Knight
Kiplinger
Why business and consumers will prosper
WORLD BOOM AHEAD Why Business and Consumers Will Prosper
Knight Kiplinger Kiplinger Books, Washington, D.C.
Published by The Kiplinger Washington Editors, Inc. 1729 H Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20006
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kiplinger, Knight A. World boom ahead : why business and consumers will prosper / Knight Kiplinger. -- [Rev. ed.] p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 0-938721-70-4 (paperback) 1. Economic forecasting. 2. Business forecasting. 3. Twenty -first century--Forecasts. I. Title. HB3730.K517 1999 338.5'42--dc21 99-27769 CIP © 1999 by the Kiplinger Washington Editors, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by an information storage and retrieval system, without the written permission of the Publisher, except where permitted by law. This publication is intended to provide guidance in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold with the understanding that the author and publisher are not herein engaged in rendering legal, accounting, tax or other professional services. If such services are required, professional assistance should be sought. First edition. Printed in the United States of America. 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Acknowledgments
A
book of this breadth could not have been researched, reported and written by one author working alone. By the time I finished the last chapter, events would have overtaken the forecasts I had written a year or two earlier. So, much of the reporting and analysis came from my colleagues at Kiplinger, who cover these subjects for our weekly and biweekly reports on the business outlook. Their input was the starting point for my writing, and near the end of the job, they critiqued, challenged and helped me refine my forecasts. My use of the first-person plural—the editorial “we”—is not an author’s false modesty. It reflects the reality of our collegial reporting and forecasting process. I tip my hat with great respect to the Kiplinger colleagues who assisted me on the first edition of World Boom Ahead: our longtime executive editor Jack Kiesner, who retired in mid ’99; editorial manager and foreign affairs editor Gary Matthews, who has since returned to U.S. diplomatic service in Bosnia; chief of research Annemarie Albaugh; editors Gini Barazia, Peter Blank, Melissa Bristow, Marty Chase, Martha Craver, Ken Dalecki, Mike Doan, Bill Eby, John Fogarty, Jerry Idaszak, Steve Ivins, Elizabeth Kelleher, Joan Pryde, and Mark Sfiligoj; and research reporters Romaine Bostick, Greg Luberecki, Gerry Moore, Jenny Morrison, and Amy Roberts. I am especially indebted to David Koenig, a former Kiplinger editor, for his timely and diligent help in organizing the staff ’s work into some well-focused drafts. Austin Kiplinger—my father, colleague and editor emeritus of our organization—provided astute judgment, inspiration and (most appreciated of all) editorial supervision of the weekly Kiplinger Letter during the final months of my writing and revision.
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World Boom Ahead Every author needs a tough and caring editor, and I was very fortunate to have one in David Harrison, the director of Kiplinger Books. With candor and good humor, he kept the project on schedule, revived my spirits when they flagged, and made countless improvements in the content and presentation of my ideas. My executive assistant, Emily Melton, was the best scheduler, facilitator, gatekeeper and friend an author could have. Several other Kiplinger staffers contributed valuable assistance: Rosemary Beales Neff fine-tuned the manuscript; Daniel Kohan provided a clean design; Dianne Olsufka proofread the galleys; and Don Fragale smoothed the book’s course through production and printing. I reserve my deepest gratitude and affection for my family—my wife, Ann, my son, Brigham, my daughters, Sutton and Daphne—who gracefully endured Dad’s preoccupation, distraction and occasional irascibility while he was working at home on “the book.” (Although our beloved Kerry Blue terrier, Henry, cannot read this acknowledgment, I hope he can sense my gratitude for his comforting presence, lying nearby while I banged on the keyboard, paced back and forth and struggled for the right words.) Finally, I want to acknowledge the contributions of our many editorial sources—the men and women in business, government, academe and research who give us the benefit of their judgment every week for our Kiplinger Letters. Some of our best sources are our subscribers, who suggest story ideas and contribute to our knowledge of their fields. It is they who are the real experts on what lies ahead. We journalists are simply the communicators of their knowledge, experience and foresight. K.A.K.
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CONTENTS
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Introduction to the 1999 Edition
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The Big Picture
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Meeting the Challenge of New Competition • Technology at the Forefront • The Meaning of a ‘Boom’ • The 20th Century Growth Record • 21st Century Growth Will Double or Triple • How the U.S. Will Fare • Prosperity Amid Relative Decline • Labeling the Century Ahead • 50 Years of Amazing Change • A Technology Sampler • Alternative Scenarios • Sneak Previews of the 21st Century • A Millennium of Progress
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Major Global Trends
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Higher Growth, Greater Wealth • Declining National Sovereignty • Government as Facilitators of Growth • Emergence of a Global Middle Class • Emulation of the American Growth Model • More Political Freedom and Democracy • Fewer World-Changing New Inventions • Integration of All Peoples into One Global Market • No Global Depression, but Plenty of Regional Slumps • Globalizing of Antitrust Policy • Economic Sanctions Will Wane • Low World Inflation • Broader Sharing of World Leadership • New Sources of Capital • Rising World Population, but a Lower Rate of Growth• Adequate Supplies of Food, Fuel, Water • No Worldwide Warfare, but Regional and Civil Strife • Worldwide Empowerment of Women
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America’s Bright Economic Future
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A Surge in Productivity • Adequate Capital for Growth • Foreign Role in U.S. Growth: Customers and Investors • American Multinationals Spread Their Reach • No End to Trade Deficits • Strong Foreign Investment in U.S. • American Firms Keep Moving Abroad • U.S. a ‘Debtor Nation’? No Big Deal • The Mighty Dollar • U.S. Manufacturing: Alive and Well • The Reindustrializing of America • Low Inflation Ahead • Interest Rates Will Stay in Present Range • Coming Squeeze on Corporate Profits • Smoother Business Cycles • Shorter, Milder Recessions
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Expanding World Markets
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Canada • Europe, West and East • The New Euro • Asia • China Rising • Japan: Finally Opening Up • India at a Crossroads • Ailing, but not Toothless, Tigers • Crisis in Indonesia • Taiwan Emerges Stronger • South Korea Tries Openness • Anglo-Asia: Australia and New Zealand • Latin America • Mexico Recovers from Crisis • Another New Dawn for Brazil • Venezuela Banks on Oil • Costa Rica: A Central American Success Story • The European Trade Challenge in Latin America • The Middle East and North Africa • Sub-Saharan Africa • Russia and the CIS
World Boom Ahead 5
Government’s Role in the U.S. Economy
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A Public Sector of Stable Size • The Government Spending Outlook • Supporting Tomorrow’s Elderly • Medicare and Social Security Will Be Stabilized •The Structure of American Taxation • More Regulation of Daily Business Life • The Antitrust Revival • Standardization of Laws • A Trend Toward Freer Trade
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Upheaval in Education and Training
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Distance Learning • Intense Business Involvement in Education • New Respect for Vocational Education • Improving Our Public Schools • Alternatives to Public Education • Big Changes Ahead for Higher Education
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America’s Standard of Living
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Global Comparisons • Personal Income Keeps Rising • Big Gains for Women, Racial Minorities and Seniors • The Distribution of Riches • Reasons Behind Growing Income Inequality • Social Mobility • The Outlook for Poverty • A Nation’s Health Is More Than Wealth • Fears about America’s Future
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World Population Growth
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Young Nations, Old Nations • No Doomsday Ahead • Relentless Urbanization • A Declining World Population after Mid Century?
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Constantly Changing American Population
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Growing, But More Slowly • The Graying of America • The Aging Boomers • The Baby-Boom Echo • Super Seniors • Generation X• Intergenerational Conflict Ahead • Surging Racial Diversity • Why Immigration Is Good for America • The Major Racial and Ethnic Groups • Where Americans Will Live • State-by-State Outlook • Hot Metro Areas • Political Impact of Regional Growth • The Growth Wild Card: Anti-Growth Sentiment • Households, Marriage and Divorce • Business Implications
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Threats to the World Boom Ahead
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Military and Political Concerns • American Military Alliances and Preparedness • The Dilemma of Civil Wars • Mountains of Deadly Weapons • The Nuclear Threat • Terrorism and ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ • The Specter of Cyber-Sabotage • The Explosive Middle East• China’s Growing Military Might • Conflict on the Asian Subcontinent • Tension in East Asia • Russia will Rise Again • Overpopulation, Famine and Disease • Government Corruption and Organized Crime
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World-Changing Technology The Bounty of Technology • Troubling Technology Challenges
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CONTENTS 12
Ubiquitous Computers
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Flatter Growth in Computing Speed Ahead • Totally New Kinds of Chips • Fast Growth in Non-PC Chip Markets • ‘Wintel’ PCs Versus Network Computers • Competition from New Information Appliances • Antitrust and the Computer Industry • Superintelligent Software • Dictation and Translation from Print and Voice • Virtual Reality • The Ultimate Goal: Ease and Transparency • Full Globalization of the Computer Industry
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Telecommunications and Information Technology
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A Force for Freedom and Open Markets • The All-Powerful Internet • New Modes of Data Transmission • The Wired World • Phone Companies • Cable TV • Electric Utilities • International Calls Through Oceanic Cables • The Wireless Challenge • Cellular Phones and PCS Companies • TV and the Internet Come Together • Broadcast TV • Direct TV Comes on Strong— and then Radio, Too • Information by Satellite • Pricing and Regulatory Battles Ahead • Amazing New Appliances • Ubiquitous Electronic Spies
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Biotech Takes Off
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Deciphering the Human Genetic Code • Medical Wonders • Attacking Cancers • New Drugs for Every Disorder • Battling the Aging Process • Attacks on Genetic Diseases • Human Drugs from Plants and Animals • Animal Organs for Humans • The Future of Gene Therapy • The Promise of Cloning • Genetic Testing • Biotech’s Boost to the Food Supply
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Robotics, New Materials and Energy
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Automation in Industry • Designing in Virtual Reality • New Materials for Every Purpose • Amazing Polymers • New Materials from Agriculture • New Uses for Ceramics • Energy Technology • Electricity from Sun and Wind • Electricity from Hydrogen, Via Fuel Cells • Comeback for Nuclear Power? • The Ultimate Conservation Play: Superconductivity
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Outlook for Key Industries
267
The Money Business • Fully Global Markets • The New Look of Banking • Rising Profitability in Financial Services • Delivering Health Care • The Government’s Role • The Employer’s Dilemma • New Focus on Prevention • Home Health Care Boom • Telemedicine • The Energy Industry • Serious Conservation • Plenty of Fossil Fuels • American Energy Production• Nuclear Energy in Eclipse—for Now • Alternative Energy Sources • Deregulation and Globalization • The Environment Business • Corporate Initiatives • The Water Business • Farming and Food • Less Government in U.S. and World Agriculture • Agricultural Trade • The Food Industry• Globalization of Food • Retailing, Marketing and Media • Catalogs and Online Shopping • Global Retailing • Targeted Advertising • Housing and Construction • More Suburban Sprawl, but Urban Vitality,
World Boom Ahead Too • Strong Demand for Housing • Moderately Rising Home Prices • Slower Growth for Office Space • Strong Demand for Industrial Space • Slower Growth in Retail Space • Transportation and Travel • Strains on Energy Supplies and the Environment • The Worldwide Auto Business • Ever-Faster Trains • More Competition in Making Airplanes • Defense and Aerospace • Industrializing Outer Space • Commercial Satellites
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The Future Shape of Business
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New Business Structures • Ascendant Transnationals • Constant ‘Rolling Up’ of Medium-Sized Firms • Growth by Acquisition • More Joint Ventures • Questionable Profitability of Megamergers • The Demise of Big, Closely Held Companies • The Securitizing of Everything • Improving Workplace Standards • Converging Management Styles • The Internet as Business Tool • Management and Marketing • Corporate Liability Will Be Limited • Environmentalism in Every Decision • Growing Clout by Institutional Investors • New-Style Executives • The Rise of the CIO • Itinerant CEOs, with Shorter Tours of Duty • Ever-Rising Executive Pay—While Times Are Good • The Geography of Business Growth • Fierce Competition in Economic Development • Growing Power of the Nonprofits • High Taxes Ahead for Nonprofits
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The Changing Way We Work
347
The Lengthening Workweek • Declining Job Loyalty • Telecommuting • Self-Employment Boom • Tight Job Markets • Individual Empowerment and Teamwork • More Scrutiny of Employees • Less Formal Affirmative Action • Continuing Decline in Union Power
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Good Careers for Tomorrow
357
Science and Engineering • The Red Hot Internet • Good Fields for Social Science and Humanities Majors • Slow Growth for Middle Management and General Office Work • The Health Care Boom • Financial Services • Making People Happy • Education • Good Jobs Without Much or Any College Required • Finding Your Career on the Internet
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Investing for the Years Ahead
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Greater Volatility Ahead • U.S. Equities • Higher Stock Valuation • Overheated IPO Market • The U.S. Outlook • No Big U.S. Market Slump 15 Years from Now • Global Investing • The Strong Record of Global Markets • Contrarian Global Investing • Well-Priced Regional Markets • Picking Top Multinationals • Success in Emerging-Markets Stocks
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Postscript: The Kiplinger Record
381
Index
393
Introduction to the 1999 Edition
T
he world is at the end of an amazing decade of political and economic turmoil, which is also the close of the most remarkable century in world history, which is also the end of a millennium. Democracy is on the ascendance. In most nations, accelerating economic openness is laying the groundwork for higher growth in the decades ahead. And the nation leading the way is the United States, a situation that was not assumed by most people a decade ago. Now the big question is: Will these positive trends continue, or does the world face a very different future? That’s the subject of this book, a revised edition of a work completed in the summer of 1998 and published that fall. It’s a very broad treatment of many complex subjects. It is intended to give people in management a quick, easy distillation of what lies ahead in technology, population, world markets, government policy, business management, key industries and much more.
CREDIBILITY IN FORECASTING The plausibility of a long-range forecast is too often colored by ephemeral conditions of the present moment and recent past. Forecasts that don’t square with the prevailing public mood, whether optimistic or pessimistic, tend to be met with scepticism. At the Kiplinger organization, we have an uncanny knack for issuing forecasts that—however accurate they later turn out to be—are out of sync with public sentiment at the time they are published. We showed this knack once again in the fall of 1998, with the publication of the first edition of World Boom Ahead. As it arrived at book stores, the U.S. stock market was in the throes
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World Boom Ahead of a sharp decline that would depress the Dow Jones Industrial Average by more than 19%, from a peak of 9337 in July to 7539 in September. A drop of this magnitude—twice the decline of a mere “correction”—is normally defined as a bear market. Amid panic selling, many market analysts predicted a lengthy bottom before prices recovered. Growing concern about the condition of overseas markets compounded public anxiety. Over the previous few months, the Russian economy had gone into a free-fall, and its government virtually defaulted on its debts. Then Brazil teetered on the edge of collapse. The rescue resources of the International Monetary Fund were being rapidly depleted. The ailing economies of Asia were showing few signs of recovery from the currency and stock collapses that began a year earlier. More than half the world was in recession. While the U.S. economy continued to grow, America’s struggling trade partners weren’t able to buy as many U.S. exports as before. After more than a dozen years of double-digit growth, total U.S. exports of goods and services would register an annual decline of about 2%. There was talk of a U.S. recession in 1999, as weak global markets finally took their toll on our domestic economy. All in all, this was not a propitious moment to release a book entitled World Boom Ahead. The book’s jacket copy acknowledged that the thesis suffered from a credibility problem. “After seven years of economic expansion and soaring stock prices, some dark clouds are forming on the horizon. Do they presage a severe storm or just a passing shower?” My answer: “a passing shower,” probably a brief period of slow global growth, followed by a long trend of robust expansion. But the public mood remained very wary. I was clearly on the defensive. At the start of an interview on a radio program, the host asked, only half in jest, “World boom ahead? Don’t you mean world doom ahead?”
FROM GLOOM TO EUPHORIA But over the following 12 months, the pendulum of public opinion began a slow swing back toward a higher level of confidence in the future. The major U.S. stock indexes arrested their slide, and began a wild ride that took the Dow over 11,000 in the spring of ’99, with stock prices racing far ahead of likely growth in corporate earnings. The American people—exhilarated by low unemployment and strong gains in personal income, stock prices and home values—maintained a spending spree fueled in part by heavy borrowing. While the economies of emerging markets weren’t improving very rapidly, neither were they getting worse. Crises in Russia and Brazil
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C H A P T E R T K Chapter Head
didn’t spread worldwide and exhaust the resources of the IMF. Investors began to return cautiously to the stock markets of developing nations, bringing large gains to emerging-market equity indexes. All in all, it looked as if the U.S.—indeed, the whole world—had dodged the bullet of a broad economic collapse. The odds are good that, early in the year 2000, the U.S. economy will set a record for the longest expansion in our nation’s history— longer than the peacetime record of continuous growth between 1982 and 1990, and longer even than the expansion of ’61 through ’69, when high military spending, federal social spending and consumer demand combined into a powerful stimulus. Once again there is talk of “The New Economy”—a perpetualgrowth machine that defies traditional business cycles. This theory first surfaced in ’97, went dormant during the emerging-market crises of ’97-’98, and resurfaced during the euphoria of surging stock indexes, productivity gains and consumer spending in 1999. But my colleagues and I at The Kiplinger Letter remain skeptical. Market excesses—labor shortages, capital crunches, euphoric speculation in tech stocks, excess capacity, import competition—will continue to cause occasional corrections and economic downturns. After a hot decade, the U.S. economy will need to catch its breath, as will Europe. Meanwhile, Japan and the rest of Asia will slowly get back on their feet and resume strong growth, They will once again help the U.S. bear the burden of stimulating global growth, and in the process, they will create better overseas markets for American goods and services. The “world boom ahead” foreseen in this book is much more than the expansionary phase of any one nation or region. It will be a long, broad sweep of gradually accelerating global growth, stimulated by a convergence of new technology, growing political and economic freedom, investment in less-developed nations, more-open trade, the rising status of women, slowing population growth and many other trends.
FRESHENING THE FORECASTS Writing a book of forecasts is like trying to hit a moving target. Parts of it will be outdated soon after publication as new developments occur. These new developments—in world affairs, technology, business conditions, whatever—can make the forecaster look either foresighted or foolish. In reviewing a first edition for possible revisions, the author is torn between two impulses: either changing nothing, to highlight both his earlier prescience and his (hopefully few) miscalls, or updating everything that has changed in the time since first publication.
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World Boom Ahead I have chosen a middle ground, which I hope is useful to you the readers of this new edition of World Boom Ahead. I have tried to take note of significant new developments, but only if they materially affect the outlook in a certain area. I have not attempted to re-report every subject, which would be a Herculean effort in a book as broad as this is. As a result, some facts may be out of date, some predicted events may have already occurred as forecast, and some may have turned out differently. Who knows what the future holds for us, what sudden crisis or startling scientific breakthrough will drastically change the course of history? Certainly not I. As this book goes to press in the middle of 1999, its thesis could be seriously undermined by any number of lifechanging developments. I’ve tried to anticipate as many as possible and assess their likelihood, but forecasting is a fragile art, not a science.
ASSESSING LIKELIHOOD Subscribers to The Kiplinger Letter don’t want wishy-washy analysis of all the things that might happen; they want our clear, informed judgment on the most likely outcome. This book is full of such judgments and, in most cases, the reasons why we reached those conclusions. The Kiplinger mission is to help managers with their decisionmaking. The foundation of our method is a combination of current reporting and historical analysis. Current reporting helps us with the task of short-run predictions. Historical analysis helps us with the task of projecting long-term trends. “Real-time” forecasting—based on constant, fresh interviews with management decisionmakers—gives us an earlier alert of what lies ahead than if we waited for the release of statistical reports and “leading indicators,” which are actually snapshots of recently past events. This is the way three generations of our staff have worked since our organization was founded in 1920 by my grandfather, W. M. Kiplinger, a former Associated Press reporter who specialized in the then-unfashionable beat of economics. The Kiplinger publications, then and now, have always been a query service, helping our readers with their special information and forecasting needs. I look forward to hearing from you about any questions or comments you may have about the judgments in this book. My best wishes to you for success and satisfaction in the exciting and challenging years ahead. Knight A. Kiplinger July 28, 1999
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CHAPTER 1
The Big Picture
O
n the eve of the 21st century, the world stands on the threshold of a long, strong surge in economic growth and living standards, unprecedented in world history. Over the next few decades, this boom will bring several billion more people—now toiling in marginal local economies—into a fully integrated world marketplace. They will constitute an immense new global middle class with vast purchasing power, and they will be both tough competitors and avid customers of the advanced nations. This global expansion will be driven by technology—more specifically, by the dispersal of late-20th-century technology to the far corners of the earth, sharply lifting the productivity (output per hour worked) of the world’s labor force. This, in turn, will boost the real incomes of hundreds of millions of workers, enabling them to afford more of the goods and services of their own country and other nations. These products will flow ever more freely as trade barriers gradually decline worldwide. The bywords of the 21st century will be the 3 Ds: dispersal (of technology and production), decentralization (of leadership in world affairs and business) and democratization (of information, political authority and ownership of capital). The result will be a powerful convergence in economic performance worldwide. Economic success will be more broadly shared by more people in more nations than ever before. The nations will be knitted together in near-seamless webs of telecommunications, trade in goods and services, and instant flows of capital. This is already happening, but by comparison with the vastly more open markets of 2020, today’s world economy is a labyrinth of trade barriers, currency controls and restraints on foreign investment.
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World Boom Ahead This entire process—technology dispersal, rising real incomes, freer world trade—will bring about more fundamental change in the way people live than has occurred in the previous several hundred years.
GRADATIONS OF GAIN The speed and degree of change will be most startling in today’s less advanced nations. These nations will also be the greatest beneficiaries of the world boom ahead, experiencing a doubling of their share of annual world production over the next 20 years. The wealthiest nations, with only 15% of the world’s population, will also enjoy rising incomes and living standards, even as their share of the world’s output steadily declines from its dominating level of 80% today. As a group, the wealthiest nations will see only modest improvement in their late-20th-century growth rates. Their scientists, entrepreneurs, giant transnational corporations and surplus capital will be the engines of growth in the world boom ahead. But their domestic economies—being so big and rich already—won’t achieve rates of growth that anyone would mistake for a boom. The United States, as the most open, scientifically creative and economically free large nation, will set the pace for the advanced economies. If the advanced nations won’t be booming, who will be? The primary beneficiaries of the world boom ahead will be today’s least affluent nations—in Asia, Latin America and Africa. But not all of them . . . only those whose leaders choose to create and maintain economic systems hospitable to both home-grown entrepreneurship and foreign investment. Their fortunate citizens will enjoy the greatest percentage rise in their living standards, albeit from very low levels today. The citizens of the world’s most advanced nations—the United States, Japan, the European Union and a few others—will have to cope with tough competition from low-wage workers in the less developed nations. This competition will intensify over time as workers benefit from modern education, declining trade barriers, and rising productivity from the dispersal of capital and manufacturing technology to all lands.
MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF NEW COMPETITION This would be bad news for the advanced nations were it not for the fact—often overlooked—that capable producers soon become capable consumers. Fierce competition from newly industrialized nations has not caused any decline in absolute living standards in the advanced world over the past two decades, and it won’t in the future.
