Women and Terrorism: Female Activity in Domestic and International Terror Groups (Comtemporary Terrorism Studies)

Women and Terrorism

This book examines the relationship between women and terrorist activities in the post-World War II era. Utilizing comparative research into 26 terrorist organizations worldwide, the work identifies a dichotomy whereby women are significantly more active in domestic terrorist organizations than in international groups. Women and Terrorism argues that domestic terrorist organizations employ revolution, secession, or other means to change internal aspects of the state and the social and economic structure it maintains. This offers the possibility of change in women’s societal status; therefore, women are drawn to domestic terrorist organizations in much higher proportions and choose a much greater level of activity, entering the ranks of combat, leadership, and policymaking. By contrast, international terrorist groups oppose outside forces, such as imperialism, capitalism, Western culture, or other more nebulous concepts. Gonzalez-Perez argues that female lack of participation in these activities reflects the fact that women will be relegated to the status quo, regardless of the success or failure of the international terrorist movement. This book will be of much interest to students of terrorism studies, international security, gender politics, and international relations in general. Margaret Gonzalez-Perez is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Southeastern Louisiana University.

Contemporary terrorism studies

Understanding Terrorist Innovation Technology, tactics and global trends Adam Dolnik The Strategy of Terrorism How it works, why it fails Peter Neumann and M.L.R. Smith Female Terrorism and Militancy Agency, utility and organization Edited by Cindy D. Ness Women and Terrorism Female activity in domestic and international terror groups Margaret Gonzalez-Perez

Women and Terrorism Female activity in domestic and international terror groups

Margaret Gonzalez-Perez

First published 2008 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2008. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

© 2008 Margaret Gonzalez-Perez All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-92655-2 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0-415-46467-6 (hbk) ISBN10: 0-203-92655-2 (ebk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-46467-3 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-92655-0 (ebk)

Contents

1

Preface Acknowledgments List of acronyms

vii ix x

Introduction

1

Domestic and international terrorism

5

International terrorist organizations 6 Domestic terrorist organizations 7 Defining terrorism 8 States, nations, nationalism, and international actors 12 Models of women’s participation in terrorist organizations 14 2

The Americas: new women in a new world

21

The Americas: domestic terrorism 22 The Americas: international terrorism 48 3

Asia: freedom birds and water buffaloes

60

Asia: domestic terrorism 60 Asia: international terrorism 71 4

Africa and the Middle East: behind the veil

79

Africa and the Middle East: domestic terrorism 80 Africa and the Middle East: international terrorism 88 5

Europe: discontent on the continent Europe: domestic terrorism 102 Europe: international terrorism 111

102

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Contents

6

Conclusion

122

Future research 129 Normative implications and policy suggestions 130 References Index

132 156

Preface

The purpose of this book is to offer a new perspective on women and terrorism. Traditionally, most scholarly work on this topic has focused on the role of women as victims or hailed them as “mothers of revolution” who have sacrificed their sons to terrorist causes, with little reference to their own participation. In recent years, some scholars have conducted interviews with female terrorists from specific groups, yielding a wealth of primary source material. Yet until now, no single volume has attempted to gather the wide variety of information available and provide a comprehensive, comparative examination of women’s participation in terrorism. This book seeks to fill that niche. Women and Terrorism: Female Activity in Domestic and International Terrorist Groups offers a basic theoretical model that helps explain the varying levels of female participation in terrorist organizations. Previous works have cited religion, paternalism, socialism, or other phenomena as factors in women’s terrorist activity, or the lack thereof. This model provides a new perspective by building upon a fundamental distinction among terrorist groups and comparing the levels of female participation in both domestic and international terrorist organizations. An examination of post-World War II terrorist organizations throughout the world demonstrates that women in domestic terrorist organizations choose a much higher level of activity, rising above simple support services and entering the ranks of combat, leadership, and policymaking. They do so because domestic terrorists oppose their own state and the forces within it that they deem to be oppressive. Women join domestic terrorist organizations because they too seek to overthrow the agents of the society that they believe restrict their influence and limit their potential. Conversely, by definition, international terrorist groups oppose outside forces, such as imperialism, capitalism, Western culture, or other more nebulous concepts. Success for international terrorists means the ouster of external influences, not necessarily any change in the domestic society or its treatment of women. Therefore, women have little to gain from actively participating in international terrorist groups. Regardless of the outcome, the women will still be relegated to their status quo.

viii Preface Women and Terrorism: Female Activity in Domestic and International Terrorist Groups is an effort to present women and terrorism from a new angle and possibly provoke some thought and consideration of how government policies could be used to improve the circumstances of women, particularly in developing nations, and thereby reduce the specter of terrorism.

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Laverne Simoneaux of Sims Memorial Library’s Reference Department who provided unfailing assistance in my research endeavors for this book. I would also like to thank Barbara Tanner Brooks and Erin Ballam of the Sims Memorial Library for their tireless efforts as well as the Orr Memorial Research Fund for its generosity. Finally, my thanks go to my husband, Lennie F. Perez, for his enduring patience through interminable discussions of all things related to women terrorists.

Acronyms

AMES AMNLAE AMPRONAC ARCI ARENA BBC BMG CAFTA CCP CNN COMADRES CONAMUS CONAVIGUA CPN-M CRZ DFLP EAB EGP ELN EPL EPRLF ETA EZLN FAR FARC FBI FDR FLN FMLN

Association of Salvadoran Women Luisa Amanda Espinoza Association of Nicaraguan Women Association of Women Confronting the National Problem (Nicaragua) Army of the Republic of Chechnya-Ichkeria Nationalist Republican Alliance (El Salvador) British Broadcasting Corporation Baader-Meinhof Gang (Germany) Central American Free Trade Agreement Chinese Communist Party Central News Network Comrade Mothers (El Salvador) National Coordinator of Salvadoran Women National Coordinating Committee of Guatemalan Widows Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Compact Revolutionary Zone Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine Association of Women Patriots (Basque) Guerrilla Army of the Poor (Guatemala) Army of National Liberation (Colombia) People’s Liberation Army (Colombia) Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (Sri Lanka) Basque Homeland and Liberty Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Mexico) Revolutionary Armed Forces (Guatemala) Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces Federal Bureau of Investigation (USA) Democratic Revolutionary Front (El Salvador) National Liberation Front (Algeria) Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (El Salvador)

Acronyms FRELIMO FSLN FTAA GUPW IED IRA JRA KADEK KGK KHK KKK LIFEMO LTTE M-19 NAFTA NATO NLF OAU OMM ORPA PFLP PFWAC PGT PKK PLA PLAF PLO PNC PUK RAF SDS SL TBA TTU TULF UN UNRG WKKK WUO WWI WWII ZANLA ZANU

Liberation Front of Mozambique Sandinista Liberation Front (Nicaragua) Free Trade Area of the Americas General Union of Palestinian Women Improvised explosive device Irish Republican Army Japanese Red Army Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress Kongra-Gel (Kurdistan) Kurdistan People’s Congress Ku Klux Klan (USA) League of Mozambican Women Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka) April 19 Movement (Colombia) North American Free Trade Agreement North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Liberation Front (Vietnam) Organization of African Unity Organization of Mozambican Women Revolutionary Organization of People in Arms (Guatemala) Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Palestinian Federation of Women’s Action Committees Guatemalan Workers’ Party Kurdistan Workers’ Party People’s Liberation Army (Nepal) People’s Liberation Armed Front (Vietnam) Palestinian Liberation Organization Palestinian National Congress Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Red Army Faction (Japan) Students for a Democratic Society (USA) Shining Path (Peru) Tri-Border Area Trade Transparency Units Tamil United Liberation Front (Sri Lanka) United Nations Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity Women of the Ku Klux Klan (USA) Weather Underground Organization (USA) World War I World War II Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army Zimbabwe African National Union

xi

Introduction

The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 caused a resurgence of interest in terrorism studies in the United States and throughout the world. Although scholars have examined many factors related to terrorism, including nationalism and globalization, the influence of gender on terrorism has received comparatively less attention. Alan Bairner contends that such studies “have endeavored relatively successfully to neglect the issue of gender,” but adds that they cannot “be fully understood without reference to gender” (2001: 21, 26). In an effort to contribute to this area of inquiry, this study focuses on the relationship between women, the state, and terrorism, in a comparative analysis. This analysis argues that women are more active and participate at much higher levels in terrorist groups that espouse domestic objectives and act against a state government, than women in terrorist organizations with an international agenda that targets globalization, imperialism, or foreign influence. My argument is not that domestic terrorist groups are necessarily more open to women’s issues, but that women choose to become active and involved in domestic terrorist organizations because they anticipate a greater potential for change in their hierarchical status. Much of the extant research on women and terrorism discusses domestic terrorist organizations in specific states, either singly or in comparisons of a few groups. While these in-depth studies contribute significantly to the field of inquiry and provide valuable insight into a limited number of organizations, this examination seeks to provide a broad comparative overview of female terrorists within a theoretical framework. Although the geographical scope of this study is global, the temporal investigation is limited to terrorist organizations with documented female terrorist activity during the post-World War II (WWII) era. Some studies have argued that left-wing terrorist organizations demonstrate greater female participation. However, as the following chapters reveal, terrorist groups such as Cuba’s revolutionary Communists, Vietnam’s Front for National Liberation, Japan’s Red Army, Italy’s Red Brigade, Germany’s Red Army Faction, Northern Ireland’s Irish Republican Army, and the Weather Underground of the US were all undoubtedly leftist, yet

2

Introduction

they were unable to recruit a female membership of more than 25 percent. Furthermore, those women rarely rose to the levels of combat, command or policymaking. Other theories propose that terrorist groups with feminist agendas attract more women, but disagree on which groups demonstrate a genuine commitment to such an agenda, while others argue that most forms of feminism are inherently pacifist and, as such, could not contribute to terrorist activism. This analysis confines its scope to the post-WWII era, eliminating comparisons between pre-feminism and post-feminism movements. Some scholars contend that Liberation Theology, a radical offshoot of Catholicism, drew more women to Latin American terrorist organizations. If so, why was that not the case for all Latin American terrorist groups? Furthermore, the institutional Catholic Church with its traditional view of gender roles was certainly more prevalent and influential, acting as a mitigating force to the impact of Liberation Theology. A broader theory suggests that all major religions inhibit women’s terrorist participation. However, the predominantly Hindu women of Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are extremely active, as are the mainly Catholic women of many Latin American terrorist organizations and the Muslim women of the Chechen and Kurdish rebels, yet Muslim women in Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Liberation Organization, and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine are not. Still other analyses have focused on individual personalities among female terrorists. Because this study addresses the level of terrorist participation among female members in general rather than individual anomalies, it does not include terrorist organizations with only one or two noteworthy highranking female cadres, such as Norma Ester Arosito of Argentina’s Montoñeros or Leila Khaled of the Palestinian liberation movement. Instead, this analysis focuses on the comparison of various groups exhibiting female participation and explains why these organizations yield varying levels of female activity. In addition, this study offers some suggestions for policymaking in an era that is increasingly characterized by security concerns related to terrorism. Throughout the book, each chapter includes case studies of post-WWII domestic and international terrorist organizations that exhibit evidence of female participation at some level. This study contends that high levels of female terrorist activity appear predominantly in domestic terrorist organizations because the characteristics of these groups are more conducive to the rejection of traditional gender roles and the acceptance of active female participation, thereby encouraging the mobilization and participation of women. Conversely, international terrorist organizations that focus on external opponents do not attempt to transform the conventional behavior patterns of the sexes within, or outside, the terrorist group or state. Accordingly, women choose to be far less active in international terrorist groups. Chapter 1 addresses the terminology used in this book, examining the

Introduction

3

problems of defining terrorism, states, and nations. This chapter also establishes the theoretical foundation of the book and explains the models of female terrorist participation that are used. The domestic terrorist groups are largely homogeneous political groups combating what they perceive as the oppressive and discriminatory behavior of their states’ governments. Terrorist ventures in these states are not directed toward the ouster of foreign troops, the withdrawal of foreign capital, or the elimination of Western culture. This internal focus on restructuring the state’s society includes the restructuring of traditional perceptions of women as well. Women function in a wide variety of roles within these domestic terrorist groups, from support operations to active command of guerrilla warfare troops and policymaking. Conversely, international terrorist organizations exhibit a decidedly more external agenda. These terrorist cells emphasize the removal of sources of conflict outside the state, often seeking to end what is in their view an exploitative relationship between Western powers and their state. The termination of these ties may include the goal of overthrowing the capitalist economic system within the state, or even throughout the world. These operations may also focus on the removal of foreign influence from state politics, the economy, and society. Such goals center not on changing the internal structures of the state, but on restructuring the state’s relationship to the outside world. This external or international orientation does not include the reorientation of the traditional role of women within the state nor within the terrorist group, except in the most superficial and temporary manner. International terrorist movements may have an impact upon the state, like domestic terrorists, but such results are generally byproducts of international activities, not the primary goal. Chapter 2 addresses both domestic and international terrorist movements of North, Central, and South America that exhibit female participation. The vast majority of these groups exist in Latin America and include Uruguay’s Tupamaros, El Salvador’s Farabundo Martí, Nicaragua’s Sandinistas, Guatemala’s National Revolutionary Unity group, Peru’s Shining Path, Colombia’s FARC, Mexico’s Zapatistas, Cuba’s Communist Party, the TriBorder Area (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay), Hezbollah, and the United States’ Ku Klux Klan and Weather Underground. Chapter 3 examines female terrorist activity in Asia. This chapter focuses on case studies of Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers, India’s Naxalites, Nepal’s Communist Party, Vietnam’s National Liberation Front, and Japan’s Red Army. Chapter 4 discusses women terrorists in Africa and the Middle East. Case studies include Zimbabwe’s ZANLA, Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party, Mozambique’s FRELIMO, Algeria’s National Liberation Front, as well as Palestine’s Palestinian Liberation Organization, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas. Chapter 5 focuses on Europe, examining Spain’s Basque ETA, Chechnya’s

4

Introduction

Army of the Republic, Italy’s Red Brigades, Germany’s Baader-Meinhof Group and Red Army Faction, and Ireland’s Irish Republican Army. Chapter 6 offers some concluding observations and suggests some considerations for anti-terrorist and counter-terrorist policymaking, as well as suggestions for future research.

1

Domestic and international terrorism

Since “9/11,” it is only natural that the American view of terrorism has come to focus on international terrorist organizations. As Paul Wilkinson of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence states, “No broad categorization can do full justice to the variety and complexity of the modern phenomenon of terrorism,” but the distinction between “international terrorism involving . . . two or more states and domestic or internal terrorism which confines its activities within the borders of a specific state” is an important one (2000). Brian Jenkins defines international terrorists as those who “cross national frontiers to carry out their attacks or deliberately select victims because of their connections to a foreign state” (1985: 25) and as J. Bowyer Bell notes, “The practitioners of terror can largely be categorized on the basis of their aspirations” (1975: 8). Thus, terrorist organizations are classified largely on the basis of their goals and targets. While some scholars may prefer to categorize terrorist groups as left- or right-wing, ethnic, religious, state-sponsored, or any of a myriad of other possibilities, the dichotomous classification of domestic and international is not a novel one. The US Justice Department’s National Security Division, Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, and Federal Bureau of Investigation all use this classification in their publications regarding terrorism. According to the FBI, International terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence committed by a group or individual, who has some connection to a foreign power or whose activities transcend national boundaries, against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. (Terrorist Research and Analytical Center 1995) At the other end of the spectrum, we find that, “Domestic terrorism involves groups or individuals who are based and operate entirely within the US and Puerto Rico without foreign direction and whose acts are directed at

6

Domestic and international terrorism

elements of the US Government or population” (Terrorist Research and Analytical Center 1995).

International terrorist organizations International terrorist groups typically include in their platforms an opposition to imperialism, globalization, capitalism, or Western culture in general, and exhibit an international agenda. In these internationally oriented terrorist groups, women function in primarily supportive roles; cooking, sewing uniforms, providing shelter, and sometimes sex to the males in the organization. In this sense, women’s roles deviate very little from the traditional gender roles of females in a developing state. Such terrorist organizations challenge the global hierarchy and its distribution of power and wealth, but they have little effect on domestic policies, particularly those pertaining to women. Women may participate, but their activity is controlled and limited by the entrenched gender roles of their culture and by the male leaders of the terrorist movement. An internationally oriented agenda may include goals that affect the host nation of a terrorist group, but the terrorist movements classified as international in this study exhibit predominantly external, or international, objectives. Many scholars agree that the internationalization of terrorism began in 1968 with the establishment of “guerrilla training camps for tens of thousands of terrorists in Cuba, Algeria, Libya, Syria, Lebanon, South Yemen, North Korea, East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union” (Sterling 1981: 3). Prior to 1968, terrorism occurred more or less randomly, and usually among members of the same ethnic group, race, or religion (O’Ballance 1979: 415), yet by 1976, over 140 terrorist organizations had established networks of international connections (Milbank 1976). Indeed, during the Cold War, some even contended that all terrorism was internationally linked in a vast network, sharing strategy, tactics, munitions, and other resources, orchestrated by the Soviet Union. In the twenty-first century, similar theories have arisen regarding radical Islamic terrorism and the jihad, or holy war. These internationally oriented terrorist groups seek to eliminate external sources of control, such as the capitalist economic system and Western imperialism. The primary objectives of international terrorist organizations are not to restructure their relationship to the national government nor to influence domestic policy; instead, these groups struggle to alter the relationship between their national government and what they perceive as the external forces of international economic or political oppression. Because such movements focus on the external, they devote little attention to overcoming traditional gender restrictions on women. While these groups may recruit women, female members serve in predominantly limited support roles and rarely rise to the more active levels of leadership and decisionmaking processes.

Domestic and international terrorism

7

Domestic terrorist organizations Women who are actively engaged in organized terrorism at the highest levels of command and policymaking are associated less with internationally oriented groups than with domestic terrorist organizations. This study employs the term “domestic” to describe these groups instead of other commonly used terms, such as “nationalist,” to avoid confusion with the widely varying definitions of terms related to nation, state, nationalism, ethnonationalism, ethnopolitics, regionalism, tribalism, communalism, parochialism, and subnationalism. Other studies may use disparate terminology, but in the interest of maintaining the distinction between domestically oriented terrorist organizations that oppose the state apparatus under which they operate, and terrorist groups with international agendas, this study employs the terms domestic and international. Domestic terrorist organizations are internal in nature. Because they take action against what they perceive as the forces of oppression within their own state, economy, or societal structure, the organization itself is often revolutionary, challenging tradition and the ruling regime; therefore, the group is much more likely to challenge the conventional view of women and their historical gender roles. This provides greater opportunity for females to participate actively in the group’s activities, such as guerrilla warfare, policy formation, and even leadership roles. Domestic movements do not oppose the external forces of imperialism, such as the inequities of global capitalism; rather, they target the governments of their own states and seek to overthrow, reform, or secede from the state. In rejecting the traditional power structure and its control, these groups also challenge its restrictions on women’s activities and limited gender roles. As Jill Steans explains, “national identity is frequently articulated as a form of control over women” (1998: 81). Thus, women who participate in conflict with the state must necessarily oppose the masculine state’s dominance of women. Women terrorists “see themselves as victims not only of what their male comrades would call ‘political oppression’ but also of male oppression . . . with oppression having to be fought on two fronts” (MacDonald 1991: 232). Thus, women are not only present in larger numbers in domestic terrorist organizations, but also ascend to the highest levels of combat, leadership, and policymaking. Some observers have noted that women are actually better terrorists than their male comrades due to greater stamina, loyalty, and an ability to stomach extremes of violence (Sreedharan 1998), in addition to the notion that “the women are often fiercer and crueler than the men” (Dobson and Payne 1977: 164–5). One law enforcement official elaborates, writing that female terrorists are, “ferocious and more intractable in these acts than their male counterparts. There is a cold rage about some of them that even the most alienated of men seem quite incapable of emulating” (Shuichi 1957: 2). Other security personnel share this view, arguing that, “woman as terrorist must be dealt with after the fashion of the gorgon

8

Domestic and international terrorism

if those responding would survive” (Hidenori 1955: 586). The following chapters address the role of women in domestic terrorist organizations, comparing those of the Americas, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, in an effort to illuminate the similarities and differences in their growth and rise to power.

Defining terrorism Because this analysis includes women engaged in activities ranging from guerrilla warfare, revolutions, state-sponsored terrorism, separatist movements, to organized militia movements, it is necessary first to clarify the use of the term “terrorism.” As one journalist writes, “Those who deal with terrorism on a daily basis are keenly aware that the terminology is a problem” (MacDonald 1991: xiii). Most scholars agree with the fundamental distinction between domestic and international terrorism used in this book; however, others argue that all post-1968 terrorism is part of an interconnected network. Still others find the internal–external dichotomy too simplistic and insist on differentiating between national liberation struggles, secessionists, irredentists, rightists, leftists, ethnic, religious, ideological, state-sponsored terrorists, etc. Bell expresses the dilemma eloquently in his statement, There is no satisfactory political definition of terror extant or forthcoming, there is similarly no common academic consensus as to the essence of terror and no common language with which to shape a model acceptable to political scientists or social psychologists. . . . Of course, the difficulties of academicians in parsing rigorous verifiable results . . . has not inhibited the practitioners of such a strategy. (1975: 6) The debate over terrorism is, in itself, a volatile one and will not be resolved to everyone’s satisfaction in this book. However an operational definition of terrorism is imperative to any examination of the subject. The most widely used definitions of terrorism are the classic and compatible views offered by counterterrorist security specialist Brian Jenkins and Walter Laqueur, a prominent scholar on repressive regimes and opposition movements. Jenkins defines terrorism as the threat or use of force for the purpose of political change, noting that, although simplistic, this definition allows security personnel to move beyond endless debates over terminology (Jenkins 1984, cited in White 2003: 8). Laqueur’s definition includes the illegitimate use of force, a political objective, and the targeting of innocent people (1987: 72), including peasant wars, general wars, civil wars, revolutionary wars, wars of national liberation, and resistance movements (1977b: 7). Laqueur acknowledges the difficulty in defining terrorism, noting that

Domestic and international terrorism

9

over 100 definitions have been suggested by scholars, governments, and other organizations. Depending upon their origin and use, these definitions may include political, religious, ideological, or strategic aspects (1999: 5–6). In addition, new terms and nuances are constantly emerging, such as “asymmetric warfare,” to characterize terrorism (2004: 58). Tomis Kapitan’s (2003: 48) definition conforms to those of Jenkins and Laqueur, as “the deliberate use of violence, or the threat of such, directed upon civilians in order to achieve political objectives.” James P. Sterba focuses on the fear factor, defining terrorism as “the use or threat of violence against innocent people to elicit terror in them, or in some other group of people, in order to further a political objective” (2003: 206). Daniel E. Georges-Abeyie adds criminal activity, defining terrorism as “violent criminal behavior designed primarily to generate fear in the community . . . for political purposes” (1983: 71). Donald M. Snow focuses on specific demands, describing terrorism as “the commission of atrocious acts against target populations in order to gain compliance with some set of demands or conditions that the terrorists insist upon” (2003: 71). J. Bowyer Bell adds the dimension of goals or targets to the definition, noting that, “The practitioners of terror can largely be categorized on the basis of their aspirations” (1975: 8). Thomas B. Thornton, however, discounts the terrorists’ goal, stating that terrorism consists of “violent . . . behavior . . . designed to generate fear in the community” (1964: 71–91). Paul R. Pillar further organizes the concept of terrorism into five essential elements: premeditation, political motivation, noncombatants as targets, clandestine agents, and the presence of a threat (2001: 14–15). Martha Crenshaw argues that terrorism is defined by the actions, targets, and chances of success involved. Crenshaw distinguishes between revolutionary violence and terrorism, defining the latter as “socially and politically unacceptable violence aimed at an innocent target to achieve a psychological effect” (1983). However, as Jonathan White notes, this method allows the dominant political power to define terrorism (2003: 9). Griset and Mahan acknowledge the difficulties in defining terrorism as well, stating that it is often difficult to differentiate between terrorism, guerrilla warfare, conventional warfare, and criminal activity (2003). Daniel E. Georges-Abeyie concurs, noting that, “no distinct break exists between terrorism and guerrilla warfare” (1983: 72). Yeshofat Harkabi supports the interconnectedness of these forms of terrorism, stating that, “terrorism is an outgrowth of guerrilla warfare, which is perhaps the oldest form of warfare” (1985: 19); however, the various definitions of guerrilla warfare “are consistent in that they define guerrillas as small groups who engage in unorthodox attacks on the state or its military apparatus” (Gonzalez-Perez 2006: 314). Terrorists, on the other hand, target not only authorities, but also civilian populations in an effort to generate chaos and fear (Mao 1961: 41–4; Osanka 1962: 1, 25; Paget 1967: 14–15; Porzecanski 1973). Thus, terrorists commonly utilize guerrilla tactics, but guerrillas do not necessarily engage in terrorism, or politically motivated violence against noncombatants.

10

Domestic and international terrorism

Edward Herman extends the definition of terrorism to include state repression as a form of state-sponsored terrorism, arguing that corrupt Latin American regimes have created more misery than any other form of terrorism (1983). Michael Stohl agrees, stating that terrorism is used more by national governments than by any non-governmental actors (1988: 20–8). Harkabi explains this phenomenon, noting that terrorism may become a mode of operation by governments as a form of covert warfare or surrogate warfare. As wars become increasingly difficult to launch, states may choose to weaken their opponents either by launching clandestine terrorist operations or by instigating terrorism by supporting local terrorists in their adversary’s territory. (1985: 21) Laqueur counters that government repression differs significantly from terrorism in that repression is a long-term phenomenon while terrorism is an immediate and comparatively short-lived crisis (1999: 5–6), and that since September 11, 2001, “the essence of terrorist operations now is indiscriminate attacks against civilians” (2004: 58). Laqueur also notes that the Cold War perceptions of terrorism as solely a leftist phenomenon, or a consequence of poverty, have been largely discredited (2004: 50). Because the forms of terrorism are so varied, and may share few common traits, “perhaps the only characteristic generally agreed upon is that terrorism always involves violence or the threat of violence” (Crenshaw 1983). Alex Schmid analyzes these divergent perspectives and offers an amalgamation of their common elements, concluding that terrorism is an abstract concept and as such can have no single correct definition (1983: 70–111). In fact, there is not a consensus on the definition of terrorism within the international community, nor even among the institutions of the US government. Since 1983, the US State Department has defined terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (US Department of State 2000). The Federal Bureau of Investigation does not limit its definition to attacks on noncombatants, or even government or military personnel, as A terrorist incident is a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. (Terrorist Research and Analytical Center 1995) The Counterterrorism and Threat Assessment Warning Unit of the US Justice Department’s National Security Division defines terrorism in accordance with the US Code of Federal Regulations as “the unlawful use of force

Domestic and international terrorism

11

or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (1998: 28 C.F.R. Section 0.85). The US National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals does not even require a political objective as it finds that, “Terrorism is the threat of violence and the use of fear to coerce, persuade, and gain public attention” (1976: 3). The United Nations (2005) has tried to define terrorism to the satisfaction of its many member states for years. Its predecessor, the League of Nations, defined terrorism in 1937 as, “All criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public.” While the UN strongly condemns all acts of terrorism, its members have been unable to agree upon a single definition due to the fact that certain definitions might impugn one state or another. The working definition proposed to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime by A.P. Schmid in 1992 reads, Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2005) Clearly, as the Counterterrorism and Threat Assessment Warning Unit’s annual publication, Terrorism in the United States, states, “There is no single, universally accepted definition of terrorism” (1998). Laqueur agrees, explaining that, “no definition of terrorism can possibly cover all the varieties of terrorism that have appeared throughout history” (1977b: 7). At least three books devote entire chapters to defining terrorism (Hoffman 1998; Tucker 1997; White 2003). In the interest of moving beyond the definitional debate and creating a common and practical definition, this study adopts a definition based on the views of Laqueur, Jenkins, White, Sterba, Kapitan, Herman, Stohl, Griset, and Mahan. Terrorism, then, is the use or threat of violence against noncombatants by individuals, groups, or state governments for political objectives; these activities may include guerrilla warfare, revolutions, state-sponsored terrorism, separatist movements, and organized militia movements.

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Domestic and international terrorism

Beyond any official or commonly established definition, the word “terrorism” also connotes negative associations for most readers. As William R. Farrell notes, “No one seems to readily call him- or herself a terrorist. They refer to themselves as a revolutionary, a liberator, or a freedom fighter” (1990: 143). In an effort to avoid imposing normative value judgments on the groups discussed herein or the accuracy of government claims against them, this study will refer to “terrorists,” but will also employ the terms “rebels” or “insurgents.”

States, nations, nationalism, and international actors Most scholars agree with the fundamental distinction between domestic and international terrorism used in this book; however, others find the internal–external dichotomy too simplistic and insist on differentiating between national liberation struggles, secessionists, irredentists, rightists, leftists, ethnic, religious, ideological, state-sponsored terrorists, etc. The terminology to describe the two different types of terrorists in this study is also problematic. As stated previously, terrorist groups characterized by opposition to their own states’ governments are labeled as “domestic,” while those that struggle against external forces beyond their state borders are described as “international.” Both designations are open to question. The more obvious pairing of terms would be “national” and “international.” However, such an appellation implies that the first category is nationalist. This could be true, depending upon the interpretation of nationalism. If the reader interprets nationalism as loyalty to a sub-group within the state, such as an ethnic group or nation of peoples that acts in opposition to the state, then “national” would accurately reflect the character of the domestic terrorist groups. Conversely, if the reader infers that nationalists are those loyal to the state and its policies, such an understanding would be inaccurate in this context. Therefore, this book chooses to use the term “domestic” in reference to terrorist groups that oppose the internal or domestic forces of authority within their state. As Walker Connor’s detailed and comprehensive study of nationalism and its terminology states, “The most fundamental error involved in scholarly approaches to nationalism has been a tendency to equate nationalism with a feeling of loyalty to the state rather than with loyalty to the nation” (1994: 91). John T. Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning agree, defining nationalism as “the self assertion of ethnic groups” (1998: 3). Connor points out, It would be difficult to name four words more essential to global politics than are state, nation, nation-state, and nationalism. But despite their centrality, all four terms are shrouded in ambiguity due to their imprecise, inconsistent, and often totally erroneous usage. (1994: 91)

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The Latin origins of the word “nation” refer to birth or breed, but by the seventeenth century, the connotation had evolved to encompass all the residents of a state, regardless of ethnicity (ibid.: 94). The term “nationalism” emerged soon after, referring to loyalty to a people, but mutated into an allegiance to the state during the fascist era of the early twentieth century (ibid.: 98–9). Cited in Connor’s work, The International Relations Dictionary defines a nation as “a social group which shares a common ideology, common institutions and customs, and a sense of homogeneity” (Plano and Olton 1988). This view is similar to that of Montserrat Guibernau, who defines a nation as sharing cultural, territorial, political, and historical characteristics, in addition to a psychological consciousness as a group (1999: 14). Josef Stalin, the first Soviet Commissar of Nationalities, characterized the nation as a “historically evolved, stable community” with common language, territory, economic life, and culture” (1913: 8). None of the latter three definitions refers to any ethnic component, bringing the meaning of “nation” that much closer to that of “state.” Max Weber’s classic definition of the state as, “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” is much more distinct and differentiates the political entity of the state from the human nation (1914). Yet the concept again grows muddled with the development of the term, “nation-state.” Originally the word indicated a political entity populated with a homogeneous group of people; however, very few states are, in fact, home to ethnically homogeneous societies (Connor 1994: 96). The various terms become yet more interchangeable with other scholars’ definitions, “A state is a nationstate when people identify with the territorial unit organized as a political entity, that is, a nation, more strongly than with any other politically relevant group (racial, ethnic, etc.), and they give the nation primary loyalty” (Cottam and Cottam 2001: 1). Still others accept the ambiguity of the terminology, arguing that nationalism is both pro-state and anti-state (Alter 1994: 2). Efforts to clarify the meanings and usage of terms like nation, state, and nationalism have led to still more confusion with derivations such as ethnonationalism, primordialism, pluralism, tribalism, regionalism, subnationalism, communalism, parochialism, and the like (Connor 1994). Some have even abandoned terms because of their negative nuances, “In modern usage, nationalism has negative connotations, suggesting an extreme ideology, and is judged in more or less moral terms” (Alter 1994: 2). “International,” as used in this study, refers to terrorist organizations that attack external targets beyond the borders of the home state. Although the meaning of “international” is perhaps more widely agreed upon than “national,” it suffers from the same inaccuracies of connotation. International literally describes something between nations of peoples, not necessarily between states. Yet the substitution of “inter-state” only adds to the confusion, as Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary Unabridged defines interstate as

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Domestic and international terrorism

“between or among states of a federal government” (1978: 961). The more recent term, transnational, is of no value as the word still depicts relations across nations rather than states. Despite its inaccuracy, one need only glance at the thousands of international relations books and articles published each year to realize that the word “international” is widely understood and commonly used to discuss what would more precisely be termed “inter-state” relations. Therefore, for lack of a more technically correct term and because the inaccurate definition is more widely understood, this study employs the word “international” to describe terrorist groups whose primary activities and targets are beyond the borders of their home states.

Models of women’s participation in terrorist organizations Although women account for a much smaller proportion of terrorists than do men, scholars in recent years have begun to focus their attention on the growing numbers and importance of women in these roles. Jill Steans finds that, “historically, women have always participated” in conventional and revolutionary military movements (1998: 89) and J. Ann Tickner refutes the “widespread myth” that conflicts are fought primarily by men (2001: 49, 57). Laqueur agrees, stating that women have participated in almost all guerrilla movements (1977b: 398). Karla J. Cunningham concurs, but finds that most female activity has been limited to support roles (2003: 186). Thomas Strentz, Special Agent with the Behavioral Science Instruction and Research Unit at the FBI Academy, adds that, “The role of the female in these groups is historically that of a servant to the male . . . [who] does not consider a female as an equal” (1988: 18). Charles A. Russell and Bowman H. Miller (1978: 85) counter that, this frequent relegation of women to a support role is not the product of male chauvinism but rather practical experience. In the minds of most terrorist leaders, and as demonstrated by actual operations, women are simply more effective than men in such supporting activities [as operating a safe-house, storing weapons, or forging documents]. Georges-Abeyie agrees that women played a very minor role in terrorism from the 1950s until the 1980s, but anticipated in 1983 that women would become much more active in future terrorism (1983: 81). He contends that as women acquire all of the cultural characteristics of success, such as higher education and technical training, and enter the mainstream of the professional and corporate world in greater numbers, they will become frustrated with the limited rewards reaped by their efforts and will seek to change the system that maintains their status quo. He predicts that, “These highly skilled women will perceive the reality of blocked opportunity while becom-

Domestic and international terrorism

15

ing more conscious of their unique exclusion from the system of rewards, thus fostering and reinforcing demands for sociostructural change of both a socialist and feminist nature” (ibid.: 71). In support of his contention that women will “play an increasingly dynamic and important role” in terrorist activity, Georges-Abeyie provides seven criteria as prerequisites for the growth of female terrorist operations. As a result of being a segregated minority, women may feel economically deprived or politically repressed, suffer from inflation or unemployment more so than the dominant majority, be encouraged by external forces, have a historical “outsider” to blame, have a group of frustrated elites to provide leadership and rationalize violence, and live in societies with at least a minimal tradition of democracy and upward mobility (ibid.: 71). He argues that, “We must recognize that women comprise a self-conscious, dynamic sector of our society which often perceives itself to be an oppressed majority. . . . That oppression mirrors all of the . . . classic conditions conducive of terrorist violence” (ibid.: 84). Georges-Abeyie also argues that female terrorists will emerge predominantly within organizations that espouse feminist or socialistic principles (ibid.: 83). Frances S. Hasso agrees, stating that female terrorism is supported by feminist ideology and that feminism is solely an international phenomenon. Contrary to this study, she contends that nationalism is a male product that reinforces traditional gender distinctions; therefore feminist movements are antithetical to domestic movements (1998: 441–2). However, a comparative examination of women’s participation in terrorist movements presented later in this study indicates that within domestic revolutionary and terrorist movements, feminism and nationalism are interactive. A feminist agenda draws more active women members, and a high percentage of active female membership generates more commitment to women’s issues. However, women’s terrorist activity is not incumbent upon the presence of feminism. Theories that attribute female terrorism as an outgrowth of feminism equate terrorism with normative behavior (Hudson 1999: 10). Such an assumption may, or may not, be accurate, but nonetheless indicates the need for a more accurate model. Linda L. Reif explains that past studies have argued that “women face greater barriers to participation and hence should participate less extensively than men. . . . Women should tend to perform support roles” (1986: 154). Like Reif, Griset and Mahan challenge traditional views, arguing that women fill a variety of roles within terrorist organizations, from merely supportive to active leadership functions. Griset and Mahan present a typology of women in terrorist organizations based on their levels of participation, distinguishing among Sympathizers, Spies, Warriors, and Dominant Forces (2003: 158–9). They characterize Sympathizers primarily as camp followers who provide money, time, sewing, cooking, and even sex to the males in the terrorist organization. Spies are a more active group, serving as decoys, messengers, intelligence-gatherers, and contributing strategic support to the men as well. Sympathizers and Spies are linked by the lack of any return on

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Domestic and international terrorism

their investment in the movement; they help to elicit political change but are not expected to share in, or benefit from, that change. Warriors are more active participants who are recruited and trained to use weapons and incendiary devices in guerrilla warfare. They may fight alongside their male counterparts, but they are not allowed to become leaders and have little, if any, input in policy formation. Furthermore, there is rarely any anticipation of change in their status once the group’s goals have been achieved. The Dominant Forces participate at the highest level, providing leadership, ideology, strategy, and motivation. These women often fill commando positions at the core of the group. Griset and Mahan contend that Dominant Forces may engender more fear than men in similar positions because this powerful and violent status is so unlike the traditional female role. Dominant Forces expect to share fully in the benefits and changes wrought by the terrorist movement (2003: 159–60). Although Luisella de Cataldo Neuburger and Tiziana Valentini deny that women ever benefit from terrorist participation, they do acknowledge that women sometimes act as Dominant Forces within terrorist organizations, planning strategy, claiming responsibility for terrorist actions, deciding where to plant bombs, training in terrorist camps, and deciding whom to kidnap or assassinate (1996: 8). Georgina Waylen’s study of gender and third world politics also finds women in a variety of roles within revolutionary movements, but focuses more on the results of women’s participation, rather than the causes of it (1996). Reif agrees that women participate in terrorism at varying levels, but links participation levels to limitations imposed by both the external societal structure and the internal organizational barriers within the terrorist group. In her study of women guerrillas, she proposes that “women participate in nearly all nondomestic spheres of national life to a lesser extent than men” and that women operate within a “structurally subordinate position” in Latin America due to the prohibitions and restrictions imposed by traditional gender roles, family care-giving duties, lack of education, lack of paid employment, and little access to political participation or even political knowledge (1986: 97). Drawing from Marxist and feminist theory, Reif posits that women’s activities are determined largely by a sexual division of labor that limits women to the private sphere of the home, where child-bearing, childrearing, and care-giving duties occur. Conversely, the sexual division of labor places men in the public sphere, outside the home, where their activities are much less proscribed (1986: 147–8). Reif argues that internal organizational barriers also limit women’s participation. Some terrorist groups are exclusively male, or at least male-dominated, organizations that perceive women as unwelcome intruders and do not actively recruit female members. They often ignore issues associated with women’s platforms, such as day care, health care, education, and housing, prioritizing instead economic policy, political representation, and foreign influence (ibid.: 150).

