World War II US Armored Infantry Tactics

World War [I

US Armored Infantry

Tactics

ABOUT THE AUTHOR AND ILLUSTRATOR G O R D O N L R O T T M A N e n t e r e d t h e U S A r m y in 1967, v o l u n t e e r e d for S p e c i a l Forces a n d c o m p l e t e d t r a i n i n g as a w e a p o n s specialist. H e s e r v e d in t h e 5 t h S p e c i a l Forces G r o u p in V i e t n a m in 1969-70 a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y in a i r b o r n e infantry, l o n g - r a n g e patrol a n d i n t e l l i g e n c e a s s i g n m e n t s until retiring after 26 y e a r s . H e w a s a S p e c i a l O p e r a t i o n s Forces s c e n a r i o w r i t e r at t h e J o i n t R e a d i n e s s Training C e n t e r for 12 y e a r s a n d is n o w a f r e e l a n c e writer, living in Texas.

P E T E R D E N N I S w a s b o r n in 1950. I n s p i r e d b y c o n t e m p o r a r y m a g a z i n e s s u c h as Look and Learn h e s t u d i e d illustration at L i v e r p o o l A r t C o l l e g e . Peter has since contributed to hundreds of books, predominantly o n historical s u b j e c t s , i n c l u d i n g m a n y O s p r e y titles. A k e e n w a r g a m e r a n d m o d e l m a k e r , h e is b a s e d in N o t t i n g h a m s h i r e , U K .

Elite • 176

World War II US Armored Infantry Tactics

GORDON L ROTTMAN

ILLUSTRATED BY PETER DENNIS Consultant

editor

Martin

Windrow

First p u b l i s h e d in G r e a t Britain in 2 0 0 9 b y O s p r e y P u b l i s h i n g , M i d l a n d H o u s e , W e s t W a y , Botley, O x f o r d 0 X 2 OPH, UK

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS T h e a u t h o r is g r a t e f u l f o r t h e a s s i s t a n c e p r o v i d e d b y Y v e s B e l l a n g e r a n d

4 4 3 Park A v e n u e S o u t h , N e w York, NY 10016, USA

J.J. H a y s

Email: [email protected] © 2009 Osprey Publishing Ltd. All rights reserved. A p a r t f r o m a n y fair d e a l i n g for t h e p u r p o s e o f private s t u d y , r e s e a r c h , c r i t i c i s m o r r e v i e w , as p e r m i t t e d u n d e r t h e C o p y r i g h t , Designs a n d Patents Act, 1988, no part of this publication m a y be r e p r o d u c e d , s t o r e d in a retrieval s y s t e m , or t r a n s m i t t e d in a n y f o r m or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical,

ARTIST'S N O T E Readers m a y care to note that the original paintings f r o m w h i c h the c o l o u r p l a t e s in this b o o k w e r e p r e p a r e d are a v a i l a b l e f o r p r i v a t e sale. A l l r e p r o d u c t i o n c o p y r i g h t w h a t s o e v e r is r e t a i n e d b y t h e P u b l i s h e r s . All e n q u i r i e s s h o u l d b e a d d r e s s e d t o :

p h o t o c o p y i n g , recording or otherwise, w i t h o u t the prior written permission

Peter D e n n i s , 'Fieldhead', T h e Park,

of the copyright owner. Enquiries should be addressed to the Publishers.

Mansfield, N o t t i n g h a m s h i r e N G 1 8 2AT, UK

ISBN: 9 7 8 1 8 4 6 0 3 6 9 2 7

The Publishers regret that they can enter into no correspondence u p o n this matter.

e b o o k ISBN: 9 7 8 1 8 4 9 0 8 120 7 Editor: Martin W i n d r o w D e s i g n : Ken Vail G r a p h i c D e s i g n , C a m b r i d g e , UK ( k v g d . c o m )

ABBREVIATIONS

T y p e s e t in S a b o n a n d M y r i a d Pro

AAA

Index b y Fineline Editorial Services

A b n Div

airborne division

O r i g i n a t e d by U n i t e d Graphic Pte Ltd, S i n g a p o r e

AFA

a r m o r e d field artillery

P r i n t e d in C h i n a t h r o u g h W o r l d Print L t d .

AIB

armored infantry battalion

AIR

armored infantry regiment

0 9 1 0 11 12 13 1 4 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

1

antiaircraft artillery

AP

A C I P c a t a l o g u e r e c o r d f o r t h i s b o o k is a v a i l a b l e f r o m t h e B r i t i s h L i b r a r y

A r m d Div

armor-piercing A r m o r e d Division

AT

antitank

CC

Combat

CCA, CCB, CCC

C o m b a t C o m m a n d s A , B, a n d C ( a k a C C R )

Command

FOR A C A T A L O G U E O F A L L B O O K S P U B L I S H E D BY OSPREY M I L I T A R Y

CCR

C o m b a t C o m m a n d Reserve

A N D A V I A T I O N PLEASE C O N T A C T :

GHQ

General Headquarters

Osprey Direct, c/o R a n d o m House Distribution Center, 400 Hahn Road, Westminster, M D 21157 Email:

[email protected]

Osprey Direct, The Book Service Ltd, Distribution Centre, C o l c h e s t e r R o a d , F r a t i n g G r e e n , C o l c h e s t e r , Essex, C 0 7 E-mail: c u s t o m e r s e r v i c e @ o s p r e y p u b l i s h i n g . c o m

www.ospreypublishing.com

7DW

HE

high-explosive

HHC

Headquarters and Headquarters Company

HMG

heavy machine gun

HQ

headquarters

Inf Div

Infantry Division

LMG

light machine g u n

MG

machine gun

NCO

n o n - c o m m i s s i o n e d officer

OVE

on-vehicle equipment

RC

Reserve C o m m a n d

SMG

submachine gun

SOP

standard operating procedures

SP/SPM

self-propelled/ m o u n t

TD

tank destroyer

TF

Task Force

LINEAR MEASUREMENTS D i s t a n c e s , r a n g e s , a n d d i m e n s i o n s a r e g i v e n in t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y US system of inches, feet, yards, a n d statute miles rather than metric. To covert these figures t o metric t h e f o l l o w i n g conversion formulas are provided: feet to meters

multiply feet by 0.3058

yards to meters

multiply yards by 0.9114

miles to kilometers

m u l t i p l y miles b y 1.6093

THE WOODLAND

TRUST

O s p r e y P u b l i s h i n g are s u p p o r t i n g t h e W o o d l a n d Trust, t h e UK's l e a d i n g w o o d l a n d conservation charity, by f u n d i n g t h e dedication of trees.

CONTENTS INTRODUCTION

4

ORGANIZATION

8

The armored division - Combat commands . Armored infantry regiments and battalions

ANATOMY OF THE ARMORED INFANTRY BATTALION

17

WEAPONS & EQUIPMENT

26

Companies - platoons - squads

Individual weapons - crew-served weapons - The halftrack

TACTICS: THEORY, AND CAPABILITIES

30

PRACTICE: TANK-INFANTRY COORDINATION

48

UNITS IN ACTION

55

Lack of doctrine - Lack of training . Movement formations - The squad and platoon: life in the halftrack - dismounted formations - Mission capabilities: the rifle company the armored infantry battalion - the armored infantry regiment . Fire support

Understanding and exploiting the balance of strengths and weaknesses . Communications

Failure and success: CCA, 12th Armored Division, January-February 1945 dismounted company action without armor - tank-infantry team clearing a town

ASSESSMENTS & CONCLUSIONS

61

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

63

INDEX

64

WORLD WAR II US ARMORED INFANTRY TACTICS INTRODUCTION In the y e a r s f o l l o w i n g the m o d e r a t e l y effective a p p e a r a n c e o f t a n k s o n the battlefields o f the G r e a t W a r there w a s a g r e a t d e a l of d e b a t e in r e g a r d s their future roles a n d e m p l o y m e n t , g i v i n g rise t o t w o b a s i c s c h o o l s of t h o u g h t o n a r m o r tactics. O n e s a w tanks only as slow-moving gun platforms providing direct s u p p o r t t o the infantry: in effect, s i m p l y m a c h i n e g u n - d e s t r o y e r s a n d o b s t a c l e - b r e a c h e r s . T h e m o r e d y n a m i c s c h o o l e n v i s i o n e d highly m o b i l e i n d e p e n d e n t a t t a c k forces with their o w n artillery, engineers, logistical s u p p o r t , a n d ( o h , yes...) s o m e infantry. A r m o r w a s the cavalry's r e p l a c e m e n t , intended t o slice t h r o u g h e n e m y lines a n d strike d e e p in the rear t o d e s t r o y a n d d i s r u p t c o m m a n d p o s t s , reserves, artillery, a n d logistics. In reality, b o t h capabilities are n e c e s s a r y - t a n k s s u p p o r t i n g infantry, a n d i n d e p e n d e n t c o m b i n e d - a r m s a r m o r f o r c e s - b u t r e g a r d l e s s o f the t a n k s ' r o l e , infantry is a critical necessity for the successful e m p l o y m e n t o f a r m o r , a s a r e all other a r m s a n d services.

Pre-war M3 halftracks of a rifle platoon line up for maneuvers. Bumper markings were not standardized at this time, but were usually yellow; these vehicles belongs to the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized). A.30cal M1917A1 water-cooled machine gun can be seen pointing skyward on the lead halftrack.

Three pre-war M3 halftracks with winches in place of the bumper-mounted roller. Typically only the company maintenance section had a halftrack with a winch, but in practice they were issued irregularly and any number might be found in a unit. All three vehicles mount .50cal M2 machine guns.

M o s t a r m o r - f o r c e p r o p h e t s a c c e p t e d the n e e d for s o m e infantry, b u t the question w a s h o w to t r a n s p o r t them, a n d h o w exactly should they be e m p l o y e d ? F o r the m o s t p a r t these v i s i o n a r i e s s e r i o u s l y u n d e r e s t i m a t e d the r a t i o of infantry n e c e s s a r y t o s u p p o r t t a n k s . T a n k e r s v i e w e d i n f a n t r y j u s t a s i n f a n t r y m e n v i e w e d t a n k s - a s essentially a s u p p o r t for their o w n a r m - a n d the necessity for the c o m p l e t e i n t e g r a t i o n o f units o f all b r a n c h e s for effective c o m b i n e d - a r m s o p e r a t i o n s w a s far f r o m u n d e r s t o o d .

T h e i n t e g r a t i o n o f infantry a n d a r m o r h a d a s l o w s t a r t . T h e first s u c h effort w a s in 1 9 2 9 w h e n C o m p a n y H , 3 4 t h I n f a n t r y w a s m o t o r i z e d w i t h l ^ - t o n s i x - w h e e l t r u c k s a n d w a s m a d e p a r t o f the f l e d g l i n g M e c h a n i z e d F o r c e , a h o d g e - p o d g e o f s m a l l t a n k , a r m o r e d car, artillery, a n d s u p p o r t u n i t s . T h i s " G a s o l i n e B r i g a d e " d i d n o t " b e l o n g " t o a p a r t i c u l a r b r a n c h ; a n effort w a s m a d e t o p l a c e it in the c a v a l r y , since it w a s v i e w e d a s a n e x t e n s i o n o f the c a v a l r y ' s m o b i l i t y a n d s h o c k p o w e r , t h o u g h m a n y felt t h a t the r e s u l t i n g b r a n c h j e a l o u s i e s w o u l d be c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e t o the F o r c e ' s d e v e l o p m e n t . R e g a r d l e s s , A r m y Chief of Staff G e n D o u g l a s M a c A r t h u r d i s b a n d e d the F o r c e

An M3 halftrack secured by rope and chocked in place aboard a transport for overseas movement. The canvas top cover is in place, but without the bows that would raise it about a foot higher. 5

An M3 halftrack rolls through an Algerian town. The American flag adorned the sides of halftracks in North Africa as a means of friend-or-foe recognition.

a n d t u r n e d its a s s e t s over t o the cavalry, w i t h the infantry c o m p a n y , engineers, a n d artillery reverting t o their o w n b r a n c h e s ' c o n t r o l . A n e w unit w a s created in 1 9 3 3 , 1st C a v a l r y R e g i m e n t ( M e c h a n i z e d ) ; this w a s n o t a c o m b i n e d - a r m s unit, b u t p u r e l y cavalry. In the m e a n t i m e the infantry d e m a n d e d its o w n t a n k c a p a b i l i t y s i m p l y a s s u p p o r t for i n f a n t r y m e n o n f o o t ; the I n f a n t r y T a n k S c h o o l h a d b e e n c r e a t e d , a n d the e x i s t i n g 1st T a n k R e g t b e c a m e the 6 6 t h Infantry Regt (Light T a n k ) .

Rows of M3 halftracks stored in Britain and waiting issue to deploying units. All have bumper winches. Note the soil spread on the white star marking on the hood, to make it less noticeable to aircraft.

In 1 9 3 8 the 7 t h C a v a l r y B r i g a d e ( M e c h a n i z e d ) w a s a c t i v a t e d , w i t h the 1 s t a n d 1 3 t h C a v a l r y R e g t s ; this relied o n c o m b a t c a r s (light t a n k s ) a n d a r m o r e d c a r s for c o m b a t p o w e r , w i t h s o m e artillery b u t n o infantry. In 1 9 4 0 the i n f a n t r y c o n s o l i d a t e d its t a n k s i n t o the P r o v i s i o n a l T a n k B d e , strictly a h o l d i n g u n i t f o r t a n k s . D u r i n g t h a t y e a r ' s L o u i s i a n a M a n e u v e r s the t w o b r i g a d e s w e r e f o r m e d i n t o a n ad hoc t a n k d i v i s i o n ; the v a l u e of these units w a s r e c o g n i z e d , a n d after the s u c c e s s of the G e r m a n P a n z e r s in E u r o p e it w a s realized that c o m b i n e d - a r m s a r m o r e d divisions were essential, with h a l f t r a c k - b o r n e i n f a n t r y a s s i g n e d t o the n e w f o r m a t i o n s . T h e 7 t h C a v a l r y B d e b e c a m e the 1st A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n , a n d the P r o v i s i o n a l T a n k B d e the 2 d A r m d D i v o n J u l y 1 5 , 1 9 4 0 . T h e a r r i v a l o f e q u i p m e n t w a s s l u g g i s h while A m e r i c a s l o w l y g e a r e d u p for w a r . In 1 9 4 1 - 4 2 the A r m y p l a n n e d t o o r g a n i z e five m o t o r i z e d infantry divisions; e a c h w o u l d be fielded a l o n g s i d e t w o a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s , the three c o m p r i s i n g a n a r m o r e d c o r p s . T h e y w e r e t o be o r g a n i z e d a l o n g the lines o f a s t a n d a r d infantry d i v i s i o n , b u t the infantry r e g i m e n t s w o u l d be p r o v i d e d sufficient t r u c k s t o m a k e t h e m c o m p l e t e l y m o b i l e . T h e r e w o u l d a l s o be significantly i n c r e a s e d m a i n t e n a n c e a s s e t s , a n d a r e c o n n a i s s a n c e s q u a d r o n rather than a t r o o p . T h e o r i g i n a l test division - 4 t h Inf Div - w a s partly equipped with halftracks, but these were w i t h d r a w n . T h e 6th-8th a n d 9 0 t h Inf D i v s w e r e a l s o r e o r g a n i z e d a s

6

The effects of antitank gun fire on an M2 halftrack car; the contents of the ammunition storage compartment had detonated and caused the entire vehicle to burn. The 3.7cm Pak 35/36 AT g u n nicknamed the Turklopfer (Doorknocker) by German soldiers, as it was ineffective against most tanks - was still deadly to lightly armored American halftracks.

m o t o r i z e d , b u t d i d n o t receive a d d i t i o n a l t r u c k s . In early 1 9 4 3 these d i v i s i o n s w e r e c o n v e r t e d b a c k t o s t a n d a r d i n f a n t r y ; they r e q u i r e d t o o m a n y vehicles a n d t o o m u c h s h i p p i n g s p a c e , fuel, a n d tires. T h e 4 t h M o t D i v w a s t o be " a r m o r i z e d , " with halftrack-equipped a r m o r e d infantry regiments a n d full-tracked self-propelled artillery. T h e 4 t h r e q u i r e d m o r e s h i p p i n g s p a c e t h a n a n a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n ; r e j e c t e d by t h e a t e r c o m m a n d e r s , it w a s c o n v e r t e d t o s t a n d a r d infantry. T h e A r m o r e d F o r c e w a s established o n J u l y 1 0 , 1 9 4 0 at Ft K n o x , K e n t u c k y to c o n d u c t service tests for a r m o r e d units a n d o v e r s e e their o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d training. It w a s r e d e s i g n a t e d the A r m o r e d C o m m a n d o n J u l y 2 , 1 9 4 3 , w i t h a lessening o f its c o n t r o l o f the a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s , a n d a t the s a m e t i m e the a r m o r e d c o r p s w e r e r e d e s i g n a t e d a r m y c o r p s . 1 It w a s r e d e s i g n a t e d yet a g a i n , a s the A r m o r e d Center, o n F e b r u a r y 2 0 , 1 9 4 4 , b e c o m i n g e s s e n t i a l l y a r e p l a c e m e n t t r a i n i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n . E v e n t h o u g h a r m o r e d infantry units w e r e c o m p o n e n t s of a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s , m o s t o f their t a b l e s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n , d o c t r i n e , o r g a n i z a t i o n , a n d training s t a n d a r d s w e r e the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f the Chief of Infantry at Ft B e n n i n g , G e o r g i a . T h e fighting in N o r t h A f r i c a in early 1 9 4 3 identified m a n y f l a w s in a r m o r d o c t r i n e , tactics, o r g a n i z a t i o n , a n d e q u i p m e n t . T h e U S A r m y suffered g r e a t l y f r o m b r a n c h p a r o c h i a l i s m , a n d the c o s t o f s u c h self-centeredness w a s l e a r n e d the h a r d w a y in c o m b a t ; in the early d a y s the s i t u a t i o n actually w o r s e n e d , a n d c o - o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n a r m o r a n d infantry w a s e x t r e m e l y p o o r . S e p a r a t e t a n k b a t t a l i o n s s u p p o r t e d infantry d i v i s i o n s , b u t often i n f a n t r y c o m m a n d e r s d i d n o t include t a n k unit officers in their staff m e e t i n g s . E v e n the u n i t s o f the 1st A r m d D i v w e r e frittered a w a y in s u p p o r t o f i n f a n t r y . F a r f r o m c o m b a t w e l d i n g t h e m i n t o a t e a m , the d i s t r u s t b e t w e e n t a n k e r s a n d i n f a n t r y m e n actually intensified. F o r t u n a t e l y , m a n y o f t h e s e i s s u e s h a d b e e n r e s o l v e d b y 1

Armored corps were redesignated standard army corps on October 10, 1943 before deploying overseas: II Armd Corps became XVIII C o r p s , III became X I X C o r p s , and IV became X X Corps. I Armd Corps w a s inactivated in Tunisia and its assets became Seventh Army on July 10, 1 9 4 3 . The Army planned for 61 armored divisions in 1 9 4 1 , reduced this to 4 7 along with 23 armor corps in 1 9 4 2 , then to 2 6 , then 2 0 . In practice only 16 armored divisions were organized. 7

the t i m e o f the i n v a s i o n o f c o n t i n e n t a l E u r o p e in m i d 1 9 4 4 , w i t h the r e c o g n i t i o n of the n e e d for i n c r e a s e d t a n k - i n f a n t r y training a n d c o o r d i n a t i o n . O n l y the 1st a n d 2 d A r m d D i v s f o u g h t in N o r t h A f r i c a ; the 1st w e n t o n t o fight in Italy a n d the 2 d o n Sicily a n d then in N o r t h w e s t E u r o p e . All other a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s ( 3 d - 1 4 t h , 1 6 t h , 2 0 t h ) s e r v e d in N o r t h w e s t a n d C e n t r a l E u r o p e . (The 16th a n d 2 0 t h s a w only one and t w o weeks' c o m b a t , respectively, in the w a r ' s final d a y s . )

T h i s s t u d y is d e v o t e d t o the a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s a n d r e g i m e n t s o r g a n i c t o a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s a n d s u p p l y i n g their infantry c o m p o n e n t . T h e y w e r e n o t s i m p l y s t a n d a r d i n f a n t r y units r i d i n g h a l f t r a c k s , b u t w e r e u n i q u e l y o r g a n i z e d , a r m e d , a n d e q u i p p e d . T h e a c t i o n s of a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s a r e m u c h s t u d i e d , b u t often the t a n k s a r e h i g h l i g h t e d a t the e x p e n s e of the a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y t h a t p r o v i d e d half o f the d i v i s i o n s ' m a n e u v e r b a t t a l i o n s . O n e r e a s o n f o r this i n e q u i t y is t h a t the a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y s e l d o m f o u g h t f r o m their h a l f t r a c k s , m o s t often fighting o n f o o t a l o n g s i d e S h e r m a n t a n k s .

ORGANIZATION The armored division 2 T h e 1 9 4 0 a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n , w h i c h never s a w c o m b a t , w a s a t a n k - h e a v y force w i t h a c u m b e r s o m e c o m m a n d a r r a n g e m e n t . It c o n s i s t e d o f a n a r m o r e d b r i g a d e w i t h o n e t w o - b a t t a l i o n m e d i u m a n d t w o t h r e e - b a t t a l i o n light a r m o r e d r e g i m e n t s , a n d a b a t t a l i o n - s i z e d artillery " r e g i m e n t " w i t h only 2 4 howitzers instead of 3 6 . A two-battalion "infantry regiment ( a r m o r e d ) " w a s a s s i g n e d t o the d i v i s i o n , s e e m i n g l y a l m o s t a s a n a f t e r t h o u g h t . T h e r e w a s a l s o a t h r e e - b a t t e r y artillery b a t t a l i o n t o s u p p o r t the infantry r e g i m e n t , b u t w i t h o n l y f o u r t r u c k - d r a w n 1 0 5 m m h o w i t z e r s p e r b a t t e r y p l u s a b a t t e r y of eight 7 5 m m a n t i t a n k g u n s . D i v i s i o n a l u n i t s i n c l u d e d engineer, o r d n a n c e m a i n t e n a n c e , q u a r t e r m a s t e r supply, a n d medical battalions; a signal c o m p a n y ; a n d a b a t t a l i o n - s i z e d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e s q u a d r o n w i t h a light t a n k , a n a r m o r e d rifle, a n d t w o r e c o n n a i s s a n c e c o m p a n i e s . T h e d i v i s i o n p o s s e s s e d 3 8 1 tanks, 148 halftracks, and 9 7 scout cars, with 1 2 , 6 9 7 troops. T h i s r a t i o o f o n l y t w o i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s t o eight of t a n k s w a s entirely i n a d e q u a t e . C o u n t i n g a s s e t s in the r e c o n n a i s s a n c e s q u a d r o n , there w e r e 2 5 t a n k c o m p a n i e s (six m e d i u m , 1 9 light) t o o n l y s e v e n rifle c o m p a n i e s . T h e d i v i s i o n c o u l d n o t s e c u r e the g r o u n d it t o o k , p r o v i d e flank a n d rear security, m o p u p , a n d p r e p a r e the g r o u n d for d e f e n s e , m u c h less h o l d it. O n l y the 1st a n d 2 d A r m d D i v s w e r e o r g a n i z e d under this excessively u n b a l a n c e d structure. In M a r c h 1 9 4 2 the a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n w a s s t r e a m l i n e d t o i m p r o v e c o m m a n d a n d c o n t r o l a n d i n c r e a s e the r a t i o o f i n f a n t r y t o t a n k s . T h e b u r d e n s o m e brigade echelon w a s eliminated, along with one armored r e g i m e n t ; there w e r e n o w t w o a r m o r e d r e g i m e n t s , e a c h w i t h o n e light a n d t w o m e d i u m b a t t a l i o n s . T h e a r m o r e d infantry regiment w a s e x p a n d e d to three b a t t a l i o n s , a n d there w e r e n o w three a r m o r e d field artillery (AFA) b a t t a l i o n s , e a c h w i t h three s i x - t u b e s e l f - p r o p e l l e d 1 0 5 m m h o w i t z e r batteries. C o m m a n d 2

See also Osprey Battle Orders 3: US Armored Operations, 1944-45.

Divisions:

The European

Theater of

During the Louisiana Maneuvers, an M2 halftrack car of 78th Field Artillery Bn comes off a pontoon bridge. Mainly used as a prime-mover, this one tows a 75mm M1897A2 field gun, which was the standard divisional artillery piece until it began to be replaced by the 105mm M2A1 howitzer in 1940. The 78th FA Bn later became an armored field artillery (AFA) battalion of the 2d Armored Division.

a n d c o n t r o l e l e m e n t s w e r e p a r t o f the d i v i s i o n h e a d q u a r t e r s : d i v i s i o n h e a d q u a r t e r s , a r m o r e d s i g n a l a n d service c o m p a n i e s , h e a d q u a r t e r s o f the division artillery c o m m a n d , a n d t w o s m a l l c o m b a t c o m m a n d h e a d q u a r t e r s and headquarters detachments. T h e t w o C C s could control any m i x of tank, a r m o r e d infantry, a n d a r m o r e d artillery units p l u s other s u p p o r t i n g e l e m e n t s . While the r a t i o of infantry t o a r m o r h a d i m p r o v e d it w a s still n o t e n o u g h . T h e r e w e r e n o w 1 9 t a n k c o m p a n i e s ( 1 2 m e d i u m , s e v e n light) a n d n i n e a r m o r e d rifle c o m p a n i e s . T h e r e w e r e 3 9 0 t a n k s (an i n c r e a s e ) , 6 9 4 h a l f t r a c k s , 4 0 scout cars, and 1 4 , 6 3 0 men. R e c o n n a i s s a n c e capabilities h a d been i m p r o v e d ; the r e c o n n a i s s a n c e b a t t a l i o n n o w h a d three c o m p a n i e s p l u s o n e o f light t a n k s , h a v i n g lost its rifle c o m p a n y , a n d e a c h a r m o r e d r e g i m e n t n o w had a reconnaissance company. F u r t h e r i m p r o v e m e n t s w e r e i m p l e m e n t e d in S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 3 . ( T h e n e w o r g a n i z a t i o n w a s m u c h i n f l u e n c e d b y the n e w P a n z e r d i v i s i o n , w i t h its

M3 halftracks of 6th Armd Inf Regt, 1 st Armd Div halt in a desert oasis in Tunisia; note the brown-on-olive drab camouflage pattern. The 6th AIR was the first armored infantry unit to see action.

streamlined c o m m a n d a n d c o n t r o l a n d utilization o f s m a l l e r m i s s i o n - o r i e n t e d t a s k f o r c e s ; the British w e r e a l s o u s i n g smaller, m o r e c o n t r o l l a b l e a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s . ) T h e r e v i s i o n s r e d u c e d the d i v i s i o n ' s s t r e n g t h b y a l m o s t 4 , 0 0 0 troops to 1 0 , 9 3 7 , with 2 6 3 tanks, 5 0 1 halftracks, and 5 4 a r m o r e d cars. D i v i s i o n s in the S t a t e s r e o r g a n i z e d b e t w e e n S e p t e m b e r a n d N o v e m b e r 1 9 4 3 . T h e o v e r s e a s 1st, 2 d , a n d 3 d A r m d D i v s r e t a i n e d the 1 9 4 2 s t r u c t u r e o f o n e a r m o r e d infantry a n d t w o t a n k r e g i m e n t s ; they w e r e referred t o a s " h e a v y " divisions a n d the o t h e r s a s " l i g h t . " T h e 1st w a s c o n v e r t e d t o a light d i v i s i o n in Italy in J u n e - J u l y 1 9 4 4 . T h e 2 d a n d 3 d r e t a i n e d t h e h e a v y s t r u c t u r e t h r o u g h the w a r ; the C o m m a n d i n g G e n e r a l , E u r o p e a n T h e a t e r o f O p e r a t i o n s , a p r o p o n e n t o f the o l d h e a v y s t r u c t u r e , d e c l a r e d t h a t there w a s n o t i m e t o r e o r g a n i z e the d i v i s i o n s d u e t o o n g o i n g o p e r a t i o n s . T h e 1 9 4 3 light d i v i s i o n r e o r g a n i z a t i o n s a w the t a n k a n d i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t a l e c h e l o n s e l i m i n a t e d a l t o g e t h e r ; there w e r e n o w three b a t t a l i o n s e a c h o f t a n k , a r m o r e d infantry, a n d a r m o r e d field artillery. T h e three t a n k

THE ARMORED INFANTRY'S

MOUNT

This M3A2 halftrack passenger carrier mounts a .50cai M2 machine gun on an M49 m o u n t forward, and a .30cal M1919A4 in the rear. The style and colors of nationality and unit identification, bumper numbers, and other markings varied over time and between units. Normally the right bumper marking identified the division and battalion, e.g. "8A49" for the 8th Armd Div's 49th AIB. The left bumper bore company and vehicle identification, e.g. "A-12." Halftracks of the HHC bore "HQ-number," and of the Service Co, "SVC-number." Tie-down fluorescent AL-140 air-to-ground signal panels (30.5in wide by 12ft long), intended for spelling out codes, were used for recognition. They were available in orange (as here), dark blue, cerise-red, and yellow, all with a white reverse. The vehicle is festooned with the rifle squad's personal equipment, C-ration boxes, and other gear. Rather than

backpacks armored infantrymen were issued musette bags, a haversack carried by a shoulder strap. When dismounted they traveled light, leaving most of their gear in the halftrack usually including even their cartridge belt and canteen - and carrying ammunition in their pockets. They were uniformed no differently than other infantrymen, but were often seen wearing tanker's jackets rather than field jackets, and they sometimes wore mechanic's coveralls as opposed to fatigues or wool field uniforms. On their left shoulder they displayed the triangular armored division patch (inset), in gold-yellow, blue, and red, signifying the merger of cavalry, infantry, and artillery. (When out of the line, most soldiers wore their garrison caps cocked to the right, but armored infantrymen canted them to the left - an unofficial practice.)