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C H A P T E R 1 The Big Picture
The labor forces of the richest nations will—out of sheer necessity— uu p grade their education and skills, building on their big leads in science and technology to stay one step ahead of rivals overseas. As they always have, the advanced nations will continually create new, hightech products and services to replace those that other nations can make at a lower cost. Even though global competition will restrain income growth in many advanced nations, pay hikes will continue to exceed inflation over the long run, due to productivity gains. The purchasing power— and therefore living standards—of the advanced nations will get a boost from stable prices and improving quality of countless consumer goods, especially imports from low-wage nations. In many categories, especially apparel, electronic devices and some other consumer goods, prices will actually decline over time, either nominally, adjusted for inflation or both. Today’s wealthy nations will sustain their growth by aggressively seeking new, larger markets abroad. The United States will look far beyond its own, rich consumer market of 270 million people to the other 95% of the world’s population—5.7 billion potential customers. Today the vast majority of these people are too poor to afford imported goods, and those who can are often denied the opportunity by trade barriers their governments erect to protect inefficient domestic industries. But this will change dramatically in the decades ahead.
THE URGE TO MERGE The world economy will be increasingly dominated by a new kind of business enterprise—the transnational corporation, combining several multinational firms of various national origins under one corporate umbrella. Multinationals already account for one-fifth of all global manufacturing, and their share will continually rise. Transnational giants will move into the power vacuum created by the waning ability of governments to control their economies—and their nations’ futures—in a global economy. More of these companies will be “virtual corporations” that contract for most or all of their manufacturing from independent suppliers, while employing only a small cadre of executives and creative employees in the conception, design and marketing of new products. They will be increasingly free to do their manufacturing anywhere in the world, moving wherever suppliers offer them the best quality at the lowest price. The role of small and medium-size enterprises will be to supply multinational companies with ideas, inventions, technology, raw
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World Boom Ahead materials, components, full assemblies and business services. Closely held companies will grow to a certain size, go public, catch the attention of bigger companies in their field, and then willingly submit to acquisition.
TECHNOLOGY AT THE FOREFRONT Advances in technology will be the driving force of this world economic boom, as they always have been. Human ingenuity will find new ways to make life more comfortable and interesting for its inhabitants. The technology of every field—whether in communications, energy, entertainment, agriculture, medicine, transportation or education— will rise in performance and decline in cost through mass production and worldwide dissemination. The dominant technologies of the coming century will be microelectronics, biotechnology, telecommunications and information technology. The biological sciences will be the brightest stars. The payoff from years of scientific research and investment in genetics is almost here, and it will change everyday life just as much as—perhaps even more than—the revolutions in telecommunications and computers.
UNBELIEVABLE PRIVATE FORTUNES The first few decades of the coming century will be richer in opportunity for entrepreneurs than ever before. More enormous fortunes will be created by more entrepreneurs and financiers on every continent than at any time in world history. And most of these new fortunes of breathtaking magnitude will end up being used for human betterment, through charitable giving. The new generation of global philanthropists—modern-day Carnegies, Rockefellers and Fords—will make a deep impact on education, medical research, public health, the arts and humanities, and population control. Due to pressure on wages worldwide, owners will fare better than employees, and millions of employees all over the world will recognize this. Whether by becoming their own bosses or by investing in the stock of their employers, more workers will begin to think and act like capitalists. Small-business start-ups and stock ownership by average citizens will soar on all continents. America’s stock markets, led by powerful, U.S.-based transnational businesses, will continue to achieve their historical levels of total return, and probably a little more. Stock markets in many other nations, both developing and advanced, will generate higher average returns than the U.S. markets, but with much more volatility.
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C H A P T E R 1 The Big Picture
The Meaning of a ‘Boom’
T
he word “boom” usually refers to a relatively short period of brisk economic growth. A boom typically lasts a couple of years or less, and it’s often followed by a bust—not just lower growth, but an actual contraction in output—because spikes of superheated growth usually sow the seeds of their own demise. But that isn’t how we’re using the term “boom.” The world boom that we foresee will be a long, strong but gradual expansion, in which the world’s annual growth rate moves to a substantially higher, sustainable plateau. There will be periods in which output marks time, barely advancing, and even periods in which total output declines for a time. But we do not foresee any slump as deep or long-lasting as the Great Depression or the oil-induced global downturn of the ’70s. In general, globalization of trade and capital flows will be a force for shorter, less severe global recessions. “Boom” is a relative term. One nation’s boom could be another’s bad year, depending on what each is accustomed to. The United States, the world’s largest economy, is used to growth averaging between 2% and 3% a year. So a growth spurt—say, 7% in calendar 1984 or 5% in the first quarter of 1998—could be considered a boom in this country. But that rate of growth would be an off year in a rapidly developing nation like Singapore or China, which have been routinely achieving double-digit or high-single-digit growth year after year. Our forecast of a world boom means just that—accelerating growth worldwide. It doesn’t mean that the advanced world will experience boom levels of growth for a long period of time, even by their own modest standards. In North America, Europe and Japan, absolute levels of productivity, labor-force participation, resource utilization and infrastructure development are already so high that there isn’t room for a big jump on the order of two additional percentage points, which would be a near-doubling of the long-term growth trend. Instead, these nations will see their long-term growth move only modestly higher than in the past 20 years. In the U.S., productivity gains from better education and higher automation will probably boost growth to an average level approaching 3%, a significant improvement over the mid 2% range of recent years. In the advanced nations, especially the U.S., the higher growth averages will likely be achieved by smoothing out the extreme highs and lows and beefing up the middle range, with longer expansions of moderate growth, interrupted by fewer severe recessions.
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World Boom Ahead The less-developed nations will be growing at true boom levels, probably tripling their anemic rates of growth in this century. All of their elements of growth—labor supply, capital, natural resources, technology, education—will be trending sharply upward. Liberalization of world trade will create strong demand for their production. Most significantly, governmental conditions will be conducive to strong growth. Public sectors will be shrinking due to privatization, lower tax burdens, diminishing market regulation, and openness to foreign goods and capital.
The 20th-Century Growth Record
T
he legacy of the 20th century is generally a good one in terms of economic growth and improvement in living standards— probably higher than in any previous century. But given the remarkable scientific inventions and technological developments that have occurred, economic growth could have been—should have been— much stronger. Too often, human ingenuity was trumped by human folly. The benefits of science and free-market economics were often thwarted by governmental ineptitude, greed and hostility toward neighboring nations. Improvement in the material well-being of most of the world’s people in this century has been tragically stunted by colonialism, communism, fascism, two devastating world wars, local dictatorships of the right and left, countless civil wars and regional conflicts, persistent barriers to the free flow of goods and capital, inadequate education, and the systematic wasting of the talents of more than half the world’s population, its women. Estimates of total world production are imprecise, given vast differences in the quality of statistics and methods of measuring output from nation to nation. And the further back you go in time, the harder it is to reconstruct what was really happening. But economic historians make educated guesses, and it’s likely that output in this century has increased, on average, about 1% a year. The developed nations achieved about twice that rate, but the less-developed nations lagged far behind until the last 25 years, when their growth surpassed that of the advanced nations. During a century of 1% average annual global growth were periods (such as the 1920s, ’40s and ’50s) when various nations and whole continents achieved boom levels of growth. But there were also periods (the ’30s, ’40s, ’70s and early ’80s) in which most of the world experienced a painful erosion of living standards. Over the past quarter-century, world
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growth trended up to about 2.5% a year on average, but there were sharp variations among continents and nations. The Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites experienced an erosion of output and living standards. So did the highly populous region of sub-Saharan Africa, with its 700 million citizens.
21ST-CENTURY GROWTH WILL DOUBLE OR TRIPLE If a boom can be reasonably defined as a doubling of growth, then our idea of a world economic boom would be a whole century of global growth averaging at least 2% a year, twice the growth of the century now coming to a close. The odds are quite good, however, that the record of the next century will be much better than this, building on the higher performance of the past quarter-century and hitting a stride of about 3% a year on average. This is consistent with recent World Bank forecasts of a 3% average annual growth rate in the global economy between now and 2020, assuming a continuation of trade liberalization. World Bank economists project a continuation of recent growth trends (about 2.5%) for the highest-income nations and, for developing nations, average rates ranging from 4% per year for sub-Saharan Africa to 7% for Asia (excluding Japan). Among the high-income nations, we believe that only the United States will match the global average of 3%, while Western Europe and Japan will fall a little short. A doubling or tripling of 20th-century growth is not a pie-in-thesky fantasy. It’s eminently doable because the political and economic ideologies that stunted growth through most of this century are discredited and in decline, freeing human creativity and ambition to accomplish remarkable things.
How the U.S. Will Fare
T
he United States will retain its current position as the world’s economic, technological and political leader throughout most of the next century. It will do this by maintaining its preeminence in scientific research, its flexible military might and its uniquely successful economic-development model, which will be emulated and adapted by more nations around the globe. It will also enjoy the highest rate of population growth among the advanced nations—slightly less than 1% a year, coming from a combination of fertility slightly above the population-replacement level and immigration of more than one million newcomers each year. These immigrants, like those before
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World Boom Ahead them, will ease U.S. labor shortages, in both unskilled and high-tech jobs, and contribute to the constant revitalizing of American society.
FACING UP TO ITS PROBLEMS The U.S. has done a good job of putting its economic house in order over the past 15 years, with deregulation of markets, declining government budget deficits, stable tax burdens and falling trade barriers. But still to be dealt with are looming problems in social security and medicare. Solutions are not difficult to craft in an economic sense, but they will require some straight talk and courage on the part of Congress. As much progress as America has made economically, it has a lot of unfinished business in healing its social ills—crime, falling educational performance, divorce, teen pregnancy, out-of-wedlock births in all income levels and races, drug addiction, strained race relations, resistance to assimilation of immigrants, declining spiritual health of youths, and other issues. Fortunately, many of these problems appear to be in the early stages of turnaround, and there are reasons to believe that improvement will continue.
CHANGING SHARES OF WORLD OUTPUT Today the United States, with less than 5% of the world’s population, accounts for an amazing 22% of its total annual output. That share will slowly but steadily diminish throughout the next century. This shouldn’t cause any alarm, hand wringing or self-doubt, because in absolute terms—growth in real personal income and standard of living—the U.S. will keep making solid progress. At the end of World War II, the United States was the only victorious nation whose territory wasn’t part of the battleground, whose industrial infrastructure wasn’t badly damaged, and whose ranks of future leaders weren’t decimated. In the first few years after the war, with the economies of Europe and Japan in ruins, the U.S. accounted for a stunning 45% of total world production. It was inevitable and natural that this share would decline, as the rest of the world recovered, with great help from the U.S. But contrary to popular mythology, the long decline of America’s world market share bottomed out some 35 years ago, in the early ’60s, and there has been no significant decline since then. The U.S. share of aggregate world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) held firm even as Asia’s production soared. Asia’s rising world market share comes not at the expense of America’s, but from the declining shares of Europe, the Soviet bloc and Latin America. But now the U.S. is poised for a resumption, after 35 years, of a
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gradual decline in its world market share, in which it will be joined by the other advanced nations. And this decline, like the one after World War II, will be natural, inevitable and beneficial for the world and for the U.S., because it will result from an enlargement of the entire global economy. In total output, the United States will continue to be the world’s largest economy for the next ten or 15 years. It will eventually be eclipsed in annual GDP (but not in wealth or per-capita output) by China, whose rate of growth will run triple that of the U.S. over most of the next few decades, before cooling off to a more moderate level at mid century.
PROSPERITY AMID RELATIVE DECLINE America’s relative decline shouldn’t be mistaken for an absolute decline in any measure of American success—the living standards and wealth of its citizens or the competitiveness and profitability of its businesses. All of these will continue to grow. The U.S. will experience the seeming paradox of rising real prosperity amid relative decline. America’s increasing well-being will come about not despite the growing economic power of the poorer nations, but because of it. The U.S. is the most open and international nation, and it is also the world’s leading exporter. So it has the most to gain from the soaring purchasing power of less-affluent nations. It will actually benefit from earning a progressively narrower slice of a vastly larger pie. That ever-skinnier slice—a shrinking percentage of surging world output—will be much bigger in actual size than America’s fatter slice of today’s world economy.
Labeling the Century Ahead
W
e’ve never cared for the game of naming centuries after particular nations. While many people hasten to tag this century “the American Century,” we prefer to call it “the Atlantic Century,” recognizing the gradual passage of leadership from Europe to the U.S. But a better label would be “the Democracy Century,” in honor of the triumph of self-determination over colonialism, fascism and communism. Better still, it could be called “the Technology Century,” because it has seen more world-changing inventions than any previous 100-year span.
ASCENDANT ASIA Acknowledging the risk of labeling a century before it even begins, we will make a stab at anticipating how the next one will be known to historians 100 years from now, at the dawn of the year 2100. Those par-
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World Boom Ahead tial to regional labels shouldn’t be surprised if the 21st century comes to be called “the Asian Century,” reflecting the surging economic power of that continent. It will take the nations of Asia a few years to recover fully from their current woes, but recover they will, and they will emerge more open, democratic and economically vital for having undergone the trauma of this shakeout. In fact, the ongoing slump has accelerated the longdelayed restructuring of Japan and South Korea. In a few years Asia will resume a high level of growth. The Asian continent, including India, will undoubtedly be the star region of the next century. If one nation’s name had to be conferred, ill-advisedly, in advance, “the Chinese Century” would be the best bet, because China will be the world’s largest economy in 15 years or so, as well as a political and military superpower. But a better regional label for the next 100 years would be “the Pacific Century.” Why? Because of the likelihood that one non-Asian, but thoroughly Pacific, nation will continue to be an extremely powerful force, economically, militarily and technologically. That nation is the United States, whose economy will increasingly be tied by trade and investment to the rapid growth of Asia.
A CENTURY FOR ALL PEOPLES But we continue to stand by our preference for labels that capture the essence of deep-seated, fundamental change in the worldwide human condition. The world boom ahead will be the product not of one nation or one continent, but of the talents of all peoples in all nations. So we believe—and hope—that historians in 2100 will see the appropriateness of labels like “the Century of Free Markets” or “the Age of Convergence.” Such titles would reflect how the advanced and developing nations grew together in political and economic freedom, rates of growth, income, living standards and technological leadership. In the course of this book, we’ll give you plenty of reasons why this will come to pass.
50 Years of Amazing Change
A
few decades from now, our daily lives will be as fundamentally different from today as our present lifestyles are from the world of the late ’40s and early ’50s. But the changes will be gradual, building on technologies and social changes already under way. Five decades ago, many of the aspects of our lives today would have seemed to most Americans like science fiction. Imagine the
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incredulity that would have met a prediction of cheap, powerful personal computers in the home, or instant worldwide communication on the Internet, or pocket-size wireless telephones capable of calling anywhere on earth. Or organ transplants and artificial hearts. Or in vitro fertilization of human eggs, with embryo transplantation to a surrogate mother. Or space research stations, supersonic jetliners and 160-mph bullet trains. Or a pill that prevents pregnancy. Or automated factories creating many different products on the same assembly line, with a single operator changing the mix. Or a choice of several hundred TV channels on large-screen color TV sets. Or low-cost, online trading of stocks from your own desk. Or the repair of genetic defects in plants, animals and humans. Or the ability to exactly replicate any living thing. Back in 1950, only the richest 9% of American households, living in a few urban areas, owned a television set, on which they could receive three or four channels. A 12-inch, black-and-white model cost about 13% of the average family’s entire income for the year—equivalent to about $5,200 today, on an average family income of about $40,000. Imagine the disbelief you’d have encountered in 1950 if you had predicted that, by 1998, nearly 100% of all American households would own at least one color TV, priced at less than 1% of average annual income, on which they could watch hundreds of different programs, including events happening at this very moment anywhere in the world. But even with all the changes we’ve seen in the past several decades, it’s surprising how many things haven’t changed much. Our cars still run on the same fuel that propelled them in the 1890s. Our homes are still built by workers on site, mostly out of pieces of wood. We still pay for a lot of daily expenses with paper money and paper checks given at the point of sale, and even if we charge our purchases, we pay the monthly bill with a paper check we send in the mail. Our children still learn by listening to a teacher explain things in a classroom. Most of us still go to work each day in offices, and the vast majority of our purchases are made in stores. We still get most of our health care— including routine monitoring—by visiting medical professionals at their place of business. We still use wired telephones for most of our communication. But many of these daily activities, and countless others, will be changing in the years ahead, in more and varied ways than we can imagine today. A few decades from now, our children’s children will pester us for stories of what the world was like when we carried paper money in leather wallets; steered our own cars on the highways (occasionally colliding with other cars); and had to drive to and from a
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World Boom Ahead “video store” (twice) to rent and return movies recorded on a grainy videotape. All these now-familiar activities will seem as peculiar to children in 2030 as rotary-dial phones, record players, black-and-white TVs and manual typewriters seem to our kids today.
A Technology Sampler
I
n this book we’ll tell you about a lot of remarkable changes in the decades ahead. Some you’ll like the sound of, and others will trouble you. We’ll try to present them without wishful thinking or judgment as to their desirability, but we will try to hint at the impact they will have on American life and business. Here’s a brief sampling of some of the technological changes ahead: Medicine. “Germline” gene therapy, with genetic changes in sperm and eggs that will pass to succeeding generations forever. “Designer animals,” genetically engineered to have organs and tissues that can be transplanted to humans. Cancer therapies that will trick the cancerous cells into dying off fast. Therapies to slow the aging process, by tricking cells into decaying more slowly. Gene therapies that will prevent most inherited diseases, stimulate insulin production, and reduce the incidence of conditions like obesity and baldness. Vaccines for AIDS and herpes. Edible vaccines, designed into common foods, for malaria, hepatitis, cholera and other diseases. Patenting of genetic material, triggering an endless debate over “genetic colonialism” by biotech firms seeking to own unusual substances found in the plants and animals of developing nations. Agriculture. Genetically engineered grains and produce, resistant to drought, cold, disease and pests, requiring less water and fertilizer. Biomass susbstituting for wood pulp in newsprint. Hydroponic (soilless) production of vegetables. A boom in low-fat, low-cholesterol, high-fiber foods. New materials. Plastics that conduct electricity, for use in semiconductors and batteries. Plastic ball bearings, aircraft fuselages, car bodies, bridges, freeway pylons and rebar for reinforced concrete. Ceramic auto engines. Ceramics that conduct electricity, for use in generators. Plastics made from biomass rather than petrochemicals. Energy. Fuel and fast-charging batteries for generating and storing electricity at home and in cars. Superconductivity, with stunning increases in the efficiency of electric-power generation and transmission. Photovoltaic panels that will be increasingly cheap, large and powerful. Broader use of gasolines blended with alcohol (from cheap
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C H A P T E R 1 The Big Picture
biomass, not corn) and diesel fuels blended with vegetable oils. Transportation. Low-polluting, high-efficiency (80 mpg) hybrid cars, typically running with both a small gasoline engine and an electric motor. High-speed conventional and magnetic-levitation trains. Superwide-bodied jets carrying 600 passengers on trans-Pacific routes. New supersonic airliners. Smart highways and cars, with hands-free driving and collision-avoidance systems. Global positioning for navigating private cars to their destinations. Computers and software. Faster chip speeds (but not increasing at the rate of recent years). Semiconductors whose digital switches are controlled by beams of light rather than electrons. Artificial intelligence approaching the speed and versatility of the human brain. The embedding of microprocessor controllers in virtually every mechanical device. Virtual-reality programs and graphics that simulate every imaginable human experience and sensation. “Knowbots” — intelligent personal-assistant software that will keep track of your activities, anticipate your needs and execute simple tasks of many kinds. Voice-recognition programs that will take dictation flawlessly and produce written transcriptions of rapid speech by any person in any accent. Simultaneous-translation software, coupled with synthetic-voice programs, enabling tourists and business people to converse in real time on the Internet with anyone in any land, verbally or in writing. PCs that are much easier to learn and use than today’s. Devices to give new capabilities to disabled people. Telecommunications. Totally global satellite telephones, enabling you to talk with anyone anywhere on earth, from the Sahara to Antarctica. Lightning-fast Internet access speed, via a variety of competing media—phone lines, cable-TV modems, broadcast TV, satellite, even the electric-power service to your home. “Instant-on” Internet connections, with graphically elaborate Web pages appearing faster than you can flip the pages of a magazine. Delivery of every kind of information and entertainment on whatever kind of “information appliance” you prefer, from a smart phone to your HDTV or PC. Flat, bright video screens the size of your living room wall. Vast databases from which, for a small fee, you can download and record, on reusable CDs, any music, literature, movie, art or TV program ever made, in any language. Living in the United States, we can easily forget that our current lifestyles—with cell phones, infertility therapies, satellite dishes, personal computers and Internet shopping—seem unbelievably futuristic
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World Boom Ahead to most of the world’s people. Their dreams are of a basic middle-class lifestyle that most Americans achieved a generation or two ago—good nutrition, education for their kids, homeownership, an inexpensive car, a few labor-saving appliances in the home. The economic challenge of the next century will be to make our comfortable lives of today the norm for the rest of the world. And this will happen.
Alternative Scenarios
I
n arriving at our judgment of accelerating growth in the decades ahead, we carefully considered, analyzed and finally set aside a variety of alternative scenarios. There are elements of plausibility in all of them, so any of them could happen. But we believe that they are much less likely than the vision we present in this book. Here are summaries of a few of today’s leading anxieties about the world’s future: Severe overcapacity and deflation: The growth in world manufacturing capacity will be so great, especially in the developing nations, that even rising consumer demand cannot possibly keep up. This will lead to aggressive dumping of exports, price cutting, the raising of trade barriers, general deflation, shrinking output worldwide and declining real wages, especially in the advanced nations. “Hot money” chaos: Uncontrollable flows of capital will surge in and out of world economies, especially emerging markets, destabilizing currencies and causing wild swings in production and living standards. Currency and stock speculation will run amok. A series of serious national and regional recessions will infect the entire global economy, causing worldwide slumps of long duration. The rescue resources of the advanced nations, funneled through the International Monetary Fund, will not be sufficient to shore up all the economies in need of help at one time. Burdensome aging populations: About 15 or 20 years from now, the advanced nations, with their low or negative population growth (including even China by then), will be groaning under the social-service expenses of their aging populations. A mass of retirees will have to be supported by a proportionately smaller group of workers, pushing taxes up and diverting economic resources from investment to consumption. What’s more, stock markets will decline as seniors cash out to cover their living expenses. The Malthusian nightmare: Soaring populations in today’s “Third World” will outstrip the world economy’s capacity to support
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them with food, water, fuel and jobs. This will lead inexorably to resource depletion and soaring prices, famine, out-of-control urbanization, environmental degradation and attempted mass migrations of poor people into advanced nations, where they will be unwanted but sometimes needed to fill labor shortages. Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: The biblical scourges— famine, plague, conquest and war—will recur as they have throughout history, but in more-virulent forms. Populations will be decimated and living standards compromised by antibiotic-resistant bacterial and viral infections, some of them trans-species infections like AIDS. Raging nationalism, ethnic and racial conflict will be as devastating to life and material well-being as communism and fascism were in this century. New kinds of tyrannies will subjugate large portions of the globe. Warfare will be made all the more terrible by the use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The personal nightmares that come to us in our sleep are frightening precisely because they grow out of real issues in our lives. Likewise, the scenarios above are troubling to us precisely because aspects of them have already occurred—the lethal spread of AIDS across Africa, economic chaos in markets from Asia to Russia to Latin America, overcapacity and deflation in some industries, and genocide in the Balkans. But for a variety of reasons that we will discuss throughout this book, none of these gloomy scenarios is as plausible as our vision of a steadily improving human condition.
