. 20 Lalleri community 22 language Roma identity and 114 as tool to trace migratory route 8 leaders and leadership bulibaşa/traditional leaders 53–4, 92, 165 ‘community leaders’ 102 importance 43 legitimacy 53–4 Romanian NGO’s political leadership training programme 99–100

legislation Bill T/9126 (Hungary) 116 Law 21/1924 (Romania) 98 Law 48/2002 (Romania) 88 “Law on National Minorities” (Romania) 83 Nuremberg Laws (Germany) 21 ‘On the Rights o National and Ethnic Minorities’ (Hungary) 44, 114, 115, 117 legitimacy 3, 81, 104 notion and types 53 legitimate representation 3, 32, 36, 39, 52–5, 81 criterion for 55–7 decentralization and 40, 105–6, 129, 165–8 domestic context 91–2, 97–101, 104–5, 128–9 ethnic mobilization and 46–7 transnational context 147–8, 159–60, 166–7 Lom community 8, 10 Lukacs, Mihaly 123 Lungo Drom (Hungarian political NGO) 123, 126 macrosociological approach 50, 51–2 Magyar Garda (Hungarian political organization) 113, 132, 155 Maria Theresa, Empress of Austria 17 Martin V, Pope 11 MCF Roma Union (Hungarian political NGO) 123, 126 medical care 111 MG-S-ROM 30, 138 migration of Roma 8–10 Minceir 14 Minorities Act of 1993 (Hungary) 44, 114, 115, 117 minority groups demands for recognition 65, 66 notion 64 minority rights 5, 36–7, 47 ambiguity of 64 communitarian approaches 65–6 Hungary and Romania compared 130–3

Index impact of EU’s accession criteria on protection of 44, 130–1 vs. interests 75–8 vs. justice conception of minority protection 63–6 liberal democracy and 48 notion 64 rationalization 61–2 state’s approaches 130 see also rights-based approaches minority self-government system of Hungary 114–15, 126–7, 131, 133 ethnopolitics and 121–2 legitimacy 129 local level 116, 117 national level 116, 117 shortcomings 115–17 Mohácsi, Viktória 155, 157 Moraes, Claude 157 moral rights 59–60 MSzP (Hungarian Socialist Party) 120, 121, 123 NAR see National Agency for Roma (Romania) National Agency for Roma (NAR) (Romania) 93, 99, 132 National Council for Combating Discrimination (NCCD) (Romania) 88, 131 national minority organizations, Romanian legal status and formulation 93–4, 97 see also non-governmental organizations (NGO), Romanian National Roma Self-Government (Hungary) 117, 119 National Strategy for the Improvement in the Situation of Roma (Romania) 85, 86, 99, 131, 168 guiding principles 103–4 NCCD see National Council for Combating Discrimination (Romania) negative rights 60 NGO see non-governmental organizations nomenclature of Roma 8–9, 31

199

non-governmental organizations (NGO) 72 funding 133, 145 international 41 legitimacy 55–6, 166 proliferation 30 non-governmental organizations (NGO), Hungarian 125 legitimacy 124, 129 proliferation 122 status raising strategies 123–4 non-governmental organizations (NGO), Romanian 101 criticism of government’s housing policy 87 local level 98, 99 national level 98–9, 102–3 political character and legitimacy 93–4, 97–101, 104, 105 proliferation 98 Roma representation and 94–7 O Baro Porrajmos 20–4 ‘On the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities’ (Hungary) see Minorities Act of 1993 (Hungary) Open Society Institute (OSI) 30, 41, 69, 144 Open Society Institute-Roma Participation Programme (OSI-RPP) 145–6, 167, 169 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 30, 138 Lund Recommendations 131 organizing structures of representation 3–4, 5–6, 30, 31, 51, 139–40 CEECs 29 Hungary 124–5 proliferation 37, 172–3 Romania 100 Western Romani advocacy 27–8 see also specific structures, e.g., elite; transnational organizing structures of representation OSCE see Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

200

INDEX

OSI see Open Society Institute OSI-RPP see Open Society InstituteRoma Participation Programme output legitimacy 54, 55 papal and imperial safe-conducts 11–12 parliamentary representation 34 European Parliament 155 Hungarian NGOs 123 Hungary 116–17, 118–19 Romania 71, 91, 92, 105–6, 133 Romanian NGOs 94, 96–7, 102–3 Păun, Nicolae 90, 92, 102, 105, 107n. 23, 132 persecution of Roma 15–20 Persia Roma migration to 8 Persian gypsy see Dom community Pius V, Pope 18 pluralism lack in Romanian ethnic politics 94–7 Poland Roma in 17 political decentralization 104 legitimate representation and 40, 105–6, 129, 165–8 self-government and 126 political mobilization notion 41–2 political participation 5, 36 democratic state and 48–9 domestic context 87–8, 99–101, 102–3, 126–7 ethnic identity and 38–9 interest articulation and 76, 78 international law on 47, 58n. 15 notion 57n. 2, 79–80 right to 60 ‘Roma Access to Political Participation’ conference 155 transnational context 158 ways to increase 34–5 political parties Roma representation and 71, 91, 96–7, 100 and Roma vote bank in Hungary 120–1 Romanian NGOs and 97