While the mainstay of the tank battalions was the M4 Sherman medium, the M5 Stuart light tank (left) played a valuable role in reconnaissance and security missions. Note the logs and sandbags attached for additional protection.

b a t t a l i o n s w e r e m i x e d , w i t h o n e light a n d t h r e e m e d i u m c o m p a n i e s (a r e d u c t i o n o f 1 2 7 t a n k s ) ; a d d i t i o n a l G H Q s e p a r a t e t a n k b a t t a l i o n s c o u l d be a t t a c h e d t o infantry d i v i s i o n s . T h e d i v i s i o n n o w h a d 13 t a n k c o m p a n i e s (nine m e d i u m , f o u r light) a n d nine a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y c o m p a n i e s - still n o t quite e n o u g h g r o u n d - p o u n d e r s . W i t h the l o s s o f the t a n k r e g i m e n t s ' f o r m e r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e c o m p a n i e s , the c a v a l r y r e c o n n a i s s a n c e s q u a d r o n - a b a t t a l i o n - s i z e d unit - n o w h a d f o u r c o m p a n y - s i z e d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e t r o o p s , a n a s s a u l t g u n t r o o p , a n d a light t a n k c o m p a n y . A r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s n o r m a l l y h a d a n antiaircraft artillery a u t o m a t i c w e a p o n s b a t t a l i o n a t t a c h e d , a l o n g with a t least o n e t a n k d e s t r o y e r b a t t a l i o n , s o m e t i m e s u p t o three. In r a r e instances a G H Q t a n k b a t t a l i o n w a s a t t a c h e d . T o m a k e u p for the division's deficiency in m e d i u m artillery, c o r p s artillery often p l a c e d a 1 5 5 m m t o w e d h o w i t z e r b a t t a l i o n in direct s u p p o r t . 3

Combat Commands T h e c o n c e p t o f t w o c o m b a t c o m m a n d s p r o v i d e d a g r e a t deal of flexibility. A n y n u m b e r a n d m i x o f t a n k , a r m o r e d infantry, A F A , a n d T D b a t t a l i o n s a n d c o m p a n i e s w e r e a t t a c h e d , a l o n g w i t h a r e c o n n a i s s a n c e t r o o p , a n engineer c o m p a n y , a n d other elements a s necessary. T h e C C A H H C w a s c o m m a n d e d by a brigadier-general (there w a s n o a s s i s t a n t division c o m m a n d e r ) a n d C C B by a c o l o n e l ; these w e r e r o u g h l y 1 0 0 - m a n m a n e u v e r h e a d q u a r t e r s w i t h n o a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r logistical responsibilities. T h e n e w reserve c o m m a n d ( R C ) w a s only a n eight-man H Q (with another nine s u p p o r t personnel attached from the division H H C ' s t r a n s p o r t a t i o n p l a t o o n ) ; it w a s c o m m a n d e d by a n infantry c o l o n e l w h o w a s a l s o r e s p o n s i b l e for o v e r s e e i n g the A I B s ' infantry training. T h e R C w a s n o t a " b a l a n c e d m a n e u v e r t a s k f o r c e , " b u t merely a m i n i m a l H Q c o n t r o l l i n g units r o t a t e d t o the rear for m a i n t e n a n c e , resupply, a n d rest. T h e c o n c e p t o f t h r e e m a n e u v e r u n i t s w a s j u s t a s v i a b l e for a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s a s infantry, a n d m a n y " l i g h t " a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s i n c r e a s e d the R C 3

12

The A A A Bn had four batteries each with 8x M 1 3 / M 1 4 twin or M 1 6 / M 1 7 quad .50cal SP machine guns, and 8x M l towed 4 0 m m AA guns. The T D Bn had three companies each of 12x M 1 0 , M l 8 , or M 3 6 tank destroyers and 8x M 2 0 armored utility cars, and a reconnaissance company with 6x M 8 armored and 3x M 2 0 armored utility cars and 12x M G - a r m e d jeeps. See also Osprey B T O 10: US Tank and Tank Destroyer Battalions in the ETO 1944-45.

While each armored infantry battalion was authorized an M32 tank recovery vehicle (on an M4 tank chassis), many battalions had this M31 TRV (on an M3 medium tank chassis). The 75mm and 37mm "guns" are actually dummies; the M31 's only armament was two .30cal machine guns. If a tank was disabled then situation permitting - the crew and some of the accompanying armored infantry would remain with it until it could be recovered. Crews of disabled tanks were to continue to provide fire support for as long as possible, and MGs could be dismounted for ground firing.

h e a d q u a r t e r s strength with its o w n H H C a n d e m p l o y e d it a s a third m a n e u v e r force, referring t o it a s C C R . In t w o i n s t a n c e s a r m o r e d g r o u p H H C s p r o v i d e d the C C R : the 1 0 t h A r m o r e d G r o u p w i t h the 8 t h A r m d D i v , a n d the 1 2 t h A r m o r e d G r o u p with the 9th. T h e " h e a v y d i v i s i o n s , " irrespective of p o s s e s s i n g three r e g i m e n t a l h e a d q u a r t e r s , h a d C C A a n d C C B h e a d q u a r t e r s a n d h e a d q u a r t e r s d e t a c h m e n t s , a n d s o m e t i m e s the A I R h e a d q u a r t e r s d o u b l e d a s a C C C . D i v i s i o n s e m p l o y i n g three C C s u s u a l l y " p e r m a n e n t l y a s s i g n e d " a n A I B a n d t a n k battalion t o e a c h . (The 1 2 t h A r m d Div's C C a s s i g n m e n t s p r o v i d e an example: C C A - 66th AIB & 4 3 d Tank Bn; C C B - 17th AIB & 14th Tank Bn; C C R - 5 6 t h AIB & 2 3 d T a n k Bn.) R e c o n n a i s s a n c e a n d engineer c o m p a n i e s a n d other s u p p o r t e l e m e n t s w e r e a t t a c h e d a s n e c e s s a r y , b u t the s a m e units m i g h t n o t be h a b i t u a l l y a t t a c h e d . Artillery b a t t a l i o n s w e r e s e l d o m a t t a c h e d b u t this s o m e t i m e s o c c u r r e d ; they g e n e r a l l y r e m a i n e d u n d e r d i v i s i o n c o n t r o l , a l t h o u g h they w o u l d s u p p o r t a specific C C . T h e r e w e r e three w a y s a C C c o u l d t a s k - o r g a n i z e its u n i t s ; p r a c t i c e s v a r i e d b e t w e e n d i v i s i o n s , a n d w e r e s p e c i f i e d in s t a n d a r d o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e s ( S O P ) . S o m e d i v i s i o n s v i r t u a l l y m e r g e d the A I B a n d t a n k b a t t a l i o n i n t o a single u n i t , p a i r i n g off the s u b u n i t s a t all e c h e l o n s - a rifle a n d a t a n k c o m p a n y , a rifle p l a t o o n w i t h a t a n k p l a t o o n , a n d in e x t r e m e c a s e s a s q u a d w i t h a n i n d i v i d u a l t a n k or t a n k s e c t i o n . T h i s w a s a n effective b u t e x t r e m e l y rigid s t r u c t u r e , a n d o n c e i m p l e m e n t e d a n d p r a c t i c e d for a w h i l e it b e c a m e difficult t o r e - a l l o c a t e s u b u n i t s w h e n , for e x a m p l e , a n i n f a n t r y - h e a v y t a s k f o r c e w a s n e e d e d . T h i s s y s t e m is s a i d t o h a v e b e e n c o n c e i v e d b y M a j G e n L u n s f o r d E . Oliver, c o m m a n d e r o f the 5 t h A r m d D i v , w h o a s a C C c o m m a n d e r w i t h the 1st A r m d D i v in N o r t h A f r i c a h a d s e e n the v a l u e o f solid mutual s u p p o r t between tankers a n d infantrymen. H e required the " m a r r i e d " u n i t s n o t o n l y t o t r a i n a n d fight t o g e t h e r , b u t t o live a n d m e s s together w h e t h e r in the field o r q u a r t e r s . A 1 9 4 7 A r m o r e d S c h o o l s t u d y o f W o r l d W a r II a r m o r e d infantry a n d t a n k t a s k o r g a n i z a t i o n r e c o m m e n d e d : W h e n e v e r p o s s i b l e it w a s f o u n d b e s t t o j o i n u p the s a m e t a n k a n d infantry units t o g e t h e r in t r a i n i n g a n d c o m b a t . N o t o n l y w o u l d the staff

sections

function

better

but

lower

unit c o m m a n d e r s

and 13

individual tank crews a n d infantry s q u a d s became acquainted and g a i n e d c o n f i d e n c e in e a c h other. U n i t s g a i n e d o b j e c t i v e s a s a t e a m a n d n o t i n d i v i d u a l a r m s . T o r o u n d o u t this t e a m artillery f o r w a r d o b s e r v e r s w e r e a t t a c h e d d o w n t o i n c l u d e t a n k a n d infantry c o m p a n i e s f r o m the field a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n in d i r e c t s u p p o r t o f the u n i t . T h i s g a v e a w e l l - r o u n d e d t e a m o f t a n k s , i n f a n t r y a n d artillery. T h e artillery f o r w a r d o b s e r v e r o p e r a t e d d i s m o u n t e d w i t h the i n f a n t r y a n d the o b s e r v e r w i t h the t a n k s r o d e in a t a n k . W h e n e v e r p o s s i b l e the s a m e artillery b a t t a l i o n s w e r e k e p t in direct s u p p o r t o f the s a m e u n i t s . M o r e o f t e n , the A I B a n d t a n k b a t t a l i o n o p e r a t e d a s t w o t a s k f o r c e s w i t h c o m p a n i e s c r o s s - a t t a c h e d b e t w e e n t h e m . C r o s s - a t t a c h e d units often c h a n g e d a s the m i s s i o n p r o g r e s s e d ; there w e r e t i m e s w h e n i n f a n t r y m e n d i d n o t k n o w w h a t t a n k unit they w e r e w o r k i n g w i t h , b u t t h a t w a s a c t u a l l y n o t a s g r a v e as it s o u n d s - the c o m m a n d e r s a n d staff k n e w w h a t unit they w e r e w i t h , a n d even t h o u g h u n i t s m i g h t b e s w i t c h e d they m o s t likely h a d p r e v i o u s l y w o r k e d t o g e t h e r . T F s w e r e either n u m b e r e d ( T F 1, T F 2 ) , c a r r i e d the b a t t a l i o n n u m b e r ( T F 1 5 , T F 6 8 ) , or b o r e the n a m e of the c o m m a n d e r ; see T a b l e s 1 a n d 2 for e x a m p l e s . Table 1 : C o m b a t C o m m a n d A, 12th A r m d Div; D e c e m b e r 29,1944 TF 1

TF 2

CCA Troops

43 TankBn (-)

66 AIB (-)

HHC, CCA

B-66AIB

C-43 Tank Bn

493 AFA Bn (-)

D-66AIB*

D-43TankBn (-)

A-82 Med Bn

A-493 AFA Bn

B-493 AFA Bn

A-134 0rd Bn C-572 AAA Bn

2-D-43 TankBn

1-A-119EngrBn * 12th Armd Div AlBs were unique in that they received a fourth rifle company in March 1945, manned by Colored troops.

T a b l e 2 : C o m b a t C o m m a n d B, 5 t h A r m d D i v TF Anderson

TF W i n t e r m u t e

HHC, 81 TankBn

HHC, 15 AIB

B & C 8 1 TankBn

A, 15 AIB

B&Q15AIB

A, 81 TankBn

Svc Co, 81 TankBn

Svc Co,15thAIB

T a b l e 3: H a b i t u a l C C a s s i g n m e n t s , 5 t h A r m d D i v CCA

CCB

34 TankBn

81 TankBn

CCR

10 TankBn

46 AIB

15 AIB

47 AIB

47 AFA Bn

71 AFA Bn

95 AFA Bn

A, 22 Engr Bn

B, 22 EngrBn

C, 22 Engr Bn

A, 85 Recon Sqn B, 85 Recon Sqn C, 85 Recon Sqn

14

A, 387 AAA Bn

B, 387 AAA Bn

C,

387 AAA Bn

A, 628 TD Bn

B, 628 TD Bn

C,

628 TD Bn

T h e 5 t h A r m d D i v e m p l o y e d its C C A , C C B , a n d C C R as co-equal maneuver forces, each with two battalions. T h e companies cross-attached to form one l a r g e a n d o n e s m a l l t a s k f o r c e s n a m e d after the b a t t a l i o n c o m m a n d e r s , a n d the c o m p a n i e s w e r e m a r r i e d : C o B o f the t a n k b a t t a l i o n w i t h C o B of the A I B , a n d s o o n - see T a b l e 2 . O c c a s i o n a l l y a C C w a s d i v i d e d into three T F s if a third b a t t a l i o n w a s a t t a c h e d ; this w a s c o m m o n w h e n the R C s i m p l y f u n c t i o n e d a s a reserve c o m m a n d a n d n o t a s a m a n e u v e r c o m m a n d . T a b l e s 4 a n d 5 give t w o e x a m p l e s : as used by C C A , 12th A r m d Div with a b a t t a l i o n a t t a c h e d f r o m C C B ; a n d by C C B , 1 0 t h A r m d D i v w h e n a t t a c h e d t o the 1 0 1 s t A b n D i v at B a s t o g n e - t h e C C B t r o o p s in effect p r o v i d e d a f o u r t h T F , referred t o a s " t e a m s " b y the 1 0 t h A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n . T h e r e w e r e e n d l e s s v a r i a t i o n s in the a s s i g n m e n t of u n i t s t o c o m b a t c o m m a n d s . T h e 4 t h A r m d Div, for e x a m p l e , never a s s i g n e d units t o C C s o n a fixed b a s i s , b u t r e t a i n e d a h i g h d e g r e e o f flexibility for t a s k

T a b l e 4: C C A , 12th A r m d D i v ; D e c e m b e r 7 , 1 9 4 4

TF1

TF2

TF3

CCA Troops

43 Tank Bn (-)

66AIBH

17 AIB

HHC, CCA

B, 66AIB

B, 43 TankBn

C, 43 TankBn

D, 43 TankBn

A, 92 Recon Sqn (-)

3-A, 92 Recon Sqn

2-A, 92 Recon Sqn

A, 82 Med Bn

1 -A, 119 Recon Sqn

2-A, 119 Engr Bn

3-A, 119 Engr Bn

A, 119 Engr Bn (-) A, 134 Maint Bn

1-B, 92 Recon Sqn

C, 572 AAA Bn T a b l e 5: C C B , 1 0 t h A r m d D i v ; D e c e m b e r 2 1 , 1 9 4 5

Team Roberts

Team Cherry

Team Desobry

Team O'Hara

HHC, CCB

3TankBn (-B&C)

20AIB(-A&C)

54AIB(-A&C)

B, 796th AAA Bn

C, 20 AIB

B, 3 Tank Bn

C,21 TankBn

HQ-C, 55 Engr Bn

3-C, 55 Eng Bn

plt-D, 3 TankBn

plt-D, TankBn

HQ-D, 90 Recon Sqn

2-D, 90 Recon Sqn

2-C55 Engr Bn

1-C, 55 EngrBn

HQ-C, 609 TD Bn

1-C, 609 TD Bn

1-D, 90 Recon Sqn

3-D, 90 Recon Sqn

2-C-609 TD Bn

3-C-609TD Bn

sec, B-80 Med Bn

organization. A C C might have an AIB, tank battalion, reconnaissance troop, o n e or t w o A F A b a t t a l i o n s , a battery of 1 5 5 m m h o w i t z e r s , A A A battery, t a n k destroyer c o m p a n y , engineer c o m p a n y , a n d service elements. T h e s e units w o u l d be further s u b d i v i d e d i n t o t w o o r three t a s k f o r c e s built a r o u n d a n A I B o r t a n k b a t t a l i o n , w i t h a n y m i x o f i n f a n t r y , t a n k s , a n d artillery, a n d c o n t r o l l i n g its o w n services.

Armored infantry regiments and battalions T h e first a r m o r e d infantry unit w a s the 6 t h I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t ( A r m o r e d ) , r e d e s i g n a t e d o n J u l y 1, 1 9 4 0 b y c o n v e r t i n g it f r o m a s t a n d a r d i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t a n d a s s i g n i n g it t o the 1 s t A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n . F o u r t e e n s u c h r e g i m e n t s w e r e o r g a n i z e d b e t w e e n 1 9 4 0 a n d 1 9 4 2 . O n J a n u a r y 1, 1 9 4 2 the e x i s t i n g five r e g i m e n t s ( 6 t h , 3 6 t h , 4 1 s t , 4 6 t h , 5 1 s t ) w e r e r e d e s i g n a t e d " a r m o r e d infantry r e g i m e n t s " ( A I R ) , a s w e r e all s u b s e q u e n t r e g i m e n t s ; they p o s s e s s e d t w o b a t t a l i o n s until a u t h o r i z e d a t h i r d t h a t M a r c h . T h e y w e r e initially m o u n t e d in IVi-ton c a r g o t r u c k s a n d W h i t e M 3 A 1 s c o u t c a r s w i t h limited c r o s s - c o u n t r y mobility. T h e units l a c k e d a n t i t a n k w e a p o n s , u n d e r the t h e o r y t h a t a c c o m p a n y i n g t a n k s w o u l d be sufficient. A n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l f l a w w a s t h a t they r e t a i n e d a s t a n d a r d e i g h t - m a n s q u a d a n d d i d n o t p r o v i d e drivers a n d g u n n e r s - e q u a t i n g t o the h o r s e - h o l d e r s o f o l d - w h o r e m a i n e d with the vehicles w h e n s q u a d s d i s m o u n t e d . D u r i n g J u n e t h r o u g h S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 3 m o s t o f the A I R s w e r e b r o k e n u p into three s e p a r a t e a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s , b u t r e m a i n e d a s s i g n e d t o their p a r e n t a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s . T h i s w a s b e f o r e m o s t o f the d i v i s i o n s w e r e c o m m i t t e d t o c o m b a t . T h e e x c e p t i o n s w e r e the 6 t h , 3 6 t h , a n d 4 1 s t A I R s , which remained as c o m p o n e n t units of the 1st, 3 d , a n d 2 d A r m d D i v s , respectively. In 1 9 4 4 the 1st A r m d D i v w a s c o n v e r t e d t o a " l i g h t " d i v i s i o n a n d the 6 t h A I R t o o w a s b r o k e n u p . T h e A I R w a s n o t s i m p l y three s e p a r a t e A I B s w i t h a r e g i m e n t a l h e a d q u a r t e r s ; the s m a l l e r b a t t a l i o n s l a c k e d s e r v i c e

c o m p a n i e s a n d m e d i c a l d e t a c h m e n t s , this s u p p o r t b e i n g p r o v i d e d by larger v e r s i o n s o f the u n i t s u n d e r the r e g i m e n t . A t h r e e - b a t t a l i o n A I R c o n t a i n e d 2 , 6 8 0 t r o o p s , slightly r e d u c e d in 1 9 4 5 . It w a s o r g a n i z e d i n t o a h e a d q u a r t e r s a n d h e a d q u a r t e r s c o m p a n y ( H H C ) , three a r m o r e d infantry b a t t a l i o n s , service c o m p a n y , a n d m e d i c a l d e t a c h m e n t . T h e b a t t a l i o n s h a d a n H H C a n d t h r e e rifle c o m p a n i e s : 1st B a t t a l i o n , C o s A - C ; 2 d B n , C o s D - F ; a n d 3 d B n , C o s G-I. ( T h e s t r e n g t h figures in T a b l e 6 a r e : o f f i c e r s - w a r r a n t officers-enlisted m e n . ) W h e n the A I R s w e r e b r o k e n u p the 1st a n d 2 d B n s received n e w non-sequential d e s i g n a t i o n s . T h e r e w a s n o discernible pattern in the assignment o f b a t t a l i o n n u m b e r s other t h a n t h a t the f o r m e r 1st Bn received the higher of the t w o n e w b a t t a l i o n n u m b e r s . T h e A I R H H C , Service C o , a n d 3 d Bn were a s s i g n e d the lineage a n d n u m b e r of the former A I R while the other t w o b a t t a l i o n s c o n t i n u e d their former battalion T a b l e 6 : A r m o r e d I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t , T O E 7-21 March 1,1942 l i n e a g e s . A s a n e x a m p l e , the r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of the 5 t h A r m d Div's 4 6 t h A I R is s h o w n in T a b l e 7; note that the 91-5-2,493 (100-5-2,575 w/medical detachment) o r i g i n a l A I R ' s 2 d B n a l s o p r o v i d e d a s s e t s t o the 13-2-123 H Q & H Q C o m p a n y , T O E 7-22 reorganized 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron. Regimental Headquarters 9-0-19 P e r s o n n e l w e r e shifted b e t w e e n units, t o include others 4-2-104 Headquarters Company within the division, t o a c c o m m o d a t e the r e o r g a n i z a t i o n . Company Headquarters

2-1-41

Reconnaissance & Intelligence Platoon

1-0-42

Communication Platoon

1-1-21

A r m o r e d I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n , T O E 7-25

24-0-676

HQ & HQ Company, TOE 7-26

9-0-157

Company HQ (& Recon Platoon)

2-0-34

Mortar Platoon

1-0-31

Assault Gun Platoon

1-0-32

Machine Gun Platoon

1-0-27

Armored Rifle Company (x3), TOE 7-27

5-0-144

Company Headquarters

2-0-29

Rifle Platoon (x3)

1-0-48

T h e o r i g i n a l 1 9 4 0 r e g i m e n t a l A I B s c o n s i s t e d of a h e a d q u a r t e r s a n d h e a d q u a r t e r s d e t a c h m e n t , three rifle c o m p a n i e s , a n d a heavy w e a p o n s c o m p a n y , closely p a r a l l e l i n g the s t a n d a r d infantry b a t t a l i o n . In the 1 9 4 2 r e o r g a n i z a t i o n the h e a d q u a r t e r s d e t a c h m e n t was e x p a n d e d t o a c o m p a n y , w i t h the d i s b a n d e d w e a p o n s c o m p a n y ' s e l e m e n t s r e a s s i g n e d t o the H H C . T h e battalion's rear staff echelon, supply, transport, and m a i n t e n a n c e e l e m e n t s w e r e a s s i g n e d t o the n e w service c o m p a n y . T h e t h r e e rifle c o m p a n i e s ( A - C ) a l s o u n d e r w e n t a d r a s t i c r e o r g a n i z a t i o n - see T a b l e 9. T a b l e 8: A r m o r e d i n f a n t r y u n i t a s s i g n m e n t s t o A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n s

S e r v i c e C o m p a n y , T O E 7-23

6-3-142

1st Armd Div

6th AIR (1940-44): 6th, 11th, 14th AIB

Company Headquarters

3-0-38

2d Armd Div

41 st AIR (1940-46)

Maintenance Platoon

1-1-60

3d Armd Div

36th AIR (1941-45)

Transportation Platoon

1-1-30

4th Armd Div

51 st AIR (1941 -43): 10th, 51 st, 53d AIB

Personnel Section

1-1-8

5th Armd Div

46th AIR (1941 -43): 15th, 46th, 47th AIB

Supply Section

0-0-6

Medical Detachment

9-0-72

Headquarters Section Battalion Section (x3)

6th Armd Div

50th AIR (1942-43): 9th, 44th, 50th AIB

7th Armd Div

48th AIR (1942-43): 23d, 38th, 48th AIB

3-0-15

8th Armd Div

49th AIR (1942-43): 7th, 49th, 58th AIB

2-0-19

9th Armd Div

52d AIR (1942-43): 27th, 52d, 60th AIB

1 0th Armd Div

54th AIR (1942-43): 20th, 54th, 61 st AIB

11th Armd Div

55th AIR (1942-43): 21 st, 55th, 63d AIB 56th AIR (1942-43): 17th, 56th, 66th AIB

T a b l e 7: R e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f 4 6 t h A I R ; S e p t e m b e r 2 0 , 1 9 4 3

Old unit

N e w unit

12th Armd Div

46th AIR (less 1st & 2d Bn)

46th AIB

13th Armd Div

59th AIR (1942-43): 16th, 59th, 67th AIB

1stBn,46th AIR

47th AIB

14th Armd Div

62d AIR (1942-43): 19th, 62d, 68th AIB

2d Bn, 46th AIR

16

15th AIR & 85th Cav

16th Armd Div

18th, 64th, 69th AIB

Recon Sqn (less TrpD&E)

20th Armd Div

8th, 65th, 70th AIB

B e s i d e s the 4 8 d i v i s i o n a l A I B s , i n c l u d i n g t h o s e o r g a n i c t o A I R s , 1 6 s e p a r a t e A I B s ( 5 2 6 t h - 5 4 0 t h ) w e r e r a i s e d in M a r c h a n d M a y 1 9 4 3 . T h e s e w e r e i n t e n d e d t o fill the r e q u i r e m e n t for G H Q s e p a r a t e b a t t a l i o n s p o o l e d a t a r m y level for a t t a c h m e n t t o i n f a n t r y a n d a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s . T h e " G H Q p o o l " c o n c e p t p r o v i d e d v a r i o u s c o m b a t b a t t a l i o n s ( t a n k , t a n k destroyer, field artillery, A A A , e n g i n e e r ) for j u s t s u c h p u r p o s e s , b u t this w a s n o t the c a s e with the s e p a r a t e A I B s . M o s t w e r e a s s i g n e d t o the A r m o r e d F o r c e or II C o r p s . Ten w e r e i n a c t i v a t e d in A u g u s t 1 9 4 3 a n d their p e r s o n n e l r e a s s i g n e d t o reorganizing and deploying AIBs; t w o were converted to a m p h i b i a n tractor b a t t a l i o n s , a n d t w o r e m a i n e d a s t r a i n i n g u n i t s i n t o 1 9 4 4 . O f the s e p a r a t e A I B s , only the 5 2 6 t h s a w limited c o m b a t in E u r o p e .

ANATOMY OF THE ARMORED INFANTRY BATTALION While the 1 9 4 3 A I B w a s o r g a n i z e d o n the s t a n d a r d b a s i s o f three s u b u n i t s p e r e c h e l o n , there w e r e u n i q u e differences f r o m the s t a n d a r d i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n . It w a s a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d u n i t , s i n c e t h e r e w a s n o r e g i m e n t a l e c h e l o n f o r s u p p o r t . T h e S e p t e m b e r 1 5 , 1 9 4 3 T O E - see T a b l e 9 - p r o v i d e s a n e x a m p l e of the c o m p o n e n t s u b u n i t s c o m p r i s i n g a n A I B ' s c o m p a n i e s ; c h a n g e s w e r e m a d e e a c h year, b u t they w e r e m i n o r . ( A g a i n , p e r s o n n e l s t r e n g t h s a r e g i v e n as: officers-warrant officers-enlisted men.) " B a z o o k a " 2.36in A T rocket launchers w e r e widely d i s t r i b u t e d t h r o u g h the b a t t a l i o n for a t o t a l o f 7 4 ; they were not provided dedicated crews. T h e battalion's 7 5 halftracks m o u n t e d a . 5 0 c a l or a . 3 0 c a l m a c h i n e g u n , s o m e t i m e s b o t h , a n d e a c h w a s p r o v i d e d a T h o m p s o n s u b m a c h i n e g u n a s on-vehicle e q u i p m e n t ( O V E ) .

Battalion Headquarters &c Headquarters Company T h i s w a s h o m e for the b a t t a l i o n staff a n d the v a r i o u s c o m b a t s u p p o r t a n d crew-served w e a p o n s p l a t o o n s . A r m a m e n t w a s 1 4 x 2 . 3 6 i n b a z o o k a s , three 7 5 m m SP h o w i t z e r s , three 8 1 m m SP m o r t a r s , seven . 3 0 c a l M G s , 1 3 x . 5 0 c a l M G s , 2 9 S M G s , 3 4 rifles, 1 0 7 c a r b i n e s , a n d three p i s t o l s . T h e b a t t a l i o n h e a d q u a r t e r s c o n s i s t e d of a l i e u t e n a n t c o l o n e l c o m m a n d e r ; t w o m a j o r s a s the X O (executive officer) a n d S-3 ( o p e r a t i o n s officer); three c a p t a i n s - S-2 ( c o m m u n i c a t i o n s officer), S-3 (air), a n d S-4 ( s u p p l y officer); a n d t w o lieutenants - S-l (administrative officer) a n d liaison officer. N C O s included the sergeant m a j o r (master sergeant); o p e r a t i o n s , intelligence, a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s chiefs (technical s e r g e a n t s ) , a s e r g e a n t m e s s a g e center chief, p l u s 1 6 c l e r k s , drivers, r a d i o o p e r a t o r s , a n d m e s s e n g e r s . Vehicles w e r e t w o M 3 halftracks a n d four ^ - t o n t r u c k s ( " j e e p s " ) ; t w o b a z o o k a s w e r e p r o v i d e d . The H H C ' s headquarters and maintenance sections both h a d a halftrack a n d a jeep p l u s a b a z o o k a , a n d the a d m i n , m e s s , a n d s u p p l y s e c t i o n a IVi-ton truck a n d 1-ton trailer. T h e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p l a t o o n w a s e q u i p p e d w i t h a h a l f t r a c k a n d a jeep w i t h b a z o o k a in the h e a d q u a r t e r s , a n d t w o j e e p s in e a c h o f t h e t w o s q u a d s (without m a c h i n e g u n s ) . T h e p l a t o o n w o u l d s c o u t r o u t e s a n d a s s e m b l y a r e a s , a n d help to g u i d e u n i t s . T h e a s s a u l t g u n p l a t o o n h a d a h a l f t r a c k in b o t h the h e a d q u a r t e r s a n d the a m m u n i t i o n s e c t i o n , the latter w i t h a n a r m o r e d a m m u n i t i o n t r a i l e r ; b o t h

e l e m e n t s h a d a b a z o o k a . 4 T h e three assault gun sections each had a 7 5 m m SP howitzer. T h e 7 5 m m M 1 A 1 pack howitzer mounted on a n M 3 h a l f t r a c k , the T 3 0 , w a s u s e d ) Mtdtcol Service Co f r o m 1 9 4 2 - 4 3 , a n d r e p l a c e d by the 7 5 m m M 8 SP howitzer. T h e a s s a u l t Bn Momt Compony Bn Adm & B n Sup T g u n p l a t o o n n o r m a l l y o p e r a t e d in Plot Hq Plot P a n Sac s u p p o r t o f the m a i n a t t a c k ; s e l d o m if ever w o u l d s i n g l e g u n s be Rifle Antitank Rifle Rifle attached to companies. The platoon Plot Plot Plot Plot c o u l d relieve the artillery o f s o m e c l o s e s u p p o r t m i s s i o n s , b u t did n o t r e p l a c e it. A s a s e c o n d a r y m i s s i o n , assault guns could be g r o u p e d as reinforcing artillery, but such Assault G u n Ren Mortar Mocrtine Gun| Plot Plat Plot Plat m i s s i o n s c o u l d n o t interfere w i t h The armored infantry battalion. their p r i m a r y c l o s e s u p p o r t m i s s i o n . Most AIBs received 105mm h o w i t z e r - a r m e d M 4 or M 4 A 3 t a n k s as assault guns between December 1 9 4 4 and April 1 9 4 5 . ARMORED INFANTRY BATTALION

Hq

8

HQ

Co

8

Company Hq

Bn Hq Sec

r

eodquarters Co

Compony Hq

T h e m o r t a r p l a t o o n h e a d q u a r t e r s h a d a h a l f t r a c k a n d three s q u a d s e a c h w i t h a n 8 1 m m M 4 m o r t a r c a r r i e r ; e a c h o f the f o u r vehicles h a d a b a z o o k a . T h e p l a t o o n u s u a l l y o p e r a t e d a s a unit t o c o n c e n t r a t e its fires, b u t i n d i v i d u a l s q u a d s c o u l d b e a t t a c h e d t o c o m p a n i e s . M o r t a r s p r o v i d e d i n d i r e c t fire s u p p o r t a g a i n s t t a r g e t s d e f i l a d e d f r o m o t h e r w e a p o n s , fired o n a r e a s w h e r e h o s t i l e s h a d n o t b e e n definitely l o c a t e d , d e s t r o y e d o b s t a c l e s , a n d fired s m o k e t o s c r e e n friendly m o v e m e n t s o r b l i n d the enemy. T h e light m a c h i n e g u n p l a t o o n h e a d q u a r t e r s h a d a h a l f t r a c k , a s did e a c h o f the t w o s e c t i o n s . T w o f i v e - m a n s q u a d s r o d e in e a c h h a l f t r a c k , e a c h s q u a d w i t h a . 3 0 c a l M 1 9 1 9 A 4 light m a c h i n e g u n ; s o m e units u s e d . 3 0 c a l M 1 9 1 7 A 1 H M G s a s a m o r e a c c u r a t e a n d l o n g e r r a n g e d direct a n d indirect fire w e a p o n . T h e g u n s c o u l d b e m o u n t e d o n the h a l f t r a c k w h e n m o v i n g , b u t w e r e m a i n l y u s e d d i s m o u n t e d . A s e c t i o n c o u l d b e a t t a c h e d t o the t w o f o r w a r d rifle c o m p a n i e s o r k e p t u n d e r b a t t a l i o n c o n t r o l . E a c h o f the p l a t o o n ' s three halftracks carried a b a z o o k a . U n i t s d i d n o t a l w a y s strictly c o m p l y w i t h T O E s . F o r e x a m p l e , in early 1 9 4 5 the 6 6 t h A I B ' s m o r t a r p l a t o o n h a d s i x 8 1 m m m o r t a r s o r g a n i z e d into three t w o - t u b e s e c t i o n s , a n d the a s s a u l t g u n p l a t o o n h a d t w o 7 5 m m M 8 SP howitzers and one 1 0 5 m m howitzer-armed Sherman.