Domestic and international terrorism

17

Traditional gender roles interact with class as well, further limiting the behavior of women in terrorism. Georges-Abeyie contends that most terrorist women are middle class, yet goes on to note the exceptions of lower class female terrorists among the Irish Republican Army, Basque terrorists, and several African states (1983: 76). This suggests that, in fact, female terrorists are not predominantly middle class. According to Reif, “working-class women in the labor force face even greater obstacles to political involvement than working-class men, due to their added role in the reproductive activities of the household” (1986: 151), as 40 percent of Latin American women in the workforce are household servants with physically demanding, low income jobs. Combined with low levels of education and a dearth of marketable skills, studies demonstrate that low socioeconomic status among women decreases political activity to a greater degree than the same factors among men. Although middle and upper class women have somewhat more freedom to be politically active than working class women, they are often more satisfied with the status quo and therefore less motivated to take advantage of that freedom. As Reif notes, “working class women are doubly burdened by class and gender” (ibid.: 153). Reif contends that changing historical conditions have led women to move from supportive roles, like those filled by women during the 1959 Cuban Revolution, to more active participation in the late 1980s, characterized by women terrorists in Uruguay, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. Reif’s view presents female terrorism as a chronological, incremental evolutionary process that increases in intensity over time; however, it fails to explain the cases in which women’s terrorist participation does not always increase over time, and in fact, fluctuates through the ages. It does not account for the high level of female participation in the French or Russian revolutions, followed one and two centuries later, respectively, by very low levels of female participation in the Cuban Revolution, Germany’s Red Army Faction, Italy’s Red Brigades, or any of the many other international terrorist movements. Some scholars propose that it is not the movement itself, but the economic structure of the state that determines the size, scope, and ideology of women’s movements. They contend that urbanization and industrialization heighten education levels for women, bringing them into the maledominated labor force and public sphere (Chafetz and Dworkin 1986: 220–1; Rothbard Margolis 1993: 386). Still others counter that political factors outweigh economic components, emphasizing the feminist consciousness, women’s participation through existing political parties, and the nature of the state (Fainsod Katzenstein and McClurg Mueller 1987). In contrast, many analysts believe that a feminine consciousness cannot develop in rigidly structured societies, and that women in developing states should focus on overcoming problems common to both genders rather than emphasizing women’s concerns (Chaney 1979: 15). David Bouchier (1984: 81) contributes political culture to the model, stating that egalitarian and

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Domestic and international terrorism

liberal political cultures foster political activities like women’s movements. Conversely, states with authoritarian traditions are less receptive to women’s political activity (Rothbard Margolis 1993: 386). In keeping with this idea, Fainsod Katzenstein and McClurg Mueller argue that highly centralized governments with weak labor opposition are also hostile to feminist policies, while decentralized governments with strong labor movements are more open to women’s political concerns (1987: 6–7). Caroline O.N. Moser posits that terrorist activity is the result of structural, institutional, interpersonal, and individual factors, each of which is also influenced by gender (2001: 39). Diane Rothbard Margolis has studied women’s movements and revolts within national contexts and produced some preliminary hypotheses. She contends that industrialization and urbanization increase educational and employment opportunities for women, giving rise to more radical ideologies; however, the effect may be tempered by the lack of pluralism in a society. Women’s movements may be weakened by efforts to appease the movement with piecemeal solutions. In addition, she argues that although foreign powers and international institutions may inhibit the women’s movements, particularly in developing states, as outside forces they are less able to encourage women’s movements (1993: 386). From her study of women in Poland, Renata Siemienska adds the acceptance of pluralism within the state as a necessary pre-condition for a successful women’s movement (1986: 8), while Fainsod Katzenstein and McClurg Mueller state that the agenda of government-sponsored women’s movements is often co-opted by other issues with broader appeal, like labor policy (1987: 63). Although right-wing governments rely on maintenance of the status quo for women, leftist movements are not always responsive to women’s political needs either as they are subsumed by other left-wing priorities, such as environmental issues, nuclear protests, and peace movements (Altbach 1984: 467). De Cataldo Neuburger and Valentini go even further in their analysis of women and terrorism, stating that, “whatever the case, the fact is that participation in violent crime has never benefitted the cause of women” (1996: 1). Chaney takes a more moderate approach, claiming that women’s political activity peaks at moments of crisis in their nations’ histories, but that the activity declines markedly after the crisis has passed and the status quo of women has been restored (1979: 23). Deborah M. Galvin examines the female terrorist from a sociopsychological perspective and argues that the role of women in traditional societies has contributed to a marked increase in women terrorists. As she states, the decision to engage in terroristic activity or to join a terrorist group is often quite different for a woman than a man. . . . There is almost a natural progression towards terrorism. . . . Women take up terrorism on their own initiative because it seems to accord with their own interests.

Domestic and international terrorism

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. . . Intense frustration is a strong motivator. When attempts to change socio-political situations by conventionally accepted means fail . . . women . . . have turned to terrorism. (1983: 20–3) Some authors note religious restrictions as crucial in the role of female terrorists. Karen Kampwirth cites the highly controversial religious influence of Liberation Theology as allowing women to reject traditional roles and embrace the status of rebel or guerrillera. Kampwirth also emphasizes the strategic pragmatism of recruiting women along with the rejection of the Cuban model, which diminished women’s roles (2002: 30–2). Other scholars argue that the predominantly Catholic Latin American societies impose a culture of marianismo on women, in which women’s roles are restricted to the home in accordance with traditional images of the Virgin Mary. Because Latin American men traditionally dominate the public sphere and fulfill their roles of machismo, women have assumed leadership within the private sphere, the home, while the public sphere is the domain of men (Kryzanek 1995: 34; Skidmore and Smith 1997: 63). Latin American women, however, frequently reject or reinterpret religious limitations as seen in the very active female terrorists of Mexico, Colombia, and other states discussed later in this study (Goetze 1996: 4; Kryzanek 1995: 34; Skidmore and Smith 1997: 63). Others argue that the religious traditions of Islam are responsible for the lack of terrorist activity among Muslim women (Cunningham 2003: 186; Hasso 1998: 442–5). However, if traditional religion is such a powerful constraint, it seems unlikely that it could affect devout Muslims, yet fail to affect devout Catholics. Furthermore, the highly active women of the Chechen and Kurdish terrorist movements are also Muslim, yet their religion does not impede their participation. In her studies of women in Latin America, Norma Stoltz Chinchilla finds that female participation in guerrilla movements emerged instead as a result of restive urbanites, frustration with leftist political parties that ignored women’s issues, reaction against the failure of women’s activism in Cuba, and anti-colonial nationalism (1997: 207). While these factors certainly contribute to the development of the female guerrilla, or guerrillera, this study argues that anti-colonial fervor and its resulting nationalism far outweigh any other factors. Howard Handelman concurs, stating that “women often join revolutionary movements that challenge traditional restricted gender roles for women” (2003: 116). In an extensive analysis of gender and third world politics, Georgina Waylen suggests that women became more active in guerrilla warfare during the 1970s because they were more inconspicuous than males, represented broader community participation, and imparted a feminist agenda to the cause. As Waylen states in her discussion of Latin American states in conflict, “Some of these . . . had high levels of female participation” (1996: 74).

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Several scholars have proposed that women are more active in national liberation movements than in other political forces. Simona Sharoni states that, “National liberation movements have been portrayed as the least hospitable places for women, despite the fact that women in national liberation movements . . . seem to have had more space to raise questions about gender inequalities” (2001: 86). Miranda Alison’s study of female combatants concurs, finding that such “anti-state nationalisms are more likely to be receptive to women’s non-traditional involvement” (2004: 452). April Carter links female participation to status, citing a “close association between women gaining greater social status and their playing a more active part in war” (1998: 33). Karen Kampwirth offers an alternative explanation of female guerrilla participation, proposing that a combination of poverty, migration for jobs, Liberation Theology, rejection of Cuba’s foco or vanguard strategy, state repression, education levels, and family traditions all combined to encourage women’s action (2002: 135). This study argues that levels of participation by women in terrorism are instead determined by the goals of the organization as a whole and the group’s opponent. Domestic oppression breeds higher levels of participation among women in domestic or anti-state groups while terrorist groups focused on battling international factors such as imperialism, capitalism, and globalization fail to elicit this heightened intensity of activity among women.

2

The Americas New women in a new world

The Americas, particularly Latin America, provide numerous examples of terrorist groups and female participation within them. This study contends that the high incidence of female activity at the highest levels of Warriors and Dominant Forces is due to the domestic nature of the terrorist groups, which offer opportunities for women to challenge the status quo and improve their traditional gender roles. Some scholars (Jaquette 1973; Stoltz Chinchilla 1997) offer an alternative explanation that high levels of female participation can be explained by the leftist nature of these political movements; however, although these groups often espoused feminist principles, they often did little to improve women’s circumstances or political representation. Because of this, “The region has a long history of women’s political mobilization” (Tickner 2001: 108–9). Still others argue that “there was no previous feminist tradition to build on” in El Salvador, Nicaragua, or Guatemala and that “women generally did not reach the top levels of organizational leadership,” although women served as “militarily trained combatants, urban commandos, radio operators, intelligence gatherers, purveyors of supplies and infrastructure, propagandists, and medical teams . . . organizing their neighborhoods, unions, student groups, peasant organizations . . . providing food, medical care, refuge, intelligence, and homemade weapons for the combatants” (Stoltz Chinchilla 1997: 206–7). Thus, women were mobilized, but not at high levels of participation. Yet another reason cited for women’s mobilization in terrorist movements is the oppressive cultural influence of Latin America (Skidmore and Smith 1997: 63; Kryzanek 1995: 34; Seitz 1992: 163–4). The Latin American gender roles of marianismo and machismo are based on the traditions of a submissive female caring for the household while the dominant male holds a more public position. These customs may contribute to women’s motivations to join terrorist movements, but only if those movements are domestic, for only domestic groups oppose the restrictive status quo imposed by the state. International terrorist organizations have no effect upon domestic policy issues, such as women’s roles, and therefore do not attract women seeking to rebel against societal models.

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The Americas

Yet another explanation is that Liberation Theology was a contributing factor in the mobilization of women in the FMLN (Lorentzen 1998: 193). In the wake of the Cuban Revolution and the rise of Marxism in developing nations, Catholic clergy like Brazilian bishop, Dom Helder Camera, and Colombian priest, Camilo Torres, began to empathize with the poor and oppressed, joining their demands for social justice. The second ecumenical council of the Vatican in 1962–65, or Vatican II, declared that the Church could not exist in isolation from the world, and while the Council did not condone Marxism, it did not condemn it entirely, but instead offered criticisms of both Marxism and capitalism regarding social justice. The 1968 Latin American Bishops’ Conference in Medellín, Colombia, further investigated the concept of Church involvement in the community and, in 1971, Peruvian priest Gustavo Gutierrez published “Notes on the Theology of Liberation” (Smith 1991: 15–21; Brown 1990: 11). Although the traditional institutional Church did not support political involvement to the extent recommended by Liberation Theology, and none of the clergy condoned terrorism, approximately 30 percent of priests in El Salvador advocated political activism (Montgomery 1995: 85; Gelm 1994: 47–63). This alignment conceivably could have encouraged female parishioners to consider aiding the FMLN, but it is unlikely that Liberation Theology alone accounted for the high levels of female participation in the FMLN.

The Americas: domestic terrorism The majority of terrorist groups within the Americas have demonstrated domestic agendas and correspondingly high levels of female participation. Uruguay’s Tupamaros of the 1960s sought to overthrow the elite rule of their state and establish a socialist society. The Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FMLN) and the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) merged in opposition to the military oligarchy of El Salvador. Similarly, the Sandinista Liberation Front (FSLN) of Nicaragua formed to overthrow the brutal Somoza dictatorship. The Sendero Luminoso (SL), or Shining Path, of Peru provides an example of a terrorist organization recognized worldwide as one of the most brutal (US Department of State 2000). Colombia’s Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionário de Colombia (FARC), or Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces, is acknowledged as one of the largest and most well-equipped guerrilla forces in history (The Economist 2001). The Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacionál (EZLN), or Zapatista Army of National Liberation, provides a model of one of the best-organized and politically effective terrorist movements today. The women in these groups fulfill the more active roles, defined by Griset and Mahan, of Warriors and Dominant Forces. They participate in combat, fighting alongside male comrades and taking leadership positions in battle, as well as participating in decisionmaking and policymaking for their terrorist organizations. Among international terrorist movements in the Americas, women are far

The Americas 23 less active. Fidel Castro’s communist guerrilla organization in Cuba exhibited very little female participation beyond the lowest support levels. The Islamic Jihad/Hezbollah cells in the Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay demonstrate a similar lack of women’s involvement. Within the United States, the Ku Klux Klan and the Weather Underground have also been characterized by low levels of female participation. Women in these international terrorist movements are classified as Sympathizers and Spies, contributing support to the male-dominated terrorist activities, but remaining excluded from combat or policymaking positions. Uruguay: Tupamaros The National Liberation Movement of Tupamaros formed in 1962, seeking to overthrow the oligarchic rule of Uruguay and eliminate government repression through the establishment of a socialist society (Reif 1986: 157). Known for many years as “the Switzerland of Latin America,” Uruguay enjoyed racial harmony, a large middle class, stable economy, legislative government, and a democratic spirit until internal problems erupted in the 1960s. A faltering economy, class conflict, a generation gap, corporate rule, and the ineffectiveness of political parties converged, inciting leftist extremists to abandon conventional politics and launch a domestic terrorist movement to unseat the government (Dueñas Ruiz and Rugnon de Dueñas 1971: 90; d’Oliviera 1996). As further testament to the movement’s domestic nature, its name is derived from that of Tupac Amaru, an Inca warrior who opposed the Spanish conquest and became an enduring symbol of nationalism in Latin America (MIPT 2007c; Krauss 1999). Although the Tupamaros hoped to provide an international example for third world revolutionaries (Suarez and Sarmiento 1971: 147–8) and ideologically supported Ché Guevara and the Cuban Revolution (Labrousse 1970: 84–6), they were motivated by internal factors (Lessa 2002: 53). Their primary goal was to unseat the bourgeois government by uniting those opposed to the state and frustrated by its inefficacy (Costa 1971: 205). In addition to guerrilla attacks on the Uruguayan government and terrorist assaults on civilian noncombatants, Tupamaros activities included robbing banks and casinos, as well as kidnapping both foreigners and Uruguayans for ransom. However, even the abduction of foreigners was used as a negotiation tool with the Uruguayan state rather than as part of an international agenda (Parry 1976: 275–7). Because the Tupamaros sympathized with the Cuban revolution, some predicted that they would pursue a networking strategy; however, Uruguay’s former Chief of Intelligence, Alejandro Otero, indicated that the Tupamaros did not establish any external contacts (Mercader and de Vera 1971: 60–1). Moreover, government rhetoric referred to the Tupamaros as the “internal enemy,” emphasizing an isolated threat to the state rather than a component of an international revolution (Aldrighi 2001: 38).

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Although Uruguay prides itself on the longest democratic tradition in Latin America and a well-educated populace, it did not generate a significant women’s movement in conventional politics (Jaquette and Wolchik 1998: 9); however, Uruguay experienced “considerable feminist input in terrorist organizations” (Georges-Abeyie 1983: 75). Due to the Tupamaros’ domestic orientation, women anticipated an opportunity to change their status in society and participated at all levels, from supportive roles as Sympathizers and Spies, to more active service as Warriors and Dominant Forces. All squads had at least one or two women as members, and their duties encompassed both support and combat functions. Actual reports from the Tupamaros indicate active participation of female members, particularly in robberies and kidnappings. Other sources demonstrate a wide range of support activities for women, including guarding prisoners, distributing propaganda, and engaging in robberies to generate revenue for the group’s terrorist activities (Reif 1986: 157). The Tupamaros strongly encouraged the active participation of women in battle and command positions as Warriors as well. Because Uruguay’s cities held over 70 percent of its population, the Tupamaros focused on an urban guerrilla model, updating Mao’s model for urban guerrilla warfare, incorporating sabotage, bombings, popular violence, and revolutionary struggle (Nuñez 1970: 10–19; Mercader and de Vera 1971: 33). Like other urban guerrilla movements, the Tupamaros were organized into cells of four or five terrorists. Only the leader of the cell knew who gave them their directives, a procedure that made it difficult for the authorities to extract information from the rank-and-file terrorists if captured. Within this terrorist structure, “women participated in substantial numbers” (Reif 1986: 157). Tupamaros’ arrest records from 1966 show that fully 10 percent of the early membership was female and, by 1972, that percentage had increased to over 25 percent (ibid.: 157). Other studies have verified the high level of female involvement as Warriors and Dominant Forces, reporting “a large number of women . . . [taking part] in robberies, kidnappings, and other operations, including an assault on the Women’s Prison which freed twelve female revolutionaries” and the kidnapping of British Ambassador Geoffrey Jackson (Jaquette 1973: 351). The Tupamaros’ strategies were so effective, the government declared a state of national emergency from mid-1968 to late 1972, but the curtailment of civil liberties did little to mitigate terrorist activity and may have motivated more. The fact that the Tupamaros developed specific policy positions on women’s issues lends support to the assertion of active female involvement at all levels. The Tupamaros’ political platform advocated the direct participation of women in guerrilla activities, as well as the elimination of gender discrimination in society at large. The Tupamaros’ egalitarian goals of free access to education, fair distribution of income, as well as the nationalization of health care, elderly care, and food production were “effectively adopted strategies to recruit women” (Reif 1986: 157). The causality may be recipro-

The Americas 25 cal as well, in that the large and active female membership may well have contributed to the creation of these policies. Despite the inclusion of women, the Tupamaros were not successful in their terrorist efforts and their forces dwindled until they were finally defeated in 1973 and many Tupamaros guerrillas were imprisoned (MIPT 2007c; Lessa 2002: 53). A military dictatorship ruled Uruguay for the next 12 years, but upon the return of a civilian regime in 1985, a general amnesty was declared and the Tupamaros transformed into a political party (MIPT 2007c). Many of the group’s ex-guerrillas entered conventional politics and were elected to the national legislature, including former rebel José Mujica who became the leading member of Uruguay’s Senate in 2005. A female ex-combatant, Nora Castro, was chosen to preside over the Chamber of Deputies. In addition, socialist Tabare Vasquez, whose brother was a guerrilla, was elected President. Vasquez leads the Frente Amplio, or Broad Front leftist coalition of communists, socialists, and ex-Tupamaros (McDermott 2005). He has appointed 25 women to key positions within the new government, ending 170 years of traditional politics and moving Uruguay to the political left, along with many other governments in Latin America. Although the Tupamaros terrorist movement no longer exists, its commitment to women’s representation persists. As Vasquez states, “Quietly, gradually, calmly and within the Constitution, we will transform the country” (Rohter 2004; Krauss 1999). El Salvador: Farabundo Martí The principal opposition to the military and industrial oligarchy of El Salvador emerged in the civil war of 1979–92 and comprised two terrorist guerrilla movements, the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation (FMLN) and the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR). The FMLN, itself, was actually a merger of five extant political and guerrilla movements that sought direct democratic political participation by the people, land reform, economic reform, government intervention in the economy, and restructuring of the military and police (Reif 1986: 157). The FMLN is considered a domestic terrorist organization, rather than an international movement, because its principal goal was the ouster of the repressive Salvadoran dictatorship and its activities were confined to El Salvador. Although the FMLN was a leftist movement, it did not seek to form an international socialist army, instigate a world revolution, nor combat the international forces of imperialism. Instead, the group’s goals remained confined to the overthrow of the national government. In addition, while the group’s primary target was the state, its operations were terrorist ones in that they often attacked not only political authorities and military personnel, but also civilian noncombatants. As a domestic terrorist organization offering women the opportunity to improve their traditional gender roles through a revolution against a restrictive state, females were easily recruited into the FMLN–FDR. Total

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membership was between 40 percent and 50 percent female. With such a high percentage of females, women were able to move into all levels of participation, serving not only as Sympathizers and Spies, but also as Warriors and Dominant Forces. Records from the period indicate that between 30 and 40 percent of the movement’s combat troops were women Warriors. Fully 40 percent of the revolutionary leadership was composed of women who functioned in decisionmaking and policymaking roles for the organization (Montgomery 1982: 151; Reif 1986: 160; Mason 1992: 65). During the demobilization process at the end of the civil war, United Nations observers reported similar numbers, counting approximately 5,000 female soldiers out of 15,000 total troops. Among the demobilized women, 55 percent reported serving in combat, while fewer than 30 percent performed organizational and domestic duties, and only 15 percent engaged in health and medical care (Heyzer 2004: 2; Reif 1986: 157). Admittedly, some male guerrillas reportedly harassed and assaulted female comrades, but the women combatants spoke out, demanding appropriate censure for the men (Heyzer 2004). In addition to fighting alongside males, female commanders also led many of the six-person combat units of the FMLN–FDR (Reif 1986: 160; Mason 1992: 65; Gonzalez and Kampwirth 2001: 195). These guerrilleras, or female guerrillas, were vital to the insurgency. In 1981, the Silvia Battalion formed, composed entirely of women Warriors. It was soon followed by the Anti-Yankee Battalion, composed of 250 women under the age of 30, many of whom were mothers (Mason 1992: 65). Moreover, the first three guerrillas to serve as seconds-in-command of the entire FMLN–FDR were all women: Ana Guadalupe Martinez Menendez, Maria Concepción Valladares, a.k.a. Nidia Díaz, and Melida Anaya Montes, a.k.a. Ana Maria Gomez (McClintock 1998: 255–6). With almost half its membership female, the Revolutionary Council of leaders and policymakers demonstrated the participation of women at the highest level of Griset and Mahan’s model, that of Dominant Forces (Reif 1986: 160; Mason 1992: 65). Initially, female members of the FMLN–FDR were predominantly middle and upper class women, with a strong presence of students and teachers. These were followed in the early 1970s by rural peasant women and, later, urban workers (Reif 1986: 160; Heyzer 2004). Notably, most of these women were young and the majority were mothers with family obligations, yet they “sought relief ” from the oppression of traditional society and “mobilized independently of their husbands, fathers, brothers, and boyfriends” (Mason 1992: 65). In accordance with the model of domestic terrorists proposed by this study, the women of the FMLN–FDR operated primarily as Warriors and Dominant Forces. They functioned as medics, combat fighters, and leaders, in addition to providing basic support. They also shared in decisionmaking processes and the performance of tasks that were traditionally limited to male combatants (Reif 1986: 160). Perhaps due to its origins as a hastily cobbled union of smaller resistance groups, the FMLN–FDR did not create a unified policy regarding women

The Americas 27 (Goldstein 2001: 81). Instead, several sub-groups emerged to address women’s policies and participation in the movement, serving as the Sympathizers and Spies of the movement. The most prominent of these groups, the Association of Salvador Women (AMES) formed to mobilize women in pursuit of more egalitarian policies in El Salvador, including access to safe birth control, elimination of forced sterilization, child care, education, and job training for women, while still maintaining leadership positions within the terrorist movement (Reif 1986: 160). Other conventional political organizations were also created for and by women, such as COMADRES. COMADRES formed in 1977 as an information-sharing network for women seeking news about family members who were imprisoned, dead, or had disappeared. They also lobbied the government for prisoners’ privileges and the release of imprisoned family members. In 1987, The Coordinadora Nacionál de la Mujer Salvadoreña (CONAMUS) formed as a result of the merger of women from several unions and social organizations, helping displaced women to organize and rebuild their lives (Heyzer 2004). After the insurgency, the FMLN–FDR made the transition to a recognized opposition party within the Salvadoran political system and now holds a significant number of legislative seats (US Department of State 2006). The party program of 1993 incorporated an explicit provision for the protection of women’s political and economic rights: The construction of a true democracy entails the full realization of women and their creative participation in all spheres of national life. This is a fundamental principle in the societal programme for which the FMLN fights. We have a commitment to win equal rights for women, [and] to overcome their marginalization and oppression in Salvadoran society. (Luciak 2001) In addition, the FMLN party created a Women’s Secretariat and several other women’s organizations; however, it refused to provide the director of the Women’s Secretariat with pay equal to comparable departments, and 70 to 80 percent of the female ex-combatants did not receive the benefits accorded them through the post-revolutionary land reform program because the government distributed the land to male heads of households. These women also lost social status as they were criticized for leaving their homes and families to fight in the revolution. Thus, the women who had successfully broken free of traditional gender roles found themselves again confined to these restrictions after the revolution (Heyzer 2004). Since that time, the FMLN party has grown frustrated with El Salvador’s continued poverty and the political domination of the right-wing Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA). Although the majority of the FMLN continues to work within the conventional political system, a small group of radical FMLN activists have turned away from legislative politics and

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returned to guerrilla activity. The Limón Brigade, a splinter group expelled from the FMLN, attacked police officers with automatic weapons at a demonstration outside the National University in 2006 (Tobar and Renderos 2006). El Salvador’s President, Antonio Saca, has allowed police to use stronger measures to repress this return to terrorism and anticipates that the nation’s persistent poverty will be alleviated by economic growth from the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), which El Salvador joined in April 2006. He also looks forward to the future implementation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), but FMLN legislators fear that privatization and free trade are helping only corporate industry and argue that El Salvador’s adoption of the US dollar in 2001 and its unprecedented foreign debt have left 40 percent of the population unable to afford basic human needs and the Limón Brigade radicals see these measures as simply new versions of capitalist market mechanisms that increase the wealth of El Salvador’s elite at the expense of the nation’s poor (Gentile 2006; Lapper and Thomson 2006). Nicaragua: Sandinistas The revolutionary Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) formed in 1961 to overthrow the repressive 40 year dictatorship of the Somoza family and its brutal National Guard. Its tactics consisted of revolution against the government and terrorist attacks against civilians, therefore this study identifies the FSLN as a domestic terrorist organization rather than an international one. Some scholars have argued that the FSLN was an antiimperialist movement (Kampwirth 2002: 22; Mulinari 1988: 900); however, while the FSLN clearly rejected US support of the Somoza regime, the Sandinistas’ principal target was the Nicaraguan government and its overriding goal was the overthrow of the Somoza regime. Indeed, the FSLN exhibited a “guerrilla agenda that was more explicitly nationalistic than Marxist” (Kampwirth 2002: 22). Any attacks on US agents were incidental to these domestically oriented objectives, making the FSLN a domestic terrorist organization rather than an international one. Moreover, the FSLN did not continue its revolution beyond the Nicaraguan borders and it demobilized and normalized relations with the US after the removal of Somoza. Due to the domestic nature of the FSLN movement, Nicaraguan women perceived a chance to break the gender boundaries of traditional society through participation in the revolution. The Association of Women Confronting the National Problem (AMPRONAC), established by a leader of the FSLN, found many women eager to be recruited into the Sandinista guerrilla army (Reif 1986: 158). Throughout the nation, “thousands of women were mobilized as guerrilla combatants and as members of the broader revolutionary coalition” while women’s organizations “provided critical support for the guerrillas” (Gonzalez and Kampwirth 2001: 112).

The Americas 29 Initially, the economic deprivation of the regime mobilized only working class women, but as the economy worsened and the Somoza dictatorship increased its oppression, women of all classes joined the revolution (Paxton and Hughes 2007: 236). AMPRONAC reached a peak membership of 8,000 women in 1979 (Waylen 1996: 77) and women quickly moved from support positions of Sympathizers and Spies within the FSLN to the battle and command roles of Warriors and Dominant Forces, sometimes filling as many as half of the leadership posts in battle (Georges-Abeyie 1983: 84). By the end of the 1970s, women comprised 30 percent of the Sandinista guerrilla army and functioned in combat and leadership roles, in addition to support positions (Harris 1983: 901; Reif 1986: 158; Molyneux 1989: 127; Seitz 1992: 168; Waylen 1996: 77; Goldstein 2001: 8; Gonzalez and Kampwirth 2001: 195; Paxton and Hughes 2007: 236). As some of the male combatants testified, “Women fought as men” (Mulinari 1998: 158). According to FSLN Commander Tomás Borge, “Women were in the front lines of battle, whether they threw home-made bombs or were in the trenches. They were in the leadership of the military units, on the firing lines during the war” (Harris 1983: 903). Former rebel, Gioconda Belli, reported that she routinely carried a sub-machine gun “like a handbag” and engaged in gun-running and casing foreign embassies for possible hostagetaking opportunities (Campbell 2002: 7). Among the FSLN leaders was Dora Maria Tellez, who was second in command for the 1978 siege of Somoza’s palace (Booth 1985: 164; Waylen 1996: 77). Younger women saw the guerrilleras as “some kind of mythical older sisters who . . . were unbounded and free,” contributing to the female recruitment effort (Mulinari 1998: 161). Other women “worked with the FSLN as ‘collaborators’ rather than ‘militants’, constructing networks of communication and support” (Harris 1983: 902). These women engaged in support-level activities of Sympathizers and Spies rather than the combat, leadership, or policymaking roles of Warriors and Dominant Forces, but their contribution was crucial. They provided safe havens, food, medical care, and uniforms for guerrillas. Even “middle class women transported Sandinistas in their limousines, relying on their social status to avoid suspicion” and housewives transported explosives in their shopping bags (ibid.: 902). Although these women used their gender roles to further the revolutionary cause, “once the FSLN admitted women as equals, the traditional gender division of labor often broke down” (Kampwirth 2002: 33). Some scholars attribute the FSLN’s high level of female participation to its incorporation of a feminist agenda. Nicaragua has a long history of feminist movements, beginning in the 1880s with suffrage and education campaigns, extending into the 1920s, and emerging with renewed vigor in 1961 with the founding of the Sandinista Front (Gonzalez and Kampwirth 2001: 112; Kampwirth 2002: 33). Although the FSLN focused more on the elimination of class barriers than gender barriers, the Sandinistas had

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claimed a commitment to women’s equality since 1969 and women perceived armed support of the revolutionary government to be the most viable option for eliminating the traditional oppression of women (Kampwirth 1998; Seitz 1992: 168). Moreover, “women’s rights were an integral part” of FSLN policy (Harris 1983: 903) and the AMPRONAC organization “was committed to both women’s equality and overthrowing the Somoza regime” (Waylen 1996: 77). Although the FSLN adhered to traditional cultural and religious doctrine banning contraception and abortion, it embraced egalitarian aspects of the feminist movement and “followed an ‘integrationist’ policy – trying to integrate women into the revolutionary process” (ibid.: 84). Indeed, the FSLN’s 1987 proclamation on women defined women’s exploitation as an immediate problem and its end a responsibility of the entire FSLN (ibid.: 85). The Sandinistas’ willingness to establish internal policies of respect and support for women was all the more significant in their deviation from the traditional Latin machismo of Somozan society (Goldstein 2001: 81). Conversely, other scholars find that any feminist assertions of the Sandinistas were merely superficial, that “holding feminist beliefs was not the key to political advancement within the Sandinista movement” and “its political discourses, nevertheless excluded Sandinista feminists” (Mulinari 1998: 160). The fact that AMPRONAC, a women’s rights organization within the FSLN, was not established until 16 years after the founding of the FSLN also suggests that feminist policy was not paramount to the Sandinistas. On a practical note, the FSLN’s commitment to feminism could well have been limited due to the constraints of a poor economy, the Catholic Church, and traditional machismo (Molyneux 1989: 127). Interviews with former Sandinista women reveal, however, that “the role of feminism in motivating women to join the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran guerrilla coalition were clear: when interviewed, almost nobody said that a concern for gender equality factored into her decision,” suggesting that the question of a feminist agenda is a moot point (Kampwirth 2002: 133). In any event, whether the FSLN sincerely embodied a feminist policy agenda or merely patronized its female members, the domestic nature of the FSLN movement provided the women with an opportunity, albeit uncertain, to challenge the traditional restrictive gender roles of society. The Somoza regime had espoused women’s rights for decades, yet never enacted them (ibid.: 23). Thus, Nicaraguan women realized that the best opportunity for change in women’s status lay with the FSLN rather than the state, allowing them to rise to the levels of Warriors and Dominant Forces, participating in combat and exercising policymaking authority that would otherwise be denied them in Somozan society. As in other cases, although poverty and cultural factors do not fully explain the mobilization of women in the FSLN, they may have served as contributory factors. Scholars estimate that up to 30 percent of all families were headed by women during the 1960s and 1970s and that figure grew to

The Americas 31 50 percent by the early 1980s (Harris 1983: 900; Reif 1986: 158; Seitz 1992: 165). Unofficial common-law marriages, rather than civil marriages or church ceremonies, were the norm in Nicaragua despite its overwhelming Catholic majority (Seitz 1992: 165). The national literacy rate was less than 50 percent and even lower for women, and women were typically relegated to low-paying, low-status jobs, preferably within the home (Molyneux 1989: 127–8). In keeping with the Latin American tradition of marianismo, the docile female counterpart to men’s machismo, society expected Nicaraguan women to prevail at home, en la casa, while the male domain remained in the street, or en la calle. Codified law supported these expectations, as the patria potestad law established a father’s rights over his children and treated his wife as little better than property (Seitz 1992: 163–4). Disenfranchised politically, economically, and socially by their state and forced into assuming full responsibility for their families, Nicaraguan women were promising candidates for the cause. High unemployment, low standards of living, and political unrest created many of the conditions conducive to terrorism identified by Georges-Abeyie (1983: 84) and women quickly moved from support positions of Sympathizers and Spies within the FSLN to the battle and command roles of Warriors and Dominant Forces, sometimes filling as many as half of the leadership posts in battle. By the end of the 1970s, women comprised 30 percent of the Sandinista guerrilla army, serving in combat and leadership roles, as well as support positions (Reif 1986: 158). The FSLN, then, encouraged female participation in “economic development, political activity, and national defense” (Molyneux 1989: 129). Scholars disagree on the role of the Catholic Church and Liberation Theology in mobilizing FSLN women. Some contend that the traditional Catholic Church supported women’s organizing, and that local priests and the more radical Liberation Theology of the 1970s further rallied women to oppose the state (Kampwirth 2002: 29–30; Kirk 1992: 59; Booth 1985: 179). Church groups, particularly youth groups, were initially above suspicion and therefore became “central to the revolutionary project” (Kampwirth 2002: 38). Others refer to such statements as “exaggerations” and argue that Liberation Theology did not influence the FSLN or any other revolutionary activity in Nicaragua, contending that political rebellion and religious rebellion simply “grew up together, often drawing on the same wells for inspiration, support, and strength” (Levine 1990: 230). The same demands for social justice and political accountability inspired both Liberation Theology and the Sandinista revolution, but one was not a direct result of the other. Examination of domestic movements over the last two millennia shows that the Vatican hierarchy routinely supports the status quo, even in cases of dictatorship and repression. The Church’s second ecumenical council from 1962–65 modernized Catholicism to some extent, but it would be inaccurate to assert that the Church supported revolutionary activity. The official

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Church did not support the revolution and, in fact, clashed with what it saw as the growing leftism of the Marxist-inspired Liberation Theology movement. However, it is unlikely that either force acted as the single dominant influence on women’s participation in the FSLN, and it is more probable that each balanced the effect of the other. The Sandinista movement brought down the Somoza regime in 1979 and the Sandinistas ruled Nicaragua until voted out in 1990. AMPRONAC changed its name to the Luisa Amanda Espinoza Association of Nicaraguan Women (AMNLAE) after the war and has continued to promote women’s equality (Gonzalez and Kampwirth 2001: 114; Molyneux 1989: 131). Although traditional Latin American values and social customs still influence Nicaraguan society, the role of women has dramatically changed. The Sandinista revolution brought thousands of women into the previously male-dominated public sphere, recruited women into the workforce, and initiated a national women’s rights movement (US Department of State 2000). Subsequently, the Nicaraguan Constitution of 1987 pioneered the recognition of women’s rights in Latin America, guaranteeing them not only protection from gender discrimination, but also access to education and health care (Paxton and Hughes 2007: 237). Although the fight for equality is not yet complete, women have made great strides in Nicaragua since the revolution. Guatemala: National Revolutionary Unity The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (UNRG) guerrilla army conducted terrorist activities within Guatemala from 1960 to 1996. The UNRG was composed of four distinct guerrilla factions: the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Revolutionary Organization of People in Arms (ORPA), the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), and the Guatemalan Workers’ Party (PGT) (Landau 1993: 179; Gonzalez and Kampwirth 2001: 191). Estimates of the deaths and disappearances caused by the war between the UNRG and the Guatemalan government range from 200,000 to one million (Gonzalez and Kampwirth 2001: 191; Landau 1993: 204). The conflict resulted in the displacement of an additional 1.5 million Guatemalans and the razing of hundreds of villages (Commission for Historical Clarification 1998). According to the Commission for Historical Clarification report issued in 1998, Guatemala’s guerrillas were responsible for only 3 percent of the violence during the four-decade revolution (ibid.: 71–86) and “the [Guatemalan] Army designed and implemented a strategy to provoke terror in the population” (ibid.: 26). However, the report observes that the UNRG also “committed violent and extremely cruel acts, which terrorised people and had significant consequences” (ibid.: 26). Although the UNRG’s primary targets were the Guatemalan government and military, they “also included some civilians in this category, especially representatives of eco-

The Americas 33 nomic and political power who were considered to be allies of the repression and those people suspected of providing support to the Army, or who held economic power, especially in rural areas” (ibid.: 21). Thus, though the UNRG enjoyed widespread popular support, it was a terrorist organization in that it attacked civilians and noncombatants for political purposes. The UNRG was a domestic terrorist organization rather than an international terrorist group. Two causes of Guatemala’s guerrilla wars that have been identified were the enormous income gap between the wealthy and the poor, and the intervention of the US in 1954 (Landau 1993: 148, 170). While the latter factor may well be considered international in nature, the UNRG focused its strategies and goals around the former cause, the severe and widespread poverty of the Guatemalan people, particularly the indigenous population. The UNRG did kidnap and kill three US diplomatic personnel and a West German ambassador in 1968 after the Guatemalan government refused UNRG demands, but even these terrorist acts were committed to apply international pressure to the state (Parry 1976: 287). The UNRG did not extend its attack to US territory nor even to the United Fruit Company, an American enterprise that was seen as complicit in the government’s discrimination, repression, and unresponsiveness to the poor (Vozel 2002: 26). Women were drawn into the UNRG as a result of its domestic orientation. As in many impoverished nations, the burden of poverty fell overwhelmingly on the shoulders of Guatemalan women, as they were responsible for family health care, maintaining the household, and caring for children and the elderly in the absence of any government support systems. These responsibilities were particularly burdensome for indigenous women who lacked education and job opportunities. Participation in a domestic terrorist group offered Guatemalan women an opportunity to break free of these limitations. Interviews with women of the UNRG revealed that the women explicitly felt that they were fighting “the system” of state repression rather than external forces (Vozel 2002: 26). The data on female forces within the UNRG is not as complete nor as reliable as that on other Latin American terrorist groups. Although the government attempted to gather data during the 1996 demobilization of the UNRG, the terrorist forces had dwindled to as few as 1,000, many former UNRG members had become refugees, and many chose not to reveal their terrorist past, distorting any realistic image of the group at the height of its power. According to demobilization data, women comprised 14.8 percent of UNRG combatants and 25.2 percent of political cadres, averaging an 18.3 percent membership in the UNRG, comparable to half the female membership in other Latin American terrorist movements (Gonzalez and Kampwirth 2001: 191). Although some sources indicate that women did not join the UNRG until 1978–80 and that female membership remained below 25 percent, interviews conducted with demobilized female members of the UNRG

34 The Americas demonstrate a strong female presence in support-level activities as Sympathizers and Spies, and the finding that “Female combatants were active in communications, logistics, and rearguard activities” (Gonzalez and Kampwirth 2001: 196–7; Vozel 2002: 24). Traditional women’s tasks were shared among both male and female UNRG members and a small number of women participated in combat as Warriors (Gonzalez and Kampwirth 2001: 203). Other sources indicate that women were active from the inception of the UNRG, that “Guatemalan women have always participated in the ‘process’, the struggle, and have been active at every level” (Davies 1987: 60). Interviews with UNRG women reveal support-level activities of teaching, protesting, organizing, legal work, performing mechanical work (ibid.: 60–1), agricultural work, collectively building a house, conveying information (ibid.: 66), and child care (ibid.: 67), but also include accounts of women Warriors who were captured and tortured for strategic and policymaking information (ibid.: 60–1). Indigenous women in particular were more active in guerrilla combat, or Warrior roles, than in supportive Sympathizer roles. As one interviewer concluded, the participation of Indian women . . . is less in mass organizations and more in the armed opposition. Indian women didn’t generally follow a pattern of working in mass organizations and then go into armed struggle. They have gone right from their oppression to joining the armed struggle. (Davies 1987: 63) Studies of the Guatemalan war in general indicate that the UNRG recruited both men and women for combat (Landau 1993: 180). Although the Commission for Historical Clarification report acknowledges that women played a significant role in the revolution, it does not elaborate on their role (1998: 23). However, one woman’s journal entry from 1962 demonstrates that Guatemalan women, and even young girls, served as Warriors, taking up arms, making Molotov cocktails, seizing buses, radio stations, and even churches. Indigenous women were especially active in the UNRG (Stoltz Chinchilla 1998: 10–11). In addition to support activities, women from the rural countryside began “changing their traditional clothing for uniforms in order to take up armed struggle” (Davies 1987: 63). While scholars disagree on the extent of female participation in the UNRG, they concur that the UNRG did not attract women through a feminist agenda. Throughout the civil war of almost four decades, “specific statements on women’s rights in the manifestos and programs of the four groups integrating the UNRG were notably absent. Women’s issues were part of UNRG platforms only in the most general fashion” (Gonzalez and Kampwirth 2001: 203). Although ten distinct women’s rights organizations functioned in conventional politics, the UNRG lacked any kind of feminist

The Americas 35 platform and the women’s rights in the 1996 peace accords were included only as a result of the efforts of conventional women’s political groups. Two of the more visible women’s groups in conventional politics were the Alianza Femenina Guatemalteca, or Guatemalan Feminine Alliance, and the National Coordinating Committee of Guatemalan Widows, known as CONAVIGUA. In the early 1950s, middle class women formed, with the help of the Catholic Church, the Alianza Femenina Guatemalteca, a national organization of the political left. They advocated a civil society, democracy, and equal rights for women. Although the group grew to encompass a diverse membership, as women, the group lacked political power, and they were condemned as communists by the military junta leader, Colonel Armas. The women of the Alliance engaged in conventional politics, but they mobilized around the revolution, functioning as a propaganda machine for the left and fulfilling the roles of Sympathizers and Spies (Carrillo Padilla 2004: 152–3, 157). In 1988, Guatemalan women organized another group, CONAVIGUA, whose membership was composed primarily of rural indigenous peasant women. Although only 25 to 30 percent of the 9,000 members were literate, they held protests, demanded information on the dead and disappeared, and advocated women’s political, economic, and social rights. Their platforms demanded “the dignity and unity of women . . . for women to participate, for our opinions to be taken seriously, for our dignity and rights as women to be respected” (Schirmer 1993: 52). CONAVIGUA established cottage industries for weaving and agricultural cooperatives to fund local education and medical care, but did not participate in the revolution or acts of terrorism (ibid.: 54). Although women participated in conventional opposition politics to some extent, political expression was severely restricted during the dictatorship of almost four decades. Even before the coup d’etat in 1954, women’s conventional political expression had been long constrained by Guatemala’s patriarchal society. The absence of meaningful avenues of women’s political opposition inadvertently helped channel the women’s political energies into a high level of female participation in the UNRG (Carrillo Padilla 2004: 153). As accounts from Guatemalan women demonstrate, women recognized this paternalism and sought to protect their rights through revolutionary action. They hoped to create a new conscience of social action in which they could seek greater independence through protecting their rights, both individually and collectively. In fact, laws protecting the rights of women existed in Central America prior to the Guatemalan war, but archaic judiciaries and political institutions refused to allow women to exercise these rights (Anonymous 2001, 23–4). As one Guatemalan woman summarized the problem, man-made organizations failed to recognize women’s rights, and woman-made organizations received no assistance, no support, no resources, and no protection. This was especially true for indigenous women (ibid.:

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27). Even within Guatemala’s Communist Party, women’s activities were limited. Although women received equality on paper, in reality, the Party’s conservative Soviet influence reflected earlier positions on women and restricted female influence (Carrillo Padilla 2004: 156). Women organized both within and outside the UNRG for the same reasons: education needs, economic inequity, lack of family support, and discrimination against the indigenous majority (Tribunal Supremo Electoral 2002: 72–4). The literacy rate among the general population was a meager 56 percent. Among UNRG members, literacy climbed to 84 percent, offering opportunity and access to other resources (Gonzalez and Kampwirth 2001: 198). According to the UN, in 1950 the wealthiest 5 percent of the population held 48 percent of Guatemala’s wealth; by 1975, the top 5 percent held 60 percent of the wealth. The poorest half of Guatemala’s population held 9 percent of national income in 1950, but had dropped to 7 percent by 1975 (Landau 1993: 176). A mere 16 percent of the population owned any land at all (Gonzalez and Kampwirth 2001: 198). The extreme poverty contributed to health crises as well, in that 42 percent of all deaths in the 1970s were caused by curable diseases like bacterial infections and malnutrition. Rural areas suffered even more due to the severe shortage of physicians and medical facilities. In 1960, the doctor–patient ratio was one to 4,644; by 1975, those figures had almost doubled to one to 9,000 (Landau 1993: 176). Rigoberta Menchu was a Guatemalan woman who straddled the line between conventional politics and insurgency. An indigenous woman, Menchu became an international spokeswoman for the Guatemalan revolution, as well as a proponent of democracy and egalitarian society, and in 1992 she won the Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts (Landau 1993: 173, 204). Menchu delivered public lectures and wrote of the Guatemalan government’s kidnapping, torture, and assassination of her mother, father, brother, and other family members. Through her testimonio, she was able to put a human face on the suffering of Guatemala’s indigenous majority and draw international attention to their dilemma (Menchu 1995: 229–30). The Catholic Church also played a role in the recruitment of women into the UNRG, both in alienating women from the traditional institution that supported the regime and in attracting women to the minority of priests and nuns who supported the social justice aspects of Liberation Theology. During dictator Rios Montt’s brief rule from 1982–83, the Archbishop of Guatemala Marion Cardinal Casariego openly supported Montt and the military government. Ironically, the official alliance between Church and state did not protect the clergy; a young military commander was quoted in 1982 as saying, “We make no distinction between the Catholic Church and the subversive communists” (Landau 1993: 188). As the post-war report of Guatemala’s Commission for Historical Clarification states:

The Americas 37 Only recently in Guatemalan history and within a short time period did the Catholic Church abandon its conservative position in favour of an attitude and practise based on the decisions of the Second Vatican Council (1962–65) and the Episcopal Conference of Medellin (1968), prioritising its work with excluded, poor and under-privileged sectors and promoting the construction of a more just and equitable society. These doctrinal and pastoral changes clashed with counterinsurgency strategy, which considered Catholics to be allies of the guerrillas and therefore part of the internal enemy, subject to persecution, death or expulsion. Whereas the guerrilla movement saw in the practise of what was known as “liberation theology” common ground on which to extend its social base, seeking to gain the sympathy of its followers. A large number of catechists, lay activists, priests, and missionaries were victims of the violence and gave their lives as a testimony to the cruelty of the armed confrontation. (1998: 20) With widespread popular support across class, ethnic, and gender lines, the UNRG gained control of considerable territory in the 1970s and early 1980s, but by 1984, government forces had driven the UNRG from the villages through peasant intimidation, torture, and massacres. Many UNRG fled into exile or hid in sparsely populated outlying areas (Landau 1993: 195). Peace talks began in 1990, concluding in 1996 with the demobilization of the UNRG. However, as noted previously, UNRG forces had declined considerably and many of those who remained or returned as refugees chose not to reveal their past ties with terrorist activity, making a more accurate assessment of female participation difficult. Even though female participation in the UNRG may have reached only 15 percent, half the levels in Nicaragua and El Salvador, women’s activity in the UNRG was extensive at support levels of Sympathizers and Spies, considerable in policymaking and leadership roles of Dominant Forces, and very strong in combat or Warrior positions. Peru: Shining Path The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism identifies the Sendero Luminoso (SL), or Shining Path, as one of the most ruthless terrorist groups in existence (2003; US Department of State 2006: 2; US Department of State 2005: 19). The SL launched what it called “the People’s War” in 1977, in response to the military government’s announcement of a return to civilian government and upcoming elections in 1980 (Osborn 2007: 123). Since then, over 69,000 Peruvians have been killed in the government’s battle with the SL (US Department of State 2006). Over half of the killings were committed by the SL in an effort to “escalate bloodshed to precipitate the collapse of the bourgeois state” (Osborn 2007: 127).

