WORLD WAR II: An Encyclopedia of Quotations
Howard J. Langer Editor
Greenwood Press
WORLD WAR II
WORLD WAR II An E...
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WORLD WAR II: An Encyclopedia of Quotations
Howard J. Langer Editor
Greenwood Press
WORLD WAR II
WORLD WAR II An Encyclopedia of Quotations Compiled and Edited by Howard J. Langer
Greenwood Press Westport, Connecticut
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data World War II : an encyclopedia of quotations / compiled and edited by Howard J. Langer. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–313–30018–6 (alk. paper) 1. World War, 1939–1945—Quotations, maxims, etc.—Encyclopedias. I. Langer, Howard. D744.W67 1999 940.53'03—dc21 98–26436 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright 䉷 1999 by Howard J. Langer All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 98–26436 ISBN: 0–313–30018–6 First published in 1999 Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. Printed in the United States of America TM
The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Copyright Acknowledgments The author and publisher gratefully acknowledge permission for use of the following material: ‘‘Abortions’’ and ‘‘The Revisionists’’ appear courtesy of Joseph Broder. ‘‘Abortions’’ previously appeared in The Beach Bell Echo, the publication of the 446th Bomb Group Association. Material from a personal interview with Hy Haas, August 29, 1996, appears courtesy Hy Haas. All photos are from the National Archives.
For Fran and Arnie, Bob and Sari, Art and Cathy
Contents
Acknowledgments Introduction
ix xiii
Scope of This Book
xv
1.
The War Leaders
1
2.
Military Officers
49
3.
Government Officials
127
4.
Diplomats
179
5.
Warriors
201
6.
Chaplains
229
7.
Intelligence Officials and Spies
233
8.
Scientists and Engineers
245
9.
Journalists and Cartoonists
251
10.
Historians and Biographers
281
11.
Influential Personalities
313
12.
Civilians
325
13.
Institutional Quotations
337
14.
Anonymous Quotations
359
15.
War Movies
363
16.
War Songs
373
viii
CONTENTS
17.
War Lexicon
375
18.
Miscellaneous Quotations
385
Appendix: Quotations by Category
425
Bibliography
431
Name Index
439
Subject Index
447
Acknowledgments
To begin with, I would like to acknowledge the loving assistance of my wife, Florence. It is a cliche´ to use the phrase, ‘‘without whose help this book would not have been possible . . .’’ However, it is certainly justified here. I wish to thank the staff of the New City (Rockland County, New York) Public Library for their gracious assistance, as well as the staff of the Finkelstein Memorial Library, Spring Valley, New York, the West Point Library, and the libraries that are part of the regional interlibrary loan program. In addition, I would like to thank Bob Hagelstein, Jim Sabin, and Cynthia Harris of Greenwood Press; also Hirofumi Murabayashi of the Japanese consulate in New York City for providing statements by the Japanese government on the ‘‘Comfort Women’’ of World War II. All the sources in the bibliography were helpful in the preparation of this volume. Several, however, were of special importance. To begin, William L. Shirer’s The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich was indispensable for dealing with the war in Europe. Shirer was extremely gracious in granting me an interview with him, allowing fresh insights into the character of both individuals and national groups. Brief excerpts from that interview appear in this volume. The reader is encouraged to read the full text in Social Education magazine. Also indispensable was Winston Churchill’s multivolume series The Second World War. Obviously written from the prime minister’s point of view, the volumes offer massive material not only on the European and Pacific wars but on aspects of the war often given short shrift by American historians. John Toland’s The Rising Sun was especially valuable for Japanese viewpoints of the war in the Pacific. Louis L. Snyder’s Historical Guide to World War II was most useful for checking specific names, dates, and places. Documents presented at the Nuremberg trials, published by the Office of United States Chief of Coun-
x
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
sel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, were invaluable in providing hitherto secret plans and discussions of the Axis leaders. The Broken Seal, by Ladislas Farago, was a key source for the cracking of the Japanese code prior to Pearl Harbor—and the messages that reached American intelligence well before December 7, 1941. The most readable book on the European war is undoubtedly A Soldier’s Story by Omar N. Bradley. Not only is it well written; it is filled with insights and anecdotes about the clashing egos and agendas of men at war. A frank, honest, no-holds-barred account, it truly brings history to life. The Fall of the Philippines, by Louis Morton, gives a vivid, authoritative account of a desperate effort to buy time for a wounded America in the months after Pearl Harbor. It is one of a series developed by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Veterans of the war were always extremely outspoken in discussing with me the decision to use the atomic bomb on Japan. They felt, very simply, that their lives might have been spared. Armed forces in Europe as well as the Far East concurred. The appendixes in Code-Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan—and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb, by Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, spell out—army by army and division by division—exactly when and where each unit was scheduled to participate in the invasion of the Japanese home islands. The appendixes are a bonus to truly eye-opening disclosures on official thinking in both Washington and Tokyo. A child during the war, I was filled with all the stereotypes of the enemy conveyed by the media. I found Terry Charman’s The German Home Front: 1939– 45 to give an extraordinary view of German civilian life. Heavily illustrated, it is a remarkable collection of anecdotes and quotations. It is a balanced presentation of the human and the inhuman. The account of what happened when Frau Goebbels gave up her cook, who was sent to work in an armaments factory, is an example of humor in wartime. But the book ends with the discovery of the concentration camps—a solemn reminder of Nazi brutality. Lawyer-author Lawrence Taylor summarizes the legal cases against the Japanese generals who were executed for war crimes following the end of the war. Although his point of view is obvious, his presentation of the relevant documents is powerful and persuasive in A Trial of Generals: Homma, Yamashita, MacArthur. Andre Brissaud’s sources provide a stunning view of the German intelligence operation in Canaris. I laughed out loud at See Here, Private Hargrove many decades after his book was published on life in a citizen army. Although I have quoted Marion Hargrove’s advice to new inductees, I was most taken by his description of an army buddy named John Bushemi, the camp photographer who ingratiated himself into Hargrove’s own hometown and among his friends. I would have used sections from that piece except for one thing: Later in the war, Bushemi became a combat photographer and was killed in action. It did not seem appropriate somehow to use a humorous piece about Bushemi. If you want to see Bushemi’s work, get a
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
xi
copy of The Best from Yank. There are several dramatic shots of GIs in battle. One photo in particular shows them wading through a river on a Pacific island. As they go through the jungle, on the lookout for Japanese snipers, you will find yourself holding your breath. One of the most difficult tasks I faced was to get appropriate segments from the work of John Hersey. He was such a master craftsman that virtually every word he wrote was critical to the sentence, and every sentence was critical to the paragraph. I hope the quotations from all sources in this volume will encourage the reader to go back to the original. That especially applies to Hersey’s work. While we are on Hersey, I must point out that in his Into the Valley I selected brief material about a near-panic after a Japanese trap was sprung. I included this piece to show that panic is possible, under certain circumstances, in any military force—even the toughest fighting outfit in the world, the U.S. Marines. From Ralph Ingersoll’s Top Secret I chose a remarkable segment describing Hitler’s master plan for the Ardennes offensive (the Battle of the Bulge). This is the only source I have come upon that details the Fuehrer’s quest for a second Dunkirk. The book is filled with judgments about specific British and American generals that should not be missed. William Stevenson’s A Man Called Intrepid offers a truly breathtaking account of the exploits of British spymaster William Stephenson and the secret armies he directed in Nazi-occupied Europe. I need to say a few words about some of the items in the back of the book. There is a small item in Chapter 18, ‘‘Miscellaneous Quotations,’’ called ‘‘Nazi Saboteurs.’’ It is about the case of eight Germans who were brought to America by U-boats to carry out acts of sabotage. The item in this volume gives the barest facts of this extraordinary incident in American history. The complete story in Eugene Rachlis’s They Came to Kill is highly recommended, particularly for the legal insights. For Chapter 15, ‘‘War Movies,’’ several sources were used, including Projections of War: Hollywood, American Culture, and World War II, by Thomas Doherty, Winners: The Blue Ribbon Encyclopedia of Awards, by Claire Walter, and The Blockbuster Guide to Movies and Videos, edited by Ron Casten. I used the last book not only to check out titles, cast names, and dates but to find movies whose names I had long since forgotten—but small details of which I remembered. For example, I remembered something about a musical in which Fred MacMurray found a magic lamp that took him back into American history. I hadn’t the foggiest idea what the title was, but the Casten book has wonderful indexes. In the actors’ index, under ‘‘MacMurray,’’ I found a movie called Where Do We Go from Here? Sure enough, that was the movie. That also happened with a movie about Nazis being pursued in Canada prior to Pearl Harbor. I recalled the final scene of that movie—when Raymond Massey and his Nazi captor come across the American border in a freight car. When the U.S. border guard sends the freight car back into Canada, Massey grins, straightens his cap, and gets ready to
xii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
take on the Nazi. That was all I remembered. I found the movie—49th Parallel— under the Massey listing in the index. There were nine separate reports, inquiries, and investigations concerning Pearl Harbor in the literature. That is material enough not merely for an entire book but for a set of encyclopedias. I chose to include in Chapter 13, ‘‘Institutional Quotations,’’ material from the Roberts Commission, which issued the first such report in January 1942. For material on other investigations, see President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941, by Charles A. Beard. This is a thoroughly documented work by the noted historian. The book deals with President Roosevelt’s antiwar statements versus his pro-war actions. The records of Nazi aggression and Japanese militarism do not appear to be relevant to the noted historian. In addition to those to whom this volume is dedicated, I wish to thank the following individuals for books, articles, and personal reminiscences: Herb Giller, Harold Klein, Lenny Kohl, Al Libuser, Arnold Mayer, Carl Radin, Marilyn Roberts, Bob Rosenthal, Carl Sifakis, and Hank Wexler. I appreciated the help of Joan Pomeranz and Debbie Rosenthal when my computer developed a mind of its own. A special word about the newspaper of record, The New York Times. In addition to being a historical source, it was also a provider for the names of people I had never heard of before. They showed up as entry possibilities in news and feature stories, as well as in obituaries. As a general rule, I have tried to indicate the original source of a quotation whenever possible. There are still some gaps in the book, particularly in biographical references, such as dates of birth and death. Additions and corrections would be welcomed for future editions. In final acknowledgment, my personal heroes of the war—in alphabetical order—were Jimmy Doolittle, Howard Gilmore, Bill Mauldin, Ernie Pyle, and Bert Wyman.
Introduction
There was no period like it in all of American history. The years from Pearl Harbor to V-J Day were a time of the greatest American unity ever. Historians tell us that in the American Revolution no more than a third of the colonists favored American independence; another third were loyal to the king. The rest were on the fence. There was strong opposition to the War of 1812 as well as the Mexican War. The Civil War literally tore the country in two. American participation in World War I, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and Desert Storm all had their opponents. But once we were in it, World War II was America’s own Great Patriotic War. Some historians would later call it the ‘‘Good War.’’ Soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and men of the Coast Guard and Merchant Marine took part in global battle against the common enemy. Women played a crucial role as well—in uniformed services, as nurses, and in defense plants. On the home front, everyone was in it one way or another. If you were a child, you collected old pots and pans for the scrap metal drive. If you were a housewife, you carefully saved up your ration coupons for the big holiday dinner. You sang the songs, cheered the war movies, bought the war bonds, and booed Hitler in the newsreels. You also scanned the casualty lists in the newspapers—and dreaded the sight of a Western Union messenger boy. World War II was an unprecedented shared American experience. It was the school assembly listening to the president asking for a declaration of war. It was a common prayer on D-Day. It was the commander in chief on the radio inviting you to look at a map in the newspaper as he explained the strategy of defeating Hitler first. We remember the pictures in Life and the Bill Mauldin cartoons. Because it was a radio age, we remember the spoken word: ‘‘a date which will live in infamy,’’ ‘‘peace in our time,’’ ‘‘the hand that held the dagger,’’ ‘‘give us the tools and we will finish the job,’’ ‘‘four essential human freedoms,’’ and ‘‘our sons will triumph.’’
xiv
INTRODUCTION
These are some of the most memorable quotes. They are all here, but there is a lot more. There are quotations from our Allies—the British, the Russians, the French, and the Chinese. Here also are the words of our enemies—the Germans, the Japanese, and the Italians. In addition, quotations from other countries such as Spain, Ethiopia, and Poland are included. Much of this book consists of material that did not become known until long after the war. There are the memoirs of individuals such as Churchill and Eisenhower and Marshall, as well as the great historical works by William L. Shirer, Robert E. Sherwood, and scores of others. Equally important are documents that had been secret throughout the war—documents that came out at the war crimes trials and documents revealed by the breaking of the Japanese and German secret codes. Such material is included here—plus reminiscences from men and women who were largely unknown during the war but whose exploits can now be told. There are stories of bravery and savagery, deliverance and despair, defiance and betrayal. One aspect of the war is touched on only briefly: the Holocaust. The Nazi war against the Jews of Europe was a war that was compartmentalized not only by the Nazis but by the Allies as well. Hitler never allowed the European war to interfere with the Holocaust. Except for warning about postwar justice, the Allies virtually ignored it. I have dealt with the Holocaust in historical perspective in The History of the Holocaust: A Chronology of Quotations. Also touched on briefly in this work are such prewar events as the ItaloEthiopian War, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and the Sino-Japanese War. Each served as a prelude to the world war that would follow. As the twenty-first century unfolds, those who remember the last Good War will be passing on, but their words will survive for the benefit of those yet unborn. When freedom is challenged once again, there is much that can be learned from those who fought on behalf of freedom, from those who cringed in the face of tyranny, and from those who tried to destroy the very essence of humanity and civilization. The words of that era will give us much to think about. To remember the words is to remember the sacrifices of blood and treasure during those glorious and terrible days.
Scope of This Book
The major portion of this work consists of quotations from more than 300 individuals on some aspect of World War II. Represented are major war leaders and their military staffs as well as diplomats, historians, warriors, civilians, journalists, intelligence officials, chaplains, scientists, government officials, and others. Each group appears in its own chapter. Thus, in Chapter 2, ‘‘Military Officers,’’ will appear not just Eisenhower, Patton, and Halsey but also Montgomery, Rommel, Zhukov, and Yamamoto. In Chapter 4, diplomats include Hull as well as Ribbentrop, and Molotov as well as Kennedy. In addition, there are chapters entitled ‘‘Anonymous Quotations’’ and ‘‘Institutional Quotations’’ plus ‘‘War Movies,’’ ‘‘War Songs,’’ and ‘‘War Lexicon,’’ a chapter on slang words, code names, and nicknames. Chapter 18, ‘‘Miscellaneous Quotations,’’ identifies quotations that relate to specific events of the war, from the Bataan Death March and the Indianapolis Disaster to the Dunkirk Evacuation and the Battle of Stalingrad. Other items in this true miscellany include the America First Committee, Slave Labor, Magic, Ultra, and Mein Kampf. There is an extensive bibliography plus two indexes: one on individuals and the other on subject matter. Because they are already in alphabetical sequence, the ‘‘War Movies,’’ ‘‘War Songs,’’ and ‘‘War Lexicon’’ listings are not duplicated in the subject index. Every item, however, has been numbered. This will enable the reader to find selected references chosen by the editor. Such references would not be located easily in a simple alphabetical listing. One final point: The ‘‘q.v.’’ reference will refer the reader to a specific cross entry for an individual, battle, policy statement, place, and so on. Because they are so well known and cited frequently, no ‘‘q.v.’’ will appear after the names of Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, or George C. Marshall.
WORLD WAR II
1 The War Leaders
WINSTON CHURCHILL (1874–1965)
Winston Churchill was British prime minister during most of World War II—from the fall of France until just before the Japanese surrender. First Lord of the Admiralty during World War I, he was blamed for the failure of the Dardanelles campaign and was forced to resign. In the years between the wars, he warned against Hitler and fought attempts to appease him. In 1940, Churchill became prime minister amidst catastrophic defeats in northern France. He forged an alliance with President Roosevelt before Pearl Harbor, and his brilliant oratory kept British morale high during the worst days of the London Blitz. After the war in Europe ended, a Labor Party victory removed Churchill as prime minister. 1. Dictators ride to and fro upon tigers which they dare not dismount. And the tigers are getting hungry. (1936; from While England Slept, by Winston S. Churchill.) 2. The German dictator, instead of snatching the victuals from the table, has been content to have them served to him course by course. (Speech to House of Commons, October 5, 1938.) [Following the Munich Agreement (q.v.) with Hitler.]
2
WINSTON CHURCHILL
3. I find unendurable the sense of our country falling into the power, into the orbit and influence of Nazi Germany, and of our existence becoming dependent upon their good will or pleasure. (Debate in the House of Commons following the Munich conference, October 1938.) 4. We have passed an awful milestone in our history, when the whole equilibrium of Europe has been deranged, and that the terrible words have for the time being been pronounced against the Western Democracies: ‘‘Thou art weighed in the balance and found wanting.’’ And do not suppose that this is the end. This is only the beginning of the reckoning. This is only the first sip, the first foretaste of a bitter cup which will be proffered to us year by year unless, by a supreme recovery of moral health and martial vigor, we arise again and take our stand for freedom as in the olden time. (Ibid.) 5. Disaster of the first magnitude has befallen Britain and France. We have sustained total and unmitigated defeat. . . . Czechoslovakia, left to herself, would have been able to get better terms than we have given her. . . . We have sustained a defeat without war. (Speech to the House of Commons, October 1938.) [During a debate on Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s (q.v.) appeasement policy, which turned over the Sudetenland to Hitler. The House of Commons approved the policy by a vote of 366 to 144.]
6. I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. (Radio speech, October 1, 1939.) [Following the carving up of Poland by Hitler and Stalin.]
7. I would say to the House, as I said to those who have joined this Government: I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat. (Address to Parliament upon becoming prime minister, May 13, 1940.) 8. You ask, what is our policy? I will say: It is to wage war, by sea, land, and air, with all our might and with all the strength that God can give us; to wage war against a monstrous tyranny, never surpassed in the dark, lamentable catalogue of human crime. (Ibid.) 9. You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: It is victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be, for without victory there is no survival. (Ibid.) 10. Behind this armored and mechanized onslaught came a number of German divisions in lorries, and behind them again there plodded comparatively slowly the dull brute mass of the German army and German people, always so ready to be led to the trampling down in other lands of liberties and comforts which they have never known in their own land. (Speech to the House of Commons, June 4, 1940.) [Reporting on the Dunkirk Evacuation (q.v.) of May 27–June 4, 1940. Some 338,000 British, French, and Belgian troops were evacuated from the French beaches by nearly
WINSTON CHURCHILL
3
‘‘I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat.’’ —WINSTON CHURCHILL Smoke swirls around the dome of St. Paul’s Cathedral during the London Blitz. 900 naval vessels, from warships to fishing trawlers and yachts. This was the culmination of a catastrophic defeat suffered by the Allies in northern France.]
11. When, a week ago today, I asked the House to fix this afternoon as the occasion for a statement, I feared it would be my hard lot to announce the greatest military disaster in our long history. I thought—and some good judges agreed with me—that perhaps 20,000 or 30,000 men might be re-embarked. But it certainly seemed that the whole of the French First Army and the whole of the British Expeditionary Force north of the Amiens-Abbeville gap would be broken up in the open field or else would have to capitulate for lack of food and ammunition. These were the hard and heavy tidings for which I called upon the House and nation to prepare themselves a week ago. The whole root and core and brain of the British Army, on which and around which we were to build, and are to build, the great British Armies in the later years of the war, seemed about to perish upon the field or to be led into an ignominious and starving captivity. (Ibid.)
4
WINSTON CHURCHILL
12. [Our evacuation forces] had to operate upon the difficult coast, often in adverse weather, under an almost ceaseless hail of bombs and an increasing concentration of fire. Nor were the seas . . . themselves free from mines and torpedoes. (Ibid.) 13. Suddenly the scene has cleared, the crash and thunder has for the moment—but only for the moment—died away. A miracle of deliverance achieved by valor, by perseverance, by perfect discipline, by faultless service, by resource, by skill, by unconquerable fidelity, is manifest to us all. The enemy was hurled back by the retreating British and French troops. He was so roughly handled that he did not hurry their departure seriously. (Ibid.) 14. We must be very careful not to assign to this deliverance the attributes of a victory. Wars are not won by evacuations. (Ibid.) 15. I have . . . full confidence that if all do their duty, if nothing is neglected, and if the best arrangements are made, as they are being made, we shall prove ourselves once again able to defend our Island home, to ride out the storm for years, if necessary alone. (Ibid.) 16. Even though large tracts of Europe and many old and famous States have fallen or may fall into the grip of the Gestapo and all the odious apparatus of Nazi rule, we shall not flag or fail. (Ibid.) 17. We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills, we shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this Island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle, until, in God’s good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old. (Ibid.) 18. I urged the French Government to defend Paris. I emphasized the enormous absorbing power of the house-to-house defense of a great city upon an invading army. I recalled to Marshal Petain [q.v.] [events of World War I] . . . and how he, as I put it, not mentioning Marshal Foch, had restored the situation. I also reminded him how Clemenceau had said, ‘‘I will fight in front of Paris, in Paris, and behind Paris.’’ The Marshal replied very quietly and with dignity that in those days he had a mass of manpower of upwards of sixty divisions; now there was none. He mentioned that there were then sixty British divisions in the line. Making Paris into a ruin would not affect the final event. (Recalling events of June 11, 1940; from The Second World War: Their Finest Hour, by Winston S. Churchill.)
WINSTON CHURCHILL
5
19. L’homme du destin. (Addressing General Charles de Gaulle [q.v.] following a meeting in which French officials indicated they were considering peace with Hitler, June 13, 1940; Ibid.) 20. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and to bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will say: ‘‘This was their finest hour.’’ (Speech to the House of Commons, June 18, 1940.) [After France had asked for an armistice.]
21. The gratitude of every home in our Island, in our Empire, and indeed throughout the world, except in the abodes of the guilty, goes out to the British airmen, who, undaunted by odds, unwearied in their constant challenge and mortal danger, are turning the tide of world war by their prowess and by their devotion. (Tribute to the Royal Air Force, address to Parliament, August 10, 1940.) 22. Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few. (Ibid.) 23. All hearts go out to the fighter pilots, whose brilliant actions we see with our own eyes day after day, but we must never forget that all the time, night after night, month after month, our bomber squadrons travel far into Germany, find their targets in the darkness . . . and their attacks, often under the heaviest fire, often with serious loss . . . and inflict shattering blows upon the whole of the technical and war-making structure of the Nazi power. (Ibid.) 24. The need of American destroyers is more urgent than ever in view of the losses and the need of coping with the invasion threat as well as keeping the Atlantic approaches open and dealing with Italy. There is nothing that America can do at this moment that would be of greater help than to send 50 destroyers except sending 100. (Message to American officials, August 1940; cited in From the Morgenthau Diaries, by John Morton Blum.) 25. Our supreme effort must be to gain overwhelming mastery in the air. The fighters are our salvation, but the bombers alone provide the means to victory. (September 1940.) 26. We are waiting for the long-promised invasion. So are the fishes. (Radio speech, October 21, 1940.) 27. It seems now to be certain that the Government and people of the United States intend to supply us with all that is necessary for victory. In the last war the United States sent two million men across the Atlantic. But this is not a war of vast armies, firing immense masses of shells at one another. We do not need the gallant armies which are forming throughout the American Union. We do
6
WINSTON CHURCHILL
not need them this year, nor next year, nor any year that I can foresee. (Radio broadcast, February 9, 1941.) 28. I regard these developments [about appointment of Admiral Darlan (q.v.) as successor to Marshal Petain (q.v.)] with misgiving and distrust. We have received nothing but ill-treatment from Vichy. It would have been better to have had Laval [q.v.], from our point of view, than Darlan, who is a dangerous, bitter, ambitious man, without the odium which attaches to Laval. . . . In the meantime an end should be put to the cold-shouldering of General De Gaulle [q.v.] and the Free French movement, who are the only people who have done anything for us, and to whom we have made very solemn engagements. The emphasis should be somewhat shifted. (Note to Foreign Office, February 27, 1941; from The Second World War: The Grand Alliance, by Winston S. Churchill.) 29. This man [Rudolf Hess (q.v.)], like other Nazi leaders, is potentially a war criminal, and he and his confederates may well be declared outlaws at the close of the war. (Memo to Foreign Secretary, May 13, 1941.) [Following the flight of Rudolf Hess to Scotland. Hess, chief deputy to Adolf Hitler, attempted to make peace with England prior to the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union.]