Rifle companies T h e earlier o r g a n i z a t i o n u s e d f r o m M a r c h 1 9 4 2 s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d before t h a t i n t r o d u c e d f r o m S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 3 . A n o d d i t y of the a r m o r e d rifle p l a t o o n w a s t h a t the h e a d q u a r t e r s d o u b l e d a s the first rifle s q u a d , led by a d e s i g n a t e d s q u a d l e a d e r w h e n d i s m o u n t e d ; it w a s s o m e t i m e s called the " p l a t o o n leader's s q u a d . " O t h e r p l a t o o n p e c u l i a r i t i e s w e r e the M G a n d m o r t a r s q u a d s , e l e m e n t s n o t f o u n d in s t a n d a r d infantry rifle p l a t o o n s a s they w e r e p a r t of the 4

18

M 8 armored a m m o trailer (limited standard - capacity 93x 7 5 m m ) , or M 1 0 (standard from 1944 - 117x 7 5 m m or 4 4 x 1 0 5 m m ) .

T a b l e 9: A r m o r e d I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n , S e p t e m b e r 1 5 , 1 9 4 3 , T O E 7-25

36-3-962 (39-3-995

w/medical detachment)

H Q & H Q C o , T O E 7-26

14-0-159

Battalion Headquarters

8-0-21

Headquarters Company

6-0-138

Company Headquarters

2-0-37

Headquarters Section

1-0-5

Maintenance Section

1-0-7

Admin, Mess, & Supply Section

1-0-25

Reconnaissance Platoon

1-0-20

Platoon Headquarters

1-0-4

Reconnaissance Squad (x2)

0-0-8

Assault Gun Platoon

1-0-23

Platoon Headquarters

1-0-6

Assault Gun Section (x3)

0-0-4

Ammunition Section

0-0-5

Mortar Platoon

1-0-6

Platoon Headquarters

1-0-6

Mortar Squad (x3)

0-0-6

Machine Gun Platoon

1-0-34

Platoon Headquarters

1-0-10

Machine Gun Section (x2)

0-0-12

Section Headquarters Machine Gun Squad (x2)

0-0-2 0-0-5

A r m o r e d R i f l e C o ( x 3 ) , T O E 7-27

6-0-245

Company Headquarters

2-0-48

Headquarters Section

1-0-8

Maintenance Section

1-0-6

Admin, Mess, & Supply Section

1-0-34

Rifle Platoon (x3)

1-0-55

Platoon Headquarters & Rifle Squad

1-0-11

Rifle Squad (x2)

0-0-12

Mortar Squad

0-0-8

Machine Gun Squad

0-0-12

Antitank Platoon Platoon Headquarters Antitank Squad (x3)

It was not uncommon for armored infantrymen to wear mechanic's coveralls or one-piece herringbone twill working suits, as worn by this lieutenant. He appears to have his serial number stenciled on the right pocket flap and possibly his name on the left. Armored infantrymen were sometimes called "armored doughs" or "blitz doughs" (derived from "doughboys"), though these were mainly news reporters' expressions.

1-0-32 1-0-2 0-0-10

S e r v i c e C o , T O E 7-29

4-3-68

Company Headquarters

2-0-22

Headquarters Section

1-0-4

Maintenance Section

1-0-4

Admin, Mess, & Supply Section

0-0-14

Battalion Supply & Transportation Platoon

1-1-21

Battalion Maintenance Platoon

1-1-20

Battalion Admin & Personnel Section

0-1-5

Medical Detachment

3-0-33

This armored infantryman, armed with the .45cal M 1 A 1 Thompson SMG that was issued as "on-vehicle equipment," wears the one-piece HBT working suit. He has a gasmask bag slung under his left arm, an item not much seen after the North African campaign. 19

A crew of a company's antitank platoon unlimbers its 57mm M1 AT gun from an M2 halftrack car. Note the crew's musette bags slung on the rear; it was quickly found that hanging them on the sides would get them torn off by vegetation and rubble.

c o m p a n y w e a p o n s platoon. The former had two L M G s ; standard M G squads had only one gun. T h e p l a t o o n headquarters t o w e d a 3 7 m m M 3 A 1 A T gun b e h i n d its h a l f t r a c k , a l t h o u g h this s o m e t i m e s h a m p e r e d m a n e u v e r a b i l i t y ; it h a d o n l y t w o d e d i c a t e d c r e w m e n , b u t riflemen w o u l d serve a s a m m u n i t i o n h a n d l e r s . T h e r e w a s n o f o r m o f c o m p a n y w e a p o n s p l a t o o n , all s u p p o r t i n g w e a p o n s b e i n g o r g a n i c t o the rifle p l a t o o n s . A l t h o u g h n o t o r i g i n a l l y e n v i s i o n e d for t h a t p u r p o s e , this o r g a n i z a t i o n p r o v e d t o be o f v a l u e w h e n rifle p l a t o o n s w e r e m a r r i e d t o t a n k p l a t o o n s . T h e c o m p a n y h e a d q u a r t e r s s e c t i o n h a d a n a d d i t i o n a l 3 7 m m M 3 A 1 A T g u n , a n d the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , m e s s , a n d s u p p l y s e c t i o n h a d a 3 7 m m M 6 S P A T g u n (with a t o w e d 3 7 m m a s a s u b s t i t u t e if the % - t o n t r u c k - m o u n t e d M 6 w a s n o t a v a i l a b l e ) . T h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n w a s u s e d in N o r t h A f r i c a - see T a b l e 1 0 .

The company maintenance sections and the battalion maintenance platoon were responsible for keeping the battalion's 130 half-tracked, full-tracked, and wheeled vehicles operational. Note the haftrack's "chevron" tires for maximum traction. Some units mounted them reversed, on the theory that the vehicle had more power in reverse gear and could more easily back out if stuck in mud. 20

T a b l e 10: A r m o r e d Rifle P l a t o o n , M a r c h 1,1942

(platoon total, 49 all ranks) P l a t o o n H e a d q u a r t e r s & 1st R i f l e S q u a d

(12)

Platoon commander

2nd lieutenant

Ml carbine M1 carbine

Platoon sergeant

staff sergeant

Squad leader

sergeant

M1 rifle

Antitank gunner

pvt/pfc

Ml carbine

Assistant AT gunner

pvt/pfc

M1 carbine

Rifleman (x5)

pvt/pfc

M1 rifle

Basic soldier

pvt/pfc

M1 rifle

Driver

pvt/pfc

M1928A1 SMG

M3 halftrack personnel carrier w/.30cal Ml 919A4 LMG 37mm M3A1 AT 2d & 3 d Rifle S q u a d s

(each 12)

Squad leader

sergeant

M1 rifle

Asst squad leader

corporal

M1 rifle

Rifleman (x9)

pvt/pfc

M1 rifle

Driver

pvt/pfc

M1928A1 SMG

M3 halftrack personnel carrier w/.30cal M1919A4 LMG Mortar Squad

(7)

Squad leader

sergeant

M1 carbine

Mortar gunner

pvt/pfc

M2 mortar, M1911A1 pistol

Asst mortar gunner

pvt/pfc

M1911A1 pistol

Ammunition handler (x2)

pvt/pfc

Ml carbine

Basic soldier

pvt/pfc

M1 rifle

Driver

pvt/pfc

M1928A1 SMG

M3 halftrack personnel carrier w/.30cal M1919A4 LMG Machine Gun Squad

(8)

Squad leader

sergeant

M1 rifle

Asst squad leader

corporal

M1 rifle

Machine gunner (x2)

pvt/pfc

M1919A4LMG,M1911A1 pistol

Ammunition handler (x2)

pvt/pfc

M1 carbine

Basic soldier

pvt/pfc

M1 rifle

Driver

pvt/pfc

M1928A1 SMG

M2 halftrack car w/.50cal M2 MG T h e S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 3 r e o r g a n i z a t i o n - see T a b l e 1 1 - r e t a i n e d the b a s i c 1 9 4 2 p l a t o o n s t r u c t u r e w i t h the m o r t a r a n d M G s q u a d s e n l a r g e d ; the latter received three riflemen, a l l o w i n g it t o f u n c t i o n t o s o m e e x t e n t a s a m a n e u v e r s q u a d , b u t a l s o t o c a r r y m o r e a m m u n i t i o n a n d p r o v i d e security. C a r b i n e s replaced pistols to p r o v i d e m o r e " r i f l e " strength. T h i s p l a t o o n h a d the highest strength a n d the m o s t f i r e p o w e r o f a n y U S rifle p l a t o o n . E x c l u s i v e o f d r i v e r s , the 1st S q u a d w a s t w o m e n s m a l l e r t h a n the o t h e r s a n d l a c k e d a n a s s i s t a n t s q u a d leader, t h o u g h a m a n w o u l d be a p p o i n t e d . T h e p l a t o o n s e r g e a n t w o u l d ride in a different h a l f t r a c k t h a n the c o m m a n d e r . All five s q u a d s received a b a z o o k a ; the 3 7 m m A T g u n s were w i t h d r a w n f r o m the c o m p a n y a n d p l a t o o n headquarters, since the b a z o o k a alleviated the need for them. T h e former p l a t o o n A T g u n s w e r e c o n c e n t r a t e d in a n e w c o m p a n y A T

( 1 ) 2 d & 3 d Rifle S q u a d s

SL = Squad leader ASL = Asst squad leader D = Driver 1 - 9 = Riflemen

(2) 6 0 m m M o r t a r S q u a d

(3) L i g h t M a c h i n e G u n S q u a d

SL = Squad leader SL = Squad leader ASL = Asst squad leader ASL = Asst squad leader D = Driver D = Driver 1 & 2 = Machine gunners 1 = Mortar gunner 3 & 4 = Asst machine gunners 2 = Asst Mortar gunner 3-5 = Ammunition handlers 5 & 6 = Ammunition handlers 7-9 = Riflemen

(4) H e a v y M a c h i n e G u n

(5) A n t i t a n k S q u a d

Section

SL = Squad leader D = Driver 1 = Antitank gunner 2-5 = Cannoneers 6-8 = Ammunition handlers

S = Section leader D = Driver 1 SL = 1 st Squad leader 2SL = 2d Squad leader 1 & 2 = Machine gunners 3 & 4 = Asst machine gunners 5-8 = Ammunition handlers

p l a t o o n , so did n o t hinder the m a n e u v e r a b i l i t y of rifle p l a t o o n halftracks. A n u m b e r o f w e a p o n c h a n g e s w e r e a u t h o r i z e d in 1 9 4 4 . T h e M 3 S M G a n d M I C sniper rifle r e p l a c e d M l / M l A l S M G s a n d the M 1 9 0 3 A 4 rifle in A u g u s t 1 9 4 4 , a n d the M 1 9 1 9 A 6 L M G a n d M 2 c a r b i n e r e p l a c e d t h e M 1 9 1 9 A 4 L M G a n d M l c a r b i n e in N o v e m b e r . H o w e v e r , f e w if a n y u n i t s received these w e a p o n s other t h a n the M 3 " g r e a s e g u n , " a n d n o n e r e c e i v e d the M 2 c a r b i n e b e f o r e the w a r ' s e n d . In m o s t c a s e s there w a s n o s n i p e r rifle. T h e M 1 A 1 b a z o o k a w a s r e p l a c e d by the M 9 in J a n u a r y 1 9 4 4 a n d b y the M 9 A 1 in N o v e m b e r , a n d these w e r e s o o n i s s u e d . It s h o u l d b e n o t e d t h a t the rifle a n d m o r t a r s q u a d s ' h a l f t r a c k - m o u n t e d . 3 0 c a l w a t e r - c o o l e d H M G s w e r e u s u a l l y r e p l a c e d w i t h . 5 0 c a l or . 3 0 c a l a i r - c o o l e d g u n s . T h e rifle c o m p a n y h e a d q u a r t e r s a n d m a i n t e n a n c e s e c t i o n s b o t h h a d a h a l f t r a c k a n d a j e e p , the latter s e c t i o n w i t h a trailer; the a d m i n , m e s s , a n d s u p p l y section h a d t w o IVi-ton trucks a n d trailers, a n d each section h a d a b a z o o k a . A l i e u t e n a n t m o t o r t r a n s p o r t officer h e a d e d the m a i n t e n a n c e section a n d the first s e r g e a n t o v e r s a w the a d m i n , m e s s , a n d s u p p l y s e c t i o n . T h e r e w a s n o d e s i g n a t e d c o m p a n y X O , b u t the M T O u s u a l l y p e r f o r m e d this duty. T h e n e w a n t i t a n k p l a t o o n - see T a b l e 1 2 - h a d a j e e p in t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s a n d three h a l f t r a c k s t o t o w the 5 7 m m M l A T g u n s ; s o m e u n i t s u s e d the 3 7 m m M 3 A 1 until sufficient 5 7 m m p i e c e s w e r e a v a i l a b l e in 1 9 4 4 . Rifle c o m p a n y f i r e p o w e r w a s c o n s i d e r a b l e , w i t h 1 8 x 2 . 3 6 i n b a z o o k a s , three 5 7 m m A T g u n s , three 6 0 m m m o r t a r s , 1 6 x . 3 0 c a l M G s , l O x . 5 0 c a l M G s , 2 5 S M G s , 1 4 5 rifles, 7 8 c a r b i n e s , a n d 18 M 7 rifle g r e n a d e l a u n c h e r s ( t w o p e r IVi-ton rifle s q u a d f r o m 1 9 4 4 ) . M o b i l i t y w a s p r o v i d e d b y 2 0 h a l f t r a c k s , t w o c a r g o t r u c k s , three 1-ton c a r g o t r a i l e r s , a n d three j e e p s .

Service Company T h i s w a s w h e r e the b a t t a l i o n c o n c e n t r a t e d its a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , s u p p l y , t r a n s p o r t , a n d m a i n t e n a n c e a s s e t s . It c o n t r o l l e d a s the b a t t a l i o n ' s r e a r e c h e l o n , a l t h o u g h e l e m e n t s w o u l d o p e r a t e f o r w a r d w i t h the line c o m p a n i e s . T h e c o m p a n y p o s s e s s e d s i x 2 . 3 6 i n b a z o o k a s , o n e 8 1 m m m o r t a r , five . 3 0 c a l a n d six . 5 0 c a l M G s , 2 2 S M G s , a n d 5 3 c a r b i n e s . T h e h e a d q u a r t e r s s e c t i o n h a d a % - t o n D o d g e c o m m a n d c a r ; the m a i n t e n a n c e s e c t i o n h a d a j e e p a n d a IVi-ton t r u c k w i t h trailer; a n d the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , m e s s , a n d s u p p l y s e c t i o n a 2 % - t o n t r u c k a n d trailer. The supply and transportation platoon's supply trucks delivered a m m u n i t i o n , fuel, l u b r i c a n t s , r a t i o n s , a n d w a t e r t o the line c o m p a n i e s a n d H H C e l e m e n t s . It w a s e q u i p p e d w i t h n i n e IVi-ton c a r g o t r u c k s w i t h five 1-ton c a r g o a n d f o u r a m m u n i t i o n t r a i l e r s , a M-ton D o d g e w e a p o n s carrier, a n d a j e e p , a n d h a d three b a z o o k a s . T h e m a i n t e n a n c e p l a t o o n c o n d u c t e d

HALFTRACK SEATING ARRANGEMENTS

The specified seating arrangements were intended t o allow the troops to dismount and move quickly into tactical formations, or get their crew-served weapons into operation, with the m i n i m u m of shuffling about. The Platoon Headquarters and 1st Rifle Squad (not shown) w o u l d be mounted similarly to the 2d and 3d Squads (1), but with the platoon commander riding in the place of the squad leader (SL). Note that the platoon sergeant is not shown in any of the

diagrams; he w o u l d usually ride in the platoon's tail-end halftrack, often that of the Mortar or Machine Gun squad. The Antitank Squad (5) is a c o m p o n e n t of the company AT Platoon, but the Heavy Machine Gun Section (4) is a component of the battalion MG Platoon. Halftrack drivers received specialized training and oversaw their vehicle's maintenance, in which all squad members assisted; they in turn would train other squad members as relief drivers, and one was appointed as the assistant driver.

vehicle a n d e q u i p m e n t m a i n t e n a n c e a n d r e c o v e r y o f d a m a g e d vehicles. Its vehicles i n c l u d e d a n M 3 2 t a n k r e c o v e r y vehicle ( M 4 c h a s s i s ) , a h a l f t r a c k , a n M l o r M I A 1 (late 1 9 4 4 ) L a F r a n c e h e a v y wrecker, t w o IVi-ton t r u c k s with 1-ton t r a i l e r s , a n d a j e e p . A r m a m e n t i n c l u d e d t w o b a z o o k a s , a n d a n 8 1 m m m o r t a r m o u n t e d o n the M 3 2 t o deliver s c r e e n i n g s m o k e w h e n r e c o v e r i n g vehicles (the M 3 1 w i t h the M 3 m e d i u m t a n k c h a s s i s , u s e d by s o m e u n i t s ,

T a b l e 1 1 : A r m o r e d Rifle P l a t o o n , S e p t e m b e r 1 5 , 1 9 4 3

(platoon total, 49 all ranks) P l a t o o n H e a d q u a r t e r s & 1st R i f l e S q u a d

(12)

Platoon commander

2nd lieutenant

M1 carbine

Platoon sergeant

staff sergeant

M1 carbine

Squad leader

sergeant

M1 rifle

Rifleman (x7)

pvt/pfc

M1 rifle

Rifleman (sniper)

pvt/pfc

M1903A4 sniper rifle

Driver

tech 5

M1/M1A1 SMG

2.36in M1A1/M9/M9A1 rocket launcher M4 ground signal projector M3A1 halftrack personnel carrier w/.50cal M2 MG 2 d & 3 d Rifle S q u a d s

(each 12)

Squad leader

sergeant

Asst squad leader

corporal

M1 rifle

Rifleman (x9)

pvt/pfc

M1 rifle

Driver

tech 5

M1/M1A1/M3 SMG

M1 rifle

2.36inMlAl/M9/M9Al RL M3A1 halftrack personnel carrier w/.30cal Ml 917A1 HMG Mortar Squad

(8)

Squad leader

sergeant

Asst squad leader

corporal

M1 rifle

Mortar gunner

pvt/pfc

M2 mortar, M1 carbine

Asst mortar gunner

pvt/pfc

Ml carbine

Ammunition handler (x3)

pvt/pfc

Ml carbine

Driver

tech 5

M1/M1A1/M3 SMG

M1 rifle

2.36inM1Al/M9/M9A1 RL M3A1 halftrack personnel carrier w/.30cal Ml 917A1 HMG Machine Gun Squad

(12)

Squad leader

sergeant

M1 rifle

Asst squad leader

corporal

M1 rifle

Machine gunner (x2)

pvt/pfc

M1919A4LMG, M1 carbine

Asst machine gunner (x2)

pvt/pfc

M1 carbine

Ammunition handler (x2)

pvt/pfc

M1 carbine

Rifleman (x3)

pvt/pfc

M1 rifle

Driver

tech 5

M1/M1A1/M3 SMG

2.36inM1A1/M9/M9A1 RL M3A1 halftrack personnel carrier w/.50cal M2 MG {Note: Staff sergeant, sergeants, and corporals increased one grade Jan 7,1944)

Each of the battalion's five companies had a maintenance section, and the service company a maintenance platoon; each was assigned an M3A1 halftrack with winch as a recovery vehicle. Some units fitted a hoisting boom, as being demonstrated here.

l a c k e d the m o r t a r ) . T h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a n d p e r s o n n e l s e c t i o n h a d a 2V^-ton t r u c k w i t h trailer, a n d a b a z o o k a . T h e m e d i c a l d e t a c h m e n t p r o v i d e d a b a t t a l i o n a i d s t a t i o n , three litter t e a m s , a n d three h a l f t r a c k a m b u l a n c e s ; the o n l y o t h e r vehicles w e r e a j e e p a n d a 1-ton t r a i l e r t o w e d b y o n e o f t h e a r m o r e d a m b u l a n c e s . T w o m e d i c s w e r e d e t a i l e d t o e a c h rifle c o m p a n y , a n d all p e r s o n n e l w e r e a r m e d w i t h c a r b i n e s . O p e r a t i n g alongside a r m o r e d infantry, a m e d i u m t a n k c o m p a n y h e a d q u a r t e r s w a s s i m i l a r t o the a r m o r e d rifle c o m p a n y ' s , b u t the h e a d q u a r t e r s s e c t i o n a l s o h a d t w o 75176mm gun-armed M 4 Shermans, a 1 0 5 m m howitzer-armed Sherman assault gun, and a M 3 2 tank recovery vehicle. M a n y c o m p a n i e s l a c k e d the a s s a u l t g u n , a n d o t h e r s r e p l a c e d o n e t a n k in e a c h p l a t o o n w i t h a n a s s a u l t g u n . T h e three t a n k p l a t o o n s e a c h h a d

Table 12: Antitank Platoon, S e p t e m b e r 15,1943

(platoon total, 33 all ranks) Platoon Headquarters

(3)

Platoon commander

2nd lieutenant

Ml carbine

Platoon sergeant

staff sergeant

M1 carbine

Messenger (truck driver)

pvt/pfc

M l / M l A1/M3 SMG

M4 ground signal projector 1

/4-ton truck

A T S q u a d (x3)

(each 10)

Squad leader

sergeant

M1 carbine

Antitank gunner

corporal

M1 carbine

Cannoneer ( x 4 )

pvt/pfc

Ml carbine

Ammunition handler ( x 3 )

pvt/pfc

Ml rifle

Driver

tech 5

M1/M1A1/M3 SMG

57mm M1 AT gun M3A1 halftrack personnel carrier (2x w/.50cal M2 MG, 1x w/.30cal M1917A1 HMG) (Note: Staff sergeant, sergeants, and corporals increased one grade Jan 7,1944) 25

five t a n k s , e m p l o y e d a s a " h e a v y s e c t i o n " o f t h r e e u n d e r the p l a t o o n c o m m a n d e r a n d a t w o - t a n k " l i g h t s e c t i o n " u n d e r the p l a t o o n s e r g e a n t . T h e light t a n k c o m p a n y e q u i p p e d w i t h the 3 7 m m g u n - a r m e d M 5 A 1 S t u a r t w a s s i m i l a r l y o r g a n i z e d , b u t w i t h j u s t t w o light t a n k s in the h e a d q u a r t e r s . (Only s m a l l n u m b e r s o f 7 5 m m g u n - a r m e d M 2 4 C h a f f e e light t a n k s w e r e i s s u e d to s o m e a r m o r e d divisions from J a n u a r y 1945.)

WEAPONS & EQUIPMENT Weapons

The M49 mount for a .50cal M2 machine gun on an M3A2 halftrack. The ammunition belt appears to contain repeating five-round sequences of two armor-piercing, two incendiary, and one armor-piercing/ incendiary/tracer. Note the camouflage net draped over the vehicle's rear. Aircraft sentries were always posted when the squad was mounted; by 1944 attack by Allied aircraft was more likely than by German, and all aircraft were watched with equal suspicion.

A r m o r e d infantry units u s e d the s a m e w e a p o n s a s other i n f a n t r y m e n , but they w e r e a l l o t t e d s o m e w h a t differently. T h e y w e r e n o t i s s u e d . 3 0 c a l B r o w n i n g a u t o m a t i c rifles ( B A R ) o w i n g t o the rifle p l a t o o n ' s seven m a c h i n e g u n s a n d five s u b m a c h i n e g u n s . T h e G a r a n d . 3 0 c a l M l rifle w a s a s e m i - a u t o m a t i c with a n eight-round magazine. The semi-automatic .30cal M l carbine had a 15-round m a g a z i n e , a n d u s e d a s h o r t e r c a r t r i d g e t h a n the M l rifle a n d m a c h i n e g u n s ; it w a s i s s u e d t o w e a p o n s c r e w m e n , s u p p o r t p e r s o n n e l , a n d officers. A r m o r e d i n f a n t r y u n i t s p o s s e s s e d m o r e T h o m p s o n . 4 5 c a l M 1 9 2 8 A 1 , M l , or M 1 A 1 S M G s , w i t h 2 0 - a n d 3 0 - r o u n d m a g a z i n e s , t h a n a n y o t h e r unit; these w e r e i s s u e d t o h a l f t r a c k d r i v e r s , a n d it w a s n o t u n c o m m o n for the s q u a d leader or a n o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l in a s q u a d t o u s e o n e . F r o m m i d 1 9 4 4 the " T o m m y g u n s " b e g a n t o be r e p l a c e d w i t h . 4 5 c a l M 3 " g r e a s e g u n s . " Limited use w a s m a d e of .30cal M 1 9 0 3 , M 1 9 0 3 A 1 , a n d M 1 9 0 3 A 3 Springfield b o l t - a c t i o n rifles into 1 9 4 4 , w i t h o n e per rifle s q u a d ; Springfields w i t h a n M l rifle g r e n a d e launcher w e r e u s e d until the M 7 launcher for the M l b e c a m e a v a i l a b l e late in 1 9 4 3 . T w o M 7 s w e r e i s s u e d per s q u a d ; they l a u n c h e d M9A1 antitank, Ml 7 antipersonnel, and various p y r o t e c h n i c signal (colored s m o k e a n d flare) g r e n a d e s . H a n d g r e n a d e s i n c l u d e d the M k II a n d M k I I A 1 " p i n e a p p l e " fragmentation, M k IIIA1 " c o n c u s s i o n , " A N - M 8 white smoke, AN-M14 thermite incendiary, Ml 5 white phosphorus, and M l 6 and M l 8 colored smoke. B o t h B r o w n i n g . 3 0 c a l M 1 9 1 9 A 4 light a i r - c o o l e d a n d M 1 9 1 7 A 1 heavy water-cooled machine guns were important w e a p o n s , a l t h o u g h the latter s a w less u s e ; m o r e e x p e n s i v e , it w a s often r e p l a c e d with the M 1 9 1 9 A 4 . T h e B r o w n i n g .50cal M 2 machine gun m o u n t e d on some halftracks w a s an e x t r e m e l y d e a d l y w e a p o n for s u p p r e s s i v e fire o w i n g t o its ability t o p e n e t r a t e typical cover. T h e s e m a c h i n e g u n s c o u l d be u s e d a g a i n s t g r o u n d a n d a e r i a l t a r g e t s ; w h i l e the g u n s w e r e m o u n t e d o n h a l f t r a c k s , t r i p o d s w e r e p r o v i d e d for ground-firing. T h e b a z o o k a p r o v i d e d the infantry w i t h a lightweight, m a n - p o r t a b l e A T w e a p o n . T h e M l b a z o o k a (two h a n d g r i p s ) w a s i n t r o d u c e d in 1 9 4 2 a n d the M 1 A 1 ( o n e h a n d g r i p ) in 1943; both had a 250-yard range. The M 9 and M 9 A 1 ( i m p r o v e d barrel c o u p l i n g latch) i n t r o d u c e d in m i d 1 9 4 4 h a d a 300-yard range. T h e 6 0 m m M 2 m o r t a r w a s p r o v i d e d t o rifle p l a t o o n s w h i l e the 8 1 m m M l w a s a b a t t a l i o n w e a p o n , w i t h r a n g e s

26

o f 1 , 9 8 5 a n d 3 , 2 9 0 y a r d s r e s p e c t i v e l y ; b o t h fired high-explosive, white p h o s p h o r o u s , and illumination (from 1 9 4 4 ) . T h e 6 0 m m w a s fired d i s m o u n t e d , a l t h o u g h it is p o s s i b l e t h a t s o m e units m a y h a v e built a s a n d b a g p l a t f o r m t o s u p p o r t firing it f r o m the b a c k o f their h a l f t r a c k . T h e 8 1 m m w a s fired f r o m the M 4 m o r t a r carrier b u t w a s a l s o p r o v i d e d with a b i p o d a n d b a s e p l a t e for g r o u n d - f i r i n g . The 5 7 m m M l antitank gun w a s an American-produced c o p y of the British 6-pdr M k 2 w i t h a longer barrel. It w a s a r e a s o n a b l y effective w e a p o n c a p a b l e o f p e n e t r a t i n g 3 i n o f a r m o r at 1 , 0 0 0 y a r d s , a n d c o u l d k n o c k o u t P a n t h e r s w i t h w e l l - p l a c e d side a n d r e a r s h o t s . It w a s p r o v i d e d w i t h a r m o r - p i e r c i n g a n d A P c a p p e d a m m u n i t i o n ; a n H E shell w a s n o t a v a i l a b l e until late 1 9 4 4 , thereafter i m p r o v i n g its value a s a s u p p o r t w e a p o n . T h e 7 5 m m M 8 SP h o w i t z e r o f the a s s a u l t g u n p l a t o o n w a s m o u n t e d o n a n M 5 light t a n k c h a s s i s , a n d with a n o p e n - t o p p e d turret a n d very light a r m o r it w a s n o t i n t e n d e d for direct c l o s e a s s a u l t . It h a d a 9 , 6 0 0 - y a r d r a n g e a n d carried 4 6 r o u n d s , a n d a l s o m o u n t e d a .50cal machine gun.