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The SL professes a Maoist philosophy and rejects other ethnonationalist groups in Peru; however, its goals are primarily domestic in that the organization seeks to overthrow the institutions of the Peruvian government and replace them with a communist peasant revolutionary regime (US Department of State 2006). To this end, the SL pursues “an active campaign to completely destroy the state and all its supporting social, economic and political structures” (Osborn 2007: 122). While it has attacked businesses and the embassies of several foreign states in the past, SL activities have been restricted to the confines of Peru and the vast majority of its targets lie within the Peruvian infrastructure (US Department of State 2000; Griset and Mahan 2003: 162; US Department of State 2006). This domestic agenda has attracted Peru’s women since the group’s inception. Women bound by the restricted gender roles of traditional society sought change through participation in the SL; the presence of women in the SL and their rise to power then helped recruit still more women. Many scholars contend that the SL was initially led by a woman, the late Torre Guzman, known as Comrade Norah (US Department of State 2005, 2006). Although other sources credit her husband, Abimael Guzman, with its founding, the data clearly indicate that throughout the 1980s “a large number of women [were] involved at all levels of the organization, right up to the top positions in both the regional commands and the National Central Committee” (Palmer 1995: 277). Records from 1987 indicate that over half of all SL members arrested and charged with terrorist activity were women (Gonzales 1987: 83). Other studies show that 40 percent of SL political cadres, as well as 50 percent of its Central Committee, are female. Moreover, the female members carry out the assassinations for the SL (Barrig 1998: 111; Tarazona-Sevillano 1990: 77). One study of the SL finds that the group strongly encouraged female membership and that women have “historically played a leading role” in the SL, particularly lower class women for whom the SL was much more than a terrorist organization, but also “a battle for gender equality” allowing women “to strike back violently at the traditional system that oppresses them” (TarazonaSevillano 1990: 76–8). [The] brutal violence committed by poor indio women against powerful mestizo men demonstrated, in perhaps the most dramatic way possible, that women were no longer bound by traditional gender roles. . . . They went from the bottom of Peru’s social pyramid to the top of the Shining Path. (Osborn 2007: 128) Police reported “the presence of large numbers of women in the guerrilla organization” in the 1980s and claimed that the group’s second-ranking commander in Lima was a woman, Juana Saavedra, known as Sara (Ruiz 1988). In addition, inside sources revealed that Guzman “relied heavily on a select group of female cadres” (Speck 1992). Although critics argued that

The Americas 39 the women were valued for their loyalty rather than their intellect and that their roles were those of administrators, not strategists, information surfaced after Guzman’s arrest in 1993 that SL leadership had long been controlled by women such as Edith Lagos, Laura Zambrano, and Elena Iparraguirre, who could “maintain order and keep a secret” (ibid.). In fact, Iparraguirre was sentenced to life in prison in 2006, along with co-conspirator Guzman, for terrorist crimes (US Department of State 2006). Following Guzman’s original arrest in 1993, Maria Jenny Rodriguez, also known as Comrade Rita, assumed the leadership of the SL, matching him in brutality as she continued the SL policy of killing all fellow leftist groups who participated in elections or negotiations with the government (Osborn 2007: 123; Gamini 1994). The women of the SL clearly operate primarily as Warriors and Dominant Forces, fighting in combat alongside male comrades and comprising a significant portion of the leadership and policymaking positions. Ironically, Rodriguez’s ruthless policies led the female-controlled, feminist-oriented SL to assassinate at least 40 community leaders in 1992, ten of whom were female, including Deputy Mayor and Fepomueves women’s movement leader, Maria Elena Moyano, who was murdered in front of her children (Gamini 1991; Moorehead 1992; Barrig 1998: 111). Peru’s Legal Defense Institute and the human rights organization, America’s Watch, documented the systematic terrorization of any female-led groups that rivaled the SL’s political control and the widespread use of rape as a war tactic to punish and intimidate non-compliant women. In its defense, the SL cites almost 60,000 reported rapes by police from 1980 to 2002, arguing that it must use the same war methods as the enemy. Non-governmental sources estimate that the majority of rapes, by both the government authorities and the SL, actually go unreported for fear of retribution, so these figures fail to represent accurately the actual level of violence against women from either side (Gedda 1993; Lama 1993). In addition, the Peruvian government’s chronic human rights abuses in the 1980s have been cited as a catalyst for the high levels of participation of women terrorists and their assumption of the roles of Warriors and Dominant Forces (Barrig 1998: 116). According to Amnesty International, 85 percent of human rights offenses in the 1980s were committed by Peru’s military, and the United Work Group on Forced Disappearances lists Peru as having the most disappeared citizens in the world (Amnesty International 1992). Government abuses are equaled by those of the SL, however, as many families have reported that the SL periodically sweeps through villages and forces the conscription of local women. Others assert that women voluntarily join the terrorist army, because with 80 percent of the population living below poverty level and 50 percent in what the government terms “critical poverty” throughout the 1980s and 1990s, employment opportunities have often been restricted to smuggling, the cocaine trade, or membership in the SL (Gamini 1994).

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Urbanization and the high levels of education among women may also contribute to their mobilization, as 33 per cent of university students in the 1970s were female and 36 per cent of female SL terrorists convicted in the 1980s had a college education. Some sources contend that Peru’s traditional political parties lack a feminist agenda, thereby channeling women into the more radical SL (Barrig 1998: 104–14). Past political and economic restrictions upon women in Peruvian society have been severe and easily could have contributed to mobilization. Although far from a guarantee of equality, the SL may well provide the only foreseeable opportunity to challenge the strictures of the state against women. The high level of participation that women enjoy in the SL as Warriors and Dominant Forces consequently help recruit more female members and maintain the organization’s strength. Although its power has declined in recent years, it remains active in five of Peru’s departments, or local governments, with hundreds of armed combatants conducting 92 terrorist operations in Peru in 2006, including the assassinations of five counternarcotics police officers and eight civilians (US Department of State 2006). The SL continues to live by Guzman’s 1970 statement, “The success of our revolution hinges on the active participation of women” (Ruiz 1988). Colombia: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Colombia’s four-decade-long civil war continues as the longest in the Americas with over 150,000 casualties, including over 5,000 police murdered, and 2.5 million displaced persons (Social Policy 2003; Gruner 2003; Padgett 2004). The Colombian conflict has spawned a variety of communist, socialist, peasant, and reactionary right-wing political groups, but four major domestic terrorist organizations emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. The 1960 Army of National Liberation (ELN), modeled after Fidel Castro’s guerrilla army, grew from the conviction of Camilo Torres, the “revolutionary priest,” that significant reform was possible only through violence. The People’s Liberation Army (EPL), a Maoist organization, formed after Torres’ murder. Both groups were domestic in that their goals were limited to the overthrow of oligarchical rule in Colombia (Gott 1971; Reif 1986: 156; von der Walde and Barbano 2001: 25). Although reports conflict regarding the engagement of women in combat, evidence supports the assertion that women were instrumental in policymaking and collecting information on the needs of peasant women. The EPL permitted women to join auxiliary units and witnesses reported a woman firing at army troops who had killed ELN leader Camilo Torres, suggesting that the women participated as Warriors as well (Gott 1971: 533). Another left-wing terrorist group, the April 19 Movement (M-19) formed in 1970 and became widely known for a failed assassination attempt against Colombia’s top military officer, General Rafael Samudio Molina, and the subsequent seizure of the Palace of Justice in Bogota on November 6,

The Americas 41 1985. In the latter event, M-19 took 22 of Colombia’s 23 supreme court justices hostage, executing six of them and causing the deaths of an additional five (Lewis 1985). Although women were known to be active members in M-19, the group only operated as a terrorist organization until the late 1980s when it became a political party, the M-19 Democratic Alliance. Much less information on its female membership and policies survives than in the much more powerful and long-lived FARC (The Economist 2001). The dominant terrorist movement in Colombia is the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC). FARC began in 1964 and is currently considered one of the largest and best-equipped terrorist armies in history, with 17,000 troops (The Economist 2005). Like its predecessors, the ELN and EPL, FARC’s objectives are domestic in orientation; its goals include political reform, an end to government corruption, more investment in social programs for rural areas, and reduction of Colombia’s military and defense spending. FARC promotes these policies through terrorist attacks on the Colombian government and civilians, funding its efforts through occasional kidnappings and extortion, but primarily through control of the illegal cocaine and heroin industry. FARC operates from its 42,000 square kilometer jungle enclave, but by 2000, sources credited the group with controlling “about two-fifths of Colombia” (Hodgson 2000b). After the collapse of peace talks in February, 2002, FARC embarked upon an urban campaign of terrorism, replete with waves of bombings and political kidnappings (The Economist 2002). Despite financial and military assistance to the Colombian government’s counter-terrorism efforts, FARC remains a domestic terrorist group, targeting Colombian infrastructure, rural outposts, and government authorities (US Department of State 2006). Many of the FARC guerrillas responsible for these activities are women. The group’s domestic agenda offers women an opportunity to combat the restrictions of conventional society that keep women entrenched in poverty and illiteracy. Although FARC’s early years were characterized by comparatively few females, the women of FARC have grown in both number and power, with many rising to the positions of Warriors and Dominant Forces. In 1974, FARC had less than 900 members and a mere handful were women. By the year 2000, approximately 30 percent of the 15,000 FARC members were female; within two years, women comprised between 40 and 45 percent of the 18,000 FARC membership. Female terrorists cite the grinding poverty and lack of economic, political, and social rights for women in Colombian society as an incentive to join FARC (Hodgson 2000b: 6; Cala 2001). Government statistics indicate that wages for Colombian women are 66 percent lower than those of men and illiteracy is 6 percent higher among females than males (Penhaul 2001). Colombia’s nationwide unemployment rates of over 20 percent and rural traditions that reject education for girls are both classic conditions for terrorist activity, identified by Georges-Abeyies (1983: 71).

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According to women members, FARC offers them freedom and equality from the repressive macho culture of traditional Colombian society. Anthropologist Maria Eugenia Vasquez explains, “In a country where women are usually ignored, [women guerrillas] are surrounded by symbols that give them an identity” (Hodgson 2000a). Joaquin Gomez, leader of a FARC battle division, says that women are essential and valued in the “people’s war” (Penhaul 2001). As such, FARC has actively recruited women since the early 1990s. The women contend that their roles are equal to that of the men in FARC, performing guard duty, patrolling, fighting in combat, and serving as field commanders (Cunningham 2003: 179). In addition to fulfilling the roles of Warriors, women are also extremely active as Spies in intelligence gathering, infiltrating government buildings and police stations as maids or prostitutes, and assessing schedules and floor plans without arousing suspicion (ibid.: 179). Some women admit that females are proportionately under-represented in the highest levels of command or Dominant Forces, but contend that this is due to the fact that female membership has surged in the last five years, creating a large pool of junior members who have not served long enough to be promoted (Cala 2001). Within FARC, the women do not operate as mere Sympathizers; instead, they collect intelligence information as Spies, lead guerrilla troops in combat as Warriors, and make policy decisions as Dominant Forces. At least one female guerrilla has been discovered to be part of a comprehensive new FARC plan for seizing the Colombian government. Intelligence information from a FARC member arrested in December 2004 and another in August 2006 indicates that the group is preparing to execute an orchestrated push to seize power through a general revolution or “National Military Plan” in the near future. According to the 21-page plan, found on the computer of a guerrilla/government employee arrested in December 2004, 100 FARC members have already infiltrated the government, holding prominent positions in “political, economic, social, union, cultural and ecclesiastical life” (Braziliense 2006, 2007). Although FARC, itself, claims that it will build alliances with leftist parties and sponsor a candidate in the 2010 elections, the covert plan indicates a more violent transition of power. Following the ouster of the current regime, 12 FARC members, dubbed “the apostles,” will emerge from the 100 hidden collaborators to form the cabinet of the post-revolutionary provisional government. Three additional arrests of government employees with clandestine FARC roles have resulted in information that confirms this plan and at least one of the undercover guerrillas was a woman, Jenny Vega, who worked in the government’s Family Welfare Institute in Bogotá. Her covert role might have remained intact had she not been killed with another guerrilla while handling explosives (Braziliense 2007). To fund its ambitious plan, FARC established an economic plan in 2002 that emphasized an increased reliance on kidnapping and illegal drug trafficking, particularly in the urban centers. FARC was able to generate $150

The Americas 43 million in 2002 and set a goal of a 15 percent annual increase, reaching a yearly income of $230 million for 2006. In June of 2007, FARC murdered 11 of 12 kidnapped Colombian politicians. They continue to hold a handful of foreigners and 3,000 Colombians hostage, 60 of whom are considered to be high profile and therefore politically valuable to FARC. Many of the hostages have been in captivity for several years. The government demobilized 30,000 right-wing anti-FARC death squad troops and has attempted to swap FARC prisoners for the hostages, but FARC’s demands include that Colombia cede the nation’s third-largest city, Cali, and the surrounding area to FARC. The victims’ families have entreated the government not to attempt forcible rescue missions, for fear of mass executions and retaliation by FARC (Braziliense 2007; Weekend Australian 2007). Some analysts argue that these moves indicate a weakening rather than a strengthening of FARC power. UN security consultant Rafael Nieto interprets FARC’s efforts to infiltrate the government and its lack of interest in blockading polls during elections as proof of their decline. Because “the group that has been fighting to overthrow the state since 1964 is . . . too weak to mount an effective military challenge . . . [it] is trying to play politics instead” (Lakshmanan 2006). Mexico: Zapatistas The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) of the southern state of Chiapas gained worldwide attention in 1994 when it declared war on the executive branch of the Mexican government and the Mexican Army for political and economic discrimination against the indigenous peoples of Mexico and announced the establishment of political, economic, and social equality as its major objective. The EZLN identifies itself as an “indigenous insurgency movement demanding political and economic democracy in Mexico” (Zapatistas 1998: 5), or as an “anti-globalization revolution” (ibid.). Many scholars of the movement describe it as a “post-Communist, postmodern, anti-neoliberal uprising” (Ross 2000: 5; Mora 1998: 164) or a “movement for constitutional democracy and social reform” (Kampwirth 2002: 84), or even a “peasant rebellion” (Collier 1999: 7). However, many sources have also labeled the EZLN as a terrorist organization. The Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress includes the Zapatistas as a terrorist group in its report, “Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico, 1999–2000” (2003a: 35–6). The US Department of State also defines the EZLN as a terrorist organization in its Patterns of Global Terrorism (1996). Scholar Mark R. Wrighte includes the Zapatistas in his studies of terrorist movements in Latin America as well (2002: 207). Mexico’s former president, Ernesto Zedillo, labeled the EZLN a terrorist group in 1995 and sent 30,000 troops into the jungle to capture the leaders; 21 Zapatistas were subsequently charged with acts of terrorism, sedition, subversion, and conspiracy (Crawford 1995). Since then, the EZLN has

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entered negotiations with the government of Mexico and channeled its efforts into conventional non-violent politics, but its origins, and perhaps success, derive from political violence. Therefore, despite support in the popular media and public opinion, this study includes the EZLN as a terrorist group. By all accounts, the Zapatistas are domestic actors. Their first public act was the seizure of San Cristobal de las Casas, a town in the state of Chiapas, and their declaration of war on the government of Mexico. This announcement was made to coincide with the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) because the EZLN sought to protest what they viewed as the discriminatory trade practices against the Mexican poor that NAFTA exacerbated. Although the EZLN opposes the effects of globalization in Mexico in general, and the state of Chiapas in particular, their activities are confined primarily to Chiapas. They pressure the Mexican government to exclude their agricultural products from NAFTA regulations, but unlike international terrorists, they do not cooperate with domestic forces in other nations nor act to spread the anti-globalization revolution beyond their state borders. The EZLN opposes NAFTA, and by extension, what they perceive as American collusion with the Mexican government, but the Zapatistas have not attacked the US or other international targets. Their goals do not include the elimination of global capitalism nor Western imperialism. Instead they seek economic, political, and social protection for the disenfranchised indigenous population within Mexico. The EZLN’s armed conflicts have been primarily with official military and police agents of the national government. The Zapatistas do not seek to secede or overthrow the national government; instead, they hope to reform the Mexican government. Their goals include creating more responsible and accountable policymaking processes, providing a measure of decentralization of power to the state governments, and ensuring mechanisms for broader representation, especially among the lower socio-economic population (Mora 1998: 164). Thus, the goals and targets of the EZLN are domestic, they do not engage in international attacks against the US, multinational corporations, or other external targets. As a domestically oriented group, the EZLN provides women, particularly poor indigenous women, with a unique opportunity to challenge the restrictions of traditional society and move up the socio-economic ladder. Women form the most active group within the EZLN, perhaps because “the indigenous women of Mexico are the most marginalized group in that country” (Mansbridge 2001). As primary care-givers in a traditional society, women suffer even more than their male counterparts from discriminatory state policies. Goetze notes that the domestic Zapatista women “do not consider themselves feminist, nor do they consider themselves separately from the Zapatista organization as a whole,” however she defines Zapatista women as a distinct movement that effectively uses feminism as a tool based on the

The Americas 45 following criteria: the Zapatista women have a collective identity, separate from, though related to, the EZLN; they are mobilized and take action as a distinct group; some of their goals and demands are unique to the women’s movement; they have wrought internal change in the EZLN in addition to changes in Mexican society; and they have adopted goals beyond the provincial confines of Chiapas (Goetze 1996: 1–2). Similarly, Karen Kampwirth writes, “The Zapatista rebellion is also a women’s rebellion” (2002: 84). As Mariana Mora explains, the Zapatistas attempt “to transform gender relationships within the community by breaking with traditions that subordinate women . . . Thus, Zapatismo attempts to create autonomy for women within the community without separating them from the collective whole” (1998: 166–7). The extreme poverty of the state of Chiapas has contributed to the high levels of female participation in the EZLN (Camp 1996: 91; Millan 2002: 3). Over 67 percent of the local population is classified as malnourished and 33 percent of the state is “severely malnourished.” In addition, more than twice as many people in Chiapas die from malnutrition as in the rest of Mexico (Kampwirth 2002: 87). Infant mortality is twice the rate of Mexico’s national average. Such health problems are exacerbated by the low literacy rate, estimated at between 30 percent (Women in the Zapatistas 1998) and 69 percent (Collier 1999). A total of 70 percent of homes have no electricity and 60 percent lack running water; figures are closer to 90 percent for the indigenous population. Workers in Chiapas earn three times less than the average Mexican wage, farmers earn the equivalent of half the minimum wage, and 20 percent of the population has no income whatsoever. These crushing poverty levels are actually worse for indigenous populations (Women in the Zapatistas 1998). Another contributory factor in the mobilization of women Zapatistas is the phenomenon known as marianismo. Because Latin American men traditionally dominate the public sphere and fulfill their roles of machismo, women have assumed leadership within the private sphere, the home (Seitz 1992: 164; Skidmore and Smith 1997: 63). This control is reinforced by a spiritual superiority, linked to the Virgin Mary (Kryzanek 1995: 34). Considering their relatively subordinate positions in society in combination with the paradoxical power over the home, Mexican women may seem “unlikely candidates for leaders of armed rebellion, and furthermore, unlikely to protest the structure of the rebellion to create their own demands as women . . . [yet] it is not surprising that they are participants in the Zapatista movement” (Goetze 1996: 4). Women have been active in the EZLN since its inception in 1984, a full decade prior to its 1994 declaration of war. Many women joined to escape abusive home lives and brought with them a strong desire to protect women’s rights. Within the EZLN, women have opportunities not afforded them in the external community. They often function as Warriors, rising to high-ranking levels of the guerrilla army, where they command both male

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and female soldiers (Millan 2002: 3). In fact, women led the first EZLN uprising in March 1993 and now comprise one-third of the Zapatista guerrilla forces and 55 percent of its support base (Women in the Zapatistas 1998: 2; Kampwirth 2002: 83). They also became Dominant Forces, creating policy on women’s social and economic rights, and contributing to negotiations with the Mexican government (Cevallos 2001; Franco 2001; Goetze 1996: 6–7; Rashkin 1996: 12–13). Furthermore, women commanders are active in the EZLN’s highest political organ, the Indigenous Clandestine Revolutionary Committee (Mora 1998: 167, 170) as well as the Zapatista steering committee, the General Command (Collier 1999: 61). The wide range of activity among the females as Spies, Warriors, and policymaking Dominant Forces has created entrylevel positions for local women in Chiapas who move into support roles as EZLN Sympathizers, providing food, relaying communication, and sewing uniforms. This division of labor, in turn, frees the female members to serve as combat Warriors and battle commanders (Goetze 1996: 7). Beyond their professional goals, the women, or compañeras, as they call themselves, also exercise social rights such as a right to education, their own choice of spouse, access to contraceptives, or even the choice of dance partners. These liberties remain unavailable to indigenous women in traditional Chiapas society (Cevallos 2001; Goetze 1996: 6–7). A constitutional amendment, designed in part by the National Women’s Institute of Mexico, supported by the EZLN, and passed by the Mexican Congress in April of 2001, brings national law into compliance with international conventions on indigenous rights and embodies a first step toward integrating the rights of indigenous women and girls into traditional society (Rashkin 1996: 12). This law must be enforced, however, if it is to begin providing any level of equality for women. The quest for such laws and the desire to maintain hard-won freedoms has fueled an intense mobilization of women within the EZLN. In the early 1990s, Comandante Susana and other high-ranking Zapatista women traveled to the villages to ask about the concerns of local women. Nine months prior to the January 1994 revolution, the Zapatista women drafted a tenpoint manifesto incorporating these issues and these proposals were approved unanimously. The Revolutionary Women’s Laws assert women’s equality as well as political, social, and economic rights, and were one of the two first Zapatista documents promulgated in their newsletter (Mora 1998: 168). 1 Women, regardless of race, creed, color, or political affiliation, have the right to participate in the revolutionary struggle in the space and to the degree which her capacity and desire determines. 2 Women have the right to work and receive a just salary. 3 Women have the right to decide the number of children they want and can take care of.

The Americas 47 4 Women have the right to participate in matters of the community and to have “cargo” responsibility if they are elected freely and democratically. 5 Women and children have the right to medical and nutritional attention. 6 Women have rights to education. 7 Women have the right to choose their partner and cannot be forced into marriage. 8 No woman can be beaten or mistreated by a family member or stranger. Those charged of rape or attempted rape will be severely punished. 9 Women can take positions of leadership in the organization and have military rank in the revolutionary armed forces. 10 Women have all the rights and obligations as signaled in the revolutionary laws and regulations. These laws outlined basic human rights for women and sought justice for women throughout Mexican society, but they have already helped provide equality for women within the EZLN (Collier 1999: 60; Ramos Escandon 1994: 213–14; Rashkin 1996: 12; Mora 1998: 164; Kampwirth 2002: 133). The female Zapatistas were also responsible for the EZLN’s internal laws against alcohol and wife-beating, which many women credit with transforming their lives more than any other action (Mora 1998: 170). Many women have achieved positions of authority in military command and policymaking as Warriors and Dominant Forces that would be impossible in traditional Mexican society (Mora 1998). Comandante Ramona, a Tzotzil Indian, joined the EZLN as a street vendor and rose through the ranks of the EZLN to become “a powerful and . . . esteemed spokeswoman” though she almost died from kidney failure in the late 1990s and faced death in combat numerous times (Kleist 1996). To Zapatista women, she has become a symbol of hope and possibility in an environment that offers little of either (Wolfwood 1997: 22). Comandante Trini of the Tojolabal Indians, Comandante Magdalana of the Tzeltal Indians, and Comandante Cristina are only a few of the well-known EZLN leaders, but they have helped recruit many more women to the Zapatista movement. In 1996, only a few months before the Acteal Massacre of 46 Tzotzil Indians on December 22, 1997, over 5,000 women marched on the capital of Chiapas to demand the removal of government troops and private paramilitary forces from Chiapas and protest the house-to-house searches for weapons (Women in the Zapatistas 1998: 7; Ross 2000: 250–1). The Zapatista women have moved their activities beyond the scope of the EZLN and into the communities, providing resources and cementing ties with local women. These civilian women then move into support roles of Sympathizers for the EZLN, freeing the Zapatistas to act as combat Warriors and Dominant Forces in the struggle against the Mexican government. The EZLN has organized production collectives for village women to

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provide food, relay communication, and sew uniforms for their female comrades in the guerrilla army because they fight for the same domestic goals (Goetze 1996: 7; Mora 1998; Women in the Zapatistas 1998: 14). The loyalty of local women to the EZLN is only intensified by the alienating abuse of harassment, rape, and torture that they suffer from the federal soldiers who suspect all locals of collaboration with the EZLN (Camp 1996: 92; Goetze 1996: 7). According to the Grupo de Mujeres, or Women’s Group, of San Cristobal, the number of reported rapes doubled following the inception of the revolution in 1994 and the number of women coerced or led into prostitution increased dramatically as well. EZLN figures cite over 300 rapes and almost 700 other assaults on women and girls by government troops between 1994 and 1998. Over 100 female factory workers in the border town of Ciudad Juarez were murdered in the late 1990s; despite the fact that the town has a Mexican military presence second only to Chiapas towns, no arrests were made (Women in the Zapatistas 1998: 4). The rebels fault the government troops for this increase in criminal activity while the government blames the chaotic violence of the Zapatistas (Rashkin 1996: 3), yet the continued oppression of women simply motivates the female Zapatistas to pursue the cause.

The Americas: international terrorism Very few terrorist organizations in the American continent exhibit an agenda beyond the borders of their nation-states. An examination of those that do reveals few consistent factors that can account for the reduced participation of women. The majority of terrorist organizations in Latin America have incorporated some aspect of socialist ideology into their manifestos, yet this characteristic exists in both domestic and international groups, therefore it cannot account for either an expanded nor restricted role for women. Religion does not fully explain the limited participation of women in international groups either, as both international and domestic terrorists in Latin America are predominantly Catholic, and within US international terrorists, the Ku Klux Klan purports to hold Christian beliefs while the Weather Underground was avowedly Marxist. Superficial observation may credit the restricted role of women among the terrorists of the Tri-Border Area to the influence of Islam, but the Catholicism of neighboring terrorists shares similarly confining features through marianismo and machismo. The role of feminism remains in dispute as well, as scholars differ on the presence of feminist activism in Latin America (Tickner 2001; Stoltz Chinchilla 1997). Moreover, the feminist movement of the US is commonly acknowledged to have emerged earlier and to have been more advanced than that of Central and South American nation-states, yet the Weather Underground displayed a limited role for female members. Thus, the glaring difference that emerges is that of domestic or international orientation among the terrorist groups. Those organizations with international agendas demonstrate a much more limited participation of women.

The Americas 49 Fidel Castro’s Communist guerrillas targeted the Batista regime of Cuba, but only as a component of the attack on imperialism and forces of international capitalism. The Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad cells operating in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay focus on the holy war, or jihad, against what they perceive as the excesses of Western culture, imperialism, and pro-Israel politics by establishing terrorist operations in South America, a region strategically located in relation to the US. The Weather Underground of the US opposed involvement in Vietnam, all forms of imperialism, and even traveled to Cuba and North Korea to espouse support for terrorist movements abroad. Yet all of these movements share a restricted role for women and female participation that is limited to the levels of Sympathizers and Spies. Cuba: Communist Party It has been said that “in the twentieth century, it [terrorism] has become a device for launching revolution” and Cuba’s revolution of 1959 was no exception (Harkabi 1985: 19). Some supporters may argue against the inclusion of Castro’s Cuban Revolution as a terrorist movement; however, numerous scholars, intelligence sources, and the US government identify it as such (US Department of State 2006). Rachel Ehrenfeld adds, “Fidel Castro’s record over the last thirty years is ample testimony of his willingness to promote terrorism” (1990: 21). Though it included the ouster of the Batista regime, Cuba’s terrorist movement was internationally oriented, directed against Western capitalism and the forces of imperialism that had dominated Cuba since the Spanish–American War of 1898. This international focus became even more evident only three years after the revolution with the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In letters written prior to the revolution, Fidel Castro wrote that it was his destiny to “wage war against America” (ibid.: 21). Even after successfully overthrowing the Batista regime in Cuba and gaining control of the government, Castro and the Communist Party of Cuba pursued an international agenda, sending troops to participate in insurgencies in Angola, Algeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo (then the Belgian Congo), Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Guinea-Bissau (Gleijeses 2006; Lowenthal 1977; Adams 1981: 115). Although admirers credit the spread of international socialism and Castro’s Communist Revolution with mobilizing Cuban working class women, even Cuba’s revolutionaries acknowledge that Cuban women did not actively participate in the terrorist activities of the uprising. The President of the Federation of Cuban Women and Fidel Castro’s sister-in-law, Vilma Espin, states that very few women actually participated in the Cuban struggle and that, “campesino [rural peasant] women were generally not organizationally active until mobilized by the Federation after the

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insurgency period” (Reif 1986: 155–6). Records from the revolution find only three Cuban women who were active in combat: Fidel Castro’s secretary, Celia Sanchez; Vilma Espin, wife of Castro’s brother, Raul Castro; and Haydee Santamaria, the wife of a Communist Party leader. Although “many women played critical support roles during the guerrilla days,” they “rarely found themselves in leadership or combat positions” and “relatively few women participated as combatants in the guerrilla phase of the Cuban Revolution” (Kampwirth 2002: 118). With only three women as possible Warriors and the majority as mere Sympathizers, the Cuban revolutionary movement certainly did not exhibit high levels of female participation in terrorism. This lack of female activity is not surprising, considering that the revolution was male-dominated and offered women little opportunity for significant participation as Warriors or Dominant Forces. Its stance against imperialism removed Western influence and investment from Cuba, but had little effect on women, beyond general improvements in literacy. The structural conditions of urbanization, family support, and femaleheaded households that contributed to high levels of women’s participation in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Chiapas were also present in Cuba and “the situation in Cuba in the 1950s could have allowed for women’s mass entry into the guerrilla army” (Kampwirth 2002: 19–23). However, Cuba suffered from a shortage of weapons, sexist guerrilla commanders, the absence of a feminist agenda, and its foco, or vanguard strategy, did not encourage mass mobilization. The cadre of female elites was small and “peasant women probably participated [even] less frequently” (Reif 1986: 155). The Cuban insurgency did form a Red Army battalion of women in Cuba, but battle conditions were deemed unsuitable for women and the men were not accustomed to following a female commander (Rowbotham 1972: 223–5). In his celebrated work, On Guerrilla Warfare, Ché Guevara devotes only two pages to the role of women in guerrilla activity. He states that “women can play an extraordinarily important role in the development of the revolutionary process,” that “they are capable of the most difficult deeds, of fighting with the troops,” and are “no less resilient than men,” however, he also asserts that women are “weaker than men” (1962: 57). He adds, “Of course, there are not too many women soldiers,” and emphasizes using women “particularly in communications,” noting that, “They can cook for the troops and perform other duties of a domestic nature, teach . . . perform the functions of social workers, nurse the sick, help sew uniforms” (ibid.: 57–8). Thus, even the writing of ‘el Ché’ reduces the role of women in the Cuban struggle to that of supportive Sympathizer. Analysis of interviews and letters from Cuban revolutionaries concludes that “women performed basically support and relief roles,” providing “support rather than combat performance,” as “women in the guerrilla army did housekeeping and supply assignments” (Reif 1986: 155). Furthermore, broadcast excerpts from the primary radio station of the revolution, Radio Rebelde, “reveal no attempt to mobilize specifically women” (ibid.: 155).