30. No one has been a more consistent opponent of Communism than I have for the last 25 years. I will unsay no word that I have spoken about it. But all this fades away before the spectacle which is now unfolding. (Radio address on the Nazi invasion of Russia, June 22, 1941.) 31. This bloodthirsty guttersnipe [Hitler] must launch his mechanized armies upon new fields of slaughter, pillage and devastation. Poor as are the Russian peasants, workmen and soldiers, he must steal from them their daily bread; he must devour their harvests; he must rob them of the oil which drives their ploughs, and thus produce a famine without example in human history. And even the carnage and ruin which his victory, should he gain it—he has not gained it yet—will bring upon the Russian people, will itself be only a stepping stone. (Ibid.) 32. It is not too much to say here this summer evening that the lives and happiness of a thousand million additional people are now menaced with brutal Nazi violence. (Ibid.) 33. We have to contemplate the descent from the air of perhaps a quarter million parachutists, glider-borne or crash-landed aeroplane troops. Everyone in uniform, and anyone else who likes, must fall upon these wherever they find them and attack them with the utmost alacrity— ‘‘Let every one Kill a Hun.’’
WINSTON CHURCHILL
7
(Memo to Secretary of State for War, June 29, 1941; from The Second World War: The Grand Alliance, by Winston S. Churchill.) 34. We will have no truce or parley with you [Hitler], or the grisly gang who work your wicked will. You do your worst—and we will do our best. (Speech, London, July 14, 1941.) 35. You will, perhaps, have noticed that the President of the United States and the British representative, in what is aptly called the Atlantic Charter [q.v.], have jointly pledged their countries to the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny. That is a solemn and grave undertaking. It must be made good. It will be made good. And, of course, many practical arrangements to fulfill that purpose have been and are being organized and set in motion. (Radio broadcast, August 24, 1941.) [Following the meeting with Roosevelt that produced the Atlantic Charter.]
36. If Hitler occupies Hell I will ask the House of Commons for aid for the Devil. (Following the invasion of the Soviet Union, ca. summer 1941; quoted in Stalin, by Edvard Radzinsky.) 37. I do not think it would be any use for me to make a personal appeal to Roosevelt at this juncture to enter the war. At the Atlantic meeting I told his circle that I would rather have an American declaration of war now and no supplies for six months than double the supplies and no declaration. When this was repeated to him he thought it a hard saying. We must not underrate his constitutional difficulties. . . . He went so far as to say to me, ‘‘I may never declare war; I may make war. If I were to ask Congress to declare war they might argue about it for three months.’’ (Letter to General Jan C. Smuts, November 9, 1941; from The Second World War: The Grand Alliance, by Winston S. Churchill.) 38. As I turned over and twisted in bed the full horror of the news sank in upon me. There were no British or American capital ships in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific except the American survivors of Pearl Harbor, who were hastening back to California. Over all this vast expanse of waters Japan was supreme, and everywhere we were weak and naked. (On receiving news of the sinking of the H.M.S. Repulse and Prince of Wales by the Japanese, December 10, 1941; Ibid.) 39. Last night President [Roosevelt] urged upon me appointment of a single officer to command Army, Navy, and Air Force of Britain, America, and Dutch [in the Southwest Pacific], and this morning General [George C.] Marshall visited me at my request and pleaded case with great conviction. American Navy authorities take opposite view, but it is certain that a new far-reaching arrangement will have to be made. The man the President has in mind is [British] General [Archibald] Wavell. . . . So far I have been critical of plan, and while admitting
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broadmindedness of offer have expressed anxiety about effects on American opinion. (Cable to cabinet in London, December 28, 1941.) [Churchill agreed to the plan and the appointment. The principle of unity of command was thus established.]
40. When I warned [the leaders of the French government] that Britain would fight on alone whatever they did, their generals told their prime minister and his divided cabinet, ‘‘In three weeks England will have her neck wrung like a chicken.’’ Some chicken! Some neck! (Speech, Ottawa, Canada, December 30, 1941.) 41. 1. Your prime and main duty will be to take or destroy at the earliest opportunity the German-Italian army commanded by Field Marshal Rommel [q.v.], together with all its supplies and establishments in Egypt and Libya. 2. You will discharge, or cause to be discharged, such other duties as pertain to your Command without prejudice to the task described in paragraph one, which must be considered paramount in His Majesty’s interests. (Orders to General Harold Alexander [q.v.], August 15, 1942.) [Two months later, the British launched an offensive at El Alamein (q.v.), and drove Rommel’s forces back across North Africa. The battle for Africa would end in Tunisia, with Axis forces defeated.]
42. If I could meet [Admiral Jean] Darlan [q.v.], much as I hate him, I would cheerfully crawl on my hands and knees for a mile if by doing so I could get him to bring that fleet of his into the circle of Allied Forces. (Spoken to Eisenhower, mid-October 1942; quoted in Crusade in Europe, by Dwight D. Eisenhower.) [The Allies were readying an invasion of French North Africa. Darlan had signaled an interest in cooperating with, rather than resisting, the Allied invasion forces.]
43. This is not the end, nor is it the beginning of the end. It is, perhaps, the end of the beginning. (Speech, London, November 10, 1942.) [Following the Allied invasion of North Africa.]
44. I have not become the King’s First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire. (Ibid.) 45. Mr. President, I believe you are trying to do away with the British Empire. Every idea you entertain about the structure of the postwar world demonstrates it. But in spite of that—in spite of that—we know that you constitute our only hope. And you know that we know it. You know that we know that without America, the Empire won’t stand. (Spoken to President Roosevelt, Casablanca, North Africa, January 1943; quoted in As He Saw It, by Elliott Roosevelt.) 46. We are . . . possessed of very powerful and growing forces, with great masses of munitions coming along. The problem is to bring these forces into action. The United States has vast oceans to cross in order to close with her enemies. We also have seas or oceans to cross . . . and then for both of us there
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is the daring and complicated enterprise of landing on defended coasts and also the building-up of all the supplies and communications necessary for vigorous campaigning . . . once a landing has been made. (Report to Parliament, February 11, 1943.) 47. It is because of this that the U-boat warfare takes the first place in our thoughts. There is no need to exaggerate the danger of the U-boats or to worry our merchant seamen by harping upon it unduly, because the British and American Governments have . . . given the task of overcoming them the first priority. (Ibid.) 48. The losses we suffer at sea are very heavy, and they hamper us and delay our operations. They prevent us from coming into action with our full strength, and thus they prolong the war, with its certain waste and loss and all its unknowable hazards. Progress is being made in the war against the U-boats. . . . The losses in the last two months are the lowest sustained for over a year. The number of U-boats is increasing, but so are their losses, and so are the means of attacking them and protecting the convoys. (Ibid.) 49. Let the enemy, if he will, nurse his vain hopes of averting his doom by U-boat warfare. He cannot avert it, but he may delay it, and it is for us to shorten that delay by every conceivable effort we can make. (Report to Parliament on the Casablanca Conference [q.v.], February 11, 1943.) 50. It was only after full and cold, sober and mature consideration of all the facts, on which our lives and liberties certainly depend, that the President, with my full concurrence as agent of the War Cabinet, decided that the note of the Casablanca Conference should be the unconditional surrender of all our foes. But our inflexible insistence upon unconditional surrender does not mean that we shall stain our victorious arms by any cruel treatment of whole populations. But justice must be done upon the wicked and the guilty, and, within her proper bounds, justice must be stern and implacable. No vestige of the Nazi or Fascist power, no vestige of the Japanese war plotting machine, will be left by us when the work is done, and done it certainly will be. (Ibid.) 51. The collapse of Italy would cause a chill of loneliness over the German people, and might be the beginning of their doom. (Washington, D.C., May 15, 1943.) [During an Anglo-American conference on future military activity. The Americans pressed for an early cross-channel invasion. Churchill wanted to knock Italy out of the war and temporarily delay the invasion of France.]
52. In our conferences in January 1942, between the President and myself . . . it was evident that while the defeat of Japan would not mean the defeat of Germany, the defeat of Germany would inevitably mean the ruin of Japan. (Address to the U.S. Congress, May 19, 1943.)
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53. Lots of people can make good plans for winning the war if they have not got to carry them out. I dare say if I had not been in a responsible position, I should have made a lot of excellent plans, and very likely I should have brought them in one way or another to the notice of the executive authorities. But it is not possible to have full, open arguments about these matters. That is an additional hardship to those in charge—that such questions cannot be argued out and debated in public, except with enormous reticence and even then there is great danger that the watching and listening enemy may derive some profit from what they hear. (Ibid.) 54. I do not intend to be responsible for any suggestion that the war is won or will soon be over. That it will be won by us I am sure. But how or when cannot be foreseen, still less foretold. I was driving the other day not far from the field of Gettysburg. . . . No one after Gettysburg doubted which way the dread balance of war would incline. Yet far more blood was shed after the Union victory at Gettysburg than in all the fighting which went before. (Ibid.) 55. Twice in my lifetime the long arm of destiny has reached across the ocean and involved the entire life and manhood of the United States in a deadly struggle. There was no use saying, ‘‘We don’t want it. We won’t have it. Our forebears left Europe to avoid these quarrels. We have founded a new world which has no contact with the old.’’ There was no use in that. The long arm reaches out remorselessly and everyone’s existence, environment and outlook undergo a swift and irresistible change. What is the explanation . . . and what are the deep laws to which they respond? . . . The price of greatness is responsibility. (Speech, Harvard University, September 6, 1943.) 56. We are sending our aeroplanes to land in your territory, after delivering supplies to Warsaw. If you do not treat them properly all convoys will be stopped from this moment by us. (Message he wanted to send to Stalin—but didn’t, September 4, 1944; from The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy, by Winston S. Churchill.) [Following Soviet refusal to allow British or American planes to use Russian airfields. This was during the Warsaw uprising when the Polish underground army appealed for arms.]
57. The United States troops have done almost all the fighting and have suffered almost all the losses [in the Battle of the Bulge (q.v.)]. They have suffered losses almost equal to those of both sides at the Battle of Gettysburg. The Americans have engaged 30 or 40 men for every one we have engaged and have lost 60 to 80 men to every one of ours. . . . Care must be taken in telling our proud tale not to claim for the British armies undue share of what is undoubtedly the greatest American battle of the war. (Speech, House of Commons, January 18, 1945.)
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58. I have every intention of working to the utmost for a Poland free to manage its own affairs and to which Polish soldiers in our service will be glad to return. If this fails we must provide for the Poles in arms inside the British Empire, which can easily accommodate such brave and serviceable men. . . . There may always be a certain number of individual Poles who will not wish to go back to Poland because of their inveterate hostility to Russia. For these . . . the alternative of British citizenship must be open. (Memo to the Foreign Secretary, March 5, 1945; from The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy, by Winston S. Churchill.) 59. German soldiers, who are fighting bravely to defend your native land, do you realize what will be the consequences of the war being carried on throughout the whole of Germany during the present spring and summer? You are told you are defending your homes and families and the German people. But though you may delay, you cannot stop our overrunning your whole country both from the east and west in the next few months. We feel it our duty to give you this warning, that if by your tenacity you destroy the means of production in your country and prevent or neglect the spring sowings, you will condemn Germany to a winter famine the like of which has never been seen in Europe. It will be quite impossible for us, with our duties to our own peoples and the liberated countries, to accept any responsibility for feeding Germany in the winter of 1945–46. We may do what we can, but the available transport, and the available food which we could supply would be utterly insufficient to handle or bear so heavy a burden. If therefore you force us to carry the war on through the homelands of Germany, so that these are devastated by war, you will not protect your wives and families from suffering, but on the contrary you will condemn a very large proportion of the German people to death by starvation when winter comes. Your leaders at the top will not run short as long as you continue fighting; but the population of Germany will assuredly undergo a frightful reduction by famine unless the crops of this year are sown in time and gathered fully in peace. The decision is yours, and we can only tell you that if you continue to fight, as we can well understand good soldiers would wish to do, you will not save your nation but doom it to horrors far beyond any you have endured so far and far beyond our power to give you help. (Proposed proclamation to the German army to be signed by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin; submitted to Roosevelt for his comments, March 18, 1945; cited in Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, edited by Warren F. Kimball.) [Roosevelt rejected the idea, saying that this sort of thing should be left to the propaganda people. The appeal was never made.]
60. I say quite frankly that Berlin remains of high strategic importance. Nothing will exert psychological effect or despair upon all German forces of resistance equal to that of the fall of Berlin. It will be the supreme signal of defeat to the German people. On the other hand, if left to itself to maintain a siege by the
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Russians among its ruins and as long as the German flag flies there, it will animate the resistance of all Germans under arms. There is moreover another aspect which it is proper for you and me to consider. The Russian armies will no doubt overrun all Austria and enter Vienna. If they also take Berlin, will not their impression that they have been the overwhelming contributor to our common victory be unduly imprinted in their minds, and may this not lead them into a mood which will raise grave and formidable difficulties in the future? I therefore consider that from a political standpoint we should march as far east into Germany as possible and that should Berlin be in our grasp we should certainly take it. This also appears sound military grounds. (Message to President Roosevelt, April 1, 1945, from the National Archives; cited in On to Berlin, by James M. Gavin.) 61. One day the world, and history, will know what it owes to your President. (Spoken to Edward R. Murrow [q.v.] on the death of Franklin Roosevelt, April 13, 1945.) 62. Let me tell you what General Eisenhower has meant to us. In him we have had a man who set the unity of the Allied Armies above all nationalistic thoughts. In his headquarters unity and strategy were the only reigning spirits. . . . At no time has the principle of alliance between noble races been carried and maintained at so high a pitch. In the name of the British Empire and Commonwealth I express to you our admiration of the firm, far-sighted, and illuminating character and qualities of General of the Army Eisenhower. (Message to President Harry Truman [q.v.], May 9, 1945.) 63. There was one final danger from which the collapse of Germany has saved us. In London and the southeastern counties we have suffered for a year from various forms of flying bombs . . . and rockets, and our Air Force and our ack-ack batteries have done wonders against them. . . . But it was only when our armies cleaned up the coast and overran all the points of discharge, and when the Americans captured vast stores of rockets of all kinds near Leipzig . . . that we knew how grave had been the peril, not only from rockets and flying bombs, but from multiple long-range artillery which was being prepared against London. Only just in time did the Allied armies blast the viper in his nest. (Broadcast, May 13, 1945.) [Delivered several days after the German surrender.]
64. For the same period the Germans had prepared a new U-boat fleet and novel tactics which, though we should have eventually destroyed them, might well have carried anti-U-boat warfare back to the high peak days of 1942. Therefore we must rejoice and give thanks, not only for our preservation when we were all alone, but for our timely deliverance from new suffering, new perils not easily to be measured. (Ibid.)
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65. On the continent of Europe we have yet to make sure that the simple and honorable purposes for which we entered the war are not brushed aside or overlooked in the months following our success, and that the words ‘‘freedom,’’ ‘‘democracy,’’ and ‘‘liberation’’ are not distorted from their true meaning as we have understood them. There would be little use in punishing the Hitlerites for their crimes if law and justice did not rule, and if totalitarianism or police Governments were to take the place of the German invaders. (Ibid.) 66. Forward, unflinching, unswerving, indomitable, till the whole task is done and the whole world is safe and clean. (Ibid.) 67. I have had to bear many crosses during this war, but the heaviest was the Cross of Lorraine. (Attributed, ca. 1945.) [Referring to the Free French symbol of Charles de Gaulle (q.v.).]
68. If you will not fight for the right when you can easily win without bloodshed; if you will not fight when your victory will be sure and not too costly; you may come to the moment when you will have to fight with all the odds against you and only a precarious chance of survival. There may even be a worse case. You may have to fight when there is no hope of victory, because it is better to perish than live as slaves. (1948; from The Second World War: The Gathering Storm, by Winston S. Churchill.) [Commenting on appeasement and its ultimate consequences.]
69. The moral principles of modern civilization seem to prescribe that the leaders of a nation defeated in war shall be put to death by the victors. This will certainly stir them to fight to the bitter end in any future war, and no matter how many lives are needlessly sacrificed, it costs them no more. It is the masses of the people who have so little to say about the starting or ending of wars who pay the additional cost. Julius Caesar followed the opposite principle, and his conquests were due almost as much to his clemency as to his prowess. (1953; from The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy, by Winston S. Churchill.) 70. Battles are won by slaughter and maneuver. The greater the general, the more he contributes in maneuver, the less he demands in slaughter. There are many kinds of maneuvers in war, some only of which take place upon the battlefield. There are maneuvers far to the flank or rear. There are maneuvers in time, in diplomacy, in mechanics, in psychology, all of which are removed from the battlefield, but react often decisively upon it, and the object of all is to find easier ways, other than sheer slaughter, of achieving the main purpose. (1962; from Great Destiny, by Winston S. Churchill.)
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ADOLF HITLER (1889–1945)
Dictator of Nazi Germany from 1933 to 1945. Born in Austria, Hitler fought in the German army in World War I, where he was gassed. After the war, he joined a small group of malcontents that would become the National Socialist Party [see Mein Kampf (q.v.)]. A Violent anti-Semite, Hitler rode into power in Germany on the heels of a devastating inflation that destroyed the middle class and an economic depression with massive unemployment. He bluffed England and France into appeasing him and signed a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union to protect his Eastern Front. In 1939, Germany invaded Poland. This brought France and England into the war. After the fall of France, Hitler tried to bomb England into submission, but it did not work. Hitler invaded the Soviet Union but was stopped by a devastating Russian winter. Committed by treaty to back Japan in a war with the United States, Hitler declared war on America after Pearl Harbor. It was a move that sealed the fate of Nazi Germany. His war against the Jews of Europe resulted in 6 million Jewish dead. In April 1945, with armies from east and west closing in on Berlin, Hitler committed suicide. 71. The blood shed on the European continent in the course of the last three hundred years bears no proportion to the national result of the events. In the end France has remained France, Germany Germany, Poland Poland, and Italy Italy. What dynastic egotism, political passion and patriotic blindness have attained in the way of apparently far-reaching political changes by shedding rivers of blood has, as regards national feeling, done no more than touched the skin of the nations. It has not substantially altered their fundamental characters. If these states had applied merely a fraction of their sacrifices to wiser purposes the success would certainly have been greater and more permanent. (Speech to Reichstag, May 21, 1935.) 72. Germany needs peace and desires peace! (Ibid.) 73. Germany has solemnly recognized and guaranteed France her frontiers as determined after the Saar plebiscite. . . . We thereby finally renounced all claims to Alsace-Loraine, a land for which we have fought two great wars. (Ibid.) 74. Without taking the past into account Germany has concluded a nonaggression pact with Poland. . . . We shall adhere to it unconditionally. . . . We recognize Poland as the home of a great and nationally conscious people. (Ibid.)
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75. Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to conclude an Anschluss. (Ibid.) 76. The German government is ready to agree to any limitation which leads to abolition of the heaviest arms, especially suited for aggression, such [as] heaviest artillery and the heaviest tanks. . . . Germany declares herself ready to agree to any limitation whatsoever of the caliber of artillery, battleships, cruisers and torpedo boats. (Ibid.) 77. Whoever lights the torch of war in Europe can wish for nothing but chaos. We, however, live in the firm conviction that in our time will be fulfilled not the decline but the renaissance of the West. That Germany may make an imperishable contribution to this great work is our proud hope and our unshakable belief. (Ibid.) 78. In this historic hour, when, in the Reich’s western provinces [the Rhineland], German troops are at this minute marching into their future peacetime garrisons, we all unite in two sacred vows: First, we swear to yield to no force whatever in restoration of the honor of our people. Secondly, we pledge that now, more than ever, we shall strive for an understanding between the European peoples, especially for one with our Western neighbor nations. (Speech to the Reichstag, March 7, 1936.) 79. We have no territorial demands to make in Europe. . . . Germany will never break the peace! (Ibid.) 80. The forty-eight hours after the march into the Rhineland were the most nerve-racking in my life. If the French had then marched into the Rhineland, we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our legs, for the military resources at our disposal would have been wholly inadequate for even a moderate resistance. (Cited later in Hitler’s Interpreter, by Paul Schmidt.) [Quotations by Hitler for November 5, 1937, appear in Chapter 18, ‘‘Miscellaneous Quotations,’’ under ‘‘Hossbach Memorandum.’’]
81. I have only to give an order, and in one single night all your ridiculous defense mechanisms will be blown to bits. You don’t seriously believe that you can stop me for half an hour, do you? I would very much like to save Austria from such a fate, because such an action would mean blood. (Statement to Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden, February 12, 1938.) [A month later, following a Nazi invasion, Austria was proclaimed a province of the German Reich.]
82. Don’t think for one moment that anybody on earth is going to thwart my decisions. Italy? I see eye to eye with Mussolini [q.v.]. England? England will not move one finger for Austria. And France? [After failing to move against Germany in the Rhineland] now it is too late for France. (Ibid.)
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83. It is my unshakable will that Czechoslovakia shall be wiped off the map! (Statement to German military leaders, May 28, 1938.) 84. I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia only if I am firmly convinced that France will not march and that therefore England will not intervene. (Directive to military, June 18, 1938.) 85. Would Britain agree to a secession of the Sudeten region, or would she not? A secession on the basis of the right of self-determination? (Question addressed to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain [q.v.] at Berchtesgaden meeting, September 15, 1938.) [Both German and English sources agree that Chamberlain responded that he had to talk to his cabinet and to the French about the matter. The German source—supposedly based on notes taken at the meeting—said that Chamberlain added that he, himself, personally favored the principle of the Sudetenland being detached from Czechoslovakia.]
86. I assured him [British Prime Minister Chamberlain (q.v.)], moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe. (Speech during the Czech crisis, September 26, 1938.) 87. This is the last territorial claim which I have to make in Europe. . . . I shall not be interested in the Czech State any more, and I can guarantee it. We don’t want any Czechs any more. (To Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain [q.v.], Munich conference, ca. September 29, 1938.) 87a. We must inevitably count on a war with the Western democracies in the course of a few years, perhaps three or four. (Quoted by Joachim von Ribbentrop [q.v.]; cited in Ciano’s Hidden Diary, by Galeazzo Ciano.) [At a meeting on October 28, 1938, among German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, Mussolini (q.v.) and Italian Foreign Minister Ciano (q.v.)]
88. If the international Jewish financiers in and outside Europe should succeed in plunging the nations once more into a world war, then the result will not be the Bolshevization of the earth and the victory of Jewry, but the end of the Jewish race in Europe! (Speech, January 30, 1939.) 89. For a thousand years, the provinces of Bohemia and Moravia formed part of the Lebensraum of the German people. . . . Czechoslovakia showed its inherent inability to survive and has therefore now fallen a victim to actual dissolution. The German Reich cannot tolerate continuous disturbances in these areas. Therefore the German Reich, in keeping with the law of self-preservation, is now resolved to intervene decisively to rebuild the foundations of a reasonable order in Central Europe. (Proclamation, March 16, 1939.) [Following his invasion of Czechoslovakia, Hitler proclaimed a ‘‘protectorate’’ over Bohemia and Moravia.]
‘‘If the international Jewish financiers in and outside Europe should succeed in plunging the nations once more into a world war, then the result will not be the Bolshevization of the earth and the victory of Jewry, but the end of the Jewish race in Europe!’’ —ADOLF HITLER
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90. I’ll cook them a stew they’ll choke on. (Comment, March 31, 1939.) [In response to a statement by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain (q.v.) that England would defend Poland if invaded.]