The halftrack T h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f h a l f t r a c k vehicles b e g a n a t the e n d o f W o r l d W a r I, b u t it w a s n o t until the m i d 1 9 2 0 s / e a r l y 1 9 3 0 s t h a t the U S A r m y u n d e r t o o k s e r i o u s d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e first h a l f t r a c k s w e r e e n v i s i o n e d a s u n a r m o r e d artillery p r i m e m o v e r s a n d utility v e h i c l e s - f o r e x a m p l e , f o r l a y i n g field telephone wire. T h e A m e r i c a n designs were influenced by French Citroen-Kegresse halftracks. H a l f t r a c k s w e r e b a s i c a l l y t r u c k s w i t h the r e a r w h e e l s r e p l a c e d b y t r a c k s y s t e m s t h a t p r o d u c e d less g r o u n d p r e s s u r e , t h u s e n a b l i n g t h e m t o t r a v e r s e m u d , soft g r o u n d , a n d s n o w . T h e t r a c k s a l s o p r o v i d e d i m p r o v e d t r a c t i o n a n d e n a b l e d t h e m t o better n e g o t i a t e b r o k e n g r o u n d a n d d e b r i s . H a l f t r a c k s w e r e p r o v i d e d a roller m o u n t e d o n the f r o n t b u m p e r t o a i d in c r o s s i n g ditches a n d gulleys; this w a s o n l y m a r g i n a l l y effective, a n d w a s r e p l a c e d b y a 2 0 0 f t c a b l e w i n c h for s e l f - e x t r a c t i o n . T h e f r o n t w h e e l s w e r e p o w e r e d , b u t v u l n e r a b l e t o a n t i p e r s o n n e l m i n e s . R e g a r d l e s s o f their i m p r o v e d c r o s s - c o u n t r y a b i l i t y c o m p a r e d t o t r u c k s , they w e r e n o t h e a v y full-tracked vehicles a n d c o u l d o n l y n e g o t i a t e m o d e r a t e l y difficult terrain a n d o b s t a c l e s , s o c o u l d n o t a l w a y s k e e p up with tanks. T h e 12in tracks were heavy cleated continuous rubber b a n d s , not steel links like t h o s e of t a n k s . In the late 1 9 3 0 s the A r m y d e v e l o p e d lightly a r m o r e d h a l f t r a c k s n o t only a s p r i m e - m o v e r s , w e a p o n s c a r r i e r s , a n d s u p p o r t vehicles, but a l s o a s a r m o r e d p e r s o n n e l carriers i n t e n d e d t o a c c o m p a n y t a n k s . T h r e e h a l f t r a c k s w e r e s t a n d a r d i z e d in S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 0 . T h e M 2 halftrack car w a s a l m o s t identical to the m o r e c o m m o n M 3 , e x c e p t for h a v i n g a lOin s h o r t e r p a s s e n g e r c o m p a r t m e n t ; the " w h e e l b a s e " f r o m the center o f the f r o n t w h e e l t o the center o f the t r a c k s y s t e m - w a s the s a m e o n b o t h vehicles. T h e M 2 w a s i n t e n d e d a s a p r i m e - m o v e r for A T g u n s , light artillery, a n d other t o w e d w e a p o n s , a n d ten m e n c o u l d b e s e a t e d in the passenger c o m p a r t m e n t . T h e M 3 halftrack personnel carrier h a d a longer passenger c o m p a r t m e n t seating 1 3 , and w a s provided with a rear exit d o o r - a feature the M 2 l a c k e d . It w a s i n t e n d e d t o c a r r y a rifle s q u a d , a n d w a s a l s o

The 60mm M2 mortar equipped the armored rifle platoon's light mortar squad. Since there was no fire direction center for centralized fire control, the 60mm was usually used to engage line-of-sight targets and seldom for indirect fire. In the background, the squad leader uses an SCR-536 "handie-talkie" radio, which most armored infantry units did not receive until the beginning of 1945.

27

u s e d a s the b a s i s for v a r i o u s s e l f - p r o p e l l e d m o u n t s ( S P M ) for a w i d e variety of w e a p o n s . T h e M 3 a n d its later p r o d u c t i o n v a r i a n t s w e r e the w o r k h o r s e s of the a r m o r e d infantry. T h e M 4 m o r t a r carrier w a s an M 2 modified to m o u n t a rearward-firing 8 1 m m M l m o r t a r , a n d h a d b i n s installed for a m m u n i t i o n ( 9 6 r o u n d s ) a n d mortar-specific e q u i p m e n t ; it h a d a c r e w o f s i x a n d a rear d o o r . In N o r t h A f r i c a it w a s f o u n d t h a t the r e a r w a r d - f i r i n g m o r t a r w a s n o t the best o p t i o n , a s it r e q u i r e d the c a r r i e r t o m a k e a 1 8 0 d e g r e e t u r n a n d b a c k into p o s i t i o n ; the m o r t a r h a d o n l y a limited left a n d right t r a v e r s e ( 6 5 m i l s either w a y ) . S o m e units field-modified their vehicles a n d m o u n t e d the m o r t a r t o fire f o r w a r d , t h u s a l l o w i n g the carrier t o s i m p l y halt, c o n d u c t a fire m i s s i o n , and move on. M1A1 antitank mines were carried aboard halftracks to enable the infantry to quickly lay an AT barrier if a defense was established, and to block approaches from the flanks when advancing; they might sometimes be laid exposed, and then recovered when the advance continued. The 10.81b mine contained 6lb of TNT; it was painted olive drab with black markings, a yellow band around the bottom and a yellow filler cap.

The M2 halftrack car had a 10in shorter passenger compartment than the M3 passenger carrier, but otherwise had the same dimensions. Note the ammunition compartments unique to the M2, with opening hatches behind the cab doors. 28

Halftracks were provided with various c o n v e n i e n c e f e a t u r e s . C o n s i d e r i n g t h a t they m i g h t r u n a t high s p e e d c r o s s - c o u n t r y , p a d d e d seats a n d b a c k r e s t s w e r e installed. T h e r e w e r e r a c k s for the t r o o p s ' i n d i v i d u a l w e a p o n s , h a n d - g r e n a d e s t o w a g e , e q u i p m e n t s t o r a g e s p a c e b e h i n d the p a s s e n g e r s e a t s , s m a l l e q u i p m e n t c o m p a r t m e n t s , e x t e r n a l t o o l a n d e q u i p m e n t r a c k s , M G t r i p o d s t o w a g e , t w o 5 g a l g a s o l i n e c a n brackets, a n d - o n later p r o d u c t i o n vehicles - e x t e r n a l r a c k s for A T m i n e s . T h e M 2 h a d l a r g e a m m u n i t i o n s t o r a g e b i n s o n b o t h s i d e s in the f o r w a r d p a r t of the p a s s e n g e r c o m p a r t m e n t , a c c e s s e d t h r o u g h the t o p f r o m inside the c o m p a r t m e n t or t h r o u g h e x t e r i o r side d o o r s ; these bins w e r e for a m m u n i t i o n for the w e a p o n for w h i c h the M 2 w a s serving a s p r i m e - m o v e r . M o s t halftrack v a r i a n t s h a d s t o r a g e for 7 0 0 r o u n d s o f . 5 0 c a l , 7 , 7 5 0 r o u n d s of . 3 0 c a l , a n d six

A prototype M3A1 halftrack, with the box-like M49 MG mount over the commander's seat. The large roll on the right front fender is a 36 x 44ft camouflage net, rolled in a canvas cover to prevent branches and brush from snagging on it. The side rack contains M1A1 AT mines.

b a z o o k a r o c k e t s . T h e driver's a n d p a s s e n g e r c o m p a r t m e n t s w e r e o p e n - t o p p e d , e x p o s i n g the o c c u p a n t s to weather, air-bursting shells, a n d g r e n a d e s . A r a i s e d c a n v a s c o v e r s u p p o r t e d by b o w s w a s p r o v i d e d b u t w a s s e l d o m u s e d in the field, since it restricted a l l - r o u n d visibility, firing m o u n t e d a n d i n d i v i d u a l w e a p o n s , a n d r a p i d exit over the s i d e s . A r m a m e n t w a s initially a . 5 0 c a l M 2 H M G o n a p e d e s t a l m o u n t in the f o r w a r d e n d o f the p a s s e n g e r c o m p a r t m e n t a n d a . 3 0 c a l M 1 9 1 9 A 4 L M G o n either side (or initially, w a t e r - c o o l e d M 1 9 1 7 A l s ) . O n early m o d e l s the . 3 0 c a l s w e r e m o u n t e d o n s k a t e - r a i l s r u n n i n g the l e n g t h o f e a c h s i d e a n d c u r v i n g a r o u n d the b a c k e n d ; these w e r e r e p l a c e d by three s i m p l e m o u n t i n g b r a c k e t s , o n e o n e a c h s i d e a n d o n e in the rear. E a r l y M 4 m o r t a r c a r r i e r s h a d a n a l l - a r o u n d s k a t e m o u n t for o n e . 3 0 c a l , a n d later m o d e l s a . 3 0 c a l m o u n t o n either s i d e . In p r a c t i c e m o s t h a l f t r a c k s c a r r i e d o n l y o n e m a c h i n e g u n . Halftrack a r m o r w a s minimal, being only ^ i n ( 6 . 5 m m ) thick h o m o g e n e o u s p l a t e o n the front a n d f a c e - h a r d e n e d a r m o r o n the s i d e s , rear, a n d floors; the w i n d s h i e l d a r m o r flap w a s V2in ( 1 3 m m ) thick. V i s i o n slits w e r e p r o v i d e d in the w i n d s h i e l d flaps a n d side w i n d o w s , c l o s e d w i t h sliding p l a t e s . T h e later M 5 a n d M 9 h a l f t r a c k s h a d 5/16in (8mm) homogeneous armor all a r o u n d , a n d a 5/8in ( 1 6 m m ) w i n d s h i e l d flap; this w a s n o t a n u p g r a d e in p r o t e c t i o n , b u t t o c o m p e n s a t e for the use of " s o f t e r " h o m o g e n o u s a r m o r . E x c e p t for the s h u t t e r e d f r o n t grill a n d w i n d s h i e l d f l a p virtually all the a r m o r s u r f a c e s w e r e vertical. T h e a r m o r p r o v i d e d the b a r e s t m i n i m u m p r o t e c t i o n f r o m s m a l l a r m s fire a n d shell f r a g m e n t s ; at c l o s e r a n g e a n d striking at a n e a r z e r o - d e g r e e a n g l e G e r m a n 7 . 9 m m ball a m m u n i t i o n c o u l d penetrate, and 7 . 9 m m S m K AP penetrated easily. A c o m m o n c o m p l a i n t w a s t h a t

An early production M4 mortar carrier, with the 81 mm M1 mortar facing to the rear. Note the skate-mount rail for the .30cal M19191A4 machine gun, which allowed it to be traversed to any position in the vehicle. The SCR-509 and -510 radios are fitted atop additional ammunition storage compartments.

29

b u l l e t s p e n e t r a t e d o n e s i d e a n d r i c o c h e t e d a b o u t the interior, r e s u l t i n g in h a l f t r a c k s b e i n g d u b b e d " P u r p l e H e a r t b o x e s . " H a l f t r a c k s w e r e c o m p l e t e l y v u l n e r a b l e to A T g u n s , P a n z e r f a u s t a n d similar w e a p o n s , a n d the fire of a s s a u l t g u n s a n d t a n k s . E v e n s m a l l a n t i p e r s o n n e l mines c o u l d d e s t r o y a halftrack's front tire, while a t a n k c o u l d p l o w t h r o u g h s u c h minefields. A s e r i o u s liability w a s the o p e n driver's a n d p a s s e n g e r c o m p a r t m e n t s . Air- a n d t r e e - b u r s t i n g artillery r o u n d s w e r e a s e v e r e t h r e a t ; the c o m p a r t m e n t s c o u l d be fired i n t o w h e n the v e h i c l e s w e r e m o v i n g d o w n - s l o p e , a n d w e r e o f c o u r s e e x p o s e d t o g r e n a d e s a n d t o fire f r o m m u l t i - s t o r y b u i l d i n g s . T w o 3 0 g a l self-sealing fuel t a n k s w e r e m o u n t e d inside the p a s s e n g e r c o m p a r t m e n t , o n e o n either s i d e , in the f o r w a r d p a r t in the M 3 a n d rear in the M 2 / M 4 . A 41b fire e x t i n g u i s h e r w a s c a r r i e d in the driver's c o m p a r t m e n t .

The roller aided the crossing of obstacles such as ditches, stream banks and gulleys, preventing the halftrack's bumper from digging into the bank.

Substitute versions of the halftracks were s t a n d a r d i z e d in 1 9 4 2 , the M 5 p a s s e n g e r carrier in J u n e a n d the M 9 h a l f t r a c k c a r in J u l y (but the M 9 w a s never p r o d u c e d , b e i n g s u p e r s e d e d by the M 9 A 1 ) . T h e M 5 / M 9 w e r e m e r e l y M 2 / M 3 v e r s i o n s built b y a different m a n u f a c t u r e r , a n d b e g a n t o b e delivered a t the e n d o f 1 9 4 2 . A b o x - l i k e M 4 9 m a c h i n e g u n ring m o u n t o v e r the right s i d e o f the driver's c o m p a r t m e n t w a s a d d e d , r e s u l t i n g in the M 2 A 1 , M 3 A 1 , M 5 A 1 , a n d M 9 A 1 . B e s i d e s n e w - b u i l d M 3 A l s m a n y w e r e c o n v e r t e d f r o m M 3 s a n d earlier S P M s . 5 A l t h o u g h u s e d by s o m e u n i t s for S t a t e s i d e t r a i n i n g the M 5 , M 5 A 1 , a n d M 9 A 1 w e r e m o s t l y p r o v i d e d a s L e n d - L e a s e t o the C o m m o n w e a l t h , Free F r e n c h a n d S o v i e t s . T h e M 3 A 2 w a s fielded t o c o m b i n e the roles of the p a s s e n g e r carrier a n d halftrack c a r ; the p r o d u c t i o n o f h a l f t r a c k c a r s c e a s e d in M a r c h 1 9 4 4 . A n e w m o r t a r carrier, the M 4 A 1 w i t h i n c r e a s e d t r a v e r s e ( 3 0 0 mils either w a y ) , b e g a n to be p r o d u c e d in M a y 1 9 4 3 . A further i m p r o v e d m o r t a r carrier, the M 2 1 , b a s e d o n the M 3 c a r r i e r b u t w i t h a f o r w a r d - f i r i n g m o r t a r , b e g a n p r o d u c t i o n in J a n u a r y 1 9 4 4 , b u t s a w o n l y l i m i t e d u s e ; it m o u n t e d a . 5 0 c a l rather t h a n a .30cal machine gun.

TACTICS: THEORY AND CAPABILITIES F o r t a n k s in direct s u p p o r t of infantry speed w a s n o t essential, a n d a " w a l k i n g " p a c e w a s sufficient, b u t t a n k s o p e r a t i n g in a b r e a k t h r o u g h role a n d p u n c h i n g into the enemy's rear a r e a s h a d t o m o v e faster. W h i l e it w a s recognized that b r e a k t h r o u g h t a n k s w o u l d need s o m e infantry s u p p o r t , the extent w a s not fully r e c o g n i z e d by m a n y a r m o r a d v o c a t e s ; the b a l a n c e of infantry t o a r m o r w a s typically i n a d e q u a t e in all a r m i e s , a n d l e s s o n s learned at a high price t h r o u g h the early d a y s of W o r l d W a r II w e r e n o t fully a c c e p t e d until 1 9 4 3 . F o r all p r a c t i c a l p u r p o s e s t h e r e w a s n o f o r m a l U S a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y 5

30

The M 2 series were made by Autocar and White M o t o r C o , the M 3 series by the Diamond T M o t o r Car C o and Autocar C o , and White produced all of the mortar carriers. The M 5 series and M 9 A 1 were built by International Harvester C o ; White produced all the mortar-carriers. The SP mounts converted to M 3 A l s included the 7 5 m m gun M 3 , 5 7 m m gun T 4 8 , and 1 0 5 m m howitzer T 1 9 .

An M3 halftrack, showing a non-standard bumper number system, photographed during exercises at the Desert Training Center in California; the camouflage net draped to the rear has been pulled back to give the .50cal MG a clear field of AA fire. The 3d to 7th, 9th, and 11th Armd Divs had the benefit of maneuvers in this massive training area in the Mojave Desert; although none of these formations would fight in North Africa, the amount of unrestricted space for maneuver and live firing was an invaluable training experience.

d o c t r i n e for m o s t o f the w a r . A r m o r m a n u a l s p a i d o n l y lip s e r v i c e t o t h e e m p l o y m e n t a n d i n t e g r a t i o n o f a r m o r e d infantry, a n d n o a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y m a n u a l s w e r e p u b l i s h e d until N o v e m b e r 1 9 4 4 , w h e n c o m p a n y a n d b a t t a l i o n m a n u a l s w e r e i n t r o d u c e d . By the t i m e they w e r e d i s t r i b u t e d the w a r w a s in its final m o n t h s , a n d e v e n t h e n t h e y w e r e o f little v a l u e , s i n c e u n i t s h a d a l r e a d y perfected their o w n tactics a n d t e c h n i q u e s w h i c h s e l d o m m a t c h e d the dictates o f the m a n u a l s . T h i s e x p l a i n s , for e x a m p l e , the w i d e v a r i a n c e in the practice o f the t a s k o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d e m p l o y m e n t o f c o m b a t c o m m a n d s . T h e m a n u a l s w e r e for the m o s t p a r t d e v e l o p e d o n o u t d a t e d t h e o r e t i c a l information gleaned from pre- and early-war maneuvers and on lessons from N o r t h A f r i c a . L i k e the t a n k e r s ' m a n u a l s d a t i n g f r o m 1 9 4 2 , t h e y o n l y provided minimal information o n m u t u a l s u p p o r t a n d integration of t a n k s a n d a r m o r e d infantry. F o r i n s t a n c e , a n e x a m p l e in the A I B m a n u a l o f a n " i l l u s t r a t e d p r o b l e m ( a t t a c k o f a p o s i t i o n ) " s h o w s the A I B e x e c u t i n g all a s p e c t s o f the a t t a c k w i t h the m e d i u m t a n k c o m p a n y h e l d in r e s e r v e a n d never c o m m i t t e d , while in p r a c t i c e the t a n k c o m p a n y w o u l d n o r m a l l y b e in the lead with the A I B s u p p o r t i n g it. T h e J a n u a r y 1 9 4 3 m a n u a l Armored Force Drill p r o v i d e d j u s t a b o u t every p o s s i b l e f o r m a t i o n a n d t r a n s i t i o n f r o m o n e f o r m a t i o n t o a n o t h e r for a r m o r e d infantry a n d t a n k u n i t s , f r o m p l a t o o n t o b a t t a l i o n - b u t the t w o t y p e s o f u n i t s w e r e a d d r e s s e d s e p a r a t e l y , a n d n o consolidated formations were s h o w n or discussed. M a n y veteran a r m o r e d infantry l e a d e r s w e r e n o t even a w a r e t h a t m a n u a l s e x i s t e d . C o m m a n d e r s were issued various after-action reports and training m e m o r a n d u m s (often c o n t r a d i c t o r y ) b y the A r m o r e d F o r c e , c o r p s , a n d o t h e r c o m m a n d s . T h e y a l s o s t u d i e d British b a t t l e r e p o r t s . M a n y t o o k w h a t l i m i t e d g u i d a n c e there w a s a n d d i d the b e s t they c o u l d w i t h it, c o n f i d e n t t h a t it h a d been tested a n d v a l i d a t e d by t h o s e m o r e k n o w l e d g e a b l e . F u t u r e r e g i m e n t a l a n d d i v i s i o n a l c o m m a n d e r s w e r e sent t o N o r t h A f r i c a t o o b s e r v e o p e r a t i o n s a n d learn f r o m c o m m a n d e r s a n d staffs first-hand. W h i l e c o m m a n d e r s g l e a n e d i d e a s f r o m all these e f f o r t s , they c e r t a i n l y p r o d u c e d n o s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n o f t a c t i c s . D i v i s i o n s d e v e l o p e d their t a n k - i n f a n t r y i n t e g r a t i o n p r a c t i c e s b a s e d 31

o n their s t u d i e s a n d e x p e r i e n c e s in e x e r c i s e s . It w a s often s i m p l y the c a s e that the t a c t i c s a n d t e c h n i q u e s u s e d b y a p a r t i c u l a r a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n w e r e the o p i n i o n o f the c o m m a n d e r , w i t h i n p u t f r o m his staff a n d unit c o m m a n d e r s . T h e y w e r e d e v e l o p e d by t r i a l - a n d - e r r o r in t r a i n i n g , w e r e refined in c o m b a t , a n d e v o l v e d a c c o r d i n g t o further l e s s o n s l e a r n e d , the a r r i v a l of n e w w e a p o n s a n d equipment, a d a p t a t i o n to local terrain and weather, and responses to new enemy tactics.

Armored infantry training

Typical "administrative" march formation for an armored infantry battalion.

JRCN-

ICP

-*

4 75SP

T h e r e w e r e n o d e d i c a t e d a r m o r e d infantry r e p l a c e m e n t t r a i n i n g units other t h a n the 1 5 s e p a r a t e A I B s t h a t u n d e r w e n t b a s i c i n f a n t r y a n d s m a l l - u n i t t r a i n i n g a n d w e r e then b r o k e n u p in 1 9 4 3 a s fillers t o d e p l o y i n g d i v i s i o n s . ( S o m e o f t h o s e m e n w e r e e v e n a s s i g n e d t o s t a n d a r d infantry units.) W h e n first c o m m i t t e d t o c o m b a t v i r t u a l l y all r e p l a c e m e n t s , i n c l u d i n g N C O s a n d o f f i c e r s , w e r e s t a n d a r d i n f a n t r y m e n w i t h n o a r m o r e d infantry k n o w l e d g e , a n d m o s t h a d n o t even seen a h a l f t r a c k . R e p l a c e m e n t s q u a d l e a d e r s , p l a t o o n s e r g e a n t s a n d p l a t o o n c o m m a n d e r s relied o n their h a l f t r a c k driver t o orient t h e m , a n d e v e n t o tell t h e m w h e r e t o sit. M o s t r e p l a c e m e n t p l a t o o n c o m m a n d e r s h a d u n d e r g o n e a s i x - w e e k tactical training c o u r s e at Ft Benning, G e o r g i a , b u t this i n c l u d e d n o t h i n g o n a r m o r e d infantry; it f o c u s e d m o s t l y o n w e a p o n s f a m i l i a r i z a t i o n a n d lectures o n fire a n d m a n e u v e r , w i t h few if a n y p r a c t i c a l t a c t i c a l e x e r c i s e s . T h i s t r a i n i n g deficiency w a s a m p l i f i e d d u r i n g the i n f a n t r y r e p l a c e m e n t s h o r t f a l l in the w i n t e r o f 1 9 4 4 / 4 5 , w h e n s o m e r e p l a c e m e n t s a s s i g n e d t o A I B s in-theater w e r e n o t even t r a i n e d i n f a n t r y m e n . Even units deploying f r o m the U S A suffered from inadequately trained t r o o p s . It w a s n o t u n c o m m o n for a b a t t a l i o n t o h a v e g o n e t h r o u g h the unit t r a i n i n g cycle a n d then t o be levied t o p r o v i d e s c o r e s o f N C O s a n d specialists t o c a d r e a n e w l y r a i s e d unit; their original b a t t a l i o n w o u l d itself r e c e i v e u n t r a i n e d r e p l a c e m e n t s o n the eve of o v e r s e a s d e p l o y m e n t , w i t h m a l i g n r e s u l t s for unit cohesion and confidence.

~0 0 0

Q

-81 MED

0 L_0

"G 0 MED

DET | BN M A I N T SEC I

32

BN CO

S-l,S-4

0 0

0

BN SURG

W h i l e a r m o r e d infantry units w e r e generally successful, t h e y w e r e s o m e t i m e s less t h a n efficient o w i n g to i n a d e q u a t e l e a d e r s h i p t r a i n i n g . T h e s e w e r e in effect c o m b i n e d - a r m s u n i t s d o w n t o p l a t o o n level; the rifle p l a t o o n h a d its o w n m o r t a r a n d m a c h i n e - g u n s q u a d s , a s well a s m a c h i n e g u n s m o u n t e d o n its five halftracks, which w e r e m a n e u v e r elements in their o w n right if u s e d a s such. T h e p l a t o o n s h a d t o be c a p a b l e o f w o r k i n g w i t h t a n k s habitually, n o t just o n a n o c c a s i o n a l b a s i s . The situation was made more complex by r e o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d the fielding o f n e w w e a p o n s a n d e q u i p m e n t , for w h i c h t r a i n i n g - t i m e w a s a l w a y s brief a n d o f t e n n o n - e x i s t e n t . T h e r e w e r e u n i t s t h a t received b a z o o k a s b u t w e r e u n a b l e t o e m p l o y t h e m ; since there were n o m a n u a l s a n d n o one h a d been trained to use t h e m , t h e y h a d t o w a i t until r e p l a c e m e n t s w h o h a d r e c e i v e d t r a i n i n g in their u s e j o i n e d the r a n k s . Individual and small-unit training w a s conducted w i t h i n the A I B . T h e a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y m a n first u n d e r t o o k s t a n d a r d i n f a n t r y t r a i n i n g f o l l o w e d by a d d i t i o n a l

Tank-infantry operations required close cooperation between tankers and armored infantrymen. Here tankers and infantrymen together study their planned route of advance.

specialized a r m o r e d infantry skills, a s p r e s c r i b e d in the S e p t e m b e r 1 2 , 1 9 4 3 Infantry Training Program. A s c a n be seen in T a b l e 1 3 , the e x t e n t a n d f o c u s of training w e r e m u c h different. The formation of an AIB went through several steps of organization, e q u i p p i n g , a n d t r a i n i n g p r i o r t o o v e r s e a s d e p l o y m e n t . U p o n a c t i v a t i o n the unit's c a d r e o f officers, N C O s , a n d s p e c i a l i s t s w e r e a s s e m b l e d ; s o m e c a m e f r o m t r a i n i n g units a n d o t h e r s w o u l d be levied f r o m e x i s t i n g units t o p r o v i d e a n at l e a s t m i n i m a l l y - e x p e r i e n c e d c o r e t o b u i l d the u n i t a r o u n d . M o s t l y c o n s c r i p t e d , u n t r a i n e d recruits w o u l d be a s s i g n e d a n d b a s i c t r a i n i n g w o u l d c o m m e n c e f o l l o w e d by specialist a n d technical t r a i n i n g , all given by the N C O a n d officer c a d r e . W e a p o n s a n d e q u i p m e n t t r a i n i n g w o u l d b e i n t e g r a t e d i n t o this, a s w o u l d small-unit t r a i n i n g ( s q u a d , s e c t i o n , a n d p l a t o o n ) . T h i s is w h e r e w e a p o n s c r e w s , s q u a d s , a n d s p e c i a l i s t s e c t i o n s l e a r n e d their j o b s . F u r t h e r p l a t o o n a n d c o m p a n y t r a i n i n g w o u l d b e g i n , s o m e t i m e s c o n d u c t e d in m a n e u v e r a r e a s a w a y f r o m the unit's h o m e p o s t . B a t t a l i o n - l e v e l t r a i n i n g w a s undertaken as part of divisional maneuvers; with only a couple of exceptions the a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s p a r t i c i p a t e d in a t l e a s t o n e o f t h e b i g L o u i s i a n a , T e n n e s s e e , or C a r o l i n a m a n e u v e r s . T h e W a r D e p a r t m e n t test t o a s c e r t a i n a unit's r e a d i n e s s for o v e r s e a s d e p l o y m e n t w a s often c o n d u c t e d in c o n j u n c t i o n with d i v i s i o n a l m a n e u v e r s . ( D u r i n g this p r o c e s s the d i v i s i o n m i g h t h a v e b e e n s t a t i o n e d o n t w o or three different p o s t s , g i v i n g t h e m m a n e u v e r e x p e r i e n c e

Table 13: Infantry squad training comparison Armored infantry

Standard infantry

Subject

Subject

Hours

Hours

Operations of patrols, day & night

8

Tactical training of the infantry soldier

16

Scouting & observing, day & night

8

Tactics of the crew & squad, day & night

56

Bayonet

8

Bayonet

Rifle, .30cal

68

Machine gun, ,30cal

Automatic rifle, .30cal

38

Vehicular crew drill & maintenance

Total

130

8 32 4 116 33

o n different t y p e s of terrain.) T h e y w o u l d then m o v e t o a p o s t t o g e t r e a d y for d e p l o y m e n t , a n d then t o the p o r t o f e m b a r k a t i o n . In B r i t a i n they u s u a l l y h a d s o m e t i m e for a d d i t i o n a l t a c t i c a l t r a i n i n g a n d r a n g e - f i r i n g , a t l e a s t a t the small-unit level; however, f r o m the 7 t h A r m d D i v o n w a r d s the d i v i s i o n s s p e n t only a b o u t t w o m o n t h s in B r i t a i n b e f o r e d e p l o y i n g t o F r a n c e , o r w e r e even s h i p p e d directly f r o m the S t a t e s t o F r a n c e , a n d n e c e s s a r y m a i n t e n a n c e , p r e p a r a t i o n s a n d s t a g i n g left t h e m little t i m e for t r a i n i n g .

Movement formations R e g a r d l e s s of the e c h e l o n , units u s e d the s a m e t y p e o f m o v e m e n t f o r m a t i o n s . D e p e n d e n t o n w h e t h e r they w e r e c o n d u c t i n g a m o v e m e n t - t o - c o n t a c t or w e r e e n g a g e d , the f o r m a t i o n a n d i n t e r v a l s selected w o u l d d e p e n d o n the t e r r a i n , visibility, a v e n u e s o f a p p r o a c h , e n e m y s i t u a t i o n , m i s s i o n , a n d a t t a c h m e n t s . T h e unit c o m m a n d e r ' s vehicle w a s in the center o f the line, d i a m o n d , w e d g e , a n d i n v e r t e d w e d g e f o r m a t i o n s , a n d in t h e l e a d o f t h e line a n d e c h e l o n f o r m a t i o n s . Irrespective o f the size of the unit its s u b u n i t s w e r e d e p l o y e d in similar p a t t e r n s :

Inverted and one front to subunits

wedge A l s o k n o w n a s a " V " f o r m a t i o n , it h a d t w o s u b u n i t s f o r w a r d t o the r e a r ; this s t a n d a r d " t w o u p a n d o n e b a c k " a l l o w e d a b r o a d be c o v e r e d , w i t h the r e a r s u b u n i t a b l e t o s u p p o r t t h e f o r w a r d or m o v e t o either f l a n k .