The Americas 51 Although many studies have examined the plight of women prior to the revolution and its subsequent impact on women, they offer no evidence of any female participation in revolutionary activities (Molyneux 2000; Waylen 1996; Cole 1994). Instead, the “low involvement” level of women is apparent, concluding that, “women did not participate greatly in the armed struggle,” and functioned primarily in “support and relief roles as messengers, scouts and nurses, rather than as combatants” (Waylen 1996: 73). As part of the international socialist revolution against capitalism and dominance, Castro’s Cuba perceived changes in women’s status as a result of the revolution, rather than an active force within the political transformation. Much of the official women’s agenda revolved around providing literacy programs and sewing machines to rural women, rather than drawing them into the struggle against oppression. Even after the revolution, female membership in the Cuban Communist Party remained low; by 1967, women comprised only 10 percent of the party, rising only slightly to 15 percent in 1974, and peaking at 22 percent in 1984 (Waylen 1996: 81). Tri-Border Area: Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay The nations of the Tri-Border Area (TBA), as Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay are known, experienced short-lived domestic uprisings against military regimes or socio-economic conditions in the 1960s and 1970s. Since the 1990s, however, the internationally active Islamic Jihad guerrilla wing of Iran’s Shi’ite Hezbollah, or Party of God, has established operations in the TBA (Middle East Newsline 2002). Islamic Jihad originally formed in 1982 in reaction to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and has been active in the kidnapping, bombing, and murder of Americans and other Westerners since that time (US Department of State 2005: 99–100). The TBA’s Arab community consists primarily of Lebanese who emigrated in two waves: immediately after the 1948 Arab–Israeli conflict and more after the 1985 Lebanese civil war. Paraguay’s Arab Muslim community is relatively small at 25,000, but approximately 500,000 Muslims reside in neighboring Brazil and 800,000 live in Argentina (US Department of State 2001). The TBA governments and public opinion are generally accepting of Arab political causes, as demonstrated by the May 2005 summit in which leaders of 12 Latin American nations and 22 Arab nations declared a united position on trade policy and Arab–Israeli borders, as reported by Aljazeera, Tarek El-Tablawy, and CNN (Aljazeera.net 2005; El-Tablawy 2005; CNN.com 2005). However, this atmosphere, along with the TBA states’ porous borders and the lack (until very recently) of anti-terrorism and money-laundering legislation, has allowed Hezbollah to establish a headquarters for its terrorist and illegal narcotics activities, spreading throughout Latin America (Gato and Windrem 2007). The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reports that a single company in Paraguay, owned by a Lebanese national, was conducting

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international transfers of over $500,000 per day in 2006 and investigators found large sums of money being transferred from the TBA to a bank in Ramallah associated with terrorist organizations (BBC 2006). CBS News even obtained a handwritten note from the head of Hezbollah to a TBA resident, thanking him for his contributions (CBS News 2006) and US government officials have identified specific businesses operating as fronts for Hezbollah cells (Reel 2006). Other terrorist activity within the TBA includes the Islamic Jihad’s claim of responsibility for the March 1992 attack on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 29, as well as a July 1994 bombing that killed 86; still other attacks remain under investigation (US Department of State 2005). In addition, the “Hezbollah is accused of killing more than 100 people in attacks in nearby Buenos Aires, Argentina, during the early 1990s” and is also believed to be responsible for home-made bombs left in front of the embassy in Caracas, Venezuela, next to a school (Gato and Windrem 2007). Officials acknowledge that both “Hamas and Hizbullah [sic] operate undisturbed in the tri-border area” despite concerted efforts by the TBA governments, the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism, the Organization of American States, the Mercosur Working Group on Terrorism, and the United Nations to counter such forces (Barbrosa 2004; Federal Research Division 2003b; Middle East Newsline 2002; Marcelo de Lima e Silva 2001). As an international terrorist group, Hezbollah’s activities extend well beyond the borders of the TBA. In 1983, Hezbollah was implicated in the suicide attacks on the US Marine barracks and US Embassy in Beirut and numerous other attacks, making it responsible for more American deaths than any other terrorist group prior to September 11, 2001. Since 2004, Hezbollah has also supported Shi’a insurgents in Iraq, training them in the construction of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), used to penetrate the heavily armored vehicles of US and Iraqi troops. In addition, the group receives considerable financial, political, and logistical support from the Iranian and Syrian governments, both state sponsors of terrorism (US Department of State 2006). Based on these investigations, it is clear that Hezbollah’s objectives and operations are internationally oriented in virtually every aspect. Such threats and the potential for international terrorist attacks on the US through Latin America spurred the US to form the 3+1 Group on TriBorder Area Security in 2002. Through this program, the US provides financial and legal assistance to the TBA for drafting anti-terrorism legislation and reorganizing state Financial Intelligence Units to combat the money laundering that funds terrorism (US Department of State 2006). In 2006, the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Department of State, the US Department of the Treasury, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement joined with the TBA governments to create an additional program for Trade Transparency Units (TTUs). Over two million dollars from the US has been allocated to create computer databases that monitor

The Americas 53 imports, exports, and financial data in the TBA (US Information Agency 2006; Wood 2005: 106). As an international terrorist group, Hezbollah’s operations exhibit a pronounced lack of female participation. Even though Hezbollah established operations in the TBA during the 1980s, long after the political mobilization of women in the 1970s, women have not joined forces with Hezbollah. Politically active Argentinian women have turned to left-wing political parties instead of guerrilla movements or terroristic activities (Gonzalez and Kampwirth 2001: 73). The absence of women is particularly noteworthy since the TBA’s economic problems of unemployment, inflation, and poverty fall disproportionately on the region’s female population, as is the case in so many other nations. According to studies conducted by the InterAmerican Development Bank in 2000, the wealthiest 10 percent of Argentina’s and Brazil’s populations controlled 40 percent of the wealth in those nations, while the poorest 30 percent accounted for only 7.5 percent of national income, and the majority of those in poverty were women (Moghadam 2005: 65). Yet despite this motivation to challenge the status quo, female participation in Hezbollah is nonexistent. The international nature of the group offers little opportunity to women to improve their social or economic status, and therefore yields little female activity. Hezbollah does not want women in positions of power and women have no motivation to support actively a movement that offers them so little. Although Hezbollah is a relative newcomer to the TBA, its foreign origin cannot fully explain the lack of women. The restrictions of fundamentalist Islam do not explain the lack of female participation either, as similar limitations on women exist in the culture of Catholic marianismo. Women have declined to join the evergrowing guerrilla conflict because they, as women, have nothing to gain from an international guerrilla movement. A domestic opposition might be more successful in attracting women, but the highly internationalized nature of Hezbollah in the TBA does not sustain female support, even at the minimal level of Sympathizer. United States: Ku Klux Klan US-based terrorist organizations, domestic or international, have been comparatively few. One of the more notorious and long lived is the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). The KKK originated in 1865 in Tennessee as a white supremacist movement. In the aftermath of the Civil War and the beginning of Reconstruction, the American South was in turmoil. The national government was reorganizing the antebellum political structure, the economy was in transition from the agrarian plantation-based system to a more industrial base, and the end of slavery and subsequent civil rights legislation completely changed the traditional social hierarchy. In the midst of this upheaval, five former Confederate soldiers formed the Ku Klux Klan as an organization to maintain antebellum society and attack those who dared

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challenge it. The founders derived “Ku Klux” from the Greek kuklos, or circle, and added “Klan” to identify their group (Ingalls 1979: 9). They created similar titles for organizational positions, such as Imperial Wizard and Exalted Cyclops, with members donning costumes made of white sheets and pointed hoods. This garb not only concealed the members’ identities during terrorist activities, but also conjured up images of ghosts and demons in a society that was still predominantly rural and backward. The group quickly grew, routinely intimidating freed slaves and others by burning crosses, burning victims’ homes, businesses, and churches, physically attacking victims, and even mutilating and murdering men, women, and children (Trelease 1971; Anti-Defamation League 2007). When Reconstruction ended prematurely with the Compromise of 1877, many of the antebellum political and social conventions returned to the South. National civil rights legislation and amendments were ignored and the conservative US Supreme Court failed to enforce them. Segregation laws, known as Jim Crow laws, and institutionalized racism severely limited political, economic, and social opportunities for African-Americans, making the KKK redundant and unnecessary for white supremacists (Trelease 1971; Southern Poverty Law Center 2006). The 1915 release of D.W. Griffith’s film, Birth of a Nation, stimulated a renewal of interest in the KKK, as it portrayed the Klan quite sympathetically as chivalrous knights protecting the honor of their women from African-American men (Ingalls 1979: 19), but it was not until the 1920s’ industrial surge and the subsequent wave of immigration from Southern Europe that the KKK re-emerged in force. With its rebirth, the southern creation became a nationwide phenomenon. Many of the new immigrants to the US were Catholics and Jews, people who worshiped differently, spoke differently, ate different food, and represented a vague potential threat to some white Anglo-Saxon Americans, even in the north. At its peak in 1925, the KKK boasted four million members and wielded considerable political power (Southern Poverty Law Center 2006); however, the Great Depression of 1929 soon shifted Americans’ attention to more crucial issues of survival and KKK membership declined dramatically. The 1954 US Supreme Court ruling of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas ended racial segregation in public schools and began a new wave of civil rights legislation (Ingalls 1979: 91). These changes fueled still another resurgence of the KKK as white supremacists joined the Klan in an effort to fight integration in public facilities and maintain a racially stratified system. The KKK’s terrorist activities of murders, bombings, cross burnings, and home burnings reached its peak during the 1960s as Klan members shot, tortured, and lynched African-Americans and others who supported civil rights, and systematically bombed African-American churches and meeting halls. Since that time, the KKK has declined in membership, power, and activity, but it remains active and its members have been prosecuted for terrorist crimes as recently as 2006 (FBI 1965; Anti-Defamation League 2007).

The Americas 55 The KKK clearly originated as a domestic terrorist group, but it has developed into an international terrorist movement, establishing cells in Canada, England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, as well as connections to South Africa. The KKK spread to Canada in the 1920s, settling primarily in Saskatchewan. Although total membership numbers are disputed, with historians estimating Canadian Klan membership at 25,000 and the KKK claiming 50,000, the Klan is known to have organized in hundreds of towns. Like the KKK in the US, the Canadian Klan opposed immigrants from Eastern Europe and was especially concerned about the influx of Catholics and French-speakers, although it also targeted the Chinese population (Weedmark 2007). In recent years, the Canadian KKK has also organized its terrorist activities against Canada’s Native American population (Mohawk Nation News 2006). Klan activity in the British Isles is relatively more recent. A former leader in the US KKK moved to south Wales in the late 1980s and by 1995, Klan cells were organized in Great Britain. Scotland Yard confirms that it is monitoring the organization. The Celtic Klan has drawn momentum from the growing Scottish and Welsh nationalism in the region, but has taken nationalist sentiment to extremes by targeting those with Jewish, African, or Asian heritage and demanding lynchings (Bamber and Syai 1999). Similarly, the KKK in Northern Ireland has formed as the Imperial Klans of Ireland, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. The Irish branch of the KKK uses the Internet as a recruiting tool to attract middle class white Protestants by raising fears about Muslim immigrants (Coulter 2006). The National Imperial Wizard of the US KKK has also contacted neo-Nazis in South Africa, offering to form alliances and provide military protection in return for financial support (Expat Portal 2007). With such far-flung chapters and activities, the KKK is undeniably an international terrorist group. In keeping with other international terrorist movements, the Klan offers little opportunity for the Women of the Ku Klux Klan (WKKK) to move into positions of leadership or policymaking as Warriors or Dominant Forces. In turn, women realize the limited nature of their role in the KKK and do not seek to participate at levels beyond support activities. The women of the KKK operate exclusively as Sympathizers and perhaps as Spies. The extensive investigations of Kathleen Blee (2004, 2002) and other scholars into the Klan and other white supremacist movements bears out this supposition. Although KKK propaganda claims that “women hold a very high and exalted position” (Blee 2002: 140) and is “likely to portray women as racial combatants” (ibid.: 120), women’s positions are almost entirely ones of support. In her interviews with 34 women, ages 16–90, who were active members of racist groups in the 1990s, Blee found that opportunities for WKKK are extremely limited within the organization and that their “experiences in organized racism . . . are highly gender-specific” (ibid.: 138). Klanswomen interviewed often complained of gender inequality in the

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organization, stating that women could only go to a few rallies or picnics, but could not attend the real meetings because “the Klan is male-oriented, totally sexist” (ibid.: 174). In fact, the very articles of incorporation of the Monroe, Louisiana KKK list one of the organization’s primary purposes as “To promote true and responsible manhood, loyal fraternity or brotherhood” (FBI 1965: 14). Other documents of the KKK enumerating “50 reasons why you should be a member of the Original Ku Klux Klan” proclaim that, “It is composed of HE men and not silly dilly humans” (FBI 1965: 20). Women’s operative roles range from routine clerical tasks to informal leadership activities, but even the latter consist only of mentoring young mothers, encouraging members to attend public marches, writing and distributing pamphlets, cooking, organizing clothing drives, stamping library books with racist messages, and other activities of Sympathizers. Women do not serve in any type of combat positions. In fact, the KKK often utilizes the presence of women to deflect anti-racist attacks on its public demonstrations because young racist women with baby strollers, or holding infants, tend to discourage retaliation from protestors (Blee 2004: 61; 2002: 137–8). Though they complain of inequity, women within the KKK do not formally promote feminism in any sense, as the KKK views feminism as a direct threat to the social position of the white male. In fact, feminism is often described as a Jewish, lesbian, and/or communist plot to alienate white women from white men (Blee 2004: 66; 2002: 122, 145–6; Ferber 1998: 126). Because Klanswomen are defined in terms of their sexuality (Ferber 1998: 117), and are typically objectified as sexual victims rather than aggressors (Daniels 1997: 39), they are expected not to work outside the safety of the home, to raise their own children without daycare, cook “from scratch” rather than use convenience products, hand sew, and mentor younger women in making men happy and raising children. Women are also responsible for directing the family’s consumer budget into supporting racist-owned businesses and are expected to hold drives to collect clothing, cribs, diapers, etc., to help provide for the children of the KKK (Blee 2004: 53–9). The primary role of women in the Klan is undisputably that of creating a white Christian nation by breeding as many white Christian children as possible and they experience a great deal of pressure to produce children. This fact is particularly ironic, considering that large families are one of the KKK’s principal complaints about non-white races (Ferber 1998: 108). Although the KKK’s distorted interpretation of Christianity can be compared to the extremist Islamism of other terrorist groups, religion is not the component of terrorist groups that determines female participation. Rather than religion, it is the international orientation of the KKK and the resultant institutional limitations on women that lead Klanswomen to perceive little chance to improve their status within the organization. Their duties and obligations are rigidly controlled and any challenge to these restrictions is anathema to the ideology of the group as a whole. The KKK’s inter-

The Americas 57 national focus on uniting its efforts with other white Christian populations and attacking the non-white community that lies beyond its insular membership necessarily proscribes its agenda to one that does not include an expanded role for women. The women of the KKK understand this dilemma, and although some may view it negatively, they realize the futility of challenging it from within. Thus, Klanswomen remain in the role of Sympathizer and have no access to the roles of Spies, Warriors, or Dominant Forces. United States: Weather Underground Organization Although the leftist Weather Underground Organization (WUO) was also an American terrorist organization, it shared little in common with the right-wing Christian KKK, except for an international orientation and the resultant subordinate position of women. The WUO emerged more than a century after the KKK, originating as a radical splinter faction of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) during the SDS National Convention in June of 1969. Initially, the WUO opposed only participation in the suppression of communist revolutionary activity in Vietnam. Influenced by the writings of Vietnam’s revolutionary leaders, WUO members soon committed themselves to a global Marxist–Leninist revolution and armed struggle against the forces of Western imperialism. In October 1969, 287 members of the WUO gathered in Chicago for a four-day “National Action” program and the accompanying “Days of Rage” riots in which they bombed the city’s Haymarket. From these beginnings followed numerous bombings and attempted bombings of police, government, and corporate facilities throughout the US, including the New York City Police Department Headquarters in 1970, the US Capitol in Washington, DC, and the Twin Towers in New York in 1971, the California District Attorney’s Office, Gulf Oil, Anaconda America Brass Company, and the Boston School Committee in 1974, as well as many others (FBI 1976: 153–6). The group also conducted a California prison break in September 1970, helping Dr. Timothy Leary flee to Algeria (ibid.: vii). While both the Weather Underground’s initial goal of opposing US involvement in Vietnam and its later goal of spawning a communist revolution in the US could arguably be defined as domestic policy positions, and its targets were confined to US soil, the group was international in several ways. Their support of Vietnamese communist rebels developed into a general platform of support for anti-imperialism, and their attacks on US targets were part of a global revolutionary armed struggle (ibid.: 143, 150). In addition, the WUO championed other terrorist movements abroad, attending communist revolutionary meetings in Cuba, North Korea, and Czechoslovakia. They supported Ché Guevara’s call for “creating two, three, many Vietnams” (ibid.: 9). Moreover, the WUO members themselves proclaimed, “Revolutionaries are internationalists” (ibid.: iii, 1).

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As a self-proclaimed international movement, the WUO espoused leftwing egalitarian philosophies and notions of gender equality, but failed to follow through. Female members were treated unequally, based on their gender, and their activities were often sensationalized for publicity purposes. Although the women of the WUO’s Women’s Brigade received considerable media attention, their activities were confined primarily to the levels of Sympathizers and Spies. Other than the bombing of the Health, Education and Welfare Department in March of 1974, which resulted in considerable property damage, the Women’s Brigade was otherwise relatively inactive. The Brigade was composed of 70 women, led by the highly publicized Bernadine Dohrn (Varon 2004: 59). While the presence of women in a terrorist organization in the midst of the 1970s feminist movement gained an enormous degree of notoriety, an examination of the group’s internal policies and its leadership reveals that WUO women participated only at the lowest levels of support. The very fact that women were joining terrorist organizations, in contrast to their gender stereotype, may have contributed to some degree of journalistic sensationalism that inflated women’s roles in groups like the WUO. Some such accounts credit Bernadine Dohrn not only with the leadership of the Women’s Brigade, but also of the entire WUO; however, most sources, including FBI records, identify the WUO leader as Bill Ayers (Boyd 2000; FBI 1976) and others as Jeff Jones (Varon 2004). Some sources estimate that half of the members were female and one article in the popular press referred to “scores” of “bomb-toting . . . female members as well as an entire women’s faction” (Simms 2006). However, in the approximately 300 pages of FBI files on the Weather Underground, only 28 women are listed by name (FBI 1976). Even one of the more notorious members, Susan L. Rosenberg, was convicted of conspiring to supply others with explosives, rather than actually conducting terrorist activities herself (Weiser 1999). Another member, Laura Whitehorn, was jailed for kicking a police officer in the shins at a protest, and while Rita “Bo” Brown was reportedly “renowned for her lone-gunman-style bank heists,” member Eleanor Stein claimed that “the group conducted itself in a ‘male style’ ” with “no solidarity among women” (Simms 2006). Furthermore, internal policies determined by the WUO leadership strictly defined and limited women’s freedoms. The WUO required members to live in “weather collectives,” as a rejection of bourgeois society. All female members were required to have sexual relations with all male members, and women also had relations with other women, as private monogamous relations were labeled “counterrevolutionary” (Grathwohl 1976: 149). Because the revolution was their first priority, new mothers were required to give their babies to lower-ranking members if they seemed too distracted from their political goals (Stern 1975: 187–90). It was only after female members objected to the sexism implicit in the name Weathermen that the WUO renamed itself the Weather Underground (Varon 2004:

The Americas 59 183). In her memoirs, former member, Susan Stern, depicts the WUO women as followers of the men rather than ideologically committed individuals, and complains that women’s roles within the organization were just as restrictive as in conventional American society (1975). The WUO newsletter, Prairie Fire, included a section on women that “challenged the complacency of much of the white feminist movement, and called for international solidarity with the women of the world, especially those in Vietnam, Palestine and Puerto Rico” (Jacobs 1997: 166). In practice, however, Weatherwomen operated almost exclusively in support roles, as Sympathizers led by male members (Varon 2004: 59; Kalinowski 1979; Grathwohl 1976). As Varon explains, women who joined the WUO in rejection of societal gender roles, were frustrated, at times openly challenged the male domination of New Left organizations . . . Yet in Weathermen, the women were confined mostly to the “second-tier leadership,” had to mute or disavow certain of their feminist beliefs, no matter their activist credentials, had to prove their commitment once again by showing their ability to engage in “independent” actions as “women’s cadres.” . . . The actions of the women’s cadres were driven by a coerced machismo and encouraged neither true autonomy nor solidarity among the women. (2004: 59–60) Like other international terrorist movements, this conflict between ideology and practice in the WUO can be traced to the international nature of the organization. It fought external forces, such as imperialism, capitalism, and the Western power structure, an agenda that left little room for concerns with women’s status. Thus, despite the WUO’s espoused rejection of bourgeois gender stereotypes, it mirrored rather than altered society’s restrictions upon women.

3

Asia Freedom birds and water buffaloes

Asia provides fewer, but no less significant, examples of female participation in terrorist organizations. Although Asian women do not labor under the restrictions of machismo and marianismo, many are bound by equally limiting cultural prohibitions, such as rigid patriarchies and Confucian social norms. These restrictions often persist beyond the lifespan of the terrorist movements, resulting in few post-insurgency improvements in women’s status; however, traditional gender roles have failed to limit women’s activities during the insurgency period within Asia’s domestic terrorist movements.

Asia: domestic terrorism Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam began fighting for independence from the Sinhalese majority in the early 1980s and have innovated terrorist tactics, such as suicide bombings and female assassination squads, which have been copied by many other terrorist groups. Neighboring India is home to the Naxalite terrorist movement, which is also characterized by high levels of female participation in combat and policymaking positions, but India’s independence movement against Britain is not included in this analysis due to the fact that the Gandhian strategy emphasized non-violent resistance and therefore does not conform to the previously established definition of terrorism. Moreover, women did not comprise a distinct and documented component of India’s nationalist movement. Conversely, the Liberation Army of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) initiated its terrorist campaign against the Nepalese government in 1996 and, aided by a strong female presence, continues its efforts to overthrow what they perceive as a corrupt and unresponsive government. These terrorist organizations are domestic or anti-state in that they target the internal government of their state and do not seek to expand their terrorist agenda beyond its borders. Consequently, unlike the international terrorist movements of Vietnam’s Liberation Front and Japan’s Red Army, these domestic terrorist organizations exhibit high levels of female participation.

Asia 61 Sri Lanka: Tamil Tigers The northern and eastern regions of Sri Lanka are home to the country’s approximately 3.2 million minority Tamils. Accurate demographic data are difficult to ascertain, as the most recent census was taken in 1983; however, the population is estimated to be approximately 74 percent Sinhalese who are predominantly Buddhist, and 13 percent Tamil, who are primarily Hindu (Alison 2003: 38). Since 1983, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), or Tamil Tigers, have been fighting to secede from the majority Sinhalese state and establish an independent homeland of Eelam, or “Freedom” (Cunningham 2003: 180; Alison 2004: 450). Studies find “almost daily routine slaughters” on both sides (Grosscup 1998: 235). The LTTE issued expulsion orders to all Muslims in the Jaffna peninsula of Sri Lanka in October 1990 and more than 500,000 additional Tamils are believed to have fled the area since that time due to the constant warfare (Samarasinghe 1996: 205). As of 2002, approximately 70,000 Sri Lankans were listed as casualties, including 18,000 LTTE terrorists (Alison 2003: 38). The Tamil separatist movement originated in 1972 with the secular Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) acting as an umbrella organization for various secessionist political groups. TULF members were elected to 18 of Sri Lanka’s 168 legislative seats in 1977; the meager victory resulted in widespread rioting from both Tamils and Sinhalese and 300 casualties. The Tamil minority feared that they would never be competitive with the Sinhalese majority in conventional politics, which led to the development of five Tamil guerrilla organizations, totaling over 2,500 members (Grosscup 1998: 239–40). One of these, the Eelam Peoples’ Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), was the first to recruit women, setting an example that other Tamil militants followed (Alison 2003: 38). The LTTE began recruiting women in 1979 (Samarasinghe 1996: 213) and by 1986, the LTTE had emerged as the most powerful and radical of the Tamil terrorist groups, superseding the role of the EPRLF and other rival groups (Grosscup 1998: 234). The proportion of women in the LTTE remained low, however, until June of 1990 but has increased dramatically since that time (Samarasinghe 1996: 215; Alison 2003: 39). Despite their colonial past under the Dutch (1505–1656), Portuguese (1656–1796), and British (1815–1948), the Tamils are not an internationally oriented terrorist group. They do not seek to eliminate Western imperialism, globalization, or any of the other popular international targets. While the LTTE espouses a Marxist ideology, it never enjoyed Soviet support, and unlike Vietnam’s National Liberation Front, Tamil terrorism was never part of a Cold War strategy (Grosscup 1998: 244–5). Admittedly, the LTTE was responsible for assassinating a foreign head of government, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, in a 1991 suicide bombing; however, even this operation was domestically motivated as an act of retaliation for India’s provision

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of peacekeeping forces to Sri Lanka from July 1987 to March 1990 (Joshi 1996: 21) and the LTTE’s numerous other assassinations have been directed at Sri Lankan officials and civilians (Sambandan 2002). In addition, the LTTE receives virtually no international support apart from small remittances from Tamil expatriots (US Department of State 2006). Thus, it would be fair to conclude that the LTTE is a domestic terrorist group that opposes only the government of its state. Notably, although both the Sinhalese and Tamils resisted imperial rule under three different foreign powers, none of these resistance efforts was characterized by a significant female presence (Jayawardena 1986: 115; Grosscup 1998: 235). Tamil women were an oppressed minority under imperial rule but remained inactive during the anti-colonial resistance movements. Women had little to gain from international struggles if they were to overthrow a repressive external power only to be repressed by an internal state. Tamil women did not grow politically active until the 1960s with the advent of a domestic secessionist movement against Sri Lankan authority (Maunaguru 1995: 160–2). Thus, strong political roles were not part of traditional Tamil society, but as Tamil women perceived an opportunity to expand the confines of their restrictive gender roles through participation in a domestic terrorist organization that challenged the status quo, they were quickly drawn into the LTTE movement. In turn, the LTTE incorporated women into all levels of its structure, training them for command as well as combat. Within the LTTE as a whole, female membership in the 15,000-member terrorist militia grew from 3,000 in 1992 to almost 5,000 by 2001 (Goldstein 2001: 83; Xinhua News Agency 1992). These women gather intelligence, engage in combat, conduct suicide bombings, and lead attacks on civilians (Goldstein 2001: 83; Samuel 2001: 185; de Silva 1999: 61–2). In addition to combat duties as Warriors, women are also active in policymaking and leadership roles as Dominant Forces in the LTTE. In 1994, three members of the LTTE’s highest organ, the 12-member Central Committee, were women (Bose 1994: 108–9) and the number had increased to five by 2002 (Alison 2003: 47). Women Warriors comprise one-third to one-half of the LTTE’s key weapon, the elite commando unit known as the Black Tigers. The Black Tigers conducted over 168 suicide attacks between 1980 and 2002, more than any other terrorist organization, killing approximately 1,500 in these attacks alone (Reuter 2004: 26). The Sea Tigers are a similar specialized unit of women and men who conduct attacks against the Sri Lankan Navy, bridges, and merchant vessels. Because such units require specialized instruction, the presence of a large female contingent suggests that the LTTE views women as valuable comrades and worthy of the training investment. Within the regular LTTE militia, the women’s branch is called Suthanthira Paravihal (Freedom Birds), the Women’s Front of the Liberation

Asia 63 Tigers, or the Women’s Wing. LTTE members began recruiting women as early as 1979 and established the first women’s training camp in 1984. As part of their training, women endure six months of boot camp and gain expertise in combat, explosives, and strategy. Although the LTTE is not the first terrorist group to utilize female suicide bombers, it is certainly the most prolific. Since 1987, LTTE women have engaged in 30 to 40 suicide bombings, making the Tigers the most prolific female suicide bombers of the modern era and providing a model for other terrorist groups (Zedalis 2004: 2). The use of women as suicide bombers has proven to be even more effective than that of male suicide bombers because the practice contrasts so sharply with most gender stereotypes. Female terrorists attract more media attention, and perhaps inspire more fear, because they are unexpected and contrary to traditional female gender roles. Female suicide bombers take this strategy to the next level, garnering even more notice from the media and further publicizing the demands of the LTTE. Women have come to share all of the tasks that men perform within the LTTE and virtually all of the militant Tamil organizations emphasize the need for women to participate alongside the men (Maunaguru 1995: 164). Women are often sent to fight in the front lines as Warriors and are given as many or more dangerous assignments than their male compatriots (Samarasinghe 1996: 215–16). Government sources from 2002 estimate that of the 17,648 LTTE casualty total, 3,766 were women (Sambandan 2002). In one of the more notorious LTTE attacks, 75 to 100 cadres stabbed, shot, hacked to death, and slit the throats of 57 sleeping Sinhalese villagers; witnesses reported that women led the attack and 20 of the terrorist troops were reported to be female (Cruez 1999; Balachanddran 1999). The brutal attack attracted considerable public attention, in large part due to the fact that it was led predominantly by women. In fact, “female cadres have a fearsome reputation, and it is often said that they are more violent and frightening than male members” (Alison 2004: 457). Although suicide attacks did not originate with the LTTE, the group has certainly become the most prolific in their use and women conduct the majority of those operations; however, it is important to note an important distinction between LTTE suicide missions and those of some extremist religious terrorist groups. The LTTE does not recruit suicide bombers as religious or ideological martyrs. Their goal is not a sacrifice or political statement, but an attack on a target. If the attack can be achieved more efficiently and effectively through conventional means, suicide missions are not employed. Moreover, the suicide bombers are trained and experienced combatants who act of their own volition instead of the easily manipulated, drugged, or brainwashed civilians that some religious terrorists recruit as sacrifices to their cause. Thus, LTTE tactics are more akin to “no escape missions” in combat, used as a last resort (Gambetta 2005: 283). Tamil women have also taken the lead in assassination plots against more than a dozen public figures. The LTTE holds the dubious distinction of

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being the only terrorist organization known to have assassinated two world leaders through suicide bombings. In 1991, a young female Black Tiger called Dhanu presented former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India with a flower garland and detonated explosives strapped to her waist, killing them both. The assassination was plotted, in part, by Lt. Col. Akhila, the female deputy chief of the Freedom Birds, according to investigative reports (Agence France Presse 1992). In addition, the women of the Black Tigers participated in the murders of Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993, former Prime Minister Dissanayako in 1994, the constitutional expert and Tamil parliamentarian Neelan Tiruchelvam and former Cabinet Minister C.V. Gooneratne in June 2000, and a suicide bombing that claimed the lives of four Colombo policemen in July 2004 (Hudson 1999: 67; Sambandan 2002; Alison 2004: 450). Several failed attempts include attacks on the Sri Lankan Air Force Commander of Colombo and against Police Inspector Nilabdeen of Colombo (Balachanddran 1999), as well as threats toward Chief Minister Jayalalithaa of the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu in 2002 (Press Trust of India 2002) and an attempted bombing of Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga in 1999 (Straits Times 2002; Sambandan 2002). While assassinations of political leaders and governmental authorities are routine among terrorist groups, the participation of women in such terrorist acts defies traditional gender roles and emphasizes women’s commitment to LTTE objectives and their role as Warriors. The strong presence of women in the LTTE is particularly noteworthy in light of the many societal restrictions they endure. Both Tamil and Sinhalese social structures still relegate women to a traditional, subordinate role (Jayawardena 1986: 111, 113–14; de Alwis 1995: 141; Maunaguru 1995: 169). As part of a leftist platform, all of the Tamil separatist organizations incorporate some degree of feminist agenda into their ideologies, but the LTTE promises the most extreme post-secession “radical transformation of women’s lives and social attitudes towards women” (Maunaguru 1995: 165). The Women’s Front of the LTTE established as its goals in 1991: (1) an independent and democratic state of Tamil, (2) the abolition of the caste and dowry systems, (3) social, political, and economic equality, free from discrimination, (4) women’s control over their own lives, and (5) legal protection against sexual harassment, rape, and domestic violence (Samarasinghe 1996: 218). Thus, while women’s rights are secondary to the nationalist goal of an independent Tamil state, they are given high priority. Interviews with LTTE women “emphasized that they experienced total equality with male comrades in terms of respect and tasks assigned” (Alison 2004: 455). LTTE women have made subtle changes as well, merging the terms for “new woman” and “woman warrior,” based on the conviction that the feminist agenda is inseparable from the national liberation struggle (Maunaguru 1995: 167). LTTE women have also updated the terminology referring to rape. The customary word, katpalippu, literally means the elimination of purity. LTTE women replaced this term with words that mean an

Asia 65 act by force or sexual violence, shifting the emphasis away from a stigma on the victim (ibid.: 166) and now use suicide bombing as a method for raped women to take revenge against their violators and simultaneously purify themselves, while also serving the political purposes of the LTTE (ibid.: 171). Such decisions have been criticized as anti-feminist, but women have considerable input into LTTE policymaking in their role as Dominant Forces. In 1994, three of the Central Committee’s 12 members were women (Bose 1994: 108–9) and that number had increased to five by 2002 (Alison 2003: 47). In spite of such disputes, it is clear that women are a powerful presence in the upper levels of both combat and policymaking as Warriors and Dominant Forces and have contributed significantly to the LTTE’s success. India: Naxalites While most readers are more familiar with the Indian nationalist movement than the communist Naxal movement, India’s anti-colonial independence movement does not fit the parameters of this analysis. Independence was ultimately gained in 1947, qualifying Indian nationalism as a post-war phenomenon, if only at the end. However, Mohandas Gandhi’s philosophy of passive resistance and civil disobedience does not conform to the violent political attacks on civilians and noncombatants that characterize terrorist movements. Admittedly, spontaneous communal violence erupted during the nationalist period, but these events were suppressed, rather than orchestrated by, the mainstream liberation struggle. Indeed, such sporadic outbreaks of violence continue more than half a century after independence, indicating that they were not the product of Indian nationalism. Moreover, while women supported the nationalist struggle, “they did so in a way that was acceptable to, and was dictated by male leaders and which conformed to the prevalent ideology on the position of women” (Jayawardena 1986: 108). That is, women did not comprise a distinct and documented component of the movement. Therefore, India’s liberation movement was neither a terrorist movement nor was it characterized by significant female participation. In contrast, India’s Naxalite movement meets all the parameters of a terrorist organization. The Naxalite insurgency began in 1967 when longstanding conflicts between tribal farmers and large landholders in the Naxalbari region of West Bengal gave way to an uprising of farmers, led by communist activists. The clash spawned the term “Naxalite,” describing a merger of India’s Communist Party and peasant farmers into a violent political force that has grown far beyond the borders of Naxalbari. The Naxalites focus on internal targets that represent domestic oppression, such as political leaders, police stations and informants, government buildings, and development projects. Naxalite goals include the elimination of India’s caste-based society, implementation of land reforms for the poor, and enfranchisement of the oppressed, all of which are domestic objectives (Indian Elections 2005;

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Diwanji 2003). The movement has loose links to other Maoist movements in the region, but it does not rely on them, nor on any other international sources, for support (US Department of State 2006: 30). Thus, the Naxalites are a domestic terrorist movement. The Naxalite movement exhibits a high degree of female participation and women have been active as Warriors and Dominant Forces from its inception (Singha Roy 1992: 60; US Department of State 2006: 30). As a domestic terrorist organization, the Naxalites defy the constraints placed upon women by conventional Indian society, and according to ex-Naxalite, Kalpana Sen, offer women an opportunity to break traditional gender barriers (Srila 2006: 103). The opportunities for change inherent in a domestic terrorist organization have led women not only to comprise a large percentage of the membership at 33 percent, they also hold high-ranking organizational positions as Warriors in combat and Dominant Forces shaping Naxalite policy. The Naxalites do not actively promote women’s equality as a separate agenda, and some have criticized Naxalite support of traditional societal norms, such as marriage (Srila 2006: 102), but the agrarian and leftist origins of the group have led them to encourage egalitarianism and equality of opportunity across caste and gender divisions and this practice has helped Naxalites enjoy widespread support from women at all levels of their hierarchy. At the support levels of Sympathizers and Spies, women carry supplies and act as informants. At the combat level of Warriors, women often are in charge of planting mines and detonating explosives (Sreedharan 1998). A group of 300 Naxalites, including 50 women wielding hand grenades, bombs, and AK-47 assault rifles, attacked the Karnatka State Police Reserve camp in February of 2005 in retaliation for the police killing of a Naxalite leader (Nayak 2005). Naxalite women also serve in leadership roles within the guerrilla army, commanding both male and female forces. While some terrorist groups have been accused of high female casualty rates and recruiting women for their expendability, Naxalite women have a comparatively lengthy longevity in the group, with some serving as many as 11 years in the terrorist militia (Sreedharan 1998). Naxalites actually consider women to be better guerrillas than the men because of their greater commitment to the egalitarian goals of the group. Its leftist focus on equity and redistribution of resources are domestic objectives that appeal to many women in the poorer regions of India. Extreme poverty, combined with a severe lack of public services, provides a niche for the Naxalite presence and the threat of violence makes the Naxalite offer of assistance difficult to refuse. In poor rural areas where the government failed to provide adequate infrastructure in the form of roads, schools, and clinics, the Naxalites created the Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ), or “Naxalite belt,” stretching from India’s border with Nepal to the southernmost state of Tamil Nadu (Chopra 2006; Reddy 2004). Since 1996, the CRZ has expanded from four to 14 of India’s 28 states and the Naxalites are expected

Asia 67 to extend operations further still in four additional states by 2011 (Chopra 2006). Within the CRZ, Naxalites operate a parallel administration, providing public services and maintaining some level of order, albeit through brute force (Gupta 2005; Sahni 2005; US Department of State 2006: 30). In 2006, the Naxalites escalated their program of territorial expansion, conducting several “high-level attacks, raising the insurgency’s profile” (US Department of State 2006). In the same year, they constructed a dam in the Gaya district of Bihar to provide much-needed irrigation to locals, funding the project with “revolutionary taxes,” or extortion, that the Naxalites routinely impose on villagers (Kumar 2006). The Naxalites also engage in large-scale destruction of government projects, bombing large factories and dams, murdering police, beheading opponents, attacking train stations, threatening missionaries, disrupting elections, and taking command of roadways (Chopra 2006; Gupta 2005; Nayak 2005; Ray 2002). These attacks are part of the overall plan to overthrow India’s parliamentary democracy, but also serve to show villagers the power of the Naxalites as they step in to replace government services with their own. In the past, such anti-state activities discouraged the government from investing to rebuild and reinstate political control in the CRZ, which only increased the opportunity for Naxalite governance; however, since 2005, state governments and the national government have begun releasing funds for the development of infrastructure in these rural areas (Hindu 2005). This power struggle over India grows increasingly more important as the Naxalites approach the “industrial belt” of Kalinga Nagar and the Sukinda Valley mineral deposits, threatening the iron ore and coal mining industries so vital to India’s economy (Statesman 2007). Approximately 85 percent of India’s coal reserves come from five states in the CRZ, putting “almost half of India’s total energy supply at serious political risk” (Sappenfield 2007). Electoral violence and intimidation have also become more common in India, with the Naxalites boycotting elections in 2007 and pressuring rural villagers to do likewise (Thakur 2007). Despite the brutal tactics of the Naxalites, women in the CRZ are often more amenable to their programs because these programs reduce women’s social burdens. Indian women are typically responsible for the education of their children, family health care, and the care of the sick and elderly, and Naxalite clinics help women deal with such responsibilities. In addition, women traditionally gather firewood and water for the family and are often responsible for providing part or all of the family income – duties that require access to safe roadways and marketplaces. Naxalite control of roads, bridges, and gathering places can ensure safety for women who are compliant with the group. Thus, women have become an integral part of the Naxalite movement, making the militants an even greater threat to India’s national security than the Kashmir crisis, according to India’s Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh (Sahni 2005). The poor tribal residents of India’s rural villages are caught between the

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Naxalites and government forces. The locals are often coerced into providing the Naxalites with food and shelter, fearing brutal retaliation for noncompliance, and are subsequently threatened by authorities for their complicity. In 2006, almost 700 civilians were killed in over 1,100 incidents of Naxalite violence (Indian News Agency 2007; Chopra 2006). Ironically, the failure of the government to quell this violence has only encouraged more female recruitment among the Naxalites. Women perceive the Naxalite movement as one in which they may gain access to resources and power, unlike the traditional society, and they become Warriors, often rising to become Dominant Forces. The recruitment of women then further augments the group’s strength. In response to the rapidly increasing power of the Naxalite movement, the government deployed 11 battalions of paramilitary police in 2006 and provided support for anti-Naxalite vigilante groups, such as the Salwa Judum; however, these measures have only escalated the violence as the number of casualties continues to rise (Chopra 2006) and villagers are forced “to choose between two unforgiving opposites, unleashing an unprecedented cycle of killing and revenge” (Sappenfield 2007). Nepal: People’s Liberation Army The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) emerged from a realignment of Nepal’s leftist parties in 1991 following the collapse of democracy in 1990. The CPN-M and its guerrilla branch, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), initiated a “People’s War” in 1996 through guerrilla attacks on government installations and terrorist assaults on noncompliant civilians (Acharya 1994: 479). Although the CPN-M declared a ceasefire in April 2006 and concluded a formal peace agreement with the Nepalese government the following November that allowed the CPN-M representation in the multi-party governing coalition, many CPN-M members have rejected the peace agreement and continue to conduct terrorist activities, maintaining the group’s original goal of overthrowing Nepal’s government. Although Nepal’s borders with China and India are not tightly controlled, the CPN-M never received any external aid and was not affiliated with any international terrorist groups nor any neighboring terrorist organizations, such as India’s Naxalite movement (US Department of State 2006: 31). Thus, the CPN-M’s opposition to internal forces and the prevailing domestic agenda demonstrate that the CPN-M’s PLA was, and continues to be, a domestic terrorist organization. As a domestic terrorist group, the CPN-M has attracted a large female membership seeking to change traditional Nepalese gender roles and the severe political, economic, and social constraints that past governments have placed upon women. The CPN-M’s receptiveness to these egalitarian goals has, in turn, helped recruit still more women into the movement (Onesto 2001a: 3). In light of the opportunities granted to women within the CPN-M, it is little wonder that many women in impoverished and patriarchal Nepal view

Asia 69 this terrorist organization as the most credible guarantor of equal rights (Pradhan Malla 2001). To the extent that any basic services like schools, medical care, and legal services are provided in these areas, they are supplied by the CPN-M (South Asia Forum for Human Rights 2000). As is the case in many poor states, in the absence of government-provided social programs, the burden for providing education, medical treatment, child care, elder care, as well as basic food and shelter, falls on the shoulders of women (Gupta 2005). Thus, many women have become ardent supporters of the CPN-M and PLA. Government sources estimate that women constitute between 30 and 40 percent of the PLA guerrillas actively participating in combat as Warriors (International Crisis Group 2005). These women have been “inducted into all areas of the party, army and front organisations” (International Crisis Group 2005). PLA women have seized banks, conducted assassinations, and engaged in strategic bombing. According to Commander Parvati, “Their participation has been phenomenal, sometimes even surpassing that of men” (1999). By 2004, one-third of all PLA troops were women, with many female commanders, vice-commanders, and political commissars throughout the various battalions, platoons, squads, and militia (International Crisis Group 2005; Onesto 2004). Official PLA policy calls for the inclusion of as many women as possible in each military unit (International Crisis Group 2005) and, prior to the 2006 ceasefire, each guerrilla squad of the 12,000troop militia was required to contain at least two female members (Douglas 2005; Tiwari 2001). In addition to fighting alongside male comrades, in some areas of Nepal, the PLA formed all-female guerrilla militias as well (International Crisis Group 2005). CPN-M Chairman Prachanda stated, “Our Party considers women as [a] basic revolutionary force” and the organization used every opportunity to mobilize Nepali women (Portland Independent Media Center 2004). The CPN-M and PLA also demonstrate a strong presence of women in leadership and policymaking bodies as well (Thapa 2003; Parvati 2003). Within the Party administration, there are “several women in the Central Committee of the Party, dozens of women at the regional level, hundreds in the district levels, and several thousands in the areas and cell levels in the Party” (Onesto 2004). Data from the Institute for Conflict Management indicate that in 2001, half of lower-level political cadres and 30 percent of upper-level cadres were women. The Women’s Department of the CPN-M is perhaps the most obvious of the CPN-M’s examples of women as Dominant Forces in that it is an upper-level female leadership council that formulates policy for the entire Party, the military, and its allied organizations. At the support levels of Sympathizers and Spies, the All Nepalese Women’s Revolutionary Organization is an organization for mass participation (Portland Independent Media Center 2004). Women who are not directly involved in terrorist warfare serve as propagandists, nurses, and organizers for the CPN-M and PLA (Onesto 2001b). Some of the more

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routine duties include “protecting” the CPN-M “people’s courts” to ensure that women, tribal minorities, and the poor receive “quick and fair judgment against their tormentors” (Portland Independent Media Center 2004). Because the majority of households in Nepal are headed by women, the CPN-M has been dependent upon the women to wage a Maoist agrarian revolution. Hsila Yami, the highest-ranking woman in the CPN-M, stated that “The women have more to gain than men from the People’s War” (Online Pioneer and Ideals – World News 2004). According to PLA Commander Parvati, women join the CPN-M because its anti-class agenda “directly address[es] the oppressive socio-economic relation . . . from which women are the worst sufferers” and Nepali women had no other alternatives (Parvati 1999). Although the end of the insurgency is relatively recent and negotiations with the government may eventually expand women’s freedoms, the women of Nepal still have limited property rights, and cannot inherit land nor conduct banking transactions. They cannot choose their own husbands and marriages are arranged to the mutual benefit of the families. Divorce and remarriage are forbidden, and widows are expected to honor the memory of their husbands by remaining in mourning for the remainder of their lives (Onesto 2001a; Pradhan Malla 2001). Brides are sometimes killed by the groom’s relatives if her family fails to complete her dowry payments (US Department of State 2005). The CPN-M’s prohibition of alcohol was particularly attractive to women as liquor is often viewed as the cause of physical abuse and domestic violence (Portland Independent Media Center 2004). The CPN-M contends that “the fight for women’s equality and liberation is woven into the very fabric of this People’s War” and “women are seeing some concrete outlines of a new society” that does not oppress its people (Onesto 2001a: 5). The Party has pledged that the new Maoist regime will end the traditional exploitation of women and become the guarantor of equal rights (International Crisis Group 2005). Due to the internal characteristics of the Nepali state, the PLA “has become an attracting point for women” (Portland Independent Media Center 2004) and CPN-M Chairman Prachanda commented that the Party was “overwhelmed by the unexpected response of women to join the armed struggle” (Online Pioneer and Ideals – World News 2004). Women reportedly “flock[ed] to ranks of Maoist rebels . . . Women cadres are visible everywhere, in almost all of the country’s 75 districts, as propaganda activists, agricultural production team members and guerrillas” (Online Pioneer and Ideals – World News 2004). Women have begun seizing economic liberties as well, working in collective farming, buying their own farmland, and producing marketable products like cloth and clothing. They have organized literacy campaigns and rape relief shelters (Onesto 2001a: 6–7). State reaction to women’s activity in the People’s War was quite harsh (Douglas 2005). The Nepalese Police killed hundreds of women, in addition

Asia 71 to raping, beating, and jailing thousands of them in an effort to discourage their support of the revolution. Ironically, the brutality of the government only increased the commitment of women to the terrorist movement. Not only did women move into the highest levels of terrorist activity, they have also transformed the Teej, a day of fasting and prayer for husbands’ longevity, into a day of feasting “to strengthen themselves against rape, torture and killings by the police” (Amnesty International 2002: 2). The refusal of large segments of the CPN-M to accept the 2006 ceasefire further reflects Nepali women’s dissatisfaction with the status quo. Fully one-third of the membership is female and to date, government concessions to the organization have failed to address women’s equality and the pressing economic and political burdens upon them. The creation of a parliamentary government and long-awaited constitutional reforms in 1990 neglected to include women’s concerns and the willingness of CPN-M representatives to serve in the elected legislature is seen as contrary to the group’s revolutionary Maoist ideology (Santina 2001: 34). Although predictions are difficult at this early stage, it may well be that the women of the CPN-M will become an even greater driving force as Warriors and Dominant Forces within the movement.