91. If they [Britain and France] expect the Germany of today to sit patiently by until the very last day while they create satellite States and set them against Germany, they are mistaking the Germany of today for the Germany of before the war. (Speech, April 1, 1939.) 92. He who declares himself ready to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for these powers must realize he burns his fingers. (Ibid.) 93. Our object [the forthcoming invasion of Poland] must be kept secret even from the Italians and the Japanese. (Remark to top German leaders, May 23, 1939.) 94. The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. . . . Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee. (Minutes of a secret conference of top German military and political leaders, May 23, 1939.) 95. The German friendship for the Yugoslav nation is not only a spontaneous one. It gained depth and durability in the midst of the tragic confusion of the world war [of 1914–1918]. The German soldier then learned to appreciate and respect his extremely brave opponent. I believe that this feeling was reciprocated. This mutual respect finds confirmation in common political, cultural and economic interests. We therefore look upon your Royal Highness’s present visit as a living proof of the accuracy of our view, and at the same time on that account we derive from it the hope that German-Yugoslav friendship may continue further to develop in the future and to grow ever closer. . . . I believe this all the more because a firmly established reliable relationship of Germany to Yugoslavia, now that, owing to historical events [the Anschluss with Austria], we have become neighbors with common boundaries fixed for all time, will not only guarantee lasting peace between our two peoples and countries, but can also represent an element of calm to our nerve-wracked continent. (On the occasion of a state dinner in honor of the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia, Berlin, June 1, 1939.) 96. The great drama is now approaching its climax. . . . The men I got to know at Munich are not the kind that start a new world war. (Conversation, August 1939.) [As German and Russian political and military leaders negotiated the Nazi-Soviet Pact (q.v.), including a partition of Poland.]
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97. I consider it of the utmost importance that we clarify as soon as possible the questions arising from our non-aggression pact. There is no time to be lost. The tension between Germany and Poland has become intolerable. I suggest that you receive my Minister of Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, 22 August or at the latest on Wednesday, 23 August. He will have full powers to complete and sign the agreement and the protocol. (Message to Stalin, August 20, 1939.) 98. No shrinking back from anything. Everyone must hold the view that we have been determined to fight the Western powers right from the start. A lifeand-death struggle. (Military conference, August 22, 1939.) 99. In 1918 the [German] nation collapsed because the spiritual prerequisites were insufficient. Frederick the Great endured only because of his fortitude. (Ibid.) 100. Close your hearts to pity! Eighty million people must obtain what are their rights. . . . The stronger man is right. . . . Be harsh and remorseless! Be steeled against all signs of compassion! (Ibid.) 101. Destruction of Poland is the foreground. The aim is elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line. Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be the primary objective. (Speech to his commanders, Obersalzburg, August 22, 1939.) 102. I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war—never mind whether it is plausible or not. The victor shall not be asked later on whether we told the truth or not. In starting and making a war, not the Right is what matters but Victory. (Ibid.) 103. I am only afraid that at the last minute some Schweinehund will make a proposal for mediation. (Ibid.) 104. A beginning has been made for the destruction of England’s hegemony. (Ibid.) 105. [INDIRECT DISCOURSE: In his message, Hitler requested of Italy three things:] 1. That we not divulge our decision to remain neutral so long as it was not necessary to do so. 2. That Italy make military preparations so as to fool the French and the English. 3. That Italian workers be sent to Germany to replace those Germans in the countryside and the factories who had been mobilized. (Message to Mussolini [q.v.], August 27, 1939, following Italy’s decision to stay neutral in the impending war; cited in My Truth, by Edda Mussolini Ciano.)
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106. MOST SECRET ORDER: Now that all the political possibilities of disposing by peaceful means of a situation of the Eastern Frontier which is intolerable for Germany are exhausted, I have determined on a solution by force. The attack on Poland is to be carried out in accordance with the preparations made for ‘‘Fall Weiss’’ [code name for the invasion]. . . . Date of attack—1 September 1939 Time of attack—04:15 [inserted in red pencil] (‘‘Directive No 1 for the conduct of the war’’ to the armed forces, August 31, 1939.) 107. The Polish Government, unwilling to establish good neighborly relations as aimed at by me, wants to force the issue by way of arms. The Germans in Poland are being persecuted with bloody terror and driven from their homes. Several acts of frontier violation which cannot be tolerated by a great power show that Poland is no longer prepared to respect the Reich’s frontiers. To put an end to these mad acts I can see no other way but from now onwards to meet force with force. The German Armed Forces will with firm determination take up the struggle for the honor and the vital rights of the German people. I expect every soldier to be conscious of the high tradition of the eternal German soldierly qualities and to do its duty to the last. Remember always and in any circumstances that you are the representatives of National Socialist Greater Germany. Long live our people and the Reich. (Proclamation to his armed forces, September 1, 1939.) 108. I first want to thank you for your last attempt at mediation. [On the third day of the German invasion of Poland—and the day that England and France had declared war on Germany—Mussolini had proposed an armistice, to be followed by a conference with the belligerents.] I would have been ready to accept, but only under condition, that there would be a possibility to give me certain guarantees that the conference would be successful. . . . I believe that a way could have been found, if England would not have been determined to wage war under all circumstances. I have not given in to the English, because, Duce, I do not believe that peace could have been maintained for more than one-half year or one year. Under these circumstances, I thought that, in spite of everything, the present moment was better for resistance. (Letter to Mussolini [q.v.], ca. early September 1939.) 109. Recently you have given me the kind assurance that you think you will be able to help me in a few fields. I acknowledge this in advance with sincere thanks. But I believe also—even if we march now over different roads—that fate will finally join us. (Ibid.) 110. I have no war aims against Great Britain and France. My sympathies are with the French poilu [soldier]. What he is fighting for he does not know. (Speech, Danzig, September 19, 1939.)
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111. Germany has no further claims against France. . . . I have always expressed to France my desire to bury forever our ancient enmity and bring together these two nations. . . . I have devoted no less effort to the achievement of AngloGerman understanding . . . more than that of an Anglo-German friendship. (Speech to the Reichstag, Berlin, October 6, 1939.) 112. Preparations should be made for offensive action on the northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. The attack must be carried out as soon and as forcefully as possible. . . . The object of this attack is to acquire as great an area of Holland, Belgium and northern France as possible. (Secret orders to army chief Wilhelm Keitel [q.v.], navy head Erich Raeder [q.v.], and air force commander Hermann Goering [q.v.], October 9, 1939.) 113. Since England, in spite of her hopeless military situation, shows no signs of being ready to come to an understanding, I have decided to begin to prepare for, and if necessary to carry out, an invasion of England. . . . The aim of this operation will be to eliminate the English homeland as a base for the prosecution of the war against Germany, and, if necessary, to occupy it completely. (Directive No. 16, July 16, 1940.) 114. From Britain I now hear only a single cry—not of the people but of the politicians—that the war must go on! I do not know whether these politicians already have a correct idea of what the continuation of this struggle will be like. They do, it is true, declare that they will carry on with the war and that, even if Great Britain should perish, they would carry on from Canada. I can hardly believe that they mean by this that the people of Britain are to go to Canada. Presumably only those gentlemen interested in the continuation of their war will go there. (Speech to the Reichstag, July 19, 1940.) 115. In this hour I feel it to be my duty before my own conscience to appeal once more to reason and common sense in Great Britain as much as elsewhere. I consider myself in a position to make this appeal since I am not the vanquished begging favors, but the victor speaking in the name of reason. I can see no reason why this war must go on. (Ibid.) 116. The massing of [German] troops in Roumania serves a threefold purpose a. An operation against Greece. b. Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey. c. Safeguarding the guarantee to Roumania. Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces . . . whose deployment far from our base requires a long time. Desirable that this deployment is complete without interference from the enemy. Therefore disclose the game as late as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the last possible moment and to line up for attack at the earliest possible moment. (Statement, January 20, 1941.)
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[Statement following a meeting with Mussolini (q.v.) on Italian setbacks in Greece. Germany would come to the aid of its Axis partner.]
117. The war against Russia will be such that it cannot be conducted in a knightly fashion. This struggle is one of ideologies and racial differences and will have to be conducted with unprecedented, unmerciful and unrelenting harshness. (Talk to top military leaders, March 1941.) 118. The commissars are the bearers of ideologies directly opposed to National Socialism. Therefore the commissars will be liquidated. German soldiers guilty of breaking international law will be excused. Russia has not participated in the Hague Convention and therefore has no rights under it. (Ibid.) 119. From the beginning of the struggle it has been England’s steadfast endeavor to make the Balkans a theater of war. British diplomacy did, in fact, using the model of the World War, succeed in first ensnaring Greece by a guarantee offered to her, and then finally in misusing her for Britain’s purposes. The documents published today [by Germany] afford a glimpse of a practice which, in accordance with very old British recipes, is a constant attempt to induce others to fight and bleed for British interests. In the face of this I have always emphasized that: (1) The German people have no antagonism to the Greek people but that (2) We shall never, as in the World War, tolerate a power establishing itself on Greek territory with the object of at a given time of being able to advance thence from the southeast into German living space. We have swept the northern flank free of the English; we are resolved not to tolerate such a threat in the south. (Proclamation on the invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia, April 6, 1941.) 120. In the interests of a genuine consolidation of Europe it has been my endeavor since the day of my assumption of power above all to establish a friendly relationship with Yugoslavia. I have consciously put out of mind everything that once took place between Germany and Serbia. I have not only offered the Serbian people the hand of the German people, but in addition have made efforts as an honest broker to assist in bridging all difficulties which existed between the Yugoslav State and various Nations allied to Germany. (Ibid.) 121. He [Winston Churchill] is the most bloodthirsty or amateurish strategist in history. For over five years this man has been chasing around Europe like a madman in search of something that he could set on fire. (Speech to the Reichstag, May 4, 1941.) 122. As a soldier he [Churchill] is a bad politician and as a politician an equally bad soldier. (Ibid.) 123. Your armies will shatter the Russian colossus. It will be a hard fight— the Asiatics are cruel and cunning, but you will meet them with a determination
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as hard and cold as ice. Only one people will come out of this alive—our people. You must make your troops put aside all their notions of restraint and humanity. I expect to annihilate the bulk of the Red Army in the great battles on the frontier. . . . This will be the last campaign of this war, and it will ensure the security of the Reich for many generations. This is a struggle between two antithetical ideologies. We cannot refuse to give battle, and one day the world will thank us for having responded to the call of destiny. (Address to German High Command, late June 1941; cited in Operation Valkyrie, by Pierre Galante with Eugene Silianoff.) [On the eve of the invasion of the Soviet Union.]
124. I am one of those men who in adversity simply becomes more determined. (Letter to Mussolini [q.v.], November 20, 1942; cited in Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, by Walter Warlimont.) 125. In the year 1933, Germany obtained the political . . . and material prerequisites for carrying on a battle which today is deciding the fate of the world. Just as at that time there were only two possibilities in the interior: Either victory of the National Socialist revolution and, in consequence, a planned social reconstruction of the Reich, or the Bolshevik revolution and, in consequence, the destruction and enslavement of all; so today there are only these two alternatives: Either Germany, the German armed forces and along with us the allied countries, so that Europe will win, or the Central Asiatic Bolshevik tide will break in from the East over the oldest civilized continent, just as destructively and annihilatingly as it did in Russia itself. (Proclamation, on the tenth anniversary of his rise to power, January 30, 1943.) 126. Jodl [q.v.]! I demand to know! Yes or no? Is Paris burning now? (To Chief of Staff Alfred Jodl, August 25, 1944; cited in Is Paris Burning?, by Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre.) [This was Hitler’s verbal follow-up to the German army’s order of two days earlier: ‘‘Paris must not fall into the hands of the enemy, or, if it does, he must find there nothing but a field of ruins.’’ General Dietrich von Choltitz never carried out the destruction order.]
127. The Hindu brigade is a practical joke. There are Hindus who won’t kill a louse—they’d rather be eaten alive—so it’s hardly likely that they’d kill an Englishman. That just seems ludicrous to me. Why would the Hindus fight more bravely to defend our country than they fought at home, even under the leadership of Chandra Bose, to free India from the English? Why would they be any braver back here? I suppose that if we used the Hindus to turn prayer wheels, or some similar occupation, there’d be no stopping them then. But the thought of using them in a real, bloody battle is ridiculous. Since we hardly have a surplus of materiel at our disposal, these hare-brained propaganda stunts are totally unacceptable. (Briefing, March 23, 1945; cited in Operation Valkyrie, by Pierre Galante with Eugene Silianoff.)
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[Hitler was referring to a brigade of Hindu volunteers recruited by the Indian nationalist Chandra Bose. The Hindu brigade in Germany was a propaganda ploy, focusing attention on the issue of Indian independence from Britain. A similar volunteer group did fight for the Japanese against the British in Burma and India.]
128. Berlin will remain German and Vienna will become German again. (On the fall of Vienna, April 13, 1945.) 129. Now that fate has removed from the earth the greatest war criminal of all time, the turning point of this war will be decided. (Order of the Day, on the death of President Roosevelt, April 15, 1945.) 130. Anyone who proposes or even approves measures detrimental to our power or resistance is a traitor! He is to be shot or hanged immediately! This applies even if such measures have allegedly been ordered on the instructions of Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels [q.v.], the Gauleiter, or even in the name of the Fuehrer. (Proclamation to the People of Berlin, Der Panzerbar, April 23, 1945.) 131. I will fight before Berlin, in Berlin, or behind Berlin. (Attributed, ca. April 23, 1945; quoted in The Memoirs of Field Marshal Keitel, edited by W. Goerlitz and D. Irving.) [Some historians question this quote. It parallels the statement of a French general speaking of Paris during World War I.]
132. I shall defend the city to the end. Either I survive this battle for the capital or I go down in Berlin with my men. (Ibid.) 133. My wife and I choose to die in order to escape the shame of overthrow or capitulation. It is our wish that our bodies be burnt immediately in the place where I have performed the greater part of my daily work during 12 years’ service to my people. (Last will, April 29, 1945; cited in The Last Days of Hitler, by H. R. Trevor-Roper.) 134. It is untrue that I, or anybody else in Germany, wanted war in 1939. It was wanted and provoked exclusively by those international politicians who either came of Jewish stock, or worked for Jewish interests. After all my offers of disarmament, posterity cannot place the responsibility for this war on me. (Final testament, April 29, 1945; cited in ibid.) 135. After a six-years’ war, which in spite of all setbacks will one day go down in history as the most glorious and heroic manifestation of a people’s will to live, I cannot forsake the city which is the capital of this state. Since our forces are too small to withstand any longer the enemy’s attack on this place, and since our own resistance will be gradually worn down by an army of blind automata, I wish to share the fate that millions of others have accepted and to remain here in the city. Further, I will not fall into the hands of an enemy who requires a new spectacle, exhibited by the Jews, to divert his hysterical masses. I have therefore decided to remain in Berlin, and there to choose death voluntarily at
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the moment when I believe that the residence of the Fuehrer and Chancellor can no longer be held. (Ibid.)
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (1882–1945)
President Roosevelt took the oath of office five weeks after Adolf Hitler became German chancellor. The only American president to win election to the office four times, Roosevelt recognized the peril of Nazism and supported aid to the Allies long before Pearl Harbor. After the Japanese attack, Roosevelt led a united nation against Axis forces throughout the world. He gambled an unprecedented amount of money to develop the atomic bomb. He died several weeks before the German surrender and four months before the Japanese capitulation. 136. There is a mysterious cycle in human events. To some generations much is given. Of other generations much is expected. This generation of Americans has a rendezvous with destiny. (Acceptance speech, Democratic National Convention, Philadelphia, June 27, 1936.) 137. In this world of ours in other lands, there are some people, who, in times past, have lived and fought for freedom, and seem to have grown too weary to carry on the fight. They have sold their heritage of freedom for the illusion of living. They have yielded their democracy. I believe in my heart that only our success can stir their ancient hope. They begin to know that here in America we are waging a great and successful war. It is not alone a war against want and destitution and economic demoralization. It is more than that; it is a war for the survival of democracy. We are fighting to save a great and precious form of government for ourselves and for the world. (Ibid.) 138. It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading. When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease. (Speech, October 9, 1937.) [Civil war was raging in Spain, with Nazi Germany helping the forces of Franco (q.v.) and the Soviet Union helping the loyalists. Japan had moved into China.]
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139. War is a contagion, whether it be declared or undeclared. It can engulf states and peoples remote from the original scene of hostilities. We are determined to keep out of war, yet we cannot insure ourselves against the disastrous effects of war and the dangers of involvement. We are adopting such measures, as will minimize our risk of involvement, but we cannot have complete protection in a world of disorder in which confidence and security have broken down. (Ibid.) 140. America hates war. America hopes for peace. Therefore, America actively engages in the search for peace. (Ibid.) 141. Without a declaration of war and without warning or justification of any kind, civilians, including vast numbers of women and children, are being ruthlessly murdered with bombs from the air. In times of so-called peace, ships are being attacked, and sunk by submarines without cause or notice. Nations are fomenting and taking sides in civil warfare in nations that have never done them any harm. Nations claiming freedom for themselves deny it to others. Innocent peoples, innocent nations, are being cruelly sacrificed to a greed of power and supremacy which is devoid of all sense of justice and humane consideration. (Ibid.) 142. If those things come to pass in other parts of the world, let no one imagine that America will escape, that America may expect mercy, that this Western Hemisphere will not be attacked, that it will continue tranquilly and peacefully to carry the ethics and the arts of civilization. If those days come, ‘‘there will be no safety by arms, no help from authority, no answer in science. The storm will rage till every flower of culture is trampled and all human beings are leveled to a vast chaos.’’ If those days are not to come to pass—if we are to have a world in which we can breathe freely and live in amity without fear—the peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort to uphold laws and principles in which alone peace can rest secure. (Ibid.) 143. You must master at the outset a simple but unalterable fact in modern foreign relations between nations. When peace has been broken anywhere, the peace of all countries everywhere is in danger. . . . Passionately though we may desire detachment, we are forced to realize that every word that comes through the air, every ship that sails the sea, every battle that is fought, does affect the American future. (Fireside Chat, September 3, 1939.) [On this date, England and France declared war on Germany.]
144. I should like to be able to offer the hope that the shadow over the world might swiftly pass. I cannot. The facts compel my stating, with candor, that darker periods may lie ahead. The disaster is not of our making; no act of ours engendered the forces which assault the foundations of civilization. Yet we find ourselves affected to the core, our currents of commerce are changing, our minds
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are filled with new problems, our position in world affairs has already been altered. (Message to Congress, September 21, 1939.) [Message on repealing the embargo provisions of the Neutrality Law. At this time, Poland was crumbling under the Nazi invasion from the west and the Soviet invasion from the east.]
145. These are ominous days—days whose swift and shocking developments force every neutral nation to look to its defenses in the light of new factors. The brutal force of modern offensive war has been loosed in all its horror. New powers of destruction, incredibly swift and ready, have been developed; and those who wield them are ruthless and daring. (Address to Congress, calling for an increase in defense spending, May 16, 1940.) 146. No old defense is so strong that it requires no further strengthening, and no attack is so unlikely or impossible that it may be ignored. (Ibid.) 147. Surely the developments of the past few weeks have made it clear to all our citizens that the possibility of attack on vital American zones ought to make it essential that we have the physical, the ready ability, to meet those attacks and to prevent them from reaching their objectives. (Ibid.) 148. We have the lesson before us over and over again—nations that were not ready and were unable to get ready found themselves overrun by the enemy. (Ibid.) 149. So-called impregnable fortifications no longer exist. (Ibid.). 150. For more than three centuries we Americans have been building on this continent a free society, a society in which the promise of the human spirit may find fulfillment. Commingled here are the blood and genius of all the peoples of the world who have sought this promise. We have built well. We are continuing our efforts to bring the blessings of a free society, of a free and productive economic system, to every family in the land. This is the promise of America. It is this that we must continue to build—it is this that we must continue to defend. It is the task of our generation, yours and mine. But we build and defend not for our generation alone. We defend the foundations laid down by our fathers. We build a life for generations yet unborn. We defend and we build a way of life, not for America alone, but for all mankind. (Address, as German armies smashed into France, trapping Allied forces at Dunkirk [q.v.], May 26, 1940.) 151. On this 10th day of June, 1940, the hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor. (Speech on the Italian invasion of France, now crushed by the Nazis, June 10, 1940.) 152. We will pursue two obvious and simultaneous goals: we will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation and, at the same
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time, we will harness and speed up the use of those resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and every defense. . . . We will not slow down or detour. Signs and sights call for speed—full speed ahead. (Ibid.) 153. As I have already stated to you and to Mr. Churchill, this Government is doing everything in its power to make available to the Allied Governments the materials they so urgently require, and our efforts to do still more are being redoubled. This is so because of our faith in and our support of the ideals for which the Allies are fighting. The magnificent resistance of the French and British Armies has profoundly impressed the American people. I am, personally, particularly impressed by your declaration that France will continue to fight on behalf of Democracy, even if it means slow withdrawal, even to North Africa and the Atlantic. It is most important to remember that the French and British Fleets continue mastery of the Atlantic and other oceans; also to remember that vital materials from the outside world are necessary to maintain all armies. I am also greatly heartened by what Prime Minister Churchill said a few days ago about the continued resistance of the British Empire, and that determination would seem to apply equally to the great French Empire all over the world. (Response to message from Premier Reynaud [q.v.] of France, calling on the United States to enter the war against Germany, ca. June 12, 1940.) 154. Should the French government . . . permit the French Fleet to be surrendered to Germany, the French government will permanently lose the friendship and goodwill of the government of the United States. (Note to the Petain [q.v.] government, as it sought an armistice with Nazi Germany, June 17, 1940.) 155. If you learn anything in Africa of special interest, send it to me. Don’t bother going through State Department channels. (To Robert Murphy [q.v.], White House, September 1940; quoted in Diplomat among Warriors, by Robert Murphy.) [This meeting established Murphy as a personal representative of the president. It set him off on the first of a number of secret wartime missions on behalf of Roosevelt.]
156. There are those in the Old World who persist in believing that here in this new hemisphere the Americas can be torn by the hatreds and fears which have drenched the battle grounds of Europe for so many centuries. Americans as individuals, American Republics as nations, remain on guard against those who seek to break up our unity by preaching ancient race hatreds, by working on old fears, or by holding out glittering promises which they know to be false. ‘‘Divide and conquer!’’ That has been the battle cry of the totalitarian powers in their war against the democracies. It has succeeded on the continent of Europe for the moment. On our continents it will fail. (Speech, October 12, 1940.)
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157. I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars. (Campaign speech, Boston, October 30, 1940.) [The 1940 Democratic Party platform also opposed getting involved in any ‘‘foreign wars’’ but added the words ‘‘unless we are attacked.’’]
158. The experience of the past two years has proven beyond doubt that no nation can appease the Nazis. No man can tame a tiger into a kitten by stroking it. There can be no appeasement with ruthlessness. There can be no reasoning with an incendiary bomb. We know now that a nation can have peace with the Nazis only at the price of total surrender. (Radio address, December 29, 1940.) 159. In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world. The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way— everywhere in the world. The third is freedom from want—which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peace time life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world. The fourth is freedom from fear—which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world. That is no vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our own time and generation. (State of the Union Address, January 6, 1941.) 160. When the dictators are ready to make war upon us they will not wait for an act of war on our part. They, not we, will choose the time and the place and the method of their attack. (Ibid.) 161. I cannot bring a divided nation into war. I learned that from the First World War. I felt the same urgency then that your people feel now. But [President Woodrow] Wilson taught me a lesson. I am going to be sure, very sure, that if the United States publicly enters the war, it will enter united. (Spoken to William Stephenson [q.v.] British intelligence official, January 1941; quoted in A Man Called Intrepid, by William Stevenson.) 162. Wendell Willkie [q.v.] will give you this—he is truly helping to keep politics out over here. I think that this verse applies to your people as it does to us: Sail on, O ship of state; Sail on, O Union strong and great; Humanity with all its fears,
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With all the hopes of future years, Is hanging breathless on thy fate! (Letter to Winston Churchill, February 1941.) [Willkie was Roosevelt’s opponent in the 1940 presidential election. Churchill read this verse from Longfellow during a radio broadcast on February 9, 1941. He said, ‘‘Here is the answer which I will give to President Roosevelt: Give us the tools and we will finish the job!’’]