Wedge O n e s u b u n i t f o r w a r d a n d t w o t o the rear, e c h e l o n e d t o the right a n d left. T h i s w a s u s e d w h e n neither f l a n k w a s s e c u r e , o r w h e n t h e s i t u a t i o n i n d i c a t e d t h a t a n e n v e l o p m e n t or f l a n k i n g a t t a c k m i g h t b e c o n d u c t e d t o o n e or the other f l a n k . Echelon T h e s u b u n i t s w e r e d e p l o y e d in a " s t e p p e d " o r s l a n t e d f o r m a t i o n t o o n e flank or the other - the f l a n k t h a t w a s e x p o s e d . Column S u b u n i t s f o l l o w i n g o n e b e h i n d the o t h e r o n r o a d s , n a r r o w a v e n u e s o f a p p r o a c h , a n d w h e n the f l a n k s w e r e s e c u r e - the e a s i e s t f o r m a t i o n t o c o n t r o l a n d the fastest m o v i n g . Line T h e line f o r m a t i o n w a s o n l y u s e d b y d i s m o u n t e d s q u a d s a n d p l a t o o n s . T h e d i s m o u n t e d M G a n d m o r t a r s q u a d s c o u l d a c c o m p a n y the p l a t o o n o r p r o v i d e s u p p o r t i n g fire. Diamond T h e b a s i c f o r m a t i o n for the i n f a n t r y p l a t o o n , n o t u s e d b y t a n k units. T h e p l a t o o n leader's vehicle a n d the t w o o t h e r rifle s q u a d s f o r m e d a

FORMATIONS - MOUNTED ARMORED

•

TANK

RIFLE

&

PLATOONS

While armored rifle and tank platoons and companies worked side by side and both platoons had five vehicles, their movement formations were different. It should be noted that the rifle platoon did not use the tank platoon's inverted wedge; and that there was no tank platoon equivalent of the rifle platoon's diamond. Each formation had its uses, allowing maximum firepower to the front, flanks, all-round, or in combinations. The column was for rapid and easily controlled movement, and was used frequently, since so much movement was by road. The diamond provided excellent all-round fires; it allowed the mortar and MG squad halftracks to maneuver to either flank, or switch easily into wedge and line formations. The echelon and wedge provided fire to one or

both flanks, and the latter still provided effective fire to the front; naturally, the line maximized frontal fire. Intervals depended on terrain, visibility and the tactical situation; the standard "by the book" interval between vehicles on level, open terrain was 25 yards apart sideways and front to rear, and in column formation a 25-yard interval was recommended. Platoons had to learn an orderly transition from one formation t o another, and adjustments had t o be made when vehicles were battle-damaged, malfunctioned, or left behind bogged down. Key:

= Rifle squads; M 4 = Mortar squad; M G 5 = LMG Squad T a n k p l a t o o n : 1 = Platoon leader; 4 = Platoon sergeant

A r m o r e d rifle p l a t o o n : R1 t o R3

w e d g e , w i t h the p l a t o o n l e a d e r a n d 1st S q u a d at the a p e x , a n d the m o r t a r a n d M G s q u a d s o n line t o the r e a r o f the w e d g e . W h e t h e r the c o m p a n i e s w e r e f o r m e d in line, c o l u m n , e c h e l o n , w e d g e , o r i n v e r t e d w e d g e , w i t h i n e a c h c o m p a n y f o r m a t i o n the p l a t o o n s c o u l d b e in the d i a m o n d f o r m a t i o n , w h i c h p r o v i d e d a l l - a r o u n d o b s e r v a t i o n a n d fire f r o m the h a l f t r a c k ' s m a c h i n e g u n s . D e p e n d i n g u p o n the t e r r a i n a n d t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n the s u b u n i t s w o u l d n o t n e c e s s a r i l y be in the s a m e f o r m a t i o n a s the p a r e n t u n i t . F o r e x a m p l e , a c o m p a n y in a n i n v e r t e d w e d g e m i g h t h a v e the t w o f o r w a r d p l a t o o n s in a line f o r m a t i o n t o c o v e r a w i d e f r o n t , w h i l e the s u p p o r t p l a t o o n t o the rear m i g h t b e in a c o l u m n .

Air security on the march of an armored rifle platoon: machine guns are pointed to the front, right, rear and left, and each halftrack has all-round air observers. The weapons can just as easily engage ground targets.

In c o m b a t the c o m p a n y H Q vehicles (other t h a n the c o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r ' s ) w o u l d c o n s t i t u t e the c o m p a n y ' s rear e c h e l o n a n d be c o - l o c a t e d w i t h the b a t t a l i o n service c o m p a n y . T h e c o m p a n y C O ' s h a l f t r a c k is d e p i c t e d in m a n u a l s l e a d i n g f o r m a t i o n s , b u t in reality it w o u l d n o r m a l l y be in the center a n d t o the rear o f the f o r m a t i o n , or b e h i n d the lead p l a t o o n , in order t o see m o r e of the f o r m a t i o n a n d better c o n t r o l it. O t h e r vehicles m i g h t a c c o m p a n y the c o m p a n y a t t i m e s , s u c h a s the a r m o r e d r e c o v e r y vehicle a n d the a r m o r e d a m b u l a n c e . T h e s e m i g h t f o l l o w t o the rear or be integrated into the f o r m a t i o n , for instance between the 2 d a n d 3 d P l a t o o n s . T h e s a m e a p p l i e d t o the a n t i t a n k p l a t o o n , w h i c h is n o t e v e n d e p i c t e d in s o m e m a n u a l s . F o r a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m o v e the c o m p a n y h e a d q u a r t e r s vehicles w o u l d u s u a l l y trail the m a i n b o d y o f the c o m p a n y .

Tank/armored infantry deployment W h e n t a n k s a n d a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y w e r e i n t e g r a t e d - a s w a s m o r e the rule t h a n the e x c e p t i o n - all o r m o s t o f the t a n k s w o u l d u s u a l l y be d e p l o y e d f o r w a r d w i t h the i n f a n t r y f o l l o w i n g , t o be m o v e d f o r w a r d w h e n necessary. If o p e r a t i n g u n d e r the p a i r e d c o n c e p t the t a n k a n d rifle p l a t o o n s w o u l d be in a m i x e d f o r m a t i o n , p e r h a p s w i t h the t a n k s f o r w a r d a n d the h a l f t r a c k s t o the rear, or i n t e r m i x e d w i t h i n the j o i n t f o r m a t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o unit S O P . C o m b a t s a w a n y m i x o f m o v e m e n t p r o c e d u r e s d e p e n d i n g o n the unit's p r e f e r e n c e g a i n e d t h r o u g h e x p e r i e n c e , the t e r r a i n , a m o u n t o f d i s p e r s i o n a l l o w e d b y visibility, a n d the e n e m y s i t u a t i o n a n d t a c t i c s . A typical s e q u e n c e for a m o v e m e n t t o c o n t a c t w o u l d see the c o m b i n e d a r m o r e d infantry a n d t a n k c o m p a n i e s a d v a n c i n g in a w e l l - d i s p e r s e d c o l u m n formation. R e c o n n a i s s a n c e p l a t o o n s a n d / o r light t a n k s w o u l d be r e c o n n o i t e r i n g f o r w a r d a n d g u i d i n g the c o l u m n . T e r r a i n a n d e n e m y d i s p o s i t i o n s w o u l d d e t e r m i n e the e x t e n t o f f l a n k s e c u r i t y ; this w a s k e p t t o a m i n i m u m , a s it s l o w e d the c o l u m n . W h e n a p p r o a c h i n g the o b j e c t i v e o r w h e n e n e m y w e r e e n c o u n t e r e d the c o l u m n w o u l d b e g i n t o d e p l o y i n t o a m o r e d i s p e r s e d f o r m a t i o n t o a l l o w the m a x i m u m n u m b e r s o f w e a p o n s t o e n g a g e . A n e x p e r i e n c e d a n d p r u d e n t c o m m a n d e r w o u l d n o t r u s h i n t o the a t t a c k b e f o r e d e p l o y i n g his t a n k s , T D s , A T g u n s , m o r t a r s a n d artillery i n t o s u i t a b l e a t t a c k f o r m a t i o n , a n d a s s i g n i n g t a r g e t s . A n e x p e r i e n c e d unit c o u l d d o this quickly, t o m a i n t a i n t e m p o a n d a l l o w the e n e m y o n l y m i n i m a l r e s p o n s e t i m e . T h e t a n k s m o v e d f o r w a r d ; the i n f a n t r y d i s m o u n t e d f r o m their h a l f t r a c k s a n d j o i n e d u p w i t h the t a n k s ; a n d the h a l f t r a c k s m o v e d t o / r e m a i n e d in e n f i l a d e , a l t h o u g h s o m e m i g h t h a v e m o v e d t o firing p o s i t i o n s .

36

A n a r m o r e d rifle c o m p a n y a t t a c h e d t o a t a n k b a t t a l i o n m i g h t h a v e a rifle p l a t o o n f o l l o w i n g the l e a d t a n k p l a t o o n a n d the rest of the c o m p a n y f o l l o w i n g the t a n k c o m p a n y . Alternatively, a t a n k c o m p a n y m i g h t be in the lead with the rifle c o m p a n y f o l l o w i n g , a n d the other t w o o r three t a n k c o m p a n i e s f o l l o w i n g it. A n o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t y w o u l d b e for rifle p l a t o o n s t o be p a i r e d w i t h t a n k p l a t o o n s in the lead c o m p a n y . T h e s e c o n d c o m p a n y in the c o l u m n w o u l d be a t a n k c o m p a n y , f o l l o w e d by a rifle c o m p a n y , a n d s o o n . E l e m e n t s s u c h a s the a s s a u l t g u n a n d m o r t a r p l a t o o n s w o u l d be p o s i t i o n e d w h e r e they c o u l d b e s t b e b r o u g h t into a c t i o n d e p e n d e n t o n the c i r c u m s t a n c e s . T h e t a n k battalion's light t a n k c o m p a n y w a s often split u p . It or p a r t o f it might be directly under the C C a s a r e c o n n a i s s a n c e unit, or p l a t o o n s m i g h t be attached to both the t a n k battalion a n d A I B for r e c o n n a i s s a n c e or flank security m i s s i o n s . O n e e x a m p l e of their u s e w a s t h a t they w o u l d f o l l o w b e h i n d the infantry at night or in forests. W h e n c o n t a c t w a s m a d e g u i d e s led the t a n k s f o r w a r d to e n g a g e the e n e m y w i t h m a c h i n e g u n s a n d 3 7 m m canister (the latter r o u n d ' s 1 2 2 lead balls w e r e effective b o t h a g a i n s t t r o o p s in light cover, a n d t o strip a w a y c a m o u f l a g e a n d v e g e t a t i o n ) . C o n s i d e r e d o b s o l e t e by s o m e , light tanks h a d their uses; they c o u l d traverse m u d d y fields in w h i c h S h e r m a n s w o u l d b o g d o w n , or t h r e a d their w a y t h r o u g h trees a n d b r o k e n g r o u n d . T D p l a t o o n s or c o m p a n i e s m i g h t a l s o be integrated into b a t t a l i o n a n d c o m p a n y f o r m a t i o n s ; integrated f o r m a t i o n s c o u l d be quite c o m p l e x a n d v a r i e d , d e p e n d i n g o n m a n y factors. ( E x a m p l e s of f o r m a t i o n s are s h o w n in Plates C a n d D.)

Combat engineers with SCR-625 mine detectors, escorted by armored infantry to the rear, clear a gap through a minefield which has already claimed an M5 light tank.

The squad and platoon T h e h a l f t r a c k w a s b a s i c a l l y a m e a n s of t r a n s p o r t i n g i n f a n t r y m e n r a t h e r t h a n a c o m b a t vehicle; it w o u l d n o t be e m p l o y e d offensively a l o n g s i d e t a n k s w i t h the i n f a n t r y m e n f i g h t i n g f r o m it. T h e m a n u a l Crew Drill for Half-Track Vehicles s t a t e d : " S m a l l A r m s Fire F r o m Vehicle. - W h e n rifle o r c a r b i n e fire f r o m the vehicle is d e s i r e d , the s q u a d l e a d e r h a l t s the vehicle a n d specifies in the fire o r d e r the m e m b e r s o f the s q u a d w h o a r e t o fire. Rifle or c a r b i n e fire f r o m a m o v i n g vehicle is o f little v a l u e . " T h e h a l f t r a c k ' s a r m o r w a s t o o light, the o p e n t o p far t o o v u l n e r a b l e , a n d it c o u l d n o t a l w a y s k e e p p a c e w i t h t a n k s o n difficult t e r r a i n u n d e r c o m b a t c o n d i t i o n s . L i k e the d r a g o o n s o f o l d ,

Armored infantrymen, deployed in extended order, cross a clear area to search the forest on the far side. A halftrack to the right, beside a house, is prepared to give covering fire with its machine gun. 37

When the halftracks were left in the rear, armored infantrymen would frequently hitch rides aboard tanks. While it was recommended that no more than a squad ride on each tank, as can be seen this was often ignored; this particular scene is obviously in a relatively secure area.

•

a r m o r e d infantry w e r e t r a n s p o r t e d into battle a n d t h e n d i s m o u n t e d t o fight. M o s t units d i s m o u n t e d w h e n e n g a g e d , o r w h e n the a c c o m p a n y i n g a r m o r w a s e n g a g e d a n d they m o v e d u p o n f o o t t o s u p p o r t the t a n k s . T h e h a l f t r a c k s c o u l d b e left b e h i n d the n e a r e s t cover or c o n c e a l m e n t ; s o m e units s e l d o m e m p l o y e d the m o u n t e d M G s for fire s u p p o r t , r e g a r d i n g t h e m a s defensive a n d A A w e a p o n s , b u t m a n y units e m p l o y e d a t least s o m e of the h a l f t r a c k s t o p r o v i d e s u p p o r t i n g M G fire for the d i s m o u n t e d infantry. O n o c c a s i o n the h a l f t r a c k s w e r e m a n e u v e r e d t o fire o n different e n e m y p o s i t i o n s a n d a d v a n c e d b e h i n d the i n f a n t r y a n d t a n k s t o p r o v i d e c o n t i n u e d s u p p o r t . T h e y c o u l d a l s o be e m p l o y e d t o p r o t e c t e x p o s e d f l a n k s , the a t t a c k i n g unit's rear, a n d the s u p p l y line. In the d e f e n s e h a l f t r a c k s w e r e p o s i t i o n e d a s m o b i l e firing p l a t f o r m s a n d p r o v i d e d a " b a s e " for s p a r e a m m u n i t i o n , r a t i o n s , a n d g e a r ; they w e r e a l s o s o m e t i m e s u s e d t o e v a c u a t e casualties and prisoners. T h e driver a n d o n e o r t w o s q u a d m e m b e r s r e m a i n e d w i t h the halftrack t o o p e r a t e its m a c h i n e g u n ( s ) , a n d o t h e r s q u a d m e m b e r s often g a v e letters a n d p e r s o n a l i t e m s t o their driver for s a f e k e e p i n g . G u n n e r d u t y w a s r o t a t e d t o g i v e m e n a b r e a k , a n d e v e n lightly w o u n d e d , i n j u r e d , or ill m e n d r e w this duty. A n N C O w a s d e s i g n a t e d in c h a r g e o f the p l a t o o n vehicles - the senior m a n p r e s e n t , the p l a t o o n s e r g e a n t , the m o r t a r o r M G s q u a d leader, or a rifle s q u a d l e a d e r o r a s s i s t a n t s i m p l y n e e d i n g a b r e a k . T h e nine s q u a d riflemen w e r e d e s i g n a t e d N o s . 1 t h o u g h 9 ; the N o . 4 w a s the b a z o o k a g u n n e r ( " r o c k e t e e r " ) a n d N o . 5 his l o a d e r , b u t all s q u a d m e m b e r s w e r e t r a i n e d t o o p e r a t e the b a z o o k a . If the b a z o o k a w a s n e e d e d , then w h e n d i s m o u n t i n g the s q u a d l e a d e r w o u l d o r d e r , " R o c k e t s , " a n d if n o t he w o u l d order, " N o r o c k e t s , " a n d N o s . 4 a n d 5 w o u l d serve a s riflemen. N o s . 6 a n d 7 w e r e s c o u t s , t h o u g h this p r a c t i c e s o o n fell f r o m u s e . If a h a l f t r a c k M G w a s d i s m o u n t e d for g r o u n d u s e it w a s m a n n e d by riflemen N o . 1 t h r o u g h 3 u n d e r the c o n t r o l of

FORMATIONS - MOUNTED ARMORED TANK

RIFLE

&

COMPANIES

Armored rifle and tank companies typically operated together in combined formations, for all practical purposes as a single unit. The deployment of platoons depended on the tactical situation and terrain, although most units had more or less SOP formations when moving to contact on roads, advancing dispersed cross-country, or deployed in battle formation. The platoon symbols do not indicate a particular formation. That would depend on the tactical situation, terrain, and visibility, and platoons might assume different formations from one another. In these examples, the armored rifle company is Company A and the tank company is Company B. In one instance a light tank platoon from the tank battalion's Company D is attached, as is the AlB's battalion HMG section and/or assault gun platoon. 1 : The armored rifle and tank companies are deployed in an attack formation on a wide frontage. The 3d Tank Platoon is short a tank. The infantry are dismounted, with squads

following the tanks. The attached light tank platoon is deployed in echelon to protect the exposed right flank. 2: The column formation was used for the approach and even the movement-to-contact when engagement was likely. This is because most movement was accomplished on roads, and it allowed ease of control. Once engaged, the formation w o u l d deploy as necessary, based on the enemy's disposition, terrain, and obstacles. The lead rifle and tank platoons' squads and tanks are interspaced, followed by the t w o company HQs, while the other rifle platoons follow the tank platoons. The AlB's assault gun and 81 m m mortar platoons accompany the formation. 3: On each flank one tank platoon is forward in the inverted wedge formation, with the dismounted squads of a rifle platoon accompanying the tanks. A battalion HMG section follows the 1 st Platoons on the left, to secure that flank and support by fire. The supporting platoons follow, prepared to deploy to either flank or relieve a platoon suffering losses.

3d Plat 1st P l a t

I

•

M

•

|

• J I

d P l a t

I •

M

•

•

I Plat/Lt Tk Co

Co HQ

8, HQ/1

J

I

f

2/1

I

5

3/1

9 KEY

| Mort/1

I i

J

MG/1

CD

2/B

HQ

COs

i

CD

1/B

A&B

121

1/A

i s Cmd Grp

±

Aslt Gun

2/B

2/A

0

A r m d Inf

I

• •

A r m d Inf A T

Medium Tank

Light Tank

Tank

Infantry

CD

3/B

\ E 1 Platoon

3/A

3 AT/A

D i s m o u n t e d Inf

CD

Bn MG

3/B

Mort/A

2/A

•• •• ••

3/A

•••

AT/A

Section

Squad

76mm gun-armed Shermans spread out onto side streets as they reach an intersection. No infantrymen are apparent; this may be an instance when they are distancing themselves owing to frequent Panzerfaust or other AT fire. The infantry may be ahead of the tanks clearing likely firing positions.

ilSJ V11 n .W--%iiiiwgil.

the a s s i s t a n t s q u a d leader. In the M G s q u a d t w o riflemen w e r e the b a z o o k a c r e w if n e e d e d . A n e x a m p l e o f h a l f t r a c k s b e i n g left in the r e a r is p r o v i d e d by a 9 t h A I B (6th A r m d D i v ) i n f a n t r y m a n ; it is a p p a r e n t t h a t the t a n k s w e r e relied u p o n t o n e u t r a l i z e e n e m y d e f e n s e s : . . . f r o m b e h i n d a hill, s o m e o f o u r t a n k s t o o k u p p o s i t i o n s o n the rear s l o p e a n d b e g a n firing i n t o the t o w n . F i r s t o n e t a n k , then a n o t h e r , w o u l d c r a w l u p t o a p o i n t w h e r e the g u n w o u l d clear the hilltop [hull d e f i l a d e ] , fire a t the t a r g e t , b a c k o u t o f sight a n d a n o t h e r t a n k , a little further d o w n the line, w o u l d roll u p a n d d o the s a m e t h i n g . W h e n the t a n k s s t o p p e d f i r i n g , w e , the a r m o r e d infantry, left o u r h a l f t r a c k s b e h i n d the hill a n d w e n t t o w a r d the t o w n in a s p r e a d o u t f o r m a t i o n . A s w e c r o s s e d a s u g a r b e e t field, w e c a m e u p o n a n u n d e r g r o u n d b u n k e r w h i c h w a s flush w i t h the s u r f a c e a n d s o well c a m o u f l a g e d , I a l m o s t fell i n t o the e n t r a n c e . T h e r e w e r e G e r m a n s i n s i d e . A s e r g e a n t t r i e d t o g e t t h e m t o s u r r e n d e r , b u t they r e f u s e d . We fired i n t o the b u n k e r , then e n t e r e d t o m a k e s u r e o f n o further r e s i s t a n c e . H o w h a l f t r a c k s w e r e d e p l o y e d w a s s o m e t i m e s n o t even s t a n d a r d i z e d within u n i t s , a n d it w a s r e p o r t e d t h a t even p l a t o o n s within the s a m e c o m p a n y m i g h t e m p l o y t h e m differently, d e p e n d i n g o n the e x p e r i e n c e a n d preferences o f unit l e a d e r s . T h e a d v a n t a g e s of e a c h s q u a d h a v i n g its o w n vehicle w e n t b e y o n d merely b e i n g a b l e t o ride r a t h e r t h a n w a l k . T h e s q u a d w a s p a r t l y p r o t e c t e d f r o m w e a t h e r even w i t h o u t erecting the c a n v a s c o v e r (this w a s d o n e d u r i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m a r c h e s , b u t it c o u l d still be a c o l d ride in the winter.) Rather t h a n rely o n daily resupply f r o m the c o m p a n y rear, a r m o r e d infantry could carry a c o n s i d e r a b l e a m o u n t of s p a r e a m m u n i t i o n , rations, a n d water with them; they typically carried three d a y s ' w o r t h , a n d held s o m e in reserve in case the situation prevented timely resupply. T h e y a l s o carried a considerable a m o u n t of " c o m f o r t i t e m s , " including one-burner s t o v e s , g a s o l i n e lanterns, c o o k i n g gear, w a s h p a n s , b u c k e t s , 5 g a l w a t e r c a n s , l a u n d r y items, s o u v e n i r s , a n d s o forth. E a c h halftrack c a m e w i t h a 3 6 x 4 0 f t c a m o u f l a g e net, a n a u t o m o t i v e t o o l kit, first-aid kit, D - h a n d l e shovel, p i c k - m a t t o c k , a A V i k c r o s s c u t s a w a n d a single-bit a x e , which 40

c o u l d be b r o u g h t u p w h e n d i g g i n g in t o a u g m e n t the men's small entrenching t o o l s . S o m u c h e x t r a n e o u s g e a r w a s slung o n the sides a n d carried o n e x t e r n a l s t o w a g e r a c k s t h a t halftracks t o o k o n the a p p e a r a n c e of g i p s y c a r a v a n s . A r m o r e d infantrymen carried their bedrolls, a u g m e n t e d by liberated quilts, in the vehicles, s o did not h a v e t o w a i t a n d h o p e for the c o m p a n y trains t o bring t h e m u p , a s d i d s t a n d a r d infantry. A c a n v a s t a r p c o u l d be d r a p e d over the p a s s e n g e r c o m p a r t m e n t , with the s q u a d b u n d l e d u p w a r m inside, or it c o u l d be attached to the vehicle's side a n d s t a k e d to the g r o u n d as a shelter. S q u a d s p o o l e d their Ka n d C-rations for c o o k i n g in their collection of p o t s a n d p a n s , a n d s o m e m e n devised w a y s of heating C-ration c a n s o n the engine m a n i f o l d . T h e s t o w a g e in a vehicle a l s o a l l o w e d t h e m t o m a k e use of the p o p u l a r 1 0 - i n - l r a t i o n s (three meals for ten m e n for o n e d a y ) . T h e s q u a d s h a d the benefit o f the s p a r e w e a p o n s s t o w e d in their h a l f t r a c k s , w i t h the o p t i o n t o u s e the M G s , b a z o o k a s a n d m i n e s if n e e d e d . W h e n d i s m o u n t e d the s q u a d a n d p l a t o o n u s e d b a s i c a l l y the s a m e m o v e m e n t f o r m a t i o n s a s their s t a n d a r d infantry c o u n t e r p a r t s , b u t s o m e m o d i f i c a t i o n s w e r e r e q u i r e d . 6 T h e 1st S q u a d w a s s m a l l e r t h a n the 2 d a n d 3 d , a n d t h e r e w e r e n o B A R s . R e g a r d l e s s o f the d i s m o u n t e d f o r m a t i o n ( c o l u m n , l i n e , inverted w e d g e , w e d g e , e c h e l o n ) , the t w o - g u n M G s q u a d m i g h t be p o s i t i o n e d t o the rear t o a l l o w it t o m o v e i n t o firing p o s i t i o n s in the center o r f l a n k s , o r the g u n s m i g h t be a t t a c h e d t o specific rifle s q u a d s . A n o t h e r o p t i o n w a s for rifle s q u a d s t o d i s m o u n t a . 3 0 c a l f r o m their h a l f t r a c k a n d u s e it o n its t r i p o d . T h e m o r t a r s q u a d w a s t o the very rear, r e a d y t o p r o v i d e s u p p o r t .

An M 3 surrounded by its squad. The infantrymen viewed their halftrack not as an armored fighting vehicle, but as a means of transport and a mobile home.

T h e realities o f c o m b a t s a w m o s t s q u a d s d r a s t i c a l l y u n d e r s t r e n g t h , n o t just f r o m c o m b a t c a s u a l t i e s b u t f r o m f a t i g u e , illness, a n d n o n - b a t t l e i n j u r i e s . O n e or t w o h a l f t r a c k s w e r e t y p i c a l l y " d o w n , " u s u a l l y w i t h m e c h a n i c a l p r o b l e m s . L o s s e s w e r e often heavy, w i t h c o m p a n i e s d o w n t o 4 0 - 5 0 m e n a t t i m e s ; p l a t o o n s m i g h t field 2 0 - 3 0 m e n , w i t h the M G s q u a d b e i n g m e r g e d into the t w o o r three s m a l l rifle s q u a d s . T h e m o r t a r s q u a d m i g h t r e m a i n o r d i s a p p e a r ; s o m e units m a d e little u s e o f p l a t o o n m o r t a r s , a n d in s o m e c a s e s u n d e r s t r e n g t h M G a n d m o r t a r s q u a d s w e r e m e r g e d t o u s e either w e a p o n a s n e e d e d . A s a n e x a m p l e , in ten m o n t h s o f c o m b a t a c o m p a n y o f the 9 t h A I B lost 89 d e a d , 2 9 2 w o u n d e d , 19 missing or c a p t u r e d - losses a l m o s t a p p r o a c h i n g t w i c e the c o m p a n y ' s T O E s t r e n g t h .

Missions: the rifle company A rifle c o m p a n y m i g h t be p a i r e d w i t h a t a n k c o m p a n y t o fight a s a t e a m , o r c r o s s - a t t a c h e d t o a t a n k b a t t a l i o n , w h i c h h a d p r o b a b l y a t t a c h e d o n e o f its o w n c o m p a n i e s t o the A I B in e x c h a n g e . W h i l e rifle p l a t o o n s m i g h t be p a i r e d with t a n k p l a t o o n s , the p l a t o o n s o f a single rifle c o m p a n y a t t a c h e d t o a t a n k b a t t a l i o n w e r e s e l d o m s e p a r a t e d t o t a n k c o m p a n i e s - this s t r e t c h e d the rifle p l a t o o n s t o o far, a n d a c o m p a n y w a s m o r e effective if its s t r e n g t h w a s c o n c e n t r a t e d . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e r e w e r e c i r c u m s t a n c e s in w h i c h a p l a t o o n 6

See Ospey Elite 1 0 5 : World War II Infantry Tactics: Squad and

Platoon. 41

a t t a c h e d t o a t a n k c o m p a n y c o u l d be effective, e s p e c i a l l y if there w a s little threat f r o m e n e m y infantry. M o s t c o m m o n l y the t a n k s w o u l d be f o r w a r d a n d the infantry f o l l o w i n g m o u n t e d , d i s m o u n t i n g w h e n n e c e s s a r y t o m o v e f o r w a r d t o s u p p o r t or p r o t e c t the armor. T h e A T p l a t o o n w o u l d f o l l o w t o the rear. It m i g h t be e m p l o y e d w i t h all three g u n s c o n c e n t r a t e d , b u t individual g u n s w e r e m o r e u s u a l l y p o s i t i o n e d to p r o v i d e covering fire in o v e r l a p p i n g s e c t o r s . In the defense all o f the g u n s might be p o s i t i o n e d in the m a i n line of r e s i s t a n c e , b u t s o m e m i g h t be p l a c e d in the c o m b a t o u t p o s t line, c o v e r i n g g a p s b e t w e e n units or e x p o s e d f l a n k s . T h e a r m o r e d rifle c o m p a n y w a s c a p a b l e o f c o n d u c t i n g a w i d e v a r i e t y o f m i s s i o n s , a n d often several o f t h e m s i m u l t a n e o u s l y : 1. F o l l o w i n g a t a n k a t t a c k t o d e s t r o y r e m a i n i n g r e s i s t a n c e . 2 . Seizing a n d h o l d i n g t e r r a i n g a i n e d b y t a n k s . 3. 4. 5. 6.

A t t a c k i n g t o seize t e r r a i n f r o m w h i c h t a n k a t t a c k s c a n b e m a d e . F o r m i n g a b a s e o f fire in c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h A F A a n d T D s . A t t a c k i n g in c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t a n k s . C l e a r i n g minefield l a n e s , w i t h or w i t h o u t e n g i n e e r s u p p o r t .