Asia: international terrorism In a treatment of terrorism in Asia, many readers would expect a section on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), its revolution, and the civil war that spanned three decades in Asia’s largest and most populous state, the People’s Republic of China. Although many of the activities of the CCP during that era could arguably be classified as terrorism, these operations did not include a significant level of female participation. Numerous scholars have already addressed the lack of women’s mobilization in the CCP (Adie 1967; Turley 1972; Young 1973; Wolfe and Witke 1975; Davin 1975, 1976; Andors 1983; Salaff 1984; Wechsler Segal et al. 1992; Rosen 1995; Rofel 1999). Therefore, in a comparison of female terrorist participation such as this one, there is little to compare in a case study of the CCP. As such, the CCP is not included in this analysis. A more contemporary terrorism debate concerns the separatist movement of the Uighurs in western China’s Xinjiang province. The Uighur region shares borders with eight nations, including Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan, offering the possibility for enormous international activity, but the Uighur resistance was considered a minor separatist movement prior to the terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001, and China’s government labored under substantial criticism from the international arena regarding its human rights abuses of the Uighurs (US Department of State 2006). Since the emergence of a global war on terror, however, the predominantly Muslim Uighurs have attracted worldwide attention as a terrorist threat and possible venue for Al Qaeda operations, reducing criticisms of

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China’s “counter-terrorism” measures. The Uighur separatists have not yet exhibited any identifiable female participation levels, thus, while intriguing, they are excluded from this particular analysis as well (Atal 2003; Kurlantzick 2003; Vicziany 2003; Millward 2004; Malashenko 2005). The international terrorists of Asia with documented female participation consist of Vietnam’s National Liberation Front (NLF) and the Japanese Red Army (JRA). The two movements are dissimilar in many ways. The women of the NLF were predominantly illiterate peasants, while those of the JRA were middle and upper class, often with university educations. The NLF was a mass movement that permeated not only North and South Vietnam, but spread into neighboring Cambodia and Laos, and received support from China and the Soviet Union. In contrast, the JRA was a relatively small group that quickly abandoned its home state of Japan and established cells in Europe and the Middle East. Their goals differed as well, in that the NLF consistently sought to remove French, and later American, political control, and institute a communist regime. The JRA’s goals were more nebulous, espousing the creation of a World Army to lead a World Revolution, but with little thought given to practical implementation. The two groups share the adoption of terrorist tactics and strategy, however, and reliance on an international network of assistance. In addition, despite the very different socio-economic levels of the women in each terrorist group, they both operated primarily in lower-level support roles as Sympathizers and Spies within the organizations, rather than Warriors or Dominant Forces. Vietnam: National Liberation Front The Viet Minh formally began in 1941 as a nationalist Vietnamese resistance movement against France’s colonial government. By the early 1950s, the communist Vietnamese People’s Liberation Armed Front (PLAF) had absorbed much of the Viet Minh and assumed the leadership of the antiFrench terrorist movement. Although many may disagree with the characterization of the Vietnamese insurgency against French colonial rule as a terrorist action, the rebellion meets the definition of terrorism used in this study in that it employed violence against noncombatants for political objectives, including the use of guerrilla warfare and suicide bombs. Guerrillas attacked villages, murdering local leaders, and detonated bombs in the larger cities to incite terror and induce civilian compliance (Parry 1976: 418; Mallin 1966: 28; Pike 1966, 1969, 1970). Within a single 24-day period in February 1968, the Viet Minh and PLAF militia “systematically and deliberately shot to death, clubbed to death or buried alive some 2,800 individuals of Hue – government personnel, administrative personnel, students, teachers, priests, rural-development personnel, policemen, foreign medical teams,” and others (Jones 1974: 93). This conflict was not merely a quest for independence; it was also an international power struggle between the communist and democratic super-

Asia 73 powers over influence in Asia. Rife with insurgent attacks on civilians and complicated by the official and unofficial participation of the US, Soviet Union, China, Cambodia, Laos, and other states, the conflict in Vietnam became perhaps the most international of all terrorist insurgencies of the twentieth century. As an international terrorist movement against Western imperialism and capitalism, the Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF) offered little opportunity for women to improve their political, economic, or social conditions, because the movement targeted external opponents, not the patriarchal traditions of Vietnamese society. Lacking the motivation for active participation in the movement, women remained content to participate only at the support levels of Sympathizers and Spies. The NLF, in turn, chose to limit women’s activities to these positions, in accordance with traditional Vietnamese gender roles (Gonzalez-Perez 2007). The women of Vietnam had no part in politics, education, or professional careers (Duiker 1982: 109). Rather, they were expected to observe the Confucian “three submissions” of obedience to the father, husband, and oldest son, in addition to the “four virtues” of hard work, proper appearance, submissive speech, and subservient behavior (Marr 1981: 192). The Vietnamese legal system was even more restrictive for women, condoning conventions such as forced marriage, widow-burning, and polygamy (Tetrault 1994: 112). The traditional view of women is perhaps best described by the Vietnamese proverb, “A hundred daughters is not worth a single testicle” (Marr 1981: 193). French occupation alleviated some forms of oppression, but never legislated any changes in status for women, and on the whole, advocated preserving the old traditions out of respect for “ancestral customs and usage” (Tetrault 1994: 112), adding new burdens to Vietnamese women, such as the subsistence wage and labor-intensive work bordering on slavery throughout the region’s rubber plantations (Duiker 1982: 110). NLF propaganda typically portrayed women as active members of the Vietnamese insurgency, shooting down planes and capturing pilots, but these instances were extremely rare (Goldstein 2001: 80). Militia sources list approximately 60,000 women in the regular PLAF troops, over 100,000 in the volunteer youth corps, over one million in militias and other local forces, as well as 40 percent of the regimental commanders (Goldstein 2001: 80; Taylor 1999: 31; Eisen Bergman 1974: 154). However, women “within the army itself mainly worked on medical, liaison, antiaircraft, or bombdefusing tasks,” and were not generally assigned to active combat or the front lines (Goldstein 2001: 80). Moreover, in mixed-sex militia units, “the men often considered the women inferior in combat. Thus, the PLAF increasingly directed women into support roles and away from combat and policymaking” (Goldstein 2001: 80; Duiker 1982: 117–19). Some studies credit women with holding between 11 percent (Turley 1972: 803) and 25 percent of the top leadership positions in the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG), including the posts of Foreign Minister, and Minister and Vice-Minister of Public Health (Wiegersma 1988: 209),

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but these women were very few in number and were usually second-incommand to male leaders (Turley 1972: 797, 803). Moreover, as “leaders,” women were typically responsible for organizing meetings, arranging for couriers, and other clerical tasks rather than actual policy and decisionmaking (Taylor 1999: 40). The most well known of these leaders was Madame General Nguyen Thi Dinh, the Deputy Commander of PLAF and the President of the Vietnamese Women’s Union. Despite the propaganda images of Dinh, she complained in a 1987 interview about the lack of women’s rights and status in Vietnamese society (Jones 1987). Recalling the Vietnam war, she stated that even among the guerrilla troops, men were hostile to women and she acknowledged widespread discrimination in the leadership of the PRG. Dinh said that many women were promoted as mere recruitment symbols. She explained, “There is no open opposition in the leadership to having women rise up, but in their minds they deny women” (ibid.). Terminology has contributed to the distorted perception of women in the Vietnam insurgency. Many studies refer to women as guerrillas or soldiers, when in fact they engaged only in support activities as Sympathizers and Spies. According to one source, “about 840,000 female guerrillas operated in the north and some 140,000 in the south,” serving in “community mobilization, intelligence gathering, and the transport of materiel [sic]” (Tetrault 1994: 115), adding that women’s most significant role was that of food production and that unarmed women had the moral authority of passive resistance (ibid.: 118–19). While these activities were important, they were not equivalent to guerrilla warfare or policymaking. The phrase “Long Haired Army” added to the confusion. It originally referred to 5,000 women and children who marched on government buildings to protest corruption, the poor economy, and government atrocities in 1960 (Duiker 1982: 114). By 1967, the term was used to describe all female PLAF members and propaganda claimed that they numbered two million, a wild exaggeration (Taylor 1999: 72). Certainly it was not unknown for women to join the PLAF, but it was nonetheless uncommon (Taylor 1999: 82; Duiker 1982: 112). Male soldiers were often resentful of women and considered them a liability in combat (Goldstein 2001: 80; Duiker 1982: 115). The few female PLAF members served not in guerrilla units, but in special units such as the medical corps, liaison work, or bomb-defusing teams. General policy discouraged female participation beyond the support level (Duiker 1982: 117). A small number of women acted as snipers, but most women who fought did so as unarmed village militia, standing in front of US tanks with picks and hoes to stop troops from destroying rice fields (Taylor 1999: 38, 82). News reports from the period indicate that women rarely served in combat, and then only as a last resort after male troops had been depleted (Wiegersma 1988: 209; Gottschang Turner 1998: 20, 23, 33). Women played an important part in the Vietnamese insurgency, but

Asia 75 almost exclusively at the levels of Sympathizers and Spies. The women in the PLAF and other insurgent militia units functioned “primarily as support staff” (Taylor 1999: 27) and were employed at the lowest levels of agriculture, industry, and military production (Duiker 1982: 118–19). Their primary function was the transportation of supplies and equipment. Women reportedly carried 200-pound loads of weapons, munitions, and supplies, on foot or by bicycle through mountains, monsoons, and darkness, all the while evading detection (Taylor 1999: 12; Tetrault 1994: 114). Though men were stronger, women complained less and had greater stamina, leading one author to describe them as “the water buffalo of the revolution” (Pike 1966: 178). The Dan Cong battalion, two-thirds of whose members were women, was responsible for transporting supplies to the front lines during the battle of Dien Bien Phu; virtually all PLAF supplies arrived on the women’s backs or bicycles in the midst of monsoon rains that made the roads impassable to motor vehicles (Tetrault 1994: 115). In addition to transport, insurgent women also provided other support services. Female cadres were almost solely responsible for agricultural production, as well as the preparation and delivery of food to fighting forces. As one PLAF member stated, “to produce is to fight” (Eisen Bergmann 1974: 127). They also gathered intelligence information, dug tunnels and bunkers, hid insurgents, provided clean clothes for male insurgents, diverted enemy troops from strategic sites, built coffins, buried the dead, wove cloth, nursed the wounded, carried messages, distributed propaganda, and built roads (Taylor 1999: 72; Gottschang Turner 1998: 15, 20–3, 33, 76, 93, 149; Eisen Bergman 1974: 103–7, 127, 142; Turley 1972: 797). Although women suffered high casualty rates, the majority of these women were engaged in road construction and were killed in bombing raids on the road system (Eisen Bergman 1974). Such support activities were simply extensions of the traditional gender role for Vietnamese women. Despite their Marxist ideology, the NLF drew on Confucian tradition in exorting women to carry out the “three responsibilities,” of tending to the household and children, producing food for the soldiers, and defending the villages in their husbands’ stead (Turley 1972: 800; Tetrault 1994: 113; Taylor 1999: 9). Women were also expected to provide the “five goods” of production, self-improvement, family care, studying, and defense participation (Duiker 1982: 114). The role of Vietnamese women changed little during the insurgent period and they had little reason to anticipate any improvement from fighting the French or the US. Therefore, as an international terrorist movement, the Vietnamese insurgency earned only support-level participation from Vietnamese women. Japan: Red Army In 1972, fringe members of two radical student organizations in Japan formed the Japanese Red Army (JRA). The organization viewed itself as an

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elite student vanguard that would lead a World Red Army in a World Revolution of the proletariat (Kuriyama 1973: 336; Parry 1976: 433–4; Steinhoff 1989: 724). Although similar international terrorist movements were emerging in other advanced industrialized nations at this time, the JRA differed significantly in that its supposed radicalism and challenge to the conservative status quo operated within many of the social norms established by that conservative society, such as traditional gender roles. The contradictory nature of the group has been characterized as the “bizarre offspring of Trotskyism and traditional Japanese” society (Kuriyama 1973: 341). Because of the JRA’s ideological ties to Trotskyism, it “placed heavy emphasis on internationalism” (ibid.: 342). Its efforts to coordinate a global communist party and a global army that would conduct a global revolution clearly reflected an agenda that focused on international issues almost to the exclusion of domestic politics. The JRA’s commitment to international goals presents itself even more clearly in its terrorist activities, which included the establishment of cells in Europe and Palestine, as well as collaborations with other terrorist groups, such as Germany’s Baader-Meinhof Gang, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Libya, North Korea’s Intelligence Service, and even the Black Panthers of the US (Parry 1976: 433; Farrell 1990: vii). Evidence suggests that the Red Army even established ties with the notorious international terrorist, Ilyich Ramirez Sanchez, known as Carlos the Jackal (Farrell 1990: 158). As an international terrorist group, the JRA offered little opportunity to change the rigid societal roles of women in Japan and “had a fairly traditional view of male–female relations. Women were to be the supporters, while soldiering was left to the men” (Farrell 1990: 10). The women of the JRA were not true leaders but simply surrogates for male leaders who were temporarily unavailable. . . . Shiomi Kazuko was simply a stand-in for her imprisoned husband, Nagata for a whole string of males (Kawashima, Sakaguchi, and then Mori), and Shigenobu for the deceased Okudaira until other males were brought to the organization who could take over. (Steinhoff 1976: 317) Intrigued with the unconventional image of female terrorists, the media glamorized the women of the JRA, particularly its leader, Fusako Shigenobu. However, the women reputed to be the powerful leaders and anarchic masterminds of Red Army terrorism were, in fact, engaged primarily in support functions as Sympathizers and Spies for the JRA while men held the decisionmaking roles (Steinhoff 1976; Farrell 1990: 10, 12, 16; Parry 1976: 434; Kuriyama 1973). Shigenobu exercised her limited leadership by arranging meetings, providing first-aid kits at protests, fund-raising,

Asia 77 creating promotional leaflets for which “she was much in demand because of her beautiful handwriting,” selling the organization’s newspaper, and arranging a phone signal system (Steinhoff 1976: 301, 313, 730). She and the other female leaders, Shiomi and Naga, did the feminine jobs that keep a political movement going, and they had significant personal relationships with men in leadership positions . . . but they were only thrust into externally visible positions of leadership when the men around them disappeared for one reason or another. (Steinhoff 1976: 317) The terminology of “leadership” is also misleading due to the fact that the JRA, though active, was extremely small. JRA membership never reached beyond 40 individuals and was often half that number (MIPT 2005a; US Department of State 2006: 38). Moreover, at its height, the leadership core held only 15 members (International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism 2003). It is true that “women invariably formed between one-third to half of the organization” (O’Ballance 1979: 149) but male leaders were the norm in the JRA, as well as in its precursors, the United Red Army and Red Army Faction (Steinhoff 1976: 434). Women participated in the JRA, but they did so as women, functioning within the parameters of traditional gender roles. Women “achieved their positions of prominence by performing distinctly female roles in male-dominated organizations” (ibid.: 302–3). In spite of the presence of women in the JRA, the majority of JRA terrorist operations were planned and conducted by male members of the JRA and other terrorist organizations. Indeed, the undertakings conducted in cooperation with the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) were referred to as Sons of the Occupied Territories Operations. The JRA’s deadliest terrorist act was the 1972 attack on the Lod Airport in Tel Aviv, Israel, which killed 26 and injured 80. This operation was a precursor to the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre as well as the subsequent terrorist assaults of the 1970s and 1980s, and was thus “a seminal event in the history of modern terrorism” (Farrell 1990: 141). Yet this pivotal act was conducted by three men of the JRA with no female participation whatsoever. In the 1973 hijacking of a Japanese Airlines flight from Paris to Tokyo, only one of the five hijackers was female and this Iraqi woman was not even a member of the JRA. The 1974 attempted bombing of the Shell Oil refinery in Singapore was conducted entirely by men (O’Ballance 1979: 156–9). Surrendering after three decades in hiding, Shigenobu was eventually tried and convicted in 2006 of conspiracy in the planning of the JRA’s 1974 seizure of the French Embassy in The Hague and the 1975 takeover of the US Embassy in Kuala Lampur (US Department of State 2006), but the evidence showed only that Shigenobu was a collaborator. Even the judge who presided over the trial concluded, “It cannot be said she played the leading role” (Kyodo News 2006). Shigenobu’s 1974 embassy operation also differed

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noticeably from events such as the earlier Lod Airport massacre in that the JRA freed their ten hostages after four days rather than killing them, suggesting that Shigenobu was not the “Empress of Terror” as the media once dubbed her (Joyce 2006). Another female member, Mariko Yamamoto, was extradited from Lebanon to Japan in 2000. At her trial and conviction, the judge recognized that although Yamamoto participated in the JRA, she was “a mere subordinate,” gathering papers to illegally obtain passports for other members, rather than serving as a Warrior or Dominant Force (Mainichi Daily News 2002). The women of the JRA provided support for the group’s operations, facilitating meetings and communication, but female participation was limited almost exclusively to support roles as Sympathizers. Despite the group’s espoused left-wing activities, the JRA operated within the traditional norms of Japanese gender roles until it disbanded in 2001. The international nature of the movement challenged imperialism and capitalism, but did nothing to alter women’s subservient position in society. Locked in the rigid gender roles of traditional Japanese society, the women of the JRA simply extended their services as helpers and subordinates into the revolutionary organization, but never operated as Warriors or Dominant Forces.

4

Africa and the Middle East Behind the veil

Africa and the Middle East provide fertile ground for the study of terrorism. The two are technically distinct regions, but considerable overlap exists in that the states of the Middle East include several of those in North Africa and both regions share a common presence of Arab identity and Islam. Because of these similarities, this study examines the two together. Significant differences exist as well, however, as presented in the following pages. The conflicts that we view today as wars of national liberation or independence struggles were widely perceived as terrorist movements in their own era. As explained previously, while some may take exception to the application of the word “terrorism” to certain independence movements, it is not used as a pejorative term and is not intended to imply any normative value or judgment. Rather, the terminology applies to those movements that meet the standards established in Chapter 1. Liberation movements that do not meet the criterion of employing violence against civilian noncombatants for political objectives are not included in this study. In fact, although numerous wars of liberation occurred in Africa after World War II, many of those conflicts did not conform to the specifications of terrorist movements. In addition, any terrorist movements that fail to exhibit women’s participation at even the support level are excluded from this study as well, as female participation is the focus of this analysis. Within the many terrorist groups of Africa and the Middle East, very few reveal any level of female activity. The prevalence of African women’s roles as Sympathizers and Spies in the majority of the anti-colonial wars has been documented by numerous scholars (White 2007; Adugna 2001; Becker 1995; Cherifati-Merabtine 1994; Lazreg 1994; Amrane 1982; Cock 1991; Isaacman and Isaacman 1984; Urdang 1979). As White notes, “Although African women in many revolutionary armies were taught to use weapons, they were often deployed in supportive roles, ordered to fight only when necessary, and assigned secondary roles as cooks, child-care providers, laundry workers, and porters” based on the premis that “there is no humble task in the revolution” (2007: 869). Becker concurs, explaining that while African men in liberation movements oppose colonial regimes, they also identify with the role of powerful oppressor, adopting gendered Western

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concepts of development and modernization for men while relegating women to traditional roles (1995: 23). As Paxton and Hughes note, Women have neither played a significant part in the creation of the modern state system on the [African] continent, nor have they been able to establish regular channels of access to decisionmakers . . . for many women in Africa, women’s political participation has been little more than an extension of their submissive domestic role. (2007: 237) In addition to the national liberation movements of the Cold War era, a variety of guerrilla movements have emerged in Africa since the 1990s, such as the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary Patriotic Front of Rwanda, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, and the Lord’s Resistance Army of Uganda, to name just a few; however, the terrorist organizations that have emerged in the post-Cold War era do not exhibit women’s participation and involve women primarily as victims of their activities rather than participants (Harsch 2005; Mutume 2005; Africa Recovery 1998; Nordstrom 2005). Furthermore, information gathering from contemporary terrorist organizations is problematic, and the ongoing demobilization and disarmament process in recently deactivated terrorist groups has yet to yield extensive data on women’s roles. Therefore, terrorist organizations that have not yet exhibited reliable evidence of female participation are not included in this examination. Recent studies on the use of child soldiers in Africa have indicated the use of girl soldiers; however, these examinations reveal that female child soldiers are very different from adult female terrorists. Child soldiers are almost always pressed into service against their will or out of desperation, whether sold to rebels by their parents, abducted, or orphaned. They are typically unaware of the nature of the terrorist movement or its ideology and do not consciously choose to join the group (McKay 2005; McKay and Mazurana 2004; Kearns 2002; Mazurana et al. 2002; Mazurana and McKay 2001; Brett and McCallin 1996). As such, girl soldiers do not conform to the model proposed in this study, that of women choosing to participate in domestic terrorism and electing not to serve in international terrorist movements.

Africa and the Middle East: domestic terrorism According to the definition established in Chapter 1, African uprisings that could be characterized as terrorist include those of Nigeria, Eritrea, the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, Algeria, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. Yet the wars of independence in Nigeria, Eritrea, and Guinea-Bissau did not include women participants. Only in Zimbabwe, where the anti-state terrorist activities were domestic in nature, have women participated at the highest levels

Africa and the Middle East 81 of combat and policymaking as Warriors and Dominant Forces. Within the Middle East, we find a wide variety of terrorist groups as well; however, the majority is international. Only the Kurdistan Workers’ Party is domestic in its orientation, thus attracting high levels of female participation. As discussed previously, women have little to gain from active involvement in a conflict with external forces. Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe Army of National Liberation Any examination of terrorism in Zimbabwe must be set in the context of its colonial past. The “scramble for Africa” among the European colonizers began in the late nineteenth century. By the post-WWII era, many African colonies had gained independence in what became known as the “first wave of democratization” (Keller 2007: 46). In British colonies in particular, white settlers recognized the growing demand among Africans for self-rule along with the growing reluctance of Britain to maintain its colonial empire, exacerbated by the 1956 Suez Crisis. The white minority in Britishcontrolled Zimbabwe, then known as Rhodesia, feared that Britain would grant the colony independence as an African majority-ruled state. In a preemptive strike supported by South Africa, the white colonial leadership of Rhodesia issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. Britain willingly gave up Rhodesia, but refused to recognize the new state (Facchini 2007: 674; Coggins 2006: 363; Pakenham 1991: 670–1). The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and its military wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), soon initiated a guerrilla warfare campaign against the white minority Rhodesian government, which regarded the action as a terrorist assault (Urdang 1995: 213; Salih 2007a: 670). Thus, while the liberation wars of most African nations were international, Zimbabwe’s uprising was actually domestic, in that it sought freedom not from imperial Britain, but from its own repressive minorityruled state government. As is often the case in other parts of the world, both sides of the Zimbabwean conflict engaged in terrorist activity from 1966 until Zimbabwean independence in 1980. Christopher Mojekwu (1978: 178) explains, “The establishment of zones of terror” and homelands in African nations were “clearly aggressive acts by the white minority government.” However, he also notes that ZANLA employed terrorism as well (ibid.: 179). Other studies concur, noting that rural residents often feared ZANLA guerrillas, and especially dreaded being caught between them and the Rhodesian government forces. ZANLA guerrillas actively tried to elicit support from villagers by calling themselves the children of the villagers, much as the guerrillas in Vietnam did, but often killed locals who were uncooperative (Ranchod-Nilsson 1994: 72–3; Kriger 1988: 306; Ranger 1986: 379). ZANLA mobilization was extremely effective and ZANU organized support committees to procure all the necessities for waging an armed

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insurgency, “but mobilization was achieved through guerrilla coercion rather than guerrilla ideology” (Kriger 1988: 312). The guerrillas either appointed or elected villagers to these committees; however, the candidates often tried to avoid service on such committees as their very lives depended upon their committee work. ZANLA rebels also coerced villagers into identifying government informants, or “sell-outs,” creating local intelligence networks (West 2000: 183; Ranchod-Nilsson 1994: 73). When ZANU originally formed, only men were allowed to train as guerrillas, but as women contributed more and demonstrated their bravery, they also demanded entry into the guerrilla ranks and “by the end of the war, thousands were fighting and many became commanders of men and women” (Thompson 1982: 247). Conventional women’s organizations did not mobilize women into the insurgency. Instead, women mobilized themselves to free themselves (ibid.: 250). Unlike women in other African colonies, the women of Zimbabwe were active at all levels of the insurgency (Urdang 1995). Thousands of women operated as Sympathizers and Spies at the support level, smuggling supplies and weapons wrapped up in bundles, disguised as babies. Women loaned their clothing to the ZANLA guerrillas so that they might disguise themselves as female field workers and avoid detection by government forces. One woman explained that she would “feed the comrades and that is a way of fighting” (Ranchod-Nilsson 1994: 62, 75). ZANLA women were also active in combat as Warriors and trained both male and female cadres, even in instances where husbands were required to follow the orders of their wives. Men realized that for Zimbabwe to be free, women had to be free as well and many women became commanders, holding the highest ranking positions among ZANU’s Central Committee and ZANLA’s General Staff. Women received military training and fought side by side with men. Between 25 and 33 percent of the 30,000-member guerrilla army were women (Ranchod-Nilsson 1994: 62). One of the most famous female guerrillas was Joice Nhongo, known as “Mrs. Spill-blood Nhongo” (Goldstein 2001: 82). As women’s status changed within the ZANU and ZANLA infrastructure, a dramatic change developed in the surrounding society. ZANU prohibited the lobola, or bride-price tradition that, in effect, allowed a man to buy his wife and ensured that her family would not allow her to leave him out of fear of refunding the payment. Men and women were required to share the responsibilities of household and child care. Such efforts helped resocialize men to accept women’s equality. To ensure that the gains made by women were not lost, ZANU formed a Department of Women’s Affairs (Thompson 1982: 248–51). Despite the enormous changes in gender roles wrought by ZANLA, there is little evidence of a formal feminist agenda within the organization or Zimbabwean society. ZANLA’s greatest grievances were over land and agricultural policies that displaced African farmers and redistributed their fertile land to white farmers. Under colonial rule, the Rhodesian government often increased demands for crop production and the entire family suffered. To

Africa and the Middle East 83 appease the male heads of household, the government enacted laws that increased men’s legal authority over their wives, “thus, an unlikely alliance between these two groups sought to control African wives and daughters” (Ranchod-Nilsson 1994: 76). As the primary food producers, women were far more affected by oppressive agricultural policies than were men and “in addition to complaints about state policies, African women identified African men as contributing to women’s oppression” (Ranchod-Nilsson 1994: 77). During the first 30 years of colonial rule in Zimbabwe, as in many other colonies, the British had outlawed practices that they deemed morally repugnant, such as child marriage, forced marriage, bride prices, and coming-of-age initiations such as scarification. Such dramatic changes in the status of women disrupted the traditional fabric of society and incited isolated uprisings among Zimbabwean men, beginning as early as 1896. Other colonial policies, including forced labor, heavy taxes, and land seizures exacerbated the discontent. To appease African leaders, all of whom were male, the colonial government not only reinstated the patriarchal traditions repressive to women, but also codified them into law. The white Rhodesian government continued this practice. Zimbabwean women, therefore, participated actively in the armed struggle as Warriors against the state not only to liberate the African majority, but to free themselves from a feudal patriarchy and assume the role of Dominant Forces (Schmidt 1990). Just as the Rhodesian government and Zimbabwean men had joined forces to control women during the colonial era, ZANLA guerrillas and Zimbabwean women united to liberate women from that control during the war of liberation. Women often enlisted help from ZANLA guerrillas to stop physical abuse from their husbands. Recognizing their dependence on the women’s support activities, the guerrillas often beat, threatened, and killed husbands who drank, hit their wives, or tried to limit their activities (Ranchod-Nilsson 1994: 79–81). Throughout the insurrection, Zimbabwean women “described their goal not only in terms of freedom from racial and economic oppression, but also in terms of freedom from oppressive gender relations” (Seidman 1984: 419). Women participated in the Zimbabwean liberation to “challenge male control over their mobility, sexuality, and productive and reproductive capacities” (Schmidt 1990: 622). The women of Zimbabwe, therefore, fought to change not only external oppression, but internal oppression imposed by the Rhodesian government and Zimbabwean men. Ironically, the very independence that Zimbabwean women fought to achieve has failed to liberate them. The government of President Robert Mugabe has transformed women from Warriors and Dominant Forces into victims of yet another oppressive regime (Hunter-Gault 2007: 170). Although Zimbabwean women are the most educated in the southern African region, they represented a disproportionate share of the hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans who were dispossessed by so-called land reforms

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and they became the victims of “rampaging radical nationalist militias” who murdered, raped, and pillaged under Mugabe’s protection (Hunter-Gault 2007: 170; McFadden 2005: 3). However, the fact that their source of oppression is a domestic one suggests that future revolutionary movements will again include the force of Zimbabwe’s women. Turkey: Kurdistan Workers’ Party Although a large number of terrorist groups can be found in the Middle East, the vast majority do not include female participation. Among the few that do are the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK), of Turkey. Before WWI, most of what we know today as the Middle East was controlled by the Ottoman Empire. The empire was in decline, however, and the Great War brought the “Sick Man of Europe” to its knees. With most of Africa claimed by European imperial powers, the Middle East became the newest opportunity for colonial activity and the British Empire moved quickly to negotiate the division of the region among itself, France, and local rulers. By 1920, most of the area had been partitioned into modern nation-states with arbitrary borders that failed to recognize centuries-old tribal, ethnic, and religious schisms. As the largest ethnic group within the Middle East, the Kurdish people were scattered among Turkey, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Armenia and would soon become the world’s largest stateless nation (Katzman and Prados 2005; McDowall 2005). As the twentieth century wore on, the Kurds agitated for representation and civil liberties while their host states grew increasingly more repressive, prohibiting the speaking and teaching of the Kurdish language, banning newspaper and radio broadcasts in Kurdish, and forbidding the flying of the Kurdish flag. The Kurds of the five states responded by creating powerful nationalist movements, particularly in Turkey, home to the largest population of Kurds, estimated at over 25 million, or 20 percent of Turkey’s total population (CIA 2007). In 1974, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party emerged in Turkey as a leftist organization of Kurdish students, led by Abdullah Öcalan, whose surname means “he who takes revenge” (BBC News 2000). Their goal was to incite a revolution in the Maoist tradition of peasant uprisings, overthrowing the government of Turkey and establishing an independent Kurdish state; however, they did not become active until 1984. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of extremist Islamic terrorist organizations in the 1990s, the PKK shifted away from its secular leftist ideology to gain more popular support. Öcalan was arrested in 1999, however, and the PKK made further changes, announcing a ceasefire and changing its name to the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) to pursue a non-violent threestage plan for Kurdish autonomy, although the group continued military training. In early 2003, KADEK dissolved to form the pan-Kurdish Kurdistan People’s Congress (KHK), but changed its name to Kongra-Gel (KGK)

Africa and the Middle East 85 later that year, all the while espousing a non-violent platform as it continued to commit terrorist attacks. The 2002 ceasefire ended in the spring of 2004, and the group reclaimed the original name of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in 2005. Since that time, the PKK has continued to pursue its terrorist operations in Turkey and more than 37,000 Turks and Kurds have been killed as a result (MIPT 2007b). Although nationalist Kurds reside in five distinct states, the PKK is a domestic terrorist organization rather than an international one. In one sense, all of the Kurdish nationalist terrorist groups operate within what is known as Kurdistan, the Kurdish-occupied lands that span the five states. They do not extend their operations beyond the territory that is historically, if not legally, theirs. More specifically, the PKK is a domestic terrorist group in that its activities are confined even further to Turkey. The PKK’s goals are not to create an international Kurdistan, but to overthrow the Turkish government that refuses to grant Turkish Kurds autonomy. The PKK targets Turkish rule over Turkish Kurdistan and those who support it (Ergil 2001: 113). Further evidence of the PKK’s domestic orientation is the fact that the PKK conducted its operations exclusively within Turkey until the 2003 US invasion of Iraq opened the borders of northern Iraq’s Kurdish zone, and even afterward, Iraqi Kurds have been reluctant to offer refuge to Turkish Kurds because the Kurds of each host state have their own competitive nationalist terrorist groups that conduct anti-state activities within those states. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is the primary Kurdish terrorist group within Iraq, while the Kurdish Ansar al Islam performs the same functions within Iran, and these groups are more rivals than allies. Throughout the 1990s, the PKK was engaged in ongoing guerrilla warfare with the PUK and the Democratic Kurdistan Party (Ahmed and Parker 2007; Harding 2003). In fact, the Iraqi Kurds prefer to see Turkey’s PKK not only disbanded but banned from Iraq. While they are sympathetic to the Kurdish nationalist cause, “many Iraqi Kurds view the PKK as an entity . . . which has caused many problems to the relatively stable Kurdistan area of Iraq” (Ahmed and Parker 2007) and they believe that the presence of the PKK is responsible for the Turkish government’s opposition to an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan. The Iraqi Kurds hope to pursue positive political relations with Turkey and see the PKK as the major obstacle to that goal. Moreover, Iraq’s Kurds believe that Kurdish resistance within Turkey is futile (Barkey 2007: 54; Howard 2002). Because the PKK is a domestic terrorist organization, women are very active within it and participate at all levels, including those of Warriors and Dominant Forces. Interestingly, this occurs despite the fact that PKK women are predominantly Muslim. Some scholars have suggested that the presence of Islam is what inhibits women’s participation in some terrorist groups, yet the women of the PKK, like those of the Chechen Army of the Republic, are both Muslim and extremely active in their respective terrorist organizations due to the domestic orientation of their groups.

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Many scholars contend that the terrorist activism of PKK women is due to the oppressive patriarchy that severely restricts women’s rights, particularly in rural areas (Özcan 2007; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2007; Salih 2007b; Gambetti 2004; Laqueur 2003; Mojab 2001). Education and employment outside the home are rare for women (Gambetti 2004: 12). Arranged marriages and bride prices are routine, with little input from the bride, and honor killings and other forms of corporal punishment are used to control women (Özcan 2007; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2007; Laqueur 2003: 91). Kurdish women face the obstacles of patriarchy, Islam, repressive governments, and disintegrated economic and social structures (Mojab 2001: 12). These burdens, coupled with the discrimination all Kurds face in Turkey, make the lives of Kurdish women particularly difficult. As one PKK woman states, the PKK offers her protection “from the oppression of a male society” (Salih 2007b). Other scholars counter that Kurdish women have a long history of leadership roles and that Kurdish society embraced women’s equality in the early years of the twentieth century (Klein 2001; Alakom 2001; van Bruinessen 2001). A progressive attitude toward the “woman question” that faced many societies was particularly important for Kurds because it mirrored modernity and the goal of statehood. As early as 1913, Kurdish newspapers discussed women’s rights and by 1919, the Society for the Advancement of Kurdish Women had formed “for women to participate in the ‘national awakening’ ” (Klein 2001: 32). Although Kurdish nationalists promoted the veiling of women, this was a reactionary response to Turkey’s Westernization program and was, thus, a symbol of Kurdish nationalism rather than of women’s subjugation. Indeed, “women were . . . assigned a clear role in nation-building” (Klein 2001: 35) and many women attained positions of political, and even military, leadership in Kurdish society (van Bruinessen 2001: 95). Despite these conflicting perspectives on the role of Kurdish women in conventional society and politics, the evidence demonstrates that women are extremely active within the PKK at all levels, including those of Warriors and Dominant Forces. The oppressed view of Kurdish womanhood offers motive for women to join the PKK and overthrow Turkish domination, creating an independent Kurdish state that may offer them more opportunities. Conversely, the progressive interpretation suggests that female leadership and militancy are ingrained aspects of Kurdish society and the PKK is merely a continuation of this tradition. This study contends that either or both of these arguments are feasible and that they both conform to the theory that it is the domestic nature of the PKK that drives female participation. Assuming that Kurdish women are oppressed, a domestic terrorist movement provides an opportunity to change women’s status within the community. If one accepts the argument of a Kurdish tradition of equality, a domestic terrorist cause simply reflects the expansion of those rights further still.