Sneak Previews of the 21st Century
I
f you’re wondering what new directions the world will take in the next century, you don’t have to wait for the year 2000 to find out. The millennium jumped the gun. It burst from the starting gate more than two years early, in the summer of 1997. And in the following 12 months, the world was treated to an amazing array of startling developments—in technology, world affairs and business. These developments—a dizzying mix of the heartening and the scary, the troubling and the exhilarating—foreshadow several major trends of the next century. They came in a rush, in week after week of news headlines, symbolizing the quickening pace of global transformation. Consider these recent occurrences, which in an earlier time would have constituted a whole decade of change, but now are crammed into one year:
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World Boom Ahead Near-collapse of Asian economies, followed by an expensive international rescue, amid growing concern that it would engulf the whole world in recession. Western corporate invasion of Japan and South Korea by U.S. and European multinationals buying assets at distress prices. Indian and Pakistani nuclear testing and mounting belligerence. Transnational megamergers of gigantic European and U.S. corporations. Rebirth of U.S. antitrust policy, with suits against Microsoft, Intel and Lockheed Martin, and challenges to many more mergers. New drugs for breast cancer, AIDS and impotence. Disabling of telecommunications across America by the malfunction of one satellite, Galaxy IV, taking out pagers, credit card verification computers, police and hospital radios, commercial TV and public radio broadcasts. Signs of revolution in U.S. education, in the form of vouchers, charter schools and serious public-school reform. Communications marvels including direct-from-satellite phoning, high-definition TV and accelerating Internet speed. A new for-profit venture to decipher and patent the human genetic code, in competition with the federal government’s Human Genome Project. The specter of cybersabotage, with mounting evidence that the U.S. computer infrastructure—systems controlling military defenses, commercial air traffic and telecommunications—is highly vulnerable to being crippled by hackers and foreign agents. More than just news events that would fade from memory in a few weeks, these events were telling glimpses of the century just ahead. They brought startling messages about a new world that will be very different—for better or worse—from the world we know today. The deepening Asian crisis, for example, was a splash of cold water in the face of “New Economy” theorists and cheerleaders, giddy over the globalization of investing and their certainty of smooth, never-ending global growth. The Galaxy IV satellite problem reminded us of the world’s growing dependence on technology, and how the compression of more capacity into smaller devices increases the degree of disruption from the disabling of a single satellite or breaking of one high-capacity transoceanic fiber-optic cable. Tensions on the Indian subcontinent underscored the reality that the post-Cold War world will not necessarily be a safer place to live.
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A Millennium of Progress
A
s forecasting journalists, we at the Kiplinger organization try to be calm, hard-headed and realistic in weighing the prospects for change. But we admit to one bias born of our study of history and our 75 years of experience in reporting the world economy: We cannot help but be impressed by humankind’s long record of adapting to changing circumstances, finding solutions to problems and inventing devices to make life easier. We view history as a long, gradual improvement in the material well-being of the human species, and based on the record, we believe this trend will continue. Like other trends, this improvement hasn’t moved in a straight line. There have been descents of great depth and duration, such as the centuries-long social and economic devastation of sub-Saharan Africa by European, African and Arabic slave traders, by subsequent colonization, and by the corruption and incompetence of postcolonial regimes. In this century, the scourge of communism in Russia and China, as well as tight government economic control in India, caused a half-century of stagnation in living standards for more than half of the world’s people. And we should soberly note that the global trade and investment liberalization now under way has a precedent—the late19th-century movement that collapsed with the start of World War I and remained on hold until late in this century. Nor are we sanguine that the passage of time brings any discernible improvement in human nature. The greatest genocides in history have occurred in the present century, in which the technology of modern killing was harnessed to the will of evil individuals, misguided ideologies, and racial, religious and ethnic hatred. But even accounting for horrors and follies, the world has seen a broad, jagged upward trend in the human condition—in health, longevity, income, comfort, education, political self-determination and personal self-fulfillment. Shortly before his death in 1998, economist and business professor Julian Simon wrote, “The progress that humanity has experienced in the last two centuries has no precedent. Since 1750, every trend in material human welfare has shown accelerating improvement, almost everywhere. It is our happy fate to live in the midst of this most amazing time.” We agree, and we are convinced that the most dramatic improvement in world living standards lies just ahead. Most of the world’s people did not participate in the bounty of the 20th century to nearly the degree that those in a few advanced nations did. This is
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World Boom Ahead about to change, as the developing nations move to center stage. The world will discover that economic growth is not a zero-sum game, with one nation’s gains coming at the expense of others. In the world boom ahead, there will be only gradations of winners. The Chinese have a wonderfully understated curse: “May you live in interesting times,” meaning treacherous times as fraught with danger as they are rich in opportunity. This will describe very well the early decades of the 21st century. There will be unlimited opportunities for nations, companies and individuals who can see the changes coming—in technology, demographics, business organization and marketing, and social attitudes. For those who cannot or will not accept the inevitability of fundamental, rapid change, the dangers will be overpowering. But if you prepare for them and adapt your way of thinking, working and viewing the world, you will prosper mightily.
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CHAPTER 2
Major Global Trends
S
everal broad economic, geopolitical and social trends, many of them already well under way, will characterize the coming century and, 100 years from now, will define its place in world history. This chapter presents a brief overview of the major themes:
HIGHER GROWTH, GREATER WEALTH Worldwide economic growth will probably average about 3% a year for most of the 21st century, a rate that, if sustained, would be three times the average annual rate of the century now coming to a close. This will create more new personal wealth, worldwide, than in any previous period of history, including the era of industrialization in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. So many new centimillionaires and billionaires are already being created every year that Forbes magazine has to continually raise the qualifying hurdle on its list of the world’s richest plutocrats. And it’s not just the high-tech boom that will make people rich. Take, for example, the story of Pleasant Rowland, a former school teacher and reporter, who in 1986 created a line of high-priced dolls depicting girls who lived in various eras in American history, sold not in stores but by catalog. As her American Girl dolls and accessories approached $300 million sales in 1998, Ms. Rowland sold her closely held Pleasant Company to Mattel for $700 million.
DECLINING NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY The power of governments to shape their nations’ destinies will steadily decline in the years ahead. The forces of this erosion will be
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World Boom Ahead many and varied: globalization of markets, the rise of transnational corporations, international environmental treaties, adjudication of trade disputes by the World Trade Organization (WTO), antitrust action across national boundaries, and demands for structural economic change from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a condition for massive financial aid in times of crisis. With foreign trade growing as a share of virtually every country’s GDP, a nation’s well-being will increasingly be determined by economic conditions outside its control—especially the economic health of its trading partners. Recession in the economy of one nation will diminish demand for the products of its trading partners. And it will also increase the flow of excess production to other, more prosperous nations. So governments will cajole each other to bring their economic policies more in line with the needs of other nations, by raising or lowering interest rates, stimulating or curtailing domestic consumption, easing trade barriers, etc. This is the sort of pressure that the U.S. and other nations were exerting on Japan in mid 1998, when stimulation of its economy was perceived to be crucial to avoiding a deepening and spreading of the Asian slump. In Western Europe, nations joining the European Community and the new euro currency group will surrender (sometimes grudgingly) a good deal of their political and fiscal sovereignty, in the hopes of stronger economic growth in the entire region. But even in regions where formal integration never happens, markets will be reaching similar ends on a piecemeal basis. More and more trade disputes will go for settlement to the World Trade Organization, whose verdicts will ruffle feathers and affect commercial interests everywhere, but generally level the playing field for all exporters. Occasionally its rulings will conflict with a nation’s initiatives on nontrade issues like environmental control, human rights and food safety. For example, the WTO ruled in 1998 that the U.S. was guilty of imposing nontariff trade barriers on shrimp from Thailand, Pakistan and Malaysia that was caught with nets that don’t conform to American standards for protection of the endangered green sea turtle. The WTO also nixed an eight-year-long European Union (EU) ban on imports of U.S. beef raised with hormones, calling it an illegal trade barrier to protect European cattle interests. Similarly, it ruled against the EU on a banana-import policy that favored produce from European colonies. The erosion of sovereignty will be especially pronounced in developing nations that seek large amounts of foreign capital, because those investors will often demand market reforms in exchange for their
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C H A P T E R 2 Major Global Trends
financial commitments. And if things go badly wrong, and governments need a bail-out from the IMF, they will find themselves forced to surrender even more control over their nation’s fiscal, monetary and business management practices.
GOVERNMENTS AS FACILITATORS OF GROWTH Throughout the world, many governments don’t just regulate businesses, they own and manage businesses—and generally rather badly. But in the years just ahead, most government-owned enterprises in most nations—telephone systems, factories, power plants, airlines—will be sold to private, profit-making interests in their own country and abroad. In the process, the public sectors of most nations will drastically shrink, employing fewer people and passing less of the GDP through their budgets. But this trend will meet with great resistance in many developing nations, where government-owned enterprises are sources of vast embezzled wealth for ruling elites. (“In Nigeria, corruption isn’t part of government; it’s the object of government,” a Nigerian political scientist told The Washington Post after the death of dictator Sani Abacha in 1998.) This doesn’t mean that governments will cease to regulate business in countless ways; in fact, there will generally be more, not less, regulation of workplaces, environmental conduct, health care, etc. But the new, emerging role of government in most nations will be as a facilitator of economic development. At their best, governments at all levels—from municipalities to national capitals, even supergovernments like the European Union— will try to smooth out conflicting standards, shorten approval processes and remove bottlenecks. They will do this not out of compassion for businesses, but to make their cities, states, nations and regions more attractive to business investment and job growth for their citizens. The most successful governments won’t try to fine-tune national economies that are too diverse and fast-changing to be tuned at all. They will see their role to be clearing the way for entrepreneurs to organize human resources, technology and capital to create wealth for everyone. Governments will do this by creating and maintaining environments of economic openness and opportunity, while making sure— through quality education and job-training programs—that their citizens are able to compete in the global economy.
EMERGENCE OF A GLOBAL MIDDLE CLASS The chief socioeconomic phenomenon of the 20th century has been the creation of large, high-producing, high-consuming middle
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World Boom Ahead classes in North America, Western Europe, Japan and a few other nations. In these societies, the very rich and the very poor make up relatively small portions of the population, and most people live in a middle range with a level of material comfort once enjoyed only by a few. Most of the world’s people still live far below the Western standard of middle class, at or just above subsistence level. But this is beginning to change very rapidly, and the trend will accelerate in the first few decades of the new century. To be middle-class means different things in different nations, of course. The statistical middle range of living standards in many other nations, even relatively advanced nations, would strike many Americans as Spartan. Nonetheless, thanks at least in part to the ubiquity of American pop culture, the rest of the world is increasingly familiar with the American model of middle-class life, and it is that model to which it aspires. It includes, at a minimum, the ability to afford a multi-room apartment or ideally your own home, a car, a phone, labor-saving appliances, home entertainment devices, occasional meals outside the home, and occasional travel in your own land or maybe abroad. Middle classes are born of political rights, universal education, entrepreneurial opportunity, strong job creation, and governmental policies that foster open markets and proconsumer policies, rather than the protection of entrenched business elites. As these conditions spread worldwide, so will the new global middle class. Today’s middle classes, with their vast purchasing power, have been instrumental in stimulating economic growth throughout the world by their appetite for imported products made by the mass of lower-income people elsewhere. Their support (willing or not) of economic globalization—foreign investment, technology transfer, free trade—will lead to the emergence of a new, vastly larger, truly global middle class. It is estimated that the middle-class population of Asia alone will reach one billion people in a few decades. This powerful new middle class will, in turn, fuel growth in the advanced nations through its purchases of the more sophisticated products and services of the mature economies.
CONVERGENCE OF LIVING STANDARDS Great disparities in national income and living standards, which have typified the 19th and 20th centuries, will flatten out. In the process, the enormous share of total world GDP now enjoyed by the developed nations will decline, and that of the less-developed ones will rise by the same percentage.
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According to the World Bank, the less-advanced nations, with the vast majority of the world’s population, now account for less than 20% of aggregate Gross Domestic Product (GDP) , while the 23 most-developed ones (the U.S., Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the countries of Western Europe) account for more than 80%. Within that four-fifths, the U.S. and the nations of the European Union each account for more than 20% of aggregate world GDP and Japan for less than 10%. The World Bank estimates that by 2020 the developed nations’ share of annual world GDP will decline to 67%. The so-called “newly industrializing” nations—Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan—will see their share rise from 2.3% in 1992 to 3.8%. The “developing” nations (including most of Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, Eastern Europe and Russia) will nearly double their present share to a projected 30%. The stars within this group will be what the World Bank calls the “Big 5” economies of the Third World—China, India, Brazil, Indonesia and Russia (and some of its former republics and satellites). The Big 5’s share will double to 16%. Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines will also more than double their world market share, to 2.4%, up from less than 1% in 1992. The standout region in the next century will continue to be Asia. The burst bubble of the “Asian miracle,” and the painful restructuring that followed, will lay the groundwork for a stronger Asian future. The U.S. economy is so much larger than any other nation’s that it will remain the largest national economy for another decade or so. But eventually it will be surpassed in total annual output (but not per capita product) by China, a nation with lots of land, resources and an enormous (but now slow-growing) population. It’s simply a matter of growth arithmetic. The U.S. economy will be expanding at about 3% a year, and China will be growing at an average of two to three times that, from a much smaller base. China has been averaging about 11% annual growth for the past 15 years, but that rate is already beginning to decline. It is not likely that even the most dynamic newly industrializing nations will be able to sustain double-digit, or even high-single-digit annual growth for long periods of time. In the early stages of industrialization, nations tend to build productive capacity before they do their infrastructures and the amenities of modern societies. These will soon require enormous financial commitments. While such investments are essential foundations of future economic development in any nation, for a time they will divert capital from the creation of additional manufacturing capacity and will moderate the boomy growth rates of early industrialization.
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World Boom Ahead
EMULATION OF THE AMERICAN GROWTH MODEL Key elements of the American development model are private ownership of business; public stock markets; decentralized economic decision making; a relatively small regulatory role for government; low taxation; borders that are relatively open to the flow of goods, capital and even people (immigrants); and a pro-consumer, rather than proproducer, bias in economic policy. Since the end of World War II, the American economic model had two main rivals competing for the allegiance of both developed and lessdeveloped nations: the socialist model (either democratic or communist) of state-owned and -directed business; and the Japanese capitalist model of privately owned businesses engaged in cooperative planning with the government and among themselves. Both have been discredited by their inability to adapt quickly to changing world circumstances, sustain growth and achieve high personal income without high consumer costs. So the American model of decentralized markets and individual freedom—accompanied by constant and jarring restructuring to adapt to rapid change—is catching on worldwide, and it will continue to be ascendant in the early decades of the 21st century. Emulation of the American model will be a major force in opening markets, stimulating the flow of goods and capital among nations, transferring technology and production, and creating markets for broad public stock ownership. It is tempting to equate the modernization of the world with the “Americanization” of the world, but that’s too simple. The American model will be creatively modified and localized to reflect the richly varied cultural, religious and economic histories of each nation. In Asia, for example, there will be a persistent feeling that the Western political and economic tradition puts too much emphasis on individual rights and privileges, rather than the citizen’s obligation to society. The Asian emphasis on community interests and values as superior to individual rights will temper American-style capitalism from Japan to Singapore to China. In the Arab world, Muslim clerics will play a role in the economies of Middle Eastern nations, limiting the intrusion of American-style popular culture, defining the role of women, and choosing trading partners on political and religious grounds as much as market considerations.
MORE POLITICAL FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY The past economic progress of autocracies such as China, Singapore and formerly white-ruled South Africa have shown that rapid economic modernization does not require a high degree of political
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freedom. But in the long run, political repression is almost as devastating to economic enterprise as wars are. Fortunately, it is not possible for repressive governments to maintain their political grip very long after they have uncorked the genie of economic freedom. Centrally controlled economies can achieve faster development in the short run than democracies, and this will still be attractive to some foreign investors. But in the long run, societies that adopt moreparticipatory systems for both economic and political decision making are likely to achieve steadier and ultimately higher levels of development, with less political turmoil. Some people dispute that democracy is a necessary precondition for economic development, and in fact argue the opposite—that messy self-governance can’t achieve modernization as efficiently as an authoritarian regime can. This notion was widespread in global investment circles in the mid ’90s, as far more capital poured into such authoritarian societies as China, Indonesia, Nigeria and Vietnam (and only slightly less repressive regimes such as Singapore and Malaysia) than into established democracies such as India or the chaotic new democracies of Russia and other former Soviet republics. For example, China attracted some $44 billion of capital inflow in 1996, helping it achieve a stunning 10% rate of growth. Indonesia pulled in some $18 billion. But India’s economy, considered to be an Asian growth laggard at 6.8%, received far less. This hard-nosed capitalist preference for investing in centrally controlled economies was expressed with blunt eloquence in the spring of 1996 by a noted Asia investor, Philip Tose, speaking at a gathering of Harvard Business School alumni in Hong Kong. According to a Wall Street Journal report on his remarks, Tose specifically cited democracy as the reason that nations such as India would forever lag the economic development of an Indonesia or China. At the time of his unabashedly elitist remarks, Tose was flying high as founding chairman of Hong Kong’s Peregrine Securities Group, one of the world’s biggest investors in Asia’s emerging markets, especially one of his favorite repressive regimes, Suharto’s Indonesia. Within nine months of his remarks, Peregrine was bankrupt, a victim of the bursting Asian bubble, and within a year thereafter, Suharto was deposed and Indonesia was plunging into economic chaos.
NO BROADLY CONQUERING NEW TYRANNIES Another factor in stronger economic growth in the next century will be the absence of any new, lengthy and geographically broad sub-
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World Boom Ahead jugations of large numbers of people by global or regional tyrannies, akin to 20th-century communism in Russia and China, which depressed living standards in those nations for decades. Similar restraints on living standards were caused by dictatorships of the left and right in certain nations of Latin America, Africa and Asia, and by well-intentioned democratic socialism and central planning in parts of Western Europe. But democracy is fragile, and there will be occasional regression to tyranny in many nations, in response to political and economic instability or ethnic and religious conflict. These tyrannies won’t last as long as they have in the past, when societies could be closed off to the outer world. In addition to police enforcement, tyranny requires ways to keep its people in ignorance of the outer world, to control the society’s economic resources, and to tax its businesses to support the government. A global society, with a freer flow of information, goods and capital, makes all of these conditions hard to sustain.
FEWER WORLD-CHANGING NEW INVENTIONS Some 100 years ago, a U.S. government official named Charles Duell opined, “Everything that can be invented has been invented.” Duell’s myopia would be easier to understand had he not been the head of the U.S. Patent Commission. We don’t wish to associate ourselves in any way with this sentiment. Inventiveness will be just as robust in the next century as it has been in this one. However, the new inventions, by and large, will be improvements and refinements of current technologies. It will be wellnigh impossible for coming generations to top the 20th century’s record in the breathtaking magnitude of its two greatest achievements: breaking free from Earth’s gravitational pull through powered flight, progressing from a vertical distance of a few feet in 1903 to thousands of miles into space by the 1960s; and unlocking the fundamental secrets of life through the unraveling of the DNA code, which led to the ability to clone existing species and create custom-designed plants and animals. Comparable achievements this century include the wireless transmission of sound, pictures and data; tiny electronic devices that do elaborate calculations and simulate human thinking; drugs that kill bacterial infections in humans and animals; effective birth control; in vitro fertilization and embryo transplants in humans; the splitting of the atom; and organ transplants and artificial organs. But the geniuses of the 20th century have left a lot of unfinished
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business. New mountains to climb include: achieving nuclear fusion, to create a virtually limitless supply of energy; conquering the aging process; discovering life elsewhere in our universe (or another one); achieving superconductivity, virtually eliminating resistance in electrical generation and transmission; improving artificial intelligence to the point that robots can truly mimic human reasoning and choices; and perfecting cryogenics—the ability to suspend life and revive it at any later date. While there will not be as many world-changing inventions and discoveries in the coming century, the benefits of science that until now have been narrowly enjoyed by a few wealthy nations will be dispersed throughout the world.
INTEGRATION OF ALL PEOPLES INTO ONE GLOBAL MARKET The volume and diversity of world trade in both manufactured goods and services will rise at an accelerating pace in the 21st century, picking up the torrid pace at the end of this century. Between 1987 and 1997, the total value of world trade doubled, growing at a rate of 7% per year, far faster than world economic activity in general. Continued accelerating growth in world trade will come from the gradual acceptance of empirical evidence that everyone prospers when each nation makes what it can most efficiently and then acquires from other nations the goods and services it makes less efficiently.
Ceaseless domestic efforts to thwart globalization Despite the clear superiority of open markets, the trend of globalization will not advance in a straight line. It will progress in fits and starts for decades, forcefully resisted in every nation, highly developed or less so. When citizens whose jobs are threatened by foreign competition clamor for help, their governments will be tempted to respond with protectionist measures. The larger constituencies on the other side of the issue—consumers whose cost of living would be raised by the protective measures, or the growing corps of workers whose jobs depend on free-flowing trade—will be harder to mobilize.
Free-flowing capital The free flow of investment capital, the lifeblood of economic expansion, will accelerate. The wealthy nations proved very willing suppliers of capital in the ’90s, with several years of double-digit increases in capital flows to the developing nations—a surge of 20% in 1996 alone. This money—largely from private sources, as opposed to the governmental aid programs so common in previous decades—
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World Boom Ahead went into building new factories, and purchasing privatized government assets, corporate stocks, government bonds, etc. That 1996 surge looked suspiciously unsustainable at the time, and it turned out to be. Much of it was lavished on speculative investments in Asia—including office towers and shopping malls—contributing to the overheated conditions that led to the Asian financial shakeout the following year. In addition to the prospect of a high rate of return, foreign investors demand other conditions to justify taking a risk. Their ideal investment site has political stability and a respect for private property, with little danger that assets will be expropriated; relatively low inflation, so that the value of their assets won’t be eroded by soaring prices; and a liquid securities market and easy currency trading, so they can sell their assets and bring their capital home, even on short notice. Until recently, few less-developed nations met these conditions. That has changed greatly in the past decade, and the trend will continue. So there will be hot global competition for investment capital, with nations vying for it through incessant improvement of their investment climates—lower taxation, improved market liquidity, generally pro-business regulatory conditions. The U.S. will meet the competition by continuing to combine a superb business environment with unmatched political stability.
Capital flows as a barometer of national health The global liquidity boom, with stock markets flourishing everywhere, has emboldened owners of capital to invest it in once-shunned corners of the globe. But as the nations of Asia discovered in 19971998, foreign capital is a stern master. If it perceives financial trouble ahead in a wildly boomy economy, it will flee as swiftly as it arrived, sending the local currency into a tailspin and robbing the economy of fuel for future growth. In the early stages of the Asian financial crisis, some Asian government leaders blamed their woes on fickle or cynical foreign-currency traders and institutional investors. They failed to see that they can’t have it both ways—attracting foreign capital when they want rapid growth but also limiting the ability of that capital to withdraw when it wants. Daily flows of capital, as reflected in currency values, are an instant, continuous referendum on the perceived dynamism, stability and future prospects of every nation. The capital markets aren’t always right in the long run, but they have a good sense of what the near future holds. Investors who have fled will return to a foreign market
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when they see that its government and business leaders have taken steps to correct imbalances.
The spread of individual stock ownership Nothing gives people a sense of attachment—to their economy’s success, to their employer, to their nation—like ownership of stock, especially in the enterprises where they work. So the American concept of broadly fragmented private ownership through individual stockholdings, mutual funds, pension funds and other institutional investors will spread worldwide. During the ’90s, new public stock markets were established in some 50 nations—from formerly communist Eastern Europe to Africa to the South Pacific—that previously had no mechanism for daily pricing and transactions in securities issued by corporations in their countries. Not surprisingly, many of these new stock markets are rife with accounting problems, trading irregularities and illiquidity, problems typical of small, thinly traded markets. But in a decade or two, investors and speculators in any nation will be able to buy and sell, with ease and safety, the foreign currencies, stocks and bonds of virtually any nation or corporation. And Western concepts of accounting “transparency” will make such investing much less risky than it is today.