7. P r o t e c t i n g t a n k units in b i v o u a c , o n the m a r c h , in a s s e m b l y a r e a s , a n d at rally p o i n t s . 8. A s s i s t i n g in f o r c i n g a river c r o s s i n g . 9. A s s i s t i n g in seizing a b r i d g e h e a d . 1 0 . E s t a b l i s h i n g or b r e a c h i n g o b s t a c l e s . 1 1 . A t t a c k i n g or d e f e n d i n g b u i l t - u p a r e a s . 12. Organizing and defending a position. 13. Performing reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance. 1 4 . P e r f o r m i n g offensive o r defensive o p e r a t i o n s a s p a r t o f a b a t t a l i o n . 1 5 . T a k i n g limited o b j e c t i v e s w h e n s t r o n g e n e m y A T d e f e n s e s m a d e the use of tanks impractical. 16. Sending out raiding parties. 1 7 . P e r f o r m i n g security m i s s i o n s . T h e r e w e r e f e w a t t a c h m e n t s t o the c o m p a n y f r o m b a t t a l i o n a p a r t f r o m a m e d i c a l t e a m , w i t h a h a l f t r a c k a m b u l a n c e , a litter t e a m , a n d a c o u p l e o f medics. T h e M G p l a t o o n could be attached to a c o m p a n y or a t w o - g u n section t o t w o c o m p a n i e s . T h e g u n s m i g h t be p o s i t i o n e d t o p r o v i d e o v e r h e a d fire (least d e s i g n e d t e c h n i q u e ) , t o fire t h r o u g h g a p s b e t w e e n u n i t s or c o v e r exposed flanks. W h e n a defense w a s called for or the a t t a c k w a s p a u s e d t o a l l o w units t o c o n s o l i d a t e , r e o r g a n i z e , r e s u p p l y , a n d rest b e f o r e c o n t i n u i n g the o f f e n s i v e ,

B

A R M O R E D INFANTRY BATTALION IN THE ATTACK An illustrative problem, the attack of a position, was provided in FM 17-42, Armored Infantry Battalion, November 1944. While the manual was current with ongoing tactics, especially in regard to integration with tank units, this example demonstrates how the AlB's supporting weapons (assault guns, mortars, AT guns) were deployed in a two-phase assault to secure two ridgelines. Ridge "A" is occupied by the AIB, and

the weapons are deployed to support the assault on Ridge "B", the intermediate objective. Once that objective is seized most of the supporting weapons are brought forward to support the follow-on attack on Ridge "C", the main objective. Note that some supporting weapons remain in their original positions, as they have the range to continue their support without re-deploying. Some of the company 57mm AT guns also remain in place to protect the rear of the advancing units. ( K e y t o s u b u n i t i d e n t i t i e s as p e r P l a t e D.)

Two armored infantrymen wolf down a frontline Thanksgiving dinner complete with turkey. They wear the M1943 winter field uniform; note the TL-122 flashlight tucked in the left man's jacket opening.

then a d v a n c e d units m i g h t h a v e to p a u s e to a l l o w l a g g i n g units t o c a t c h u p , r e s u m i n g the a d v a n c e o n l y w h e n the f l a n k s w e r e s e c u r e . T e r r a i n , weather, e n e m y r e s i s t a n c e , a n d l a g g i n g r e s u p p l y c o u l d a l s o force a h a l t , even if only t e m p o r a r y . T h e infantry w o u l d be the m a i n defensive force, b u t the t a n k s a n d T D s w o u l d be in c l o s e p r o x i m i t y for fire a n d m a n e u v e r s u p p o r t , p r o t e c t i n g the i n f a n t r y a s they d u g in a n d e s t a b l i s h e d their fire p l a n . Part, if n o t m o s t of the t a n k u n i t s w o u l d m o v e f o r w a r d into h a s t y d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s , hull d e f i l a d e if p o s s i b l e or using whatever cover w a s available. They might be a c c o m p a n i e d by infantry to protect t h e m f r o m c l o s e - i n a t t a c k s , a n d w o u l d u s e their M G s a n d m a i n g u n s t o drive off c o u n t e r a t t a c k s a n d c u r i o u s p a t r o l s . O t h e r t a n k s w o u l d r e m a i n b e h i n d the infantry, p r o v i d i n g o v e r - w a t c h i n g fires a n d s e r v i n g a s a r e s e r v e . O n c e the d e f e n s e w a s p r e p a r e d the t a n k s w o u l d w i t h d r a w b e h i n d the m a i n infantry line; their a c c o m p a n y i n g infantry, o r at least p a r t of it, w o u l d r e m a i n f o r w a r d m a n n i n g screening o u t p o s t s . T h e t a n k s , n o w p r o t e c t e d by the infantry screen, w o u l d r e s u p p l y , pull m a i n t e n a n c e , a n d p r e p a r e t o r e n e w the a t t a c k . Rifle c o m p a n i e s typically d e f e n d e d w i t h t w o p l a t o o n s f o r w a r d a n d the A T g u n s positioned a m o n g them covering tank avenues of a p p r o a c h . Battalion M G s e c t i o n s m i g h t be i n t e g r a t e d into the d e f e n s e , w h i c h c o u l d be reinforced w i t h s o m e h a l f t r a c k m a c h i n e g u n s . O n e rifle p l a t o o n w o u l d be t o the rear; this w a s the " s u p p o r t " p l a t o o n a n d w a s n o t c o n s i d e r e d a " r e s e r v e . " It w a s p o s i t i o n e d t o s u p p o r t the f o r w a r d p l a t o o n s by fire, a n d c o u l d m a n e u v e r to p r o t e c t a flank or c o u n t e r a t t a c k . It w a s this p l a t o o n that p r o v i d e d the o u t p o s t s a n d local security p a t r o l s . If the A T g u n s w e r e n o t needed to s u p p o r t the attack or d e f e n s e , the d i s m o u n t e d A T p l a t o o n w o u l d o p e r a t e a s a s m a l l rifle p l a t o o n , w i t h its t h r e e t e n - m a n s q u a d s ( e a c h w i t h three rifles, s i x c a r b i n e s a n d o n e S M G ) p r o v i d i n g a v a l u a b l e a u g m e n t a t i o n t o the c o m p a n y .

The AIB T h e m i s s i o n o f the A I B , a n d t h u s its s u b o r d i n a t e e l e m e n t s , w a s o r i e n t e d t o w a r d o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s in conjunction with tanks. T h e 1 9 4 4 doctrine s t a t e d t h a t : " T h e A I B in the a t t a c k m a k e s full u s e o f its mobility, firepower, a n d light a r m o r p r o t e c t i o n f r o m s m a l l a r m s f i r e " ; b u t there is n o m e n t i o n of t a n k s , or o f the fact t h a t the i n f a n t r y virtually a l w a y s d i s m o u n t e d t o fight, their m o b i l i t y b e i n g e m p l o y e d s i m p l y t o k e e p p a c e w i t h the a r m o r . In the o f f e n s i v e the A I B c o u l d b e u s e d in o n e o f t h r e e b r o a d w a y s : a s a n a s s a u l t f o r c e , a t t a c k i n g o n a p r e d e t e r m i n e d f r o n t t o seize d e s i g n a t e d o b j e c t i v e s ; a s a s u p p o r t f o r c e , s u p p o r t i n g the a s s a u l t f o r c e ( u s u a l l y t a n k s ) a n d c o n s o l i d a t i n g its g a i n s ; a n d a s a r e s e r v e , p r o v i d i n g d e p t h for the a t t a c k a n d flank a n d rear p r o t e c t i o n . T h e i n f a n t r y w o u l d be c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h the t a n k s t o fulfill the r a n g e o f m i s s i o n s listed a b o v e for the a r m o r e d rifle c o m p a n y . T h e battalion operations order provided information on enemy and friendly t r o o p d i s p o s i t i o n s ; the b a t t a l i o n ' s m i s s i o n , a s s e m b l y a r e a or other final a p p r o a c h - m a r c h d e s t i n a t i o n ; m o v e m e n t a n d a t t a c k p h a s e lines, z o n e of a d v a n c e , w i t h f r o n t a g e s a n d m o v e m e n t directions for b a t t a l i o n e l e m e n t s , a n d m o v e m e n t f o r m a t i o n s ; c o m m u n i c a t i o n s (call-signs, frequencies, signal 44

Fire support: an armored division had one or more tank destroyer battalions habitually attached to it, and they often fought alongside the armored infantry. Here, engineers prepare to demolish a knocked-out M10 with demolitions; severely damaged tanks and TDs were often blown apart to prevent the Germans from using them as pillboxes.

flare/smoke c o l o r s ) ; route-of-march c o m m a n d p o s t a n d vehicle control; m i s s i o n s for e a c h e l e m e n t o f the b a t t a l i o n ; a n d l o g i s t i c a l a r r a n g e m e n t s ( a m m u n i t i o n , s u p p l y a n d fuel p o i n t s , a i d s t a t i o n , vehicle recovery, e t c ) . In the a t t a c k the halftracks w e r e u s e d t o q u i c k l y m o v e into a t t a c k p o s i t i o n s where the infantry d i s m o u n t e d t o fight o n f o o t , u s u a l l y in c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t a n k s . S o m e vehicles - s e l d o m all - w e r e p o s i t i o n e d for fire s u p p o r t , a n d the others w i t h d r a w n to a p r o t e c t e d a r e a . T h e y m i g h t be c o n c e n t r a t e d at c o m p a n y or battalion levels in a g r o u p for easy control. Refueling a n d quick m a i n t e n a n c e could be undertaken. T h e y c o u l d be c o m m i t t e d to action w h e n required, m o v e d to another p o s i t i o n , or m o v e d f o r w a r d w h e n n e e d e d . P l a t o o n s or c o m p a n i e s w e r e n o t t o be c o m m i t t e d w i t h o u t c o o r d i n a t e d fire s u p p o r t . A n t i t a n k g u n s , M G s , p l a t o o n a n d b a t t a l i o n m o r t a r s , a s s a u l t g u n s , t a n k s , T D s , a n d 1 0 5 m m SP h o w i t z e r s w e r e t o deliver p r e p a r a t o r y fires on objectives and k n o w n or suspected enemy positions, assembly areas, etc., a n d w e r e p r e p a r e d t o shift fires t o o t h e r t a r g e t s a s n e c e s s a r y .

The AIR T h e tactical d o c t r i n e for the early a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t specified t h a t it c o u l d a t t a c k t o drive-in hostile c o v e r i n g f o r c e s , t o d e v e l o p a s i t u a t i o n , a n d t o seize terrain f r o m w h i c h t o l a u n c h the t a n k a t t a c k . It c o u l d f o l l o w the t a n k a t t a c k closely t o d e s t r o y r e m a i n i n g r e s i s t a n c e , p r o t e c t the d i v i s i o n ' s f l a n k s , o c c u p y a n d h o l d c a p t u r e d g r o u n d , a n d c o v e r the r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the t a n k units by screening a n d o u t p o s t s a s they p r e p a r e d t o c o n t i n u e the a d v a n c e . It w a s a l s o u s e d t o s e c u r e b r i d g e h e a d s , in w h i c h r o l e it w a s a s s u m e d t h a t the retreating e n e m y h a d d e s t r o y e d b r i d g e s , w h i c h w o u l d h a l t the a r m o r . T h e infantry w o u l d c r o s s the river by f o r d i n g , r u b b e r b o a t s a n d h a s t i l y erected f o o t b r i d g e s ; they w o u l d clear the far s i d e , a n d e s t a b l i s h a d e f e n s e c o v e r e d by artillery o n the friendly s i d e , w h i l e e n g i n e e r s e r e c t e d / r e p a i r e d b r i d g e s a n d set u p ferries. T h i s w a s a g r e a t d e a l for the r e g i m e n t ' s t w o , o r l a t e r t h r e e b a t t a l i o n s t o a c c o m p l i s h in s u p p o r t o f t h e d i v i s i o n ' s e i g h t o r e v e n t h e p o s t - 1 9 4 2 six t a n k b a t t a l i o n s . 45

T h e three remaining A I R s that s a w c o m b a t from 1 9 4 3 were mainly a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h e a d q u a r t e r s t o c o n t r o l a n d s u p p o r t each's three A I B s , w h i c h w e r e d e t a i l e d o u t t o C C s . T h e A I R h e a d q u a r t e r s itself m i g h t function a s a n H Q for a C C C o r o t h e r t a s k f o r c e .

Fire support A p a i r o f " m a r r i e d " a r m o r e d infantry a n d t a n k b a t t a l i o n s fielded c o n s i d e r a b l e f i r e p o w e r : 5 3 m e d i u m a n d 1 7 light t a n k s , nine a s s a u l t g u n s , six 8 1 m m a n d nine 6 0 m m m o r t a r s , a n d nine 5 7 m m A T g u n s (if all w e r e p r e s e n t a n d o p e r a t i o n a l , w h i c h w a s s e l d o m the c a s e ) . O f c o u r s e , only a p e r c e n t a g e of these w e a p o n s c o u l d be directed at t a r g e t s at a n y given time o w i n g to their p o s i t i o n in the f o r m a t i o n , terrain restrictions, a n d the enemy's d i s p o s i t i o n . T h e r e were three other i m p o r t a n t m e a n s of fire s u p p o r t . T h e p a i r e d b a t t a l i o n s h a d scores o f m o u n t e d m a c h i n e g u n s ; t h e s e t e n d t o be d i s c o u n t e d by c o m p a r i s o n w i t h t a n k g u n s , m o r t a r s , a n d artillery, b u t in fact p r o v i d e d a very v a l u a b l e s o u r c e o f fire s u p p o r t for o f f e n s i v e , d e f e n s i v e , a n d s u p p r e s s i v e fire, a n d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e by fire. A r m o r e d field artillery b a t t a l i o n s m o s t l y r e m a i n e d directly under division c o n t r o l . A l t h o u g h specific b a t t a l i o n s w o u l d be p l a c e d in direct s u p p o r t of a C C , the battalion w o u l d n o t necessarily a c c o m p a n y or even be in the immediate vicinity o f the s u p p o r t e d C C , a n d its fires c o u l d be shifted t o s u p p o r t other C C s o n order. T h e p r i o r i t y o f fires for all d i v i s i o n a l a n d a n y a t t a c h e d or s u p p o r t i n g c o r p s artillery m i g h t be given t o the lead C C , split equally between the t w o f o r w a r d C C s , or split w i t h the b u l k of the artillery a s s i g n e d to s u p p o r t the m a i n a t t a c k a n d the b a l a n c e the s u p p o r t i n g or s e c o n d a r y a t t a c k . Battalions o r batteries m i g h t be a t t a c h e d directly t o a C C , d e p e n d i n g o n the situation. E a c h A F A h a d three f o r w a r d observer t e a m s , o n e of which a c c o m p a n i e d a C C s lead elements, typically riding in a d e d i c a t e d t a n k or halftrack. W h e n resistance w a s e n c o u n t e r e d d u r i n g the C C s a d v a n c e the F O w o u l d immediately call in the a p p r o p r i a t e fire m i s s i o n s , a n d if timely these often neutralized or s u p p r e s s e d resistance b e f o r e direct e n g a g e m e n t w a s necessary. T h e artillery a l s o fired o n s u s p e c t e d or p o s s i b l e t a r g e t s including t o the flanks. T h e G e r m a n s were often s t u n n e d by the s h o r t t i m e in w h i c h A m e r i c a n artillery r e s p o n d e d a n d by its a c c u r a c y , v o l u m e , a n d r a t e of fire; they called it "automatische Artillerie." B e s i d e s d e s t r u c t i o n , n e u t r a l i z a t i o n , c o u n t e r b a t t e r y , a n d h a r a s s i n g fires o n p o i n t a n d a r e a t a r g e t s , artillery c o u l d a l s o deliver s c r e e n i n g s m o k e a n d , at

A R M O R E D INFANTRY COMPANY SUPPORTING A DEFENSE

While armor was envisioned to be the "arm of decision," welding its shock-power, firepower, and armored protection to mount unrelenting offensive, no armor unit could maintain a non-stop, continuous offensive operation. They had to rest, rearm, refuel, and refit; they might have t o hold up while other units caught up, or phases of other operations were completed, or when terrain, weather, or the enemy situation delayed operations. Tank units could not effectively hold ground, although they could reinforce the infantry's defense. Infantry was essential to the defense; besides direct small-arms fire they provided local security patrols, outposts and listening

posts, laid mines, emplaced obstacles, and conducted counterattacks. To protect the infantry while they dug in and readied the defense, tanks would screen the infantry, and they themselves were protected from close-in attacks. Here two platoons of an armored infantry company dig in and set up crew-served weapons (1); the support platoon protects the two forward screening tank platoons (2), while its machine guns and mortar crews dig in with the other rifle platoons further to the rear. The third tank platoon is held in reserve (3). A 57mm AT gun is being positioned (4), and some of the rifle company's halftracks and the service company's trucks have moved up to drop off ammunition and supplies (5 & 6). Both rifle and tank platoons are understrength.

night, i l l u m i n a t i o n . S m o k e w a s v a l u a b l e for s c r e e n i n g friendly m o v e m e n t s a n d blinding e n e m y o b s e r v a t i o n , a n d if fired o n m a n e u v e r i n g e n e m y units it w o u l d s l o w a n d c o n f u s e t h e m a n d h a m p e r their target acquisition and aim. Smoke r o u n d s w e r e a v a i l a b l e for the 1 0 5 m m howitzer, 7 5 / 7 6 m m and 1 0 5 m m tank g u n s , 7 5 m m howitzer, a n d 8 1 m m and 6 0 m m m o r t a r s , a n d m a n y t a n k s h a d 2in smoke mortars.

Fire support: the armored infantry battalion possessed three 75mm M8 self-propelled howitzers in the assault gun platoon, each with a towed ammunition trailer that could be dropped at need. They could provide both indirect and direct fire support, but being open-topped and built on an M5 light tank chassis they lacked sufficient armor to function as true close-in assault guns, and were generally replaced late in the war by up-armored 105mm gunarmed Sherman tanks.

E q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t w a s the air liaison officer, w h o r o d e further b a c k in the c o l u m n . Each advancing division w a s t y p i c a l l y p r o v i d e d a c e r t a i n n u m b e r of on-call air strikes per day, f r o m f i g h t e r - b o m b e r s that m i g h t be orbiting n e a r b y t o deliver their o r d n a n c e o n call, or o n s t a n d b y alert at a f o r w a r d airstrip. T h e P-47 T h u n d e r b o l t s a n d P-51 M u s t a n g s could attack targets with general-purpose bombs (usually 250 and 5001b), anti-personnel f r a g m e n t a t i o n b o m b l e t s , n a p a l m fire b o m b s , 4 . 5 / 5 i n r o c k e t s , a n d . 5 0 c a l m a c h i n e g u n s . F i g h t e r - b o m b e r s a l s o r a n g e d a h e a d of a n a d v a n c i n g a r m o r e d division attacking targets of opportunity, especially enemy armor, troop f o r m a t i o n s , artillery, f l a k , a n d s u p p l y c o n v o y s . A n A A A s e c t i o n , p l a t o o n , o r b a t t e r y of h a l f t r a c k - m o u n t e d twin or q u a d . 5 0 c a l M G s w e r e often a t t a c h e d t o A I B s or C C s , interspersed t h r o u g h c o l u m n s t o p r o v i d e A A p r o t e c t i o n ; the t w i n g u n s h a m m e r e d o u t a l m o s t 1 , 0 0 0 r o u n d s p e r m i n u t e . H o w e v e r , their real v a l u e w a s a g a i n s t g r o u n d t a r g e t s , s u p p o r t i n g the infantry a d v a n c e by p l a c i n g s u p p r e s s i v e fire o n w o o d l i n e s , villages, a n d other a r e a s h a r b o r i n g k n o w n or s u s p e c t e d e n e m y p o s i t i o n s . O n e e x a m p l e of their u s e w a s by the 6 t h A r m d D i v n e a r M e t z , w h e r e engineers w e r e w o r k i n g t o r e c o n s t r u c t a b r i d g e b l o w n by the G e r m a n s , a n d infantry w e r e u n a b l e to c r o s s the river t o clear the o p p o s i t e s h o r e . A t o w e d 4 0 m m g u n w a s e m p l a c e d o n a hillside a n d a " q u a d - 5 0 " h a l f t r a c k p u l l e d o n t o o p e n g r o u n d n e a r the b r i d g e ; the 4 0 m m n e u t r a l i z e d a n M G p o s i t i o n by achieving a i r b u r s t s a m o n g the trees in w h i c h it w a s h i d d e n , a n d the q u a d - 5 0 s p r a y e d the r i d g e , eliminating rifle fire a n d p r o v i d i n g " t o u c h - u p " w h e n snipers g r e w b o l d . Often t w o t o six t w i n / q u a d - 5 0 s w o u l d w o r k over a w o o d l i n e or a n objective village's o u t s k i r t s even if n o fire w a s received, a n d w h e n the infantry m o v e d in they often f o u n d c h e w e d - u p , a b a n d o n e d p o s i t i o n s . W h e n fire w a s received, the " f i f t i e s " w o u l d h a m m e r s t r e a m s o f t r a c e r s into the a r e a , r e p o r t i n g t h a t the enemy's fire c e a s e d o w i n g to a " p e r s o n n e l m a l f u n c t i o n . " (It is a g r o u n d l e s s a n d i r r a t i o n a l m y t h t h a t it is illegal t o fire . 5 0 c a l M G s at p e r s o n n e l targets.)

PRACTICE: TANK-INFANTRY COORDINATION In i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s w i t h n i n e i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s , s i n g l e t a n k a n d t a n k d e s t r o y e r b a t t a l i o n s w e r e t y p i c a l l y a t t a c h e d t o s u p p o r t the i n f a n t r y ; by c o n t r a s t , in a n a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n the infantry u s u a l l y s u p p o r t e d the t a n k s , a s they b r o k e t h r o u g h e n e m y p o s i t i o n s a n d a t t a c k e d into the e n e m y ' s rear. 48

Armored infantrymen fight their way through a town alongside M4 tanks. Enemy fire could come from any direction, including the rear; time and manpower did not always allow every building to be cleared floor-by-floor. Typically, the tank/infantry task forces punched through towns eliminating resistance, and left it to follow-on reserve units to completely clear the area.

T h e infantry served to protect the t a n k s f r o m close-in a t t a c k s , seized g r o u n d f r o m which the t a n k s c o u l d a t t a c k , a n d established a b a s e o f fire to s u p p o r t the t a n k a t t a c k ; they f o l l o w e d the t a n k s closely, a s s i s t i n g by fire, b r e a c h i n g A T o b s t a c l e s , seizing the o b j e c t i v e , m o p p i n g u p , a n d p r o t e c t i n g the t a n k unit's r e o r g a n i z a t i o n a s it p r e p a r e d t o r e s u m e the a t t a c k . T h e infantry's s u p p o r t i n g w e a p o n s assisted in destroying or neutralizing e n e m y A T a n d other s u p p o r t i n g w e a p o n s . T h e t a n k s , in t u r n , s u p p o r t e d the infantry a t t a c k w i t h direct fire, d e s t r o y i n g a u t o m a t i c w e a p o n s , n e u t r a l i z i n g the o b j e c t i v e until the infantry arrived, breaking u p counterattacks a n d countering enemy reserves; they created p a t h s t h r o u g h b a r b e d wire, anti-personnel m i n e s a n d other light o b s t a c l e s , a n d neutralized enemy c o m m a n d , c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d logistics facilities. T a n k s a l s o e n g a g e d e n e m y a r m o r - irrespective of the q u e s t i o n a b l e official doctrine that t a n k d e s t r o y e r s e n g a g e d t a n k s a n d t a n k s d i d n o t ; if e n e m y t a n k s a p p e a r e d , the t a n k e r s e n g a g e d t h e m . T a n k d e s t r o y e r s a l s o s u p p o r t e d infantry m u c h like t a n k s ; they w e r e s o m e w h a t faster, less h e a v i l y a r m o r e d a n d h a d semi-open-topped turrets, but otherwise they p o s s e s s e d m u c h the s a m e support capabilities as tanks. Effective t a n k - i n f a n t r y c o o r d i n a t i o n b e g a n w i t h j o i n t t r a i n i n g . N o m a t t e r

A rifle squad hugs an M4 tank to avoid sniper fire; note the Culin hedgerow-cutter mounted on the Sherman's bow, for tearing gaps through Normandy's banked hedgerows. Apart from the at-least-notional shelter provided by their bulk, there were two other reasons for infantrymen to follow close behind tanks. A Sherman had 16.5in-wide tracks (23in, on later versions); infantrymen would walk in the tread path to avoid antipersonnel mines, since the impervious tank tracks would have touched them off. Another reason to stay close during wintertime was the hot engine exhaust, welcome despite the noxious fumes. The left hand man carries a BAR; although these were not authorized for armored infantry until June 1945, some units had occasionally managed to obtain a few.

h o w well a n a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y o r t a n k u n i t h a d t r a i n e d o n its o w n a n d h o w p r o f i c i e n t it w a s , if they d i d n o t t r a i n together in all a s p e c t s of their o p e r a t i o n s a n d at all e c h e l o n s then their effectiveness w o u l d be l i m i t e d , w i t h a c o n s e q u e n t c o s t in s p e e d a n d lives. H a b i t u a l j o i n t t r a i n i n g

allowed

both infantrymen and tankers to learn one another's

capabilities

regards

to

and

cross-country

limitations

in

movement,

maneuver, and w e a p o n s employment. It m i g h t r e q u i r e t w o t o three d a y s o p e r a t i n g t o g e t h e r in c o m b a t b e f o r e functioned

smoothly. While

battalions

of

they or

elements of b a t t a l i o n s c o u l d be a s s i g n e d t o 49

a n y c o m b a t c o m m a n d in a division, it w a s f o u n d that h a b i t u a l p a i r i n g ensured c o m b a t effectiveness. If p o s s i b l e a n a r m o r e d infantry a n d t a n k b a t t a l i o n , a l o n g w i t h their s u p p o r t i n g artillery b a t t a l i o n , w o u l d be r o t a t e d t o the reserve c o m m a n d together t o m a i n t a i n the a s s o c i a t i o n . It w a s f o u n d t h a t s m a l l t a n k - i n f a n t r y t e a m s fighting their w a y t h r o u g h e n e m y d e f e n s e s w e r e e x t r e m e l y effective, b u t this r e q u i r e d the c l o s e s t c o o p e r a t i o n a n d m u t u a l s u p p o r t , a n d s o u n d t r a i n i n g of e a c h i n d i v i d u a l in his o w n a n d his unit's s h a r e o f the j o b w a s s t r e s s e d . J o i n t t r a i n i n g t o d e v e l o p t e a m w o r k h a d t o s u p p l e m e n t t e c h n i c a l t r a i n i n g if m i s s i o n s w e r e t o be a c c o m p l i s h e d a t m i n i m u m c o s t in lives a n d t i m e . O f t e n i n f a n t r y m e n u n d e r t r a i n i n g w e r e given rides inside t a n k s ; this m a d e t h e m a p p r e c i a t e the t a n k e r ' s limited field o f v i s i o n , a n d the c l o s e d - o f f feeling t a n k e r s e x p e r i e n c e d in " b u t t o n e d - u p " t a n k s . S u c h a n i n s i g h t h e l p e d i n f a n t r y m e n u n d e r s t a n d the difficulty t a n k e r s h a d in detecting a n d e n g a g i n g t a r g e t s - i n c l u d i n g t h o s e s u p p o s e d l y m a r k e d for t h e m by the infantry - a n d in selecting m o v e m e n t r o u t e s . It a l s o i n c r e a s e d the i n f a n t r y m a n ' s c o n f i d e n c e w h e n f a c i n g e n e m y t a n k s , a s he better u n d e r s t o o d their l i m i t a t i o n s . M u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the l i m i t a t i o n s o f i n f a n t r y a n d t a n k s in n e g o t i a t i n g different t y p e s o f t e r r a i n w a s essential. In m u d , r o c k s , d e n s e trees a n d b r u s h , b r o k e n g r o u n d , a n d r u b b l e d b u i l t - u p a r e a s the infantry w o u l d h a v e t o c a r r y the a t t a c k , w i t h t a n k s p r o v i d i n g s u p p o r t i n g fires. O n o p e n terrain, clear r o a d s a n d avenues of a p p r o a c h with limited m a n m a d e and n a t u r a l o b s t a c l e s the t a n k s c h a r g e d o n t h r o u g h , w i t h the infantry k e e p i n g u p t o p r o v i d e s u p p o r t w h e n n e e d e d . B o t h n e e d e d t o b e a b l e t o r e c o g n i z e the s i t u a t i o n s in w h i c h o n e or the o t h e r s h o u l d t a k e the l e a d . C l o s e a t t e n t i o n h a d t o be p a i d by t a n k e r s a n d i n f a n t r y m e n t o e a c h o t h e r s ' s i t u a t i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e a p p a r e n t i n a b i l i t y o f the t a n k s t o effectively e n g a g e t a r g e t s d e s i g n a t e d by the infantry m i g h t be d u e to excessive s m o k e a n d d u s t o b s c u r i n g i n f a n t r y t r a c e r fire, f l a r e s , or m a r k i n g - s m o k e . C o n v e r s e l y , if the t a n k s c o n t i n u e d t o a d v a n c e a n d f o u n d t h a t the infantry h a d l a g g e d behind it m i g h t b e d u e t o M G p o s i t i o n s o v e r l o o k e d by the t a n k s , o r u n - b r e a c h e d i n f a n t r y o b s t a c l e s . R a t h e r t h a n c h a r g i n g o n a h e a d w i t h o u t infantry s u p p o r t , it w a s c o n t i n g e n t o n the t a n k e r s t o d e t e r m i n e the i n f a n t r y ' s s i t u a t i o n a n d

BREACHING THE "SIEGFRIED LINE"

The formidable "Seigfried Line" or Westwall was breached in September and October of 1944. Units developed their o w n procedures for defeating bunkers. Typically, t w o or three tanks would approach a bunker from different directions after it and the surrounding area was barraged by artillery, assault guns, and mortars. This served to drive the defenders into the bunker from the t w o - and three-man fighting positions scattered around it (these potentially offered more resistance than the bunker itself). Most of the original antitank guns had been removed from the bunkers during the course of the war, leaving t h e m defended only by machine guns. While tank main guns and MGs fired into embrasures and suspected fighting positions (1), the infantry assault teams moved in with bazookas, satchel charges, and sometimes flamethrowers (2). The divisional armored engineer battalion possessed 18x M1A1 flamethrowers until November 1944, when these were withdrawn as they were so little used. Their disposition was left to the discretion of the theater commander; they were

sometimes placed in storage, but other units retained them. Flamethrowers were operated by engineers or specially trained armored infantrymen. Often the simple demonstration of firing a flame burst within the embrasure's field of vision was all that was necessary to perusade the bunker's defenders to wave a white flag*. An even more successful tactic was the use of dozer-tanks, here a 105mm howitzer-armed M4A3 assault tank (3). The M l blade, introduced in 1943, was designed for Shermans with VVSS suspension (shown here), and the M l A1 for the wider HVSS suspension. If the garrison refused to surrender, the dozer-tank would first plow earth into the embrasures, and then bury the exits - the occupants usually trotted out with Hande hoch before that final step. Engineers would place 500lb charges inside to collapse the bunker, preventing its reuse if recaptured during a counterattack. (* For more detail on the use of flamethrowers, see Elite 160: World War II Infantry

Assault

Tactics.)

p e r h a p s s e n d a n e l e m e n t b a c k t o a i d t h e m in r e s u m i n g their a d v a n c e .