Africa and the Middle East 87 Initially, the PKK consisted of very few women and sometimes even employed kidnapping as a recruitment strategy; however, the group’s original Marxist ideology soon led it to embrace women’s rights. Along with ideological considerations, a more pragmatic concern arose as Öcalan “recognized that feudal family and tribal structure had to be dissolved and disbanded in order to recruit new members . . . one way . . . was to change the social status of women” (Özcan 2007). The PKK began to replace the tribe as the basic unit of Kurdish society, bringing the concept of gender equality with it. Women eagerly joined the PKK as a way to escape family repression, improve their societal position, and gain access to political and economic rights that they had previously been denied. Their “Service in the peshmerga force is voluntary and morale is high” (Howard 2002). Öcalan has written of the traditional societal role of women, as well as the PKK philosophy of women’s rights, during his imprisonment. He contends that women of the Middle East have been subordinated for thousands of years. He notes that early cultures deified women, largely due to their reproductive capacity, and later monotheistic religions such as Christianity and Islam did not initially discriminate against women; however, these religions “degenerated” over time, excluding and subduing women. Öcalan argues that women’s rights are inextricably intertwined with human rights, thus the Kurdish battle for human rights must incorporate a commitment to women’s rights. The freedom and equality of women have to be essential values in the new civilisation. Woman, who has been practically eliminated from our society ever since the end of the neolithic, must take her place in society again as a respected, free and equal being. This objective must be pursued with all the theoretical, practical and organizational means available. Woman’s reality is a problem more concrete and accessible to analysis than concepts like proletariat or oppressed peoples, which were so popular in the past. The extent to which social transformation takes place will be determined by the change women experience. Any part of society will enjoy freedom and equality to the same degree that women achieve freedom and equality. Women’s participation in society will be decisive in establishing a permanent democracy. Hence, the new social movement will found its uniqueness largely on women’s position in society. (2007: 255) Of the 4,500 to 5,000 PKK members, approximately 1,100 are women. PKK women at the support levels of Sympathizers and Spies serve in front organizations, raising funds, preparing propaganda, organizing street demonstrations, providing communication, intelligence, and logistical support (ibid.). In the early days of resistance, PKK women served primarily in support positions, often accompanying their husbands on rebel operations

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in the mountains. The women prepared the camps, cooked, cared for the wounded, transported equipment and munitions, and relayed communication (Howard 2002); however, with the escalation of the Kurdish insurgency in the 1980s, PKK women rapidly moved into the roles of Warriors, fighting alongside their male comrades. Female participation in the insurgency grew to such an extent that the PKK began creating special women’s units for the female militants in the 1990s (Özcan 2007). Today, the women of the PKK are instructed in ambush techniques, mortar launching, and military tactics, as well as the more conventional subjects of math, computer science, and history that are often denied Kurdish women. These women are able students in their guerrilla education and are often familiar with weapons and combat prior to their training. As one PKK woman pointed out, “The Kurds have seen so many Kalashnikovs, . . . Everybody knows how to use one already” (Harding 2003). Their enthusiasm and ability have led PKK women to become “the Kurds’ first and last line of defence, drawing on their legendary hardiness and intimate knowledge of the peaks and valleys of the Zagros mountains” (Howard 2002). In 1995, PKK women Warriors also began participating in suicide bombings. Although women have conducted the majority of the PKK’s suicide bombings at 11 of the 15, “live bombs,” as the PKK refers to them, are not its preferred tactic. Following Öcalan’s arrest in February 1999 and death sentence in June 1999, the PKK felt pressured to resort to extreme measures, resulting in a peak of six suicide missions in March and three more during the trial (Ergil 2001: 119). The judicious use of female suicide missions, therefore, lends further evidence to the argument that the women of the PKK are not simply used by the organization as expendable sacrifices. They are measures of last resort, suicide operations conducted by women who are also extremely active in combat and leadership roles as well. As Dominant Forces, PKK women also provide important leadership skills to the organization. According to PKK rules, 40 percent of the party’s appointed leadership council must be female (and 40 percent are male). The remaining 20 percent are elected, providing an opportunity for even more women in leadership and policymaking positions (Salih 2007b). The women of the PKK engage in terrorist activity at all levels with the hope of transforming their society into one that embraces gender equality just as the PKK has.

Africa and the Middle East: international terrorism The failure of most African terrorist groups to include women as active participants and provide them with the opportunities for command and decisionmaking seen in other groups is due to the fact that these terrorist movements are international rather than domestic. Unlike domestic resistance groups that offer women the chance to challenge traditional gender

Africa and the Middle East 89 roles and restrictions, international opposition movements focus on attacking an external enemy instead of breaking down the internal barriers within a society. This outward focus results in a lack of opportunity for women and a reluctance to accept expanded gender roles of Warriors and Dominant Forces for them. Consequently, women find little incentive to join internationally oriented terrorist groups. A small number of terrorist organizations in Africa exhibit female participation at the support levels of Sympathizers and Spies, but most African terrorist movements exclude women entirely. Women’s participation in Nigeria’s liberation war and subsequent civil war consisted of nothing beyond the most benign civil disobedience (Johnson 1982; Dennis 1987; Abdullah 1993; Okonjo 1994). Eritrea’s struggles against Ethiopian rule from 1952 to 1993 were bitter indeed, but did not integrate the participation of women (Silkin 1983; Rock 1999). Similarly, Guinea-Bissau’s fight against Portugal’s unyielding control was a bloody and violent one, but included women only at the level of conventional political participation (Urdang 1979; Azarya and Chazan 1987; Urdang 1995: 218). Therefore, these states have been excluded from this comparison of women’s participation in terrorist movements. The revolutions in Mozambique and Algeria, on the other hand, exhibit considerably more female participation, albeit at support levels of Sympathizers and Spies. The role of Algeria’s women in its liberation has been widely publicized, and even sensationalized, thanks to the writings of Frantz Fanon, a participant and ardent supporter of the Algerian National Liberation Front. However, closer examination of the actual roles played by these women reveals support-related activities, with only the rarest occasions of actual combat. Mozambique’s women also contributed substantially to its liberation, but again, in a support capacity. The Palestinian liberation movement has gained considerable media attention from a relatively small number of female suicide bombers, but these events are not necessarily indicative of an active terrorist role for women, as the following case studies demonstrate. In the immediate aftermath of WWII, Israel’s Haganah, Irgun, and Stern Gang operated as the dominant terrorist forces of the Middle East, but the Haganah and Stern Gang demonstrated only minimal female participation and the others virtually none. Some biographies label any women engaged in conventional politics or familial ties to male insurgents as terrorists, but examination of their activities refutes that nomenclature (Katz 1953; Mardor 1964; Bloom 1982; FBI 2005). More recent Zionist terrorist groups like Kach, Kahane Chai, and Gush Emunim show no women’s contributions either (Sprinzak 1991; Hanauer 1995; Cohen-Almagor 1997). While Iran’s 1979 revolution and seizure of American hostages at the US Embassy certainly constitutes terrorism, the women of Iran did not actively participate in this movement either. It is true that the revolution’s strict Islamic interpretation of gender roles prohibited non-traditional female

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activity, but women would have been able to exercise more political freedoms during the transition from the Shah’s regime to the revolutionary Islamic government. The overriding factor in the absence of female participation in the 1979 operation was the fact that women as a group had nothing to gain, and indeed lost a great deal, from this revolution (Nashat 1983; Nategh 1986; Zuhur 1992; Farhi 1994; Moghadam 2002). Some sources have characterized Maryam Rajavi as a terrorist and claim that she is a co-founder of Iran’s Mujahadeen e-Khalq along with her husband; however, there is no evidence that she actually engaged in any terrorism during the 1979 revolution, or any subsequent terrorist activities. Acting in cooperation with Iran, French officials arrested Rajavi in 1993 but released her without filing any charges (MIPT 2007a). Her political operations seem to be limited to working with the Iranian National Council of Resistance (PBS Frontline/World 2007) and advocating egalitarian legislation for women (Katzman 2005; Rubin 2003). For these reasons, the aforementioned groups and individuals are not included in this examination. Mozambique: Liberation Front of Mozambique Portugal began colonizing Africa in the late nineteenth century and even though most European powers had liberated their colonies by the end of WWII, the Portuguese economy had grown so dependent upon the income from the colonies that they literally could not relinquish them (Urdang 1979; 1995: 17). The Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) formed in 1962 as a merger of three exiled political opposition groups and trained in Algeria for two years before initiating Mozambique’s war of liberation in 1964. Today we characterize Mozambique’s actions against Portuguese control as a national liberation struggle or a revolution, but at the time it occurred, many nations branded the guerrilla warfare and attacks on Portuguese authorities, civilians, and business enterprises as terrorism. As explained previously, the term terrorism is not intended to imply any normative judgment; it is simply applied to those groups or movements that conform to the definition established in Chapter 1. FRELIMO used widespread insurgent terror to pressure villages to revolt, as rebels did in Vietnam, but this tactic was generally employed sparingly in Africa as it is a dangerous strategy that can alienate the populace. Typically, FRELIMO guerrillas used selective violence, targeting uncooperative locals (Henriksen 1976: 381–2). However, rural residents were fearful of guerrillas and were often pressured into informing on neighbors suspected of collusion with the government forces (West 2000: 183). FRELIMO was an international terrorist organization in that it drew financial aid from Algeria and Egypt, augmented by military hardware from China, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe. Documentation of the extent of Soviet participation in FRELIMO’s activities was limited until after the

Africa and the Middle East 91 Soviet fall, but declassified records reveal that the Soviet Union was supplying the rebels with weapons, transportation, communication equipment, clothing, food, and other supplies, as well as military advisors and training (Shubin 2007: 252–3). The Organization of African Unity (OAU) supported FRELIMO as well, but its assistance created less impact due to a lack of funds and organization. FRELIMO was also international in that it established safe havens for training and resupply in bordering states. The Portuguese armed forces predictably relied on foreign assistance, further adding to the international nature of the conflict (Henriksen 1976: 385, 389; Henriksen 1977: 33–4). It is tempting to generalize about simultaneous liberation struggles in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau due to their common Portuguese colonization, and assume that Angola, as the first to rebel, incited similar reactions in its sister colonies, but revolutionaries in each planned and implemented war independently of the others (Henriksen 1976: 377–8). As such, they experienced differing levels of female participation. As a revolution against external forces, Mozambique’s insurgency offered little appeal to women who could expect no improvement in women’s status from the transition to independent rule. When interviewed, former FRELIMO members “emphasized that the abstract appeal of fighting against either colonialism or imperialism evoked little enthusiasm” (Isaacmen and Isaacmen 1984: 142). It is not surprising, therefore, that women participated in Mozambique’s independence movement only in limited support capacities. FRELIMO’s platform incorporated both nationalist and socialist agendas, but FRELIMO never institutionalized any formal commitment to women’s rights or a feminist agenda as the various groups within it never reached a consensus on the matter. The groups with socialist leanings tended to be more sympathetic to women’s liberation, but the more nationalist groups rejected the idea (Sheldon 1994: 41). One of FRELIMO’s sub-groups, the Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM), has been hailed as a feminist vanguard of women’s emancipation, but as Kathleen Sheldon points out, the segregation of Mozambican women into the OMM enabled the male leaders of FRELIMO to control and even ignore them. FRELIMO leaders espoused the necessity for women’s liberation as a component of the independence struggle, but did little more than include the notion in speeches. The OMM’s own program defines its purpose as promoting women’s emancipation “as defined by the Frelimo Party” (1994: 33). However, some of FRELIMO’s policies equated the emancipation of women with allowing them to participate in the economy (Disney 2004: 9). Liberation leader, Amilcar Cabral, referred to Mozambican women’s struggle as “fighting two colonialisms,” that of the Portuguese colonial government and the traditional Mozambican patriarchy (Urdang 1979: 18). Pre-colonial traditions included the practices of polygamy and lobolo, or bride price, usually paid by the groom to the bride’s family in cattle or cash. Women had limited political and religious influence in pre-colonial

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Mozambique, usually assuming power only in the absence of males who had migrated elsewhere for work, and “More generally women were seen as commodities to be owned, as indicated by the use of the same word for slave and for wife” (Sheldon 1994: 37). Literacy was extremely low during the colonial era, at 5 percent for the total population and half that for females. Colonial rule brought no advancement in women’s status. Portuguese rule included the use of forced labor in which the state or private companies recruited workers as involuntary, low-wage contract labor, usually in the production of rice, sisal fiber, and cotton for textile exports. Women were particularly vulnerable to forced labor as they often could not leave due to a lack of funds and child care obligations. Under the forced labor system, women had to neglect their subsistence farming to meet their textile quotas, creating further difficulties. The state began conscripting women for road construction in the 1940s and continued the practice well into the revolutionary period. Virtually all paying jobs were limited to male workers, including occupations traditionally held by women in other countries, such as teaching, nursing, and domestic work. Prior to the advent of cashew exporting in the 1950s, “the number of women working for a wage was never more than a few hundred” (ibid.: 39). As late as 1961, Mozambique’s Governor General legally restricted the wages of African women to 55 percent that of African men (Isaacmen and Isaacmen 1984: 156). When the FRELIMO insurgency began in 1964, some women joined the movement, but were denied access to combat and positions of leadership as the leadership was almost exclusively male and strongly opposed guerrilla training or militia activity for women (ibid.: 156). The women’s complaints drew a response from the Central Committee in 1966 that reprimanded male members for excluding women from decisionmaking and advocated incorporating women at all levels of the organization. These orders were rarely put into practice however. LIFEMO (League of Mozambican Women), organized in 1966, was the first opportunity for women to participate in the insurgency, but the women were assigned primarily to agricultural production and defending the already liberated zones, freeing the men to fight in offensive battles (ibid.: 164). FRELIMO formed a Women’s Detachment in 1967 to grow food, transport weapons, and “inform and mobilize the peasant population” while they continued to deny women advancement in the military ranks (Arnfred 1988: 5). In 1968, women were allowed into the officer corps and hundreds received guerrilla training and socialist indoctrination, but shortly thereafter, the FRELIMO command issued orders that women could not join combat missions (West 2000: 184–7). One former member of the Women’s Detachment described their participation as picking up sticks and stones to defend themselves during a colonial massacre (Isaacmen and Isaacmen 1984: 138) and others stated that “most women in the movement spent almost all of their time working in the fields surrounding the FRELIMO bases” (ibid.: 156). Another FRELIMO woman reported that despite their training, “We

Africa and the Middle East 93 women were still expected to fetch water, clean house, prepare dinner, and take care of the children” (White 2007: 871). There are a few instances of women participating in combat, but these are clearly in contravention to official policy (Isaacmen and Isaacmen 1984: 156). In addition, no data exists to indicate that women were ever promoted to higher-level positions of command or policymaking (Sheldon 1994: 42). Despite the lack of female presence in combat and policymaking positions, FRELIMO openly acknowledged the need for women in support capacities as Sympathizers. Women fulfilled five important roles: (1) recruiting new male insurgents, (2) espionage, (3) transporting equipment, (4) providing food, and (5) organizing basic social services in liberated zones (Isaacmen and Isaacmen 1984: 153). In a 1973 speech to the First Conference of Mozambican Women, FRELIMO’s leader, Samora Machel, recounted the contributions of Mozambique’s women to the liberation struggle, citing their efforts in transporting equipment, mobilizing the population, providing food and medical aid for guerrillas, teaching, organizing orphanages, and relaying information. He also added that these efforts came in spite of the fact that, “women are the most oppressed, humiliated and exploited beings in society” (Cochran and Scott 1992). While the support activities of Sympathizers and Spies were definitely vital to the struggle, they are not equivalent to combat or policymaking activities. Women were notably absent from “positions of authority” as Dominant Forces and FRELIMO’s male leadership remained committed “to perpetuating historic sex inequality, despite its revolutionary political agenda” (Isaacmen and Isaacmen 1984: 153). As Sheldon notes, “Reports of women’s roles in the revolution refer to military activity, but it is clear that this was a minor part of their contribution to the armed struggle” (1994: 42). FRELIMO generally preferred to use women for gathering intelligence, mobilizing support, organizing, managing social institutions such as health clinics, schools, and agricultural collectives (West 2000: 183, 186–7). Many of the Women’s Detachment were even prostitutes, valued for their assertiveness and ability to gather intelligence from the Portuguese military, although technically, sexual relations between male and female guerrillas were prohibited for fear that they would interfere with military discipline or result in pregnancies (Urdang 1995: 190). The participation of women “remained a point of contention” within the organization, although “in limited instances they participated in armed combat missions” (West 2000: 183). One FRELIMO commissar reprimanded a female guerrilla trainee by reminding her that a weapon could not make her the equal of a man (Urdang 1995: 217). In sum, while support activities such as agricultural production, supply transports, and information gathering are all valuable services, these activities are those of Sympathizers and Spies. Women seldom participated at higher levels, in the roles of Warriors and Dominant Forces, in Mozambique’s liberation movement. After witnessing little change in women’s status from the pre-colonial patriarchy

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to the colonial patriarchy, Mozambican women undoubtedly anticipated no new opportunities in the post-colonial independence society. Although the FRELIMO male hierarchy certainly did not embrace a feminist agenda or spontaneously offer any advancement opportunities for women, the women themselves did not use their agricultural and strategic power to force their way into the hierarchy as many women in domestic terrorist organizations have done. Algeria: National Liberation Front In 1954, the National Liberation Front (FLN) of Algeria formed to liberate Algeria from French colonial control through an anti-imperialist, anti-colonial revolution using terrorist tactics. The FLN waged a guerrilla war against French authorities in “one of the bloodiest and bitterest wars of independence in modern times” until gaining independence in 1962 (Grose 2007: 62). Because the FLN directed its efforts against a foreign colonial power, targeting European authorities, institutions, and civilians, rather than an Algerian government exclusively, the FLN’s terrorist actions are considered international, rather than domestic. In her studies of the Algerian independence movement, terrorism scholar Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson describes FLN activities as “anti-European terrorism” and contends that the revolution itself began among Algerian workers influenced by French urbanization and industrialization, providing a truly international foundation for the FLN (1978: 62–3). The Algerian struggle was international in another sense in that it incorporated a complex mixture of African, Asian, Arab, and European conflicts within the context of the revolution (Lazreg 1994: 6–10). Moreover, the conflict also fueled Western fears of a Soviet foothold in North Africa and made this war of independence crucial in Cold War alliances. Although anecdotal reports exist of limited female participation in the FLN’s struggle against French rule, women were never integrated into the higher levels of command or policymaking as Dominant Forces in the FLN and few were soldiers or Warriors. Initially, “there was no provision for women to enjoy any political or military responsibilities” whatsoever in the FLN and even after a lack of manpower forced the FLN “to use some women combatants” and admit over 10,000 female members, the “overwhelming majority of those who served in the war were nurses, cooks, and laundresses” (Moghadam 1993: 83). Although myth has expanded the role of Algerian women in the resistance, reliable records exist on only a fraction of Algerian women in the revolution and those present women in only basic support roles, half acting as nurses, and the rest as liaisons, fund-raisers, and other low-level functions (Benallégue 1983: 711, 706–7). After the war, 11,000 women identified themselves as militants and some sources claimed that 84 percent of women served in the civilian FLN and 16 percent in the military branch (ibid.: 703–4). However, official records indicate that the moudjahidat, or female troops, comprised only about 11 percent

Africa and the Middle East 95 of the FLN, or 205 women, in combined military and civilian services and females designated as soldiers constituted only 2 percent of the women in the FLN. The vast majority served in “nursing, communications, engineering, [and] food preparation” (Lazreg 1994: 124). They operated in a civilian capacity, and, while they participated in some bombings and attacks on French police, their duties consisted primarily of “fund-raising, liaison work . . . safe housing, food and medical supplies, and purchase of weapons” as Sympathizers and Spies (Amrane 1982: 85; Cherifati-Merabtine 1994: 19). These duties correspond to the traditional role of Algerian women under colonial rule as one of passive resistance in which women’s activities in the FLN “fit in a ‘traditional’ pattern of gender roles, where men held positions of responsibility and command, and women executed orders” (Lazreg 1994: 45, 124, 129). Women were virtually absent in combat and the FLN was extremely reluctant to arm women, including nurses in combat zones (Amrane 1982: 134). According to Frantz Fanon’s personal account of the Algerian revolution and other sources, women were totally excluded from any combat until 1955 (Fanon 1967: 48; Cunningham 2003: 174). Although Fanon credited Algerian women with extensive participation in the liberation struggle, his definition of significant activities included the “revolutionary role of the sex worker” (1967; White 2007: 859), whereas this study categorizes such participation in the role of Sympathizer and less crucial than the combat and leadership contributions of Warriors and Dominant Forces. Clearly, “the armed woman combatant was certainly not a reality, but rather a myth, perhaps based on a few individual cases which struck the popular imagination” (Amrane 1982: 85). Some scholars argue that it was the radical Islamic aspect of the Algerian revolution, rather than the international orientation of the movement, that limited female participation at any level above a support role, because in a colonial Algeria that rejected all things French, Islam garnered even greater support. Although the FLN was secular, and even struggled against radical Islamist forces later, its traditional views of women became radicalized. Equality for women became associated with Western notions of progress, and was therefore antithetical to Algerian independence. Islam became the foundation of anti-colonial resistance and “practically all political formations in Algeria . . . incorporated Islam into their political platforms, especially in relation to women” (Winter 2001: 16). Others counter that Islamism did not become a significant force until after the revolution and that the FLN was actually very receptive to French culture. Because Algerians enjoyed legislative representation in France’s National Assembly, received education in the French tradition, and spoke French rather than Arabic, “there was an emotional bond between them and their former masters, which has little parallel in English-speaking Africa” and while the Algerian rebels were “critical of the French State . . . [they] were wedded to the republican ideals of liberty, equality, and modernity that, in theory at least, provided its ideological underpinning” (Chafer 2007: 438).

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Regardless of Algerian attitudes toward the French, Islam was not initially a motivating factor in what was essentially an anti-colonial revolution, and religion was primarily used to distinguish Algerian culture from French imperialism; therefore, it is unlikely that Islam was responsible for the limited participation of Algerian women in combat, leadership, and policymaking. Rather, Islam was simply a component of a revolution that sought to oust an external force, but not to alter the status of women. Therefore, it was the international nature of the FLN armed struggle that led to limited participation of women. This relationship becomes even clearer when we learn that the FLN newspaper, El Moudjahid, proclaimed that Algerian women needed liberation only from France, not from traditional Algerian society (Kopola 1995: 1–5). Thus, the women of the Algerian independence movement remained confined to the roles of Sympathizers and Spies, rather than Warriors or Dominant Forces. Palestine: Palestinian Liberation Organization, Hamas, Islamic Jihad As stated previously, the Middle East is host to a wide array of terrorist movements. They include the secular Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and its many splinter groups such as the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, as well as their fundamentalist Sunni rival Hamas along with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s fundamentalist Shi’a Hezbollah, the reactionary Wahabbi Al Qaeda, the Israeli nationalist Gush Emunim, and many others ranging from secular to fundamentalist, Zionist to Islamic, left-wing to right-wing, nationalist to international. Despite the assorted agendas and objectives of these terrorist groups, virtually all share a common concern, the Arab–Israeli conflict in Palestine. Understandably, many Arab states demonstrate great empathy for Palestinian nationalism. They object to the Western powers’ blanket approval of the British Mandate and Britain’s post-WWI division of the Middle East into states like Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Even more so, many Arab states object to the Anglo-American decision to establish the state of Israel in Palestine, pitting Arabs and Jews against each other in a struggle for survival. For many Jews, Israel embodies a haven and sanctuary from centuries of European persecution and pogroms against their people. Yet for many Arabs, Israel represents an outpost of Western imperialism, a capitalist system of dependent development that has been imposed upon them, and a denial of the opportunity to implement their own Palestinian state. Thus, although the quest for Palestinian statehood and the terrorist war against Israel and its supporters may initially seem to be a domestic struggle involving only a handful of Palestinian and Zionist terrorist organizations within the state of Israel, this conflict extends far beyond national boundaries and has existed as an international conflict on the world’s stage for more than a generation.

Africa and the Middle East 97 News media have emphasized the advent of women in Palestinian terrorism, citing the emergence of several female suicide bombers in the Middle East since the 1980s, but these incidences are newsworthy precisely because they are comparatively few. Despite the fact that in surveys of both men and women in 2002, 80 percent of Palestinians supported suicide attacks, only a fraction of Palestinian suicide bombings are conducted by women (Jordan 2002: 33; Kremmer 2002: 11). Wafa Idris is sometimes cited as the first female Palestinian suicide bomber, detonating her suicide belt on January 27, 2002 (Naaman 2007: 933; Victor 2003: 4, 64); however, the “originator of female martyrdom” in Palestine was 19 year old Dalal al-Maghrabi, who conducted the first known female Palestinian suicide mission in 1978 at the behest of the secular Al Fatah (Gambetta 2005: 81, note on 308; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996). In 1985, she was followed by at least six separate women suicide bombers in Lebanon, under the direction of the secular Syrian Socialist National Party, the Lebanese Ba’th Party, the Lebanese Communist Party, the Syrian-backed Shi’a Amal, and the Iraniansupported Shi’a Hezbollah (Gambetta 2005: 87; Fisk 1990: 610–11). Female suicide bombings in Palestine virtually disappeared during the 1990s, re-emerging in 2002 during the second Intifada, first in secular terrorist organizations, then in religious groups like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas (McGirk and Hamad 2007; Gambetta 2005: 95–7). Since Idris’ suicide bombing in 2002, nine more Palestinian women have conducted successful suicide operations, along with over 80 failed attempts (Naaman 2007: 933; McGirk and Hamad 2007). However, these suicide bombings do not indicate an integrated role for women in the Palestinian terrorist movements. As one Palestinian woman explained, “Til Wafa, women had just helped jihad by making food. I thought: We can do more” (Miller 2007: 47). Many scholars agree that “the increase in women suicide bombers reflects neither a progressive attitude towards women nor gender equality in the religious, revolutionary, and national liberation movements that promote such terror,” and that women continue to play a “distinctly marginal role in most of these groups” (ibid.: 53; Bloom 2004; Schweitzer 2000). In addition, these instances are essentially the only female activities above the support levels of Sympathizers and Spies. The media promote the myth of female suicide bombers as Warriors because it contributes to the sensationalism of terrorism (Berkowitz 2005: 603) and Yassir Arafat’s reference to Palestinian women as his “army of roses” feeds this imagery (Victor 2003), yet most of these women were not even affiliated with any political movement (Hasso 2005: 28). Female suicide bombers have become a favored topic of both popular and scholarly examination, but these accounts are plagued by “occidentalism,” in that Western-centric media treat Eastern cultures differently, framing common factors as unique phenomena, and creating a type of Eastern exceptionalism (Brunner 2007: 957). This study attempts to avoid the pitfalls of occidentalism by examining women terrorists, including female suicide bombers, within a comparative global

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context and classifying them by the same standards. As such, Palestinian female suicide bombers are not an aberration, but further evidence of the distinction between levels of female participation in domestic and international terrorist movements. From interviews conducted with failed suicide bombers, psychologist Ariel Merari (1998) has determined suicide bombers act not as loners, but as components of a highly organized and controlled plan. Their missions are “never the result of an individual or deranged person acting on his own, but rather actions planned and prepared by an organization” (Speckhard et al. 2004: 14). Thus, it is the terrorist group, rather than the individual, that determines the suicide bomber’s behavior. This study takes that analysis one step further, arguing that it is the domestic or international nature of the group that determines the female suicide bomber’s behavior. A crucial distinction in the use of female suicide bombers is whether or not women have access to other roles within terrorist organizations. Domestic terrorist organizations that employ women as suicide bombers also utilize women in combat, policymaking, and leadership, as Warriors and Dominant Forces, but women’s participation in Palestinian terrorism is strictly limited to supportive roles as Sympathizers and Spies because the Palestinian resistance is international rather than domestic. As Moghadam notes, “the conflict with Israel and non-resolution of the national question has hardened identities and strengthened patriarchal tendencies leading to the imposition of social controls on Palestinian women” (2005: 63). Therefore, the use of Palestinian female suicide bombers, on its own, does not indicate an active terrorist role for women as Warriors or Dominant Forces, as they remain excluded from combat, decisionmaking, leadership roles, and policymaking. Instead, these women are used by the male-dominated terrorist organizations as expendable tools, rather than integrated into the infrastructure of the terrorist group. In the past, some have contended that the lack of female participation as Warriors and Dominant Forces is largely due to the internal restrictions of fundamental Islam on women’s activities (Cook 2005: 377; Cunningham 2003: 184; Gwynne 2004: 6). However, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have reversed their prohibitions on female participation in recent years. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad states that Islam does not prohibit women’s participation in war, and although the group claims that it does not actively recruit women for suicide bombings, it allows them; however, no women serve in combat or policymaking as Warriors or Dominant Forces (Dickey and Kovach 2002). Similarly, Hamas’ Sheikh Ahmed Yassin initiated the group’s first female suicide mission in 2004 (Naaman 2007: 933). In fact, Hamas is responsible for most of the Palestinian suicide bombings, including four of the female suicide bombers, indicating that the organization clearly does not oppose using women as weapons, but denies them access to combat and leadership positions (al Ghazali 1981). Because “religious authorities are making exceptions and finding legal precedent to

Africa and the Middle East 99 permit women’s participation,” it is unlikely that religious doctrine is the primary factor in limiting female terrorist activity (Bloom 2005). Even the Islamist group, Al Qaeda, is believed to be recruiting women for terrorist operations (Associated Press 2003). In any event, the Palestinian liberation movement originated as a secular movement. Due to its international nature, Islamist terrorist organizations have become involved in the conflict, but even among the secular components, women’s participation is strictly limited. The common factor among both secular and Muslim groups is the international orientation of the struggle, which deters female participation. Furthermore, other societies are characterized by strong religious doctrines and traditional gender roles, such as Catholicism in Latin America and Confucianism in Nepal, yet female terrorist activity is plentiful in these societies because the terrorist conflicts are predominantly domestic rather than international. Some critics may point to the sensationalized operations of Leila Khaled with Al Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in the 1960s as an example of Palestinian women in the role of Warrior; however, contemporary records of events, along with Khaled’s own autobiography, reveal that even she functioned primarily in a supportive role for terrorist operations. By her own account, she participated in two airplane hijackings, accidentally dropping her gun down her pants during one, but seemed focused on the symbolic nature of the operation and actively avoided actual violence (Cronin 2002: 160–83). As Stack O’Connor states, “Her fame and involvement . . . were not typical of women participating in Palestinian militancy. Most were involved in support roles and on the fringe of groups” (2007: 97). Palestinian armed conflict, as well as leadership and policymaking, is carried out exclusively by men (Kawar 1994: 555). An examination of the Palestinian liberation movement and the development of women’s roles within it illustrates the fact that, apart from the small number of suicide bombings, women choose to function only in support roles as Sympathizers and Spies. In 1964, the new Palestinian Women’s Association sent delegates to the first Palestinian National Congress (PNC), the assembly that created the PLO. The following year, the PLO organized the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW) as its women’s branch, but “no change from traditional roles was immediately present” (Strum 1992: 34). Indeed, the GUPW never challenged the common gender roles. Instead it focused on coordinating the support work of Palestinian women in the West Bank and throughout the Arab world, organizing charities, building orphanages, hospitals, schools, and providing classes in sewing, nursing, and adult literacy (Berger Gluck 1997: 105, 108). As part of an internationally oriented movement, “When women challenged patriarchal power structures, they did so in order to fashion a political response to their common enemy outside, rather than directing their challenge internally, into their own society” (Dajani 1994: 37). The Palestinian Federation of Women’s Action Committees (PFWAC)

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developed in alliance with the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the PLO. The PFWAC has been identified as “the most effective women’s organization in the territories” and “distinctly powerful”; however, the women of PFWAC were encouraged to engage in “gendersegregated political work” (Hasso 1998: 442, 445). PFWAC members gave lectures, operated literacy projects, and provided sewing and knitting courses, all of which are primarily supportive and gender-related roles (ibid.: 446–7). Even within the secular DFLP, women remained in support roles due to the “gender restrictions imposed on most girls and women” and only a small number of Palestinian women engaged in “mixed-gender activities” (ibid.: 445). Interviews of Palestinian women during the 1987 Intifada indicate that even during this period of escalated conflict, women’s activities focused primarily on support. Their participation included demonstrations and stonethrowing, but revolved more around “organizing a social support network,” forming literacy campaigns in refugee camps, preparing food, providing clothing, and organizing health education (Ricks 2006: 90; Abdo 1994: 156–9). In addition, women also wrote and distributed pamphlets, joined demonstrations, carried flags, donated blood, violated curfews, and defied Israeli land seizures. Some Palestinian women also shed their headscarves, shortened their skirts, and wore pants, but Hamas and Islamic Jihad soon reinstituted strict controls over women’s attire and mobility (Victor 2003: 9–11). Women participated in the resistance, but almost entirely at support levels and in ways that were determined and restricted by the male members of the group (Cook 2005: 379; Patkin 2004: 81; Reeves 1989). Admittedly, the uprising made women more visible and created more opportunities for them, such as protest marches and the formation of food storage committees, medical supplies committees, and neighborhood watch committees (Sharoni 1995: 56, 70–3). Palestinian women also distributed food and supplies, organized classes, and canned produce to facilitate the boycott of Israeli goods (Davies 1987; Kawar 1994: 548; Berger Gluck 1995: 111); however, while marches and committee work are clearly a form of participation, the level of activity is that of a supportive nature, as Sympathizers, rather than one of combat or leadership as Warriors and Dominant Forces. Indeed, some scholars have interpreted Palestinian women’s behavior as more of a withdrawal during the Intifada (Sharoni 1995: 60). The lack of Palestinian female terrorist activity is even more noteworthy in light of the fact that “of all the different Arab societies . . . always Palestinian women have been the most liberated . . . best educated . . . and least bound by traditional roles” (Copeland 2002). During the second Intifada in 2000, women’s roles remained similarly constrained, “operat[ing] as a welfare system, caring for the wounded and the sick, as well as those orphaned or who have lost their chief financial providers in the violence, and they maintain the educational system as teachers” (Muaddi Darraj 2004: 31). Women who were considered “active in

Africa and the Middle East 101 the resistance” were those who participated in demonstrations, attended school, worked outside the home, and whose children became martyrs (Holt 2003: 229). Within this traditional society, Palestinian women’s proper role is seen as “mothers of the nation, mothers of the martyrs, or housewives” (Jamal 2004: 131). Even the most recent draft of the Palestinian constitution does not recognize women as “full persons,” denying them equality in marriage, divorce, custody, inheritance, and domestic abuse (Azzouni 2005: 221–2). Some contend that Palestinian women lack the education and political skills to become leaders or Dominant Forces (Holt 2003: 233), but Nepali women have overcome these disadvantages to take active roles as Warriors and Dominant Forces in their resistance. The fundamental difference is that Nepal’s terrorist movement is a domestic one, offering opportunities for women to change the status quo, while the Palestinian insurgency is international, limiting the potential rewards for female participation. Realizing the improbability of any improvement in their status, Palestinian women resign themselves to continuing their support roles in the international conflict or they submit to sacrifice as suicide bombers.

5

Europe Discontent on the continent

Europe: domestic terrorism Continental Europe is often credited with the creation of both terrorism and nationalism in the form of the French Revolution and its subsequent Reign of Terror. Revolutionary leader Maximilien Robespierre went so far as to proclaim that “Terrorism is nothing other than justice . . . a consequence of the general principle of democracy” and that the first maxim of the new administration must be to “lead the people’s enemies by terror” (1794). The use of terrorism as a means to a nationalist end continued into the early twentieth century with the growth of Serbian separatism and the assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Ferdinand and the inception of World War I. Through the 1960s the majority of European terrorist groups were motivated by nationalism. As such, it is not surprising that in this cradle of terrorist development we find an abundance of both domestic and international terrorist organizations. Both the Basque separatists of Spain and the Chechen separatists of Russia share a strong sense of cultural and ethnic identity that a long history of oppression by their states has molded into extreme nationalism and separatism. Spain: Basque Homeland and Liberty When the “Catholic kings,” Ferdinand and Isabel, united their kingdoms in 1492, forming the nation-state of Spain, provinces with unique cultural and linguistic identities, such as Galicia, Cataluña, and the Basque provinces, were incorporated under Castillian rule, but were not forced to give up their national identities. During the brief reign of the Second Republic, the Spanish government granted the Basque region some degree of autonomy in return for an alliance against the fascist forces of General Francisco Franco during the civil war of 1936–39. Franco’s victory soon ended that autonomy and, in retribution for Basque support of the fallen republic, outlawed the teaching of the Basque language and culture, Basque radio programming, and Basque cultural activities in an effort to force them into Spanish society.

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By the 1960s, Basque nationalist resistance had grown and organized into the terrorist organization of the Euskadi Ta Azkatasuna (ETA) or Basque Homeland and Liberty. ETA began in 1959 after a series of Basque assemblies to determine a course of action. The fifth assembly of the ETA, or ETA-V, decided upon an armed terrorist war against the Spanish government. The sixth assembly in 1971 resulted in a schism of the group into the original ETA-V, focused on removing Spanish control only over the Basque region, and the new ETA-VI that hoped to overthrow the entire national government of Spain and instate a communist regime. While the communist ETA-VI soon splintered and ultimately dissolved, the original ETA-V divided into the ETA-Military and the ETA-Political Military by 1974. The ETA-Political Military preferred to consider political negotiations along with armed struggle. It later fragmented into three groups, including what is now the main Basque party, known as the Popular Unity Party or Herri Batasuna. The ETA-Military remained convinced that terrorism was the only solution and is the ETA that we know today (Chapman and Chapman 1980: 68–9; MacDonald 1991: 6; Hamilton 1999: 258). In March 2006, ETA declared a permanent ceasefire and entered negotiations with the Spanish government; however, on December 30 of that year, the group detonated a massive car bomb at Madrid’s Barajas International Airport that killed two civilians. The government subsequently ended negotiations and ETA resumed terrorist activities (US Department of State 2006). ETA is a clear example of a domestic terrorist organization. Its members target primarily Spanish government authorities and police. One of their more notorious acts was the assassination of Spain’s Prime Minister Carrero Blanco in 1973 (Carr 2000: 207). Their agenda is anti-state, focused on a war of attrition with the Spanish government in an effort to make independence the only affordable option. Investigative sources agree that ETA is domestic and that it has virtually no support outside its region (The Economist 1996: 42). Scholars concur that ETA’s tactics and strategy are all focused inwardly and do not seek to challenge any external forces (Chapman and Chapman 1980: 65). Perhaps the greatest evidence of ETA’s domestic nature is the failure of the more internationally oriented communist ETA-VI to attract Basque support and the continued appeal of the merely separatist ETA-V. Not surprisingly, women have been active in Basque nationalism since the 1900s. They were particular targets of the repressive Franco regime as women were confined to traditional gender stereotypes until the crumbling economy required them to join the workforce (Hamilton 2000: 159–60). Thus, Basque women had even greater reason than Basque men to engage in anti-state, or domestic, terrorism. The women of ETA are known as etarras (Daly 2000). The Basque nationalist women’s group, Emakume Abertzale Batza (EAB) or Association of Women Patriots, formed in 1922, was inspired by the Irish nationalist women’s group Cumann na mBan. They

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were active in support roles, preparing food and clothing for prisoners, writing letters to government officials, marching in protests, and even engaging in hunger strikes, but Basque women remained behind the scenes and outside of the policymaking decisions until the 1960s (Hamilton 1999: 68, 247). Existing within Spain’s very traditional social order, “Sexism in the organization was simply a ‘mirror’ of society” and “male nationalists . . . exploited stereotypes about ‘female character’ – the misogynist ‘virgin/whore’ model of extreme female behaviour” (Hamilton 1999: 200–1). ETA’s propaganda routinely portrayed women as anonymous victims rather than perpetrators of terrorism and women were seldom arrested on suspicion of terrorism. Thus, the traditional stereotype of women as non-terrorist enabled them to become more effective than their male counterparts in many instances. As more women began participating on the same level as men, in commando, leadership, and policymaking positions, their male comrades began to change their own stereotypical views of women. Despite the presence of women in the organization, some male members still held reactionary attitudes toward gender issues, claiming that “feminism . . . questions the ‘natural’ order of things” (ibid.: 204). Such attitudes accounted for women’s confinement to support roles until the etarras’ demands for greater participation emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. The 1960s brought a loosening of restrictions under the dictatorship of the aging Franco, but the oppression of Basques continued and etarras often felt it necessary to prove their commitment and militancy through violent action. As one etarra explained, “if the man had to measure up to 10, the woman had to get to 50” (ibid.: 203). Arrest records from the early 1960s reveal that all ETA arrests were of men, but by the early 1980s, women made up 8 percent of ETA arrests (ibid.: 160). In 2002, Spanish government sources indicated that arrests of ETA women had increased by 33 percent over the previous year, while arrests of males had risen by only 10 percent. Moreover, 25 percent of new ETA recruits were women and they were “beginning to scale the chain of command” (Tremlett 2002) into roles as Warriors and even Dominant Forces. Today, Spanish police report that ETA has at least one woman in each terrorist cell (Gelibter 2005) and government sources indicate that “The female of the species has always been as deadly as the male in the annals of ETA, the Basque separatist group, but women are now becoming increasingly influential” (Daly 2000). Since the end of the ETA ceasefire in December 1999, the organization has been under the growing leadership of women. Maria Soledad Iparragire Genetxea, also known as “Anboto,” became the leader of ETA in October 2000, after working in the ETA for over 20 years. She began her terrorist career as a teenager, concealing explosives for the ETA and gradually worked her way up to a Warrior role through attacks with assault weapons and assassinations. The leader of

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ETA’s strategic and logistical committee is also a woman, Anne Lizarralde (Antolín 2002; Daly 2000). In 2002, two of ETA’s “most brutal and effective” operatives, Nerea Bengoa and Ana Belen Egues, were placed in charge of key active service units in Barcelona and Madrid. Belen had previously proven her leadership abilities by establishing a sleeper cell in Madrid during ETA’s 1999 ceasefire (Tremlett 2002). While the presence of women as Dominant Forces in leadership and policymaking positions within the ETA is clear, estimates of female ETA membership vary significantly. Using data from the 1970s, Robert P. Clark (1984) posits a 10 percent female membership, but the small size of the sample has led others to question this conclusion. Other sources lowered that figure to 8 percent by the early 1980s, but using data from unpublished police records, General Captain of the Spanish Army Andres Cassinello reported a dramatic increase in the number of women arrested on suspicion of terrorist activity and estimated etarra membership at 12 percent in the mid-1970s, increasing to 17 percent by 1982 (Hamilton 1999: 313). In 1979 and 1980, 56.5 percent of women arrested were accused of armed actions, 23.8 percent charged with gathering or relaying information, and 19.6 percent had unknown charges (ibid.: 325). Another indication of growing etarra activity is their perceived dangerousness by authorities. In the 1960s, female suspects reported far less torture than male prisoners disclosed, and were rarely raped. Yet by the 1980s, etarra suspects claimed that they were not only tortured with the same degree of severity, but were also routinely gang-raped and sodomized (ibid.: 250–1). The increased attention to extracting information from female prisoners and subjecting them to physical punishment suggests that the authorities recognize the increased levels of terrorist participation among etarras. Since the late 1970s, authorities have “witnessed a growing presence of women in public and political positions in the ETA as increasingly more women joined the action commandos and Spanish police sources began to speak of female militants as ‘dangerous elements’ ” (ibid.: 216). Although women may be less well known, they are very much present in the ETA as commandos, assassins, contract killers, explosives experts, car bombers, and purveyors of illegal arms sales and smuggling. ETA women Warriors are in the front lines of the armed struggle, fighting both alongside their male counterparts and alone (Antolín 2002: 15). Indeed, Belén González Peñalba, a.k.a. Carmen, has been identified as “one of the most wanted terrorists in Spain” (ibid.: 31). Women terrorists of the ETA make use of society’s traditional gender stereotypes, presenting themselves as innocents to remain undetected while simultaneously promoting violence to shock and intimidate. Etarras are very aware of the “tension between the popular image of women as innocent tools, and the equally misogynist vision of them as naturally deceitful” (Hamilton 1999: 208). Within the ETA organization, women have been able to move into leadership positions as Dominant Forces by perpetuating

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the belief “that women acted more ‘coldly’ in armed actions than men” (ibid.: 208) and the “male fantasy of Woman as the ultimate ‘terrorist,’ . . . the ‘amazon’ model,” and the image of the “white hands that kill” (ibid.: 216–17). In keeping with such gender stereotypes, female terrorists are often characterized as simply girlfriends of male terrorists, and indeed, may portray themselves in that light to escape detection. For some, the ETA does fulfill the role of family. The ETA’s original female martyr, Txabi Etxebarrieta, was killed by police in 1968. Her family rejected the violence of ETA, blaming it and her etarra mentor, Itziar Aizpura, for the young woman’s death. The family and the older etarra even fought over the control of the woman’s burial and martyred image, resulting in the ETA’s attempted kidnapping of Etxebarrieta’s body (ibid.: 230). However, most etarras proclaim that they are not seduced into the armed struggle through lovers, but that they chose their lives carefully and thoughtfully, as a commitment to Basque nationalism, not as an outgrowth of some personal relationship (ibid.: 219). Another celebrated etarra, Dolores González Catarain, a.k.a. Yoyes, who rose to a leadership role in ETA and then left the movement, compared the separation to leaving a husband. Indeed, ETA suspected her of betraying secrets to the Spanish police and subsequently assassinated her in front of her two children to signify that she was being punished for the abandonment of her true family (Antolín 2002: 45; Hamilton 1999: 234–5). Women without husbands and children are more able to shoulder the burdens of the armed struggle but are often viewed as serving in maternal roles through their ETA activities. Those who have children often feel that they must pass the legacy of nationalist activism to the next generation; they want their daughters to follow in their footsteps as etarras (Hamilton 1999: 226–8). Although etarra activity began to increase at the same time that feminist movements were growing throughout Europe, feminism has never been a strong motivating factor for Basque nationalist women. Organized feminism did not emerge in Spain until 1975, with the death of Franco. The movement had never been a strong one, even during the brief republic, but was severely repressed under Franco as women were restricted from working outside the home, harshly punished for adultery, and abortion, contraception, and divorce were illegal (ibid.: 278). While some women militants were committed feminists, such as Spanish communist women, others disagreed with feminist politics. Many former etarras interviewed “clearly demonstrated a commitment to eradicating gender power imbalances” but none claimed to have joined ETA for feminist reasons. Moreover, the feminist movement is largely pacifist, while the etarras are committed to armed struggle (ibid.: 262, 209, 224). Within the internal organization, “the priority accorded armed struggle far outweighed any obligation to engage in serious and sustained feminist debate” (ibid.: 214).