Relentless spread of manufacturing The geographic dispersal of manufacturing capacity has been going on since the dawn the industrial revolution. Technological knowledge and the resulting manufacturing capacity have moved gradually but relentlessly from high- to lower-cost production centers. Low-cost production centers are not just low-wage locales, but places where total production costs—including wages, capital, land, transportation, taxes and regulatory burdens—are lower than elsewhere. In the 19th century, America was the new, low-cost manufacturing center feared by British manufacturers, even as it was favored by British financiers, who sent their capital to this fast-growing, less-developed land. Subsequently, American manufacturers sought out lower-cost production centers, too, and today U.S. multinational companies manufacture their goods all over the world. In the 21st century, regions of the world never before heavily engaged in manufacturing, including parts of Africa and Latin America, will be called into global production. This will boost living standards dramatically in those countries, while restraining labor costs in moredeveloped nations. Heavy capital investment in the Third World will
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World Boom Ahead move these nations into higher levels of manufacturing, as is already happening in electronics, automobiles, printing and pharmaceuticals. The broad adoption of manufacturing technology in the poorer nations could reasonably be expected to lead to declining living standards in the more-developed nations. But the world’s richer nations will, by and large, continue to excel in leading-edge technologies that will keep them one step ahead of the developing nations in creating new products and services that haven’t yet been replicated and transferred overseas. Manufacturing will not atrophy in the developed world. The U.S., Japan and Europe will continue to be the centers of high-value manufacturing, especially the sophisticated capital goods with which the rest of the world will make less-expensive consumer products. The U.S. will continue to be a world leader in the manufacture of aircraft, aerospace equipment, microprocessors, scientific-research equipment, medical devices and pharmaceuticals derived from genetic engineering.
BOOMING TRADE IN SERVICES The newest battleground in world trade won’t be manufactured goods, farm products or fuel, but something you can’t even see or touch—services. As manufacturing, both low- and high-tech, moves to the lessdeveloped nations, the growth of service exports will be the best opportunity for many mature economies to grow, prosper and maintain world economic leadership. This will be especially true of the United States, which is already the world’s low-cost, high-productivity exporter of services—finance, telecommunications, architecture, health care, education, tourism, transportation, engineering and law, among others—and is poised to broaden its lead over the competition.
More global competition in services While the U.S. has a strong trade surplus in services, other nations are enviously eyeing the growth of world trade in services, and they’re getting in on the act. Using low-cost international phone lines, any lower-wage Englishspeaking nation (Jamaica, Ireland, India and Australia, for example) can provide the U.S. market with teleservices, word processing and data entry, with the data telecommunicated back to the U.S. Computer programming is booming in India. Engineers and mechanical draftsmen in India and Eastern Europe, using computer-assisted design (CAD) software, do drafting for General Electric that was once done in
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GE’s midwestern U.S. factories. Every airline in the world is competing hard for the same business travelers. International engineering and construction management pits strong U.S. firms such as Bechtel and Fluor against competitors from South Korea and Europe. And the world’s biggest banks are all seeking access to each other’s turf.
NO GLOBAL DEPRESSION, BUT PLENTY OF REGIONAL SLUMPS Entire regions will continue to be susceptible to business cycles, and rapid movements of capital in an integrated global economy will accentuate volatility. These boom-and-bust episodes will result from the overenthusiasm of world investors for a particular region that they deem to be the next hot place, a sure-fire success that knows no limits of growth. And there will be occasional worldwide slumps caused by geopolitical situations, such as a war accompanied by curtailing of production of the world’s most commonly used commodity, petroleum. The Asian financial crisis wasn’t the first of these regional shakeouts, just the biggest so far. The first one was the Latin American debt crisis of the 1970s, followed by the Mexican banking crisis of 19941995. In an increasingly interconnected global economy, a broad and deep regional recession will depress demand throughout the world, heightening competition among all exporters, driving down prices for a period of time and raising calls for protection of domestic producers. And as we have seen several times before, a deep plunge in the stock markets of one region or another will often trigger drops in others, until traders refocus on the unique fundamentals of each market and look for buying opportunity, thereby stabilizing prices. Will heightened globalization make it more likely that severe regional recessions will spiral into global recession or even depression? It’s possible, but not likely. In the last global depression, in the 1930s, nations foolishly thought they could insulate their populations from the effects of global competition and falling prices by closing their borders to imports. This is less likely to be repeated, because the world has learned from past protectionist follies and because the world is vastly more interrelated. Exports account for so much more of most large corporations’ total sales that they will resist government efforts, often on behalf of organized labor, to push over the first domino and start a chain reaction of contracting world trade. The International Monetary Fund is another force that will minimize the risk of regional recessions’ expanding into global depressions. With its emergency war chest of contributions from the advanced nations, the IMF can inject capital into a sick economy on short notice
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World Boom Ahead and—most significantly—demand deep structural reforms as a condition for the aid. The fund’s resources are not limitless, of course, and its coffers could be overwhelmed by simultaneous crises around the globe—as nearly occured in 1998, with massive assistance to Southeast Asia, Russia and other trouble spots. The system depends on the willingness of the wealthy nations to replenish the IMF bailout funds, and as Congress showed in 1998, there will be considerable resistance to continuously bailing out nations that don’t seem to be helping themselves enough. The best argument for such aid will continue to be the risk of letting a major economy collapse, dragging down many others.
Globalization a force for long-term stability Some people fear that a knitting together of world financial markets—with rapid, electronic movement of capital in and out of equity markets, corporate and government bonds and national currencies—will aggravate economic instability. Volatility will increase, but slumps will be briefer. Recoveries will start almost immediately, as capital rushes opportunistically into nations where inflated prices have been brought back down to earth—if governments take corrective actions fast to win back the trust of foreign capital. Those Asian governments that moved quickly to restore confidence in their economies through market liberalization recovered soonest. Those that refused simply prolonged the pain.
BIGGER AND BIGGER ENTERPRISES Merger and acquisition activity will boom both within nations and between nations, as seen in the combining of Daimler-Benz with Chrysler and Bertelsmann with Random House in 1998. Many of the resulting giants will be transnational corporations, distinctly different in their structure and management style from the traditional multinationals that have grown over the last 40 years. In corporate culture, breadth of stock ownership and global political power, they will be truly global citizens, belonging and beholden to no single nation, only to their global shareholders. The growth of transnationals will be just one aspect of a worldwide trend toward bigness in business that will see an explosion of consolidations in virtually every industry, from steelmaking and autos to retailing and telecommunications. Some mergers, combining firms in separate but related fields, will have the potential to either heighten or reduce competition, and the outcome won’t be clear for some time thereafter. For example, the $48
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billion merger of AT&T, the largest long-distance phone company, with Tele-Communication, Inc., the second-largest U.S. cable-TV company, combined two potential rivals for the Internet access market in homes. But it may enable AT&T/TCI to compete with the Baby Bells for local phone service, where the promise of competition has been woefully unfulfilled since telephone deregulation. The new company will be positioned to offer the long-anticipated “one-wire” integration of local calling, long-distance service, cable TV and Internet on one monthly bill.
GLOBALIZING OF ANTITRUST POLICY Antitrust officials in the advanced nations will get more involved in pursuing anticompetitive mergers and behavior by companies not residing in those nations. There will generally be more consultation and coordination to avoid duplicative investigations and differing recommendations. In 1998, for example, antitrust officials in the U.S. and the European Union made a pact to coordinate a variety of antitrust activities, especially in price fixing. But they pointedly declined to include joint review and approval of transnational mergers, leaving the U.S. and EU to go their separate ways. In theory, this continues to give each side veto power over enormous corporate combinations on each continent, because access to each market is essential to the combined firm. But a lot of backstage dickering will usually result in agreement among the various antitrust agencies in different countries. EU trustbusters balked at giving their blessing to the $15 billion merger of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, a deal that passed muster with the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, because of a fear that the combined U.S. manufacturers would hamper the sales of Europe’s Airbus consortium. The U.S. threatened trade reprisals if the EU didn’t back down, and the Europeans eventually did. Similarly, the EU considered withholding approval of the MCI-WorldCom deal, unless the merged firms sold not only MCI’s Internet business but WorldCom’s UUNet as well. But the EU eventually let the merger go forward.
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WILL WANE One of the most common forms of international punishment of rogue states and repressive regimes in the late 20th century has been the economic boycott, which the United States has made into an art not appreciated even by its allies. The U.S., with its tradition of moralism rather than pragmatism
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World Boom Ahead in world affairs, has long been partial to using economic boycotts, embargoes and other trade sanctions to effect political change. It’s increasingly evident that such boycotts have a dubious record of accomplishing the desired results, in large part because rival nations rush in to fill the trade vacuum, hurting U.S. companies. The high-water mark for this American impulse to use trade as an instrument for social change in foreign lands has probably been reached with the Helms-Burton Act, which punishes foreign firms that acquire Cuban assets once expropriated from U.S. corporations. In the next century, this American moralism will yield to a less judgmental approach, under pressure from allies and American corporations seeking a level playing field with their multinational competitors. Sanctions don’t have a very good record of deterring negative behavior or forcing errant regimes back into the fold after they have strayed. What they do achieve is the imposition of enormous hardship on the citizens of the targeted nation, who in most cases (as in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq) are so oppressed that they are unable to effect real change. Sanctions also seem to harden the resolve of the rogue regime, enabling it to whip up an “us against them” mentality toward the U.S. The immediate imposition of U.S. sanctions on India after its nuclear testing in 1998 did not deter its neighbor, Pakistan, from undertaking similar testing soon thereafter, even though both nations could ill afford the cutoff of international aid and loan guarantees that followed. And the U.S. sanctions left many American corporations in limbo on large infrastructure projects that could not go forward without U.S. loan guarantees, opening the door for competing corporations to take over the ventures. With Pakistan, there is the added concern that a desperately poor government, weakened further by international sanctions, might become a rogue state desperate to generate revenue by selling its nuclear technology to other Islamic governments. Over time, economic sanctions will fade as a tool of international order. The United States will move toward embracing the concept of “constructive engagement,” in which active trade and open channels of discussion are used to influence outcomes and keep nations in line. In the near future, U.S. sanctions will even be eased against Iran, Cuba and Iraq, under pressure from U.S. allies that want to do business there.
LOW WORLD INFLATION Inflation is far from dead in the world economy, and periods of high global economic growth will be accompanied by rising costs for fuel, labor, capital and resources. But high inflation will be confined
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largely to domestic markets. It will be caused by these factors: rising service-sector prices (in health care, for example) in local and national sectors not susceptible to international competition; rising wages from labor shortages (especially of skilled workers); and, mostly in developing nations, monetary policies that are overly loose. But there won’t be long, broad rises in world commodity prices caused by widespread shortages of fuel, food and minerals. Price spikes will be episodic and brief, sometimes caused by the attempts of producer cartels to restrict supplies. Supplies of key commodities such as petroleum will sometimes be interrupted by war and political instability. And governments will never fully break themselves of the democratic tendency toward the inflation of money supplies to mollify debtors. The broader trend will be restraint of prices, even brief periods of deflation in certain categories of goods, caused by fierce competition among producer nations that are more and more evenly matched. On balance, the forces of inflation and disinflation (or even deflation) will hold each other in check pretty well, resulting in a continuation of price stability in global markets.
BROADER SHARING OF WORLD LEADERSHIP No nation will dominate the 21st-century world economy as the United States has dominated the 20th century. The U.S. will remain the only true world superpower for decades to come, with its unique combination of military might, political influence and a compelling model of economic openness, not to mention a pervasive pop culture of great appeal to other people. But the rest of the world will need the U.S. less in the next century as a military protector and source of development capital. Other nations will flex their muscles in the world economy and be less inclined to go along with U.S. leadership. The world’s decreasing need for American help, both military and financial, will coincide with the declining financial ability of the U.S. to be the world’s chief policeman and financial protector. In the five decades after World War II, the U.S. devoted an inordinate amount of its economic resources to helping rebuild Europe and Japan and to ensuring its own military preparedness. That relieved its democratic allies, especially former foes Japan and Germany, of the need to provide for their own defenses, and was an economic boon to those nations. In the decades ahead, the U.S. will spend relatively less on military capability, directing more of its national income to infrastructure, social services, health care, basic research, public education and other nondefense needs, all of which will strengthen the economy.
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World Boom Ahead In countless ways, economic leadership in the world will be more broadly shared. For example, national contributions to the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and United Nations are based roughly on a nation’s share of aggregate world GDP. As the developed nations’ share of total world economic activity declines, newly industrialized nations will assume more of the financial burden of assisting their less successful neighbors. There will be broader sharing of leadership in research and technology, too. As scientists and engineers (many of them trained in U.S. universities and corporations) fan out across the globe, the awarding of patents will be spread more evenly, although the U.S., Japan and a few other developed nations will continue to dominate. The less-developed nations won’t continue to be just assembly sites for products designed and engineered in developed countries. More and more of the original product development will be done on site in the newly emerging economies, integrating engineering and production as never before.
NEW SOURCES OF CAPITAL In the early stages of any nation’s economic development, investment capital usually comes from offshore. Europe and the U.S. were virtually the only major sources for such capital in the Third World until the 1970s, when the oil-rich Arab nations began investing overseas, and the 1980s, when Japan became a significant capital provider. All of these investors will continue to be active, but they will be joined by many new funders, giving world business a new diversity of capital sources. Much of the industrial development of Southeast Asia and China will be spurred by capital from the worldwide expatriate community of ethnic Chinese, including citizens of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Canada, Indonesia and the U.S. As the economies of the less-developed nations grow and achieve serious capital accumulation, more and more of their growth will be financed by the retained earnings of their own businesses.
RISING WORLD POPULATION, BUT A LOWER RATE OF GROWTH World population will keep increasing, from six billion today to about 7.5 billion in 2020, an increase of 25%. Well over 95% of the growth will occur in the world’s poorest nations. Even as total population increases, the rate of growth will continue to decline, and that decline will accelerate. But high population growth in many developing nations will be a dismaying challenge. They will struggle with rapid urbanization, maintaining food supplies, and
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protecting air and water quality amid rapid economic development. Most of the developed nations, including Japan and almost all of Europe, have already achieved or are fast approaching zero population growth, with low immigration and a fertility rate well below the population-replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. The world population growth rate will decline because rising living standards—and related trends in urbanization, education and job opportunities for women—are historically accompanied by broader contraceptive use and declining birth rates.
CONSTANT RESOURCE SUBSTITUTION Throughout history, anxiety about dwindling resources—food, water, wood to burn or build with, metallic ores, fuels for lighting and heat—has proven to be unfounded. In every crisis of commodity scarcity, human ingenuity has led to a variety of solutions, including finding new reserves, getting more product from existing reserves through new extraction and refining technologies, and supplementing and eventually replacing the scarce resource with a new substance that works as well and proves to be plentiful and cheap. There is no reason to believe that this process has run its course. On the contrary, it is likely that increasing knowledge in plant science, new-materials research, desalination, geology, nuclear physics and other fields will increase future generations’ ability to augment and replace currently popular resources.
ADEQUATE SUPPLIES OF FOOD, FUEL AND WATER So despite the fact that the earth and its resources will be called on to support upwards of 75 million more people each year for decades, there will not be a world crisis of supply or price in major natural resources, including the three most basic raw materials of economic growth: water, food and fuel. Some recent trends in world agriculture—such as flattening growth in crop yields, declining amounts of land under cultivation, and stagnant harvests of ocean fish—do raise concern. But advances in technology will accelerate in the next century and will, as they have throughout history, provide adequate food for a growing world population. What’s more, world agriculture will do its job while employing a sharply dwindling number of workers. Today, with no food crisis on the horizon, much of the world’s tillable land isn’t even in service. The U.S. and Canada have vast uncultivated acreage in the Middle West and Great Plains that could be
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World Boom Ahead pressed into service as demand and farm prices rise. In Argentina, huge tracts of rich land suitable for growing wheat are now used for grazing cattle, which are inefficient converters of protein. Lands like these in many nations will be able to boost the world’s grain production to cover population growth for years to come. As urbanization and manufacturing spread, so will world trade in food products. A nation’s self-sufficiency in food may continue to be an issue of national security, but it will not be an economic necessity. A relatively small number of nations with vast land areas—including the United States, Canada, Argentina, the former Soviet republics and Australia, as well as some of the larger nations of Africa and Asia—can continue to be major exporters of food to the world. Late in the next century, the age-old, ironclad link between land and food production will begin to be disconnected. Vegetables grown not in soil, but hydroponically, in shallow trays of nutrient-rich water, will become a significant food source. The light for this aquaculture will come from the sun or from arrays of artificial lights, and where land is scarce, the whole process will take place in towering skyscrapers, veritable veggie factories. Energy companies continue to find vast new reserves, and technology will lower the cost of pinpointing and exploiting the mostpromising areas. In addition, pressure on mounting energy demand will be eased by a relentless trend toward conservation. This doesn’t mean self-denial, because virtually everything—from homes and appliances to factory systems, airplanes and automobiles—will be designed and engineered to operate on less energy. Throughout history, commonly used fuels have been supplemented and replaced by new energy sources according to the laws of supply and demand—that is, change occurred only when a fuel became scarce and the price soared. In the next century, however, the workings of resource markets will be altered by a potent new force: environmental concern. Powerful political voices in the advanced nations will call for drastic curtailment of fossil-fuel use, thought by many scientists to contribute to global warming. This pressure for reduced energy consumption will be widely resented and resisted in the developing nations, which suspect it’s an attempt to hold back their rising economic competition with the wealthier nations.
NO WORLDWIDE WARFARE, BUT REGIONAL AND CIVIL STRIFE There will be no massive world wars in the next century, no conflagrations of the scale that twice devastated major parts of the globe in
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C H A P T E R 2 Major Global Trends
this century. There are several reasons why the odds are against such a war. One is the broader distribution of conventional armaments worldwide. Some would argue that this increases the chance of conflict, but we believe that it’s a deterrent to aggression. And small wars will be less likely to develop into big ones because nations will be more tightly knit economically. Multinational corporations, with production, sales and customers spread all over the world, will not want to jeopardize their markets by supporting their governments through long, devastating wars. Even where there are no global economic interests at stake—such as in the Balkans—multilateral forces from the UN or NATO will be deployed to contain the conflicts for humanitarian purposes. There will be small wars between neighbors from time to time, and maybe even the use of tactical nuclear and/or biochemical weapons by terrorist groups and rogue states. One need only look at the terrible, ongoing anguish in Kosovo to see the effects of nationalistic, ethnic and racial resentment, which in this case had been kept in check by five decades of communist rule. Powerful neighbors may still attempt to impose their political and military will on weak neighbors, as Iraq attempted to do with Kuwait in 1990. In the coming decades, an economically and militarily powerful China will have the ability to subjugate much of Asia, as Japan did in the 1930s. And a resurgence of Russian nationalism will someday pose a new military threat to the same neighbors that the Soviet empire dominated for a half-century. The world’s major nations will continue to be reluctant to intrude in civil wars, as evidenced by international inaction in the ’90s against mass murder in Rwanda, Sudan, and—until it was almost too late—in Bosnia. The NATO campaign against Yugoslavia’s genocide in its province of Kosovo will stand out as an exception that proves the difficulty of international involvement in such conflicts.
WORLDWIDE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN The political and economic empowerment of women has been one of the most significant developments of the late 20th century. But because that empowerment has been limited largely to the advanced nations, it hasn’t yet had the dramatic impact on the world economy that its global spread will have in the century ahead. Bringing more than half of the world’s population into the global market economy as high-achieving producers, consumers and investors will make profound changes in every aspect of life in the 21st century.
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World Boom Ahead Virtually all women, everywhere are already “working women,” and they have been since the dawn of civilization. But until fairly recently, the vast majority have toiled outside cash economies, earning little but producing incalculable output through their management of households, rearing of children, growing and preparing of food, and making of clothing and simple crafts for the home. Whether in a cash economy or working at home, women clearly account for a disproportionate share (well over half) of all the hours worked each year. That’s because women do not take as much leisure time for themselves as men have traditionally felt entitled to, by the cultural norms of most societies. In many nations, social and legal constraints still block women’s access to the same educational, occupational and economic opportunities that men enjoy, depriving the world economy of the benefits of their intelligence, creativity and entrepreneurial zeal. Now this is all changing. In nations of Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, girls will someday have the same access to public education that boys do. Child care will become more institutionalized in developing nations, so more women will have the choice of working outside the home, if they wish. Labor-saving home appliances—stoves, washing machines, refrigerators, and so on—will become common in developing nations, freeing women to join market economies full-time or part-time. Women will benefit from the trend toward “microcredit”—very small loans to individuals and cooperatives to create small businesses, serving first their local economies, then broader markets. A telecommunications mogul in Bangladesh, for example, has expanded the sale of his company’s cellular phones by extending credit for buying phones to poor but entrepreneurial women in rural villages that have no wired phone service. The women, some of whom now own the only phone in town, charge their equally impoverished neighbors small sums to make calls, thereby paying off the loans and making a profit over time. As they enter the market economy of manufacturing and skilled services, women will be an enormous force in the worldwide rise in living standards. The addition of so much new labor into the market economy will have wide-ranging, and not fully foreseeable, social and economic effects. For example, it could have the effect of restraining wage increases, or actually lowering wages, in the traditional, mostly male global work force. At the same time, the cash earnings of the new global corps of employed women will be a great stimulus to consumer demand for food, appliances, housing and services. On balance, the trend will be highly positive for the world economy.
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CHAPTER 3
America’s Bright Economic Future
T
he U.S. will continue to set the pace for the world’s most advanced nations in virtually all categories of economic success and competitiveness—total production, per-capita GDP, productivity, wealth, standard of living, trade volume, scientific research and technology. Over the next 20 years or so, the average annual rate of economic growth will rise above a two-decade average in the mid 2% range to a new, higher plateau of nearly 3%. Business cycles will be moderated by a number of new situations in the global economy, but they will not disappear. The long trend line of economic expansion will still be punctuated by occasional recessions and spurts of much higher growth. This improvement in America’s long-term economic performance will result from steady increases in the size of the labor force (growing about 1.3% a year) and—most important—a big boost from higher capital investment. This will raise U.S. productivity by an average of more than 1.7% a year—nearly double the average gains of the past two decades. On the demand side of the growth equation, the biggest force will be robust overseas purchases of American goods and services, especially high-tech manufactured goods and sophisticated, exportable services such as telecommunications, banking and investments, health care, entertainment, education, engineering and architecture, and law. Here are a few highlights of our U.S. economic forecast, with more detail to follow in this chapter: Inflation and interest rates. Consumer inflation will average a little less than 3% a year over the next few decades. Interest rates will be pulled in opposite directions by two strong, countervailing forces—
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World Boom Ahead restrained by low inflation and low federal deficits, but pushed higher by worldwide competition for business capital. On balance, lenders will demand the historically typical three points over the inflation rate for short-term loans to the U.S. government. Personal savings rates. Savings rates, now at the lowest level in a half-century, will rise for 15 to 20 years, as baby-boomers save for retirement. Then rates will flatten or decline, as boomers draw down savings in retirement. Corporate profits. American businesses with foreign competition will have difficulty raising prices, and will experience a squeeze on profit margins. Foreign trade. The total value of U.S. foreign trade—both exports and imports of goods and services—will continue to grow strongly. Due largely to imports of cheap oil, the U.S. will run a continuous trade deficit in merchandise, only partially offset by its surplus in service exports. Capital inflows and outflows. Foreign investment in the U.S. economy will remain a very strong and beneficial force. American firms will accelerate their overseas expansions, too. Manufacturing. American production of tangible goods will continue to grow in value indefinitely. Manufacturing’s share of the U.S. economy will hold level for a decade or so, then begin a slow decline. The composition of America’s manufactures will continue to shift from simple, labor-intensive goods to high technology. Job growth and the labor force. Rising productivity in manufacturing and services will restrain job growth to a level about matching increases in the labor force. There will be labor shortages and strongly rising pay in a variety of high-tech fields, partially relieved by immigration.