Armored infantrymen take potshots at suspected enemy positions in order to draw fire, in which case the tank's 76mm gun and MGs will come into play.

T h e distance between infantry and tanks w a s n o t a c o n s t a n t , a n d d e p e n d e d o n the r o u g h n e s s of the g r o u n d , density of vegetation, visibility ( f o g , r a i n , s n o w ) , the t y p e a n d effectiveness o f e n e m y fire, a n d o b s t a c l e s . I n f a n t r y m e n m i g h t h u g the r e a r or side o f a t a n k for p r o t e c t i o n f r o m s m a l l - a r m s fire, but if t a n k s w e r e r e c e i v i n g A T g u n , artillery, or m o r t a r fire the infantry w o u l d h a v e t o distance t h e m s e l v e s , s o m e t i m e s by a c o n s i d e r a b l e m a r g i n . S m a l l - a r m s a n d A T g u n fire directed at tanks ricocheted, m a k i n g them h a z a r d o u s to infantry even 5 0 y a r d s a n d m o r e a w a y . A c o m m o n tactic w a s for the e n e m y t o d r i v e the i n f a n t r y a w a y f r o m the t a n k s w i t h m a c h i n e - g u n , m o r t a r , a n d artillery fire (one t a n k e r d e s c r i b e d the p i n g i n g s o u n d of M G fire, a n d hearing the i n f a n t r y m e n " s q u e a l i n g like r a b b i t s " w h e n hit). O n c e the infantry were s e p a r a t e d f r o m the t a n k s the e n e m y ' s o w n i n f a n t r y c o u l d m o v e in w i t h c l o s e - a t t a c k w e a p o n s s u c h a s P a n z e r f a u s t s , P a n z e r s c h r e c k s , rifle g r e n a d e s , hand-delivered shaped-charges and demolition charges. Tank-infantry c o o p e r a t i o n m e a n t not only c o m m a n d and support c o o r d i n a t i o n a t c o m p a n y a n d b a t t a l i o n e c h e l o n s , b u t the s m a l l e s t d e t a i l s o f t e a m w o r k in c o m b a t . A t n i g h t the i n f a n t r y w o u l d l e a d o u t w i t h the t a n k s f o l l o w i n g , especially in w o o d l a n d a n d b r u s h . T h e t a n k p l a t o o n sergeant o r l e a d e r w o u l d a c c o m p a n y the r i f l e m e n ; w h e n the t a n k s w e r e n e e d e d he c o u l d q u i c k l y b r i n g t h e m u p , k n o w i n g the l o c a t i o n o f the i n f a n t r y a n d h a v i n g h a d t a r g e t s p o i n t e d o u t t o h i m . T h i s a l s o r e d u c e d the c h a n c e of infantrymen being run over - a very real d a n g e r ; there were n u m e r o u s i n c i d e n t s in t r a i n i n g a n d c o m b a t w h e n t a n k s u n k n o w i n g l y r a n t h r o u g h bivouac areas, with g r u e s o m e results. A s the t a n k s m o v e d u p , a v o i d i n g o f t e n - m i n e d trails a n d r o a d s if p o s s i b l e a n d led by the g u i d e s , the b o w g u n n e r s c o v e r e d the a r e a t o the left a n d the c o a x i a l g u n n e r s the a r e a t o the r i g h t . T h e y w e r e p r e p a r e d t o m a c h i n e - g u n

Two armored infantrymen rush across a plowed field under fire, passing a knocked-out Panther tank. The GIs wear tanker jackets. 52

Crew survivors dash for cover from a disabled Sherman during street fighting; in such situations accompanying armored infantrymen gave them covering fire.

a t t a c k i n g i n f a n t r y off o f a c c o m p a n y i n g t a n k s "back-scratching." M i n e - r e m o v e r s f o l l o w e d j u s t b e h i n d the i n f a n t r y t o c l e a r t a n k r o u t e s , a n d the i n f a n t r y m e n c h e c k e d c l e a r i n g s f o r A T p o s i t i o n s o n the e d g e s . T w o i n f a n t r y m e n r o d e o n e a c h t a n k , o n e a r i f l e m a n a n d the o t h e r m a n n i n g the t a n k ' s t u r r e t - m o u n t e d A A m a c h i n e g u n ; b o t h c a r r i e d g r e n a d e s a n d u s e d the turret for p r o t e c t i o n . S m a l l - a r m s tracer fire often p r o v e d u n s a t i s f a c t o r y for d e s i g n a t i n g t a r g e t s to t a n k s since there w a s t o o m u c h of it flying a b o u t ; the U S u s e d red t r a c e r s , a n d G e r m a n tracers first b u r n e d red then p a l e g r e e n , or vice v e r s a . R e d a n d violet s m o k e h a n d g r e n a d e s w e r e generally u s e d t o m a r k t a r g e t s , t h o u g h since they generated t o o m u c h s m o k e a n d c o u l d o b s c u r e the t a r g e t for the t a n k e r s often half of the s m o k e c o m p o u n d w a s r e m o v e d . S m o k e h a n d g r e n a d e s fitted to rifle g r e n a d e a d a p t e r s w e r e pre-ignited s o t h a t they w o u l d leave a s m o k e trail to the t a r g e t , a n d s m o k e s t r e a m e r rifle g r e n a d e s w e r e later i n t r o d u c e d . W h e n t a n k s m o v e d f o r w a r d to s u p p o r t the infantry, a n infantry leader directing the t a n k s w o u l d signal his l o c a t i o n by p l a c i n g his helmet o n the r a i s e d m u z z l e of his w e a p o n to attract the t a n k c o m m a n d e r ' s a t t e n t i o n ; the p l a t o o n leader's t a n k w o u l d m o v e in that direction s o they c o u l d m a k e c o n t a c t . Even t h o u g h the infantry w e r e p r o v i d e d h a l f t r a c k s , these often r e m a i n e d in the rear a n d the infantry w o u l d m o u n t t a n k s . Typically, a s q u a d w o u l d ride o n o n e t a n k ; they w e r e c a u t i o n e d t o w a t c h for l o w b r a n c h e s a n d t e l e p h o n e / p o w e r lines, n o t t o s m o k e o w i n g t o the fire h a z a r d , a n d n o t to h a n g o n t o other riders b u t only t o the t a n k itself. T h e t a n k - r i d e r s h a d t o be r e a d y to a v o i d the traversing turret a n d be p r e p a r e d t o d i s m o u n t i m m e d i a t e l y if fired upon. The tank c o m m a n d e r could order them to dismount at any time, a n d only he c o u l d a l l o w t h e m t o m o u n t . T h e infantry l e a d e r w a s r e s p o n s i b l e for e n s u r i n g t a c t i c a l integrity a n d o r g a n i z i n g the t r o o p s t o g o i n t o i m m e d i a t e action w h e n d i s m o u n t i n g . T h e infantry w o u l d d i s m o u n t t o clear o b s t a c l e s a n d debris, conduct reconnaissance, rout out snipers, and ground-guide tanks w h e n necessary, a n d w o u l d s p r e a d o u t t o p r o v i d e security at a n y halt. 7

Colored smoke grenades were not available until late 1 9 4 3 . The M l 6 came in red, yellow, green, violet, orange, blue, and black; the M l 8 , in the first four colors only, generated more vivid and denser smoke. 53

Tank-infantry communications C o l o r e d s m o k e grenades, flares, tracers, and a r m - a n d - h a n d s i g n a l s w e r e of only limited v a l u e for communicating between tankers and infantrymen.7 H a l f t r a c k s a n d t a n k s w e r e p r o v i d e d a n M - 2 3 8 flag set ( r e d , y e l l o w , g r e e n ) . V o i c e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s w a s i m p o s s i b l e o t h e r t h a n by r a d i o a n d t e l e p h o n e .

Communications: an SCR-528 radio had one transmitter and one receiver. It was similar to the SCR-508, which differed by having two receivers (the smaller set to the right), enabling it to simultaneously monitor the frequencies of a commander's own subunits and that of his higher commander. These radios had a range of approximately 10 miles.

At company and platoon levels radio communication w a s possible between tanks and h a l f t r a c k s . T h e p r o b l e m w a s t h a t the h a l f t r a c k s w e r e u s u a l l y in the rear, a n d the a r m o r e d infantry h a d n o man-portable radios capable of talking to tank radios. M a n - p o r t a b l e radios w e r e n o t a u t h o r i z e d for A I units a t all until N o v e m b e r 1 9 4 4 , a n d these c o u l d n o t c o m m u n i c a t e or " n e t " w i t h v e h i c l e - m o u n t e d r a d i o s a n d w e r e strictly u s e d for c o m m u n i c a t i n g b e t w e e n g r o u n d t r o o p s . T h e s e sets w e r e m o s t l y issued in December 1 9 4 4 and January 1 9 4 5 ; one backpacked S R C - 3 0 0 "walkie-talkie" F M r a d i o w a s a u t h o r i z e d for the c o m p a n y HQ, a n d a S C R - 5 1 1 " p o g o - s t i c k " r a d i o m i g h t be s u b s t i t u t e d if the " 3 0 0 " w a s n o t a v a i l a b l e . T h e s e w e r e for c o m m u n i c a t i o n s w i t h b a t t a l i o n . T h e c o m p a n y C O a n d e a c h p l a t o o n leader w a s a u t h o r i z e d a S C R - 5 3 6 " h a n d i e - t a l k i e " u s e d o n l y for internal c o m p a n y c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , a n d this s m a l l h a n d h e l d A M r a d i o c o u l d n o t net with the " 3 0 0 . " In o r d e r t o c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h the infantry's S C R - 5 3 6 s , a n o t h e r w a s m o u n t e d in e a c h p l a t o o n l e a d e r ' s t a n k . A b o l t w a s r e m o v e d f r o m the c o m m a n d e r ' s h a t c h r i m p r o v i d i n g a h o l e for the a n t e n n a , a n d a s h o r t piece of r u b b e r h o s e w a s p l a c e d a r o u n d the aerial to k e e p it f r o m g r o u n d i n g . T h e r a d i o w a s m o d i f i e d s o t h a t the t a n k c o m m a n d e r c o u l d use a t h r o a t m i c r o p h o n e a n d o p e r a t e the s w i t c h w i t h a n i m p r o v i s e d e x t e n s i o n . Rifle p l a t o o n l e a d e r s ' h a l f t r a c k s w e r e e q u i p p e d w i t h a n S C R - 5 1 0 r a d i o a n d the c o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r ' s w i t h a n S C R - 5 2 8 ( m o u n t i n g a r a d i o m e a n t the l o s s o f t w o t r o o p s e a t s ) . T h e t a n k c o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r h a d a n S C R - 5 0 8 , his p l a t o o n c o m m a n d e r s S C R - 5 2 8 s , a n d the i n d i v i d u a l t a n k s S C R - 5 3 8 s . T h e S C R - 5 0 8 a n d 5 1 0 h a d a f r e q u e n c y r a n g e o f 2 0 - 2 9 . 9 M e g a c y c l e s ( M c ) a n d the S C R - 5 2 8 a n d 5 3 8 h a d 2 0 - 2 8 M c ; this m e a n t t h a t all of these r a d i o s c o u l d net, b u t this h a d t o b e finely c o o r d i n a t e d b e t w e e n the t w o b a t t a l i o n s at all e c h e l o n s , a l o n g w i t h a s s i g n i n g f i r e - s u p p o r t a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e net f r e q u e n c i e s . T h e s e w e r e all f r e q u e n c y - m o d u l a t e d ( F M ) r a d i o s , w h i c h w e r e

Leaving a village smouldering after passing through it, an M3A2 halftrack advances across the fields. Halftracks were sometimes brought up to transport the infantry across open ground exposed to long-range machine gun and mortar fire. 54

p i o n e e r e d by the U S a s a t a c t i c a l r a d i o b e c a u s e they o p e r a t e d m o r e r e l i a b l y than a m p l i t u d e - m o d u l a t e d ( A M ) r a d i o s used by m o s t armies. A M r a d i o s e n c o u n t e r e d difficulties w h e n m o u n t e d in vehicles a n d g e n e r a t e d m o r e s t a t i c . A m e a n s w a s n e e d e d to e n a b l e a c c o m p a n y i n g i n f a n t r y m e n to v o i c e - c o m m u n i c a t e with t a n k s , a n d a n effective m e t h o d w a s to p l a c e a n E E - 8 field telephone inside the turret with a flashlight fixed n e x t t o it. A 2 0 f t length of four-strand electrical c o r d w a s run to the rear of the t a n k a n d a n EE-8 h a n d s e t fitted, the h a n d s e t switch being m o d i f i e d s o it c o u l d trigger the flashlight inside the turret, alerting the tank c o m m a n d e r of a call. Often the infantry c o m m a n d e r simply carried the h a n d s e t rather t h a n leaving it a t t a c h e d t o the t a n k , w h e r e it could be d a m a g e d by fire. S o m e units m o u n t e d the h a n d s e t with a n e x t e n s i o n c o r d inside a .50cal a m m u n i t i o n c a n w e l d e d t o the tank's rear. A n o t h e r m e t h o d w a s to d r a g a n u p - t o - 1 0 0 f t length of t e l e p h o n e w i r e b e h i n d the t a n k , s o the f o l l o w i n g infantry c o m m a n d e r c o u l d a t t a c h a n E E - 8 h a n d s e t or T S - 1 0 s o u n d - p o w e r e d p h o n e t o the w i r e w h e n necessary. T h e s e a d d i t i o n s w e r e n o t fitted o n all t a n k s , but o n p l a t o o n a n d c o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r s ' .

UNITS IN ACTION Dismounted company action without armor In m i d - J a n u a r y 1 9 4 5 , C C A o f the 1 2 t h A r m d D i v w a s t a s k e d t o c l e a r a n e n e m y b r i d g e h e a d in the W e y e r s h e i m - G a m b s h e i m - O f f e n d o r f - H e r r l i s h e i m a r e a of n o r t h e a s t F r a n c e n e a r the G e r m a n frontier. T h i s w a s a r a r e i n s t a n c e in w h i c h a n A I B f o u g h t o n its o w n w i t h o u t a r m o r , o t h e r t h a n a s i n g l e p l a t o o n . T h e f o c u s will be o n C o m p a n y C , 6 6 t h A I B . T h e 6 6 t h A I B m o u n t e d o u t a t l a m f r o m villages w h e r e it h a d b i v o u a c k e d , a n d h a d u n d e r t a k e n training in p r e p a r a t i o n for the o p e r a t i o n . T h e c o m p a n i e s w e r e a t n e a r full s t r e n g t h . T h e b a t t a l i o n a p p r o a c h e d its a s s e m b l y a r e a a t H o e r d t a b o a r d 7 5 h a l f t r a c k s , in the o r d e r C o C , H H C , C o A , a n d C o B. In the a s s e m b l y a r e a at 3 . 1 5 a m they d i s m o u n t e d a n d w e r e b r i e f e d . C o m p a n y B w o u l d be in reserve, C o A t o the left a n d C o C t o the right, a n d the b a t t a l i o n ' s a s s a u l t g u n s a n d m o r t a r s w e r e set u p in t h e rear. T h e o b j e c t i v e w a s the S t e i n w a l d , a s m a l l f o r e s t e d a r e a ; C o A w o u l d clear the w o o d l a n d t o the n o r t h of a n e a s t - w e s t r o a d r u n n i n g t h r o u g h it, a n d C o C the s o u t h s i d e . A n e s t i m a t e d 1 6 0 G e r m a n s w e r e in the w o o d s , a l o n g w i t h s i x a r m o r e d vehicles. O n c e the f o r e s t w a s c l e a r e d the b a t t a l i o n w o u l d a s s e m b l e a n d , o n o r d e r , p r o c e e d to O f f e n d o r f for the R h i n e R i v e r c r o s s i n g s t o the s o u t h e a s t . All c o m p a n i e s d e p a r t e d H o e r d t at 3 . 4 5 a m o n f o o t in the o r d e r o f C o C , C o A , H H C , a n d C o B; they f o l l o w e d the n o r t h s i d e o f the D e r i v a t i o n C a n a l , u n d e r c o v e r o f its r a i s e d b a n k . T h e c o m p a n i e s ' A T g u n s w e r e left in the a s s e m b l y a r e a , the A T p l a t o o n s s e r v i n g a s rifle p l a t o o n s . T h e y r e a c h e d the

T a b l e 14: T a s k o r g a n i z a t i o n , CCA, 12th A r m d Div

CCA Troops

TF1

TF2

TF3

HHC, CCA

43 TankBn (-)

66 AIB

17AIBR

C, 119EngrBn

A, 119 Engr Bn

1-B, 43 TankBn

D, 43 TankBn

A,134 MaintBn

1-B, 92 ReconSqn

C, 572 AAA Bn

This M3A1, its back festooned with the squad's gear along with an air-ground recognition panel, mounts three machine guns: (left to right) .30cal M1919A4, water-cooled .30cal M1917A1,and .50cal M2. Ration boxes are stacked and tied on the front bumper.

L a n d g r a b e n C a n a l a t 4 . 4 5 a m , a n d C o B d u g in a l o n g it w i t h H H C . T h e e n g i n e e r s w e r e c o m p l e t i n g f o u r f o o t b r i d g e s o v e r the c a n a l , a n d C o s A a n d C q u i e t l y c r o s s e d a t 5 . 1 5 a m in s i n g l e file, e a c h u s i n g t w o b r i d g e s a n d b e i n g g u i d e d b y b l i n k e r lights t o their rear, w h i c h they k e p t a l i g n e d . T h e s u p p o r t p l a t o o n w a s 1 5 0 y a r d s b e h i n d the l e a d p l a t o o n s , p r o t e c t i n g the f l a n k . A f r o z e n d r a i n a g e d i t c h 4 f t d e e p , o r i e n t e d S W t o N E , w a s the b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n the t w o c o m p a n i e s ; the line of d e p a r t u r e r a n p e r p e n d i c u l a r t o the s o u t h w e s t e n d o f the d i t c h . T h i s is w h e n p r o b l e m s b e g a n t o d e v e l o p . T h e r e w a s n o identifiable terrain f e a t u r e for the line o f d e p a r t u r e , a n d in the d a r k n e s s a n d f o g visibility a c r o s s the s n o w - c o v e r e d g r o u n d w a s o n l y a b o u t 2 0 feet. T w o o u t p o s t e d G e r m a n s w e r e c a p t u r e d w i t h o u t f i r i n g ; b u t a s C o C a d v a n c e d o n the right they d i s c o v e r e d t h a t they w e r e o n the N W side o f the d r a i n a g e ditch in the C o A z o n e , f u r t h e r t o t h e left t h a n i n t e n d e d . T h e p l a t o o n s w e r e still in c o l u m n f o r m a t i o n , a n d the c o m p a n y C O w a s c o n f e r r i n g w i t h the p l a t o o n l e a d e r s w h i l e the t r o o p s r e s t e d , w h e n f o u r M G s o p e n e d fire f r o m a h e a d a n d the right f l a n k , c a t c h i n g the p l a t o o n s in the o p e n . P i n n e d d o w n w i t h n o c o v e r a n d the s u n r i s i n g , the c o m p a n y C O h a d n o c h o i c e b u t t o s i g n a l the a t t a c k . H e a n d the first m e n t o rise w e r e c u t d o w n ; C o C m a n a g e d t o set u p a n L M G and an H M G , but both were k n o c k e d out within 10 minutes. G e r m a n m o r t a r s b e g a n b a r r a g i n g the c o m p a n y , e s p e c i a l l y the s u p p o r t p l a t o o n t o the rear. M e n w e r e c r a w l i n g b a c k t o a f r o z e n s t r e a m o n w h i c h C o A m e n w e r e a l s o falling b a c k u n d e r h e a v y fire; there a t l e a s t o n e m a n o u t of every three w a s w o u n d e d , a n d all C o C officers w e r e d e a d . T h e A T p l a t o o n , w h i c h h a d b e e n f o l l o w i n g f u r t h e r t o t h e rear, m o v e d i n t o the s t r e a m b e d for cover. B a t t a l i o n c o u l d n o t be r a i s e d o n the r a d i o ; five P - 4 7 s b o m b e d a n d strafed the S t e i n w a l d , b u t the o r d n a n c e s t r u c k the forest's center, s p a r i n g the G e r m a n s d u g - i n o n the e d g e s . T h e 1st a n d 2 d P l a t o o n s o f C o C w e r e virtually w i p e d o u t b y M G , m o r t a r , a n d s n i p e r fire, a n d 3 d P l a t o o n a t t a c h e d itself t o C o A . O n e m a n m a n a g e d t o m a k e it t o the r e a r w i t h the G e r m a n p r i s o n e r s , w h o helped carry t w o w o u n d e d . H e w a s ordered to return with an ammunition t r u c k , b u t e n c o u n t e r e d m o r e t r o o p s drifting t o the r e a r a n d , t o l d t h a t it w a s p o i n t l e s s , he r e t u r n e d w i t h the t r u c k . 56

C o m p a n y A fell b a c k w i t h h e a v y l o s s e s , a n d the r e m n a n t s o f b o t h c o m p a n i e s d u g in o n the L a n d g r a b e n C a n a l a t 1 . 0 0 p m w i t h a t a n k p l a t o o n in s u p p o r t ; the b a t t a l i o n ' s a s s a u l t g u n s a n d m o r t a r s h a d n o t fired in s u p p o r t d u e to a c o m m u n i c a t i o n s failure. T h e 7 0 r e m a i n i n g m e n o f b o t h c o m p a n i e s w e r e sent b a c k t o H o e r d t for rest, b u t they r e t u r n e d t o the c a n a l a n d r e s u m e d the defensive p o s i t i o n s the n e x t a f t e r n o o n , w h e r e they r e m a i n e d until the 1 9 t h . T h e a t t a c k w a s a failure, b u t the benefit o f s t u d y i n g this p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n is that it d e m o n s t r a t e s the i m p o r t a n c e o f e m p l o y i n g s u p p o r t i n g w e a p o n s a n d a r m o r : it c o u l d h a v e r e s u l t e d in s u c c e s s if even a s m a l l n u m b e r o f t a n k s h a d b e e n e m p l o y e d a n d better u s e m a d e o f a s s a u l t g u n s a n d m o r t a r s . T h e p l a t o o n s p i n n e d d o w n in the o p e n h a d n o effective m e a n s o f r e t u r n i n g fire o t h e r t h a n s m a l l a r m s ; direct-fire w e a p o n s c a p a b l e o f s u p p r e s s i n g the w o o d l i n e s h o u l d h a v e b e e n p o s i t i o n e d t o s u p p o r t the c o m p a n i e s . C o m m u n i c a t i o n s w e r e i n a d e q u a t e : n o field t e l e p h o n e s lines w e r e l a i d b y the a d v a n c i n g c o m p a n i e s , w h i c h relied u p o n o n l y o n e r a d i o .

Tank-infantry team clearing a town O n F e b r u a r y 4 , 1 9 4 5 , C C A o f the 1 2 t h A r m d D i v w a s still in a c t i o n in n o r t h e a s t F r a n c e , p u s h i n g t o w a r d the G e r m a n f r o n t i e r n e a r C o l m a r . T h e h e a v y l o s s e s suffered earlier by the 6 6 t h A I B h a d b e e n m a d e g o o d . T F D o c w a s c o m p o s e d o f the 6 6 t h A I B (less C o C ) ; C o A , 4 3 d T a n k B n ; 1st P l a t o o n , T r o o p A , 9 2 d C a v a l r y R e c o n S q n ; a n d 1st P l a t o o n , C o A , 1 1 9 t h A r m o r e d Engineer B a t t a l i o n . T h e t a n k p l a t o o n s e a c h h a d f o u r 7 5 m m - g u n S h e r m a n s and one 1 0 5 m m Sherman assault gun. This force w a s assigned t w o objectives. T h e t o w n of O b e r m o r s c h w i h r w a s t o be t a k e n by C o A , 6 6 t h A I B , w i t h the b a t t a l i o n ' s a s s a u l t g u n p l a t o o n a n d a n 8 1 m m m o r t a r section. H a t t s t a t t t o the s o u t h w e s t w o u l d be s e c u r e d by C o B, 6 6 t h A I B a n d C o A , 4 3 d T a n k B n , u n d e r the c o m m a n d o f the f o r m e r ' s

With visibility cut off by the thick, churning smoke from a burning building, infantrymen double-time down a village street to clear it of any Panzerfaust-armed Germans lying in ambush. The tank commander is covering them as best he can with the .50cal machine gun. 57

C O . T h e G e r m a n s w e r e c o n d u c t i n g a d e l a y i n g a c t i o n b u t their d e f e n s e s w e r e w e a k . T h e b a t t a l i o n C O t o o k his c o m p a n y C O s t o a site w h e r e they c o u l d o b s e r v e the t e r r a i n a n d their r o u t e s , a n d the u n i t s m o v e d u p t o t h a t p o i n t a n d p i c k e d u p their C O s at 3 p m . T h e i n f a n t r y w e r e m o u n t e d in h a l f t r a c k s , a n d T F D o c m o v e d o u t in the o r d e r C o B , 6 6 t h A I B ; C o A , 4 3 d T a n k B n ; C o A , 6 6 t h , a n d H H C , 6 6 t h . A t 4 p m A - 6 6 p u l l e d o u t o f the c o l u m n t o a d v a n c e s o u t h w e s t a r d s o n O b e r m o r s c h w i h r , a n d the rest o f the f o r c e c o n t i n u e d o n t o Hattstatt. T h e H H C set u p its a s s a u l t g u n s a n d m o r t a r s o n a r i d g e o v e r l o o k i n g O b e r m o r s c h w i h r , w h e r e a single O P h a d a n e x c e l l e n t v i e w t o s u p p o r t b o t h a t t a c k s . T h e i n f a n t r y h a l f t r a c k s a t first p r e c e d e d the t a n k c o m p a n y , b u t o u t s i d e H a t t s t a t t the S h e r m a n s t o o k the l e a d e x c e p t for t w o h a l f t r a c k s o n the p o i n t . T h e rest of the c o m p a n y p u l l e d over, a n d the s q u a d s d i s m o u n t e d to m o v e o n f o o t o n either side o f the r o a d t o a v o i d b e i n g seen f r o m the t o w n . B e f o r e a d v a n c i n g the C O c a l l e d the p l a t o o n l e a d e r s f o r a final b r i e f i n g . G e r m a n 1 0 . 5 c m artillery b e g a n i m p a c t i n g t o the rear, b u t n o n e l a n d e d a m o n g the units. A t 4 . 4 0 p m i n f a n t r y m e n w h o h a d g o n e t o the t o p o f a hill t o o b s e r v e the t o w n c a p t u r e d 2 0 G e r m a n d e f e n d e r s w i t h o u t r e s i s t a n c e . A t 5 p m the a d v a n c e w a s s i g n a l e d , m o v i n g b a s i c a l l y e a s t t o w e s t . 1 s t P l a t o o n of B-66 m o v e d a l o n g b o t h sides o f the r o a d w i t h the 1st T a n k P l a t o o n f o l l o w i n g a t 5 0 y a r d s ; the p a i r e d - o f f 2 d a n d 3 d rifle a n d t a n k p l a t o o n s f o l l o w e d in s e q u e n c e , the t a n k p l a t o o n s in a p a i r o f s t a g g e r e d c o l u m n s . R o u n d i n g the b e n d l e a d i n g i n t o t o w n , they r e c e i v e d s o m e fire f r o m f o x h o l e s t o the right o f the r o a d ; the t a n k s m a c h i n e - g u n n e d the a r e a a n d G e r m a n s s t a r t e d c o m i n g o u t o f the w o o d s t o s u r r e n d e r , b u t the A m e r i c a n s i g n o r e d t h e m a n d k e p t a d v a n c i n g . T h e 1st T a n k P l a t o o n ' s a s s a u l t g u n h a l t e d a n d w a s i m m e d i a t e l y hit by m u l t i p l e A T r o u n d s ; the b u r n i n g S h e r m a n b l o c k e d the r o a d , b u t the 2 d T a n k P l a t o o n o p e n e d fire w h i l e the G e r m a n s c o n t i n u e d t o fire o n t h e m . T h e 2 d P l a t o o n i n f a n t r y m e n t o o k c o v e r in the d i t c h e s a n d w e r e u n s c a t h e d . T w o m o r e t a n k s w e r e hit, w i t h o n e c r e w m a n killed in e a c h , a n d at least o n e of the e s t i m a t e d three G e r m a n A T g u n s w a s k n o c k e d o u t . In the m e a n t i m e , u r g e d o n b y the C O o f B - 6 6 , the 1 s t rifle a n d t a n k p l a t o o n s c o n t i n u e d the a d v a n c e . T h e y fired a t d e t e c t e d a n d s u s p e c t e d e n e m y p o s i t i o n s , a n d the artillery F O d i r e c t e d h o w i t z e r fire f r o m the s u p p o r t i n g 4 9 3 d A F A Bn into the a r e a w h e r e the A T g u n s w e r e firing o n the stalled t a n k s , f o l l o w e d by s m o k e t o blind the G e r m a n s . T h i s a l l o w e d the three r e m a i n i n g t a n k s t o r u s h t h r o u g h f o l l o w e d by the 3 d T a n k P l a t o o n , its a s s a u l t g u n a l s o firing s m o k e t o screen the f o u r t a n k s ; the rifle p l a t o o n s f o l l o w e d .

HI

I TANK AND A R M O R E D RIFLE COMPANIES SEIZE A VILLAGE

Buildings on the far side of the village burn from 105mm SP howitzer fire (8), and the battalion 81 m m Mortar Platoon fires A dismounted rifle company with a tank company attacks into WP smoke into the village's right flank buildings (9) to cover the a French village. The 1 st Rifle and 1 st Tank platoons ( 1 ) attack on infiltration of the 3d Rifle Platoon moving in from the trees to the main road and into the town square (2); the tank platoon's the right (10). The plan is for the two 1 st Platoons to fight their light section has split off onto the road to the left (3). A 57mm way through the village to the far side (11), to link up with the AT gun (4) has been positioned to cover the outer buildings on 3d Rifle Platoon and prepare to defend against any the left. The 2d Rifle and 2d Tank platoons are attacking from counterattack. The t w o 2d Platoons will clean the rest of the the right flank (5). The lead tank was knocked out after crashing village as the remainder of the Antitank Platoon moves up to a stone wall (6) on its way toward the platoons' objective, the reinforce the 1st and 3d Platoons. A battalion heavy machine church; another tank covers the evacuation of the crew, while gun section (not yet arrived) and the AT gun at (4) will secure the rest of the platoon redirects further to the right flank (7). the left flank (12), covering the road passing the cemetery (13).

An armored infantry unit passes through a German town. Note the add-on equipment rack on the rear of the jeep, of which each AIB had 24 (some units called them "peeps").