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Chechnya: Army of the Republic Geographically, Russia is actually located in Central Asia; however, politically, it is usually grouped with European nations due to its historical, political, and cultural development. As a republic of Russia, Chechnya’s independence movement is also included in this chapter on European terrorist groups. Chechnya is a republic of southern Russia, bordering Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Georgia. Bound by a common ethnicity, language, religion, and tribal structure, the people of Chechnya have exhibited a strong sense of nationalism for centuries. Even before the imposition of Islam in the fifteenth century, Chechens maintained a separate identity, caught between Europe and Asia. Shortly after the institution of Soviet rule, Stalin imposed a greater sense of insularity upon the Chechens, removing them from strategic locations and relocating them to more isolated areas. It was not until the fall of the Soviet empire and its strict control that Chechen nationalism was free to seek separation from Russia. The first Chechen separatist war lasted from 1994 to 1996 and caused enormous devastation to the Chechen infrastructure. The second war of 1999 to 2000 continued the destruction, but international disdain limited the degree of Russian oppression against the Chechen independence movement. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, however, the predominantly Muslim republic of Chechnya has lost much of its sympathy in the international arena and Russia’s ongoing human rights abuses are now considered counter-terrorism strategies (Kramer 2004: 6). Despite Russian rhetoric, Islam was not the driving force behind Chechen separatism, as Sufi missionaries brought Islam to Chechnya well after its sense of ethnic unity had developed (Ness 2005: 369; Arquilla and Karasik 1999: 210: Galeotti 2002: 342–3). While it has been confirmed that Wahhabi militants from Saudi Arabia joined the Chechen insurgency at some point after the first war with Russia, contributing financial resources, weapons, and trained terrorists, the Chechens emphasize that they are simply utilizing opportunities and that their primary objective, separation from Russia, remains intact. Their goals do not include those of the reactionary Wahabbis who wish to eliminate nation-state boundaries and return to the days of the Islamic caliphate. Instead, the Chechens strive to maintain a domestic terrorist organization in that they seek separation from Russia (Williams 2004: 197). Such claims are supported by the conflicts that have arisen between the Chechens, who struggle to direct their domestic wars, and the Wahabbis, who use their resources to pressure the Chechens into embracing international goals. The power struggle between domestic Chechen terrorists and international Wahabbi terrorists within the Chechen separatist movement has led observers to coin the phrase “Arabization of the Chechen conflict,” indicating that the movement that began as “a separatist independence movement has been hijacked” by Islamic jihadists (Franchetti 2003). Thus, the Army of the Republic of Chechnya-Ichkeria (ARCI) began

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as a domestic terrorist movement, but is in danger of becoming an international terrorist group through an internal usurpation of power by the Wahabbis. Indeed, during the Moscow theater attack, much of which was filmed by the insurgents themselves and later included in the documentary, Terror in Moscow, although a flag and headscarves used by the terrorists in the film are inscribed in Arabic, the domestically oriented Chechen terrorists are unable to read them. One female terrorist explains her nationalist motivation, saying, “Every nation has the right to decide its own fate. Russia has taken this from us” (Reed 2003). Subsequent interviews with the theater hostages indicated that the some of the male terrorists were not Chechen, but Arab, and spoke Russian instead of Chechen. In addition, the terrorists were far more interested in ferreting out hostages employed by the Russian government than they were in promoting Islam (Speckhard et al. 2004). Thus, the Chechen liberation movement originated as, and strives to remain, a domestic terrorist movement. The Chechen rebels, the ARCI, publicly condemned the September 11 terrorist attacks on the US, but Russia well understands the importance of linking Chechen militants to Al Qaeda, accurately or not, to avoid international reprimand for government attacks on Chechen communities and human rights abuses. In defense of their terrorist actions, the ARCI points to widespread arrests of their countrymen, Russian government attacks on Chechen civilians, and other human rights violations documented by groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. They argue that Russian President Vladimir Putin has taken advantage of a global anti-terrorism fervor to increase oppression of the Chechens, much like China’s “Strike Hard” campaign against its Muslim Uighur minority. The Russian government, then, depicts the Chechen separatist movement as Islamic terrorism and part of the Al Qaeda network of terror (Williams 2004: 198, 201). As a result, the international community is faced with the dilemma of supporting nationalist terrorists or state-sponsored terrorism. From its inception as a domestic terrorist organization, the ARCI was able to attract female members seeking to expand women’s opportunities through their anti-state activities. Chechen society is historically patriarchal and has no tradition of female warriors (Lawall and Spengeman 2004: 16). The disappointment of Chechnya’s failed bid for independence in the wake of the Cold War, however, drew many Chechen women into the ARCI liberation movement (Duffy 2000). Moreover, the social and economic devastation of the Chechen conflict launched Chechen women into roles as vocal political spokespersons in the public sphere and the primary breadwinners at home, sharply increasing their status in a patriarchal society (Abdullaev 2004). Since the Chechen state declared independence in 1991, the military response of the Russian government has severely reduced the number of male workers, leaving women as heads of most households. Russia’s carpet-

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bombing of the Chechen capital, Grozny, in 1999 destroyed the Chechen infrastructure, and the planting of Russian mines in Chechen farm fields has severely handicapped agricultural production, further increasing economic pressures for Chechen women. Additionally, human rights abuses, such as rape, torture, and murder by Russian troops, have pushed Chechen women to action. Some Chechen women have held peace marches, but others have exercised their power by joining the Army of the Republic and becoming terrorists (Healing 2005: 43–5). ARCI women have moved into the role of Warriors, taking up arms to become soldiers and snipers, positions previously reserved for men (Banner 2006: 217). ARCI women have also become the primary forces in suicide missions. Between 2000 and 2006, Chechen insurgents conducted approximately 30 distinct terrorist operations, killing over 1,200. Over 60 percent of these operations involved suicide bombing (ibid.: 215). Chechen suicide bombings are distinguished from other suicide attacks by the fact that they typically kill twice as many victims as other groups’ suicide operations and 70 percent of the bombings are conducted by women (Abdullaev 2004). Women reportedly, make up a clear majority of Chechen suicide attackers; a statistic that runs in stark contrast to gender patterns in most other suicide campaigns in the world. . . . Nearly 70 per cent of Chechen suicide attacks involve women and around 50 per cent involve women exclusively. . . . Only 25 per cent of Chechen suicide bombers are male. (Reuter 2004: 26) In June 2000, female Chechen insurgents killed 27 Russian Special Forces troops (Nivat 2005: 413; Zedalis 2004: 2). In October 2002, 41 Chechen terrorists, including 19 women, stormed a Moscow theater, holding 800 hostages for 57 hours and were stopped from completing their mission only by a gas attack from Russian forces. According to witnesses, one of the female terrorists was visibly pregnant, yet she “showed no weakness” (McDonald 2003). In May 2003, ARCI women killed close to 80 victims and wounded over 100 at two separate events, a public prayer meeting and a government compound in northern Chechnya. In June, a female suicide bomber killed herself and over a dozen bystanders near a Russian military base close to the Chechen border. The following month, two female Chechen suicide bombers detonated bombs, killing themselves and 14 victims at a Moscow rock festival (Glasser 2003). In 2004, Russia experienced over a dozen Chechen terrorist attacks and almost all of them were conducted, in part, by women (Jack 2004). ARCI women were also among the 27 masked terrorists who held over 200 parents and children hostage during the three-day Beslan school siege in September 2004 (James 2004). The Russian media have dubbed the Chechen female suicide bombers “Black Widows” who fight to avenge the deaths of husbands killed by

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Russian troops, or “White Stockings,” conjuring up myths of giant Baltic women with sniper rifles. The Chechens refer to these female suicide bombers as Shadhidki (Healing 2005: 47). Some critics contend that the Shadhidki, or Chechen female suicide bombers, are simply drugged (Kirilov 2005: 13), but the duration and logistical complexity of the Moscow theater siege, the school attack in Beslan, and the bombing of two Russian airliners belie such superficial explanations. Moreover, as the documentary Terror in Moscow reveals, the female suicide bombers strapped on their own explosive belts and were clearly in control of their own detonators, contrary to some reports (Reed 2003). Similarly, interviews with hostages from the theater attack reported that, “The women wore officer’s army belts and put explosives there. . . . Every woman had a pistol revolver and a grenade” (Speckhard et al. 2004: 308). One female terrorist even defied a male comrade’s admonition not to violate the Muslim prohibition against drinking alcohol (ibid.: 321). Therefore, it seems that the female Warriors are not mere subordinates taking orders from male comrades, but active participants in the terrorist cause. It is crucial to note that although these Chechen women are Muslim, they are not engaging in suicide missions as an act of martyrdom (Banner 2006: 218). They do not sacrifice themselves for religious purposes, because Sufism, the dominant form of Islam in Chechnya, does not support martyrdom and strictly prohibits suicide. Although Chechen female insurgents rely on suicide bombings over conventional combat to a greater extent than Sri Lanka’s LTTE women, this is due to practical considerations. Chechen women terrorists lack the infrastructure supports and access to other weaponry that the LTTE has, and therefore, consider suicide bombing a more pragmatic means of combat. In addition, while a female Chechen sniper may eliminate a handful of enemies, a suicide bomber can kill much larger numbers, sacrificing only one Warrior, making the use of the female suicide bomber an efficient and economical means of warfare. As one female suicide bomber reportedly told a hostage in the Moscow theater siege, “It is better to die here with you than in Chechnya for nothing. We will die regardless” (Reed 2003). Russian government sources argue that women are more vulnerable to radical influences and that the women of Chechnya are especially susceptible because so many of them have lost family members in the insurgency against Russia (Conley 1991: 332). However, most suicide bombers do not exhibit psychological abnormalities, are not socially isolated, are well educated, and are relatively stable financially (Banner 2006: 218; Merari 1998). If women were actually more open to radicalism than men, women would populate radical movements throughout the world in numbers at least equal to, if not surpassing, men. Yet that is not the case. While Chechen women may mobilize, in part, due to the loss of loved ones, women have lost family members in every terrorist movement that has existed, yet all do not take action. It is the domestic nature of the Chechen terrorist movement that draws women.

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They participate at the highest levels of combat, leadership, and policymaking as Warriors and Dominant Forces because they anticipate the elimination not only of repression against Chechens, but against Chechen women’s disadvantaged position in society as well. Although the ARCI may well be in a stage of transition from domestic Chechen terrorists to international Wahabbi jihadists, to the extent that the ARCI is still a domestic terrorist group, it retains the high level of female activity characterized within domestic terrorist movements; however, as the organization is usurped by the international jihadists and opportunities for women disappear, women’s roles in the movement are predicted to decline.

Europe: international terrorism International terrorism in Europe reached its peak in the 1970s following the emergence of the radical student movements of 1968, the anti-war movement, and the anti-nuclear movement. While the majority of those who opposed such government policies did so through legal protest and electoral participation, fringe groups formed that rejected not only specific policies but also the democratic structures and practices of governments throughout Europe and much of the world. The majority of the terrorist groups that arose in Europe during the post-WWII era have been international rather than domestic (Sterling 1981: 8). Indeed, some European terrorist groups have attracted collaborators from terrorist groups in the Middle East, Asia, and the American continent. Terrorist organizations as diverse and far-flung as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Japanese Red Army, and the Weather Underground have worked in tandem with Europe’s international terrorist groups. Another striking characteristic of Europe’s international terrorist organizations is the low level of female participation. Obviously, Europe does not share the traits that are often used to explain a lack of female participation, such as Latin America’s marianismo and machismo, or Asia’s Confucian conformity, or Islam’s proscribed gender roles. In fact, feminism and women’s rights movements are more advanced in the industrialized states of Europe than in the vast majority of the world. In this context, the role of international terrorism and its lack of appeal to women becomes even more evident as we examine the role of women in Italy’s Red Brigades, Germany’s Baader-Meinhof Gang, and the Irish Republican Army. Italy: Red Brigades The 1960s was a time of great change for Italy. According to data gathered in 1952, 50 percent of Italy’s households lacked running water and 75 percent did not have an indoor bathroom, but by the early 1960s, indoor plumbing, televisions, and family automobiles became the norm as industry and consumerism skyrocketed throughout the country. Yet

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survey respondents in a national poll indicated that the most significant historical development of the previous 50 years was the advent of terrorism. Industrialization, WWII liberation, and the fascist period lagged far behind. As one scholar notes, “The terrorism of the 1960s and 1970s was neither a war nor a revolution, but something of both” and “cut across class and regional lines, affecting the entire society” (Drake 1999: 62–3). Although there were numerous radical left-wing political groups in Italy at the time, the Brigate Rosse, or Red Brigades, were by far the most violent and notorious. They viewed alternative groups of the left as traitors to the socialist cause and puppets of the democratic capitalist regime. Political support for the left was strong in Italy’s post-war era and the official Communist Party enjoyed considerable popularity, earning over 30 percent of the votes in some elections; but the Communists had renounced the goal of revolution to make these inroads into the electorate and dissatisfied radicals broke from the leftist mainstream to create violent opposition groups. Some Catholic priests, such as Don Lorenzo Milani, also criticized Italy’s materialist society, emphasizing the need for a commitment to social justice and return to spiritual values, but like the Communists, the Church sought reform only through established channels and conventional non-violent politics (ibid.: 65, 70). The Red Brigades formed in 1969 when Renato Curcio, a student at the University of Trento, began recruiting Marxist students and automobile factory workers in Milan for a violent socialist revolution. The left-wing movement opposed the imperialism and capitalism of rightist political forces and sought to incite a world revolution through class warfare. The Brigades began their campaign of violence by sabotaging factory equipment and breaking into labor union offices, but by 1972 had expanded their activities into bombings, political assassinations, kidnapping, and “kneecapping,” or shooting victims’ knees to permanently cripple them (MIPT 2005c). From 1969 through 1984, Italy suffered thousands of terrorist attacks, killing or seriously injuring more than 1,200 victims, including “policemen, politicians, lawyers, judges, university professors, union leaders, industrialists, and unclassifiable bystanders” (Drake 1999: 63). The Red Brigades were international in both their goals and tactics, as they sought to bring about a global revolution through terrorist attacks on the forces of imperialism and corporate power. The Christian Democratic Party of Italy came under fierce attack as it was perceived to be the conservative capitalist puppet of the imperialist US, at that time embroiled in the Vietnam conflict. In retaliation for what the Brigades viewed as the Christian Democratic Party’s collaboration with Western imperialists, the terrorist group committed their most notorious crime in 1978 with the kidnap and murder of former Prime Minister of Italy, Aldo Moro. Moro’s continued role in the Italian government, as well as his leadership of the Conservative Party, made him an ideal target for the leftist Red Brigades, intent on destroying bourgeois society. The Christian Democrats were

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viewed as the political arm of the Catholic Church, which the Red Brigades viewed as “the forbidding presence” that was “the principal cause of Italy’s sadly repressed state in matters having to do with sex and family” (ibid.: 64). It is believed that Moro’s kidnapping was intentionally timed to occur as he left church, headed to a political appointment (Wagner-Pacifici 1988). The heinous nature of this act alienated any popular support that the Red Brigades had previously enjoyed in their country, but negative public opinion and severe anti-terrorist measures from the government did not diminish Brigade operations. The Red Brigades continued to target prominent international figures, including foreign industrialists, diplomats, and military personnel. Other international terrorist acts included the 1981 kidnapping of US General James Lee Dozier, the commander of NATO, in an effort to alienate NATO members and weaken the defense alliance against the Soviet Union’s Warsaw Pact. In 1984, the Brigades kidnapped Leamon Hunt, the US chief of the Sinai Multinational Force and Observer Group, to protest US military intervention in the Middle East (MIPT 2005c). Brigade terrorist activity reached a peak in 1979 with 2,513 attacks that year, declining to 30 by 1986 (Ferracuti 1998: 59), but their agenda of violence remained intact and the 1970s and early 1980s came to be known as the “years of lead” due to the many bullets fired by the Red Brigades (Westcott 2004). As an international terrorist organization in an industrialized European state, the Red Brigades had little to offer female members and their enrollment figures reflect that. Even though the 1970s saw increased enrollment of women in universities and more women in the workforce, women were not drawn into the Red Brigades in comparable proportions (Weinberg and Eubank 1987: 244–5). Like many leftist terrorist organizations, although the Red Brigades tried to present “a strong female presence, the absolute number of females that were engaged in them was rather limited” (Ness 2005: 356). Like other international organizations, women’s participation in the Italian Red Brigades was limited primarily to that of Sympathizers and Spies, with only very few women serving in nominal leadership positions. Interviews of 2,512 left-wing Italian terrorists, active from 1970 to 1984, found that 18 percent were female, but the interviewers acknowledge that missing data likely reduces this number (Weinberg and Eubank 1987: 249, 253). Although women were “represented at all levels of the terrorist organization,” only 7 percent or fewer of the 215 female members occupied leadership positions, while less than 66 percent were classified as “regulars.” The “regular militants” of the Red Brigades were full-time operatives who lived “underground,” avoiding family and friends and maintaining false identities to facilitate their operations. The “irregular militants” did not renounce their normal lives, occupations, or family connections, because “their task was, in fact, to win popular support for the organization” (della Porta 1995: 129). While the Red Brigades may have held as many as 300 female

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members at its peak, “these women overwhelmingly belong to the category of supporters” (Weinberg and Eubank 1987: 253, 257; Talbot 2003: 6). Despite the Red Brigades’ socialist origins, feminism and women’s movements did not play a role in women’s involvement in the Red Brigades. In fact, the Red Brigades and militant feminist groups were mutually exclusive. Both expected their members to give them first priority and neither tolerated the other (MacDonald 1991: 174). Approximately 27 percent of the female members claimed to have joined due to a family member’s involvement in terrorism, rather than a strong personal conviction. An additional 35 percent were university students, suggesting a temporary commitment (Weinberg and Eubank 1987: 254). Leadership and decisionmaking opportunities were similarly limited for women in the Red Brigades. Female members had to fight for equality with men within the organization, challenging traditional gender stereotypes of motherhood and non-violence. There were no female leaders or commanders in the movement. Just as in conventional society, the Red Brigades considered both violence and leadership to be masculine attributes (Ness 2005: 356). The decline of the Red Brigades came from a combination of strict counter-terrorism policies and the internal fragmentation of the organization. The Italian government implemented unprecedented “special measures” after the murder of Moro. Terrorism suspects were detained and interrogated without benefit of legal counsel and criminal penalties were significantly enhanced, including the addition of automatic life sentences for the murder of public officials. Concessions were made to those who provided information and testimony against other terrorists (Drake 1999: 67). This political pressure combined with the increasing friction of the terrorist leaders’ growing egos to create serious rifts within the Brigades. By 1984, the Red Brigades had split into the Communist Combatant Party and the Union of Combatant Communists, and four of the original leaders wrote an open letter from prison abandoning the armed struggle (MIPT 2005c). The two factions remain in existence but their wave of terror came to an end with the murder of Roberto Ruffilli, an advisor to the Christian Democratic Party, in 1988. In 1999, after a hiatus of more than a decade, another advisor, Massimo D’Alema, was assassinated (Drake 1999: 68). Since that time, the groups’ efforts have been severely hampered by the Italian government’s vigorous investigations and prosecutions of terrorist suspects. These legal measures have grown increasingly stringent in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US. The international objectives of the Brigades presented little allure to women. In an advanced industrialized European state, women faced fewer societal obstacles than women in developing countries, and any existing problems were unlikely to be changed by the international orientation of the Red Brigades. The Communist Party’s ability to work within the conventional political system while promoting egalitarian concerns offered a much more viable alternative to Italian women of the political left.

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Germany: Baader-Meinhof/Red Army Faction The Baader-Meinhof Bande, or Baader-Meinhof Gang (BMG), formed in 1969 under the leadership of university student Andreas Baader and journalist Ulriche Meinhof. Baader was already active in left-wing student protests and had been arrested in the “German Autumn” of 1967 for setting fire to department stores to protest the police shooting of an anti-Shah (of Iran) protestor on June 2 (Red Army Faction 1971: 1). Meinhof, a journalist covering Baader’s 1968 trial, portrayed him in a sympathetic light. As West Germany’s Christian Democratic Union and Social Democratic Party formed a Grand Coalition to gain a majority in the Bundestag, Baader and Meinhof grew more alienated, and while the parliamentary coalition encouraged cooperation among moderate parties, it also stifled dissent from the more radical factions with which Baader and Meinhof identified (Bracher 1972: 617). Following the death of the original student protest leader by police, Baader and Meinhof assumed control of the loosely knit university students and organized them into a terrorist organization. The group embraced a socialist agenda and became part of the student revolution, influenced by other radical Marxist movements of the 1970s (Mitscherlich-Nielson 1978: 13). In 1970, Meinhof issued a manifesto, “The Concept of the Urban Guerrilla,” advocating the use of the Latin American urban guerrilla strategy used by Uruguay’s domestic terrorists, the Tupamaros, for an international agenda. Meinhof signed the manifesto with a new name, the Rote Armee Fraktion, or Red Army Faction (RAF). The moniker was inspired by the Japanese Red Army, which had hijacked a plane to North Korea that year and was seeking training from Palestinian terrorists, and the word fraktion, which referred to a communist military unit. The RAF soon came to be considered Europe’s deadliest terrorist organization (International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism 2003). Like many other international terrorist organizations of the 1970s, the RAF opposed imperialism in general and US involvement in Vietnam in particular. As one RAF publication states, “It is crucial to note that the RAF defined itself first and foremost by its struggle against US imperialism” (Red Army Faction 1971: 30). In 1970, West Germany’s Federal Republic opened negotiations with East Germany through its Ostpolitik, or eastern policy. Although the improved relationship reduced the likelihood of an armed conflict, the RAF interpreted it as the East German Democratic Republic’s tacit approval of US imperialism and its expansion to Asia and Latin America (ibid.: 16). As the RAF explained, “The Federal Republic’s indirect financial and military support of American wars of aggression enable it to profit from the exploitations of the Third World without taking any direct responsibility for these war crimes” (ibid.: 17). The RAF also rejected the consumer society of the capitalist world economy and sought to overthrow the corporate-backed democratic power

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structures through a socialist world revolution. The concept of an international revolutionary network of urban guerrillas in Vietnam, Latin America, and the US was the key factor in the RAF’s development and the group hoped to end West Germany’s role as a junior partner in American imperialism (Tolmein 1997: 36). In pursuit of these goals, the group attacked American military bases in West Germany, German police stations, government personnel involved in the reunification of East and West Germany or European integration, and targeted industries that they deemed to be in collusion with US and European imperialist consumer society, including newspaper offices (International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism 2003; MacDonald 1991: 203). Initially, the RAF was known for “low casualty bombings” (Whitlock 2007). In May of 1972, the RAF bombed the US military barracks in Frankfurt, killing one person; later that month, the bombing of the European headquarters of the US Army killed three. The remainder of the year saw four other RAF bombings in German cities (Horchem 1985: 63–4). The death toll began to mount, however, as the RAF hijacked a Lufthansa airliner in 1977, killing the pilot and diverting the flight to Somalia to rendezvous with foreign terrorists. When a German counter-terrorist squad rescued the passengers, the RAF responded within hours by executing Hanns-Martin Schleyer, the kidnapped director of the national labor federation (Whitlock 2007). In the same year, the group also assassinated West Germany’s chief federal prosecutor, Siegfried Brubach (ibid.). In 1981, the RAF launched a series of attacks against US military targets in protest of NATO’s nuclear weapons in Germany. They also firebombed US military sites in Frankfurt and Wiesbaden and attempted to bomb the American library in West Berlin and the Dow Chemical plant in Dusseldorf. The RAF detonated a car bomb at the US Air Force headquarters at Ramstein and attempted to assassinate US General Frederick Kroesen by firing anti-tank weapons at the general’s car (US Department of State 1981: 16–17). The International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism (2003) estimates that the RAF was responsible for the murders of between 30 and 50 individuals and seriously injuring hundreds from 1969 until the group’s disbanding in 1998. The RAF also established coalitions with other terrorist organizations, especially Palestinian terrorist groups, sharing training facilities and strategies (Karmon 2000). To finance these and other operations, the group conducted bank robberies, demanded kidnap ransoms, burglarized government offices to steal documents, and stole BMW automobiles, which jokingly became referred to as Baader-Meinhof Wagens (MacDonald 1991: 203). The organization had a vast network of supporters that enabled it to continue its activities despite the stringent counter-terrorism operations of the German government and the formation of the renowned anti-terrorism squad, the Grenschutzgruppe 9 (Horchem 1985: 64). The RAF was the longest-lived and most dangerous of Germany’s left-wing terrorist organizations.

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As an international terrorist organization, the RAF offered women little incentive to join. Although the group espoused a socialist platform, it did not include any specific feminist agenda. In the thriving economy and egalitarian environment of post-war West Germany, women who sought to advance their position in society would undoubtedly choose to join other organizations. Most scholars agree that approximately 33 percent of the RAF consisted of women. They disagree, however, over what type of roles and positions the women occupied within the organizational hierarchy. One study contends that women comprised 60 percent of the RAF leadership (Russell and Miller 1978), while others find such claims to be wildly exaggerated, but speculate that women “were at least as likely as men to have attained leading positions” (Merkl 1995: 203). Still others maintain that a significant number of women filled the ranks of the RAF, but that there were few leaders or women Warriors in combat, as “women who carried out attacks or who served as leaders were exceedingly rare” (Weinberg and Eubank 1987: 243). Women served as “helpers, advisers, and spies . . . organisers” and hid weapons under their coats in case of arrest (Horchem 1974: 5). While these Sympathizer and Spy functions undoubtedly contributed to the existence of the RAF, they are primarily support services, not combat, leadership, or policymaking roles. Ex-RAF member, Silke Maier-Witt, reported that her principal duties were surveillance and that she “regularly jogged past the house” of Germany’s Foreign Minister and “sneaked around the American quarter of Bonn” rather than engaging directly in fighting or decisionmaking (Boston 2001: A1–2). Brigitte Mohnhaupt was convicted in 1985 of “involvement” in nine assassinations with a male RAF comrade, Christian Klar, including that of the West German chief prosecutor and the director of the nation’s labor federation in 1977, as well as the 1981 rocket-propelled grenade attack against the vehicle of the NATO Commander. Although Mohnhaupt and Klar were convicted at the same time, only Mohnhaupt was granted parole. Moreover, her 2007 parole negotiations were held in private; therefore the full extent of her participation remains a subject of contention (Dempsey 2007; Landler 2007). Several studies find that the women of the RAF “lacked self-esteem,” desired a male authority figure, and were easily manipulated into filling the lower-level support services needed by a terrorist organization (Jäger et al.1981: 24–8, as cited in Merkl 1995: note 88). Psychological reasons for RAF women’s subservience are frequently cited, but these observations acknowledge the subordinate role, nonetheless (Mitscherlich-Nielson 1978: 14). Journalistic sources agree that women filled support roles only, referring to “the myth of the terrorist woman” and crediting their role of “media darlings” to sensationalistic journalism (MacDonald 1991: 207). Other studies of the RAF simply declare that the men outweighed the women (Paczensky 1978: 9). Women in the BMG and RAF, then, filled the roles of Sympathizers and Spies.

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Women’s dissatisfaction with the RAF even led some members to form the Rota Zora, a female splinter group that declared a guerrilla war against the institutionalized sexism of bourgeois capitalist society. The group derived its name from a 1941 novel in which the red-haired Croatian heroine, Zora, leads a band of orphans on a quest for social justice (Paterson 2007). The group zealously protested the RAF’s restrictions on women’s reproductive options, such as birth control and abortion, which contributed to its departure from the larger movement (Varon 2004: 359). The Rota Zora pursued its specialized campaign after leaving the RAF, bombing sex shops, adult cinemas, and industrial giants like Bayer and Siemens that were perceived as perpetuating the objectification of women; however, in the 45 terrorist operations that the group conducted from 1977 to 1995, the members were careful to avoid any casualties, inflicting only property damage (Paterson 2007). Thus, even the members of the all-female unit cannot fully be considered Warriors or Dominant Forces. The purportedly star-crossed love between the RAF’s early leaders, Baader and Meinhof, and their ensuing suicides in prison has undoubtedly contributed to the inflated reports of women’s leadership in the RAF. Yet despite the presence of Meinhof in a nominal leadership role, her position stemmed from her romantic relationship with Baader rather than any independent terrorist credentials. In addition, the RAF’s definition of combat differed from conventional perceptions. During a trip to a PLO training camp in Jordan, Baader reportedly equated sexual promiscuity with “shooting,” saying that both were equally important to the anti-imperialist struggle (Vague 2002: 96). Although she was undeniably a symbolic figurehead and media attraction, she did not routinely serve in combat or policymaking, and was therefore neither a Warrior nor a Dominant Force. By 1985, there were still 25 RAF terrorists in action and approximately half of them were women; however, most were part of the support network that maintained the RAF’s ability to operate (Horchem 1985: 64). In 1997, the German government declared that the RAF was no longer a threat, and in 1998 the RAF announced its dissolution in an eight-page press release (International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism 2003). Ireland – Irish Republican Army The Irish Republic Army (IRA) formed in 1916 as an international terrorist organization intent on ending centuries of oppressive British control over Ireland. After the 1922 partition of Ireland, the IRA also targeted the British government of Northern Ireland. However, the inclusion of the Ulster government as an opponent did not shift the IRA’s terrorism to a domestic focus because the primary target remained the British government. The IRA attacked the agents of British rule in Northern Ireland, such as the Royal Ulster Constabulary and British military troops. IRA attacks even extended to London during the English Campaign of the 1970s. Therefore,

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the IRA is an international terrorist organization in that it opposes the external forces of British rule and British participation in the government of Northern Ireland and seeks to unite Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland. As an international terrorist organization with a nationalist agenda against an external force, the IRA expectedly exhibits only limited participation from female members. While the IRA enjoys the popular support of many women, their involvement is confined almost exclusively to support level activities, such as information gathering, transportation, and provision of food, shelter, and equipment. Women’s formal part in the nationalist struggle began as early as 1881 when the IRA formed the Ladies’ Land League so that women could represent nationalist opposition to landlord abuses, but the women’s “uncompromising stance” left the male nationalist leadership “determined to ensure that women would never again be given the power that had been handed to the Ladies’ Land League” (Ward 1983: 5). In subsequent decades, the Fenians, as nationalist Irish in support of armed struggle were then called, totally excluded women from participation in the cause. The League’s successor, the Cumann na mBan, or League of Women, formed with 100 women in 1914 and their constitution stated the movement’s goals as: (1) advancing the cause of Irish liberty, (2) organizing Irish women for this purpose, (3) assisting in the arming of Irishmen to defend Ireland, and (4) financing these efforts through establishment of the Defence of Ireland Fund (ibid.: 93). Even among women, a feminist agenda or consideration of women’s issues fell to the goal of ousting British rule, for as soon as the men had realised the necessity of having a subordinate organisation to do the necessary but tedious work of collecting funds, the women had eagerly responded, but without first extracting a public commitment from the Volunteers that the women would be politically equal to the men (ibid.: 96) and “Cumann na mBan’s main function was to service the needs of the local Volunteers” (ibid.: 158). The women learned first aid, signaling, map reading, care of weapons, and attended lectures on the structure and constitution of their organization, in addition to acting as scouts, gathering intelligence, providing communication between IRA leaders, transporting ammunition, food, and other supplies; however, “no member of Cumann na mBan took an active part in the fighting, their role being confined to the three areas of nursing, cooking, and dispatch carrying” (ibid.: 111, 158–9). In the late 1960s, the younger women of Cumann na mBan demanded access to the ranks of the IRA military and training. With the split of the

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Provisional IRA, the Provos allowed women to participate in military activities, but without full status as IRA members. As the IRA reorganized its hierarchy, it integrated women into the organization on what was promised to be an equal footing with men (Alison 2004: 451; Ward 1983: 258–9). However, even though women were provided with revolvers for self-defense, they typically remained “as far removed from the firing as possible, organising places for the men to be fed and the wounded treated” (Ward 1983: 111). Interviews from 2003 and 2004 indicate that female combatants in the IRA participated in bomb-making and assassinations; however, the interviews also agree that “it is women who have had central responsibility for transporting, moving, hiding, cleaning, and storing weapons and explosives materials” (Alison 2004: 457). Linda Edgerton describes the IRA as an “armed patriarchy” and contends that “women have a long tradition of active participation in the Republican organizations, although largely through separate units and in ways dictated by the male-dominated movement” (1986: 73). IRA women admit that they “sometimes face resistance from male comrades” due to traditional gender stereotypes of Irish society (Alison 2004: 448). Yet it is not only the patriarchy of the IRA that limits women’s participation; it is the women themselves. Women are not permitted to join the Cumann na mBan if they are unwed mothers, divorced, or living with a man without being married. The women impose very traditional gender roles upon themselves (Fairweather et al. 1984: 238–9). IRA women share the national resistance goals of the male IRA members, but often reject the organization’s positions on women’s issues, such as birth control and abortion, which are strongly influenced by Catholic doctrine (Alison 2004: 459). Indeed, both the Catholic and Protestant churches in Northern Ireland are much more conservative on women’s issues than they are in England or other locales. Moreover, in what has been described as a “backwater of feminism,” women’s “efforts have been directed almost wholly to civil rights rather than to women’s issues” (Edgerton 1986: 61). Even conventional political groups for women, such as Women Together, Witness for Peace, Community of the Peace People, focus on protesting civil rights abuses by the British government rather than promoting women’s rights (McClung Lee 1983: 204). Inghinidhe na hEireann is presently the only independent nationalist women’s organization, but “like the formation of Cumann na mBan . . . [was] only a partial victory in that women were then carefully consigned to the role of subordinates and given no real opportunity to influence the direction of the movement” (Ward 1983: 3). Although some women persisted in their calls for equality within the IRA and other Irish nationalist organizations, “the militant and outspoken individuals never won out. As anomalies within the rigidly masculine tradition of Irish nationalism, they were either deliberately suppressed or eventually compelled to amalgamate with the wider movement” (ibid.: 248). Entry into the European Union has broadened opportunities for Irish women, as

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seen in the 1990 election of feminist Mary Robinson to the Presidency (Sales 1997: 28). However, the traditional role of women is embedded in the Irish constitution, and it was only “after a long campaign by women members, Sinn Fein voted to support a woman’s right to choose in the 1980s. It later abandoned the policy . . . reflect[ing] the continuing hold of traditional community values” regarding women (Sales 1997: 175). Even noted Republican leader, Erskine Childers, stated that “the feminine mind is anarchistic and selfish. Women have neither principles themselves nor any sort of abstract belief in principles. Their only guide is their own desires. They are selfish and uncivilised animals” (Peatling 2003: 179). The consensus of most scholars is that women within the nationalist Irish Republican movement participate only at the lowest levels of support due to the actions of both men and women within the patriarchal society. Women’s resistance is composed primarily of protest letters, civil suits filed in court, and conducting classes in Gaelic (Ward 1983: 17, 51). Other Irish nationalist groups have “criticised the absence of an independent voice for women” in both Sinn Fein and the IRA (Sales 1997: 175) and observers note that Irish feminists and nationalists seem to be mutually exclusive (Galligan et al. 1999: 149). In the shadow of the nationalist cause, women’s equality has “foundered over the mutually reinforcing cleavages of nationalism and religion that structure Northern Ireland’s political alignments” (Wilford 1999: 195). The pattern of a passive or domestic role for women within patriarchal Irish society has extended into the twenty-first century. Not only does Irish nationalism fail to support a feminist agenda, but the “current Northern Ireland peace process marginalises the political influence of women” (Peatling 2003: 182, 179). Outside the IRA, traditional society perceives that the mere presence of women in a terrorist organization is “doubly deviant” and “inspires an exaggerated fear in the state,” causing the state to describe inaccurately female members as “terrorists” even though their activities are limited to support levels (Pickering and Third 2003: 9). Even studies that find evidence of female participation in combat positions admit that “existing research suggests that female combatants are often perceived as a necessary but temporary aberration in a time of national crisis” (Alison 2004: 458).