Higher Growth Ahead
T
he U.S. economy is now producing more than $8 trillion worth of goods and services a year—a GDP that’s virtually the same as all the nations of the European community combined, and about two and a half times the size of Japan’s. The American people, with less than 5% of total world population, account each year for some 22% of the world’s total production. The U.S. is a nation of vast size—the third-largest in land area, after Russia and China, and the third-largest in population, after China and India. It also has exceptionally rich natural resources. U.S. growth has averaged 2.4% since 1978 but 3.2% since 1991—
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C H A P T E R 3 America’s Bright Economic Future
the best record among all the world’s large economies in this decade. With the exception of a brief, mild recession from late 1990 through early 1991, the economy has expanded continually for 16 years, since the fall of 1982. In the nearly three decades since 1970, the U.S. economy has experienced only five calendar years in which its total level of economic activity declined rather than grew—1974, 1975, 1980, 1982, and 1990. In the other years, rates of growth ranged from virtually nothing (1970 and 1990) to spurts as high as 7% in 1984 and 5.8% in 1973. The expansion of the ’90s has been remarkable both for its length and for the evenness of its moderate growth. While the paucity of exhilarating boom years (just an occasional quarter or two of 4% growth) has been disappointing to some, the smoothness of the growth has been a big key to the longevity of the expansion. In the decades ahead, the U.S. will achieve a long-term average annual growth rate resembling the ’90s—about 3% a year.
A Surge in Productivity
T
he key to this long-range forecast of higher economic growth is a judgment that U.S. productivity growth—probably understated for years in government statistics—will get a big boost from heavy capital spending on automation. Overall productivity—the value of output per hour worked—took off in 1996-’98, rising by a very impressive 2% each year. This level of gain will be tough to sustain as a long-term trend, but it is much closer to what future performance will look like than the 1% productivity gains of the past two decades. A developing nation can hike its growth rate by putting more people to work, but an advanced nation with slow growth in the labor force can boost productivity only by pairing its labor force with better and better capital equipment. As Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist Paul Krugman puts it, “Productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run, it’s almost everything; the rate of growth of our living standard equals the rate of growth of our domestic productivity . . . period.” If a company gets more output from each hour of labor, it can pay workers more and boost profits, too, without raising prices. Higher real wages, in turn, stimulate the economy by giving workers more money to spend on goods and services. And that is precisely what will happen in the United States (and the world) over the next decade. American productivity growth was much more robust in the
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World Boom Ahead quarter-century between the end of World War II and the inflationary spike of the early ’70s than in the years since 1973. The annual rate of productivity growth appears to have fallen by more than half, from 3.4% (1948 to 1973) to about 1.3% (1974 to 1992), according to the Labor Department. With that slower growth came a slower rise in the real wages—and therefore living standards—of many workers. There are many explanations for this, including lower capital investment (from a declining national savings rate), the new and permanently higher cost of energy, myopic leadership by both business managers and labor unions, declining public education, erosion in the work ethic, and a federal tax code that discouraged investment.
STRONG IN MANUFACTURING, WEAK IN SERVICES Productivity gains have been impressive in American manufacturing in the ’80s and ’90s, with factory automation boosting output per hour at a rate of between 3% and 4% a year. There is plenty of evidence of similar strong gains in service-sector productivity, in such fields as mass-market retailing (with a boom in catalog sales and lightly staffed “superstores”), telecommunications (fewer phone operators), health maintenance organizations (physicians and nurses seeing more patients per hour), and financial services (ATMs, online banking and online stock trading). Nonetheless, government statistics indicate very anemic growth in service productivity—less than 1% a year until a very recent jump to about 2%. Because services are the biggest and fastest-growing sector of the economy, overall productivity growth in the U.S. economy has been averaging only about 1% a year, even during the long expansions of the ’80s and ’90s. Some economists, notably Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan, say the full benefits of revolutionary advances in technology usually take longer to show up in productivity data than optimists had predicted. But, he adds, they eventually they do show up, and these benefits now lie just ahead for the U.S. and world economies. Other observers, especially in business, are simply convinced that the government statistics have been wrong—failing to accurately measure the dramatic productivity gains that they see occurring in services. The accuracy of official productivity data is more than some game for academics, because it can affect policy decisions. If overall productivity continues to log something like the recent gains of 2% per year, the Federal Reserve could manage monetary policy for higher economic growth without fear of igniting inflation.
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C H A P T E R 3 America’s Bright Economic Future
Adequate Capital for Growth
T
he main reason productivity is poised to ascend to a higher plateau of average growth is that American business has been on a capital-spending binge for 15 years—with double-digit annual increases in investments in new plants and equipment in virtually every line of work. Business investment must be fueled by private capital from many sources—retained corporate earnings, personal savings by Americans, and money invested in the U.S. from overseas businesses and savers. So let’s take a look at the recent data on all of these, and then figure out whether the U.S. will have adequate capital to continue the productivity gains that are critical to a higher rate of economic growth.
AMERICA STILL ISN’T MUCH OF A SAVER The United States, as a nation, is not much of an achiever in the savings and investment department. About 18% of its annual GDP goes to “private investment”—money spent by individuals and businesses on things of enduring value (like construction of homes and apartments) and on things that will produce future value (like new factories, machinery, and office buildings). This “private investment” portion of America’s annual production is a relatively small share compared with that of many other nations. America’s 1996 rate of capital investment was a little higher than that of Sweden (14.5%), Great Britain (15%), and Mexico (16%), and about the same as Italy (17%), Poland (17.1%), Canada (17.5%), and France (18%). But the investment rate was substantially lower than the rates of several countries deemed to be America’s major competitors: Germany (21.7%), Japan (28.5%), and South Korea (36.6%). Among the lessdeveloped nations, India has been running a domestic savings rate of 22% and China a breathtaking 42%, as corporate earnings and personal incomes rose much faster than investment opportunities for business and the availability of sophisticated goods for Chinese consumers to buy. National savings come from a combination of sources: business savings (retained and reinvested corporate profits, plus money set aside for replacing depreciating assets); individual savings; government savings, in the form of budget surpluses (or for most of the past 40 years, “negative savings”—borrowing—created by annual budget deficits); and capital inflows from foreigners, who either choose to invest abroad or must invest abroad to recycle the foreign currencies they amass from their trade surpluses.
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World Boom Ahead America’s private savings rate, both business and individual, began a steep decline in the early 1980s, and the decline has continued since then. At the same time, the government wasn’t saving anything, but was borrowing heavily to cover annual deficits, diverting capital from business and contributing, to some unknown degree, to higher interest rates.
Anemic personal savings Saving by individuals hit post-World War II peaks of about 9.4% of disposable (after-tax) income in 1975 and then again in 1981. But it has plummeted in the years since, running barely 4% for most of the ’90s and hitting 3.8% in 1997—the lowest level since 1946. There are many explanations for this low savings rate, including these: • People tend to save less of their new earnings when their assets are rising strongly in value (the “wealth effect”). Soaring home equity and stock prices in the ’80s contributed to low savings then, and the long bull market of the ’90s has probably had a similar effect. • For ten years the U.S. had the world’s highest taxation of capital gains, a situation that improved only recently, with the 1997 tax cut. • Borrowing is rewarded by the tax deductibility of interest on business loans and on consumers’ home-equity loans, but America’s corporate profits continue to be taxed twice, first as corporate income and then again, if distributed to shareholders, as personal dividend income. • America is demographically younger than most advanced nations, and young people in their early-career and household-formation years tend to save less than older people do. • Today’s senior citizens are freer-spending, and less savings-conscious, than earlier generations were, due to strong income from social security, private pensions and investments. • Spending on such durable products as cars and home improvements is counted in government statistics as consumption, even though these purchases have residual value. In the affluent U.S., where such expenditures are heavy, they depress the official savings rate more than in other nations. • Individual savings rates tend to decline when people feel confident about the nation’s future and their well-being, as has been the case during most of the ’90s (at least as reflected in consumer-confidence polls).
HIGHER SAVINGS AHEAD Fortunately for America’s future competitiveness, this long trend of declining national savings will not continue indefinitely. The future looks generally positive.
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C H A P T E R 3 America’s Bright Economic Future
Business savings has been picking up in the ’90s and will probably continue. A higher percentage of earnings is being retained and reinvested, rather than paid out as dividends to shareholders. Stockholders don’t mind the lower yield from dividends, especially since taxation of capital gains was reduced. U.S. corporate earnings growth will not be as boomy in the next decade or so as it has been in the ’90s, but the trend toward higher retention of earnings will continue to boost the rate of business investment.
Government no longer a big ‘dissaver’ Government at all levels—federal, state and local—will be a positive factor in a rise in the national savings rate, reversing the negative role it has played for 25 years. While actual budget surpluses—and the resulting paying down of previous debt—will be very rare or nonexistent in Washington, federal deficits will continue to account for a relatively small share of a growing economy, on the order of 1% to 2%, rather than the 4% to 6% seen in the mid ’80s. This will reduce the government’s competition for capital and keep interest rates in the present moderate range.
Aging boomers get the idea The U.S. personal savings rates will probably tick up a little from recent all-time lows. Why? Because the 74 million baby-boomers, now in their peak earning years, finally seem to be getting serious about saving for retirement, encouraged by big gains in stocks and government incentives like Roth IRAs. While the stock market will not be as boomy in the next decade as in the ’90s, most investors will take a patient, long-term view and keep putting money in on a regular basis.
FOREIGN INVESTORS GIVE AMERICA A LIFT For better or worse, Americans have long been relieved of some of their savings obligation by the eagerness of foreign savers to send their money here, for investment in everything from plants and equipment to financial assets. Since 1993 there has been an enormous surge of foreign capital into U.S. Treasury notes, corporate bonds and publicly traded stocks. By 1997 the annual purchases were more than three times the level of 1993. There is no reason to believe that this flow will diminish in the years ahead, even with exciting equity investment opportunities in developing nations. Besides the need to recycle the dollars they acquire by selling us their products, foreigners have had plenty of other good
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World Boom Ahead reasons to invest in America. The U.S. will continue to be the world’s most dynamic large economy, investment returns will be good, and— as the Asian financial crisis has shown—the safety of U.S. markets poses a stark contrast to volatility in other nations.
AMERICA WILL DO WELL DESPITE LOW SAVINGS A final word on America’s low rate of domestic savings and capital investment, compared with other nations’: It’s been low throughout a 15-year period in which America has done better economically than most of the advanced nations with higher savings rates (Japan, for example, and several nations of Western Europe). Part of the explanation for this seeming paradox lies in the difference between a proportion and an absolute amount. The proportion of America’s output that goes into new investment might be low compared with other nations, but the amount is stunningly large, due to the immensity of the U.S. economy. And this annual increment of investment adds to a capital stock of factories, laboratories, offices and schools that is already vastly larger, more modern and more productive than any other nation’s.
Foreign Role in U.S. Growth: Customers and Investors
A
merica has long been the world’s leading exporter in value of goods and services, but foreign trade has been a relatively small part of its total economy, due to the size and affluence of its domestic market. Many American businesses didn’t bother to look abroad for sales growth, as firms in smaller nations such as Japan, Germany and the Netherlands have done for years. Now, emboldened by surging consumer and business demand in other lands, American businesses of all sizes are looking far beyond their shores, searching for newly capable customers on every continent—5.7 billion potential customers or 95% of the world’s population. Stories like these are happening in every U. S. state: • Kingsdown, a maker of luxury bedding in Mebane, N.C., exports $3,000 mattress sets to Japan, the Middle East and South America; • Multiplex, based in Ballwin, Mo., sells beverage-dispensing equipment in Taiwan, Germany, France, Canada and England; • Quickie, a Fresno, Cal., maker of high-performance wheelchairs, sells its equipment all over the world; and • Pantone, a Carlstadt, N.J,. maker of color-control processes for print-
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ing, textiles and other applications, sells its products in Asia through a Hong Kong office. And giant American companies are stepping up their foreign initiatives, too. U.S. toy maker Mattel embarked in 1998 on an ambitious strategy to double its foreign sales over the next five years, reducing its U.S. sales to 50% of total revenues, down from 65% today. “Only 3% of the world’s kids are in the U.S.,” Mattel CEO Jill Barad told The Wall Street Journal, while announcing a new line of less-expensive dolls for foreign markets, including “Global Friends” dolls that reflect the look and attire of children in major world capitals.
EXPORTS A RISING SHARE OF ECONOMY Commitments such as these explain why exports are a strongly rising share of the economy. From 1985 through 1997, exports rose every year, averaging double-digit growth until interrupted by a slight downturn in 1998, when the emerging markets crisis in Asia and elsewhere severely impaired the ability of foreign customers to buy U.S. goods. Sales of American services to foreign customers (either in their home country or on our shores) rose by a similar percentage. Purchases by Americans of imported goods and services rose, too, but not as much as exports. While the total volume of foreign trade in and out of America was growing at double-digit levels, the overall economy was growing at less than 3% a year. So foreign trade’s share of total economic activity nearly doubled, from about 13.8% of GDP in 1986 to 26% in 1996. America’s export boom isn’t restricted to a few big manufacturing states. According to a study by the Massachusetts Institute of Social and Economic Research, 46 of the 50 states experienced varying degrees of export growth from 1992 through 1996. Several previously small exporters such as South Dakota, Hawaii, Arizona and New Mexico doubled or tripled their export volume in this period. Big industrial states such as Michigan and Missouri achieved 67% and 56% growth, respectively, in exports, and South Carolina, a hotbed of foreign investment, boosted its exports 76%.
SERVICES EXPORTS BOOM The U.S. is the world’s largest seller of services, and its lead is likely to grow in the decades ahead, despite increasing global competition in lines ranging from commercial aviation to civil engineering. In increasing numbers, foreign customers will travel the world on U.S.-based airlines. They will watch TV shows and movies pro-
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World Boom Ahead duced in the U.S. They will come to America to have difficult surgery performed. They will study at American universities, either on U.S. campuses, at a foreign campus of a U.S. college, or through Internet or televised distance-learning programs. They will make phone calls, even in their own countries, on wireless phones tied to American-owned satellite systems. They will run their appliances on electrical current from a U.S.-owned, or U.S.-engineered, utility. Their garbage will be collected and their industrial wastes processed by American companies. Some of their biggest buildings will be designed by American architects. Foreign businesses will hire U.S.-based management consulting firms to guide their way into global partnerships and new markets. They will buy consumer products through American retailers who operate vast, fully stocked virtual stores on the Internet, and their goods will arrive via Federal Express and United Parcel Service. And foreign tourists will keep flocking to the U.S. to spend their entertainment and leisure money in America’s theme parks, wilderness areas and historical sites. Other foreign citizens will seek capital for their businesses from, and pay fees to, U.S. investment bankers, and investors all over the world will use the brokerage services of U.S. firms, whether at local offices overseas or on the Internet.
BIG-TICKET EXPORTS AND CONSUMER GOODS, TOO America’s export strength has traditionally been derived largely from high-priced capital goods and other items bought by businesses— jet airliners, computers and scientific equipment, for example. Sales of these products will be joined by surging trade in consumer products that, though not necessarily better than another country’s similar product, carry an unusually high cachet with the new global middle class, especially young consumers. Levi Strauss, for example, is selling its jeans at some 28 retail stores in Malaysia. Teens in Asia, Latin America and Europe chat on Motorola cell phones on long-distance calls cleared by AT&T. They gobble McDonald’s Big Macs and guzzle Coke and Pepsi, do homework on IBM and Macintosh home computers, and wear clothing from Nike and Champion. They carry bankcards issued by Citicorp. They use personal-care products made by Procter & Gamble and Johnson & Johnson. And in amazing numbers, they derive their distorted view of life in America from U.S.-made movies and television programming. It is estimated that MTV’s music videos are seen by more youths around the world—in nations as different as Brazil, India and China—than in the U.S. The mix of songs on MTV’s overseas networks, however, is truly
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C H A P T E R 3 America’s Bright Economic Future
international and generally more wholesome than the U.S. version; American hits are interspersed with large doses of the local pop music.
AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS SPREAD THEIR REACH “American-brand” goods are not necessarily made in the U.S. Many of these consumer products are, and will increasingly be, made by American multinational companies in their overseas plants. In a few decades most of the biggest American multinationals will have vastly more employees outside the U.S. than on home turf. That’s true today of only two large American corporations, Ford and IBM, which have 54% and 51% of their employees in plants and offices outside the U.S. Another group of U.S. multinationals, including AT&T, General Electric, PepsiCo and General Motors, have between one-fifth and one-third of their total employment in non-U.S. facilities. The world leaders in non-domestic employment are multinationals based in small European nations—Switzerland’s Nestlé, with 97% of its employees in other nations, and the Dutch electronics firm Philips, with 82%. Over time, American companies will increasingly emulate this model of international growth.
NO END TO TRADE DEFICITS It is highly unlikely that American exports and imports—of goods and services combined—will be in balance at any time in the next few decades. There are three reasons why: First, the U.S. is the world’s most open economy. Second, the U.S. is the world’s richest nation, and therefore able to afford all the imports it wishes to buy. Third, over half of the trade deficit is attributed to petroleum, which world producers are happy to supply at cheap prices while U.S. reserves sit in the ground to await the higher prices of another day. (Some people consider U.S. dependence on foreign oil to be a national-security issue, but it’s not much of one, given the geographic variety of imported-oil sources today and in the future.) Over the next few years the trade deficit will probably widen, due to weakness in Asia, which will impair the growth of exports to that region and flood the U.S. market with Asian goods that the continent’s weak economies can’t absorb. In any event, persistent U.S. trade deficits will have no particular bearing on America’s continued economic success in the world economy. In recent years, the rising U.S. trade deficit has not been due to American economic weakness. Rather, it arises from the financial capac-
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World Boom Ahead ity of a booming United States to absorb the bargain-priced excess production of trading partners whose economic growth, and therefore domestic consumer demand, have been relatively weak. There are highly successful nations that regularly run big trade deficits, and there are less-successful nations with big surpluses, especially poor nations whose citizens can’t afford to buy goods from the rest of the world. The enormous trade surpluses of one affluent nation— Japan—haven’t saved it from a decade of economic stagnation in the ’90s. Instead, Japan’s surpluses—a symptom of its closed markets and high consumer prices—have contributed to its economic woes.
MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS Among America’s 20 largest trading partners in 1997, fourteen of them sold the U.S. more goods and services than they bought, and those 14 nations included the top four trading partners, Canada, Japan, Mexico and China. The U.S. ran a small surplus with its number-five partner, Great Britain. America’s biggest trade surpluses were with (in order) the Netherlands, Australia, Brazil, Hong Kong, Belgium and Great Britain. In total dollars, the U.S. deficit with Japan was the largest, at about $56 billion, but the greatest percentage imbalance was with China, whose factories and workers supplied the U.S. more than five times the value of products and services that China bought from America. But much of the merchandise coming from China (as from many of the less-developed nations) is imported to the U.S. by American firms that contracted with Chinese companies for production or that made the goods in factories they own in China. The U.S. trade deficit with Japan will decline in the next few years, as Japan gradually opens its economy to foreign capital and goods to stimulate growth, lower consumer costs, and raise living standards in its struggling economy. But the deficit with China will keep growing, supplanting the Japanese deficit as the biggest in volume—and as the hottest issue in U.S. trade policy. The United States will press China to open its economy to more American goods and also improve its sorry record in the protection of U.S. patents and copyrights.
STRONG FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN U.S. Since the U.S. will continue to run a sizable trade deficit, it will automatically see a high level of foreign investment, because net inflows of foreign capital are always at least equal to a nation’s trade deficit. The surplus dollars earned by overseas producers will simply come
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back to the U.S. as heavy—and very beneficial—foreign investment in plants, stocks, bonds and bank deposits. In addition, if an economy is attractive to foreign investors for its sheer market size, affluence, growth prospects, investment returns and political stability—as the U.S. is—it will receive even more foreign capital than required to cover its trade deficit. In 1996, foreign investors poured $408 billion more into U.S. financial assets than American investors placed overseas, and this was almost 200% more than the volume of just three years earlier. More than half of that foreign money went into U.S. government bonds—the ultimate safe haven for the world’s capital—with the rest going to corporate bonds, certificates of deposit (CDs) and stocks (only about 3% of the $408 billion, but helpful support for U.S. stock prices). A lot of China’s $50 billion trade surplus with the U.S. in 1997— maybe as much as 40%, or $20 billion—found its way back to the U.S. in financial investments, with heavy Chinese purchases (by government and businesses) of U.S. Treasuries and mortgage-backed bonds issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These infusions of Chinese capital helped keep U.S. interests rates low and contributed to the long boom in U.S. home sales. So far, the Chinese haven’t been big direct investors in American plants, equipment or whole companies. But that will come in the decade ahead, as it develops multinational firms of its own.
More foreign-owned facilities Direct foreign investment (DFI) in the U.S.—the purchase of entire American companies, or expansion of foreign-owned manufacturing facilities—has remained very strong throughout the ’90s, even as vast amounts of capital from the advanced nations (U.S., Japan and the countries of Europe) flowed into hot markets of the developing world. For example, America’s total DFI greatly exceeded that of China, which has led all the developing nations in its receipt of foreign investment capital in the ’90s. The foreign companies sending this capital to the U.S. are typically multinationals starting or expanding U.S. operations or making American acquisitions in everything from chemicals, banking and textiles to computers, publishing and pharmaceuticals. Their products are either consumed in the U.S. market or exported to overseas customers, counting as American exports. Heavy foreign investment has long been a boon to the U. S. economy, creating jobs and helping communities grow. Foreign-owned firms employ only 5% of all American workers, but in the manufacturing sec-
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World Boom Ahead tor they employ more than double that percentage—almost 12%. Foreign capital is attracted to America by the dynamism of the U.S. economy, with its high consumer income, its talented, highly productive work force, its moderate wages (especially compared with Europe), and its relatively low taxes, regulation and barriers to foreign capital. The only downside to heavy foreign investment is the possibility that the earnings of the foreign-owned businesses will flow out of the U.S. to foreign shareholders, or that foreign-owned firms will be less supportive of their local American communities than U.S. firms are. But up to now, neither situation has been a problem. Most earnings of foreign facilities have been reinvested in the U.S. market, which is a positive for America’s future.
Regional boosts from foreign money The benefit of this foreign investment is evident everywhere, but particularly in the southeastern states—the Carolinas and Georgia especially—which have long been strongholds of heavy foreign investment from Europe and Japan and which, not coincidentally, have been among America’s fastest-growing state economies. Alabama is another state much blessed by foreign investment, with a new Mercedes plant near Tuscaloosa and a British Steel iron-smelting operation near Mobile (dismantled and moved from Scotland). The latter supplies iron to a British Steel minimill in Tuscaloosa and another mill in Decatur, Georgia, that’s owned jointly by British Steel, Japan’s Sumitomo and America’s LTV. Despite the fact that the U.S. is a mature auto market where growth in units sold will not match that of developing nations, foreign automakers—from BMW and Mercedes to the big Japanese makers— are beefing up their U.S. production to try to gain market share. In the process, they will replace some future volume of imported cars with their American-made cars. Toyota has expanded its Kentucky plant, is planning to build another in either the U.S. or Canada, and will double the originally planned capacity of a truck plant in Indiana. Honda, with two auto plants in Ohio, is thinking about adding another one in another state, ideally a place where labor is more plentiful than in the boomy manufacturing climate of Ohio.