163. The British people are braced for invasion whenever such attempt may come—tomorrow—next week—next month. In this historic crisis, Britain is blessed with a brilliant and great leader in Winston Churchill. But, knowing him, no one knows better than Mr. Churchill himself that it is not alone his stirring words and valiant deeds that give the British their superb morale. The essence of that morale is in the masses of plain people, who are completely clear in their minds about the one essential fact that they would rather die as free men than live as slaves. (Speech supporting Lend-Lease [q.v.] bill, March 15, 1941.) 164. The British people . . . need ships. From America, they will get ships. They need planes. From America they will get planes. They need food and from America, they will get food. (Ibid.) 165. Our country is going to be what our people have proclaimed it must be—the arsenal of democracy. (Ibid.) 166. I have said on many occasions that the United States is mustering its men and its resources only for purposes of defense—only to repel attack. I repeat that statement now. But we must be realistic when we use the word ‘‘attack’’; we have to relate it to the lightning speed of modern warfare. (Speech, May 27, 1941.) 167. Some people seem to think that we are not attacked until bombs actually drop on New York or San Francisco or New Orleans or Chicago. But they are simply shutting their eyes to the lesson we must learn from the fate of every nation that the Nazis have conquered. The attack on Czechoslovakia began with the conquest of Austria. The attack on Norway began with the occupation of Denmark. The attack on Greece began with the occupation of Albania and Bulgaria. The attack on the Suez Canal began with the invasion of the Balkans and North Africa. The attack on the United States began with the domination of any base which menaces our security—north or south. (Ibid.) 168. Nobody can foretell tonight just when the acts of the dictators will ripen into attack on this hemisphere and us. But we know enough by now to realize that it would be suicide to wait until they are in our front yard. When your enemy comes at you in a tank or a bombing plane, if you hold
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your fire until you see the whites of his eyes, you will never know what hit you. Our Bunker Hill of tomorrow may be several thousand miles from Boston. (Ibid.) 169. Anyone with an atlas and a reasonable knowledge of the sudden striking force of modern war knows that it is stupid to wait until a probable enemy has gained a foothold from which to attack. Old-fashioned common sense calls for the use of a strategy which will prevent such an enemy from gaining a foothold in the first place. We have, accordingly, extended our patrol in North and South Atlantic waters. We are steadily adding more and more ships and planes for that patrol. It is well known that the strength of the Atlantic fleet has been greatly increased during the past year, and is constantly being built up. (Ibid.) 170. An unlimited national emergency confronts this country. (Radio address, May 27, 1941.) 171. From the point of view of strict naval and military necessity, we shall give every possible assurance to Britain and to all who, with Britain, are resisting Hitlerism or its equivalent with force of arms. Our patrols are helping now to insure delivery of the needed supplies to Britain. All additional measures necessary to deliver the goods will be taken. Any and all further methods or combination of methods, which can or should be utilized, are being devised. (Ibid.) 172. There are some timid ones among us who say that we must preserve peace at any price—lest we lose our liberties forever. To them I say: never in the history of the world has a nation lost its democracy by a successful struggle to defend democracy. (Ibid.) 173. Today the whole world is divided between human slavery and human freedom—between pagan brutality and the Christian ideal. (Ibid.) 174. We will not accept a Hitler-dominated world. And we will not accept a world, like the post-war world of the 1920s, in which the seeds of Hitlerism can again be planted and allowed to grow. (Ibid.) 175. The total disregard shown for the most elementary principles of international law and of humanity brands the sinking of the Robin Moor as an act of an international outlaw. [It is] a first step in assertion of the supreme purpose of the German Reich to seize control of the high seas. (Message to Congress, June 20, 1941.) [On May 21, the Robin Moor, an American freighter, had been sunk in the South Atlantic by a German submarine. The U-boat captain had ordered passengers and crew into lifeboats before the ship was torpedoed.]
176. To collect and analyze all information and data which bear upon national security; to correlate such information and data and to make it available to the President, and to such departments and officials of the Government as the President may determine. . . . [And to carry on] such supplementary activities as
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may facilitate the securing of information, important for national security. (Executive Order creating the Office of Coordinator of Information, July 11, 1941.) [The coordinator was William J. Donovan (q.v.). In June 1942, the office’s name would be changed to Office of Strategic Services. After the war, the OSS would evolve into the Central Intelligence Agency.]
177. Normal practices of diplomacy—note writing—are of no possible use in dealing with international outlaws who sink our ships and kill our citizens. . . . No matter what it takes, no matter what it costs, we will keep open the line of legitimate commerce in these defensive waters. (Fireside Chat, September 11, 1941.) [After several American vessels had been sunk and an American destroyer was attacked with torpedoes.]
178. When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him. These Nazi submarines and raiders are the rattlesnakes of the Atlantic. They are a menace to the free pathways of the high seas. They are a challenge to our sovereignty. (Ibid.) 179. From now on, if German or Italian vessels of war enter the waters, the protection of which is necessary for American defense, they do so at their own peril. The orders which I have given as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army and Navy are to carry out that policy—at once. (Ibid.) [This would become known as the ‘‘shoot-on-sight’’ order.]
180. Hitler has attacked shipping in areas close to the Americas in the North and South Atlantic. Many American-owned merchant ships have been sunk on the high seas. One American destroyer [the Greer (q.v.)] was attacked on September 4 [1941]. Another destroyer [the Kearny] was attacked and hit on October 7 [1941]. Eleven brave and loyal men of our Navy were killed by the Nazis. We have wished to avoid shooting. But the shooting has started. And history has recorded who fired the first shot. In the long run, however, all that will matter is who fired the last shot. (Radio address, October 27, 1941.) 181. This means war. (Spoken to Harry Hopkins [q.v.], December 6, 1941.) [After receiving a decoded copy of the Japanese message scheduled to be presented to Secretary of State Hull (q.v.) the following day. It broke off further diplomatic negotiations.]
182. We are all in the same boat now. (Telephone conversation with Winston Churchill, December 7, 1941.) 183. Yesterday, December 7, 1941—a date which will live in infamy—the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan. The United States was at peace with that Nation and, at the solicitation of
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Japan, was still in conversation with its Government and its Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Indeed, one hour after Japanese air squadrons had commenced bombing in Oahu, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States and his colleague delivered to the Secretary of State a formal reply to a recent American message. While this reply stated that it seemed useless to continue the existing diplomatic negotiations, it contained no threat or hint of war or armed attack. It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago. During the intervening time the Japanese Government has deliberately sought to deceive the United States by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace. (Address to Congress, December 8, 1941.) 184. Yesterday the Japanese Government also launched an attack against Malaya. Last night Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong. Last night Japanese forces attacked Guam. Last night the Japanese attacked Wake Island. This morning the Japanese attacked Midway Island. Japan has, therefore, undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area. The facts of yesterday speak for themselves. (Ibid.) 185. Always will we remember the character of the onslaught against us. No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory. I believe I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will make very certain that this form of treachery shall never endanger us again. With confidence in our armed forces—with the unbounded determination of our people—we will gain the inevitable triumph—so help us God. I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December 7, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire. (Ibid.) 186. On the morning of December 11 [1941] the Government of Germany, pursuing its course of world conquest, declared war against the United States. The long known and the long expected has thus taken place. The forces endeavoring to enslave the entire world now are moving toward this hemisphere. Never before has there been a greater challenge to life, liberty, and civilization. Delay invites greater danger. Rapid and united effort by all the peoples of the world who are determined to remain free will insure a world victory of the forces of justice and of righteousness over the forces of savagery and of barbarism. Italy also has declared war against the United States. I therefore request the Congress to recognize a state of war between the United
‘‘December 7th, 1941—a date which will live in infamy . . .’’ —FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT Japanese view of Hawaii attack: Smoke rises from Hickam Field, above, and Pearl Harbor, below.
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States and Germany and between the United States and Italy. (Message to Congress, December 11, 1941.) 187. TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN 1956: I am writing this letter as an act of faith in the destiny of our country. I desire to make a request which I make in full confidence that we shall achieve a glorious victory in the war we now are waging to preserve our democratic way of life. My request is that you consider the merits of a young American youth of goodly heritage—Colin P. Kelly, III—for appointment as a Cadet in the United States Military Academy at West Point. I make this appeal in behalf of this youth as a token of the Nation’s appreciating of the heroic services of his father who met death in the line of duty at the very outset of the struggle which was thrust upon us by the perfidy of a professed friend. In the conviction that the service and example of Captain Colin P. Kelly, Jr. will be long remembered, I ask for this consideration in behalf of Colin P. Kelly, III. (Letter, December 17, 1941.) [The letter would end up on the desk of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Young Kelly decided to go through the regular process of applying for West Point and was admitted on his own.]
188. War costs money. So far we have hardly even begun to pay for it. We devoted only 15 percent of our national income to national defense. As will appear in my budget message tomorrow, our war program for the coming fiscal year will cost $56 billion, or in other words more than half of the estimated annual national income. (State of the Union Address, January 6, 1942.) 189. Our enemies are guided by military cynicism, by unholy contempt for the human race. We are inspired by a faith which goes back through the years to the first chapter of the Book of Genesis—‘‘God created man in His own image.’’ We on our side are striving to be true to that divine heritage. We are fighting, as our fathers have fought, to uphold the doctrine that all men are equal in the sight of God. Those on the other side are striving to destroy this deep belief and to create a world in their own image, a world of tyranny and cruelty and serfdom. (Ibid.) 190. I should like to tell you . . . about the men we have in our armed forces. There is, for example, Dr. Corydon M. Wassell. He was a missionary, well known for his good works in China. He is a simple, modest, retiring man, nearly 60 years old, but he entered the service of his country and was commissioned a lieutenant commander in the Navy. Dr. Wassell was assigned to duty in Java caring for wounded officers and men of the cruisers Houston and Marblehead which had been in heavy action in the Java seas. When the Japanese advanced across the island, it was decided to evacuate as many as possible of the wounded to Australia. But about twelve of the men were
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so badly wounded that they could not be moved. Dr. Wassell remained with them, knowing that he would be captured by the Japanese enemy. But he decided to make a last desperate attempt to get the men out of Java. He asked each of them if he wanted to take the chance, and every one agreed. He first had to get the twelve men to the sea coast—50 miles away. To do that, he had to improvise stretchers for the hazardous journey. The men were suffering severely, but Dr. Wassell kept them alive by his skill, inspired them by his own courage. And as the official report said, was ‘‘almost like a Christ-like shepherd devoted to his flock.’’ On the sea coast, he embarked the men on a little Dutch ship. They were bombed, they were machine-gunned by waves of Japanese planes. Dr. Wassell took virtual command of the ship, and by great skill avoided destruction, hiding in little bays and little inlets. A few days later, Dr. Wassell and his little flock of wounded men reached Australia safely. And today Dr. Wassell wears the Navy Cross. (Radio broadcast, April 28, 1942; cited in the New York Times, April 29, 1942.) 191. In every camp and on every naval vessel soldiers, sailors, and marines are inspired by the gallant struggle of their comrades in the Philippines. The workmen in our shipyards and munitions plants redouble their efforts because of your example. (Message to General Wainwright [q.v.], May 5, 1942.) [The message was actually prepared by General Marshall. It was on the eve of the surrender at Corregidor. Marshall wanted to have Wainwright awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. That move was blocked by MacArthur. After the war, President Truman (q.v.) presented the medal to Wainwright.]
192. INDIRECT DISCOURSE: [Roosevelt] said MacArthur’s assurance to his men early in December [1941], after the attack, that ample reinforcements of men, planes, tanks, and materiel were on the way and would reach the Philippines very soon—in ample time to relieve shortage—was unjustifiable. MacArthur knew this was not true. [It is] justifiable to give incorrect information in some circumstances in time of war; but criminal to raise false hopes—hopes that MacArthur knew could not be fulfilled. (July 11, 1942; quoted in Off the Record with F.D.R., by William D. Hassett.) 193. The United Nations are going to win this war. When victory has been achieved, it is the purpose of the Government of the United States, as I know it is the purpose of each of the United Nations, to make appropriate use of the information and evidence in respect to these barbaric crimes of the invaders, in Europe and in Asia. It seems only fair that they should have this warning that the time will come when they shall have to stand in courts of law in the very countries which they are now oppressing and answer for their acts. (Statement, August 21, 1942.)
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194. You will at an early date contact personally and through your Psychological Warfare and other assistants those French nationals whom you consider reliable, and give them the following information: Information having been received from a reliable source that the Germans and Italians are planning an intervention in French North Africa, the United States contemplates sending at an early date a sufficient number of American troops to land in that area with the purpose of preventing occupation by the Axis and of preserving French sovereignty in Algeria, and the French administrations in Morocco and Tunisia. No change in the existing French Civil Administrations is contemplated by the United States. Any resistance to an American landing will, of course, have to be put down by force of arms. The American forces will hope for and will welcome French assistance. (Directive to Robert D. Murphy [q.v.] September 22, 1942; cited in Our Vichy Gamble, by William L. Langer.) 195. My friends, who suffer day and night under the crushing yoke of the Nazis, I speak to you as one who was with your army and navy in France in 1918. I have held all my life the deepest friendship for the French people—for the entire French people. I retain and cherish the friendship of hundreds of French people in France and outside France. I know your farms, your villages, and your cities. I know your soldiers, professors, and workmen. I know what a precious heritage of the French people are your homes, your culture, and the principles of democracy in France. I salute again and reiterate my faith in Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. No two nations exist which are more united by historic and mutually friendly ties than the people in France and the United States. Americans, with the assistance of the United Nations, are striving for their own safe future as well as the restoration of the ideals, the liberties, and the democracy of all those who have lived under the tricolor. (Broadcast to the French people, November 7, 1942.) [The broadcast, in French, was made as American forces were invading French North Africa, then under the control of Vichy France. The idea was to keep French military resistance to a minimum.]
196. Day in and day out we shall heap tons upon tons of explosives on their war factories and utilities and seaports. Hitler and Mussolini [q.v.] will understand the enormity of their miscalculations—that the Nazis would always have the advantage of superior air power. That superiority has gone—forever. Yes—the Nazis and the Fascists have asked for it—and they are going to get it. (Annual Message to Congress, January 7, 1943.) 197. Our forward progress in this war has depended upon our progress on the production front. There has been criticism of the management and conduct of our war production. Much of this self-criticism has had a healthy effect. It has
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spurred us on. It has reflected a normal American impatience to get on with the job. We are the kind of people who are never quite satisfied with anything short of miracles. . . . [In 1942] we produced about 48,000 military planes—more than the airplane production of Germany, Italy and Japan put together. . . . I suspect Hitler and Tojo [q.v.] will find it difficult to explain to the German and Japanese people just why it is that a ‘‘decadent, inefficient democracy’’ can produce such phenomenal quantities of weapons and munitions—and fighting men. (Ibid.) 198. We have given the lie to certain misconceptions—especially the one which holds that the various blocs or groups within a free country cannot forego their political and economic differences in time of crisis and work together toward a common goal. (Ibid.) 199. While we have been achieving this miracle of production, during the past year, our Armed Forces have grown from a little over 2,000,000 to 7,000,000. In other words, we have withdrawn from the labor force and the farms some 5,000,000 of our younger workers. And in spite of this, our farmers have contributed their share to the common effort by producing the greatest quantity of food ever made available during a single year in all our history. (Ibid.) 200. Washington may be a madhouse—but only in the sense that it is the Capital City of a nation which is fighting mad. . . . And I think that Berlin and Rome and Tokyo, which had such contempt for the obsolete methods of democracy, would now gladly use all they could get of that same brand of madness. (Ibid.) 201. Victory in this war is the first and greatest goal before us. Victory in the peace is the next. That means striving toward the enlargement of the security of man here and throughout the world—and, finally, striving for the Fourth Freedom—Freedom from Fear. (Ibid.) 202. Undoubtedly a few Americans, even now, think that this Nation can end this war comfortably and then climb back into an American hole and pull the hole in after them. But we have learned that we can never dig a hole so deep that it would be safe against predatory animals. We have also learned that if we do not pull the fangs of the predatory animals of this world, they will multiply and grow in strength—and they will be back at our throats once more in a short generation. (Ibid.) 203. In an attempt to ward off the inevitable disaster, the Axis propagandists are trying all of their old tricks in order to divide the United Nations. They seek to create the idea that if we win this war, Russia, England, China, and the United States are going to get into a cat-and-dog fight. This is their final effort to turn one nation against another, in the vain hope
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that they may settle with one or two at a time—that any of us may be so gullible and so forgetful as to be duped into making ‘‘deals’’ at the expense of our Allies. To these panicky attempts to escape the consequences of their crimes, we say— all the United Nations say—that the only terms on which we shall deal with an Axis government or any Axis factions are the terms proclaimed at Casablanca: ‘‘Unconditional Surrender.’’ (Address following the Casablanca Conference [q.v.] February 12, 1943.) 204. Ask them [our servicemen] what they are fighting for, and every one of them will say: ‘‘I am fighting for my country.’’ Ask them what they really mean by that and you will get what, on the surface, may seem to be a wide variety of answers. One will say he is fighting for the right to say what he pleases and to read and listen to what he likes. Another will say he is fighting because he never wants to see the Nazi swastika flying over the First Baptist Church on Elm Street. Another soldier will say he is fighting for the right to work and earn three square meals a day for himself and his folks. Another will say he is fighting in this World War so that his children and grandchildren will not have to go back to Europe, or Africa or Asia to do this ugly job all over again. But all these answers really add up to the same thing: every American fights for freedom. And today the personal freedom of every American and his family depends, and in the future will increasingly depend, upon the freedom of his neighbors in other lands. For today the whole world is one neighborhood. (Speech, White House Correspondents Association dinner, February 12, 1943.) 205. President Lincoln said in 1862, ‘‘Fellow Citizens, we cannot escape history. We of this Congress and this administration will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance or insignificance can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass will light us . . . in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation.’’ Today, eighty years after Lincoln delivered that message, the fires of war are blazing across the whole horizon of mankind—from Kharkov to Kunming—from the Mediterranean to the Coral Sea—from Berlin to Tokyo. Again—we cannot escape history. We have supreme confidence that with the help of God, honor will prevail. We have faith that future generations will know that here, in the middle of the Twentieth Century, there came the time when men of good will found a way to unite and produce and fight to destroy the forces of ignorance, intolerance, slavery, and war. (Ibid.) 206. From time to time since the present war began there have been reports that one or more of the Axis powers were seriously contemplating use of poisonous or noxious gases or other inhumane devices of warfare. I have been loath to believe that any nation, even our present enemies, could or would be willing to loose upon mankind such terrible and inhumane weapons.
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However, evidence that the Axis powers are making significant preparations indicative of such an intention is being reported with increasing frequency from a variety of sources. Use of such weapons has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind. This country has not used them, and I hope that we never will be compelled to use them. I state categorically that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies. . . . Any acts of this nature committed against any one of the United Nations will be regarded as having been committed against the United States itself and will be treated accordingly. (Statement, Washington, D.C., June 8, 1943.) 207. At this moment the combined armed forces of the United States and Great Britain . . . are carrying the war deep into the territory of your country. This is the direct consequence of the shameful leadership to which you have been subjected by Mussolini [q.v.] and his Fascist regime. (Joint statement with Prime Minister Churchill, addressed to the people of Italy after the invasion of Sicily, July 16, 1943.) 208. Mussolini [q.v.] carried you into this war as the satellite of a brutal destroyer of peoples and liberties. Mussolini plunged you into this war, which he thought Hitler had already won. . . . The time has now come for you, the Italian people, to consult your own selfrespect and your own interest and your own desire for a restoration of national dignity, security and peace. The time has come for you to decide whether Italians shall die for Mussolini and Hitler—or live for Italy and for civilization. (Ibid.) 209. Among many other things, we are, today, laying plans for the return to civilian life of our gallant men and women in the armed services. They must not be demobilized into an environment of inflation and unemployment, to a place on a bread line or on a corner selling apples. We must, this time, have plans ready—instead of waiting to do a hasty, inefficient, and ill-considered job at the last moment. I have assured our men in the armed forces that the American people would not let them down when the war is won. (Speech, laying the foundation for the ‘‘G.I. Bill of Rights,’’ July 28, 1943.) 210. The least to which they are entitled [are] . . . 1. Mustering-out pay . . . to cover a reasonable period of time between his discharge and the finding of a job. 2. In case no job is found, . . . unemployment insurance. . . . 3. An opportunity for members of the armed services to get further education or trade training at the cost of their government. 4. Allowance of credit . . . under unemployment compensation and federal old-age and survivors insurance, for their period of service.
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5. Improved and liberalized provisions for hospitalization, rehabilitation, and medical care for [the] disabled. . . . 6. Sufficient pensions for disabled. (Ibid.) 211. There are now rumors that Mussolini [q.v.] and members of his Fascist gang may attempt to take refuge in neutral territory. One day Hitler and his gang and Tojo [q.v.] and his gang will be trying to escape from their countries. I find it difficult to believe that any neutral country would give asylum to or extend protection to any of them. I can only say that the government of the United States would regard the action by a neutral government in affording asylum to Axis leaders or their tools as inconsistent with the principles for which the United Nations are fighting and that the United States Government hopes that no neutral government will permit its territory to be used as a place of refuge or otherwise assist such persons in any effort to escape their just deserts. (Statement after Mussolini was deposed by the king of Italy, July 30, 1943.) 212. Now is the time for every Italian to strike his blow. The liberating armies of the Western World are coming to your rescue. . . . The German terror in Italy will not last long. . . . Strike hard and strike home. . . . Have faith in your future. All will come well. March forward with your American and British friends in the great world movement toward freedom. (Statement to the Italian people, issued jointly with Winston Churchill, September 10, 1943.) [Following the surrender of Italy and the Allied invasion of the Italian mainland.]
213. I hope, some day, everybody in America will realize what a debt he owes to George Marshall. There’s just nobody like him. Nobody! (Spoken to Elliott Roosevelt [q.v.], Teheran, November 1943; quoted in As He Saw It, by Elliott Roosevelt.) 214. I learned more just talking to the Chiangs last night than I did from more than four hours of meeting with the Combined Chiefs. . . . More about the war that isn’t being fought, and why. Chiang [Kai-shek’s (q.v.)] troops aren’t fighting at all—despite the reports that get printed in the papers. He claims his troops aren’t trained, and have no equipment—and that’s easy to believe. But it doesn’t explain why he’s been trying so hard to keep Stilwell [q.v.] from training Chinese troops. And it doesn’t explain why he keeps thousands and thousands of his best men up in the northwest—up on the borders of Red China. (Spoken to Elliott Roosevelt [q.v.], Cairo, November 1943; Ibid.) 215. Buccaneer is off. (Message to Churchill, December 5, 1943.) [Buccaneer was the code name of a planned amphibious operation off Burma. It would have been combined with a Chinese military offensive operation against the Japanese. Its cancellation indicated decreased confidence in Chiang Kai-shek’s (q.v.) Chinese forces and increased emphasis on the forthcoming cross-Channel invasion of Europe.]