6

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Clearly, the domestic terrorist groups examined in this book exhibit participation at higher levels of combat, leadership, and policymaking than do international terrorist organizations. Using Griset and Mahan’s model, it is apparent that women from domestic terrorist organizations operate as Warriors and Dominant Forces while women in international terrorist movements remain in the roles of Sympathizers and Spies. Women in domestic terrorist groups oppose the internal structures of their own state and defy the discrimination and disadvantage therein. The more opportunity for improvement that they perceive, the more likely women are to mobilize and seek higher positions within the hierarchy of the domestic terrorist group. Therefore, it is not necessarily that the terrorist organization allows women to fight or proceed into the echelons of leadership and policymaking, rather, the female members are responsible for mobilizing themselves and pursuing increasing levels of participation. Of course, the relationship may become reciprocal as more women fill the ranks of combat troops and command, moving into the positions of Warriors and Dominant Forces. As part of the overall anti-state program, the leadership can incorporate women’s issues and concerns into the group’s objectives, at times even incorporating a feminist agenda, as seen in some of the case studies from previous chapters, such as the Tupamaros, Sandinistas, Shining Path, Nepali Communists, and Tamil Tigers. The rising numbers and levels of women’s involvement has a cyclical effect, causing the group to become more responsive to women’s objectives, thereby attracting still more women. Thus, women are initially drawn to the organization as a means of eliminating oppressive state forces and their impact on the group’s internal policies attracts still more female recruits. Among the domestic terrorist groups of the Americas, those of Central and South America share a common historical and cultural past due to Spanish colonial rule and the predominance of Catholicism. From this shared culture emerged the concept of Liberation Theology in the 1970s, which strongly influenced many Latin American terrorist movements, as well as the gender roles associated with marianismo and machismo. However, these terrorist groups were also associated with leftist socialist ideologies.

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Therefore, women labored under the inhibiting factors of marianismo, yet the effects were balanced by the mitigating forces of socialism. Yet all of the region’s domestic terrorist groups exhibited high levels of female membership, with Uruguay’s Tupamaros and Guatemala’s National Revolutionary Unity exhibiting lows of 25 percent with the remaining movements at 40–50 percent female. These numbers are particularly noteworthy considering that formal feminist policies or agendas existed in only the Tupamaros, Nicaragua’s Sandinistas, and Peru’s Shining Path. The common factor of poverty contributed to women’s mobilization in Nicaragua, Guatemala, Colombia, and Mexico, but women terrorists also emerged in relatively stable economies and among middle and upper class women in other nations. Similarly, El Salvador and Uruguay revealed a historical tradition of political activism for women, but this was less evident in other cases. Only the Sandinistas of Nicaragua, El Salvador’s Farabundo Martí, and Uruguay’s Tupamaros have made the transition from terrorist movement to political party, gaining legislative representation and institutionalizing improvements in women’s political, economic, and social status in their respective countries. In spite of these many disparate characteristics, all of these terrorist groups exhibit high degrees of female participation at the levels of Warriors and Dominant Forces, as explained by Griset and Mahan’s model. They also display the common factor of a domestic orientation, rather than an international one. The nations of Asia also share some degree of traditional patriarchy; however, that has not prevented the emergence of domestic terrorist movements and correspondingly high levels of female terrorist activity. Despite the fact that Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, India’s Naxalites, and Nepal’s Communists all have Marxist origins, only the Tamils and the Nepali Communists have any formal feminist agenda, yet approximately one-third of each group is composed of women who are active at all levels, including those of Warriors and Dominant Forces. Unlike Latin America, the women of these terrorist organizations do not share any common religious characteristics that might motivate their political violence. The Tamils and Naxalites are from predominantly Hindu origins, while the Nepali Communists typically come from a Buddhist background. Further distinguishing the groups is the fact that only the Tamils utilize female suicide bombers. Indeed, they are known as the most prolific of all suicide bombers, conducting more suicide bombing operations than any other terrorist organization. The shared traits among these groups are the domestic nature of their insurgencies and the resulting participation of women as Warriors and Dominant Forces. The domestic terrorist groups of the Tamils, Naxalites, and Nepali Communists recruit women not as part of some superficial homage to a particular ideology, but out of pragmatism. The domestic terrorist organizations need women’s participation and are therefore open to women, even in cultures that traditionally do not encourage female Warriors and Dominant Forces.

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The terrorist movements of Africa present considerable challenge due to the difficulty of collecting data. This dearth of information limits our ability to identify patterns of terrorist behavior and draw conclusions. Although this study focuses on the activity of groups that meet the technical definition of terrorist and those that also include women participants, this is a very broad category. The wars of liberation that took place in the post-WWII era differ from the ethnic and tribal conflicts that have emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War. Furthermore, the introduction of new conflicts and actors, such as privatized military firms and child soldiers, is certain to play some part in the causes and effects of terrorism; however, the lack of reliable data inhibits our ability to study the interplay of these phenomena and draw logical conclusions. The Middle East presents similar challenges in that there are many terrorist groups to study, but the continuous dealignment and realignment of these groups as radicals splinter from comparative moderates makes careful examination and comparison difficult. Within this examination of Africa and the Middle East, we find fewer domestic terrorist movements and, therefore, less female participation at the levels of Warriors and Dominant Forces; however, the Zimbabwe Army of National Liberation and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party fall into this small category. Most of the nations of Africa and the Middle East share a past of colonial rule and national liberation movements; however, the data on these insurgencies is typically presented from a Western or Euro-centric perspective, if it is available at all. The region has also been host to many post-Cold War ethnic conflicts and civil wars, but again, the data are difficult to gather. Thus, although terrorism in this area of the world deserves more research, conducting it is problematic. Zimbabwe’s ZANLA was a national liberation movement of the Cold War era, based on ethnic cohesion and the desire for independence, rather than any religious or leftist motivation. While ZANLA had no formal feminist policy, it did abolish the custom of bride prices and encouraged both men and women to expand their traditional gender roles. ZANLA did not actively recruit women, but Zimbabwean women mobilized themselves, demanding access to a movement that offered them hope. Eventually, the organization’s membership was estimated to be 25 to 33 percent female. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party of Turkey is also a domestic nationalist movement. It originated with a Marxist ideology, but shifted to Islamism after the fall of the Soviet Union. Despite Kurdish patriarchal traditions and the Islamic religious influence on its ideology, the PKK does not limit women’s participation. In fact, 11 of the PKK’s 14 suicide bombing operations have been conducted by women; however, because women are integral members of the PKK as Warriors and Dominant Forces, suicide bombings are used only as a last resort in times of desperation. European terrorist movements present their own difficulties in analysis. Much like Asia, the international terrorist groups of Europe have declined and domestic terrorist organizations have moved to the forefront of terrorist

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operations; however, we find women in groups from both leftist elites of the 1970s and longer-term nationalist ethnic movements. The European domestic terrorists of this study consist of the ethnically cohesive secessionist groups, the Basque ETA and the Chechen resistance. Between 11 and 25 percent of ETA members are female and many of the group’s leaders are women, even though the ETA espouses no formal feminist agenda. In addition, although most etarras are Catholic, religion plays no role in their movement. The Chechen resistance is also a secessionist insurgency with no feminist agenda, but it exhibits even higher levels of female participation than the ETA. The Chechen militants also differ from the ETA in that they often use female suicide bombers. Although they do not employ these tactics as frequently as Sri Lanka’s Tamil rebels, the Chechen suicide operations are considered more deadly because they typically kill twice as many victims as other suicide bombings. The Chechen terrorist movement is also unique in this analysis in that it appears to be in a state of transition from domestic to international, which may well affect its female participation in the future. Since its inception as an ethnic secessionist insurgency, external forces in the form of Wahabbi jihadists have co-opted the movement with plentiful funding and Islamist soldiers, or mujahadeen. The internal power struggle between the domestic Chechen militants and the international jihadists for control of the terrorist movement has left the group in a state of flux. Although the Chechen resistance has to date exhibited female activity as Warriors and Dominant Forces, the shift to an internationally motivated terrorist organization will limit the motivation for women’s participation and will undoubtedly result in a decline of female participation. Those terrorist organizations that reject women or relegate them to subservient support roles demonstrate an obvious focus on international agendas and external enemies. The insurgents of these groups demonstrate female participation, but in a much more limited form and at the lower levels of support activity. The international terrorist groups of the Americas are comparatively fewer than the domestic terrorist organizations, but like the domestic groups, they exhibit few shared characteristics to explain their levels of female participation, other than the international orientation of the group. Both Cuba’s Communists and the Weather Underground of the US were socialist, but the similarity ended there. Cuba’s Communist women lived in poverty while the women of the Weather Underground Organization were affluent and university-educated. Beyond the general egalitarian ideology of the party, Cuban Communists had no formal feminist policy, yet the WUO created a detailed women’s platform – which it then failed to follow. Under Spanish control as recently as 1898, Cuba certainly held the restrictive gender roles of marianismo and machismo, as well as the motivating force of Liberation Theology, but the WUO experienced none of these in the US. Furthermore, the Cuban insurgents emphasized the foco, or vanguard, strategy, while the WUO sought a world revolution. Yet both terrorist movements exhibited low levels of female participation, with women filling

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the roles of Sympathizers and Spies rather than Warriors or Dominant Forces. The other two international terrorist groups of the Americas are the Hezbollah of the Tri-Border Area and the Ku Klux Klan of the US. Despite their obvious differences, these two organizations share several characteristics. Both are reactionary movements established in contravention to significant political and societal changes. The KKK emerged as a backlash against the American South’s loss of the Civil War, the subsequent end of slavery, and the institutionalization of racial equality. Hezbollah originally formed as a reaction against Western influence and US troops in Lebanon, and now persists as a proponent of international jihad. Both organizations also share a religious motivation in that the KKK claims to protect white Christian values, while Hezbollah promotes the strategy of Islamic jihad against infidels and apostates. Neither group has any form of feminist agenda and, in fact, both tend to restrict women to traditional gender roles, yet their low levels of female participation are due to their international orientation. As international terrorist structures, neither offers women any opportunity to improve their political, economic, or social status, therefore women choose not to mobilize. The two international terrorist groups of Asia, Japan’s Red Army and Vietnam’s National Liberation Front, present similar contrasts. Both groups were composed of up to 50 percent women, held Marxist ideological views, and developed from the Cold War antagonism between the US and USSR, but the membership of these groups was very different. The women of the JRA were affluent and well-educated urbanites, much like those of the WUO, while the women of the NLF were predominantly poor and illiterate agrarian peasants. Neither movement held formal feminist policies, as the JRA focused on international Trotskyism and the NLF maintained the traditional Confucian social norms of woman’s obedience to father, husband, and son. Both groups’ members were of Buddhist origin, but their religion had little influence on their political behavior. Yet, like the KKK and Hezbollah, the JRA and NLF shared a powerful tie, that of internationalism. The international agendas of the JRA and NLF espoused Marxist egalitarianism, but never implemented programs of equality because they were too preoccupied with combating external forces. The JRA and NLF both directed their energies outwardly, against the forces of Western imperialism and capitalist inequities, thus the movements neglected the inequities within their respective domestic societies and failed to elicit female participation beyond the levels of Sympathizers and Spies. Africa and the Middle East provide still more examples of international terrorist groups and minimal female participation. Mozambique’s FRELIMO was a national liberation movement, similar to that of Zimbabwe, but it was markedly international as part of the Cold War struggle between the superpowers, drawing aid from Algeria, Egypt, China, the USSR, and Eastern Europe. FRELIMO’s socialist platform included general

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notions of egalitarianism and land reform, but no specific agenda for women’s rights. Similarly, Algeria’s national liberation movement was also an international movement, combating French colonial rule and European imperialism. Various myths have arisen around the role of women in the Algerian resistance, but records indicate that these reports were highly exaggerated, much like the propaganda about women in Vietnam’s NLF. In rejecting all that was French, the FLN also eschewed the modernizing forces of French liberal democracy and embraced the gender roles established by Islam; therefore, the FLN attracted few female participants. Only 11 percent of the FLN consisted of women and those held the limited positions of Sympathizers and Spies. The Palestinian national liberation movement drew even fewer women. This ongoing conflict has become perhaps the most enduring and internationalized of all terrorist situations, involving nationstates and state sponsors of terrorism, terrorists and counter-terrorists, and international organizations throughout the Cold War and well into the postCold War era. Yet less than 20 women have actually participated in the conflict at any level beyond that of Sympathizer or Spy. The only female activity that could be considered to meet the criteria of Warrior is that of the Palestinian suicide bombers, yet even these operations demonstrate that the women are not integral members of their terrorist movements like those of the LTTE, PKK, or Chechen resistance. Instead, the female bombers of Palestine are recruited only weeks before they are deployed as living bombs. Thus, they are not Warriors, but only Sympathizers, or perhaps less. The international nature of the Palestinian liberation movement holds no opportunity for advancement for women and women react with limited motivation to join. Europe’s international terrorist organizations also exhibit low levels of female political violence, despite the differences between them. Italy’s Red Brigades and Germany’s Baader-Meinhof Gang were both groups of disaffected university students that emerged in the 1970s. These affluent intellectuals promoted a socialist agenda and even copied the urban guerrilla warfare of the domestic Tupamaros in Uruguay, yet their goals centered on an international workers’ revolution. Despite their socialist ideologies, the Brigades and the BMG did not incorporate gender equality or feminism into their own organizations. Women made up a third of the BMG and a mere 18 percent of the Red Brigades. Furthermore, the female members provided support to the male leaders of the organizations, rather than filling the roles of Warriors and Dominant Forces. The women of the Irish Republican Army also held limited power in their organization, even though the IRA was a cohesive ethnic terrorist group rather than a leftist ideological group of transient university students. None of the groups formalized policies on women’s rights or implemented them within their organizations. The limited female participation was not a result of an absent feminist agenda in the movements, nor the dominance of Catholicism in Italy, southern Germany, and Ireland, for Spain’s ETA is also Catholic and likewise lacks a

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policy on women’s rights, yet women are extremely active in that group. Instead, it is the international orientation of the Red Brigades, BMG, and IRA that limit opportunities for women and thereby fail to attract them. Women in international terrorist groups are much less likely than their counterparts in domestic terrorism to participate in combat and they are rarely found in leadership or policymaking positions. While males in terrorist groups may attempt to regulate strictly the behavior of females, these efforts seem to be successful only in internationally oriented groups. This study has demonstrated that international terrorist organizations exhibit far less female participation not as a result of male domination, but due to the lack of female mobilization. Women are simply less likely to sacrifice and demand access to an organization that offers no opportunity for improvement in the status of women as a whole. It is true that international terrorist organizations may suffer from the same patriarchy and gender inequality of the society from which they emerged, but many domestic terrorist groups share these origins and continue to reveal high levels of participation among female members. In contrast to this study, some scholars have argued that religious limitations on women imposed by Islam or Catholicism are responsible for the absence of women at higher levels of authority in international terrorist organizations (Cunningham 2003: 186; Kampwirth 2002: 30–2; Hasso 1998: 442–5; Skidmore and Smith 1997: 63; Kryzanek 1995: 34). However, domestic terrorist organizations often exist under identical conditions, yet their female members are far more active in combat, leadership roles, and policymaking. Many ideologies and doctrines discussed in previous chapters, such as machismo, marianismo, and Confucianism, emphasize a subordinate role for women, yet those in domestic terrorist groups defy these strictures and engage in participation at the highest levels. Other scholars contend that terrorist groups with a socialist ideology necessarily incorporate a feminist agenda (Stoltz Chinchilla 1997: 207; Fainsod Katzenstein and McClurg Mueller 1987: 63). However, feminism typically does not advocate political violence. Moreover, there are numerous socialist terrorist organizations that exhibit very little female participation. Cuba’s Communists, Vietnam’s National Liberation Front, Japan’s Red Army, Italy’s Red Brigades, Germany’s Red Army Faction, the Irish Republican Army, and the Weather Underground of the US are all leftist, yet virtually no women occupied high-ranking positions in these terrorist groups. Some studies credit female terrorist activity to individual personality differences (Merkl 1995; Mitscherlich-Nielsen 1978), yet several of the sources cited in this study conducted interviews with female terrorists (Alison 2004; Cunningham 2003; Victor 2003; Kampwirth 2002; Hamilton 2000; Lorentzen 1998; Speckhard et al. 2004; Goetze 1996; MacDonald 1991; Eisen Bergmann 1974; Jaquette 1973), and despite the fact that the subjects were all terrorists, they differed in every other conceivable way. They were not simply variations of a theme or reproductions from some mythical tem-

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plate of the woman terrorist. Some were feminist, while others were not. A few subscribed to traditional religious beliefs, while others were ambivalent, or even atheistic. Some were mothers, though most were childless. Some exhibited psychological problems, yet the majority appeared to be sane and functional within society. This study argues that with such divergent characteristics, the overriding factor that unites these women are their desires to oppose domestic or international forces and impose domestic or international change. The issue of female suicide bombers is an integral, yet distinct, issue in a study of women terrorists and deserves further mention. As stated previously, the groups known for utilizing female suicide bombers are Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers, Turkey’s PKK, the Chechen resistance, and the Palestinian liberation movement. It could be argued that the use of women on suicide missions indicates their inherent lack of value to society as a whole and the terrorist movement in particular. However, evidence indicates that the female suicide bombers of the Tamil, Kurdish, and Chechen insurgencies are integral members of their respective movements. They enter the groups usually of their own volition, receive lengthy combat training, and serve in various capacities within the organization, often moving from support level activities to combat, and perhaps even leadership and policymaking positions. The time and resources invested in these women strongly suggest that they are valued members of the terrorist movement. In contrast, the female suicide bombers of the Palestinian liberation movement are not members of the terrorist group that ultimately sends them on their final mission, nor are they usually affiliated with any political organization, even of a conventional variety. In addition, these women typically receive a maximum of two weeks of training, a practice that may explain the high proportion of failed missions. Finally, the financial stipend awarded to the family of the martyred women is customarily half the amount awarded to the family of a male suicide bomber. The absence of political membership, the lack of training, and the cursory payment to the family all indicate that the female suicide bombers of the Palestinian liberation movement are seen by their mission coordinators merely as expendable and economical tools of convenience. This dichotomy between the previous three groups and the Palestinian bombers conforms to the model of domestic and international female terrorist activity. The first three groups are domestic terrorist movements in which women are highly active, yet the Palestinian movement is an extremely internationalized one. Offering no in-depth opportunity for female participation, it has great difficulty recruiting women and is only able to take advantage of a small minority of women who are willing to martyr themselves.

Future research While the study of women in terrorism is a fascinating topic, partially because it counters traditional views of women, it is made all the more

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difficult by the lack of available information. Although numerous databases on terrorist activity in general have been compiled by governmental, academic, and private sources, comparatively little empirical information is available on women in terrorism. The most abundant information is typically available on the most inactive and outdated terrorist groups. Obviously, groups that are currently engaged in violent and illegal political activities are more secretive about their identities, the details of their operations, and the structural characteristics of their organizations, but the lack of data seriously hampers efforts to study female participation in terrorism. For example, there is evidence of women participating in the many ethnic conflicts that have emerged within Africa; yet again, too little information. Studies abound on the significance of personality in political movements. It is commonplace to study legitimate national leaders through the application of these models. These tools could readily be applied to terrorist leaders if accurate data on the leaders’ identities and personalities were available. The strategies and decisionmaking processes so frequently employed in examinations of bureaucracies could prove instrumental in the study of organizational hierarchies within terrorist groups as well. These models could also explain the external relationships between terrorist groups and inter-terrorist cooperation. Another avenue of exploration is that of the changes between terrorist groups of the Cold War era and those of the post-Cold War era. Predictably, groups emphasizing a leftist or socialist ideology seem to have declined since the fall of the Soviet Union. It appears that they are giving way to those with a right-wing reactionary or religious orientation. Within the Americas, a superficial examination suggests that domestic and leftist terrorist groups, such as those of Latin America, have declined while international and religiously motivated terrorist organizations, such as the jihadists of the TBA and the purportedly Christian KKK and fundamentalist abortion clinic bombers, are emerging. Within Asia, left-wing international movements have been replaced by ethnic nationalist groups. Now independent, African nations have seen the decline of nationalist independence movements and are now witnessing the growth of ethnic terrorist groups that exhibit strong international ties. In the Middle East, domestic ethnic terrorism appears to have been overcome by a highly internationalized and reactionary religious terrorism. Europe’s international leftist movements have virtually disappeared, leaving only domestic ethnic nationalists. This transformation, if that is indeed what it is, is only in its infancy, but it bears watching and deserves scholarly examination when enough data are available.

Normative implications and policy suggestions As a policy tool, studies in this area could encourage government institutions to provide gender equity and opportunities for women in economic,

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political, and social arenas, thereby reducing terrorist movements’ appeal to women, and thus, diffusing the infrastructure of such movements. Poverty, human rights abuse, and discrimination are all factors that generate discontent among women and provide potential mobilization for political violence against the state. If viewed as a means to build stability in a society, governments may be more inclined to seek equality for women and provide them with legitimate avenues of dissent, as well as a voice in politics and policymaking. Studies have long shown that among the many factors that potentially influence socio-economic and political development in a society, the status of women has proven to be among the most powerful (Boserup 1970: 119). Throughout most of the world, women yield a direct impact on agriculture, food production, industry, education, health care, child care, elder care, and myriad other components of society. Data indicate that increases in educational, professional, and legal opportunities for women produce exponential gains in their community. Conversely, the oppression of women correlates to a societal decline. It is these women, who suffer from a reduced status imposed by the state, who are more highly motivated to join terrorist organizations. In advanced industrialized states, fewer women may experience such restricted access to political and economic participation, and we see that lack of female activity in groups like Italy’s Red Brigades or Germany’s Red Army Faction. However, women in neighboring states with equally advanced political and economic systems exhibit very high levels of terrorist participation because the state apparatus oppresses them, as we see in the Army of the Chechen Republic and Spain’s Basque Homeland and Liberty organization. Clearly, if states could be induced to reduce the motivating factors behind women’s terrorist participation, the states would benefit both from improved development levels and from decreased support for terrorist operations. The incorporation of half of any natural population distribution into a political movement can only enhance its chances of success. Conversely, the absence of half of a population can only reduce the movement’s effectiveness and opportunity to achieve its goals. Of course, this study is certainly not an endorsement of terrorism as a means to achieve any group’s political goals, but rather an alternative view of terrorism and the role of women.

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Index

3+1 Group on Tri–Border Area Security 52 Abdullaev, N. 108, 109 Acharya, M. 69 Africa: domestic terrorism 80–8, 124; international terrorism 88–101, 126–7 Al Fatah 99 al Ghazali, Z. 98 Al Qaeda 108 Aldrighi, C. 23 Algeria, international terrorism 94–6 Alison, Miranda 20, 61, 63, 64, 65, 120, 121 All-Nepalese Women’s Revolutionary Organization 69–70 Altbach, H. 18 Alter, P. 13 Americas: domestic terrorism 22–48, 122–3; international terrorism 48–59, 125–6 America’s Watch 39 Amnesty International 39, 71 Amrane, D. 95 Ansar al Islam 85 Anti-Defamation League 54 Antolín, M. 105 April 19 Movement (M–19), Colombia 40–1 Arab Muslim community, Tri-Border Area 51–2 Argentina, international terrorism 51–3 Army of National Liberation (ELN), Colombia 40 Army of the Republic of Chechnya (ARCI) 107–11 Asia: domestic terrorism 60–71, 123; international terrorism 71–8, 126

Association of Salvador Women (AMES) 27 Association of Women Confronting the National Problem (AMPRONAC), Nicaragua 28–9, 30 Association of Women Patriots (Emakume Abertzale Batza) 103–4 Azzouni, S. 101 Baader-Meinhof Gang (BMG) 115–18, 127–8 Bairner, Alan 1 Balachanddran, P.K. 64 Bamber, D. 55 Banner, F. 109, 110 Barrig, M. 38, 39, 40 Basques, Spain 102–6 Bell, J.B. 8 Belli, Gioconda 29 Benallégue, N. 94 Berger Gluck, S. 99 Berkowitz, D. 97 “Black Widows”, Chechnya 109–10 Blee, Kathleen 55, 56 Bloom, M. 99 Borge, Tomás 29 Bose, S. 62, 65 Boserup, E. 131 Boston, W. 117 Bouchier, David 17–18 Bowyer Bell, J. 5, 9 Boyd, R. 58 Bracher, K.D. 115 Brazil, international terrorism 51–3 Braziliense, C. 42, 43 Breuning, Marijke 12 Britain: in Ireland 118–21; Ku Klux Klan in 55; in Zimbabwe 81–3 British Mandate, Palestine 96

Index 157 Brunner, C. 97 Buddhism 126 Cabral, Amilcar 91 Campbell, D. 29 Canada, Ku Klux Klan 55 Carr, R. 103 Carrillo Padilla, A.L. 35, 36 Carter, April 20 Cassinello, Andres 105 Castro, Fidel 49–50 Catholic Church 2, 31–2, 36–7, 112–13, 120, 122, 125, 127–8 Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 28 Chafer, T. 95 Chaney, E. 17, 18 Chapman, R.D. and M.L. 103 Chechnya, domestic terrorism 107–11 Chiapas, Mexico 44–8 Childers, Erskine 121 Chopra, A. 68 Christian Democratic Party of Italy 112–13 Christianity: and Ku Klux Klan 56–7; see also Catholic Church; Protestant Church Clark, Robert P. 105 class 17 Cochran, A.B. 93 Cold War 10, 94, 124, 126, 127 Collier, G.A. 43, 45, 46 Colombia, domestic terrorism 40–3 Commission for Historical Clarification, Guatemala 32, 34, 36–7 Communist Combatant Party, Italy 114 Communist Party, Guatemala 36 Communist Party, India 65 Communist Party of Cuba 49–51, 125–6 Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) 68–71 Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ), India 66–7 Confucianism 73, 126 Conley, J. 110 Connor, Walker 12, 13 Coordinadora Nacionál de la Mujer Salvadoreña (CONAMUS), El Salvador 27 Copeland, L. 100 Costa, O. 23 Cottam, M. and R.W. 13

Coulter, J. 55 Crawford, L. 43 Crenshaw Hutchinson, Martha 9, 10, 94 Cronin, I. 99 Cuba, international terrorism 49–51 Cunningham, Karla J. 14 Dajani, S. 99 Daly, E. 103, 104 Daniels, J. 56 Davies, M. 34 “Days of Rage” riots, US 57 de Cataldo Neuberger, L. 16, 18 de Vera, J. 23 Defence of Ireland Fund 119 della Porter, D. 113 Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) 100 Democratic Kurdistan Party 85 Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), El Salvador 25–8 Department of Women’s Affairs, ZANU 82 Dickey, C. 98 Dinh, Nguyen Thi 74 Disney, J. 91 Dobson, C. 7 domestic terrorism: Africa/Middle East 80–8, 124; Americas 22–48, 122–3; Asia 60–71, 123, 124; Europe 102–11, 124–5; overview 2 domestic terrorist organizations 7–8 Dominant Forces 15–16 Douglas, E. 70 Drake, R. 112, 114 Duffy, D.M. 108 Duiker, W.J. 73, 75 East Germany 115 economic state structure 17–18 Edgerton, Linda 120 Eelam Peoples’ Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) 61 Ehrenfeld, Rachel 49 Eisen Bergmann, A. 75 El Salvador, domestic terrorism 25–8 Ergil, D. 85, 88 Espin, Vilma 49–50 ETA (Euskadi Ta Azkatasuna) 102–6, 125, 127–8 Etxebarrieta, Txabi 106 Eubank, W.L. 113, 117

158

Index

Europe: domestic terrorism 102–11, 124–5; international terrorism 102–21, 127–8 evolutionary processes 17 Fainsod Katzenstein, M. 17, 18 Fairweather, E. 120 Fanon, Frantz 95 Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation (FMLN) 25–8 Farrell, William R. 11, 12, 76, 77 feminist agendas 2, 15, 122–9 Fenians, Ireland 119 Ferber, A.L. 56 France, in Algeria 94–6 Franchetti, M. 107 Franco, General Francisco 102, 103, 104, 106 Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 28 Freedom Birds, Sri Lanka 62–5 future research 129–30 Galligan, Y. 121 Galvin, Deborah M. 18–19 Gambetta, D. 63, 97 Gamini, G. 39 Gandhi, Mohandas 65 Gandhi, Rajiv 61–2, 64 Gato, P. 52 Gelibter, G. 104 gender equity 130–1 gendered roles 16–17 General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW) 99 Georges-Abeyie, Daniel E. 9, 14–15, 17, 24, 29, 31, 41 Germany, international terrorism 115–18 Goetze, D. 44–5, 46 Goldstein, J. 27, 30, 82 Gomez, Joaquin 42 Gonzalez, V. 28, 33–4, 36, 53 González Catarain, Dolores 106 Gonzalez-Perez, M. 9, 73 Grathwohl, L. 58 Griffith, D.W. 54 Griset, P.L. 9, 15–16, 22, 38, 122 Grose, T.K. 94 Grosscup, B. 61 Guatemala, domestic terrorism 32–7 Guatemalan Feminine Alliance 35 Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (UNRG) 32–7

Guatemalan Workers’ Party 32 Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), Guatemala 32 guerrilla warfare 9, 24 Guevara, Ché 50, 57 Guibernau, Montserrat 13 Gupta, K. 69 Gutierrez, Gustavo 22 Guzman, Torre 38–9 Hamas 52, 96–101 Hamilton, C. 103, 104, 105, 106 Handelman, Howard 19 Harding, L. 88 Harkabi, Yeshofat 9, 10, 49 Harris, H. 29 Hasso, Frances S. 15, 97, 100 Healing, R. 109, 110 Henriksen, T.H. 90 Herman, Edward 10 Heyzer, N. 26, 27 Hezbollah 52–3, 126 Hidenori, N. 8 Hodgson, M. 41, 42 Holt, M. 101 Horchem, H.J. 116, 117 Howard, M. 87, 88 Hudson, R. 15 Hughes, M.M. 29, 32, 80 Hunter-Gault, C. 83–4 Idris, Wafa 97 India, domestic terrorism 65–8 Indigenous Clandestine Revolutionary Committee, EZLN 46 Ingalls, R.P. 54 Inter-American Development Bank 53 international actors 12–14 International Crisis Group 69, 70 International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism 37, 115, 116, 118 international terrorism: Africa/Middle East 88–101, 126–7; Americas 48–59, 125–6; Asia 71–8, 126; Europe 102–21, 127–8 international terrorist organizations 6 Iparragire Genetxea, Maria Soledad 104–5 Iparraguirre, Elena 39 Iraq, Kurds in 85 Ireland, international terrorism 118–21 Irish Republican Army (IRA) 118–21, 127–8 Isaacmen, A. and B. 91, 92, 93

Index 159 Ishiyama, John T. 12 Islam 95–6, 99, 107–8, 110, 128 Islamic Jihad 51–2, 96–101 Israel, terrorist war against 96–101 Italy, international terrorism 111–14 Jack, A. 109 Jacobs, R. 59 Jäger, H. 117 Jamal, A. 101 Japan, international terrorism 75–8 Jaquette, J.S. 21, 24 Jayawardena, K. 65 Jenkins, B. 5, 8, 9 Jim Crow laws, US 54 Jones, C. 72, 74 Joshi, M. 62 Joyce, C. 78 Kampwirth, Karen 19, 20, 28, 29, 30, 33–4, 36, 45, 50, 53 Kapitan, T. 9 Karmon, E. 116 Kawar, A. 99 Keller, E. 81 Kirilov, R. 110 Klar, Christian 117 Kleist, R. 47 Kongra-Gel (KGK), Turkey 84–5 Kopola, N. 96 Kovach, G.C. 98 Kramer, M. 107 Kriger, N. 82 Kryzanek, M.J. 21 Ku Klux Klan 53–7, 126 Kumar, P. 67 Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) 84 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan) 84–8, 124 Kuriyama, Y. 76 Ladies’ Land League, Ireland 119 Lakshmanan, I. 43 Landau, S. 33, 36, 37 Laqueur, Walter 8–9, 10, 11, 13 Lawall, K. 108 Lazreg, M. 94, 95 League of Mozambican Women (LIFEMO) 92 League of Women, Ireland 119–20 left-wing terrorist organizations 1–2 Legal Defense Institute, Peru 39

Lessa, A. 23, 25 Levine, D. 31 Lewis, M. Jr. 41 Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) 90–4 Liberation Theology 2, 31–2, 122 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 61–5, 110 Limón Brigade, El Salvador 28 Lizarralde, Anne 105 lobola (bride-price) 82, 91 “Long Haired Army”, Vietnam 74 Lorentzen, L.A. 22 Luciak, I. 27 Luisa Amanda Espinoza Association of Nicaraguan Women (AMNLAE) 32 McClung Lee, A. 120 McClurg Mueller, C. 17, 18, 19 McDermott, J. 25 MacDonald, M. 7, 8, 103, 114, 116 Machel, Samora 93 Mahan, S. 9, 15–16, 22, 38, 122 Maier-Witt, Silke 117 Mansbridge, P. 44 Margolis, Diane Rothbard 18 marianismo 31, 45, 122–3 Marr, D.G. 73 Marxism 126 Mason, T.D. 26 Maunaguru, S. 62, 63, 64 Menchu, Rigoberta 36 Merari, Ariel 98 Mercader, A. 23 Merkl, P.H. 117 Mexico, domestic terrorism 43–8 Middle East: domestic terrorism 80–8, 124; international terrorism 88–101, 126–7 Milbank, D. 6 Millan, M. 46 Miller, Bowman H. 14, 97, 117 Mitscherlich-Nielson, M. 115, 117 Moghadam, V.M. 53, 94, 98 Mohnhaupt, Brigitte 117 Mojekwu, Christopher 81 Molyneax, M.D. 30, 31 Mora, Mariana 44–5, 46–7 Moro, Aldo 112–13 Moscow theatre attack 108, 109 Moser, Caroline O.N. 18 Mozambique, international terrorism 90–4

160

Index

Muaddi Darraj, J.S.100 Mugabe, Robert 83–4 Mulinari, D. 29, 30 Naaman, D. 98 National Coordinating Committee of Guatemalan Widows (CONAVIGUA) 35 National Liberation Front (FLN), Algeria 94–6, 127 National Liberation Movement of Tupamaros 23–5 national liberation movements 20 National Military Plan, Colombia 42 National Women’s Institute of Mexico 46 nationalism 12–14 Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), El Salvador 27 NATO 113, 116 Naxalites 65–8 Nayak, N. 66 Nepal, domestic terrorism 68–71 Ness, C.D. 113, 114 Nicaragua, domestic terrorism 28–32 Nieto, Rafael 43 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 44 O’Ballance, E. 6, 77 Öcalan, Abdullah 84, 87, 88 Olton, R. 13 Onesto, Li 68, 69, 70 Organization of African Unity (OAU) 91 Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM) 91 Osborn, R. 37–8, 39 Otero, Alejandro 23 Ottoman Empire 84 Özcan, N.A. 87, 88 Paczensky, S.V. 117 Palestine, international terrorism 96–101 Palestine Women’s Association 99 Palestinian Federation of Women’s Action Committees (PFWAC) 99–100 Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 99 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 96–101, 127

Palestinian National Congress (PNC) 99 Palmer, D.S. 38 pan-Kurdish Kurdistan People’s Congress (KHK) 84–5 Paraguay, international terrorism 51–3 Parry, A. 23, 33 Parvati, C. 70 Paterson, T. 118 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 85 Paxton, P. 29, 32, 80 Payne, R. 7 Peatling, G. 121 Penhaul, K. 41, 42 People’s Liberation Army (EPL), Colombia 40 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Nepal 68–71 People’s War, Nepal 68–71 personality effects 2, 128–9 Peru, domestic terrorism 37–40 Pickering, S. 121 Pike, D. 75 Pillar, Paul R. 9 Plano, J.C. 13 policy suggestions 130–1 political culture 17–18, 123 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 99 Popular Unity Party (Herri Batasuna), Spain 103 Portland Independent Media Center 69, 70 Portugal, in Mozambique 90–4 Pradhan Malla, S. 69 Protestant Church 120 Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG), Vietnam 73–4 Putin, Vladimir 108 Ranchod-Nilsson, S. 82, 83 rape 64–5 Rashkin, E. 48 Red Army (JRA), Japan 75–8, 126 Red Army Faction, Germany 115–18 Red Brigades, Italy 111–14, 127–8 Reed, D. 108, 110 Reel, M. 52 Reif, L.L. 15, 16, 17, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 31, 50 religious influences 2, 19, 31–2, 36–7, 56–7, 73, 95–6, 99, 107–8, 112–13, 120, 122–9

Index 161 Renderos, A. 28 research, normative implications/policy suggestions 130–1 Reuter, J. 62, 109 Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), Guatemala 32 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) 40–3 Revolutionary Organization of People in Arms (ORPA), Guatemala 32 Revolutionary Women’s Laws, Mexico 46–7 Rodriguez, Maria Jenny 39 Rota Zora, Germany 118 Rowbotham, S. 50 Ruiz, W. 38 Russell, C.A. 14, 117 Russia, in Chechnya 107–11 Sahni, A. 67 Sales, R. 121 Salih, M.A. 86, 88 Samarasinghe, V. 61, 64 Sambandan, V.S. 63, 64 Sandanista National Liberation Front (FSLN) 28–32 Santina, P. 71 Sappenfield, M. 67, 68 Sarmiento, R.A. 23 Schirmer, J. 35 Schmid, A.P. 10, 11 Schmidt, E. 83 Scott, C.V. 93 Seidman, G.W. 83 Seitz, B.J. 31 Sen, Kalpana 66 Sharoni, Simona 20, 100 Sheldon, K. 91, 92, 93 Shigenobu, Fusako 76–8 Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) 37–40 Shubin, V. 91 Shuichi, S. 7 Siemienska, Renata 18 Simms, M. 58 Singh, Manmohan 67 Singha Roy, D.K. 66 Snow, Donald M. 9 Somoza regime, Nicaragua 28–9, 32 Southern Poverty Law Center, US 54 Spain, domestic terrorism 102–6 Speck, M. 38 Speckhard, A. 98, 108, 110 Spengeman, S. 108

Spies 15–16 Sreedharan, C. 7, 66 Sri Lanka, domestic terrorism 61–5 Srila, R. 66 Stack O’Connor, A. 99 Stalin, Josef 13 state repression 10 states 12–14 Steans, Jill 7, 14 Steinhoff, P.G. 75–6 Sterba, James P. 9 Sterling, C. 6, 111 Stern, Susan 58, 59 Stohl, Michael 10 Stoltz Chinchilla, N. 19, 21, 34 Strentz, Thomas 14 Strum, P. 99 Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), US 57 Suarez, C. 23 Sufism 110 suicide bombers 63, 123, 129 Syai, R. 55 Sympathizers 15–16 Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) 61 Tarazona-Sevillano, G. 38 Taylor, S.C. 74, 75 terrorism, definitions of 8–12 terrorist organizations 6–8; models of women’s participation 14–20 Terrorist Research and Analytical Center 5–6, 10 Tetrault, M.A. 73, 74, 75 Thakur, V. 67 Third, A. 121 Thompson, C.B. 82 Thornton, Thomas B. 9 Tickner, J. Ann 14, 21 Tobar, H. 28 Tolmein, O. 116 Torres, Camilo 22 traditional societies 18–19, 122–9 Trelease, A.W. 54 Tremlett, G. 104, 105 Tri-Border Area (TBA), international terrorism 51–3 Tribunal Supremo Electoral, Guatemala 36 Trotskyism 76, 126 Turkey, domestic terrorism 84–8 Turley, W.S. 73, 74, 75

162

Index

Unilateral Declaration of Independence, Rhodesia 81 Union of Combatant Communists, Italy 114 United Nations (UN) 11 United Work Group on Forced Disappearances 39 urban guerrilla model 24 Urdang, S. 82, 90, 91, 93 Uruguay, domestic terrorism 23–5 US: international terrorism 53–9; and Tri–Border security 52–3; in Vietnam 115–16 US CIA 84 US Department of State 10, 27, 32, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 49, 51, 52, 62, 66, 68, 70, 71, 77, 103 US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 10, 54, 56, 57, 58 US Information Agency 53 US Justice Department 10–11 US National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals 11 Vague, T. 118 Valentini, Tiziana 16, 18 van Bruinessen, M. 86 Varon, J. 58–9, 118 Vasquez, Maria Eugenia 25, 42 Victor, B. 97, 100 Viet Minh 72 Vietnam: international terrorism 72–5; US involvement in 57, 115–16 Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF) 73, 75, 127 Vietnamese People’s Liberation Armed Front (PLAF) 72–5 Vozel, A.L. 33–4 Wagner-Pacifici, R.E. 113 Wahabbis 107–8 Ward, M. 119, 120, 121

Warriors 15–16 Waylen, G. 16, 19, 29, 30, 51 Weather Underground Organization (WUO) 57–9, 125–6 Weber, Max 13 Weedmark, K. 55 Weinberg, L. 113, 117 Weiser, B. 58 West, H.G. 90, 92, 93 Westcott, K. 113 White, A. 93, 95 White, J.R. 8, 9 Wiegersma, N. 73 Wilford, R. 121 Wilkinson, Paul 5 Williams, B.G. 107, 108 Windrem, R. 52 Winter, B. 95 Wolchik, S.L. 24 Wolfwood, T. 47 Women of the Ku Klux Klan 55–7 Women’s Brigade, KKK 58–9 Women’s Detachment, FRELIMO 92–4, 126–7 Women’s Group, San Cristobal 48 women’s participation models 14–20 Women’s Secretariat, FMLN 27 Women’s Wing, LTTE 62–5 Wrighte, Mark R. 43 Yamamoto, Mariko 78 Yami, Hsila 70 Yassin, Ahmed 98 Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) 43–8 Zedalis, D.D. 63 Zimbabwe, domestic terrorism 81–4 Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) 81–4, 124 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) 81–2