Europe will stay U.S.’s biggest foreign investor Many Americans believe Asian corporations, especially Japanese, are the largest foreign owners of business assets in the U.S. But while Asian investment took the biggest jump over the past 15 years—rising twelvefold to $143 billion by 1996—the Asian share of total foreign
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business assets in America is much less than that of Europe’s multinational firms—only 21% to Europe’s 65%. In the decade ahead, European multinationals are likely to maintain their number-one position as the biggest foreign owners of American plants, equipment and operating companies. While a united Europe will see a substantial improvement in its business climate and costs of production, especially with strong growth opportunities in Eastern Europe and Russia, European multinationals will continue to be attracted to the unique business opportunities in America. Great Britain, already the number-one owner of U.S. production assets, led all nations in additions to American holdings in 1997, with $13 billion of new direct foreign investment. But 1998 has been the year of the Germans, with transnational megamergers by Daimler-Benz (with Chrysler), Bertelsmann (with Random House) and others. All told, European firms poured more money into the U.S. in the first five months of 1998 than in all of the previous year. Japanese companies, hungry for capital in their troubled home economy, invested less than $2 billion in new U.S. acquisitions and expansions in 1997, down from nearly $9 billion the year before.
AMERICAN FIRMS KEEP MOVING ABROAD International investment is a multilane highway, of course. While foreign businesses have been shoveling money into American operations, U.S. multinationals have also been investing increasing amounts of their capital in new or expanded capacity overseas. In the first half of the ’90s, direct foreign investment by U.S. businesses overseas exceeded the very heavy flows from foreign firms into the U.S. Aggressive U.S. firms are pushing further into the world economy in all lines of business in both the developed nations of Europe and Third World nations. U.S. automakers are building factories in Russia and China. Coca-Cola bottles its beverages in the former East Germany. Gillette makes razor blades in Poland. Whirlpool is making refrigerators in India, where Motorola is big in pagers. American petroleum companies are investing heavily in developing the rich reserves of former Soviet republics. Frito-Lay sells its potato chips in China and Thailand. AES, a power company based in the Virginia suburbs of Washington, D.C., acquires and builds new electric-generating plants all over the world. Otis, a part of United Technologies, has joint ventures making elevators in Vietnam and China. Anheuser-Busch makes Budweiser in China. Citicorp took advantage of financial crises, and falling prices, in Mexico and Thailand to acquire failing banks in those
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World Boom Ahead countries, and its credit card business is booming in Thailand. Most significantly, the deepening financial crises in Japan and South Korea in 1998 began to open those markets, for the first time ever, to the full acquisition of their ailing local companies by foreign corporations from the U.S. and Europe. In 1996 the total value of all U.S.-owned business assets overseas ($796 billion) was 26% greater than the value of foreign-owned business assets in America ($630 billion), measured by what those assets cost when originally purchased. But much of the U.S. business investment overseas took place long ago, when prices were much lower, while foreign assets in the U.S. are generally of more recent purchase. So the true difference in value is probably much greater than 26%.
Destinations of U.S. investment Canada, America’s biggest trading partner by far (with nearly $1 billion of two-way trade every day), was once also the site of the greatest share of U.S.-owned plants and facilities. As recently as 1982, American production facilities in Canada had a value one and a half times greater than American-owned assets in all of Asia. While U.S. investment in Canada has doubled in the years since then, flows of American investment into Europe and especially Asia have been much heavier—a fourfold increase in Europe and a fivefold increase in Asia. As a result, Canada today is the site of only 11% of American business assets abroad (down from 21% in 1982), compared with 50% in Europe, 18% in Asia and 18% in Latin America. Africa and the Middle East (including North Africa) account for only about 1% each of U.S. direct foreign investment.
U.S. A ‘DEBTOR NATION’? NO BIG DEAL One of the silliest nonissues in American economic debate is concern about the U. S.’s being a “debtor nation”—a popular and troubling notion during the darkest days of America’s “declinist” anxiety in the late ’80s. While it doesn’t get talked about as much in these days of greater American self-confidence, it still rears its head from time to time, with as much public misunderstanding as ever. If your idea of a debtor is someone who owes any amount of money, then the United States is certainly a debtor. So is any individual American with a home mortgage, or any business that borrows money to expand. But if your idea of a debtor is someone whose total debts constitute a high percentage of his assets, or even exceed his assets, then the U.S. is definitely not a debtor nation.
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In the jargon of international economics, America is called a “debtor” nation because the total value of a single class of assets—those owned by foreigners, such as factories, office buildings, corporate stocks and bonds, U.S. Treasury bonds and bank deposits—is greater than the value of overseas assets owned by Americans. This is true, and it has been true since 1987, but it’s next to meaningless as a measure of America’s strength. “Net foreign debt,” economists Herbert Stein and Murray Foss observe, “is only a comparison of arbitrarily chosen totals of assets and liabilities”—and rather minor totals, at that. If it were ever necessary for Americans to square their debts with the world—a truly remote possibility—the assets available for this reconciliation wouldn’t be just America’s assets overseas, but its total assets everywhere, including in the U.S. Foreign claims on Americans—the assets foreign investors and businesses own in the U.S.—had an estimated market value of $3 trillion in 1993. That same year, U.S. assets abroad were estimated at a lower amount, about $2.5 trillion—hence the “debtor” status. But the value of U.S.-owned assets in America was estimated at a breathtaking $21 trillion, for a total American national wealth of $23.5 trillion. So foreign-owned assets in the U.S. represented only 13% of America’s total wealth. Now, you wouldn’t lose sleep at night if your family or your business had such a ratio of assets to liabilities—7.5 to 1. As Stein and Foss sum it up, the concept of America as a “net debtor nation” is “not a threat to the United States or a sign of economic weakness.”
THE MIGHTY DOLLAR The U.S. dollar will remain strong, trading at or slightly less than its present range for years. In mid 1998, it was unusually high against the yen, due to Japan’s lingering economic malaise, but it drifted down as Japan got back on its feet the following year. The value of any nation’s currency rises and falls with other people’s desire to own it—to buy products and services of that nation, to invest in its assets, to visit it as a tourist, student or medical patient, or for a variety of other purposes. The strength of the dollar in recent years has been based on a robust world desire to own dollars for purchasing American goods and services, to invest in U.S. Treasuries, and to participate in the successful U.S. economy as equity investors. But currency values are in constant flux. In 1998, the very high dollar dampened demand for American exports in recession-wracked Asia, and this eventually brought the dollar back into line. Similarly, the occasional rush of world investment capital to a hot, fast-growing
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World Boom Ahead region with soaring stock prices—like Asia before the crash there— will dampen demand for American assets, softening the value of the dollar.
Dollar a global means of exchange But the U.S. dollar isn’t just the currency of America. It is the dominant means of exchange of the global economy. Since the U.S. is the largest player in world trade, every transaction going in and out of the country—fully 20% of world trade volume—is priced in dollars. And because of the dollar’s stability, it is trusted by so many other nations that it is used for many transactions not involving American parties at all. Some 48% of all the world’s trade transactions are priced in dollars. Some 62% of the currency reserves of national governments are held in dollars. Due to the immensity of American stock, bond and currency markets, and strong foreign investor demand for U.S. assets, dollars are used in an estimated 80% of all the world’s investment transactions each day. And in the informal (black) markets of developing nations, American currency is always more highly valued than local money. This global demand supports a high valuation for dollars. While an excessively high level (as in the mid ’80s and late ’90s) can overprice U.S. products and trim exports, a moderately high level contributes to low American inflation and interest rates.
New competition to the dollar Over the next few years, the dollar will get its first competition for the hearts, minds and pocketbooks of the world: the euro, the new currency of 11 European Union nations (not including, at first, Britain, Sweden, Denmark and Greece). It will eventually be used not only in its issuing nations, but also in other global transactions now using the German mark, the world’s second most popular currency, and the French franc. There is also the possibility that many nations of Eastern Europe that now use dollars extensively will migrate toward the euro. And there could be a parallel trend in Asia, with the emergence of the yen as the dominant currency for trade and investment. But it’s not a foregone conclusion that the euro will succeed to the extent that the 11 “euroland” nations’ will abandon their own national currencies once a dual-use transition ends in 2002. There is a strong possibility that the fiscal discipline required by the member nations—especially reducing government deficits to less than 3% amid double-digit unemployment in Europe—will cause a populist backlash
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against monetary integration and delay or scuttle full adoption of the new currency. The strength of the euro, like any currency, will ultimately rest on the economic vitality and dynamism of the issuing nations. And correspondingly, the strength of the dollar will depend on the future performance of the U.S. economy. As Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers told a congressional hearing in 1997, “If the United States maintains strong and credible policies, the dollar will remain a sound currency; the fate of the dollar will be largely in our hands.”
U.S. Manufacturing: Alive and Well
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ontrary to public misperception, the value of manufactured goods produced in America rises virtually every year, with occasional dips during recessions, and this long trend will continue. Manufacturing’s share of the U.S. economy has not declined in recent years, but has held fairly steady in a narrow range between 20% and 23% of GDP. The U.S. still has a significant productivity edge over its major competitors, and it enjoys an enormous superiority over the Third World nations. But as advanced manufacturing technology spreads to the developing world, this superiority will gradually diminish. The U.S. will import even more consumer goods and capital equipment than it does today. Annual increases in U.S. manufacturing value have been especially strong over the past decade, averaging about 5% a year, with gains as high as 8.6% in 1994 and 7.4% in 1995. Strength was especially evident in high-value durable goods such as cars, appliances, electronics, machinery and aircraft, with a record gain of 12.4% in 1994. The more high-tech the manufacturing, the greater America’s, but even such basic industries as steel and textiles are enjoying a resurgence, due to enormous productivity gains. The steel industry is a good example of America’s new manufacturing strength. After a terrible decline in the ’70s and early ’80s, American-made steel has made an amazing comeback over the past ten years, thanks to heavy capital investment in productivity, the development of highly efficient minimills using scrap as their raw material, and heavy foreign investment by Japanese and British steelmakers. Today the U.S. is probably the low-cost steel producer in the world. Total production in 1996 was 105 million tons, about 30% higher than a decade before, even with tough world competition and relatively
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World Boom Ahead low U.S. trade barriers to foreign-made steel. And U.S. steel output in 1997 was the second-highest in American history.
THE REINDUSTRIALIZING OF AMERICA America’s resurgent manufacturing strength should have silenced the myth of “deindustrialization,” but it lives on in public discourse. What accounts for the durability of this myth? It comes from two facts: the changing composition of U.S. manufactured goods and the declining number of people producing tangible goods, a function of soaring productivity in manufacturing, mining and construction. All over America, manufacturers large and small are creating totally new high-tech products every week—in biotech, telecommunications, scientific instruments, microelectronics and countless other fields. And the rising value of these new kinds of goods more than offsets the declining value of old-style simple goods, such as apparel, shoes, dinnerware and toys. A case can be made that the U.S. is reindustrializing, rather than deindustrializing. But most Americans don’t notice this trend because of the prominence in their lives of foreign-made consumer goods. The American home is full of foreign consumer products—apparel made in Hong Kong, Mexico, India, Poland, Bangladesh or Mauritius; shoes made in Malaysia, Brazil or Italy; an automobile made in Japan or Germany; TVs, stereos and PCs made in Singapore or Thailand; toys, dishes and clothing (and lots of other things) made in China. Americans who remember a time when all of this stuff had a “Made in the U.S.A.” label, and imports were negligible, tend to buy into the deindustrializing myth. The products that America makes best today (and exports) are big, expensive and often used by business rather than consumers. You won’t find in the home such great American products as airliners made by Boeing, high-speed commercial laser printers made by Xerox, telecommunications switching systems made by Lucent, tractors and road graders made by Caterpillar or satellites made by Hughes.
SLOW JOB GROWTH IN MANUFACTURING While it seems obvious that the vitality of an industry should be judged by the increasing value of its output, many Americans (especially politicians) want to make employment, rather than output, the measurement of health. Machinery doesn’t vote; people do. Herein lies the root of America’s misperception of its manufacturing strength. Even the manufacturing employment issue isn’t as simple as it
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looks at first glance; there is continuing confusion between the actual number of manufacturing jobs versus the share of total U.S. employment that those jobs represent. The number of goods-producing jobs (including construction and mining, but not farming) has been virtually flat for the past 25 years. The number of people working in the tangible-goods industries in 1996—a little over 24 million—is a little higher than the number working in such fields in 1970 and just slightly less than the numbers in 1980 and 1990. The number of people working in manufacturing has actually ticked up a little during the economic expansion of the ’90s, due to the boom in high-tech manufacturing. What’s astounding is that manufacturing production has soared in the U.S. over the past 25 years with only a negligible increase in the number of workers producing it. This, quite simply, is what productivity is all about. Because employment in the service sector is growing much more rapidly, manufacturing jobs are a shrinking share of the work force. This has been going on for years. The goods-producing sector (not including farming) accounted for 41% of jobs in 1950, 33% in 1970 and only 20% in 1996; the Labor Department estimates that its share will drop to 18% by 2005 and probably continue to head south thereafter. All other jobs are counted in the service sector, whose share of total employment has risen from 59% in 1950 to about 80%. It is likely that the number of manufacturing jobs in the U.S. won’t fall in the years ahead, but it won’t rise much either. American firms—and foreign-owned subsidiaries in the U.S.—will continue to increase the number of plants, productive capacity and variety of products made in the U.S. But advances in automation will be so great that the growth in employment will be far lower than the rise in output.
A Slow-Growing U.S. Work Force
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n the next 10 to 15 years, job growth will slow a bit from the torrid pace of the ’80s and ’90s, according to forecasts by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). This won’t result in a surge in unemployment, however, because the labor force will also grow more slowly— about 1.3% a year. Labor shortages will continue in certain highly skilled occupations—such as computers and health care—and in high-growth geographic areas. Such shortages will be relieved in part by immigration. Changes in the work force will mirror changes in the overall population. Women, racial minorities and immigrants will account for a higher proportion of new entrants to the job market, while white males,
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World Boom Ahead retiring in large numbers, will be a declining portion of the work force. Women will make up about 48% of the work force in 2010 and 50% or more by 2020. The percentage of Hispanic workers will increase from 9% now to 12% in 2010 and 14% or 15% by 2020. African-American workers will compose a bit more than 11%, a fairly steady share. The percentage of Asian and other minority workers will increase sharply, but will still make up only about 5% of the work force in 2010. Whites, now about 77% of the work force, will fall to less than 70% by 2020. The work force will also be aging. There will be an increase in older workers, while those aged 25 to 44 will decline in actual numbers, not just in their share of the work force. The upper age levels of the work force are even more predominantly white than the labor force as a whole. So as these workers retire after 2010, the composition of the work force will shift even more toward women and racial minorities.
ALMOST ALL JOB GROWTH IN SERVICES The U. S. economy has shown an amazing capacity to create new jobs over the past decade, while most of its major competitors were mired in sluggish job growth and high unemployment. Employment in manufacturing has been basically flat, so almost all the growth has been in the service sector. Service employment grew by more than 20 million jobs—an average of two million a year. A key aspect of the economic angst felt by many Americans has been a feeling that lost manufacturing jobs were replaced by low-wage jobs in services. Examples often cited include declining employment in steel or automaking and soaring employment in minimum-wage retailing, household help and fast-food occupations. There is some validity to this concern, but it looms larger in public debate than it should. First of all, high-wage union jobs in steel and automaking were never typical of all manufacturing pay, just as the minimum wage is not typical of service-sector work today. Manufacturing does pay more on average than service work, but the differential is something like 10%, not 200% or 300%. A lot of those new service jobs do pay less—sometimes much less—than the average U.S. wage. In 1993, according to the Commerce Department, about 58% of service-sector jobs were in 14 fields—including retail clerking, child care, gardening, office and house cleaning, car washing, fast food—that pay less than the average American wage. (The biggest component of this lower-wage group is retailing, which pays on average only about 60% of the typical American wage in the private sector.)
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HIGH-WAGE SERVICES, TOO Conversely, the other 42% of service-sector workers toil in the larger number of fields (19 different lines of work) that pay a higherthan-average wage or salary. These include such fields as medicine, education, stock brokerage, real estate, banking, law, engineering, insurance, accounting, architecture, long-haul trucking, airline piloting and maintenance, telecommunications and computer-systems design and maintenance. Job growth in most of these fields has been especially strong in recent years, which should—but has yet to— dispel the myth that America’s service sector boom has been driven largely by “junk jobs.” One characteristic of America’s good new jobs, whether in manufacturing or services, is that they invariably require a solid education, usually beyond the high school level. If America has a job-creation problem, it’s that today’s economy is not creating the kinds of low-skill, moderate-wage jobs that can be filled by young people of limited education (high school or less), like the old factory jobs of the ’50s and ’60s. That day simply isn’t coming back, so America’s critical challenge in the decades ahead is to improve education and vocational training to match the jobs that are emerging in abundance. This is in the early stages of coming to pass, as we’ll show later in our discussion of education and job training.
Low Inflation Ahead
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ne of the great economic debates of the late ’90s concerns the long-term prospects for inflation: Could double-digit (or highsingle-digit) inflation return? Or are we headed for a lengthy period of very low inflation or even deflation—that is, declining prices? The last bout of hyperinflation, in the late ’70s and early ’80s, was caused by a global phenomenon external to the U.S. economy—an artificial jacking-up of oil prices by a powerful cartel. That’s not likely to happen again, because of diversity in oil supply. Other major inflationary factors have included loose monetary policy and federal deficits that were a very high percentage of GDP. These situations are also not likely to be repeated in the next decade or so.
INFLATIONARY FORCES Nonetheless, there is a deep-seated tendency toward inflationary government policies in all social democracies. Debtors like inflation a lot more than they admit, because they can pay off their obligations with
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World Boom Ahead money that’s worth less than what they borrowed. And debtors outnumber creditors by a wide margin. World commodity prices—of everything from wood pulp and oil to metal ores and grains—will be a mixed picture. Soaring worldwide economic growth in the Third World will mean increased competition with the developed nations for these commodities. With normal lags between rising demand and increased production, there will be occasional price spikes in commodities, causing inflationary pressures in the U.S. and elsewhere. But these should level off with adjustments in production. There will be upward pressure on wages and fringe benefits in labor-short regions of the country and in high-skill occupations needed by fast-growing technology lines. Businesses will try to pass higher labor costs on to their customers in higher prices, but in many situations it won’t be possible. While foreign competition will restrain wages and prices in many areas (especially manufacturing), there are plenty of business sectors, mostly in services, with relatively little global competition. Such sectors include housing and construction, health care, media and advertising, higher education, domestic travel, financial services, restaurant dining, household help, entertainment and phone service. These are important and generally rising shares of household budgets, and they are highly susceptible to inflationary pressure. Recent trends toward consolidation in many of these national businesses will reduce competition and make it easier for big players to raise prices.
DISINFLATIONARY FACTORS On the anti-inflation side of the scale, start with stable U.S. monetary policy, providing enough liquidity and credit to fuel moderate growth without encouraging over-expansion and speculation. Add in more responsible fiscal policy, with generally lower government deficits at the federal, state and local levels. In the private sectors, prices and wages will be increasingly restrained by global competition in manufactured goods, agriculture and energy.
THE BOTTOM LINE: MODERATE INFLATION Weighing all these price pressures and pressure relievers, the preponderance of evidence points to a generally low level of consumer inflation, not much different from what the U.S. has experienced in the past 15 years. For planning purposes, expect consumer prices to rise a little less than 3% a year on average.
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But there won’t be actual deflation. Prices will fall in particular business sectors, especially in response to automation, new technology, economies of scale and global competition, as has been seen in consumer electronics for years and is now being seen in services including telecommunications and securities trading. And prices fall due to occasional imbalances of supply and demand, as in housing and auto prices. But a long period of deflation would have to be accompanied by a collapse in personal income, credit and consumer demand—both at home and in the world economy—and that’s just not on the horizon.
REVISING THE CPI Over the past few years a consensus emerged among economists that the government’s consumer price index—the periodic calculation of the cost of a market basket of goods and services consumed by most Americans—was overstating price increases by as much as one percentage point a year. In particular, economists believed, the CPI didn’t recognize that when the price of a product rises, consumers frequently make substitutions—buying a different kind of product, particular brand or container size, or shopping at a different retail outlet. So in 1998 the Bureau of Labor Statistics made changes in the CPI formula that are expected to trim about eight-tenths of 1% off the annual increase in future years. This change will have a major effect on the U.S. economy, because the government’s CPI is the standard for cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) in countless private and public uses, including labor contracts, commercial and residential leases. Most significantly, the CPI is used in raising government pension benefits (social security, military and civil service) and adjusting the tax brackets and standard deduction on federal income-tax forms. In its effect on the federal budget, shaving the CPI will tend to reduce future deficits. That’s because it will restrain spending hikes by allowing smaller increases in government pensions, while boosting tax revenues by not raising the standard deduction or broadening the tax brackets as much as the old CPI formula did.
INTEREST RATES WILL STAY IN PRESENT RANGE In a fully global capital market, the price of borrowed money will be determined by supply and demand for credit not just within one nation, but among all nations. The future cost of borrowed money in the U.S. will be restrained domestically by low government deficits, low inflation, a strong dollar,
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World Boom Ahead strong capital creation by business and big inflows of foreign capital. But interest rates will occasionally be pushed higher by strong worldwide competition for business capital. These two forces, which will tend to balance each other, will keep the cost of money in the present general range for years to come. Over the past ten years, the prime lending rate has run between three and six points higher than the level of consumer price inflation in a given year. Lenders don’t believe that low inflation will be a permanent feature in the economic landscape, so the prime rate tends to remain on the high side, especially when corporate demand for credit is strong. That’s why the prime sat at 8.5% through much of 1997 and 1998, even as inflation cooled down to less than 3% and other key interest rates, such as Treasuries of various durations, fell to their lowest levels in several decades.
Coming Squeeze on Corporate Profits
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merican businesses, especially the large publicly traded companies that make up the major American stock indexes, have enjoyed more than a decade of strongly rising total corporate profits, running at double-digit rates of growth during the ’90s. This degree of earnings growth, while still possible for smaller, fast-growing firms with surging sales, will not be consistently achieved in the years ahead by as broad an array of U.S. firms.
CORPORATE PROFITS AS A SHARE OF INCOME As a share of total national income, corporate profits slid downward in a long, irregular path from the mid 1960s to around 1980, taking a big hit from soaring energy prices in the ’70s. Profits began trending up after the recession of 1981-1982, fattened by slower growth in employment, surging capital spending on productivity enhancements, and strong earnings from overseas operations. This has continued through the ’90s, but the pretax corporateprofit share of national income, now at about 10%, is still well below its 14% peak around 1965. (On the other hand, cash wages and salaries have shown a modest increase in their share of national income over the past few decades, while fringe benefits—such as health care and retirement contributions—have seen a big jump in share since the ’60s.) In the past few years, corporate profits have been boosted by an unusual combination of circumstances, including a slowing in the rise of health care costs, unusually low interest rates, a stunning increase in
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exports to developing nations (in part due to a lower dollar), and moderate wage demands from a labor force content just to be employed after the downsizing wave of the early ’90s.