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216. The commander selected to lead the continued attack from these other points [the invasion of Europe] is General Dwight D. Eisenhower. His performances in Africa, in Sicily and in Italy have been brilliant. He knows by practical and successful experience the way to coordinate air, sea and land power. All of these will be under his control. (Christmas Eve broadcast, December 24, 1943.) 217. The war is now reaching the stage where we shall all have to look forward to large casualty lists—dead, wounded and missing. War entails just that. There is no easy road to victory. And the end is not yet in sight. (Ibid.) 218. Almighty God. Our sons, pride of our nation, this day have set upon a mighty endeavor, a struggle to preserve our republic, our religion, and our civilization, and to set free a suffering humanity. Lead them straight and true, give strength to their arms, stoutness to their hearts, steadfastness to their faith. (Radio broadcast, Prayer for the Normandy Invasion, D-Day [q.v.], June 6, 1944.) 219. The enemy is strong. He may hurl back our forces. But we shall return again and again, and we know that by Thy grace and by the righteousness of our cause, our sons will triumph. Some will never return. Embrace these, Father, and receive them, Thy heroic servants, into Thy Kingdom. (Ibid.) 220. With Thy blessing, we shall prevail. . . . Lead us to the saving of our country, and with our sister nations into a world unity that will spell a sure peace. (Ibid.) 221. [D-Day (q.v.) prayer for the armed forces] God of the Free, we pledge our hearts and lives today to the cause of all free mankind. Grant us victory over the tyrants who would enslave all free men and nations. Grant us faith and understanding to cherish all those who fight for freedom as if they were our brothers. Grant us brotherhood in hope and union, not only for the space of this bitter war but for the days to come which shall and must unite all the children of earth. (Yank, the Army Weekly, ca. June 7, 1944; quoted in Yank: The Story of World War II Written by the Soldiers.) 222. Our earth is but a small star in the great universe—yet of it we can make, if we choose, a planet unvexed by war, untroubled by hunger or fear, undivided by senseless distinctions of race, color, or theory. (Ibid.) 223. Grant us that courage and foreseeing to begin this task today, that our children and our children’s children may be proud of the name of Man. The spirit of man has awakened and the soul of man has come forth. Grant us the wisdom and the vision to comprehend the greatness of man’s spirit that suffers and endures so hugely for a goal beyond his own brief span. Grant us honor for our dead who died in the faith, honor for our living who work and strive for the faith, redemption and security for all captive lands and peoples. Grant us patience with the deluded and pity for the betrayed, and grant us the skill and valor that
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so cleansed the world of oppression and the old base doctrine that the strong must eat the weak because they are strong. (Ibid.) 224. Yet, most of all, grant us brotherhood, not only for this day but for all our years, a brotherhood not of words, but of acts and deeds. We are all of us children of earth—grant us that simple knowledge. If our brothers are oppressed, then we are oppressed. If they hunger, we hunger. If their freedom is taken away, our freedom is not secure. Grant us a common faith that man shall know bread and peace, that he shall know justice and righteousness, freedom and security, an equal opportunity and an equal chance to do his best, not only in our own lands but throughout the world, and in that faith let us march toward the clean world our hands can make. Amen. (Ibid.) 225. Personally, I wished much in Honolulu [where a meeting on Pacific strategy had taken place] that you and I could swap places and personally, I have a hunch that you would make more of a go as President than I would as General in the retaking of the Philippines. (Letter to MacArthur, August 1944.) 226. These Republican leaders have not been content with attacks upon me, or my wife, or my sons—they now include my little dog, Fala. Unlike the members of my family, he resents this. Being a Scottie, as soon as he learned that the Republican fiction writers had concocted a story that I had left him behind on an Aleutian island and had sent a destroyer back to find him—at a cost to the taxpayers of two or three or twenty million dollars—his Scotch soul was furious. He has not been the same dog since. (Presidential campaign address, September 23, 1944.) [The president, speaking to the International Teamsters Union, was responding to reports of an alleged misadventure during a wartime trip.]
227. It is all very well for us to make all kinds of preparations for the treatment of Germany, but there are some matters in regard to such treatment that lead me to believe that speed on these matters is not an essential at the present moment. It may be in a week, or it may be in a month, or it may be several months hence. I dislike making detailed plans for a country which we do not yet occupy. (Memo to Cordell Hull [q.v.], October 20, 1944; cited in Diplomat among Warriors, by Robert Murphy.) 228. We must emphasize the fact that the European Advisory Commission [a group of Americans, Britons, and Russians working on German occupation plans] is ‘‘advisory,’’ and that you and I are not bound by this advice. This is something which is sometimes overlooked, and if they do not remember that word ‘‘advisory’’ they may go ahead and execute some of the advice which, when the time comes, we may not like at all. (Ibid.)
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229. In view of the fact that we have not occupied Germany, I cannot agree at this moment as to what kind of a Germany we want in every detail. (Ibid.) 230. You know peace, like war, can succeed only when there is a will to enforce it, and where there is available power to enforce it. (Speech, October 21, 1944.) 231. I live in a small town and I always think in small town terms, but this goes for small towns as well as for big towns. A policeman would not be a very effective policeman, if when he saw a felon break into a house, he had to go to the town hall and call a town meeting to issue a warrant before the felon could be arrested. So to my simple mind, it is clear that, if the world organization is to have any reality at all, our American representative must be endowed in advance by the people themselves, by constitutional means through their representatives in Congress, with authority to act. (Ibid.) 232. If we do not catch the international felon when we have our hands on him, if we let him get away with his loot, because the town council has not passed an ordinance authorizing his arrest, then we are not doing our share to prevent another world war. (Ibid.) 233. We seek peace—enduring peace. More than an end to war, we want an end to the beginnings of all wars—yes, an end to this brutal, inhuman and thoroughly impractical method of settling the differences between governments. (Jefferson-Jackson Day speech, scheduled for delivery on April 13, 1945.) [Roosevelt died the day before.]
234. The once powerful, malignant Nazi state is crumbling, the Japanese war lords are receiving, in their own homeland, the retribution for which they asked when they attacked Pearl Harbor. But the mere conquest of our enemies is not enough. We must go on to do all in our power to conquer the doubts and the fears, the ignorance and the greed, which made this horror possible. (Ibid.) 235. Today we are faced with the pre-eminent fact that, if civilization is to survive, we must cultivate the science of human relationships—the ability of all peoples, of all kinds, to live together and work together in the same world, at peace. (Ibid.) 236. Today as we move against the terrible scourge of war—as we go forward toward the greatest contribution that any generation of human beings can make in this world—the contribution of lasting peace, I ask you to keep up your faith. . . . And to you, and to all Americans who dedicate themselves with us to the making of an abiding peace, I say: The only limit to our realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today. Let us move forward with strong and active faith. (Ibid.)
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JOSEPH STALIN (1879–1953)
Stalin was dictator of the Soviet Union during World War II. A Communist revolutionary as a youth, he was twice sent to Siberia for his activities. After the Communist Revolution, he rose to power quickly. After the death of Lenin, he took charge. In August 1939, he concluded a nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany in which the two agreed to split up Poland. When the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Stalin rallied his forces to defend Mother Russia. For three years, he pushed the Allies for a second front in Europe. He agreed to come into the war against Japan three months after victory in Europe. The declaration of war came just ninety days after V-E Day. For Russia, it was the shortest, cheapest war in its history, lasting less than a week. 237. I hope that the German-Soviet nonaggression pact will bring about a decided turn for the better in the political relations between our countries. (Telegram to Hitler, August 21, 1939.) 238. The assent of the German Government to the conclusion of a nonaggression pact provides the foundation for eliminating the political tension and for the establishment of peace and collaboration between our countries. The Soviet Government have instructed me to inform you that they agree to Herr von Ribbentrop’s [q.v.] arriving in Moscow on August 23. (Ibid.) 239. We had formed the impression that the British and French Governments were not resolved to go to war if Poland were attacked, but that they hoped the diplomatic lineup of Britain, France, and Russia would deter Hitler. We were sure it would not. (Recalling events of summer 1939 prior to the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact [q.v.], related to Winston Churchill, August 1942; quoted in The Second World War: The Gathering Storm, by Winston Churchill.) 240. INDIRECT DISCOURSE: Stalin was sure that the Germans [who invaded on June 22, 1941] would be defeated, but by the most sacrificial means; the Red Army would retreat and destroy everything as it went, and ‘‘our forces are numberless.’’ In short, a war of attrition. Britain and America, Stalin noted in passing, had said that they would send aid, but his message to the Soviet people was that their sacrifices alone would overwhelm the Germans. (Radio broadcast, July 3, 1941; from Stalin: Man and Ruler, by Robert H. McNeal.)
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‘‘The assent of the German Government to the conclusion of a nonaggression pact provides the foundation for eliminating the political tension and for the establishment of peace and collaboration between our countries.’’ —JOSEPH STALIN, TELEGRAM TO HITLER
Two days later, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov signs the Nazi-Soviet Pact while German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and Stalin look on.
241. We secured peace for our country for one and a half years, as well as an opportunity of preparing our forces for defense if fascist Germany risked attacking our country in defiance of the pact. (Radio broadcast, July 3, 1941.) [Referring to the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 1939.]
242. Not a step backward! (Order of the Day, July 28, 1942.) 243. The situation at Stalingrad has deteriorated further. The enemy stands two miles from the city. Stalingrad may fall today or tomorrow if the northern group of forces does not give immediate assistance. See to it that the commanders of forces north and northwest of Stalingrad strike the enemy at once. . . . No delay can be tolerated. To delay now is tantamount to a crime. (Message to Marshal Zhukov [q.v.], September 3, 1942; cited in Enemy at the Gates, by William Craig.) 244. In view of the absence of a second front in Europe, the Red Army alone is bearing the whole weight of the war. Nevertheless the Red Army has not only stood firm against the onslaught of the German Fascist hordes, but has also in the course of the war become a menace to the Fascist army. (Order of the Day on the 25th anniversary of the Red Army, February 22, 1943.) 245. The struggle against the German invaders is not yet ended. . . . It would be stupid to suppose the Germans will give up even one kilometer of our land without a struggle. The Red Army has before it a severe struggle against the cunning, cruel and as yet strong enemy. . . .
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Long live our great motherland! Long live our glorious Red Army, our valiant Red Navy, our intrepid men and women guerrillas! . . . Death to the German invaders! (Ibid.) 246. The babble about peace in the fascist camp only indicates that they are going through a grave crisis. But of what kind of peace can one talk with the imperialist bandits from the German-fascist camp who have flooded Europe with blood and studded it with gallows? Is it not clear that only the utter routing of the Hitlerite armies and the unconditional surrender of Hitlerite Germany can bring peace to Europe? Is it not because the German fascists sense the coming catastrophe that they babble about peace? (Order of the Day, May 1, 1943.) 247. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. (Designation first used by Stalin, July 1943.) 248. The Pope? How many divisions does he have? (Attributed, ca. end 1943.) 249. There has been no instance yet in the history of wars of the enemy jumping into the abyss by himself. To win a war one must lead the enemy to the abyss and push him in to it. (Order of the Day, February 23, 1944.) 250. The history of war never witnessed such a grandiose operation [as the cross-Channel invasion]. Napoleon himself never attempted it. Hitler envisaged it but was a fool for never having attempted it. (Conversation with Averell Harriman, June 10, 1944.) 251. INDIRECT DISCOURSE: There was dissatisfaction, he [Stalin] continued, because the Polish Government was not elected. It would naturally be better to have a Government based on free elections, but the war had so far prevented that. But the day was near when elections could be held. Until then we must deal with the Provisional Government, as we had dealt, for instance, with General De Gaulle’s [q.v.] Government in France, which also was not elected. (Statement at Yalta Conference [q.v.], February 8, 1945; cited in The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy, by Winston Churchill.) [Following the German invasion of 1939, the Polish government had fled to London to set up a government-in-exile. When the Soviet Union drove the Germans out of Poland, it created what it called a provisional government for Poland. Stalin supported the provisional government as the legitimate one, while the United States and Great Britain backed the one in exile. The issue of a democratic Polish government was discussed at length at Yalta.]
252. INDIRECT DISCOURSE: He [Stalin] did not know whether Bierut [of the Moscow-supported Polish provisional government] or General De Gaulle [q.v.] enjoyed greater authority, but it had been possible to make a treaty with General De Gaulle, so why could we not do the same with an enlarged Polish Government, which would be no less democratic? It was not reasonable to de-
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mand more from Poland than from France. . . . If we approached the matter without prejudice we should be able to find common ground. The situation was not as tragic as I [Churchill] thought, and the question could be settled if too much importance was not attached to secondary matters and if we concentrated on essentials. (Ibid.) [Stalin promised Roosevelt and Churchill that the provisional government of Poland would be expanded and that free elections would be held. Neither promise was kept.]
253. On behalf of the Soviet government and myself, personally, I express our profound condolence to the government of the United States of America on the occasion of the premature death of President Roosevelt. . . . The government of the Soviet Union expresses sincere sympathy to the American people in their great loss and their conviction that the policy of friendship between the great powers who are shouldering the main burden of war against the common enemy will continue in the future. (Message on the death of Roosevelt, April 13, 1945.) [Another message is attributed to Stalin: that he asked his ambassador in Washington to find out if an autopsy had been performed on Roosevelt’s body. Stalin apparently suspected that the president might have been poisoned.]
254. The Fatherland and the Party will never forget the role played by the commanders of the Soviet armies in our national defensive struggle. The names of all these generals who gained the victories and saved the Fatherland will stand forever carved on the tablets of honor which history will erect on the battlefields. Of these battlefields, one is of very special significance, that is the field on which the battle of Moscow, the capital of our Soviet Union, was fought. And the name of Comrade [Georgi] Zhukov [q.v.] remains indissolubly connected with this battlefield as the symbol of victory. (Banquet speech, Moscow, May 25, 1945.)
2 Military Officers
HAROLD ALEXANDER (1891–1969)
A field marshal in the British army, Alexander took part in many crucial battles of the war, including Dunkirk, El Alamein (q.v.), Tunisia, Sicily, and Italy. Some military historians believe that the victory at El Alamein, credited to Bernard Montgomery (q.v.), really belonged to Alexander, who laid out the plan that Montgomery carried out. It is no secret that Eisenhower asked for Alexander instead of Montgomery to head British forces in the invasion of Western Europe. 255. The knowledge not only of the enemy’s precise strength and disposition but also how, when and where he intends to carry out his operations has brought a new dimension into the prosecution of the war. (Tunisia, ca. March 1943; cited in The Ultra Secret, by F. W. Winterbotham).
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SEIZO ARISUE
SEIZO ARISUE (n.d.)
Seizo Arisue was a lieutenant general on the Imperial Japanese Army general staff. He and Lieutenant General Torashiro Kawabe were the sources for the evaluation below. 256. INDIRECT DISCOURSE:The strategists at Imperial General Headquarters [Arisue and Kawabe] believed that, if they could succeed in inflicting unacceptable losses on the United States in the Kyushu operation, convince the American people of the huge sacrifices involved in an amphibious invasion of Japan, and make them aware of the determined fighting of the Japanese army and civilian population, they might be able to postpone, if not escape altogether, a crucial battle in the Kanto [Tokyo] area. In this way, they hoped to gain time and grasp an opportunity which would lead to the termination of hostility on more favorable terms than those which unconditional surrender offered. (Intelligence report to General MacArthur, based on interviews after the war, ca. late 1945; cited in Code-Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan—and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb, by Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar.)
HENRY H. ARNOLD (1886–1950)
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Air before Pearl Harbor, Arnold would later become commanding general of the U.S. Army Air Forces. 257. Issue following instructions to all units under your command. The present critical situation demands that all precautions be taken at once against subversive activities. Take steps to protect your personnel against subversive propaganda, protect all activities against espionage, and protect against sabotage of your equipment, property, and establishments. This does not authorize any illegal measures. Avoid unnecessary alarm and publicity. Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security. On or before December 5, this year, reports be submitted to Chief of Army Air Forces of all steps initiated by
CLAUDE AUCHINLECK
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you to comply with these instructions. (Cable to General MacArthur, November 28, 1941; cited in The Brereton Diaries, by Lewis H. Brereton.) 258. How in the hell could an experienced airman like you get caught with your planes on the ground? That’s what we sent you there for, to avoid just what happened. (Telephone call to General Lewis H. Brereton [q.v.] in the Philippines, December 11, 1941; Ibid.) [In his book, Brereton says that he told Arnold that he had tried to do everything he could to get authorization to attack Japanese air bases on Formosa on December 8 but had been relegated to a ‘‘strictly defensive attitude.’’ Although he did not say it to Arnold at the time, Brereton adds in his book: ‘‘Weather, fatigue, badly needed repairs and widely dispersed aircraft seriously curtailed our operations.’’]
CLAUDE AUCHINLECK (1884–1981)
This British field marshal led forces in Norway, India, North Africa, and Burma. He was replaced in North Africa by Field Marshal Harold Alexander (q.v.). 259. There exists a real danger that our friend Rommel [q.v.] is becoming a kind of magician or bogey-man to our troops, who are talking far too much about him. He is by no means a superman, although he is undoubtedly very energetic and able. Even if he were a superman it would still be highly undesirable that our men should credit him with supernatural powers. I wish you to dispel by all possible means the idea that Rommel represents something more than an ordinary German general. The important thing now is to see that we do not always talk of Rommel when we mean the enemy in Libya. We must refer to ‘‘the Germans’’ or ‘‘the Axis powers’’ or ‘‘the enemy’’ and not always keep harping on Rommel. Please ensure that this order is put into immediate effect, and impress upon all Commanders that, from a psychological point of view, it is a matter of the highest importance. (Letter to all commanders and chiefs of staff, North Africa, 1942; quoted in Rommel: The Desert Fox, by Desmond Young.)
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PATRICK BELLINGER
PATRICK BELLINGER (1886–1962)
Patrick Bellinger was an American admiral in charge of the Pacific fleet’s air corps at Pearl Harbor. 260. Air raid Pearl Harbor. This is no drill! (First report of the attack, December 7, 1941.)
WERNER VON BLOMBERG (1878–1946)
Blomberg was the Reich Minister for War and commander in chief of the German Armed Forces before the war began. Later, Hitler would personally assume that role. 261. The intention to unleash a European war is held just as little by Germany. Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a continuous preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces. To counter attacks at any time, and to enable the military exploitation of politically favorable opportunities should they occur. The further working on mobilization without public announcement in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to begin a war suddenly and by surprise both as regards strength and time. (Directive for the United Preparation for War of the Armed Forces, to come into force on August 1, 1937; issued June 24, 1937 [Top Secret]; cited in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, by the Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality.) 262. Special preparations are to be made for the following eventualities: Armed intervention against Austria, warlike entanglement with Red Spain [then in a civil war]. . . . [German actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia might involve] England, Poland, Lithuania [who might] take part in a war against us. (Ibid.) 263. Probable warlike eventualities. . . . War on two fronts with focal point in the West.
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Suppositions. In the West, France is the opponent. Belgium may side with France, either at once or later or not at all. It is also possible that France may violate Belgium’s neutrality if the latter is neutral. She will certainly violate that of Luxembourg. (Ibid.) 264. The military-political starting point used as a basis for concentration plans . . . can be aggravated if either England, Poland or Lithuania join on the side of our opponents. Thereupon our military position would be worsened to an unbearable, even hopeless, extent. The political leaders will therefore do everything to keep these countries neutral, above all England and Poland. (Ibid.)
GUENTHER BLUMENTRITT (n.d.)
Blumentritt was a German general who became Chief of Staff to General von Rundstedt (q.v.). He was involved in the German assault on France in 1940 and on the Soviet Union in 1941. 265. Hitler . . . gave us his opinion that the war would be finished in six weeks. After that he wanted to conclude a reasonable peace with France, and then the way would be free for an agreement with Britain. (Rundstedt headquarters, Charleville, France, events of May 24, 1940, the day after Hitler ordered a puzzling halt to German forces about to cut off British forces from Dunkirk; from The German Generals Talk, by B. H. Liddell Hart.) 266. He [Hitler] then astonished us by speaking with admiration of the British Empire, of the necessity for its existence, and of the civilization that Britain had brought into the world. . . . He said that all he wanted from Britain was that she should acknowledge Germany’s position on the Continent. . . . He concluded by saying that his aim was to make peace with Britain on a basis that she would regard as compatible with her honor to accept. (Ibid.) 267. INDIRECT DISCOURSE: He [Blumentritt] felt that the ‘‘halt’’ [at Dunkirk] had been called for more than military reasons, and that it was part of a political scheme to make peace easier to reach. If the British Army had been captured at Dunkirk, the British people might have felt that their honor had suffered a stain which they must wipe out. By letting it escape Hitler hoped to conciliate them. (Ibid.) 268. Then the weather suddenly broke and almost overnight the full fury of the Russian winter was upon us. The thermometer suddenly dropped to thirty
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degrees of frost. This was accompanied by heavy falls of snow. Within a few days the countryside presented the traditional picture of a Russian winter. (Winter, 1941; from The Fatal Decisions, edited by Seymour Freiden and William Richardson.) 269. The battle of Moscow was the first major German defeat on land during the Second World War. It marked the end of the Blitzkrieg technique which had won Hitler and his Wehrmacht such spectacular victories. . . . It was in Russia that the first fatal decisions were taken. From the political point of view, perhaps the most fatal of all had been the decision to attack that country in the first place. . . . Many of our leaders had grossly underestimated the new enemy. This was partly due to ignorance. . . . Several of our responsible senior officers had never campaigned in the East, having spent the whole of the First World War on the Western Front, and had no idea of the difficulties presented by the terrain nor of the toughness of the Russian fighting man. They chose to ignore the warnings of the experts. (October 1941; Ibid.) 270. When Moscow was . . . almost in sight, the mood both of commanders and troops changed. With amazement and disappointment we discovered in late October and early November [1941] that the beaten Russians seemed quite unaware that as a military force they had almost ceased to exist. During these weeks enemy resistance stiffened. . . . Marshal Zhukov [q.v.] had now assumed command. . . . For weeks his men had been constructing a defensive position in depth. . . . Skillfully camouflaged strong points, wire entanglements and thick minefields now filled the forests which covered the western approaches to Moscow. (Ibid.) 271. Within the next few days Marshal Zhukov [q.v.] was to launch the great Russian counteroffensive which began on December 6th [1941]. . . . The turning point in the East had been reached: our hopes of knocking Russia out of the war in 1941 had been dashed. (Ibid.) 272. Every soldier outside Moscow knew that this was a battle for life or death. . . . In 1941 the choice for the Germans was only to hold fast or to be annihilated. (Ibid.)
TADEUSZ BOR-KOMOROWSKI (1895–1966)
Bor-Komorowski led the underground uprising against the Germans in Warsaw in August 1944. The battle began as the Russian army approached the gates of the city.
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273. At exactly five o’clock [on August 1, 1944] thousands of windows flashed as they were flung open. From all sides a hail of bullets struck passing Germans, riddling their buildings and their marching formations. In the twinkling of an eye the remaining civilians disappeared from the streets. From the entrances of houses our men streamed out and rushed to the attack. In 15 minutes an entire city of a million inhabitants was engulfed in the fight. Every kind of traffic ceased. As a big communications center where roads from north, south, east, and west converged, in the immediate rear of the German front, Warsaw ceased to exist. The battle for the city was on. (Events of August 1, 1944; quoted in The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy, by Winston Churchill.) [The Red Army not only stopped its advance on Warsaw but actually pulled back several miles. The Soviet leaders not only refused to aid the uprising but vetoed allowing British or American supply planes from landing on Soviet airfields after long-range flights from Italian bases to Warsaw. After two months, the uprising was crushed by the Germans. Churchill would later call the affair ‘‘the martyrdom of Warsaw.’’]
OMAR N. BRADLEY (1893–1981)
One of the top American commanders in the European theater, General Bradley led armies in North Africa, Sicily, France, Belgium, and Germany. His armies landed at Normandy, broke out at St. Lo, liberated Paris, were bloodied at the Battle of the Bulge (q.v.), crossed the Rhine, and linked up with Russian forces on the Elbe River. 274. Patton [q.v.] snapped at the assignment to Tunisia when Ike offered it to him. In the words of Eisenhower, Patton was to rejuvenate the jaded II Corps and bring it to a ‘‘fighting pitch.’’ By the third day after his arrival, the II Corps staff was fighting mad—but at Patton, not the Germans. For George had set out deliberately to shock II Corps into a realization that the easygoing days were ended. Rather than wait for the effect of this change in command to filter down to the divisions, Patton sought a device that would instantly bring it home to every GI in the corps. He found what he was looking for in uniform regulations. [Patton set up a system of fines for soldiers who violated dress regulations.] (Events of March 1943, Tunisia; from A Soldier’s Story, by Oman N. Bradley.) 275. In a radio message from Rome [Premier Badoglio (q.v.)] begged Ike to delay the [Italian] surrender until after the Allied landing [at Salerno].