A t a n i n t e r s e c t i o n o u t s i d e o f the t o w n t w o M G s o p e n e d fire o n the 1st Rifle P l a t o o n , w o u n d i n g t w o m e n , b u t w e r e q u i c k l y silenced by the lead t a n k . T h e B - 6 6 C O p l a c e d the M G section ( f r o m b a t t a l i o n ) a n d a 2 d P l a t o o n s q u a d a t the intersection t o k e e p fire o n the e n e m y p o s i t i o n to the s o u t h w e s t ; the rest o f 2 d P l a t o o n w a s d i s p a t c h e d t o p r o t e c t the n o r t h flank. T h e 1st Rifle P l a t o o n c o n t i n u e d o n i n t o t o w n , f o l l o w e d b y the 3 d s o m e 1 5 0 y a r d s b e h i n d , b u t o n e s q u a d w a s d e t a c h e d t o r e i n f o r c e the 2 d P l a t o o n s q u a d a t the intersection (it s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t this k i n d o f flexibility - c r o s s - a t t a c h i n g s q u a d s b e t w e e n p l a t o o n s - is e s s e n t i a l for s u c c e s s f u l o p e r a t i o n s ) . T h e p o i n t s q u a d r a n into a s t o u t l o g r o a d b l o c k i n s i d e the t o w n ; this w a s n o t m i n e d , b u t b l o c k e d the a d v a n c e . O n e o f the s q u a d w a s hit by a s n i p e r a s they p u l l e d b a c k . A s a t a n k r o l l e d u p a n d b l a s t e d H E r o u n d s into the r o a d b l o c k the riflemen fired o n the sniper a n d threw grenades. W i t h the r o a d b l o c k s h a t t e r e d , the t a n k r a m m e d t h r o u g h it a n d the 1st Rifle P l a t o o n f o l l o w e d , s e a r c h i n g for s n i p e r s a n d A T g u n s a n d M G s h i d d e n in a l l e y s . T h e riflemen a d v a n c e d 2 5 y a r d s d o w n b o t h sides o f the r o a d a h e a d o f the t a n k , w h i c h c o v e r e d t h e m w i t h m a c h i n e g u n s ; o n c e a stretch h a d been c l e a r e d they w o u l d r e t u r n t o the t a n k for c o v e r a n d close-in p r o t e c t i o n a s it m o v e d u p , a n d the p r o c e s s w a s r e p e a t e d - it w a s slow, b u t effective. U p o n r e a c h i n g the t o w n center a t a n k a c c o m p a n i e d by a rifle s q u a d w e n t a r o u n d e a c h s i d e o f the s q u a r e c h e c k i n g the s i d e s t r e e t s . T h e s e c o n d t a n k then f o l l o w e d the first d o w n the m a i n street. O n the far w e s t side of the t o w n a s e c o n d l o g r o a d b l o c k w a s b r e a c h e d in the s a m e m a n n e r a s the first. W h i l e the 1st rifle a n d t a n k p l a t o o n s w e r e w o r k i n g a c r o s s the t o w n center, t h e 2 d P l a t o o n (-) m o v e d a r o u n d the n o r t h s i d e o f the t o w n m e e t i n g n o o p p o s i t i o n . W h e n all e l e m e n t s r e a c h e d the w e s t s i d e o f the t o w n the B - 6 6 C O d e p l o y e d t h e m t o e s t a b l i s h a p e r i m e t e r a r o u n d it: 1st P l a t o o n o n the w e s t s i d e , 2 d o n the n o r t h , a n d 3 d o n t h e s o u t h . T h e m a r r i e d t a n k p l a t o o n s c o - l o c a t e d w i t h the rifle p l a t o o n s , e x c e p t t h a t p a r t of the 3 d T a n k P l a t o o n w a s s t a t i o n e d o n the e a s t s i d e . P a t r o l s w e r e d i s p a t c h e d t o m a k e c o n t a c t with a d j a c e n t p l a t o o n s . A d i s m o u n t e d A T P l a t o o n s q u a d s e c u r e d the e a s t s i d e , 60

releasing the 2 d P l a t o o n s q u a d a n d M G s e c t i o n t o r e i n f o r c e the T h e o t h e r t w o A T s q u a d s set u p in b u i l d i n g s i n s i d e the t o w n t o w e s t e r n a p p r o a c h e s . It w a s d a r k , a n d the t r o o p s w o u l d n o t s t a r t h o u s e s for d i e h a r d d e f e n d e r s until d a y l i g h t . N o n e t h e l e s s , s e v e r a l w e r e f o u n d , w h o r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e y h a d b e e n left b e h i n d t o r o a d b l o c k s while m o s t o f the other d e f e n d e r s w i t h d r e w t o hills t o

west side. c o v e r the searching stragglers construct the w e s t .

By 1 1 p m the t o w n w a s r i n g e d by infantry a n d 1 4 t a n k s . T h e r e w e r e still G e r m a n s i n s i d e , s o the i n f a n t r y m e n a n d t a n k e r s w e r e p r e p a r e d t o d e a l w i t h a n y efforts t o e s c a p e a s well a s a t t a c k s or r e i n f o r c e m e n t a t t e m p t s f r o m the o u t s i d e . T h e artillery F O in his o b s e r v a t i o n p o s t t o the n o r t h w a s c o n t a c t e d o n the c o m p a n y r a d i o , a n d r e l a y e d the fire p l a n t o his b a t t a l i o n . P r e p l a n n e d fires w e r e p l o t t e d a r o u n d the n o r t h , w e s t , a n d s o u t h s i d e s , p l u s fires f r o m the 6 6 t h AIB's o w n m o r t a r s a n d a s s a u l t g u n s . W i t h the firing d y i n g a w a y , j o y o u s French i n h a b i t a n t s b e g a n e m e r g i n g f r o m b a s e m e n t s t o g r e e t their l i b e r a t o r s . T h i s w a s a well e x e c u t e d o p e r a t i o n in w h i c h the a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y u s e d their h a l f t r a c k s t o a p p r o a c h c l o s e t o their o b j e c t i v e . T h r e e t a n k s w e r e l o s t o n the a p p r o a c h , b u t r e s i s t a n c e inside the t o w n w a s light. C l o s e c o o r d i n a t i o n b e t w e e n infantry a n d t a n k p l a t o o n l e a d e r s w a s effective; the o p e r a t i o n w a s c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h the artillery, a n d o b s e r v e r s w e r e in p l a c e . T h e b a t t a l i o n ' s supporting w e a p o n s were integrated, to include attaching a battalion M G section t o the rifle c o m p a n y . T h e rifle a n d t a n k p l a t o o n s w o r k e d very c l o s e l y in m u t u a l s u p p o r t , effectively b r e a c h i n g o b s t a c l e s a n d c l e a r i n g the m a i n street of t h r e a t s . A n effective d e f e n s e b a c k e d b y a s o l i d fire s u p p o r t p l a n w a s e s t a b l i s h e d , even t h o u g h night h a d fallen ( e s t a b l i s h i n g a d e f e n s e in the d a r k , e s p e c i a l l y in a b u i l t - u p a r e a , is a c h a l l e n g e ) . T h i s a c t i o n p r o v i d e s a g o o d e x a m p l e o f the benefits a n d c a p a b i l i t i e s o f truly c o m b i n e d - a r m s o p e r a t i o n s .

ASSESSMENTS & CONCLUSIONS A 1 9 4 6 a s s e s s m e n t o f a r m o r f o r c e s by the A r m y G r o u n d F o r c e f o u n d t h a t " T h e b a s i c d o c t r i n e s o f the A r m o r e d F o r c e h a v e c h a n g e d v e r y little s i n c e 1 9 4 0 , b u t there h a v e b e e n m a n y c h a n g e s in t e c h n i q u e . M a n e u v e r a b i l i t y a n d gunnery b e c a m e m o r e essential to success as antitank w e a p o n s developed, a n d the principles of the c o m b i n e d a r m s a n d fire a n d m o v e m e n t w e r e s t r o n g l y e m p h a s i z e d a s a result o f c o m b a t e x p e r i e n c e . T h e c o m b a t e x p e r i e n c e o f the British a n d A m e r i c a n a r m o r e d units h a d a s o b e r i n g effect u p o n the t h e o r i e s of invincibility w h i c h s o m e l e a d e r s h e l d . T h e y b e g a n t o a p p r e c i a t e t h a t t a n k s were not all-powerful and invulnerable, that a r m o r e d tactics could not be b a s e d u p o n the a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t a n k s c o u l d f o r c e their w a y t h r o u g h a well o r g a n i z e d d e f e n s e . " T h e G e n e r a l B o a r d o f the U S F o r c e s , E u r o p e a n T h e a t e r d e t e r m i n e d t h a t the t a n k - t o - i n f a n t r y r a t i o w a s u s u a l l y u n b a l a n c e d : A n a l y s i s i n d i c a t e s t h a t in m a n y o f the o p e r a t i o n s in w h i c h the m a i n effort w a s e n t r u s t e d t o a r m o r , infantry w a s a t t a c h e d o n the u s u a l s c a l e o f o n e [ s t a n d a r d ] r e g i m e n t per a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n . T h e s e a t t a c h m e n t s w e r e m u c h m o r e f r e q u e n t in the c a s e o f the h e a v y a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s for the o b v i o u s r e a s o n t h a t w h i l e t h e r e is p a r i t y a t b a t t a l i o n level b e t w e e n i n f a n t r y a n d t a n k s in the light d i v i s i o n , a o n e - t o - t w o r a t i o exists in the h e a v y unit. E v e n the light d i v i s i o n s , a l t h o u g h successful in e x p l o i t a t i o n a n d p u r s u i t w i t h o u t a t t a c h e d infantry, r e q u i r e d a d d i t i o n a l d i s m o u n t e d s t r e n g t h w h e n e m p l o y e d o n s e c o n d a r y m i s s i o n s . It c a n be

Armored infantrymen examine a knocked-out and burned-out Panther PzKpfw V. Formidably armored from the front, it had comparatively thin side armor; what appears to be a 75mm penetration hole can be seen to the left of the leftmost man.

s t a t e d t h a t c o m b a t e x p e r i e n c e h a s definitely s h o w n the need for at least p a r i t y b e t w e e n i n f a n t r y a n d t a n k u n i t s in a n a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n . C o n s e n s u s o f field c o m m a n d e r s is t h a t the r a t i o o f infantry t o t a n k units a t c o m p a n y level s h o u l d be three t o t w o . Ideally, a fourth A I B w o u l d have been a d d e d to provide m o r e flexibility. Effective infantry firepower w a s f o u n d essential for successful a r m o r o p e r a t i o n s . It w a s often f o u n d after t a n k s w e r e sent in that the objective w a s occupied by m o r e A T w e a p o n s a n d o b s t a c l e s t h a n e x p e c t e d ; the infantry w o u l d have to p a s s t h r o u g h the h a l t e d t a n k s a n d a s s a u l t the o b j e c t i v e t h r o u g h c l o s e c o m b a t . O n c e the objective w a s r e a s o n a b l y secure the t a n k s w o u l d m o v e f o r w a r d . O n o t h e r o c c a s i o n s the i n f a n t r y w o u l d b e in defensive p o s i t i o n s a n d the t a n k s l a u n c h e d their a t t a c k t h r o u g h t h e m , the infantry then f o l l o w i n g . T h i s d i d n o t a l w a y s a l l o w effective c o o r d i n a t i o n b e f o r e the a t t a c k w a s l a u n c h e d ; it w a s m o r e effective for the t a n k s a n d infantry a c c o m p a n y i n g the a t t a c k t o link u p a n d c o o r d i n a t e in the a s s e m b l y a r e a b e f o r e e x e c u t i n g the a t t a c k . A r m o r doctrine w a s basically solid, but tactics, techniques and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l f a c t o r s w e r e g r e a t l y refined in j u s t a b o u t all a r e a s ; the 1 9 4 4 m a n u a l s w e r e s o o n r e p l a c e d b y m o r e p r a c t i c a l e d i t i o n s , a n d this i m p r o v e d b o d y o f k n o w l e d g e c o n t i n u e d t o serve the U S A r m y for m a n y y e a r s . T h e a r m o r e d infantry o r g a n i z a t i o n , w e a p o n s , e q u i p m e n t , a n d tactics w e r e p r o v e n v i a b l e after a l m o s t a y e a r of intense c o m b a t in N o r t h w e s t E u r o p e . T h e m o b i l e , s e l f - c o n t a i n e d b a t t a l i o n s w e r e c o n s i d e r e d q u i t e effective, b u t the m a j o r deficiency w a s the h a l f t r a c k . It offered o n l y m o d e r a t e c r o s s - c o u n t r y c a p a b i l i t i e s , c o u l d n o t k e e p u p w i t h t a n k s in m a n y t y p e s of t e r r a i n , l a c k e d a d e q u a t e a r m o r p r o t e c t i o n , a n d the o p e n t o p g r e a t l y e n d a n g e r e d the p a s s e n g e r s . A full-tracked a r m o r e d personnel carrier with o v e r h e a d protection, a n d ideally a n a m p h i b i o u s capability, w a s desired; even t h o u g h a c c o m p a n y i n g t a n k s w e r e n o t a m p h i b i o u s , a m p h i b i o u s p e r s o n n e l carriers w o u l d a l l o w the infantry to c r o s s w a t e r o b s t a c l e s t o secure the far side, establish a b r i d g e h e a d , a n d a l l o w engineers t o c o n s t r u c t b r i d g e s a n d o p e r a t e ferries. T h e b a s i c W o r l d W a r II a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n o r g a n i z a t i o n p r o v e d t o be a n effective f o r m a t i o n a n d , w i t h u p g r a d i n g , it e n d u r e d for a l m o s t a n o t h e r 2 0 y e a r s . T h e three C C s b e c a m e c o - e q u a l m a n e u v e r f o r c e s , a l t h o u g h the third 62

w a s still referred t o a s C C R until r e d e s i g n a t e d C C C in 1 9 5 4 . F r o m 1 9 4 9 there were four of e a c h t a n k a n d a r m o r e d rifle b a t t a l i o n s , w i t h four line c o m p a n i e s , b u t n o w r e d u c e d in strength. T h e f o u r t h t a n k b a t t a l i o n w a s e q u i p p e d w i t h h e a v y t a n k s a n d h a d o n l y three c o m p a n i e s , the o t h e r b a t t a l i o n s h a v i n g m e d i u m t a n k s . T h e infantry-to-tank r a t i o w a s i m p r o v e d , w i t h 1 6 rifle a n d 1 5 t a n k c o m p a n i e s ( 1 2 m e d i u m , three h e a v y ) . T h e b a t t a l i o n h e a d q u a r t e r s a n d service c o m p a n i e s w e r e c o m b i n e d . T a n k d e s t r o y e r b a t t a l i o n s w e r e d i s b a n d e d since the h e a v y t a n k b a t t a l i o n t o o k over their f u n c t i o n , a n d a n A A b a t t a l i o n w a s m a d e o r g a n i c t o the d i v i s i o n . Rifle s q u a d s w e r e r e d u c e d in size a n d o r g a n i z e d the s a m e a s s t a n d a r d infantry, b u t r e t a i n e d the a d d i t i o n a l driver; issue of a s q u a d B A R w a s finally a p p r o v e d in J u n e 1 9 4 5 , r e c o g n i z i n g its necessity w i t h s q u a d s fighting d i s m o u n t e d . Service s u p p o r t units w e r e m u c h i n c r e a s e d in size a n d c a p a b i l i t i e s . P o s t - w a r A I B s still h a d W o r l d W a r II h a l f t r a c k s , only p a r t l y r e p l a c e d by the interim M 4 4 a n d M 7 5 a r m o r e d utility vehicles. T h e y b e g a n t o be r e p l a c e d by full-tracked, a m p h i b i o u s M 5 9 a r m o r e d p e r s o n n e l carriers in 1 9 5 4 , a n d by M l 13 A P C s in 1 9 6 0 . T r u e c o m b i n e d - a r m s units w e r e finally achieved in 2 0 0 5 , w h e n the distinction b e t w e e n m e c h a n i z e d a n d t a n k b a t t a l i o n s w a s r e m o v e d (other t h a n t r a d i t i o n a l b r a n c h d e s i g n a t i o n s being r e t a i n e d ) . T o d a y ' s M o d u l a r F o r c e c o m b i n e d - a r m s b a t t a l i o n s c o n s i s t o f t w o rifle c o m p a n i e s e q u i p p e d with B r a d l e y M 2 - s e r i e s infantry fighting vehicles and two A b r a m s Ml-series tank companies.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Emery, W e s t o n L . , C-66 - A World War II Chronicle

of an Armored Infantry (privately p u b l i s h e d , 1 9 9 2 ) Company G a b e l , C h r i s t o p h e r R . , The 4th Armored Division in the Encirclement of Nancy (Ft L e a v e n w o r t h , K S ; C o m m a n d & G e n e r a l Staff C o l l a g e , 1 9 8 6 ) Gillie, M i l d r e d C . , Forging the Thunderbolt: A History of the Development of the Armored Force ( H a r r i s b u r g , PA; M i l i t a r y Service P u b l i s h i n g , 1 9 4 7 ) A History of American Semi-Tracked Vehicles H u n n i c u t t , R.P., Half-Track: ( N o v a t o , C A ; Presidio Press, 2 0 0 1 ) M e s k o , J i m , M2/M3 Half-Track-Armor Walk Around (Carrollton, T X ; S q u a d r o n Signal Publications, 2 0 0 4 ) M e s k o , J i m , M3 Half-Track in Action ( C a r r o l l t o n , T X ; S q u a d r o n S i g n a l Publications, 1996) W i l s o n , J o h n B. Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades (Washington, D C ; Center of Military History, 1 9 9 8 ) Z a l o g a , Steven, US Halftracks of World War Two ( L o n d o n : A r m s & A r m o r Press, 1 9 8 5 ) F M 1 7 - 5 , Armored Force Drill ( J a n u a r y 1 9 4 3 ) F M 1 7 - 1 0 , Armored Force Field Manual Tactics and Techniques (March 1942) F M 1 7 - 3 3 , The Armored Battalion, Eight and Medium ( M a r c h 1 9 4 2 ) F M 1 7 - 3 6 , Armored Employment of Tanks with Infantry ( M a r c h 1 9 4 4 ) F M 1 7 - 4 0 , Armored Infantry Company (November 1944) F M 1 7 - 4 2 , Armored Infantry Battalion (November 1944) F M 1 7 - 7 1 , Crew Drill for Half-Track Vehicles ( S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 3 ) ( T h e s e m a n u a l s m a y be o b t a i n e d f r o m M i l i t a r y / I n f o P u b l i s h i n g ; http://www.military-info.com/Index.htm)

INDEX References to illustrations are shown in bold. Plates are shown with page locators in brackets. AA battalions/guns 12, 48, 63 AAA battalions/platoons 12, 15, 17, 48 Admin, Mess, & Supply Section 20, 23 AFA battalions/platoons 8, 11, 12, 13, 15 field guns (40/75/105/155mm) 7, 8, 9, 9, 15, 45, 46,48, H8(58), 59 role of forward observer teams 46 use of in attack 36, 45, 46, 48, H8(58), 59 AIBs 15 "administrative" marches 32, 36, 40 assignment to ADs 15, 16 combat without armor 55-7 organization of 16, 17-21, 23-6, 63 and overseas deployment 33, 35 raising/breaking up of (1943) 17,32 small-unit training within 32-3 air liaison officers 48 air observers/security 36 air strikes (on-call provision of) 48, 56 air-to-ground signal panels A(10), 11, 56 armored cars 5, 6, 11, 12, 63 armored divisions 7, 8-9, 11, 15, 16, 63 Armored Force 7, 17, 31, 61-2 artillery forward observers 14, 59, 61 assault gun platoons 12, 17-18, 57 use of in attack 37, 38, D2(39) assault guns (75/105mm) 17, 18, 25, 27, 30, E(42), 43, 45, 46, 48, 50, G3(51), 57, 61 use of in attack E(42), 43, 45, 46, 48, 50, G3(51), 59, 61 AT platoons/squads 15, 17, 23, 25, 27 bazookas (2.36in) 17, 18, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 32, 38, 40, 41, 50, G2(51) guns (37/57/75mm) 8, 12-13, 20, 20, 21, 23, 27, 36, E(42), 43, 44, 45, 46, F4(47), 55, H4(58), 59 mines 2 8 , 2 8 , 2 9 , 4 1 as small rifle platoon 38, 44, 55 transport of 20, 20, 21, B5(22), 23, 27 use of in attack 12-13, 36, E(42), 43, 45, 50, G2(51), 56, H4(58), 59, 60-1 use of in defense 43, 44, 46, F4(47) carbines (JOcal) 17, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 37, 44 CCs 9, 12-15, 46, 62-3 demolition charges 45, 50, 52 Desert Training Center 31 dozer-tanks (M4/M4A3) 50, G3(51) engineer battalions/companies 8, 12, 15, 17, 37, 4 5 , 4 8 , 5 0 , G2(51), 56, 62 field telephones 55, 57 fire support 45, 45, 46, 48, 49, 52-3, 52, 60 flag sets (M-238) 54 flamethrowers (Ml Al) 50, G2(51) grenades 26, 28, 29, 30, 53, 54, 60 halftrack cars (M2/2A1/5A1/9/9A1) 7, 9, 20, 21, 23, 27, 28, 28, 29, 29, 30 halftrack drivers, roles of 23, 32, 38 halftrack recovery vehicles (M3A2) 24, 25 halftracks (M3/M3A1/M3A2) 6, 11, 17, 18, 20, 20, 23, 24, 25, 27, 30 armament (.30/.50cal) 4, 5, A(10), 11, 17, 18,25, 26, 2 8 - 9 , 2 9 , 3 0 , 3 1 , 3 2 , 3 8 , 4 1 , 4 4 , 48,56 armor protection 27, 29-30, 37, 62 camouflage and markings 4, 6, 9, A(10), 11, 1 1 , 2 6 , 3 1 , 4 0 development/production 4, 5, 27, 30, 63 limitations/weaknesses 27, 29-30, 37, 62 movement formations C(34), 35, 36 OVE 5, 6, A(10), 11, 11, 27, 29, 30, 40-1

64

provision of air security from 36 seating capacity Bl-5(22), 23, 27, 29 squad use of as "home" A(10), 11, 41, 41 storage capacity A(10), 11, 11, 28-9, 29, 40,41,56 use of in attack of 36, 37, 37, 38, 40, E(42), 43, 45, 53, 54, 54, 55, 59, 61 use of in defense 38, 46, F5(47) HHCs 11, 13, 16, 17-18, 19, 57, 59-61 HMG sections B4(22), 23 use of in attack 38, D3(39), 60 use of in defense 44 HMGs (.50cal) 5, A(10), 11, 12, 17, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 26, 27, 29, 29, 31, 48,56, 56 HQ and service companies 9, 11, 15, 16, 19, 23-5, 25,36, 63 infantry assault teams 50, G2(51) infantry battalions 8, 11, 12, 15, 16, 48, 49-50 use of in attack 8, E(42), 43 infantry companies/platoons/squads 4, 5, 6, 8, 14, 19, 31, 35-6,44 coordination with tanks 5, 38, Dl-3(39), E(42), 43, 44, 46, Fl-6(47), H(58), 59-61 perception of tankers 5, 7, 13-14, 49-50 protection of 46, 48-9, 53 in urban warfare 49, 53 infantry-to-tank ratio 8, 9, 30, 61-2, 63 training program 30-1, 32-3 transport of 37, 38, 38 use of in attack 36, 37, 37, 38, 40, 41, E(42), 43-4, 45, 46 use of in defense 41, 43-4, 45, 46, Fl-6(47) infantry divisions 6-7, 48, 49 infantry regiments 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15-16, 17 jeeps 12, 1 7 , 2 3 , 2 4 , 2 5 , 2 5 , 6 0 "light" armored divisions 11-13, 61 LMGs (.30cal) 4, A(10), 11, 13, 17, 18, 2 0 , 2 1 , 2 3 , 2 4 , 2 6 , 29, 29, 40, 41, 56, 56 Louisiana Maneuvers 6, 9, 33 maintenance battalions/sections 5, 6, 8, 17, 20, 23, 25 "married" AIB/tank battalions 13-14, 46 medical teams/units 8, 16, 19, 25, 43 MG platoons/squads/sections 18, 20, 26, 32, 37,38,40,41,43,45,60,61 movement formations 35, 36, 41 operational strength 21 transport of B3(22), 23 use of in attack 21, E(42), 43, 45, 46, 50, Gl(51) use of in defense 44, 46, F2(47) minefields/mines 30, 37, 46, 49, 53 mortar carriers 18, 27, 28, 29, 29, 30 mortar platoons/squads 18, 20, 31, 32, 38, 57 movement formations 35, 36, 38, D2(39), 41 operational strength 21, 23 personnel/equipment 26-7, 27, 29, 29 transport of 18, B2(22), 23 use of in attack 27, 27, 29, 36, 37, 4 1 , E(42), 43, 45, 55, H9(58), 59, 61 use of in defense 46, F(47) mortars (60/81mm) 17, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26-7, 27, 28, 29, 30, 36, 37, E(42), 4 3 , 4 5 , 4 6 , F ( 4 7 ) , 4 8 , 55, 57, 59, 61 Panthers/Panzers 6, 27, 30, 49, 52, 62 Panzerfausts/Panzerschrecks 30, 40, 52, 57 pistols 17, 21 radios 2 7 v 2 9 , 54, 54, 55, 56, 57, 61 reconnaissance units 6, 8, 9, 12, 15, 17, 36

Reserve Command 12-13, 14 rifle companies/platoons/squads 8, 9, 13, 15, 16 air security on the march 36 combined-arms formations 38, Dl-3(39) cross-attachment/pairing of 41, 43, 60 movement formations C(34), 35-6, 37, 38, D2-3(39), 41 organization/strength 16, 17, 18, 19,20, 21,23,24, 32,38,41,63 transport of 4, 20, Bl(22), 23, 27, 38, 40-1 use of in attack 1 1 , 3 2 , 3 6 , 3 7 , 3 8 , Dl(39), H l - 2 , 5, 10(58), 59, 60, 61 tanks for cover/transport 49, 52, 52, 53, 57, 60 use of in defense 44, 46, Fl-6(47) weapons 20, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26-7, 27 rifle grenades (launchers) 23, 26, 52, 53 rifles/sniper rifles (.30cal) 17, 21, 23, 24, 2 6 , 3 7 , 4 1 , 4 4 , 49, 63 satchel charges 50, G2(51) scout cars 8, 9, 15 "Siegfried Line", breaching of 50, Gl-3(51) signal companies 8, 9 SMGs (.45cal) 17, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 44 smoke, use of 46, 48, H9(58), 59 tank battalions 11-12, 15, 17, 37, 45, 63 close operations with AIBs 13 cross-attachment/pairing of 41, 49-50 ratio of to infantry battalions 8 tank companies/platoons 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 25-6, 31, 57, 59, 63 cross-attachment/pairing of 41, 43, 61 in mixed formations 36, 37, 38, Dl-3(39) movement formations C(34), 35, 38, Dl-3(39) organization/strength 12, 26 use of in attack 7, 11, 37, 38, Dl(39), 40, E(42), 43, 48, 49, Hl-7(58), 59, 60, 61 use of in defense 46, F2-3(47) tank-infantry teams 8, 48-50, 49, 61-2 cooperation between elements 8, 31-2, 33, 43-4, 45, 57, 57 communications between 54-5, 54 effectiveness of 50, 52-3, 52, 53 joint training of 8, 49-50, 52-3, 52, 53 proximity of infantry to tanks 52, 52, 57 use of in attack 36-8, Dl-3(39), 40, 50, Gl-3(51), 52, 57, Hl-13(58), 59-61 tank recovery vehicles 13, 13, 24-5 tanks see also tank-infantry teams debate on best use of 4 enemy attacks on 52, 53 M3 Grant/Lee 13 M4/M4A3 Sherman 8, 12, 13, 18, 25-6, 33, 37, 40, 48, 49, 50, G l , 3(51), 52, 53, 57, 57, 59 M5/M5A1 Stuart 12, 12, 26, 27, 37, 48 M24 Chaffee 26 movement formations C(34), 35, 38, D(39) tank-to-infantry ratio 8, 9, 30, 61-2, 63 use of in attack 8, 30, C(34), 35, 36, 37, 38, 38,D(39), 40, 40, E(42), 43, 44, 45, 46, F2-3(47), 48, 49, 49, 50, G l , 3(51), 52-3, 52, 53, 57, 57, H6(58), 59, 60, 61 use of in defense 44, 46, F2(47) task forces 14, 15,57,59-61 TD battalions/platoons 12, 15, 17, 37, 63 use of in attack 36, 45, 45, 48, 49 use of in defense 44 TDs 1 2 , 3 6 , 4 4 , 4 5 , 4 5 , 4 9 transportation platoons 12 trucks and trailers 5, 6, 7, 15, 17, 20, 23, 24, 25, 46, F6(47), 48, 56 uniforms/clothing A(10), 11, 19, 19, 44, 52 urban warfare 40, 49, 49, 53, 57, 57, 60

RELATED T I T L E S

BTO 003 • 9 7 8 1 8 4 1 7 6 5 6 4 8

N V G 003 • 9 7 8 1 8 5 5 3 2 2 9 6 7

N V G 011 • 9 7 8 1 8 5 5 3 2 4 6 7 1

NVG 073 • 9 7 8 1 8 4 1 7 6 5 4 2 6

W A R 056 • 9 7 8 1 8 4 1 7 6 3 3 2 3

W A R 078 • 9 7 8 1 8 4 1 7 6 5 5 4 9

VISIT THE OSPREY WEBSITE Information a b o u t f o r t h c o m i n g books • A u t h o r i n f o r m a t i o n • R e a d extracts a n d s e e s a m p l e p a g e s • S i g n u p for o u r free n e w s l e t t e r s • C o m p e t i t i o n s a n d prizes • O s p r e y b l o g

www.ospreypublishing.com To order any of these titles, or for more information on Osprey Publishing, contact: North America: [email protected] U K & Rest of World: [email protected]

The history of military forces, artifacts, persona Iities and te;uJllllJUt~JJ..}!!l.dJUdJ~----,

World War II US Armored Infantry Tactics When the USA entered World War II, the organization and combat doctrine of armored infantry was in its infancy. In common with other nations'forces, the US Army at first greatly underestimated the necessary ratio of mechanized infantry to tanks, and it gained painful experience in North Africa in early 1943. By the time US armies landed in Europe in 1944 these lessons had been absorbed, but they were still applied differently from one division to another, depending on individual and unit experience. This book explains in detail how the techniques and tactics of effective tank-infantry cooperation were developed, and gives in-depth data on unit equipment and organization . • Full color artwork. Unrivaled detail • Photographs . Ta ctical scenarios

OSPREY

US $18.95 UK£11.99

CAN $22.00 IS B N 978-1-84603-692-7

5 1 895