TOUGHER GAINS AHEAD While none of these situations will go into a 180-degree reversal in the years ahead, the stars will not continue to be so perfectly aligned for American business profits. Wages and salaries in a labor-tight U.S. market, especially in high-skill technology jobs, will rise at a faster rate. Health care costs will begin to climb again, as the baby-boom generation ages and has more medical needs, and as additional efficiencies from the big shift to managed care are harder to come by. A strong dollar will dampen the spectacular growth rate (but not the absolute volume) of U.S. exports. Earnings from U.S. operations will be under increasing pressure from foreign competitors. And even businesses that don’t have much foreign competition will find their margins squeezed from ever-larger domestic rivals, who are using technology to reduce prices costs or who are achieving economies of scale by consolidating with other firms in their field. It’s important to remember the distinction between total profits— a volume figure—and profit margins—or earnings as a percentage of each dollar of sales. Margins can fall even as total earnings are growing, and that’s the situation that many dynamic businesses find themselves in today and will continue to experience in the years ahead.
Smoother Business Cycles
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n the euphoria that swept over America in 1997, before the collapse of Asian financial markets, there was a lot of talk about “the new economy.” There was a growing feeling, especially on Wall Street, that America had created a perpetual-growth machine, demolishing business cycles and rendering national recessions obsolete. We disagreed at the time, and want to reiterate that the U.S. and world economies are still governed by the laws of supply and demand. There will be occasional excesses that must be worked off by contractions of growth. Having said that, we acknowledge that there are, indeed, some fundamentally different things about how business is conducted worldwide today—changes in technology, trade policy, business organization and management, global outsourcing, international finance and many other trends. Taken together, these forces will tend to smooth out the traditional cycles of boom and bust.
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MODERATING INFLUENCES Future U.S. business cycles will be moderated by a variety of factors, including these: • a rising share of the economy coming from services, for which the demand is generally more stable than for tangible goods; • less dependence on U.S. consumers alone to sustain sales growth, due to rising revenues from a variety of foreign customers; • less inventory buildup, due to broader use of computers, satellite tracking and just-in-time manufacturing and deliveries, allowing businesses to keep less product on hand; • broader outsourcing to a variety of vendors, reducing the need to lay off a firm’s own workers when sales soften; and • broader securitizing of American assets, especially commercial real estate, spreading the risks of ownership across more investors and smoothing out regional boom-and-bust cycles.
SHORTER, MILDER RECESSIONS As a result of all this, future national recessions are likely to be fairly brief and not too deep. The severe slumps in the mid and late ’70s were caused by external shocks—a tenfold increase in the price of oil and the worldwide hyperinflation that followed—events not likely to be repeated. The deep economic slump in the early ’80s was a fundamental and painful restructuring of U.S. industry that also need not be repeated. Now the service sector is going through a similar restructuring, with downsizing and consolidation in retailing, financial services, telecommunications, health care and other service lines. But so far, this has been accomplished without a national recession and rising unemployment. There will still be slumps affecting particular industries and particular regions of the U.S., as have occurred throughout the long, jagged line of expansion since 1982. But the amazing diversity of the U.S. economy will enable robust growth in certain areas to offset weakness in others, keeping the national economy on a more even keel than in the past. The rising share of foreign trade in the U.S. economy will make it more vulnerable to severe slumps elsewhere in the world. But greater diversity in America’s export markets—growing sales to an ever-widening list of nations on all continents—will temper the risks of globalization.
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Expanding World Markets
F
aced with moderate growth in domestic consumer demand in the next century, the world’s richest nations— in North America, Europe and Asia—will be heavily dependent on surging growth in the less-developed nations for their future prosperity. And the developing nations will oblige, by opening their markets to two-way trade and foreign investment on an unprecedented scale. The most promising overseas markets for U.S. firms will be those with the biggest populations, the highest personal incomes, and the best governmental climates for foreign trade and investment. But only a few nations, most of them in Europe, offer all three of these traits. There are nations that are enormous in population but still relatively anemic in consumer purchasing power, such as China, India, Indonesia, Brazil and Russia. And there are nations with prosperous but small populations, such as Canada, the Netherlands, Taiwan, Switzerland and Australia, which by virtue of their purchasing power and open markets rank among America’s top 20 export customers. Finally, there are nations that, possessing large populations and rich resources, would have become powerful producers and consumers long ago were it not for decades of mismanagement or repression by their political leaders. Sadly, this is a long list that has included, for most of this century, such nations as Russia, China, India, Argentina, Brazil and most of the nations of Africa and the Middle East. But fortunately for humankind’s future, the general level of governmental competence and economic freedom is rising worldwide. This trend toward economic freedom will be the single most important force accelerating world growth in the 21st century.
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A WORLD TOUR OF DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS This chapter offers a quick world tour of trends in economic development. While it cannot be comprehensive, it spotlights regions and nations that have significant trade and investment relations with the United States. A useful resource for anyone thinking of investing or conducting business in a foreign nation is the annual Index of Economic Freedom, published jointly by The Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation, a Washington think tank. (Visit www.heritage.org or www.wsj.com for ordering information.) This reference work describes the governmental and economic framework of every nation (taxes, tariffs, foreign investment rules, property rights, inflation, black market, regulation, and so on) and ranks them according to the degree of economic freedom enjoyed by businesses and individuals there. Its 1998 rankings ran from top acheivers Hong Kong, Singapore, Bahrain, New Zealand, Switzerland and the U.S. to such cellar dwellers as Somalia, Vietnam, Bosnia, Iraq, Cuba, Laos and North Korea. (Hong Kong’s future ranking is likely to be reduced by the Chinese government’s massive intervention in the Hong Kong stock market during the stormy days of 1998.) Our references in this chapter to “highly rated for economic freedom” or “liberalization” and similar judgments are derived from data in the 1999 edition of this guide, augmented by our own staff reporting on recent political situations in these nations.
Canada
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o two nations are better next-door neighbors than the United States and Canada, especially considering the vast disparity in the size of their populations. Canada’s population of about 30 million is barely one-ninth that of the U.S.’s. But the high-productivity Canadian economy creates goods and services each year with a value of more than $600 billion—almost as much as Mexico does with a population that is more than triple Canada’s. Canada’s per-capita GDP is in the world’s top ten, on a par (adjusted for purchasing power) with that of Japan, Austria and Denmark. And it’s only 20% lower than the U.S.’s (which is second to that of tiny Luxembourg). Two-way trade between the U.S. and Canada has nearly doubled in the past decade, boosted by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). At about $320 billion a year, the value of these transactions is the largest between any two nations on earth—about $130 billion
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greater per year than America’s two-way trade with Japan, for example, and twice the value of the annual trade between the U.S. and Mexico. This trade will continue to grow robustly, with Canada selling the U.S. rising amounts of natural gas and oil, lumber, grain and other farm products, uranium, hydroelectric power, steel, aluminum, paper, and other goods. U.S. producers will sell Canadians processed foods, electronics, automobiles, furniture, textiles and many other consumer products. Cross-border investment will be heavy by corporations based in both nations. Canada will experience modestly stronger economic growth than it has over the past 15 years, as its decade-long economic liberalization programs begin to pay off. Canada will be increasingly attractive to higher investment by both Canadian and foreign multinationals. The wild card for Canada’s future continues to be the issue of independence for French-speaking Canada. It is likely that Quebec’s perception of its financial self-interest will prevail over its nationalistic fervor, and it will not fully secede. But the turmoil will continue to make Quebec a less attractive locale for foreign investment than other provinces of Canada.
Canada comes on strong Free trade between two nations virtually preordains that there will be some degree of convergence in their costs of doing business, including taxes, wages and regulatory burdens. After NAFTA, Canada was faced with the choice of liberalizing its economic environment or losing a growing number of businesses and talented citizens to its giant neighbor to the south. Canada wisely chose the path of liberalization, embarking in the ’80s on the path of privatizing state-run industries, cutting taxes, restraining the growth of social spending and reducing government deficits, both at the federal and provincial levels. This progress, which has continued under both Conservative and Liberal administrations in Ottawa, has created a vibrant business climate, attractive to both existing corporations and new entrepreneurs. Canada’s federal taxation of capital gains is 22%, similar to the U.S.’s long-termgain rate, and its top corporate tax rate is a similar 46%. While the income-tax burden on middle-income taxpayers is similar to that in the U.S., the top marginal rate on high-income Canadians is higher, with a combined federal-provincial tax bite of about 53% in Ontario. While Canada is now one of the most economically liberalized nations, it still has more barriers to foreign investment than the U.S. Foreign investments in, or takeovers of, Canadian firms must be
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World Boom Ahead deemed by the government to be of “net benefit to Canada,” a determination that, although not often denied, has a chilling effect on purchase of Canadian firms by foreign multinationals in sensitive industries such as energy, telecommunications and media. Canada is also highly restrictive of non-Canadian banks’ setting up branches there.
Civility and order On balance, Canada will prosper by combining its improving business climate with its traditionally high-quality social services (such as national health care), a low crime rate and a high degree of public civility. These will make Canada very attractive to immigrants. But despite having an enormous land area to settle, Canada will continue, for the foreseeable future, to restrict immigration largely to well-educated, wellheeled expatriates—ranging from Californians moving north to ethnic Chinese bringing their big bank accounts to Vancouver, British Columbia. As an aging society like the U.S., Canada will have the same need for more and more young workers, especially low-skill labor, to fill service positions and help support the retirement of a graying population. This may lead, a decade or so from now, to higher immigration quotas.
Europe, West and East
T
he economies of the European Union, like most of the advanced world, will grow much more slowly than the economies of the developing countries of Asia, Latin America and Africa. They will also grow less strongly than the United States’s average rate of about 3% a year—say, at about 2.5%. But several trends—notably a slowing of wage increases and social spending, amid the increasing integration of economies—will give Europe’s growth a little boost over its sluggish rates of the past quartercentury. “Eurosclerosis” is not dead, but flexibility and global competitiveness will be ascendant in Europe. And even with slow growth, the affluence of Europe—coupled with its increasing openness—will make it a very important market for foreign producers of every kind of product and service. The integrated European Union is already as big an economy as the United States, and with Eastern Europe added in, it’s much bigger. Europe accounts for a slightly higher percentage of total world trade than the U.S. (about 19% versus 17%). As trade barriers decline, Europe will become an even better market for U.S. goods. European multinational companies will look to Eastern Europe as
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a source of inexpensive labor. This will boost their competitiveness in world trade but also exacerbate tensions with labor unions in Germany, France and other Western European nations. And the same European multinationals will accelerate their investment in North America and the rest of the world, in a quest for lower labor costs and a more hospitable regulatory environment than even a revitalized Europe will offer. European multinationals were already the largest foreign investors in the United States, well before the late-’90s buying binge that saw major acquisitions by German automakers, Swiss and Swedish heavy-equipment makers, German and British publishers, and a Dutch grocery conglomerate.
The new euro The EU’s common currency, the euro, will greatly facilitate trade among the 11 members that will use it (who constitute the European Monetary Union), and its gradual acceptance will also lubricate trade between EU nations and the rest of the world. The euro won’t pose much of a challenge to the dollar as the world’s dominant reserve and trade currency, but it will help U.S. businesses by easing worries about currency fluctuations in so many different countries. The fiscal discipline that the euro requires will be put to a severe test in the next European recession, whenever it comes. In times of economic contraction and rising unemployment, there will be voter pressure for higher social spending, amid declining tax revenues. Euro governments won’t be able to stimulate their economies by devaluing their currency, and if they boost social spending, they will risk raising their budget deficits above the EU’s 3%-of-GDP target. Germany will lead the forces for fiscal conservatism and a strong euro, while socialists and labor unions in France and elsewhere will pose a threat to monetary integration with their calls for ever-higher wages, job protection and expensive benefits. But the euro will survive, and eventually—years from now—the monetary union will encompass all of Europe, including the four current holdouts.
Eurosclerosis in remission Europe is still a continent of high pay and long vacations, high taxes, high trade barriers with the outside, overregulation by government, intractable trade unions that resist downsizing and love to call crippling national strikes, sluggish job growth, and double-digit unemployment. Joblessness averages 10% throughout the region, and in
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World Boom Ahead early 1998 ranged from about 5% in the Netherlands, Britain and Denmark to 20% in Spain and East Germany. But a new spirit of competitiveness is slowly emerging. There is widespread privatization of formerly state-owned industries, ranging from power generation to telephone systems and airlines. Government deficits have been reduced so much—mostly by strong economic growth but also by controlled social spending—that virtually all the nations choosing to participate in the European Monetary Union (with the exception of Greece) will be close to the 3%-of-GDP goal. It is getting a little easier for companies to downsize by laying off workers, and the European market for temporary labor is surging by 10% a year, bringing a new flexibility to corporate staffing. In Denmark a 50% cut in unemployment benefits has brought a big drop in unemployment among young adults. In terms of growth rates, the shining stars of the new Europe will continue to be the nations that are moving most surely toward globalization, deregulation and reduction of their public sectors, such as Britain, Ireland, Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. European nations that have the added benefit of low labor costs— Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece—will enjoy especially strong growth if they can begin to move (or in the case of Ireland and Spain, continue moving) in the direction of economic liberalization. France’s and Italy’s growth will be impeded by their clinging to outmoded government policies. Germany, dynamic though it is, will have its hands full trying to achieve full economic integration with its eastern sector.
Major U.S. trading partners Because many U.S. companies are so dependent on the European market, a 1% increase in the economic growth of Europe can mean more to the companies’ bottom line than 7% or 8% growth in Asia. The United Kingdom will remain one of the best U.S. trade partners, continuing to buy computers, telecommunications equipment, software, aircraft, machinery, financial services, movies, videos and television programming. Because they speak the same language, Britons are an excellent test market for small and medium-size companies U.S. to test the European market. U.S. companies will build more factories and distribution centers in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (assuming the peace agreement holds). Intel, IBM and Hewlett-Packard already operate in Scotland, in the area dubbed Silicon Glen. Germany has struggled with the costs of reunification, and it is
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hobbled by an aging population. Its economic growth will recover some of its old steam in the next decade. Germany will remain an important market for U.S. exports, including computers, telecommunications, transportation equipment, machinery, entertainment and financial services. Along the lines of NAFTA, the next several years will see an increase in free trade between the U.S. and the European Union, probably starting with computer hardware and software, semiconductors, and telecommunications equipment and service. Europe’s traditionally protected industries—agriculture, textiles and steel—will be the last to open fully. But even as governments fight over agricultural trade, often posturing to curry favor with their politically potent farmers, food trade between the U.S. and Europe has grown strongly in the late ’90s, in everything from dairy products and vegetables to processed foods and bull semen. With the World Trade Organization taking a stand in favor of trade openness—and against non-tariff barriers such as scientifically dubious health concerns about U.S. food additives—the volume will continue to rise.
Europe’s big challenges Europe still has a lot of challenges ahead, besides integrating its monetary systems and continuing to resolve its high costs of production and government spending. Workers in the EU will face increasingly tough competition from low-cost labor in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and unions will resist the steady shift of manufacturing by western European multinational companies into those lower-cost centers. With birth rates so low, Europe will face worsening labor shortages, which it will meet in part with immigration from Turkey and North Africa. But that immigration will aggravate social welfare costs and cultural assimilation tensions. And even with immigration, a decade or two from now Europe will be facing the dilemma of how to support a growing retired population with a relatively small work force. The big issue, in the end, will be the future of European economic integration. Like welfare reform in the U.S., the euro is being launched in the best possible economic climate. An economic downturn will bring back old national rivalries, as farmers and manufacturers try to boost production and grab market share from neighboring nations. Eventually, the nations of Europe will have to do more than just meet targets on lower government deficits. They will have to achieve more convergence in their tax rules and total tax burdens, internal
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World Boom Ahead business regulations, labor costs, and social safety nets. To achieve real competitiveness in the world economy, vis-à-vis North America, Asia and Latin America, this convergence should be toward liberalization and lower costs. But that means great pressure on the highcost societies—especially Germany and France—and that means great political risk to their leaders. In short, there is a lot more turmoil ahead for an integrated Europe. While the survival of European monetary integration is not a foregone conclusion, we believe that the necessary, sometimes painful, adjustments will be made.
Rebirth for Eastern Europe The former Soviet satellites of Eastern Europe are all making progress toward economic and political liberalization, with especially notable success achieved by the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia and Latvia. Multinational firms from all over the world view Eastern Europe as both a reservoir of skilled, low-wage labor and a consumer market of vast potential—that is, once personal incomes begin to rise strongly. But multinationals are also finding that the socialist traditions of Eastern Europe are still an impediment to doing deals there. For example, General Motors decided to walk away from a planned deal to privatize a Polish auto plant when the government insisted that GM retain several thousand more workers than were needed. Significantly, South Korea’s Daewoo car company took over the plant on the Polish government’s terms, but Daewoo ended up using the deal as a ruse for importing nearly complete Korean vehicles, probably at a loss, to gain market share in Eastern Europe.
Asia
O
ver the next two decades, the earth’s economic center will shift thousands of miles—from the Atlantic Ocean, bordered by Europe and North America, to the Pacific Ocean, on whose shores sit the two great national powers of the next century, the U.S. and China. Asia will recover in a couple of years from the financial crises that enveloped the region in 1997-1998 and dampened economic growth worldwide. Years from now, the crisis will be remembered as an event that changed forever the fundamental economic structure and way of doing business in much of Asia. Plunging stock prices, rapidly eroding
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currencies, defaulted bank loans—these all combined to accomplish in a few years what decades of political pressure and diplomatic cajoling had failed to accomplish: significant first steps toward the dismantling of Asian “crony capitalism” and the opening of closed economies to heavy foreign investment. The foreign lenders and investors who fueled rapid growth in East Asia in the ’80s and ’90s—inflating the balloon that burst in 1997— will be extra cautious about their choice of projects for several years. But the conditions that fed Asia’s economic miracle are still in place, including geography, large and youthful populations, cheap labor, and great determination to become manufacturing giants. The continent’s long-term prospects remain excellent.
Gigantic world markets By 2020, it is likely that five of the world’s six largest economies will be Asian—China, Japan, India, Indonesia and a reunited Korea (the U.S. will occupy the number-two position). China will pass Japan as the continent’s dominant force, then pass the United States as the world’s largest economy—in sheer volume of annual production, but not on a per-capita basis. Even if growth in China, India and Indonesia averages just 6% a year—a fairly conservative projection—Asia will soon produce the economic output of the U.S. and Europe combined. Just as the U.S. was the big, affluent market of choice for the world’s exporters in the late 20th century, so Asia will be the focus of multinational manufacturers and service companies seeking new customers. Prosperity will produce a huge new middle class over the next 20 years, nearly a billion strong. Many will be young, well educated and eager to spend some of their earnings on a better standard of living. They will buy automobiles, television sets, VCRs and a range of home appliances. They will subscribe to cable or satellite TV services and watch American movies and other entertainment fare. At the same time, trade barriers will be coming down all over the Pacific Rim. The 18 nations of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation group (APEC) will remove barriers and tariffs among themselves for environmental products, energy goods and services, chemicals, telecommunications equipment, medical devices, lumber, toys and gems by 2010.
The Asian miracle comes back to reality The rise of Asia in the second half of the 20th century has been the most amazing economic-development story in history. No other
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World Boom Ahead people in any era raised their average standard of living so much in so brief a period of time. Just fifty years ago, most Asians were living at a bare-subsistence level, lower than the average citizens of Latin America or Africa. While that still defines the material lives of hundreds of millions of Asians, especially in India, China and much of Southeast Asia, many others have achieved a middle-class standard of living. And a small but rapidly growing number have achieved considerable wealth, in many lines of work. The big questions, as this decade and century come to an end: Will the Asian miracle continue? Yes, but at a lower rate of growth. Will the long-awaited restructuring and opening up of these notoriously clubby economies continue after the current crisis passes? Yes. As Asian production costs rise, will foreign capital, the driving force of world growth today, look for ever-greener pastures, with even lower wages, on other continents, such as Latin America and Africa? Yes, and that will give Asia tough competition in simple manufacturing and drive down the cost of consumer products worldwide.
CHINA RISING For a number of years to come, China will remain a communist society with a high degree of government direction of the economy, political repression and social control. But political and economic liberalization will slowly emerge, resulting in something resembling democracy within two decades. China will gradually develop commercial and political ties to Taiwan, which will become a semi-autonomous affiliate of a greater Chinese empire. By 2010, Shanghai will surpass Hong Kong to become the financial hub not only of China but also of the entrepreneurial network of 100 million overseas Chinese, who are important business leaders and holders of wealth throughout Southeast Asia and even in such far-flung spots as Los Angeles and Vancouver. China’s determination to become a global power may be best symbolized by its frenzy of skyscraper construction. Four of the world’s five tallest buildings are being built in China. The Shanghai World Financial Center will soar 95 stories into the sky and become the world’s tallest building (counting its antennas) when it is finished in 2001. All five of the world’s tallest structures, including the Petronas Towers in Malaysia, were designed by American architecture firms—evidence of mounting U.S. strength in the export of highvalue services.
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Doing business in China In the shorter run China, with its 1.2 billion consumers and producers, will be a tantalizing, baffling and frustrating market in which to do business. While the Japanese model of central planning, tough import controls and restricted access is discredited in most of Asia, it is alive and well in China. Most big foreign-financed projects (those over $30 million) must have national and local government approval (too often lubricated with bribes). And China often insists that in a joint venture, the Western partner transfer its technology to the Chinese partner, through elaborate education and training programs. It is widely assumed that the purpose of this is to enable China to develop locally owned, competing industries in everything from autos to aerospace. But it’s no longer necessary for every foreign investor to have a Chinese partner for every venture, and new wholly foreign-owned firms have recently outnumbered new joint ventures.
Heavy investment in China Multinational companies will keep rushing into China, more tempted by the size of the market than turned off by the government’s foreign-investment ground rules. Intel, Kodak, Microsoft, Coca-Cola, Hewlett-Packard, GE, IBM, McDonald’s, AT&T, Nike, Boeing and United Technologies are just a few of the major American corporations already active there. Some multinationals are beginning to have second thoughts about how much new production the Chinese consumer market can absorb in the near future. For example, many of the world’s automakers— Ford, GM, VW-Audi, Suzuki and others—rushed in to create joint ventures, but some of them, such Daimler-Benz and Chrysler (separately, before their merger), have either pulled out or trimmed their plans considerably, concerned that production will race ahead of the Chinese consumer’s ability to afford cars. But GM remains committed to building midsize Buicks in China, as well as electric cars. And its research centers—practically full-blown universities—are teaching Chinese engineers how to use the latest U.S. technology in fuel-injection and braking systems. (A GM executive wryly notes that many of the young Chinese automotive engineers don’t know how to drive a car; they still ride bicycles to work.) Importing technological expertise, especially from the U.S. and Japan, is part of China’s master plan to build the basic industries vital to its future. The government vigorously defends key sectors from for-
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World Boom Ahead eign competition, including autos, chemicals, aerospace, electronics, machinery and building materials. But China also wants to join the World Trade Organization, and to impress the world with its readiness to do so, it plans to reduce its tariffs from an average of about 23% to 15% within the next two years. This will boost China’s imports of products from the advanced nations. Another kind of technology transfer between the U.S. and China is taking place every day in the classrooms of America’s finest universities, where an estimated 42,000 Chinese students come to study each year. They contribute to the U.S. trade surplus in services, but unlike students from other Asian nations, who are free to remain in the U.S. as high-tech workers (which many do, happily for our economy), the Chinese students are ordered by their governments to return home with their new and valuable American education.