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Eisenhower minced no words. . . . ‘‘I intend to broadcast the existence of the armistice at the hour originally planned. . . .’’ At the same time, however, he reluctantly ordered [General Matthew] Ridgway to cancel the drop of his 82d Division on Rome. Badoglio had indicated that the Italian government could not guarantee a safe landing. Eisenhower also called for the immediate return to Carthage of Brigadier General Maxwell D. Taylor, then underground in Rome. . . . Taylor was to have arranged for safe delivery of the airdromes in the vicinity of Rome. This hasty switch on the eve of [General Mark] Clark’s [q.v.] invasion was to shelve the 82d Division at a time when it was most desperately needed. For there was insufficient time left to shift the 82d back to its original objective at Capua in support of the Salerno landing. (Recalling events of September 1943; Ibid.) 276. Because England had been counted upon to quit with the fall of France, the enemy had failed to provide the craft he would require for a cross-Channel invasion. That failure perhaps more than any other doomed Germany to defeat. (ca. June 1945; Ibid.) 277. Among the Western Allies three . . . giants towered above all others during the last World War—Roosevelt, Churchill, and Marshall. Together they probably influenced the lives of more men than any other triumvirate in the history of mankind. (Ibid.) 278. Montgomery’s luster was dimmed not by timidity as his critics allege, but by his apparent reluctance to squeeze the utmost advantage out of every gain or success. For Monty insisted upon a ‘‘tidy’’ front even when tidiness forced him to slow down an advance. (Ibid.) 279. Patton . . . had one enemy he could not vanquish and that was his own quick tongue. (Ibid.) 280. [In the spring of 1944] we could still not free our minds from the fear that Stalin might make a deal and leave us to face the Axis alone. If we were to fail on the Overlord invasion, we might never get a second chance. (Ibid.) 281. [T]he battle belonged that morning [D-Day (q.v.)] to the thin, wet line of khaki that dragged itself ashore on the Channel coast of France. (Ibid.) 282. You must know after what has happened I cannot serve under Montgomery [q.v.]. If he is to be put in command of all ground forces, you must send me home, for if Montgomery goes in over me, I will have lost the confidence of my command. (Statement to Eisenhower, January 1945; Ibid.) [Following rumors of a Montgomery promotion.]
LEWIS H. BRERETON
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WALTHER VON BRAUCHITSCH (1881–1948)
Brauchitsch was commander in chief of the German army from 1938 to 1941. Initial victories in Poland, the Low Countries, and France were overshadowed by defeats in the Soviet Union. Following his resignation, Brauchitsch was succeeded by Hitler himself. 283. You ought not to have shown this to me. It is a matter of high treason. We cannot under any pretext contemplate that sort of thing. We are at war. It may be permissible to discuss whether we can make contact with a foreign power in time of peace, but in wartime nothing of this kind can be done. Moreover it is less a question of parties now; this is an ideological struggle. The elimination of Hitler would serve no purpose. (Spoken to General Franz Halder [q.v.], February 1940; cited in Canaris, by Andre Brissaud.) [Brauchitsch was referring to a document shown to him by Halder. Report X, as it was called, had come about through secret discussions of anti-Nazi Germans, the Vatican, and Allied diplomatic figures. The document cited the possible conditions under which peace could be concluded with the Allies. It included the elimination of Hitler and the Nazis from power in Germany. The Sudeten territory of Czechoslovakia would remain with Germany, and plebiscite votes would be held in the disputed area of the Polish Corridor as well as Austria.]
284. A frontal attack against a defense line, on too narrow a front, with no good prospects of surprise, and with insufficient forces reinforced only in driblets. (Analysis of Operation Sea Lion, Hitler’s plan to invade England, September 1940; cited in Operation Sea Lion, by Peter Fleming.)
LEWIS H. BRERETON (1890–1967)
A U.S. Army general, Brereton was in charge of the Far East Air Force in the Philippines at the time of Pearl Harbor. On the first day of the war—December 8 in the Philippines—Brereton was ready to launch a bombing raid on Japanese air bases on the island of Formosa. His superiors, however, had put the air force in a defensive posture,
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and a Japanese air attack on Clark Field destroyed a large part of Brereton’s force. Brereton was reassigned to Java in the Dutch East Indies. Later, he would serve in Australia, the Middle East, and Europe. He helped plan the Ploesti Raid (q.v.) of 1943. In the summer of 1944, he headed the 1st Allied Airborne Army in operation Market-Garden (q.v.), an unsuccessful thrust into Holland. 285. Two messages from the War Department alerted us to the possibility of an attack by Japan at any hour. (Diary excerpt, Manila, November 30, 1941; from The Brereton Diaries, by Lewis H. Brereton.) 286. I grabbed the phone and talked to General [Richard] Sutherland, who informed me that the Japs had bombed Pearl Harbor . . . and that a state of war existed. It came as a surprise to no one. (Diary excerpt, Manila, December 8, 1941; Ibid.) 287. The force of 164 bombers roared at tree-top level [over the Ploesti oil fields] through a curtain of ground fire and, in some cases, concentrated attacks by enemy fighters. Explosions of boilers and gas-storage tanks spread flame and smoke. . . . Liberators flew so low that they dipped their wings through tree tops. One plane actually brought back pieces of corn stalks in its bomb bay. . . . One boiler house exploded so violently that it destroyed a Liberator flying over the target. Many of the men said that it became almost unbearably hot in their planes as they flew through the wall of flames, licking 300 feet and higher. (Diary excerpt, Benghazi, North Africa, August 1, 1943; Ibid.) 288. The German progress with jet aircraft places them way ahead of us in this field. If they can make them in sufficient strength they may become a serious threat to our deep heavy-bomber penetration. (Diary excerpt, Normandy, France, July 30, 1944; Ibid.) 289. Despite the failure of the 2nd Army to get through to Arnhem and establish a permanent bridgehead over the Lower Rhine, Operation Market was a brilliant success. The 101st Division took all its objectives as planned; the 82nd Division dominated the southern end of the bridge at Nijmegen until noon of D-plus-l, by which time it had been planned for the Guards Armored to be there; the 1st British Division similarly dominated the Arnhem bridge from its northern end until noon of D-plus-3, 24 hours later than the time set for the arrival of the 2nd Army. Hence the airborne troops accomplished what was expected of them. It was the breakdown of the 2nd Army’s timetable on the first day—their failure to reach Endhoven in 6 to 8 hours as planned—that caused the delay in the taking of the Nijmegen bridge and the failure at Arnhem. (Report to General George Marshall and General Henry Arnold [q.v.], October 3, 1944; Ibid.)
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[This was from Brereton’s report to his superiors on Market-Garden (q.v.). Market was the airborne operation. Garden was the ground operation, which failed to reach its objectives.]
MARK W. CLARK (1896–1984)
Clark was an American general who led U.S. forces in the invasion of French North Africa and Italy. Prior to the African operation, he landed by submarine to negotiate as bloodless an invasion as possible. He was in charge of American landings at Salerno and Anzio, Italy. His most controversial command was the assault across the Rapido River. 290. YBSOB [for ‘‘yellow-bellied son of a bitch’’]. (Algiers, North Africa, November 1942; cited in Diplomat among Warriors, by Robert Murphy.) [Used, in reports to Eisenhower, to describe French officials in North Africa who were slow in responding to Allied requests.]
291. I maintain that it is essential that I make that attack [across the Rapido River], fully expecting heavy losses, in order to hold all the German troops on my front and draw more to it, thereby clearing the way for ‘‘Shingle’’ [code name for the Anzio landing]. (Diary excerpt, January 20, 1944; from Calculated Risk, by Mark Clark.) 292. The men had to cross a low, muddy area, heavily mined, to reach the steep river-bank. Heavy enemy fire not only caused casualties, but destroyed the white tape that had been used to mark lanes previously cleared through the minefields. Visibility was poor, considerable confusion developed, and it was nine o’clock in the evening by the time elements of A and B Companies of the 1st Battalion had forced a way across the Rapido. . . . Under the most intense and steady resistance by hostile artillery, mortars, and Nebelwerfer [rocket launchers], as well as machine-gun and rifle fire, the 1st Battalion put up a tremendous fight to secure its position. Engineers struggled with footbridges, most of which were destroyed by mines or artillery as they were being erected. From remnants of four damaged and destroyed bridges one was finally installed to permit the rest of Companies A and B to get across the river. The Company C attack put only a few men across, despite the efforts of the other two companies to silence the enemy fire along the west bank. Men were swept
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down the icy river. Mines on the banks and in the water took a heavy toll. Rubber boats were sunk by small-arms fire. Assault boats were knocked out by mortar fire. On the hostile bank the men who had crossed successfully encountered barbed wire, mines, machine-gun fire, and steady artillery barrage. (Description of events of January 20–21, 1944; Ibid.) [The excerpt deals with a handful of the units involved in the Rapido River assault. Clark mentions several others, who fought as bravely and met similar fates.]
292a. The Anzio convoys are at sea. We have no indications, as yet, that the enemy has discovered them. (Diary excerpt, January 21, 1944; Ibid.)
BELTON COOPER (n.d.)
Cooper was a captain in the U.S. Third Armored Division. It entered Nordhausen, Germany, in April 1945. It was near the location of a German V-2 rocket factory. The captain came upon some of the slave laborers. 293. A strange apparition emerged from the side of the building. A tall fraillooking creature with striped pants and naked from the waist up. . . . I could not tell whether it was male or female. There was no face, merely a gaunt human skull staring out. The teeth were exposed in a broad grin and in place of eyes were merely dark sockets. . . . We passed three large stacks of what appeared to be waste paper and garbage piled in rows six feet high and 400 feet long. The stench was overwhelming and as I looked I noticed that parts of the stack were moving. To my absolute horror, it dawned on me that these stacks contained the bodies of naked human beings. A few were still alive and they were writhing in the excrement and human waste. (Recalling events of April 11, 1945, memoir, Eisenhower Center, University of New Orleans; cited in Citizen Soldiers, by Stephen E. Ambrose.)
W. SCOTT CUNNINGHAM
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ANDREW B. CUNNINGHAM (1883–1963)
A British admiral serving in the Mediterranean, Cunningham protected the British lifeline from Gibraltar to Suez. He led naval forces in the invasions of North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and southern France. In 1943 he became First Sea Lord. 294. Be pleased to inform their Lordships that the Italian Battle Fleet now lies at anchor under the guns of the fortress at Malta. (Message to London, September 10, 1943.) [Reporting the safe arrival of the Italian fleet, following the surrender of Italy.]
W. SCOTT CUNNINGHAM (n.d.)
Defended by 400 U.S. Marines, Wake Island held out against the Japanese invaders for two weeks before surrendering the Pacific outpost. Here, Navy Commander Cunningham tells the story behind an oft-quoted quotation. 295. We had heard with pride that President Roosevelt himself had hailed Wake’s resistance effort, and we had tried to discount as propaganda for enemy consumption the gloomy reports that relief for Wake would not be expected. But now we heard something that set our teeth on edge. When Pearl Harbor asked the defenders of Wake if there was anything that could be done for them, the story went, an answer came back: ‘‘Yes. Send us more Japs.’’ If there was anything we didn’t need at Wake it was more Japs. I had sent no such message, and since the release of dispatches was at all times under my direct control, I dismissed the story as a reporter’s dream, as did most of the others on the atoll who heard it. Not until years later, in fact, did I learn through Bucky Henshaw, one of the decoding officers, how the story began. . . . Part of the decoders’ job is to ‘‘pad’’ messages with nonsense at the beginning and end as a device to throw off enemy code-breakers. Such padding was either
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entirely meaningless or, on occasion, something involving a private joke. . . . It was not expected that the padding would be filed with the text of the message. On the morning we turned back the invasion fleet . . . [the decoder] had done the padding on my message. He had begun it: SEND US STOP NOW IS THE TIME FOR ALL GOOD MEN TO COME TO THE AID OF THEIR PARTY STOP CUNNINGHAM MORE JAPS. . . . What the world took as a gesture of defiant heroism from Wake Island was actually nothing of the kind and was never intended to be. (From Wake Island Command, by W. Scott Cunningham, with Lydel Sims.)
CHARLES de GAULLE (1890–1970)
De Gaulle was a French general who decided to carry on the war against Nazi Germany even after the French government had signed an armistice in June 1940. De Gaulle became head of the Free French National Committee, which was based in London. Tens of thousands of French colonial troops were mobilized to fight the Nazis. Later in the war, de Gaulle competed for leadership with Admiral Jean Darlan (q.v.) and General Henri Giraud. After the former was assassinated and the latter dropped from the scene, de Gaulle became undisputed leader of Free France. He insisted on taking part in the liberation of Paris in 1944. After the war, he became the most powerful French political leader. 296. Certain circles [in France] saw the enemy in Stalin rather than in Hitler. They busied themselves with finding means of striking Russia, either by aiding Finland or bombarding Baku or landing at Istanbul, much more than in coming to grips with Germany. (Recalling events of March 1940; from Memoires de Guerre, Vol. 1, by Charles de Gaulle.) 297. The leaders who, for many years past, have been at the head of the French armed forces, have set up a government. Alleging the defeat of our armies, this government has entered into negotiations with the enemy with the view to bringing about a cessation of hostilities. It is quite true that we were, and still are, overwhelmed by enemy mechanized forces, both on the ground and in the air. It was the tanks, the planes, and the tactics of the Germans, far more than their numbers, that forced our armies to
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retreat. It was the German tanks, planes and tactics that took our leaders by surprise and brought them to their present plight. But has the last word been said? Must we abandon all hope? Is our defeat final? No! (Radio broadcast, London, June 18, 1940; cited in Churchill and de Gaulle, by Franc¸ois Kersaudy.) 298. Speaking in full knowledge of the facts, I ask you to believe me when I say that the cause of France is not lost. The very factors that brought about our defeat may one day lead us to victory. For France is not alone! She is not alone! She is not alone! Behind her is a vast empire, and she can make common cause with the British Empire, which commands the seas and is continuing the struggle. Like England, she can draw unreservedly on the immense industrial resources of the United States. (Ibid.) 299. This war is not limited to our unfortunate country. The outcome of the struggle has not been decided by the Battle of France. This is a world war. Mistakes have been made. There have been delays and untold suffering, but the fact remains that there still exists in the world everything we need to crush our enemies some day. Today we are crushed by the sheer weight of mechanized force hurled against us, but we can still look to a future in which even greater mechanized force will bring us victory. Therein lies the destiny of the world. (Ibid.) 300. I, General de Gaulle, now in London, call on all French officers and men who are at present on British soil, or may be in the future, with or without their arms; I call on all engineers and skilled workmen from the armament factories who are at present on British soil, or may be in the future, to get in touch with me. Whatever happens, the flame of French resistance must not and shall not die. (Ibid.) 301. The battle is about to begin and I will speak on the wireless. That is all right. But as regards discussing the question of administration [of liberated French territory], it is clear that the President [Roosevelt] has never wanted to see me, and yet now suddenly I am being told, I must go and talk to the President, etc. . . . Why do you seem to think that I need to submit my candidacy for the authority in France to Roosevelt? The French government exists. I have nothing to ask, in this respect, of the United States of America nor of Great Britain. (Statement to Winston Churchill just outside General Eisenhower’s headquarters in southern England, June 4, 1944; Ibid.) [With D-Day (q.v.) less than forty-eight hours away, de Gaulle complains about the forthcoming administration of French territory.]
302. This being said, it is important for all the Allies that the relations between the French administration and the military command should be organized. Nine months ago we proposed as much. Since the armies are about to land in France, I understand your haste to see the question settled. We ourselves are
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ready to do so. But where is the American representative? Without him, as you well know, we can decide nothing in this respect. Furthermore, I notice that the Washington and London governments have made arrangements to do without an agreement with us. I have just learned, for example, that despite our warnings, the troops and services about to land are provided with so-called French currency, issued by foreign powers, which the government of the republic refuses to recognize and which, according to orders of the inter-Allied command, will have compulsory circulation on French territory. I expect that tomorrow General Eisenhower, acting on the instructions of the President of the United States and in agreement with you, will proclaim that he is taking France under his authority. How do you expect us to come to terms on this basis? (Ibid.) 303. The decisive battle has begun. . . . Of course, it is the battle of France, and it is France’s battle! . . . For the sons of France, whoever they may be, wherever they may be, the simple and sacred duty is to fight the enemy with all available means. . . . The directives issued by the French government and by the French leaders who have been delegated to issue them must be followed to the letter. . . . Behind the heavy clouds of our blood and our tears, the sunshine of our greatness is presently reappearing! (Broadcast to the people of France, June 6, 1944; Ibid.)
KARL DITTMAR (n.d.)
General Dittmar commented on German military affairs over Berlin radio. His analyses were regarded as unusually frank. 304. I always felt that I was walking a tightrope with a noose around my neck. (Quoted in The German Generals Talk, by B. H. Liddell Hart.)
KARL DOENITZ
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KARL DOENITZ (1891–1980)
Commander in chief of the German navy, Doenitz was personally chosen by Hitler to take over the German government on the Fuehrer’s death. A week after Hitler’s suicide, Doenitz authorized the unconditional surrender of the Reich. Early in the war, Doenitz was in charge of the U-boat operation. It was he who conceived the idea of a ‘‘wolf-pack’’ approach to destroy Allied shipping. Immensely successful in the early years of the war, the U-boat was doomed by new detection techniques. Convicted of crimes against peace at Nuremberg, Doenitz served ten years in prison. 305. The enemy knows all our secrets and we know none of his. (Ca. January 1945; cited in Historical Guide to World War II, by Louis L. Snyder.) 306. I assume command of all services of the armed forces with the firm intention of continuing the fight against the Bolsheviks until our troops and the hundreds of thousands of German families in our eastern provinces have been saved from slavery or destruction. Against the English and the Americans I must continue to fight for as long as they persist in hindering the accomplishment of my primary mission. (Order of the Day, May 1, 1945.) [After taking over as head of the German government, following Hitler’s suicide.]
307. In view of the present situation, I have decided to dispense with your further assistance as Reich Minister of the Interior and member of the Reich Government, as Commander-in-Chief of the Replacement Army, and as Chief of the Police. I now regard all your offices as abolished. I thank you for the service which you have given to the Reich. (Letter to Heinrich Himmler [q.v.], May 5, 1945; cited in The Last Days of Hitler, by H. R. Trevor-Roper.) [According to Trevor-Roper, similar letters were addressed to other top Nazi officials. It signaled the end of the Nazi regime.]
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ERNEST DUPUY
ERNEST DUPUY (n.d.)
Dupuy was General Eisenhower’s press aide. 308. Under the command of General Eisenhower, Allied naval forces, supported by strong air forces, began landing Allied armies this morning on the northern coast of France. (Press statement, June 6, 1944.)
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (1890–1969)
Eisenhower was Supreme Commander of Allied forces in Western Europe during World War II. He was handpicked by General George C. Marshall to work in the War Plans Division of the U.S. Army. Later, he was sent to Europe to head American forces assembling in Britain. Eisenhower headed the North African campaign, the invasion of Italy, and—finally—the invasion of France and the defeat of Nazi Germany. After the war, he was tapped for the presidency and served two terms. 309. Of more immediate importance to me was the decision [at the Casablanca Conference (q.v.)] that the British Eighth Army and the Desert Air Force, coming up through Tripoli and lower Tunisia, would be assigned to the Allied forces under my command when once they had entered the latter province. During the day I spent at Casablanca, I was informed of this general plan, but not until General [George C.] Marshall later came to Algiers did I learn that it had been definitely approved. General [Harold] Alexander [q.v.] was to become the deputy commander of the Allied forces. . . . This development was extraordinarily pleasing to me because it meant, first and foremost, complete unity of action in the central Mediterranean and it provided needed machinery for effective tactical and strategical co-ordination. I informed the President and the Chief of Staff that I would be delighted to serve under Alexander if it should be decided to give him the supreme authority. I made this suggestion because the ground strength of the Allied Force, after amal-
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gamation with the desert units, would be even more predominantly British. All announced ourselves as satisfied and thus there began what was, for me, an exceptionally gratifying experience in the unification of thought and action in an allied command. (Recalling events of January 1943; from Crusade in Europe, by Dwight D. Eisenhower.) 310. Anglo-Canadian armed forces have today launched an offensive against Sicily. It is the first stage in the liberation of the European Continent. There will be others. (Statement to the people of France, July 10, 1943.) 311. I call on the French people to remain calm, not to allow themselves to be deceived by the false rumors which the enemy might circulate. . . . When the hour of action strikes, we will let you know. (Ibid.) 312. Following upon the conclusion of hostilities, there must be no room for doubt as to who won the war. Germany must be occupied. More than this, the German people must not be allowed to escape a sense of guilt, of complicity in the tragedy that has engulfed the world. Prominent Nazis, along with certain industrialists, must be tried and punished. Membership in the Gestapo and in the SS should be taken as prima facie evidence of guilt. The General Staff must be broken up, all its archives confiscated, and members suspected of complicity in starting the war or in any war crime should be tried. The German nation should be responsible for reparations to such countries as Belgium, Holland, France, Luxembourg, Norway, and Russia. The war-making power of the country should be eliminated. Possibly this could be done by strict controls on industries using heavy fabricating machinery or by the mere expedient of preventing any manufacture of airplanes. The Germans should be permitted and required to make their own living, and should not be supported by America. Therefore choking off natural resources would be folly. (Conversation with U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Henry L. Morgenthau, Jr. [q.v.], 1944; from Crusade in Europe, by Dwight D. Eisenhower.) [Morgenthau had conceived a plan to turn postwar Germany from an industrial to an agricultural society.]
313. If you had called him a bastard, that would be one thing. But you called him a British bastard. For that, I’m sending you home. (Addressed to an American officer, Supreme Allied Headquarters, London, attributed, ca. spring 1944.) 314. From February 1 to June 1 [1944], I visited 26 divisions, 24 airfields, five ships of war, and numerous depots, shops, hospitals, and other important installations. . . . Soldiers like to see the men who are directing operations; they properly resent any indication of neglect or indifference to them on the part of their commanders and invariably interpret a visit, even a brief one, as evidence of the commander’s concern for them. . . . It pays big dividends in terms of morale, and morale, given rough equality in other things, is supreme on the battlefield. (Re-
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calling events of 1944 prior to the Normandy Invasion, June 1, 1944; from Crusade in Europe, by Dwight D. Eisenhower.) 315. Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based upon the best information available. The troops, the air, and the Navy did all that bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone. (Communique´ never released, prepared ca. June 5, 1944; cited in My Three Years with Eisenhower, by Harry C. Butcher.) [If the Normandy landings had failed, Eisenhower was fully prepared to take the blame for it. He shared the draft of the proposed communique´ with Butcher on July 11, 1944, telling him that similar communique´s had been prepared in advance for every previous amphibious landing under his command.]
316. Because this opportunity may be grasped only through the utmost in zeal, determination and speedy action, I make my present appeal to you more urgent than ever before. I request every airman to make it his direct responsibility that the enemy is blasted unceasingly by day and by night, and is denied safety either in fight or in flight. I request every sailor to make sure that no part of the hostile forces can either escape or be reinforced by sea, and that our comrades on the land want for nothing that guns and ships and ships’ companies can bring to them. I request every soldier to go forward to his assigned objective with the determination that the enemy can survive only through surrender: let no foot of ground once gained be relinquished nor a single German escape through a line once established. (Order of the Day, August 13, 1944.) [In August 1944, a major Allied breakout in France was being challenged by a severe German counterattack. Eisenhower would later compare it with the Ardennes offensive four months later. The German attack in August, fought in good weather and with intensive Allied air support, would be quickly repulsed.]