political representation disproportionateness 62, 79 elections and 90 enhancement in Hungary 44 enhancement in Romania 44 IRU and 143 notion 57n. 1, 70 pursuit of 70–2 Romania 87 under communist regimes 27–8 political representative(s) definition and notion 89–90 ‘Romani representative’ 70–1, 90–2 Portugal Roma in 18 positive rights 60 preferential treatment 33, 61–2, 72, 81n. 1, 88, 130 process rights 64 proximate interests 74, 77, 171 public health care 86 racial discrimination 149 ethnic identity and 69–70, 74, 112 Hungarian context 131–2 Hungarian educational sector 112 Hungarian medical care 111 legislative intervention in Romania 88 Roma issues and 69–70 see also European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) racist attacks Hungary 113–14, 132, 134n. 12 Racz, Istvan 123 Răducanu, Gheorghe 90 representation 35, 39, 163–4 impact of actors of representation on 39 legitimacy and 46–7, 56–7 notion 73–4 of people vs. interests 72–4 see also legitimate representation resource mobilization 50–1 rights citizenship 66–70 of minorities see minority rights moral 59–60 negative 60

Index notion 64 positive 60 process 64 rights-based theories 57, 59–61, 172 Ritter, Robert 21–2 RNC see Roma National Congress Roma 1–3, 163 historical overview 4–5, 7–10 indifference towards public and political life 103 as natives 68 as pilgrims and penitents 11–12 reclamation of nomenclature 31 as social problem 26, 68–9, 84, 138, 150 sub-groups in Hungary 114, 121 Travellers and 12–15 Roma Civil Rights Foundation (Hungary) 119–20 Roma Integration Decade Programme Strategy Plan (2007–2015) (Hungary) 111 Roma National Congress (RNC) 28, 41, 143–4, 147, 168–9 critique of elitism 167 legitimacy 159, 166, 167 Roma nationalism 43, 141–2 Romania 5, 38, 83–4, 130 access to public goods 85–9 constitutional provision for Romani political representation 71, 92, 105–6, 106n. 4 ethnic mobilization 101–2 interest articulation 91, 103–4 legitimate representation 104–5, 132 localized legitimacy 91–2, 97–101 political participation 87–8 political participation and NGOs 99–101, 102–3 political representation 90–3 political representation enhancement 44 Roma population 96, 106n. 3 supremacy of RPPE 94–7, 166 Romanichals 14 Romani CRISS 98–9, 101, 103 romanticization of Roma 19–20, 69 Roma Party (Partida Romilor) (Romania) 91

201

Roma Party Pro-Europe (RPPE) (Romania) 44, 92, 100, 105 monopolization over Roma representation 94–7, 166 ‘Roma Situation in an Enlarged Europe’ report 138 Romaversitas (Hungarian NGO) 124 Rousseau, Jean Jacques 69 RPPE see Roma Party Pro-Europe (Romania) Russia Roma in 18 Scottish Travellers 14 shared interests 77, 84, 103, 104, 121, 169, 173 ethnic identity and 171–5 Hungary 110–14, 131 political participation and 78 Romania 84–9, 103, 131 transnational 146–7 see also interest(s) Sigismund, Holy Roman Emperor 11 Sinti community 22, 28, 144 The Situation of Roma in an Enlarged Europe Union 138, 149 slavery of Roma 16–17, 18 Social Democrat Party (Romania) 91 Roma affinity 96–7, 132 Social Democrat Roma Party (Romania) 91 see also Roma Party Pro-Europe (RPPE) social inclusion 68 programmes in Romania 86–7 social integration 25, 68–9, 150 Hungary 111, 131 see also assimilationist policy social movement 31–2, 35, 45–6, 49–52 ethnic mobilization and 65 factionalism and fragmentation in Romania 95–6, 99, 101 identity and 51–2, 101, 141 notion 50 organizing structures of representation and 172–3 transnational context 140–2 ‘transnational dimension’ 170 social utility 103–4

202

INDEX

Soros Foundation 35 Spain Roma migration to 18 stalactite mobilization 55 stalagmite mobilization 4, 49, 55, 128, 138, 139, 145, 167–8 state approaches to minorities 130 ethnic mobilization and 43–4 primary obligation of equal rights 72 rights-based approaches and 57, 60–1, 62, 63 sterilization 111, 133n. 5 Syrian gypsy see Dom community Tinkers 13, 14 transnational advocacy networks 6, 41, 136, 144–6, 160, 169 criticism of 148 transnational minority 6, 137–40, 163, 170 transnational organizing structures of representation 30, 40–1, 136–7, 138–9 ethnic mobilization and 157–8 interest articulation and 158–9 legitimacy 52–3, 56, 147–8, 159–60, 166–7

political participation 158 proliferation 40, 83, 129, 164, 168–70 relevance 137 Roma voice and 140, 146, 160 see also international organizations Travellers 12–15, 146, 169 Tully, J. 54 ultimate interests 74, 77 see also shared interests UN see United Nations United Nations (UN) 30 US Holocaust Memorial Council 24 Varga, Jozsef 123 Vlax-speaking Roma 14 Voicu, Mădălin 90, 91, 92, 97, 102 Weber, R. 52, 53 Welsh Travellers 14 Wolf, Sigmund 21 Working Group of Roma Association (Romania) 85, 99 World Bank 69 World Romani Congress 27–8, 143 see also International Romani Union (IRU)