Trade strife with China While the multinationals in China are producing in part for the domestic Chinese market, a lot of their products come back to the U.S. as Chinese exports, albeit of American brands. China rationalizes its enormous and growing trade surplus with the U.S. as a natural “stage of development” situation for an emerging economy: America has a voracious appetite for the cheap consumer goods that China makes so well, but the Chinese can’t yet afford to buy as much of the high-value products that are America’s specialty. America’s exports to China, especially expensive capital goods, will indeed rise strongly with that country’s growing affluence, but not nearly fast enough to erase China’s enormous trade surplus with the U.S. for years to come. So America’s toughest trade battles will be with China, not Japan. Tension were already high over the lackluster effort by Chinese government officials to crack down on its country’s thriving software-piracy industry and the U.S.’s continuing criticizism of China over its human-rights record (treatment of dissidents), forced abortions, use of child and prison labor, and supplying of missile technology to such volatile nations as Pakistan, Libya and Iran. Relations were further strained in 1998 by revelations of attempted Chinese influence on Clinton administration trade policy through illegal campaign contributions. Then in 1999 came the scandal of probable theft of nuclear weapons secrets from the Los Alamos laboratory. Finally, there was the Chinese outrage over the accidental NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. In the end, however, the economic objective of increased two-
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way trade and investment with China—and continued diplomatic rapport with an emerging giant—will override all other foreign-policy considerations.
China’s rate of growth will decline China’s double-digit annual growth of the ’90s is likely to diminish significantly, for a variety of reasons. As the financial crisis of 1997-98 was unfolding elsewhere in Asia, it was widely assumed that China would be unaffected by the debacle. But it was not immune from the spillover effects. Foreign investment still poured into China, but at a lower rate than its mid-’90s peak. China’s desired membeship in the World Trade Organization was derailed in ’99 by growing tensions with the U.S. But China will eventually be admitted in the WTO, after showing evidence of its commitment to honor the organization’s open-trade rules. Having China in the WTO will be a great long-term benefit to the United States and other advanced nations in their attempts to gain access to the enormous Chinese market. Then there’s the issue of geography in China’s development. Much of its recent growth has been in coastal areas of the south, near existing transportation and ports. As development spreads inland, the cost of modernizing China’s infrastructure will be monumental. China plans to spend up to $1 trillion over the next several years on highways, bridges, dams, sewers, power plants, railroads, airports, telecommunications and other needs of a fast-growing society. This less-glamorous but vital investment will divert money from China’s export-manufacturing sector. It will also create enormous selling opportunities for multinationals, many of them American-based, in engineering, construction management, heavy equipment, phone equipment and many other fields.
Challenges big challenges A recent study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development identified several other big challenges for China, including feeding its population (as farmland is converted to other uses) and avoiding environmental disaster from pollution. The Chinese banking system needs a major overhaul, too, with clear accounting rules and less cronyism in lending. State-run monopolies are in need of major employment pruning or outright privatization. The Chinese government still owns and operates an astounding number of businesses—an estimated 118,000—most of which are unprofitable. But state-run enterprises employ some 114 million Chi-
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World Boom Ahead nese, approximately two-thirds of all urban workers, so drastic downsizing could lead to social unrest. Further, even a mild slowdown in economic growth could leave many of China’s newly minted college graduates without work. There is also the issue of growing political tension between the booming coastal areas and the mostly rural and poor interior. As China enters the economic big leagues of world competition, it cannot ignore any of these challenges. Managing and financing them all simultaneously will tax the ingenuity and social control of the Chinese government. Since it will be impossible for central planning to accomplish these tasks, the very complexity of China’s economic development will hasten its transition to decentralized markets and a growing degree of political freedom.
JAPAN: FINALLY OPENING UP The Japanese economy of ten years hence will be a very different organism from today’s tightly knit circle of business and government planning. The long stagnation of the ’90s, aggravated by the Asian financial crisis of 1997-99, will finally open Japan to foreign investment far faster than most people thought possible. And while Japan is not likely to resume the torrid pace of growth and capital formation it achieved in the ’80s, it will emerge from its long economic malaise a stronger nation and bolder global competitor.
Lingering recession, not world domination In the late ’80s it was widely assumed, in Japan and in the U.S., that the following decade would be the one in which Japan clearly sprinted ahead of the United States as the world’s most dynamic economy. Then the bubble of inflated Japanese asset values—stocks, real estate, the yen—burst, and the economy still hasn’t recovered its old vitality. For a year or so, in 1995 and 1996, it seemed to be back on track, with an occasional period of growth stronger than America’s. But then the collapse of the Southeast Asian economies—big customers, borrowers and investment partners of Japanese manufacturers and banks—helped push Japan back into recession. Of the more than $100 billion owed by South Korean corporations and banks to foreign lenders at the end of 1996, an estimated $24 billion was owed to Japanese banks, whose books were already loaded with uncollectable (but not yet written-off) loans in their own nation. How the mighty have fallen. A 1998 ranking of national economies in the World Competitive Yearbook dropped Japan nine places
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to 18th in global competitiveness. In the early ’90s, it ranked second behind the U.S., which has held the number-one spot for a decade. Japanese newspapers in 1998 bemoaned a rapid succession of Japanese asset sales to U.S. firms, calling it the “third American invasion,” after Commodore Perry in 1853 and General Douglas MacArthur in 1945. By the summer of 1998, the yen had fallen so low against the dollar that the U.S. Treasury felt compelled to buy yen. A year later, with the Asian crisis waning, Japan appeared to be back on the path of growth.
Slow to take its medicine Japan’s big problem has been its reluctance to acknowledge, and proceed to undertake, the painful restructuring that every advanced nation must go through to remain competitive in the new world economy. The United States was the first to take the bitter medicine in the early ’80s, followed by Great Britain and other nations in Europe, where the process is ongoing. Japan knows what it must do—cut taxes and government regulation, write off massive amounts of bad debt on real estate, abolish lifetime corporate employment and automatic seniority raises, open up its markets to foreign investment and cheap foreign goods, and continue to move manufacturing offshore. It is now doing some of these things, and it will keep doing more, but all of it so tentatively and slowly that its seven-year stagnation will drag on for a while longer.
Down, but far from out With all the excitement about China and the concern about Japan’s weakness, it is easy to count Japan out. That would be a mistake. Japan has an enormous economy of great diversity, either the second largest in the world (using current exchange rates) or the third, behind China (adjusting for purchasing-power parity). It is a major investor of capital overseas, from which it derives a mounting flow of dividends and interest. The educated work force, technological knowhow, savings ethic and hard work that built Japan’s economy from the devastation of World War II into a global power will continue to give Japan a crucial role in the world economy. In technology, Japanese multinationals continue to target key industries of the future—including robotics, new materials, biotech and microelectronics. They have no intention of slipping from the world stage. It’s clear that Japan won’t again match its awe-inspiring growth of the ’70s and ’80s. Its economy and its society are more mature. Due to a virtual absence of population growth, which will lead to a declining
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World Boom Ahead population in the next century, Japan faces the prospect of relatively few workers supporting a large retired class, to a much greater extent than the U.S. does. As slowly as it is restructuring, the changes are proceeding, producing impressive productivity (and profit) gains in steelmaking, shipbuilding and other heavy industries, and keeping Japan competitive with rivals in South Korea, the U.S., and Europe. The long-protected telecommunications and financial-services industries are feeling the heat of competition from a number of foreign-owned firms. Japanese consumers, long forced to pay high prices at protected specialty retailers, are now enjoying lower prices at highly efficient convenience stores (such as Japanese-owned 7-Eleven stores) that sell a wide range of groceries, drugs and even travel services. And more companies are following Honda’s lead, begun in 1992, in replacing seniority-based promotions and raises with merit pay and advancement.
Foreign purchases of Japan’s companies For years it has been relatively easy for an American company to establish a subsidiary in Japan or form a joint venture with a Japanese firm. But one kind of foreign investment has been exceedingly difficult to make—the outright acquisition of a Japanese company. Japanese firms have not sought foreign acquirers, nor have they had to, with so much Japanese capital available. Occasional foreign acquisition attempts were rebuffed, tangled up in red tape or thwarted by a friendly offer (not necessarily for a higher price) from a Japanese company. But the economic woes of the late ’90s changed this. When stock prices were down, struggling Japanese companies couldn’t find the easy domestic capital they needed, and foreign offers suddenly looked very tempting. When Yamaichi Securities collapsed in late 1997, Merrill Lynch stepped in with $300 million to acquire 30 branches staffed with 2,000 employees. GE Capital acquired the more lucrative parts of Toho Mutual Life Insurance Co., and Bass PLC, a British company, bought the prestigious Inter-Continental Hotel group from Saison, a once high-flying Japanese retail and services conglomerate. Daimler-Benz, fresh from its deal with Chrysler in the spring of 1998, began negotiations with Nissan to acquire its diesel-truck division. Ford’s consumer credit division bought the financing operations of a major Japanese retailer, Daiei. Foreign acquisitions such as these will accelerate, and the biggest change they will make will be exposing Japan’s business leadership and consumers to the more free-wheeling, fast-moving management style that characterizes today’s transnational corporations.
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To find workers at a moderate cost for its auto, electronics and other manufacturing industries, Japan will continue to shift production to lower-cost Asian countries, Eastern Europe, Latin America and, yes, the United States. Decades from now, Japan will prosper largely from collecting dividend and interest income from the vast overseas investments of its multinational corporations and its personal savers, as the tiny European nation of the Netherlands has done for generations. Significantly, the U.S. will take a similar path, as its multinationals spread manufacturing all over the globe and American workers recognize that the best way to benefit from global competition is as stockholders.
INDIA AT A CROSSROADS India—with 950 million people, a fast-growing middle class, and some three million scientists, engineers and technicians eager for work—is destined to be a major world power in the 21st century. But in 1998, a year of enormous change in India, it was not clear what kind of a world power would emerge under the muscle-flexing Hindu nationalism of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Will India continue on its new path of developing nuclear weapons that threaten neighboring Pakistan and China, both of which India has fought in territorial disputes during the past three decades? Will India continue the trend of economic liberalization and openness to foreign investment that has progressed in fits and starts since 1991? Which wing of the BJP will prevail—the internationalist group which favors foreign investment, or the protectionist wing, which seems to view multinational corporations as neocolonial successors to the British imperial rulers who controlled India until 1947? Perhaps not even the BJP leaders know the answers to these questions. But we believe that, over time, pragmatism will win out over ideology, and cooperation will prevail over belligerence. India will come to see that its self-interest lies in openness, international cooperation and repudiation of the use of nuclear weapons. The alternative would result in isolation and a terribly expensive arms race with its neighbors. India would risk a long-term loss of foreign investment, international aid and loan guarantees that are crucial to raising its woefully low standard of living.
India compared with China At the end of the 1940s, India and China had much in common— the two largest populations in the world, largely agrarian economies
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World Boom Ahead and a majority of their people living in appalling poverty. Thereafter their paths diverged, politically more than economically. While China was ruled by a communist dictatorship and India became the world’s largest democracy, both economies were planned and tightly controlled by their governments, with state-owned industries, barriers to foreign investment, high tariffs, wage and price controls, bureaucratic regulation of everything. And as a result, both India and China suffered very slow improvement in living standards. Strangely, it was communist China that moved away from economic closedness and control sooner and more boldly. China had been liberalizing its economy (but not its political freedoms) for nearly a decade before India’s long-ruling Congress Party, spurred by a financial crisis in 1991, began taking tentative steps toward openness.
Getting India on track Over the following several years, as barriers to foreign goods and capital declined and modest privatization of industry gathered momentum, foreign investment (heavily American) poured into India. The economy grew at a rate averaging nearly 5% a year, peaking at almost 8% in 1996. This pales in comparison with China’s double-digit growth spurt, but it was a major improvement for India. American exports to India soared, especially in capital goods such as telecommunications equipment, planes and aircraft parts, electricpower plants, computers and software, plastics and chemicals, and equipment for mining and steel making. American multinational energy firms AES and Enron (with Bechtel and GE Capital as co-investors with Enron) each began developing massive electric generating plants that they would own and operate, selling the power to state-run distribution systems. Many U.S. firms are entering the Indian market by joint venture. Harris Corp., a Florida-based electronics manufacturer, has forged alliances worth close to $1 billion with four partners in India to provide basic telephone services.
Sultans of software India has become a world-class giant in software production, with activity centered in New Delhi and especially in Bangalore, the Silicon Valley of Asia. Programmers working for multinational software firms and home-grown Indian companies write millions of lines of code used by the likes of American Express, Citibank, IBM and Hewlett-Packard. Satellite links enable Indian programmers to create, revise, repair and transmit software to clients all over the world instantly. “If a neighbor-
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hood ATM swallows your bankcard because of a problem with the machine’s new software, the problem may be fixed overnight by experts in Bangalore,” says John Stremlau of the Carnegie Commission. And a lot of the reprogramming to fix the computer world’s “millenium bug” is also being done in India. India’s fast-growing software industry, with annual sales exceeding $1.5 billion a year, exemplifies the tough challenge that the advanced nations will face in high technology in the next century. India has the English-speaking world’s second-largest work force of scientists, engineers and technicians, and is turning out an estimated 20,000 computer-science graduates each year. Many of them are willing to start work for about $10,000 a year. That’s about one-fourth the pay of their counterparts in the U.S., but it enables the young Indian professionals to live like kings in Bangalore, where the average annual income is about $400. While the U.S. will continue to be the creativity leader in software of all sorts, including artificial-intelligence agents and virtual-reality programs, a lot of the heavy lifting—the tedious writing of code—will be done in developing nations. As The Economist has noted, while other nations of Asia provide world business with “cheap hands” that can assemble electronics, apparel, shoes and toys, India aims to be the world’s “cheap brains” in the information technology business. The challenge for Europe and North America will be to continually upgrade public education to keep their labor forces a step ahead of the ambitious youths of the developing nations.
India’s nuclear-testing shock When the BJP came to power in 1998 and shocked the world with its underground tests of nuclear weapons, the U.S. and some of its allies—notably Japan, which is India’s most generous provider of unilateral foreign aid—immediately announced a variety of financial sanctions, such as an end to foreign aid and loan guarantees. In the short run, these restrictions will cut into investment in India by the U.S., which has been India’s largest foreign investor in recent years. If other nations, especially American allies in Europe, don’t follow suit but use the sanctions as a selling opportunity for them, the U.S. sanctions will end up hurting American exports more than they will hurt the Indian economy. (Private-sector trade and investment not dependent on U.S. government assistance won’t be affected by the sanctions.) The crisis over India’s nuclear testing and the subsequent sanctions came at a time when foreign investment—and India’s growth
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World Boom Ahead rate—were already beginning to cool from the torrid mid-’90s pace. The BJP’s future economic policies are hard to read. On the one hand, the party attracts the young professional elite with pro-business rhetoric that calls for an attack on bureaucratic red tape and corruption. But it also champions a kind of economic nationalism that favors limiting foreign investment (welcome only for big infrastructure projects) while continuing to protect Indian firms from import competition or acquisition by foreign multinationals. It is possible that the crises of 1998 foreshadow a broad retreat from economic openness and the beginning of a dangerous period of military tension on the Asian subcontinent. The pro-Hindu BJP could turn up its anti-Muslim rhetoric and actions, alienating India’s large Muslim minority and further inflaming relations with Muslim-majority Pakistan. Pakistan and China could start new rounds of nuclear testing to match India’s. There could even be warfare between India and Pakistan, India and China, or both. But there is another very different—and more likely—scenario that could unfold over the next few years: Having proven its point that it is a power to be reckoned with, India will rejoin the world community and forswear deployment of nuclear weapons. Eventually, it will sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1996, which still awaits ratification by several nuclear powers, including the U.S. India is likely to follow this path because it cannot easily do without international aid and loan guarantees.
India’s long-range future The challenges facing India are still enormous. While some 240 million Indians—ranging from the newly rich to the desperately poor—jam into sprawling, unsanitary cities, three-quarters of all Indians live in rural areas, trying to eke out a subsistence living farming small plots. Agriculture, by far India’s largest industry, has not shared in the new prosperity resulting from economic reforms. Many smaller farmers have had to deal with declining government subsidies for seed, energy and fertilizer at the same time that they are whipsawed by drought and wide fluctuations in world crop prices. In its internal economics, the BJP will have little choice but to resume the stalled liberalization and privatization of the early ’90s if it wants to match the high rates of growth—on the order of 8% a year— that are necessary to raise living standards in a nation where most people are desperately poor. Still to be privatized is all of India’s banking industry. India’s tariffs average about 48% (more than a third higher
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than in 1991), but the government plans to eliminate tariffs on telecommunications equipment and electronics by 2000. As India grows in economic power in the decades to come, it will retain and lure back more of its best and brightest engineers and entrepreneurs, who today are attracted to America, Europe and other advanced economies. It is significant that one of the world’s fastestgrowing multinational steel companies, Ispat International, was founded in Calcutta but is no longer headquartered in India. Frustrated by governmental regulation, steel magnate Lakshmi Mittal moved his home to England and Ispat’s headquarters to the most international of all European nations, the Netherlands. Over the past 25 years, Mittal has built Ispat into one of the top five steel producers in the world, with mills in Indonesia, Mexico, Kazakstan, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Trinidad and Tobago, the U.S. (Inland Steel, acquired in early 1998) and, yes, India. In a generation or two, this kind of Indian enterprise will start, grow big, and branch out into the world—without ever moving its headquarters from the home country.
AILING, BUT NOT TOOTHLESS, TIGERS The smaller economies of Asia tend to be lumped together in the public mind, but they are vastly different in their histories, scope of industrial power and governmental structures. Not surprisingly, the effects of the Asian financial crisis have varied enormously from nation to nation, and their postcrisis prospects will vary a great deal as well.
Crisis in Indonesia The near-term outlook is bleakest for Indonesia, where currency collapse and demise of Suharto’s corrupt and repressive rule was followed by social, political and economic chaos. The very survival of Indonesia as currently constituted is in doubt. Rebels in East Tibor and Irian Java are emboldened in their campaigns for secession. Consumer purchasing power has plummeted. The military has lost its ability to prevent widespread looting. And ethnic Chinese, the backbone of the retail economy, have been violently driven out of this predominantly Muslim nation of 210 million people.
Taiwan emerges stronger Not every Asian nation suffered badly in the regional meltdown. Singapore and Hong Kong had big drops in their stock markets, but they emerged relatively unscathed. (Hong Kong saw a modest contraction in its economy in early 1998, accompanied by a 25% drop in tourism.)
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World Boom Ahead Taiwan has been another opportunistic survivor. It stayed out of trouble by keeping its external debt low, accumulating massive reserves of foreign exchange—an estimated $90 billion—and avoiding the overbuilding and fantastic run-up in real estate prices that afflicted Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. Taiwan found itself in the enviable position of being able to buy into the troubled economies of its neighbors at bargain prices. The small island nation went shopping for luxury hotels in South Korea and Thailand, a bank in Thailand, and manufacturing facilities all over Southeast Asia. By these and other investments, Taiwan will seek to bolster its claim to be regarded as a powerful independent nation in the region, not a rebellious province of the People’s Republic of China. China deeply resents Taiwan’s “Go South” strategy of investment in other Southeast Asian nations, and it will continue to threaten its small neighbors with trade reprisals if they expand their commercial relations with Taiwan. In the very long run, commercial ties between China and Taiwan will grow, eventually bringing Taiwan into China’s political sphere without military conquest by the mainland.
South Korea tries openness The nation that will be most changed by the Asian crisis will be South Korea, whose precrisis economy was most closely patterned after Japan’s, a neighbor both resented for its past domination and admired for its remarkable economic success. On the insistence of the IMF, as a condition for massive bailout funds, the Korean government embarked on an ambitious plan to privatize many state-owned businesses, and it eased restrictions on foreign investment in several key business sectors, including commercial airlines, oil refining and investment banking. Debt-ridden Korean chaebols (powerful interlocking conglomerates with close ties to the government) began selling operating divisions to such multinationals as Coca-Cola, Procter & Gamble and Germany’s BASF chemical and fiber firm. AES invested nearly $900 million in electric-generating operations, and Germany’s Commerzbank bought a 30% interest in the state-run Korea Exchange Bank. Daewoo, the Korean automaker whose loss-leader expansion strategy has given U.S. automakers fits, was reduced to courting General Motors to acquire a big chunk of the company for assumption of some of Daewoo’s massive corporate debt. Other big buyers in Korea in the wake of the Asian contagion included U.S. paper companies, GE, DuPont and Kodak. The stronger Korean chaebols have also been buyers, cherry-picking the assets of their bankrupt brethren.
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Sustainable growth ahead And so it will go throughout East Asia for several years to come— the forced internationalization of economies, with the Asian nations emerging stronger for it. South Korea will recover and strengthen its position as a world player in many key industries, including electronics, steel, shipbuilding and car manufacturing. The International Iron & Steel Institute forecasts that the Asia-Pacific region will account for 44% of world crudesteel production by 2005, up from 33% in 1995. Singapore already enjoys a standard of living that rivals or surpasses most European countries. It has attracted investment from many multinational electronics giants, including IBM, Texas Instruments, Motorola and Plessey. Ethnic Chinese dominate the business community in this city-state, which has a diverse population that includes Malays, Hindus and Muslims. Singapore often rates near the top among the best places to do business, despite (or because of) an authoritarian government that is quick to punish those who dissent from official state views. The military, police, legal system, press and trade unions are firmly under the control of the ruling People’s Action Party. The signs of Malaysia’s rapid growth in the ’90s are everywhere in Kuala Lumpur, even after the bubble burst. The skyline is going straight up, the streets are packed with Mercedes and Jaguars, a new $4 billion international airport is nearing completion, and an entirely new capital city is being built on the southern outskirts of Kuala Lumpur. Malaysia’s ascent was made possible by an infusion of $20 billion in foreign investment in the mid-’90s. When the yen was strong, many of Japan’s largest electronics companies opened facilities in Malaysia to make televisions, camcorders and VCRs. But Malaysia’s long-term outlook may not match that of its neighbors. Its work force probably can’t remain competitive very long against China and Indonesia. And its labor costs are already rising because skilled workers are in short supply. These trends will dampen foreign investment over the long term, with investors preferring to bet on Thailand, Singapore and other Asian countries. Keep an eye on two future tigers, Vietnam and the Philippines. The World Bank estimates that Vietnam will grow at or above 8% a year over the next decade, with industrial sectors growing at a 10% clip or better. Sony, Toyota and U.S. multinationals are building factories and entering joint-venture deals there. Eventually its tightly controlling communist government will go the way of all repressive regimes, but not soon.
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ANGLO-ASIA: AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND These two Anglo-Asian nations will become more Asian and less Anglo in the years to come. Rich in natural resources, with plenty of space to grow and well-educated populations, they are also geographically well positioned to be important links between the mature economies of the Old World and the surging Asian economies that will be ascendant in the next century. In the judgment of Hamish McRae, associate editor of the Independent in London and a keen analyst of the world economy, both nations will hitch their wagons to the rising stars of Asia, and they “have a golden future ahead of them.”
Australia goes multiracial Under a succession of governments since the early ’80s, Australia has firmly embraced the goals of open markets, denationalizing industries, lowering tariffs, reducing government deficits and encouraging foreign investment. Most significantly, Australia began to embrace a new vision of itself as a multiracial, multicultural society—with better treatment of not only its aboriginal people, but of people from any background. It opened its vast expanses to more and more immigrants, especially from Asia and Eastern Europe. More than half of all immigrants in the ’90s have come from Asia, with large numbers from Hong Kong, Vietnam and the Philippines. Many of these immigrants, from both Asia and Europe, are well educated and highly entrepreneurial, contributing strongly to high-tech business in Australia and building economic links with their former homelands. Australia has been