317. It was literally possible to walk for hundreds of yards at a time stepping on nothing but dead and decaying flesh. (Events of August 1944; quoted in Rommel: The Desert Fox, by Desmond Young.) [Describing the site of a vast area filled with German soldiers and French farm animals killed during the battle of the Falaise gap. It marked the breakout from Normandy; the Second Battle of France was now well under way.]
318. There would be some reason to hope Germany would call it a day. But I think as early as August [1944] it became evident all along the front the German was fighting in many instances because the Gestapo made him. The Gestapo’s control is as firm as ever as far as we can see, so the German is going to battle it out to the end. I feel that Hitler’s leading gang of brigands has nothing to lose, and as long as he has this powerful weapon in his hands to make others fight, he
‘‘Soldiers like to see the men who are directing operations. . . . [They] interpret a visit, even a brief one, as evidence of the commander’s concern for them. . . . It pays big dividends in terms of morale, and morale, given rough equality in other things, is supreme on the battlefield.’’ —DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER Calling on American paratroops as D-Day approached.
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and his gang don’t care. They are ready to fight it out to destruction. (Press conference, Paris, November 21, 1944.) 319. So far as the troops are concerned, I have not yet had reported to me a single instance where a V-2 [German rocket] killed a soldier. . . . The Germans are shooting principally at our supply centers and at London. (Ibid.) 320. We cannot be content with his mere repulse. By rushing out from his fixed defenses the enemy may give us the chance to turn his great gamble into his worst defeat. . . . let everyone hold before him a single thought—to destroy the enemy on the ground, in the air, everywhere—destroy him! (Order of the Day during the Battle of the Bulge [q.v.], December 21, 1944.) 321. The enemy is making his supreme effort to break out of the desperate plight into which you forced him by your brilliant victories of the summer and fall. He is fighting savagely to take back all that you have won and is using every treacherous trick to deceive and kill you. He is gambling everything, but already, in this battle, your unparalleled gallantry has done much to foil his plans. In the face of your proven bravery and fortitude, he will completely fail. . . . United in this determination and with unshakable faith in the cause for which we fight, we will, with God’s help, go forward to our greatest victory. (Order of the Day to all Allied forces during the Battle of the Bulge [q.v.], December 23, 1944.) 322. Field Marshal Montgomery [q.v.], like General Patton [q.v.], conformed to no type. He [Montgomery] deliberately pursued certain eccentricities of behavior, one of which was to separate himself habitually from his staff. He lived in a trailer, surrounded by a few aides. This created difficulties in the staff work that must be performed in timely and effective fashion if any battle is to result in victory. He consistently refused to deal with a staff officer from any headquarters other than his own, and, in an argument, was persistent up to the point of decision. (1944; from Crusade in Europe, by Dwight D. Eisenhower.) 323. I would say the German as a military force on the Western Front . . . is a whipped enemy. (Press conference, Paris, March 28, 1945.) 324. This is my honest opinion—there will be no negotiated unconditional surrender. It will be an imposed unconditional surrender. I believe that the Allied Armies and the Russians from the East have to take over everything, and that will be unconditional surrender. (Ibid.) 325. This is a military conference today, not political. But I should say this: our experience to date leads to the view that you have got to take each locality, go in and establish an order over it that can prevail until finally that time comes when our governments can decide what must be done. The first thing is to establish order, and we are going to have to do that with force of arms. (Ibid.)
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[In answer to a question regarding what German personalities might be involved in a surrender.]
326. Well, I think mileage alone ought to make them [the Russians] do it [i.e., reach Berlin first]. After all, they are 33 miles [away] and we are 250. I wouldn’t want to make any prediction. They have a shorter race to run, although they are faced by the bulk of the German forces. (Ibid.) 327. Such trouble as I have ever had in press relations in this war . . . with very, very minor exceptions . . . usually come from the headline writers at home. (Ibid.) 328. Personal Message to Marshal Stalin: My immediate operations are designed to encircle and destroy the enemy forces defending the Ruhr, and to isolate that area from the rest of Germany. This will be accomplished by developing offensives around the north of the Ruhr and from Frankfurt through Kassel, until the ring is closed. The enemy enclosed in this ring will then be mopped up. (March 28, 1945, from the National Archives; cited in On to Berlin, by James M. Gavin.) [This quotation—and those immediately following—constitute what is arguably Eisenhower’s most controversial communication of the war. Many top British political and military figures were outraged by two things: First, that Eisenhower had communicated directly with Stalin; second, that his message indicated that he did not seem to regard Berlin as a major military objective at this point in the war.]
329. I estimate that this phase of operations will terminate in late April or even earlier, and my next task will be to divide the enemy’s remaining forces by joining hands with your forces. (Ibid.) 330. For my forces the best axis on which to effect this juncture would be Erfurt-Leipzig-Dresden; moreover, I believe, this is the area to which the main German governmental departments are being moved. It is along this axis that I propose to place my main effort. In addition, as soon as the situation allows, a secondary advance will be made to effect a junction with your forces in the Regensburg-line area, thereby preventing the consolidation of German resistance in a redoubt in southern Germany. (Ibid.) 331. Before deciding firmly on my future plans, I think it most important that they should be coordinated as closely as possible with yours both as to directions and timing. Could you, therefore, tell me your intentions, and let me know how the proposed operations outlined in this message conform to your probable action? (Ibid.) 332. If we are to complete the destruction of the German armies without delay, I regard it as essential that we coordinate our action and make every effort
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to perfect the liaison between our advancing forces. I am prepared to send officers to you for this purpose. (Ibid.) [Stalin would respond that the plan was a good one, that Berlin was not really a military objective anymore. The Soviet leader then secretly set his top generals to work to plan the Berlin attack.]
333. I visited every nook and cranny of the camp [near Gotha] because I felt it my duty to be in a position from then on to testify at first hand about these things in case there ever grew up at home the belief or assumption that ‘‘the stories of Nazi brutality were just propaganda.’’ (Events of April 1945; from Crusade in Europe, by Dwight D. Eisenhower.) 334. The mission of this Allied force was fulfilled at 0241 local time, May 7, 1945. (Message to the Combined Chiefs of Staff following the German surrender, May 7, 1945.) 335. You will, officially and personally, be held responsible if the terms of this surrender are violated, including its provisions for German commanders to appear in Berlin at the moment set by the Russian high command to accomplish formal surrender to that government. That is all. (To General Jodl [q.v.] after the surrender documents were signed, Reims, France, May 7, 1945.) 336. The route you have traveled through hundreds of miles is marked by the graves of former comrades. Each of the fallen died as a member of the team to which you belong, bound together by a common love of liberty and a refusal to submit to enslavement. Our common problems of the immediate and distant future can be best solved in the same conceptions of cooperation and devotion to the cause of human freedom as have made this Expeditionary Force such a mighty engine of righteous destruction. Let us have no part in the profitless quarrels in which other men will inevitably engage as to what country, what service, won the European war. Every man, every woman, of every nation here represented has served according to his or her ability, and the efforts of each have contributed to the outcome. This we shall remember—and in doing so we shall be revering each honored grave, and be sending comfort to the loved ones of comrades who could not live to see this day. (Victory Order of the Day, ca. May 9, 1945.) 337. This war was a holy war. More than any other in history this war has been an array of the forces of evil against those of righteousness. (Speech, Frankfurt, Germany, June 10, 1945.) 338. Americans assess the cost of war in terms of human lives, the Russians in the over-all drain on the nation. The Russians clearly understood the value of morale, but for its development and maintenance they apparently depended upon over-all success and upon patriotism, possibly fanaticism.
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As far as I could see, [Marshal Georgi] Zhukov [q.v.] had given little concern to methods that we considered vitally important to the maintenance of morale among American troops: systematic rotation of units, facilities for recreation, short leaves and furloughs, and, above all, the development of techniques to avoid exposure of men to unnecessary battlefield risks, all of which, although common practices in our Army, seemed to be largely unknown in his. (1948; from Crusade in Europe, by Dwight D. Eisenhower.) 339. As a matter of fact I approved that one [an execution order for desertion during World War II]. It was for a repeated case of desertion. The man [Eddie Slovik (q.v.)]—he was one of those guardhouse lawyers—he refused to believe that he would ever be executed. At the very last moment I sent my Judge Advocate General to see him. He was on the gibbet. And I said, ‘‘If you will go back and serve in your company honorably until this war is over, you’ll get an honorary discharge and not the death sentence.’’ He said, ‘‘Baloney,’’ or words to that effect. And so he was executed. (Recalling events of January 1945; interview with historian Bruce Catton, February 1963; cited in The Execution of Private Slovik, by William Bradford Huie.) [Huie’s reaction to the above: ‘‘Those statements are as puzzling to me as they are to the Army’s Office of the Judge Advocate General.’’]
JOHN EISENHOWER (1922–
)
John Eisenhower was a lieutenant in the U.S. Army when he visited the Soviet Union with his father, the Supreme Commander in Europe. 340. I have been in Russia several days and have listened to many toasts. I have heard the virtues of every Allied ruler, every prominent marshal, general, admiral, and commander toasted. I have yet to hear a toast to the most important Russian in World War II. Gentlemen, will you please drink with me to the common soldier of the great Red Army. (Leningrad, 1945; quoted in Crusade in Europe, by Dwight D. Eisenhower.)
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THOMAS F. FARRELL
THOMAS F. FARRELL (1891–1968)
Farrell was the number-two man of the Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bomb. He served directly under Leslie Groves (q.v.). Farrell was a brigadier general in the U.S. Army. 341. The faith of those who had been responsible for the initiation and the carrying-on of this Herculean project had been justified. I personally thought of Blondin crossing Niagara Falls on his tightrope, only to me this tightrope had lasted for almost three years. (On the test explosion of the A-bomb Alamogordo, New Mexico, July 16, 1945; quoted in Groves’s memo to Henry Stimson [q.v.] of July 18, 1945.)
ERICH FELLGIEBER (n.d.)
Fellgieber was one of the German generals involved in the plot to kill Hitler on July 20, 1944. 342. The bomb has exploded. Hitler is dead. (Telephone call to conspirators in Berlin, July 20, 1944; cited in Operation Valkyrie, by Pierre Galante with Eugene Silianoff.) [Half right. The bomb had exploded—but Hitler had survived.]
HERMANN GOERING
75
MAURICE GAMELIN (1872–1958)
Gamelin was one of the top French Army commanders prior to and during Hitler’s invasion of France in 1940. Two years after the French surrender, he was arrested by the Vichy government. He spent the rest of the war years in German prisons, until freed by the Allies. 343. If the Belgians only call on us at the moment when they are attacked by the Germans, there is no doubt that they lack the means of defending themselves until they are reinforced. And we would have to run the risk of a battle of confrontation with the difficulty of supporting their retreating armies. This would be an arduous task. (Letter to Premier Daladier, September 1, 1939; from Servir, Vol. III, by Maurice Gamelin.) [On the problem of how to respect Belgian neutrality while preparing for an invasion through that country.]
HERMANN GOERING (1893–1946)
Head of the German Luftwaffe, Goering was chosen by Hitler to be his successor in the event of the Fuehrer’s death. At the close of the war, when Hitler announced that he would stay in Berlin and fight to the death, Goering tried to take over German leadership. He was promptly denounced by Hitler as a traitor. Captured by the Allies after the war, Goering was put on trial at Nuremberg, convicted, and sentenced to be hanged. He cheated the hangman by taking poison. 344. The worst is over; things will improve for we possess the territories with the most fertile soil. We shall send our best agriculturists to follow the fighting troops; they will provide our troops and the homeland with the produce of the land. . . . We have taken the best provinces from the Russians. I have seen how the people live in Holland, Belgium, France, Norway and Poland. And I have formed a great resolve: foremost in the feeding of the hungry come the German
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people. . . . If there is any hunger, it will not be in Germany. (Speech, Harvest Festival, October 4, 1942.) 345. My Fuehrer! In view of your decision to remain in the fortress of Berlin, do you agree that I take over at once the total leadership of the Reich, with full freedom of action at home and abroad as your deputy, in accordance with your decree of June 29, 1941? If no reply is received by 10 o’clock tonight, I shall take it for granted that you have lost your freedom of action, and shall consider the conditions of your decree as fulfilled, and shall act for the best interests of our country and our people. You know what I feel for you in this gravest hour of my life. Words fail me to express myself. May God protect you, and speed you quickly here in spite of all. (Message to Hitler, April 23, 1945.) [Goering really believed that this was Hitler’s wish. He had checked out his feelings with key Nazi leaders, who told him that the leadership was his to assume. When Hitler received the message, he denounced Goering as a traitor.]
LESLIE R. GROVES (1896–1970)
An American army general, Groves was selected to run the supersecret Manhattan Project to develop and build the atomic bomb. Before the project was finished, Groves had put together a workforce of more than 100,000, from scientists to construction workers. The price tag came to an unprecedented $2 billion. 346. Operated on this morning. Diagnosis not yet complete but results seem satisfactory and already exceed expectations. (Message to President Truman [q.v.] at Potsdam Conference [q.v.], Germany, July 16, 1945.) [Translation: The atomic device exploded successfully.]
347. At 0530, 16 July 1945, in a remote section of the Alamogordo Air Base, New Mexico, the first full-scale test was made of the implosion type atomic fission bomb. For the first time in history there was a nuclear explosion. And what an explosion! . . . I estimate the energy generated to be in excess of the equivalent of 15,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT, and this is a conservative estimate. (Memo to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson [q.v.], July 18, 1945; cited in Now It Can Be Told, by Leslie R. Groves.) 348. There are tremendous blast effects. For a brief period there was a lighting effect within a radius of 20 miles equal to several suns in midday; a huge ball of
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fire was formed which lasted for several seconds. This ball mushroomed and rose to a height of over 10,000 feet before it dimmed. The light from the explosion was seen clearly at Albuquerque, Santa Fe, Silver City, El Paso and other points generally to about 180 miles away. The sound was heard to the same distance in a few instances, but generally about 100 miles. Only a few windows were broken, although one was some 125 miles away. A massive cloud was formed which surged and billowed upward with tremendous power, reaching the substratosphere at an elevation of 41,000 feet, 36,000 feet above the ground, in about 5 minutes. (Ibid.) 349. We still have no reason to anticipate the loss of our plane in an actual operation, although we cannot guarantee safety. (Ibid.) 350. A blind woman saw the light [of the test explosion of the atomic bomb]. (Ibid.)
HEINZ GUDERIAN (1888–1954)
Guderian was the German general who developed armored warfare tactics. These resulted in major German victories first in Poland and later in France. These ‘‘blitzkrieg’’ tactics worked initially in the invasion of the Soviet Union, but the harsh Russian winter and muddy spring bogged down the Nazi advances. When Guderian tried to pull back at the beginning of the Russian winter, Hitler fired him. Later in the war, he would hold other less important military posts. 351. Hitler [visiting Guderian’s headquarters in Poland in 1939] asked about casualties. I gave him the latest figures that I had received, some 150 dead and 700 wounded for all the four divisions under my command during the Battle of the [Polish] Corridor. He was amazed at the smallness of these figures, and contrasted them with the casualties of his own regiment, the List Regiment, during the First World War. On the first day of battle that one regiment alone had lost more than 2,000 dead and wounded. I was able to show him that the smallness of our casualties in this battle against a tough and courageous enemy was primarily due to the decisiveness of our tanks. Tanks are a life-saving weapon. (From Panzer Leader, by Heinz Guderian.) 352. Hitler wanted to know what had proved particularly satisfactory about our tanks and what was still in need of improvement. . . . For their further development their present speed was sufficient, but they needed to be more heavily
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armored, particularly in front; the range and power of penetration of their guns also needed to be increased, which would mean longer barrels and a shell with a heavier charge. This applied equally to our anti-tank guns. (Ibid.)
FRANZ HALDER (1884–1972)
Halder was the German general who organized the Polish campaign. He later fell out of favor with Hitler over the Soviet invasion and was dismissed from his post. Arrested after the plot to kill Hitler in July 1944, he was imprisoned at Dachau until the war ended. 353. Our left wing consisting of armor and motorized forces, which has no enemy before it, will thus be stopped dead in its tracks upon direct orders of the Fuehrer! Finishing off the encircled enemy is to be left to Air Force! (Diary entry, May 24, 1940.) [After receiving orders to stop the assault on the English and French trapped at Dunkirk.]
354. These orders from the top just make no sense. The tanks are stopped as if they were paralyzed. (May 26, 1940; Ibid.) [On May 27, Hitler ordered the attack to resume—but it was too late.]
355. The pocket [at Dunkirk] would have been closed at the coast if only our armor had not been held back. Now we must stand by and watch countless thousands of the enemy get away to England under our noses. (May 30, 1940; Ibid.) 356. The success against Poland [in September 1939] was only possible by our almost completely baring our Western border. If the French . . . had used the opportunity presented by the engagement of nearly all our forces in Poland they would have been able to cross the Rhine without our being able to prevent it and would have threatened the Ruhr, which was decisive for the German conduct of the war. (Testimony at Nuremberg war crimes trial, ca. 1946.)
WILLIAM F. HALSEY, JR.
79 ‘‘Launch planes. To Col. Doolittle and gallant command good luck and God bless you.’’ —ADMIRAL WILLIAM F. HALSEY, JR., MESSAGE TO CARRIER HORNET
Col. James Doolittle and army fliers take off from the Hornet to bomb Tokyo and other Japanese cities.
WILLIAM F. HALSEY, JR. (1882–1959)
A U.S. naval officer, Admiral Halsey was involved in numerous battles with the Japanese in the South Pacific. He led the small naval force that accompanied the carrier Hornet, which carried the Doolittle (q.v.) bombers to their rendezvous off Japan. Halsey also took part in battles off the Santa Cruz islands, the Marshalls, the Gilberts, and the Solomons. His most controversial engagement took place in October 1944. Ordered to guard the San Bernardino Strait during the invasion of Leyte in the Philippines, Halsey was drawn away by a decoy Japanese force. The move could have been disastrous to the American landing force. However, the main Japanese fleet withdrew before taking advantage of the situation. 357. Launch planes. To Col. Doolittle [q.v.] and gallant command good luck and God bless you. (Message to carrier Hornet, April 18, 1942.) [Halsey’s small naval force was escorting the Hornet to a point from which it would launch the Doolittle raiders. Believing that enemy ships had spotted them, Halsey ordered the raiders to take off immediately.]
358. We are drowning and burning the bestial apes all over the Pacific, and it is just as much pleasure to burn them as to drown them. (Newsreel interview, ca. March 1944; cited in Memoirs of a Revolutionist, by Dwight Macdonald.) 359. I hate Japs. I’m telling you men that if I met a pregnant Japanese woman, I’d kick her in the belly. (Dinner with newspapermen, Washington, D.C., ca. March 1944; Ibid.)
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WILLIAM F. HALSEY, JR.
360. The back of the Jap navy has been broken in the course of supporting our landings in Leyte. (Broadcast message, October 25, 1944; cited in Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, by Thomas B. Buell.) [Following the battle of Leyte Gulf.]
361. The pursuit phase of the Battle of the Western Pacific is now in progress. . . . And those that escape the surface and air forces are committed to the tender mercies of the implacable submarines. (October 26, 1944; Ibid.) 362. We had two fleets in Philippine waters under separate commands [in the Leyte invasion]; my Third Fleet was under command of Admiral Nimitz [q.v.]; Kinkaid’s [q.v.] Seventh Fleet was under command of General MacArthur. If we had been under the same command, with a single system of operational control and intelligence, the Battle for Leyte Gulf might have been fought differently to a different result. It is folly to cry over spilled milk, but it is wisdom to observe the cause, for future avoidance. When blood has been spilled, the obligation becomes vital. (ca. October 26, 1944; from Admiral Halsey’s Story, by William F. Halsey, Jr., and J. Bryan III.) 363. We have chosen our antagonist [a Japanese carrier force coming from the north]. It remained only to choose the best way to meet him. . . . 1. I could guard San Bernardino with my whole fleet and wait for the Northern Force to strike me. Rejected. It yielded to the enemy the double initiative of his carriers and his fields on Luzon and would allow him to use them unmolested. 2. I could guard San Bernardino with TF 34 while I struck the Northern Force with my carriers. Rejected. The enemy’s potential surface and air strength forbade half-measures. If his shore-based planes joined his carrier planes, together they might inflict far more damage on my half-fleets separately than they could inflict on the fleet intact. 3. I could leave San Bernardino unguarded and strike the Northern Force with my whole fleet. Accepted. It preserved my fleet’s integrity, it left the initiative with me, and it promised the greatest possibility of surprise. Even if the Central [Japanese] Force meanwhile penetrated San Bernardino and headed for Leyte Gulf, it could hope only to harry the landing operation. It could not consolidate any advantage because no transports accompanied it and no supply ships. It could merely hit and run. (Ibid.)
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GOTTHARD HEINRICI (1889–1931)
Heinrici, a German general, led armies on the Russian front. He specialized in defensive tactics in front of Moscow in 1942 and at the Oder River in 1945. 364. [Expecting an imminent enemy attack, he would withdraw his forces under cover of darkness to a secondary defense position a few miles back.] It was like hitting an empty bag. The Russian attack would lose its speed because my men, unharmed, would be ready. Then my troops on sectors that had not been attacked would close in and reoccupy the original front lines. (Quoted in The Last Battle, by Cornelius Ryan.) 365. The German defeat in the East was, in my opinion, due to one main reason—that our troops were compelled to cover immense spaces without the flexibility, in the command, that would have enabled them to concentrate on holding decisive points. Thus they lost the initiative permanently. (Quoted in The German Generals Talk, by B. H. Liddell Hart.) 366. Hitler always tried to make us fight for every yard, threatening to courtmartial anyone who didn’t. No withdrawal was officially permitted without his approval—even a small-scale withdrawal. This principle was so hammered into the army that it was a common saying that battalion commanders were afraid ‘‘to move a sentry from the window to the door.’’ (Ibid.) 367. When the Russians were found to be concentrating for an attack [late in the war, as they pushed toward Berlin], I withdrew my troops from the first line under cover of night to the second line—usually about 2 kilometers behind. The result was that the Russian blow hit the air, and its further attack did not have the same impetus. (Ibid.)
ADOLF HEUSINGER (1897–1982)
A lieutenant in World War I, Heusinger would become a lieutenant general in World War II, serving the German High Command as
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chief of the Operations Section. He was suspected in the 1944 plot to kill Hitler. Though never tried, Heusinger had reason to believe that the SS (Schutzstaffel) would try to kill him. At the end of the war, Heusinger surrendered to American authorities. He was questioned by U.S. Army Intelligence about many aspects of the war. His candid opinions offer remarkable insights into the German military mind at key points in the war. His military career was capped with his work for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 368. In 1939 Hitler assured Brauchitsch [q.v.] that England and France would not declare war when Germany moved against Poland. The general staff expected a war of two or three months’ duration. After France and England declared war, the opinion was that it would last a long time, but no definite time was predicted. Both Brauchitsch and the chief of the general staff had grave doubts as to Germany’s ability to conduct a prolonged struggle. In the general planning it was estimated that we would require a four months’ reserve of armaments and munitions to carry through the period of conversion to war production. At the outbreak of the war, however, we had only a two months’ reserve. This gap was bridged during the inactive period of the war between the Polish and western campaigns. (Interview, Military Intelligence Center, Oberursel, Germany, September 12, 1945; obtained through the National Archives; cited in Operation Valkyrie, by Pierre Galante with Eugene Silianoff.) 369. The general staff was of the opinion that a French attack in the west [during the Sudeten crisis of 1938] would have broken through, as our fortifications were not complete, nor were they in 1939, when the French could have broken through, although at heavier cost. The West Wall was completed only from Trier south to the Rhine in 1939. Northward it was incomplete and without any depth. After 1940 construction ceased. To a certain extent the West Wall was a bluff, like the Atlantic Wall. With regard to the latter it was impossible to fortify the entire coast and every military man must have concluded that a landing and a penetration of five kilometers would end all difficulties as far as fortifications were concerned. (Ibid.) 370. In professional circles [prior to 1939] the following were the most highly regarded [in the German army]: Beck, Halder [q.v.], Manstein, Heinrich Stulpnagel, Fritzsche [q.v.], and Brauchitsch [q.v.]. Also Rundstedt [q.v.], although he was not as active in the War Ministry. General Beck was undoubtedly the greatest spirit in the general staff. However, he was always of the opinion that war would be a catastrophe and in this opinion he found a great friend in General Gamelin [q.v.]. In the general staff we always said that General Halder and General Manstein had received ‘‘the necessary two drops of the wisdom of Solomon.’’ In the top level of the general staff, Manstein was regarded as the ablest and most
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original planner. That is also my opinion. However, there was no Schlieffen. (Ibid.) 371. The first plan for an offensive campaign [in the West] was formulated in November 1939. In substance it was a repetition of the 1914 Schlieffen plan. As the start of the campaign was delayed, doubts arose as to the achievement of any surprise with this plan. The basic idea of the new plan—the breakthrough in the Ardennes, crossing of the Meuse, and the trapping of British, French and Belgian forces in the north by pushing the tank forces through to the Channel— came to several minds at once. And in justice it should be said that one of these was Hitler’s. However, General Manstein, then chief of staff to Marshal Rundstedt [q.v.], deserves the greater credit. He worked out the plan and proposed its adoption. The order was given to the Operations Division in February 1940 to replan the campaign along the proposed lines. From February 1940 to May 1940 the plan was subject to the sharpest criticism. Among the critics was General Guderian [q.v.], who described the plan as a ‘‘crime against Panzers.’’ General Halder [q.v.] deserves the credit for defending the plan against all critics and insisting upon its execution. General Bock was also opposed to it and appealed to the chief of the general staff. Halder said once that he would stick to the plan if the chances of succeeding were only ten percent. (Ibid.) 372. [The German general staff was] very well informed [of British defenses after Dunkirk]. All equipment of the expeditionary force was lost, and we knew that there were few reserves of men and materiel in the homeland. Never in modern times had Britain been in a more critical situation. Only a man like Winston Churchill could have brought the country through such a crisis. We had no plans for an invasion and no equipment and specially trained forces with which to undertake the invasion. Hence the delay, the hesitation, and finally Hitler’s decision not to risk it. Whether we should have risked it is of course now only a matter of historical interest. Admiral Wagner, with whom I have discussed this question recently and who was then chief of Naval Operations, is of the opinion that it would have failed. I think it could have been done. Militarily, this was for us one of the lost opportunities of the war. With regard to the air attack in August and September [1940]—the Battle of Britain—I can speak only from the standpoint of the army. It was not thought possible to conquer Britain from the air. The objective was to destroy British air power and gain control of the air. This failed. English aircraft were greater in number than estimated or Britain’s production was higher than estimated. By the middle of September it was obvious that the attack against London would not be decisive. Our losses in aircraft from improved flank and other defense measures became too high in proportion to results achieved. The air attacks were then switched to new objectives—the production and armament plants became targets with a view of knocking out or delaying British rearmament. But in my opinion these were only substitute objectives fixed after the failure to achieve
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the first main objective—to destroy the British air power and gain control of the air over London and the south coast. (Ibid.) 373. [The original timetable for the Russian invasion] called for the launching of the campaign in May [1941], with the objectives to be reached in five months—that is, in October. But the campaign did not begin until late June, bringing the terminal date into November. Originally, Hitler, the C[ommander] in C[hief], and the chief of the general staff agreed that wherever they stood in November, they would close down operations. However, they gambled with the weather, which in the late autumn was favorable, just as it was to Napoleon in 1812, and kept saying, ‘‘We can risk it.’’ Then came the bitter weather, and the German armies started to retreat. As far as winter preparations were concerned, measures had been taken by the supply services, but they were inadequate. Clothing was prepared for a hard German winter, but it was inadequate for a severe Russian winter. The transport failed because German locomotives were not equipped for extremely low temperatures. Moreover the Russians in their retreat destroyed all the water tanks and this created enormous difficulties in train operations. The campaign should have been halted earlier and necessary measures taken to hold the positions already taken. When the German armies began to retreat, Hitler dismissed Brauchitsch [q.v.] and personally took command. He always maintained thereafter that he personally saved the German army from the fate that had overtaken Napoleon’s forces in the retreat from Moscow. (Ibid.)
COURTNEY HODGES (1887–1966)
Hodges was an American general who commanded the First Army in Europe. 373a. Brad, we’ve gotten a bridge. (Telephone call to Bradley [q.v.], March 7, 1945; quoted in A Soldier’s Story, by Omar N. Bradley.) [First news that American troops had seized a Rhine bridge intact at Remagen.]
HASTINGS ISMAY
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MASAHARU HOMMA (1888–1946)
Homma was a Japanese general who successfully invaded Luzon Island in the Philippines in December 1941. After the war, he was charged with being responsible for the Bataan Death March (q.v.). Homma pleaded that he knew nothing of the atrocities committed by the Japanese army but was found guilty and executed. 374. Things don’t look very good. I was amazed to hear the details of Japanese atrocities. Even Major [John] Skeen [his defense counsel] says that although he is doing his best for me, the case is quite hopeless. (Manila, the Philippines, January 1946; quoted in A Trial of Generals: Homma, Yamashita, MacArthur, by Lawrence Taylor.) [Spoken to his wife during a recess in his war crimes trial.]
375. INDIRECT DISCOURSE: He [Homma] said that the military force is a thing which should be used to defend the Motherland, and work in harmony and try to preserve the world peace, and should never be used to invade the other countries. He also said, constantly, that if a country ever engaged in a war of invasion, that country will inevitably lose. . . . Because he studied about the United States, and England, because he was always interested in the world trends and kept his eyes open on it, and also because he understood Japan thoroughly, he realized that the spread of war was not only a misfortune for Japan but to all mankind. This view was not welcomed and was not popular among the people. People used to call him pro-American, a pro-American element. At that time that name was an insult. (Testimony of Mrs. Fujiko Homma on her husband’s feelings about the Japanese military; Ibid.)
HASTINGS ISMAY (1887–1965)
Ismay was the chief military adviser to Winston Churchill during the war.
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376. He [Admiral Ernest J. King (q.v.)] was as tough as nails and carried himself as stiffly as a poker. He was blunt and stand-offish, almost to the point of rudeness. At the start, he was intolerant and suspicious of all things British, especially the Royal Navy; but he was almost equally intolerant and suspicious of the American Army. War against Japan was the problem to which he had devoted the study of a lifetime, and he resented the idea of American resources being used for any other purpose than to destroy Japanese. He mistrusted Churchill’s powers of advocacy, and was apprehensive that he would wheedle President Roosevelt into neglecting the war in the Pacific. (Ca. January 1943; from The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay, by Hastings Ismay.)
ALFRED JODL (1890–1946)
Jodl, a German general, along with Admiral Hans von Friedeburg, signed the unconditional surrender of Germany on May 7, 1945. An active participant in Hitler’s crimes, Jodl was tried at Nuremberg, found guilty, and hanged. 377. Alarming news from Holland, cancelling of furloughs, evacuations, roadblocks, other mobilization measures; according to reports of the intelligence service the British have asked for permission to march in, but the Dutch have refused. (Diary excerpt, May 8, 1940.) [Two days later, the Nazis attacked. The Dutch had refused British army units prior to the attack in order to maintain their neutrality, as spelled out by international treaty.]
378. The planned attack on Greece from the North [by Nazi Germany in April 1941] was not executed merely as an operation in aid of an ally. [Italy had invaded Greece in the autumn of 1940—and was being trounced.] Its real purpose was to prevent the British from gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our Rumanian oil area from that country. (Lecture, November 7, 1943.) 378a. General Eisenhower insists that we sign today. If not, the Allied fronts will be closed to persons seeking to surrender individually [to the Western Allies rather than to the Russians]. I see no alternative; chaos or signature. I ask you to confirm to me immediately by wireless that I have full powers to sign capitulation. (Message to Admiral Karl Doenitz [q.v.], the German chief of state, May 7, 1945.) 379. We, the undersigned, acting by authority of the German High Command, hereby surrender unconditionally to the Supreme Commander, Allied
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Expeditionary Force, and simultaneously to the Soviet High Command, all forces of land, sea, and the air who are at this date under German control. (Instrument of Surrender, Reims, France, May 7, 1945.) 380. With this signature the German people and the German Armed Forces are, for better or worse, delivered into the hands of the victors. In this war, which has lasted more than five years, both have achieved and suffered more than perhaps any other people in the world. In this hour I can only express the hope that the victor will treat them with generosity. (Statement after signing document of unconditional surrender, Reims, France, May 7, 1945.) 381. If we did not collapse in 1939, that was due to the fact that during the Polish campaign [in 1939] the approximately 110 French and British divisions in the West were held completely inactive against the 23 German divisions. (Testimony at Nuremberg war crimes trial, ca. 1946.)
WILHELM KEITEL (1883–1946)
An early military adviser to Hitler, Keitel rose to become a field marshal of the German army during the war. Although he opposed the attack on the Soviet Union, he carried out Hitler’s orders, including the execution of hostages and destruction of entire villages, such as Lidice. He was hanged at Nuremberg. 382. No document must be lost, since otherwise enemy propaganda will make use of it. Matters communicated orally cannot be proven; they can be denied. (Statement to aides, May 22, 1933.) [Keitel was secretly building up the German army, contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.]
HUSBAND E. KIMMEL (1882–1968)
Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet at the time of Pearl Harbor, Kimmel was accused of dereliction of duty and was relieved of his
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command. He was never court-martialed and was permitted to retire from the navy. Kimmel insisted to the end that if he had been made aware of the intercepted Japanese coded messages about ship movements at Pearl Harbor, he would have been prepared to resist the Japanese attack. 383. I cannot excuse those in authority in Washington for what they did. And I do not believe that thousands of mothers and fathers whose sons perished on that tragic 7th day of December 1941 will excuse them. They will be judged at the bar of history. In my book they must answer on the Day of Judgment like any other criminal. (From Admiral Kimmel’s Story, by Husband E. Kimmel.)
EDWARD P. KING, JR. (1884–1958)
King was major general in charge of the Bataan defense on Luzon Island, the Philippines. In April 1942, he surrendered Bataan to the Japanese. 384. INDIRECT DISCOURSE: At the outset he [King] made it clear that he had not called the meeting to ask for the advice or opinion of his assistants. The ‘‘ignominious decision’’ [to surrender Bataan], he explained, was entirely his and he did not wish anyone else to be ‘‘saddled with any part of the responsibility.’’ ‘‘I have not communicated with General [Jonathan] Wainwright [q.v.],’’ he declared, ‘‘because I do not want him to be compelled to assume any part of the responsibility.’’ Further resistance, he felt, would only be an unnecessary and useless waste of life. ‘‘Already our hospital, which is filled to capacity and directly in the line of hostile approach, is within range of enemy light artillery. We have no further means of organized resistance.’’ (Meeting with officers on Bataan shortly after midnight, April 9, 1942; from The Fall of the Philippines, by Louis Morton.) 385. Tell General Wainwright [q.v.] that I have decided to surrender Bataan. This decision is solely my own, no member of my staff nor of my command has helped me to arrive at this decision. In my opinion, if I do not surrender to the Japanese, Bataan will be known as the greatest slaughter in history. (Telephone call from Bataan to Brig. Gen. Lewis C. Beebe on Corregidor, April 9, 1942; Ibid.) 386. INDIRECT DISCOURSE: After this telephone conversation King told his staff . . . that if he survived he expected to be court-martialed, and he was
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certain that history would not deal kindly with a commander who would be remembered for having surrendered the largest force the United States had ever lost. (April 9, 1942; Ibid.)
ERNEST J. KING (1878–1956)
Commander in chief of America’s Atlantic fleet prior to Pearl Harbor, King was put in charge of the Pacific fleet as well, following the surprise attack. Several months later, he also became chief of Naval Operations. He emphasized the role of carriers in the Pacific war. 387. I have been concerned for many years over the increasing tendency— now grown almost to ‘‘standard practice’’—of flag officers and other group commanders to issue orders and instructions in which their subordinates are told ‘‘how’’ as well as ‘‘what’’ to do to such an extent and in such detail that the ‘‘Custom of the service’’ has virtually become the antithesis of that essential element of command—‘‘initiative of the subordinate.’’ (Memo, Cinclant Serial 053, January 21, 1941; cited in Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, by Thomas B. Buell.) 388. We are preparing for—and are now close to—those active operations (commonly called war) which require the exercise and the utilization of the full powers and capabilities of every officer in command status. There will be neither time nor opportunity to do more than prescribe the several tasks of the several subordinates (to say ‘‘what,’’ perhaps ‘‘when’’ and ‘‘where,’’ and usually, for their intelligent cooperation, ‘‘why’’); leaving to them—expecting and requiring of them—the capacity to perform the assigned tasks (to do the ‘‘how’’). (Ibid.) 389. If they [subordinates] are not habituated to think, to judge, to decide and to act for themselves in their several echelons of command—we shall be in sorry case when the time of ‘‘active operations’’ arrives. (Ibid.) 390. Reference: My confidential memorandum, serial 053, dated 21 January 1941. . . . Much progress has been made in improving the exercise of command through the regular echelons of command—from forces through groups and units to ships. It has, however, become increasingly evident that correct methods for the exercise of initiative are not yet thoroughly understood. . . . When told ‘‘what’’ to do—make sure that ‘‘how’’ you do it is effective not
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only in itself but as an intelligent, essential and correlated part of a comprehensive and connected whole. (Memo, Cinclant Serial 0328, April 22, 1941; Ibid.) 391. You have expressed the view—concurred in by all of your chief military advisers—that we should determine on a very few lines of military endeavor [in the Pacific] and concentrate our efforts on these lines. . . . [The memo deals first with a broad look at military operations by our allies in other parts of the world. King then offers his ‘‘very few’’ recommendations.] Australia—and New Zealand—are ‘‘white man’s countries’’ which it is essential that we shall not allow to be overrun by Japanese because of the repercussions among the non-white races of the world. . . . Our primary concern in the Pacific is to hold Hawaii and its approaches (via Midway) from the westward and to maintain its communications with the West Coast. . . . When ‘‘strong points’’ are made reasonably secure, we shall not only be able to cover the line of communications—to Australia (and New Zealand) but— given the naval forces, air units, and amphibious troops—we can drive northwest from the New Hebrides into the Solomons and the Bismarck Archipelago after the same fashion of step-by-step advances that the Japanese used in the South China Sea. (Memo for President Roosevelt, March 5, 1942; Ibid.) 392. When the going gets rough, they call out the sons of bitches. (Ca. 1942; cited in George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945, by Forrest C. Pogue.) 393. One of the rules of General Jackson was ‘‘mislead, mystify and confuse the enemy.’’ If that’s their [the Japanese] strategy, why that’s what they may have been doing. (Press conference, October 1944, during the battle of Leyte Gulf; cited in Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, by Thomas B. Buell.) [A reporter had asked why the attacking Japanese fleet had divided their forces into three separate parts.]
394. If one can only hold on for a little time longer, things will be eased up and in due time the trouble will iron out. That has been my own belief, not to say creed, but it works out for me. No fighter ever won by covering up—by merely fending off the other fellow’s blows. The winner hits and keeps on hitting even though he has to take some stiff blows in order to be able to keep on hitting. (Undated; Ibid.)
WILLIAM D. LEAHY
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WILLIAM D. LEAHY (1875–1959)
The U.S. chief of Naval Operations before the outbreak of World War II, Leahy became ambassador to the Vichy government after the fall of France. Later, he became Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman (q.v.). 395. He [Marshal Henri Petain (q.v.)] has told me that when the German demands appear to him to be outside the Armistice Agreement, and when he objects on that ground, the Germans claim the right to take the final interpretation, and when he disagrees, they carry out their intention without regard to his attitude in the matter. (Memorandum of conversation, ca. March 1941; cited in Our Vichy Gamble, by William L. Langer.) 396. [Shortly before the Allied invasion of French North Africa, Admiral Jean Darlan (q.v.) arrives in Algiers to be with his polio-stricken son. Leahy informs the president.] The first thing that impressed Roosevelt was the nature of the boy’s illness. Roosevelt remembered his own illness and proposed that we send a letter to Darlan. I replied I thought it would be a very nice thing to do. Later Roosevelt sent Darlan’s son to Warm Springs [a Georgia treatment center for polio] and kept him there for a considerable time. Darlan was most grateful, and it is my belief that this thoughtfulness on the part of the president helped us in the critical situation that was developing. (From the Leahy Memoirs; cited in Diplomat among Warriors, by Robert Murphy.) [The ‘‘critical situation’’ was a series of negotiations to allow the landing of U.S. troops in French North Africa with a minimum of resistance. Finally, a deal was struck with Darlan.]
397. I had then [during the time he was U.S. ambassador to Vichy France], as I have now, the conviction that your principal concern was the welfare and protection of the helpless people of France. It was impossible for me to believe that you had any other concern. However, I must, in all honesty, repeat my opinion as expressed to you at the time that positive refusal to make any concessions to Axis demand, while it might have brought immediately increased hardship to your people, would in the long view, have been advantageous to France. (Letter to Henri Petain [q.v.]; quoted in the New York Times, August 2, 1945.) [Petain, facing trial for treason in France, had requested a letter from Leahy regarding Petain’s actions as head of the Vichy government.]
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RAYMOND E. LEE (1896–1958)
Lee was a U.S. Army general who was a military observer in London. 398. I . . . believe the British can resist invasion. It will be hard, bloody business, but what has occurred so far in Crete [invasion by the Germans from the air] does not alter my opinion. By some error of judgment or lack of imagination, the R.A.F. withdrew all its planes [from Crete]. Even a few fighters would have wrought havoc amongst the German troop carriers at the outset and would have been well expended. There is likely to be serious criticism of this decision and technical reasons will not serve to quell it. (Analysis, London, May 27, 1941; cited in Roosevelt and Hopkins, by Robert E. Sherwood.) 399. At the same time I have never believed and cannot see how the British Empire can defeat Germany without the help of God or Uncle Sam. Perhaps it will take both. God has undoubtedly been on the side of the big battalions so far, but may change sides. (Ibid.)
DOUGLAS MacARTHUR (1880–1964)
MacArthur was commander of Allied forces in the Pacific. A veteran of World War I, MacArthur served in the Philippines, building up local defense forces. Upon the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, MacArthur was ordered to leave Bataan for Australia to take command of the Allied forces. He led campaigns in New Guinea, the Philippines, and other islands on the way to Japan. Upon the Japanese surrender, he was appointed Supreme Commander of Allied forces. After the war, he served brilliantly as United Nations commander in the Korean War. He was replaced by President Truman (q.v.) after policy disagreements. 400. Since I have no air or sea protection you must be prepared at any time to figure on the complete destruction of this command. You must determine
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whether the mission of delay would be better furthered by the temporizing plan of Quezon or by my continued battle effort. (Message to President Roosevelt, February 8, 1942.) [MacArthur was referring to an enclosed message from President Manuel Quezon asking that the United States declare immediate independence for the Philippines. The United States and Japan would be asked to withdraw all military forces from the islands, thus neutralizing them. The Quezon message came after many requests for reinforcements and supplies—which could come only by submarine. Roosevelt’s response to Quezon was that the United States had to carry on the fight against Japanese militarism, that any Japanese promise could not be trusted, and that the United States would live up to its commitment to grant independence to the Philippines in 1946.]
401. The temper of the Filipinos is one of almost violent resentment against the United States. Every one of them expected help and when it has not been forthcoming they believe they have been betrayed in favor of others. (Ibid.) 402. So far as the military angle [in the Philippines] is concerned, the problem presents itself as to whether the plan of President Quezon might offer the best possible solution of what is about to be a disastrous debacle. (Ibid.) 403. The President of the United States ordered me to break through the Japanese lines and proceed from Corregidor to Australia for the purpose, as I understand it, of organizing the American offensive against Japan, a primary object of which is the relief of the Philippines. (On arrival in Australia, March 17, 1942.) 404. I came through and I shall return. (Ibid.) 405. ‘‘Tokyo Rose’’ had announced gleefully that, if captured, I would be publicly hanged on the Imperial Plaza in Tokyo, where the Imperial towers overlooked the traditional parade ground of the Emperor’s Guard divisions. Little did I dream that bleak night [when he was leaving the Philippines by PT (patrol torpedo) boat to take command in Australia] that five years later, at the first parade review of Occupation troops, I would take the salute as supreme commander for the Allied Powers on the precise spot so dramatically predicted for my execution. (Recalling March 1942; from Reminiscences, by Douglas MacArthur.) 406. [I am] utterly opposed, under any circumstances or conditions, to the ultimate capitulation of this command [on Bataan]. . . . If it is to be destroyed it should be upon the actual field of battle taking full toll from the enemy. (Message to General George Marshall, April 1, 1942, cited in The Fall of the Philippines, by Louis Morton.) 407. INDIRECT DISCOURSE: In this message MacArthur had explained that he had ‘‘long ago’’ prepared a ‘‘comprehensive plan,’’ and that he had not told [General Jonathan] Wainwright [q.v.] about it ‘‘as I feared it might tend to shake his morale and determination.’’ He offered also to attempt to return to the
‘‘I came through and I shall return.’’ —DOUGLAS MacARTHUR Two and a half years after pledging he would return to the Philippines, MacArthur wades ashore at Leyte Island.
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Philippines ‘‘to rejoin this command temporarily and take charge of this movement.’’ (Ibid.) 408. The Bataan Force went out as it would have wished, fighting to the end its flickering, forlorn hope. No army has done so much with so little, and nothing became it more than its last hour of trial and agony. To the weeping mothers of its dead, I can only say that the sacrifice and halo of Jesus of Nazareth has descended upon their sons, and that God will take them unto Himself. (Statement on the fall of Bataan, April 1942.) 409. The fall of Corregidor and the collapse of resistance in the Philippines, with the defeat of Burma, brings about a new situation. At least two enemy divisions and all the air force in the Philippines will be released for other missions. Japanese troops in Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies are susceptible of being regrouped for an offensive effort elsewhere since large garrisons will not be required because of the complacency of native population. The Japanese Navy is as yet unchallenged and is disposed for further offensive effort. A preliminary move is now underway probably initially against New Guinea and the line of communications between the United States and Australia. The series of events releases an enormously dangerous enemy potential in the Western Pacific. That the situation will remain static is most improbable. (Memo to President Roosevelt, May 8, 1942.) 410. I am of the opinion that the Japanese will not undertake large operations against India at this time. That area is undoubtedly within the scope of their military ambitions, but it would be strategically advisable for them to defer it until a later date. On the other hand, the enemy advance toward the south has been supported by the establishment of a series of bases while his left is covered from the Mandated Islands. He is thus prepared to continue in that direction. Moreover, operations in these waters will permit the regrouping of his naval and air forces from the East. Such is not the case in movement towards India. He must thrust into the Indian Ocean without adequate supporting bases, relinquishing the possibilities of concentrating his naval strength in either ocean. The military requirements for a decisive Indian campaign are so heavy that it can not be undertaken under those conditions. On the other hand, a continuation of the southern movement at this time will give added safety for his eventual move to the west. (Ibid.) [MacArthur had been asked to comment on Churchill’s belief that the Japanese would invade India next.]
411. In view of this situation I deem it of the utmost importance to provide adequate security for Australia and the Pacific area, thus maintaining a constant frontal defense against a flank threat against further movement to the southward. This should be followed at the earliest possible moment by offensive action. (Ibid.)
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DOUGLAS MacARTHUR
412. Corregidor needs no comment from me. It has sounded its own story at the mouth of its guns. It has scrolled its own epitaph on enemy tablets. But through the bloody haze of its last reverberating shot, I shall always seem to see a vision of grim, gaunt, ghastly men, still unafraid. (Statement on the fall of Corregidor, ca. May 8, 1942.) 413. O